FBM-126022
Intert* Protocol for Diving
Op«rAt ions In COitutiiBttO Water
(U.S.) Environmental Protection Agency
Cincinnati, OH
Nov 95
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EPA/600/2-*5m0
Novralwr 1985
INTERIM PROTOCOL FOR OlVlflG OPERATIONS
IM CONTAMINATED WATER
DJ
Ktchera P, Traver, P. E.
Stntor neseartft	Lilting vfMctr
Re1ti»» Control branch
Lr«S« Environmental Protection Agency
Edison, be* Jfr$«> 088J/
tPA/KUW |A6 A[>-1 3-F-2-826-C
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UFFiCk UP KtitARCH AKt OEVElOt^EKT
U.S. LNVlRuM#l£HTAL PmOTECTIOM A&EfiCY
tluCINfcATL, «$*«8

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TfCHKtCAl REPORT OAT*
iftrtH- iftidrt., >ti -J iUri ( Hi frwi , .. .I'lf*- »"K
l *t'ont *eTj
EPA/biKJ/2-a j/jJO
* TITLI Jk-O »U«T:TlI
lattris Protocol For Diving OparttlooB in
fontwirattd W»t*c
!) L • I

Ml 12°
T* MORi}l
Richard P. Traver
9 f|NP	ORGAW/Jk tl6lt fc*W* 4SJ ¦ DO«t0 M9c»«wli.kwi>tr
C*BIDA

>7 **0W*O»l«l« AGEWCV «|AMf Ar,D tDCftlif
Hinrdom Hut* Engi ft—ring Hiaauch L^ofatoiry
Offic* a£ StHueh iitd D*i*Xo{a>rtt
V.8. EnvlraAiaDttl Protection
Cincinnati, Ohio iSju
!'» "HW	AWHK'OOCOVIfllO
final August 1931-Hct. 1994
1*	*«« hc v ceoi
tPA/600yii
11 au^LCMCKlTAMy XOftft
Richard P Traver <201) 521-6677
Project Officer:
l *&***&	—	
The purpose Of this research prograe antf resulting **nu«l hive been to Improve end
update EPA*s safety capability which involve underwater hazardous cheaical c)tmup
responses. Tht mau^I Includes the nsMHunt, test tag, evaluation, and denmitruion
of coMwrcfil underwater protective suits, clothing, support equipment, and breathing
apparatus In waters contaftfnated with hazardous substances that m»y be tnjurtous to «
diver's health. The manual also Identifies specific types of Ma-water" huards. their
location and effects upon divers, their equipment and considerations for protection
surface support personnel. The oajor participates and beneficiaries oi this progran
sponsored by the EPA and WOM are the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Anty Corps of Engineers,
Department of Energy, Association of Diving Contractors, end the «*ny local underwater
search and recovery units.
The helmets which were successfully evaluated for chemical exclusion were the
Draeger Hebwt System, the Desco "Pot* Diving Hat, Qlving Systems International
Superm*-178 Helmet, Horse Engineering *K-12 Uavy Deep Hater rte'met System, ind Safety
Set Sjrttees SS-20 Helau Helmet. Seven different suit configurations were evaluated
along with the above stated heloets. One diving dress was fro* Draeger with the regain-
ing six supplied by fIking Diving System.
17
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Unclassified
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NOTICE
This docuMnt has bnn ravitwcd in accordance with
U.S. Environmental Protection Agney policy and
approved for publication, Mention of crsd« im#ej
Or cOMrciil products dots not constitute tltdorte-
¦ent or raconandatiwi for
ii

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FORCWRti
Today's rapidly developing and chifsffaf technologies and Industrial
products and practices frequently carry «rfth the# the Increased generation
of sol id md hiji'dout	Th($< attHils, If improperly dealt wltl),
can threaten both publtc health awl the envt-oiwient* Abandoned 
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the subject Interagency Agreement (IAG) with iOM has
been to isjro*# and update LPA's safety capability which involve underwater
haiadous chemical cleanup responses* tt Has 1 Iuded the assessment, testing
evaluation, and demonstratIon of commercial underwater protective suits,
clothing, support equipment, and breathing apparatus in waters contaminated
with tiazardouf substances that my be injuria to a diver's health. The
field evaluation/demonstration of the equipment and protocol developed under
this joint federal agency effort was held August 27-31, 1334 at the NCAA Sand
Point Facility, Seattle, Washington. The *ajor participates and beneficiaries
of this program sponsored by the CM and noaa were trie ILS. Coast Guard, U.S.
Ar*y Corps of Engineers, Department of Energy and Association of Diving
Contractors.
The JA& between the EPA and the WDAA Diving Operations Office was entered
into on August 1981, Work performed by NOAA Included the assessment of the
ne*d for chemical dMng protection and ;he "state-of-the-art" for diving
operations In hazardous environments. NOAA acquired and modified currently
available commercial diving dress and helmets, and has carried on an ongoing
training program of EPA personnel to meet the stringent MOM diving standards.
NCAA, EPA and Coast Guard have performed functional evaluations of the modified
equlp&nt. The £PA prepared chemical diving operations protocol Is to be
reviewed by the Coast Guard Strite Teams, Naval and Anjy Diving Units and the
Associatln of diving Contractors for application at a real world 'spill of
opportunity". The Seattle simulated "spill1* was utilized to shakedown the
nifwly developed procedures and modified equipment prior to being put Into
actual field response operations.
Hemerous chemical diving suits and helmets have been reviewed for chew'-
leal exclusion and Material c treatability. Five specific diving helmets and
seven suits or 'dresses' have been modified and functionally evaluated at the
White Oak Naval Undersea* Weapons Toner located in Maryland. Equipment
evaluation at White Oafc. had been performed Airing April, June, and October
of 1982. and February and March of 1933.
NCAA and IPA coordinated a three day worfcshdp/semlnar entitled, "Protec-
tion of Clivers 1n Waterways Receiving Hazardous Chemical, Pathogenic and
Radioactive Substances Discharges", finis meeting took place on November
8-12, 19H2 at the Uhderseas Medical Society, Sethesda, Maryland. Aproxlmately
40 participants representing scientists and diving experts from government,
military. Industry and acedemla attended. The Coast Guard was well rep-
resented. The workshop proceedings (IMS Publication ICR-60{CW}?-l-83) are
available by contacting the Underseas Medical Society at (301) 530-922$.
1 v

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Initial evaluation* of the modified commercial dMng dresses and helmet
assemblies mere collated during Kerch 1983 at the EPA oil b Hazardous
Materials Simulated Environmental Test Tank {0HRSETT) located at the £arle
Maval Weapons Station* Leonardo, Mew Jersey, This operation utilized a SOOO
gallon tank containing ammonia and fluorescein dye tracers in which the suits
were safely evaluated.
Subsequent chemical tank testing was perforated at the MOAA Uivlng Unit
located in Waul, Florida In December 1983 and February 1984, These series
of tests extended the OHHSETT work by subjecting divers to water teoperatures
of up to 112*F to simulate conditions typically encountered within cooling
cores of nuclear ^iteration facilities, Radical data telemetry was applied
using recta J thermometers for body core temperature monitoring and EK£ pickups
for heart rate. The results of these "hot-water" tests showed excellent
performance of the "Su1t«-Under-Su1t" diving ensemble specifically developed
by MOM for not only thecal regulation (cooling or heating) but as a positive
pressure Suit to evclude contaminates from the encapsulated diver even 1n the
event of a suit breach.
The helaats which were successfully evaluated for chemical exclusion
were the Oraeger Helmet System, the Desco "Pot" Diving Hat, Diving Systems
International Super11ta-17B Helmet, *iorse Engineering WC-12 fcavy Deep water
Helmut Systes, and Safety Sea Systems 5S-20 Helm** Helmet, Seven different
suit configurations were evaluated along with the above stated helmets. One
diving dress was from DraegerwitH the remaining s!k supplied by Viking Oivlng
Systems.
Peer review comments from the "Inter1» Protocol" and additions from the
detailed equipment and procedural evaluation plan will be refined Into a
draft "Field Operations Handbook and Manual for Chemical Oivlng". This
document will hopefully be adopted for actual practice on a trial basis by
the Coast Guard Strike Team. Comments will be Incorporated into the final
landbook scheduled for conviction In December 1935,
This report covers a period from August 1961 to October 19W and work
w»s c deleted as of September 1984.
v

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COHTEHTS
				Hi
Abstract ........			. , . 1*
				xl
Tibtei. ..... 		ir
Acknovledipent			xrtl
1.	Introduction ......... 	 ........ 1*1
Diving Tasks «...			....... 1*8
Diving Env1"onaent ................... 1-11
2.	Conclusions ......................... 2*1
3.	Recommendations 				3-1
4.	Development of the Harm*) of Practice. ............	4-1
Background 					 .	4-1
Work Task Description. ......... 		4-6
Audience 	 ............. 		4-6
5.	Pathogenlcally Contaminated Underwater Operations ......	5-1
Clinical Types of Infections That Hay Occur for#
Frequently in Di verS. 				5-3
Sfnositls ............... 	 ..	5-3
Qtltli Eitema					5-3
Conjunctivitis and Pharyngitis. .... 		5*3
Meningitis. .....................	5-3
Pneumonia 	 ...........	5-3
Gastrointestinal Illnesses			5*4
Skin					5-4
6.	Analysis of Hazardous Chemical Materials Release data ....	6-1
Vessel Transport «f Materials. .............	6-1
Hazardous Chemicals.	6-7
Types of Material Spilled and Material properties. ...	6*14
Petroleum Products					6-14
Source and Cause of Spill		 .	6-34
^Typical" Spill En*riron«ent			6-41
Location of Spills .................	6-41
Depth 				6-41
Currents ..... 	 ........	6*41
Underrate'* Visibility	6-41
Bottom Conditions	6-42
Sea State ... 	 ..........	6*4?
Shore Facilities Available. ...... 	 . .	6-42
vii

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CONTENTS (continued)
7, Hazardous Substances . 		........	7-1
Introduction	...4,7-1
Biological Hazards ......	7*1
Radiation Hazards. 			 . . . .	7*2
Ch«vlc«1 Hazards		 ~ . 				7-2
Fine Hazards. ....................	7-2
Explosive Hazards ... 	 .........	7-5
Toxic Hazard* 			 				7-6
C&rroslvB Hazards ..................	7-14
Hj2«<-ds Que to Chemical Reactivity	7-15
Physical Properties of Chemicals	7-16
8* Hazardous Substance Identification Systems . . 	 ...	8-1
Introduction . 						9-1
NfPA 704 H Hazard Identification System. . 		8-1
Description 				a-1
Summary of Hazard Ranking Systea			8-?
DOT Hazard Identification System ............ 8-4
9.	Use of the Hazardous Soostance Data Sheet. .... 	 9-1
Introduction ..... 	 ....	9-1
Filling Out the Hazardous Substance Data Sheet 		9-1
fxanple of OociMentation Weeded to Couplets a
Hazardous Substance Data Sheet			9-5
Hazardous Substance Data Sheet 	 ........	9-6
Completed Example of Hazardous Substance Data Sheet. . .	9-B
10.	Diving Physiology. ...... 	 10-1
11.	Diving Modes and Equipment 	 ........ ll-l
Ambient Diving . . 	 ........ 11-1
Surface Supplied Diving. 	 . 	 11*1
Self-Contained Diving.				 11-5
Diving Dress ...................... 11-8
12.	Protection Using Self-contained Apparatus			1Z-1
Protection Requirements for SCUBA Diving in
BialoglciUy-Cpn.amlnated Water ........... 12-1
I J. Selection of Specific Self-Contained Equ1(i»ertt *nd procedures
for Biological Hazards ..................	13-1
AGA D!vato<- R1 g					13*1
ASA Dlvator and &ry Suit Compatibility			13-4
Kirby-torfift Sank Mask .................	13-5
Recommended Diving Dress for Microbiological Hazards . .	13-9
vlii

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CONTENTS (continued)
L4» Modified Suffice-Supported Diving Syslim 		14*1
Draeger Constant Volume Suit 	 *	14-1
flK-12 Surface-Supplied QWing SySte* (SSOS) 	14-10
Superllte-178 MeTBet 	 ...... 		14-15
Heliai* SS-20 Model B 		.	14*19
Desco Diving Hat , 		14-19
15.	Using Surface-Supplied Equipment , , 			.	15-1
Protecting the 01 vc 		15-3
Protection Using Surface Supply, ............	15-3
SurfiC? Supplied Divers Uftbfltc&l 	 		15-6
Accessory Equipment for Surface-Stippl led Diving ....	15-6
Surface*Stfpplled Air Systems ..............	15-7
16.	Heat 5t<-a»s in Encapsulated 01ve«*$ 				16-1
Losing Heat fro* the Body			16-1
Tolerance Units 		16-2
Heat St-ess Monitoring . . . 				16-3
Real Tim* Heat Stress Monitoring ............	16-4
Effects of Heat Stress	16*5
17.	Medical Monitoring	17—1
Perspectives on Response Team Exposure Potential ....	17-1
Prep1*ceaent/Pre-eaplDjwent Examinations ........	17-1
Jt—Ray	17—4
Electrocardiogram ............. 		17-4
Pulmonary Function. 		17-1
Aw blent Air Monitoring. ...............	17-4
18.	Personnel Protection for Surface Support Operations .....	13-1
Routes of Exposure 	 .........	18-1
levels of Protection .... 	 ........	18-2
Respiratory Hazards and Protection	16*3
Ox/gen Deficiency					18*3
Aerosols			18-5
Gaseous Contaminants 	 ~	18*5
Respiratory Protective Devices . . 	 .	16-5
Equipment Classification - General Considerations. . . .	18-6
Air Purifying Respirators			18-6
Atmosphere Supplying Respirators. . 		18-6
Protective Clothing. 	 .....	18-7
Performance Requlreaents 				18*7
Chemical Resistance. . . . 				18-8
Chemical Resistance Chart. .......... 		18-9
Types of Protective Clothing 			 ....	18*12
Meat Stress and Body Cooling					18-12
Worker Monitoring. ........ 	 ......	18-14
Equipment list by Hdie^ci Level			18-14
lx

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CONTENTS (continued)
19. Incident Evaluation , « 	 	 ..........	19-1
Introduction 						19-1
Ptus® 1. Initial	..............	19—1
Oata Withering and Revlews/Prel1ml nary Assessment . .	19-2
Off-Site Reconnaissance 		19-3
On-Site Survey. ............ 		19-4
Muse 11: Comprehensive Evaluation 				19-5
Sumaery.			19-6
20* Field Sampling and Analysis 				20-1
Sampling Equipment ............. 	 20-1
Hazardous NttfliU Spills Detection Kit ........ 20-3
Hazardous MaterlaW Identification Kit ........ . 20-3
Ctiollnesterase Antagonist Honitor. ........... 20-4
Cyclic Colorimeter* ................... 20-4
21.	Ka*ard Evaluation: "Go* or 'Kp-Gb* 	 ........ 21-1
Introduction 						21-1
Use of Tables. 		«...	21-2
Relation of Dermal Toxicity Data and
Levels of Protection. .......... 		21-4
Other Reference* .. 		21-4
"No-Go' Scenarios			21-21
22.	General Qlving and Emergency Procedures			22-1
Planning the Divine Operation. ... 	 ..... 22-1
Definition of Mission and Goals ........... 22-1
01 ve Team Organlration 				22-1
Dive Master/Supervisor. .... 	 ..... 22-1
Diving Medical Offlcer/Medlcal Technician ...... 22-2
Science Coordinator ......... 	 ... 22-2
Divers. 	 ................ 22-2
Tenders for Surface-Supplled Diving ......... 22*3
Support Divers and Other Support Personnel. ..... 22-3
^eaU-Scale Operation ...... .......... 22-3
Selection of Surface-Support Platform ........ 22-3
Environmental Considerations. ............ 22-7
Surface Conditions ................ 22-7
Visibility .......... . 	 .... 22-8
Loss of Surface Air Supply	22-8
Hying After Diving at Sea Level ......... 22-9
23.	Additional On-Scene Response Considerations, ......... 23-1
Access				 €	23-1
Physical Examinations , ...... 	 ....	23-1
Weather ........ ................	23-1
Respiratory Protection .................	23-1
Person*! Hygiene ....... 		23-2
Personnel Exposures 	 ............	23-2
Hospital & Emergency Services. 				23-2
Fire ............ 	 .....	23-2
x

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CONTENTS {continued)
24.	Decontamination Procedures , . t 				24-1
Pecoslamination and Kins* Solutions* . . . . .	24-1
Operational Considerations	%	. . . 24-4
Sailing Devices M-8
Tool S	.	. . . .		 24-a
RfSpiretflfj 		24-8
Hetty Equipment		 		. , « . * 24-9
SanltUIng of Periorvat Protective Equipment	24-9
Persistent Contamination			24-9
Disposal of Contaminated Materials,	24-9
25.	Sources of Information and Response Assistance . 		25-1
NOAA Hazardous Material* Response- Project. .......	25-t
Research Planning Institute, ,¦•««...>>.>••	2S-Z
Chemical Support Safety 
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FIGURES
Nwnfeer	Page
1.1	Hazardous Chealcal Underwater Tasks*	1-4
1.2	Yacyum~A1r Lift Trucks for Contaminated l)n<3en*atar Sediment
Removal.	1-5
1.3	Dlvf Utilization of Vacuim A1r-Llft far Removal of
Contaminated Und^^ilt;^ Sediment , . , , 			 ,	1-6
1.4	Underwater Recovery of Sunken 55 Gallan Smnis. .**.*»**	1-7
1.5	Emergeoty Response of Special I zed Dive1* 5e«i- .........	I»l0
4.1 Hydro Products RCK-150, Free Striving* Tethered Resgtely
Controlled fsNfclt Handling Div«r Sledge	......	4-1
lol Examples of Ha widows Cheralcal Releases		 , . , ,	6-2
t,l Total Materborne Com >-x« of the United States,
1969-1978 ................	. . .	«-3
6*3 Ton-Miles of Freight Carried on the Materieays of the
United States. 1969-1973			6-4
6.4	Principal Cowwdltles Carried by Hate*. , , . 		6-6
6.5	All Petroleum Product Spills, 1977-1980 * 		6-10
6.6	Locitlon of Petroleum Product Spills
>	10.000 Gallons* 1977-1980 		6-U
6»7 Location of Petnjleua Product Spill*
>	1Q,000 Gallons. 1977-1980 (Modified)			§~U
6.8	AH Heiardows Chemical Spills > 4? Gallons, 1977-1980 . . , r	6-13
6.9	All Huar&ju* Chemical Spill„ 1977-1930 {Excluding Beaches/
Non-navigable). ,, f	»	6-15
7.1	The F1r« Triangle 		.	7-4
1.2	Dose-Response Curves. . 		7-11
8.1 HFPA 7Q4 K Kuard Identification System 		8-2
xil

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figures (continued)
MlWlwr	Page
8.2	ModtfIcation of DOT Huard Identification SyStew. ...... 8-5
11. L	Cm Atmosphere JIM Suit	«... 11-2
11.2	MANTIS One-Kan Sutvslble Vehicle ............. 11.3
11.3	C^n-cflt Wt-12 (left) and Fo<"mer MK-S (rljht) Deep Water
Giving Systees, 	 ............. 11-4
11.4	Closed-Circuit Nixed Gas Scuba. 			 . U-6
11.5	Open-Circuit Self Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus
(scyw)	ii—7
11.6	Viking variable Volume Heavy Duty Dry Suit ulth Surface
Suppled AGA Mask 				U-U
13.1	AGA 01 v4tor* Full face **$k			13-2
13.2	Patbogenlcal ly Protected Diver *1th Heavy Outy Viking Or/
Suit and Surface Supplied Urby-Horjan Band Mask.	13-6
14.1	Draege* Constant Volume Suit Modified Demand Regulate. . . . 14-3
14.2	Series Ejhaust Valve. . . 	 ..... 14-4
14.3	Draeger Coomjii Ication Assenbly			14-S
14.4	Modified Oraeger Hood .................... 14-6
14.$ Q»-aegir Syste*			14-7
14.6	Urae9er Suft-Under-Suit (SOS) ................ 14-B
14.7	SUS Neck Ring Assembly. 	 ........... 14-9
L4.& Navy MX-12 Surface-Supplied Diving System (SSQS).		 14-11
14.9	Modified Viking 'Sult-Under-Suit* for MK-12 System. ..... 14-13
14.10	Outer Chaffing Garment for MIU12 Viking 'Sult-llnder-Suit"
Qriss			14-H
14.11	Multiple Gloving System ................... 14-16
14.12	Super] Ite-UB Helmet WModl flcatlons. ............ 14-17
14.13	Superl1te-I7B Olaph"a^n Protection Cap. ...... 	 14-16
xlil

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FIGURES (Continued)
Wtwber	Paoe
14.14 fedlfled Viking Suit fo" Super! 1 te-l?6.	14-20
14. IS Belima SS*20 Model 8 Helmet . , , , 					14-21
14.16 Desco Dicing Hat w/flodi ft cations. *			*	14-22
15.1	Surface Supplied *K-12 Entry Procedyre. ...........	15-2
15.2	49' Diameter; T#o Person Recompression Chamber, .......	lLS-5
15.3	Surface Supply Air Systems. . 				IS-&
16.1	Medical Monitor Harness . 				16-6
16.2	Surface Body Temperature Nonitoring			16-7
17.1	Ttvee Lead Pickup and L1f«pak 4 Heart Monitor	U-5
17.2	Ambient Helmet Air Monitoring , . 	 ........	17-6
16.1 levels of Personnel Protection. ...............	18-4
20.1	Hazardous Materials Detection Kit. 1 Hazardous Material
Identification Hit. .............. . 		20-6
20.2	Pesticide Detection Apparatus 4 Cyclic Cotoriaetc	20-7
22.1	1000 Gallon "01p" Tank for Leak Detection of Draeger Sult-
OHMSETT 			 				22-4
22.2	MO Sal Ion "Dtp" Tank for Leak Detectfon of NK-12 Suit. . . .	22-5
22.3	Surface-Support Platforms ....... 		22-6
24.1	Layout of Personnel Decontamination Station
(Levels A i 0 Protection) .................	24-2
24.2	Hininum Layout of Pe^onnel Decontamination Station
(Levels A. 6 I C Protection). 		24-3
24.3	Qoclcslde Oecon Operations . 				24*5
24.4	Shipboard Decon Operations. ........... 		24-6
xiv

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TABLES
Number	Pag*
S.l	Patfeo^eos Known or Suspected to Inhabit Polluted Water
and Some of Their Assocla ted Diseases . .			5*2
5.1	PHrvc i pa 1 Comeodlties In Vate^torne Coi"*rce, 1977-1979 * * .	6-5
6.2	taterbo'tif Commerce: Petroleua Products, ..........	6-fl
S.l	liitrbQ^ns Conwce: Chemicals ...............	6-$
6.4	Hazardous Clwntcil PliC^rjeS ................	6-16
6.5	Frequently Spilled ttattrborn* Chemicals and Thei*
Phjrstcal Pipettes					6*19
6.6	Comparison of P-loHty Mj/j^ous Substances in Mate^ways. , .	6-40
7.1	Systemic Poisons ......................	7-7
7.2	Asphyxiants. 				7-7
7.3	Irritants, 						7-0
7.4	Allergic Sensitizers ........ 	 ......	7-9
7.5	Carcinogens and Teratogens .................	7-9
7.6	Relative Index of Toxicity			7-12
7.7	Hazards Due to Chemical factions (Incompatibilities) ....	7-13
7.0	Corrosives			7-15
7.9 flammable Compounds and Elements	7-|6
8.1	United Nations Hazard Class System . 	 ......	9-4
a.2 Hazardous HateMals. . 				8-6
17.1 Occupational and Nedlcal History Assessment. ........	17-3
IS.I Clothing Materials Chemical Protection by Generic Class, . .	IB-11
21.1 Chemical Deraal Toxicity Data 	 ......	21-5
xt

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Tables (Continued}
toatoer	Page
22.1 Optional fli/gen - Breathing Time Before Flying After
Diving 						22*10
24.1 Uses of Sene'il	Purpose Etecort Solutions. . . , ~ ~	?4-J
xvi

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ACKMJtoUttoCftEftTS
The preparation of this document was tccomplished by gathering vital
information and related references from man* different experts In the
diving community a^d enemical spill response organizations located both in
tne public ano private sectors, without the expertfse supplied by
Dr. 0. horgan tells, Jr., Director of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Aoffinlstration waving Operations Office, the preparation of this manual of
practice mouIo not have been possible.
I would like to thank the following individuals have made signifl*
cant contributions in not only the conduct of this project but fur ttielr
patience in reviewing this manual for validity and completeness.
0.5* Environmental Protection Ageno
Anthony drown	Jin Patrick
Conrad Kleveoo	Hay Thacker
Don lawnom	fadney U. Turpln
hatlonal Oceanic I Atmospheric Administration
Peg^y Senas	William Phoel
LT. John dlackwell
LMjgJ Arthur franc 1s
Lisa fancier
LT. uavld Hunuerlowe
Clifford hewell
LT.(j{|j Paul Pegnato
LT. Stanton Ramsey
John Robinson
Richard Kutkmrski
George Smith
Steve tlrick
LT. Robert Nillfscnoft
D«S* Coast fatiaro
LT. Hichael Carr
BMZ/DVi NlChael Downey
LI. Mlchard tauoiosl
LT. Haren Levi
etKJ/Olr I Steve Magaro
Dndr. William Rorher
Oadr. hichael Taylor
l>.$. hivy
Arthur J. Baenracft
Otejr. James C. Coolbaugh
LT, OMr. John Cocowltch
Richard A. flame y
u. 5. Oegajrtmgnt of Energy
Dr. nillian Forester
Or. Susan L. Rose
xril

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U.S. Amy Corps of Engineer*
baH Arnold
Coustoau Societj
kt Chard Parity	Clirt Let HtrHm
lotemat tonal UndtrwaUr Contractors, Inc.
Andre (Uleme
SarQgfl ^tjtg unp*rwater ttecpyerr bolt
Stephen bardic*	Peter SI aton
Safely Sea S>sUpi», Inc.
George wymer
»tkin& Technical Mutter
An^eTa Mvnin	Sti9 tniulan
Jorn Stubdil	rilchard iahornlak
Olttri Institute of Ttcfan>jj>ay»
Eugene "Ike" Eutenefer
rrlli

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secriuN i
INTliUDUCTlQN
This report is a Manual of Practice (NOP) and is Intended to provide
guidance to agencies which utilize diver* In waterways of environmental
quality that may be acutely or chronical3y detrimental to hioan health.
This HOP 1$ an Interim document and 1s a precursor of the final MOP which
Is planned for release In beceufcer 1985.
The final nop will fie based on actuil field evaluation and demon-
stration of modified equipment and newly-developed response procedures.
The final HUP will be reviewed by approximately 25 experts from government
agencies and private Industry.
The present KiP dociaent, however* though primarily based on
preliminary field evaluation of diving dress ana equipment In controlled
chemically-conlaminated unoerwater env1roi*cnts, offers practical
Information for lamed late use as a <^1de to safer underwater operations.
In addition, the present HUP document contains a compilation of Information
fro* two recently completed CPA studies entitles, "Evaluation of the Use of
hirers and/or Remotely uperated vehicles (KM) in Chemically Contaminated
waters" and "Chemical Tank Testing of Modified Commercial Divine Helmets
and uress," as well as information from documents issued ay other
agencies* The present hop will contain Information on toxicity of the most
prevalently spilled hazardous substances to entble the user to make a
judgment on whether deploying divers Into waters containing these
contaminants Is advisable or not* In summary, the present HOP will provide
information on (1) evaluation of hazards, depending on the nature of
contaminants present ("Go/no-Go* situations to determine whether diving is
possible or not), {2J "when and "how" to utilize divers in hazardous
environments, (3) medical and physiological Implications of a diver's
exposure, (4) state of the art review of diving and surface support
personnel protection when they perform underwater tasks in contaminated
waters, and (5J decontamination operations for diving personnel and
equipment. The specific "Job" to which the HOP can be applied will depend
on the user's particular needs. Jt should be stressed, however, that this
HtiP is Intended to serve only as guidance.
Several agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NUAA), Navy, and Coast
6uard are oundated by Federal law and regulations to angage In activities
that require personnel to dive in hazardously contaminated underwater
environments. Because of Inadequate understanding of hazard and Inadequate
protection against 1t, many diving and surface support personnel have
suffered acute Injuries (2). Equipment deterioration has been responsible
1-1

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for at least or* fatality and undoubtedly Is responsible for many Incident!
of diver txpouit to contaminants. Ve»y little Information Is available on
low-1ev«1 exposure to contaminants which the dlven or surface support per-
sonnel might have suffered. Only acute or 1 Mediate effects to exposures
have been reported. Oironlc, long-ten* toxicity has not been Investigated.
This fs a serious problem which Is just now being addressed by several
government agencies*
Biological and chemical contamlnation are significant problem in most
harbors, bays, and other natural bodies of water In the Unfted States.
Biological contamination results from sewage discharge, both treated and
untreated. The dangers to divers In Maters contaminated with pathogenic
microorganisms are well recognized. MOW has conducted research program
to modify and develop the best procedures and equipment that would protect
divers against pathogenic microorganisms.
Splits of petroleum products, hazardous Materials, and other miscella-
neous Materials are a very significant contributor to chemical contam-
ination of waterways. Between the years of 1977*1961, 64,609 such spills
were reported to the U.S. Coast Guard office of Marine Environment and
Syst«s.[TJ This represents a total of 7.5.6 * 10o gallons of material
released Into navigable waterways alone. From 1974 to 1981, 464 large
spill or release Incidents were reported. Involving a total of 20.9 * 10*
pound* of dry harardous and other substances.
There Is a steady Increase, over the past decade. In the waterborne
transport of petroleum and chemical products In the United States. It Is
expected that this trend will continue, thus Increasing the potential for
releases of these products Into the waterways of the United States. Chemi-
cal contamination can take the form of corrosive substances or poisons
which affect the human Internal system on both an acute or chronic basis,
A review of current requirements of various governmental civilian and
military agencies clearly demonstrates a need for underwater activity that
Involves diving In response to chemical release situations.
The tasks a dlwr may perform can be divided Into seven different
groups:
1* Damage Assessment: Divers can be used to assess the extent of
damage sustained In an accident, primarily an accident Involving
vessels and pipelines. Damage assessment Is usually done In
response to a known leak or possible leak. The diver should have
a basic understanding of the structure and construction of the
object they are Inspecting. If a vessel Is Involved, all of the
standard safety considerations of diving under or around vessels
must be observed by both divers and vessel personnel. (See Figure
1.1)
2. Location of Source: if a spill Is noted In an area and an under-
water source suspected, a diver can help to locate the source.
For reasons of both safety and efficiency, consideration must be
given to type of material, potential sources, current, bottom

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contours, bottcxc type, search pattern, underwater position
recording, etc.
3.	Location of Material: For substances which sink In water,
especially those that are not highly mlsclble or readily
dissolvable, a diver can investigate the location of the spilled
material and extent of contaminated area.
4.	Containment/Cleanup: For materials on the bottom, underwater
¦fences* can be erected to contain spilled material for cleanup*
Cleanup of tha material can be done by divers using suction lifts,
guiding small dredge-type scoops, etc. The effectiveness of
cleanup operations, whether done underwater or from the surface,
can also be Investigated* Divers can at so assist with the
deployment of surface containment and cleanup equipment* (See
Figures 1.2 and 1.3)
5* Recovery of Containers or Contents of Containers: Divers can be
used to recover drums or other containers of chemicals that have
been dumped or lost underwater. Moses can also be affixed to
containers (drums, barges, vessel compartments) and the contents
of the containers can be pumped to the surface. (See Figure 1.4)
6* Repalr A
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USCS Strike Te» Recovery
Operation of Air Florid*
Art line Crasht14th Street
Bridge* Potomac River,
Washington. D.C.
Oeplojvent of Divers
to Atteopt Shutdown
of Offshore Oil Plat-
Form Blowout
Figue l.l Hazardous Chealcal Underwater Tasks
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figure UJ2 Vicuum-Air lift Trucks for Cont*a1rt«terf Underwater
Sediment Renoval
1*5

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Figure 1.3 Diver UtlVfttttafl of Vjcuuto Air-Lift for ftemovjrt of
Contaminated Sediment*
1-6

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85 flallan Overpack
Recovery Owns
500# Air lift Bag with
Filled Overpack Recover Drum
\
Dockside Handling of
Recovered Sunken Drum
Figure 1..4 Underwater Recovery of Sunken 55 Gallon Drums
1-7

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This hOP r«fwt will discuss very specific topics which are Important
to increased safety of diving operations* It is Appropriate to review
briefly the various types of diving operations.
Divine Tasks
(Jiving tasks can tie conveniently broken oown into five categories*
These are commercial diving* military diving, support diving, and sport
diving* Generally, commercial diving is surface-supplied diving and sport
diving is Self-Contained underwater Wreathing Apparatus (SCU8A) diving.
Hilitary diving is predominantly surface-supplied diving* but there are
some aspects of military duty that require the SCWA diver* Research
diving is preaomlnantly SCLrtiA diving, but circumstances sometimes require
the use of surface-supplied diving* Support diving is atwut equally
olvided between surface-supplied and SOJ&A diving*
Commercial olvlnft* There are three »ain comnercial diving tasks;
salvage diving, underwater construction, and the diving support for the
offshore oil industry* There are some other forms of commercial diving,
¦ostly harvesting of some type of shellfish usually for food or pearls.
Salvage diving often is nothing more than retrieving the contents of a
sunken ship or plane. At times it involves a repair of a sunken ship's
hull sufficiently to refloat the ship. Underwater construction is the
second of these tasks. Bridges, tunnels, wharves, and harbors require
commercial Giving work during their construction. A new area of commercial
diving has evolved in the support of the nuclear power industry for the
changing of spent fuel rods fctthin containment pools of reactor cores. The
third area, Che offshore oil industry. nquires significant diving support
which ranges from deep saturation dives to relatively shallow dives in
support of the drilling platform*
MUtary diving, in many respects, military diving is very similar to
commercial diving* The fcavy has salvage tasks, and both the Navy and the
Army do underwater construction* Submarine rescue diving is a unique
application u* salvage diving, where ute salvage goal Is to remove
personnel from a sunken submarine. Another unique aspect of Military
diving is the cuaoat role that sooe divers play. Navy SEAL and Underwater
Ueootition Teams use SCUflA diving as an integral part of their combat
tactical operations- The Navy has been actively involved in research an
saturation diving since the mid-sixties* The Nan-in-the-Sea program was a
full-scale demonstration of man's ability to live for extended periods
underwater.
The U.5- Coast &uard National Strike Force is mandated by the Federal
Mater Pollution Control Act (FVPCAJ "to provide assistance for oil and
hazardous substance removal a no shall have knowledge of ship's damage
Control techniques, divine and pollution removal techniques and
methodologies41.
During 1962 the diving billets for the National Strike force were all
moved to Elizabeth City, horth Carolina, and on October 1* 1981, the
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National Strike Force Dive Team officially became an element of tte
National Strike Tom. The Dive Team Is aide up of two officers in)
thirteen enlisted divers. The divers are til trained at Navy Diving
Schools and upon reporting to the 0fve Tew ere fully committed to the
diving progrmn. The Teas Is equipped with SCUBA., lightweight surface-
supplied systwrs utilising Seperlite 1?'s and MK T and iftsvy 12 deep sea
systems- In iddftion, the toast Guard has a wide variety o* underwater
damage assessment and control equipwrit. All of the Dive Teas gear 1$
designed and packaged for transport aboard C-13C aircraft or over the
road* In the event of a hazardous materials spill or potential spin, the
01 ve Tean would respond with as ouch equipment as could be effectively
transported* As a minima the Coast Guard would bring one of the surface-
Supplied systews, SCUBA gear, and damage assessment equipment. fSee figure
Research diving. Research diving is a broad category that includes
most of tfie noSTTTtary diving tfan# by the government and almost all diving
done by universities and private foundations.
national government research organizations such is the Mattonal
Science Foundation (SSF). the national Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration CNOAA), the U.S. Ertvfronaental Protection Agency TOSEPAl,
and the Smithsonian Institution routinely use divers fn their wort.
Scientists who work for the above research organizations collect data
wherever they can be found. Whe« ft becomes necessary to search for
Information underwater, the scientist becomes a diver or uses the services
of a diver. The same is true for scientists working with universities and
private foundations. Host of this diving is SCUBA diving. It takes place
In areas as remote as the Equatorial Pacific and the waters off the
Antarctic Mainland* but it also occurs In local harbors, lakes, and rivers.
with the exception of a few well-endowed private foundations, most of
these diving activities ha*e Id coanon Meager budgetary support. £qtrlpm>At
gets much use, and purchase of new equipment is rare.
Support diving. Support diving is a catchall category containing
diving tasks tftat do net fit into any one of the other groupings. There
are, however, several distinct tastes that actually fall under the general
heading of support. Municipalities located near water usually have support
divers attached to their police and sheriffs' offices to operate as search
and recovery teams* Similarly, institutions having a waterfcorne capability
usually employ a support diving team.
As the name implies, support divers are ancillary tn the sain effort*
However, thgy usually accomplish something that cannot otherwise be
achieved. For example, within NQAA, divers Install tide and current gauges
and dean ship bottoms as support divers, but they also collect scientific
data and Install underwater equipment as research divers*
Support divers for institutions and universities often perform similar
kinds of diving. Their key function Is support. Support divers working
for municipalities perform various tasks in harbors and wharves. Those who
1-9

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J
4
m

A «¦ w

uses C-130 Tr«wrt
USCG Strike Tea*
Eper^ertcjc Response
Palletized Dive 6e*r
Figure 1.5 £aergency Response of Specialised Olve Sear
1*10

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ere diving for law enforcement agencies often search for evidence or
retrieve bodies. Support divers rarely see clear* clean water and
routinely are exposed to everything contained in the murky water they dive
In.
Sport diving, There are tvo kinds of sport diving. The amateur sport
diver dives for fun. The professional sport diver earns his livelihood
from diving*
The «oateur diver usually is un«. who has had some formal training and
carries a certification card from one of the national certifying
organisations. His diving activities tend to be limited to a few weekends
during the warm season and to a diving vacation every so often, He is an
undemater sightseer. Some uateurs, as they gain no re experience, become
underwater explorers, photographers* and hunters. The exploring is often
In ana around sunken ships, and the^r are frequently located in highly-
polluted waters.
The professional diver usually Is an Instructor teaching other sport
divers. Often he is also in the retail business, selling diving equipment
or running charter Uve trips. There are a few professional divers who
make their living hunting for sunken treasures, ana there are a number of
professional divers who are also professional underwater photographers,
Jiving £rtylrar«ie^t
The o1/1ng environment is a complex world that has been subject of
countless papers ana scientific writing over the years, because we are
primarily concerned with diving into contaminated waters» only three
parameters—water temperature, water currents, and water contamination—
will oe briefly discussed. These are not t*e only parameters that affect
tne diver, but they have the most direct nearlng when a elver is exposed to
contaminants present 1r< the water he dives into.
water temperature is of major concern to the diver. The primary
reason that the diver dresses in cwttersome diving suits is to protect
himself against the cold. Cold water tenperature can result in hypothermia
a.nd ultimately death If one is not protected against it. n«re are
instances where the water temperature is too warn for comfort which is
known as hyperthermia* Such an example is, near Ensenada on the 6aja
Peninsula in Mexico. An underwater vent discharges geothermally-heated
water at over 100 degrees Celsius, which is the boiling point of water-
generally, hot water is of himian origin and can be found near power plant
csolant discharge outlets* In nuclear reactor containment 'ponds" and outer
cooling canals, and similar locations. Encapsulated divers will also be
subjected to hyperthermia because of their inability to "dump" internal
body heat,
water currents are usually something a diver considers when he plans
his dive, something he must anticipate when swlmlng to the dive site,
preparing for unaerwater salvage lifts, deployment of scientific oata-
gathering equipment, or when calculatlny his self-contained air supply.
There are clrcmstances when the current becomes too strong to be
1-1 l

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compensated for by the diver's skill. MOM divers Installing current
gauges will try to do the InstilTation at slack water, but thfs Is not
always possible. Divers participating In hydrographic surveying are
required to determine accurately the location and depth of underwater
obstructions (such as wrecks). Quite often* these are located where
currents pose hazards* These conditions often force the diver to use SCUBA
when otherwise he would cnoase surface-supplied equipment. A surface-
supplied umbilical increases the odds of becoaing entangled* and an
especially strong current can put enough force on the umbilleal to pull a
fllver up from the bottom*
The third enviroiwental condition tends to be wore severe In the sane
high current areas discussed above. Biological and chemical contamination
are significant problems in most harbors and bays. Biological contami-
nation results from sewage discharge* both treated and untreated, and from
agricultural feedlot runoff. Chemical contamlnation is the result of
manufacturing pure products being accidentally spilled and chemical
byproducts being intentionally released Into rivers and coastal waters.
Chemical contamination can take the form of corrosive Substances or poisons
that affect the hwan internal system on both an acute or chronic basis*
Another contamination problem can be caused by the inadvertent spilling
Of nuclear waste or the accidental discharge of radioactive coolant Into the
natural water system.
Of these three contamination problems, the chemical one generally is
obvious, one can usually smell It or see discoloration; the nuclear one
generally is clearly marked, and there probably are people actively
involved in cleaning it up; but the biological one often is not at all
obvious* The mater can appear clean and taste fine> yet be seriously
contaminated. Even the novice diver typically will stay away from water
that is slicked and smells "funny." The authorities probably will not let
him enter nuclear-contaminated water, but unless the diver has specialized
knowledge or routine access to soneone who does* even an experienced diver
can find himself diving In seriously contaminated water and subsequently
suffering the consequences.
it should oe stressed that chemical contamination may also he unnoticed
when a relatively low concentration gf a tasteless and odorless substance
is present.
1-12

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SECTION 2
conclusions
In today's society, Hazardous materials are a comnon &*d essential
commodity of coaaerce. hazardous Materials used In great volumes 1n
the production of all the Hats we consider to be comaon essentials of
everyday life. These essentials run the spectrin fro* plasties to synthetic
fabrics to pesticides. Indeed, In the cosmor household cost of the furnish-
ings have required the use of several hazardous aaterlals for their produc-
tion.
Because they are used in large volumes. Many of these hazardous Mat-
erials art transported by tankers over road and rails and over water by
barges and ships, And, as with all forMs of transportation, accidents are
not Infrequent. In this case, however, an accident can have the compounding
effect of endangering human health and the environment far removed from the
scene as, for example, when a tractor-trailer wrecks and spills Its cargo
of highly toxic material Into a river upstream of a township's drinking
mater reservoir. In such & case the leak atst be plugged and the released
Material contained as quickly as possible to prevent it from entering the
reservoir and endangering the health of the township's citizenry. Also,
the safety and health of the response personnel Is a major concern and that
Is the purpose of this nanual.
It has been the purpose of this project to Identify the problems, to
locate immediate commercial solutions and to establish long and short-tern
goals for equipment and procedures development which will Insure the health
and safety of personnel Mho oust work ont about, In, or under water when
engaging In emer^ncy or remedial response activities under Superfund, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act.
It is expected that this project has begun to define the a roundworm
necessary to develop a hazardous substance diving operations star
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procedures which can be used as 1s or quickly modified or mated with other
existing equipment and procedures to provide tunedUte protection to divers
working in waters cont«rlflat«d with hazardous awterlals. A secondary
objective has been to identify the future research necessary to insure
greater safety and capabilities In hazardous contaminated waterways.
The conclusions for the Manual of Practice are presented according to
each section.
SECTION A - DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANUAL Of PRACTICE
4.1 A rev1cm of current requirements of various civilian and military
agencies dearly demonstrates a need for underwater m response to chemical
release situations. Capabilities for underwater activity In relation to
damage assessment, location of products, containment/cleanup activities,
environmental assessment, research studies, ar.d other activities require
that divers enter these contaminated environments. Unfortunately, there
has been very limited capability for either government or private organiza-
tions to safely enter these environments to perform necessary tasks.
Experience In these environments by all groups, government and private,
have often resulted In Injuries, primarily chemical bums, to the divers
and/or surface support personnel. Very little Information 1s available on
low-level exposure to chenlcals, the divers or surface support personnel
may have received in these ejqieriences. Oily acute or immediate effects
have been reported. Chronic, long-term toxicity has not been investigated.
This is a potentially serious problem that 1s just now being addressed by
several government agencies.
SECTION 5 - PATHOGCNlCAlU CONTAMINATED UNOERUATER OPERATIONS
5.1 little or no Information Is available documenting diver Infec-
tions. This creates a problem for attending physicians who are not knowledg-
eable about the kinds of microorganisms encountered In the aquatic environ-
ment, resulting In selection of antibiotics or other drugs for treatment
being an element of chance.
SECTION 6 - ANALYSIS Of HA2AR00US CHEHlCtt MATERIALS RELEASE OATA
$.1 A review of actual spill data indicates that there are a
significant number of incidents of toxic material release to the waterways,
and that these releases pose a serious problem for both public health and
safety and protection of the environment. The location of the majority of
these releases indicate that hosl spills occur in protected river channels
and port and harbor areas of the U.S. These areas not only allow the most
significant potential for exposure of the general public to toxic sub-
stances, but also create some of the most complicated environments for
spill response teams, primarily divers, to safely respond to these 1nci~
dents. These facts Indicate that efficient and safe response team equip*
ssent and procedures must be developed In order for various groups charged
with spill investigation and cleanup activities, Including underwater
activity, to fulfill their mandated assignments to protect the health and
welfare of the public and the environment.
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6.2	the USCG strike tea* arbitrarily assumed that divers would be
dispatched to spills of 10,000 gallons or more. This represents .6* of the
43,382 spills, 280 over three years, or 93 events a year. However, the 280
spills represent 80.34 of the total volume of spills or 32,900,000 gallons.
As Indicated, most spills are In river channels, followed by part and
harbors, then Open coastal waters (primarily bays and estuariesJ,
6.3	Equipment problems In chemically contaminated water environments,
primarily doe to petroleum products, 1s well documented* Of vers frequently
enter these environments resulting In deterioration and failure of equipment.
The problem 1s not only expensive but can be life threatening, Equipment
deterioration is responsible for at least one fatality and undoubtedly
responsible for many incidents of diver exposure to the contaminants*
6.4	There has been a very limited use of Remotely Operated Vehicles
(RQV) technology In response to chemical release situations. Based an the
analysis of underwater activity that would normally be useful in response
to spill situations, ROVs may be able to contribute significantly by allowing
certain underwater activities to be performed without having to risk placing
a diver in thB water. The current state-of-the-art with these vehicles
Halts their use primarily to inspection and evaluation of underwater
conditions to determine whether or not a diver is necessary and to diver
assistance tasks to Increase the safety and effectiveness of the dfver
while In these environments. Underwater visibility and entanglement are
viewed as the two most serious potential drawbacks to effective use of ROVs
In these situations.
Because ROV technology Is so new, there will probably be more varied
and reliable uses of these vehicles In spill-response situations as develop-
ment of the overall ROY Industry progresses.
5ECTI0H 13 - SELECTION Of SPECIFIC SELF-COHTAINED EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES FOR
BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS
13.1	As a result of earler NCAA work {4) It has been demonstrated
conclusively that divers do face biological hazard when they enter polluted
waters- It has defined In general terms the scope of the bacteriological
hazard. The probability that a vlrological hazard exists as well can be
extrapolated from data available in the literature*
13.2	To quantify the microbiological hazard a diver can be facing a
waterborne Indicator organism, Known to adhere to objects submerged in
water. I.e. Aeromonas spp., was studied 1n great detail. Aeromonas spp.
have been iapl Icated in disease amd it is now considered to be a pathogen
capable of causing wound infections, gastroenteritis, and other disease
States. Furthermore, It Is associated with pollution. Aeromonas was found
in significant numbers in almost every diving area examined In this study.
13.3	The ability to disinfect or decontaminate a diving suit, from
bacteriological contamination so that the diver is protected when removing
it, as well as support personnel assisting the diver and handling the gear,
was confirmed.
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131.4 In the absence of immediate* on-site, application of tests to
evaluate the extent of hazards at a particular diving site. It Is recom»ended
that coital areas {e.g. harhors and Other sites near cities) routinely and
minimally be considered to be bacteriologically contaminated from a diver
protection standpoint, and appropriate measures be taken to protect the
diver.
15.5 The most effective bacteriological protective gear and mode of
Operation Is as follows:
Suits: The standard open celluar neoprene vet suit provides only thermal
protection. Designed to be flooded during diving, the wet suit provides no
barrier between the diver and the water. Because of Its surface texture the
wet suit picks up debris from the water, and can not be adequately cleaned
and disinfected, resulting in the accumulation of infectious material and
Subsequent infection.
Three brands of variable vol use dry suits were tested under the earler
NCAA Study: Unlsult; Aguata; and Viking* All provided excellent barriers
for diver protection, assuming no leakage at critical points, e.g. around the
face seal. Differences In effectiveness were apparent, however, especially
+rt ease of disinfection* Through, rinsing after use and spraying with a .isln-
fectant Inside and out, followed by rinsing, should avoid possible infection
of the diver or support personnel.
Aquala and Viking suits responded very we IK Each was equally easily
disinfected. Treatment recommended is a fresh water rinse, 5-«n1n disinfection
contact time, thorough fresh water rinse, and air drying. Because of the
high humidity atmosphere Inside the suits, the Interior should be exposed and
subjected to disinfection as well. Betadlne, Away* and Zepamlne disinfect-
ants can be used with approximately equivalent results. They should be
applied using a pressurized spraying apparatus for best effect.
Masks: AGA provided good protection, when properly sealed with the dry-
Suit hood. Setter protection, but limited visibility, was afforded by KMB
and Superllte 17 Basks, Disinfection of these pieces of equipment is best
accomplished by thorough rinsing, followed by wiping the interior with 70$
alcohol and air-drying*
Air Supply: Demand mode appeared to be less of a problem than free
flow, especially when conmynications equipment was used with the masks. When
the free-flow mode was stopped and restarted, during periods of talking, the
diver received an aerosol of water in his/her face, a potentially hazardous
condition in polluted waters. Changes In the design of this equipment could
alleviate the problem.
Clearly, the need exists for careful and thorough assessment of the
potential bacteriological hazard to divers in any give diving area. In
general, clarity of water is not a good indication of microbiological hazard
for lack of it), even though pollution may be obvious. Bacteriological
analysis should be done, if not regularly, then at least initially* A/aong
the most co*won infections occurring in divers unprotected by suitable gear

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is externa) otitis, an infection that can be aggravated, as we have reported
in this study, by wearing protective diving hoods~ Accordingly, it 1$
recoinraiKted prophylactic use of acetic acid ear drops under all circumstances.
Such medication 1s readily available.
13.6 If a biological hazard is suspected, a current biological analysis
of the body of water way be available from the state health department* If
current biological Information is not available* samples can be taken and
analyzed. Analysis tine of a sample for biological hazards is generally on
the order of days. If the suspected threat justifies the delay, an analysis
should be Bade to substantiate and identify the biological hazard. If,
however, a biological hazard is suspected and the criticalIty of the incident
requires thu use of divers but prevents biological analysis, the following
safety measures should be used:
A* The divers should have current Immunizations (I.e. appropriate
prophylactic procedures should be used).
B.	The divers should be completely encapsulated to prevent con-
tamination.
C.	The divers Should be thoroughly decontaminated prior to desulttng.
SECTION 16 - HEAT STRESS I* ENCAPSULATED 01 VERS
16.1	The diver Is a very poor judge of his own thermal status.
16.2	The onset of serious consequences of hyperthermia can occur abrupt-
ly and often without obvious warning.
16*3 If hyperthermia Is probable* appropriate monitoring of the diver's
status should be conducted* Breathing rate determined by standard cammunl-
catlon equipment can be a simple and reliable method. If an elevated breath-
ing rate does not return to normal (for the particular diver) within two
minutes after a diver Is Instructed to stop work, hyperthermia should be
suspected and corrective action should be taken.
SECTION 18 - PERSONNEL PROTECTION FOR SURFACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
18.1 Training Is required of surface support personnel in the utiliza-
tion of the type of protective gear used during diving and subsequent decon-
Mlnatlon operations*
SECTION 19 - INCIDENT EVALUATION
19.1 OSC's will occasionally get "caught up* In the toxicology of the
response, and will occasionally lose sight of the more common and mundane
site consideration, i.e. oxygen content, explosive Index, etc.
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SECTION 20 - FIELD SAILING AFffi AMAlYSlS
20.1	S«Bp11^9 a chemical directly from its container Is preferred.
However, if direct sampling is not possible, samples *ay be taken close
downs trees of the container. Sampling methods nay range from the use of
conventional sampling equipment to the use of remotely controlled vehicles
for stapling.
20.2	Once a s*nq>1e has been taken, it must he analyzed. Conventional
portable analysis equipment will provide rough quantitative data about the
chemical which may or may not be adequate for identifying the chemical. The
time required for analysis by portable equipment is generally only a few
minutes* If more precise identification of the chemical is required, mobile
laboratories are available through various government agencies and n111
provide precise analysis of the sasple* Analysis by a mobile lab will require
from a few minutes to a few hours. If time allows, conventional laboratories
may be used for sample analysis. The total time required, including
transportation and analysis of the s&qple* 1s generally several hours.
SECTION 21 - HAZARD EVALUATION: "GO* OR "NO-GO"
21.1	Evaluations should be made to determine whether too much ewphasiS
's being placed on Vorst case" approaches when responding to a hazardous
substance spill or release>
21.2	The Marine Safety Officer (MSG), On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) or
Response Officer (RO] must be allowed to make the decision that "no divers"
or surface personnel enter "highly* contaminated "hot" areas~
SECTION 22 - GENERAL DIVING AMD EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
22.1 Volatile substances awst be considered when using diving bells and
saturation system*.-
2Z.2 Present commercially available radio coonunicatlon systems do npt
always supply reliable or completely intelligible service. This situation
complicates the surface support of diver tending and also adds additional
risk to operations.
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SECTION 3
RECOMMENDATIONS
Throughout the course of this project, as solutions and answers were
sought to provide adequate protection to divers engaged in operations within
biologically and/or chemically contaminated waterways, more and more questions
and unknowns were revealed. As was stated in the conclusion sertlon, the
need for this manual Is Immediate. Due to tine and budget limitations.,
project priorities were immediately Identified and pursued. ATthogh some of
the following recommendations were Identified early in the project but not
engaged, does not signify that they are minor ones and need not be pursued.
The balance of the recommendations are the result of now knowing the limita-
tions of our newly acquired knowledge, and recently tested modified diving
dresses. It is hoped that some of the following Items will be satlfied
through actual operational adaptation, and that others will find support from
appropriate sponsor agencies. As with the conclusions* the recommendations
are presented by section.
SECTION 4 - OEVELOPWUT OF THE MANUAL OF PRACTICE
4.1 A survey of diving operations previously conducted in polluted
water environments should be made. The cooperation of the Board of Directors
of the Association of Diving Contractors (ADC) should be solicited at their
next annual mating with the emphasis of the purpose to be finding guidelines
to help rather than rules to restrict. The little knowledge accumulated to
date shows no acute effects of polluted water diving, but the potential of a
problem exists and their assistance will help determine Its magnitude.
4.? Technology transfer of the Information enclosed in this Interim
Protocol must be made at the local regional level. This would allow for
specific regional needs and situations to be assessed and adressed with
regards to hazardous underwater operations.
It Is therefore strongly reco»»ended that one-day Intensive technical
overviews be presented at various EPA regional locations in the next year,
lite purpose of this seminar/workshop would be to thoroughly familiarize
regional Marine Safety Officers and Gn-Scene-Coordinators to the contents of
the Manual of Practice. This would include the identifications of underwater
response tasks, problem and spitl identification, hazard evaluation, modified
diving equipment available far response, protection of surface support
operations and decontamination procedures.
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The sites of the seminars are proposed fr the following locations;
Athens, OA
" Chicago, 11
* Seattle, VA
' Washington, O.C
(EPA Regions I, 11> III)
(EPA Regions IV, VI)
(EPA Regions V, VII)
(EPA Regions VMI, IX. X)
The seminars Mould be strongly recommended far OSC's, MSO's, TAT, FIT,
and (JSCS Strike Team personnel, ft is also hoped that these seminars would
be made open to the general commercial diving Industry along with other
Interested governmental agencies* The following Is a partial 71st af the
various organizations who have requested copies of the final Manual of
Practice:
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
U.S. Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren, VA
U.S. Navy Experimental Diving Unit, Panama City, FL
U.S. Naval Kedlcal Research Center, Bethesda,
U.S. Naval Supervisor of Salvage, Washington. DC
U.S. Naval Supervisor of Diving, Washington, DC
U.S. Coast Guard, National Strike Team, Elizabeth City, HC
U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, DC
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. Department of Energy
Undersea? Medical Society
Cousteau Society
Association of Diving Contractors
Viking Diving Systems
Safety Sea Systems
Diving Systems International
Divers Institute of Technology
Suboteanic Consultants, Inc.
Nuclear Startup Services
Ocean Corporation
University of HaryJand
International Underwater Contractors
Hamilton Research Ltd.
Virginia Highway Research Council
University of New Orleans
Diver local Union 10?6
Webb Associates
SECTION 7 - HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
7.1 Federal transportation regulations should be checked as to what
"types" and "classes" of chemical substances are carried by bulk water
transportation, l.e, barges, tankers. This information should be checked
against the JR8 Associates report entitled: "Evaluation of the use of Divers
and/or Remotely Operated Vehicles in Waterways Contaminated by Hazardous
Substances Discharges," by Steven A- HcLellan, for amounts, frequency,
geographical locations and types of chemicals most frequently spilled or
released.
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7*2 Longitudinal studies should focus on toxic chemical-pathogen
interactions, It Is critical to krw what synergistic effects may occur,
enhancing Infection and/or disease,, Data gathering now on this aspect of the
hazard of diving In toxic chemical spills in sewage-polluted areas will
prevent serious problems down the road*
SECTION & - USE OF THE HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DATA SHEET
9.1 Training is needed for OSC's, WSC's and #0's 1n the utilization and
understanding of results obtained from rapid field response monitoring
equipment such as the Will, OVA, Microtox, Photovac* and Kach Hazardous
Materials Identification kit*
SECTION 10 - omwe physiolosy
10*1 Compression of toxic vapors In the atmosphere in divers breathing
air must be considered* At elevated pressures vast toxic gaseous material
become more toxic.
SECTIOK 14 - MODIFIED SURFACE - SUPPORTED DIVING SYSTEMS
14.1	Specific protocol and procedures need to he established for post-
operation Inspection and replacement of internal parts 1n breathing apparatus
(diaphragms) and protective dotting.
14.2	Further testing and evaluation of suit and helmet modifications
are necessary with various Hazardous environments considered. Communication
between agencies and companies need to be strengthened on the effectiveness
of these modifications* The manufacturers themselves are interested In making
the equipment more resistant, the modifications for polluted Mater may have
useful adaptation to their standard models*
14*3 An ongoing listing of manufacturers currently producing modifica-
tions of diving equipment for use In polluted waters should be made available.
The list should be open-ended to allow addition as new Items or companies
develop*
14,4 There Is a need for chemical material compatibility Information to
be grouped according to suit models {both surface and underwater), and the
chemicals they would come If* contact with* Information should include the
amount of exposure time and various chemical concentrations the suit material
is subjected to before Its Integrity is rendered ineffective. Information as
to cleanahllity of the specific suits and materials with respect to which
specific decontamination solutions should also be Included,
H.5 The Naval Surface Weapons Center 1s currently evaluating chemical
permeation rates of various commercially available diving dress materials and
helmet exhaust dlaphrams* It Is recommended that if a superior suit material
Is found, prototype diving dresses be thoroughly evaluated under the control'
led chemical dive tank test environment which was developed under this program.
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14.S Investigations should be Initiated In evaluating the Navy HC-14
self-contained retoreather system for possible full encapsulated diver opera-
tions. TMs system would eliminate the need for surface air supplied system^
correspond^ng uflib! Heats, reduce the number of surface support personnel
and allow for free swToning operations.
SECTION IS - USING SURFACE SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT
IS.I The Information, techniques and equipment developed under this
program will be only as good as the Individual's training* It 1s strongly
recofeiended that KOAA, EPA and the U5C5 develop a "Hazardous Materials Diving
Operations Course" which would be administered under the current N0AA training
program* This course would be Available to qualified military, government
and selected civilian diving/response personnel. It 1s envisioned that such
a course would be set-up In three separate week-long phases*
The first phase would be completion of the EPA Hazardous Material Incident
Response Operations Course located In Edison, RJ, The second phase would be
five days of "Hands-on" surface supplied diving operational training with the
newly modified chemical diving dress at the Underseas Weapons Tower, White
Oak, MO the third phase of the training would be a week of actual field
operational training.
The diving systems would Include the U.S. Navy Mark-12 S.S.O.5., the
Super1 lie 176 and the Helmjx SS-20, all mated with modified heavy duty Viking
dry suits or mated with a "Suit Under Suit* (S.U.S.) systea developed by
nOAA. The Super!Ite 178 has been modified to Include a series exhaust valve
(S.EJL) and a second stage diaphragm protector. Viking dry suits would also
be utilized with A.6.A. Clvator full face Basks for simulated response in
pathogenicity contaminated waterways*
To demonstrate each system, a number of taks would be performed over the
5 day period* The tasks envisioned at this time include, but are not limited
to, the following:
I. Underwater location techniques using search patterns and pinger
JXators
?. Free liquid/solid recovery
3, Sediment ssnpllng
4* Current meter installation
5.	Dru« overpacklng and recovery
6.	Tide gauge well Installation
7.	underwater Cutting
3. Vacuum removal of chemically contaminated sediments
To further enhance the exercise, diving accident /management and hazardous
environment scenarios would be incorporated* Operation would be staged frcur
both docksIde for harbor response and fro" a work tug for ship board shakedown*
Gives would be simulated under conditions that would require personnel
protection and respiratory shipment for surface dive tenders decontamination
of divers and support personnel.
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A number of diver monitoring systens would be utilized during hazardous
diving scenarios. The parameters that would be hard-Mire telemetry monitored
will Include Internal helmet gases and temperature, diver el ec trocar d1ogr«,
diver core temperature, and Internal suit and helmet integrity.
SECT row 1$ - MEAT smss in encapsulated divers
1G.1 Information should be gathered in a readily available formate to
allow the appropriate on-scene supervisor to decide when the most appropriate
tlne/teaperature level can be reached before utilizing body cooling devices.
It oust be recognized that a trade-off exists In the carrying of the extra
weight and bulk of the cooling unit versus being warmer, but less encumbered.
16.2 Maintaining the di»er cool during predlve and postdlve procedures
can be advantageous.
SECTION 17 - MEDICAL WMITOREMi
17.1	Environmental/site nonitorkng for hazardous materials is considered
more appropriate than routine medical monitoring. The latter should be
conducted on a ease by case basis. Otherwise, a comprehensive annuat diving
physical should constitute adequate routine nedical surveillance.
11.2	Appropriate Immunizations should be obtained by diving and support
personnel who conduct operations in known polluted Mater. Routine: tetanus,
typhoid and polio. High risk areas:	globulin and others, as approp-
riate.
17.3	Available information on aquatic pathogen abundance and distribu-
tion and their drug susceptibility should be consolidated and made available
to medical personnel who treat divers and support personnel.
17.4	A study should be conducted to determine if the contamination of a
diver might affect the way he can be medically treated, in the event he Is
injured. If contamination does affect treatment, then best estimates of
proper treatment should be developed where possible. Also* If special
equipment is required, It should be secured. If no known treatment is
available for a given contamination, the Diving Supervisor may elect to not
allow diving.
17.5	Specimens should be Forwarded for processing to a designated
laboratory to provide a data base documenting diver wounds, infections and
illnesses directly associated with exposure to the aquatic environment so
that a body of information can be gathered, from which guidelines for phy-
sicians and divers can be extracted to advance the everyday, practicat medical
care of divers*
17.6	A seroconversion study should be undertaken, whereby groups of
divers are monitored prior to exposure, during and post-exposure to assess by
serological methods actual exposure and inmunological response. Surface
support personnel provide a useful central group, as would commercial oyster-
men/divers to estimate chronic exposure to marine pathogens. An annual survey
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of divers should Also be undertaken, in conjunction with the seroconversion
Study, via annual physical examination, to obtain a data base valuable for
assessing diver risk, If an*.
SECTION 16 - PERSONNEL PROTECTION FOB SURFACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
1B.1 The methods avallable to protect surface support crews at this
time May preclude dlvtng operations due to several factors. The current
equipment Is, as a rule* hot. heavy, and if SCBA 1s used, does not allow a
sufficient length of time between changes of the SCBA system, these problem
cay be major drawbacks to being able to conduct diving operations In response
to spills, even If adequate diver protection is available. Research Is needed
to refine available surface support protection equipment to eliminate or
reduce these problems.
SECTION 19 - tNCIDtKT EVALUATION
19.1	A literature survey should be conducted on the compatibility of
diving equipment with hazardous chemicals and the results «*ade readily
available through the one point contact.
19.2	A list of hazardous chemicals, grouped into categories of hazard
levels, should be compiled and made readily available for the Diving Super-
visor. Presently, the USCfi National Response Center, the HOAA lHaz-Mat Group
and the JRB {3} have recommended lists of these types of chemicals. These
lists should be compiled and the kftC designated as the point of contact.
They have a toTl-free phone number, operating 24 hours a day: 1-800-424-8802.
The ROM Haz-Mat Group should develop the capability to serve as the coord-
inating center for the diving-related aspects of the hazards of these chew-
teals.
19.3	Once on site, the Diving Supervisor should evaluate all factors
which may affect the diving operations or plan of approach. These factors
should include, but are not limited to, the following;
A. Environmental Conditions
1.	ueather
2.	Wind Conditions
3.	Current/Tide
4.	Water Turbidity
5.	Hater Temperature
&~ Containment Information
1.	Container Type and Volume
2.	i'iJtage Indication {Odor, Visible Sheen, etc.)
3.	Amount Remaining in Container
4.	Leakage
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C. Location
1.	Depth
2.	Barriers/Obstacles
3.	Available Access
4.	Proximity to NedicaT Support
SECTION 20 - FIELD SAMPLING & ANALYSIS
20.1	Investigate the use cF a stalk mounted1 underwater video system
to remotely survey the location of sunken materials, drums or assess hotter
conditions from a surface platform*
SECTION 21 - HAZARD EVALUATION: "SO' OR "NO-GO*
2K1 The Supervisor should consider the complexity of the diving
operation first (how deep, how long, weather conditions, etc.) and the problems
of the polluted ataosphere second.
21.2	A decision "matrix" should be available, covering the following
areas:
a)	Application of diving operations
h)	Preparations for diving 1n polluted waters
c)	Operational procedures for polluted waters
dj	Decontamination procedures
e)	Emergency procedures
SECTION 24 - DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES
?4.1 Proper procedures to safely remove the chemical contaminants from
diving eoulpaent a"d surface tending personnel must be developed. These
procedures will depend on the type af contaminant and the degree of contact
by surface support and diving personnel with the contaminant. These pro-
cedures must also address other areas of concern such as contamination of the
divers support platform, maintenance of "clean" areas, and other factors.
24„2 Decontamfnation studies should be extended to develop procedures
offering aaxi
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SECTION 4
DEVELCPttNT OF THE MANUAL OF PRACTICE
BACXSROIWO
At the direction of EPA Releases Control Branch, Jftfl Associates pr*~
pared a document entitled, "Evaluation of the Use of Divers and/or
Remotely Operated Vehicles (RDVi in Chemically Contaminated Waters."
This report documented the steady increase, over the past decade, in
the waterborne transport of petroleum and chemical products In the U.S.
It is expected that this trend win continue, thus increasing the
potential for releases of these products into the waterways of the United
States.
A review of actual spill data findicates that there are a significant
nunfcer of incidents of toxic materials released to the waterways, and
that these releases may pose a serious problem for both public health and
safety, and for the protection of the environment. The location of the
majority of these releases indicate that most spills occur 1n protected
rivers, channels, ports, and harbor areas of the U.S. These areas not
only have the most significant potential for exposing the general public
to toxic substances, but also create some of the most complicated
environments for spfll response teams, primarily rfivers, to respond
safely to these incidents. These facts indicate that efficient and safe
response team equipment and procedures must be developed. This will
permit the various groups responsible for spill investigation and cleanup
activities, including underwater activity, to fulfill their mandated
assignments to protect the health and welfare of the public and the
environment-
A review of current requirements of various civilian, government, and
military agencies clearly demonstrates a need for underwater activity
which involves divfng In response to chemical release situations.
Capabilities for unden#ater activity fn relation to damage assessment,
location of products, containment/cleanup activities, environmental
assessment, research studies, and other activities require that divers
enter these contaminated environments. Unfortunately, there is a very
limited capability for either government or private organizations to
enter these environments safely to perform necessary tasks. Eaperienee
in these environments by all groups, government and private, has often
resulted in Injuries, primarily chemical burns, to the divers and/or
surface support personnel. Very little information 1s available on
low-level exposure to chemicals that the divers or surface support
personnel may have received in these environments. Only acute or
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1w»d1ate effects have been reported, Chronic, long-term toxicity has not
been Investigated, This Is a serious problem that is Just tow being
addressed! by several government agencies.
Equipment problems In chemically contaminated water environments,
primarily due to petrol eun products, are well documented, Givers
frequently enter these environments and the result is deterioration and
failure of equipment. This problem 1s not only expensive twit can he life
threatening. Equipment deterioration has been responsible for at least one
fatality (3) and is responsible for many incidents of diver exposure to tiie
contaminants.
There has been very United use of rfeaotety-operated vehicles fPOV)
technology 1n response to chemical release situations. Based on the
analysis of underwater activity that would normally be useful In response
to spill situations, RQV$ nay be able to contribute significantly by
allowing certain underwater activities to be performed without having to
risk placing a diver in the water. The current state-of-the-art with these
vehicles limits their use primarily to Inspection and evaluation of
underwater conditions 1r* determining whether or not a diver Is necessary,
and If diving Is possible to Increase the safety and effectiveness of the
diver while In these environments. Underwater visibility and entanglement
are viewed as the two most serfous potential drawbacks to effective use of
RCYs in these situations.
Because ROV technology is so new, there will probably be more varied
and reliable uses of these vehicles In spill-response situations as
development of the ROV industry progresses, (See Figure 4.1)
An Interagency Agreement I#A0-13-F-2-826-0) between EPA and Mational
Oceanic and Atmcspneric Administration (ItfOAA) was enacted 1n August 1901 to
Improve and update safety capabilities which involve underwater hazardous
chemical cleanup responses. The work scope Includes the assessment,
testing, evaluation, and demonstration of commercial underwater protective
suits, clothing, support equipment, and breathing apparatus In waters
contaminated with hazardous substances which may be injurious to a diver's
health.
Under the EPA/NGAA TAG, a workshop/seminar entitled, "Protection of
Divers In Waterways Receiving Hazardous Chemical, Pathogenic and
Radioactive Substances Discharges,11 was held at the Undersea Medical
Society on November 9-11, 1982, The proceedings from this workshop are now
available (13). Participants at this meeting agreed unanimously that there
is: {a) no way that divers can be prevented from working In hazardous
environmentsp and (b) research and development are needed to modify
coonercially available diving dress and helmet assemblies to protect divers
from hazardously-contaminated environments,
NMA has extensive Involvement and expertise in underwater diving.
MOAA's activities Include production of the HOAA Diving Manual, the develop-
ment of certification standards, and the operation of a diver certification
training program for civilian government divers. HOAA divers have partici-
pated In m*erous research programs which involved diving in waters
Infested with pathogenic microorganisms. To protect Its divers against
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Figure 4.1 - Hydro Products RCV-150, Fret Swinging, Tethered Remotely
Controlled Vehicle Handing Diver Sledge Haaner
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these microorganisms, procedures and equipment were modified or developed,
and then tested» MOAA's experience In the development of protection for
divers in water contaminated nrlth microorganisms Is, In many respects,
applicable to protecting divers In waters contaminated with hazardous
substances. MOAA continues to strive to Improve its diver health and
safety protection capabilities toy conducting additional research and
testing.
Ttie successful accomplishment of various research and operational
functions of both MOAA and EPA 1s dependent upon these organizations being
able to have their own or coapaercial underwater divers operating safely in
waters that are polluted with agents that are harmful to diver health and
safety.
The performance of specific underwater functions during pollution
cleanup or research efforts can save significant amounts of time and
resources. Appropriate safety procedures and equipment are needed, however,
in order to safeguard the health and welfare of underwater divers engaged
in these activities.
Numerous commercial diving suits and helmets have been reviewed for
chemical exclusion and material compatibility. Five specific diving
dresses have been modified and evaluated functionally at the Vhite Oak
Naval Underseas Weapons Tower located in Maryland* Equipment evaluations
at White Oak have been performed during April, June, and October of 1982,
and In February and March of ]&$3*
Mo degree of static laboratory test Mill be adequate to determine the
effectiveness of suit and helmet modifications* Actual dive operations are
necessary to test equipment changes. This Is caused by the various
complexities of body moYonents and Min-waterB positions during underwater
work tasks. Seals and position straps can easily fail during strenuous
diving operations, thereby allowing leakage of contaminants*
Many diving tanks exist in the various coonercial companies and
governwentel agencies which serve as training sites for new diving
personnel. However, none of these installations is capable of receiving
either a representative pollutant or surrogate contaminate to allow for
realistic, controlled testing arid evaluation of newly modified diving
fear. The existing EPA Oil & Hazardous Materials Simulation Envlronmental
est Tank (otft$ETT) is capable of simulating open-water diving conditions
while providing su'table high-efficiency water treatment operations (see
Append!* "A").
Initial evaluations of the modified commercial diving dresses and
helmet assemblies were completed during March 1983 at OH^ETT which Is
located at the tarle Naval Weapons Station, Leonardo, Mew Jersey. This
operation utilized a 5,000-gallon tank containing amaonla and fluorescein
dye tracers in which the suits were safely evaluated.
The Bodlfled helmets, which were successfully evaluated for chemical
exculsion, were the Oraeger Helmet System, the Desco "Pot* Diving Mat,
Diving Systems International Superlite-17B Helmet, Morse Engineering HK-12
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Wavy Deep Water Helmet System, and Safety Sea System Helmax Helmet. Six
different suit configurations war* evaluated along with the above stated
helmets. One diving dress was fron Draeger with the remaining five
supplied by Viking Technical Rubber. The final Manual of Practice CWP)
protocol will desert to the specific modification which were made to each
diving helmet and dress.
Th# Manual of Practice (NOP) Is Intended to serve only as a guidance
docment for Governmental agencies and private organizations responding to
incidents which require the Intervention of underwater diving personnel.
These dive teams carry out specific work tasks In waterways whose environ-
mental quality oay be acutely or chronically detrimental to personal health
The procedures and protocols as presented wf11 cover:
a.	Hazard Evaluation;
b.	"When and Mow" to Utilize Divers in Hazardous Environments;
c.	Medical and Physiological Implications of Diver Exposure;
d.	Stato-of-the-Art Review of Dfver and Surface Support Hazardous
Environment Protection;
e.	Decontamination Operations for Diving Personnel and Equipment.
The publication and distribution of this "Interim Protocol1' document
at this time, prior to the completion of final field evaluation and
demonstration of modified equipment and newly developed response
procedures. Is needed to serve as a reference guide to safer underwater
operations. Field evaluation and shakedown of the procedures, techniques,
and equipment descrfpted herein need to be conducted prior to the issuance
of a complete finalized MOP. The final protocol will also Include specific
procedures and illustrations of the equipment modifications to the various
diving dresses that have been evaluated.
The MOP will cover general procedural activities related to hazard
evaluation, diver deployment and recovery, surface tending operations, and
equipment decontamination procedures. Specific dive team organization will
be detatledi describing each team meabers's job or task function. Both
fixed diving platform (dockside) and shipboard operational organization and
logistics will be presented in the final protocol,
Operations will generally fall In three scenarios: gross spillage of
chemical is) resulting from tanker collisions, sinkings, highway or ran
accidents releasing contaminants directly into a waterway, or pipeline
discharges; large general areas of contamination as the result of dumpsftc
(land) leachate and surface runoff generation, hazardous material release
from open ocean diaping. long-term release from sunken tfrtats and containers;
and the trapping of hydrogen sulfide (HoS) In underwater bottom depres-
sions as the result of anaerobic biological activity, or high biological
contamination in waterways receiving sanitary sewage discharges*
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work task description
Specific work tasks which diving personnel would be engaged in while
exposed to hazardous water environments could include, but not limited to:
1, Classification/Determination of distribution and extent of
contamination resulting from a release of heavier-than-water
hazardous substances (solids and liquids);
2„ Determination of the effectiveness of clean-up operations (e.g.,
dredging of spilled hazardous substances);
3.	Conducting clean-up operations (e.g., operation of handheld
dredges for vacumlng small pools of sunken hazardous substances);
4.	Placement and retrieval of underwater sampling, monitoring or
research equipment {e.g., sedimentation boxes, bottom benthos
boring units, etc.);
5.	Location and recovery of sunken containers of hazardous substances
(e.g., drtns, barrels, trailer truck container boxes, truck
tankers, etc,);
6.	Evaluation of the fate and effect of contamlnents upon the aquatic
environment*
audience
The Manual of Practice (HOP) is intended for a selected audience of
individuals who find It necessary to occasionally operate on and under
hazardously contaminated waterways. The MOP is prepared for use by both
the diving supervisor, diver, and surface tenders. Specific targeted user
comnunitles Include: On-Scene-Coordlnators (OSC); Marine Safety Officers
(M$0); Military Diving Operations (i.e.. Naval Supervisor of Diving; Haval
Supervisor of Salvage; Naval Experimental Diving Unit; Naval Explosive
Ordinance Disposal; Arqy Corp of Engineers; Coast Guard Strike Team; NCAA
Hazardous Material Diving Unit); NASA Space Shuttle Recovery Unit; Depart-
ment of Energy Nuclear Containment Diving Unit; Departoent of Transportation
Bridge Inspection Unit; Association of riving Contractors; regional, state,
and county governments; scientific research agencies and academic organiza-
tions; and police* ftre, and volunteer underwater recovery units.
Consents, corrections, additions, or deletions are actively encountered
for incorporation in the final HOP. Your input is welcomed. Please address
your Information to:
Richard P. Traver	Or* J, Morgan Wells, Jr.
Releases Control Branch	Diving Program Office
l/.S. Environmental Protection Agency National Oceanic A Atmoppherlc Attain*
Rarlten Depot - Hoo<&ridge Avenue	6001 Executive Blvd.
'dtson, MJ 08037	Rockvllle, I® 20852
(201) 321-6i77 - FTS 340-6677	(202) 443-8007 - FTS 143-8007
Anthony P. Brown	It. Richard Gaudlosl
Office of Health ft Safety (PM-273)	Ship's Salvage Diving Officer
U.S. Environrsental Protection Agency	National Strike Team
401 *M" Street. S.W.	l/.S. Coast Guard
Washington, DC 20460	Elizabeth City, NC 27309
(212) 362-3650 - FTS 382-3650	(919) 931-0268 - FTS 931-0268
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5EC1IU* S
MTmOQlCALir CONTAMINATED UHDEflWATER OPERATIONS
hater* are said to be polluted or contaminated If they look odd* smell
funny, or If It i$ known that contaminants are being dumped into the water.
Water need not look odd or swell funny to be contaminated, however. In the
past decade the world-vide presence of a number of waterborne pathogens in
polluted waters definitely has teen established, and Infections caused by
some thirteen different organisms have been documented (Dally et al., 1980).
flaily and his colleagues 11980) found viable organism counts as high
as i x 10° per Willi litre (nil) in the Anacostia Kiver In Washington,
U.C., ana counts to 760 per ml tn the hew York 0i^ht» Coolbaugb and his
colleagues U982) found total organise counts In the ftonolk, Virginia,
area of 14,0 * 10$ per nl, counts ranging between 7.2 and 14*0 x 10'
per a) in tne Seattle, Washington, area, and counts ranging from 7.8 to
14,0 * 1(}5 per flil 1n the New fork area.
uivers and their equipment were found to be generally contamlnated
after diviny in these waters. The contamination was particularly evident
in the aiver's ears and throats. Wound Infection of a diver following a
polluted water dive has also been reported. This report was able to trace
a severe wound infection to t*a species of Aer exponas, one of which was
resistant to soaa antibiotics. This antibiotic resistance was found in
about nine percent of the Aerocnonas Isolated, The huaart diseases and
symptomatic reactions that have been traced to waterbome pathogens or are
known to be caused by them are many and varied. Table 5-1 contains a
listing of most of these. The listing is not complete, but it does
demonstrata the broad range of the contaminated water problem.
Sottetlmes si vers (deliberately or inadvertently) work In waters marred
by fecal pollution from sewage outfall or other sources. Herein, divers
could be at risk of a wide variety of Infections acquired by Ingest ton of
even snail quantities of polluted water. Among the most likely pathogens
ot concern would be: (1) hepatitis A and b viruses, (?) 27 ran viruses that
cause gastroenteritis (Norwalk agent and related viruses). (3) bacterial
pathogens that cause alarrheal 1sease Including shigella, salmonella, ana
Campylobacter. Shlgella has been shown to be capable of Initiating clinical
Infection In healthy young adults when as few as 10 organisms are Ingested.
Furthermore, epidemiological evidence in at least one Instance has incrimi-
nated transmission of shigellosis occurring by divers svloming In contam-
inated river water. Campylobacter is also capable of Initiating clinical
Infection when only a few hunored organisms are ingested.
5-1

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TABLE 5.1. PATHOGENS KWNH M OISTOTO) TO INKttrr l>0lUrra>
wmi MO SCK CF mi* ASSOCIATED diswsss
AcinttaMMba tpecles;
MnaoMi tp«cl«
ttpllltrfi pnl1fppiwis1»
CipflliHi nepatfca
Camci'f »1r*is«
Dracunculns ¦Hfiwnsfs
Echlrococcui (nnutinlt
tCW trfniut
Entcropithogefilc EtcfitrfcMt coTt
filirdtA lufella
Hlfiitftli vlrui
L»g1 artel Is iptcin
Leptospira hUrrgjini
ItycmiMeteHiBi tuberculosis
HiiglHi fowlerl
J»otio wlrw
^wdoaoiH} umgliKii
R*Ov1r»s
5ilniic^l l(KClM
£chf»tasMa Mnso4vi
StMtteum imNto»<(»
ScMitosnu J«ponicn
Vibrio iwtld	
WttlM
teeblc ¦enlfigotflctphtlHIs
CboTer* 11 He Infectfons. septlceult,
PfKWOIl{«
Iteutofe Infect ton of Intestinal or
hepatic cipHhrtis
Meurtxfynli» aseptic Beolngftls
Gufnea war* disease, neaitxNte
Infectfon of suftcutanoout tissue*
irlth iyjtta
-------
Clinical Types of Infections That Hay Occur jjorg Frequently In Divers
The diver wearing a wee sutt and using SCUBA H in intimate contact
with his aquatic environment* His skin, externa) auditory canals, nasal
passages, and oral cavity all have some greater or lesser exposure to the
water In which he Is diving. Accordingly, the following are Infections of
the organ systems at risk that may become Infected In the course of diving.
In most instances there has been a description in the medical literature
ascribing transmission of these infections through contact with in aquatic
environment*
Sinusitis
The sinuses represent spates or vaults within the cranial bones that
are lined with respiratory epithelium and communicate with the nasal and
oropharyngeal cavities by means of sinus ostia. Sinusitis 1$ a well-*
recognized medical problem from which many divers suffer from time to
time. In the course of purulent sinusitis* the affected sinus falls to
communicate freely through its ostium and bacterial proliferation then
occurs in the poorly Graining sinus. Treatment Involves measures to re-
establish adequate communication through the sinus ostium and antibiotics
to Suppress the bacterial purulent infection. Antibiotic therapy 1s based1
on the best estimate of the species of bacteria involved and their
sensitivity. It is conceivable that aquatic bacteria can colonfze the
sinuses ano play a role in sinus Infection.
Otitis Externa
Purulent infection of the external auditory canal, otitis externa, fs
an annoying Infection nest often acquired in the course of swiamfng or div-
ing# The most frequent etiological agent, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, is an
aquatic organism. (Jtltls externa is colloquially referred to as "swimmer's
ear."
Conjunct 1 v1tl$ and Pharyngitis
There 1s no known evidence at present that Incriminates the trans-
mission of conjunctivitis or pharynlgitls Infections by means of aquatic
Contact*
Meningitis
Occasionally swlwners or divers in fresh water In the Kiddle Atlantic
states develop a severe form of meningitis due to being Infected with free-
living amabae of the genera Waeglerla or Acantharoeba. These amehae reach
the meninges by passages through the cribriform plate in the nasopharyngeal
area.
Pneumonia
Theoretically, an increased Incidence of pneumonia might occur in
5-3

-------
divers due to aerosol Inoculation related to a regulator* This has not
been recognized however.
gastrointestinal Illnesses
Hepatitis A. shigelloses* salmonellosis, and eampytobacttirfosls have
all been associated with ingestion of contaminated water. Shigellosis has
been acquired by swiping in contaminated waters. Aeromqnas hrtrophila
represents another enteric pathogen that lives In the aquatic environment
and can cause enteric infection. Thus, these various enteric infections
must be considered to be real hazards should divers unknowingly work in
fecally contaminated waters without proper protection.
Skin
Any interruption of the integrant can result in secondary Infection
due to an assortment of Vibrio or Aeromonas species and other bacteria in
the aquatk environment. Otner pathogens in the aquatic environment that
can cause skin Infection Include Erysipeiothrix rtivsiopathlae and
Mycobacterium marlnum.
5-4

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sec-Tiun 6
ANALYSIS OF HAZJWMMJS CHEMICAL HATERIALS RELEASE UATA
This section ooci/»e
-------
Chemical Foaarlrvg Agents It)
Elizabeth River, NJ
Shipboard Tanker
Fires
Off Shore OH Platforsi
Blowout
Figure 6.1 Examples of Hazardous Chemical Releases
6-2

-------
fSi*#* i,m*i santmi wt
SiCBJlWnpM ¦ i.. .>*«««<¦» f-"-?—| -"If
• :	L
t
ffAfi
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W*
K
II
—r
C- ¦ '"'""'" "•" " "¦''' . '-. "'' - - ^ '
8 W&&?A	-:
|T"
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;• *. . •"•, w^ t -3 " : : l.
r

11
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: ;• - •-: ; x o x -v: ¦: •' * 1 It c- Co: >~.<: : -:• :•;
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'*
til -i
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					1.~ .¦..-j^.—i.'f..»,.'— !¦¦ <¦.".. rry^T^rrrf ? . ...m .
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-*• :

FIGURE 6.2. TOTAL HATEPBORhE COMMERCE OF THE IPN1TE0 STATES, H69-I978
S^3

-------
'--•VI
mriy
«<53W$IP*» ¦ » tB
1
01XE»
MT^mMrCS
•w* • **:<>-. • .>v .» syavvv-. •sv,; .^. .»•. ;,%v
.v.;.i
l»T7
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rfrTJ
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ffTI
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w


*s
X>-X'•!-!' 'v-*-* •'¦v/' / !\



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,.' ,-vy. ¦fc"-'. •.%.-. *.v, v«.V. v-' .%-.•¦-.-v ASS '.L- • • .---• >xo>>!, %¦-•.



< .Vb' -J,V.'. V.V.V. \-w- • ,W -r-'
K j ; svvv> JCv. • v.vlv\v ^vTvM •M-rO

irr r,v;^-'--_r.v_-





rl-v-^v: "	-j

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•V.-X*xv.v.\i

w::::
mm*

K^W'X-K-lwWtWW'I'
n
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o
§
1
1
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V.v.*. V. VAV.V

FIGURE 6.3. TOH-MILES OF FREIGHT CARRIED OH THE MTERWAlfS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1969-1978
fi-4

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Foreign and Domestic

1977
Percent
1978
Percent
1979
Percent
Petroleum and products
49.1
48.7
46.5
Coal and coke
12.3
10.0
11.9
Iron ore, iron and stone
6.6
7.8
7.8
Sand, gravel and stone
5.4
5.8
5.5
Grains
6.2
6.9
7.3
Logs and lumber
2.8
2.6
2.7
Chemicals
5.3
5.1
5.5
Seashells
0.6
0.5
0.4
Ail other commodities
11,7
12.6
12.4

100,0
IOO.O
JOO.O
TA2LE 6.1. PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IN WATERBORNE COMMERCE* YEARS 1977,
1973 and 1479
6-5

-------
AAOUxn
12.4%
\ Iron Oft
\ tad |m
\ and M
SmuIA 7.W
CiwdA
Figure6.4 Principal Comittodllles Cinicd by Witer
6-6

-------
comoaltles transported In 1977, I Si78. and 1979. As shown, the t*o
commodities we are Interested In, petroleum and chemtcaH, account for a
significant percentage of all waterborne commerce. figure 6.3 graphically
depicts this Information for 197$. The Corps of Engineers provides a
further breakdown of the various groups of products or compounds that make
up the two categories (see Table 6.2 and Table 6*3). based on figures fro#
these two tables, a potential of spillage of a certain material can he made
based on the amount of that material transported. Many other variables
will also have a great Influence on the potential spill of these products,
such as exact aetoo of transport, loading and unloading procedures, form of
product (dry, liquid, etc*
As part of the evaluation, certain criteria were used to relate the
spill Information to situations where d1verS/KOV's would be useful. One of
these criteria Is volume* kith regard to petroleum sptlls, it was felt
that the volune of a spill would need to he sufficiently large 1n most
casts to justify the use of divers/AOYs* The USC6 Strike Force stated that
ft woulo oe difficult to justify using divers for a spill volume under
10,000 gallons jnless Other extreme circumstances were present. Another
criterion was that divers or KUVs would not be useful for spills onto
beaches or into non-navigable waterways. Spills Into these water-bodies
were eliminated from further consideration.
figure 6.5 indicates the location of alT petroleum product spills
greater than 10,000 gallons In the same manner as Figure 6.4. By con-
sidering the two criteria stated above, the results change significantly.
The most revealing change is the comparison of the number and volume of
spills over 10,GOO gallons to the total nutter and volume of all spill.
There *ere only ?60 spills over 10,000 gal long which accounted for 0.6
percent of all spills (43>3&2J. fet this small fraction accounted for 60.3
percent of the total spill voluoe.
Host of these large spills occur In the inland, Atlantic, and Gulf
areas ano typically enter river channels or ports and harbors. The largest
total volume of spilled products enter river channels and open coastal
waters, however, there is a problem with this volume data, because, as
detailed in Figure $.6, two very large spills probably biased the relative
proportions of products entering different locations. For this reason,
Figure 6.7 way more accurately aepict typical spill locations. As
indicated, river channels, followed by ports, and harbors and open coastal
waters (primarily bays and estuaries), receives the greatest number and
volume of petroleum product spills. The geographical areas impacted most
are the inlano, Atlantic, and Pacific areas.
The "mega spills," like the two above, are infrequent enough that they
shouio oe viewed as Individual incidents to be dealt with accordingly.
Also not that these two spills along account for approximately 27 percent
of the total volume spilled.
hazardous Chemicals
The location of hazardous chemical spills was analyzed In the same
manner as petroleum spills. Figure 6.6 shows the primary location of all
6-7

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Ptirrot
Crude Petroleum	53,8
Residua] Fuel Oil	19+5
Gasoline	9.2
Distillate Fuel GiJ	8.5
Coke, Including Petroleum Coke	L9
Lubricating Oils and Greases	LT
Jet Fuel	1.2
Asphalt, Tar, Pitches	1 <0
liquified Petroleum Gases	1.0
Napiha, Mineral Spirits, Solvents	0-8
Kerosene	0.4
Other Petroleum and Coal Products	0 J
Asphalt Building Materials	<0.1
Table e.2 Waicrbortae Commerce : Petrol etna Product*
6-8

-------

PlfttW
MbccUaneous Cbemial Products
47J
Otter Fertilizer MiKiiil
9.7
Niirocetvous Qmioit FotiSw
*.4
Sodium Hydroxide {Cautfk Soda)
3.9
Bcazene ind T^utw
4.6
? hoi italic Chemical FcrtiHzcn
4.6
AJcofcots
4.4
Crude Coal Tar, OU, Qu Producu
4.0
Ptaufe Materia!*, CelMote aad Syoihetic Restat
JJ.
Sulphuric Add
*4
Pocauk Chemical Fcnfliim
2J
Palais, Vinkhtt, ijqum, Enaioeh
0.
-------
GtHPffcteil Am
Tjya Waltfbotfy
Tool Number
Spills
434*2
foul Volume
Spilk
41 s 10* G«Uo
-------
Gwinptkil Am
Type WiiinM;
Tool Number
Spoilt
2X0 (0,6*.)
Toul Volume
Spilii
32,929,400 Callow
(MJ*>
urc 6. & Location of Fetroltui* Pro duel Spills >10,300 Gallon* (]?T7 through 1980)
6-11

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Gwgriplikal Are*	Type Wtterbody
Open UUwtoftl 2-^%
Uvar
' IfTT NtUr lM rMOOsOW ftftMtt « HMfe	CMMlt M mdwdK.
		 - r	r	1 * ~ r - ¦ r' J ~i •	t			
f)prt 5 7 Location of hiroleun Product Spills >10,(WO Gallons (1977 through 19M)

-------
Geographic*! Art*
Tirp* Wattrixtfy
Toul Number
Spilli
3J21 <45,W»)
Tout Volume
SptUj
4,276,»0 GkUoua
(W,S«0
Ftfuf g ^ AH Hazardous Olemkai Spills >42 GiIIom {1977 through 1990 )
6-13

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spills with the exception of those onto beaches or Into non-navigable
waters. Also note that there wme 312 spills of unknown quantity. These
spills were not Included in the spill volume Information analysis. Figure
6. indicate* somewhat different locations for these products as opposed to
petroleun. The Gulf receives the larger percentage of both number and
volume of spills, followed by Inland and Atlantic# In respect to water-
bodies. river channels again receive the largest number and volute of
spills. The ports and harbors receive a large number of spills, but a
comparatively smalt volume. The opposite is true of the open coastal
category. These waters receive a relatively small number of spills but a
large percentage of the total volume.
A volume criterion of at least 42 gallons of spilled material was
established to help define situations in which divers/MVS could be
justified. This amount is a standard volume for a barrel. Using this
criterion. Figure 6,8 shows tha location of spills. Note that there are a
total of 352 spills, not Including the T12 of unknown volume, and these
spiIts account for 45.9 percent of the total number of hazardous chemical
spills. Yet these 352 spills account for 99.8 percent of the total volume
of material spilled. Table 6.4 demonstrates this relationship between the
size of a spilt, the nuaoer of spills, and the tot*? voltne in a given
range.
Types of Material Spilled and Material Properties
Information in this section concerning hazardous chemical spills will
emphasize (1) the relative frequency and volume of spills; (2) the physical
properties of the material spilled, which will help Identify tasks required
of a diver/RDV; 13J the materia) toxicity, and thus exposure risk to divers
and surface support personnel; and (4) other hazards as may be defined.
Information concerning the frequency and volume of spills is taken front
PJK5 oata. Alt data concerning physical properties, toxicity, and other
hazards Is from published EPA, JjSCG, and National institute of Occupational
Safety and health ihlOSJi) literature.
Analysis of petroleum product spills will be limited to the types of
material spilled, frequency, and physical properties (floats/Sinks) in
water.
The criteria for this section are (1} petroleum product spills greater
than 10,000 gallons per incident, (2J hazardous chemical spills greater
tnan 42 gallons per incident, and (3J spills onto beaches/non-navigable
water will not be considered.
Petroleum Products
Petroleun products have heen grouped Into eight different types of
products. The type of product and the total number of spills during the
period 1977 through 1980 are as follows;
Type of Product	humber of Spilis
Crude 011	79 (28.I*)
Diesel Oil	74 (26.4*>
6-H

-------
GaomUolAm
Tjrpt WmrDm^

Tuttl Number
spin.
Tool Volume
Spill*
<3»3.S23 C«lkxu
it,i%
Rjuft 6.9 All KixafdODi Chimicil Spills (1977 i&rough 1910 )
IExd«diD| BdChn/Nan Nav%lblt)
6-lG

-------
II
rm
IVM
10*
1*00*
•
%
VOLtlML
%
*
%
WUtMl
*
#
*
«wwl
*
f
*
»oui»a
%
u
tt
I4A
»u
U
M

J*

42
17*
m
U
a
1)4
M
a*
w- «fc„
u
tu
UB1
Oil
1!
O.l
IJH
.1
»
UJ
LSI
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tdff
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p
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UN
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a
u
IJU
.1
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111

A
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urn
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114
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is
u

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u
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aiv
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IT
11
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U
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(
0.1
ii*j»
tl
-
-
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itmae±m.m
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t
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ST
-
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w
—
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m
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d


-
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—
—
TOTAL .
w
woo

me
m
I®*

lap a
tw
iota
4UJ4
ioa 0
IB
10M
UMW
¦OIL*
Table fj 4 Huarddas Oemical Diybv^
6-16

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Type of frcouct	Wurohgr of Spills
tfesiduat Fuel 01]	42 (15.(ft)
waste or llther Oil	32 (11.42)
tiasoTirte	31 (11.4ft)
UlstniatE? Fuel 011	14 ( S.Qi)
Asphalt, Creosote* Coat	Tar 5 { 1.75)
Solvents	3 ( l.W).
TOTAL 280 (lOOft)
The majority of petroleum products will float on the surface of the
water. It 1s for this reason that the emphasis in cleanup technologies has
been geareo primarily toward surface technologies* iWe are several
petroleua compounds that do sink, or unoer certain conditions, primarily
low temperatures, will sink* The general floating/sinking properties of
the eight types of petroleum products listed are shown below;
Type of Product	Property
Crude Oil	Floats and sinks; various fractions
separate and can behave Independently.
ulesel oil	Floats.
fteslaua) Fuel lit 1	Lighter fractions usually float.
heavy fractions» especially If cola
ana In fresh water, can sink.
waste or Other Oil	Float or sink; depends on composition.
Gasoline	Floats; rapioly evaporates.
distillate Fuel vll	Floats; rapidly evaporates-
Asphalt, Creosote4 Coal	Tar Sinks.
Solvents	Floats; rapidly evaporates.
The acute toxicity of petrolew products Is usually related to the
degree of reflnefnent. All types are capable of causing chemical burns In
prolonged contact with any area of exposed skin* Products which cone In
contact with the eyes, mucous membranes* and other sensitive areas of the
body {lips, ears* aroplt, genital area) have been shown to cause severe
burns, inhalation of fumes will often cause headache, nausea, and stuporous
effects. Aspiration of the pure product can cause stgnifleant lung damage.
Ingestion usually causes nausea and can burn the oral-upper gastrointestinal
tract* Petroleum products are associated with several documented and sus-
pected chronic effects such as skin irritation, skin cancer, olid aesthetic
effects, chemical pneumonitis* central nervous systea damage, and blood
ofscroers.
As expected* there is also tne potential for fire and/or explosion
with most petroleum products.
6-17

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Different sources of petroleum spills ana the number of spills from
each source our In# the period 1977 through I9&0 are grouped Into the seven
Categories listed below. Several of these categories have subgrcupings of
particular Interest related to some type of underwater activity response.
Source	fftmber of Spills
Vessels ItotaT)	118
-	Tank ship	*6
-	Tank barge	69
-	Other	23
Marine facility	32
Vehicle Transportation	€
Transportation-riglated Facility	5
Transportation Pipeline {total)	46
-	Offshore Pipeline	1
ton-transportation^flelated Facility (total)	SO
-	tfffshore Production Platform	S
Miscellaneous	21
Uf the 11S spills fron vessels during this tine period* 56 were from
leaks In the hull or tank compartments that were caused by a collision or
grounding incident. Barges are the most common source of these spit is. and
as was shown earlier, the najorlty ot these spills occur In river channels
or ports and harbors. Sixty-seven spills fro* various sources cere caused
oy pipeline or hose ruptures or leaks. These three causes alone {vessel
grounolngs/collisions and pipeline or hose ruptures) account for 44 percent
of all of the Targe petroleum spills. Other major causes are equipment
failure {other than pipe or hose rupture), personnel errors itan* overflow,
misuse of equipment)* ano unknown causes.
The variety of hazardous cheralcals far exceeds tne variety of
petroleum products. The properties, toxicity, and other hazards of these
chemicals also vary greatly.
in order to address this problem in the perspective of how divers can
oe used, Table 6.5 lists the materials, number of spills {1976 through
198UJ, brief physical description, toxicity data, and general hazard data
in the following groups basea on their behavior In water:
a.	Highly Soluble/Hiscible Compounds
5.	Slightly Soluble/STowTy tlssolving/Floating Compounds
c.	Slightly Soluble/Slowl> Dissolving/Sinking Compounds
o»	Insoluble/Floating Compounds
e-	InsoIuole/SInking Compounds
f.	compounds which Could tfeact Violently with Water.
6-18

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i»i*	FREQUENTLY SPILlEO WATER SCIWE CHEMICALS AND THEIR
mumi.y »iui»iA/MisciHJE QMMHiikii	PHYSICAL PROPERTIES
Nh»»ti«|	_ Ha, >1 l»llli/T«tl Ctllw*	k««t)pi	Tnicli^	K#iiiN
H» lt»	lli>	n» (mo	Jt'fniilcl
4. >(»>
r * BHiriir4' »•
I»lISO
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tAKIi.
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-------
because of the Halted scot>e of this paper, not all compound* spilled
In nounts greater then 42 gallons are listed. Compounds that have low
human and aquatic toxicity or were not spilled frequently and in large
volumes are not shown.
As Indicated In Table 6.5, the variety of materials and their proper-
ties Is quite large. The decision as to when and how to use dlvers/ROV's
In response to releases of these chemicals will necessarily involve many
considerations*
Table 6.6 makes a comparison of priority hazardous substances that are
encountered in the water environment.
Source ana Cause of Spills
The functions a diver/RO* will perform In response to spills wilt
Depend not only on the material ano its properties but also on the source
of tne spill and its relateo cause. This section briefly discusses some of
the major sources and causes ot both petroleum spills and hazardous
chemical spills.
The following list shows the various sources and numbers of spills of
hazardous chemicals outing the period 1977 through 1980 in the sane format
as that for petrolewn spills.
Source	Humber of Spf1 Is
Vessels (total}	133
-	Tank ship	35
-	Tank barge	77
-	Other	2\
Marine fad I Ity	61
Vehicle Transportation	30
Transportation-Delated facility	16
Transportation Pipeline (total)	6
«- uffsnore Pipel ine	0
Mon-transportatton-Relateo facility (totjij	168
-	iFff shore Product ion Platform	0
Miscellaneous	48
The breakdown of sources above is very significant in ter*s of
diver/HUV response. Spills from vessels account for about 29 percent of
the. total nutter ot spills, and another 13 percent are at marine facilities
(port or harbor). As indicated, the majority of spill sources are the non-
transportation-relateo facilities (primarily storage, production, and
processing facilities)*
6-3"9

-------
TABLE G-fi
ta»jf!iww or mmmtT wwwaus sumutas in mrmiom
«n
j
Wit. tMtl tM>
fOUIttiai IHCIKW HT* MM
fctlk tli
J«t^4rl
C*IbtIm
CfcraalM rwprmdi
rcunm'c Mil (CHI) | Cbr«*nt $«lu
urnia t»rM onjhjJr'n
EUj-l AIcoJmI
Fthjl ItnniK
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&ljnal Mic Madrid*
Ntuyl *!«»*~* frt»UW*«U
(thfl CflIMM
htlgfl IkUMcryliu
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(UplbttM
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Will
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hr»WTiniU
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1*1*4 ft*
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Chlorite
Cir&O" D(mWl4t
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K-i
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Feretldrtyfe
Fftmic Held
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*«•»»
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W
-------
The causes of these sptUs are more varied than those with petroleum
spills. Tank overflows are the most frequent cause* regardless of the
source. The second most common cause Is, once again* pipeline or hose
ruptures and leaks. Leaks from the hulls or tank compartments of vessels
as a result of grounding or collision Mas the third leading cause with 25
Incidents. iither causes Include various equipment failures* improper
hanollng of equipment, personnel error, and unknown causes.
"Typical" Spill Environment
The foregofng analysis has provided the information necessary to draw
conclusions and make certain assumptions about the types of spill environ-
ment In which dlvers/KCV's would most cannon ly be placed In response to
spills. The following Is a suemary of the range of typical spill site
conditions. These conditions will apply to both petroleum and hazardous
chemical spills unless otherwise noted.
Location of Spills
Bas&d on our previously determined criteria (spill volume ano exclusion
of Deaches/non-navlgaole), the distribution of spills requiring underwater
activity will be oaseo on where the largest number of spills occur. Rivers,
primarily the Mississippi ana all of its tributary systems, and ports and
harbors serving the Inland areas and the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, will
undoubtedly be the most common water-bodies to receive spills.
This fact is very significant because tnese areas allow the most im-
mediate and direct pollutant exposure to large concentrations of people
through 11) contact recreation, (2) drinking water supplies, (3) bloaccumu-
lation of toxics In fish and shellfish harvested from rivers, and (4)
occupational exposure. Spills Into open coastal waters, while potentially
serious, will not occur as often and probably will not be complicated by
the intense human contact present in rivers, ports* and harbors.
Uepth
The full range coulo be from a tew feet to several hundred feet. An
assumption of ?Q to 100 feet would be appropriate for typical spill areas.
Currents
A current In these areas can almost always be expected, uccaslonally,
it will complicate diving operations and he a major factor in dispersal
of a spilled compouno. Currents could become severe in an area that is
flow restricted le'9»i narrow channel). A current of C>5 to 3 knots would
be common. Up to 7-6 knots are possible In certain areas. In areas of
tidal currents, pollutant transport and dispersal monitoring will become
complicated.
dnoerwater Visibility
The areas Identified In the "location of Spills* section are known for
their muriiiness and lack of visibility. 4ero visibility will undoubtedly
5-41

-------
be common and Is a critical and limning factor In perforata? underwater
activity in a chemically-contamlnated environment - Spills In open coastal
waters ana the Great Lakes Mill likely have better visibility.
bottom Conditions,
Hud will be the most conation substrate* Some coastal ports and harbors
nay have sand or sand/rock bottoms* Open coastal spills will probably have
sand bottoms. in most of these areas* especially ports and harbors, a great
deal of debris and jun* will often be Uttering the bottom. Otver/ftOV
entanglement or tearing or a suit is a potential problem.
Sea State
only a fraction of one percent of the spills occur if* the open ocean
(outside of bays, estuaries, sounds, etc.). Since almost all spills occur
in protected waters* the sea state will rarely exceed six to eight feet.
»toul1c health viewpoint and the difficulty encountered
in siver/cleanup, personnel protection. Spills in open coastal waters will
probably oe more easily addressed tn many instances but, as Indicated*
there are few spills In th#ae areas.
#-42

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SECTION 7
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
INTROCUCTtOH
At An Incident, response personnel nay tie exposed to a nunber of sub-
stances that are hazardous because of their chemical, biological* or radio-
logical characteristics,
Radiological hazards present a problem for response personnel. Radio-
active materials can emit alpha or beta particles or gama waves, all of
which can have a harmful effect on health If workers are exposed to excessive
amounts.
Biological agents are Hying organisms (or their products} that can
cause sickness or death to exposed individuals.
Chemical hazards are classified Into several groups. Including fire,
toxic, corrosive, and reactive hazards, A material may generate "Ore than
one chesiical hazard during an Incident* for example* toxic "ipors can be
released during chemical fires. The hazards can be I result of the physical
/chemical properties of a material or of Its chemical reactivity with
other materials or the environment to which 1t Is exposed.
Many hazards may be present at any one Incident. It Is Important to
understand the fundamentals of each and their relationships so that effective
safety practices may be employed to reduce the risk to the public and response
personnel.
BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS
Biological hazards can cause infection or disease in persons who are
exposed. Biological hazards may Involve plants or animals including micro-
organisms, They are divided Into five categories: viral* rickettsial/
chlamydial, bacterial* fungal, and parasitic.
Biological hazards, such as disease-causing agents, may be present at a
hazardous waste site or involved in a spill, like chemical hazards, they may
be dispersed throughout the environment via wind and water.
Many biological agents require a carrier to Inoculate a host. Hence,
controlling the agent may require controlling the carrier. For Instance*
rabid rodents at a landfill may be a biological hazard. Rocky Mountain
Spotted Fever* which Is carried by ticks* Is also 1n this category.
7-1

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The s«*e personal protective requirements of a response to a chemical
hazard apply to biological hazards. Body coverings and respiratory protetive
equipment should be utilized. Especially iimaortant Is the need to maintain
personal cleanliness. Showertng after removing protective clothing and
thoroughly Mashing exposed body parts. Including hands and face, should help
remove any residual contamination.
RADIATION HAZARDS
Radioactive Materials that nay be encountered at a site can emit three
types of harmful radiation: alpha particles, beta particles, and gma waves.
All three forms harm 11vino organisms by Imparting energy which Ionizes
molecules 1n the cells* Hence, the three are referred to as ionizing radia-
tion. Ionization nay upset the normal cellular function, causing disfunction
Or death.
An alpha particle Is postively charged. The beta is an electron posses-
sing a negative charge. Both particles have mass and energy. Both are
emitted from the nucleus* They travel short distances in Material before
Interactions with the material causes them to lose their energy* The outer
layers of the skin and clothing generally protect against these particles.
Therefore, they are considered hazardous primarily when they enter the body
through Inhalation or ingestion.
Gamma radiation Is pure electromagnetic energy and is wave like, rather
than particulate, In nature. Gamma waves pass through all materials to some
degree. Clothing, Including protective gear, will not prevent gamma radiation
from Interacting with body tissue.
Unlike many hazards that possess certain properties to alert response
personnel (odor, Irritation, or taste), radiation does not warn. Hence,
preventing the radioactive material from entering the body or protecting
against external radiation 1s the best protection. As with biological and
chemical hazards, the use of respiratory and personnel protective equipment,
coupled with scrupulous personal hygiene, will afford good protection against
particulate radiation.
CUEWCAL HAZARDS
Fire Hazards
Combustibility—
Combustibility is the ability of a material to act as a fuel, that is,
to burn* Materials t*:it can be readily ignited and sustain a fire are
considered to be combustible, while those that do not are called noncom-
bustible. Three elements are required for combustion to occur: fuel, oxygen,
and heat. The concentration of the fuel and the oxygen oust be high enough
to allow ignition and maintain the burning process. Combustion is a chemical
reaction that requires heat to proceed;
heat
fuel + oxygen	> products

-------
Heat is supplied by the Ingltlon source and Is maintained by Che
combustion* or It must be supplied from an external source* The relationship
of these three fire components is Illustrated as a triangle in Figure 7.1.
Host fires can be extinguished by removing one of these components, Far
example* Mater applied to a fire removes the heat, thereby extinguishing the
fire. when a material by Itself generates enough heat to self-Ignite and
combust, spontaneous combustion occurs,, either as a fire or explosion*
F1 amiability—
Flammabllity Is the ability of a material (liquid or gas) to generate a
sufficient conentration of combustible vapors under normal conditions to be
Ignited and produce a float. It is necessary to have a proper fuel-to-air
(oxygen) ration (< fuel In air) to alio* combustion. There 1s a range of fuel
concentrations in air for each material where it can be Ignited and sustain
combustion. This Is called the Flammable Range. The lowest concentration
of fuel In this range Is the Lower Flammable Liait (LFL). Concentrations
less than the LFL are not flamnabte because there is too little fuel - that
1s» the atxture 1s too "lean". The highest ration that is floanable Is the
Upper Flammable Halt (UFL). Concentrations greater than the UFL are not
floatable because there Is too much fuel displacing the oxygen (or too little
oxygen). This mixture 1s too •rich". Fuel concentrations between the LFL
and UFL are optimum for starting and sustaining fire. Example: The 1ft. for
benzene IS 1.3% {13,000 ppa), the Ufl fs 7,1% (71,000 ppm), thus the flatmable
range Is 1.3* to 7.It.
A flammable material is considered highly combustible If It can burn at
ambient temperatures (68*F). But a combustible aaterlal is not necessarily
flammable, because It may not be Ignited easily or the ignition maintained,
Pyrophorlc materials will ignite at room temperature in the presence of a
gas or vapor or when a slight friction or shock 1s applied.
Motet The U.S. Department of Transportation {POT), the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and health (HIOSH), and the National Fire
Protection Association (JIFPA) have established strict definitions
for flamiability based on the flash point of a material.
Gas or Vapor Explosions—
A gas or vapor explosion is a very rapid, violent release of energy, [f
combustion is extremely rapid, large amounts of kinetic energy, heat* and
gaseous products are released. The major factor contributing to the explosion
is the confinement of a flammable material. When vapors or gases cannot
freely dissipate, they enter the combustion reatlon more rapidly. Confinement
also increases the energy associated with these molecules, which enhances the
explosive process. Poorly ventilated buildings, sewers, rfr**s» and buU
liquid containers are examples of places where potentially explosive atmo-
spheres nay exist.
Explosive gases/vapors exhibit an explosive ronae, which 1s the same as
the flammable range. The upper explosive limit (UEl) and lower explosive
limit (LEI) are the UFL and: LFL but In confined areas. Most reference books
list either limits or flammable limits which are Identical.
7-3

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OXYGEN
Figure 7.L The fire triangle* Each side of the triangle rep-
resents one of the necessary elements of £ fire. The optimum
situation, position number 1, it the best fuel-to-oxj^en ratio,
with sufficient heat to Ignite the fuel and support Its combustion.
Each comer Illustrates the renova) of one component; In number 2
there Is Insufficient fuel (concentrations below the lower Fl«wnab1e
Unit), In number 3 there is not enough oxygen (concentrations
Above the Upper flovable Limit], and in nuaber 4 the heat source
1s not adequate. A fire can be defined as a self-sustaining,
flaming combustion.
7-4

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Suaaary: Practical Considerations-
Fires and explosions require fuel, air (oxygen), and an Ignition source
(heath At a hazardous materials Incident, the first two are not easily
controlled. Consequently, while working on-site where a fire hazard may he
prasent, the concentration of combustible gases in air Must be aonltored, and
any potential Ignition source must he kept out of the area.
Host dangerous flanmabte substances;
are easily Ignited (e.g., pyrophorics}-
require little oxygen to support coafattstlon.
have low IFl/lEL and a wide Ftamable/Explosive
range.
Hazards related to fires and explosions:
physical destruction due to shock waves, heat, and
flying objects
initiation of secondary fires or creation of flammable
conditions.
release of toxic and corrosive confounds into the
surrounding; environment.
Explosive Hazards
Explosives—
An explosive 1s a substance which undergoes a t/ery rapid chemical
transformation, producing large amounts of gases and heat. The gases pro-
duced, for exa^>le, nitrogen, oxygen, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and
stream, due to the heat produced, rapidly expand at velocities exceeding the
speed of sound. This creates both a shock wave (high pressure wave front}
and noise (brlsance).
Types of Explosive Hazards—
High or detonating--Cheatcal transformation occurs very rapidly with
detonation rates as high as 4 Miles per second. The rapidly expanding gas
produces a shock wave which nay be followed by combustion.
Primary high explostve: detonating wave produced In an extremely short
period of tiae. Hay be detonated by shock, heat, or friction. Exa^les are
lead azide, mercury fulminate, and lead styphnate.
Secondary htgh explosive: generally needs a booster to cause 1t to
detonate* Relatively insensitive to shock, heat, or friction. Exa^les are
tetryl, cyelonlte, dynanite, and TXT,
Low or def1agratino--Rate of deflagration up to 1000 feet per second,
Generally ccwbustfon followed by a shock wave. Exasples are smokeless powder,
magnesium, and Kolotov cocktail.
7-5

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Practical CMfidentlons--
Hlgh Or low does not Indicate the explosion hazard (or power) but only
the rate af chentcal transforation.
Explosions can occur as a result of reactions between many chemicals not
ordinarily considered as explosives. Aoannlw nitrate, a fertilizer, can
explode under the right conditions, Alk&H metals and water explode; as will
water and peroxide salts. Picric acid and certain ether compounds become
highly explosive with age. Gases, vapors, and finely divided particulates,
when confined, can also explode If an Ignition source is present*
Toxic Hazards
Toxlcity—
Toxlc materials cause local or systemic detrimental effects In an
organise. Exposure to such materials does not always result in death, although
that is often the most immediate concern* Types of tonic hazards can be
categorized by the physiological effect they have on the organism. A material
may Induce more than one physiological response.
Types of Toxic Hazards—
Systemic poisons--Systemic poisons are chemical agents which act on
specif!ctarget organs or organ systems [Table 7,1}, a subgroup includes
anesthetics and narcotics, which may not be toxic In the classical sense
because they dfi not necessarily cause Irreversible harm. However, for re-
sponse personnel, these agents can be extremely hazardous because they can
impair jud^ent and the thought processes* Anesthetics and narcotics depress
the central nervous system, resulting in loss of sensation or 1n stupor. If
concentrations are great enough, cocna and death can occur,
Asphralants--Asphyxlants are agents which deprive the tissues of oxygen,
a condition called anoxia. This group Is divided Into simile and chanlcal
asphyxiants (Table 1.1). The sli^le asphyxiants act by diluting or displacing
atmospheric oxygen, which lowers the concentration of oxygen In air.
Breathing air with low oxygen concentration causes insufficient oxygen
In blood and tissues* Thfs can cause headache, unconsciousness, and even-
tually death* Inert gases can be staple asphyxiants*
Chemical asphyxiants act in one of two ways. Some prevent the uptake of
oxygen in the blood. Carbon monoxide* for example, Interferes with the
transport of oxygen to the tissues by strongly binding with hemoglobin to
form carboxyheaoglobin, which leaves inadequate hemoglobin available for
Oxygen transport.
A second type of chemical asphyxiant does not permit normal oxygen
transfer either from the blood to the tissues or within the cell itself.
Hydrogen cyanide is an example of this type.
7-S

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A common, and extreaety toxic* exuple of a confound that is both a
cheated and single asphyxiant Is hydrogen sulfide. The chemical action,
actually that of a neurotoxic systemic putson* stops oxidation of the
respiratory issues* paralyzing the lungs. The result Is thai no air enters
the lungs* which causes sl^la asphyxiation. Oxygen concentrations in the
lungs drop, causing death.
TABLE 7.1. SYSTEMC POISONS
Anesthetlcs/Narcoti cs
Confounds Damaging
the itervous System
Olefins
Ethyl ether
Isopropyl ether
Parafflnlc hydrocarbons
Aliphatic ketones
Aliphatic alcohols
Esters
Methanol
Carbon disulfide
Metals
Organometall 1c*
Confounds Damaging
Liver Function
Confounds Damaging
Kidney Function
katogenated hydrocarbons
Carbon tetrachloride
Tetrachloroethane
Compounds Dmnaglng
Blood-Circulatory System
Aniline
Toluidine
Nitrobenzene
Benzene
Phenols
TAfiLE 7,2. ASPHTX1AATS
Sii^ale Asphyxiants	 _ Chemical Asphyxiants
Aliphatic hydrocarbons	Anllfne
Helium	Wethyl aniline
Nitrogen	Cyanogen
Hydrogen	hydrogen cyanide
Nitrous oxide	Totutdine
Carbon dioxide	Carbon monoxide
Methane
7-7

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Irritants—Irritants are materials that cause Inflwtiw of membranes.
The mechanism of Irritation 1s either hy corrosive or drying action* and may
affect the eyes, skin, respiratory membranes, or gastrointestinal tract. The
Irritant must cose In direct contact *1th tissue to cause an Inflammation
reaction* Consequently, skin, eye, and respiratory Irritants are the greatest
concern for response personnel (Table 7.3).
TABLE 7.3. IRRITANTS
Skirt Irritants	Respiratory Irritants
Acids	Aldehydes
Alkalies	Ammonia
Solvents	Hydrogen chloride
Metallic salts	Ozone
Detergents	Nitrogen dioxide
Skin exposure to irritating materials. In high enough concentrations,
may result In contact dermatitis, characterized by redness, itching, and
drying of the skin, These dermatitis-causing materials are called primary
Irritants. Organic solvents are examples of primary irritants, eliciting a
response In hours. Strong {or absolute) Irritants are the acids and alkalies,
producing observable effects *ithin minutes. Extremely corrosive agents can
cause skin ulceration and destroy tissues.
If respiratory tissues are Insulated by Irritant gases or fumes, they
constrict in a reflex fashion, accompanied by involuntary coughing. Tra-
cheitis and bronchitis are Inflammations of the major air passages. Exanples
of Irritant gases are chlorine, ammonia, ozone, and sulfur dioxide. More
insidious Irritating agents can reach the terminal respiratory passages
(alveoli) deep in the lungs and may result in pulmonary edema, pneumonia, and
eventually death.
tt is important to note that many particulates such as dusts, although not
chemically active hazards, can be severly irritating.
A1lerglc Sensitizers--A sensitization to a chemical involves Immune
mechanisms! When a foreign substance called an antigen enters body tissue,
It triggers production of antibodies, vhich react ulth the antigen to make it
Innocuous. Upon first exposure to a specific chemical, there are no antibodies
1n the body, After subsequent exposures, the concentration of antibodies
Increases until a threshold Is reached. At this point, the antibody level 1s
high enough so that upon exposure to the chemical, the antigen-antibody
reaction, also called an allergic reaction. Is severe enough to manifest
Itself In one or more symptoms. The body has become "sensitized" to that
chemical.
Skin and respiratory sensitizers may show the sane sjmptoms as Irritants
(for example, dermatitis, bronchitis, and conjunctivitis) and can range from
discomfort from poison 1vy to a fatal reaction from isocyanates (Table 7.4).
7-8

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TABLf 7.4. AILERS1C SENSITIZERS
Skin Sensitizers
Poison ivy
Poison oak
Epo*y monomers
Nickel
Formaldehyde
Toluene di-isocyanate
Respiratory Sensitizers
Sulfur dioxide
Isocyanates
Mutagens. Teratogens, and Card nolens—An agent that can cause cancer In
an organism is called a carcinogen. Cancer occurs In the organism exposed to
the carcinogen. This differs from a Mitogen, which changes a gene in a sperm
or egg cell of the parent. The parent 1s not affected, but the offspring
suffer the consequences. Teratogenesls is also manifested 1n offspring but
differs from mutagenesis in that if results from exposure of the eabryo or
fetus to the agent itself. While some teratogens and carcinogens have been
Identified, it is not possible to accurately "pinpoint" autagens because of
the difficulty In observing mutagenic action In cells, Table 7.5 lists some
teratogens and classes of carcinogens.
TABLE 7,5. CARCINOGENS A WD TERATOGENS
Carcinogens	_
Halogenated hydrocarbons
Polynuclear aromatlcs
Aromatic amines
Teratogens	
01ethylstilbestrol (DES}
Thalidomide
Routes of Exposure—
There are only three pathways for Substances to enter the body:
Through contact with skin, eyes, and hair
Inhalation
ingestion
The primary function of the skin is to act as a barrier against entry of
foreign Materials Into the body. If this protective barrier is overcame,
toxic chemicals enter. The barrier Is greatly diminished by lacerations and
abrasions. Also, many organic solvents greatTy increase the permeability of
the skin to materials that would otherwise not pass through it. Another
factor is that the skin provides a large surface area for contact with toxic
agents.
Inhalation is the most rapid route, Immediately Introducing toxic
chemicals to respiratory tissues and the bloodstream. Once admitted to the
blood through the lungs, these chemicals are quickly transported throughout
the body to contact all of the organs.
7-9

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Health hazards to personnel from Ingestion of materials are a lesser
concern than skin and respiratory hazards. The number of substances that can
be Ingested are Hatted--that 1s, tt Is difficult to swallow vapors and gases.
Also, Ingesttble materials only get to the mouth through hand-to-mouth con-
tact. Even then* toxicity by mouth is of a lover order because of the adds,
alkalies,, and enzjaes in the gastrointestinal tract. But these same condi-
tions *ay enhance the toxtc nature of a compound* Wiite Ingestion of toxic
chemicals is not a great concern on-site, studies have shewn that gun and
tobacco cfcewers can absorb significant Mounts of gaseous substances during
an 6-hour day,
Measurement of Toxlcity—
Generally. a given amount of a toxic agent will elicit a given type and
intensity of response. Called a dose-response relationship, It is the basic
for measurement of the relative harmfulness of a chemical* Because hwtans
cannot he used as test organisms* aliwost all toxlcological data are derived
from other mammalian species, and results are extrapolated to hunans. The
test organism Is chosen for Its ability to simulate human response, for
exaaple, most sitln tests are performed on rabbits because their skin response
most closely resembles that of humans.
In nuch Lexicological testing, the response measured is death, The test
data are plotted on a dose-response curve. From this curve the dose, measured
in milligram (mg) of test accent per kilogram {kg) body weight of test
organism, that killed a certain percentage of test organisms can be calculated.
This dose is called the lethal dose. Most often, experiments are designed to
measure the dose that kills SOX of the test organisms. Tliis Is the lethal
dose 50, or LQcg, and is a relative measurement of toxicity. If confound A
has an LD50 ¦ 1000 mg/kg and confound 6 has an lOgQ ¦ 500 mg/kg, confound B
is more toxic than compound A at that dose {Figure 7.2). A value similar
to the IO50 used for Inhalation exposures 1s the lethal concentration SO, or
tCgQ, and is measured as parts per million of toxic agent per exposure time
{ppm/hr). Table 7.5 illustrates the use of LD5Q values as a relative index
of toxicity.
Another important factor to consider when determining the toxicity of a
material Is the relationship between concentration and exposure time.
Generally, and an acute exposure refers to a large single dose received over
a short period of time, A chronic exposure is several small doses over a
longer period of ti^e, The difference (1n terms of deleterious effects) is
that a small acute exposure may result in no effect on an organism, while a
chronic exposure to the same dose may show an additive effect; that 1s. the
cumulative dose tnay be harmful. On the other hand, a large single dose In a
short period of time might be much more hazardous than the spe dose
acftninistered over a longer time.
7-10

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DOSE (ng/kg)
This illustration Indicates that compound A is n>ore toxic
than 6; that Is, A gives the sa®e response (SO* deaths)
as fi at a lower dose.
100 _
f/t
»»
01
2 5
yi vi
U« IB
EX #-
50

C D
/<
n
i
IJ1
.4-	
i
_i_
DOSE (ng/ks)
Fro* this Illustration, confto^nd C could be assorted to be
•ore toxic than compound G, based on LDc
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The rate at which a chemical reaction occurs depends on the following
factors:
Surface area of reaetants available at reactions site — for example,
a large chunk of coal is combustible, twit coal dust Is explosive.
Physical state of reactant - solid, liquid* or gas
Concentration of reactants
Temperature
Pressure
Presence of a catalyst
TABLE 7.6- RELATIVE INDEX OF TOXICITY
Probable Oral Lethal Dose for Hwans
Toxicity Rating or Class	Cose	For Average Adult
1.	Practically nontoxic
2.	Slightly toxic
3.	Moderately toxic
4* Very toxic
5.	Extremely toxic
6.	Supertoxic
>15 g/fcg
5-15 g/kg
0.5-5 g/kg
50-500 ng/kg
5-50 mg/kg
>S flg/fcg
More than 1 quart
Between pint and quart
Between ounce and pint
Between teaspoonful and ounce
Between 7 drops and teaspoonful
A taste (less than 1 drops)
Source: ToxIcqlogyt The Basic Science Of Poisons, 2nd ed.
Casarret and Doul 1~ (eds. )„ 19?5.
C
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Response personet who lust determine carpal1 fell 1ties should refer to "A
Method for Determining the Comparability of Hazardous Waste*" (CPA fiOO/Z-SO-
076), published by EPA's Office of Research and Development.
Sometimes the Identity of a waste Is Inpossible to ascertain due to
money and time constraints. In this event, single tests aust be performed to
determine the nature of the Materia! or mixture. Tests such as pH, oxidation-
reduction potential, and flash point are useful. In addition^ very snail
stxwnts of the reactants may be carefully combined to determine conpatlbillty.
Practical Cons1 derations—
If materials are co^atible, they may be stored together 1n bulk tanks
or transferred to tank trucks for ultlnate disposal. Bulk containment of
wastes for transport requires only one chemical analysis* wherea? one is
required for each dr« or container transported.
Cwsjjatlbtlity Information is also very i^mrtant irt evaluating an ac-
cident Involving several different hazardous materials. The ultimate handling
and treatment of the materials may be partially based on such Information.
TABLE 7.7. HAZARDS DUE TP CHEMCAL REACTtO^S {lhCOKPATIRIUTIES)
Generation heat - e.g., acid and mater
Fire - e.g.. hydrogen sulfide and calcium hyp,.:htorite
Explosion - e.g.. picric acid and sodium hydroxide
Toxic gas or vapor production - e.g.* sulfuric acid and plastic
Flammable gas or vapor production * e.g., add and metal
Formation of a substance with a greater toxicity that the reactants -
e.g.* chlorine and aaroonia
format'on of shock - or friction-sensitive compounds
Pressor!zat1on of closed vessels - fire extinguisher
Solubilization of toxic substance* - e.g., hydrochloric acid and
chromium
Dispersal of toxic dusts and mists
Violent poljmeHiatlon - e.g., agaonia and acrylonitrite
7-13

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Practical Considerations—
The Host Immediate concern for rehouse personnel Is how the health of
site workers and the public cut be protected* The following factors ftjst be
considered;
* What toxic agent Is present?
-	How will It enter the body?
-	How will It affect the hunan body?
-	Kow toxic 1s It?
Answers to these and related questions will dictate how the public Is
protected (e.g., a warning or evacuation of an area), how personnel are
protected (types of respiratory and protective gear e^iloyed). and what
¦onlturing (e.g., continuous or Intermittent) is required.
Corrosive Hazards
Corros Ion-
Corrosion Is a process of material degradation, Upon contact, a cor-
rosive Material pay destroy body tissues, metals, plastics, and other mat-
erials. Technically, corrostvity is the ability of awterlal to Increase the
hydrogen Ion or hydronluo Ion concentration of a material, or to transfer
electron pairs to or fro® Itself or another material. A corrosive material
Is a reactive compound or element that produces a destructive chemical charge
In the material It Is acting upon. Common corrosives are the halogens,
adds, and bases {Table 7.8). Skin Irritation and burns are typical results
when the body contacts an addle or basic material.
The corroslveness of acids and bases can be compared on the basis of
their ability to dissociate (form Ions] 1n solution. Those that form the
greatest number of hydrogen 1ons (4*) are the strongest acids, while those
that for* the most hydroxide Ions (OH") are the strongest bases. The H+ ton
concentration In solution Is called pH. Strong acids have a lew prt (many H
In solution), while strong bases have a high pH {few H+ in solution; many OH"
In solution). The pH scale ranges from 0 to 14 as follows:
increasing acidity neutral increasing basicity—>
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
pH Measurements are valuble because they can be done quickly on-site, providing
immediate information about the corrosive hazard.
7-14

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TABLE 7*6. CORROSIVES
Halogens
Acids
Qroftlne
Chlorine
Fluorine
lodloe
Oxygen (ozone)
Acetic acid
Hydrochloric acid
Hydrofluarlc acid
Nitric add
Sulfur! acid
8as« (Caustics)
Potass ii*a hydroxide
Sodlw hydroxide
Practical Considerations--
When dealing with corrosive materials In the fields it is Imperative to
determine;
How toxic 1s the corrosive material? Is It an irritant or does It
cause severe burns7
What kind of structural damage does 1t do, and what other hazards
can It lead to? For example, will it destroy containers holding
other hazardous aaterlals, releasing them to the environment?
Hazards Cue to Chemical Reactivity
Reactivity Hazards—
A reactive material 1s one that can undergo a chemical reaction under
certain specified conditions* Generally, the term 'reactive hazard* is used
to refer to a substance that undergoes a violent or abnormal reaction in the
presence of water or under normal artlent atmospheric conditions, Among
these types of hazards are the pyrophoric liquids which will Ignite In air at
or below nomal room teo^erature in the absence of added heat, shock, or
friction, and the water-reactive flammable solids which will spontaneously
combust upon contact with water (Table 7.9).
Chemical Reactions—
A chemical reaction is the interaction of two or more substances,
resulting In chemical changes. Exothermic chemical reactions, which give off
heat, can be the most dangerous. A separate source of heat Is required to
maintain endothermlc chemical reactions. Removing the heat source stops the
reaction.
7-15

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Chemical reactions usually occur in one of the following ways:
Combination	A * a --> AS
Decomposition	AB --> A + 0
Single replacement	A ~ BC — > 6 ~ AC
Double replacement	AB + CO AD ~ CB
TA&tE 7.9, FLAMMABLE COMPOUNDS AMD ELEMENTS
PldBWable Liquids
Fleemable Solids
Aldehydes
Ketones
Amines
Ethers
Aliphatic hydrocarbons
Aromatic hydrocarbon*
Alcohols
Nitroaliphatics
Haterjteactlye flammable Solids
Potassium
Sodium
Lithium
Phosphorus
Magnesium dust
Zirconium dust
"Itanium dust
Rluinum dust
Zinc dust
Pyrophpric Liquids
Grganometallic compounds
Dimethyl zinc
Tributyl ali^inum
Physical Properties of Chemicals
Chemical confounds possess Inherent properties which determine the type
and degree of the hazard they represent. Evaluating risks of an Incident
depends on understanding these properties and their relationship to the
environment*
Solubility—
The ability of a solid, liquid, gas, or vapor to dissolve in a solvent
is solubility. An insoluble substance c», be physically mixed or blended In
a solvent for a short time but 1s unchanged when it finally separates. The
solubility of a substance is independent of Us density or specific gravity.
The solubility of a material is Important when determining its react-
ivity, dispersion, mitigation, and treatment* Solubility 1s generalTy given
In parts per million (ppm),
Density/Speciftc Gravtty--
The density of a substance Is Its mass per unit volume, couwonly expressed
in grams per cubic centimeter (g/cC). The density of water is 1 g/cc since 1
cc has a mass of 1 g.
7-16

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Specific graftty (SpG) Is the ratio cf the density of a substance {at a
given temperature) to the density of water at the tesperature of Its •axiwum
density (4*C).
Numerically, SpG is equal to the density in g/cc, but is expressed as a
pure nuafcer without units* If the SpG of a substance is greater than 1 (the
SpG of water), it Mill sink in water, The substance will float on water If
Its SpG is less than 1, This 1s Important when considering Mitigation and
treatment methods.
Vapor Density—
The density of a 99s or vapor can be compared to the density of the
ambient atmosphere. If the density of a vapor or gas Is greater than that of
the ambient air, then it will tend to settle to the lowest point. Jf vapor
density Is close to air density or lower, the vapor will tend to disperse 1n
the atmosphere- Vapor density is given in relative tenas similar to specific
gravity.
In settling* dense vapor creates two hazards. First, if the vapor
displaces enough air to reduce the atmospheric concentration of oxygen below
16*, asphyxia way result. Second* If the vapor 1s toxic, then inhalation
problems predominate even if the atumphere is not oxygen deficient. If a
substance Is explosive and very dense, the explosive hazard may be close to
the ground rather than at the breathing zutie {normal sampling heights).
Vapor Pressure--
The pressure exerted by a vapor against the sides of a closed container
Is called vapor pressure. It is temperature dependent., As temperature
Increases, SO dees the vapor pressure. Thus, more liquid evaporates or
vaporizes. The lower the boiling point of the liquid, the greater the vapor
pressure it will exert at a given teoiperature. Values for vapor pressure are
most ofter given as mi 11 inters of mercury (mm Hg) at a specific temperature.
Boiling Polnt--
The boiling point is the temperature at which a liquid changes to a
vapor - that is, it is the temperature where the pressure of the liquid equals
atmospheric pressure. The opposite change In phases 1s the condensation
point. Handbooks usually 11st temperatures as degrees Celsius (*C) or Fahren-
heit (*F). A Major consideration with toxic substances 1s how they enter the
body. With high-trailing-point liquids, the most coonrnn entry is by body
contact. Vith low-bo111ng-polnt liquids, the Inhalation route is the most
common and serious.
Helting Point--
The temperature at which a solid changes phase to a liquid is the melting
point. This temperature is also the freezing point, since a liquid can change
phase to a solid. The proper temtnclcgy depends on the direction of the
phase change.
7-17

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if a substance has been transported at & temperature that maintains a
solid phase, then a change In tenjierature nay cause the solid to melt* The
particular substance may exhibit totally different properties, depending on
phase. One phase could be inert white the other could be highly reactive.
Thus, It 1s Iterative to recognize the possibility of a substance changing
phase due to changes in the anient temperature.
Flash point
If the ambient teaperature in relation to the material of concern Is
rights then it *ay give off enough vapor at Its surface to alto* Ignition by
an open flan.j or spark.
The minimus tenperature at which a substance produces sufficient flam-
mable vapors to Ignite Is Its flash point. If the vapor does Ignite, com-
bustion can continue as long as the temperature regains at or above the flash
point.
The relative flamraabtlity of a substance Is based on Its flash point. An
accepted relation between the two Is:
highly fl amiable:
Moderately fldovaable:
Relatively Inflaomabte:
Flash point less than 100"F
Flash point greater than 100'F
but less than 2MTF
Flash point greater tnan 200*F
7-lfl

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SECTION 8
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE tOENTIFICAIICW 5rST£NS
INTRODUCTION
Hazardous materials are stored and transported In Urge quantities.
Frequently, sow stored or transported material is released, presenting a
potential hazard to the public and environment. Such an Incident can be
managed more expeditiously when the hazardous material is specifically
Identified and characterized* Unfortunately* the contents of storage tanks
or trucks may not be Identified specifically or properly* Records or shipping
papers may be Inaccessible. Even with such Information, ati experienced person
Is needed to define the hazards and their seriousness*
Because of the Immediate need for information concerning a hazardous
material, two systems for hazard Identification have bean developed, Both
help responders to deal with a hazardous materlat incident quickly and safety,
and both Mere devised for persons untrained In chemistry.
The first Is the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) ?04 M
System, which 1s used mostly on storage tanks and smaller cotalners. The
second system is used exclusively on containers and tanks transported In
interstate commerce. The U.S. Department of Transportation {DOT) Is respon-
sible for this system* Its use, by May of placards and labels, Is required
under DOT regulations found 1n the Code of Federal Regulations 49 (49 CFR)>
H£PA 704 H HAZARD IDENTIFICATION SYSTDi
Description
The NFPA Is a standardized system which used numbers and colors on a
sign to define the basic hazards of a specific material* The three, Health*
Flammablllty, and Reactivity, are identified and rated on a scale of 0 to 4
depending on the degree of hazard presented (Figure 8.1).
The ratings for individual chemicals can be found 1n the NFPA "Guide to
Hazardous Materials*. Other references such as the U.S. Coast Guard manual,
CHRIS Volume 2, and the National Safety Council's "Fundamentals of Industrial
Hygiene" contain the NFPA ratings for specific chemicals. 5uch Information
can be useful not only In emergencies but also during long-term remedial
activities when extensive evaluation is required.


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FIGURE 8-1. HFPA 704 M HAZARD IDENTIFICATION S*$7£H
Summary of Hazard Banking System
Health Hazard [Blue)—
Rank H umber
4
Description
Materials that cn very short
exposure could cause death or
major residual Injury even
though prompt medical treatment
was given.
Materials that on short exposure
could cause serious temporary or
residual Injury even though
proipt medical treatment was
given.
Materials that on Intense or
continued exposure could cause
teaportry Incapacitation or
possible residual injury unless
proupt medical treatment was
given.
Materials that on exposure would
cause Irritation but only minor
residual injury even If no treat-
ment was given.
Materials that on exposure under
fire conditions would offer nn
hazard beyond that of ordinary
combustible material*
Examples
Acrylonltrlle
Broml tie
Parathiofl
Aniline
Sodlw hydroxide
Sulfuric acid
Bromo benzene
Pyridine
Styrene
Acetone
Methanol
8-2

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FlaflMsblllty Hazard (Red)—
Rink Dunbar
Description
Examles
1
0
Materials that U) rapidly or
co^>letely vaporize at atmos-
pheric pressure and normal
ambient temperatures and burn
readily or (2) are readily
dispersed In air and burn
readily.
Liquids and solids that can be
Ignltled under almost all onbient
temperature conditions.
Materials that must be Moderately
heated or exposed to relatively
high wblent temperatures before
Ignition can occur.
Materials that must be preheated
before ignition can occur.
Materials that Mill not burn.
1, 3-Butadlene
Propane
Ethylene oxide
Phosphorus
Acrylonitrile
2-flutanone
Kerosene
Sodiui
Red phosphorus
Reactivity Hazard {Yellow)"-*
Rank N«ber
Description
Materials that In themselves are
readily capable of detonation or
of explosive decomposition or
reaction at normal temperatures
and pressures*
Materials that {1) 1n themselves
are capable of detonation or
explosive reaction but require
a strong initiating source or
(2) must be heated under confine-
ment before Initiation or (3}
react explosively with water*
Materials that (1J In themselves
are normally unstable and
readily undergo violent chemical
change but do not detonate or (2)
may react violently with water
or P) may for® potentially
explosive mixtures with water.
Ex amies
Benzoyl peroxide
Picric acid
TUT
Dlborane
Ethylene oxide
2-H1tropropane
Acetaldehyde
Potassium
8-3

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Rant Number
Description
ExmpIot
1
Materials that in themselves are
normally stable but which can
(1] become unstable at elevated
twqjeratures or (2) react with
Mater with some release of
energy but not violently.
Ethyl ether
Sulfuric add
0
Materials that in themselves are
normally stable, even when
exposed to fire, and that do not
react with water.
Special Information (White) —
The white block denotes special Information about the chemical* For
example, H pay indicate that the material is radioactive by displaying the
standard radioactive symbol, or unusually water-reactive by displaying a
large W with a slash through it {M)> For a more complete discussion or these
various hazards, consult the HFPA Standard 704 H.
DOT HAZARD INFORKATION SYSTW
The Ws Hazardous Materials Transportation Administration regulates
aver 1,400 hazardous materials* The regulations require labels on small
containers and placards on tanks and trailers. These placards and labels
indicate the nature of the hazard presented by the cargo. The classification
used for the placard and labels is based on the United Nations Hazard Classes
(Table £Ll). The UK hazard class nuaber 1s found In the bottom corner of a
DOT placard or label.
The various hazards are defined In Table S.2.
TABLE 8.1. UN HAZARD CUSS SYSTEM
United Nations
Hazard
CI ass Number
Description
9
6
7
a
1
I
3
4
5
Class A, 6, and C Explosives
Nonflammable and flammable compressed gases
flamable liquids
Flammable solids, spontaneously combustible
substances, and water-reactlve substances
Oxidizing materials, Including organic
peroxides
Class A and 8 poisons, irritants, and etiologic
(disease-causing) materials
Radioactive materials
Corrosive materials (adds, alkaline liquids,
and certain corrosive liquids and solids)
Miscellaneous hazardous materials not covered
by any of the other classes 	
8-4

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To facilitate handling a hazardous material Incident, soHe placards are
being altered to accept a 4-dlgit Identification number {Figure S.2), This
nutfber corns fro# the Hazardous Material Table in the 00T regulations* 49 Cflt
172,101. This ID nuntar also must be written on the shipping papers or
Manifest. In the event of an Incident, the ID nuber on the placard Mill he
tnuch easier to obtain than the shipping papers. Once the nueher 1$ obtained,
the DOT4s "Emergency Response Guide Boole" can be consulted* This book des-
cribes the proper Methods and precautions for responding to release of each
hazardous material with an ID number. The DOT system goes one step further
In aiding response personnel than the NFPA system. However, using both
systems when responding to hazardous material incidents will help to Identify
and characterize the Materials involved properly.
hazard symbol
ID ftgflber
UN Hazard Class Number
Figure 8*2. MODIFICATION OF DOT HAZARD IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
a-5

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TABLE 8.2. Hazardous Material! Definitions
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TllAKSPOKTAITON
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS DEFINITIONS
flllMq d*tl&lilHi ki«t tan lUtiiftid liu th« C»4i »f rtdinl
Ittdftlaai, TliU tMrini(nrw r«u lOC-i 77L Kafir (*
ntuunj t»li« he wwlit!	won: lialMiilti| ^n^tMU in o»t-
ir in cnu^btH cmcinilri m <¦<	d4fli»lil^*i.
WttAHtOOl mmm, - Ikm * itftiueei ir uiirlil «HIII
by Ua iKHiifji Tl
canmm
% Uqnl4 i l!td pelic itan 1007, m4 Inlet* iHtf. m
ditimtnid by tviCn H»L-i t» Sie. l73,llJ(rf>, twrrfxleo* an
bw4 U foe. m.US(bl,
murttit
Any liquid ir hIH tint imn *l) tar dtullil
juuit
% liquid hi.|n| * fluk peltc Mlflw 100'f. «» Hiinlul fry
taiu llatii ti l*c, 173,115(4]- rif iuip[l«ni» Mi 17)-11JU>

>»r»lMli! Ll««l< - Any liquid (hit t(nlzi* ifonMnNiwlr lw Jrj M
CHiiMiil Cl* - A*y uiifiil or ilitwf l« il» unUlwr t
pmaun nEuJlni 4D p*|i u JB*!,. ir i inii«N «k«riln
IX piii THSTi » inf liquid fii»iiiii HtKtu fc«i"i i
o
U&MpanmM
8-6

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TABLE 6.2 (Continued)
MUM CUM
tm BlTtOHJ
ruMHRI US
Amy (MfiiMiii |u «tiiln| «Mulr«aaata (n l«wr f Ijmhlllry
l iliHtanT llilt <«¦*. tlaM injigtln, *>t tint ff»-
etlitrli u iHESlUd In 9*t. 173^30®On)

lej a«nnd |m «ck«r tka • (liaiUi 
cjih Ur«t friction. Niiliri luit (in Mitafittutai
or pnmutii, w uttldi cam b# 1(>UH uHllj «n4 ii« Ifltri
Wffta m rl|im*l; Afici parti rlt»t 1/ m '» eimM • NtiM w«i*
rntMlu humi. (V- lll.iro)
(KOU
nyin»
Aa «(mii cgnriii>ln| (h bl«d«ai -C-S itfimnri aaJ
k&UIi aay h-a (nnilltrri ¦ «( fepdrosm p*r«*l4« vtun 1
«• or not* oi eJi» *yii«ja* iihi tan raplat«4 ky ert««'t
ndtiili auft ta elitM u «a *r|ulg ytrmUi «la»—(1«t
Sen. 1T).U1I(] (*t 4rU, rinvIM,
»f a iltnti, Chat ytvlda l> ca iiimliti O* eoa-
NtN> at itrjiaU uurr. (In 3*&, DJ-Ul)
Ml«» A,
LCW««L' |M» »r llfili* «l aeeh
mUW tfcit * **ry*SnTtmrml of (Im (M. «r vapor «f M

quhi
furit*' HatntlUi), MNr Hi" CliM a »r Ifiltitlni utir-
Ub, ItiMa u bt n Unit ca ua u ca alftrJ • hiuri
io haaLUi tterln* tr«°ip*iu[lsi| or vHlcti, l« iIm itmn vt
4jk|ut« 6au Da iMain t an rraivd CO *r*
th«- UJ.MJ)
yyTarne
SWF
A Liquid or >el 14 tvtttiK* lAlck <«wn wuci with fir* «r Snt a ayaclflc wKvlcy init«r
(tea 0.002 far tm. 173.319) i>IU( peat)«fiy *ad utJdi cm rawt irina< aaaeyaafa «r
UfCDafart to p«ii«i|tTa and «i*»» in ilit tvant it lui«|< darlii
ifaur*ruclaa. (Sae. 15 J. 5DO{(0 (1) |
a-7

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TABLE 8.2 (Continued)
HUMS CUil
(4Ft»|TI0«$
MJ
t miTli] (Inelwdlnc a i»IU t*n wit »W Miir) sapakla
tflpufltaat 1m<|( La i triMfxrt or ««i»i f™
laafcaca Muring N»ttrl«l« Mitln| «m it bvth »f
iki f*l)NlB| erltnU in Mfrl aatarlal*t (1) A »wW
(kit kw i c®rr««J«) nL< O.JM lieb pii jnf (W) am
•IhIih {needed J0?J-t6> AC i twt t«v*i«(«4 of UO'f. Jb
mc^MU 141 La dmriM <> UQ ttii^ird «4 «clCUJli7 JulfHtrl bf on* (n lac. lM.lfll. (IM, 1)3.306
Q0(1>I

t «iNclil Which has ethaz likaraii dunctnlitlct ut ^iktIM
ai n DIM ar OSH-i tru* lAidt wtat It wialtabla [«( afelpaaat,
lolw UndfJM far [naiperWl«> tuk
OAM-C «at»rUi la apMllleillr uml in $««. 17Z.1DI. |S*c«
in.MOO) (3)|

A ¦a(*rUi u a (miimi nuJUf iHildi, th»utb «tNrttlai
¦m, tmi pm&ag-
U|> nay bit ka ntiriili fwr -fcleA tutftlm Ka fTtrtW la
Sa«r 177-in. A 4MpfLof liKriptlmi qfUukli to m(I) MK
¦aiirltl «r catapr? ar OCM-9 Htnliki la lauod la far. 173.101.
|Sae.
mn
A a*tarlal due li vl IhIiiM l« w) tdar hacat4 elaaa. hut la
f» ii* raqalraaaat* »f thla iDMufnr. tatftMt L& Ul«
clui Iscledv (1} 1• utdaua MI(M ui (11) fauiint ful«M2at
aa la Sac. IH.I, jSae.
m nuoniK ui orrtut to seuia utmooi mtf mo I* 'uJAurxow ar
Hainan htduu iu sKinncrr. is«. i;uij
in
Khh i Mitfiil tint la rMlup4 ar dlitfllxiUi) ttt a far* 1>-
cttdil aad m(U^U far ula dret^i mmU aalaa ar
;utna«iilltti> f«r try In41*t4«ala far ;rlila Tiklt l« t«, HI.IBI nfcan alfarad far
LfMipAiutloi la era ^Ltp, ar in tm CrMiftrt niklct* If oat
H(k
-------
TABLE 6.2 (Continued)
HUTU
(fnip«iutl«n —a mj a»t-rl*l chat *a «*J«d
t* tha hmriM wvM Hftlfat T«qiil int» *t |h bilnMKtl
PretMtlM Ai—ery u CfC, Titlt 44, rail 113, ChapUP '• IWt. l?l,l)
Ktt Imlli M (1m Bauriaaa VMM M4 C*u*U4t«l lifaladgM
N(«r U Cn, Tlih U, tart* MO-»I aa* rarta IJJ-1IS*
niar#1i Onu ntilaltM. call Tail T««t t»po) OMHi tl
(au> IM-liOi
|Qtt
jflHSECL
*Mna til* anlaM WWt flf a faaoartoa* M(«rUIl aa ^wlfM 1*
tkoia NttSgaa ttfliukU fa ikt potlnllt M4W rla Gain 1. (lac. Ul.l>
y
¦aaaa m aalltf nWtMC* (iBeiaMai •lirffrt «ai pafiaa) «Udt aaj
aiif|i afmtoma ba#ti*a « «alf-l(altln oa4*r ca^ltlw* anaallf
iMitai la tranaynrtatlaa at «M<* aa?, mm caalKt *|ii tka acsa-
*$>r>#rt, «iarp aa taeraaaa la aa4 Iplta. (Jae. 171.f)
wnjucQji
Naaaa aar avlU nM(ia«a {laelarta* al«4nt mi pacta) wMtk, *9
luarMtlaa vltfc wtaf, la Ukal| t» >anw aiinm innply flaMWa
or to |tv> mtt (ImaUa «* wtir |paaa Is ia«a[iTTMnr at trwurtHl# luufca Xtttritli H|riiU—¦ flat! WKtoi
[«;«? "t «»¦*• tuna 'f""« -1 OIlaUlflM *¦ *—* ^ c**- Tul* **¦
100-177.
Iifciatin	Hflilm, Bff-U
Of (lea of Operation* aarf bianvit
murlilt Iruu^utitln IrtMa
¦aaaarch and	Ptopb U»|«i«Littln
(tftfoiak at InM^tWlM
«aa»it»tW. B.C. Itm
nil Hlarill M nfnrfwi4 d(t«u a^Mlil p*nla*i
-------
SECTION 9
USE OF THE HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DATA SHEET
INTRODUCTION
A hazardous substance data sheet ts an effective ¦etns of presenting
data on a particular compound and the related Incident. It Is much easier
for response personnel to have the necessary information 1n one place than
continually to consult different sources which way or may not have the desired
data. Condensing the Information on physical, chemical» and toxicological
properties of the coa^ound and Incident onto two pages also speeds briefing
of any personnel arriving on site when Ltme is ts^ortant. As many sources as
possible should be used to fill out the sheets as some Information on the
save property nay vary from one reference to another.
FILL INS OUT THE HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DATA SHEET
Under 'flame of Substance," list both the common name and the name approved
by the International Union for Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC). Both
should be Bntered, since it may be necessary to look up Information under
different names. If $ compound uses snore than one coonon name, list all
synonyms. Write in the formula after the chemical name, because so* ref-
erences index chemicals hy their formulas.
Part 1 lists the physical /chemical properties of the compound. In the
far fight column labeled "Source," enter the reference from which the
Information was obtained. If the information Is found later to be incorrect
or conflicting, H say be corrected. It also makes It easier to refer back
to a particular source If additional information Is needed. The properties
included in the data sheet are:
normal Physical States Check the appropriate space for the physical
state of the chemical at normal ambient tei^eratures (20*C-24'C).
Molecular Weight! Usually expressed In grams per gram-mole. This
Information IS essential because neutralization or any other chem-
ical treatment would require the nuciber of moles of chemical
present.
Density and Specific Sravity; Only one Is required. Density 1s
usually expressed 1n grams per milliliter. Specific gravity Is
dimensionless* Indicate Che temperature at which specific gravity
is measured and circle the appropriate letter corresponding to
degrees Fahrenhelt('F) or Celslus('C).
9-1

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Solubility:	Usually expressed In parts ptr Million op
milligrams per liter, which are equivalent (that is* 1 ppm *
1 mgi/L )* Solubility 1s to|)L ature dependent.
Splubil1ty: Enter any other material for which solubility date are
needed. Tor Instance, recovering a spilled material by solvent
extraction may require solubility data for any one of a nurtser of
organic compounds.
Boiling Point: Expre5..*d in degrees Fahrenheit or Celsius. It Is
the tenperaturf at which the vapor pressure of the compound equals
atmospheric pressure (760 mm mercury at sea level). The boiling
point is raised If any Inpuritles are present.
Melting Point: Same as freezing point. Melting point Is lowered
If any In^urlties are present.
Vyor Pressure: Usually expressed in millimeters of mercury or
atiospheres at a given temperature. Strongly toilerature dependent.
Vapor Density: Dimension!ess quantity. Expressed relative to air.
flash Point: Expresed In degrees Fahrenheit or Celsius. Indicate
whether the figure 1s based an an open cup or closed cup test.
Other; Enter any miscellaneous data* for example biochemical oxygen
demand, autoIgnition te^>erature, or odor threshold concentrations.
Part 11 Is a compilation of five types of hazardous charcterlsties. lo the
far right colwmt labeled "Source-, enter the reference from which the
Information mas obtained.
Section A list toxlcological hazards:
Inhalation: Under "Concentrations*" enter the current TLV (Three-
hold limit Value} concentration. This Is iqrartant for selecting
levels of protection for workers who will he in the area.
Ingestion: Enter the toxicity level In milligrams per kilogram
(mg/kg) of the body i»eight.
Sfcin/Eye Absorption - Contact: Determine from the references
whether these hazards exist.
Carcinogenic. Teratogenic, Mutagenic: It 1s difficult to ohtalo
concentration data on these hatarosi since very lfttle is known
about the mechanisms which cause these effects.
Aquatic: Usually expressed in parts per million (ppm) for a
particular species.
Other: Enter an IDLN (Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health)
concentration, or any other pertinent miscellaneous Information.
9-2

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Section B contains fire hazard data:
Combustibility: Applies ta any cwpound .iMch can be oxidized In
fllr. Almost every organic e abound Is combustible*
Toxic By-products: If the compound is combustible, enter .yes,
because all combustion processes yield some carbon aonoxlde. list
the particular toxic by-products in the spaces below.
F1 vmah 111 ty/Explos t ve^es* Ljgi ts: Expressed as a percentage by
valufle in air. Usually flammahTe limits and explosive limits are
Synonysous.
Section C contains reactivity data;
Reactivity Hazard: If the material 1s reactive. Indicate the
substances WHTcfi are Incompatible with the material~
Section D contains comvslvUy data:
pH: Some references give the pH of an aqueous solution at a given
concentration. For instance, the pM of 0.51 solution of sod 1m
hydroxide is 13, There Is also space for listing the types of
materials known to be corroded by the compound In question.
neutralizing Agent: Some references list neutralizing materials
which may help at an Incident by bringing the pH of the affected
area to neutral (pH of 7).
Section E contains radioactivity data:
Background; List a background level. Background is usually on thf
order of 0.01 mil 11 roentgens per hour (rit/hour). 5ee Part 2, "Field
Monitoring*.
Alpha, Beta, Gamma: Exposure rates on soae elements may be found
in the "Radiological Health Handbook," published by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services.
Parts III. IV, and V of the sheet describe the specific Incident and recoamend
safety Measures. Sometimes, parts of the following sections will be left
blank, simply because of a lack of accurate Information. Enter available
incident Information as pronptly is possible, however, so that mitigation
Measures can start.
Part III describes the incident:
Quantity Involved: Usually express In gallons, barrels, or liters for a
liquid, and pounds or kilograms for a solid.
Release Information: Indicate if the contalner(s) Is (are) still leak-
ing, and If possible, the rate of discharge.
$-3

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Honltqrlng/Sarollnq Recommended: Indicate what type(s) of monitoring
should be Initiate to coapfeFely characterise an incident and if on-
site samples are necessary, See sections on Saapllng and Field Moni-
toring.
Part IV« BecgWtended Protection. covers:
Public: Based on the data obtained in the first three parts and the
proximity of the incident to populated areas, make an Initial public
hazard evaluation. The OUT AOS reference segaent Number 111, "Degree of
Hazard to Public Health," is helpful in recommending action to protect
public health.
Environment: Depending on the type of release and potential pathways of
dispersion, propose potential activities such as booming, sklmning. or
chemical/physical treatment. OHHTftDS segments 113, "Action Levels," and
114, "in Situ Amelioration," can help determine Initial response activ-
ities.
Uorkera Decide on levels of protection for response personnel, once
again based on the physical, chemical, and toxicological properties of
the materials In question. Gl«TA0$ segment 1GB, "Personal Safety
Precautions*- aids 1n this decision. See also "Standard Operating Safety
Suides,* Part 5.
Part V> fteco®nended Site Control, covers:
If enough information 1s available, establish three work zones (See
Standard Operating Procedures, Part 6):
-	Exclusion Zone (contaminated)
-	Contamination Reduction Zone
-	Support Zone (nun-contaminated)
Hotline: Establish site boundary.
Any person who crosses the Hotline {the outer boundary of the Exclusion
Zone) must be in the proper level of protection predeslgnated by the
site safety officer.
Decontamination line: Based upon the tonicity of the conpound(s) In-
volved, establish a decontamination system In the Contamination
Reduction /one. "See Standard Operating Safety Guides," Part 7.
Camnand Post Lxation: Locate the cwnnand post. This decision Is usu-
ally constrained by wind direction, accessibility, and logistical con
<1deratlons. It should also be a safe distance from the Hotline,
9-4

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EXAMPLE OF DOCUMENTATION NEEDED TO COMPLETE A HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DATA
SHEET (PARTS 1 AND II)
Denzene has been chose as an extople. For purposes of Illustration,
seven sources of infomvation twre utilized;
-	"Condensed Chgnlcal Dictionary* by Gessner 6. Kavley
-	"The Merck Index"
-	"Oanqgrous Properties of Industrial Materials* by N. Irvtng Sax
-	'NtOSH/OSHA Pocket Guide to Chewlcal Hazards*
-	"Documentation of the Threshold Limit Values (TLIQ"
-	CHRIS, VuliM 2
-	OHMTAOS
9-5

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V. HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DATA SHEET
/ SUBSTANCE:
COMMON: ______CHEMICAL; _____
i. physiuuchehicai properties
SOURCE
*>miT Physical State: 	Gas 	liquid 	Solid	
Nrieeialar Weight	——»«• - ——
Density	s/"1 "
Specific gravity	# *F/"C ' '
Solubility: Water	4 *?/% ——
Solubility:	Hj* C ——
Boiling Point	*F/*C ————
Mel ting Point
Vapor Pressure	mmtfo *F/*C ——
Vapor Benslt*		T	"F/'C	
Flash Point	*F/#C ——
Other:			
II. HAZARDOUS CHAMCTERlSlTlCS
A. TQilCOLOStCAl HAZARD
Inhalation
Ingestion
SkinVEye Absorption
Sic In/Eye Contact
Carcinogenic
Teratogenic
Mutagenic
Aquatic
Other: 		_____
fmI HAZARD
Gcmbustibfltty
Touclc % predicts:
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
res
Yes
Yes
Yes
res
HAZARD
m
He
m
Np
Ho
Ho
Ho
Ho
Ho
Yei
Yes
Ho
No
CONCENTRATIONS
SOURCE
CONCENTRATIONS
SOURCE
F1 aionabll ity	Yes Ho
LFL
ua	zzuzzmzn m:
E*p1os1veness	tes Ho
La
ua	zzrzzzzi 		
REACTIVITY HAZARD Yes No CONCENTRATIONS	SOURCE
t-6

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HAZARD	CONCENTRATIONS
SOURCE
0. COftROSIVm HAZARD Yes NO
PH
Neutralizing agent:
£~ RADIOACTIVE HAZARD Yes No EXPOSURE RATE	SOURCE
Background		 	
Alpha Particles		;	 	
Beti Particles			
Gamma Radiation		 	
HI. DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT;
Quantity Involved	
Release Inforaatlon 	
Momtorlng/S^pUng Recommended
IV. RECOMMENDED PROTECTION:
Public 	
Environment
Worker
V. RECOWENOEtl SITE CONTROL:
Hotline 	
Decontamination Line
Coanand Post Location
9-7

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IV. EXAMPLE -- COMPLETED
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DATA SHEET
QftfZE V?
COMMON: fiEWZ.BQfrf/VZQt-i cYcuttiff/t-7ftIFye) CHEMICAL:	C4 lij
I. PH* SICJIL/CHSUI CM. PROPERTIES
SUBSIANCE:
Rorwal Physical State:
Molecular Weight
Density
Specific gravity
Solubility: Mater
Solubility: 	
Boiling Point
Melting Point
Vapor Pressure
Vapor Density
Flash Point (Ct>
Other*
Gas
II. HAZARDOUS CHARACTER1SITICS
A. TOX1COLOGICAL HAZARD
inhalation
Ingestion
Skin/Eye Absorption
Skin/Eye Contact
Carcinogenic
Teratogenic
fetagenic
Aquatic
Other: tiRtf tt*t\
9. FIRE HAZARD
Combustibility
Toxic Byproducts:
HAZARD
g5)
No
jVo
No
fTep
No

No
rr^Q
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
MSI
No
ft®
Ho
No
y Liquid
2M.
SOURCE
Solid CH*/S JL
<#amL
*i*fF1 9
	i£—
CONCENTRATIONS
nv

¦c LMuJZ
" cwf/rx
i§Sasz
CONCENTRATIONS


SOURCE
UWttM
unwr^y
m
***
twsvpiM »5JStr
SOURCE
rianwiafclHty	No
LFL
UFL
Exploslblllty	tfcp
LEL
UEL
C. REACTIVITY HAZARD U
-------
D. CORHOSIVm
PH
Heutraliiirvg a^ervt:
HAZARD
Yes
COHCEKTRATIOKS
E. RADIOACTIVE HAZARD Yes
Background
Alpha Particles
Beta Particles
Guni Radiation
III. INCIDENT RELATED:
(fciantlty Involved 	
<©
©
Release Information
source
ojmjML
EXPOSURE RATE
SOURCE
cufts AT
Hoflitor^ng/SampHng Recctttaunded
V. RECOWIEMDED PROTECTION:
Public
Environment
Uorler
V, RECOfflOiDED SITE COHtftQL;
Hotline
Decontamination Line
Command Post 1 ocatlon
4-9

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allows for a multiple gloving system to be attached to the suit as shown In
F1g, 14.11. A latex chenical-reslstant glove Is worn followed by a cotton
wortc glove to detect any leakage frcn outer gloves and for warmth. Over
the cotton glove fs a heavy neoprene rubber glove which Is covered by an
outer cotton chaffng glove for abrasion resistance.
The neck or collar of the suit Is a tapered latex rubber tube. The
tube can be trfmed as necessary for different neck sizes. Ihls fs
Important as excess pressure around the neck, even If bearable* can have
adverse effects on a diver. Triimnlng the tapered neck tube should be done
carefully to avoid accidentally over-entarglng It, The latex collar is
surrounded by a latex hood and both are attached to the suit In the s$»e
manner as the cuffs.
The diver dons the Viking Sport through a heavy metal zipper on the
back of the suit at the shoulders. When closed, the zipper is watertight.
The Viking suit can be adjusted easily for buoyancy by adding or
venting air. Insulation is provided by undergarments. Afr Is added by a
power inflator. A low pressure hose (provided with the suit) connects the
regulator first stage to a valve on the left breast of the suit, allowing
the diver to add air when this valve fs pressed. Another valve, on the
upper left ana, releases air frc* the suit. Tfie outlet can be adjusted to
maintain a desired internal pressure. Thus, when afr expands In the suit
during ascent, 1t vents automatically.
The $uperLfte-l7B Helmet
The Superilte-1 WB Coonenclal Diver's Helmet is constructed of molded
fiberglass as shown frv Tig, 14.12 and wefghs approximately 24 pounds dry.
The helmet system consists of two pieces: the necV dam-yoke and the
hat. The diver slfps on the neck dam with the attached yoke hinging into
place. The neck cla»p 1s then slipped onto the hat and locked. The lock
system not only seals the neck datn to the hat but also secures the front of
the yoke, eliminating any extra steps.
The Superi.1 te-17B fs designed for the requirements set forth by
government agencies. The design anticipates future safety requirements by
providing a system for prevention of accidental removal, complete head
protection, a demand breathing systen for gas econoirjy wfthcut absorption
canisters, antifloodfng features, rapid emplacement (even with thick
gloves), rapid removal, and a neck dam clamp that breaks a low pressure
lock mechanically .
Kod1 ficatlons to the SupcrL1te-l7B Include the use of a series exhaust
system in which exhaust gases exit from the dive hat through a wlnimum of
two in-line exhaust valves. This valve systew eliminates small ainounts of
water back-flushing Into the heloet before a single exhaust can completely
close. Secondly, Isolation of the second stage diaphragm by a brass cap as
shown fn Figure 14.13, has been done to protect the diaphragm frcw poten-
tially dangerous contaminants. ftnbfent pressure reference is achieved
through a tube running from the brass cap to the Inside of the helrset
14-15

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I
SECTION 10
DIVING PHYSIOLOGY
Roughly €0 percent of the Earth's atr 1$ the Inert gas nitrogen.
This Inert gas Is absorbed by body tissual when air Is breathed under
pressure. The same also Is true when Another Inert gas, such as helturn,
is substituted for nitrogen on deeper dives* Each body tissue absorbs
this gas at its own characteristic rate, Upon ascent, these tissues give
up their absorbed gas at a rate that can be determined experimentally*
The actual physiological processes Involved are complicated ana not yet
completely understood; however* the body's reaction to this off-gassing
can be understood without this knowledge.
[f decompression Is too rapid, snail bubbles of Inert gas will form
1n the tissues* causing a conoltiwi called Decompression Sickness yUCS)
or the Benus. The diver experiences excruciating pain in his Joints, and
the condition can lead to serious complications if not immediately and
properly treated. This treatment usually Involves placing the patient
under pressure in a recompression chamber as a major part of the overall
remedy.
A volume of gas descending in water halves its volume approximately
every feet. The inverse 1s true upon ascent- If the volume of air In
question Is In a diver's lungs* and if he does not expel the air as he
ascends, the expanding air will force Us way through the walls of the
alveoli, causing bubbles to form In the blood vessels. This condition Is
known as a gas eobo_11sa and can occur In as shallow as four feet of
water. Shoul? one of these bubbles block the flow of blood* and thus
oxygen, to a vital organ (especially the brain), serious and imedlate
consequences would result. [f the situation is not Immediately ana
properly treated, the victim probably will die. As the treatment for
DCS* treatment for embolism also involves recompression.
For the diver* a controlled ascent is extremely important. As Impor-
tant* Is ailowinu sufficient time for the dissolved gasses to come out of
solution without forming the dangerous bubbles* The U«S» itavy decom-
pression Tables (U.S. department of the Navy, 1573} were designed to
assist the diver 1n this tasic ana can he found in most diving references.
There are many other aspects of diving physiology, however, that are
not pertinent to the subject ot this manual - DCS and gas embolism are
risks associated with every dive* risks easily exacerbated by unfamiliar
equipment* Or equipment that fails to function correctly.
10-1

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SECTION 11
DIVING NODES AMD EqUlFWEMT
Diving has Its roots tn antiquity* but most significant developments
hire occurred during the last 400 years. With the invention of the two-
stage demand regulator tn 1943. 41ring became not only a worfc tool, but
also a sport currently practiced by millions of enthusiasts around the
worl d*
There are two basic diving modes, tn one atmosphere diving the diver
Is encased to a rigid container or suit which contains air at the surface
pressure of 14,7 pounds per square inch fpsi). Som development was done
on suits like this In the 1930'$. Recently* much worfc has been done with
the titanlun JIM Suit» shorn In Fig* 11,1, which is capable of allotting a
direr to do functional work In a one atmosphere environment at depths
exceeding 1,000 feet. The HAflTISt as shown In Figure 11.2,, Is a one person
submersible vehicle which also operates at one atmosphere*
In ambient diving the diver is subjected to the ambient pressure of
the water at the depth to which he Is dtvfng, ftnfrlervt diving consists of
two swijor subgroupings* surface supplied diving and sel f-contained dlvfng
using some form of 5elf-contained lioderaiter flreathlM~i»pparatus TSCUBAjU
Surface supplied diving Is that mode generally used by cnmmerrTal dlvfng
activities. SCUBA diving* while primarily a sporting activity tn terms of
numbers of participants, is widely used in the scientific comnutfty for
data collection and research support, and to some extent In the military as
well.
Surface supplied diving* Surface supplied diving is the direct descen-
dant of tne siebe diving dress discussed In the foregoing section. There
are three modern, applications. Modern hard-hat rigs are most similar In
appearance to the original Siebe unit. Basically* they consist of some
sort of rigid helmet (made of anything from brass to fiberglass) attached
to some sort of waterproof suit. Fig. 11.3 shows both the new New MIC-12
deep diving system and the original HK5 hard-hat rig used for decades. The
suit Is protected by appropriate one-way valvlng and is weighted to maintain
neutral buoyancy when submerged. Air and communications are brought to the
diver through an uwblIleal which also contains a strength member. When
diving In a hard-nat rig, the diver can be considered Isolated from his
environment except for the affects of ambient pressure. A thorough
description of specific equipment end procedures associated with surface
supplied diving can be found In Sections 14, 15, and 2?.
Diving from a Personnel Transfer Capsule (PTC) can be thought of as
second order surface-supplied diving* Divers enter a recompression chancer
at the surface. This chamber is large enough for them tn live inside for
11-1

-------
11.1 One Atmosphere JIH Suit
.11-2

-------
¦Line drawn# of the MMJs submenu
Figure 11.? - MANTIS One-Han Submersible VehlcU
11-3

-------
New Navy MK-12 Rifl
Former Navy HK-5 (Ms
Figure 11.3 Current Navy
HC-5 (Right)
WC-12 Cleft) and Former
Oeep Mater Diving System
11-4

-------
several days. The whole clumber 1s pressurized to the writing depth of the
dive. After about twelve hours the divers are saturated. Mien It Is tine
to divef they don their equipment and enter the PTC which Is mated to the
recompression chamber In soak pressure-tight fashion. The PTC 1s sealed
and lowered to diving depth. Usually a PTC 1s fed alrt power, arid cmtuM-
catlons through an umbilical from the surface. Occasionally ft is self-
sufficient for some period of time* except for the cable which suspends It
at depth* Upon reaching depth, the divers open the PTC which remains dry
because Internal gas pressure balances outside water pressure. The divers
wear hand flasks supplied through uafaillcals from the PTC In the performance
of their work outside the PTC.
Self-contained diving;. Self-contained diving has two major sub-
divisions! CIosed-circult divlng Is the direct descendant of the wort done
In the late ISQO's by Fleuss* Slebe* and Gorman. Open-circuit diving has
changed very little since the Invention of the open-circuit demand regulator
by Cousteau and fiagnan In 1943. equipment has kept pace with technology,
but changes have been mere refinements of the original which still is
acceptable for use under Host circumstances today.
Closed circuit diving uses the principle that oetabollcally-produced
carbon dioxide can be removed from the breathing gas mixture with pure
oxygen and so eliminate the problem of maintaining the delicate balance
between oxygen and the inert gas being used, when pure oxygen Is being
used, the diver normally Is limited to a depth of 25 feet because of
physiological complications that arise when oxygen 1s breathed at higher
partial pressures. A tightly fitting mask must be worn to prevent the
escape of gases around the rebreather nask+ The unit has a bag Into and
from which the diver breathes. Exhaled passes pass over a chemical (such
as barium hydroxide) that absorbs carton dfoxide, and in the case of the
more sophisticated units, the gas is monitored continuously to ensure that
there Is always sufficient, but not too much, oxygen present In the gas.
Rebreather units leave no telltale trail of bubbles, so they are
ideally suited for clandestine military diving. When, for operational
reasons, a diver on a deep dive cannot be anchored to an umbilical* he can
dive for a longer period of time using a rebreather Instead of open-circuit
because his tank can he filled with pure oxygen Instead of a very small
percentage of oxygen mixed with a large amount of useless Inert gas.
Since the rebreather 1s a self-contained unit, exhausting no gases, it
may be suited for a polluted water diving dress which fully encapsulates
not only the diver but the breathing apparatus as well* Further Investiga-
tion Is required In this area of equipment modification* Figure 11*4
illustrates an example of a closed-circuit diving system.
Open-circuit diving, comnonly called SCUBA dfvlng, and shewn 1n
Fig. ll+5, Is the predominant form of noncomerclal diving in the world
today. It normally consists of one to three tanks of compressed air
carried on the diver's back, feeding a regulator which reduces the tank
pressure to some fixed pressure above ambient (usually between 120 and 140
psl). This first stage regulator feeds a second stage regulator which is
attached to a mouthpiece through which the diver breathes. This second
11-5

-------

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U-6

-------
figure IKS Upen^ctreult self contained underwater
breathing apparatus {SCUBA)
11-7

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stage regulator reduces the InteriMdfate pressure to aatblent and opens only
when the diver inhales* The diver exhales into the second stag* regulator
where the exhaled air passes through a check valve into the surrounding
water,
The diver's eyes and nose am covered Utth a face mask which normally
constats of a tvpered glass plate mounted in a soft rubber frame held
against the face with a rubber strap, An alternate face mask consists of a
full face covering with sane means of attaching the second stage regulator.
This attachment generally takes one of two form, fa some full face masks
the regulator mouth piece is removed and the regulator Is attached directly
to a port In the atsk. Air is fed either to the complete mask or to an
oral-nasal Hunted Inside the mask. In other full face nsks, after the
second stage regulator is mounted to tte Bask, the mouth piece Is reattached
to the part of the regulator that protrudes Into the mask, Most masks In
use allow the diver access to his nose without flooding the mask so he Is
able to pinch his nostrils to equalize pressure against his ear draws.
The self-contained diver generally weighs slightly more than the water
he displaces and, therefore,. is negatively buoyant. To control this
situation, he wears a weight belt and a buoyancy compensator tBCl. The BC
Is a sophisticated life VflsTT~capable of oral and automafTc-Inflation
underwater. The diver Inflates the BC sufficiently to bring himself to
neutral buoyancy* Upon descent he must add air and upon ascent he must
vent air to renin so. The purpose of the weight belt is to extend his
buoyancy dynamic range {and to give him negative buoyancy If he Is one of
those Individuals who is naturally positively buoyant}.
Diving Press
The two basic categories of diving dress are functions of the kind of
diving being perforated, Underwater work falls Into either a non-swfianfng
or a swimming mode. What the diver wears is, therefore* dependent upon
whether or not he is swlming*
Mon-swtiHng diving dress, The non-swlmlng diver Is usually involvfed
with heavy underwater work. Heavy woric almost always Is associated with
massive structures where the diver's primary consideration Is protection
from abrasion and other physical Injuries resulting from his coming into
contact with what he is working on. The usual diving dress In these
clrcumstances is a heavy, rubberized canvas outfit as shown In the MK-5 rig
in Fig. 11*3* Weighted boots and a heavy harness are usually part of this
outfit, Gloves may or nay not be attached, where they are not. rubber
cuffs seal the wrists. In some cases the neck of the suit Is attached to a
heavy collar that is attached to the helmet, allowing free cormtmlcatlon of
air between suit and helmet. Otherwise, there Is a rubber seal at the neck
and a snap-ring device that connects the helmet neck to the suit neck. In
this version, air from the helmet does not enter the suit, and air for the
suit must be supplied separately.
The constant voltifte suit is distinguished from the variable volume suit
by what happens to the suit when ft receives air. Upo*n being fTTTe3" with
air. the rubberized canvas suit discussed above will distend to whatever
11-8

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Its <1 omul dlnenslons are. The suit becomes somewhat rigid at this point,
and overpressurUI ng the suit will iik« It more so. Because the Internal
volune of this suit does not change* It 1s called a constant valine suit.
A variable volume suit Is made of a material that stretches* It usually is
much more pi table than a constant volume suit. In nerval use enough air is
Injected Into the suit to lift it off the body sufficiently to allow the
diver to be comfortable* Because the suit stretches and shrinks Kith
Increasing and decreasing internal pressure* It requires much less attention
on the diver's part and generally Is nuch wore comfortable to wear, A
variable volune suit mist always be supplied with a source of air. There
Is a third type of Milt that falls between the t» Just discussed. These
suits ire scMnwhat stretchy, and thus not constant volume suits, but not
nearly so stretchy as variable volume suits. Suits In this category are
called variously by either nine* depending upon the manufacturer.
In practice the constant vol low suit usually Is used with the heavier
(and normally defer) hard-hat rigs. The variable volune suit Is found more
often with the newer, lightweight hard-hat rigs and with band masks.
Swlwrfng diving dress. The swlming diver's primary clothing consid-
er! tioiTTTT£ETrTCy7~aS3~h1 s diving dress reflects this. Where conditions
allow, the swlmlng diver will wear no diving d.ass at all. Environmental
conditions determine what he wears when the water ts not warm and pleasant.
There are t*» basic categories, the wet suit and the dry suit.
The wet suit Is constructed of a formfitting± closed-cell foam noo-
prene rubber material which usually Is sandwiched between an Inner and an
outer layer of nylon fabric. Some suits have the nylon on the inside only,
and some do not use the nylon fabric. Although the nylon protects the
suit's outer layer and eases donning the suit. It also makes the suit less
flexible. Suit material ranges In thickness from l/1fi-1nch to 3/S-1nch.
The thicker the material, the warmer the suit is, Suits generally haw one
to three pieces, not counting foot, hand, and head covering. The two- and
three-piece styles consist of pants which may stop at the Mist or be
bibbed* an optional inner vest, and a jacket. The one-piece suit Is like a
jwpsult with a slide fastener up the front or across the shoulders. Suits
may have attached or separate boots, always have separate gloves or mitts,
and my have a separate or an attached hood* The wet suit offers time
limited protection against cold only.
The dry suit originated as a watertight rubber suit worn over a
diver1 s Insulating garment* The air inside it would compress wfth depth
and the diver could experience suit squeeze, a condition where his skin is
severely pinched between clothing folds. A recent development Is an out-
growth of the variable volune non-swinnrfng dress discussed above. As in
the above case* there are constant volume, variable volume, and halfWay
between versions.
The constant volume dry suit Is a lightweight suit constructed of
rubberized material designed to retain the flexibility required by a
SMlmlng diver. These suits are designed with an inlet air valve controlled
11-9

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by the diver and an exhaust valve. The exhaust valve always can be manually
operated, but In some suits there Is also a provision for automatic opera-
tion so that the suit Mill vent as the diver ascends from deeper to
shallower ifapths* These suits usually have boots attached; however, they
can be obtained with ankle seels and separate hoots. Gloves are always
separate, but in soae versions the gloves can be attached to cuffs on the
sleeves via rings so they for* an Integral part of the suit* There are
rubber seals at the wrists. Hoods way or my not be attached. Where they
are tot, the suit has a rubber neck seal. Where they are, the suit nay or
nay not have a neck seal, depending upon the design of the hood* In some
versions the hood can be attached to the suit in a manner similar to
attachable gloves* by claapfng the suit and hood material between a rigid
under-rlng and a clamp ring* giving the suit greater versatility In use*
The variable volune dry suit can be constructed of the sane closed-cell
foam neoprene as wet suits. As in the non-swlHBing dress previously
discussed, they differ fro® the constant vol we suits fn that titty stretch
when filled with air* Since they are constructed of the same material as
wet suits, they have all the insulating characteristic* of the wet suit
without the discomfort of being wet. And since the diver remains, for the
most part* dry, body teagjerature is rot lost as quickly to the surrounding
water.
Hewer variable volume dry suits are now being Manufactured that are
constructed of crushed foam neoprene. This type of suit has fewer insul-
ating qualities, but Is much tougher and more flexible than Che older style
suit. In cold water, insulating garments Bust be worn underneath this suit.
Another variety of variable vol we dry suit is constructed of rubber,
(See Figure 11.5) It has no insulating qualities at all and requires that
insulating garments he worn beneath the suit even In moderately cool water,
but it is the most flexible of the suits*
Seals at neck and wrist of the variable volune dry suits are the same
as for constant volume suits. Design of boots and hood Is also the same
for both types of suits. The only distinguishable difference between these
suits Is the inherent stretch of the variable volume dry suit, and In the
case of the neoprene suit, Its inherent insulating ability.
Host of the dry suits have In common some form of waterproof slide
fastener with a very few wfcere entry Is nade through a very stretchy neck
opening* Regardless of whether the suits are constant or variable volume
(or one of the halfway versions}, they tend to be either bulky in design
with a lot of internal volume, or snug-fitting in design. The snug-fitting
suits usually have an across-the-shoulder entry» The bulky suits have
several different entries, Some start near the crotch In front and go up
around the neck and back down to the crotch in front. Some begin at the
middle of the back and go through the crotch to the chest. Wany have an
across-the-shoulder entry iust as in the snug fitting suits. And a few are
entered through the neck opening which stretches sufficiently, wfth the
help of two or three tenders, to allow the suit to be pulled up over the
diver's legs and torso.
11-10

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Figure 11.6 - Viking Variable Volume Heavy Duty Dry Suit
with Surface Supplied AOA Mask
11-11.

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SECTION 1£
WOTECnOft USING SELF-CONTAINED APPARATUS
The snail group and the sport diver are left with onljf one option If
th
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method of pressurizing Jits nusk cannot be used; however, a method must be
devised to prevent the Influx of water Into the mask* This Is the primary
retirement. Should the diver Inhale droplets of contaminated water, *11
other efforts of conta1r*>ent mould be futile.
The diver's entire body not covered by the face nuk must be Isolated
from the surrounding rmriroiiment. There are circumstances where the hands
may be exposed (so long as they can be decontaminated later); however, this
should be an option—full body coverage capability is necessary. This body
covering should not unduly restrict the diver's ability to move and work
underwater-
The diver oust have the ability to adjust his buoyancy, either with
the suit directly, with an auxiliary buoyancy device* or with a domination
of both. This buoyancy mechanism must not restrict the diver's ability to
move and work underwater.
The equipment should be available off the shelf with little or no
modification requireo to make it functional for use In biologically-
contaminated water. IdealTy* It should be within a reasonable price range
affordable by the small group or the sport diver. It should be simple in
design for ease of maintenance* and simple in use for ease 1n trainlng-
/Wid finally* the equipment must not pose a greater threat to the diver
than would exposure to the contaminated water.
In sumary» the diver's air supply and his body must be isolated* he
must be able to wurJt competently ana safely In the equipment, and the
equipment must be staple, convenient* Inexpensive, and Avallahle-


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SECTION 13
SELECTION OF SPECIFIC SELF-CONTAINED EQUIPMENT
MD PR0C£0UKES FOR BlOLltiZCAl HAZARDS
The selection of this self-contained equipment to protect divers from
biological hazards was based upon a series of rigorous tests, together with
the stipulations that the diver be able to perform work tasks competently
and safely in the equipment* and that the gear also be relatively simple
and convenient to service* wear* and operate*
Specific controlled tests were run for the Poseidon Unlsuit, the
tonpeHal bubble Suit, the Poseidon Jet Suit, and the Villi;*, Suit. A total
of 1,110 recorded dives here made during the KOAA study (4J along with
approximately 60 unrecorded dives- Helnets evaluates were the AGA Divator
System* the Kirby-Horgan Band Mask, and the Super!ite }?.
The AGA levator ftlq. A significant portion of the testing was per-
formed to gain in understanding of how the complete AGA Divator rig would
be suited for polluted water diving. The rtg 1s adaptable to a surface
supply umbilical, so this aspect also was tested.
The ASA uwator full face mask, as shown In Figure 13.1. is outfitted
with a skirt and Inner oral nasal manufactured of a special rubber that is
soft, rugged, ana light-weight, yet Impervious to seawater and to extremes
of cold and limited chemical concentrations- It has a built-in second
stage regulator equipped with a safety pressure device that creates a
safety pressure inside the mask* «Jhen the safety pressure is turned on by
rotating the valve cover toward the diver, a pressure of about one inch of
water column over ambient pressure Is maintained within the mask. This
safety pressure seals a reverse lip at the skirt of the mask, creating a
positive and comfortable seal against the facial contours. It also
precludes In-leakage and* according to the manufacturer, assures that the
mask 1s self-purging should It become necessary to remove it and put it on
underwater* with the safety pressure on, It is nearly impossible to
accidentally have the mask removed underwater, making It unlikely that It
would ever be knocked off fry bumping Into an object or by a high current.
The faceplate consists of an extremely wide-angle, hlgh-lapact poly-
carbonate having tbe same refractive Index as water. Peripheral vision Is
exceptional; however, there Is a pronounced "aquarium effect" where the side
panels meet the front plate. Some of the masks used during these tests had
the side panels roughened up with sandpaper on the inside to eliminate this
effect. The mask accommodates wireframed glasses without modification. It
has a reoovable o-r1ng sealed cover plate for Installation of a microphone*
13-1

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QIAL-NASAL
EXHALATION
CHAW* EL
5RC0HC STAG*
DIAPfCMH AMD
SAFETY VALVR
ASSEMBLY
SECOND STaCE
heculatoh
HtchAriish
quick
RELEASE
BUCKLE
MASK SKIRT
9
WV

MUSHROOM
valve
DEFROSTER
PORT
inhalation
CHANNEL
AlH INLET
Figure L3.1 AGA Full Face Mask
13-?

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Die MM Dlvator also Incorporates separate Inhalation and exhalation
channels to Qlnialze carbon dioxide build-up inside the mask» Inhaled air
crosses the faceplate, becoming moisturized as ft clears the faceplate, and
enters the oral-nasal through Bushman valves, Exhaled air passes directly
through the oral-nasal into the exhalation channel, and through a one~way
valve Into the water* Because of the positive pressure Inside the mask*
water is unlikely to baekflow through the one-way valve* This feature,
more than any other, was why the KOAA Report considered the AEA Dlvator
such a good prospect for biologically-polluted water diving use.
SCUBA second stage regulators normally are supplied with air from the
first stage regulator at about 140 ps1 above ambient. The AGA first stage
supplies the mask with only 90 ps1. This first stage regulator is specifi-
cally designed to mount beneath two snail inverted air tanks and is not
well-suited for mounting on standard SCU6A tanks* Host of the testing,
therefore* was accomplished with standard tanks using first stage regulators
that had their secondary pressures reduced to 90 psi. The AGA first stage
regulator, however* also accommodates a surface-supplied uobilical, so tests
were run with the complete A&A Olvater rig* In addition to reducing the
secondary output pressure of these standard first stage regulators, they
were freeze protected* This amounts to filling the pressure-sensing
mechanism with silicone, fluid and sealing the opening with a flexible
rubber cap. Ir, this way the pressure sensing Mechanism is isolated from
contact with the water, hut It can still transmit a pressure signal to the
control sechanlsa. Kits for making thfs codification usually are supplied
by the regulator manufacturer.
There is a pressure sensing mechanism Inside the A&A, Dlvator first
stage regulator that will keep the diver breathing umbilical air so long as
It Is supplied at a pressure greater than 90 psl. As discussed in the prev-
ious section, however * pressure greater than 110 psl will break the
pressure-balancing diaphragm inside the second stage mechanist*, when the
umbilical pressure drops below 90 psl, the regulator automatically switches
to the tanks, and the diver does not know this Is happening, taring field
tests 1n this mode, occasionally a diver found his tank pressure much lower
than 1t should have been when he switched to his tanks* The reason was
traceu to this phenomenon- To prevent this during the tests* the AGA tanks
were secured by the alver until he actually needed them. This turned out
to be practical and easy to do*
Luring early dives with the conplete AGA Levator rig, divers found they
were excessively heavy. It was determined tmt when the AHA tanks are
filled with air they are 19 pounds negative 1n fresh water. This Implies
that a wet-suited diver needs no extra weight when diving with this rig,
and a dry-suited alver can use IS pounds less than J«e normally would use.
This results 1n an extremely comfortable dive, especially when diving In a
non-neoprene suit.
During an evaluation dive, the diver descended on surface supply and
at depth he switched from wobHical to tanks. Very shortly thereafter he
experienced heavy breathing resistance, he commenced twnedlate ascent to
the surface* Ay the time he had reached the surface, he could get no air
at all froQ the mask, yet his tank gauge showed nearly 4,D00 psl in the
13-3

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tanks. In the field this could have been a potentially dlsasterous problem*
although It was easily handled under the controlled circumstances of the
In-depth study*
A detailed lock at this problem determined that water from a previous
dive which had found Its way Inside the ASA first stage regulator had not
been completely removed by the five minutes of free-flow. It had penetrated
around the main valve spring where It was isolated free mbllical air
flowing through the regulator. When the diver disconnected his until Ilea]
and switched to his tanks* water around the main spring was distributed
throughout the regulator by the high-pressure tank air flowing past the
spring. The aolabatlc pressure change dropped the regulator body tempera-
ture below freezing* and the entire regulator became clogged with ice.
This seems to be a design defect of the AGA Levator first stage
regulator, since there appears to be no way to get water away from the main
spring without using tank air which imoeolately freezes up the regulator*
7h1s problem effectively precludes its use for combined surface-supply and
SCliHA operations except under carefully controlled circumstances where
there is absolutely no chance of water getting into the first stage*
ASA Pivjtar and dry suit compatibility The ASA levator seats against
the face with a broad /turned Inward sfcirt* The internal safety pressure
assists In making the seal* (Jives were made with the mask seal against the
face and the hood seal against the mask, and the other way round* Some
face seals had been modified so that they made a good seal with the outer
side of the A£A levator mask. Some of the face seals were designed with a
smooth rubber surface facing out so that the mask could make a good seal
against it* Thus, the two *utsic configurations were mask outside of hood*
and hood outsfde of mask*
The AGA Uivator conformed well to most facial contours and so generally
made a good seal against the face* In cases where the diver's facta!
contours or his facial hair Interfered wfth a complete seal, air leaked out
from around the masJt* With the hood outside the mask, the hood filled with
air. for divers experiencing this problem, It was found that the hood made
a better seal against the face than the mask old « These divers were more
satisfied with the mask against the outside of the hood seal* In cases
where the hood seal outer surface was nylon, there was a continual stream
of air leaking from arouna the mask- Where the hood seal outer surface was
smooth rubber, the mask maoe an effective seal against the hood and there
was no leakage of air*
Future suits should be obtaineo with a smooth rubber outer surface on
the face seal* and the mask normally should be worn against this surface*
The ASA Dlvator mask can be aade compatible with all types of dry suit
hoods* The ideal arrangement, however, is a hood face seal with a smooth
rubber outer surface against which the mask seals.
The summary of the A&A ulyator evaluation and testing is as follows;
13-4

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1.	Any first stage regulator from the top list to the havy Experi-
mental Ulvlng 6roup regulator study (Hlddleton, 1980) can be used to supply
the AGA Dlyatcir mask. Care must be taken to ensure that the regulator,
adaptor fitting (If any), ana hose are compatible. The regulator must have
Its secondary output pressure reduced to 90 pst, and the pressure sensing
¦eohanlsn must be freete-protected*
2.	The coMplete AbA levator rig, including mask, first stage regu~
lator, tanks, and backpack, is compatible for polluted water diving, but
there sre certain drawbacks* The unit cannot be used In the contained:
surface supply-SCll&A «de without very special precautions* The suit air
supply must oe thought out In advance* one care mst be exercised to ensure
that fittings are compatible* An appropriate charging source for the tanks
also »ust be available for full utilization of the rig.
3* A flooded A6A fitvator Mask will devater Itself automatically If
proper procedures are used; however, the diver should be trained and
practiced In these procedures. It is unlikely that the mask will become
dislodged or knocked off accidentally*
4* The ASA Dlvator mask can be made compatible with all types of dry
suit hoods. The Ideal arrangement* however* Is a hood face seal wltti a
smooth rubber outer surface against which the mask can seal.
5. khen used with an AGA Olvator, snug-type dry suits consume about
one-thlro less air than do bulky-type suits* Bulky-type non-neoprene suits
consume about one-thlro aore air than do bulky-type neoprene suits*
The Klrbv-horqan Band rtask
The lightweight diving outfit Is surface-supplied with air for
breathing, but unlike the deep-sea outfit, it does not admit air into the
diving dress for buoyancy control* (living which uses lightweight equipment
is Halted In depth, depending upon the equipment being used*
If the KK Band Mask or USA MX. 1 shown in Fig. 13* Z fs used, depths are
limited to 130 feet (39.6 meters J without the support of an open bell and
190 feet 157.9 meters) with a bell. The basic conponents of a lightweight
outfit are:
The «ask group which includes all valving. There are two different
models of lightweight masks—the standard or "Jack Browne- rig, which
1s not suitable for polluted water operations, or the KM Mask and USK
UK 1*
The rfivlnu dress group, which Includes the diving Oress (with two
styles, wet or dry, available), and gloves, shoes* chafing pants,
weighted belt, ana knife.
The hose group, which includes the air hose and fittings, lifeline,
coamunlcations cable (If applicable) and the pneunofathometer.
13-5

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Figure 13.2 P*ttiogen1ca11y Protected! Diver with Heavy Duty Ylklng Dry
Suit and Surface Supplied Klrby Morgan Sand Hask
13-6

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The band hask Is an lopraved version of the standard lightweight muk.
It permits two-way voice eoaunlcitfan between the diver and the surface,
add It has features that ratnimiie the dangers of flooding* face squeeze*
and CUg buildup* The mask 1s basically a demand breathing apparatus, hut
Incorporates an emergency free flow capability for defogging the faceplate.
This free flow najr also be used as an emergency breathing nude or far clear-
ing the mask when flaoaM. The oemand regulator Is manually adjusted during
a dive to accommodate changing overbottom pressures supplied to the aask.
It can be adjusted to provide continuous flow through the orat-nasal mask
should a specific operational dive scenario require this. The mis*, how-
ever * 1s basically a demand Mask and provides all the air required by the
diver then used in the demand mode; the above "d1al-a-breath* and emergency
free Mw are not routinely utilised. For added safety beyond 60-foct
depth usage, the sasJc Is equipped with a backup air supply bottle commonly
referred to as a "come home bottle*" or "pony bottle*"
The band mask is built around a molded plastic frame upon which are
mounted a rubber face seal* a head harness* a faceplate lens made of
l/4-1nch acrylic plastic, a side block assembly, a demand regulator and a
moveable nose pod* which con be used by the diver as an aid Id clearing his
ears and sinuses.
-- Side rilock tesemhljf -- This assembly functions as a manifold. It
Is fitted with an on/off defogger valve, uhich controls a steady
air flow Into the mask and across the Inside of the faceplate.
This feature 1s also used as an emergency breithing mode In the
event of demand regulator failure. The emergency breathing supply
valve for the come hone bottle is located on the rear of the side
block. The nan-return valve Is located within the side block
assembly.
« Demand Regulator — The demand regulator is set into the mask in
front of the diver's mouth. This regulator Is similar to the
second stage of a single hose SCUM regulator- Air passes to the
demand regulator from tbe side block assembly through a hard pipe;
the flow of air is controlled by the diver's breathing rate* A
manual purge button permits the diver to establish a free flow
through the regulator- The regulator Is adjusted by a knob on its
side to accommodate air supplied at overbottom pressures as
necessitated by operational requlrements* The knob can be opened
slightly to permit a free flow through the oral-nasal aask as
discussed previously,
—	Emergency A1 r Supp1y — The emergency breathing supply valve
provides an air supply path parallel to the non-return valve-
Threads on the Inlet of this valve permit attachment of the "come
home bottle" whip. The "come home bottle* is equippeo with a
SCUBA type first stage regulator.
—	Frame Exhaust Valve -- This is a mushroom-type valve which Is
located In the mask frame under the demand regulator. The exhaust
valve Is at the lowest point In the mask; thereforea when the mask
13-7

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upright, the discharge through the valve automatically purges
water from the mask* Under ordinary conditions, this valve
accomodates the steady defogger flow*
— Pral-Nasal Mask — This unit Is aounted Inside the main body of the
Bisk* an arrangement which reduces both dead space within the *ask
ana the potential for CO^ build-up. In normal demand operation,
the air flews directly into the oral-nasal raasfc and 1s directed
through the regulator exhaust. When emergency free flew,
defegging, or venting Is executed &y opening the defogger valve,
part of the flow enters the oral-nasal mask through a check ualve
In its wall and passes out through the regulator exhaust valve.
The oral-nasal aask is a vital component of the MK ! mask and nust
never be removed-
-- Communications — farphone and microphone assemblies are Installed
1n the Mask* Cottwunfcation wires pass through a watertight fitting
In the mask frame and are appropriately connected to internal
terminal posts. Standard fiavj amplifiers are compatible with this
equipment*
the diving dress which has been utilized with the banc* aasfc
Includes the UnUuit. Viking Dry Suit* and standard wst suit*
A sunary of tne band nask test evaluations is as follows:
I, ugnai^d mode* normally used tor band mask operations,, cannot be
used for polluted water diving*
2* Open circuit mode is effective for polluted water dlying, but only
should be ised With surface supply because of high air consumption.
3* Both hem 1 and Hod 2* when coupled to a p&Uuted water-modified
hood, can be -used for polluted water diving In either SCliBA or surface-
supply mode.
Modification one (Hod 1J consisted of placing U«S« Divers' eKhalation
flutter valves over the exhaust tee ends to prevent back flour of water into
the second stage regulator attached to the mask. The standard hood* which
has a slide fastener from the top of the head down the back for ease of
entry, was replaced with a hood minus the slide fastener- Hits was
designed specifically for ease of mating to the neck seal using Viking neck
e'limps<, Hod 1 was intended for SCUBA use in demand mode only except for
occasional use of the defogger valve to clear the faceplate* During
surface-Supplied tests, both demand and open circuit were used.
Notification two (Hod 2} consisted of removing the second stage exhaust
valve entirely* blanking off the opening* and reversing the mushroom valve
through the oral-nasal so that air flow was from the oral-nasal to the mask
instead of tne other way around. In this configuration* breathing air
could be obtained only through the demand waive. Air fro* the defogger
valve coulo be used to clear the faceplate, but was not available for
i3-a

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breathing. Hood wodlficat1 ens were identical lo those for Hod I,
The band mask Is supplied from a first stage regulator just as standard
SCUBA regulators are* The first stage regulator must be freeze protected
as with the AGA blvator. During these tests* the U«S» Divers Conshelf and
the Scubapro Hark 5 were used* but It mist be remesbered that the Nark 5 is
difficult tc freeze protect. The test dives were In clean water, so freere
protection was not critical, and the available supply of freeze protected
first stage regulators was augmented by the HARK 5 regulators present.
During normal use, most divers put a small hole 1n the top of their dry
suit and band mask hoods. While diving, air often escapes around the neck
seal or face seal and accumulates in the hood. This hole serves to let that
air out. This hole also lets water 1n, so this practice is unacceptable for
diving 1n contaminated water. A provisional solution to this problem was
found, during the Field studies* A Sea Quest BC overpressuriiatlon valve was
installed In the hoods- The valve was fitted with the lightest spring
available from Sea Quest* but when this proved to be too stiff, It was
further reduced by clipping off various lengths until an apparently satis-
factory size was found* BC overpressurlzatlon valves adjusted In this
fashion were Installed in all suit and band aask hoods.
4, when the modified hooa 1s mated to a dry suit* care must be taken
to ensure that the whole arrangement Is not too tight. Removal of thick
neoprene heads from the dry suit* leaving enough material to mate with the
band nask hood, appears to be the best solution where thick hoods cause
excessive tightness*
5* Effective hood relief valve cracking pressure experimentally 1s
less than 0.2 psl. The position of the spring within valve housing, or the
valve housing used, is not a significant factor- Relief valve findings are
Sketchy, however, and more work Is needed before further definitive
statements can be made*
Jteeoamendad Dlvlno Uress for Hicrobloloolcal hazards
The recom&enaed systwi presented here Is not the only solution to the
problem of protecting a SCUBA diver from the hazards of polluted water* It
certainly Is not the best solution, for gaps still exist* and research still
goes forward; but It is a working solution, one that the ffndlngs of this
study clearly show adequately protects the SCUBA diver* It can be
considered an Interim solution for biologically-contaminated water* one
that can be^ already is being used around the world where standard
SCUOA techniques are Inadequate, and where surface supply cannot be used.
One of the basic premises of this undertaking was that the final solu-
tion had to Include equipment that was available off-the-shelf with little
or no modification required to make it functional for use fn contaminated
water. Also, it had to be reasonably priced, simple fn design, and easy to
use.
13-9

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There were two elements specifically required, a suit and a mask* The
research turned up a generalized suit solution, and two mask solutions, one
generalized, and the other brand specific, the preferred solution being the
latter* Uilliscraft (15) went to great lengths to avoid specific brand
enforcement or disparagement during this study, and the inclusion of a
specific mask In the recommended solution should not be considered as an
endorsement of the manufacturer's product; rather* It should be considered
as an endorsement of the underlying principles the Manufacturer chose to
apply in the production of this particular mask* Any future mask appearing
on the market which would possess stellar characteristics would be equally
acceptable after a suitable series of tests to ensure that it did not
compromise the essential requirement—absolute exclusion of the outside
environment*
The Suit* The recommended suit Is a "smooth skin" dry suit having the
following characteristics: It nust have an attached hood and attached
boots, although the hood may be removable so long as 1t can be mated to the
suit with a waterproof seal as In the Viking Suit* It must have a means of
Inflation from either the divert air tanks or fro* an external "pony
bottle*" Care must be taken to ensure that any adaptors used in the
Inflation hose are flow matched to the hose* It must have a diver*
controllable exhaust valve that keeps water out of the suit* The hood must
have an Installed relief valve that relieves automatically to vent off any
air accumulating In the hooa. And above all, the sutt must keep the diver
completely dry on a test dive in clean water*
A diver requiring hand protection can add special cuffs to his dry
suit and attach heavy-duty rubber gloves with long cuffs to these suit
cuffs* Attachment can be accomplished by slipping a short piece of plastic
pipe over hand and wrist, and clamping the glove and suit cuff to this pipe
section with a hose clamp* Care should be taken to ensure that the seams
where the cuffs attach to the suit are genuinely waterproof.
The pa.sk* The recownenoed mask is the AGA ulyator mask couplGd to any
standard "first stage regulator noted 1n the top listing of the flavy
Experimental Utvlng Group regulator study (ftlodleton, 1980}* This first
stage regulator must have its secondary output pressure reduced to 90 ps1,
and it nust be freeze-protected» Since the AftA Clvator Is manufactured to
metric standards, ano mast of the first stage regulators on the Navy list
are manufactured to IUS. standards, it may be necessary to use adaptors to
connect the two items* where possible, the AGA Ulvator hose should have
Its metric fittings removed and an appropriate fitting attached* Otherwise,
care must be taken to ensure that the adaptors are flow matched to the hose-
In use, the mask safety pressure must always be turneo on*
The complete AGA ulvator rig also is acceptable, provided appropriate
means are used to supply air for suit inflation. This complete outfit,
however, is quite expensive, especially when one considers the required
ancillary equipment, so this solution does not really meet the originally-
stipulated cost retirements*
It is possible that other manufacturers will choose to produce Masks
that, like the Olvator, are internally pressurised to prevent iri~leakage of
13-10

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water* khan produced, such masks also will be acceptable provided 1n-
leilnge Is absolutely prevented. A particular point to witch out for Is
back-seepage around the exhaust diaphragm In the Orator, this problem is
circumvented by separating the Inhalation and exhalation channels. Any new
ntasfc Must solve this problem with equal success.
The other recommended mask solution is a band mask* Hod 1 or Mod 2,
Mod 1 consists of attaching flutter valves to both sides of the mask exhaust
tee, Nad 1 consists of removing the second stage regulator exhaust dia-
phragm and housing, blanking off the opening* and reversing the mushroom
valve in the oral-nasal. For both modifications, the hood is replaced with
one having no slide fastener and having a straight neck designed for attach-
ment to the suit neck with a ring and clamp similar to the Viking Suit ring
and clasp. The hood also must have a relief valve near the top set to
release at no more than 0*2 psl*
The band mask is not the solution of choice, because, like the complete
ASA LHvator rig. It is qcite expensive and, therefore* outside the origi-
nally stipulated cost requirements* Many diving organizations, however,
already possess one or more such masks, and In this case, this solution Is
much less expensive than any other. H must be Stressed that diver comfort
is loner than with the A&a Qivator, and the band mask configured for
polluted water diving is more cumbersome to put on and take off. Diver
abandonment of his breathing equipaent underwater also is much store
difficult with this equipment, but this action always should be considered
as the very last resort in polluted water.
A final consideration when using a modified band mask for polluted
water flivfng is that it Bar be necessary to remove neuprane dry suit hoods
in order to make the rig sufficiently comfortable. Should this he dune,
enough suit hood material oust he left to allow for mating of the band mask
hooa tc the dry suit.
33-11

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SECTION 14
HOD1FIED SURFACE-SUPPORTED DIVING SYSTEMS
Draegar Constant Vol Lime Suit
The ftraeger Constant Volume Suit with neck entry emerged as a likely
candidate for providing adequate protection in polluted water. Its thick,
smooth neoprene surface can be decontaminated more readily than other dry
suits. The hood fully encloses the divert head, has the demand regulator
bum In, and seals to the suit at the neck entry point In a simple*
reltable fashion, thereto eliminating the need for a water-tight rfpper.
Early In the evaluation program It became apparent that most exhaust
valves In demand regulators allow a few small droplets of water to enter
during the exhaust cycle. When the demand valve is activated, the Jet of
incoming air breaks up the droplets Into a mist which Is then Inhaled by
the diver. This normally 1s not noticed by the divet\ and In clean water
It 1s of nc significance. Failure of the exhaust valve was also of
concern.
To compensate for these weak points, the exhaust valve of a Scubapro
HarK 5 demand regulator was eliminated and the valve port "blanked off"
{F1g. 14,11, The pathway of breathing gas was then "In only- through the
demand regulator and Into the Draeger oral mask. A separate exhaust
valve was mounted in the part which formerly contained the Draeger demand
regulator. To eliminate "splash back* and to provide greater
reliability, two exhaust valves were mounted In series* separated and
sealed at each end by large "O" rings. Fig+ 14.i shows a breakdown of
this series exhaust valve (5EV). Test dives with these modifications
showed a slight but acceptable increase in exhalation resistance* The
demand regulator will also freeflow slightly when the outlet of the SEY
15 higher in the water column than the demand: regulator diaphrap.
To provide communications, a microphone and electrical penetrator
were mounted in the plug provided on the right side of the Draeger hood*
The earphone Is mounted in an existing pocket on the outside of the
hood. This configuration (Fig, 14.3} provides excellent communications
with a minimum of penetrations into the suit, It can be used with hard
wire or wireless systems,
Some divers experience difficulty 1n equalizing their ears during
descent when using this apparatus. To assist divers In wr clearing, an
ear equalization pad (Gaudlosf pad), made of foam neopraie, was glued
Into the lower portion of the mask. Fig. 14.4 shows the Draeger hood
with all of the above-mentioned modifications and additions,
14-1

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Suit-Under-Suit
Thermaregulatlon Is a coanon problem in diving* Normally, hypothermia
Is the problem, and diving suits an designed to keep divers Mm. either
passively with insulation, or actively by pissing hot water through
specially constructed suits. WMA divers have encountered situations in
which significant overheating of the diver has occurred due to Ham water
and the necessity of wearing a dty suit for protection against polluted
water. The "sutt-under-suif (5US} was developed to allow heating or
cooling of the diver, and to reduce the probability of contanlnation of the
diver's bofr In the event of damage to the suit. [See figure 14,5)
Dry suits containing air have significant Internal/external pressure
differentials, depending upon the position of the diver In the water.
Since both a pressure differential and a hole are required for entry of
water into a dry wit, elimination of one of these factors will eliminate
entry of outside water. If the inside of a dry suit Is filled with water,
the Internal/external pressure differential can he reduced or eliminated.
This same water can be used for diver thermoregulation.
Fig. 14*S shows the SUS. A tight-fitting foam neoprene undersuit with
attached feet and neck entry wakes up the Innermost portion of this system.
The neck of this suit seals to the neck ring of the Draeger suit. A neck
dun provides a seal between the neck ring and the diver's neck (Fig, 14.7L
The Draeger suit and hood seal is then wade In a normal fashion over the
$[|S and neck dam. Clean water is pimped into the area between the SlIS and
the Qraeger suit via the umbilical from the surface, and the water exits
through the exhaust valves near the ankle of the Draeger suit. The neck
dam prevents entry of this water into the hood.
The suit is filled with water while the diver Is at the surface of the
water with Ms feet in an elevated position to allow the escape of air
through the exhaust valves. The diver must exit fro* the water slowly at
the end of the dive to allow adequate time for water to drain from the
suit. A two-way valve is provided to alio* the diver to control the rate
of flow through the suitt and to provide discharge of pu^ied water In order
to maintain a rapid flow through the hose. Ihe latter fs sonatinas
necessary to maintain proper water temperature.
Test dives with this system proved to be significantly more comfortable
for the diver than an air-filled dry suit. No pressure differentials exist,
thereby eliminating suit squeeze. Buoyancy changes due to compression and
expansion of air end air shifting within the suit are also eliminated.
Another feature of the Draeger hood that MOAA has modified is the
hinged faceplate. The hinge normally allows the faceplate to be opened on
the surface for the diver's comfort. It was felt that the danger of an
accidental opening in the polluted water or leaks through the seal out-
weighed this short-term convenience. A new texan faceplate was machined to
replace the original and fs fitted Into a recessed groove behind the opening
for the original. This faceplate Is held In place hy the original clamp.
This configuration has comfort drawbacks for divers with long noses.
14-2

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Demand Regulator Mod. II
exfiausi
plug
regulator body
SIDE VIEW
regulator cover
diaphram
rubber y
gasket \
mouth piece
adapter
Ffgure J4 rl
14-3

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S«rt*» Exhaiut ViLv* Mod. I {Brvtfcdnwfi}
iiii
t. E>hiuil hIh body
2,	O-flint, |00= 1 ui\ WsVif)
3,	Chttfc vib* body
4,	o^ninptoD=iKw = y»u)
s. Chtcfc mIm body
ftu 0 RJnS {0D- 1 W a Vt I
T C#p
«. Ekhuti ifUN bodfy up
Figure 14,2

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Driigor ComnuiiUMttwi Mdd- >1
OdtphocM & marsh
marina eoftntctton
Figure 14.3
14-5

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Drager Polluted Water Ditfng Hood (Hod. I
54Hh Exhaust Vahrt
fltferophoft* Mod. u
Demand ftegutatar Mod. II
Ftgura 14+4
14-15

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Standard nn-aeoer
Draeger Howl w/Modtfied Viking
"Su1 t-Uncfer-SuU" Dress
Figure 14.5 - praeger System
14-7

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Suit Under Suit (SALS.)
Drager neck ring
damp
LJ
neck yoke
water inlet
Inner layer suit
outer layer suit
attached
2-way water
Intet waive
fa-aide water
water Inlet whip
Drager ankle
exhaust vahre
Figure 14.6
US

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S.li.S. Nock Assembly

Ongtf n#ck ring
dtnp
Figure 14.7
14-9

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The HjMZ Surface-Supplied Diving System (SSOS)
The MK-12 SSDS as shown in Figure 14*8, consists of four major assem-
blies* the helmet assembly, the recireular assembly, the dress assembly and
support equipment* The helmet nay be used with air or mixed gas as the
breathing radium* with the use of the reel rculator as a modular, add-on
component for mixed gas operation. The normal diving dress consists of a
crushed foam neoprene nylon dry suit, outer chafing garment* jocking
harness, lightweight diving boots* and gloves. Two-, four-, and five-pound
lead weights (to a maximum of 6C 1bs) fit into the caH, thigh, and hip
pockets of the outer parent. The swinging dress consists of either a wet
suit or swim trunks with jocking harness, fins, scuba weight belt or outer
garment, and weights and the neck-dam with exhaust valve In the ambient
configuration. All dress configurations require the use of the jacking
harness to provide helmet stability.
The WC-12 SSOS air operations will support a diver performing tasks
varying from light to heavy *»rfc to depths of 250 FSW. Operating the rtlC-12
SSOS with console overbottmi pressure determined by hose length and dive
depth provides the means of ensuring adequate airflow through the helmet.
The HK-12 is an open circuit system irt air operations. The air is supplied
from the surface by the umbilical hose through a non-return valve within
the air supply adapter, through stainless steel tubing to the atr supply
valve, and out into the helmet by means of the air supply dlffuser. The
air Is directed up across the front viewport and toward the diver's face,
exiting the helmet vie the exhaust valve* In the adjustable configuration,
the normal operating range of the exhaust valve provides a helmet pressure
differential of 0.3 + 0,0$ psi to 2,0 + 0,3 psi with a flow of 6 ACfH.
The helmet shell is laid up with fiberglass cloth and polyester resin
for a strong* light* impact-resistant structure. The shell is coated with
a highly visible yellow gel coat to provide the definition, A cast
lead weight is cut to fit into the crown of the helmet, then laminated with
fiberglass and resin. The weight Is sized and located to make the helmet
neutral in buoyancy and to counterbalance the weight of the base and breach
rings. This makes the centers of gravity and buoyancy coincide, resulting
in a stable comfortable helmet in all positions.
The standard diving dress is a cocmerdally available drysuit modified
to accept the MK-12 lower breach ring. It is made of 1/A-ineh closed cell
neoprene rubber-backed on both sides with nylon fabric. The seams curve
around the legs to produce minimum stretching of the seams, reducing tension
and consequently reducing the chance of leaks. The seams are butt-fitted,
glued with neoprene cement, and covered on the inside surface with seal
tape.
The outer nylon chafing garaent serves several purposes. It provides
protection for the dry suit against snagging* tearing, and abrasion;
provides inflation restraint to prevent inadvertent flow-up, has pockets
for Installing diver weights* and aids in maintaining the jocVfng harness
in place.
The standard HK-12 SSOS diving dness is virtually Impossible to
decontaminate and does not provide a dry suit/glove interface. As a result
14-10

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HK-12 SSDS and Modified
Viking Suit w/VHght Pockets
HC-12 5SDS and Modified Vlfclng
Suit wo/Melght Pockets
tK-12 SSDS and Standard
Issue Faa« Nwprene Suit and
Chafing Garment
Ftggr§ 14* B Wavy Hfc-12 Surface-Supplied Oivlng System (SSDS)
14-11

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of this situation* Wing Technical Rubber has produced two variations cf
the MK-12 diving dress as show in Figure 14.8 which are veiy suitable for
contaminated water operations. Each is delivered with the lower MK-12
helmet breach ring attached,
The first Yfklng suit model is an exact duplicate of the standard HK-12
outer chafing garment. This Viking dress provides all necessary wight
pockets to accept the GO pounds of lead toars» blocks, and rods required for
diver buoyancy control. This suit also includes the empress, calf* and
thigh straps to prevent diver "blow-up" or overpressurlzation.
The second Viking WK-12 model suit Is a smooth dress with no weight
pockets or compressive straps. this model retires tl» utilization of the
standard outer chafing overalls.
The Viking suits are made of very heavy weight 1.1 im thrtck natural
rubber bonded onto polyester tricot fabric, the rubber provides the
mterproofing but no insulation. The diver wears either clothing or
insulated underwear for warmth. The thickness of these undergarments can
vary with the water temperature expected. For especially cold water*
Viking offers a Jumpsuit made of 10 run thick polyester foam, lined on two
Sides with nylon. This thermal underwear can be worn over a pair of long
cotton underwear*
The design of the Viking suit has a number of advantages* Meoprene
compresses at depth, becoming thinner and providing less Insulation* The
Viking, however, relies upon the air Inside ft and, especially* the under-
garments* to keep you warm* As the air In the suit Is compressed at depth
and the suit begins to cling, you merely add air Into it until comfortable.
The Viking Suit has also been modified to function 1n the SIS mode is shown
in Figures 14.9 and 1*. 10 and to mate with the HK-12 helmet.
The rubber surface of the Viking is smooth and not likely to snag on
rocks and other sharp objects. It 1s also easy to decontaminate. The
fabric-reinforced rubber doesn't stretch easily and won't balloon when air
is added to the suit. The suit material Is thinner than neoprene and takes
up less space when rolled up. The entire suit fits Into a carrying bag the
slie of the average knapsack (eight Inches In diameter and 24 inches long).
Aiiy suit is only as waterproof as its seams and seals* The seams of
the Viking suits are sewn and theft vulcanized under a rubber tape, making
the whole suit basically one piece of rubber. Ibis provides not only
waterproofing but strength.
There are only four openings in the Viking suit; the necb, each wrfst*
and the back zipper. The boots are attached to the suit and are of the sane
material, only reinforced and Ixrnded to a tough rubber sole complete with
molded tread, An additional layer of rubber 1s bonded to the front of each
leg running from just above to just below the knee as added chafing
resistance.
The wrists of the suit are sealed by stretchy latex cuffs* These are
cemented to the arms under rubber tape but can be replaced easily If
damaged* Cuff rings are hard slipped Inside the sleeve of each arm which
14-12

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Donning Outer
VtUng Suit Qngr
Inner 1/8* Suit
Mating N«ck Ring For Inner
and Outer Suits
Figure 14.9 Modified Viking "Sult-Undflr-Sult" for Ht~l2 System
14-1 3

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Figure 14.10 Outer Chaffing Garment for NK-12 Viking
*Suit-Lfnder-5ti1tB Dress
U-14

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Inner Latex Glove
Outer Heavy Neoprene Glove
Hose Clamp to Secure
Neopreae Glove
Outer Cotton Chaflflg Glove
Figure 14,11 Multiple Gloving System
14-16

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Modified lower Breach
Ring on Viking Suit for
SuperlIte - 176
figure lfl.12 Superllte 17-6 Helmet w/Hodifications
14-17

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Figure 14.13 Super!Jte 17-B Diaphrega Protection Cap
1*-1&

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through existing openings which are located in the helmet shell which were
previously used for communications.
By reduction of Internal dead air space, the SupeH.lte-178 r&qulres
only 24 pounds of total weight. Placing the weights on the exterior of the
hat allows this redaction* This redaction of total weight (30$ or more) is
very noticeable under water—tho hat acts more as part of the diver's head.
Most of the hardware on the forward part of the helmet Is interchange-
able with the H*11Qx~!8A/B masks, because of this Intei-changeablllty. spare
parts inventories need very little enlargement to handle servicing and
Qaintenamre.
The SuperL1te-1 ?B was mated with a specially cut Viking heavy duty
co^nerclal diy suft as shown in Figure 14.14. The collar of the Vikfng was
arranged so that the bottom "toilet" seat collar was covered by suit
material and secured by a drawstring. This created a totally dry seal
between the helmet and the suit.
The He!max SS-20 Hpdel a
The design of the Melngx SS-20 Kodet & Mel pet, shown in Fig, 14.15, by
Safety Sea Systws^ Inc., is that of a "clam shell*1 type mask with a hinge-
up head protector equipped with locking levers that seal a one-half inch
thick stainless steel hood ring between the hull section and the head
protector when in the closed and locked position. The nechanlcal
arrangement allows very quick donning and removal of Helm* by the dfver in
either a standing or sitting position. The hull and the head irotector
frame are manufactured from stainless steel. The view port Is 3/BT thick
tuffak (polycarbonate) and 1s coated with a permanent anti-fog compound.
The system is Intended for use with an usftllical that will supply the
breathable gas and the coomunication cable.
Helmftx is equipped with a de«and regulator with an adjustable
tensioning device that allows pressure between 80 psl to ISC p$1 over
ambient diver pressure to be adjusted to proper demand sensitivity. Also
mounted to the same manifold as the demand regulator 1s a one-quarter turn
free flow valve that is designed for metering a steady flow to the diver.
The exhaust valve for the Helmet incorporates a series design utilizing two
"mushroom" valves to prevent any contaminated backwateHng into the helmet.
The Helmax helmet was mated with a specially modified Vlkfng commercial
heaw duty dry suit. The attached hood of the Viking received the Kelmax
helmet ring which allowed for a totally dry seal to be made.
The Pesco Plying Hat
The Desco Diving Hat 1s of simple, rugged, all-metal construction,
that rests on and turns with the diver's head as shown In Figure 14.16. tt
has approximately neutral buoyancy under water. Its low center of gravity
and excellent fore-and-aft balance bold it comfortably and securely on the
diver's head in all working positions.
14-19

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figure 14,14 Mo
-------
Figure 14,15 Helmax 5S-20 Model 0 Helmet
14-21

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i
figure 14,16 Desco Diving Hat m/Modlf Icatlon*
14-?Z

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The neck ring seal is of a ne* and unique design,, providing two Inde-
pendent and complementary waterproof seals. It 1$ designed so that the
diver can put the hat on or take It off quickly. In close quarters, without
assistance from a tender, and even while wearing heavy gloves«.
Unlike the $uperlite-l ft, which Is a demand air supply system, the
Desco Diving Hat Is a free air flow system Air 1s continually Introduced
into the helmet to maintain a positive pressure. The only mortification
made to this system is the addition of the series exhaust which is similar
to that mentioned In the Supertlte-17B modiflcations,.
The construction of the nee* ring Insert permits the hat to be used
either with a neck gasket or with an inflatable diving dress having a
stretchable rubber collar. In either instance, the dress or neck gasket
material can be easily assembled to the neck ring Insert without the use of
screws and without perforation of the material.
The entire hat may be readily and completely disassembled 1n the field
using only a wrench and screwdriver. Neck gaskets can be changed, or the
hat converted to use vrith a dress or dry suit, without use of tools.
The liner Is adjustable to fit various head sizes, and can be rectoved
for cleaning.
A specially modified Viking heavy duty commercial suit was utilized
with the Pesco Hat. The lower breach ring of the helmet is attached to the
Viking suit, providing for a totally dry seal.
14-23

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SECTJW* 15
USIhG SUKFACE-StlPPLItO EQUIP^T
All personnel, aivers, and surface tenders should perform a thorough
check of equipment. (It a dicing operation is staged from a vessel, the
ship's captain must bt notified that oSvers are about to enter the water,
and clearance should be obtained before the diving operation commences.)
Tne water snoulo be enter-en using a ladder as shown in figure 15.1.
jimp entries are discouraged froa a height of more tha» 10 feet above the
water.
The air supply system, helmet or mask, and communications should be
Checked to ensure they are functioning properly. If not, corrections must
be maoe prior to descent.
A oesceni line shoulo oe used at all times In depths greater than
20 feet. Uescent rate will depend upon the diver; generally, however. It
should not exceed 75 feet per minute.
If descending in a tioeway or current, divers should keep their backs
to the current so that they will be forced against the descent Hne.
Currents In excess of three knots generally will preclude all diving
operations.
when the bottom is reached, the surface tender should be notified and
the diver should proceed to the work site. The surface tender also should
keep the oiver constantly informed of bottom time. The diver should always
Pe notified a tew minutes in advance of termination time so there is time
to complete the Us* and prepare for ascent.
tilvers ana surface tenders should review thoroughly line pull signals.
Although voice is the primary means of communication between ajvers and
surface tenders when surtace-supplied equipment is used, the line Is the
backup ceotiunlcation should the voice system fall.
When work is completed, the alver should return to the ascent line and
signal the surface tender that he is ready for ascent. The surface tender
should pull in excess umbilical line slowly and steadily. The diver should
never release the ascent line, but may assist the tender by climbing the
line, lhe surface tender or dive master must inforra the diver well in
advance of decompression requirements. A diving stage may be required for
long decompressions, when decompression is completed, the diver should
return on board ship via the ladder or aiving stage, with assistance as
required from the surface tenders.
15-1

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figure 15.1 Surface-Supplied WC-12 Entry Procedure
15-?

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Protecting the biver
Although the contaainated water problem has been brought sharply into
focus during the last decade, the basic nature of the problem has been
understood for a long time. Since the inception of oivfng, part of the
oevelopment effort has been directed towards solutions to this problem.
Protection Usim. Surfacs Supply
The haro-hat diving rig is Ideally suited for diving in polluted water.
A suit with built-in or attachable gloves covers ths diver's complete body.
The suit 1s nateu to a breastplate or lower breach ring that is mated to
the helnet, and the complete unit is waterproof. The diver's only contact
with the environment is ambient pressure through the suit. If the suit has
no leaks, and if it Is properly cleaned before the diver takes it off, he
will he completely protected fron contact with the water and anything it
contains.
kodem equivalents of the old hard-hat rig do equally well. The main
consideration Is isolation of the diver. So long as the suit 1s completely
dry, and so long as the mating between suit and hat does not leak, the
diver remains unexposed to the contamination. In fact, his tenders are at
greater risk than he is because of their exposure to the contaminants while
handling the diver and his equipment.
A couaercial firm requiring dlviny in polluted water generally will
perform that diving with new equipment to ensure that the diver remain dry
and protected. More careful attention is paid to procedure. Equipment
repair is more carefully controlled. A firm not willing or able to go to
these lengths should contract the job out to another firm that can and will.
Some salvage firms have specialized teams who contract out for these Jobs*
huAA found that band Basks can oe useo for diving in biologically
polluted water so long as they are useo on open circuit instead of deaand
mode. The effect of using open circuit, ojr flowing air through the
oefogyer valve while securing the demand valve completely) is to put a
slight positive pressure in the mask so that any leakage is from the mask
Into the water instead of the other way round, when the mask Is used in
demand mode, the diver's inhalation develops a slight negative pressure
Insloe the mask that causes a slow accumulation of water In the nask. The
source of this water is the exhaust check valve In the demand valve and
other small leaks throughout the mask. Each inhalation breaks this water
into fine droplets which then are inhaled fay the diver along with any
contamination the water contains. Thus, the contamination problem is
compounded having the oiver aspirate the pathogens directly Into his
lungs.
band masks are considerably less expensive than hard hats, a<
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There are other limitations to the use of surface-supplied equlpnent
tor diving In polluted water. These limitations are especially critical
for the research and sport diving groups, the logistics of surface-supplied
diving are considerable. A1r for the divers can i>e supplied by one of two
means. £1ther enough large bottles of high pressure air are brought to the
aive site to support the required diving* plus a safety factor* plus an
emergency supply, or a compressor capable of Resting the same requirements
is located at the dive site. Jt must be noted that 1n response to a
chemical spill, if little volatile organic vapors are present at the dive
site, a compressor Intake would pump high pressure contaminated afr either
to the diver or Into the cascade system. The utilization of off-site filled
cascade bottles Is the only acceptable way to supply breathing air to clivers
at chemical spills, flat should the compressor become disabled* there also
shoulo be another compressor or a set ot emergency high pressure air bottles
available. Standaro procedure when Baking surface-supplies dives also calls
for the presence ot a rec&apresslon chamber as shown in Figure 15-2 (hUAA
Diving Office, 19111). The presence of a chamber calls for the presence of
personnel trained in Its use,, and for the adoltlonal presence of a
hyperbaricatly trained Emergency Medical Technician or a physician, if
possible.
The logistics for a safely run surface~supplied diving operation can
Overwhelm the small organization and are completely out of reach of the
Individual sport diver-
Required training for diving with surface supplied equipment 1s not
more difficult than that required for SCIUSA, but it is different. The U.S.
Navy teaches surface-supplied diving before introducing SCUBA when surface-
supplied aivtng is part of the curriculum, this is done to ensure that the
required habits for surface-supplied diving are adequately Ingrained before
the diver familiarizes hloseIf with the Inoependente of SCUBA diving. NUAA
teaches SUItiA techniques first because most diving within NuAA is SCUBA,
however* selected divers are trainee in surface-supplied techniques at a
later date. Teaching the SCUtfA diver to adjust to the surface-supplied
tether has been a continuous problem, as a SCUBA diver ooes not immediately
adjust to the requirements of surface-supplied diving.
If the logistics hurale can be overcome, the problem of training still
oust be raced. The research group with adequate funding to handle the
logistics could probably also accomplish the training, as the NUAA Diving
uffice has cone. Once again, however, the small group and the sport diver
are left out.
There is yet a third problem that oust be solved before polluted water
can oe tackled with surface supplied gear. Surface-supplies equipment is
intrinsically more expensive than SCOttA equipment. The state of repair of
equipment useo for diving 1n contaminated water Is much more critical than
that of routinely used equipment. This adds to the cost, koutine opera-
tions in polluted water require more frequent replacement of equipment
which again Increases the cost. As before, the smalt group and the sport
diver have little recourse to this method.
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Figure 15.2 48" Diameter, Two Person Recompression Chamber
15-5

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^urface-Supp!ted diver's umhUfcjl
The lightweight diving air hose used with the standard «ask is a
5/16-inch l.U. oxygen hose manufactured pler Z£-h-461. This hose is designed
to withstand a working pressure of 250 psf and & proof pressure of 700 ps1
held for two minutes. After two years lightweight diving hose shall be
hydrostatleally tested to 375 ps 1 ana held for one minute, with retesting
every six months thereafter, until 1t 1s rettred from service after five
years.
hose useo for diving with the standard lightweight mask fs supplied In
lengths of 50 feet, with a female coupling at each end* Two standard length
hoses may be coupled together with a double «ale fitting if i longer usfclIl-
eal Is required.
In operations utilizing a surface-supplied mask, a leader hose is
provided. This leader hose is approximately 30 Inches long with a 3/6-fneh
internal diameter. It leans fro® the side block assembly to the umbilical
attachment at the diver's waist, where 1t attaches to the umbilical. tither
3/6-1nch or 1/2-inch J.J)* diver unbilical hese will be used with the mask.
The lifeline serves three purposes; it removes strain from the air
nose; it permits tending the diver and assisting him in descent and ascent;
and it provides a oeans for maintaining comnunlcatIons with the diver* The
lifeline is made up by the diving unit, using 3-1/4" line of equal strength
{3O0 pound workiny load mini«4iraj. If a surface-supplied mask is to be used,
the communications cable should oe sized to the lifeline. The lifeline Is
secured to the diver using either a slip bowline, snap ring, or custom-made
harness, and in such a manner as not to interfere with the emergency
ditching of the weight belt. The new havjf hrt-12 uablMcal incorporates the
lifeline or "strength14 member In the coarounication line which is made Of
Kevlar, a material used in bulletproof vests.
A pneuMfathometer hose is the final component of the umbilical. It
should be adjusted so that the open end will terminate at the diver's chest.
This hose gives surface tending personnel the Giver's exact depth at all
times.
Accessory Equipment for Sgrface-Supplied Hiving
Accessory equipment which are often useful In lightweight Giving
operations Intluoe the following;
—	hand leadline tor seasuring depth.
—	descending line to guide the diver to the bottom ana for use in
passing tools and equipment. This 3-inch line is cable-lain to
prevent twisting and to facilitate easy identification by the
diver on the bottom. In use, the end of the line may be fastened
to a fixeo underwater object, or ft nay be anchored with a weight
heavy enough to withstand the force of the current.
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-- distance line made of 60 feet of 15-thread cable-laid manlla. The
distance line fs attached to the bottoa end of the descending line
and Is used by the diver as a guide for searching as well as a
means for relocating the descendfrvg line.
—	decompression stage,, constructed to carry one or two divers, Is
used both for putting divers Into the water and for brfngfng thee
to the surface, especially when decompression stops must be made.
The stage platform fs made In an open gril1 wort pattern to reduce
resistance from the water and may Include seats. Guides for the
descending Hue, and several eyebolts for attaching tools,
steadying lines or weights, are provided. The frames of the
stages are collapsible for easy storage,
-- stage line for raising and towering the detrwipressiort stage. It
1s made up from 3" ar 


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Oock$1de Trailer Mounted Air Hack
w/Comaunlcations Box
Shipboard 01 Deck Mounted Air Hack
kr/tnaminicatiCrtS Box
Figure 15.3 Surface Supply Air System?
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SECTION 16
HEAT STRESS IN ENCAPSULATED DIVERS
Encapsulated divers who oust work In warn contaminated waters are tn
thermal difficulty- The water need not be hot. People are surprised that
lukewarm can be dangerous* Past experiences show surprising results 1n
thermal stress which cane from seemingly bland surroundings. The central
thread running through these varied experiences 1s that In all cases there
was a restriction of the normal pathways of heat loss from the body,
especially the ability to lose heat by evaporation.
Then there are the exajuples of men who are severely limited by protec-
tive clothing. Soldiers In chemical warfare gear can just tolerate warn
climatic conditions at rest, but are unable to run, dig, and march; either
they collapse from heat stress or they tear off their (tasks, hoods, and
gloves which are completely Impermeable. Rocket fuel handlers must wear
Impermeable coveralls, and It is evident that they cannot work Twig If It
Is hot. Various means of cooling have been tried. Similarly, workers In
the chemical Industry may have to enter a tank to clean or repair It, and
their protective clothing and respirators become thermally Intolerable If
there Is no way to cool the* underneath the suit. In the nuclear In-
dustry. workers In hot Zones, hot from radiation, wear complete coveralls
for protection, and in many cases they are generously ventilated with clean
air through flexible supply and return ducts. Fresh air is vital, both
because we must consume oxygen and dump CO?, and because we have to
dissipate metabolic heat.
Losing Meat frtw the Body
Thermal balance In air environments is well studied, We are accus-
tomed to being able to regulate heat loss in a wide range of temperatures,
and for a wide range of activities that vary the internal heat production
enormously. When air temperature 1s well below skin teoperature of 33°C
(91 of), enough heat flows to the cold air so that we lose Internally-
generated heat readily* But as soon as either the air Is warm or the heat
production Is high, or both, not enough heat 1s lost by convectlve transfer
alone. The result is that skin temperature rises, and at 350C (9SoF)
sweating begins. As the sweat evaporates, 1t cools the skin, and thermal
balance is restored. Without this physiological response, man would not be
able to live In summer, or Inhabit the desert? and tropics*
The metabolic heat to be dissipated ranges from around 100 kcal/hr at
rest to 300 and 600 kcal/hr during normal physical work. In heavy effort a
fit man can sustain levels like 900 or 1,0CQ kcal/hr. In comfortable afr
16-1

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temperatures, surface hti.it loss by convection Is around 50 kcal/hr, and
Insensible water loss accounts for another 50 or so by evaporation. The
cooling from evaporation of sweat 1$ a powerful addition. If a Hter of
sweat evaporates in an hour, It takes 580 kcal of heat with it. A man who
cannot evaporate his sweat Is In trouble unless you arrange to chill the air
where he works, or supply hi® with some other form of direct cooling*
Tolerance Halts
When you cannot lose heat as fast as you make it, you store it* The
question then is. how much storage is tolerable? The quick answer Is: 150
to 200 kcal. So, considering the heat generation rate, it does not take
long to accumulate too nruch if heat loss pathways are sharply restricted.
Thermal tolerance for heat is defined in a number of ways* There is
tolerance for heat defined by the person's ability to think, reroe»*er, and
solve problems. As heat storage accumulates, this sort of cognitive be-
havior degrades first, then psychomotor performance* As a rule of thumb,
these performance limits are reached at about three-fourths the amount of
heat storage which defines physiological tolerance* Physiological tolerance
for non-compensable heat storage causes, 1n a resting subject, anxiety, high
heart rate, rising rectal temperature, heavy sweating, pallor around the lips
and eyes, extreme restlessness, and then loss of consciousness. This used
to be called impending heat stroke* It happens when about 150 kcal of heat
has been stored and rectal temperature is 39<> to 39.50C (about 1O30F)*
If the man cannot be extracted from the heat exposure, he progresses into
clinical heat stroke, a lethal medical emergency. There have been cases of
heat stroke In the diving industry, usually in compression chambers, but
also in divers In the water. Divers working in the cooling canals and reac-.
tor cores of a nuclear generating plant are subjected to water temperatures
in excess of 430C (llOOf).
Despite the absence of documented information, It is still possible to
speculate on how a diver in complete waterproof encapsulating dress gets too
hot in mildly warm water. If he were nude, his skin temperature would he
the same as water temperature, and water-skin temperatures from about 2flo
to 33<>C would be coaforteble and allow heat dissipation even during hard
work. Water in contact with the skin has a high capacity to carry off
heat. However, If a suit is placed between the skin and the water, the
thermal situation changes remarkably* Because of contaminants in the water,
the dive must be totally Isolated from it.
Heat transfer from skin to water is hampered by the loss of free con-
vectlve transfer from skin to moving water because of the physical barrier
interposed by the suit. So now the body heat must pass by conduction from
skin to suit, by conduction through the suit material, and then to the water.
The thicker the suit material, the slower the conduction through it* If
underwear Is worn, it further slows heat transfer.
The diver moves about and does some work. This requires muscle work,
and the temperature in major muscles rises from around 34®C to 3$£>C.
Therefore, the skin overlying thigh and arms and torso gets warmer than its
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usual 33°C, and soon is warn enough to Initiate sweating. It 1s assured
that the waterproof suit and underwear, however thin, have significantly
decoupled the man from the water„ and direct heat dissipation 1s seriously
restricted. Mow, as sweating falls to cool because there Is no way for it
to evaporate, the skin 1s not cooled, and its temperature rises even more.
Meanwhile* heat generation continues quickly from work as well as the
roetabolisn needed for just being alive. There is nowhere for the heat to
go, so it is stored*
Stored heat can be tolerated only to a certain level—a level which
remains to be established for this particular condition of work and thermal
restriction. As a guess, it 1$ 200 kcal for the beginning of performance
changes*
Stored heat causes the body temperature to rise. Once the surface
tissues have risen to near the internal temperature, It takes only 60 kcal
to cause a degree of rise in core temperature. If the diver is working at
an expected rate of 300 kcal/hr, the tine to go from 37® 38°C rectal
temperature Is only 12 minutes. In 36 minutes he would have reached 40oc.
Too hot. Of course there Is a buildup tine of 10 or 20 minutes before this,
so the total time is probably 45 rinutes. It is further assumed that the
water temperature is not so high that it contributes directly to the
thermal burden. This means that the scenario should apply for water
temperatures between 2So and 37oc.
If a ma" had to work 1n water warmer than 37°C, he would have to
store not only his own metabolic heat but that which leaked in through the
suit as well. So his time to tolerance would be even shorter.
The great difference between the encapsulated diver and a man doing
the same work 1n warm air is that the diver cannot lose heat by sweating,
though sweat he will*
Heat Stress Monitoring
For monitoring the body's recuperative ability to excess heat, one or
more of the following techniques should be used as a screening mechanism.
In the monitoring of personnel, both divers and surface support tenders,
wearing Impervious clothing should commence when the asfcient temperature is
70oF or above. Frequency of oonltoHng should increase as the aabient
temperature increases or as slow recovery rates are indicated, when
temperatures exceed 850F, workers should be oonltored for heat stress
after every work period.
1. Heart rate (HR) should he measured by the radial pulse for 30
seconds as early as possible in the resting period. The HR at the
beginning of the rest period should not exceed 110 beats per
minute. If the HR is higher, the next work period should be
shortened by 10 minutes (or 33X)f while the length of the rest
period stays the same. If the pulse rate is 100 beats per minute
at the beginning of the next rest period, the following work cycle
should be shortened by 335,
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2,	Body temperature should be measured orally with a clinical
thermometer as early as possible in the resting period. Oral
temperature (OT) at the beginning of the rest period should not
exceed 990F. If It does, the next wort period should be
shortened by 10 minutes (or 331), while the length of the rest
period stays the same. However, If the 01 exceeds 99.7*>F at the
beginning of the next period, the following work cycle should be
further shortened by 33*. OF should be measured again at the end
of the rest period to make sure that it has dropped below 99&F.
3.	Body water loss {8WL) due to sweating should be measured by weigh-
ing the worker in the morning and In the evening. The clothing
worn should be similar at both weighings; preferably the woriter
should be nude. The scale should be accurate to plus or minus 1/4
lb* 0VL should not exceed 1.5* of the total body weight. If It
does, the worfcer should be Instructed to increase his daily intaM
of fluids by the weight lost. Ideally, body fluids should be main-
tained at a constant level during the wor* day. This requires
replacement of salt lost in sweat as well.
fl. Good hygienic standards must he maintained by frequent change of
clothing and dally showering. Clothing should be permitted to dry
during rest periods. Persons who notice skin problems should
consult medical personnel iaoediately .
Real Time Heat Stress Monitoring
Environmental conditions of underwater operations can not only vary
with the degree of contamination but also with temperature. Severely cold
conditions in the vicinity of 28&F are not unusual for winter or Arctic
operations, but the utilization of "hot water' suits have dramatically
extended the divers duration against cold exposure.
However, the water In the cooling pools that surround nuclear reactors
and in the canals at nuclear generating facilities that are used for
cooling process waters is extreraely hot, between 11C°F and 120°F.
The use of the SUS suit, described on page 14-?, provides total
cooling for the diver In these extremely hot conditions. During tests at
the HQAA Diving/ffyperbarlc Training Center in HI ami, Fla., In Dpcemfoer 1983
and February 1584, divers descended into a tank of water that was gradually
heated up to ll^F, Each diverts condition was constantly monitored hv
electrocardiogram and core temperature probes; helmet conditions were
monitored by additional temperature probes. At each Increase in the water's
temperature, the divers were to execute a 20-minute series of exercises.
In the first series cf tests, three divers dove without benefit of the
50S suit's cooling system. After performing one ?Q-m1nute exercise cycle
in 107° water, heart rate increased from 7C to l&fl beats per ninute, and
body core temperature jumped from 98.6® to 102°. All three divers
suffered severe heat exhaustion symptoms and had to be helped out of the
test tank. Wearing a SUS suit with surface supplied cool water, the divers
*«re able to stay underwater over an hgur end complete three 20-mimite
l£-4

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exercise routines with no evidence of heat stress* What's "ore, they did
so In 112® water, even hotter than the day before, and still merged
¦feeling fine*"
By this time, the SUS suit and Modified Versions of two coaoerciaTly
available suits and two helmets had been Identified as effective for dfvlng
in contaalnated «raters. The SUS suit will have a working range of 100
degreest it will warm divers In below freezing water as cold as 3CP and
water as hot as 130°.
Figures 16.1 and 16.? show the development and use of a real time heat
sensor system Incorporated Into the diver's aedlcal eon (coring harness.
The rectal the mm 1 probe gives an accurate reading of body core tempera-
tures of the diver under various work loads and environmental conditions.
An additional set of thermal sensors within the helmet Monitor heat buildup
within the diver's head area, which can be controlled by venting the hat
wore frequently* All sensors have hard wire telemetry through the surface
supported umbilical to a TSt 40C tele-thermometer.
Effects of Heat Stress
If tte body's physiological processes fall to maintain a nerval body
temperature because of excessive heat* a number of physical reactions can
occur ranging from alld (such *s fatigue. Irritability, anxiety, and
decreased concentration, dexterity, or movement) to fatal. Standard
reference books should be consulted for specific treatment.
Heat-related problems are:
H&et rash: caused by continuous exposure to heat and humid air
and aggravated by chafing clothes. Decreases ability to tolerate
heat as well as being a nuisance.
Heat cramps: caused by profuse oerspiration with inadequate fluid
intake and chemical replacement (especially salts}. Signs: muscle
spasm and pain in the extremities and abdomen.
- Heat exhaustion: caused by increased stress on various organs to
meet Increased deaands to coo! the body* Signs: shallow breath-
ing; pale, cool, moist skin; profuse sweating; dirtiness and
lassitude.
Heat stroke: the most severe fom of heat stress. Body *"St be
cooled imediately to prevent severe injury and/or death. Signs
and syapto&s are: red, hot, dry skin; no perspiration; nausea;
dizziness and confusion; strong, rapid pulse; com.
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3-EKG P1ck-Jps, Hela&t And Rectal
T«perature Protes
Figure 16.1 Medical Monitor Harness
16-6

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Medical Monitoring
Harness Interface
YSI 400 Tele-Thermometer
Figure 16.? Surface Body Temperature Monitoring
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SECTION 17
MEDICAL HON[TORINS
Pgrsggctlws on Response Team Exposure Potential
Hazardous ssterlals response personnel, both the dfver end surface
support personnel, can be exposed to conditions that are typical of normal
occupational exposures. Therefore, special attention should bt given when
developing medical surveillance programs for this type of worker. The teaa
member can be exposed to thousands of toxic chemicals that may or say not
be Identifiable it the time of response. £ven if the substances are Identi-
fied, potential health effects of exposure to these chemicals or Mixtures
of the chemicals say not be known. Some other differences betaken the
noraal industrial worker and the response team oenber are as follows:
1.	Usually the response tean nesfesr's exposure to hazardous substances
is relatively short 1n duration and dependent primarily on the
length of the cleanup operation.
2.	Industrial exposures are controlled by engineering and Industrial
hygiene practices. However, the response team member's source of
protection from exposure to hazardous substances Is usually proper
work practices and proper utilization of personal protective
equipment, e.g., gloves, respirators* coveralls, chenfeal suits,
boots, etc,
3.	generally, industrial exposures evolve from known substances and
sources, whereas the response team Member may be exposed to
substances that are unknown 1n type, quantify, concentration, etc.
Preplaceaent/Pre-awployaent Ixawfnations
Preplacenent examinations serve an essential function in health
surveillance by providing a historical record of previous exposures,
Information on the state of health prior to joining the team, and a
baseline for comparisons with later health observations. Preplacement
examinations are used to ensure that workers are physically able to use
personal protective equipment. Employment and medical history, a physical
examination, and biological monitoring are elements of the ^replacement
examination and should be tailored to the specific hazards of the job under
consideration*
Hazardous material response personnel may be required to utilize
protective respirator equipment. Occupational Health and Safety Standard
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29 CFR 1910, Part 134, requires that no employee be assigned to a task that
requires the use or a respirator unless it has been determined that the
person Is physically able to perform under such conditions. The baseline
evaluation should determine whether a team member can utilize respiratory
equipment. Once a determination has been made as to the physical ability
to wear a respirator and perform the work task* a periodic review of the
employee's "health status* should be made. Annual evaluations are ccnman
practice. It 1s recommended that a physician with knowledge of pulmonary
disease and respiratory protection practices should determine what medical
factors are pertinent.
Potential respirator wearers should be examined for any evidence of
respiratory impairment such as emphysema, obstructive lung disease, and
bronchial asthma. These conditions may justify forbidding a person to wear
a respirator that restricts Inhalation and exhalation, but would allow the
individual the ability to perform adequately in a continuous-flow supplied
air device. Other medical conditions that may prevent an employee from
wearing a respirator wight include: diabetes, epilepsy, use of certain
drugs, skin sensitivities, e^ltysema, chronic pulmonary obstructive
dfsease. and coronary artery disease.
The primary element of any baseline medical evaluation 1s the comple-
tion of a comprehensive medical health history form. In addftlon, an
occupational history questionnaire should be completed so that possible
pre-existing exposure to chemicals can be traced. Table 17.1 gives
exa^les of basic parameters that could be considered In an occupational
and medical history assessment.
The current general EPA Medical Monitoring Program recommendations are
to provide a comprehensive baseline examination for participants in the
program. Specific medical Monitoring for hazardous materials response
personnel Is under development and is due for release fn the fall of 1963.
Periodic monitoring s>^ld Include, as a minimum, an Interim nedlcal
and occupational history review, a screening physical examination, basic
blood and urine laboratory tests, and a physician's evaluation. The
monitoring examination should be supplemented by procedures and special
tests only as warranted by exposure to specific significant hazards or
stresses.
Each Individual should receive a basic panel of blood counts and
chemistries to evaluate blood-forming, kidney, liver, and endocrine/
metabolic function. The following blood tests are considered to be the
mlnlaum desirable:
o	W»1te blood cell count and differential cell count
o	Hemoglobin and/or hematocrit
o	Albumin, globulin, and total protein
o	Serum glutamic oxalacetic transaminase (SCOT)
o	Lactic dehydrogenase fLDH)
o	Alkaline phosphatase
o	Calcit«
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TABLE 17.1 OCCUPATIONAL Attn fCDlCAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT
Occupational History
1.	Previous Employers
2.	Occupation/Position
3,	Industrial Processes
4,	Possible Chemical Exposures
Hedleal History
1.	Basic Physical Parameters, e»g,, age, sex. height
2.	Genetic History Studies (maternal/paternal/siblings), e»g,,
diabetes, hypertension
3.	Personal Healtti History
a.	Past Injuries/illnesses
b.	Allergies
C, Hyposensitization*
d. Current medical therapy
4.	Exercise Habits
5.	Personal Habits
a.	Cigarette Sacking
b.	Alcohol
c.	Drug use
o	Phosphorus
o	Uric acid
o	Creatinine
o	Urea nitrogen
o	Cholesterol
o	Glucose
Each response team aember should have a routine urinalysis that
consists	of the following:
o	Specific gravity
o	pK
o	Microscopic examination
o	Protein
o	Acetone
o	Clucose
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X-Ray--
A baseline chest K-rjy should be a standard 14 x 17~ineh P-A
{posterior-anterior] exposure. "TCie lateral view is not necessary for
routine screening purposes. The X-ray way be obtained from the examining
physician, a local radiologist, or a local hospital. The file should be
read or reviewed by a board-certified radfologfst or other competent
medical specialist. Subsequent periodic chest X-rays should be performed
only when clinically Indicated: and not as a routine measure.
Electrocardiogram—
An electrocardiogram should be Included in the baseline examination.
Ordinarily ft should be of the standard TZ-lead resting type and interpreted
by an internist or cardiologist* Subsequent periodic electrocardiograms
should be obtained only when recon»ended by the examining physician, and not
as a routine measure. Figure 17.1 shows a three lead EKG pickup and a
Llfepak 4 heart monitor for real time tracking of wor* stress.
Pulmonary function-'
Pulmonary function testing is desirable as a part of the baseline
examination. It may be Indicated periodically for employees at respiratory
system risk, such as those with significant exposure to toxic dusts and
irritants* As a minimum* it should consist of simple tests of lung
ventilation: forced expiratory voliaae in one second [FCV| > and forced
vital capacity (FVC).
Workers who are significantly exposed to certain designated Materials
my require additional special procedures In addition to the basic panel of
tests. The physician should determine who is in need of special tests
after reviewing the history forms and after consulting with supervisors
and/or medical monitoring coordinators and health and safety designees.
Provision should be narfe for repeating tests when necessary. Consultative
assistance, is available from the EPA Occupational Health and Safety Staff
regarding special tests.
Ambient air ¦onltoring—
While not a true medical monitoring function, it is desirable to
monitor the helmet atmosphere of the diver for contamination. Figure 17.2
shows the use of a battery operated air sampling pump known as a Poly Meter
which is worn under the divers dress. This unit pulls a measured air flow
through a specific chemical detector tube Which will measure the concen-
tration by discoloration. The diver and tenders are able to measure any
contamination just by visual observation. Based upon prior knowledge of
what contamination 1s present, the appropriate detector tube can be
selected.
17-4

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S\
V
Figure 17.1 Three Lead EKG Pickup and llftpak * Heart Monitor
17-S

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Position of Helmet Mounted
Detector Tub®
Specific Chetlcdl
Detector Tube
Poly Meter Mr
Sampling Pump
Figure 17.2
Ambient Helnet Air Homtorlng
17-6

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SECTIOH IE
personnel protectcom for
SURFACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
A major area of consideration that has not been addressed previously
Is the protection of surface tenders and support personnel* Previous
commercial operations have shown that the recovery of sunken chemical
drums and containers onto work barges will lead to sane degree of
contamination of the ship's deck and surrounding equipment. UWb11ical
and line tenders handling the divers' support hoses will come Into
intimate contact with the contaminated water. Appropriate levels of
personnel protection *jst be defined for these special situations. The
limited deck area will not allow for large 'clean areas" for personnel
decontaalnation and changing of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
air tanks, Depending on the level of hazardous material toxicity, this
could dictate the need for airline-supplied respirators for surface
support personnel functioning in the high-contamination areas. Also,
appropriate considerations and procedures need to be developed for
decontamination of surface support personnel. "Clean" locations Bust be
developed for suiting op divers, and procedures far moving divers and
their gear back to decontamination stations* Specific procedures need to
be developed for umbilical, helmet, and diver dress decontamination
operations.
Evaluating the hazards associated with toxic chemical spill Incidents
involves various degrees of complexities. The release of a single known
chemical compound does not represent as difficult a problem to assess as
an Incident involving multiple compounds. Likewise, it becomes progres-
sively more difficult to determine hazardous effects as the number of
compounds increase.
The most 1n>ortant first step though Is to Insure the safety of all
personnel Involved In the spill incident.
Routes of Exposure
Only three natural pathways of chemical exposure to the body exist:
1.	Through body contact (skin, Including eyes and hair),
2.	inhalation, and
3» by Ingestion.
The primary function of the skin 1s to act as a barrier against entry
of foreign materials into the body. However, this protective barrier can
be overcome, permitting chemical toxins to enter. The protective nature
10-1

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of the skin can tie greatly diminished by lacerations, abrasions, and moisture.
Also, many organic solvents can greatly increase the permeability of the skin
to materials that would otherwise not pass ti.*iugh it. Another factor is
that the skin provides a large area for surface contact of the toxin.
Inhalation 1s the most rapid exposure route. Toxins are introduced t?
respiratory tissue and the boodstream Immediately. Once admitted to the
blood through the lungs, these toxic chemicals are quickly transported
throughout the body providing contact with all organs.
Health hazards to personnel from Ingestion of materials are of minimal
concern relative to skin and respiratory hazards. The nimtoer of substances
that can be ingested are limited; i.e.* 1t 1s difficult to swallow vapors and
gases. Also* contact with ingestlble materials is limited In that they only
?et to the mouth through hard contact. Even when ingested, toxicity by mouth
is of a lower order due to subjection to acidic* alkaline* enzjvatlc conditions
of the gastrointestinal tract. However, these same conditions may enhance
the toxic nature of a compound. It should also be noted that gw and tobacco
chewers can absorb appreciable mnounts of gaseous substances during an eight-
hour work shift.
The establishment and execution of personnel protection program when
responding to hazardous chemical spills or releases find their basis in the
letters "10LHV
The definition of IDLH provided Jo 30 CFR H.3(t) is as follows:
"Immediately dangerous to life or health" means conditions that
pose an immediate threat to life or health or conditions that
pose an inwediate threat of severe exposure to contaminants*
such as radioactive materials, which arc likely to have adverse
cumulative or delayed effects en health."
The purpose of establishing an IDLH exposure concentration Is to ensure
that the worker can escape without Injury or Irreversible health effects from
an IDLH concentration in the event of failure of the respiratory protective
equipment. The IDLH Is considered a maximum concentration above which only
highly reliable breathing apparatus providing maximum worker protection 1s
permitted. Since Ifllrt values are conservatively set* any approved respirator
may be used up to Its maximum use concentration below the 1DLH.
levels of Protection
It is Important that personnel protective equipment and safety require-
ments be appropriate to protect against the potential or known hazards at an
incident. Protective equipment should be selected based on the types{s),
concentrations^), possibilities, and routes of personnel exposure from
substances at a site. In situations where the type of materials and
possibilities of contact are unknown or the hazards are not clearly identifi-
able, a more subjective determination must be made of the personnel protective
equipment required for initial safety. Level B protection Is the minimum
level recommended on Initial entries until the hazards have heen further
identified and defined through monitoring* sampling, and other reliable
methods for analysis; and personnel protection equipment corresponding with
those findings can be utilized.
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The appropriate level of protection shall be determined prior to the
Initial entry on-site based on best available Information. Subsequent
information «ay suggest changes In the original level selected. ReceoiMnded
levels of protection are:
1. Level A
Level A protection should be worn when the highest available
level of respiratory, skin, and eye contact protection Is needed*
While Level A provides the maximum available protection, It does
not protect against all possible airborne or splash hazards. For
exiuapl e, suit material may be rapidly permeable to certain chemicals
In high air concentrations or heavy splashes* (See Figure 18*1]
?. level 8
level 0 protection should be selected when the highest level
of respiratory protection 1$ needed, but cutaneous or percutaneous
exposure to the small unprotectec areas of the body (i.e* Reck and
back of head} is unlikely, or where concentrations are known within
acceptable exposure standards. (Sec Figure 18.1)
3. Level C
level C protection should be selected when the type{s} and
concentration^) of rwplrable material is known* or reasonably
assumed to be not greater than the protection factors associated
with air-purifylng respirators; and exposure to the few unprotected
areas of the body (1*e. neck and back of head) is unl 1kely to cause
harm. Continuous monitoring of site and/or individuals should be
established, (See Figure ll.l)
4* Level 0
"	level D 1s the basic work uniform and should be worn for all
site operations* Level t} protection should only be selected when
Sites are positively identified as having no toxic hazards* (See
Figure 18.1)
Respiratory hazards and Protection:
The longs do not have defenses which are 1001 effective against toxic
gases% vapors or particulates. Such hazards may impair or destroy portions
of the respiratory tract or they nay be absorbed directly Into the bloodstream*
Those hazards in the blood may eventually affect the function of other organs
and tissues* The lungs must be protected from toxic hoards* This can be
accomplished by avoiding or m in 1m 1ring exposure. Engineering controls such as
ventilation will help decrease exposure* However, when such controls are not
practical ©r feasible, protection can be afforded by the use of respirators*
There are respirators which filter gases, vapors, and particulates in
the ambient atmosphere* When concentrations are too high, respirators are
avail abl e which will supply i clean source of breathable air to the wearer.
Oxygen Deficiency:
The body requires oxygen to maintain the various ongoing process. If
the oxygen concentration decreases, the body will react by exhibiting various
symptoms* Deal th will occur when the concentration reaches only 6%. The
effects of oxygen deficiency are listed on the following table.
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level "C"
Levtl "8*
Level "A"	Experimental 2 1/2 Hour level "A"
Flaure 1S.1 Levels of Personnel Protection
18-4

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©2 Vol %
At Sea Level
Physiological Effect
16-12	Increased breathing volume, accelerated
heartbeat, Ispalred attention and thtnJc—
ing, taoaired coordination,
14-10	Very faulty judgment, very poor muscular
coordination, nuscular exertion causes
rapid fatigue that may cause permanent
heart danage, Intermittent respiration.
10-6	Nausea, vomiting, Inability to perform
vigorous inovenent, or loss of all we
Kent, unconsciousness* followed by
death.
Less than 6	Spasmctle breathing, convulsive movements,
death in minutes.
Aerosols
Aerosol Is a term used to describe particulates in air without regard to
their origin. Particulates are collected on the walls of the nasal cavities
and conducting tubes. Particulates ranging 1fi sl*e from S to 39 microns are
deposited In the nasal and pharnyg&al passages. The trachea and smaller
conducting tubes collect particulates 1-5 microns 1n size. Any particulates
which travel Into the conducting tubes are carried by force of inhalation*
For particulates to reach the alveolar spaces they must diffuse fro* the
smallest conducting tubes into the alveolar spaces. Only particulates less
than ,5 microns in disaster diffuse Into the alveoli. Larger particles do
reach the alveolar spaces due to gravity and settling. The smallest parti-
culates may never be deposited in the alveoM and so may diffuse baci into
the conducting tubes to be exhaled.
Gaseous Contaminants
Gases and vapors are filtered to some degree by the respiratory tract*
If soluble, gases and vapors will be absorbed into the walls of the passages
to the alveolar spaces. Not all will be absorbed and so they will finally
diffuse into the alveolar spaces* Here, the gases or vapors can be directly
absorbed Into the bloodstream.
Respiratory Protective Devices
Respiratory apparatus can be divided Into two general types: A1r
Purifying and Atmosphere Supplying. These two categories can be further
divided Into groups based on their construction and operation*
All respirators are composed of two main components: the facepiece and
the device which supplies or purifies air* The faceplece cones in three
configuratlons which Is directly related to the snount of protection afforded
by the respirator;
I) Quarter Hasfc (type B - Half Mask) fits from nose to top of chin and
utHzes two-or four-point suspension.
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Z) Nil f Milk (Type A - Half Mask) fits under chin and over the nose«
To be approved It must have four-point suspension.
3) FuH Faceplece covers all of the face from under the chin to the
forehead,
The full faceplece provides the best protection because ft Is more easily
fitted chi the face than either the half or quarter mask.
Equipment Classification - General Considerations
Air Purifying Respirators--
The use of air purifying respfrators is predicted on several factors.
The atmosphere that the respirator is to be used in must have at least 19.51
o*ygen. The concentration of the contaminant must be at IDLH levels.
Mechanical filters are used for particulate hazards and chemical sorbents
are used for gases and vapor hazards* Respirators are approved for use up to
predestgnated concentration*. The respirator Is also limited by Its length
of service which 1$ based on the eontrailnant concentration*
Another important requirement 1s that the contaminant being filtered
have warning properties which will alert the user to the exhaustion of service
capacity of the respirator.
Atmosphere Supplying Kespirators--
There are four types of respirators whfch supply breathing air to the
user» Atmosphere-supplying respirators provide from five alnutes to several
hours of breathing air. The first type and the oldest Is the oxygen genera-
ting respirator. This type of respirator has a canister which converts car-
bon dioxide to oxygen. Oxygen generating respirators have been used 1n the
military and for escape purposes In nines.
The hose mask is another type of atmosphere-supplyIng respirator. It
utilizes a remote source of a clean atmosphere. The clean air 1s drawn
through the hose by the user or by a blower. The airline respirator 1s
siallar to the hose mas* except that the source of air is compressed.
Sel f-contained breathing apparatus (SC6A) uses a cylinder to hold com-
pressed air or oxygen and allows the wearer to carry It with him/her without
the confinement of a hose or airline. SCBA's and airline respirators operate
in one of several modes, continuous deaand or pressure demand.
The amount of protection an atmosphere-supplying respirator gives Is
based on two factors: the type of faceplece and its mode of operation. As
was indicated earlier, the full face mask provides the best protection. Of
the three modes of operation, continuous, demand» and pressure dewand, the
pressure demand mode provides the best protection. Alrl ine respirators aay
use any one of the three operational modes* SCBA's *111 operate in either
demand or pressure demand. Hose masks are considered to be demand operateo.
18-6

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An escape SCtiA must have at least 5 Minutes of breathing air avail able-
Fran 5-15 minutes of air supplies are found with escape devices. This escape
supply 1s stored In a small cylinder or colled stainless steel tubes.
Escape devices are not to be used for entry Into hazardous atmospheres
under any circumstances.
To beat the major Hnrlting factor of SCSA's, air supply* combination
airline and SCBA's have been Manufactured* The SCBA nay be used to enter and
retreat from the site if there Is enough air (greater than 15 minutes). The
airline Is used to supply air anile the person Is working on-site.
This outline Is not complete by any Beans.
Protective Clothing
The hazardous properties of chemical substances necessitates the use of
protective clothing. The decree of protection required is dictated by the
predominant physical, cheaical, or toxic property of the Material. Tor
example, protection required for a corrosive compound Is different from that
of a compound which releases a highly toxic vapor. The type of activity,
such as work or observation around the substance, must also be considered
Mhen assigning protective clothing. As with the selection of proper respir-
atory protective apparatus, a thorough assessment of the encountered hazards
oust be conjjleted before any decision making.
Once the specific hazard has been identified* the appropriate clothing
can be selected* Several factors must be considered in the selection of
clothing. The most important is the safety of the Individual. The level of
protection assigned must match the hazard confronted. It Is also very
Important that the Individual be well-trained fn the use of procedures for
site activities* Other factors Include cost, availability, co^atlbillty
with other equipment, suitability, and most Important, performance.
Performance Requirements
The primary safeguard of any protective clothing Is the material from
which it was manufactured. In selecting a suitable piece of protective
clothing, the following characteristics of the protective material should he
considered: strength, flexibility, thermal limits, cleanabllity, lifetime,
and chaiical resistance.
The strength of a material Is based on four specific requirements. It
must be resistant to tears, punctures, and abrasions, and It must possess
suitable tensile strength.
For ease of movement and to facilitate wort activity in protection
clothing, the material should be flexible enough to allow such activity.
Dexterity is especially important in materials used 1n the manufacture of
gloves.
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The ability of dotting to Maintain Its protective capacity In temper-
ature extremes Is advantageous. Also to be considered Is the allowance of
mobility In cold temperatures and transfer of heat to the wearer In hot
climates.
Decent *sination can be difficult and expensive If the protective cloth-
ing Is not launderable. Some materials are nearly 1 possible to clean suffi-
ciently under any circumstances Because of these problems, much protective
clothing 1s being considered disposable.
Sana types of clothing are more durable than others when subjected to
severe conditions over time. The ability to resist aging and the Initial
cost of the garment should be considered before procurement. Here again Is
an advantage of disposables.
The final and most Important consideration Is the chemical resistance of
the protective material. When clothing comes In contact with a hazardous
liquid or vapor, it must maintain Its structural integrity and protective
qualities.
Chemical Resistance
Resisting chemical attack by a protective material 1s not a simple task.
The material must be able to avoid degradation, penetration, and permeation
by the Insult chemical. Any or all of these actions may result upon contact,
especially when prolonged.
A protective material may or may not be affected by a chemical agent.
If the material is inert to that substance, then it will not be degraded.
However, fhls does not preclude penetration or permeation of the material by
the agent. Any level of degradation of the protective Material may occur if
it is reactive with the chemical agent. Damage to the material may be as
severe as con^lete deterioration of the protective material. Contact with
the agent and subsequent permeation may result in the swelling or shrinking
of the material or a change in Its structure and chemical makeup. Changes
such as these nay serve to enhance or restrict permeation by the chemical
agent.
The penetration by a chemical through a protective material is the result
of design and construction imperfections. Penetration Is not affected by the
actual protective material. Stitched seams, button holes, porous fabric and
zippers will allow a hazard to penetrate the protective garment. A protective
suit with self-sealing zippers and lapped seans made of nonporoms etautomeric
material will prevent penetration because of its design and construction.
However, as soon as that suit is ripped or punctured, Its ability to avoid
penetration Is lost. Again the suit with the finest design and manufacture
¦ay still be permeable and degradable while maintaining Impenetrability.
The ability of a protective materUl to resist permeation 1s a character-
istic off that material. When a chemical agent comes in contact with the
protective material, a concentration gradient is established. The concen-
tration of the agent opposing the outside wall of the material is high, and
the concentration inside the material is low (or zero). Because the tendency
1B-8

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fs to establish equilibrium* diffusion and other molecular forces "drive" the
agent into the Material. When the agent passes con*>1 etely through the Mat-
erial, it Mill condense on the Inside wall and/or diffuse Into the atmosphere
opposing this Inside wall. The process of permeation will continue as long
as te concentration gradient remains greater In the outside atmosphere. The
amount of time required for this sorptfon process to begin Is the Initial
breakthrough point.
The permeation rate is based upon several factors. These include the
concentration of the attack chemical and the thickness of the protective
material. The rate is Inversely proportional to the thickness of the material
while the concentration is dtrectly proportional to the permeation rate*
The amount or degree of permeation is related to the exposure conditions
which include temperature and contact time- The contact time Mill ultimately
dictate how much of the chemical will successfully permeate the protective
material. The use of protective clothing warrants 9 conscious effort to
avoid prolonged exposure or contact with any hazardous chemical.
It is inportant to be cognizant of the fact that no material will resist
permeating by all agents. So®e degree of permeation can be expected in most
cases. The various types of protective materials usually possess the abfl ity
to protect only against certain classes of chantcals. The other classes of
compounds may readily permeate the material.
Once a liquid or vapor 1s sorbed by the material, there is a need for
laundering. The ability to be completely decontaminated is an advantageous
characteristic of protective material. Most materials* no matter how resis-
tant to strength loss* will allow permeation. With many of these materials
It Is impossible to remove al contamination completely. Materials such as
butyl rubber and v1ton» which will desorb most contamination upon cleaning,
are available but also expensive. This Is where the use of disposable
clothing may be advantageous.
The Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren, VA is currently conducting
extensive chemical permeation tests on the vartous materials found in diving
suits, helmets and exhaust assemblies, Once this data has been released to
the public it will be incorpora*ed into this section under the final protocol.
Chemical Resistance Charts
In choosing protective materials based on a selected hawrd, various
tables are available which indicate relative effectiveness. It 1s important
to recognize that such tables reflect only the material's ability to resist
degradation by the agent. This 1s not the sas»e as resistance to permeation.
A material may be physically unaffectsd by a substance, but may still be very
permeable to that agent. This is not to Say that such charts are not useful.
They can be so long as the seriousness of the hazard is properly considered.
If the hazard is extremely toxic, then any activity Involving that agent
should be reevaluated. The potential risk involved must be weighed against
the potential gain.
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Table 13.1 provides in Illustration of available data usually presented
by the manufacturer. {This information is general and indicates effective-
ness by generic classes of chemical compounds). Upon studying this table, It
Is apparent that the protective capabilities of these materials are variable,
1.	Tyvek - a DuPont product described as a spun bonded olefin which Is made
of nonwoven polyethylene fibers. In tMs form. Tyvefc has reasonable
tear, puncture and abrasion resistance and 1s excellent in holding out
particles. Another desirbale quality of this material Is Its resistance
to static build-up. Once laundered, it loses that property. Tyvek Is
inexpensive and suitable as a disposable garment. Its melting point Is
27G*F.
2.	Hqwex - This is another DuPont product, Nomex Is composed of an aromatic
poly aside fiber. It is noncombustible and has flame-resistance up to
220*C, thus providing good thermal protection. It Is also very durable
and acid-resistant. Nomex is easily laundered.
3.	Polyethylene - This 1s an inert yet pemeable material. It Is sometimes
used as a coating or Tyvek garment which gives them resistance to acids,
bases* and salts. Polyethylene will absorb organic solvents.
4.	Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) - This material is used to manufacture many
types of protective clothing. It Is resistant to adds but will also
allow permeation. Upon decontamination, PVC Mill retain traces of the
contamination* PVC has been coated on Nooex to develop a strong pro-
tective material. Fully encapsulating suits such as the Wheeler Acid
King and the H5A Rocket Fuel Handlers suits are examples of such a
cortjination. These suits cost In the neighborhood of S6G0.00.
5.	Neoprene - This synthetic elastomer provides very good protection aganlst
many chemicals. Keep 1n wind that a material which will not degrade may
still be permeated. Neoprene provides better protection than PVC but as
with PVC,. It will retain contaminants upon decontamination. Many
respirator facepleces and breathing hoses are also made of neoprene.
6.	Chlorinated Polyethylene (CPE} Dr Chloropel - Tlvs material is manufactured
by 1LC tover and-used in the manufacture of splash suits and fully
encapsulating suits. The U.S. Army Is currently testing prototype
suits as protection against nerve agents and the U.S. Coast Guard Is
also conducting tests with suits made of CPi. The manufacturer supplies
chemical resistance information but no data on permeability. It is
considered to be a good all-around protective material. Four hundred
dollars will be sufficient to buy a suit made of CPE.
7.	Sutyi Rubber - This material is especially resistant to permeation by
gases, it Is used in the manufacture of boots* gloves, splashsults,
aprons* and fully encapsulating suits. The Arqy has been using butyl
rubber garments against toxicologlcal agents for many years. Butyl
Rubber is resistant to many compounds except halogenated hydrocarbons
and petroleum compounds* which is a common deficiency of most protective
materials. One advantage Butyl Rubber does have Is its ability to
release all contamination upon laundering.
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Table la.I.
CLOTHING KATERIALS CHEMICAL PROTECTION 0Y GENERIC CLASS
Generic Class
Butyl
Rubber
Poly Vinyl
Chloride
Heoprene
Natural
Rubber
Alcohols
E
E
E
E
Aldehydes
E-G
G-F
E-G
E-F
Amines
E-F
G-F
E-G
G-F
Esters
G-F
P
G
F-P
Ethers
6-F
G
E-G
G-F
Fuel s
F-P
G-P
E-G
F-P
Halogenated
Hydrocarbons
G-P
G-P
G-F
F-P
Hydrocarbons
F-P
F
G-F
F-P
Inorganic Acids
G-F
E
E-G
F-P
Inorganic Bases
and Salts
E
E
E
E
Ket is
E
P
G-F
E-F
Natural Fats
and QtIs
G-F
G
E-G
G-F
Organic Arlds
E
E
E
E
E - Excellent	F - Fair
G - Good	P - Poor
Source; Survey of Personnel Protective Clothlug and Respiratory Apparatas.
September 19/4, DOt, I'SCG, Office of Research and Development,
13-11

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Chew-Pro of East Wind, Inc. manufactures fully encapsulating suits and
other Butyl Rubber garments. Their fully encapsulating suit Is used a great
deal by EPA and its contractors. A Butyl Rubber suit is available for nearly
$1,000.00.
8.	V1ton - This Is a DuPont fluoroelastomer which has recently been employed
In a fully encapsulating suit. The suit is manufactured by Chem-Pro of
East Wind, Inc. VIton has been tested far permeability and it has been
shown that its overall protective capabilities, especially with liquids,
surpasses that of butyl rubber and neoprene. There are chemicals which
VIton Is not as effective as other materials such as the ketones and
aldehydes. V1ton also has the ability to extricate all contaminants
upon thorough cleaning which Is an advantage over other Materials which
do not. A fully encapsulating V1ton suit costs about S3TOOO.QQ>
9,	Others:
a)	Natural rubber - used In the manufacture of boots and gloves. It
resists degradation by alcohols and caustics.
b)	Httrlle - This Material Is being used In protective boots and gloves
because of its resistance to petroleum products.
c)	Poly Vinyl Alcohol (PVA) - This is an excellent protective material
for use against aromatic and chlorinated hydrocarbons. The major problem
with PVA is the fact that it is soluble In water*
It Is evident that there are protective Materials available for specific
cheMical hazards. Yet, there is really no one material good for all types of
hazards; thus, selection can be difficult. Because protection can be Halted
by the protective material employed in the suit or gloves, several layers of
protection should bq considered. Disposable boots and gloves and PVC rain-
suits serve such a purpose. They can be used to provide an e*tra layer of
protection and then discarded. This also lessens the amount of decontam-
ination required for the Inside layer of garments.
Types of Protective Clothing
As has been emphasized, the selection of appropriate protective gear 1s
based on the protection required. Appropriate protection is achieved by
assembling a complete set of gear. This includes hardhat, safety glasses or
faceshleld (preferably both), body covering (coveralls Or pants and jacket),
gloves, and safety shoes (steel toe and shank). If one item 1s omitted, the
safety of the Individual is compromised.
Heat Stress I Body Cooling
with any clothing which provides protection aganlst hazardous substances.
It is infjortant to recognize the hazards created by wearing such clothing.
Because the body is shielded from normal circulation of air, It is not allowed
to carry out its functions normally. Perspiration generated does not evap-
orate, thus eliminating the body's ins in mechanism of cooling. With that
13-12

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gone, the body is prone to heat stress which can be exhibited as heat stroke
or heat exhaustion. This is very common as the ambient temperature rises
above 65-70*F. Work schedules In fully encapsul ated clothing must he regu-
lated very conservatively as heat stress may become more of a threat than the
chemical hazard itself.
The best way to cowbat any heat stress is to allow the body tD perfom
its normal cooling functions* The most efficient body cooling process Is by
evaporation. While in protective clothing that has no ventilation, profuse
perspiring occurs. If the perspiration is left in contact with the skin, 1t
has a better chance of eHaporat1ng and cool Ing the body surface. When the
perspiration is allowed to run off the body quickly, evaporation will not
occur as much as is desirable. This will happen when only shorts are worn
under a fully encapsulating suit. Another hazard when dressed minimally in a
suit Is the t™perature of the suit itself. On a hot day the suit material
can become very hot and cause severe burns to the person inside.
When wearing a fully encapsulating suit, It Is advisable to wear long
underwear. It will cling to the body when soaked with perspiration, thus
allowing the greatest possible amount of cooling oy evaporation. This wtll
also protect the body from burns frcsn the suit itself. The best way to
prevent heat Illness 1s to 1i«1t the amount of work in the suits.
When extended periods of work In fully encapsulated suits Is required,
some sort of cooling must be provided to the worker. The best method is by
allowing frequent rest periods. Soaetimes this is not enough so a cooling
device must be employed. There are effective cooling units available for use
with supplied air units, The cool air 1s directed to all parts of the body.
A vortex tube is used to generate the cool air. Actually, the vortex tube
separates the supplied air into warm and cool components and releases the
warm «ir. When self-contained air 1s used for breathing, the cooling device
must also be self-contained. Vests have been designed to carry Ice packs for
cooling. There are several other conraerdal devices available to combat heat
generated by fully encapsulating suits.
Heat stress symptoas should be observed for all levels of protection,
but especially In Levels A and B. For example, Army personnel wearing the
military M3 toxlcologlcal suit (a two-piece butyl rubber suit) are required
to follow these guidelines:
Ambient Temperature	Haximum Wearing Time (Hours)
Above 90'F
1/4 hour
3S-90°F
80-85°F
70-80"F
60-?0®F
50-60^
3O-50*F
1-1/2 hours
1/2 hour
L hour
2	hours
3	hours
5 hours
8 hours
Bel ow 30®?
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Worker Bonitaring
Besides normal safety monitoring, the use erf fully encapsulating suits
requires special monitoring of the wearer. Normally, monitoring Is required
when any respiratory apparatus Is In use. But, because the use of fully
encapsulating 1s warranted due to potential exposure to extreaely toxic vapor
atmospheres, It Is especially Important to assure that the wearer 1s properly
protected* There are two methods of monitoring an Individual in a fully
encapsulating suit, biological monitoring and personal monitoring.
Biological monitoring is useful because it indicates what the actual
exposure was to the wortter. Prior to going on-site, a urine sample 1s taken.
Its contents are compared to a saaple after activity has ceased for the work
period. The analysis should! indicate any absorbed exposure due to ha2arrf
permeations or penetrations through the suit.
The use of personal monitoring measures the atmospheric concentrations
within the suit. This gives an indication of potential body exposure.
Personal sanpling ptnps equipped with charcoal tubes may be used to collect
organic vapors. This type of pump must be worn underneath the encapsulating
suit. If cotton socks or gloves are worn, their contents may be analysed
directly. Also, this will give an indication of potential exposure to the
atmospheric hazard. This type of measurement is a qualitative Indicator
wheras use of the personal sampling pumps Is quantitative.
Any exposure data 1s valuable when working with hazardous materials*
Such data confirms or contradicts the criteria initially used In decision
¦alclng for the selection of protective clothing.
Equipment List by Hazard Level
The following lists provide an inventory of necessary equipment needs In
order to function in hazardous chemical environments.
level A
Personal Protection Equipment
q Positive Pressure SCBA (HESfl/NIOSH approved)
o Totally Encapsulating Suit [boots & gloves attached)
o 3loves - Inner (tight-fitting & chemical-resistant)
o Boots - Chemical protective, steel toe and shank. Depending on
o suit boot construction; worn over suit boot*
o Cloves - Outer, chemical protection. Depending on suit construction
worn over suit gloves. Hay be replaced with tight-fitting, chemical-
resistant gloves worn inside suit gloves*
o Underwear - Cotton, long John type*
o Hard hat* {under suit)
o Disposal protective suit* gloves* and boots. {Worn under or over
encapsulating suit)4
o Coveralls* (under suit)
o 2-way Radio Ctmminidations
IS" 14

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level 6
Personal Protective Equipment
o	Positive Pressure SC8A (HESA/NIOSH approved)
o	Two-piece chemical-resistant suit
o	Chemical-res 1stant hood*
o	Coveralls (fire-resistant) under splash suit*
o	Gloves - Outer, chemical protective
o	Gloves - Inner, tight-fitting, chemical resistant
o	Boots - Outer (chemical-protective heavy rubber threw ways)
o	Boots - Inner (chemical-protective, steel toe and shank)
o	2-way Radio CQmronlcatIons
o	Hard-hat*
o	Face Shield*
Level C
Personal Protective Equipment
o FuUface, air-purifying respirator {MESA/K10SB approved)
o Chemical-resistant clothing: overalls & long sleeved jacket or
coveralls, hooded 2-piece chemical splash suit, when applicable -
hooded disposal coveralls*
o Gloves - Outer (chemical-protective)
0 Gloves - inner (surgical type)*
o Cloth Coveralls - Fire-resistant {inside chemical protective cloth
ing)*
o Escape Mask
o Hard-hat* (Face shield, optional)
0> Boots - Outer (chemical-protective heavy rubber throw aways}*
o Boots - Inner (cherotcal-protective, steel toe & shark)
o 2-#ay Radio communications
Level D
Personal Protective Equipment
o Coveralls - Fire-Resistant
o Boots/Shoes - Safety or chemical-resistant steel toed boots
o Boots - Outer (chemical-protective heavy rubber thro* aways)*
g Escape Mask
o Safety Glasses
o Hard-hat* (face shield optional)
o Gloves*
*Opt$onal Equipment
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SECTION 19
INCIDENT EVALUATION
introduction
The primary objective In responding to incidents Involving hazardous
substances is to prevent or reduce any actual or potential damage to public
health or the environment. To accomplish this objective, it Is necessary to:
-	Identify the substance Is) involved.
-	Evaluate its behavior In the environment and effects on public health
and the environment.
-	Initiate actions to ameliorate the effects.
Throughout a hazardous material incident, from Inception to final
disposition, a high priority activity is obtaining the necessary information
to assess its impact. This process of identifying the actual or potential
impact of the material(s) on public health, envlronraent, and response person-
nel, and determining the most effective methods for preventing or reducing
the associated hazards, is known as Incident evaluation.
in those incidents where the substance(s) involved Is knomn or easily
identified, the isedia affected clearly ascertained, and the environmental ef-
fects recognized, the characteriiatlon of the incident is relatively straight-
forward. For example, the effects of a discharge of vinyl chloride Into a
small stream are relatively easy to evaluate. More complex are incidents
such is an abandoned waste site where there is not enough initial Information
to Identify the hazards and evaluate their Jnpact.
Evaluating a hazardous substance incident is generally a two-phase
process, Ph$$e 1, and Initial evaluation, and Phase II, a comprehensive
evaluation.
PHASE t: INITIAL EVALUATION
The first phase Is an initial ar preliminary evaluation based on
information that fs readily available - or can be collected fairly rapidly
- to determine If emergency protective measures are necessary. During this
Initial phase, a number of key decisions must be aade regarding:
-	Imminent or potential hazard and risk to public health and/or the
environment.
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-	I mediate need for protective actions to prevent or reduce the impact
on public health and/or the environment.
-	Healtfi and safety of response personnel*
After emergency measures have been taken, other measurt.; to restore the
situation to environmentally acceptable conditions start. If there is no
emergency, more time Is available for acquiring data to evaluate hazards and
design plans for cleanup, additional considerations For the health and safety
of response personnel. Information for characterizing the hazards can be
obtained in a variety of ways, depending upon the nature of the event and the
amount of time available. The following outlines an approach for collecting
the information needed to evaluate the impact of a hazardous materials
incident, hot every incident requires following all the steps. The informa-
tion below provides a relatively detailed guide which could be adapted to meet
a specific situation.
Data Gathering and Review/Preliminary Assessment
Upon notification, discovery, or Investigation of an environmental
episode, obtain as wjch of the following information as possible:
Brief description.
Exact location.
Date and time of occurrence.
Current weather and forecast.
Terrain - include topographic map.
Geology and hydrology - include appropriate maps.
Aerial photographs.
Habitation - population centers, proximity of people, population at
risk.
Communications.
Accessibility by air and roads.
Waterways.
Detailed description of incident and circumstances.
Pathways of dispersion.
Hazardous materials Involved and their physical/chemical
properties.
Any other related background Information.
19-2

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Present status of Incident and Mho has responded.
Environmentally sensitive areas - endangered spedes, delicate
ecosystem „
Economically sensitive areas - industrial, agricultural.
Information about an incident, especially abandoned waste sites, may
also be available from:
Other Federal agencies
State and local health or environmental agencies.
Company records.
Court records.
Water departments, sewage districts.
State and local authorities.
Off-Site Reconnaissance
At responses in which the hazards are largely unknown or there Is no
need to go on-site Inmediately, make visual observations and monitor atmos-
pheric hazards near the site. Also collect vartous types of off-site samples
that aay Indicate on-site conditions. As an additional precaution, approach
from upwind direction.
In addition to collecting information not included in the preliminary
survey or needed to verify or supplement available information, off-site
reconnaissance would include:
General layout and map of the site.
Monitoring ambient air for:
-- organic vapors, gases, and particulates.
-- ojcygen deficiency,
-- specific materials, If known.
-- combustible gases.
—	T/jergank vapors, yises, and partfculates.
—	radiation.
Placards, labels, markings on containers, or transportation vehicles.
- , Types and nuefters of containers, buildings, and iinxjun
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leachate or runoff.
Biological indicators - dead vegetation, animals, insects, and f
Unusual odors or conditions*
Visual observation of vapors, clouds, or suspicious substances.
Off-site samples.
—	surface water
—	drinking water
-- site runoff
—	groundwater (wells)
Interviews with inhabitants and indications of aedical problems.
On^Slte Survey	<«
A more thorough evaluation of the hazards leading to remedial operations
generally necessitates personnel entering the defined site. Prior to going
on-site, develop an entry plan addressing what will be accomplished initially
and prescribe the procedures to protect the health and safety of response
personnel. Upon entering the site, collect the following information and
observations:
Monitoring ambient air for:
-- organic vapors, gases, and particulates.
-- oxygen deficiency.
—	specific materials, 1f know.
-- combustible gases.
-- inorganic vapors, gases, and particulates.
-- radiation.
Types of containers, Impoundment, or other storage systems.
—	numbers, types, and quantities of material
—	condition of storage systems, state of repair, or deterioration
Physical condition of material.
-- solids, liquids, gases
19-4

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—	color* turbidity
-- behavior - foaming, vaporizing, corroding
leaks or discharges from containers, tanks, ponds, vehicles, etc.
Potential pathways of dispersion*
-- air
-- surface water
-- groundwater
~ land surface
—	biological routes
Labels, markings, identification tags, or other Indicators of
material.
Saaples.
-- standing water
-- sol 1
-- wells
—	Storage containers
—	drainage ditches
-- streams and ponds
PHASE II: COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION
The second phase, comprehensive evaluation, which may not be needed in
all responses, is aroare soethodical program designed to collect data to enhance,
refine, and enlarge the Initial data base. This phase would provide more
comprehensive information for characterizing the environmental hazards assoc-
iated with incident response operations and for making decisions. As a
continuously operating program, the second phase also reflects environmental
changes resulting from response activities.
Available Information and/or information obtained through Initial site
entries may be sufficient to Identify and assess thoroughly the hwnan and
environmental effects of an incident. If not, additional monitoring and
sampling are required. Phase 11, an environmental surveillance program, will
need to be designed and implemented to allow a complete evaluation of all the
effects of the Incident on all i»edia. Abo, since mitigation and remedial
measures taken at the site may cause changes in the original conditions, a
19-5

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survelUance prograa aust be maintained to Identify any changes at the site.
Phase II (which may not be required on all responses) Is to refine* supplement,
or complement Information obtained through Initial investigations and to
maintain the surveillance program throughout the lifetime of the Incident.
SUMMARY
Evaluating the hazards associated with an incident involves various
degrees of co«plexitie$. The release of a single, known chemical compound
may represent a relatively si*>le problem, (t becomes progressively aore
difficult to determine harr*«l effects as the nwnber of compounds increases,
Evaluation of the hazards associated with an abandoned waste site, storage
tanks, or lagoons holding vast amounts of known or unknown chemical substances
is far more complex than a single release of an Identifiable substance.
Effectively acc
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SECTION iO
FIELD £AhPLIhti AMD ANALYSIS
Prior to deploying diving personnel at a hazardously contaminated
water site, the JSC or USD must obtain In formation as to the nature and
concentration of materials and assess Che risk to underwater divers. As
was described in Section 16 on "Incident Evaluation", sample acquisition
forms the basts for any response action.
At present, there are numerous accepted standardized1 methods for
collecting environmental samples. Many of these methods are specified by
Industrial, governeental, or scientific organizations such as the American
Society of Testing Materials (AS7MJ. Common publications which spell out
specific sampling requirements for a particular analysis are Standard
Hethods for the Examination of frater and wastewater and Methods for Chemical
Analysis of Mater~an~d waste? Sampling procedures can also be found in the
feaeral Register. It there 1s conflicting information, employ the most
recent ILS. Government methoo.
Personnel collecting hazardous samples should use protective clothing
and equipment to a1n1ml2e exposure. The use of special collection equipment
presents a proolenu Limited information is available, and no universally
accepted stanaaraized laethods have been devised for the collection of
hazardous sample*.
Sampling Equipment.
Equipment to collect ana contain hazardous samples should be:
Disposable or easily decontaminated. A collection device may be
reused again only alter thorough cleaning.
Inexpensive, especially for disposable items.
Easy to operate* because personnel may be wearing cunfcersome
safety clothing and respiratory equipment.
ten-reactive, so that It does not contaminate samples.
Safe to use-
All information pertinent to fielo activities will he recorded in
20-1

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various forms: logbooks* sample tags, photographs* etc. Proper documenta-
tion ana document control are crucial to enforcement actions* since the
government's case in a formal hearing or criminal prosecution often hinges
on evidence gathered by the Science Coordinator. Therefore* each field
worker must keep oetaileo records of Inspections, Investigations* photo-
graphs taken etc.* and revlek all notes thoroughly before leaving the site.
The purpose of document control Is to assure that all documents for a
specific project are accounted for when the project Is completed. Account-
able documents Include Items such as logbooks, field oata records, analyti-
cal records* ano photos. Each document should hear a serial number and
Should be listed* with me number, in a project orcu&^nt Inventory assembled
at the project's completion. Waterproof ink must he used in recording all
data in documents bearing serial numbers.
The first area of sampling is air monitoring for:
Organic vapors, gases* ana particulates.
Oxygen deficiency.
Specific materials IW known),
Corabustthle gases.
Inorganic vapors, teases, and particulates,
Kadlation.
Samples must also oe taxen of the contaminated water surface, mid-depth and
bottom.
Allowing for free head space In the top of the water sample container,
a number of air monitoring tests can be run on the aqueous sample.
A number of field Instruments which are currently used analyze
•ambient'1 air for percentage of the lower flamoablHty limit of a vapor or
gas In air, concentration of oxygen, or concentration of toxic vapors/gases.
These devices coae in two categories* general survey and specific survey,
based on the type of sampling performed.
General survey instruments include;
Combustible yas Indicators
Ultraviolet photoionization detector
Flaae Ionization oetection
Century Systems Urganlc Vapor Anal zer
Infrared Spectrophotometer
- Hlran Infrared Spectrophotometer
Specific survey instruments are devices that measure a specific
material. Oxygen meters and direct-reading colorimetrie tubes are virtually
always used at incidents involving hazardous substances,
Appenalx 6 entitled *A1r Monitoring and Survey Instruments" presents
Information on the characteristics Of field Instruments along with detailed
20-2

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explanations on the characteristics, capabilities, and |imitations of these
units.
A number of different types of devices and techniques are utilised for
sampling at incidents Involving hazardous substances* Using the correct
liquid and solid materials samplers, selecting sample containers and clos-
ures, and preserving samples, are all critical fn obtaining the necessary
analytical data tnat will provide the JSC and hSU with the true perspective
on the condition of the incident. Appendix c describes various sampling
equipment and metftoos.
Hazardous Materials Spills Detection Kit
In oraer to facilitate rapio detection, a Hazardous Materials Spills
Detect ton Kit, shown 1n fig* 20.1, for performing non-specific tests wHh a
broad response to many contaminants has been developed by the EPA. The kit
is designed for use at spills when the identity of the contaminant 1s known
and the important consideration is tracing the spill plume until counter-
measures can be taken.
The hazardous Materials Detection Kit can be carried by one person and
is versatile enough to be modified for special applications* It contains a
ph aeter. conouctivity seter, spectrophotometer, filter assembly, efferves-
cent jar, miniature chromatographic columns, enzyme "tickets", ana data
sheets- 1he instrument components are battery-powered for field use,
although the spectrophotometer and conductivity meter can be modified for
120- or 4^0-V a.c. operation using the adapter and cable that are provided*
The kit has all the necessary Instrumentation, equipoent, and reagents that
say be needed by a field investigator to detect and trace contaminants in
waterways.
Hazardous Materials detection Kits, which are commercially available,
have oeen useo during emergency responses to hazardous materials spills.
Additional information about the kits «ay be found in the £PA report,
LMU&rJO/2-7fi-05S.
Hazardous Hatei imTs Identification Kit
There are nearly 3DD materials classified as hazardous substances by
EPA (Federal Kegister, February 16, 1979), ana a field kit capable of
rapidly and accurately identifying each of these substances would be too
unwieldy to be practical. Thus, thirty-six representative hazardous
materials (toxic nrtals, anions, organic compounds) were selected and a
Held kit was designed by the tPA to identify these and related substances.
Tfte identification iil>J kit, shown In Fig. 20.1, consists of two major
components: (1) an inverter/shortwave UV lamp unit for photochemical and
tnermal reactions ana (2) a package with reagents and auxiliary equipment,
Including test papers, detector tubes, spray reagents, spot test supplies,
ana thin-layer chromatography apparatus. Equipment to facilitate the
recovery of contaminants fron water and soil is also Included. The field
20-3

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identification Kit contains aetaileo operating Instructions and data cards
for each of the 36 representative hazardous substances.
Identification of groups of contaminants, rather than quantification
of specific substances, is the intended use of the identification kit. The
III kit can be used in conjunction with the hazardous haterials Detection
Kit, which contains a pH meter, spectrophotometer, conductivity meter, and
Other analytical equipment. Utilization of both kits can improve
identification capability, particularly for Inorganic materials. for
example, cyanide and fluoride cannot be distinguished by the ID kit alone;
nowever, when the kits are used concurrently, identification becones
possible.
Spills or discharges of to*fc pesticides in waterways pose a serious
threat to the aquatic environment and municipal water supplies* kith the
increased use of organophosphate pesticides, which are toxtc at very low
levels, precautions are needed to reduce this . threat, because of the
stability of toxic organophosphate pesticides under "normal" environmental
conditions, It Is Imperative to detect these hazardous compounds rapidly .
CitQlinesterase Antagonist Horn tor
Automatic systems have been developed to monitor water for the presence
of organophosphate and carbamate Insecticides. The principle used for
detecting these cnol1nesterase-inh1b1t1ng toxic substances Is based upon:
(IJ the collection of enzyme inhibitors on Inmobillied chollnesterase. (2)
the chemical reaction of immobilized chollnesterase with a substrate,
butyrylthlocholinesterase, in the presence of enzyme inhibitors, and (3)
the electrochemical monitoring of substrate hydrolysis products*
The Chollnesterase Antagonist Monitor tCW-4), shown in Fig. 20.2
(developed by tPA) is a ruyyed instrument that Is designed for aplo
detection of toxic Materials in a river, stream, or pond. The portable
apparatus can be used from alongside the banks of a stream or from a boat.
An operator Is needed to note the presence of enzyme inhibitors when the
baseline voltage increases 10 or more millivolts in one sampling cycle, as
indicated on the printout of a strip chart recorder- The CAM-4 can operate
continuously—with little maintenance--for an eight-hour period when using
a 12-V automobile battery or a 110—V a.c. power source.
Cyclic Colorimeter
The Cyclic Colorimeter, shown in Fig. 20.{developed by the EPAJ is
useful for field monitoring of heavy metal spills. It incorporates
hydraulic, optical, and electronic components that are designed for the
automatic detection of most heavy metal pollutants. When an indicator,
sodium sulfide, is injected aropwise Into a sample stream, the presence of
a heavy metal contaminant causes cyclic variations in optical transmittance
at the Indicator Injection frequency* These variations are detected by a
lamp and photocell, coupled to an electronic subsystem, which produces
either a quantitative indication of the pollutant or an alarm when a
threshold level is exceeded.
2{J-4

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7>e Cyclic Colorimeter is capable of detecting low levels of many heavy
o£tal< In water at widely varyrn^ temperatures. The detector oalntalns
adequate sensitivity for a period of about two weeks without maintenance.
Sca,e buildup and stream turbidity do not affect its performance.
The Cyclic Colorimeter is comnercialTy available. Instriaaent aesign
specifications and descriptions of laboratory and field tests are Included
in the final report, £pA-bQO/2-79-064-
2D-5

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E>4444444444
M4	i
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«4*"
Hazardous Materials
Detection Kit
Hazardous Materials
Mentification Kit
Figure 20
20-6

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CAHM
Pesticide Detection
Apparatus
Cyclic Colorimeter
Figure 20.2
20-7

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SEC7JLN 2I
HAZARD EVALUATION:
"Gcrtw "No-eo*
intrgfluctjon
The utilization of encapsuluting suits ana helmets b/ diving personnel
will permit underwater operations to be conducted in contaminated environ-
ments* There will, however„ be response situations In which the hazardous
substance Is) involved wit] present such a risk as to preclude the deployment
ot diving personnel except fn dire energency, for short periods of exposure,
or not at afl-
lt Is recognized that much of the toxicity date Available toaay Is
based upon "pure product" contact. A diver in an underwater response
operation will normalTj have the beneficial protection of his surrounding
environment as an added buffer between him and the pure contaminant
dilutlon.
In most large wateroodies currents, tides, and winds provide for water
col^n "turnover" or nixing. A pure cheaical product emanating from a
point source, such as a cruffi, barge, ship discharge line, etc., will
experience as rapid dilution frora its original strength from even as close
as a few feet from its origin. This is not to indicate that the diver or
USC should assume that "dilution Is the solution,"
TabJe 6-5 includes a number of hazardous substances which are
"slightly soluble and insoluble sinking compounds," Materials Such as
these will accumulate in "pockets" and bottom depressions under no or low
current conditions. Situations of diver response with the presence of
these chemicals requires extra caution Que to the "pure product" condition
they can fie encountered in underwater- A brief listing of these materials
Is as f01low$;
Acetic Anhydride
Acrjlonltrtle
ttroeine
Cresol
tpichlorohydrin
Carbon Tetrachloride
Turpentine
Naphthalene
Hydrogen Sulfioe
Methylene Chloride
Perchloroetnylene
Lfichloropropane
2M

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Methyl Parathlon
Pol florin a ted Biphenois
Trlchloroethyfene
Chlordane
Special caution should be exercised by diving personnel operating in
"natural* polluted waterways which receive sewage and industrial runoff as
opposed to a point source discharge of hazardous material. Hydrogen
sulfide is a substance which 1s produced due to polluted and decomposing
bottom benthos sediment. N?S is a slightly soluble sinking compound
which will accumulate In bottom depressions and which a diver can enter
into easily without prior warning. The material exhibits a very high skin
penetration and an extreme systemic hazard as well. Full encapsulation of
the diver is requlreo with as limited exposure as possible being exercised.
The second area 1n which a diver will come into contact with "pure
product" is with "insoluble or slightly soluble floating" compounds which
will be at the water surface and will coat the diver upon entry and exit
from the operation site. txamples of such compounds are:
benzene
Methyl Methacrylate
Styrene
Toluene
Chromium Salts
Ethylbenzene
Glycol Salicylate
Methyl tthyl Ketone
Xylene
The use of a fire hose on the surface chemical slick will disperse the
contaminant for the diver upon entering and leaving the water.
Of the 5ti hazardous chemicals list In Table 6.6 of the U.S. Coast
Guard's Pollution Incident Response System uata base. 30 tare listed in
Table 21.1 entltleo "Dermal Toxicity," and are noted by "W"* Materials
laentifted by the Navy and tnvlronment Canada are identified by ana
""H-* respectively* A11 materials of concern identified by hQAA 1n Table
6.6 are incorporated in the other lists.
The approximately 350 chemicals listed In Table 21.1 are identified In
the (J11 and Hazardous Materials Technical Assistance System (OtftTADS) as
being oermally active. Since CrtftTAOS contains only about 2100 chemicals,
or may not Indicate a listed chemical as a skin hazard* other reference
sources should also be consulted.
Use of Tables
A. Categories
Table 21.1 divides chenteals into two categories:
21-2

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Category 1 (more serious) which includes;
Gases, having a systemic dermal toxicity rating of moderate to
extremely hazardous and a skin penetration ranking of moderate to
high.
Liquids ana solid* having a systemic aertpal toxicity rating of
extremely hazardous and a skin penetration ranking of moderate to
high*
Gases having a local aernaal toxicity rating of moderate to
extremely hazardous.
Liquids and solids having a local deroal toxicity rating of
extremely hazardous.
Category 2 (less serious) 
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U. Potency (SystaicJ
Extreme Haaard (IU5Q: I ag/kg-50 og/kg)
Moderate Hazard (LD^: 50-500 *gAg)
Slight Hazard (LBM: 500-15,000 fttg/kg)
£. Potency (Local)
+++ Extrese - Tissue distinction/necrosis
+~• Moderate - Irrttation/1nf1a
-------
Table 21.1. CHEMICAL OEfiMAL TOXICITY DATA
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-------
Table 21.1. {Continued)
~
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-------
Table 21.1 {Continued}
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-------
Table 2U1 {Continued}

Ajilnt
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-------
Table 21,1 (Continued)
OMAktl
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-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)

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-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
Quieil
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-------
Table 21,1 (Continued)
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-------
Table ?1.1 {Continued)
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-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
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-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
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MOSH/OSKA Pocket 6u1de to Chemical Hazards* ll.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC 2040^ (August 19S1>.
Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances. U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 UMOJ.
Whenever possible, ddte In one reference should be cross-checked with other
references.
"fic-So* Scenarios
The utilization of diving personnel In contaminated environments Is to
always be the *1ast resort" to get "the job done.' Application of remotely
operated soapier*, bottom dredges» remotely operated underwater video
systems, etc. are all to be considered prior to Deploying divers. However,
even If divers are the only means for accomplishing an underwater task,
there are some Instances In which the contaminates Involved preclude the
use of divers under extreme emergency conditions for either short durattons
of exposure, or not at aVK
dased upon the chemical/water interface of aaterials found in the U.S.
Coast Guard 31st In Table 6.6, and the dermal Toxicity Data presented in
Table 21.1. uwbllical support encapsulated diver exposure to the following
chemicals should be for as short a period of time as possible, and only In
response to protection of public health, or aasslve environmental damage:
Cresol (Phenols)
Carton Tetrachloride
Naphthalene
hydrogen Sulfide
Methylene Chloride
Perchloroethylene
Otchloropropane
Polycblortnated B1phenyls
Trlchloroethylene
Benzene
hethy! Methacrylate
Styrene
Toluene
Ethylbenzene
Xylene
The classification of the above chemical substances Is based upon
their Insolubility 1n water, and a permissible level of concentration of
oetween 10 PPM/8-hour period to 100 PW/8-hour period. This list is by no
means meant to be a complete categorization. Each chemical substance
encountered at a spill site nust be evaluated for solubility* permissible
concentrations, and propensity to attack diving dress materials.
21-21

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Examples of Insoluble chemical substances in *htch a diver should never
Oe allowed to operate are as follows:
Acetic Anhydride
Acrjlonf trlle
Brontne
ipichlorohycirin
rtethyl Par*th1on
Lhlordtne
Again, this Hist is not complete.' Selection of these cheaitals are
based upon their insolubility and permissible concentrations being less
than 10 PPto/fi-hour period.
The 0SC and diving officer must consult specific cheaical charac-
teristics references in oroer to make an educated on~sfte decision on
whetner or not tq deploy diviny personnel.
21-22

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SECriLiN iz
GENERAL UIVJNC AhD EMERGENCY PROCURES
Adherence to established oivlng procedures and recognition of any
special precautions that nay tie needed because of local conditions will
enhance the safety of diving operations. Diving personnel should have a
thorough understanding of the procedures described In this section* Poor
procedures result not only in unnecessary and costly delays* but also may
affect the success of a project and increase the probability of accidents*
PLAiiHlWG TH£ DIVING OPERATION
definition of Hissfon and Goals
A clear definition of the mission ano its goals Is the first step. To
establish an operational plan, ail parties engaged in the project should
participate. Including those who will be diving and those engaged in non-
diving roles. Resources, including divers, diving equipment, surface or
underwater support platforms, and support equipment* should be determined*
The data or samples to be gathered, work to be performed, or observations
to be made snoula be identified, and the bottom time should be estimated as
closely as posslole.
DIVE TEAM ORGANIZATION
Dive Master
&1ve aasters have total responsibility for the safe and efficient con-
duct of diving operations. They must be experienced divers qualified to
handle the requirements of the proposed dive. Mo diving should be conducted
*nen the dive aaster is not present* ftie dive master's responsibilities are
¦any, and induce but may not be 11mltea to:
Overall responsibility for the diving operation
* Safe execution of all olving
Preparation of a basic plan of operation
Liaison with other organizations
Selection of equipment
Proper maintenance, repair, and stowage of equipment
Selection, evaluation, and briefing of divers and other personnel
Monitoring the progress of the operation and updating requirements
as necessary
Maintaining the diving log
Monitoring of decompression Iwhen required)
ZZ-\

-------
The dive master is responsible for the assignment of all divers to an
operation and for ensuring chat their qualifications meet the requirements
of the dive. The dive master shall ensure that All divers are briefed
thoroughly on the missions and goals of the operation, individual respon-
sibilities Mill he assigned each diver by the dive master* Where special
tools or techniques ire to be used, the dive ntaster shall ensure that each
diver is familiar with their application.
Training and proficiency dives should be Bade as necessary to ensure
safe and efficient operations, during operations involving a large nunber
of divers or in very complex dives, dive Masters should perform no actual
diving, but instead should oevote their efforts to directing the operation.
Hiving Medical Officer/hedical Technician
Though there are obvious advantages to having a qualified diving
medical officer on site, this may not always oe practical. As an alterna-
tive to a divmy medical officer, an Emergency Medical Technician trained
in the care of diving casualties may fie utilizeo. An individual so trained
is able to respond not only to emergency medical situations, but also is
capable of communicating effectively with a physician located at a distance
from the diving site. There are specialized courses available Designed to
train Emergency heoical Technicians in the care of diving casualties.
In the event that neither a physician nor a trained technician is
available, the dive master should obtain the n&ses and phone numbers of at
least three diving medical specialists who can be reached for advice in an
emergency, fcmergency consultation is available on 24-nour call at the Navy
Experimental Giving Unit, Panama City, FL 3240?, teTephone (904) 234-4351*
4353; the National naval Medical Center, ttaval rtedlcaf Research Institute,
tujthesda, HU 2C014„ telephone 13U1J 295-02:83; Brooks Air force &ase, San
Antonio, Texas 78235, telephone (512) 536-32/$; and the Dining Accident
(Network (DanJ. Durham, fiorth Carolina, telephone (9lgj 694-3111. Each of
these services is referred to as a "tends watch," and is available to
provide advice on the treatment of diving casualties. Diving personnel
should be sure to ootain and keep the phone numbers of these facilities,
especially if diving operations are to be conducted in remote areas.
S.c 1 en ce_Coo roi nator
t)n missions where diving Is performed in support of scientific pro-
grams, a science coordinator may be needed. The science coordinator Is the
prime point of contact for all scientific aspects of the program, Including
scientific equipment, its use, calibration, and maintenance. Working with
tne aive master, the science coordinator briefs divers on upcoming missions
and supervises the debriefing and sample or data accumulation after a dive,
elvers
Although the oive master 1s responsible for the overall oiving opera-
tion, each diver is responsible for being 1n proper physical condition, for
checking out personal equipment prior to the dive, and for thoroughly under-
n-z

-------
standing the purpose and the procedures to be used for the dive. 01vers al so
are responsible for using safe diving procedures and for knowing all emergency
procedures, A clean water "dip" tank should be utilized prior to entering
contaminated waters to assure proper seals and that no suit leaks are present.
(See Figures 22*1 and 22.2)
Tenders for Surface-Supplled Diving
The tender must be qualified to tend divers Independently and to operate
all surface-support equipment. To use aanpower efficiently, the tender may
be a qualified diver used fn a diver-tender rotation system. Though there Is
no specific requirement that tenders be qualified divers, they should be
trained In theory and operational procedures by the divers and diving supervi-
sors. Ideallyt tenders should be trained by Instructors and assigned to
diving operations by the diving supervisors. A tender-assistant rtwy assume a
tender's responsibilities when lie is under the direct supervision of fully
qualIf led diving and tending personnel * and he My receive instruction in
proper tending procedures during field operations. Another tender* diver, or
qualified person should be assigned as coomunlcat ions person, console opera-
tor, tiaefceeper, record keeper, and diver's assistant. Tenders mst also be
adequately protected against chemical hazards both from spl ash and respiratory
aspects as shown in Figure 22.3.
It Is recommended that one qualified person be designated as standby
diver, ready to enter the water promptly In an emergency. The standby diver
say accept tender responsibilities fn routine operations; in more coapi leated
diving operations, however, the standby diver must be freed of all other
duties.
Support Pivers and Other Support Personnel
In most diving operations the ntnher and types of support divers depend
upon the size of the operation and V type of diving equipment used. As a
general rule, those surface-support personnel working directly with the diver
also should be qual 1fied divers. Using unqualified personnel who do not under-
stand diving techniques and terminology «ay cause confusion and unnecessary
complications. Persons not qualified as divers can be used when the need
arises only after they have demonstrated an understanding of diving procedures
to a standard acceptabl e to the dive (Raster.
5mal 1 'Seal e Operat ions
For self-contained diving operations, a minimum of two divers should be
used. In a snail -scale operation where the complexity of the assigned task
is minimal, the dive master may dive, and no Surface support is required.
For an operation of increased scope, or If the tasks to be performed under
water become more complex, standby divers and even tenders may be required.
Selection of Surface-Support Platform
During the course of operations, divers will enter the water fro®
pi atforms of various sizes and descriptions, rangfng from samll, Inflatable
rubber boats to large research vessels. Barges, specially outfitted for
diving* also may be used. {See Figure 22.3)
22-3

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Figure 22 J 10C0 Gallon "Dip" Tank for Leak Detection of
Draeger Suit - OHMSETT
22-4

-------
Flrnire 22.2 300 Gallon "Dip" Tank for Leak Detection of HK-12 Suit
22-5

-------
Dockslde Operations
Shipboard Operations
Diving Stag*
Platform
Figure 22. 3 Surface-Support Platforms
22-6

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Generally, the operational requireeents, type of diving equipment,
magnitude of the diving tasic, and prevailing and predicted environmental
conditions will dictate the best surface-support platform to use. for
example, nearshore a lying which uses self-contained equipment in relatively
calm water may be accomplished without ouch difficulty from a snail boat.
More extensive offshore diving operations* using self-contained or
umbilical-supplied equipment, would be undertaken from a large vessel with
adequate deck space.
Environmental Conditions
Environmental conditions at a dive site should be considered in
planning a diving operation* Generally, environmental conditions can be
oivicted Into surface environmental conditions and underwater environmental
conditions* Surface conditions include weather, sea state, and ship
traffic. Underwater conditions include depth, bottom type, currents, water
temperatures, and visibility.
Surface Conditions—
Weather conditions are an important factor to consider In planning a
dive, whenever possible, diving operations should be cancelled or delayed
during bad weather. Current and historical weather oata should be reviewed
to determine if proper conditions will prevail or are predicted for a suf-
ficient amount of time to complete the mission* Critical weather changes
and wind shifts may jeopardise the safety of personnel and platforms. All
boaters should avail themselves of the continuous marine weather broadcasts
provided by ftuAA on the following frequencies: 162,4G hHi, 162.475 MHz* or
162.55 depending on the local area. These Broadcasts can be neard in
most areas of the ti^., and require only the purchase of a VHF radio
receiver. VhF equipment ccotes in three levels of sophistication, ranging
from the one- or two-bana weather radios to Aulti-oand radios and two-way
sets. The weather raoios are the least expensive and are designed to ptek
up NliAA radio broadcasts only.
Whenever possible, avoid or Halt diving in moderate seas. Do not
attempt scuba or surface-supplied diving in rough seas for a graphfc
representation of the various sea states. Sea state limitations depend to
a large cegree on the type and size of the diving platfor»- Diving
operations may he conducteo in rougher seas fro* properly moored larger
platforms such as olving barges, ocean-going ships, or fixed structures.
Divers using self-contained equipment should avoid entering the ocean in
heavy surf, if baa weather sets in after a diving operation has commenced,
appropriate recall signals should be employed.
Since many diving operations are conducted 1n harbors, rivers, or
¦ajar shipping channels, other ships often present serious problems. At
times, it ®ay he necessary to close off an area or liaiit the movement of
Other ships. Ship traffic should be taken Into consideration during dive
planning and, If time permits, a local "Notice to Mariners" should be
issued. Any time that diving operations are to be conducted in the vicinity
of other ships, the other vessels should oe notified of the diving by
22-7

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message or signal. For Information on proper lights* shapes, and flags to
tie displaced during diving operations* see U.S. Coast Guard {IS11).
If the operation will be carried on 1n the middle of an active fishing
ground, small boats operated by people with various levels of experience
and competence must be anticipated* The diving tea® should assume that
these operators are not acquainted with the meaning of any diving signals,
and should take the necessary precautions to ensure that they remain clear
Of the area.
Visibility--
Uivers frequently are requiredito dive in water where visibility is
minimal and sometimes at the «fo level. Special precautions are
appropriate when visibility is at zero or severely limited. If scuba 1$
used* a budo> line or other reference, system and float Is recommended. A
convenient way to attach a buddy line!'is to use a rubber loop that can he
slipped on and oft the wrist easily* '.This Is preferable to tying a line,
which would prevent rapid removal* I
»
a
heavy concentrations of plankton $ften accumulate at the therrocline*
especially during the summer in the mlb-Atlantic states. Divers may flno
that plankton absorb most of the light at the thermocllne or that even
though the water below the thermocllne* is clear, a light may still be
required for visibility* Thermoc11nes lb clear water diffuse light within
the area of greatest temperature change*lcausing a significant decrease 1n
visibility.	^
A sense of touch is extremely important to a diver Or scientist working
in low or iero visibility- The ability to use touch cues when handling
tools or instruments in a strange work L>nviromrent is valuable to a diver
in the oark* Rehearsing work functions on the surface while blindfolded
will increase proficiency in underwater tasks-
Underwater tow-light-level closeo-circuit television has been used
successfully when light levels are reduced, because a television camera
"sees" more In these conditions than ooei the human eye. This 1s true
mainly when the reduced visibility is cauled by the absence of light; In
cases where the problem is caused by high Urbfdlty, the TV camera does not
offer a significant advantage* when the pil-pose of the dive is inspection
or ooservatlon and a closed-circuit televtMon system is used, the diver
serves essentially as a mobile underwater platform. The monitor is watched
by surface support personnel who. In tuml direct the moveaents of the
diver* lAnoerwater television cameras are available that are either
handheld or mounted on a helmet.	'
Loss ot Surface A1r Supply-^
A oiver using uifcilical-suppliea equipment who experiences a loss of
air supply usually has a limited amount of usable air left in the helmet or
constant^volume suit* If the supply of ait to the mask does not resuoe
again quickly* the ulver should signal the leaders, requesting to be
21-B

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brought to the surface, or should make a control leu Ascent. 7he diver
should not discard the diving equipment unless it Is hopelessly fouled.
A self-contained emergency air supply systea (come-home or bailout
cyllnderj may be used In conjunction with surface-supplied diving equipment.
Such a system consists of a scuba cylinder assembly, a reduction regulator
(first stage of a standard single hose regulator), and a backpack/harness
assembly. Although the capacity of the scuba cylinder uy vary free 10 to
140 cubic feet, many divers prefer to use a 40 to SO ft* cylinder, rather
than a large 72 ft* cylinder, for an emergency supply.
The first stage regulator used with the emergency air supply is fitted
with a relief valve in the auxiliary law-pressure port to prevent over-
pressure of the regulator to the mask hose In the event of regulator
malfunction* Self-contained emergency air may be fed directly Into the
mask through a special attachment on the sloe valve or directly Into the
diver's air hose assembly. In the latter case, the check valve should be
located between the intersection of the emergency gas supply hose and the
primary surface supply hose.
For total redundancy, a completely separate stjba unit also may be
used as a backup system. In tit is case the diver «ould ditch the he 1 net or
mask In an emergency and insert the scuba regulator mouthpiece. This
procedure is useful if the surrace-supplieo hose Is badly tangled or the
helmet or mask is not aoapteo for self-contained emergency air systems.
Another method commonly used by commercial divers is to have a standby
oiver with a spare hose available.
Flying after Diving at Sea Level —
Since specialized governmental diving units capable of hazardous
response operations will not be located throughout the United States, It is
fair to expect that dive team members will utilize *1r transportation as a
means ot arriving at the dive site. Flight planning following the comple-
tion of a alve operation must take Into account the following information;
The elimination of inert gas from body tissues after an exposure to
pressure continues for a period of 24 hours or more after the dive before
equilibration «1th the ambient partial pressure of nitrogen in the air at
the surface 1s completed. Muring this period, reducing the ambient pressure
further will create a condition identical to that which occurs during
decompression after a dive. After diving, divers should exercise caution
when traveling in mountainous terrain as well as when flying. The cabin
atmosphere in modern pressurized aircraft usually Is maintained at an
altituoe of 8,000 feet 10*74 atmosphere), and this reduction in pressure
may be sufficient to cause Inert gas dissolved in a diver's tissues to come
out in the form of bubblest causing decompression sickness. This has
occurred, with severe symptoms, in divers who fly after diving. Flying
after diving 1s a recognized hazard that should se avoided. Termination of
the flight, which increases the ambient pressure to 1 atmosphere, does not
necessarily cause the gas bubbles to decrease Sufficiently in size to stop
22-9

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cams 1 no symptoms- Recompression treatment way be required to relieve
symptoms. Since a Qiver may have left the vicinity of a recompression
chamber* It fifty oe difficult to find a charter fn which treatment can be
instituted. The delay that results may cause pernanent tissue damage and
extend treatment time.
If it is necessary to fly foaeoiately after a decompression dive» a
series of repetitive olves. or recwipression treatment (as with an injury
that requires medical capability beyond that available at the dive site),
the diver should oe transported at low altitude by helicopter or aircraft,
or In a pressurized aircraft at a cabin atmosphere of not more than £100
feet of altitude. If it is necessary to transport Oy air a olver suffering
from oecoopresslon sickness, the flight should be conducted at the lowest
safe altituoe possible or 1n a pressurized aircraft in which the cabin
ataosphere does not exceed 600 feet of altitude. In addition, the victim
Should breathe pure oxygen until arrival at a recompression chamber.
before flying in an aircraft in which the cabin atmosphere is less
than a.000 feet (usually the case In nost flights), a diver who has
coapleted any number of oives on air and been decompressed according to the
U.S. Navy Standard Air Decompression Tables should wait at sea level«
breathing air, for the computed surface interval that allows him to be
classified as a Group 0 oiver in the U.S. kavy Repetitive Diving Table.
Before flying, the diver should check with the flight engineer to
ascertain Lhe oiaxiBun planned cabin altitude and to inform him that divers
will be aboard.
To shorten the necessary surface Interval before flying, oxygen may be
breathed instead of air. Table 22.1 lists the length of oxygen-breathing
time necessary before flying Is allowed, for the various Repetitive Oive
Group classifications.
Table Z2.1
Optional uxygen"Breathing T
Before Flying After uivl
vlng
Times
Repetitive hive Groups
Oxygen Time
Before Flying
feroups ft through Z
Groups H through L
Groups £ through 6
Groups A through \i
(Hr.-NfnJ
1:30
1:00
0:30
0:00
22-10

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SECTION 23
ADDITIONAL Uh-!>CEK£ R£SPOf*S£ CUNSIOE*ATIOMS
Access
The access for ftnaatifers of the news media into the operations must be
determined oy the uiC or MSli. A specific Individual should be selected
as the spokesperson for the release of All official information. At!
response team personnel are to direct Inquiries from the news wed la to
this Individual* Notts people will generally go to anj lengths to get a
shot of site operations even if operations are 1n a hot contaminated
area, for safety reasons, nonessential response team individuals and the
public are to be kept away from the site during operations. Any
"official" visitor dust be accompanied at all tlaes by a response team
member while on-site. At the discretion of the O&C, the site ano
Surrounding area may be evacuated of all personnel. Work with local la*
enforcement authorities. They are on your side {usually}.
Physical Examinations
Only individuals Mho have received a complete physical examination
within the past year should be permitted within "hot" contaminated
operational work areas.
heather
Consideration must he made as to sea state for any diving operation.
Deployment a no recovery of both diving personnel* gear, equipment, and
salvaged items are greatly complicated by htyh seas. Diving personnel
working in relatively shallow waters (10-15 feet) can also be susceptible
to air embolism due to wave aepth variances as small as four feet'
Mind ana temperature should be closely monitored and wind chill
calculations made every hour during cold weather. Surface-support
personnel will be particularly prone to frostoite and exposure once they
becooe wet.
ttesptrator* Protection
ho Individuals will be allowed tnsiae the "hot" operational site
without appropriate respiratory protection. Respirators, except during
donning ana removal, shall be either positive pressure SCBA's, unbilical
airlines, or air purifying canister full-face mask units. All personnel
23-1

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wearing respirators oust shave at the start of eacn work oay to prevent
leakage at the facepiece-to-face-sea1.
Personal Hygiene
No one wilt he permuted to eat, drink, or smoke inside the fencea
area. Outside the fence* they vtTl thoroughly wash hands and face with
soap ano water before doing so. Individuals oust wash hands with soap and
*ater before urinating* All footgear worn inside the fence must renin on
site until the field work Is coapleteo. At the end of each day* disposable
clothing will he removed and disposed of in 55-galIon metal dru«s» which
will remain Inside the fence. Individuals are expected to shower promptly
ano thoroughly after leaving the site at the end of each day.
Personnel txposure
If clothing is ripped or tarn, it is to be removed and replaced as
soon as possible. Disposable clothing contaminated with an observable
amount of chemical resiaue is to be removed and replaced immediately.
Resioue on looon suits" 1s to be washed off as soon as possible. In the
event of oirect skin contact, the affecteo area 1s to be washed imnediately
with soap ana water ano the person taken to a hospital. A person will be
stationed In the aecontamination area to assist In the removal of
protective gear.
hospital A tmergenc.y bervices
One response team number, stationed outside the 'hot" operational
area* oust know the quickest route to local medical facilities. Contact
snoula be rode* prior to operations consenting, with the local first aid
squad, hdsplial emergency room, and nearest operational recompression
chamaer. Contact with the area Coast Guard station is necessary if
air/helicopter evacuation of injured divers must be made. Phone numbers of
all emergency response and service organizations oust be prominently
displayeo next to the comnand post telephone.
Fire
If the response operation Involves flaranable material, the local Fire
Department must be contacted to assist in standing a "fire watch1* just off-
site duriny operations, fire personnel must have hao training in SC8A and
should be prepareo to spread foam (light waterJ in the event of a ftre.
23-2

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SECTton 24
DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES
As part of the system to prevent or reduce the physical transfer of
contaminants by people and/or equipment from on-site, procedures oust be
instituted for decontaminating anything leaving the Exclusion Area and
Contamination Reduction Area. These procedures include the decontamination
of personnel, protective equipment, monitoring equipment, clean-Up
equipment, etc. Unless otherwise demonstrated, everything leaving the
Exclusion Area should be considered contaminated and appropriate nethods
established for decontasination.
In general, decontamination at the site consists of rinsing equipment,
personnel, etc., with copious amounts of water and washing sane with a
detergent/inter solution. If contaminants are known, then a specific
detergent and/or solvent can be used to decontaminate. Fig. 24.1 illus-
trates the maximum physical layout for personnel decontamination during a
worst case situation, Fig. 24.2 Illustrates the minimum physical layout
for personnel decontamination for a relatively small well-identified
situation. Each sfte requires special consideration and the decontamin-
ation procedures should be modified fron the maximum to mrfninum layout
based on known Information.
Decontamination {Deconl and ftlnse Solutions
The decon solutions should be solutions of water and chemical compounds
designed to react with and neutralize the specific contaminants. The tem-
perature and contact time also should be considered in order to insure
co«vlete neutralization. An excellent unit for applying decon and surfac-
tant solutions is a la-Pre$sure Washer, Model 914. The washer delivers
4 GPM at 1000 psi and can withdraw decon solutions via a siphon feed hose.
The contaminants will not always be known In a majority of cases and
it will be necessary to use a decon solution that is effective for a
variety of contamirants. Two of these general decon solutions are listed
below:
o Decon Solution A - A solution containing 5* Sodium Carbonate
< Ha?C031 and 51 Trisodium Phosphate (Ma3P04). Mix four
(4) pounds of cooaercial grade W2CO3 plus four {4) pounds
commercial grade Ha^POa with each ten (101 gallons of water.
These chemicals are available at most hardware stares.
24-1

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tqulpfllini
Wind t}lite Plktlic
ClQlllfll



"

J
Field

Ffadrett
Sho*»e<

Firii


Aid
\ F4*IU
Eipciiigrti
Can
(32 gjillaul
Figure2^i Maximum layout of personnel decontamination
station. (Revets A & B Protection)

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Wind Dliiciisn
I
?:
Oicon
Solution
<4
S Ho move ^
/Bool Covtri
and Qutor Glavds
Ramciug
Boot! /Glovea
and
Outes
G^nnanu
(For Di*pO*tl and
Off Silo
Deconttmin ation)
PlflEHC
Sheet
Figure z4.i Minimum layout of the PDS.
(Lovoi A, Q & C Proloctioiil

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o Decon Solution 6 - A solution containing 101 Calclun Hypochlorite
CCannoijO. K?* tight (8) pounds ©f Ca(CIO)? with each ten
(10) gallon^ of water. Calcium Hypochlorite (HTH) fs available at
nost hardware or pool supply stores.
The rinse solutions used In decon should have the ability not only to
remove tlw decon solution physically, but also to neutralize excess decon
solution.
A general purpose rinse solution, used for both decon solutions listed
above consists of a five (S) percent solution of Trisodtum Phosphate. Mix
four (4) pounds NajPGty with each ten (10) gallons of water.
A final rinse of liquid Ivory soap solution Is reconoended on all decon
procedures followed by fresh water. (See Figures 24.3 and 24.4)
irrational Considerations
The decontanination procedures Illustrated in Fig,. 24,1 are for Level A
protection which *ore often than not requires a detailed decontamination
process during a worst case situation (I.e., Dloxin contamination, chemical
fire. 1 mediately dangerous to life or health atmospheres}. Fig. 24.2
illustrates the nlnloum physical layout for personnel decontamination
during a relatively small, well-defined situation (i.e., pesticide spill,
solvent spill, etc.).
Less extensive procedures for decontamination can be subsequently or
initially established when the type and degree of contamination through
analysis becomes known or the potential for transfer 1s judged to be
minimum. These procedures generally Involve one or two washdowns only, and
fewer precautionary weasures In doffing equipment. These procedures would
not involve additional decontamination of the protective clothing which is
removed. Table 24.1 lists general decon solutions and their applications.
In extreme situations when there	may be a question of the efficacy of
decontamination to known or strongly	suspect substances of a highly toxic
nature, protective clothing nay have	to be discarded after use or tested
after decontamination,
Consideration must also be given to the protective equipment worn by
those personnel operating the decontamination line. In most cases, chemical
protective clothing, boots, and gloves should suffice. Unless 1t is suspec-
ted and/or confirmed that personnel needing decontamination are highly
contaminated, air-purifying respirators with suitable canisters can he worn
(Level C Protection),
Decontamination solutions should be designed to react with and
neutralize the specific potential contaminants involved in an incident.
However, since the contaminants at an uncontrolled waste site will be
unknown In the majority of cases, it is necessary to use a decontamination
solution that 1s effective for a variety of contaminants. Several of these
24-4

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DocksIds Deeon of
Superllte 17 Rig
Gross Initial Washdwn
of M(-12 Rig
Final Oecon of
MK-12 Rig
Figure 24.3 Dockside Decon Operations
24-5

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Initial Cross In-Water
Contaminant Wastitfown
of SunerHte 17
F1n*1 Shipboard
Decon of HC-1Z *19
Pressure Waster w/
Concentrated Dscdti
Solutions
Figure 24.4 Shipboard Oecon Operations
24-6

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Table 24,1 USES OF GENERAL PURPOSE DECON SOLUTIONS
TYPE OF HAZARD SUSPECTED	SOLUTIOH	INSTRUCTIONS
1. Inorganic acids* metal processing wastes.
A
To 10 gallons of water, add 4 pounds of sodium
carbonate (soda line) and 4 pounds of trlsodium
phosphate.
Stir until evenly Mixed.
2. Heavy ratals: mercury» lead, cadolum, etc.
A
Same as 11 above.
3. Pesticides, fungicides, chlorinated
phenols, dioxins, and PCB's.
0
To 10 gallons of water, add 8 pounds of calciin
hypochlorite. Stir with wooden or plastic
stirrer until evenly mixed.
4. Cyanides, ammonia, and other non-actdie
Inorganic wastes.
B
Same as #3 above.
5. Solvents and organic corpounds, such as
trichloroethylene, chloroform, and toluene.
C (or A)
To 10 Gallons of water, add 4 pounds of
trlsodium phosphate. Stir until evenly mixed.
6. P8B fs and PCB's.
C {or A)
Same as 15 above.
7. Oily, greasy unspecified wastes.
C
Same as #5 above.
8. InprgefliC bases, alkali, and caustic waste.
D
To 10 gallons of water, add 1 pint of
concentrated hydrochloric acid. 5tir with
a wooden or plastic stirrer.

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general purpose decontaraination solutions {sob* Ingredients are available
at hardware or swlmlng pool supply stores) are listed be7ow:
Decon solution A
Decon Solution 0
Decon Solution C
-	A solution containing 91 Sodium Carbonate
(K&2CO3) and ®S Trlsodftm Phosphate
,
-	A solution containing 101 Calcium Hypochlorite
fCafC10)2),
-	A solution containing Si Trisodium Phosphate
CHa3P04h Tliis solution can also be used as
a general purpose rinse.
0 Decon Solution 0 - A dilute solution of Hydrochloric Acid (HC1),
All diving helmets, jocking harnesses, welglht belts, and unbfllcals oust be
thoroughly scrubbed, deconned, and rinsed after each operational day.
Insofar as possible, measures should be taken 10 prevent contamination
of sampling and monitoring equipment, Sampling devices become contaminated,
but monitoring instruments, unless they are splashed, usually do not. Once
contaminated, Instruments are rtlfffcult to clean without damaging them. Any
delicate instrument which cannot be decontaminated easily should be protec-
ted while it Is being used. It should be bagged, and the bag taped and
secured around the Instrument. Openings are made In the bag For s&^ile
intake.
The following are specific areas of concern In decontamination
operations!
1.	Stapling devices
Sampling devices require special cleaning. The EPA Regional
Laboratories can provide information on proper decontamination
methods.
2.	Tools
Wooden tools are difficult to decontaminate because they absorb
chemicals. They should be kept on site and handled only by
protected workers. At the end of the response, wooden tools
should be discarded. For decontaminating other tools, Region
Laboratories should be consulted.
3. Respirators
Certain parts of contaminated respirators, such as the harness
assembly and leather or cloth components, are difficult to
decontaminate. If grossly contaminated, they nay have to be
discarded. Rubber components can be soakeo in soap and water and
scrubbed with a brush. Regulators must be maintained according to
manufacturer's recoimwndatons. Persons responsible for decontami-
nating respirators should be thoroughly trained In respirator
maintenance.
?fl-8

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4* heavy Equipment
fen1 looteri, trucks, pack-hoes, bulking chambers, and other heavy
equipment are difficult to decontaminate. The aethoo generally
usm 1$ to Mash thetn with water under high pressure and/or to
scrub accessible parts with detergent/Water solution under
pressure* 1f possible. In some cases, shovels* scoops* and lifts
have been sand blasted or steam cleaned* Particular care must be
given to those components in direct contact with contaminants such
as tires and scoops. Swipe tests should be utilized to measure
effectiveness.
5.	Sanitizing of Personnel Protective Equipment
Respirators, reusable protective clothing, and other personal
articles not only must be oecontaminated before being reused, but
also sanitized. The inside of masks and clothing becooes soiled
oue to exhalation, booy oils* and perspiration. The manu-
facturer's instructions should be used to sanitize the respirator
mask, It practical, protective clothing should be machine trashed
after a thorough decontaminations otherwise It must be cleaned by
hano.
6.	Persistent Contamination
In some instances* clothing and equipment 11 become contamlnateo
with substances that cannot be removed by normal decontamination
procedures. A solvent may be used to reiove such contamination
from equipment if it does not destroy or degrade the protective
material. If persistent contamlnation Is expected* disposable
garments should be used. Testing for persistent contamtnaton of
protective clothing and appropriate decontamination must he done
by qualified laboratory personnel,
7.	uisposal of Contaminated Materials
ATI materials and equipment used for decontamination oust be
disposes of properly- Clothing, tools, buckets, brushes* and all
other equipment that 1s contaminated must he secures in orums or
other containers and labeled. Clothing not completely decontami-
nated on-site shoulo be secured in plastic bags before being
removeo from the site*
Contaminated wash and rinse solutions should he contained by using
step-in-containers (for example, child's wading poo!) to hold
spent solutions. Another containment method is to dig a trench
about 4 inches deep and line it with plastic. In both cases the
spent solutions are transferred to drums» which are labeled and
disposed of with other substances on site.
24-9

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Append ix f, Anne* l» 2, ana 3 describe basic decontamination procedures for
a worker wearing Level LA, H, or C protection, Ihe basic decontamination
lines t^tuation 1/, consisting of approximately 39 stations, are almost
identical! except for changes necessitated by different protective clothing
or respirators- for each annex, three specific situations are described in
which, the basic tor full decontamination) procedure is changed to taJce into
account differences In the extent of coniamlnalton, the accompanying
chanyes in equipment worn* and other factors* The situations illustrate
decontamination setups based on Known or assures conditions at an incident,
hany other variations are possible.
Annex 4 describes a «ri!nimum layout for personnel decontamination. The
rtumher of individual stations ahve been reduced. Although the decontami-
nation equipment and amount ot space required Is less than needed In the
procedures previously describee, there is also a much higher probability of
cross-contami nation.
JN-10

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SECT1UH as
SUUHCtS OF INFORMATION AND J?ESPOKS£ ASSISTANCE
in a hazardous spill situation, the OSC or MbO must swiftly assess site
conditions* hot only prior to allowing diving personnel Co enter a contam-
inated water environment, but also to whatever hazards his/her surface
response workers face.
Hany sources of information ano organizations can provide response
personnel with technical data ana physical assistance regarding both the
hazards associated with an incident and methods of dealing with then. It
is necessary to be aware of these resources ana to know how to use them.
The information, which way include data on sites, topography, meteor-
ology, physical/chemical properties of the naterial, applicable treatment
nethoos, anu available cleanup resources» can be provided by various
agencies, maps, reference books, and manuals. It is advisable to get data
from at least two sources and to use the latest ealtlon of any reference,
especially when searching for hygienic standards or toxicological data.
Access to on-line computer files may be possible at the site 1f a
telephone, portable terminal,, and 120-volt outlet are available. Aerial
photographs can also provloe useful information when Interpreted properly.
hUAA tazardotfs Materials Mesponse Project
HUAA's hazardous Materials Response Project thAZHAT) is a member of
one of tne groups of special forces available upon request to Federal On-
Scene Coordinators (OSC) for response to actual or potential releases of
pollutants, such as oil and hazardous materials, as well as for contingency
planning. When responding to a potentially hazardous spill, HAZMAT relies
upon four main groups for quick reliable information. The functions of
these groups are outlined below.
Trajectory Ana lysis/Physical Oceanography
w. Jerry bait
hUAA/UNPA
7600 Sand Point May, h.E.
Seattle, Washington 98115
1^11-6^527-6^17
The trajectory analysis/physical oceanography group is concerned with
the movement and spreading of pollutants In the marine environment. Their
goal is to define trajectories for both waterburne and airborne contaminants
1n a timely manner. In order to achieve this objective, tJr. Gait has
developed a sophisticated coaputer model. Field equipment such as cameras,
25-1

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portable jarkrooais, and current seasuring equipoent help to verify their
predictions in the field.
Research Planning Institute
His iri»TrtiSfttJl sensitivity analysis group i$ concerned w1 th environ-
ment*!) resources at risk tn* a pollutant discharge* Advance capping of
coastal areas develop reference naps available ror iosaediate referral 1n
the event of a spill. The Kesearch Planning Institute has a staff of pro-
fessionals in the areas of chcalstry, geology* biology, marine ecology* and
geochemistry which lends its support to the development of these valuable
references.
Environmental Sensitivity Analysis
trr. Erich Smotach
lt. Jacqu£ Michel
Hesearch Planning institute
§25 Gervais Street
Columbia, St 25201
18031256-7322
Cheafcal Support wd Safety
nRTwwhciT"S^ptJiTwd Safety group works closely together to define
the hazard and make appropriate safety recommendations. The cheralstry/
safety prctlm is best defineo by consulting a number of reference sources.
HAMT routinely uses the following references along with a coaputer-based
information system known as the Cheated) Information System {CIS).
Chemical Support Safety and Health
Checistry: Or. Ed uverton
Center £01^610-Organic Studies
University of hew ia-leans
lew Orleans, LA 70122
1504)*83-6640J
Safety and Health:
David Kunerlowe
MJAA/WA
7600 Sand Point *ay» N.I*
Seattle, Mashington 38115
{206)527-6326
Center for Oisease Control
The Center for disease Control provides detailed technical assistance
1n himn toxicology and in the evaluation and monitoring of health risks.
GDC has experts locates in all coastal regions to assist with safety-related
4JW human exposure problems.
national Center for Disease Control
br, Georgia Jones
COC-Center of Environmental Health
l$QO Clifton Road, N.£.
Atlanta, &A 30333
Appendix F contains a listing of basic references, On-line Computer
Systeas, remote sensing ana sap Interpretation information, ano a Hst of
	jt *	T _	—jm				.	A	Jk.M	*.

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REFtrttACES
t. Lindsay. D. e*, ane «~ S. Stricoff. BA feasibility Study of the State
of the Art of Personnel Monitors." 0«S. Coast Guaro Report No.
CG-k>-30-79» November 19?G-
2. Craven, J» P. et il. "Marine Technology Society Journal." Volurce 15
- No. 2, 1981.
3* HcLellan, $. A.t ana it* F* 3usb>». ^valuation of the Use of 01 vers
and/or Keootely Operated *enteles in Chemically Contaminated Waters."
OSfcPA Contract Ho. 66-03-31)3 TMS #3 Task 42-3, Nove«ber 1982.
4.	Coolbaugh, J. C», and k. h. ColwelK "Microbial Hazards Associated
with Diving In Pollutes haters.* NOAA contract to. 04-8-HQW1,
*epte*>er 1981.
5.	haroicJt, S. P., ana P. ilaton. "Hazardous Materials and the Search
and Recovery Teaa," 1962.
6.	Caldwell, w» t. "Polluting Incidents In and Arouna U.S. katers."
kj.S* Coast buard.
7.	Perntce, J. "UbEPA tdison facility Manual," 1982.
8.	Turpin, k. U.. "tPA Interim Standard Operating Safety Guloesi"
September 198*.
9- bi>tPA Occupational health I Safety Manual- Chapter to. EPA Diving
Safety Policy, February 11* 1982-
10.	heCraciten, E., and J. A. Rogers. "Response to Spills of Hazardous
Materials; development of Spills Response Kit, Remedial Actions,
Procecures ana Response Concepts,- September 19£2. Wa^al Sea Systems
Ccroano.
11.	bchvope, A,0,, P. P. Costas, J. 0* Jackson, ano 0. V. ueltman*
"Guidelines for the Selection of Chemical Protective Clothing."
Volumes i ana II. uStPA Office of Occupational Wealth and Safety.
12.	Shaver. V* K.« and K» L. 6>rko*iti. "Guidelines Manual - Post
Accident Procedures for Chemicals and Propellants." Air Force Rocket
Propulsion Laboratory Report *AFkPL TR-82-077, January 1983.

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13* wells, J. H.f ana H, Keetu "Protection oi Divers In Water Containing
haiaraous Gheaicals, Pathogenic Organisms &> Radioactive Haterlal."
undersea Kecical Society Heport Mo- CK 60(CWJ February 2, 19&3.
14.	D.S. Amy Corp. of Engineers. "Superfund Overview Course." Volumes J
Si 11. Huntsville Ofvfslon, oanuary 1983*
15,	nilliscroft, k» fa. *A System for Protecting SCWA 01 vers fro« the
Hazards ot Contaminated Mater," Doctoral Dissertation, California
Coast University, January 1963.
16- Sell, T. "hazardous Materials Incident Response Operations Manual."
USfcPA ull & Special naterial$ Control Division 6 U.S. Coast Guard,
January 1963.
77. flasn, J. "Chemical Tank Testing of Modified Camtercial Diving Hetaets
and Dress-' fcPA Contract ho. 68-3-3056, May 1983.
18. tiotzua, J. ft. "hew £PA/N0AA Project on Hazardous hiving Techniques."
Ocean Science hews, Volume 25, no. 4, January 24, 1943.
19- U.S. Navy. "II.b. Kavy Otvlng Manual - Volume 1t Air Diving." havy
uepartoent, Washington, u.C. fcAVSEA C9S4-IP-0O1-901Q, 19?3.
20.	U.S. Coast Guam. "Polluting Incidents In ana Around U.S. Maters."
CUHuTlhM *16450.20, 1982.
21.	Levlne, h.J*., "The tpiaemiology of Aquatic Infections and a Program of
study for Determining Microbial Hazards," Unoersea Meafcal Society
Report Mo. Ck 601 Cm./ February 1, 1583.
22.	Campell, S.Li., "nuclear litying Safety, Proceeding of Protection of
Divers in water Containing hazardous Ctoeicals, Pathogenic Organises,
4no Kaaioactive Haterlal," Undersea Meotcal Society rteport No.
Ck $CIC*}, February 1, 19&3-

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APPENDTX A
OHMSCTT
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AliENCY
Tk LI»S. Environmental Protection Agency operates the Oil and Haurdout
Wjrertal Simulated EnvJrorwnMitaf Te\» Tank (OHtt^F.TT) I	Jlrd in Leonardo* New
Thh f jk.iliTv prAvKfc\ ,*| environmental! oUi-« : nduct testing and
ck'vcl* ipm of dev and T1 r- ' " '	li>a f ot oil an«J
h«t.£.it dons i tenat spills
TV ,ify Cut are Of l" I > it	- m? leetl laTi^;	< ¦ ' • v villi 4 »iM
depth of 2.* merrcs (3 feet). The tank be fiih * tl 'rv^	ater. IT* tank
is spanned b> j iiridge capable of everting hori#ontu lt
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The prinicipal systems of me tank include a wave generator, a beach, and 4
I titer system. The wave generator and absorber beach can produce regular waves to
0.6 metre <2 leet) high and to 43 metres (1*7 feet) long, a? well as a serin of 0.7
metres (2.3 feel) hi#i reflecting, complex waves meant w simulate the water surface
of a harbor. The tank water b clarified by recirculation through a *10 cubic
metre/hour (1400 gallon per minute) <£atomaceous earth filter system to permit full
use of a sophisticated underwater photography and vide© imagery system aid to
remove the hydrocarbons thai enter the tank water as a result of testing. The towing
bridjg* has a built-in oil barrier which is used to skim oil to the North aid of the tank
for cleanup and recycling.
When t>v tank must bo emptjed for maintenance purposes, the entire water
volume of 9309 cubic metres (2.6 millon gallons) a filtered and treated until a meets
all applicable State and Federal water quality standards before being dii
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APPENDIX B
AIR HON I TOR[H& AND SURVEY INSTRUMENTS
I.	MTMOirCTION
Response to an environmental incident requires careful preparation
and prompt action to reduce the hazards. Concurrently, the health
and safety of response personnel and the general public must be
protected. Air monitoring and survey Instruments provide
Information to determine how these requirements are being met-
The purpose of this part is to;
-	List field instruments useful for on-site work,
-	Describe the operating theories and principles of these Instru-
ments,
-	Illustrate the proper interpretation and limitations of the
data obtained.
Used correctly, these Instruments provide data that help response
personnel to determine:
-	Potential or real effects on the environment,
-	Ifimedlate and long-term risks to public health, including the
health of response workers,
-	Appropriate personnel protection and respiratory equipment to
be used on-site,
• Actions to «1tigate the hajard(s) safely and effectively.
II.	CHARACTERISTICS OF FIELD INSTRUMENTS
To perfor* effectively in the field, air monitoring
Instruments must he:
-	Portable
-	Able to generate reliable and useful results
-	Sensitive and selective
-	Inherently safe	\
AH of tnese traits may or may not be present in any one
instrument.

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A, Portability
A prime consideration that determines the usefulness of a
field instrument is, portability. Transforation shock
resulting from the movement from one place to another,
together with unintentional abuse, ranks high in
shortening the usable life of an Instrument. Tf> reduce
this trauma, instruments should be selected that have
reinforced shells or Frames, shock-counted electronic
packages, ar padded containers for shipment.
Exposure to the elements and the test atmosphere Itself Is
of concern for those Instruments repeatedly used In
adverse conditions or as long-term monitors. Anodized or
coated finishes, weather-resistant packaging and remote
sensing are effective in reducing downtime and increasing
portability.
In short, a portable unit should possess ease In
mobility, the ability to withstand the rigors of use,
quick assembly, and short check out and calibration time.
B,	Reliable and Useful Results
Response time, the Interval between an Instrument
"sensing" a contaminant and generating data, 1s important
to producing reliable and useful results in the field.
Response time depends on: testis) to be performed, dead
time between s«nple periods (the time for analysis, data
generation, and data display), and the sensitivity of the
Instrument. Response time establishes the pace of the
overall survey and the individual tests.
Another consideration is that the Instrument must give
results that are immediately useful. Instruments should
be direct reading, with little or no need to interpolate.
Integrate, or compile large amounts of data.
C.	Sensitivity and Selectivity
A third requirement of a good field instrument is the
ability to sample and analyse very low contaminant levels,
and to discern among contaminants exhibiting similar
characteristics-

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Sensi11viry defines the T{iN«$t concentration an
instrument can accurately and repeatedly analyze. In the
strictest sense, it is a function of the detecting ability
of the Instrument, and does not address the electronic
amplifier. If the unit has one. The operating range
establishes the upper and lower use limits of the
Instrument, It encompasses the sensitivity limit at its
lower end and the overload point at its upper.
Selectivity establishes what contaminants trill elicit a
response on the instrument. Additionally~ selectivity
mandates Which, If any% Interferences »ay produce a
sluilar response. Selectivity and sensitivity "must be
reviewed and Interpreted together. Many devices have high
selectivity but widely varying sensitivities for a given
family of chemicals, for example aromatic:, aliphatlcs,
and Amines.
Amplification, often used synonymously (and Incorrectly)
with sensitivity, deals with an electronic amplifier's
ability to Increase very small electrical signals
emanating from the detector. This capacity may be fixed
or variable. However, changing the amplification of the
detector does not change Its sensitivity. For optimum
field usefulness, an instrument should possess high
sensitivity, wide range, high selectivity, and the ability
to vary the amplification of detector signals.
D. Inherent Safety
One of the greatest concerns when using an electrically
operated Instrument is 1t£ potential to ignite a flammable
atmosphere. The sources of this Ignition could be: an
arc generated by the power source itself or the associated
electronics, arwVor a flame or heat source Inherent in the

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I, ContrDls
Three method* exist to prevent a potential Ignition
source from igniting a flanmable atmosphere:
-	Encase the Ignition source in a rigidly but 11 container*
"Explosion-proof" Instruments allow the fl amiable
atmosphere to enter. If and when an arc is generated,
the ensuing explosion is contained within the specially
designed and built enclosure. Within it, any flames or
hot gases are cooled prior to editing into the ambient
flammable atmosphere so that the explosion does not
spread into the environment,
-	Reduce the potential for arcing among components by
encasing them in a solid insulating material. Also,
reducing the instrument's operational current and
voltage below the energy level necessary for Ignition of
the flammable atmosphere provides equal protection, An
"intrinsically safe" device, as defined by the National
Electrical Code, is Incapable "of releasing sufficient
electrical or thermal energy under normal or abnormal
conditions to cause ignition of a specific hazardous
atmospheric mixture 1n fts most easily ignited
concentration. Abnormal conditions shall Include
accidental damage to any...wiring, failure of electrical
components, application of over-voltage, adjustment and
maintenance operations and other similar conditions."
-	Buffer the arcing or flame-producing device from the
flammable atmosphere with an inert gas. In a pressurized
or "purged" system, a steady stream of, for example,
nitrogen or helium is passed by the potential arcing
device, keeping the fl&iraable atmosphere from the
Ignition source. This type of control, however, does
not satisfactorlly control analytical devices that use a
flane or heat for analysis.

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I Ea Unions Atmospheres
Depending upon the response worker's background. the term
"hazardnu*; atmosphere" conjures up situations, ranging fro#
toxic air cuntanfnants to flammable atasopheres. For our
purposes, an atraosphere Is hazardous If It meets the following
cr1teria:
-	It Is A mixture of any flammable material1 In air (see Class
and Group below) whose composition 1s within this material's
fTanwable range.
-	k critical volume of the nlxture 1s sufficiently heated by an
outside ignition source-
-	The resulting exotherralc reaction propagates the flame
beyond where 1t started.
Hazardous atmospheres can be produced by one of three general
types of materials:
-	Flanwable gases/vapors
-	Combustible dusts
-	Ignltable fibers
Whereas the flaranable naterial may define the hazard associated
wiu? a given product, the occurence of release, (how often the
material generates a hazardous atmosphere) dictates the risk.
Two types of releases are associated with hazardous
atmospheres:
-	Continuous: Those existing continuously in an open
unconfined area during normal operating conditions.
-	Confined: Those existing In closed containers, systems or
piping, where only ruptures, leaks, or other failures result
in a hazardous atmosphere outside the closed system.
There are six possible environments 1n whidi a hazardous
atmosphere can be generated, However not every type of control
will prevent an Ignition in every environment. To adequately
describe the characteristics of those environments and what
controls can be used, the National Electrical Code defines each
characteristic:
-	Class Is a category describing the type of flamnable material
that produces the hazardous atmosphere:
-- Class 1 Is fl amiable vapors and gases, such as gasoline,
hydrogen. Class I Is further divided into groups A,B
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- Division is the term describing the "location" of generation
and release of the flammable material*
-- Division 1 Is a location where the generation and release are
continuous. Intermittent, or periodic into an open,
unconfined area under normal conditions.
-- Division 1 is a location where the generation and release are
In closed systems or containers and only fron ruptures, leaks
or other failures.
Using this system, a hazardous atmosphere can be routinely and
adequately defined. As an example, a spray-painting operation
using acetone carrier would be classified as a Class I,
Division 1, Group D environment. Additionally, an abandoned waste
site containing intact closed dru« of methyl ethyl ketone,
toluene, and xylene would be considered a Class I; Division Z,
Group D environment. Once the containers begin to leak and produce
a hazardous atmosphere, the envlroiwnt changes to Class I,
Division 1, Group 0.
III. CERTIFICATION PROTOCOLS
A given ignition control device is selected for a specific Class,
Division, and Croup, per the manufacturer's specifications and the end
user's requiresent. There are no guaranties however, that the device
will prevent Ignition of a hazardous atmosphere, unless It has been
tested. The test should include the worst case situation(s) this device
could encounter In the field.
A. Primary Certification Croups
Several engineering. Insurance, and safety industries standardized
test protocols, established inclusive definitions, and developed codes
for testing electrical devices used in hazardous locations. The
National Fire Protection Association {NFPA)f a forerunner in this
endeavor, created Minimum standards in its National Electrical Code
(NEC), published every 3 years*
This code spells out among other things:
-	Types of controls acceptable for use in Hazardous atmospheres, that
ts, e*piosion-proof, Intrinsically safe, or purged.
-	Types of areas In Which flamnjble atmospheres can be
generated-01vision 1 or Divfslon 2.
-	Types of materials that generate these atmospheres, that 1s» Class
E, II, or III and their associated groups.

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Other national groups such as Underwriters Laboratory Ml* 1,
factory Mutual (fM), and the American National Standards
1115ti tute (AHSt), together witti NFPA, developed test prulucuK
for certifying explos1on-proof, intrlnslcal ly safe, or purged
devices to meet minimum standards of acceptance.
An electrical device certified under one of these test
protocols carries a permanently affixed plate showing tlio logo
of the laboratory granting certification and the Clas^(rs),
fiivlsion(s), and Group!s) it was tested against.
Certification means that If a device Is certified as
explosion-proof, Intrinsically safe, or purged for * given
Class, Division, and Group, and is used, maintained, am)
serviced according to the manufacturer's instruct!unsT it
will not contribute to Ignition*
Any Manufacturer wishing to have an electrical device
certified by FM or (JL must subalt a prototype for trstintj,
If the unit passej, it Is certified as submitted.
However the manufacturer agrees to alio* the testing
laboratory to randomly check the manufacturing plaint at any
time, as well as any marketed units* Furthermore, any change
In the unit requires the manufacturer to notify the tost
laboratory, which can continue the Certification or withdraw
1t until the "odifled unit can he retested.
B. Selection of Certified Devices
Gn a si'.e generating a hazardous atmosphere (or having the
potential to), the use of certified equipnent gives response
personnel a margin of safety. The following points will
assist in selection of equipment that will not contribute to
ignition of a hazardous atmosphere?
-	In an area designated Division 1, there Is a greater
probability of generating a hazardous atmosphere than in
Division 2. Therefore, the test protocols for Division 1
certification are more stringent than those for Division
2. Thus a device approved for Division 1 is also
permitted for use 1n Division 2, but not vice versa.
-	There are so many Groups, classes, and Divisions that
it is Impossible to certify an all-Inclusive instrument.
Therefore, select a certified device based gn the
chemicals and conditions most likely to be encountered.
Tor example a device certified for a Class li, Division 1,
Group E {combustible metal dust) would offer little
protection around a flammable vapor or gas.

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The use of a certified Instrument in an environment other
than what it has been certified for provides no better
protection than use of a noncertlfled device.
An Instrument certified as Intrinsically safe for a given
Group In a Class I, 01 vision 1 area carries
unon Incendiary" certification for Olvfslon 2-
An Intrinsically safe certification contains requirements
for redundant systems, and provides protection under normal
and abnormal or faulty conditions, tAllc a non Incendiary
certification does not* Instead, Ignftlon protection Is
offered only when the certified device 1s used according
to the nanufacturer1S instructions and under the
environmental conditions expected In a Division 2 area.
This certification may also be awarded to instruments that
are Incapable of releasing sufficient electrical or
then&al energy to Ignite flamaable gases or vapors of a
Division 2» Class 1 location (Figure 1-1).
6 3067
enaFho.
FIGURE J.l
EXAMPLE OF INSTRUCT CERTIFICATION
B-9

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A unit my be certified either by UL. FM or both. Both
laboratories follow tost protocols established by NFPA and
ANSI. Therefore on* certlftcation is no better or worse
than the other. The Important consideration Is that the
device is approved for the Classfes}, Dlvisfon(s) and
Grwp($) It Mill be used in.
The aention of FN or UL in the Manufacturer's equipment
literature does not guarantee certification. All certified
devices that are used in hazardous I Datable) locations ajst
be warfced to show Class, Division, and Group, per NEC Table
$0C-2(b).
C. Other Certifications
Other organisations such as the Hlne Safety and Health
Adalnlstration (mska)„ Canadian Standards Association (CSA)„
National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA), and the
U»S» Coast Guard (USCG) have developed their omi testing and
certification sendees for electrical devices in hazardous
locations cannon to their Jurisdiction.
NSHA tests and certifies electrical equipment to be used in
hazardous atmospheres associated with underground mining.
These atmospheres usually contain methane gas and coal dust;
hence the tests and certification are specific to those two
contaminants*
Often the same testing equipment 1s used in the Mines as well
as above ground and therefore carding both certifications:
KSHA and FM or UL {Figures 1-Z ami 1-3). Note that FM
certifies the puap for Class It, Group G, grains, dusts, and
flours, which are not found underground.
rtabls Pump
rsr, *>-.
MSA
FIGURE 13
FIGURE 5.?
B-IC

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A device with only an KSHA certification does not offer the
sane protection In hazardous atmospheres generated from other
materials in the same Class and Group as methane (Class I,
Group D) or coal dust {Class II. Group FL Only when the
device is approved by ^HA and Ul. and/or FM for a specific
Class and Group does the certification offer the same
protection for all withers of that Class and Group.
FTElu INSTRUMENTS
A. Introduction
Several field instructs 1o use today analyze aufelent air
for:
-	Percentage of the lower flammability limit of a vapor or
gas 1n air.
-	Concentration of oxygen.
-	Concentration of toxic vapors/gases.
There are no formalized schemes separating one type of
Instrument from another. However, to facilitate training,
the Instruments can be divided into two categories - general
survey and specific survey - based on the type of sampling
performed*
0. General Survey Instruments
General survey Instruments are devices capable of measuring a
number of compounds or materials via a specific test. All
must be calibrated and given their pre-operational checks In a
noncontamlnated atmosphere. General survey Instruments
Include the combustible gas Indicator, ultraviolet
photolonizatlOn detector, gas chromatography and Infrared
spectrophotometer. They provide Information to the trained
operator on the next 'step" to take, be ft additional
sampling, monitoring, or evacuation of personnel from the
site.
1. Combustible Gas Indicators (CGI's)
The Combustible Gas Indicator {CGI) is one of the first
instruments to be used to survey a site. It measures the
concentration of a flamtble vapor or gas in air.
indicating the results as a percent of the lower Explosive
Limit (LEU of the calibration gas or vapor. Depending on
the manufacturer and model, a meter needle indicating 1.0
or lOOt reveals that the test atmosphere contains a
concentration of flammable material in air at the LEI.
This environment could Ignite or explode In the presence
of an ignition source. A meter reading of Q<5 or 5-01
Indicates that the air contains approximately 1/2 of the
LEL.

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In addition, the needle rapidly can cl lafen to 1.0 (lOOt^
pas$ itT and then fall to zero, or b<»low. This does not
indicate that the CGI 1$ malfunctioning or that the
atmosphere contains no vapors. it indicates that the
concentration of vapor, or gas-in-a1r exceeds the Upper
Explosive Limit [UEL) of the calibration gas. Such a
situation calls for rapid evacuation of the area because
this atmosphere can quickly become highly fltunable.
i. Theory
Kost combustible gas Indicators operate on the "hot wire'
principle- In these detectors, a filament is heated by
the burning of the vapor or gas. The heat increases the
electrical resistance of the wire thereby decreasing the
Current passing through it. The current In this filament
is compared to that of a reference filament, and the
percent of the l£L (for the calibration gas) Is
displayed.
to. Limitations
As with any instrument based on an electrochemical
reaction„ all CGI's have several limitations:
-	The reaction Is temperature dependent- Therefore* the
measurement Is only as accurate as the incremental
difference between calibration and anient (sailing)
temperatures.
-	Sensitivity is a function of physical and chemical
properties of the calibration gas versus those of the
unknown contaminant.
The hot wire CGI suffers from these additional
drawbacks:
-	For accurate measurements, the oxygen content must be
at the concentration at which the manufacturer
calibrated the unit.
-	Several chemicals can poison or shorten the life of
the filament, among them tetraethyl lead, silicones,
and halides.

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>. Ultraviolet (UV) Ptioto ionization Detector
a. Theary
The liqht from the sun when passed through a prism is
dispersed into the many colors that stake up the White
1 ight spectrum. The hues of colors from the deep reds
through the deep purples are a relatively small
segment 1n the overall electromagnetic le-m) spectrum.
The e-« spectrum covers long wavelengths such as radio
waves through the ultrashort wave gawta radiation
{Figure 1-4K As t»»e wavelengths decrease in size
{higher frequencies 1, the wave energy Increases. This
relationship between energy and frequency Is based
upon Planck's equation.
All atoms and molecules are composed of particles:
electrons,, protons, and neutrons, Electrons,
negatively charged particles, rotate In orbit around
the nucleus, the dense inner core. The nucleus
consists of an equal number of protons |positively
charged particles] as electrons found in the orbital
cloud. The interaction of the oppositely charged
particles and the laws of quanta mechanics keep the
electrons in prhits outsit the nucleus.
The energy required to remove the outermost electron
from the aclecule is called the Ionization potential
(IP) and Is specific for any compound or atomic
species* IP Is "measured in electron volts {eY). High
frequency radiation (ultraviolet and above) is capable
of causing ionization and is hence called ionizing
radlatlon.
*hen a photon of ultraviolet radiation strikes a
chemical compound. It ionizes the molecule if the
energy of the rsdlatlon is equal to or greater than
the IP of the compound. Since Ions are capable of
conducting an electrical current, they »ay be
collected on a charged plate. The Measured current
will be directly proportional to the nusAer of ionized
molecules.

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b, Practical Considerations
The HNU Is typical of field photolonlzation units now
available. It consists of two parts connected via a
signal-power cord {Figure 1-5):
-	A probe consisting of the uv light source« pump,
ionization chartber, and a preamplifier.
-	A readout unit consisting of amplifier and electri-
cal circuits, a display deter, and
battery pack.
An electrical pynp pulls tfce air stream past a
IQ.2-«V UV source. The radiation produces an 1on pair
for each molecule of contaminant ionised. The free
electrons produce a current directly proportional to
the number of tons produced. The current is
amplified, detected, and displayed on the meter,
normally, the HNU is used with a IthZ-eV source that
ion1ie5 many of the conr»on air contaminants. A probe
using a 9,5-eV source and another using a 11.7-eY
source are also available.
The 11.7-eV source should he used to Initially
investigate an area. However, 1t requires constant
Maintenance and frequent replacement. Thus, except in
rare situations, the 10.2-eY loop/probe should be
used. It offers relatively high radiation levels
without tiroe-consuming maintenance and costly
equipment.
Parallel use of the 9.5-eV and 10.2~eY lamp/probe sets
allows seaiquantitative analysis. Assume a mixture
consisting of two materials, one with an IP of 9.2-eV,
the other Mfth 10.2-eV. Beth will he measured by the
ICLZ-eV 1 asp/probe, but only the 9.2-eV contaminant on
the 9.5-eY lamp/probe. Subtracting the second
reading from the first gives the concentration of the
lO-Z-eV contaminant.

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READOUT LMIT
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PORtAfcE phgtqiohiihtion **uhuer

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Lifflltatlons
Although the HNU photolon Jzatlon unit 1s an excellent
instrument for survey, there are very Important
limitations.
-	The response to a gas or vapor may radically
change when the gas or vapor is mixed with other
Materials. As an example, a HMD calibrated to
ammonia and analysing an atmosphere containing 100
ppm would Indicate 100 on the meter. Likewise, a
unit calibrated to benzene would record 100 in an
atmosphere containing 100 ppm concentration,
however. In an atmosphere containing 100 ppm of
each, the unit could indicate considerably less or
more than 200 ppm„ depending on how It was
calibrated.
-	Electromagnetic Interference from pulsed DC or AC
power Tines, transformers, and high voltage
equipment may produce an error as will nearby
transmissions.
-	The lamp window must be periodically cleaned to
ensure Ionization of the air containments.
-	Although the HNU measures concentrations from I ppm,
the response (to benzene) is linear frow 0 to about
600 ppm. This wans the HNU reads a true
concentration of benzene only between 0 and 600.
Greater concentrations may be _read" at a higher or
lower level than the true value.
Use 4t sites
The HNU is a good choice to determine the proper lever
of protection In evaluating a hazardous waste site oe
sp111. The need to properly Interpret the HHU's data
cannot be overemphasized. Equally important is the
need to understand the limitations of this
instrument.

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ihp parth.uUi ly Important limitation for on-site use
Is Ik** iho liNU responds toward mixtures containing
chemicals *jth very similar IP's* In a typical
Industrial plant, usually only one 9a* or vapor must
be *eaMired in a specific setting. Tills is relatively
&1*l»1e for U10 ittlU, and Interferences and
complications rarely exist. As a rule, the I1NU Is
wore sensitive to complex co&p winds arid less sensitive
to simpler nrtcs. In order of decreasing sensitivity,
«i •*$*¦> pd imi 4 «cilc of 1 to 10, the hhU respondes to:
-	Aromatic* (e.g.» benzene, toluene, xylene) and
aliphatic awlne hydrocarbons; 10
Unsaturated chlorinated hydrocarbons te»g.,
trichlnrnethy lene, dichloroethylene): 5-9
-	ihisitMr^tpn hydrocarbons (e,g», propylene): 1-5
Paraffin it hydrocarbons with 5 to 7 carbons (e.g.,
he*arn*, heptane); 1-3
Aamoriia ami paraffinlc hydrocarbons with 1 to 4
rjrharn Iethane* propane): less than I.
la compensate for this lack of sensitivity, the HNU
Incorporates a span pot (potentiometer), which varies
the gain on the amplifier. In the full clockwise [CW]
position at level 9*$* the HHU Indicates the
approximate air concentration of all chemicals with a
sensitivity of 10 for example, aromatic hydrocarbons.
In full counterclockwise (Ctrtj position at level 0, It
indicates the approximate concentration of anaonia or
paraf Hnlc hydrocarbons. Kith the span pot positioned
at any intermediate paint, HMD Indicates the
appror innate air concentration of the chemical whose
sensltlvEty corresponds to that level.

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When the i>pan pot Is set at 0 (fully CCw) «ml lite
function switch to the 0-Z0 range, the scal«- i»r th»:
meter face reads 0-2 ppm. This expansion, Which Is
valid only For paterfils that have a relative
sensitivity of 10, allows measurements in the
parts-per-bl11 ion range (ppbh
In most circumstances, using the HMD on the lowest
setting (span pot 9.8, function switch 0-20] provides
adequate data to select the proper protection (levels
A, B, C, 0) for on-site workers. Unfortunately,
several chemicals- for example, acrolein-exhibit
medium to low sensitivity (Q-5)\ while their
toxicological effects place their threshold limit
value (TIV) at a very low level. If these chemicals
are Indicated by the HHU [on Its lowest setting)
response could select too low a protection level.
Consider this scenario:
The air In an unknown hazardous environment must
he sampled. Response personnel survey the site
with an HMU, which indicates 2.0 ppa (Instrument
set to highest sensitivity!* Level C protection
nay he worn based upon the Instrwent's data.
Later, the air contaminant Is found to be
acrolein with a TLV of 0.1 ppm (100 ppb) and an
1 m»ediAte dangerous to life or health (IDLH)
level of 5 ppa.
Thus total reliance to the HMU data without regard for
the chemical makeup of the sample can be a problem.
3. Flame Ionization Detection (FID)
a. Theory
The Flo uses Ionization as the detection method, much
the same as m the HMU, except that the ionization Is
caused by a hydrogen flame, rather than by a UV light.
This flame has sufficient energy to tonlze any organic
species with an IP of 1S.4 or less. The Ions are then
passed between two charged plates. The conductivity
change Is Measured, the current charge Is displayed on
an measured, the current charge is displayed on an
external meter, and read fn parts per million.

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t>. Century Systems Organic Vapor Analyzer (OVA)
The Century Systems Organic Vapor Analyzer (OVA) Is a
portable FID unit. This package consists of two major
parts,
-	A 91-pound package containing the sampling pump,
battery pack, support electronics, flame Ionization
detector, hydrogen gas cylinder, and an optional
gas chromatography (GO column.
-	A hand-held meter/sampling probe assembly.
The OVA can operate in two modes:
-	Survey mode: A sample of ambient air is routed
through the OVA Into the detector„ aliening all
organic species to be Ionized and detected at the
same time. Based on the sensitivity of the
instrument to various compounds, a concentration
Is displayed on the meter. The OVA 1s calibrated
to nethane.
Gas chromatography node: Gas chromatography (GC)
is a technique for separating volatile substances
by percolating a gas stream over a stationary
phase. The components to be separated are carried
through a column packed with an inert solid. A
liquid i5 spread as a thin flint over this solid and
Is the basis for separation. The different
components of the sample migrate through the column
at different rates. The component bands then leave
the column and are measured by the detector* In
this fashion, individual components of the
ambient atmosphere may be analyzed* More complete
instructions on the use of the Century Systems OVA
can be found In the owner's manual.

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c. Limitations
As wfth HNll fhotoionfur, the OVA responds
differently to different compounds. Below is a
Hit, provided by the Manufacturer of the relative
sensitivities of the Ova to some cowion organic
compounds. Since the 1nitrument Is factory
calibratea to methane, ill relative responses ire
given In percant, with methane it 100.
Compound	Relative Response
Methane	100
Ethane	90
Propane	64
n-Butane	61
n-Pentane	100
Ethylene	85
Acetylene	200
Benzene	ISO
Toluene	120
Acetone	100
Methyl ethyl ketone	BO
Methyl isobutyl ketone 100
Methanol	15
Ethanol	25
Isopropyl alcohol	65
Carbon tetrachloride	10
Chloroform	70
Trfchloroethylene	72
Vinyl chloride	35
4. Infrared Spectrophotomer
a. Theory
The atoms of trfifch molecules are composed are held
together by bonds of various types and lengths.
These arrangements, as In the classical ball and
spring configurations often presented In
Introductory chemistry, establish finite locations
and discrete movements for etch atort (ball) and
bond I spring). These movements can be either
vibrational-rotational stretching or bending of
the ch^lcal bonds. The frequencies of these
movements are on the yder of Infrared radiation
(IB). A given bond aovement can be Initiated by
stimulating the molecule with IR of varying
frequency* As the bond moves* It absorbs the
characteristic energy associated with that
movement. The frequent!#i and Intensity of IR
absorbed are soedflc for a compound and Us
concentration, providing a ^fingerprint" which can
be used as an analytical tool*

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HIran infrared Spectrophotometer
Th# M1ran (acronyn for minidture infrared
analyzed is a line of field IH spectrophotometers
used to measure' concentration! of opon In
ambient air.
It uses a variable-path gas cell. Several movable
¦irrors permit repeated passes, producing paths
frtw several centimeters to several peters>
Field analysis presents problems not normally
encountered in spectrophotometry in the
laboratory. With 1ab 1 nstmsients„ the analyst can
control the concentration of material entering the
sample cell. To analyze uncontrollable gas, the
Hi ran rust make repeated passes to achieve
relfable results, liquid or solid samples are
preferable to gas samples because they possess
¦ore Molecules than a gas of the satne volume-
Additionally * the spectra of analyses of the saiae
chemical in the liquid phase and gaseous phase are
Markedly different, V.e gaseous state, the
¦olecules are free to rotate, and Inter nolecular
actions are at a *rin1inu'>. The liquid state
¦locks" the wilecules in a given structure.
Limitations
The Mi ran 1s designed for Industrial hygiene wort
In occupational settings where knoMi types of
naterfals are generated and where 120-volt AC
pc«er 1s available. At hazardous waste sites*
neither of these conditions is common, making
Mlrans of questionable value- rhey also have not
been recognized by any approving agencies as being
safe for use In a hazardous location. Basically,
the Mi ran is designed for quantifying simple
one-or two-component mixtures. They should be
used no a hazardous waste site with another
analytical procedure such as gas chromatography.

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C. Specific Survey Instruments
Specific survey Instruments are devices that measure a
specific Mterlal. Oxygen meters end direct-reeding
colorl metric tubes are often used at Incidents Involving
hazardous substances.
1. Oxygen Meters
The oxygen content In a confined space Is of prime concern
to anyone about to enter that space. Removal of oxygen
by combustion, reduction reactions, or displacement by
gases or vapors is a hazard that response personnel cannot
detect. Consequently, remote measurements must be made
before anyone enters any confined space*
a. Theory
An oxygen detector uses an electrochemical sensor to
determine the oxygen concentration In air. The sensor
consists of; two electrodes, a sensing and a counting
electrode; a housing containing a basic electrolytic
so1u*;an; and a semipermeable Teflon membrane (Figure
1-6).
Oxygen rolecules (0^1 diffuse through the menfcrane
into the solution. Reactions between the oxygen and
the electrodes produce a minute electric current which
Is directly proportional to the sensors's oxygen
content. The current passes through the electronic
circuit* The resulting signal is shown as a needle
deflection on a meter, which Is usually calibrated to
reed 0-10%, 0-254, or 0-100% oxygen.
FIGURE 8-6
OXYGCM DETECTOR

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fe. Limitations
The operation of oxygen meters depends on the Absolute
atmospheric pressure, The concentration of natural
oxygen {to differentiate It from manufactured or
generated oxygen1 is a function of the atmospheric
pressure at a given altitude.
At sea level. where the weight cf the atmosphere above
greatest, more 0? molecules are compressed Into a
given voluae than at higher elevations* as elevation
Increases, this compression decreases, resulting In
fewer Og molecules being "squeezed" Into a given
mime. Consequently, an 0j Indicator calibrated at
sea level and operated at an altitude of several
thousand feet will falsely Indicate an oxygen-
ieficient atmosphere {less than- 19.5V|.
High concentrations of carbon dioxide {CCio^ shorten
the useful life of the oxygen detector cell.
Therefore, the unit can be used In atmospheres greater
than Q,5t CO2 only with frequent replacing or
rejuvenating of the oxygen detector cell.
Although several Instruments can measure an
Oxygen-enriched atntosphere (0? greater than 21%),
no testing or other work should ever be performed
under such conditions because a spark, arc or flame
could lead to fire or explosion. Oxygen measurements
are post Informative *hen paired with combustible gas
measurements* Together, they provide response
personnel with quick and reliable data on the hazards
they may encounter.
2, Direct-Reading Colorlmetrlc Indicator Tubes
In evaluating hazardous waste sites, the need often arises
to quickly measure a specific vapor or gas. Direct-reading
col 0rime trie indicator tubes can successfully fill that
need.
a. Theory
The interaction of two or more substances may result
tn chemical changes. This change may be as subtle as
two dear liquids producing a third clear liquid, or
as obvious as a colorless vapor and colored solid
producing a differently colored substance. Indicator
tubes use this latter phenomenon to estimate the
concentration of a gas or vapor in air.

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Colorimetric Indicator tubes consist of an impregnated
9lj» tube wfth ah indicating chemical (Figure 1 -71.
The tube Is connected to a piston cylinder- or
bellous- type pump. A known volume of contaminated
air H pulled at a predetermined rate through the
tube. Fhe contaminant reacts vith the indicator
chenleal in the tube, producing a sta'n whose length
Is proportional to the contaminant's concentration- A
preconditioning filter nay precede the substrata to;
-	Remove contaminants Cother than the one In question)
that may interfere with the measurement.
-	React with a contaminant to change it into a
compound that reacts with the Indicating
chemical -
-	Completely change a nonindicating contaminant
into n indicating one.
b. Limitations
Several indicating chemicals may be able to measure
the concentration of a particular gas or vapor, each
operating on a different chemical principle and each
affected in varying degrees by temperature, air volume
pulled through the tube, and interfering gases or
vapors. A "true" concentration versus the 'measured"
concentration may vary considerably among and between
manufacturers. To Halt these source? of error,
Control the numerous types and Manufacturers of tubes,
and provide a degree of confidence to users, the
ttatlonal Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
tests and certifies Indicator tubes. Certified tubes
have an accuracy of + 351 at 1/2 the TLV of the
chemical and +25% at the TLV.
To improve performance of all tubes, tbey should be:
-	Refrigerated prior to use to maintain shelf life of
approximately 2 years.
-	Calibrated and used at the same temperature.
-	Calibrated with ttie pump prior to sampling
(pressure test) and on a quarterly basis
Nolumetrlc test).

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Undoubtedly the greatest source of error Is how the operator
"reads" the endpolnt, The jagged edge where centalnant
meets indicator chemical makes It difficult to get accurate
results from this seemingly simple test. A diligent and
experienced operator should be able to accurately read the
endpoint.
Vll. CCHCLliSlOM
A, Combined Instruments
Several instrument packages combine two or more detectors.
For example, a combined hot wire detector for combustible
gases and an oxygen sensor use a ccwjicwi punqj, battery, and
electronic circuit, normally, each detector operates
Independently. thereby allowing one to be used even if the
other Is not working properly-
Combination units afford response personnel several
advantages over single units, chiefly portability.
Additionally, combined Instruments may Incorporate an
adjustable alarm circuit that alerts the user to potentially
hazardous conditions. This capacity frees the user of the
need to take frequent meter readings and focuses attention
on other hazards.
& Other Useful Instruments
Several manufacturers of micro-miniature electronic circuits
and fuel cells have entered the field of specific
contaminant analysis. These devices analyze the mblent
atmosphere for the more insidious gases and vapors, such as
hydrogen sulfide and carbon monoxide. Although their use
1s limited, they nay be useful In certain situations.

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REFERENCES
1.	National Electrical Cod*, VoK 70, National fire Prevention
Association, *75 Atlantic Aye., Boston, HA 02210 (1975>.
2.	Clayton, George D¦ (ed-l, The Industrial Envlronaent - Iti
Evaluation and Control„ 3rd 5T77 Public Health Services
Publ IcatToTT fl973).
3.	Clayton, G.O., and F\E. Clayton {ed.), Patty's Industrial Hygiene
and Toxiciology, 3rd revised ed., Vol. It General Principles,
John Hiley and Sons, Mew York, HY (1978)
4.	Klinsky, Joseph (ed-). Manual of Recoaoegded Practice for
Cowbustible Gas Indicators and Portable Direct Reading
Hydrocarbon Detectors, 1st ed*. Awerfcan industrial Hygiene
Association. Akron, OH (1980).
5.	Conley, Robert, Infrared Spectroscopy, 2nd ed., Allyn and Bacon,
Inc., Boston. MA 11972].
B-2&

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APPENDIX C
SAMPLING EQUlPHEtfT AMD METHODS
I. INTRODUCTION
A variety of equipment and techniques are used for sampling at Incidents
Involving hazardous materials. Using liquid and solid Materials samplers,
selecting sample containers and closures, preserving sables, and all are
ioportant to obtaining analytical data that give a true picture of
conditions of the Incident-
II. SAMPLERS
The various samplers currently aval)able can be applied In certain
situations, but they h«vfi limitations that rust also be recognized {Table
3-1).
A. L1 qu i ds
1r Open-Tube/Drum Sampler
A glass open-tube Is the «»st versatile of hazardous liquid
sanplers because of Its wide range of applications, relatively low
cost, and ease of operation.
Description: The open-tube sampler is rtde of hollow glass lor
plastic tubing), usually 4 feet (ft.) long- The inside diameter
11.0.) is generally 1/4 - 1/2 Inch (in.), depending on viscosity of
sanjple. Open tubes made specifically for sampling (called drum
samplers) can be purchased. The only difference is that drum
samplers have a constricted orifice at the top to facilitate
plugging the opening to maintain a vacuun in the tube.
Procedure for use
a. Slowly lower tube into the liquid to the desired depth. It nay
be desirable not to nix the contents of the container so that a
more representative sample can be collected.
h. At desired depth, stopper tube with a rubber stopper or thuirto
or crease a piece of flexible tubing attached to the open end
of the saaple tube. Stoppering establishes a vacuum 1n the
tube, enabling withdrawal of the sample from the container.
c.	Slowly withdraw tube from vessel and expel saaple into
appropriate saaple container. Avoid handling the portion of
sampler that was in the lf
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2. Composite Liquid Haste Sampler (COL I WASA)
The composite liquid waste sampler (C0UWA5A) is a valuable tool in
some applications. In sampling hazardous liquids, however, it is
difficult to decontaminate and may cause cross-contamination.
Description: The *nain parts of the COL NASA are sampling twoe.
Closure-locking mechanism, and closure system (Figure 3-1). The
sailing tube consists of 5 ft. by 1 5/8 in. I.D. translucent
pipe, usually polyvinyl chloride (PVC) or boroslllcate glass
plumbing tube. The closure-locking mechanism consists of a
short-length, channeled aluminum bar attached to the sampler's
stopper rod by an adjustable swivel. An aluminum bar serves both
as a T-handle and lock for the sampler's closure system.
Procedure for Use:
a.	Put sampler In open position by placing stopper rod handle in
T-posltlon and pushing rod handle until It sits against
sampler's locking block,
b.	Slowly lower sanpler into liquid so that liquid Inside and
outside the tube are about the same. If the level Inside the
sampler tube Is lower than outside sampler, sampling rate is
too fast, resulting 1n a (unrepresentative sample.
c.	When sampler stopper hits bottom of waste container, push the
tube downward igalnst stopper to dose sampler. Lock sampler
1n close position by turning T-handle until it is upright and
one end rests tightly on locking block.
d.	Slowly withdraw the sampler from container.
e.	Carefully discharge sample Into a suitable sampler container by
opening sampler. This Is done by slowly pulling lower end of
T-handle away fro« locking block, while lower end of sampler 1s
positioned in a sample container.
3. Pond (Dip} Sampler
The pond (dip) sampler can be used to collect liquids or sludges
from ponds, pits, lagoons, or open vessels, but only as far as its
limited reach.
Description: The pond (dip) sampler consists of a container in an
adjustable clamp attached to the end of a telescoping pole 8-15 ft.
long. The pole can be of wood, plastic, or metal because the
sample is collected In a jar or beaker which is secured In the
clamp (Figure 3-21.
Procedure for use: Ladle liquids fro* into sample containers.

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FIGURE 3-2
PONC (DIP) SAMPLER

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A. Hamjiil Pumps
The principal drawback of manual pumps Is that they require large
aawunts of disposable tubing, which must be compatible with the
waste being sampled.
Oescrlption; Manual pumps most cwnaorily operate ty peristalsis,
bellows, tfTaphragm or siphon. They ane available in various sizes
and configurations [Figure 1-3).
Procedure for use: Operate according v> manufacturer"s
instructions. TrT cost cases this Involves placing sample Inlet
hose into liquid, then manually activating a crank or bellows. To
avoid contamination of the pump, a liquid trap is Inserted In the
sample Inlet hose wbere the sa«ple 1s collected. The compatibility
of the plastic Inlet hose with the sairple must be determined to
avoid sample contaaination.
5. Weighted Cottle Sampler
Weighted bottle samplers are difficult to use In very viscous
liquids. In addition, the outside of the bottle is exposed to the
waste. This is undersirable if the bottle is used as the sample
container.
Description: The weighted bottle sampler consists of a glass
slniteis a bottle stopper, and a line for opening the bottle and
lowering and raising the sampler during sampling (Figure 3-4)~
There are variations of this saapler, as illustrated In the
American Society of Testing Materials (ASTH) nethods 0 270 and I
30Q. This sampler can be either fabricated or purchased,
Procedure for use:
a.	Gently lower sampler Into liquid to desired depth so as not to
remove stopper prematurely.
b.	Pull out stopper with a sharp Jerk or sampler line.
c.	Allow bottle to fill conpletely until air bubbles stop.
d.	Raise sampler and cap bottle.
e.	wipe bottle, which can be used as sampler container.
Alternatives to the weighted bottle sampler are the Kemwerer
sampler and the extended bottle sampler.

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Pu^p inlet
Manual
pump
Vacuum
flask
7
sample
FIGURE 3-3
MANUAL PUMP
Hazardous
liquid



-------
Cork
Uuf
HWJRL 3-4
WtlUHHI] BOTTLE- SAMPLER

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B. Solids
1.	Grain Sampler
Grain sailers are best used for collecting granu*-. • oose
solids. Moist. compressed, and large particle solidb. „re
difficult to collect*
Description: the grain simpler consists of two slotted
telescoping tu-es, usually made of brass or stainless steel
(Figure 3-5). The outer tube has a conical„ pointed tip on one
end that permits the sampler to penetrate the material be^g
sampled. The sampler is opened and closed by rotating the
inner tube. Grain samplers are generally 24 to 40 In, long by
1/? to 1 1/Z fn. In diaaeter.
Procedure for use:
a.	Insert sampler (in the close position) into material being
saapled from a point near a top edge or corner„ through
center, and to a point diagonally opposite point of entry.
b.	Rotate inner tube into open position.
c.	Wiggle sampler a few times to allow materials to enter open
slits.
d.	Place sampler in close position and withdraw.
e.	Place sampler in a horizontal position„ if possible, with
slots facing upward,
f.	Rotate and slide out outer tube from the inner tube.
g* Transfer sample In Inner tube into a suitable sample
container,. If inner tube is not removable, turn sampler
upside down and pour contents out of an opening in end of
the tube,
h. Store sampler in a plastic bag until decontamination.
2.	Sampling Trier
Sampling triers are used to sample compressed solids. One
difficulty, however, is the removal of the core sample cut with
the trier.
Description; A typical sampling trier is a long tube about 24
to 40 in. long and 1/2 to l in. in diameter, with a slot that
extends almost Its entire length (Figure 3-6j. The tip and
edges of the tube slot are sharpened to allow the trier to cut
a core when rotated in a solid material. Sampling triers are
usually nade of stainless steel with wooden handles-

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61-100 ca,
(24-40")
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1*27-1.54 ca
FIGURE 3r-5
GRAIN SAMPLER
1.27-2.54 cm C%-1"
FIGURE 3-6
SAMPLING TRIER

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Procedure f&r use
a.	Insert trier into solid arterial at G to 45* angle fro*
horizontal to tflirilrtlze spi J age froa sampler. Tilt containers
IT necessary*
b.	Rotate trier once or twice to cut a core of aaterial.
c.	Slowly i.lthdraw trier, making sure that slot is facing upward.

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c

1
122-1B3 ca
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FIGURE 3-7
WASTE PILE SAMPLER
FIGURE 3-8
TROWEL

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Description: A garden-variety trowel looks like a small shovel.
Tlie Made is usually about 3 by S in, with a sharp tip [Figure
1-H). A laboratory scoop is similar, but the blade Is usually *>re
curved and has a closed upper end to contain material. Scoops come
In different sizes and materials. Stainless steel or polypropylene
scoops with 2 3/4 by 6 1ru blades are preferred. Another
alternative for small samples is a stainless steel table spoon.
Procedure for use:
a. Collect small* equal portions of sample from surface or near
the surface or material to be sampled.
h. Deposit samples in a suitable container.
c. Dispose of sampler or place in a plastic bag until
dfhtontaifll nation.
5. Soil Auger (Manual)
A nanual soil auger can sample deeper and more compacted soils and
solids than other samplers, but it 1s difficult to get the sample
In a container.
Description: The soil auger consists of a hard metal central shaft
an
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If the cleaning process has the potential for producing toxic fumes,
ensure adequate ventilation. If the washings are hazardous, store
them In closed waste containers and dispose of them properly In
approved disposal sites. Names of nearby sites say be obtained by
calling the agency in the State responsible for regulation of
hazardous wastes- Store clean samplers In a clean and protected area;
polyethylene plastic tubes or bags are usually adequate.
[. CONTAINERS, CLOSURES/CLOSURE UMERS
h. Containers
The rest fmporant factors to consider when chosing containers far
hazardous material samples are compatibility* resistance to breakage,
and volume. Containers trust not melt, leach, rupture, or leak as a
result of chemical reactions with constituents oF a sample. Thus it
Is important to have some Idea of the composition of the sample. The
containers mist have walls thick enough to survive sample collection
and transport to the laboratory. Containers with wide mouths make 1t
easier to transfer samples from samplers. Also, the containers must
be large enough to contain the required volume of the sample or the
entire volume of a sampler.
Plastic and glass containers are generally used for collection and
storage of hazardous material samples. Commonly available plastic
containers are made of high-density or linear polyethylene (LPE),
conventlal polyethylene, polypropylene, polycarbonate. Teflon FEP
[fluerlnated ethylene propylene), polyvinyl chloride (PVC), or
polymethylpentene. Teflon FEP Is the most Inert, giving it the
widest range of application* Plastic containers are used only when
the constituents of the material are known not to react with the
plastic.
Glass containers are relatively inert to nost chemicals and can be
used to collect and store almost all hazardous material samples* Two
exceptions are strong alkali solutions and hydrofluoric acid. Glass
bottles with wide mouths (to fad! late sample collection) are
recommended for samples containing petroleusi distillates, chlorinated
hydrocarbons, pesticides, solvents, and other substances incompatible
with plastk.
Several types of glass containers are available* Hint glass bottles
are cheap and available 1n various shapes and sizes. Borosilicate
glass 1s more Inert, but the selection of containers Is smaller.
Also, it is more expensive*
S. Closures/Closure Liners
Sample containers mist have tight, screw-type lids* Plastic bottles
are usually provided with screw caps made of the same material as the
bottles. Cap liners usually are not required. Glass containers
usually come with glass or rigid plastic screw caps. Caps often have
paper liners coated with wax. Other Uner materials are polyethylene,
— —^	&Nil Ta^lnn Cf* D

-------
Kir Hmtjininij ^drocarbnns, p^stlcide^, and petroleum residues, caps
with Mlon liners are recommended for me with amber glass bottles.
1 cf 11»n 11riers may be purchased from plastic specialty supply house*.
ihp election of containers, closures,	and linings must be coordinated
with the laboratory, which cay rewire	specific containers for certain
analyses.
I'nnuiiiFipi rtype and size) must comply	with DOT regulations.
PRFS»HV(\rrilM ftND ST0RAl1£ OF SAMPLES
Samples should t>i> analyzed immediately after collection for best results-
Hazardous wastes are such complex mixtures that it is difficult to predict
exactly rue physical, biological, and chemical changes that occur in the
samples. The pH may change significantly in a matter of minutes, sulfides
and cyanides »«y be oxidized or evolve as gases, and hexavalent chromium
may slowly be reduced to the trivalent state. Certain cations may be
partly lost as they are adsorbed on the walls of the sample containers.
Microorganisms nwy grow in certain constituents- Volatile compounds may
be rapidly lost.
In d number of cases, swch changes may be slowed down or prevented by
refrigeration at 4 to G"C, or t>y adding preservatives, However, these
treatments may be only partially effective. Refrigeration may reduce loss
of volatile components and acid gases such as hydrogen sulfide and
hydrogen cyanide, but it also introduces the possibility that some salts
¦ay precipitate at lower temperatures* On warming to room temperature for
analysis, the precipitates may not redissolve, thus giving inaccurate
results. Preservatives aay retard constituents to stable hydroxides,
salts, or compounds, but they may also convert other forms (such as the
products of nitration, sulfonatlon, and oxidation, of organic components)*
Thus, subsequent analyses may njt identify the original components or
concentrations-
Safety must also be considered because a preservative may be highly
reactive with the sample, Addition of a preservative may change the DOT
packaging, labeling, and shipping requirements for a sample. Shipping
hazardous sables packed fn ice may not be permitted by DOT regulations
(Refer tn Part *>: Hazardous Material Sample Packaging, Labeling, and
Shipping J.

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STANDARD IPEHATIHG SAFETY
PART I
ENVIRONMENTAL INCIDENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
An environmental Incident involves a release or threat of a release
of hazardous substances that pose an I nutrient and substantial danger
to public health and welfare or the environment. Each incident pre-
sents special pnjbless. Response personnel aust evaluate these prob-
lems and determine an effective course or action to mitigate the
Incident*
Any Incident represents a potentially hostile situation. Chesteals
that are combustible. explosive, corrosive, toxic, or reset We, along
with biological and radioactive materials can affect the general pub-
lic or the environment as well as response personnel. Workers may
fall, trip, be struck by objects, or be subject to danger from elec-
tricity and heavy equipment. Injury and illness may also occur due
to physical stress and climate. ititlle the response activities needed
at each Incident are unique* there are many similarities* One Is
that all responses require protecting the health and ensuring the
safety of the respondent.
II. EXPOSURE TO TOXIC SUBSTANCES
Toxic (Including radioactive material and etiological agents) or
chemically active substances present a special concern because they
can be inhaled, ingested, absorbed through the skin, or destructive
to the skin* They may exist In the air or due to site activities
become airborne or splash on the skin. The effects of these sub-
stances can vary significantly. Ingested or Inhaled the substances
can cause no apparent illness or th^y can be fatal~ On the skin they
can cause no demonstrable effects. Others however can daaaga the
skin, or be absnrbed, leading to systemic toxic effects.
Two types of potential exposure exist;
~ Actrte: Exposures occur for relatively short periods of time*
generally hours to 1-2 days. Concentrations of toxic air contam-
inants which may be Inhaled art high relative to their protection,
criteria* In addition, substances may contact the skin directly
through splashes. Immersion, or air with serious results.
- Chronic: Exposures occur over longer periods, of time, generally
months to years* Concentrations of toxic air contaminants which
may be Inhaled are relatively low. Direct skin contact by immer-
sion. splash, or air Involves substances exhibiting low dermal
activity.
0-1

-------
In general, acute exposure* to chemicals 1n air are «or« typical in
transportation accident, Mres, or releases at chemical manu-
facturing or storage facilities. Acute air exposures da not persist
for long periods of time. Acute sktn exposures occur when workers
must be close to the substances In order to control the release
(patching e tank car, ofMoading a corrosive material. etc -) or
contain and treat the spilled material. Once the 1nraed1ate problems
have been alleviated, exposures tend to become sore chronic In nature
as cleanup progresses.
Chronic exposures usually are associated with longer-term remedial
operations. Contaminated soil and debris from emergency op-erat f ons
may be Invotved, selt and ground water may be polluted, or Impound-
ment systems may contain diluted chemicals. Abandoned waste sites
represent chronic problems. As activities start at these sites,
however, personnel engaged in sampling, handling containers, bulking
compatible tlqufds, etc. face &n increased risk of acute exposures
to splashes, or the generation of vapors, gases, or particulates.
At any specific Incident, the hazardous properties of the materials
¦ay only represent a potential threat* For example, if a tartk car of
liquified natural gas Involved 1n an accident rest Ins intact, the
risk from fire and explosion 1s low. In other incidents, hazards are
real and risks high as when toxic or flacoable vapors are being re-
leased, The continued health and safety of response personnel
requires that the hazards - real or potential - at an episode he
assessed and appropriate preventive measures instituted.
HEALTH AND SAFETY OF R£SP0HS£ PEftSOMNiL
To reduce the risks to workers responding to hazardous substance
incidents, an effective health and safety program must be Implemented*
This would include, as a minimum:
-	Safe wort practices.
-	Engineered safeguards.
-	Medical surveillance.
-	Environmental and personnel monitoring.
-	Personnel protective equipment.
-	Education and training,
-	Standard operating safety procedures«.

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As part of a comprehensive program, standard operating safety pro-
cedures provide Instructions on how to accomplish specific tarts In a
safe Banner. In concept and principle, standard operating safety
procedures are Independent of the type of Incident* Their appli-
cability at a particular Incident must be determined and necessary
¦edifications Bade to match prevailing conditions, for example,
personnel protective equipment. In principle, Is an initial con-
sideration for all incidents; however, its need and the type of
equipment required Is based on a case-by-case evaluation. Likewise,
someone must make the first entry onto a Site. The exact entry
procedure to be used can only be determined after assessing the
conditions prevailing at that incident.
The purpose of this document is to provide standard operating safety
guides related to site control and entry, The guidance included is
not meant to be a comprehensive treatment of the subjects covered.
Rather, It 1s meant to be used to complement professional training,
experience, and knowledge.
~ OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY POLICY
EPA's Occupational Health and Safety staff is responsible for
developing, supporting, and evaluating a progrta to protect the
health and safety of CPA employees. The Standard Operating Safety
Guides complement, and supplement the policies, procedures, and
practices contained in CPA's Occupational Health and Safety Manual,
1* particular, with Chapter 9 - Hazardous Substances Responses* EPA
Order 1440.2 - Health and Safety Requlrments for Personnel Engaged In
F1?ld Activities, and EPA Order 1440.3 - Respiratory Protection.

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PART 2
STANDARD OPERATING SAFETY PROCEDURES
I. GENERAL
There are many guides or procedures for performing the variety of
tasks associated with responding to environmental episodes Involving
haxardous substances. These may be afalnlstrative, technical, or
flufia^eswnt-oriented* Alt these procedures are Intended to provide
uni forts Instructions for accomplishing a specific task. In addition
to other types of procedures, safety-oriented operating procedures
arc needed. The purpose of this document Is to provide selected
Standard operating safety guides which can toe used to develop more
specific procedures.
IK development OF STANS ARC OPERATING SAFETT PROCEDURES
A i>ajor consideration 1n responding to accidental releases of hazard-
ous substances or Incidents involving abandoned hazardous waste sites
1s the health and safety of response personnel. Not only must a
variety of technical tasks be conducted efficiently to Mitigate an
incident, but they wjst be accomplished In a Banner that protects the
worker. Appropriate equipment and trained personnel, combined with
standard operating procedures, help reduce the possibility of ham to
response workers.
For procedures to be effective:
They *ist be written 1n advance. Developing and writing safe,
practical procedures Is difficult when prepared under the stress
of responding to an incident.
They must be based on the best available information, operational
principles, and technical guidance.
They aust be field-tested, reviewed, and revised when appropriate
by temp*tent safety professionals.
They must be understandable, feasible, and appropriate.
All personnel involved In site activities must have copies of
the safety procedures and be briefed on their use.
- Response personnel must be trained and periodically retrained
In personnel protection and safety.

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I[J. RESPONSE ACTIVITIES
Many of the procedures Involved In response activities are primarily
concerned with health And safety In concept and principle, these
are generic and independent of the type of incident. They are ad*oted
or modified to meet site-specific requirements* Each hazardous
materials Incident must be evaluated to determine its hazards and
risks. Various types of environmental samples or measurements may be
needed initially to determine the hazards or to provide additional
information far continuing assessment* Personnel oust go on-site to
accomplish specific tasks. Efforts are required to prevent or reduce
harmful substances front migrating from the site due to natural or
huaan activities. Contalrmenfc, cleanup, and disposal activities stay
be required. Each of these activities requires that safety procedure
be developed or existing procedures he adapted so that response
personnel are protected.
IV, OPERATING GUIDES
The standard operating safety guides that follow cover primarily site
control and entry* These guides illustrate technical considerations
necessary in developing standard Instructions. For a given incident,
the procedures reconmencfed should be adapted to conditions imposed by
that Specific situation.

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PART 3
SITE ENTRY - GENERAL MEASURES AMJ REQUIREMENTS
I. INTKQCUCTICrt
Personnel respondlog to environmental episodes involving chemical
substances encounter conditions that are unsafe or potentially unsafe.
In addition to tie danger due to the physical, chemical „ and toxico-
logieal properties of the material present, other types of hazards
electricity, water, heavy equipment, falling objects, loss of balince,
or tripping, for example - can have an adverse effect on personnel.
This part discusses safety measures and precautions associated only
with the hazardous nature of chemical compounds.
II. SAFETY PRACTICES
A. Personal Precautions
1.	Eating, drinking, chewing gum or tobacco, smoking, or any
practice that Increases the probability of hand-to-mouth
transfer end Ingestion of material 1s prohibited In any area
designated contaminated,
2.	Hands and face must be thoroughly washed upon leaving the
work area,
3.	Whenever decontamination procedures for outer garments are In
effect, the entire body should be thoroughly washed as soon
as possible after the protective garment is removed,
4» No fecial hair which Interferes with a setfsfectory fit of
the mask-to-face-seal 1s allowed on personnel required to
wear respirators.
5.	Contact with contaminated or suspected contaminated surfaces
should be avoided. Whenever possible, do not walk through
puddles, leachate, discolored surfaces, kneel on ground, lean,
sit, or piece equipment on dn*s, containers, or the ground.
6.	Medicine and alcohol can potentiate the effects froa exposure
to toxic chemicals. Prescribed drugs should not be taken by
personnel on response operations where the potential for
absorption, Inhalation, or ingestion of toxic substances
exists unless specifically approved by a qualified physician.
Alcoholic beverage intake should be minimized or avoided
during response operations.
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8, Site Safetj Plans
1. f Site Safety PUn nsi tw developed for all phases of site
operations and made available to all personnel, unless time
precludes ft, the plan *ust &e written and posted,
2* AH personnel must be familiar with itandard operating safety
procedures and Any additional Instructions and information
contained in the Site Safety Plan.
3.	All personnel wst adhere to the Information contained in the
Site Safety Plan.
C. Operations
1.	All personnel going on-site must Be adequately trained and
thoroughly briefed on anticipated hazards, equipment to be
nam, safety practices to be followed, emergency procedures,
and communications.
2.	Any required respiratory protective devices and clothfng must
be wgrti by all personnel going into areas designated for
wearing protective equipment.
3- Personnel on-site must use the buddy system when wearing
respiratory protective «
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9. Wind indicators visible to ill personnel should be strate-
gical IjC located throughout the site.
10.	Personnel and equipment in the contaminated area should be
minimized, consistent with effective site operations.
11.	Work areas far various operational activities ovst be estab-
1ished.
12.	Procedures for Heaving a contasninated area mist be planned
and Implemented prior to going on-site. Wort areas and
decontamination procedures oust be established based on
expected site conditions.
KEDICAL PROGRAM
To safeguard the health of response personnel, a medical program must
be developed, established, and maintained. This program he* two
essential components: routine health care and emergency treatment.
A. Routine Health Care
Routine health care and maintenance should consist of at least:
1.	Pre-employment medical examinations to establish the Indi-
vidual's state of health, baseline physiological data, and
ability to wear personnel protective equipment. The fre-
quency and type of examination to be conducted thereafter
should be determined by medical personnel knowledgeable In
the area of toxicology.
2.	Arrangements to provide spedel medical examinations, care,
and counseling in case of known or suspected exposures to
toxic substances. Any social tests needed depend on the
chemical substance to whfch the Individual has been exposed.
0. Emergency Medical Care and Treatment
The Medical Program must address emergency medical care and
treatment of response personnel. Including possible exposures to
toxtc substances and Injurfes resulting from accidents or physical
hazards. The following items should be Included In emergency
cart provisions:
1.	Hue, address, and telephone number of the nearest aedlcal
treatment facility* This should be conspicuously posted,
A map and directions for locating the facility, plus the
travel time, should be readily available.
2.	The facility's ability to provide care and treatment of
personnel exposed or suspected of being exposed to toxfc (or
D-B

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otherwise hazardous). If t&e facility lacks co*1 cologKdl
capability, arrangements Should be made for consultant
Services.
3,	Mmtnl strati on arrangements for accepting pattents.
4,	Arrangements to quickly obtain ambulance, emergency, fire,
and police services. Telephone numbers and procedures for
obtaining these services should be conspicuously posted.
5,	Emergency showers, eye wash fountains, and first aid equipment
readily available on-site- Personnel Should have first aid
and oedicat emergency training.
6,	Provisions for the rapid identification of the substance to
which the worker has been exposed (if this has not previously
been done]. This information niust be given to medical person-
nel .
7,	Procedures for decantaminiticm of Injured workers and pre-
venting contamination of medical personnel, equipment, and
facilities.
IV. EDUCATION AND TM1JHM6
All personnel involved in responding to environmental Incidents must
be trained to carry out their response functions. Training must be
provided in the use of all equipment. Including respiratory protective
apparatus and protective clothing; safety practices and procedures;
genera] safety requirements; advanced first aid; and hazard recogni-
tion and evaluation.
Safety training must be a continuing part of the total response
program. Periodic retraining and practice sessions not only create
a high degree of safety awareness, but also help to maintain profi-
ciency 1n the use of equipment and knowledge of safety requirements.
V. QUALIFIED SAFETT PERSONNEL
Personnel responding to chemical Incidents must make many complex
decisions regarding safety. Making these decisions correctly re-
quires m*jre than elementary knowledge. For example* selecting the
most effective personnel protective equipment requires not only
expertise In the technical areas of respirators, protective clothing,
air Monitoring, physical stress, etc., but also experience and profes-
sional jud^vnt. Only a competent, qualified person (specialist} has
the technical Jud
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1*ed trilling* ind continual Uudy, acquires expertise to ajlte sound
decisions.
STRESS
A,	introduction
Both physiological and psychological stress effect response
personnel. Under certain condition*, stress contributes signif-
icantly to accidents and ham* workers 1n other Mays, To reduce
the potential for abnomal physical stress or mental anxiety:
1.	Workers oust be periodically examined by medical authorities
to determine If they are physically, and ff possible* psycho,
logically fit to perform their jobs.
2.	Continual practice and training mist be provided In using
personnel protective equipment, especially the self-con-
tained breathing apparatus and chealcal-resistant protective
clothing.
3.	An effective safety program oust be implemented and a con-
certed effort nade to protect the worker. These actions
help assure personnel that their health and safety will be
protected now and 1n the future.
B.	Heather
Adverse weather conditions are Important considerations in plan.
n1ng and conducting site operations. Hot or cold weather can
cause physical discomfort, loss of efficiency* and personal
Injury. Of particular Importance is heat stress resulting when
protective clothing decreases natural body ventilation. Heat
stress can occur even when temperature are moderate. One or more
of the following reconendatlons will help reduce heat stress:
1.	Provide plenty of liquids. To replace body fluids (water and
electrolytes) lost due to sweating, use a 0.11 salt water
solution* aore heavily salted foods, or commercial mixes. The
comerclal mixes may be preferable for those employees on a
low-sodium diet.
2.	Provide cooling devices to aid natural body ventilation.
These devices* however* add weight, and their use should be
balanced against worker efficiency. Long cotton underwear
act a$ a wick to help absorb moisture and protect the skin
from direct contact with heat-absorbing protective clothing.
It should be the minimum undergiraent worn.
3.	Install mobile showers and/or hose-down facilities to reduce
body temperature and cool protective clothing*
3-10

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A. In extremely hoc weather„ conduct nonemergency response
operations In the early morning or evening.
5.	Cnstire that adequate shelter Is available to protect personnel
against Neat, cold, rain, snow, etc., which decrease physical
efficiency and Increase the probability of accidents.
6.	In hot neither, rotate workers wearing protective clothing.
C. Heat Stress Monitoring
For monitoring the body's recuperative ability to excess heat,
one or tore of the following techniques should be used as a
screening mechanism. Monitoring of personnel wearing protective
clothing should coamence when the ambient temperature Is 70
decrees Fahrenheit or above. Frequency of Monitoring should
Increase as the ambient temperature increases or If slow recovery
rates are Indicated. When temperatures exceed degrees F workers
must be monitored for heat stress after every wort period.
1.	Heart rate (Hft) should be measured by the radial pulse for 3G
seconds as early as possible in the resting period. The Hit
at the beginning of the rest period should not exceed 110
beats per minute. |f the HR Is higher, the next wort period
should be shortened by 10 minutes (or 331)~ while the length
of the rest period stays the same. If the pulse rate is 1Q0
beats per minute at the beginning of the next rest period,
the following work cycle should be shortened by 331.
2.	Body temperature should be measured orally with a clinical
thermometer as early as possible in the resting period. Orel
temperature (01) at the beginning of the rest period should
not exceed 99 degrees Fahrenheit. If It doei, the next work
period should be shortened by 10 minutes (or 33th while the
length of the rest period stays the same. However, if the OT
exceeds 99.7 degrees Fahrenheit at the beginning of the next
period, the following work cycle should be further shortened
by 331. 0T should be measured again at the end of the rest
period to make sure that it has dropped below 99 degrees
Fahrenheit.
3.	Body Mater loss (BWL) due to sweating should be measured by
weighing the worker in the morning and In the evening. The
clothing worn should be similar at both weighings; preferably
the worker should be nude. The scale should be accurate to
plus or sinus 1/4 lb. BVL Should not exceed i.Si of the
total body weight. If it does, workers should be Instructed
to Increase their dally Intake of fluids by the weight lost.

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Ideally, body fluids should be maintained at a constant level
during the work day. This requires replacement of salt lost
1n $veat as well.
4. Good hygienic standards mist be maintained by frequent change
of clothing and dally showering. Clothing should be permitted
to dry during rest periods. Persons Mho notice skin problem*
should Immediately consult medical personnel.
Erfects of Heat Stress
If the body's physiological processes fall to maintain a norwl
body temperature because of excessive heat, a number af physical
reactions can occur ranging from mild (such as fatigue, irrita-
bility, anxiety, and decreased concentration, dexterity, or
movement) to fatal. Standard reference books should be consulted
for specific first aid treatment. Medical help must be obtained
for the more serious conditions.
Heat-related problem are:
-	Heat rash: caused by continuous exposure to heat and hunld air
and aggravated by chafing clothes* Decreases ability to
tolerate heat as well as being a nuisance.
-	Heat cramps: caused by profuse perspiration with inadequate
fluid intake and chemical replacement (especially salts).
Signs: muscle spasm and pain In the extremities and abdomen.
-	Heat exhaustion: caused by Increased stress on various organs
to meet Increased demands to cool the body* Signs; shallow
breathing; pale, cool, moist skin; profuse sweating; dizziness
and lassitude.
-	Heat stroke: the cost severe form of heat stress.
Body must Be	cooled 1 meedlately to prevent severe Injury
and/or death.	Signs and symptoa* are: red, hot, dry skin; no
perspiration;	nausea; dizziness and confusion; strong, rapid
pulse; coma.	Medical help must fa* obtained tmediateiy«
Effects of Cold Exposure
Persons working outdoors In temperatures at or below freezing may
be frostbitten. Extreme cold for a short time may cause severe
Injury to exposed body surfaces, or result in profound generalized
cooling, causing death. Areas of the body which have high surface
area - to-vol <« ratio such as fingers, toes, and ears, are the
most susceptible.
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two factors influence the development of $ cold Injury: ambient
temperature and the ve'odty of the wind. Hind cMll Is used to
describe the chilling effect of moving air in combination with
To* temperature. For Instance, 10 degrees Fahrenheit with a wind
of 15 miles per hour {mph) is equivalent in chilling effect to
still air at -18 degrees Fahrenheit.
As * general rule, the greatest incremental! increase 1ft wind
chill occurs when a wind of 5 nph increases to 10 mph. Addi-
tionally, water conducts beat 24C Hoes faster than air* Thus,
the body cools suddenly when cheaicat-protective equipment is
rwnoved if the clothing underneath is perspiration soaked.
Local injury resulting from cold 1s Included 1 n the generic term
frostbite. There are several degrees of damage. Frostbite of
the extremities can be categorized into:
-	Frost nip or Incipient frostbite: characterised by suddenly
blanching or whitening of skin.
-	Superficial frostbite: skin has a waxy or white appearance
and is firm to the touch, but tissue beneath is resilient.
-	Deep frostbite: tissues are cold, pale, and solid; extremely
serious injury.
Systemic hypothermia 1s caused by exposure to freezing or rapidly
dropping teaperature. Its sysptoas are usually exhibited in flye
stages: I) shivering, Z) apathy, iistlessness, sleepiness, and
(sometimes) rapid cooling of the body to less than 95 degrees
Fahrenheit, 3) unconsciousness, glassy stare, slow pulse, and
slow respiratory rate, 4) freezing of the extremities, and
finallyt 5) death.
Standard reference books should be consulted far specific first
aids treatment*. Medical help must be obtained for the more
serious conditions.
F. Indicators of Toxic Exposure Effects
-	Observeable
—	changes in complexion, skin discoloration
--	lack of coordination
—	changes in deweangr
—	excessive salivation, pupillary response
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--	changes in speech pattern
- J4or>~0bserveable
--	headaches
—	dizziness
--	blurred vision
--	crimp5
--	irritation of eyes, skin, or respfratory tract
SUMKARf
The health and safety of response personnel are major considerations
In all response operations* All site operation planning aust incor-
porate an analysis of the hazards Involved and procedures for pre-
venting or minimizing the risk to personnel. The Site Safety Plan
establishes the safety practices and procedures to be followed so
that the welfare and safety of workers are protected* The plan onit
evaluate both the nature of the chemical compounds present And other
hazards that could affect response personnel.
D-14

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PART 4
SITE ENTRY - SURVEY AND RECQNKAUSANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The teain Initially entering the site 1? to accomplish one or more
of the following objectives:
-	Determine the hazards that exist or potentially exist affecting
public health, the environment, and response personnel.
-	Verify existing information and/or obtain information about the
Incident.
-	Evaluate the need for prompt mitigation.
-	Collect supplemental Information to determine the safety requlre-
aentt for personnel Initially and subsequently entering the site.
Before the team enters the site, as ouch information as possible
should be collected, depending an the tine available, concerning the
type of hazards, degree of hazard(s), and risks which nay exist.
Based upon available information (shipping manifests, transportation
placards, existing records, container labels, etc,) or off-site
studies, the team assesses the hazards, determines the need to go on-
site. and Identifies Initial safety requirements.
IX. PRELINIKARY GH-5ITE EVALUATION
The initial on-site survey fs to determine, on a preliminary basis,
hazardous or potentially hazardous conditions. The main effort Is to
rapidly Identify the immediate hazards that nay affect the public,
response personnel, and the environment. Of major concern are the
real or potential dangers - from, fire, explosion, airborne contam-
inants and to a lesser degree relation and oxygen deficient atmos-
pheres.
A. Organic Vapors and Gases
If the type of organic substance Involved In an Incident Is known
and the material Is volatile or can become airborne, air measure-
stents for organlcs should be made wljn one or more appropriate,
property calibrated survey instruments.
When the presence or types of organic vapors/gases are unknown,
Instruments such as a photolonlzer (HWJ Systems*} and/or a por-
table gas chromatograph (Foxboro Systems OVA*), operated In the
total readout aode, should be used to detect organic vapors.
D-LS

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Until specific constituents can to identified, the readout Indi-
cates total airborne substances to which the Instrument 1s
responding. Identification of the individual vapor/gas consti-
tuents (My permit the inst-uments to be calibrated to these
substances and used for more specific and accurate analysis.
Sufficient data should be obtained during the tnltlal entry to
nap or screen the site for various levels of organic vapors.
These gross measurements may be used on a preliminary basis to;
1) determine levels of personnel protection* 2) establish site
work zones, and 3) select candidate areas ror •ore thorough
qualitative and quantitative studies.
Very high readings on the Kffj or OVA My also Indicate the dis-
placement of oxygen or the presence of cortu&tfble vapors,
B.	inorganic Vapors and Gases
The number of direct reading instilments with the capability to
detect and quantify nonspecific inorganic vapors and gases Is
extremely Halted. Presently, the HMJ pltotolonlzer has very
limited detection capability while the Foxbare OVA has none.
(See Appendix 1 for characteristics). If specific inorganics are
known or suspected to be present, measurements should be ®ade
with appropriate instruments, if available* Colorimetric tubes
are only practical if substances present are known or can be
narrowed to a few.
C.	Radiation
Although radiation monitoring Is not necessary for all responses*
it should be incorporated 1n the initial survey where radioactive
materials may be present - for example, fires 4t warehouses or
hazardous material storage facilities* transportation Incidents
involving unknown materials, or abandoned waste sites.
Normal background exposure-rate for gamma radiation Is approx-
imately 0.01 to 0.0Z *1 111 roentgen per hour (mR/nr) on a gas&a
survey Instrument. Work can continue with elevated radiation-
exposure rates; however* if the exposure-rate Increases to 3-5
times above game background* a qualified health physicist should
be consulted. At no time should work continue with an exposure
rate of 10 rnfi/hr or above without the advice of a health physicist*
EPA's Office of Air, holsr and Radiation has radiation specialists
in each Region* as veil as at Headquarters* Montgomery, Alabama*
and Las Vegas* Nevada* to assist* The absence of gaemu readings
above background should not be Interpreted as the co^>lete absence
of radioactivity. Radioactive materials emitting low-energy gam-
~The use of any trade names does not Imply their endorsement by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.

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ma, alpha, or beta radiation may be present, but for a number of
reasons may not cause a response an the Instrument. Unless
Airborne, these radioactive materials should present mi nlm«1
haiard, but more thorough surveys should be conducted 95 site
operations continue to conqiletely rule Out the presence of any
radioactive arterial,
0. 0*ygen Deficiency
Normal air contains about 20.SX by volume of oxygen. At or
below 19.51 oxygen air-supplied respiratory protective equipment
is needed. Oxygen measurements are of particular Importance for
work in enclosed spaces, low-lying areas, or In the vicinity of
accidents that have produced heavler-than-alr vapors which could
displace ambient a1r„ These oxygen deficient areas are also prime
locations for taking further organic vapor and combustible gas
measurements, since the air has been displaced by other sub-
stances. Oxygen-enriched atmospheres increase the potential for
fires.
E,	Cofcustlble Gases
The presence or absence of combustible vapors or gases must be
determined. If readings approach or exceed 101 of the lower
explosive limit (LELJ, extreme caution should be exercised In
continuing the investigation. If readings approach or exceed 251
LEL, personnel should be withdrawn lastedlately. Before resuming
any on-site activities, project personnel In consultation with
experts in ffre or explosion prevention must develop procedures
for continuing operations.
F,	Visual Observations
While on-site, the initial entry team should make visual obser-
vations which Mould help in evaluating site hazards, for example,
dead fish or other animals; land features; wind direction; labels
on containers indicating explosive, flaumable, toxic, or corrosive
materials; conditions conducive to splash or contact with uncon-
flned liquids, sludges, or solids; and other general conditions.
G,	Direct-Reading Instruments
A variety of toxic air pollutants. (Including organic and In-
organic vapors, gases, or particulates) can be produced at, for
example, abandoned waste sites; fires at chemical manufacturing,
storage, reprocessing, or formulating facilities; or fires Invol-
ving pesticides. Direct-reading field 1nstn«nts will not
detect or measure all of these substances. Thus, negative
readings should not be Interpreted as the complete absence of
airborne toxic substances. Verification of negative results can
rt _11

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only be done by collecting air samples and analyzing then in 6
laboratory.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
A.	InttiaJ Surveys.
In general, the initial entry is considered a relatively rapid
screening process for collecting preliminary data an site hazards.
The tint needed to conduct Che initial survey depends on the
urgency of the situation, type of incident, information needed,
slie of site, avallability of resources, and Level of Protection
required for Initial entry personnel. Consequently, Initial
surveys nay need hour;, or days to complete and consist of more
than one entry.
B.	Priority for Initial Entry Monitoring
Of immediate concern to Initial entry personnel are atmospheric
conditions which could affect their Immediate safety. These
conditions are airborne toxic substances, combustible gases or
vapors, lack of oxygen, and to a lesser extent. Ionizing radia-
tion. Priorities far monitoring these potential hazards should
be established after a careful evaluation of conditions.
When the type of material Involved 1n an incident Is Identified
and its release into the environment suspected or known, the
nate rial's chemical/physical properties and the prevailing weather
conditions say help determine the order of monitoring. An unkrown
substance or situation presents a more difficult monitoring
problem.
In general, for poorly ventilated spaces - buildings, ship's
holds, boncars, or bulk tanks - which must be entered, combustible
vapors/gases and oxygen-deficient atmospheres should be monitored
first with tM# members wearing, as a minimum, Level B protective
equipment (Levels of Protection are described in Part S). Toxic
gases/vapors and radiation, unless known not to be present,
should be measured next.
For open, well-ventilated areas, combustible gases and oxygen
deficiency are lesser hazards, and require lower priority.
However, areas of lowLr elevation on-site {such as ditched and
pulleys) and downwind areas may have cortustlble gas mixtures, in
addition to toxic vapors or gases, and lack sufficient oxygen to
sustain life. Entry teams should approach and monitor whenever
possible from the upwind area.

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C. Periodic Monitoring
Tht monitoring surveys, made during the inltli! site entry phase
are for a preliminary evaluation of atmospheric hazards. In some
situation:. Che Information obtained may be sufficient to preclude
additional monitoring - for example, a chlorine tank determined
to b« releasing no chlorine. Materials detected during the
Initial site survey call for a more comprehensive evaluation of
hazards and analysts for specific components, A program «s*j5t be
established for monitoring, sampling, and evaluating hazards for
the duration of site operations» Since site activities and
weather conditions change, a continuous program to monitor atmos-
pheric changes oust be Implemented utilizing a comblnation of
stationary sampling equipment, personal monitoring devices, and
periodic area monitoring with direct-reading instruments.
D.	Off-Site Monitoring and Sampling
Whenever possible, atmospheric hazards in the areas adjacent to
the on-site zone should be monitored with direct-reading instru-
ments^ and air samples should he taken before the initial entry
for on->s1ts Investigations. Negative instr«ent readings off-
site should not be construed as definite indications of on-site
conditions, but only another piece of Information to assist In
the preliminary evaluation.
E.	Monitoring instruments
It Is imperative that personnel using monitoring instruments be
thoroughly familiar with their use, limitations, and operating
characteristics. All instruments have inherent constraints in
their ability to detect and/or quantify the hazards for which
they were designed. Unless trained personnel use instruments and
assess data readout, air hazards can be grossly misinterpreted,
endangering the health and safety of response personnel, [n
addition, only ln$tr»ents approved for use In hazardous locations
should be used, unless combustible gases or vapors are absent,
F.	Ambient Atmospheric Concentrations
Any indication of atmospheric hazards - toxic substances* combus-
tible gases, lack of oxygen, and radiation should be viewed as a
Sign to proceed with care and deliberation. Readings indicating
nonenploslve atmospheres, low concentrations of toxic Substances,
or other conditions may increase or decrease suddenly, changing
the associated risks. Extreme caution should be exercised 1n
continuing surveys when any atmospheric hazards are Indicated.
D-19

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TAflU 4-5
ATXOSPhEAEC HAZARD GUIDELINES
Konlcoring Egulpaent
Radiation survey
Hiiint	Ambfent Level
19.51-25%
> 25.OX
> 10 mR/hr
Action
Continue investigation
with cautions.
Continue on-site
monitoring with extreme
caution as highf ¦ levels
are encounters
Explosion hazard; withdrai
from area immediately.
Htmftcr wearing SC8A.
NOTE: CoabustlbJe gas
readings are not valid
In atmospheres with
< 19.Si oxygen.
Continue investigation *1t
caution, 5CBA not needed,
based On oxygen content
only.
Discontinue inspection;
fire hazard potential.
Consult specialist.
Potenttal radiation hazarc
evacuate site, Continue «
torlng only upon the advlc
of a health physicist.
Combustible gas indicator Explosive < 105 LEL
atmosphere
lOt-251
> ZSI lel
Oxygen concentration meter Oxygen	< 19.51
Radiation < 1 mR/hr
Continue Investigation.
If radiation is detected
above background levels,
this signifies the presen<
of possible radiation soui
at this level, more thoroi
monitoring 1s advisable.
Consult with j
heaUh physicist.
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TABLE 
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PART 5
51TE EMTRr - LEVELS OF PROTECTION
I. IHTROOUCTIOH
Personnel must wear protective equipment when response activities
Involve known or suspected atmospheric contamination, when vaporsT
gases, or particulates may be generated by site activities, or when
direct contact with sktn-affectinq substances may occur. Full face-
piece respirators protect lungs, gastrointestinal tract, and eyes
against airborne toxicants. Chemical-resistant clothing protects the
?kin from contact with skin-destructive and -absorbable chemicals.
Good personal hygiene Halts or prevents ingestion of «ater1aU
Equipment to protect the body against contact witrt known or antici-
pated toxic chemicals has been divided into four categories according
to the degree of protection afforded:
-	Level A: Should be worn when the highest level of respiratory,
skin, and eye protection is needed,
-	Level Bt Should be worn when the highest level of respiratory
protection ts needed, but a lesser level of skin protection.
-	Level C: Should be worn when the criteria for using air-purifying
respirators are »et.
-	Level D: Should be worn only as a work uniform and not on any
site with respiratory or skin hazards* It provides no protection
against chemical hazards.
The Level of Protection selected should be based on:
-	Type and measured concentration of the chemical substance
in the anbient atmosphere and Its toxicity.
-	Potential for exposure to substances in air, splashes of liquids,
or other direct contact with material due to work being done.
tn situations where the type of chemical, concentration, and
possibilities of contact are not known, the appropriate Level of
Protection mst be selected based on professional experience and
Judpwnt until the hazards can be better Identified.
While personnel protective equipment reduces the potential for contact
with toxic substances, ensuring the health and safety of responders
requires, In addition, safe work practices, decontamination, site
entry protocols, and other safety procedures. Together, these provide
an Integrated approach for reducing ham to workers.

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II. LEVELS OF PROTECTION
A. level A Protection
1. Personnel protective equipment
-	Supp11ed-*1r respirator approved by tFle Nine Safety and
Health ministration (MSHA) and National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIDSH).
Respirators nay be:
—	pressure-deaand, self-contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA)
or
—	pressure-deaand. airline respirator (with escape bottle
for mediately Dangerous to Life and Health (tODO or
potential for IDLM atjnospAere)
-	Fully encapsulating chenlcal-resistant suit
-	Coveralls*
-	Long cotton undenrear*
• Gloves (inner), chemlcat-reststent
-	Boots, ctealcal-resistant, steel toe and shank. (Depending
on suit construction, worn over or under suit hoot)
-	Hard hat* (under suit)
-	Disposable gloves and boot cavers* (Worn over fully encap-
sulating suit}
-	CooHng unit*
-	2-Way radio cooBunicatlons* (Inherently safe}
I. Criteria for selection
Meeting any of these criteria warrants use of Level A
protection:
- The chealcal substance has been Identified and requires
the highest level of protection for skin, eyes, and the
respiratory system based on:
— measured (or potential for) high concentration of
•Optional

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atmospheric vapors„ gases„ or particulates
or
— site operations and work functions Involves high
potential for splash, Immersion, or exposure to un-
expected vapors, gases, or particulate of materials
highly toxic to the skin,
-	Substances with a high degree of hazard to the skin are
known or suspected to be present, and skin contact Is
possible.
-	Operations Bust be conducted In confined, poorly venti-
lated areas until the absence of substances requiring
Level A protection Is determined.
-	Direct readings on field Ft is* ionization Dectcrj (FID) or
Phototoi»1 ration Detectors {PCD) and similar Instruments
Indicate high levels of unidentified vapors and gases tn
the air, (See Appendixes I and II.)
3. Guidance on selection
a. Fully encapsulating suits are primarily designed to
provide a gas or vapor tight barrier between the wearer
and atmospheric contaminants. Therefore Level A Is gen-
erally worn when high concentrations of airborne sub-
stances are known or thought to be present and these
substances could severely effect the Skin. Since Level A
requires the use of a self-contained breathing apparatus*
the eyes and respiratory system are also more protected.
Until air surveillance data are available to assist In the
selection of the appropriate Level of Protection* the use
of Level A may have to be based on Indirect evidence of
the potential for atmospheric contamination or other means
of skin contact with severe skin affecting substances.
Conditions that may require Level A protection Include;
- Confined spaces^ Enclosed, confined, or poorly ventilated
areas are conducive to build up of toxic vapors, gases, or
particulates. (Explosive or oxygen-deficient atmospheres
also are more probable In confined spaces.) Confined space
entry does not automatically warrant wearing Level A pro-
tection, but should serve as a cue to carefully consider
and to justify a lower Level of Protection.
-	Suspected/known highly toxic substances: Various sub-
stances that are highly toxic especially through skin

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absorption for example, fuming corrosives, cyanide com-
pounds, concentrated pesticides, Department of Tran-
sportation Poison "A" Materials, suspected carcinogens,
and Infectious substances nay be known or suspected to be
Involved, field Instruments ma/ not be available to
detect or quantify air concentrations of these materials.
Until these substances are Identified and concentrations
¦easured, saxlnua protection "ay be necessary.
-	Visible emissions; Visible air missions from leaking
containers or railroad/vehicular tank cars, as well as
smoke from chemical fires and others, Indicate high
potential for concentrations of substances that could be
extreme respiratory or skin hazards,
~ Job functions: Initial site entries are generally walk-
throughs In «Mch Instruments and visual observations
are used to make a preliminary evaluation of the hazards.
In Initial site entries* Level A should be worn when:
—	there ts a probability for exposure to high con-
centrations of vapors, gases» or particulates.
—	substances are known or suspected of being extremely
toxic directly to the skin or by being absorbed.
Subsequent entries are to conduct the many activities needed
to reduce the environmental impact of the incident, levels
of Protection for later operations are based not only on data
obtained from the Initial and subsequent environmental moni-
toring, but also on the probability of contamination and ease
of decontamination.
Examples of situations where Level A has been worn are:
-	Excavating of soil to sample burled drums suspected of
containing high concentrations of dloxln.
-	Entering a cloud of chlorine to repair a value broken In a
railroad accident.
-	Handling and moving drums known to contain oleum.
-	Responding to accidents Involving cyanide* arsenic* and un-
diluted pesticides.
b» The fully encapsulating suit provides the Highest degree of
protection to sktn, eyes, and respiratory system If the suit
material resists chemicals during the time the suit is worn*
While Level A provides maxlmua protection, all suit material
may be rapidly permeated and degraded by certain chemicals

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fro» extremely htgh atr concentrations, splashes, or immersion
of boots or gloves in concentrated liquids ar sludges. These
itnitatlcns should be recognized when specifying the type of
fully encapsulating suit. Whenever possible, the suit
material should be matched with the substance It is used
to protect against.
fl. Level & Protection
1.	Personnel protective equipment
-	Supplied-a1r respirator (HSHA/H10SH approved).
Respirators My tie:
—	pressure-demand, self-contained breathing apparatus
or
—	pressure-demand, airline respirator (with escape bottle
for IDLH, or potential for IDIH, atnosphere)
-	Chemical-resistant clothing (overalls and long-sleeved
jacket; hooded, one or two-piece chemical-splash suit;
disposable chemical-res1stant„ one-piece suits)
-	Long cotton underwear*
-	Coveralls*
-	Gloves (outer), chemic!I-resistant
-	gloves (inner), chemical-resistant
-	Boots (outer), chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank
-	Boot covers (outer)» chemical-resistant (disposable)*
-	Hard hat (face shield)*
-	2-Way radio communications* (Intrinsically safe)
2,	Criteria for selection
Meeting any one of these criteria warrants use of Level fl
protection:
-	The type and atmospheric concentration of toxic substances
has been identified and requires a high level of respira-
tory protection, but less skin protection than Level A.
These would be atmospheres:
~Optional

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—	with concentrations lirined lately Dangerous to Life and
Health, but substance or concentration In the air
does not represent a severe skin hazard
or
—	that do not meet the selection criteria permitting the
use of air-purifying respirators*
-	The atmosphere contains less than 19,51 oxygen,
-	It Is highly unlikely that the work being done will generate
high concentrations of vapors, gases or particulates, or
splashes of material that will affect the skin of personnel
wearing Level 8 protection,
-	Atmospheric concentrations of unidentified vapors or gates
are Indicated by direct readings on Instrweots such
as the FIO or P1D or similar instruments, but vapors and
gases are not suspected of containing high levels of
chemicals toxic to skin, {See Appendixes I and II,}
3. guidance on selection
a.	Level B does not afford the «a*imwn skin (and eye} pro-
tection as does a fully encapsulating suit since the
chenicaI-resistant clothing is not considered gas* vapor,
or particulate tight. However, a good quality, hooded,
chemical-resistant, one-piece garment, with taped wrist,
ankles, and hood does provides a reasonable degree of
protection against splashes and to lower concentrations 1n
air. At most abandoned hazardous waste sites, ambient
atmospheric gas or vapor levels have not approached concen-
trations sufficiently high to warrant Level A protection.
In all but a few circumstances (where highly toxic mater-
ials are suspected) Level B should provide the protection
needed for Initial entry. Subsequent operations at a site
require a reevaluate on of Level B protection based on the
probability of being splashed by chemicals, their effect
on the skin, the presence of hard-to-detect air contaim-
Inants. or the generation of highly toxic gases, vapors,
or particulates, due to the work being done.
b.	The chemical-resistant clothing required In Level B is
available In a wide variety of styles, Materials, construc-
tion
detail, ahd permeability. One or two-piece garments are
available with or without hoods. Disposal suits with a
variety of fabrics and design characteristics are also
available. Taping joints between the gloves, boots and
suit, and between hood and respirator reduces the pas*
sibllty

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for splash and vapor or gas penetration. These factors
and other selection criteria all affect the degree of
protection afforded. Therefor®, a specialist should
select the most effective chemical-resistant clothing
based on the Known or anticipated hazards and Job function.
Level 6 equipoent does provides a high level of protection
to the respiratory tract. Generally 1f a self-contained
breathing apparatus Is required for respiratory protection,
selecting chealcaI-resistant clothing {Level B) rather than
a fully encapsulating suit (level A) is based on needing
less protection against known or anticipated substances
affecting the skin. Level & skin protection Is selected
by:
-	Comparing the concentrations of known or Identified
substances In air with skin toxicity data.
-	Qetenalnlng the presence of substance* that are destruc-
tive to or readily absorbed through the Skin by liquid
splashes, unexpected high levels of gases, vapor, or
particulates. Or other aeans of direct contact.
-	Assessing the effect of the substance {at Its neasured
air concentrations or potential for splashing) on the
snail areas left unprotected by chemical-resistant
clothing. A hooded garment taped to the mask, and
hoots and gloves taped to the Suit further reduces area
of exposure.
c. For Initial site entry and reconnaissance at an open site,
approaching whenever possible from upwind. Level B protec-
tion (with good quality, hooded, cheaical-resistant cloth-
ing) should protect response personnel, providing the
conditions described In selecting Level A are known or
Judged to be absent.
C. Level C Protection
1. Personnel protective equipment
-	Air-purlfylng respirator, full-face, canister-equipped
(KSHA/HIC5H approved)
-	Chemfcal-resistant clothing (coveralls; hooded, one-piece
or two-piece chemical splash suit] chemical-resistant hood
and apron; disposable cheaical-resistant coveralls)
-	Coveralls*
-	Long cotton underwear*
-	Gloves (outer), cheaical-resistant

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•	Gloves [Inner}, chemical-resistant-
-	Boots (outer), Che«ical-resistant* steel tu and shank
-	Boot covers {outer), chemical-resistant (disposable}*
-	Hard hat (face shield*)
-	Escape mas**
-	1-Way radio coramn1cations* {inherently safe)
Criteria for ^election
Meeting all of these criteria permits use of Level C protec-
tion:
-	toygen concentrations are not less than 19.51 by volume.
-	Measured afr concentrations of Identified substances will
be reduced by the respirator below the substance's thres-
hold limit value (TLV) and the concentration Is within
the service Unit of the canister.
-	Atmospheric contaminant concentrations do not exceed IOLH
levels.
-	Atmospheric contaminants, liquid splashes, or other
direct contact Mill not adversely affect any body area
left unprotected by chenlcal-resistant clothing.
-	Job functions do not require self-contained breathing
apparatus.
- Direct reaolngs are a few ppms above background on In-
struments such as the FID or PID. (See Appendices 1 and
II.)
Guidance on selection
a. Level C protection 1$ distinguished from Level 3 by the
equipment used to protect the respiratory system, assuming
the same type of chemical-resistant clothing 1s used. The
main selection criterion for Level C is that conditions
permit wearing air-purifying respirators.
The air-purifying device wist be a full-face respirator
(hSHA/MIOSH approved) equipped with a canister suspended
from the chin or on a harness. Canisters must be able to

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remove the substances encountered. Quarter-or half-mask5
or cheekcartridge* full-face masks, should be used only with
the ippfdvtl of 4 qualified individual.
In addition, a full-face, air-purifying mask can be used
only If:
Substance has adequate warning properties.
Individual passes a qualitative fit-test for the mask,
Appropriate cartridge/canister 1s used, and its service limit
concentration Is not exceeded.
, An air surveillance program is part of all response opera-
tions when atmospheric contamination Is known or suspected.
It is particularly important that the air be thoroughly
nonltored when personnel are wearing air-purifying
respirators.
Periodic surveillance using direct-reading instruments and
air sampling Is needed to detect any changes fn air quality
necessitating a higher level of respiratory protection.
Level C protection with a full-face, air-purifying respl-
rat or should be worn routinely In an atmosphere only after
the type of air contaminant Is Identified, concentrations
measured and the criteria far wearing air-purlfylng respi-
rator set. To peralt flexibility In precrtblng a Level of
Protection at certain environmental Incidents, a specialist
could consider using air-purifying respirators In uniden-
tified vapor/gas concentrations of a few parts per million
above background as Indicated by a needle deflection on the
FID or P1D. However a needle deflection of a few parts per
million above background should not be the sole criterion
for selecting Level C. Since the Individual components nay
never be completely identified, a decision on continuous
wearing of Level C must be made after assessing all safety
considerations, including:
The presence of (or potential for) organic or Inorganic
vapors/gases against which a canister Is Ineffective or
has a short service lire.
The known (or suspected) presence In air of substances with
low TLYS or tOLtt levels.
The presence of particulates in air.
The errors associated with both the Instruments and monitoring

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procedures used.
The presence of (or potential for} substances In air which do
not elicit a response on the instrument used.
The potential for higher concentrations In the ambient
atmosphere or In the atr adjacent to specific site
operations.
d. The continuous use of a1r-pur1fytng respirators {Level C)
wist be based an the Identification of the substances
contributing to the total vapor or gas concentration and
the application of pubItshed criteria for the routine use
of air-purifying devices. Unidentified ambient concen-
trations of organic vapors or gases In air approaching or
exceeding a feu ppa above background require* as a minimum,
Level B protection.
0. Level 0 Protection
1,	Personnel protective equipment
-	Coveralls
-	Gloves*
-	Boots/shoes, leather or cheelcal-resistant, steel toe aid
shank
-	Safety glasses or chemical splash goggles*
-	Hard hat (face shield)*
2,	Criteria for selection
Meeting any Df these criteria allows use of Level D protection:
-	Wo contaminants are present.
-	work functions preclude splashes, looerslon, or potential for
unexpected Inhalation of any chemicals.
Level D protection Is primarily a work uniform. It can be
worn only tn areas ubere there Is no possibility of
contact with contamination.
[11. PROTECTION IN U NX NOW ENYlRttMENTS
In all Incident response, selecting the appropriate personnel pro-
tection equipment Is one of the first steps In reducing health
effects from toxic substances. Until the toxics hazards at an
environmental incident can be Identified and personnel safety

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procedures used.
The presence of (or potential for} substances 1n air which do
not «Hc1t a response on the instrument used.
The potential for higher concentrations In the ambient
atmosphere or in the air adjacent to specific site
operations,
d« the continuous use of air-purifying respirators (level C)
«ust be based on the Identification of the substances
contributing to the total vapor or gas concentration and
the application of published criteria for the routine use
of a1r~pur1fy1ng devices. Unidentified ambient concen-
trations of organic vapors or gases 1n air approaching or
exceeding a few PP" above background require, as a minimum,
Level B protection.
Level D Protection
1.	Personnel protective equipment
-	Coveralls
-	Gloves*
-	Boots/shoesv leather or chemical-resistant, steel toe and
shank
-	Safety glasses or chemical splash goggles*
-	Hard hat (face shield)*
2.	Criteria for selection
Meeting any of these criteria allows use of Level D protection:
-	No contaminants are present.
-	Nor* functions preclude splashes» Imerslon, or potential for
unexpected Inhalation of an? chemicals.
Level D protection is primarily a work uniform. It can be
worn only In areas where thare Is no possibility of
contact with contamination.
PROTECTION IK UNKNOWN ENVIMWENTS
In all incident response, selecting the appropriate personnel pro*
tectlor equipment 1$ one of the first steps fn reducing health
effect5 from toxic substances. Until the toxics harards at an
environmental incident can be identified and personnel safety

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¦ea$ure& commensurate with the hazards Instituted, preliminary
measures will have to M based on experience, judgment, and
prefits!©nil knowledge. One of the first concerns In evaluating an
unknown situation Is atmospheric hazards. Toxic concentrations (or
potential concentrations} of vapors, gases, and particulates; low
oxygen content explosive potential and* to a lesser degree, the
possibility of radiation exposure all represent Immediate
Atmospheric hazards. In addition to making air measurements to
determine these hazards, visual observation and review of existing
data can help determine the potential risks from other materials.
Once 1 mediate hazards, other than toxic substances have been
eliminated, the Initial on-site survey and reconnaissance, which
may consist of nore than one entry, continues. Its purpose is to
further characterize toxic hazards and, based on these findings,
refine preliminary safety requlreaents. As data are obtained from
the Initial Survey, the Level of Protection and other safety pro-
cedures are adjusted. Initial data also provide Information on
which to base further monitoring and sampling* No one method can
determine a Level of Protection In all unknown environments. Each
situation aust be examined Individually.
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SELECTING LEVELS Of PROTECTION
Other factors which should be considered In selecting the appro-
priate Level of Protection aret
A, Heat and physical stress
The use of protective clothing and respirators increases
physical stress. In particular heat stress, on the wearer.
Chemicalprotective clothing greatly reduces body ventilation
and diminishes Its ability to regulate its temperature. Even
In moderate ambient temperatures the diminished capacity of the
body to dissipate heat can result in one or sore heat-related
problems.
All chemical protective garments can cause heat stress. Some-
what less stress is associated with Level B or C when the
protective clothing does not require the use of a hood, tightly
fitted against the respirator face piece, and taped glove,
boot, suit Interfaces, slt.ce more body ventilation and evapora-
tion «ay occur. As aore body area is covered, the probability
of heat stress increases. Whenever any chemical-protective
clothing 1s worn, a heat stress recovery monitoring program
must occur (see Part 3, Section V),
Hearing protective equipment also increases the risk of acci-
dents. It is heavy, cumbersome, decreases dexterity, agility.
Interferes with vision, and 1s fatiguing to wear, These

-------
factors all Increase physical stress And the potenttal of
accidents. in particular the necessity 'or selecting Level A
protection, should be balancad against the Increased probability
of physical stress and accidents. Level 0 and C protection
somewhat reduces accident probability, because the equipment Is
lighter. Test cumbersome, and vision problems less serious.
6. Air Surveillance
A program must be established for routine* periodic air surveil-
lance. Without an air surveillance program, any changes could
go undetected and Jeopardize rasponse personnel. Surveillance
can be accomplished with various types Of air pumps and fil-
tering devices followed by analysts of the filtering media;
portable real-time monitoring Instruments located strategically
on-site; personal dosimeters; and periodic walk-throughs by
personnel carrying direct-reading Instrrents. (See Part fl)
C. Decision - Logic for Selecting Protective Clothing
No adequate criteria, similar to the respiratory protection
decision-logic, are available for selecting protective clothing.
A concentration of a known substance in the &1r approaching a TLV
or permissible exposure limit for the skin does not automa-
tically warrant a fully encapsulating suit. A hooded* Mgh
qualityt chemical-resistant Suit may provide adequate pro-
tection. The selection of Level A over Level B 1s a Judpent
that should be made by a qualified individual considering the
following factors:
. The physical form of the potential contaminant. Airborne
substances are more likely for body contact with personnel
wearing non-encapsulating suits, since they are not consid-
ered to be gas or vapor tight.
-	Effect of the material on skin:
—	highly hazardous substances are those that are easily
absorbed through the skin causing systemic effects, or
that cause severe skin destruction* Skin contact with
liquids are generally more hazardous than vapors, gases
and particulates.
—	less hazardous substances are those that are not easily
absorbed through the skin causing systemic effects* or
that do not cause severe skin destruction
-	concentration of the material - the higher the concentration*
the higher the risk of harm.

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- The potential for contact with the swterlal due to work
function and the probability of direct exposure to the siuil
area of skin unprotected by Level B or C chenlcal-resistant
clothing,
0. Chemical $ Toxic to Skin
The chenlcals listed In Appendix MI are Identified 1n the Oil
and Hazardous Hater laU Technical Assistance Data Base System
(QWTAfiS) as having adverse skin effects ranging frea Irritation
to absorption Into the body. Knowledge concerning the presence
or absence of these materials could be useful In selecting the
necessary level of Protection. Othir substance* affecting the
skin, but not listed 1n OHHTADS. may be present. Therefore, a
Major effort should be made to Identify all substances.
E. Atmospheric Conditions
Atmospheric conditions *uch as stability, temperature, wind
direction, wind velocity, and barometric pressure determine the
behavior of contaminants In air or the potential for volatile
¦aterlal getting Into air. These parameters Should be consld-
erect In determining the need for and Level of Protection
required.
f. Work In Exclusion Zone
For operation^ 1n the Exclusion Zone (area of potential con-
tamination), different Levels of Protection may be selected,
and various types of chMlcal-resistant clothing worn. This
selection would be based not only on measured air concen-
trations. but also on the job function, reason for being In the
area, the potential for skin contact or Inhalation of the
materials present, and ability to decontaminate the protective
equipment used, (see Part 6)
G. Escape Masks
The use of escape masks 1s an option in Level C protection. A
specialist should determine their use on a case-by-case basis.
Escape masks could also be strategical1y located on-site In areas
that have higher possibilities for harmful exposure.
V. VAPW Oft HAS CONCENTRATIONS AS INDICATED BY DIRECT-READING INSTRUMENTS
Instruments such as the FID and PiD can be used to detect the presence
of many organic vapors or gases either as single compounds or mixtures.
Dial readings are frequently referred to, especially with unidentified
substances, as total vapor and gas concentrations (In ppm). Kore

-------
correctly they ire deflections of the needle on the dial Indicating
en instrument response ind does not directly relate to total concen-
tration fn the «1r. As a guide to selecting! Level of Protections,
tused on dial readings response, the following values could be used.
They should not be the sole criteria for selecting Levels of Pro-
tection.
Dial Reading	Level of Protection
Background to 5 ppe	C
above background
5 ppa ebove background	B
to $00 ppa
500 ppn above background	A
to 1000 ppa
Vapor or gas concentration, as Indicated by the readout on Instnments
such as the fIDS or PIDs are a useful adjunct to professional Judgpent
In selecting the Level of Protection to be worn In an unknown eflvl-
ronmnt. It should not be the single selection criterion* but should
be considered with all other available Information. Total vapor or
gas concentration as selection criteria for Levels of Protection
should only by used by qualified persons thoroughly faaillar with the
Infonutlon contained In Appendices I and [1,

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PART 6
SITE CQHTRQl ¦ WORK ZWES
I. introduction
The activities required! during response* to Incidents involving
hazardous substances may contribute to the unwanted moveaent of con-
taminants from the site to uncontamlnated areas - Response personnel
and equipment may become contaminated and transfer the material fnto
clean areas. Material may become airborne due to its volatility or
the disturbance of contaminated soil may cause It to becoae wind-
blow. To minimize the transfer of hazardous substances fron the
site, contamination control procedures are needed. Two general
method* art used; establishing site work zones (discussed here) and
removing contaminants from people and equipment (discussed in Part
7).
II. CQHTSOL AT THE SITE
A site must be controlled to reduce the possibility of: 1) contact
with any contaminants present and 2) removal of contaminants by per-
sonnel or equipment leaving the site. The possibility of exposure or
translocation of substances can be reduced or eliminated In a member
of ways, including;
-	Setting up security and physical barriers to exclude unnecessary
personnel from the general area.
-	Minimizing the number of personnel and equipment On-site consistent
with effective operations,
-	Establishing wort zones within the site.
-	Establishing control points to regulate access to work rones.
-	Conducting operations in a manner to reduce the exposure of person-
nel and equipment and to eliminate the potential for airborne
dispersion.
Implementing appropriate decontamination procedures.
HI. WORX ZOHES
One method of preventing or reducing the migration of contaminants
Is to delineate zones on the site In which prescribed operations occur.
Movement of personnel and equipment between zones and onto the site

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CONTAMMATKM
cowmoc urn
1CCIM COWTWOt
POWTt
CONTJUMAflOfl
MOUCTKM
COMWXM
COHTAWUnOH
MOUCTKW ZOWt
OUQMAH Of Itn WMK JtOMIl
rKRJM 6-t

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Itself mouN be United by access control points. By these seans.
Three contiguous zones (Figure 6-1) are recostaen&d:
-	Zone 1: Exclusion Zone
• Zone 2: Contanlnatlon Reduction Zone
-	Zone 3: Support Zone
A.	Zone 1: Exclusion Zone
The Exclusion Zone, the Innermost of three drees. Is the zone
where contamination does or could occur. All people entering the
Exclusion Zone Must wear prescribed Levels of Protection. An
entry *nd exit check point oust be established at the periphery
of the Exclusion Zone to regulate the flow of personnel and
equipment Into and out of the zone and to verify that the proced-
ures established to enter and e*It are followed.
The outer boundary Zont 1, the Hotline, is initially estab-
lished by visually surveying: the fsnediate environs of the
Incident and determining where the hazardous substances Involved
are located; where any drainage* leachate, or spilled material
is; end whethar any dlscolorations are visible. Guidance 1n
determining the boundaries Is also provided by data froa the
Initial site survey Indicating the presence of organic or In-
organic vapors/gases or particulates In air, combustible gases,
and radiation, or the results of water and soil sampling.
Additional factors that should be considered Include the distances
needed to prevent fire or an explosion from affecting personnel
outside the zone, the physical area necessary to conduct site
operations, and the potential for contaminants to be blown from
the area. Once the Hotline has been determined 1t should be
physically secured, fenced, or well-defined by landmarks. During
subsequent site operations, the boundary nay be modified and
adjusted as more Information becomes available.
B,	Subarcas Within the Exclusion Zone
All personnel within the Exclusion Zone nust wear the required
Level of Protection, Personnel protective equipment 1s designated
based on s1t*-spedf1c conditions including the type of work to
be done and the hazards that might be encountered. Frequently
within the Exclusion Zone, different Levels of Protection are
Justified* Subareas are specified and conspicuously marked as to
whether Level A, B, or C protection is required (Figure 6-2), The
Level of Protection is determined by the neasured concentration
of substances In a1r» potential for contamination, and the known
or suspected presence of highly toxic substances.

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Different Levels of Protection in the Exclusion Zone nulght also
tie designated by job assignment. For example,, collecting samples
from open containers might require Level B protection, whfle Tor
walk-through ambient air monitoring, Level C protection might be
sufficient. The asslgraent, when appropriate, of different
Levels of Protection within the Exclusion Zone generally makes
for a sore fleilbte, effective* and less costly operation white
Still Maintaining a high degree of safety*
C.	Zone 3: Support Zone
The Support Zone, the outermost part of the site, is considered a
noncontamlnated or clean area. Support equipment (comand post,
equipment trailer, etc.} 1s located in the zone; traffic is
restricted to authorlied response personnel. Since normal work
clothes are appropriate within this zona, potentially contaminated
personnel clothing, equipment, and samples are not permitted, but
are left fn the Contamination Reduction Zone until they are
decontaminated.
The location of the convand post and other support facilities In
the Support Zom depends on a number of factors, Including;
Accession1ity; topography; open space available; locations of
highways, railroad tracks; or other limitations.
Wind direction; preferably the support facilities should be
located upwind of the Exclusion Zone. However, shifts In
wind direction, and other conditions may be such that an Ideal
location based on wind direction alone does not exist.
- Resources: adequate roads, power lines, water, and shelter.
D.	Zone 2: • Contamination Reduction Zone
Between the Exclusion Zone and the Support Zone Is the Contamina-
tion Reduction Zone which provides a transition between contam-
inated and dean zones. Zone 1 serves as a buffer to further
reduce the probability of the clean zone becoming contaminated or
being affected by other existing hazards. It provide* additional
assurance that the physical transfer of contaminating substances
on people, equipment, or In the air is limited through a combina-
tion of decontamination, distance between Exclusion and Support
Zones, air dilution, zone restrictions, and work functions.
Initially! the Contamination Reduction Zone Is considered to be a
noncontaminated area. At the boundary between the Exclusion and
Contamination Reduction Zones, Contmlnation Reduction Corridors
(decontamination stations) are established, one for personnel
and one for heavy equipment. Depending on the size of the opera-
tion, more than two corridors may be necessary. Exit from the

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Exclusion Zone Is through a Contaafnation Reduction Corridor. A?
operations proceed, the area around the decontamination station
(nay become contaminated, but to a much lesser degree than the
Exclusion Zone. On a relative basis, the amount of contaminants
should decrease ftoq the Hotline to the Support Zone due to the
distance involved and the decontamination procedures used.
The boundary between the Support Zone and the Contamination Reduc-
tim Zone, the Contamination Control Line, separates the possibly
low contamination area from the clean Support Zone, Access to
the Contamination Reduction Zone from the Support Zone fs through
a control point. Personnel entering there would wear the pre-
scribed personnel protective equipment, 1f required, for working
in the Contamination Reduction Zone, Entering the Support Zone
requires removal of any protective equipment worn in the Contaml-
nation Reduction lone.
!, OTKEft CONSIDERATI0HS
A. Modifications
The use of a three-zone system* access control points, and exac-
ting decontamination procedures provides a reasonable assurance
against the translocation of contaminating substances. This site
control system 1s based on a worst case situation. Less string-
ent site control and decontamination procedures may be utilized
If more definitive Information Is available on the types of
substances Involved and hazards they present. This Information
can be obtained through air monitoring. Instrument survey and
sampling, and technical data concerning the characteristics and
behavior of material present.
6. Area Dimensions
The distance between the Hotline, Contamination Control Line, and
com&rvd post and the size and shape of each zone have to be based
on conditions specific to each site (Figures 6-2 and 6-3). Con-
siderable Judgment is needed to assure that the distances between
zone boundaries are large enough to allow room for the necessary
operations, provide adequate distances to prevent the spread of
contaminants, and eliminate the posslbHty of injury due to ex-
plosion or fire. Long-term operations would Involve developing
reasonable methods (for example, air surveillance, swipe testing,
and visible deterioration) to determine if material Is being
transferred between zones and to assist 1n modifying site bound-
aries.
The following criteria should be considered In establishing area
dimensions and boundaries:

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-	Physical and topographical features of the site.
-	Weather conditions*
-	Field/laboratory measurement* of air contaminants and environ-
mental samples.
-	Air dispersion calculations,
-	Potential for explosion and flying debris.
-	Physicalt chemical, toxlcological, and other characteristics of
the substances present.
-	Cleanup activities required.
-	Potential for fire,
-	Area needed to conduct operations.
-	Decontamtnation procedures,
-	Potential for exposure.
-	Proxlatty to residential or Industrial areas.
C. Monitoring and Sampling
To verify that site control procedures are preventing the Spread
of contamination* a monitoring and sampling program should be
established* The Support Zone should be periodically monitored
for air contaminants using direct-reading Instruments and col-
lecting air samples for particulate, gas, or vapor analysis.
Analysis of soil samples collected in the most heavily trafficked
area would Indicate contaminants being carried from the Exclusion
Zone by personnel, equipment* or w1fld« Occassional swipe tests
should be taken 1n trailers and other areas used by personnel.
These same types of samples should be collected and air monitored
1n the Contamination Reduction Zone. Increased concentrations In
air or other environmental media nay indicate a breakdown in
control over the Contamination Reduction Corridor, Ineffective
decontamination procedures, or failure to restrict Site access.

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PART" 7
SITE CONTROL - DECONTAMINATION
[. INTRODUCTION
Personnel responding to hazardous substance Indents may become
contaminated In a nuaber of ways Including:
-	Contacting vapors, gases, mists, or particulates In the air.
-	Being splashed by materials white sampling or opening containers.
-	Walking through puddles of liquids or on contaminated soil*
-	Using contaminated Instruments or equipment.
Protective clothing and respirators help prevent the wearer from
becoming contaminated or Inhaling contaminants; while good work
practices help reduce contamination on protective clothing, Instru-
ments* and equipment.
Even with these safeguardst contamination nay occur. Harmful Mate-
rials can he transferred Into clean areas, exposing unprotected
personnel* In removing contaminated clothing, personnel may contact
contaminants on the clothing or Inhale them. To prevent such occur-
rences , methods to reduce contamination, and decontamination proced-
ures must be developed and established before anyone enters a site
and must continue (modified when necessary) throughout site opera-
tions «
Decontamination consists of physically r^ovlng contaminants or
changing their chemical nature to Innocuous substances. How extensive
decontamination must be depends on a number of factors, the most
Important being the type Of contaminants Involved. The mora harmful
the contaminant, the more extensive and thorough decontamination must
be* Less harmful contaminants may require less decontamination.
Combining decontamination, the correct method of doffing personnel
protective equpment, and the use of site work zones minimizes cross-
contamination from protective clothing to wearer, equipment to
personnel, and one area to another. Only general guidance can be
given on methods and techniques for decontamination. The exact
procedure to use must be dateralned after evaluating a number of
factors specific to the Incident.
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Initial Planning

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The Initial decMtulniUsn p3an assumes ill personnel jnd equip-
nent leaving the Exclusion Zone (area of potential contamination]
are grossly contaminated. A &yitera 1i then set up for personnel
decontamination to wish and rinse. At least once, all the pro-
tective equipment worn. This Is done in combination with a
sequential doffing of protective equipment, starting at the first
station with the nest heavily contaminated Hen and progressing
to the last station *1tfi the least contaminated article* Each
piece procedure requires a separate station.
The spread of contaminants during the washing/doffing process is
further reduced by separating each decontanlnation station by a
mlnlmtw of 3 feet. Ideally, contamination should decrease as a
person moves from one station to another further along In the
line.
While planning site operationst methods should be developed to
prevent the contamination of people and equipment. For example,
using remote sampling techniques, not opening containers by hand,
bagging Monitoring Instruments* using drm grappters, watering
down dusty areast and not walking through areas of obvious con*
tamlnation would reduce the probability of becoming contaminated
and require I less elaborate decontamination procedure.
The Initial decontamination plan is based on a worst-case situ-
ation or assises no Information is available about the incident.
Specific conditions at the site are then evaluated* Including:
•	Type of contaminant.
•	The amount of contamination,
•	Levels of protection required,
- Type of protective clothing worn.
The Initial decontamination plan is modified, eliminating unneces-
sary stations or otherwise adapting it to site conditions, For
Instance* the initial plan might require a complete wash and
rinse of chemical protective garment:. If disposable garments
are worn* the wash/rinse step could be meltted. Hearing dis-
posable boot covers and gloves could eliminate washing and
rinsing these Items and reduce the number of stations needed.
B. Contamination deduction Corridor
An area within the Contamination Reduction Zone is designated the
Contamination Reduction Corridor (CRC). The CftC controls access
into and out of the Exclusion Zone and confines decontamination
activities to a limited area. The size of tfte corridor depends
on the maber of stations in the decontamination procedure.

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1 HEAVY EQUIPMENT
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1	AREA
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EXCLUSION
ZONE

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CONTAMINATION
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_ CONTAMINATION
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ACCESS CONTROL
POINT • EXTHANCE:
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ACCESS CONTROL
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CONTAMINATION REDUCTION 10ME LAYOUT
FIGURE M

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overall dimensions, of work control 2ones, and amount of space
available at the site, A corridor of 75 feet by IS feet should
be adequate for full decontamination. Whenever possible, 1t
should be a straight path.
The CRC boundaries should be conspicuously marked, with entry and
exit restricted. The far end Is the hotline - the boundary
between the Exclusion Zona and the Contamination Reduction Zone.
Personnel exiting the Exclusion Zone must 90 through the CRC.
Anyone In the CRC should be wearing the Level of Protection
designated for the decontamination ere*. Another corridor may be
required for heavy equipment needing decontamination. Htthln the
CRC, distinct areas are set aside for decontamination of person-
nel , portable field equipment, resoved clothing, etc. These
areas should be marked and personnel restricted to those wearing
the appropriate level of protection, ATI activities within the
corridor are confined to decontamination.
Personnel protective clothing, respirators, monitoring equipment,
and sampling supplies ere all maintained outside of the CftC,
Personnel don their protective equipment away from the CRC and
enter the Exclusion Zone through a separate access control point
At the hotline.
EXTENT OF DECONTAMINATION REQUIRED
A. Modifications of tnltlal Plan
The orlglnel decontamination plan must be adapted to specific
conditions found et Incidents. These condltfons nay require more
or less personnel decontamination than planned, depending on a
number of factors.
1. Type of Contaminant
The extent of personnel decontamination depends on the effects
the contaminants heve on the body. Contaminants do not ex-
hibit the same degree ^f toxicity (or other hazard). When-
ever It is known or suspected that personnel can become
contaminated with highly toxic or sk1n*de*truct1ve substances,
a full decontamination procedure should be followed. If less
hazardous materials are Involved, the procedure cin be down-
graded.
Z. Amount of Contamination
The amount of contamination on protective clothing is usually
determined visually, tf it is badly contaminatedi e thorough
decontamination is generally required. Gross material remain-
ing on the protective clothing for any extended period of
time afty degrade or penmate It. This likelihood Increases

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with higher air concentrations end greater amounts of liquid
contaalnatlon* Gross contwlnitfon also Increases the proba-
bility of personnel contact. Swipe tests may help determine
the type and quantity of surface contaminants.
3. Level of Protection
The level of protection and specific pieces of clothing worn
determine on e preliminary basis the layout of the decontamin-
ation line. Each Level of Protection Incorporates different
problems 1n decontamination and doffing of the equipment, for
example: decantamlnation of the harness straps and backpack
assembly of the self-contained breathing apparatus is dif-
ficult* A butyl rubber apron worn over the harness makes
decontamination easier. Clothing variations and different
Levels of Protection may require adding or deleting stations
in the original decontamination procedure.
Work Function
The work each person does determines the potential for contact
with hazardous materials. In turn, this dictates the layout
of the decontamination line. For exanple, observers, photo,
grapfeers, operators of air samplers, or others in the Ex-
clusion Zone performing tasks that will not bring then 1n
contact with contaminants may not need to have their garments
washed and rinsed. Others 1n the Exclusion Zone with a
potential for direct contact with the hazardous material will
require more thorough decontamination. Different decontamin-
ation lines could be set up for different Job functions, or
certain stations in a line could be omitted for personnel
performing certain tasks.
5.	Location of Contamination
Contamination on the upper areas of protective clothing poses
a greater risk to the worker because volatile eroounds may
generate a hazardous breathing concentration botn for the
-worker and for the decontamination personnel. There Is also
an Increased probability of contact with skin when doffing
the upper part of clothing.
6.	Reason for Leaving site
The reason for leaving the Exclusion Zone also determines the
need and extent of decontamination, k worker leaving the
Exclusion Zone to pick up or drop off tools or Instruments
and 1 mediately returning may not require decontamination. A
worker leaving to get a new air cylinder or to change a
respirator or cantster, however, may require some degree of
decontamination, individuals departing the CRC for a break,
lunch, or at t^a end of day, must be thoroughly decontaminated.
0-48

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3. Effectiveness of Decontamination
There 1s no method to Immediately determine ho* effective decon-
tamination Is in removing conU«f runts. QHcoToratlons. stains,
corrosive effects, and substances adhering to objects nay In-
dicate contaminants ivtve riot been removed. However, observable
effects only Indicate surface contamination and not permeation
(absorption) Into clothing. Also man; continents, are not
easily observed.
A Method for determining effectiveness of surface decontamination
is wipe testing. Cloth or paper patches - swipes - are wiped
over predetermined surfaces of the suspect object and analyzed In
a laboratory. Both the Inner and outer surfaces of protective
clothing should be swipe tested. Positive indications of both
sets of swipes would indicate surface contamination his not been
removed end substances have penetrated or permeated through the
garment. Swipe tests can also be done on skin or Inside clothing.
Permeation of protective garments requires laboratory analysis of
a piece of the material. Both swipe and penmeatlon testing
provide after-the-fact Information. At wig with visual obser-
vations, results of these tests can help evaluate the effec-
tiveness of decontamination,
C. Equipment
Decontamination equipment, materials, and supplies are generally
selected based on availability. Other considerations are ease of
equipment decontamination or dfsposablllty, Host equipment and
supplies can be easily procured. For example, soft-bristle scrub
brushes or long-handle brushes are used to remove contaminants.
Hater in buckets or garden sprayers Is used for rinsing. Large
galvanized wash tubs or stock tanks can hold wash and rinse
solutions. Children's wadfng pools can el so be used. Urge
plastic garbage cans or other similar containers lined with
plastic bags store contaminated clothing and equipment. Contam-
inated liquids can be stored temporarily In metel or pTastlc cans
or drums. Other gear includes paper or cloth towels for drying
protective clothing and equipment.
0, Decontamination Solution
Personnel protective equipment, sampling tools, and other equip-
ment are usually decontaminated by scrubbing with detergent-water
using a soft-bristle brus
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mixtures fraa a variety of known or unknown substance;. The
appropriate decontamination solution must be selected In consul-
tation with an experienced chcnlst.
E. E$tat>1 ishment of Procedures
Once decontamination procedures have teen established, all person-
nel requiring decontamination must be given precise Instructions
(and practice. If necessary). Compliance Mist be frequently
checked. The time it takes for decontamlnation oust be ascer-
tained. Personnel wearing SCBA's mist leave their work area with
Sufficient «1r to walk to CRC and go through decontamination.
V. DECONTAMINATION DURING MEDICAL EMERGENCIES
A.	Basic Considerations
Part of overall planning for Incident response Is managing medical
^ergencles* The plan should provide for:
-	5
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Life-saving car* should b* Instituted immediately without consid-
er' ng decontamination. The outside garments can b« removed
(depending on the weather) if they do not cause delay*. Interfere
¦1th treatment, or aggravate the problem. Respirators and back-
pack aisAblies must always be removed* Fully encapsulating
suits or chemical-resistant clothing can be cut away. If the
outer contaminated garments cannot be lafely removed, the Inrflvld-
ual should ba wrapped In plastic, rubber» -or blankets to help
prevent contaminating the inside of ambulances and medical person-
nel, Outside garments are than removed at the medical facility*
Flo attampt should be Bade to wash or r1n$e the victim at the
Site. One exception would hp 1 f It Is known that the Individual
has been contaminated with an extremely toxic or corrosive
material which could also cause severe Injury or loss of life.
For minor medical problens or Injuries, the normal decont&alnation
procedure should he followed.
C. Heat Stress
Heat-related illnesses range from heat fatigue to heat stroke*
the aost serious. Heat stroke requires prompt treatment to
prevent Irreversible damage or death. Protective clothing may
have to be cut off. Less serious forms of heat stress require
prvapt attention or they may lead to a heat stroke. Unless the
victim 1$ obviously contaminated, decomtamination should be
omitted or minimized and treatment begun Immediately.
0» Chemical Exposure
Exposure to chemicals can be divided Into two categories:
-	injuries from direct contact, such as acid bunts or Inhalation
of toxic chaaictls.
-	Potential Injury due to gross contamination on clothing or
equipment.
For inhaled contaminants treataent can only be by qualified
physicians. If the contaminant Is on the skin of In the eyes,
timed lata measures mist be taken Co counteract the substance's
effect. First afd treatment usually 1s flooding the affected
area with water; however, for a few chemicals, water may cause
more severe problems.
When protective clothing is grossly contaminated, contaminants
may be transferred to treatment personnel or the wearer and
cause Injuries. Unless severe medical problems have occurred
simultaneously with splashes* the protective clothing should be
washed off as rapidly as possible and carefully removed*

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V. PROTECTION FOR DECONTAMINATION WORKERS
The Level of Protection wortt by decontaalnation workers is determined
by:
-	Expected or visible contain Initios on workers*
-	Type of contaminant and associated respiratory and skin hazards.
• Total vapor/gas concentrations In the CSC.
-	Particulates and specific inorganic or organic vapors 1n the CRC,
-	Results or swipe tests.
A. Level C Use
Level C includes a full-face, canister-type air-purifying
respirator, Hard hat with face shield (If splash is a problem),
chariest-resistant boots and gloves, and protective clothing.
The body covering recommended Is chemical-resistant overalls with
an apron, or chemical-resistant overalls and jacket.
A face shield is reemwtended to protect against splashes because
respirators alone nay not provide this protection. The respirator
should have a canister approved for filtering any specific known
contaminants such as amonla, organic vapors, add gases, and
particulates.
3» Level B Use
In situations where site workers may oe contaminated with un-
knowns, highly volatile liquids, or highly toxic "aterials,
decontamination workers should wear Level B protection.
Level B protection Includes SCBA. hard hot with face shield,
chemical-resistant gloves, and protective covering. The clothing
suggested Is chemical-resistant overalls, jacket, and a rubber
apron. The rubber apron protects the SCBA harness assembly and
regulator from becoming contaminated.
VI, DECONTAMINATION OF EQUIPMENT
Insofar as possible, measures Should be taken to prevent contamination
of stapling and monitoring equipment. Sampling devices become con-
taminated, but monitoring Instruments, unless they are splashed,
usually do not* Once contaminated. Instruments are difficult to
clean without damaging them* Any delicate Instrument which cannot be
easily decontaminated should be protected while it is being used. It

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should tie pi seed In a clear plastic big, and the bag taped and secured
Around (he Instrument. Openings are made 1i the bag for sample
Intake,
A. Decontamination Procedures
1.	Sampling devices
Soling devices require special cltaring. Hie EPA Regional
Laboratories can provide information on proper decontamination
nethodj,
2.	TOOlS
Wooden tools are difficult to decontaminate because they
absorb chemicals. They should be kept on site and handled
only by protected workers. At the end of the re$pon$ea
wooden tools should be discarded. For decontaminating
other tool*. Regional Laboratories should be consulted.
3.	Respirators
Certain parts of contaminated respirators, such as the harness
assembly and leather or cloth components, are difficult to
decontaminate. If grossly contaminated, they may have to be
discarded, Rubber components can be soaked In soap and water
and scrubbed with a brush. Regulators must be maintained
according to manufacturer's recommendations. Persons respon-
sible for decontaminating respirators should be thoroughly
trained In respirator maintenance.
4.	Heavy Equipment
Bulldozers, trucks, back-hoes» bulking chambers, and other
heavy equipment are difficult to decontaminate. The method
generally used Is to wash the* with water under high pressure
and/or to scrub accessible parts with detergent/water solution
undar pressure. If possible. In some cases, shovels, scoops,
and lifts have been sand blasted or steam cleaned. Particular
care must be given to those components in direct contact with
contaminants such as ttres and scoops. Swipe tests should be
utilized to measure effectiveness.
9. Sanitizing of Personnel Protective Equipment
Respirators, reusable protective clothing, and other personal
articles not only mist be decontaminated before being reused* but
also sanitized. The Inside of masks end clothing becomes suited
due tu exhalation, body oils. *hd perspiration. The eanufac-
turer's Instructions should be used to sanitize the respirator
¦ask. if practical, protective clothing should be machine washed
after a thorough decontamination; otherwise It must be cleaned by
hand.

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C.	Persistent Contamination
In Some 1nStances, clothing and equipment wfll become contamin-
ant ad with substances that cannot be removed by normal decontamin-
ation procedures. A solvent may be used to remove such contamin-
ation froea equlraent if It does not destroy or degrade the pro-
tective water1*1, if persistent contamination Is expected,
disposable garments should be used. Testing for persistent
contamination of protective clothing and appropriate decon-
tamination ivst be done by qualified laboratory personnel*
D.	Disposal of Contaminated Materials
All materials and equipment used for decontamination must be
disposed of properly. Clothing, tools, buckets, brushes, end
all other equipment that is contaminated must be secured in drums
or other containers and labeled. Clothing not completely decon-
taminated on-site should be secured in plastic bags before being
removed from the site.
Contaminated wash and rinse solutions should be contained by
using step-in-containers (for example* child's wading pool) to
bold spent solutions. Another containment method Is to dig e
trench about 4 Inches deep and line it with plastic. In both
cases the spent solutions are transferred to drums, which are
labeled and: disposed of with other substances on site.
AMKOLS
Annex 1, 2. and 3 describe basic decontamination procedures for a
worker wearing Level A* Bt or C protection. Tbe basic decontamination
lines (Situation l)v consisting of approximately 19 stations, are
almost Identical except for changes necessitated by different pro-
tective clothing or respirators. For each annex, three specific
situations are described in which the basic (or full decontamination)
procedure is changed to take Into account differences In the extant
of contamination, the accompanying changes In equipment worn, and
other factors, the situations Illustrate decontamination setups
based on known or assumed conditions at an Incident. Many other
variations are possible.
Annex 4 describes s mini sum layout for Level A personnel decontamin-
ation. The number of Individual stations have been reduced. Although
the decontamination equipment and amount of space required Is less
than needed fn the procedures previously described, there Is also a
wdi higher probability of cross-contamination.

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AHNEX 1
LEVEL A DECOHTAMmAttON
EQUIPMENT WORK
The full decontamination procedure outlined is for workers wearl09
Level A protection (with taped joints between glovest boots, and
suit) consisting of:
-	Fully encapsulating suit.
-	Self-contained breathing apparatus.
-	Hard hat (optional).
-	Ch«ro1cat-re$istent, steel toe and shank boots.
-	Soot covers.
-	Inner and outer gloves.
PROCEDURE FOR. FULL DECONTAMINATION
Station 1; Segregated Equipment Drop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, supHng devices and C italners,
monitoring Instruments, radios, clipboards, etc.) on plastic jp
cloths or In different containers with plastic liners. Each will be
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the drop reduces
the probability of cross-contamination.
Equlpvent: various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop cloths
Station 2: Boot Cover and Glove Wash
Scrub outer boot covers a d gloves with decon solution or detergent/
water.
Equipment; container (20-30 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
D-55

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Station 3: Boot Cover and Glove Rinse
Rinse off decon solution from Station 2 using copious amounts of
water. Repeat as many tines as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 fa lions J
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle, soft-brl5tle scrub brushes
Station 4: Tape Jtamoval
Renove tape around boots and gloves and deposit in container with
plastic Hoar.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastfc liners
Station 5; Boot Cover Removal
Remove boot covers and deposit in container wfth plastic liner.
Equipment: container (3M0 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 6; Outer glove Removal
Roaove outer gloves and deposit In container with plastic Uner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 7: Suit/Safety Boot Wash
Thoroughly wash fully encapsulating suit and boots. Scrub suit
and boots with long-handle, soft-brittle scrub brush and copious
amounts of dtccn solution or detergent/water. Repeat as many
times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
deCQfl solution
or
detergent/utter
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
B-56

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Station 8: Suit/Safety Boot Rinse
Rinse off decern solution or detergent/water using copious Amounts
of water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container {30-S0 gallons)
or
Mgh-pressure spray unit
Mater
2-3 long handle, soft-brtstle scrub brushes
Station 9: Tank Change
If worker leaves Exclusion Zona to change air tank, this 1$ the
last step tn the decontamination procedure, Worker's air tank 1s
exchanged, new outer gloves and boots covers donned, and joints
taped. Worker then returns to duty*
Equipment: air tanks
tape
boot covers
gloves
Station 10; Safety Boot Removal
Reoove safety boots and deposit In container with plastic liner*
Equipment; container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
boot jack
Station 11: Fully Encapsulating Suit end Hard Mat Removal
With assistance of helper, remove fully encapsulating suit {and
hard hat). Hang suits on rack or lay out on drop cloths.
Equipment: rack
drop cloths
bench or stool
Station 12; SCBA Backpack Removal
While Still wearing facep1ece» remove backpack and place on tats3e.
Disconnect hose frt» regulator valve and proceed to next station*
Equipment: table
D-57

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Station 13: Inner Clove Hash
Wish with decon solution or detergent/water that wtll not harm
Skirt. Repeat is nany tines « ntcinir^.
Equ1(Hent: basin or bucket
decon solution
or
detergent/water
saiall table
Station 1*7 Inner Glove Rinse
Rinse with wate-- Repeat as many tines as necessary.
Equt(*eftti water basin
basin or bucket
stall table
Station tS: Faceplece Reaoval
Reaave faceplece. Deposit 1n container with plastic liner. Avoid
touching face with fingers.
Equipment: container (30-SQ gallons]
plastic liners
Station 16: Inner Glote Removal
flenove Inner gloves and deposit In container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20^30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 17: Inner clothing Reaotal
Reaove clothing soaked with perspiration. Place in container with
plastic liner, inner clothing should be reaeve4 as soon as possible
since there Is a possibility that saail amounts of contaalnants sight
have been transferred In reading fglly encapsulating suit,
Equtivcnt: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station IS: Field Wash
Shower If highly toiric, skin-corrosive or skin*absorbab1e materials
are known or suspected to be present. Hash hands and face 1f shower
Is not available.

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Equipment; water
soap
snail table
basin or bucket
field showers
towels
Station 19: Redress
Put on clean clothes, A dressing trailer 1s needed In fncleaent weather„
Equipment; tables
chairs
Tockers
clothes
C* FULL DECQNTAMJHAT10H {SIT. 1) AMD THREE MODIFICATIONS

STATI OM WK6ER
1
z
3
4
5
6
7
a
9
10
11
12
13
14
IS
16
17
10
19

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X











X





X
X

I
X
X


X
X
X
X


X





t
X
X










Situation 1: The Individual entering the Contamination Reduction
Corridor-TT observed to be grossly contaminated or extremely toatc
substances are known or suspected to be present.
Situation 2: Sane as Situation 1 except Individual needs new air tank
and wiii return to Exclusion Zone*
0-59

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Situation 3: Individual entering the CSC Is expects to be minimally
contaminated. Extremely toxic or &Lin~corros1ve materials are not
present, No outer gloves or boot covers ire worn. Inner gloves are
not contaminated.
Situation 4: S*»e as Situation 3 eacept individual needs new air tank
and will petum to E*ctus1on Zone.
0-60

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AHKEX I
LEVEL a DECONTAKINATIOH
A. EQUIPMENT WORN
The full decentAsfnation procedure outlined 1s for workers wearing
Level 6 protection (with taped Joints between gloves, boot, and suit)
consisting of:
-	On#-piece, hooded, cheatcaI-res 1stant splash suit.
-	Self-contained breathing apparatus.
-	Hard hat.
-	Chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank boots *
-	Boot covers
-	Inner and outer gloves.
B» PROCEDURE FOR FULL 0ECW1TAMINAT10H
Station 1: Segregated Equipment Drop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, sampling devices and containers,
monitoring Instruments, radios, clipboards, etc,) on plastic drop
cloths or in different containers with plastic liners. Each w^ll be
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the drop reduces
the probability of cross-contamination.
Equipment: various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop cloths
Station 2s Boot Cover and Glove Hash
Scrub outer hoot covers and gloves with decon solution or detergent/^
water.
Equipment: container {20-30 gallons)
decern solution
or
detergent water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
D-fil

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Station 3; Boot Cower and- Glove Rinse
Rinse off decon solution from Station 2 using copious counts of
water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (3&-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-Handle, soft-brl$tte scrub brushes
Station 4: Tape Removal
Remove tape around boots and gloves and deposit 1n container with
plastic liner*
Equipment: container (20-3& gallons)
plastic liners
Statton S; Boot Coyer Removal
Reanve boot covers and deposit In container with plastic liner*
Equipment; container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 6i Outer Glowe Rewval
Rosove outer gloves and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment; container (20-30 gallons
plastic liners
Station 7: Suit/Safety Boot Wash
Thoroughly wash chemical-resistant splash suit. SC0A, gloves* and
safety boots. Scrub with long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brush
and copious Mounts of decon solution or detergent/water, Wrap
SC0A regulator (if belt-mounted type) with plastic to keep out
Miter, Wash backpack assembly with sponges Or cloths.
Equipment: container (3D-S0 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent/water
Z-3 long-handle, soft-bristle Scrub brushes
small buckets
sponges or cloths
0-62

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Static** 8: SuU/SCW/B
-------
Station 13: Inner Glcve Uash
Wash Inner gloves with decon solution or detergenc/nater that will
not har™ skin. Repeat as "any tf»es at necessary.
Equipment: deCQn solution
Or
detergent/water
basin Or bucket
Mill table
Station 14; Innar Glove Rinse
Rlns« inner gloves with witer. Repeat as «atiy times as necessary*
Equipment; water
b^sin or backet
$jm11 table
Station IS: Facepiece flemovil
Remove facaplece. Avoid touching face with gloves* Deposit in
container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station If: Inner Glove Removal
Remove Inner gloves and deposit In container with plastic Uner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 17: Inner Clothing Removal
Remove clothing soaked with perspiration. Place in container with
plastic Hner* to not weir Inner clothing off-site since there is
« possibility small amounts of contanlnants sight have been
transferred In removing fully encapsulating suit.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 18: Field Ulsh
Shower If highly toxic, skin-corrosive, or skln-absorbable materials
are tnown or suspected to be present. Mash hands and face ff shower
is not available.
0-64

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Equipment: water
soup
mU titles
basins or buckets
field $hswtn
Station 19: Redress
Put on clean clothes. A dressing trailer 1$ needed In 1ncle*ent
weather.
Equipment: titles
chairs
lockers
Clothes
C. FULL OECQNTAWHATION (SIT. 1) AND THREE MODIFICATIONS

STATION NUMBER
1
2
3
4
5
C
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
H
IS
IS
17
le


X
I
X
X
I
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X i
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X











X





X
X

X
X
X


X
I
X
X
X

X





X
X
X










Situation 1: The individual entering the contamination Reduction
corridor is observed to be grossly conta«1 nated Or exttenely toxic
substances are known or suspected to be present.
Situation 2: Sane as Situation l except Individual needs new air tank
and will return to Exclusion Zone,
0-65

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Situation 3: Individual entering the CRC 1* expected to be minimatlj
COTtaSTnateS. Extremely tonic or jkln-corroslve aaterlats arc not
preient No outer gloves or boot covers ire worn. Inner gloves are
not contaminated.
Situation I: Sane as Situation 3 except tndlvlduat need* new sir tank
and mi 11 return to Eicluilcm Zone,
0-66

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AKNEX 3
LEVEL C DECWTAWNATION
A. EQUIPMENT WORN
The full decontanrlnation procedure outlined Is for workers wearing
level C protection (with taped Joints between gloves, boots, and
suit} consisting of:
-	One-piece, hooded, chemical-resistant splash suit.
-	Canister equipped, full-face mask.
-	Hard hat.
-	Chealct Uresis tent, steel toe and shank boots»
-	Boot covers.
-	Inner and: outer gloves.
B. PROCEDURE FOR FULL DECONTAMINATION
Station li Segregated Equipment Ofop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, sampling devices end ccr^ainer*.
monitoring Instrtx&ents, radios, clipboards, etc.) On plastic drop
cloths or In different containers with plastic liners. Each will be
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the drop reduces
the probability of cross-contamination.
Equipment; various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop cloths
Station 2: Boot Cover and Slove Wash
Scrub outer boot covers and gloves *ith decon solution or detergent/
water.
Equipment: container (20~3€ gallons)
dncon solution
or
detergent water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
D-67

-------
Station 3: Boot Co*er anc Glove Rtnse
Rinse off 
-------
Rinse off decon solution or detergent/water us*«
-------
Station 13: tnner Glo*e Rinse
Rinse 1nr«r gloves with Meter. Repeat is ma; times as necessary.
Equipment: water
basin or bucket
$0411 table
Station 14; Faceplece ftemoval
Reaove faeeplece. Avoid touching face with gloves. Deposit
facepleee in container with plastic liner.
Equlpsent: container {30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station IS: Inner filove Removal
fi«fe Inner gloves and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment; container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 16; Inner Clothing Removal
Remove clothing soaked with perspiration. Place In container with
plastic liner. Do not wear Inner clothing off-site since there is
a possibility small amounts of contaminants ntgtfit have been
transferred In rawing splash suite.
Equipment; container (20-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 17: field Wash
Shower 1f highly toxic, sk1n-corros1vr or tkln-absorbable Materials
are known or suspected to be present. Wash hands and face if shower
1s not available.
Equipment: water
soap
tables
wash basins/buckets
field showers
Station 18: Redress
Put on clean clothes. A dressing trailer Is needed In Inclement weather.
D-70

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Equipment: cables
chalrs
lackers
clothes
C. fUlL OECQNTAKINATION (SIT. 1} AMD THREE MODIFICATIONS








STATION
NUMBER








1
2
3
4
5
6
7
6
9
10
11
12
13
1«
15
16
1?
19

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X










X





X
X

X
X


X
X
X
X


X





X
X
X









Situation I: The Individual entering the Contort nation Reduction Corridor
IS observed to be grossly contaminated or extremely $V1n corrosive substances
«re known or suspected to be present.
Situation Same as Situation 1 except Individual needs new canister or
nasfc and will return to Exclusion Zone.
Situation 3: Individual entering the CRC Is expected to be minimally
contaminated. Extremely skin-corrosive materials are not present. Mo
outer gloves or boot covers are worn* Inner gloves are not contaminated.
Situation 4: Same as Situation 3 except individual needs new canister or
isFi™ return to Exclusion Zone.
D-71

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ANifEX 4
LEVEL A DECONTAMINATION, MINIMUM LAYOUT
A, EQJJPMEKT WORN
The decontamination procedure outlined 1s for workers wearing Level A
protection (with taped joints between glomes, boots, end suit) consisting
of:
-	Fully encapsulating suit with Integral boots and gloves.
-	Self-contained breathing apparatus*
-	Herd hat (optional).
-	Chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank boots.
-	Boot covers.
-	Inner and outer gloves.
B, PROCEDURE FOR FULL BECONTAMINATION
Station 1: Segregated Equipment Drop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, stapling devices and containers.
Monitoring Instruments, radios, clipboards, etc,) on plastic drop
cloths or In different containers with plastic liners. Each will be
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the drop reduces
the probability of cross~contaa1nation.
Equipment; various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop clothes
Station 2: Outer Garment, Boots, and Gloves Wash and Rinse
Scrub outer boots, outer gloves, and fully-encapsulating suit with
decon solution or detergent water. Rinse off using copious amounts
of water.
Equipment: containers (30-50 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent water
0-72

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rtaie water
2-2 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station I; Outer Boot and Clowe Removal
Remove outer boot* end gloves. Deposit In container with plastic
liner.
Etfulpatnt: container |3o»IC gallons)
pi attic Hoar*
bench or stool
Station 4; Tank Change
If worker le*«e* £*dy#-km Zone to change air ttnk, this la the last
step In the d*contu1 nation procedure. Worker's air tank Is exchanged¦
ne« outer glovei and boot covers donned, joints taped* aid wrttf
returns to duty*
Equipment: air tanks
tape
boot covers
Station 5: Boot* Gloves, and Outer Garment Removal
toots,. fully-eficapsulatlng suit* %M Inner flew removed and deposited
In separate container! lined irltli plastic*
Equipment; containers (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station SCRA (aaovil
SCBA backpack and facaplece la farmed. Hands and face are thoroughly
trashed. SCBA deposited on plastic sheets.
EqulpsMK't: plastic sheets
basin or bucket
soap and towels
bench
Station 7: Held Mash
Thoroughly Mash hands and face. Shower as soon as possible.
0-73

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Equipment: witer
soap
tables
Mesh teslfl/buckflt
0-»?4

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MRT 6
AIR SURVEILLANCE
1. IKTROOUCtlOft
Accidents Involving hazardous materials or remedial actions at aban-
doned waste sites can release a variety of substances Into the air.
Chemical fires, transportation accidents, open or leaking containers,
w1nd-blovn dust, and site cleanup activities produce fissions which
can rapidly affect the health and safety of response workers and the
puttie. Hazardous atmospheres can involve:
-	Flammable or explosive vapors, gases, and aerosols (explosive
atmosphere).
-	Displacement of breathable a1 r (oxygen-deficient atmosphere).
-	Radioactive materials (radioactive environment).
-	Toxic vapors, gases, and aerosols (toxic atmosphere).
The presence of one or more of these hazards determines subsequent
actions to protect people or the environment, operations to mitigate
the Incident, and safety considerations for response workers.
Airborne hazards can ba predicted If the substance Involved, Its
chemical and physical properties, and weat^r conditions are known.
But air surveillance Is necessary to conflra predictions, to Identify
or measure contaminants, or to detect unknown air pollutants.
This part provides guidance primarily on longer-term air sampling for
toxic substances, information Is given 1n Part 4, Initial Site Entry
Survey and Reconnaissance* regarding Initial determination of airborne
hazards.
II. OBJECTIVE OF AIR SURVEILLANCE
Air surveillance consists of air monitoring (using direct-reading
Instruments capable of providing real-time Indications of air
contaminants) and air sailing {collecting air on an appropriate
media or In a suitable sampling container followed by analysis.)
The objective of air surveillance during response is to determine the
type of chemical compound (and associated hazard) and quantity of
airborne contaminants on-site and off-site and changes in air contami-
nants that occur over the lifetime of the incident.

-------
The data obtained are used to help establish criteria for worker
safety, document potential exposures, determine protective measures
tor the public, evaluate the environmental Impact of the Incident,
and determine mitigation activities. To accomplish this requires
establishing en effective alt surveillance program, tailored to meet
the conditions generated by eath Incident.
Ill* TYPES OF llfClDQfTS
As part of Initial hazard evaluation, direct.reading Instruments
(DRls}. visible Indicators (signs, labels, placards, type of con-
tainer, etc.), and other Information (manifests, consists, Inven-
tories, Agency records, ate.} are used to evaluate the presence or
potential for air contaminant release. Limited air sampling may also
be conducted if time 1s available, based an an assessment of this
preliminary information, a more ce^rehenslve air surveillance
strategy Is developed and implemented.
Two general types of incidents are encountered:
-	gnviwenttl ggrgencles* including chemical fires* spills, or
other releases of hazardous Materials which occur over a rela-
tively short period of tl^. Since contaminants aey be released
rapidly* there «ay be no time for air surveillance* In Incidents
where the released Material can be quickly identified (and suffi-
cient time is available)* direct-reading, hand-held Monitoring
Instruments can be used to provide information on types of
hazards* Mr sampling generally is limited unless the release
continues long enough for appropriate equipment to be brought in,
-	longer-term cleanup. Including planned removals and remedial
actions at abandoned waste sites as well as restoration after
emergency problems have been controlled. During this period,
especially at maste sites, workers and the public may be exposed
to a wide variety of airborne materials over a much longer period
of time. Since cleanup activities require more time (and planning)
to accomplish, appropriate equipment for air monitoring and samp-
ling can be secured, and an air surveillance program established*
IV* GENERAL SURVEILLANCE KE1H0D5
During site operations, data are needed about air contaminants and any
changes that may occur* Surveillance for vapors, gases, and parti-
culates Is done using DRls and air Stapling systems* DRls can be
used to detect "any organic* and a few Inorganics and provide approxi-
mate total concentrations. If specific organic* (and Inorganics)
have been identified, then DRls, calibrated to those materials,
can be used for more accurate on-site assessment* In many Instances

-------
however, only a?r stapling (and laboratory analysts) can be used for
detection and quantification.
The wast accurate Method for evaluating any air contaminant 1$ to
collect saeples. and analyze the* at a reliable laboratory. Although
accurate* this method has tw disadvantages: cost and the time re-
quired to obtain results. Analyzing large numbers of samples tn
laboratories is very expensive, especially If results are wanted
quickly. On-site laboratories tend to reduce the turn-around time,
but unless they can analyze other types of samples, they also are
costly* In emergencies, time Ts often not available for laboratory
analysis of samples either on-site or off-site.
To obtain air monitoring data rapidly at the site, Instruments uti-
lizing flame Ionization detectors [FIDO photoionizatfon detectors
(PZDs) and other similar Instruments can be used. These may be used
as Survey Instruments {total concentration mode) or operated as gas
chromatography (gas chromatograph mode). As gas chromatographs,
these 1nctn*ents can provide real-time, quail tat ive/quantetive data
when calibrated with standards of known air contaminants. Combined
with selective laboratory analysis of sables* they provide a tool
for evaluating airborne organic hazards on a realtime basis, at a
lower cost than analyzing all samples In a laboratory. An example of
an air surveillance program used by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's Environmental Response Teas Is contained 1n Annex 1.
V. W SANPUK6
For more complete Information about air contaminants, measurements
obtained with Ofils must be supplemented by collecting and analyzing
air samples. To assess air contaminants more thoroughly, air sampling
devices equipped with appropriate collection media are placed at var-
ious locations throughout the area. These samples provide air quality
Information for the period of time they operate, and can Indicate con*
tlmlnant types and concentrations over the lifetime of site operations.
As data are obtained {from the analysis of samples, ORIs, knowledge
about materials Involved, site operations, and potential for airborne
toxic hazards), adjustments are made in the type of samples, manber
of samples collected, frequency of sampling, and analysis required.
In addition to air samplers, area sampling stations may also include
ORIs equipped with recorders and operated as continuous air monitors.
Area sampling stations are located In various places including:
-	Upwind - Because many hazardous Incidents occur near industries or
highways that generate air pollutants, samples must be taken upwind
of the site to establish background levels of air contaminants.
-	Support zone » Samples must be taken near the command post or other
supportfa~cTI1t1es to ensure that tftey are In fact located in a
clean area, and that the area remains clean throughout operations
at the site.

-------
-	Central nation reduction zone - fllr sables should b? collected
4 long the decontrol nation Tine-to ensure that decontamination
workers ire properly protected and that on-site workers arc not
removing their protective gear In a contaminated area.
-	Exclusion zone - Tl* exclusion *one presents the greatest risk of
exposure to chemicals mef requires the most air sampling. The
location of sampling stations should he based upon hot-spots
detected by DRIs, types of substance present* end potential for
airborne contaminants. The data fro* these Stations* in con-
junction wfth Intermittent walk-around surveys wit J' DRIS, ere used
to verify the selection of proper levels of worker protection and
exclusion zone boundaries, as veil as to provide « continual
record of air continents.
-	Downwind - One or nore sampling stations are located downwind from
the site to Indicate If any air contaminants are leaving the site.
If there are Indications of airborne hazards in populated areas,
additional samplers should he placed downwind.
MEDIA FOR COLLECTING Ajft SAMPLES
Hazardous material Incidents, especially abandoned waste sites.
Involve thousands of potentially dangerous substances - gases, vapors,
and aerosols that could become airborne, A variety of media - liquids
and solids - art used to collect these substances. Sampling systems
typically Include a calibrated air sampling pump which draws air Into
selected collection Media, some of the most common types of samples,
and the collection awdla used for them are:
- Organic vapors - Activated carbon Is an excellent adsorbent for
most organic vapors. However* other solid adsorbents (such as
Tenax, silica gel, and Florlsll) are routinely used to sample
specific organic compounds or classes of compounds that do not
adsorb Or desert well on activated carbon. To avoid stocking a
large number of sorbents for all substances anticipated, a smaller
fwber chosen for collecting the widest ruga of Materials or for
substances known to be present generally are used. The vapors are
collected using an Industrial hygiene personal sampling puap with
either one sampling port or a manifold capable of slultaneously
collecting staples on several sorbmnt tubes, for exa^ile, a mani-
fold with four sorbent tubes (or as Individual puaps with varying
flow rates). The tubes might contain:
—	Activated carbon to collect vapors of materials with a boiling
point above 0 degrees centigrade. These materials Include
most odorous organic substances, such as solvent vapors*
—	A porous polymer such as Tenax or Chromosorb to collect sub-
stances (such as high-molecutar-welght hydrocarbons, organo-

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phosphorous compounds, and the vapors of certain pesticides)
that adsorb poorly onto activated carbon. Some of these porous
polymers also adsorb organic Materials at Tew artlent tempera-
tures wore efficiently than carbon.
A polar sorbent such is silica gel to collect organic vapors
(aromatic amines, for example) that exhibit a relatively high
dlpnle moment.
— Another specialty adsorbent selected for the specific Site.
For example, a Fieri si 1 tube could be used If polychlorinated
blphenyls are expected.
¦* Inorganic gases - The Inorganic gases present it an incident would
prima rlfy fee polar compounds such as the haloadd gases. They can
be adsorbed onto silica gel tubes and analyzed by Ion chromato-
graphy* [fingers titled with selected liquid reagents can also
be used.
* Aerosols - Aerosols (solid or liquid particulates) that may be en-
countered at an Incident Include contaminated and noncDfitamlnated
soil particles, heavy-metal particulates* pesticide dusts, and
droplets of organic or Inorganic liquids. An effective method r
sampling these materials 1s to collect them on a particulate
filter such as a glass fiber or membrane type. A backup Implnger
filled with a selected absorbing solution may also be necessary»
Colorlmetrlc detector tubes can also be used with a sampling pump
Mtwn monitoring for some specific compounds* Passive organic vapor
monitors can be substituted for the active system described If passive
monitors are available for the types of materials suspected to be
present at a given site.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health's (KIOSH)
Manual of Analytical Hethods. Volumes 1-7, contains acceptable
methods for collecting and analyzing air samples for a variety of
chemical substances. Consult 1t for specific procedures.
VII. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Samples are analyzed to determine types and quantities of substances
present. The following provides additional guidance on Sample col-
lection and analysis.
- Aerosols
Samples for aerosols should be taken at a relatively high flow rate
(generally about 2 liters/minute) using a standard Industrial
hygiene pwp and filter assembly. To collect total particulates,

-------
a membrane filter hiving i 0.6 micrometer port sire Is coram.
The sample can bt weighed to determine total particulates, then
analyzed destructively or nondestructive!/ for metali. If the
metals analysis Is done nonde struct tvely or If the filter Is
sectioned, additional analyses (for example, organlcs, Inorganics,
and o.tlcal particle sizing) can he performed.
" So^bent Samgles
The sorbent material chosen, the amount used, and sample volune
will vary according to the types and concentrations of substances
anticipated at a particular site, Polar sorbent material such
as silica gel will collect polar substances which are not adsorbed
well onto activated carbon and some of the porous polymers. The
silica gel sample can be split and analyzed for the haloacid gases
and an»et1c amines.
Activated carbon and porous polymers will collect a wide range of
compounds. Exhaustive analysis to Identify and quantify all the
collected species Is prohibitively expensive at any laboratory and
technically difficult for a field laboratory. Therefore, sables
should be analyzed for principal hazardous constituents {PHCs}.
The selection of PHCs should be based upon the types of materials
anticipated at a given site, ft-om generator's records, end fro®
Information collected during the initial site survey. To aid In
the selection of PHCs, a sample could be collected on activated
carbon or porous polymer during the Initial site survey and ex-
haustively analyzed off-site to identify the major peaks within
selected categories. This one thorough analysis, along with what
Is already known about a particular site, could provide enough
Information to select PHCs. Standards of PHCs could then be
prepared and used to calibrate Instruments used for field analysis
of samples. Subsequent, routine off-site analysis could be limited
to scanning for only PHCs, saving time and money. Special adsor-
bents and sampling conditions can be used for specific PHCs If
desired, while continued multimedia sampling will provide a base
for analysis of additional PHCs that may be Identified during the
course of cleanup operations.
- Passive Dosimeters
A less traditional method of sanpHng 1s the use of passive dosi-
meters* The few passive dosimeters now available are only for
gases and vapors. Passive dosimeters are used primarily to monitor
personal exposure* but they can be used to monitor areas. Passive
monitors are divided into two groups:
— Diffusion samplers. In which molecules move across a concentra-
tion gradient, usually achieved within a stagnant layer of air,
between the contaminated atmosphere and the Indicator material.

-------
¦¦	devices, which rety on the natural permeation of a
contaminant through t membrane. A suitable membrane H Select-
ed that Is easily permeated by the contaminant of interest and
Impermeable to aTl others. Permeation doslteeters are thereform
useful in pick-tag out a single contaminant fro® a si store of
possible Interfering contaminants.
Some passive dosimeters may be read directly, as are pftU and
colorimetrlc length-of-staln tubes. Others require laboratory
analysis slmlTiar to that done on solid sorbents.
VIII. PER50MEL MONITORING
In addition to area atmospheric sampling* personnel monitoring - both
active and passive - can be used to sample for air contaminants. Repre-
sentative workers are equipped with personal samplers to Indicate con-
tarn)flints art specific locations or for specific work being done,
placed on workers* generally within 1 foot of the mouth and nose* the
monitors Indicate the potential for the worker to Inhale the con-
taminant*
I*. CALIBRATION
As a rule, the total air sailing system should be calibrated rather
than the pump alone* Proper calibration Is essential for proper
operation and for accurate Interpretation of resultant data* As a
minimi*, the system should be calibrated prior to and after use* The
overall frequency of calibration win depend upon the general handling
and uh of a given sampling system. Pump mechanisms should be recall*
brtted after repair* when newly purchased* and following suspected
abuse. Calibration methods can be found In the KIOSK Manual of
Analytical Methods (Volumes 1-7),
X. KETEQR0LS1CAL CONSIDERATIONS
Meteorological Information Is an Integral part of art air survelUance
program, data concerning wind speed and direction, temperature,
barometric pressure, and humidity, singularly or in combination*
are needed for;
-	Selecting air sampling locations.
-	Calculating air dispersion.
* Calibrating instruments.
-	Determining population at risk or environmental exposure from
airborne contaminants.

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Knowledge of «1>Ki speed end direction It necessary to effectively
place air sailers. In source-oriented ambient air sampling
particularly, stvpleri need to be located downwind (at different
distances) of the source end others placed to collect background
sables. Shifts In wind direction must be known and sampler* re-
located or corrections made for the shifts. In addition* atmodpheric
simulation models for predicting contaminant dispersion and concen-
tration need windspeed and direction as Inputs for predictive calcu-
lations. Information may be needed concerning the frequency and
intensity with which that winds bio* from certain directions {wind-
rose data], consequently, the wind direction oust be continually
Monitored.
Air stapling system need to be calibrated before use and corrections
in the calibration curves made for temperature end pressure, After
sampling, stapled air volumes are also corrected for temperature end
pressure variations. This requires knowing air temperature and
pressure.
Air sampling Is sometimes designed to assess population exposure (and
frequently potential worker exposure}. Air samplers are generally
located fn population centers Irrespective of wind direction. Even
in these Instances, however, meteorological data Is needed for air
dispersion modeling. Models are then used to predict or verify
population-oriented sampling results.
Proper dat> is collected by having meteorological stations on site or
obtelnln" it from one or more of several government or private
organlr ons which routinely collect such data. The choice of how
Information is obtained depends on the availability of reliable data
at the location desired, resources needed to obtain meteorological
equipment, accuracy of information needed, and use of information.

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AJINEX 5
GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE TEWTS
Alft SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
t. APPROACH
A variety of long-tern air surveillance programs can be designed to
detect a wide range of airborne compounds. To tapTement any program
a number of factors oust be considered, Including type of equipment,
costs, personnel required, accuracy of analysis, time required to
obtain results (turn-a round- tine J t and availability of analytical
laboratories.
One approach to air surveillance, developed and used by the US£PA
Environmental Response Team (EftT), Is described here. This program
achieves a reasonable balance between cost, accuracy, and tlae in
obtaining data using a combination of direct reading Instruments
(ORIS) and air sampling systems to;
-	Rapidly survey for airborne organic vapors and gases*
-	Identify and measure organic vapors and gases,
-	Identify and measure particulates and Inorganic vapors and gases.
The approach Is based on;
-	Using flame ionization detectors (FIDs) and/or photolonlzatlon
detectors (PlOs) for initial detection of total organic gases and
vapors and for periodic site surveys (for total urganics). Equip-
ped with strip chart recorders, the detectors are used as area
monitors to record total organic concentration and changes In
concentration over a period of time* Calibrated to specific
organic contaminants, they are used to detect and measure those
substances.
-	Collecting area air samples using personal pui*s and organic gas/
vapor collection tubes* Samples are analyzed using the gas chroma-
tograph (GC) capabilities of field Instruments. Selected samples
are also analyzed 1n laboratories accredited by the American
Industrial Hygiene Association (A1HA),
-	Using PIDs and/or FIDs (as a survey Instrument or GC) to provide
real-time data and to screen the number of samples needed for
laboratory analysis.

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- Stapling for part 1cy1 ales , 1 rigrgani c acids, aro«at1c elites, halo-
genated pesticides, etc., *Hen th#y are known to t* involved or
wtten there irt indications. that these substances nay be a problem
II. EQUIPMENT
At present, the fallowing equipment is used for organic gts/vapor
monitoring however,, other equivalent equipment c*n be substituted:
-	HHU Systems Photolonlier {P ID}
-	Foxborg OVA (IFIB}
-	HJA Accuhtler 808 Snpl 1ng pyap
-	6il11an Model Number rtFS-UTJ13 Stapling ?unp
-	Tew* adsorption tubes (oetil)
-	carbon-packed adsorption tubes (metal)
-	Carbon-packed adsorption tubes (glass)
— 150 arl 1119rai« end 600 milligram sites
III. PROCEDURE
TMs procedure fs generally applicable to most responses. However,
Since each focident Is unique, modification* aay be needed.
Organic eases and Vapors, The sequence for monitoring organic gases
ana vapors consist* of several steps.
-	Octcmine total background concentrations.
-	Determine total concentration on-site.
-	Collect on*s1te area samples,
-	Identify specific contaminants,
Background concentrations. Background readings of total organic gases
In? vapors, using DRIs (FI0/N0 J, ere aide upwind of the site in areas
not expected to contain air contaminants. If Industries* highways, or
other potential sources contribute to concentrations on-site* these
contributions should be daterained. Depending on the situation and
the time available, additional aonltortng should be done nearby to
deteraln* if contaminants are leaving the site.
Concent rations ofv«site. The on-site area Is monitored {using ORIS}
Tor total L gas7vTpor concentrations, measured at both ground end
breathing zone levels. The Initial walk-throughs are to determine
general ambient concentrations and to locate higher-then ambient
concentrations (hot-spots}.

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Iran5lent contributors on-site, for example, exhausts from engtnes,
should be avoided. Concentration; are recorded and plotted on a site
up. Additional DRI monitoring 1s then ({one to thoroughly define any
hat-Spots located1 during the survey.
Are* samples. Sampling stations are located throughout the site. The
number and locations depend on evaluating many factors, including hot-
spots (by DftI), active work areas, potentials for high concentrations,
and wind direction. As a minimum, stations should be located In a
clean off-site area (control or background station), exclusion zone,
and downwind of the site. As data are accumulated, location, rubber
of stations, and frequency of sampling can be adjusted.
Routinely, two 4-hour samples are collected, in the morning and after*
noon respectively, using personal stapling pumps equipped with Tenax
and/or carbon-packed, metal adsorption tubes. Total gas/vapor concen-
tration {using DRI) should also be determined at the start and finish
of each sampling run. The readings obtained may show an approximate
relationship (depending on organic* present) which m1 11 be helpful
later 1n placing samplers.
Samples are desorbed with a thermal desorber and analyzed on the OYA-fiC
for total organic concentration and number of peaks, Chroaatograms
of samples taken at the sane location but at different times or from
different stations can be compared. Differences In heights Of "total"
peak, ntflber of Independent peaks, and relative peak heights. If
judiciously Interpreted, are useful for making preliminary judgments
concerning air contaminant problem*. Page A5-6 shows a suggested
format for calculating total gas/vapor concentration*
If relatively high concentrations are detected by the Initial DRI
surveys samplers equipped with carbon-packed collection tubes (glass]
are run next to Tenax/carbon-packed, metal equipped samplers. The
latter samples are analyzed 1n the field. The carbon-packed collec-
tion tubes are analyzed by an AIHA accredited laboratory.
Area surveys using DRI are continued routinely tw-four times dally.
These surveys are to monitor for general ambient levels, as well as
levels at sampling stations, hot-spots, and other areas of site activ-
ities. As Information 1s accumulated on airborne organic*, the
frequency of surveys can be adjusted.
Specific contaminants. Personal monitoring pumps with carbon-packed
collection tubes (glass) are run on the first afternoon, concurrent
with samplers equipped with Tenax/carbon-pacVed, metal collection
tubes. Generally, when total gas/vapor readings are low and only a
few peaks seen (from the field GC analysis of morning samples).
100-150 mg carbon-packed tubes (glass) are used and operated at a
flow rate of 100 cubic centlmeters/minute until approximately 30
liters of air have been collected* Depending on suspected contam-
inants and their concentrations, higher flow rates and/or volumes may
n DC

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bt needed. When total gas/v$ppr readings are high god there are «any
peaks (from the morning samp lei), then larger glass, carbon col lection
tubes (600 mg) art operated at a Mow rate from 0.5 to 1 1 Iters/minute
to collect 90 to ISO llteri of air.
The results frle analysis,
glass collection tubes should be collected dally. Only samples
collected every third to fifth day are sent to A1HA accredited labora-
tories for analysis; the remaining Samples are Stored In a cool place
(preferably refrigerated). Selected stored series are analyzed If
third to f*fth day samples Indicate changes 1n air contaminant pat-
terns. tf daily on-site surveys detect low contaminant(s) levels,
then 100-150 >g glass carbon columns are used, if the survey reveals
relatively high levels of contaminants, then 600 mg glass carbon
tubes are used.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health P&Afl Analy-
tical Method No. J2? (see Annex 6) should be followed as closely as
possible. How rates and collection tubes described in this guide
are pr1«rtly for organic solvents, if other than organic solvents
are suspected, then the NtOSH Manual of Analytical Methods (Volume
1-7) should bm consulted for the appropriate collection vdla and
flow rates. Table 1 lists the organic solvents Identified by the
HIOSH P6CJM Ho. 127, many of which are found at hazardous waste
sites. These are Identified for possible gas chromatography/mass
spectrometry analysis.

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Particulates and Inorganic tests and Vapors. Sampling for particu-
lates is not dona routinely. If these types of air contaminants ere
known or suspected to exist, a sampling program is instituted for
them. Incidents wh^fe these contaminants night be present are:
fires Involving pesticides or chemicals» incidents Involving heavy
netals, arsenic, or cyanide compounds, or altlgatlan operations that
create dust (fnm contaminated soil and excavation of contaminated
soil),
Sampling Media and analytical methods for these air contaminants
should folio# guidance given In the wtOSK Manual of Analytical
Methods.

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3MPIE CALCULATION
Volume s**sp]«icf by MOA Accuheler Wfi Personal Stapling Pump:
Volume sampled (cc) • [final stroke count - Initial stroke count)
X (cc**/streke*) X (multiplier factor for orlMct used**)
•Specified on pump Itself.
••Specified In pump operations manual and Table 2. (for KDA Accuheler)
Calculation:
At Oeglnnlng of sampling period, Accuheler stroke counter reads
16292.9. At end of stapling period, it reads 16632.9. What Is the
vo1<*e of air sampled*
Vol use sampled (cc) • 16532.9 (final stroke count) - 16292.9 (initial
stroke count) X 5.7 (cc/pump stroke) I 1.1 (multiplier for orifice)
Volume sampled - 2131.8 CC or 2.1 liters.
Reporting Format (for OVA GC Thermal Oesorber)
a.	Total 6C Mode: Total concentration determined - 22 ppm as
CH4 (¦ethane)
b,	Time weighted - volume dm	trati on (ppm)
average (ppm)
¦ Q.3DO (liter) X 22 jpfm) -
2,1 (liters)
3.14 ppm as CH4 (methane'
C. Peaks; SC node
4 peaks observed
d, Survey Concentration (total organlcs by OSI)
Start of sampling period
End of tempiin? period
ppm. tf»e
ppm, time
ATTACH CHHOKATOgjAjj
D-SS

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TABLE 1
Organic Solvents Identified bj PfCAM Analytic Method No. 127
Oreanlc Solvent
Molecular Weight
Acetone
58.1
Benzene
79.1
Carbon tetrachloride
1S4,0
Chiorofore
U9.0
Dichloreaetlune
84.}
p-Qioxam
oe.i
Ettyleae dlchloride
99.0
Methyl ethyl ketone
72,1
Sty rent
104.0
Tetrtchloroethy1ene
166.0
Toluene
9Z.X
1\1 ,?-Tr1chloroethene
133.0
1.1,1-Trlchloroethane
133.0
{methyl chloroform)

TricMcroetfoyl eite
131*0

106.0
Reference: Winuil of Analytical Methods
U,S. Ot|wrt»Mt cf Health Education 1 Welfare*
Public Health Service* Center for Disease Control
Natlontl institute of Occupational Safety & Health,
WEV (NtOSH) Publication No. 77-157-A
n_RQ

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TABLE 2
Multiplier Factor for NDA Accuhaler 90S
Person*! StmpMnjf Ptwps
Vol Me/Strpte
Orlfki Color ttorwal flow Bate - cc/aln	Hultlpl 1g?
Calibration	rellow	100	1.1
«t 20 cc/iiln
1.06
1.00
0.99
0.97
relloM
100
O^nfe
50
Red
20
Brown
10
Purple
S
Blue
2
Green
1
Black
0.5
Reference: Instruction Manual* Accuhaler. Personnel Sawllng Pump
Models m and "81^	 	
HDA Sctenttftc, tnc., Eladale Avenue,
Glenview. 1L 60DZ5
0-M

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n
%
l
n
n
at
It

fl
f
t*
* La
9
9
K
9
a*
f
U"
1
&
i

H
I
I!
I

-------
5 C	C £
if f f » =
e.;i i [ If
m»f*
!K?
| trl?
f

111
**
h
I fflf^-6*
-I*? f
?f f?
?r
li
I -
Ml
I
11
It
if
I
V-
I
1
pr
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i

-------
6.j A mecbunCil or electron*; integrate* i rworan ana tome mcuiw >« annaiuii|
ifct
6.6	MxTDcmribfc Iibah 2.1 ml, |ti^iuted.
6.7	HuadltDQ syringe*: 10 pi, aod doovbhcM jiitt for makinf Miivlifdi.
6.1 Pipttc 0_5-ral delivery pJp«u or I.O-raJ typ< (rvtuiud in 0. l-ml taemnem*.
6.9 Vofumrtxic Hub; 10 ml or OHivteiat ilea far tmkiag ttiodud mliliin.
74	SpeelroqaiJhy aurboa dkulfide {Mstheuxi CoietttftO and Sell),
1-1	S*np)( of the specific (OOp«g«t mwlw study, jjrrfcfibJy chioouUxiiulity pede.
7 .3	Bureau of Mica Grade A be&nn.
7.4	fcepurUed hidnpa
7J	Filund ODpnacd ak.
t.1 Ctfrii ^ Ffilprai* All	toed fer die laboratory analysis lftctfd be dftnpat
wished aad thoroughly rind wKJ> tap wmo ud iMdt wiler.
8.2	«f FiiiiimI PBft, Each pcCTQOtl pump mot be calibrated with a rtpreseat*-
dwe dumd (obc n tile toe This wifl inkdmize tnon uueuted with uueeftaiotto ia
the nfrrplr tofkuse coCcdcdL
11 f*„n.in	**-»--«•-- fj *? i
cJ v nfitrnm mam Mffpf cm
SjXI tofrwuflafriy before caopfaf, the each of die tube should be bnftea to provide an
opomg II k*M ooe-halT the btieraal tonxXf of the lobe (2 not).
U.2 The taoll auction of charcoal h need u a bedc-up and ibonld be pm Wooed nturt
the uiBptisf pcrap.
U.3 The efaftrsaaJ tube should be verticil duriii| umfjiaj to reduce dsumeltai tbroeffe.
the daitaiL
1-3.4 Ait betoj nmptaJ afapuld sot be passed through aey boce or tubbg before catering
the daiftnl tube.
yj The flow, time* tod/or tdme must be tneaaered as accurately at pouitk The wn>
pk Should be ttfcefl at a flow rale of 1 tpm or to main the tote) taatple nkme
requtftd The ¦dumuat and magtaxun sample vol unci ih*t should be eo1fe«ed lot
each softest are illow in Table L The nAiiRun vetun quoted mutt be eaQected if
Hie desired sensitivity is to be achieved.
93.6 The unpeuturt and pmun of the atmosphere betag sampled should be measured
and recorded.
8.3,7 Tie e&ifCOtl wbe* shoeld be Capped with the supplied ptofjc ops rnupediately
afls	Uodcr 00 dtcwBtimt should tubber caps be ised.
84.8 One Uibe sbouSd be handled ia the suae wanner as the sample rube (break, self, and
trattponl, exeept thai ao tir i» sacked through (hit tube. Thai wbe should be
labeled u a btujV,
13 J Capped tubes should be packed tlrfuly before they are shipped to miniiniit tube break-
ife dudq
127-3
n_ol

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i
:Hr«!
888B«cJ|
?

&

;
uf»l
lis
in
if
i?
sf
I
n
s
it
ifl
*11*
n
8 itP
8
i:
I
i
M Ml*
8.5"
\*\
Ifl
!II

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1.5.2 Procedure for daefmJrtioi dewrpfion tfficKncy. Activated chwrcoal (quinlent to
the amount in the Em icction of the urapNni tube {IQO nf> kt mcaiared inlo a
5
-------
vbcre.'
Mi * m| found in Irni icclwn o! umplc uibt
Q|> ¦ o| found ii (rwu kohm of blank tube
A limiJar proccdm* Is folb*0.*j x loop{
Mr wtwm ianpied (Htm)
wbcre;
U7-*

-------
TAftL£ 1
Fanntten Aisodited WUb FICAB AoaJ^iot Me(W N« U1
OnakW ill
riirtrtit
MmImWi
• (f/Hflll
Umtu v«
MU-#I
few (Um)
Milium^]
GC C.hia
Tm^I'Q
W+M
Acetone
D
-
0.5
7.7
60
58,1
Btfuoe
A
0,0!
05
35
90
78.1
Cvtoa KtnefcJMide
A
0.20
10
60
<0
154.0
CWoftrform
A
0.10
0-5
13
SO
11?

D
0.02
0l5
3.8
85
¦4.9
p-DJnuce
A
0,05
1
IB
100
88.1
EthytnedichtorWIfi
D
0.05
1
12
TO
99.0
Methyl dtsjrt ketone
B
0.01
0.5
13
80
72.1
Siyitae
D
0.10
1.5
34
150
104
TdnchlorDclh^Dc
B
0.06
1
25
130
166
1,1 ,2-trictoJofoetli«oe
B
0,05
10
n
150
133
l,l,l-Uidi3omtlitBe
(mettyl cMofotom)
B
0.05
0.5
13
ISO
133
TrieUarocdiykne
A
0.05
1
17
SO
131
TqImok
B
0J)1
0J
22
120
92.1
Xylene
A
0,02
Ql5
11
100
106
ft) MWrnutn velum*, la Sim, nquW to muaan 04 Hat* lb OSHA madacl
|k] Tkae in biviliinH^ niaiM aMUhd wttti dltl teM from a nUwhl plot 4 » SO* Im for ura«*tm at hwdilty,
TSh {4kO ot wilHtfM (vdiafauii bo( ba In n 
127-7

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PART 9
SITE SAFETY PUN
I. IKTHOOUCnON
The purpose of the site safety plan is to establish requirements for
protecting the health and safety of responders during All activities
conducted at an Incident, ft contains safety information. Instruc-
tions* and procedures.
A site safety plan must be prepared and reviewed by qualified personnel
for each hazardous substance response* Before operations at an
Incident convince, safety requirements must be written* conspicuously
posted or distributed to all response personnel, and discussed with
tfcem. The safety plan oust be periodically reviewed to keep It
current and technically correct.
In non-emergency situations, for example, long-term remedial action
at abandoned hazardous waste sites, safety plans are developed
simultaneously with the general work plan. Workers can become
familiar with the plan before site activities begin. Emergency
response generally requires verbal safety Instructions and reliance
on existing standard operating procedures until, wfcen time permits, a
plan can be written.
The plan must contain safety requirements for routine (but hazardous}
response activities and also for unexpected site emergencies. The
major distinction between routine and emergency site safety planning
Is the ability to predict, monitor* and evaluate routine activities.
A site emergency is unpredictable and may occur anytime.
II. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
The site safety plan must:
-	Describe the known hazards and evaluate the risks associated with
the Incident and with each activity conducted.
-	List key personnel and alternates responsible for site safety,
mponte operations, and for protection of public.
-	Describe Levels of Protection to be worn by personnel.
-	Delineate work areas.
-	Establish procedures to control site access.
-	Describe decontamination procedures for personnel and equipment.
-	Establish site emergency procedures.

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- Address emergency nedlcal care for injuries and toxicolpgtcal
problems.
-	Describe requirements for an environmental surveillance program.
-	Specify any routine and special training required for responders.
-	Establish procedures for protecting workers from weather-related
problems.
III. SITE SAFETY PLAH SCOPE AND DETAIL
The plan's scope, detail, and length Is based on:
* Information available about the Incident.
-	Time available to prepare a site-specific plan,
-	Reason for responding.
Three general categories of response exist - emergencies* character,
nations and remedial actions. Although considerations for personnel
safety are generic and independent of the response category, in
scope, detail, and length safety requirements and plans vary consid-
erably. These variations are generally due to the reason for
responding (or category of response) , Information available* and the
severity of the Incident Kith Its concomitant dangers to the respon-
ded
A. Emergencies
1. situation:
Emergencies generally require prompt action to prevent or
reduce undesirable affects, Ineediete hazards of Hre»
explosion, and release of toxic vapors or gases are of prime
concern. Emergencies vary greatly In respect to types and
quantities of material* numbers of responders. type of work
required, population affected, and other factors. Emergencies
last from a few hours Co a few days,
-	Information available: Varies from none to such. Usually
information about the chemicals involved and their associ-
ated hazards 1s quickly obtained In transportat1on~related
Incidents, or Incidents Involving fixed facilities.
Determining the substances involved 1n some Incidents,
such as mysterious spills, requires considerable time and
effort.
-	Time available: Little time, generally requires prompt
action to bring the incident under control.
-	Reason for response: To 1 element prompt and Imedlate

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act,1ms to control dangerous or potentially dangerous
situations.
2. Effects an Plan
In emergencies, tiae 1$ not available to write lengthy and
detailed safety plans. Decisions for responded safety are
based or a continual evaluation of changing conditions.
Responding organizations must rely on their existing written
standard operating safety procedures or a generic plan, and
verbal safety Instructions adapted to meet site-specific
conditions* since heavy reliance Is placed on verbal safety
Instructions an effective system to keep all responded
informed oust be established. Whenever possible, these
Incident-specific Instructions should be written.
B. Incident Characterization
1.	Situation:
In non-emergency responses *for example„ preliminary inspec-
tions at abandoned wastes sites or more comprehensive waste
site investigations the objective 1s to determine and charac-
terize the chemicals and hazards involved,, the extent of
contamlnotion, and risks to people and the environment, In
general. Initial inspections, detailed Investigations, and
extent of contamination surveys are limited In the activities
that are required and number of people involved. Initial or
preliminary Inspections generally require 1-2 days. Complete
Investigations nay last over a longer time period.
-	Information available: Kuch background information,
generally United on-site data for Initial inspection.
On-site Information more fully developed through additional
site visits and Investigations.
-	Time available; In most cases adequate time Is available
to develop written site-specific safety plan.
-	Season for response: To gather data to verify or refute
existing Information, to gather Information to determine
scope of subsequent investigations, or to collect data for
planning remedial action.
2.	Effects on Plan:
Sufficient time is available to write safety plans, In scope
and detail, plans tend to be brief containing safety require-
ments for specific on-site work relevant to collecting data.
As information Is developed through additional Investigations,
the safety plan 1s modified and, if necessary, more detailed
and specific requirements added.

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Remedial Actions
1.	Situation;
Rnwdlil actions ere cleanups which last over a long period
of tine. They cwnence after more fvnedl&te problems at an
emergency have teen controlled, or ttiey ifivolv# the nit ligation
of hazards and restoration of abandoned hazardous waste
sites, Numerous activities are required involving many
people, a logistics and support bate, extensive equipment,
and more involved work activities. Remedial actions say
require Months to years to completely accomplish,
-	Information available: Much Known about on-site hazards.
• Time available: Ample time for work planning,
-	Reason for response: Systematic and couplet* control,
cleanup, and restoration.
2,	Effects on Plan:
Since ample time Is available before work cooMnces, site
safety plan tends to be comprehensive and detailed. From
prior Investigations much detail say be known about the
materials or hazards at the site and extent of contamination.
SITE SAFETY PLM DCVELOPKENT
To develop the plan as such background information es possible should
be obtained, time permitting about the Incident. This would Include,
but not be United to:
-	Incident location and nane*
-	site description.
-	Chemicals and quantities Involved,
-	Hazards associated with each chemical.
-	Behavior and dispersion of material involved.
-	Types of containers, storage, or transportation methods,
-	Physical hazards.
-	prevailing weather condition and forecast.
-	Surrounding populations and land use.
-	Ecologically sensitive areas.

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-	Facility records.
-	Preliminary assessment reports,
-	Off-Site surveys.
-	Topographic aw) hydro!ogle information.
The Information Initially available or obtained through subsequent
characterization provides a basis for developing a site-specific safety
plan. Information is needed about the chemical & and hazards Involved,
movement of material on and off the site, and potential contact with
respanders or the public* This type of Information Is then used 410119
with the reason for responding (and work plan) to develop the safety
plan. The plan is tailored to the conditions Imposed by the Incident
and to its environmental setting. As additional information becomes
available the safety plan is modified to protect against the hazards
discerned and to provide for site emergencies that may occur.
V, ROUTINE OPERATIONS
Routine operations are those activities required In responding to en
emergency or a remedial action at a hazardous waste site. These
activities may Involve a high degree of risk, but are standard opera--
tions that all Incident responses may require.
Safety practices for routine operations closely parallel accepted
industrial hy?1tne and industrial safety procedures. Whenever a
hazardous Incident progresses to the point where operations become
more routine, the associated site safety plan becomes a more refined
document. As a minimum* the following must be Included as part of the
site safety plan for routine operations.
-	Describe the Known Hazards arid Risks
This must include all known or suspected physical, biological,
radiological, or chemical hazards. It Is Important that all health
related data be kept up-to-date. As air, water, soil, or hazardous
substance monitoring and tempting data becomes available, it must
be evaluated, significant risk or exposure to workers noted, poten-
tial impact on public assessed, and changes made in the plan.
These evaluations need to be repeated frequently since much of the
plan Is based on this Information.
-	List key Personnel and Alternates
The plan must identify key personnel (and alternates) responsible
for site safety. It should also identify kf»y personnel assigned
to various site operations. Telephone oirters, addresses, and
organizations of these people must be listed In the plan and
posted in a conspicuous place.

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Designate Level; of Protection to be Horn
The Levels of Protection to be worn it locations on-site or by
work functions ftist be designated* This Includes the specific
types of respirators end clothing to be worn for mcIi level.
Ko one Shall be permitted in areas requiring personnel protective
equipment unless they have been trained 1n Its use end ere wearing
It.
delineate Work Areas
Work areas (exclusion zone, contMlnation reduction zone, and
support zone) need to be designated on the site map and the mo
posted. The size of tones, zone boundaries* and access control
points Into each zone «,jst be aarfcetf and oade known to ell site
workers.
List Control Procedures
Control procedures Mist be Implemented to prevent unauthorized
access. Site sicurfty procedures - fences, 419ns* security
patrols, art check -in procedures • must be established. Procedures
¦nt als* be established ta control authorized personnel Into wort
zones where personnel protection 1s required.
Establish Decontamlnation Procedures
Decontamination procedures for personnel and equipment must be
established* Arrangements must also be made far the proper
disposal of contaminated uterlal, solutions* and equipment.
Address Requirements for an Enrlrowntal Surveillance Program
A program to monitor site hazards must be Implemented. This would
Include air monitoring and sampling, and other kinds of media
sampling at or around the site that would Indicate chemicals
present, their hazards, possible migration, and associated safety
requirements.
Specify Any Routine and Special Training Required
Personnel must be trained not only In general safety procedures and
use of safety equipment, but in any specialized work they may be
expected to do.
Establish Procedures for Heather-Related Problems
Heather conditions can affect site work. Temperature extremes,
high winds, storms, etc. Impact on personnel safety. Mark
practices *#st be established to protect workers from the effects
of weather and shelters provided* when necessary. Toqieratore
extremes* especially heat and Its effect on people wearing protec-
tive clothing, must be consldereo and procedures established to
monitor for and minimize heat stress*

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. OK-SlTt EMERGENCIES
The plan au$t address site emergencies - occurrences that require
Imwdlate actions to prevent additional problems or him to re Spon-
gers, the public, property, or the environment. In general, all
responses present a degree of risk to the workers. During routine
operations risk is minimized by establishing good wort practices and
using personnel protective equipment. Unpredictable events such as
fire, chemical exposure* or physical Injury may occur and Bust be
anticipated* the plan must contain contingencies for managing them,
- Establish Site Emergency Procedures
-- List the napes and emergency function of on-site personnel
responsible for emergency actions along with the Special
training they have.
—	Post the location of nearest telephone (if none at site).
~ Provide alternative aeons for emergency communications.
—	Provide a list of emergency services organizations that my be
needed* Jtaaes, telephone Fibbers, and locations must be
posted. Arrangements for using emergency organizations should
be made beforehand. Organizations that might be needed are:
« Fire
-	Police
-	Health
-	Explosive experts
-	Local hazardous materia! response units
-	Civil defense
-	Rescue
—	Address and define procedures for the rapid evacuation of
workers. Clear, audible warnings signals should be estab*
11shed, well-marked emergency exits located throughout the
site* and Internal and external comrwiIcations plans devel-
oped. An example of codes that could be used for emergency
operations based on direct-reading Instruments Is contained irt
Annex 7.
—	A complete list of emergency equipment should be attached to
the safety plan. This list should Include emergency equipment
available on-site, as well as all available medical, rescue,
miport, fire-fighting, and mltlgative equipment.

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- Address emergency medical care.
-- Determine location or rtfirt it medical or Mergence core
facility. Determine their capability to handle chemical
exposure cases.
—	Arrange for treating, admitting, artd transporting of Injured
or exposed workers,
—	Post the medical or energetic/ care facilities location, travel
time, directions, and telephone n^j«r.
-- [>etengine local physician's office location, travel directions,
availability, arvd post telephone summer 1f other medical cart
is not available.
—	Determine nearest ambulance service and post telephone number.
—	List responding organization's physicians, safety officers, or
toil col ovists kmc and telephone number, Also Include nearest
poison control canter, if applicable.
—	maintain accurate records on any exposure or potential exposure
of site workers during an emergency (or routine operations}.
The mltifmua amount of information needed (along with any
medical test results) for personnel exposure records 1s
contained 1n Annex fl.
-	Advise workers of their duties during an emergency. In particular,
U 1s Imperative that the site safety officers, standby rescue
personnel, decontamination workers, and emergency medical techni-
cians practice emergency procedures.
-	Incorporate into the plan, procedures for the decontamination of
Injured workers and for their transport to medical care facilities.
Contamination of transport vehicles, medical care facilities, or
of medical personnel may occur and should be addressed in the
plan. Whenever feasible these procedures should be discussed with
appropriate medical personnel 1n advance of operations.
-	Establish procedures In cooperation with local and state officials
for evacuating residents who live near the site.
IKPLENEHTATlEm Of Ttt£ SITE SAFETY PLAN
The site safety plan, {standard operating rafety procedure or a
generic safety plan for emergency response) must be written to avoid
misinterpretation, ambiguity, and mistakes that verbal orders cause,
The plan east be reviewed and approved by qualified personnel. Once
the safety plan Is implemented, its needs to be periodically examined
and modified, If necessary, to reflect any changes in site work and
condttlon$«

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All agencies and organisations which have an active role at the incid-
ent «gst be familiar with the plan. If passible the plan should
be written in coordination with the organizations Involved. Lead
personnel from these organisations should sign the plan to signify
they agree with it and will follow Its provisions.
AH personnel involved at the site oust be fasHiar with the safety
plan, or the parts that pertain to their specific activities,
frequent safety Meting should be held to keep all Informed about
site hazards, changes in operating plans, nodi ftcations of safety
requirements, and for exchanges of information. It Is the responsi-
bility of personnel Involved at the site as workers or visitors to
comply with the requirements In the plan,
frequent audits by the Incident aanager or the safety designee should
be wade to determine compliance with the plan's requirements. Any
deviations should be brought to the attention of the incident manager*
Modifications 1n the plan should be reviewed and approved by appropri-
ate personnel.
[][. SWIPlE SAFETY PLANS
Annex 9 and 10 are two examples of Site Safety Plans* Since no one
sample plan or plan format can adequately address all safety requlre-
sents for the variety of Incidents that occur* they should be used
as a guide to help develop an Incident-specific plan* They can also
be used, with necessary adaptation* as generic plans for emergency
response*
In soae Incidents, the sample plans contained in Annex 9 and 10 night
be satisfactory to use by themself* By filling In the blanks an
effective safety plan Is available* In many Incidents they should
only be considered as a check list (which does not exhaustively cover
every condition) which must be addressed. Users of these saeple
plans and any other type examples must realize their application to
any one Incident My not be acceptable* Therefore they must be used
with discretion and te^iered by professional judgement and expert,
ence. They are not scant to be all Inclusive but exa^les of consid-
erations, requirements, and format which should be adapted for
Incident-specific conditions*

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Emergency Operation Codes
Real-Time Monitor
(suggested Bin latum action plan)
(Site Wame)		
COPE DESiSKATIOHS
1.	6REEA
A* Normal operations
2.	TEtlUW A
A* Cessation of specific work activity on-site because of:
(1)	Continuous organic readings on direct-reading Instrument of
* ppm above background (measured 20-30 ft. from point of
suspected release), and
(2)	Current or projected meterologlcal conditions indicate
a probable Impact on work activity.
6* If background readings above » pp» are obtained during
cessation of activity, redesign activity to lower releases
and/or delay that on-site actlvlt until off-site air monitoring
Indicates accepted off-site concentration.
C. Site personnel will immediately notify EPA/State of site condi-
tion.
3.	YELLOW B
A. Termination of all work on-site because of:
0) Continuous organic readings on direct-reading Instrument
above * ppm; (measured approximately 1,000 ft. fro® nork
area oFTTte property limits), and
(2) Current or projected mettorologic conditions indicate <
potential Impact on Inhabited areas.
ft. Site personnel will lowed lately notify EPA/State of site
conditions.
C. EPA/State wfll modify off-site air monitoring to meet the
needs of contingency plan.

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4. RED
k. Termination df all wort on-site because of:
(1) Continuous organic readings on d1r*ct-reading Instruments
above ~ ppa (measured downwind at the nearest occupied
area off-site, and
{ZJ Current projected aeteoroloQic conditions indicate a po-
tential Impact on Inhabited areas*
B» Site personnel will {mediately notify EPA/$tate of site condi-
tions.
C, Local officials making evacuation/public health decisions will be
advised by EPA/State to:
(1)	Release e public health advisory to potentially affected
areas since on-site control methods will not reduce the
source of contamination; and/or
(2)	Implement a temporary relocation plan because on-site activi-
ties indicate a potential for continuous above background/
acceptable readings at the nearest Inhabited erea(s).
Concentration should be determined by appropriate
response personnel.

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RESPONSE SAfET? CHECK-OFF SHEET
{nlnlaup required (fata)
t. BEFORE RgSP0R5E	E5pToyee
j. Incident: Site 	___	 City	State
a. Response Dates					
Z* Type of Response; Sptll 	Fire 	Site	Tpa*n_	Other
3.	incident Safety Plan: Region	 ERT	Hot Developed _
4.	Suspected chemical(si Involved; (a)	(M
tc)	 1<31
5. Protective level Is) Involved: A	8
(a) If Level C - 1. identify CaMster
2, Describe air monitoring source(s)
(b) If level D JUSTIFY (In consent* section at bottom of page),
6. 9C&A-Identify Buddy: Name/Organization	 	
7, last Response: (a) level Used: A	B
(b) Medical Attentiw/Exam Performed: Yes _____ No
It. AFTER RESPONSE
1. Protective level Used: A 	 &	 C	D	
a. level C - Identify eannlster:		b. Level D {coanent below)
c. level B or C skin protection: TyveVSaran Acid/Rain	Other	
list possible chemical exposure: Same as above; (a)
<«>) _	(c>	_ nr~
3. Equipment Decontamination: (a) clothing (b) respirator fc) monitoring
Disposed:			
Cleaned: 	
No Action:
4.	Approximate time 1n exclusion area:	hours per day for	da
5.	Has Bed leal attention/exam required for this response; Yes	Ho
Part t: DATE PREPARED: 	Reviewed by	Date	
Part II: DATE PREPARED;	Reviewed by	Date	
CttWEHTS;		

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(Suggested format Tor «1nlmua site safety plan)
SITE SAFElr PLAN
(Kame of Hazardous Waste Site/Spill)
I.	General Information
As 2 minimum, all personnel Involved with emergency response, waste
lite cleanup, drum handling and opening, sampling, site Investigations,
etc., will follow the applicable Federal/State rules and regulations. In
addition, all site personnel *111 follow, as a minimum, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Office of Emergency and Remedial Response! Hazardous
Response Support Division's, Standard Operating Safety Guides and Chapter
9 Hazardous Substance Response, from the epa occupation Health and Safety
Ml Mil l~
In the event of conflicting plans/requirements, personnel must Imple-
ment those safety practices which afford the highest personnel protection.
If site conditions change and U fs necessary to Modify levels of
Protection A, 6, or C the safety designee on-site shall notify the On-Scene
Coordinator before making recommendations to site personnel.
II.	APPROVALS
111* Summary of Minimum Requirements
A, The safety officer/deslgnee shell:
1. Describe chemicals, hazards, and risk Involved
t. List key personnel
a.	Response manager (OSC)/altennate			
b.	Safety off leer (i)/altemate	
c.	Other responsible site personnel/alternate		
3,	Prescribe Levels of Protection
4,	Designate work zones: Support area, contamination reduction
area, exclusion area.
5,	Implement procedures to control site access.
{SI6MATURE}	 (SIGNATURE!
On-5cene-Coordlnator	(OSC) DATE safety Offl
($t6NATURE)
REVIEW C WW ITT EE	DATE
DATE

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6.	Define dKMtulnition procedures.
7.	Delineate entry And escape routes*
8.	Identify/contact aedtcAl facility, etc.:
*» F,r* ^
b,	jtafagtance 	
c.	Police 	.
d,	Health 	
e.	Etc. 	
9.	List responsible parties and emergency contacts:
a.	Federal Severn*nt EPA/USCS/COC/OSHA
b.	State Govemaatit Environmental /Health Agency
c.	County /City Sovefwent 			
10* Establish personnel air monitoring.
11. Specify routine ind special training needed
1Z* Establish procedures for managing weather.related problems.
6. Levels Of Protection
I. Level C protection should be used for those Job functions
listed below where there 1s no potential for personnel
contact with either hazardous materials or gases* vapors, or
particulates exceeding requirements for wearing alr-purlfyfng
respirators,
(Identify job functions in this paragraph:
e.g. - monitorIng/survelllance» supervisors,
observers, etc.)
(Identify specific type of respirator In this paragraph:
e.g. - approved respirator and type of canister.)
(Identify skin protection in this paragraph:
e.g. - double boots, double gloves, tyvele/saran hooded,
disposable coveralls, etc.)

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2„	B protectIon should be used for those joh functions
listed oeTow which bind either on potential or known
site conditions and/or vapor and gas concentrations,
Level C ts unsatisfactory.
Identify job functions In this paragraph:
(e.g. - Heavy equipment operations„ samplers, equipment/
drum handlers, etc.)
Identify specific respirator* protection fn this paragraph:
(e.g. - self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). air-line
respirator)
Identify skin protection In this paragraph:
(e.g. - double boots* double gloves, type of chemical re-
sistant garment, etc}
3.	If Level A protection Is applicable, write a paragraph in
plan listing where and when It is to be worn.
4.	Level Q Is not adequate protection for any work on-site
where potential for exposure Is possible.
5.	LevelIt C and 8 way be modified based on monitoring and
sailing data collected on-site. Safety designee should
not make any modification to the Level of Protection
without discussing it with the On-Scene-Coordinator,
C. Air Monitoring - defer to, Standard Operating Safety
Guides, Part 8, Air Surveillance.
0. Training
Personnel will have either formal training or prior on-the-
Job*tra1n1ng for those tasks they are assigned to at the
Incident, All unfamiliar activities will be rehearsed
beforehand.
E. Respiratory Protection Program
All contractor and government personnel Involved in on-site
activities shall have a written respiratory protection pro-
gram. All personnel wearing air-purifying respirator on-site
are required to be f1t«tested. All personnel wearing respir-
ators must have been properly trained in their use. All
respirators are to be properly decontaminated at the end of
each workday.
Persons having beards or facial hair «tst not wear a respir-
ator if a proper mask-to-face-seal can not be demonstrated by
a fit test. A log of all Individuals wearing personnel
protective equipment shall be maintained Including time In
the exclusion zone.

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F» AU contractor and government personnel who are exposed to
ha^rdous levels of chemicals must be enrolled in a medical
¦on4 toring program.
G.	General Safety Rules and Equipment
1. There will be no eating, drinking* or sacking In the ex-
clusion or contamination reduction zone.
Z. All personnel *i$t pais through the contamination reduc-
tion zone to enter or exit the exclusion zone.
3.	As a minimum, emergency eye washes will be on the hot side
of the contest nation reduction tone and/or at the work
Station.
4.	As a minimus, an emergency deluge shower/spray cans are to
be located on the dean side of the contamination reduc-
tion area.
5.	At the end of the work day,, all personnel working 1n the
exclusion area shall take a hygienic shower,
6.	All supplied breathing air shall be certified as grade D or
better.
7.	Where practical, all tools/equipment will he spark proof,
explosion resistant, and/or bonded ecd grounded.
8.	fire extinguishers will be on-site for use on equipment
or small fires only.
9.	Since site evacuation may be necessary If an explosion,
fire, or release occurs, an individual shall be assigned
to sound an alert and notify the responsible public
officiij If required. For example» the evacuation signal
may be two long blasts every 30 seconds until all person-
nel are evacuated and accounted for.
10.	An Adequately stocked first-aid kit will be on-scene at
all times during operational hours. It 1s suggested that
an oxygen Inhalator respirator be available end a quail-
fled operator present. The location of these items and
the operator shall be posted.
H.	Homing Safety Kcetlng
A morning safety meeting will be contacted for all site per-
sonnel and they will sign a dally attendance sheet and should
sign a master sheet Indicating they have read the site safety
plan and will comply. The safety procedures, and the dey's
planned operations should be discussed.

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14 4 0 TM17
S/2S/B4
:CUP^TIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY HAtfUAL
APPENDIX A * SAMPLE SAFETY PLAN
tdistance in preparing the safety plan can be obtained from
ve OHS
tsignec 	 located In Room 	 of Building 	
: by telephoning 	«,
rviEw
F»iponi» Safety Cotnfiiitte* Chairperson. 	
>P Ft OVALS
OSC/5FC		
OHS Designee	_
OIC
1QJECT LEADER
Branch	-	
Building
Room	'
phone					
VIZ OP PLAN PREPARATION		
k2ARPOUS SUBSTANCE RESPONSE
Lte Name	Site No. ^^
tZARDOUS/SUBSTANCES {known or suspected, contaminated padla
or in storage container* etc,):

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1440 TNI 2
S/15/M
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AMD SAFETY KANUAL
HA2AJU) ASSESBMCNT (toxic ffftcti, reactivity, stability#
flamnability, and operational hazards with
aaapling, decontaminating, ate.):
MONITORING PROCEDURES (If required by th« Project Leader)
¥
Monitoring the aite for identity and concentration of
contamination in all aedia:
Madical nonltorlng procedures foe evldenca oC personnal
exposurei
Personnel monitoring procedurest

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1440 TNJi
5/15/84
DCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY HAPUJAL
DECONTAMINATION AMP DISPOSAL
D*contajniMtlon Procedures
(contsminattd: personnel
surfaces, materials, lnstrusten
equipment, etc}:
Disposal Procedures (contaminated equipment, supplies,
disposable, washw*ter):
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
in event of overt personnel exposure tsJcln contact.
Inhalation, lngestlc
In event of personnel injury:
*
n_l 1 r

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1440 TNl2
5/XS/84
OCCUPATIONAL. HEALTH AKO SAFETY «A»UAL
in «v«nt o£ pottncitl or actual fir* or axploaion:
In «v*nt of potential or actual ionizing radiation axpoturt
In «v«nt of «nviron»nC«l accident {apread of conttoinitioi
outaIda situ):
jUBUGBflCY SERVICES (ccaplata hara or hava itpif t« lilt ivtiltb]
on-aitaT
Lw*tlQft	Ttlfphont
^argancy Radical Facility
KabuUne* 8«r*ie*
n^i i

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S/1S/6 4
CCU PAT ION AL HEALTH AND SAFETY HAN UAL
Location	Telaphone
ire Department
dice Department
oiaon Control Center
'ERSOWNEL POTENTIALLY EXPOSED It) HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
Personnel Authorized to Enter site
1.		
2.		
3» 	
4. 	
5« 	
0-116

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1440 TW12
5/15/64
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY KANUAL
Other P*r«annil Aftftlgned to Handle Hazardous $ubat«ne>i
Klwcontajninat*, 8o«jy*« samples)
1. 			
2 *
3.
4.
5.
ALTERATIVE WORK PRACTICES
(Describe alternative work practices not specified in this
Chapcar. indicate work practices specified in the
Chapter for which proposed alternative work practices
will servf S3 substitute*)
APPROPRIATE LITERATURE CITATIONS
LEVEL Of PROTECTION
SITE MAP
tAttach a site nap in advance of a response, If possible,
at an early stsye of an emergency response. Map should be
properly scaled and keyed to local landmarks,)
0-119

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APPENDIX I
CHAJWCTtRISTlCS OF THE HNU PHOTOlQHtZCR
AND
ORGANIC VAPOR AKAUZEK
I. INTRODUCTION
The HJW Photolonlzer and tl>e Foxboro Organic Vapor A/valuer (OVA) Are
used In the field to detect a variety of coopounds In air. The two
Instruments differ in their modes of operation and In the number and
types of compounds they detect (Table 1-1), Both 1nstrwnt$ can be
eied to detect leaks of volatile substances from drws and tanks,
determine the presence of volatile compounds In soil and water, make
soblent air survey*, and collect continuous air monitoring data. If
personnel are thoroughly trained to operate the trastn«ents and to
Interpret the data* these Instruments cap be valuable tools for
helping to decide the levels of protection to be Norn, assirt In
determining other safety procedures, and determine subsequent ml-
toring or sampling locations.
II. OVA
The OVA operates In t*o different modes, In the survey mode, It can
determine approximate total concentration of all detectable species
In air* uith the gas chromatograph (GC) option, individual components
can be detected and Measured independently* with scae detection
limits as low as a few parts per *11 Hon (ppm).
In the GC aode, a suit sample of anient air Is injected into a
chromatographic column and carried through the colum by a stream of
hydrogen gas* Contaminants with different chamical structures are
retained on the column for different lengths of tfae (known as reten-
tion t1»es) and hence are detected separately by the flame Ionization
detector. A strip chart recorder can ba used to record the retention
tlaes, which are then expired to the retention times of a standard
with known chemical constituents. The saaple can either be Injected
Into the column frai the air sailing hose or injected directly with
a gas-tight syringe,
tn the survey mode, the OVA is internally calibrated to Methane by
the Manufacturer, When the Instrument 1s adjusted to manufacturer's
Instructions It Indicates the true concentration of methane in air.
In response to al 1 fither detectable compounds, however, the Instrument
reading amy be higher or lower than the true concentration, Relative


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TABLE 1-1
CO MP MI SO* OF THE OVA AND H*U
Serialise
Amplication
Detector
Limitations
Calibration gas
E«e of
operation
Detection limits
Response tine
Maintenance
Useful range
Strvfee life
OVA
Responds to many organic gases
and vapory.
In iur»ij aMr, detects total
concentrations of oases And
vapors* In GC node. Identifies
and Matures specific compounds.
Flait ionization detector (FID)
Does not respond to Inorganic
gases and vapors, Hit available
for temperature control.
Methane
Requires experience to Inter*,
pret correctly, especially
In fiC mode.
0*1 ppn (methane)
Z-3 seconds (survey mode)
for C?U
PeHcdicaUy clean and Inspect
particle filters, valve rings,
and burner chaaiber. Check
calibration and ptaplng system
for leaks. Recharge battery
after each use,
O-WOO pp-
HtlU
Responds to many organic
and some Inorganic gases
and v*par$,
[n survey aode, detects
total concentrations of
gases and vapors. Som
Identification of compounds
possible. If more than one
probe is used,
photolonlzatlon detector (NO
Does not respond to Methane.
Oo
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response ratios for substances other th«n methane are available. To
correctly interpret the readout, U is necessary to either
calibration charts relating the instrument readings to the true
concentration or to adjust the Instrument so that It reads correctly.
This is done by turning the ten-turn gas-select knot), which adjusts
the response of the Instrument* The knob Is normally set at 3*00 *t>en
calibrated to methane* Calibration to another gas 1s done by ¦en-
suring a known concentration of a gas and adjusting the g« select
knob until the instrument reading equals that concentration*
The OVA has an inherent limitation In that it can detect only organic
molecules. Also, it should not be used at temperatures lower than
about 40 degrees Fahrenheit because gases condense In the pimp and
colwn* It has no column temperature control, {although temperature
control kits are available) and since retention times vary with
ambient temperatures for a given column, determinations of contam-
inants are difficult, Despite these limitations, the GC mode can
often provide tentative Information on the Identity of contaminants
1n «1r without relying or costly, time-consuming laboratory analysis*
HJIlf
The KKU portable photoionlzer detects the concentration of organic
gases as well as a few tnorganic gases* The basis for detection Is
the Ionization of gaseous species. Every molecule has a character-
istic Ionization potential (l.P.) which Is the energy required to
remove an electron from the molecule, yielding a positively charged
ion and the free electron* Tire Incoming gas molecules are subjected
to ultraviolet (uv) radiation* which Is energetic enough to lonlte
many gaseous compounds. Each molecule is tranfomed into charged ion
pairs, creating a current between two electrodes*
Three probes* each containing e different UV light source, are avail-
able for use with the HNU. Ionizing energies of the probe are 9*5,
10.2, and 12*7 electron volts (cV}» All three detect mai^y aromatic
and large molecule hydrocarbons * The 10,2 eV and 11.7 e¥ probes* 1n
addition, detect sow* smaller organic molecules and some halogenated
hydrocarbon*. The 10.2 eV probe Is the most useful for environmental
response work, as it Is sore durable than the 11*7 eV probe and
detects more co^iounds than the 9.S eV probe*
The HMJ factory calibration gas is benzene. The span potentiometer
(calibration) knob 1s turned to 9*6 for benzene calibration. A knob
setting of lero Increases the response to benzene approximately
tenfold. As with the OvA, the Instrument's response can be adjusted
to give more accurate readings for specific gases and eliminate the
necessity for calibration charts*

-------
Iflille the primary me of the HNU Is as a quantitative instrument, it
can also be used to detect certain contaminants, or at Yeast to
narrow the range or po*s1M1tlet. Noting Instrument response to a
contaminant source with different probes can eliminate soae conta-
ainanti fnow consideration. Tor Instance, a compound's Ionization
potential may be such that the 9.5 eY probe produces no response, but
the 10,2 eV and 11.7 eV probe? do elicit a response. The HNU docs
not detect methane.
The WW is easier to use than the OVA. its lower detection limit
Is also in the 1
-------
APPENDIX II
JIAtlOHAU FDR HELMING TOTAL ATMOSPHERIC VAP0R/WS CONCENTRATIONS
10 THE SELECTION OF THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of using total* itMiplxrk vapor/gas CDnuntNtlmi for
determining the appropriate Lev*) of Protection Is to provide a
ntiMdctl criterion for selecting Level A, B, or C« In situitfsns
wfwre the presence of vapors or gases 1$ not known, or If present,
the Individual components ere unknown, personnel required to enter
that environment must be protected. Until the constituents and
corresponding atmospheric concentrations of vepor, gas, or particulate
can be determined and respiratory and body protection related to the
toxicologic^ properties of the Identified substances chosen, total
vapor/gas concentration, wfth Judicious Interpretation, can be used
as a guide for selecting personnel protection equipment.
Although total vapor/gat concentration measurements are useful to a
qualified professional for the selection of protective equipment,
caution should be exercised In Interpretation. An Instrument does
not respond with the same sensitivity to several vapor/gas contam-
inants as 1t docs to a single contaminant. At so since total vapor/
gas field instalments see all contaminants in relation to a specific
calibration gas, the concentration of unknown gases or vapors nay he
over or under-estimated.
Suspected carcinogens, particulates, highly hazardous substances, or
other substances that do not elicit an instrument response may be
known or believed to be present. Therefore, the protection level
should not be based solely on the total vapor/g;s criterion. Rather,
the level should be selected case-by-case, with special emphasis on
potential exposure and chvical and toxlcologlcal characteristics of
the Mown or suspected material.
It. FACTORS FOR. CONSIDERATION
In utilizing total atmospheric vapor/gas concentrations as a guide
for selecting a Level of Protection, a number of other factors should
also be considered:
- The uses, limitations, and operating characteristics of the
monitoring instruments must be recognized and understood.
Instruments such as the HKU Photolonizer, Foxboro Organic Vapor
•See Part VJl for explanation of term.


-------
Aiwlyier (OvA), MlRWt infra red Spectrophotometer, and athtn do
not respond identically to the same concent rat i on of a substance
or respond to all substances. Therefore, experience. knowledge,
and good .Judgement mutt be used to complement the data obtained
with instruments.
-	Other hazards my exist such as 91111 not detected by the HNU or
OVA, (i.e. phosgene, cyanides. arsenfc* chlorine), explosives,
f I amiable materials, oxygen deficiency. liquid/solid particles, and
liquid or solid chealcals.
-	Vapors/gases with a very low TLV or IDlH could be present. Total
reading* on Instruments, not calibrated to these substances, My
rot Indicate unsafe conditions.
-	The risk to personnel entering an area must be weighed against
trie need far entering. Although this assessment 1* largely a
value jud^ent, it requires a conscientious balancing of the
variables involved and the risk to personnel against the need to
enter an unknown environment.
-	The knowledge that suspected carcinogens or substances extremely
toxic or destructive to skin are present or suspected to be present
{which My net be reflected in total vapor/gas concentration)
requires an evaluation of factors such as the potential for ex-
posure^ cheat cal characteristics of the material, limitation of
Instruments, and other considerations specific to the incident.
-	What needs to be done on-site must be evaluated. Based upon total
atmospheric vapor concentrations. Level C protection may be judged
adequate; however, tasks such as moving drums, opening containers,
and bulking of materials, which increase the probability of liquid
splashes or generation of vapors, gases, or particulates, may
require a higher level of protection.
-	Before any respiratory protective apparatus is Issued, a respir-
atory protection program must be developed and Implemented ac-
cording to recognized standards (ANSI ZS8.2-1980).
l£V£l A PROTECTION {500 to 1,000 FPH ABOVE BACJCGAOUMO)
Level A protection provides the highest degree of respiratory tract,
skfn. and eye protection If the inherent limitations of the ptrsoiwel
protective equipment are not exceeded. The range of 500 to 1,000
parts per million (ppm) total vapors/gases concentrate in air was
selected based on the following criteria:
- Although Level A provides protection against air concentrations
greater than 1,000 ppm for most substances* an operational re-
striction of 1,000 ppm Is established as a warning flag to:
D-17*

-------
" tvtlult! the need to enter fnvlr^nnjents with unknown
concentrations greater than 1,000 ppffi
—	Identify the specific constituents contributing to the total
concentration and their isiodittii toxic properties
—	determine sore precisely concentrations of constituents
-- evaluate. the calibration and/or sensitivity error associated
with the Instrument(s)
-- evaluate Instrument sensitivity to wind velocity, huaidlty
temperature, etc.
-	A Halt of SOO ppw total vapors/gases in air was selected as the
value to consider upgrading fro* Level 8 to Level A. This concen-
tration yes selected to fully protect the skin until the constit-
uents ceo be Identified and measured and substances affecting the
skin excluded.
-	The range Of 500 to 1,000 ppm Is sufficiently conservative to pro-
vide a safe margin of protection 1f readings are low dut to Instru-
ment error, calibration, and sensitivity; If higher than antici-
pated concentrations occur; and 1f substances highly toxic to the
skin are present.
IHth properly operating portable field equipment, ambient air
concentrations approaching 500 ppm have not routinely been encoun-
tered on hazardous waste sites. High concentrations have been
encountered only In closed buildings, when containers were being
opened, when personnel ware working in the spilled contaminants,
or when organic vapors/gates were released 1n transportation
accidents. A decision to require Level A protection should also
consider the negative aspects; higher probability of accidents due
to cumbersome equipment, and most importantly, the physical stress
caused by heat buildup In fully encapsulating suits.
LEVEL 6 PROTECTION (S to 500 ABOVE BACKGROUND)
Level B protection is the minima Level of Protection recomaended
for Initially entering an open site where the type, concentration.
and presence of airborne vapors are unknown. This Level of Protection
provides a high degree of respiratory protection, skin and eyes are
also protected, although a small portion of the body (neck and sides
of head) My be exposed. The use of a separate hood or hooded,
chemical-resistant jacket would further reduce the potential for
exposure to this area of the body. Level 8 Impermeable protective
clothing also Increases the probability of heat stress.


-------
A Malt of 500 ppm total Atmospheric *apor/gss concentration on
portable field Instrument* has been selected as ttve upper restriction
on the use of Level 6. Although Ltvtl & personnel protection should
be adequate for aost casmonly encountered substances it air concen-
trations higher tn«n SOO ppn, this limit his been selected as a
d»c1i1«i point for s careful evaluation of the risks associated with
higher concentration*. These factors should be considered:
-	The necessity for entering unknown concentrations higher than 500
ppa wearing Level B protection.
-	The probability that subst*nce(s) present are severe skin hazards.
-	The work, to be done and the increased probability of exposure*
-	The need for qualitative and quantitative identification of the
specific components.
-	Inherent limitations of the Instruments used for air aonltDMitg.
-	Instrument sensitivity to winds, huBldltjr, temperature, and other
factors.
V. LEVEL C PROTECTION (BACKGROUND TO S PPM A&OVE BACKGROUND)
Level C provides skin protection identical to Level B, assialng the
same type of chemical protective clothing is worn, but lesser pro-
tection against inhalation hazards. A range of background to 5 ppa
above ambient background concentrations of vapors/gases In the atmos-
phere has been established as guidance Tor selecting Level C pro-
tection, Concentrations in the air of unfdentlfled vapors/gases
approaching or exceeding $ ppm would warrant upgrading respiratory
protection to'a self-contained breathing apparatus.
A full-face* air-purifying mask equipped with an organic vapor can-
ister (or a combined organic vapor/partlculate canister) provides
protection against low concentrations of mast coaeon organic vapors/
gases. There are some substances against which full-face, canister-
equipped masks do not protect, or substances that have vary low
Threshold Limit Values or Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health
concentrations. Many of the latter substances are gases or liquids
in their normal state. Gases would only be found In gas cylinders,
while the 11 quidm would not ordinarily be found In standard con-
talners or drums. Every effort should be aede to Identify the In-
dividual constituents (ami the presence of particulates) contributing
to the total vapor readings of a few parts per million. Respiratory
protective equipment can then be selected accordingly. It 1s ex-
ceedingly difficult, however, to provide constant, real-tlae Iden-
tification of all components 1n a vapor cloud with concentrations of
a few parts per million at a site where ambient concentrations are
constantly changing. If highly toxic substances have been ruled out.
A_ I •>!

-------
but ambient levels of a fe* parts per million p«fs1$t, It Is unreas-
onable to assume only self-contained breathing apparatus should be
worn. The continuous use of a1r-pertfylng masKs In vapor/gas concen-
trations of a few parts per Million gives a reasonable assurance Chat
the respiratory tract is protected, provided that the absence of
highly taxie substances has been confirmed.
Full-face, air-purifying devices provide respiratory protection
against most vapors at greater than 5 pp*; however, until more
definitive qualitative information Is available, concentrations)
greater than 5 ppa indicates that a higher level of respiratory
protection should be used. Also, unanticipated transient excursions
aay increase the concentrations in the environment above the limits
of alr-purify1ng devices. The Increased probability of exposure due
to the work being done nay require Level B protection, even though
ambient levels are low.
INSTRUMENT SENSITIVITY
Although the measurement of total vapor/gas concentrations can be a
useful adjunct to professional judgment In the selection of an appro-
priate Level of Protection, caution should be used In the inter-
pretation of the measuring Instrument's readout. The response of an
instrument to a gas or vapor clout! containing two or more substances
does not provide the same sensitivity as measurements Involving the
individual pure constituents. Hence the instrwent readout may
overestimate or underestimate the concentration of an unknown com-
posite cloud. This saaie type (if Inaccuracy could also occur in
measuring a single unknown substance with the Instrument calibrated
to a different substance. The Idiosyncrasies of each Instrument oust
be considered 1n conjunction with the other parameters in selecting
the protection equipment needed,
Using the total vapor/gas concentration as a criterion used to deter-
mine Levels of Protection should provide protection against concen-
trations greater than the Instrument's readout. However, when the
upper limits of Level C and B are approached, serious consideration
should be given to selecting a higher Level of Protection, Cloud
const1tuent(s) must be identified as rapidly as possible and Levels
of Protection based on the toxic properties of the specific sub-
stance (t) Identified.
I. EXPLANATION OF PHRASE TOTAL ATMOSPHERIC VAPOR/OAS CONCENTRATION
The phrase total atmospheric vapor /gas concentration Is cnwonly
used to describe the readout, In ppm, on PtOs and FlDs, More
correctly It should be called a dial reading or needle deflection.
In atmospheres that contain a single vapor/gas or mixtures of
vapors/gases that have not been Identified, the Instruments do not
0-12R

-------
read the total vapor&/ffts*s present only the instrument's rtspense,.
This response, as Indicated by a deflection of the needle in the
dial, docs not Indicate the true concentration. Accurate dial
readings can only be obtained by calibrating the instrument to the
substance being measured.


-------
APPENDIX 111
DEftNAl TO*[CITY OMA
S£LCCT[W OF CHEMICALS
The Approximately 350 chemfcih listed In Table IIl-l, at the end of
this appendix, are Identified In the Oil And Hazardous Katerials
Technical Assistance System (qhmtAdS) as being dermally active.
Since OfPfTADS contains only about 1200 chemicals, or nuy ngt Indicate
a listed ctmica 1 as a skin hazard, other reference sources should
also be consulted.
The data m Table 111-1 were cp^>iled by a toxicologist through a
special project with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. As
with any source Of information, the data should be cross-checked
against other standard references.
USE OF TABLES
A. Categories
Table 111-1 divides chemicalj into two categories:
Category 1 (sore serious), which includes:
-	Gaves having a systemic dermal toxicity rating of moderate to
extremely hazardous and a skin penetration ranking of moderate
to high.
-	Liquids end solids having g systemic demal toxicity rating of
extremely hazardous and a skin penetration ranking of moderate
to high.
-	Gases having a local derma! toxicity rating of moderate to
extremely hazardous.
-	Liquids and solids having a local dermal toxicity rating of
extremely hazardous.
Category 2 (less serious), which includes:
-	Gases having a systemic demal toxicity rating of slightly
hazardous and a sMn penetration ranking of slight.
-	Liquids and sol ids having a systemic dermal toxicity rating of
slightly hazardous and a skin penetration ranking of moderate
to slight.
0-130

-------
-	Case? ham 113 a local ceniit toxicity rating of sTIghtly hai-
ardous.
-	Liquids and solids having a local dtnu) toxicity ^ttnj of
Mdertte to slightly Hazardous.
B.	Physical State
The physical state of tha chealcats listed is their norMl itite.
In a fire, seme listed as so)Ids or Hquld could vaporize and
represent a greater hazard to the skin* The chemical* llstetf way
alsQ he found ilitd with other substances, nftlcli could change Ho*
tftny affect the skin.
C,	Skin Penetration
Negligible Penetration (solid - polar)
~	Slight Penetration (solid - nonpolar)
~> Hotterate Penetration (ltquld/soUd - nonpoUr)
•** High Penetration (gas/liquid - nonpolar)
D,	Potency (Systemic)
•-H- Cztr^ Hazard (LDgg: 1 ftg/k?»SQ ngAg)
*~ Moderate Hazard (LDsq: SO-500 agA?)
~	Slight Hazard llDso1 500-15,000 lag/kg)
E.	Potency (local)
«-*-f Eitw - Tissue destruction/necrosis
+~ Moderate - Lrrltatl on/! nfl edition of skin
~	Slight - Reddening of sfcln
[II. RELATION OF TABLE II1-1 W LEVELS OF PROTECTION
The purpose of Table III-l is to provide data that a qualified person
can use in conjunction with other s1te»spec1f1c knowledge to select
protective clothing. The data relate to Skin tonicity ptily and
should not be used to select respiratory protection equipment.
Lethal Mount to
<"'7b"-'kTHwraiii «an
drops to 20 ¦!
1 ounce - 1 pint
(l pound]
1 pint ~ 1 quart
(2»2 pounds)

-------
The known or suspected presence «nd/Of measured concentration of
Category 1 chetricals at or above the listed concent rations warrant?
wearing a fully encapsulating suit (level A). The known or suspected
presence end/or Measured concentration of Category 2 chemicals at or
above the listed concentrations suggests that a lesser level of skin
protection (Level 8 or C) is needed.
There Is no decision-logic for choosing protective clothing as there
is for choosing respiratory protective equipment. The use of a fully
encapsulating suit over other types of chemical-resistant clothing 1s
general)y a jud$j«ent made by a qualified Individual based on an
evaluation of ail pertinent information available about the specific
incident. Other guidance and criteria Tor selecting personnel pro-
tection equipment are contained In Part 5. Site Entry - levels of
Pratectlon and in Appendix n.
OTHER R£f£H£NCES
Table 111-1 does not Include all substances affecting the skin.
Cther standard references should be consulted, in particular:
-	Threshold Halt Values for Chcrlca! Substances and Physical Agents
In the tfprfcrooa Environment HIth Intended Changes for" 1982.
Jtaericen conference of kovemoentai industrial HygTinTsts, 6500
6lenway Ave.. Building D-5. Cincinnati, OH 45211 (19«2J»
-	KIOSH/QSHA Pocket Guide to Chegleal Hajtards. U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC 2D402 (August 1981).
-	Registry of Tonic Effects of Chmical Substances. U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, OC £?W02 (1900).
Whenever possible, data In one reference should he cross-checked with
other references.
0-132

-------
TMLE JIM
OERAAL TOXICITT
Ch«a1cal
Physical'
State
Skin
Pcnetretlor
QtralS
Tonicity
Potency
Ptnalsilble
Concentration
Category
1,2 Dlchtoroproploatc >c1d
Mild
~
local
++
-
2
2,4,5 * T Acid
solid
~
syit«1c
local
~
n
10
2
2,4,5 - T frrinei
solid
~
systaalc
local
~4
10 wg/*V*fe
I
2,4,5 - T
solid
~
lyStMlc
local
*
~
10
2
2.4,5 - TP Acid
$o1 id
~
*
i ys tonic
local
4
44
10 mqtw^fth
2
2,4,5 - TP Acid esters
liquid
«
tystcalc
local
~
~
10
2
2,4,5 - T Sal(t
solid
*
IjfltMtC
local
~
~
10 «g/*3/&i
2
2,4 - 0 Acid
solid
~
systaric
local
4
~~
10 igV/Bh
2
t4( * Dlchlorophenol
solid
~
systwlc
local
~
es
2
2,4 - D - Eiteri
liquid
j 44
iysto*lc
Iocs)
~
4
10 eg
2
2 - Ethyl ***** Acrjlita
liquid

local
4+4
-
2
2 » Methyl - 5 - ethyl pyrt-
dine
liquid
M
local
4
-
2

-------
, TABLE 1II-1 (COflTIftUEO]
KWWL TOXICITY
Chemical
Physical
Stete
Skin
Penetration
Dermal
Toxicity
Potency
Permissible
Concentretion
C>te*)rj
t " H«ptho1
solid
4
locel
++
-
Z
3,5 - Jtjrlefiol
solid 1
~
systemic
locel
H
~
-
2
Aceteldehyde
liquid
~
locel
systemic
«¦
200 ppm/8h
3SO mg/m3/8h
?
Acetic Anhydride
liquid
+
locel
lysteale
*4
*
5 ppm/dh
20 mqfwrftih
« A
Acetone
liquid
+~+
locel
~+
1,000 ppm/Bh
2.400 mitrffih
2
i
Acetone tyenobydrin
liquid

systemic

io ppit/ah
i
1
Acetoacetone
llqctid

local

-
2
Acetyl Bromide
fonlng
liquid

local

5 ppn/15 min
1
Acetyl Chloride
fuming
liquid
~++
local

S ppm/lS mln
1
Acrldlne
solid
4-
locel
sensitizer
~-M
-
2
Acrolein
liquid
+
local
sensitizer
++~
0.1 ppm/6h
.25 ma/«3/8h
2
Acrylonitrlle
liquid
~4+
systemic
local

2 ppa/0h
1

-------
TABLE EIM (COHTtfttJEO)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chetlctl
Phjrticil
State
Ski*
Penetration
Denial
Toxicity
Potency
Permits1b!e
Concentration
Category
Adiplc Acid
solid
~
local
~
-
2
Adlpoaltrllo
liquid
~~~
*yst«*1c
~M
IS mi/m^/Sh
I
AlkyldlMthyl 3,4 -
D1 chl orobeniy I
Chloride
liquid
*
local
~
~
2
A1tyt Alcohol
liquid
++
sy$te»1t
local
~~
++
2 PP«/f>
5 ng/»3/8h
2
Allyl Chloride
1iqeld

local
«
I ppt/ftl
3 Bq/a3/8h
2
AmohIi
gas
~
local
~4*
25 ppa/BIt
13 mufm f6t\
I
Amaonluai Bicarbonate
solid
~
local
++
-
2
taMlua Bichromate
lolld
~
local

-
2
AmkmIub SlfluorliJe
solid
4
local
H
-
2
tanntvi IHulflti
solid
+
lK4t

-
2
Avonlna C
-------
TABLE MM (CONTINUED)
OCMttl TOXICITY
ChttlcAl
Physical
State
Skin
Penetration
Ocrpil
Toxicity
Potency
Permissible
Coocentritloo
Category
Anaonlua CI trite
{Dlbatkj
solid
~
local
4-M
-
2
(Mawnil* Ferrocywlde
Mild
*
local
~

2
ArmniIim Hydroxide
liquid
~~
local
4
+r*
-
1
ftmooli* Phosphate
(Dibasic)
solid
~
local
4+
-
2
Amonlw Sultanate
solid
«¦
local
*~
10
2
Amttflli* Sulfide
solid
~
local

-
2
Aanonlua Sulfite
col Id
~
local
«
-
2
Aavaanlua Tartrate
solid
~
local
~+
-
2
tanxtlvi Thlocyinite
solid
~4
local
systesric
**

2
Annonla* Thlosulfate
Mild
~
local
~+
-
I
Anl1 Ins
liquid

local
++
S ppa/Sh
2
Antloony
solid
~
*yst«a1e
local

0.5 mq/wP/tin
1

-------
TABit II[-1 (CONTINUED)
KRhAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Phytic el
Stets
SMa
PftftitratlOf
Derail
Toxicity
Potency
Permissible
Concentration
Cattery
m
Antimony Pefltochlorlde
1fq«1d
•M-
local
++~
-
2
Ar^on - 37 (radioactive)
g»(
+~+
systemic
¦M-t
-
1
Anlne
gas

•jfttflilC
~~4
O.CS ¦9/m3/fih
1
Arsenic
sol id
*4
local
syitielc
+~4
.25 mj/m^/Sh
1
Arsenle-?< (radioactive)
solid
~~
systemic
~~~
•
1
Arsentc-76 (radioactive)
solid
w
systemic

-
1
Arsenic*?? (radioactive)
solid
~+
systemic

-
1
Arjenlc Acid
solid
~+
local
systemic

0.5
1
Arsenic Dlselflde
sol id
H
local
systemic
«+t
-
1
Arsenic Pentotide
solid
f+
local
systesic
«~
-
1
Arsenic TM bromide
solid
M
local
systemic
~++
*+•~
0.5 mg/afyflh
1
Arsenic Trichloride
solid
H
local
systemic

0.5 mg/**/8i
1

-------
TABLE I1I-1 (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOX1CITT
Chmldl
Physical
State
Skin
Penetration
Oemil
Toxicity
Potency
Penal t% lb le
Concentration
Category
Arsenic Trlo*tde
vol Id
44
local
systealc
444
444
,2S ag/a^/Sh
1
Arsenic THsulfide
solid

local
systemic
~44
444
03 ag/a^B*
J
B&rltai
solid
4
local
4*
0.5 mq/m^fSh
?
Benzene
liquid
44
local
systemic
4+
44*
75 ppa/30 aln
1
Bcnropfitfio^a
solid
4
local
44
-*•
2
Benzoyl Chloric
liquid
+*
local
+4+
5 ng/b^/ih
1
Benzoyl Peroxide
solid
H
local
4+4
S ¦§/«%ttt
1
Benzyl Alcohol
liqvld

local
systole
44
4
-
2
Benzyl Bcnzoate
liquid
44
local
44
»
2
Benzyl Broalde
liquid
~~
^DCll
4*
-
2
Benzyl Chloride
liquid
44
local
444
1 ppa/Bh
2
Beryllluei Nitrate
sal Id
4
local
~+
0.25 WQfnlfBh
2

-------
TABLE ItM (COHTWOfC)
OCIHAL TOJCICITT
Oiatlcil
Physical
State
Sklh
Penetration
(kraal
Toxicity
Potency
Permissible
Concentration
Category
Broobeni ylcyanl d«
liquid
<77 F-*ol1<
~4
total
svsteodc
+~
t++
-
1
Calclus Hypochlorite _
solid
~
local

-
1
Calclua 0»1d*
solid
+
local
~+
10 ag/«3/30 »ln
2
Cildifl Pboiphlde
solid
~
local
~~
-
2
Caaphor
sol id
4
local
srsteaic
~+
~+
t PlWOfc
2
Ctpttn
solid

local
syiteale
~~
»4
5 nj/n^/Gh
Z
Carbaryl
solid
*~
local
systaalc
~
«-+
S fcq/^/Bh
2
£>rbofvrw
liquid
~~
local
systeailc
m
0 A
I
CtHion Otsilflde
liquid
+~
local
syst«o1c
H
+4*
20 pps/$i
60 m/nr/Sh
t
Carbon Jtafio*1de
g»i

sjfst«a1c

SO pp«/6t)
1
Carbon Tetrachloride
liquid
~~~
syiteale
local
m
~
10 pjm/Sb
1
Cetyld1methylbenzyl-
«roaonlues Chloride
solid
~
local
~
**
2

-------
TABLE II1-1 (COPTTtHUED)
DO?MAI TOIICITT
Chealcal
Physical
State
Sic in
Penetration
terval
Toxicity
Potency
Peralsilble
Concentration
Category
Chi orKClophenoae
solid
~
local
Wtealc
~~
44
.0$ ppa/fii
2
CMordtne
solid
~
local
systemic
44
44
.5 ag/aVfih
Z
8ron1»e
llqold
{fining)
~+
local
systealc
w
44
.1 ppa/Bh
1
Butyl Ml M
liquid
44-
local
~44
5 ppa/Bh
1
Batyl Mercaptan
liquid
+4
local
44
.5 ppn/Sh
2
Butyric Acid
liquid
4*
local
44
-
I
Calclua AriMite
solid
~
local
ijitaMc
44
4*-*
1 wq/mi*/ah
\
Calciw Arsenlte
sol id
~
local
systeaic
44-
444
a
1
Caktw Cirfelde
sol Id
4-
local
4*
~
2
Calcium Cyanide
solid
+~
systertc
local
444
44
$ «g/«3/13 nil)
1
Chlorine
9«
4+4
local
444
1 ppo/Bh
3 mfa f Sh
1
Chlorine - 36 (radioactive)
. 9**
444
local
444
-
I

-------
TAau 11 l-i (commjan
DOtNAL Ttwtcm
CHaelcal
physical
State
Skin
taetratlof
Geratl
Toxicity
Potency
Remissible
Coneentratlor
Category
Chloro*c»ttc Acid
Mild
4*
local
44
-
Z
ChlorobtxitM
lipoid
44
local
mteitc
44
44
75 ppm/Al
3SO mq/P/Sh
Z
Chlorobettdltfl*
liquid
++
local
~4
25 ppn/Bh
2
CMor (Methane

-------
TWlE 11W {CONTINUED)
OERHAL TOXICITY
Chealcal
Phjrtleit
State
Skin
Pcnetratlof
0er*«1
Toxicity
Potency
Permissible
Concentration
Category
CrotOAildehyde
liquid

local
systemic
+~
++
2 ppa/8h
2
CuHtcne
llqsld
~~
local
systemic
4*
~
50 ppm/Bh
2
Cuprfc Acetate
solid

local
systealc
h
0.1 «g/«^/flh
2
Cuprlc Acetoarseoate
solid
~
local
tyttalc
4*
44
0.1 mq/m^/Bh
2
Citprle Sulfite. Amonlated
solid
~
locil
«
2 h
2
Cyanogen
gat

systemic
local
m
~~
10 ppa/Bh
I
Cytnogcn Browlrfe
solid
**
local
systdlc
f+
0.5 ppa/8*
1
Cyanogen Chloride
S«
+++
local
$ys(oi1c
~+
10 ppallS *1n
5 »Q/flr/B*>
1
Cyclchexanol
liquid
~
local
systemic
4-+
~
50 ppa/dh
2
Cycloheianone
liquid
~
local
systealc
++
~
50 ppm/ah
2
Cyclohexylmlne
liquid
++
local
systemic
~+
*-*
10 ppft/Bh
2
Dec&bor&ne
solid
~
local
systealc
~+
4-»
.0$ ppi/Bh
j ?
	"

-------
table iji-i (cofrriMuto)
DCRHAL TOJtlCm
Cho«le*l
Physical
State
Shin
Penctr*t1of
Derail
Tonicity
Potency
Remissible
Concentration
Category
D«cinil
liquid
+4
local
44
•»
4

DI*cetone Alcohol
1Iqald
44
local
tystemlc
+4
~
SO Pfmftoi
2
(Maaylaatne
liquid
4+
local
systc*1c
44
44
-
2
Olborine
gas
H
local
syitMlc
4-4
44
<1
1
Dlc«b*
solid
~
local
systenMc
4
+4
-
2
OlcMoblnll
solid
~
»0C4l
syitaric
4
~
-
2
Qlchlone
wild
~
local
44

2
Dlcblorotfl/lounwotfeaflc '
gu
44
lystealc
44
1,000 p*W8h
2
DIcMoroetfeyl Ether
liquid
H
local
H? teste
44
4-4
5 piW®>
2
Olchlor Methane
Itqifd
44
local
systemic
44
44
200 nm/8ti
I
Olchtaropropaae
liquid
44
local
iy&teoHc
44
4
75 pps/Bh
2
DldOompropenc
liquid
44
local
systaatc
44
44
-
2

-------
TABLE IIM (CttfTMUED)
OERWU. TOXICITY
Chmlctl
Physical
St «te
Skin
Penetration
OenMl
Toxicity
Potency
Permissible
Concentration
Category
Olchlorapropene Qlchloropro-
pefte
liquid
44
local
systemic
w
~4
-
2
DtcMoms
liquid
H
tyttenfc
44
.1 pp«/Bh
1 mq/tr/8h
2
Olcyclopentidtan*
liquid
4+
lccil
4-M-
5 Ppm/Sh
2
Dlethumlwlne
solid
~
lKtl
44
-
Z
(Heth/lwloe
liquid
44
local
4-f
25 ppa/dh
2
Methylene Glycol
liquid
~
tyitealc
~
-
t
OlethylenetrlMlne
liquid
~
local
~4-4
1 pp*/8h
2
Diethyl Phtheltte; Cthjrl
Formate
liquid
~>
local
4-
-
2
OlMthyla»lne
oily
liquid
44
local

10 pp»/dti
ia wr*3/an
2
l,N - dlncthftinlllre
oily
Itquid
444
systemic
local
+4
4
$ ppo/ati
25
2
DlMth^Hulhti
liquid
H
local
~~4
1 ppm/ah
2
Dloxtne (p-dloKine)
liquid
4+
local
jys teste
+4
4
SO ppn/Oh
2

-------
ime ISM (COKTIWED)
OERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Physical
Stat*
Skin
Denial
Toxicity
Potency
Permissible
Concentration
Category
OlpNftpata
gat
~4
local
m

1
Diktat


local
mtolc
44
OA mg/m*/ft»
2
Dlsvlfoton*
t14014

$yst«a1e
W
J n»§/m^/Bh
1
Dluran

*~
local
systolic
M
~+
-
2
DttBP

H
systolic

-
2
PMSMIH4-i.il


systemic

-
2
l-Oodoetnol
Solid
~
local
~
-
t
Entktulfan
solid
~~
syataalc
m
0.1 mfl/o3/*
I
Eruiathil


local
++


Cplch1«f*hjrdH*
Kqald
*~
local
sjrstcBtc
~
~+
5 ppm/fih
19
2
ftfvlon
liquid


H
-
2
ftJiyl Aeetat*
liquid
~*
local
H
400 ppm/Sh
J 400 *g/a3/&h
I

-------
TABLE ltl-l (CONTINUED)
DCRMl TOXICITY
Chemical
Physical
State
Skin
Penetration
Dermal
Toxicity
Potency
Permissible
Concentration
Category
Ethyl Aerylate
liquid
H
local
systolic
H
25 pfM/Sfe
100 mq/i»3/flh
2
Ethyl Benzene
liquid
«+
local
systemic
~+
100 ppm/8fe
2
Ethyl Chloride
liquid
~4
local
frostbite
~~
1,000 pp«/8h
?
Ethylene
gas
H
local
frostbite
~4

2
Ethylene Cyanohydrtn
liquid
++
systemic
-f
-
2
Ethylene Blbromlde
liquid
4+
local
systemic
~4
+~
20 ppm/Bh
50 ppa/S mln
2
Ethylene Bichloride
liquid
~+
local
systemic
¥*
IB ppm/8h
200 pim/S mln
2
Ethylene Glycol 01acetate
liquid
++
systaelc
~
-
2
Ethylene Glycol Honoethyl
Ether Acetate
liquid

systemic
local
~
f
100 ppat/6*
2
Ethylene Glycol Honoethyl
Ether
liquid
~+
systemic
~
iS ppm/fih
I
Ethylene Oxide
liquid
*
local
m
SO ppm/flh
2
Ethyl Ether
liquid
+
local

400 ppm/Bh
?
r.*.*

-------
TABLE III-1 
-------
TABLE 111*1 (COfTURKft)
DC1UWL TWIClTf
Oittletl
myilcil
St >u
Sfclft
Fmctrttlof
towl
Toxicity
Money
Nmtifllblo
Concentration
Catoprj
Gm oils
11*Hid
44
local
4
-
2
Otjtxol |
liquid
4
locil
4
-
2
Guthltti
solid
4*
tjitwte
44
-
2
Hept«e*1«r
Mild
4+4
tjntMlc
locil
44
4
.5 wffwPftii
z
Hapitw*
llfitd
44
locol
intate
4
4*
wo pp«/ah
2
NqitlMt
lipid
44
Vocal
mtMlc
~
44
*
2
HFTF
11q*1d
444
IJIllMlC
444
-
1
ttomborti
liquid
44
local
tyitMic
44
4*
-
2

Mild
44
locil
IrttMlC
444
4+
-
2
HtxMt
liquid
44
local
mtatc
4
44
500 pfn/Si
2
HtKMOl
liquid
44
loctl
444
44
-
?
Hetyle** Glycol
Itqald
44
lOCJl
44
4
25 ppa/ft
m
2

-------
tmlc m-i (carnmcD)
mm TDiicin
Owrtetl
nytlctl
Stiti
Skin
POMtratla
Bnal
Tonicity
Fotoncj
Nnrtitlhlt
CoocootrttlM
Cdoforjr
Hydro*(no
ltqold
44
local
iptalc
++4
44

1
HydrocMoHe MM
tlqold
44
loctl
sntwtc i
444
4
s in/1
1
Hydrofluoric Acid
11«»1d
+~
loctl
mtoolc
444
4
3 *mf*
I
hi (1*1 Ms) (NtdtMetlvo)


SJftt«RlC
44*
-
1
Hydroftn Cftftldo
in
Hf
ijntiilc
4*4
to *¦/*»
I
Hjnirafu Flosrldo
l«
*++
loctl
444
3 w-/»
1
Nfiroftfi Sulfldo
fM
m

444
10 ffm/fh
1
Hjdro*Mloono
wild
44
loctl
mtooic
44
*4
t
Z
Hjpocfelerou Acid
liquid
44
loctl
444
m
i
~
Indole
wild
+~
loctl
444
-
*
Iron Oust
ttltd
*
loctl
44
-
?
Iiobutjrl Alcohol
lipoid
H
lOCBl
tfftMlC
4
44
100 fpmfm
2

-------
TlftLE 1IM (COiTIMKO)
deimn. micrrt
CMmIciI
Plfileil
Stat*
Skin
Panatratlof
Owl
Tonicity
Fot«acjf
fvn»1 tslbla
Gancattratlon
Catoyorj
Icobatjrafdahjrdo
llqald
~~
local
ifitaolc
++~
~
-
2
laofcotyrlc AcM
Iffold
~
local
tjitMle
~
m
2
Isophonwi
H«afd
H
local
ifitak
~~
H
2$ nm/m
2
Isafhtfctloyl CMortda
Mild
~
local
tystoalc
«+
~
*
2
lieprapfl Acrtit*
HqiM
«+
lacal
tjitaic
«¦
~
250 *¦/«
t
ItipropylalN
llqafd
~~
local
mtaic
~+
«+
5 *¦/»
2
iNpropjfl Ethtr
llqafd
4*
local
ijitalc
~~
~
250 pmtm
2
Hipim
llqald
H
local
ijitak
~
~~
-
2
Krjptm BS (radlolctlvi)
fit
~M
VJfVtwtc
+++
-
1
load ArMnato
solid
~
local
IJltBlC
~ '
~~
.5
2
lead noabarata
Mild
~
local
ijr&toale
+~
-
2
Lindas*
Mild
~+
fjntoolc
~4
.5 ¦§/aV®»


-------
, t«u iii-i (courtmrnj)
DOWN. TOX1C1TT
OMitoil
Wijilcil
St it*
Skin
P*Mtr«t1of
0ml
Toxicity
Potoocy
PoraHilbla
Coacaatratlw
Catofery
Halathloa
llfald

ijntak
444
10 •»/•*/»
2
KP
11
tyitarie
4
44
inmfrn
2
Ntthyl Abrylata
\tmu
44
local
¦yitaolc
~44
44
lOpptf*

Mafhyl Any! Acatat*
llqtld
44 -
local
•ystaatc
4
44
SOpf^Bh
2
fethyl «^l Alcolwl
11«a1d
44
local
tyitalc
44
4
25 Ofmfm
2
»
Mathyl Ira Ida
liquid
or |H
4
local
444
n nm/m
1
Methyl ChiorId*
1 lipid
4
local
444
loo pmfm
2
Methylene dlarlde
liquid
44
local
tntaoic
44
44
500 pfm/th
2

-------
IMLC II1-1 {CWTliOCD)
flEHML fOlICITT
Ch«BlC«l
ffusical
Stafta
Skin
Pcnttnttor
|mi1
Toalcltj
Money
PiraiiilblB
Concentration
Catogory
Kttliyl Ithjfl mom
lffald
4+
\K*\
mt«1c
~
44
510 ¦£/**/»
2
iffchjfl (fofaityl Kutonc
Hqald
44
local
ijitalc
~
+
100 pmSm
2
mth?\ Mre«9tiA
»«
~44
loci*
ijitalc
44
44
10 ppa/flti
2
Mathyl Hafftflcrflato
Hqoid
+~
local
444
100 ppmttto
2
fetfeyl ftratMoa
liquid
4++
•plank
44*
200 Qfio^
1
Rcxacarbite
solid
44
local
tntaiic
4
444
-
2
HmocMeroacctofi*
liquid
~+
local
tyitaalc
44
4*
•m
2
NmocMarod If1oor«aettiM
lfq*l4
44
local
(frostbit#J
sntwlc
m
44
umptmfrn
2
NnmUijIailM
S«
444
local
4*4
lo vmfm
i
1
PtaMoHnprepanol nine
Itqotd
+~
local
44
-
2
HnnawUi^yit
l»
444
local
444
10 ppmf&i
I
PteffteUme
liquid
4+
local
sntalc
+4
44
20 wmfm
2

-------
TAftLE II1-1 (COftTIMH)
mm Toi rem
Oh«nUt1
Phjslcal
St at#
Skin
taotritlM
Dorsal
TuleUjr
PalonCf
Nnriiilhti
CoocoNtratlM
CltOfSTJ
HttfttBrd hi
l«
. 44
local
444
¦»
1
•-lylmft
Tiqvld
44
local
•jnt-lc
44
~
100 ppa/Sh
I
•-iflyl Broolda
llqoli
4*
local
in too 1c
H
W
-
I
H+m
ulM
H
local
mtoric
4*
-
2
Halo*
llfild
44
local
mtaslc
4
44
3 ¦iM3/#!
t
test it*
11«i1J
H
local
~~
100 pprnfm

N*M*alano
Wild
~
local
intaik
H
**
lOwrm/m
2
NaohtJioMc AcU
' Ml 14
~
local
44
*
2
n-tatyl Hcrtm
llqald
H
local
~
ISO ppa/ft
710 si/rVft
2
ft-tottyl Acrylitt
l^ld
~4
local
444
-
t
n-batyt Alcohol
liquid
H
' local
44
4
50 ppi/A
*
n-fcotjralfeMe
11*14
H
local
444
-
2

-------
TMLU IIM (CONTENDED)
DQHVU. loxicin
Cheated
Stele
Skin
PwtetnMw
Derail
toxicity
Potency
Poratulfela
Concentration
Cateforj
Nickel tapenlia Sulfite
eolld
~
local
44
I wffJ/m
2
Hiclcel Cerbonjrl
ltqeld
44
local
syitailc
44
44
.09 PtWBb
2
Nitric Ae1d
)1«old
~
local
444
2
I
NUrle Oxide
t»
H
local
444
» P9*/»
1
Nltrtlotrlicotte Acid
Mild
~
local
44
-
2
HHrofOT Dioxide

+»
local
44
S pfet/lfi aile
1
11trob«A28f>t
liquid
44
locel
triUolc
44
44
1 Prnfm
5 ¦fl/a/flfc
2
Nltrsfwi Cblarlde
llqald
44
local
44
m
2
Mtrofljfccrlnt
Hqald
~4
locel
int«k
44
44
2 •ifmhrn
t
Ozone
«et
4
local
44
44
,1 ppi/fe
2
Nltreis Oxide
««
44
local
444
25 Pfm/ah
2
NMi**e
lfqold
~4
local
44
-
Z

-------
TABLE 111-1 (C9NTIMJED)
KM* TMICITT
Om\col
Plnleil
Stata
Skin
Pmtrit 14*
OarM1
Tonicity
Money
Fwtitlblt
Cawcoatrattao
Catajoiry
Hnn-^1 Wwml
11*1*
H
local
444

2
A«prtfjfl Alcflkol
11*14
H
TOCil
mt«lc
~
~
200 *•/»
2
OM2IN
still
4
local
mt*Hc

-
2

Mild
H
local
mt«k
444
~
-
2

Mill
~
lOCil
ifitate
~
~H
4»
2
Qxjdlprop looltrl 1 ¦
Hqotd
44
tjfttMrie
local
44
~
-
2
o~*jrlana
11*14
44
local
mtale
~
4
100 ppa/K
2
para-oltroanllliio
wild
~
local
IJlttilC
~4
4+
I Pf"/»
2
Knttall
ltqatd
«4
local
tjrstaolc
4+
4
-
2
4
ParcliloroMtAyl Mrcapta*
liquid
4+4
loctl
arttooic
~4
44
.1 ppa/*
2
nwnsleirtjlaiN Qiltrtdi
tfqold
44
local
44
-
2
Phmolmcrtvrle Aeetiti
solid
~
local
lltt«alc
4
444
¦m
2

-------
TWJE I1M (CONTINUED)
ocm TO* EC IT*
Ottukit
P%pfc*l
State
Skin
fonetratlof
Oral
Toxicity
Pottncjr
Fnviitlbli
Concentration
CtitOgorf

9«
~
local
444
.1 wmft*
i
Wilts Ptwiptarous (yellsw)
191 td

local
•intaic
*++
•+
-
i
ftaiphoratff
Ifquid
++
1oct1
sjrttalc
44
-
2
ftattwlf Ide
Mild
~
local
Ifltfftc
+++
~+
I m§fw?fBn
2
PtMnphfrcut Trlcfelartdt
liquid
++
local
I|«tHlC
m
H
*5 ppolOh
3 mq/wr/8h
2
Pfcthal Ic-Aci 4-M*tW-l*Ur
liquid
H
local
*
m
2
Ffctfetl it JMiydrlfe
10114
4
local
Mtaalc
44
~
l
2
(MiltroplMMOl
Mild
4
local
sjrttMlc
44
+~
-
2
Potssslua Arscnite
Ml id
~
local
tntaalc
44
«S pgA^/Sh
2
FoIksIm Ar*«*U*
solid
4
Iocs!
iyit«alc
44
~4*
-
2
flotasslwi FmwgiMte
solid
~
local
4+4
-
2
PnpM
S»
44
focal
frostbite
444
i*ooo w*/»i
2

-------
TABLE MI-1 (C0KT1MCD)
DERMAL TQKICtn
Otairical
flijtlcal
State
skin
Panotratl*
tamal
Toxicity
Potency
Peralttlbl*
Concentration
Cvttfory
Npgilti


systatfc
44
m
2
hvptnuldihjidi
Hqald
4+
tocal
444
-
2
Proplmtc Acid
11*itd
H
iDCBl
44
10ppa/«.
2
Propionic A*hj4r14«
liquid
44
loCftl
~44
m
2
Propyl Actt«t<
llqold
44
local
44
4
200 ppn/flh
2
Propyl Bine
1t*td
~4
Tocil
mtmtc
44+
+4
-
2
Propyltut
|U
444
loctl
~
4.000
2
Propyltno Oxldo
llqald
44
loctl
+4
ioo nmfrn
2
p-xylono
11*1*
44
loctl
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-------
TAKE III-! (C0MT1HOCD)
mm. toxicity
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-------
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-------
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-------
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-------
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* ¦























•



¦




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APPENDIX E

MANUAL
CHAPTER ID

EPA DIVING SAfETY POLICY
OCCUPATIONAL

HEALTH AND SAFETY


1.	*VHffg£. This Chapter establishes h^ttKy policy regarding
ccmtnercial divinq tperationa til aooorJtnw with IlepartiMt of Labor,
Occupational Safety ar»fl Health Adminintraticm regulations at 2^ CFR
1*10, Suhnart T. Its purpose Is to assure that all Elvira operations,
perftnrad urvVr the auspices of M, an con&vrteri In a safe narner,
accordina to uniform pmc edges, awl by sufficiently trained peremiel.
This Chapter establishes Agency procedures for developing vti aAninl-
sterinn such standard safety practice*.
2.	SCOPE, the requixHnarvts ami procedures specified In this chapter
shall apply to all 'living operatkns involving any project of the
Agency and carried out ty any employee, either temporary or permanent,
of the Aqency during the count* of His/her employment* In addition,
these reouirenents «hsU also apply to any visitina iw-ftdency cnployee
encaged in a joint divine operation at, or unier the auspices of, any
Agency facility to the extent that this person is not noverrMfd by
otxrrarnble r«quir«m»ts of Che Anency or institution that he/she
represents, thia Chapter an>lie« tneoardless of omer^ilfi n? oquimert,
sny eouijwnt u*<"1 in cm junction vith Aaenw divinq of*frttlc*m
rte coUecticns, of eqiiljnmt mint»nanwp with
the only exoepticn belnn the handlirrr of an actual aneiwicv situation.
It Is not the intent of these provisions to delay or harper am ac«-'rtl
rescue operation therefore. It is the responsibility of the ttnit
Hiving officer or TJive Supervisor at the some tr> determine the
ultimate course of action durim a particular aiwrocney and ty rksirt*
so, runt rr>t aaqravste the situation or >eop*rdlze the safety of
additional r^rsGnnel.
3.	Wq^inWION. The Assistant Mminidtrator for Mranistration
shell broadly administer the Aoency'a Hivlrw Safety Program
thr^wh the f^curatinfsl Health and Safety Sta^f CWS),
a.	Pesignatlcri-. lb* Occupational itealth ar*i Safety Staf«", \ip*i
th* advice of the ET* Hiving Safety amndttee, aha] ^ administer the
Anency'fl Hiving afety Prouran and coordinate safety policy and
procedures.
b.	EPA Diving Safety CtjnrtitLee.
(i) Ocppoaltion. The EPA Divirw Safety Oanrnittee flhali be
cr*npnsed of thp follrwlrn nwnherst
T" (2/11/02)
1
E-l
CHAT 10
PAP 1

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manual
chapter 10
EM Q1VIHG SAFETY POLICY
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
(a) Oiaimui	or	en by (tamlttM Msnhersr
{b} Active EPft Diving Officers? and
{c) OHSS Shfety Prcqrwn Nbmger.
(2) Revisions* All reujiiiiBidationa For revisions of the t*-
gulatJjOna rust be agreed upon 1ff FPft Hi vino Safety Ocrmrittfte.
f3) IteapongiMlitio. Hie RPA Divina Safety Onmrittee
be responsible fori
(a)	RecCTTTrmrlLna policy ami dwv^9 in operating prt>-
ceAiras within F!PA that vtll ensue? a safe and efficimt diving pcogranty
(b)	fleviewina existim policies. uiuasUrM, «n1 trainina
need* to ensure a continually hi^h level of technical skills and taw-
letos throughout the EP& rtivim progrgn;
fd Planning, oroarnroiinrr, and dLrectiiw, in cooperation
with the rr«ss# matter of r7tilicy pertaining tr> the initial certif-
ication of new divers and refresher traininn of experianced divers:
(d)	iterniBrtiiw chanoes in opuratlm policy to the
Director, Otupotiaral Health and Safety Staff and the Assistant
Artuinistrator for Research and fJewelopient, arrl ReoinnnL Administrator*;
(e)	Serving as an appeal hoard in cases Where a diver's
certification has been suspended;
{Cl Piaming< pcogrwrninq, and developing diver wortc-
shops, seminars, and other activities considered essential to maintaining
a hddh level of competency snona divers*
(q) Ktviwinq ftPA divinn accident* or pntwitially
dangerous experiences arrl rep^rtinq rr> preventive measure® to ensure the
avoidance or reoccurrence of incidents; and
Chi Meeting, at least, annually to discuss recarren-
datiorts and proposed actions.
In addition, members ney participate In the Safety Of£i cur/Designees
Annual Meeting.
16
th www
PAR 3
2
E-2

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MANUAL
CHAPTER 10

EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
OCCUPATIONAL

HEALTH AMD SAFETY
c. Diving Safety Ccwwdlttee Chalrmn. The Committee will select or
vote for a chairman to represort than and act as focal point cn all
EJK divirzj activities-
(1)	Qusliflcatiesn The Qislitnn tfiall:
(a)	Be a trained diver with a wide range of experience;
(hj Be a currently certified H* diver:
(c)	Have a least 5 jear's experience as a diver; and
(d)	Have successfully completed a nationally reccgnised
instructors certification course or it's equivalent*
(2)	Reaponslbl titles ¦
{a) t*sue through GHSS, EPA Diver OrtlEication to quali-
fied BfilDjeeB based on freJumndtttloti and data frnn the mit diving
officer:
(b)	Coordinate with OSS, and Diving Safety Committee
training certification and other safety programs for divers;
(c)	confer with CHSS Industrial Hygienist tonxjsr on the
approval and use of specialized breathing apparatus or mixture of cpses*
(d)	Review and initiate through CHSS, appropriate action
on reccmrendationB made by the Diving Safety Cannittee; and
(e)	Rttnaln abreast of new diving tedmlques, procedures
ard equipment.
d. Unit Diving officer>
(1)	Designation. Ihit Diving Officer* dhall be selected Crcni
various CPA instal latjLOis <4nich conduct diving operations- These
diving officers shall be appointed by the installation director-
(2)	Qualifications. The Uhit Diving Officer shall be a
trained, currently certified diver experienced in the types of diving
conducted by the organizational wit.
(3)	Responaibillfcies * The Unit Oiviiq OfflLcwr rtndl be re-
sponsible, within the ixiit, fori
7M (2/11/32)
3
rm m
PAR 3

-------
MANUAL
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
CHA. fER 10
EPA DIVING SAFETT POtlCf
(a) Ensuring that all diving gear and accessory equipment
be maintained in a safe operating condition;
(b} Ensuring the maintenance of eguipnmt files at the
reporting ir>tt levels, to include type, tararri nftrc, serial nwher, antf
rqia irs completed on coffressors, tank;a, cqulatDrs, depth gauges^
(reaaure (puges, tetdvs, helirerts, hoses, pneifXJretera and deeanjression
fteters •
(c)	Enaurlrg that a oompetant Dive Supervisor is in dtaige
of the diving operations conducted by the uiit'e various operations;
(d)	Reporting imedlately all diving related accMmta
<-hich occur within his init on EPA Form 1440-9 and other Appropriate
Accident reporLa as Outline} in Chapter 3 of thia Mferual to the
occupational Health end Safety Staff through the local Safety Officer/
Designee;
(e)	>teintaining a file of each diver in the unit, or de-
legating the responsibility to the £>lwp Supervisor. Files shall ij>-
clurte hut not be limited to: diving physical exams (siijject to the
recjuironcnte of the Privacy Act of 19741, training reoonto. letters
of certification, and monthly dive logs, etc: and
(f)	Dive plan/leg infcmation.
e- Dive Supervisor.
(11 Designation* Depending on the wiit organization, a Dive
Supervisor will be assigned for eacii operation by the Unit Diving
Officer.
(2)	Qualification, The Dive Supervisor shall be a currmtly
certified! diver experienca.1 in that specific type of diving*
(3)	Responsibilities. The Dive Supervisor shall be in complete
charge of the individual diving operation as a member of the dive
team at the location of the dive, and shall be responsible for and
ensure thatt
(a) All diving operations are conducted safely in accord-
ance *ith ppea=ribol EPA diving safety rules and regulations;
CHAP 10
PAH 3
4
E-4
tn m\m

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MANUAL
CHAPTER 10

EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AKD SAFETY
(b)	Ml divers arc certified, properly trained, and
physically (it to perform the required diving, and that the prescribe*}
files on the divers art? maintained if the responsibility has been
delegated by the Unit Olviryj Officer;
(c)	All equipment is In a safe operating condition, and
that thrj required maintenance reenrds arc maintained as directed by
the Unit Diving Officerr
Id) Dives are terminated utiert, in his/her opinion, signif-
icant environmental, personal, or equipment problems ore encountered and
emergency aid is suraoned;
(e) onergency procedures are understood by all personnel
prior to diving;
(f| All divers are monitored after each dive for synjifccnia
o£ ^compression sickness; and
('3> He/she is knowledgeable in dive plan and overall
operation to he performed,
c. individual Diyer~
< 1) Designation. Individual divers shall be certified by the
EPA Diving Safety oarmlttoe Chairman upon recommendation frar the unit
Diving Officer,
(2)	Qualifications, Divers shall be sufficiently trained to
undertake the assigned diving tasks.
(3]	Responsibilities. The individual diver shall be respon-
sible for and ensure that:
(A) A good physical condition ami a high level of diving
proficiency are raaintaiTwd;
(b>	The equi(xoBnt is in a safe operating condition;
(cI	Diving conditions are safe; and
{d|	TT»e dictates of training or diving regulation® are not
violated.
tm (2/11/R2)
5
t-5
lo
PAH 1

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MANUAL
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AMP SAFETY
CflAITJ-R 10
EPA DIVING SAFETY ttlLICY
g. Tender.
(1)	Qe&iqnatigiu the Dive Scp^rvi»3r will select the Teivbr
bo bo used for a Stifle dive. His/her naas will appear on (he Oive
Plan/Log and will, therefore, be apfrwed beforehand by the tait Diving
Officer,
[2)	Qualifications. The itenJer neodi not be a currently KPA
Certified diver, but must, in the opinion ot the Dive SwpecvI«or and the
Unit Diving Officer* have sufficient knowledge of basic "first aid,
swiflirting, life saving, boat operation and other procedures to be used in
An emergency,
(3} Responsibilities. Thy "tender will jSerfgra the [ollowingt
{a) Assist the divers, OS rujuustod, in putting on or
taKiroj off equipment;
{b> Record in siting ttvj "down" and "up* tln^s of all
di'-ers on the teara;
(c> riaintain a constant visual observation of tin? diver's
exhaust bubbles and,
_l wani off boat traffic which nvay pose a hazard to
the ^Jbreecged divers;
2 in larger vessels, advise the vessel operator as
to the location of"the divers and their readiness for being retrieved;
(d)	Assist the divers, as requested, in exiting the water;
arti
(e)	Perform no other concurrent function vfotdh will inter-
fere with the conduct of the above duties,
A. POLICIES.
a. Individual Diver Responsibility. Bach diver has the rtipotwi-
bllity and pcTvTnige to	~tb dlvo if diving conditions sre unsafe
or unfavorable; If at any specific time, the diver feels that be or she
is not in good physical or rental condition for diving; or if by diving.
CliAP 10
FAP 3
%
E-fi
jzimrm

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MANUAL
CHAPTER 10
EPA QIVMG SAFETY POLICE
OCCUPATIONAL
health Alio safety
the diver would violate the dictates of training or these regulations-
The conditions and reasons for refining to dive nay be required to be
docintentert* If requested, the incident will be reviewed by the officer
in charge of the Repcctixij Uhit with the Unit Diviraj Officer
a**} diver, and appropriate action may be taken. Any action resulting
frcn this review may be appealed to the El* Diving Safety Ctraittee.
b. S3JBA Diving Tear#. Except uVJer anen^ency conditions, the
lxrkly syntqn of at least tvo {2} divers will always be required. In
the evert that diving is shallow within a restricted area, with voter
conditions af law velocity arid turbidity, the bufldy diver nay remain at
the surface fully equipped, maintaining visual, verbal and /or physical
contact with the worfciret diwer at all tiroes. A surface attendant shal J
hr in the Immediate area arty time diving conditions require it.
c- Diver Proficiency- Ertv certified divers should log on avwrage
of at l^st two (2) diving days per month. Any tJjn» si* (6) weeks or
hdtp elapses without a dive, the diver should complete a requalifying
Any time three (3) months or nore elapoes without a dive, the
iltwr utiwt coifilefce a requalifylngprograp before res jrung vork dives.
The FTYs Diving afcty Ccmmttep Oiairman, with the advice of the Divim
officer or designee, shall specify the requalifying fnogran. This re-
quird«»it i\ay be waived by the official in charge of the project,
program, or Reporting Uhit during amrgerrcy conditions* A report of
sucti vniver must he ahuttrtl to the Office of Occupational Health ami
Safety Staff through the l*iit Diving Officer for review by the EPft
Diving Safety Ccmittee. Supervisors will authorize the necessary
tim and payment for qualifying dives if dlviz^ is required for
official prog ran activities. Diving equipment will be available
during nonduty hours for purposes of oaintaining diver proficiency.
5. T31VE& TRMJGHG AND CERTIFICATION.
a. Training.
(1) Basic. All prospective EPA divers must have BiEC^sfuHy
carpietikl a basic"diver training course offerel by one of the nationally
rflOOgniied private agencies (e-g. NAlJl, PADI, VMCA, NASlS) or by the
U.S. davy. Training courses givey by colleges or universities must be
airroved for ccntent by the EI9V Divtrp Officer before being accepted
for this requirement.
rTTOOTT
7
E-7
lfl
PAF 4

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MANUAL
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AfO SAFETY
CHAPTER 10
EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
(2) National Qcanic and Atupg^ierlc ftAidnlBtratlm {UMAl
Training. All warfcinq divwrs, soiior diver® and diving instructors
shall attovl the NOAA 'Diving teciient ^naqeRBnt" class within 1 year
of adoption of th-ia Oiapter.
b. Medical RequirBiienta.
(1) Prior to aco^itance for initial diver tminiiV) or ceft-
iflcation, and annually there* ffcer, eadi rtiwr shall be required to
underqo a	physical exAiii nation. The individual diver 6h?ilI
ptovldd the exairdjiina physician with the (bllowing listed NMA
medical Somn, u appropriate, in order to ensure an exani nation
appropriate to diving activities:
(a)	HQAA Ftoim 64-5, Part t, Medical Rvaluatiai Criteria;
(b)	NOR* Fbrm 64-5, part IT, t>ivinq Fitness Medical
FValuation Report;
(c^ SF-7P, tertiFicaticn of tedLeal Rxaunation (Civilian
Personnel):
(Jrw\ Firmn 64-S, fart ri,
enly, to the liiit Diving Officer for retentim in the
filet and
UUP 10
FAR 5
8
E-8
TM (2/11/02)

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CHiPTEfi 10
MANUAL

EPA DIVING SAFETY FOtlC1/
OCCUPATIONAL

HEALTH AM) SAFETY
(cJ Retain a copy of all forms Cor personal reoocxis and to
provide additional copies should the originals be lost In transmittal.
C3> Signed copies of NCAA 64-5, »rt II, marked "Apprwed"
shall, upon screening ot documents Car earpletenesflp substantiate
nedical qua li Cleat ions for diving.
(4) In any instance where an employee does not neet
established physical standards/ or in any instance where there is a
question about en employee's medical qualification fine diving, the
EPA Diving Safety Committee Chairman may consider a waiver based an
a review of the case by an expert selected by the SPA Medical
Monitoring Program Manager, vho shall render its. medical opinion
and reoonmendations in a timely manner.
(5 J Based upon the opinion and reoortrerriations of the medical
expert seteefced by the tedical Monitoring Ptugract Maiagerr the SW
Diving Safety Committee Chairman shall:
(a) Refuge waiver;
fbj Ap(rove waiver and certify fitness for full diving
duty; or
(c) Apprcve waiver and restrict diving duty as appro-
priate*
it)is designation shall only be nade for conditions that ore not signi-
ficantly disabling and do not constitute a significant threat to the
eoployee or fellow divers.
(6) Mo waiver of any portion of established nodical evalua-
tion criteria shall be granted without further consultation with the
Medical Monitoring Manager. If, after consultation, a waiver is
granted, the Diving Safety Consittee Chairman shall be notified in
writing 20 days prior to the commencement of the waiver, stating
the reasons for granting the «iv«r.
c. Certification. The unit Diving Officer sufcmits the prospective
diver's recerd of qualifications to the EPA Diving Safety Committee
Chairman for final review. Copies of the following should be included;
™(2/11/82}
9
E*9
CHAf> 10
PAP S

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MANUAL
CHAPTER 10
OCCUPATIONAL
EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
HEALTH AHE» SAFETY

(1)	Present certificate;
(2)	The physician's tfcving Fitness nodical Evaluation Report;
(3)	The msulfca Of other tests conducted by the Unit. Diving
OfEicerj
<41 A written statement of the Unit Diving Officer's evaluation
of the overall qualifications and per£br*anc& of t*« & spective diver;
(?) An EPA certification issued by the Unit Diving Officer
in one of the following categories;
(a) Trainee Diver. A diver who has ootipleted a basic
SCUBA diu&r training course but has feffcffiiEd fewer than 15 open uitier
dives. Diver Trainees nay not be faired together to fbm a dive team nor
nay they perform working dives. They my acctn^sny a working diver as a
buddy on dives involving a sis®ii» task, at the discretion oC the thit
Diving Officer.
Cb) Marking OitenceT good jsnlgewent) and considerable experience and who
has logged at least 100 dives. The unlimited diver shall be capable of
serving as tine Dive Supervisor on a given dive*
(6} At the rectnz£endation o£ the tiiit Giving Officer, along
with supporting docwentatign, the 52'A Diving Safety Ccwsuttee Chairman
will issue new classifications as appropriate.
.•s- Reciprocity. In order bo encourage and facilitate joint opera-
tions between rpa facilities and neighboring colleges, universities,
private institutions, or other government agencies, the Uhit Giving
(Officer may Sf^rowc such dive plans upon inspection of the crectentials
of the prosp?ctive non-EPA diver, providing the criteria for certifi-
cation of that diver by the institution he/she represents is curaparabie
to those in this Manual. Hie visiting diver must also have permission
from his/her diving officer and must be oovered by an accident insurance
plan by his/her institution* Questions in this flutter should be directed
to the EPA Diving Safety Gomittee.
CHAP 10
PAR 5
10
£-10
™ (2/11/B2)

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MANUAL
CHAPTER 10

EPA DtVIMG SAFETY ML1CT
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH SAFFTY
6. DIVING QBEWMONS.
a.	OartitlMtfani Bach diver who is an eiifiloyee of the D.S.
DwicgnuMtaT"Protection Agency nifit have an ERft. <£rti(ioatlm at the
level of tha dive being ocnducted. Bach non-E^A dlwr	in a dive
under the Auspices of any EpA facility must have a certification eofpar-
able to EPA certification fron th» Institution ha/she repeesenvs on file
with Che Chit Diving Officer.
b.	MMts*
{1) All dives shall »wploy open circuit SOJBA using ccmtxresacfd
air wiloss otherwise specifically wpprwed fay the Unit Diving Officer
in writing«
(2J All dives shall be within the no dcaangressicn Limits as
specified in the U.S. Navy Deconfressicn Tables. When there is a need
for divas beyond this liirdt the dives oust be approved in advance
by the Oivir*g Safety GGnuiittee.
(3) No solo diving will be permitted.
(41 No diving will he conducted without the submittal and
authorisation of a Dive Plan.
(5)	No dive exceeding the 130 foot depth will be permitted in
the ateenoe of a wsrking daooapteaslen chamber attended by trained
person rial.
(6)	Cave and under ice diving will generally not be permitted.
Submit all requests bo the Unit Diving Offiqer and fiotvacd copies to the
Diving Safety Committee Chairman.
(?) Dives in waters of great depths, uheo; the diver is not in
visual contact with the bottom (over bottom dives) and there a diver
could lose his/her orientation or descend beyond safe limits, will be
cxmdiicted with SOmc provision for direct «j3nfcact with the surfaop such
a* a buoyed weighted line with depth markings.
c.	Dive TOOK. A, standard SCUBA diving tean shall consist of a
mintnsam of 3 aentaersi the Dive Supervisor, the diver buddy* and the
Tender. Some situations nay require a third diver in the water, but at
™ iVll/%2)
11
E-ll
m io
PAR G

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MANUAL
CHAPTER 10

EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
OCCUPATIONAL

HEALTH AND SAFETY

no tine fit lull any diver in the water lose visual or tactile contact
with at least one other diver. If such contact is lest, all divers
must irnrredlately surface. In the situation requiring diving fro- a
boat, the vessel operator's principle responsibility is for the
safety of his/her vessel and its occupants. Hence, depending en the
size of the vessel and ttie conditions. It may be deemed inappropriate
by the Unit Diving officer, the Dive Supervisor, or tl» vessel operator,
foe the latter to serve also as the Tender. When this is the case,
the niw Supervisor will advise the vessel operator as to the safety
precautions specified in this Chapter. At the discretion of the Uhit
Diving Officer, a single diver may enter tlie water if line bonded
from the surface. However, a fully equipped stand-by diver must bo
at the dive site ready to give iraiediate assistance.
d» Equipment. Ml items of equipment shall be visually and opera-
tional ly irwp?ctid before each actual use and must be in proper operating
condition. All dive team Menbors shall be familiar with their ure» The?
following equipnent shall be present at tlie dive site for all dives.
(U Rtrsonal equipment.

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MANUAi
CKAPTEK 10

EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH ASD SAFETY
en required by local
regulation. An appropriate dive Elag is a square red (lag with a white
diagonal stripe at least 12" square (depending on tho size of the
vessel) l/i all waters except those froqjented by international traffic.
In this cas>, the international cede flag "Alpha* will be also IIsod.
In any case* divers will make ovary effort to avoid diving in areas
in wtiic*i traffic would cause a saEety hazard*
lb) First Aid Kit - shall be approved by the unit's
physician who performs the annual physicals. A copy of the African
tbtional Red Cross publication. Standard First Aid and Personal
Safety shall be included and a oc^y of the TiXA/Sea Grants took,
First Md for Boaters and Divers. Also uiL»rgcncy oxygon should be-
an board.
(C) Ladder - shall be prenridud wftcri diving frcra a vessel,
dock or other surface irfierc elevation above the surface oC the water
presents a difficulty to the diver* The ladder mast extend sufficiently
below the surface of the water to support the diver vtiilc still in the
water*
(d) Safety Plan - a copy of this Diving Safety Chapter,
the U.S. Navy Decompress ioi Tables and emergency aid information shall
be present at earti dive site.
{e} CoiBWjnic^tions - at each dive site, shore or wsscl,
located beyond the range of other reasonable voice ccr>Tiunication, a
2-way radio will be provided for use in strnnoniiu emergency aid*
(f) Additional support tanks-should bo on beard and be
available*
(gj Uhdcrttiter transfonder/comnnicator should be on
board.
™ (2/11/82)
13
E-l 3
CHAP 10
PAH. 6

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MANUAL
CJEAFIER ID
epa diving safety policy
OCCttPftMCKAL
fffLAimi AND SAraDf

e. The Dive Plan/Log. Div*»rs are required to log all dives- The
EPA Diving Plan/log will be initiated by the prospective Dive Super-
visor desiring to conduct a dive and submitted to the Uhit Diving
Officer for approval. After the dive is completed, details of the
dive will be recorded and Che Dive Supervisor will certify that the
regulations of the* Manual were adhered to and submit it each n**ith to
the Unit Divtnq Officer.
OIA31 10
tWf b
14
E-14
TN
(2/|l/RTj

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EN\nBCM®4TAL PR.TBCr.iOM KSHCX
MANUAL
APPENDIX A


ODOJPmTCHAL
EPA DIVIMG SAFETY RJLEB
dEALTM MID SAFETY
L C&rtitlcafclon* Each diver must have a valid EPA certi flatten or EFA
equivalent.
2.	sole Diving~ rto one may djw? unattended.
3.	tepthymtg, Dives shall not Exceed 130 foot. tapc^sls for
planned dives to depths greatec than 130 feet will require written
approval by the [hit Divirej Officer or designee*
4.	Dgoompressim Tables. Decompression tables should be copied foe use
by a" pBoEograpliic method nhidi tepedduess art exact copy* It this
method is not available, then the hand copied sci»edtilfl« should bo
checked fee accuracy and signed by several persons.
5.	PgooggrogBioa Dives. Hiving activities v*nich exceed the limits of
no^craipressioh hUSt be approved in advance by the EPA Diving COTWittee.
6.	Over-Itottom Dives* Dives in waters where a diver could sense a loas
of orientation or descend below safe diving depths are to be considered
over-bottom dives* Mo over-bcttam. dives shall be made tnle?® acme direct
contact with the surface is maintained, such as net webr a marked line
3US|z;nded fron a surface float, of depth gauges for all participants,
which permits the diver to determine vrfx?tber ascunsion or desoensien
occurs. Ail such divers *USt be equipped with a buoyancy ccr^ensati^
device*
7* toat Tending. CurirEj dives beytard swiirvdng distance fran shore or
thoso in areas of strong currents, a saaJLl boat with a qualified
operator will tend the diver.
8.	Jjgogrcrogsion chaaber. the location, availability and teleptone
nuttier of all accessible and operable recsn^jcession chafitoers shall tx
maintained by the dive ^ecvisar who instructs the dive tear.
9.	aierqency Procedures. The Unit Diving Officer, with the approval
ot the KPA Diving Safety Conmittee* will prescribe ener^ency procedures
bo he used in handling diving-related accidents in the operational
area, and all divers Shall be familiar with those [procedures* Ml
emergency lists and prooeskiEes shall be available at the dive
location.
10.	First Aid Training. All divers should have appropriate First Aid
and CPR training*
Th
U/ll/82)
ID-A-I
E-15

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MANUAL
OCEHPKrKHAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
APPBJDI* A
EPA DIVING SAFETV POUOf
IX. EfcfuipffiBnt.
a.	Life grogort. ftsn circuit 9CUBA using corafressad air shall
be Other types of egulprsertt (I.e., surface-suppLied diving
equipient, closed-circuit rebreathers, seaiiclaeod units oc other types
of diving apparatus utilizing gas jatxtures) say be approved for use
by the Diving Safety Oanmitta# Chairman. individuals ceqiesting «ae at
ciosed-ctccuit robreathecS; semiclosed units* or other types of equip-
ment must have teen trained and qualified in fcte ua? of sudh equipment.
Dive gijpervisoafB shall also be trained in the use of such equipment
and shall be ready to assist in case a£ an energency.
b.	ttoiwa and Weight Belt. All harness and weight belts oust
have a quick release, operiEIe~by a single imtiori by oithor hand*
c- Flotation Device, ^ch diver shall w&ar an adequate in-
flatable vest or ether flotation device,
<$.	gg„ An in^nater ctnpass Shall be carried by «ach diver
when, In the opinion of the Dive Supervisor, lack of underwater
orientation is likely to occur and oay create a hazard.
e.	Depth Gauge. One underwater depth gauge shall be carried by
each diver wRen diving in an area qf unknown depth or an area of uneven
hot bom contours when a diver might reasonably exceed the planned dive
depth.
f.	Dgcwgragatoft Hater. use of decompress ion metera mil be
authorised enly by the Wving safety comittoe Chairman. Decw*
press Ion meters will rot be used Cor div^s tliidi require deoAp^flsion
stops. Decompression meters car be used as an alternative method of
determining tlie allowable tine at depths before a decompression stop is
required. In all cases at least two rasters must be used simultaneously
with the cron? conservative meter used to determine the allowable dive
time. Decompression meters must be recalibrated every eighteen 118}
nrjnths by a qualified technician.
g. Diving Natch, a diving watch shal I be worn by each aesnber of a
diving team.
Diving Flag. A diving flag shall he shown while actively diving
in areas subject to boating or other hazardous traffic.
10-A-?
£-16
™ l2/ll/fi2>

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APPSND1X A
MANUAL

EPA DIVING SAFETY JULES
OOCUP/tTICHAL

HEALTH AND SAFETY
i. Air Gpapresgcr. No peraoo shall operate a SCUBA, air ocnfcessor
without having first read the instructions and assisted an operator
experienced in its operation. An operational leg shall be maintained
for all EPA SCUQA compressors*
12,	Byiiprent Maintenance. All diving gear and accessory equipnent
shall be maintained in a safe operating csanditicn. Manyfacturers recooi-
HEndod servicing policy shal 1 be Co I lowed. Equipment in qL*?atinciable
condition shall be repaired, overhauled, or discarded. All regulatory
valvesj depth gauges, and decompression meters must be critically
examined, calibrated, or checked for accuracy by a ocmpetent mechanic
or appropriate specialist every eighteen (IB) months. A record of
the inspection and repair will be filed with the unit Diving
Officer.
13,	Air 'fork inspection and Testing. Ttie interior of all cylinders must
be visually inspected annually by a trained pers*i; cylinders shall be
hydrostatics lly tested at least every three (3} years. The date of the
Last test must be recorded on trie tank.
14,	Air. Tanks shall be charged only with air certified as meeting
established air standards.
TH 12/U/&Z)
10-A-3
E-I7

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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
5Aei*E ISLAND
QUL? »»£«!£. ruMlfiA Jill)
EPA Diving Physical Examination Checklist
Jim Patrick
Diving Supervisor
Name of Diver
Date
Organization				
A copy of all physical examination reports *111 be submitted to the Unit Diving
Offleer.
Physical examinations should be reported on the following:
0 1. Report of Medical Examination, SF-03,
0 2. Report of Medical History, SF-93.
All reports should be COMPLETE as described by NQAA Diving Medical Evaluation
Criteria (keyed to SF-88)~ with PARTICULAR ATTENTIQH to:
0 3. 12 Lead Resting EKG - Required for initial certification and
annually after age 35.
Q 4. Audiogram - Required for initial certification and every 5 years
~	thereafter,
0 5» Chest x-ray - Required for Initial certification, bi-annual1y
until age 40, and annually thereafter*.
0	6-	Blood Pressure - Required for all examinations,
0	7.	Height and Weight - Required for all examinations*
0	S.	SF-&8 Item #77A marked qualified for diving.
0	9.	Date of Physical - Required en all report forms*
0 10. Signature - Required on ALl report forms; all signature blocks
for both the examining physician and the examinee should be
completed.
I have reviewed the attached physical examination report and consider It to be
complete. There are no obvious omissions nor obvious inconsistencies with the
NQAA Diving Medical Evaluation Criteria*
Signature of UD0~ ™	Date
E-1&

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*00 DIVER INFORMATION SUMMARY
NOAA
|	| "OS |—| HQ
Q NMFS O E ttl
| | Noo-NOAA:
Wane of A^encjr
N«ne of Diver
Date of Birth
Blood Type £ RH Factor
TRAINING «. CERTIFICATIONS:
Operational; 	
Ory-Sult: 	
[Hyenaster:
Chiunb. Oper: 	
EMT:
DATE OF LAST:
Physical
Name of UOO
Certification Level
Oate of Certification
Polluted Water:
Surface Suppl led:
Mixed Gas;
Open Sell:
Other:
Chest X-ny
EKG
Audioqraa
NOTES:
E-19

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DIVER RESUHE
Nae
Date
1. Fondat Training (date, location, certification):
2. Special qualifications (ex. UDT, EOD. Instructor);
3. Other Training (ex, «1xed 
-------
PARTI
MEDICAL EVALUATION CRITERIA
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-------
APPENDIX F
BASIC DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES
ANNEX 1
LEVEL A DECONTAMINATION
A. EQUIPMENT UORN
The full decontamination procedure outlined 1s for workers wearing
Level A protection (with taped Joints between gloves, boots. And suit)
consisting of;
*	Fully encapsulating suit with integral boots and gloves.
-	Self-contained breathing apparatus.
-	Hard hat (optional}.
-	Chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank boots.
-	Boot covers*
•	Inner and outer gloves.
A. PROCEDURE FOR FULL DECONTAMINATION
Station 1: Segregated Equipment Drop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, sailing devices and containers,
monitoring Instruments, radios, clipboards, etc.) on plastic drop cloths
or in different containers with plastic liners. Each will be
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the drop reduces the
probability of cross-contamination.
Equipment: various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop cloths
Station 2: Boot Cover and Glove Wash
Scrub outer boot covers and gloves with decon solution or detergent/
water.
Equipment: container 120-30 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
F-l

-------
Station 3: Boot Cover and Glove Rinse
Rinse off dec on solution frem Station 2 using copious amounts of water.
Repeat as «any tines as necessary.
Equipment: container C3D-S0 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle„ soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 4: Tape Removal
Remove tape around boots and gloves, and deposit in container with plastic
liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 5: Boot Cover Reaoval
Remove boot covers and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic Hners
bench or stool
Station 6: Outer Glove Removal
Remove outer gloves and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container C20—3X3 gallon?)
plastic liners
Station 7; Suit/Safety Soot Wash
Thoroughly wash fully encapsulating suit and boots> Scrub suit and boots
with long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brush and copious amounts of decon
solution or detergent/water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent/water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
£tation_8^ Suit/Safety Ooot Rinse
Rinse off dec on solution or detergent/water using copious aaounts of
water. Repeat as nany times as necessary.

-------
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 lung-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 9: Tank Change
If worker leaves Exclusion Zone to change air tank, this is the last Step
in the decontamination procedure* Worker's air tank is exchanged, new
outer gloves and boots covers donned, and joints taped:. Worker then
returns to duty.
Equipment: Air tanks
tape
boot covers
gloves
Station 10: Safety Boot Re«wal
Reaove safety boots and deposit In container with plastic liner.
Equipment; container (30-50 gallons]
plastic 11 tiers
bench or stool
boot jack
Station 11: Fully Encapsulating Suit and Hard Hat Removal
With assistance of helper, remove fully encapsulating suit (and hard hat).
Hang suits on rack or lay out on drop cloths.
Equipment: rack
drop cloths
bench or stool
Station 12; SCBA Backpack Removal
While still wearing facepte^e. reaove backpack and place on table.
Ofsconnect hose from regulator valve and proceed to next station.
Equipment: table
Station 13; Inner Glove Wash
Wash with decon solution or detergent/water that will not harm skin*
Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: basin or bucket
decon solution
or
detegent/water
small table

-------
Station 14; Inner Glove Rinse
Rinse with water. Repeat as aa.ty times as necessary *
Equipment: water
basin or bucket
snail table
Station 15: Facepiece Removal
Remove facepieee. Deposit in container with plastic liner. Avoid
touching face with fingers.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 16: Inner Glove Removal
Reaove inner gloves and deposit In container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 17: Inner Clothing Removal
Remove clothing soaked with perspiration. Place in container with plastic
Hner. Do not wear inner clothing off-site since there Is a possibility
that small roounts of contaaiinants might have been transferred In removing
fully encapsulating suit.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic Hners
Station 18: Field Vash
Shower if highly toxic, skin-corrosive or skIn-absorbable materials are
known or suspected to be present. Vash hands and face if shower Is not
available.
Equipment: water
soap
small table
basin or bucket
field showers
towels
Station 1?: Redress
Put on dean clothes. A dressing trailer is needed in Inclement weather.
Equipment: tables
chairs
lockers
clothes

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C. FULL DECONTAMINATION [SIT. I) AMD THREE MODIFICATIONS
s
I
STATION NUMBER
T
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
a
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
1
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
t
2
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X










3
X





X
X

X
X
X


X
X
X
X

4
X





X
X
X










Situation 1: The Individual entering the Contain!nation Reduction
Corridor is observed to be grossly contaminated or extremely toxic
substances are known or suspected to be present*
Situation 2: Same as Situation 1 except Individual needs new air tank
and will return to Exclusion 2orve.
Situation 3: Individual entering the CRC Is expected to minimally
containnateti- Extremely toxic or skin-corrosive materials are not
present. No outer gloves or boot, coders are worn. Inner gloves are not
contaminated.
Situation 4; Sane as Situation 3 except individual needs new air tank
and «i u return to Exclusion Zone.

-------
EXCLUSION
ZONE
OuTtn OL0VB
REMOVAJ,
TMt
HKWtt
«QOT COVtH
t
OLOVEWUH
TANK CKUKU
0-
•0OTCDVDI
I0OT ««OI t
«nO
removal.
"BLn 1111
I" I
lljl KEDflEU
CQftTAMMATtOM
' " CDKflOLUNt
SUPPORT
ZONE

-------
ANNEX I
LEYEL 0 DECONTAMINATION
A. EQUIPMENT UOJDJ
The full decontamination procedure outlined Is for workers wearing
Level 6 protection (with taped joints between gloves, boot, and suit IT
consisting of:
-	One-piece, hooded, chemical-resistant splash suit*
-	Self-contained breathing apparatus-
-	Hard hat-
-	Chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank boots.
-	Boot covers
-	Inner and outer gloves.
B. PROCEDURE FOR FULL DECONTAMINATION
Station 1: Segregated Equipaent Drop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, sampling devices and container's
monitoring Instruments, radios, clipboards, etc.} on plastic drop cloths
or 1n different containers with plastic liners. Each wilt he
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the drop reduces the
probability of cross-contamination.
Equipment: various sfze containers
plastic liners
plastic drop cloths
Station 2: Boot Cover and Glove Wash
Scrub outer boot covers and gloves with decon solution or detergent/
water.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes

-------
Station 3: Boot Cover and Glove Rinse
Rinse off dec 0*1 solution fro a Station 1 using copious amounts of water.
Repeat as many tines as necessary.
Equipment: container {30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 4: Tape Removal
Remove tape around boots and gloves and deposit In container with plastic
lfner.
Equipment: container [20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 5: Soot Cover Removal
Remove boot covers and deposit In container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 6: Outer Glove Removal
Remove outer gloves and deposit In container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 7: Suit/Safety Boot Nash
Thoroughly wash chemical-resistant splash suit, SCflA, gloves, and safety
boots. Scrub with long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brush and copious
amounts of decon solution or detergent/water. Wrap SCBA regulator [If
belt-mounted type) with plastic to keep out water. Wash backpack
assembly with sponges or cloths.
Equipment: container {30-50 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent/water
2-3 long-handle, soft-brtstle scrub brushes
small buckets
sponges or cloths

-------
Station fl: Sult/SCBA/Boot/Glove Rinse
Rinse off decon solution or detergent/mater using copious Mounts of
water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container [30-50 gallons)
OP
high-pressure spray unit
water
soall buckets
2-3 long-hand!e„ soft-bristle scrub brushes
sponges or cloths
Station 9: Tank Change
If worker leaves Exclusion Zone to change air tank, this is the last step
In the decontaaination procedure. Worker's air tank is exchanged, new
Outer gloves and boots cowers donned, and joints taped. Worker returns to
duty.
Equipment: air tanks
tape
boot covers
jl oves
Station 1Q: Safety Boot Retrieval
Remove safety boots and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container {30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
boot jack
Station 1L: 5CBA Backpack Removal
While still wearing faceplece, remove backpack and place on table.
Disconnect hose from regulator valve and proceed to next statfon,
Equipment: table
Station 12: Splash Suit Removal
With assistance of helper„ remve splash suit. Oeposit in container with
plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-60 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool

-------
Station 13: Inner Glove Mash
Hash Inner gloves with decon solution or detergent/water that will not
harm skin. Repeat a$ many tiaes as necessary.
Equipment: decon solution
or
detergent/water
basin or bucket
small table
Station 14: Inner Clove Rinse
Rinse inner gloves with water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: water
basin or bucket
snail table
StationlS: Faceplece Removal
Remove faceplece. Avoid touching face with gloves. Deposit in container
with plastic liner.
Equipment- container (30-50 gallons!
plastic liners
Station 16: Inner Glove Removal
Remove inner gloves and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons!
plastic miners
Station 17: inner Clothing Removal
Remove clothing soaked with perspiration. Place in container with plastic
liner* Do not wear inner clothing off-sfte since there is a possibility
snail amounts of contaminants might have been transferred in reaoving
fully encapsulating suit-
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 18: Field Hash
Shower If highly toxic, skin-corrosive, or skin-absortable materials are
known or suspected to be present. Wash hands and face If shower Is not
available.
Equipment: water
soap

-------
saall tables
basins or buckets
field shears
Sutter 19: Redress
Put On clean clothes* A dressing trailer Is needed in inclement weather*
Equipment; tables
cbalrs
lockers
clothes
C„ FULL OECONTAMIMATIQH (SIT. 1) AHO THREE MODIFICATIONS
s
1






STATION NUMBER
X
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
a
9
10
u
iz
13
14
1$
16
17
18
19
1
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
2
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X










3
X





X
X

X
X
X


X
X
X
X

4
X





X
X
X










SUuitiorM: The individual entering the Contamination Reduction
Corridor is observed to he grossly contanln-ated or extrewely toxic
substances are kno*n or suspected to be present.
Situation 2i Sane as Situation l except Individual needs nem air tank
«nd will return to Exclusion Zone.
Situation 3: Individual entering the CRC is expected to be «1nimally
contaminated. Extremely toxic or sktn-corroslve aaterlals are not
present. Ho outer gloves or boot covers are worn, Inner gloves are not
contaminated.
Situatiort_4^ Sane as Situation J except individual needs new *1r tank.
arvT TTTTTetifm to Exclusion Zone*

-------
OUTtuflion
MHO'M,
i
QtOl4«MU
tgiriwcn boot
«rMH
ramst
TAMCHkMO*
16
SCAa «aCkpaCx
JWHOVML
CONTAMINATION
REOUCTION
ZONE
HCONTMUUTHN LA If OUT
LlTtL • WWCTBM
HOUM U-l
MNU OLOVE
WASH
INMEU OLGVt
14
ex a.DT>B»a
hcuovji.
COWTJUtfMftTIOtt
' COKTPOt UHt
SUPPORT
ZONE

-------
(UINCX 3
LEVEL C OECONTAKlMATlOtf
A. EQUIPMENT WORN
Thte full decontamination procedure CHltlined iS for workers wearing
level C protection {with taped joints between gloves* boots, and suK)
consisting of:
One-piecc, hocd^d, chsnifil-reshunt splash suit.
Canister equipped, full-face 
-------
Station 3: Boot Cover Md Glove Rinse
Rinse off decon solution from Station 2 using copious amounts of water.
Repeat as many tines as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons}
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle, scft-brtstle scrub brushes
Station 4: Tape Rcmval
Remove tape around boots and gloves, and deposit in container with plastic
liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 5: Boot Cover Re®o»al
Remove boot covers and deposit In container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-SQ gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 6: Outer Glove Removal
fteatwe outer gloves and deposit In container with plastic liner.
Equipment; container (20-30 gallons}
plastic liners
Station 7: Suit/Safely Boot Wash
Thoroughly wash splash suit ana safety boots. Scrub with long-handle»
soft-bristle scrub brush and copious amounts of decon solution or
detergent/water. Repeat as asny times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-SO gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent/water
Z-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 6: Suit/Safety Boot Rinse
Rinse off decon solution or detergent/water using copious anourvts of
water. Repeat as Mny tioes as necessary.

-------
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 9: Canister or Mask Change
tf worker leaves Exclusion Zone to change canister (or m»slc), this is the
last step In the decontamination procedure* Worker's canister fs
exchanged„ new outer gloves and boots covers donned, and Joints taped.
Worker returns to duty-
Equipment: canister (or mask)
tape
boot covers
gloves
Station 10: Safety Boot Removal
Remove safety boots and deposit In container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
boot jack
Station 11: Splash Suit Removal
with assistance of helper, remove splash suit. Deposit in container with
plastic liner.
Equipment: container f30-50 gallons)
bench or stool
plastic liner
Station_12^ Inner Glove Mash
Wash inner gloves with decon solution or detergent/water that will not
harm skin. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: decon solution
or
detergent/water
basin or bucket
Station 13: Inner Glove Rinse
Rinse Inner gloves with water. Repeat as many times as necessary.

-------
Equipment: water
basin or bucket
small table
Station 14: Facepiece Removal
Remove facepiece. Avoid touching face with gloves. Deposit facepiece in
container with plastic 11ner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 15: Inner Glove Removal
Remove inner gloves and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 16: Inner Clothing Removal
Remove clothing soaked with perspiration. Place in container with plastic
lfner. Do not wear Inner clothing off-site since there is a possibility
small jaunts of contaminants might have been transferred in removing
fully encapsulating suit.
Equipment: container £30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station L7: field Mash
Shower if highly toxic» skin-corrosive or skin-absorbable materials are
known or suspected to be present. Wash hands and face if shower is not
aval table.
Equipment: water
soap
tables
wash basins/buckets
field showers
Station 16: Redress
Put on clean clothes. A dressing trailer is needed In inclement weather.
Equipment: tables
chairs
lockers
clothes

-------
C. FULL DECONTAMINATION (SIT. 1) AND THREE MODIFICATIONS
s
I
STATION WWER
T
1
2
3
4
5
&
7
a
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
IS
17
16
1
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
2
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X









3 1
X





X
X

X
X


X
X
X
X

4
X





X
X
X









Situation 1: The Individual entering the Contamination deduction
Corridor is observed to be grossly contaminated or extremely skin-
corrosive substances are known or suspected to be present-
Situation 2: Same a$ Situation 1 except Individual needs new canister
or masJt and will return to Exclusion Zone.
Situation 3: Individual entering the CRC Is expected to bo minimally
contaminated. Extremely slt1n-cori*o$1 ve materials are not present. Mo
outer gloves or boot covers are worn. Inner gloves are not
contaminated.
Situation 4; Saw® as Situation 3 except Individual needs new canister
or B»as* and will return to Exclusion Zone.

-------
CMIT9M
HUKOUMt
©¦
EXCLUSION
ZONE
ouiuount
MMQVJU.
TA»f
ftCMQWAt
iOOT cow
«
ccovt imw
0—"siS™
BOareawm
MXOVK.
»oCTcovtira
QLOItlWM
fmrflmnrrr ioot
wash
sorjuFin
'HD1UM» ¦—
IB I
unTYtOOr
NCMOVAL
CONTAMIN ATIOM
REDUCTION
ZONE
11
u]
I*UW1U(T
NIMDV4
INNER 010*1
WISH
RINlt
nCONtNHWTIOHUYOUr
iFra.c*fforccnott
nwwxa-t
<4 l
tKX «a
WHOVJl
I til
IMhUQIOVC
RtHQVU.
HNEfl dOftalNO
KMOVU
«U)
WJkSH
0——K|)

COMTDOL UN*
SUPPORT
ZONE

-------
AJMEX 4
LEVa A DECONTAMINATION, MlHfHUM LAYOUT
a. EQUWfEirf vORtf
The decontaulnation procedure outlined 1* ft— v«,rners waring Level A
protection (with taped joints between gloves, boots, and suit) consisting
of:
-	Fully encapsulating suit with integral boots and gloves -
-	Self-contained breathing apparatus-
-	Hard hat (optional]~
-	Chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank boats,
-	Boot covers.
-	Inner and outer gloves.
B. PROCEDURE FOR FULL OECONTAHIHAT[Qtt
StatlonJL^ Segregated Equipment Drop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, sampling devices and containers,
Monitoring instruments, radios, clipboards, etc.) on plastic drop cloths
or 1n different containers with plastic liners. Each will be
conttftln&ted to a different degree. Segregation *t the drop reduces the
probability of cross-contMlnation.
Equipment: various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop clothes
Station Zz Outer Garment, Boots, and Gloves Wash and Rinse
Scrub outer boots, outer gloves, and fully-encapsulating suit with decon
solution or detergent water. Rinse off using copious amounts of water.
Equipment: containers 130-50 gallons}
decon solution
or
detergent water
rinse water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes

-------
Station 3: Outer Boot and Glove Removal
Renove outer boots and gloves- Deposit 1m container with plastic liner-
Equipment: container (30-50 gallant}
pla$tic liners
bench or stool
Station ~: Tank Change
If worker leaves Exclusion Zone to change air tank, this is the last step
in the decontamination procedure. Worker's air tank is exchanged, new
outer gloves and boot covers donned, joints taped, and worker returns to
duty.
Equipment: atr tanks
tape
hoot covers
glowes
Station S; Boot* Gloves, *nd Outer Garment Removal
Bootsa fully-encapsulating suit, and Inner gloves removed and deposited
in separate containers lined with plastic.
Equfpaentt containers '30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 6: SCBA Removal
SC9A backpack and facepiece Is removed. Hands and face are thoroughly
washed. SCBA deposited on plastic sheets*
Equipment: plastic sheets
basfn or bucket
soap and towels
bench
Station 7: Field Wash
Thoroughly wash hands and face. Shower as soon as possible.
Equipment: water
soap
tables
wash basin/bucket

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tan*
CHANGE
0
EXCLUSION
ZONE
BEBflEOATEO CUWMCMT
0*0#
•-WTUHE"-
0
0-	0
OUTZK OAMMCNT. SOOT*, AND
CLO<4* **tH AM) R4NSK
CONTAMINATION
REDUCTION
ZONE
0
0
oum 0oqt juto
ClCVl REMOVAL
¦son, EUMl AMO
~UTEn ONWfT
ACH0D4
SC#A AlxOVU
ULMItU U
ManAwuiiQN utout
ino.*«sncn«(
ntURt/»!
CONTAMINATION
CONTROL tlM« '
0
FIELD WASH
SUPPORT
ZONE

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APPENDS s
SCUACES a-' INFORMATION AW) RE SPOUSE ASSISTANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Many sources of information and organizations can provide response
personnel with technical data and physical assistance regarding both the
Hazards associated with an incident and methods to deal with the*. It Is
nacessary to be aware of these resources and know how to use the*.
The Information, which may Include data on sites, topography, meteorology,
physical/chemical properties of the material, applicable treatment methods,
and available cleanup resources, can be provided by various agencies, taps,
reference books, and manuals. it is advisable to get data fn* at least
two sources and use the latest addition of any reference, especially when
searching for hygienic standards or toxicological data.
Access to on-line cowfjuter files Bay be possible at the site if a
telephone, portable terminal, and 120-volt outlet are available. Aerial
photographs can also provide useful Information whan properly Interpreted.
It. BASIC REFERENCES
A. OHMTADS: Oil and Hazardous Materials Technical Assistance Data System,
developed by the EPA. Access through EPA Regional Offices.
OHMTADS Is a computerized data retrieval system available 1n the form
of a computer print-out, manuals, or microfiche. For etch of more than
1,000 oil and hazardous substances, there are 126 possible information
segments on, for example, toxicity and associated hazards* personal
safety precautions, cleanup and disposal methods, materials handling,
and fire fighting. However, not all Information 1s available for all
materials.
ft. CHRIS: Chemical Hazard Response Information System, developed by the
U.S. Coast Guard. Access through the National Response tenter,
telephone 000/424-8302
CHRIS consists of four manuals, a regional contingency plan, a Hazard
Assessment Computer System iHACSI, and an organizational entity at
Coast Guard Headquarters. Volume 1 (C6-446-1) is designed to be used
by the first responders tt an Incident. Volimws 2. 3, and 4 (CG-446-2,
CG-M6-3, and CG-446-4, respectively) are Intended for use by the
On-Scene Coordinator's (OSC) office along with the Regional and
National Response Craters- Coast Guard stations, especially those In
major parts, will usually have these manuals.

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1. Volume l: "Condensed Guide to Chemical Hazards
Volume 1 is Intended for use by the first responders on the scene
of an Incident* The chemicals Involved nust be known, however,
before the appropriate information can be obtained from the manual.
This voime also contains a list of questions needed to access
Volume 3. All information in this volume can be found In
Volume 2.
2. Volume 2: "Hazardous Substance Data Manual*, (also available from
the M.S. Government Printing Office, Washington. OC 20402. GPO
stock number 050-012-00147-2)
Yo1tve 2 is probably the most useful in responding to spills/waste
sites. Containing information on hazardous chemicals Shipped in
large volume by water, it is intended to be used by port security
personnel and others who may be first to arrive at the scene. The
easily understood information about chemical, physical, and
toxicologic*1! properties can help quickly determine the actions to
be taken Immediately to safeguard life, property, and the
environment*
3- Vol me 3; "Hazard Assessment Handbook"
Volume 3 describes methods of estimating the quantity of chemicals
which may be released during an Incident, their rate of dispersion,
and the methods for predicting any potential toxic, fire, and
explosive hazards.
Volumes 2 and 3 are designed to be used together. The hazard
assessment code in Volume 2 for each chemical Is used in Volume 3
to select the appropriate procedures to calculate hazard
assessment.
4. Volume 4: "Response Methods Handbook"
Volume 4 contains Information on existing methods for handling
spills of hazardous materials. The appendix lists manufacturers of
equipment which may be useful. It also describes methods of spill
{primarily oil), containment. This volume Is Intended for use by
Coast Guard OSCs with some training or experience in hazard
response.
C. 'Documentation of the Threshold limit Values (TLV)*, fourth edition
(I960}. ACGIH Publications Office, 6500	Ave., Building 0-5,
Cincinnati, OH 45221
This book gives pertinent scientific Information, with references to
literature sources used to determine each TLV. Each documentation also
defines the type of toxic response for tdHch the limit fs used. This
book should be consulted for a better understanding of TLV's,

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[See Part 5, "Threshold Unit Values and Other Guidelines."}
D.	National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health/Occupational
Safety and Health Adirfnistration Resources
1.	"M1GSK/OSHA Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards," U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
Information in this pocket guide coves fron the HIOSH/OSHA
Occupational Health Guidelines. Presented in a tabular forest, it
Is a reference for industrial hygiene and ncdical surveillance
practices. Included are chenical nwes and synonyms, permissible
exposure Halts, chemical and physical properties, signs and
synptons of overexposure, environmental and aedical Monitoring
procedures, recon—ended respiratory and personal protective
equipment, and procedures for treatment.
2.	"HIOSH/OSHA Occupational Health Guidelines for Chemical Hazard's,"
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington. DC 20402
This three-vol t*e document provides technical data for most or the
substances listed In the 'HIQSH/05HA Pocket Guide." The
Information is audi nore detailed and is designed primarily for us4
by industrial hygfenlsts «d aedfcal surveillance personnel. In
addition to the information found in the "Pocket Guide/
"Occupational Health Guidelines" includes reconended aedlcal
surveillance practices, air monitoring and measurement procedures,
personnel sanitation, and spill and disposal techniques*
E.	"Fire Prevention Guide on Hazardous Materials,11 National Fire
Protection Association (tFPA), Quincy, HA 02269
The HFPA has eoablned five manuals into one comprehensive guide on
hazardous materials* These five present Information on:
1.	Flashpoint of oils, together vltti nore than 8,800 trade-na«e
chemicals* their flashpoints, nanufacturers, and principal uses*
The fl amiability hazard can be determined from this information.
2.	Fire hazards of 1,300 flmmble liquids, gases, and solids are
listed in alphabetical order with appropriate fire-fighting
information. Various properties listed Incltrde flashpoint,
specific gravity, water solubility, hazard identification, and
boiling point.
3.	Toxicity 
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5. Reco«MWied system for identification of fire huirdt of materials*
The NFPA labeling system 1s described In detail, with a careful
explanation of the ratings.
This Hernial presents a large amount of Information, but Mis with
pure chemicals, not Mixtures. Soae experience is required to
interpret the manual property.
F.	"The Herck Index/ ninth edition (19761, Merck and to., Inc.,
Raway, HI 07065
"The Iterck Index" Is a comprehensive, interdisciplinary encyclopedia of
chemicals, drugs,, and biological substances* It describes 9.S56
chemicals In a structured format* An extensive index and cross-Index
•alee the manual easy to use. It Is designed to serve a variety of
purposes* For response personnel, It provides Information on
physical/chemical properties of chemicals and their toxicity.
G.	"Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials/ fourth edition (19751,
edited by N. Irving Sax, Van Hostrand Reinhotd, Co., 135 N* 50th St*,
New York, NY 10020
This book provides a single source of concise Information on the
hazards of nearly 13,000 cn—nra industrial and laboratory materials.
Descriptive information and technical data are given In the three
sections of the book. The main section, general information, Is
designed to expedite retrieval of hazard information* The three
sections are:
1* General information: synonyms, description,, formula, physical
constants.
2.	Hazard analysis: toxicity, fire hazard, explosive hazard.
3.	Countarmeasures: handling, storage, shipping, first aid.
fire-fighting, personnel protection.
This book Is not Intended for use on site* It can be useful later,
however, to verify hazards associated with the vergency*
H.	"Condensed Chemical Dictionary," Gessner G. Hawley, Van Nostrand
Helnhold Co.. 13$ H. 50th St., Mew York, NY 10020
This book, a compendium of technical data and descriptive Information
covering any thousands of chemicals and reactions, is designed for
very quick use and can be helpful In assessing a hazardous waste site
or spill. Three distinct lypti of Information are presented:
1. Technical descriptions of compounds, raw materials, and processes.

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2.	Expended definitions, of chemical entitles, phenomena, And
terminology.
3.	Description or Identification of a wide range of trade-name
products used in the chemical Industry.
. ON-LIHE COMPTER SYSTEMS
1. OHHTADS: Access through EPA Regional Offices
OWITADS, EPA's computerized Information retrieval system, can feel p
Identify material from observations (smell, color, etc.} nde at each
site. The Information In the 126 se
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Provide up-to-date information to OSC's. When a spill occurs And
the predeslgnated DSC In that area 14 notified of the specific
details, he Is responsible for bringing the best comblnation of
response resources to bear or> the problem. SKIN helps make such
decisions.
Provide updates to equipment listings In local contingency plans.
Nhlle Marry of these plans now are out of date, SKIN enables local
and Regional Response Teams to obtain up-to-date listings.
Serves as an informational aid for Coast Guard Marine Safety
Offices, captains of the ports, and district and! headquarters
Managers- this enhances the decision-Making capability of those
concerned with budgeting, resources allocation, and planning for
pollution response.
3e used by all Federal agencies Involved with the National or
Regional Response Teaas.
Private Fins Offering Access to Data Banks
SDC: System development Corp., telephone 6CO/352-S&69 (California),
800/421-7225 (Continental U.S., except California)
The SOC Search service Is one of the most comprehensive on-line
retrieval services In the world* It provides easy, convenient access
to one of the largest families of on-line literature and reference
data bases obtainable anywhere - most of the* available only through
SDC. Its services Include: EHVIR0L1ME, which contains citations on
all areas of environmental studies and covers such subjects as air
pollution, chemical and biological contamination, energy,
environmental education, environmental design and urban ecology,
population planning, and geographical changes. The use of modern
telecoennlcatlons, SCC's co^uters, and ORBIT, its advanced,
field-tested retrieval system, permits retrieving the necessary
Information quickly, precisely, and efficiently. Because of ORSIT's
quick response characteristics, an effective search from start to
finish can often be completed In as little as S-10 minutes.
Sigsa Data Computing Corp., 926 ttayne Ave., Silver Spring, NO 20910,
telephone 301/589-6101.
This company provides computer services and products to governmental
and coanercial clients.
Sigma Data Services, Corp., same address as above, telephone
301/565-3773.
This company operates computer facilities and provides analysts and
programing services for government agencies.

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L REMOIt SNSIMG ANU MAP INTERPRETATION
A, Aerial Photography
1.	Environmental Photograph Interpretation Center, Warrenton, VA 2Z1B&,
telephone 703/557-3110 (EPA Regions I-1Y}
Environmental Monitoring and Support Laboratory, las VegasT HY 89114,
telephone 702f79&-2237 {EPA Regions V-X>
Aerial photography can be useful In a spill response In that a plane
can Fly over the area the time of the spill recording Its extent.
Subsequent flights can show the dispersion. Also, aany different
types of photography, including Infrared* can help describe waste
sites and plume dispersion. Historical photos can trace a facility
from its inception to the present, pfn-pointtng past activities that
may audi trouble spots.
Aerial photography has another use, Monitoring facilities that
produce or store chemicals. Spill and spill-threat conditions that
exist in many suth facilities May also be photographically
documented- Aerial photographers can assist with the *>nitoring of
chemical facilities for compliance with the spill prevention
regulations Issued under the Federal Vater Pollution Control Act
as amended in 1977. Aerial reconnaissance missions effectively and
economically augment compliance monitoring efforts of EPA Regions or
Other regulatory agencies * An airplane can fly over a large number
of areas and facilities in a brief period of time. Once the
photographs have been Interpreted, spill prevention personnel can use
the results to inspect areas or facilities in a Minimum amount of
time because they can concentrate on tftose areas with the spill
problem.
2.	EROS Data Center, User Services, Sioux falls, SO 57198, telephone
504/594-6511, ext. 151
The EROS system, run by the U-S. Geological Survey, uses remote-
sensing techniques to inventory, monitor, and manage natural
resources. EROS Includes research and training 1n the Interpretation
and application of remotely sensed data and provides these data at
nominal cost.
At the heart of the EROS Data Center is a central computer complex
which controls a data base of over 6 million Images and photographs
of the earth's surface features, searches for geographic data on
areas of interest, and serves as a management tool for the entire
data reproduction process. The computerized data storage and
retrieval system 1s based on latitude and longitude, supplemented by
information about image quality* cloud cover, and type of data.

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Information received from the EROS Data Center can be used In Mich
the sane way as information received frm the Environmental
Monitoring arvd Support Laboratory. EROS data provide a chronological
overview of an area, thereby establishing the extent of daauge over
time.
B. U.S. Geological Survey Maps
!~ Tomographic quandrangle saps
Topographic npt are useful In that they show the contours of the
land, the network of water features, and elevations. They also show
cities and urban areas and, In the case of a spill or waste site,
they tell how close a spill or waste site 1s to a lake, river,
stream, or population centers.
2.	Hydrologic Mps
Hydro logic mps show water in or beneath the land surface. They are
very useful **ien evaluating water supply and water-related hazards
such as flooding* They also show drainage areas, depth to ground
water. and the thickness of water-bearing formations. In the case of
a spill or waste site, a frdrologlc nap Is can Indicate any possible
contamination of the ground water and/or drainage area.
3.	Land use and land cover naps
Land use and land cover naps have been prepared by using the standard
topographic quadrangle maps or larger-scale low-altitude aerial
photographs as a base. These naps provide detailed Information about
the way people use the land or about the vegetation cover. This
Information could be useful at a spill or waste site. For example.
If chemicals enter an area being used for crops* authorities should
be advised of the chemical(s) involved and their possible effects.
4.	Sources of maps
Naps are available In areas east of the Mississippi River, Including
Minnesota. Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Island, from:
Branch of Distribution
U.S. Geological Survey
1200 South Eads St.
Arlington, YA Z220Z
Telephone: 703/557-2751
Areas west of the Mississippi River, Including Alaska. Hawaii,
Louisiana, Guam* and American Somoa, should order from:

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Branch cf Distribution
U.S. Geological Survey
Box 25286, Federal Center
Denver. CO 80225
Telephone: 303/234-3832
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ORGAHlZATIWS
A. Federal
1.	IRAP: Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan. Access through
CBEWTREC (see section 8}, telephone 800/424-4306 (24 hours), or
202/483-7616 In Washington, DC. Also through Regional Office* of
EPA and Department of Energy (DOE).
1RAP is designed to assist In coping with radiation emergencies. It
operates through ME, hut works closely with other Federal, State,
military* and regional groups. Upon receiving in emergency call,
the regional coordinator of IRAP Investigates the situation, getting
as wch Information as possible as to the type of material. If the
spill or leak appears serious, a technical response team 1s
dispatched and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Is notified. The
main functions of the response team are to assess the hazard, Inform
the public, and recommend emergency actions to minimize the hazard.
The responsibility for cleanup rests with the shipper or carrier of
the material at the time of the sptll.
2.	Coast Guard National strike Force. Access through the National
Response Center, telephone 800/424-680!~
The National Strike Force {NSF) Is a part of the National Response
Team established under the authority of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act as amended In 1977. it consists of high seas oil
cleanup equipment and trained personnel available to assist the OSC
upon request during Phase III (Containment and Countermeasures),
Phase IY (Cleanup, Mitigation, and Disposal!, and Phase V
(Documentation and Cost Recovery1. as defined In the National
Contingency Plan. A Coast Guard Strike Team 1s located on the East.
Nest, and Gulf Coasts. Each Is capable of responding to a pollution
Incident In its area with four or more men within 2 hours and be at
full strength 1n 12 hours. The teams can provide comttnlcation
support, assistance, and advice on ship salvage, diving, and removal
techniques.
3.	U.S. Army Technical {Escort Center). Chemical Emergency Response
Team. Access through the Department of the Army, Operations Center,
telephone 7-3/521-2185.
This center maintains, w standby, a 14-man alert team at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, MO, trained and experienced In handling chemical

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rtxv i".. It has re-ad fly available equipment such as
l. (»tui»,4rtdilon trucks, atr monitoring equfpaent, and protictlve
'«ihing. this team can respond fn 2 hours to a chemical emergency
wIh-o directed to do so toy the Army. Although 1t responds mainly to
* cifr.jencies Involving) Department of the Army chemicals, It assists
the other agencies such as the Coast Guard and EPA.
4. Environmental Response Team (ERTJ
lhe National Contingency Plan directed EPA to establish the ERT to
advise OSC's and Regional Response Teams on environmental Issues
related to spill containment, cleanup, and damage assessment. Th*
team, established in October 1978, provides expertise In biology,
chemistry, and engineering for envlrOTMntal emergencies, as well as
special equipment to control and clean up chemical discharges.
The ERT makes It possible for EPA to provide around-the-clock
support to the Regional Offices through personnel whose sole
responsibility Is to respond to environmental emergencies. The Team
is EPA's focal point for technical assistance to the Regions and
Program Offices during emergency episodes involving toxic and
hazardous wastes. The Team has two locations: Edison, MJ,
and Cincinnati, OH. Usually, requests for help from the Team comet
from «ach Region's Emergency Coordinator, once the conclusion has
been reached that technical assistance Is needed. The Team consists
oF 11 individuals with long experience In dealing with various types
of environmental emergencies and in responding to requests for
assistance at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites.
The Team Is responsible for coordinating the Environmental Emergency
Response unit (EERU). a cooperative effort between the Team, the
Office of Research and Development*s Oil and Hazardous Materials
Spills Branch, and contractor personnel. Services available through
the Response Unit include prototype spill control equipment such as
the mobile physical/chemical treatment system, a mobile
flocculatlon/sedimentation system,, contract laboratory analytical
services* and pilot plant treatment studies.
B. Private
1. chektrEC; Chemical Transportation Emergency Center. Access via
telephone, 800/424-9300 or 202/483-761fi In Washington, DC,
CHEHTREC Is a clearinghouse providing a 24-hour telephone number for
chemical transportation emergencies. It covers over 3,600 chemicals
which have been submitted by nanufactuers as the primary materials
they ship. CHEHTREC Is sponsored by the CDemfcal Manufacturers
Association, although nonmeeberi are also served. The vergency
telephone number Is widely distributed to emergency service
personnel, carriers, and the chemical In-Aistry. The number is
usually given on the bill of lading.

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When an onergency call It received by CHENTREC, the person on duty
writes down th# essential Information. As auch Information is
possible is obtained by phon*. The person on duty gives the caller
Infomat5on on hazards of spills, fire, or exposure that the
manufacturers of the chemicals Involved had furnished. The person
on duty then notifies the shipper of the chamlcal by phone of the
situation. At this point, responsfblIty for further guldatnco passes
to the shipper.
CHENTREC's function ts basically to serve as the liaison between the
person with the problem and the chemical shipper and/or the
manufacturer, the people who know the most about the product and Its
properties.
2.	Cffl-O&P: Cftlorlne Emergency Plan. Access* through CHEHTREC-
CHLOREP was established by the Chlorine Institute to handle chlorine
emergencies in the U.S. and Canada. The system operates through
CHEKTREC* Upon receiving an emergency call, CHENT1EC notifies the
nearest Manufacturer in accordance with a mutual aid plan. This
manufacturer then contacts the emergent scene to determine If a
technical team should be sent to assist. Each participating
manufacturer has trained personnel and equipment available for
emergencies.
3.	Matronal Agricultural Chemicals Association, Pesticide Safety Team
Network. Access through CHOtTREC-
The National Agricultural Chemicals Association operates a national
pesticide Information and response network providing advice and
on-site assistance Mhen a spill warrants it. The network operates
through CHEMTflEC. upon receiving notification of an emergency
Involving a pesticide. CHEKTREC contacts the manufacturer, who
provides specific advice on handling the spill. If necessary, spill
response teams are available on a geographical basis.
4.	TEAR: Transportation Emergency Assistance Plan, Canadian Chemic*)
Pro&icers Association. Access 24 hours a day through three regional
control centers:
-	British Columbia, 604/929-3341
-	Prairie Provinces, 403/477-8339
-	Northern Ontario. 70S/682-2&81
TEAP functions in Canada in a similar fashion to CHEHTREC tn the
U.S. It provides emergency advice, gets knowledgeable personnel
(usually the manufacturer) In touch with responsible people at the
scene of the emergency, and sees that on-the-scene assistance Is
provided if needed. When the regional control center receives a
call, the attendant records basic Information, obtains a call-back
number, and perhaps gives preliminary Information from standard

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references If the naae of the product 1s known. The attendant then
cells one of the center's technical Advisors, who calls the scene of
the accident to get ss Mich detail as possible and perhaps provides
additional advice on coping with the emergency. The advisor than
tries to contact the producer. If the producer cannot be reached,
or If distances are great, the regional control canter contacts a
company faafllar with the product. The center is also prepared to
send personnel and equipment to tfte scence If necessary* Once
contact has been established between producer and local authorities
on the scene, the technical advisor assumes a follow-up role and
notifies the Canadian Chealcal Producers Association of the
accident.

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REFERENCES ANO RESOURCES
INTRODUCTION
This reference list Is meant to provide the titles of books which may be of
value to those responding to hazardous material Incidents. Kany more books
are available which art not named here. This list can be expanded based on
personal preferences and requirements*
The references are categorized by subject. The title, author, publisher,
and place of publication are given for each* The year of publication Is not
always given because many are revised annually* The user should attempt to
obtain the «ost recent edition*
The last section lists sources of these references as well as other
information that might be useful* Usually, these agencies or associations
will provide a catalogue on request. Where available* phone numbers are
also listed.
. REFERENCES
A. Industrial Hygiene (Air Sampling and Monitoring, Respiratory Protection,
Toxicology)
1. Mr Sampling Instruments for Evaluation of Aty spheric Contaminants,
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hyglenlsts,
Cincinnati, OH*
2* Basic Industrial Hygiene, Richard Brief, American Industrial Hygiene
Association, Akron, W.
3. Direct Reading Colorlmetric Indicator Tubes Manual, taerican
Industrial Hygiene Association, Akron, W-
~ . Documentation of the Threshold Limit Values ITIVL American
conference or toverrimental Industrial Hygtentsts, Cincinnati, OH*
5. Fundamentals of Industrial Hygiene. National Safety Council,
Chicago, n..
<5. The Industrial Environment - Its Evaluation and Control, National
Institute for occupational Safety end Health, Hoc* vine. MO.
7. Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology. Frank A. Fatty, John Wiley and
SonsVTric.. Mw VortT Wr:	

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3, Manual of ReconsieDdeg Practice for Coalmsttfele Gas Indicators ami
Portable. Direct leading Hydrocarbon aetectors. wtertean iwflattrtai
Hygiene Association, XStron, OH.
9. Occupational Health sidelines for Chnlcil Hazards, Matfonal
institute for occupational safety and Heaitn, Roefcvllle* md«.
JO* Reilstn of Tonic Effects of Citeulcal Substances, national Institute
for occupational sai>ty ano neait*. HocJerme, w»
11. Respiratory Protective Devices ManualI. taerlctn Industrial Hygiene
Association. Akron, OK^— 	
It, Threshold Llalt values fcr Cheaical Substances and Physical Agents
In the Mrkroon Environment."Jberfcan Conference of dbvenrneittal
Industrial Byflenl sts. Cfrctroiatl, W»
B<. Chewlcal Data
L» Chenvical Hazard Response infonwatlon Systf, Voluee 2: Clinical
Data,U»S* Coast Guard, Washington. OC.
2 Chart stry of Hazardous Materials, Eugene Meyer, Prentice-Hall,
EngTewood CTTWs, KJ.	
3.	The Condensed Chtaictl Dictionary. G« Kntley, Van Hostrtnd Relnhold
co», mnrmrvr	
4.	CgC Handbook of Chemistry and Ptiyslcs. CRC Press, Boca Raton, R,.
5.	Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials* i- Irving Smt Van
Itulriinrile^MaCo.T U«m #5rkTRfT,J
6.	Fire Protection Guide to Hazardous Materiali, National Fire
Protection Association, Boston, m.
7.	Hjfgienlc Su1dest American Industrial Hygiene Association, Akron,
8.	The Hercfc. Index, Merck and Co., Inc., Rahway. NJ.
9.	Toxic and Hazardous Industrial Chemicals Safety Manual. The
International Technical Information Institute, Tokyo. Japan.

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8- Manual of jtecgmggndgd Practice for Combustible Gas Irvdhkatgrs and
Portable, Direct Reading Hydrocarbon Detectors. American Industrial
Hygiene Assoc 1 atlcn, Afcron, W.
9» Occupational Health Guidelines for Ch^lcal Hazards, Hational
IhsfHIite for Occupational Safety arid ^eatth. llockvflie. MD.
10.	Reg1$try of Toxic Effects of Chewical Substances. national Institute
for Occupational Safety and stealth, Rockvllle, tfh
11.	Respiratory Protective Devices Manual, toe Mean Industrial Hygiene
Association. Akron, OH.
12.	Threshold limit Values for Chewical Substances and Physical Agents
In the Workroom Environment, American Conference of Gayerrewcnial
Industrial Hygienlsts, Cincinnati„ OH.
B. Chwnlcal Data
1.	Chemical Hazard ResponseInformation Systew. Vo1u«e 2: Cheafcal
Data, U7TT coast Guard, Washington, DC.
2.	Chralstry of Hazardous Materials, Eugene Meyer, Prentice-Hall1,
EngTewood Cliffs, nj.
3.	The Condensed Chemical Dictionary. 6. rtwley, Van Noitrand Relnhold
Co., Him YorV; IW.	~~
4.	CRC Handbook of Chewlstry and Physics. CftC Press, Boca Raton, FU
5* Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials, H. Irving Sax, Van
Hostrand ReirinofiTco.. New York, W.
6.	Fire Protection Guide to Hazardous Materials, national Fire
Protection Association, Boston, ma.	~
7.	Hygienic Guides, American Industrial Hygiene Association. Akron,
8- The Merck Index, Merck and Co.. Inc., Rahway, NJ.
9. Toxic and Hazardous Industrial Chemicals Safety Manual, The
International Technical Information Institute/ Tokyo. Japan,

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C- EPA Nettods Manuals for Sailing and Analysis
1* Biological Field and Laboratory Methods fcr NnsuHa9 the Quality
Surface Mater aid If fluents, EPA ^70/4-73-001 fJiiiy 1$73T.	 	
2. EPA Solid Waste Manual. Test Methods for Evaluating Solid Haste,
PhysicaWChedcal Methods, Stf-BWWy TSBPT.		-
Handbook for Analytical Quality Control In Hater and Wastewater
laboratories. £^M/4-fo-0l§ (farth 1TO.	
4. Methods of Chealcal Analysis of Hater and Hastes, EPA-600/4-79-020
(March 1974).	 	
Microbiol o<
j1ca1 Methods for Monitoring
the Environment, Water and
Hastes* EPi
8,-600/0-70-017 (December 197
B).
6* Procedures Manual for Groundwater Monitoring at Solid Vastes
Disposal Facilities, EPA-530/5N-&11 (August 1977)*
D. Safety
1.	Best's Safety 01 rectory» A.B. Best Co., Oldwlok, MJ.
2.	CftC Handbook of Laboratory Safety. Nonun V. Steere, CRC Press, Boca
Raton, R".	 	
3* F1re Protection Handbook» National Fire Protection Association,
Qulncy, Ha.
4.	PM Approval list, Factory Mutual, Norwood* MA.
5.	national Safety Council Safety Sheets, National Safety Council,
Chicago. 1L
6.	Underwriters Laboratories Testing for PufaHc Safety, Annual
Directory, underwriters Laboratories inc.. Hortftbrook, ll»
I. AGENCIES m ASSOCIATIONS
American Conference of Governmental industrial Kyglenfsts
6500 SlenwBy Ave> - Building 0-5
Cincinnatit OH 45211
S13/661~7m
American Industrial Hygiene Association
475 Wolf Ledges Parkway
Akron, OH 443U-1067
216/762-7294

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American National Standards Institute„ Inc.
J430 Broadway
New fork, NY 10018
212/354-3300
Cospressed &as Association
12% Jefferson Davis Highway
Arlington. VA 22202
703/979-0900
CUC Press. Inc.
2000 Corporate Slvd.„ N.W.
Boca Raton. FL 33431
305/994-0555, Ext. 330
EPA Office of Research 6 Development
Publications - CERI
Cincinnati. OH 45268
513/684-7562
EPA office of Solid Waste (WH-562)
401 M. St., S.W.
Washington* DC 20460
800/424-9346
Materials Transportation Bureau
Department of Transportation
Research and Special Programs AdMlnlstration
Washington, OC 20590
202/426-2301
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Department of Labor
4015 Wilson Blvd. Room 600
Arlington. VA 22203
703/235-1452
National F1re Protection Association
BatterymarcN Park
Quincy, MA 02269
617/328-9290
National Safety Council
444 North Michigan Ave.
Chicago. II 60611
312-527-4800
NIOSH Publications Dissemination
4676 Columbia Parkway
Cincinnati, OH 45226
513/684-4287

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Occupational Safety ft Wealth Altainl strati on
Department of Labor
ZOO Constitution Ave*. H,V.
Washington, DC 20(210
202/523^613$
Underwriters Laboratories» Inc.
333 PfongSten Rd-
MorthbfOOk, IL 60062
312/272-8800
Superfntenrtent of Documents
U.S. Sovemoent Printing Office
Washington. DC 20402
202/783-3238

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