Lessons Learned
. x-xvx-.-x-x-x-x-x-x-x :•
•'•••:-y-:'f]:•:]:"••••-•'•' •••*••'••'•• '•:••'••
The Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council's
Approach to Regional Coordination and Policy Development
Prepared for U.S. EPA Region 10
February 1991
-------
LESSONS LEARNED
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST HAZARDOUS WASTE ADVISORY COUNCIL'S
APPROACH TO REGIONAL COORDINATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT
prepared by:
ROSS & ASSOCIATES
prepared for:
EPA REGION 10
February 1991
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION & EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Page 1
Lessons Relating to tfre Regional Nature of the Process
LESSON 1: Clearly Perceived Common Interests Page 5
LESSON 2: Focus on the Right Questions Page 7
LESSON 3: Confidence in Process & Evidence of Political Will Page 9
LESSON 4: Adequate Representation of All Stakeholders Page 12
Lessons Relating to the Process Itself
LESSON 5: Agreement on Analytical Framework Page 15
LESSON 6: Finality to the Process Page 18
LESSON 7: Sufficient Resources Page 20
Lessons Relating to Information Requirements
LESSON 8: Objective Information that Meets the Group's Needs Page 22
LESSON 9: Flexible Information Process Page 24
APPENDIX A: The Council Itself Page 25
APPENDIX B: Review of Meeting Content Page 28
APPENDIX C: List of All Council Members Page 31
February 1991
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In August 1988, at the behest of the governors of Alaska, Oregon, Idaho, and Washington and the Administrator
of EPA Region 10, the 22-member Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council met for the first time.
Its charge was to examine the long-term implications of the emerging hazardous waste management system in
the Northwest and to make recommendations to the governors and EPA Region 10 on ways to strengthen that
system. The impetus for the Council's creation was a growing awareness of the interdependencv that exists in
the Pacific Northwest for hazardous waste management. As an adjunct to each state's efforts to assure sufficient
and appropriate management capacity for its in-state waste generation, the Capacity Assurance Plan process
mandated by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, the states and EPA Region 10 decided that
they should also collectively explore the issues raised by this interdependence
Council members represented industry, academia, public and environmental interest groups, local elected
officials, and state legislators. Five members each were appointed by the governors of Washington and Oregon,
the two states in which most of the hazardous waste in the region is generated and managed. Four members
each were appointed by the governors of Idaho and Alaska. The EPA Region 10 Administrator appointed four
members, representing the Province of British Columbia, federal facilities, the military, and Indian tribes.
Attending all Council meetings were the directors of the environmental agencies of each of the states, the EPA
Region 10 Administrator, and the Deputy Minister of the Environment for the Province of British Columbia.
The Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council met eight times between August 1988 and June 1990.
It developed clear recommendations for the states on how they should approach hazardous waste decisions
within their scope of responsibility. The Council's recommendations are captured in the Council's 1988 and 1989
Annual Reports. While the Council did meet once more after the 1989 report was released in March 1990, the
last meeting dealt with the development of a Memorandum of Understanding between the government entities
that would promote continued cooperation among the states, EPA, Environment Canada, and the Province of
British Columbia on hazardous waste issues.
February 1991
1
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
The Council was considered by most observers to be a successful regional coordination and policy development
effort because it shaped the public debate on hazardous waste management in two important ways: it established
a regional context for decision-making about capacity and waste reduction programs; and it established the
overarching importance of waste reduction as the "capacity" option of choice.
This report outlines the lessons that were learned from the Council process, so that policymakers and others who
embark on similar efforts can learn from the experience of the Council. In general, this experience showed that,
in order for a regional planning process to succeed, it is necessary to have: participants in the process who are
willing to attend, work, discuss and agree; governmental agencies whose management is involved and who are
willing to act on the recommendations generated by the process; and, finally, staff who provide timely
information, frame the issues clearly, and coordinate input to and from the participants in the process. In some
cases, lessons were learned from shortcomings in the Council process, while most were learned from what was
done to ensure the level of success that the Council did achieve. In general, these lessons fall into three groups:
those pertaining to regional processes; those pertaining to policy-oriented processes; and finally, those pertaining
to the information requirements of any regional/policy-oriented process. Each of these lessons is summarized
below.
Lessons relating to the regional nature of the process
Lesson 1: Regional efforts work best when there are clearly perceived common interests and/or
interdependencies.
Lesson 2: Regional efforts work best when the process focuses on the significant questions and issues
which the participating entities face.
Lesson 3: Regional efforts work best when there is a process in which all participants are confident
of being heard and there is clear evidence of political will (including support of key federal
agencies) to make progress.
February 1991
2
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
Lesson 4:
Lesson 5:
Lesson 6:
Lesson 7:
Regional efforts work best when there is adequate representation of all potential
stakeholders, including those that may not yet have made their interests known.
Lessons relating to the process itself
«
A policy-oriented process works best when there is agreement on a clear agenda and
analytical framework.
A policy-oriented process works best when there is a sense of eventual finality to the process.
A policy-oriented process works best when there are sufficient resources to meet the basic
requirements of the process and to move initiatives forward.
Lesson 8:
Lesson 9:
Lessons relating to the information required to move the process forward
A policy-oriented process works best when information is perceived as objective, reasonable,
and sufficient to meet the needs of the group's decision-making process.
A policy-oriented process works best when it is flexible enough to meet the specific data
and information needs of individual stakeholders.
Each of these lessons is described more fully in this report, illustrated with observations from the Council's
experience. At the end of this report are two appendices, one which briefly describes the logistics of the Council
process and one which shows how the content of Council meetings evolved over time.
February 1991
3
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
This regional effort was recognized by EPA Headquarters as one of the most successful regional efforts
associated with the Capacity Assurance Plan requirement. By working through the Council to focus attention
on regional issues and solutions in an atmosphere of cooperation and reasoned deliberation, the governmental
entities in this region have been able to avoid the animosity and discord that affected some other parts of the
country. EPA Region 10 requested this report about the Council process so that these lessons might be shared
with others responsible for conducing regional policy-making processes.
February 1991
4
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
LESSON 1: REGIONAL EFFORTS WORK BEST WHEN THERE ARE CLEARLY PERCEIVED COMMON
INTERESTS AND/OR INTERDEPENDENCES.
For a group of counties, states, or countries to develop policy as a "region," they first must see themselves
as part of a "region." Regional identity results from common interests or problems, interdependent
economies, or shared geographic boundaries. Regional identity cannot be imposed on a group of
jurisdictions for the purposes of a policy process. If these common interests are lacking, the group may
splinter easily when trying to address substantive issues.
*.
The Council process was built on a strong sense of regional identity arising from a combination of three
factors:
The states of Washington, Idaho, and Oregon are geographically isolated from the rest of the
country by the Rocky Mountains to the east and by desert to the south. (As well, the Rockies
isolate British Columbia from the rest of Canada.) Alaska is geographically isolated from the
continental U.S., but its major economic and social ties are with the Pacific Northwest states.
There is a long history of regional governmental cooperation on environmental issues, such as
environmental protection of the Columbia River.
The economies of the states are interrelated and similar:
Boeing is a major employer in Washington and Oregon.
Both Oregon and Washington have significant aluminum and high technology industries.
Idaho, Washington, and Oregon have similar agricultural and forest products interests, and
Oregon and Washington are outlets for agricultural exports.
Spokane serves as the major hub for Eastern Washington and Northern Idaho, just as
Seattle is a major hub for Alaska.
February 1991
5
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
Even as a strong sense of regional identity existed on many other issues, the full extent of regional
interdependence for hazardous waste management became clear as a result of a preliminary two year
scoping process. This scoping process developed an initial understanding of waste movements throughout
the region which resulted in recommendations to create a Council to address specific regional concerns.
This scoping process involved two symposia attended by 700 opinion leaders in the Northwest, culminating
in a report prepared by Dr. Lee Stokes of Boise State University which clearly documented the flows of
wastes among the Pacific Northwest states:
Washington is the region's largest generator of hazardous waste; much of this waste is managed
at facilities in Oregon and Idaho.
Oregon is the second largest generator of hazardous waste and ships some wastes to both
Washington and Idaho for management.
British Columbia is both an importer and exporter of hazardous waste from and to the Pacific
Northwest states.
In most years, Alaska generates relatively little hazardous waste and has no commercial hazardous
waste management facilities; it relies primarily on facilities in the Pacific Northwest for
management of its wastes. Alaska's dependence on Washington and Oregon facilities was
highlighted last year, as management facilities in both states received tons of oil-contaminated
waste generated from oil spill cleanup activities.
This scoping process made clear that common interests would be served by analyzing hazardous waste
management issues in a regional context.
February 1991
6
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
LESSON 2: REGIONAL EFFORTS WORK BEST WHEN THE PROCESS FOCUSES ON THE SIGNIFICANT
QUESTIONS AND ISSUES WHICH THE PARTICIPANTS FACE.
Three criteria determine what might be appropriate questions for a regional process:
Is it a policy level question? Ultimately there has to be agreement on the policy level first, before
discussion of implementation issues can proceed.
Can the question be answered given the time and resources that can be devoted to it? An agenda
that is too broad sets the process up for failure because of the need to make too many trade-offs
on decisions and the need to involve too many stakeholders. An agenda that is too narrow may
allow the group to detour from a policy focus and become entangled in details or busy work, either
of which may cause the participants to lose interest in the process.
Can the question be. answered with credibility by those charged with finding an answer? Just as
a group of laypeople might not be perceived as credible if they were to address policy issues
requiring complex, technical analysis, a group of scientists alone might not be a credible body to
voice the values and concerns of the body politic.
In addressing the evolution of the hazardous waste management system in the Pacific Northwest, the
Council chose to focus on two policy questions:
Does the region have a responsibility to foster evolution of a waste management system that is
consistent with a preferred hierarchy of management options (in order of decreasing preference:
waste reduction; recycling/reuse; treatment; and then incineration or land disposal of residuals),
or should the development of the management system be left exclusively to generators and TSDs,
making choices in the context of national regulatory priorities and local, regional, or national
market opportunities?
February 1991
7
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
Does the region have a responsibility to its generating industries to ensure access to the types of
capacity necessary to manage wastes according to this hierarchy of preferred management, or
should capacity decisions be left solely to the private market?
In both cases, the Council's answer was yes, the states in the region do have a responsibility to go beyond
national regulatory priorities for hazardous waste management and to ensure access to appropriate
capacity for the waste streams generated in the region.
Because these were policy questions, and because the Council was comprised of people who spoke for
a broad range of constituencies and were perceived as credible, the Council work served to shape the
discussion in the Pacific Northwest about how the hazardous waste management system should be
modified to achieve these policy goals.
The Council was able to provide first-level answers to both these questions. Regarding waste reduction
and the preferred hierarchy, the Council was able to go beyond the first-level answers and recommend
a series of activities to the states regarding how to foster waste reduction, the first option in the preferred
hierarchy, throughout the region. However, the Council was less unified in providing its recommendation
on the need for or desirability of in-region incineration capacity due to disagreement among stakeholders
as to the level of analysis needed to make a decision. The majority of the Council concluded that there
was sufficient information upon which to make a recommendation and that making more detailed
recommendations regarding capacity went beyond the scope of the process because the analysis required
became too technical and too site-specific.
February 1991
8
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
LESSON 3: REGIONAL EFFORTS WORK BEST WHEN THERE IS A PROCESS IN WHICH ALL
PARTICIPANTS ARE CONFIDENT OF BEING HEARD AND THERE IS CLEAR EVIDENCE
OF POLITICAL WILL (INCLUDING SUPPORT OF KEY FEDERAL AGENCIES) TO MAKE
PROGRESS.
It is not enough for the entities in a region to acknowledge their common interests. In order for a
regional policy process to work well, there needs to be both broad agreement on the questions that the
process will address and an evidence of political will to implement the recommendations. Because these
are intangible qualities, the best way to assess whether this agreement and support exists is to gauge the
participation of the government entities in the process - through creation of the process itself, attendance
by concerned officials at meetings, cooperation and support of the analytical aspects of the process, and/or
interest in receiving and implementing recommendations arising from the process.
All these factors were present to support the work of the Council, as evidenced by the active involvement
of the EPA Regional Administrator, the state directors, and their key staff people.
The decision by the EPA Regional Administrator to launch the Council process and provide
funding for the process throughout its life showed clearly the value that EPA placed on this
dialogue. EPA's leadership was the foundation for the success of this effort and demonstrated a
good model for federal support in assisting regional discussions of this type.
Participating in the Council process was a clear priority for the EPA Regional Administrator and
each of the four state environmental agency directors and their counterpart from British Columbia.
Most were in attendance at each meeting, absent only when the call of state business was
particularly pressing (e.g., to address the Exxon Valdez disaster). In addition, as a result of the
Council process, the state directors met prior to each Council meeting to discuss the progress of
the Council and the issues it was confronting. Their direct involvement was important because it
allowed the Council to speak directly to the audience that would act - one way or the other - on
February 1991
9
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
their recommendations. It also allowed the state directors to clearly articulate the policy questions
on which they sought the guidance of the Council.
Staff from each of the states, the province, and EPA Region 10 provided invaluable support in
providing data and other input for the various Council analyses and in reviewing documents for
accuracy and completeness. This commitment of time was a clear indication of how important the
state directors considered this process, especially as the states' staff were already fully occupied with
the mechanics of completing the states' Capacity Assurance-Plans.
The leadership of EPA, the commitment of the state directors, and the support of the relevant
agency staff created a positive dynamic which encouraged the active attendance and involvement
by Council members and their constituencies, because they recognized that their views would be
heard and that the Council's recommendations would considered by the EPA and the states
directors as important policy guidance.
The existence of the Council process helped focus attention on hazardous waste legislation in each of the
four states. During the life of the Council, Oregon adopted a toxic use and waste reduction law which
mandated waste reduction planning on the part of regulated hazardous waste generators. In its following
session, Washington passed a similar bill, one which included the Council's goal of a 50 percent waste
reduction target. Alaska adopted the preferred hierarchy of hazardous waste management options to
guide its hazardous waste management efforts. Finally, similar legislation was introduced in Idaho,
although it did not pass. In each case, one of the sponsors of each state's legislative initiative was also
a member of the Council. As well, legislation was introduced in Washington to incorporate regional need
as a criteria for permitting new capacity in the state; that legislation was not successful.
After the cessation of Council activities, EPA Region 10, the states, and the province entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding to structure their relationship and to sustain the benefits of regional
February 1991
10
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
communication and coordination that were derived from the Council process. This MOU is further
evidence of the political support that the Council enjoyed.
February 1991
11
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
LESSON 4: REGIONAL EFFORTS WORK BEST WHEN THERE IS ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF
ALL POTENTIAL STAKEHOLDERS, INCLUDING THOSE THAT MAY NOT YET HAVE MADE
THEIR INTERESTS KNOWN.
The credibility of a regional process rests on having heard from those on all sides of an issue. This
includes both those who are clearly affected by the issues under discussion, as well as those who may be
affected but who are not yet actively involved in shaping the issue.
The Council was successful because its members represented a wide range of opinions on how best to
ensure appropriate hazardous waste management in the Pacific Northwest. Members were encouraged
to communicate with their constituencies about the issues facing the Council so that those interests could
be well represented in this effort. Financial assistance was provided, in some instances, to ensure that
members could communicate effectively with their consistencies. The Council also welcomed public
input and outside review of its documents and materials.
The following interests were represented on the Council:
federal agencies, because they are both major generators and managers of hazardous waste in the
Pacific Northwest;
Indian tribes, because they need access to management capacity as a result of cleanup activities
that are occurring on their lands and because Indian lands are often sought as sites for new
commercial management facilities;
the Province of British Columbia, because waste currently moves between the Northwest states and
British Columbia;
February 1991
12
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
the environmental community, because the proper management of hazardous waste is an
environmental issue, as well as an economic and political one;
state and local elected officials, because of their hands-on understanding of and responsibility for
the policy and political issues involved;
hazardous waste generators, because it is their behavior that any hazardous waste policy would
attempt to change.
A list of all Council members and their affiliations is found in Appendix C.
The hazardous waste management industry was not represented on the Council. However, throughout
the Council process, the industry was kept involved in reviewing and commenting on the full range of
Council activities.
To encourage the public's interest in this process, an extensive mailing list was maintained both by the
contractor and EPA Region 10. Individuals on the contractor's list received Council packets and other
information prepared for Council members. Individuals on the EPA list received periodic updates on the
Council's activities. As well, each Council meeting was announced in the major newspapers serving the
host state about a week in advance; all meetings were open to the public. At the meetings, opportunities
provided for public comment were frequently used by various interest groups.
February 1991
13
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
LESSONS: A POLICY-ORIENTED PROCESS WORKS BEST WHEN THERE IS AGREEMENT ON A
CLEAR AGENDA AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK.
A clear agenda and analytical framework precludes unplanned divergences which may or may not be
productive. It is not imperative that a clear agenda be established in advance. However, it is important
that developing such an agenda become the first task of the group.
The Council did not start with a clear agenda. It developed both its agenda and analytical framework
over the course of its first three meetings.
The Council's agenda evolved into two issues:
Assuming that management of hazardous waste should be done according to the preferred
hierarchy, to what types of capacity do the wastes generated in the region need access in order
for this to occur?
How can the Council foster waste reduction, the most preferred alternative on the waste
management hierarchy?
With respect to assessing the need for capacity, the Council adopted a six step process:
formally affirming a regional approach to capacity assessment;
analyzing the hazardous wastes generated in the Pacific Northwest;
February 1991
14
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
developing generic criteria under which it might be appropriate to provide any type of TSD capacity
within the region (e.g., it meets environmental standards, it is appropriately sized to meet regional
needs after maximum waste reduction);
4
adopting a preferred management hierarchy (including waste reduction) and assessing the capacity
needs of Pacific Northwest waste streams if they were to be managed according to that hierarchy;
determining which in-region capacity may be needed; and
designating conditions under which any needed capacity should be sited in the region.
The issue of waste reduction lent itself to a different approach. After reviewing various attempts to model
waste reduction potential for various industries in the Pacific Northwest, the Council concurred with the
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) that waste reduction potential was too unpredictable at this
time, given the extent of regulatory change affecting generators. Thus, the Council decided to adopt the
OTA approach to waste reduction which set policy targets of 10 percent reduction each year. Over a five
year period, such reduction results in a greater than 50 percent reduction from starting volumes. Given
the waste reduction initiatives already implemented in the Pacific Northwest, the Council agreed that an
additional reduction from 1987 volumes was an ambitious but achievable target. Adopting a policy goal
shifted the deliberations to focus on what policies and programs the states could implement to help
generators meet this goal; the Council adopted 13 recommendations for waste reduction activities.
A strength of the Council was in its ability to achieve consensus as it moved through the analytical process.
In its capacity assessment process, the Council was unanimous in:
endorsing a regional perspective for capacity analysis;
recommending a preferred hierarchy of management options;
February 1991
75
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
adopting a 50 percent goal for waste reduction;
recommending a series of waste reduction measures to the states; and
endorsing ten generic criteria to guide capacity decisions in the region.
However, the Council did not achieve unanimity in addressing the issue of whether incineration capacity
was needed to meet the needs of the region's waste streams, and whether that capacity should be provided
in-region rather than out-of-region. On this issue the Council split, 13-4, in favor of a resolution stating
the need for such capacity and the preference for having that capacity in-region. The dissenting Council
members felt it was premature to support the conclusions contained in Resolution 5 because the Council
has not yet addressed the full range of potential capacity needs (i.e. for recycling and metals recovery);
because the Council has not analyzed whether incineration met the environmental and health criteria (and
other generic criteria) established by the Council; and because specific conditions for developing
incineration and any other in-region capacity had not been developed by the Council to minimize
environmental and health impacts. There also was concern that the resolution could be interpreted as
endorsing a particular project. The majority of the Council believed that its resolution did not endorse
any particular project; that there was sufficient information upon which to make a recommendation; that
the Council's generic criteria were sufficient to provide policy guidance on any specific project; and that
making more detailed recommendations went beyond the scope of the process because the analysis
became too technical and too site-specific.
The vote on this issue was a clear diversion from the Council's record of consensus on all previous
resolutions. In addressing the incineration capacity issue, the Council made a major commitment to tackle
a serious and controversial regional and, indeed, national issue. As such, perspectives of Council members
were influenced by a broader array of information than that generated by and for the Council itself. As
well, the level of additional analysis necessary to address the concerns of the minority Council members
February 1991
16
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
exceeded what most Council members believed was either necessary or within the scope of a regional
advisory body which met quarterly.
The failure to achieve consensus on this issue was not viewed by Council members as a fatal event in the
life of the Council, nor did it detract from a positive assessment of the Council's overall progress or
accomplishments. It did, however, point out the fact that groups such as the Council do face limits on
both the type and depth of issues which they can successfully address. Again, this fact highlights the need
for an agenda and analytical framework that is as clearly defined as possible at the beginning of the
process. Then, when the group reaches this "limit" on an issue, it can either shift its energy to other issues
within its purview, or recognize explicitly that its mission on this issue has been completed.
February 1991
17
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
LESSON 6: A POLICY-ORIENTED PROCESS WORKS BEST WHEN THERE IS A SENSE OF EVENTUAL
FINALITY TO THE PROCESS.
A policy-oriented process works best when it has a clearly-defined termination point. The importance
of finality is best illustrated by the potential effects of operating without some deadline:
There may be a tendency to postpone action until there is "sufficient" data or analysis. However,
since there is rarely "enough" information for most decisions, decisions are made on the best
available information. If both the policy process and data requirements are open-ended, there is
never a point when the group can be asked to "fish or cut bait."
There may be a tendency to assume that the group which has been constituted to address the
policy questions should also be the group that addresses implementation issues. This is not often
the case. It is important that follow-up processes evolve as necessary and involve the stakeholders
that have an interest in the implementation of policy.
There may be a risk of burnout and/or the loss of enthusiasm on the part of participants and staff
for what ultimately is a voluntary process.
Just as the Council began without a clearly-defined agenda, it also began without a time frame in which
to complete its analysis and recommendations. While the need for an agenda was met during the first
three meetings, the Council struggled somewhat because it lacked a fixed termination point.
The Council's first meeting was held in August 1988. Its meetings in October and December of 1988
were organizational in nature, during which the Council's agenda and operating mode was established.
In these meetings, it became clear that the states could best benefit from the Council's input and
February 1991
18
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
recommendations prior to the October 17, 1989, deadline for submissions of hazardous waste Capacity
Assurance Plans as required under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act.
In 1989, the Council held two meetings (including a two-day meeting in July) which dealt with substantive
aspects of its analysis of need for capacity. At its September meeting, the Council concluded its
recommendations on the capacity issue, so that the states could incorporate the Council's findings into
their Capacity Assurance Plans due on October 17.
The continued role of the Council became less clear at that point. The future of the Council was first
discussed at the September meeting. Two additional meetings followed, in December of 1989 and in June
1990, which also focused on the future of the Council. Because Council members and state directors
agreed that the process had been useful, there was reluctance to disband the process, even though the
majority of the Council and the state directors felt that the Council's substantive regional policy agenda
had been completed.
The Council's experience illustrates the importance of having some well conceived, and clearly understood,
notion of how the transition between a policy and an implementation orientation will take place. The
willingness of governmental entities to enter into an MOU enabled the Council to disband knowing that
its policy recommendations would be considered, even in the absence of the continuation of the Council.
In addition, the MOU provided a mechanism by which a formal, regional body (such as the Council) could
be constituted in order to address a serious regional policy issue, should one arise.
February 1991
19
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
LESSON 7: A POLICY-ORIENTED PROCESS WORKS BEST WHEN THERE ARE SUFFICIENT
RESOURCES TO MEET THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE PROCESS AND TO MOVE
INITIATIVES FORWARD.
The Council was funded by EPA Headquarters and Region 10 as part of the SARA Capacity Assurance
Process. Throughout the Council process, there were sufficient resources to provide the level of
information and support needed to keep the process moving forward.
Sufficient resources are necessary to generate needed information; the notion of "sufficient" is obviously
related to the agenda and the duration of the process. Resources are required if the existing staff of the
government entities would be overburdened by taking on the full responsibility of an additional process.
Also, if the coordinative and analytical activity is assigned to existing government staff with other
substantive governmental responsibilities (i.e., management or permit issuance), it is likely that the
regional process will not be the first priority; this may cause delays and lead to disinterest in the process.
EPA Region 10, in consultation with the states, chose to hire a consultant to staff the Council. A
consultant was chosen in order to avoid: any problems with perceived biases on hazardous waste issues;
potential conflicts with regulatory and permitting decisions that are within the purview of state staff; and
any institutional biases. As well, the consultant was able to provide logistical support without burdening
state staff people who were enmeshed in meeting the CAP deadline.
State and EPA Region 10 staff supplemented the consultant support in two ways: they assisted with some
logistical activities (e.g., contracting with the hotel when their state hosted a meeting); and they provided
substantive contributions to the capacity assessment information analysis.
EPA Region 10 also provided sufficient resources to pursue Council recommendations with respect to
development of a Memorandum of Understanding to sustain the progress of the Council among EPA
February 1991
20
-------
Padfic Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
Region 10, the states, and British Columbia. Implementation of the MOU will be supported by
contributions from each of the signatories. Ensuring that this MOU was developed was important to the
process, so that regional coordination by the government entities would continue after the Council ended
its activities.
February 1991
21
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
LESSON 8: A POLICY-ORIENTED PROCESS WORKS BEST WHEN INFORMATION IS PERCEIVED AS
OBJECTIVE, REASONABLE, AND SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE GROUPS
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.
For a policy process, it is important that information is both objective and is seen as being sufficient to
address the issue. Information which is not seen as objective serves to fragment and divide a process.
At a minimum, the group must trust that, while maybe not complete or as fully detailed as some would
like, the information does not contain any biases which distort the conclusions drawn from it. As well,
it is important that the group agree on the appropriate range of tolerance about the information put
before it Generally, this tolerance is dictated by the nature of the decision being made. Technical
decisions about the type of pollution controls for a specific facility, for example, require quite different
types of information than policy decisions about how to foster implementation of a preferred waste
management hierarchy. While policy decisions will lead to subsequent technical and implementation
decisions, the level and type of information necessary to make technical decisions is not necessarily
required at the time that the implementation decisions are to be made.
The Council chose to use a "reasonableness" test in assessing the need for capacity.
It was clearly acknowledged up front that hazardous waste management practices were undergoing
enormous change, driven in large part by implementation of new federal regulations (notably, the
Land Disposal Restrictions). These regulations were seen as driving up the cost of waste disposal,
thus providing an economic incentive for waste reduction. Compounding the problem of change,
the Council recognized that it was relying on data already two years old and, hence, it was unsure
how many changes in waste management practices had already occurred.
On the other hand, imminent regulatory changes, such as planned adoption of the Toxicity
Characteristic Leaching Procedure to replace the Extraction Procedure Toxicity Test, were seen
as expanding the universe of hazardous waste in ways that could not be predicted at the time.
February 1991
22
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
In the face of this dynamic reality, the Council considered whether estimating future waste
reduction potential for each generating industry was reasonable. It decided that such an approach
was unreasonable because of the large number of regulatory, technical and economic assumptions
required and the significant uncertainty that existed around each assumption.
Instead, the Council believed that the amount of waste reduction that occurred would be the result
of federal and state efforts to encourage such reduction (e.g., directly through technical assistance
programs, or indirectly through higher waste management costs occasioned by, for instance, the
Land Disposal Restrictions). Thus, the Council chose to work backwards: instead of trying to
'predict' waste reduction, it adopted an ambitious and hopefully feasible target for waste reduction,
and then recommended to the states the types of activities they would need to implement to help
generators reach that target. This target was then factored into the need for capacity analysis.
Almost any process could generate vast quantities of relevant information. However, it is important for
information to be tailored to the decision being made (summarized, reformatted, etc.) so that the group
does not need to sort through extraneous information. On the other hand, the process also needs to be
flexible enough to address specific information requests, when it appears that those requests are necessary
to build confidence or would further progress.
The Council's process was stymied under the weight of the questions raised regarding the next level of
detail in its deliberations on the need for incineration capacity: should incineration be on-site? offsite?
in-region? out-of-region? The questions proved too difficult to answer given information-gathering
capabilities of the process.
February 1991
23
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
LESSON 9: A POLICY-ORIENTED PROCESS NEEDS TO BE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO MEET THE
SPECIFIC DATA AND INFORMATION NEEDS OF INDIVIDUAL STAKEHOLDERS.
Information needs cannot be fully projected, and thus, there may be a need to respond to specific
information concerns of various participants.
This was clearly the Council experience. As the analysis unfolded, specific questions emerged which had
not been foreseen at the start of the process, including an analysis of the need for metals recovery capacity
in the region and a discussion of the feasibility of promoting waste exchanges in the region as part of
regional waste reduction efforts. As well, to ensure objectivity of the analysis of the waste streams in
terms of the application of the preferred hierarchy for those waste streams, some Council members
requested outside peer review of the analysis. In each instance, information was provided to assist in
the deliberation about the specific questions posed, and the process moved forward.
February 1991
24
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
APPENDIX A: THE COUNCIL ITSELF
In 1986, recognizing the regional nature of the hazardous waste management challenge, the directors of the
environmental agencies of Washington, Oregon, Alaska, and Idaho, and the Administrator of EPA Region 10
began to work together to' understand the region's hazardous waste streams and discuss the potential for a
regional response to the challenge of reducing the volume of hazardous waste and managing the remainder safely.
It seemed then that a consistent and coordinated regional response would not only be appropriate, but desirable.
In 1987, a four-state steering committee was created by EPA and the states to organize two symposia which laid
the ground work for understanding regional flows of various types of hazardous waste and for identifying the
issues this waste flow raises for policymakers. One of the recommendations emerging from these symposia was
the creation of a council, to advise on appropriate regional approach to these regional concerns. Thus, the
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council was formed as an advisory body charged with examining
the hazardous waste management issues facing the Pacific Northwest.
There were 22 members of the Council. The governors of Idaho and Alaska each approached four members
and the governors of Oregon and Washington each appointed five members. The EPA Region 10 Administrator
also appointed four Council members. (See Appendix C for a full list of Council members and their affiliations.)
Council Logistics
A brief review of the logistics of the Council meetings:
one-day meetings were held approximately each quarter;
the meeting site rotated among the states, except during the legislative sessions when the need to minimize
travel time dictated that the meeting be in Seattle;
February 1991
25
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
each Council member participated in one or more committees which met either in person or by
conference call between meetings;
prior to each Council meeting, meeting packets were distributed a week in advance which provided the
reports of the various subcommittees and analyses requested at the prior meeting;
at the close of each meeting there was agreement on the general agenda for the next meeting;
most work between meetings was done by the contractor, with environmental agency staff from the host
state responsible for arranging the place of the next meeting, etc.;
each state was provided a fund with which to pay for meeting expenses when it hosted a Council meeting,
as well as to pay for the travel of its Council members to all meetings;
each meeting was advertised one or two weeks prior to the meeting in the major papers serving the host
state;
substantive support on issues was provided by staff from all states; and
each state was also responsible for selecting a hazardous waste reduction award winner; the winners were
provided a plaque from the Council at the meeting.
The Council's Structure
The Council was guided by two co-chairs, one from Oregon and one from Washington. Responsibility
for chairing the meetings was rotated between the two, both sat on the Strategic Planning Committee, and
each took responsibility for one of the two committees that addressed substantive issues.
February 1991
26
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
The Strategic Planning Committee provided guidance to the chairs on meeting agenda and procedural
issues, and reviewed substantive information prepared for the Council, as necessary, between full Council
meetings.
Two committees were formed, dealing with waste reduction and the need for capacity. Each committee
was responsible for reviewing information developed for the Council and developing drafts of
recommendations and reports on which the full Council acted.
The state directors and EPA Region 10 Administrator attended the meetings and sat at one end of the
table, facing the Council members. At every meeting, the state directors updated the Council on the
hazardous waste management activities in their states. They were available throughout the meetings to
answer questions posed by Council members and to offer their observations on the issues facing the
Council. The presence of the directors helped the Council focus on relevant issues. As well, the
participation of the directors signified the political will behind the Council process and elevated the
importance of its deliberations.
February 1991
27
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
APPENDIX B: REVIEW OF MEETING CONTENT
Seattle. August 1988 The Seattle meeting was primarily an information and organization meeting. Each state
environmental agency director provided an overview of the status of hazardous waste management issues in
his/her state. This was followed by a discussion of the Council's statement of purpose and the adoption of such
a statement. The Council also brainstormed in two areas: what are the components of a regional hazardous
waste management plan and what are the components of a waste reduction strategy. Two committees were
formed to structure these ideas for the next meeting.
Boise. October 1988 The Boise meeting built on the groundwork laid in the Seattle meeting, clarifying how
the Council would operate and identifying some of its objectives with regard to waste reduction. The Council
also began to focus on how hazardous waste should be defined in the context of its activities. The Council
indicated that its focus should be broader than simply the legal definition of hazardous waste.
As well, the Council was briefed on EPA's draft guidance document for the states to use in completing their
SARA CAPs. The Council endorsed the cooperative, inclusive process by which EPA developed this guidance
document but refrained from endorsing the document, per se, because of insufficient time to study it.
The Council formed two standing committees to address the issues of waste reduction and the regional need for
TSD capacity. The Strategic Planning Committee handled any administrative concerns of the Council. Each
of the standing committees was charged with returning to the Council with a proposed workplan.
Portland. December 1988 In Portland, the Council adopted a set of working definitions of hazardous waste to
guide its activities in waste reduction and its analysis of the region's need for TSD capacity. In addition, it
adopted a formal affirmation of a regional approach to hazardous waste management in the Pacific Northwest.
February 1991
28
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
The Council also adopted the workplans of its two standing committees. In the coming year, the Council agreed
to focus its efforts in two primary areas of concern: fostering and supporting efforts in waste reduction, and
advising the states and EPA on the TSD capacity needed to manage wastes generated in the region.
Seattle. March 1989 The Council adopted a preferred hierarchy of hazardous waste management options. The
Council adopted a list of 10 generic criteria against which the location of any capacity in the region should be
evaluated. In addition, it reviewed and deliberated on an analysis of the waste generated in the Pacific Northwest
Anchorage. July 1989 The Council reviewed and deliberated on an analysis of the capacity implications of
managing the region's waste streams in relation to the preferred hierarchy. The Council passed a motion
recognizing the need for incineration in the Pacific Northwest, based on an analysis of the demands that would
be placed on capacity if there were both a 50 percent waste reduction by 1995 and the management of residuals
in accordance with the preferred hierarchy.
Portland. September 1989 At this meeting, the Council adopted two resolutions: one recommended the states
and EPA take a comprehensive approach to waste reduction; the other recognized the need for hazardous waste
incineration capacity in the region and recommended to the states the conditions under which that capacity
should be considered for siting in the region. In addition, the Council passed a resolution urging the states to
include waste reduction in their CAPs as a source of capacity and that they do so in a way that fosters reliance
upon waste reduction as the management option of choice. Finally, the Council submitted a letter to EPA
Administrator Reilly, asking him to recognize the regional efforts of the Pacific Northwest states.
As well, the Council adopted a discussion paper which explained how the Council's goal of 50 percent waste
reduction by 1995 was determined and how the Council hoped this goal would be used to influence decisions.
Coeur d'Alene. December 1989 At this meeting, the Council discussed its future and recognized that it was
moving into a period of consolidating its gains and broadening public awareness about its work. The Council
recognized that there appeared to be no major additional regional policy issues outstanding at the time which
February 1991
29
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
would benefit from Council analysis and recommendations. The Council saw four specific tasks on its 1990
agenda:
to investigate the possible need for additional metals recovery capacity in the region;
to continue to support and promote the Pollution Prevention Research Center;
to describe for nationwide use by EPA the development of the Pacific Northwest framework for addressing
regional hazardous waste issues (in the form of this Lessons Learned report); and
to develop a statement concerning the institutionalization of the Council's goals by the government entities
in the region.
Portland. June 1990 The Council deliberated on the issues that should be addressed in a Memorandum of
Understanding among the states, the province, and EPA Region 10. The Council indicated that, by passing the
baton to others through the MOU, its work was completed.
February 1991
30
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
APPENDIX C:
LIST OF COUNCIL MEMBERS (Individuals marked with an * were appointed to fill
vacancies on the Council.)
Alaska
Kay Brown
Don Oilman
Tony Knowles
Tom Painter
Julie Petro*
Mark Tumeo*
Idaho
Joan Cloonan
Denton Darrington
Leanna Lasuen
William Saul
Oregon
Ron Cease
Frank Deaver
William Hutchison (Co-Chair)
Laura Pryor
Ann Wheeler
Alaska State Representative
Mayor, Kenai Peninsula Borough
former Mayor of Anchorage (resigned from the Council to run for political
office)
Conoco (resigned from the Council due to a job transfer)
NANA Regional Corporation, Inc. (Appointed - Spring 1990)
University of Alaska, Fairbanks (Appointed - Spring 1990)
J.R. Simplot Company
Idaho State Senator
Idaho State Representative
Dean, College of Engineers, University of Idaho
Oregon State Representative
Corporate Environmental Services, Tektronix, Inc.
Tooze, Marshall, Shenker, et. al., also chair of the Oregon Environmental
Quality Commission which oversees the activities of the Oregon Department
of Environmental Quality
Gilliam Country Judge
Attorney representing environmental groups
February 1991
31
-------
Pacific Northwest Hazardous Waste Advisory Council
Lessons Learned
Washington
Pam Crocker-Davis
Ron Kendall (Co-Chair)
Pat Murnmey
Nancy Rust
Liz Tennant*
Kirk Thomson
EPA Appointees
Earle Anthony
John Barry
Richard DuBey
Raymond Jones*
Rear Admiral J.R. Reason
Washington Toxics Coalition (resigned upon assuming a job with the
Washington Department of Ecology)
Professor, Western Washington University (resigned because of a job transfer)
Spokane County Commissioner
Washington State Representative
Seattle Audubon Society (Appointed - January 1989)
Boeing
Environment Canada (originally appointed to the Council when an official of
the Province of British Columbia)
U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
DuBey Law Firm, representing Indian tribal interests
Admiral, U.S. Navy (appointed - August 1989)
Admiral, U.S. Navy (resigned from the Council due to a job transfer)
February 1991
32
------- |