UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PLANNING OCTOBER 1978
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT DRAFT FINAL REPORT
AGENCY WASHINGTON DC 20460
AEPA Environmental Emergency
Response
Volume II Survey of States
Survey of Industry
Frequency of Spills
and Costs of Cleanup
PREPARED FOR THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY BY U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY - OFFICE OF
PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
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VOLUME II
I. SURVEY OF STATES
II. SURVEY OF INDUSTRY
III. FREQUENCY OF SPILLS
AND COSTS OF CLEANUP
Prepared for the EPA Task Force
On Environmental Emergencies
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SURVEY OF STATES
ON
RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCIES
Report to
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
July 1978
81099-30
Arthur D Little, Inc
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
List of Figures I-v
I. SUMMARY 1-1
A. HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 1-1
B. FINDINGS 1-2
C. PROBLEMS 1-3
D. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 1-4
II. METHODOLOGY 1-5
III. ANALYSIS OF STATE OPERATIONS 1-9
A. ORGANIZATION 1-9
B. COMMUNICATIONS .1-14
C. OPERATIONS ., 1-16
D. CLEAN UP AND PREVENTION 1-20
E. COSTS 1-22
F. FEDERALr-STATE RELATIONSHIPS T-25
IV. IN-DEPTH STUDY OF ELEVEN STATES 1-27
A. ARKANSAS 1-30
B. CALIFORNIA 1-37
C. COLORDAO 1-47
D. CONNECTICUT 1-54
E. INDIANA 1-60
F. KENTUCKY 1-66
G. LOUISIANA 1-75
I-iii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Page
H. MISSISSIPPI 1-80
I. NEW JERSEY 1-86
J. OHIO . 1-9A
K. PENNSYLVANIA 1-101
V. STATUTORY EMERGENCY POWERS FOR HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 1-109
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 1-109
B. GENERAL EMERGENCY AND HEALTH STATUTES 1-112
C. SPECIFIC POLLUTION STATUTES 1-114
D. MISCELLANEOUS STATUTES 1-117
E. LIABILITY AND DAMAGE RECOVERY 1-118
VI. CONCLUSIONS 1-123
A. LAWS 1-122
B. ORGANIZATION 1-123
C. COMMUNICATIONS 1-124
D. OPERATIONS 1-124
E. CLEAN UP AND PREVENTION 1-125
F. COSTS 1-126
G. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS 1-126
APPENDIX I—ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN THE
FIFTY STATES 1-127
APPENDIX 2--TABLES TO ACCOMPANY SECTION V 1-147
I-iv
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
No. Page
1 Arkansas I~36
2 California I~46
3 Colorado I~53
4 Connecticut I-59
5 Indiana r-65
6 Kentucky . I-74
7 Louisiana 1-79
8 Mississippi I~85
9 New Jersey 1-93
10 Ohio 1-10°
11 Pennsylvania 1-107
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I. SUMMARY
This study reviews the current status of environmental emergency response
by state governments. EPA has defined an environmental emergency as an
accidental or deliberate release of hazardous chemicals (other than oil)
which pose an immediate threat to the public health or the environment.
Because of their established responsibilities in both public health and
environmental protection, state governments were identified as a critical
topic for study early in the development of the EPA Task Force on Environ-
mental Emergencies. The study presented here describes the current status
of state efforts to respond to environmental emergencies, and identifies
the strengths and weaknesses in existing state programs, as well as
problems in the relationship between state and Federal agencies respond-
ing to environmental emergencies.
A. HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The study began in the fall of 1977 when EPA Regional Offices under the
direction of Al Smith of Region IV collected a basic set of data on the
response capabilities of each state for the Environmental Emergency
Response Task Force.
When a more detailed survey of each state was proposed in January, 1978,
regional offices reported that manpower in the Environmental Emergency
branch of each regional office was insufficient to obtain the amount of
information required. General distribution of a questionnaire to each
state government would have required OMB approval, and the quality of
the information returned could not be guaranteed. A revised strategy
was adopted to reflect these constraints.
Arthur D. Little, Inc., was retained on an extension of its previous
task order to conduct in-depth interviews with eleven states. A pro-
file of each state derived from these interviews is presented in Chapter
IV. At the same time, a small number of additional questions were asked
of every state by EPA Regional Offices. All of this information on
environmental emergency response in each of the fifty states is analyzed
and presented in tabular form in Appendix 1. All the data available on
state operations—from the in-depth interviews and the general survey—
are analyzed in Chapter III.
Information on current state operations was supplemented by an Arthur D.
Little, Inc., review of the statutes governing environmental emergency
response in each of the fifty states. Because state laws were generally
silent on liability for hazardous substance spills, Arthur D. Little,
Inc., also reviewed available materials on the common law of liability
for spills of hazardous chemicals. Chapter V presents the results of
this legal research.
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B. FINDINGS
1. Evaluating State Response
To fully respond to an environmental emergency, any government requires:
• a fast and accurate system for reporting incidents;
• a contingency plan which defines agency responsibilities
in an emergency;
• trained personnel and back-up information to advise public
safety officials in the early phases of an emergency;
• environmental personnel at the scene of an incident
to assess the extent of environmental damages;
• personal protection gear and testing equipment for the
personnel at the scene;
• laboratory capacity for monitoring hazardous pollutants;
• trained personnel who can supervise industry clean up or
direct government clean-up efforts;
• contingency funds to hire contractors or the internal
capacity (labor and equipment) to actually clean up
spilled materials; and
• sanctions or other penalties to force spillers to accept
responsibility for spills and correct dangerous conditions.
In addition to all these resources, a government must have an organization
which effectively coordinates these resources in the tense atmosphere
surrounding an environmental emergency.
Most state governments dispatch environmental personnel to hazardous
substance emergencies, but very few states have the range of resources
listed above. The best response capacity is found in the few states
with a special environmental emergency or spill response unit. State
laws do not make special provisions for environmental emergencies (such
as that contained in §311 and §504 of the FWPCA). State funds for
emergency response have been scarce. As a result, few specialized
spill response units have developed.
Most states attempt to deal with environmental emergencies by using
environmental personnel who ordinarily have other duties. In these
states, it is most difficult to get funds for special training, equip-
ment or clean up.
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2. Deficiencies
The study shows the most significant gaps in state capability in:
• laboratory and testing facilities;
• contingency funds or clean-up capacity;
• specialized training and equipment for on-scene
coordinators; and
• contingency planning for environmental emergencies.
3. Strengths
Federal assistance in filling these gaps, can supplement the strengths
in state government response including:
• geographically dispersed state environmental officials
who can verify and update reports of spills and other
emergencies;
• civil defense mechanisms designed to coordinate different
state agencies at time of crisis;
• radio networks which permit direct communication with
public safety or environmental officials in the field;
• training programs for local firemen;
• continuing relationships with local public safety and
emergency service personnel;
• equipment resources maintained by the highway department
which can be called in situations where a contractor
is inappropriate or unavailable; and
• regulatory authority, independently supported by state
statute, which may be used to correct situations leading
to an environmental emergency.
C. PROBLEMS
State governments desire to maintain control of environmental emergencies
which occur within their borders wherever possible. The Federal govern-
ment has been given responsibility for environmental emergencies under
§311 and §504 of the Water Pollution Control Act, as well as the general-
ized emergency provisions of TSCA, RCRA and the Safe Drinking Water Act.
The tension between these objectives has led to conflict during environ-
mental emergencies in the past. Case studies prepared by EPA have
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described some of these conflicts. Problems in the state-Federal
relationship identified here include:
• coordination of press releases;
• disparities in state and Federal penalty policy;
• different concerns in assessing possible evacuations; and
• rotation of Federal agency personnel.
D. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The response of state governments to our request for in-depth interviews
was most gratifying. In each state, responsible officials gave hours
of their time to discuss the current situation; these discussions were
candid, and the observations often thought provoking. State officials
expressed great interest in the actions which the Federal government
might take as a result of the overall report of the Task Force on
Environmental Emergencies.
Officials from EPA's regional offices were also invaluable to the study.
They provided the state contacts and sometimes helped in arranging
interviews. Ideas expressed by Environmental Emergency coordinators
identified key issues and concerns. Comments by Al Smith of Region IV
and Jack Conlon of Region I have been particularly extensive and helpful.
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II. METHODOLOGY
The results presented here are derived from three separate but closely
related studies:
1. Survey of States. This general background information was
gathered by EPA Regional Offices, directly from state
officials, and by reference to the regional response plan
or prior experience with individual states. Items covered
in this survey include:
a. designated state agencies.
b. on-scene coordinators
c. contingency funds
d. state resources available for clean up
e. laboratory capability
f. budget information (available in very few states)
g. recent developments
This data (supplemented by information collected during
in-depth interviews) is presented in tabular form in
Appendix 1.
2. In-Depth Interviews. Eleven states were selected for these
interviews on the basis of recommendations made by EPA En-
vironmental Emergency coordinators from the Regional Offices
who met in Washington on January 23 and 24, 1978. The states
selected were:
a. Arkansas
b. California
c. Colorado
d. Connecticut
e. Indiana
f. Kentucky
g. Louisiana
h. Mississippi
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i. New Jersey
j. Ohio
k. Pennsylvania
Officials in each of these states were interviewed by Arthur D.
Little, Inc. staff in February and March 1978. Up to six differ-
ent agencies were interviewed in each state. Notes from these
interviews are available in our files.
An initial profile on each state, contained in the preliminary
draft of this report, was returned to each official interviewed
for comment. Corrections contained in these comments have been
incorporated in state profiles, which are presented in Chapter IV.
Each profile is divided into sections as follows:
1. Summary
2. Laws
3. Organization (including a simple organization chart)
4. Communications
5. Operations
6. Clean Up and Prevention
7. Costs
8. Problems
While the eleven states are not representative in a statistical
sense, states are included which fall into the following categor-
ies :
a. industrialized; high concentration of the chemical
industry (New Jersey, Ohio, Louisiana)
b. relatively rural (Colorado, Arkansas, Mississippi)
c. centralized chemical spill response (New Jersey, Ohio)
d. decentralized spill response (Kentucky, California)
e. small states (Connecticut, Colorado, Mississippi)
f. large states (Ohio, California, Pennsylvania)
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The range of states covered is sufficient to derive some general
conclusions about the problems which all states encounter in
responding to environmental emergencies. Information presented
in the state profiles, as well as that presented in the tables
in Appendix 1 is analyzed in Chapter III.
3. Legal Analysis. Arthur D. Little, Inc. began this study by
drawing up a list of areas of possible state legislation which
might affect environmental emergency response. Included in
this list were:
a. generalized emergency powers
b. public health emergenices
c. air and water pollution control statutes
d. specific oil or chemical spill prohibitions
e. fish and game laws requiring restitution for pollution
damages
f. pesticide application laws
g. spill liability
Statutes from each of the fifty states were then reviewed to
identify any laws in these areas. In each of the eleven states
which were the subject of an in-depth interview, additional
material was gathered on statutes and regulations. The material
on all fifty states is analyzed in Chapter V, while a brief
sketch of applicable laws is resented in each state profile in
Chapter IV.
Since state statutes were generally silent on liability for dam-
age caused by the release of hazardous chemicals, we also under-
took a review of common law on the subject. Law review articles
and leading cases were studied. Very little material was avail-
able dealing directly with the subject of hazardous substance
liability. An analysis of the limited information available on
common law liability for hazardous substances is presented at
the end of Chapter V.
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III. ANALYSIS OF STATE OPERATIONS
Review of the eleven state profiles, as well as the tables in Appendix 1,
summarizing data collected in each state, permit some significant conclu-
sions on state capability. Because of the diversity of state governments,
it is impossible to develop generalizations which will apply to every
state, but the information analyzed here should aid in the development of
a policy on Federal-State relations during environmental emergencies.
The material presented here is broken down in the same sections used to
organize the profiles of the eleven states interviewed in-depth. State
laws are not discussed here, but are analyzed in greater depth in Chapter
V. We have added a section on Federal-State relationships, and have
also broken down Operations to separate findings on:
1. Emergency phase and evacuation
2. Equipment
3. Spill management
4. Training
A. ORGANIZATION
1. Primary Agencies—Environment and Civil Defense
Relatively few states have a spill response unit with employees who spend
full time planning for, or responding to environmental emergencies. Of
the eleven in-depth states, only Ohio and New Jersey had sizeable full
time spill response programs. Both states place the spill response unit
within an Environmental Protection Agency which controls most environmental
programs. The Connecticut EPA also employs personnel who are dedicated to
spill response, but this program is much smaller in size. Indiana also
had a small office in its Water Pollution Program dedicated to spill res-
ponse. Of the 50 states, 21 indicated that they had designated on-
scene coordinators for environmental emergencies, and only 10 of these
clearly employed people full time for such purposes.
The predominant mode of organization for environmental emergency response
involved designation of personnel for monitoring and supervision at the
time of the incident. This assignment of personnel with other responsi-
bilities clearly makes it difficult for individual employees to develop
extensive experience in the management of hazardous substance spills.
It is also more difficult to provide intensive training in the handling
of hazardous substances if responsibility is dispersed widely across a
state.
When states do not have a special spill response unit, the quality of the
state response in an environmental emergency is improved by the presence
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of one or both of the following conditions:
a. A Clear, Single Focus for Emergency Operations in the Head-
quarters of the State Environmental Agency. Even if he has
other responsibilities, an official who regularly coordinates
environmental agency response will develop a certain amount of
expertise in assessing situations, forcing polluters to clean
up, and mobilizing the resources of the agency. The task
seems somewhat easier if the designated individual also has
control over the enforcement of pollution fines and penalties
under state law. In Mississippi, we observed an environmental
emergency program keyed around a single individual, the
Director of Enforcement in the Pollution Control Commission.
The emergency response program seemed to function reasonably
well, although there was no spill response unit. However, this
kind of program would be difficult to operate effectively in
a larger state. We noted that Pennsylvania and California
delegated to regional officials the supervision of most
incidents. It is also difficult for programs dependent on a
single individual to build up the same resources or equipment
for clean up, personnel protection, and air and water sampling.
b. An Active Civil Defense Program which Works to Coordinate
Inter-Agency Response in Advance. In Arkansas, a very active
Office of Emergency Services had recently completed a revised
disaster plan with a special section on hazardous materials. The
Department of Health, and Pollution Control and Ecology had
also signed a special memorandum on the distribution of respon-
sibility during a hazardous material emergency. This kind of
specific planning for environmental emergencies does not occur
unless the Civil Defense agency recognizes the unique environ-
mental aspects of such disasters.
In addition to providing one stimulus for advance planning in a state
without a special environmental emergency unit, an active Civil Defense
agency can provide a forum for resolving some of the disputes which arise
between public safety and environmental agencies. In Kentucky, The
Office of Emergency Services has recently moved into this role. It is
easier for a Civil Defense agency to play this dispute resolution or
mediation role if they actively coordinate a number of emergencies each
year. Some Civil Defense agencies which we observed (Arkansas, for
example) maintain a 24-hour emergency communication and coordination
center, and these agencies seemed to have greater capability to manage
state response in an environmental emergency.
Although every state has some form of Civil Defense organization, not
every one is well suited to the management of environmental emergencies.
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If such emergencies are treated the same as other disasters, without
special advance planning, on-scene management by Civil Defense and Public
Safety personnel may ignore environmental concerns.
All eleven states which we interviewed had some form of environmental
response to hazardous material emergencies. In each of these states,
the environmental agency provided a delegate to the Regional Response
team created by §311 of the FWPCA. In three of fifty states, however,
the Civil Defense agency is shown as the designee to the Regional
Response team, and even the ad hoc response by environmental agencies
in such states is minimal.
2. Health Departments
As observed below in the analysis of state laws, some states have trans-
ferred environmental health functions to an integrated environmental
protection agency. In Pennsylvania, even occupational and radiological
health had been transferred to the environmental agency. In these states,
Health Departments have little involvement during most environmental emer-
gencies.
Even in states which have left significant environmental health programs
in Health Departments, the role of the Health Department is usually
secondary. Only 7 of 50 states list the Health Department as the desig-
nated state agency for emergency response under §311. Another two states
list the Health Department as a coordinate or secondary response agency.
Health Departments which handle air pollution or safe drinking water
programs will usually supplement the environmental agency in these areas.
Environmental health bureaus may participate in general planning for pub-
lic health emergencies, particularly the loss of public water supplies
and sewage treatment systems. In a few states interviewed, such as
Arkansas and Mississippi, the Health Department has made specific plans
to offer advice on toxicology and medical treatment when a hazardous sub-
stance is released. Although environmental emergencies have significant
public health aspects, it appears that most states have placed the lead
responsibility on state environmental agencies.
3. Transportation and Highway Departments
Highway maintenance equipment and crews can usually be called in for clean
up and containment of uncomplicated roadside spills. In California, special
hazardous material training has been provided to maintenance crews. High-
way crews represent the only actual supply of clean-up manpower available
within most state governments, but the special training program in Cali-
fornia is unusual, and knowledge of hazardous substances is generally
very low. In addition, some states reported that highway maintenance
departments had a certain amount of autonomy and were not always available
when needed. The key role in clean up played by Cal Trans and the Colorado
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Highway Department did not appear to be duplicated in the other nine
states we interviewed.
One exception to the general rule of limited involvement by state highway
or transportation departments was Pennsylvania. Here, the Department of
Transportation has a Hazardous Material Transportation Safety Board. In-
spectors from this Board provide emergency advice on hazardous material
handling to State Police and local public safety officials. This ad-
visory role is undertaken in addition to enforcement of state regula-
tions on the placarding and transportation of hazardous cargoes. Other
states, including Arkansas and Louisiana, expressed increasing interest
in controls on hazardous material transportation.
4. Fish and Wildlife
Officers from Fish and Wildlife Departments play an important role in
investigating environmental emergencies, particularly in rural areas.
Where the Fish and Wildlife function is incorporated in the Environmental
Agency, such as New Jersey, these officers play a secondary role. How-
ever, in California, the Fish and Game Department plays the lead role
in hazardous substance spill response. If a state has a "fish kill"
statute, (see Chapter V), the law is usually administered by the Fish
and Game Department, and provides a significant additional state sanction
in the event that a hazardous material release causes a fish kill.
5. State Police
In every state interviewed, state patrolmen were the first state officials
to arrive at the scene of environmental emergencies caused by transporta-
tion accidents outside of large cities. The 24-hour State Police radio
network in each state usually provides the first notification of such
incidents to the designated spill response agency. In several states
interviewed, such as Kentucky, the troopers carried the DOT hazardous
material handbook and will initiate evacuations in rural areas before
the arrival of additional state personnel. Once the Fire Marshall or
environmental personnel have arrived, State Police limit their role to
crowd control and assistance in evacuation.
6. Fire Fighting
Local Fire Departments respond to every fire and serious accident, and
they are present at most environmental emergencies. Fire Departments
in rural areas are usually volunteer. In most cases, the Fire Department
where the incident occurs takes command of the immediate emergency phase
of an effort. In a few states interviewed, such as Kentucky, the State
Fire Marshall provides advice to the Fire Departments, and may effectively
assume direction of the fire forces at the scene.
Every state interviewed had some form of state-sponsored training pro-
gram for local firemen. These programs vary in size and quality at the
moment, and are being expanded in Pennsylvania and Mississippi. While
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the level of expertise in handling hazardous materials amongst most
rural and suburban fire fighters is not yet adequate, these state train-
ing programs can provide a base for expanded hazardous material training
programs. The National Fire Prevention and Control Academy, a part of
the Department of Commerce, is working through these state programs to
disseminate a number of fire service training programs, including one on
on pesticide fires which was developed jointly with the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency.
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B. COMMUNICATIONS
In general, state governments have a good capacity to receive reports
on an environmental emergency, even from remote locations. Where the
environmental agency does not have mobile radios, reports can be trans-
mitted over Fish and Game or State Police radio networks and relayed to
the environmental agency. Specially equipped spill units, such as those
in Ohio and New Jersey, have mobile radios even when other pollution
control officials in the state are not supplied with radios.
None of the state agencies designated to take the lead in environmental
emergencies have 24-hour communications and command centers. Instead,
they rely on telephone reports to a designated duty officer outside of
office hours.
In states with a special spill response unit (Ohio, New Jersey) or a
well-developed contingency plan, this responsibility will usually rotate
between officials who are always available on their home phone or a
beeper. They are contacted in off-duty hours by State Police or Civil
Defense if an emergency is reported. In states without a regular duty
rotation, it may be necessary for the State Police or another spill
reporter to run through several names on a designated call list, and
this can delay state environmental response. Further delays may be en-
countered in dispatching an employee of the environmental agency to the
scene in off-duty hours because of difficulty in contacting district or
regional officials at home. Dispatch of personnel is faster and more
reliable in states with special spill response units, but most of the
states interviewed indicated confidence that an environmental agency
official would reach the site of an emergency within a maximum of 2 to
4 hours of the report. Even while waiting for an environmental official
to arrive at the scene, an environmental emergency coordinator in a
state agency can monitor the situation through reports from the State
Police or Civil Defense radio network.
The designated duty officer in the state environmental agency is res-
ponsible for notifying other parties, including Federal EPA and other
state environmental programs such as Safe Drinking Water. Notifica-
tion of downstream water users is performed by the Safe Drinking Water
program in most states interviewed, but can be performed by the duty
officer in an emergency.
While all but the smallest states (Connecticut, New Jersey) dispatch
environmental personnel from regional or district offices to a reported
emergency, most maintain central direction of the emergency response.
Exceptions among the states interviewed were California and Pennsylvania,
where district officials generally handled all aspects of spill res-
ponse. In Ohio, personnel from the special spill response unit are dis-
tributed around the state, and are expected to take charge as on-scene
coordinators, but they relay reports on major incidents back to the duty
officer in Columbus.
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While each of the eleven states interviewed had a program for notifica-
tion of environmental officials by the State Police, communications
within states do break down. For example, the State Police in Pennsyl-
vania until recently reported only a portion of spills to the Department
of Environmental Protection. Transfer of information to other health
and environmental programs may be incompete. One local Health Depart-
ment interviewed complained that it had never received the results of
drinking water testing performed after a major spill in the community.
A review of our interview notes suggests that such communication pro-
blems are less frequent where there is a formally designated spill res-
ponse unit and/or a well-developed contingency plan.
The information used by states in assessing environmental emergencies
and recommending a response is usually only a portion of the total in-
formation available nationally. In the states interviewed, hazardous
material textbooks, such as the volume by Sax, were the most commonly
used reference. The small hazardous material handbook issued by the
Office of Oil and Special Materials was also widely used in the field
and highly praised.
CHEMTREC was the most widely used hazardous material information system.
Both Public Safety and environmental agencies use the CHEMTREC 800 num-
ber regularly to get immediate product information and notify the manu-
facturer of the spill.
The Chemical Hazard Information System (CHRIS), developed by the Coast
Guard was used by environmental agencies in Indiana, California, New
Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania (of the eleven states interviewed).
States told us they had attempted unsuccessfully to obtain further copies
of the CHRIS manual.
Only New Jersey has used state funds to tap into the OHM-TADS system
directly. Other states do use the EPA funded OHM-TADS system indirectly
when they request information from the EPA Regional Office. In most
hazardous material releases, state officials prefer to use the reference
materials which are readily available in their office. EPA advice is
sought only when these standard references are inadequate.
We did encounter one example of potential duplication between state and
Federal information systems. The Environmental Health Bureau in Arkansas
was developing a computerized bank of information on toxic substances.
They were not aware of the OHM-TADS or CHRIS systems. Neither system
appears to have all the data on treatment of victims exposed to hazard-
ous substances which is desired by the Arkansas Health Department, but
there will be significant overlap between this proposed state system
and OHM-TADS and CHRIS.
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C. OPERATIONS
1. Emergency Phase and Evacuation
Officials from state environmental agencies play a secondary role in any
incident until the immediate danger of explosion, fire, or the release
of a toxic gas is past. Command at the scene will be exercised by the
local fire chief in small-to-medium sized incidents. In very large or
complex situations, the state Office of Emergency Services or Civil
Defense will assume a coordinating role between different state and
local agencies.
The power to order an evacuation is usually vested in local elected
officials or Public Safety officers (Police Chief, Sheriff). In rural
areas, the State Police may begin evacuation in the immediate vicinity
of an accident even before the arrival of local officials. If the local
officials are unavailable or incapacitated by the accident, evacuation
may be ordered by a State Police Commander or Civil Defense Coordinator.
State Police and local Public Safety officials work together to evacuate
the population and keep crowds away from a wreck, fire, or other inci-
dent.
State and local officials are generally not reluctant to evacuate sparsely
populated areas when a substance which is clearly dangerous is being re-
leased or is in danger of release. In Louisiana, a rural population was
evacuated ten miles away from a train wreck involving chlorine tank cars.
Problems in evacuation occur when Public Safety officials do not recog-
nize the highly hazardous nature of a substance, or where the risk seems
small and a large population must be moved. Publicity surrounding recent
incidents with chlorine and ammonia suggest that there will be little
resistance to evacuation after future accidents involving these sub-
stances. Problems will more likely occur when the combustion of differ-
ent substances threatens to produce toxic compounds which are poorly
understood by Public Safety officials.
Our interviews suggest that state officials will be less likely than
Federal officials to recommend the evacuation of large populations in
marginal conditions. Precise models to determine toxic gas concentra-
tions at various distances from an incident are used infrequently during
emergencies. State or local officials, faced with the enormous risks
and costs associated with evacuating large populations, are reluctant to
order an evacuation where concentrations near the lower limit of risk
are expected. The Coordinator of Mississippi's environmental emergency
program described such an incident where hydrogen sulfide concentrations
from a gas well blow out were expected to slightly exceed acceptable
levels in downtown Jackson. Rather than evacuate 250,000 people,
Mississippi officials decided to accept the small risk to the aged and
infirm who remained in their homes.
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Federal environmental officials, on the other hand, are not directly con-
cerned with the logistics or dangers of an evacuation, and are likely to
recommend a greater margin of safety in an evacuation. As a result,
some conflicts in evacuation decisions can be expected in the foresee-
able future. The frequency of such conflicts will decrease with in-
creased publicity on hazardous substances and improved training of the
Public Safety officials who will make evacuation decisions.
2. Equipment
No state has both the full protective gear and training to work in a
highly hazardous atmosphere and stop leaks of highly hazardous materials
such as phosgene, chlorine, etc. Only industry and the military have
the training and equipment to work in such conditions.
The personal protective gear available to state environmental and Public
Safety officials at the scene of an incident is very limited. In general,
environmental officials have no more equipment than local firemen—rubber
turn out coats, boots, and Scott air packs. In states without a special
spill response unit, even this equipment is unavailable to the District
Warden or Pollution Control officer who first responds to a reported
spill. New Jersey, with its large spill response budget, is acquiring
full protective suits, and Ohio is acquiring acid suits for its on-scene
coordinators. Most states interviewed do not have the funds to acquire
such equipment.
Very few states have advanced on-site sampling equipment which can be
used to identify toxic substance concentrations at the scene of an inci-
dent. While Fire Departments and some environmental agencies have ex-
plosimeters, only Ohio, New Jersey, and the Arkansas Health Department,
of the states interviewed, indicated that they owned MSA-type toxic gas
samplers. Most states can only take air or water samples and send them
back to the laboratory for analysis.
No state has specialized clean-up equipment such as vacuum trucks, car-
bon filtration units, or chemical transfer pumps. Even New Jersey, which
now has the largest environmental emergency response unit of any state
interviewed, relied on contractors for actual clean up.
States with oil spill funds have stockpiled absorbent materials and con-
tainment booms for quick response to spills. Five such states were
identified with stockpiles which could be useful in some hazardous sub-
stance emergencies. In addition, Highway Maintenance Departments can
use sand or similar materials for absorbing roadside spills. One state
interviewed (Pennsylvania) was acquiring small amounts of material for
making filter fences and will issue this material to the district pollu-
tion officers who respond to spill reports. This was an exception in
our interviews, and most states will not have stockpiles of clean-up
materials in the near future.
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L>
Trucks and earthmoving machinery are the one item of clean-up equip-
ment generally available to state governments. These are used by High-
way Maintenance Departments and can be released for building dikes and
ditches to contain a spill. The ease with which the equipment is ob-
tained for hazardous substance emergencies depends upon the effective-
ness of a state's contingency plan and the autonomy of the Highway
Department.
3. Spill Management
State environmental officials do not assume any control of an incident
until after the danger to public health and safety has passed. Except
in those states with designated on-scene coordinators like New Jersey
and Ohio, the primary function of environmental agency officials at
the scene is to take samples and attempt to make the spiller clean up.
If the spiller is reluctant, officials at the scene will ask the Central
Office to pressure the transportation or chemical company responsible.
Because few states have trained their field employees in clean up tech-
niques, advice on clean up must be obtained from the Central Office.
States with special spill response units are the exception, and on-scene
coordinators in these states will give directions on clean-up techniques.
Although environmental emergencies require state personnel to work out-
side of normal duty hours, this did not seem to present a barrier to
response in most states. Those that cannot pay overtime grant compensa-
tory time off (officially or unofficially) to personnel who have worked
overtime at an emergency. Only six of fifty states were identified
where the lack of compensation for overtime work would inhibit state
management of an environmental emergency.
4. Training
All states interviewed expressed the need for more training of personnel
who respond to hazardous material incidents. Ohio and New Jersey have
obtained some special training for their on-scene coordinators, but only
New Jersey reported that money was not a barrier to improved training.
Ohio could not get out-of-state travel funds for training classes.
Where states do not have predesignated on-scene coordinators, training
is even more of a problem. District officers who respond to spills have
generally not had training in hazardous materials as part of their
original indoctrination.
Only the Coast Guard and EPA have sponsored training programs which
would meet all the needs of state agencies in teaching the following
subjects important to management of an environmental emergency:
• identification of hazardous materials
• toxicology and environmental effects of hazardous materials
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» personal protection in hazardous material incidents
• clean up and containment techniques
The states we interviewed would welcome Federally supported training
programs, but most would need Federal support for travel as well as
tuition. The EPA training* by Vanderbilt would be most effective if
directed towards designated on-scene coordinators and personnel in a
Central Office who manage all state responses. A second program may be
necessary for District Office officials who respond relatively infre-
quently to check out reported spills.
Training of local firemen is a problem of even greater magnitude than
training of personnel in state environmental agencies. Although all
states interviewed do maintain fire training programs, only a small
proportion of all the firemen in the country go through such programs
each year. An even smaller proportion receive hazardous material train-
ing. In Kentucky, for example, only 360 persons took the hazardous
material course at the fire school last year. Courses offered by com-
munity colleges or railroads and other industries do not yet reach
enough of the rural firemen who are the first to respond to hazardous
substance incidents. Both Public Safety and environmental officials
emphasized the importance of expanded hazardous material training for
fire fighters, particularly in rural communities.
*
Created by Vanderbilt University
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D. CLEAN UP AND PREVENTION
All eleven states interviewed indicated that industry was cleaning up
most spills resulting from process upsets and transportation accidents.
Those states with contingency funds have been forced to use such funds
for clean up less than ten times per year. When asked to give the num-
ber of reported spills for which industry response was inadequate, state
officials usually replied "very few" or "less than ten percent".
Several states praised the large chemical companies—notably duPont—
for the technical information provided after a transport spill of the
company's product. Railroads were most frequently cited as a problem
in obtaining clean up, but the states which cited railroad problems
(Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, New Jersey) have seen recent improvements.
Ohio took CONRAIL to court to get better response and is considering
action against a second railroad. The line most often cited as a problem
in clean up during past incidents, was CONRAIL. The problems may, in
part, be attributable to the bankruptcy and subsequent reorganization of
the system.
The states interviewed identified the following additional sources of
hazardous substances for which industry response is sometimes inade-
quate:
« small trucks
• abandoned mines
• old chemical plants owned by small operators
• abandoned disposal facilities
• illegal (clandestine) dumps of hazardous materials
(particularly in New Jersey and Pennsylvania)
States have adopted a variety of strategies using state regulatory powers
to prevent future spills. Pennsylvania and Louisiana have tied spill pre-
vention requirements into their state permit programs. Mississippi uses
the leverage from the NPDES program to obtain improvements in fixed facil-
ities.
Pollution fines and penalties (see Chapter V) are also used to obtain
preventive measures by industry. There is a basic difference in the use
of penalty powers between state and Federal governments. State govern-
ments interviewed, such as Indiana and Ohio, indicated a willingness to
reduce or forego fines and penalties when proper corrective actions are
taken. States which used their own penalty powers flexibly to encourage
corrective action by industry expressed annoyance at Federal spill penal-
ties which were assessed without consideration of the corrective actions
taken.
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Four states interviewed (Arkansas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Ohio) expressed
concern about the availability of adequate disposal sites for the wastes
coming from hazardous material spills. Most states are concerned about
releases from inadequate disposal sites. States without adequate disposal
sites (Kentucky, Pennsylvania) are also concerned about disposal facilities
and look to the Federal government for assistance. Arkansas, on the other
hand, has a hazardous waste incinerator and is concerned about the wastes
being transferred into the state for disposal. A network of Federally-
owned disposal sites was suggested by some state officials as the answer
to providing readily accessible and safe disposal.
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E. COSTS
1. Special Funds
Many environmental emergencies require containment or clean-up actions
which are beyond the capability of state agencies. Special contractors
are needed, and special funds are necessary to hire such contractors.
Less than one-third of the fifty states appear to have such special
funds.
Relatively few states have large contingency funds to be used for the
clean up of hazardous substance spills. Ten coastal states have spill
clean-up funds exceeding $100,000, but the use of these funds is clearly
restricted to oil in major states including Maine, New York and Washington.
Of the eleven states interviewed in depth, only New Jersey had a major
($25 million) spill clean-up fund available, and this fund is not usable
in some environmental emergencies because it is restricted to a predesig-
nated list of hazardous substances. As a general rule, these larger
coastal funds are supported by a levy on oil transfer or terminals—New
Jersey, for example, imposes a $.01 per barrel tax on oil to support its
fund. Even where state law authorizes the use of the fund for clean up
of non-oil hazardous substances, no provision is made for taxing these
substances.
A slightly larger group of states has smaller amounts of money available
for hazardous substance clean up. These monies are usually collected
from pollution fines or levies imposed after clean up. in previous spills.
Of the eleven states interviewed in depth, three states had access to
special funds of this type. The states were Mississippi, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania. Procedures were available for the release of these funds
for emergency clean-up contracts, but because of the small size of the
fund, contracts rarely exceeded a few thousand dollars. Each of the three
states indicated that they would expect Federal assistance from the §311 k
fund for large scale clean-up operations. In addition to Mississippi,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania, we have been able to identify six other states
with access to a small, special fund for clean-up contracts (see Appendix 1)
Slightly more than two-thirds of the states have no contingency fund for
hazardous substance clean up.* (This includes coastal states with an "oil
only" pollution fund.) Limited government sponsored clean up may occur
in these states if the Highway Departments use maintenance crews or con-
tractors to clear away a truck accident releasing hazardous materials.
In Colorado and California, the Highway Department undertook such clean
ups regularly. In the Golden State, Cal Trans maintenance crews had re-
ceived special training in the identification and handling of hazardous
substances. Off of state highways, the states without a contingency
fund have no way of initiating clean up after a hazardous chemical re-
lease. In at least one such state—Arkansas—state officials considered
themselves fortunate that major incidents to date had been adequately
handled by industry. States without contingency funds which were inter-
viewed indicated that they would seek assistance from the Federal govern-
*"Some states have funds authorized by law, but money has not been appro-
priated.
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ment (§311 k fund) for spills which could not be cleaned up by industry
or state personnel.
Emergency reserves or disaster funds might offer another source of funds
in the event of environmental emergencies. Indiana, for example, indi-
cated that it might draw on the Governor's emergency reserve in a very
serious situation, but to date, this has not been done. Use of disaster
funds may require declaration of a disaster or state of emergency by
the Governor, and our state interviews did not identify any incident
where the extraordinary powers available in a disaster have been acti-
vated for an environmental emergency. We concluded that state disaster
funds are a potential, but unlikely source of funding in very large in-
cidents which directly threaten the public health of large numbers of
people. Such funds will not be used in more common hazardous substance
releases.
States in our in-depth study which did have access to a contingency fund—
New Jersey, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Ohio—each stated that the
threat of using the fund was as important as the actual expenditure of
funds to hire contractors. When a state can initiate a clean-up contract
and collect costs from the spiller, environmental officials have been
successful in forcing the spiller to clean up. States without contingency
funds stated that they had been generally successful in obtaining industry
clean up, but almost all of those we interviewed wanted access to a clean-
up fund to push reluctant spillers and clean up the small percentage of
spills where there is no industry response. Funds are used infrequently
(less than ten times per year) in those states which have them, and state
officials indicated that industry failed to respond and clean up in less
than 10% of reported spills.
2. Operating Costs
Of the states we interviewed in depth, only Ohio and New Jersey had sub-
stantial spill response units. New Jersey is expanding to 26 professional
staff. The 1979 operating budget of $660,000 came from the special fund,
raised by a l£/per barrel oil levy. Funding of spill response units from
oil levies occurs in other coastal states. In Ohio, spill response unit
salaries, estimated at $150,000 to $200,000 per year, are paid by state
funds appropriated to the Office of Administration of the Ohio Environ-
mental Protection Agency.
In none of the other nine states interviewed was there a special "spill
response" or environmental emergency operating budget, although Indiana
and Connecticut had employees largely dedicated to spill response. Thus,
it is impossible to obtain a total cost for the resources currently com-
mitted to these functions in the states. In general, personnel who res-
pond to an environmental emergency are drawn from the monitoring and
enforcement groups operating state or NPDES wastewater discharge permit
programs. As a result, environmental emergency response activities are
indirectly supported by Federal §106 planning grants, which pay some
of these monitoring and enforcement salaries. Emergency response thus
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reduces the number of man-years available for meeting other objectives
in state and Federal pollution control programs.
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F. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS
The frequency and nature of contacts between the U.S. EPA and state
governments clearly varies between EPA regions. Even when we allow for
the bais introduced by interviewing state officials, this difference is
significant. California, Arkansas, Louisiana and Connecticut reported
infrequent on-scene contact with EPA when hazardous substances are re-
leased. In the coastal states (California, Louisiana, and Connecticut)
state officials worked more frequently with the Coast Guard.
Regions IV and VIII—where we interveiwed officials in Colorado, Kentucky,
and Mississippi—appeared to have the most frequent contacts with EPA
Regional Offices. On-scene response by Federal officials appeared to be
most frequent in these states. States in Regions II, III and V (New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Indiana interviewed) appeared to have less
frequent contact with EPA officials, but these states did expect EPA in-
volvement and assistance in most major incidents.
Each of the eleven states where we conducted interviews desires to retain
control of environmental emergencies within state boundaries. One state,
Louisiana, felt Federal standards for clean up might be unrealistically
high. In general, state officials felt that their responsibilities for
public health and the environment required them to supervise response
to these situations. Only when Federal clean-up funds are required are
they clearly willing to cede control of an incident to a Federal coordin-
ator.
This position was stressed by relatively high officials in state capitals.
EPA Regional Office personnel report incidents where state personnel are
glad to have the EPA coordinator take charge at a site. Inexperienced
field personnel may welcome a Federal takeover, but the heads of the
state agencies, whom we interviewed, stressed the importance of state
management of emergencies.
The area of State-Federal cooperation most widely recognized in our inter-
views was the laboratory analysis of air and water samples resulting from
a hazardous substance release. Seven states have no laboratories avail-
able. Another thirteen states were described as limited in laboratory
capability in the survey of fifty states. Even states with relatively
sophisticated laboratories may be swamped by the volume of samples in an
emergency. These states welcome the assistance from EPA laboratories
which has been provided in the past. One or two officials complained
that sample results had not been distributed to all state and local agen-
cies involved in spill response. Such complaints were infrequent.
State officials have perceived a problem described by on-scene coordina-
tors from EPA Regional Offices. Many branches of a Regional Office do
not place a high priority on emergency response. Kentucky officials des-
cribed an incident where they needed advice on tolerance for a harmful
organic released into a water supply after a derailment. When the inform-
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ation was not available from the Regional Office, the state finally sought
advice directly from EPA in Washington.
One source of friction between state and Federal officials in the past
has been the handling of press relations. Some state personnel are annoyed
by the publicity attendant upon EPA response to an environmental emergency,
particularly because state management of smaller incidents often receives
little publicity. A more important problem occurs in releasing information
to the press. In some incidents, such as the 1977 carbon tetrachloride
spill in the Ohio River, EPA released statements and public advisories
without consulting with responsible state government officials. Statements
by the State of Ohio and EPA appeared to be directly contradictory, and
Ohio officials told us they were embarrassed when asked for comment by
the press because they had not read the EPA release. A clear protocol
for joint State-Federal press releases, incorporated in an expanded con-
tingency plan, might relieve these strains in the future.
Our interviews showed that good working relationships had developed be-
tween many state officials and EPA Regional Offices. The tenure of state
officials (in the Central Office) who handle environmental emergencies is
relatively long. Most of those we interviewed had been involved for at
least five to ten years, and the majority were career employees of the
state agency. In contrast, Coast Guard Commanders who work with these
state officails in coastal areas and along the Mississippi River system
are rotated periodically. Working arrangements such as notification pro-
cedures developed with one Coast Guard Commander are not known to his
successor, and problems between the Coast Guard and the state recur
periodically. States are diverse as Mississippi and Ohio reported this
problem.
In addition to laboratory analysis and clean-up funding, disposal is another
area in which state governments already look to the Federal government for
assistance. States without full hazardous waste disposal sites needed
Federal help in arranging for disposal. In Arkansas, where a hazardous
waste incinerator is located, the state was also concerned about the im-
portation of wastes. The interviews were completed before the recent
Supreme Court decision in the case of New Jersey vs Pennslyvania which bars
states with disposal sites from placing an embargo on the importation of
hazardous wastes. At the time of the interviews, officials in states
without hazardous waste disposal sites suggested that a network of dis-
posal facilities on Federal land might be the only answer to the disposal
dilemma.
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IV. IN-DEPTH STUDY IN ELEVEN STATES
To gain a deeper understanding of state operations, we traveled to eleven
states to interview officials charged with administering different aspects
of each state's spill response program. The eleven states selected were
chosen to cover a wide spectrum of problems and program capabilities. Our
selections were based, in part, on comments made by Environmental Emergency
coordinators from EPA Regional Offices. At a Washington meeting on January
23 and 24, 1978, these EPA officials were asked to indicate states that
were candidates for in-depth interviews.
We have attempted to include a broad range of state programs. Some states
have funds and well developed spill response units; other states rely on
more informal responses when hazardous chemicals are released. Some states
are large and some are small. Some have concentrations of the petroleum
and chemical industries. Some are densely populated, some are quite rural.
Each has experienced trouble with the unintended release of hazardous
chemicals.
On-site interviews were completed between February 27 and March 27, 1978.
Up to six agencies and offices, and as many as ten state officials, were
interviewed in each state.
State officials were remarkably helpful, and made large amounts of time
available for interviews. A genuine concern for the threat from major
chemical spills was expressed by almost all the respondents. Many offered
valuable insights into both administrative and technical problems associ-
ated with spill response. States are eager to learn what EPA will do,
but they are also interested in developments in other states. A number
of officials asked us to compare operations in their state with other
states we have observed.
Interviews were conducted using an interview guide which had originally
been developed to seek information from fifty states. We used the inter-
view guide as a starting point for each interview. However, we departed
readily from this guide when state experience cast new light on particu-
lar problems. We encouraged state officials to tell us about specific
incidents which had raised concern in the past. In some cases, we were
able to observe the handling of an environmental emergency which occurred
during our visit to the state.
The names of all officails interviewed, and summary notes from each inter-
view, are on file at Arthur D. Little, Inc. The summaries provided here
distill information obtained from multiple sources in each state. We
have attempted to be as objective as possible, but some element of inter-
pretation and judgment has been necessary in distilling nearly one hundred
hours of interviews.
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We would like to thank all the state officials interviewed, as well as
EPA Regional Office staff, for their cooperation and assistance.
The material on each state is presented in the following sections:
1. Summary
Highlights of the state, including any particular strengths or innovative
approaches, are briefly noted.
2. Laws
Major state statutes affecting the response to environmental emergencies
are briefly presented. Included are:
• generalized emergency powers,
• public health emergency powers,
• specialized spill statutes (if any), and
• prohibitions on air and water pollution.
3. Organization
In this section, we discuss each of the agencies or offices which play
a role in responding to environmental emergencies. Mechanisms for coor-
dinating state agencies are reviewed. An organization chart showing the
location in the government of state agencies with major responsibilities
is included for each state at the end of the text for each state.
(Figures 1-11)
4. Communications
Systems for state notification of spills or accidents, and procedures for
evaluating spill reports are outlined. The availability of radio com-
munications to state officials in the field is considered.
5. Operations
This section discusses the actual management of spills. State prepara-
tions, including training and equipment are reviewed. If the state will
undertake clean up, directly or under contract, these actions are dis-
cussed.
6. Clean Up and Prevention
State officials were asked to indicate the record of industry in cleaning
up chemical spills in the state. Significant comments on industry res-
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ponse are presented here. State actions to prevent spills or environmental
emergencies (fines, conditions on discharge permits, transportation regula-
tions) are also discussed here.
7. Costs
Each state was asked to indicate the resources committed to spill response.
If the state has a contingency fund for clean up (formal or informal), the
amount of such fund is indicated here. Where a special spill unit exists
and is budgeted separately, we have indicated the amount of the operating
budget. A few states were able to give us statistics on the effort ex-
pended on spill response by groups budgeted for other purposes (highway
maintenance departments), but many states were unable to provide any cost
data.
8. Problems
Significant problems in environmental emergency response recognized by
state officials are discussed here.
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A. ARKANSAS
1. Summary
Spill responses are coordinated on a 24-hour basis through the Office of
Emergency Services (OES) pursuant to a state-wide Emergency Operations
Plan (EOF). Although several state agencies are involved in spill res-
ponse activities, the Department of Health (DOH) and the Department of
Pollution Control and Ecology (DPC&E) have lead responsibilities and
have radio-equipped vehicles operating on the OES communications net.
DPC&E1s responsibilities of containment, clean-up, and monitoring are
supported by DOH, which also is responsible for direct public health as-
pects of hazardous materials spills. The coordination role of OES,
under the EOP, enables necessary support to be provided upon request to
the lead agencies.
Arkansas does not have a contingency fund for spill clean ups and this
is a major concern to state officials who feel that the state has been
lucky that the persons responsible for spills to date have had sufficient
financial resources to cover clean-up costs. Although contingency funds
for containment and clean up are not available, the state laws adminis-
tered by DPC&E do permit DPC&E to recover costs associated with investi-
gations and restoring environmental damage.
The Governor's office has been actively engaged in developing a stronger
capability for responding to the broad spectrum of problems associated
with hazardous materials and toxic substances. Recently, a cabinet-level
police committee was formed by the Governor, along with other working
committees which have more specific charges, such as evaluating and im-
proving the state's emergency response capabilities.
2. Laws
The Department of Pollution Control and Ecology is enabled by the Arkansas
Statutes Annotated §82-1901, et.seq., to regulate, monitor, and dispense
permits for activities incidental to the pollution of the air and waters
of the state. Fines for water pollution violations may not exceed $10,000
per day; an additional civil penalty of up to $5,000 may be assessed to
reimburse the state for investigating, removing, or correcting the adverse
effect of the pollution as well as compensating the state for loss of
wildlife, fish, or aquatic life.
The Emergency Services Act of 1973 (§11-1935), provides for the services
of local and state agencies in the event of major "man-caused" catastro-
phies. State and local health boards are also empowered to react to any
situation posing health problems by virtue of incorporation within the
Emergency Services Act as well as independent, statutory authorization in
§2-201, et.seq.
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The Hazardous Material Transportation Act of 1977 (§76-2901, et.seq.)
requires the transporter or carrier of hazardous materials to promptly
notify the Arkansas State Police of the escape of a hazardous material
from its immediate container.
3. Organization
DPC&E manages the state's air and water pollution control programs as well
as the state's solid waste program. It is the state's designated agency
on the Federal Regional Response Team under §311 of the FWPCA. The Depart-
ment does not have a special spill unit. Instead, spills are normally
monitored by field personnel who are involved with routine inspection and
monitoring programs and who are closest to the scene. Technical (chemical,
engineering, biological) support is provided from the central office as
indicated by the individual situation.
The Arkansas Department of Health operates the Safe Drinking Water Program.
An active emergency response program is maintained by the Environmental
Health Bureau, Arkansas Department of Health. Environmental Health main-
tains an emergency communications van and supervises the Department's
response to disasters such as tornadoes. Environmental Health also main-
tains a 24-hour capability to respond to toxic substance spills using
staff in the Little Rock headquarters or 200 sanitarians stationed through-
out the state.
Fire fighting is handled by local fire departments, with the assistance
of the Forestry Commission in rural areas. The State Fire Marshall does
not take an active role during disaster response. Evacuations would be
ordered by local public officials, and carried out by the sheriff and the
State Police.
OES actively coordinates the efforts of responding agencies during an
emergency. Incident reports are relayed to affected state agencies through
the OES 24-hour communications center. OES area and county coordinators
are available throughout the state and serve as coordination links at the
accident scene. The recently revised disaster plan has a full section on
man-made disasters, including hazardous material spills. This assigns
specific responsibilities to each state agency, depending upon the nature
of the incident. DPC&E is assigned the environmental clean-up role. This
assignment is modified by an agreement between DPC&E and DOH wherein the
two departments agree to coordinate their emergency response and notify
OES of the plan of action. DPC&E assumes control of containment, clean-
up, and monitoring. The response of the Health Department is to handle
essential medical care and health protection.
4. Communications
OES serves as the state's communication center and Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) for spill responses. Spill reports are funneled through the
EOC to affected agencies (local, state and Federal) and to the media, if
the spills are significant. The State Police relay reports of hazardous
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material spills to OES. Spills are reported, via OES, to both DOH and
DPC&E. Spills distant from populated areas are typically "worked" pri-
marily by DPC&E, whereas spills in populated areas require coordinated
response of both DOH and DPC&E.
Normal surveillance activities of DPC&E result in the detection and re-
porting of some spills which are not otherwise reported. Additionally,
provisions of regulations enforced by DPC&E and permits issued by DPC&E
require industries to report certain "upset conditions," including spills.
Whenever the Department detects, or has reported to it, spills transmitted
to DOH and OES DPC&E, depending upon the nature of the spill, may also
notify other agencies such as the Game and Fish Commission, EPA, Corps
of Engineers, and the Coast Guard. Such notifications may also be accom-
panied by a request for assistance.
Assistance in communications, coordination and reconnaissance at the spill
scene is provided by local law enforcement agencies and State Police upon
request of DOH, DPC&E and OES.
Using DPC&E or Department of Health radios, on-scene personnel at the
spill site communicate directly or by relay to headquarters personnel.
Such communications primarily relate to material identification, safety
precautions, and procedures for containment and clean up. Headquarters
personnel communicate via telephone with GHEMTREC, the shipper, manu-
facturer and other persons having information which would be useful to
field personnel.
5. Operations
DPC&E may request equipment for containment or other forms of assistance
from state and Federal agencies. Typically, this request is made through
OES; and OES, using information available to it (such as call lists and
information held by the area coordinator), calls for equipment which is
nearest to the scene and which meets the request of DPC&E. To further
augment this capability, the Governor has directed the National Guard
to train and equip teams which could move to the scene at short notice.
Arkansas has no contingency fund to hire clean-up contractors. Officials
at DPC&E attempt to get spillers to undertake environmentally sound clean-
up, and have been generally successful. After the wreck of one truck full
of hazardous waste, a stream was diverted and the contaminated stream bed
buried at an estimated cost of $500,000.
In the event of a full-scale toxic substance catastrophe, where the
Governor declared a state emergency, it would be possible to obtain
special state funds and Federal assistance reserved for natural disasters,
or to call up a substantial contingent of the National Guard.
As with other states interviewed, Arkansas has no capacity to work in
highly hazardous environments and patch leaking containers of toxic gas.
Cooperation from the military has been good, and Air Force technicians
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in "moon suits" were called in from an Arkansas missile base to repair a
leaking tank truck which contained boron trifluoride.
Laboratory capacity in the state appears good. DPC&E and DOH have well-
equipped laboratories which can be manned 24 hours a day. DOH also has
on-site toxic gas sampling kits for personnel responding from the Little
Rock office. EPA labs have been used for backup, as a source of standards
and for consultative services relative to analytical methodologies.
While Arkansas is not reluctant to seek advice from EPA, the presence of
Federal on-scene coordinators has been infrequent in the past. "Creeping
environmental emergencies" - such as pesticide residues - are an item
of real concern in the minds of Governor Proyor's staff, and they have
been seeking clarification from EPA on the role of the states in regulating
toxic substances under TSCA.
The Game and Fish Commission conducts assessments of wildlife losses
associated with spills and advises DPC&E in writing of the estimated wild-
life replacement costs. DPC&E, in turn, requires, under the laws which it
administers, the person responsible for the spill to compensate the Game
and Fish Commission for the loss. Funds so recovered are used by the
Game and Fish Commission to restore wildlife in the affected area. Game
and Fish can, and has, banned fishing and hunting in areas affected by
spills. Typically, this is done in conjunction with Health and DPC&E.
6. Clean Up and Prevention
Spill prevention measures are increasingly the subject of consideration
in Arkansas. Spill prevention considerations are being integrated into
the DPC&E permit system. Regulatory measures involving the transportation
of hazardous materials have been undertaken by the Arkansas Transportation
Commission, the Commission did adopt DOT regulations for intra-state
transport of hazardous materialsand increased insurance requirements, al-
though additional regulations suggested by DPC&E and DOH were rejected as
unduly costly. State officials are interested in the tightening of Federal
DOT regulations which would effectively prevent spills.
Prevention of spills is a primary consideration of the Governor's Committee
on Toxic Substances and Hazardous Materials which is reviewing the adequacy
of existing regulations and developing information and informational programs
designed to acquaint workers with appropriate spill prevention measures.
DPC&E's major involvement after a spill is the supervision of the industry's
clean up effort. The railroads, the trucking industry and fixed facilities
are improving their response to spills which threaten the environment.
Although Arkansas has not yet experienced a spill which caused environ-
mental clean-up costs to exceed the transporters' financial capability,
Arkansas officials recognize the possibility, if not probability,.that a
spill could occur which would greatly exceed the transporters financial
capability.
1-33
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A hazardous waste incinerator is located at El Dorado, and the state is
worried about the increased amount of hazardous waste in transit. However,
no actions have yet been taken to restrict import of wastes, and the
state does not have a fully permitted land disposal site. Because the
state cannot undertake clean-up operations, location of a disposal site
for spilled materials has apparently been left to the spiller and his
clean-up contractor.
7. Costs
Because Arkansas spill response builds upon existing programs, there is
no estimate of the operating cost of such activities. Health Department
capability is built upon traditional Environmental Health appropriations.
Response from Pollution Control and Ecology is drawn from activities
funded with §106 grants, and costs are minimal because emergency res-
ponse is not recognized in planning grants.
The Office of Emergency Services did receive a $250,000_grant from the
Federal Diaster Assistance Agency in 1975 to revise the State's disaster
contingency plan. Part of this grant was used to develop the section
in the new state plan on man-made diaster, including hazardous chemical
spills.
8. Problems
All Arkansas officials felt a need for a contingency fund which could be
used for spills where §311 funds could not be used-
DPC&E feels the categorical funding of EPA programs (air, water, solid
waste, etc.), as well as the provisions of §311, have slowed the develop-
ment of the state's response capabilities. §311 can be used only in certain
situations and it is the only major provision of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act which does not explicitly provide for, and encourage, assump-
tion of parallel activities by the states. Because the development of
state response capabilities has not thus far occupied a high and discrete-
ly visible priority within any EPA program, DPC&E's allocation of program
resources for such purposes has been minimal and time spent in responding
to spills detracts from time committed to other formally recognized EPA
program elements. DPC&E would like to see a specific Federal grant for
training, equipment, and planning of spill response. Although Federal
financial assistance is desired, the state clearly wants to maintain
prime responsibility for supervision of emergency response.
A similar situation exists in DOH where the development of spill response
capabilities has been limited to traditional Environmental Health appro-
priations. Neither officials of DOH or DPC&E feel that existing appropria-
tions provide sufficient funds or authority to develop sufficiently trained
and equipped response teams.
1-34
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Hazardous material information systems developed by the Federal govern-
ment have not effectively been made available to Arkansas. The Health
Department had not heard of CHRIS and was attempting to develop a computer
system containing toxicological information on hazardous materials which
is similar, in part, to OHM-TADS. Health officials would like to see
hazardous material information systems such as OHM-TADS supplemented
with instructions for medical treatment of those exposed to specific
chemicals.
Arkansas officials cited the inaccuracy of bills of lading or garbled
transmission of information from cargo manifests as real problems in
directing emergency response. One truck loaded with supposedly innocu-
ous wastes turned out to be contaminated with a highly hazardous pesticide.
DPC&E officials would like to have hard copy transmission of cargo mani-
fests to avoid garbled communications from radio operators who are not
trained in chemical terminology.
1-35
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GOVERNOR'S
COMMITTEE
ON TOXIC
HAZARDOUS
MATERIAL
policy planning
and coordination
DEPARTMENT OF
POLLUTION
CONTROL &
ECOLOGY
i
OJ
coordinate
response
assess &
collect
fines
technical
experts
MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT
DEPARTMENT
OF
HEALTH
ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH BUREAU
OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY
SERVICES
LABORATORY
200 FIELD
SANITARIANS
SAFE DRINK-
ING WATER
emergency
medical advice
monitoring of
public health
effects
investigate
spills
disaster con-
tingency plan;
(emergency
operations)
24-hour commut
cations centei
field coordin
ators
FIELD
PERSONNEL
supervise clean up
investigate spills
Figure 1 - ARKANSAS
-------
B. CALIFORNIA
1. Summary
Several_agencies play a major r;9le_in the California chemical spill res-
ponse effort although none have been designated to lake a clear formal^
lead in all situations. Different agencies play a"leading role for differ-
ent aspects of spill response.
The Fish and Game Department is designated as the lead agency for oil
spills under the Oil Spill Contingency Plan; as such the Department's
state-wide network of wardens has experience and training in on-scene co-
ordination for oil. On occasion, the Oil Spill Contingency Plan proce-
dures have been used during chemical spills and Fish and Game Department
personnel have played a lead role.
The California Department of Transportation (Cal Trans) responds to all
spills on public roads and assumes responsibility for clean up, either
with Department road maintenance crews or with private clean-up contractors.
The California Department of Health provides on-scene coordination and moni-
toring for all disposal of hazardous waste.
The Office of Emergency Services (OES) is the lead agency for all disaster
and contingency planning in the state, including oil spills. OES provides
an excellent 24-hour interagency communication system for all emergencies,
(including chemical releases) and coordinates the efforts of other state
agencies during a disaster.
Federal EPA participation is rarely solicited by any of the state agencies,
but EPA personnel may arrive on-scene for major incidents, particularly if
they occur in the Los Angeles or San Francisco areas. The Coast Guard will
play a lead role in situations involving marine and tidal waters and their
assistance is sought in these situations by the Fish and Game Department
and Cal Trans.
Most of the major agencies which are involved in chemical spills are operat-
ing their response programs under less than optimum conditions. Response
to chemical spills is ad hoc in both the Department of Health and the Fish
and Game Department; neither agency has been specifically mandated to res-
pond to such spills. In addition, the Department of Health has sought and
not received an appropriation for a contingency fund. The Fish and Game
Department, which has operated traditionally from a fee-sponsored budget,
feels its budget must be expanded to meet its increasing burden of environ-
mental functions. To date, it has not received sufficient support for
increased funds, including those which would be used in support of the
Department's emergency response activities.
1-37
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OES recognizes the need to provide leadership in coordination of response
to chemical spills, but its requests for sufficient state funding from
the legislature to take the lead in providing a formal contingency and
response plan for chemical emergencies have been denied.
Several features of the California response program warrant favorable
mention. These include:
• A history of contingency planning, including the oil spill
plan, which has given all major state agencies experience
in coordinated emergency response.
• Major involvement of the most regionalized agency, the Fish
and Game Department, which allows for a low response time
and fosters strong on-scene relationships among personnel
who have worked together in previous situations. For ex-
ample, when fire fighters ignore environmental considera-
tions, the local game warden may readily work with the
Fire Chief to change operating practices.
• An excellent communication system and 24-hour communica-
tions center.
• Specialized training of highway maintenance personnel (Cal
Trans) in the recognition and clean up of hazardous material.
2. Laws
Section 13305 of the California Water Code provides for the abatement
of pollution or nuisance caused by an industry or business whenever
ordered by a Regional Water Quality Control Board. The Board is em-
powered to abate the condition in absence of compliance with such an
order, and thereafter attach a lien to the property of the offender for
the costs of abatement and removal. Refusal to comply with an abatement
order may also result in a fine of up to $6,000 per day (§13350).
All monies collected under (§13305 and §13350) are to be deposited in
the State Water Quality Control Fund established in §13400. Within the
Water Quality Control Fund there is a Water Pollution Clean Up and Abate-
ment Account, derived from all civil penalties and one-half of the crimi-
nal fines collected thereunder, provided that the Clean Up and Abatement
Account shall not exceed $25,000 at any time. The State Water Quality
Control Board may transfer, upon request, monies from the Clean Up and
Abatement Account to other public agencies with authority to clean up a
waste or abate its effect on the waters of the state (§13442).
The California Emergency Services Act (Gov. Code §8550, et.seq.), defines
a state of emergency necessary for the Governor to invoke state-wide
emergency services as the "existence of conditions of disaster or of ex-
treme peril to the safety of persons and property within the state caused
by such conditions as air pollution...or other conditions...which condi-
1-38
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tions, by reason of their magnitude, are or are likely to be beyond the
control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any
single county, or city....". The absence of a specific mention of water
pollution within this statute is probably due to a later §8579.1, et.seq.,
which specifically addresses oil spills, and incorporates funding from the
State Water Pollution Clean Up and Abatement Account. However, this
statute refers only to oil spills, and does not pertain to hazardous
chemical discharges.
Under the Health and Safety Code, a health district board may transfer
its powers to a comprehensive environmental agency of the same juris-
diction (§1155). In the event of a local health emergency, the local
health officer is granted vague and broad powers over all environmental
health programs (§1155.7).
The Hazardous Waste Control Law (Health and Safety Code §25100, et.seq.),
in additon to regulating the transport,' storage, and disposal of hazardous
wastes, requires that all persons transporting hazardous wastes shall
keep with them a list setting forth the composition, amount, origin, and
destination of those wastes. Such list may also include information on
antidotes, first aid, or safety measures to be employed in the event of
accident (§25160).
3. Organization
In the Fish and Game Department the response effort is organized around
the 300 wardens located throughout the state. Involvement in chemical
spill response is a nutural extension of their lead in the oil spill pro-
gram. To supplement regular staff, the Department has two so-called
pollution wardens who are available for immediate response anywhere in
the state. They are called by the area warden if their assistance is
required.
The Department feels a need for a special contingency plan for chemical
emergency response, but currently utilizes the procedures established
under the oil spill plan. There is no contingency fund which the wardens
can draw upon for on-scene clean up.
Cal Trans has a designated response team in each of its several districts
throughout the state. Each team has been trained in response to chemical
spills and consists of 3 to 5 people. These "identification teams"
minimally consist of a superintendent, an assistant superintendent, and
a district landscape specialist. They are dispatched to all incidents
which occur on the state's public roads.
Cal Trans operates using the procedures identified in the state Oil Spill
Contingency Plan. At local request, the agency has assisted approximately
15 local areas, primarily city and county jurisdictions, in preparation of
transportation contingency plans for spill incidents, including chemical
spills.
1-39
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Cal Trans has no contingency fund, although it regularly uses the highway
maintenance budget to employ clean-up contractors. Often, the agency
prefers to initiate clean up using these funds and collect from spillers
later rather than wait for spillers to contract directly with clean-up firms,
The spill response program in the Department of Health lies with the
Division of Hazardous Materials and Waste Management which has responsi-
bility for the management of hazardous waste. Under California state law
any material which is spilled becomes a waste and must be disposed of in
an approved manner. The Division does not operate under any specific
contingency plan, but works with the other agencies using procedures de-
veloped for the oil spill plan.
There are no formally designated positions for spill response within the
Division. However, approximately six persons do provide on-scene coor-
dination, and two of these respond quite frequently. However, the Depart-
ment is in the process of revising parts of its organization structure
and staffing so that spill response will be specifically designated in
certain job descriptions. In addition, hiring over the next 12 to 20
months should allow response personnel to focus more on preparedness for
spills.
Often, DOH personnel arrive relatively late on scene and focus on moni-
toring the disposal operations. However, the Division personnel have no
funds from which to hire contractors.
Division response personnel have not had training specifically addressed
to spill response. However, Division adminstrators believe that their
extensive training in waste disposal problems is adequate training for
their role in most response situations.
The OES operates primarily from its central facility in Sacramento, but
has four area offices from which personnel can be dispatched to incidents.
With regard to emergency spills, the agency's primary role is coordination
of interagency planning and communication. However, completion of a multi-
agency planning effort for chemical crises has been unsuccessful to date
because of the lack of funds and the lack of agreement on agency roles.
During a chemical emergency, OES operates its communications center using
procedures established under the oil spill plan.
The California State Fire Marshall's office serves as a resource and pro-
vides technical assistance to local fire authorities. The office has no
direct authority over local fire departments, but prepares education and
training guidelines and standards for local fire fighters.
The California Highway Patrol does not have designated chemical response
organizations or teams. Officers are dispersed throughout the state, are
connected to a 24-hour dispatcher, and are dispatched to all incidents on
the state's public roads. They consider their response to chemical emer-
gencies as just one of many emergency situations to which they respond on
a frequent and regular basis.
1-40
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4. Communications
The Fish and Game Department does not have a 24-hour phone number or dis-
patcher. During working hours, calls come to the district, or directly
to the area wardens. During non-work hours all calls go directly to the
wardens. The majority of calls are received from the Highway Patrol or
from local fire and police officials. These persons, as well as OES,
have up-to-date phone numbers for all of the area wardens. In addition,
the wardens are on the police radio network and if they cannot be reached
at home they can be accessed through their vehicle radios. This call
system has been considered satisfactory except for occasional delays in
receiving calls from the Coast Guard.
In accord with the state's Oil Spill Contingency Plan, the Fish and Game
Department notifies the OES of all oil spills; OES then notifies other
agencies. Because as yet there is no formal plan for chemical spills,
the Fish and Game Department may use discretion in notification of OES.
However, many small and virtually all medium to large spills are reported
to OES.
Gal Trans receives the majority of its calls from the Highway Patrol, the
local sheriff's offices, or from its own maintenance crews. Occasionally,
it will receive its first notification of an incident from OES.
The agency maintains a 24-hour phone system with a dispatcher who receives
descriptive information about an incident and dispatches the district
identification team to the scene. The dispatcher also notifies various
other agencies, depending on the nature of the problem. The Highway Patrol
will be notified if they have not received notification, and occasionally
Federal EPA is notified. If there is a potential for water pollution,
the Fish and Game Department and the California Regional Water Quality
Board, and perhaps the Health Department also are notified.
The Department of Health does not maintain a 24-hour phone and dispatch
system. During work hours, the Department's offices are called and appro-
priate persons are dispatched from there. Following regular work hours,
the OES and the Highway Patrol utilize the home numbers of Department
personnel. These persons then decide whether or not someone from the
Department of Health will be immediately dispatched to the scene, and
notify the appropriate person immediately or the following day, depending
on the nature of the incident. Department personnel may also, on occa-
sion, call the scene and advise Public Safety officials of appropriate
response actions.
OES maintains a 24-hour emergency communication center staffed by trained
personnel. Communication staff have a detailed check list of data to
obtain from the caller, including the spills potential for pollution of
water. The dispatcher may use. his or her discretion to determine which
agencies to call, but in general a standard group of agencies is contacted
for chemical spills. These include the regional Water Quality Control
Board, the Fish and Game Department, and frequently the Department of
1-41
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Health and Highway Patrol. In certain situations, local officials will
be notified.
5. Operations
The Fish and Game Department, Cal Trans, and the Highway Patrol will dis-
patch personnel to the scene of all incidents. The Department of Health
does not use formal criteria to determine whether to dispatch personnel
but will assess the severity of the clean up and disposal problems on a
case-by-case basis.
In most incidents, Cal Trans or the Fish and Game Department assume the
lead role on-scene. If a Federal agency is involved, particularly the
Coast Guard, that agency may assume the lead. As in most states, fire
authorities have on-scene command during the initial phases of an incident
involving fire or high fire potential. To date, attempts at pre-incident
contingency planning have not successfully resolved conflicts which some-
times occur between agencies in the assertion of on-scene command.
The Fish and Game Department has virtually no response equipment, although
the Department would like to equip its people with basic personal protec-
tive gear and some mobile van units to be used for on-site analysis.
Standard sampling equipment is available to the local wardens and the
pollution wardens. In addition, each pollution warden has the CHRIS man-
ual.
The state laboratory in Sacramento is adequate for most spill-related needs
of the Fish.and Game Department. The laboratory has an excellent organics
capability, and when it is not available, commercial laboratories are
used. In addition, the Department has a small, sparsely equipped field
laboratory van which it desires to improve.
Although the Fish and Game Department relies on Cal Trans or the spiller
to contract for clean up, frequently a Department fund is drawn upon to
obtain immediate services, equipment and supplies for containment. Up
to $500 per incident can be used in this manner.
Cal Trans has more response equipment than most other agencies. The iden-
tification teams have personal protective gear, including breathing appara-
tus, sampling devices, and radio communications equipment.
Cal Trans regularly employs clean-up contractors from the agency's main-
tenance budget which is subsequently reimbursed by collections from
spillers. To date, spillers have not objected to this practice and have
readily reimbursed Cal Trans for contractor expenses. In the metropoli-
tan districts, certain contractors are retained on a task order basis
and average contractor response time has been low—approximately one to
one and a half hours.
Department of Health personnel have a moderate amount of equipment for
spill response. The Department maintains two trucks equipped with
1-42
-------
personal protective gear including air packs, gas masks, and an emergency
shower.
The State Fire Marshall's office does not provide equipment for response
but has established the California Mutual Aid system for fire fighters.
Under this system communities share equipment within pre-defined juris-
dictions. Information on the deployment of specialized equipment for
chemical response was not available.
There have been several training programs addressed to spill response in
California. These include programs sponsored by Cal Trans, the Fire
Marshall's office, the Federal EPA, and the OES (general emergency and
disaster training). Of these, Cal Trans' training appears to have been
the most comprehensive and to have reached the largest group of state
and local officials. Special note is to be made of the EPA training which
is a highly praised course on the prevention and handling of pesticide
fires.
The Fish and Gam Department wardens, primarily four-year college gradu-
ates with backgrounds in natural resources or law enforcement, have almost
no spill response training. A few of them may have recived a two-hour
awareness training at their squad level, but this would be only in dis-
tricts where there have been serious spill incidents.
Cal Trans has a state-wide training plan which requires that identifica-
tion team members receive spill response training. Team members have
been trained in a Cal Trans sponsored course. In addition, Cal Trans has
sponsored training for response personnel in other agencies. In recent
years, they sponsored a training program in three of Cal Trans districts
which was attended by approximately 30 persons representing local fire
and safety officials and members of the State Highway Patrol, Department
of Health, Department of Agriculture and the Federal EPA.
Cal Trans officials believe that their personnel currently have received
sufficient training but stress that additional training is needed by public
safety agencies and by the California Highway Patrol.
Although the academic backgrounds of Department of Health response per-
sonnel lie in the chemical and toxicological areas, they have had very
little training addressed to spill response. Department adminstrators
would support training addressed to the role of their personnel on scene.
The Highway Patrol is distinguished from other state agencies by its per-
ception of training needs. Agency officials believe that their personnel
have been adequately trained for emergency situations in general and do
not need additional spill response training, except for an awareness of
the potential dangers.
The California Fire Marshall's office sponsors training for state fire-
fighters, both paid and volunteer. Currently, the office is developing
education and training guidelines and standards for fire fighters. Upon
promulgation, these"will be the first requirements for fire fighters train-"
ing in the state.
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6. Clean Up and Prevention
The only state agency which has initiated a prevention program with in-
dustry is Cal Trans which initiated discussions with many of the area's
petrochemical companies several years ago. Although most of these com-
panies have responded with improved clean-up programs, Cal Trans would
like to see their relationship with industry strengthened.
Cal Trans officials believe that future prevention efforts should include
addition and revision of certain regulatory requirements. In particular,
they cited the 1,000 Ib. regulatory exemption for many chemicals and the
lack of specification regarding securing of containerized cargoes within
trucks. They also advocate additional requirements for color coding of
chemicals with dissolvable dye in order that response personnel can view
the scene of a spill from a distance and determine the attendant hazards.
Several of the agencies interviewed agreed that, in general, industry has
provided excellent assistance in response to chemical incidents in recent
years. In a few cases, industries have developed their own in-house clean-
up capability for response. In most cases, industry personnel have been
made available to supply the necessary technical expertise and advice on
chemical properties and appropriate handling.
7. Costs
Cost data was available only for Cal Trans. The following figures show
the approximate level of effort and costs for spill removal in only one
district
-------
Personnel in all agencies except Cal Trans need more spill response
training.
1-45
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M
I
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
FISH AND GAME
DEPARTMENT
maintains 24-
hr phone system
to receive
reports
dispatch
identification
teams
technical
assistance to
communities'
contingency
planning
dispatches
warden to
scene
Pollution
Wardens (2)
may
supervise
clean up
on-scene
surveil-
lance and
reports
- may supervise
clean up
- technical
assistance
during
cleanup
DISTRICT
IDENTIFICATION
TEAMS
supervise
clean up
employ clean up
contractors
OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY
SERVICES
maintains
24-hr
communication
center
state-wide
disaster and
contingency
planning
operations
center dur-
ing major
emergencies
DEPARTMENT
OF
HEALTH
LABORATC
DIVISION OF
HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS AND
WASTE MANGE-
MENT
supervises
and monitors
disposal of
spilled
material
AREA OFFICES
(4)
Figure 2 - CALIFORNIA
-------
C.. COLORADO
1. Summary
The spill response program lies within the Colorado Department of Health,
the Water Quality Control Division (WQCD). The program is run on an ad
hoc basis, without adequate funding and administrative backing to expand
as the staff believes necessary. Other state agencies which play a role
in spill response include the Department of Highways, the Division of
Disaster Emergency Services (DODES) and the Fish and Game Department,
Division of Wildlife. Radiological prevention and response functions in
the state are handled separately by the Department of Health, Division of
Radiological and Hazardous Wastes. On occasion, this Division provides
direction in the handling of spills involving air-related emergencies.
EPA works well with WQCD and it appears that there has been virtually
no conflict between EPA and the state with regard to spills. When EPA
responds to an incident, it does assume lead responsibility, but state
on-scene personnel feel that regardless of the lead agency, the response
efforts are a cooperative undertaking.
To date, the spill situation in Colorado has been less severe than that
in many Eastern states. The vast majority of spills to which the state
responds result from transportation accidents, primarily trucks. In
addition, there are several large Federal military installations which
handle large quantities of hazardous materials and assume responsibility
for most of their own spills.
The strengths of the response program in Colorado include the following:
• the smooth, although informal, relationship between EPA
and the Colorado Department of Health;
• the highly trained and organized radiological prevention
and response program;
* the Colorado Committee for Hazardous Material Safety,
which provides a unique training program for local and state
response personnel; and
• the clean-up functions routinely carried on by the
Division of Highways.
2. Laws
Under the Colorado Revised Statutes Annotated, the Water Quality Control
Act (§25-8-101, et.seq.) empowers the Water Quality Control Commission
to regulate, monitor and dispense permits for all instances of water
1-47
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pollution. In addition to requiring reporting of all accidental dis-
charges, the Commission may order the offender to clean up the spill.
Any failure to either report an accidental discharge or to comply with
a clean-up order may result in a $10,000/day fine.
The Disaster Emergency Act of 1973 (§28-2-101, et.seq.) provides for
state and local disaster agency response in the event of man-made cat-
astrophies, including "oil spill or other water contamination requir-
ing emergency action to avert danger or damages...." as well as ....
"air contamination' "•
3. Organization
Within the Department of Health, the primary spill response personnel
include the Section Chief of Monitoring and Enforcement in the WQCD.
the Section Chief for Field Services and the Industrial Waste Consultant
in the Technical Services Section, who is the general program coordinator.
The 18 engineers of the WQCD rotate on a weekly basis as duty officers
for receiving spill reports and contacting appropriate personnel. The
primary capability of the Division, relative to spills, is in the area
of investigation.
The state has neither a formal contingency plan nor a contingency fund.
In lieu of a plan, the Agency operates with an up-to-date phone listing
of .agency personnel.
The Division of Disaster Emergency Services (DODES) serves as the coordin-
ator for all state agencies in emergencies. The agency operates a duty
officer system for receipt of emergency calls 24 hours a day. Each of
the six trained duty officers is also a coordinator of an area of the
state and knows the local personnel in his area.
DODES is currently revising the state disaster plan. However, it will
not include a specific component for chemical emergencies.
Maintenance crews from the Department of Highways clean up roadside spills
on a routine basis. A few crew members have attended the Colorado Com-
mittee for Hazardous Safety Material training, but most crew members are
untrained in spill response.
The Division of Wildlife has 140 wildlife conservation officers (WCO)
located in numerous districts throughout the state. The WCOs are all
college educated. Many have- considerable general emergency experience
as -Federal Wardens or local .sheriff's officers for their home areas,
but they are not trained specifically for spill response. WCOs regu-
larly respond to any reported fish kills, to document damage for purposes
of enforcement and mitigation. When first on the scene, the wardens may
assume on-scene control and take initial precautionary measures to secure
the area until additional response personnel arrive.
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4. Communications
There is a 24-hour phone capability in Colorado through which spills are
reported. However, because of the complexity of the system, communica-
tion can become cumbersome. The Air National Guard operates a 24-hour
phone number at Buckley Field near Denver. In addition, the DODES and
the WQCD each receive calls during working hours. Both the DODES and
the WQCD utilize a duty officer system for receiving calls and contact-
ing other agencies. The State Highway Patrol dispatcher receives spill
reports from the patrolmen and uses up-to-date lists and schedules of
s.he duty officers from both the WQCD and DODES to contact those agencies.
Within the WQCD, the duty officer carries a beeper with him at all times
to receive calls from the DODES. Upon receipt of information about an
incident, the duty officer decides whether someone within the Division
should respond, and if so, he locates the appropriate District Engineer
and dispatches him to the scene. If the Engineer is not available, the
duty officer may contact the Division of Wildlife and have an area warden
sent to the scene. In addition, the duty officer may call other agencies,
including the Division of Air Pollution, Department of Highways, certain
local personnel and EPA, Region VIII.
About 50% of the calls received by WQCD come directly from spillers and
about 50% come from other agencies, primarily EPA Region VIII and the
state Highway Department.
At DODES, the duty officer decides on the appropriate agencies to contact
when a spill report is received. Usually the Department of Health, Water
Quality and Air Pollution Divisions, and the Department of Highways are
notified. DODES usually does not call the Division of Wildlife.
Approximately 90% of the spill reports received by DODES come from the
State Highway Patrol or from local sheriff's departments; the remaining
10% of calls are from spillers and the general public.
When the Division of Wildlife receives reports of fish kills, both the
WQCD and EPA Region VIII are informed of the situation. This notifica-
tion procedure was agreed upon several years ago in an informal meeting
held among the agencies and has proven to be effective.
5. Operations
Criteria used by the WQCD to determine whether to dispatch personnel to
the scene include the spill volume and the apparent threat to surface
water. In addition, the distance of the spill from the nearest response
personnel and the availability of manpower influence dispatch decisions.
If the spill is considered very small and the spiller has taken reasonable
action to insure clean-up, no government official may respond. In a
moderate spill, EPA and WQCD jointly decide which agency will respond.
1-49
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Occasionally, WQCD will use CHEMTREC to determine the extent of tvazarxl
and the appropriate response. On many occasions, EPA Region VIII is
consulted regarding appropriate response.
At DODES, the duty officer may also use CHEMTREC to determine the extent
of hazard and the appropriate response. In addition, the duty officer
makes a decision regarding activation of the Emergency Operations Center
(EOC). If a sustained, multiple agency response is anticipated, the
Center is usually activated. Once activated, the DODES officer assumes
a coordinating function, and follows the spill response effort through
to completion.
Some WQCD district personnel who are dispatched to the scene have 4-wheel
drive vehicles, but they have virtually no response equipment to work
with. Further, their communication from the site is dependent upon the
radio capability of other agencies, primarily the Division of Wildlife
and the Highway Patrol.
The Highway Department has no special equipment for response beyond that
used in regular road maintenance. The most important resource is sand,
which is frequently used as an absorbent.
The WQCD does not have a fund from which to hire contractors and the
spiller is relied upon to do so. However, in many situations, both the
spiller and the state prefer to have the Highway Department handle the
clean up, as the cost to the spiller is far less than if a contractor is
used and, in certain locations, contractors are not readily available.
Following clean up, the Highway Department bills the spiller for materials,
damage to Highway property, and in certain circumstances, labor costs.
The response time of on-scene coordinators varies greatly with the loca-
tion of the incident. For spills in certain areas, such as on the western
slope, response time may be as high as 3 to 4 hours. For the Highway
Department, the response time for maintenance crews is usually shorter.
Training at the local level, and for some state personnel, has been hand-
led by the Colorado Committee for Hazardous Materials Safety. All types
of local personnel have been involved in the Committee's training course
including fire and safety officials, medical and rescue squads, and elected
public officials with decision-making responsibilities in emergencies. The
course has been very well received, and has been offered in locations
throughout the state such that local participants are required to travel
no more than 70 miles. The course has been cited as a possible model for
a nationwide program of hazardous material training for local officials.
The training course lasts three days and includes all aspects of response.
Included are a series of films designed to heighten the awareness of
participants, and simulation exercises in which participants play their
real-world roles in simulated emergencies.
1-50
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WQCD personnel have not attended the Committee's course and have had no
other training addressed specifically to hazardous materials response.
In contrast, DODES duty officers have all attended the Committee's train-
ing course. Most of the officers are also trained as Area Civil Defense
coordinators and have had Federal disaster assistance training. In turn,
they assist in the training of local Civil Defense directors each year.
The Highway Department has sent approximately 150 of its 1200 maintenance
personnel to the Committee's training course. A subsequent attempt in-
volving these persons in training their colleagues was only moderately
successful and it is now felt that the remaining Department personnel
who respond to spills should attend such a training program.
Wildlife Conservation Officers have not attended the Committee's train-
ing. The division administrator feels that some of their other duties
have given them appropriate training for emergency response, mainly
the assumption of police powers.
6. Clean Up and Prevention
The WQCD prevention efforts are closely tied to enforcement. There
have been no initiatives with industry or transporters to develop con-
tingency plans or spill prevention and response plans, except for SPCC
plans for facilities with an NPDES permit.
In the past, most fines were levied for failure to report, rather than
for environmental damage. However, for large spills caused by negli-
gence, fines are used and are seen as a deterrent to additional spills.
The level of fines is increasing and there is an attempt to correlate
fines with damages resulting from spills. In 1977, one fine was levied
at each of the following levels: $1,500, $15,000, and $15,000.
The Department of Highways participated in an industry effort for pre-
vention and planning in recent months. The Motor Carriers Association,
consisting primarily of transporters of petroleum products, met to dis-
cuss a response plan for chemical emergencies. One of the larger firms
suggested that each firm contribute approximately $100 per truck to
create a fund for the purchase of absorbents and other clean-up equip-
ment to be deployed throughout the state at Highway Department mainten-
ance depots. Although the Highway Department and most large companies
favored the program and agreed to contribute $100 for each of their
trucks, the smaller truckers decided not to participate in the plan.
As a result, the plan was not implemented.
At the Division of Wildlife, prevention is also tied to enforcement.
The Division's statutes allow fine collection up to $10 per fish killed,
depending on the type and size of fish. Division personnel feel that
their efforts to deter future fish kills have been hindered by a lack
of litigation support from the the Attorney General's office.
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7. Costs
There is no budgeted allocation for the response program in Colorado.
However, the WQCD believes that their spill response effort involves
less than one man-year of effort spread among the program's many parti-
cipants. The annual cost of this level of effort was estimated at
approximately $23,000.
Some data on fines and clean-up fees collected from spillers for 1976
and 1977 was available. The Department of Health collected approxi-
mately $21,500 in fines from spillers in 1976. In 1977, the Depart-
ment of Highways collected approximately $5,000 to cover the costs of
their spill clean-up activities. Both agencies believe these figures
are representative of collections in recent years.
8. Problems
Colorado's spill response program has problems which are in part attri-
butable to the lack of funding and administrative interest by some De-
partment officials and the legislature. Specialized response training,
including that addressed to on-scene coordination, is required for WQCD
and DODES personnel. In addition, these people need improved equipment
and protective clothing. It would also appear that the system for spill
notification, and subsequent communication between state agencies, re-
quires streamlining.
1-52
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DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH
I
WATER QUALITY
CONTROL DIVISION
- supervises
clean up
- dispatches
district
engineers
- enforcement
supervises
clean up
investigates
spills
DIVISION OF
RADIOLOGICAL
AND HAZARDOUS
WASTES
supervises
radiological
incidents
technical
assistance
during air
emergencies
DEPARTMENT OF
HIGHWAYS
MAINTENANCE
DIVISION
provides manpower
and equipment to
clean up spills
DIVISION OF
DISASTER
EMERGENCY
SERVICES
coordinates state
agencies during
major emergencies
maintains 24-hour
phone system
prepares state's
disaster plan
FISH AND GAME
DEPARTMENT
DIVISION OF
WILDLIFE
WILDLIFE CONSERVA-
TION OFFICERS (140)
investigates and
documents fishkills
assists in securing
spill area
enforcement for
fishkills
Figure 3 - COLORADO
-------
D. CONNECTICUT
1. Summary
In Connecticut, the Spill Response Program resides totally within the
Department of Environmental Protection, the Division of Environmental
Quality, Water Compliance Branch. The state plays a leading role in
all spills, but it shares the formal lead agency designation with the
Coast Guard under an agreement whereby the Coast Guard is the formal
lead agency for marine and tidal waters and the state is the formal
lead agency for inland areas. The EPA rarely responds to spills in
Connecticut, and is not considered the lead agency when in Connecticut.
The state is satisfied with this sharing of responsibilities and does
not expect greater EPA involvement.
The Spill Response Program has a staff of five persons with clearly
designated response functions. Although these are not their only func-
tions, the staff's other work is closely related and all levels of the
Department support the priority given to the spill response function.
Legislative support has not been as complete as desired and repeated
attempts to secure a contingency fund have been denied.
The strengths of the Connecticut program include the following:
• the departmental support for the program and its personnel;
• excellent relations with the only other major response agency,
the Connecticut Highway Patrol. This has been fostered to some
extent by the smallness of the state which permits reliance on
personal relationships;
• a relatively low response time to the scene, also fostered by
the state's small area, in addition to good agency organiza-
tion; and
• a contingency planning and prevention effort with industry and
local municipalities which has improved working relationships
with both groups.
2. Laws
The Connecticut General Statutes Revised provide that anyone causing
pollution or contamination of land or waters of the state through the
discharge of hazardous substances shall be liable, if damages are esti-
mated by the Commissioner of Environmental Protection to be greater than
$5,000, for all costs and expenses incurred by the Commissioner in con-
1-54
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taining and removing such pollution (§25-54ee). Should negligence be
proven in civil action to recover costs, the defendant, at the discre-
tion of the court, may be liable for one and one-half times the cost
and expenses incurred by the Commissioner. The statutes also require
that any hazardous chemical spill into the waters of the state be re-
ported promptly to the state police, and in relevant circumstances, to
the Coast Guard; failure to report any such discharge may result in a
maximum fine of $5,000 (§25-54dd). In addition to being liable for all
costs of controlling and abating instances of pollution -statutue viola-
tions, violators shall also be liable for the costs of restocking and
replenishing wildlife, plant life, and aquatic life damaged or lost as
a result of pollution violations (§22a-6a).
§28-1, relating to civil preparedness, contains reference only to
natural disasters; (any gubernatorial action designed to cope with a
massive hazardous discharge would be founded on a reference to general
emergency situations).
Municipal directors of health are empowered to abate all forms of nui-
sance injurious to the public health (§19-79). When such nuisance is
abated or removed from private property by the town or municipality,
costs of abatement or removal may be recovered in civil action against
the owner of the private property.
3. Organization
The Spill Response Program lies within the Department of Environmental
Protection, the Division of Water Quality, Water Compliance Branch.
The Department is the only agency aside from the Highway Patrol which
responds' to spills. The Department of Emergency Services would be acti-
vated should there be a catastrophic event; however, no such event has
occurred to date.
There are five persons assigned to spill response, four field response
persons and one supervisor. The field response staff are trained in
biological and chemical areas, while the supervisor is an engineer.
Although spill response is not their sole function, it is given top
priority when spills occur. The rest of staff time is spent on related
work, including the monitoring and inspection of industrial facilities.
There has been an oil spill contingency plan for several years. It is
largely a collection of phone numbers of response personnel and is now
outdated. The Department currently maintains and uses another up-to-
date phone list which is also given to the Highway Patrol dispatcher.
Interest in producing a chemical response contingency plan is not high.
The current communication practices work adequately, and it is believed
that any new plan which diverges from those practices could be a hind-
rance to response. Further, it is felt that in such a small state oil
and chemical response can be handled with similar organizational pro-
cedures.
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There is no state contingency fund. For several years, the Department
has sought a legislative appropriation for a $100,000 revolving contin-
gency fund and has not been successful. In mid-1978, Department staff
indicated tentative plans to attempt securing the fund again in 1979.
4. Communications
The Department has a 24-hour system for handling incoming spill reports.
During regular working hours, the phone is manned by a moderately trained
screener who takes basic information on the caller and the spill location
and type. The screener then passes this information on to one of the
staff members of the Spill Response Program.
The staff member first attempts to gain more information by phoning the
caller and then proceeds to the scene. In contrast to most other states,
Connecticut responds to virtually all reported spills, regardless of
size or location.
The Department notifies the Highway Patrol if that agency is not the
source of the report. The Coast Guard is called if the spill is in the
area of Coast Guard jurisdiction or if the state believes that Coast
Guard assistance will be necessary. Region I EPA is rarely called.
After regular working hours, a recording machine refers all calls to the
Highway Patrol. Once reported to the Patrol, the dispatcher sends a
patrol car to the scene and contacts the appropriate staff member of the
Spill Response Program.
The vast majority of calls reporting spills to the Department are from
the Highway Patrol, and to a lesser extent, the Coast Guard.
5. Operations
The Department responds to virtually all spills, hence there have been
no formal criteria established to assess whether an on-scene response
will occur.
There is no history of environmental or public health emergencies being
declared following chemical releases. However, an incident which re-
quired a multi-agency response would activate the involvement of the
Department of Emergency Services, and informally this would be considered
an environmental emergency.
On-scene decisions regarding the lead agency vary, depending on the situ-
ation. When there is no fire potential, the Highway Patrol assumes lead
until the Department arrives on the scene. At that point, the Department
assumes full lead responsibility in all situations where the Coast Guard
is not present. If the Coast Guard is present, it assumes the lead in
all situations which occur in marine and tidal waters. At times, these
agreed upon jurisdictions have not been respected by certain Coast Guard
on-scene coordinators who have attempted to assume lead responsibility
in areas where the state feels they should not have precedence.
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When there is a fire potential and a local Fire Department has responded,
that Department has lead until the fire has been extinguished or the
immediate fire danger has passed. Frequently, the on-scene coordinator
and fire authority work very closely together. The Department of Environ-
mental Protection has fostered these relationships over the years by hav-
ing follow-up discussions with fire personnel and working with the Fire
Chiefs' Association.
The Spill Program's on-scene coordinators rely primarily on their past
experience to make decisions regarding the level of hazard and the
appropriate response. The rarely use CHEMTREC or available hazardous
materials manuals, nor do they call the Regional EPA.
In most routine, medium-sized spills the key persons on scene may in-
clude the Department's coordinator, the Coast Guard coordinator, the
Highway Patrol, a representative of the spiller, the clean-up contractor,
and appropriate local authorities.
To date, Department response personnel have had virtually no response
equipment. However, they soon will have air packs and full chemical
suits. The Department has had access to Fire Department equipment de-
ployed throughout the state as well as to equipment for chlorine res-
ponse which is available through chlorine manufacturers. This equip-
ment has rarely, if ever, been used in the past.
The state maintains a list of contractors and advises spillers at the
scene of appropriate clean-up firms. They rely on the spiller to hire
the clean-up contractor. Because Connecticut is a small state, and re-
lations with contractors have been good, contractors' response has been
prompt.
It is reported that when EPA or the Coast Guard secures the contractor,
clean-up charges exceed the amounts charged when industry hires the
clean-up firm. In addition, Connecticut personnel believe that spiller-
employed contractors monitored by state personnel produce a more thorough
clean-up than when the contracting is handled at the Federal level.
The Department's spill response personnel have virtually no spill res-
ponse training beyond their experience. Their academic backgrounds are
in the biological and chemical areas. Similarly, Highway Patrol offi-
cers are rarely trained in spill response.
Local response personnel are rarely trained in chemical spill response
either. The Department has followed up several fires involving oil and
chemicals with local Fire Departments to emphasize greater attention to
environmental concerns when selecting response options. Fire Department
efforts at spill containment have improved, although continued, repeated
emphasis on environmental concerns is needed.
1-57
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The Department would sponsor attendance of their response personnel at
future training sessions, if such programs were reasonably close to
Connecticut. Further training of staff is desired.
6. Clean Up and Prevention
Industrial contingency planning has been integrated with discharge per-
mits and a related spill prevention program. Although there has been no
formal contingency planning with industry, the Department feels that the
close relationship with producers has fostered a high awareness of spill
potential, and this heightened concern substitutes for a contingency plan.
The Department has had a major role in contingency planning efforts at
the local level and has provided technical assistance to communities in
plan preparation. Currently, approximately 40 municipalities have some
kind of up-to-date, formal contingency plan. These 40 communities tend
to be the larger municipalities, or towns which are members of one of
the watershed associations which have encouraged spill contingency plan-
ning. The Department believes that contingency plans have improved the
effectiveness of spill response and have placed priority on completing
this process for all communities.
7. Costs
Cost data for the emergency response program was not available.
8. Problems
Until a contingency fund is created, Connecticut will not have clean-
up capacity equal to its current staff commitment.
Connecticut spill response personnel have received virtually no train-
ing addressed to chemical spill response. Some state officials desire
better protective gear for response personnel than has been available
in the past.
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COMMISSIONER,
DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
DIVISION OF
CONSERVATION
AND PRESERVATION
DIVISION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
WATER COMPLIANCE
BRANCH
DEPARTMENT OF
EMERGENCY
SERVICES
general response
during incidents
at catastrophic
level
- supervises clean up
- technical assistance
to communities'
contingency planning
- investigate spills
Figure 4 - CONNECTICUT
-------
E. INDIANA
1. Summary
Indiana's spill response program, with the exception of fire and police
officials, is located within the State Board of Health which manages
both air and water pollution programs. The Division of Water Pollution
Control has formally designated an emergency response section. The
Division of Air Pollution Control also has a response program, although
it is not formally recognized at all administrative levels.
Indiana desires to maintain authority and responsibility for all spills
which have a potential to affect a state water supply or the general
health and welfare of the state's citizens. They call on EPA for certain
functions when they need assistance, and EPA does not respond to an
incident unless invited.
The emergency response section in the Water Pollution Control Division
has received adequate support from the Board of Health Administration
and from the legislature. Statutes under which the section operates are
considered comprehensive and workable. However, the Air Pollution Divi-
sion's response program is maintained only by the internal efforts of
the program's staff.
Program strengths in Indiana include the following:
• the well-defined structure and clear recognition for the
water division's emergency response section;
• an evaluation conference procedure which occurs following
receipt of spill reports;
• the frequent use of field personnel from other state
agencies to verify and expand on initial spill reports;
and
0 prevention initiatives taken by the section with industry
and municipalities.
2. Laws
Under the Indiana Code, hazardous spills currently are the joint res-
ponsibility of the Stream Pollution Control Board (SPCB) and the Environ-
mental Management Board (EMB).
In recent years, §13-7-1, et.seq; transferred all pollution abatement
functions within the state to the EMB. However, the SPCB and the Air
Pollution Control Board also retained all of their respective pollution.
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It is evident from §13-74-1, which prohibits acts of pollution, that the
EMB is intended to have jurisdiction for all forms of water and air pollu-
tion, concurrent with the Stream and Air Pollution Boards. The EMB has
delegated day-to-day administration of the air and water pollution pro-
grams to the Stream Pollution Control Board and Air Pollution Control
Board, but approves all regulations from these agencies prior to promul-
gation.
The EMB may levy penalties up to $10,000 per day for any violation and
$500 per hour for refusal to comply with an emergency order to abate.
All fines and penalties collected by the EMB established under §13-7-13
are to be remitted to an Environmental Management Special Fund. SPC Reg-
uation 16 provides that the SPCB utilize the same penalties as those
allowed to the EMB.
The Civil Defense and Disaster Act of 1975 (§10-4-1-1, et. seq.) includes
among its definition of disasters, "oil spill, other water contamination
requiring emergency action to avert danger or damage, air contamination
Section 16-1-4-9 gives local health officials the general right to protect
public health and to order the abatement of any unlawful conditions
detrimental to public health. A town or city may recover by civil action
any expenses incurred in executing an order ignored by an offending
person (§16-1-25-14).
3. Organization
The emergency response section within the Division of Water Pollution
Control has a full-time chief plus three full-time and two part-time
staff members. Although some of the staff time is allocated to monitor-
ing and related activities, spill response is an unquestionable priority
and much of the section's time is dedicated to spill response planning
and prevention activities. In cases where a long-term monitoring effort
is required following a spill incident, personnel from the state's
Division of Fish and Wildlife are used in order to reduce the time demand
on the emergency response section staff.
The response effort within the Air Pollution Control Division resides in
the air monitoring branch. The branch chief coordinates response activities
and he and four of his staff members actively participate in on-scene
response. Because the air response program is not formally recognized,
response activities divert effort from mandated air monitoring activities.
However, when there is a need for an air related spill response, it
receives first priority.
The state has a contingency plan for emergencies, and appropriate sections
are used during spill response by both air and water personnel.
There is no contingency fund for spill clean up, but there is a Governor's
emergency fund which could be accessed with only moderate delay. To date,
this fund has not been used.
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4. Communications
The state has a general emergency 24-hour telephone system through which
spill reports are received. The majority of the calls are relayed to
the Division of Water Pollution Control. The Division maintains a beeper
system for locating appropriate duty officers of the emergency response
section after hours and on weekends.
Following a spill report, water, air and radiological personnel are con-
vened to discuss an appropriate response. In most situations, Region V
EPA is notified of the incident; in many other situations, appropriate
local authorities are also notified. In many situations, the local
Board of Health representative or the local conservation officer is
called and dispatched to the scene for a further assessment and descrip-
tion of the incident.
5. Operations
Criteria used to determine whether to dispatch personnel to the spill
scene include the proximity of the spill to water, soil type, spill type
and quantity and the anticipated response of the spiller. However, in a
spill of any consequence, state personnel will respond regardless of the
quality of the spiller's past performance.
An order could be issued for use of a special Governor's fund under emer-
gency conditions; however, this has never been required to date. In
addition, the Governor could declare a formal state of emergency, but
no spill has yet required such action. In rare instances where a spill
clean-up fund is required, the state will call on EPA for use of the
§311 fund.
In virtually all situations, the on-scene coordinator for the Division
of Water Pollution Control is considered to play a lead role on-scene.
At times, there have been conflicts with the on-scene fire authorities
regarding lead, but these have diminished in recent years.
To determine the extent of hazard and appropriate response, CHEMTREC
is used extensively by the emergency response section personnel. In
addition, rather regular use is made of the state toxicologist, the
CHRIS system, the services provided by NACA and by the chemical pro-
ducers and other area industries. On occasion, Region V EPA is con-
sulted for advice.
Some response equipment has been purchased in the past. Both divisions
have personal protective gear and the air division has a transportable
radio system and toxic gas detection equipment. The water division is
currently seeking additional protective gear, an emergency truck, and
radio communication capability.
Clean-up contractors used on-scene are hired by the spiller. The water
division monitors their effort, but does not contract directly with them.
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Water division personnel have attended general environmental seminars
and conferences, but have had very little training in spill response.
The staffs' backgrounds are limited to biology, agronomy, and chemistry
and do not include engineering.
The staff of the air division likewise has not received training specific
to emergency response. Although staff members have been well trained to
handle their various pieces of equipment, they have not attended emer-
gency or spill response training programs.
6. Clean Up and Prevention
The chief of the spill response section in the water division has initi-
ated an informal prevention program. He frequently speaks to industries
and municipalities about spill prevention and response, either at public
meetings or by visiting their facilities. In addition, detailed con-
tingency plans and remedial measures have been required of chronic spil-
lers in lieu of, or in addition to, fines. To accomplish this, the
enforcement and compliance section works closely with the spill responses
section which prescribes the needed measures and approves the spiller's
plans.
Several of the state's larger municipalities have contingency plans re-
lating to hazardous materials incidents. The water division has en-
courged such planning but has not initiated a state-wide contingency
planning program.
There has been an improvement in industry's prevention and response to
spills in recent years. However, the railroads remain a difficult group
to work with, and CONRAIL is cited as a frequent spiller with a non-
cooperative attitude. The pipeline industry considered very responsible in
terms of prevention and spill response, while the trucking industry is
considered average.
7. Costs
Detailed figures for the spill response program were not available.
Although the Division of Water Pollution Control's spill response pro-
gram is included in the Board of Health budget, detailed figures were
not available. However, Division personnel estimate the annual cost of
the program to be approximately $65,000-$70,000. This figure includes
all personnel salaries and an annual allocation of approximately $5,000
for equipment purchase and maintenance.
8, Problems
Problems recognized by the Indiana program currently include:
• the need to strengthen the air program through formal
agency and legislative recognition and support;
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• administrative provisions for overtime compensation and
liability coverage for spill response staff;
• staff training in emergency response for both air and
water personnel; and
• better coordination of penalty policies with the Coast
Guard.
Indiana has had a continuing difference with the U.S. Coast Guard
over enforcement policy. The Coast Guard levies §311 fines after all
spills, while the state uses its fining authority more flexibly to ob-
tain improved industry practices. When the state decides that a fine
is warranted, the spiller is then subject to a double penalty because
of the "blanket" fine policy pursued by the Coast Guard. Indiana
officials find the Coast Guard's approach rigid and would like the
state to take the lead in coordinating the levying of fines.
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I
cr.
STATE BOARD
OF HEALTH
STREAM POLLUTION
CONTROL BOARD
DIVISION OF
WATER POLLU-
TION CONTROL
DIVISION OF AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL
- supervise clean up
- spill response
planning
- spill revention
activities
supervises clean up
during air phase of
emergencies
DIVISION OF FISH
AND WILDLIFE
LOCAL CONSERVA-
TION OFFICERS
long-term
monitoring
following
spill
incidents
on-scene surveillant
and reports
long-term monitoring
following spill
incidents
Figure 5 - INDIANA
-------
F. KENTUCKY
1. Summary
Several agencies are involved in spill response on a routine basis in
Kentucky. These include the Department of Natural Resources and Environ-
mental Protection (DNREP), including its Divisions of Water Quality,
Hazardous Materials and Waste Management, and Sanitary Engineering; the
Disaster Emergency Services (DES); the Office of the State Fire Marshall;
the Kentucky State Police; the Department of Transportation, Division of
Highway Enforcement; and the Department of Mines and Minerals, Division
of Explosives and Blasting.
Of these, the DNREP, Division of Water Quality, has played the most im-
portant role in environmental response. The DES has recently assumed a
strong coordinating role in all emergencies which involve more than two
agencies. The Office of the Fire Marshall has also had a signifcant in-
fluence on the current response pattern in Kentucky.
Region IV EPA has responded on-scene to approximately. .7-8 spills involving
chemicals in the past year in Kentucky. It is believed that the Division
of Water Quality has responded to approximately 140 such spills during
this period. EPA responds to spills in Kentucky either when it is asked
by the state to provide additional expertise, or when it desires to do
so. When EPA is on-scene, it assumes the responsibility for on-scene
coordination and the various state agencies assume supporting roles.
State response to chemical spills has occurred on an ad hoc basis until
very recently. However, following a series of incidents which pointed
out the need for better and more explicit organization, DES assumed a
consistent coordinating role. The agency sponsors the 24-hour phone
reporting capability in the state and now notifies other agencies of
spill incidents according to a well-defined procedure. In addition, DES
assumes the coordinating role whenever more than two state agencies or
local jurisdictions are involved. During serious incidents, representa-
tives of the various agencies involved convene at an Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) at DES headquarters. The EOC serves as the decision making
forum for the agencies and has facilitated resolution of their differ-
ences relating to response actions.
DES is revising and formalizing a state-wide contingency plan which has
a significant emphasis on response to hazardous materials incidents.
Each relevant agency will contribute a section for itself to that plan.
Although the DNREP program currently is on an ad hoc basis with no funded
positions dedicated to spill response, department administrators recently
have given high priority to development of formal staffing and operations
plans for improved management of environmental emergencies. Key adminis-
trators within DNREP are strongly backing the development of this improved
response capability.
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2. Laws
The Kentucky Revised Statutes, §224.055, et.seq., create the Department
for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, and empower that
department to provide for the prevention, abatement, and control of all
water, land, and air pollution. §224.110 states that any death to fish
and wildlife from acts of pollution shall result in the responsible
parties being held liable by the state for any costs of restocking or
restoring such fish or wildlife. Penalties assessed for violations of
air and water pollution statutes shall not exceed $5,000 per day for
negligent acts, or $10,000 per day for willful acts (§224.994).
Authority relating to disasters is contained in §39.400, which provides
that disaster and emergency services may be called upon by the Governor
for "man-caused disasters".
Local authority, under §212.620, extends to local health boards which
have the power and authority to order the owner, occupant, or user of
any nuisance which may affect the health of the residents of a county
or municipality to remove said nuisance at his own expense within 24
hours.
3. Organization
DES is responsible for the state contingency plan which includes a new
section on hazardous materials response. In addition, in all chemical
emergencies which involve more than two agencies, DES has the responsi-
bility to coordinate and facilitate inter-agency communications and
decision-making. DES operates a 24-hour Communication Center and noti-
fies all agencies which should be involved in any given emergency. When
the OEC is activated, each involved agency sends a representative to the
Center. Here, decisions which cannot be made on-scene are discussed and
agreed upon; and necessary equipment and support resources from all
state agencies can be located and readily accessed.
DES has area offices throughout the state whose personnel frequently
are deployed to the spill scene to provide descriptions and assessments
of the spill. Also, DES is responsible for contingency planning and
training at the local level.
The primary spill response function in the DNREP lies with the Division
of Water Quality. However, the divisions of Hazardous Materials and
Waste Management and Sanitary Engineering also have response authority.
The Division of Water Quality has five persons who regularly respond to
spills. Their academic backgrounds include engineering and biological
skills. Additionally, personnel in the five field offices, largely
generalists, provide initial response in certain situations.
Although there are designated response personnel in each of the other
DNREP divisions, the program is not as clearly defined as in the Divi-
sion of Water Quality, and the level of response required is propor-
1-67
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tionately less. Virtually none of the DNREP personnel have had train-
ing in response to chemical emergencies.
DNREP is operating without a formal contingency plan and without a con-
tingency fund. A list of up-to-date phone contact numbers substitutes
for the plan, and in general is believed to be adequate.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) has two divisions involved in
emergency response: Highway Enforcement and Maintenance. Enforcement
personnel, whose routine function is to regulate trucks on the Kentucky
highways, are located throughout the state and operate from their homes.
During a spill incident, they may serve as extensions of the Kentucky
State Police in securing the immediate area. At times, they will be
first on-scene but usually they provide supplementary manpower to
State Police efforts.
The Office of the State Fire Marshall has a Hazardous Materials Section
which responds to all incidents or accidents involving hazardous materials
regardless of whether a spill occurs. The Hazardous Materials Section
is staffed by 13 persons strategically located in 11 District Offices
throughout the state. Section members drive state-owned cars which have
communication with Kentucky State Police vehicles. As a result, response
time to incidents and accidents generally is less than one hour.
On-scene, a key role of Hazardous Materials Section personnel is to deter-
mine whether more than two state agencies are needed for response. When
this is the case, a call is made to DES requesting that a DES coordinator
report on-scene and serve as coordinator of the responding state agencies.
The Office of the State Fire Marshall has no authority over city and rural
fire departments. However, these departments usually will follow the
recommendations of the Fire Marshall's Office in handling a situation in-
volving hazardous materials.
The Office of the State Fire Marshall responded to approximately 145
hazardous material incidents last year, of which 20 were train wrecks.
In addition, personnel in the Hazardous Material Section make routine
inspections of LPG facilities, gas stations, and other hazardous facili-
ties.
Many Hazardous Materials Section personnel have a background in the
petroleum industry. However, there are no formalized hiring criteria
which require this, or other experience or training.
The State Police force is the primary law enforcement agency in all but six
or seven urban counties. There are approximately 630 State Police who
patrol the roads throughout Kentucky resulting in an average response
time to any incident, including hazardous incidents, of approximately
23 minutes.
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There are 16 State Police districts, each of which has a senior officer
on duty 24 hours a day and a 24-hour radio capability. When an incident
is reported, the district relays the information to the state Headquar-
ters in Frankfort.
Each district has a contingency plan for all incidents including hazard-
ous materials spills. The plan includes an extensive phone list for
other personnel who may be required. In addition, all State Policemen
carry the DOT Hazardous Materials book in their cruisers and the dis-
trict post has a copy of the Association of American Railroads' manual.
4. Communications
DES has a 24-hour phone system staffed by a duty officer with a phone
list of persons from all relevant state agencies. Incoming reports of
significant accidents or disasters are received from the State Police
or the Fire Marshall's office. If the duty officer determines that an
incident will involve a response by more than two agencies, he then
assumes a coordinating role and calls all agencies on the list. In
certain situations, he may activate the EOC. If a multiple agency res-
ponse is required, or if the description of the incident is not suf-
ficently thorough, he also will dispatch someone from one of the DES
area offices to more thoroughly report on the incident.
The Water Quality Division of DNREP maintains a 24-hour phone tape which
informs persons, reporting incidents of the phone number of the current
DNREP duty officer. The duty officer records all relevant available
information on the spill and determines whether or not a significant
department response is warranted. Potential for water pollution, the
volume, and the type of spill are the criteria used to determine the
need for an immediate response. Personnel from the field offices fre-
quently are dispatched to the scene to inspect the site and relay to
the duty officer a more complete description of the incident. If the
situation is sufficiently serious, one of four designated response
personnel then is dispatched to the scene. The average response time
for this first phase response is approximately 1-3 hours.
The DNREP duty officer will also call a number of other agencies to in-
form them of the incident. In virtually all situations ORSANCO (Ohio
River Sanitation Commission) and Region IV EPA are notified. At the
state level, DES is notified unless it reported the incident originally.
If there is a potential for a water supply contamination, or need for
air pollution advice, then the Department's Sanitary Engineering (Water
Supply), Hazardous Materials and Waste Management, and Air Divisions may
be notified. Notification of these Divisions is made through the Office
of the Commissioner of the DNREP.
Approximately 95% of the calls to the Water Quality Division's phone
number come from other state agencies, primarily the State Police or
DES. This phone number has not been publicized to potential spillers
or to the general public.
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5. Operations
When the DBS duty officer receives an incident report, he may utilize
one of several information sources to help in determining the extent of
hazard. Preferred sources are a manual published by the National Safety
Council, CHEMTREC, and the EPA field guide to hazardous materials. They
find CHEMTREC and the EPA book superb and commented that the latter is
extremely difficult to obtain. The red pamphlet published by DOT is
considered incomplete and difficult to use.
During an incident, DES's role is primarily that of coordination, but
in certain circumstances it will directly influence or make decisions.
Both on-scene and at the EOC, DES will assume authority if the agencies
present are in dispute and cannot agree on an appropriate action. DES
also has the capability to solicit a declaration of a State-of-Emergency
from the Governor in order to gain additional resources, but has never
used this power during a hazardous materials incident.
The Water Quality Division, DNREP, dispatches someone to almost all
spill situations, minimally for initial reconnaissance. However, if
the spill is minor, and the spiller is a trusted party who fully des-
cribes his intended clean-up operations, an on-scene coordinator may
not be sent to the scene.
The Water Quality staff relies most heavily upon their own experience
to determine the extent of hazard and the appropriate response. How-
ever, they will use CHEMTREC and call Region IV EPA for technical
advice.
The Division has and uses authority to recommend the closing of municipal
water supply systems but the Division of Sanitary Engineering has a
particular set of problems when dealing with water supplies for com-
munities on the Ohio River. ORSANCO has not yet provided an effective
forum for resolving different-approaches to the closing of water intakes.
Hence, communities close their water supplies at varying times, and
according to different criteria. Frequently, Cincinnati is closed be-
fore many Kentucky communities even know that there is an incident, and
this has caused complaints from certain Kentucky communities. The Divi-
sion does not have formal criteria for deciding when notification should
occur. Rather they gather as much information as possible on each in-
cident and make a case-by-case decision as to the extent and time of
hazard.
At the scene of a spill, decisions are made by various agencies, depend-
ing on the type of hazard and phase of the emergency. Where there is
a fire or a strong fire or explosion potential, the local fire authority
and the Office of the State Fire Marshall are assumed to have the lead
until the imminent danger has passed. During this phase, the environ-
mental agencies play a support role or standby until they can begin
their clean-up work. In the later phases of an incident, or in inci-
dents where there is no fire or explosion potential, the lead is assumed
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by the environmental agency—Water Quality Division (DNREP) or Region
IV EPA. This phased approach to on-scene command has recently been
formalized by DES with the intent that disputes which have occurred in
the past between environmental officers and the state Fire Marshall's
office be reduced.
No state agency has access to funds to employ contractors for clean up
although in certain situations, the state may use Highway Department
equipment to stabilize the situation until the contractor arrives. The
Federal contingency fund has been used infrequently, even when Region IV
sends an on-scene coordinator. In general, state on-scene coordinators
rely on the spiller to retain a clean-up contractor.
DNREP has minimal protective gear, and does not feel its response person-
nel should be close to immediate hazards. However, response and safety
would be improved by the addition of boots, gloves and a two-way radio
system for response personnel.
A new and improved laboratory is being developed by DNREP, and will have
the capability to test for organic contaminants. EPA laboratories at
Athens have frequently been used to supplement the state labs in the
past.
Training in hazardous materials response for most state personnel was
considered to be poor and to be a high priority for the future. The
only staff with any training are a few who attended hazardous materials
training at Vanderbilt University; and in the Hazardous Materials and
Solid Waste Division, a few who attended a course given by the Office
of the State Fire Marshall. The level of salaries in DNREP intensifies
this problem in that field offices, which respond during the initial
phases of an incident, are staffed by generalists without biological or
engineering backgrounds. The Director of the Water Quality Division
feels that a yearly hazardous materials handling course would be ex-
tremely helpful for both his on-scene coordinators and selected field
staff.
Firemen in the state have received a fair amount of training, but more
is needed according to the Fire Marshall's office. Approximately 1800
firemen annually attend the State Fire School course in Lexington. A
Hazardous Materials course is given at the school, and approximately
360 attended this course last year. In addition, some smaller group
training sessions have been held around the state and have focused on
hazardous material response.
Kentucky State Police annually receive 40 hours of in-service training,
including a brief refresher on the identification of hazardous materials.
A small percentage of local sheriffs and policemen has also been trained
through an annual course sponsored by the Bureau of .'raining within the
Department of Justice.
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6. Clean Up and Prevention
Following an accidental release, the Division of Water Quality decides
on enforcement actions. A conference is usually held with the spiller
where a fine and mitigative-preventive actions are required. The Divi-
sion Director feels that requiring the spiller to correct the conditions
which led to the spill is far more of a deterrent to future spills than
the levying of a fine. However, not all spillers are subject to enforce-
ment action. In general, a non-chronic spiller with reasonable operating
practices is not fined. When spills occur from outright negligence and
cause serious or potentially serious damage, spillers may be fined quite
heavily.
In general, relations with industry, with the exception of the railroads,
have improved and are quite good. DNREP assumes that industry is acting
in good faith most of the time, and duPont is cited as exceptional in
this regard. Many railroads have a poor record with spill reporting and
with clean up, and their attitude is characterized by "doing as little
as necessary".
7. Costs
None of the response agencies interviewed include the Spill Response
Program as a separate budget item.
The Director of DNREP's Division of Water Quality, observed that, in
effect, the funds received by the Division under §106 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act are supporting the program in that these
funds provide salaries for personnel who respond to spills in addition
to their other activities. He believes that additional funding, spe-
cifically allocated to spill response, is essential in the near future
if chemical spills continue to occur with the frequency and intensity
of recent years.
DES, the Kentucky State Police and the Office of the State Fire Marshall
consider spill response as just one part of their mandate to respond
to various situations, none of which received a separate budget alloca-
tion.
DOT estimates that the effort involved in responding to approximately
20 spills during 1977 totaled about one half of 10% of the Agency's
budget for that year. Dollar figures for this effort were not avail-
able.
8. Problems
The problems of the Kentucky program appear to stem from a low level of
funding. Primary problems were cited in the following areas:
• DNREP must move its program from an ad hoc response to
a formal agency function. This requires increased fund-
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ing, and eventually a revised legislative mandate for
response.
• Consideration should be given to shifting the current
water focus of the response program. Full agreement
on response roles is needed between the Water Quality
Division and other Divisions, such as Water Supply,
Waste, and Air.
• Training for both state and local officials is a great
need.
• Certain agencies need more personal protective gear,
including the DNREP. The radio system for all agencies
needs improvement.
• All officials in Kentucky felt that a greater prevention
effort would result in an improved spill record. Cur-
rently, lack of funding for prevention programs is the
limiting factor.
• Regulatory authority over the railroads may need revi-
sion. The state Department of Transportation has
virtually no authority over the railroads, a function
traditionally belonging to the Railroad Commission,
which is an elected body.
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r\T c A QTTT?!?
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
17KfI7T>/"'f M/->V
H
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•*
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SERVICES
1 1 - coordinates
NATURAL ENVIRONMENTAL all emergencies
RESOURCES PROTECTION involving
agencies
- maintains
24-hour
DIVISION OF
r~ WATER QUALITY ~~
- supervises
clean up
- maintains
24-hour
phone
system
for re-
porting
spills
- dispatches
field
personnel
- enforcement
DIVISION OF DIVISION OF phone for
HAZARDOUS SANITARY reporting
MATERIALS ENGINEERING spills
SSx - — s -
following spills
- supervises
disposal
c . , T , - recommends clos-
of spilled . ,.
. , ing of water
material ° . .
supplies to
local jurisdictions
LABORATORY 1 FIELD OFFICES
DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT
OF OF MINES
TRANSPORTATION AND MINERA
1
DIV. OF DIV. DIV. OF
HIGHWAY OF EXPLOSIVES
ENFORCEMENT MAIN- AND
TENANCE BLASTING
- assists
in secur- - pro- - supervis
ing area vides response
on scene equip- for ex-
ment plosives
for incident
clean up
- on-scene surveillance and reports
Figure 6 - KENTUCKY
-------
G. LOUISIANA
1. Summary
Basic responsibility for handling hazardous chemical spills and oil spills
reaching state waters is vested in the Stream Control Commission. Admin-
istration of the Commission's powers is handled by a Water Pollution Con-
trol Division within the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission. The state
Health Department is also involved because it handles air pollution, solid
waste disposal, and the implementation of the Safe Drinking Water Act.
Spill response in Louisiana is heavily water oriented and is clearly
designed:
o to protect the health of downstream water users, and
• to prevent fish kills and significant damage to wildlife.
Spills which only affect the land and do not threaten wildlife or down-
stream water users apparently do not receive as much attention. Because
Louisiana industry is concentrated along navigable waterways, the Coast
Guard is seen as the prime Federal agency in responding to both oil and
hazardous material spills.
While the state has no contingency fund for spill clean up, this is not
thought to present a major obstacle. The responsiveness of major indus-
tries is improving, and the state permit program has been used to obtain
improved spill prevention procedures and equipment in major facilities.
Plants along the lower Mississippi have developed clean-up cooperatives,
and the state and industry have developed a series of charts which can
be used to forecast the arrival of a spill at downstream water intakes.
Like the other southern states observed, Louisiana has a well developed
capacity in Civil Defense for the coordination of state efforts in res-
ponse to a natural or man-made disaster. Disaster preparedness plans
have been updated to reflect the threat from hazardous chemicals.
2. Laws
The Stream Control Commission is empowered to enforce all laws and regu-
lations incidental to water pollution in the state. (see §56:1431, et.
seq). The Commission may collect damages for loss of fish, wildlife,
or other aquatic life, and assess fines of up to $25,000/day for viola-
tions of water pollution statutes.
The state Division of Health is charged with the handling, disposal, and
storage of waste materials, and with the regulation of air pollution.
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The Louisiana Disaster Act of 1974 provides for state and local disaster
agencies to deal with "man-made catastropies" as well as natural dis-
asters.
3. Organization
The Water Pollution Control Division handles industrial discharges and
permits, and takes the lead on spills of oil or hazardous material into
water. The Oil and Gas Commission handles spills from production facili-
ties which do not threaten water pollution. The Louisiana Health Depart-
ment manages the municipal sewage treatment program, as well as air pollu-
tion, solid waste disposal, and the Safe Drinking Water program. Health
and Water Pollution Control share the Federal §106 planning grant.
Civil Defense is part of the Department of Public Safety, and operates a
24-hour communications system and has developed an extensive contingency
plan for natural or man-made disasters. The State Police respond to most
major incidents and notify the Civil Defense Communications Center.
Local fire companies fight fires, but the State Fire Marshall does res-
pond to major incidents, and has taken command of fire fighting resources
in some difficult situations.
Authority to order evacuations is vested in the Chief Executive Officer
of the local government, but State Police and Civil Defense do cooperate
in completing such evacuations. Residents have been evacuated up to ten
miles from the scene of some rural train wrecks.
4. Communications
The state requires notification of spills. Reports are phoned in to a
24-hour number maintained by the Oil and Gas Commission. Reports of
hazardous substance spills and oil spills threatening waterways are then
referred to the Director of the Water Pollution Control Division. He
sends a Water Pollution employee from one of the District Offices to the
scene of the spill for a full report. They arrive at the scene in a
maximum of 2-3 hours.
In the event of a major transportation accident or gas release, the State
Police receive the first notice. They then notify Water Pollution or the
Air Control Commission (within the Department of Health and Human Re-
sources) as appropriate. State Police also alert the Civil Defense Com-
munications Center.
If downstream water users should be notified of a spill, Water Pollution
notifies the Environmental Health Division in the Department of Health
and Human Resources. Environmental Health then checks flow rates on the
Mississippi, determines spill travel time, and issues appropriate warn-
ings to downstream users.
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Advice to State Police or Civil Defense on evacuations necessitated by
a gas release also comes from the Health Department (Air Pollution).
5. Operations
If containment of a spill is required, Water Pollution can request the
Highway Department to build a dike or other containment barrier.
Water samples can be taken at the scene by Water Pollution employees and
processed in the agency's own laboratory, which has gas chromatography
and mass spectroinetry equipment.
The state has no contingency fund for spill clean up, and Water Pollution
Control does not believe that such a fund is necessary. The Federal govern-
ment can be called on for use of the §311 fund in clean ups at bankrupt
facilities. Otherwise, Water Pollution is generally satisfied with in-
dustry clean-up efforts. Because most of Louisiana industry is located
on navigable waters—particularly the Mississippi—the Coast Guard is the
state's prime contact during s-pills.
Water Pollution Control and Environmental Health confer periodically to
coordinate their emergency efforts, but there is no written contingency
plan outside the Civil Defense plan. When permits are required for dis-
posal or open burning of spill debris, these are obtained from the Health
Department.
6. Clean Up and Prevention
Louisiana relies on industry for spill clean up. Major industries do
clean up, and the petrochemical plants have formed a cooperative venture—
Clean Gulf Association—which has stockpiled clean-up material.
Dumps and mystery spills are not a large problem, but the state does
devote efforts to tracing the source of such spills. The state imposes
penalties for spills resulting in fish kills, and has occasionally in-
voked the statutory power to halt a spill or discharge which endangers
public health or fish life. This power is used sparingly.
Tank trucks are licensed by the Public Service Commission in Louisiana,
and Water Pollution officials feel that this license provides sufficient
leverage to make tank truck operators responsive to the need for clean up.
While some smaller industries do present spill problems to the state,
pollution statutes are considered adequate to make these operators res-
ponsive to the need for spill prevention and clean up. Issuance of state
discharge permits is tied to specific spill prevention investments or
procedures.
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7. Costs
If a state of emergency were declared, it might be possible for a state
agency to spend unbudgeted funds on clean up. The state expects most
emergency costs to be financed out of agency budgets, and does not even
provide a general reserve for emergencies. Obligations incurred by state
agencies in a disaster must be approved by a disaster emergency funding
board.
Because the state has not spent money directly on clean up, no cost data
were available. Investigation of spills, and monitoring of industry clean
up, are performed by state employees who would otherwise be managing the
state's wastewater discharge program, or carrying out work for the Wild-
life and Fisheries Commission or the air pollution program in the Health
Department.
8. Problems
Louisiana seems concerned that an expanded Federal effort in hazardous
material spills may produce an excessive response to some incidents. To
the casual observer, it appears that the Water Pollution Control Commission
uses a variety of formal and informal powers to obtain adequate spill res-
ponse from industry.
There is a clear demarcation in responsibility between Water Pollution and
the Health Department (handling air emergencies). Problems in the coor-
dination of these response efforts were not cited. Informal cooperation,
and coordination of the two agencies through State Police and Civil Defense
may explain this. Concern for hazardous substance spills is increasing,
and new legislation regulating the transportation of hazardous materials
within the state is expected later this year. At the present time, only
LNG, ammonia, and certain pesticides are covered by specific legislation
and regulations.
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i
•-j
WILDLIFE AND
FISHERIES
COMMISSION
STREAM POLLUTION
CONTROL
COMMISSION
HEALTH
AND
HUMAN RESOURCES
SAFE DRINK-
ING WATER
- supervise
clean up
- spill investigation
- enforcement/state
permit program
SOLID WASTE
AIR POLLUTION
- downstream
notifica-
tion
- advice on
gas clouds
PUBLIC
SAFETY
CIVIL DEFENSE
contingency
planning
coordinates
other agencies
in emergency
Figure 7 - LOUISIANA
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H. MISSISSIPPI
1. Summary
Response to environmental emergencies in Mississippi is coordinated by
the Director of Enforcement of the Mississippi Air and Water Pollution
Control Commission. The most appropriate field staff from Pollution
Control are dispatched to provide first hand information from the scene
of a spill or emergency. These situation reports are combined with in-
formation from hazardous material texts or staff experts in Jackson
headquarters. Resultant recommendations are relayed to the state Civil
Defense coordinator or to the Pollution Control staff at the scene.
Because staff are pulled from regular duties in surveillance and in-
spection for on-scene response, they have relatively little in the way
of special equipment or protective gear. Training as "on-scene coordina-
tors" is not provided, although the Director of Enforcement, who has the
most experience in the area, might assume responsibility at the scene in
a major spill or prolonged emergency.
Funds are available for the state to order in a clean-up contractor.
These funds are drawn from a special pollution abatement account. An
amendment to the penalty provisions of the state Pollution Control
Statue authorizes the state to undertake clean up and bill the spiller
for the costs incurred. Mississippi reports that it rarely is required
to use the contingency fund. Most clean-up costs are incurred by the
responsible industry or transporter.
2. Laws
The Air and Water Pollution Control Commission is empowered to issue
and enforce all rules, regulations, and orders incidental to control
and abatement of all forms of pollution in the state. A Water Pollution
Abatement Grant Fund has been established, and all penalties collected
pursuant to violations for water pollution (maximum—$5,000 per day)
shall be deposited in this Fund. In addition to authorizing such penal-
ties, §49-17-43 provides for assessing the cost of restocking fish or
wildlife destroyed by a pollution act on the polluter. The violator is
also liable to the state for any costs of clean up incurred in the event
that there exists a necessity for immediate remedial or clean-up action.
The Air and Water Pollution Control Commission may draw upon the Water
Pollution Abatement Grant Fund to pay the costs of contracting emergency
clean up or remedial actions, and any reimbursement for such costs are
to be deposited back in the Fund.
The Mississippi Civil Defense Law (§33-15-1, et.seq.) includes no specific
mention of water or air contamination, or disasters arising from man-made
causes, and is directed toward natural disasters and enemy attacks.
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§41-1-1, pertaining to the Department of Public Health, does not spec-
cifically grant the power to abate public nuisances, but rather enables
regulatory power for the general interests of health and life.
3. Organization
The Air and Water Pollution Control Commission responds to all spills
and environmental emergencies. Emergency coordination with Civil
Defense and local officials is handled by the Director of the Enforce-
ment Division.
The Health Department is responsible for solid waste and drinking water.
They will also send a team to the scene of a major disaster to advise on
the medical treatment of those exposed to the hazardous substance.
Although the state now runs a Fire Academy for the training of local
firemen, the State Fire Marshall has no operational authority at the
scene of an accident. The Highway Patrolman is the first state official
to arrive at an incident (usually within 30 minutes). Highway Patrol
secures the area, and will evacuate people within one-half mile of highly
toxic or explosive materials.
Major incidents involving several state agencies are coordinated through
the state Civil Defense Operations Center. The general disaster plan
requires all agencies to communicate through the Center, although this
procedure sometimes breaks down.
In spills which do not threaten human life, or after the immediate danger
is past, the Air and Water Pollution Control Commission takes the lead
in supervising environmental clean up. No contingency plan for hazardous
material spills has been written because of the infrequency of such in-
cidents. Because of the relatively small size of the Mississippi State
government and the Pollution Control Commission, and the substantial ex-
perience of the Enforcement Director who coordinates emergency response,
the need for a formal document is minimized.
4. Communications
Major transportation accidents, explosions, and other disasters are re-
ported, day and night, to the emergency coordinator at Pollution Control
by the Civil Defense Operations Center. Less significant spills may be
reported by citizens or Pollution Control employees directly to the Com-
mission office during working hours.
The emergency coordinator- (Enforcement Director) will dispatch the near-
est appropriate Pollution Control employee (one of 30) from one of three
offices—Gulfport, Jackson, or Oxford. Pollution Control vehicles have
radios tied into the same 24-hour dispatcher used by Fish and Game. The
emergency coordinator has a radio tied into the Civil Defense Operations
Center.
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Pollution Control employees dispatched to an incident have a minimum of
two years of college, and usually have a college degree plus two to three
years experience. They have received some training in hazardous materials,
and carry the small EPA hazardous material guide.
On-scene observations are radioed back to Pollution Control headquarters.
Here, Commission personnel will consult hazardous chemical textbooks,
attempt to contact the manufacturer or shipper, and seek advice from
state or Federal experts. Information in NPDES files may be consulted
if the explosion or spill occurred at a permitted facility. Advice on
evacuation, toxicity, and immediate precautions will then be relayed to
the Civil Defense Opertions Center and Pollution Control staff members
at the scene. Replies to news media questions will be agreed upon, and
these questions are then fielded by the emergency coordinator in Jackson.
Only two Mississippi cities draw their water from surface supplies. For
this reason, notification of downstream water users is only rarely a
major activity after a spill. Most spills into the Mississippi are as-
sumed to reach acceptable dilution before arrival at downstream water
users.
Continued observation by Pollution Control staff determines if the spiller
is taking adequate clean-up measures. If pressure from the Pollution Con-
trol Commission fails to bring adequate clean-up, a contractor may be
ordered in using the Clean Water Fund accumulated from pollution penalties.
$80,000 is available in the fund, and $170,000 additional could be made
available with the approval of the Director of the Pollution Control Com-
mission.
Operations
Pollution Control personnel dispatched to the scene of a spill serve as
the Commission's eyes and ears. They do not, generally, make decisions
or give advice directly to Public Safety officials during the immediate
danger phase of an incident. They have only limited protective gear and
are not equipped to undertake clean up. If the spiller does not clean up,
the state prefers to use contractors, rather than state employees,
for clean up. The contractor produces a single bill for all services
which can then be recovered from the spiller.
Staff responding to spills can take air and water samples for subsequent
analysis in Pollution Control or Fish and Game laboratories. Samples are
also processed by EPA laboratories after major incidents. Equipment which
indicates toxic gas concentrations at the scene is not currently available.
Pollution Control defers to public safety considerations and public safety
agencies until the immediate danger to life and property is past—even
if this risks some degradation of the environment. After the immediate
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danger is past, Pollution Control assumes prime responsibility for moni-
toring clean up, and supervising clean up if the state orders in a con-
tractor.
In part because spill response is included within the Enforcement Division,
Pollution Control has made an effort to force facilities to take spill
prevention actions. Mississippi operates the NPDES program, and even
though the enforcement of spill prevention regulations under §311
is not delegated to the state, Pollution Control reports some success in
forcing permitted facilities to take spill prevention measures.
6. Clean Up and. Prevention
Prior to 1972, Mississippi had some trouble obtaining voluntary clean up
from some spillers. In that year, the Commission obtained an amendment
to the Penalty Section of the Pollution Statute which requires the spiller
tc clean up, and authorizes the state to clean up and collect costs from
the recalcitrant spiller.
For a truly massive spill, the state would expect to request Federal
assistance from the §311 fund for clean-up costs. Use of the state
fund obviates the need to call in a Federal official to supervise clean
up of a realtively small spill.
Railroads in Mississippi have no specific contingency plans for environ-
mental clean up, but they have been willing to accept clean-up costs.
Truckers have been more of a problem, particularly independent haulers,
but the state has been successful in forcing clean-up costs on the shipper
when the hauler is obstinate.
Large industries have been generally responsive to demands for environ-
mentally sound clean up, but some smaller industries have presented more
of a problem. Nevertheless, all clean-up expenditures ordered by the
state under the 1972 law have been recovered without litigation. To
date, deliberate dumping and mystery spills have not been a problem in
Mississippi.
7. Costs
Because Mississippi draws resources from other programs, particularly
the permit program, for emergency response, operating costs for envir-
onmental emergencies are difficult to estimate. The state uses its
power to order a contract clean up very rarely, and expenditures on
such clean ups are a few thousand dollars or less. To date, the state
has received repayment for every clean up ordered by the Air & Water
Pollution Control Commission.
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8. Problems
Mississippi has a uniformly high water table which makes land disposal
of hazardous materials difficult. There is no fully certified hazardous
waste disposal facility in the state. Where possible, spilled materials
are returned to the manufacturer, who is presumed to have disposal facilities
for such materials. Sometimes, Pollution Control will request an extra-
ordinary permit from the State Board of Health for land disposal of spilled
materials. With the exception of a chlorine spill, Mississippi has not
yet been faced with large amounts of highly hazardous materials from a
spill.
The State Training Program for firemen is only two year old, so hazardous
material information has not yet been disseminated to many of the state's
rural volunteers. However, local officials have shown no unwillingness
to order evaculations in dangerous situations.
The state has no capability to work in highly hazardous environments
(chlorine, phosgene, etc.). Assistance would be required from industry
or the military. State officials have the impression that assistance
from army chemical warfare teams would take some time to obtain because
of red tape.
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oo
Ul
AIR & WATER
POLLUTION
CONTROL
COMMISSION
Director
of
Enforcement
- supervise
clean up
DEPARTMENT
OF
HEALTH
- solid waste
- drinking water
- advice on treatment
of toxic substance
OFFICES
-NPDES (Jackson)
files (Gulfport)
(Oxford)
victims
- on-scene surveillance
and reports
CIVIL
DEFENSE
operations
center
coordination of
state agencies
in disaster
dispatch field
staff
- initiate clean-up
contracts
Figure 8 - MISSISSIPPI
-------
I. NEW JERSEY
1. Summary
The Garden State has the most fully developed spill response program of
any state interviewed. The Office of Hazardous Substance Control with-
in the Department of Environmental Protection is specifically charged
with preventing spills, responding to incidents, and preparing cases for
the enforcement of spill violation penalties. The office has a staff of
10 professionals (mostly engineers) and will receive an expanded budget
of $660,000 in 1978-1979 permitting expansion of the staff to 26 posi-
tions.
The state has a spill contingency fund of $25 million which extends to oil
and hazardous chemicals. The fund, raised by a tax on the oil and chemical
industry, covers clean up, damages, and administrative costs. The fund can
be used on land spills potentially effecting groundwater, but current statu-
tory language limits use of the fund to actual spills of specified hazardous
chemicals. Use of the fund in situations of imminent danger or to re-
pair damages from dumps which predate passage of the law is not clearly
permitted by the existing language.
The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) proposed explicit spill
prevention regulations last year which were withdrawn after industry
opposition, but revised prevention regulations were promulgated on March
30, 1978.
The centralized response capability of the special spills unit (Office
of Hazardous Substance Control) situated in Trenton, near the center of
this geographically compact state, gives New Jersey a relatively unusual
administrative capacity to supplement the large contingency fund avail-
able for hazardous material spills. The Chief of the Office of Hazard-
ous Substance Control (OHSC) has been with the program since approximately
1970, and was involved in amending the New Jersey oil spill bill to cover
hazardous substances.
Industry responsiveness to spills has generally been improving, although
the bankrupt New Jersey railroads still present a significant problem.
Despite the availability of the fund, and a continuing increase from the
75 chemical spills reported in 1975, the clean-up fund is used only in-
frequently. Allocations of approximately $80,000 were made from the fund
between April and November 1977 to respond to chemical incidents. Most
of these incidents resulted from illegal or abandoned dumps. Even when
the state must begin the clean up of a transportation or process spill,
the responsible party usually pays the contractor directly thus obviating
any need to use contingency funds.
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2. Laws
The Spill Compensation and Control Act (§58:10-2311), prohibits the
discharge of hazardous substances into "the waters of the state or onto
lands from which it might flow or drain into said waters". Whenever
"any hazardous substance is discharged, the Department of Environmental
Protection shall act to remove or arrange for the removal of such dis-
charge, unless it determines such removal will be done properly and
expeditiously by the owner or operator of the major facility or any
other source from which the discharge occurs."
The New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund of $25 million created by this
Act is strictly liable for:
1. cost of restoring, repairing, or replacing any real
or personal property damaged or destroyed, any result-
ing loss of income from damaged property prior to restor-
ation, and any resulting reduction in value of such
damaged property;
2. restoration and replacement of damaged natural resources;
3. loss of income incidental to damaged real or personal
property, provided the loss exceeds 10% of the amount
claimant normally derives from said property;
4. certain losses of tax revenues by state or local govern-
ments;
5. interest on loans incurred by the claimant for the
purpose of ameliorating the adverse effects of a dis-
charge; and
6. all clean-up and removal costs.
All such damages may be recovered without regard to fault, by the fund
from offending parties, subject to the following limitations and de-
fenses:
1. absent a showing of gross negligence or willful miscon-
duct, liability for any instance of discharge is limited
to 50 million dollars for each major facility or $150
per gross ton for each vessel;
2. full damages may be recovered for a showing of gross
negligence or willful misconduct; and
3. a defendant under this Act may raise the defenses of
an act or omission caused solely by war, sabotage,
government negligence, God, or a third party (provided
that the employee or agent of the defendant may not be
considered a third party).
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For purposes of declaring a state of emergency (App A: 9-33.1), a
disaster is defined as an "unusual incident resulting from natural or
unnatural causes which endangers the health, safety or resources of the
residents of one or more municipalities of the state " The law
would appear to cover man-caused disasters such as hazarous chemical
spills.
A general right to consider any matter relating to the preservation
and improvement of public health attaches to the state Department of
Health (§26:1A-11). The Pesticide Control Act of 1971 invests the
Pesticide Control Council with regulatory power over pesticides, but
includes no mention of liability insurance or spill reporting require-
ment s.
3. Organization
Department of Environmental Protection has an Office of Hazardous Sub-
stance Control (OHSC) reporting to the Assistant Commissioner for
Science which functions as representative of the Commissioner's office
during environmental emergencies and is the DEP coordinator during
natural disasters. The office handles all reports of oil and hazard-
our material spills, including preparation of penalty cases. The
Office also administers spill prevention regulations.
The spill clean-up and damage compensation fund is administered by a
special officer in the Finance Department.
Department of Environmental Protection also includes Water Resources,
Solid Waste Management, Bureau of Potable Water, Air Pollution, and
Radiological Health, as well as Parks and Forests and Fish and Game.
State Health Department is relatively little involved in emergency
response, although concern is being expressed for the occupational
health of workers in the Office of Hazardous Substance Control.
In the event of a significant spill or emergency, a member of OHSC will
be dispatched to the scene. He can communicate by radio with the Chief
of the Office. Most advice on the handling of a spill will come di-
rectly from OHSC, but if time allows, experts in the Air Pollution
Division will be used to project the dispersion of a smoke plume or gas
cloud. Advice will also be sought from experts in the toxic chemical
and cancer program within the office of the Commissioner, DEP. In the
event of a very significant disaster, such as the recent Rollins' En-
vironmental Services fire, the Chief of the Office of Hazardous Sub-
stance Control will go to the scene.
State Police handle the coordination of state efforts during the immedi-
ate emergency phase. The state has no Fire Marshall with operational
authority.
The State Police are the leading public safety agency for the state,
and emergency planning (Civil Defense) has recently been transferred
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to the State Police. Planners in the State Police are considering
creation of a 60-man strike force for all types of emergencies which
would be prepared to assist OHSC in handling chemical spills.
Fire fighting at the scene of the accident is directed by the local
fire company, which is assisted by fire fighters from surrounding com-
munities under mutual aid agreements. Advice from OHSC is provided
directly to the State Police and the lead fire company.
4. Communications
The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection maintains a 24-
hour telephone number to which all spills must be reported. During
working hours, a staff member at OHSC takes down details of the spill
report on a prepared form. Smaller spills are assigned to a staff mem-
ber for subsequent investigation, and preparation of a report and penalty
recommendat ion.
In the event of a major spill, an OHSC staff member will be assigned to
respond directly from Trenton. State cars used in response have radios
which are tied into the DEP radio network. Radio contact with the Coast
Guard, spill contractors, and other DEP Divisions such as Fish and Game
and Marine Police is possible with existing frequencies. A patch into
the State Police is currently being planned. OHSC is also ordering
mobile phones for direct communication from the scene of the accident
to telephone based information sources such as CHEMTREC.
In non-working hours, incoming calls reporting major incidents are di-
verted to the home telephone of a Duty Officer in OHSC. He can handle
the report over the telephone, respond himself, or send another member
of the Office.
The Bureau of Potable Water is advised of spills affecting water, and
this Office notifies downstream water users. During off-hour emergen-
cies, OHSC may notify the downstream water users directly.
On-scene coordinators from OHSC are supplemented by Fish and Game per-
sonnel and Marine Police in assessing the extent of a spill. If assist-
ance is needed from other units within DEP, the Office of Hazardous
Substance Control calls directly for this assistance. OHSC speaks for
the Commissioner of Environmental Protection in these circumstances,
and any reluctance to release resources for spill response has been
resolved by a call from the Commissioner.
After transportation accidents and explosions, the first notification
to Environmental Protection may come from the State Police. Response
procedures are the same in such incidents.
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5. Operations
Evaluation of the hazards from a particular spill is based upon past
experience and general professional training. Specialized training in
the handling of hazardous substances has been somewhat limited in the
past, but with the availability of funds from the expanded spill con-
trol budget OHSC staff are able to attend national seminars and train-
ing programs.
CHEMTREC is used frequently for information on specific chemicals.
OHSC has a CHRIS manual and does use it. New Jersey has now made
arrangements for direct use of the OHM-TADS system, and information
from the data base will be transmitted directly to OHSC upon inquiry.
Each member of OHSC also has the EPA hazardous material manual (small
blue book).
Men responding to spills have protective gear including self-contained
breathing apparatus and respirators. More extensive protective gear
is maintained in a new response van.
Samples would usually be tested by the Health Department laboratory,
or by outside laboratory under contract to DEP. The Chemistry Depart-
ment at Rutgers has been used for advice on occasion. EPA laboratories
in Region II and at the Edison laboratory have also been called in to
assist the state.
When they respond to the scene of a spill, staff from OHSC are the pri-
mary source of information on evacuation, toxicity, containment, and
exotic fire fighting requirements. Additional information from other
state and Federal sources is fed to the scene through OHSC and its on-
scene coordinator or its Director.
During the attempt to contain a spill, heavy equipment can be obtained
from the Highway Department or New Jersey Turnpike Authority if a spill
contractor is not available. Sorbent materials have been stockpiled at
various locations throughout the state. OHSC assesses the response of
the spiller, and determines if money is to be used from the contingency
fund.
6. Clean Up and Prevention
New Jersey has awarded standby contracts to seven spill clean-up firms.
One of these firms is ordered to the scene if OHSC finds the spiller's
response unsatisfactory. The fund is used infrequently, and contractor
costs are sometimes paid directly by the spiller.
The fund also pays the administrative costs of the spill response pro-
gram. Overtime can be paid to spill coordinators although the payments
must come from the appropriation budgeted for OHSC, rather than the con-
tingency fund.
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Claims by individuals for damages suffered as a result of a spill are
submitted to the spill fund administrator in the Treasury Department.
Until recently, fund administrators served only part time, and the
management of the fund is now being improved.
Spill response by large chemical companies and tank truck lines has
been generally adequate. Small chemical facilities have the worst en-
vironmental record and give more of a problem in clean up because they
have small cash reserves.
Railroads have presented one of the most difficult problems in spill
clean up. New Jersey railroads are generally bankrupt and incorporated
into CONRAIL. They resist expensive clean-up measures and do not res-
pond to threats of state penalties.
7. Costs
In 1976, 1,282 oil and chemical spills were reported in the state.
Approximately 1,500 were reported last year. In 1977, the state desig-
nated a list of chemicals which required mandatory spill reporting.*
Prior to this designation, 10%-20% of reported spills involved hazard-
ous chemicals other than oil. Allocations from the contingency fund
for hazardous material clean up from April to November of 1977 were
approximately $80,000, distributed as follows:
® waste chemical drums - $11,000;
• dump of waste oil - $1,144;
• contamination of well field from previous dumping of
PCB's - $65,000; and
• illegal dump of cyanide compounds - $3,139.67.
The New Jersey statute authorizes the expenditure of interest earned on
the spill contingency fund for research purposes. In fiscal 1978,
$300,000 is allocated to research on spill prevention and control.
The office of Hazardous Substances Control will receive an operating
budget of $660,000 in fiscal 1979. This will permit staff expansion to
26 positions. This money is drawn from the oil transfer tax, and is not
drawn from the general fund.
*
Same as original list designated for §311, FWPCA.
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8. Problems
Clear statutory language authorizing expenditure of the contingency
fund on old dumps, unknown chemicals, and situations which threaten an
imminent release is desired. This would turn the New Jersey spill
statute into a general environmental emergency power. At the moment,
state officials do not believe they are clearly empowered to intervene
and use the contingency fund in these situations.
Disposal of spilled material had not been a problem until the explosion
of the Rollins facility. At the time of the interview, a disposal prob-
lem had not occurred since the accident.
New Jersey would like to see the Federal government clearly recognize
state capabilities in handling environmental emergencies, and define
the role that states are expected to play. Federal assistance would be
welcomed:
• in supporting training of on-scene coordinators, and
• in performing long-term assessments of the environmental
impact of major spill.
While New Jersey does not need contingency funds for clean up, state
officials did say that the Federal government should consider delega-
tion to the states of expenditures from §311 fund.
1-92
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M
I
DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
ASST. COMM.
FOR SCIENCE
OFFICE OF
HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCE
CONTROL
supervise clean up
spill reports
spill prevention
enforcement actions
WATER
RESOURCES
SOLID
WASTE
POTABLE
WATER
FISH AND
GAME
AIR
POLLUTION
disposal
permits
assists in
spill monitoring
Figure 9 - NEW JERSEY
-------
J. OHIO
1 . Summary
Ohio has a well developed spill response capability in a special unit
within the state's Environmental Protection Agency. Spill response
personnel are stationed in four district offices and in Columbus. They
investigate spill reports to prepare penalty actions and also serve as
on-scene coordinators when needed. Through the Columbus office, they
can tap into additional expertise in the state and federal governments.
-M funds are available for the state to initiate clean-up but are
rarely used. Parallel investigations are performed by the Department
of Natural Resources, Division of Wildlife of spills which cause fish
kills. These investigations can produce an independent claim by the
state for damages for the fish killed.
In Ohio, the role of Civil Defense appears limited to after the disaster
coordination of state relief services. Any advice from Ohio EPA on fire
fighting or evacuation would usually be. provided directly to fire compan-
ies, local officials or state police at the scene of an accident.
Notification of downstream water users after a spill is a significant
issue in Ohio. Many Ohio communities draw their drinking water from
the Ohio River. Entities involved in spill notification on the Ohio
could include three EPA regions, five states, the Ohio River Sanitation
Commission, the State Drinking Water Program (within Ohio EPA) , the State
Health Department, numerous local health departments and individual water
treatment plants. Interdepartmental notification procedures have improv-
ed since the 1977 carbon tetrachloride spill.
2 . Laws
The director of the Environmental Protection Agency has the power under
§6111.03 to prevent, control, and abate instances of water pollution.
Penalties up to a maximum of $10,000 are authorized by §6111.07 for any
pollution violation or refusal to comply with an abatement order.
§595.01, relating to civil defense contingencies, includes a general
mention of disaster under which the Governor may declare a state of emer-
gency. No specific mention of "man-made" diaster or more narrowly de-
fined disaster situation is included. The code (§3207-01) does give the
Local Boards of Health the general power to abate all public health nui-
sances .
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3. Organization
The Environmental Emergency Section of Ohio EPA is a discrete office
with a Director reporting to the Agency's Assistant Administrator.
State funds appropriated to the EPA Director's Office support one on-
scene coordinator in each of five regional offices (including Columbus)
plus a central office staff including the Director and Assistant
Director, a geologist, an air specialist and a chemist. On-scene co-
ordinators in the regional offices generally have associate degrees
or bachelor of science degrees in fields such as biology. The Director
believes that greater staff continuity can be achieved by using personnel
with this level of training because state salaries are more competitive
with the outside market.
When water supplies are threatened by a spill, responsibility for down-
stream notification is assumed by the Water Supply Office within EPA.
The Environmental Health bureau of the Health Department works with local
health departments to develop emergency plans. These plans focus on the
preservation of public health after a • natural disaster, but preparation of
the plans does provide an opportunity for increasing the understanding of
hazardous material problems in local health departments. In an unusual
development, one county health department (Montgomery County -Dayton)
has built its own environmental emergency team. The State Health Depart-
ment also runs a major laboratory which is used for sample analysis by
the Environmental Emergency and Water Supply Offices in Ohio EPA.
The Ohio Department of Natural Resources administers a law which permits
recovery for the value of fish and wildlife killed in pollution
incidents. The division of Wildlife maintains a close working relation-
ship with the Ohio EPA, and reports of fish kills on spills are exchanged
regularly. County game protectors are dispatched to reported fish
kills and spills. They conduct their own investigation of the source
of the spill and count the fish killed. Supervision of clean up is
left to the Environmental Emergency Section of Ohio EPA, but the Division
of Wildlife prepares an independent case for recovering fish losses from
the polluter. In very large cases, EPA and Wildlife may coordinate legal
actions, but they are usually pursued independently.
4. Communications
While reporting of spills is not yet mandatory (a bill has been introduced),
EPA maintains a 24-hour toll free number for telephone reports. A member
of the central office Environmental Emergency staff is designated as
duty officer and takes the incoming spill report. All reports are re-
corded on a standard form, and minor spills are referred to the appropriate
regional office for later follow-up.
If the spill appears significant, the duty officer will reach the regional
spill coordinator and order him to the scene. The coordinators have four-
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wheel drive vehicles with radios on the Department of Natural Resources'
frequency, although this system is active only 8 hours per day. Commun-
ications in off-duty hours must be made by telephone, but regional staff
carry a beeper at all times.
At the same time the regional coordinator is dispatched, the duty officer
in Columbus will make other notifications including the U.S. EPA regional
office, ORSANCO, the Environmental Health bureau of the Department of
Health, the Water Supply Office of Ohio EPA and the Division of Wildlife.
The Environmental Health Division passes the word, to affected local
health departments. The Division of Wildlife will order the county game
proctector to the scene.
The Water Supply Office notifies downstream water users of a spill, giving
the expected arrival time and the toxicology of the spilled material.
Advice is also given on the treatment of contaminated water. Ohio EPA
does not advise utilities to turn off water supplies. If an alternate
water supply is not available, or the intake on a contaminated river cannot
be shut down long enough for the spill to pass, a public health advisory
on use of the water will be issued. This announcement is usually cleared
with the local health officer and waterworks superintendent prior to the
issuance of a press release. In the worst cases, the National Guard can
be used to ship in drinking water.
In a major emergency, the duty officer from the environmental emergency
section in Columbus will remain in contact with the state police, the
on-scene coordinator, water supply and other affected groups. The
duty officer may contact CHEMTREC, or use the CHRIS manual and other
texts to offer immediate advice to public safety officials at the scene.
The Environmental Emergency Office is the focal point for advice on
toxic gases as well as liquid spills. This advice is relayed through
the state police radio system or the on-scene coordinator. Only local
officials have the authority to order an evacuation, and Ohio EPA
is reluctant to push for evacuation in marginal cases. However, the
decentralization of the on-scene coordinator has enabled them to
develop working relationships with many local fire and police chiefs,
and recommendations from the coordinators are rarely rejected.
5. Operations
Spill response personnel in Ohio are usually well equipped. They have
self-contained breathing apparatus and rubber coveralls, gloves and
boots. Acid suits are on order. For testing the air and water, they
have an explosimeter, MSA-type toxic gas direction devices and water
sampling kits. Vehicles are equipped with a small oil boom and sorbent
material. Each man has a copy of the Sax textbook on hazardous materials.
If industry response is inadequate, Ohio can call in a contractor for immed-
iate containment of a spill. Although $100,000 authorized for a contin-
gency fund was never appropriated, $35,000 has been accumulated from
penalties and settlements. Twenty thousand dollars of this is
available for extraordinary expenses. Ohio prefers to stabilize a
situation for contract money and is used as a lever to force industry
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to complete the clean up. If large-scale government clean up is required,
they expect to call in the Federal government to use the Section 311
Clean up fund.
Ohio Health Department laboratories (with 24-hour capability) are usually
used for sample analysis, but other laboratories, including EPA facilities,
have assisted. On occasion, Ohio has had trouble getting priority for
its samples at EPA's Cincinnati laboratory. State aircraft have been
used for the delivery of samples to these laboratories.
6. Clean Up and Prevention
Railroads in Ohio have presented a significant spill clean up problem.
Conrail was so obstinate that the state filed suit, and the railroad has
now hired an experienced contractor and is much more responsive after
accidents. The C&O system is still reluctant to undertake adequate
clean up, and Ohio is weighing a similar suit.
The large chemical trucking lines have been good about clean up and have
developed spill clean up capacity of their own. Smaller truckers are
more of a problem, and the state police have been very helpful in tracing
registrations and holding drivers until a responsible party is forced to
clean up.
The Director of the Environmental Emergency Unit sees public opinion as
a powerful force motivating chemical companies to clean up spills. The
threat of bad publicity can bring forth improved clean up resources. Clean
up by Ohio chemical companies is currently good.
While Ohio has no spill prevention regulations per se, the Director of EPA
can require specific measures to stop pollution, including spill clean up
and prevention. Each spill report prepared by the on-scene coordinator
includes an investigation of steps to prevent future spills. Penalties
up to $10,000 may be imposed for a spill, but these may be waived if the
spillor cleans up and takes designated corrective actions to prevent
future spills. The penalty power gives EPA the leverage to force upgrading
of spill prevention measures.
The Division of Wildlife collects compensation for damage to fisheries
and habitat using a formula based upon the number, species, and size of
organisms killed. Collection of this compensation is rarely waived. In
a few cases, the Division of Wildlife has used the court to force imple-
mentation of measures which would prevent future fish kills.
7. Costs
The spill response unit at Ohio EPA is not budgeted separately, but is
supported by state funds appropriated for the general operation of the
Administrators Office. With ten-twelve professional personnel, the
annual cost of the operation can be estimated around $150,000-$200,000.
Very few direct payments are made for clean up. When such payments are
made they come from a $20,000 allocation of $35,000 previously collected
1-97
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in administrative settlements after previous spills. Such expenditures
do not exceed a few thousand dollars per incident.
The Division of Wildlife and the Environmental Health bureau support
environmental emergency response with personnel usually assigned to
other tasks, so operation costs are not available. Collections by the
Division of Wildlife for damages to fish and wildlife have been rising
steadily and reached $379,144 in 1975 and $83,513 in 1976 after averaging
$29,228 between 1964 and 1973.
8. Problems
Ohio does not need more manpower for emergency response and does not feel
greatly hampered by the relatively small amount of available clean up
funds. There are a number of areas in which help is needed:
• on-scene coordinators need radios tied into a 24-hour
emergency network;
• a "full service" hazardous material disposal site is
needed within the state. While EPA has assisted in
finding out-of-state disposal sites, the Environmen-
tal Emergency Unit would like to see more positive
planning for disposal sites by the Federal govern-
ment;
• turnover in Coast Guard unit commanders produces re-
curring communications problems with the state. A
more formal protocol for state and Coast Guard res-
ponse actions may be necessary;
• money for training of on-scene coordinators (including
out-of-state travel);
• a requirement for mandatory reporting of spills to
Ohio EPA. A bill requiring such reports was caught
in the Legislature because of industry opposition
to "another regulation";
• a clearer arrangement on the issuance of drinking water
alerts by state and federal government is necessary.
Federal press releases issued without state clearance
have contradicted state and local advice to water
consumers.
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Training for local fire and police services was not clearly cited as a
major need, as it was in other states. The Environmental Emergency
Unit, in cooperation with industry, has scheduled an annual conference
on oil and hazardous materials within the state. Ohio also runs a state
fire training school, and EPA's on-scene coordinators devote some time
to liaison with local fire departments. Ohio has had major pesticide
plant fires and other emergencies which suggest the need for further
training, even though the geographic dispersion of the EPA on-scene
coordinators makes it possible for them to arrive and provide advice
to fire companies during the critical emergency phase of many incidents.
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o
o
EPA
ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR
WATER SUPPLY
SPILL RESPONSE
PROGRAM
- notify water
users
REGIONAL CO-
ORDINATORS
(5)
- supervise clean up
- spill reports
- spill investigation
- prepare enforcement cases
- spill prevention
HEALTH
DEPARTMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH
BUREAU
- liaison with
local health
departments
NATURAL
RESOURCES
DIVISION
OF
WILDLIFE
COUNTY GAME
PROTECTORS
- investigate
spills & fish
kills
- collect damages
Figure 10 - OHIO
-------
K. PENNSYLVANIA
1. Summary
Spills affecting water are handled on a relatively decentralized basis
by the Water Quality section of the Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Resources. Staff from one of the seven District Offices is dis-
patched to the scene of the reported spill to monitor the situation.
DER is attempting to acquire a limited supply of clean-up equipment which
could be carried by each field vehicle, but spill response is only a
side-line for field staff and training in hazardous materials for "on-
scene coordinator" duties is limited. The state can issue clean-up con-
tracts in moderate amounts on short notice, using money from the Clean
Water Fund. This fund is tapped for spill clean up less than ten times
per year, usually for $3,000 per incident or less.
While Water Quality has the clear lead in supervising spill clean up,
other agencies are involved during the immediate emergency after an ex-
plosion or transportation accident. Pennsylvania has a Hazardous Material
Transportation Safety Board, and a staff member from this agency is
contacted by the State Police for information after a toxic chemical re-
lease in a highway accident. An engineer from the Public Utilities
Commission might be contacted after a rail accident. Information might also
be sought directly from the Air Pollution Division in DER, or possibly the
Health Department. After a disaster, relevant state agencies would be
pulled together in the central and regional offices of the Council of Civil
Defense.
2. Laws
Pennsylvania's water pollution statute contains a general prohibition
(Title 35, §691.3, et.seq.) against all unpermitted instances of water
pollution, and provides for the establishment of civil penalties modeled
on the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Originally, under the aegis
of the Department of Health, these provisions have been transferred to
the Water Quality Section of the Environmental Protection Agency. Re-
covery for damage to fish and wildlife as a result of pollutant activi-
ties may be obtained through civil actions by the Commonwealth under
Title 30, §202.1.
The state has its own Hazardous Substances Transportation Act (Title 25,
§2313) providing for the regulation of loading, placarding, and routing
of all vehicles involved in the transport of hazardous substances, as
well as fines of up to $5,000 for any offenses under the Act.
Title 71, §1689.101, creates an emergency disaster fund for "accidents
caused by forces beyond the control of man or by factors that were not
foreseen" at the time of appropriation. An open account of $5 million
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is provided for this purpose, but monies must ultimately be transferred
from other accounts or appropriated by the legislature to cover emergency
expenditures. Disaster conditions are simply defined as "those condi-
tions which seriously affect the welfare of a substantial number of citi-
zens of the Commonwealth". Expenditures from the emergency fund were
originally limited to state agencies, but a recent amendment permits
$1,000,000 of the $5,000,000 to be spent by local governments.
3. Organization
The Department of Environmental Resources (DER) has a broad range of res-
ponsibilities. In addition to industrial water pollution, municipal
sewage, air pollution and solid wastes, DER handles functions often left
in Health Departments, including safe drinking water, radiological and
occupational health. The Water Quality section of DER handles field
operations in the inspection and monitoring of industrial effluents,
sewage treatment plants, and water supplies. A network of 7 Regional
Offices with 62 professional staff enforces the requirements of the
Pennsylvania wastewater permit program. This field organization, coor-
dinated by the Chief of Water Quality operations in Harrisburg, handles
oil and chemical spills, other than immediate emergencies created by
the release of toxic gasses. In toxic gas episodes, the Air section of
DER would be asked directly for advice by Public Safety officials.
The Hazardous Material Transportation Safety Board, part of the Pennsyl-
vania Department of Transportation, not only enforces Board regulations,
but also assists when an emergency occurs. The State Police contact one
of three Board inspectors, who then provides advice on the hazardous
material released in a highway accident from his own experience or from
CHEMTREC. The inspector will attempt to trace the source of an unidenti-
fied shipment, and may require a representative of the carrier to report
to the scene of the accident.
Pennsylvania requires the reporting of railroad accidents to the Public
Utilities Commission (PUC) and public safety officials may seek advice
from an engineer at the PUC.
The Council of Civil Defense, with state-wide headquarters in Harris-
burg, and three district headquarters, is responsible for coordinating
the activities of all state agencies in a major emergency. The Council
staff draws up state contingency plans and provides a 24-hour duty offi-
cer system which can activate the emergency plan, convene state agency
representatives, and begin operation of the Council's recently improved
radio communications network.
The Department of Labor and Industry has responsibility for the state
fire training program. Because of the concern of a number of state agen-
cies, including the state Council of Civil Defense, this program is be-
ing directed towards improved hazardous material training.
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4. Communelations
Pennsylvania requires the reporting of all spills. The primary contact
for most routine spill reports is one of the seven Water Quality Regional
Offices. A 24-hour answering service at each office contacts the regional
Chief of Water Quality operations with spill reports. The inspector
responsible for the geographic district will then be sent to check out
the spill and the adequacy of the response. If the incident is signifi-
cant, the Regional Office would then notify Water Quality operations in
Harrisburg. District Water Quality inspectors do not have radios in
their vehicles, so information must be'relayed by telephone, or through
the Fish Commission radio system. (Fish Commission officers will report
to most spills which cause, or threaten to cause, a fish kill.)
If the spill is caused by an accident or explosion handled by the State
Police, the report is forwarded to Water Quality operations. At one time,
the State Police were reluctant to report accidents or spills which did
not appear to threaten water pollution, but all spill reports are now
passed on to DER. Responsibility for field surveillance of these situa-
tions is also transferred to the Regional Offices. In major emergencies,
Water Quality operations in Harrisburg maintain contact with the situa-
tion through telephone reports from the Regional Offices and messages
relayed from the State Police or Civil Defense Communications Center.
Notification of downstream water users is also performed by Water Quality
Regional Offices. The time and description of the spill is given, and
downstream water users are left to make their own decision on a shift to
alternate water sources.
In general, Water Quality does not coordinate aspects of environmental
emergency response other than clean up and water supply notification.
Requests from local Public Safety officials or State Police on immediate
hazards and toxicity are forwarded directly to Hazardous Material Trans-
portation staff, the Public Utilities Commission (for railroads), or Air
experts within DER by the State Police or the Civil Defense coordinator.
The Pennsylvania Council of Civil Defense is responsible for coordinating
the efforts of all state agencies in an emergency. In the event of a
significant accident, a Civil Defense duty officer is contacted at home
after business hours. He has notification lists for other state agencies,
and retains contact with the situation by telephone to the State Police
radio center in Harrisburg (which can relay a message to any point in the
state). If the emergency appears of sufficient magnitude, and a county
Civil Defense Director requests further state assistance, the duty officer
will activate the Civil Defense Command Center. Representatives from lead
agencies, including DER, would then convene in Harrisburg, and at one of
three district Civil Defense headquarters. Coordination of additional
state resources and relief efforts would occur through this mechanism.
During the recent Johnstown flood, radio communications capacity proved
inadequate to contact all necessary emergency services. Civil Defense
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has now purchased sophisticated radio patching equipment which will en-
able the Civil Defense Command Center to tie into all important emergency
radio networks.
5. Operations
Water Quality personnel who initially investigate spills usually have a
natural sciences degree and very limited training in the handling of
hazardous materials. They have no self-contained breathing apparatus
or protective clothing. They carry the chemical transportation safety
index and the small EPA Hazardous Material manual. Additional advice
can be obtained from geologists and aquatic biologists in each Regional
Office. The Director of Water Quality operations in Harrisburg has the
CHRIS manual and Merck index for further backup.
With material now on order, each district inspector will be issued a
small boom and equipment to make filter fences so small spills can be
immediately contained upon arrival at the scene.
For laboratory analysis of samples, DER has three laboratories of its
own and additional contract support. Some of the more exotic substances
are sent to EFA for analysis, and Pennsylvania welcomes the use of
specialized EPA equipment such as the Environmental Response Unit from
Edison.
Some problems have occurred when EPA on-scene coordinators have moved in
to take over spill response at an incident. State employees who have
handled spills without publicity in the past may feel upstaged. DER
recognizes that spill response is a positive program which can serve as
an antidote to the usual negative regulatory image carried by the de-
partment.
6. Clean Up and Prevention
DER has found trucking companies and railroads generally responsive to
the need for environmentally sound clean up. Small industries have been
the biggest clean-up problem, but they are moved to action by the state's
threat to clean up and bill the spiller.
Deliberate dumps and abandoned disposal facilities have created problems
in Pennsylvania. Apparently criminal elements have been involved in
some illegal discharges of hazardous wastes which required subsequent
containment or clean up. Hazardous wastes left by previous landowners
have also created problems, and Pennsylvania requested assistance from
the §311 fund to contain leaching of oil and pentachlorophenol from one
property. Federal expenditures were terminated before the problem was
resolved, apparently because of a shortage in the §311 fund.
Pennsylvania has no approved disposal site for hazardous wastes, but up
to the time of the interview, clean-up debris disposal was not a problem
because of the proximity of the Rollins facility in New Jersey. Permits
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for landfilling oily wastes can be obtained by Water Quality from the
Solid Waste Division of DER, but the agency is not sure what will be done
with large amounts of hazardous waste debris with the New Jersey facility
unavailable.
Small fines on spillers are administered at the Regional Office level as
part of normal enforcement actions conducted on a decentralized basis.
Larger cases, and those requiring substantial legal assistance, would be
coordinated through Water .Quality's central office.
Pennsylvania requires that industries prepare pollution incident preven-
tion plans similar to Federal SPCC plans. This requirement has been in
effect since 1971, and issuance of state discharge permits is conditional
on compliance with the requirement. The prevention plans must include
spill notification lists (regional Water Quality office, downstream users)
For the trucking industry, Pennsylvania's Hazardous Material Transporta-
tion Safety Board has adopted Federal DOT regulations for all intra-state
trucking. While this does not necessarily prevent accidents, it does re-
quire placarding and cargo identification. The state has prosecuted over
400 violations of these regulations.
7. Costs
If industry clean up is inadequate, the state can tap a clean water fund
of $600,000 collected from past fines and settlements. Prompt approval
of a clean-up contract is arranged by the Water Quality central office.
Clean-up contracts from the fund are used only a few times each year,
and rarely exceed three thousand dollars, so annual expenditures would
run less than $25,000. Access to the fund is most useful in forcing
voluntary clean up. If a very large government clean-up expenditure is
necessary, Pennsylvania would expect to tap the Federal §311 fund.
While the state's $5 million emergency reserve is apparently available
for "man made" disasters, the interviews revealed no case in which it
has yet been used to pay costs associated with an environmental emergency
caused by the release of hazardous substances, although the recent
Johnstown flood emergency included hazardous material problems. The
Federal government absorbed the cost of handling and cleaning up the haz-
ardous materials released by the flood (see case study prepared by EPA) .
The state assisted in identifying and storing the recaptured drums of
hazardous materials.
None of the Pennsylvania agencies involved in response to environmental
emergencies have staff dedicated to emergency planning for spill response,
so it is not possible to estimate an operating budget for this activity.
However, the Department of Environmental Resources is using $24,000 from
a Federal grant to acquire limited clean-up supplies for Water Quality
inspectors in the field.
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8. Problems
One of the biggest problems is training. Ignorance of the hazards of
certain chemicals has resulted in the injury of many firemen. At the
local level, training of police and firemen in hazardous material has
been limited. The state is now moving to expand the capacity of the
fire training school (in the Department of Labor and Industry) to train
firemen in the handling of hazardous substances. A network of 200 state-
wide instructors is planned, and the state is funding the development of
a training manual at Penn State.
The state Hazardous Material Transportation Safety Board has worked to
train local fire departments on hazardous material transport and pla-
carding regulations, and the Council of Civil Defense has distributed
the Federal DOT pamphlet on transportation of hazardous materials, but
expanded training programs are clearly needed.
Because of the multiple responsibilities assigned to the geographically
decentralized Water Quality inspectors, training is largely limited to
on-the-job instruction from existing employees. There is no specific
training program for handling hazardous material spills.
Some past misunderstandings and conflicts between state DER employees
and Federal on-scene coordinators suggest the need for prior agreement
on the roles state and Federal governments should play at the scene of a
spill. This is particularly true prior to commitment of the §311 fund,
when both governments are supervising the spiller's clean-up effort.
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WATER
QUALITY
I
M
O
state-wide
coordination
technical
backup
major en-
forcement
action
DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
RESOURCES
AIR
POLLUTION
WASTE
DISPOSAL
SAFE DRINK-
ING WATER
REGIONAL
OFFICES
(7)
supervise clean up
check spill reports
small enforcement
actions
DEPARTMENT
OF
TRANSPORTATION
COUNCIL
OF
CIVIL DEFENSE
HAZARDOUS
MATERIAL
TRANSPORTATION
SAFETY BOARD
- disaster plan
- coordination of
all state agencies
in a disaster
- advice after
truck accident
- enforce regulations
Figure 11 - PENNSYLVANIA
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V. STATUTORY EMERGENCY POWERS FOR HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
This Chapter reviews the statutory powers at the state level authorizing
action for environmental emergencies occasioned by spills or other re-
leases of hazardous non-oil substances. The information below is based
on a survey of the statutes of all fifty states. The survey covered all
general emergency/disaster legislation, public health provisions, environ-
mental protection statutes, air and water pollution acts, fish and game
legislation, and hazardous and solid waste statutes. It also included a
review of case law on liability issues.
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As a general rule, the states lack a comprehensive statutory approach for
environmental emergencies resulting from hazardous non-oil substances.
There are few exceptions to this general statement; Alaska's recently en-
acted Environmental Conservation Act is a noteworthy example. General
emergency/disaster statutes are the most common source of legislative
authority for emergency action. However, the predominant pattern in this
area of state law is for legislation with any degree of comprehensiveness
to be confined in its application to specific kinds of environmental harm
(e.g., water pollution or destruction of fish and wildlife) or to specific
kinds of substances (e.g., pesticides).
Specific legislative provisions authorizing emergency action are summarized
on a state-by-state basis in Table 1.'"" The major findings supported by the
information in this table are:
o Statutory authorizations for emergency action are most com-
monly found in general emergency/disaster provisions or in
specialized statutes, such as water pollution acts, con-
cerned with specific kinds of environmental damage only.
There are no state statutes providing for the regulation of
hazardous substances generally. Nor are there any statutes
granting emergency hours predicated on events specifically
caused by "hazardous substances". As a result, there are no
adequate statutory definitions of hazardous substances.
© The emergency powers which exist are phrased in general terms
only and there is a lack of precise definition of "emergency"
or the criteria to be applied. As a general rule, the power
to declare an emergency under general emergency/disaster
statutes lies with the Governor of the state. Under the
specialized water pollution statutes, the power lies with a
designated administrative official or body.
9 As a general rule, public health statutes do not provide ade-
quate authorization for action for environmental emergencies.
Contained in Appendix 2
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• As Table 1 indicates, there are only a few legislatively
designated contingency funds for essential emergency action.
As a general rule, the legislative authorizations for damage
abatement, clean up, and other emergency related activities
do not specify the source of the funds required to support
the action.
• In approximately one-third of the states, there are authori-
zations for the recovery of clean-up and abatement costs.
These provisions are usually in water pollution statutes only
and are not found in the more general emergency/disaster pro-
visions.
• There is little statutory authorization for recovery of
damages sustained by the public generally or by private
parties as a result of spills or releases of non-oil hazard-
ous substances. The major exception to this general rule is
for public damage in the form of fish and other wildlife.
o With the exception of statutes regulating pesticide applica-
tors, there are not liability insurance or other financial
responsibility requirements which apply to hazardous sub-
stances. Issues concerning liability are a matter of judi-
cial case law and both the standards of liability and the
nature and extent of damages subject to recovery can vary
considerably'among the different states.
As a result, the typical pattern of state law with respect to environmen-
tal emergency action is one of patchwork consistency at best. For example,
a fund may exist at the state level for executive (gubernatorial) applica-
tion for emergencies phrased in broad general language. But comprehensive
specific powers to abate nuisances, to fine violators, to assess damages,
and to exercise clean-up responsibilities may exist with respect to water
pollution only. Further, requirements for liability insurance may exist
only for commercial pesticide applications (which is common), or hazardous
waste disposal permits, whereas clear liability for compensation for pub-
lic damage may exist only with respect to fish and wildlife only, or, in
the case of a handful of states for clean-up costs incurred as a result
of specific acts of water pollution.
There appears to be a trend in the direction of more comprehensive statu-
tory approaches to emergencies from water pollution by non-oil hazardous
substances. If there is a trend, it is in its early stages only. We were
able to note general instances of recent legislation where traditional
nuisance abatement powers have been shifted from the public health area
to newly created environmental agencies and where natural disaster powers
have been amended to include "man-made" emergencies, or, in a few states,
air pollution and water contamination requiring emergency action to avoid
damages to the public.
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The recognition of public needs implicit in legislative shifts of the kind
described above suggests that the nucleus for statutory action exists at
the state level in the form of historical precedents with respect to nar-
rowly defined kinds of injury. That is, ample authority exists in many
states, but is fragmented and in need of re-organization and consolidation.
What is needed is the impetus which will motivate legislatures to take a
step in the direction of a more comprehensive approach.
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B. GENERAL EMERGENCY AND PUBLIC HEALTH STATUTES
1. General Emergency/Disaster Acts
Every state has general emergency/disaster legislation. Provisions of
this kind appear to have their origin in natural disaster (hurricane,
flood, etc.) and civil defense (enemy attack) concerns. One advantage
of the latter focus is the common existence of state, county and local
officials for delegation of authority for communications, for equipment
and other purposes.
About half the states have statutes which make provisions for "man-made"
disasters. Table 2*provides a summary of these states. The statutory
language tends to be vague, but the inclusion of "man-made" disasters
makes it clear that the authorizations involved extend to include more
than natural causes. This suggests a wide range of authority exists for
gubernatorial or other executive authority to act in the event of environ-
mental emergencies in at least half the states.
Most states recognize the existence of local emergencies and some provide
for local appropriations (e.g., Oklahoma, New Mexico), or provide for
access of local authorities to state funds (e.g., Colorado, Kentucky,
Pennsylvania). However, the legislative provisions are broadly drafted
and there is little guidance as to the criteria to be followed in declar-
ing an emergency or in specifying actions to be taken.
As indicated in Table 2, at least ten states have general emergency stat-
utes with provisions making direct reference to some kind of environmen-
tal emergency. California specifically refers to oil spills only. The
rest (i.e., Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Michigan,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Virginia) contain
language indicating application to environmentally-related emergencies
from any kind of hazardous or polluting substances generally.
Funds. The establishment of funds for emergency relief purposes is common
to emergency/disaster statutes as is authorization to use such generally
appropriated funds as may be available at the time. However, it is diffi-
cult to characterize these funds as applicable to environmental emergen-
cies. Generally, there are few specific limitations on the use of the
funds. This leaves a wide range of executive discretion in their appli-
cation. Of course, it is possible that limitations are placed in guber-
natorial emergency decrees or in standing contingency emergency plans.
Compensation/Reimbursement. With the exception of an oil spill compensa-
tion law in California's disaster statute, emergency/disaster statutes do
not contain provisions with respect to the compensation or reimbursement
of the state (or local body) for actions taken for minimizing damage, for
cleaning up, or for restoration of the environment. Nor are there pro-
Contained in Appendix 2
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visions for compensating third parties for damages sustained. This prob-
ably reflects the natural disaster (and civil defense) orientation of
statutes of this kind.
The state, together with private persons who sustain injuries, might be
entitled to receive expenditures, damages, etc. in instances where the
spill, dumping, etc., was in violation of a specific statute of the type
discussed below. Or, the recovery might be limited to the general law
of tort liability, which is also discussed below.
2. Public Health Provisions
In general, the public health statutes of the different states are not
directly applicable to environmental emergencies. These statutes typi-
cally authorize administrative powers to abate "nuisances" which threaten
the public health. As a general rule, the power lies with county or local
boards of health or public health officials. The tendency - largely be-
cause of historical patterns - is to focus on personal health and disease,
not environmental emergencies.
However, the statutory language is broad, almost vague, and susceptible
of justifying emergency action in light of modern scientific awareness
of environmental impacts on human health. Certainly, toxic wastes which
affect water quality have direct impacts on sanitation. For this reason
at least fifteen states have entrusted the board of health (or an equiva-
lent agency) with responsibilities related to water pollution, chemical
wastes, or the like. Table 3^provides a summary of these states. In a
few other states, (e.g., Alaska and New Jersey) this environmentally re-
lated health responsibility has been transferred from the health agency
to one with broader environmental concerns and powers.
As a general rule, public health agencies lack either specific emergency
funds or the power to obtain reimbursement for expenditures or compensa-
tion for public damages. This probably reflects the traditional disease
orientation noted above. We found only three states - Kentucky, Missouri,
and Michigan - which authorize state or local health agencies to r-ecover
expenses required to abate a health nuisance.
'''Contained in Appendix 2
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C. SPECIFIC POLLUTION STATUTES
Our research found that statutes which fall into this category - typically
air and water pollution acts - contained the most precise authority for
dealing with emergencies from hazardous substances. However, there are
no general hazardous substances statutes. The tendency is for emergency
authority to be fragmented, i.e., oriented toward a particular part of
the natural environment only (e.g., water or air), or toward a specific
source of potential injury (e.g., from pesticides). Only Alaska has a
comprehensive environmental act which enables or facilitates the develop-
ment of an integrated plan for emergencies from hazardous substances
generally. Other state environmental protection acts lack specific treat-
ment of emergency action or are dependent on the existence of a specialized
statute (such as for water or air pollution).
1. Water Pollution
Statutes directed at water pollution tend to have the best developed
authority for dealing with environmental emergencies from spills of
hazardous substances. By definition, however, the statutory authoriza-
tions (and resulting potential for program development) are limited in
their application to water injury only.
As a general rule, water pollution statutes are comprehensive and demon-
strate an awareness of the need for administrative program development
and planning. Typically, water pollution is prohibited and an agency is
given the authority to enforce the prohibition. Powers to enter on prop-
erty and inspect for damage are fairly common, together with the authority
to abate pollution sources, to issue desist-orders or to obtain injunc-
tions. Fines and penalties are frequently prescribed.
Several water pollution statutes have an emergency focus - e.g., those
in Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio, Nebraska and New Mexico.
Some of the coastal states - California, Maryland, Massachusetts - in-
clude oil spill provisions as part of their water pollution programs.
Further, two states, Connecticut and New Jersey, have spill emergency
provisions for dangerous substances other than oil.
Funds and Compensation. Only a few states authorize the establishment
and maintenance of funds for water pollution emergency actions. The fund
in Mississippi is accumulated from fines. In Nebraska, authorization
exists for use of the Governor's general emergency fund. In New Jersey,
(which has one of the most sophisticated statutory approaches), the fund
is maintained by the Department of Environmental Protection. Other lead-
ing states lack a specific mention of a fund but are empowered to assess
fines which would be large enought to permit clean-up action if the state
made appropriate administrative arrangements for the use of the money.
In Massachusetts, the fine for water pollution can be as large as $25,000
per day; in Maryland, $10,000 a day.
Several states establish liability for water polluters and provide for
the recovery of state (public) expenditures for abatement and restoration
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incidental to the correction of unlawful water pollution. These include
Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut (all costs over $5,000), Florida, Indiana,
Minnesota, Ohio, New Jersey and New York. In another group of states,
liability to the state for water pollution appears to be limited to
damages to fish and wildlife, e.g., Illinois, South Carolina and Wash-
ington.
In general, the liability discussed above seems to be predicated on the
basis of an unlawful or negligent act of the polluting source. Only
Alaska and Minnesota have statutory provisions which suggest that liabil-
ity exists for all hazardous substances per se. Further, there are no
water pollution statutory provisions which establish liability standards
for damage to private persons and property. New Jersey's comprehensive
Spill Compensation and Control Act provides compensation for private
losses from its fund. The fund, in turn, can seek reimbursement from
appropriate violators pursuant to established case law liability prin-
ciples.
2. Fish and Wildlife Acts
Over the majority of the states have a "fish and wildlife" (or game)
statute concerned with negligent injury or damage to this animal form
of public property. Many of these statutes are closely related to, or a
part of, the water pollution statutes described above.
Typically, conduct injurious to fish and wildlife is prohibited and an
administrative enforcement mechanism is established. The power to abate
sources of injury is common, together with fines for violations. In a
few states, misdemeanor penalties are established. Many statutes of this
kind provide for the liability of the violator to the state for the
damage incurred. However, this liability is geared toward compensation
for the fish or animal species involved and rarely contemplates recovery
for clean-up and other costs. Thus, any funds involved are limited to
replenishment of stock only.
3. Pesticide Applications
Regulation of pesticide applications presents another form of statute
which is common to most states. However, statutes of this kind are ex-
tremely limited because of their applicability to pesticides only.
The most common form of legislation creates a licensing scheme for com-
mercial applicators of pesticides. In a few instances, the licensing
is limited to air applications only. It is very common for a licensee
to be required to meet a standard of financial responsibility, usually
satisfied by liability insurance requirements. While there is consid-
erable variety among the states, the insurance amounts required tend to
be fairly small, in the neighborhood of $5,000 to $25,000. The damage
contemplated by these insurance requirements appears to be neighboring
crops, livestock, etc. Alaska has the only pesticide statute which
specifies liability for clean-up costs.
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Several pesticide statutes have damage reporting provisions. Some estab-
lish a claims adjustment process. There are no provisions in these stat-
utes which authorize emergency action or establish public funds for clean-
up and other incidental expenditures which may be required.
A. Air Pollution
While a great many states have air pollution statutes, their application
is almost exclusively limited to automobile and industrial emission con-
trol. That is, the emergency powers which do exist show little orienta-
tion to damage from toxic vapors. Kentucky is a major exception to this
general finding.
In a few states, air pollution control is part of a broader legislative
approach to air and water (or environmental pollution. This applies in
Florida, Minnesota, Nebraska and South Carolina. This seemingly enables
a more comprehensive treatment of emergencies generally, including damages
from toxic vapors. However, of these four states, only Minnesota has an
established fund and only Florida and Minnesota provide liability to the
state for costs expended in emergency situations.
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D. MISCELLANEOUS STATUTES
In addition to the statutes discussed above, we examined the statutory
hazardous waste, solid waste and transportation policies of each state.
As a general rule, statutes of this kind are of limited or no value in
providing authorization to deal with emergency situations resulting from
hazardous non-oil substances.
Most states have a transportation regulatory mechanism of some kind.
Where hazardous substances are involved (e.g., by motor carriers), the
predominant pattern is to follow the regulations of the U. S. Department
of Transportation and the emphasis is on flammable or explosive, rather
than toxic, substances.
Hazardous waste and solid waste statutes are becoming increasingly common
at the state level. They tend, however, to be basically concerned with
siting controls and rely on permitting or licensing approaches as their
basic regulatory scheme. These statutes are not oriented toward emer-
gency situations and rarely contain provisions for establishment of funds,
the development of contingency plans or the recovery of costs. In a few
states, statutes of this kind are enforced by environmental agencies with
other environmental concerns and responsibilities, e.g., Connecticut,
Indiana, Minnesota and Oklahoma. This enables coordination with water
pollution, public health and other more emergency based powers.
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E. LIABILITY AND DAMAGE RECOVERY
1. Summary and Conclusions
The state statutory provisions that enable corrective action in the event
of environmental emergencies contain little or no guidance on the subject
matter of liability for injury or loss resulting from non-oil hazardous
substances. There are no provisions for liability in general emergency/
disaster statutes or in public health provisions which sanction some kind
of emergency action.
Some specialized statutes applicable to limited kinds of environmental
damages (e.g., water pollution) do provide that polluters will be liable
to the state for clean-up and restoration costs and, in some states, for
damages involving fish and game losses. In the majority of states, how-
ever, even the more specialized limited application statutes fail to pro-
vide for liability for necessary state expenditures. In almost all statutes
which sanction some kind of emergency action, there is no mention of
liability to private parties.
There are no state statutory requirements for liability insurance or finan-
cial responsibility which apply generally to persons manufacturing, stor-
ing or handling hazardous substances. Liability insurance (or other forms
of financial responsibility) requirements are found only in statutes regu-
lating pesticide applications (which are common) and in statutes regulat-
ing disposal sites for solid or hazardous waste (which exist in only a few
states).
The effect of this general lack of state statutory treatment of liability
is to relegate disposition of all questions concerning standards of liabil-
ity and the nature and extent of damage covered to judicial case law. The
case law applicable to liability questions can and does vary among the
states. The currently existing body of cases dealing with hazardous sub-
stances is heavily concerned with pesticides. These cases show a marked
trend in the direction of the imposition of strict liability which elimi-
nates the need to show that damages were caused by fault or negligence.
Thus, it is probable that courts confronted with other forms of hazardous
substances will continue to move in the direction of strict liability.
However, because of dominance of case law, there is no clearcut uniform
standard which can be said to apply uniformly nationwide.
2. Statutory Provisions Concerning Liability and Insurance
As discussed in the prior sections of this Chapter, only a few states pro-
vide for the establishment and maintenance of ongoing funds for expendi-
tures required for emergency action necessitated by spills or releases of
hazardous non-oil substances. For this reason, the opportunity for the
state (or a public agency) to obtain compensation from offending parties
for expenses incurred for emergency action is of paramount importance.
However, neither general emergency statutes, nor public health provisions
which sanction emergency action for the abatement of nuisances, provide
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for the liability of persons responsible for hazardous substances.
Some statutes do make provision for certain kinds of costs or damages
which might be sustained by the state:
o Water pollution statutes commonly provide for fines and/or
penalties from violators. Some go further and provide for
liability to the state (or public agency) for costs incurred
for pollution abatement, for clean-up, and for environmental
restoration. No state water pollution statute specifies
liability for injury to private persons or property and none
impose mandatory requirements applicable to hazardous sub-
stances for insurance or other kinds of financial responsi-
bility.
• In many states, recovery of specific enumerated damage to
public property is statutorily provided for in the form of
compensation for the destruction of fish and other wildlife.
In particular, liability to the state for "fish, shellfish,
and other aquatic life" injured by water pollution is common.
• State law requirements for liability insurance (or other
forms of financial responsibility) for substances that are
potentially dangerous to the environment are exclusively con-
fined to pesticide applicators and, in a few states, to
hazardous waste or solid waste regulatory schemes. Statutes
regulating pesticide applications commonly require a minimal
amount of liability insurance (e.g., $5,000-$25,000); some
require the reporting of damage claims. The few hazardous
waste and solid waste statutes enacted at the state level are
disposal site oriented. There are no statutory insurance or
financial responsibility requirements which apply to hazard-
ous substances generally.
None of the statutes examined either specify or create the standard of
liability to be observed in the event of damage from released hazardous
substances. That is, the provisions in the specialized statutes summar-
ized above that provide for liability to the state for abatement and
clean-up costs or that require insurance (as in the case of pesticide ap-
plicators) leave all questions concerning standards of liability and the
nature and extent of damages which are recoverable to judicial case law.
as discussed in the following section, the case law pertaining to liability
for hazardous substances is just beginning to emerge and except in the
area of pesticides, is sufficiently uncertain to invite varying inter-
pretations among the courts of the different states. The result is a
lack of any precisely ascertainable uniform standard of liability for
hazardous substances which applies nationwide.
One aspect of the uncertainty of the case law in this area is the fact
that the state agencies charged with acting in the event of environmen-
tal emergencies might be able to recover funds expended for clean-up and
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restoration of the environment despite the lack of a specific statutory
authorization. This result could conceivably be obtained even if the
state was acting pursuant to its non-specific general emergency/disaster
authorization. Again, the law in this area is only in the embryonic
stage and the result of possible differences among the states denies the
existence of a uniform national standard.
The same observations apply in the case of damages to private persons.
None of the state statutes authorizing action for environmental emergen-
cies contain provisions for liability for private losses or injuries. The
effect is to leave private persons dependent on liability standards estab-
lished by judicial rule.
3. Case Law Liability Standards
a. General Negligence
In the absence of a .specific statutory determination of responsibility
for the harmful effects of hazardous substances, all issues pertaining
to liability will be determined by the courts pursuant to established
case law. The substantive legal area involved is known as tort law; and
the general rule is one of negligence. That is, the basic rule of law,
is that a person is legally responsible for injuries to others which were
caused by negligent behavior.
The test for negligent behavior is a very general one. A judge or jury
is asked to determine whether the conduct in question is that of a rea-
sonably prudent person acting under the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. To recover damages, it is the legal burden of the in-
jured party to prove that the other party (the defendant) acted negli-
gently and that the injuries or losses sustained were, in fact, the prox-
imate result of the negligence.
In technical matters, the responsibility for proving negligence can be a
difficult burden to sustain. The fact that an accident happened is not
enough. For example, in the area of hazardous substances an injured party
might have to demonstrate that preventative measures (e.g., in the form
of new technologies for storage or transit) which would have prevented
the accident or spill were available, but were not taken. It would be
an adequate defense (and, therefore, a protection from liability) if rea-
sonable precautions had been taken. Or, a court might hold that certain
kinds of losses were too remote (i.e., not legally caused) from the activ-
ity in question regardless of the defendant's actual behavior.
b. Strict Liability
Where hazardous substances are concerned, there is a possible exception
to the general rule requiring proof of negligence. Known as strict li-
ability (or liability for ultrahazardous activity), this exception creates
liability upon a showing of injury or loss only. The injured party does
not have to prove negligent behavior. The underlying social principle is
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that a person engaged in ultrahazardous activity is responsible for the
damage that is the natural consequence of the activity, without regard
to notions of fault or negligence.
In the early part of this century, the American courts deemed an activity
ultrahazardous if it involved a risk of serious harm which could not be
eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care and was not a matter of
common usage. The most common activity held to be ultrahazardous involved
explosives.
Technological advancements in recent years have served to broaden the
application of strict liability to the point where the term "ultrahazardous"
is seldom used anymore. There is a decided general trend toward strict
liability in most matters involving complex technological considerations.
These recent changes in legal attitudes have contributed to the fashion-
ing of a new set of criteria to be applied for strict liability. Today,
it is generally considered that a court should look to the following
factors:
1. Whether the activity involves a high degree of risk of
harm to others;
2. Whether the potential harm is great;
3. Whether the risk can be eliminated by the exercise of
reasonable care;
4. Whether the activity is a matter of common usage;
5. Whether the activity is inappropriate to the place
where it is conducted; and,
6. Whether the activity has substantial value to the
community.
These criteria do not afford precise guidance as to the applicability of
strict liability standards to hazardous substances generally. Although
legal commentators agree that a majority of the factors must be considered
favorable to the imposition of liability before strict liability may be
imposed, there is considerable room for differences of opinion among
judges. Further, it is always possible that some states will remain very
conservative in their interpretation of these factors, while others will
be very liberal.
Our research has disclosed very little settled appellate litigation on
this question of applying strict liability to hazardous non-explosive
substances. The only significant body of cases pertains to damages to
adjoining land from.aerial pesticide applications. In this area, studies
have shown that most courts have, in fact, applied standards of strict
1-121
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liability without indicating that they were doing so or without analyzing
the factors listed above. See Kennedy, Liability in the Aerial Applica-
tion of Pesticides, 22 So. Dak. L. Rev. 75 (1978). However, the appellate
courts in some farm states have specifically rejected strict liability
for pesticide applications.
On hazardous substances generally, one recent case in Florida - Cities
Service Co. v. State of Florida, 312 So. 2d 799 (1975) - has held that
the defendant Cities Service Company was strictly liable for fish, wild-
life and other damage to the state from the escape of phosphate slime
from a settling pond maintained for a phosphate mine. The escape resulted
from a bursting dam and there was no showing of negligence in the design
or maintenance of the dam.
This case is important for several reasons. First, it is the only clear-
cut case imposing strict liability for the maintenance of a hazardous sub-
stance. Second, it was concerned with environmental damage. And, third,
it imposed liability in favor of the state without a specific statutory
designation authorizing the state to recover.
This Cities Service case appears to be a landmark case in the area and is
consistent with an overall trend in the direction of strict liability,
especially those cases involving aerial pesticide applications. However,
we were unable to locate any other recent case on point. It is, there-
fore, impossible to generalize about the state of the law in this area.
The factors enumerated above are sufficiently broad to enable a court in
any given state to deny strict liability for a substance that might be
considered generally hazardous. And, it might taken many years of liti-
gation before one could accurately state that a general rule had truly
emerged. As a result, we conclude that the law of strict liability in
this area is in an embryonic stage only and that there is no clear stan-
dard which can be said to apply uniformly among the different states at
this time.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. LAWS
• Few states have a comprehensive statutory structure govern-
ing hazardous material spills and environmental emergencies.
• State laws are silent on liability for the release of most
hazardous substances.
• The common law on liability for hazardous chemicals is very
sketchy, but recent precedents suggest that strict liability
may be applied.
• Damages imposed for the loss of fish and game are an exception
to the general silence of state laws on liability for hazard-
ous substances.
• One-third of states have provided for the recovery of clean
up and abatement costs.
• Public Health statutes are generally inadequate to support
state action in an environmental emergency.
• General emergency powers in half the states include language
referring to "man-made" emergencies.
• Pollution statutes in many states authorize the penalizing
of spills as unpermitted discharges.
B. ORGANIZATION
• Almost all states will send an environmental official to major
hazardous material emergencies.
• Only 21 states have predesignated on-scene coordinators for
environmental emergencies. In only 10 of these states is this
a full time activity.
• Environmental emergencies are handled best when the state has
a special spill response unit.
• If the state has no special spill unit, environmental emer-
gency response is improved by:
a. a single focus in the environmental agency
b. a strong Civil Defense (emergency services) agency with
a specialized hazardous material contingency plan
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• State Health Departments play a relatively small role in
environmental emergencies.
• State Highway Departments are the only resource for clean up
equipment and labor in a state government, but few are pro-
perly trained.
• State Police are the first officials at the scene of most
hazardous material emergencies.
• States have training programs for volunteer firemen which
could serve as the focus for expanded training in the hand-
ling of hazardous materials.
C. COMMUNICATIONS
• State Police radio networks permit rapid reporting of major
environmental emergencies.
• Either Pollution Control or Fish and Game officers in most
states have radios which can be used to transmit additional
information on reported spills.
• States without a special spill unit or duty officer in the
environmental agency will have trouble initiating a response
in off-duty hours.
• Federally supported hazardous material information systems
(CHRIS, OHM-TADS) are not widely utilized by the states.
D. OPERATIONS
1. Emergency Phase and Evacuation
• Environmental officials play a secondary role until the immedi-
ate danger to public safety is past.
• Authority to order an evacuation lies with local public
safety or elected officials.
• State Police in many states will begin evacuations in rural
areas prior to approval of elected officials.
2. Equipment
• States do not have the equipment or experience to stop leaks
and releases of highly hazardous substances.
• States do not own specialized clean up equipment.
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• Only a few states have on-scene detection and monitoring
equipment for hazardous materials (Bendix tubes, etc.).
• Only states with special spill response units have adequate
personnel protective gear.
• Heavy construction equipment can be made available for spill
containment and control from State Highway Departments with
proper contingency planning.
• States with available funds have arranged for the stock-
piling of sorbent materials around the state.
3. Spill Management
• Only states with special spill response units have field
personnel trained to direct a clean-up operation.
• Field personnel in most state environmental agencies can be
used only to take samples and determine if the spiller is
undertaking clean up.
• Lack of overtime compensation is not a barrier to environ-
mental emergency response in most states.
4. Training
• State environmental agencies need the kind of courses for
on-scene coordinators created by EPA and Coast Guard. It
will be necessary for the Federal government to pay travel
and tuition costs for these courses.
• Expansion of hazardous material training for local fire
fighters is necessary.
E. CLEAN UP AND PREVENTION
• Industry response is considered adequate by state officials
in 90% of reported spills.
• Biggest problems with inadequate clean up have been presented
by:
a. CONRAIL
b. small truckers
c. small chemical plants
d. abandoned disposal sites
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e. deliberate dumps
• State spill penalties and discharge permit programs are used
to obtain corrective action by industry. State bargaining on
penalties may conflict with Federal penalty policy.
• States without adequate disposal sites feel a network of
Federally-sponsored disposal sites may be necessary to
assure disposal of the hazardous wastes from an environ-
mental emergency.
F. COSTS
1. Funds
• Only 15 to 16 states have contingency funds which can be used
for the clean up of hazardous substances.
• Only New Jersey and Alaska have funds which specifically ex-
tend to hazardous substances and are adequate for very large
emergencies (costing more than $1,000,000). Five more states
have multi-million dollar oil funds which might be used in a
hazardous material emergency.
• The remaining state contingency funds are $100,000 or less.
These states are reluctant to spend more than a few thousand
on each clean-up contract.
• Two-thirds of the states must rely on Federal funds for clean
up. Another nine states expect Federal assistance if the
costs exceed a few thousand dollars.
2. Operations
0 Only two of eleven states interviewed had state funded spill
response units of substantial size.
• Time spent on environmental emergency response is taken from
other pollution control functions.
• §106 grants support environmental emergency response indirectly.
G. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS
• Frequency and extent of EPA response to environmental emergen-
cies varies widely between regions.
• Failure to clear press releases with state officials has gen-
erated conflict between states and EPA in past emergencies.
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• State laboratory facilities are not adequate for environmental
emergencies. Assistance from EPA laboratories in the past
has been good.
• States desire to maintain control of environmental emergencies
within their borders. They are reluctant to cede control
to EPA unless Federally funded clean up is required.
• Periodic turnover in Coast Guard District commands creates
a problem in building good working relationships between the
Coast Guard and officials in state environmental agencies.
-------
APPENDIX 1
ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN
THE FIFTY STATES
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APPENDIX 1
ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN
THE FIFTY STATES
The attached tables give a brief summary on the status of environmental
emergency response in each state. The information was gathered with the
assistance of EPA Regional Office Environmental Emergency Response Units,*
which directed a limited series of questions to their counterparts in
each state.
Information collected by EPA Regional Offices has been supplemented in a
number of ways. Where a state was the subject of in-depth interviews,
this information was condensed and placed in the table. These states
are indicated by spelling the state name in capital letters.
Where state or regional contingency plans were available, additional in-
formation was gathered on the functions performed in each state. Some
EPA Regional Offices provided additional material, including copies of
state regulations, which supplemented basic data items. This material
is included whenever possible.
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE
Region/State
States are listed according to the EPA administrative region where they
are located.
Single State Agency Designated for Response to Spills
The organization listed here is usually the agency which provides the
designated liaison to the Regional Response team created by §311
of the FWPCA. Where possible, the administrative subdivision assigned
to spill response is listed. In some states, more than one agency plays
a prime role in spill response. In such cases, each primary agency is
listed.
Predesignated On-Scene Coordinator
£
In this column the number of state employees specifically
assigned in advance to coordinate oil or hazardous material
response is listed. If a department uses the nearest avail-
able official for spill surveillance without prior designa-
Coordinated by Al Smith of Region IV.
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tion or training, the entry in this column is usually "0".
In some cases, employees with other functions may have re-
ceived some training in spill response, but they are usually
not listed in this column.
# of Reg. Offices
This number is intended to give an index of the geographic
dispersion of state response capability. It shows the number
of offices from which employees of the lead agency are dis-
patched for spill response. For states without predesignated
spill coordinators, this column may be blank, although the
lead agency has employees dispersed throughout the state.
State Contingency Plan
States were asked if they had a prepared spill response plan. If EPA
Regional officials could find no satisfactory plan on paper, but the
state does respond to spills, this condition is noted by the legend
"ad hoc". Some state plans are limited to oil spills, and this fact
is noted.
Emergency Contact Authority
This column indicates if the state can engage clean-up contractors in
the event of an environmental emergency without following normal state
contracting procedures.
$ Limit
This shows the maximum amount of such emergency contract com-
mitments.
Use of emergency contracting authority requires the availability of a
contingency fund or special state appropriation.
Emergency Overtime
"Yes/No" shows whether the state pays overtime to personnel assigned to
spill response.
"Comp. Time" denotes the granting of compensatory time off in return for
overtime work during a spill emergency.
Laboratory Capability
Indicates if the state has laboratories which can be used to identify
unknown chemicals or determine the concentration of spilled pollutants.
Some comments on the adequacy of this laboratory capability are included.
Arrangements with other state agencies or private laboratories are some-
1-130
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times shown. For states within Region VII, specific laboratory quali-
fications are shown (GC = gas chromotography, MS = mass spectrometry,
O&G = oil & gas).
Equipment Available to OCS's
This column indicates any special response equipment or protective gear
issued to state employees designated as on-scene coordinators. It also
indicates equipment which is made available during a spill response by
other state agencies (such as Highways).
Operating Budget for Spill Response Agency
If spill response is a discrete organizational unit, the approximate amount
of the unit budget is shown. In some cases, states interviewed were able
to estimate the amount of effort devoted to spill response, and this
amount is shown (a % of amounts budgeted' for other purposes). In most
states, spill response budgets do not exist.
Contingency Fund
If a state has a special appropriation or revolving fund for clean up of
spills, the total available is shown in this column. Restrictions on
the use of such a fund are listed, including the common restriction of
clean-up funds to oil spills. If a contingency fund is supported by a
special revenue source, such as pollution penalties or a barrel tax on
oil transfers, the source of funds is shown.
Recovered from Spillers
If the state has taken specific action to recover clean up expenditures
from spillers, this fact is noted. Some comments are based upon review
of state spill laws, and may apply only to oil if the spill law or fund
is limited to oil.
New Developments
Pending statutory, regulatory> or administrative changes in the state
spill response program are listed whenever they could be identified.
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REGION
STATE
Single State
Agency Designated
for Response to
Spills
RESOURCES
Predesignated
On-Scene
Coordinators
State
Contingency
Plan
= of Reg.
Offices
Emergency Con-
tact Authority
S Limit
Emergency
Overtime
Region I
CONNECTICUT Dept. of Enviro
Protection
C.O.*
Yes
(Oil & Chemi-
cals)
Yes
Yes
Region I
Maine
Dept. of Enviro
Protection, Bur.
of Water Quality
Control
13(5-10
fully quali-
fied)
C.O.
+ 3
Oil Only
Yes
Yes
Region I
Massachusetts
Env. Affairs — Div.
of Water Poll. Control
11 P. T.
(1 spill
Program
Manager)
3 P.O. for Water Yes (Clean
Program authority
specific to oil)
Yes
Yes
Region I
New
Hampshire
Region I
Rhode Island
Water Supply &
Poll. Control Comm.
Dept. of Enviro
Man., Div. of
Water Supply &
Poll. Control
0
(ad hoc)
2 Part Time
C. 0. only
C.O.
No;
ad hoc
response
No
No
No
No
Yes
Region I
Vermont
Dept. of Natural
Resources
1 OSC Di-
rector + call
of field
inspectors
(6)
Yes
No
Comp. Tjme
* Contract Office
-------
Laboratory
Capability^
Equipment Available
toOSC*s
FINANCING
Operating Budget
for Spill
Response Agency
Contingency Fund
Total 0th"
Appropriated Than Oil
Recovered
from
Spiders
New Developments
Yes
From other state agen-
cies/personal protective
gear currently being
purchased.
Not Available
No
Very little, rarely
seek cost recovery
for other than cat-
astrophic level in-
cidents. Charge only
for clean-up cost
reimbursement not
for agency
time
Legislative approval of a
S100,000 Contingency
Fund rejected this year
Yes, DEP lab
& Contract
Boats - not much specific
to hazardous
Restricted to
oil work, oper-
ating budget
from fund
Coast Prot.
S4M including
damages
1/2 i/Bbl
Oil Only
Liability to state
for costs
Require placarding & set
up hazardous material
transport steering
committees
Yes
Boats - Have standing
clean-up contract.
Yes
5100,000 - Ap-
propriation —
hazardous ma-
terial included
Liable for costs
& environ.
damages from
oil
Contingency Fund &
barrel tax proposed last
year, failed - mandatory
insurance also failed
Highway Department
Law authorizes,
but never appro-
priated
Bill filed to create a
barrel tax - (failed last
two years)
No 3°ats
No
Filed Contingency Fund
and barrel tax last year
Yes Boats, some Highway
(Limited) Department equipment
No
No
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RESOURCES
REGION
STATE
Region II
NEW JERSEY
Region II
New York
Region III
Delaware
Region III
Maryland
Region III
PENN-
SYLVANIA
Region III
Virginia
Region III
West
Virginia
Region IV
Alabama
singe state
Agency Designated Predesignated
for Response to On-Scene
Spills Coordinators
# of Reg.
* Offices
Dept. of Enviro 8 C. 0.
Protection Office of (expanding
Hazardous Sub- to 26)
stance Control
Dept. of Trans- 0 full time 9
portation
Dept. Nat. Re- 0 5
sources, Div.
Environ. Control
Dept. Nat. Resources, 8 3
Water Res. Admin.
Dept. of Enviro. Any Dis- 7
Resources, Bur. trict In-
Water Quality spector
Management (46) on
assignment
State Water 14 6
Control Board not full time
DNR. Division 0 1
Water Resources
Some Overlap Yes 3
Water Improve-
ment Comm.
State
Contingency
Plan
Includes land
(under de-
velopment)
State clean-up
of oil clearly
authorized (plan
under develop.)
Yes
Yes
Yes
(Annex to
C. D. plan)
Yes
No
No
Emergency Con- Emergency
tact Authority Overtime
S Limit
Yes 7 Con- Yes
tracts
Pre-negoti-
ated
Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes Usually Yes
(Expe- small
dited (S2.000-
Ap- 3,000)
proval)
Comp. Time
No Comp. Time
Comp. Time
-------
Laboratory
Capability
Equipment Available
to OSC's
Operating Budget
for Spill
Response Agency
FINANCING
Contingency Fund
Recovered
from
Spillerj
Total Other
Appropriated Than Oil
New Development!
Health Dept.
Industry required to
have contingency plans
identifying available
equipment: protective
gear on order.
S660.000 for 1979
S25M
S.01/Bbl
Includes
pesticide &
hazardous
(§311).
Fund pays
damages
S50M (S150/ton)
Limit on liability
w/o gross neg.
Regulation on spill
prevention. Doubling of
staff pending.
No Highway Dept. equipment.
Transfer License (Oil)
requires com. plans
identifying equipment.
S25M
1«YBbl transfer
Oil Only, SSOM fin. surety
En. Con. re- required for oil
quired to fac., strict liabil-
certify dis- ity for damages
busement
Oil Spill Law effective
April 1, 1978
Yes Equipment from other
state agencies.
Yes
Yes
Containment booms,
trucks, boats
Yes, 1975 Responsible for
3500,000 from oil 3270,000 clean-up &
terminal licenses available restoration costs
Yes
(3inOER,
& contract)
Sorbent & filter fences
on order for District
Offices.
Yes
Can draw
from 3600,000
Clean Water
Fund collected
from past
penalties
Yes
H.O.'s have trucks &
spill booms.
No
No Equipment from other
state agencies
No
County & State construc-
tion equipment
No
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REGION
STATE
RESOURCES
Single State
Agency Designated
for Response to
Spills
Predesignated
On-Scene
Coordinators
£ of Reg.
= Offices
State
Contingency
Plan
Emergency Con-
tact Authority
S Limit
Emergency
Overtime
Region IV
Florida
Fr. Water, Dept.
of Env. Reg.
Coastal - Dept.
of Nat. Re-
sources
ad hoc 7
Dist. Off.
2-3 Specialists 11
& Designated
at incident
Coordinate
WNational
Contingency
Plan
. Yes
Comp. Time
Comp. Time
Dept of Nat.
Resources,
Env. Prpt.
Division
ad hoc
ad hoc
Comp. Time
Region IV
KENTUCKY
Dept of Nat.
Resources,
Environmental
Protection
ad hoc
Civil Defense,
as part of
actual dis-
aster plan
None
Comp. Time
Region IV
MISSISSIPPI
Air & Water
Poll. Control
Comm., En-
forcement Div.
District
Officals
assigned
No
Usually
limited
to a few
51,000
Comp. Time
Region IV
North
Carolina
Health & Environ-
mental Control
On Assign-
ment
12
ad hoc
Comp. Time
Region IV
South
Carolina
Dept. of Natural
& Economic Re-
sources
On Assign-
ment
No
Comp. Time
-------
Laboratory
Capability
FINANCING
Equipment Available
to OSC's
Operating Budget
for Spill
Response Agency
Contingency Fund
Recovered
from
Spillers
New Development]
Total
Appropriated
Other
Than Oil
None
Fresh Water
No
Boats, etc. Access
to other equipment
Coastal
S35M authorized
317M available
24/Bbl tax
State Highway &
Forestry Equipment
No
Some DES can and does,
coordinate access to
heavy equipment from
all state agencies.
No
1977: S100-
150,000 from
est. 8 black-
water spills.
525,000 from
8-12 small,
various spills
DER reviewing
Resources for
spill response
None. Prefer to use
contractors
From pollu-
tion abate-
ment fund
(Up to
S80.000)
Yes
Return to
abatement fund;
law requires
repayment
Complete trailerized
clean-up package (for
oil)
S5M
Yes - clean up only -
pre-positioned at 3
Highway Depc. depots
No
Highway Depart-
ment reimbursed
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RESOURCES
REGION
STATE
Region IV
Tennessee
Region V
Illinois
Region V
INDIANA
Region V
Michigan
Region V
Minnesota
Region V
OHIO
Region V
Wisconsin
Single state
Agency Designated
for Response to
Spills
Civil Defense
Environmental Pro-
tection Agency,
Water Pollu. Div.
Stream Pollution
Control Board
Dept of Nat. Re-
sources, Oil &
Hazardous Mat.
Section
Pollu. Cont. Agency
Enforcement Branch
Environmental Pro-
tection Agency,
Emergency Response
Office
Predesignated
On-Scene
Coordinators
-of Reg.
= Offices
- --- -- --
No 4
1 10
4 0
10 6
4 5
7 5
4 5
State
Contingency
Plan
No
Yes;
Good for
Air
Yes
Private con-
tingency plans
also required,
includes haz-
ardous
Yes
Includes haz-
ardous ref. to
§311
Yes
Emergency Con-
tact Authority
S Limit
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes 520,000
Yes
Overtime
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
-------
FINANCING
„ . . Recovered
Operatmg Budget
Laboratory Equipment Available R J^Uy Contingency Fund SpUhr. New Development.
-- --- ' Total Other
Appropriated Than Oil
No
None
Yes
Yes-Limited Yes - Personal protective Water Personnel - No (Access to
for Water for Water and Air. Air S70.000; Equip- general erner-
Commercial has considerable detection ment - S5-7.000 gency fund)
labs supple- equipment
ment
525,000 Includes
65 Hazardous
Yes YM
S150000 S35000 Includes Return fines & Spill reporting law
Yes Hazardous exp. to fund, ship- proposed
max SUM (SlOO/t)
S8M shore fac.
Yes Yes
1-139
-------
RESOURCES
ncuiun
STATE
Region VI
ARKANSAS
Region VI
LOUISIANA
Region VI
New Mexico
Region VI
Oklahoma
Region VI
Texas
Region VII
Iowa
Region VII
Kansas
Region VII
Missouri
Region VII
Nebraska
single state
Agency Designated
for Response to
Spilli
Dept. of Pollution
Control & Ecology;
Oept. of Health
Water Pollution
Control Comm.
Environ. Improve-
ment Agency
Oept. of Pollution
Control
RR Comm. (O&G
Wells & Distri-
bution) + Dept.
of Water Resources
Dept. of Environ-
mental Quality
Dept. of Health
& Environment
Dept. of Environ-
mental Quality,
Water Pollu. Div.
Dept. of Environ-
mental Control,
Surveillance &
Monitoring
Predesignated State
On-Scene Contingency Emergency Con- Emergency
Coordinators Plan tact Authority Overtime
# of Reg.
£ Offices S Limit
Dispatch 7 Yes No Comp. Time
Regular (In Civil
Officer Defense Plan)
0 7 Good Civil De- None Comp. Time
fense Plan
0 C. O. only No Comp. Time
0 4 Yes Comp. Time
Not full 22 Yes Yes Yes
time
1 6 Yes Yes
0 1 Yes Yes
0 0 Yes Yes
0 2 Yes Yes
:-iuo
-------
Laboratory
Capability
Equipment Available
to OSCs
Operating Budget
for Spill
Response Agency
FINANCING
Contingency Fund
Total
Appropriated
Other
Than Oil
Recovered
from
Spillers
New Developments
Yes Highway & Forestry;
Health has gas sampling
equipment
None
No
Request for tighter
transport regulations
Yes Highway Department
None
No
Yes State Equipment
Yes
($5,000/incident)
1977 law gives authority
over hazardous material spills
Yes
State Equipment
No
Yes RR Comm. -Oil & Gas -
Requires cont. plans.
Gulf Coast Industry
Associations
Coast
5500,000 Fund.
includes haz-
ardous
O&G/Metals
GC/MS
limited
State Equipment
S10.COO
O&G/Metals
GC/MS
limited
State Equipment
None
S to general fund
O&G/Metals
limited ORG
No GC & MS
None
0/G Metals
GC/MS
limited :
State Equipment
Can draw from
Gov. emergency
fund
1-141
-------
REGION
STATE
Agency Designated
for Response to
Spills
Predesignated
On- Scene
Coordinators
fi^of Reg.
= Offices
State
Contingency
Plan
Emergency Con-
tact Authority
S Limit
Emergency
Overtime
Region VIII
Utah
Region VIII
Wyoming
Division of Health
Dept. of Environ-
mental Quality,
Water Quality
Division
0
Full Time
Limited
(Includes
Hazardous)
No
Maybe
No
Region IX
Arizona
Oept. of Health
Services
Yes
Yes
Region IX
CALIFORNIA CAL TRANS
Fish & Game
Region VIII
COLORADO
Dept of Health
Oept. of Health
3-5
Person
Team
0 Full Time
Many
District
Offices
District
300 Wardens
Yes Oil/re-
newed multi-
agency effort
for other
hazardous
material. Off.
of Emerg.
Services has
the lead for
development
1 Full Time
0
Full Time
Limited
Yes Only Yes
Agency to
use regu-
larly
Yes Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Region VIII
Montana
Region VIII
North
Dakota
Region VIII
South
Dakota
Dept. of Health
8t Environmental
Sciences
Dept. of Health
Division of
Civil Defense
0
Full Time
0
Full Time
0
Full Time
Limited
Limited
Limited
Yes
Maybe
Comp. Time
-------
FINANCING
Operating Budget
Laboratory Equipment Available for Spill
Capability to OSC'» Response Agency
Contingency Fund
Recovered
from
Spillers
New Developments
Total
Appropriated
Other
Than Oil
Limited From state agencies
No
Limited
No
Yes
Other state agencies
No
(Disaster funds
under special
circumstances)
Excellent
Excellent
Maintenance equipment;
private industry equip.;
materials, etc. have been
used on request
1975-76 S6.400
1976-7756,100
in one District
See Notes
Uses operat-
ing budget
80% for oil
spills
Oil -95/90%
F&G Code soon will be re-
vised to explicitly mandate
chemical response. No
program change antici-
pated
Good Highway Department will < 1 man year
clean up. OES can acti-
vate any state equipment,
but not requested to date
No
Highway Dept. bills spil-
ler. (S5.000,1977 from
numerous oil spills.) Cost
is much less than that of
private contractor
Limited
From state agencies
No
Limited
From state agencies
No
Limited From state agencie
No
1-143
-------
REGION
STATE
Single State
Agency Designated
for Response to
Spills
RESOURCES
Ji
TT
Predesignated
On-Scene
Coordinators
= of Reg.
Offices
State
Contingency
Plan
Emergency Con-
tact Authority
$ Limit
Emergency
Overtime
Region IX
Hawaii
Region IX
Nevada
Civil Defense &
Disaster
Yes
Yes
Region X
Alaska
Dept. of Environ-
mental Conserva-
tion, Oil Terminal
& Tanker Safety
1-4
Yes
Under
Development
Yes, Non-
Professionals
Region X
Idaho
NoOff-
Duty Sys-
tem.
ad hoc
3 Reg. &
3 Branch
No
Comp. Timt
Region X
Washington
Dept. of Enviro.
Quality
Dept. of Ecology
None
Full
Time
8
Part
Time
5 Reg.
6 Branch
Clear state
clean-up
authority
limited to
oil
Comp. state
clean up of
oil authorized
Yes
SI,500
Possible
Comp. Time
for Profes-
sionals
Possible,
Comp. Time
usual
-------
FINANCING
Laboratory
Capability
Equipment Available
to QSCi
Operating Budget
for Spill
Response Agency
Contingency Fund
Recovered
from
Spillen
New Development]
Total
Appropriated
Other
Than Oil
No
No (some ac-
cess to CO &
disaster funds)
None
S30M
(Bbl tax) Oil
State can re-
cover cost of
clean up & miti-
gating (re-
stocking, etc.)
Strict liability for
hazardous spills
Limited
No
Good
From other stats agencies
Established
by law
(noS)
No
Liable for state
expenses on clean-
up; strict liability
for damages to
private parties
Good
From other state agencies
3100,000
Costs & Marine
use tax
(14/gal)
No
Spiller must clean
up oil, liable for
state expense,
strict liability
for damages
1-145
-------
APPENDIX 2
TABLES TO ACCOMPANY SECTION V
1-147
-------
TABLE 1
ALASKA
ARIZONA
SPECIFIC STATE POWERS FOR ACTION CONCERNING HAZARDOUS SPILLS
STATE
ALABAMA
AGENCY
Public Health
POWER TO
ABATE
Yes
RECOVERY OF
CLEANUP COSTS
No
MAXIMUM
FINES /PENALTY FUND
$25-$500 for re- No
DAMAGE
RECOVERY
No
SPILL
REPORTING
No
Dept. of Env.
Conservation
Dept. of Health.
Services
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
fusal to abate
pollution of
drinking water
$100,000 initial,
$5,000/day
Coastal
Fund
$10,000/day
No
Abatement,
restoration
of environ-
ment, inciden-
tal adminis-
trative costs,
and damages to
third party
No
Oil Only
No
ARKANSAS
Pollution Con-
trol Commission
Yes
Yes
$10,000 fine; No
$5,000 civil penalty
Costs of correct-
ing adverse effect
on water quality
and loss of fish
or wildlife
No
CALIFORNIA Water Quality Yes
Board (local.
regional)
COLORADO Water Quality Yes
Control Comm
Yes; includes $6,000/day
lien on property
No recovery;
cleanup may
be ordered
$10,000/day
Cleanup &
Abatement
account
from fines
& penalties
No
Costs of abate-
ment
No
Oil Only
Yes-any
hazardous
on water
-------
TABLE 1 (Continued)
I
M
O
STATE
CONNECTICUT
DELAWARE
FLORIDA
GEORGIA
HAWAII
IDAHO
ILLINOIS
AGENCY
Dept. of
Environmental
Protection
POWER TO
ABATE
Yes
Div. of Env. Yes
Control
Dept. of Env. Yes
Regulation
Water Quality Yes
Control Board
Dept. of Health Yes
Dept. of Health Yes
& Welfare
Pollution Con. Yes
Board
Local Gov't
Yes
RECOVERY OF
CLEANUP COSTS
Recoverable in
civil action if
damages greater
than $5,000
For oil only
Yes
No
No
For costs of
terminating
source of
environmental
degradation
No
For costs of
removal of water
pollutant
MAXIMUM
FINES/PENALTY
$5,000
$1,000-$5,000
$10,000
$10,000 Water
and Air Only
$2,500-$25,000
$l,000/day
$10,000 +
$l,000/day
FUND
No
No
Pollution
Recovery
Fund
No
No
No
No
No
DAMAGE
RECOVERY
SPILL
REPORTING
Abatement, res- Water pollut
toration, & only
restocking of
wildlife; if
negligence proven,
1 1/2 times
damages; if gross
neglicence-treble
damages
No
Abatement, res-
toration, &
restocking of
aquatic life
No
No
Abatement Only
Any discharg
of pollutant
No
No
No
No
For fish and
aquatic life
Removal of pollu-
tant only
No
No
-------
TABLE 1 (Continued)
STATE
INDIANA
AGENCY
Env . Manage-
ment Board
POWER TO
ABATE
Yes
RECOVERY OF
CLEANUP COSTS
No
MAXIMUM
FINES /PENALTY
$10,OQO/day;
$500/hour for
refusal to
abate
FUND
Env . Man-
agement
Fund from
fines
DAMAGE
RECOVERY
No
SPILL
REPORTING
By administi
tive regulai
IOWA
KANSAS
KENTUCKY
LOUISIANA
MAINE
MARYLAND
Env. Quality Yes
Dept.
Dept. of Health Yes
& Environment
Dept. of Nat. Yes
Resources &
Environ. Pro-
Tec t ion
Stream Control Yes
Commission
Dept. of Environ- Yes
mental Protection
Dept. of Natural
Resources
Yes
No
No
No
No
Oil Only
For water
pollution, to
$10,000/day
$10,000/day No
For water poll- No
ution, $100/day
For water pollu- No
tion, $5,000/day
($10,000, if
willful)
For water pollu- No
tion $25,000/day
$200/day
$10,000/day No
No
No
Limited to
restocking
fish
No
Oil Only Oil Only
Penalty assessed
includes cleanup
& restoration of
environment
No
No
No
No
Oil Only
No
MASSACHUSETTS Div. of Water Yes
Pollution Control
Oil Only
For water pollu- No
tion, $25,000/day
Oil Only
No
-------
TABLE 1 (Continued)
.STATE
MICHIGAN
AGENCY
Water Resources
Commission
POWER TO
ABATE
Yes
MINNESOTA
Pollution Control Yes
MISSISSIPPI
M
I
t_n
fo
MISSOURI
Air & Water Yes
Pollution Control
Commission
Clean Water Yes
Commission
RECOVERY OF
CLEANUP COSTS
MAXIMUM
FINES/PENALTY
In legal action $lO,000/day
For air & water
pollution, at
discretion of
court
For water poll-
ution
For water
pollution
$25,000/day
$5,000/day
$25,000/day
FUND
No
No
Fines go
into Water
Pollution
Abatement
Grant Fund
No
DAMAGE
RECOVERY
By suit; full
value of in-
juries done to
state, includes
cost of investi-
gation
For cleanup &
restoration of
wildlife
Cleanup & re-
stocking of
fish & wildlife
Cleanup & cost
of restoration
of waters
SPILL
REPORTING
No
For discharg
into waters
No
No
MONTANA
Dept. of Health
& Env. Sciences
Yes
For water
pollution
For water
pollution,
$10,000
($25,000 if
willful); $25,000
$25,000 for
wrongful dis-
posal of
hazardous
waste
No
For water pollu-
tion, cost of
investigation &
terminating adverse
affect on environ-
ment
No
-------
TABLE 1 (Continued)
STATE
NEBRASKA
AGENCY
Dept. of Env.
Control
POWER TO
ABATE
Yes
RECOVERY OF
CLEANUP COSTS
No
MAXIMUM
FINES/PENALTY
$500/day
NEVADA
Dept. of
Cons. & Nat-
ural Resources
Yes
For water poll- $10,000/day
ution
M
U)
NEW
HAMPSHIRE
• Water Supply
Poll. & Cont.
Comm.
• Local Board
of Health
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
$l,000/day
No
FUND
May draw
from Gov-
ernor ' s
emergency
fund
No
No
No
DAMAGE SPILL
RECOVERY REPORTING
For water poll- No
ution, restock-
ing of fish and
aquatic life
For water poll- No
ution, costs of
correcting
adverse effects
as well as re-
storing environ-
ment
No No
Removal costs No
NEW JERSEY
Dept. of Env.
Protection
Yes
For spills
into water
$l,000/day
for first
^violation;
$3,QQO/day
thereafter
New Jersey
Spill Com-
pensation
Fund
For restoration
of property and
environment,
cleanup & remov-
al costs, & in-
terest on loans
used to cleanup
by 3rd parties,
plus some loss
of income
By admini-
strative
regulations
NEW MEXICO
• Water Quality
Commission
Yes
No
$10,000/day
No
No
No
• Env. Improve-
ment Agency
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
-------
TABLE 1 (Continued)
STATE AGENCY
NEW YORK Dept. of
Environmental
Conservation
POWER TO
ABATE
Yes
RECOVERY OF
CLEANUP COSTS
For spill into
water
NORTH Env. Manage- Yes
CAROLINA ment Comm.
NORTH State Water Yes
DAKOTA Pollution
Control Board
OHIO Env. Protection Yes
Agency
OKLAHOMA Oklahoma Water Yes
Resources Board
OREGON Environmental Yes
Quality Comm.
PENNSYLVANIA Dept. of Environ- Yes
mental Resources
RHODE ISLAND Dept. of Environ- Yes
mental Management
Yes
No
No
No
Oil Only
No
Oil Only
MAXIMUM
FINES/PENALTY FUND
$2,500, plus No
$500/day; $10,000
for violation of
abatement order
$250 No
For water poll- No
ution, $25,000
per day
For water poll- No
ution, $10,000
For water poll- No
ution, $500/day
$500/day No
$10,000/day No
For water poll- No
ution, $500/day
DAMAGE
RECOVERY
For cost of
abatement, re-
moval, & measures
taken to minimize
adverse conditions
Restoration of
wildlife; removal
and cleanup costs
For damages to
environment
No
No
For restoration
of fish and
wildlife
No
No
SPILL
REPORTING
For water
spills
No
No
No
No
Oil Only
No
No
-------
TABLE 1 (Continued)
STATE
SOUTH
CAROLINA
SOUTH
DAKOTA
TENNESSEE
TEXAS
POWER TO
AGENCY ABATE
Dept. of Health Yes
& Environmental
Control
Environmental Yes
Protection
Agency
Water Quality Yes
Control Board
• Water Develop- Yes
ment Board
• Dept. of Water Yes
Resources
RECOVERY OF
CLEANUP COSTS
No
No, but cleanup
may be ordered
For water
pollution
No
Yes
MAXIMUM
FINES/PENALTY
$10,000
$10,000/day
$10,000
$10,000 plus
$l,000/day
DAMAGE SPILL
FUND RECOVERY REPORTING
No For restoration No
of fish, wildlife
and plant life
No No No
Water Penalty shall in-
Quality elude cost of re-
Control moval and restora-
Fund tion of environment
No
No
No
Texas Cleanup costs
Coastal only
Protec-
tion
Fund
Yes, for spil
into water
Yes, for spil
into coastal
waters
UTAH Committee on Yes
Water Pollution,
Div. of Health
VERMONT Water Resources Yes
Board
No
Water pollu-
tion only
None
$10,000/day
No No No
No Yes, for costs No
of removal and
compensation for
destruction of
public property
-------
TABLE 1 (Continued)
POWER TO
STATE
VIRGINIA
WASHINGTON
WEST
VIRGINIA
AGENCY
Local agencies
Water Pollution
Control Comm.
Water Resources
Board
ABATE
Yes
Yes
Yes
RECOVERY OF
CLEANUP COSTS
No
Oil Only
No
MAXIMUM
FINES /PENALTY
$500/day
$5,000/day
$10,000/day
FUND
No
Oil Only
No
DAMAGE
RECOVERY
No
For restoration
of fish and wild-
life only
No
SPILL
REPORTING
No
Oil Only
No
WISCONSIN
WYOMING
Dept. of Natural Yes
Resources
Local Board of
Health Only
Yes
No
No
$10,000/day
None
No
No
No
No
No
No
I
M
Ol
-------
TABLE 2
STATES WITH EMERGENCY GENERAL POWERS
APPLICABLE TO MAN-MADE DISASTERS
N.B. All states have general statutory emergency powers to act in disaster
situations. The states listed below have emergency provisions_which
include emergency situations occasioned by "man-made" circumstances,
i.e., other than natural causes or enemy attack.
STATE
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California*
Colorado
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
STATUTORY CITATION*
Section 26.20.010
Section 26-301
Section 11-1934
Gov. Code, Section 8550
Section 28-1-101
Title 16, Section 3101;
Title 7, Section 5701
Section 252.31
Section 86-1802
Section 46-1001
Chap. 127, Section 1101
Section 10-4-1.1
Section 29C.1
Section 48-904
Section 39.400
Section 701
Title 37-A, Section 5
SPECIFIC MENTION OF HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCES
Oil spill emergency included.
Includes oil spill or other water
and air pollution.
Includes oil spill or other water
and air pollution.
Includes oil spill or other water
and air contamination requiring
emergency action.
Includes oil spill or other water
and air pollution.
Includes oil spill or water con-
tamination and air pollution
requiring emergency action.
*Except as indicated, all statutory references are to the annotated edition
of the legislative compilation.
1-157
-------
TABLE 2 (Continued)
STATE
Maryland
Michigan
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
STATUTORY CITATION
Art. 16A, Section 1
Section 30.401
Section 77-2301
Section 81-829.38
Section 414.010
Section 107:1
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Exec. App. A: 9-33
Section 9-13-15
Exec. Laws, Section 10
Section 166A-1
Section 37-17.1-01
Section 54-16-01
Section 5915.01
Title 63, Section 683.2
Section 401.010
Title 71, Section 1689.1
Section 30-15-1
Section 25-5-10
Section 33-15-1
SPECIFIC MENTION OF HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCES
Includes oil spill or water con-
tamination and air pollution
requiring emergency action.
Includes air and water pollution
requiring emergency action
Includes oil spill or water con-
tamination and air pollution
requiring emergency action, plus
specific coastal contamination
provisions.
Includes oil spill or Other
contamination requiring emergency
action.
Includes harm from hazardous
materials.
1-158
-------
TABLE 2 (Continued)
SPECIFIC MENTION OF HAZARDOUS
STATE STATUTORY CITATION SUBSTANCES
Texas Civ. Stat. Art. 6889-7
Virginia Section 44-146.13 Includes industrial or trans-
portation accidents, such as oil
spills or other injurious en-
vironmental contaminants.
West Virginia Section 15-5-1
Wisconsin Section 22.16
1-159
-------
TABLE 3
STATES WITH PUBLIC HEALTH PROVISIONS POTENTIALLY
APPLICABLE TO EMERGENCIES FROM HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
N.B. All states have enacted public health provisions authorizing actions in
the case of nuisances to the public health. The states listed below
have specific enabling language indicating the contemplation of action
in instances of environmental damage.
STATE
Alabama
Arizona
California
Colorado
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Iowa
Louisiana
Minnesota
New Hampshire
North Dakota
STATUTORY CITATION*
Title 22, Section 3-1
Section 36-101
Health and Safety Code,
Section 1101
Section 25-1-107
Section 381.031
Section 88-108
Section 37-102
Sections 137.6; 657.1
Section 4055
Section 145.912(14)
Sections 149.1; 198.1
Section 23-04
SPECIFIC MENTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
APPLICATION
Responsibility includes pollution
of drinking water.
Environmental Protection Service
located within Department of
Health Services.
County Board's powers may be exer-
cised by local Environmental Agency.
Consolidated Dept. of Health and
Environmental Sciences.
Dept. of Health & Welfare administers
environmental laws.
Designated powers include handling,
storage, and disposal of chemicals.
Local Boards of Health enforce air
and water pollution standards.
Board of Health administers water
pollution laws.
*Except as indicated, all statutory references are to the annotated edition
of the state legislative compilation.
1-161
-------
TABLE 3 (Continued)
SPECIFIC MENTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
STATE STATUTORY CITATION APPLICATION
Oklahoma Title 63, Section 1-206 Local Boards of Health maintain
water pollution and environmental
health programs.
Utah Section 17-5-72
Section 26-5-1
Section 26-22-16
Washington Section 43.20A.010 Dept. of Social and Health Services
charged to cooperate with Dept. of
Ecology.
1-162
-------
REPORT OF A LIMITED SURVEY OF INDUSTRY CAPACITY
TO RESPOND TO ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCIES
ARISING FROM THE RELEASE OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
Final Report
to
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
August 1978
81099-30
Arthur D Little, Inc.
-------
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY II-l
II. METHODOLOGY I1L~5
III. ANALYSIS I][-7
A. TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCY RESPONSE (CHEMICAL
MANUFACTURERS) II~7
B. FIXED FACILITY RESPONSE . 11-12
C. COSTS TO THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 11-13
IV. TRANSPORTERS 11-15
A. GENERAL SUMMARY OF ALL MODES INTERVIEWED—
RAILROADS, TRUCKS, BARGES II-15
B. RAILROADS 11-16
C. TRUCKS (BULK CHEMICAL CARRIERS) 11-20
D. BARGES 11-21
V. CLEAN-UP CONTRACTORS 11-23
A. RESPONSE CAPABILITY 11-23
B. POSSIBLE FEDERAL ACTIONS TO FACILITATE CLEAN-UP 11-24
VI. CONCLUSIONS 11-27
APPENDIX A—SAMPLE QUESTIONS 11-29
APPENDIX B—PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED 11-33
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
During the review of state capabilities by the EPA Task Force on Environ-
mental Emergencies, many state officials interviewed stated that industry
clean up of hazardous material spills was adequate in 90% of reported
spills . EPA on-scene coordinators who have monitored the cleanup, of
chemical spills were also aware that industry had extensive clean-up capa-
bility. It became apparent that a review of industry capacity would be a
necessary part of the overall study of response to environmental emer-
gencies. To outline more fully the capability of industry to handle environ-
mental emergencies, EPA commissioned this survey, by Arthur D. Little, Inc.,
of industry associations and representative firms in the following fields:
• chemical manufacture
• chemical transportation
- rail
- highway
- barge
• chemical spill clean up (a new industry of independent
contractors who work for firms in one or more of the
industries above, as well as for government)
Questions to be addressed to industry representatives covered the following
major issues:
• Who pays for actual clean up of spilled materials?
- after a transportation accident?
- after a process or storage accident?
• What preparations have been made in advance by industry
to deal with hazardous material spills?
• How is the latest knowledge on the properties of hazardous
chemicals made available at the scene of a hazardous
material spill?
• What gaps exist in industry preparation for hazardous
material spills?
We did not attempt to define an optimum industry response and measure
current performance against such a standard. However, we did identify
the following elements which must be present if a hazardous material spill
is to be properly handled. If the following elements are present and well
coordinated, then we would consider industry response to be adequate:
*
See Arthur D. Little report to EPA, "Estimation of the Frequency and
Costs Associated with the Cleanup of Hazardous Materials," Section III-
E, Draft Final Report, August 1978.
II-l
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• funds to pay for cleanup and disposal of spilled
materials;
• clean-up equipment reflecting the latest generally
applicable advances in clean up technology, manned
by well-trained experts familiar with hazardous
chemicals;
• readily available experts with the latest knowledge
on the hazards and properties of the chemicals spilled;
• a reliable system for identifying and reporting the
hazardous materials released.
In interviews with twenty-six organizations in chemical manufacture, trans-
port, and clean up, Arthur D. Little, Inc. attempted to determine the
extent of the capacity in each sector of'the industry to handle these major
functions after a hazardous material release. Because of time and budget
limitations, the group interviewed was relatively small and not represen-
tative in a statistical sense. All interviews were completed by June 10,
only a little more than a month after the project began.
It is apparent from the statements of almost all the organizations inter-
viewed that industry does regard the unintended release of hazardous
materials as a problem, and has taken a number of steps to improve the
handling of hazardous material spills, both by individual firms and by
collective organizations. Findings on current capacity are presented on
an industry-by-industry basis in the analysis section, but we can summarize
some highlights here:
• the largest chemical companies have organized transpor-
tation emergency programs to provide expert advice when
a company product is spilled during transport;
• firms specializing in the clean up of hazardous materials
have grown rapidly. The transportation companies (rail-
roads, truck lines) are providing a rapidly expanding
market for their services;
• railroads are hiring environmental staff and preparing
for hazardous material incidents, 'even training local
firemen in some cases. Railroads can be expected to be
more sensitive to environmental insults caused by derail-
ments than they have been in the past;
• most transporters agree that regulated rates for common
carriers do not reflect the true costs (environmental
and fiscal) of transporting highly hazardous substances.
However, only a few incidences were cited where the
transporter actually refuses to carry bulk shipments
of highly hazardous materials because of the associated
costs and risk.
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One overall impression arising from the interviews is the indication
that "big" is better, and that large transportation and chemical compa-
nies have more thoroughly developed response systems. While the Bureau
of Explosives of the Association of American Railroads does provide
technical assistance which is made available to all railroads in the
event of a hazardous material emergency, there is no comparable system
for the chemical industry. CHEMTREC provides a single communications
link to all chemical firms, but only the chlorine and pesticide indus-
tries have fully developed mutual aid programs to provide assistance in
the event of any emergency involving a hazardous substance. If a small
or poorly prepared chemical company provides no technical assistance in
the event of an accident involving its product, public safety officials
and transporters cannot rely on support from the chemical industry as
a whole.
Similarly, to date there is no integrated industry sponsored effort to
train local firemen and public safety officials in preparation for
transportation accidents involving hazardous materials. Industry sup-
ported training has generally been provided on a firm-by-firm basis.
Industry response must be an important part of any national system to
respond to environmental emergencies. Industry is generally capable
and willing to pay the costs of cleaning up after the release of a
hazardous substance. However, portions of the transport and chemical
industries have a substantial distance to go to reach the level of
preparedness observed in some industry leaders.
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II. METHODOLOGY
In keeping with our proposed work plan (April 6, 1978) for this task,
we interviewed industry associations and a selection of major firms to
determine the status of current industry preparations for response to
environmental emergencies. A total of twenty-six organizations were
interviewed, eighteen in person. Because of the approaching deadline
for completion of the EPA report, this task was completed in slightly
more than one month, with slightly more than two man-months of effort.
Respondents were asked to focus in each discussion on the following
issues:
• contingency plans,
• training of response teams,
t equipment and skills available for response,
• funds available for response,
• extent of mutual aid agreements within the industry,
• joint training with public safety agencies, and
• current problems.
Because of the limited time and manpower available, the survey is not
representative in a statistical sense. However, we did find many com-
mon threads in the statements by different representatives in each
industry. Where different interviews confirmed our perception of a
general trend, we have cited this trend in the analysis, although we
are not in a position to say exactly what proportion of an industry is
following the trend.
We began by contacting the major industry associations identified by the
Office of Public Awareness at EPA. These associations provided an over-
view of industry emergency response efforts and assistance in identifi-
cation of individual firms suitable for interviews. The firms selected
were chosen because of their apparent familiarity with leading industry
efforts, as well as their knowledge of the status of preparation for
environmental emergencies amongst the majority of firms in the industry.
During May 1978, we interviewed the following sample of fifteen firms
in the major affected industries:
• four railroads,
• two tank truck lines,
• four chemical companies,
• one barge line, and
• four spill clean-up contractors.
II-5
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Those firms and associations interviewed are listed in Appendix B.
Arthur D. Little, Inc. staff also attended a seminar on response to
hazardous material transportation emergencies sponsored by the Manufac-
turing Chemists Association where we had the opportunity to speak with
representatives of various companies and to ask additional questions.
While a single interview guide was not developed, we attempted to ask a
nucleus of similar questions of all respondents. Where one respondent
offered a particularly unusual or controversial observation, we attempted
to check this assertion with other respondents. Appendix A contains a
listing of some of the core questions of each interview. We did pursue
different areas in greater depth with different respondents when these
respondents showed a particular interest or knowledge in some portion of
the subject matter.
The following pages describe the emergency response programs of chemical
producers, transporters and clean-up contractors. We have attempted to
indicate when our observations and conclusions pertain only to the firms
interviewed and when we believe they pertain to the industry as a whole.
Wherever possible we have included a description of the actual response
capability, cost considerations, prevention and training activities, and
selected concerns relating to the §311 Regulations.
In order to retain the confidentiality of information provided, we have
not specifically identified the contributions of any of the firms inter-
viewed. However, we have maintained a file of notes on each interview,
and any question as to the validity of our conclusions or the basis for
such conclusions may be addressed by a review of these notes.
II-6
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III. ANALYSIS
A. TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCY RESPONSE (CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS)
1. Characterization of Company and Plant Response Programs
Three large chemical companies* interviewed have well-developed programs
for responding to spills during the transport of materials which they
manufacture. Common elements of the more comprehensive transportation
emergency programs include:
• Top-level management backing, which guarantees that funds and
transportation resources (corporate aircraft, travel funds)
are available for emergency response.
• A single contact point (or pre-designated series of contact
points) made available to transporters, customers, and
CHEMTREC, and manned by trained operators 24 hours per day.
• A company-wide contingency plan which identifies and gives
24-hour contact numbers for company personnel with pro-
duction, distribution, and toxicology expertise on each
company product.
• A system of emergency coordinators, usually regional, who
manage each emergency response.
• Special training for corporate personnel responding to
spills.
• Collection of data on spills and monitoring of spill pre-
vention programs.
a Development of data bases to provide relevant information
to response personnel on physical, chemical, and toxicological
properties of spilled materials.
• On rare occasions, provision of specialized equipment,
materials and disposal facilities needed for cleanup
after a transportation spill.
The Manufacturing Chemists Association (MCA) and the major chemical pro-
ducers cited above are trying to encourage all chemical producers and
shippers to establish emergency programs. They have taken the lead in
promoting response to transportation emergencies by all producers and
*
Ranked first, second, and fourth in gross
sales in the chemical industry.
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shippers in order to protect the public and the reputation of the industry
and its larger, more visible members. They seek to avoid poorly-handled
incidents on the part of other companies which could reflect upon the
entire industry.
To this end, four MCA sponsored seminars were held throughout the
country in the spring of 1978 and such seminars will continue in the
fall of 1978. These seminars were well attended and focused on insti-
tuting emergency response programs within individual companies. Com-
ments by participants indicate that the comprehensive transportation
emergency programs created by the largest companies have not yet been
replicated throughout the industry. While many companies will send
advisors to the scene of certain spills, a full response program by
smaller chemical manufacturers seems to be inhibited by the following
factors:
• Lack of top management commitment. Without a strong
corporate commitment to emergency response, the other
barriers listed below will not be removed.
• Decentralized operations and budgeting. Plant or
divisional profit centers are reluctant to spend money
on emergencies which are not immediately associated
with their own operations.
• Concern for additional liability which may be incurred
by providing advice at the scene of transportation
accidents.
• Insufficient corporate-level staff to coordinate and/
or support a company-wide response program.
» Lack of experience in dealing with emergencies and a
general reluctance to become involved in incidents
occurring off company property. Smaller companies may
not be involved in a large enough number of spills to
provide comprehensive experience and justify the time
and expense of program development.
Transportation emergency response programs sponsored by the major chemical
companies are designed to provide product specific advice, not clean-up
equipment and labor. The transporter is expected to assume clean-up
costs.
In the event of transportation accidents involving a common carrier,
action by the large chemical manufacturers is limited to an advisory
role. Transporters, public officials, and clean-up contractors are
advised on clean-up techniques, toxicology, safety hazards, and environ-
mental dangers.
While small quantities of spilled material may be recovered by the manu-
facturer's response team, major clean-up costs are the financial respon-
sibility of the transporter and cleanup is performed by the transporter
II-8
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or a spill contractor. In unusual situations where the proposed clean-
up method is considered counter-productive or hazardous, the manufacturer's
response team may intervene with public safety officials or environmental
on-scene coordinators to encourage a different approach.
Response outside company property by these chemical manufacturers is
limited to transportation routes. Manufacturers will not provide on-
scene response inside a customer's plant, although they will provide
product data to the customer's representatives. Some chemical manu-
facturers state that they exercise "product stewardship" in controlling
sales and will not sell highly hazardous products to companies which
are incapable of handling these materials or have a poor safety record
with such materials.
2. Industry Sponsored Mutual Aid and Assistance Programs
Mutual aid and assistance programs between competing firms in the chemical
industry are not numerous. The programs listed below are the only cooper-
ative industry efforts identified in the United States. Canadian chemical
manufacturers sponsor a multi-product mutual assistance program called
TEAP (Transportation Emergency Assistance Plan).
• CHEMTREC
CHEMTREC, sponsored by the Manufacturing Chemists Association (MCA),
is a communication and information transfer program which ties
together and coordinates existing response efforts by chemical firms.
Through CHEMTREC, spill response personnel and others receive advice
and technical assistance on specific products which is provided by
individual chemical producers, distributors and formulators.
CHEMTREC also provides its users with basic information prepared
in advance on the handling of chemical substances and serves as the
link to the mutual aid and assistance programs discussed below.
CHEMTREC operates a 24-hour per day communications center which
serves callers through a widely distributed toll-free number.
Thoroughly trained personnel called "communicators" staff the
center at all times. When a call is received, the communicators
elicit from the caller considerable descriptive information on
the spill and provide the caller with basic information, prepared
in advance, on the appropriate handling of specific hazardous
substances. The communicator then alerts the manufacturer of
the incident involving its product and provides the manufacturer's
personnel with descriptive information and a telephone number where
the caller is to be contacted.
Since its inception in 1972, the CHEMTREC program has served to
catalyze and encourage improvement of emergency response programs
in individual firms.. CHEMTREC's need to identify technical
assistance personnel in each company has caused many firms to
develop at least a rudimentary response program. Currently,
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CHEMTREC and its larger members are advocating that all companies
distribute only the CHEMTREC telephone number to public safety
personnel and others likely to seek assistance in a hazardous
material emergency. It is believed that using a single nation-
wide number for the industry will lessen confusion in obtaining
information after an accident.
• Chlorine Emergency Plan (CHLOREP)
Administered by the Chlorine Institute, this program designates
emergency response teams from chlorine manufacturing facilities
to handle any emergency in a specified geographic area. Teams
are dispatched through CHEMTREC. The nearest response team can
be dispatched to the accident or spill, regardless of the manu-
facturer involved. Increased exposure to liability for the company
fielding a response team is apparently considered a cost of doing
business in the chlorine industry. Response teams have appropriate
emergency kits for patching leaking chlorine containers. More
than 6,000 are sited throughout the country. Standardized design
of chlorine containers makes possible the use of these pre-
positioned emergency kits. The Institute's Container Specifi-
cations Committee is responsible for both container and emergency
kit design.
• Pesticide Safety Team Network
Sponsored by the National Agricultural Chemical Association, this
program is comprised of 14 Association members which are among the
nation's largest pesticide manufacturers. The program began in
March 1970. The network members have entered into an agreement
for mutual assistance to pesticide emergencies, and each has
agreed to "hold harmless" each of the other members for liabilities
arising from response actions. The manufacturer of a spilled
product is not billed for labor and materials expended on clean
up, unless excessive amounts are involved.
The network consists of some 45 safety teams located at member
facilities around the country. The system will respond to
pesticide emergencies regardless of the origin of the pesticides.
The system is tied into CHEMTREC for access by all persons who
wish to report a spill incident involving a pesticide.
e Vinyl Chloride
This industry is beginning to develop a common response to trans-
portation spills, including equipment standardization and production
of patching kits. A formal response program, similar to the
Chlorine Institute, has not yet been developed. Industry members
are encouraged to sign reciprocal response agreements with other
members, but reports of vinyl chloride spills are still forwarded
to the manufacturer, who may then arrange for response by a
competitor close to the spill.
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Beyond the chlorine, pesticide and vinyl chloride industries, we found
no formal mutual aid programs for specific hazardous substances. How-
ever, there is some evidence of an increasing trend towards cooperation
by competing manufacturers of extremely hazardous substances. The
anyhydrous ammonia industry has expressed increasing concern for trans-
portation accidents, and ammonia producers have jointly funded some
research on the problem. In the hydrocyanic acid industry, an informal
program of mutual assistance during transportation incidents was
reported by a major chemical company. For another hazardous substance
which is now being shipped in bulk quantities, two large chemical
producers have arranged joint training for their corporate response
teams.
3. Local Arrangements for Mutual Assistance
Industry respondents indicated that geographic spill clean-up cooperatives
have not developed for chemicals to the same extent that they have de-
veloped for oil. Reasons for the lag in developing local assistance
arrangements include:
• Common equipment and techniques can be used on all oil spills;
thus the stockpiling of equipment lowers the cost of prepara-
tion for individual members. Different clean-up equipment
may be required for cleanup of each chemical spill, thus re-
ducing the apparent economies of spill clean-up cooperatives.
• Specialized knowledge is as important as specialized equipment
in chemical spill response; this suggests a greater need for
cooperatives on a substance-by-substance basis rather than on
a regional basis, except where needs coincide.
• For competitive reasons, some companies may be unwilling to
provide response information in advance on certain chemicals
with proprietary formulations. Thus response planning,
which requires knowledge of the compound and its hazardous
characteristics, cannot be undertaken adequately.
Most major chemical plants work regularly with local public safety offi-
cials to prepare for fires or the release of a toxic gas from the manu-
facturing facility. Such preparations include provisions for traffic
control, potential evacuation measures, and identification of fire fight-
ing hazards within the plant. In some situations, plants will offer to
assist public safety agencies in handling hazardous materials emergencies
caused by the products of other chemical firms. This voluntary extension
of assistance is not generally encouraged by corporate policy, and is done
on a plant-by-plant basis as part of a "good neighbor" policy.
Since much of the knowledge about handling hazardous materials is product
specific, plant safety personnel can assist public safety agencies with
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hazardous material emergencies in the community only when the product
involved is identical, or similar to, a product manufactured in the plant.
One large chemical company did report a successful mutual aid program
amongst chemical producers in the Kanawha River Valley around Charleston,
West Virginia. Expert assistance from large manufacturers was made avail-
able to public safety officials and chemical concerns who are not prepared
for accidental releases of hazardous chemicals. In one case, the manu-
facturer interviewed cleaned up a major spill after a customer's tank
truck ruptured during a delivery run. In contrast to the reported success
of mutual aid arrangements in the Kanawha Valley, we found another multi-
corporation chemical complex where joint emergency planning attempts by
industry had collapsed in recent years. We therefore conclude that
public safety personnel can rely on receiving technical assistance from
the chemical industry in handling hazardous material emergencies only
if:
• the product is the focus of a mutual aid system—chlorine,
pesticides (vinyl chloride to some extent); or
• the product was shipped by a major chemical company with a
transportation emergency system; or
• the product is released within the manufacturer's plant.
In other situations, technical assistance may be available from local
chemical manufacturers if:
• the plant manager is willing to provide assistance; and
• the hazardous material released is the same, or similar
to, a product manufactured in the facility from which
assistance is requested.
In the following situations, public safety officials cannot rely upon
technical assistance from chemical manufacturers:
* transportation spills of hazardous chemicals other than
chlorine, pesticides (and vinyl chloride), unless the
manufacturer is one of the large chemical companies with
a transportation emergency program; and
• spills by small formulators and distributors of hazardous
chemicals (once ownership of the material has shifted
from the manufacturer to the formulator or distributor).
B. FIXED FACILITY RESPONSE
Respondents indicated that preparations to prevent in-plant spills in
the chemical industry are, in general, further developed than prepara-
tions for transportation accidents. For example, one chemical company
11-12
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which has a comprehensive, well-developed contingency plan for in-plant
spills, has an embryonic and sometimes reluctant corporate response to
transportation emergencies. Many companies recognize that spill preven-
tion, containment, and control (SPCC) regulations will be issued for
hazardous substances, and have moved to install diking, drains and other
means of preventing spills from leaving the plant site.
The above comments imply no judgment on the percentage of chemical plants
which will comply with SPCC regulations when issued. However, prevention
of on-site spills and response to such spills has received a higher
priority from most chemical manufacturers than response to transportation
accidents.
C. COSTS TO THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Chemical manufacturers with spill response or transportation emergency
teams do not budget separately for this task. Team members who actually
respond to an incident are carried on plant payrolls in their regular
function—production, distribution, public relations, occupational health.
They are simply detatched from the functions for an emergency response.
Out-of-pocket costs (travel, per diem) are met out of the plant operat-
ing budget.
Since chemical manufacturers do not generally assume the costs of actual
cleanup-after a transportation accident, they are not faced with very
large unpredictable out-of-pocket costs from transportation incidents.
When cleanup is a manufacturer's responsibility—in a production accident,
or when faulty operation of a company-owned vehicle is responsible—the
clean-up operation is funded by plant operating budgets.
Because of the funding of clean-up operations out of maintenance and
operating budgets, it was not possible to identify the costs of spill
response to the chemical industry in this report. A similar problem was
encountered in reviewing insurance coverage, where pollution and spill
related claims are paid as part of the company's comprehensive general
liability policy. Payments for spill related claims are not isolated,
and we were informed by insurance companies that the only method of iso-
lating such costs would be a closed claim study which would probably re-
quire eighteen months to complete.
The large chemical corporations interviewed do have staff at the corporate
level who are largely dedicated to the coordination of the company's
emergency response efforts. This staff is usually located in a Trans-
portation and Distribution division, or in a Safety and Pollution Control
office. Staff is responsible for developing policies for all company
units during transportation emergencies, developing data bases on company
products, organizing training programs, and maintaining data systems on
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spill incidents and analyzing the data collected. While these expenses
are not large in relation to total sales,* they may represent a signifi-
cant addition to the size of a corporate staff in a small-to-medium sized
chemical company, and constituted a clear deterrent to an improved res-
ponse system in one company interviewed.
Perhaps .025 - .050% of total chemical sales for a medium-sized
chemical company (estimated staff cost - $100,000 to $200,000 for
an organization with sales from $200 to $800 million).
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IV. TRANSPORTERS
A. GENERAL SUMMARY OF ALL MODES INTERVIEWED—RAILROADS. TRUCKS'
AND BARGES
• The use of specialized contractors to handle hazardous material
spills is increasing rapidly. This is verified by the rapid
growth in the contractors interviewed, as well as statements
by transportation companies interviewed that they were using
specialized spill clean-up contractors or considering the addi-
tion of such contractors to in-house spill clean-up capacity.
• In general, transporters state that current rates do not reflect
the risks and costs associated with the carriage of hazardous
materials. ICC rates are set according to tonnage and product
value, without reference to clean-up costs, potential damages,
or Section 311 penalties. Since 1972, railroad rates per ton
mile for most classes of chemicals have increased less rapidly
than rates for all carload traffic, or for environmentally
innocuous materials such as coal and foodstuffs. The rate per
ton mile for ammonia has grown only 9% while rates for all
carload traffic have risen 35%.* All goods transported help
to subsidize the high cost/ton of cleaning up hazardous
materials. The true cost of transporting these hazardous
materials is understated in the market because all goods trans-
ported help to pay the costs associated with hazardous material
accidents. Prompt revision of regulated rates to reflect true
transportation hazards is desired by several of the transporters
interviewed.
• At least one company in each mode of transport interviewed
stated that it had given consideration to banning the carriage
of certain hazardous substances. Although as common carriers
they cannot actually refuse to carry a cargo legally offered
by a shipper, each firm indicated a belief that it could refuse
to accept cargoes for which sufficiently safe vehicles were not
available. For example, one trucking firm interviewed has used
this explanation in recent years and consistently refuses to
carry certain bulk pesticides (i.e., parathion) and "carcino-
gens." We did not encounter other examples past or current of
this type in the trucking industry, nor were we able to find
any hazardous cargoes which had been specifically embargoed by
the railroads. However, some railroad officials indicated that
tank car safety requirements for several substances carried
should be increased.
• In response to the §311 regulations, the waterways operators
expect hazardous cargoes which remain on the river to shift to
*
Chemical Week, July 5, 1976, p. 34.
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dedicated tows, with some attempt to pass the liability for
Section bb spill penalties to the shipper.
• Integration of hazardous substances designations by DOT and
EPA is desired by transporters, and will be necessary before
government and industry can respond promptly to all spills.
Railroads and trucking lines interviewed both expect problems
in complying with §311 reporting requirements because ship-
pers are not yet required by DOT regulations to identify some
120-150 of the designated §311 substance. While large chemi-
cal companies state that they are willing to voluntarily
identify all §311 substance on bills of lading, there is no
regulation which requires smaller manufacturers or formulators
to identify such substance. Efforts are being made to facili-
tate voluntary identification, but there will be a gap in the
reporting of §311 spills until DOT regulations are synchro-
nized with EPA requirements.
Some transportation companies interviewed state that they are
planning to report all spills regardless of the amount or
product spilled to avoid any charge that they failed to re-
port the spill of a designated substance in a "harmful"
quantity. These companies believe that it will often be
difficult, if not impossible, to accurately assess how much
of a substance has actually entered a water body. Thus, the
only safe alternative is to report all spills. If this prac-
tice is widely followed, it could place unexpected burdens on
the National Response Center (NRC) and the Environmental
Emergency staff in regional offices. EPA should monitor the
number and type of spills reported to the NRC as the new §311
regulations are implemented to determine if the NRC is receiving
excessive numbers of reports on spills of little environmental
consequence. Changes in NRC procedures or reporting require-
ments may be necessary.
B. RAILROADS
1. Characterization of Emergency Response
The four large railroads interviewed have developed some expertise in
handling hazardous material spills. In addition, the roads are turning
increasingly to specialized hazardous material contractors for clean-up
assistance. These trends, combined with the additional factors listed
below are producing improved environmental cleanup. Additional factors
improving railroad spill cleanup are:
• greater press coverage and public attention to railroad
wrecks and accompanying spills;
• promulgation of §311 regulations on reporting , cleanup,
and penalties for hazardous chemical spills;
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• improved assistance from chemical shippers.
Most railroads gradually are internalizing a concern for the environment,
as evidenced by the addition of environmentally trained personnel and by
the increasing use of hazardous materials clean-up contractors. As a
result, conflicts between environmental concerns and the economic pres-
sure to quickly reopen a rail line may diminsh somewhat in the near future.
However, differences will remain, on occasion, over the required scope
and duration of clean up and the criteria used to determine clean-up
completion.
The respondents interviewed indicated that all the major roads in the
western half of the country have entered retainer contracts with a clean-
up firm which has pre-positioned equipment and guarantees a six hour
response time anywhere on the contracting lines. Eastern railroads, on
the other hand, have placed more reliance on their own internal resources
and on traditional derailment contractors. However, they are increasingly
using hazardous materials clean-up firms, and some are currently consider-
ing establishment of retainer agreements.
Railroad operating crews are not trained nor expected to initiate clean-
up and containment actions. As a result, containment actions immediately
following an accident must be taken by public safety officials, company
maintenance personnel or specialized response teams.
Virtually all railroads rely on fire departments along the right-of-way
to fight fires after a derailment. Railroad crews are not prepared to
fight major fires resulting from a hazardous material accident. In un-
populated country, fires often are allowed to burn themselves out.
In the event of a leak from a tank car of a highly hazardous substance
(as opposed to an accident or derailment), many railroads will expect the
chemical company owning the car to send a team to stop the leak. The car
will be isolated, and unless there is an immediate safety hazard, the
railroad will wait for the owner's transportation experts to arrive.
This is particularly true if the car is found to be leaking after loading
at a shipper's facility.
The Bureau of Explosives, Association of American Railroads, provides 17
field inspectors who assist in the handling of hazardous material acci-
dents and incidents. Although the inspectors assume an advisory role
only, and financial responsibility for clean-up lies with the railroad,
Bureau inspectors are a prime source of expertise available to all rail-
roads. Bureau of Explosives' inspectors are familiar with railroad
operations, equipment and hazardous materials, and have a manual developed
by the Bureau on the handling of 1,676 DOT-designated hazardous materials
to supplement their experience.
Railroad information systems are designed to provide cargo data which can
be useful to public safety and environmental officials. Most large
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railroads* have the capacity to identify the contents of trains from a
central dispatcher's office. All trains carry shipping papers which
identify cargoes, but some cars picked up from the shipper may not be
identified to the central railroad information system until their
arrival at the shipping yard.
In addition, some railroads interviewed currently attach to the train
manifest appropriate information extracted from the Bureau of Explosives
manual for handling DOT-designated hazardous materials.
To facilitate cargo identification following an accident, the Bureau of
Explosives is currently developing a code which will identify environ-
mentally hazardous substances. However, respondents indicate that the
ability to identify such substances in a derailment will be limited un-
til DOT lists all §311 substances in the hazardous material regulations,
thus requiring shippers to identify all environmentally hazardous pro-
ducts.
2. Prevention and Training
Respondents indicate that the training for most railroad operating crews
is limited to self-protection during release of hazardous cargoes. Rail-
road crews are not expected to have specific expertise in the containment
or handling of hazardous materials after an accident. They are instructed
to provide cargo information to public safety officials responding to the
accident and to notify the company dispatcher of the occurrence. Further
notification of state and Federal agencies is then handled by the dis-
patcher, or the railroad's maintenance or environmental and safety
departments.
Because of the reliance on local fire departments, some railroad security
and safety personnel interviewed have made efforts to train local fire-
men. For example, one western railroad made available an extensive
hazardous material course, including training with actual tank car fit-
tings, to departments along the track. Several railroads have distributed
to local fire departments the hazardous material handling manual prepared
by the Bureau of Explosives. These actions generally have been taken on
a company-by-company basis, but the Bureau of Explosives, working with
Western Kentucky University, is now developing a training program for
local firemen which can be used nationwide.
In a separate effort, the National Fire Protection Association, under
contract to DOT, recently has developed a training course for firemen
handling hazardous material incidents on trains. However, the Bureau
of Explosives and some railroads interviewed have expressed serious doubts
about the accuracy and utility of the course.
*A11 four of the lines interviewed .
11-18
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3. Costs to the Railroads
Railroads expect to pay the costs of cleaning up hazardous materials
released after a derailment. Spill clean-up costs are paid from operat-
ing and maintenance budgets, and are not readily segregated in existing
records. Environmental clean-up costs thus reduce the budgeted total
available for track maintenance, and this, combined with pressure to
reopen tracks, may account in part for past railroad reluctance to clean
up chemical spills to the satisfaction of state and local officials.
Railroads carry large comprehensive general liability insurance policies,
with substantial deductibles,* which will cover damages and clean-up
costs. The deductible amount would first be met from operating and
maintenance budgets. As discussed earlier, claims data on spill-related
costs are not available.*
While eastern railroads have used clean-up contractors on a spot contract
basis, the major western railroads have entered into a retainer contract
with a major clean-up firm. Retainer payments under this contract have
been used to finance a network of prepositioned spill clean-up units
'with a value estimated at $250,000 per unit. (The spill clean-up indus-
try is reluctant to discuss finances or the value of equipment which
they own. However, observation of this firm and another major contractor
indicate that clean-up industry firms have made significant capital
investments in specialized vehicles and related clean-up equipment and
protective gear.)
While summary figures for railroad clean-up expenditures are not avail-
able, respondents did cite individual multi-car derailments where clean-
up bills exceeded $500,000.
All four of the major railroads interviewed do maintain some staff con-
cerned with hazardous material incidents. These staff are responsible
for the preparation of contingency plans. They also supervise clean-up
operations after accidents, arrange clean-up contracts, conduct training
programs for railroad employees (and some fire fighters in communities
along the right-of-way), and analyze accidents with the intent to prevent
future incidents. This staff is usually located in a Safety or Environ-
mental Engineering Department (and may also be responsible for pollution
control at fixed facilities operated by the railroad).
See Arthur D. Little report to EPA, "Estimation of the Frequency and
Costs Associated with the Cleanup of Hazardous Materials." Draft
Final Report, August 1978.
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C. TRUCKS (BULK CHEMICAL CARRIERS)
1. Characterization of Emergency Response
Spill notification to appropriate company personnel is generally through
a 24-hour dispatcher. Since spills are not uncommon, firms are at least
informally organized for spill response, if not formally prepared.
Trucking firms generally rely upon the services of specialized spill
clean-up contractors for comprehensive services. However, one major
trucking line interviewed has developed a captive clean-up firm.
Generally, because of the distances involved, a carrier cannot ensure
rapid deployment of its own personnel to the spill site. Thus, local
authorities are relied upon for immediate response to spills. If further
help is required on-scene, a carrier may ask for assistance through a
mutual aid system with other carriers in the National Tank Truck Carriers
association.
2. Prevention and Training
The National Tank Truck Carriers association currently is encouraging
industry-wide expansion of driver training to include reporting require-
ments, use of CHEM CARDS,* and knowledge of the general characteristics
of materials carried as indicated by placards.
Respondents interviewed could cite only one example of the training of
public safety officials by the trucking industry. One tank truck line
interviewed maintains two vans equipped with truck valves and other
hardware as classrooms for training company drivers. The vans travel
continuously to the company's terminal facilities for these training
sessions. The firm has received and fulfilled numerous requests from
fire and police departments for similar, hands-on training for emergency
response.
3. Costs
Major trucking firms, rather than shippers, accept the financial res-
ponsibility for clean-up expenses. These are seen as routine costs of
doing business. Response to spills does not involve an immediate fault
determination. The tank truck lines interviewed stated that they would
authorize a contractor to begin clean up without waiting to determine
the cause of the accident. It would appear that these firms will initi-
ate clean up even when the accident was caused by the negligence of
another driver.
Capsule information on major hazardous substances developed by
CHEMTREC and M.C.A.
11-20
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Environmental clean-up expenses are not budgeted separately by tank
truck firms, but are paid from allocations for fleet operations and
maintenance.
D. BARGES
1. Characterization of Emergency Response
Barge lines rely on hazardous material clean-up contractors, traditional
salvage contractors and, on occasion, spill cooperatives to respond to
chemical spills. Hazardous material firms and salvage firms may work
closely together on the same incident.
Barge operators desire the technical advice of shippers on the properties
and handling of spilled materials. They receive such assistance for
chlorine through The Chlorine Institute, but report that they have not
had satisfactory response for other materials such as vinyl chloride and
ammonia.
Accidents involving hazardous materials travelling by barge have a number
of unusual aspects that differentiate them from other transportation
emergencies. These differences are related only in part to the larger
amounts carried in a single vehicle (barge). Other special conditions
associated with hazardous materials incidents on the waterways include:
• need for special knowledge in marine salvage procedures;
• small number of properly equipped barges for offloading a
damaged barge. For example, there are only 40 liquid ammonia
barges on the Mississippi River system. It may take several
days to get a barge to the site of an accident; and
• trade-offs between public safety and water pollution. The
most effective way of reducing the public safety danger
from an ammonia barge accident may involve dissolving large
quantities of the cargo in the water, with the accompanying
risk to aquatic life.
Federal supervision of environmental emergencies resulting from barge
accidents on the inland rivers will clearly require close cooperation
between EPA and salvage experts in the Coast Guard. Marine salvage is
a highly specialized field in which EPA on-scene coordinators have no
experience. Salvage efforts often require quick decisions which entail
major environmental risks. The weighing of these risks introduces a
new element in the making of salvage decisions, and conflict between
salvage and environmental experts can be expected.
3. Costs
Respondents indicated that most waterways operators were not concerned
about third party liability, or clean-up costs up to the $150 dollar per
11-21
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ton limit. Insurance coverage is available and considered adequate for
these purposes. Operators are very concerned about the potential $5
million penalty under §§bb of §311 of the Water Pollution Control Act
for release of a non-removeable substance. They cannot insure against
this penalty. Because of the large volumes in a single barge, the
waterways operators face a much larger potential fine, and have smaller
corporate assets, than the railroads or large tank truck lines. One
operator indicated that attempts were underway to modify towage contracts
to place financial responsibility for a §§bb penalty on the chemical
company shipping the product. Highly dangerous products such as ammonia
and chlorine are expected to move from common carriers to dedicated tows
to take advantage of such protections, but the industry is not optimistic
that contract modifications will be effective in passing penalty costs
back to the shipper.
While representatives of all transportation modes expressed their interest
in seeing the costs of hazardous substance spills placed back on the
chemical industry by higher rates, only the barge industry indicated that
it was specifically exploring contract mechanisms for imposing transport-
ation spill costs (in this case, the §§bb penalty) back on the chemical
industry.
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V. CLEAN-UP CONTRACTORS
A. RESPONSE CAPABILITY
The contractors interviewed (covering most of the country) appeared
capable of providing a core clean-up team (4-6 men) and substantial basic
equipment within 6 hours throughout their service area. These contractors
can also provide specialized equipment within this time.
Contractors interviewed appeared to be well stocked with the following
items:
• protective clothing and breathing apparatus,
• communication equipment (generally superior to that
currently available to state and Federal environmental
agencies, except the Coast Guard),
• clean-up and patching tools,
• sorbent and neutralizing materials,
• published materials on the properties of most
hazardous substances,
• specialized chemical transfer equipment, and
• boats and vehicles for reaching remote accident sites.
When distant from the contractor's base of operations, heavy construction
equipment for damming, diking, building of retention and treatment ponds,
etc., may be obtained from local construction contractors near the spill
site.
The spill clean-up contractors interviewed appeared to be growing rapidly
in total sales and invested capital. The two firms with the widest reputa-
tion in handling hazardous material spills have entered the field in the
last decade, building on a base in the general construction industry.
Both are currently involved in a significant expansion of their equipment
and area of geographic coverage. While exact business volumes were not
available, one company reported that it had 45 men available for emergency
response, while the other appeared to have approximately 100 men available.
The contractor originally retained by the western railroads is expanding
to 19 the number of prepositioned chemical spill clean-up units west of
the Mississippi River. Another firm, which seems to have dominated rail-
road cleanups in the Midwest and northern South, has recently expanded to
two new district offices.
11-23
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Contractual arrangements for the acquisition of clean-up services appear
to vary significantly. One firm based its initial expansion on a series
of retainer agreements with the major western railroads. A second firm
interviewed has built its business on spot contracts, without such
retainer arrangements. A third, smaller firm was developed as a wholly-
owned subsidiary of a tank truck line, but now provides spill cleanup
and general environmental services to the parent company and other
clients.
Based upon the observed growth of the firms interviewed, as well as
the statements of most major transporters, it appears that the market
for spill clean-up services is growing very rapidly, and that firms with
substantial technical expertise and equipment are growing to meet this
demand.
The only types of incidents which the leading contractors state that
they are generally unwilling and unprepared to handle are:
• radioactive materials, and
• specifically designated explosives, particularly military
munitions.
The contractors expect the military to handle munitions, and the govern-
ment collectively to handle radioactive materials.
Disposal was cited as a problem by some, but not all, of those who
had been in charge of past clean-up efforts. While few incidents could
be cited where disposal was altogether impossible, several respondents
stated that total clean-up costs were substantially increased by the
need to transport spill debris long distances to acceptable, properly
permitted disposal sites.
B. POSSIBLE FEDERAL ACTIONS TO FACILITATE CLEAN-UP
The above cited comments by respondents regarding disposal, taken to-
gether with remarks by the National Solid Waste Association (May 25
public meeting) and those made earlier in this study by state officials,
suggest Federal consideration of the following:
• research into improved on-site neutralization or
incineration,
11-24
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• prohibition of state embargoes against import of wastes
to properly permitted disposal sites*, and
• return of spill debris to the shipper for disposal through
the channels used for production wastes.
In addition, there may be a need for the Federal government to provide
certain highly specialized pieces of equipment (a mobile, high-temperature
incinerator) which are used too infrequently for purchase by a single
contractor. This apparent need for specialized equipment led to the
development of the EERU (Environmental Emergency Response Unit),
although carbon absorption techniques are now being applied to some
spills without use of the EERU. As clean-up contractors acquire equip-
ment incorporating new clean-up technologies, it may not be necessary
for EPA to continue to directly own and operate such equipment.
When EPA owns specialized eqiupment such as the EERU or a mobile
incinerator, some contractors would like to obtain the use of such
equipment without "Federalizing" the overall response. If not already
developed, EPA should consider a rental arrangement where the equip-
ment is rented to a spill clean-up contractor who retains financial
and technical responsibility for spill clean up.
*The Supreme Court decision in the Case of New Jersey vs. Pennsylvania
was released after completion of the interviews in this study. It is
too early to tell the net impact of the decision on disposal of spill
debris. The decision clearly forbids embargoes on the importation of
wastes into states with disposal facilities accepting wastes from
sources within the state. However, the Supreme Court decision does
not obligate states to approve disposal facilities, and local efforts
to block all chemical waste disposal (such as the Wilsonville, Illinois
case) may become more common.
H-25
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The ability and willingness of industry to respond to environmental emer-
gencies caused by the release of hazardous chemicals has improved greatly
in the recent past, and appears likely to continue to improve in the near
future. Unless developments such as the use of §311 or a hazardous chemi-
cal contingency fund alter behavior, industry can be expected to bear the
response burden it has accepted in the recent past (estimated at 90% of
reported spills by state officials). Much of the cost of clean up will
fall upon transporters, while there will be great variability in the
amount of technical assistance provided by manufacturers.
Although major chemical companies are now embarked on a campaign to im-
prove the response to transportation emergencies, significant deficiencies
or problems with response by chemical manufacturers have been identified
as follows:
• The chemical industry has no generalized mutual assistance plan
which will assure the provision of expert advice on safety and
cleanup when the manufacturer of the substance is unwilling or
unable to respond to an incident. CHEMTREC provides a communi-
cation link to all chemical firms, and limited general informa-
tion on product hazards, but technical assistance remains the
responsibility of individual firms.
• Mutual aid or assistance programs have not been created for
hazardous substances other than chlorine, pesticides, and
vinylchloride (still in its early stages). Government could
place more reliance on industry response if mutual aid arrange-
ments similar to CHLOREP or the Pesticide Safety Network were
developed for other dangerous bulk chemicals (such as ammonia)
and for general classes of hazardous chemicals which are pro-
duced and shipped in smaller quantities.
• Small-to-medium sized chemical companies have not yet created
adequate systems to provide advice and technical assistance
in the event of a spill of their own product during a trans-
portation accident. The largest chemical companies have
created transportation emergency programs which may serve as
a model for other organizations but cost and liability concerns
have discouraged smaller chemical companies from copying the
transportation emergency programs created by industry leaders.
While the chemical industry is aiming to improve in-plant spill prevention
and control, and provide technical advice to transporters and public safety
agencies, it does not generally assume the costs of clean up and damages
caused by the release of hazardous substances during transportation. These
costs are borne by the transporter, and paid out of operating and mainten-
ance budgets, and in cases of very expensive accidents, from comprehensive
11-27
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general liability insurance. While exact cost statistics are not avail-
able, it appears that sufficient clean-up funds have generally been made
available by large transport operators.
An increasing shift to the use of specialized clean-up contractors has
caused a major expansion by these firms, and the leaders in this field
are equipped with the expertise and machinery to apply all but the most
exotic clean-up technologies. Although the clean-up industry is appa-
rently healthy and expanding, it is expensive, and there is no automatic
assurance that small operators will obtain competent clean-up assistance.
Government will be required to contract for, or maintain directly, the
resources to clean up spills by marginal operators.
Certain other aspects of the transportation industry require considera-
tion in the formation of public policy towards environmental emergencies:
• Regulated interstate freight rates do not yet reflect the
additional costs and risks resulting from the transportation
of highly hazardous substances.
• Although some rail lines have made commendable efforts to
train firemen along their own rights of way, industry has
not yet sponsored hazardous material training courses which
have reached all fire companies along major transportation
routes. Since train crews and truck drivers have no special
equipment and little special training to handle hazardous
material emergencies, local public safety officials will
continue to be the first line of defense in the case of
major environmental emergencies. In most cases, they will
arrive one to several hours prior to clean-up crews, chemi-
cal company experts, or Federal environmental officials.
• To date, there is only spotty evidence to suggest that bulk
shipment of certain hazardous cargoes has been restrained
by the environmental risks and costs associated with an
accident. Two chemical companies and one tank truck line
indicated that they had embargoed certain types of bulk
cargoes, but most respondents indicated that such actions
had only been discussed, and some were unsure that a common
carrier could refuse transport of a vehicle carrying a
hazardous substance if the vehicle complied with existing
regulations.
11-28
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE QUESTIONS
Chemical Producers-
1. Do you have a transportation emergency program?
2. How is this program organized?
3. Where does your emergency program fit in the corporate structure?
4. What management backing does your emergency program have?
5. How is the program budgeted?
6. What kind of incidents would you respond to?
t
7. How do you determine the degree of response?
8. Will you respond to the spill of a competitor's product? Under what
circumstances?
9. What is the distribution of responsibility between your emergency personnel
and the transporter at the scene of an accident?
10, Have there been any developments toward mutual aid or assistance arrange-
ments for any of the chemicals which you produce?
11- What responsibilities do you expect the Federal government, and state
and local authorities to take in the event of a chemical spill?
12. Are there any situations caused by your products which you are not pre-
pared to handle?
Transporters ._—' -
1. How are you organized to respond to spills of hazardous substances by
your vehicles?
2. What do your personnel do in the event of a spill, and what responsibility
11-29
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APPENDIX A (Continued)
do you assign to different parts of your organization?
3. What responsibility do you expect the producer of a chemical to take in
the event of a leak? What responsibility do you expect him to take in
the event of an accident resulting in a spill?
4. What responsibility do you expect Federal, state and local authorities
to assume in the event of a spill?
5. What have you done to prepare public safety agencies along your routes
for hazardous material spills?
6. What do you expect your operators (train crews, truck drivers) to do in
the event of a spill?
7. What training addressed to hazardous material spills have your operators
received.
8. What types of accidents are you not prepared to handle?
9. Have you considered refusing to handle any hazardous substances? Can
you refuse to handle such substances?
10. Who is financially responsible for the consequences of the hazardous
material spill?
11. Have you adjusted your rates or operating procedures to reflect the
carriage of hazardous substances?
Industry Associations
1. What cooperative emergency response mechanisms do you sponsor for your
members?
2. Describe the history of your cooperative response arrangements. Why do
you believe that similar operations have not developed in many other
industries?
11-30
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APPENDIX A (Continued)
3. What is the status of preparation by your various members for chemical
spills?
4. What hazardous material response training do you sponsor or encourage for
your members and for others? '
5. (of transportation association) Have your members considered refusing to
carry certain hazardous cargoes? Are you taking any actions to improve
the safety of hazardous material haulage?
Hazardous Material Clean-Up Contractors
1. Describe your company's organization, including the pre-incident deploy-
ment of equipment and personnel.
2. What is your average or typical response time for personnel and equipment?
3. What equipment do you have?
4. What are the limits of your capability for spill clean up? Are there
certain chemicals or situations to which you will not respond?
5. What training and experience do your response personnel have?
6. What responsibilities do you expect on-scene public officials, chemical
producers and carriers to assume?
7. Do you have problems disposing of spill waste?
8. Do you work for both public and private sector customers? Are retainers,
task contracts or other similar arrangements used?
11-31
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APPENDIX B
PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS INTERVIEWED
American Petroleum Institute
Thomas G. Nanney
Senior Environ. Affairs Assoc.
American Trucking Association
John Brennan
American Waterways Operations
Association
- Harold Muth
Director, Govern. Relations
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
- D. Jenks, Jr.*
Bureau of Explosives
Association of American Railroads
- Robert Graziano, Director
- Deborah Guinan, Environ. Spec.
Chemical Leaman
- Richard C. Littlepage, V.P. &
Asst. to Pres.
- Harry Elston, Mgr.—Engineering
and Real Estate
- J. N. Kavanagh, V.P., Safety
Chemical Specialties Manufacturers
Association, Inc.
- Dan R. Harlow, Director
Scientific Affairs
Chlorine Institute
- Robert L. Mitchell, Jr.*
Executive Director
Coastal Services
- Thomas E. Rogers
Operations Supervisor
Compressed Gas Association
- Edwin A. Olsen*
Executive Director
Conrail
- Tom Pendergast*
Dow Chemical
- Robert J. Mesler, Jr., Senior
Distribution Technologist
duPont Chemical
- George Palmer*
Charles R. Bigelow, Div. Mgr.
Planning: Haz. Mat. & Packaging
Hooker Chemical
- Fred Olotka, Director of
Health, Environment & Safety
- James Glattly
Charles Wolosin, Manager
Product Protection
Manufacturing Chemists Association
John C. Zercher, Manager
Chem. Trans. Emergency Center
- Carl Gosline
- Carl A. Wallis
National Agricultural Chemicals
Association
- Denis Hayley*
National Marine Services
- William A. Creelman*
Exec. V.P., Transportation
National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.
- Clifford Harvison
Managing Director
0. H. Materials
- Joseph Kirk
- James Walker, V.P., Marketing
Oil Spill Association
- Mark Shaye, Attorney
*Not interviewed in person.
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Pakhoed U.S.A.
Paktank
Emserv, Inc.
- Mark Hooper, President
- J. Eric Warner, Manager
Development
- John Breyette
Southern Pacific Transportation
Company
- Robert Andre*
Southern Railroad System
- Jeremiah J. O'Driscoll
Manager, Planning-Safety
Synthetic Organic Chemical Manu-
facturers Association
- Ronald Lang*
Union Carbide Corporation
- George Hanks
- F. D. Bess*
Western Environmental Services
- Keith Roberts
- John Hopkins
11-34
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ESTIMATION OF THE FREQUENCY AND COSTS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE CLEANUP
OF
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SPILLS
Final Report
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
September 1978
81099-30
Arthur D Little, Inc.
-------
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
List of Tables III-Y
List of Figures III-vii
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY III-l
II. METHODOLOGY III-5
A. INTRODUCTION III-.5
B. DEFINITIONS ' III -3
C. METHODOLOGY FOR RESPONSE COST ESTIMATION III-6
III. ANALYSIS III-9
A. SPILL FREQUENCY III-9
B. SPILL SIZE ANALYSIS III-2A
C. SPILL LOCATION ANALYSIS III-33
D. RESPONSE COSTS III-38
E. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS FOR RESPONSE COSTS 111-48
F. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 111-54.
G. DAMAGES TO THIRD PARTIES 111-57
H. FINANCING CLEANUP 111-69
IV. CONCLUSIONS 111-83
A. SPILL FREQUENCY 111-83
B. COSTS OF SPILL CLEANUP 111-83
C. PAYING FOR SPILL CLEANUP 111-84
APPENDIX A—REFERENCES III-85
-------
LIST OF TABLES
Table
No. Page
1 1975 Hazardous Material Accidents 111-12
2 Hazardous Material Accidents 111-12
3 Summary of Rail Accidents Involving Hazardous
Materials (January 1, 1971 to December 31, 1974) III-14
4 Summary of Rail Accidents Involving Hazardous
Materials (January 1, 1975 to December 31, 1976) III-16
5 Summary of Total Spill Frequency Data Estimated
for 1978-1982 111-20
6 Estimated Water Spill Frequencies 111-22
7 Spill Size Distribution Summary 111-28
8 Revised Spill Frequency Estimates (1978-1982) 111-29
9 . Revised Water Spill Frequencies 111-30
10 Tally of "Incident Location" (by State) of
Approximately 32,000 Hazardous Materials Incident
Reports Received During 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974
and 1975 111-34
11 Data Summary for Ranking of Regions 111-36
12 Projection of Distribution of Yearly Spills 111-37
13 Scenario Characterization 111-40
14 Land Spill Response Costs III-.46
15 Response Cost Summary 111-47
16 Response Cost Estimation Procedure 111-49
17 Total Response Cost Estimates III-50
18 Hazardous Materials Incident Reports Received
During 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975 Which
Property Damage was Reported at $448,000 or
More III-58
III-v
-------
LIST OF TABLES
(Continued)
Table
No. Page
19 Tabulation of Property Damage Figures Excerpted
from 32,000 Hazardous Materials Incident Reports
Received from 1971 Through 1975 111-60
20 Property Damage Estimates III-62
21 Hazardous Materials Incident Report
1975 - 1967 - 1977 111-64
22 Commodities Causing Deaths and Injuries as
Reported on Hazardous Materials Incident Reports
(for the Year 1977) 111-66
23 Summary of Insurance Coverage Available for
Chemical Spills 111-68
24 Shipments of Selected Chemicals by Type of
Carrier 1972 111-72
25 Variation in Average Net Profit with Company
Size 111-78
26 U.S. Chemical and Allied Products Industry
1972 Business Tax Returns 111-80
27 Chemical Sales of the Top 50 Chemical Producers,
1977 IH-81
Ill-vi
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
No. Page
1 Tally of "Incident Locations" (by State) Based
on 32,000 Hazardous Materials Incident Reports
Received During 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975 111-32
2 Seven Years Experience, Hazardous Materials
Incident Reports, and Injuries 111-65
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Working for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its Task Force
on Environmental Emergencies, Arthur D. Little, Inc. conducted an analysis
of the costs of response to hazardous chemical spills. EPA has defined
an environmental emergency, for the purposes of the Task Force study, as
a release of hazardous substances (other than oil and related products)
which poses an immediate danger to public health and the environment.
This report estimates the costs which the Federal government might expect
to incur for response to environmental emergencies arising from the re-
lease of hazardous chemicals during production, storage, and distribution.
It includes all hazardous non-oil chemicals [not just substances on the
list for §311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)]. It
includes releases of solids, liquids, and gases to all media.
The costs estimated herein are for immediate response to a chemical spill
and are derived by extrapolating from many sources of data on the frequency
and cost of past spills. These costs include:
« extraordinary expenses associated with on-scene monitoring;
o containment of the spill;
0 cleanup of spilled materials;
o disposal of contaminated materials; and
• limited restoration of the environment after cleanup efforts
(i.e., filling in ponds, trenches, etc.).
The following costs are not included in the total cost estimate derived
at the conclusion of the analysis:
- property damages and evacuation
administrative costs
• EPA On-Scene Coordinator salaries
• EPA laboratories
e public safety personnel
- long-term environmental restoration
- leaching from hazardous waste disposal sites
- deliberate dumps of hazardous wastes (partially excluded)
Costs associated with property damages and evacuation are discussed
separately in the report (Section III.H), but the scarcity of data
severely limits this discussion.
III-l
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Ongoing administrative costs of state, Federal, and local agencies who
respond to environmental emergencies are excluded because these costs
would be incurred by government in the absence of any fund for environ-
mental cleanup. Administrative costs at the Environmental Protection
Agency are analyzed in another report of the EPA Task Force.
The costs of long-term environmental restoration, or mitigation of environ-
mental insults, are excluded from this analysis. In discussion with
EPA officials, it was generally agreed that the amount spent on long-term
mitigation or restoration is, at least partially, a function of available
funds. Clean-up efforts by government and industry in the past have been
limited to the removal or neutralization of spilled materials and contam-
inated debris. These costs do not provide an adequate basis for estimating
the long-range costs of mitigating environmental insults—such as the $1
billion estimate for removal of kepone from the bed of the James River.
Costs estimated here are for expenditures which will occur in the days
and weeks immediately following the release of a hazardous chemical.
A few incidents involving deliberate dumps or leaching from hazardous
waste disposal sites are included in the data bases used in the analysis,
but the original scope of the study was limited to chemical spills. The
data on these types of incidents are far sketchier than that available
in the incomplete data bases on transportation and production spills, and
we are not able to forecast the frequency and cost of these incidents with
any reliability in this report.
No single fund for the cleanup of hazardous substance spills now exists.
§311 k of the FWPCA is to be used to clean up 271 designated hazardous
chemicals and oil spilled onto water. Recent litigation over the designa-
tion of the 271 hazardous substances has raised questions about the avail-
ability of this fund for chemical spill cleanups. Section 504 of the
FWPCA contains broad environmental emergency powers, but none of the $10
million authorized has been appropriated. Discussions around the pend-
ing oil Superfund bill have suggested extension of the proposed fund to
hazardous chemicals.
This analysis is not tied to any particular statutory emergency provision
or fund; instead, we have projected the costs associated with all chemical
spills within the scope of the study. We have estimated the number of
spills for which Federal clean-up assistance will be required. This
gives a proportion of total costs which will be charged to the Federal
government. When applied to total response costs, this yields the esti-
mated expenditures to be incurred by a Federal clean-up fund.
In general, industry appears to be well insured against the costs of
cleanup and immediate damages associated with hazardous chemical spills.
This finding is based upon insurance industry interviews summarized in
Section III.H.I.
Clean-up costs not accepted by industry must be borne by government. A
companion Arthur D. Little, Inc. study, "Survey of States on Response
III-2
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to Environmental Emergencies" shows that few states have the capacity to
make large clean-up expenditures. The Federal government will be the
main source of clean-up funding. We estimate that the Federal government
may be required to clean up in 10% of all incidents.
An annual average of 2,126 chemical spills in excess of 100 gallons is
projected for the 1978-1982 period. Based on the assumption of 90% indus-
try cleanup, the Federal government will be forced to assume direct clean-
up responsibility in 213 of these spills each year. The most probable
annual cost for Federal cleanup of these chemical spills is $13.0 million.
The likely range of cleanup costs runs from $6.5 million to $26.1 million
per year. Spills will be most frequent in EPA Regions IV and V (more
than 400/year over 100 gal), and least frequent in EPA Regions I, VIII,
and X (less than 100/year).
In Section III.H, we examine various ways in which Federal clean-up costs
may be raised from the chemical industry. On an annual basis, the total
needed ($13 million in 1978 dollars) is slightly more than .01% of total
chemical sales and approximately .2% of chemical industry profits. Six
different options for raising the fund are analyzed. The most feasible
would be a periodic assessment on all chemical sales or a surcharge on
the corporate income tax paid by chemical firms.
In reviews of preliminary drafts of this analysis EPA officials have
questioned the results as too low. A sensitivity analysis and careful
discussion of assumptions is provided in Section III.F. We note again
that the fund amount excludes:
• administrative costs,
• long-term environmental restoration,
• third party damages,
• evacuation and public safety costs,
• leaching from abandoned disposal sites, and
e some deliberate dumps of hazardous chemicals.
The analysis is a conservative estimate of the total contingency fund
necessary to permit immediate Federal intervention in transportation,
storage, and process spills of all hazardous chemicals, when the party
at fault fails to clean up.
An important point of reference is provided from the use of the §311 k
fund on oil spills. A maximum of 5.6% of reported spills have required
government funded cleanup in the years from 1974 to 1977. Total expendi-
tures from the fund since 1972 have been less than $45 million.
III-3
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II. METHODOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
Discussions with officials in eleven states have confirmed prior obser-
vations that some fraction of chemical spills, currently estimated to
be about 10% by number, are not responded to satisfactorily by the parties
at fault. To deal with such incidents in the future, the Federal govern-
ment will need a contingency fund or appropriation to cover the costs
of direct response activities undertaken by the Federal government after
release of a hazardous substance (other than oil or a related product)
into the environment. All chemicals (other than oil or related products)
are included in the analysis; projections are not limited to those
materials currently listed as hazardous materials under §311 of the FWPCA.
The intent of this chapter is to estimate average yearly numbers and
volumes of spills projected to occur over a five-year span. Additionally,
the analysis evaluates the yearly nation-wide costs for chemical spill
response, the portion of these costs that may potentially be borne by
the Federal government, various alternatives for recovering otherwise non-
recoverable expenditures through special taxes on the chemical industry,
and the availability of insurance for reimbursement of clean-up costs
and damages to third parties.
B. DEFINITIONS
We have defined "spill" as the unintentional release of hazardous chemi-
cals into the environment as a result of natural disasters, process
accidents, or transportation mishaps. Not included in the definition
are normal continuous discharges from stationary sources which were
approved by state or Federal authorities, but are suddenly discovered
to cause exceptional harm to the environment. Data is insufficient to
include in this analysis a comprehensive estimate of incidents caused
by leaching from waste disposal sites and similar long-term sources of
pollutants, although such processes may sometimes trigger an environ-
mental emergency.
"Chemical crises" are interpreted as relatively short-term events. A
"response" to a spill may involve numerous activities. We have included
in this analysis primary responses involving monitoring, damage mitiga-
tion, and cleanup and restoration of environmental insults created during
cleanup (dams, filter ponds, etc.). Our analysis does not include the
costs which might be associated with total restoration of environmental
damages caused by a spill (restocking of fish, etc.)» since data is un-
available and expenditures will vary based upon the amount of money
available. Additionally, and separately, we have briefly considered the
costs of property damage associated with environmental emergencies.
"Federal intervention" is defined to include incidents where Federal
authorities temporarily take overall responsibility for a response effort,
and preempt the authority or responsibility of all others. It is not
III-5
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interpreted to involve situations where Federal authorities simply monitor
the activities of responsible parties responding to an emergency.
C. METHODOLOGY FOR RESPONSE COST ESTIMATION
A probabilistic assessment of future response costs for chemical spills
required a multi-faceted analysis involving:
• evaluation of current and past spill frequencies for eight
pertinent source categories using available and published
data;
• projection of spill frequencies into the future for a five-
year period;
• evaluation of spill size distributions and mean spill volumes
for each source category;
• re-estimation of spill frequencies by deletion from consider-
ation of all spills below a minimum spill volume.
• disaggregation of feasible spill scenarios into eleven
categories requiring distinctly different types of responses;
• estimation of the fraction of spills which occur in each of
the eleven spill categories;
• assignment of response costs to the eleven spill categories
on a per unit volume of spill basis;
• estimation and summation of total nation-wide response costs
for each combination of source and spill categories (for the
activities cited above);
• assessment of the percentage of these total costs that may
be borne by the Federal government;
• estimation of the future frequency and magnitude of public
evacuations based upon historical data; and
• estimation of property damages incurred by innocent parties.
The first step involved compilation, review, and analysis of accident
and/or incident reports which involved substances of interest and which
were submitted to various organizations. Results were estimates of
current pertinent yearly spill frequencies for eight source categories
having the potential to release significant quantities of chemicals;
i.e., they concerned the bulk processing, transfer, or transportation of
chemicals.
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Where data sufficed for a source category, trends were established and
estimates were made of.the yearly average spill frequency expected over
the five-year period 1978 to 1982. Where data were insufficient for
source-specific trend establishment, we provided estimates based upon
observations of the general trend in numbers of spill reports submitted
to the Federal government. Application of percentages derived from an
EPA analysis then allowed differentiation between spills to water and
spills to land.
Since the volume of chemical released generally dictates the magnitude of
hazards to the public and the environment, and directly influences the
necessary scope of response activities, available reports of pertinent
chemical spills were utilized with the purpose of defining mean spill vol-
umes for each source category. These same reports also served for the de-
velopment of spill size distributions.
An assumption that spills involving less than 100 gallon amounts will not
precipitate Federal intervention as a general rule, which is later more
fully discussed, allowed deletion from consideration of the large number
of minor leaks and splashes which rarely develop into serious situations.
This had the effect of revising previously projected spill frequencies
downward, while simultaneously causing increases in mean spill volumes.
Spills were disaggregated into eleven spill categories requiring distinctly
different types of responses. These were differentiated by location of
spill (i.e., either land or water), and by the density, solubility, vola-
tility, and reactivity characteristics of chemicals. Subsequently, by
review of the characteristics of 400 chemicals shipped in bulk over water
and/or considered hazardous polluting substances circa 1972, estimates
were made of what fractions of all spills can be associated with each
spill category.
A review of the literature and discussions with spill clean-up contractors
provided response costs for monitoring, damage mitigation, and cleanup on
a per unit volume of spill basis for each of the eleven spill categories.
It also set the stage for computation of nation-wide costs for these activi-
ties.
The cost computation procedure involved straightforward computations with
appropriate parameters identified above. For each of the eight source
categories, we simply multiplied pertinent spill frequencies by the appro-
priate mean spill size to provide the total volume of chemicals expected
to be spilled on a yearly basis. This product was then further multiplied
by the fractions of spills associated with each spill category and the
appropriate costs estimated for each spill category. Results were total
costs for each combination of the source and spill categories, and when
further summed, the total cost for nation-wide comprehensive response to
all spills.
Discussions with officials in eleven states and a spill clean-up contractor
had indicated that approximately 10% of all spills are not satisfactorily
III-7
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handled by the parties responsible. This percentage was, therefore,
applied to the total cost figure to provide a worst case potential yearly
cost to the Federal government. We also crudely estimated best case and
most probable case costs, but these were not supported with data since the
data are not available. As a result, there is substantial uncertainty
in the estimates.
III-8
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III. ANALYSIS
A. SPILL FREQUENCY
1. Introduction
Numerous independent data sources exist which may be used in the task of
characterizing the occurrence of hazardous chemical spills. Unfortunately,
however, all of the sources are of limited value for our purposes. For
example, some only address particular types of spill sources, while others
may combine statistics for oil and related material spills with those for
chemical spills. Yet others do not readily allow differentiation of
one-quart innocuous spills of battery acid from major 20,000 gallon spills
of a pesticide. Additionally, although some sources mandate spill report-
ing, they note complete uncertainty as to the degree of compliance with
reporting requirements.
In the following, we present the results of an analysis which considered
the applicability of numerous data sources, and attempted to evaluate
current and future spill experience by utilizing what were determined to
be the most valid and reliable parts of a number of data bases.
2. Data Sources
Subsequent text identifies and discusses the actual sources of data
utilized for evaluation of current spill experience and projections to
the future. Discussions are also presented on other sources which
appeared promising at first glance, but were not found to be useful to
this study.
The data sources examined or contacted for information included:
• DOT Hazardous Material Incident (HMI) Reporting System;
• U.S. Coast Guard Pollution Incident Reporting System
(PIRS);
• A list of chemical spills compiled by the EPA prior to
August of 1975;
• DOT Office of Pipeline Safety Operations carrier accident
reports;
• Federal Highway Administration Motor Carrier Accident
Reports;
• Federal Railroad Administration Accident/Incident
Bulletins;
• Annual reports to the Secretary of Transportation on
Hazardous Materials Control;
III-S.
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• Various reports published by the Federal Government
which include previous analyses of spill expierence
(Ref. 1-7);
• Various reports and documents pertaining to the economic
impact of §311 regulations (Ref. 8 and 9 and internal
EPA memoranda);
• Data compiled during a joint program of the Association
of American Railroads and the Railway Institute concern-
ing tankcar safety;
• A number of insurance companies;
• A number of spill clean-up contractors;
• A major U.S. producer of chemicals;
• Manufacturing Chemists Association; and
• Proceedings of the bi-annual symposiums dealing with
control of hazardous materials spills and other
pertinent papers in the literature.
Additionally, during discussions with numerous industry associations,
chemical producers, chemical transporters, and state officials in eleven
states,* we asked if records are kept of spill experience, and obtained
copies if they were.
A few data sources provided partial statistics for calendar year 1977.
Generally, however, all Federal agencies contacted could not provide
complete statistics for 1977 at the time this analysis was conducted in
Spring, 1978. Thus, the latest available statistics were for calendar
year 1976, and detailed analyses of statistics in some cases were
for calendar year 1975 experience.
3. Major Assumptions
Very often we found that available statistics do not necessarily provide
a clear indication of current or past spill experience, but do represent
the most complete body of information currently available. The problem
stemmed from the fact that one is always unsure of what portion of spills
are currently unreported. Indeed, the DOT Office of Hazardous Materials
(OHM) clearly states on data sheets that the reports of spills it has
received in the past may only represent a. small portion of mandatorily
reportable incidents. Additionally, it attributes large yearly increases
in the number of reports submitted mostly to better reporting by carriers,
and only vaguely to the possibility of actual increases in spill
frequencies.
*Companion report by Arthur D. Little enumerates and discusses the
results of interviews with state officials and industry personnel.
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To account for unreported spills and possible increases in actual numbers
of spills per year from pipelines, trucks, and waterborne vessels, we,
therefore, arbitrarily doubled spill frequencies derived from pertinent
reports submitted during 1976. This action provided a crude estimate
for the actual average spill frequencies expected for the five-year
period 1978 to 1982 for these sources. The estimates are completely
unsupported by quantitative data, because data do not exist of sufficient
validity to allow the definition of trends in actual numbers of spills
on a year-to-year basis. Nevertheless, they are judged to err on the
conservative side for the following reasons.
a. Spill reports received by the Coast Guard for identified
hazardous chemicals in 1977 numbered slightly less than
the number received in 1976;
b. The spill incident rate for interstate pipelines has
been dropping steadily for at least a decade;
c. A recent interview with a major chemical transporter
by truck indicated that 5 percent of all tank lines
currently carry 80 percent of all freight, and that
major lines are aware of reporting requirements;
d. State and Federal agencies are continually developing,
upgrading, and/or better enforcing hazardous chemical
regulations;
e. Reporting of hazardous material spills has been required
of transporters by the Department of Transportation.
Following passage of the Hazardous Material Transportation
Act of 1975, penalties up to $10,000 could be imposed on
a transporter for failure to report a spill. Reporting
increases expected from promulgation of §311 regulations
will be reduced because of the presence of this pre-existing
penalty.
f. We expect that most, if not all, large spills and
spills involving spectacular causes have been reported
in the past.
Other reasons are given on a case-by-case basis in the following text.
A second major assumption is that spills from boxes, pails, or a single
drum will as a general rule not warrant official Federal intervention.
Its rationale is that only a few materials are so hazardous as to provide
a "chemical crisis" in such small quantities, that the local authorities
could easily handle retrieval of small quantities on land, and that a
small quantity spilled onto water would most likely disperse well before
a response could be initiated. Where pertinent but small quantities of
§311 materials might be involved, we noted that these substances are
generally considered difficult to recover or non-recoverable when
III-ll
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TABLE 1
H
H
I
M
ro
Carrier Type
Private
Authorized
Exempt
Unknown
Total
Carrier Type
Private
Authorized
Exempt
Unknown
Total
1975
Accidents
452
675
12
7
1,U6
Accidents
520
892
10
5
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
Fatalities
54
57
17
1
129
TABLE 2
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
Fatalities
73
87
7
1
ACCIDENTS*
Injuries
510
772
39
10
1,331
ACCIDENTS*
Injuries
482
876
21
6
Driver/
Refief-Driver
Killed
13
22
1
1
37
1,427
168
1,385
Driver/
Relief-Driver
Killed
19
26
2
_0
47
Total
Property Damage
$ 4,587,701
6,127,829
179,099
44,350
$10,938,979
Total
Property Damage
$ 5,131,795
8,824,154
103,500
50,000
$14,109,449
*Cargo at time of accident included hazardous materials.
-------
spilled into large bodies of water. The result of this assumption,
therefore, was that we only considered spill frequencies for sources
involving the bulk transport, processing, or transfer of chemicals, i.e.,
for sources which have the potential to spill large quantities.
4. Pipelines
'Che DOT Office of Pipeline Safety Operations (OPSO) requires a pipeline
carrier accident report on DOT Form 7000-1 whenever failure of a liquid
pipeline causes sufficient damage and/or injury to exceed minimum damage
criteria. Data summaries for recent years clearly demonstrate a signifi-
cant yearly decrease in the numbers of incidents, and the fact that very
few incidents (3 each in 1975 and 1976) appear to involve hazardous
materials other than petroleum products. The data are, however, limited
to interstate pipelines.
A. review of spill reports submitted to the Pollution Incident Reporting
System (PIRS) maintained by the U.S. Coast Guard indicated 15 reported
chemical discharges from pipelines onto water during 1976, three during
1975, and five each in 1974 and 1973. To account for spills onto land,
we double the 1976 rate for spills onto water to provide an estimate of
30 spills per year. To account for unreported spills and any increases
in the spill rate, we again double the rate to obtain an estimate of 60
spills per year.
5. Trucks
The Federal Highway Administration requires Motor Carrier Accident Reports
from all interstate commercial motor carriers subject to the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations (49 CFR 394). Tables 1 and 2 summarize accidents
for 1975 and 1976 (latest summaries available). These statistics are not
generally useful to the task at hand because there is no indication given
as to the numbers of accidents which resulted in actual cargo release, or
the numbers of cargo releases which occurred without an attendant accident.
They are presented simply to demonstrate that this obvious source of data
was considered in the analysis.
The only comprehensive recent assessment of highway vehicle spill incident
experience presently available is a DOT/Office of Hazardous Materials (OHM)
analysis of tank truck and trailer spill experience for calendar year 1975.
This analysis, covering the 1,568 relevant incident reports received in
that year, notes that 17.2% of incidents involved releases in transit
caused mostly by vehicular accidents, 3.6% involved in-transit releases
due to equipment failure, and slightly less than 79.2% occurred during
loading or unloading activities. In terms of materials involved, it was
found that about 74% of all spills involved gasoline, fuel oil, or crude
oil, while these substances accounted for 82.2% of spills due to in-transit
vehicular accidents and 76.8% of spills during loading or unloading. These
data are significant because they allow one to differentiate between spill
locations (i.e., in-transit or loading/unloading) and between chemical
spills and spills of petroleum products.
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF RAIL ACCIDENTS INVOLVING HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS (JANUARY 1, 1971 TO DECEMBER 31, 1974)
Number of Percent Persons Persons
Year Accidents Increase Killed Injured
1971 80 - 1 57
1972 99 23.75 . 0 226
1973 123 24.24 2 384
1974 148 20.33 10 613
SOURCE: "Fifth Annual Report of the Secretary of Transportation of
Hazardous Materials Control," for calendar year 1974,
Department of Transportation.
REPORTING CRITERIA: The damage threshold for reporting train accidents
was $750 for the period 1957 through 1974. In addition, acci-
deats had to be reported which involved the death of one or more
persons, injury to one or more persons (requiring medical treat-
ment), or any occupational illness of a railroad employee.
111-14
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A considerably less formal DOT analysis of tank truck and trailer spill
experience using 1976 data provides additional information. This notes
that 1,800 HMI reports were received in that year, that 54% of spills
involved loading and unloading, and that 6% of spills were due to loose
fittings, valves, or closures. It can be noted that the total number of
spill reports increased by 14.8% from 1975 to 1976 while the number of
spills attributable to loading or unloading activities decreased by 21.7%.
The increase in reports can be partially accounted for by better reporting
by carriers. The decrease in spills during transfer activities is more
likely due to an increased use of automatic shut-offs and other spill
preventative measures during loading and unloading.
The 1976 data suggest that 972 spills occurred during loading and unloading
and that 828 spills occurred in transit when all hazardous materials are
considered. When gasoline, fuel oil, and crude oil are deleted from con-
sideration by use of percentages derived from 1975 data, it is seen that
147 in-transit spills and 225 spills while loading or unloading involved
chemicals of interest and were reported. These computations are based upon
the most recent hard data available and do not involve significant assump-
tions.
Extrapolation of these frequencies to the future requires further consid-
eration of the fact that the DOT has not been able to assess the specific
degree of compliance with reporting requirements on a year-to-year basis,
and that there may be some actual increase in the yearly spill frequency.
In consequence, one must conclude that these results simply provide a
lower bound for the true extent of the problem. For greater accuracy,
there is a need for a correction factor to account for uncertainties.
For reasons stated previously, it is, therefore, assumed that these current
frequencies, derived from required spill reports, must be doubled to pro-
vide an estimate of actual numbers of spills expected yearly during the
time period 1978 to 1982. This results in yearly average spill frequency
projections of 294 in transit and 450 loading/unloading chemical spills.
6. Railroads
Although there are data available for assessing the spill experience of
railroads, much of these are misleading and difficult to utilize for our
projection purposes. In the following, therefore, we summarize the most
recent data available, discuss their appropriateness for use, and proceed
to formulate projections which must be considered crude in nature.
Table 3 provides a summary of railroad accident experience involving
hazardous materials for the years 1971 to 1974. Compiled by the Office
of the Associate Administrator for Safety, Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA), the data pertain to all accidents in which hazardous materials of
any type were released from any type of railcar. They suggest an average
yearly increase in the number of accidents of approximately 23% for the
latter three years covered.
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TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF RAIL ACCIDENTS INVOLVING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
(January 1, 1975 to December 31, 1976)
Year Accidents
1975 690
1976 768
Total Cars
in Accidents
51,847
52,702
Total Cars
with Hazmats*
5,280
3,347
Total Cars
Damaged
with Hazmats*
903
847
Total Cars
Releasing
Hazmats*
131
166
People
Evacuated
3,495
19,369
SOURCES: FRA, Office of Safety, "Accident/Incident Bulletins" No. 145 (for 1976)
and No. 144 (for 1975).
CRITERIA: In 1975, the damage threshold was increased to $1,750. This had the effect
of reducing the number of reportable accidents.
NOTE: There was a 26.72% increase in spills from 1975 to 1976, when only cars actually re-
leasing hazardous materials are considered. The corresponding increase in the number
of accidents was 11.30%.
* Hazmats - Hazardous Materials
-------
Accident/incident bulletins from the EPA for calendar years 1975 and 1976
provide the most recent data available until the Fall of 1978. Since
somewhat different parameters are reported, and since a new reporting
criterion took effect in 1975 which tended to reduce the number of report-
able accidents, data for these years are separately presented in Table 4.
They suggest a 26.72% increase in actual spills from 1975 to 1976; an
increase in line with the 23% previously cited.
Although the FRA only reports 166 actual spills from railcars involved in
accidents in 1976, over 800 HMI reports were submitted to DOT's Office of
Hazardous Materials (OHM) during that year for rail tank cars. An analysis
of these shows that 42% (about 336) of all tank releases of any hazardous
materials were due to loose fittings, valves, and closures, while 31% (about
248) were due to defective fittings, valves, and closures. Since these
latter incidents do not generally, if at all, involve accidents, it is
clear that the FRA data only considers a small sub-set of total spill
experience. Of further interest is that a total of 959 reports were sub-
mitted for all types of railcars in 1976. This indicates that the majority
of spills, over 83%, involved tankcars.
In this analysis, a basic guideline has been made that only significant
chemical spills potentially warranting Federal intervention are of interest.
Hence, the data available for tankcars are most appropriate for use, and
as previously demonstrated, comprise over 83% of all incidents involving
railroads in general. Any projections from that data, however, are com-
plicated by the observations that:
• FRA data only consider spills resulting from an FRA
definition of the term "accident";
• About 73% of HMI reports (42% + 31%) are obviously for
leaks from tank fittings; and
• There is no clear indication of what percentage of releases
are in transit and what percentage are for loading and
unloading activities.
A subsequent section of this chapter presents data indicating an average
spill volume from tankcars in transit on the order of 11,092 gallons (based
upon review of 107 major incidents). This is a reasonable figure when one
considers the fact that approximately 67% (Ref. 5, 6) of tankcars which
were involved in accidents during 1965-70, and which discharged part or
all of their cargo, lost all contents. It is not a reasonable average for
use, although it is the only one available, to apply to large numbers of
relatively small leaks from tankcars not involved in accidents. An appli-
cation of this sort would result in excessively conservative results.
For projection purposes, therefore, it is assumed that:
• The Federal Government may intervene in major railroad
accidents occurring in transit;
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• The Government will generally not respond to the numerous
minor leaks which occur daily throughout the country while
trains are in transit; and
• The Government may respond to significant spills during
loading and unloading activities.
The first assumption is more a statement of fact than a hypothesis. It
allows one to utilize the FRA accident data directly to project spill
frequencies for all hazardous materials. The second assumption recognizes
that leakage from fittings is not uncommon and rarely generates concern
that an environmental emergency has developed. Although exceptions can
be envisioned quite easily, this is considered acceptable as a general
rule, and allows one to delete from consideration the majority of DOT/OHM
incident reports.
The third assumption recognizes that certain incidents during loading
and unloading may require a Federal presence, and suggests that one must
define what relative proportions of spills occur during such activities.
This can be accomplished by analogy of tankcar experience with tank truck
and trailer experience.
Extrapolation of FRA accident data, which must be considered accurate for
all significant accidents, is accomplished by conservatively assuming that
the number of tankcars releasing hazardous materials will increase by 25%
each year. Although the FRA has recently been quite active in promoting
tankcar safety, the most recent record suggests an increase in accidents
rather than a decrease. Thus, one can simply project an average yearly
spill frequency of 426 major in transit spills during the time period
1978 to 1982 for all hazardous materials.
Truck data for 1976 suggested that 54% of all spills occur during loading
and unloading. Assuming that this percentage will not drop due to the
increased use of fail-safe devices, the number of yearly spills projected
for tankcars, by analogy, becomes 500 for all hazardous materials.
Finally, one must be concerned with the fact that many of the spills from
tankcars might involve oil and related products, and not the types of
hazardous materials of interest to this study. In the case of tank trucks
and trailers, it was seen that an average of 74% of all spills involved
petroleum products, and this fact substantially reduced the number of
spills of interest.
The 1977 edition of Reference 10 presents a summary of railroad operations
in the United States. It indicates that there were 1.38 million car-
loadings (all types of cars) of chemicals and allied products in 1976,
as opposed to 371 thousand carloadings of petroleum products. Thus, 21.2%
of hazardous material operations involved petroleum products, and 78.8%
involved other substances. Figures for 1975 are quite similar and
respectively provide percentages of 22.9 and 77.1. It follows, using the
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1976 percentages, and assuming a similar mix of cargoes will exist in the
future, that the chemical spills of concern will yearly involve 336 in
transit releases and 394 releases during loading and unloading activities.
7. Vessels
In 1976, the Coast Guard boarded and inspected 40,853 vessels transporting
hazardous materials and inspected 6,770 waterfront facilities which handle
hazardous materials. Additionally, it maintained surveillance patrols in
all major port areas. These activities suggest that the validity of the
PIRS data for vessel spills and spills at marine facilities must be con-
sidered significant for areas within Coast Guard jurisdiction.
PIRS contains reports of 85 spills from vessels into water for 1976, and
of 81 such spills in 1975 where the material involved is of interest and
was specifically identified. In consequence, it is fully conservative to
project an average yearly spill frequency of 170 for the period of time
1978 to 1982, with the 100 percent increase accounting for non-reported
spills, spills of "unknown" but hazardous materials (excluding oils), and
possible increases in the incident rate.
The number of spills at marine facilities reported by PIRS for 1976 provides
an estimate of spills associated with the loading and unloading of vessels,
since most subcategories for this classification involve cargo transfer
facilities. The total so obtained for 1976 is 35, and the average frequency
projected for the near future is 70. Again, the current known rate is
doubled to account for uncertainties.
8. Fixed Facilities
Within this category can be included all spills at fixed facilities not
previously associated with spills from pipelines, trucks, rail vehicles,
and vessels. Inspection of 356 spill reports submitted to PIRS in 1976
for materials of interest indicated that 147 spills involved non-transpor-
tation facilities not included in other categories. These data suggest
that 44.1 percent of spills originate at fixed facilities.
The 379 spill reports analyzed by the EPA in Reference 8 include 181 for
incidents at fixed facilities. Thus, the EPA data base suggests that
47.8 percent of all spills involve this category.
Both data bases are obviously quite consistent. In consequence, it is
concluded that a reasonable and slightly conservative estimate is that
50 percent of all spills occur at fixed facilities.
9. Summary and Discussion
Table 5 summarizes the results of this analysis for each of the source
categories. In all cases, the incident rates are for chemical spills from
sources which have the potential of releasing significant quantities of
hazardous materials of interest either onto land or into water.
111-19
-------
TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF TOTAL SPILL FREQUENCY DATA ESTIMATED
FOR 1978-1982
Source
Pipelines
Tank Trucks (in transit)
Total Spills/Year
60 .
294
Tank Trucks (loading/unloading) 450
Rail Tankcars (in transit) 336
Rail Tankcars (loading/unloading) "394
Vessels (in transit) 170
Vessels (loading/unloading) 70
Other Fixed Facilities 1774
TOTAL 3548
Rationale
A conservative estimate based
upon PIRS data.
Estimate from extrapolation of
DOT data analyses.
As above.
Extrapolation from FRA data.
See text.
A conservative estimate
based upon PIPS data.
As above.
Assumes 50% of all
significant spills involve
such facilities.
111-20
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The results presented for pipelines are considered conservative because:
• The interstate pipeline data are considered valid and
indicate only a few spills per year for chemicals;
• The Coast Guard data agree that few spills from pipelines
occur;
• There are relatively few long-distance pipelines for
chemicals in operation;
• The currently known frequency rate was doubled and
redoubled to account for uncertainties; and
• The incidence rate for interstate pipeline spills has
been dropping steadily for at least a decade.
For highway shipments the situation is less clear, Although firm base-
line estimates were generated from an analysis of reported spills, there
was no indication of what percentage of spills are reported. Nevertheless,
projections are considered to err on the conservative side this time.
Reasons are:
• The large yearly increases in DOT reports from the trucking
industry indicate a growing awareness of reporting require-
ments. Major tanklines (5% of total operators) account for
80% of all freight, and are aware of these regulations;
• After seven years of accounting for increases by suggesting
the occurrence of better reporting by carriers, the DOT (in
May 1978) now notes that some part of the increase may be
due to an increased incidence of spills. This suggests that
DOT personnel are of the opinion that a large fraction of
firms are now reporting spills;
• It is likely that firms who do no.t report minor spills
report those spills which are significant; and
• The projection includes a 100% increase to account for
uncertainties.
The analysis for in-transit railroad tankcars is based upon valid statistics
and a clear trend in numbers of spills. Nevertheless, since it discounts
in-transit leakage from fittings, there is some concern as to accuracy.
• The results may be accurate if current trends continue
and the Federal government only considers response to
major spills;
• They may be non-conservative if the accident rate increases
and/or the Federal government chooses to respond to minor
leaks; and
111-21
-------
TABLE 6
ESTIMATED WATER SPILL FREQUENCIES
Source
% Spills No Spills
to Water to Water
Comments Regarding
Pipelines 50
Tank Trucks (in transit) 42
Tank Trucks (loading/unloading) 42
Rail Tankcars (in transit) 15
Rail Tankcars 15
(loading/unloading)
Vessels (in transit) 100
Vessels (loading/unloading) 100
Other Fixed Facilities 59
30 An unsupported estimate.
123 Estimate based on EPA voluntary
spill report data.*
189 Estimate based on EPA voluntary
spill report data.*
• 50 Estimate based on EPA voluntary
spill report data.*
59 Estimate based on EPA voluntary
spill report data.*
170 All vessel spills assumed into
water.
70 All vessel spills assumed into
water.
1047 Based upon EPA voluntary spill
report data.*
1738 (49% of all spills)
* As presented in Reference 8.
111-22
-------
• They may be conservative if new safety regulations are
effective in reducing spill frequencies.
Spills from tankcar loading and unloading activities could not be suffi-
ciently disaggregated from any available data base. In consequence, an
analogy with tank truck and trailer experience provides a figure of unknown
validity. The estimate is considered the best available, however, because
the analogy itself is obviously quite appropriate.
PIRS 1976 data for vessels in transit were doubled to provide an estimate
for this source. Because of the visibility and scope of Coast Guard
activities in all major ports, this projection can only be considered
reasonable. The contention is supported by the observation that the
majority of spill reports involve very small amounts. Larger spills are
more likely to be observed and reported, although some major releases of
soluble material in polluted waters may escape detection.
For vessel loading and unloading activities, the projection utilized the
number of spills at marine facilities. Although it was not clear whether
all these incidents actually involved vessels, it is clear they mostly
occurred at waterfront transfer facilities. Thus, the projection is con-
sidered conservative for the reasons enumerated above, and there is only
concern that the category may have been named inappropriately.
Since 50% of all significant spills are projected to occur at fixed
facilities not addressed above, one-half of total spills are shown in
this category.
.Assuming the various projections presented are approximately correct, one
finds it advantageous to further disaggregate frequencies into those for
land spills and those for water spills. This is accomplished for water
spills in Table 6 by the application of percentages which were published
by the EPA (Ref. 8) and which describe the split between spills to land
and spills to water. A single digression is the assumption that all
vessel spills enter water when EPA data suggest that only 68 percent of
spills from vessels enter water. Since PIRS data only addressed actual
spills to water, and since subsequent projections are based upon these
data, this was appropriate and necessary.
111-23
-------
B. SPILL SIZE ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
Investigation of mean spill amounts and spill size distributions furthers
the goal of estimating total response costs. Mean spill volumes ultimately
define the average response cost per spill, since there is a direct relation-
ship between the volume to be cleaned up and the total cost of such clean
up. Spill size distributions allow deletion from consideration of those
incidents of insufficient magnitude to warrant Federal intervention.
In this latter regard, one must account for the fact that significant
fractions of the spill frequencies projected in the previous section
are comprised of spills involving minor leaks from fittings, splashes
from openings, etc., from sources which have the potential to discharge
large quantities. Although these are very common occurrences, they are
not incidents which would generally precipitate official Federal inter-
vention. Exceptions might occur with spills of extremely hazardous sub-
stances, but these would be relatively few in number and should rarely
entail significant expenses.
Further, one must note that the validity of all data bases encountered
in this analysis must be considered as a function of spill volume. It is
patently clear that larger spills and spills involving spectacular causes
are considerably more prone to be reported than very small spills. These
latter spills are often common, are handled routinely in day-to-day
operations, and are not consistently reported to governmental or other
data gathering institutions.
2. Major Assumptions
Previous discussion has demonstrated a need for a mechanism which allows:
• Deletion from consideration of those minor spills which
will not create an environmental emergency; and
• Enhancement of the validity of a spill frequency and
mean spill size determinations by factoring out the
distorting influence of patchy reporting for small
spills and leaks.
An obvious and practical choice for such a mechanism is selection of a
minimum spill volume. Although the choice of a specific figure is com-
plicated, it can be accomplished if a significant degree of conservatism
is utilized. Hence, for the purposes of this study, it is assumed that
spills involving amounts less than or equal to 100 gallons will not
generally cause an environmental emergency and require a Federal clean
up effort. Further, it is assumed that small spills of highly hazardous
materials where federal authorities do intervene will be balanced by
incidents involving releases of larger quantities where the material
111-24
-------
dissolves in a large water body and no clean up is feasible. By using
the 100 gallon cutoff, we include all significant releases from bulk
shipments, as well as releases from two or more standard shipping drums.
3. Data Sources
Data sources utilized in this analysis included the U.S. Coast Guard's
Pollution Incident Reporting System (PIRS) and a list of incidents
reported to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (Ref. 8).
Pertinent data from the former data base cover the four-year period
1973 to 1976, whereas the latter data base encompasses the period from
August 1970 to August 1975. As previously noted, more recent and complete
data for any year were not available.
Generally, all spill reports providing spill size information were utilized
in the analysis, with few exceptions. Certain data which were misleading
were exluded. For example, EPA statistics on train wrecks showed the
total amount spilled, but not the number of cars involved. Hence, the
analysis here is based upon the number of individual cars which release
their contents. EPA data could not be used in determining the amount
spilled per car.
4. Mean Spill Sizes
The following discussions provide the results of a mean spill size.
analysis for each of the various source categories. These mean sizes
were derived from consideration of only those spills involving amounts
in excess of 100 gallons. If all spills had been considered, the mean
spill size would have been considerably lower for most source categories.
Pipelines
EPA data describe 16 spills with an average size of 8,809 gallons.
PIRS records 14 incidents with an average of 7,201 gallons. Both
data bases are consistent and provide an overall average spill size
of 8,059 gallons based upon a total of 30 incidents.
Tank Truck (in transit)
PIRS data show 40 spills into water with an average size of 2,334
gallons. EPA data describe 91 incidents with an average size of
3,206 gallons. Both data sources are essentially consistent and
provide an overall average of 2,940 gallons per spill based upon
a total of 131 incidents.
Tank Truck (loading/unloading)
The data for this source category are sketchy. PIRS describes only
3 spills into water with an average size of 300 gallons. EPA in-
cident descriptions do not allow differentiation between spills in
111-25
-------
transit or at terminals, although most incidents for this mode are
clearly on-the-road accidents. Since the 300 gallon average is not
unreasonable when one considers the possible sources of a spill,
and the widespread use of automatic shutdown and spill containment
systems, it is selected for further use.
Tankcars (in transit)
Both data sources are extremely consistent. PIRS describes 30
incidents with an average size of 10,890 gallons, while EPA data
include 77 spills with an average size of 11,170 gallons. For
the total of 107 spills, the average is 11,092 gallons.
Tankcars (loading/unloading)
PIRS includes 8 spills with an average size of 7,388 gallons, while
the nature of EPA data do not allow differentiation between spill
locations. Although the average is considered to be quite high,
there are no data to support a lower figure.
Vessels (in transit)
Coast Guard data regarding spills from vessels must be considered
most reliable and pertinent for this source category. These data
provide an average of 44,526 gallons based upon 75 incidents with
known spill amounts.
EPA data were considered for use, but were determined to be signifi-
cantly biased towards larger spill sizes, and not representative
of a wide range of actual experience.
Vessels (loading/unloading)
The EPA data only included two isolated incidents from this source
involving an average of 150 gallons. Thus, PIRS data for 31 inci-
dents at marine facilities were utilized to generate an average size
of 7,835 gallons.
Fixed Facilities
EPA reports include the release (12/30/70) of 36 million gallons
of water with 500 mg per liter of suspended solids. If this "spill"
of 75 tons of solids dispered in water is deleted from consideration,
an average size of 44,391 gallons can be computed for 178 incidents.
Further deletion of a 4.5 million gallon spill of industrial wastes
from a chemical plant (5/25/74) gives an average of 19,218 gallons
for 177 incidents.
PIRS data, which do not include the 4.5 million gallon release,
provide an average of 16,614 gallons for 131 incidents occurring
in the three-year period 1974 to 1976. Thus, both data sources
111-26
-------
give essentially consistent results when one EPA spill report is
ignored and the same period of time is examined.
The 1970 release of suspended solids was from a steel company and
occurred over a period of two days. It is not unreasonable to con-
clude it did not involve truly hazardous substances, and would not
have required Federal intervention. The large release of industrial
wastes poses a dilemma, however. If it is included in an overall
average, the average becomes 32,615 gallons for 308 incidents.
The dilemma arises from the presumption that a large fraction of
the waste was comprised of water, and the judgement that the magni-
tude of the average is therefore unreasonable. This latter judge-
ment is supported by the observation that both data bases are signi-
ficantly biased towards larger spills due to non-reporting of smaller
spills.
To resolve the issue, it is decided that the waste release should
be ignored on the grounds that the waste is likely to have been
mostly comprised of water rather than pure chemicals. The average
spill size then becomes 18,110 gallons from consideration of 307
incidents.
5. Spill Size Distribution
More detailed analysis of the data bases allows development of spill
size distributions for each source category. These, in turn, allow
determination of what percentage of spills involve amounts in excess of
100 gallons.
Table 7 summarizes the results of spill size distribution computations.
Table 8 provides revised spill frequencies for each source category when
only spills in excess of 100 gallons are considered. For comparison
purposes, it also provides data concerning spills over 500 gallons in
magnitude. Similarly, Table 9 presents revised spill frequencies for
spills into water. Of interest in this latter table is the result that
a total of 917 spills involving 100 gallons or more can be expected into
water. This figure is comparable to prior EPA estimates of 700 signifi-
cant spills per year, although a radically different methodology has
been applied for estimation purposes.
The computation process for defining spill size distributions revealed
a significant bias in the EPA data set. Specifically, it was seen that
the size distributions tended to reflect the presence of inordinate
numbers of large spills. For example, PIRS data suggested 48.22% of
spills at fixed facilities involved amounts less than 100 gallons, while
EPA data suggested only 16.82% of pertinent spills were in this classifi-
cation. For vessels in transit, the respective percentages were 73.59%
and 22.73%. Thus, it appears that the EPA system, for one reason or
another, is not being provided the numerous reports of minor spills
(0-100 gallon) which are being recorded by PIRS.
111-27
-------
TABLE 7
M
00
SPILL SIZE DISTRIBUTION SUMMARY
Source
Category
Pipelines
Tank Truck
(in transit)
Tank Truck
(loading/unloading)
Tankcar
(in transit)
Tankcar
(loading/unloading)
Vessel
No. Spills
Examined
39**
167**
6*
122**
9*
284*
Percent
< 100 G
23.08
22.75
50.00
13.11
11.11
73.59
Percent
< 500 G
38.46
44.91
100.00
24.59
44.44
85.92
Percent
< 1,000 G
46.15
53.29
-
27.05
55.55
88.73
Percent
< 5.000G
69.23
68.62
-
40.16
77.77
93.31
Percent
< 10,000 G
76.92
97.01
-
64.75
88.88
93.66
Percent
< 50,000
100.00
100.00
-
100.00
100.00
95.42
(in transit)
Vessel
(loading/unloading)
Fixed Facility
97**
253*
68.04 87.63 89.69 93.81 95.88
48.22 68.38 75.49 88.54 93.68
97.84
97.63
PRIS Data Only.
**
Both EPA and PIRS Data.
-------
TABLE 8
Source
Category
*
Pipelines
Tank Truck
(in transit)
Tank Truck
(loading/unloading)
Tankcar
(in transit)
Tankcar
(loading/unloading)
Vessel
(in transit)
Vessel
(loading/unloading)
Fixed Facility
REVISED
Total
Spills/Yr*
60
294
450
336
394
170
70
1774
3548
SPILL FREQUENCY
Percent
> 100 G
76.92
77.25
50.00
86.89
88.89
26.41
31.96
51.78
ESTIMATES
Total
> 100G
46
227
225
292
350
45
22
919
2126
(1978-1982)
Percent
> 500 G
61.54
55.09
0.00
75.41
55.56
14.08
12.37
31.62
Total
> 500G
37
162
0
253
219
24
9
561
1265
From Table 5
111-29
-------
TABLE 9
REVISED WATER SPILL FREQUENCIES
Source
Category
Pipelines
Tank Trucks
(in transit)
Tank Trucks
(loading/ unlo ad ing )
Tankcars
(in transit)
Tankcars
(loading/unloading)
Vessels
(in transit)
Vessels
(loading/unloading)
Fixed Facility
No. Spills
to water*
30
123
189
50
59
170
70
1047
1738
Percent Total
> 100 G > 100 G
76.92 23
77.25 95
50.00 95
86.89 43
88.89 52
26.41 45
31.96 22
51.78 542
917
Percent Total
> 500 G > 500 G
61.54 18
55.09 68
0.00 0
75.41 38
55.56 33
14.08 24
12.37 9
31.62 331
516
*From Table 6
111-30
-------
Since the procedure for defining mean spill sizes had generally considered
both data sets, it was decided to utilize size distributions derived from
PIRS data exclusively where significant differences were noted and the
PIRS data set contained a sufficient number of spill reports. To do other-
wise would have given overly conservative results when the mean spill
volumes were subsequently multiplied by total numbers of spills in a cost
analysis. The results in Table 7, therefore, indicate the specific data
sources utilized for computations.
111-31
Arthur D Little Inc -
-------
NEBRASKA ""^^—-^
«• . '
/ cbloHAnn i
j 974 C jL.--fciimi«vv/> 7
j J* «4 />-rs^iSo
on Reported Number of Incidents In Named State
8. North Carolina
9. Tennessee
10. Indiana
11. New Jersey
12. Missouri
13. Michigan
14. Wisconsin
1. Pennsylvania
2. Ohio
3. California
4. Texas
5. Illinois
6. New York
7. Georgia
Source: Materials Transportation Bureau, DOT.
FIGURE 1 TALLY OF "INCIDENT LOCATIONS" (BY STATE) BASED ON 32,000 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
INCIDENT REPORTS RECEIVED DURING 1971, 1972,1973, 1974 AND 1975
-------
C. SPILL LOCATION ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
To evaluate expected regional workloads, EPA desires to study the distri-
bution of forecast incidents between regions. The following discussion
presents the results of an analysis intended to rank the ten EPA regions
by incident frequency. This is accomplished by individual review of those
data bases providing pertinent information, followed by selection of a set
of results which is judged most appropriate. The projected annual number
of incidents is then distributed between regions according to the results
of the analysis.
2. DOT Materials Transportation Bureau
Figure 1 and Table 10 provide a tally of incident locations by state based
upon approximately 32,000 hazardous materials incident (HMI) reports
received by DOT's Materials Transportation Bureau. The data covers the
years 1971 to 1975 inclusive, and represent the most current such tally
available from the Bureau as of June of 1978.
Assignment of spill reports from individual states to the appropriate EPA
regions, followed by computation of percentages of total spills occurring
in each region, allows ranking of the regions. The results of this pro-
cedure are presented in Table 11. Also shown here are results obtained
from analyses of other data bases to facilitate comparison, although the
attributes of each other data base are separately discussed below.
Important observations concerning the Materials Transportation Bureau data
are that the majority of incidents involve releases from packages of
materials or minor leaks, that only transportation incidents are covered,
and that incidents involving oil and similar materials are included in the
data base. In consequence, there is concern that a number of factors can
potentially distort the results of the analysis when one is only concerned
with incident locations for significant chemical spills requiring Federal
intervention. Alternatively, however, one must appreciate that the large
sample size of the data base is unparalleled and may provide the best
overall results.
3. U.S. Coast Guard
Review of 1229 chemical spill reports included in the Coast Guard's
Pollution Incident Reporting System (PIRS) provides the results and
ranking also presented in Table 11. Given the Coast Guard's jurisdictional
areas, and the concentration of industry in various sectors, it is not
surprising to find differences between these results and those obtained
from review of HMI reports. More specifically, it is seen that the region
encompassing Texas and Louisiana ranks first, although it ranked fourth
in the previous set of results.
111-33
-------
TABLE 10
TALLY OF "INCIDENT LOCATIONS (BY STATE) OF APPROXIMATELY 32.000 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
Incident
Location
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist. of Col.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
1971
49
0
44
13
207
47
24
1
2
40
107
0
23
96
60
19
23
28
64
0
20
29
50
41
27
71
31
1972
89
1
69
37
277
63
53
6
4
93
165
2
27
238
135
34
30
104
115
12
65
68
105
106
40
92
45
1973
73
3
92
54
357
64
84
18
8
139
237
0
26
316
208
76
46
113
121
8
76
105
157
91
66
158
33
INCIDENT
1974
186
6
132
114
491
95
57
29
9
191
401
2
27
390
265
91
69
91
179
12
101
159
244
165
57
276
52
REPORTS
1975
271
11
157
127
518
112
77
27
12
315
392
5
43
565
344
152
148
138
234
11
126
184
395
150
89
377
95
RECEIVED DURING 1971, 1972,
Total
668
21
494
345
1,850
381
295
81
35
783
1,302
9
146
1,605
1,013
372
316
474
713
43
388
545
951
563
279
974
256
Incident
Location
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
American Samoa
Puerto Rico
Canada
1973,
1971
19
4
1
59
24
57
134
1
105
29
49
146
3
18
6
68
154
27
1
43
61
13
54
7
0
2
0
1974 and
1972
16
16
4
108
42
146
232
7
358
52
39
352
9
61
3
146
230
63
3
84
39
47
118
8
0
0
17
1975
1973
38
27
6
215
69
294
104
20
415
65
53
573
20
74
52
223
346
76
6
149
43
63
156
40
0
0
10
1974
58
19
14
272
106
422
402
26
547
87
47
854
21
107
30
330
457
49
7
235
47
62
230
60
1
1
25
1975
74
21
16
326
114
430
428
20
831
85
34
1,200
36
90
32
407
569
87
4
264
75
99
305
111
0
0
20
Total
205
87
4.1.
;ec
1,500
74
2,255
318
222
3,125
89
360
123
1,174
1,756
302
21
775
265
284
854
225
1
3
72
SOURCE: Materials Transportation Bureau, DOT.
-------
Problems with this set of results derive from the facts that only spills
into water are included in the data base, and that one can reasonably assume
the data set is biased towards those regions with concentration of Coast
Guard surveillance forces.
4. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Anaylsis of 875 spill reports received by the EPA provides the results
also shown in Table 11. These results differ from the others, but are
clearly consistent with the HMI report analysis in many respects, and
especially for top-ranked regions.
Few problems are immediately evident with the EPA data base in terms of
particular biases in regard to locations. Nevertheless, one might con-
sider the possibility that results favor inland regions (Region VIII for
example), and that the relatively small .sample size could include dis-
tortion caused by enthusiastic spill reporters in one region or another,
5. Federal Railway Administration (FRA)
Trains transporting hazardous materials can be found wherever there are
concentrations of industry and major transportation corridors leading
from manufacturers to users. In consequence, the FRA accident/incident
data for the years 1975 and 1976 (most recent publicly available at the
time of this analysis) may provide useful insights to an analysis of
incident locations.
Table 11 presents two sets of results derived from FRA data. The first
set provides a ranking based upon 1504 accidents involving trains trans-
porting hazardous materials. An "accident" in these data did not
necessarily involve spillage. The second set provides a ranking based
upon the number of rail cars which actually released hazardous substances
to the environment and covers 301 spills. Since the potential release of
materials from damaged or otherwise vulnerable cars may necessitate Federal
response, each set of results provides useful information.
6. Conclusions
When the biases of the various data sources were accounted for, and an
attempt was made to utilize all results, it was found that the rankings
provided by the HMI report data analysis appeared to best represent the
nationwide spill situation. In consequence, our best estimate at this
time is that significant future spills of interest will be roughly dis-
tributed like the distribution provided by the HMI reports. In terms
of absolute numbers of spills, we expect the 2,126 significant yearly
spills previously projected to be distributed as shown in Table 12.
111-35
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TABLE 11
DATA SUMMARY FOR RANKING OF REGIONS
SOURCE:
Region
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
DOT/HMI
% Rank
3.29
7.42
14.91
20.13
23.05
11.10
5.94
4.33
7.76
2.08
9
6
3
2
1
4
7
8
5
10
USCG/PIRS
%
2.60
14.00
11.72
7.82
17.09
30.27
1.39
0.40
9.11
5.61
Rank
8
3
4
6
2
1
9
10
5
7
EPA
%
1.59
1.72
24.68
16.58
24.68
11.66
1.02
12.12
3.20
2.74
Rank
9
8
1/2
3
1/2
5
10
4
6
7
FRA Accidents
%
4.06
4.85
7.45
18.62
24.26
22.21
10.57
2.66
3.46
1.86
Rank
7
6
5
3
1
2
- 4
9
8
10
FRA Spills
%
3.32
6.31
17.94
17.27
17.26
16.94
14.28
2.32
1.66
2.66
Rank
7
6
1
2
3
4
5
9
10
8
M
OJ
-------
TABLE 12
PROJECTION OF DISTRIBUTION OF YEARLY SPILLS
Region Percentage No. of Spills
I 3.29' 70
II 7.42 158
III 14.91 317
IV 20.13 428
V 23,05 490
VI 11.10 236
VII 5.94 126
VIII 4.33 92
IX 7.66 163
X 2.08 44
99.91* 2,124*
*Round-off errors and a few spills in American possessions cause the
slight discrepancies indicated.
111-37
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D. RESPONSE COSTS
1. Introduction
The intent of this section is the estimation of response costs for spills
of hazardous substances (excluding oils) onto land and into water. The
task is complicated by a paucity of data, and the infinite variety of
situations which must be addressed. Nevertheless, it can be accomplished
by disaggregation of spills into categories for which some manageable
data exists.
Response costs are defined as those possible costs to the Federal govern-
ment for hiring a spill clean-up contractor and others for monitoring
efforts, damage mitigation, cleanup, and limited restoration of the en-
vironment .
2. Spill Scenarios
Recognition of the difficulty associated with response cost estimation
requires an appreciation for the multitude of factors which influence the
outcome of a hazardous material spill. While it is not the intent of
this discussion to fully address the issue, it is considered worthwhile
to provide an overview of the types of situations which may present them-
selves .
First of all, it is necessary to understand that a number of basic factors
will generally define the outcome of an incident. These are:
• the chemical and physical properties of the substance;
• the type of spill source;
• the location of the spill (land and/or water);
• the location of vulnerable resources in relation to the spill
site;
• weather conditions in the area;
• the presence, direction and velocity of transport media;
• the speed with which response activities are initiated; and
• the nature of accumulated wastes and the difficulties associated
with their proper disposal.
Next, it must be realized that each of these factors encompasses a wide
range of circumstances which can drastically affect the response costs
associated with a spill. For example, one can consider the possible
combinations of properties which define the action of a substance upon
release. Depending upon these properties, a substance may float or sink
111-38
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in water, dissolve or not dissolve, and boil, evaporate quickly, or slowly.
It may also exhibit one or more of these behaviors simultaneously or se-
quentially.
Specific conditions defined by each of the other factors then determine
how much chemical may be released, what the particular hazards of the
chemical are, how fast and by which transport media the substance may
disperse, and the nature and scope of response activities possible and/or
feasible at the point in time such actions are initiated.
3. Spill Scenario Classification
It would require a massive effort to address each and every sequence
of events which may occur when one or more substances are discharged to
the environment. It is however feasible to classify substances into
categories requiring generic types of responses. This is accomplished
below, following the lead of previous EPA attempts (Ref. 8) at response
cost estimation for chemicals of concern to §311.
a. For Water Spills
Spill Category 1
Spill Category 2
Spill Category 3
Spill Category 4
Spill Category 5
Spill Category 6
Spill Category 7
b. For Land Spills
Spill Category 8
Spill Category 9
Liquids or solids which dissolve in the water
column and do not produce hazardous gases or vapors.
- As above, but hazardous gases or vapors are produced.
- Floating insoluble substances which do not produce
hazardous vapors or gases.
- As above, but hazardous gases and vapors are pro-
duced.
- Sinking insoluble substances which do not produce
hazardous vapors or gases (i.e., boiling points
greater than ambient).
- As above, but hazardous vapors or gases are pro-
duced .
- Liquids or solids which are self-reactive or re-
active with water.
- Liquids or solids which are self-reactive or re-
active with water.
Compressed gas releases (includes releases over
water).
111-39
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TABLE 13
SCENARIO CHARACTERIZATION
Spill No. of Substances Percentage
Category with Cited Behavior of Total
For Water Spills -
1 143 35.8
2 28 7.0
3 114 28.6
4 21 5.3
5 41 10.3
6 8 2.0
7 44 11.0
399* 100.0
For Land Spills -
8 44 9.4
9 36 7.7
10 311 66.6
11 76 16.3
467 100.0
*Some substances may exhibit more than one type of behavior depending
upon environmental conditions.
111-40
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Spill Category 10 - Liquids or solids which do not boil or quickly
evaporate.
Spill Category 11 - As above, but hazardous vapors or gases are pro-
duced.
Given these categories, it is advantageous to estimate what percentage
of all spills will involve each classification. This was accomplished by
detailed review of the "Hazard Assessment Codes" assigned to each of the
400 chemicals addressed by the initial edition of Ref. 11 with suitable
adjustments for materials which are petroleum products. These codes,
based upon specific criteria, provide clear indications of the actions
of hazardous materials upon their release. The 400 substances addressed
include all hazardous materials which may be shipped in bulk over waters,
together with about 140 non-redundant substances which were in EPA's
list of hazardous polluting substances circa 1972. Thus, they represent
or include all substances considered problematic. The results of the
analysis are summarized in Table 13.
4. Response Cost Estimation
Previous analyses have provided estimated spill frequencies and mean
spill volumes for 8 pertinent source categories. Additionally, the range
of possible spill scenarios has been disaggregated into 11 spill categories
encompassing both land and water.spills. Assignment of response costs
on a unit weight or volume basis to these latter categories is therefore
necessary to complete the basic data set for total response cost estima-
tion. This is accomplished below.
In all cases, we make the assumption that the costs shown are in 1978
dollars. Although we realize that some of the costs reported in the
literature are averages for incidents which occurred over a number of
years, we did not attempt to retrace all cost estimates and normalize
them to a particular base year. Rather, we presume that any errors intro-
duced by this assumption will be relatively slight, that any inflationary
pressures will be partially offset by the rapid growth of competition in
the chemical spill clean-up industry, and that the constant search for
more effective clean-up methods will introduce most cost effective tech-
nology.
Spill Category 1
The case of a soluble liquid or solid dispersing in a water column,
with no attendant vapor or gas hazards, has been previously addressed
by the EPA (Ref. 8). Having examined the circumstances sur-
rounding 19 acid spills in which neutralization techniques with
basic chemicals were used, the EPA estimated the approximate
response cost at $1 per pound of hazardous material spilled.
111-41
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Spill Category 2
When flammable or toxic gases are released from the spill source
or significantly contaminated waters, the scope of response activi-
ties is usually enlarged. More specifically, one must be concerned
with monitoring concentrations in air throughout affected areas,
evacuation of the public, and provision of specialized equipment
for use in responding to the spill (self-contained breathing appara-
tus, explosion-proof equipment, etc.)* The expenses of these activi-
ties would be in addition to those estimated above.
Review of the equipment rental rates (Ref. 7) obtained from a com-
mercial spill response company indicates the availability and cost
of 4-man respirator kits ($40 per day), explosion-proof fans ($40
per day), and power generators ($45 per day). If one assumes that
one each of these would be necessary for each 100 gallons of highly
volatile chemical released, and further assumes a half-day response
per 100 gallons, an additional per pound cost of $0.08 can be esti-
mated.
Mobile air-quality monitoring activities require vehicles, respira-
tor kits, communications equipment, and various analytical instru-
ments. Based upon published rates from the above cited company,
and subjective judgements, it is estimated that a $0.15 per pound
figure is of the correct order of magnitude for such efforts. This
figure is derived by assuming two mobile teams of two individuals
apiece are necessary to monitor downwind areas affected by a 1000-
gallon release of a highly volatile liquid.
Overall, the additional cost for response to hazardous vapors is
estimated at $0.23 per pound, and the total cost for this category
becomes $1.23 per pound.
Spill Category 3
This category encompasses the typical spill of an oil-like sub-
stance. The EPA (Ref. 8) has estimated a clean-up cost of approxi-
mately $0.84 per pound by averaging the expenses incurred in 26
actual oil spills. An analysis by the State of Washington (Ref. 12)
for a hypothetical spill of oil in Puget Sound yielded a clean-up
and mitigation cost of $1.00 per pound. Since many of the substances
covered in this analysis are more dangerous than oil, it is considered
prudent to select the higher cost of $1.00 per pound.
Spill Category 4
Similar to the previous category, this category addresses volatile
liquids (e.g., benzene). Based upon the discussion above for air-
quality monitoring activities and specialized equipment, costs of
$1.23 per pound are estimated.
111-42
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Spill Category 5
Insoluble substances which sink in water and must be removed by
vacuum pumping or dredging activities have also been the subject
of earlier EPA response cost estimates (Ref. 8). Based upon analy-
sis of one spill event involving 265 gallons of PCB, a total clean-
up cost of $22 per pound was computed. This event is known to have
involved quite unusual circumstances, however, and cannot definitively
be considered representative for all incidents involving the subject
materials. Indeed, the effort was in part regarded as a research
and development study, and the cost rate denoted as being quite high.
For shallow pond dredging, a cost of $1.00 per pound for a moderate
(4,000 gallon) spill appears in Reference 9 and other documents
citing the same personal communication with a dredging company.
This is a difficult figure to accept for our purposes because dredg-
ing recovers large amounts of contaminated bottom materials and it
is not unusual to pay a dollar or two per cubic foot of dredged
waste for disposals alone, according to an Eastern spill clean-up
contractor recently interviewed.
The basic dilemma here stems from the fact that most spills of heavy
insoluble substances into deep waters are generally not feasible
for retrieval attempts except at substantial effort and cost while
spills into small bodies of water and/or shallow waters can be res-
ponded to with relatively little difficulty. In consequence, to
resolve the issue with a modicum of reasonability, the two cost
rates are simply averaged to provide an estimate of $11.50 per
pound of chemical spilled.
Spill Category 6
This spill category generally applies to those relatively few sub-
stances which, like chlorine, produce a cloud or plume of toxic
vapors. Because response activities for water spills would gener-
ally be limited to leak stoppage, air-quality monitoring, and public
evacuation, it is presumed that a total response cost of $0.50 per
pound is conservative. Of this, about $0.27 per pound is assumed
devoted to the specialized equipment and personnel necessary to stop
the flow and secure the discharge source. Evacuation costs are not
included.
The rather high cost rate, which would provide almost $120,000 for
response to a 20,000 gallon gaseous release of chlorine, is deemed
justified because of the nature of the substances assigned to this
category. Besides chlorine, this category addresses cyanogen chloride,
methyl bromide, phosgene, and nitrogen tetroxide. All of these are
poisonous liquefied gases requiring prompt and comprehensive response
at any cost under circumstances which do not allow cleanup in the
common sense of the term.
111-43
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Spill Category 7
Substances which are self-reactive include strong oxidizers and
materials subject to polymerization. Substances which react with
water can produce a wide variety of products, each with its own
peculiar hazards and properties.
The observation can be made that the estimated cost rates for cate-
gories 2 and 4 allow comprehensive treatment of the wide variety of
hazards associated with floating or dissolving chemicals which gen-
erate hazardous vapors or gases. Thus, it is considered reasonable
to assign a similar cost of $1.23 per pound for response to sub-
stances in Spill Category 7, since products of reactions will gen-
erally display one or more of the phenomena covered by Categories
2 and 4.
Spill Category 8
The first category for spills onto land involves the same types of
materials covered directly above. The differing locale, however,
can significantly vary the nature of feasible responses.
Land spills of most hazardous materials will generally entail one
or more of the following containment and clean-up steps:
• containment by plugging sewers, building dikes, etc.;
• removal of spilled material from the site using vacuum
pumping equipment, earthmoving equipment, and/or sorbents,
as applicable;
• disposal of contaminated materials;
• sampling and analysis of groundwater supplies;
• .restoration or protection of groundwater supplies, if
applicable; and
• restoration of surface soils.
The estimation of the cost for a thorough response as outlined above
is difficult. Spills onto land are rarely responded to so compre-
hensively, and there is a virtual absence of information on the
subject. Nevertheless, ballpark figures can be developed if one
assumes a specific spill scenario, estimates the types and numbers
of personnel and equipment necessary, and attaches a cost to each
item. Thus, it is assumed that a typical incident involves 4,000
gallons of a liquid chemical spilling onto topsoil and flowing to a
drainage ditch. Response actions include plugging the drainage
111-44
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ditch, pumping collected liquid, removal of contaminated topsoil,
and disposal of collected liquid. Further activities are considered
atypical for the average, relatively uncomplicated incident.
Using estimated or published rates from References 7 and 9, the
average response cost is estimated to be on the order of $0.16 per
pound. Specific details of the computation are presented in
Table 14.
A discussion with a Southern clean-up .contractor, which predominantly
responds to local spills from tank trucks, revealed that its typical
charge for response to a 6,000 gallon spill from a tank truck ranges
from $2,000 to $3,000. The rates include waste disposal at the
firm's own waste treatment facility, are said to be much lower than
competitors, and provide an estimate of $0.06 per pound. Thus, this
rate provides a lower bound, and the $0.16 per pound estimate above
appears to be reasonable for use as an average.
Spill Category 9
Compressed gas releases will require leak stoppage, air-quality
monitoring, and other such activities necessary to protect the public
from effects of toxic or flammable contaminant concentrations in air.
Costs are obviously analogous to those for Spill Category 6 at $0.50
per pound.
Spill Category 10
The substances of concern to this category require response activi-
ties similar to those discussed for Spill Category 8. Costs are
therefore assumed to be $0.16 per pound.
Spill Category 11
As for other categories involving hazardous vapors or gases, a cost
of $0.23 per pound is considered appropriate for monitoring and
other activities. Additionally, a cost of $0.16 per pound is neces-
sary for general containment and cleanup as described in Spill
Category 8. The total cost then becomes $0.39 per pound.
5. Summary and Conclusions
Table 15 summarizes the results of this analysis and provides response
costs on per unit weight and volume bases. As is evident, parts of the
analysis provide results justified by previous experience, while others
provide results derived judgementally.
111-45
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TABLE 14
LAND SPILL RESPONSE COSTS
Item
Motorized elevating
scraper w/driver
Back hoe w/driver
Vacuum tank trailer
Operator
Tractor
Dump trucks (2)
Operators (2)
Supervisor
Laborer
Rate
($/hr)
100
32
35
11
12
36
22
16
10
Time Onsite
(hr)
4
4
4
4
4
6
6
8
8
$1316
Disposal costs:
Total cost:
According to an Eastern spill clean-up
contractor, he is currently paying from
$.20 to $5.00 per gallon for disposal
depending upon the specific nature of the
waste. Since wastes are often taken back
by shippers, and since the $5.00 per gal-
lon figure is considered extreme for the
majority of chemicals, we assume an aver-
age disposal cost of $1.00 per gallon.
1.00 +
1316
4000
$1.33/gallon
$0.16/pound
111-46
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ditch, pumping collected liquid, removal of contaminated topsoil,
and disposal of collected liquid. Further activities are considered
atypical for the average, relatively uncomplicated incident.
Using estimated or published rates from References 7 and 9, the
average response cost is estimated to be on the order of $0.16 per
pound. Specific details of the computation are presented in
Table 14.
A discussion with a Southern clean-up .contractor, which predominantly
responds to local spills from tank trucks, revealed that its typical
charge for response to a 6,000 gallon spill from a tank truck ranges
from $2,000 to $3,000. The rates include waste disposal at the
firm's own waste treatment facility, are said to be much lower than
competitors, and provide an estimate of $0.06 per pound. Thus, this
rate provides a lower bound, and the $0.16 per pound estimate above
appears to be reasonable for use as an average.
Spill Category 9
Compressed gas releases will require leak stoppage, air-quality
monitoring, and other such activities necessary to protect the public
from effects of toxic or flammable contaminant concentrations in air.
Costs are obviously analogous to those for Spill Category 6 at $0.50
per pound.
Spill Category 10
The substances of concern to this category require response activi-
ties similar to those discussed for Spill Category 8. Costs are
therefore assumed to be $0.16 per pound.
Spill Category 11
As for other categories involving hazardous vapors or gases, a cost
of $0.23 per pound is considered appropriate for monitoring and
other activities. Additionally, a cost of $0.16 per pound is neces-
sary for general containment and cleanup as described in Spill
Category 8. The total cost then becomes $0.39 per pound.
5. Summary and Conclusions
Table 15 summarizes the results of this analysis and provides response
costs on per unit weight and volume bases. As is evident, parts of the
analysis provide results justified by previous experience, while others
provide results derived judgementally.
111-45
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TABLE 14
LAND SPILL RESPONSE COSTS
Item
Motorized elevating
scraper w/driver
Back hoe w/driver
Vacuum tank trailer
Operator
Tractor
Dump trucks (2)
Operators (2)
Supervisor
Laborer
Rate
($/hr)
100
32
35
11
12
36
22
16
10
Time Onsite
(hr)
4
4
4
4
4
6
6
8
8
Cost
($)
$400
128
140
44
48
216
132
128
80
$1316
Disposal costs:
Total cost:
According to an Eastern spill clean-up
contractor, he is currently paying from
$.20 to $5.00 per gallon for disposal
depending upon the specific nature of the
waste. Since wastes are often taken back
by shippers, and since the $5.00 per gal-
lon figure is considered extreme for the
majority of chemicals, we assume an aver-
age disposal cost of $1.00 per gallon.
1.00 +
1316
4000
$1.33/gallon
$0.16/pound
111-46
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ditch, pumping collected liquid, removal of contaminated topsoil,
and disposal of collected liquid. Further activities are considered
atypical for the average, relatively uncomplicated incident.
Using estimated or published rates from References 7 and 9, the
average response cost is estimated to be on the order of $0.16 per
pound. Specific details of the computation are presented in
Table 14.
A discussion with a Southern clean-up contractor, which predominantly
responds to local spills from tank trucks, revealed that its typical
charge for response to a 6,000 gallon spill from a tank truck ranges
from $2,000 to $3,000. The rates include waste disposal at the
firm's own waste treatment facility, are said to be much lower than
competitors, and provide an estimate of $0.06 per pound. Thus, this
rate provides a lower bound, and the $0.16 per pound estimate above
appears to be reasonable for use as an average.
Spill Category 9
Compressed gas releases will require leak stoppage, air-quality
monitoring, and other such activities necessary to protect the public
from effects of toxic or flammable contaminant concentrations in air.
Costs are obviously analogous to those for Spill Category 6 at $0.50
per pound.
Spill Category 10
The substances of concern to this category require response activi-
ties similar to those discussed for Spill Category 8. Costs are
therefore assumed to be $0.16 per pound.
Spill Category 11
As for other categories involving hazardous vapors or gases, a cost
of $0.23 per pound is considered appropriate for monitoring and
other activities. Additionally, a cost of $0.16 per pound is neces-
sary for general containment and cleanup as described in Spill
Category 8. The total cost then becomes $0.39 per pound.
5. Summary and Conclusions
Table 15 summarizes the results of this analysis and provides response
costs on per unit weight and volume bases. As is evident, parts of the
analysis provide results justified by previous experience, while others
provide results derived judgementally.
111-45
-------
TABLE 14
LAND SPILL RESPONSE COSTS
Item
Motorized elevating
scraper w/driver
Back hoe w/driver
Vacuum tank trailer
Operator
Tractor
Dump trucks (2)
Operators (2)
Supervisor
Laborer
Rate
($/hr)
100
32
35
11
12
36
22
16
10
Time Onsite
(hr)
4
4
4
4
4
6
6
8
8
Cost
($)
$400
128
140
44
48
216
132
128
80
$1316
Disposal costs:
Total cost:
According to an Eastern spill clean-up
contractor, he is currently paying from
$.20 to $5.00 per gallon for disposal
depending upon the specific nature of the
waste. Since wastes are often taken back
by shippers, and since the $5.00 per gal-
lon figure is considered extreme for the
majority of chemicals, we assume an aver-
age disposal cost of $1.00 per gallon.
1.00 +
1316
4000
$1.33/gallon .
$0.16/pound
111-46
-------
ditch, pumping collected liquid, removal of contaminated topsoil,
and disposal of collected liquid. Further activities are considered
atypical for the average, relatively uncomplicated incident.
Using estimated or published rates from References 7 and 9, the
average response cost is estimated to be on the order of $0.16 per
pound. Specific details of the computation are presented in
Table 14.
A discussion with a Southern clean-up .contractor, which predominantly
responds to local spills from tank trucks, revealed that its typical
charge for response to a 6,000 gallon spill from a tank truck ranges
from $2,000 to $3,000. The rates include waste disposal at the
firm's own waste treatment facility, are said to be much lower than
competitors, and provide an estimate of $0.06 per pound. Thus, this
rate provides a lower bound, and the $0.16 per pound estimate above
appears to be reasonable for use as an average.
Spill Category 9
Compressed gas releases will require leak stoppage, air-quality
monitoring, and other such activities necessary to protect the public
from effects of toxic or flammable contaminant concentrations in air.
Costs are obviously analogous to those for Spill Category 6 at $0.50
per pound.
Spill Category 10
The substances of concern to this category require response activi-
ties similar to those discussed for Spill Category 8. Costs are
therefore assumed to be $0.16 per pound.
Spill Category 11
As for other categories involving hazardous vapors or gases, a cost
of $0.23 per pound is considered appropriate for monitoring and
other activities. Additionally, a cost of $0.16 per pound is neces-
sary for general containment and cleanup as described in Spill
Category 8. The total cost then becomes $0.39 per pound.
5. Summary and Conclusions
Table 15 summarizes the results of this analysis and provides response
costs on per unit weight and volume bases. As is evident, parts of the
analysis provide results justified by previous experience, while others
provide results derived judgementally.
111-45
-------
TABLE 14
LAND SPILL RESPONSE COSTS
Item
Motorized elevating
scraper w/driver
Back hoe w/driver
Vacuum tank trailer
Operator
Tractor
Dump trucks (2)
Operators (2)
Supervisor
Laborer
Rate
($/hr)
100
32
35
11
12
36
22
16
10
Time Onsite
(hr)
4
4
4
4
4
6
6
8
8
$1316
Disposal costs:
Total cost:
According to an Eastern spill clean-up
contractor, he is currently paying from
$.20 to $5.00 per gallon for disposal
depending upon the specific nature of the
waste. Since wastes are often taken back
by shippers, and since the $5.00 per gal-
lon figure is considered extreme for the
majority of chemicals, we assume an aver-
age disposal cost of $1.00 per gallon.
1.00 +
1316
4000
$1.33/gallon
= $0.16/pound
111-46
-------
ditch, pumping collected liquid, removal of contaminated topsoil,
and disposal of collected liquid. Further activities are considered
atypical for the average, relatively uncomplicated incident.
Using estimated or published rates from References 7 and 9, the
average response cost is estimated to be on the order of $0.16 per
pound. Specific details of the computation are presented in
Table 1A.
A discussion with a Southern clean-up contractor, which predominantly
responds to local spills from tank trucks, revealed that its typical
charge for response to a 6,000 gallon spill from a tank truck ranges
from $2,000 to $3,000. The rates include waste disposal at the
firm's own waste treatment facility, are said to be much lower than
competitors, and provide an estimate of $0.06 per pound. Thus, this
rate provides a lower bound, and the $0.16 per pound estimate above
appears to be reasonable for use as an average.
Spill Category 9
Compressed gas releases will require leak stoppage, air-quality
monitoring, and other such activities necessary to protect the public
from effects of toxic or flammable contaminant concentrations in air.
Costs are obviously analogous to those for Spill Category 6 at $0.50
per pound.
Spill Category 10
The substances of concern to this category require response activi-
ties similar to those discussed for Spill Category 8. Costs are
therefore assumed to be $0.16 per pound.
Spill Category 11
As for other categories involving hazardous vapors or gases, a cost
of $0.23 per pound is considered appropriate for monitoring and
other activities. Additionally, a cost of $0.16 per pound is neces-
sary for general containment and cleanup as described in Spill
Category 8. The total cost then becomes $0.39 per pound.
5. Summary and Conclusions
Table 15 summarizes the results of this analysis and provides response
costs on per unit weight and volume bases. As is evident, parts of the
analysis provide results justified by previous experience, while others
provide results derived judgementally.
111-45
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TABLE 14
LAND SPILL RESPONSE COSTS
Item
Motorized elevating
scraper w/driver
Back hoe w/driver
Vacuum tank trailer
Operator
Tractor
Dump trucks (2)
Operators (2)
Supervisor
Laborer
Rate
($/hr)
100
32
35
11
12
36
22
16
10
Time Onsite
(hr)
4
4
4
4
4
6
6
8
8
$1316
Disposal costs;
Total cost:
According to an Eastern spill clean-up
contractor, he is currently paying from
$.20 to $5.00 per gallon for disposal
depending upon the specific nature of the
waste. Since wastes are often taken back
by shippers, and since the $5.00 per gal-
lon figure is considered extreme for the
majority of chemicals, we assume an aver-
age disposal cost of $1.00 per gallon.
1.00
4000
= $1.33/gallon
= $0.16/pound
111-46
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TABLE 15
RESPONSE COST SUMMARY
Spill Category
$/lb
$/gal*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1.00
1.23
1.00
1.23
11.50
0.50
1..23
0.16
0.50
0.16
0.39
8.34
10.26
8.34
10.26
95.91
4.17
10.26
1.34
4.17
1.34
3.25
*Assumes specific gravity of 1.0
111-47
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E. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS FOR RESPONSE COSTS
1. Approach
The foregoing analyses provide sufficient data for estimation of total
costs for responding to all significant spills of hazardous chemicals on
a yearly basis for the sepcific response activities considered. The
approach for this effort is straightforward and best illustrated by an
example giving costs for one source category.
The yearly spill frequency for spills from tank trucks in transit was
estimated to be 227 (over 100 gallons). Of these, 95 spills were desig-
nated as spills into water, and the remaining 132 as spills onto land.
Spill size analyses provided a mean spill size of 2,940 gallons. Thus,
one can simply compute that 279,300 gallons will spill into water from
this source yearly, and that 388,080 gallons will spill onto land. Pre-
vious results pertaining to categorization of spills and response costs
then allow cost estimation by spill category. An example of the computa-
tional procedure is presented in Table 16. Table 17 summarizes the re-
sults of a similar effort for all source categories.
The total of approximately $261 million (1978 dollars) shown in Table 17
represents the estimated potential expense involved with comprehensive
response to all projected hazardous chemical spills involving amounts in
excess of 100 gallons. By no means does this total suggest the actual
expense which the government may be expected to bear, or the cost which
is currently borne by various parties. Under many circumstances, an
effective response may be impossible.
2. Cost to the Federal Government
To determine the costs associated with Federal response, we must deter-
mine the proportion of spills for which private industry response is inade-
quate. Interviews with state officials in eleven states indicated that 10%
of currently reported spills were not cleaned up by industry.
In our industry interviews, we learned that most major railroads and tank
truck lines have made arrangements for hazardous material spill cleanup.
The use of specialized contractors for this purpose is increasing. In-
dustry response to spills should improve further with the threat of §311
penalties, and we therefore conclude that assumption of 10% of total
theoretical clean-up costs by the Federal government represents a worst
case. Annual response costs from a Federal contingency fund would then
equal $26.1 million.
Some of the spills occur in major bodies of water where soluble chemicals
cannot be removed. Clean-up and damage mitigation (through neutraliza-
tion) is impossible in such circumstances. These spills for which cleanup
is not technically feasible significantly reduce the total projected clean-
up expenditure, and the burden which must be assumed by the Federal govern-
ment when industry response is inadequate. Thus, we estimate that the
111-48
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TABLE 16
RESPONSE COST ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
SOURCE CATEGORY:
Tank trucks and trailers In transit.
TOTAL SPILL AMOUNTS:
To Water
To land
Spill Category
Water Spills
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Land Spills
8
9
10
11
- 95 spills x 2,940 gallons/spill
- 279,300 gallons
-132 spills x 2,940 gallons/spill
-388,080 gallons
Fraction Total Spill
of Spill Amount
.358 x 279,300 x
.070 x " x
.286 x " x
.053 x " x
.103 x " x
.020 x " x
.110 x " x
1.000
.094 x 388,080
.077 x
.666 . x "
.163 x
iTooo
Cost per
Gallon
8.34
10.26
8.34
10.26
95.51
4.17
10.26
1.34
4.17
3.25
Total
Cost
833,912
200,593
48,883
346,338
205,585
$ • 725,415
-------
TABLE 17
TOTAL RESPONSE COST ESTIMATES
M
H
M
1
Ui
O
Source
Category
Spill
Category
Water
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Subtotals
Land
8
9
10
11
Subtotals
Totals
Pipelines
553,424
133,123
442,121
100,793
1,823,455
15,459
209,194
3,277,569
23,347
59,516
165,420
98,193
346,476
3,624,045
Tank Trucks
(In Transit)
833,912
200,593
666,198
151,878
2,759,130
23,294
315,218
4,950,223
48,883
124,609
346,338
205,585
725,415
5,675,638
Tank Trucks
/ Loading/ \
(Unloading )
85,093
20,469
67,979
15,498
281,544
2,377
32,165
505,125
4,912
12,523
34,805
20,660
72,900
578,025
Tank Cars
(In Transit)
1,655,880
398,314
1,322,854
301,580
5,455,894
46,254
625,922
9,806,698
338,110
861,890
2,395,545
1,421,989
5,017,534
14,825,232
Tank Cars
/Loading/ \
I Unload ingj
1,147,042
275,915
916,352
208,907
3,779,343
32,040
433,581
6,793,180
277,317
706,919
1,964,817
1,166,310
4,115,363
10,908,543
Vessels
(In Transit)
5,982,398
1,439,036
4,779,234
1,089,556
19,793,716
167,106
2,261,342
35,512,388
0
0
0
0
0
35,512,388
Vessels
/Load ing/ \
^Unloading/
514,649
123,796
411,144
93,731
1,702,797
14,376
194,537
3,055,030
0
0
0
0
0
3,055,030
Fixed
Facilities
29,306,693
7,049,578
23,412,609
5,336,538
96,561,456
818,623
11,077,909
173,564,406
859,988
2,192,232
6,093,107
3,616,852
12,762,179
186,326,585
Cost
Totals
40,079,091
9,640,824
32,018,491
7,299,481
157,335
1,119,529
15,149,868
237,464,619
1,552,557
3,957,689
11,000,032
6,529,589
23,039,867
260,504,486
-------
most likely annual cost of Federal response efforts is one-half of the
worst case, or $13.0 million. These costs exclude:
• appropriations for staff normally assigned to coordinate
environmental emergency response, and
• EPA resources (such as laboratories) funded for other pur-
poses but used in such emergencies.
It does represent our best estimate of out-of-pocket costs for monitor-
ing, damage mititation and cleanup.
This most probable estimate of $13 million assumes that:
1. The Federal government will officially intervene in all sig-
nificant spills not satisfactorily handled by responsible
parties;
2. That all states and local authorities will turn to the Federal
authorities for financial assistance in all cases;
3. That half of all spills will occur in circumstances permitting
a full clean-up response;
4. That all previous analyses in the study were conservative in
nature, as intended;
5. That an unusually rare and serious catastrophe will not occur
in the time span of interest; and
6. That spills of concern will be distributed among the eleven
spill categories in a fashion consistent with our projections.
For those who would consider this projection too low, we would point to
the following supporting evidence:
• EPA Regional Coordinators for Environmental Emergencies gen-
erally agree that the most serious environmental emergencies
are already reported. Increased reporting will identify larger
numbers of incidents, but these will usually be of lesser signif-
icance .
• The State of New Jersey, which has a §311 type fund of $25
million and a special spill prevention and response unit spent
only $80,000 from its contingency fund for chemical spill clean-
up in seven months of 1977. Although this single data point
must be treated with caution, a straight projection based on
population (and not discounting for New Jersey's prominent place
in chemical manufacture, transport, and disposal) would suggest
a national expenditure of $4 million per year.
111-51
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• The volume of oil and related products in commerce is signifi-
cantly greater than the volume of potentially hazardous chemicals.
Annual expenditures from the §311 fund for government cleanup
of spilled oil have not reached the annual level estimated for
chemicals. Between 1974 and 1976, the §311 k fund was used for
cleanup in only 4.37%, 4.16% and 5.56% of reported annual oil
spills. Some clean-up technology is available for all oil spills,
while a significant proportion of chemical spills cannot be cleaned
up. Although some individual chemical spills may be far more
expensive to clean up, when measured in dollars per pound spilled,
the precedent from oil spill cleanup out of the §311 fund suggests
the reasonableness of our assumption that the Federal government
must cleanup in 10% of all spills and most probably will spend
$13 million per year.
• Congress recognized that a significant number of hazardous chemical
spills to water could not be cleaned up when it wrote §311—the
high §§bb penalities are intended to provide a financial deter-
rent to spills which substitutes for the financial penalty
imposed by the cost of cleaning up spills of oil and removable
substances.
• A 1978 estimate presented at the EPA sponsored Hazardous Materials
Spill Conference placed the cost for removal and mitigation of
all spills to water of substances designated in §311 at $23.2
million. The analysis presented in this present study extends
to all hazardous substances, but its worst case is approximately
equal to total public and private expenditures on cleanup and
mitigation of §311 spills in the earlier analysis by Jonathan
Amson of EPA and J. Leslie Goodier ("An Analysis of the Economic
Impact of Spill Prevention Costs in the Chemical Industry").
If we halve the most probable case estimate, we project a best case ex-
penditure of $6.5 million. The best case and most probable case estimates
are simply intended to indicate probable orders of magnitude. Although a
number of qualitative attempts were made to further refine the validity
of these results, none provided substantially different results while
simultaneously being completely defensible. Quantitative attempts with
the same purpose were thwarted by a lack of reliable information con-
cerning the small subset of spills which might require clean up by the
Federal government.
Any fund designed to cover these expenditures on environmental emergencies
should be appropriated to cover a period of several years. Cost recovery
from irresponsible spillers will require lengthy litigation. In addition,
significant year-to-year variations from the average annual expenditure
can be expected. The fund must have the flexibility to cover costs in
a year when several major incidents occur, driving expenditures substan-
tially above the average. We recommend a five-year appropriation. Assess-
ment of actual costs incurred and cost recoveries obtained will then per-
mit a refinement of these estimates during the first five-year appropri-
111-52
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ation period. An environmental emergency response fund to cover the
activities discussed in this analysis requires the following appropri-
ations :
Average Annual Five-Year Fund
Expenditure* With Inflation**
Best Case 6.5M 37.4M
Most Probable 13.OM 74.8M
Worst Case 26.1M 150.1M
*
In 1978 dollars.
**
Assumes 7% annual inflation rate.
111-53
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F. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
1. Introduction
Roughly 50 or so parameters with estimated values were utilized in the
analysis to obtain the response cost totals presented above. The accuracy
of each of these values obviously affects the magnitude of final results.
Thus, it is well to briefly examine the possible effect of errors in esti-
mates, and to identify those parameters which are of most significance.
2. Spill Frequencies
A 100% increase in one of six transportation spill frequencies would
affect final results by no more than 5%. If all six of these frequencies
were simultaneously doubled, final results for response costs would in-
crease by less than 14%.
The frequency for vessels in transit is somewhat more important. Here,
a 100% increase would cause slightly more than a 14% increase in total
costs. The most important frequency is that for fixed facilities. For
this source category, a 100% increase would affect total costs by roughly
72%.
3. Minimum Spill Size Assumption
The assumption that spills less than 100 gallons in volume will not gen-
erally require Federal intervention allowed substantial refinement of
spill frequency projections. Since the assumption also resulted in higher
mean spill volumes, however, choice of the 100 gallon limit did not
materially affect cost estimates. Indeed, if we ignore the assumption,
and presume that all spills are of interest (including those less than
100 gallons in magnitude), the final cost total presented would increase
by only a fraction of 1%.
4. Mean Spill Sizes
All costs for source categories are directly proportional to the magni-
tude of pertinent mean spill sizes. For six of the eight source cate-
gories, a 100% increase in one estimated mean size would increase the
final cost total result by less than 5%. If all six were doubled, the
increase in the final cost total would be slightly less than 14%.
The effect of mean spill volume increases for vessels in transit and fixed
facilities would parallel results for spill frequencies. A 100% increase
for either of these values would cause cost total increases of roughly
14% and 72% respectively.
5. Response Costs (Per Unit Volume)
All sub-total costs estimated for spill categories are directly propor^
tional to the magnitude of pertinent response costs assigned on a per
111-54
-------
unit volume basis. Thus, if all cost rates were doubled, the final total
cost result would double.
The most significant cost rate is that for heavier-than-water, insoluble
substances. Indeed, Spill Category 5 provides about 51% of the final
cost total. If its cost rate alone were doubled, the final cost total
would increase by 51%.
Other significant response cost rates are those for Spill Categories 1
and 3. A 100% increase in either of these would increase the final cost
total by roughly 15% or 12% respectively.
Disposal costs included in the estimates represent routine charges made
for the disposal of clean-up debris and chemical industry wastes. Very
restricted options for the disposal of highly hazardous wastes could raise
this cost in some cases. A multi-million dollar cost for disposal alone
was originally estimated for debris from the Louisville sewer incident.
The availability of disposal sites, and thus the cost of disposal after
cleanup, will be a function of EPA policies under the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act.
6. Fraction of Spills Attributable to Spill Categories
It is difficult to gauge the effect of possible errors in the determina-
tion of what fractions of spills are attributable to each spill category.
Since the fractions must equal 1.00 when summed, any increase in one
fraction must be offset by decreases in others. It is possible to note,
however, that the fraction assigned to Spill Category 5 (for heavy, in-
soluble substance) is considerably more influential than all others. A
doubling of this fraction, and corresponding decreases in other fractions,
could increase the final cost total result as much as 50%.
7. Percentage of Cost Total Borne by Government
The worst case estimate of costs potentially bearable by the Federal
government entailed the estimate that these involved 10% of all response
costs on a nation-wide basis. Obviously, the cost to the Federal govern-
ment is directly proportional to the specific percentage chosen.
8_. Conclusions
The parameters which most significantly affect the outcome of this analy-
sis are:
1. The percentage of all costs potentially borne by the Federal
government;
111-55
-------
2. The response cost per unit volume assigned to Spill Category 5
(heavy, insoluble substances);
3. The fraction of all spills to water which may involve Spill
Category 5; and
4. The spill frequency and mean spill volume estimated for fixed
facilities.
111-56
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G. DAMAGES TO THIRD PARTIES
1. Property Damage
Property damage resulting from hazardous chemical spills is of great
concern because of the uncertainty as to whether or not victims of hazard-
ous chemical releases will be compensated for their losses. While property
damages are not included in the spill clean-up fund estimated earlier, we
have attempted a crude estimate of the property damages which might be
associated with the 2,126* yearly spills of hazardous materials which we
have projected.
Data on property damages resulting from hazardous material spills are
extremely poor. State statutes are generally silent on liability for
releases of hazardous chemicals.** Trends in the common law on liability
for hazardous substances are not completely clear, and the scarcity of
cases suggests that many claims are settled out-of-court where no records
are kept. While most industries appear to carry adequate insurance for
immediate damages from hazardous chemical releases (Section III.H), claims
data are not segregated for hazardous chemical payments.
The one nation-wide source of data available is maintained by the U.S.
Department of Transportation. The following discussion is based upon
this data.
a. DOT Property Damage Data
Table 18 describes those hazardous materials incidents occurring during
1971 to 1975 in which property damage was reported at $448,000 or more.
It is the most current listing available as of June 1978.
Table 19 provides a more complete tabulation of damage figures excerpted
from 32,000 reports filed during the same time period. These tabulations
have also not been updated by the DOT and are the most current available.
There are major difficulties associated with the use of these data for
estimating total damages incurred by innocent parties. Among these are
the facts that:
• The damage figures include losses on the part of parties
responsible for the incident.
• Thirty percent of reports show no property figure. Since every
spill must cause some dollar property damage, even if it is only
the cost of cleanup and/or lost materials, this makes all figures
suspect.
Greater than 100 gallons.
See Arthur D. Little, Inc. report, "Survey of States on Response to
Environmental Emergencies."
111-57
-------
TABLE 18
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENT REPORTS RECEIVED DURING
1971, 1972, 1973. 1974 AND 1975 WHICH PROPERTY DAMAGE WAS
REPORTED AT $448,000 OR MORE
Reported
Property Damage
$7,929,000
Date and Location
of Incident
7/19/74
Decatur ,
IL
Commodity, Carrier,
LPG, N&W
puncture,
in j ured )
etc.
Rwy. Switching, derailment,
explosion (7 dead, 349
HMI
Report No.
4080869
$4,500,000
8/30/74
Galbraith, AK
Gasoline, Alaska International Air,
Inc. Report-merely states "cause
unknown." (Lockheed Hercules)
(1 dead, 3 injured)
4090900
$1,671,421
9/21/74
Houston, TX
Butadiene, SP Rwy. Car punctured by
coupling car; blast caused by ignition
of leaking material. One dead, and FRA
records show 15 hospitalized but
probably many more injured.
4110598
$1,250,000
5/8/71
Port Newark, NJ
Sodium Hydrosulfite. American Presi-
dent Lines. Fire in hold
2110419
$1,000,000
8/8/72
San Pedro, CA
Various flammable liquids. Rainbow
Truck Lines. Tank truck struck
filling pipe; rupture, fire.
2080246
$ 876,195
4/28/73
Roseville, CA
Explo. A bombs, Sou Pac RR. 18
carloads, fire - explosions
3050342
$ 685,000
1/22/72
E. St. Louis, IL
LPG, Alton & Southern RR. Derailment,
tank car punture. (NTSB report
indicates a higher property damage
figure.)
2070201
$ 500,000
1/14/71
Genessee County
Michigan
Gasoline, Refiners Transport.
truck overturn, puncture.
Tank
1020040
$ 500,000
1/8/71 Anhydrous ammonia, Burlington Northern
New Cambria, MO RR. Tank car derailment, puncture.
1010021
$ 500,000
12/1/71
Visalia, CA
Gasoline, Asbury System. Tank truck 1120085
$ 448,000
1/4/73
Harrods, OH
Pentane, Erie Lackawanna RR. Tank car
derailment.
3010191
SOURCE: Materials Transportation Bureau, DOT.
111-58
-------
• Many reports tend to understate the damage, as evidenced by the
fact that the National Transportation Safety Board estimated
damage to exceed $9 million dollars in the E. St. Louis incident,
while the incident report noted $685,000.
• Environmental damage (damage to trees, other plants, water
supplies, wildlife, etc.) may or may not have been considered
in property damage figures. Most likely, such damages are not
included.
• Lost business or wages may or may not have been considered.
Given these and many other significant complications, it is only possible
to develop crudely derived estimates of property damages, with the quali-
fications that the results are highly suspect and simply provide bench-
marks for further refinement. This is accomplished by assuming that the
2,216 yearly spills which were predicted elsewhere in this report will
be distributed in terms of property damages in a fashion similar to dis-
tributions derived from Table 19. The analysis is performed by choosing
a lower limit dollar range and distributing the 2,126 spills in the same
manner as reported incidents which cause damage at or above this chosen
level.
For example, let us assume that all spills of interest involve property
damage of $500,000 or greater. Table 19 indicates that only 10 incidents
in the past have met these criteria, with 3 incidents involving almost .
exactly our lower limit. We would compute that 10% of all significant
spills involve each of the first 7 property damage figures on Table 19
and that 30% involve our lower limit. Thus, we would compute that 212.6
spills each involve $7.9 million in damages, 212.6 each involve $4.5
million, and so on. Summation of the results would next provide a total
property damage estimate.
Table 20 presents the results of a similar effort for a number of lower
limit ranges. If one assumes that any spill in excess of 100 gallons
will minimally cause $100 to $249 in damage, it suggests a total property
damage figure of $18.9 million. At the next level, for $250 to $499, it
suggests a total of $32.0 million, and so on.
Interpretation of these results is difficult. For an order-of-magnitude
estimate, we assume that any 100 gallon spill will cause at least $500
to $999 in property damage. Total damages from all 2,128 yearly spills
would then equal $45.8 million.
Great caution must be applied in using this result. The information is
far too limited to make any conclusions about the impact of including
The highest level recorded
111-59
-------
TABLE 19
TABULATION OF PROPERTY DAMAGE FIGURES EXCERPTED FROM
32,000 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENT REPORTS RECEIVED FROM
1971 THOUGH 1975
Property Damage Shown
on HMI Reports
$7,929,000 (Decatur, 111)
$4,500,000 (Anchorage, Alaska)
$1,671,400 (Houston, Texas)
$1,250,000 (Port Newark, N.J.)
$1,000,000 (San Pedro, Calif.)
$ 876,195 (Roseville, Calif.)
$ 685,000 (E. St. Louis, 111.)
$ 500,000
$ 250,000 to $499,999
$ 100,000 to $249,999
$ 50,000 to $99,999
$ 25,000 to $49,999
$10,000 to $24,999
$ 5,000 to $9,999
$ 2,500 to $4,999
$ 1,000 to $2,499
$ 500 to $999
$250 to $499
$100 to $249
$ 50 to $99
$ 25 to $49
$ 10 to $24
$ 1 to $9
"0" or blank or shown as
"UNKNOWN"
TOTAL REPORTS
1971
Reports
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
1
3
18
44
68
38
34
68
64
86
184
176
195
250
164
805
2,200
1972
Reports
0
0
0
1
1
0
; °
0
5
7
10
38
69
44
38
99
100
131
324
379
398
594
587
1,575
4,400
Reports
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
3
5
15
39
94
58
66
110
133
186
492
487
674
833
858
1,946
6,000
1974
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
4
7
8
36
99
60
87
179
180
238
694
791
928
1,414
1,283
2,489
8,500
1975
s Reports
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
10
19
36
75
69
68
154
192
490
916
1,114
1,383
1,887
1,349
3,014
10,800
Total
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
16
32
70
193
405
269
293
610
669
1,131
2,610
2,947
3,578
4,978
4,241
9,829
32,000
*******************
Less than 1/10 of 1 perc'ent of the reports (26 reports) indicated property damage
exceeding $250,000.
Less than 1/2 of 1 percent of the reports (102 reports) indicted property damage
between $50,000 and $250,000.
Less than 3/4 of 1 percent of the reports (193 reports) indicated property damage
between $25,000 and $50,000.
1 1/4 percent of the reports (405 reports) indicated property damage between $10,000
and $25,000.
3 3/4 percent of the reports (1,172 reports) indicated property damage between
$1,000 and $10,000.
14 percent of the reports (4,410 reports) indicated property damage between $100
and $1,000.
50 percent of the reports (15,744 reports) indicated property damage between $1 and $100,
111-60
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TABLE 19 Continued
Every spill must cause some dollar property damage, even if it is only the cost
of clean-up and/or lost material. Since 30 percent of the reports showed no
property damage figure, this makes all the figures suspect. Therefore, only
limited credibility can be attributed to these property damage figures as many
appear to understate the damage. For example, in the East St. Louis incident
noted above ($685,000) the National Transportation Safety Board estimated property
damage to exceed 9 million dollars.
SOURCE: Materials Transportation Bureau, DOT.
111-61
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TABLE 20
PROPERTY DAMAGE ESTIMATES
Lower Limit Range
(If every spill
causes damage at
least equal to
this amount)
$50,000 to $99,999
25,000 to 49,999
10,000 to 24,999
5,000 to 9,999
2,500 to 4,999
1,000 to 2,499
500 to 999
250 to 499
100 to 249
Total
Property Damage
(millions)
$602.3
288.1
148.1
112.4
88.6
61.3
45.8
32.0
18.9
If one assumes that any spill of interest will minimally
cause damages in excess of a particular Lower Limit Range,
and distributes the 2,126 predicted yearly spills like the
distribution of incident reports received down to that
range, then the resulting total damage figure is that
shown on this Table.
111-62
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damage compensation in any hazardous chemical spill fund. Although this
projection covers all projected spills, the cost data available come
solely from transportation incidents. It would be necessary to deter-
mine from a case-by-case review of past spills the total damages and the
proportion not compensated under existing law and insurance arrangements.
There is, however, an inference that the costs of environmental cleanup
may well exceed the cost of property damages to third parties resulting
from hazardous chemical spills.
b. Injuries and Fatalities
Comprehensive data is available only for transportation related incidents.
The DOT Materials Transportation Bureau mandates immediate notification
of any incident involving death or injury, and keeps detailed records
concerning such incidents. Indeed, the data available on this subject
appears to surpass in detail and timeliness all other data available
from this source.
Table 21 presents the total numbers of deaths and injuries recorded by the
Bureau during the years 1975 to 1977 inclusive. These and other data in-
dicate that the number of deaths per year due to chemical releases during
transportation activities has cycled between 12 and 32 over the last seven
years with no definitive trend. The average for the total seven-year span
is 23.43 deaths per year. The situation for injuries was initially more
volatile, but appears to have reached a plateau over the last four years.
The average for the last four years is 780 injuries per year. Figure 2
graphically displays recorded experience for both' fatalities and injuries,
and also shows the total number of reports received in each year for com-
parison purposes.
Of further interest are statistics from DOT which indicate which materials
were associated with fatalities and injuries. These are presented for
1977 in Table 22, and show that the majority of fatalities involves gaso-
line (17), crude oil (3), or fuel oil (1). Thus, oil and related sub-
stances account for approximately 65.6% of deaths, while only causing 4.8%
of injuries.
In terms of "who" was killed, we can deduce from DOT data sheets that 15
incidents in 1977 involved the death of one person during a vehicular
accident; three incidents involved two deaths each during a vehicular
accident; and that at least two other fatalities involved employees
engaged in transportation or transfer activities. Thus, it is reason-
able to conclude that the majority of fatalities involve truck drivers
in transit or other employees engaged in loading or unloading activities.
Indeed, from the rather terse incident descriptions we were provided,
it appears that the 32 fatalities in 1977 could not have involved more
than a half dozen or so "innocent" by-standers.
A similar determination could not be performed for injuries from data
made available to us. Nevertheless, it is possible to assume that re-
leases of toxic or explosive gases mostly injured innocent victims, and
to note that 150 or so reported injuries involved such materials in 1977.
111-63
-------
TABLE 21
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENT REPORTS
1975 - 1976 - 1977
MODE
Air Carriers
Hwy Carriers
(For-Hire)
Hwy Carriers
(Private)
Rail Carriers
Water Carriers
Freight
Forwarders
TOTAL
INCIDENTS REPORTED
1975
152
9,009
905
679
32
2
10,799
1976
84
10,255
572
959
15
12
11,898
19771
130
13,000
1,250
1,500
50
20
15,954
REPORTING CARRIER
1975
31
392
116
45
23
2
609
1976
24
429
125
42
8
8
636
19771
50
500
150
50
20
10
780
FATALITIES2
1975
0
7
20
0
0
0
27
1976
0
12
4
2
0
0
18
19771
0
13
17
1
0
0
31
1975
44
398
91
146
1
15
655
N JURIES3
1976
44
568
49
198
1
0
820
19771
94
448
60
233
0
0
750
All figures estimated except 15,954 actual count of reports received.
"Fatality must have been attributable to the hazardous material involved.
Injured person must have received medical treatment.
Did not involve injuries to passenger or crew members and did not occur during flight.
-------
Hazardous Materials
Incident Reports Submitted
! - Approx-
imately 935
'carriers submitted
'these 60,000 reports
(Approximately 50 diff-
"erent air carriers, 600 for-hire
"highway carriers, 200 private
"highway carriers, 60 rail carriers and
'25 water carriers).
' Since 935 carriers represent only a small
fraction of all carriers who may be transport-
ing hazardous materials, it is likely that the
60,000 reports represent only a small portion of
I reportable incidents. Through seminars and
inspection visits, a greater awareness of the regulation
has been created. It is believed this increased awareness of
'reporting requirements accounts for the greater portion of the
increased number of incidents reported, rather than a significant
increase in the number of incidents occurring. However, it has
recently been estimated that 4 billion tons of hazardous materials are
now being shipped annually. Therefore, the rising number of reported
incidents probably reflects this increased movement to some degree.
Fatalities (Due to unintentional release of hazardous materials)
Inquiries (Due to unintentional release of hazardous materials)
9
*
Includes
349 Injured '650
at Decatur, III,
7/19/74
1971
1972 1973
1974
1975 1976
1977
Source: Hazardous Materials Incident Reports, DOT.
FIGURE 2 SEVEN YEARS EXPERIENCE
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENT REPORTS,
AND INJURIES
111-65
-------
TABLE 22
COMMODITIES CAUSING DEATHS AND INJURIES AS REPORTED ON HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS INCIDENT REPORTS (FOR THE YEAR 1977)
(Revised 5/24/78)
Hazard
Class
Fl Liq
Corr
Fl Liq
N-F1 Gas
Fl Liq
Corr
Corr
N-F1 Gas
Fl Gas
Corr
Corr
Fl Liq
Orm-A
Fl Liq
Combust
Fl Liq
Corr
Oxidizer
Fl Gas
Oxidizer
Fl Gas
FL Liq
Corr
Corr
Corr
Commodity
Acetaldehyde
Acetic Anhydride
Alcohol, N.O.S.
Anhydrous Ammonia
Asphalt
Bromine
Calcium Hypochlorite, Dry
Chlorine
Compressed Gas, N.O.S.
Corrosive Cleaning Liq
Corrosive Liquid, N.O.S.
Crude Oil
Dichlorome thane
Flammable Liquid, N.O.S.
Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Hydrochloric Acid
Hydrogen Peroxide
Liquified Petroleum Gas
Mercurous Nitrate
Methyl Mercaptan
Methyl Methacrylate
Nitric Acid
Sodium Hydroxide, Liq
Sulfuric Acid
Sub-Total
All Other Commodities
Total Deaths and Injuries
Number of Commodities Reported
Number of Incidents
All Modes
D
0
0
0
5
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
1
1
18
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
32
0
1
1
5
4
81
3
101
3
44
3
16
16
0
1
25
5
31
17
8
22
2
5
7
43
17
83
543
201
32 744
98
368
Highway
D
0
0
0
3
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
1
1
17
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
30
0
1
0
1
1
24
3
101
1
14
3
16
9
0
0
22
4
31
9
4
10
0
0
7
43
6
33
342
161
30 503
81
254
Rail
D
0
0
0
2*
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2*
0
1
0
4
2
57
0
0
0
30
0
0
6
0
0
3
1
0
6
4
12
0
5
0
0
11
50
191
40
2 231
36
107
Air
D
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
7
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
10
0
10
Water
D 1
NO REPORTED
DEATHS OR
INJURIES BY
WATER IN
1977
0
0
0
0
0
* - 1 fatality at the time of the 11/9/77 Pensacola, Fla.
incident occurring at a later date.
incident, with the second fatality from this
-------
Because of the many variables involved, the difficulties associated with
assigning values to human life or suffering, and the fact that a single
catastrophe could at any time cause numerous deaths in a populated area,
we do not estimate a possible yearly cost for the deaths and injuries
associated with hazardous chemical spills.
2. Evacuations
The only comprehensive data on public evacuations resulting solely from
hazardous chemical spills appear to be that kept by the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA). These data cover the four year period 1971 to 1974
inclusive (latest available), and only pertain to evacuations resulting
from railroad accidents.
Within the time span noted, there were 450 accidents resulting in chemical
spillage and 94 public evacuations involving a total of 48,867 people.
This suggests that 20.9% of accidents result in evacuation of an average
of 520 persons each, or alternatively, that every incident requires evacu-
ation on the average of 109 persons.
FRA data for 1975 and 1976 do not denote the number of evacuations con-
ducted. They do, however, state that 3,495 people were evacuated in 1975
and 19,369 in 1976. Since the total of 22,864 people were evacuated due
to a total of 297 individual spills, which we can crudely estimate re-
sulted from 179 or so accidents using data in References 3 and 4, an
average 128 evacuees per spill can be computed. The overall average for
six years then becomes roughly 115 per accident.
Comparable data are not available for spill sources other than railroads.
During industry interviews conducted for another portion of the Environ-
mental Emergency Task Force effort, one railroad official stated that the
railroad would pay for housing evacuees. Payment of evacuation costs is
not usually discussed by the parties responsible for a spill, so we were
unable to determine the current distribution of such costs. Because no
data exist relating evacuations to hazardous chemical incidents outside
the railroad industry, we are unable to project total evacuation costs.
111-67
-------
TABLE" 23
SUMMARY OF INSURANCE COVERAGE AVAILABLE FOR CHEMICAL SPILLS
Marine
Smaller Firms
Larger Firms
Spill Liability Third Party Liability
WQISA
Self Insure
VQIS
London Market
Self Insure
Shoreside
Chemical Plans
Railroads
Trucking
CGL
CGL
CGL
CGL
CGL
Self Insure
CGL
Notes: 1. Water Quality Insurance Syndicate.
2. Comprehensive General Liability Insurance.
Source: Arthur D. Little, Inc., based on industry interviews.
111-68
-------
H. FINANCING CLEANUP ^
1. Insurance Coverage
The relatively small percentage of costs (here estimated at 10%) which
must be borne by government is further confirmed by an analysis of
insurance coverage generally available and carried by industry. This
coverage is adequate for the costs of clean up and damages associated
with most projected spills.
Insurance companies distinguish between two types of incidents which
may be covered:
« marine spills (both for offshore waters and inland waters;
and
• shoreside spills (i.e., onshore spills which may eventually
find their way into a waterway).
Insurance coverage available to cover liability arising from chemical
spills is summarized in Table 23.
a. Marine Spills
Coverage for marine spills is provided by at least one insurance
syndicate, The Water Quality Insurance Syndicate (WQIS), a recently
formed consortium of 28 marine insurance companies. The syndicate
insures commercial marine vessels (tankers, barges, tugs, etc.) but not
drilling rigs or recreational vessels, providing coverage for spills of
petroleum or hazardous chemical substances as determined by the 1972
and 1977 Clean Water Acts. Most larger carriers prefer to self-insure
themselves against possible spills, while many small carriers prefer
outside coverage. The majority of vessels insured by WQIS are American
Flag vessels.
Current insurance coverage for hazardous substances spills covers clean-
up costs of up to $150/ton under policies ranging in size from a minimum
of $250,000 up to a maximum of $14 million per incident. Additional
insurance coverage can be purchased for third party property damage.
For example, WQIS will provide up to $5 million coverage for third-party
property damage under standard policies and an additional $10 million
under special policies, while some London-based firms will provide up to
$30 million coverage. As of June 1978, no claims for hazardous chemical
spills had been made to the WQIS because the list of hazardous chemicals
had not been finalized.
111-69
-------
b. Shoreside Spills
Insurance coverage is generally available for shoreside liabilities,
including clean-up costs which might result from a hazardous substance
spill, through comprehensive general liability insurance (CGL). Such
policies provide some protection against hazardous chemical spills,
where the spills are sudden and accidental. Recently, because the
liability resulting from onshore spills is relatively vague, some
insurers have been more reluctant to provide this pollution coverage
under their comprehensive general liability insurance. Nevertheless,
coverage of sudden and accidental spills is still generally available.
Looking ahead, some insurance firms have developed a new type of onshore
pollution insurance coverage. This coverage is quite expensive at this
time but it specifically covers onshore spills of hazardous chemicals
and other substances.
Comprehensive general liability insurance is normally purchased by
corporations for protection from many types of potential disasters. In
most policies, coverage is limited to some maximum amount per incident.
The amount of coverage and the size of the deductible vary among cor-
porations.
In determining insurance rates, consideration is given to the previous
performance of the insured corporation. In recent years, companies
insuring corporations that produce or transport chemicals have become
increasingly concerned with potential liability due to spills of
hazardous chemicals. In general, clean-up costs and third party property
damage costs due to most recent chemical spills have been small and
insurance companies have not had to reimburse insured corporations for
damage because costs were within the amount of the deductible. Note the
tabulation of damages from spills reported to DOT (Table 19); only five
incidents exceeded $1 million over a five-year period. While insurance
organizations keep loss statistics for comprehensive general liability
claims, the statistics are not kept according to sub-lines of coverage
such as that covering damages due to a hazardous chemical spill. Thus,
data on spill frequency and insurance payments for spills are not
available from the insurance industry.
Typical terms of insurance coverage are as follows:
• Production Facilities. Chemical manufacturers generally
carry $5 million to $50 million coverage for third
party property damage, depending upon the size of the
corporation.
111-70
-------
• Railroads. Railroads generally carry $25 million to
$50 million in third party property damage with large
deductibles ($1 million to $2 million). Practically
speaking, railroads self insure for minor incidents,
but are covered for major incidents.
• Trucking Firms. The larger trucking firms generally
carry $25 million to $50 million in coverage. Coverage
is believed to vary greatly for smaller firms.
It should be noted that the coverage outlined above is generally limited
to sudden and accidental spills.
c. Insurance and Industry Concerns
The U.S. insurance industry is concerned that the potential liability
due to hazardous chemical spills may be so great that the insurance
coverage for such incidents may be too large for U.S. firms to cover.
In that case, many insurance dollars would flow to foreign markets,
especially to London. The insurance industry is also concerned that
clean-up costs may be defined to include mitigating measures as well as
actual clean-up costs. The uncertainty inherent in the definition of
"mitigating measure" is obviously a problem. However, actions required
by Federal regulation as a result of a spill and clearly made a
responsibility of the spiller would probably be included in covered
clean-up costs.
The entire issue of bonding and liability insurance for chemical spills
is one which is undergoing rapid development at this time. Most large
industries appear to be adequately insured for clean-up costs and
damages which have occurred in hazardous material incidents to date.
2. Financing A Hazardous Chemical Spill Contingency Fund
a. Introduction
A hazardous chemical spill contingency fund is necessary to cover the
cost of spill cleanups where liability is unknown or uncertain. The
uncertain liability cases would be litigated to replenish the fund,
while the unknown liability cases~would be a net drain on the fund. To
avoid resorting to general revenues to cover the cost of hazardous chemi-
cal spill cleanup by unknown spillefs, alternative financing mechanisms
are considered here.
*Substances specifically designated by the Administrator of EPA are
already covered under the fund established by § 311 k of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act-when spilled into U.S. waters.
111-71
-------
TABLE 24
SHIPMENTS OF SELECTED CHEMICALS BY TYPE OF CARRIER.1972
M
•~J
to
Inorganics
Basic
Intermediates
Organlca
Basic
Cyclic Intermediates
Gum and Hood
Fatty Acids
Other
Polymers
Fertilizers
Industrial Gases
Pesticides
Inorganic Pigments
Adheslves
Surfactants
Explosives
Organic Colors
Miscellaneous Chemicals
Inorganics
Basic
Other
Organlcs
Basic
Cyclic Intermediates
Gum and Wood
Fatty Acids
Other
Polymers
Fertilizers
Industrial Gases
Pesticides
Inorganic Pigments
Adheslves
Surfactants
Explosives
Organic Colors
Miscellaneous Chemicals
Percentage of Total
Tons,
Thousands
18,148
26.2S3
44.401
2,336
3,045
.896
563
23.660
30.500
24,427
24,345
3,989
2,078
1,478
1.418
1.106
711
369
18.433
153,255
Ton-Miles,
Millions
4,869
10,207
15,076
818
1,610
524
351
12.648
15,951
13,902
6,313
1,231
1,067
855
435
433
381
186
11.061
66,891
Rail
61.9
42.6
50.5
34.7
46.4
68.4
58.8
40.7
42.0
44.6
58.1
30.4
32.4
32.6
5.9
16.1
34.4
5.7
31.6
45.0
73.9
54.0
60.0
27.6
60.5
82.5
73.0
55.1
55.5
59.6
74.8
77.3
46.2
51.6
17.3
33.8
44.4
12.3
26.5
54.0
Motor
Carrier
23.2
31.4
28.0
20.2
37.2
27.8
31.1
26.0
26.8
43.8
23.4
2.5
42.9
55.6
58.2
66.4
49.6
75.7
24.7
29.7
15.3
14.9
15.0
11.5
19.9
14.9
19.4
15.6
15.9
29.3
13.0
2.1
36.4
36.4
61.1
55.7
46.5
77.8
13.7
19.1
Private
Truck
9.2
9.0
9.1
0.9
3.5
3.2
8.6
4.8
4T4"
8.3
12.9
66.6
23.0
9.7
34.7
17.1
15.8
17.1
9.6
10.7
5.3
3.2
3.9
0.2
1.9
1.4
5.7
2.5
2.4
4.4
5.3
19.2
14.6
5.4
19.5
8.6
7.9
6.3
4.7
4.5
Water
5.7
16.9
12.3
44.2
12.6
-
0.5
25.7
24.6
2.9
5.6
0.5
0.6
1.9
-
0.4
0.3
1.2
34.1
14.0
5.1
27.7
18.9
60.7
17.5
-
1.0
25.8
25.4
6.3
6.9
1.4
1.1
6.5
0.2
1.9
1.2
2.9
55.1
21.5
Other and
Unknown
0.2
oa
_
0.3
0.6
1.0
2.8
T5
0.4
-
-
1.1
0.2
1.2
-
-
0.3
-
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.3
-
0.2
1.2
0.9
1.0
0.9
0.4
-
-
1.7
0.1
1.9
-
-
0.7
-
oT
Total
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
100. OZ
SOURCE: Kline Guide to the Chemical Industry, Third Edition, Charles H. Kline & Co., Inc., 1977.
-------
As background, it is instructive to consider the analogous situation
for oil spills. Congress is currently considering what has been called
a "Superfund" to be used for oil spills. The oil Superfund would
require a levy on oil coming into terminals at a proposed rate of 3c/
barrel. The levy would be collected until a $200 million fund had
been accumulated and then the levy would stop until the fund was
significantly diminished. At this time the levy would be reactivated
and the fund would be replenished to the $200 million level.
A hazardous chemical spill contingency fund would in some ways be
analogous to this oil Superfund. It would be levied over a relatively
short period of time until it reached a pre-determined size (estimated
earlier to be about $74.8 million in the most probable case). The levy
would then be relaxed until the fund had been significantly diminished.
On the other hand, the method used to collect the oil Superfund (a
barrel-head tax) is not a realistic alternative for the chemical spill
fund. There are relatively straightforward statistics available con-
cerning oil transportation. Careful records are kept of both port
activities and the amount of oil passing through ports. This is not
generally true for the chemical industry. There are currently more
than 100,000 different commercial chemicals produced in the U.S., by
more than 10,000 firms. In 1976, 42% by weight (84 million tons) of
chemicals and allied products were transported by train from the site
where they were produced (Ref. 13). Thirty-seven percent (74 million tons)
were transported by ship, and 21% (42 million tons) by truck (Ref. 14, 15).
Shipments of selected chemicals by type of carrier are presented in
Table 24. Whatever the difficulties of implementing an oil Superfund,
the administrative difficulties associated with a similar, transporta-
tion-based hazardous chemical fund would be several orders of magnitude
greater due to the very large number of products and participants in
the chemical industry. There is currently no adequate record system
detailing movement of chemicals by product and by carrier. Should such
a record system be developed, there remains the problem of accounting
for the tremendous variation in the hazards associated with spills of
different chemicals.
b. Options for Industry Funding of Hazardous Chemical Spill Contingency Fund
Six potential means of implementing a hazardous chemical spill contingency
fund are:
• a transportation tax on hazardous chemicals,
• a transportation tax on all chemicals,
• a sales tax on hazardous chemicals,
• a sales tax on all chemicals,
111-73
-------
• a periodic fee assessed as a percentage of gross chemicals
sales, and
• an income tax surtax on chemical companies.
Advantages and disadvantages of each of these six proposals are dis-
cussed below. Some general issues which apply to these funding options
include:
• Who should pay the fee—producers, transporters, or users?
• Should all chemicals be taxed directly (or indirectly) in
order to simplify the collection procedure, or should
only identified hazardous chemicals incur the burden of
this tax?
• Should the amount of the tax vary between different
chemicals because some are more hazardous or more difficult
to clean up than others?
• How will the tax or fee be collected:
(1) Transportation Tax on Hazardous Chemicals
This proposal is quite similar to the oil Superfund discussed pre-
viously. ,A tax, based on product weight or gallonage, value, or some
measure of toxicity, would be paid by transporters when chemicals are
loaded onto ships, railroad cars, barges, trucks, etc. The tax could
vary by type of chemical or be the same for all types of chemicals.
This form of the tax makes transporters bear the burden of collection
and reporting. It also allows approximately one half of the chemicals
producted in the U.S., those used on their production site and not
transported, to escape taxation. By focusing on hazardous chemicals,
the tax is applied to those chemicals that are most likely to cause
emergency health risk situations. As noted earlier, the system would
be difficult to implement because it would require a definition of
quantity transported and toxicity for each hazardous chemical. This
system would be difficult to administer, requiring detailed records
covering amounts shipped, payment, and other loosely scattered data.
As discussed previously, the number of shipments of chemicals made
each year is very large and the administrative costs of tax collection
would be disproportionately high.
(2) Transportation Tax on All Chemicals
This proposal is similar to Option 1, the difference being that all
chemicals are taxed rather than only hazardous chemicals. Again, the
tax could be based on product weight (or gallonage), some measure of
toxicity of chemicals being transported, or the products' wholesale
value. Chemicals manufactured and used within a single plant would not
111-74
-------
be taxed. The tax does not focus on the hazardous chemicals most like-
ly to cause an emergency situation but on all chemicals. Because more
chemicals would be covered by this tax, the administrative mechanisms
of collecting the tax would be more complicated.
(3) A Sales Tax on Hazardous Chemicals
A sales tax of some percentage of the sales value of the hazardous
chemicals would be levied and paid by the producer or selling party.
To some extent, applying the tax as a sales tax will avoid double
taxing derivatives of hazardous chemicals which are shipped and pro-
cessed by one firm. Where the same firm is moving these chemicals from
plant to plant in further processing, they would not be taxed until
they were finally sold.
Hazardous chemicals are sold by many producers, many wholesalers, and
others. Policing and managing such a tax will be very difficult. How-
ever, some exclusions could be made in the law, for example, whole-
salers and retailers could be excluded and only producers taxed. Also,
small producers (e.g., producers with annual sales of less than $30
million) could also be excluded, thus reducing the administrative
burden of collecting the tax.
(4) Sales Tax on All Chemicals
This method is similar to Option 3, with the broadening of all chemicals
being included rather than only hazardous chemicals. This proposal
would avoid the problem of distinguishing which chemicals are hazardous.
The tax could be applied as some percentage of the sales value of the
chemical. The administrative structure required to collect the tax
would be much greater, of course, because all chemicals are included.
However, the burden of tax per chemical would be somewhat less because
it is spread over all chemicals rather than just hazardous chemicals.
Because this proposal does not distinguish nonhazardous chemicals, it
can be criticized as being unfair to producers of nonhazardous chemicals.
(5) Assessment of a Periodic Fee as a Percentage of Gross Annual
Chemical Sales
This method would involve assessing a producing firm (or other firms
in addition to producers) on the basis of a previous year's gross
chemical sales. If only producers are assessed this fee, fewer com-
panies are affected than in other proposals. However, other firms
could cause spills as well as producers, and to that extent this pro-
posal might be criticized as being unfair. There is a need to deter-
mine annual chemical sales for firms which have nonchemical operations.
Generally, the larger firms separate their chemical sales from other
sales in their 10K reports. Other firms for which chemical sales are
not known would have to publish their chemical sales value, or at least
tell the collecting agency their annual chemical sales value. This
would be a controversial requirement of this proposal.
111-75
-------
As with the previous methods discussed, this method could be applied
to only hazardous chemicals or to all chemicals. Again, there are
questions of fairness involved in this consideration.
An important benefit of this proposal is that it would be a periodic
levy (rather than an ongoing tax) which would have to be updated from
time to time when the fund is depleted. Also, based upon a previous
year's chemical sales and the percentage of the fee that needs to be
determined, a chemical firm would be able to plan the outlay of funds
needed to meet this fee. On the negative side, because a periodic
updating would be required, the administrative collection staff for
this method would have to be assembled at one time, disbanded, then
assembled again in order to administer another collection. Also,
because of the periodic updating feature, there may be some objection
from industry because of the uncertain effect on profits due to
uncertain timing and amounts of the tax.
(6) An Income Tax Surtax on Chemical Companies
Under this method, the IRS would apply a surtax to the tax paid in a
given year by chemical firms. If the income tax surtax were applied
to producers it could be criticized as being unfair because producers
have little control over safety precautions taken by transporters.
However, it would be difficult to apply the tax to transporters, since
transporters are shipping many different commodities including chemicals
and it would be difficult to estimate revenues and profits derived from
chemical transportation versus transportation of other goods. Thus,
this is proposed as a tax on chemical producers.
For companies with nonchemical operations, it will be difficult to
determine chemical profits versus total company profits. U.S. Steel
has the vast bulk of its earnings coming from steel operations, but
also has a sizable chemical subsidiary. It may be difficult for a
corporation such as this to allocate costs among divisions to deter-
mine the chemical profits versus total company profits. Under this
proposal there could be a minimum size provision to reduce the number
of chemical companies which would be required to pay this tax. This
would ease the administrative burden of collecting the tax. By using
an income tax surtax, the government would not discriminate between
hazardous chemicals and nonhazardous chemicals. Alternatively, one
could try to determine a percentage of sales that a company has of
hazardous chemicals and reduce total company profits by that same
percentage in determining what the surtax should be. Once a suitable
mechanism has been developed, it would be relatively easy for the IRS
to implement such a regulation.
A final drawback is the benefit that this method gives to marginal pro-
ducers and companies with large tax sheltering losses. State interviews
111-76
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reveal that producers of marginal profitability are most reluctant to
incur significant clean-up expenses. They should not be sheltered from
a contribution to the clean-up fund as well.
c. Summary
The hazardous chemical spill fund should, if possible, be funded by
organizations most likely to cause hazardous chemical spills cleaned up
by the fund. Spill penalties and fines will serve to channel appropriate
costs to identifiable spillers.
Where the source of a spill is known, liability generally may be deter-
mined and spill clean-up costs eventually recovered from the party
causing the spill. The fund will be depleted as the costs of spills
whose source is unknown are covered.
Hazardous chemical spills which occur in transportation are usually
caused by an accident. A ship is grounded, a train is derailed, or a
truck is involved in an accident. Such incidents are known and those
concerned can determine whether a chemical spill has occurred. While
payment may be made from the fund to facilitate clean up, it is antic-
ipated that the fund would generally be reimbursed. The fund is most
likely to be depleted by mystery spills and process spills from small
operators and shippers. For this reason transportation taxes (Options
1 and 2) may not be the most equitable means of funding. Both the
transportation and the sales taxes (Options 3 and 4) would be very
difficult to administer. The periodic fee as a percentage of chemical
sales (Option 5) or the income tax surtax on chemical companies
(Option 6) appear to be reasonably equitable and administratively
manageable.
d. Size of Hazardous Chemical Spill Contingency Fund Relative to
Chemical Industry Size
In 1976, sales of the U.S. chemical industry exceeded $100 billion.
Over the past decade, the after-tax profitability of the chemical
industry has generally been in the range of 6-8% of industry sales.
Although significant variation occurs, profits for the industry as a
whole were most likely in the range of $6-8 billion in 1976.
For an assumed five-year clean-up contingency fund of $74.8 million
projected earlier in this report, the chemical industry would be con-
tributing slightly more than 0.2% of after-tax profits each year based
on the more conservative $6 billion profit estimate. The same $74.8
million Fund requirement represents 0.07% of 1976 chemical industry
sales. (A $150.7 million annual Fund requirement would represent about
0.4% of industry profits over five years and 0.14% of one year [1976]
industry sales.)
111-77
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TABLE 25
VARIATION IN AVERAGE NET PROFIT WITH COMPANY SIZE
Annual
Sales Level
Over $1,000 M
$100 - 999 M
$25 - 99 M
$5 - 24 M
No. of U.S. Cos. with
More than 50% of
Sales in Chemicals
14
28
28
16
Average Net Profit
As % of Sales
7.0
6.3
6.1
3.5
SOURCE: Kline Guide to the Chemical Industry, Third Edition, 1977.
111-78
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The impact of the clean-up fund on individual firms within the chemical
industry would vary somewhat by company, by sector of the industry, and
by company size. For example, to illustrate how sales volume impacts
profitability within the industry, one may examine the performance of
publicly held chemical companies with over $4 million in sales which
derive more than half of;their revenues from chemicals. Table 25
demonstrates how average net profit varies by size of firm. Note that
the larger firms are slightly more profitable, with profitability
dropping sharply in the smallest category. These variations suggest
that a clean-up fund collected as an income tax surtax would impose
slightly harsher penalties on the larger, more profitable firms in the
chemical industry. Significant variations in profitability are also
observed by industry sector. Unfortunately consistent profitability
data are not available on these individual sectors. The degree of
diversification within most companies in the industry does not lend
itself to financial statements which reveal profitability by product
line. However, a general pattern is apparent. At one extreme, true
commodity chemicals are sold in large volumes to composition specifica-
tions. Prices tend to approach costs at the expense of profits. This
class of chemicals, therefore, has the highest sales volume but relative-
ly low profitability. Specialty chemicals, in contrast, are generally
sold to performance specifications accompanied with a high level of
marketing effort. Because of the degree of product differentiation
possible, profitability is generally quite high.
The economic impact of financing a hazardous chemical spill fund gener-
ally will be more burdensome for smaller companies. The latest available
(1972) Internal Revenue Service statistics on tax returns for chemical
companies are presented in Table 26. The IRS statistics classify
business organizations among industries by the major industry of the
business organization. Thus, the statistics include non-chemical opera-
tions of chemical firms, but exclude chemical operations of firms with
the major portion of their business outside the chemical industry. The
1972 IRS statistics do not provide a more detailed breakdown of firms
with sales greater than $5 million. In 1972, tax returns were filed by
12,633 chemical businesses, with 9,729 corporate returns, 2,384 proprie-
torship returns and 520 partnership returns. The 664 corporations with
1972 sales of over $5 million represented only 5% of all the chemical
organizations filing tax returns, but 92% of total receipts and 97% of
the net income before tax. Thus, the administrative burden of collecting
a tax or fee based on annual sales or profit would be eased considerably
by exempting smaller business organizations and without materially
affecting the amount of revenue to be collected.
Estimated chemical sales of the 50 largest U.S. chemical producers for
the year 1977 are presented in Table 27. The chemical sales of the
50 largest chemical firms totaled approximately $60 billion in 1977 or
52% of total chemical sales in .1977 (estimated to be $113 billion by
the Federal Trade Commission). Thus, estimated clean-up expenditures
111-79
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TABLE 26
U.S. CHEMICAL AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INDUSTRY
1972 BUSINESS TAX RETURNS
Annual Amount of
Business Receipts
Under $10,000
$10,000 to $25,000
$24,000 to $50,000
$50,000 to $100,000
$100,000 to $200,000
$200,000 to $500,000
$500,000 to $1,000,000
$1,000,000 to $5,000,000
Over $5,000,000
Total Corporate
Proprietorships
Partnerships
All Chemical Businesses
SOURCE: Internal Revenue
Number of
Tax Returns
1,188
412
797
1,098
1,140
1,745
1,008
1,669
664
9,729
2,384
520
12,633
Service, Statistics
Total
Receipts
($ million)
.6
8
30
81
158.-
571
747
3,506
65,465
70,573
95
438
71,106
of Income — 1972,
Net Income
Before Tax
(Less Deficit)
($ million)
-7
-5
-5
-4
-2
5
37
150
5,863
6,033
6
1
6,040
Business Income Tax Returns, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1976; and Arthur D. Little, Inc. estimates.
111-80
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TABLE 27
CHEMICAL SALES OF THE TOP 50 CHEMICAL PRODUCERS. 1977
Total Company
ik
L976a
1
2
3
4
5
I
6
8
9
10
Ik
12
13
16
15
14
19
17
18
20
25
22
23
24
21
38
26
27
30
29
31
32
28
36
35
33
34
37
42
41
39
44
46
43
45
40
47
50
49
Company
duPont:
Dow Chemical
Monsanto
Union Carbide
Exxon
W. R. Grace
Celanene
Allied Chemical
Shell Oil
Occidental Petroleum
Hercules
American Cyananld
Eastman Kodak
Gulf Oil
Standard Oil (Ind.)
Bordenf
Stauffer Chemical
Rohm & HaasS
Ethyl Corp.
Phillips Petroleum
Air Products' 'h
PPG Industries
Diamond Shamrock
Mobil
International Minerals
Atlantic Richfield
Ashland Ollh
FMC8
BASF Wyandotte
B. F. Goodrich
Standard Oil of California
Olin
Ciba-Geigy
Reichhold Chemicals
American lloechst
Texaco
U.S. Steel
Mobay Chemical
Williams Cos.
National Distillers
Union Oil of California
Lubrizol
Akzona
Esmarkf'J
Kerr-McGee
NL Industries^
Pennvalt
Continental Oil
Nalco Chemical
Borg-Warner
Chemical
Sales
1977
(S millions)
7.225
4,380
3,930
3,900
3.578
2,184
2.172
1,773
1.671
1,465
1,410
1,290
1,217
1,208
1,169
1,156
1,130
1,124
1,117
1,015
925
872
853
849
831
830
823
800
780
754
742
682
680
674
670
665
664
622
593
561
561
507
474
472
470
469
448
442
434
422
Percent
Change
from
1976
12
11
9
9
11
11
12
4
10
5
6
10
10
15
8
5
13
11
11
5
17
8
7
7
0
55
11
10
16
8
12
8
-3
15
13
6
9
14
23
11
7
12
12
4
8
-3
7
15
16
6
Total
Sales
1977
(S millions)
9,435
6,234
4,594
7,036
54,126
3,976
2,320
2,923
10,112
6,018
1.698
2,412
5,967
17,840
13.020
3,481
1,233
1,124
1,282
6,284
947
2,506
1,530
32,126
1,280
10,969
4,786
2,292
816
2,223
20,899
1,472
962
674
810
27,920
9,610
622
1,240
1,587
5,477
507
809
5,250
2,165
1,587
835
8,700
446
2,032
Chemical
Sales
as I of
Total
Sales
77
70
85
55
7
55
94
61
17
24
83
53
20
7
9
33
92 .
100
87
16
98
35
56
3
65
8
17
38
96
34
4
46
71
100
83
2
7
100
48
35
10
100
59
9
22
30
54
5
97
21
Enterprise Met
SIC Code
Number11
281
281
281
281
291
281
281
281
291
509
281
281
383
291
291
202
281
281
281
291
281
321
281
291
287
291
291
352
-
301
291
281
-
281
-
291
331
-
287
208
291
289
221
201
291
281
281
291
289
371
Income
($ millions)
545.1
555.7
275.6
385.1
2,423.0
140.5
70.0
138.4
735.1
217.9
57.9
139.4
643.4
752.0
1,011.6
126.9
116.0
45.6
78.0
516.9
67.7
91.7
162.1
1,004.7
108.2
701.5
164.3
120.6
27.6
60.1
1,016.4
78.1
'
13.7
13.0
930.8
137.9
23.1
65.3
85.0
334.2
58.1
7.5
67.0
119.2
66.4
41.7
380.6
50.1
104.0
Profit Marglnd
Percent Rank
1977
5.8
8.9
6.0
5.5
4.5
3.5
3.0
4.7
7.3
3.6
3.4
5.8
10.8
4.2
7.8
3.6
9.4
4.1
6.1
8.2
7.1
3.7
10.6
3.1
8.5
6.4
3.4
5.3
3.4
2.7
4.9
5.3
-
2.0
1.6
3.3
1.4
3.7
5.3
5.4
5.9
11.5
0.9
1.3
5.5
4.2
5.0
4.4
11.2
5.1
1977
17
6
14
19
28
37
43
27
10
36
39
16
3
30
9
35
5
32
13
8
11
34
4
42
7
12
38
23
40
44
26
21
-
45
46
41
47
33
22
20
15
1
49
48
18
31
25
29
2
24
1976
23
4
8
13
24
38
44
30
10
42
17
18
1
28
9
40
7
32
20
12
11
16
6
39
5
15
41
36
29
48
33
25
-
45
46
43
31
37
19
21
26
2
49
47
14
27
34
22
3
35
Return on
Stockholders'
Equity*
Percent Rank
1977
12.6
17.8
11.5
11.3
12.4
11.4
8.5
11.6
14.0
13.2
7.6
11.9
14.9
10.2
15.0
12.4
17.1
8.6
14.8
16.7
15.9
8.6
20.4
12.2
16.7
14.2
17.1
12.7
11.0
7.7
13.3
12.0
-
7.2
-
9.9
2.7
9.2
9.1
11.7
13.7
21.4
2.5
9.0
11.9
9.4
13.5
13.4
24.1
11.9
1977
21
4
31
33
22
32
43
30
14
19
45
27
11
35
10
23
5
41
12
7
9
42
3
24
8
13
6
20
34
44
18
25
-
46
-
36
47
38
39
29
15
2
48
40
28
37
16
17
1
26
1976
37
3
10
19
21
35
45
36
12
22
20
27
11
33
18
31
6
42
17
13
8
15
4
28
2
23
9
41
14
47
26
30
-
39
-
40
46
44
43
24
25
5
48
34
16
32
29
7
1
38
•vised
iterprise Standard Industrial Classification according to the "Directory of Companies Filing Annual Reports with the Securities 6 Exchange Commission".
•deludes extraordinary or nonrecurring income or losses.
let Income as a percentage of net sales.
set income as a percentage of net worth.
:hemical sales include significant amounts of nonchemical products, such as welding equipment, fabricated plastics, coatings, metals, minerals, adhesives,
ind the like.
}ata exclude results from discontinued operations.
For the year ended Sept. 30.
For the year ended June 30.
For the year ended Oct. 29.
rprise Standard Industrial Classifications listed are as follows: 201 meat products; 202 dairy products; 221 weaving and finishing mills, yarn
-------
from the annual fund would represent approximately two hundredths (.02)
of one percent of annual sales by the 50 largest chemical producers,
and approximately 0.013% of the sales of chemical organizations exceed-
ing $5 million in sales.
Although no firm conclusions should be drawn without further analysis
of the potential economic impact on the chemical industry of the hazard-
ous chemical spill fund, it is clear that, in and of itself, a periodic
fee or income tax surcharge of the magnitude discussed above represents
a relatively small portion of estimated 1976 industry profits. The
economic impact of the fee on individual firms within the industry will
vary, and should be considered in choosing the most equitable method of
taxation. However, it appears that neither segmentation of the industry
by size nor by sector would result in one group of firms that would
receive unduly harsh treatment under a periodic fee or an income tax sur-
tax of the magnitude described above.
111-82
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. SPILL FREQUENCY
Based upon extrapolation of historical data from several sources, we
estimate that:
• An average of 3,548 spills of hazardous chemicals (other than
oil) can be expected in the five-year period from 1978-1982.
• An annual average of 2,126 hazardous chemical spills will
be greater than 100 gallons in size.
• EPA Regions IV and V can be expected to have the most hazardous
chemical spills (428 per year over 100 gallons in Region IV;
490 per year over 100 gallons in Region V).
• Regions I, VIII, and X will have the fewest spills—less than
100 per year in excess of 100 gallons.
• Spills of hazardous chemicals greater than 100 gallons will be
distributed between sources as follows (annual average):
- pipelines 46
- tank truck (in transit) 227
- tank truck (loading/unloading) 225
- railroad tank car (in transit) 292
- railroad tank car (loading/unloading) 350
- vessels (in transit) 45
- vessels (loading/unloading) 22
- fixed facilities 919
B. COSTS OF SPILL CLEANUP
Costs associated with the immediate cleanup of spills of all hazardous
chemicals during production, transportation, and storage are estimated
as follows:
• If all projected spills over 100 gallons could be cleaned up,
the total annual cost would be $261 million.
• The Federal government is expected to provide clean-up resources
in 10% of all spills.
111-83
-------
• Average annual Federal clean-up expenditures are $13.0 million
in the most probable case. Worst case is $26.1 million; best
case is $6.5 million. (1978 dollars)
• A Five-year appropriation, or revolving fund, is recommended.
Allowing 7% for inflation, a Federal clean-up fund for hazardous
chemical spills should contain the following amounts:
- best case $37.4 million
- most probable case $74.8 million
- worst case $150.1 million
C. PAYING FOR SPILL CLEANUP
Our review of possible sources for payment of clean-up costs by the chemi-
cal industry shows the following significant findings:
• Comprehensive general liability coverage carried by major in-
dustries is generally adequate for the costs of spill cleanup
and immediate damages.
• A five-year clean-up fund of $74.8 million (most probable case)
is equal to approximately .07% of industry sales in 1976.
• The fund could be maintained by an annual levy on the chemical
industry equal to approximately 0.2% of annual after tax profits.
• Collection of a transportation or transfer tax on chemicals
will be difficult because of the diversity of transporters
and shippers. Such a system would be much more complex than
that required to collect an oil Superfund.
• A periodic fee as a percentage of chemical sales, or an income
tax surcharge on chemical companies, would be equitable and
maneageable methods of raising a spill clean-up fund from the
chemical .industry.
• If restricted to chemical producers with sales more than $5
million, the annual levy to support a chemical spill clean-up
fund would be slightly more than 0.01% of sales.
111-84
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APPENDIX A
REFERENCES
1. "Risk Analysis in Hazardous Materials Transportation: A Mechanism
for Interfacing the Risk Analysis Model with the Hazardous Material
Incident Report System" NTIS Report No. PB-239 859, September 1974.
2. Buckley, J.L, and Wiener, S.A., "Documentation and Analysis of
Historical Data on Hazardous Material Spills," Factory Mutual Re-
search Corp. report to EPA under Contract No. 68-03-0317, April 1976.
3. White, W.D., and Stoehr, L.A., "Spill Risk Analysis Program: Method-
ology Development and Demonstration - Volume II," Final Report to the
U.S. Coast Guard, NTIS Report No. AD A042978, April 1977.
4. Lyman, W., et al., "Survey Study to Select a Limited Number of Hazard-
ous Materials to Define Amelioration Requirements," USCG Report No.
CG-D-46-75, March 1974.
5. "A Model Economic and Safety Analysis of the Transportation of Hazard-
ous Substances in Bulk," A.D. Little, Inc., report to U.S. Department
of Commerce, July 1974.
6. Steel, W.A., et al., "The Incidence of Hazardous Material Accidents
During Transportation and Storage," NBS Report No. COM-74-10512,
November 1973.
7., Young, G.K., et al., "Analysis of Oil Spill Trends, "Report to the
CEQ and EPA, August 1976, NTIS No. PB-260917.
8. "Development Document for Hazardous Substance Regulations," Draft
Report, Environmental Protection Agency, January 1976.
9. "Response by Regulated Industry in Terms of the Degree of Prevention
and Associated Cost Relative to the Hazardous Substance Portion of
Section 311 of the FWCPA Amendments of 1972," Final Report to the
EPA from Arthur D. Little, Inc., December 1976.
10. "Yearbook of Railroad Facts - 1977 Edition," Association of American
Railroads, Washington, D.C.
11. "Hazardous Chemical Data," U.S. Coast Guard Report No. CG-446-2
(2nd volumes of CHRIS data base).
12. State of Washington, Office of Program Planning and Financial Manage-
ment," Background to Requested Oil Spill Contingency Fund," April,
1975.
13. Yearbook of Railroad Facts, 1977.
111-85
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14. Waterborne Commerce of the U.S., 1976.
15. Freight Commodity Statistics, December 31, 1974.
111-86
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