&EPA
           United States
           Environmental Protection
           Agency
             Office of Air and Radiation
             (ANR-443)
             Washington, DC 20460
EPA-AA-TSS-I/M-89-2
January 1991
           Air
I/M  Network  Type:
Effects  On Emission
Reductions, Cost,  and
Convenience
           Technical  Information
           Document
           By

           Eugene J. Tierney

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                         I/M Network Type:
       Effects On Emission  Reductions, Cost, and-Convenience
                         EXECUTIVE SUMMARX

     The  Clean Air Act  Amendments  (CAAA)  of 1990  require
that  EPA revise  and  republish  Inspection  and  Maintenance
(I/M) guidance in the Federal  Register  addressing  a  variety
of issues including network type,  i.e.,  whether  the  program
is centralized or decentralized.

     Nearly  every State  that  must operate  an  I/M  program
will need to obtain legislative  authority  to meet  revised
guidelines.   This  need  provides an opportunity  to  reassess
the  effectiveness  of  current  I/M  program designs and  make
changes that will lead to improved air quality over the  next
decade.   Network type is the  most obvious and  influential
factor at work in  an  I/M program.   This  report  attempts  to
analyze  how  emission  reduction  effectiveness,  cost,  and
convenience vary  by  network type.

     Major factors that  influence the emission reductions  in
an  I/M  program  are  test procedures,   analyzer accuracy,
quality  control,  inspector  competence  and  honesty,  and
quality  assurance.   One  of  the  fundamental  features  that
distinguishes centralized programs  from  decentralized is the
number of analyzers, stations,  and inspectors.   Decentralized
programs  range  from  hundreds to  thousands  of stations,
analyzers and inspectors.  By contrast, large  centralized
programs have 10-20 stations in a given  urban  area with 3-5
testing  lanes each.  Consequently, maintaining a high level
of quality assurance and  quality control  over  analyzers and
inspectors  is very difficult  and costly in  decentralized
programs while readily available and  easily  implemented  in a
centralized system.   The  results of a wide  array of  program
audits,  studies,  and  other  analyses  by  EPA and local
governments  show that  decentralized programs suffer  from
improper testing  by inspectors, less  accurate  analyzers, and
from  more variation  in  test  procedure  performance.   The
magnitude  of the  differences  is  difficult  to accurately
quantify, but evidence indicates that decentralized programs
may be 20-40% less effective than centralized.

     Obtaining additional emission  reductions  from  in-use
motor vehicles is essential to  meeting the goals for enhanced
I/M  programs in  the  CAAA of  1990.   To  achieve this,  I/M
programs  need to adopt  more  sophisticated procedures and
equipment to better identify  high  emitting vehicles.  This
would result in higher costs,  which may  make it difficult  to
justify  low  volume  decentralized stations,  and  longer  test
times,  implying  the need for  more  lanes and stations  in  a
centralized  system.   Further,  alternatives  such as  loaded
transient  testing  may  not be practical  in  decentralized

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programs.   Thus,  centralized programs,  which are  already more
effective,  may  also have  greater potential  for improving
effectiveness.

     The  cost  of  I/M  programs  is  also  important   Two
components of cost are  addressed in  this  report:  the  cost to
the motorist and the cost of program oversight.  There is a
distinct   difference  in  cost  between  centralized  and
decentralized   programs;   centralized   programs   are
substantially cheaper,  and the  gap  is  widening.   In most
cases centralized  programs  have had   decreasing or stable
costs while decentralized programs have gotten more expensive
due to improved  equipment and the demands  by  inspectors for
higher compensation.  This  trend is  likely to continue given
the additional inspection requirements imposed by the  CAAA of
1990.

     Convenience  is  named  as  the  major  advantage  of
decentralized  programs.    There  are  many  more inspection
locations,  and   waiting  lines  are  generally non-existent.
Vehicles  which  are identified  as  high  emitters   can  be
repaired by the  testing facility, which is also authorized to
issue  a  compliance or  waiver  certificate  after   retest.
Centralized  testing facilities, on the  other hand,  can be
visited without  appointment, but the motorist may encounter
waiting lines during peak usage  periods.  Vehicles which fail
the  inspection  must be  taken elsewhere  for  repair  and
returned to a testing facility afterwards.

     This  report discusses the  results of  a  consumer survey
on  decentralized  program  experiences  and  also discusses
inspection  facility siting  and  reported waiting  time  in
centralized  programs.     Individual's  experiences  in
decentralized programs vary, depending on  whether they seek
an inspection without an appointment, and whether the  nearest
licensed  facility  is  also capable  of  completing   complex
engine  repairs.    So  do  the  experiences  in  centralized
networks;  most  vehicles will  not need repair and one well-
timed  inspection  visit  will  suffice.  On the  other hand,
inadequately sized networks can  produce serious  problems for
consumers.

     In summary,  the majority of centralized programs have
been found  to be more  effective at reducing emissions at a
lower  cost than  decentralized  programs.   Improvements  to
decentralized programs are needed to assure  that objective,
accurate  inspections are performed.  These improvements are
likely to be costly, and desired levels of sophistication may
be beyond the capabilities of most private garages.  Consumer
convenience  continues to be an  important factor in  network
design and public acceptance.
                               -11-

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                         Table of Contents
                                                                Page
Executive Summary	i
Table of Contents	iii
List of Figures	iv
List of Tables 	v
1.0  Introduction	1
2 . 0  Background	2
3.0  Emission Reductions from I/M Programs	5
     3.1  Formal Test Procedures	5
     3.2  Emission Analyzer Accuracy and Quality Control 	 12
     3.3  Emission Testing Objectivity and Accuracy 	 15
          3.3.1  Background	15
          3.3.2  Supporting Evidence	21
                 3.3.2.1  Failure Rate Data	22
                 3.3.2.2  Overt Audit  Data	24
                 3.3.2.3  Covert Audit Data	26
                 3.3.2.4  Anecdotal Evidence	27
                 3.3.2.5  Waiver Rate  Data	28
                 3.3.2.6  Test Record  Data	30
          3.3.3  Conclusions	32
     3.4  Visual and Functional Inspections of Emission Controls 35
          3.4.1  Background	35
          3.4.2  Supporting Evidence	36
          3.4.3  Conclusions	43
4.0  Program Costs	44
     4.1  Inspection Costs	44
     4.2  Repair Costs	48
     4.2  Conclusions	49
5.0  Convenience	50
6.0  Future Considerations Affecting the Comparison of Network
     Types	53
7.0  Predicted Emission Reductions From MOBILE4 and an Additional
     Assumption Regarding Waivers 	 56
8.0  Conclusions	58
                               -111-

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                           List  of  Figures
                                                                Pag
3-1  Vehicles Passing California I/M After Extended
     Preconditioning	9
3-2  Old and New Emission Test Failure Rates in I/M Programs .... 23
3-3  Failure Rates in Manual and Computerized Stations in New
     Hampshire	24
3-4  Fraction of Covert Audits Finding Improper Tests	27
3-5  Overall Tampering Rates in Select I/M Programs	37
3-6  Catalyst and Inlet Tampering Rates in Select I/M Programs . . 38
3-7  Tampering Rates in Decentralized and Centralized Programs . . 39
3-8  Aftermarket Catalyst Usage in Anti-Tampering Programs	40
3-9  Tampering Rates in I/M and Non-I/M Areas in California	41
3-10 Frequency of Proper Tampering Tests	42
4-1  Cost Per Vehicle of I/M Programs	45
4-2  Cost Per Vehicle By Network Type	46
4-3  Cost By Program Age	47
4-4  Nationwide Inspection and Oversight Cost of I/M	48
5-1  Average Daily Waiting Times in Illinois' I/M Program 	 51
7-1  Benefits From Various Potential Changes to I/M Programs .... 57
                               -iv-

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                           List  of  Tables
                                                                Pag
2-1  Currently Operating or Scheduled I/M Programs	2
3-1  Test Procedures Currently Used in I/M Programs	6
3-2  Error of Commission Rates Using High Speed Preconditioning . . 7
3-3  Change in Failure Rates From First Idle to Second Idle	8
3-4  Model Year Coverage of Anti-Tampering Inspections 	 11
3-5  Gas Audit Failure of Emission Analyzers By Program 	 13
3-6  Early Emission Test Failure Rates in I/M Programs 	 17
3-7  Waiver Rates in I/M Programs in 1989	29
3-8  Model Year Switching Between Initial and Retests 	 31
3-9  Vehicles With Dilution Levels Below 8%	32
                                -v-

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1.0  INTRODUCTION

     At any point in time, a certain percentage of vehicles on the
road are emitting  pollutants  in excess of their  design  standards
due to repairable causes.   Motor  vehicle  emissions  inspection and
maintenance  (I/M)  programs  employ  a short  screening  test  to
identify high emitters and a retest after repairs  to confirm their
effectiveness in reducing emissions.   It  is  the mandatory initial
screening test and the retest after repairs that  differentiate I/M
from a public information campaign about motor vehicle maintenance
or a program to train automotive mechanics.

     Where and  how  those  tests  are conducted has been one of the
fundamental choices  in  designing  an I/M program.    This  choice is
generally made by the elected  officials  who establish the necessary
authorizing legislation.   Two  basic  types of  I/M systems exist:  1)
inspection  and  retest  at  high  volume,  test-only  lanes  (a
centralized network), and 2)  inspection and retest  at privately-
owned,   licensed  facilities   (a  decentralized   network) .     A
combination of  centralized  and decentralized  inspections  is  also
found,  the latter usually  being  for  retests only.

     This  report  discusses  how the  choice of network design can
affect the quality,  cost,  and  convenience of  I/M inspections.  This
report examines operating results  from inspection programs across
the United States to  compare  the  effects  of  network design.   Each
section will present available  information and attempt to come to a
conclusion regarding the relative  merits of each network option.

     The discussion of network choice is particularly important in
light of the Clean Air Act (CAAA)  Amendments  of 1990, which include
significant changes for  I/M programs.  The CAAA amendments require
centralized  testing  in  enhanced  areas,  unless  the  State  can
demonstrate that decentralized testing  is  equally  effective.   The
phrasing  of this  requirement  implies a  desire  on  the  part  of
Congress for  getting the most  out of  I/M,  while not wishing to
close out  the  decentralized option altogether.   This  report  lays
the  groundwork  for  discussing what  may be  necessary   to  make
decentralized as effective as  centralized testing.

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2.0  BACKGROUND

     The first emission I/M program was  established  in the State of
New Jersey with mandatory inspection and voluntary repair in 1972.
In  1974,  repairs  became mandatory for  vehicles which  failed the
inspection test.  New  Jersey  added the  emission inspection to its
existing,  centralized  safety inspection  network.   The  States of
Oregon  and  Arizona followed suit  by  establishing  centralized
inspection programs  in 1975  and  1976.   Oregon, like  New Jersey,
established a State-operated  network, while  Arizona was the first
State to implement a contractor-operated network.

     Following passage of the Clean  Air Act Amendments  of 1977,
which mandated I/M  for areas  with long  term air quality problems,
other State and local  governments  established inspection programs.
Table 2-1  illustrates  the  choices which have been  made regarding
network design in  the United States as of January, 1991.
Table 2-1
Currentlv Ooeratina or Scheduled I/M Proarams
Centralized
Contractor
Operated
Cleveland 1
Connecticut
Arizona
Illinois
Florida 3
Louisville
Maryland
Minnesota 3
Nashville
Washington
Wisconsin


(11)
Centralized
State/Local
Operated
D.C.
Delaware
Indiana
Memphis
New Jersey
Oregon



(6)
Decentralized
Computerized
Analyzers
Anchorage
California
Colorado
Dallas/El Paso
Fairbanks
Georgia
Massachusetts
Michigan
Missouri
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Mexico
New York
Pennsylvania
Virginia
(15)
Decentralized Decentralized
Manual
Analyzers
Davis Co,UT 2
Idaho
N.Carolina 2
3 Rhode Island
Provo, UT
Salt Lake City



(6)
1 Texas and Ohio are counted as one program each but are listed
2 Committed to switching to decentralized computerized analyzers
3 Scheduled to begin in 1991.
Parameter
Inspection
Houston l
Louisiana
N . Kentucky
Ohio
Oklahoma



(3)
in 2 columns .
                               -2-

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     Decentralized networks are more abundant due to a variety of
factors.   In seventeen areas, the emission  inspection  requirement
was simply added to a pre-existing decentralized  safety inspection
network.    Another  ten areas  implemented  decentralized systems
because they were perceived to be less costly and more convenient
to the vehicle  owner.

     Those areas  choosing  to implement centralized systems cited
improved  quality control and avoidance .of conflict of  interest as
the  main  reasons.    Eleven  areas  selected  to  have  private
contractors own and operate the inspection network so  as to avoid
the   initial  capital  investment   as   well  as   the   ongoing
responsibility  for staffing and maintenance.   Following New  Jersey
and Oregon's  lead,  four States chose to use State-owned centralized
facilities and  government employees to operate the test  system.

     The  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency  (EPA)  did not  attempt
to specify network choice  when it first established  I/M  policy in
1978.   EPA  assumed  that  decentralized  programs  could  be as
effective as centralized programs, if  well  designed  and  operated.
At  the  time  that  the policy  was   developed,  there  were no
decentralized   I/M programs  to  observe.    EPA  did,  however,
anticipate the increased  need  for oversight  in a  decentralized
network,  and the 1978 policy required additional  quality  assurance
activities for  such systems.

     In 1984,  EPA initiated I/M program audits  as  a part of the
National  Air Audit System.  The  audit procedures were  developed
jointly by EPA,  the State  and  Territorial  Air Pollution  Program
Administrators  (STAPPA), and the Association of Local Air  Pollution
Control Officials  (ALAPCO).  Since the audit  program's inception,
EPA has fielded audit teams on 96  different  ^occasions totaling 320
days of on-site visits  to assess program adequacy.   Audit  teams are
composed  of trained  EPA staff  specializing   in  I/M program
evaluation.   Every currently operating  I/M program has been  audited
at least  once and many have been audited  several  times.   The major
elements  of I/M audits  include:

     1)   overt visits  to  test  stations  to check for  measurement
          instrument  accuracy,  to  observe  testing,  to  assess
          quality  control  and  quality   assurance  procedures
          instituted by the program,  and  to  review records  kept in
          the station;

     2)   covert visits to  test stations to  obtain  objective  data
          on inspector performance;

     3)   a  review  of  records  kept  by the program,  including the
          history  of  station  and  inspector performance   (e.g.,
          failure  rates and  waiver rates),  enforcement actions
          taken  against  stations  and  inspectors  found  to be
          violating regulations, and similar documents;
                               -3-

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     4)   analysis  of  program operating statistics,  including
          enforcement  rates,  failure rates,  waiver  rates,  and
          similar information;  and,

     5)   entrance and exit  interviews with  I/M program officials
          and a  written  report describing the audit findings and
          EPA recommendations on correcting any problems found.

Further detail on audit  procedures can be found in  the National Air
Audit System Guidance.1

     EPA has pursued several other means  of monitoring  I/M  program
performance.    Roadside  emission   and   tampering  surveys2  are
conducted in  I/M areas  throughout the country  each year.   These
surveys provide  information on how  well  programs are correcting
tampering and  bringing  about  tailpipe emission  reductions.   EPA
requests certain I/M programs to  submit  raw test data for in-depth
analysis .   These  data  are  analyzed in  a   variety of ways  to
determine whether programs  are  operating adequately.3    Studies
conducted by individual  States  and other organizations also  provide
information  on  program  effectiveness.4'5'^   In preparing this
report, all  of these sources were considered  in the  discussion of
network design impacts.
                               -4-

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3.0  EMISSION REDUCTIONS  FROM I/M PROGRAMS

     From an environmental perspective, the most critical  aspect in
evaluating  an  I/M program  is  the emission  reduction  benefit it
achieves.   There  are  three  major  factors related to network  type
that  must  be  considered  in  making  such  an  assessment:   the
prescribed  test procedures,  instrumentation  and quality  control,
and actual test  performance  (including the issuance  of waivers).

3.1  Formal Test Procedures

     In order to assure that air quality benefits are achieved, it
is necessary  to  assure that high  emitters  are identified by the
emission  test  and are  properly  repaired.    The Federal   Test
Procedure (FTP),  which is used  to  certify that  new  vehicle designs
meet emission standards,  is not practical for use in the field,
because it  is very expensive  and  time consuming.   Short  emission
tests were  developed for I/M programs  to  allow rapid screening of
in-use  vehicles  for   emission performance.    It  is  desirable,
however,  that an  I/M test  be able to  predict  about  the   same
pass/fail outcome  that the  FTP would,  and especially that it not
fail a vehicle which could not  benefit from repair.

     Generically,  there are three  short tests  currently  in use in
I/M programs: idle, two-speed and  loaded/idle.   Which programs use
which  test  is  shown  in Table 3-1.   There are  some  variations
between how programs  define and  carry out  these  tests,  but the
basic  approach  is  the same for  each  test.  There is  no direct
relationship between network type  and test type,  although loaded
testing is currently only done  in centralized programs.

     The use of preconditioning, or preparation of  the  vehicle for
testing, is another test-related variable illustrated  in Table  3-1.
Preconditioning  is performed  to  assure  that  the vehicle  is at
normal  operating  temperature, and  that  any  adverse  effect of
extended idling  is eliminated.   Some I/M programs utilize  a period
of  high  speed  operation  (2500  rpm  for  up  to  30  seconds) to
precondition  vehicles;  some   operate  the vehicle  on  a chassis
dynamometer prior  to  conducting  the  idle  test;  others  do no
preconditioning.   Most decentralized  programs,  especially those
employing   computerized   analyzers,    conduct   high   speed
preconditioning.   To reduce costs  and  test time, many  centralized
programs did not  adopt  preconditioning.   As with loaded  testing,
only centralized programs are doing loaded preconditioning.

     The importance of properly preconditioning a vehicle for the
short test has become  increasingly  apparent to  EPA  during  the  last
few  years  due to  concerns  about  false failures  of  newer model
vehicles.   As a  result,  the merits of high  speed preconditioning
and  loaded preconditioning have  been  studied to assess  their
effectiveness.  Two recent  EPA studies7 gathered data related to
this issue,  one  which recruited vehicles  which failed the short
test in Maryland's centralized  I/M program, and one  which  recruited
vehicles from Michigan's  decentralized I/M program.  In  both


                               -5-

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                            Table  3-1

          Test  Procedures Currently Used in I/M Programs
       Program

          D.C.
      Delaware
       Indiana
       Memphis
    New Jersey
        Oregon

       Arizona
   Connecticut
       Florida
      Illinois
    Louisville
      Maryland
     Minnesota
     Nashville
    Washington
     Wisconsin

        Alaska
    California
      Colorado
        Dallas
       El Paso
       Georgia
         Idaho
 Massachusetts
      Michigan
      Missouri
        Nevada
 New Hampshire
North Carolina
    New Jersey
    New Mexico
      New York
  Pennsylvania
  Rhode Island
          Utah
      Virginia
Network
 Type1

 CG/D
   CG
   CG
   CG
   CG
   CG

   CC
   CC
   CC
   CC
   CC
   CC
   CC
   CC
   CC
   CC

   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
   D
Test Type2

Idle
Idle
Two Speed
Idle
Idle
Two Speed

Loaded/Idle
Idle
Idle
Two Speed
Idle
Idle
Idle
Idle
Two Speed
Idle

Two Speed
Two Speed
Two Speed
Idle
Idle
Idle
Idle
Idle
Idle
Idle
Two Speed
Idle
Idle
Idle
Idle
Idle
Idle
Idle
Two Speed
Idle
Precondition! ng

None
None
High Speed
None
None
High Speed

Loaded
Loaded
Loaded
High Speed
High Speed
High Speed
Loaded
None
High Speed
Loaded
High
High
High
High
High
High
None
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
None
High
High
Speed
Speed
Speed
Speed
Speed
Speed

Speed
Speed
Speed
Speed
Speed
Speed
Speed
Speed
Speed
Speed

Speed
Speed
1 CG = Centralized government, CC = Centralized contractor, D= Decentralized
2 Idle  =  pass/fail determined only from idle emission readings
  Two Speed  =  pass/fail determined from both idle and 2500 rpm readings
  Loaded/Idle =  pass/fail determined from loaded and idle readings.
                               -6-

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studies,  vehicles  that  had failed their  regularly  scheduled I/M
test  were  tes'ted  on the  full  FTP  and  carefully examined for
anything that needed repair.  Both studies revealed the existence
of errors of  commission  (i.e.,  failed  vehicles  which  had low FTP
emissions and no apparent defects but nevertheless failed the I/M
short test)  in these programs which utilize 15-30 seconds of high
speed preconditioning.   The  results are  shown  in Table 3-2.   Since
owners of incorrectly failed vehicles are  subjected to unnecessary
inconvenience  and  repair expense,  the elimination of  incorrect
failures is  a priority.  To  address  the need  for  improved test
procedures,  EPA  issued  a technical report  detailing  recommended
alternative   short   test  procedures   in  December,   1990.8   The
procedures  include  three  variations of  the   idle  test,  two
variations  of the two speed  idle test,  and a loaded test procedure.
In all but the  loaded test  procedure  and the idle test procedure
with  loaded preconditioning,  a  second-chance  test which  includes
three minutes  of high speed  preconditioning  is  recommended upon
failure of  the initial test.
Table 3-2
Error of Commission Rates Usincr Hiah Speed
Total Number
Vehicles Incorrect
Program Recruited Failures
Michigan 237 70
Maryland 178 55
* The Michigan study used FTPs to verify whether each
correct. The Maryland study gave vehicles a second
as incorrect failures the vehicles that passed. No
these vehicles, but they were assumed to be passes.
Precondit ion ing*
Incorrect
Failure
Rate
30%
33%
I/M failure was
short test and counted
FTPs were Conducted on
     Twenty-four of  the  thirty-five programs currently operating
use  high speed  preconditioning.   Seven  programs  do  no formal
preconditioning.    Three  centralized  programs  utilize  loaded
preconditioning  and Florida and  Minnesota will  soon  begin such
testing.

     EPA has not done a definitive study of loaded preconditioning
or no preconditioning programs but there is some revealing  evidence
in the data from the programs that use loaded preconditioning.  In
these  programs,  the  idle  test  is  repeated  on  initially failed
vehicles  after 30 or more seconds of loaded operation.   The change
in pass/fail status  is shown  in the Table 3-3.  Although  these data
are  not  accompanied by  FTP results,  the  in-depth studies  in
Maryland  and  Michigan  indicate that  vehicles  which  pass  I/M
cutpoints  after  loaded  operation  are more  likely  to  be  low


                               -7-

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emitters.   The seven programs that  use  no formal preconditioning
may be experiencing  failure patterns similar to-those on the first
idle of the loaded preconditioning programs, i.e., they may have a
large number of incorrect failures.
                             Table  3-3

       Change  in Failure Rates From First Idle to Second Idle


                    Failed First    Failed Both
     Model  Years      Idle Test        Tests          Delta*

      Pre-1981          46%             21%            -54%

      Post  1980          52%             39%            -25%
* Delta is the percent  of unpreconditioned failures eliminated by loaded
  preconditioning.
     Fifteen to thirty seconds of 2500 rpm operation does not seem
adequate to precondition all  vehicles.   No preconditioning at all
is probably worse.   Thirty to ninety  seconds  of loaded operation
seems  to work  well but  may only  be feasible  in a  centralized
network  because  the  purchase  and  installation  of  a  chassis
dynamometer is considered to be beyond the financial capability of
most private garages.  The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
has endorsed  three  minutes of  2500 rpm operation  as  adequate to
precondition recent model  year  vehicles,  and EPA's analysis shows
that extended unloaded preconditioning reduces incorrect failures.
This  type  of preconditioning  is  feasible  in  a  decentralized
network,  and several programs  that have recently  switched to BAR 90
type analyzers  are  currently pursuing this  approach.  .Figure 3-1
shows  the  results  of second  chance testing  on  42,555  vehicles
covering 1968 and newer model  years in California using 3 minutes
of 2500 rpm preconditioning on vehicles that  fail  the initial test.
The data show that  37% of  the vehicles that fail the initial test
pass after extended  preconditioning.

     Based  on  this  evidence,  improving preconditioning  is a high
priority.  The relative cost of loaded preconditioning and  extended
high  speed preconditioning  is  an  important  question.    Loaded
preconditioning  requires  the  installation  of dynamometers.   In
centralized programs,  that  cost  can  be  spread over   tens  of
thousands tests.  The typical decentralized  station inspects about
1000 vehicles per year.   Loaded preconditioning seems to accomplish
the task of readying the  vehicle for testing in much less time than
high speed preconditioning, i.e.,  30 seconds  vs.  180 seconds.  In  a
decentralized  station,  the time  factor  is  important  in  terms of
wage  labor.   In centralized  programs,   minimizing test  time is
essential to keeping throughput high and test costs  low.


                                -8-

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                            Figure 3-1
  Vehicles Passing California I/M After  Extended Preconditioning
    Vehicles Tested
   Initial Failures
       Pass  After
    Preconditioning
        24%  of
       Vehicles
        Tested
 37% of
 Initial
Failures
     Loaded  mode  operation is  definitely  necessary if  an  I/M
jurisdiction wishes  to test for  emissions  of oxides of  nitrogen
(NOx) .   There  has  been little  attention focused on NOx  in  recent
years.   Only Los Angeles, California experiences  violations  of  the
ambient air  quality standard  for  nitrogen  dioxide,  and  emission
control  planners  elsewhere  have  historically  concentrated  on
hydrocarbon-only  control strategies  for reducing  ozone levels.
There  has  been growing  interest lately, however,  in a  strategy
which  combines HC and NOx  controls to  reduce  the potential  for
ozone  formation.   As  discussed above,  loaded mode  testing  may  be
practical  from a  cost  standpoint  only  in  centralized  networks .
Tampering checks may also provide NOx emission reductions.  Section
3.4 addresses such tampering checks.

     Transient  loaded mode operation  may also  be  essential  for
implementing tests  that  better identify vehicles that should  get
repairs.   The steady-state  idle,  two speed  and  loaded   tests
currently used in I/M programs  identify only 30-50% of the vehicles
that need  repair.   EPA has developed a  prototype short  transient
test that  identifies essentially  all  vehicles  that  need repair.
This procedure  is being evaluated in the  centralized I/M program in
Indiana.   Results thus far show that the  test accurately identifies
vehicles that  need repair,  while minimizing  the  number of falsely
failed  vehicles.

     A transient loaded  test is  a  more  complicated,  expensive  and
time consuming test.   It  involves  the use of a  more sophisticated
dynamometer  than  those  in  use in  most  loaded  testing programs.
                               -9-

-------
More  sophisticated  sampling and  measurement  equipment  is  also
involved.  The" test has many advantages, however-, over the current
tests.   First, by accurately predicting FTP results it identifies
more  vehicles  for repair,  which  should lead to  greater emission
reductions from the program and  better  cost  effectiveness.  It also
allows  for  NOx testing and a  functional test  of  the  evaporative
control  system.    Evaporative  emissions represent  a very  large
portion  of  the total  hydrocarbon  emissions from  motor  vehicles.
Having an effective functional test to identify vehicles that need
evaporative  system  repair  is  essential to  reducing  in-use
emissions.   Transient testing  may  also allow  the  elimination of
other tampering checks frequently performed  in I/M programs.  It is
accurate enough to not require this  "double  check."

     Anti-tampering inspections  are  another  part of the formal test
procedure in I/M programs.  As Table 2-1 shows,  some programs only
inspect for the presence and proper connection of emission control
devices (parameter inspection),  while others do  both emission tests
and tampering checks.  Table  3-4 shows the  current tampering test
requirements in I/M programs.  Centralized programs typically do no
anti-tampering checks  or  fewer than  decentralized programs.  Again,
the concern for rapid  throughput in centralized lanes  has been an
important factor  in  this  choice.    Recently,  centralized programs
have  been adding  anti-tampering checks to  their emission  only
programs.  Maryland,  Arizona, and New Jersey are examples of this.
Their experiences show that anti-tampering inspections  can be done
quickly  if  limited  to  the  items  that are  not  in  the  engine
compartment:   the presence of a  catalyst, the integrity of the fuel
inlet  restrictor, and a  test  for  leaded  fuel  deposits in  the
tailpipe.  Inspection  of  underhood  components  is  possible in both
centralized and  decentralized  networks,  but only  two  centralized
programs  have  so  far adopted  such inspections.   Decentralized
programs,  in which throughput  is less of  a consideration,  have more
readily included  underhood checks in their regulations.

     To conclude, the  choice of network  type  affects  the relative
costs  of  improvements in  preconditioning and test   procedures.
Decentralized programs  spread the equipment  cost across as few as 3
or 4  tests  per day.   Centralized  programs have shied  away  from
preconditioning and anti-tampering  checks in the past because of
lack of clear need  (at the time of  original program adoption)  and
the impact on throughput,  not because of the hardware  cost.  Anti-
tampering  checks are  currently more  prevalent in decentralized
programs  (the effectiveness of decentralized anti-tampering checks
is an important factor which will be discussed in a later section).
Centralized networks are  probably the  best  choice  for  loaded mode
emission testing  for NOx  control and for  improved identification of
vehicles  needing  repair.    An  alternative  that  has not  yet  been
tried but might  be practical from  a  cost perspective would  be a
limited-participation decentralized  network,  in  which  a  small
number of  stations  would be licensed  to insure a high  volume of
business at each.
                               -10-

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Table 3-4
Model Year Coveraae of Anti-Tamoerina

(oldest
Network
Program
Arizona
Connecticut
D.C.
Delaware
Florida2
Illinois
Indiana
Louisville
Maryland
Memphis
Minnesota2
Nashville
New Jersey
Oregon
Washington
Wisconsin
Anchorage
Fairbanks
California
Colorado
Dallas/El Paso
Georgia
Idaho
Massachusetts
Michigan
Missouri
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Davis Co., UT
Provo
Salt Lake City
Virginia
Louisiana
N. Kentucky
Ohio
Oklahoma
Houston
1 C = Centralized
Tvoe1
•™ J jr-^fc
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
A
A
A
A
A
model year
Catalytic
Converter
75



75



77

76

75
75

75
75
75
75
75
80
78
84


81
81
85
75
84
77


84
77
84
75
80
80
80
79
80
, D= Decentralized,
checked
Fuel
Inlet
75



75



77

76

75
75

75
75

75
75
80
78
84


81
81
85
75
84
77


84
77
84
75
80
80
80
79
80
Inspections
is listed)
Lead
Test
75















75
75


80







75





77


80
80
80
79
80
Air

Pump PCV
IT V\t1»f ^
67












80


75
75
67
75
68
78
84


71
81

75
84
77


84
77
84
73
80
80
80
79
68













80


75
75
67

68




71



64
77


84


73
80
80
80
79
68
Evap
Canister













80




70

68




71



84



84


73
80
80
80
79
68
A = Anti-tampering only
2 Not currently operating
-11-

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3 .2  Emission ^Analyzer Accuracy and  Quality Control

     I/M tests are conducted with  non-dispersive infrared analyzers
which can  measure hydrocarbons (HC)  (as hexane),  carbon  monoxide
(CO),  and carbon dioxide (C02) ,  although not all equipment  includes
the latter capability.  The concentration of pollutants  in vehicle
exhaust  is measured  by placing  a  steel probe,  attached to  the
analyzer by a sample hose,  in  the  exhaust pipe and drawing  a sample
of exhaust into the  instrument.   The  concentration  in the exhaust
stream is  compared  to  the  I/M program's  pass/fail  cutpoints  (1.2%
CO and 220 ppm HC  for the majority of the fleet).

     Accurate  measurement  capability is  essential  for   several
reasons.   First,  although  cutpoints  are high  enough that  small
errors  do  not   critically  affect  emission  reductions,   any
significant  error  affects  equity  and  public confidence in  the
testing process.    Naturally, public support of  the  program  is
critical to the ultimate success  of the  effort.   Second,  leaks  in
the analyzer  dilute the emission sample  and  could lead  to  false
passes of  high emitting vehicles.  Leaks  can quickly and easily
become large  enough  to cause large amounts of dilution.   This
results in a  loss in emission reduction benefits to the  program.
Finally,  bad  data  obscure  what  is  happening  in  the  program.
Tracking the  performance of vehicles in the  fleet  over time is  one
indicator of the  success of an I/M program.   Inaccurate  readings
could mislead planners and  decision makers.

     The accuracy of  the  reading depends on  periodic calibration
checks and adjustments,  regular maintenance of filters and  water
traps,  and detection  and repair of  leaks in  the  sampling system.
Each I/M program has requirements  for maintaining the analyzers  and
also has  an  independent  audit program  in  which  analyzers  are
checked  on  a  periodic basis.    EPA  recommends  that   program
administrators use  a +5%/-7%  tolerance  when  auditing  inspection
equipment.   That is, if an  analyzer  reads a  known  concentration  of
gas more than  5 percent too  high or  7 percent too low during  an
audit,  then  it should  be  taken  out  of  service until  it can  be
adjusted or repaired.

     EPA audits of operating I/M programs also include  independent
instrument checks  with a gas bottle that EPA names  and ships to  the
site from  its Motor  Vehicle  Emission  Laboratory  in  Ann Arbor,
Michigan.    Table  3-5 presents  the  findings  from EPA audits
regarding the accuracy of different programs' instrumentation.

     The findings show  mixed  results  depending upon program  type.
Centralized  contractor-run   programs  show  very   strong   quality
control.   Centralized  government-run programs and decentralized
programs are  comparatively  weak.
                               -12-

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Gas Audit

Program
D.C.
Delaware
Indiana
Medf ord
Memphis
Subtotal
Connecticut
Illinois
Louisville
Maryland
Washington
Wisconsin
Subtotal
California
Colorado
Georgia
New Hampshire
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Subtotal
I CG = Centralized
Table 3-5
Failure of Emission Analyzers Bv Procrram

Network
Type1
CG
CG
CG
CG
CG
CG
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
government,
Number of
Analyzers
Tested '
13
9
24
4
9
59
32
47
6
11
12
11
119
22
21
21
14
17
11
106
CC = Centralized
Rate of
HC
Failures
23 %
67 %
29 %
50 %
44 %
37 %
0 %
0 %
0 %
0 %
25 %
18 %
4 %
9 %
29 %
14 %
29 %
•35 %
27 %
23 %
contractor,
Rate of
CO
Failures
15 %
22 %
8 %
0 %
33 %
15 %
0 %
0 %
0 %
0 %
8 %
9 %
2 %
14 %
14 %
10 %
21 %
65 %
18 %
23 %
D= Decentralized
     Minimum quality  control requirements  are  specified in  the
Emission Performance Warranty Regulations  promulgated  pursuant  to
Section 207 (b)  of  the Clean Air  Act  Amendments  of 1977.   Among
other things, these regulations require weekly gas  span  and leak
checks.    Centralized  programs  go  far   beyond  these   minimum
requirements, typically conducting these checks two or more  times
per  day.    The  best  centralized  programs, in terms  of  quality
control results, conduct leak checks and recalibrate equipment  on
an  hourly  basis.     Frequent  multi-point calibrations,  daily
preventative  maintenance,  and  careful monitoring of equipment
performance  also characterize  these  quality  control programs.
While such activities  are possible  in a centralized program with a
limited  number  of analyzers  and the  economies  of  scale  in
purchasing  large quantities of  high  pressure  calibration  gas,
                              -13-

-------
decentralized^ stations  simply  could not  afford this  level  of
control.   Also,  the  low average  test  volume- in decentralized
stations  limits  the number of  vehicles  affected by an  equipment
error.  As a result, decentralized programs all require stations to
conduct these checks only weekly.  Some quality control practices,
such  as  monthly multi-point  calibrations,   are  never  done  in
decentralized programs.

     Centralized government-run  programs-tend to have problems with
calibration  gas  quality.   In fact,  most  of  the quality  control
failures in these programs can be traced  to gas problems.   This is
also true of the  two  centralized contractor-run  programs  that  had
quality control problems.   Finally,  limited operating budgets in
centralized government-run programs usually result in less frequent
quality control checks  and  less technical expertise available to
maintain test equipment,  when  compared with centralized contractor-
run programs.

     Decentralized inspection  facilities  suffer from both problems
to  one  degree or  another.    Each individual  station  usually  is
allowed to  purchase  gas on  the open market  and has  no way  of
knowing if the gas is accurately labeled  unless the  State operates
a gas naming program.  The program manager also  purchases  gas  for
auditing station analyzers.   These  audits  serve as the  only tool
for ensuring  gas  accuracy in decentralized programs.   However, with
a few exceptions,  quality assurance audits occur only  two  to four
times per  year,  which limits their  effectiveness.   Computerized
analyzers  used in  decentralized  programs are programmed  to lock  out
from testing if the weekly calibration check and  leak check by  the
station owner are  not  conducted  and passed.   In  theory, this
ensures  a  nominal  level  of  instrument   accuracy.    Before
computerization,   these  quality   control checks depended upon  the
operator to remember  to  do  them and do them correctly.   However,
EPA auditors  frequently report finding computerized analyzers with
leaking sample  systems,  even  though  the  analyzer  has  recently
passed  a  leak  check  conducted by the  owner.   The  leak  check
mechanism  is  easily  defeated (thus saving repair costs  and analyzer
down time)  by temporarily removing the probe or  the entire sample
line and tightly sealing the  system to pass the  check.   A simpler
approach  is   to  kink  the  sample line  to  accomplish  the  same
objective:   excluding the most  susceptible portions of the sample
system  from  the  leak check.     EPA  auditors   have  observed this
happening during overt station  audits.  At this  point, no  one  has
devised a  solution to  this problem that could not  be defeated.

     To conclude,  quality control in  centralized  programs  can more
easily  meet  the  highest  standards  achievable  given   current
technology  since  economies  of scale allow   the  use  of  better
practices.  Decentralized programs may always have to settle  for
lower  quality control  and the associated  burden  of extensive
quality assurance, and less emission  reduction benefit due,to  the
number of  stations and inspectors involved.
                               -14-

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3.3  Emission Testing Objectivity and Accuracy

3.3.1     Background

     Apart from the design  considerations related to test procedure
choice and instrument quality control, two  crucial  factors  in  the
effectiveness of  the inspection process are  whether the test  is
actually conducted and whether it is done correctly.  Even the best
design is defeated by failure to address these factors.  Obviously,
simple  error or  inspector incompetence  is a  problem,  but  more
significantly, malfeasance is a problem, as well.   Thus,  the term
"improper  testing"  will  be used  in  this  report to  refer to  a
deliberate failure by inspectors  to  "fail" vehicles that  exceed
idle  emission cutpoints  or which  violate  anti-tampering  rules,
either at initial test or  at  retest.  The degree of machine control
of the  testing  process  and the  level  of human  supervision  of  the
inspector  influence the  degree  to  which  improper  testing  is
possible.  Obviously, decentralized programs do  not  allow for  the
same  level  of  human  supervision  of  the  testing  process  as
centralized  programs.   Overt quality  assurance visits  occur,  at
most, once  per month and  rarely  involve the  observation  of  the
testing  process.   Even  if testing  were   observed  during  these
visits,  only  the  most inept  inspectors  would  deliberately perform
the test incorrectly while  being observed by the State auditor.

     In  the  early  1980's,  almost  all decentralized  I/M programs
employed manual emission analyzers, and the  inspector/mechanic  was
responsible  for  every step of  the process: selecting  the  proper
cutpoints based on  a vehicle's model  year and  type,  recording  the
results from  an analog  (needle on  dial)  display  onto a  test form,
and making the pass/fail decision.  In  short  there was  no machine
control of the  inspection  process,  so  the  inspector's proficiency
and honesty were key to  objective and accurate tests.

     Across the board, decentralized manual  analyzer programs were
reporting  operating  statistics  which  did  not  agree with  those
reported by  either centralized programs  or  decentralized programs
using computerized analyzers,  or  with the  available  information
about in-use emission performance.   In  most  cases,  the reported
failure rate  was  only 20 to  40 percent  of what  would be expected.
Table 3-6 shows failure  rates from  all programs reporting data from
the early 1980's.

     Table 3-6  might be  hurriedly interpreted  to mean  that  the
manual  programs  were  bad  and  the computerized and  centralized
programs were good. The  reported  failure rate,  however, is only one
indicator of  I/M program performance.  It would be rash to conclude
that  a   program  is succeeding  or failing based  only on  that
statistic.   There  are several reasons why this  statistic is not a
completely reliable indicator.   The failure rate  in  a  program is
defined as the  number of  vehicles  that fail an  initial  test.   In
order to accurately calculate this  statistic,  it  must be possible
to  distinguish  initial tests  from  retests.    The  computerized
analyzers used in decentralized programs include a prompt that asks


                              -15-

-------
whether the test is initial or a retest.   In  some cases, inspectors
are not aware"that  a  vehicle  has been inspected-before at another
station and code a retest as an  initial test.  Another more common
problem  is that the  inspector  simply  chooses initial test  (the
default prompt) for any test.  This confuses actual failure rates.
Some centralized programs have the same kind of prompt but require
the owner to present a document (e.g., vehicle  registration or test
form)  which is  marked  when  a  test  is  performed.   This reduces the
problem but  EPA audits have  found instances where coding  is not
accurate.   Many centralized systems use a computerized record call
up system, based on the license plate  or  VIN,  that automatically
accesses the pre-existing  vehicle record in the database.  Thus,  it
is nearly always clear  which  is  the  initial  test  and  which is the
retest.   It  is  possible to sort out  the  miscoding  problem in any
database that includes  reliable vehicle identification information
but this  dramatically  complicates  data  analysis,  and  I/M programs
have not systematically pursued this.   Another reason  why reported
initial tests  failure  rates  are not  reliable indicators  is the
problem of  false  failures  discussed  previously.    The  quality  of
preconditioning and the sophistication of the test procedures vary
from  program to  program.    Inadequate preconditioning  or  less
sophisticated test  procedures may  result in  exaggerated failure
rates.  Most importantly,  even if the reported failure rate on the
initial inspections were  entirely accurate,  there  could  still  be
problems with retests..  In a manual program,  the quickest  approach
to completing any test  is  to  make up a passing reading,  so it  is
not  surprising  that   few   failures  were  ever reported.    In  a
computerized program the  analyzer  must  at least at some  point  be
turned on, vehicle  identification data entered, and the test cycle
allowed  to run its  course or  no compliance document  will  be
printed.   Since most   cars will pass  their  first test  with  no
special tricks, the least-time  approach for  a  dishonest inspector
may be to do a  reasonably normal first inspection  on all vehicles,
producing  a respectably  high  failure  rate  report,  and  devote
special attention only  to the  retest  of the  failed  vehicles.   So,
failure rates were useful  in  identifying  the severe problems that
existed in manual I/M programs, but they are  not useful in drawing
finer distinctions between  better run programs.

     EPA  examined  in  more  depth six possible  causes of  the low
failure rates   in the  manual  programs  [see EPA-AA-TSS-IM-87-1]  .
This  study analyzed  and  discussed  roadside idle survey  data,
reported  I/M program  data,  and data collected during  I/M program
audits.   EPA concluded that  five of  the explanations - quality
control practices,  fleet maintenance,  fleet mix, differing emission
standards, anticipatory maintenance,  and pre-inspection  repair -
did not   sufficiently   explain  low reported failure  rates.    By
process  of elimination,  EPA  concluded  that the  major  problem
contributing to low  reported failure rates in decentralized, manual
I/M programs was  improper inspections by test  station personnel.
Anecdotes  and observations  reinforced this explanation.
                               -16-

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                            Table  3-6

       Early Emission Test Failure  Rates  in I/M Programs1
 Centralized
  Arizona
  Connecticut
  Delaware
  Louisville
  Maryland
  Memphis, TN
  Nashville, TN
  New Jersey
  Oregon
  Washington, D.C,
  Washington
  Wisconsin
                        Reported
20.2
17.2
13.7
15.7
14.6
 8
24
26.1
24.0
18.4
19.0
15.3
Expected2
    %
   36.8
   33.0
    7.7
   16.2
   14 .0
    3.7
   25.4
   27.8
   38.3
   13.4
   28.1
  Average

Decentralized  Computerized Analyzers
   19.3
.55
.52
.00
.97
.00
.00
.97
. 94
.63
.00
.68
.79

.85
  Fairbanks, Alaska
  Anchorage, Alaska
  California
  Michigan
  New York4
  Pennsylvania
19.4
15.7
27.7
15.8
 5.1
17.6
  Average

Decentralized  Manual Analyzers
   22.7
   24.7
   28.7
   12.9
   33.4
   19.5
.85
.63
.96
.00
.15
.90

.75
  Georgia                   6.6
  Idaho                     9.8
  Missouri                  6.7
  North Carolina            5.6
  Clark Co., Nevada         9.5
  Washoe Co., Nevada      11.0
  Davis Co., Utah           8.7
  Salt Lake Co., Utah     10.0
  Virginia                  2.3

  Average
             25
             16
             20
             21
             29
             29
             21
             21.
             15.6
                .26
                .58
                .33
                .27
                .32
                .37
                .41
                .47
                .15

                .35
 1     1983-1985 data, for all model years,  including light-duty trucks.
 2     Expected rates are based on data from the Louisville I/M program for
      1988.  They vary by area due mainly to differences in outpoints.
 3     Values greater than 1.00 are reported as 1.00.
 4     New York's analyzers are only partially computerized.
                              -17-

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     In part because of the poor experience of the manual programs
that had start'ed earlier and because  of  encouragement from EPA,  the
next round  of  six  decentralized  programs  that  started  in the mid-
1980s chose to require computerized analyzers.  By the beginning of
1989,  four of  the  previously  manual  programs   had  required
inspection  stations to purchase and use new computerized analyzers
to  reduce  improper testing.   Two  more programs are  scheduled to
switch in the  near future.   Thus,  most decentralized programs  now
utilize computerized analyzers  to control  the testing process.  The
timely   question   is   whether  decentralized   programs   using
computerized analyzers in fact get  as much emission  reduction as a
comparable centralized program, as  Table 3-6 might suggest could be
the  case.   The   next  section  examines the  evidence  that  is
available,  including that  from the newer  computerized centralized
programs.   The remainder  of  this  section discusses  hypothetical
problems as a useful preliminary to an examination of the evidence
with some comparison to centralized programs.

     The  new computerized analyzers  reduce  many  of  the  errors
likely with the use of manual equipment by reducing  the number  and
difficulty  of  the  decisions  an  inspector  has to make.    The
inspector enters vehicle  identification  information  (make,  model
year,  vehicle  type,  etc.),   and  based  on  this,   the  computer
automatically selects appropriate emission standards,  performs  the
test, makes  the pass/fail  decision, prints the compliance document,
and stores the results on magnetic  recording media.   However, much
of the process still relies on the inspector to  correctly conduct
the manual  steps of the process:  determine vehicle  information,
key  in  information correctly,  properly precondition the  vehicle,
properly insert the probe  in the tailpipe for  the duration  of  the
test, maintain idle  speed at  normal  levels,  etc.   Thus,  improper
testing is  still possible,  and is  not limited to cases  of  simple
human error.

     There are a variety of motivations that  can  lead an inspector
to  intentionally perform  an improper  test.   First and  foremost,
some inspectors may not be interested in deriving revenue from  the
repair of vehicles  but  are primarily  in the business  to profit from
testing.    In  many  cases,  I/M  tests  are  performed  by  service
stations or  other outlets  that  have test analyzers but do not stock
a full range of emission  parts and do not employ fully  qualified
engine mechanics.   The service  such an  outlet  offers may  be to
provide as many customers  with a certificate  of compliance with as
little hassle as possible.  In addition to improper  testing on  the
initial test,  improper  testing on  the retest of a  failed vehicle
also occurs.   One  example  of  the  motivation  for  this is  when a
mechanic attempts a repair but  fails  to resolve the excess emission
problem.  It puts  the  mechanic in  a difficult position  to  tell a
customer  that  the vehicle  still  failed after  the  agreed  upon
repairs were performed.   To  save face,  the  mechanic falsifies  the
results and the vehicle owner  believes  the problem  was corrected.
Finally,  some  inspectors  may  not hold  the I/M  program in  high
regard or may  doubt its technical  effectiveness, and  may want to
                               -18-

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help out customers by passing them since they perceive no  harm  in
doing so.

     The mid-1980s experience  in manual  decentralized programs
amply demonstrated that  many licensed inspectors were willing  to
report test results they  had  not actually obtained, for the  reasons
given in the  previous  paragraph or others.   To  determine  whether
this  willingness  still  exists  and  the  degree  to  which it  is
affecting computerized  programs, it is useful to enumerate the ways
in  which   it  is possible  to conduct a  computerized inspection
improperly.   This will  suggest  the  type of  evidence one  might
expect  to  be able to see.   The  most  basic  form of deliberate
improper testing is no  test at all, i.e. the inspector provides the
customer with a  compliance document without inspecting the vehicle.
The accounting systems in most programs  require that the  inspector
somehow produce an electronic  record of an  inspection for  each
certificate  or  sticker  issued.   This  electronic  record  can  be
produced by testing a  "clean"  vehicle to achieve  a  passing  score
but entering the required identification information as if  it were
the subject vehicle.

     Another approach  is to  intentionally enter  erroneous  vehicle
identification information to make  it  easier for a vehicle to pass.
All  I/M  programs  have  looser  emission  standards  for  older
technology vehicles  and most  have  looser standards for  trucks
compared with cars.  Model year input to the computerized analyzer
governs  automatic selection of  emission  standards  used  by  the
system to  decide pass/fail outcome.     Thus, by  entering an  older
model  year or  truck  designation  into  the computer, the  system
automatically selects  looser standards.   The  compliance document
will then  show  the improper  model  year, but may  never be  examined
closely enough to be questioned.

     The decentralized computerized  analyzer  requires' a  minimum
amount  of  C02 in  the  sample stream  in order  to consider a  test
valid.  Most programs use cutpoints of 4-6%,  well below ±he 10-14%
C02 found  in most  vehicles' exhaust.   One way to improperly  test is
to  partially  remove  the probe from  the tailpipe  such that  the
sample  is  diluted  enough to  pass  the HC and CO  standards  but not
enough to fail the C02  check.

     Similarly,  computerized analyzers  allow engine  speed during
the idle test to range between 300-1600  RPM.   Improper testing may
be accomplished  by raising the engine  speed above normal during the
idle test.   This usually  lowers  apparent emission levels leading to
a  passing  result.   To EPA's knowledge,  no I/M agency tries  to
detect such actions on  a  routine basis.

     Another  technique is  to make temporary vehicle  alterations,
e.g., introduce  vacuum leaks  or  adjust idle,  to get the vehicle to
pass and then readjust the  vehicle after the test.   This  type  of
improper testing is nearly impossible  to detect.
                               -19-

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     Finally, vehicle owners can obtain  inspection documents on the
black  market  in  some programs.    A  major  eiement  of  quality
assurance  in  a  decentralized program is to determine  whether all
stickers or compliance certificates  can  be accounted for during the
periodic  audits  of stations.   A routine problem  is the  loss  or
theft of certificates or stickers, despite regulatory requirements
that such documents be kept  secure.   Recently, Texas, New York, and
other I/M  programs  have experienced problems  with  counterfeit I/M
stickers.

     As  with the   comparison  of  decentralized  and  centralized
programs,  the failure rates  in Table 3-6 should not be taken to be
reliable indications of which centralized programs were working the
best.  The  low failure  rate  programs  may have been doing a better
job  at  getting  cars  fixed  one  year so they do  not appear  as
failures the next,   and  in recording  only one  test  on each vehicle
as the initial test.   A closer  look at  hypothetical possibilities
and at the supporting evidence is  necessary.

     Improper testing is  also  possible in  centralized  networks,
with some reason  to suspect  that  such  problems could be more common
in government-run systems than in  contractor-run systems.   The lane
capacity  in  some  government-run programs  was not  designed  or
upgraded  over time  to  handle  the  growing  volume  of  vehicles
demanding inspection.   Also,  the  test  equipment used is essentially
identical  to the  equipment  used in decentralized  computerized
programs.    (This has  been a  cost-based  decision, not  one inherent
to government-run stations.)   Thus,  all  of the pitfalls associated
with the  use  of  those  analyzers  are 'possible.  Finally,  because
enough aspects of  government-run programs  continue to be  manual
operations, they  are subject to  both error and malfeasance,  making
close  personal   supervision  essential.   As  a result  of  these
problems,  vehicles have,  at times,  been  waved  through  without
emission testing in government-run  lanes as  a result of  routine
problems  like equipment breakdown,  and sloppy testing  practices
have been observed.   Through the  audit  process, EPA and"the State
and local jurisdictions have made some progress in  resolving these
problems.    It should be noted here that intentional  violation  of
program policy  or  regulations  by  individual  inspectors  (i.e.,
deliberate  improper testing) is  not evident  in  these  programs.
Shortcuts   have   been  observed  on  visual  inspections,   but
infrequently.   On occasion  inspectors have been caught stealing or
selling certificates or accepting  payments  but  the  supervision
typical of centralized programs  generally prevents  this.

     Centralized contractor-run  programs can  be expected  to suffer
few if any problems with improper  testing for several reasons.  The
level  of   machine  control  in  these  programs  is   such  that  the
inspector has almost no influence over the test outcome.   In fully
automated systems,  the inspector  only  enters a license plate number
to call up a  pre-existing  record that  contains the  other vehicle
identification information  used  to  make  the pass/fail  decision.
Individual  inspectors are  held  accountable  for  certificates  of
compliance  just  as a cashier is  held responsible for a  balanced


                               -20-

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cash drawer.  The actual  test  process  is  completely  computerized.
In addition to" machine  control  of the inspection-process,  the level
of  supervision  in  centralized  programs  is  very  high.    The
contractor is under pressure and scrutiny  from both the  public  and
the government agencies responsible for oversight.   This  pressure
has led to high levels of quality control  and quality assurance in
every aspect of the  inspection  system.

     Two  other  problems  that  may  affect emission benefits of  a
program regardless  of  network  type are readjustment  after repair
and test  shopping.   Readjustment  after  getting  a   "repair"  and
passing the test probably  happens  to some extent in all programs.
A  survey9  of mechanics  in  Arizona showed  a significant  percent
admitting to have made  such  readjustments.  This problem stems from
the fact  that  poor  quality  repairs may sacrifice  driveability in
order to  reduce  emissions to pass  the test.   Readjustment occurs
after obtaining  a passing  reading  to  improve driveability.   The
improvement  may  be real  or imagined.   Some  owners   still  have  a
1970s mind  set when it  comes  to  emission  controls   and  will  not
believe that a readjustment  is not necessary.   This problem is
somewhat  limited  to older technology  vehicles  since computerized
vehicles are not adjustable,  per se.

     Test shopping occurs  when  an individual fails an  emission test
at one  I/M  test  station  (either centralized  or decentralized)  and
goes to another station to get another initial test.   EPA auditors
hear  complaints from  inspectors in  decentralized programs  that
sometimes  they fail a  vehicle but the  owner refuses repair  and
finds another station to get a  passing  result.  In some cases these
complaints have been verified by follow-up investigations conducted
by program  officials.   Test  shopping can  result  in a small number
of dishonest garages "inspecting" a  disproportionately large number
of cars that should be failed and repaired.   However, detecting or
preventing  this  type  of problem  has only  been systematically
pursued in  one  decentralized program.   In a  centralized  program,
the  main effect  of  test  shopping is  that cars  with  variable
emission levels sometimes  pass  on a  second or third test.

3.3.2     Supporting Evidence

     The  foregoing background discussion described what  can go
wrong with  testing  in  each  program  type,  and  why it  is  reasonable
to suppose  a special problem may exist in decentralized programs.
However,  the closest possible  scrutiny  is  appropriate given  the
stakes  involved:   air  quality benefits and basic  network choice.
Ideally,  an  in-depth  field  study of the issue would  be  useful to
quantify  the extent of each of these  problems and  measure their
impact on the emission  reduction benefits of the program.   However,
such a study would require years of  investigation and  cost millions
of dollars.  Further,  the results  may  not be  clear cut  because of
the  difficulty  of  observing  I/M  program  operations   without
affecting the normal behavior of those observed and the  difficulty
obtaining a  vehicle or station  sample that  is not biased by  the
                               -21-

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non-participation of owners  and  mechanics who know they have evaded
program requirements.

     Short of doing such a study,  there are a variety of sources  of
information that  shed  light on  the extent of  improper  testing  in
I/M programs.   One major source  is the audit  program EPA initiated
in  1984.   Another  source is the  auditing  conducted by  programs
themselves.   Data  analysis by both  programs and  EPA have  also
provided  information.   Complaints and anecdotal  information  from
consumers  and  others  involved  in  test  programs  are also  useful.
Finally,  EPA  has  conducted some  in-depth  studies  of  testing
programs that  contribute additional data on improper testing.

3.3.2.1   Failure Rate Data

     It  was  expected  that  switching  from  manual  analyzers  to
computerized  analyzers would solve  the problem  of low  reported
failure rates on  the  initial test,  and that  appears to  have  been
the case.  Figure 3-2 shows  failure rate data from I/M programs  in
the 1987-1988  time frame.

     Figure 3-2  also  compares  failures  rates  from the  1986  time
frame  and failure  rates from  the  1988 time  frame.    The  data
indicate that centralized program failure rates have decreased  in
most cases.   This  is  expected  as more  new  technology  vehicles,
which  fail  less  often,  enter  the  fleet  and  as the  program
effectively  repairs   existing  vehicles  in  the  fleet.     Some
centralized programs, Wisconsin  and Louisville,  for example, do not
show this trend because they  regularly  increase the  stringency  of
their  cutpoints  to  maintain high  levels of  emission  reduction
benefits.  The decentralized  manual analyzer programs  show little
change or  small  increases in failure  rates  in this time  period.
The increases  may result from increased pressure on these programs
to perform.  It is  clear  that the  failure rates in  these programs
remain lower than  expected.

     A good example of this  is the New Hampshire program which,  at
the time, used manual  analyzers in about 20% of the stations and
computerized  analyzers in the rest.  Figure  3-3 shows  the  failure
rate  data from  each  segment  of  the program,  with  the manual
analyzer stations reporting a failure rate approximately  25%  that
of the computerized stations.
                               -22-

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                              Figure 3-2
      Old and New Emission Test Failure  Rates in I/M Procrrams*
      Centralized Programs
   AZ 1^^T^^^^^f
   CT •^•^•••^•••i
   DC ^I^MHW^MMW^M
   DE •™^*^^^F^B-~-
   KY
   MD
   NJ •^••••^^^^•^^M
   WI
      Decentralized Manual Programs
   ID "^^"^^•ll1™™^™™1"^""
   NC
   UT
   VA
      Decentralized Programs Recently Switching to Computerized

   GA ^^^^™"^™™""1^™™1™^"™1111^™™1
      Decentralized Programs: Computerized Analyzers From Inception
   PA ^^ss^sSi^sn^ssums    - ^^
   MI •••^^•^^•••^••^••ll  ..   ,
      0 .        5         10        15         20         25         30
                        HI Old Data     H Recent  Data
*  The recent data is from 1987 - 1988 and the  old data is from 1985 - 1986.
                                 -23-

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                            Figure 3-3

Failure Rates in Manual and Computerized  Stations in New Hampshire*

           Manual
         Analyzers
 * About 20% of the stations in the New Hampshire program used manual
  analyzers while the rest used computerized equipment.
     The  decentralized  computerized programs  now  report  high
failure rates, in the range of what would be expected based on the
emission standards and vehicle  coverage  of  these programs.  Thus,
the operating data  from  decentralized computerized programs would
suggest that more initial inspections are being performed  properly
than was the case using manual analyzers.  As discussed previously,
there  are  problems  with  relying solely  on  failure  rate  as  an
indicator.   Increased failure  rates are certainly a precondition to
successful emission  reductions,  but  not sufficient.   The central
factor  is  whether  the final  test  on each vehicle  is  performed
objectively.

3.3.2.2   Overt Audit Data

     Quality assurance efforts in decentralized I/M programs always
include overt audits of licensed  inspection stations, typically on
a quarterly basis or more often in systems  using manual analyzers.
Overt audits generally consist of collecting data from recent tests
(either magnetic media or manually completed test forms),  checking
analyzer accuracy,  and observing inspections  in progress.  These
audits  serve to  maintain a  presence of  program management  and
control  in the  station.   With  computerized  analyzers,   software
prompts  inspectors  through each  step of the  procedure,   so overt
audits  of  the test  stations  rarely  find problems  with inspectors
not knowing how to correctly  perform an  emission test.  Of course,
overt  audits  still  find  problems  unrelated  to  the   emission
analyzer: missing stickers,  certificate security  problems,  disarray
in  record-keeping,  and similar administrative details  that could
lead  to  a  finding  of   improper  testing.    Overt  audits  of
decentralized I/M programs by EPA generally  involve observations at
only a  small  fraction of the  licensed test  stations and no attempt
is  made  to obtain a statistically accurate sample.   As a result,
the  following discussion will speak  in  general  terms about overt
audit  findings  without citing specific  rates.  Nevertheless,  EPA


                               -24-

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believes that  the  findings from these  station visits are  fairly
representative".

     Manual   operations  observed  during   overt   audits   of
decentralized programs are done incorrectly so often  that  this  is
almost always identified as a major problem.   This  is  true  of both
anti-tampering checks,  discussed in more detail in Section 3.4,  and
emission  tests.    Inspectors  fail  to  conduct the emission  test
properly by eliminating important' steps, such as preconditioning or
engine restart, or  by not strictly  following criteria,  such as when
to take the sample  and at what speed to precondition.  The properly
conducted test is the exception  rather  than the rule when it comes
to manual  operations.   For  example,  the  most  recent audit of  a
manual  program by  EPA  included  overtly  observing  10  different
inspectors test vehicles.  Only  two inspectors followed procedures
completely.   Computerized analyzers prevent  some  but not  all  of
these  problems.    Sloppiness  is also  observed  in steps  such  as
properly  warming up  the  vehicle,  avoiding  excessive idle,  and
properly inserting  the probe  in the tailpipe.

     Overt audits find evidence of  improper testing based on review
of paperwork and test  records.   Auditors  find  that  stickers  or
certificates have been issued or are missing but  no test  record is
available to document  proper  issuance.   Inspectors doing improper
inspections  issue  the  certificate  or  sticker  and then  at  a
convenient  time enter the data  into  the computer  and  probe  a
passing vehicle to create both the magnetic and paper test record.
In programs  in which stations are  required to keep detailed repair
records,  suspicious  information  has been  found.   For example,  a
station might  charge  the  same exact amount of money for  repairing
and retesting most vehicles that  come  to it.   This is an  extremely
unlikely  occurrence.    Another  example  is  where  the  station
supposedly documents  the same repair on different vehicles  again
and again.   The chances that any  one  repair is the  one  actually
needed in so many cases makes  the records dubious.

     Centralized programs tend to  vary considerably with  regard to
manual operations.   In some  cases,  the  only  manual operations  are
verification  of  vehicle  identification,  probe  insertion,  and
pressing a button.   In other  cases,  especially where anti-tampering
checks  are  conducted, manual operations  can  be significant.   In
these cases,  more variation has been observed  in the consistency of
testing.    This is  especially  a  problem in  programs  that  do
uncontrolled high speed preconditioning.   Subjective judgment must
be used by  the  inspector in  instructing the  motorist  to  raise
engine  speed  without  the use  of  a  tachometer.    Centralized
inspectors can also  get  sloppy with probe  insertion,  although  the
carbon dioxide check prevents  excessive dilution of the sample.

     The evidence  from EPA and  State overt audits indicates that
some  degree  of  improper  testing  occurs  in  every decentralized
program,  whether    manual or  computerized.   The  findings  in
centralized  programs  indicate that high  levels of  quality  control
are usually achieved,  especially in the contractor-run systems.


                              -25-

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3.3.2.3   Covert Audit Data

     In  addition  to overt audits,  many programs and EPA's  audit
program have initiated covert  audits.  These audits involve sending
an auditor  to  a station with an unmarked vehicle, usually  set  to
fail the  emission  test or the anti-tampering check.  The  auditor
requests an inspection of the vehicle without revealing  his  or her
true  identity.   Similarly,  some programs  have initiated  remote
observation of suspect  inspection   stations.    Auditors  use
binoculars  to  watch  inspectors  working  and  look  for  improper
practices.  If  problems are  found in either  of these approaches,
enforcement actions are taken  against stations.  These audits serve
to  objectively assess the  honesty and competence  of  licensed
inspectors.

     The findings  from covert audits in 19  decentralized programs
are  shown  in   Figure   3-4 .   Note  that the  sample  sizes  vary
considerably.   The  small samples represent covert audits conducted
during an EPA audit.   I/M  program quality assurance  staff  and EPA
auditors formed teams  to conduct the audits.   The  large  samples
represent data  on  covert  audits  conducted  by  local I/M  program
staff.   The stations visited  are randomly selected,  but the small
samples may not be statistically significant  (no attempt  was made
to obtain a statistically valid  sample).   Nevertheless, the samples
reported  by  California,  North  Carolina,  New  York,   and  Utah
represent large fractions of  the station population  and  are  likely
to  be  representative.   In  any case,  the  results indicate  a
consistent pattern:  that  improper  testing is found  during  covert
audits  in which  the  inspector does not know that his  or  her
performance  is  being  evaluated by an auditor.  Improper testing has
always been  found to  one degree  or another whenever EPA audits have
included covert efforts.  The problems  discussed in  Section 3.3.1
are those  encountered during these  audits.   As a  result  of  the
ability  of  covert  audits  to  identify  problems in  I/M  programs,-
covert auditing is  being given a higher  priority during  EPA audits
and EPA is encouraging  programs  to conduct such audits on a routine
basis.   It should  be clear, however, that these are  covert  audits
on the initial  test.   EPA  is  concerned  that  there does  not  appear
to be  a practical means  by  which  covert audits can be done  on
retests.  Covert audits have  other  limitations, as well.   Covert
vehicles  and   auditors must  be  changed   frequently   to   avoid
recognition.   Experience indicates that  inspectors are getting wise
to covert  audits  and  perform perfect  inspections  for  strangers.
Thus,  the effectiveness of covert  audits  as a long-term  quality
assurance tool  is questionable.

     Covert audits have not  typically   been  done  in centralized
programs.   EPA included  covert  audits  of the  centralized  and
decentralized  stations in the  hybrid New Jersey program  because
overt audits showed problems  with quality control.    In  2  out of 8
State-run stations covertly  audited in  1989, the vehicle was  not
failed for not  having a catalyst, as it  should have been.  The same
vehicle was used for covert  audits of  the  licensed  decentralized


                               -26-

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stations  in New  Jersey  and 6 out  of  8  stations  did not  fail the
vehicle for a'missing catalyst.
                              Figure 3-4
          Fraction of Covert  Audits Finding Improper  Tests'
                      in Decentralized Programs
        Virginia
        Michigan
    New Hampshire
Northern Kentucky
        New York
      New Jersey
         Houston
   North Carolina
         El Paso
          Nevada
   Salt Lake City
        Colorado
       Provo,  UT
         Georgia
          Dallas
      California
 Davis County,  UT  ,,.. .., ; v
           Tulsa
      New Mexico
         Overall
                       ,   •. ^  -.V -^
                            f

                     \ % f^Kfy^ff>vff^ "• "• •WX- v.

                       AM. rfSV^A s V". ^\AU>kAk ^S
      27
 	46
   14
   1290
   84
  12
455
32
                                                       Sample Size
                                              11746
                                                                  36
                    0%  10%  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90%  100%

*  Improper tests  includes the full range of problems, including failure to
   conduct the test and use of improper procedures
3.3.2.4
       Anecdotal Evidence
      Anecdotal  evidence and  complaints  derived from decentralized
program managers  and  auditors,  consumers,  inspectors,  and others
are  also primary  sources.   Reports  of  improper testing cover  the
full  range of  possibilities.   Common  anecdotes include failure  to
test  the vehicle,  probing  another vehicle,  raising the engine  speed
and not  fully inserting probes into tailpipes.   EPA and  I/M program
                                 -27-

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management  are  often alerted to improper  testing  at  a particular
I/M  station  by  a concerned citizen.   Another so-urce of complaints
and  anecdotes is  inspectors themselves.  Inspectors complain about
people  who  are test  shopping,  a practice which hurts  the honest
inspector.   Inspectors  have  explained to covert auditors how they
can  get  around  the  test  program  requirements.    Forthcoming
inspectors also tell of customers who  try to  bribe them or convince
them to falsify  results.  When the inspector refuses,  the customer
simply announces that another station will surely comply with such
a. request.   Sometimes,  sharp inspectors have noticed vehicles they
recently  failed  showing a current  sticker but  which  are still in
violation.

     EPA  has not  been  privy  to  similar anecdotal  evidence  in
centralized  programs.   It  is not clear whether  that is because it
does not exist or that because  of the  tighter control,  EPA auditors
are simply not given that information.

3.3.2.5   Waiver Rate Data

     Most I/M programs issue  waivers to vehicles that fail a retest
but have met certain minimum  requirements.  Programs .vary widely in
what they require motorists to  do  before qualifying for a waiver,
but  the most common requirement is to spend a minimum  amount  of
money on emission-related repairs.   Table 3-7 shows the percentage
of failed vehicles  that  get  waived in programs  that allow waivers
and the minimum cost expenditure  required.

     A  waiver represents lost  emission  reductions   to the  I/M
program, -so high waiver rates mean substantial  numbers of vehicles
that  are   high   emitters  are  not   getting   adequate   repair.
Conversely,  a truly  low waiver  rate indicates that maximum emission
reduction benefits  are  being obtained.   However,  improper testing
is,  in  a  sense, a form  of unofficial waiver  that  may be  an
alternative  to the  legitimate waiver  system  employed  by programs.
A low reported  waiver rate by itself  is therefore  ambiguous  with
respect to program success.

     Waiver  rates  tend to vary by program  type  to  some  degree.
Centralized programs  typically  have  higher  rates   and  manual
analyzer  decentralized  programs  typically  have lower  rates.   The
centralized  programs  in  Arizona, Delaware,  Illinois,  Indiana,  and
Wisconsin probably represent  reasonable waiver  rates.   This is not
to say that  these limits  are acceptable but  all of these programs
have  good  to excellent  enforcement.  Enforcement  is  important
because there is no  need to apply  for a waiver  if  there  is  no
threat  from driving without an  I/M sticker. These programs  have
established  substantial procedural requirements  for   receiving  a
waiver,and try hard to limit waivers to only those vehicles  that
have met the  requirements, in most cases.   Given  this,  the waiver
rates seen  in these  programs might be what  one  should expect from
other programs.
                               -28-

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Table 3-7
Waiver Rates in I/M Programs in 1989
(percent of initially failed
Pre-1981 Vehicles
Waiver
Program Rate1
Decentralized. Manual
Davis Co., UT 13%
Idaho 7%
North Carolina 0%
Provo, UT 3%
Salt Lake City, UT 4%
Decentralized Computerized
Alaska 1%
California 29%
Colorado 2%
Dallas/El Paso, TX na
Georgia 14%
Massachusetts na
Michigan 10%
Missouri 11%
Nevada 4%
New Hampshire na
New York na
Pennsylvania 2%
Virginia 8%
Centralized Government
Delaware 3%
Indiana 10%
Memphis 1%
Centralized Contractor
Arizona 12%
Connecticut 5%
Illinois 11%
Louisville 17%
Maryland 20%
Seattle, WA 21%
Spokane, WA 9%
Wisconsin 12%
1 na = data not available
2 Some programs vary cost limits by
Cost
Limit2'3

$60
$15
$50
$15
$15

$150
$50
$50
$250
$50
$100
$74
L
$200
$50
L
$50
$60-$175

$75
$100
$50

$200
$40
L
$35
$75
$50
$50
$55

model years
thus, some of the limits listed here are only
group. Some programs do not have
repairs, indicated by the letter
a set cost
L.
vehicles)
Post-1980 Vehicles
Waiver
Rate1

7%
26%
0%
4%
2%

1%
9%
1%
na
12%
na
9%
14%
2%
1%
na
1%
3%

1%
13%
2%

12%
4%
11%
12%
19%
22%
9%
9%

Cost
Limit2-3

$150
$30
$50
$100
$100

$150
$175-$300
$200
$250
$50
$100
$74
L
$200
$50
L
$50
$200

$200
$100
$50

$300
$40
L
$30-$200
$75
$150
$150
$55

and by pollutant failure/-
typical of
the model year
limit but required specific

3 Except in Alaska and Utah, cost waivers are not given for

tampering.
-29-

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     In decentralized programs, low waiver  rates  occur  when  it  is
inconvenient for either the motorist to obtain ©r the inspector  to
issue a waiver.   In Colorado,  an appointment must be made with  a
State  representative to  visit the  station when  the vehicle  is
present to issue the waiver.  In North Carolina,  the  motorist must
go  to  a  State  office to  get the  waiver.    Alternative ways  of
avoiding  an objective test  become very  attractive  when  this  level
of inconvenience is involved.   Similarly, if the mechanic has  to  do
extra  paperwork,  e.g.,   in Pennsylvania,  the  improper testing
alternative is again more attractive.   Effective  January I,  1990,
California switched to  a  centralized waiver processing system. The
data shown in Table 3-7  represent  the combination of easy to get
waivers   and  the  aggressive  enforcement  against   stations  in
California lead  to  waiver rates  that would be considered typical
given the  cost  limits.

     Centralized  programs  are  able  to  control   the issuance  of
waivers to a high degree,  but end up with higher  waiver  rates than
are found  in  decentralized programs.   This paradox results from the
fact  that  it   is   usually  very  difficult  to  escape  the   test
requirement in  centralized programs.   Lower  rates  are  sometimes
found when the  enforcement system  is not  adequate  and  motorists
faced with tough  requirements  simply  choose to operate  in a non-
complying mode,  e.g.,  Connecticut.   Another  factor that may  be
operative  in some centralized programs (e.g.,  Seattle and Spokane,
Washington)  is  that  the  program's  geographic  coverage  is  so
constrained that  it is relatively  easy  for an otherwise subject
motorist  to provide  an  address,  for  the  purpose of vehicle
registration, that  places  it outside the I/M area.

     Thus,  the   potential  for  waiver  control  is  very  high  in
centralized programs that  have high quality enforcement  programs
and adequate  geographic  coverage.   High costs  limits  and  other
rigorously enforced qualification requirements are needed to keep
waiver rates  below 10%  of failed  vehicles.   Waiver control  in
decentralized   programs  may  not  accomplish  much  since the
alternative  of avoiding an objective test is readily available.

3.3.2.6   Test Record Data

     In an ongoing  effort  to identify techniques for finding and
correcting operating problems, EPA has begun analyzing computerized
test  records from a  variety of  decentralized  programs.   The
analyses involve looking  at test  histories  of  vehicles,  especially
comparing  initial tests and retests.  At this  point,  the analysis
is  still  underway and  the  results  discussed  in  this section
represent a  small  part  of  the  complete project.    It  is   often
difficult  to calculate similar statistics because programs do not
all record and  store  the same data.   Thus,  some of  the  analyses
that follow were  done  on some programs  but  could not be done  on
others.

     Three programs were  analyzed to assess the rate of switches  in
model year between  the initial test  and a  retest.    An  incorrect


                               -30-

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model year entry could mean  that  the  wrong outpoints are selected
for a vehicle','  since  the  computer automatically- selects outpoints
based on model year.  In decentralized programs, audits have found
cases where the model year entry on an init-ial test was changed to
an older year,  yielding  a  less  stringent cutpoint, and resulting in
a test pass decision.   Table  3-8  shows that a  small amount of model
year  switching  between  initial and  retest occurred  in  all three
programs.

     Naturally,  some level  of  error is  to be  expected  in  any
program.  However,  higher rates of switching were found in the two
decentralized programs as  compared with the centralized program.

     There  is  no reason  an  inspector must  wait for  a  retest to
input an  incorrect  model year,  so Table  3-8 may  not reflect  the
true  problem.   The incidence  of  incorrect model  year entries on
first  tests  was therefore  also analyzed   for  Pennsylvania by
comparing  the  vehicle identification  number with the  model  year
entry.  Only 1981  and later vehicles were analyzed  because these
are easily distinguished by the standardized  17 character VIN  that
went  into effect for that model year.  The data revealed that  6.4%
of the  1981  and later vehicle  records had model year entries  that
were  pre-1981.   This  means  that  looser  emission standards  were
being applied for these  tests.
Table 3-8
Model Year Switchincr Between
Program
Connecticut
New Hampshire
Pennsylvania
Network
Type
C
D
D
Sample
Size
1949
3632
4958
Initial and Retests
Number
Switched
20
67
156
Percent
Switched
1.0
1.8
3.1
     Another  data  element analyzed  was  the  CO+C02  scores  from
initial test failures and retest passes  on  the  same vehicles.  Test
histories of vehicles failing  the initial test  were constructed and
the dilution levels were compared between initial and retest in New
Hampshire and  Wisconsin.   (Pennsylvania was not  included because
test time  is  not  recorded, making it difficult to  determine the
actual final test).  These  I/M  programs accept as valid any C0+C02
measurement above  6%.   A vehicle with no  exhaust  leaks and no air
injection system has a  C0+C02 level of about 14%.   Table 3-9 shows
the fraction of vehicles in the sample that were below  8% CO+C02 on
the initial test and the retest.  On the initial test about 12% of
the vehicles  in Wisconsin  and about 10%  of  the vehicles  in New
Hampshire scored below  8%.  On the retest, the number of vehicles
scoring  below  8%  nearly  doubled in New Hampshire  to  19%  of the

                               -31-

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vehicles, while the number was essentially unchanged in Wisconsin.
This analysis," while in no way conclusive, is consistent with what
audits  and  anecdotes  are  telling  us about  intentional  sample
dilution in decentralized programs.

     The time that elapses between an initial test on a vehicle and
a retest is another aspect that EPA  is investigating.  An analysis
of  New  Hampshire  data indicates  that about half  of  all  failed
vehicles get retests within ten minutes of  the  initial test.   The
overall  average  time  between initial  and  retests  is  only  11
minutes.   Presumably,  if an  inspector fails a vehicle,  and  then
does diagnosis  and  repair  on that  vehicle, one  might  expect  a
longer amount of  time  to have elapsed.   Covert audit experience
indicates that inspectors in decentralized stations have performed
multiple tests on a vehicle that  initially  fails  in an attempt to
get a passing score without any diagnosis or repair.

Vehicles With

Sample
Program Size
New Hampshire 390
Wisconsin 503
Table 3-9
Dilution Levels Below
Initial
Test Failures
Below 8%
10%
12%

8%
Retest
Passes
Below 8%
19%
11%
3.3.3     Conclusions

     The available evidence shows that  objectivity  and quality of
testing and the accuracy of  instrumentation differ by program type.
It was  previously  found that decentralized programs  using manual
analyzers  suffered  from severe quality control problems  both in
testing  and instrumentation.   At  this  point,  only one  manual
program has not committed to switching to computerized analyzers.

     Decentralized programs using  computerized analyzers represent
a substantial  improvement  over manual  systems.   Analyzer  quality
control is  better, but  EPA audits still fail about  20-25% of the
analyzers  checked.   The gross  level of errors  made  by inspectors
and the  influence  of incompetent  inspectors are  far  less  because
software controls some  aspects of the test  and  determines  some of
the major decisions  about the outcome.

     Computerized decentralized programs  seem to  have substantial
failure  rates,  much closer  than  before to  what  we  would expect
based  on  the emission  standards  being used  and  the  vehicle mix
being  tested.   Nevertheless,  we  observe improper  testing during
audits, and program records describe in detail cases discovered by

                               -32-

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program auditors.   Improper retests are certainly problematic  since
these are  veh'icles  that have already been  found to need  repair.
Thus,  improper testing  of  these  vehicles  directly  impacts the
emission benefit of  the  program.

     At this point, the  information available on  improper  testing
in decentralized programs is  sufficient  to conclude  that  a  problem
definitely exists.   Where waivers are  cheap  and convenient, the
waiver  rate  is  typically about  10-20%  in  both  centralized and
decentralized programs.   Improper testing is  a cheap and convenient
alternative  in  the  decentralized  programs  where  waivers  are not
readily available,  and for some  vehicles easier than a true  repair.
It  may be  optimistic  to think  that  more  than 60-80%  of high
emitting  vehicles  are  actually   repaired  in  any  decentralized
computerized analyzer program.  The actual  percentage  may  be more
or  less,  but it  is difficult  or  maybe  impossible to  accurately
determine.   Detecting  improper  testing is  extremely  difficult
because of the  ways in  which  it occurs.  It is  relatively  easy  to
catch the  gross violators using  covert  vehicles  set to fail the
test, as EPA and State experience  shows.  But, some stations simply
will not test vehicles for other than regular customers.   Cautious
inspectors  may not  do an imprope-r  initial  test for  strangers.
Doing  covert audits  at  new   car  dealerships  presents  formidable
problems; usually,  only  regular customers who purchased  a  vehicle
from the dealer would get tested at the dealership.   Conducting  an
evaluation of improper retesting would require purchase of  repairs
and  subsequent  retesting, driving the  cost of quality  assurance
higher.   Given these problems, it may  be  too difficult for most
State  programs  to adequately  quantify  the  incidence  of  improper
testing.

     The question arises  about  what  can be  done  to deal with the
vulnerability  of  decentralized computerized* programs  to  improper
testing.  It is unlikely that test equipment can be  developed that
will  completely  prevent improper testing,  at  least  not  at   a
reasonable cost.   Improvements  are being made in the  form of the
"BAR-90" equipment and software, but programs that have adopted the
updated equipment have experienced costs about 2-3 times  the  price
of  "BAR-84"  equipment of  about  $6000  -  $7000.   Nevertheless, even
these   improvements   will   not  prevent   improper  testing   in
decentralized computerized programs.

     Another way to address the problem is  through more aggressive
quality assurance and enforcement.  More intensive covert and  overt
auditing  and   more  sophisticated data  analysis  will  enhance
identification  of  problem  stations  and inspectors.    Obtaining
funding  for  additional  auditors,  covert  vehicles,  computers,
programmers,  analysts,  judges,  etc.  will have  to  be  given   a
priority even in the face of tight  government budgets.

     Streamlined administrative   procedures  and  broader  legal
authority for suspending or revoking station licenses  and imposing
fines  will  also  help  rid   programs  of   problem   stations and
inspectors.  Most  decentralized programs face major obstacles  in


                               -33-

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trying to  get rid of problem  stations  once they have  identified
them.    Administrative  procedures  requirements saddle  program
managers with difficult and expensive barriers.   Convincing  judges
to  impose  significant  penalties  or to  suspend stations  for  a
substantial amount of time  are  considerable problems.   Furthermore,
permanently barring  specific individuals from  a program is  more
difficult.   Decentralized programs  will  have to  put more financial
and good will  resources  into  this aspect of quality assurance.

     Some,  but  not  all,  centralized government-run programs  have
suffered from improper testing although  for  different  reasons  than
decentralized  programs.    Unlike  the situation in  decentralized
programs,  it  has been  easier  to  gather sufficient  evidence  to
quantify the  emission reduction  loss from  poorly  run programs.
Ultimately, the problems found in  these programs can be  resolved
and high quality  results can be obtained.   The  solution is  better
management  and equipment,  more computer  controls and  expanded  test
capacity.  EPA is  working with  the remaining problem  government-run
programs  to upgrade their systems to achieve  better results.

     Contractor-run centralized I/M programs  do  not seem to  suffer
from serious improper testing problems as  far as we can  tell.   The
efficient  management  and  thorough  computer  control  of  these
programs  eliminate nearly all opportunities for improper  testing.

     Even  with  all  the  possible  improvements,  decentralized
programs   will  have  a  more  uncertain  measure of   their   own
effectiveness  than  centralized  programs,   due  to  the  greater
possibility of continuing but invisible test  irregularities.
                               -34-

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3.4  Visual and Functional  Inspections of Emission Controls

3.4.1     Background

     EPA  provides State  Implementation Plan  emission  reduction
credits for the inspection of certain emission  control components.
The  inspection  involves  determining whether the emission  control
device is present  and properly connected.  The components for which
credit  is available  are  the catalytic  converter,  air  injection
system,  PCV  valve,  evaporative canister, EGR  valve and gas  cap.
Additional  credit  is  given  for  misfueling   checks:   requiring
catalyst replacement  if the fuel inlet restrictor is tampered or if
there is evidence  of  lead  deposits in the tailpipe.

     Implementation of anti-tampering inspections has varied widely
among I/M programs, as can be seen in Table  3-4.  Of course, anti-
tamper ing  inspections are  a completely manual operation.   They
depend upon the skill and the persistence of the inspector  to find
components  and make the  determination  that   they are properly
connected.    While  this   is  fairly  easy  for  the  catalyst  and
misfueling checks, finding  underhood components can be  difficult.
The  configuration of  components varies  from make to make and even
among models from the same manufacturer.  Thus,  inspector training
is an essential component  of an anti-tampering program.

     With the  cooperation  of State  and  local governments,  EPA has
conducted  roadside tampering surveys of motor  vehicles  in cities
throughout the country each year for the  past 10 years.    These
surveys  provide  information about  national tampering  rates  and
trends  in tampering  behavior.   The  surveys  also provide EPA with
the  basic information needed to  estimate  the  emission  reduction
potential of a  program.   In addition,  they  provide information on
local tampering rates.

     There are two components to the emission benefit attributed to
I/M  programs that relate to tampering.   Anti-tampering inspections
are  supposed  to identify  and correct existing  tampering when the
program starts.  Also, tampering programs are supposed to deter new
intentional  tampering both  on  existing vehicles  as well  as  new
vehicles  entering the fleet.  As it turns   out, emission  testing
programs have the  latter effect as well.  Because of the difficulty
in determining  whether  a  vehicle  actually exhibits tampering,  the
emission  reduction benefit  includes an assumption that  not  all
tampering  will be identified  and corrected.   In  the past,  this
concept applied equally to  centralized and decentralized programs.

     Until   1984,  when  California  and   Houston,   Texas  began
comprehensive anti-tampering programs,  Oregon was the only  program
that inspected the complete range of emission  control  components
(see Table 3-4 for details).  A  few other  decentralized programs
were doing comprehensive emission  control checks,  but only  as part
of pre-existing safety inspection  program and no emission reduction
credit  was  being claimed.    Texas and  California  were   formal
                               -35-

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programs  and  the  emission  reduction  credit  assigned  to these
systems was ba'sed on  the  experience in Oregon.

     Improper  anti-tampering testing  is  as  much  if not more of a-
problem in  I/M programs  than improper emission testing,  since  the
process  is  completely manual.   The  same  opportunity exists  for
irregularities as with tailpipe testing,  with no greater ability by
the program to detect them.   Decentralized inspectors  have  many of
the same motives for improperly inspecting a vehicle  for  tampering
as. they do for omitting or improperly conducting an emission test.

     Centralized programs  are also  subject  to  improper anti-
tampering checks.  Unlike  emission  tests,  the tampering check is
completely manual and  relies on the honesty, attention to  detail,
and  competency  of  the  inspector  to  be  performed correctly.
Centralized  programs  may  benefit from  the presence of  on-site
supervision,   the  importance  to  the  contractor  or agency  of
maintaining a public  image  of being  accurate and  impartial,  and by
the  opportunity  for  inspectors  to  become  more  familiar with
underhood  geometries  due to their constant  exposure.   At this
point,  Oregon  is  the  only centralized program that  has been
conducting comprehensive  tampering checks  long  enough  to  be fairly
evaluated,  in  terms  of fleet-wide tampering rates.  Nevertheless,
observations  of tampering  checks  in the  centralized  lanes  in
Arizona  and  New Jersey provide additional  information about
potential effectiveness and will be discussed where appropriate.

3.4.2     Supporting  Evidence

     Tampering  surveys conducted by  EPA are  the  main source of
tampering rate information.   Comparing programs is difficult since
the  model  year  and  emission  control component  coverage  varies
widely among programs.   Even a  perfect program  would not  eliminate
all tampering  since  inspections are spread  over  one or two years
(in  biennial  programs)  and the  fleet  is constantly changing.
Immigration of vehicles from  outside the program area is one source
of "new" tampering.   Also, as vehicles  age the  likelihood  of either
passive  or  intentional  tampering increases.   Thus,  an  ongoing
program is needed to control these problems, and  we expect to  see
at least low levels of  tampering whenever a survey is conducted.
                               -36-

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                             Figure 3-5

          Overall Tampering  Rates  in  Select I/M Programs*
                                                         21.0%
                                                                 24.8?
        Centralized
        I/M + ATP
Decentralized
I/M + ATP
I Decentralized
 ATP Only
No Program
 * The rates shown here are for catalyst,  inlet,  air, PCV and evaporative
   system on 1980 - 1984 vehicles.  Programs listed inspect and have
   been doing so for at least two years at the time of the survey.
     Figure  3-5  lists all programs that were operating  for  at  least
two  years at the  time of  the survey  and inspecting  at least  the
1980 -  1984  model  years for catalyst,  inlet,  air injection  system,
PCV  and evaporative  canister.  The  analysis was  limited to  these
model years  and  components to establish  a fair basis for comparing
results.   Two no-program  areas  are included  for reference  and  the
rates  are all  from  1987  and  1988 surveys.   Decentralized  anti-
tampering-only programs still  show high overall tampering rates  and
appear  to be at  most  about  65% effective  (Dallas)  compared to  the
extremes  of  San  Antonio and the Oregon sites.   Decentralized  I/M  +
anti-tampering programs have  lower tampering  rates  (except for El
Paso) but not as low  as in the Oregon cities.
                                -37-

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     Given  the model years  and survey years  involved,  it may  be
that  the  I/M" tailpipe  test  requirement  has -played a  role  in
deterring  tampering  in  the  combined  programs,   rather  than  the
tampering check being successful in getting tampering fixed once it
has occurred.    At this point,  the  Oregon  program is  the  only one
that   serves  to   represent   centralized  I/M   anti-tampering
effectiveness.    The low  rate  in  Portland may also   reflect
deterrence more than  detection but that cannot be  said of Medford
since  the  program there  started  much  later,  in  1986.    When  the
analysis is limited to catalyst  and  inlet  tampering,  decentralized
programs appear  to be more  effective  at  finding and fixing  this
tampering,  as  shown  in  Figure 3-6.   This may  reflect  the  lower
skill  and  effort  required to  detect  these  types of tampering,  or
the higher cost and therefore profit  associated with repair.
                            Figure 3-6

     Catalyst  and  Inlet Tampering Rates in Select I/M Programs*
                                                               14.0%
    CU Centralized   5 Decentralized  Hi Decentralized  H No Program
        I/M + ATP       I/M + ATP       ATP Only
 *  The rates shown here are for catalyst and inlet tampering 1980 - 1984
    model year vehicles only.
                               -38-

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                             Figure 3-7

     Tampering Rates  in Decentralized and Centralized Programs*
                       Decentralized Be Centralized
                                                         15%
                                    13%
                          12%
        PCV
Catalyst
Inlet
Air System
                                     Fuel       Evap
                                   Switching   Canister
* The rates shown here are  for 1975  -  1983 model year vehicles only  in the
  1987,  1988 and 1989 tampering surveys..
     Tampering  rates may  be  an indicator  of  the effectiveness  of
emission  testing, with  or without  tampering checks.   Figure  3-7
shows the combined tampering  rates by  component  from the surveys  in
1987-1989 for model  years  1975-1983.   The tampering  rates  are lower
in  the centralized  I/M  programs   for  catalyst,  inlet  and  fuel
switching.   Underhood tampering shows a less dramatic difference
but is  still  lower in centralized programs,  despite the  fact  that
only  two  of  the  seven  centralized programs represented in the
survey  do underhood tampering checks.    Only  one decentralized
program represented here does no tampering  checks at  all.
                                -39-

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Figure 3-8
Af termarket Catalvst Usacre in Anti-Tamoerincr Procrrams*
Phoenix
Medford
Tucson
Tulsa
Oklahoma City

408
259
378 4.5%
1.5%
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
1.5%

5.6%
5.4%

San Antonio |5^Ho.6%
Covington §43 3J8 0.5%
Dallas |482| 0 . 4%
New Orleans 1 0.2%
493
LJ Centralized ST Decentralized W Decentralized • No Program
I/M + ATP I/M + ATP ATP Only

* All of the operating programs listed here started in January 1986 except
Phoenix, Tucson, and Oklahoma City which started in January 1987. The
sample size is the number Hated-inside the bar.
     Another  indicator of  the effectiveness  of  anti-tampering
programs  is  the frequency  with  which aftermarket  catalysts  are
found  during   tampering  surveys,  i.e.,  evidence   of   actual
replacement of  catalysts.   Since aftermarket catalysts are  much
cheaper  than  original  equipment  manufacturer  parts,  one  would
expect them  to be  the replacement  of choice  in  all  programs .
Figure 3-8 shows the findings  for  aftermarket catalysts from areas
with  catalyst  inspections  that  started operation after  1984.
Programs  that started earlier mostly have been  causing owners not
to remove their original  catalysts,  not  making  them replace  ones
already removed.  Also,  prior  to  1985,  anyone wanting to replace a
catalyst  would not have been able to buy an aftermarket catalyst.
The  three centralized  programs  show relatively  high rates  of
                              -40-

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aftermarket  catalyst   installation.   On  the  other  hand,  the
decentralized"programs show  relatively  low rafees  of  aftermarket
catalyst usage, in some cases  no  different than non-l/M areas.
                            Figure 3-9

       Tampering Rates in I/M and Non-I/M Areas in California
     60
     50
     40
     30
     20
     10
           Pre 1975
1975-1979      1980-1983
     Model Years
Overall
                           I/M
             NON I/M
     A variety  of  sources of data on decentralized anti-tampering
programs are  available.   California  has done extensive review and
evaluation10  of  its  decentralized biennial program,  which  started
in the major  urban areas  around the State  in 1984.  The study used
a variety of  techniques including roadside tampering surveys.  One
of the  many  important  findings of  this  study was  that  roadside
tampering  rates for  the  items  checked in  the  I/M test  did not
differ substantially between the  vehicles that  had  already been
subject to  I/M  and those that  had  not.   It should  be noted that
California  uses  a  broader definition of  the term "tampering" for
both its survey and  I/M checklist than  that used by EPA; thus, the
overall rates are  not comparable to  EPA's national  survey  rates.
These results are illustrated in Figure  3-9.
                               -41-

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     In addition to the survey data,  audits of decentralized  anti-
tampering  programs   find  improper  inspections.     Covert
investigations continually find that inspectors fail to check  for
components, fail to fail tampered vehicles, and sometimes  fail  to
do  the  inspection  at  all.   California's covert  auditing work
indicates  that  licensed  inspectors  neglect  to  fail  tampered
vehicles in the majority of cases.  Figure  3-10 shows  the  results
by component.   During EPA overt audits  in  decentralized programs,
inspectors have  been   asked  by  auditors  to  demonstrate   an
inspection, and are  frequently  unable  to do the  check correctly,
either neglecting  to  check for one or more components or improperly
identifying components.
   100%

    90%

    80%

    70%

    60%

    50%

    40%

    30%

    20%

    10%

     0%
                           Figure 3-10

                Frequency of Proper Tampering Tests
               in California's Covert  Audit  Program
                         Full Effectiveness Level
/tl Ob served Effectiveness  Level
                   -. ••••>
            Inlet
   Evap
 Canister
PCV
Air System  Catalyst
     In contrast to the apparent  ineffectiveness of  decentralized
tampering programs,  the success of the centralized Oregon program
can be seen during audits of the program.   The inspection  system  is
well  run  and  the  inspectors, employees  of  the Department  of
Environmental   Quality,   are  highly  trained  and  perform  the
inspections diligently.   By contrast, EPA's  observations  of the
                               -42-

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centralized  lanes  in  New  Jersey have  found  that  inspectors
sometimes neglect to check for the presence  of  catalysts, the  only
component they  are  supposed to check.   Management oversight and
motivation of  inspectors is  not  adequate in  that  program.   New
Jersey has historically  low tampering rates,  so roadside  surveys
are of only limited use in evaluating  program  effectiveness there.
Arizona,  Wisconsin,  and Maryland also  recently  started anti-
tampering inspections,  the first contractor-run systems  to do so.

3.4.3     Conclusions

     Based  on  the  evidence that  decentralized  anti-tampering
inspections  were  not resulting  in  tampered emission controls
getting repaired to the  degree expected,  EPA  reduced the emission
reduction benefit (in MOBILE4, for purposes  of approving post-1987
SIPs)  associated with them  by  50%,   unless   a  specific  program
demonstrates better performance.   Centralized  tampering programs,
except in New Jersey,  seem to be working about as well  as expected,
but additional survey work needs to be done in centralized programs
that have recently started anti-tampering inspections.

     The  potential  for  effective  anti-tampering   checks  in
centralized  and  decentralized programs  is influenced by basic
constraints.   In  the  decentralized systems, there  is less  concern
about throughput, but  inspection  quality  seems  inherently  limited
by the difficulties  of imposing high levels of quality  control.  In
centralized systems the time it takes  to conduct  the inspection  is
a major  constraint  leading  most  programs that have started anti-
tampering checks to do only the catalyst, inlet  and sometimes the
air system.  It should be noted that  these three  checks obtain 58%
of the potential  HC and  85% of the potential  CO  benefit of visual
anti-tampering checks.  Furthermore, the remaining available checks
are  all  for underhood  components   which * require considerable
expertise  and  care  in   inspection.    Given  this, limited  but
effective  centralized  checks  may  result  in  greater emission
reduction benefits than  the comprehensive but  largely  ineffective
decentralized checks.   It  is  not  known if decentralized  program
performance  could  be  significantly  improved  by limiting  the
tampering check to the easily found items and focusing  enforcement
and educational  resources on those  items.

     The magnitude of training differs sharply between  centralized
and decentralized programs.   Depending on the  size  of  the  system,
the number of  licensed inspectors in  a decentralized  program can
range  from a few hundred to over 10,000.   Centralized programs
range from a few dozen to a  couple  of hundred inspectors. So,  just
the  physical magnitude  of  the  training requirements for anti-
tampering  inspections  can be daunting in a decentralized  system,
which partly explains why EPA audit  findings  show  that  inspector
proficiency is an ongoing problem in decentralized programs.
                               -43-

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4.0  PROGRAM COSTS

4.1  Inspection Costs

     Just as there is a wide range  of  I/M program designs, there is
also a  wide range  of program  costs.   In  every  case,  there  are
expenditures related  to  establishing  inspection  sites,  purchasing
equipment,  labor  associated with  conducting the inspection,  and
program oversight.  But the  actual  level of  expenditure seems to be
most related  to  the  age of the inspection  network,  and  to  the
centralized/decentralized choice.

     To  compare  the   full  cost  of  different  I/M  designs,  EPA
collected and  analyzed  data from as many  I/M  programs  as could
provide four basic  pieces of information for calendar  year 1989:
I/M program agency  budget,  number  of initial tests, the  fee  for
each test,  and the portion of the test fee returned to the State or
local  government.   Using  these  parameters,  EPA  calculated  an
estimated cost per vehicle  in  33 I/M programs currently operating
around the country.   The  results  are displayed in Figure 4-1.

     Decentralized computerized  programs  have the highest  costs,
averaging  about  $17.70  per  vehicle,  as  shown  in  Figure  4-2.
Removing the two highest  cost areas  (Alaska  and California) reduces
the average to $13.41.  These two programs are much  more expensive
due to  larger  fees  retained  by  the  two  States  for  aggressive
program enforcement,  higher labor  and  material  costs,  in  Alaska
especially,  and a  more involved and  complicated test  in California.
Decentralized  programs  with  manual  inspections incur  lower costs at
an average  of  $11.60.   Most decentralized  programs  cap  the  test
fee,  which  may not  represent  the  full  cost to  the station  or,
eventually,  the  public.   Centralized  contractor-run  programs
average $8.42  per  vehicle, and  centralized government-run programs
claim the lowest  costs at $7.46  per vehicle (the  latter figure is
somewhat uncertain because detailed  budget information is not often
available).
                               -44-

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                          Figure 4-1

               Cost  Per Vehicle of I/M Programs


                        I Centralized   II Decentralized
     Anchorage
     Fairbanks
    California
        Nevada
      New York
       El Paso
    New Mexico
 Massachusetts
 New Hampshire
      Virginia
North Carolina
       Indiana
         Idaho
      Michigan
     Wisconsin
       Georgia
   Connecticut
      Colorado
Salt Lake City
         Provo
    Washington
      Missouri
         Davis
  Pennsylvania
          D.C.
      Illinois
      Maryland
       Arizona
        Oregon
     Nashville
    Louisville
       Memphis
    New Jersey
                vvvwkV^vwww-.'LVWVwJWWw. wtvw.vffnyyftfff*. ss v.Vf.f^,::::: w.wsssf.vs.::-f : :
                                    $32
              <$16
         $12
        $11
       $10
     $8
 $6
$5
                             -45-

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                             Figure  4-2

                  Cost Per Vehicle Bv Network Type

      J-,          h "*  W\S$ v,"1!, i> ff&Wf s    f WW* % %   -C-.-. S                  -i, — _  ^-, ._
      Computer  s ^  ;;„.. -f,^^ ;, ",,; ^s-                        $17.70
        Manual
    Contractor
    Government ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B $7 . 46
     There is also a relationship between the age of a program and
its inspection  fees.   Older programs  that  added I/M  to  existing
safety systems have amortized the infrastructure costs and tend to
utilize old technology in the  inspection  process.   These  programs
come out cheapest, but at a price.  They have neither the  capacity
nor equipment capability  that matches  the demand  created  by  a
growing population of  vehicles.

     The  middle  aged  programs  generally  came  on  line  after
computerization  was   in   full  swing   and  tend  to  be   more
sophisticated.   In this category,  centralized  and  decentralized
systems tend to experience  similar costs - around ten dollars.

     In the  newest  programs, and in  those  where a  transition is
occurring  from manual  to  computerized  analyzers,  a  divergence
appears.   The increasing sophistication and growing  expertise in
operating  centralized  testing  networks,  along   with   growing
competition among  centralized contractors, has tended to keep costs
stable, or even decreasing  in  some  cases.  At  the  same time, the
increase in. mechanic  labor  costs  and  the  requirement that garages
purchase new, more  sophisticated  testing  equipment  has caused the
fees in upgraded  decentralized programs to  rise significantly.  A
comparison of  the average  fees for programs of  different  ages is
shown in Figure 4-3.
                               -46-

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                            Figure 4-3

                       Cost Bv Program Acre
      Upgraded  ?&,
     Decentral  ^\f


   Middle Aged


   New Central
    Contractor


           Old
    $15
$13
     The  ability  of   "new"   centralized  programs  to  provide
inspections at a lower  cost is well illustrated by the  following
example.    The  cost  of  inspections  in Arizona's  centralized,
contractor-run program recently dropped  from $7.50 to $5.40.   The
decrease resulted from the competitive  bidding  process that  ensued
when  Arizona  issued  a  new RFP  for the program.   The  decrease
occurred despite  substantial improvements in the quality,  quantity,
and range of equipment and services called for in the new contract.
The  changes include  all  new  test  stations and  test equipment .
Expansion of the network  to include an  additional station  and  14
additional  lanes.   Test station  hours  are expanded on  Saturdays.
There are three lanes for testing heavy  duty vehicles rather  than
two.   Finally,  the  contractor built  and staffed  a  new referee
station, and all of the  other  State  referee  stations  were  upgraded
with  new equipment.    The open market  process  associated  with
contractor  operated  systems   has  forced  suppliers  to  innovate
technically, allowing  these reductions in cost.

     If  we assume  that  all   I/M programs  in  the  country  were
centralized and that  the  inspection and oversight costs  would  be
the  same as  the average of   current  centralized  programs,   the
national cost  of  I/M would be about $230  million less than  the  cost
in  1989.   Figure 4-4 shows the  total  current  cost  of  I/M to  be
about  $570  million.   If  all  programs   were central,  at today's
average cost per  vehicle in centralized programs, the national  cost
of  I/M  would  be  $340 million.   It  may  be the  case that the  per
vehicle  cost  in  some  decentralized programs,  such  as  the  one  in
California,  would be higher than the current national average if it
switched to centralized testing.   Thus,  the potential savings  may
not be as high as $230 but likely would be substantial.
                               -47-

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                            Figure 4-4

          Nationwide Inspection and Oversight Cost of I/M
           Currently and if All Programs Were Centralized
     $600,000,000


     $500,000,000


     $400,000,000


     $300,000,000


     $200,000,000


     $100,000,000


               $0
Centralized

Decentralized
                     Current  Cost    All Central
4.2  Repair Costs

     Repair expenditures are also  a  legitimate  cost of I/M.  But,
regardless of the inspection network,  the  repairs will be performed
in the same way - either by the vehicle owner or by a professional
mechanic.  Any difference in the cost of  similar repairs should be
attributable to the  relative efficiency of different mechanics or
to differences in shop  labor rates,  rather than where the  initial
test was conducted.

     Repair  cost information  is  collected only  sporadically in
decentralized I/M programs,  and is  unreliable.   Generally, programs
do not require cost  data to be entered into the record unless the
vehicle  is to  get   a  waiver.    Only a  few centralized  programs
collect  cost  data.   These programs  generally  require motorists
coming in  for  a  retest to  provide cost  information.   Thus, while
some reliable repair cost data exists for  centralized programs, an
analysis  of  the  difference between  centralized and decentralized
repair costs is not  possible.

     It  may  be  that total  repair  costs  are higher in  centralized
programs,  since  improper testing in  decentralized programs allows
some vehicles owners to avoid  needed repairs.   One should  bear in
mind, however, that  decentralized  programs  put  more vehicle owners
                               -48-

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in a situation in which they  may be persuaded to obtain repairs and
maintenance  s'ervices  they  do not  need or  would otherwise  have
purchased elsewhere.   In  a  1987  public opinion survey11  ,  sixteen
percent of   motorists living in four  decentralized  program areas
reported  that  while  their   vehicle  was  being  tested,   service
technicians recommended or suggested other  services  such  as tune-
ups, brakes, or  tires.  Forty-three percent  of  the   motorists who
had services recommended believed that they were not really needed.

4.2  Conclusions

     Inspection  and  oversight costs of  I/M programs  differ widely
among programs.   Decentralized programs  are more expensive  than
centralized programs,  in  nearly all cases.   The average  cost of
decentralized  computerized  analyzer programs is  about  double the
cost of centralized  contractor systems.   The national cost of I/M
could be substantially lower,  on the order of $200 million less, if
all programs were centralized.
                               -49-

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5.0  CONVENIENCE

     The relative convenience of decentralized vs. centralized I/M
is an issue that should concern  policy makers because inconvenience
and lost time can be the most negative impact of an I/M program on
the public, and it is important  that the program be accepted by the
public.  The  factors influencing  the  convenience  or inconvenience
of  an   I/M program  are  station   location,  hours  of  operation,
required number of visits,  waiting  time, and certainty of service.

     Decentralized programs typically offer numerous test stations
scattered  throughout the  program  area and are open  to  the  public
during the week and on  weekends.  These features form the basis for
providing  a  convenient  inspection network.   Theoretically,  I/M
tests can  be  combined with  other  planned vehicle  services,  or  a
vehicle owner can  simply  drop into the corner garage  for  a quick
test.    In  practice,  the situation  is  not  as  simple.   According to
survey  work done  in  decentralized programs11,  the majority  of the
public  experience  one  or  more  "inconveniences"   in  getting their
vehicles tested.  About 60 percent of  the vehicle owners surveyed
reported waiting  anywhere from 25 to  50 minutes  to be  tested.
Thirty four percent  had left  their  vehicles at a station as long as
a day for testing.   Some of these may have chosen to do so in order
to have  other services performed, however.   About  20 percent  of
vehicle owners surveyed were  turned away by the first decentralized
station they  visited for  a test.   Also 20 percent  reported being
told to make  an  appointment and  return  at  a later date.    (The
responses  total more  than  100  percent,  because some  motorists
surveyed had had multiple  experiences with I/M inspections.)

     In a decentralized program, all vehicles must get service at  a
licensed   station,   not  just  those  which  will   need repair.
Decentralized  I/M does not guarantee that a  vehicle  owner  will  be
able to get a quick  emission test on demand at the  first  station
visited.

     Centralized test networks appear less convenient because there
are a limited number of test  stations operating during fewer hours
than at a typical  service  station.   Further,  centralized  test
stations  are  not  as conveniently  located  as  service  stations.
Nevertheless,  centralized testing has been shown  to be  reasonably
convenient when the  network  is  well  designed.   A  good  example  is
the Milwaukee,  Wisconsin  system which  imposes an  average  travel
distance of  5-6 miles on  vehicle  owners and  a  maximum of 10-15
miles.   The Wisconsin program is also a good example of providing
rapid service.  About  98  percent  of all  vehicle  owners  wait  less
than 15  minutes for a test.    In  the busiest month  in  Wisconsin,
only 4  percent  of the  vehicle  owners have  to  wait more than  15
minutes  and  maximum  waiting  time  is   30  minutes.    In  other
centralized  programs,  average   waiting  times  are   generally
comparable  to the Wisconsin experience.    Maximum  waiting times
vary,  however,  due to  the rush  at the end of the  month  for those
who wait till the last minute to get tested.   Figure 5-1 shows the
daily and  overall average  waiting  times in  Illinois.   Towards the


                               -50-

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end  of  the  month,  the  deadline  for  compliance,  waiting times
increase,  but "overall Illinois achieves an average waiting  time of
under ten  minutes.  So,  good network design  means  short  waiting
times and short driving distances  for  vehicle owners.
                            Figure 5-1

       Average Daily Waiting Times in Illinois'  I/M Program
           30


           25


           20


   Minutes 15


           10


            5


            0
               WRFSTWRFSTWRFSTWRFSTW
                        Operating Days in the Month of
                                    August
     Some centralized  I/M programs have experienced problems with
waiting times.  In one instance,  the problem related to  enforcement
of the program which was very uneven.   On occasion  the police  would
suddenly start to  enforce the testing requirement and  long queues
would develop of people who neglected to get tested  when they were
scheduled.   This has happened in a  decentralized program, too.   In
another  case,  population growth  was  not matched  by expansion  of
testing  facilities.  As  the  area grew,  the program  administration
failed to install  new lanes and test  facilities  and eventually  a
crisis developed.  It is  obvious that good  management and adequate
funding of the program are needed to avoid these kinds of problems.
For the  majority of  centralized  I/M areas where that is the  case,
however,  waiting times are not a  problem.

     For some motorists whose vehicles fail  the  initial  inspection,
a centralized program may, in fact,  be considerably less convenient
than a decentralized program,  because  they will need to return  to
an inspection  facility  for a retest  following  repairs.  But this
inconvenience will be limited to  the portion of  the population that
fails the initial inspection.   At present,  this  portion  is about  15


                               -51-

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to 20 percent.  In the survey mentioned previously,  a much greater
percentage of'the  respondents  in  decentralized -programs  needed to
make two trips  just to accomplish  an  initial  inspection.   This is
in part because the  type of automotive service  facility  that  can
provide  on-demand inspections most readily   (retail   gasoline
stations)  in  a  decentralized program  is  also most  likely to  lack
the repair expertise and parts  inventory  to  repair  many  vehicles.
This will  become more likely  in  the  1990s  and  as  a  result,  the
"extra" trip  for a repair  in  a  centralized program  would  often
occur in a decentralized  program anyway.

     The biggest  potential  convenience problem  in a  centralized
program is where owners are  "ping-ponged" between failing tests  and
ineffective repairs.   On-site  State advisors  and steps to improve
repair  industry  performance  can help.    Well  run  centralized
programs do these types of things.  For example,  Wisconsin monitors
repair  facility  performance  and  visits  shops  that  are  having
trouble repairing vehicles to  pass.   The  visits  include  providing
assistance to the mechanic  in  proper  retest  procedures,  providing
calibration of the test equipment the  shop might own, and referrals
on where additional training  can be obtained.
                               -52-

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6.0  FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS  AFFECTING  THE COMPARISON  OF NETWORK
     A  number of  future  developments may  affect  the  relative
performance and cost  of different network types .   For the  most part
these developments  cannot,  at this time, be subject to the kinds of
evidential  examination   produced  above.    What  follows  is   a
discussion of  the potential outcomes based on known constraints.

     Biennial inspections  are becoming an  increasingly attractive
alternative to annual inspections.  The largest portion of the cost
of I/M  is  in  the  inspection process.   Thus, reducing inspection
frequency  will cut  the  overall cost  of  I/M,   although  it may
increase  the  per  test  cost.    EPA  has  found  that  the loss  in
emission reduction benefits is less than the  savings.  Thus, in  a
typical  switch,  about  10% of  the  benefits  will be  lost but  a
minimum 20%   of   the dollar  cost  will  be  averted.    Owner
inconvenience  will be reduced by essentially  50%,  since  a  test is
required only  half  as often.

     As  a  result  of  switching  to  biennial  inspections,  some
existing centralized networks  will  have extra capacity that can be
used to absorb growth, provide shorter lines in peak periods,  or to
allow  a longer inspection process.   However,  in the short run,
there could be  an  increase in  the per test cost  in  some networks
unless  excess existing inspection facilities  or  lanes  are  closed.
Biennial inspections  in decentralized programs mean fewer  tests per
year per station  and analyzer.   This means  that overhead  costs
(training,  staff,  equipment, etc.) must be spread over fewer tests,
unless  sufficient numbers of  stations  drop out .    In  order  to
maintain profitability,  an increase  in the test  fee will  likely be
required.

     The  CAAA of  1990  require  EPA  to establish  a  performance
standard  for  enhanced I/M programs using  an annual program as  a
model.   This  means that  testing on a biennial basis  will  require
programs to make  up  for  the  associated emission  reduction  loss.
Given   the  reduced   effectiveness  of  decentralized   programs,
achieving  enough  reductions  will  be  more difficult,  if not
impossible .

     Another  option  being considered  by some  and pursued by at
least two programs  is exempting  new vehicles until they reach three
or four years of age.  The most recent three model years  represent
about  22%  of  the vehicle  fleet.   However,  because they have had
little  time to develop  problems,  inspecting them produces very
little  emission  reduction.  Exempting  these vehicles would have
effects  similar to that of biennial testing,  reducing test volume
and revenue.   The  same  kinds  of impacts in terms  of  each  network
type  would follow  as well.   However,  it  should  be noted that
exempting new vehicles can cause owners to miss  the opportunity to
exercise  the  2  year/24,000 mile  emission  performance  warranty
provided under Section 207  of the Clean Air Act.
                               -53-

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     Another major  change  needed  in all I/M programs in  the  next
few years  will  be adoption of advanced test procedures,  improved
preconditioning methods,  better emission sampling algorithms,  more
sophisticated computer systems,  and more extensive data  recording.
All of these improvements are needed as a result of refinements  in
our understanding of existing  vehicle technology and what we expect
in terms  of  future  technology.   The need  for  preconditioning was
discussed  in detail  in section  3.1.    The adaptability of I/M
programs to changing conditions becomes a  major  issue in  light  of
these needs.

     Most centralized programs use  mainframe or  mini  computers  to
operate the analyzers  and record data.  These systems can easily  be
reprogrammed  whenever  a  change   in  the  inspection process  is
desirable.  Such  a  change  can be  debugged  and  implemented quickly
with  a  minimum of  expense  and  difficulty.    The   existing
computerized emission analyzers in  decentralized  I/M  programs are
for  the most  part  hardware programmed  or  closed-architecture
systems,  with  computer  chips rather than   software  governing
operation of  the analyzer.  Thus, making changes to these analyzers
requires  installation   of  new  computer  chips,  a  more costly
proposition than a simple software update.

     The latest  developments  in  decentralized analyzers  call for
the  use   of   an  open-architecture  system   that  will  allow
reprogramming;  however,  these  analyzers cost  $12,000-$15,000 for
the basic  machine as compared to  $6,000-$8,000 for the  existing
technology.  This additional  expense will  further the  demand for
increased  test  fees  in decentralized programs.    The  existing
analyzers  in  most  programs  are  aging,  although  still good for
repair work if  properly maintained and  calibrated regularly.   Many
decentralized programs will be faced with  the  choice  of replacing
computerized  analyzers  to meet new testing  requirements,  or making
a switch to centralized testing.

     On the  newest  fuel  injected vehicles, current  short tests
leave room  for improvement.   As  time  passes,  the fuel  injected
portion of the fleet will grow more and more important,  making  it
more important  to  improve testing of  these vehicles.    However,
improved test  procedures may require  the  use  of  steady-state  or
transient dynamometers.   At this point, the use  of either type  of
dynamometer is  most  feasible in centralized programs where  the  cost
can be  spread  over many tests.   Use  in  a decentralized  program
would likely  result  in fewer test locations.

     Another testing frontier  relates to the  use  of   "on-board
diagnostics"  or  OBD.   Starting  in 1981,  some motor vehicles  were
manufactured with computers that  monitor engine performance during
vehicle operation, detect any malfunctions  in the system, and  store
diagnostic  information  in the  computer  memory.    Usually,  the
motorist  is  alerted through  the  use  of  a malfunction  indicator
light on the dashboard of the vehicle.   OBD  is  currently  required
for  all  new  vehicles  in California,   and  EPA  is   developing
regulations to  standardize the systems at the federal  level,  as


                               -54-

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required by the  CAAA of 1990.   I/M  programs  will be required  to
perform OBD checks once  these vehicles  are in -use. OBD has  great
potential   to   enhance  repair  effectiveness  and  provide   an
alternative or an add-on  to  emission testing.   In the near  term,
decentralized I/M programs may suffer from improper testing of OBD
since  checking  for  the  malfunction  light,   while simple,   is
essentially a  manual process.   Even in  the  long  term  when the
vehicle computer will "talk"  directly with the  analyzer computer,
there will be ways to defeat a decentralized  test,  for example,  by
connecting the analyzer to a  known "clean" vehicle  instead of the
subject vehicle,  as  is done currently with the emission test.
                               -55-

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7.0  PREDICTED EMISSION REDUCTIONS FROM MQBILE4  AND  AN  ADDITIONAL
ASSUMPTION REGARDING WAIVERS

     The emission reduction impacts of  various potential changes to
I/M programs were analyzed for  their  relative effects and to assess
the difference between centralized and  decentralized networks.  The
most recent version of EPA's  mobile source emission model, MOBILE4,
was used  for the mechanics  of the  calculation.   MOBILE4  assumes
that anti-tampering  inspections in decentralized are  only  half as
effective as  centralized  programs; it  assumes  emission  testing is
equally effective in either program type.   For the purpose  of this
analysis,  an additional "what if" assumption regarding the outcomes
of a higher waiver limit was  made, as explained below.

     Figure  7-1  serves   mainly to  put the  known  and possible
differences  between centralized and decentralized programs into
perspective with the  emission  reduction effects  that  are possible
via other program changes.  The first bar  in each of the charts in
Figure 7-1 shows the VOC  emission reduction benefit from a  typical
emission test-only I/M program.  While no  two programs are  exactly
alike, a  typical program was  taken  to be  one which covered  all
model years, all light duty vehicles  and light duty trucks,  failed
20%  of the  pre-1981  vehicles, used  an  idle  test,  and  annual
inspections.  The waiver rate is assumed to be 15%.

     The next bar  shows the  level  of  benefit  this  program  design
would achieve if  it switched to biennial inspections.   The third
bar  shows  the   benefit   from  a  typical  program  with biennial
inspections that exempts  vehicles up to four  years  old.  The next
bar shows the impact  of reducing waivers to  5% of failed vehicles
by increasing the cost limits  and tightening  procedures.   For  the
purposes of this bar,  decentralized programs.are assumed to  achieve
no additional benefit on the theory that improper testing would be
substituted when  waivers  are  constrained.    Other  judgmental
estimates can be interpolated visually.  The next two bars show the
benefit  from  adding  catalyst  and  misfueling  checks.     The
differential impact  is based  on the assumptions built into MOBILE4.
The assumptions  for decentralized  programs are  that  detection is
50% of centralized,  but deterrence is assumed to be equal that of a
centralized  program.   The addition  of an  improved  emission test
(i.e., a transient  test)  would not be  feasible in a decentralized
program,  so no additional  benefit  is  credited there.   Finally,
underhood  checks are  added  and the differential impact is once
again  based on the  assumptions built  into  MOBILE4.    The  figure
shows the benefit in  1990, 1995 and  2000.   These scenarios  do  not
take  into  consideration  any   loss  in  benefit  associated  with
improper  emission  testing  in  decentralized  programs  (except  as
noted  in  the reduced waiver scenario).  MOBILE4.1,  which  will be
used to  construct  base inventories  required by  the  CAAA of 1990,
will do so.  Benefits  for carbon monoxide reductions are not shown
but are similar except that tampering checks are not as important.
                               -56-

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                              Figure  7-1
   Benefits  From  Various Potential  Changes to  I/M  Programs*
                                   Centralized
Decentralized
                           " ?••*••• 5
           Typical Program ^JU^Q
        Switch to Biennial ^^ggg	
                           VAX. •. v x- v-'-v'. % AS •. .. f- s f V.A.-V. A
       Exempt  New Vehicles ^^^g^^^pp^^^^^gi
                             -.%"•  ^'•\'  '•'•'    ""j
            Reduce Waivers ^^^^^^^^^^^|^^^^^
•Add  Catalyst  & Inlet Test ^^^^^^g^^^g^^^^
                           4^v.^ ...vXvSv^. v%% -.\. \   J. ,
            Add Lead Test ^^^j^^^^^
 Add Better Emission Test ||||
      Add Underhood Checks ^	
                         .000    .100    .200    .300     .400    .500    .600
                               Grams Per Mile VOC Reductions in 1990

                            -  dp '      %\«»     % i  M
           Typical Program ^^^_^^^|^g^^|^||
        Switch to Biennial
       Exempt  New Vehicles |^^^	
            Reduce Waivers  xv
 Add  Catalyst  & Inlet Test |^j|j^|j^j^^j^|j^^^im
                           *'W(i1MSS^>)1 v*lhy>^ v^ "• '"" %
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8.0  CONCLUSIONS

     The  first I/M  programs,  established  voluntarily  by  three
States  in  the  1970s,   were  set  up  as  centralized  networks.
Decentralized networks appeared in  response to the requirements of
the  1977  Clean  Air  Act  Amendments and  currently comprise  the
majority of I/M programs in the United  States.  The early thinking
was  that  decentralized  inspection  would be  less  costly and more
convenient to  the  vehicle owner:    It  was  acknowledged that more
quality assurance would be required to ensure equivalent emission
reductions, but  it was  also assumed,  at least  officially,  that
success could  be achieved  with a reasonable  level  of resources.

     This report discusses the  relative effects of centralized and
decentralized  I/M programs.   It  focuses  on  three  key  issues:
emission  reduction  effectiveness,  cost,  and convenience.   It
presents  information  derived from  EPA testing programs,  EPA  and
State audits of I/M programs, and analyses of  I/M  operating data.

     Recent studies   have  found  that  vehicles   require  adequate
preconditioning before  a  test  to  assure that they  are at normal
operating temperature,  and  that any  adverse effect  of extended
idling is eliminated.   A  period of  loaded  operation  on a chassis
dynamometer   has   been  found  to  be  most  effective.    Most
decentralized  programs,  especially  those  requiring  the use  of
computerized  analyzers  do unloaded, high-speed  preconditioning.
This  can  work  if   I/M  programs  extend   the   length  of  the
preconditioning,  as  EPA has recommended.   A chassis  dynamometer
would allow a  shorter  period but the purchase  and  installation of a
chassis dynamometer is considered  beyond the financial capability
of most private repair facilities.   Some centralized programs have
avoided pre-conditioning because  it was not  thought  essential  and
to keep costs  and  test  time as low as possible.   The trend now,
however,  is to provide loaded preconditioning and a  second chance
test to vehicles which fail an initial  idle test.

     Centralized programs  typically  do few  or no anti-tampering
inspections.      Decentralized   programs   typically   require
comprehensive  checks on  at least  some  portion  of  the  vehicle
population.    The   effectiveness   of  decentralized  tampering
inspections is highly suspect,  however.  As with  preconditioning,
centralized programs are starting  to add anti-tampering checks to
the normal test routine.

     EPA  audit findings  show  that  centralized contractor-run
programs  have very  high  levels  of  instrument   quality  control.
Centralized government-run systems  and computerized decentralized
programs are  comparatively weak.    The  quality  of calibration  gas
that is purchased, the  frequency  with which checks are performed,
the  easy  opportunity   to   defeat the  checks,  and  the   less
sophisticated  instrument  technology  are  to   blame.   Manual
decentralized  programs  have,  with  a  few  exceptions,   had
unacceptable  levels  of quality control.   This  has   led  to most
manual programs changing over to computerized  analyzers.


                               -58-

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     The available evidence shows that objectivity and quality of
testing -  the  keys to emission  reduction  effectiveness  - differ
greatly  by  program  type.    It  was  previously  found  that
decentralized programs using manual  analyzers had a very high rate
of inspectors conducting  tests improperly,  either intentionally or
inadvertently.   For the most part, inspectors were passing  vehicles
which  should  have   failed  and  been  repaired.    The  use  of
computerized analyzers in  decentralized  programs  has reduced the
level  of   inadvertent improper  testing.   Correspondingly,  the
initial test  failure rates have  risen  substantially in  programs
that have  computerized.   Audits have found,  however,  that  improper
testing,  both on the initial test and the  retest, sometimes occurs
despite the use of computers.

     Current inspection  costs per  vehicle  were  determined for  a
number of operating programs.   The earliest decentralized  programs
did,  in  fact,  charge  lower  inspection  fees,  because  State
legislatures imposed fee  caps  to protect vehicle owners.  The trend
has  reversed,  however,   since  requirements  for  computerized
analyzers  have been  imposed.   Sophisticated, high through-put
centralized systems are now "outbidding"  the local  garage, much as
franchise  muffler  and tune-up  shops  have overtaken their  respective
aspects of the  repair business.   The trend occurring in  programs
which are  new,  revised,  or reauthorizing  is for increasing fees in
decentralized   programs   and  decreasing  fees  among  competing
contractors.   Decentralized  computerized programs  now  have the
highest  costs,   averaging  $17.70  per  vehicle.     Centralized
contractor-run  programs  average $8.42 per vehicle.   Centralized
government-run  systems claim the lowest  cost at $7.46 per  vehicle,
on average.

     The factors influencing the  convenience or inconvenience of an
I/M program  include  station  location, hours of operation, waiting
time,  required  number  of  visits,  and  certainty  of   service.
Decentralized programs offer stations located  conveniently to most
motorists.   However,  a  significant  number of respondents  to  a
recent survey reported being turned away  without an inspection, or
having to  wait  25-50 minutes  for an  inspection.   Because  there is  a
growing  scarcity  of qualified  mechanics   in  the  automotive
aftermarket,  and since many gas  stations have converted  repair bays
into convenience  stores,  it has become increasingly difficult to
obtain "on demand" automotive services.   Centralized  programs have
a limited  number  of facilities,  and may experience  long  lines if
the system is not well designed.   Most new programs,  however, have
taken steps to minimize the travel  distance and the  waiting time,
such that  centralized programs are  just  as  convenient  or more
convenient than decentralized  systems.

     The overall  conclusion  is that centralized I/M will usually
offer greater emission reduction benefits  than decentralized I/M,
unless the  decentralized program makes  special  efforts that may
border on  the  unreasonable.   It has been shown that this greater
benefit  can  be  achieved  at  a  lower   cost  and   with  limited
                               -59-

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inconvenience to the motorist.   These advantages  also  dovetail  with
trends  in I/M'  technology,  which  all point  in- the  direction  of
increased sophistication, leading  to higher cost unless  economies
of scale  can be  achieved.   There is a growing need to assure  that
all of the emission reduction potential of I/M programs is achieved
in actual operation.  Quality is a  must,  if I/M is to  play its  part
in achieving the ambient air quality standards.
                               -60-

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                            References
1    National  Air  Audit System  Guidance Manual  for FY  1988  and
     FY 1989, USEPA, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards,
     EPA-450/2-88-002,  February 1988.

2    Motor Vehicle  Tampering Surveys  -  1984 -1988, USEPA, Office of
     Mobile Sources.

3    A  Discussion   of  Possible  Causes  of  Low  Failure Rates  in
     Decentralized  I/M Programs,  USEPA,  Office  of Mobile Sources,
     EPA-AA-TSS-I/M-87-l,  January 1987.

4    Evaluation  of  the California  Smog Check  Program,  Executive
     Summary  and  Technical  Appendixes,  California  I/M  Review
     Committee, April 1987.

5    Report of the  Motor Vehicle Emissions Study Commission, State
     of Florida,  March 1988.


6    Study of  the Effectiveness  of  State Motor Vehicle Inspection
     Programs,  Final Report, USDOT,  National  Highway  Traffic Safety
     Administration, August 1989.

7    I/M Test  Variability,  EPA-AA-TSS-I/M-87-2,  Larry C. Landman,
     April 1987.

8    Recommended I/M Short  Test Procedures  For the 1990s:   Six
     Alternatives,  USEPA,  Office of  Air and Radiation,
     EPA-AA-TSS-I/M-90-3,  March 1990.

9    Vehicle Emission  Inspection Program Study,  Behavior Research
     Center,  Inc.,   Phoenix, AZ,  1989.

10   Evaluation of  the California Smog  Check  Program, April  1987

11   Attitudes Toward  and Experience  with  Decentralized Emission
     Testing Programs,  Riter Research,  Inc.,  September 1987.
                               -61-

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