BHARC-300/84/016a
EPA^ei/9-83-116a
INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR IMPROVED WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT:
POLICY DIRECTION
Prepared for
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region 10
Frederic A. Morris
Susan M. Carney
A. Henry Schilling
Project Director
May 16, 1984
Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers
4000 N.E. 41st Street
Seattle, Washington 98105
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
1.0 INTRODUCTION 1
2.0 THE LOGIC OF POLICY COORDINATION 4
2.1 A DEFINITION 5
2.2 REASONS FOR COORDINATION 6
2.3 PARTICIPANTS 9
2.4 LEVELS OF POLICY COORDINATION 9
2.5 FORMS OF COORDINATION 11
2.6 CONSTRAINTS 14
2.7 GENERAL PRINCIPLES 15
3.0 CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 17
3.1 MISSIONS AND AGENCIES 17
3.2 POLICY COORDINATION IN PRACTICE .... 27
4.0 POLICY COORDINATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE . . 41
4.1 EPA CHESAPEAKE PROGRAM 42
4.2 SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION 48
4.3 INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION/GREAT LAKES. . . 53
4.4 GULF COAST WASTE DISPOSAL AUTHORITY ... 60
4.5 DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMMISSION . . . .64
4.6 IMPLICATIONS 69
5.0 INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION .... 73
5.1 STATUS QUO 74
5.2 PUGET SOUND INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT GROUP . . 81
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5.3 PUGET SOUND PROGRAM 84
5.4 PUGET SOUND WASTE DISPOSAL AUTHORITY ... 87
5.5 PUGET SOUND WATER QUALITY COMMISSION ... 91
5.6 PUGET SOUND PROTECTION AGENCY 95
6.0 CONCLUSION 98
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This is the first of two reports analyzing institutional options for
the improved management of water quality in Puget Sound. The present
report examines options for improving the coordination of policy
direction. A companion volume examines options for improving the
coordination of investigation, research, and other activities.
For purposes of both reports, Puget Sound quality management is
defined to reflect the stated objectives of the federal Clean Water Act.
It encompasses all governmental decisions and actions concerning the
development and use of land and water resources of the Sound, including
the control of pollutant discharges, that could affect (1) the chemical,
physical, or biological integrity of Puget Sound; (2) the propagation and
harvest of fish, shellfish, and wildlife in, on, or adjacent to the Sound;
(3) recreation in and on the Sound; and (4) human health. Further, any
research or investigation that generates information relevant to these
matters is also considered part of Puget Sound water quality management,
even though such research or investigation might have other, more general
purposes as well.
Following an introduction, Chapter 2 describes an analytical
framework for developing and assessing approaches to policy coordination.
This chapter defines policy coordination as the capacity of government
agencies with responsibilities or interests in a particular policy problem
to reach agreement on how that problem should be addressed. Ordinarily,
agreement is required at four stages: (1) in identifying prioritity
issues; (2) in determining what information is necessary to address each
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issue, through new research if necessary; (3) 1n developing a strategy to
address the issue; and (4) in assessing the results of the strategy once
implemented. This chapter also explores the reasons for policy
coordination, the candidates for participation, various levels and forms
of coordination, and constraints to improvement. It closes with a set of
general principles to be used in assessing the need for additional
coordination and developing mechanisms to provide it.
Chapter 3 examines current institutional arrangements for water
quality management on Puget Sound. First, it describes the involved
agencies and their missions. The two government agencies with the most
general, direct responsibility for the management of Puget Sound's water
quality are the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Washington Department of Ecology (WDOE). Agencies with more specific
responsibilities or interests include the Corps of Engineers (permits for
construction, dredging, diking, and dredge-spoil disposal), the Food and
Drug Administration (seafood contamination), the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (research), the U.S. Coast Guard (permitting of
construction; oil spill monitoring and clean-up), the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (habitat protection and endangered species), the
Washington Department of Fisheries (fisheries, resources, including
aquaculture), the Washington Department of Game (fisheries resources), the
Washington Department of Natural Resources (lands management and
aquaculture). the Washington Department of Social and Health Services
(public health protection, shellfish bed certification), tribal
governments (fisheries resources), cities and counties (sewage treatment,
land and shoreland use, public health protection), metropolitan municipal
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corporations (pollution abatement, sewage treatment), and port districts
(harbor development).
Chapter 3 describes the ways in which these agencies coordinate
policy with respect to Puget Sound water quality management. For the most
part, they must coordinate on an informal, ad hoc, or tacit basis.
Coordination also occurs through three more formal, but still limited
mechanisms: the Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program, the State
EPA Agreement, and the Puget Sound Water Quality Authority.
The Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program is an informal
consortium of EPA Region 10, WDOE, and DSHS. Governed by a Steering
Committee of senior managers from each of these agencies, the Program has
identified several priority issues, assembled about $1 million in
budgetary resources, and used these resources to commission research aimed
at a better understanding of the issues.
The State-EPA Agreement is negotiated annually between EPA Region 10
and the State of Washington, represented by WDOE, DSHS, and the Washington
Department of Agriculture. By its terms, the SEA aims to identify
"priority environmental problems and commitments directed at resolution of
those problems by each party," for a range of environmental media across
the State of Washington. The SEA addresses Puget Sound water quality both
as an interprogram priority and as an important component of its water
quality program. In practice, the SEA appears to play a constructive but
limited role in the coordination of Puget Sound water quality policy. It
essentially represents a record of decisions made elsewhere rather than
itself serving as a vehicle for reaching collective decisions.
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The Puget Sound Water Quality Authority is a new entity established
by Washington State statute. Its first members began serving in September
1983. The PSWQA consists of 21 members appointed by the Governor. Its
functions are to study the impact of pollution in the Sound on the health
of marine life and human populations; to study procedures for interagency
coordination; and to make reports on Puget Sound water quality to federal,
state, and local agencies, which may include legislative and regulatory
recommendations. The Authority shows promise as a focal point for
building consensus on policy with respect to the Sound's water quality
through public education and public participation. Whether it can also
secure agreement on priorities among the range of responsible and
interested agencies, much of which are not directly represented on the
authority, seems an open question.
In short, the mechanisms for policy coordination perform valuable
functions, but no one institution effectively brings together all
interested and responsible agencies in a coherent fashion. Therefore,
additional institutional options merit consideration.
Consideration of institutional options for the coordination of
policies bearing on Puget Sound water quality management need not start
from scratch. Other regions, similar in varying degrees to Puget Sound,
have devised mechanisms for coordinating water quality management. While
other regions differ from Puget Sound in some ways—for example by
involving more than one state—these approaches can serve as partial
models, and the experience of the other regions as sources of insight, for
the development of institutional options suited particularly to the Puget
Sound's needs. To provide such comparative perspective, Chapter 4
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examines five models from other regions: (1) EPA's Chesapeake Bay
Program, (2) the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development
Commission, (3) the International Joint Commission (Great Lakes), (4) the
Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority, and (5) the Delaware River Basin
Commission. This chapter describes each of the "five models in terms of
objectives, participants, level of coordination, form of coordination, and
results. In describing results, it includes attention to the six
dimensions specified by EPA Region 10 in commissioning this report. These
dimensions are: (1) the ability to develop an agreed upon set of
long-range goals. (2) the ability to develop effective mechanisms for
public involvement, (3) the ability to establish coordinated research
needs, (4) the ability to bring about a focusing of interagency resources,
(5) the ability to review individual agency policies, and (6) the ability
to exercise regulatory/decisionmaking functions.
After describing each regional model, Chapter 4 draws some general
implications with respect to each of these six criteria. In general, most
of the criteria are rather difficult to meet. Of the five cases, only two
seem to have achieved even partial success in establishing long-range
goals. The Chesapeake Bay Program appears to have "worked up" to some
agreement on long-range goals by starting with a more concrete task that
could attract agency participation: allocation of federal research
funds. The Gulf Coast Authority presents a different case. It has acted
as a focal point for a single goal that had a lot of preexisting support,
but no institutional home: protection of Galveston Bay from Houston Ship
Channel pollution.
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Of the five models, the two that have most effectively fostered
public participation are those that largely owe their creation to
preexisting public interest, which then carried over to public Involvement
once the institutions were established: the Chesapeake Bay Program and
the San Francisco Conservation and Development Commission. At a minimum,
a regional institution must command at least some real decisionmaking
power 1f it 1s to entice public participation.
Establishment of a common research agenda faces the same hurdle as
coordination of long-range goals: the agencies will participate only if
they have a shared interest 1n doing so. Of the five cases, the
Chesapeake Bay Program offers perhaps the only workable means of creating
this interest: offering the agencies the opportunity to allocate research
resources outside their own budgets.
Focusing of agency resources generally 1n accordance with common
goals impinges on the very core of the agency's autonomy. Only a super
agency, such the Gulf Coast Authority, has much chance of doing so, by
partly replacing individual agencies themselves.
None of the five cases suggest that interagency institutions can
easily review the policies of individual agencies. Ordinarily, the
constituent agencies share a powerful interest in avoiding such reviews.
Finally, to have an impact, a coordinating institution must have some
decisionmaking authority—either to allocate resources or to regulate
individual agencies. The marginal roles of the International Joint
Commission and the Delaware River Basin Commission stem from the lack of
such effective authority. In contrast, the Chesapeake Bay Program has
allocated research funds; the San Francisco Bay Conservation and
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Development Commission regulates shoreline use; and the Gulf Coast
Authority constructs and operates waste disposal facilities.
Chapter 6 draws partly on this experience from other regions to
develop six institutional options for consideration in the management of
Puget Sound water quality. These options are the "evolving status quo,"
plus five others: an interagency management group modeled on the Columbia
River Management Group, a Puget Sound program analgous to EPA's Chesapeake
Bay Program, a Sound-wide waste disposal authority, a federal-state
compact, and a Washington State super agency. Each of these options is
presented in the same format: a brief description, an evaluation
according to the six criteria used in Chapter 4 plus an additional general
criterion of decisionmaking effectiveness, an assessment of implementation
barriers, and a summary of evaluation of strengths and weaknesses.
The "status quo" option entails continuation of the institutional
arrangements described in Chapter 3. The key elements of this option are
a strengthened Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program with expanded
participation and a decisionmaking agenda; a separate federal-state-local
agreement negotiated annually to identify priority issues and make
resource commitments; and a Puget Sound Water Quality Authority that
serves to build consensus on key issues through active public education
and public participation. While the difficulties or implementing this
evolution are significant, its advantage lies in the possibility of
incremental but steady progress over time.
A Puget Sound Interagency Management Group would be modeled in part
on the Columbia River Water Management Group. It would consist of one
member from each of the federal and state agencies described in
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Chapter 3. It would meet monthly to exchange information among the
agencies on emerging policy Issues, research needs, and water quality
management strategies. Chairmanship would alternate between EPA and
WDOE. The Group would not have its own staff or budget, but would rely on
the chairing agency for staff and logistical support. The major advantage
of such a group is the relative ease and low cost of establishing it. The
major disadvantage 1s the uncertainty that 1t would accomplish much beyond
facilitating a general exchange of views among the agencies.
Analogous to the EPA's Chesapeake Bay Program, the Puget Sound
Program would aim to develop a comprehensive understanding of the Puget
Sound Ecosystem. With the advice of a management committee, co-chaired by
EPA and WDOE, and representing the interested and responsible federal and
state agencies, EPA would allocate a separate package of federal funds to
a series of research projects addressing priority issues over a period of
four to six years. The greatest strength of such a program arises from
its having this attractive, concrete purpose. This mission would give the
agencies a shared interest in participation. And the process would help
foster a common perspective on the priority issues facing the Sound. The
greatest weakness of this option is the difficulty of obtaining
Congressional sanction and federal funds.
A Puget Sound Waste Disposal Authority would be modeled on the Gulf
Coast Waste Disposal Authority or on Seattle Metro. Such an Authority
would construct, own, and operate sewage treatment plants and interceptors
for all sewage districts discharging into the Sound. It would be governed
by a board or council of members representing the constituent areas within
its jurisdictions. The greatest strength of such an authority would be in
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establishing a Sound-wide governmental unit with the resources,
representation, and mission to sharply focus water quality management
activities. Its main weaknesses are the difficulty of establishment
(state legislation and individual local approval would be required), and
possibly, operational problems.
A Puget Sound Water Quality Commission would be a federal-state
compact between Washington and the United States. It would be governed by
two commissioners, one each from the federal government and Washington
State. The commission would develop and adopt a comprehensive Puget Sound
water quality plan binding on all federal and state agencies. The
Commission's approval would be required for any public or private project
that could have a substantial affect on the Sound's water quality. The
greatest strength of such a commission lies in tying together the federal
and state governments in a single unit responsible for setting policy.
Its greatest weakness is the possible inability of the Commissioners to
deliver the individual government agencies—in which case policy will be
no better focused than it is under the status quo.
A Puget Sound Protection Agency would be a Washington State super
agency with general responsibility for all Puget Sound water quality
protection missions now performed by WDOE, DSHS, and any other agencies.
Its greatest strength is in rationalizing Puget Sound water quality
management at the state level. Its greatest weaknesses are the very
strong barriers to implementation.
Chapter 6 offers a number of general conclusions: First, the various
interested and responsible agencies do need to coordinate their policies
with respect to the Sound's water quality. Second, present arrangements
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do provide a degree of policy coordination. Third, however, present
arrangements are not fully adequate. Fourth, therefore, some additional
measures should be considered to involve more agencies and give the
evolving process more institutional permanence.
Fifth, of the institutional options considered in Chapter 6, none is
completely appropriate. A Puget Sound Interagency Management Group, while
comparatively cheap and easy to establish, is unlikely to have much
impact. A Puget Sound Water Quality Commission would probably be both
difficult to establish and not very effective. A Puget Sound Waste
Disposal Authority or a Puget Sound Water Protection Agency could improve
policy coordination among local and state agencies, respectively. But
they would do relatively little to improve policy coordination with and
among the federal agencies. And they would be extremely difficult to
implement absent a much greater sense of urgency than now exists.
Sixth, constructive evolution in the status quo is the single most
attractive option. A combination of expanded participation and a stronger
decisionmaking role for the Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program;
an annual federal-state-local-tribal agreement analogous to the SEA but
focused specifically on Puget Sound water quality; and a Puget Sound Water
Quality capable of educating the public, building consensus, and providing
general guidance would provide a fairly comprehensive framework for policy
direction. This option would also be easier to implement than the others
because its essential elements are already in place.
Seventh, a Puget Sound Program merits the most serious
consideration. This option shows the most promise of drawing other
agencies in creating a broader common understanding and regional
perspective.
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Eighth, some additional supplementary measures should also be
considered. These are not full-fledged institutional options, but they
could be constructive. These include: issuance of an annual State of the
Sound report, by either the Puget Sound Water Quality Authority or EPA
jointly with the Washington Department of Ecology; establishment of a
separate State-EPA agreement for Puget Sound water quality; and
sponsorship of an annual scientific symposium by the Puget Sound water
quality authority or EPA jointly with WDOE.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This is the first of two reports analyzing institutional options for
the improved management of water quality in Puget Sound. The present
report examines options for improving the coordination of policy
direction. A companion volume examines options for improving the
coordination of investigation, research, and other activities.
Four aspects of the scope of these reports merit particular mention.
First, no bright line separates policy direction from the planning
and conduct of research and activities. But at least in emphasis, policy
direction refers to the designation of priority issues and the development
of strategies to address them, whereas investigation, research, and other
activities refers to individual actions taken to implement those
strategies.
Second, both reports focus on water quality management in Puget
Sound. Activities that are of vital importance to the life of the Sound,
from research to navigation, are addressed in these reports only insofar
as these activities relate to water quality management-mot because these
activities are not important in and of themselves, but because this
analysis does have a limited and specific focus.
Third, there is no generally accepted definition of "water quality
management." For purposes of these reports, Puget Sound water quality
management is defined to reflect the stated objectives of the Federal
Clean Water Act. It encompasses all governmental decisions and actions
concerning the development and use of land and water resources of Puget
Sound, including the control of pollutant discharges, that could affect
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(1) the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of the Sound; (2) the
propagation and harvest of fish, shellfish, and wildlife in, on, or
adjacent to the Sound; (3) recreation in and on the Sound; and (4) human
health. Further, any research or investigatation that generates
information relevant to these matters is also considered part of Puget
Sound water quality management, even though such research or investigation
might have other, more general purposes as well.
Fourth, the report recognizes that Congress and the Washington
Legislature have set much of the policy governing the protection of Puget
Sound's water quality, primarily through the federal Clean Water Act and
the state Water Pollution Control Act. Both these statutes and their
implementing regulations are extremely detailed. The Environmental
Protection Agency, the Washington Department of Ecology, and other
governmental agencies must work within this policy framework. Still, they
exercise considerable latitude in establishing priorities and targeting
resources to achieve statutory goals. And the issues they identify may
lead to recommendations for legislative change. In these senses, EPA,
WDOE, and other agencies make policy. It is the coordination of such
policy to which this report is addressed.
As sources of information, both reports rely on a combination of
theoretical and case study literature on implementation and interagency
coordination; existing descriptions of Puget Sound water quality
management institutions; previous analyses of regional water quality
management programs, both in the Sound and in other areas; official
documents; and discussions with involved officials.
This report is organized as follows:
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Following this introduction, Chapter 2 describes an analytical
framework for developing and assessing approaches to policy coordination.
Chapter 3 examines current institutional arrangements for water
quality management on Puget Sound. It describes the involved agencies and
their missions and discusses the mechanisms now being used for policy
coordination.
Chapter 4 provides comparative perspective for the consideration of
water quality management options. It first develops a set of dimensions
for comparing various models adopted elsewhere, next describes five such
programs in terms of the dimensions, and then draws implications for Puget
Sound.
Based on the analytic framework developed in Chapter 2, the diagnosis
of existing arrangements made in Chapter 3, and the comparative experience
sketched in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 describes and evaluates six institutions
that might be considered for improving the policy coordination of Puget
Sound water quality management. Chapter 6 offers conclusions.
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2.0 THE LOGIC OF POLICY COORDINATION
Few virtues in public administration command more honor than
coordination. Yet few such virtues seem more difficult to achieve:
public programs almost universally provoke the complaint of insufficient
coordination. In some cases, the call for better coordination is
unjustified—stemming only from a vague impression that government should
somehow be tidier than it ordinarily is. In many cases, however, better
coordination is indeed urgently needed: the overlapping jurisdictions of
multiple agencies can stifle the achievement of important governmental
objectives. But even when fully justified, the quest for better
coordination often falls short—in large measure because the incentives
operating on individual agencies pull powerfully in the direction of
autonomy. Given these difficulties, efforts to improve coordination
should focus on those instances where the need is clear; proposed
solutions should be tailored to the particular circumstances; and the
incentives operating on the various agencies should be explicitly taken
into account. In short, sensible approaches to coordination require
careful analysis.
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an analytic framework for
examining policy coordination of Puget Sound water quality management.
This framework includes: (1) a definition of policy coordination,
(2) reasons for coordination, (3) types of participants, (4) levels of
coordination, (5) forms of coordination, (6) constraints to coordination,
and (7) general principles.
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2.1 A DEFINITION
As Eugene Bardach has observed, coordination is a slippery concept.
At a minimum, one should distinguish between the coordination of agency
activities (the subject of the companion volume) and the coordination of
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agency policies (the subject of-this report). For present purposes,
policy coordination can be defined as the capacity of government agencies
with responsibilities or interests in a particular policy problem to reach
agreement on how that problem should be addressed.
Ordinarily, agreement is required at four stages: (1) in identifying
priority issues; (2) in determining what information is necessary to
address each issue, through new research if necessary; (3) in developing a
strategy to address the issue; and (4) in assessing the results of the
strategy once implemented. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the policy
process is in logic both sequential and iterative. While the actuality is
IDENTIFY PRIORITY ISSUES
DETERMINE INFORMATION
AND RESEARCH NEEDS
DEVELOP STRATEGY
ASSESS RESULTS
FIGURE 2.1 Logic of Policy Formulation
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ordinarily a good deal messier, this logic sequence is still a useful
benchmark. In formulating the objectives of options for improved
coordination, it is important to be as specific as possible about the
particular steps at which agreement is intended.
2.2 REASONS FOR COORDINATION
The need for policy coordination arises from the constitutional and
statutory division of responsibility among government agencies according
to level of government (federal, state, local), geographic jurisdiction,
and functional mission. By keeping decisionmaking authority as close as
possible to the citizens affected and by fostering functional expertise,
such division of responsibility helps make government responsible and
efficient. Inevitably, however, agencies cannot always act in isolation:
the decisions and actions of one impinge on the responsibilities and
interests of others. These spillover effects, and the obligation of each
agency to defend its interests in the face of them, give rise to the need
for policy coordination.
Negative Spillovers
In "The Tragedy of the Commons," Garrett Hardin makes eloquent use of
parable to describe a familiar situation. All the town's citizens have
unlimited rights to graze their cattle on the town's common pasture.
Ultimately, the pasture can no longer support all the cattle sent out to
graze and is in some danger of withering altogether. If the citizens
could collectively agree to limit the grazing rights of each, the commons
would flourish and all would benefit. But the decision must be
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collective. No citizen's individual interest lies in unilaterally
reducing his or her use of the commons: for unless everyone else does
likewise, each person will be worse off than before.
Because everyone would be better off if each participated in joint
restraint, the commons situation is perhaps the most poignant case of
"negative spillovers." But the broader class includes all situations
where decisions and actions impose harms beyond the decisionmaking unit.
Such spillovers can occur between environmental media (e.g., when water
pollution controls create a solid waste disposal problem), between
geographic areas (e.g., when water pollutants migrate), and between
missions (e.g., when pollution abatement interferes with resource
management). In all such instances, some form of policy coordination may
be necessary so that each agency's decisions take into account the effects
on all agencies' interests.
Positive Spillovers
One can readily think of cases that are essentially mirror images of
Hardin's Tradegy of the Commons. Instead of overusing a common resource,
decisionmakers fail to establish some public resource in the first place.
Consider a very large lake prone to spring flooding. All of the many
towns bordering the lake would benefit from construction of a flood
control dam. But no town has the incentive to contribute to the financing
of such a dam—because even if the town did not contribute, its citizens
would still benefit from the dam once constructed. Since all towns are in
this same position, the dam is not built. It will go forward only if all
towns can collectively agree that each will contribute.
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As 1n the tragic commons situation, this too 1s a special case, 1n
this Instance of positive spillovers where decisions or actions confer
benefits beyond the decisionmaklng unit. Here the danger arises that
beneficial decisions and actions will not be taken because each
decisionmaker underestimates the benefits. Quite frequently, 1t is in the
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realm of knowledge that positive spillovers occur. When the benefits of
new information beyond those to the decisionmaker are not taken into
account, research and investigative activities may go underprovided. But
a variety of other cases may arise as well--e.g., 1n the area of
enforcement policy. Just as coordination facilitates the consideration of
negative spillovers in policy decisions, it performs the same role in
helping agencies to Include the effects of positive spillovers.
Process Values
The existence of spillovers creates the need to coordinate policy for
reasons of efficiency: inappropriate decisions and actions may be taken
if all costs and benefits are not brought into account. But the process
of coordination itself may have additional, independent value. One
obvious benefit is increased fairness. The opportunity to participate in
decisions that affect one's Interests is deeply embedded in most people's
sense of justice and fair play, and 1n the American political and legal
tradition. Participation also fosters acceptance. Agencies called upon
to implement or otherwise support policy decisions are apt to do so more
enthusiastically and efficiently if they have participated in the decision
Itself.
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2.3 PARTICIPANTS
By definition, the need for policy coordination does not arise
generally, but only with reference to a particular public policy problem
area. Typically, each agency's mission relates to the problem area in a
distinctive way. In considering which agency should participate in
coordination, and how, it may be useful to distinguish between agencies
having general responsibilities and those having more specific
responsibilities or interests.
First are those agencies that are generally responsible for
addressing the public policy problem in question, in the sense that they
have a wide variety of obligations with respect to the problem: i.e., for
identifying priority issues, determining research needs, developing
strategies, and assessing results.
In contrast are those agencies with narrower (but not necessarily
less important) involvement. Some may be specifically responsible for
addressing a particular aspect of the problem—e.g., by performing
supporting research or administering a particular statute. Others may
have a strong interest in how the problem is addressed. Some of these
agencies are interested because their own activities may contribute to the
problem. Others are interested because the means chosen to address the
problem may affect their capacity to perform their own missions. Still
other agencies may have both types of interests.
2.4 LEVELS OF POLICY COORDINATION
Policy coordination has been defined as the capacity of multiple
agencies to reach agreement on policy. But reaching such agreement does
not necessarily require each agency to share directly in the
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decislonmaking process. Levels of coordination other than shared
dedsionmaking can also facilitate such agreement.
Information Sharing
At the lowest level, agencies can share Information about their sense
of priorities, research needs, strategies, and results. Especially with
regard to non-controversial matters, simply knowing more about each
other's preferences can lead agencies to make mutual adjustments in their
own programs. If continued over time, this process can lead to
convergence on common policy. It can also be a first step in fostering
personal and institutional relationships that lead to higher levels of
coordination.
Consultation
As an intermediate level of policy coordination, agencies can advise
each other as to their policy preferences. Such consultation can grow out
of Information sharing, as two-way exchange evolves into genuine
dialogue. It still implies no obligation for any agency actually to
follow the advice 1t rece1ves--only to solicit such advice and to make a
good faith effort to give it careful consideration in agency
decislonrnaking. As trust builds, officials that consult regularly may
tend to give increasing weight to their counterparts' advice.
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Shared Decisionmaking
Subject to legal constraints, agencies can coordinate their policies
by actually sharing their decisionmaking authority. At this level of
policy coordination, certain decisions take into account the preferences
of the participating agencies through some explicit voting procedure,
including rules for aggregating the votes such as majority rule or a
requirement of unanimity. Formally, shared decisionmaking guarantees
agreement: each agency is bound to accept the results. As a practical
matter, absent a shared interest in reaching a decision or a procedural
device that forces the agencies to decide, they may simply defer making
decisions altogether.
Central Control
At least in theory, the highest level of policy coordination occurs
through central control. One agency commands the legal authority to set
policy and impose it on the other agenci.es. In practice, central control
is extremely difficult to achieve, primarily because the central authority
ordinarily lacks effective sanctions to deter non-compliance. While
tempting as a simple means of coordination, central control generally
creates only an illusion of coordination, while the agencies continue to
act autonomously.
2.5 FORMS OF COORDINATION
Policy coordination at any level may be accomplished through any one
of several forms, ranging from less to more formal. Typically, higher
levels of coordination (such as shared decisionmaking) tend to occur
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through more formal mechanisms, but this tendency Is not Invariable. More
formal approaches to coordination are also more apt to require explicit
statutory authority. Four points along this spectrum are ad hoc
procedures, established procedures, the Interagency council, and the super
agency.
Ad Hoc Procedures
At a minimum, agencies can coordinate their policies informally,
using whatever procedures seem suitable at the time. Letters, phone
calls, or casual meetings may do the job. Ad hoc procedures have
considerable merit as a means of coordinating individual agency
activities, as discussed in the companion volume to this report. As a
separate means of coordinating policy, however, ad hoc procedures may be
less useful. Left to their own devices, most agencies seek to avoid
policy coordination absent very strong shared interests in doing so. Ad
hoc procedures by definition need not be invoked, and with respect to
policy coordination, usually are not. Ad hoc procedures can, however,
serve as useful supplements to other forms of policy coordination.
Established Procedures
At a minimum, agencies ordinarily need to take the further step of
establishing regular procedures for coordinating their policies. Examples
Include the negotiation of interagency agreements on policy, to be amended
periodically; the establishment of a working group that holds regular
meetings to explore Issues of common concern; the conduct of joint public
meetings; and the issuance of regular reports, either jointly or by a
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single agency with the opportunity for other agencies to review drafts
before the report is issued. Establishing regular procedures for
coordination greatly enhances the likelihood that coordination will in
fact take place. By imposing deadlines and creating mutual expectations,
these activities tend to induce participation especially over time as they
become ingrained in agency standard operating procedures.
Interagency Council
A third form of policy coordination, ordinarily requiring new
statutory authority, is the establishment of a council in which the
various agencies are represented, but still retain their separate
identities. Such a body could facilitate any level of coordination, from
information sharing to consultation to shared decisionmaking to central
control. The challenge of the interagency council is to make it a truly
deliberative body, rather than a discussion group that accomplishes little
or a vehicle for staking out predictable public positions. Generally, for
an interagency council to work, it should be charged with producing a
specific, tangible output, and its members must have a strong shared
interest in reaching agreement.
Super Agency
The most drastic means of policy coordination is the establishment of
a super agency. It can either result from the merger of several agencies
into one or simply supersede their authority with respect to a particular
category of policy decisions. The establishment of a super agency makes
most sense when the interests of the individual agencies are so diverse,
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and the political pressures on them so intense, that they cannot
reasonably be expected to reach agreement on policy. A super agency, in
contrast, may better absorb these pressures because in the aggregate they
may tend to offset each other. As a corollary, however, a super agency
tends to be less responsible to particular concerns than individual
agencies. A sometimes reasonable compromise is a hybrid form in which the
super agency is subject to direction by an interagency council.
2.6 CONSTRAINTS
In logic, many if not most public policy problems would seem to
create the need for policy coordination among two or more agencies. The
federal system alone guarantees the involvement of federal and state
jurisdictions in many instances. And the complexity of all but the most
routine policy problems has tended to spawn multiple agencies at any given
level of government. Yet as stated at the beginning of this chapter, lack
of effective coordination is a near universal complaint about public
programs. Why is policy coordination so rarely accomplished?
Much of the answer lies in the very powerful constraints operating on
most agencies. At a minimum, policy coordination absorbs agency resources
(time, money, personnel) that could be directed towards internal
activities for which the agency is more directly accountable. Policy
coordination further violates organizational imperatives that stress
autonomy in decisionmaking and control of information and resources. It
also can impose political costs on an agency when the resulting
coordinated decision reflects compromise among competing values. What
looks like sensible cooperation to the disinterested may strike the
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agency's political constituency as a sellout or capitulation to
illegitimate interests. Finally, there may be legal constraints on an
agency's freedom to share its decisionmaking authority or even to consult
with other agencies. Small wonder that policy coordination is a virtue
most honored in the breach.
2.7 GENERAL PRINCIPLES
There can be no magic formula that determines when greater policy
coordination is appropriate, who should participate, at what level, in
what form, given the applicable constraints. Nonetheless, several general
principles do seem clear.
!• Define the Problem. Policy coordination can meaningfully occur
only with reference to a particular policy problem. Take care to define
as concretely and specifically as possible the problem that may require
coordination.
2. Establish the Need. Do not view policy coordination as an end
in itself. The need for considering policy coordination only arises when
the responsibilities or interests of individual agencies overlap.
3. Specify Objectives. Clarify the stages of policy formulation at
which agreement is sought: in identifying priority issues, establishing
research needs, devising strategies, assessing results, or some
combination.
4. Don't Attempt to Over-Coordinate. Overcoming the constraints to
coordination is costly and difficult. Employ the fewest participants, at
the lowest level, in the least formal manner consistent with taking all
relevant interests into account.
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5. Consider "Graded Coordination." Reserve the highest levels and
most formal means of coordination for agencies with general responsibility
for addressing the particular problem. Employ lower levels and less
formal means of coordination for agencies with more specific
responsibilities or interests in addressing the problem,
6. Be Realistic. Considerable analysis and very strong
justification should support any proposal for modes of policy coordination
that require constitutional or statutory change, major reorganization,
abolition of existing agencies, or other drastic steps.
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3.0 CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Institutional arrangements for Puget Sound water quality management
follow the familiar pattern of "marble-cake federalism" characteristic of
most domestic public policy problems in the United States. Responsibility
is shared among federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, each charged
with distinct though often overlapping missions.
This chapter briefly describes the missions of those agencies
involved in Puget Sound water quality management, next examines policy
coordination among these agencies, and then summarizes possible needs for
improved coordination.
3.1 MISSIONS AND AGENCIES.
The distinctions among agencies presented in Section 2.3 above
provides a framework for describing the involved organizations. First are
those agencies with general responsibility for Puget Sound water quality
management. Second are those agencies whose missions give them more
specific responsibilities or interests concerning Puget Sound water
quality management. Table 3.1 lists the governmental agencies involved in
Puget Sound water quality management, grouped according to this
distinction.
Agencies With General Responsibility for Water Quality Protection
The two government agencies with the most general, direct
responsibility for the management of Puget Sound water quality are the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Washington Department
of Ecology (WDOE). Of course, both agencies have additional, broader
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Agencies Generally Responsible for Puget Sound Water Quality Management
Environmental Protection Agency
Washington Department of Ecology
Agencies With More Specific Responsibilities or Interests
Corps of Engineers
Food and Drug Administration
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Washington Department of Fisheries
Washington Department of Game
Washington Department of Natural Resources
Washington Department of Social and Health Services
Tribal Governments
Cities and Counties
Metropolitan Municipal Corporations
Port Districts
TABLE 3.1 Missions and Agencies
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responsibilities as well—for the protection of environmental interests
beyond water quality and for the protection of areas beyond Puget Sound.
Still, Puget Sound water quality management is a significant focus.
Environmental Protection Agency. EPA's general responsibility
derives primarily from the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended
in 1972, and further amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977 and the
Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981. EPA
is directed to regulate the quality of the nation's navigable waters,
including marine areas such as Puget Sound, by establishing effluent
limitation standards, approving state water quality standards and
implementation plans, setting national performance standards for
individual industries, establishing effluent standards for toxic
pollutants, and establishing the permitting procedures known as the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). EPA is further
directed to conduct investigative and research activities in support of
water quality objectives. And EPA is given a developmental role through
its administration of grants for state pollution control programs,
construction of treatment works, and area-wide waste treatment
management. EPA has used its statutory authority to delegate many water
quality management activities to other agencies of the federal government
and to Washington state. But it retains direct responsibility for some,
such as "Section 301(h)" waivers of secondary treatment for
municipalities, and ultimate responsibility for all.
An increasingly important additional source of statutory authority
for EPA's mission in Puget Sound is the Comprehensive Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). This Superfund statute
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governs remedial responses to contain the release of hazardous
substances. Because such releases can threaten marine environments, their
control has become part of the overall management of Puget Sound water
quality.
Organizationally, the focus of EPA's Puget Sound water quality
management efforts Hes primarily In the Region 10 office, headquartered
In Seattle, and responsible for Alaska, Idaho, and Oregon, as well as
Washington State. Like other regional offices, 1t is responsible for
accomplishing EPA's national program objectives within its region. The
regional office also represents EPA in dealings with federal, state, and
local agencies 1n the region. Within the Region 10 office, the Water
Division and the Environmental Services Division play the key roles In
Puget Sound water quality management, in response to direction from the
regional administrator and in conjunction with the Assistant
Administrators for Water, Solid Waste and Emergency Response, and Research
and Development at EPA headquarters.
EPA Region 10 also maintains subregional operations offices in each
of the four states comprising the region. These offices work closely with
state environmental officials, primarily in addressing day-to-day
business. Thus EPA's Washington Operations office in Olympia also
participates 1n Puget Sound water quality management.
Washington Department of Ecology. The Washington Department of
Ecology (WDOE) was established to manage and develop the state's "air and
water resources 1n an orderly, efficient, and effective manner and to
carry out a coordinated program of pollution control involving these and
related land resources." Like EPA, WDOE is charged with protecting a wide
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range of environmental interests, including water quality. A close
linkage between the responsibilities of EPA and WDOE derives from EPA's
practice of delegating the administration of certain national programs to
WDOE, subject to EPA's oversight. Delegated programs that are
particularly pertinent to Puget Sound water quality management include the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) as applied to
non-federal facilities and the wastewater construction grants program.
WDOE has also applied to EPA for authority to administer the NPDES program
for federal facilities and the industrial pre-treatment program. WDOE has
determined that assumption of complete responsibility for administering
the "Section 404" dredge permitting system is infeasible at this time. In
addition to these responsibilities for administering federal programs,
WDOE's Puget Sound water quality mission includes duties derived from
state law, such as the establishment of water quality standards to protect
beneficial uses and the conduct of marine pollution studies.
Organizationally, the management structure of WDOE essentially
parallels that of EPA. For purposes of Puget Sound water quality
management, the key subunits are the Office of Water Quality Management,
the Shorelands Division in the Office of Water and Land Resources, and the
Office of Operations and Enforcement. WDOE also maintains regional
offices, which play important roles in permitting and enforcement.
Agencies with Specific Responsibilities and Interests
While EPA and WDOE have general responsibility for managing water
quality in Puget Sound, a number of other federal, state, and local
agencies have critical, specific responsibilities and interests, generally
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deriving from their other, broader missions. Such agencies may be charged
with some specific aspect of water quality management, such as issusing a
particular type of permit. They may engage in developmental or regulatory
activities that potentially affect Puget Sound water quality through
associated pollutant loadings. They may be charged with promoting,
managing, or regulating beneficial uses of the Sound that depend on water
quality. Or they may perform investigations and research that has
implications for managing the Sound's water quality. In many cases, a
given agency's involvement extends to several of these aspects.
Corps of Engineers. The primary domestic mission of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers is the construction, operation, and maintenance of
public works. In Puget Sound, this responsibility mainly involves the
support of ports and navigation—for example, through the maintenance of
navigation channels. In addition, under a memorandum of understanding
with EPA, the Corps participates in the regulation of water quality by
administering permits under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act for
construction in or over the Sound, and Clean Water Act Section 404 permits
for dredging, diking, and dredge spoil disposal. In addition, the Corps
engages in limited research and investigation activities in support of
these permitting responsibilities. All of these functions are carried out
by the Corps' Seattle District Office.
Food and Drug Administration. Among FDA's duties is the
responsibility for regulating impurities and contaminants 1n seafoods.
Depending on the type of seafood, FDA either establishes regulatory
requirements limiting contaminants by product or provides voluntary
guidance on appropriate levels to state and local government and to
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industry. Compliance with requirements or acceptance of guidance may in
turn lead to the adoption of regulatory requirements that affect water
quality.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Part of the U.S.
Department of Commerce, NOAA performs a variety of functions ranging from
weather prediction to oceanic surveys. Among NOAA's diverse programs,
three contribute to the management of Puget Sound water quality through
the conduct of research, field investigations, and laboratory studies
pertaining to the chemical, physical, and biological properties of the
Sound and man's impact on them. First, the Ocean Assessment Division
within the National Oceans Service conducts research on marine ecology, as
part of what was formerly the Marine Eco-Systems Analysis (MESA) program.
This program has provided funding for a number of substantial studies
directed specifically at understanding the impact of man's activities on
the Puget Sound ecosystem. Second, the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) is responsible for protecting certain forms of marine life and
managing certain fisheries. Accordingly, NMFS conducts research
pertaining to the effects of marine pollution on fisheries and also
comments on certain permit applications to ensure that this marine life is
adequately protected. Third, NOAA's Environmental Research Laboratories
have conducted still additional research bearing on physical chemistry
aspects of Puget Sound water quality.
U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard's primary mission on Puget Sound
is to support navigation and maritime safety. In particular, it maintains
a system of navigational aids, establishes shipping lanes, monitors the
movement of large ships, and regulates the shipment of dangerous cargos.
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The Coast Guard also has several specific responsibilities 1n support o*
water quality. These Include the Issuance of permits for the construction
of bridges, dams, dikes, and causeways under Section 9 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act and the responsibility for containing oil spills through
monitoring and clean-up activities. The Coast Guard unit that carries out
these missions on Puget Sound is the 13th District, based in Seattle.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
1n the Department of the Interior serves as the focal point for federal
efforts to conserve, protect, and enhance fish and wildlife and their
habitats. Along with the National Marine Fisheries Service of NOAA, the
Fish and Wildlife Service administers the Endangered Species Act, which
gives the Service a particular Interest in the impact of Puget Sound water
quality on endangered species.
Washington Department of Fisheries. The Washington Department of
Fisheries is responsible for managing sport salmon and all commercial
fisheries resources (Including shellfish resources) in Puget Sound.
Obviously, the health of these resources depends heavily on water
quality. Accordingly, the Department of Fisheries conducts extensive
investigative research related to water quality impacts on these
resources. It also plays a limited regulatory role in providing advice to
EPA and the Department of Ecology on the impact of water quality on
fisheries.
Washington Department of Game. Among many other things, the
Washington Department of Game is responsible for managing non-salmon sport
fish species 1n Puget Sound. Its Interest in water quality is thus
analogous to the Department of Fisheries and Its role is essentially
parallel.
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Washington Department of Natural Resources. The Department, through
the Division of Marine Land Management, manages state-owned shore!ands,
tidelands, and beds of navigable waters. This includes leasing of state
land for the placement of structures for aquaculture and other activities,
sale of geoducks and other clams from state-owned land, and permission to
dispose of dredge material and other wastes on state-owned land. In
addition, the Department fosters aquaculture through funding research and
development work and preferential leases. Finally, the Department manages
approximately 300 miles of state-owned tidelands that are available for
public recreation, including the collecting of shellfish.
Washington Department of Social and Health Services. DSHS performs a
wide array of missions related to the provision of social services and the
protection of public health. The duty of DSHS to protect public health
gives it a general, vital interest in Puget Sound water quality. Local
health departments also share in the responsibilities to protect public
health. In addition, DSHS has the specific responsibility for certifying
that water quality criteria are met in all commercial shellfish growing
areas, which is accomplished by conducting intensive water quality
investigations and shoreline surveys.
Tribal Governments. Federal judicial decisions over the past decade
and a half have established the right of Washington Indian tribes to 50%
of treaty area salmon and steelhead runs. These decisions give tribal
governments a strong interest in Puget Sound water quality, an interest
subsequently affirmed by another court decision establishing their right
to protect these resources from any government-approved activity
threatening them. Although the scope of this right is not yet entirely
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clear, tribal governments clearly have an extremely Important role to play
in water quality management by virtue of their interests in fisheries
resources. Several Puget Sound tribes have also begun commercial
aquaculture developments.
Cities and Counties. Units of local government are major users of
the Sound through their construction and operation of sewage treatment
facilities. The Sound's water quality constrains the ability of these
agencies to add additional facilities and partly determines the level of
treatment, pre-treatment, or both that may be necessary. Cities and
counties also can affect Puget Sound water quality through their
regulation of land and shoreline use, both through zoning and through the
administration of the Washington Shoreline Management Act, which requires
both shoreline management planning and the permitting of individual uses
consistent with the plan. At the same time, water quality is a valuable
amenity to those communities bordering on the Sound. Further, county
health departments have front-line responsibility for addressing public
health problems posed by marine pollution within the county.
Metropolitan Municipal Corporations. The Municipality of
Metropolitan Seattle (Metro) is responsible for areawide water quality
planning and pollution abatement within its boundaries. In support of
this mission, Metro operates five sewage treatment plants for sixteen
cities and local sewer districts. By virture of this role as sewage
treatment "wholesaler," Metro is analogous to cities and counties in
having a strong interest in the ability of the Sound to accept pollution
loadings. Metro also generates information through regular monitoring and
analysis of discharge effects on the Sound. The agency further conducts
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toxic control programs and long-range planning—for example, its salmon
enhancement and milfoil control projects. Metro has reached the final
stages of a three-year study to identify toxic materials in local waters,
and is implementing parts of a long-range plan to use sludge, chiefly as a
soil conditioner and/or fertilizer in non-agricultural areas. The
Snohomish Metropolitan Corporation (Snomet) plays a similar role in
Snohomish County.
Port Districts. The state's ports determine the level and location
of ocean-going shipping on Puget Sound. The port districts can affect
water quality through their planning and development of harbor area
transportation and industrial support facilities.
3.2 POLICY COORDINATION IN PRACTICE
In principle, the need for policy coordination in the management of
Puget Sound water quality seems strong. The Sound is a classic, tangible
instance of the commons. Its diverse marine environment supports a wide
array of commercial, recreational, and governmental uses from fishing to
shipping to waste disposal. But these uses are interdependent. And the
Sound is a finite, even fragile, resource. Its continued vitality
requires collective understandng of ecological processes and collective
restraint in its use. Thus, the federal, state, and local agencies with
responsibilities or interests in the management of Puget Sound water
quality need to coordinate policy. In particular, they need to reach
agreement on (1) priority issues, (2) information and research needs,
(3) water quality management strategies, and (4) assessments of the
results.
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In practice, the 10 federal and state agencies, the 12 counties, 28
Incorporated cities, 25 port districts, and 12 tribal governments with
responsibilities or interests 1n the management of the Sound's water
quality lack a unifying institution for policy coordination. Rather, they
must coordinate on an informal, ad hoc, or tacit basis or-rely on three
more formal but still limited coordinating mechanisms: the Puget Sound
Water Quality Management Program, the State-EPA Agreement, and the Puget
Sound Water Quality Authority.
Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program
Initiated 1n the fall of 1982, the Puget Sound Water Quality
Management Program is an evolving, largely informal collaboration between
EPA Region 10 and the Washington Department of Ecology. Subject to
direction by a Steering Committee consisting of senior managers in the two
agencies, staff within EPA and WDOE assigned to support the Program
identify priority Issues and direct resources to achieve a better
understanding of those issues.
Objectives. The Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program was
established primarily in response to growing evidence that serious water
quality problems exist 1n certain local areas of the Sound and the
realization that the potential longer term effects of continuing waste
discharges on the quality of Puget Sound as a whole are not well
understood. The Program 1s Intended to target specific problems for
priority attention and to focus the resources and attention of executive
management in WDOE and EPA on addressing those problems.
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Participants. Program direction is provided by the Steering
Committee. Primarily, it consists of senior managers from EPA Region 10
and WDOE. EPA members initially included the Deputy Regional
Administrator, the Water Division Director, the Environmental Services
Division Director, the Washington Operations Office Director, and the Air
and Waste Management Division Director. Their counterparts from WDOE
included the Deputy Director, the Assistant Director for Water Programs,
and the Assistant Director for Land Programs, which then had
responsibility for solid and hazardous waste. As the Steering Committee
evolved, the solid waste officials from both EPA and WDOE phased out. To
ensure adequate attention to public health matters, the Washington
Department of Social and Health Services Division Director for Health
joined the Committee. The Program does not maintain its own independent
staff, per se. However, the Puget Sound Coordinator in WDOE works full
time on these issues and the Director of Environmental Services at EPA
Region 10 puts in a good deal of his time. .
Level of Coordination. The Puget Sound Water Quality Management
Program provides a means of consultation among WDOE, DSHS, and EPA Region
10. The two staff members from the agencies work closely together to
identify issues, study needs, assemble resources, and consult with EPA
Headquarters. The Steering Committee gives direction to these efforts.
Essentially, the staff members develop proposals and submit them to the
Committee for review and concurrence.
Form of Coordination. The Steering Committee serves as an informal
interagency council. It lacks a formal charter with voting rules and the
like. It meets about once a month and operates on a consensus basis. The
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two assigned staff take responsibility for Identifying the need for a
meeting, preparing the agenda, and drawing on Individuals within each
agency for further staff support as needed. The overall Program 1s an
evolving, Informal Institution, based on close personal relationships and
a converging set of shared expectations.
Results. The Program has Identified four priority Issues requiring
attention: bacterial contamination of shellfish beds; toxic contamination
of urban/industrial embayments; longer term, cumulative effects of
pollutant loadings on the Sound; and the management structure for Puget
Sound water quality. The Program has assembled about $1,000,000 in
budgetary resources (from EPA Headquarters, state general revenues, and
federal grants), which have been used to commission several research
projects addressing these issues. The Steering Committee has had some
success in changing the sense of priorities among their agencies as to
permitting, field investigations, and monitoring. And the staff have also
worked with other agencies such as NOAA to help secure better fit between
their research and Program priorities, also with some success.
State-EPA Agreement
The "SEA" is an agreement between EPA Region 10 and the State of
Washington, represented by WDOE, DSHS, and the Washington Department of
Agriculture. Negotiated annually since 1979, it provides another
mechanism for coordinating Puget Sound water quality policy.
Objectives. By its terms, the SEA alms to identify "priority
environmental problems and commitments directed at resolution of those
problems by each party." It does so by identifying about a dozen
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"interprogram priorities" and by describing in some detail major
environmental programs. Besides Water Quality, these major programs
include Drinking Water, Hazardous Waste Management, Air Quality, and
Pesticides. The SEA addresses Puget Sound water quality both as an
interprogram priority and as an important component of the Water Quality
Program. Within these two rubrics, priorities for study and action are
identified. (At a finer level of detail, the SEA also serves to
coordinate agency activities in support of policy priorities. This aspect
of the SEA is discussed in the companion report.)
Participants. The SEA is intended to be a federal-state
partnership. The federal partner is EPA Region 10. Participation on the
state side is more complicated. Nominally, the State of Washington is a
party. But the Agreement is signed by the directors of WDOE, WDSHS, and
WDA. Some effort is made to consult with the other agencies. And control
of some funds by WDOE provides leverage in eliciting their cooperation.
Nonetheless, for purposes of Puget Sound water quality management, the SEA
is essentially an EPA-WDOE exercise.
Level of Coordination. The SEA provides a vehicle for information
sharing and consultation between EPA and WDOE. In form, the agreement
represents the results of shared decisionmaking. EPA and WDOE agree on
priorities and make commitments for addressing them. But on closer
inspection, the commitments look more like aspirations. The parties
promise only "best efforts" in the performance of commitments; have
limited recourse (EPA's option of witholding some grant funds) in the
event of non-performance; and condition their commitments on the
availability of state and federal appropriations.
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Form of Coordination. Annual negotiation of the SEA provides an
established procedure for setting priorities and making commitments.
While this procedure is not Itself embodied In written rules, six years'
experience 1n negotiating a document that necessarily builds on the
previous year's has created fairly stable routines.
Results. The SEA appears to play a constructive though limited role
in the coordination of Puget Sound water quality policy. Because it is
negotiated by the senior managers of EPA Region 10 and WDOE and because 1t
covers such a broad range of environmental media across the entire state,
the SEA necessarily treats any one priority area in a very brief and
general way. Thus the 1984 SEA Executive Document devotes about three
quarters of a page to Puget Sound water quality, by summarizing the 1984
Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program as approved by the Steering
Committee. The SEA essentially represents a record of decisions made
elsewhere rather than itself serving as a vehicle for reaching collective
decisions.
Puget Sound Water Quality Authority
The Puget Sound Water Quality Authority 1s a new entity established
by Washington State statute. Its first members were appointed in
September 1983. Because it is so new, the PSWQA must be examined
primarily in terms of its design, although the Authority's initial
meetings do provide some indication of the direction its members wish to
take.
Objectives. The statute creating the PSWQA does not explicitly state
its objectives. Rather, the Authority's functions alone are identified:
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to study the impact of pollution in the Sound on the health of marine life
and human populations; to study procedures for interagency coordination;
and to make reports on Puget Sound water quality to federal, state, and
local agencies, which may include legislative and regulatory
recommendations. Senator Phil Talmadge, prime sponsor of the enabling
legislation in the Senate, has described the Authority as intended to be
"an independent body representing diverse interests and backgrounds to
focus on Puget sound as a unique resource," which should develop its own
goals, objectives, and recommendations.
Participation. The PSWQA consists of 21 members appointed by the
Governor. In making appointments, the Governor is directed to seek
"representation of all interested parties, including federal, state, and
local government, environmental and health agencies, business, citizens
groups such as environmental and public health groups, and the fisheries
and tourism industries." While the Authority's enabling statute refers to
"representation" of interested parties, Authority members do not
"represent" their agencies or employers in the sense of directly speaking
for them. Rather, the members are "representative" of a broad range of
views and backgrounds. Of the initial appointees, 10 are from government,
6 from citizen groups, and 5 from business. Thus a majority of the
Authority's members are non-governmental. Of the government agencies with
officials serving on the Authority, most are agencies whose interest in
water quality arises primarily through use: cities, counties, port
districts, Metro. There are no members from state agencies with resource
management interests. Only one member is employed by a federal agency
(NOAA).
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Level of Coordination. By statute, the PSWQA commands fairly limited
powers: to commission studies and to make reports that Include
recommendations. The Authority has no direct appropriation for the
support of its activities; instead the Legislature earmarked $85,000 of
WDOE's biennial appropriation for use by the Authority. Insofar as the
Authority acts as a vehicle for Interagency coordination, 1t does so by
information sharing and consultation. While the PSWQA's conclusions may
carry some weight 1n the decisionmaklng of agencies, they are not binding.
Form of Coordination. In form, the Authority might seem to resemble
an Interagency council. In practice, the Governor's choice of
appointments has made the Authority a general citizens' advisory group,
rather than a vehicle for Interagency coordination.
Results. Because the Puget Sound Water Quality Authority is but a
few months old, one cannot reasonably expect concrete results. The
Council itself has decided to spent its first several months in
self-education. However, the way the Authority has chosen to organize
itself provides clues as to its likely capacity for action. At least
during its first year the Authority will operate through three standing
committees (Administration and Public Involvement; Status of Water
Quality; and Impacts of Water Quality); special committees as needed
(beginning with two committees, one on Marine Waivers and another on Other
Regional Water Quality Management Approaches); and a coordinating
committee. The Council expects to issue a report presenting the results
of the deliberations of each of Its standing committees by September, 1984.
The Puget Sound Water Quality Authority shows promise as a focal
point for wide-ranging discussions on policy with respect to the Sound's
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water quality. Whether it can also secure agreement on priorities among
the range of responsible and interested agencies seems an open question at
this point. If the Authority can develop sufficient stature—in
particular, clout with the state legislature—through the quality of its
reports and cultivation of a broad constituency, it may grow into
performance of this function.
Evaluation
These arrangements can be evaluated at two levels: (1) for their
general capacity to facilitate agreement on key issues, information and
research needs, management strategies, and results assessment, and (2) for
their capacity to address particular issues.
At the first, more abstract level, present arrangements seem
partially effective. The Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program has
identified four key issues and associated research needs, which in turn
are reflected in the State-EPA Agreement. However, it remains uncertain
whether the federal, state, and local agencies that do not participate in
either the Program or the SEA would agree that these are in fact the most
important issues, that they have been appropriately defined, and that
needed information and research have been appropriately identified and
responsibilities allocated. It is also uncertain whether the results of
the commissioned research will lead to agreement on appropriate management
strategies, and later, on interpretation of the results.
At the second, more concrete level, the system does appear likely to
do a reasonable job of the issues actually chosen as priorities, as a
review of the three more "technical" issues indicates.
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Shellfish Bed Contamination. The presence of fecal coll forms 1n the
waters of Puget Sound has led to the decertification of commercial
shellfish beds. The main source of this bacteriological contamination 1s
human and animal wastes. Fecal conforms are both contaminants themselves
and indicators of the probable presence of other contaminants. Because •
shellfish beds are not located 1n urban embayment areas, there are few if
any clearly Identifiable point sources of contaminants. Rather, the
problem stems from nonpolnt sources of pollution. The two leading
contributors are large and small agricultural operations and residential
developments. Contamination occurs when runoff from these lands and
on-site waste disposal systems enters streams in Puget Sound's watershed.
Such diffuse sources do not lend themselves well to control through
treatment requirements; the preferred solution 1s to prevent such
pollution from entering the watershed at all. Agricultural waste control
requirements, control of development, and stringent on-site waste
treatment standards appear to be the most workable options.
Addressing the problem of shellfish bed contamination will first
require common understanding of pollution sources, pathways to the Sound,
and impacts on shellfish, and then agreement on an appropriate control
strategy. At a minimum this implies the need for coordination among
counties (knowledge of land use and responsibility for control), WDOE
(knowledge of pollution sources and pathways), and WDSHS (knowledge of
shellfish impacts and responsibility for certification). Plans for
addressing the problem appear to involve an appropriate range of
participants. In one area (Burley Lagoon and Minter Bay) they call for
water quality investigations by WDOE to support basin planning by Pierce
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and Kitsap counties. In another area (Henderson and Eld inlets), Thurston
County is taking responsibility for determining contamination levels,
identifying upland sources, and developing a program of corrective
actions. However, while use of the SEA to allocate water quality
management planning funds under Section 205 of the Clean Water Act
provides an incentive for counties to participate, one cannot be confident
that they will always be appropriately involved in identifying and
addressing water quality problems in which they have a responsibility or
interest.
Toxic Contamination of Urban Embayments. The presence of many toxic,
persistent, and bioaccumulative chemicals, both organic and inorganic, has
been documented in many areas of the Sound. The highest concentrations of
these contaminants have been found in bottom sediments and tissues of
bottom-dwelling fish and shellfish in bays near large urban and industrial
centers. At present, there is substantial uncertainty about the sources
of this pollution. Past disposal of toxic waste directly into the Sound,
as well as municipal and industrial discharge, are probably the main
sources. At least in the case of municipal and industrial discharge,
these sources may be continuing. Dredging operations may also contribute
to toxic pollution—both through the disposal of dredged material
containing toxic contaminants, and through the dredging itself, which may
stir up toxicants and thereby introduce them into the water column. Still
further toxic pollution may derive from nonpoint sources of herbicides,
pesticides, and other pollutants: runoff from urban areas, discharge from
storm drains that collect highway runoff, and runoff from parks, roadways,
and silviculture operations. Uncertainty about the sources of toxic
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pollution is paralleled by uncertainty about which chemicals are the most
significant contaminants and how marine life and public health are
affected.
Resolving the uncertainties about the nature, sources, and effects of
the toxic contamination of urban/industrial embayments and then developing
control strategies will require agreement among virtually the entire range
of agencies with responsibilities and interests in water quality
management. At a minimum, participants should include EPA and WDOE
(general water quality protection responsibilities, research and
investigation); the Corps of Engineers (dredging); NOAA (research); DSHS
(public health), cities, counties, and Metro (municipal discharges and
land use control); and probably the state's resource management agencies
as well.
The problem seems to be too broad to address wholly within the
framework of the Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program or the SEA.
Present plans for addressing the problem consists of a series of studies,
primarily by WDOE and EPA that will seek to define the problem, identify
sources, and develop criteria. As a core of activity to address the
problem, this approach seems sensible. But the present arrangements may
not fully Integrate contributions from NOAA or from DSHS. And the
incomplete involvement of cities, counties, and Metro early in the
process, other than through hearings and comments, may complicate the
development of control strategies later. In short, unless present
arrangements are supplemented, they may be overextended in attempting to
address the particular problem.
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Longer Term Effects. The press of statutory deadlines and permit
applications requires regulatory agencies responsible for protecting Puget
Sound's water quality to make a number of decisions based on best current
information. However, legitimate questions are being raised about the
difficulty of predicting the long-term and area-wide impacts of immediate
regulatory decisions, given imperfect knowledge about the relationships
between pollutant loadings and adverse impacts on beneficial uses.
Particular gaps in present knowledge include the linkages between
contaminant input and their eventual distribution in the physical
environment, as well as the processes that cause uptake of contaminants by
marine biota and the ultimate effects on the biota themselves and on other
beneficial uses of the Sound.
To address the problem of long-term effects will require integration
of a great deal of disparate research results to identify particular gaps
in knowledge and then agreement on a research agenda to fill the gaps.
Close coordination among all agencies and other institutions performing
research on Puget Sound water quality will be required. This problem has
been identified as a priority issue by the Puget Sound Water Quality
Management Program and appears in the 1984 SEA. But unless a way is found
to integrate the knowledge of other agencies, this problem may not be
fully addressed.
Summary. This brief review of present arrangements' approach to
three priority problems suggest that they are incomplete as instruments of
policy coordination. For problems in which only a few agencies beyond
WDOE and EPA have interests or responsibilities they probably work fairly
well. For problems implicating a wider range of interests and
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responsibilities they are probably overtaxed. Moreover, present
arrangements may be further prone to "Type 3" errors—failing to identify
problems as a priority at all, if peripheral to WDOE's or EPA's concerns.
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4.0 POLICY COORDINATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Consideration of institutional options for the coordination of
policies bearing on Puget Sound Water Quality management need not start
from scratch. Other regions, similar in varying degrees to Puget Sound,
have devised mechanisms for coordinating water quality management. Of
course, no region presents circumstances completely analogous to Puget
Sound. In particular, most bodies of water that have spawned regional
management approaches are bounded by more than one state, unlike the
Sound. With this difference in mind, these approaches can serve as
partial models, and the experience of the other regions as sources of
insight, for the development of institutional options suited particularly
to Puget Sound's needs.
The following models for-policy level coordination were selected for
examination: (1) EPA's Chesapeake Bay Program, (2) the San Francisco Bay
Conservation and Development Commission, (3) the International Joint
Commission (Great Lakes), (4) the Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority, and
(5) the Delaware River Basin Commission.
To describe each regional approach, this chapter adopts the same
basic format used in the previous chapter to describe the Puget Sound
Water Quality Program, the SEA, and the Puget Sound Water Quality
Authority. It describes each approach in terms of objectives,
participants, level of coordination, form of coordination, and results.
In describing results, it includes particular attention to the six
dimensions specified by EPA Region 10 in commissioning this report. These
dimensions are:
1. Lonq-Range Goals: ability to develop an agreed upon set of problem
and issue definitions and priorities on an interagency basis.
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2. Public Involvement; ability to develop effective mechanisms for
public education and participation 1n dedsionmaklng.
3. Coordinated Research Needs: ability to establish a clear set of
coordinated Investigation and research needs to support program
development and management needs and targeted problems and issues.
4. Focusing of Resources: ability to bring about coordination and the
focusing of interagency resources on targeted problems, issues, and
priorities.
5. Review of Individual Agency Policies: ability to provide mechanisms
and procedures for coordinated review and evaluation of existing and
proposed policies of individual agencies as related to achieving
longer-range goals.
6. Regulatory/decisipnmaklncj Functions; ability to function as a
regulatory body with decisionmaking responsibilities.
A brief summary of each program draws implications for policy coordination
i n general.
4.1 EPA CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM
EPA established the Chesapeake Bay Program in response to federal
legislation of 1976 that authorized a five-year $25 million study of the
A
Bay. Twice extended by a year, the study phase of the Program drew to
completion in 1983. Both the process employed and the recommendations
developed seem destined to decisively influence the management of water
quality in Chesapeake Bay for some time to come.
Objectives
The primary objective of the Chesapeake Bay Program Is the
development of a comprehensive understanding of the Bay as an ecosystem.
More specifically, EPA was directed to assess water quality problems 1n
the Bay, to establish a mechanism for data collection and analysis, to
coordinate all Bay research activities, and to make recommendations on
ways to improve Chesapeake Bay water quality management.
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Participants
As the agency designated by Congress to establish and manage the
program, EPA, and in particular its Region 3 office, is the leading
participant. However, EPA established a Chesapeake Bay Program Management
Committee to make decisions concerning program policy and management. The
Committee has been central in allocating the $25 million that Congress
appropriated for the program. Chaired by EPA, the Committee also includes
representatives from the states of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia,
as well as the District of Columbia. For staff support, the Management
Committee has primarily relied on EPA Region 3 and the Maryland Department
of Natural Resources, the Maryland Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene, the Virginia Department of Commerce, the Pennsylvania Department
of Environmental Resources, and the Susquehanna River Basin Commission.
Chesapeake program managers attempted to involve a variety of members of
the Bay community, including scientists, state officials, citizens,
recreational interests, watermen, business, and industry. In addition,
EPA established a public participation program to facilitate citizen
involvement. This activity is managed by the Citizen's Program for the
Chesapeake Bay, Inc., an independent, non-profit, Bay-wide alliance of
organizations founded in 1971 to provide an avenue for a discussion of
issues affecting the Bay. Among other things, the Citizens Program
transmits research findings to the public.
Level of Coordination
The Chesapeake Bay Program has facilitated policy coordination on
several levels: from the sharing of information about research needs and
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results to consultation about research priorities to shared decisionmaklng
with respect to the allocation of research funds. Apparently, the process
of information sharing, consultation, and shared decisionmaklng has also
led to informal working relationships that facilitate coordination with
respect to priorities beyond research.
Form of Coordination
Direction for the Chesapeake Bay Program has come from the Chesapeake
Bay Program Management Committee, essentially an interagency council. The
representatives from EPA, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia, meet to set goals for the program and allocate
research funds. Except for this limited purpose, the governments
represented on the committee do not cede any of their individual
responsibilities. Reliance on EPA and state government agencies for staff
has enabled the Management Committee to focus on decisionmaking.
Results
At the outset of the program, EPA approached the scientific
community, Bay area governments, and the public to devise a list of ten
candidate issues for possible study by the Chesapeake Bay Program. Of
these, three topics--nutrient enrichment, toxic substances, and the
disappearance of submerged grasses—were chosen for primary emphasis.
During the seven years of the program, over $17 million were spent by the
CBP to support more than forty individual scientific research projects.
These are summarized in EPA's report, Chesapeake Bay Program Technical
Studies: A Synthesis. In addition to commissioning and monitoring these
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Research projects, the Chesapeake Bay Program developed a computerized
data management system to compile and evaluate data collected by the
Program's own project as well as other research efforts. All data in the
system have been verified, and are now available for use by others. This
data base is considered to be the most extensive body of scientific
knowledge on any single estuary in the world. It provides the basis for a
common understanding of the Bay's ecological problems. The Program itself
has used this data base to evaluate water and sediment quality and living
resources variables in 45 segments of the Bay.
In terms of the six dimensions, results of the Chesapeake Bay program
are as follows.
1. Long-Range Goals. Through the process of selecting the three
principal research areas, and the more than forty projects within those
areas, the Chesapeake Bay Program seems to have been reasonably successful
in achieving agreement among EPA and the state participants as to priority
research needs. In addition to setting and managing a research agenda,
the Program was also charged with more ambitious goals. By statute, it
was directed to "restore and maintain the Bay's ecological integrity."
And EPA was directed to use the CBP Management Committee, together with
the existing water quality management process, to "develop a comprehensive
basin-wide plan to reduce the flow of pollutants into the Bay." Long-term
goals at this level of generality have not yet been established, in part
because the Chesapeake Bay Program is incomplete. A "summit" meeting in
December, 1983, was to address the implementation of recommendations from
the program's seven years of study. The common understanding of the Bay's
ecology development during the course of these studies, and the process of
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interactions, should facilitate the establishment of these water quality
goals. But they have not yet been adopted.
2. Public Involvement. The Chesapeake Bay Program has actively
pursued and enlisted a great deal of public advice and support for its
efforts. Establishment and support of a public participation program
managed by the non-profit Citizens Program for the Chesapeake Bay, Inc.,
as well as consultation with Bay area scientists, government officials,
and others in the formulation of program objectives, illustrate EPA's
effort to facilitate a public involvement. Public support for the overall
program is evident in the continuing vitality of the citizens' program,
and in the general level of public concern over the health of the Bay and
support for efforts to restore it. Public involvement in the management
of the Chesapeake Bay's resources also occurs through the Chesapeake Bay
Foundation. The Foundation is a non-profit organization with an endowment
of over $3 million, an annual budget on the order of $400,000, and a staff
of about 50. Its three main programs represent bay resource interests in
administrative, legislative, and judicial proceedings; conduct
environmental education activities; and acquire lands around the Bay for
conservation in their natural state. The Foundation has generally
supported the Chesapeake Bay Program.
3. Coordinated Research Needs. Establishing a research agenda was
the Chesapeake Bay Program's principal mission. The Chesapeake Bay
Program has been effective in allocating the resources appropriated by
Congress to specific research projects that supported agreed-upon research
needs.
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4- Focusing of Resources. Because implementation of the CBP's
recommendations has not yet begun, the Program has not yet had the
opportunity to bring about the focus of other federal and state resources
on the problems, issues, and priorities identified during the course of
the program's studies. However, development of a "regional management
ethic" over the course of the program, and retention of the CBP Management
Committee to direct the implementation of the studies finding should
facilitate such a focusing of agency resources.
5. Review of Individual Agency Policies. To date, the CBP
Management Committee has not reviewed individual agency policies,
essentially because such a review would be beyond the scope of the
program's mission. Adoption of the program's recommendation that the
Management Committee develop a..comprehensive basin-wide plan should
provide a framework for coordinated review and evaluation of individual
agency policies as related to achieving longer-range goals. However, it
is too early to tell how effective this framework would be in performing
this review function.
6. Regulatory/decisionmaking Functions. To date, Program
decisionmaking has focused on identifying priority issues and allocating
research resources. It has not functioned as a regulatory body. Adoption
of a basin-wide plan would tend to push it in this direction. But again,
it is too soon to tell how well the program would function in this role.
Summary
The Chesapeake Bay Program seems to have been highly successful in
achieving common understanding of the Bay's ecological processes, in
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Identifying possible priority Issues, and 1n developing a regional
management ethic. Three elements seem to be particularly Important In the
program's success. First, It began with a sustained effort to understand
the scientific facts about the Bay's ecology. This focus provided neutral
ground on which government agencies, researchers, and others with diverse
policy perspectives could work toward a common goal of better
understanding. The common knowledge base developed can now be used as the
basis for the Inherently more difficult, political task of developing
water quality management strategies. Second, the federal government
provided significant funds. These resources, and the Invitation to help
allocate them, provided a significant carrot to Induce the participation
of state government. Third, the Program took a deliberate, measured
pace. By allowing seven years for a series of studies, the program both
developed an extremely robust data base and facilitated the development of
interpersonal and institutional relationships. Taken together, these
elements have helped create an extremely firm foundation on which to build
future efforts.
4.2 SAM FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION
The 27-member Commission was created in 1965 by the California
legislature in response to concern among Bay area citizens about the
future of San Francisco Bay.
Objectives
The McAteer-Petris Act, the Commission's enabling legislation,
initially gave BCDC the limited responsibility of preparing "a
comprehensive and enforceable plan for the conservation of the water of
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San Franciso Bay in the development of its shoreline."5 In 1969, the
Commission submitted its completed San Francisco Bay Plan to the Governor
and the legislature. The McAteer-Petris Act was then amended to give the
Plan the force of law and to make the Commission a permanent body with
responsibility for implementing the plan. Thus BCDC became the regulator
of shoreline use around the Bay and dredging and filling operations in the
Bay. In 1977, the Commission was given the additional responsibility of
implementing the Suisun Marsh Preservation Act in cooperation with local
governments and the Department of Fish and Game.6 The Act requires
cities, counties, and special districts to prepare a shoreline protection
program consistent with both the San Francisco Bay Plan and the
Preservation Act. Each plan is to include controls to protect wetlands,
riparian habitats, and agricultural lands within the Suisun Marsh. Anyone
contemplating the placement of fill, dredging, or any substantial change
in the use of the Bay or shoreline must first obtain a permit from the
Commission. Permits are only issued if the proposed project is consistent
with the San Francisco Bay Plan and the McAteer-Petris Act, or the Suisun
Marsh Protection Act and the Suisun Marsh Protection Plan, as applicable.
Level of Coordination
For the limited purpose of planning, regulating, and enforcing
filling, dredging, and shoreline use around San Francisco Bay, the
Commission is a vehicle for shared decisionmaking, in which the Plan and
other Commission decisions are binding on all state and local agencies in
the Bay area. This authority is backed up by the Commission's enforcement
powers.
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Form of Coordination
In form, the Commission 1s something of a hybrid: part Interagency
council, part super agency. It Is an Interagency council 1n the sense
that direction 1s provided by the 27 Commission members, who represent
federal, state, and local government in nine Bay area counties, as well as
the general public. It 1s a super agency 1n the sense that the Commission
has its own budget and staff, and for the Commission's limited purposes,
Its authority supersedes that of Individual state and local governments.
The Commission's budget derives from a combination of state legislative
appropriations, grants won from outside sources including the federal
government, and a percentage of the penalities levied against violators of
its regulations. BCDC maintains a staff of 29 people, four of whom
constitute the enforcement division.
Resul ts
Over a period of 18 years, the Commission has managed to formulate a
shoreline use plan for the Bay, secure its adoption, and exercise
responsibility for its implementation. The two objectives of the Bay Plan
are (1) to protect the Bay as a great national resource for the benefit of
present and future generations; and (2) to develop the Bay and its
shoreline to their highest potential with a minimum of Bay filling. In
pursuit of these objectives, the Commission now regulates all filling and
dredging 1n San Francisco Bay, which is defined to Include San Pablo and
Sulsun Bays, sloughs, certain creeks and tributaries that are part of the
Bay's systems, as well as salt ponds and pertinent other d1ked-off areas.
The Commission provides public access to the Bay to the maximum extent
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feasible, consistent with the nature of new shoreline development, within
a 100 foot wide strip inland from the Bay. The Commission is also
responsible for minimizing pressures to fill the Bay by ensuring that the
limited amount of shoreline properties suitable for regional high priority
water oriented uses is reserved for these purposes. Priority uses include
ports, water related industry, water oriented recreation, and wildlife
areas.
With respect to the specific dimensions for comparison, the
Commission appears to have performed as follows:
1. Long-Range Goals. The Commission has been extraordinarily
successful in developing clearly stated, specific long-range goals for San
Francisco Bay's development: that is, the preservation of the Bay as a
natural resource and the development of the Bay and its shore with a
minimum of filling. By operationalizing these goals in terms of the
specific elements of the Plan, and securing the passage of the Plan into
law, the Commission has further ensured the stability of these goals.
2. Public Involvement. Citizen involvement in the Commission's work
occurs mainly through the Save-the-Bay Association, a citizen's lobby
initiated by three Berkeley women in 1965. The Associations' 18,000
members helped persuade the California legislature to adopt the
McAteer-Petris Act in 1965. In 1969, the Association played a crucial
role in convincing the legislature to adopt the Bay plan itself. The
Save-the-Bay Association continues to provide citizen advice and public
support for the Commission's operations.
3. Coordinated Research Needs. Except in a few isolated instances,
research and investigation has not been viewed as essential to support the
Commission's planning and regulatory functions. However, on those
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occasions when research 1n support of the Commission was necessary, these
needs were clearly Identified and filled. The study authorized by the
original McAteer-Petris Act defined the goals of the BCDC 1n the Bay
Plan. In order to implement the Plan's recommendations, the Commission
has periodically clarified basic Issues on which those recommendations
depend. In 1976, the Commission hired a consulting firm to analyze the
concept of water-related industry. This analysis has enabled BCDC to make
priority decisions with regard to approval of water oriented development.
Program needs also led to a 1982 study aimed at improving the coordination
of permit applications for Bay area development. Still, the
identification of research needs is not a major Commission activity.
4. Focusing of Resources. As the agency primarily responsible for
the preservation of San Francisco Bay, and as the agency designated by the
federal government to review and comment on proposals for federally
permitted activities in the Bay, the Commission has been the vehicle for
achieving consistent policy with respect to dredging, filling, and
shoreline's use around the Bay. However, the targeting of new problems,
issues, and priorities, and the corresponding focusing of resources, have
not been central to the Commission's mission.
5. Review of Individual Agency Policies. Within its area of
regulatory responsibility: the Commission reviews programs and projects
sponsored or permitted by Individual agencies for consistency with the Bay
Plan. It may require the discontinuation of programs or projects that
violate the Commission's requirements. Beyond this relatively narrow
authority, the Commission's powers do not extend to the more general
review and evaulation of individual agencies' policies.
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6* Regulatory/Peelslonmaking Functions. Within its limited
jurisdiction, the Commission acts as a regulatory authority whose
decisions are binding on state and local agencies and carry great weight
with federal agencies. In this sphere, the Commission has been highly
effective as a regulator.
Summary
The Commission's effectiveness appears to hinge on three main
factors. First is the limited scope of its responsibilities. The
Commission has a strictly defined geographic jurisdiction—the San
Francisco Bay, plus one hundred feet of shoreline, and one goal--the
preservation of the Bay's water and land resources. Second, the
Commission and its goals enjoy great public support, channeled through a
broadly based and professionally managed citizen's group, the Save-the-Bay
Association. The Commission also enjoys the support of constituent local
governments, because its authority removes from them the responsibility of
making politically difficult shoreline use decisions. Third, the
Commission can marshal! the requisite tools to do its job: an independent
budget, staff, legal authority and enforcement powers. Fourth, the
Commission need not cope with scientific uncertainty in its sphere of
endeavor.
4.3 INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION (GREAT LAKES)
The International Joint Commission is a permanent, bi-national
institution established by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to solve
trans-boundary disputes between the United States and Canada. Article IV
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of the Treaty provided that "boundary waters and waters flowing across the
boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or
property on the other." While the Treaty gave the Commission no
enforcement authority in this regard, over the years the IJC conducted a
number of investigations concerning water pollution in the Great Lakes.
Thus studies culminated in two Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements
between Canada and the United States, the first in 1972 and a second, more
comprehensive version in 1978. The broad purpose of the Agreement is
to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem." The Agreement also
sets out a number of additional "general" and "specific" objectives. To
attain these goals, the Commission is directed to monitor water quality,
assess the effectiveness of government pollution control programs, and
advise the Canadian and U.S. Governments on means of improvement. At
least every two years, the IJC is to issue a report to the Canadian and
U.S. Governments concerning progress toward the achievement of the
Agreement's objectives. In carrying out its responsibilities under the
Agreement and especially in developing recommendations, the IJC relies on
two advisory boards established by the Agreement: the Great Lakes Water
Quality Board and the Great Lakes Science Advisory Board.
Objectives
The main purpose of the IJC is investigative: to study questions or
matters of difference between the United States and Canada along the
common frontier. The two national governments may refer questions to the
Commission, called "references." The Commission then makes an
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Investigation, reports the facts, and recommends appropriate action. In
addition, the IJC has some limited regulatory authority. Governments,
companies, or individuals must apply to the Commission for permission to
construct, divert, or make use of water in such a way as to affect the
natural level or flow of boundary water on the other side of the
international boundary, or to raise the level of trans-boundary rivers at
the boundary. For those applications approved, the Commission issues an
order of approval, often with terms and conditions. The IJC then monitors
compliance with these terms and conditions. The Commission itself lacks
enforcement authority. It can only recommend that either of the two
national governments take action in the event the Commission's orders are
violated. However, the Commission's Reports and Recommendations are said
generally to prompt action.
The principal objective of the Great Lakes Water Quality Board is to
develop recommendations for improving Great Lakes Water quality management
for consideration by the Commission. Specifically, the 1978 Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement directs the Water Quality Board to "advise the
Commission on the progress and effectiveness of ... the programs to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the waters of the Great Lakes Basin eco-system." The Board is further
directed to "identify deficiencies in the scope and funding of such
programs and evaluate the adequacy and compatibility of results," and also
to "examine the appropriateness of such programs in the light of present
and future of socio-economic imperatives." The function of the Scientific
Advisory Board is to advise both the Commission and the Water Quality
Board on scientific and research matters.
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Participants
The International Joint Commission consists of three Canadians and
three Americans. One of the Americans and one of the Canadians each
serves as a full-time co-chair. The other members serve part time. All
the U.S. members are appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The Commission has two separate head offices, one
1n Ottawa and one in Washington, each with a small staff. The IJC also
maintains a permanent blnatlonal staff at Its Great Lakes Regional Office
to assist the two water quality-related boards. The Great Lakes Water
Quality Board has 18 members, consisting of nine senior managers from the
pollution control programs of each government. The Board is jointly
chaired by representatives from the federal environmental agency of each
country: the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 5 Office and
Environment Canada. The environmental agencies of the two countries also
provide staff support, in the United States through EPA's Great Lakes
National Program Office. Initial staffing arrangements and budgetary
allocations were included in the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement,
and are reviewed annually by the two governments. The Science Advisory
Board consists of 8 government, industry, and public members from each
country, plus two ex offlcio members from the International Association
for the Great Lakes Research and the Great Lakes Fishery Commission.
Level of Coordination
Nominally, the International Joint Commission's regulatory authority
entails shared declsionmaking between the United States and Canada.
Because of the Commission's lack of enforcement authority, however, and
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Its emphasis on making recommendations to the national governments on the
basis of its investigations and studies, the Commission is essentially a
vehicle for consultation between the two governments.
Form of Coordination
Both the Commission and the Board function as bi-national interagency
councils. Both entities meet periodically and issue reports, but much of
the staff work is done at home by the constituent agencies of each: that
is, EPA Region 5 and Environment Canada.
Results
The International Joint Commission and its Great Lakes Water Quality
Board do not appear to have had great impact on water quality management
of the Great Lakes. Their monitoring and research efforts have provided
some help to the two national governments in assessing progress toward
restoring the integrity of the Great Lakes ecosystem. But the
Commission's Great Lakes water quality program has not been central to
these efforts.
1. Long-Range Goals. The Commission has demonstrated an ability to
identify long-range goals, as set out in some detail in the 1978 Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement. But given the Commission's limited powers,
it can only urge that the Canadian and U.S. government agencies active in
water quality management on the Great Lakes accept these goals and
corresponding priorities as bases for their own planning. Apparently,
such exhortations are insufficient. In its first Biennial Report under
the 1978 Agreement, the Commission noted a "sense of drift" and urged new
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initiatives on the part of the two governments "to give a continuing sense
g
of purpose, direction and commitment to Agreement activities."
2. Public Involvement. In the same Biennial Report, the Commission
partially attributes this lack of direction to insufficient public
involvement. The Commission states that "ways must be found to maintain
support of the Water Quality Agreement" and recommends the encouragement
of "citizen involvement in identifying and shaping long term ecosystem
goals in order to build greater community consensus and commitment."
However, the Commission does not offer specific recommendations in this
regard. Given the huge geographic jurisdiction of the IJC, its very
general water quality mandate, and its lack of decisionmaking authority,
it seems an unlikely focal point for intense public involvement despite
even the most creative efforts to foster it.
3. Coordinated Research Needs. The 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement included a variety of research, monitoring, and surveillance
needs, partly in the body of the Agreement, but especially in the Annexes
dealing with particular pollution problems. However, the Commission has
been relatively ineffective in prodding government programs on either side
of the border to address these needs. In its 1982 Biennial Report, the
Commission expresses concern about the level and allocation of resources
directed toward meeting such research obligations by the two governments.
Therefore the Commission has requested its Science Advisory Board to
review the adequacy of research activities relevant to the 1973 Agreement
and in particular to identify gaps that should be of concern to the
Commission.
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*• Focusing of Resources. More generally, the IJC has not been an
effective vehicle for focusing the resources of the agencies of the two
governments on agreed-upon problems and priorities. Consider the issue of
toxic and hazardous substances. In its 1981 report to the Commission, the
Water Quality Board lamented the absence of an overall ecosystem strategy
for controlling toxics:
Programs have been compartmentalized under each
legislative mandate, and the resources have been
allocated accordingly. . . . This fragmentation has
resulted in duplicate activities in some cases,
incomplete program coverage in others, and a limited
management capacity to effectively address emerging
complex problems.
All the Commission can do is recommend improvement.
5. Review of Individual Agency Policies. The IJC does not review
individual agency policies. The-1982 Biennial report contains some
criticism of the two government's commitment to reducing pollution on the
Great Lakes. But the IJC's language is so diplomatic, its criticisms so
general, and its authority so weak, that such review seems unlikely to
have much effect. (The Commission does not even fault individual agencies
by name.)
6. Regulatory/Decisionmaking Functions. The Commission has limited
authority to rule on applications for the use of Great Lakes water, but no
independent enforcement authority in this regard. Nor does this
regulatory authority appear to be central to Great Lakes water quality
management.
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Summary
The International Joint Commission and Its Water Quality Board appear
not to be major forces 1n the policy coordination of water quality
management on the Great Lakes. This marginal role seems to stem from the
Commission's rather vague responsibilities, and Its lack of enforcement
authority.
4.4. GULF COAST WASTE DISPOSAL AUTHORITY
The Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority was established by Texas
jte 1n 1969 to improve v
i
Houston-Galveston Bay area.'
statute in 1969 to improve water quality in the heavily industrialized
9
Objectives
The Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority was established to study
water pollution, plan corrective and preventive measures, provide
coordinated facilities for the disposal of municipal and industrial waste,
and regulate waste disposal on a regional basis for Chambers, Gal veston,
and Harris Counties, Texas. Among other things, the Authority is
authorized to conduct studies and research for water pollution and waste
disposal within its jurisdiction; set and enforce water quality standards;
regulate solid waste disposal; and acquire, construct, and operate waste
disposal facilities. The Authority's overriding purpose is to accomplish
these functions more effectively than could efforts on a county-wide,
city-wide, or smaller scale.
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Participants
The Authority Is governed by a nine-member Board of Directors, three
from each of the three counties that comprise its geographic
jurisdiction. Of the three members from a given county, one is appointed
by the Governor, one by the County Commissioners, and one by the County's
mayors. The Authority employs a general manager and its own staff.
Level of Coordination
The Authority 1s a vehicle for the central control of waste disposal
activity in its three county district. It accomplishes this control by
operating a significant proportion of the area's waste treatment
facilities.
Form of Coordination
The Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority is a local unit of government
that acts as a super agency within the field of waste disposal,
superseding some of the waste disposal authority of the other local
governmental units within its three county jurisdiction. The Authority's
Board of Directors meets no less than once a month, elects officers, and
employs a General Manager to implement policy as determined by the Board.
The General Manager is the chief executive officer of the Authority. He
is responsible for the actual operation of the Authority's waste treatment
facilities. The Authority was initially funded by an appropriation from
the state government, but became fiscally self-sufficient in 1976. The
Authority issues bonds for the construction of facilities and repays them
through user charges and penalties levied against violators.
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Results
The enabling legislation that established the Gulf Coast Waste
Disposal Authority was rather broad. Under its mandate, the Authority
could have chosen to act as a regulator of water quality as well as
regulator of waste disposal and operator of waste disposal facilities.
Early 1n Its existence, however, the Authority judged that attempting to
regulate and operate was an inappropriate combination of tasks for a
single agency. Acknowledging the effectiveness of existing water quality
regulatory agencies, the Authority chose to concentrate on Improving water
quality through the operation of waste disposal facilities for the
disposal of industrial wastewater, municipal wastewater, and solid waste.
These operations are based on a regional concept. Through performance of
this limited function, the Authority seems to have been relatively
effective in improving the water quality of the Houston-Galveston Bay area.
Other results are as follows:
1. Long-range goals. The Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority seems
to have been an effective focus of regional support for one overriding
goal: the protection of Galveston Bay from pollutant discharges into the
Houston Ship Channel.
2. Public Involvement. There has been general public recognition of
the need for treatment facilities such as those operated by the
Authority. But the Authority has not always enjoyed great public support
for particular siting decisions. In 1982, the Authority contracted with
the Keystone Center of Colorado to design and conduct two workshops on
public involvement in Houston-Galveston area siting decisions.
Participants in the workshops concluded that the current process of public
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participation could be improved. In particular, they judged that
provision should be made to encourage public involvement early in the
siting and permitting process, rather than postponing it until the
administrative hearing or still later stages. The Authority has stated
that it is encouraged by the "prospect of finally integrating the siting
of environmental sound facilities with effective public participation."
3. Coordinated Research Needs. The GCA exercises its authority to
conduct studies and investigations into areas of direct concern to its
operations. These include studies of the water quality of the Bay, and
the impact of waste disposal treatment, as well as feasibility studies for
plant siting and improvement and public opinion surveys. Thus in support
of GCA's own waste disposal operations, the Authority is able to provide a
agenda of research needs.
4. Focusing of Resources. Within the sphere of waste disposal, the
authority is able to focus resources (bond proceeds repaid through user
charges) on priority needs, through the economies of scale the Authority
enjoys in this area.
5. Review of Individual Agency Policies. The Authority takes
cognizance of individual agency policies only insofar as they might
contradict GCA's own regulatory requirements. In such a case GCA has the
power to challenge that policy in Texas district court and require
modification.
6. Regulatory/Decisionmaking Functions. The Authority uses both
combined treatment facilities and individual treatment facilities for
industrial and municipal waste. The Authority's only regulatory powers
are to require that solid waste be disposed of properly, generally in the
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Authority's facilities. Its enforcement powers are exercised through the
district court of the county in which a violation occurs. Other
regulation impinging on water quality is left to existing agencies. The
Authority's decisionmaking authority is limited to the siting and
operation of waste disposal facilities. Through its monopoly df these
functions within Its geographic jursidiction, the Authority has been
effective.
Summary
As a super agency exercising central control of one particular
function, waste disposal, the Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority differs
from the other institutional models explored in this chapter.
Essentially, it reduces the need for interagency coordination in the
traditional sense, at least in the waste disposal field, by assuming much
of the responsibility itself. This experience illustrates what can be
achieved by an agency with narrow functions, great power, and independent
resources. It also suggests that new entities with broad statutory powers
may wish to consider focusing their efforts on a particular aspect of
their mission to which they can make an especially strong contribution.
4.5 DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMMISSION
The Delaware Basin Commission is a federal-state compact among the
governments of Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and the
United States. Negotiated in 1961, the DRBC is a nearly unique government
agency in that it is a part of both the United States Government and the
government of each of the four member states.
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Objectives
The compact gives the Commission very broad objectives: to
"encourage and provide for the planning, conservation, utilization,
development, management and control of the water resources of the
[Delaware River] Basin." The Commission.is to develop and implement
plans, policies, and projects relating to the Basin's water resources;
adopt and promote uniform and coordinated policies for water conservation,
control, use, and management; and encourage the planning, development, and
financing of water resources projects by others. The Commission is also
authorized to construct and operate its own facilities and to borrow money
and issue bonds for this purpose. From this broad array of objectives,
the Commission has tended to pursue two: settlement of disputes among the
states over water allocation, and^promotion of river basin development in
accordance with a comprehensive plan.
Participants
The Commission itself consists of one commissioner representing each
of the constituent governments. In the case of the federal government,
the Department of the Interior is the federal member of the Commission,
but the federal commissioner himself is a president!'ally appointed
official with an office in the Department of the Interior. The Commission
maintains its own small staff, and operates on appropriations from each of
the constituent governments. Delaware provides 8% of the annual budget,
with each of the other governments providing 23%.
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Level of Coordination
In principle, the Commission provides a vehicle for shared
decisionmaking by its members. This shared decisionmaking occurs in two
ways: first, through adoption of a comprehensive water resource plan to
which all compact signatories are bound; and second, through required
approval by the Commission of any project having a substantial affect on
the Basin's water resources.
Form of Coordination
The DRBC is part interagency council, part super agency. It is an
interagency council in the sense that it is a deliberative body for shared
decisionmaking among its member governments. It is a super agency in the
sense that it has regulatory and developmental authority comparable to
that of its constituent governments. In practice, the Commission has
tended to act more as a council; it has made little use of its powers to
act as a super agency. As a council, a major problem has been that the
individual commissioners have little control over the agencies that make
up their respective governments. The federal commissioner is in a
particularly anomalous position, in part because under the compact an
individual federal agency is not bound by a particular Commission decision
unless that agency has specifically concurred in that decision.
Therefore, the federal commissioner often can do no more than report the
positions of the individual federal agencies, because he lacks a means of
enforcing a unified position. Indeed, the federal commissioner chairs an
Interagency committee that convenes one week before the Commission meets
precisely to review its agenda and develop individual agency positions.
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Results
Over its life of two decades, the Commission appears not to have had
a dramatic impact on the Delaware River Basin. It has been fairly
effective in settling water allocation disputes, where the states have a
shared interest in their resolution and the federal agencies are
relatively indifferent. With respect to other areas of activity, the
reluctance of the federal agencies to support the Commission and to be
bound by its decisions have thwarted a very strong role.
1. Long-Range Goals. The DRBC is not engaged in independent
long-range planning. Rather, its "plan" is the result of reviewing and
approving the plans of individual agencies and of approving local private
and public projects. In short, the Commission has not established a
unified set of long-range goals for the Delaware River Basin.
2. Public Involvement. Apparently the public has not been heavily
involved in the Delaware River Basin Commission's activities. The major
impetus for creating the Commission came largely from state governments
and the states' Congressional delegations rather than from any grassroots
movement. So the Commission has lacked intense preexisting public
interest to tap. Concentration of the Commission on rather narrow,
technical activities and its large geographic jurisdiction may have also
worked to discourage public participation.
3. Coordinated Research. The Commission's staff engages in
monitoring river flows, pollution spills, and other attributes of the
river basin. However, the Commission itself has neither undertaken its
own independent research nor served as a mechanism for coordinating the
research of member governments or their constituent agencies.
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4. Focusing of Resources. Because of the autonomy of the agencies
within each government, particularly the federal government, the
Commission has not served as a means for focusing agency resources.
However, it has had some success in inducing local governments to
consolidate their waste treatment plans.
5. Review of Individual Agency Policies. The DRBC does review the
plans of individual agencies, including federal agencies. It also reviews
project proposals of individual agencies. However, the Commission has
tended toward fairly uncritical approval of agency plans and projects
alike.
6. Regulatory/Decisionmaking Functions. The Commission exercises
regulatory and decisionmaking functions through its comprehensive planning
and approval of individual projects. Despite early aspirations, the
Commission has never fully succeeded in establishing jurisdiction in the
realm of water pollution control. Essentially, it has acted jointly with
the states in setting standards and relied on the states for enforcement.
At the federal level, neither EPA nor the Corps of Engineers have tended
to support a strong regulatory role for the DRBC.
Summary
Judged against the sweeping powers contained in its charter, the
Delaware River Basin Commission has played a disappointingly limited role
in managing the basin's water resources. This limited role primarily
reflects attitudes ranging from indifference to hostility on the part of
the federal agencies. Nonetheless, 1n one area where the states have had
a shared interest in effective Commission action—settling water
allocation disputes among the states—it has performed a useful role.
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4.6 IMPLICATIONS
Each of these five models grew out of very particular circumstances.
Moreover, five "data points" is a very small sample. Thus generalization
from these cases, much less mechanical application to the management of
Puget Sound water quality, must be done with considerable caution.
Nonetheless, these cases do offer some important implications. They can
be categorized according to the six criteria.
Long-Range Goals
Except at very high and largely innocuous levels of abstraction,
individual government agencies prefer to avoid setting explicit, publicly
stated long-range goals. Much less are agencies ordinarily inclined to
negotiate with their counterparts a collectively binding set of common
goals. Thus any institution faces a very tough uphill battle in
attempting to establish agreement on long-term goals. As the case of the
Delaware River Basin Commission suggests, even a legal instrument
mandating production of a comprehensive plan may be insufficient to induce
constructive participation. Of the five cases, only two seem to have
achieved even partial success in this regard. The Chesapeake Bay Program
appears to have "worked up" to some agreement on long-range goals by
starting with a more concrete task that could attract agency
participation: allocation of federal research funds. The Gulf Coast
Authority presents a different case. It has acted as a focal point for a
single goal that had a lot of preexisting support, but no institutional
home: protection of Galverston Bay from Houston Ship Channel pollution.
Perhaps these approaches could be adapted to Puget Sound.
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Public Involvement
Institutions can facilitate (or discourage) public Involvement, but
they cannot create 1t. Of the five models, the two that have most
effectively fostered public participation are those that largely owe their
creation to preexisting public interest, which then carried over to public
involvement in the institutions once established: I.e., the Chesapeake
Bay Program and the San Francisco Conservation and Development
Commission. (Seattle Metro has enjoyed a similar progression.)
Similarly, any new Puget Sound institution is most apt to attract public
involvement if it responds to preexisting public interests and is at least
partially created by citizen activism. At a minimum, a regional
institution must command at least some real decisionmaking powers if it is
to entice public participation. Toothless institutions generally do not
generate much public attention, as the International Joint Commission's
work illustrates.
Coordinated Research Needs
Establishment of a common research agenda faces the same hurdle as
agreement on long-range goals: the agencies will participate only if they
have a shared interest in doing so. Of the five cases, the Chesapeake Bay
Program offers perhaps the only workable means of creating this interest:
offering the agencies the opportunity to allocate a pot of research
resources outside their own budgets. Once in the game, these agencies may
gradually adjust their own research priorities to align with the common
program. This approach could be effective on the Sound, and Indeed the
Puget Sound Water Quality Program works somewhat in this fashion.
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Focusing of Resources
Focusing of agency resources in accordance with common goals impinges
on the very core of agency autonomy. Even more so than the establishment
of long-range goals and research needs, resource allocation resists
interagency coordination. No coordinating institution seems apt to
seriously affect the resource allocation decisions of individual agencies
as long as they remain separate. Only a super agency-, such as the Gulf
Coast Authority, has much chance of doing so, by partly replacing
individual agencies themselves. Attempts to focus resources devoted to
Puget Sound water quality should have few illusions on this score.
(Though a partial solution, as discussed in connection with research
needs, is to assemble a new, common batch of resources.)
Review of Individual Agency Policies
None of the five cases suggests that interagency institutions can
effectively review the policies on the individual agencies. Even when
this function is an explicit part of the institution's mandate, as in the
case of the Delaware River Basin Commission, the tendency is simply to
ratify individual agency policies without much real scrutiny. This
tendency should not be surprising. All the agencies have a shared
interest in avoiding such a review. A partial exception may be the
International Joint Commission, which does provide some oblique criticism
of agency policies in its first Biennial Water Quality Report. The IJC's
inclination to engage in such review probably stems from the membership of
the Commission itself. The commissioners represent the two governments
rather than individual agencies. Some similar source of independence
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would probably be required for a Puget Sound agency to seriously review
individual agency policies. But as the IJC also suggests this
independence comes at a cost: no one listens to the resulting critique.
Regulatory/Decisionmaking Functions
To have an impact, a coordinating institution must have some
decisionmaking author1ty--either to allocate resources or to regulate
individual agencies. The marginal roles of the International Joint
Commission and the Delaware River Basin Commission stem from their lack of
such effective authority. In contrast, the Chesapeake Bay Program has
allocated research funds; the San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission regulates shoreline use; and the Gulf Coast
Authority constructs and operates waste disposal facilities. It is these
concrete missions serving (and potentially impinging on) the interests of
agencies and publics that create the incentive for agency participation
and public involvement. Any Puget Sound institution must similarly have
well-defined decisionmaking functions if it is to have an impact.
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5.0 INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION
Puget Sound is a common resource whose preservation requires
collective restraint, based on collective understanding, among those
agencies responsible for managing its water quality. This goal implies a
need for policy coordination among responsible and interested
agencies~i.e., a capacity for reaching agreement about priority issues,
research needs, problem-solving strategies, and assessment of the results.
At present, no single institution acts as a focal point for purports
to establish general policies governing Puget Sound water quality
management. Instead, the region relies on three more narrowly focused
institutions—the Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program, the
State-EPA Agreement, and the Puget Sound Water Quality Authority—and the
autonomous federal, state, local, and tribal agencies. Present
arrangements, especially as they evolve, may prove adequate to provide
needed goals and direction. On the other hand, a new institution or
combination of institutions may be preferable.
This chapter is intended to provide perspective on the institutional
aspects of Puget Sound water quality management by evaluating six broad
institutional options for policy coordination. These options are the
"evolving status quo," plus five others: an interagency management group
modeled on the Columbia River Management Group, a Puget Sound Program
analogous to EPA's Chesapeake Bay Program, a Sound-wide waste disposal
authority, a federal-state compact, and a Washington state super agency.
Each option is presented in the same format: a brief description, an
evaluation according to the six criteria used in Chapter 4 plus a general
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criterion of effectiveness 1n reaching collective decisions, an assessment
of implementation barriers, and a summary evaluation of strengths and
weaknesses.
Several limitations of this analysis should be noted. First, in
devising options, arbitrary assumptions had to be made about the key
features of each option. One could alter these features endlessly to
generate an infinite number of options. This brief report could not
consider many variations on each theme—but readers may be stimulated to
do so. Second, there 1s considerable uncertainty about how any given
option would work out 1n practice. The models from elsewhere discussed in
Chapter 4 provide some indication, but differences in time, space, and
other circumstances complicate translation to Puget Sound. Third, major
institutional innovations are not the only alternatives to the status
quo. Marginal adjustments may also improve water quality management,
probably cheaper and more easily. (A few possibilities are discussed in
Chapter 6.) Still, the more ambitious options deserve consideration.
5.1 STATUS QUO
The "status quo" option entails continued evolution of the
institutional arrangements described in Chapter 3. Key elements are the
EPA/WDOE Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program, the State-EPA
Agreement, and the Puget Sound Water Quality Authority.
A strengthened Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program would be
the centerpiece of this option. Specifically, the Program's Steering
Committee would establish a dedsionmaking agenda in the form of periodic,
written "program decisions" rendering the Steering Committee's collective
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judgment on key issues. As necessary, the Steering Committee would form
ad hoc subgroups to advise the Committee on specific issues, such as
dredge spoils disposal. Upon completion of its work, such a group would
ordinarily disband. Additional agencies would be gradually included in
the Program, either through membership in the Steering Committee or
through participation in subgroups.
Evolution in the State-EPA Agreement would also contribute to more
coherent policy. This evolution could take two, compatible directions.
First, steps could be taken to establish a separate State-EPA Agreement
for Puget Sound Water Quality, specifying key issues and the agencies'
commitment of resources (and the timing of those commitments) to specific
tasks that would address Puget Sound water quality issues. Initially,
this statement could be included as an appendix to the present State-EPA
Agreement. Later, it could be issued as a stand-alone document. Second,
additional federal, state, local, and tribal agencies could participate in
the SEA process. Initially, they might simply agree to submit their own
plans in a format comparable to the SEA, for issuance together. Later,
they could make commitments as full parties.
Because the Puget Sound Water Quality Authority is so new, it is
difficult to predict its course or recommend specific directions. Given
the Authority's broad membership and mandate, its most constructive role
may be in developing a broad public consensus on critical issues. In
particular, the Authority could perform a valuable educational function by
sponsoring scientific films, public workshops, audio/visual displays
(e.g., at the Seattle Aquarium, Pacific Science Center, aboard the state
ferry system), and the like. It could also perform a construcive public
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participation function by continuing to hold meetings to solicit public
views on critical issues facing the Sound. On the basis of advice from
the public, and its own deliberations, the Authority could thus act as a
"board of directors" to guide and review the Steering Committee's
deliberations.
Evaluation by Criteria
The following evaluation has two purposes. The discussion under each
criterion evaluates the status quo arrangements as presently constituted.
But it also discusses how the constructive evolution just described could
help address any weaknesses. Thus this discussion serves as evaluation of
both present arrangements and their reasonably foreseeable evolution.
1. Long-Range Goals. The Puget Sound Water Quality Management
Program shows promise as a means of establishing long-range goals at least
at the level of identifying issues that require attention. But as
presently constituted this mechanism also has limitations. First, and
most obviously, only EPA, WDOE, and DSHS now participate. There is little
reason to expect other agencies to adopt the same goals, or even
consistent goals, unless they have an opportunity to influence the
Program's deliberations. Hence the need to consider ways of expanding
participation. Second, the process is new. So far it has produced only
internal agreement on priority issues, and associated information and
research needs. When the Program moves to establish a decisionmaklng
agenda that sets outcome goals and strategies for meeting them (e.g.,
through regulatory or legislative initiatives), agreement may be more
difficult to secure. Third, the informal nature of the enterprise makes
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Its stability dependent on the close personal relationships of specific
individuals. Should they depart, presently agreed-on goals may not retain
the institutional commitment of their agencies. The Puget Sound Water
Quality Authority may also be capable of establishing long-range goals,
but in so doing it is limited in several respects. In particular, because
the members of the Authority have such diverse interests, any goals they
can agree on are apt to be rather general and abstract. Moreover, neither
the Authority nor many of its members have operational responsibilities in
managing Puget Sound water quality. As a result of both these factors,
the Authority may help develop consensus on broad goals, but probably will
not choose to provide specific, operational guidance to individual
agencies.
2. Public Involvement. To date, the Puget Sound Water Quality
Management Program has maintained a fairly low profile. Non-member
agencies, much less the interested public, seem generally unaware of the
Program and in its aims. As the Program assumes an increasingly important
decisionmaking role, it will need to establish a more visible identity and
image with other agencies and the public to build understanding and
marshall support for its activities. Except for individual agency
hearings on specific permit applications and the like, the Puget Sound
Water Quality Authority at present offers the main avenue for public
involvement in the establishment of Puget Sound Water Quality policy.
Indeed, providing an opportunity for public involvement may be the
Authority's most valuable role. However, to attract participation and to
satisfy participants, the Authority must develop some ability to influence
the individual agencies. At present it lacks leverage, other than the
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power to make recommendations to the Washington Legislature and to
Influence public opinion through Its reports. Unless and until the
Authority develops clout, 1t cannot provide a fully satisfactory forum for
public Involvement. Its evolution Into a board of directors vis a vis the
Puget Sound Water Quality Program could be extremely helpful in this
regard. Besides providing a forum for public participation, the Authority
could also play a major role in educating the public on Puget Sound water
quality Issues—though the Issuance of reports, development of displays
and exhibits, and establishment of educational programs in schools and
other institutions.
3. Coordinated Research Needs. At present, the Puget Sound Water
Quality Management Program is the primary means for establishing a
broad-based, non-agency-specific water quality research agenda.
Individual agencies such as NOAA, of course, have detailed research
agendas for their own programs. As among EPA, WDOE, and DSHS, the Program
and its Steering Committee appear to have been effective in coordinating
research needs. A major deficiency is the much weaker linkage from the
Program to the research-producing subunits of other agencies and to the
academic research community. Expanded participation on the Steering
Committee or a research priorities subgroup could help fill this gap.
Research commitments could also be usefully incorporated 1n the SEA for
Puget Sound water quality.
4. Focusing of resources. While a number of complementary efforts
have been undertaken on an ad hoc basis, present arrangements do not
regularly focus resources across agencies on problems of common concern.
In principle, the State-EPA Agreement would seem to be a logical mechanism
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for performing this function. But in practice, the SEA tends instead
merely to ratify resource allocation decisions made elsewhere. At
present, the main vehicle for focusing resources across agencies is the
Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program. During the current year,
the Program has assembled a package of nearTy $1,000,000, mostly from EPA
Headquarters. WDOE has also allocated state general funds to the Program
and has given high priority to Puget Sound water quality in allocating its
federal grants. The Steering Committee has allocated these funds to
studies and analyses to address priority issues. As the Program is
expanded to include additional agencies, it could perhaps help focus the
resources of these agencies as well.
5. Review of Individual Agency Policies. No element within the
present constellation of institutional arrangements engages in
comprehensive review of individual agency policies. As the Puget Sound
Water Quality Management Program moves to establish a decisionmaking
agenda, however, it would review agency policies as part of that process.
6. Regulatory/Decisionmaking Functions. Regulatory and
decisionmaking functions are at present largely held independently by the
various agencies. One exception is the joint decisionmaking exercised by
EPA, WDOE, and DSHS in identifying priority issues and allocating Program
funds through the Steering Committee. A second is the limited control
exercised by EPA and DOE through the SEA process in allocating grant
funds, especially to local governments. A strengthened Puget Sound Water
Quality Management Program would establish a decisionmaking agenda.
Absent new legislation, however, agency compliance with Program decisions
would depend on good will.
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7. Decisionmaking Effectiveness. The Steering Committee seems to be
fairly effective in securing agreement between EPA, WDOE, and DSHS on how
Puget Sound water quality problems should be addressed. However, the
present system provides no regular means of securing agreement within the
broader circle of responsible and-interested agencies. An expanded Puget
Sound Water Quality Program would move in this direction.
Implementation Barriers
Because all elements of the status quo are in place, there are no
implementation barriers to the system as it now stands. However, two
barriers do operate to constrain constructive evolution. First, the
Steering Committee lacks incentives to induce agreement on the part of
other agencies as to the Program's policy priorities. Second, the Puget
Sound Water Quality Authority lacks leverage to influence the behavior of
individual agencies. Until it develops informal influence, perhaps
through a record of legislative support for its recommendations, the
Authority's impact could be marginal.
Evaluation
The present system has a number of strengths. First, it is in place,
up and running. The Management Program and Steering Committee, in
particular, seem to be effective in identifying priority issues and
focusing resources on developing a better understanding of them. Second,
the Program's informal structure should enable it to adapt and evolve, to
concentrate on addressing issues rather than following bureaucratic
routines. But the present system also has important weaknesses. None of
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its elements as yet has much effect on policy beyond the tight circle of
EPA, WDOE, and DSHS. Because the Puget Sound Water Quality Management
Program is informal and dependent on existing close personal
relationships, its durability is not guaranteed. While the State-EPA
Agreement could be strengthened, it has at present become something of a
pro forma exercise, at least for purposes of fostering agreement on
policy. And the Puget Sound Water Quality Authority as yet lacks leverage
to influence agency decisionmaking.
5.2 PUGET SOUND INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT GROUP
A Puget Sound Interagency Management Group would be modeled in part
on the Columbia River Water Management Group, which consists of
representatives from each of the federal agencies involved in water
quality management along the Columbia, as well as representatives from
each of the states in the Columbia Basin. The analog for Puget Sound
water quality management would consist of one member from each of the
federal and state agencies described in Chapter 3. It would meet monthly
to exchange information among the agencies on emerging policy issues,
research needs, and water quality management strategies. Chairmanship
would alternate between EPA and WDOE. The Group would not have its own
staff or budget, but would rely on the chairing agency for staff and
logistical support.
Evaulation by Criteria
1. Long-Range Goals. The Interagency Management Group would
probably achieve only limited success in establishing an agreed-upon set
of long-range goals, for two reasons. First, most of the individual
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agencies would not have adequate Incentives to agree to a set of goals
established by the Group. Second, as a procedural matter the Group would
lack an action-forcing device to prompt agreement on such goals, such as a
statutory requirement to prepare a long-range plan or issue an annual
report.
2. Public Involvement. The Columbia River Management Group makes
little provision for public participation. Attendance at meetings by
non-members is rare. While meetings of the Puget Sound Management Group
could be publicly announced, and open to the public, public interest seems
apt to be slight unless the Group develops into a decisionmaking body,
which seems unlikely.
3. Coordinated Research Needs. The Management Group could certainly
provide a forum for each agency to explain its own research needs to the
other members. But as in the case of establishing long-range goals, the
Group's members would lack the individual incentives to submit its
research agenda to collective review. And the Group as a whole would lack
a procedural device to prompt collective decisionmaking on research needs.
4. Focusing of Resources. Similarly, the Group would lack the
authority to collectively focus the resources of individual agencies on
particular problems. Through discussion of agency priorities, however,
the Group could possibly build a common understanding and perspective that
over time could lead to mutual adjustments in resource allocation
priorities within the various agencies.
5. Review of Agency Policies. The Group would lack the authority to
review individual agency policies. It could, however, serve as a forum
for each agency to explain its policies, recount its experience in
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implementing them, and state any problems it might have with the policies
of other agencies.
6. Regulatory/Decisionmaking Fimctions. Regulatory and
decisionmaking authority would as at present rest with the individual
agencies.
7. Decisionmaking Effectiveness. The Group would essentially serve
as an area for the exchange of information among agencies. As such, it
could help build mutual understanding and foster minor changes in the
decisions of individual agencies more in line with the informal consensus
among agencies than otherwise would be the case. But such a Group would
not have the capacity to make collective decisions binding on individual
members.
Implementation Barriers
A Puget Sound Interagency Management Group would be relatively easy
to establish. It would not require legislation or additional staff or
funds. The major barrier to implementation would be in securing the
commitment of senior managers in each agency necessary to make the Group
go: both initially by agreeing to join the Group, and later by actively
participating in meetings.
Evaluation
The major advantage of a Puget Sound Interagency Management Group is
the relative ease and low cost of establishing it. The major disadvantage
is the uncertainty that it would accomplish much beyond facilitating a
general exchange of views among the agencies. The Columbia River
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Interagency Management Group seems to work fairly well because the federal
agencies In particular have a strong interest 1n sharing information so
they can exercise their operational responsibilities in managing the
Columbia. That sort of concrete, operational interest seems to be lacking
in Puget Sound water quality management.
5.3 PUGET SOUND PROGRAM
Analogous to the EPA's Chesapeake Bay Program, the Puget Sound
program would aim to develop a comprehensive understanding of the Puget
Sound ecosystem. With the advice of a Management Committee co-chaired by
EPA and WDOE, and representing the interested and responsible federal,
state, local, and tribal agencies, EPA would allocate a separate package
of federal funds to a series of research projects addressing priority
issues over a period of four to six years. (Because current knowledge
about the Sound is more complete than knowledge about Chesapeake Bay at
the outset of its Program, the funds involved would be considerably
smaller.) With express Congressional sanction and a very substantial
appropriation, this Program could be considered a separate, new
institution. Alternatively, simply through the provision of federal
dollars, it could be grafted onto the evolving status quo and managed by
the Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program.
Evaulation by Criteria
1. Long-Range Goals. At least Initially, the Puget Sound Program
would not be intended to establish long-term goals per se. Rather, by
providing the agencies with an opportunity to share in the allocation of
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federal research funds, it would invite their participation in the
identification of priority issues, the commissioning of research to
address the issues, and the review of results. However, this process
could foster personal and institutional relations, and common
understanding, that could ultimately lead to convergence among the
agencies on long-range goals.
2. Public Participation. As in the case of the Chesapeake Bay
Program, EPA could use a portion of federal Program funds to sponsor an
independent public participation program. With its own funding and a
well-defined purpose—providing an avenue for public advice in the
identification of priority issues—such a program could enhance public
involvement in Puget Sound water quality management.
3. Coordinated Research Needs. Establishment and execution of a
research agenda would be the core purpose of the Puget Sound Program. The
opportunity to participate in the allocation of additional federal funds
would help ensure the active participation of the various agencies. An
agreed-upon research agenda is the likely result. While the individual
agencies would still be free to pursue their own research agendas
independently, participation in the Program could help create shared
perspectives, and therefore engender a better fit among individual agency
research programs.
4. Focusing of Resources. The experience of the Chesapeake Bay
Program strongly indicates that a Puget Sound Program could effectively
focus the funds appropriated by Congress to the Program. To replicate
this success, it is especially important that the Puget Sound Program
first identify priority issues so that Program resources can be targeted
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to better understanding them. Otherwise, there could be a tendency to
dissipate these resources across a range of unrelated research projects
favored by individual agencies. To the extent this process builds
consensus among the agencies about the critical issues, it could also
facilitate the focusing of individual agency resources on those issues.
5. Review of Agency Policies. The Puget Sound Program would not
review Individual agency policies except as necessary to identify priority
issues and settle on research needs to address them.
6. Regulatory/Decisionmaking Functions. Except for decisionmaking
about the allocation of Program resources, regulatory and decisionmaking
authority would continue to be held by the individual agencies, as under
the status quo.
7. Decisionmaking Effectiveness. A Puget Sound program could
contribute to more effective decisions in at least three ways. First, the
decisions of the Program itself, through the advice of the Management
Committee, would represent constructive, collective choices in identifying
key issues and directing resources to better understanding them. Second,
the regional perspective gained through this process could result in
Individual agency decisions that took this perspective into account.
Third, the Program might evolve into a vehicle for making collective
decisions about long-range goals and water quality management strategies.
Implementation Barriers
The main barrier to Implementation is the need for federal
legislation or at least a substantial commitment of federal funds. Even
though a Puget Sound Program could operate effectively at much lower
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funding levels than that allocated to Chesapeake Bay, these may be
difficult to obtain. Federal resources are generally scarce at present.
Moreover, there is no sense of crisis or even particular urgency in
addressing Puget Sound water quality. Assuming the necessary legislation
and funds were forthcoming, they would encourage but still not guarantee
the constructive participation of all key agencies.
Evaluation
The greatest strength of a Puget Sound Program arises from its having
an attractive, concrete purpose: allocation of federal research funds.
This mission would give the agencies a shared interest in participation.
And the process could help foster a common perspective on the priority
issues facing the Sound. The greatest weakness of this option is the
difficulty of obtaining Congressional sanction and federal funds.
5.4 PUGET SOUND WASTE DISPOSAL AUTHORITY
A Puget Sound Waste Disposal Authority would be modeled on the Gulf
Coast Waste Disposal Authority described in Chapter 4. It could also be
thought of as a "super-Metro," similar in form and function to the
Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, but encompassing the entire Sound
region. Such an Authority would construct, own, and operate sewage
treatment plants and interceptors for all sewage districts otherwise
discharging into the Sound and provide industrial waste treatment
facilities. It would also address stormwater runoff problems in
cooperation with local government. It could be governed as is the Gulf
Coast Authority by a board of directors of appointed members representing
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the counties in its jurisdiction. Or It could be governed by the same
sort of council that directs Seattle Metro, consisting of elected or
appointed representatives from the cities, counties, and unincorporated
areas in the Authority's service area.
Evaluation by Criteria
1. Long-Range Goals. A Puget Sound Waste Disposal Authority would
be required by its enabling statute or the political debate surrounding
its formulation or both to prepare a comprehensive sewage treatment plan
for the Sound. This requirement, and the Authority's focused mission,
should enable it to set long-range water quality goals, at least insofar
as water quality is affected by waste water discharge.
2. Public Involvement. Like the San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission, Seattle Metro was established only through the
sustained efforts of citizen activists who believed strongly in the
importance of creating such an institution. In both cases, intense public
involvement carried over into the actual operations of the agencies once
established. A Puget Sound Waste Disposal Authority could well follow the
same path. Because its establishment would require a similar political
effort, not Just at the state level but in the constituent cities,
counties, and unincorporated areas, the Authority would begin life with a
preexisting corps of political supporters. Any mechanism established for
public involvement would tap this interest in participation.
3. Coordinated Research Needs. Like Metro, the Authority would
establish and execute its own research agenda. Because the Authority
would represent all localities within its geographic jurisdiction, it
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would serve as a vehicle for coordinating their research needs (and for
executing research too expensive for any but the largest jurisdictions to
fund individually). The Authority would not itself serve as a means of
establishing a common research agenda with the principal federal and state
agencies. However, it would bring to deliberations with these agencies a
strong, unified voice representing the perspective of localities.
4. Focusing of Resources. The principal purpose of the Authority
would be to focus local government resources on waste water treatment and
related activities more efficiently than could the local governments
themselves. As the examples of both the Gulf Coast Authority and Seattle
Metro indicate, it could be quite effective in doing so. Other than as a
new and powerful participant in interagency deliberations, however, the
Authority would not have a role in helping to focus the resources of other
agencies.
5. Review of Agency Policies. The Authority would review the
policies of other agencies only for its own information and to ensure that
its own activities did not conflict with any applicable regulatory
requi rements.
6. Regulatory/Decisionmaking Functions. Through its Council, the
Authority would exercise decisionmaking functions with respect to the
siting, financing, construction, and operation of sewage treatment
facilities within its jurisidiction and also with respect to related
activities such as monitoring and research. The Council could also be
authorized to exercise the regulatory authority over water quality and
waste treatment otherwise exercised by its constituent local governments.
For the rest, regulatory and decisionmaking functions would be performed
as under the status quo.
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7. Decisionmaking Effectiveness. Because of Its specific, concrete
mission, its financial resources, and its formal powers, the Authority
should be effective in reaching decisions about water quality goals and
the siting and construction of sewage treatment facilities. The Authority
would also bring a strong voice, comparable to EPA's and WDOE's, to
interagency deliberations in the Puget Sound Water Quality Program.
Implementation Barriers
Establishment of a Puget Sound Waste Disposal Authority would almost
certainly require new state legislation. While in theory such an
Authority could be created under the same enabling legislation that
authorizes the formation of "metropolitan municipal corporations" such as
Seattle Metro, that statute gives particularly heavy representation on the
Council to the "central city" and the "central county" (i.e., the most
populous city and county within the metropolitan jursidction). Giving
such powers to Seattle and King County in a Puget Sound-wide Authority
would be unacceptable to other localities. Therefore a new enabling
statute would be required. Puget Sound water quality may not be an issue
of sufficient urgency to attract the necessary support for such a statute
in the legislature.
Equally problematic are the constituent local governments. Some if
not many may be reluctant to participate. Enabling legislation that
required their individual approval could result in an Authority with
patchwork boundaries or less that Sound-wide jurisdiction. Legislation
that required participation without individual approval, even if
constitutional, would be commensurately difficult to enact.
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Once established, the Authority might be imwieldly to govern and
operate. Both Metro and the Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority are
geographically compact. Integration of a Sound-wide waste disposal system
could be physically and politically difficult.
Evaluation
The greatest strength of a Puget Sound Waste Disposal Authority would
be in establishing a Sound-wide governmental unit with the resources,
representation, and mission to sharply focus a critical set of water
quality management activities. Its main weaknesses are the difficulty of
establishment and, possibly, operational problems.
5.5 PUGET SOUND WATER QUALITY COMMISSION
A Puget Sound Water Quality Commission would be a federal-state
entity established by a compact between Washington and the United States.
Thus it would be analogous to the Delaware River Basin Commission
described in Chapter 4. The Commission would be governed by two
commissioners, one each from the federal government and Washington state.
In developing positions, each commissioner would secure the clearance of
individual agencies through separate federal and state interagency
advisory councils. The Commission would develop and adopt a comprehensive
Puget Sound water quality plan binding on all federal and state agencies.
The Commission's approval would be required for any public or private
project that could have a substantial effect on the Sound's water
quality. The Commission would have its own independent staff and a budget
derived from federal and state appropriations on a 50-50 basis.
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Evaluation by Criteria
1. Long-Range Goals. Establishment of long-range goals through
development of a comprehensive plan would constitute the compact's
principal mission. However, the experience of the Delaware River Basin
Commission suggests that the establishment of such a plan could be
difficult. To secure federal approval of the compact, some provision
would probably have to be made for requiring the federal commissioner to
obtain concurrence from the individual federal agencies on the
commissioner's positions. But in developing the comprehensive plan, the
federal commissioner may be unable to obtain concurrence for a single
position. Even 1f the Washington legislature were willing to give the
state commissioner the power to override individual state agency
objections, the Inability of the federal commissioner to state a unified
federal position would greatly complicate if not preclude establishment of
a plan.
2. Public Involvement. There is no reason in principle why the
Commission could not attract public involvement through attendance at its
meetings, the formation of advisory councils, and the like. However,
there appears to be no groundswell of public opinion favoring formation of
such a body on which these efforts could build. Unless some interest can
be generated in the process of establishing the Commission or developing
the comprehensive plan—e.g., through some quick progress early—intensive
public participation seems problematic.
3. Coordinated Research Needs. Establishment of a research agenda
would not be central to the Commission's mission. However, to the extent
the Commission attempted to set such an agenda, the same difficulties that
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could be expected to bedevil long-range planning generally would likely
arise in this context as well.
4. Focusing of Resources. To focus resources, the Commission must
first identify a clear set of priority goals and issues through
establishment of a long-range plan. Even if the Commission could
establish such a plan, its ability to focus resources would be subject to
the same centrifugal tendencies that impede agreement on the goals
themselves. The individual agencies, especially the federal agencies,
seem unlikely to submit their resource allocation decisions to direction
by the Commission. Nor will they incline toward providing the Commission
with its own resources to perform the functions they would prefer to
perform individually.
5. Review of Agency Policies. Except in the context of reviewing
individual project proposals, the Commission would not be in a position to
seriously scrutinize individual agency policies. The Commission might
examine such policies in the process of attempting to adopt a
comprehensive plan, but would probably tend simply to incorporate
individual agency policies in the overall plan.
6. Regulatory/Decisionmaking Authority. In theory, the Commission
would have the authority to adopt a comprehensive plan and enforce it
through required approval of all projects for consistency with the plan.
In practice, this authority is apt to be constrained by the practical veto
power of the individual agencies. The Commission might also assume the
regulatory powers now held by EPA, WDOE, and the Corps of Engineers.
Assumption of such powers would have to be carefully spelled out in the
compact itself and in federal and state legislation.
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7. Peelslonmaldng Effectiveness. The effectiveness of the
Commission as a decisionmaking unit would probably be constrained by the
reluctance of individual agencies to cede authority to the Commission. If
they supported a strong decisionmaking role for the Commission, it would
have the capacity to be an effective decisionmaker.
Implementation Barriers
Development of the necessary compact would require protracted
negotiations both among the federal and state agencies and between the
federal government and Washington State. Interstate compacts are
notoriously difficult to negotiate. There is little reason to expect easy
negotiation in this case—on the contrary since so many agencies'
interests are at stake, negotiation should prove difficult. -Once signed,
the compact would require ratification by Congress and the Washington
Legislature. Ratification, too, rarely goes quickly or smoothly. A
particular complication in this case could be a multiplicity of committee
jurisdictions since the interests of so many agencies would be affected.
Finally, once established the Commission would require significant
operating funds from both the state and federal governments. Since these
funds are apt to come at the expense of individual agencies, resistance
may be expected.
Evaluation
The greatest strength of a Puget Sound Water Quality Commission lies
in tying the Federal and State governments together in a single unit
responsible for setting policy. The greatest weakness is the possible
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inability of the commissioners to deliver the individual agencies—in
which case policy will be no better focused than it is under the status
quo.
5.6 PUGET SOUND PROTECTION AGENCY
A Puget Sound Protection Agency would be a Washington State super
agency. It would assure responsibility for all Puget Sound water quality
related missions of WDOE, DSHS, the Department of Fisheries, the
Department of Game, and the Department of Natural Resources. In short, it
would be the sole state agency with regulatory authority for water quality
protection of the Sound.
Evaluation by Criteria
1. Long-Range Goals. The Agency should be very effective in
establishing a unified state position on water quality goals for the
Sound. However, because the Agency's responsibilities would be primarily
regulatory, it would still have to reach agreement with state agencies
having other interests in the Sound's water quality—for example, the
resource enhancement components of the Departments of Fish and Game. (Of
course, in principle it would be possible to merge these activities into
the Agency as well.) And the Agency would still have to reach agreement
with the federal agencies on goals. But the State could speak with a
stronger, more unified voice in these negotiations.
2. Public Involvement. The Agency could provide a useful focal
point for public involvement—it would offer a "one-stop shopping" place
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for all the publics with particular interests in the Sound's water
quality. The Agency's substantial regulatory and decisionrnaking powers
would tend to attract their attention. Of course, the effectiveness of
public involvement would depend on the particular public participation
mechanisms adopted by the Agency.
3. Coordinated Research Needs. The Agency should be effective in
coordinating State research needs. As in the case of establishing
long-range goals, agreement with the Federal agencies (especially EPA and
NOAA) would be required. But this process would be easier with the State
speaking through the single voice of the Agency.
4. Focusing of Resources. Probably the greatest appeal of a Puget
Sound Protection Agency derives from its ability to focus state resources
(including federal funds made available to the state) on those areas
requiring most attention. The Agency would also be more persuasive then
the current mix of state agencies in influencing the resource allocation
decisions of the federal agencies.
5. Review of Agency Policies. Because the Puget Sound Protection
Agency would replace those components of other state agecies now
responsible for Puget Sound water quality management, it would eliminate
much of the need to review the policies of these state agencies.
6. Regulatory/Decisionmaking Authority. The Agency would become the
sole regulatory/decisionmaking unit at the state level, with all the
regulatory authority over Puget Sound water quality management now
exercised by the individual agencies. Non-regulatory decisionmaking at
the state level and all federal regulatory and decisionmaking functions
would remain constituted as under the status quo.
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7. Decisionmaking Effectiveness. Establishment of the Agency should
greatly improve the effectiveness of Washington State government in
reaching decisions bearing on the Sound's water quality. By easing the
complexity of coordinating with the federal agencies, it should also
improve decisionmaking more generally.
Imp!ementati on Barri ers
Establishment of a Puget Sound Protection Agency would require state
legislation. The individual agencies affected and their legislative
allies could oppose such a measure. Uncertainty about which functions to
include and which to exclude would further complicate the legislative
process. Once established, considerable disruption in agency business
would extend through a transition period of a year or more. Some
inefficiency would also probably result from overlaps with the
capabilities of the agencies whose functions are partially absorbed.
Evaluation
The greatest strength of a Puget Sound Protection Agency would be in
rationalizing Puget Sound water quality management at the state level.
The greatest weaknesses are the very strong barriers to implementation.
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS
While this examination of Institutional options does not purport to
be definitive, it does support several reasonably firm conclusions.
First, the various interested and responsible agencies do need to
coordinate their policies with respect to the Sound's water quality.
Decisions interact strongly across geographic jurisdictions, environmental
media, and agency interests.
Second, present arrangements do provide a degree of policy
coordination. The Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program in
particular has already contributed to agreement on priority issues and
research needs among EPA, WDOE, and DSHS. The Program and its Steering
Committee appear to be evolving along a constructive path.
Third, however, present arrangements are not fully adequate. Because
other agencies do not participate in the Puget Sound Water Quality
Management Program, apparent consensus may unravel when the Program begins
to devise regulatory or other strategies to address priority issues. The
other agencies may object to these strategies. They may also raise issues
that the Steering Committee has neglected. In addition, even the
agreement among EPA, WDOE, DSHS may dissolve over time, because present
agreement appears to depend heavily on personal understandings among
particular individuals.
Fourth, therefore, some additional measures should be considered to
involve other key agencies and give the evolving process more
Institutional permanance.
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Fifth, of the Institutional options considered In Chapter 6, none is
completely appropriate. A Puget Sound Interagency Management Group, while
comparatively cheap and easy to establish, is unlikely to have much
impact. A Puget Sound Water Quality Commission (federal-state compact)
would probably be both difficult to establish and not very effective. A
Puget Sound Waste Disposal Authority or a Puget Sound Protection Agency
could improve policy coordination among local and state agencies,
respectively. But they would do relatively little to improve policy
coordination with and among the federal agencies. And they would be
extremely difficult to implement absent a much greater sense of urgency
than now exists.
Sixth, constructive evolution in the status quo is the single most
attractive option. A combination of expanded participation and a stronger
decisionmaking role for the Puget Sound Water Quality Management Program;
an annual federal-state-!oca!-tribal agreement analogous to the SEA but
focused specifically on Puget Sound water quality; and a Puget Sound Water
Quality Authority capable of educating the public, building consensus, and
providing general guidance would provide a fairly comprehensive framework
for policy direction. While implementation barriers are significant, this
option would be far easier to implement than the others. Moreover, it
could be built gradually, over time.
Seventh, a Puget Sound Program merits some serious consideration.
This option shows promise of drawing in other agencies and creating a
broader common understanding and regional perspective. After a four to
six year evolution, agency relationships could then be reassessed. By
that point, development of a common perspective could have reduced the
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need for ambitious Institutional fixes. Obtaining the requisite federal
mandate and dollars to inaugurate the Program would not be easy—but this
task would still not be as difficult as establishing a federal-state
compact, a waste disposal authority, or a state super agency.
Eighth, some additional supplementary measures should also.be
considered. These are not full-fledged institutional options, but they
could be constructive. For example:
Issue an annual State of the Sound report. Either the Puget Sound
Water Quality Authority or EPA jointly with WDOE could issue an annual
report describing the state of Puget Sound's water quality, including
priority issues, research needs, regulatory strategies, and results in the
past year. Models of this type of report at the national level are the
Council on Environmental Quality's annual report Environmental- Quality and
the annual report of the Council of Economic Advisers. Such a report
should be clearly written, attractively bound, and widely distributed.
The PSWQA's enabling statute could be amended to require such a report,
giving it greater prominence and stability, but this would not be
absolutely necessary.
Such a report would be a useful vehicle for providing public
information. But it would also be a mechanism for policy coordination.
All responsible and Interested agencies would have a strong incentive to
contribute information about their programs and priorities to make sure
their story was accurately told in a highly visible public document.
Similarly, the process of providing comments on the initial draft's choice
of priority issues, research needs, regulatory strategies, and
interpretation of results would tend to produce compromise and
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agreement—an the more so if the various agencies were actually required
to sign the document, but this is probably not necessary.
Hold annual scientific symposia.
The Puget Sound Water Quality Authority or EPA and WDOE could sponsor
a yearly symposium for the presentation of scientific papers and
discussion of research needs addressing Sound water quality issues.
Individual sessions or panels at the symposium could focus on issue areas
identified by the Authority and the proceedings bound and distributed,
perhaps as an appendix volume to an annual report. Presenters and
discussants should include representatives from the various agencies,
researchers on contract to them, and other members of the Sound's
scientific community.
Such a symposium would provide an efficient and enjoyable means of
sharing information about research results and needs among all interested
and responsible agencies. It would serve as a way of tapping the
expertise of academic specialists without formal ties to government. And
it could lead to consensus on technical issues, or at least better define
the disagreements and uncertainties. Because researchers are ordinarily
quite anxious to participate in such conferences, broad representation
should be relatively easy to achieve.
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REFERENCES
1. Eugene Bardach, The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill
Becomes a Law. (Cambridge, Massachusetts:MIT Press, 1977), p. 132.
2. Bardach, p. 133.
3. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," as reprinted in Garrett
Hardin and John Baden eds., Managing the Commons (San Francisco,
W.H. Freeman, 1977), pp. 16-30.
4. Pub. L. No. 94-116 (1975).
5. Cal. Gov't Code sec. 66600 et seq.
6. Cal. Pub. Res. Code. sec. 29000 et seq.
7. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978.
8. International Joint Commission, First Biennial Report under the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 19/8 (1982)"
9. Texas Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 7621d-2.
10. This discussion relies heavily on Martha Derthick, Between State and
Nation (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974),
Chapter 3.
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PERSONS INTERVIEWED
CORPS OF ENGINEERS
Steve Martin (Commencement Bay permits)
Fred Weinman (works with, suggested by Martin)
DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY
Tom Elwell
Glen Fielder
Carol Fleskes
Jim Krull
Bob Monn
Dan Petke
Bob Saunders
Chris Smith
Greg Sorlie
Joan Thomas
Phil Miller
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Gary O'Neal
John Underwood
DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES
Russ Cahill
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Dave Jamison
Craig Partridge
Steve Til ley
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES
Floyd Frost
Ken Merry
Jim Pluntze
METRO
John Lampe
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Chen
Howard Harris
OREGON WATER RESOURCE DEPARTMENT
Chris Wheeler
PIERCE COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT
Derek Sandison
Dr. Bud Nicola
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PUGET SOUND COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS
Pete Beaulleu
ASSOCIATION OF CITIES
Chuck Mize
SNOHOMISH COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT
Dr. Clarice Hyatt
TACOMA (City)
Mike Price
TACOMA (Port)
Gary Kuczinski
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