United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Environmental
Research Laboratory
Athens GA 30601
EPA-600/5-78-005
April 1978
Research and Development
&EPA
Alternative Policies
for Controlling
Nonpoint Agricultural Sources
of Water Pollution
Socioeconomic Environmental
Studies Series
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RESEARCH REPORTING SERIES
Research reports of the Office of Research and Development, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, have been grouped into nine series. These nine broad cate-
gories were established to facilitate further development and application of en-
vironmental technology. Elimination of traditional grouping was consciously
planned to foster technology transfer and a maximum interface in related fields.
The nine series are.
1. Environmental Health Effects Research
2. Environmental Protection Technology
3. Ecological Research
4 Environmental Monitoring
5. Socioeconomic Environmental Studies
6. Scientific and Technical Assessment Reports (STAR)
7. Interagency Energy-Environment Research and Development
8. "Special" Reports
9. Miscellaneous Reports
This report has been assigned to the SOCIOECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTAL
STUDIES series. This series includes research on environmental management,
economic analysis, ecological impacts, comprehensive planning and fore-
casting, and analysis methodologies. Included are tools for determining varying
impacts of alternative policies; analyses of environmental planning techniques
at the regional, state, and local levels, and approaches to measuring environ-
mental quality perceptions, as well as analysis of ecological and economic im-
pacts of environmental protection measures. Such topics as urban form, industrial
mix, growth policies, control, and organizational structure are discussed in terms
of optimal environmental performance. These interdisciplinary studies and sys-
tems analyses are presented in forms varying from quantitative relational analyses
to management and policy-oriented reports
This document is available to the public through the National Technical Informa-
tion Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.
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EPA-600/5-78-005
April 1978
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES FOR CONTROLLING
NONPOINT AGRICULTURAL SOURCES OF WATER POLLUTION
by
W. D. Seitz
D. M. Gardner
S. K. Gove
K. L. Guntermann
0. R. Karr
R. G. F. Spitze
E. R. Swanson
C. R. Taylor
D. L. Uchtmann
J. C. van Es
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, Illinois 61801
Contract Number 68-01-3584
Project Officers
George W. Bailey
Thomas E. Waddell
Environmental Research Laboratory
Athens, Georgia 30605
ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
ATHENS, GEORGIA 30605
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DISCLAIMER
This report has been reviewed by the Athens Environmental Research Lab-
oratory, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, and approved for publication.
Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views
and policies of the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, nor does mention
of trade names constitute endorsement or recommendation for use.
11
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PARTICIPATING STAFF
RESEARCH ASSOCIATE
M. E. Hay
RESEARCH ASSISTANTS
S. B. Cherry
T. K. Clarke
K. L. Frohberg
J. T. Hannon
R. S. Hewett
L. K. Keasler
D. L. Mclaughlin
M. C. Nelson
K. A. Olberts
R. K. Petges
S. J. Raines
I. J. Schlosser
C. S. Turner
EDITOR
T. W. Knecht
PARTICIPATING UNIVERSITY UNITS
Institute for Environmental Studies
Agricultural Experiment Station
College of Commerce
School of Life Sciences
Institute of Government and Public Affairs
iii
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FOREWORD
As environmental controls become more costly to implement and the
penalties of judgment errors become more severe, environmental quality
management requires more efficient analytical tools based on greater
knowledge of the environmental phenomena to be managed. As part of this
Laboratory's research on the occurrence, movement, transformation, impact,
and control of environmental contaminants, the Technology Development and
Applications Branch develops management and engineering tools to help
pollution control officials achieve water quality goals through watershed
management.
Agricultural sources contribute significantly to water pollution
problems in many areas of the United States. This project was designed
to evaluate the technological, economic, social, legal, and institutional
aspects of implementing selected best management practices for these
nonpoint sources. Emphasis by a multidisciplinary team of scientists is
on policies to control soil erosion, which contributes to the pollution
problem by increasing turbidity in waterways and by carrying nutrients,
pesticides, and other substances into waterways.
Linkage of this kind of information with our best capabilities to
predict the fate of pollutants in the environment should assist in ensuring
that the wisest decisions in environmental management are made and that
society's resources are effectively utilized.
David W. Duttweiler
Director
Environmental Research Laboratory
Athens, Georgia
IV
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ABSTRACT
Six soil conservation policies representing a variety of approaches
for controlling water pollution from nonpoint agricultural sources in
the Corn Belt were examined. The policy options were an education program,
a tax credit for erosion control practices, a 50 percent subsidy for ter-
racing and similar land modifications, a requirement that a conservation
plan be developed, a requirement that a conservation plan be implemented,
and a requirement that greenbelts be developed where needed. Because
implementation of policies would likely be carried out by soil conserva-
tion agencies, existing state and Federal programs and laws directed to
the control of soil erosion were surveyed. Clearly, soil conservation
agencies must be considered in any attempt to develop effective and efficient
pollution control policies in this area.
The aggregate economic impact of the policies was investigated using
d state-of-the-art, market-equilibrium, linear programming model of crop
production in the Corn Belt. The economic impacts of the policies at the
individual farm level and their effects on long-term soil productivity
were analyzed through the use of a watershed model. The Corn Belt model
indicates that soil erosion policies will not have a significant negative
economic impact—and may have a positive impact—on producers. The impact
on consumers and the net social impact on erosion controls are highly
dependent on soil-loss coefficients. Taken together, the models indicate
that soil erosion control can be achieved without severe adverse effects
on the agriculture sector in total and that arbitrary soil-loss standards
could have adverse impacts on farm income in selected areas.
An analysis of social factors indicates that farm community acceptance
of the policies will likely be better if traditional agricultural agencies
are involved in the implementation of policies than if new agencies are
developed or if existing nonagricultural agencies are used. Farmer resist-
ance is expected if mandatory policies are adopted.
The equity of the policies was examined from the perspectives of the
general public, the agricultural sector, conservation equipment manufac-
turers, and water users. An analysis of the legal framework under which
policies of this type would be implemented indicated that such policies
could be drafted so as to be consistent with existing legislation.
This report was submitted in fulfillment of Contract No. 68-01-3584
by the Institute for Environmental Studies of the University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign under the sponsorshop of the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency. This report covers the period from January 26, 1976, to
April 25, 1977, and work was completed as of November 30, 1977.
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CONTENTS
Foreword iv
Abstract v
Figures ix
Tables xi
Acknowledgements xv
Executive Summary xvi
1. Introduction 1
Nature of the Problem 1
Objective 3
Approach 3
2. Existing Soil Conservation Programs, Policies, and Laws 5
Existing Programs and Agencies 5
Existing and Proposed Laws 7
Costs of Existing Programs 17
3. Policy Development and Selection 23
Policy Components 26
Examples of Policy Development 27
Selection of Policies for Analysis 30
Land-Water Interface and Stream Greenbelts 32
4. Economic Impacts of Erosion Control Policies 36
The Corn-belt Model 37
Watershed Analysis 73
5. Institutional Arrangements and Costs 101
General Policy Arrangements 101
Institutional Functions 102
Arrangements and Costs for Six Selected Policies 104
6. Social Acceptance 116
Social Factors Affecting NPS Pollution Control Strategies. .116
Farmer Attitude Survey 128
7. Equity 159
Equity Bases 160
Equity Criteria 161
Policy Implications of Criteria 166
Conclusions 173
8. Legal and Political Constraints 175
Voluntary Programs 175
Mandatory Programs 178
Policies Designed to Control Nitrogen 184
9. Conclusions 193
References 196
Bibliography 202
Vll
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Appendices
A. Summary of Erosion and Sedimentation Laws 209
B. Administrative Costs of Existing SCC/ASCS Programs
in Corn Belt States 226
C. The Land-water Interface 235
D. Modeling Results 242
E. Policy Implementation Cost Estimates 256
F. Survey Questionnaires and Cover Letters 293
G. Survey Results 311
H. Metric Conversion Table 313
vm
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FIGURES
Number Page
1 Schematic for the development of policies to control erosion
and sedimentation 24
2 Schematic for the development of policies to control plant
nutrients 25
3 Major land resource areas of the corn belt 39
4 Average soil loss per acre per year with and without chisel -
plowing constraints 55
5 Impacts of soil loss limits 56
6 Impacts of soil loss taxes 61
7 Impacts of terracing subsidies 62
8 Impacts of terracing subsidies and soil-loss constraints 64
9 Change in net social cost and percentage reduction in gross
soil loss 66
10 Change in producers' surplus and percent reduction in gross
soil loss 67
11 Change in consumers' surplus and percent reduction in gross
soil loss 68
12 Change in government cost and percent reduction in gross
soil loss 69
13 Impacts of restrictions on nitrogen application and soil loss ... 71
14 Diagram of crop production activities included in the linear
programming model 77
15 Net income as a percent of benchmark-solution income by farm ... 91
16 Average soil loss per acre per year by farm 92
17 Average nitrogen utilization per acre per year by farm 93
IX
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FIGURES (continued)
Number Page
18 Percentage of total benchmark watershed acreage eroded to
zero inches of topsoil remaining, unconstrained solution 96
19 Net watershed income for an average year by ten-year
periods for 100 years 98
20 Cumulative net watershed income over ten-year periods for
100 years 99
21 Interrelationships of selected policies for the control of
nonpoint-source pollution 127
Cl Mean and standard error of suspended solids load in Wertz
Drain study area 238
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TABLES
Number Page
1 SCS Costs per Acre for Planning and Plan Revision in Selected
States, 1970-74 , 18
2 Accomplishments and Costs of Black Creek Watershed Project:
September 1976 20
3 Agricultural Conservation Program Practices 21
4 Potential Costs and Benefits of More Effective Management
of Near-channel Areas 34
5 Effects of Various Management Practices on Equilibria of
Equivalent Watersheds 35
6 Simplified Matrix Representation of the Corn-belt Model 41
7 Economically Optimal Nitrogen Rates for Corn 43
8 Annualized Terracing Costs in $ per Acre 46
9 Actual Acreages of Crops Planted in 1969 (thousands of acres)
Compared to Acreages in the Benchmark Solution of the
Corn-belt Model Using High Soil-loss Coefficients 48
10 Acreages of Crops by Land Resource Area and Land Capability
Unit Determined by the Benchmark Solution of the Corn-belt
Model Using Low Soil-loss Coefficients (thousands of acres) ... 49
11 Effects of Restricting Chisel Plowing 53
12 Direction of Impact on Producer's Surplus with Changes in
Soil-loss Limits 58
13 Direction of Change in Crop Acreages with Changes in
Soil-loss Restrictions 59
14 Soil Type Acreages in Selected Farms in the Big Blue Creek
Watershed by Slopes and Erosion Classes 76
XI
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TABLES (continued)
Number Page
15 Row and Grain Crop Cost and Yield Adjustments Relative to A
System of Up-and-down Cultivation and Conventional Tillage
Under Specified Alternative Conservation and Tillage Practices . . 81
16 Yield Responses to Nitrogen Fertilization by Soil Groups
(yields in bushels/acre) 82
17 Soybean Yields by Soil Type 84
18 Adjustment in Nitrogen Application Rates for Different Crop
Rotations (pounds per acre) 85
19 Nitrogen Supplied by Alfalfa 86
20 Crop Management Factor, C, under Alternative Cropping Systems
in this Study 89
21 Erosion Control Factor, P, under Various Conservation Practices . . 89
22 Acreages of Soils by Type and Slope/Erosion Class which
Completely Erode within the 100-year Period by Farm 97
23 Summary of Estimated Administrative Costs for Policy 1:
Education 106
24 Summary of Estimated Administrative Costs for Policy 2: Tax
Credit 107
25 Summary of Estimated Administrative Costs for Policy 3: 50%
Cost Sharing 109
26 Summary of Estimated Administrative Costs for Policy 4:
Mandatory Conservation Plan Development Ill
27 Summary of Estimated Administrative Costs for Policy 5:
Mandatory Conservation Plan Implementation 113
28 Summary of Estimated Administrative Costs for Policy 6:
Greenbelt Development 114
29 Estimated Annual County-level Administrative Costs for a
Five-year Program 115
30 Farmer Attitudes on Soil Erosion 132
31 Relationship Between Perceived Need for Erosion Control and
Selected Policies 133
xn
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TABLES (continued)
Number Page
32 Farmer Estimates of Effectiveness of Practices to Reduce
Soil Erosion 134
33 Farmers' Descriptions of Their Own Soil Conservation Practices . . .134
34 Farmers Who Have Developed Approved Soil Plan Classified by
Number of Acres in Row Crops 136
35 Percentage of Farmers in Each Soil Productivity Index 136
36 Perceived Fairness of Cost Sharing for Terracing and
Equivalent Modifications 138
37 Estimates of Percentage of Farmers That Would Participate
in Cost-sharing Policies 139
38 Groups Perceived as Being Most Unfairly Treated by Cost-
sharing Policies 139
39 Perceived Fairness of Tax Credit and Loan Proposals 141
40 Estimates of Percentage of Farmers That Would Likely
Participate in Tax Credit and Loan Proposals 141
41 Groups Perceived as Being Most Unfairly Treated by Tax Credit
and Loan Proposals 142
42 Perceived Fairness of Requiring Development and Implementation
of Soil Conservation Plan Policies 144
43 Percentage of Farmers That Would Likely Cooperate with
Policies Requiring Development and Implementation of a Soil
Conservation Plan 144
44 Groups Perceived as Being Most Unfairly Treated by Policies
Requiring Development and Implementation of• a Soil
Conservation Plan 145
45 Perceived Fairness of Greenbelt Policies 146
46 Estimates of Percentage of Farmers That Would Likely
Cooperate with Greenbelt Policies 146
47 Groups Perceived as Being Most Unfairly Treated by Greenbelt
Policies 148
48 Perceived Fairness Summary Table (Farmer Respondents Only) .... 149
xiii
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TABLES (continued)
Number Page
49 Participation/Cooperation Rates Summary Table (Farmers Only) ... 151
50 Summary of Groups Perceived by Farmers as Being Most
Unfairly Treated 153
51 Relationship Between Perceived Fairness of Policies and
Respondent's Soil Productivity Index 155
52 Evaluation of Policy Fairness by Farmers Who Have as Compared
to Those Who Have Not Developed a Soil Conservation Plan .... 157
53 Equity Effects of Alternative Policies Under the Equality
Criterion 167
54 Equity Effects of Alternative Policies Under the Earned-
rewards Criterion 168
55 Equity Effects of Alternative Policies Under the Least-
risk Criterion 169
xiv
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The project was carried out with support provided by the Athens Environ-
mental Research Laboratory, U. S. EPA, Thomas E. Waddell and George W. Bailey,
Project Officers. The research was conducted by a large interdisciplinary
team comprising staff members from seven academic units on the campus of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The project was coordinated
through the Institute for Environmental Studies, which provided secretarial,
editorial, and business office support.
In addition to those directly involved in the project, numerous other
staff members at the University provided assistance. Members of the Agricul-
tural Experiment Station were particularly helpful. In addition, Arlo W.
Biere, Kansas State University; Daniel Bromley, University of Wisconsin;
George L. Casler, Cornell University; Neil E. Harl, Iowa State University;
Gerald L. Horner, USDA, NRED; and William L. Miller, Purdue University, served
as consultants in the early phases of the project. Soil Conservation Service
personnel, at both the federal and state levels, and particularly in the
Illinois office, were very helpful in providing information when requested.
Personnel of the Agricultural Conservation and Stabilization Service and of
numerous state agencies in the corn-belt states also provided needed
assistance.
While the contribution of all these individuals is recognized and
appreciated, responsibility for any errors rests with the research team.
xv
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Agricultural sources contribute significantly to water pollution problems
in many areas of the United States. This report evaluates a number of alter-
native policies aimed at reducing the level of pollution emanating from those
sources. The report concentrates on the problem of soil erosion from agri-
cultural lands because it is an integral part of the pollution problem.
Sediment particles increase turbidity in waterways and reduce the capacity of
reservoirs, transportation arteries, and drainage ditches. In addition, the
particles carry certain plant nutrients and other substances such as pesticides
into waterways. Finally, the soil erosion process also reduces the produc-
tivity of agricultural land.
EXISTING PROGRAMS
Soil erosion control policy in this country has a long history. For more
than 30 years the Soil Conservation Service (SCS), the Agricultural Stabiliza-
tion and Conservation Service (ASCS), and the Soil and Water Conservation
Districts (SWCDs) have conducted an extensive program which relies on voluntary
compliance and provides some economic incentives to encourage farmers to im-
plement soil conservation practices. Provisions exist, however, for the soil
and water conservation districts to assume a regulatory stance and thus mandate
the adoption of conservation practices. It is clear that this set of institu-
tions will need to be considered in any attempt to develop new policies in this
area if such policies are to be efficient and effective. For the same reason,
a model state law developed for the improvement of soil conservation practices
builds on the existing soil and water conservation districts.
The costs of administering the SCS and ASCS programs in the corn belt
were found to vary widely among the states. An analysis was not successful
in explaining the variation, perhaps because of the high proportion of over-
head costs and the large number of programs. Thus, while administrative cost
estimates are given for a typical county-level program, the variation in
practice may be considerable in different areas.
In addition to the well-established programs at the federal level, the
states have recently begun initiatives to control the level of soil erosion.
Iowa, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Michigan, South Dakota, New York, New Jersey,
Montana, and the Virgin Islands have all adopted laws recently (most since
1970) pertaining to the soil erosion problem. Legislation is pending in
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Kansas, and Minnesota. In general, this legisla-
tion is structured around the use of a soil conservation plan at the individual
farm level and often involves meeting the soil-loss tolerance limits estab-
xvi
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lished for individual soils by the Soil Conservation Service and used in de-
termining acceptable erosion rates. The policies in existence do not represent
a wide range of approaches to the problem.
SELECTION OF POLICIES FOR ANALYSIS
Because of the narrow range of nonpoint policies existing or being con-
sidered at the state and federal level for the control of sediment and nutrients,
the research team developed schematics to identify alternative policies. In
these schematics, alternative control instruments, performance indicators,
control techniques, compliance measures, and temporary penalties are identi-
fied. While the schematics can be used to conceive a wide range of policies,
they do not contain information which would make it possible to identify
radically new and superior policy options.
Six policy options were selected for detailed analysis in the study.
They were: (1) an educational program, (2) a tax credit for erosion control
practices, (3) a 50-percent subsidy for terracing and similar modifications,
(4) a requirement that a conservation plan be developed, (5) a requirement
that a conservation plan be implemented, (6) a requirement that greenbelts be
developed where needed. The education program is essentially a promotional
campaign directed at farmers to encourage them to cooperate voluntarily in the
existing soil conservation program. It was selected because it was hypothesized
to be the alternative most readily accepted by farmers, although it is
recognized that its effectiveness is likely to be limited.
The tax-credit policy would provide tax reductions for farm operators
who adopt pollution control practices such as terracing. Such a policy would
be easy to administer. In some cases it might be necessary only to encourage
farmers to take advantage of existing provisions in the tax law. Implemen-
tation would be difficult if it were necessary to revise the tax law. The
policy could involve providing SCS-type assistance to individual farmers in
determining the types of control techniques suitable for their farms.
The third policy would be an extension of the existing Federal program
which subsidizes farm operators for the cost of implementing soil erosion
control practices, particularly terracing of land. At present, the funds
under this program are limited and the maximum amount payable to any farmer
in a single year is $2,500. This policy would involve changing the present
percent of cost shared by the government and the limits on the support that
can be provided to individual operators.
The fourth policy analyzed would require farmers to develop (but not
necessarily implement) a soil conservation plan for their farms. This policy
would, in effect, be a mandatory education program to make farmers aware of
the level of erosion occurring on their farms and of the measures necessary
to reduce the erosion to tolerable rates. Such a policy should be reasonably
easy to implement through the SCS and SWCDs. It might also be an effective
precursor to the fifth policy analyzed, which would make it mandatory for
farmers to implement the soil conservation practices specified in the plans.
The latter policy would be comprehensive and would allow the farm operator
to choose from the full range of options for the control of soil loss.
xvii
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Because of decreased profitability and reduced freedom of choice, there would
likely be significant reluctance to accept this program at the farm level,
especially if government subsidies were not provided to cover a portion of
the cost of adopting various conservation practices.
The sixth policy analyzed would require the development of greenbelts
along water courses where appropriate. This policy is oriented primarily
toward water quality (rather than erosion control) and thus represents an
approach that differs substantially from that currently pursued by existing
federal agencies. Research indicates that such greenbelts may be effective
in improving water quality. These strips would provide a filtering mechanism
to trap eroded soil particles and would support an ecosystem capable of using
some of the plant nutrients lost from agricultural land. The shading pro-
vided by vegetation growing on the greenbelt would have a moderating effect
on water temperature, contributing to improved water quality. While the use
of greenbelts was considered as a separate policy option in this report, it
is clear that such an approach would need to be implemented in conjunction
with a soil erosion control program to maintain soil productivity and hold
soil losses to a sufficiently low level that the greenbelts could continue to
assimilate them over a long term. Conformance with the policy could be
determined by air surveillance.
POLICY ANALYSIS THROUGH MODELING
One of the major analytical tools used in this project was a large linear
programming model of crop production in the corn belt. This model was
constructed to determine the impact of various constraints on both farmers
and consumers. A unique feature of the model is that it can determine the
competitive equilibrium prices and quantities of the major crops produced in
the corn belt under various constraints, allowing a more accurate determination
of the impacts of various policies than is possible with the more commonly
used fixed-price models. In the development and revision of the model, two
sets of soil-loss coefficients were generated in consultation with the Soil
Conservation Service. These coefficients relate the amount of soil loss to
specific crop production activities and were chosen to approximate the actual
soil losses based on experience. Numerous runs of the model were made using
the higher soil-loss coefficients to examine the effect of alternative con-
straints. A sufficient number of runs were made with the lower soil-loss
coefficients to make comparisons. As a result, the output of the model can
be expected to bracket the actual impacts of policy implementation on pro-
ducers and consumers. This model was used to analyze the impact of both soil-
loss and nitrogen-limitation policies.
The corn-belt model indicates that soil erosion control policies will not
have a significant negative economic impact—and may have a positive impact--
on producers. For example, when soil-loss constraints ranging from 2 to 5
tons per acre per year are applied, the range of impact on producers is from
-$80 million to +$500 million per year. The model indicates that if the high-
er soil-loss coefficients are appropriate, then the soil-loss constraints
will generate increases in producers' income. If the lower soil-loss coeffi-
cients are accurate, the impact on producers is relatively small and may be
either positive or negative.
xviii
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Obviously, the impact on consumers and the net social impact of soil
erosion control policies are highly dependent on the soil-loss coefficients.
If the lower coefficients are accurate, the impacts on consumers and society
in general is small, amounting to less than $200 million. If the higher
soil-loss coefficients are accurate, the impact on consumers is negative and
ranges from $400 to $1,200 million because of the inelastic demands. The
$1,200 million negative impact occurs with a soil-loss limit of 2 tons per
acre per year applied uniformly over all acreage in the corn belt, a limit
which would be much stricter than adoption of the soil-loss tolerance
limits used by the Soil Conservation Service. The primary causes of these
economic impacts are a reduction in acreage and a corresponding increase in
crop prices for the major crops. For example, crop acreage and corn pro-
duction would both decrease approximately 6 percent under a 2-ton-per-acre
soil-loss limit, resulting in a reduction in gross soil loss of more than 70%.
Soybean production would decrease over 15 percent. As a result, corn prices
would increase by approximately 15 percent and soybean prices by almost 20
percent. A uniformly applied soil-loss limit of 5 tons per acre would
achieve substantial reductions from current levels of total soil loss, almost
45%, with a much less dramatic impact on crop production, prices, and con-
sumer costs as measured by changes in consumers' surplus.
When the effects of implementing soil-loss restrictions are compared
with those of imposing taxes on soil losses, it is found that the net impact
on society would be less with a soil-loss tax but that the incidence of the
impact would be changed significantly. Producers would be very adversely
affected by the tax, while consumers would be somewhat better off. The tax
system has a negative impact on soybean production but very little impact on
corn production. Policies which would subsidize terracing are not as effici-
ent from a social perspective as either soil-loss constraints or taxes. A
terracing subsidy program would benefit producers at increased governmental
cost but would have little direct impact on consumers.
A number of runs were made with combinations of soil-loss limits and
terracing subsidies. When the relative efficiency of such policies is con-
sidered, the combination of subsidies and constraints appears reasonably
efficient in reducing gross soil loss at nearly the same level of social
cost as under the restrictions discussed above. It is possible that if the
environmental benefits of such policies were included in the computation of
social cost and if the more flexible tolerance limits established by soil
type were used, soil erosion control policies would be quite efficient from
a social perspective.
It is important to realize that the impacts of soil-loss control
policies are not evenly distributed among geographical areas. For example,
under some policies a substantial number of acres are removed from produc-
tion, but total farm income remains nearly the same because of increases in
crop prices. Clearly, in areas where production ceases, farm operators would
be adversely affected while in those areas where crop production continues,
and especially in those areas where no expenditures are required for soil-
loss control, the higher crop polices would have a significant positive impact
on farm income.
xix
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The model was also used to analyze the impact of restricting the quan-
tity of nitrogen that can be applied on agricultural land. The results in-
dicate that a 100-lb-per-acre restriction would have a relatively small impact
on both producers and consumers. The net social impact would be approximately
$300 million with a very slight increase in producers' welfare and a decrease
of slightly over $300 million in consumers' welfare. There would be some in-
crease in soybean production and a decrease in corn production, but the im-
pacts would not be great enough to generate large changes in product prices.
A 50-lb-per-acre nitrogen restriction would, however, generate significant
changes. The net social cost would be over $1 billion with a negative im-
pact of approximately $3 billion on consumers and a positive impact of $2
billion on producers. This positive impact occurs because of the reduction
in production costs, especially fertilizer costs, and the simultaneous in-
crease in product prices due to the reduction in corn and soybean production.
It is important to note that while a nitrogen restriction applied uniformly
to all farmers can generate a substantial increase in total farm income,
this gain occurs only through the operation of the market. If an individual
farmer reduced fertilizer applications while others did not, it would put him
at a competitive disadvantage. This distinction may explain the negative
reaction of farmers to fertilizer limits.
As would be expected, when nitrogen limits are combined with soil-loss
restrictions the impacts increase. In general, farmers gain and consumers
lose. The results are quite significant under the 50-lb-per-acre nitrogen
restriction and also become significant under a 100-lb-per-acre nitrogen
restraint if it is combined with a 2-ton-per-acre soil-loss restriction.
Under that combirration the major portion of the impact results from the
soil-loss restriction.
One other significant finding is that the adoption of conservation
tillage would significantly reduce the level of soil loss and at the same
time improve the income position of farmers and the welfare of consumers.
This finding is consistent with the continuing adoption by farmers of these
tillage practices. If this technique were adopted on that 70 percent of the
crop acreage for which it is appropriate, significant reductions in soil
loss would occur. It is also likely that implementing any policy requiring
improvement in soil erosion control would stimulate even more rapid adoption
of this technique.
To analyze in more detail the variation in impact of soil-loss con-
straints on individual farmers, a watershed model representative of the corn
belt and surrounding areas was constructed. This second model also serves
to determine the long-run impacts of soil erosion control policies on the
productivity of agricultural land. The results indicate that the application
of soil-loss restrictions would result in substantial differences in the
impact on individual farmers with varying qualities of land. These dif-
ferences are evident under watershed- or farm-level restrictions on soil loss
and with nitrogen restrictions at several levels. The model aTso dramatically
indicates the effect of soil erosion control policies in maintaining the
productivity of soil over a long time period. It further indicates that it
is not economic for the individual farmer to adopt soil erosion control
policies unless that farmer has an extremely long planning horizon and
assumes a very low discount rate on future income.
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Taken together, the models imply that soil erosion control can be achieved
without severe adverse effects on the agricultural sector in total and that
arbitrary soil-loss standards could have adverse impacts on farm income in
selected areas. The regional resource allocation implications of adopting
soil loss control policies only in selected areas is not addressed.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND COSTS
If soil erosion or nitrogen control policies are adopted, it will be
necessary either to make institutional arrangements or to utilize existing
institutions to carry them out. The costs of a hypothetical set of
institutional arrangements were estimated using the cost synthesis technique
of determining the cost of functions that would need to be performed under
each of the six principal policies considered. Sixteen such functions were
identified. The basic categories of costs for performing those functions
included labor and labor support, equipment, buildings, office support,
and program support. These costs were estimated on the assumption that
entirely new institutions would be created to implement the policies. As
noted earlier, however, some of these policies could be carried out primarily
by using the existing institutional framework. Doing so should result in
lower costs.
A cost estimate was derived for each of the six policies on the basis
of a hypothetical county in a hypothetical state in the corn belt. It was
assumed that the policy would achieve its objective in a five-year period.
The cost of an education program was estimated at $163,000 per county per
year for five years. The administrative costs of a terracing program de-
signed to implement all needed terraces was estimated to be almost $1 million
per county per year for 5 years. The cost of a tax-credit policy was es-
timated to be essentially zero because in this particular case it was assumed
that the existing Internal Revenue Service agencies would be used. The
development of a conservation plan for each farm in the county was estimated
to cost just under $490,000 per county per year for five years. Required
implementation of these plans would increase the cost to almost $590,000
per year. Finally, a program to develop greenbelts around water courses is
estimated to cost $265,000 per year over a five-year period.
It is important to note that attaining these goals in a five-year per-
iod would be extremely difficult and perhaps impossible in some cases. The
technical personnel required to develop conservation plans and the equipment
necessary to implement the plans are probably not available at the level
necessary to achieve the goals in a five-year period. A time frame of 10
to 20 or more years may be more realistic. Thus, the annual costs would
more likely be lowered somewhat and extended over a longer period.
LEGAL AND SOCIAL FACTORS
An analysis of the legal framework under which policies of this type
would be implemented indicated that such policies could be drafted so as to
be consistent with existing legislation. An analysis of the social factors
indicates that farmer and farm community acceptance of the policies will
likely be better if traditional agricultural agencies are involved in the
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implementation of policies than if new agencies are developed or if existing
nonagricultural agencies are used. It is reasonable to expect, however, that
if mandatory policies are adopted, resistance will be encountered, even if
implemented by the traditional agricultural agencies (which have relied in
the past on voluntary cooperation). The primary thrust of these agencies in
the past has been to encourage the adoption of practices that are consistent
with both the short-term interests of individual farm operators and the long-
term interests of society.
In a related study, Illinois farmers and ASCS directors were surveyed to
ascertain their reactions to alternative policy options. The results indicat-
ed that 75 percent of farmers believed soil conservation to be necessary for
maintaining soil productivity, and 70 percent felt that it is needed to main-
tain acceptable levels of water quality. Twenty-five percent of the farmers
believed that they should be doing a better job of soil erosion control, while
35 percent replied that they are doing the best they can under the circum-
stances. In general, those policies which would allow the farmer some flexi-
bility in selecting the means of controlling erosion were viewed as more fair
than those which would impose uniform prohibitions of, for example, certain
tillage practices. Nitrogen control policies were rated strongly negative,
while interest-free loans and tax credits for soil erosion control were re-
ceived quite favorably. In general, more farmers viewed flexible soil erosion
policies as fair than unfair. It is also somewhat surprising that the re-
quirement to develop greenbelts along streams was viewed as reasonably fair
by about the same proportion of farmers as viewed the mandatory implementation
of soil conservation plans as fair. When asked to estimate the percent of
farmers who would develop a conservation plan if required to do so, the
respondents estimated on the average that 45 percent would develop such a plan.
EQUITY
Finally, to analyze the equity of public policies, three criteria were
developed: Equality, earned-rewards, and least-risk. Any policy which would
tend to reduce the income or wealth differences in the population would be
consistent with the equality criterion. Any policy which would improve the
degree to which individuals pay for benefits received or are compensated for
costs incurred would be consistent with the earned-rewards criterion. Under
the least-risk criterion, the policy that best conserves resources for future
generations or avoids the adoption of technology with the possibility of
future adverse consequences is regarded as the most equitable. The six
alternative policies were rated as to their consistency with these three
equity criterion, both from the general standpoint of consumers and taxpayers
and in terms of their impact on various members of the agricultural community
and on water users. Considerable variation was found among the policies when
their conformity to these criteria was subjectively evaluated, and no one
policy was highly rated according to all three criteria. It appears that the
policies could be modified or elements of several policies could be combined
to produce a policy more consistent with the equity criteria. While signifi-
cant additional work could be done in assessing the degree to which policies
conform with the equity criteria established, the present effort indicates
that such an analysis is feasible and may be helpful to the decision makers
who will determine public policy.
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The major conclusions drawn from the study are presented in Chapter 9
of this report.
xxiii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
For over 30 years, public policy has been in effect in this nation to
attempt to reduce the rate of soil erosion from agricultural land. The
primary reason for this policy was to maintain the productivity of the soil,
although it was also recognized that erosion causes sedimentation problems
in reservoirs. Much remains to be done, however, even from the perspective
of maintaining productivity. In addition, the relatively recent increase in
interest in environmental quality has resulted in concern about the effects
of soil erosion on water quality. It is now recognized that not only eroded
soil but also plant nutrients and other chemicals applied to agricultural
land may contribute to water pollution. This combination of concerns has
led to a search for an effective and equitable policy for the control of ag-
ricultural nonpoint-source (NFS) pollution.
From an agricultural perspective, soil erosion is the primary concern
because the quantity of sediment is large and because plant nutrients and
other substances may move into the waters in association with the sediment.
It has been estimated that approximately four billion tons of sediment enter
the waterways of the 48 contiguous states each year and that three-quarters
of this sediment comes from agricultural lands (National Research Council
Committee on Agriculture and the Environment, 1974).* In a nationwide
survey of seven types of NPS pollution it was estimated that 85 percent
of the soil erosion occurs on croplands (USEPA, 1973). The same study esti-
mates that cropland is the source of 50 percent of the total sediment that
enters our waterways. The USDA has estimated that 64 percent of our crop-
land needs treatment for soil erosion (Trimble, 1974). The erosion problem
is especially serious.in certain areas of the cornbelt where row crpps are
grown on soils susceptible to high erosion rates. Numerous other examples
of soil-loss estimates can be found in the literature. The January-February,
1977, issue of the Journal of Soil and Water- Conservation carried a series
of articles on the problem.
By 1940, the potential for producing food had been lost or seriously
reduced on some 200 million acres in the U.S. (Bennett, 1939). "Based on
the fact that at least a third of the topsoil on the remaining cropland has
been lost, and that for each inch of topsoil loss there has been a corres-
ponding decrease in productivity, we estimate that the production potential
of U.S. cropland has been reduced 10 to 15 percent" (Pimentel et al., 1976).
References are listed on pp. 198-203.
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Corn yields are reduced annually by an average of four bushels per acre for
each inch of topsoil lost (Pimentel et al.3 1976), and yield reductions for
other crops have also been estimated. On many types of soils changes in
equipment, increased application of fertilizers, and other technical
changes can compensate for the reduction in productivity caused by soil
loss; however, these activities often raise the costs of production.
The full costs associated with sediment in waterways generally cannot be
estimated because a substantial portion of these costs are aesthetic in
nature and therefore not readily quantifiable. It has been estimated, how-
ever, that the decrease in the useful life of reservoirs resulting from sedi-
mentation costs 50 million dollars annually (Stall, 1962). The annual cost
of dredging rivers and harbors has been placed at 250 million dollars. A
study of identifiable damages from sediment in the upper Mississippi River
basin found annual damages of 25 million in 1960 dollars (U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 1970). The major categories of damage were those to trans-
portation facilities and drainage improvements. An estimated 90 percent or
more of the sediment in reservoirs in this river basin is accounted for by
sheet erosion (Glymph, 1957). A U.S. estimate of sediment damages was $500
million per year (Wadleigh and Dyal, 1970). In a recent series of estimates
based on six watersheds in Illinois, Guntermann, Lee, and Swanson (1975)
estimated that the offsite damages from sedimentation exceed the on-the-
farm damages due to productivity losses.
In addition to these direct costs associated with sedimentation, the
erosion problem is of concern because sediment is a principal carrier of
plant nutrients and other potentially detrimental substances into the water.
Thus, the control of sediment may provide a means of controlling associated
pollutants as well.
While it is clear that sediment plays a role in the transport of plant
nutrients and other substances, the exact levels are not clear (Logan and
Schwab, 1976). Work is now being initiated to develop procedures for the
systematic tracing or routing of sediments and nutrients through a water-
shed (McElroy et al., 1976). Until such work is successful, planning sedi-
ment control by means of watershed treatment will remain a difficult problem.
It has been estimated that more than half of the surface waters in the
U.S. used as water supplies have been affected by excessive algae growth. It
has also been estimated that up to 60 percent of the nitrogen and 40 percent
of the phosphorus found in these water supplies may be attributed to agri-
cultural runoff (McCarty et al., 1967). Approximately 50 million tons of
plant nutrients are lost annually from croplands (Wadleigh, 1968). In ad-
dition to the impact on water quality, these lost nutrients must be replaced
if the land is to produce the desired yields. Several estimates indicate
that the replacement of lost nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium)
will cost approximately $7 billion annually (Beasley, 1972; USDA, 1965).
•• ..In the context of the analysis presented in this report, it should be
'recognized that the relationship between soil erosion and water quality is
not precisely understood. It is obvious that greatly accelerated erosion
rates result in increased turbidity and sedimentation, but the exact pro-
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portion of the eroded soil that reaches the water and the manner in which it
moves once it arrives there are not known. Also, the impact of the sediment
on the aquatic habitat is not fully understood. While these questions are
addressed in a section of this report, the major thrust of the analysis is on
methods for reducing soil erosion from agricultural land. Concentrating on
such control measures is a reasonable approach because (1) erosion is clearly
a partial cause of the water problem, (3) there are associated implications for
soil productivity, and (3) this aspect of the physical problem entails
important public policy issues.
OBJECTIVE
As a step toward solving the problems outlined above, the USEPA spon-
sored the research project described in this report. The objective of the
project was to examine alternative policies for the control of agricultural
nonpoint sources of water pollution. The research, carried out during the
one-year period by an interdisciplinary team of scientists at the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, was administered and coordinated by the
university's Institute for Environmental Studies.
APPROACH
The approach planned for this study was to examine in a preliminary
manner a wide range of existing policies for the control of agricultural non-
point sources of pollution and then to select from among them six represen-
tative policies for intensive analysis. A search of existing and proposed
state and federal legislation and programs, however, produced only a limited
number and variety of NPS control strategies. Team members therefore sup-
plemented the list by developing additional control policies by a method
described later in this report. The six ultimately selected for analysis
were chosen to represent a broad range of approaches to NPS control and to
provide opportunities to analyze the potential impacts of such a diverse
array of policies. Those chosen varied from programs in which participation
would be completely voluntary to ones which would mandate performance and
impose penalties for noncompliance.
The search for existing policies and laws related to NPS pollution
control at the federal and state level is discussed in Chapter 2. Also
presented is a history of federal and state soil conservation efforts and
agencies, a summary of proposed state legislation, and a brief discussion of
the costs of present federal programs directed toward the reduction of soil
erosion.
Chapter 3 discusses the development and selection of the six policies
subjected to detailed analysis during the course of this project. One of the
policies would require the establishment of "greenbelts" along waterways to
provide vegetative filtering of runoff water, thus capturing sediment and
plant nutrients and preventing them from entering the waterways. Because
such a policy has not been widely considered, a discussion of the underlying
principles and possible impacts of greenbelts on water quality is included.
The remaining chapters present analyses of the various aspects of the
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six policies and of related NPS control techniques. Chapter 4 presents the
results obtained when two linear programming models were applied to determine
the impacts of a number of alternative control techniques. One of these
models is applicable to the entire corn belt and indicates the impacts that
can be expected at the aggregate level. The other is a watershed model
which concentrates on the impacts of soil erosion control practices in main-
taining soil productivity over a long planning horizon.
Chapter 5 describes the institutional arrangements necessary to carry
out each of the six policies and provides an estimate of the cost at the
county level of implementing these policies. To generate these costs it was
necessary to identify in detail all of the activities required under each
policy and their component costs. Chapter 6 discusses the sociological
factors involved in implementing policies of this type and discusses the
results of a survey which indicates the possible reaction of Illinois
farmers to these policies.
Chapter 7 presents three equity criteria that could be used in eval-
uating alternative policies. A subjective analysis of the six policies ac-
cording to these criteria is also presented. Chapter 8 reviews the legal
implications of implementing the six policies analyzed and discusses whether
nitrogen constraints are legally feasible. The final chapter indicates the
principal conclusions that can be drawn from this work.
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CHAPTER 2
EXISTING SOIL CONSERVATION PROGRAMS, POLICIES, AND LAWS
During the initial phase of this project, a number of current and recent
institutions, programs, and laws related to the control of soil erosion and
thus to the control of pollution from agricultural nonpoint sources were
examined. The purpose for this review was to obtain information on a wide
range of control policies which could then be analyzed for their legality,
equity, cost, and administrative characteristics. Pertinent literature was
reviewed and numerous individuals in appropriate positions were contacted to
determine what policies were currently in effect. The variety of the policies
discovered was not wide.
The initial section of this chapter presents background information on
existing agricultural agencies concerned with soil erosion problems. Such
agencies provide obvious opportunities for implementing agricultural NPS
control programs. The second section analyzes those present federal and state
laws which have a bearing on existing and potential erosion control and NPS
pollution control programs. Costs for the existing programs, insofar as they
could be ascertained, are presented in the final section.
EXISTING PROGRAMS AND AGENCIES
The federal Soil Conservation Service (SCS), the local Soil and Water
Conservation Districts (SWCDs) and the federal Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation Service (ASCS) are governmental agencies that have been developed,
in part, to address the problem of soil conservation.
The first funds ($160,000) for soil erosion investigations were approp-
riated in 1929. A temporary Soil Erosion Service was established in 1933 with-
in the U.S. Department of the Interior, partly as a conservation measure and
partly as a means of providing employment through conservation demonstration
projects in conjunction with the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National
Industrial Recovery Act.
In 1935, the various soil erosion activities of the U.S. Departments of
Interior and Agriculture were merged into the Soil Conservation Service within
the latter department. The SCS set a policy of providing planning, organi-
zational, and technical assistance to individual farm producers and watershed
groups to aid them in developing sound soil conservation practices. That
policy continues today. The objectives of the SCS are to bring about desir-
able physical adjustments in land use with a view to bettering human welfare,
conserving natural resources, establishing a permanent and balanced agricul-
ture, and reducing the hazards of floods and siltation. These objectives are
5
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pursued through complementary programs of soil conservation, farm forestry,
flood control, submarginal land utilization, drainage, and irrigation. The
central thrust is to extend sound land-use practices to all land, public and
private, which is vulnerable to soil erosion.
Because the pace of achievement was slow when all the initiative was at
the federal level, a novel institutional development was fostered. Local
identification was seen as being a necessary ingredient in fashioning a na-
tional program which could meet local conditions, assimilate the insights of
the practicing farmers, and encourage the necessary farmer cooperation. The
development of Soil and Water Conservation Districts (SWCDs) met these needs.
The districts were authorized under standard state enabling laws which out-
lined district functions, powers, and organizational arrangements. Legally,
the districts are subdivisions of the state but are clearly dependent upon
and a complementary vehicle for implementation of the policy envisioned for
the U.S. Soil Conservation Service. Cooperation between the districts and
the SCS is facilitated through a formalized memorandum of understanding.
All states have enacted the enabling legislation, in most cases patterned
after a model act. The linkage at the state level is often a state agency with
other general code responsibilities for conservation and management of natural
resources. Essentially all of the nation's farmland is encompassed in the
almost 3,000 districts. Each district was initiated upon petition of the
farmers and is partly governed by an elected farmer committee system. Under
the auspices of these districts, federally-funded and well-trained conserva-
tion specialists provide educational, planning, and technical assistance to
cooperating farm operators to aid them in developing basic farm conservation
plans.
Two types of powers are vested in the districts to enable them to achieve
erosion control and, specifically, to promote the application of soil conser-
vation practices by individual farm operators. Under the first power,
authorized in the standard enabling act in almost all states, the districts
can offer a variety of voluntary conservation activities in agreement with
land users. These activities include developing conservation plans, conduct-
ing demonstrations, providing information on prevention and control measures,
and lending equipment. The second, provided in a majority but not all of the
states, is the power to prescribe types of compulsory land-use regulations
for the prevention and control of erosion. Such regulations are imposed
subsequent to specified processes which include petitions, hearings, and a
referendum approved by the affected land users. For example, Illinois
districts are authorized to adopt land-use regulations with the approval of
three-fourths of those landowners voting. Except in a few western states,
however, few such regulations have been developed.* In addition, SCS is pro-
viding assistance to some 148 projects of the Resource Conservation and Devel-
opment Program in specific agreement with public agencies involved in partic-
ular land or water management activities.
The federal Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS)
administers a policy of providing financial assistance to achieve agricul-
*Such regulations are more frequently used in watershed drainage districts.
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tural soil conservation. Initiated in 1936 with the Soil Conservation and
Domestic Allotment Act, the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP), also now
referred to as the Rural Environmental Assistance Program (REAP), has function-
ed under the federal agency charged with production control and with price and
income support. This administering agency was first named the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration (AAA), but is now the ASCS. The ACP was originally
conceived as a means of controlling production. By offering federal payments,
it sought to induce farmers to engage in soil-conserving practices and, hence,
to curtail the production of soil-depleting annual crops. This approach to
production control was developed as a way of bypassing the restraints upon
direct control imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling that the 1933
Agricultural Adjustment Act was unconstitutional. Later, the ACP was con-
verted to an independent program of cost-sharing for specified voluntary soil
conservation practices by farmers.
Currently, the ASCS, SCS, and SWCDs cooperate in implementing soil con-
servation programs. The local SWCDs provide direction, the SCS provides
technical assistance, and the ASCS provides funding (up to $2,500 per farm
per year) to cooperating farmers for the adoption of soil conservation prac-
tices.
The technical assistance, subsidization, and sometimes compulsory
performance aspects of these existing soil conservation policies have obvious
implications for the development of programs by the states to achieve the now-
federally-mandated control of agricultural NPS water pollution.
EXISTING AND PROPOSED LAWS
Federal Laws
As indicated in the preceding section, federal laws related to soil
erosion control have generally been promulgated for the purpose of preserving
natural resources and maintaining crop productivity (or for indirectly con-
trolling production). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) of 1972
was the first federal legislation to formally recognize the problem of non-
point-source pollution and to cite agricultural activity as one of the many
diffuse sources of such pollution.
Nonpoint sources of pollution are excluded from the effluent limitations
set forth in Sections 104 and 402 of the act, which identify water pollutants
and establish the nationwide point-source management system (National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System, or'NPDES). A number of sections in
the act, however, apply directly or indirectly to the control of nonpoint
sources.
Section 304 the most directly stated NPS provision, mandates the analysis
and study of NPS pollutants. Subsection 304(e) specifically directs the
Environmental Protection Agency to issue guidelines for identifying and
evaluating nonpoint sources of pollution and to recommend control methods and
procedures.
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Section 208 contains the strongest statement concerning NPS pollution.
This section directs the development and implementation of area-wide water
quality management plans. The objective in formulating such plans is to
identify those areas which have substantial water quality control problems,
leading to the development of corrective planning and regulatory programs.
These management plans are being designed to achieve the goals of the act —
namely, water that is fishable and swimmable by 1983, and the complete elimi-
nation of pollutant discharges by 1985 where technically, economically, and
socially achievable. Specifically, the plans are to identify and set forth
procedures and methods for the control of agricultural nonpoint pollution
sources and the means of implementing such controls.
This "208 planning process" is now underway. Detailed management plans
and implementation time schedules for the states will be due in 1978. The EPA
originally required that this planning be carried out only in certain desig-
nated areas with severe problems. In such areas, the planning effort is
generally carried out by a regional commission formed for that purpose. As
the result of a court decision (Natural Resources Defense Council, et al. v.
Train, et al.), however, the EPA now must require the states themselves to
carry out this planning activity for those areas which are not included in the
designated planning areas. The EPA is also required to provide support to the
states for such planning activities.
It is the intent of Congress that in implementing Section 208, provisions
be made to involve citizens in the planning process and the design of control
policies.
Unlike the specific effluent limitations and standards the act authorizes
for the control of point sources, effluent standards are not specified for the
abatement of NPS pollution. Since nonpoint sources are only partially
controllable, the EPA has indicated that states should adopt, when possible,
"best management practices" (BMPs). These practices are the control techniques
that a state considers to be the most reasonable and effective and which are
suitable to local conditions at the time of implementation. Such practices
include crop rotation, less intensive cropping systems, conservation tillage,
and structural controls. It is significant to note that these best management
practices are preventive measures—they are directed toward controlling soil
erosion on-site rather than dealing with sediment after it has eroded.
Section 209 of the FWPCA deals with river-basin planning and undoubtedly
will cover 208 plans as they affect a particular basin.
Section SOS is concerned with elements in proposed state programs dealing
with water-quality standards and implementation plans. State planning and
management for the control of NPS pollution are elements of this overall state
water-quality management process and represent a combination of planning and
implementation as directed in Sections 303 and 208.
Section 305 of the act instructs each state to carry out water-quality in-
ventories, which involve reporting annually on the nature and extent of NPS
pollutants, recommending methods for controls, and estimating the cost of
control.
8
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State Laws
This section presents a general survey of existing and proposed state
statutes relevant to the agricultural NPS pollution problem and also describes
a model law. The individual statutes are summarized in Appendix A. Research
revealed little in the way of innovative approaches to soil erosion control at
the state level.* (The CRIS and WRSIC data retrieval systems also produced
little information of value.t) Many states and counties have erosion-control
regulations, but these regulations are primarily applicable to the disturbance
of land by commercial, highway, and construction activities. In a number of
states, controlled agricultural activities are specifically exempted from soil
erosion ordinances and laws.
Control of sediment pollution involves constraining the way land is
used. Jurisdiction over land-use policy has traditionally been delegated to
states and often by them to local governments. These units, in turn, have
usually left the problem to the realm of private policy. Most federal or
state policy directed at agricultural erosion has been a response to concerns
not about water quality but about soil productivity, food supply, and reser-
voir damage. Significant policies of this nature have been in effect for
decades.
As outlined in the first section of this chapter, public policy re-
sponding to problems of agricultural soil erosion originated in the early
1930s. Development of these policies followed a slowly rising national con-
sciousness, initially appearing in the early 1900s, of the waste and exhaus-
tion of the nation's natural resources. A quarter century later, public
awareness was sufficient to precipitate the development of agricultural soil
conservation policies. The principal concerns addressed by these policies
were farmland productivity, farm family livelihood, community economic viabil-
ity, flood damage, and reservoir capacity. Water quality, although a factor,
was a lesser concern. Erosion was perceived primarily in terms of a loss in
food-production capacity rather than of the detrimental effect on stream water
quality resulting from sediment and the chemicals it carries.
The several state laws reviewed in this section were written during
the extended period between implementation of SWCD-type legislation and pas-
sage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments in 1972. As in
earlier statutes and programs, these laws emphasize soil erosion control for
*A number of reference sources, reports, and papers present summaries of
state statutes covering soil erosion controls. Rather than duplicate such
previously published material, only those states having agricultural land
controls will be discussed here. For additional information see the recent
six-state study prepared by the National Association of Conservation Dis-
tricts (NACD) for the EPA, Erosion and Sediment Control Programs, 1976 (NACD
P.O. Box 855, League City, Texas 77573). Also, see (1) Compilation of Fed-
eral3 State and Local Laws Controlling Non-Point Pollutants, September, 1975;
(2) NACD-208 Series of Informational Newsletters, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6.
tCurrent Research Information Retrieval System, UDSA; Water Resources Sci-
entific Information Center, UDSI.
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the purpose of saving the soil resource, not preserving water quality. Ap-
pendix A contains a summary of the major provisions of the enacted laws and
proposed bills covering agricultural activities.
Some of the existing state laws are complementary to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972, and the states therefore may choose to coor-
dinate their Section 208 water quality management planning with those exis-
ting state statutes. Some state laws, however, may be contradictory to the
objectives and mandate of the FWPCA. In such cases it will be necessary to
amend or replace the existing laws and programs with ones that are compatible
with federal directives. Particular problems may arise if it is found nec-
essary in meeting the objectives of Section 208 to replace present voluntary
soil conservation programs with mandatory programs or regulatory action. De-
spite the fact that the state statutes characterized in the following discus-
sion are of several different types, they contain similar patterns of pro-
visions. For example, these laws and proposed bills include agricultural ac-
tivities either by direct enforcement or indirectly by requiring compliance
with an approved conservation plan. Some states have exempted plowing and
tilling from their laws if the landowners are farming under the guidelines of
an accepted conservation plan, while others have deleted agriculture alto-
gether. While not all of the statutes require implementation of conservation
plans, they at least demand more than intent to show compliance with the law.
Citizen participation is required under many of the laws. For example,
Iowa and South Dakota statutes both provide for citizen participation but in
different ways. South Dakota legislation requires the "development of guide-
lines with full opportunity for citizen participation," while in Iowa, the
implementation of conservation practices on a farm can be made mandatory only
after a complaint is filed by a neighbor alleging erosion damage from that
farm. Thus, action on the part of the injured citizen is a necessary ele-
ment. The state of Kansas has proceeded with planning for soil erosion con-
trol by first offering a public education program and an opportunity for
citizens to become involved in the design of erosion-control legislation.
Next to the conservation plan, the most common feature of state laws
and bills is the provision for economic assistance in forms such as cost-
sharing incentives and conservation practice financing. Most states will
continue to rely on ASCS-SCS technical and financial assistance in their soil
erosion control programs. In other states, such as Iowa and Ohio, the laws
prohibit enforcement of compliance measures unless the state has authorized
sufficient funds to support implementation costs for conservation work.
Enforcement procedures and penalties for noncompliance are also similar
among the various state statutes. In general, the penalty provisions specify
that violators will be subject to fines and found guilty of petty offenses
and misdemeanors. Most state laws require forfeiture of cost-sharing funds
if a landowner does not follow prescribed conservation practices. Enforce-
ment proceedings are initiated by a neighbor's complaint or by the local SCS
office. As reported above, orders to comply do not have to be followed
unless technical and financial assistance is available. In Michigan, enforce-
ment proceedings include regular on-site inspection and monitoring.
10
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Model State Lou
A "Model State Act for Soil Erosion and Sediment Control" developed dur-
ing the 1973 National Symposium on State Environmental Legislation for the
Council of State Governments contains many provisions similar to existing
and proposed state laws. The thrust of the model legislation is directed to-
ward the state SWCD's. Amendments to existing SWCD enabling legislation
would give the districts authority to establish erosion and sediment control
programs. Soil erosion control policy would be implemented through the state
SWCD and the local districts.
Under the model law, sedimentation would be controlled by requiring the
filing, approval, and implementation of a proper conservation plan. The
implementing agency would make periodic inspections to monitor areas with
soil erosion problems. Inspections would also be made to review complaints
and appeals by landowners whose property is damaged by a neighbor's eroding
soil. Violations of the soil erosion control law would be deemed a misde-
meanor and the violator would be subject to a fine not to exceed $500 or one
year's imprisonment.
Agricultural activities carried on in accordance with an approved con-
servation plan would be exempt from earthmoving permits and required plans.
According to the model law, state agencies and districts should be eligible
to receive and dispense funds for implementation of the law's provisions.
Legislatures should provide landowners with 50% cost-sharing funds and tech-
nical assistance if the landowners are expected to comply with established
conservation standards.
Ex-isti-ng State Laws
Iowa. This state was one of the first to propose a law (the Soil Con-
servancy Law) promulgating rules and regulations for soil erosion control.
The law was adopted by the state in 1971.
The new law actually amended Iowa's existing SWCD law to place a ton-
nage limitation on soil loss. Under this law a landowner is required to im-
plement soil conservation practices if his property is shown to be the source
of excessive sediment pollution to another person's property. Only the owner
or occupant of the land damaged by the sediment can file a complaint initi-
ating such a requirement. The local conservation district, however, must
bear the burden of proving that a nuisance exists, and the state must provide
cost-sharing funds in an amount equal to 75% of the conservation remedy. Ad-
ditional provisions include the promotion of land-use planning and the coor-
dination of district conservation activities. (Note that for a conservation
program pursued voluntarily, the state will pay only 50% of the cost. The
law thus tends to encourage "friendly complaints" which make the higher 75%
rate available to the landowner.)
Hawaii. The state enacted soil and sediment control legislation early
(it was passed in 1968 and revised in 1975). The tilling and clearing of
land come under the jurisdiction of the act. The law directs county govern-
11
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merits, in cooperation with SWCDs, to promulgate soil control ordinances. If
the counties fail to enact such legislation, the state will intervene and
establish local standards and regulations.
Pennsylvania. The enabling law for Pennsylvania's sediment and erosion
control program is the "Clean Steams Law" passed in 1937 and amended in 1972.
This law is one of the exceptions to the earlier generalization that the pur-
pose of most state erosion control statutes is to maintain productivity rather
than to preserve water quality. Rather than concentrating on the primary pre-
vention of soil erosion as a means to reduce sedimentation, this legislation
calls for preventing additional pollution of state waters and for the reclaim-
ing and restoring every polluted stream in the state to a clean, unpolluted
condition. Responsibility for implementation of the bill is delegated to the
local SWCDs. The bill also recognizes that achievement of water-quality goals
requires a comprehensive program of watershed management.
Agricultural activities are within the overview of the Pennsylvania law
and may be exempt only when such activities are carried out under the guide-
lines of a conservation plan. Although persons engaging in any earth-moving
activity must obtain a permit for such action, plowing and tilling for agri-
cultural purposes are exempted. However, agricultural activities must be so
conducted as to prevent erosion and sedimentation. The control devices
specifically mentioned in the law are catch basins, interceptor channels, and
diversion terraces. High rates of soil erosion are permissible if a catch
basin or similar structure is provided to prevent soil from leaving the
property and entering a waterway. Even though these methods may keep streams
free of silt, they do not have the added affect of protecting the land's
productive potential.
The law requires each landowner to prepare a conservation plan by July 1,
1977. These plans need deal only with sediment reduction and thus do not
represent a complete and formal soil conservation plan.
Michigan. The state legislature enacted its soil erosion and sedimentation
control act in 1972. The law is applicable to all activities that involve
"earth changes" and that contribute to soil erosion or sedimentation.
In the law as originally enacted, control provisions were applicable to
agricultural practices. Two years later the law was amended to include
special provisions for plowing and tilling for crop-production purposes.
Agricultural activities, however, do come within the scope of the law. Per-
sons engaged in agricultural production who have entered into a formal agree-
ment with a soil conservation district to carry out practices in accordance
with rules and regulations of the law will not be subject to the law's require-
ments for land-use plans or to its earth-disturbance permit system but will be
subject to enforcement procedures after January 1979. The state Department of
Agriculture has been given the authority to set guidelines for agricultural
practices when controls take effect in 1979.
New York. The state legislature recently passed a bill which became
effective on July 1, 1976, amending that state's soil and water conservation
district law.
12
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The New York law controls only sediment and animal waste pollutants, not
fertilizers. Agricultural landowners are required to apply to local SWCDs for
assistance in developing a conservation plan by January 1978. During or before
January 1980, the districts must, in return, provide a conservation plan for
each of these applicants. The law does not require implementation of the plan,
but all plans are to be reviewed every five years.
The law originally proposed for New York state contained provisions for
limiting the rate (in pounds per acre) and methods of fertilizer application.
The bill would also have prohibited tillage and fertilization of lands having
slopes greater than 20%. Strong public objections led to defeat in favor of
the present law.
South Dakota. In 1976, South Dakota passed an act titled "To Regulate
Land-Disturbing Activities within the State Resulting in Soil Erosion and Sed-
iment Damage." While applications of the law are broad, the provisions for
implementation are rather specific.
The State Conservation Commission must develop erosion control guide-
lines within 12 months. Like other state soil erosion control laws, South
Dakota has mandated that these guidelines be based on relevant watershed and
drainage-basin data. Surveys of areas with critical erosion and sediment
problems are to be utilized. Conservation standards are to be developed by
conservation districts and are to include criteria, techniques, and methods
for erosion and sediment control. Guidelines must include recommended soil-
loss limits and alternative conservation practices. The law provides for
public participation in the development of the control guidelines.
Another similarity between the South Dakota law and other laws is the
reliance placed on a permit system to monitor land-disturbing actions. As
with the Iowa law, an enforcement provision directs the conservation districts
to accept, investigate, and validate petitions from persons whose property has
been adversely affected by soil erosion from neighboring land.
New Jersey. The state's "Soil Erosion and Sediment Control Act" (1975)
provides that conservation standards are to be established by a state soil
conservation committee subject to the approval of the state secretaries of
agriculture and environmental protection. As in the South Dakota law, these
standards are to be based on relevant watershed data. The major provisions
of the law concern municipal activities; agricultural activities, however,
are included in the general mandate of the law.
Montana. The Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act of 1975 was
enacted primarily for control of proposed projects affecting streams. Recog-
nizing the need for agricultural use of rivers and the needs to preserve the
water for beneficial uses, the Montana legislature passed this bill to estab-
lish a policy of preserving the natural or existing form and course of streams
and keeping soil erosion and sedimentation to a minimum.
In addition to provisions for agricultural activity control, the law
includes regulations for river dredging and stream channelization activities.
Conservation districts are the implementing organization and must adopt rules
13
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and establish standards and guidelines in accordance with standards set by
the State Board of Natural Resources and Conservation, overseer of the law.
If the Department of Fish and Game is notified of a proposed project, a re-
view team aided by SCS technical assistants may be appointed to examine plans
on-site. If an acceptable plan cannot be agreed upon, an arbitration board
is appointed. If the arbitration panel requires modification of the original
plan, cost-sharing must be provided for those additional measures needed.
If a project has not received prior approval, it will be declared a
nuisance and subject to legal action. Violators (those initiating projects
before approval) will be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be subject to costs
of restoring damaged streams.
Virgin Islands. The Virgin Islands' law on soil and shore erosion ex-
empts lands under approved cultivation methods for agricultural purposes.
Presumably those agricultural lands that are not cultivated under an approved
conservation plan must at some time come under an enforcement policy for
erosion control.
Proposed State Legislation
In a number of states, soil erosion control bills which encompass agri-
cultural activities are currently undergoing legislative review. Several of
these proposed acts are expected to become law in the spring of 1977.
Illinois. The proposed Illinois bill differs from the model law by
designating the Illinois Department of Agriculture rather than the state SWCD
commission as the administrating agency of the state erosion and sediment
control program. The implementation and enforcement of the law, however, is
to be performed by the SWCDs, as provided in the model law.
Each district is to develop a technically and economically feasible
program consistent with agriculture department guidelines. To aid in devel-
oping the state program, an advisory commission must be created with at
least half of the members deriving 50% of their income from farming.
Indiana. A bill proposed in the Indiana legislature would require a
conservation plan to be approved prior to any prohibited land-disturbing ac-
tivity. An individual who has developed and is abiding by an approved con-
servation plan but who cannot receive the technical and financial assistance
necessary for implementation of a formal control program would not be penal-
ized.
Ohio. An "Agricultural Pollution Abatement Standards and Regulatory
Act" is expected to be adopted in the spring of 1977- The first version of
this bill did not pass. It is believed that the new version, which provides
for greater cost-sharing and expanded appeal opportunities, should pass dur-
ing the spring legislative session. Under the law, the Division of Soil and
Water Districts in the state Department of Natural Resources would recommend
abatement practices for sediment and animal wastes in accordance with state
standards and would develop regulations in cooperation with the local SWCDs.
14
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A unique feature of the proposed Ohio legislation is the inclusion of a
soil-loss limitation timetable* based on the USDA-SCS Technical Guide on
soil-loss tolerances or "T" values, which are site specific. These tolerances
do not consider the amount of soil loss that would degrade water quality. The
Ohio law, however, is written in such a way that if the water quality stand-
ards are not met, the accepted level of conservation practices will be revised.
Another feature is that tillage is prohibited adjacent to a ditch, stream, or
lake where soil would readily erode into these bodies of water.
Cost-sharing for the improvements necessary to meet standards is also
provided for in the proposed legislation, but the extent of compensation has
yet to be determined.
Kansas. Like Illinois's proposed soil conservation law, the Kansas
law is a direct descendent of the model law. Kansas is also one of the first
states to propose soil legislation in direct response to the mandates of the
FWPCA. In 1974 a Kansas Task Force was formed to further consider how the
FWPCA might be implemented in that state. Since then the group has recom-
mended specific legislation and has also recommended that the state (1) de-
velop a land treatment and management program that meets unique conservation
needs in Kansas; (2) draft legislation which will comply with federal require-
ments but recognize public and private rights of citizens; and (3) involve
citizens in the design of regulations. To initiate such involvement, the
state Cooperative Extension Service in cooperation with other groups and
agencies has developed an extensive public education program on soil erosion
problems.
Highlights of the suggested legislation include limitations on land-
disturbing activities, compliance with the law through an approved conserva-
tion plan, an arrangement for cost-sharing for land treatment practices, pro-
vision to control by conservation districts for abatement programs, and auth-
orization of the state conservation commission to set guidelines.
During the 1975 legislative session a first draft of the proposed bill
was introduced but did not pass. The bill is now being redrafted with
revisions to reflect current Section 208 policy and planning.
Minnesota. In the proposed Minnesota bill, land-disturbing activities
are defined to include tillage on agricultural land. The state SWCD Commission
will sponsor the erosion control program and will develop standards and regu-
lations with the assistance of an advisory board. To be in compliance with
the law, a person engaged in a land-disturbing activity must have an approved
*Average annual soil loss limited to:
Phase I - 2 times T value until 1980
Phase II - 1.5 times T value from 1980 - 1985
Phase III- T value after 1985
(T value taken from Technical Guide developed by the Soil Conservation Ser-
vice, U.S. Department of Agriculture; if guide does not apply, practices
approved by SCS District will be used.)
15
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conservation plan for erosion and sediment control.
This bill was introduced during a previous legislative session and is
now expected to be reintroduced as a response to the federal requirement for
Section 208 planning.
County Soil Erosion Ordinances
There are many counties which have enacted ordinances for the control
of soil erosion, but most of these laws do not include control of agricul-
tural practices. In Walworth County, Wisconsin, however, a zoning ordinance
was passed in 1974 which permits tillage on some soil types only if done in
accordance with county conservation standards (derived from SCS standards).
The county zoning administrator is responsible for putting the ordinance in-
to effect.
In Vernon County, Wisconsin, the local SWCD has proposed an ordinance
specifically directed toward management of agricultural land for conservation
of soil and water and for the control of erosion and sedimentation. The or-
dinance, entitled "Soil and Water Conservation District Land Use Regulations
for Erosion and Sediment Control ," is to be implemented by the district.
All agricultural land would be subject to the ordinance except that
having a slope of less than six percent. To comply with the ordinance, a
landowner must contour plow, employ other conservation management practices
acceptable to the district, or manage the land to meet standards in the SCS
Technical Guide. If technical assistance and/or public cost-sharing funds
for the management practices specified in a conservation plan are not avail-
able, then compliance is waived.
Enforcement of this ordinance includes investigating citizen complaints
and filing those complaints with the district attorney for prosecution if the
violation is not halted or remedied. Violators would also forfeit cost-shar-
ing funds if conservation measures are not put into effect.
Other Laws
Several types of laws not considered in the preceding discussion could
be applied to the control of agricultural NPS pollution. Such laws may be of
value in developing alternative control policies.
Laws dealing with stream pollution are based on riparian rights and the
right to protection against nuisances. Both types of law rest on the concept
that a landowner whose property borders a stream not only has a right to clean
water but also has a responsibility not to degrade the water quality and
thereby cause a nuisance to downstream neighbors. Most states have statutes
that cover such rights. Iowa's Soil Conservancy Law, for example, is based
on the nuisance doctrine.
Most states also have water pollution statutes (environmental protection
laws and regulations) which prohibit the discharge of any contaminant at
concentrations which may cause water pollution (as defined by state standards)
16
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and the deposition of any contaminant upon the land in such places and manner
as to create a water-pollution hazard.
Finally, as described previously, each state has a Soil and Water Conser-
vation District Law. Most of the SWCD statutes were enacted in the 1930s
but have been continuously amended to reflect changes in soil technology and
in the general outlook on soil conservation. One important amendment adopted
by a number of states is the authorization to promulgate land-use regulations
with enforcement mechanisms to control soil and water resources.
A number of other laws could be applicable to agricultural NPS pollution
control programs: statutes on fertilizers, planning and zoning ordinances on
the local and county levels; and floodplain and flood protection laws. While
the miscellaneous statutes and proposed bills discussed in this section do not
specifically refer to agricultural nonpoint sources of pollution the scope
of some may be broad enough to cover certain agricultural activities.
COSTS OF EXISTING PROGRAMS
In assessing the relative merit of alternative programs for NPS pollution
control it will be necessary to evaluate the costs of implementing each pro-
gram. Detailed cost estimates for administering selected representative
programs will be presented in Chapter 5. To provide a background against
which to interpret and compare those estimates, this section provides infor-
mation on the administrative costs of existing governmental programs in the
area of soil conservation and erosion control.
It should be recognized that a wide range of techniques is potentially
applicable to the control of NPS pollution. The costs summarized here are
those for the only two general approaches currently being applied on a major
scale: assisting farmers in developing soil conservation plans (the task of
the SCS and the SWCDs) and providing farmers with financial assistance for
the cost of implementing soil conservation measures (a function of the
Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) administered by the ASCS). Because
very little has been done to date toward implementing other approaches to NPS
control, cost data for other techniques are unavailable.
Costs of SCS Programs
Data on the costs of SCS operations—the development and revision of
soil conservation plans—in eleven states are presented in Table 1. Although
a knowledge of the planning costs for each type of conservation measure (such
as contouring, terracing, etc.) would be helpful in estimating costs for NPS
control policies, the available data unfortunately did not permit such a
breakdown. If the number of acres that would be treated by the various prac-
tices as a result of a given policy were known, it would be possible to de-
velop an estimate of the cost of the policy. Because of the lack of detailed
information, however, it was not possible to make such estimates. Note that
Table 1 includes only the planning costs; the costs of the conservation
structures are excluded.
The per-acre SCS costs in actual dollars range from a high of $4.81
17
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00
Table 1
SCS Costs per Acre for Planning and Plan Revision in Selected States, 1970-74
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Actual
Real*
Actual
Real*
Actual
Real*
Actual
Real*
Actual
Real*
IL
1.84
2.50
2.00
2.60
2.46
3.09
2.56
3.04
3.09
3.33
IN
2.68
3.64
2.52
3.28
3.27
4.10
3.57
4.25
4.13
4.45
IA
1.31
1.77
1.28
1.66
1.36
1.71
1.54
1.83
1.51
1.63
KS
.53
.72
.59
.77
.69
.87
.96
1.14
.89
.96
MI
2.10
2.85
2.89
3.76
3.25
4.08
4.09
4.87
4.76
5.13
MN
1.78
2.42
1.77
2.30
2.08
2.61
1.78
2.12
2.22
2.39
MO
1.77
2.40
2.03
2.64
2.18
2.74
1.79
2.13
1.91
2.06
NB
.34
.46
.42
.54
.40
.50
.49
.58
.58
.63
OH
4.77
6.48
4.41
5.73
4.70
4.95
4.16
4.95
4.81
5.18
SD
.39
.53
.48
.62
.53
.67
.44
.52
.51
.55
WI
2.59
3.52
2.56
3.33
2.59
3.25
2.52
3.00
2.95
3.18
*Inflated to 1975 values using the U.S. Government implicit price deflator.
Source: Conservation Costs and Accomplishments (USDA, various years).
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(Ohio, 1974) to a low of $.39 (South Dakota, 1970). In real dollars* the
high is $6.48 (Ohio, 1970) and the low is $.46 (Nebraska, 1970). Whether we
look at real or actual dollars it is evident that a wide range of present SCS
costs exists among these eleven states.
Iowa, which enacted its "Soil Conservancy Law" in 1971, shows a relative-
ly low planning cost (real dollars averaged over 1970-74) of $1.75 per acre.
Even though the control program relies on the SCS to develop soil conservation
plans, the per-acre cost of planning did not increase significantly from 1970
(prior to policy implementation) to 1974 (after the policy had been functioning
for several years). This fact may indicate that the program has resulted in
changes in SCS activities which, in turn, have kept planning costs from
increasing. The program may have improved the efficiency of some SCS work
by allowing the staff to devote less time to convincing farmers that they need
a program, thus leaving more time for soil conservation plan development.
Costs of Black Creek Watershed Project
The USEPA has sponsored an advanced sediment control program in Indiana's
Black Creek Watershed since June 3, 1974. The accomplishments and costs of
that program are shown in Table 2. The cost of planning conservation programs
(technical assistance costs) for acres under contract is $16.99/acre in actual
1976 dollars. In real dollars (base year 1975) the cost is $16.30 per acre.
This price is considerably higher than the state SCS planning costs.
The higher cost of the Black Creek Project probably results from the
special care and emphasis given to this experimental project and from the in-
itial lack of cooperation on the part of the Amish farmers. The cost was also
inflated by initially concentrating on stream-channel stabilization, which cost
$90,341. Most of that amount was spent on streams during the first year, but
the project then switched to other less expensive methods which have proven
more effective. Therefore, it is reasonable for the Black Creek costs to be
higher than statewide SCS costs. For these reasons, it does not seem appro-
priate to use these cost data as a basis for estimating the costs of achieving
soil erosion control under an expanded voluntary-subsidy program.
The subsidy payments included in some present agricultural policies
could also form a part of a nonpoint-source pollution control program. The
administrative costs of the ASCS/ACP program were therefore analyzed to gain
insights into the costs of subsidy programs. The cost data used cover the
years from 1969 to 1975 for the states of Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio,
Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska. These data include only the admin-
istrative costs associated with the payment of subsidies and omit the actual
subsidies paid.
The cost data were broken into the 35 categories of accomplishments
listed in Table 3. The following ratios were computed for each state for each
Conversions to real dollars with 1975 as the base year were based on the gov-
ernment implicit price deflator as given in Eoonomio Report to the President.,
Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office (1976).
19
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ro
o
Table 2
Accomplishments and Costs of Black Creek Watershed Project: September 1976
Total incentive payment for acres under contract
Technical assistance costs for acres under contract
Total cost of land treatment including technical
assistance on acres under contract
Total incentive payments for acres adequately treated
Cost of technical assistance for acres adequately treated
Total cost for land treatment including technical
assistance for acres adequately treated
ACCOMPLISH-
MENT
(acres)
10,795
10,795
10,795
5,986
5,986
5,986
TOTAL
COST
$444,702.89
183,432.87
628,135.76
444,702.89
183,432.87
628,135.76
UNIT
COST
($/acre)
41.20
16.99
58.19
74.29
30.64
104.93
NOTE: District cost share for all practices averaged 70%.
Source: Lake, J.G., 1976. An institutional approach to implementing best management practices.
In Best management practices for non-point source pollution control.
Chicago, 111.: USEPA Office of the Great Lakes Coordinator. P-88.
Report No. EPA-905/9-76-005.
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Table 3
Agricultural Conservation Program Practices
PRACTICE
NUMBER
DESCRIPTION
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
Establish Permanent Cover
Improve Permanent Cover
Planting Trees and Shrubs
Timber Stand Improvement
Construction of Dams and Reservoirs
Strip Cropping
Terrace Systems
Construction of Diversions or Spreaders
Stream Bank Stabilization
Develop Permanent Wildlife Cover
Sediment Retention Structures
Sediment or Chemical Runoff Control Measures
Reorganizing Irrigation Systems to Control Erosion
Rotational Type Cover
Tillage Operations on Pasture
Livestock Watering Facilities to Protect Vegetative Cover
Construction of Stock Trails
Control Noxious Weeds
Establish Orchards and Perennials
Drainage to Permit Conservation Farming
Subsoil ing
Temporary Cover
Stubble Mulching
Contour Farming
Wind and Erosion Control Operations
Mulching to Control Wind Erosion
Animal Waste Storage and Diversion
Non Burning Disposal of Residues
Disposal Pits for Solid Wastes
Conservation Practices for Natural Beauty
Shrub Control on Pastures
Land Leveling
Install Livestock Watering Pipelines
Fences to Protect Vegetative Cover
Lining Irrigation Ditches
Source: Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service 40-Year'
Summary, 1936 - 1975. (USDA).
21
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year: ACP administrative cost per farm participating in ACP; ACP administrative
cost per unit of accomplishment; and ACP administrative cost per dollar paid
out (subsidy, cost-sharing, etc.). The results are presented in Appendix B.
The ACP cost per farm on the average (in real dollars, 1975 base year)
ranges from $220.95 for Illinois in 1974 to $30.03 for Minnesota in 1970. The
ACP cost per unit of accomplishment (real dollars, 1975 base year) ranges from
$19.14 for Illinois in 1974 to $.19 for Minnesota in 1970. The ACP cost per
dollar paid out (real dollars, 1975 base year) ranges from $.23 for Ohio in
1974 lo $.08 for Minnesota in 1970.
The above ratios show that the costs of present conservation programs
vary greatly among corn-belt states.
Since these ratios involve many different conservation activities, an
analysis of the contribution of the activities to the total cost of the ASCS
was undertaken. If it were possible to explain this cost variation in terms
of the extent to which specific conservation activities were implemented, it
would then be possible to use the results in estimating the costs of possible
NPS pollution control policies involving those practices. A statistical (re-
gression) analysis was therefore carried out. SCS and ASCS administrative
costs were regressed on the units of conservation activities conducted, on
the characteristics of farms, and on other descriptive statistics such as
rainfall. The analysis was applied to data for the corn-belt states for 1969
through 1975. The results were not of value. In most cases they were not
statistically significant, and even where significant results were obtained,
the combination of variables was not meaningful for estimating the costs of
alternative policies.
22
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CHAPTER 3
POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND SELECTION
As originally planned, the approach to be followed for this research
effort was to investigate initially a wide range of existing policies appli-
cable to the control of nonpoint sources of pollution from agriculture and
then to select six representative policies for intensive analysis. As indi-
cated in Chapter 2, however, existing policies do not represent a wide vari-
ety of approaches to the problem.
To ensure that a broad range of potential NPS control measures could be
considered prior to selecting the six policies, the research team developed
the schematic diagrams shown in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 pertains primarily
to measures for controlling erosion and sedimentation, while Figure 2 relates
primarily to the control of soluble nutrients.*
Each diagram lists a large number of activities, practices, and techni-
ques which are potential elements of NPS control policies. These items are
grouped into five categories which form the principal components of such
policies:
Control Instruments (I)
Performance Indicators (P)
Control Techniques (C)
Compliance Measures (M)
Temporary Penalties (T)
A policy is developed from the diagram by selecting one or more appro-
priate items from the five different categories. The particular items
chosen, of course, are those which can be combined to make a policy which is
workable and internally consistent. Note that some policies might use sever-
al items from a particular category and that not all policies will require
all five components. Before demonstrating the use of the schematics in policy
development, it will be helpful to describe in more detail the functions of
the five principal components.
*To the extent that phosphorus moves with sediment, the schematic diagram in
Figure 1 would be pertinent to the control of phosphorus. Since nitrogen is
believed to move through the soil primarily in solution with water rather
than in association with sediment particles, there is little overlap between
the two schematics for the control of that nutrient.
23
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Sediment Control
Instruments (I)
Performance
Indicators (P)
Erosion Control
Techniques (C)
Compliance
Measures (M)
Temporary
Penalties (T)
NO POLICY
P_ERSUASION_
Education
ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES
Subsidies
Loans
Market for
Rights
Investment
Credits
Tax Relief
Taxation
Effluent Charges
MANDATED
PERFORMANCE
Regulations
Prohibitions
INVESTMENTS
Land Purchase
Rights Purchase
QUANTITY OF
SOIL
Transferred
Deposited
Removed/Lost
CONSERVATION
TECHNIQUES
Contouring
Terracing
Land Forming
Concentration of
Sediment
TURBIDITY
Status of
Plant/Animal
Life
TILLAGE
CROP ROTATION
STATUS OF
AQUATIC LIFE
STRUCTURES
Catch Basin
Waterways
Ditching
~ "fifing" ~
GRASS WATERWAY
GREENBELT
LAND-USE
RESTRICTIONS
MEASURING
SOIL MOVEMENT
Gross Soil
Loss Equation
Depth of Soil
Remaining
MEASURING
WATER RUNOFF
Water Quality
Catch Basin
Deposits
AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE
Land Use
Erosion
Water QuaTity
ON-SITE
INSPECTION
Land Use*
Erosion
Water Quality
PUBLIC
ATTENTION
Mass Media
Meetings
SELF REPORTING
REVOCATION
OF SUBSIDY,
LOAN, ETC.
PENALTIES
IMPOSED
Court Order
Tax
Prohibition of
Property Use
Fine
Imprisonment
Misdemeanor
Land use includes crops produced, conservation practices, and tillage practices.
Figure 1. Schematic for the development of policies to control
erosion and sedimentation.
24
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Nutrient Control
Instruments (I)
Performance
Indicators (P)
Control
Techniques (C)
Compliance
Measures (M)
Temporary
Penalties (T)
NO POLICY
PERSUASION
Education
ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES
Markets for
Rights
Taxes on Pro-
duction or Use
MANDATED
PERFORMANCE
Regulations on
Amount or Timing
QUANTITY OF
NUTRIENTS
In Water
~In Soil" "
In Runoff
STATUS OF
AQUATIC LIFE
APPLICATION
Rates
Timing
CONSERVATION
TECHNIQUES
Terracing
Contouring
TILLAGE
CROP ROTATION
NUTRIENT
FILTERS
Grass Waterways
Greenbelts
MEASURING
NUTRIENT
MOVEMENT
Loading
Functions
Water Measures
MEASURING
APPLICATION
RATES
Per Acre by Crop
Per Farm
PUBLIC
ATTENTION
Mass Media
Meetings
SELF-REPORTING
PENALTIES
IMPOSED
Court Order
Tax
Misdemeanor
Fine
Imprisonment
Figure 2. Schematic for the development of policies to control
plant nutrients.
25
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POLICY COMPONENTS
Control instruments are the various methods which can be used to induce
farm operators to modify their operations so as to achieve the desired objec-
tive; for example, to reduce soil losses. These methods range from voluntary
programs, in which persuasion is the only tool for promoting compliance, to
programs providing economic incentives and to mandatory policies, in which
compliance would be obtained, if necessary, through legal enforcement
actions. For still other methods, compliance would be promoted by providing
economic incentives. Examples of instruments for the control of erosion
include educational programs to inform farmers of sound soil conservation
practices, cost-sharing subsidies for the terracing of sloping land, and a
regulation prohibiting the loss of more than five tons of soil per acre per
year.
Performance indicators are the means of assessing the amount and type of
damage occurring and hence of determining to what extent the policy is suc-
cessful. The performance indicators operate in two ways. First, they can be
used to determine whether the new policy is achieving the desired results.
For erosion and sediment control the most likely indicators would be either
the amount of soil lost or a measure of the water quality. It should be
noted that although the emphasis of the FWPCA is on water quality, a lack of
adequate knowledge about sediment delivery ratios will likely lead to the
development of a policy in which the principal measure of compliance will be
the quantity of soil removed or lost from an agricultural field. As more
information on the movement of sediments and other materials is acquired, the
development of water-quality-oriented policies will be possible.
Control techniques are the means of achieving the objective of the con-
trol policy. Often these are physical changes in the way that the land sur-
face is managed. The exact technique to be used may be specified as a part
of the policy or it may be left to the farmer to select a technique which
will achieve the required level of performance. In the case of erosion con-
trol, for example, a particular policy might require terracing on all land
having a slope greater than specified, while another policy might prohibit a
soil loss of more than a specified number of tons per acre per year, leaving
the choice of control technique to the individual farmer. Note that in
addition to specifying techniques or performance levels it is also possible
to establish policies which would prohibit the use of certain techniques
(such as moldboard plowing on some or all soil types).
Compliance measures are used to determine whether the individual is con-
forming to the requirements of the policy, as indicated by the performance
indicators. For education-oriented policies, a check on the number and type
of educational activities could be made. Under other policies, the means of
determining whether an Individual is in compliance would range from the indi-
vidual's own report of his action to on-site inspections of actual practices
in use. In USEPA terminology, measuring compliance would involve determining
whether BMPs are in effect. Estimates of soil loss would likely be made
through techniques such as the Gross Soil Loss Equation, but conceivably the
actual depth of topsoil remaining or the water quality could be measured
26
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directly. Clearly, the method selected for assuring compliance will signifi-
cantly influence both the cost of the policy and the reaction of farm opera-
tors to it.
It is important to distinguish performance indicators from compliance
measures. Performance indicators are used in determining the success of a
policy, whereas compliance measures are methods for examining the actions of
the individuals who are subject to the policy. For some policies, performance
indicators and compliance measures are directly related. If, for example, a
policy is established which limits the rate of soil loss from land and if the
compliance measure for that policy involves assessing the rate of soil loss
from an individual farm, then the performance indicator would also likely in-
volve the measurement of soil movement and hence would be closely linked to
the compliance measure. In contrast, a policy established to reduce the aver-
age rate of erosion to some acceptable limit by subsidizing changes in conser-
vation or tillage practices involves differing measures of performance and
compliance. Compliance measures would indicate whether the individual has
carried out the specified action required and is eligible to receive a subsidy
payment, whereas the performance indicators would deal with the average change
in sedimentation resulting from the subsidy policy.
Temporary penalties, used only in policies which mandate performance, are
the means of assuring that individual farm operators follow the prescribed
action. They include the full range of sanctions which may be employed to
assure compliance with the law. The penalties are temporary in that a viola-
tor is only penalized if his actions are not consistent with the policy's re-
quirements, and the penalty ceases when he complies. The purpose of the
penalties is to ensure that all operators comply with the policy so that per-
formance goals can be met and so that all individual operators are treated
consistently.
EXAMPLES OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT
The following examples illustrate the use of the schematic in Figure 1
for developing alternative policies for the control of erosion and sedimenta-
tion.
Mandatory Sedimentation Control Policy
This sediment policy would regulate the quantity of sediment leaving a
specified area of land. To avoid exceeding this limit, the individual would
be allowed to use any appropriate method of erosion control. An on-site
inspection of the land use would be made to determine whether or not the indi-
vidual was in compliance with the policy limitation. Since this policy is
mandatory, any violators would be subject to a temporary penalty: prohibition
of the use of their property as long as the violation continues. Schematical-
ly, the policy would comprise these components:
27
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M
Mandated
Performance
Quantity of
Soil
Regulation Transferred
Individual's
Choice
On Site
Inspection
Land Use
and
Measuring Soil
Movement
Gross Soil
Loss Equation
Penalties
Imposed
Prohibition
of Property
Use
Policy Prohibiting Fall Plowing
In this policy, which would prohibit fall plowing, aerial surveillance
could be used to determine if any operator has violated the prohibition. No
performance indicator is required directly since the absence or presence of
fall plowing determines whether or not a farmer is in compliance. However,
the status of aquatic life could be used as an indication of the success of
the policy in achieving social objectives. Since the policy would be manda-
tory, violators would be subject to a penalty, in this case a fine.
I
M
Mandated
Performance
Prohibition
Status of
Aquatic
Life
Tillage
No Fall
Plowing
Aerial
Surveillance
Land Use
Penalties
Imposed
Fine
Subsidy Policy
This policy would be directed toward reducing sedimentation by offering
an economic incentive for erosion control efforts. The incentive would be a
subsidy paid to the farmer to help pay the cost of such measures as building
terraces. In this case the performance indicators (based upon on-site inspec-
tions) would be used to determine whether or not the terraces are necessary.
After the terraces have been built, the farmer would be responsible for their
maintenance. A compliance measure, on-site inspections of the terraces, would
be used to determine their condition. If the farmer allowed the terraces to
deteriorate, the government would penalize him by revoking his subsidy. This
case is one where performance indicators and compliance measures are not
directly related.
28
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M T
Economic Quantity Conservation On-Site
Incentives of Soil Techniques Inspection Revocation
Subsidies Removed Terracing Other of Subsidy
or Lost Land Use
Education Policy
An education policy would promote erosion control through persuasion.
Citizens would be informed of the damage being caused by nonpoint-source
pollution and instructed about the various erosion control techniques which
could be used to decrease the amount of pollution. Improved understanding of
the problem would hopefully result in voluntary improvements. Performance
indicators would be used, first, to determine if the educational program is
necessary, and second, to determine if any change occurs as a result of the
policy. Because a persuasive policy involves no penalties, compliance meas-
ures are not necessary to determine if violations have occurred. Compliance
measures could be used, however, to help assess any change in the performance
indicators.
IP C M T
Persuasion Performance Erosion
Education Indicators Control
Choice Techniques
Individual's
Choice
The plant nutrients schematic in Figure 2 shows the various ways of
attempting to control nitrogen and phosphorus pollution. The alternatives
range from having no policy to establishing a very definite policy regulating
the amounts of fertilizer applied. This schematic is used in the same way as
the sediment schematic (Figure 1).*
As the above examples illustrate, it is important to select those com-
ponents which will operate in conjunction with each other to achieve the pol-
icy objectives. It should be recognized that the use of these schematic dia-
grams to formulate policies is but one part of the overall policy-making
process. The schematics aid only in developing ideas for policies. Before it
* Because of the associations between water runoff, soil loss, and nutrient
loss, policies developed to control one pollutant will have impacts on pollu-
tion from the remaining sources.
29
-------
reaches the implementation stage, each policy must be examined for its polit-
ical and legal implications, its level of execution, its social acceptability,
and its equity.
SELECTION OF POLICIES FOR ANALYSIS
Using the available information on existing policies and laws (see
Chapter 2) and the schematic diagrams, the research team formulated a wide
range of NPS control policies. After some discussion the team decided to con-
centrate on the six general policies described below. Policies 1 through 5
were selected because they range from a completely voluntary educational
policy to a very restrictive policy in which the implementation of a soil
erosion control plan would be mandatory. Policy 6 was added because of the
finding that streamside management may be an important component of effective
water quality control.
These policies were then subjected to detailed analysis. The remaining
chapters of this report present the results of the social, legal, economic,
and equity analyses of the policies and of other relevant policy components.
In the following discussion of the six policies the general nature of the
policy is specified without indicating the exact elements to be used. Speci-
fying in detail the policy provisions was not felt to be necessary or appro-
priate in this type of analysis. For example, temporary penalties to be used
with mandatory policies are not specified. The general description is ade-
quate for the analysis to follow and individuals in the policy arena are more
qualified to set the specifics.
Policy 1: Education
The education policy envisioned is in essence a public promotional pro-
gram. Because it is a voluntary program and represents a positive approach to
reducing soil erosion, the likelihood of its acceptance is high. Through
public meetings, seminars, and publications, the program would provide infor-
mation on the benefits of reducing agricultural NPS pollution, on methods of
reducing the damage by controlling erosion, and on the associated effect of
maintaining soil productivity. The policy would rely on voluntary cooperation
to correct the problem, and thus its effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. It
would be relatively simple to implement, however, since it need only involve
expanding the existing education program of local SWCD offices and county SCS
offices. If, in addition, the Cooperative Extension Service were involved in
the educational effort, the impact would be strengthened.
Policy 2: Tax Credit
Under a tax credit policy, a farm operator would be allowed a deduction
on his income tax for the cost of implementing erosion control practices,
which would be classified as pollution control mechanisms or capital invest-
ments. The policy would have greater impact if the credit could be accumu-
lated and carried forward over years until the farm operator had sufficient
income to take advantage of the credit. Such a policy could be adopted simply
by modifying federal or state tax laws to permit such deductions. For this
30
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policy to be effective it would be necessary to continue providing technical
and planning assistance through the SCS and SWCDs. Making the tax credit con-
tingent on the approval of (or an inspection by) such an agency would likely
increase the effectiveness of the program, since the number of instances in
which support was provided for unnecessary practices would be reduced. Also,
the success of the program would improve as the amount of the permissible tax
credit increases, although the cost to the government would also increase.
Policy 3: Fifty-percent Cost Sharing
Under a 50% cost-sharing policy, half the cost of implementing soil
erosion control practices on a particular farm would be borne by the govern-
ment under a contractual agreement with the farmer. This policy was selected
for analysis because of its expected implementation feasibility and its
assumed capability for inducing the desired performance. It would essentially
be an extension of the existing SCS technical assistance program and the ASCS
financial disbursement function. Implementation would involve such activities
as informing the public of the availability of cost-sharing arrangements and
integrating the administrative, financial, and monitoring functions of the
SCS, the ASCS, and the SWCDs.
Cost sharing would provide an incentive to implement more and better con-
servation practices. Such a policy should ensure some improvement in erosion
control and hence in water quality because of its predominantly positive
approach. It would be relatively easy to adjust the rate of cost sharing in
an attempt to achieve the desired results. It would also be possible to com-
bine this policy approach with others to develop a more sound approach. A
negative aspect from the farmer's point of view is that failure to properly
implement and maintain the practices or structures could lead to forfeiture
of government payments.
Policy 4: Required Conservation Plan Development
A policy requiring the development of a soil conservation plan is one
step beyond an educational or strictly voluntary program toward mandated per-
formance. Note, however, that the policy described here does not require
implementation of the plan and hence can be expected to have limited effec-
tiveness. The thrust of the policy is therefore largely educational, since
developing a plan would make the farmer aware of what should be done on his
land to reduce erosion. The policy was selected for analysis because it pre-
sented an opportunity to estimate the costs of conservation plan development
and because it should be quite feasible to implement, inasmuch as the tasks it
would involve are already being performed by the SCS and the SWCDs.
A unique feature of the policy is that its implementation would bring
each farmer into direct, one-to-one communication with an SCS technician.
This individual, on-farm attention would help induce positive responses and
cooperation from the farmers. The effectiveness of this approach might be
limited, however, at the outset by a temporary shortage of trained personnel,
contractors, and equipment, and in the long run by the fact that the imple-
mentation of conservation plans is not mandatory.
31
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Policy 5: Required Conservation Plan Implementation
A policy requiring not only the development but also the implementation
of a soil conservation plan is an extension of Policy 4. It is the most com-
prehensive policy alternative. It provides an opportunity for individual, on-
site planning technical assistance and could be combined with financial assis-
tance for the implementation of the plan. It also offers the most promise for
soil erosion control by allowing choice among the full range of alternative
control techniques. Analysis of this policy provided an opportunity to com-
pare the costs of making conservation plan implementation mandatory with the
costs of simply requiring the development of such a plan (Policy 4).
Policy 6: Development of Greenbelts
As described in the following section of this chapter, greenbelts may be
very effective in controlling the movement of eroded soil into waterways. In
fact, to achieve desired water quality levels it may be necessary to establish
these vegetated buffer strips along streams in addition to employing more
conventional soil conservation techniques to agricultural fields. A policy
requiring the development and maintenance of greenbelts was therefore selected
for analysis.
The development of greenbelts of varying widths and cover types along
streambanks represents an attempt to prevent nutrients and sediment from
entering streams once erosion has occurred. Selection of this practice as
one alternative policy is not intended to suggest that greenbelts by them-
selves are an adequate management technique; rather, they should be regarded
as a supplement to other conservation techniques in and near channel areas,
thus contributing to the improvement of water quality.
The main administrative component for the greenbelt policy would be sur-
veillance (most likely by air) of the installation and maintenance of vegeta-
tive buffer acreage along the streambanks. Penalties would be imposed for
noncompliance and could lead to court action. Obviously, this policy would
apply directly only to those landowners whose property borders streambanks.
Since in many cases soil eroded from land distant from streams and on the
property of other farm operators would be deposited along a greenbelt, some
mechanism to spread the costs of greenbelts over a wider segment of society
would likely be desirable.
LAND-WATER INTERFACE AND STREAM GREENBELTS
Research reported by Karr and Schlosser (1977) and summarized in
Appendix C suggests that in addition to reducing soil erosion through effec-
tive land management it may be necessary to allow the development of a more
"natural" aquatic ecosystem if the water quality objectives of Public Law
92-500 are to be met. That research indicates the value of emphasizing the
link between terrestrial and aquatic environments and the dynamics of stream
behavior.
Greenbelts, along with soil conservation practices and the maintenance
of "natural" stream morphology, may produce substantial improvements in water
32
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quality in areas of intensive agriculture. Furthermore, such management en-
hances the quality of fishery resources and should provide a variety of rec-
reational benefits. The magnitude of these benefits must be weighed against
the costs. The data available at present are not adequate for a detailed
presentation of costs and benefits. An early attempt to consider such costs
and benefits is presented here and summarized in Table 4. Before the econom-
ic, social, and environmental costs and benefits can be evaluated, research at
the individual drainage system and watershed levels must be completed. This
research must integrate relevant knowledge from the agricultural and engineer-
ing sciences, especially the universal soil-loss equation and unit stream
power concept, along with increased knowledge of the dynamics of sediment and
nutrient transport at the land-water interface.
To illustrate the possible impact of a greenbelt policy, used alone or in
combination with erosion control policies, we can compare six hypothetical,
identical watersheds under different management programs. We can then indi-
cate how amounts and sources of sediments would be expected to vary among
watersheds under these policies (see Table 5). In a natural forested water-
shed (Table 5, line 1), the concentration of suspended solids will be low
because sources of sediment will be minimal in both terrestrial and aquatic
areas. When land is cleared for row-crop agriculture (line 2), sources of
sediment will be increased. Water quality will decline because of the combin-
ation of increased sediment availability and surface runoff. A channeled
stream flowing through a forested watershed (line 3) may have high sediment
loads because of higher unit stream power and unstable channel bottom and
slopes. The source of sediments is the channel itself. Simultaneous clear-
ing of the land (without employing conservation measures) and channeling of
streams (line 4) produces high sediment loads since both the land and channel
are unstable. The latter situation is common throughout much of the U. S.,
especially in the heavily agricultural areas of the Midwest.
Another common managment strategy is the use of conservation practices
on the land with continued maintenance of channelized streams (line 5). With
careful managment in fields (through techniques such as minimum tillage and
rotational practices), the effects of the terrestrial disequilibrium can be
reduced. However, because instabilities in the channel continue, sediment
loads may be from medium to high. For the long term, the best management op-
tion in many areas is to continue row-crop agriculture with effective soil
erosion control but with a more natural (equilibrium) channel management
(line 6).
33
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Table 4
Potential Costs and Benefits of More Effective Management of Near-channel Areas*
Costs
Benefits
co
1. Land taken out of production to
maintain a vegetative filter and
to allow meandering channel.
2. Reduced drainage rates.
3. Maintenance of greenbelts.
4. Reservoir areas for various pests.
5. Need for management of recreational
areas.
1. Reduced sediment, nutrient, and pesticide inputs into
streams.
2. Increased shading and decreased water temperature will re-
duce problems associated with release of nutrients from
sediments and algae blooms. Also will increase the oxygen-
carrying capacity of the stream.
3. Improved habitat for fisheries and terrestrial wildlife.
4. Increased recreational opportunities.
5. Decreased cost of channel construction and maintenance
activities since natural processes will provide the vegeta-
tion along streambanks via succession and the stream itself
will initiate meandering and pool-riffle formation.
6. Loss of water due to phraetophytes. 6. Reduced downstream flooding.
7. May allow more intensive agriculture with reduced effects
on the aquatic ecosystem when best land management prac-
tices (i.e., minimum tillage) are not feasible.
*This is not meant to be a comprehensive list. Furthermore, the magnitudes of the suggested costs and
benefits have not been adequately evaluated.
-------
Table 5
Effects of Various Management Practices on Equilibria of Equivalent Watersheds*
CO
en
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
MANAGEMENT
PRACTICE
Natural watershed
Clear land for row-crop
agriculture; maintain
natural stream
Channelize stream in
forested watershed
Clear land and
channelize stream
Best land surface
management with
channelization
Best land surface
management and
"natural" channel
RELATIVE AMOUNT
Land Surface
None
High
None
High
Low
Low
OF SEDIMENT FROM
Stream Channel
None
Lowt
High
High
High
Low
SUSPENDED SOLIDS
LOAD IN STREAM
Low
Medium
High
Very
High
Medium-
High
Low-
Medium
SOURCE OF
SEDIMENT
Land surface
Channel banks
Land surface and
channel banks
Channel banks
Equilibrium be-
tween land and
channel
*These are best estimates of relative effects for a variety of watershed conditions, including sources
and amounts of sediment.
"t'Will increase if hydrograph peaks (floods) are more severe.
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CHAPTER 4
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EROSION CONTROL POLICIES
One of the central factors determining the acceptability of policies such
as those discussed in previous chapters is their economic impact on the agri-
cultural sector. To obtain as much information as possible on the nature of
those impacts, two large linear programming models were used. These models
provided a wealth of information on the possible economic effects of a
reasonably wide variety of policy options. While the options addressed in
this analysis are not completely consistent with the six policy alternatives
examined in other sections of this report, the reader can extrapolate the
results to determine such impacts. An attempt to structure an economic
analysis of those six policies would have required developing new analytical
methods, a task which was beyond the scope of this project and which might
have produced methods less powerful than those already available.
The linear programming models were used to analyze the economic impacts
of selected restrictions on soil loss, nitrogen application rates, and
specific production techniques in the corn belt. One of these models is a
large, aggregate model, used here to project at the corn-belt level the
producers' surplus, consumers' surplus, and net social costs resulting from
the application of NFS control techniques. The second model includes several
representative farms in an individual watershed and is structured to suggest
the variation in the impacts of several NPS control policies among individual
farms and over a long time period.
The corn-belt model measures at the aggregate level the impacts of soil-
loss and nitrogen restrictions through the solution of a large linear pro-
gramming model which provides the capability to estimate market prices for
corn and soybeans based on estimates of the demands for these products. Thus,
the model generates a competitive market equilibrium in the production of
these crops and is able to indicate the price impacts of several types of
restrictions. In addition to estimating producers' and consumers' surplus,
solutions to the model indicate changes in soil loss, nitrogen use, crop
production, acreage, pesticide use, and crop prices.
The watershed model is based on a single watershed in Illinois which
is representative of the corn belt and the surrounding areas. The model is
structured to analyze (1) the impacts of farms having different soil charac-
teristics and (2) the long-term impacts of continued production under the
existing institutional framework and under soil-loss restrictions. The im-
pacts of soil-loss and nitrogen restrictions on production, farm income,
nitrogen use and soil loss are all measured for the several representative
farms. The implications of continued production for soil loss are analyzed
36
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over a 100-year planning period with an estimate of the discounted and undis-
counted farm-level income impacts.
THE CORN-BELT MODEL
The model used for this analysis is a linear programming model of the
production and marketing of corn, soybeans, wheat, oats, hay, and pasture in
the corn belt for a single year. The production of corn and soybeans in this
area accounts for about 70 percent and 60 percent, respectively, of the total
U.S. production of these commodities. The model was originally developed by
C.R. Taylor to analyze the impact of nitrogen and pesticide restrictions on
agriculture (Taylor and Frohberg, 1977).* Much of the following description
of the model is taken from that source. Under the present USEPA contract,
Taylor revised the model so it could be used to analyze the impact of soil-
loss restrictions.
The objective function of the model is consumers' plus producers' sur-
plus in the corn and soybean markets less the total variable costs of pro-
ducing a specified amount of small grains, hay, and pasture. Small grains
are constrained for the corn belt as a whole; hay and pasture constraints are
set by Land Resource Area (LRA). As is well known, the maximization of sur-
plus gives a competitive equilibrium solution (Takayama and Judge, 1964).
The demand functions for corn and soybeans were incorporated into the
model in a stepwise fashion, with steps in two-cent increments. The demand
functions used in the model were:
Qc = 5613712245 - 7637751 OOP0
[Eq.l]
Qs = 1469981594 - 130224637P5
where
Qc = bushels of corn demanded
Qs = bushels of soybeans demanded
Pc = per-bushel price of corn
Ps = per-bushel price of soybeans
At the mean, the elasticity of demand for corn is -.50 and the corres-
ponding figure for soybeans is -.64. These demand functions were subjectively
specified after reviewing recent demand analysis, as summarized in Taylor and
Frohberg (1977). The quantities of wheat, oats, hay, and pasture demanded were
treated as constants in the model because these are relatively minor crops in
the area (wheat and oats account for 11 percent of the acreage in the area;
hay and pasture, 26 percent) and also because the inclusion of stepped demand
functions for these crops would have increased the size of the model to the
point where the cost of obtaining a solution would have been prohibitive.
Fixing the quantities demanded of the minor crops will cause a slight over- or
*The model was developed under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to the
Agricultural Experiment Station, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
37
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underestimation (depending on the policy) of the change in surplus resulting
from the policies.
The land base for the area modeled was divided into 11 land capability
units (LCU's) within each of 17 geographical regions which are land resource
areas (LRA's) defined by the USDA Soil Conservation Service (see Figure 3).
For each LCU within each LRA, crop production activities in the model differ
by crop rotation (an average of about 11 rotations for each LCU within each
LRA), conservation practices (straight-row planting, contouring, and terrac-
ing), and tillage methods (fall plowing, spring plowing, and chisel plowing).
Rotations, rather than just single crop activities, were included in the
model to reflect the influence of the previous crop on the fertilizer and
pesticide requirements of the current crop.
Estimation of Changes in Producers' and Consumers' Surplus and Net Social Cost
The results of this model include an estimate of the changes in producers'
and consumers' surplus and in net social costs. These changes are determined
by comparing the results of a benchmark solution of the model to a solution
under which certain constraints (such as a specified maximum allowable soil
loss per acre) are imposed. The measure of producers' surplus can be defined
as the gross revenue of corn and soybeans less the nonland production costs
for all crops (including soil-loss taxes) and less the costs of terracing;
or it can be defined as the land rents from production and terracing. The
estimate of producers' surplus is the gross revenue of corn and soybeans minus
the nonland costs of production for corn and soybeans, to which are added the
shadow prices* for other crops multiplied by the quantity produced and from
which are substracted their nonland production costs and the difference be-
tween terrace subsidies and terrace costs, if any. Terrace subsidies set on a
fixed, per-acre basis ($40/A) generate a contribution to producers' surplus
when the subsidy is greater than the annualized cost of construction at the
farm level. Changes in producers' surplus are calculated by determining the.
difference between the estimate for the benchmark run and for the constrained
run in question.
Consumers' surplus is defined as the difference between what consumers
are willing to pay and the market price they do pay for a product. It is
represented by the shaded area in the following diagram:
Price
Quantity
*In a competitive equilibrium, price equals marginal cost; in this model the
shadow price is defined to be marginal cost.
38
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Figure 3. Major land resource areas of the corn belt.
39
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To calculate the estimate of consumers' surplus, the price-quantity
observations from the corn and soybean demand curves are summed and the gross
revenue for corn and soybeans is subtracted. Model results are given in
terms of estimated changes in consumers' surplus, which are calculated for
corn and soybeans by the equation:
ACS! = QB + QC x PR - Pr [Eq.2]
2 B L
where CSi = consumers' surplus for corn and soybeans
QB = quantity produced in benchmark solution
Qc = quantity produced in constrained solution
PB = price generated in benchmark solution
Pp = price generated in constrained solution
and for all other crops by:
ACS2 = Q xPB - Pc [Eq.3]
where CS2 = consumers' surplus for all other crops
Q = the constant quantity produced
PR = price generated in benchmark solution
Pp = price generated in constrained solution
The total change in consumers' surplus is:
ACS = ACS] + ACS2 [Eq.4]
Thus, the change in consumers' surplus is a measure of the impacts on
purchasers of agricultural products. This measure reflects both price and
quantity impact.
In addition, the impact of governmental costs or receipts are calculated
as the amount of subsidies paid or of taxes received. The sum of the changes
in producers' surplus, consumers' surplus, and governmental costs relative to
the benchmark solution is the estimate of net social costs.
Operating Principles of the Model
A simplified matrix representation of the model is given in Table 6.
The first column of this matrix represents the set of 14,542 crop-production
activities representing each region and each production alternative included
in the model. The vector C represents the per-acre variable production costs
exclusive of labor and fertilizer while the vectors Y , Y , Y , Y , and Y
give the yields associated with each activity. Each production activity takes
one acre of land from the appropriate LRA and LCU (see row set number 11).
The vector (nsc) gives the carryover nitrogen supplied by soybeans to corn
in a rotation and, similarly, the vector(nhc) gives the carryover nitrogen
supplied by hay or pasture to corn in a rotation. The vectors (nw), (no),
40
-------
Table 6
Simplified Matrix Representation of the Corn-belt Model
123 4
Crop Com Productior
Production Sell Correction
Row Activities Soybeans Sell Corn Activity
Description (acres) (bu.) (bu.) for Step 2
.
1 Objective function — C /V /V /V /V 0
2 Base com product.on 1 >* -J°0.-J°2.-[_!°0--!«.
(kdl) KI yi L KI r,
3 Base com production 2
4 Base corn production 3
(P, K. and labor correction) Yf -1-1
5 Soybean production P -1-1
6 Wheat production Y*
7 Oats production Y*
8 Hay-pasture account P
9 Hay production
10 Pasture production
11 Land 1
12 Terraccable land 1 or 0
13 Labor L
14 Potassium fertiliser K
15 Phosphorous fertilizer P
16 Corn nitrogen needs n, nt (n, - n,)
17 n supplied by soybean
to com nsc
18 n supplied by hay to
corn nhc
'9 Wheat n needs nn>
20 Oats n needs no
21 Hay-pasture /i need:. nh
22 Soybean demand step 1 1
23 Soybean demand step 2 1
24 Corn demand step t 1
25 Com demand step 2 1
26 Qom transfer 2 1 -(Qg - QJIQ\
5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Transfer n Transfer n
Correct Correct Corn from from Buy n Buy n Buy n Buy n
Com P. K, Soybeans Hay-Pasture for for for for Hay- BaJe
Harvest and Labor to Com to Corn Corn Wheat Oats Pasture Buy Buy Buy Hay
Costs Requirements (Ibs.) (Ibs.) (Ibs.) (Ibs.) (Ibs.) (Ibs.) Labor P K (tons) Pasture Constraint
20
, = 0
— 1
1 = °
2: 0
2: WO
a OD
-I -1 a 0
1 a HP
aum a PP
s L
s Mr
_f -1 L sO
— 1 s 0
-k, -' s°
-1 -1 -1 sO
— 1 & 0
-1 a 0
-1 so
-1 sO
-1 sO
s C,'
s C,' - C.'
* el' - e.'
- 0
-------
and (nh) give the nitrogen required for wheat, oats, hay, or pasture,
respectively.
The second set of columns of the matrix in Table 6 represent two steps
on a stepped demand function for soybeans. These steps are:
* if 0 i Qs
CEq>5]
where p^ = price of soybeans for the i step
(f. = maximum total quantity of the soybeans that will be purchased
j. U
at the i and higher prices
with P* > P£
Each of these activities draws from the soybean production, as indicated by
the -1 coefficient in row 5. The soybean demand step constraints (rows 22 and
23) reflect the inequality shown in equation 4. For simplicity, only two steps
were indicated in the matrix in Table 6, whereas the model actually contains
75 such steps.
The fourth, fifth, and sixth set of columns in the matrix together re-
present steps on a demand function for corn and, for each respective corn/
nitrogen fertilizer price ratio, represent steps on a fertilizer response
function for corn; that is, the model calculates the optimal fertilization
rate and associated yield for each market price.
Before considering this matrix formulation, let us consider the special
class of nitrogen-yield response functions for which it applies. This class,
which is used by Illinois agronomists to tailor fertilizer recommendations to
individual situations (Illinois Cooperative Extension Service, 1974), is one
for which the optimal per-acre nitrogen fertilization rate is given by
multiplying the maximum yield obtainable (for a given level of nonfertilizer
management) times a factor which varies with the price ratio but does not vary
with the basic soil productivity level. The figures used as a basis for this
study are given in the second column in Table 7. These optimal nitrogen
factors imply points on a response function. The points, which are expressed
on the basis of percentage of maximum yield, are shown in the fourth column of
Table 7. The phosphorus and potassium fertilizer application rates are
assumed to be equal to the amounts of these nutrients removed in the grain,
thus approximately maintaining the P and K levels in the soil (Illinois
Cooperative Extension Service, 1974).
The steps on the demand function considered here are:
p^ if 0 < Qc < (£
c c~ c~ c
p if Q Qc Q
42
-------
Table 7
Economically Optimal Nitrogen Rates for Corn
Corn Price
Nitrogen Price
oo
40
30
25
20
15
10
5
2
0
Optimal n Factor
(pounds n per bushel
of maximum yield)
1.3382
1.2931
1.2780
1.2659
1.2479
1.2178
1.1575
0.9766
0.4341
0
(ni)*
Optimal Pounds of
n per Bushel
of Actual Yield
1.3382
1.2937
1.2792
1.2677
1.2507
1.2226
1.1680
1.0132
0.5608
0
(Yi)
Implied Yield as a
of the Maximum
100.00
99.95
99.91
99.86
99.78
99.61
99.10
96.39
77.40
50.49
Percentage
Yield
*The index increases as one goes down the column of figures.
-------
where PI = price of corn for the i step
Cfr = maximum total quantity of corn that will be purchased at the
1
with pc
J.L.
i and higher prices
To follow the logic of the matrix formulation used to incorporate the
above type of response function and stepped demand function into the model,
first suppose that the supply price is less than PI and thus that it is prof-
itable to produce some amount of the product. With a positive price of ni-
trogen, Vp, the maximum per-acre corn yield, which is given by the vector Y
in the production activities set, will not be obtained if the optimal nitrogen
rate is applied. Rather, at a price ratio of Pf/Vn), only Y-j percent ( (from
Table 7) of the maximum per-acre yield will be obtained. This condition is
reflected in the model by the first sell corn activity taking for each unit
sold an amount (100/Yi) of the maximum per-acre yield (row 2 of Table 6). To
reflect the stepped nature of the demand function, the amount of the product
which can be sold at Pf is constrained by the corn demand step row to be less
than or equal to Qf. The optimal nitrogen level at a price ratio of PI/V^
is r\i pounds per unit of the product (from column 2 of Table 7). The
total nitrogen requirement will thus be r\i times the quantity sold at Pj.
The cell of the matrix given by the corn nitrogen needs row (row 16 of
Table 6) and the first sell corn column (column 14 of Table 6) will thus give
the total quantity of nitrogen required.
Supposing that the maximum quantity that can be sold at P^, Qj, is sold,
let us next consider selling an additional quantity at the next highest price,
P2. Since P2 should be used in calculating the optimal nitrogen rate on the
intramarginal production as well as the marginal production, the per-acre
yield and nitrogen rate used in producing the quantity sold at P
-------
Since some harvest costs are proportional to yield, a correct corn har-
vest cost activity (Table 6, column 8) is inserted into the model to reduce
harvest costs by an amount equal to the per-bushel harvest costs, HC, times
the difference in the maximum production and the actual production. Similar-
ly, column 9 in Table 6 corrects labor requirements that are proportional to
yield as well as the phosphorus and potassium fertilization rates for the
difference in the maximum production and the actual production.
Additional activities are included in the model to: (1) subtract from
corn nitrogen needs the amount of nitrogen added by legumes in rotation with
corn; (2) purchase the required amount of inorganic nitrogen fertilizer for
the crops; (3) purchase labor; (4) purchase phosphorus; (5) purchase potas-
ium; and (6) allow hay to be baled at a cost of C dollars per ton or to
substitute for pasture with the baling cost.
Data Sources
The basic set of crop budgets used for the study were obtained by up-
dating the prices and input levels in the 1970 USDA budgets (Worden, 1971)
for the North Central Region. Since a different regional delineation was
used, budgets for LRA's were obtained by weighting with crop acreages the
budgets for the USDA regions. These updated budgets for each crop and LRA
were then modified to reflect the different yield levels of LCU's, tillage
methods, conservation practices, and rotations. Terracing costs used are
given in Table 8. Yield adjustment coefficients for LCU's were obtained from
unpublished SCS data. The budgets were also modified to reflect cost differ-
ences not related to yield for the alternative tillage methods, conservation
practices, and rotations. These latter cost adjustment factors were obtained
from many sources, including farm management manuals, Experiment Station
bulletins, and unpublished data. All coefficients are for 1974 technology
and price relationships.* The model represents the optimal allocation for a
single year. Thus, any reductions in productivity resulting from soil loss
that would occur over a number of years are not incorporated in this model.
These reductions are addressed in the next section.
The land acreage base for the model was obtained from the 1967 Conser-
vation Needs Inventory. The land constraint in the model for an LCU within
4m LRA was the 1967 total of acreage devoted to the six crops, of idle land,
and of land in conservation programs.
Two sets of soil-loss coefficients were used. The model was initially
constructed with coefficients supplied by the federal Soil Conservation
Service. Local SCS personnel reviewed these results and suggested that the
soil losses were higher than expected. A new set of soil-loss coefficients
were constructed by Illinois SCS personnel using the Universal Soil Loss
Equation (USLE). A number of the policy runs were repeated using these
coefficients. As will be indicated in the discussion of the results, the
revised soil losses may be somewhat low. If so, the two sets of results
*Specific coefficients will be furnished upon request to C.R. Taylor, Texas
A & M University.
45
-------
Table 8
Annualized Terracing Costs in $ per Acre
LAND
RESOURCE
AREAS
91
95
97
98
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
no
111
113
114
115
lb 2EC 2Wd
f 9.41
9.41
13.29
13.29
5.61
9.21
9.83
9.91
2.83
6.62
11.48 14.35
6.14
20.53
18.45
16.60
11.16 14.56
6.14
LAND CAPABILITY UNITS3
2S6 3E 3W 3S
10.82
10.82
13.29
13.29
5.61 5.61
12.01
19.13 12.61
10.97
4.29
13.43
22.23 14.35
8.18
24.60
25.32
24.40
20.16
8.18
4E 4W
5.61
13.89 9.20
22.78
5.45
17.92
22.20
8.18
27.13
32.98
25.92
26.35
12.24 8.18
4S 5-8S
16.67
12.24
12.24
aln each case, higher numbers represent more significant limitations.
LCU 1 soils do not have limitations.
CE soils have predominantly erosion limitations.
W soils have predominantly wetness limitations.
eS soils have other limitations.
Where no terracing costs are given, terracing is assumed to be an inappropriate technique for the
LRA-LCU combination.
-------
bracket the actual soil losses to be expected.
Model Results
The model was run for each of the following conditions and constraints:
High Soil-loss Coefficients:
1. Benchmark
2. Soil-loss constraints of 2, 3, 4, 5 tons/acre
3. Soil-loss taxes of $4, $2, $1, and $.5/ton
4. Terracing subsidies of $4, $10, $15, $20, and $40/acre
5. Prohibition of chisel plowing
6. Prohibition of fall plowing
7. Prohibition of straight-row cultivation
8. Soil loss of 3 tons/A and terracing subsidies of 50% of cost,
$15/acre, and $20/acre
9. Nitrogen restriction to 50 IbS/acre
10. Nitrogen restriction to 50 Ibs/acre and soil-loss constraints
of 2, 3, 4, 5 tons/acre
11. Nitrogen restriction to 100 Ibs/acre
12. Nitrogen restriction to 100 Ibs/acre and soil-loss constraints of
2, 3, 4, 5 tons/acre
Low Soil-loss Coefficients:
1. Benchmark
2. Prohibition of chisel plowing
3. Restriction of chisel plowing
4. Soil-loss constraints of 2, 3, 4 tons/acre
5. Soil-loss tax of $4/ton
6. 100% cost sharing for terracing
7. 100% cost sharing for terracing and soil-loss constraint of 2
tons/acre
8. Nitrogen restriction to 50 and 100 Ibs/acre
Complete results of these runs are presented in Appendix D. In the
following discussion, selected results will be presented to illuminate the
nature of the impacts of the several policies and policy components studied.
Benchmark Solution
An understanding of the benchmark runs is important because the results
serve as a basis of comparison for the results obtained under each of the
constrained runs. Table 9 gives the actual acreages of crops planted in the
several regions of the corn belt and the crop acreages developed in the bench-
mark solution of the model using the high soil-loss coefficients. The two
sets of acreages are reasonably consistent. The regions with large acreages
tend to be more accurately reflected in the model results than are some of
the regions with fewer acres.
Table 10 indicates the acreages of crops by Land Resource Areas and Land
47
-------
-p.
oo
Table 9
Actual Acreages of Crops Planted in 1969 (thousands of
in the Benchmark Solution of the Corn-belt Model Using
acres) Compared to Acreages
High Soil-loss Coefficients
LRA
91
95
97
98
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
113
114
115
Region
Wisconsin and Minnesota
Sandy Outwash
Southeastern Wisconsin
Drift Plain
Southwestern Michigan
Fruit and Truck Belt
Southern Michigan Drift
Plain
Loess, Till, and Sandy
Prairies
Central Iowa and Minnesota
Till Prairies
Eastern Iowa and Minnesota
Till Prairies
Northern Mississippi Valley
Loess Hills
Nebraska and Kansas Loess-
Drift Hills
Iowa and Missouri Deep
Loess Hills
Illinois and Iowa Deep
Loess and Drift
Iowa and Missouri Heavy
Till Plain
Northern Illinois and
Indiana Heavy Till Plain
Indiana and Ohio
Till Plain
Central Claypan Areas
Southern Illinois and Indiana
Thin Loess and Till Plain
Central Mississippi Valley
Wooded Slopes
ALL
Corn and
Grain Sorghum
Actual
218
1,677
109
1,428
5,259
4,976
1,630
1,440
1,474
3,189
7,874
1,207
1,472
4,480
870
1,729
2,015
41 ,047
Model
2
5
4
1
1
1
2
8
1
4
1
2
2
41
0
789
95
,844
,718
,993
,356
,980
,028
,001
,241
890
,541
,591
,421
,035
,249
,700
Soybeans
Actual
7
191
16
607
1,151
3,644
789
133
280
1,406
4,090
897
1,135
3,475
983
1,420
1,269
21 ,493
Model
2
4
1
2
4
1
2
2
1
24
0
789
0
645
,039
,308
,356
0
748
,001
,619
611
,541
,272
657
,035
,238
,859
Small
Actual
153
781
46
610
3,689
1,132
465
660
418
530
1,218
253
203
1,687
384
563
627
13,419
Grains
Model
487
1,810
223
523
2,611
1,460
415
22
382
328
247
0
56
4,283
302
0
339
13,488
Hay and
Actual
608
1,981
106
1,184
3,803
2,084
984
2,511
1,013
2,205
3,096
2,927
291
2,434
956
1,236
2,506
29,925
Pasture
Model
781
1,930
136
1,225
4,145
2,276
1,021
2,644
1,112
2,613
3,328
3,270
395
2,329
907
1,364
2,340
31,816
-------
Table 10
Acreages of Crops by Land Resource Area and Land Capability Unit Determined by
the Benchmark Solution of the Corn-belt Model Using Low Soil-loss Coefficients
(thousands of acres)
LRA LRA
Crop 91 95
LCU 1
Corn 163
Soybeans 163
Wheat 1 1
Oats 163
Hay
LCU 2E
Corn
Soybeans
Wheat 182 279
Oats 1056
Hay 45 753
LCU 3E
Corn
Soybeans
Wheat
Oats
Hay 169 669
LCU 4E
Corn
Soybeans
Wheat 124
Oats
LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA
97 98 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109
4 138 1460 1342 279 175 116 410 3495 247
730 671 279 116 410
730
368 2325 1673 612 1100 237 854 2519 423
115 1162 1673 612 237 854 2519 423
115
81 138 1162
415
93 553 7 260 519 436 32
553 7 259 436 32
43 93 7
279 2264 534 1292 950 1452 2173 1530
24
7 24 382
LRA LRA LRA
110 111 113
260 33
260 33
617
395 1382 71
395 583
71
477 214
526
65
177 772 194
39
39
LRA LRA
114 115 Total
395 1010 9527
395 3057
11
893
617
255 481 12695
255 481 9309
255 831
2508
314 2218
145 2571
145 1432
145 145
201
369 850 13674
63
124
452
Hay
298
73 726 151 75 779
554 574 560 29 338 116 404 522 5199
-------
Table 10 (continued)
en
o
LRA
Crop 91
LCU 2W
Corn
Soybeans
Wheat 170
Oats
Hay
LCU 3W
Corn
Soybeans
Wheat
Oats
Hay 57
LCU 4W
Corn
Soybeans
Wheat
Oats
Hay 73
LCU 2S
Corn
Soybeans
Wheat
Oats
Hay 39
LCU 3S
Corn
Soybeans
Wheat
Oats
Hay 105
LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA
95 97 98 102 103
548 40 1537 1785 1431
548 1431
16 1431
47 75 396
50 63 319
50 319
727 953
31 85
31 85
24 13 38
123
123
201 21 718
222
98 146
146
108 43 98
294 165
LRA LRA LRA
104 105 106
393 270 123
393 123
393
62 30
62 15
28
4
1
76
232 69
9 15
9 15
9 15
3
LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA
107 108 109 110 111 113 114
304 2727 31 774 2740 100 715
304 1364 774 2740 715
304 2740
100
665 299
85 188 97 423 542
85 188 97 423 542
664 401
317
15 11
15
11
4 25 41 31 33
1
19 117 210
1
24 130 3 93
7
130 56 86
7
30 27 21 23
LRA
115 Total
613 14131
613 9005
3214
1940
1482
1859
1781
1065
683 2756
146
131
3 3
11
283
200
123
63 409
941
812
275
170
99 371
265
668
-------
Table 10 (continued)
Crop
LRA LRA
91 95
LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA
97 98 102 103 104 105 106 107 108
LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA LRA
109 110 111 113 114 115
Total
LCU 4S
Corn
Soybeans
Wheat
Oats
Hay
187 25
31
31
45 93 66 188 101 119 3 24 111
27
12 30 13 2
31
27
31
1019
LCU 5-8
Corn
Soybeans
Wheat
Oats
Hay
106 184
24
24
20 72 273 165 70 426 87 232 444
8
8
411 29 82 23 157 283
32
32
3064
-------
Capability Units in the benchmark solution using low soil-loss coefficients.
These data indicate that (1) the expected general tendency of allocating row
crops to the more productive soils, and pasture and small grains to less pro-
ductive soils is observed and (2) the model probably produces a more effici-
ent allocation than would be observed if the data were available to make
comparisons. In several LRA's, all acreage of LCU 1 is in row crops and all
of LCU 3 and 4E is in pasture. Partially because of farm operators' prefer-
ences for certain crops and partially because of the existence of several
LCU's in a given field, the results will not be as clear-cut as indicated
here. This factor will tend to give model results that would produce crops
more efficiently, with higher net farm income and less soil loss, than is
actually observed.
The LCU designations are based on the Conservation Needs Inventory.
Thus, conservation practices that were in effect at the time of the inven-
tory (1967) are reflected in the model. Terracing and other conservation
practices carried out since that time are not reflected. Since the annual
costs of crop production are higher in all cases when terracing costs are
included, there is no terracing in the benchmark solution. Similarly, since
spring plowing is more economical in almost all cases, this technique was
used for almost all acreage in the benchmark run. Use of the model to
analyze the effects of prohibiting fall plowing is therefore not revealing.
Chisel plowing is a technique which provides lower production costs on
approximately 70 percent of the corn belt acreage and is therefore included
in the benchmark model at that level.
In general, the benchmark solution indicates a somewhat more efficient
organization for the production of crops than would be expected in practice.
This fact should not have a significant adverse effect, however, on the
comparisons among solutions since the same relationships can be expected.
There are some discrepancies between the two benchmark solutions using
different soil-loss coefficients, as indicated by the data in Table 11. Crop
prices, except for corn, are higher when the low soil-loss coefficients are
used. Corn production is also higher for that case. Of course, the quantity
of soil lost differs substantially between the two solutions; the average
loss is 2.96 tons per acre planted using the low coefficients as compared to
5.3 tons per acre with the higher ones. Since no constraint is imposed on
soil lost, this difference does not explain the differences in crop prices
and production. The price and production differences must be due to the ran-
dom choices possible in a model of this size and complexity and to rounding
errors. These differences should remind the reader of the need to interpret
all results with care; minor differences among model runs may not be signif-
icant.
Restriction of Chisel Plowing
The runs in which varying levels of chisel plowing are permitted are
summarized in Table 11. When chisel plowing is used in all situations where
it is profitable, as reflected in the two benchmark solutions, over 77 mil-
lion acres are chisel plowed, resulting in substantial reductions in soil
loss. The magnitude of the impact can be appreciated by comparing the runs
52
-------
Table 11
Effects of Restricting Chisel Plowing
Benchmark Benchmark
(High SLC)* (Low SLC)
Social Cost (mil. $)
Consumer Cost (mil. $)
Producer Cost (mil. $)
Government Cost
(mil. $)
Crop Prices
Corn ($/bu.)
Soybeans ($/bu.)
Wheat ($/bu.)
Oats ($/bu.)
Hay ($/bu.)
Pasture ($/ton)
Production
Corn (mil. bu.)
Soybeans (mil. bu.)
Acres Terraced (mi 1 . )
Reduced Tillage
(mil. acres)
Gross Soil Loss
(mil. tons)
Gross Soil Loss (tons
per acre planted)
Insecticide Expenditures
Index
Herbicide Expenditures
Index
N Load (bil. Ibs.)
N Load (Ibs. /acre)
0
0
0
0
2.46
5.26
4.97
2.33
56.15
3744.2
785.0
0
77.33
595.81
5.3
100
100
4.19
100.58
0
0
0
0
2.46
5.28
5.00
2.34
56.37
3760.2
784.5
0
77.33
330.58
2.96
100
100
4.19
100.96
; — s n —
Chisel
Plowing
Prohibited
(High SLC)
-270.8
210.51
-481.31
0
2.46
5.22
4.80
2.29
54.39
3736.6
792.3
0
0
2275.85
20.35
92
86
4.19
100.93
Chisel Chisel Plowing
Plowing on 33 Million
Prohibited Acres Only
(Low SLC) (Low SLC)
-281.55
269.60
-551.15
2.46
5.22
4.84
2.28
53.61
23.83
3740.3
792.3
0
0
578.07
5.17
97
87
4.19
100.24
-269.14
222.60
-491.74
2.46
5.22
4.84
2.28
54.69
24.08
3738.4
792.3
0
33.22
478.19
4.27
98
93
4.19
101.21
53
-------
in which chisel plowing is prohibited to those in which chisel plowing is re-
stricted to 33 million acres, the latter area being the estimated acreage on
which the practice is currently used (See Figure 4). With the high soil-loss
coefficients, the use of chisel plowing wherever profitable reduces soil loss
to 26 percent of the more than 20 tons per acre lost when chisel plowing is
prohibited. With the low soil-loss coefficients, the use of chisel plowing on
33 million acres reduces losses from 5.33 to 4.27 tons per acre, while use on
77 million acres holds soil losses to an average of 2.96 tons per acre. Since
chisel plowing is the more profitable method on 77 million acres and since
farmers are continuing to adopt the practice, the benchmark runs may be inter-
preted as a projection of what can be expected in the future under the present
institutional arrangement.
All constraint runs in this analysis are compared to the benchmark solu-
tions in which the use of chisel plowing is not limited. If all runs with
soil-loss constraints were made with no restrictions on chisel plowing (thus
showing the tendency to shift to that practice as a means of meeting the con-
straint) and were compared to a run with restricted chisel plowing (reflect-
ing current practice) the following changes would be observed: (1) the
reduction in soil loss from soil-loss constraints would be greater, (2) the
cost of soil-loss control would be reduced, and (3) some modifications in crop
production pattern changes might be observed. Thus, the manner in which chisel
plowing is handled in the model results in conservative estimates of the impact
of expenditures for soil erosion control, soil-loss as is evident from the
information contained in Table 11.
Soil-loss Limi.tations
The results presented in Figure 5 illustrate the impact of restricting
soil losses to 2, 3, 4, and 5 tons per acre in the cornbelt. If the low soil-
loss coefficients are correct, the costs to society will not be large. If
the high coefficients are accurate, the costs would be significant, especially
if the lower soil-loss restrictions were adopted. Because of the manner in
which the model is constructed, it is not possible to model the impact of
adopting the soil-loss tolerances set by SCS. These tolerances generally vary
between 2 and 5 tons, so the results presented here should bracket the
expected impact. SCS limits are established at a level which will not prevent
production; hence the impact would be less severe with those limits than
indicated by the model solution, since in the latter case considerable acre-
age is not used for production because the technology required to achieve the
specified soil-loss limit is not available.
Contrary to popular belief, the burden of the restrictions falls more
on consumers than producers. For all soil-loss restrictions, consumers lose,
while producers gain for some restrictions and lose for others. We expect
that the mixed impact on producers results from idiosyncrasies of the model
(related to steps on the demand function). Allowing for these idiosyncrasies,
it would seem that the effect on producers is either very small or beneficial.
Although the restrictions increase the prices of the major crops and the cost
of production, producers benefit because the effect on costs is smaller than
that on prices. The crop price and production impacts using the low soil-
loss coefficients are not shown in Figure 5 because they are insignificant.
54
-------
22
20
18
i-
O ic
<|) IO
k.
Q)
0- 14
0)
o
o
,. 12
i
Q.
(O
8 10
_j
o>
2 6
0)
>
4
2
n
— High Soil- Loss
Coefficients
Model
—
—
_
—
—
—
Low Soil-Loss
Coefficients
Model
77.33
33.22 77.33
Acres Chisel Plowed
Figure 4. Average soil loss per acre per year with
and without chisel-plowing constraints.
55
-------
1200
en
en
-1400
None 5
160
150
140
>- 130
O
0)
120
110
100
o
90
m 80
a>
o
tn
O
O
Jt ^n
i i i i
~
-
-
-
Corn-i
^^^^-Jfts,^^^
Acreage-' >v
SBJo
_
-
-
1 i 1 1
None
Figure 5. Impacts of soil-loss limits.
-------
For example, soybean production drops only 3 percent with a 2-ton-per-acre
limit. Logically, those producers who now have high soil-loss rates would
earn lower profits if a restriction were imposed and those without serious
soil erosion problems would gain. Thus, we see that under a soil-loss re-
striction the largest losses would be taken by producers with serious erosion
problems and by consumers.
Although consumers would pay more for food, some of them would benefit
from a restriction because off-site damages would be reduced. All future
consumers would be expected to benefit from the maintenance of a higher qual-
ity soil resource.
The soil-loss restrictions do not significantly affect the total use
of pesticides (the only substantial changes in pesticide use occur in those
runs in which the acreage chisel plowed changes). With increasingly stringent
soil-loss limits, the nitrogen use per acre increases slightly, but the
total amount used decreases as a result of reduced corn acreage.
The information in Tables 12 and 13, generated using the low soil-loss
coefficients, indicate that the impacts on producers by region would vary con-
siderably. Table 12 indicates for each land resource area the direction of
the impact on producers' surplus resulting from changes in soil-loss restric-
tions. The first column (B-4), for example, indicates the direction of the
impact produced by a change from the benchmark solution (no soil-loss restric-
tion) to a situation in which a 4-ton-per-acre restriction is imposed. These
data indicate that as increasingly stringent soil-loss limits are imposed,
only one region (LRA 115) experiences the consistently negative impacts that
would generally be expected. Producers in five regions are better off with
a two-ton restriction than they are in the benchmark (unrestricted) case.
These shifts occur because of several factors: changes in total acreages
planted and thus in production and prices, shifts of crops among regions,
and, in certain regions, the removal of acreage from production if that land
cannot meet the soil-loss limits.* Since hay and pasture are constrained by
region, dropping the least productive areas because the soil-loss limits can-
not be met may result in hay and pasture being moved to more productive land
with some present hay and pasture land also dropping out of production.
Table 13 summarizes changes in crop acreages with changes in soil-loss
limits and,thus,also reflects the variation in impacts among regions. In
the case of corn, almost every possible pattern of change occurs as the soil-
loss restriction shifts progressively from the unrestricted (benchmark) case
to 2 tons per acre. There are also numerous shifts in crop acreage among
producing regions. The manner in which the model is constructed may have
resulted in underestimating the shift from corn and soybeans to other crops
so as to meet the soil-loss limits imposed. Since the production of other
*The model is structured in such a way that acreage which cannot meet soil-
loss requirements is dropped, and it is then assumed that neither production
nor soil loss occurs on that land. This method of calculating soil loss would
be appropriate only if the land reverted to a "natural" state and if that state
did not generate soil loss. Thus, this feature of the model tends to overes-
timate the effectiveness of soil-loss restrictions in reducing soil losses.
57
-------
Table 12
Direction of Impact on Producers' Surplus
with Changes in Soil-Loss Limits
Soil-Loss Limit (tons/acre)
LRA B*+4 4 + 3 3 + 2 B* + 3 B* + 2
91
95
97
98
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
no
111
113
114
115
£
+ - + - -
+ + - + + +
+ + - + + +
+ + - + +
+ + - + - -
+ - + + +
+ + - + -
+
+ - - - +
+ + - - +
+ - +
+ + - + + +
+ + - + -
+ + - + - -
+
+ + - - -
_ _
+ - +
*B denotes the benchmark solution (no soil-loss restriction)
+ denotes an increase in producers' surplus
- denotes a decrease in producers' surplus
58
-------
Table 13
Direction of Change in Crop Acreages with Changes in Soil-Loss Restrictions
Soil-Loss Limit (tons/acre)
Wheat Oats Hay
LRA B+4* 4+3 3+2 B+4 4+3 3+2 B+4 4+3 3+2 B+4 4+3 3+2 B+4 4+3 3+2
91
95
97
98
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
113
114
115
Z
000000-
+ - +
+ 0000
- - + - - - -
+ + o
+ + - - + 0
+ + - 0
-o 0 +0 0
_ + + + _ + _0
+ - + - +
+
0
+ +
+ + + ---
+ - - -0
+ - + -- + -
-------
- + - - + -
-
0
+
0
0
0
0
0
-
0
~0
-
0
+
+
+
+
~o
0
-o
0
0
0
0
0
+
-
0
+o
-
0
-
+
-
0
-
-
-
+
+
+
+
0
0
0
0
0
0
+
0
0
+
0
+
+
-
+
0
0
0
0
0
0
-
0
+ 0
+
0 +
+ + - +
+
- - + -
+ -1- +
_
+
+ +
0 +
0
+ 0 +
0
+o + -
+o +
+
0
+ + +
-
*B denotes the benchmark solution (no soil-loss restriction)
+ denotes an increase in acreage planted
- denotes a decrease in acreage planted
blank denotes no change in acreage planted
0 denotes that none of this crop was planted under either soil-loss limit
+o denotes an increase from zero acres
-0 denotes a decrease to zero acres
59
-------
crops is constrained at a given level, the only change in the total acreage
of wheat, oats, and hay occurs as a result of including higher- or lower-
yielding acreage in the solution. If returns from these crops were included
in the objective function, they could be substituted for corn and soybeans
under some restrictions, modifying model results to some degree.
While crop acreage shifts can only be summarized in terms of differential
impacts on regions (because the model was constructed on that basis), the same
type of variations would occur among farmers on soils with varying capabili-
ti es.
Soil-loss Taxes
The information in Figure 6 summarizes the impact of imposing soil-loss
taxes at rates of $.50, $1.00, $2.00, and $4.00 per ton of gross soil loss.
The net social cost of achieving reductions in soil loss is somewhat less
with soil-loss taxes than with soil-loss limits, and consumers fare somewhat
better. The impact on producers is also reversed. Soil-loss taxes result in
a large negative impact on producers, as is reflected by the significant
government receipts that would be generated by the taxes.
Crop prices would be significantly affected. The price of soybeans, the
most erosive of the crops, is increased dramatically while corn prices hold
about constant and the prices of nonrow crops decrease significantly. The
increase in soybean prices is consistent with the significant reduction in
soybean production in the cornbelt. It is also worth noting that the acreage
in production decreases somewhat with the higher soil-loss tax rates, imply-
ing that on some acreage it is more profitable to cease production than to
pay the soil-loss tax or to incur the costs of applying erosion control tech-
niques. This situation reflects one assumption of the model; namely, that the
operator does not pay taxes on soil losses from land not involved in produc-
tion. If this assumption were modified, production would continue on such
land.
As expected, all of the impacts ('except for hay and pasture prices) were
reduced when the model was run with the low soil-loss coefficients and a soil-
loss tax of $4.00 per ton.
Terracing Subsidies
Figure 7 summarizes the impacts of terracing subsidies ranging from $5
to $40 per acre. In the model, the costs of terracing given in Table 8 are
annualized to reflect the annual impact on farm income of an investment in a
terrace system. In these runs, a terracing subsidy at a fixed number of
dollars per acre is paid to encourage the installation of terraces.* It is
assumed that the total amount is paid regardless of the annual cost of the
terrace. Thus, in the $40-per-acre run, the farm operator would receive more
compensation than the actual annual cost of installing the terraces. Since
*The payment would need to continue for several years because the estimates
of terracing costs are annualized.
60
-------
CT>
D = Revised Soil
Loss Coefficient -
D = Revised Soil
Loss Coefficient
Government
Receipts^
D -
Consumer's
Surplus
Net Social
Cost
Producer s
Surplus
5 3
Q)
O
CO
o
to
(O
o
o
CO
D - Revised Soil
Loss Coefficient
I
1234 012
Soil Loss Tax (dollars/ton)
o
H 1-
.c
o
112
110
108
+. 106
c
a>
102
O
TJ
O
o
0)
f
(f)
•D
O
100
98
94
92
O 90
O
? 88
0)
0> 86
O
a>
O 84
O= Revised Soil
Loss Coefficient
Corn
Soybeans
Figure 6. Impacts of soil-loss taxes.
-------
CTI
'Consumer's
Surplus
0)
o
o
(O
(O
o
o
CO
0
-1400
I
10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50
Level of Subsidy (dollars/acre)
Figure 7. Impacts of terracing subsidies.
10 20 30 40 50
-------
the $40-per-acre-per-year subsidy is higher than the actual annual cost of
terracing on any of the land where the technique is assumed to be possible,
the $40 run indicates the maximum possible impact from a terracing program.
The prices and acreages under the several runs are not summarized in this
figure because (as shown in Appendix D) there are no significant changes from
the benchmark solution. The high government cost and the high levels of pro-
ducers' surplus under the larger terrace subsidies are a result of the way in
which the subsidies are assumed to be paid; that is, more funds are paid to
producers than would be necessary to induce them to incur the terracing costs.
Since the governmental costs and producers' surpluses cancel where overpayment
occurs, however, the net social cost of the terracing subsidy plan is a rea-
sonable indication of the cost of achieving given levels of reduction in soil
losses. It is of particular interest that the reduction in soil loss or in-
crease in acres terraced improves very little when the subsidy is increased
from $20 to $40 per acre.
Prohibition of Straight-row Cultivation
As summarized in Appendix D, the model was run once with straight-row
cultivation prohibited using high soil-loss coefficients. Under this condi-
tion, producers' surplus is reduced approximately $145 million, net social
costs are increased approximately $133 million, and the difference is a small
increase in consumers' surplus of slightly over $11 million. Again, there is
no significant impact on acreages or prices, and soil loss is reduced from
5.33 to 3.01 tons per acre per year.
Prohibition of Fall Plowing
The results of a run in which fall plowing was prohibited are also sum-
marized in Appendix D. As noted earlier, prohibiting such plowing does not
have a significant impact because very little of the acreage is fall plowed
in the benchmark run, a result of the fact that the production costs included
in the model show spring plowing to be somewhat less expensive.
Combinations of Soil Erosion Control Policies
Figure 8 gives the results of combining selected approaches to the con-
trol of soil losses. Policy D combines a soil-loss restriction of three tons
per acre with a 50 percent reduction in the cost of terracing through a gov-
ernment cost-sharing program. Policy E combines a soil-loss restriction of
three tons per acre with a $15-per-acre terracing cost subsidy, the full
amount of which is paid regardless of the cost of terracing to any farm oper-
ator who installs terraces. In policy F, a soil-loss restriction of three
tons per acre is imposed and cost-sharing at $20 per acre is provided; that
is, a farmer who terraces his land is eligible to receive the full cost of the
terraces up to $20 per acre. In each case, the terracing-cost subsidy is
computed on an annualized basis. Also included in the figure is Policy A, the
benchmark solution; Policy B, which provides a $15 terracing subsidy alone;
and Policy C, which includes only a soil-loss restriction of three tons per
acre.
63
-------
1000-
800-
600-
400-
200-
o>
C -200 -
O
-400
-600
-800
-1000
-1200
Change In
Net Social
Cost
IB
Change ln(
Consumer's
Surplus
A B
Change In
Producer's
Surplus
IB
Change In
Government
Cost
*-. 6-1
w
|-
5 4-
O
(O i
CO—
w
0
^_ ^
S 2"
0
-• i-
^ 6-
w
A
.1 5-
—
1 4-
__
B
« 3-
o
o
C
t fc»
D
o> 2"
h-
E F § '-
o
< 0-
A
B
C
D
E
^^^
F
A
B
C
D
E
F
Benchmark Solution
$!5/acre Terracing Subsidy
Soil Loss < 3 tons/acre/year
Soil Loss < 3 tons/acre/year and
50% Terracing Cost Subsidy
Soil Loss < 3 tons/acre/year and
$!5/acre Terracing Subsidy
Soil Loss < 3 tons/acre/year and
$20/acre Terracing Cost Reduction
Figure 8. Impacts of terracing subsidies and soil-loss constraints.
64
-------
From these results it is apparent that the impacts of the three combina-
tion policies, in terms of the soil-loss rates achieved and economic effects,
are approximately equivalent to those of a three-ton-per-acre soil-loss res-
triction. They are also equivalent in terms of acreage planted, production of
corn and soybeans, and commodity prices. The social costs for all of the
combination policies are higher than for the terracing subsidy alone, reflect-
ing primarily the higher cost to consumers in the form of reduced consumers'
surplus. Producers' surplus is positive for all of these policies, but the
combination policies generate a higher level of producers' surplus than do the
soil-loss limits alone or the terracing subsidy alone. The difference is
greater when compared to the terracing subsidy alone. The combination poli-
cies and the soil-loss restrictions all generate lower levels of soil loss
than does the terracing subsidy alone. The $15-per-acre terracing subsidy
reduces soil losses from 5.3 to 3.46 tons per acre. A soil-loss restriction
of three tons per acre generates an average soil loss of 2.25 tons per acre,
and the most effective of the combination policies, that which combines the
soil-loss limit with a $15-per-acre subsidy, reduces soil losses to 1.87 tons
per acre. Thus, the terracing subsidy alone reduces soil losses by 35 per-
cent, soil-loss limits alone reduce it by 58 percent, and the most effective
of the combination policies reduces it by 65 percent of the gross soil loss
occurring in the corn belt in the benchmark solution.
Relative Efficiency of Soil-loss Control Policies
Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12 indicate the relative economic efficiency of the
several policies tested in controlling soil loss. The changes in net social
cost, producers' surplus, consumers' surplus, and governmental cost are plotted
relative to the percentage reduction in gross soil loss in the corn belt. It
is important to note that three additional categories of costs and benefits
are not included in these calculations: the costs of administering the poli-
cies in question, the environmental benefits associated with adopting the poli-
cies, and the long-run impacts on soil productivity. When comparing the re-
sults generated by the model using the high soil-loss ceofficients, it is clear
that the soil-loss tax is the most economically efficient overall, as would be
expected from economic theory. However, while the net social costs of achiev-
ing a given reduction in soil loss are lowest in the case of taxation, it is
important to realize that such a policy causes significant reductions in pro-
ducers' surplus as a result of the taxes paid. These governmental tax receipts
are, of course, reflected in the net social cost, giving rise to the overall
estimation that the policy is highly efficient. The taxation policy, then, is
the only one that generates a significant reduction in producers' well-being
with benefits to both the government and to consumers. It is also likely that
the administrative costs—primarily for tax assessment—would be quite signif-
icant under a policy of this type, at least with the present technology.
The soil-loss restrictions, except for the two-ton-per-acre limit,
approximate the tax solution reasonably well when the high soil-loss coeffi-
cients are used. That is, a soil-loss limit policy is not significantly less
efficient than the tax policy. The distribution of benefits and costs, how-
ever, is quite different. If a policy which limits soil loss to three tons
per acre per year results in a $500 million increase in cost over the bench-
mark solution, but because producers gain $500 million, the total negative
65
-------
1300
1200
1100
^ 1000
3 900
O
800
•2 700
O
V)
c 600
g 500
c 400
Z 300
200
100
O High Soil Loss Coefficients
I = Soil Loss Limits
2 = Terrace Subsidy
3= Soil Loss Tax
4= Soil Loss < 3, 50% Terrace Cost Subsidy
5= Soil Loss <3,$I5 Terrace Subsidy
6= Soil Loss <3, $20 Terrace Cost Reduction
7= No Straight Row Cultivation
0 Low Soil Loss Coefficients
la = Soil Loss Limits
lb= Soil Loss< 2, 100% Terrace Subsidy
2a= 100% Terrace Subsidy
3a= Soil Loss Tax $4.00
I
10
20 30 40 50 60 70
Reduction In Gross Soil Loss (percent)
Figure 9. Change in net social cost and percentage reduction in gross soil loss.
80
90
-------
£
(A
"a.
w.
3
CO
Jfi
«
o
o
w
Q.
_c
0>
C
o
£
o
1000
800
600
400
200
0'
-200
-400
-600
-800
-1000
-1200
-1400
-1600.
O High Soil Loss Coefficients
I = Soil Loss Limits
2 = Terrace Subsidy
3= Soil Loss Tax
4= Soil Loss ^ 3, 50 % Terrace Cost Subsidy
5= Soil Loss < 3, $15 Terrace Subsidy
6= Soil Loss < 3, $20 Terrace Cost Reduction
7= No Straight Row Cultivation
O Low Soil Loss Coefficients
la = Soil Loss Limits
lb= Soil Loss < 2, 100% Terrace Subsidy
2a= 100% Terrace Subsidy
3a = Soil Loss Tax $4.00
I I I I
, 3a
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Reduction In Gross Soil Loss (percent)
Figure 10. Change in producers' surplus and percent reduction in gross soil loss.
-------
m
3
CO
oo
o
o
o
o
I2OO
1000
800
600
400
200
0
-200
-400
-600
-800
-1000
-1200
-I40Q
O High Soil Loss Coefficients
I = Soil Loss Limits
2 = Terrace Subsidy
3 = Soil Loss Tax
4= Soi I Loss ^ 3, 50 % Terrace Cost Subsidy
5 = Soil Loss < 3, $15 Terrace Subsidy
6 = Soi I Loss < 3, $20 Terrace Cost Reduction
7 = No Straight Row Cultivation
Low Soil Loss Coefficients
la = Soil Loss Limits
Ib = Soil Loss<2, 100% Terrace Subsidy
2a= 100% Terrace Subsidy
3a= Soil Loss Tax $4.00
2a
1
la
a
3a
I
I
I
I
I
10
20
80
30 40 50 60 70
Reduction In Gross Soil Loss (percent)
Figure 11. Change in consumers' surplus and percent reduction in gross soil loss.
90
-------
CO
Q.
VO
-1400.
0 Low Soil Loss Coefficients
Ib = Soil Loss < 2, 100% Terrace Subsidy
2a= 100% Terrace Subsidy
3a= Soil Loss Tax = $4.00
O6
05
I
I
I
20
30 40 50 60
Reduction In Gross Soil Loss (percent)
70
80
90
Figure 12. Change in government cost and percent reduction in gross soil loss.
-------
impact on consumers is approximately $1 billion. As noted earlier, using the
low soil-loss coefficients, the impacts are significantly lower, with all of
the economic changes being less than 200 million dollars. The small negative
or rather significant positive impact on producers (depending on which set of
soil-loss coefficients is assumed to be correct) is a rather surprising re-
sult. It occurs because the model includes a supply and demand function for
the major crops, allowing the impact of the soil-loss restriction to be trans-
lated into higher prices which generate higher gross receipts at the farm
level. Such results will not be demonstrated by a model which is limited to
fixed commodity prices.
As previously discussed, the higher net social cost generated by soil-
loss restrictions is due in part to the fact that some land must be taken out
of production to meet the soil-loss limits, which are applied on a uniform
per-acre basis. Hence, the impacts on individual farmers would be quite var-
iable. While some farmers would receive higher net incomes resulting from
higher prices for the ma4or crops, others would be forced to remove land
from production and would, therefore, be adversely affected. Equity questions
such as this are addressed in Chapter 7.
The policy of banning straight-row cultivation appears reasonably ef-
ficient, but it is important to realize that the means of achieving reduced
soil loss is quite different from a soil-loss restriction. In this case,
all land remains in production; on some of the land soil loss is reduced to
very low levels through contouring or terracing, but on other land high
levels of soil loss continue. As an example, with a three-ton-per-acre soil-
loss limit, all land must either meet the limit or be dropped from production.
With the banning of straight-row cultivation, however, some land would move
from a two-ton-per-acre soil loss to one ton or less, while other acreage
might move from 20 to 10 tons per acre. While the two policies may produce
equivalent average rates of soil loss, the impacts on long-term productivity
and water quality would be quite different.
The terracing policies are not as effective in reducing soil losses as
the soil-loss restriction and taxation policies. With a terracing subsidy
providing a fixed number of dollars per acre there is a significant shift
of funds from the taxpayers to the farmers as a result of subsidizing at a
higher level than the cost experienced. Policy 2A (a 100-percent subsidy)
shows that the transfer would be eliminated if the subsidy were based on a
percentage of the actual cost incurred, as is the present practice.
Combining terracing subsidies with soil-loss restrictions produces a
more efficient result than can be achieved by a soil-loss restriction alone.
In these cases, benefits flow to the producers from both consumers and tax-
payers.
Soil-loss and Nitrogen Restrictions
Figure 13 summarizes some of the major impacts of imposing soil-loss
limits while constraining maximum nitrogen application rates to 50 and 100
pounds per acre. The nitrogen restriction would reduce application rates
from approximately 140 pounds per acre to the constraint level. The con-
70
-------
(0
o
o
"o
8
co
i
I
o
O
3000
2000
1000
0
-1000
-2000
-3000
-4000
-5000
NR
NR =
"50 =
100 =
No Nitrogen
Restriction
N < 50 Ibs/A
N< 100 Ibs/A
I i
lone 5
3000
^ 2000
J
"w I00°
"a.
w
3
CO
to -1000
0)
E-2000
CO
3-3000
~-4000
£-5000
O
.50
NR = No Nitrogen
Restriction
50 = N< 50 Ibs/A
IOO = N< 100 Ibs/A
CO
_3
O.
w
3
to
M
3000
2000
1000
0
-KXX)
g-2000
2-3000
—-4000
0)
o>
g-5000
^
O
lone
NR = No Nitrogen
Restriction
50= N< 50Ibs/A
100= N< 100 Ibs/A
i i i
Soil
5432 "'None 5
Loss Constraints (tons/acre/year)
140
130
120
£s_ no
o o
100
II
90
-0-2
Is
Q.TJ
O O
k. w.
00-
80
70
A = Acreage
~ C = Corn Production "
SB = Soybean Production
_50 = N< 50 Ibs/A
100= N< 100 Ibs/A
60
None
C = Corn
— S = Soybeans
W= Wheat
^ 140
O 60
None
O
.C
o
I
130
120
o no
g 100
w
0)
^ 3 90
co
s
80
70
a.
o
O 60
I ^^
0=0ots
- H = Hay
P = Pasture
I I
None
3 2
Soil Loss Constraints (tons/acre/year)
Figure 13. Impacts of restrictions on nitrogen application and soil loss.
71
-------
straints are assumed to apply to all sources of nitrates including those added
by legumes and are, therefore, quite restrictive. In general, it is clear that
the 50-pound-per-acre nitrogen restriction has a significant impact when ap-
plied alone and that as more stringent soil-loss limits are added, the impact
generally increases. The impact of a 100-pound-per-acre nitrogen restriction
is not significantly different from the impact of a soil-loss restriction
alone; the impact on producers is almost exactly the same. Another signifi-
cant result is the increase in producers' surplus when nitrogen applications
are restricted. Thus, while farm income would be reduced by a restriction at
the individual farm or regional level (realization of this fact explains the
negative farmer reaction to nitrogen restrictions), restrictions at the na-
tional level improve farm income. The difference is explained by the price-
increasing effect of a national restriction.
The nitrogen restrictions alone have a reasonably strong impact on the
agricultural sector. Reducing the level of nitrogen applied reduces the
yield and the profitability of corn, making soybeans a relatively more
attractive crop. At the 50-pound-per-acre nitrogen limit, the reduction in
yield is great enough so that even though the acreage of corn and beans is
increased relative to that of other crops, the total production declines.
When the increased prices for corn and soybeans are combined with the lower
production costs resulting from the use of less nitrogen, the result is a $2
billion increase in producers' surplus. The 100-pound-per-acre restriction
does not significantly influence producers' surplus. Both the 50- and 100-
pound restrictions generate reductions in consumers' surplus, with the 50-
pound-per-acre restriction having a much more significant effect.
When soil-loss restrictions are applied along with nitrogen restrictions
the impacts are increased. The direct impact of the soil-loss restrictions
is to force some acreage out of production entirely because the soil-loss
limit cannot be met, as discussed above. In addition, at the more restrictive
soil-loss limits the use of intensive row-crop production is reduced in favor
of less intensive crop rotations, giving rise to significant reductions in
the prices of wheat and oats. The reductions in yield resulting from ferti-
lizer restrictions and from reductions in row-crop acreage combine to reduce
production and increase prices for corn and soybeans. This combination leads
to a significant positive impact on producers' surplus and a major negative
impact on consumers' surplus.
While the results presented here indicate the general tendency of res-
ponse to specific restrictions, the fact that demand curves for the minor
crops are not included may introduce some bias (a fixed quantity of the minor
crops is specified in the model under a perfectly inelastic demand curve).
The model does not have as much flexibility to meet these constraints as would
be expected in the real world. The fact that the constraints for hay and
pasture are determined on an LRA basis while the constraints for wheat and
oats are determined on a corn-belt basis may also bias the results. The gen-
eral findings, however, are considered to be a reasonable reflection of what
could be expected in a real situation—reduced corn and soybean acreage and
consequent higher prices for these crops resulting in improved farm income,
a negative impact on consumers, and an overall negative impact in terms of
net social costs.
72
-------
WATERSHED ANALYSIS
This section reports the results of an analysis of the long-term (100-
year) impacts of soil erosion control policies at the watershed and the
individual farm levels. While it is not possible to actually combine the
results with the aggregate impacts reported in the previous section, it is
important to recognize that the aggregate model does have such implications.
It is also important that, while it is not possible to reflect the findings of
the aggregate model in the watershed examined here, such impacts would occur
in actual applications.
This section includes a description of the watershed selected, the model
and data used, and the results generated. The results include the implications
of an erosion pontrol policy, or the lack thereof, when viewed in terms of the
impact on the soil and its productivity over a 100-year period. The variation
in impact among farms with differing soil types is also discussed in some
detail. It was not necessary to analyze as wide a range of policy alternatives
with the watershed model as with the corn-belt model to determine the nature
of the impacts expected,
Watershed Selection
For this analysis, it was necessary to select a watershed that is repre-
sentative of the corn belt,* With the advice and consultation of soil special-
ists, it was determined that the watershed should:
1. Include soil types that reflect the soil associations
common throughout much of the corn belt
2. Have predominant soil slopes ranging from zero to seven
percent
3. Contain between 5,000 and 25,000 acres or contain natural
subdivisions of that size
4. Exhibit a wide variety of sediment damages, both on-site
and off-site
5. Contain a reservoir
6. Have available detailed soils data, structure costs, and
damage estimates for the watershed area
7. Be oriented primarily toward agriculture
8. Be located in Illinois
A watershed used in a previous study by Seitz et al, (1975)--the Big Blue
Watershed located in northeastern Pike County, Illinois—met these criteria
and was therefore selected for the present project.
*The following descriptions of the watershed are taken from Seitz et al. (1975)
and USDA Soil Conservation Service (1959).
73
-------
Description of the Watershed
The Big Blue Watershed covers 26,690 acres. It is approximately 13 miles
long and 4i miles wide, with Big Blue Creek flowing southeasterly through its
length.
This watershed is naturally divided into three drainage sections:
1. An area associated with a relatively large, multipurpose
reservoir
2. An area associated with a smaller reservoir intended only
for flood control
3. An area located downstream from the two structures.
To facilitate analysis and construction of the linear programming model, only
the part of the watershed associated with the larger reservoir was used in
this study. Unless specifically indicated, subsequent references pertain only
to that part of the watershed which is located in the western one-third of the
watershed and contains the headwater area of Big Blue Creek. It is character-
ized by gently rolling hills interspersed with a few level ridgetops and a
broad, flat valley with gently sloping valley walls. The gradients of the
main stream and its tributaries are moderate.
Using the 1972 plat map of Pike County, hypothetical farm units approx-
imating the size and location of actual major farms were developed. These
units are representative of the entire watershed. Relatively small land
holdings, such as rural residences, were generally omitted from the representa-
tive farm structure by combining them with larger farm units. Actual farm
boundaries were generally modified to conform to existing soil-type, slope,
and erosion-class boundaries. This adjustment resulted in somewhat irregular-
ly shaped farms but offered the advantage of reducing the number of instances
in which small acreages of a particular soil class had to be divided between
adjacent farms. The procedure also reduced the number of activities and hence
the size of the linear programming model but is not expected to alter the
results of the analysis. The hypothetical farm structure was transferred to
the watershed map to identify soil data (type, slope, and erosion class) for
each farm.
Because time and resources were limited, it was necessary to select a
sample of farms for the detailed analysis reported here. Nine farms were
selected to represent the physical and topographical characteristics of the
watershed.
Watershed Soil Types
A major portion of the watershed's soils are moderately thick loess.
Except for an area of prairie soils in the northern part of the drainage area,
a majority of the soils have developed under timber vegetation. The bottom-
land soils are generally cumulative types developed chiefly from silty deposits
resulting from erosion of the upland areas. The soils in the watershed may be
grouped into four general classes:
74
-------
1. Upland timber soils: Light-colored, silt loam soils with
moderately slow permeability occurring on slopes ranging
from 1 to 15 percent. Typical Illinois soil types within
the group are Bogota, Clary, and Fayette.
2. Upland prairie soils: Dark-colored, silt loam soils with
moderate permeability occurring on nearly level to gently
sloping land. These soils were developed under prairie
vegetation in eight feet or more of loess. Typical Illinois
soil types within the group are Muscatine and Tama.
3. Steeply sloping timber soils: A heterogeneous group of
soils developed on exposures of weathered glacial till,
limestone outcrops, or thin loess. They generally occur on
slopes exceeding fifteen percent and are not cultivated.
They are utilized as pasture or woodland. Typical soil types
are Hickory and Elco.
4. Bottomland soils: Dark to moderately dark-colored silt loam
soils with moderate permeability occurring on nearly level
valley floors adjacent to Big Blue Creek. These soils are
moderately to highly productive if adequately protected from
overflow. Typical soil types within this group are Arenzville
and Radford.
A breakdown of soils by type and erosion class is given in Table 14.
The Watershed Linear Programming Model
This model is structured as a profit-maximizing model subject to land
contraints. The crop production activities included in the model are framed
in terms of crop rotations.* These crop production activities are diagrammed
in Figure 14. Mote that each farm unit contains a number of land types
(slope-erosion combinations). The conservation practices possible on each
type of land are up-and-down tillage, contouring, and terracing. The alter-
native tillage methods available are conventional tillage, the plow-plant
method, chisel plowing, and, in the case of rotation 5 (double-crop option),
zero tillage. Nitrogen-use rates of 50, 100, or 150 pounds per acre are
possible under each rotation with the exception of rotations 7 and 8, wood-
land and pasture, where only a 50-pound-per-acre rate is allowed.
Cost and Yield Data
Production cost data for the crop rotation components were developed
from the Illinois Farm Management Manual (Hinton, 1976). Total production
*See the section, "Rotations, Tillage and Conservation Practices, and Crop
Prices" presented later in this chapter for a description of each rotation.
75
-------
en
Table 14
Soil Type Acreages in Selected Farms in the Big Blue Creek Watershed
by Slopes and Erosion Classes*
Soil Type
Hickory (8)
Keomah (17)
Clinton (18)
Tama (36)
Muscat ine (41)
Atterberry (61)
Sable (68)
Drury (75)
Sicily (258)
A
29.
33.
13.
50.
19.
5.
Stronghurst (278) 9.
Rozetta (279)
Fayette (280)
Wakeland (333)
Downs (386)
Orion (415)
TOTAL
% of Total
Watershed area
39.
70.
270.
12.
4
8
8
0
4
0
3
3
1
1
7
Bl
341.
55.
34.
6.
4.
28.
24.
32.
9.
10.
547.
25.
2
0
4
9
4
8
3
6
4
0
6
B2 Cl C2 C3 Dl D2 D3 E2 E3 F2
134.4
36.2 101.2 113.8 1.9 17.5 54.2 116.2 13.1 28.8 166.8
21.9
5.0 5.0 5.6
17.5
6.2 76.9 10.0 12.5 40.6 19.4
13.1 5.0 56.8 32.5 24.4 26.9 78.1 20.0
15.0 8.8
49.3 134.9 289.4 11.9 17.5 113.6 181.2 40.0 126.3 321.2
2.3 6.3 13.6 .6 .8 5.3 8.5 1.9 5.9 15.0
F3 62 Total
20.0 154.
29.
8.1 1032.
90.
84.
6.
23.
44.
46.
9.
198.
5.0 271.
39.
33.
70.
5.0 28.1 2135.
.2 1.3 100
4
4
8
7
4
9
8
4
8
3
2
2
3
8
1
5
% of
Total
Nine-
farm
Area
7.
1.
48.
4.
4.
.
1.
2.
2.
.
9.
12.
1.
1.
3.
100
2
4
4
3
0
3
1
1
2
4
3
7
8
6
3
.1
*Letters designate slopes:
A = 0 to 2%
B = 2 to 4%
C = 4 to 7%
D = 7 to 12%
E = 12 to 18%
F = 18 to 30%
6 = over 30%
Numbers designate erosion classes:
1 = 7 to 14 inches of topsoil remaining
2 = 3 to 7 inches of topsoil remaining
3 = 0 to 3 inches of topsoil remaining
-------
Farm Unit
Land Types
(Soil Type, Slope and Erosion Class)
Conservation Practices
Up-ond- Down Tillage T
/
Contouring
/
Tillage Practices
Convent ionalT Plow -Plant
(Chisel
Rotations Rotations
1,2,3,4,5,6* 1,2,3,4,5,6
Fertilization Fertilization
F,G,H** F,G,H
3lowinq
Rotations
l,2,3,4,5*,6
Fertilization
F.G.H
| Terracing
"\
Tillage Practices
Conventional) Plow-Plant (Chisel Plowing
Rotations
1,2,3,
4,5,6
Fertilization
F,G,H
1
Rotations
1,2,3,4,5,6
Fertilization
F.G.H
Rotations
l,2,3,4,5*,6
Fertilization
F,G,H
T llage Practices
Conventional | Plow -Plant (Chisel Plowing
1
Rotations Rotations
1,2,3,4,5,6 1,2,3,4,5,6
Fertilization Fertilization
F,G,H F,G,H
Rotations
l,2,3,4,5*,6
Fertilization
F,
G.H
Woodland
and
Pasture
Fertilization
F
* The Rotation Numbers Refer to the Patterns Described in the Section "Rotations, Tillage and
Conservation Practices, and Crop Prices."
These Letters Designate Nitrogen Application Rates !
F = 50 Ibs/acre
G = 100 Ibs/acre
H = 150 Ibs/acre
* Rotation 5 Is Planted With Zero Tillage Rather Than Chisel Plowing.
Figure 14. Diagram of crop production activities included in the linear programming model
-------
cost comprises direct*, labor, and fertilizer costs.
Direct costs include preplanting soil preparation, seeding, harvesting,
conditioning, machinery depreciation, repairs, fuel, seed, spray, seasonal
hired labor, and other materials. Labor is valued at four dollars per hour.
Fertilizer cost is based on the estimates given in the Illinois Farm Manage-
ment Manual, t The total cost of crop production is a summation of these
components.§ A general total cost calculation of the following type was
estimated for corn, soybeans, wheat, oats, and meadow:
TC = D + F + L [Eq.7]
where TC = Total cost
D = Direct cost
F = Fertilizer cost
L = Operator labor cost
The individual cost components included in estimating production costs
for the different crops are related to yield levels. Based on information
from Hinton (1976), the cost functions (1976 costs) are developed as follows
(cost values are in dollars per acre, yield values in bushels per acre).
Corn
For corn production, the direct costs, D , in dollars per acre are a
discontinuous function of the yield, Y , expressed in bushels per acre:
C
DC = 54.4 for YC £ 80 [Eq.8]
D = 54.4 + 5.6/20(Y -80) for 80 < Y < 100
c c — c—
D = 54.4 + 6.00/20(YC -100) for 100 < Yc < 120
DC = 54.4 + .13(Y -120) for 120 <_ Y <_ 150
The fertilizer cost, F , is a linear function of yield:
F_ = $.ll*Yr [Eq.9]
\f \*
*Direct crop costs are based on a 260-339 acre farm.
tPrices, including spreading cost, were based on these values:
15 cents per pound of N
20 cents per pound of P205
8 cents per pound of K20
A charge of $2.00 per acre was added for limestone maintenance.
§The fertilizer cost component of total cost does not include the cost of
nitrogen. Nitrogen cost for each farm and for the watershed is treated in
the model as an activity. This approach was taken to facilitate revision
of the model when considering policy alternatives such as a nitrogen-use
limit for the watershed or on a per-farm, per-acre, or per-ti11 able-crop-
acre basis.
78
-------
and the labor cost, L is again a discontinuous function of yield:
v*
L = 4.4*$4.00 for Y < 80 [Eq.10]
c c —
Lc = 4.5*$4.00 for 80 <_ YC£ 100
Lc = 4.6*$4.00 for 100 £ Y^i 120
L = 4.7*$4.00 for 120 £ Y <_ 150
C C
Soybeans
For soybeans, direct costs, D ., and labor cost, L ., are again a dis-
continuous function of yield, Y .; IRd fertilizer cost,Fs^, is again a linear
function:
Dsb = $42.50 for Ygb <_ 33 [Eq.ll]
= $42.50 + 4.00/17(Ysb-33) for 33 <_ Ysb <_ 50
Fsb = $.27(Ysb) S [Eq.12]
Lsb = 4.5*$4.00 for Ygb <_ 33 [Eq.13]
= 4.6*$4.00 for Ygb <. 33
Wheat
The relationships are similar for wheat:
D = 26.70 for Y < 40 [Eq.14]
W W — L T J
= $26.70 + $2.00/15(Yw-40) for 40 <_ YW £ 55
F = $.23*Y [Eq.15]
w w L 1 j
L = 2.0*$4.00 for Y <. 40 [Eq.16]
W W
= 2.1*$4.00 for Y < 40
w —
Oats
The direct and labor cost functions for oats are fixed, but fertilizer
cost varies with yield:
DQ = $25.00 at all levels of yield, YQ [Eq.17]
F°=$.12*Yo ° [Eq.18]
L = 2.00*$4.00 at all levels of Y [Eq.19]
o o J
Meadow
For meadow, the cost and yield values for alfalfa are assumed. The cost
functions for alfalfa are:
79
-------
D = $20.00 [Eq.20]
m
F = $3.85*Y [Eq.21]
ro m
L = 5.60*Y [Eq.22]
m m
In rotations where oats are used as a nurse crop for meadow, a direct
cost for seed of $5.60 is added to the cost function.* The resulting yield
of the combination, oats plus alfalfa, is valued in terms of the oats; the
value of the catch crop is disregarded.
Pasture and Woodland
The cost functions for pasture and woodland activities are viewed as
long-term investments rather than as annual costs. These costs are, however,
annualized to make them compatible.
The costs of the pasture activity can be expected to vary with the
initial physical condition of the area to be planted or reseeded. Actual
costs depend on the amount of brush or tree removal, gully repair, or fertil-
ization required. The cost function developed for this activity is based on
average estimates.
Pasture costs are separated into two types: (1) those related to in-
itial establishment, such as seedbed preparation, seeding, seed costs, and
herbicides, all of which are treated as an investment; and (2) the recurring
fertilizer and management costs. The coefficients used here for pasture, how-
ever, include only the annual fertilizer and management costs ($20.00 per acre
per year).
The woodland activity can be viewed as a composite of two activities,
tree planting and timber-stand improvement. The coefficients are formed in
terms of timber-stand improvement. The cost estimates related to the wood-
land activity are applicable on an average situation based upon published
data combined with the opinions of forestry specialists (USDA Soil Conserva-
tion Service, 1959; Seitzet al., 1975). The woodland activity costs include
fire control, livestock grazing control, improved forestry and sustained yield
practices, and replacement planting. The initial investment costs annualized
over an average rotation of 60 years plus the annual maintenance costs
are estimated at $3.73 per acre per year. Land-conversion costs, such as
clearing existing woodlots for pasture or crop production, are not included.
The specified costs and yield functions were modified for alternative
tillage systems and conservation practices as set forth in Table 15. Gener-
ally, the cost adjustments occur in the direct costs for row and grain crops.'1'
*The seed costs shown here are not those given in the Illinois Farm Manage-
ment Manual but reflect the seed costs required in the above combinations ac-
cording to the opinion of University of Illinois Agronomy Department personnel,
"''Computationally, these adjustments are made without modifying the cost
functions.
80
-------
Table 15
Row and Grain Crop Cost and Yield Adjustments Relative to A System of Up-and-down Cultivation
and Conventional Tillage Under Specified Alternative Conservation and Tillage Practices3
00
COST
Conventional Tillage
Plow-plant Tillage
Chisel -plow Tillage
Zero Tillage
Contouring
Terracing
Conventional Tillage and:
Contouting
Terracing
Plow-plant Tillage and:
Contouring
Terracing
Chisel -plow Tillage and:
Contouring
Terracing
Zero Tillage and:
Contouring
Terracing
CROPS PRODUCED IN
TRADITIONAL ROTATIONS
CHANGE ($/acre) YIELD CHANGE (*)
b
+1.05
-1.00
b
+0.75
+4.50
+0.75
+4.50
+1.80
+5.55
- .25
+3.50
b
b
b
None
c.d
b
None
None
None
None
None
None
c,d
c.d
b
b
SOYBEANS IN
DOUBLE-CROP ROTATION
COST CHANGE ($/acre) YIELD CHANGE (%)
b
+1.05
b
-1.50
+0.75
+4.50
+0.75
+4.50
+1.80
+5.55
b
b
-0.75
+3.00
-40
-35
b
-30
None
None
-40
-40
-35
-35
b
b
-30
-30
For a detailed account of adjustments see: Seitz, W. D. et al, 1975. Evaluation of agricultural policy
alternatives to control sedimentation, Research Report No. 99, Water Resources Center, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
bNot applicable.
cYield on well-drained soils reduced by 5 percent.
dYield on poorly drained soils reduced by 15 percent.
-------
Table 16
00
IS3
Yield Responses to Nitrogen Fertilization by Soil Groups
(yields in bushels/acre)
CROP
HARVESTED ROTATIONS
Continuous Corn
Corn-Soybeans
CORN Corn*-Corn-Soybeans-
Oats (Catch Crop)
Corn*-Soybeans-Corn-
Wheat-Meadow
Corn-Wheat-Meadow-
Meadow
NTTDflCFN
INI 1 KUUt.ll
(Ibs/acre)
50
100
150
50
100
150
50
100
150
50
100
150
50
100
150
I
95
120
140
110
132
145
111
133
144
120
138.5
145
140
145
145
- - 90TI
II
85
110
130
100
122
130
101
123
130
115
125
130
130
130
130
GROUPS
III
75
100
118
90
112
118
91
112
118
103.5
115
118
118
118
118
IV
60
85
100
85
100
100
76
95.5
100
92
100
100
99
100
100
*The yield given in these
rotations are the averages
of corn yield in the
rotation.
Group I: Tama, Ipara, Sable, and Muscatine Soils
Group II: Atterbury Soil
Group III: Keomah, Clarksdale, Sicily, Stronghurst, Rozetta,
Haymond, Wakeland, Downs, and Orion Soils
Group IV: Clinton, Sylvan, Drury, and Fayette Soils
-------
Table 16 (continued)
00
(X)
PROP
HARVESTED
WHEATT
OATSft
ROTATIONS
Corn-Soybeans-Corn-
Wheat-Meadow
Wheat-Soybeans
Corn-Wheat*-Meadow-
Meadow
Corn-Corn-Soybeans-
Oats (Catch Crop)
MTTDnrrw
INI 1 KUutIN
(Ibs/acre)
25
50
75
25
50
75
25
50
75
25
50
75
I
41
52
52
45
55
58
47
52
52
59
75
80
9DTI R
II
36
48
49
39
50
54
43
49
59
53
69
72
pniipc _ _ _
III IV
29
40
43
32
43
49
37
43
43
47
60
61
^Legume seeded in wheat except where followed by soybeans.
*Assumed 20 Ibs of nitrogen from alfalfa.
f"1" Assumed stiff-strawed varieties.
-------
Yield value changes occurring as a result of soil types and soil drainage
characteristics were handled in the computation process by changing crop
prices. Yield adjustments needed as a result of alternative tillage systems
were made by changing the crop yield data shown in Table 16.*
Yield estimates for crops produced on different soil conditions were ob-
tained from published research results (Odell and Oschwald, 1968) and from
Prof. F. Welch, University of Illinois Department of Agronomy. The estimates
are presented mainly by a grouping of soils with respect to native productiv-
ity and response to nitrogen fertilization. These estimates assume a high
level of management. The soybean yields by soil type are given in Table 17.
TABLE 17
Soybean Yields by Soil Type1"
SOIL
Hickory
Keomah
Clinton
Syl van
Tama
Muscatine
Ipava
Atterberry
Sable
Drury
Clarksdale
Sicily
Stronghurst
Rozetta
Fayette
Haymond
Wakeland
Downs
Orion
YIELD
(bu/acre)
--
35
34
24
42
46
47
40
46
33
39
37
38
36
33
39
38
37
37
"'"from Odell and Oschwald (1968) on an individual
soil basis.
The high management level is based on high input levels thought to be
near those required for maximum profit. This level is based on present tech-
nology and is used by about 10 percent of the farmers.
High-level management, as defined by Odell and Oschwald (1968) implies
that a number of conditions have been met: (1) those drainage improvements
*These modifications are also accounted for in the computation process,
84
-------
which are consistent with soil properties and which will maximize profits have
been made; (2) limestone applications have been sufficient to maintain a soil
pH of 6.0 or above for cash grain-cropping systems and a pH of 6.5 for cropping
systems with alfalfa or clover; (3) available phosphorus test levels have been
maintained at 40 to 50 and available potassium test levels at 240 or higher;
(4) crop residues have been returned; (5) corn-plant populations are 20,000
to 24,000 stalks per acre (lower for drouthy soils); (6) erosion control
practices have held soil losses below amounts considered to cause serious
soil damage; (7) weed and insect control have been adequate and timely; (8)
tillage operations have been fitted to the soil and requirements of the crops;
(9) excessive tillage has been avoided; (10) high-yielding, good-standing crop
varieties are used; (11) timely harvesting and other crop-production operations
are carried out as conditions permit; (12) flexibility is maintained in the
crop-production system so that adjustments can be made for changes in climatic
conditions and the economic situation (Odell and Oschwald, 1968). Nitrogen is
applied at rates of 50, 100, and 150 pounds per acre. As shown in Table 18,
the nitrogen application rates were adjusted according to the make-up of each
crop rotation. For example, in Rotation 2 (corn-soybeans) only 25 pounds of
nitrogen need be supplied per acre to achieve a nitrogen level of 50 pounds per
acre because of the nitrogen supplied by the soybean crop. Table 19 gives the
nitrogen supplied by alfalfa, which was used in appropriate rotations.
Table 18
Adjustment in Nitrogen Application Rates
for Different Crop Rotations
(Pounds per Acre)
Rotation 50 Ibs/A 100 Ibs/A 150 Ibs/A
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
C
C-Sb
C-C-Sb-Ox
C-C-Sb-W-M
W-Sb (dbl crp)
C-W-M-M
50.00
25.00
31.25
25.00
12.50
18.75
100.00
50.00
62.5
50.00
25.00
37.50
150.00
75.00
93.75
75.00
37.50
56.25
Rotations^ Tillage and Conservation Practices, and Crop Prices
A set of crop rotations was developed for use in the model. The rotation
patterns included in the set represent a range of land-use intensities so as
to reflect the differing capabilities of various land types to support crop
production activities with varying levels of soil losses. These crop rota-
tions are:
85
-------
Table 19
Nitrogen Supplied by Alfalfa*
SOIL
ALFALFA PRODUCED
(tons/acre)
N FROM ALFALFA
(Ibs/acre)
Hickory
Keomah
Clinton
Sylvan
Bold
Tama
Muscatine
Ipava
Atterberry
Sable
Drury
Clarksdale
Sicily
Stronghurst
Rozetta
Fayette
Raymond
Wakeland
Downs
Orion
2.2
4.6
4.4
3.7
2.9
5.4
5.6
5.5
5.1
5.1
4.2
4.8
4.6
4.8
4.6
4.4
4.7
4.6
4.8
4.2
44
92
88
74
58
108
112
no
102
102
84
96
92
96
92
88
94
92
96
84
*Source: Prof. Fred Welch, Agronomy Department, University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
86
-------
1. C
2. C-Sb
3. C-C-Sb-Ox
4. C-C-Sb-W-M
5. W-Sb (double crop)
6. C-W-M-M
7. Pasture
8. Woodland
where C = corn
Sb = soybeans
Ox = oats with an alfalfa catch crop
W = wheat
M = meadow or alfalfa
In the model these rotations may be produced on all but two land types: (1)
on land with slopes less than four percent permanent pasture and woodland
activities are not permitted; (2) on land types with slope gradients exceed-
ing 18 percent, permanent pasture and woodland activities are the only
alternatives. The reason for these modifications is that slope group E would
not generally be used for continuous cropping activities.
Three tillage practices are considered: conventional, plow-plant, and
chisel plowing. These tillage practices may be used for the six crop ro-
tations noted above, the exception being that zero tillage replaces chisel
plowing under the soybean-wheat double-crop rotation (Rotation 5). The per-
manent pasture alternative is assumed to use only conventional tillage. The
woodland alternative does not use any of the tillage practices.
The conservation practices considered are up-and-down tillage, contour-
ing, and terracing, but not all of these practices are available on each land
type. The choice of conservation practices was based upon SCS recommendations
concerning slope gradients.
The prices used in this analysis were: corn, $2.46 per bushel; soybeans,
$5.26 per bushel; wheat, $4.97 per bushel; oats, $2.32 per bushel; alfalfa/
pasture, $24.00 per ton; and woodland, $25.00 per 1,000 board feet (Seitz
et al.3 1975). The above prices, with the exception of that for woodland, are
1976 minimum cost prices determined in the corn-belt model developed by
Robert Taylor and others and described in the first section of this chapter
(Taylor and Frohberg, 1977).
The net return coefficients for each crop activity are averages of ten-
year periods with a five percent discount rate. The geometric mean, with the
following form, was used to compute the discount rates.
87
-------
In logarithmic form:
N 1ogx + •'logx + log xN
Antilog of (1/N I log x, = ] ^ ) [Eq.23]
1-1 ] jj
The geometric mean was used for several reasons: it is rigidly defined
by a mathematical formula, it depends on the value of every item in the dis-
tribution, no single item can be changed in the least without affecting the
value of the geometric mean, and its value is not as greatly influenced by
extreme items as are the values of the quadratic, arithmetic, and harmonic
means (Naugh, 1952; Spurr et al, 3 1973).
Gross Soil-loss Coefficients
The soil-loss coefficients were obtained through the use of the Universal
Soil Loss Equation (Mischmeier and Smith, 1965). The C and P factor values
used in this study are given in Tables 20 and 21.
Results
The watershed model was used to calculate the impacts of selected res-
trictions on a number of representative farms in a watershed and to deter-
mine the long-term role of soil-loss limits in maintaining soil productivity.
The complete results of the model runs for the farm comparisons, given in
Appendix D, are summarized here, followed by an analysis of the long-term
impacts of soil conservation practices.
Benchmark Solution
In the benchmark solution, the 2,135.5 acres of land which comprise the
nine farms in the watershed are distributed among the crops as follows:
wheat, 21.97%; corn, 32.22%; soybeans, 25.59%; pasture, 16.59%; and oats,
3.62%. The actual 1975 crop acreages for the county in which the watershed
is located were: wheat, 8.8%; corn, 48.4%; soybeans, 32%; pasture, 7.9%*;
and oats, 3%.
The percentage of land devoted to oats in the model solution is approx-
imately equal to the actual value for the county. The percentage of land in
pasture is appropriate since the model was forced to include either pasture
or woodland, on certain soil-type slope-erosion combinations and since it
allocated all of this land to pasture. The actual pasture-plus-woodland
acreage in the county is at about the level indicated in pasture by the model.
The high figures for wheat acreage and the low values for corn and soybean
acreage result from using the crop prices generated by the corn-belt model.
The price of wheat specified by that model is higher than that observed in
the market, thus affecting the crop distribution in the results of the water-
shed model.
*This percentage is an average over the previous six years. The 1975 Pike coun-
ty average was not available at the time these percentages were calculated.
88
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Table 20
Crop Management Factor, C, under Alternative
Cropping Systems in this Study*
Crop
Rotations
(1) Continuous Corn
(2) C-Sb
(3) C-C-Sb-Ox
(4) C-C-Sb-W-M
(5) W-Sb (double-crop)
(6) C-W-M-M
(7) Pasture
(8) Woodland
Conven-
tional
.400
.560
.350
.220
.360
.052
.014
.014
Tillage
Plow-
Plant
.240
.290
.210
.120
.336
.024
Practices
Chisel
Plowing
.070
.084
.060
.006
.020
Zero
Tillage
.162
*Minor adjustments were made to reflect the quantity of crop residue in
those cases where heavy residues were expected as a result of heavy
fertilizer use.
Table 21
Erosion Control Factor, P, under Various Conservation Practices
Erosion
Class
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
Slope
(%)
0-2
2-4
4-7
7-12
12-18
18-30
30+
Up & Down
Tillage
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
P Values
Contouring
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.8
0.9
1.0
Terracing
0.12
0.10
0.10
0.12
0.16
0.18
0.20
Slope Length Limits
for Contouring
(ft.)
400
400
300
150
70
60
50
89
-------
Conventional and zero tillage were the primary tillage practices actually
used in the county. The model selected up-and-down tillage, contouring, and
terracing conservation practices, with up-and-down tillage being predominant.
In an earlier study of this watershed by Seitz et al. (1975), contouring and
terracing were not observed in the optimal unconstrained solution. That
study, however, was a single-period analysis and did not reflect the effect
of soil loss on net returns in later years. The objective function of the
model used here was formulated with a weighted average of net returns over a
ten-year planning period, thus taking into consideration the effect of soil
loss on net income. As a result, the model results specify contouring and ter-
racing on some of the shallower soils. This result is consistent with the
fact that on farms with deeper, more productive soils (Farm No, 2, for example)
up-and-down tillage alone was used.
While there are some differences between observed conditions in the water-
shed and the benchmark solution of the model, these differences should not
preclude analyzing the results of the model to determine the impacts of
selected restrictions on the various farms and the long-term impacts. In re-
viewing the benchmark solution, it is important to note that this watershed
was selected to represent the corn belt, broadly defined to include the
surrounding areas. Since these surrounding areas are more sloping, the soil-
loss rates are higher than the average rates indicated by the corn-belt model,
and the income impacts in this watershed should be greater than in the corn
belt as defined for the aggregate analysis.
Farm-level Analysis
In addition to the benchmark unconstrained solution, the model was run
with soil-loss limits at the farm and watershed levels* and with farm-based
soil-loss limits combined with nitrogen application limits of 50 and 100
pounds per acre per year.
The data on net income, soil loss per acre, and nitrogen per acre are
summarized in Figures 15, 16, and 17 for the watershed and by the farm. In each
case the average impact at the farm level is contracted with the average for
the watershed. In Figure 15 the net income by farm and the total watershed
income under each of the four constraints are given as a percent of the bench-
mark solution income. The most important result is the substantial variation
in impact on the income of the different farms. Farm 2 realizes a very small
income reduction while Farm 4 experiences an income reduction of almost 20
percent under the watershed soil-loss limit. Under the most restrictive case—
a farm soil-loss limit combined with a nitrogen limit of 50 pounds per acre--
*The soil-loss limits were computed for the farms and for the watershed from
the Soil Conservation Service tolerance ("T-") limits which are based on soil
type. The total soil loss that would result if erosion occurred at the toler-
ance limit for each soil type was set as the maximum allowable total loss at
the farm or watershed levels. Thus, while the total loss equals the SCS tol-
erance limit, the loss by soil type within the farm or watershed will not
necessarily equal the SCS tolerance limits. Some soils may exceed the limits
while others may realize lower levels of loss.
90
-------
Watershed Based SCS "T"
100 r- Limits
a>
E
o
o
O
V)
o
E
0)
CD
c
0)
o
0)
0.
<
w
0)
o
u
c
a>
95
90
85
80L-
Farm-Based SCS'V
100 r- Limits
95
90
85
80
100
95
90
85
80 •—
100
95
90
85
801-
Watershed
Farm-Based SCS "T"
Limits and N < 100
Farm-Based SCS "T1
Limits and N < 50
3456
Farm Number
Figure 15. Net income as a percent of benchmark-solution income by farm.
91
-------
Watershed-Based SCS "T" Limits
T 5.5
O
a>
u.
O
o
(A
O
V>
V>
O
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
O
CO 3.0
U
O
>, 5-°
Q)
O 4.5
O
4.0
Farm-Based SCS "T" Limits
co
o
3.5
— 3.0
O
en
26 r-
Benchmark Solution
O 24
>K
£ 22
O
£ 20
v> 18
v>
o
o
CO
16
14
Watershed
3456
Farm Number
Figure 16. Average soil loss per acre per year by farm.
92
-------
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
BF
W 50 BF
100
ft 50BF
100
R - Renr
F - Farn
W= Watt
IOO= Farn
and
50= Farn
ana
3K Nitrog
Crops
hmark
i-Base
irshed-f
n - Base
N < IOC
i -Based
N < 50
en Car
Include
Solution
d SCS"T" Limits
Based SCS"T" Limits
d SCS'T" Limits
)
SCS"T" Limits
ryover From Previous
d
W 50BF
100
4 1^
] £
W 50BFW 50 BF
100 100
N 50BF
IOO
•
]
W 50BFW 50BFW 50BFW 50
100 100 100 100
Watershed
Farm Number
Figure 17. Average nitrogen utilization per acre per year by farm.
93
-------
all farms are adversely impacted, but the difference among farms still exists.
The results of the corn-belt model discussed earlier indicated clearly
that such soil-loss and nitrogen-use restrictions may generate price increases
that would result in higher overall incomes for the farm sector. Such price
increases, however, would not eliminate differences in income among farms; in
fact, they may increase them. Highly productive farms such as Nos. 2 and 6
would likely realize substantial increases in income while farms such as Nos.
1 and 4 would benefit to a lesser degree from higher prices because their
total output would be reduced. Thus, it is possible that the relative impact
on individual farms may be more disparate than shown here. It is also pos-
sible to generalize these results: under reasonably uniform restrictions,
farms in highly productive areas would benefit relative to farms in poorer
areas.
The soil losses from individual farms and from the watershed also vary
with the type of restriction imposed, as shown in Figure 16.* Under either
the farm or the watershed limits, the average soil loss in this watershed falls
from slightly over 19 tons per acre to approximately 4 tons per acre per year.
It is interesting that Farm 2, with the lowest rate of erosion under the
unconstrained solution (of about 14 tons per acre) shows the highest rate of
erosion under the constrained solution (at less than 5.5 tons). This result
is consistent with the objective of maximizing income, since the farm with
the least erosive soil would tend to be "used" the most heavily in a con-
strained solution; that is, it is constrained the least. As expected, the
variation in soil-loss rates is higher under watershed-based limits than under
farm-based limits because in the former case the model operates under a more
flexible set of constraints and increases income relative to that attainable
under uniform farm-level constraints.
Figure 17 illustrates the average rate of nitrogen use per acre per
year.t The small increase in nitrogen-use rates under the models run with
soil-loss constraints is due to a shift from the wheat/soybean double-crop
system to corn as a means of reducing soil erosion.§ Careful study of Figure
17 indicates that the five runs produced a wide range of conbinations of
results. Only for Farm 9 is the nitrogen use higher in the basic solution
than in any of the constrained runs. When nitrogen use is limited to 100
*The results obtained with a combination of soil-loss limits and nitrogen re-
strictions are not shown because, as reflected in Appendix D, the soil losses
are the same as those obtained when the farm-based SCS tolerance limits alone
are applied.
fThe nitrogen constraint models were constructed by eliminating all rotations
containing nitrogen application rates in excess of the limit rather than by
setting a restraint on the total amount of nitrogen used, as in the case of
sediments, in order to reduce the computational burden.
§As noted earlier, the wheat price in the model has resulted in a somewhat
higher level of wheat production than observed. Thus, this shift may not be
observed in practice, or at least not to the degree shown here.
94
-------
pounds per acre and soil loss is constrained, the rate of nitrogen use on sev-
eral farms is actually greater than when neither is restricted. The reason is
that the farms shift from soybean-to corn production as a part of the response
to the soil-loss restrictions imposed. On Farm 2, the combination of a soil-
loss restriction and a nitrogen limit results in higher levels of nitrogen
use than with a soil-loss limit alone. Again, the significant price impacts
shown by the corn-belt model cannot be produced in a watershed model of this
type. The watershed model results can, however, be read as an indication
that combinations of constraints on soil loss and nitrogen use, when applied
to farms with soils of different production capabilities and using different
crop rotations, can produce a wide variation in responses. Thus, it is not
clear that the impacts will be as straightforward as is commonly expected.
A limitation on nitrogen application rates does, of course, reduce the
variation in application rates among farms. If nitrogen presents a water-
quality problem when applied at high rates, this result implies that a limit
may be effective.
Long-term Analysis
This section presents the results of an analysis undertaken to determine
the potential impacts on productivity of continuing to produce crops at high
levels of erosion. The initial soil depths were estimated and the model was
solved for the first ten-year period. Given the rates of soil loss exper-
ienced and based on the bulk density of the soil, the number of inches of
topsoil remaining was adjusted to account for the soil lost in the ten-year
period; that is, from year 11 to year 20. Again, the erosion rates and bulk
densities were used to adjust the number of inches of topsoil remaining prior
to the solution of the next ten-year model. This procedure was repeated ten
times to cover a 100-year period. For the discounted solutions, the returns
were discounted from the first year of the 100-year period at a rate of five
percent, to a rate arbitrarily selected. While the analysis could be repli-
cated with higher (or lower) discount rates, the nature of results can be
extrapolated from those presented here.
Figure 18 indicates the percentage of acreage on which the topsoil erodes
to zero inches over the 100-year period. Table 22 lists by farm, soil type,
and erosion class the number of acres of those soils which completely erode
within the 100-year period. It also indicates the number of years required
for complete erosion to occur. Under the unconstrained solution, 1,217.3
acres completely erode in the 100-year period, as compared to 198.1 acres
when farm-based SCS tolerance limits are imposed.
Figure 19 shows the net revenue for an average year during each of the
ten-year periods. Two sets of results are presented. In one case it is as-
sumed that pasture can be produced on soil after all topsoil is removed. In
the other case it is assumed that no production can occur after the topsoil
is gone. The income in the initial years is clearly higher under the un-
constrained solutions. When SCS tolerance limits are followed, income is
higher in the later years of the 100-year period. When these income streams
are discounted, as shown in the lower curves, the differences are almost elim-
inated. Figure 20 indicates more clearly the impact of discounting. In that
95
-------
1001—
90 -
— 80 -
70 -
Q
^ g 60
.* x:
w 0
o ^c
J 0 50
m N
_ 0 ^O
1 ~
«•- •§ 30
O O
? fi
0>
M
^f
10
n
r^- P
in ^
IO | *° !
—
^0 _ o fr^
** ^ m
r~. r~- CD
t
0 ^
&* ro
CO c>
CO CO
£
cvi
r- r-
ro ro
ro
^^
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Time (years)
80 90 100
Figure 18. Percentage of total benchmark watershed acreage eroded to
zero inches of topsoil remaining, unconstrained solution.
96
-------
Table 22
Acreages of Soils by Type and Slope/Erosion Class which
Completely Erode within the 100-Year Period by Farm
Soil Type -
Slope/Erosion 1
Class
280-B2
280- C2
280-D2
280-D3
280-E2
280-C1
280- F3
18-C1
18-D3
18-C3
18-B1 16.2
18-B2 30.0
18-C2 31.9
18-D2 26.2
18-D1
18-E2
75-B1
75-C1
75-C2
75-D2 5.6
279-C1
279-C2 17.5
279-C3
279-D2
279-D3
258-B1
258-C1
386-C2
386-D2
Total Acres 127.4
Farm Number
23456
5.6 7.5
21.2 35.6
8.8 7.5
9.4
8.8
5.0
23.1 55.8
5.6 9.4
10.6 114.4 66.2
5.0 26.9
1.2 20.6
17.5
5.6
28.8
5.0
1.9 12.5
12.5
10.6
13.1 11.2
17.5
8.8 6.2
8.8
17.6 121.2 159.3 131.2 178.9
7 8
16.2
15.0
18.1
5.0
35.6 23.7
1.9
41.9 28.1
6.2
16.2
6.2
5.0
6.2
45.0
10.0
30.0
83.7 226.6
q Total
Acres
13.1
56.8
32.5
24.4
26.9
5.0
5.0
22.5 101.4
41.9 116.2
1.9
63.1 341.2
36.2
33.8 113.8
54.2
17.5
7.5 13.1
28.8
5.0
5.0
5.6
6.2
76.9
10.0
12.5
40.6
24.3
17.5
15.0
8.8
168.8 1217.3
Years to
Completely
Erode
52.1
29.8
20.3
50.0
14.4
43.1
50.0
50.6
50.0
83.3
81.7
52.1
29.8
20.3
32.0
14.4
94.7
55.6
34.0
23.2
40:7
26.9
83.3
18.2
41.7
77.9
45.2
32.1
20.8
97
-------
Assumptions
I. Production Under SCS
Tolerance Limits, Discounted 0%
2. Unconstrained, Discounted 0%,
Pasture Production On Eroded Soil
3. Unconstrained, Discounted 0% , No
Production On Eroded Soil
4, Same As I , Discounted 5%
5. Same As 2 , Discounted 5%
6. Same As 3, Discounted 5%
10
20 30 40 50 60 70
Time (years)
80 90 100
Figure 19. Net watershed income for an average year by
ten-year periods for 100 years.
98
-------
2.4
2.2
w
2 2.0
"o
r
I '-8
0)
E 1.6
o
u
c
TJ
0)
1.4
(O
V 1.2
O
*- 1.0
0>
0)
.> 0.8
*-
_o
3
E 0.6
3
o
0.4
0.2 I
SCS Tolerance
Limits, Not Discounted
Unconstrained,
Not Discounted
Unconstrained, Discounted
SCS Tolerance Limits , Discounted
10 20 30
40 50 60
Time (years)
70 80 90 100
Figure 20. Cumulative net watershed income over ten-year
periods for 100 years.
99
-------
figure, the cumulative net income, discounted and undiscounted, is shown for
the solution under SCS tolerance limits and under the unconstrained solution
assuming that no production is possible after all topsoil has eroded. If
the undiscounted or zero-discount-rate curves are considered, the unconstrain-
ed solution shows higher income through a 40-year period; after that, the SCS
tolerance limits generate higher income. Under the five-percent discount
rate, the SCS tolerance limit estimates generate slightly lower incomes over
the first 50 years with negligible differences beyond that point.* Thus, even
in a watershed where soil losses are high, the farm operator must have an
unrealistically long planning horizon if he is to consider adopting soil con-
servation practices to generate higher incomes.
This set of results would also be significantly affected by an equil-
ibrium solution that generated higher prices for crops produced under the con-
strained solutions. Thus, while the individual farmer is not able to adopt
conservation practices individually, the imposition of soil-loss limits may
generate higher incomes. The long-run projections on income would, of course,
be modified as prices and price ratios between inputs and outputs changed.t
In interpreting these results, it is also important to realize that in a
watershed where high levels of erosion are actually occurring the short-term
income reduction required to achieve SCS tolerance limits may be greater
than in those cases where the tolerance limits are exceeded only marginally.
In this analysis it has been assumed that no soil regeneration occurs, given
the short time period from a geologic perspective. Also, the loss of soil
is assumed to occur evenly over space.
*if it is assumed that pasture production is possible after complete removal
of the topsoil, then the farm operator would not choose the constrained
solution even under a 100-year planning horizon.
tA more detailed analysis of the set of relationships is under way and will
be published as a separate report.
100
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CHAPTER 5
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND COSTS
The implementation of policies for the control of agricultural non-
point-source pollution may require changes in existing political institutional
arrangements—the interactions between the various governmental bodies which
will be involved in administering and implementing the policies and between
such agencies and private bodies and individuals. A particular policy might
require simply an expansion or modification of existing governmental activi-
ties or functions, while another policy might require that additional func-
tions be established.
This chapter will assess the institutional arrangements required for
policy implementation in general and for implementation of the six policies
described in Chapter 3 in particular. A detailed analysis of the institu-
tional functions required for each of the policies serves as the basis for the
estimates of the administrative cost of each policy. Detailed cost estimates
for the policies and for the functions on which they are based are presented
in Appendix E.
GENERAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS
As discussed in Chapter 3, each prospective policy consists of some or
all of these components: (1) performance indicators, (2) control instruments,
(3) erosion control techniques, (4) measures of compliance, and (5) temporary
penalties. Each component implies one or more institutional arrangements,
existing or new, required to implement that component. No attempt is made
here to determine the detailed organizational structure of or among such
institutions.
Performance indicators are used to analyze the need for a policy before
its implementation and the performance of the policy after it is implemented.
A performance indicator normally implies measuring present conditions and the
extent of NPS pollution and reporting that measurement to a decision-making
central institution. The institution must then decide whether or not a
pollution problem exists and whether action is appropriate. If so, a policy
would be developed and implemented. After the policy is in effect, further
measurements would be made to determine whether the policy is achieving the
desired objectives. It might also be necessary to create institutions which
can carry out these functions.
The development of control instruments—techniques for inducing
101
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compliance with a policy—will generally be undertaken by the legislative body
which develops the policy. Since the necessary legislative system is already
in existence on both the state and national levels, no additional institution-
al arrangements are required by this policy component. Some type of addition-
al institution, however, may be required to report the physical, economic, or
social impact of the control instruments, measured by the performance indica-
tors, to the central NPS control agency.
To determine the type of erosion control techniques applicable to
various farm situations, to select the management system for an individual
farm, and perhaps to supervise its installation, local and/or regional
agencies will be required. These agencies would also conduct inspections to
ensure proper and continued performance of the practices. The results of
these inspections would be reported to a central agency.
The types of compliance measures to be used would be determined by the
legislators in developing the policy. After these provisions have been
enacted, a separate agency (in order to assure control) would be assigned
the responsibility of determining compliance. The purpose of such an insti-
tution would be to ensure compliance by farmers and report results to the
central authority. If violations are discovered they would be reported to a
disciplinary agency so that corrective action could be initiated.
Institutions responsible for handling temporary penalties would also be
needed. The type and degree of penalization must be decided, and an institu-
tion responsible for enforcing the penalty must be designated or established.
Once the violation is corrected, the appropriate institution must be notified
so that the penalization may be terminated.
INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS
The following paragraphs list and describe the types of functions that
would typically be required of governmental agencies involved in administer-
ing NPS pollution control policies. The functions required by a specific
policy will depend on the nature of the policy and its components; not all
policies will involve all of these functions. Estimates of the costs for
performing each function have been prepared and are presented in Appendix E.
Once the functions required to implement a particular policy are known, the
appropriate cost estimates can be combined to produce an estimate of overall
policy implementation costs.
Function A: Monitoring is the inspection of some object or action
over time, generally to determine whether a problem exists. In the case of
NPS pollution control, monitoring is used to record a change in the quality
of a particular body of water, to determine the rate of soil loss from a
certain tract of land, or to determine whether certain practices are being
followed.
Function B: Reporting is the process by which an agency is informed
about the public's response to a policy. For example, if the policy pro-
vides that individuals are entitled to a subsidy for complying with a regula-
tion, the controlling agency would be informed as to which individuals were
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or were not in compliance with the regulations. The agency would then award
the subsidies to the complying individuals (or penalize those not in compli-
ance). Reporting the impact of a policy can also be a part of determining
the effectiveness of that policy. Reporting ,the quantitative change in a
performance indicator after a policy has been in effect for some period of
time will show if the policy has resulted in the reduction of NFS pollution.
Function C: Notification of Assessment of Penalty is the process by
which an employee of the designated NPS control agency informs policy
violators that there has been a violation and that prescribed penalties may
therefore be imposed.
Function D: The Board of Review is formed if required under a given
policy. The board is responsible for reviewing those cases of alleged policy
violations which are appealed by the alleged offenders.
Function E: Court Action is the use of courts to rule on policy viola-
tion cases and to prescribe the execution of a penalty.
Function F: Subsidy/Tax Transfer is the payment or credit of money to
an individual, usually granted when the individual fulfills some prescribed
requirement. For example, a farmer may be granted a 50% cost-sharing subsidy
for constructing terraces. The subsidy/tax transfer function must be estab-
lished for this payment to be executed.
Function G: Maintenance of an Office is a function which may be re-
quired to accommodate the personnel needed to implement and enforce a policy.
The costs include maintaining the physical structure in which the personnel
are located as well as providing office equipment and salaries.
Function H: Individual Analysis of Farm Needs or Assessment is the
process in which agency personnel contact individual farmers and survey or
study their farms to obtain information relevant to the control of NPS pollu-
tion from the farm operation. For example, the agency's technician might in-
spect a terrace to see if it was properly installed and qualifies the farmer
for a subsidy payment.
Function I: Contracting with Individual Farmers is simply making some
type of agreement with the farmer. For a typical NPS control policy this
activity might consist of the agency agreeing to formulate a conservation
plan with a farmer.
Function J: Education is an activity which would form part of a program
organized to better inform individuals about NPS pollution and alternative
management strategies. An example would be weekly classes for farm operators
conducted by soil conservation district personnel to discuss the causes of
NPS pollution and methods of correcting it.
Function K: Training of Technicians is an activity required to provide
qualified personnel to carry out various other institutional functions.
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Function L: Reporting Need involves notifying the proper NPS control
agency (depending on the policy) of the results of an analysis of farm needs.
For example, if the analysis shows that a terrace is needed, the agencies
responsible for planning and paying for the terraces must be notified.
Function M: Formation of a Program comprises the time and effort in-
volved in deciding the type, degree of concentration, qualifications, limita-
tions, and structure of various NPS control programs.
Function N: Construction includes not only the physical construction of
a land management structure but also the design and planning which are pre-
requisite to such construction.
Function 0: Publication and Notification of Legislation is the process
of informing the public (especially those groups most affected) about new
legislation, explaining the regulations and the possible costs and benefits.
In most cases, this activity would include the publication of notices in local
newspapers.
Function P: Administrative Organization is the process of establishing
an agency responsible for administering the policy and for creating the other
agencies necessary to implement the policy.
Function Q: Central Coordination comprises the correspondence and
management activities which keep the implementing agencies functioning as one
unit. A central coordinator would tie all of the other policy agencies
together.
ARRANGEMENTS AND COSTS FOR SIX SELECTED POLICIES
The six policies selected by the research team for intensive study
(see Chapter 3) were analyzed to determine the institutional functions re-
quired to implement each of them. The purpose of that scrutiny was to make
possible an estimate of implementation costs based on the cost estimates for
each of the functions involved. The analysis of the functions required by
each policy component and the cost estimates for each policy are summarized
in this section; detailed cost data for the policies are presented in
Appendix E.
Policy 1: Education
The performance indicators for an education policy would require insti-
tutional functions H (individual analysis of farm needs or assessment), G
(maintenance of an office—both county and central), L (reporting need), P
(administrative organization), and Q (central coordination). Prior to policy
development, the conservation practices presently in use would be analyzed by
an agency to determine whether an education program is needed. Although such
an agency would normally require an office, the SWCD offices could be used,
thereby avoiding additional costs. The decision of need would be reported to
the administrative organization and it, in cooperation with the central coor-
dination staff, would make the proper arrangements. The state SCS center
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could be expanded to handle the administration and coordination of this pro-
gram so that the costs could be kept to a minimum.
Once a policy has been established, its effectiveness must be measured,
involving functions A (monitoring), K (training of technicians), and B (re-
porting impact). Technicians would monitor the farms after the policy has
been in effect for some time, and the results would be reported. Comparing
these results to data from the period prior to policy implementation would
indicate the policy's effectiveness.
The control instruments of the education policy would require institu-
tional functions J (education) and K (training of technicians). Once the
program is laid out and its extent defined, the number of technicians needed
could be determined and they could then be properly trained. If present SCS
personnel are utilized in the training and if SWCD personnel are included in
the education program, the cost could be reduced. The actual time spent edu-
cating and the materials used in the program must be included in estimating
the costs. Some of the actual education time may be absorbed by the county
extension service, the SCS, and the SWCD, thereby reducing the costs.
The cost of the erosion control techniques (i.e., construction equipment
purchase, or any yield reduction) would be borne by the farmer under this
policy. Since the policy would not be mandatory, no measures of compliance
and no temporary penalties are involved; thus no costs would be incurred for
those components. Of course, since the policy is voluntary, there would like-
ly continue to be environmental damages, the cost of which would be borne by
society at large.
Creating a slide program to be presented to groups of farmers by the
SWCDs is an example of an education program using these institutional arrange-
ments. The components of such programs might include problem assessment, al-
ternative control strategies (BMPs), economic aspects, and benefits at the
farm and societal levels. The intensity of the program could vary, depending
on the funds available. Many other types of education programs could be
formulated, of course. Examples include mailing educational materials to
farmers or offering lectures in the agricultural department of local high
schools.
Cost estimates for this policy are summarized in Table 23. A more de-
tailed breakdown of the costs is presented in Appendix E.
Policy 2: Tax Credit
Institutional functions 0 (publication and notification of legislation)
and F (subsidy/tax transfer) would be required for the performance indicators
under a tax credit policy. An office must be set up and physically maintain-
ed. An administrative agency would also be needed to train the personnel
necessary to make assessments of farm conservation needs and present struc-
tures. The SWCDs would fill the needs for an office, for management, and for
inspection at a low cost compared to forming a new agency.
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Table 23
Summary of Estimated Administrative Costs for Policy 1: Education
POLICY
COMPONENT
INSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTIONS
ANNUAL
COST
Performance
indicators (P)
Control
instruments (I)
Erosion
control techniques (C)
Measures of
compliance (M)
G: Maintenance of county and
central offices
H: Analysis of farm needs
L: Reporting need
P: Administrative organization
Q: Central coordination
J: Education
K: Training of technicians
M: Formation of program
N: Construction
A: Monitoring
B: Reporting
K: Training of technicians
Total annual cost per county for a five-year program:
$96,000
56,600
0
10,100
$162,700
The performance-indicator agency would certify whether planned struc-
tures will qualify for a tax credit. Under this policy, a loss in income
caused by making some change in the farming operation to reduce erosion could
be considered an expense to the farmer and could qualify as a tax credit al-
though the administration of such a provision would be difficult. This income
loss would also be determined by the performance-indicator agency.
The control instruments would require functions B (reporting impact),
Q (central coordination), and F (subsidy/tax transfer). The formation of a
tax program would not incur any substantial costs since the legislature would
formulate the program when it establishes the policy. The reporting of impact
could be borne by the farmer, since he would report to the central agency that
he qualifies for a tax credit. If personnel from an outside agency, however,
go from farm to farm and report tax credits, costs will be incurred which
must be considered. Costs for a central agency to pay the tax credits would
be greatly diminished if the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) performed that
function. It might be necessary to hire additional personnel to handle the
increased load, but the expense would be less than that of forming an entirely
new organization.
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The cost of all erosion control techniques would be borne by the farmer.
The measures of compliance would require monitoring of the farms to see if the
farmers do, in fact, qualify for the tax credits for which they apply. The
operation can be performed by the IRS in cooperation with the SWCDs by check-
ing a certain percentage of the tax returns, in a manner similar to the normal
IRS procedure.
If someone were receiving credit but did not qualify for it (as deter-
mined by a board of review), the tax agency would be notified and the violator
would be subject to legal action.
A basic program example for this policy is to assign the Internal Reve-
nue Service the task of giving the tax credit as requested on federal income
tax forms. The IRS would then work in cooperation with the SWCDs by having
the districts check those farms receiving tax credits. The SWCD would verify
whether the credits are legitimate and report to the IRS. Depending on
whether or not the credits were justified, the IRS would take the appropriate
action. This arrangement would create new responsibilities and costs for the
IRS.
An estimate of the county-level costs for the policy is given in Table
24. More complete figures are presented in Appendix E.
Table 24
Summary of Estimated Administrative Costs for Policy 2: Tax Credit
POLICY
COMPONENT
INSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTIONS
ANNUAL
COST
Performance
indicators (P)
Control
instruments (I)
Erosion
control techniques (C)
Measures of
compliance (M)
Temporary
penalties (T)
F: Subsidy/tax transfer
F: Subsidy/tax transfer
N: Construction
F: Subsidy/tax transfer
F: Subsidy/tax transfer
$30
0
0
0
0
Total annual cost per county for a five-year program:
$30
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Policy 3: 50% Cost Sharing for Terracing and Equivalent Modifications
The performance indicators for this policy would require institutional
functions 0, G (county), P, Q, G (central), H, K (for H), and L. The first
step in making the policy effective is to inform the public about it (function
0) so that individuals can take advantage of its provisions. Newspapers could
be used for this purpose, and the cost would be minimal. It would be neces-
sary to maintain a county office (function G); the SWCD offices could be used
to avoid the expense of new structures. The administrative organization
(function P) to oversee the policy and the training of technicians (function
K) could be integrated with the present SCS organization. The technicians
would be needed to inspect possible conservation modifications (function H)
so that the cooperator can be assured that his modification will qualify for
a subsidy. The technicians' decisions must be reported to a central agency
(functions G and Q) so that the amount of money required for subsidy payments
could be determined. If enough funds are available, the central agency would
issue its approval of the subsidized modification.
The control instruments require only functions M (formation of a pro-
gram) and B (reporting impact). The formation of a program represents little
or no administrative cost since the legislation which establishes the policy
will determine most of its details. The impact of the policy, however, must
be reported to the central agency.
The erosion control techniques eligible for cost sharing involve con-
struction (function N). The cost would originally be borne by the cooperator.
Once the construction is complete, the modification must be inspected and
monitored (functions A and K) by an agency to verify that the structure meets
the required qualifications. If so, the central coordinating agency must be
contacted (function B), and it, in turn, must see that the subsidy payment is
made to the cooperator (function F). The SWCDs could do the monitoring, with
the SCS acting as the central coordinator and the ASCS being responsible for
the subsidy payment. Because these three organizations are presently engaged
in these types of functions, utilizing them in an NPS control program would
make the policy more efficient as well as less expensive to administer.
A temporary penalty would occur under this policy if the cooperator did
not maintain the modification properly. The board of review (function D)
would have to decide the case and then notify the subsidy agency (function F)
to revoke any further subsidy payments and possibly regain the subsidy already
paid.
An example of a program which could function under these arrangements
is one which would require the local SWCD to plan or approve modifications
and specify them as being eligible for cost sharing. The SWCD would notify
the ASCS (the subsidy-paying agency), which would either grant or deny the
subsidy depending on the funds available. The farmer would be notified of the
decision. If the subsidy is available, the local SWCD would monitor the modi-
fication after completion to be sure it met the qualifications for subsidy
payment.
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Table 25 presents a cost estimate for this policy. Appendix E presents
a more detailed cost evaluation.
Table 25
Summary of Estimated Administrative Costs for Policy 3: 50% Cost Sharing
POLICY
COMPONENT
INSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTIONS
ANNUAL
COST
Performance
indicators (P)
Control
instruments (I)
Erosion
control techniques (C)
Measures of
compliance (M)
Temporary
penalties (T)
G: Maintenance of county and
central offices
H: Analysis of farm needs
K: Training of technicians
L: Reporting need
0: Notification of legislation
P: Administrative organization
B: Reporting
M: Formation of a program
I: Construction
A: Monitoring
B: Reporting
K: Training of technicians
D: Board of review
F: Subsidy/tax transfer
Total annual cost per county for a five-year program:
$539,500
7,400
0
10,100
$424,200
$981,200
Policy 4: Required Conservation Plan Development
The performance indicator for this policy would be the number of approv-
ed conservation plans developed. The use of this performance indicator re-
quires arrangements 0, G (county), P, Q, G (central), H, and K (for H). As
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in the previous policies, the public must be notified about the new legisla-
tion (function 0). Offices must be established (function G) to provide a base
of operations for the technicians. The administrative organization (function
P) must arrange to train the technicians (function K), who in turn formulate
and approve conservation plans (function H). Since the SCS, in cooperation
with the SWCDs, already performs the above tasks, it would be most feasible
and least costly to assign these tasks to those agencies.
The costs for control instruments would involve function M (formation of
a program), I (contracting with individual farmers), and B (reporting impact).
The cost of program formation in this case would involve setting guidelines
which all approved conservation plans must meet. A contract would be estab-
lished between the farmer and the agency, with the agency agreeing to create
an approved conservation program for the farmer. The plans formulated would
be reported as the immediate impact of the policy. The SWCDs could perform
these functions.
The erosion control techniques could be any of those included in an
approved plan. The cost for construction (function N) would be zero, since
the techniques would be implemented at the farmer's expense. The government,
however, would have to bear the cost of forming the conservation plan.
Since the policy would only require that the farmers have an approved
plan and would not require implementation of that plan, the measure of com-
pliance would involve the farmer proving that he has a plan. Therefore,
there would be no administrative cost to the government. In most cases the
existence of a plan is a matter of public record, as the SWCDs presently keep
plans on file.
A temporary penalty involves issuing a notice of noncompliance (function
C), a task which could be handled by the SWCDs. The board of review (function
D) would decide the case, which may result in court action (function E). The
court action would not involve any new costs, since the case would be handled
by the present court system and district attorney.
An example of a program in this case would be one in which the SCS co-
operates with the SWCD to form conservation plans for all farmers requesting
plans. The SWCD would keep records of the plans, and those records could be
checked to prove compliance with the law.
A cost summary for this policy is presented in Table 26, based on the
detailed estimates in Appendix E.
Policy 5: Required Conservation Plan Implementation
Except for the measures of compliance and the provisions for temporary
penalties, this policy would be identical to policy 4. The implementation
policy would require that the plan not only be formed but be put into prac-
tice. As a result, the farmers' land must be monitored (functions A and K)
and the findings must be reported (function B) to determine if the farmer is
actually in compliance. This responsibility could be executed with little
cost by the SWCDs.
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Table 26
Summary of Estimated Administrative Costs for Policy 4:
Mandatory Conservation Plan Development
POLICY
COMPONENT
INSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTIONS
ANNUAL
COST
Performance
indicators (P)
Control
instruments (I)
Erosion
control techniques (C)
Measures of
compliance (M)
Temporary
penalties (T)
G: Maintenance of county and
central offices
H: Analysis of farm needs
K: Training of technicians
0: Notification of legislation
P: Administrative organization
Q: Central coordination
B: Reporting
I: Contracting with farmers
M: Formation of program
N: Construction
C: Notification of penalty
D: Board of review
E: Court action
Total annual cost per county for a five-year program:
$455,000
26,900
0
0
7,100
$489,000
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The temporary penalty would involve a few more options but require the
same agencies as policy 4. The court could call on the conservation agencies
(SWCDs) to implement an approved plan on an individual's land and then charge
that individual for the cost of implementation.
A possible program arrangement would be for the SWCDs to form conserva-
tion plans as requested and then monitor the farms to verify that the plans
were being properly implemented. The results would be reported to the SCS,
which would in turn notify the state's attorney of any violations.
Table 27 summarizes the estimated costs for this policy. See Appendix
E for a more complete breakdown.
Policy 6: Development of Greenbelts
Performance indicators would not be required for a greenbelt policy
since it is assumed that it would apply to all designated streams regardless
of their present level of pollution. Therefore, no costs would be incurred
for this category.
The control instruments would require functions 0, G (county), P, Q, G
(central), M. H, K (for H), and B. First, notice of the legislation must be
published (function 0). A new or existing agency (function G) would execute
the policy. This agency would train personnel (function K) who, in turn,
would advise property owners (function H) on establishing the proper green-
belt in accordance with the formulated program. The plans would be reported
(function B) so that the farms could later be monitored or inspected for com-
pliance. The SCS would seem to be a good agency for the overall direction of
this program, while the SWCDs could handle the local requirements.
The erosion control technique is the development of greenbelts (function
N) which the government would plan, but the cost of installation would be
borne by the farmers. Compliance with this policy could be easily and inex-
pensively measured by aerial surveillance (functions A and K). An agency in
charge of the surveillance would be needed. It may be possible for the SCS to
undertake that function. Imposing penalties (functions C, D, and E) would in-
volve the use of the present court system.
An example of such a program would be to assign the SWCDs the task of
designing greenbelts in accordance with SCS standards. The farmers would then
have to construct the greenbelts and the SCS would use aerial surveillance to
check for compliance. Noncompliance would be reported to the courts by an
enforcement agency.
Estimated costs for a greenbelt policy are shown in Table 28 and are
given in fuller detail in Appendix E.
Analysis of Alternative Policies
The estimated administrative costs of each of the six policies discussed
above are summarized in Table 29. Although this discussion of institutional
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Table 27
Summary of Estimated Administrative Costs for Policy 5:
Mandatory Conservation Plan Implementation
POLICY
COMPONENT
INSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTIONS
ANNUAL
COST
Performance
indicators (P)
Control
instruments (I)
Erosion
control techniques (C)
Measures of
compliance (M)
Temporary
penalties (T)
G: Maintenance of county and
central offices
H: Analysis of farm needs
K: Training of technicians
0: Notification of legislation
P: Administrative organization
Q: Central coordination
B: Reporting
I: Contracting with farmers
M: Formation of program
N: Construction
A: Monitoring
G: Maintenance of office
K: Training of technicians
C: Notification of penalty
D: Board of review
E: Court action
$538,000
27,000
0
Total annual cost per county for a five-year program:
10,100
7,100
$582,200
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Table 28
Summary of Estimated Administrative Costs for Policy 6:
Greenbelt Development
POLICY
COMPONENT
INSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTIONS
ANNUAL
COST
Control
instruments (I)
Erosion
control techniques (C)
Measures of
compliance (M)
Temporary
penalties (T)
B: Reporting
6: Maintenance of county and
central offices
H: Analysis of farm needs
K: Training of technicians
M: Formation of program
0: Notification of legislation
P: Administrative organization
Q: Central coordination
N: Construction
A: Monitoring
K: Training of technicians
C: Notification of penalty
D: Board of review
E: Court action
Total annual cost per county for a five-year program:
$256,500
0
4,100
4,500
$265,100
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Table 29
Estimated Annual County-
level Administrative Costs for a
Five-year Program
POLICY ANNUAL
COST
1. Education 162,600
2. Tax Credit 0
3. Cost Sharing 981,200
4. Plan Development 489,000
5. Plan Implementation 582,200
6. Greenbelt 265,100
functions and costs has treated the policies separately, it may be determined
that a combination of policies or of policy components would represent the best
strategy for NPS pollution control. If such a combination is used, it should
not be difficult to determine the institutional arrangements needed. The
total policy cost may be estimated from the data on the costs of institutional
functions as presented in Appendix E.
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CHAPTER 6
SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE
In selecting the most effective policies or practices for the control of
nonpoint sources of pollution, decision makers will need to consider an array
of economic, legal, political, and institutional issues. Also of importance
is an assessment of the sociological aspects, since the ease with which the
chosen control measures can be implemented and their ultimate success will de-
pend in part upon their acceptability to those affected: principally, the
farmers, who will have to alter their operations or make investments in con-
trol measures, and the public, which will directly or indirectly pay at least
a portion of the costs.
The first section of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the socio-
logical aspects of NPS pollution control, based primarily on a review of the
available literature. The second section presents the results of a sampling
survey conducted among Illinois farmers to obtain an indication of the per-
ceived acceptability and equitability of selected control alternatives.
SOCIAL FACTORS AFFECTING NPS POLLUTION CONTROL STRATEGIES
Excessive soil erosion is an environmental problem; inducing people to
prevent it is in part a sociological one. This section will examine several
erosion control policies to see what social factors may aid in or impede
their success. While many elements such as technological feasibility, econ-
omic viability, and legality play a role in the success of a particular
policy, the present discussion will consider additional factors frequently
overlooked in technical, economic, and legal analyses. Specifically, this
section will treat the following issues with respect to each policy: the
administrative organization needed to carry out the policy, the response to
the policy by farmers, and the response to the policy by members of the com-
munity other than farmers.
Administrative Organization
In considering the formal organizational structure necessary to implement
a particular policy, we assume that any new policy will be implemented through
an existing bureaucracy which already carries out compatible functions. The
various policies will therefore be analyzed to determine which existing organ-
izations could best perform the specific task required to implement the
policies.
The decision-making process is a second important element of the adminis-
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trative organization. As with many agricultural policies, erosion control
practices will, in their selection, design, and implementation, need to be
extremely sensitive to local conditions. If the decision makers are too far
removed from the locale where the program will be implemented, they may be
misinformed about local conditions and opportunities and, as a result, use
inappropriate control measures.
The decision-making process is based in part on the information and meas-
ures used to determine when sediment control is necessary and what methods of
control (BMPs) are most desirable for a given situation. If the policies are
not technically competent, participants in the program will become disillu-
sioned about their utility. Developing adequate and cost-effective policies
to achieve the control of nonpoint-source pollution requires substantial ana-
lytical data about the impact of alternative control methods (Miller and
Everett, 1975). If the implementing organization does not have the facilities
to gather or analyze the necessary farm-level data, it may have to depend on
other agencies over which it has no control, thus almost certainly resulting
in reduced efficiency and credibility.
In addition to being sensitive to local conditions, the implementing
organization will need to be responsive to new developments in erosion control
technology. It must also be able to anticipate future developments, so that
alternatives may be provided for in advance of a crisis situation. Many of
today's problems are the unanticipated consequences of policies for attaining
some other socially desirable goal (Wilkening and Klessig, 1976).
The dual need for responsiveness to local conditions and to technological
developments appears to be met most adequately if the decision-making struc-
ture of the organization combines technical expertise with meaningful partic-
ipation by local citizens in determining how to meet national goals.
Farmer Response
The response of farmers to any policy is affected by a number of factors,
one of which is made up of economic considerations. Farmers generally try to
maximize their profits within the economic, technological, and institutional
constraints under which they operate (Schneider, 1976). However, research
indicates that there may be a conflict between the motivation for maintaining
resources (soil productivity) and the motivation to obtain immediate economic
payoff (Wilkening and Klessig, 1976; van Es and Pampel, 1976). It is likely
that the farmers most responsive to resource conservation programs are not
necessarily the same ones most responsive to productivity-enhancing innova-
tions (Kronus and van Es, 1977; Pampel and van Es, 1977).
In addition to economic factors, the farmers' responses must also be con-
sidered in the light of social factors. These factors have been shown to
affect farmers' responses to attempts to change their behavior (Rogers and
Shoemaker, 1968). For example, the nature of the source of information is
quite important. Further considerations are the perceived necessity for and
legitimacy of the policy as well as the extent to which the desired behavioral
changes tie in with the farmers' existing behavior. In the area of pesticide
pollution, for example, "integrated pest management" is a widely discussed
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policy, but it seems that the complexity of the approach as well .as the atti-
tude toward calculated risk is counter to the farmer's pyschological attitudes
and previously learned behavior (Sewell, 1975).
Community Response
While individual farmers may currently be regarded as the basic decision
makers affecting sedimentation control, they act within a social milieu that
takes account of the interdependent interests and actions of many individuals
(Ostrum,_1975). Community response to a proposed policy may be very difficult
to anticipate. The "public interest" has long been a point of unending con-
troversy whenever there is public involvement in private endeavors. The
"public" or "community", whether it is regarded as or defined to be the people
living in the area immediately surrounding the site affected by the policy or
as the population of the state, nation, or world, is largely unorganized and
frequently "represented" by persons who have a singularly vested interest in
what is happening.
On the one hand, the public attitude toward scientific approaches to
environmental problems is suspicious and simplistic—the public is not quite
ready for the integrated complexity of solutions (Sewell, 1975). In general,
too, concern for environmental problems changes as information about and con-
cerns for competing issues like jobs, food, and energy become more salient
(Wilkening and Klessig, 1976).
At the same time, community interest in water quality and the prevention
of erosion may be favorable for esthetic reasons as well as in terms of pre-
serving a natural resource for future use. However, maintaining water quality
may well become an issue of balancing tangible costs to the farmer and less
tangible benefits (or at least benefits which are more difficult to quantify)
to the community (Schneider, 1976).
Evaluation of Alternative Policies
In evaluating the alternative policies an attempt will be made to identi-
fy factors which may facilitate the success of a policy or program or, alter-
natively, factors which may hamper its success. As stated previously, within
that context the administrative organization, the farmer response, and the
community response will be examined.
Three aspects of problem solving will be considered: creating awareness
of the problem, developing a solution, and implementing that solution. It
will become clear from the discussion that some proposed policies contain
elements of all three problem-solving aspects, while others tend to concen-
trate on particular aspects.
Awareness of Problem
Creating an awareness of the problem includes the ability to develop
among the public, both farmers and others, an understanding of the nature of
nonpoint-source pollution directed toward finding and applying a solution to
the problem.
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The USDA Cooperative Extension Programs have a history of providing
farmers with both information and leadership toward better farming practices.
Their credibility is found to be generally high. A study on pesticide use by
Iowa and Illinois farmers indicates that Extension Service information can
have an effect on changing harmful practices that have become prevalent (von
Romker and Moray, 1974). The Extension Service has a history of successfully
introducing new technology to farmers, and it has the organization and decision-
making structure which would make it appropriate for the type of programs
discussed here. It combines expertise with local farmer input, and it has a
geographically decentralized structure which enables it to respond to issues
from a base of technical expertise yet with regard to local conditions.
As indicated previously, the Extension Service work is well accepted by
many farmers. In the past, however, much of that work has focused on educa-
tional activities compatible with the efforts of most farmers to maximize
profits or to increase productivity. While much of the technology introduced
to farmers in the past has helped them to increase their productivity, sedi-
mentation control practices now being recommended are primarily oriented
toward resource conservation and may not be profitable to the farmer. While
the Extension Service may be an excellent organization for mounting an edu-
cational campaign on erosion control, it should be understood that it may need
to apply new approaches in this effort. Van Es and Pampel (1976) concluded
that:
Our findings indicate that environmentally sound practices
farmers considered profitable had high rates of adoption. En-
vironmental practices considered less profitable had low rates of
adoption. Farmers weighed profitability heavily when considering
the adoption of environmentally positive practices. This is less
so for commercial practices, which were adopted by a sizable
group of farmers even when considered less profitable.
We suspect this variation results from the different com-
munication patterns associated with environmental and commercial
practices. A network of supporting institutions (commercial
enterprises, mass media communication, advertising, etc.) which
provides information at various stages of the farmers' decision-
making process, advocates adopting commercial practices. Since
it is unlikely that environmental practices will, at least in
the near future, be similarly advocated, the degree of profit-
ability will be more crucial to adoption. To introduce less
profitable environmental practices will necessitate strong pro-
motional activities.
Any educational effort may be further complicated by the
fact that what we know about the adoption of commercial prac-
tices may not be very useful in preparing campaigns oriented
toward environmental innovations. The fact that the same farm-
er characteristics that relate consistently to the adoption of
commercial practices don't relate well to the adoption of en-
vironmental practices, certainly argues against assuming that
environmental campaigns demand nothing but another application
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of the known strategies.
Like all campaigns, environmental quality campaigns must
be designed initially to reach the most receptive farmers. We
found that the current commercial and Extension clientele are
most receptive to commercial practices. For environmental edu-
cation campaigns to effectively reach the current clientele,
Extension will have to devote special efforts to explaining the
need for the adoption of environmental practices and their im-
portance to the general welfare and the long-term welfare of
the farming community. While the technical aspects of these
practices must also be communicated, past campaigns have probab-^
ly placed too much emphasis on the technical aspects at the cost
of stressing the noneconomic need for the adoption of the prac-
tices.
The Soil Conservation Service (SCS) also does education work, although
most of its efforts have been concentrated on problem solving rather than
creating problem awareness. The amount of educational effort expended by the
SCS appears to vary over time and locality, but much of what has been said
about the Cooperative Extension Service can probably also be stated for the
SCS. While the SCS does not have the strong, diverse educational program
that is typical of the Cooperative Extension Service, it does have experience
directly related to providing technical assistance for erosion control and
resource preservation.
It appears that more effort will be needed to create awareness among the
general public. While no scientific polls are available, personal observa-
tions indicate that the general public has very little understanding of soil
erosion and the more complex issue of its control. The Extension Service
could make a more concerted effort to reach the general public, as could
other agencies, especially the Environmental Protection Agency. The generally
low level of information among the public appears to leave the area wide open
to those who might want to manipulate public opinion in support of a particu-
lar position.
Development of a Solution
Of the policies discussed here, two would require changes at the farm
level where needed: policy 5, which would make the implementations of a con-
servation plan mandatory, and policy 6, which would require the development of
greenbelts. The conservation plan would cover essentially all farms and po-
tential erosion situations. The greenbelt policy is an example of one which
would provide a specific solution to maintaining water quality (that is,
through vegetative filtering). Farmers without streams on their property
would not participate in the latter program, while those with streams would
carry the main responsibility for maintaining water quality standards, thus
raising the possibility of equity problems.
A comprehensive soil conservation plan would determine for each farm
what steps need to be taken to achieve certain water quality or soil erosion
control objectives. The plan's recommendations would be geared to the
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specific conditions found on a farm. Since the plan would in essence be the
technical specification of the control practices needed in a given erosion
situation, the expertise of persons who have experience in soil erosion con-
tol is needed to evaluate those specifications and determine that the most
appropriate control methods are being recommended.
The administrative organization that would bear the responsibility for
helping farmers develop plans would most likely be the Soil Conservation
Service. It, of all existing agencies, has the most experience in that area
and would provide a much-needed foundation for any program that included plan-
ning for soil conservation. Because the present role of the SCS is mainly
that of consultant to farmer-initiated projects, mandatory soil conservation
planning would increase that function of SCS. This role would not change
SCS's technical approach nor should it affect its relationship with farmer
clientele.
The organizational structure of the SCS--technical expertise combined
with local farm decision-making participation—should provide the best avail-
able guarantee that the planning is done both in a technically competent way
and that it is maximally responsive to local farming needs. Effective farmer
participation would aid in the efficiency of the program and help guard
against "over-engineering" on the part of the experts.
It is assumed that the SCS does not presently operate on the scale neces-
sary to provide soil conservation plans for all farms. Handling the required
expansion of the system may not be without its problems. While additional
public funds may be made available to enable an agency to carry out a specific
task, it has often been very difficult to terminate the flow of these funds
after the objective has been accomplished. Bureaucracies have been innovative
in justifying new ways to continue to spend at a given level.
A possible solution may be to charge the farmers a fee for the service
rendered. If the fee were collected locally, it could have a number of posi-
tive effects. It would allow local expenditures and revenues related to the
soil conservation plan to be closely matched. It could also enhance local
farmer control over the program, allow for flexible rate setting and. hope-
fully, increase efficiency. As the local efforts related to soil conservation
plan development begin to taper off, local revenues would also decrease, thus
avoiding the gradual diversion of these funds into other areas. Combining
these separate local efforts into an effective national program, however,
might be a major problem.
Clearly, the fee approach would meet with farmer resistance, especially
if farmers perceive nonfarm interests to be the only beneficiaries. However,
local control over the fee structure combined with the opportunity to decrease
the impact of the fee through a tax deduction would probably do much to re-
duce farmer objections to such a policy.
Another issue of farmer response relates to the attitudes farmers may
have toward a mandatory conservation plan policy. The agricultural community,
although not alone in this respect, has been a very outspoken opponent of
governmental regulation of its activities. Requiring development of a soil
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conservation plan actually represents a very minimal interference in the farm
operators' freedom to make decisions. The farmers may well perceive it, how-
ever, as a first step toward mandatory implementation. A very extensive edu-
cation effort would be necessary, including a special effort to obtain the
cooperation of leaders in the agricultural sector, to guide farmers into
accepting the policy. It is important to avoid overcommitment to a non-
regulative program as a means of gaining farmer acceptance of the policy. It
will be tempting to entice them with promises that there will be no further
regulation. It may very well be necessary, however, to implement certain
regulations at a future time.
It may be more useful to stress, in conjunction with the education ef-
fort which will make farmers aware of needed conservation practices, that the
plan will actually be the application of expert knowledge to individual situ-
ations. It could also be stressed that the program would be especially help-
ful at the time of the transfer of land, since the prospective buyer could be
given a plan indicating what had been done to conserve soil and maintain water
quality as well as what might yet need to be done.
Of course, community response to the planning policy would vary depending
on perceived costs and benefits. Some persons might think of increased gov-
ernment expenditures for the SCS as further bureaucratic expansion serving
only a special-interest minority. However, the benefits to the community
would be an improvement in water quality for recreation as well as the avail-
ability of quality water supplies and productive soil resources for both pres-
ent and future generations. It would appear relatively easy to find public
support for these objectives, given the proper educational effort.
Streambank protection through the development of greenbelts would also
provide the same benefits for the community. As mentioned before, the main
goal of Streambank protection is to keep eroded soil out of the water through
the use of a vegetative screen. While Streambank protection could be included
in a conservation plan, it need not always be a part of such plans. Many
tillage and rotation practices reduce the amount of soil lost (to both wind
and water), but with a greenbelt policy more attention would be paid to the
loss of soil into waterways while the emphasis on overall soil loss would be
reduced. This policy would require more investment in activities that are
further removed from normal farming practices in many instances—activities
such as seeding and maintaining a vegetative cover along a waterway. Thus,
although greenbelt development could conceivably be a part of a farmer's total
conservation plan, to the farmer it may well appear to be a separate activity.
Farmers have not responded enthusiastically to Streambank protection pro-
grams recently, at least partly because these programs have permitted public
access to the waterways that flow through their land. However, the idea of
planting and maintaining a "free zone" between cultivated land and the water
that flows through the property may be more acceptable to farmers, especially
when divorced from the recreational access issue. However, since there is no
generally accepted way of determining the cost of pollution (Schneider, 1976),
a farmer may resent having to protect his streambanks to prevent soil from
his or someone else's farm from running into the water.
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The approach to a greenbelt policy would have to take into consideration
the inequities that might arise from a blanket policy on streambank protec-
tion. The incorporation of greenbelt requirements into a total conservation
plan might seem more equitable to most farmers than a separate greenbelt
policy.
Community reaction to such an improvement might be very mixed, similar to
the general response to a policy requiring conservation plan development.
Some factions in the community might look upon a greenbelt policy more favor-
ably and with more interest than they would on a conservation plan policy.
Wildlife enthusiasts would appreciate the improved habitat for animals and
fowl that could be developed by such programs. In general, the greenbelts
might enhance the beauty of the rural countryside. The greatest benefits to
the community would likely be those which accrue from improvement in water
quality.
Implementation of a Solution
There are three ways of implementing a solution to the problem of agri-
cultural nonpoint-source pollution: (1) relying on voluntary implementation,
(2) coupling voluntary implementation of a conservation plan with incentives
such as tax credits or subsidies and pollution charges, and (3) mandating
implementation of a plan with or without some compensation to the farmer.
In addition to concerns about costs, the probability of compliance is a sig-
nificant factor of interest for each type of implementation.
The present effort to induce voluntary participation in erosion control
programs has not been sufficient to avoid soil erosion in many instances, as
indicated in the introductory section of this report. Many farmers use con-
servation practices on their farms and work with the Cooperative Extension
Service, the Soil Conservation Service, or the Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation Service, but with purely voluntary implementation. The strength
of the agencies involved in promoting that conservation program must lie in
their ability to persuade farmers to engage in the practice. In a sense,
agents must be salespersons for the conservation activities. Currently, the
agencies often deal with farmers already interested in the idea of implement-
ing some conservation practice; they do not deal extensively with those farm-
ers not interested in conservation. As mentioned in the discussion of educa-
tional programs, a conflict exists between immediate profit concerns and re-
source conservation, making it difficult for many farmers to change their be-
havior.
Community response to the present voluntary conservation program is
rather oblique. So far, the level of agricultural nonpoint-source pollution
has rarely been considered a crisis situation, except occasionally for levels
of agricultural chemicals in water. As mentioned previously, few people are
aware of sedimentation as a real problem, and it appears that the voluntary
approach to prevention will be considered adequate by the community until soil
erosion and other nonpoint-source water pollutant problems become more of an
issue.
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Voluntary implementation of conservation practices with the support of
economic incentives would reduce the conflict between profit and conservation
motives. These policies have been somewhat successful, especially through the
ASCS programs. The programs may be expanded and improved, but they do not
remove the farmer's option to do nothing toward conservation.
Mandatory conservation plan development may provide a way to exert in-
fluence over farmers who might not have given soil conservation much thought
or who may underestimate the need for soil conservation on their farms. The
agency certifying the required plan could inform the farmer about various tax
incentives, positive or negative, for the construction of pollution-reducing
structures or could explain available tax options. The required plan becomes
a useful "foot in the door" for the advocacy of needed conservation practices
without the onus of appearing to force the farmer's hand.
Given their competitive positions, most farmers perceive that they have
little choice but to fully utilize the resources under their control unless
restrictions are imposed on all farmers (Wilkening and Klessig, 1976). For
example, while in some instances shifts to conservation tillage methods per-
mit maintenance of farm income and significant reductions in rates of erosion,
further reduction of erosion rates comes at the cost of income (Narayanan and
Swanson, 1972).
A farmers' view of a conservation plan will also depend heavily on the
investment value the operator puts on the farm itself (Schneider, unpublished).
If the land will leave the farmer's control in a few years (because of indus-
trial encroachment or use for housing developments), then the value of the
farm lies in the greatest immediate profitability. However, the farmer with
an eye to the future productivity of the farm land for inheritance will real-
ize more easily the value of the conservation plan, both as a concept which
is profitable over the long term and as money in the pocket. Even then,
though, the farmer has to operate within economic parameters over which he
has little control. Economic incentives in the form of subsidies or tax
exemptions may encourage those farmers already interested to undertake the
necessary steps.
Making the implementation of a conservation plan mandatory (policy 5) is
clearly the most demanding of the six policies in the sense that it involves
the greatest degree of compulsory interference with farm operations. However,
both the water quality problem (which is not evaluated in this report) and the
necessity to bring all acreage in an area under an erosion control program in
order to obtain water quality improvement and to maintain productivity are
reasons that required participation may be necessary. The drawbacks of such
programs are well known. They tend to be accompanied by cumbersome adminis-
trative machinery which may be costly and is likely to be resented by those
affected by the regulations. Poor communications and misunderstandings be-
tween the regulatory agency and those regulated are a familiar part of most
scenarios. Regulations are usually promulgated by a central authority, fre-
quently causing inequities and inefficiencies.
As noted before, soil erosion/water quality programs may need to be more
sensitive to local conditions than almost any other area in which activity is
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regulated. Requiring the implementation of soil conservation plans may be the
most appropriate way of combining regulatory activity with sensitivity to
local conditions and maximum allowance for local initiatives. General stan-
dards are often set by the political decision-making process, while public
agencies are left to decide how to implement the policies. It appears that
an approach of stating the criteria to be met while leaving implementation to
local decision-makers, including farmers, would be most appropriate for ero-
sion and water quality control programs.
The primary administrative organization could be the Agricultural Stabili-
zation and Conservation Service, although the SCS and the USEPA might also be
involved as cooperating agencies. The ASCS has been an enforcement agency for
various soil conservation policies. It has experience evaluating compliance,
and, to the extent that the program combines regulation with some policy of
compensation, the ASCS appears to have the most appropriate available admin-
istrative machinery. The SCS could provide technical assistance, although
such assistance could also come from private contractors. The USEPA might
become involved especially in situations where farm land and nonfarm land need
to be involved jointly in an erosion control program.
Problems are likely to arise when several agencies are involved, since
cooperation is usually not very smooth in such cases, especially if each
agency's role is not carefully defined and areas of responsibility are not
specified. Those areas become ones for which no agency takes responsiblity.
Careful consideration should be given to issues of organizational linkages;
channels of communication between agencies should be established and it should
be made very clear to the farmer which agency he must deal with at the local
level when he has a particular problem.
It is clear that a mandatory conservation program is currently not popu-
lar with most farmers, partly because of the high premium farmers have placed
on their autonomy in farm decision making and the high value they place on
unrestricted property rights. At the same time, farmers have accepted regu-
latory activity interfering with their decision-making autonomy in such areas
as grading standards for farm products, milk marketing orders, and many public
health regulations. While the farmers have not cherished those regulations,
there is little evidence that compliance problems have been widespread once
the regulations have been introduced. Without an extensive educational cam-
paign, however, and the active participation of farm leaders in the decision-
making process, it appears that it will be costly to overcome the expected
negative reactions by farmers.
In addition to the perceived threat to their autonomy, farmers will be
concerned about the economic implications of the program. Under a program
based on voluntary compliance, a farmer may find himself at a disadvantage
because his economic competitors are not participating in the program. Under
a mandatory program this particular problem is only partially alleviated,
since the economic cost will vary depending on local conditions. To help
cushion the economic impact, a policy of compensation could be instituted.
As with the incentive program, this compensation could take the form of a tax
credit, a subsidy, a tax, or a fine. As reported below, farmers appear to
favor tax credits over subsidization programs. Subsidization is often
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associated with specific structures or technological approaches, and this
categorical approach may not be the most efficient one.
In the absence of a perceived crisis situation, we may assume that the
response from the community will largely be one of apathy combined with con-
cerns about the government expenditures needed to suuport the conservation
programs. Farm support programs have a reputation for benefiting the well-
to-do while failing the small operator, and it is likely that those proposing
future programs will be called upon by the general public to answer such a
charge. In addition, the general public and special interest groups within it
may argue that since private industry has been called upon largely to carry
its own financial burden in pollution abatement, agriculture should be subject
to the same rules. While the importance of food production, the inability of
the individual farmers to pass costs on to consumers, and the benefits of
erosion control to the nonagricultural community may well justify a compensa-
tion policy, these issues will need to be discussed in the general political
decision-making debate that will precede policy formation.
Figure 21 schematically outlines the various policies discussed above and
indicates their possible interrelationships. The policies have been divided
according to whether participation is voluntary or mandatory. The past and
current erosion control programs can be found on the left side of Figure 21,
as they are voluntary approaches.
The voluntary or mandatory approaches have been treated here as being
mutually exclusive. It is, however, possible to design policies which would
incorporate a mix of voluntary and mandatory measures (Council on Agricultur-
al Science and Technology, 1976). Farms or regions where nonpoint-source
pollution poses the gravest threat to water quality may be chosen for the man-
datory implementation of erosion measures, while in other regions it would be
possible to rely on cooperation by farmers. This approach would place less
of a burden on financial and technical resources and allow the most severe
cases of nonpoint-source pollution to be treated with the urgency that is
required.
Additional Factors
Several other issues which will affect the success and acceptability of
erosion control policies have not yet been considered. While we will not
cover these issues extensively, they should not remain unnoticed.
Time Dimension
The success and acceptability of any program can be affected greatly by
timing. A program may become unusually expensive or extremely threatening if
it is undertaken as a "crash" effort. It is difficult to draw up a time
schedule for any of these policies, and the gravity of the problem or polit-
ical pressure may call for immediate action. However, a well-developed time-
table which indicates when various objectives need to be accomplished and
which take into account the capabilities of the organization involved, the
available financial resources, and the need to educate farmers and the gen-
eral public may do much to increase the likelihood of success.
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Voluntary
Mandatory
Problem
Awareness
Education
Development
of Solution
Farm Conservation
Plan
Stream Bank Protection
Implementation
of Solution
Economic Incentives
(Tax Credit, Subsidy)
Goal
Mandatory Development
of Soil Conservation
Plan
Mandatory Soil
Conservation Plan
Implementation
Stream Bonk Protection
Economic Compensation
(Tax Credit, Subsidy )
Nonpoint-Source Pollution
Control
Figure 21. Interrelationships of selected policies for the
control of nonpoint-source pollution.
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The Impact on Small Farmers
In the present discussion we have assumed that farmers can afford to
participate in any of the programs but need to be encouraged to do so, or, to
equalize the different economic impact between them, they may need to be par-
tially compensated. In considering any policy, however, it should be recog-
nized that some farmers may be driven out of agriculture if they must make
heavy investments in soil erosion control activities, must substantially
change their farming operations through a system of crop rotation, or must
take certain acreage out of row-crop production. While the equity analyses
reported in the next chapter deal with these issues more directly, this as-
pect of policy development obviously deserves very careful attention.
Farmer Participation in Decision Making
As noted previously, effective participation by farmers in decision mak-
ing will affect the implementation of policies at the local level. This is
not the place to deal extensively with the problems involved in citizen par-
ticipation in bureaucratic decision making. The literature on that subject
is voluminous, although few studies have examined the nature of farmer partic-
ipation in that bureaucratic decision making which affects their own enter-
prise. Research on citizen participation indicates that frequently neither
the objectives of the citizen participation nor the role and power of the
citizen participants have been defined well enough to allow a functional sys-
tem to develop (van Es, 1976). New policies which incorporate elements of
farmer participation in the decision-making structure will need to carefully
specify the objectives to accomplished and the ways in which the participation
is to be implemented.
FARMER ATTITUDE SURVEY
The purpose of the farmer attitude study was to explore the probable re-
action of farmers, as inferred from their attitudes, toward several proposed
policies.* A knowledge of farmer attitudes can be useful in estimating the
likelihood that the farmers will cooperate with or adopt these policies. In
addition, a study such as this may be successful in identifying the factors
affecting attitudes. Therefore, insight may be gained into the kinds of ed-
ucational programs which would have the highest likelihood of success.
Procedure
A questionnaire was designed to determine:
1. The perceived fairness of each of the proposed policies
2. The groups that would be unfairly treated by each policy
*This case study was supported by a grant from the Illinois Institute for
Environmental Quality. It is included in this report to indicate the type
of findings that would likely have been obtained had it been possible to
conduct a survey covering the entire corn belt.
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3. The likely rate of adoption of each policy and/or the
cooperation rate
4. General experience and attitudes toward soil conservation
practices.
The questionnaire was specifically designed to avoid reference to pollu-
tion control or "the environment."
After the questionnaire was reviewed by a number of ASCS staff members,
it was pretested by sending it to a small convenience sample of central
Illinois farmers who were then contacted by telephone for their responses.
Following numerous changes, a second pretest was conducted with another group
of central Illinois farmers.
Based on these pretests, the three questionnaires reproduced in Appendix
F were developed for the study. The first two, titled "Farmer Attitude
Survey," are identical except that the first contains nine policies while the
second contains eight policies different from those in the first questionnaire.
Pretests clearly indicated that farmers were both unable and unwilling to
answer a questionnaire covering all 17 policies. By using only eight or nine
policies in a single questionnaire, total interview time was limited to
approximately 20 to 30 minutes. The third questionnaire contains all 17
policies but deletes several attitude and farming method questions. This
questionnaire was sent to ASCS County Executive Directors in the counties
from which the farmer samples were drawn.*
All interviews were conducted during the last two weeks of July and the
first three weeks of August, 1976. The actual procedure for the farmer ques-
tionnaire was to send a letter to all farmers included in the sample informing
them that they would be receiving a questionnaire from the University of
Illinois (see Appendix F). Several days later the questionnaires were sent to
the farmers with an appropriate cover letter (see Appendix F). Within seven
days after receiving the questionnaire, each farmer was telephoned by a
trained interviewer. If the farmer could not complete the questionnaire at
the time he was called, the interviewer attempted to make an appointment to
call back at a time convenient for the farmer. If a farmer could not complete
the questionnaire by telephone, he was urged to fill it out and return it by
mail. All farmers who had not been contacted by telephone after four attempts
were sent a letter asking them to complete the questionnaire and return it
by mail.
This method of administering the questionnaire—mailing copies to the
farmers and obtaining responses by telephone—was chosen on the assumption
that the policies were too complex to be described accurately over the tele-
phone. It was also assumed that the completion rate would be low without a
telephone interview/follow-up. Disproportionate response rates were to be
avoided if at all possible. Correspondence addressed to respondents used
j
*The questionnaires used were developed in consultation with the Survey
Research Laboratory of the University of Illinois. The laboratory's role,
however, was limited to advising on questionnaire design-
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University of Illinois, Department of Agricultural Economics letterhead to
insure neutral responses. An unpublished, exploratory study suggested that
this approach introduced relatively low bias and would produce relatively high
cooperation rates.
The procedure used to administer the questionnaire to ASCS County Execu-
tive Directors was identical.
The sample for this study was drawn from 11 counties within the state of
Illinois. It was established that, if properly chosen, 11 counties would in-
clude all major soil types to be found in the state and hence would also in-
clude all major variations in farming practices, yield, and economic return.
With the aid of the State of Illinois ASCS office, 11 counties were selected
to be representative of the entire state. Selection criteria included that
the counties be nonurban in their general makeup and that they have an up-to-
date soil survey. The counties selected were:
Douglas Montgomery
Greene Richland
Lake Stephenson
LaSalle Wabash
Logan Will
Massac
The farmers to receive the questionnaire in each of the 11 counties were
chosen by instructing the ASCS County Executive Director to select 20 names on
a random basis from all farmers in his respective county. To achieve random-
ness, the director was instructed to draw from his files only names that ap-
peared at prespecified intervals. For example, if his files were approximate-
ly 400 inches long, he was instructed to draw a name every twenty inches. The
only restriction was to exclude very large and very small operators. Specif-
ically, operators with less than 160 or more than 1500 acres were to be ex-
cluded. In all, one hundred thirty-five fanners and eleven ASCS County
Executive Directors received questionnaires. To achieve a statistically
valid sample, a larger sample would have been necessary. However, for the
purposes of this case study, sufficient insights were obtainable without hav-
ing a sample large enough to allow hypothesis testing and statistical infer-
ence.
The above procedures resulted in 87 completed fanner questionnaires (a
64.4% response rate) and ten completed ASCS County Executive Director ques-
tionnaires. The sample size and number of completed questionnaires were ade-
quate for this case study type of investigation with its rather general ob-
jectives. The proportion of farms covered in each acreage category appears to
be consistent with farm size in each of the counties. It is important to
note, however, that while the counties sampled represent most of the soil
structures and farming practices to be found in the corn belt, some caution
must be used in extrapolating these data to the entire corn belt because of
the physical, economic, and social differences that may exist within that
region of the nation.
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Results and Discussion: Background Data
To provide a background for understanding the farmers' attitudes toward
soil erosion control policies, some general information derived from the sur-
vey about the respondents' beliefs and farming practices is presented here,
followed by a discussion of the survey results for individual policies.
Table 30 presents the farmers' responses to several questions that re-
flect general attitudes on soil erosion control. It is encouraging to find
that only 9.3% of the farmers indicated that soil erosion control is not
needed to maintian soil productivity and that only 12.9% indicated that ero-
sion control is not needed to achieve water quality. It should be noted,
however, that 75.6% and 69.4%, respectively, responded with a clear "yes" to
these two questions. One can conclude that appropriate policies designed to
control soil erosion will be evaluated positively (at least philosophically)
by most farmers. While positive evaluation is not the same as acceptance of
the policies, these findings have important implications for the success of
any enforcement program. If most individuals do not perceive that a problem
exists, it is hard to enforce a law requiring a change.
A substantial proportion of farmers were skeptical that soil erosion can
be measured on either a farm-by-farm or a watershed basis. Therefore, any
policy based on the measurement of soil erosion will face difficulties unless
farmers are educated to the practicality of soil erosion measurement.
In general, no clear relationship was found between farmer attitudes on
soil erosion control and perceptions of the fairness of the policies examined.
The data in Table 31, however, indicate that there is an apparent, though
slight, positive relationship between the attitude that erosion control is
needed to achieve water quality and the perceived fairness of requiring an
approved soil conservation plan. Conversely, a negative relationship appears
between the attitude that erosion control is needed to achieve water quality
and the perceived fairness of the policy of prohibiting deduction of real
estate taxes from federal income tax unless an approved soil conservation plan
has been developed and implemented.
Table 32 contains farmer estimates of the effectiveness of several prac-
tices commonly suggested as being useful to reduce soil erosion. The results
may seem surprising to some in that two widely discussed methods (terracing
and contouring) are not considered to be as effective as the practices of con-
servation tillage (zero till, chisel till, and strip till), the elimination of
fall moldboard plowing, and changing crop rotations. However, recognizing
that much of the land in Illinois cannot economically benefit from terracing
and contouring, these results are not unanticipated. The slope of the land is
a major consideration in determining the effectiveness of these practices.
Another variable of interest is the farmers' descriptions of their own
soil conservation practices. Table 33 indicates the responses. These data
suggest that only 25 percent feel that they could improve. However, those who
report their performance as "adequate," "average," or "best under circum-
stances" could be encouraged to improve their soil conservation practices.
These self descriptions of farmers' soil conservation practices were compared
131
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Table 30
Fanner Attitudes on Soil Erosion Control
(percentage of respondents)
QUESTION
YES
MAYBE
NOT
SURE
NO
Is erosion control needed
to maintain soil produc-
tivity? 75.6 12.8 2.3 9.3
Is erosion control needed
for achievement of water
quality 69.4 9.4 8.2 12.9
Can the amount of soil ero-
sion be measured on a farm-
by-farm basis? 44.7 20.0 18.8 16.5
Can the amount of soil ero-
sion be estimated for a
watershed? 42.9 19.0 22.6 15.5
Total sample, n=87
132
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Table 31
Relationship Between Perceived Need for
Erosion Control and Selected Policies
FAIRNESS OF REQUIRING AN APPROVED SOIL CONSERVATION PLAN
(Number of Respondents in Each Category)
IS EROSION CONTROL
NEEDED FOR ACHIEVE-
MENT OF WATER
QUALITY?
Yes n=26
Maybe n=6
Not Sure n=l
No n=3
VERY
FAIR
8
0
0
0
SOMEWHAT
FAIR
10
3
0
0
SOMEWHAT
UNFAIR
3
1
0
1
VERY
UNFAIR
5
2
1
2
IS EROSION CONTROL
NEEDED FOR ACHIEVE-
MENT OF WATER
QUALITY?
Yes n=32
Maybe n=2
Not Sure n=6
No n=8
FAIRNESS
(Number of
VERY
FAIR
6
0
0
0
OF PROHIBITING TAX DEDUCTION
Respondents in Each Category)
SOMEWHAT SOMEWHAT VERY
FAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR
9
1
1
0
5
0
1
2
12
1
4
6
133
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Conservation
Tillage
Elimination of
Moldboard Fall
Table 32
Farmer Estimates of Effectiveness of
Practices to Reduce Soil Erosion
(percentage of respondents)
PRACTICE
Terracing
Contouring
VERY
EFFECTIVE
19.8
19.5
SOMEWHAT
EFFECTIVE
27.2
39.0
NOT VERY
EFFECTIVE
28.2
17-1
NOT AT ALL
EFFECTIVE
24.7
24.4
53.7
Total sample, n=87
31.7
8.5
6.1
Plowing
Changing Crop
Rotations
45.2
60.5
33.3
29.1
9.5
5.8
11.9
4.7
Table 33
Farmers' Descriptions of Their Own Soil Conservation Practices
Performance
Category
Excellent
Adequate
Average
Percentage
of Respondents
5.0
25.0
10.0
Best under
circumstances
Should do
better
Total
Total sample, n=87
35.0
25.0
100.0
134
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to the farmers' own perceptions of the fairness of the various policies, but
meaningful relationships were not found.
The number of fanners who reported having an approved soil conservation
plan is shown in Table 34. A significantly smaller percentage of the farmers
with between 200 and 300 acres in row crops report having an approved soil
conservation plan than do those in other acreage categories.
As the data in Table 35 show, farmers who farm land with soil productiv-
ity indexes over 130 are more likely, by a small margin, to have a soil con-
servation plan. This difference is probably a reflection of the fact that
farmers with higher soil indexes have either professional management or the
economic incentive to achieve even higher yields, or both.
Results and Discussion: Policy Perception
Discussed below are nine policies that fall into four categories:
1. Cost sharing for terracing and equivalent modifications
2. Tax credits and loans
3. Required development and implementation of soil conser-
vation plans
4. Greenbelts
Information on an additional eight policies covered in the survey is not re-
ported here except for some general information presented in Appendix G.
These policies were selected because they conform,in general terms, to the six
policy alternatives being considered in this report. The following discussion
presents an analysis of responses by farmers and ASCS County Executive Direc-
tors to specific questions about each of these nine policies and about associ-
ated attitudes concerning soil conservation practices and beliefs.
Three measures of farmer attitudes were the major focus of this investi-
gation. The first is the respondents' perception of the fairness of the poli-
cies under investigation. Fairness is of interest because it reflects a basic
attitude. It indicates what the respondents will tolerate based only on their
conception of the problem as they see it now. Fairness is a general concept,
and it does not imply that the farmers have analyzed the policy from a societ-
al perspective. Rather, it deals with whether the farmer perceives a given
policy to be fair or unfair. Pretests established clearly that farmers under-
stood this concept.
Closely related to the question of fairness is that of participation or
cooperation rates. This measure is of interest because it not only indicates
attitude toward the policy but also indicates the approximate percentage of
fanners who would voluntarily participate or cooperate without significantly
expanded education or enforcement programs. Pretests also established that
fanners understood this concept.
To round out direct measures of farmer attitudes toward proposed policies,
135
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Table 34
Farmers Who Have Developed Approved Soil Plan
Classified by Number of Acres in Row Crops
FARM SIZE
(acres)
Under
130 -
200 -
301,-
Over
130
199
300
500
500
PERCENTAGE
HAVING PLAN
64.3
50.0
23.5
55.6
82.1
Total sample, n=87
Table 35
Percentage of Farmers in Each Soil Productivity Index
Range Who Have Developed a Soil Conservation Plan
PRODUCTIVITY INDEX
Under 115
115 - 130
Over 130
PLAN
YES
56.5
53.3
64.7
DEVELOPED
NO
43.5
46.7
35.3
Total sample, n=87
136
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a third measure was used. Respondents were also asked to identify groups that
they felt would be unfairly treated if a given policy were in effect. This
measure not only helps in predicting which groups would have difficulty coop-
erating or complying but also indicates the arguments that might be used by
those not cooperating or complying. It does not, however, provide information
on what farmers might do if they did not cooperate or comply, or, if they did,
how they might alter their farming practices. Rather, this question only sug-
gests politically sensitive groups to include in further analyses.
In addition to farmers, ASCS County Executive Directors (hereinafter
called ASCS directors) were also asked for their perceptions of fairness,
their predictions of participation or cooperation rates, and their estimates
of what groups might be unfairly treated.
The following discussion of each group of policies focuses on these
three measures.
Cost Sharing for Terracing and Equivalent Modifications
Fairness—Table 36 presents perceptions of the fairness of three policies
in the category of cost sharing for terracing and equivalent modifications.
Respondents were asked to indicate how fair each of these three policies would
be. In general, this group of three policies was viewed by farmers as essen-
tially fair. Between one-fourth and one-third of farmers rated these policies
as very fair. ASCS directors, however, were evenly split on the fairness of
the policies of full cost sharing for terracing and 50% cost sharing for slope
modification.
Approximately 28% of the farmers viewed 50% cost sharing for terracing as
in some way unfair, while only 10% of ASCS directors viewed this policy as
unfair.
Views of the fairness of 50% cost sharing for slope modification are
similar to those for the 50% for terracing policy. Approximately 55% of the
responding farmers perceived it as in some way fair, while 33% thought it un-
fair and 11% said they did not know. ASCS directors tended to view this pol-
icy as less fair than did farmers.
Participation Rate—Estimates of participation rates by fanners, although
subjective, are valuable in estimating the acceptance of individual policies.
Table 37 shows the participation rates estimated by both farmers and ASCS
directors when asked what percentage of farmers in their county would take
advantage of such a policy if it were made available. For full cost sharing
for terracing, the farmers responding indicated that approximately 43% of the
farmers in their county would take advantage of this policy, while ASCS direc-
tors indicated that approximately 29% of the farmers would do so. Farmer
respondents indicated that approximately 36% of farmers would take advantage
of 50% cost sharing for terracing, while ASCS directors indicated that only
approximately 12% of farmers in their counties would take advantage of this
policy.
Cost sharing for terracing and other activities has been available for
137
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Table 36
Perceived Fairness of Cost Sharing for
Terracing and Equivalent Modifications
POLICY
VERY
FAIR
SOMEWHAT SOMEWHAT VERY
FAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR
(percentage of respondents)
DON'T
KNOW
1. 50% Cost Sharing
for Terracing
(n=36) [Farmers] 33.3
(n=10) [ASCS] 20.0
2. Full Cost Sharing
for Terracing
(n=49) [Farmers] 30.6
(n=10) [ASCS] 10.0
3. 50% Cost Sharing
for Slope Modification
(n=36) [Farmers] 25.0
(n=8) [ASCS] 12.5
36.1
70.0
46.9
40.0
30.6
37.5
16.7
10.0
8.2
30.0
25.0
25.0
11.1
2.8
8.2
20.0
8.3
25.0
6.1
11.1
138
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Table 37
Estimates of Percentage of Farmers
That Would Participate in Cost-sharing Policies
POLICY
RESPONDENTS
FARMERS ASCS
DIRECTORS
1. 50% Cost Sharing for Terracing
(n=29)
2. Full Cost Sharing for Terracing
(n=41)
3. 50% Cost Sharing for Slope
Modification
(n=26)
11.8
29.2
26.5
36.1
43.4
28.6
Table 38
Groups Perceived as Being Most Unfairly Treated by Cost-sharing Policies
POLICY/GROUP
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS
FARMERS
ASCS
DIRECTORS
1. 50% Cost Sharing for the Cost
of Terracing
Farmers Not Needing Terracing
Smal1 Farmer
Taxpayers
2. Full Cost Sharing for the Cost
of Terracing
Farmers Not Needing Terracing
Taxpayers
Small Farmer
3. 50% Cost Sharing for the Cost
of Slope Modification
Farmers Not Needing
Small Farmer
Taxpayers
Tenants
22.9
11.4
5.7
27.7
12.8
6.4
21.9
9.4
6.3
6.3
10.0
10.0
10.0
40.0
20.0
10.0
139
-------
many years. The discrepancy between farmers' and ASCS directors' perceptions
of the number of farmers who would participate in these two policies may be
related to the experience of ASCS directors. Yet this explanation does not
account for the farmers' greater optimism. A more detailed investigation
would be necessary to explain this difference and to determine which percep-
tion is more accurate.
For 50% cost sharing for slope modification, responding farmers indicated
that approximately 26% of farmers in the county would take advantage of this
policy, but ASCS directors indicated that about 28% would do so.
Groups Unfairly Treated—Table 38 includes a listing of the three or four
groups most often mentioned by farmers and ASCS directors as being unfairly
treated under each of these three policies if they were adopted. For all
three policies, farmers not presently using terracing or slope modification
are seen by approximately 21 to 27% of farmers as being unfairly treated.
ASCS directors felt particularly strongly about farmers who are not presently
using terracing. They felt they would be unfairly treated under the policy of
full cost sharing for terracing. The small farmer who cannot afford the cost
of terracing or slope modification or of the extra resources used to maintain
such a modification was perceived as being unfairly treated, as were taxpayers,
who could be expected to bear much of the cost.
Tax Credits and Loans
Fairness--As Table 39 indicates, both the policy of interest-free loans
and that of an investment tax credit were viewed by most farmers as being
either very fair or somewhat fair. Most ASCS directors also rated both these
policies as very fair or somewhat fair. More ASCS directors may have rated
the investment tax credit as being fair because of their familiarity with this
widely used industry practice.
Participation Rate—As the data in Table 40 clearly indicate, both
farmers and ASCS directors anticipate that a rather large number of farmers
would take advantage of both the interest-free loan and the investment tax
credit. The estimates of the number of farmers who would apply is almost
identical for the two groups of respondents (approximately 56% for interest-
free loans and approximately 64% for the investment tax credit). These esti-
mates are noticeably higher than those for the policies included in Table 38.
Groups Unfairly Treated—Neither farmers nor ASCS directors perceived any
group except taxpayers as being unfairly treated under either of these poli-
cies. ASCS directors were more sensitive to the issue of taxpayers being un-
fairly treated. As shown in Table 41, 40% of the directors, as compared to
16.7% of the farmers, thought taxpayers would be unfairly treated.
Required Development and Implementation of Soil Conservation Plans
Fairness—The two policies considered in this category differ in the
specification of punitive measures for noncompliance. The first policy is a
regulation requiring the development and implementation of an improved soil
conservation plan. (The respondents were given no indication of penalties for
140
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Table 39
Perceived Fairness of Tax Credit and Loan Proposals
POLICY
VERY SOMEWHAT SOMEWHAT VERY DON'T
FAIR FAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR KNOW
(percentage of respondents)
Interest-Free Loans to
Cover Farmer Cost of
Soil Conservation Work
(n=49) [Farmer]
(n=10) [ASCS]
44.9
40.0
Investment Tax Credit
for Farmer Cost of Soil
Conservation Work
(n=37) [Farmer] 54.1
(n=10) [ASCS] 70.0
30.6
30.0
37.8
20.0
16.3
30.0
5.4
10.0
6.1
2.7
2.0
Table 40
Estimates of Percentage of Farmers that
Would Likely Participate in Tax Credit and Loan Proposals
POLICY
RESPONDENTS
FARMERS
ASCS
DIRECTORS
Interest-Free Loans to
Cover Farmer Cost of
Soil Conservation Work
(n=47)
Investment Tax Credit
for Farmer Cost of Soil
Conservation Work
(n=34)
57.2
55.8
63.5
64.6
141
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Table 41
Groups Perceived as Being Most Unfairly
Treated by Tax Credit and Loan Proposals
POLICY/GROUP
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS
ASCS
DIRECTORS
FARMERS
4. Interest-Free Loans to
Cover Farmer Cost of
Soil Conservation Work
(n=48)
Taxpayers
Farmers Not Needing
Nonfarmers
5. Investment Tax Credit
for Farmer Cost of Soil
Conservation Work
(n=38)
Farmers Not Needing
Taxpayers
Farmer Without Loan
Nonfarmers
16.7
6.3
40.0
10.0
7.9
5.3
5.3
5.3
142
-------
noncompliance or subsidies for cooperation.) As the data in Table 42 indicate,
approximately 18% of responding farmers perceived this policy as very fair and
34% as somewhat fair. The ASCS directors were evenly divided on this propos-
al 's fairness. It is somewhat surprising that half of the directors reacted
negatively to the policy, given their involvement in the current soil conser-
vation program. An explanation of this finding would require additional
investigation.
The regulation prohibiting the deduction of real estate taxes from fed-
eral income tax unless an improved soil conservation plan has been developed
and implemented was not viewed favorably by farmers. Approximately 65% of
farmers perceived that it was in some way unfair. ASCS directors were evenly
divided as to whether this policy was fair or unfair.
Cooperation Rate—As the data in Table 43 show, farmer respondents indi-
cated that only approximately 45% of farmers would likely formulate and imple-
ment a soil conservation plan even if such plans were required. ASCS direc-
tors were somewhat more optimistic, estimating that approximately 62% of
farmers would cooperate with such a policy. Surprisingly, both farmers and
ASCS directors felt that only approximately 62% and 68%, respectively, of
farmers would likely develop and implement a soil conservation plan, even with
the prospect of being unable to deduct real estate taxes from their federal
income tax if they failed to do so. This result may indicate a feeling that
many farmers would find the amount of foregone tax a rather small price to
pay for not having to complete and implement a soil conservation plan.
Groups Unfairly Treated—Farmers as a whole did not perceive any one
group as being unfairly treated. As Table 44 indicates, however, several
ASCS directors felt that all farmers would be unfairly treated if either pol-
icy were implemented. Again, this is interesting given the ASCS involvement
in soil conservation programs.
Gveeribelts
Fairness—Two of the policies covered in the survey deal with regulations
requiring greenbelts along streams to improve water quality. The first policy
would require a recreational greenbelt while the second requires a nonrecre-
ational greenbelt. Surprisingly, 50% of responding farmers indicated that a
recreational greenbelt was to some degree fair, while only one out of ten
ASCS directors indicated that such a recreational greenbelt was at all fair.
As shown in Table 45, responses are slightly more favorable for a policy re-
quiring nonrecreational greenbelts along streams and drainage ditches. Ap-
proximately 60% of both farmers and ASCS directors felt that such a policy
was to some degree fair.
Cooperation Rate—Again, as shown in Table 46, it is surprising that far-
mers expressed an anticipated cooperation rate of 41% for a recreational green-
belt and an anticipated cooperation rate of 36% for a nonrecreational green-
belt. Anticipated cooperation rates given by ASCS directors are more in line
with what would be expected. They expressed an anticipated cooperation rate
of approximately 20% for the policy requiring a recreational greenbelt and
approximately 49% for a nonrecreational greenbelt.
143
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Table 42
Perceived Fairness of Requiring Development and
Implementation of Soil Conservation Plan Policies
VERY SOMEWHAT SOMEWHAT VERY DON'T
FAIR FAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR KNOW
(Percentage of Respondents)
Required Development and
Implementation of Approved
Soil Conservation Plan
(n = 38) 18.4 34.2 15.8 26.3 5.3
(n = 10) [ASCS] 30.0 20.0 30.0 20.0
Prohibition of Deduction
of Real Estate Taxes from
Federal Income Tax Unless
Approved Soil Conservation
Plan is Developed and
Implemented
(n = 49) 12.2 22.4 16.3 49.0
(n = 10) [ASCS] 20.0 30.0 10.0 40.0
Table 43
Percentage of Farmers That Would Likely Cooperate with Policies
Requiring Development and Implementation of a Soil Conservation Plan
POLICY
FARMERS
ASCS
Required Development and
Implementation of Approved
Soil Conservation Plan
(n = 38) 44.6 61.6
Prohibition of Deduction
of Real Estate Taxes from
Federal Income Tax Unless
Approved Soil Conservation
Plan is Developed and
Implemented
(n = 47) 61.7 68.0
144
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Table 44
Groups Perceived as Being Most Unfairly Treated by Policies
Requiring Development and Implementation of a Soil
Conservation Plan
POLICY/GROUP
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS
FARMERS
ASCS
DIRECTORS
Required Development and
Implementation of Approved
Soil Conservation Plan
(n = 37)
Everyone
All Farmers
Small Farmers
Tenants
Farmers Not Needing
Prohibition of Deduction
of Real Estate Taxes from
Federal Income Tax Unless
Approved Soil Conservation
Plan Is Developed and
Implemented
(n = 48)
All Farmers
Landowners
Everyone
Taxpayers
13.5
10.8
8.1
5.4
16.7
12.5
6.3
20.0
10.0
30.0
10.0
145
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Table 45
Perceived Fairness of Greenbelt Policies
VERY SOMEWHAT SOMEWHAT VERY
FAIR FAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR
(Percentage of Respondents)
8.
9.
Required Recreational
Greenbelt
(n = 49)
(n = 10) [ASCS]
Required Nonrecreational
Greenbelt Along Streams
and Drainage Ditches
(n = 38)
(n = 10) [ASCS]
18.4 32.7
10.0
28.9 31.6
60.0
20.4
30.0
10.5
20.0
28.6
60.0
23.7
20.0
DON'T
KNOW
5.3
Table 46
Estimates of Percentage of Fanners That Would Likely
Cooperate with Greenbelt Policies
POLICY
FARMERS
ASCS DIRECTORS
Required Recreational
Greenbelt
(n = 46)
Required Nonrecreational
Greenbelt Along Streams
and Drainage Ditches
(n = 36)
41.5
20.4
36.4
48.6
146
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Groups Unfairly Treated—A very high percentage of ASCS directors felt
that farmers with land along streams would be unfairly treated by policies
requiring greenbelts, especially if those greenbelts were recreational. As
indicated in Table 47, 80% of the directors indicated that farmers along
streams would be unfairly treated by a policy making recreational greenbelts
mandatory. Fifty percent felt that farmers along streams would also be un-
fairly treated if nonrecreational greenbelts were required. Farmer respon-
dents also indicated that those farmers with land along streams would be un-
fairly treated, but this group was mentioned less often than by ASCS directors.
Twenty-eight percent of those respondents felt that farmers along streams
would be unfairly treated by requiring recreational greenbelts, while approxi-
mately 27% listed that group for nonrecreational greenbelts.
Tables 48, 49, and 50 summarize the reactions of farmers to all of the 17
policies evaluated. Table 48 presents the responses on policy fairness,
Table 49 summarizes the expected participation or cooperation rates, and
Table 50 indicates the groups of individuals who farmers feel would be un-
fairly treated by such policies.
Addi-t'lonal Analyses of Responses
To aid in interpreting the responses for the policies discussed above,
the relationship between those responses and two other factors were examined.
First, the farmer respondents were classified into three groups according to
the soil productivity index of their land to determine whether there was any
correlation between that index and the farmers' perceptions of the fairness of
each policy. Second, the respondents were classified according to whether or
not they had completed a soil conservation plan for their farms. The fairness
evaluations and the listings of groups that the farmers felt might be unfairly
treated under each policy were then compared for those who had and those who
had not completed a plan. The results are discussed below.
Soil productivity indices were constructed for each county by weighting,
on the basis of expert judgment, the productivity indices for the major soil
types in each county by the approximate acreage of each type. For analysis,
the data were collapsed into three soil productivity ranges, with an approxi-
mately equal number of the farmers surveyed falling into each range. From
these data, summarized in Table 51, it can be seen that soil productivity of
the farmers' land, on the average, does not differentially affect their per-
ceptions of the fairness of those policies relating to terracing and equiva-
lent modifications. Within these three policies, there are only minor varia-
tions among the responses in each soil productivity range.
For policies relating to tax credits and interest-free loans for soil
conservation work, the data in Table 51 indicate that the perceived fairness
varies somewhat with the soil productivity of the responding farmer. These
differences are not major, but do indicate that further study is needed if
the adoption of either of these policies is to be seriously considered. A
higher proportion of farmers with soil productivity indices of 130 or over
felt that interest-free loans were fair than those with lower productivity
indices. A slight reversal is noted for the policy of granting an investment
tax credit.
147
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Table 47
Groups Perceived as Being Most Unfairly Treated
by Greenbelt Policies
POLICY/GROUP
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS
FARMERS
ASCS
DIRECTORS
8. Required Recreational Greenbelt
(n = 49)
Farmers Along Streams
All Farmers
Landowners
Cattle Farmers
9. Required Nonrecreational
Greenbelt Along Streams and
Drainage Ditches
(n = 37)
Farmers Along Streams
Farmers Who Pay for It
All Farmers
28.6
10.2
8.2
6.1
27.0
10.8
8.1
80.0
10.0
50.0
10.0
148
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Table 48
Perceived Fairness Summary Table
(Farmer Respondents Only)
FAIR* UNFAIR^ DON'T KNOW
POLICY (Percentage of Respondents)
Cost Sharing for Terracing and Equivalent
Modifications
1. 50% Cost Sharing for Terracing
(n = 36) 69.1 27.8 2.8
2. Full Cost Sharing for Terracing
(n = 49) 77.5 16.4 6.1
3. 50% Cost Sharing for Slope
Modification (n = 36) 55.6 33.3 11.1
Tax Credits and Loans for Soil Conservation
and Pollution Abatement Work
4. Interest-free loans to Cover Cost of
Soil Conservation Work (n = 49) 75.5 22.4 2.0
5. Investment Tax Credit for Cost of
Soil Conservation Work (n = 37) 91.9 8.1
Development and Implementation of Soil
Conservation Plans
6. Required Development and Implementa-
tion of Approved Soil Conservation
Plan (n = 38) 52.6 42.1 5.3
7. Prohibition of Deduction of Real-
estate Taxes from Federal Income
Tax Unless Approved Soil Conservation
Plan is Developed and Implemented
(n = 49) 34.6 65.3
Development of Greenbelts Bordering
Waterways
8. Required Recreational Greenbelt
(n = 49) 51.0 49.0
9. Required Nonrecreational Greenbelt
Along Streams and Drainage Ditches
(n = 38) 60.5 34.2 5.3
*Total of very fair and somewhat fair.
"•"Total of somewhat unfair and very unfair.
149
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Table 48 (continued)
FAIR* UNFAIR"1" DON'T KNOW
POLICY (Percentage of Respondents)
Soil
10
11
12
13
14
Use
15
16
17
Losses, Tillage Practices, and Terracing
. Prohibition of Fall Moldboard Plowing
(n = 49)
. Required Conservation Tillage (n = 35)
. Soil Losses Required to Be Less than
3 Tons per Acre (n = 44)
. Soil Losses Required to Be Less than
5 Tons per Acre (n = 35)
. Required Contouring or Terracing on
Slopes Greater than 9% (n = 49)
of Nitrogen Fertilizer
. Nitrogen Application Limit of 100 Ibs
(n = 38)
. Nitrogen Tax of 20<£/1 b (n = 46)
. Nitrogen Tax of 10
-------
Table 49
Participation/Cooperation Rates Summary Table (Fanners Only)
PERCENTAGE OF FARMERS THAT
POLICY WOULD LIKELY PARTICIPATE
Cost Sharing for Terracing and Equivalent
Modifications
1. 50% Cost Sharing for Terracing (n = 29) 36.1
2. Full Cost Sharing for Terracing (n = 41) 43.4
3. 50% Cost Sharing for Slope Modification
(n = 26) 26.5
Tax Credits and Loans for Soil Conservation and
Pollution Abatement Work
4. Interest-free Loans to Cover Cost of Soil
Conservation Work (n = 47) 57.2
5. Investment Tax Credit for Cost of Soil
Conservation Work (n = 34) 63.5
Development and Implementation of Soil Conserva-
tion Plans
6. Required Development and Implementation of
Approved Soil Conservation Plan (n = 38) 44.6
7- Prohibition of Deductions of Real-estate
Taxes from Federal Income Tax Unless
Approved Soil Conservation Plan is
Developed and Implemented (n = 47) 61.7
Development of Greenbelts bordering Waterways
8. Required Recreational Greenbelt (n = 46) 41.5
9. Required Nonrecreational Greenbelt Along
Streams and Drainage Ditches (n = 36) 36.4
Soil Losses, Tillage Practices, and Terracing
10. Prohibition of Fall Moldboard Plowing
(n = 49) 43.0
11. Required Conservation Tillage (n = 35) 39.7
12. Soil Losses Required to Be Less than
3 Tons per Acre (n = 44) 53.8
13. Soil Losses Required to Be Less than
5 Tons per Acre (n = 35) 55.2
151
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Table 49 (continued)
POLICY
PERCENTAGE OF FARMERS THAT
WOULD LIKELY PARTICIPATE
14. Required Contouring or Terracing on
Slopes Greater than 9% (n = 49)
Use of Nitrogen Fertilizer
15. Nitrogen Application Limit of
100 Ibs/acre (n = 38)
16. Nitrogen Tax of 20$/lb (n = 46)
17. Nitrogen Tax of 10
-------
Table 50
Summary of Groups Perceived by Farmers as Being Most Unfairly Treated
GROUP11
POLICY
ALL
FARMERS
FARMERS
NOT
NEEDING
TAX-
PAYERS
FARMERS FARMERS
ALONG EVERY- WITH
STREAMS ONE FLAT LAND
- (Percentage of Respondents)
ROLLING
FARMS
NITROGEN
USERS
THOSE
DESIRE
HIGH YIELD
en
co
1. 50% Cost Sharing for
Terracing
2. Full Cost Sharing for
Terracing
3. 50% Cost of Sharing for
Slope Modification
4. Interest-free Loans to Cover
Cost of Soil Conservation
Work
5. Investment Tax Credit for
Cost of Soil Conservation Work
6. Required Development and Imple-
mentation of Approved Soil
Conservation Plan
7. Prohibition of Deduction of Real
Estate Taxes From Federal Income
Tax Unless Approved Soil Conser-
vation Plan is Developed and
Implemented
Required Nonrecreational Green-
belt along Streams and Drainage
Ditches
10.8
16.7
8. Required Recreational Greenbelt 10.2
8.1
22.9
27.7
21.9
6.3
7.9
5.7
12.8
6.3
16.7
5.3
13.5
6.3
28.6
27.6
*0nly those groups which are perceived as being unfairly treated by 15% or more of the farmers under at least one policy
are included.
-------
Table 50 (continued)
"^ -^GROUP*
POLICY ^ -^^^
10.
n.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
Prohibition of Fall Noldboard
Plowfngt
Required Conservation Tillage
Soil Losses Required to be Less
Than 3 Tons Per Acre
Soil Losses Required to be Less
Than 5 Tons Per Acre
Required Contouring or Terrac-
ing on Slopes Greater than 9%
Nitrogen Application Limit of
100 Ib/acre
Nitrogen Tax of 20£/1 b
Nitrogen Tax of lOt/lb
FARMERS FARMERS
ALL NOT TAX- ALONG EVERY- WITH ROLLING NITROGEN
FARMERS NEEDING PAYERS STREAMS ONE FLAT LAND FARMS USERS
12.2
11.4
11.4
14.3
6.1
13.2
37.5
31.6
2.0 32.7
5.7 17.1
2.3 15.9
8.6 17.1
6.1
10.5 5.3
8.3 20.8
26.3 18.4
THOSE
DESIRE
HIGH YIELD
26.3
2.1
2.6
*0n1y those groups which are perceived as being unfairly treated by 15% or more of the farmers under at least one policy
are included.
fA group "Farmers Who Need to Plow" was identified for this policy.
-------
Table 51
Relationship Between Perceived Fairness of Policies
and Respondent's Soil Productivity Index
PRODUCTIVITY
INDEX
VERY SOMEWHAT SOMEWHAT VERY
FAIR FAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR
(Percentage of Respondents)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Full Cost Sharing for
Cost of Terracing
50% Cost Sharing for
Cost of Terracing
50% Cost Sharing for
Slope Modification
Interest-free Loans to
Cover Farmer Cost of
Soil Conservation Work
Investment Tax Credit
for Farmer Cost of
Soil Conservation Work
Required Development
and Implementation of
Approved Soil Conser-
vation Plan
Prohibition of Deduction
of Real Estate Taxes
from Federal Income Tax
Unless Approved Soil Con-
servation Plan Is Devel-
oped and Implemented
Required Recreational
Greenbelt Along
Streams
Required Nonrecreational
Greenbelt Along Streams
and Drainage Ditches
<115
115 - 130
>130
<115
115 - 130
>130
<115
115 - 130
>130
<115
115 - 130
>130
<115
115 - 130
>130
<115
115 - 130
>130
<115
115 - 130
>130
<115
115 - 130
>130
<115
115 - 130
>130
38.5
29.4
31.3
25.0
36.4
37.5
28.6
20.0
33.3
46.2
44.4
47-1
66.7
54.5
47.1
22.2
18.2
18.8
14.3
16.7
5.9
14.3
22.2
17.6
33.3
40.0
23.5
53.8
52.9
43.8
50.0
36.4
31.3
28.6
50.0
26.7
30.8
27.8
35.3
33.3
36.4
41.2
33.3
36.4
37.5
28.6
16.7
23.5
28.6
38.9
29.4
44.4
20.0
35.3
0
5.9
18.8
12.5
27.3
12.5
28.6
30.0
26.7
15.4
22.2
11.8
0
9.1
5.9
22.2
18.2
12.5
14.3
16.7
17.6
14.3
22.2
23.5
0
10.0
17.6
7.7
11.8
6.3
12.5
0
18.8
14.3
0
13.3
7.7
5.6
5.9
0
0
5.9
22.2
27.3
31.3
24.9
50.0
52.9
42.9
16.7
29.4
22.2
30.0
23.5
155
-------
Neither of the policies relating to required soil conservation plans ap-
peared fair to a large proportion of responding farmers, but the data in Table
51 indicate that there are no variations in perceived fairness based on the
soil productivity of the respondents.
Farmers with either low- or high-productivity soil are more apt to per-
ceive a policy requiring recreational greenbelts as unfair than are those with
land of moderate productivity. Table 51 also clearly indicates that over one-
half of the responding farmers in these two categories perceive this policy as
unfair. A considerably lower but still substantial proportion (between 22%
and 51%) of farmers view a nonrecreational greenbelt as unfair. Also, the
more productive the land of the responding farmer, the more apt he is to view
this policy as unfair. No data are available to indicate whether fanners who
have streams and drainage ditches on their property perceive the fairness of
greenbelts differently from those who do not.
Not reported in tabular form are the data for the perceived fairness of
each policy versus the number of acres that the respondents have in row crops.
Similar to the data reported in Table 51, those farmers with 200 to 300 acres
in row crops are less apt to judge each policy as fair than farmers with either
either more or less acreage in row crops. This seeming inconsistency may dis-
appear, or be explained, with further research into basic causes of these
judgments.
Of particular interest is the question of whether those farmers who have
developed a soil conservation plan perceive the fairness of the policies under
study differently from those who have not developed such a plan. Almost all
farmers who have developed a plan have worked with the SCS and have been ad-
vised on the most appropriate soil conservation practices for their individual
operations.
In Table 52, the perceived fairness of the nine policies is tabulated
both for those respondents who have completed a soil conservation plan and for
those who have not. It is apparent from these data that having developed a
plan does not greatly affect the evaluation of fairness except for two of the
policies. First, farmers who have completed a plan perceive the policy of
providing interest-free loans as less fair than do those who have not com-
pleted a plan. Second, there are noticeable differences for the policy of
requiring the development of a soil conservation plan. Approximately 66% of
those who have not developed a soil conservation plan perceive this policy as
to some degree fair, while only 44% of those who have such a plan think it
fair. More dramatic, however, is the large percentage of those having a plan
(39%) who perceive the policy as very unfair. This finding suggests that some
serious objections might arise if this policy were adopted—not on the part of
those who would be required to develop plans but from those who have completed
their plan without the benefit of such a policy.* One possible explanation is
that farmers may feel it is unfair to those who have personally paid for their
own plan rather than unfair to farmers who would take advantage of the pro-
posed policy.
^The categories of individuals who would be unfairly treated were quite
general: all farmers, everyone, and small farmers.
156
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Table 52
Evaluation of Policy Fairness by Farmers Who Have as Compared to
Those Who Have Not Developed a Soil Conservation Plan
SOIL CONSER-
VATION PLAN
POLICY DEVELOPED?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Full Cost Sharing for
Cost of Terracing
50% Cost Sharing for
Cost of Terracing
50% Cost Sharing for
Slope Modification
Interest-free Loans to
Cover Farmer Cost of
Soil Conservation Work
Investment Tax Credit
for Farmer Cost of
Soil Conservation Work
Required Development
and Implementation of
Approved Soil Conser-
vation Plan
Prohibition of Deduction
of Real Estate Taxes from
Federal Income Tax Unless
Approved Soil Conserva-
tion Plan is Developed
and Implemented
Required Recreational
Greenbelt Along Streams
Required Non recreational
Greenbelt Along Streams
and Drainage Ditches
(Yes)
(No)
(Yes)
(No)
(Yes)
(No)
(Yes)
(No)
(Yes)
(No)
(Yes)
(No)
(Yes)
(No)
(Yes)
(No)
(Yes)
(No)
VERY SOMEWHAT SOMEWHAT VERY
FAIR FAIR UNFAIR UNFAIR
(Percentage of Respondents)
25
46
33
35
26
29
37
62
57
50
22
16
15
5
21
11
41
21
.8
.7
.3
.3
.7
.4
.5
.5
.9
.0
.2
.7
.6
.9
.9
.8
.2
.1
51.
46.
44.
29.
33.
35.
34.
25.
36.
38.
22.
50.
18.
29.
31.
35.
23.
42.
7
7
4
4
3
3
4
0
8
9
2
0
8
4
3
3
5
1
9
6
11
23
33
23
21
6
5
5
16
16
18
11
18
23
11
10
.7
.7
.1
.5
.3
.5
.9
.3
.3
.6
.7
.7
.8
.8
.8
.5
.8
.5
12
11
11
6
11
6
6
5
38
16
46
52
28
29
23
26
.9
0
.1
.8
.7
.8
.3
.3
0
.6
.9
.7
.9
.9
.1
.4
.5
.3
157
-------
The data in Table 52 reveal some other noteworthy differences in percep-
tions of fairness both within and between policies depending on whether the
responding farmer has or has not developed a soil conservation plan. For in-
stance, for the policy of granting full cost sharing for terracing, farmers
without a soil plan are almost unanimous in perceiving this policy as fair
while over 20% of farmers with a plan find this policy unfair, but 35% of
farmers without a plan also find it unfair.
The results reported here must be understood and interpreted in the con-
text of a basic knowledge of farmer practices and of the discussions included
in the remainder of this report. Depending on how the data are combined and
interpreted, they can support several conclusions. It should be remembered,
however, that these data are not intended to be definitive but rather to sug-
gest directions for future work. Few of the results are sufficiently clear-
cut to provide more than general guidance in the policy formulation process.
158
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CHAPTER 7
EQUITY
Optimality in public finance and expenditure generally involves consider-
ation of three aspects: (1) economic efficiency, (2) administrative efficien-
cy, and (3) equity (Sandmo, 1976). The first aspect was analyzed in Chapter 4
and the second was discussed in Chapter 5. In each of these cases the social
goal is to minimize costs and maximize benefits subject to political or tech-
nical constraints. Equity considerations, in contrast, involve judgments on
the fairness of the distribution of benefits and burdens caused by public pol-
icies. Such judgments depend, by necessity, on criteria more complex than
simple maximization or minimization of benefits or costs.
It is the purpose of this section to develop criteria for judging the
equity of six alternative policies for the control of nonpoint-source agricul-
tural water pollution. These criteria will be largely, but not wholly, sub-
jective. The applicability of data such as those reported in Chapter 6 (the
farmer attitude survey) are limited because of the difficulty of separating
self-interest motives from equity motives in the respondents' judgments of
"fairness." While the survey technique is well suited to gathering data on
"perceived fairness," the results are better interpreted as a measure of the
public's fondness of a particular policy than as a judgment on the policy's
inherent equitableness.
The difficulty in interpreting the survey results as a measure of equity
stems from the abuse of the words equity and fairness in common usage. A
farmer may, for example, insist vehemently that a proposed policy would treat
him unfairly. When asked, he will support his contention by showing how much
he stands to lose in relation to others if the policy is implemented. This
evidence in itself, however, is not sufficient cause for labeling the proposal
"unfair." Others may gain more than he will lose. Or possibly the farmer's
present income is in part the result of an unfair advantage over other farmers
or water users, an advantage he would lose if the policy is implemented. If
pressed, the farmer will likely defend his position by claiming that the pro-
posal will affect him counter to some commonly accepted standard of justice:
"A man is free to use his property as he pleases" is a typical argument
against land-use regulation. "All citizens should contribute a fair share to
provide for public services" underlies the complaint against "over"-taxation.
Ordinarily, however, one would not guide the farmer through such a the-
oretical discussion to determine the basis of his claim to unfair treatment.
One would accept his contention that he thinks the policy is unfair. Without
questioning the logic of each individual's assertion, we cannot be certain
159
-------
(1) that the underlying criterion of fairness is one which is generally ac-
cepted or (2) that the proposal actually violates the criterion. Consequent-
ly, "unfair" is inappropriately applied to many situations.
If the farmer in the example did a thorough job of explaining his reasons
for considering himself unfairly treated, le would probably present not merely
one criterion of fairness but several. He might claim., from one perspective,
that his share of the tax burden was disproportionate to the benefits he was
receiving. He might then add, for example, that the interests of the country
would be best served by allowing his enterprise to flourish without govern-
mental interference. Some justifications would, of course, be emphasized more
than others. The ones he would choose to emphasize more might be selected
because of the intensity of his beliefs or because he thought they would be
better received by his audience. In either case they would form an explicit
justification of a position which the farmor would probably have seen as in-
tuitively correct from the outset. The plausibility of his defense would de-
pend on the audience's acceptance of his criteria and their knowlege of the
facts.
This process of revealing the underpinnings of intuitive beliefs is es-
pecially important for policy makers. A "?eel" for the fairness of a policy
is not sufficient for evaluating the far-roaching effects of modern regulatory
laws. Though an individual's unexamined u:;e of the fairness concept may be
tolerated, the promulgation of predictably unfair laws should not. The pur-
pose of this section is to develop equity criteria capable of culling out in
advance policies which would be regarded a^> reasonably unfair from a societal
perspective.
EQUITY BASES
People act on the basis of experience. They learn from experience. With
time they adjust their opinions to more adequately reflect their expanded
knowledge. In this respect the fairness criteria are no different from any
other opinions. They change with the accumulation of experience. If a per-
son's beliefs change too rapidly—that is, on the basis of too little addi-
tional experience—the person is considered fickle or capricious. If they do
not change fast enough, the person may be regarded as dogmatic or out of touch
with reality. Ordinarily, people strike a reasonable compromise between con-
sistency and relevancy.
This individual reaction to changed circumstances has its counterpart at
the societal level. To the extent that people in a society are affected by
the same sets of institutions—schools, churches, bureaucracies—and are sub-
jected to the same natural events, it might be expected that they would share
similar conceptions of fairness. With time, it would also be expected that
their sentiments would change at somewhat similar rates, gradually adjusting
to different circumstances. If the government does not react to the changing
mood of society, its laws become outdated. If it is too quick to react to
slight changes in public opinion, the laws will lack continuity. Once again,
it is necessary to compromise between relevancy and consistency, this time
at a policy-making level.
160
-------
Just as it is inadequate to determine whether a policy is fair on the
basis of intuition, it is also improper for policy makers to leave the com-
promise between relevancy and consistency to common sense or intuition.
Equity criteria must be selected explicitly because they reflect an histor-
ical trend of the recent past or because they conform to a current ethical
sentiment of particular significance. A proper selection of criteria will
make it possible to anticipate the ethical trend of the near future, accept-
ing a certain lack of specificity in exchange for increased longevity. With
this aoproximated trend as a model, prospective policies can be compared to
see how closely they parallel the sentiments of society. This final compari-
son will naturally involve subjective weightings of values; but, in contrast
to the intuitive approach to policy making, these judgments should be con-
strained as a result of the analysis oulined here.
EQUITY CRITERIA
In a reasonably open political system, social values eventually become
incorporated into social institutions. As a consequence, stable institutions
generally reflect a set of similarly stable social ethics. Likewise, dynamic
institutions usually imply the existence of social values with a growing popu-
lar base. By examining institutions, we should be able to determine both the
durability and potency of certain equity criteria. It may be asserted that
social values fall into a lexicographic hierarchy. Maintenance of public
health, for example, could be held as uncompromisable regardless of economic
or other considerations. In theory, such orderings have easily predictable
effects, but in practice they tend to rely upon less rigid criteria of the
type to be developed in this section. For this reason, we have excluded lexi-
cographic value orderings from the analysis.
In our culture, the following three criteria for judging the equity ef-
fects of policies seem to be particularly influential:
1. Equality: Those policies which reduce income or wealth differences
in the population are seen as equitable.
2. Earned Rewards: Those policies which improve the degree to which
individuals pay for benefits received and are com-
pensated for costs incurred are considered equitable.
3. Least Risk: Policies which increase conservation of resources for
future generations or decrease dependence on technical
processes that may have adverse future consequences are
regarded as equitable.
Equality
In our society, democracy is the accepted form of government. Over the
past two centuries the principle of political equality has been reaffirmed by
continued efforts to make our system conform to that principle in practice as
well as in theory. Democracy, or the equality norm in a political context,
has shown itself to be both durable as a norm and dynamic in its influence.
161
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As might be expected, the increased conformance to the political equality
norm has been paralleled by increased demand for economic equality. Evidence
of this phenomenon can be seen in the implementation of a progressive income
tax, extensive public welfare programs, and an array of more specific anti-
poverty measures. The purpose of these initiatives has been to compensate for
disparities arising from differences in wealth and heritage. From a political
point of view, the amount of economic inequality permissible has been declin-
ing since 1890 (Goode, 1976).
The use of an equality criterion of fairness in evaluating policy is jus-
tified by the pattern of institutional change outlined above. The version of
the equality criterion to be considered here asserts that each individual is
entitled to a similar economic status regardless of the comparative advantages
he may possess. Any policy which in the short run diminishes the difference
between high- and low-income groups in this country will be regarded favorably
under this standard. Standing alone, out of context, this criterion seems
extreme. Absolute equality is not an ideal situation. The use of "equality"
when complemented by the remaining criteria in a policy analysis model, how-
ever, returns this criteria to an appropriate context.
Employing this criterion in pollution, those best able to bear the costs
of control would be expected to finance the appropriate measures, irrespective
of the pollution's source. Further, the elimination of the pollutant should
most benefit the least advantaged.* A poor farmer with steeply sloped fields
would, for example, benefit more from a subsidized terracing program to re-
duce erosion than would a wealthier farmer on level terrain. The subsidy's
cost, on the other hand, would be supported in conformance with the equality
doctrine through a progressive income tax.
It should be noted that while a policy may adhere to the equality criter-
ion in a restricted situation, it may not be egalitarian when seen in a more
general context. The "poor" farmer in the example may be better situated,
financially, than the average income tax payer. Or it may be that the urban
poor would be better served by a job training bill than would the rural poor
by a terracing subsidy program of equal cost. Both of these situations would
be undesirable following the equality norm since the policy would not bring
the greatest benefit to the least advantaged.
Earned-rewards Principle
The nation's economic system is another enduring institution. The theo-
retical rationale associated with that system embodies another set of social
values. One axiom typically aired is that individuals attempt to maximize
utility. That is, a person uses his resources, be they land, labor, or capi-
tal, in such a way as to maximize his satisfaction. With the assumption that
society as an aggregate holds the same values as its members do individually,
we can deduce the even more important precept that a nation should achieve the
greatest benefit or satisfaction for the greatest number of its citizens. If
*The notion that government should benefit the least advantaged most has been
popularized by John Rawls as the "difference principle" (Rawls, 1971).
162
-------
it does not, the government is promoting an inefficient distribution of bene-
fits: the level of satisfaction would rise if appropriate policies were
changed.
Since the satisfaction caused by eating food, for example, is difficult
to measure and impossible to use in interpersonal comparisons, economic theo-
rists have accepted the principle of market evaluation of utility or satisfac-
tion. A good's (or a service's) value is its price in relation to other goods
(or services) in the marketplace. An orange may be worth two apples, or 1,000
bushels of corn may equal the cost of installing a system of land terraces.
By this rationale, people get as much satisfaction from receiving an orange
(or 1,000 bushels of corn) as they do from two apples (or a system of ter-
aces).
Individual economic inputs (i.e., land, labor, and capital) are valued in
our economic system by their contribution to the total value of the final pro-
duct. Thus a product's market value is the sum of its inputs' true costs, in-
cluding reasonable profits. If an input, say labor, is increased by adding
one more hour, the total value of the good produced increases. The difference
between the original total value and the new total value is the worth of the
additional hour's labor. In short, an individual's reward should be propor-
tionate to his contribution.
Our second criterion of equity reflects this aspect of economic theory
and is termed the earned-rewards principle. It states that those who receive
the benefit of a good or service should pay its cost of production. It rests
on the ethic of earned rewards. Forcing someone to accept a cost for which
compensation is not received would be inequitable, as would bestowing a bene-
fit on someone who will not pay its true cost.
The first of two critical factors in applying the earned-rewards princi-
ple is political scope, an element also important in the case of the equality
criterion. The Benthamite goal of the greatest good for the greatest number
can be applied to any convenient division of mankind (Bentham, 1823). For
the present purposes, "greatest number" is presumed to refer to citizens of
this nation. An overall evaluation of benefits and costs must then be made in
a national context. Though farmland erosion into streams may, for example,
prevent certain water uses, if a change in policy altering the situation would
result in a loss to society greater than the gain to society, application of
this principle implies that the alteration in policy would be unwarranted,
since any redistribution of benefits and burdens would be less efficient in
providing the greatest good for the greatest number.
This criterion, in addition to being applied on a national scale, can be,
and commonly is, applied at a more micro level. A policy change can be eval-
uated in terms of whether individuals in society are impacted appropriately.
For example, polluters may be expected to pay the costs of cleaning up, just
as consumers are expected to pay the full costs of the products and services
they purchase. To the extent that polluters are unable to shift the costs of
pollution control through increased product prices or decreased wages for
labor, the earned-rewards principle is synonymous with the "polluter pays"
principle. The latter principle has definite intuitive appeal in that the
163
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polluter is, in some sense, the wrongdoer and is forced to bear the entire
cost of his actions. In practice, however, pollution control is typically
considered an additional cost rather than an unshiftable tax on the polluter's
profits. Hence, some or all of the expense of pollution control will be
shifted, depending upon the level of competition and mobility of capital and
labor in the polluting industry (Pechman, 1977). For the purposes of this
section, it has been assumed that, although shifting occurs, it is not com-
plete: farmers and consumers share the cost of pollution control.
Time is the second critical factor affecting the earned-rewards principle.
Farmland erosion may, for example, be filling up a reservoir with silt.
Should the farmers pay the cost of dredging since the soil loss is one of the
costs of producing the benefit (the crop)? Or should those who benefit from
the reservoir pay the cost since, before the dam blocked the way, silt flowed
harmlessly down the river (ignoring, for the moment, other ill effects)? One
solution to this dilemma is to determine the situation before either the dam
or agriculture affected the river and let that be the benchmark level of silt
from which costs and benefits are calculated. If silt loss from a farmer's
fields is equal to or less than it would be if the land were in a "natural"
forest or grass state, dredging would be the reservoir users' responsibility.
If it exceeded the "natural" level, the cost of dredging this excess would be
assigned to the farmer (Mishan, 1971).
The time or priority issue is often analyzed in terms of property rights
(Coase, 1960; Mishan, 1971). The crucial factor in this interpretation is the
ownership of pollution rights. Simply put, the level of contamination will
vary depending upon whether the polluter or the pollutee holds the property
right to pollute (Mishan, 1971). If it is assumed that farmers have histor-
ically been allowed to drain their lands into neighboring streams regardless
of the effect on water quality and have come to consider this a "right," any
movement toward increased water quality will depend on the appropriation of
some portion of the farmers' "right" to pollute. On the other hand, if reser-
voir users controlled the right to pollute, stream quality would equal or ex-
ceed the "natural" level mentioned in the previous paragraph. If it is judged
that the natural level of pollution is the proper benchmark, equity under the
earned-rewards criterion requires either that polluters pay the cost of sedi-
ment damage in excess of the benchmark or that reservoir users pay for the
privilege of lower-than-natural silt deposition rates.
This earned-rewards approach to costs and benefits requires that we dis-
tinguish between overlapping groups of consumers. Forcing a farmer to pay for
soil conservation may raise the price of his product—corn, for instance.
Since everyone eats corn directly or indirectly, everyone will help pay the
cost of this control measure in proportion to the amount consumed. If the
erosion control were subsidized, taxes, not prices, would go up and, once
again, everyone would be affected. The incidence, however, would be different,
Unless the subsidy were financed by a sales tax or a production tax on corn,
distribution of soil conservation costs would not be proportionate to the
amount of benefit (corn) consumed. Though beneficiaries of subsidy and regu-
latory policies may be the same in the aggregate, the patterns of benefit and
cost incidence differ. As a consequence, a regulation requiring farmers to
reduce soil erosion would be considered superior to a subsidized soil conser-
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vation program. An effluent tax on soil loss, as a tax on production capable
of being shifted to the consumer in the form of increased prices, would also
be regarded favorably under the earned-rewards criterion.
Least-risk Criterion
The two previous criteria are nondeterministic. There is no blatant bias
in their conception of the future: the equality and earned-rewards criteria
can be espoused in relative independence of time factors. They do not implic-
itly predict the future course of social change. Though this characteristic
may be regarded by some as a flaw, it is the basis of their durability. Con-
cepts which attempt to predict the uncertain are generally short-lived.
Our third criterion, nevertheless, anticipates an historical trend. The
fact that the anticipated trend is a physical rather than an ethical one, how-
ever, may make it less unpredictable. The earth has limited resources. De-
pletion of one resource means increased reliance on those remaining. This
means less flexibility and higher costs in meeting the needs of society in the
future, assuming a constant level of technology. As resources are depleted,
the risk that the next shortage may not have an adequate solution is increased.
This viewpoint has had periods of wide popularity. In the late 18th cen-
tury and again in the late 19th century, grim predictions were made about the
effects of resource consumption, especially by the affluent British. In each
instance, the power of technological innovation and the impact of new fron-
tiers were underestimated. The recent resurgence of concern has occurred at a
time when technological alternatives have become increasingly sophisticated.
Because of what is perceived as the radical nature of those alternatives and
because of their uncertain long-term effect, many believe that technological
innovation can no longer safely handle the problems of resource depletion.
The criterion of fairness implicit in this belief is that of least risk
to the majority. Risk could be minimized, for example, by postponing the im-
plementation of an invention until there has been time to discover any adverse
effects, even though the invention would be capable of increasing productivity.
Those supporting this criterion demonstrate an aversion to risk, an aversion
which is generally concentrated in those who are comparatively affluent. The
same risk is often of less significance to those with less at stake. This
follows from the assumption that those individuals deriving a higher-than-
average standard of living from the earth's resources have a higher-than-
average desire to maintain the status quo (Schumacher, 1973). "Average" may
refer to an historical average or to a current national or global median. In
a society supporting this criterion, any policy designed to accelerate re-
source use or employ radical technologies would be considered inequitable to
the majority: the risk would outweigh the possible benefit.
While this rationale may be the prime motivating factor behind the least-
risk criterion, there is another, more altruistic, aspect of the principle.
By adhering to the least-risk ethic, today's society assumes a responsibility
to preserve natural resources for future generations. In the case of soil
erosion, the intensity of production may be reduced at present to assure a
productive resource for future generations. The conservative approach to
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adoption of technology provides an aging process for radical innovations, cur-
ing them of potential long-term ill effects. In terms of equity between gen-
erations, this criterion favors a more even distribution of the earth's natur-
al endowment.
When applied to environmental issues, this standard is characterized by a
preference for low-risk, conventional technology and by a desire to conserve
known resources. The unknown long-term effects of certain chemical fertiliz-
ers and pesticides should encourage a bias toward natural crop growth pro-
cesses (Schumacher, 1973). The rising world population and the fragile con-
stitution of many green revolution plant varieties may also reinforce prefer-
ences for more conservative methods of cultivation. The future cost of reser-
voir dredging or replacement and reductions in soil productivity motivates
programs (such as that of the Soil Conservation Service) which are designed to
keep sediment from reaching the reservoirs. Our state of comparative afflu-
ence makes risk avoidance, by this argument, imperative. This criterion might
be called a maturity ethic encouraging, as it does, conservation and technol-
ogical retrenchment (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975).
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CRITERIA
In Chapter 3 of this report six prospective policies for controlling
nonpoint-source water pollution are presented. To analyze these six alterna-
tives in terms of the criteria developed in this section, we have constructed
three matrices (Tables 53, 54, and 55), highlighting the equity effects of the
various policies on selected societal groupings. The categories within the
"general" perspective offer the most general tests for conformity to the cri-
teria. The more focused "agricultural" and "water users" perspectives present
the equity effects on subgroups within the agricultural sector and on a number
of groups outside agriculture affected by agricultural water pollution.
Each policy has been rated on conformity to a criterion as follows:
strongly consistent ++
consistent +
no effect NE
inconsistent
strongly inconsistent
consistency undertermined U
mixed effects* M
These ratings are done on a subjective basis. The value of the ratings is to
show what can be accomplished in the analysis of equity issues. While there
will be differences of opinion, addressing the issues should be instructive to
policy makers.
This designation can be interpreted as meaning either that some members of
the group are affected "-" and some affected "+", or that the same member is
affected both "-" and "+".
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Table 53
Equity Effects of Alternative Policies Under the Equality Criterion
POLICY
'ERSPECTIVE
1
EDUCATION
50* COST
SHARING FOR
TERRACING
TAX CREDIT
SOIL CONSER-
VATION PLAN
DEVELOPMENT
SOIL CONSER-
VATION PLAN
IMPLEMENTA-
TION
GREENBELT
SENERAL
Consumers of Agri-
cultural Products
Income Tax Payers
AGRICULTURAL
High Soil
Erodability/
Low Soil
Erodability
Land Adjacent
to Streams/
Land Away
from Streams
Owners/
Renters
Current Owners/
Future Owners
CONSERVATION
EQUIPMENT
MANUFACTURERS
NE
dATER USERS
Other Area
Landowners
Municipal Water
Supplies
Reservoir Benefi-
ciaries (flood
control)
Water Recreation
Users
Industrial Water
Users
Commercial
Fishing Industry
++ = strongly consistent
+ consistent
NE = no effect
- = Inconsistent
— - strongly inconsistent
U = consistency undetermined
M mixed effects
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Table 54
Equity Effects of Alternative Policies Under the Earned-rewards Criterion
POLICY
PERSPECTIVE
1
EDUCATION
50% COST
SHARING FOR
TERRACING
TAX CREDIT
SOIL CONSER-
VATION PLAN
DEVELOPMENT
SOIL CONSER-
VATION PLAN
IMPLEMENTA-
TION
GREENBELT
GENERAL
Consumers of Agri-
cultural Products
Income Tax Payers
AGRICULTURAL
High Soil
Erodability/
Low Soil
Erodability
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
Land Adjacent
to Streams/
Land Away
from Streams
Owners/
Renters
Current Owners/
Future Owners
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
CONSERVATION
EQUIPMENT
MANUFACTURERS
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
WATER USERS
Other Area
Landowners
Municipal Water
Supplies
Reservoir Benefi-
ciaries (flood
control}
Water Recreation
Users
Industrial Water
Users
Commercial
Fishing Industry
++ = strongly consistent
+ = consistent
NE = no effect
inconsistent
-- = strongly inconsistent
U consistency undetermined
M mixed effects
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Table 55
Equity Effects of Alternative Policies Under the Least-risk Criterion
POLICY
PERSPECTIVE
1
EDUCATION
50% COST
SHARING FOR
TERRACING
TAX CREDIT
SOIL CONSER-
VATION PLAN
DEVELOPMENT
SOIL CONSER-
VATION PLAN
IMPLEMENTA-
TION
GREENBELT
GENERAL
Consumers of Agri-
cultural Products
Income Tax Payers
AGRICULTURAL
High Soil
Erodability/
Low Soil
Erodability
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
Land Adjacent
to Streams/
Land Away
from Streams
Owners/
Renters
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
Current Owners/
Future Owners
CONSERVATION
EQUIPMENT
MANUFACTURERS
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
NE
WATER USERS
Other Area
Landowners
Municipal
Water Supplies
Reservoir Benefi-
ciaries (flood
control)
Water Recreation
Users
Industrial Water
Users
Commercial
Fishing Industry
++ strongly consistent
+ consistent
NE no effect
inconsistent
strongly inconsistent
U consistency undetermined
M = mixed effects
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Conformity to the Equality Criterion
Table 53 presents the results of using the equality criterion to judge
the extent to which the policies diminish the difference between high- and
low-income groups in this country in the short run. A short-run period of not
more than about five years was chosen to simplify the analysis of policy ef-
fects. Technological, demographic, and other exogeneous changes are likely to
have significant impacts in the long run, altering the importance of any
policy in promoting or inhibiting equality. Those policies requiring conser-
vation measures which would likely raise the cost of food production and con-
sequently raise food prices to consumers, such as policies 5 and 6, rate neg-
atively from this general perspective since the poor spend a greater propor-
tion of their income on food than the rich. Policies 2 and 3 are rated favor-
ably because of the cost-reducing effect of the subsidy or tax credit. The
effects of policies 1 and 4 are "undetermined" since the educational program
on which they rely may result in the adoption of both cost-reducing and cost-
increasing measures. The effect of the cost-sharing policy on taxpayers is
"mixed" since it will raise taxes progressively in accord with the equality
criterion but will confer benefits on farmers who may or may not be the most
disadvantaged. The tax credit plan similarly rates "mixed" with respect to
taxpayers by progressively raising the income-tax level to provide relief for
those wealthy enough to take advantage of it. For both the tax-credit and the
cost-sharing plans, the cost to taxpayers is considered to be significant
while the public costs, including administrative expenses, of the other poli-
cies are assumed to be minor.
The analysis of the agricultural sector was made under the assumption
that farms on erosive soil are less profitable (defined in terms of return to
nonland inputs) than farms on soils without erosion problems and that soil
erosion control measures are not profitable at the farm level, in the short
run.
In our pairings (e.g., high and low erodibility; owners and renters; near
streams and away from streams), we have rated each policy's efficiency in re-
ducing the effect of erosion as a source of income inequality. If a policy
reduces the difference in income between two paired groups, either by increas-
ing low incomes or be reducing high incomes, the policy is given positive rat-
ings on both entries. Mandatory policies 5 and 6 reduce the income of poorer
farmers (high soil erodibility) without affecting the wealthier farmers' in-
come, thus increasing inequality. Therefore, the policies are given a pair of
strongly negative ratings. Policies 1 and 4 are assumed to educate farmers to
opportunities to improve their operations and would thus have a weak positive
effect. Policies 2 and 3 both subsidize the poorer farmers in the adoption of
soil conservation practices on a voluntary basis. Thus, it is likely that
practices which would minimize differences would be adopted.
Since the proximity to streams is not assumed to be correlated with in-
come, all policies are rated U from that perspective. It is assumed that
owners are generally wealthier than the renters who operate their farms, that
owners incur the costs of soil erosion control (and receive any subsidy) but
also benefit from long-term positive effects on land value, and that owners
and renters share in any increase in income that might result from improved
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practices.* Under these assumptions, policies 1 and 4 are consistent with the
criterion since the policies may result in some improvements, at the owner's
expense, with shared benefits. Policies 2 and 3 are similarly rated because
while the subsidy will reduce the cost to the owner, it will stimulate greater
improvements, the benefits of which the renter will share. Policy 5 is
strongly consistent because the owner is forced to incur the full costs and
the renter, who is assumed to be poorer, shares in the benefits. Policy 6
reduces the land in cultivation for both and is therefore undetermined. Since
the relative income position of current and future owners is not clear, the
effects in this dimension are undetermined.
Water-user groups are considered affluent if, in general, their members
have an income higher than the national average. Conservation equipment manu-
facturers and industrial water users are assumed to be comparatively wealthy
on the premise that stockholders, not the employees or the consumers, are the
primary bneficiaries of decreased water treatment costs or increased equipment
sales. Thus, policies 1 through 5 are all rated inconsistent to some degree.
Policy 6 is also inconsistent with respect to industrial users in that water
quality would be improved, but the policy would not affect conservation equip-
ment manufacturers since the improvements would occur through reduced land use.
Given that the poor spend a greater portion of their income on water than the
rich, it is assumed that any reduction in municipal water treatment costs as
a result of increased water quality would be more significant to the poor than
the wealthy. Hence, the erosion control policies are rated as consistent with
the equality criterion from that perspective. Since there is no reason to
expect that landowners in flood control areas and other area landowners are
generally more or less wealthy than average, all policies are rated as mixed.
For this analysis water recreation users and those in the commercial fishing
industry are assumed to be neither more nor less wealthy than average, end
thus the policies are rated "mixed" with respect to the equality criterion.
Variations in the strength of the ratings are due to variations in the
effectiveness of the policies in reducing erosion. Measures which do not man-
date or strongly encourage reduced soil loss receive weaker ratings than those
which, evaluated intuitively or from modeling results, promise greater reduc-
tions in soil erosion.
Conformity to the Earned-rewards Criterion
Conforming to the earned-rewards principle demands a strict, positive
correlation between costs and benefits. The deqree of conform'ty of each of
the six policies is indicated in Table 54.
The full cost of agricultural products, "benefits" produced on the land,
should be reflected in their prices. Soil loss into streams is equivalent to
waste disposal: its cost should be borne by the farmers directly and the con-
sumers indirectly. Policies 5 and 6, whose effects are not primarily the re-
sult of tax-funded programs of persuasion or incentives, transfer the costs to
*The validity of this assumption will depend on the nature of the contract be-
tween the owner and the operator.
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those receiving benefits, in accordance with the criterion. Policies 1 and 4
may encourage the adoption of some practices that result in transfers in the
same direction but to a lesser degree. Policies 2 and 3 do not generate such
transfers since the actions are compensated, and for this reason they are
rated negatively both in terms of consumers and taxpayers. Policies 1, 4, 5,
and 6 would all involve taxpayer costs, but under policies 5 and 6 this would
be a minimal proportion of the total cost.*
In the agricultural sector, policies 1 through 5 are assumed to have
direct effects on farms with low soil credibility. Policy 6 will have neg-
ative effects to the extent that soils that are not erosive are removed from
production to form greenbelts. The extent to which farmers on erosive soil
are encouraged or forced to support soil erosion control determines their rat-
ing. Given the assumption that there is an equal distribution of erosive land
near to and away from streams, it is not clear how policies 1 through 5 should
be rated. Under policy 6, land adjacent to streams is rated mixed since ero-
sive and nonerosive land would be removed from production, in part to control
erosion from other areas. The land away from streams is given a negative rat-
ing because of the reliance on other land to provide the control of sediment
losses. Given the assumed relationship between owners and renters, the poli-
cies are rated in terms of the extent to which landowners are encouraged or
forced to incur costs of reducing soil loss from their land. Since renters
are not assumed to share in the cost of pollution control but do share in any
benefits, policies 1 through 5 are rated in terms of their efficiency in
achieving erosion control. Under policy 6, the renters would share through
reduced land available to farm. If one assumes that the land market will ac-
curately reflect the value of the land, eroded or in good condition, the dis-
tribution of costs between present and future owners should not be affected.
Similarly^ there is no reason to expect effects on the conservation equipment
manufacturers.
From the water users' perspective, any measure which decreases the users'
input costs is consistent with the earned-rewards principle. This judgment is
made on the premise that farmland erosion is higher than the natural or prim-
itive rate. Those policies which decrease the unjustified costs expeditiously
are rated higher to reflect this fact.
Conformity to the Least-risk Criterion
Invoking the least-risk criterion implies that a favorable rating will be
received by policies that encourage the use of historically safe technology
and are effective in conserving resources. The degree to which the six poli-
cies are consistent with this criterion is indicated in Table 55.
For society in general, we would expect food consumers to favor any poli-
cy which conserves arable land. As taxpayers, the general public should pre-
fer those preventative measures designed to avert the more costly programs
which could be required if erosion control were postponed. The public should
*An effluent tax policy would rate highly under this criterion and under the
equality criterion unless the revenue generated was transferred to the wealthy.
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also react negatively to policies they perceive as weak or ineffective in con-
serving resources.
In analyzing this criterion from the "agricultural" perspective, it is
assumed that farmers would evaluate the policies in terms of a responsibility
to maintain the productivity of the soil for future generations. They would
likely believe, however, that society should incur the costs of doing so.
They would rate policy 6 negatively because, except for land near streams, it
does not achieve erosion control, it only improves water quality. Policies 1
and 4 also would be rated low, since they do not assure the maintenance of
productivity. Policies 2 and 3 would be rated positively because incentives
are provided to insure some action and a sharing of costs among taxpayers.
Policy 5 would be positively rated because it reduces productivity, but only
weakly since society does not share in the cost. These ratings hold for ero-
sive soil, either adjacent to or away from streams, and for current landowners.
Future landowners would be expected to rate policies strictly on their effec-
tiveness.
Water users will also rate policies on their appropriateness to the risk
involved. Here the concern would be to generate a high-quality aquatic eco-
system or to maintain reservoir capacity. Each of the policies are rated ac-
cording to their assumed ability to achieve these goals. Education would
likely get the weakest positive rating.
CONCLUSIONS
The equity criteria presented here are meant as guidelines for anticipat-
ing fundamental reactions to environmental control policies. To the extent
that they reflect the society's ethical trend, they should be useful. The
earned-rewards principle, as the norm of earned rewards, represents the peren-
nial, conventional standard. The equality ethic, long an insurgent ideal,
seems at present the most politically vigorous of the criteria. Finally, as
the ethic of affluence and responsibility, the least-risk criterion anticipates
the results of continued "profligate" resource consumption. Together they
compose a model spanning a spectrum of diverse sentiments capable of predict-
ing the equity impact of prospective policies.
Any attempt to summarize the ratings raises the problem of weighting the
criteria and the groups. Since the criteria were generated subjectively,
there is no legitimate basis for assigning weights to criteria. Even if
weights were inferred, perhaps, from revealed preferences on a national scale,
there would be little reason to believe that those weights would be valid in
analyzing smaller groups. If weights could somehow be found for all the cri-
teria for each group, it would still be necessary to formulate a rule for
weighting the relative significance of each group's opinion before a summary
ranking could be determined.
Though general conclusions are not possible because of conflicting rat-
ings and the weighting problem, some comments can be made on the equity impact
of certain policies on certain subgroups. Those who pay income taxes would
likely regard the soil conservation implementation plan as fair under each of
these criteria. From the standpoint of equity, municipal water users are
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expected to view all of the policies favorably, with the tax credit and con-
servation plan implementation programs seen as somewhat better than the others,
The soil conservation plan implementation program appears acceptable, on the
basis of equity, to farm owners in general.
The remaining policies are rated negatively for at least some groups by
some criteria. If one analyzes these ratings, it becomes obvious that the
policies could be improved somewhat before they are adopted and that combin-
ing the elements of more than one policy would, as least in some ways, be
superior.
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CHAPTER 8
LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
The alternative policy approaches discussed earlier raise varying con-
stitutional and statutory issues. This section will examine these alternatives
from a legal standpoint and discuss the relevant constitutional and statutory
problems. For the purposes of this discussion it is helpful to divide the six
alternative policies into two groups: those involving voluntary actions by
farmers and those which compel certain actions. In general, compulsory pro-
grams are potentially more subject to legal constraints, since they raise the
issue of whether such actions violate the protections of the U.S. Constitution.
In addition to these six alternative policies, other policies designed to
minimize nitrogen levels in water will be discussed. In considering policy
implementation and potential challenges to pollution-control legislation at
the state level, the state of Illinois, its constitution, and its laws will be
used as examples.
VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS
Educational Policies
There are few legal constraints to educational policies for the control
of agricultural nonpoint-source (NPS) pollution. There is a long tradition of
state and federal support of educational activities; one example is the com-
bined state and federal support of the Cooperative Extension Service. Clearly,
an intensification of such educational activity would be a legitimate function
of either level of government.
Actions of the state or federal government to compel a farmer to attend
NPS pollution education events would raise constitutional questions. This
issue is not developed further, however, because such an attendance require-
ment is inconsistent with the principal objective of an educational policy:
encouraging voluntary action on the part of farmers through a better aware-
ness of NPS pollution problems and control practices.
Cost-sharing Policies
Although there are few legal constraints to federal cost-sharing programs,
federal legislation in aid of agriculture is confined to that which may be
enacted in the exercise of the limited powers of the federal government.
Article 1, Sec. 8, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the sub-
stantive power to appropriate funds to provide for the general welfare of the
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United States. Congress could also base such authority upon the commerce
clause, U.S. Const. Art. 1,8. Although agriculture cannot be favored with
public aid for individual private enterprise, a certain amount of discrimina-
tion intended to encourage agriculture has been allowed (Liberty Warehouse Co.
v. Barley Tobacco Growers' Co-op Marketing Assoc., 276 U.S. 71 (1927).
The federal government has the authority to participate in subsidy
programs to encourage soil conservation. Typically, these subsidy programs
also include federal regulations which must be met as a prerequisite to re-
ceiving aid. As long as the regulations are reasonable, the federal government
has the power to regulate in connection with its aid programs (Wickard v.
Filbarn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942)).
State authority to provide a subsidy or cost-sharing program for soil
conservation improvements such as terracing would arise from inherent sovereign
powers. Although earlier court decisions often opposed recognition of farmers
as a separate class on the grounds that this classification violated the equal
protection of the laws (Kelleyville Coal Co. v. Harrier, 207 111. 624 (1904)),
modern policy reflects a multitude of farm aid laws which have received judicial
sanction. Farm land may be properly distinguished from other land within
certain limits. It might not even be necessary to distinguish agricultural
land from other land, depending on the type of conservation plan and subsidy
used. Nevertheless, if it is necessary to make that distinction, the distinc-
tion should not cause serious equal-protection arguments.
The constitutionality of a state cost-sharing program could also be chal-
lenged because it would grant public money for an individual use. For example,
several states have offered bounties for persons planting certain trees and
hedges. At least two states, Colorado and Missouri, found these statutes to be
unconstitutional. It seems unlikely, however, that such a result would be
reached with soil conservation subsidies. Although the farmer would benefit
from the improved conservation over a period of time, the immediate benefit
would be to the general public who would enjoy cleaner water. The fact that
the Iowa conservancy law has not been challenged tends to support this view.
Tax-incentive Policies
The federal government faces few constitutional constraints in effecting
a tax-incentive policy. In fact, current tax law provides some incentive for
soil conservation expenditures. Normally, capital expenditures which increase
the value of farmland would not be tax deductible. To encourage conservation,
however, investments in soil conservation projects could be made deductible.
Expenditures in this category have included planting trees to prevent erosion
and filling in gullies.
Under the Internal Revenue Code a farmer may elect to deduct nondepreci-
able capital expenditures incurred to conserve soil and prevent erosion. The
availability of a current deduction is more advantageous than a capitalization
of the expenditure. Other soil conservation expenses may be currently deducti-
ble because they are by their nature expenses of a currently deductible type
rather than capital outlays. Such expenses have included terracing for the
purpose of maintaining productivity where the terracing did not increase the
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value of the land.
A new federal income tax incentive policy would need to provide addition-
al incentives beyond a mere deduction. Such a policy could involve tax
credits; for example, a tax credit equal to 50% of the conservation practice
or equipment costs could be allowed. Such a tax-credit policy would be, in
effect, a cost-sharing policy implemented through the income tax system. Thus,
the earlier discussion of legal constraints upon a cost-sharing policy
generally would be applicable.
The manner of determining the tax credit could raise some legal issues.
For example, if the tax credit is a percent of the actual expenditures on
conservation practices, the calculation of the credit would deal with easily
ascertainable facts. On the other hand, if the credit were based upon lost
income resulting from a less intensive cropping pattern, the calculation of
the credit would be based upon rather amorphous determinations. The latter
approach would be more open to challenge as an arbitrary method.
There are also practical constraints upon a federal income-tax-credit
policy. The Internal Revenue Service would actively resist the introduction
of excessively complex sections into the code. The service would have a
number of political allies among legislators supporting a streamlining of
the tax system. The tax credit policy would therefore need to be as simple
and straightforward as possible.
At the state and local level, there are also few constraints upon a tax
policy. There are also fewer opportunities, however, to implement such a
policy. For example, state sales taxes and local property taxes are major
tax systems for state and local governments. Many states offer tax incentives
in the form of sales- and use-tax exemptions for pollution control facilities.
Such exemptions do provide some incentive for investments in pollution con-
trol equipment which would be subject to the tax in the first place. The
technology for the control of NPS pollution, however, generally does not
employ equipment. Rather, it involves conservation practices and the use of
devices such as terraces, grass waterways, and structures. Because such
technology is generally not subject to the sales and use tax, any exemption
is inconsequential.
Special provisions in property tax laws can also provide some incentive
toward the desired actions. For example, certain desirable improvements to
land can be made exempt from the property tax—that is, the assessed valua-
tion of the property is not increased even though the fair market value of
the property increases because of the improvement. Such an approach is not
readily adaptable to encouraging NPS pollution control because the type of
improvements needed (e.g., terraces, waterways, and structures) do not signi-
ficantly increase land value and hence there is no basis for an exemption.
Such improvements generally do not increase net farm income in the short run,
although they may in the long run.
If the state employs an income tax, there would be some opportunity to
offer tax incentives for pollution-control expenditures. For example, the
state could employ an income tax credit similar to the proposed federal one.
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Such a policy would generally not face significant constitutional problems.
However, since the amount of state income tax paid by a farmer is generally
very small compared with the federal tax, such a policy at the state level
would probably not be very effective. Furthermore, given the financial crises
in many states, it is questionable whether such a policy would be
politically acceptable.
MANDATORY PROGRAMS
The mandatory development and implementation of soil conservation plans
would be very beneficial for a number of reasons. First, such a policy would
force the owner of land to be aware of existing conservation problems and the
role which he must necessarily play if those problems are to be solved.
Secondly, a comprehensive conservation plan would, by its nature, involve
evaluating the various alternatives available to control soil runoff and
other environmental matters and hopefully would lead to a logical choice of
control techniques best suited to the affected land. Finally, the require-
ment for conservation plans could be placed into the existing framework of
soil- and water conservation districts so that advice, consultation, and
aid could be given during the drafting and implementation of such plans.
Unfortunately, mandatory conservation plans imply a forced action.
However, it is unlikely that such forced action would be found unconstitu-
tional, assuming that the required action was expected to make farmers more
aware of their role in reducing nonpoint-source pollution.
Mandatory Implementation of Soil Conservation Plans
Requiring the implementation of a soil conservation plan would be sub-
ject to some constitutional constraints. The constraints would depend upon
whether the policy was implemented by the federal or the state government.
A separate analysis will therefore be devoted to each level of government.
The analysis assumes that the required implementation of a soil conservation
plan would involve some limitation upon row-crop agriculture. (This assump-
tion is made because such limitations would be the most severe of the require-
ments. Other means-of achieving the plan would be less restrictive on the
farmer.)
A most critical federal constitutional issue that would arise with any
mandatory implementation policy would be the Fifth Amendment prohibition
against the taking of property for public use without just compensation:
"...nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compen-
sation." Assuming row-crop agriculture to be one of the most productive
techniques of agriculture, it might be maintained that legislation prohibit-
ing the use of that technique amounts to a taking of the property in vio-
lation of the Fifth Amendment, since the most profitable use of the land
would no longer be possible. This argument would raise a variety of distinct
legal issues.
It is often assumed that the provisions of the Fifth Amendment extend to
all actions by any level of government. Such is not the case, however.
Although the Fifth Amendment contemplates proper compensation in situations
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involving the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, the
"Constitutional provisions against the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation impose no barrier to the proper exercise of
the police power" (29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain 6 (1965)). To determine whether
row-crop restrictions would violate the Fifth Amendment, it therefore becomes
essential first to ascertain the distinctions between the power of eminent
domain and the police power, and second to determine under which power the
federal government would be acting if it were to impose restrictions on the
use of row-crop agriculture.
Eminent domain has been defined as "...the right or power to take private
property for public use; the right of the sovereign, or of those to whom the
power has been delegated to condemn private property for public use, and to
appropriate the ownership and possession thereof for such use upon paying the
owner a due compensation" (29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain 1 (1965)). The power of
eminent domain is "an inherent and necessary attribute to sovereignty, exist-
ing independently of constitutional provisions and superior to all property
rights" (29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain 2 (1965)). In the United States, the power
of eminent domain may be exercised by the federal government in furtherance of
powers conferred on it in the U.S. Constitution, by the individual states
within their territorial boundaries, or by various political bodies within the
states to which the power has been properly delegated by the state legislature
(29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain 18-19 (1965)).
The police power "is the exercise of the sovereign right to a government
to promote order, safety, health, morals, and the general welfare of society
within constitutional limits" (16 C.J.S. Constitution 174 (1956)). Though
the police power, like the power of eminent domain, is a power inherent in all
governments, in the United States it is a power reserved to the states by the
Constitution. (It should be noted, however, that a comparable federal power
is to be found in the general-welfare clause of the Constitution; Article I,
Section 8.) But the police power is not an unlimited power. As a rule, the
police power extends only to the governmental function of regulation; regu-
lation for the welfare of society (16 C.J.S. Constitution 175 (1956)).
Obviously, it is often very difficult to establish whether a government
is acting under the power of eminent domain or under its police power. No
magic formula exists. The more severe the loss to an individual property
owner—the more severely the use of private property is restricted—the more
likely it is that a court will find that the regulating body has acted under
the power of eminent domain and not under the police power; that is, the more
likely it is that a court will find an improper exercise of police power, deem
there to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment, and therefore require
compensation.
In applying the eminent domain/police power dichotomy to restrictions
placed upon row-crop agriculture, three particular issues arise: Is there
a taking?; Are the restrictions reasonable?; Is there a public purpose for
the regulations?
A crucial matter would be whether row-crop restrictions placed upon
agriculture in certain areas would constitute a taking. It is therefore
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necessary to review how the judiciary has dealt with other situations in
which regulations have been imposed, The most readily apparent parallel to
the placing of restrictions on the cultivation of land is that of zoning.
Since 1926, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the need for muni-
cipalities and states to regulate, by zoning, certain activities within their
boundaries to protect the health, safety, welfare, and morals of their citizens
(Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 71 L. Ed, 303, 54 A.L,R. 1016
(1926)).
It has since been stated frequently that there is a strong presumption of
validity with zoning regulations (Van Alstyne, "The Search for Inverse Con-
demnation Criteria", 44 So. Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1970)) and there is little
doubt today that most limitations placed upon the use of property under pro-
perly adopted zoning regulations, even if quite severe in their application,
do not constitute takings. Certainly, it is equally clear that an ordinance
which would deprive an owner of the entire use of his property would be an
unconstitutional taking (Anderson, American Law of Zoning 66 0972)). Thus,
with zoning, most judicial analysis has by necessity been on a case-by-case
basis.
Still, certain examples may be cited which give an indication of how
courts view the taking issue in zoning: In Goldbladt et at, v. Town of
Hampstead (369 U.S. 590 (1961)), the U,S, Supreme Court upheld a city ordin-
ance which in effect prevented the owner of land which had been used as a
quarry for years from continuing excavation, despite the fact that the
ordinance prevented use of the land in the most financially rewarding way
(the ordinance forbad future excavation to a depth below that of the water
table, a practive which the plaintiff had been undertaking for years and
which, as a result, had created a 25-acre lake). In Kopetzke et al, v.
County of San Mateo, (396 F. Supp, 1044 N.D, Calif,, 0975)), a county board's
moratorium on the issuance of building permits to owners of land in certain
areas of apparent soil instability was upheld and no taking was found, once
again despite the fact that the value of the property was reduced consider-
ably as a result. In Petterson v. City of Naperville (9 111, 2d 233 (1956)),
city ordinances requiring the placement of curbs and sewers in roads built by
private contractors within new subdivisions were not found to be takings,
However, in Nashville, C, and St, Louis Ky v. Walters (297 U«S, 405 (1S39)),
a taking was deemed to have occurred when a town ordinance was passed which
required railroads to pay one-half the cost of eliminating grade crossings
(i.e., building overpasses and underpasses). And finally, in Kirby v. Rock-
ford (363 111. 531, 2 N.E. 2d 842 (1936)), a drastic financial loss resulting
from zoning was found to be too extreme, and thus a taking was held to have
occurred.
Surely, there is ample reason to use the long-standing validity of zoning
regulations to justify the implementation of row-crop restrictions. Both are
sets of rules which presumably are meant to benefit the public health, safety,
and welfare. Nonetheless, the zoning analogy is not a perfect parallel.
Though cases exist where no taking has been found even when the ordinance in
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question has been imposed upon a previously unregulated party,* most zoning
contemplates the granting of variances and exceptions for nonconforming uses
existing at the time the ordinance is implemented. Since row-crop restric-
tions would not be effective if nonconforming uses were allowed (because those
exceptions would literally "swallow up" the regulation), it must be assumed
that little if any provision would be made for those individuals presently
using their property in a manner which the proposed restrictions would prohi-
bit (other than perhaps a time table for compliance). There is therefore a
definite distinction between zoning and row-crop restrictions.
Very important parallels to the issue of taking as it applies to row-crop
restrictions may be seen in other pollution-control areas. Numerous federal
and state courts have upheld legislative restrictions placed on point-source
polluters (City of Monmouth v. Pollution Control Board, 57 111. 2d 482, 313
N.E. 2d 161 (1974); Chicago v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, 52 111. 2d 320
(1972); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)). Significantly,
Illinois courts have upheld restrictions in pollution matters aside from
point-source pollution. One pertinent example is the Illinois Coal Operators
Association v. P.C.B., 59 111. 2d 305 (1974). In that case, the appellant was
unsuccessful in efforts to have the noise-pollution restrictions placed upon
the operation of its facility declared unconstitutional as takings.
Reviewing the issue of taking, it would appear that the courts would not
find there to be an unconstitutional taking by mere application of an other-
wise proper row-crop-restriction law. Admittedly, there may be circumstances
where the implementation of row-crop restrictions might be so onerous that a
court would find these to be an unconstitutional taking as those restrictions
are applied to a particular individual. It seems, however, that in light of
the numerous zoning cases and pollution cases, most courts would be strongly
disinclined to hold particular row-crop restrictions to be invalid as takings,
preferring instead to allow such restrictions as a valid exercise of the
police power. /
Ancillary to the issue of taking is the issue of reasonableness. For
any restriction or regulation to be justified under the police power or the
power of eminent domain, it must be reasonable. As stated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Lawton v. Steele (152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)),
To justify the State in. . .interposing its authority on
behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
means are reasonably necessary for accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted a similar view in Sherman-Reynolds, Inc.
(47 111. 2d 323, 327 (1970)).
To be a valid exercise of the police power, the enact-
ment of the legislation must bear a reasonable relation
*Two examples are the previously cited Goldbladt case and also Hadachrech
v. Los Angeles (239 U.S. 394, 36 S. Ct 193, 60 L. Ed. 348 (1915)), a case
where the City of Los Angeles annexed land including property used by Had-
achrech to operate a brick yard and subsequently ordered the brick yard
shut down because its operation violated city ordinances.
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to the public interest sought to be protected, and the
means adopted must be a reasonable method to accomplish
such objective.
The Illinois Supreme Court commented in the same case that it is firmly
established that questions of doubt as to reasonableness will be resolved
in favor of the body imposing the regulation in question.
Even this rule is not applied with strict precision,
for this court has often said that debatable ques-
tions as to reasonableness are not for the courts
but for the legislative...Goldbladt et al. , v. Town
of Hampstead, 369 US 590, 574. Where the reasonable-
ness of the legislation is fairly debatable the courts
will not interfere with legislative judgment and will
not substitute their judgment for that of the legis-
lative department.
Thus, if row-crop restrictions may be demonstrated to be even "debatably"
reasonable, in theory, they would be upheld against attacks made on a rea-
sonableness ground.
Reviewing the application of the standard set by the courts, it seems
likely that row-crop restrictions would not be found to be invalid on the
basis of unreasonableness. There seems to be clear congressional and legis-
lative history establishing the need for control of nonpoint-source pollution
from agricultural runoff. Limiting the use of row-crop agriculture in areas
of high runoff potential would significantly reduce soil loss from runoff.
Consequently, controls placed upon row-crop agriculture would be deemed
reasonable as a matter of course.
The last issue which must be dealt with in this area is whether there
would be found to be a public purpose behind the imposition of row-crop
restrictions. This issue would appear to be the most easily resolved of all
of those arising under the Fifth Amendment.
As shown earlier, both the power of eminent domain and the police power
require that legislation applied under these powers be for a public purpose.
Property may not be taken under eminent domain for the sole satisfaction of
a private party 4 (Water and Water Rights, supra.) 56 (R.E. Clarke, ed). Like-
wise, a regulation may not be imposed under the police power for a nonpublic
purpose (16 C.J.S. Constitution 174 (1956)).
With row-crop restrictions, there is little doubt that the purpose is
solely one of a public nature. The whole theory behind any such restriction
is not to benefit any individual but rather to help the population as a
whole by regulating the amount of pollution entering the public waters via
soil runoff and by preserving our soil resources for future generations.
Indeed, it seems unlikely that a more "public" purpose for a particular
bit of legislation could be found.
In summary, it does not appear likely that the Fifth Amendment prohibi-
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tion on the taking of property without compensation would severely restrain
the imposition of row-crop restrictions. Such legislation would fall within
the police power of the state and would not be considered a taking. Addition-
ally, it does not appear that the matters of reasonableness or public purpose
would severely limit the applicability of row-crop limitations so long as the
restrictions were kept within a rational framework.
Due-process Restraints Upon State Action
The second federal constitutional matter which might be expected to arise
with the imposition of row-crop limitations by the state is that of the due-
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
...nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.
Restrictions placed upon the use of row-crop agriculture by the state, the
argument might run, result in a deprivation of property without proper consid-
eration of due-process requirements.
Significantly, most of the issues which arise under the due-process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment are issues which also arise under the Fifth Amend-
ment just-compensation clause. It has long been recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court and the state supreme courts that rules, regulations, or res-
trictions properly promulgated by exercise of the police power will not be
found to violate due process (16 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law 295 (1964)),
Thus, the very issue underlying attacks based on the due-process clause is
whether there is a proper exercise of the police power; that is, whether the
exercise of the police power is reasonable.
The standard of reasonableness used to decide a due-process argument is
the same as that used to decide an initial challenge to the police power.
When the courts decide that the use of the police power in a given situation
is reasonable, it is routinely decided that no due-process violation has
occurred. Once the hurdle of reasonableness is cleared as to the implementa-
tion of the row-crop restrictions by the state, arguments that such restric-
tions violate an individual's due-process rights will fail.
A final constitutional contention that might be advanced is that row-
crop restrictions amount to a denial of equal protection in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is a possible argument in a situation where a parti-
cular landowner is affected somewhat more severely by the restrictions than
are other landowners. Placed in this framework, the basis of the argument
would be that row-crop restrictions violate the Fourteenth Amendment because
they do not treat all landowners equally and, in effect, tend to be discri-
minatory.
As with due-process considerations, the equal-protection clause is not
meant to limit ordinances, rules, regulations, or restrictions properly enacted
under the police power (16 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law 297 (1964)). Of
course, "any attempted exercise of police power which results in a denial of
equal protection of the laws is invalid" (16 Am. Jr. Constitutional Law
297 (1964)). Thus, the key question concerning equal protection becomes,
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How equal is equal? That is, how uniformly must a law be applied?
In the area of regulation, the answer to the above question seems to be
rather clear. As long as the ordinance in question can be shown to have a
reasonable relation to the people affected by the scope of its classification,
and as long as the restrictions imposed are not arbitrary or irrational, the
statute should not be found to violate the equal-protection clause.
Greenbelt Development
One unique approach to controlling soil runoff is to require the placing
of greenbelts between cultivated fields and bodies of water. Though the
resolution of the issues which would arise with implementation of this
approach is not necessarily clear, the identity of those issues is rather
apparent.
The first legal issue which would be argued if greenbelts were required
is that the police power had been exceeded and that land had been taken with-
out just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution. A greenbelt policy would place a definite restriction on the use
of particular land.
A second legal issue which would arise is that of due process. For the
farmer who has considerable acreage surrounding water, legislation requiring
greenbelts passed without that farmer's active input into the legislative
process would be quite harsh and would quite likely violate his due-process
rights.
Equal protection considerations would also seem to limit the effective-
ness of the greenbelt alternatives. If used as a sole method of runoff con-
trol, greenbelts would obviously have their most serious effect on the person
with the most acreage surrounding water. Though legislation need not affect
all people completely equally, the peculiar hardships which legislation such
as this would impose on some people would arguably put greenbelt legis-
lation into the realm of denying equal protection.
It must not be assumed, however, that greenbelts are a bad alternative
for pollution control, If a significant relationship could be shown between
the prevention of sedimentation and the need for a "buffer zone," certain
legal objections would fail. It is interesting to note that a likening of
greenbelts to pollution control devices might well be one way of overcoming
constitutional objections to the implementation of greenbelt controls,
Still, it appears that the greatest strength of the greenbelt concept
lies in either encouraging voluntary implementation or in including it as
part of a total control concept, Greenbelts might be a very good alternative,
and, if offered as part of a package upon implementation of gross-soil-loss
restrictions or mandatory conservation plans, might prove valuable.
POLICIES DESIGNED TO CONTROL NITROGEN
Nitrogen Restrictions
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One of the first points that should be determined when considering non-
point-source pollution restrictions, whether at the state or federal level, is
whether the restrictions should be statutory or administrative standards.
Statutory restrictions would definitely be preferable from a legal standpoint.
Courts have traditionally granted more deference to legislative determinations
than to administrative regulations. This preference is especially important
in the area of nitrogen fertilizer restrictions or taxes, since at this time
there is only limited evidence that high levels of nitrogen in rural waters
result primarily from nitrogen fertilizers or that those high levels present
a health or pollution hazard.*
With the recent surge of environmental regulations, the courts have been
examining agency actions more and more closely. This examination requires an
analysis of the environmental consequences of both the action itself and a
failure to act (122 U. Pa. L.R. 509, (1974)). The eighth circuit used a good-
faith balancing of competing interests in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Engineers (470 F. 2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1072
(1972)), and held that the action could be enjoined if the agency balance was
arbitrary. Other circuits have refused to review good faith judgments and
agency substantive decisions (Ely v. Velde, 451 F- 2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971);
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F. 2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971)). The bal-
ancing test, which is always subjective, is particularly so in this area,
since environmental costs are more qualitative than quantitative and since the
assessment methods are not refined.
Even after the court has determined that the regulations are within the
zone of reasonableness, it will still refuse to enforce them if it feels there
has been insufficient consideration of nonenvironmental factors. This aspect
of review could be significant if an attempt was made to impose harsh nitrogen
restrictions which would substantially reduce grain yields. In International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus (478 F. 2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973)), the court
scanned global economic consequences for the overall economy if the EPA
maintained what the court viewed as an overly onerous auto-emission standard.
While all courts might not be willing to go as far as the D.C. circuit, it
would appear that the agency would have difficulties supporting nitrogen
restrictions under any of the tests used unless it was possible to obtain more
substantial data indicating that high levels of nitrogen in water supplies are
dangerous.
The court of appeals for the eighth circuit granted, pending appeal, a
stay of an injunction to stop any asbestos discharge unless the actual exist-
ence of, and not just the potential for, a health hazard was proven (Reserve
Mining Co. v. U.S.A. (498 F. 2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974)). The court felt that
it was improper to take judicial notice of the unknown. The court suggested
that it might be proper for the legislature to protect society from those
unknown risks but that the court could not do so without the necessary proof.
*Aldrich, S.R. Perspectives on nitrogen in agriculture: food production and
environmental implications. Paper presented at the American Association for
the Advance of Science Meetings, 20 February 1976, Boston, Mass.
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In other words, what the legislature could simply say was a health hazard the
administrative agency would be forced to prove,
While the eighth circuit probably represents the more traditional view,
some courts, in response to recent public concern about the pollution problem,
have cited legislative action such as the Federal Environmental Pesticide
Control Act of 1972, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 and the 1970 Clean Air Act as a clear statement of congressional intent
to shift regulator emphasis to a more extensive consideration of potential
health and environmental effects, A risk-benefit approach which allows a
margin of safety has been emerging. This margin of safety compensates for any
scientific lack of knowledge and allows regulations of products which are
potentially harmful but whose harm is not presently provable,
The present trend is away from the nineteenth-century attitude that
development should be encouraged at any cost and toward a more wary approach
of weighing the risks of future injury against any benefits of present ex-
ploitation of property. One problem of putting this new philosophy into the
old judicial framework is the requisite standard of proof. Causal relation-
ships in environmental proofs get so technical and complicated that lay per-
sons, including judges, tend to label them as merely speculative (48 S, Cal.
L. Rev. 371 (1974)).
In contrast to the close examination to which administrative regulations
are subjected, the courts tend to give complete deference to congressional
determinations. As long as the end is legitimate (as unpolluted water cer-
tainly should be) statutory fertilizer control need only be a reasonable way
of achieving pure water if it is to be upheld by the courts. As the United
States Supreme Court stated in Berman v, Parker (348 U.S. 26 (1954)), H, . .
when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in
terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary?
is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation,
whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of Columbia or
the states legislating concerning local affairs,"
If it is established that nitrogen in the water supply is determined to
be a health hazard and that a major source of such nitrogen ts fertilizer run-
off, then a per-acre restriction or nitrogen should be a legitimate regulation
at either the state of federal level,
Restrictions at the State Level
Regulation of nitrogen application should be within the police powers of
the state. The states have the power to impose reasonable regulations to
protect the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public, First,
the corn-belt model analysis reported in Chapter 4 indicates that limiting
the nitrogen applied per acre to 100 pounds only decreased corn yield by an
estimated three percent, while limiting application to fifty pounds/acre,
a severe nitrogen restriction, decreased corn yield by only an estimated 13
percent. Second, even though limiting the amount of nitrogen applied de-
creased the corn yield by 13 percent, the estimated yield of soybeans was only
cut by nine percent. Third, while the fifty pounds/acre restriction reduced
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corn yield by 13 percent, this reduced yield increased the price of corn per
bushel by an estimated 20 percent. Instead of reducing the profitability of
farmland and being an unjust taking, the nitrogen restriction might actually
increase profitability because not only would the farmer receive a higher price
for his corn, but he would save money by using less fertilizer.
These estimates by yields and prices were based on the assumption that
restrictions would be placed on the whole corn belt; the price increase per
bushel of corn would be less if the restrictions were limited to a single
state. Even so, the economic consequences of a fifty pounds/acre restriction
would not be great enough to be considered by the court as a taking of prop-
erty which would require compensation. In the present atmosphere of abundant
land-use regulations, as long as there is a legitimate public purpose, a
taking is found only in extreme situations where the regulations render the
land almost totally worthless. These nitrogen restrictions do not even ap-
proach that extreme.
Once the state legislature decides to use its police power to regulate
nitrogen application, the legislation still must satisfy the requirements of
the state constitution. Challenges to the validity of the statute can be
minimized by careful drafting. It should be precisely stated that the purpose
of the statute is the protection of the public health and welfare, because the
purpose is the first thing that courts consider when a statute is challenged.
Using Illinois as an example, three aspects of legislation which are frequent-
ly challenged under the state constitution are due process, equal protection,
and special legislation.
Due process should no longer be a problem to environmental legislation
in Illinois. In 1974, an Illinois appellate court said that the due-process
guarantee is modified by reasonable exercise of the police power by the
legislature to regulate or prohibit anything harmful to the welfare of the
people (Freeman Coal Mining Corp. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 21
111. App, 3d 157, 313 N.E. 616 (1974)), Unless the Supreme Court of Illinois
rules to the contrary, that statement is a favorable precedent for environ-
mental legislation in Illinois.
The equal-protection clause of the Illinois Constitution should not
create problems for the proposed legislation either. The courts have gener-
ally used the 'conceivable basis' standard for reviewing statutes. A person
challenging a statute must show that the classification is arbitrary and that
no set of facts support that classification (People ex Tel. Vermilion County
Conservation District v. Lenover, 43 111. 2d 209, 251 N.E. 2d 175 (1969)).
The court has said that classification is primarily a legislative function
with which there should be no judicial interference except to determine
whether the legislative action is clearly unreasonable (DuBois v. Gibbons,
2 111. 2d 392, 118 N.E. 2d 295 (1954)). The only foreseeable problem with
the per-acre nitrogen restriction would arise if animal waste runoff was de-
termined to be the major source of nitrogen in the water (as suggested by
Smith in Agriculture and the Quality of Our Environment, 173, 180, and 185)
while the only burden for nitrogen control was placed on crop farmers. A pol-
lution control permit system is in effect for large, confinement livestock
operations. The crop farmers might then have an equal-protection argument, but
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if the courts follow their precedent, the law should still be considered a
valid legislative determination.
Article 4, Sec. 13 of the Illinois constitution prohibits the General
Assembly from passing any special or local legislation. This provision is
similar to the equal-protection clause. Discussing the limitations which the
special-legislation clause imposes, the Illinois Supreme Court has said, "A
Statute may be constitutional*though the legislature did not extend.its pro-
visions to all cases that might be reached" (Youhas v. Ice, 56 111. 2d 497,
309 N.E. 2d 6 (1974)). The court then cited an earlier opinion which stated,
"if the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be
overthrown merely because there are other instances to which it might have
been applied" (Union Cemetery Association v. Cooper, 414 111. 23, 33 (1953)).
The feedlot versus fertilizer situation previously mentioned would again be
the only foreseeable complication.
In conclusion, a properly drafted per-acre nitrogen restriction should
be a valid assertion of Illinois's police powers and should not violate the
due-process, equal-protection, and special-legislation provisions of the
Illinois Constitution provided it is established that nitrogen in water is a
major source.
This/type of law apparently does not violate any existing legislation.
The new Illinois Environmental Protection Act may even provide authority for
a law restricting the amount of fertilizer applied. Title III: Water Pollu-
tion - Acts Prohibited says: "no person shall: . . . (d) deposit any contam-
inants upon the land in such place and manner so as to create a water pollu-
tion hazard." If proof is available that excessive nitrogen application
creates a water-pollution hazard, then limitations on fertilizer application
could be .set up under the existing law. . .
Restrictions at the Federal Level
Although technically the federal government does not have the police
powers which were reserved for the states in the Tenth Amendment, in practice
the federal government exercises powers in the nature of police powers. The
U.S. possesses whatever power is appropriate to the exercise of any attribute
of sovereignty specifically granted it by the Constitution. Some of the fed-
eral regulatory measures have been sustained as arising under the general
welfare provision of the federal Constitution or under Article IV, Sec 3
granting Congress the power to make all needful rules and regulations respect-
ing the territory or other property belonging to the United States. Whatever
the authority relied on, previous congressional legislation in the area of
environmental control has been upheld and enforced by the courts.
A White House administrative order created the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) to handle the details and technical decisions of
its campaign for a cleaner environment. Although criteria such as the per-
acre nitrogen restriction would probably be issued by the USEPA and not voted
on by Congress itself, the regulation would be within the scope of P.L.
92-500. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendment mandates that state
action be taken at all levels (federal, state and local) so as to eliminate
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water pollution by 1985. Sec, 304(e)(2) requires the administrator to issue
processes, procedures, and methods to control pollution resulting frcm agri-
cultural activities including runoff from fields and crops. The courts have
been very cooperative in enforcing the various regulations imposed as a re-
sult of P.L. 92-500, and in fact have read the law more expansively than the
administrator in several instances (People of the State of California v.
E.P.A., 511 F. 2d 963 (1975); National Resources Defense Council Inc. v.
Train and the E.P.A., 396 F.A. 1386 (1975)). It is very unlikely that a per-
acre nitrogen restriction would be held invalid at the federal level because
Congress lacked the power to regulate such a substance.
Congress has imposed a similar type of restriction on farmers under
P.L. 86-139 as a means to control certain insecticides. The nitrogen limit-
ation should be a relatively small burden because it only restricts excessive
nitrogen application—it is not a complete prohibition of use as in the case
of insecticides.
There is a presumption that all legislation passed is constitutionally
valid. A law restricting the amount of nitrogen applied per acre could be
challenged as an interference with property rights. The United States Con-
stitution protects property rights, but all property is held subject to such
reasonable restraints and regulations as the legislature has established to
protect the safety, health, and general welfare of the public. Invasion of
property rights can only be justified by the presence of a public interest
(Newland v. Child, 93 Idaho 530, 254 P, 2d 1066 (1953)). Since there is
clearly a public interest in unpolluted water, this law should be a valid
regulation of property rights.
The other possible challenges to this regulation would be a denial of
due process and equal protection or an uncompensated taking. The due process
and equal protection agruments would be handled at the federal level in a
manner similar to that used at the state level. Those arguments should not
be a real threat to the validity of this law as long as it applies to all
land equally. Since the law would be applied nationally and not to an
individual state, it would be less of an economic burden if imposed at a
federal level than at the state level and, as previously discussed, it might
actually generate higher farm income.
While this law would not violate any existing legislation, it would
mean a policy change for the Congress and the Department of Agriculture. The
U.S. government has a history of encouraging the development and use of fer-
tilizers. The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act provides for pay-
ments and grants-in-aid for enhancement of soil fertility and the purchase of
fertilizers. The Internal Revenue Code provides a tax deduction as a business
expense for expenditures on fertilizers. The TVA is empowered to develop,
manufacture, and sell fertilizer. The War and National Defense Law has spec-
ial provisions for the development of fertilizers in relation to ammunition.
In 1973, low-income persons in California brought suit against the
Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of the Interior, and other official: to
require them to take action to control water pollution caused by ag- .cultural
users of pesticides and fertilizers. The plaintiffs were concerned with the
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dangerous after-effects of these substances which caused a high level of ni-
trate in the well water used for consumption and bathing. The plaintiffs were
denied the remedy they sought, which was to prohibit federal agencies from
giving subsidies and loans to users of agricultural chemicals (Kings County
Economic Community Development Association et al. v. Hardin, 478 F. 2d 278
(1973)). This case points out the anomaly involved when the government, on the
one hand, encourages the use of fertilizers and, on the other hand, discour-
ages, or even makes illegal, the pollution resulting from that use.
Federal Nitrogen Tax
The imposition of excise taxes is generally held to be within the power
of the legislature unless specifically restrained by the constitution. Art-
icle I, Sec. 8(1) of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to lay and
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. The federal government has pre-
sently imposed several taxes of a regulatory nature, similar to the proposed
nitrogen tax.
The federal excise tax on fuels has essentially a regulatory function.
The fuel tax is truly a use tax, since for some uses a fuel, such as for
tractors, credit is allowed for taxes paid while for other uses, such as car
travel, it is not. The gasoline tax is imposed at the manufacturer's level.
A federal tax on nitrogen would be preferable to a state tax for several
reasons. First, implementation would be easier because it could be applied
at the manufacturer level on all nitrogen fertilizer produced. Second, if all
nitrogen produced were taxed, the problem of smuggling across state lines
would be avoided. The state cigarette taxes and alcohol taxes are evidence
of the problems which arise when adjacent states tax a product at different
rates (81 Yale Law Jrn., July (1972)). Third, it would be more equitable if
all farmers functioned under the same burden. Fourth, the short-term effect
of a state tax on nitrogen may have only a very minimal effect on the amount
of nitrogen applied with a tendency for the farmers in that state to absorb
the increased cost, while a federal tax would have a tendency to reduce the
application with the knowledge that the national production will drop and
prices should increase. Also, the long-term response to nationally increased
nitrogen fertilizer prices may be a technological advance.
As with the per-acre nitrogen restriction, the nitrogen tax imposed at
the federal level would involve a policy change. In this instance the govern-
ment would be imposing an excise tax on a substance which actually qualifies
as a legitimate expense deduction. The same is partially true, however, for
the fuel tax. That tax is imposed on diesel fuel which is used by truckers
and which is a legitimate business expense for them. Also, research and de-
velopment benefits are given to oil investors, a situation comparable to that
of providing benefits for fertilizer development.
Nitrogen Tax at the State Level
Another proposal is to impose a state tax on nitrogen. The character of
the tax imposed depends on the legislative intent, the practical operation,
and the actual effect. Since the purpose of the tax is to impose an economic
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limitation upon the amount of nitrogen used, rather than to raise revenue, the
tax would technically be an exercise of the state's police power and not its
taxing power. The constitutional restrictions applicable to the taxing power
are not imposed upon a regulatory tax (16 Am. Jur. 2d sec. 265, p. 519 (1964)).
The public purpose required for the police power is less than that required
for state taxing power. In this sense the same requirement that the means be
reasonable would apply to the nitrogen tax as it would to the nitrogen re-
striction. The expense imposed should be taken into consideration in estimat-
ing the reasonableness of a statute enacted under the police power. Pre-
sumably the nitrogen tax, however, would be set at a level which would dis-
courage excessive use of nitrogen rather than all use. The U.S. Supreme Court
has said that the cost and inconvenience would have to be very great before
these factors would become elements in considering whether such an exercise
of police power is proper (Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685 (1913)).
The 14th amendment provisions do not interfere with the proper exercise of a
state's police power (Durant v. Dyson, 271 111. 382, 111 N.E. 143 (1916)).
If the revenue collected from the nitrogen tax went into the general fund,
the police power would be the only authority required, If, however, the money
collected was earmarked for removing nitrogen from water or for some other
type of effort to correct pollution, then the taxation would constitute a
mixture of the state's police power and its taxing power and the regulation
would have to conform to the tax-power requirement.
There is no historical precedent in Illinois for a regulatory tax under
the state's taxing power because prior to 1969 the courts interpreted the
1870 constitution as limiting the General Assembly's taxing power to those
taxes, which were specifically enumerated: property taxes, occupation taxes
and franchise taxes. The 1970 constitution authorized the General Assembly
to raise revenue . . . except as limited or otherwise provided in the consti-
tution. The only apparent limitations are reasonableness of the classifica-
tions and uniformity of taxes within a class.
The states have wide discretion in making classifications to produce
reasonable systems of taxation. The only two constitutional standards which
the state must meet are equality and uniformity. The U.S. Supreme Court has
said that the equal-protection clause does not impose an iron rule of equal-
ity, which would prohibit the flexibility required for state taxation schemes.
Rather, a state may vary the rate of excise upon various products and will
not be required to maintain a precise scientific uniformity with reference to
use or value (Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 35 L. Ed.
351, 93 S. Ct. 1001 (1973)).
In this respect the tax on nitrogen and not other fertilizers should be
a reasonable classification. In 1952 a use tax imposed by the state of Il-
linois was determined to be reasonable and not a violation of the equal-pro-
tection clauses even though it classified cigarettes apart from other tobacco
(Johnson v. Halpin, 413 111. 257, 108 N.E. 2d 350 (1952)). From the stand-
point of water pollution, nitrogen is distinguishable from other fertilizers
because it readily leaches from the soil.
The requirement of a public purpose under the state taxing power refers
191
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to the use made of the revenue, not the motivating purpose of the legislature
(A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, Washington, 292 U.S. 40 (1933)). Hence, if the
money collected from the nitrogen tax were earmarked for some special purpose,
then that purpose must qualify as a legitimate effort to directly promote the
welfare of the community.
The nitrogen tax in Illinois would probably be in the form of a selective
sales tax for Illinois retailers plus a selective use tax for all nitrogen
bought in other states and brought into Illinois. The state has inherent
power to enact sales and use tax laws.' Illinois has, in fact, enacted both
a general sales tax (Chapter 120, sec.'440 111. 'Rev. Stat.) and a general use
tax (Chapter 120, sec. 439). Both of these "statutes have been upheld by the
courts. Illinois also has selective sales and use taxes on cigarettes (Chap-
ter 120, sec. 453) which have been upheld by the courts.
The problem with a nitrogen tax would be a practical one of enforcing
it rather than a legal one of having the authority to enact the tax.. The
Buck Act (4 U.S.C. ,.se'c. 105-110) does deny the states the right to levy or
collect any tax on or from the United States or any instrumentality thereof.
-The state, in drafting its legislation, need only exercise care that the
statute does not expressly require' that the tax be passed on to the ultimate
purchaser in circumstances where the purchaser may be an instrumentality of
the federal government (29 Tax Lawyer 377 (1976)).
*
The nitrogen-tax should not conflict with-any rulings under the inter-
state-commerce clause. This lax would be imposed by the state legislature on
the" people of the state and would not burden citizens of other states. The
interstate:commerce clause has traditionally been used to invalidate laws
passed by one state which burden those citizens of another state who carry
on some kind-of business with the state imposing the law.
The existing sales-tax and use-tax statutes in Illinois exempt farm
chemicals from being taxed (Ch. 120, sec. 439.3 and 441). These exemptions
should probably be left unaltered if the special^tax is'imposed, avoiding
the ambiguity and pyramiding effect of double taxation.
Two states presently have some type,of provision for an environmental
tax, but neither is analogous to a nitrogen tax. Iowa Statute 467. A 20
provides for a special annual tax, the proceeds to be used for repayment of
expenses incurred in organizing subdistricts,, for acquisition of land or
rights, or for improvements within the subdisirict .boundaries. An Ohio
provision, 1515.28, provides that if the county commissioners resolve that a
tax is needed, then the people will vote on it. The proceeds of the tax
would go to employ assistants, purchase materials and equipment, and con-
struct and maintain improvements.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS
1. While it is possible to identify a reasonably wide range of alternative
policies for controlling agricultural NFS water pollution, the range
of those that appear practical (economically and institutionally) is
likely to be much more limited. Perhaps this fact is reflected in the
findings that, while there is considerable activity in the policy devel-
opment arena, the policies being developed are not highly varied.
2. The aggregate corn-belt model suggests that the agricultural sector may
not be adversely affected by soil-loss restrictions and would be posi-
tively impacted by nitrogen-application restrictions. These effects
result from a rise in crop prices which more than offsets reductions in
crop production and increases in costs.
3. The corn-belt model indicates that reductions in soil loss were to be
achieved through a tax on soil losses, the tax burden would generate
adverse impacts on the agricultural sector.
4. The watershed and aggregate models suggest that the impacts on farmers
would not be uniform. Farmers on nonerosive land would benefit signifi-
cantly while farmers on erosive land might be forced to remove land from
production.
5. The consumer and tax costs of erosion control will depend on the extent
of control desired and the means of achieving the control selected. An
accurate estimate of these impacts must await more precise estimates of
soil-loss coefficients. The high estimate of impacts on social cost is
roughly approximated at $1.2 billion, excluding governmental administra-
tive costs and reductions in environmental damages.
6. The continued adoption of the chisel-plow technique would result in sub-
stantial reductions in soil loss with some associated increase in pesti-
cide use according to the results of the corn-belt model.
7. Adopting soil-loss controls would result in changes in the proportions
of the various crops produced and in their prices. Generally the prices
of row crops increase as their production decreases in favor of produc-
tion of grain crops, hay, and pasture. With increasingly stringent soil-
loss limits, the nitrogen use per acre increases slightly but the total
amount used decreases as a result of reduced corn acreage.
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8. A terracing subsidy policy alone is not as cost effective as other
approaches, but it can be combined with soil-loss restrictions to reduce
the negative impacts on some farm operators.
9. It may be necessary to use greenbelts along flowing waters in addition
to controlling runoff from the level surface to achieve desirable levels
of water quality.
10. The watershed long-term analysis suggests that continued use of current
practices can result in the loss of all topsoil on significant acreage
over a 100-year period. When projections are made on the basis of con-
stant prices and a 5-percent discount rate, the producer cannot econom-
ically control the erosion. Even at a zero discount rate, the farm op-
erator's planning horizon would need to be 50 years long before soil
loss would be controlled.*
11. The costs of developing an institutional framework de. nuvo for policy
implementation will be a significant addition to the economic impacts
projected in the aggregate analysis. The annual costs of a five-year
program to accomplish the goals established range up to $980,000 for a
typical county. The costs of a program to implement soil conservation
plans were estimated at about $1/2 million per county for a five-year
program. Costs savings would be possible if existing agencies were
used to carry out appropriate functions.
12. An analysis of the social acceptance of conservation practices by farm-
ers suggests that the voluntary approach (unless combined with economic
incentives) will not be highly successful. The use of existing agricul-
tural agencies will result in a more favorable reaction by farmers and
the farm community than if new agencies were created.
13. In a related study of Illinois farmers, it was determined that a majority
of farm operators feel soil erosion to be a problem both from the per-
spective of maintaining soil productivity and from that of water quality.
This study also suggests that there are a number of policy approaches
to the control of soil erosion that a majority of the farmers feel are
"fair." Further, nitrogen-restriction policies are viewed as "unfair"
by a substantial majority of farmers. This finding is consistent with
the reduction in income that would be experienced if an individual farm-
er reduced fertilization rates but inconsistent with the substantial in-
crease in producer income projected by the cornbelt model if a nitrogen
restriction were placed on all farmers.
14. It is possible to determine the nature of the impacts on various seg-
ments of society under several equity criteria. No single policy is
*A more comprehensive analysis of this problem is under way and will be re-
ported in a separate document.
194
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consistently more equitable than all others, however, under all equity
criteria and for all social segments.
15. When the policies considered here are compared to commonly accepted
land-use controls, it appears that policies for the control of soil loss
or those which impose nitrogen limits can legally be developed.
195
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208
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF EROSION AND SEDIMENTATION LAWS
Government Unit Page
Hawaii 210
Illinois 210
Indiana 212
Iowa 213
Kansas 215
Michigan 216
Minnesota 217
New York 217
Ohio 218
Pennsylvania 219
South Dakota 220
New Jersey 221
Montana 222
Walworth and Vernon Counties, Wisconsin 223
Model Law 224
209
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AREA
HAWAII
IDENTIFICATION Act relating to Soil Erosion and Sediment Control
STATUS
Enacted in 1968; revised in 1975
LIMITATIONS
County governments in cooperation with SWCDs are mandated
to enact ordinances for the control of soil erosion and
sedimentation. If a county fails to promulgate rules and
regulations the State Department of Health will do so.
Criteria, techniques, and methods for erosion control
are to be based on relevant watershed and drainage basin
physical data. Inclusion of surveys of land and water
with critical erosion problems.
ENFORCEMENT
Compliance is based oh evidence that an acceptable conser-
vation program is being implemented in accordance with the
SWCD.
AREA
ILLINOIS
IDENTIFICATION
Illinois House Bill 962 as amended, to develop and coor-
dinate a comprehensive State soil erosion sediment control
program.
STATUS
Proposed to Assembly Committee Session, 1976.
POLLUTANT
Sediment
LIMITATIONS
AND
PERFORMANCE
1. 111. Dept. of Agriculture obligated to develop compre-
hensive state erosion and sediment control program, in-
cluding minimum guidelines to be used in implementation
by SCS districts, and to submit same to Governor and
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General Assembly, sixty days after which the latter
could disapprove or adoption would be automatic. It
must be consistent with objectives of Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972, PL 92-500, and any amend-
ments, and finance the increased Dept. and SCS work
load.
2. Each SCS district has one year from above adoption to
develop a technically feasible and economically reason-
able program consistent with the Department's program
and guidelines.
3. Dept. and Districts must hold public hearings during
development of its program, and to organize an Advisory
committee representing nine different interest groups
with at least half being persons deriving half their
income from farming.
4. SCS must make available upon request adequate technical
information for any installation recommended in above
planning, and also provide cost-sharing for any such
installation of any costs in excess of the likely econ-
omic benefits to the user.
5. All users of land-disturbing activities (excepting home
gardens and landscaping) shall comply with above guide-
lines.
ENFORCEMENT 1. Any alleged violation of this policy may be passed to
the Dept. or SCS for investigation, attempted resolu-
tion, or eventual referral to State's Attorney or At-
torney General.
2. Violator is guilty of petty offense, subject only to
unspecified fine.
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AREA
INDIANA
IDENTIFICATION A proposal for Soil Erosion and Sediment Control.
STATUS
Proposed possibly for 1977 General Assembly; endorsed by
Directors of the Indiana Association of Soil and Water
Conservation Districts on September 22, 1975.
POLLUTANT
Sediment
LIMITATIONS
AND
PERFORMANCE
1. No prohibited land-disturbing activity shall be pursued
without an approved plan for erosion and sediment con-
trol.
2. SCS district establishes standards and guidelines (as
stringent or more so than those in item 3 below) for
erosion and sediment control, reviews and approves user
plans, and acts on violation complaints filed internally,
by the State Committee, or by a citizen using the en-
forcement procedure below.
3. State Soil and Water Conservation Committee develops
guidelines and standards using as one measure "T"
values in SCS technical guide, and also specifies fi-
nancial assistance to be made available.
4. Any user is deemed in compliance if he has an approved
plan, or is using practices conforming to standards
(and not found otherwise), or has no technical or spec-
ified financial assistance available.
ENFORCEMENT
1. District enforcement as follows:
(a) Alleged damage inspected
[bj Responsible party notified of valid complaint
[c) District seeks voluntary solution and offers avail-
able technical and financial assistance
(d) Uncorrected alleged violation referred to county
prosecuting attorney.
(e) Violation is misdemeanor, carrying possible fine
up to $500/day of occurrence.
(f) Appeal by convicted user may be made within 30 days
2. User destroying any installation involving cost-sharing
funds shall forfeit same.
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AREA
IOWA
IDENTIFICATION
Regulation by Conservation Districts of Sedimentation from
Agricultural Land Use
STATUS
Adopted by State government, 1971; Conservancy Law 467.D
POLLUTANT
Sedimentation
LIMITATIONS
1. Regulation of soil erosion resulting in or contributing
to damage by siltation to any internal improvement of
a conservancy district, or resulting in or contributing
to damage to property not owned by the owner or occu-
pant of the land on which the erosion is occurring.
2. Maximum soil loss on agricultural land is specified in
tons per acre per year, depending on the soil type, as
specified by the "T" values in column 2, Table V, sec-
tion IIIB, of the Work Unit Technical Guides.
ENFORCEMENT
1. Erosion fitting the above description is declared to be
a nuisance. Amount of erosion determined by the "uni-
versal soil loss equation". Wind Erosion Equation,
used by the states west of Iowa, has been adopted by
Iowa.
2. Court order used to enforce conservation practices.
3. Iowa Natural Resources Council approves state plan.
4. Owner or occupant of land being damaged must file com-
plaint against offender.
5. District SCS responsible for specific planning and im-
plementation. Complaint filed with SCS, which investi-
gates, notifies landowner and seeks voluntary solution.
SCS commissioners review report, determine if nuisance
exists, and issue administration order. Agriculture
given 6 months to initiate correction which must be com-
pleted within one year of date order issued. User not
in violation if specified funding absent.
6. If no correction, SCS may petition district court for
immediate compliance and contempt judgment.
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7. Order necessary for implementing cost-sharing and court
enforcement and cost-sharing funds must be available
for enforcement proceedings. For permanent practices,
75% of cost shared; for temporary practices, share set
annually by State SCS; State SCS may authorize district
to cover sharing over 75%; state may recover cost share
if practice not maintained.
ADDED 1. July 1973 - first complaint handled by State Council
INFORMATION
2. Cost-sharing funds of $2 million (both 1973 and 1974
provided); users eligible for only up to 50% of cost
when applied for practice pursued voluntarily.
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AREA
KANSAS
IDENTIFICATION
Kansas Task Force on Erosion and Sedimentation Proposal
(patterned after Model State Act for Soil Erosion and
Sediment Control)
STATUS
Legislation has been adopted to be in effect after Jan. 1,
1977-
POLLUTANT
Sedimentation
LIMITATIONS
AND
PERFORMANCE
The State Commission shall develop by 1978 guidelines for
erosion and sediment abatement. Each SCS district shall
develop an erosion and sediment control program consistent
with these guidelines.
Anyone engaging in a "land disturbing activity" (defined
as including all agricultural tillage but not home garden-
ing) must file plans for the control of soil erosion and
sediment damage with the Soil Conservation district and
obtain approval to proceed.
ENFORCEMENT
1. The district or Commission has the right to inspect the
site for compliance.
2. If the district does not have financial assistance avail-
able for the landowner to install conservation methods,
the landowner is not required to do so.
3. Anyone dissatisfied with initial decision of the dis-
trict or Commission may obtain an appeal for reconsid-
eration.
4. Violation shall be deemed a misdemeanor. Fine up to
$500 or one year's imprisonment for each and every viola-
tion. Each day the violation continues shall consti-
tute a separate offense.
ADDED
INFORMATION
1. An elaborate educational effort of the citizenry about
this policy has been mounted by the Kansas Cooperative
Extension Service (see its Erosion and Sedimentation
--Information Kit, 1974).
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AREA
MICHIGAN
IDENTIFICATION
Soil Erosion and Sedimentation Control
STATUS
State Public Acts of 1972 (Act No. 347) and amended by
Public Acts of 1974 (Act No. 197)
POLLUTANT
Sediment (1974 Amendment excludes land disturbance for
crop production until 1978, then must have approved soil
conservation plan)
LIMITATIONS
AND
PERFORMANCE
Any earth changes within 500 ft. of a lake or stream and
involving more than one acre of land need a permit and
conservation plan approved.
ENFORCEMENT
1. Water Resources Commission establishes rules and super-
vises.
2. County responsible for administration and enforcement
of rules and notificational violations.
3. Commission or agent may inspect site for compliance.
4. Original act delegated State Department of Agriculture
to submit soil erosion and sedimentation control pro-
gram. Land user would enter into agreement with Soil
Conservation District to pursue relevant agricultural
practices.
5. Violation is a misdemeanor.
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AREA
MINNESOTA
IDENTIFICATION
Soil Erosion Control Bill
STATUS
Proposed for this legislative session - spring 1977.
This bill was introduced during a previous legislative
session. It is expected to be reintroduced and passed
with provisions directly relating to 208 planning.
LIMITATIONS
Land-disturbing activities include agricultural land.
The state SWCD Commission will sponsor the erosion control
program and with the assistance of an advisory board will
develop standards and regulations.
ENFORCEMENT
To be in compliance with the law a person engaged in a
land-disturbing activity must have an approved conserva-
tion plan for erosion and sediment control.
AREA
NEW YORK
IDENTIFICATION
'To Amend Soil and Water Conservation Districts' Law in Re-
lation to Soil and Water Conservation Plans" (with special
emphasis on agri. land)
LIMITATIONS
Every owner or occupier of agricultural land is required
to apply to the local SWCD by January 1978, for a conser-
vation plan.
By January 1980, the SWCDs are to have provided a soil and
water conservation plan for every landowner. These plans
are to be reviewed every five years after development.
There is no provision for implementation of the plans.
ENFORCEMENT
There is no requirement for an owner/occupier to follow
the conservation plan prepared for his land.
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AREA
OHIO
IDENTIFICATION Agricultural Pollution Abatement Standards and Regulations
STATUS
Proposed: Bill is expected to pass in January, 1977.
POLLUTANT
Sedimentation and animal wastes
LIMITATIONS
AND
PERFORMANCE
1. Average annual soil loss limited to:
Phase I - 2 times T value until 1980
Phase II - 1.5 times T value from 1980-1985
Phase III - T value after 1985
(T value taken from Technical Guide - developed by the
Soil Conservation Service, U.S. Dept. of Agr.); if Guide
does not apply, practices approved by SCS District will
be used.)
2. No tillage adjacent to ditch, stream, or lake which will
allow soil to readily erode into them is permitted.
3. Ohio Division of Soil and Water Districts shall recom-
mend methods and practices to meet standards.
4. The Division will develop cooperative agreements with
district SCS for implementation.
ENFORCEMENT
1. Land user considered to be in compliance if land managed
according to plan approved by local SCS district.
2. Violation complaints against offending party may be
filed with district SCS by their own surveillance, by
the Division, by any property owner suffering damage,
or by citizens of the State.
3. SCS district upon finding violation will proceed to
seek solution through voluntary cooperation with its
cost-sharing program.
4. Alleged offender has right to meet with Board of Super-
visors.
5. If violation continues, state EPA reviews and may issue
an administrative order.
218
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6. Order not permitted unless technical and cost-sharing
assistance available.
7. State will pay any residual not paid by federal cost-
sharing of a combined maximum up to 75% of cost of
approved practices or repair of deterioration from nat-
ural causes.
8. If violation is not corrected some type of action de-
veloped with Ohio EPA will take place. This action was
not specified in the proposal.
AREA
PENNSYLVANIA
IDENTIFICATION
The Clean Streams Law, Act 222 of 1970, supplemented with
"Erosion Control Rules and Regulations" adopted by Envir-
onmental Quality Board, 1972
STATUS
Adopted 1970, 1972
POLLUTANT
Sediment, fertilizers, pesticides
LIMITATIONS
AND
PERFORMANCE
Whenever Environmental Quality Board, Environmental
Hearing Board, and Department of Environmental Resources
finds pollution or danger of pollution resulting from
a land condition, the agency may order the condition
corrected or implement correction itself.
Plowing and tilling for agricultural purposes are ex-
empted from a required permit system of all earthmoving
activity, as are all earthmoving activities where a con-
trol plan has been developed by SCS or it involves less
than 25 acres.
All earthmoving activities, including agricultural, must
be conducted so as to prevent erosion and sedimentation
according to a plan to be available upon inspection at
all times; plowing and tilling provision in effect July
1, 1977. Sediment can be reduced by proper catch basin.
ENFORCEMENT
1. Any violator may be guilty of summary offense and sub-
ject to a fine up to $1000 for each offense, or impris-
onment if such defaulted, and guilty of a misdemeanor
219
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for second violation, if occurring within 2 years of
previous violation.
2. Each day of violation constitutes a separate offense.
3. Civil cost penalties may also be assessed.
4. Penalties may be assessed to recover costs of correc-
tion unless problem resulted from nature or during com-
pliance with a conservation district plan.
ADDED
INFORMATION
1. Although not stated, there is an implication that agrv
cultural land users would obtain "proper" plans from
SCS or similar agency.
2. No cost share funds are provided by the state.
AREA
SOUTH DAKOTA
IDENTIFICATION
Act to Regulate Land-disturbing Activities within the State
Resulting in Soil Erosion and Sediment Damage
STATUS
Bill was adopted in 1976
LIMITATIONS
Development of control guidelines including recommended
soil loss limits and conservation practices by SWCD dis-
tricts.
Development must provide full opportunity for citizen par-
ticipation.
Specific agency must be designated to issue permits for
land-disturbing activity; not SWC districts
ENFORCEMENT
District receives petitions from persons adversely affected
by land-disturbing activity and must investigate/determine
validity of complaint.
On own volition a district can initiate court action for
injunctive relief from damaging land-disturbing activity.
220
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AREA
NEW JERSEY
IDENTIFICATION
Soil Erosion and Sediment Control Act
STATUS
Enacted in 1975
LIMITATIONS
State Soil Conservation Committee must establish standards
based on relevant topographical and physical watershed
data.
The Committee must include criteria, techniques, and
methods for control of erosion and sedimentation in accor-
dance with different soil types and slopes.
Standards and regulations must be approved by the State
Secretary of Agriculture and the Commissioner of Environ-
mental Protection.
Implementation in rural sector will be under direction of
SWCD. The districts are to certify erosion and sediment
control plans.
The State Soil Conservation Committee may make grants to
the districts to assist soil erosion control activities.
ENFORCEMENT
Violators are subject to fine and injunctive relief may
be sought.
221
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AREA
MONTANA
IDENTIFICATION
Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act of 1975.
STATUS
Legislation adoption in 1975
LIMITATIONS
Preserve and prohibit unauthorized activities in natural
rivers and streams and lands and property adjacent to them.
Standards and guidelines are established by the conserva-
tion districts. Landowner must give notice of proposed
project to SWC districts. Such notice is to be reviewed
by Department of Fish and Game and a special review team.
If an acceptable project plan cannot be agreed upon, an
arbitration board is appointed. If this board requires
modification of landowner's project cost-sharing must be
provided for the cost of alterations.
ENFORCEMENT
If commencement of a project begins prior to approval it
will be declared a nuisance and subject to legal action.
Initiating a project without consent is a misdemeanor
and subject to monetary penalties from $25-$500. Violators
may also be subject to payment of costs for restoring dam-
aged stream.
222
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AREA
WALWORTH AND VERNON COUNTIES, WISCONSIN
IDENTIFICATION
STATUS
Waiworth County: Soil erosion ordinance passed in 1974
Vernon County: Soil erosion proposed in 1976
LIMITATIONS
Waiworth - zoning ordinance passed permitting tillage on
some soil types only if such tillage practice meets county
conservation standards which are in turn based on SCS
standards
Vernon - proposed ordinance specifically directed toward
management of agricultural land for control of erosion
and sediment.
All agricultural land is subject to provisions of ordinance
except land less than 6% slope.
ENFORCEMENT
Waiworth - Enforcement of acceptable tillage practices is
carried out by county zoning administrator.
Vernon - If a landowner is to comply with ordinance he must
employ conservation management practices acceptable to the
local SWCD or manage his land according to standards set
forth in the SCS Technical Guide. Conservation districts
may investigate and file citizen complaints against pol-
luting neighbor. Violators forfeit cost-sharing funds.
223
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AREA
MODEL LAW
IDENTIFICATION
Model State Act for Soil Erosion and Sediment Control
STATUS
Only to use as a model; developed by The Committee on Sug-
gested State Legislation (published 1973), The Council of
State Governments, Iron Works Pike, Lexington, Kentucky
40505.
POLLUTANT
Sediment
LIMITATIONS
AND
PERFORMANCE
1. Require filing and approval by the soil conservation
district of plans for control of sediment associated
with any land-disturbing activity (defined in detail
and including all agricultural land uses involving
tilling, soil moving, and clearing, excepting home
gardens and landscaping).
2. Conservation standards for various soil types, land
uses, land-disturbing activities must be cleared drawn
up, first, at the state level, and then consistent with
it, at the district level.
ENFORCEMENT
1. Responsibility for sediment control would rest with ex-
isting Soil Conservation Districts that already have
relevant responsibilities under the laws of 50 states,
acting in conjunction with the appropriate state agency,
and additional policies concerned with water quality
and environmental problems would appear as amendments
to existing conservation districts enabling laws of
individual states.
2. Review by state agency or district of submitted plans
by land users may result in mandated modification.
3. Land users must have at least 50% cost-sharing assis-
tance or adequate technical assistance in order for
public enforcement of approved practices.
4. As applicable above, implementing agency shall period-
ically inspect the compliance of the land-disturbing
activity with the approved plan; violations continued
after due notice (for agricultural users, remedy must
224
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commence within 6 months and be completed within 12
months) of remedies required shall be subject to con-
viction and penalties permitted in the enabling legis-
lation.
5. State agencies and districts are eligible to receive
and dispense either private or public funds for purposes
of implementation of this policy. State funds should
finance activities of this policy.
6. Decisions of state agencies and districts subject to
court review if appeal filed within 30 days.
7. Violations deemed misdemeanors and subject upon convic-
tion to fine not to exceed $500 or one year's imprison-
ment for each and every violation (each day of violation
considered separate offense.
8. Legal actions for state or district will be pursued by
state or county attorney.
225
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APPENDIX B
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF EXISTING
SCS/ASCS PROGRAMS IN CORN-BELT STATES
Table No. State Page
Bl Illinois 227
B2 Indiana 228
B3 Iowa 229
B4 Minnesota 230
B5 Missouri 231
B6 Nebraska 232
B7 Ohio 233
B8 Wisconsin 234
226
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Table Bl
Administrative Costs of Existing ASCS/ACP Subsidized Conservation Programs in Illinois
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
TOTAL
Actual Dollars
Real Dollars
(base=1975)
Actual Dollars/Farm
Real Dollars/Farm
Actual Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Real Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Per Dollar of
Subsidy Payment
1969
1,018,932
1,445,294
41.46
58.81
2.12
3.00
.14
*This low figure results from a
formed" to "acres served".
Source: The values in
1970
930,950
1,264,878
40.99
55.69
2.19
2.97
.13
1971
810,426
1,053,870
47.03
61.16
5.46
7.10
.14
1972
757,815
952,029
40.42
50.78
4.43
5.57
.10
change in recording the accomplishment
this table are derived
from data taken
from the
1973
942,543
1,122,075
94.79
112.84
12.06
14.36
.13
1974
518,545
558,777
205.04
220.95
17.76
19.14
.19
units for variable 12
ACP-Practice
1975
782,189
782,189
155.26
155.26
4.01*
4.01*
.17
from "acres
Accomplishments by
States (USDA) and data obtained from the ASCS Budqet Division (Holmes, written communication).
-------
Table B2
Administrative Costs of Existing ASCS/ACP Subsidized Conservation Programs in Indiana
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
1969
1970
1971
1972
TOTAL
Actual Dollars 788,202 712,667 690,380 684,672
Real Dollars
(base=1975) 1,118,017 968,298 897,763 860,141
Actual Dollars/Farm
Real Dollars/Farm
Actual Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Real Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Per Dollar of
Subsidy Payment
*This low figure results
formed" to "acres served
31.64
44.88
1.41
2.00
.19
from a change
Source: The values in this table are
31.71
43.09
1.48
2.01
.15
in recording
derived from
45.27
58.86
3.08
4.01
.20
the accompl
35.43
44.51
2.26
2.84
.12
ishment
data .taken from the
1973
839,549
999,463
149.17
177.59
10.26
12.21
.18
1974
1975
410,446 666,207
442,291 666,207
152.58
164.42
9.69
10.44
.21
units for variable 12 from
ACP-Practice
114.82
114.82
5.53*
5.53*
.17
"acres
Accomplishments by
-------
ro
Table B3
Administrative Costs of Existing ASCS/ACP Subsidized Conservation Programs in Iowa
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
TOTAL
Actual Dollars
Real Dollars
(base=1975)
Actual Dollars/Farm
Real Dollars/Farm
Actual Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Real Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Per Dollar of
Subsidy Payment
1969
1,087,580
1,542,444
24.75
35.11
1.51
2.14
.14
*This low figure results from a
formed" to "acres served".
Source: The values in
1970
1,194,934
1,623,552
27.62
37.52
1.71
2.33
.14
1971
994,544
1,293,295 1,
37.39
48.62
3.25
4.23
.15
change in recording the accompl
this table are derived
1972
903,364
134,879
29.84
37.49
1.91
2.40
.11
ishment
from data taken from the
1973
1,132,477
1,348,187
107.16
127.57
4.90
5.83
.14
1974
443,343
477,740
157.49
169.71
10.83
11.66
.13
units for variable 12
ACP-Practice
1975
890,342
890,342
123.08
123.08
4.54*
4.54*
.14
from "acres
Accomplishments by
States (USDA) and data obtained from the ASCS Budget Division (Holmes, written communication).
-------
Table B4
Administrative Costs of Existing ASCS/ACP Subsidized Conservation Programs in Minnesota
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
TOTAL
Actual Dollars
Real Dollars
(base=1975)
Actual Dollars/Farm
Real Dollars/Farm
Actual Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Real Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Per Dollar of
Subsidy Payment
1969
525,027
744,719
28.01
39.73
.75
1.06
.10
*This low figure results from a
formed" to "acres served".
Source: The values in
1970
485,012
658,984
22.10
30.03
.69
.93
.08
1971
621,846
808,642
44.96
58.47
1.37
1.78
.16
1972
608,686
764,681
35.54
44.65
.87
1.09
.09
change in recording the accomplishment
this table are derived
from data taken
from the
1973
742,952
884,467
66.88
79.62
3.28
3.90
.12
1974
287,946
310,287
79.63
85.81
4.13
4.45
.11
units for variable 12
ACP-Practice
1975
770,041
770,041
111.73
111.73
3.49*
3.49*
.18
from "acres
Accomplishments by_
States (USDA) and data obtained from the ASCS Budget Division (Holmes, written communication).
-------
Table B5
Administrative Costs of Existing ASCS/ACP Subsidized Conservation Programs in Missouri
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
TOTAL
Actual Dollars 1,581,119 1,560,745 1,082,600 1,123,149 1,368,318 359,992 1,078,709
Real Dollars
(base=1975) 2,242,722 2,120,577 1,407,802 1,410,991 1,628,950 387,922 1,078,709
Actual Dollars/Farm 30.68 30.51 29.17 33.12 79.84 77.52 63.28
Real Dollars/Farm 43.52 41.45 37.93 41.60 95.04 83.53 63.28
Actual Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Real Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Per Dollar of
Subsidy Payment
1.88
2.67
.20
1.87
2.53
.21
3.15
4.10
.17
3.24
4.07
.15
5.54
6.59
.17
4.68
5.05
.12
4.17*
4.17*
.17
*This low figure results from a change in recording the accomplishment units for variable 12 from "acres
formed" to "acres served".
Source: The values in this table are derived from data taken from the ACP-Practice Accomplishments by
States (USDA) and data obtained from the ASCS Budget Division (Holmes, written communication).
-------
ro
Table B6
Administrative Costs of Existing ASCS/ACP Subsidized Conservation Programs in Nebraska
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
TOTAL
Actual Dollars
Real Dollars
(base=1975)
Actual Dollars/Farm
Real Dollars/Farm
Actual Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Real Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Per Dollar of
Subsidy Payment
1969
604,007
856,748
42.22
59.89
1.45
2.06
.13
*This low figure results from a
formed" to "acres served".
Source: The values in
1970
476,292
647,136
37.90
51.50
1.37
1.87
.09
1971
522,795
679,837
51.72
67.25
3.76
4.89
.12
1972
602,360
756,734
50.50
63.45
2.05
2.57
.11
change in recording the accomplishment
this table are derived
from data taken
from the
1973
717,428
854,018
88.47
105.33
4.12
4.90
.13
1974
324,793
349,992
110.59
119.17
3.95
4.26
.15
units for variable 12
ACP-Practice
1975
716,833
716,833
143.14
143.14
3.73*
3.73*
.18
from "acres
Accomplishments by
States (USDA) and data obtained from the ASCS Budget Division (Holmes, written communication).
-------
Table 87
Administrative Costs of Existing ASCS/ACP Subsidized Conservation Programs in Ohio
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
TOTAL
Actual Dollars
Real Dollars
(base=1975)
Actual Dollars/Farm
Real Dollars/Farm
Actual Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Real Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Per Dollar of
Subsidy Payment
1969
691
908
30
42
1
2
1970
,481 609,
,824 827,
.07
.66
.60
.27
.14
*This low figure results from a change
formed" to "acres served".
Source: The values in
States (USDA) and data
this table are
obtained from
31.
42.
1.
2.
,
in
1971
1972
370 580,573 583,764
948 754,971 733,372
22
42
53
08
13
recording
47.33
61.55
.77
1.00
.14
the accompl
40.68
51.11
2.75
3.46
.10
ishment
derived from data taken from the
the ASCS Budget Division (Holmes
1973
692,
823,
95.
113.
5.
6.
.
126
960
19
32
62
69
14
239
258
95
102
9
10
units for variable
ACP-Practice
1974
1975
,516 697,803
,099
.20
.58
.32
.05
.13
12 from
697,803
131.49
131.49
7.07*
7.07*
.23
"acres
Accomplishments by
, written communication).
-------
Table B8
Administrative Costs of Existing ASCS/ACP Subsidized Conservation Programs in Wisconsin
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
TOTAL
Actual Dollars
Real Dollars
(base=1975) 9,
Actual Dollars/Farm
Real Dollars/Farm
ro
•*" Actual Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Real Dollars/Unit
of Accomplishment
Per Dollar of
Subsidy Payment
1969
663
411
39
55
1
2
,973
,806
.12
.49
.71
.42
.13
*This low figure results from a
formed" to "acres served".
Source: The values in this
1970
649,
882,
42.
58.
2.
2.
.
change in
735
792
77
11
00
72
14
1971
1972
491,193 529,
638,743
38.79
50.45
2.25
2.93
.11
recording the
table are derived
from data
665,
38.
48.
1.
2.
•
683
431
73
66
94
43
10
accomplishment
taken from
the
1973
664
791
66
78
4
4
units
,536
,114
.11
.70
.15
.94
.13
1974
365,204
393,539
89,95
96.93
9.48
10.21
.18
for variable 12 from
ACP-Practice
1975
650,612
650,612
106.90
106.40
5.98*
5.98*
.20
"acres
Accomplishments by
States (USDA) and data obtained from the ASCS Budget Division (Holmes, written communication).
-------
APPENDIX C
THE LAND-WATER INTERFACE
Attempts to improve water quality by controlling nonpoint sources com-
monly focus on standard erosion control techniques. However, many processes
affect the transport and deposition of eroded materials between initial move-
ment on the land and movement into and within a channel.
This discussion examines the value of greenbelts in reducing the deliv-
ery of eroded materials to stream channels. In addition, it examines how
stream channel characteristics affect the ability of water to transport sedi-
ment. This attempt to integrate results of studies by engineers, agricul-
turists, hydrologists, foresters, and ecologists addresses the practicality
of maintaining a more natural in- and near-stream ecosystem as a means of im-
proving water quality.
VEGETATION AS A NUTRIENT AND SEDIMENT FILTER
Early observations documenting the use of vegetation as a sediment fil-
ter* in channels are primarily descriptive. More recently, both field
(Wilson, 1967) and laboratory (Trollner et al. , 1976) studies have documented
the ability of real and simulated vegetation to filter sediments from shallow-
channel flow. Data from field studies indicate that:
1. Filter efficiency varies with type of vegetation; efficient species
remove 50% of initial sediment concentration (5000 ppm) in 300 ft
and 99% in 1000 ft.
2. An inverse relationship exists between particle size and the vegeta-
tion length required to remove a given precentage of the particles.
3. The rate of sediment deposition in the filter is constant over a
range of slopes. After a critical slope is reached, the filter
efficiency decreases to zero.
Therefore, several variables determine the effectiveness of real vegeta-
tion in removing sediments from shallow-channel flow. These variables, which
act in an interrelated manner, include filtration length, slope of the filter,
*In this discussion the word filter will be used as a shorthand to indicate
the process by which the sediment content of water flowing through vegeta-
tion or surface litter is decreased. This decrease results from changing
velocity, turbulence, and other characteristics of flowing water in associa-
tion with vegetation and/or surface litter.
235
-------
grass characteristics, size distribution of incoming sediment particles,
degree of submergence of the filter, application rate of the water to be fil-
tered, and initial conditions. Many of these same variables were judged im-
portant on the bases of laboratory studies by Trollner et at. (1976) and of
minimal amounts of field data. Unfortunately, little quantitative informa-
tion is available on how these variables are interrelated when real vegeta-
tion is used as a filter under runoff conditions encountered in agricultural
watersheds.
Since most nutrients (especially phosphorus) in surface runoff are at-
tached to the clay fraction of sediment (Sommers et al. , 1975), the useful-
ness of vegetation for reducing nutrient loads will depend on its ability to
filter sediments from surface and shallow-channel runoff. Studies of natural
vegetation to filter sediments from surface runoff come from the forestry
(Trimble and Sartz, 1957; Haupt, 1959) and agricultural literature (Mannering
and Johnson, 1974). These studies show that the sediment-trapping capacity
of vegetation varies with the slope and slope length before the water reaches
the filter. In one trial Mannering and Johnson (1974) found a 54% reduction
in sediments in a 15-m strip of bluegrass sod. Another study of surface run-
off through heavy cornstalk residue on the lower 10 ft of a 35-ft erosion
plot carried only 3 to 5% of the sediment expected from a bare surface
(G. R. Foster, hydraulic engineer, USDA-ARS, personal communication).
Clearly, vegetation can serve as an effective sediment filter. However,
the width of the filter required to remove a given fraction of incoming sedi-
ment and the duration of its effectiveness is dependent on the interaction of
physical factors, biological factors, and specifications of water quality
standards, all of which have not been thoroughly evaluated under normal agri-
cultural conditions. Land-use practices for land adjacent to streams in typ-
ical agricultural watersheds indicate that these relationships should be
investigated and the subject given more effective consideration in ongoing
planning programs.
CHANNEL MORPHOLOGY AND WATER QUALITY
The concept of unit stream power was developed to predict total sus-
pended sediment concentration of a stream based on channel morphology (Stall
and Yang, 1972; Yang and Stall, 1974). The rate of sediment transfer is dir-
ectly related to unit stream power (USP)--the rate of energy expenditure by a
stream as it flows from a higher to a lower point. It is defined as the time
rate of potential energy expenditure by a stream as it flows from a higher to
a lower point. It is defined as the time rate of potential energy expendi-
ture per unit weight of water in an alluvial channel. USP can be expressed
mathematically in terms of average water velocity, V, and, under steady
uniform-flow conditions, the surface slope of the water, S*:
*More complex considerations of lift force, critical velocity, drag force,
and particle diameter have been added to this basic concept. For a detailed
discussion of these considerations, consult the publications by Stall and
Yang cited above.
236
-------
UNIT STREAM POWER = ~ = ^ ^ = VS
where
t = time
Y = elevation above a given point, equivalent to
the potential energy per unit weight of water
X = longitudinal distance
The effect of stream morphology on USP was demonstrated by a study of
the Middle Fork of the Vermilion River (Stall and Yang, 1972). Measurements
of area of flow, roughness coefficients, width, depth, velocity, and slope
were made on a 3360-ft test reach containing three riffles and two pools.
Measurements were made at low, medium, and high discharges, and USP was cal-
culated for the natural stream and an "equivalent" channel without pools and
riffles. USP was reduced by 23 to 26% in a pool-and-riffle stream during
medium- and low-flow conditions when compared to an equivalent uniform chan-
nel of the type normally formed by present channelization practices. Pools
and riffles served as an effective means for the channel to reduce USP and
therefore reduce its erosive energy and sediment-transporting capability dur-
ing low and medium flows. At high flows the pools and riffles were obscured
and had no effect on USP-
Data collected at Black Creek (Karr and Gorman, 1975) relating suspended
sediment concentrations to stream morphology correlate well with the results
of Stall and Yang (1972). Karr and Gorman measured suspended solids concen-
tration in a channelized section above a forest, in a meandering pool-riffle
sections within a forest, and in a channelized section below a forest. The
meandering pool-riffle section acted as a "sediment trap" during low- and
medium-flow conditions, resulting in a decrease of 28% in suspended solids by
the time the flow reached the lower end of the forest, as shown in Figure Cl.
This reduction is very similar to the reduction in USP caused by pools and
riffles. As the flow left the forest, suspended solids concentrations at-
tained the same level as in the channel above the forest. An increase in the
roughness factor in the woodlot is the likely factor responsible for the
decreased sediment loads since the slopes are lower (.25) above and below the
woodlot than in the woodlot (.40). During periods of high runoff, however,
the forest or other vegetation along the stream acts in conjunction with
stream morphology to improve water quality.
Therefore, allowing streams to maintain their natural morphology to re-
duce USP and suspended sediment concentrations is a feasible management alter-
native for improving water quality, especially during periods of low and in-
termediate flows. During such periods the erosive energy of the stream is
reduced, and pools act as sediment traps to reduce suspended sediment concen-
trations and increase the suitability of the water for human uses and aquatic
organisms.
237
-------
100
so
tn
-o
o
en
o>
T3
C
0>
Q.
in
3
cn
80
70
I I
12 II 10 9 87 6543
Station Number
2 I
Figure Cl. Mean and standard error of suspended solids load
in Wertz Drain study area.
EFFECTS OF STREAMSIDE VEGETATION ON WATER TEMPERATURE AND NUTRIENT DYNAMICS
Temperature is important in regulating the physical and biotic character-
istics of streams. A number of studies have documented the effect of stream-
side vegetation on water temperature. In one study, stream temperatures were
measured throughout the year on a farm that was originally forested but which
had been farmed for several years following clearing of the forest (Greene,
1950). Weekly maximum temperatures of streams in cropland ranged from 5.0°
to 12.8°C (average, 6.4°C) above a nearby forested stream. During the cold-
est month (February) the temperature of the forest stream frequently ranged
as high as 3.9°C above the farm stream. In another study, stream temperatures
inside a small woodlot (19°C) were much lower than in unshaded areas (28°C)
nearby (Karr and Gorman, 1975). These data indicate that vegetation serves
as an effective buffer against temperature extremes; shaded streams are cool-
er in the summer and warmer during the coldest periods.
A detailed analysis of the use of "buffer" strips (near-stream vegeta-
tion) to control temperature has been made in the field of forestry (Brown
and Brazier, 1972). Net thermal radiation in relation to stream discharge
was the primary determinant of stream temperature. When strips of brush or
238
-------
trees were left along the stream, no increase in temperature occurred. Exam-
ination of temperature in various streams with different types of vegetation
indicated that angular canopy density (ACD, a measure of the shading ability
of the vegetation) is the only buffer-strip parameter correlated with temper-
ature. Buffer strip width is not important. Furthermore, buffer effective-
ness decreased with increasing stream size. Small streams have the greatest
temperature problem but are the easiest to control because of the inverse
relationship between temperature change and stream discharge for a given in-
put of thermal radiation. Finally, if temperature control is accomplished in
the upper reaches of drainages, temperature-associated problems will be re-
duced both in upstream areas and in downstream areas, including small lakes
and reservoirs.
The importance of temperature in determining various water quality para-
meters and in regulating biotic communities cannot be overemphasized. As
temperature increases, the capacity of the water to hold oxygen decreases.
Since oxygen is utilized during the decomposition of organic matter, at ele-
vated temperatures the ability of the stream to assimilate organic wastes
without oxygen depletion is reduced. This effect exaggerates the impact of
each additional unit of waste added to the system.
Even more important with respect to water quality and eutrophication is
the effect of temperature on the rate at which insoluble (attached) nutrients
are converted to soluble and readily available forms (Sommers et dl. , 1975).
In a laboratory study, Sommers et al. showed an exponential increase in phos-
phorus released from sediment with an increase in temperature. Slight in-
creases in temperature above 15°C produce substantial increases in the amount
of phosphorus released.
These data, along with those previously discussed, indicate that by re-
moving vegetation which shades agricultural drainages, several detrimental
patterns will develop: (1) increases in temperature (from 5.5 to 6.5°C) will
occur during summer periods, resulting in increased rates of phosphorus dis-
association from sediments; (2) increases in phosphorus concentrations in the
drainages result in higher nutrient concentrations in receiving bodies such as
lakes and reservoirs; (3) increasingly large blooms of nuisance algae and peri-
phyton will appear because of elevated nutrient concentrations, temperature,
and light availability. The effect of all these factors will be to decrease
water quality and the quality of biotic communities.
The importance of streamside vegetation goes beyond its use in reducing
sediment and nutrient transport to streams. Its potential for controlling
temperature, enhancing the oxygen-carrying capacity of the stream, and reduc-
ing nutrient availability and utilization is evident. Its significant econom-
ic impact on fishes is discussed below.
IMPACT OF NEAR-STREAM VEGETATION (GREENBELTS) AND CHANNEL MORPHOLOGY ON BIOTA
A review of the abiotic needs of fishes indicates that any attempt to im-
prove the quality of those resources will have to use a multipurpose approach
to the problem. Eliminating only one of the factors deterimental to fish pop-
ulations will result in little improvement. For example, if nutrients are pre-
239
-------
vented from entering streams but channelization is still performed, no improve-
ments in fisheries resources will occur. Similarly, if sediments and nutrients
no longer enter streams but vegetation is removed from stream banks, elevated
temperatures will probably prevent any substantial increase in the quality of
the fish community. For this reason it is important to maintain both near-
stream vegetation and natural channel morphology. Data collected at Black
Creek (Karr and Gorman, 1975) and in forested areas where buffer strips were
left between clear-cut areas and streams (Hall and Lantz, 1969), indicate that
these factors acting together not only result in improved water quality but
also in more diverse and stable fish communities. Furthermore, significant
improvements in other segments of the aquatic biota (benthic insects, etc.)
can also be expected (Hynes, 1975; Minshall, 1967).
OTHER ADVANTAGES OF GREENBELTS
The earlier discussion has addressed several major advantages which might
accrue from the use of greenbelts along streams. A number of other potential
advantages have not been explicitly addressed. These advantages include:
1. Suspended sediments can cause considerable damage, including wear
and tear on metal parts wherever machinery contacts flowing water.
Reducing sediment loads by using greenbelts could reduce the mag-
nitude of this problem.
2. Changes in water temperature and in sediment and nutrient loads
can precipitate major shifts in algal communities. These shifts
can affect the taste and appearance of water.
3. High water quality and the associated rich biotic communities can
reduce the problem of pathogens surviving in water supplies.
4. The frequency and cost of removing sediment from drainage ditches or
streams could be decreased by filtering sediments from surface runoff.
5. Costs for removing the excess turbidity from water used for human
consumption could be reduced.
6. Flood damage—that is, the cost of cleaning up the sediment
deposited—could be reduced.
7. The probability of flooding could be reduced because the greenbelts
would lead to less clogging of the channel by sediments and because
the release of runoff would be better controlled.
8. Costs for storage space destroyed by the silting-in of reservoirs
would be diminished.
LAND-WATER INTERFACE
While the primary emphasis of this project was to analyze alternative
policies for the reduction of soil loss from agricultural land, the current
state of knowledge about sediment transport and effects in the aquatic envir-
onment was also assessed. To understand the dynamics of water quality and
biological communities of streams one must recognize the relationships between
240
-------
water bodies and the land and atmosphere which surrounds them. A complex
interplay of biological, geological, chemical, and physical phenomena in both
the terrestrial and aquatic environments are of major importance in determin-
ing stream characteristics, including water quality (Hynes, 1975; Likens and
Bormann, 1974; Janzen, 1974; Sioli, 1975).
In undisturbed watersheds both terrestrial and aquatic environments are
in an equilibrium, albeit a dynamic equilibrium. Drastic fluctuations in water
levels are uncommon in relatively humid regions. Rainfall is absorbed by the
land surface and released from the soil to the stream over a long period
(Hewlett and Nutter, 1970) and there is little surface runoff. Nutrient cycles
are "tight" in natural watersheds with few nutrients being lost to the drainage
waters (Likens and Bormann, 1974). The small amounts of nutrients lost from
the terrestrial environment are readily assimilated by the biotic communities
of the stream and erosion in this equilibrium state is minimal (Hobbie and
Likens, 1973).
When the natural vegetation is removed, instabilities in the terrestrial
environment result, especially if conservation practices are not employed.
These instabilities have repercussions which affect the aquatic environment
and disturb the equilibrium in that section of the "ecosystem" (Tansley, 1935).
Often, the response is to modify the stream channel to: (1) improve drainage
of the land surface, and (2) reduce natural bank erosion and other bank in-
stabilities stimulated by the modification of the land surface with the advent
of agriculture and urban development. These channelization activities create
more instabilities in the aquatic environment. The combined effects of modi-
fying the land and restructuring the channels result in disequilibria in both
the aquatic and terrestrial areas. Readily observed signs of these disequi-
libria include:
1. Rapid runoff resulting in drastic fluctuations in the water levels
of streams, with flooding during heavy rains.
2. Large volumes of nutrients and sediment are lost from terrestrial
ecosystems to aquatic ecosystems, often over short time periods
(Hobbie and Likens, 1973; Likens and Bormann, 1974).
3. Increased fluctuations in stream temperature (Likens, 1970).
4. Increased streambank erosion as the stream attempts to reestablish
its equilibrium by forming pools, riffles, and meanders (Yang, 1971 a,
1971b).
5. Decreased diversity and stability in the biotic component of the
aquatic ecosystem. This change results from the less stable physical
environment produced by a complex of sediment, nutrient, and tempera-
ture effects (Margalef, 1968; Odum, 1969; Karr and Gorman, 1975;
Gorman and Karr, 1977).
A more detailed presentation can be found in Karr and Schlosser (1977).
241
-------
APPENDIX D
MODELING RESULTS
CORNBELT MODEL
Table D8:
Table D9:
Results by Individual Farm and Nine-farm Total with Nitro-
gen Application Rates of 50, 100, or 150 Pounds per Acre
and No Soil-loss Restrictions (Period: 1 to 10 Years) .
Results by Individual Farm and Nine-farm Total with Soil
Losses Restricted to SCS Tolerance Limits on a Per-farm
Basis and with Nitrogen Application Rates of 50, 100, or
150 Pounds per Acre (Period: 1 to 10 Years)
Table D10: Results by Individual Farm and Nine-farm Total with Soil
Loss Constrained to SCS Tolerance Limits on a Per-Farm
Basis and Nitrogen Application Rates Restricted to 50
or 100 Pounds per Acre (Period: 1 to 10 Years) ....
Page
Table Dl: Effects of Soil-loss Constraints (High Soil-loss
Coefficients Used 244
Table D2: Effects of Soil-loss Constraints and Other Restrictions
(Low Soil-loss Coefficients Used) 245
Table D3: Effects of Soil-loss Tax (High Soil-loss Coefficients Used) . .246
Table D4: Effects of Prohibitions on Tillage Practices and of
Combined Soil-loss Limits with Terracing Subsidies
(High Soil-loss Coefficients Used) 247
Table D5: Effects of Terracing Subsidies (High Soil-loss
Coefficients Used) 248
Table D6: Effects of Restricting Nitrogen Application Rate to
100 Ibs/Acre and Imposing Soil-loss Limits (High Soil-
loss Coefficients Used) 249
Table D7: Effects of Restricting Nitrogen Application Rate to
50 Ibs/Acre and Imposing Soil-loss Limits (High Soil-
loss Coefficients Used) 250
WATERSHED MODEL
251
252
253
Table Dll: Results by Individual Farm and Nine-farm Total with Soil
Loss Constrained to SCS Tolerance Limits on a Per-farm
242
-------
Basis and Nitrogen Application Rates Restricted to 50
or 100 Pounds per Acre (Period: 1 to 10 Years) 254
Table D12: Results by Individual Farm and Nine-farm Total with Soil
Loss Constrained to SCS Tolerance Limits on a Watershed
Basis and with Nitrogen Application Rates of 50, 100, or
150 Pounds per Acre (Period: 1 to 10 Years) 255
243
-------
Table Dl
Corn Belt Model Results: Effects of Soil-loss Constraints (High Soil-loss Coefficients Used)
Net Social Cost (mil. $)*
Change in consumers' surplus (mil. $)
Change in producers' surplus (mil. $)
Government cost (mil. $)**
Crop prices:
Corn ($/bu.)
Soybeans ($/bu.)
Wheat ($/bu.)
Oats ($/bu.)
Hay ($/ton)
Pasture ($/ton)
Production:
Corn (mil. bu.)
Soybeans (mil. bu.)
Acres in production (mil.)
Acres terraced (mil.)
Reduced tillage (mil. acres)
Gross soil loss (mil. tons)
Gross soil loss (tons per acre)
Insecticide expenditures index
Herbicide expenditures index
Nitrogen load (bil. Ibs.)
Nitrogen load (Ibs. /acre)
BENCH
MARK
0
0
0
0
2.46
5.26
4.97
2.33
56.15
24.99
3744.2
785.0
111.86
0
77.33
595.81
5.33
100
100
4.19
100.58
SOIL
LOSS
2t/A
-1190.57
-1205.74
15.17
0
2.80
6.26
3.45
1.45
55.33
24.27
3483.9
654.9
104.2
23.63
77.97
154.63
1.49
89
89
3.99
102.13
SOIL
LOSS
3t/A
-480.29
-1007.13
526.84
0
2.62
5.76
4.51
2.40
58.07
25.98
3621.7
721.6
107.9
9.19
79.06
242.58
2.25
103
93
4.10
101.17
SOIL
LOSS
4t/A
-248.79
-728.61
479.82
0
2.54
5.58
5.04
2.39
58.36
26.30
3682.9
743.3
108.7
2.18
76.24
304.10
2.80
93
97
4.15
100.71
SOIL
LOSS
5t/A
-202.05
-433.63
231.58
0
2.52
5.44
4.93
2.40
57.13
25.39
3698.3
762.8
110.2
2.04
77.34
323.31
2.94
93
100
4.16
100.52
*Excluding Environmental Benefits
**Cost of Program Administration Not Included
-------
Corn Belt Model Results:
Table D2
Effects of Soil-loss Constraints and Other Restrictions
(Low Soil-loss Coefficients Used)
Net Social Cost*
Change In consumers' surplus (mil. $)
Change 1n producers' surplus (mil. $)
Government cost (mil. $)**
(receipts or direct expenditures)
Crop prices:
Corn ($/bu.)
Soybeans ($/bu.)
Wheat ($/bu.)
Oats ($/bu.)
ro Hay ($/ton)
01 Pasture ($/ton)
Production:
Corn (mil. bu.)
Soybeans (mil. bu.)
Acres terraced (mi 1 . )
Acres in production (mil.)
Reduced tillage (mil. acres)
Gross soil loss (mil. tons)
Gross soil loss (tons per acre planted)
Insecticide expenditures index
Herbicide expenditures index
N load (bil. Ibs.)
N load (Ibs. /acre)
BENCH
MARK
RUN
0
0
0
2.46
5.28
5.00
2.34
56.37
25.13
3760.2
784.5
0
111.861
77.33
330.58
2.96
100
100
4.19
100.96
NO
CHISEL
PLOW
-281.55
+269.60
-551.15
0
2.46
5.22
4.84
2.28
53.61
23.83
3740.34
792.30
0
111.86
0
578.07
5.17
97
87
4.19
100.24
CHISEL
PLOWING
RESTRICTED
-269.14
+222.60
-491.74
0
2.46
5.22
4.84
2.28
54.69
24.08
3738.4
792.3
0
111.86
33.22
478.19
4.27
98
93
4.19
101.21
SOIL
LOSS
£2t/A
-374.13
-150.33
-223.8
0
2.52
5.44
4.96
2.34
53.72
23.49
3698.3
763.0
12.76
110.86
75.91
118.01
1.06
98
101
4.16
100.72
SOIL
LOSS
£3t/A
-151.32
-197.29
+45.97
0
2.50
5.40
5.07
2.40
55.39
24.30
3706.5
768.9
3.34
110.86
77.21
170.38
1.54
99
99
4.17
101.51
SOIL
LOSS
<-4t/A
-87.22
-6.06
-81.16
0
2.48
5.34
5.02
2.35
54.77
23.94
3717.0
776.7
2.31
111.86
77.90
186.53
1.68
99
99
4.17
101.38
SOIL LOSS
TAX
$4.00/TON
-301.21
+300.39
-1008.86
+407.26
2.48
5.32
4.90
2.30
51.25
21.73
3728.9
775.6
10.05
111.86
77.51
101.81
0.91
102
102
4.18
100.24
100%
TERRACE
COST
SHARING
-322.07
0
0
-322.07
2.46
5.28
5.00
2.34
56.37
25.13
3740.2
784.5
30.84
77.33
268.75
2.41
100
100
4.19
100.96
100% COST-
SHARING
PLUS S15_2t/A
-529.49
-314.09
+106.67
-322.07
2.52
5.42
5.05
2.37
55.64
24.83
3695.3
765.6
30.84
74.65
106.48
0.95
99
101
4.16
100.72
* Excluding Environmental Benefits
**Costs of Program Administration Not Estimated
-------
Table D3
Corn Belt Model Results: Effects of Soil-loss Tax (High Soil-loss Coefficients Used)
Net Social Cost (mil. $)*
Change in consumers' surplus (mil. $)
Change in producers' surplus (mil. $)
Government cost (mil. $)**
Crop prices:
Corn ($/bu.)
Soybeans ($/bu.)
Wheat ($/bu.)
Oats ($/bu.)
Hay ($/ton)
Pasture ($/ton)
Production:
Corn (mil. bu.)
Soybeans (mil. bu.)
Acres in production (mil.)
Acres terraced (mi 1 . )
Reduced tillage (mil. acres)
Gross soil loss (mil. tons)
Gross soil loss (tons per acre)
Insecticide expenditures index
Herbicide expenditures index
Nitrogen load (bil. Ibs.)
Nitrogen load (Ibs. /acre)
BENCH
MARK
0
0
0
0
2.46
5.26
4.97
2.33
56.15
24.99
3744.2
785.0
111.86
0
77.33
595.81
5.33
100
100
4.19
100.58
SOIL
LOSS TAX
$4.00/t
-389.64
+344.19
-1505.56
+771.73
2.44
5.56
4.57
2.19
51.01
21.79
3750.1
746.4
110.7
18.53
81.20
192.93
1.74
92
100
4.20
99.64
SOIL
LOSS TAX
$2.00/t
-192.21
+251.78
-959.31
+515.32
2.44
5.44
4.74
2.28
52.67
22.76
3759.6
763.1
111.6
7.74
79.82
257.66
2.31
93
99
4.20
99.88
SOIL
LOSS TAX
$1.00/t
-107.82
+286.33
-722.49
+328.34
2.44
5.34
4.79
2.26
53.21
23.11
3751.3
776.7
111.86
1.25
78.27
328.34
2.94
94
101
4.20
100.00
SOIL
LOSS TAX
$0.50/t
-85.19
+160.85
-457.79
+211.75
2.46
5.30
4.82
2.28
54.15
23.73
3744.2
781.5
111.86
1.02
78.21
423.51
3.79
94
100
4.19
100.24
* Excluding Environmental Benefits
**Cost of Program Administration Not Included
-------
Table D4
Corn Belt Model Results: Effects of Prohibitions on Tillage Practices and of Combined
Soil-loss Limits with Terracing Subsidies (High Soil-loss Coefficients Used)
Net Social Cost (mil. $)*
Change in consumers' surplus (mil. $)
Change in producers' surplus (mil. $)
Government cost (mil. $)**
Crop prices:
Corn ($/bu.)
Soybeans ($/bu.)
Wheat ($/bu.)
Oats ($/bu.)
Hay ($/ton)
Pasture ($/ton)
Production:
Corn (mil. bu.)
Soybeans (mil. bu.)
Acres in production (mil.)
Acres terraced (mil.)
Reduced tillage (mil. acres)
Gross soil loss (mil. tons)
Gross soil loss (tons per acre)
Insecticide expenditures index
Herbicide expenditures index
Nitrogen load (bil. Ibs.)
Nitrogen load (Ibs. /acre)
BENCH
MARK
0
0
0
0
2.46
5.26
4.97
2.33
56.15
24.99
3744.2
785.0
111.86
0
77.33
595.81
5.33
100
100
4.19
100.58
NO
CHISEL
PLOW
-270.80
210.51
-481.31
0
2.46
5.22
4.80
2.29
54.39
23.84
3736.6
792.30
111.86
0
0
2275.85
20.35
92
86
4.19
100.73
NO
FALL
PLOW
-7.02
56.95
-63.97
0
2.46
5.24
4.95
2.32
55.73
24.67
3744.2
789.3
111.86
0
76.41
596.29
5.33
101
100
4.19
100.64
NO STRAIGHT-
ROW
CULTIVATION
-133.23
+11.66
-144.89
0
2.46
5.28
4.97
2.33
55.97
24.89
3744.2
784.5
111.86
0
77.34
337.16
3.01
100
99
4.19
100.69
SOIL LOSS
3t/A PLUS
50* TERRACING
COST-SHARE
-495.65
-1023.38
594.75
67.02
2.60
5.72
4.80
2.44
58.52
26.36
3626.4
727.18
107.9
12.44
78.17
235.62
2.18
102
94
4.11
101.27
SOIL LOSS
3t/A PLUS
$15/A SUBSIDY
FOR TERRACING
-612.62
-1060.02
876.65
429.25
2.60
5.72
4.83
2.44
58.82
26.68
3630.2
727.18
107.9
28.62
78.06
201.90
1.87
99
93
4.11
102.02
SOIL LOSS
3t/A PLUS
$20 TERRACING
COST REDUCTION
-597.83
-1050.70
713.97
261.10
2.60
5.70
4.85
2.44
58.84
26.69
3627.0
728.40
107.9
27.42
78.08
204.02
1.89
98
93
4.11
102.06
* Excluding Environmental Benefits
«*Cost of Program Administration Not Included.
-------
Table D5
Corn Belt Model Results: Effects of Terracing Subsidies (High Soil-loss Coefficients Used)
ro
-P»
Net Social Cost (mil. $)*
Change in consumers' surplus (mil. $)
Change in producers' surplus (mil. $)
Government cost (mil. $)**
Crop prices:
Corn ($/bu.)
Soybeans ($/bu.)
Wheat ($/bu.)
Oats ($/bu.)
Hay ($/ton)
Pasture ($/ton)
Production:
Corn (mil. bu.)
Soybeans (mil. bu.)
Acres in production (mil.)
Acres terraced (mil.)
Reduced tillage (mil. acres)
Gross soil loss (mil. tons)
Gross soil loss (tons per acre)
Insecticide expenditures index
Herbicide expenditures index
Nitrogen load (bil. Ibs.)
Nitrogen load (Ibs. /acre)
BENCH
MARK
0
0
0
0
2.46
5.26
4.97
2.33
56.15
24.99
3744.2
785.0
111.86
0
77.33
595.81
5.33
100
100
4.19
100.58
SUBSIDY
$5/A
-5.20
+0.28
0.11
5.59
2.46
5.26
4.97
2.33
56.14
24.99
3744.2
785.0
111.86
1.19
77.33
594.45
5.26
100
100
4.19
100.58
SUBSIDY
$10/A
-105.53
+6.78
+37.90
150.21
2.46
5.26
4.97
2.33
56.05
24.93
3744.2
785.1
111.86
15.02
77.40
522.46
4.12
100
100
4.19
100.57
SUBSIDY
$15/A
-198.52
-11.29
+194.24
381.47
2.46
5.28
4.99
2.34
56.21
25.01
3744.2
784.5
111.86
25.43
77.41
475.27
3.46
102
99
4.19
100.84
SUBSIDY
$20/A
-256.64
-11.29
+333.04
578.39
2.46
5.28
4.99
2.34
56.21
25.01
3744.2
784.5
111.86
28.92
77.41
452.55
3.21
102
99
4.19
100.84
SUBSIDY
$40/A
-300.44
-9.41
+942.35
1233.38
2.46
5.28
4.99
2.34
56.19
24.99
3739.0
784.5
111.86
30.83
77.47
437.83
3.07
101
99
4.19
100.81
* Excluding Environmental Benefits
**Cost of Program Administration Not Included
-------
Table D6
Corn Belt Model Results: Effects of Restricting Nitrogen Application Rate to
100 Ibs/Acre and Imposing Soil-loss Limits (High Soil-loss Coefficients Used)
ro
-P»
vo
Net Social Cost (mil. $)*
Change in consumers' surplus (mil.
Change in producers' surplus (mil.
Government cost (mil. $)**
Crop prices:
Corn ($/bu.)
Soybeans ($/bu.)
Wheat ($/bu.)
Oats ($/bu.)
Hay ($/ton)
Pasture ($/ton)
Production:
Corn (mil. bu.)
Soybeans (mil. bu.)
Acres in production (mil.)
Acres terraced (mil.)
Reduced tillage (mil. acres)
Gross soil loss (mil. tons)
Gross soil loss (tons per acre)
Insecticide expenditures index
Herbicide expenditures index
Nitrogen load (bil. Ibs.)
Nitrogen load (Ibs. /acre)
BENCH
MARK
0
$) 0
$) 0
0
2.46
5.26
4.97
2.33
56.15
24.99
3744.2
785.0
1 11 . 86
0
77.33
595.81
5.33
100
100
4.19
100.58
NITROGEN
RESTRICTION
N 100 Ibs/A
-300.28
-320.88
20.60
0
2.56
5.24
4.87
2.30
56.07
25.03
3658.0
789.7
111.86
0
79.72
586.2
5.24
95
101
3.19
75.83
NITROGEN
RESTRICTION
N 100 Ibs/A
PLUS SOIL
LOSS 2t/A
-1376.88
-1604.63
227.75
0
2.88
6.24
3.54
1.59
56.31
24.84
3408.3
659.5
104.1
24.11
81.81
154.2
1.48
89
91
2.92
74.33
NITROGEN
RESTRICTION
N 100 Ibs/A
PLUS SOIL
LOSS 3t/A
-804.22
-1358.36
554.14
0
2.72
5.74
4.46
2.42
58.20
26.10
3545.2
722.7
107.9
8.54
79.40
244.34
2.26
103
92
3.13
76.80
NITROGEN
RESTRICTION
N 100 Ibs/A
PLUS SOIL
LOSS 4t/A
-564.84
-1102.56
537.72
0
2.64
5.58
4.99
2.41
58.53
26.43
3602.9
745.4
108.7
1.94
77.64
307.09
2.82
92
97
3.18
76.90
NITROGEN
RESTRICTION
N 100 Ibs/A
PLUS SOIL
LOSS 5t/A
-524.99
-772.04
247.05
0
2.62
5.42
4.91
2.39
56.99
25.39
3621.7
764.3
110.2
2.04
78.76
325.46
2.95
93
100
3.18
76.36
* Excluding Environmental Benefits
**Cost of Program Administration Not Included.
-------
Table D7
Corn Belt Model Results: Effects of Restricting Nitrogen Application Rate to
50 Ibs/Acre and Imposing Soil-loss Limits (High Soil-loss Coefficients Used)
Net Social Cost (mil. $)*
Change in consumers' surplus (mil.
Change in producers' surplus (mil.
Government cost (mil. $)**
Crop prices:
Corn ($/bu.)
Soybeans ($/bu.)
Wheat ($/bu.)
Oats ($/bu.)
Hay ($/ton)
Pasture ($/ton)
Production:
Corn (mil. bu.)
Soybeans (mil. bu.)
Acres in production (mil.)
Acres terraced (mil.)
Reduced tillage (mil. acres)
Gross soil loss (mil. tons)
Gross soil loss (tons per acre)
Insecticide expenditures index
Herbicide expenditures index
Nitrogen load (bil. Ibs.)
Nitrogen load (Ibs. /acre
BENCH
MARK
0
$) 0
$) 0
0
2.46
5.26
4.97
2.33
56.15
24.99
3744.2
785.0
111.86
0
77.33
595.81
5.33
100
100
4.19
100.58
NITROGEN
RESTRICTION
N 50 Ibs/A
-1288.19
-3324.79
2036.6
0
3.08
5.82
5.34
2.67
63.73
29.65
3266.3
714.2
111.86
0
78.87
592.0
5.29
111
102
2.20
48.73
NITROGEN
RESTRICTION
N 50 Ibs/A
PLUS SOIL
LOSS 2t/A
-2489.10
-4163.30
1674.2
0
3.42
6.64
3.92
1.78
62.25
28.58
3001.6
605.29
104.1
24.66
81.65
152.8
1.47
99
91
1.77
42.53
NITROGEN
RESTRICTION
N 50 Ibs/A
PLUS SOIL
LOSS 3t/A
-1907.74
-4212.14
2304.4
0
3.26
6.24
4.92
2.74
65.22
30.41
3131.7
657.91
107.9
6.81
81.04
245.5
2.27
114
93
2.05
47.48
NITROGEN
RESTRICTION
N 50 Ibs/A
PLUS SOIL
LOSS 4t/A
-1627.67
-3960.57
2332.9
0
3.18
6.08
5.38
2.72
65.31
30.54
3192.9
679.55
108.7
2.06
79.46
304.0
2.80
105
98
2.14
48.59
NITROGEN
RESTRICTION
N 50 Ibs/A
PLUS SOIL
LOSS 5t/A
-1497.46
-3677.06
2179.6
0
3.14
5.98
5.37
2.71
64.23
29.78
3222.9
693.03
110.2
1.81
79.68
330.2
3.00
107
101
2.14
47.92
* Excluding Environmental Benefits
**Cost of Program Administration not Included.
-------
Table D8
ro
ui
Watershed Model Results by
Rates of 50, 100, or
Individual Farm and Nine-farm Total with Nitrogen Application
150 Pounds Per Acre and with No Soil -loss Restrictions
(Period: 1 to 10 Years)
CROP ACTIVITIES
Farm
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Total
Row-crop
(acres)
187.50
185.90
152.30
159.78
184.40
365.50
176.63
217.05
74.80
1703.856
Two-crop3
(acres)
110.60
79.30
142.50
98.80
129.10
126.90
203.10
48.10
938.40
Wheat
(acres)
110.60
79.30
142.50
98.80
129.10
126.90
203.10
48.10
938.40
Total SGMb
(acres)
110.60
83.20
144.53
106.30
165.20
143.48
205.45
57.00
1015. 75f
Pasture
(acres)
134.40
14.40
30.60
74.30
67.50
33.10
354.30
TILLAGE PRACTICES
Conven-
tional
(acres)
76.90
185.90
76.90
19.30
93.10
272.50
66.30
16.30
35.60
842.80
Zero
Tillage
(acres)
110.60
79.30
142.50
98.80
89.80
126.90
203.10
48.10
938.40
CONSERVATION PRACTICES
Up & Down
(acres)
168.70
185.90
127.50
142.50
149.40
233.40
126.90
210.00
48.10
1392.40
Contouring Terracing
(acres) (acres)
18.80
13.10 15.60
11.20 8.10
42.50
13.80 154.40
66.30
9.40
35.60
56.90 331.90
Net
Revenue0
($)
21731.55
27241.86
16126.23
20083.03
20283.71
38157.19
20523.45
25912.94
8993.79
199053.73
Total
Soil Loss
(tons)
4168.92
2753.44
3824.03
3445.80
3462.76
6349.79
3811.25
4879.32
1270.27
33965.59
Total
N/Famid
(Ibs)
12917.50
27885.00
11161.25
3967.50
12575.00
30836.25
5730.00
4161.25
2826.25
112060.00
aTwo-crop denotes the double-cropping option of wheat and soybeans of rotation 5.
bSGM 'denotes small grain (wheat and oats) and meadow.
cThe net revenue values are annual averages for the ten-year period discounted.
''Some acreage uses no nitrogen and some rotations use very little nitrogen.
'Components are: corn, 688.1; and soybeans, 1015.75-
^Components are: wheat, 938.4; and oats, 77-35-
-------
Table D9
Matershed Model Results by Individual Farm and Nine-farm Total with Soil Losses Restricted
to SCS Tolerance Limits on a Per-farm Basis and with Nitrogen Application
Rates of 50, 100, or 150 Pounds Per Acre (Period: 1 to 10 Years)
CROP ACTIVITIES
Farm
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
^O o
01 8
rx> 9
Total
Row-crop Two-crop3 Wheat
(acres) (acres) (acres)
120.06
176.05
118.23
68.62
143.38
299.70
106.11
149.89
40.72
1226. 36e
21.43
.88
7.39
29.60
8.58
22.60
20.97
17.93
14.58
147.15
Total SGMb
(acres)
67.45
9.85
34.35
93.18
48.52
101.90
87.09
69.51
42.99
554. 84f
Pasture
(acres)
134.40
14.40
30.60
74.30
67.50
33.10
354.30
TILLAGE PRACTICES
Conven- Zero
tional Tillage
(acres) (acres)
187
185
156
161
191
401
193
219
83
1781
.50
.90
.20
.80
.90
.60
.20
.40
.70
.20
CONSERVATION PRACTICES
Up & Down Contouring
(acres) (acres)
106.30
146.40
58.10
125.60
77.60
140.50
63.10
106.90
41.90
866.40
Terracing
(acres)
81.20
39.50
98.10
36.20
114.30
261.10
130.10
112.50
41.80
914.80
Net
Revenue
($)
18901.66
26793.28
15013.56
16117.45
18938.23
36632.55
18524.63
23117.11
7896.83
181935.29
Total
Soil Loss
(tons)
637.40
901.90
653.60
1050.40
877.80
1761.90
1070.00
1147.60
467.20
8567.80
Total .
N/FarnT
(Ibs)
13915.72
26095.57
13827.24
5835.23
15144.76
35773.23
8373.18
10984.23
2608.73
132557.89
^Two-crop denotes the double-cropping option of wheat and soybeans of rotation 5.
bSGM denotes small grain (wheat and oats) and meadow.
°The net revenue values are annual averages for the ten-year period discounted.
dSome acreage uses no nitrogen and some rotations use very little nitrogen.
Components are: corn, 1026.79; and soybeans, 199.57.
Components are: wheat, 147.15; oats, 158.17; and meadow, 249.52.
-------
Table D10
Watershed Model Results by Individual Farm and Nine-farm Total with Soil Loss Constrained
to SCS Tolerance Limits on a Per-farm Basis and Nitrogen Application Rates
Restricted to 50 or 100 Pounds Per Acre (Period: 1 to 10 Years)
CROP ACTIVITIES
ro
in
10
Farm
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Total
Row-crop Two-crop3
(acres) (acres)
111.30
145.02 22.38
107.15
66.99
132.57
263.56
106.11
148.52
40.72
1121. 92e 22.38
Wheat
(acres)
20.6
22.38
5.11
29.64
7.05
19.44
20.97
17.46
14.58
157.24
Total SGMb
(acres)
76.20
63.26
49.05
94.82
59.33
138.05
87.09
70.88
42.99
681. 66f
Pasture
(acres)
134.40
14.40
30.60
74.30
67.50
33.10
354.30
TILLAGE PRACTICES CONSERVATION PRACTICES
Conven-
tional
(acres)
187.50
185.90
156.20
161.80
191.90
401.60
193.20
219.40
83.70
1758.82
,.,e,ro Up & Down Contouring
(acres)
106.30
22.38 22.38 124.02
58.10
125.60
77.60
140.50
63.10
106.90
41.90
22.38 22.38 844.02
w
81.20
39.50
98.10
36.20
114.30
261.10
130.10
112.50
41.80
914.80
J£*
18606.53
25202.83
14771.16
16090.50
18731.20
35953.40
18525.67
23074.83
7897.28
178853.39
Total
Soil Loss
(tons)
637.40
901.90
653.60
1050.40
877.80
1761.90
1070.00
1147.60
467.20
8567.80
Total .
N/Farm
(Ibs)
8327.47
10779.37
7910.36
4526.06
10803.24
19638.05
8373.18
10252.57
2608.73
83219.02
aTwo-crop denotes the double-cropping option of wheat and soybeans of rotation 5.
SGM denotes small grain (wheat and oats) and meadow.
^he net revenue values are annual averages for the ten-year period discounted.
Some acreage uses no nitrogen and some rotations use very little nitrogen.
Components are: corn, 764.61; and soybeans, 357.32.
Components are: wheat, 157.24; oats, 294.82; and meadow, 229.60.
-------
Table Dll
Watershed Model Results by Individual Farm and Nine-farm Total with Soil Loss Constrained
to SCS Tolerance Limits on a Per-farm Basis and Nitrogen Application
Rates Restricted to 50 Pounds Per Acre
(Period: 1 to 10 Years)
en
CROP ACTIVITIES
Farm
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Total
Row-crop
(acres)
109.42
139.43
103.46
65.37
125.19
254.16
110.03
142.88
45.50
1095.346
Two-crop3
(acres)
6.79
18.43
23.54
6.62
33.80
89.19
Wheat
(acres)
27.56
24.72
34.89
41.47
63.36
45.16
69.98
17.43
324.62
Total SGMb
(acres)
78.08
46.48
59.35
96.44
85.14
170.99
89.79
110.32
38.30
774. 89f
Pasture
(acres)
134.40
14.40
30.60
74.30
67.50
33.10
354.30
TILLAGE PRACTICES
Conven-
tional
(acres)
187.50
185.90
149.41
161.80
173.47
378.06
186.58
185.60
83.70
1692.01
Zero
Tillage
(acres)
6.79
18.43
23.54
6.62
33.80
89.19
CONSERVATION PRACTICES
Up & Down
(acres)
23.81
6.79
18.43
23.54
6.62
33.80
113.00
Contouring
(acres)
106.30
122.59
51.31
125.60
59.17
116.96
54.48
73.10
41.90
753.41
TO
81.20
39.50
98.10
36.20
114.30
261.10
130.10
112.50
41.80
914.80
£Lf
18160.08
24335.84
14167.64
15947.63
17779.86
34596.95
17992.68
22572.72
7864.17
173417.57
Total
Soil Loss
(tons)
637.40
901.90
653.60
1050.40
877.80
1761.90
1070.00
1147.60
467.20
8567.80
Total .
N/Farma
(Ibs)
4840.07
5809.38
4164.49
3518.66
4840.22
10518.20
4594.76
5046.47
2006.50
45338.75
aTwo-crop denotes the double-cropping of wheat and soybeans of rotation 5.
SGM denotes small grain (wheat and oats) and meadow.
°The net revenue values are annual averages for the ten-year period discounted.
Some acreage uses no nitrogen and some rotations use very little nitrogen.
Components are: corn, 693.78; and soybeans, 401.56.
Components are: wheat, 324.62; oats, 145.98; and meadow, 304.29.
-------
Table D12
Watershed Model Results by Individual Farm and Nine-farm Total with Soil Loss Constrained to
SCS Tolerance Limits on a Watershed Basis and with Nitrogen Application
Rates of 50, 100, or 150 Pounds Per Acre
CROP ACTIVITIES
ro
in
en
Fam
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Total
Row-crop Two-crop3 Wheat
(acres) (acres) (acres)
142.32
185.90
113.09
102.94
139.50
263.44
98.54
151.65
38.69
1236. 07"
10.88
11.02
24.91
9.86
39.82
37.07
15.59
17.28
166.43
Total SGMb
(acres)
45.19
38.42
58.86
52.40
138.17
94.67
67.76
45.01
540.45f
Pasture
(acres)
134.40
14.40
30.60
74.30
67.50
33.10
354.30
TILLA8E PRACTICES
Conven- Zero
tlonal Tillage
(acres) (acres)
187.50
185.90
156.20
161.80
191.90
401.60
193.20
219.40
83.70
1781.20
CONSERVATION PRACTICES
Up ft Down Contouring
(acres) (acres)
106.30
146.40
58.10
125.60
77.60
140.50
63.10
106.90
41.90
866.40
Terracing
(acres)
81.20
39.50
98.10
36.20
114.30
261.10
130.10
112.50
41.80
914.80
Net
Revenue
($)
19780.90
27160.36
14764.81
17556.90
18774.35
35571.88
17987.13
23195.99
7753.28
182545.60
Total
Soil Loss
(tons)
856.33
970.92
580.20
1420.28
830.77
1390.34
922.65
1168.51
427.80
8567.8
Total .
N/Far»a
(Ibs)
16501.25
27885.00
13171.25
6448.13
14934.15
31458.75
6480.00
11422.50
2102.50
130403.52
*Two-crop denotes the double-cropping option of wheat and soybeans of rotation 5.
bSOI denotes snail grain (wheat and oats) and Meadow.
cThe net revenue values are annual averages for the ten-year period discounted.
dSoie acreage uses no nitrogen and SOME rotations use very little nitrogen.
"Components are: corn, 1037.45; and soybeans, 198.62.
'components are: wheat. 166.43; oats, 118.22; and meadow, 255.83.
-------
APPENDIX E
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COST ESTIMATES
This appendix presents cost estimates for each of the institutional func-
tions required in implementing nonpoint source pollution control policies. As
indicated in Chapter 5, not all of these functions will be required for some
of these policies. Also presented are estimates of administrative costs for
implementing the six policies selected for intensive analysis (see Chapter 3).
These estimates are based on an assessment of the institutional functions re-
quired by each policy and on the cost estimates for those functions.
A complete list of the institutional functions is given in Table El.
Tables E2 through E22 present itemized cost estimates for the functions. The
total cost for each function is the sum of the following items of expense:
1. Labor
2. Labor Support (e.g., travel, telephone, and mailing expenses)
3. Equipment
4. Building
5. Office Support (e.g.. cost of office supplies and copying)
6. Program Support (e.g., training and publication costs)
In calculating the costs it was assumed that there are 1221 farms per
county* and 93 counties per state. These values are averages for the corn
belt, which includes the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin. It was also assumed that the em-
ployee turnover rate would be 35% per year.
The administrative costs for implementing the six NFS control policies,
summarized in Tables E23 through E28, were derived by summing the costs of the
institutional functions required by each of the policy elements:
1. Performance Indicators (P)
2. Control Instruments (I)
*Agricultural Statistics, 1976. Washington, D. C.: United States Department
of Agriculture (1976).
The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1976. New York: Newspaper Enterprise
Association, Inc. (1975).
256
-------
3. Erosion Control Techniques (C)
4. Measures of Compliance (M)
5. Temporary Penalties (T)
In constructing the costs it was again assumed that each county contains
1221 farms and is in a state having 93 counties. The cost estimates cover a
period of five years, a time period considered to be adequate to accomplish
the policy objectives. The total cost listed for each policy is the imple-
mentation cost per county per year for the five-year period.
Number Page
El Institutional Functions Required to Implement Nonpoint-
Source Pollution Control Policies 259
E2 Estimated Cost for Function A, Monitoring 260
E3 Estimated Cost for Function B, Reporting Impact 262
E4 Estimated Cost for Function C, Notification of Assess-
ment of Penalty 263
E5 Estimated Cost for Function D, Board of Review 264
E6 Estimated Cost for Function E, Court Action 266
E7 Estimated Cost for Function F, Subsidy/Tax Transfer 267
E8 Estimated Cost for Function G, Maintenance of an Office
(I. For One Administrator) 268
E9 Estimated Cost for Function G, Maintenance of an Office
(II. For One Technician) 270
E10 Estimated Cost for Function G, Maintenance of an Office
(III. For One Secretary) 272
Ell Estimated Cost for Function G, Maintenance of an Office
(IV. For State Central Office) 274
E12 Estimated Cost for Function G, Maintenance of an Office
(V. County Office) 275
E13 Estimated Cost for Function H, Individual Analysis of Farm
Needs 276
El4 Estimated Cost for Function I, Contracting with Individual
Farmer 27P
El5 Estimated Cost for Function J, Education 279
257
-------
TABLES (continued)
Number Page
El6 Estimated Cost for Function K, Training of Technicians 281
El7 Estimated Cost for Function L, Reporting Need 283
E18 Estimated Cost for Function M, Formation of a Program 284
E19 Estimated Cost for Function N, Construction 285
E20 Estimated Cost for Function 0, Notification of Legislation .... 285
E21 Estimated Cost for Function P, Administrative Organization .... 285
E22 Estimated Cost for Function Q, Central Coordination 286
E23 Estimated Implementation Costs for Policy 1: Education ...:.. 287
E24 Estimated Implementation Costs for Policy 2: Tax Credit 288
E25 Estimated Implementation Costs for Policy 3: Fifty-percent
Cost Sharing 289
E26 Estimated Implementation Costs for Policy 4: Required
Conservation Plan Development 290
E27 Estimated Implementation Costs for Policy 5: Required
Conservation Plan Implementation 291
E28 Estimated Implementation Costs for Policy 6: Development
of Greenbelts 292
258
-------
Table El
Institutional Functions Required to Implement
Nonpoint-source Pollution Control Policies
FUNCTION
KEY
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
0
P
Q
DESCRIPTION
Monitoring
Reporting Impact
Notification of Assessment of Penalty
Board of Review
Court Action
Subsidy/Tax Transfer
Maintenance of an Office
I. For One Administrator
II. For One Technician
III. For One Secretary
IV. State Central Office
V. County Office
Individual Analysis of Farm Needs
Contracting with Individual Farmer
Education
Training of Technicians
Reporting Need
Formation of a Program
Construction
Publication and Notification of Legislation
Administrative Organization
Central Coordination
COST
TABLE
E2
E3
E4
E5
E6
E7
E8
E9
E10
Ell
E12
E13
E14
E15
E16
El 7
E18
El 9
E20
E21
E22
259
-------
Table E2
Estimated Cost for Function A, Monitoring
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
ro
en
o
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
(3) Equipment
(4) Building
(5) Office
Support
One technician can monitor 4 farms per day.1 The average salary
for a technician is $10,000/year with 250 working days per year.
(a) Travel
Based on the size of an average county and assuming that
the monitoring office is located near the center of the
county, the equation Miles Traveled = (nxlO) + 10, where
n = number of farms traveled to per day per car, is used
to estimate travel for the monitor. The number of miles
are multiplied by $ .15 per mile to compute cost. It is
assumed that one monitor per car covers 4 farms per day.
(b) Telephone and Mailing
Assume that one technician spends $2/day on phone calls
and mailing for monitoring arrangements. This amount is
divided by four farms per day.
The equipment needed by one technician to monitor farms costs
$60.00.^ This cost is depreciated on a straight-line bars is
over ten years to compute a yearly cost of $6.00. This yearly
cost is divided by the number of farms monitored per year.
None
Assume that miscellaneous office supplies such as paper and envel-
opes used in recording monitoring results would cost $ .25 per
farm.
$ 10.000/farm
$ 1.875/farm
$ .500/farm
$ .006/farm
$ .250/farm
-------
Table E2 (cont.)
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
(6) Program
Support
Assuming that the employee has the proper educational background,
two weeks of additional training are needed for monitoring.
Training costs are figured under function K. Using those costs,
2 weeks of training costs $751.20 per technician. Since there
is a 35% employee turnover rate,l the number of new technicians
needing training will depend on the length of the program. The
following equation is used to take this training cost and turn-
over combination into account.
Total Training Cost = ((1 + (.35(m-l))) x 751.20) x
number of technicians needed, where m = the length
of the program in years.
TOTAL COST = ($12.63 x number of farms) + ((!+(.35(m-l))) x $751.20) x number of technicians needed
^Source: State Soil Conservation Service, Champaign, Illinois. ~~~
-------
Table E3
Estimated Cost for Function B, Reporting Impact
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
ro
CT>
ro
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
(3) Equipment
(4) Building
(5) Office
Support
(6) Program
Support
Assume that the secretary can type and mail an average of eight re-
ports per day. The secretary has a salary of $7500 per year1 for
250 working days.
Cost of mailing reports
The equipment required for a secretary is listed for function G,
maintenance of an office.
None
Assume a cost of $ .50 per report for copying, paper, envelopes,
etc.
If the impact report involves violations which have occurred, these
violations must be published in the form of an official notice.
The cost of publication of violations is covered under function
C, Notification of Assessment of Penalty.
$ 3.75/report
$ .50/report
$ .50/report
TOTAL COST: $ 4.75/report
Source: State Soil Conservation Service, Champaign, Illinois
-------
Table E4
Estimated Cost for Function C, Notification of Assessment of Penalty
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
ro
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
S (3) Equipment
(4) Building
(5) Office
Support
(6) Program
Support
Assume that it takes a secretary one hour to type up the notifica-
tion, send copies to the violators, and prepare the papers for
publication. The secretary's salary is $7500/year, which is
equivalent to $3.75/hour.
Assume that mailing the notifications costs $ .50.
Listed in G
None
Assume a cost of $ .50 per notification for office supplies,
It costs $ .25 per line for publishing.2 Assume that five lines
are needed per penalty and that the notice is published in four
newspapers within the county.
$ 3.75/penalty
notification
$ .50/penalty
notification
$ .50/penalty
notification
$ 5.00/penalty
notification
TOTAL COST:
Source: State Soil Conservation Service, Champaign, Illinois
Source: The News-Gazette, Champaign, Illinois
$ 9.75/penalty
notification
-------
Table E5
Estimated Cost for Function D, Board of Review
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
(1) Labor
IV)
cr>
(2) Labor
Support
(a) Board Members
The Board of Review has five members who donate the time
they spend serving on the board. It is assumed that the
board meets once a month for 2 hours every month and that
it reviews 4 cases every month.
(b) Clerical
Official minutes of the board meeting must be taken by a
secretary present for two hours during the meeting. It
takes an additional hour to type the minutes. Three hours
of clerical time at $3.75 per hour1 for 4 cases.
(o) Technician
Each case is presented by a technician who spends one hour
preparing the presentation. The technician must also at-
tend the two-hour meeting. A technician's hourly rate is
SS.OO/hour.1
(a) Travel
The board members are paid for their travel expenses to and
from meetings. Assuming that there is one board per county
with the meeting located at the county center, the estimated
distance travelled is 25 miles per meeting per member. There
is an annual statewide meeting held for board members. The
travel distance for this meeting is estimated to be 200 miles
per five members. $ .15 per mile is paid for mileage expense,
$ 2.813/case
$120.000/year
$ 5.000/case
$255.000/year
-------
Table E5 (cont.)
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
ro
en
(2)
(3) Equipment
(4) Building
(5) Program
Support
(b) Telephone and Mailing
The telephone-mail expense is incurred in contacting the
proper individuals about the meeting. This cost is es-
timated to be $2.50 per meeting plus $2.00 per case.
None
Assume that the county office is used in the evening at no cost.
A notice of the public meeting must be published. Assume that this
no-tice requires ten lines per meeting at $ .25 per Iine2 in
four different sources (newspapers).
TOTAL COST:
ISource: State Soil Conservation Service, Champaign, Illinois.
^Source: The News-Gazette, Champaign, Illinois.
$ 30.000/year +
2.000/case
$120.000/year
$525.000/year
$ 9.810/case
-------
Table E6
Estimated Cost for Function E, Court Action
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
ro
CT>
CT>
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
(3) Equipment
(4) Building
(5) Office
Support
(6) Program
Support
(a) Technician
Assume that a technician spends eight hours on each case
taken to court.
(b) Court Officials
The court costs concerned with the public's side of the
case accrue to the local governing body.
None
None
None
None
None
TOTAL COST:
$ 40.000/case
$ 40.000/case
-------
Table E7
Estimated Cost for Function F, Subsidy/Tax Transfer
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
.1
(a) Subsidy
According to the ASCS-ACP data for the corn belt states' (Tables Bl to B8) the
average administration cost incurred in paying subsidies from 1969 to 1975, in
real dollars, equals 14.5% times the amount of subsidy. According to the corn
belt model, if terracing is provided everywhere it is needed in the corn belt
(557 counties) it will encompass 30.84 million acres at a cost of 322.07 million
dollars per year for ten years.2
Multiplying the yearly cost by ten years and dividing that amount by 557 counties,
a total cost of $5.782 million per county is obtained. Assuming that the subsidy
PO payment will be 50% of the total cost, the government will be administering the
5 payment of 2.891 million dollars per county. 14.5% times $2.891 million results
in an administration cost of $419,195 per county for subsidy payment.
Note that subsidies may also be paid on conservation projects other than terracing
(and it's unlikely that all this terracing would be done) but the present cost
information is limited to terraces and thus this figure is used in the estimate.
(b) Tax Transfer
The tax transfer will be arranged as a standard deduction on the present tax
form. Therefore, any increase in administration cost will be negligible.
TOTAL COST:
$419,195.007
county
0.00
^Source: Practice Accomplishments by States, Agricultural Conservation Program. Washington, D. C.:
U. S. Department of Agriculture (1976).
2The determination of areas "needing" terracing and the total cost are taken from the 100% subsidy
run of the corn belt model. The 50% subsidy rate was used in determining this cost estimate because
it is more likly to represent the policy adopted.
-------
Table E8
Estimated Cost for Function G, Maintenance of an Office
(I. For One Administrator*)
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
ro
co (3) Equipment
(4) Building
Janitorial services require five hours per week per 200 sq. feet of
office space.1 When supplies are included, janitorial services
cost $6 per hour.l From figures given in Space Planning2 a head
administrator is assumed to require 150 sq. feet of office space.
This figure includes cabinet space and a portion of a waiting area.
None
The following items of equipment assumed to be required are listed
with their respective costs.3
(a) One desk, $180.
Cb) Three filing cabinets (4 drawer), $345.
(a) One upright cabinet (78" x 36" x 18"), $90.
(d) One swivel desk chair, $85.
(e) Two standard desk chairs, $110.
(f) One adding machine, $135 + $35/year maintenance.
(g) One desk lamp, $20.
Twenty-year, straight-line depreciation is assumed.
(a) Space
According to two sources in Champaign, office rent is approx-
imately $5 per sq. foot per month. As already mentioned, an
administrator requires 150 sq. feet.4»5
(b) Utilities
Utilities average $ .75 per sq. foot of office space per *
month.5
$ 1,170.00/year
$ 83.25/year
$ 9,000.00/year
$ 1,350.00/year
-------
ro
Table E8 (cont.)
pvprMcr
IT£M EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION COST/UNIT
(5) Office
Support Office support is assumed to average $100 per administrator per year. $ 100.00/year
(6) Program
Support None
TOTAL COST: $11,703.25/year
*This tabulation includes those items and costs required by a head administrator, usually located in the
central office.
1 Source: AAA Janitorial Service, 515 Edgebrook, Champaign, Illinois.
2Source: Bareither, H.D., and Schillinger, J.L. 1968. University Space Planning. Urbana, 111.: Univ.
of 111. Press.
3Source: Mr. R.J. Cheek, Purchasing Department, Business Office, University of Illinois.
^Source: State Soil Conservation Service, Champaign, Illinois.
SSource: Office and Desk Space Rental Service, Hunt and Associates, 201 West Springfield Ave., Champaign,
Illinois.
-------
Table E9
Estimated Cost for Function G, Maintenance of an Office
(II. For One Technician*)
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
ro
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
(3) Equipment
(4) Building
Janitorial services require 5 hours per week per 200 sq. ft. of
office space.1 Including supplies, janitorial services cost
$6 per hour.1 According to Space Planning,2 one technician
requires 135 sq. ft. of office space.
None
The following items of equipment assumed to be required are listed
with their respective costs.3
(a) One desk, $180.
Cb) Two filing cabinets (four drawer), $230.
(s) One upright cabinet (78" x 36" x 18"), $90.
(d) One swivel desk chair, $85.
(e) One standard desk chair, $55.
(f) One desk lamp, $20.
Twenty-year, straight-line depreciation is assumed.
(a) Space
A technician requires 135 sq. ft. of office space and rent
is $5 per sq. ft. per month.*
(b) Utilities
Assume $ .75 per sq. ft. per month.4
$ 1,053.00/year
$ 33.00/year
$ 8,100.00/year
$ 1,215.00/year
(5) Office
Support
Assume $100 per technician per year.
$ 100.00/year
-------
Table E9 (cont.)
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
ro
(6) Program
Support
None
TOTAL COST:
$10,501.00/year
*This tabulation includes those items and costs
^Source: AAA Janitorial Service, 515 Edgebrook,
^Source: Bareither, H.D., and Schillinger, J.L.
of 111. Press.
3Source: Mr. R.J. Cheek, Purchasing Department,
^Source: Office and Desk Space Rental Service,
Illinois.
required by one technician at a county or central office.
Champaign, Illinois.
1968. University Space Planning. Urbana, 11,1.: Univ.
Business Office, University of Illinois.
Hunt and Associates, 201 West Springfield Ave., Champaign,
-------
Table E10
Estimated Cost for Function G, Maintenance of an Office
(III. For One Secretary*)
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
£> (3) Equipment
ro
(4) Building
A secretary requires 75 sq. ft. of office spaceJ Janitorial ser-
vices including supplies are $6 per hour per 200 sq. ft per week.2
None
The following items of equipment assumed to be required are listed
with their respective costs.3
(a) One desk, $180.
(b) One typewriter, $545 + $46.32/year maintenance
(a) One upright cabinet (78" x 36" x 18"), $90
(d) One swivel chair, $85.
(e) One desk lamp, $20.
Ten-year, straight-line depreciation is assumed.
(a) Space
A secretary requires 75 sq. ft. of office space and rent
is $5 per sq. ft. per month.4
(b) Utilities
Assume $ .75 per sq. ft. per month.4
$ 585.00/year
$ 138.32/year
$ 4,500.00/year
$ 675.00/year
(5) Office
Support
Assume $100 per secretary per year.
$ 100.00/year
-------
co
Table E10 (cont.)
EXPENSE *
ITEM EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION * COST/UNIT
(6): Program
Support None
TOTAL COST: $5,998.32/year
ro
*This tabulation includes those items and costs required by a secretary located at either a central
or county office.
^Source: Bareither, H.D., and Schillinger, J.L. 1968. University Space Planning. Urbana, 111.:
Univ. of 111 . Press.
2Source: AAA Janitorial Service, 515 Edgebrook, Champaign, 111.
3Source: Mr. R.J. Cheek, Purchasing Department, Business Office, University of Illinois.
^Source: Office and Desk Space Rental Service, Hunt and Associates, 201 West Springfield Ave.,
Champaign, Illinois.
-------
Table Ell
Estimated Cost for Function G, Maintenance of an Office
(IV. For State Central Office*)
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
ro
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
(3) Equipment
(4) Building
(5) Office
Support
(6) Program
Support
None
None
The following items of equipment assumed to be required are listed
with their respective costsJ
(a) One tape recorder, $100.
(b) One Xerox machine rented for $70/month, $840/year.
(e) One adding machine, $135 + $35/year maintenance.
(d) One overhead projector, $180 + $35/year maintenance.
(e) One slide projector, $200.
Seven-year, straight-line depreciation is assumed.
None
None
None
$ 997.95/year
TOTAL COST: $ 997.95/year
*This tabulation includes those items and costs which are required by a central office and which have
not been included elsewhere.
^Source: Mr. R.J. Cheek, Purchasing Department, Business Office, University of Illinois.
-------
Table E12
Estimated Cost for Function G, Maintenance of an Office
(V. County Office*)
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
(3) Equipment
(4) Building
(5) Office
Support
None
None
The following items of equipment assumed to be required are listed
with their respective costs.'
(a) One tape recorder, $100.
(b) One copying machine, $200 + $65/year maintenance
(a) One adding machine, $135 + $35/year maintenance
(d) One slide projector, $200.
Seven-year, straight-line depreciation is assumed.
None
(a) Phone
(b) Mail
Assume that the phone cost for normal business operations
averages $30 per month.2
Assume that the mailing cost averages $100 per person
(excluding secretaries) per year.2
TOTAL COST:
$ 190.71/year
$ 360.00/year
$ 100.00/per-
son/year
$ 550.71/year
$ 100.00/per-
son/year
*This tabulation includes those items and costs which are required by a county office and which
have not been included elsewhere.
ISource: Mr. R.J. Cheek, Purchasing Department, Business Office, University of Illinois.
2Source: State Soil Conservation Service, Champaign, Illinois.
275
-------
Table El3
Estimated Cost for Function H, Individual Analysis of Farm Needs
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
(1) Labor
01
(2) Labor
Support
(3) Equipment
(a) Technician
One technician can inspect one farm and draw up conserva-
tion plans for this one farm in a period of three days.'
The average salary for a technician is assumed to be
$10,000/yearJ
(b) Secretary
Assume it takes one secretary one day per farm to set up
a mutual time for the on farm inspection and to type up
and file the plan after the technician has completed it.
The secretary's salary is $7,500/year.l
(a) Farm Travel
Based on the size of an average county and assuming the
county office is located near the center of the county,
the equation (nxlO) + 10 = number of miles traveled, is
used to estimate travel distance for the technician. In
this equation n = the number of farms traveled to per day
per car. The mileage is multiplied by $ .15 per mile to
compute cost. Assume the technician in this case travels
to only one farm in a day and only one trip is made for
each farm analyzed.
(b) Telephone - Mail
Assume $ .75 is spent on phone calls and mailing for each
farm analyzed.
The equipment needed by one technician to analyze farms costs $60.1
This cost is put on a straight-line depreciation over ten years
to compute a yearly cost of $6. This yearly cost is divided
by the number of farms analyzed per year.
$120.00/farm
$ 30.00/farm
$ 3.00/farm
$ ,75/farm
$ .072/farm
-------
Table E13 (cont.)
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
(4) Building
(5) Office
Support
(6) Program
Support
tv>
—I
None
None
Assuming the employee has the proper educational background, four
weeks of formal training along with nine months of on-the-job
training is needed.1 Training costs are figured in section K.
Using the costs from section K, 4 weeks of training costs
$1,494.90 per technician. Since there is a 35% employee turn-
over rate,' the number of new technicians needing training will
depend on the length of the program. The nine months of on-the-
job training results in an experienced technician and the new
technician working together but having an output equal to only
one technician. The following equation is used to take employee
turnover and on-the-job training into account.
[number of trainees] [(!+(.35(m-l))) x ($1494.90 + $7500)]
= total training cost.
m = the length of the program in years. The 7500 is derived
from the trainee's nine month salary during training.
TOTAL COST = (153.82 x number of farms) + (total training cost)
1
Source: State Soil Conservation Service, Champaign, Illinois
-------
Table El4
Estimated Cost for Function I, Contracting with Individual Farmer
ro
•~>j
oo
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
(3) Equipment
(4) Building
(5) Office
Support
(6) Program
Support
(a) Technician
Since the technician has already analyzed the farms, drawn
up the plans, and has spoken to the farmer in section H,
the only contracting left is to verify that the farmer ag-
rees with the plans. Therefore it is assumed that a tech-
nician only spends one hour per contract.
(b) Secretary
Assume one secretary can type up ten contracts in one day.
None
None
None
Assume clerical supplies cost $1 per contract.
Since the contract is made with a public agency it must be published.
Assume seven lines are needed to publish notice of the contract
being made and where it can be inspected. Assume the notice is
published in four sources per county at $ .25 per line.-'1
TOTAL COST:
$ 5.00/contract
$ 3.00/contract
$ 1.00/contract
$ 7.OO/contract
$16.00/contract
Source: The News Gazette. Champaign, Illinois
-------
Table El 5
Estimated Cost for Function J, Education
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
ro
•««4
UD
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
(3) Equipment
(4) Building
(5) Office
Support
(6) Program
Support
Assume one technician can instruct a class of thirty in a single
session.1 Assume that the sessions last 2^ hours and that 1%
hours of preparation time is required by the technician for each
session. The technician's salary equals $5 per hour.
(a) Travel
Based on the size of an average county and assuming the
county office is located near the center of the county,
assume the technician travels 20 miles per session at a
cost of $ .15 per mile.
(b) Telephone - Mail
Assume the cost of communications in setting up a session
is $5.
The equipment needed to conduct these sessions will come from the
county office (G).
In most cases local high schools or other public buildings will be
used to conduct the session. Assume a $25 charge for this use.
None
(a) Training
Assuming the employee has the proper background, four
weeks of formal training are required. Training costs
are figured in section K. Using the costs from section
K, four weeks of training costs $1,494.90 per technician.
This figure must be adjusted using the following equation
to take a 35% employee turnover into account.1
$ 20.00/session
$ 3.00/session
$ 5.00/session
$ 25.00/session
-------
Table E15 (cont.)
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
ro
oo
o
(6)
(a)
Total Training Cost = ((!+(.35(m-l))) x 1494.90) x the
number of technicians trained, where m = the length of
the program in years.
(b) Presentation Packets
Packets containing educational material used in educating
costs approximately $5 per person.2 Assume thirty people
per session.
(o) Publication of Session
Assume the public notice of the session wilj require ten
lines in one local paper at $ .25 per line.
TOTAL COST = $205.50/session + Total Training Costs
$150.00/session
$ 2.50/session
Source: State Soil Conservation Service, Champaign, Illinois
^Source: Champaign County Extension Service
^Source: The News Gazette, Champaign, Illinois
-------
Table E16
Estimated Cost for Function K, Training of Technicians
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
(1) Labor
ro
CD
(2) Labor
Support
(3) Equipment
(4) Building
(5) Office
Support
(a) Instructor
One instructor teaches a class of 30. Assume a salary
of $10,000 per year.1
(b) Trainee
Assume a salary of $10,000 per year for the trainee?-
(c) Secretary
The secretary is estimated to spend 16 hours per session
preparing the necessary material and making the arrange-
ments. The secretary's pay equals $3.75 per hour.
(a) Living Expense
Assume every trainee is allowed $25 per day for living
expenses during the formal training period.
(b) Travel To and From Training
Assuming the training session is located near the center
of the state and that trainees return home on weekends,
the estimated mileage is 400 miles per week. Assume two
trainees per car and $ .15 per mile for mileage.
The equipment needed for the training program is included under
the central office maintenance (G).
Rental for a conference room large enough for 30 trainees is estim-
ated to equal $ .50 per day/
Mailing information about the training school is estimated to equal
$ .50 per trainee.
$ 1.60/day/
trainee
$40.00/day/
trainee
$ 2.00/trainee/
session
$25.00/day/
trainee
$30.00/week/
trainee
$ 1.67/day/
trainee
$ .50/trainee/
session
-------
Table E16 (cont.)
FYPFI\KF
ITEM EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION COST/UNIT
(6) Program (a) Learning Packets
Support Educational materials needed for the session are expected
co to cost $5 per trainee.2 $ 5.00/trainee/
^ (b) Teaching Materials session
This includes miscellaneous supplies such as chalk, slides
and charts. $ .10/trainee/
session
TOTAL COST = $68.37/day/trainee + $7.50/session/trainee + $30.00/week/trainee
^Source: State Soil Conservation Service, Champaign, Illinois
Source: Champaign County Extension Service
-------
Table E17
Estimated Cost for Function L, Reporting Need
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
oo
u>
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
(3) Equipment
(4) Building
(5) Office
Support
(6) Program
Support
(a) Technician
The labor provided by the technician in determining the
need has already been accounted for in sections A or H,
so no further cost is incurred here.
(b) Secretary
Assume it takes a secretary ten days to make up a county
report. The secretary's salary is $7,500 per year.l
Assume it costs $1.00 per report for mailing.
None
None
The miscellaneous office supplies used in compiling the report
are estimated to cost $5.00 per report.
None
TOTAL COST:
$300.007report
$ 1.00/report
$ 5.00/report
$306.00/county
report
Source: State Soil Conservation Service, Champaign, Illinois
-------
Table E18
Estimated Cost for Function M, Formation of a Program
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
r>o
00
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
(3) Equipment
(4) Building
(5) Office
Support
(6) Program
Support
(a) Central Administrator
(b) Central Technician
(c) Secretary
The labor cost for a, b, and o is covered in central coor-
dination so no cost is shown here.
(d) County Representative
This is a county employee, probably the head technician,
who meets with the central personnel to discuss the pro-
gram to be pursued. Assume four meetings per year with
each meeting lasting one day and a salary of $10,000.
(a) Travel
The county representative is estimated to travel 200 miles
for every meeting at $ .15 per mile.
(b) Food
The county representative is allowed $10 per day for food
expenses.
None
None
Part of Central Coordination (Q).
None
$160.00/year
$120.00/year
$ 40.00/year
TOTAL COST:
$320.00/year
-------
Table E19
Estimated Cost for Function N, Construction
Construction costs accrue to the farmer initially. Subsidies to sup-
port construction may be paid to the farmer but this is not an admin-
istration cost. The administration cost of paying the subsidies is
recorded in section F. Therefore no administration cost is encoun-
tered in this construction function.
TOTAL COST = 0
Table E20
Estimated Cost for Function 0, Notification of Legislation
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
(3) Equipment
(4) Building
(5) Office
Support
(6) Program
Support
None
None
None
None
None
The general public must be notified about a new policy which may
offer them some assistance in conservation efforts. The notifi-
cation that a new policy exists and where it can be inspected is
estimated to require 30 lines in each of four county area papers
lino 1
at $ .25 per line.'
$ 30.00/county
TOTAL COST:
$ 30.00/county
T
Source: The News Gazette, Champaign, Illinois
Table E21
Estimated Cost for Function P, Administrative Organization
The costs of the administrative organization functions are either in-
cluded in the central coordination (Q) or the legislative body at the
time the bill is formulated. Therefore no costs occur here.
TOTAL COST = 0
285
-------
Table E22
Estimated Cost for Function Q, Central Coordination
EXPENSE
ITEM
EXPLANATION OR METHOD OF CALCULATION
COST/UNIT
(1) Labor
(2) Labor
Support
(a) Administrator
Assume the central coordination office has one administrator
who is in charge of the state organization.! The adminis-
trator's salary is estimated to Be $35,000 per year.
(b) Technicians
Three technicians are located at the central office.l
They mainly consult with county technicians in helping
with major conservation problems and keep the counties
posted on new developments. Their salary is assumed to
be $20,000 per year.
(a) Secretaries
It is assumed the central coordination office requires
three secretaries at an annual salary of $7,500.1
(a) Travel
The four staff members are expected to travel 10,000 miles
per person per year within the state at a cost of $ .15
per mile.*
The administrator makes an annual trip to Washington, D.C.
(b) Room and Board
The technicians are expected to average 90 days per year on
the road.* The room and board allowance is $25 per day.
The administrator is expected to travel 40 days per year in
state plus an annual three-day meeting in D.C. The D.C.
expense allowance is $50 per day.
(a) Telephone
The commercial phone cost for the central coordination office
is estimated to be $200 per staff member per year.1 The FTS
(government) line is estimated at $480 per member per year.*
(d) Mail
Mailing expense is expected to be $200 per staff member
per year
(3) Equipment This expense is in section G.
(4) Building This expense is in section G.
(5) Office
Support This expense is in section G.
(6) Program
Support None
$35,000.00/year
$60,000.00/year
$22,500.00/year
$ 6,000.00/year
$ 160.00/year
$ 6.750.00/year
$ 1,150.00/year
$ 1,920.00/year
$ 800.00/year
TOTAL COST:
$135,080.00/year
Source: State Soil Conservation Service, Champaign, Illinois
286
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Table E23
Estimated Implementation Costs for Policy 1: Education
Policy
Component
Performance
Indicators
(P)
Institutional
Function
H: Individual Analysis of
Farm Needs
Comments
In this policy the information needed has already
been compiled in the Conservation Needs Inven-
tory (CNI) so no cost is incurred.
Cost
6: Maintenance of a
County Office
L: Reporting Need
Based on an estimate of the number of people one
technician can educate, assume that only one
technician is needed for each county. Each
county also requires one secretary.
In this policy the need is already reported in the
CNI so no cost is incurred
$85,750.15
Control
Instruments
(I)
Erosion
Control
Techniques
(0
Measures of
Compliance
W
P: Administrative
Organization
Q: Central Coordination
G: Maintenance of a
Central Office (for Q)
M: Formation of a
Program
J: Education
K: Training for
Education (J)
N: Construction
A: Monitoring
K: Training for
Monitoring (A)
B: Reporting Impact
Assume that one county bears 1/93 of the total cost.
Assume that one county bears 1/93 of the total cost.
Total Cost for Performance Indicators:
Assume that one education session will be conducted
per week during 50 weeks of each year.
Total Cost for Control Instruments:
Total Cost for Erosion Control Techniques:
Assume that 10% of the farms are monitored once
each year.
Assume that a report is made for each farm monitored.
Total Cost for Measures of Compliance:
TOTAL COST PER YEAR BASED ON A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM:
0
7,262.34
3,344.04
$96.356.53
$1.600.00
51,375.00
3.587.16
$56.562.76
0
0
$7,704.30
1,802.88
579.50
$10,086.68
$163,005.97
287
-------
Table E24
Estimated Implementation Costs for Policy 2: Tax Credit
Policy Institutional
Component Functional
Performance 0: Notification of
Indicators Legislation
(p) F: Tax Transfer
Control F: Tax Transfer
Instruments
(I)
Erosion N: Construction
Control
Techniques (C)
Measures of F: Tax Transfer
Compliance (M)
Temporary F: Tax Transfer
Penalties (T)
Cost
$ 30.00
0
Total Cost for Performance Indicators: $ 30.00
0
Total Cost for Control Instruments: 0
0
Total Cost for Erosion Control Techniques: 0
0
Total Cost for Measures of Compliance: 0
0
Total Cost for Temporary Penalties: 0
TOTAL COST PER YEAR BASED ON A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM: $30.00
288
-------
Table E25
Estimated Implementation Costs for Policy 3: Fifty-percent Cost Sharing
Policy
Component
Performance
Indicators
(P)
Institutional
Function
0: Notification of
Legislation
G: Maintenance of a
County Office
Conments
Assuming that 1221 farms receive cost-sharing
Cost
$ 30.00
consideration, 3 technicians are needed In
each county (function H). Assuming that 10%
of these 1221 farms a re monitored every year,
one additional technician Is required (func-
tion A). Assume that the county office has
two secretaries.
274,756.75
Control
Instruments
(I)
Erosion
Control
Techniques (C)
Measures of
Compliance (H)
Temporary
Penalties (T)
P: Administrative
Organization
Q: Central Coordination
G: Maintenance of a
Central Office (Q)
H: Individual Analysis
of Farm Needs
K: Training for Analysis
L: Reporting Need
M: Formation of a
Program
B: Reporting Impact
N: Construction
A: Monitoring
K: Training for
Monitoring (A)
B: Reporting Impact
D: Board of Review
F: Subsidy Transfer
Assume that one county bears 1/93 of the total cost.
Assume that one county bears 1/93 of the total cost.
(H)
Assume that an annual report is made.
Total Cost for Performance Indicators:
Assume that a report is made on each farm analyzed.
Total Cost for Control Instruments:
Total Cost for Erosion Control Techniques:
Assume that 10* of the farms are monitored once each
year.
Assume that one report is made for each farm
monitored.
Total Cost for Measures of Compliance:
Total Cost for Temporary Penalties:
0
7,262.34
3.344.04
187,814.22
64.763.28
1.530.00
$539,500.63
1,600.00
5.799.75
$ 7,399.75
0
0
$ 7,704.30
1.802.88
579.50
$ 10,086.68
$ 4.979.40
$419,195.00
$424.184.40
TOTAL COST PER YEAR BASED ON A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM: $981.161.46
289
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Table £26
Estimated Implementation Costs for Policy 4: Required
Conservation Plan Development
Policy
Component
Performance
Indicators (P)
Control
Instruments (I)
Erosion
Control
Techniques (C)
Measures of
Compliance (M)
Temporary
Penalties (T)
Institutional
Function
0: Notification of
Legislation
6: Maintenance of a
County Office
P: Administrative
Organization
Q: Central Coordination
G: Maintenance of a
Central Office
H: Individual Analysis
of Farm Needs
K: Training for
Analysis (H)
M: Formation of a
Program
I: Contracting with
Individual Farmers
B: Reporting Impact
N: Construction
C: Notification of
Assessment of
Penalty
D: Board of Review
E: Court Action
Comments
Assuming that conservation plans must De made for
1221 farms, 3 technicians are needed in each
county (function H). Assume that the county
office has one secretary.
Assume that one county bears 1/93 of the total cost.
Assume that one county bears 1/93 of the total cost.
Total Cost for Performance Indicators:
In this case, reporting impact involves report-
ing each contracted farm plan so that the con-
tract will be on record.
Total Cost for Control Instruments:
Total Cost for Erosion Control Techniques:
No cost to administration. The conservation plans
are a matter of public record.
Total Cost for Measures of Compliance:
Assume a 10% rate of penalty.
Assume that 20* of penalties are taken to court.
Total Cost for Temporary Penalty:
Cost
$ 30.00
191,760.15
0
7,262.34
3,344.04
187,814.22
64,763.28
$454,974.03
$ 1,600.00
19,536.00
5,799.75
$ 26,935.75
0
0
0
0
$ 1,189.50
4,979.40
960.00
$ 7,128.90
TOTAL COST PER YEAR BASED ON A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM: $489,038.68
290
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Table E27
Estimated Implementation Costs for Policy 5:
Conservation Plan Implementation
Required
Policy
Component
Performance
Indicators (P)
Institutional
Function Comments
0: Notification of
Legislation
Cost
$ 30.00
6: Maintenance of a
County Office
Assuming that conservation plans must be made
for 1221 farms, 3 technicians are needed In
each county (function H). Assuming that 10X
of the farms are monitored once each year,
an additional technician 1s needed (function
Control
Instruments
(I)
Erosion
/*^^fr •• • 1
control
Techniques (C)
Measures of
Compliance (M)
Temporary
Penalty (T)
P: Administrative
Organization
Q: Central Coordination
G: Maintenance of a
Central Office (Q)
H: Individual Analysis
of Farm Needs
K: Training for
Analysis (H)
M: Formation of
a Program
I: Contracting with
Individual Farmers
B: Reporting Impact
N: Construction
A: Monitoring
K: Training for
Monitoring (A)
G: Reporting Impact
C: Notification of
Assessment of
Penalty
D: Board of Review
E: Court Action
A). Assume 2 secretaries for each county.
Assume that one county bears 1/93 of the total cost.
Assume that one county bears 1/93 of the total cost.
Total Cost for Performance Indicators:
In this case, reporting Impact Involves reporting
each contracted farm plan so that future mon 1 to-
ri ngs of various farms can be compared to this
contracted plan for compliance.
Total Cost for Control Instruments:
Total Cost for Erosion Control Techniques:
Assume that 10X of the farms are monitored once
each year.
Assume that a report Is made on each farm
monitored.
Total Cost for Measures of Compliance:
Assume a 10* rate of penalty.
Assume that 20* of penalties are taken to
court.
Total Cost for Temporary Penalties:
TOTAL COST PER YEAR BASED ON A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM:
274,756.75
0
7,262.34
3,344.04
187,814.22
64.763.28
$537.970.63
$ 1,600.00
19,536.00
5.799.75
$ 26.935.75
0
0
$ 7,704.30
1 .802.88
579.50
$ 10,086.68
$ 1.189.50
4,979.40
960.00
$ 7.128.90
$582.121.96
291
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Table E28
Estimated Implementation Costs for Policy 6: Development of Greenbelts
Policy
Component
Control
Instruments (I)
Erosion Control
Techniques (C)
Measures of
Compliance (M)
Temporary
Penalties (T)
Institutional
Function
0:
G:
P:
Q:
G:
M:
H:
K:
B:
N:
A:
K:
C:
D:
E:
Notification of
Legislation
Maintenance of a
County Office
Administrative
Organization
Central Coordination
Maintenance of a
Central Office (Q)
Formation of a
Program
Individual Analysis
of Farm Needs
Training for
Analysis (H)
Reporting Impact
Construction
Monitoring
Training for
Monitoring (A)
Notification of
Assessment of
Penalty
Board of Review
Court Action
Comments
Assume that 2 technicians are required for
planning and monitoring the greenbelts.
Assume that one secretary 1s needed.
Assume that one county bears 1/93 of the total
cost.
Assume that one county bears 1/93 of the total
cost.
Since this policy Involves greenbelts only,
assume that the effort required for H to be
1/3 of the normal total (1221 farms) for the
entire county.
Assume that one report Is made for each unit
monitored.
Total Cost for Control Instruments:
Total Cost for Erosion Control Techniques:
Assume that 10% of the units are monitored.
Total Cost for Measures of Compliance:
Assume a 10% rate of penalty.
For this policy, assume 2 cases per month.
Assume that 20% of penalties are taken to
court.
Total Cost for Temporary Penalties:
Cost
$ 30.00
138,255.15
0
7,262.34
3,344.04
1,600.00
62,604.74
43,175.52
193.33
$256,465.12
0
0
$ 514.04
3,605.76
$ 4,119.80
$ 399.75
3,802.20
$ 320.00
$ 4,521.95
TOTAL COST PER YEAR BASED ON A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM: $265,106.87
292
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APPENDIX F
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES AND COVER LETTERS
Page
1. Introductory letter to farmers 294
2. Cover letter to farmers 295
3. Farmer questionnaire, version A 296
4. Farmer questionnaire, version B 300
5. Introductory letter to ASCS directors 304
6. Cover letter to ASCS directors 305
7. ASCS directors questionnaire 306
293
-------
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE • DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 305 MUMFORD HALL
URBANA, ILLINOIS 61801
[Letter sent to farmers]
I need your helo. In a few days I will send you a questionnaire
concerning soil erosion. This questionnaire is being sent to only
a few farmers in your county. Therefore, your cooperation and answers
are very important to me.
But why a questionnaire on soil erosion? There is continuing
concern with soil erosion on agricultural land. Hot only is valuable
top soil being lost, but water quality may be affected by sediment and
plant nutrients being carried into streams and water supplies. The
questionnaire which I am going to send you will allow you to express
your views about various policies that might be implemented by the
Agricultural Extension Service, the Soil Conservation Service or some
other governmental body. Your views are very important.
After you have received the questionnaire and have an opportunity
to review it, we will call you long distance to obtain your answers.
Of course, your answers will be strictly confidential and not released
to any private or governmental group in any manner that would allow
them to identify your answers.
If you have any questions, please call me collect at (217) 333-3155.
Sincerely-,
lies ley D. Seitz
Associate Professor of
Agricultural Economics
294
-------
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS • 305 MUMFORD HALL
URBANA, ILLINOIS 61801
[Letter sent to farmers]
Enclosed is the questionnaire I wrote about several days ago.
As I mentioned, we need your response since we are talking to only
a very few farmers in your county.
Here is what I would like to have you do. First, read over the
questionnaire. Then, put it near the telephone. We will call you
sometime during the next week to get your answers. If the time we call
is not convenient for you, we will make arrangements to call you back.
If for some reason you do not want to wait for our call or will not be
available, please call us collect at (217) 333-3155. If we have not been
able to reach you within 10 days, please fill out the questionnaire and
send it back to us.
Again, let me assure you that your answers will be strictly confi-
dential and will not be released to any private or governmental group
in any manner that would allow them to identify your answers.
We certainly appreciate your cooperation and interest in this
project.
Sincerely
Wesley D. Seitz
Associate Professor of
Agricultural tcononn'cs
enclosure
295
-------
IMvwrity of HHnoh ol Urixma-
FARMER ATTITUDE SURVEY [Version A]
1. To start wicn, we would like some Information on the kind of farm you operate. How many acres do you
have planted: g) -cr-f ,n rQw <.rop§
b) acres in grain crops
c) acres In permanent pasture
2. Do you practice contouring? Yes. How many acres are contoured?
No
3. Is any of your land terraced? Yes. How many acres are terraced?
No
4. Over the- last 5 years, what was your average yield of corn? bushels/acre.
5. Of the land you farm, do you own It, rent It, or do you own some and rent some? Own all
Rent all
Own some, rent some
6. a. How much nitrogen fertilizer per acre are you applying this year to your corn acreage? Ibs/acre
b. How many pounds of actual nitrogen Is that per acre? Ibs/acre
c. Which fetlllzer formulation do you use most often on corn (either singly or In combination)?
Nitrogen solution (liquid nitrogen)
Anhydrous ammonia
Ammonium nitrate
Urea
7. What sort of tillage practice do you follow for corn
a. In the fall?
b. How about In the soring?
8. Now to some questions on soil erosion control.
Yes Maybe Not Sure No
a. Do you think erosion control Is needed to maintain soil
productivity on farms like yours? 1 2 3 4
b. Do you think erosion control Is needed for the achievement
of water quality? 1 2 3 4
c. Do you think the amount of soil erosion can be estimated on
a farm-by-farm basis? 1 2 3 4
d. Do you think the amount of soil erosion can be estimated
for a watershed? 1 2 3 4
9. How effective do you think the following practices would be In reducing erosion on your farm and on
others with similar conditions?
Very Somewhat Not Very Not at all
Effective Effective Effective Effective
c. Conservation tillage (zero, chisel, strip, etc.) I
2
2
2
2
3
i
.
i,
4
L
296
-------
-2-
10. Now we would like you to consider several possible policies which might be adopted to control erosion or
nutrient losses. You may not be familiar with some of these policies or they may not apply to your par-
ticular farm and some may seem far-fetched. But we do need your reactions to EACH POLICY.
For each one, we would like you to tell us:
a. how_faj_r_ you think the policy would be (very fair, somewhat fair, somewhat unfair, very unfair);
b. what group. If any, would be unfairly treated by the policy If It were adopted, and
u. supposing the policy were adopted, about what percentage of farms like yours would you guess
would go along with each policy.
SOIL CONTROL PRACTICES Very Somewh.t Son)ewhat Very
Fair Fair Unfair Unfair
A. Full cost sharing for the cost of terracing.
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
c. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would apply f6r full cost
sharing for the cost of terracing? ,.
B. A regulation requiring contouring or terracing on slopes
over 9 percent.
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
c. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would adopt the required
practices on slopes? »
C. A regulation prohibiting moldboard fall plowing.
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would discontinue
moldboard fall plowing? ,,
NITROGEN REGULATIONS
D. A regulation charging a tax on nitrogen of 20< per pound.
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
t. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would reduce their
usage of nitrogen? »
LOANS/TAX CREDITS
E. Making available Interest-free loans to cover the farmer's
cost of soli conservation work.
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
c. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would apply for these
Interest-free loans? ,
297
-------
-3-
Very Somewhat Somewhat Very
Fair Fair Unfair Unfair
A regulation prohibiting the deduction of real estate taxes
from federal Income tax unless an approved soil conservation
plan has been developed and Implemented.
a. How fair would this policy be? 1 2 3 *»
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
c. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would Implement a soil
conservation plan? ^
SOIL LOSS REGULATIONS
G. A regulation requiring soil losses to be less than 3 tons
per acre (3 tons equal about 3 cubic yards).
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
c. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would achieve less than
3 tons of soil losses per acre? ^
H. A regulation requiring a recreational green belt along
streams to achieve increased water quality.
a. How fair would this policy be? 1 2 3 *
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
c. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would develop the
required green belt? ^
As you know, for a long time the Soil Conservation Service has helped farmers develop soil conservation
plans for their land.
a. Have you developed such a plan for your farm? Yes
No (If not, go to question 12)
b. How long ago did you develop your plan? years
c. How much of the plan have you implemented? All
Most
About half
A little
None
12. Do you think this approach of farmers developing their own conservation plan for their land with tech-
_Yes
No
nlcal assistance from the Soil Conservation Service Is reasonable? y
Why or why not?
13. How could you be better assisted In your own soil conservation activities? (Please list)
(Over)
298
-------
U. Which of the following statements best describe your soil conservation practices? Please state as
many as apply to you by giving the number of the statement(s).
(1) I'm doing a better job than anyone else In the county.
(2) I'm doing an excellent job.
(3) I'm doing an adequate job.
(l») I'm doing an average job.
(5) I'm doing the best I can under the circumstances.
(6) I know I should be doing a better job.
(7) If I wanted to take the time, I could do a better job.
(8) If my landlord would cooperate, I would do a better job.
(9) If , I would do a better job.
(please specify)
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME. WE CERTAINLY APPRECIATE YOUR COOPERATION.
We will attempt to reach you by telephone within 10 days. If you will not be available or If you
prefer not to wait for our call, please phone us collect at (217) 333*3155 or mall your completed
survey to:
Wesley Seltz
Department of Agricultural Economics
305 Humford Hall
University of Illinois
Urbana, IL 61801
299
-------
Univmity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
FARMER ATTITUDE SURVEY [Version B]
1. To start with, we would like some Information on the kind of farm you operate. How many acres do you
have planted: >
a) acres In row crops
b) acres Jn grain crops
c) acres In permanent pasture
2. Do you practice contouring? Yes. How many acres are contoured?
No
3. Is any of your land terraced? Yes. How many acres are terraced?
No
4. Over the last 5 years, what was your average yield of corn? bushels/acre.
5. Of the land you farm, do you own It, rent It, or do you own some and rent some? Own all
Rent all
Own some, rent some
6. a. How much nitrogen fertilizer per acre are you applying this year to your corn acreage? Ibs/acre
b. How many pounds of actual nitrogen Is that per acre? Ibs/acre
c. Which fetlllzer formulation do you use most often on corn (either singly or In combination)?
Nitrogen solution (liquid nitrogen)
Anhydrous ammonia
Ammonium nitrate
Urea
7. What sort of tillage practice do you follow for corn
a. In the fall?
b. How about In the spring?
8. Now to some questions on soil erosion control.
Yes
a. Do you think erosion control Is needed to maintain soil
productivity on farms like yours? 1 2 3
b. Do you think erosion control Is needed for the achievement
of water quality? 1 2 3 4
c. Do you think the amount of soil erosion can be estimated on
a farm-by-farm basis? 1 2 3 4
d. Do you think the amount of soil erosion can be estimated
for a watershed? 1 2 3 I*
9. How effective do you think the following practices would be In reducing erosion on your farm and on
others with similar conditions?
Very Somewhat Not Very Not at all
Effective Effective Effective Effective
a. Terracing < ' 2 3
b. Contouring ' 2 3
c. Conservation tillage (zero, chisel, strip, etc.) 1 2 3
d. Elimination of moldboard fall plowing 1 2 3
= . Changing crop rotations I 2 3
300
-------
-2-
10. Now we would like you to consider several possible policies which might be adopted to control erosion or
nutrient losses. You may not be familiar with some of these policies or they may not apply to your par-
ticular farm and some may seem far-fetched. But we do need your reactions to EACH POLICY.
For each one, we would like you to tell us:
a. how fair you think the policy would be (very fair, somewhat fair, somewhat unfair, very unfair),
b. what group, if any, would be unfairly treated by the policy If It were adopted, and
c. supposing the policy were adopted, about what percentage of farms like yours would you guess
would go along with each policy.
SOIL CONTROL PRACTICES .. e .
Very Somewhat Somewhat Very
Fair Fair Unfair Unfair
A. A 50% cost sharing for the cost of terracing.
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
C. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would apply for 50% cost
sharing for the cost of terracing? »
"O
A 50* cost sharing for the cost of slope modification (land
level Ing).
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group. If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
c. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would apply for 50% cost
sharing for the cost of slope modification? »
A regulation requiring conservation tillage (chisel, zero,
plow plant, etc.) In place of conventional tillage (mold-
board plowing, harrowing, disking, etc.).
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
v.. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would adopt the required
conservation tillage practices? »
NITROGEN REGULATIONS
D. A regulation Imposing an application limit of 100 Ibs. of
nitrogen per acre.
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
c. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would apply 100 Ibs. or
less of nitrogen per acre? ^
t. A regulation charging a tax on nitrogen of 10< per pound.
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would reduce their usage
of nitrogen?
301
-------
-3-
TAX CREDITS Very Somewhat Somewhat Very
Fair Fair Unfair Unfair
F. An Investment tax credit for the farmer's cost of soil
conservation work.
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
c. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would take advantage of
the Investment tax credit? »
G. A regulation requiring the development and Implementation
of an approved soil conservation plan.
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
c. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would Implement a soil
conservation plan? .
SOIL LOSS REGULATIONS
H. A regulation requiring soil losses to be less than 5 tons
per acre (5 tons equal about 5 cubic yards).
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do you guess would achieve less than
5 tons of soil losses per acre? »
I. A regulation requiring a non-recreational green belt
along streams and drainage ditches to achieve Increased
water quality.
a. How fair would this policy be?
b. What group, If any, would be unfairly treated If this
were adopted?
c. If this policy were adopted, about what percentage of
farms like yours do guess would develop the required
green belt? »
II. As you know, for a long time the Soil Conservation Service has helped farmers develop soil conservation
plans for their land.
o. Have you developed such a plan for your farm? Yes
No (If not, go to question 12)
b. How long ago did you develop your plan? years
c. How much of the plan have you Implemented? All
Host
About half
A little
None
(Ootr)
302
-------
-It-
12. Do you think this approach of farmers developing their own conservation plan for their land with tech-
nical assistance from the Soil Conservation Service Is reasonable?
No
Why or why not? ___^ ___^__^___
13- How could you be better assisted In your own soil conservation activities? (Please list)
14. Which of the following statements best describe your soil conservation practices? Please state as many
as apply to you by giving the number of the statement(s).
(1) I'm doing a better Job than anyone else In the county.
(2) I'm doing an excellent job.
(3) I'm doing an adequate Job.
(k) I'm doing an average job.
(5) I'm doing the best I can under the circumstances.
(6) I know I should be doing a better Job.
(7) If I wanted to take the time, I could do a better job.
(8) If my landlord would cooperate, I would do a better job.
(9) If , I would do a better Job.
(please specify)
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME. WE CERTAINLY APPRECIATE YOUR COOPERATION.
We will attempt to reach you by telephone within 10 days. If you will not be available or If you
prefer not to wait for our call, please phone us collect at (217) 333-3155 or mall your completed
survey to:
Wesley Seltz
Department of Agricultural Economics
305 Mumford Hall
University of 11llnols
Urbana, IL 6l801
303
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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
URBANA, ILLINOIS 61801
305 MUMFORD HALL
[Letter to ASCS directors]
I need your help. In a few days I will send you a questionnaire
concerning soil erosion. This questionnaire is being sent to the
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service County Executive
Director in only 11 counties. Therefore, your cooperation and answers
are very important to me.
But why a questionnaire on soil erosion? There is continuing
concern with soil erosion on agricultural land. [Jot only is valuable
top soil being lost, but water quality may be affected by sediment and
plant nutrients being carried into streams and water supplies. The
questionnaire which I am going to send you will allow you to express
your views about various policies that might be implemented by the
Agricultural Extension Service, the Soil Conservation Service or some
other governmental body. Your views are very important.
After you have received the questionnaire and have an opportunity
to review it, we will call you long distance to obtain your answers.
Of course, your answers will be strictly confidential and not released
to any private or governmental group in any manner that would allow
them to identify your answers.
If you have any questions, please call me collect at (217) 333-3155.
Sincerely,
Wesley D. Ser
Associate Professor of
Agricultural Economics
304
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University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE • DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS • 305 MUMFORD HALL
URBANA, ILLINOIS 61801
[Letter to ASCS directors]
Enclosed is the questionnaire I wrote about several days ago.
As I mentioned, we need your response since we are talking to only
eleven Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service County
Executive Directors.
Here is what I would like to have you do. First, read over the
questionnaire. Then, put it near the telephone. Ue will call you
sometime during the next week to get your answers. If the time we call
is not convenient for you, we will make arrangements to call you back.
If for some reason you do not want to wait for our call or will not be
available, please call us collect at (217) 333-3155. If we have not been
able to reach you within 10 days, please fill out the questionnaire and
send it back to us.
Again, let me assure you that your answers will be strictly confi-
dential and will not be released to any private or governmental group
in any manner that v/ould allow them to identify your answers.
We certainly appreciate your cooperation and interest in this
project.
Sincerely.
Wesley7 D. Seift
Associate Professor of
Agricultural Economics
enclosure
305
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'SCS QUESTIONNAIRE
1- For._ county, how would you describe the land?
a. Is it primarily flat
rolling
slopino
hilly
b. What is the approximate average length of the slopes?
2. How many -icres in your county are terraced?
3. How many acres in your county are contoured?
4. Over the last 5 years, what was the average bushels per acre yield of corn
in your county?
bu/acre
5. What sort of tillage practices are most commonly used for corn in vour county
a. in the fall?
b. in the spring?
6. Based on your contact with farmers, we need your impression on farmer attitudes
about soil erosion control.
Yes Ka_yb£ Not^Sjn. S°
a. Do they think erosion control is needed to
to maintain soil productivity on farms? 1 ?. 34
b. Bo they think erosion control is needed for
the achievement of water quality? 1234
c. Do they think the amount of soil erosion
can be estimated on a farm by farm basis? 12 34
d. Do they think the amount of soil erosion
can be estimated for a watershed? 12 34
7. If farmers were asked, "How effective do you think the following practices would
be in reducing erosion on your farm and on others with similar conditions—very
effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, or not at all effective?",
how do you think they would respond to the following?
Very Somewhtt Not Very Not «t «11
effective effective Effective effective
a. Terracing 1 234
b. Contouring 1 234
c. Conservation tillage
(zero, chisel, strip, etc.) 1 234
d. Elimination of moldboard fall Blowing 1 234
e. Changing crop rotations 1 234
8. Please Indicate the general attitude of fanners toward soil conservation
practices 1n your county.
A small percentage are vitally Interested.
~~Most would be Interested 1f they were properly Informed.
""At least SOX are very Interested.
"'"'Most think 1t 1s unnecessary.
O'ther comments
306
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-2-
9. Now we would like you to consider several possible policies which might be
adopted to control erosion or nutrient losses. Some of these policies may
not apply directly to farms 1n your county and somejnay seem far-fetched.
But, we do need your reactions to EACH POLICY.
For each one, we would like you to tell us:
(a) how fair you think the policy would be (very fair, somewhat fair,
somewhat unfair, very unfair),
(b) what group, if any, would be unfairly treated by the policy 1f it
were adopted, and
(c) supposing the policy were adopted, about what percentage of farms in
your county would you guess would go along with each policy.
SOIL CONTROL PRACTICES:
Vtry SonoMt Somwhit Very
A. Full cost sharing for the cost of terracing. — f') What group. If any, would be unfairly
treated If this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms In your county do you
guess would apply for full -cost sharing
for the cost of terracing? X
B. A SOX cost sharing for the cost of terracing.
How fair would this policy be? 1 2 3
What group, if any, would be unfairly
treated If this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms In your county do you
guess would apply for SOX cost sharing
for the cost of terracing? X
C. A regulation requiring contouring or terracing
on slopes over 9 percent.
How fair would this policy be? 1 2 3
What group, 1f any, would be unfairly
treated if this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms in your county do you
guess would adopt the required practices
on slopes? X
0. A SOX cost sharing for the cost of slope
modification (land leveling).
How fair would this policy be? 1 2 3
What group, If any, would be unfairly
treated If this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms In your county do you
guess would apply for SOX cost sharing
for the cost of slope modification? X
E. A regulation prohibiting moldboard fall
plowing.
How fair would this policy be? 1 2 3
What group, if any, would be unfairly
treated if this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms in your county do you
guess would discontinue moldboard fall
plowl ng? X
307
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-3-
V«ry Somewhat Somewhat Very
f.1r fair Unfilr UnfJiC
A regulation requiring conservation tillage
(chisel, zero, plow plant, etc.) 1n place of
conventional tillage (moldboard plowing, har-
rowing, disking, etc.).
(a) How fair would this policy be? 1 2 34
(b) What group, if any, would be unfairly
treated if this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms in your county do you
guess would adopt the required conservation
tillage practices? %
NITROGEN REGULATIONS
G. A regulation Imposing an application limit of
100 IDS. of nitrogen per acre.
How fair would this policy be? 1
What group, if any, would be unfairly
treated if this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms in your county do you
guess would apply 100 Ibs. or less of
nitrogen per acre? %
H. A regulation charging a tax on nitrogen of
20« per 1b.
(a) How fair would this policy be? 1
(b) What group, if any, would be unfairly
treated if this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms in your county do you
guess would reduce their usage of
ni trogen? : %
1. A regulation charging a tax on nitrogen of
10^ per Ib.
(a) How fair would this policy be? 1
(b) What group, if any, would be unfairly
treated if this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms 1n your county do you
guess would reduce their usage of
nitrogen? %
LOANS/TAX CREDITS
J. Making available interest-free loans to
cover the farmer's cost of soil conservation
work.
How fair would this policy be? 1
What group, if any, would be unfairly
treated If this were adopted?
is!
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms in your county do you
guess would apply for these Interest-
free loans? . *
308
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-4-
Very Sonwwhit SomtwhJt Very
fill F«1r Unfitr Unfair
K. An investment tax credit for the farmer's
cost of soil conservation work.
is!
How fair would this policy be? 1
What group, 1f any, would be unfairly
treated 1f this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms fn your county do you
guess would take advantage of the
investment tax credit? %
A regulation requiring the development and
Implementation of an approved soil
conservation plan.
is!
How fair would this policy be? .1
What group, if any, would be unfairly
treated if this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms 1n your county do you
guess would implement a soil conservation
plan? X
M. A regulation prohibiting the deduction of real
estate taxes from Federal Income tax unless an
approved soil conservation plan has been
developed and implemented.
si
How fair would this policy be? ............... 1
What group, 1f any, would be unfairly
treated if this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms 1n your county do you
guess would Implement a soil conservation
p 1 an? _ X
SOIL LOSS REGULATIONS
N. A regulation requiring soil losses to be
less than 3 tons per acre (3 tons equal
about 3 cu. yds.).
How fair would this policy be? 1
What group, if any, would be unfairly
treated if this were adopted?
is!
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms in your county do you
guess would achieve less than 3 tons of
soil losses per acre? *
0. A regulation requiring soil losses to be
less than 5 tons per acre (5 tons equal
about 5 cu. yds.).
(a)
(b)
How fair would this policy be? 1
What group, 1f any, would be unfairly
treated If this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms In your county do you
guess would achieve less than 5 tons of
soil losses per acre? X
309
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-5-
A regulation requiring a recreational green
belt along streams to achieve Increased
water quality.
Very
Unfilr Unfair
CI
How fair would this policy be? 1
What group, 1f any, would be unfairly
treated 1f this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms 1n your county do you
guess would develop the required green
bel t? %
Q. A regulation requiring a non-recreational
green belt along streams and drainage ditches
to achieve Increased water quality.
li!
How fair would this policy be? 1
What group, If any, would be unfairly
treated 1f this were adopted?
(c) If this policy were adopted, about what
percentage of farms 1n your county do you
guess would develop the required green
belt? %
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION!
310
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APPENDIX G
SURVEY RESULTS: FAIRNESS OF ALL POLICIES INCLUDED
IN QUESTIONNAIRES
The following table reports the responses of farmers to the fairness ques-
tions for all policies included in both forms of the questionnaire. It in-
cludes a breakdown by whether the farmer has adopted a soil conservation plan.
In general, those soil-conservation-oriented policies that involve blanket
prescriptions on farm operations are less favorably received than those that
constrain soil loss but allow flexibility in how the operator achieves the
reduction. The nitrogen-focused policies are not viewed as fair.
311
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Table Gl
Survey Results: Fairness of All Policies Included in Questionnaire
Full Cost Sharing for
Cost of Terracing
50% Cost Sharing for
Cost of Terracing
Required Contour or
Terrace on 9% Slopes
50% Cost Share for
Slope Modification
Prohibition of Fall
Moldboard Plowing
Required Conservation
Tillage
100 Pounds of
Nitrogen/Acre Limit
Nitrogen Tax 20<£/Pound
Nitrogen Tax 10<£/Pound
Interest-Free Loan
Conservation Work
Investment Tax Credit
Conservation Work
Required Implementation of
Soil Conservation Plan
No Deduction of Taxes with-
out Soil Conservation Plan
Soil Losses <3 Tons/Acre
Soil Losses <5 Tons/Acre
Required Recreational
Greenbelt, Streams
Required Nonrec. Greenbelt,
Streams & Drainage Ditches
N
31
15
18
17
32
17
15
17
32
17
16
19
19
19
31
15
19
19
32
16
19
18
18
18
32
17
29
15
18
17
32
17
17
19
YES/
NO*
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
VERY
FAIR
25.8
46.7
33.3
35.3
40.6
29.4
26.7
29.4
15.6
11.8
25.0
10.5
21.1
26.3
6.7
5.3
37.5
62.5
57.9
50.0
22.2
16.7
15.6
5.9
13.8
13.3
33.3
17.6
21.9
11.8
41.2
21.1
SOME-
WHAT ***
FAIR
51.6
46.7
44.4
29.4
37.5
35.3
33.3
35.3
18.8
11.8
25.0
26.3
5.3
15.8
6.5
13.3
5.3 <
34.4
25.0
36.8
38.9
22.2
50.0
18.8
29.4 <
51.7
33.3
33.3
29.4 >
31.3
35.3 "
23.5
42.1 <
SOME-
WHAT
UNFAIR
9.7
6.7
11.1
23.5
6.3
23.5
33.3
23.5
31.3
17.6
6.3
42.1
31.6
15.8
16.1
6.7
15.8
5.3
21.9
6.3
5.3
5.6
16.7
16.7
18.8
11.8
17.2
20.0
5.6
17.6
18.8
23.5
11.8
10.5
VERY
UNFAIR
12.9
11.1
11.8
15.6
11.8
6.7
11.8
34.4
58.8
43.8
21.1
42.1
42.1
77.4
73.3
78.9
89.5
6.3
6.3
5.6
38.9
16.7
46.9
52.9
17.2
33.3
27.8
35.3
28.1
29.4
23.5
26.3
Plan Developed?
** Percent
indicates that the sum of somewhat fair plus very fair exceeds the sum of
somewhat unfair plus very unfair for all farmers.
312
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TO CONVERT
Acres
Bushels
Bushels
Bushels/acre
Bushels/acre
Inches
Pounds
Pounds/acre
Tons (short)
Tons (short)
Tons/acre
Tons/acre
APPENDIX H
METRIC CONVERSION TABLE
INTO
hectares
liters
cubic meters
liters/hectare
cubic meters/hectare
centimeters
kilograms
kilograms/hectare
kilograms
metric tons
kilograms/hectare
metric tons/hectare
MULTIPLY BY
0.4047
35.24
0.03524
87.08
0.0871
2.54
0.4536
1.121
907.18
0.90718
2241.6
2.2416
313
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TECHNICAL REPORT DATA
(Please read Instructions on the reverse before completing)
1. REPORT NO.
EPA-600/5-78-005
2.
3. RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION'NO.
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Alternative Policies for Controlling Nonpoint
Agricultural Sources of Water Pollution
5. REPORT DATE
April 1978 issuing date
6. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION CODE
7. AUTHOR(S)
W.D. Seitz et al.
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NO.
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.
1BB770
11. CONTRACT/GRANT NO.
68-01-3584
12. SPONSORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS
Environmental Research Laboratory - Athens, GA
Office of Research and Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Athens, GA 30605
13. TYPE OF REPORT AND PERIOD COVERED
Final, 1/26/76 to 4/25/77
14. SPONSORING AGENCY CODE
EPA/600/01
15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
16. ABSTRACT
This study of policies for controlling water pollution from nonpoint agricultural
sources includes a survey of existing state and Federal programs, agencies, and laws
directed to the control of soil erosion. Six policies representing a variety of
approaches to this pollution problem are analyzed. The aggregate economic impact of
such policies is investigated using a state-of-the-art, market-equilibrium, linear-
programming model of crop production in the corn belt. The economic effects of the
policies at the level of individual forms and their impacts on long-term soil produc-
tivity are analyzed through the use of a watershed model.
The institutional arrangements needed to implement the policies are examined,
as are the associated costs for a typical county. Literature on the social aspects
of policy acceptance is reviewed, and the results of a survey of the reaction of
farmers and ASCS directors in Illinois to different policies are presented. The
equity of the policies is examined and legal precidents are reviewed.
17.
KEY WORDS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS
DESCRIPTORS
b. IDENTIFIERS/OPEN ENDED TERMS C. COS AT I Field/Group
Water pollution
Soil erosion
Economics
Nonpoint sources
Agriculture
Modeling
48B
68D
98B
98C
18. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
RELEASE TO PUBLIC
19. SECURITY CLASS (ThisReport)
UNCLASSIFIED
21. NO. OF PAGES
338
20. SECURITY CLASS (This page)
UNCLASSIFIED
22. PRICE
EPA Form 2220-1 (9-73)
314
•e, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978- 260-880:45
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