UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PLANNING OCTOBER 1978
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT DRAFT FINAL REPORT
AGENCY WASHINGTON DC 20460
Environmental Emergency
Response
Volume IV Case Studies
PREPARED FOR THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY BY U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY - OFFICE OF
PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
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VOLUME ry
CASE STUDIES
Prepared by the EPA Task Force
On Environmental Emergencies
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CASE STUDIES
Table of Contents
Chapter Page
Foreword i
I. Flood of 1977—Johnstown,Pennsylvania 1-1
II. PCB Episode—Dittmer, Missouri/Wilscnville,
Illinois . II-l
III. Train Derailment—Rush, Kentucky III-l
IV. Carbon Tetrachloride Episode—Ohio River TY-1
V. Chemical Wastes in Sewers—Louisville, Kentucky V-l
VI. Kepone Contamination—Hopewe 11,Virginia VI-1
VII. Taconite Tailings/Asbestos Case—Duluth, Minnesota VII-1
VIII. Chlorine Barge Incident—Louisville,Kentucky VIII-1
IX. Air Pollution Episode—Allegheny County, Pennsylvania IX-1
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FOREWORD
In October 1977, the Administrator requested the Office of
Planning and Management to undertake a comprehensive study of
the Agency's capabilities in preventing and responding to envi-
ronmental emergencies. An environmental emergency task force
was established to analyze the Agency's activities, and in
December the work of the task force was expanded to include
the development of a Federal interagency plan for dealing with
chemical crises.
The overall objective of the task force is to address the
adequacy of Federal emergency performance in a number of areas,
including: notification procedures; assessment of emergencies;
the nature of the emergency and the resources required to ad-
dress the situation; immediate public health or environmental
protection actions; emergency enforcement actions; cleanup and
mitigation; disposal of hazardous substances; damage assess-
ments; cost recovery; and prevention of environmental emerg-
encies .
Program considerations to be analyzed include Federal, State,
and local government responsibilities; interagency coordination;
environmental response financing; resource requirements; and stat-
tutory authority. As part of the task force's analysis, the fol-
lowing case studies of previous environmental emergencies were
prepared:
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o Natural disasters - Johnstown, Pa., flood, 1977.
o Accidental spills - train derailment, Rush, Ky., 1973;
waste oil and polychlorinated biphenyls, Dittmar, Mo.,
Wilsonville, 111., 1977.
o Accidental or contrived release in an area under EPA
authority—chemical waste in sewers, Louisville, Ky.,
1977; carbon tetrachloride industrial spill, Ohio River,
1977.
o Accidental or contrived release in an area not under EPA
authority—Kepone, Hopewell, Va., 1975; taconite tailings/
asbestos, Duluth, Minn., 1973.
o Potential emergency coordinated through the Federal Dis-
aster Assistance Administration (formerly Office of
Emergency Preparedness) chlorine barge incident, Louisville,
Ky., 1972.
o Emergency air episode-Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, 1975.
The cases were selected on the following basis:
o If the adequacy of legislation, resources, organization, and
technology for responding to environmental emergencies could
be determined.
o If legislative authority was limited to legal remedies or
technical assistance, contingency funds were not available
for direct Federal action, the discharger was unknown or
insolvent, and solutions were usually complex.
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o If the direct inpact of a toxic substance was on human
health with only secondary impact, if any, on air, water,
or land.
It should be noted that some of the cases involved hazardous
substances, and a common major issue was the lack of authority
under Section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as
amended, since hazardous substances were not designated. This
issue was partially resolved on March 13, 1978, when hazardous
substances were designated. However, a problem still remains
because many materials capable of creating an environmental
emergency were not on the initial list.
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SUMMARY
FLOOD of 1977—JOHNSTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA
The Johnstown, Pennsylvania, flood of July 1977 resulted
when 9 to 12 inches of rain fell within a 12-hour period. Over
50 people were killed, and damage is expected to exceed $300
million. In addition, the flood caused numerous spills of oil
and drums of various hazardous substances into the Conemaugh
River system.
Within 24 hours, President Carter declared eight counties
a major disaster area, qualifying the area for Federal assist-
ance. The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA)
immediately initiated a disaster relief program. Under Mission
Assignments from FDAA, EPA Region III and other Federal agencies
carried out disaster assistance work. One of EPA's missions was
to make damage assessments of public utilities such as water and
sewage treatment facilities. In addition, EPA responsed to the
spill situation, handling the oil spill response under Section
311 of the FV1PCA and the hazardous substances work under Mission
Assignment from FDAA.
Major problems surfaced as a result of EPA's response to
the Johnstown Flood. One is the need to develop streamlined
contracting procedures to cover emergency situations. A mis-
understanding regarding proper EPA procedures resulted in a 6
month delay in formalizing a contract with a cleanup firm and
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paying it for its work. The other problem, that of responding to
hazardous substances spills, has been partially solved by promul-
gation of the list of hazardous substances. Materials not on the
list could be handled under the emergency authority in Section 504
of FWPCA, which Congress passed in December 1977. Currently, there
are no funds to implement Section 504, which places EPA in a more
difficult position than during the Johnstown Flood because FDAA
will not fund operations where an agency has the authority to take
mitigating action.
PCB EPISODE—DITTMER, MISSOURIA^LSONVILLE, ILLINOIS
The polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) episode involving Dittraer,
Missouri, and Wilsonville, Illinois, started in March 1977 when the
Missouri Department of Natural Resources began investigating citizen
complaints concerning the dumping of oil and other unknown materials
into an open pit near Dittmer. Asked for assistance, EPA Region III
inspected the site and determined that an unreported oil spill had
occurred; in addition, samples taken at the site showed high con-
centrations of PCEs. Oil and other materials had spilled from the
open pit and were leaching into a nearby stream. A Federal action
to remove the oil contamination was declared unnder Section 311 of
FWPCA. Because of the absence of the hazardous substances list,
EPA lacked both the authority and financial resources to clean up
the PCE spill. EPA had to convince the Coast Guard, the comptroller
of Section 311(k) funds, to allow its use for the PCB removal effort,
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which could not be distinguished from the oil removal operation.
This problem would not recur in the future, since PCBs are on
the list of hazardous substances.
The contaminated soil from the pit was placed in steel drums,
which were sealed and transported to Wilsonville for disposal at
a site operated by the Earthline Co. and properly permitted by
Illinois to accept the Dittmer wastes. When the citizens of
Wilsonville heard of the proposed disposal, they obtained a temp-
orary restraining order from a local judge to prevent Earthline
from disposing of the Dittmer wastes. However, the wastes were
eventually disposed of there. The legal issues were argued before
a local judge; his decision is not expected until the Fall of 1978.
A ruling against Earthline is considered a distinct possibility.
This aspect of the PCB case is especially troubling because it may
impede implementation of Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, which specifically calls for technically adequate
facilities for disposal of hazardous wastes. Should Wilsonville
succeed in opposing a properly permitted disposal site, other com-
munities may, in the future, follow a similar course of action.
TRAIN DERAILMENT—RUSH, KENTUCKY
The derailment in October 1973 of 15 cars of a 5C-unit train
near Rush, Kentucky, led to a situation that threatened the entire
area. Two cars containing acrylonitrile and five containing coke
caught fire. A car containing caustic soda was leaking, and one
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containing metallic sodium was punctured and smoking. None
of those reponding to the derailment, including EPA's On-
Scene Coordinator (OSC), were properly equipped with pro-
tective clothing or breathing apparatus. Some acrylonitrile
was leaking into Williams Creek, so the railroad constructed
a dam to prevent further contamination. However, all aquatic
life downstream from the spill was killed. Municipalities
were warned of the possibility of hazardous chemicals entering
their water systems, and two families, very near the derail-
ment, were evacuated.
The immediate threat was over the next day when the fires
were extinguished, the acrylonitrile remaining in one of the
cars was unloaded, and the sodium car was repaired. However,
during this period, the OSC and local officials differed over
the need to evacuate families from the general area, the OSC
favoring evacuation. For the next two days after the immedi-
ate threat passed, attention focussed on cleaning up and
monitoring of Williams Creek and disposing of large quant-
ities of caustic mixed with coke spilled near the derailment
scene. The cleanup was largely carried out and financed by
the railroad.
The potential for a disaster fromm the derailment was
great. Fortunately, the disaster was averted. Still, the
incident highlights the need for EPA to equip its personnel
adequately if it is to send them to such incidents. Further-
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more, there is a need to clarify EPA's proper role in advising
local authorities in matters in which it is not expert —
evacuation procedures, explosion hazards, fire-fighting pro-
cedures, and structural in tegrity of tank cars, for example.
Finally, there is the technical problem of whether to try
to put out a fire involving a hazardous or unknown chemical,
or to let it burn and run the risk of producing toxic air
pollutants.
CARBON TETPACHLORIDE EPISODES—OHIO RIVER
The case of carbon tetrachloride in the Ohio River in-
volves three independent incidents and actions that overlap
in time to constitute a single closely related environmental
emergency. In September 1976, Region III received data indi-
cating that the drinking water of Huntington, West Virginia,
contained 10 ppb of carbon tet. Additional sampling indicated
that the source was probably in the area where the Ohio and
Kanawha Rivers meet. Under Section 308 of FWPCA, inquiries
were sent to four major dischargers of carbon tet in the Ohio
Basin upstream from Huntington. The inquiries required them
to participate in a 45-day self-monitoring survey of their
effluents. One of the companies, ETC Corp., participated only
under court order.
Meanwhile, as part of its research on water supply treat-
ment, EPA found that carbon tet levels were increasing in
Cincinnati's raw and finished water. Following up on this
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information, EPA in mid-February 1977 detected a 70-ton slug
of carbon tet moving down the Ohio River. Concluding that
the levels presented a threat to human health, EPA took action
under the emergency section of the Safe Drinking Water Act.
EPA notified States and municipalities of the expected location
of the slug, but unfortunately the initial information proved
to be incorrect. The slug was tracked until it dissipated in
early March.
The third incident involved a spill on February 27, 1977,
of 2 to 3 tons of carbon tet into the Kanawha River fran the
FMC plant in South Charleston. Again, State and local entities
were notified of the spill and advised of precautionary measures
to take. The procedures for notifying States, and being certain
that the information got quickly to local water supply agencies,
worked much more effectively in this instance than with the 70-
ton slug. Still, the episode epitomizes a problem EPA will con-
tinue to face. Carbon tet is one of many common chemicals that,
though toxic, are not perceived by the public to be toxic.
Furthermore, the acute and chronic levels in drinking water that
pose a health risk have yet to be determined. Thus, incidents
similar to the carbon tet episodes of 1977 may occur again.
CHEMICAL WASTE IN SEWERS—LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY
Sometime during March 1977, an unidentified toxic material
entered the Morris Forman Sewage Treatment Plant, which threats
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almost all of the sewage generated by the Louisville, Kentucky,
metropolitan area. The plant, which is operated by the Metro-
politan Sewer District (MSB), was forced to shut down, and 32
employees required medical care, though none apparently suffered
after-effects. The material was quickly identified as a mixture
of two chlorine-containing organic compounds, both of which are
toxic when inhaled or if absorbed through the skin.
Region IV was notified of the incident when the plant had
to send raw sewage into the Ohio River. This notification is
required under the discharge permit granted the plant under
the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System. Region
IV personnel went to Louisville to provide technical assist-
ance to MSD. Their sampling of the sewers and the analvses
performed by EPA's Athens Laboratory identified the point
where the contaminant entered the sewers and established that
4 miles of sewers were contaminated. The sewage treatment
plant and one section of sewer line were decontaminated, and
the plant reopened in June 1977. However, more than 3 miles
of sewers remain to be decontaminated.
Investigation revealed that the contaminant was a waste
product from a Velsicol Chemical Company plant in Memphis,
Tennessee. Velsicol had contracted for disposal of wastes
with Chem-Dyne Corp. of Hamilton, Ohio, which in turn, had
contracted with Kentucky Liquid Recycle, a small firm oper-
ating in the Louisville area. In June 1977, Kentucky Liquid
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Recycle was indicted by a Federal grand jury on five counts
of polluting a Federal waterway and interfering with the
operation of a sewage treatment plant.
The most significant issue raised by the Louisville in-
cident is what should be the Federal role in mitigation of
environmental emergencies not covered by Section 311 of FWPCA.
Even though the amendments to FWPCA passed in December 1977
provide authority, no funds have been appropriated to carry out
this authority.
KEPONE COOTAMINATION—HOPEWELL, VIRGINIA
The contamination of the Hopewell, Virginia, area with the
pesticide Kepone, a chlorine-containing organic compound, came
to light after Kepone was found in the blood of an employee of
Life Science Products, the sole manufacturer of the pesticide.
The company sold all its product to Allied Chemical Corp. Event-
ually, more than 70 victims of Kepone poisoning were identified,
29 of whan had to be hospitalized.
A sampling program carried out by EPA's Health Effects Lab-
oratory found Kepone in soil around the plant; in the air as far
as 16 miles from Hopewell; in the water, bottom sediments, fish,
and shellfish of the James River, in some cases as far as 64
miles from Hopewell; and in sludge from Hopewell's sewage treat-
ment plant. Prior to the closing of the Life Science plant, the
City sludge digesters malfunctioned several times because of the
toxic effects of Kepone in wastewater from the Life Science plant.
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The Life Science plant was dismantled, and the contaminated
nated remnants were buried, along with other Kepone wastes, at
the sewage treatment plant, ethods are now being evaluated for
disposal of all waste materials. Another unresolved problem is
the contamination of the Kopewell/James River area. According
to the report prepared by EPA's Kepone Mitigation Feasibility
Project, the cleanup of the river may require billions of dollars
and entail a further difficult problem of disposing of contami-
nated sediments. Without such a cleanup, the James River, which
is now closed to fin and shellfishing, may have to remain closed
for decades.
Five Federal laws had a bearing on operation of the Life
Science plant—FWPCA, Clean Air Act, Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act,
and Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act—each with its own re-
quirements for compliance and a separate enforcement mechanism.
Efforts under the laws proceeded almost entirely independently,
with differing degrees of success. Subsequent to the Kepone
incident, the Interagency Regulation Liaison Group has been set
up to develop a plan to coordinate monitoring for compliance
with Federal laws. Such a plan should reduce the likelihood of
recurrence of such an incident.
The failure of water pollution control experts to recognize
the danger of the James River sooner is particularly noteworthy,
since the hazards to the environment of chlorine-containing
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organic compounds are well known. The problem with the sewage
treatment plant, however, may have tended to focus concern on
that more immediate matter. Or the fact that the State of
Virginia was in the process of being delegated responsibility
under FWPCA may have confused the relationship between Virginia
and EPA.
TACONITE TAILINGS/ASBESTOS CASE—DULUTH, MINNESOTA
In June 1973, EPA found unusually high concentrations of
asbestiform fibers, which are suspected of being a health hazard,
in the western end of Lake Superior, as well as in the drinking
water supplies of Duluth, Minnesota, and other small communities
using water from that part of the Lake. The fibers are believed
to originate in discharges from Reserve Mining Co.'s taconite
beneficiation plant in Silver Bay, Minnesota.
At the request of the White House, EPA Region V set up the
Duluth Asbestos Study Team, which also included representatives
of the Corps of Engineers (COE), Geological Survey, and Council
on Environmental Quality, to examine the problem. The Team
recommended development of technology for filtering drinking
water. Under an Interagency Agreement with EPA, COE undertook
a study to develop such technology. With enactment of the Safe
Drinking Water Act in 1974, demonstration grants became available
for new treatment technology in crises areas. Federal and State
funds were provided, and a filtration plant went into operation
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in Duluth in late 1976. The other communities involved have
either built filtration facilities or shifted to other sources
of drinking water.
A problem in the early stages of the Duluth incident was
that local officials refused to believe that there was a problem.
This is perhaps understandable, since, as with carbon tet, there
is no definitive evidence on the acute and chronic health hazards
of asbestiform fibers. Thus, EPA in the future may once again
find itself having to take action when it lacks adequate health
effects information.
Since 1969, the Federal Government has been trying to force
Reserve Mining to stop discharging into Lake Superior. At the
request of EPA, the Government brought suit against the company
in 1972 for violating the Refuse Act and Water Quality Standards.
The next year, the State of Minnesota intervened in the litiga-
tion, charging violations of air pollution control regulations
as well. A series of Federal court decisions ordered Reserve
to institute activities to abate its pollution. These remedies
are still pending.
CHLORINE BARGE INCIMWT^LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY
In March 1972, a nine-barge tow on the Ohio River struck
Shippingport Island near Louisville, Kentucky, and five barges
broke loose. A barge laden with four tanks, each containing 160
tons of liquid chlorine, presented a serious problem. Drifting
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downriver, it punctured its hull as it struck a pillar of the
HcAlpine Dam, part of a Louisville Gas and Electric hydroelec-
tric plant. Because the barge was capable of releasing a cloud
of chlorine gas into Louisville just downwind, EPA recommended
that the National Response Team be activated. The Coast Guard
assumed the role of On-Scene Coordinator for river operations,
while the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) coordinated
the efforts of other government agencies. The Corps of Engi-
neers and Coast Guard decided the best course of action was to
stabilize the chlorine barge in position and transfer the cargo
to another barge. While the barge was being stabilized, some
residents of the area were evacuated. Unloading of the barge
was uneventful and was completed four weeks after it became
lodged on McAlpine Dam. Throughout the incident, EPA main-
tained air and water monitoring programs.
Since hazardous substances had not yet been designated,
there was no authority under FWPCA. Instead, at the request of
the Governors of Kentucky and Indiana, OEP declared a disaster
and took charge of measures to protect the public should a
chlorine discharge occur. In general, the incident illustrates
the need for environmental emergency planning at the Federal,
State, and local levels. Also, the various levels of government
should identify executive authority to ensure proper and timely
responses.
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AIR POLLUTION EPISODDE—ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
An air pollution episode in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,
in November 1975 posed a serious health hazard to area residents.
The episode resulted from a stationary high pressure system in
the Eastern third of the country, acting in conjunction with a
strong double-layered temperature inversion and very light winds.
The area hardest hit by poor air quality was the Liberty Eorough-
Clairton area. The major source of particulates that contributed
to the episode appeared to be U.S. Steel's Clairton Coke I/forks.
The Allegheny County Health Department ordered U.S. Steel to take
action to abate its particulate emissions and advised Region III
of the situation. The local plan for handling air episodes ap-
peared not to be adequate, so a Region III team went to Pitts-
burgh, prepared, if necessary, to activate Section 303 of the
Clean Air Act to further curtail air pollution. Epidemiologists
and meteorologists from Research Triangle Park, North Carolina,
arrived to help gather information for an action under Section
303. Later, the Administrator of Region III was on scene to co-
ordinate EPA's activities.
Meetings between EPA and U.S. Steel resulted in the Clairton
Coke Works taking action that substantially reduced particulate
emissions. This action unquestionably had a strong effect, even
though it did not occur as quickly as it would have if the local
plan had been adequate. However, the primary factor that resolved
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the crisis was the passage of the front and changed meteorological
conditions, which improved the atmospheric ventilation of the area.
Air quality returned to normal 4 days after the episode began.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The group that prepared the case studies included represent-
atives from the offices of Enforcement, Toxic Substances, Water
Planning and Standards, Water Supply, Water Program Operations,
Solid Waste, and Air programs. Each office assisted in selection
of the cases, collection of information, and review of the draft
reports. EPA Regional offices in Atlanta, Kansas City, and
Philadelphia were very helpful by providing the majority of the
information on five of the case studies. In addition to the sup-
port provided by the EPA offices, the U.S. Coast Guard assisted
the task group by preparing one of the case studies.
The support for each of the offices is greatly appreciated,
specifically the following individuals who prepared the draft
documents:
Flood, Johnstown, Pa.
PCB Episode, Dittmer, Mo.
Wilsonville, 111.
Train Derailment, Rush, Ky.,
Carbon Tetrachloride Episodes,
Ohio River
Chemical Waste in Sewers,
Louisville, Ky.
Kepone Contamination,
Hopewell, Va.
Paul Nadeau, OSMCD
Joseph Talerico,
Water Enforcement
George Moein, Region
IV; Russ Wyer, OSMCD
Tony Mayne, Water
Supply
Irene Kiefer, OSMCD
Gary Gardner, Region
III; Martin Broseman,
Water Planning and
Standard
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Taconite Tailings/Asbestos - Eleanor Merrick, Office
Case, Duluth, Minn. of Toxic Substances
Chlorine Barge Incident, - Lt. Happle, U.S.
Louisville, Ky. Coast Guard
Air Pollution Episode, - Gordon Rapier, Region
Allegheny County, Pa. Ill; Doyle Borchers,
Office of Air & Waste
Management
Special thanks to Irene Kiefer who prepared the final document
and the Executive Summary.
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I. FLOOD OF 1977 -- JOHNSTOWN, PENNSYLVANIA
CASE STUDY SUMMARY
In July 1977, a major flood caused by an estimated 9 to 12 inches
of rain within a 12-hour period created an emergency situation for
Johnstown, Pennsylvania, and the surrounding communities (Figure
1-1). Over 50 people were killed by the flood, which caused exten-
sive damage throughout an eight-county area. In addition, the
flood caused numerous spills of both oil and hazardous substances
into the Conemaugh River system.
Within 24 hours, President Carter declared the eight counties
a major disaster area, qualifying them for Federal assistance.
The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) esta-
blished two field offices and immediately implemented a disaster
relief program. Under Mission Assignments from FDAA,
disaster assistance work was performed by the U. S. Army Corps
of Engineers (COE), the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA),
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Concurrent with
participation in the FDAA program, EPA Region m, in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, responded to the spill situation. An EPA On-Scene
Coordinator (OSC) arrived in the area and immediately started the
cleanup effort. The oil spill response was under the authority of
Section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972
(FWPCA), while the hazardous substances work was under a
Mission Assignment from FDAA. Compounding the difficulty of the
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JEFFERSON
O
CONEMAUGH RIVER
WESTMORELAND
o
INDIANA DISASTER FIELD OFFICE
CAMBRIA
O
PENNSYLVANIA
FCO FIELD OFFICE
SOMERSET
BEDFORD
O
^
/
EPA OSC COMMAND POST
FIGURE 1-1. AREA INVOLVED IN THE JOHNSTOWN, PA. FLOOD
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work was the presence of explosive vapors throughout the spill
area. This required special programs and procedures to protect
the response personnel and prevent additional damage.
The total value of the damage caused by the flood is expected
to exceed $300 million, most of which will be offset by Federal
disaster grants and loans. To date, FDAA has authorized a total
of $56 million in grants for restoration of public facilities. Of
this total, $13 million was approved for water and sewage treat-
ment facilities surveyed by EPA personnel. The spill response
team recovered 176, 000 gallons of oil, 500 cylinders of propane,
and 500 drums of hazardous liquids. EPA personnel spent 3, 323
man-hours on the Johnstown response; the total cost was $504, 000
(including contractor support), of which $428, 000 was eligible for
reimbursement from FDAA and the Section 311(k) Revolving Pollu-
tion Fund.
The EPA's response to the Johnstown Flood revealed two
major problems: EPA's need to develop a streamlined contracting
procedure to cover emergency response situations, and the
pressing need for implementation of the Hazardous Substances
Regulations (Section 311 of FWPCA) and the Emergency Response
Program (Section 504). Minor problems concerning EPA's dis-
aster assistance organization and mobilization procedures are
now being reviewed by EPA program managers.
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Date
July 19-20, 1977
July 20, 1977
July 21, 1977
July 22, 1977
July 23-24, 1977
Events
An estimated 9 to 12 inches of rain
result in extensive flooding along the
Conemaugh River in Johnstown, Pa.,
and surrounding communities.
Numerous oil spills caused by the
flood are reported to Region El,
Philadelphia, Pa. EPA declares a
Federal Removal Action, assumes role
of On-Scene Coordinator (OSC), and
activates the Regional Response Team.
EPA OSC retains a contractor to
commence spill recovery operation.
Federal Disaster Assistance Admini-
stration (FDAA) requests five EPA
personnel to report on July 21 to
conduct preliminary damage assess-
ments .
President Carter declares a major
disaster, making eight counties eligible
for Federal assistance. FDAA esta-
blishes field offices to direct Federal
disaster assistance program. Five
EPA personnel report on-scene to
begin preliminary damage assessments.
EPA OSC meets with officials from
FDAA, other Federal agencies, and
various State and local agencies to co-
ordinate EPA's spill cleanup efforts.
Pennsylvania assigns a representative
to OSC's operations team. Spill
recovery command post set up and
initial recovery priorities established.
Coast Guard's Atlantic Strike Team
arrives on-scene to assist OSC with
spill recovery.
Routine coordination meetings continue.
FDAA requests EPA assistance begin-
ning July 25 to make damage surveys
for about 2 weeks. Unidentified drums
containing various chemicals are noted
throughout flood area. OSC receives
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aerial photos of flood area to assist
with spill recovery.
July 25, 1977 EPA disaster assistance team, including
five inspectors and one disaster assist-
ance coordinator, reports on scene to
begin damage inspection surveys.
Explosion at the Royal Plate Glass Co.
results in death of one employee, high-
lighting explosive vapor problem in
Johnstown area. Chemist from Edison
Laboratory arrives on scene to help
coordinate hazardous substances/
explosive vapors response.
July 26, 1977 EPA operations team begins to respond
to explosive vapors reports. Meeting
held with Johnstown officials to develop
procedures to analyze and resolve
explosive vapors problems. FDAA
verbally authorizes EPA to proceed with
hazardous substances response under
FDAA Mission Assignment. Assignment
is limited to recovery, with Pennsylvania
being responsible for identification and
disposal. EPA retains oil spill recovery
contractor to recover hazardous sub-
stances. Contractor told to maintain
separate cost records for all FDAA
work. FDAA asks OSC to ascertain if
emergency construction grant funds are
available to repair damaged treatment
facilities. Administrator, Region ELI,
says they are not. OSC offers use of
aerial photos plus interpretation
services to FDAA officials.
July 27, 1977 Bethlehem Steel approves use of a site
for temporary storage of drums of haz-
ardous substances. OSC provides
status report to FDAA. EPA team
meets again with Johnstown officials to
coordinate roles for explosive vapors
response.
July 28, 1977 Coast Guard contracting officer reports
on scene to establish split accounting
procedures for oil spill recovery and
hazardous substances response.
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July 29-31, 1977
August 2, 1977
August 2, 1977
August 3, 1977
August 8, 1977
August 22, 1977
August 24, 1977
August 19, 1977 -
February 17, 1978
August 17, 1977 -
present
OSC participates in several meetings
to review status of the response and
establish payment procedures for
hazardous substances work.
Three additional EPA inspectors
report on scene to help expedite
damage survey work. Explosive
vapors are traced to gasoline spill;
1, 300 gallons are recovered. Storage
tank excavated and flushed.
Meeting held at FDAA HQ to resolve
issues regarding hazardous substances
recovery operations. FDAA agrees
funding will be retroactive to July 26.
Explosive vapor readings are low
throughout Johnstown. No further
problems anticipated.
Spill response work completed. Con-
tractor demobilizes personnel and
equipment. EPA representative
remains on scene until August 11 to
assist FDAA with final coordination.
EPA receives official Mission Assign-
ment for hazardous substances response
from FDAA.
Damage assessment work completed.
EPA team discharged.
EPA formalizes contract for hazardous
substances response work. Contract is
awarded on February 17.
EPA responds to FDAA requests for
additional damage and final inspection
surveys. Requests expected to continue
into foreseeable future.
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AUTHORITY
Federal Authority
The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) and
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EPA had primary responsibility for the Johnstown response
program, FDAA under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (PL 93-288)
and EPA under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972
(PL 92-500).
Disaster Relief Act of 1974
PL 93-288 is the latest of a series of laws establishing a
Federal Disaster Assistance program. Administered by FDAA, the
program provides for Federal assistance to State and local govern-
ments, certain private nonprofit organizations and individuals during
declared emergencies or major disasters.
PL 93-288 is implemented by a series of Department of Housing
and Urban Development regulations. Regulation 24 CFR 2205,
Subparts A-G, prescribe the standards and procedures to be fol-
lowed in implementing the FDAA program, 24 CFR 2205, Subpart
H, prescribes procedures for reimbursing other Federal agencies
for disaster assistance work. Of critical importance to the
Johnstown response is Paragraph 2205. 82(a), which states: "The
Administrator or the Regional Director (of FDAA) may not approve
reimbursement of costs incurrred while performing work under
an agency's own authority. " This was a key issue to be resolved
during the EPA-FDAA negotiations for funding the hazardous sub-
stances recovery work.
The FDAA assistance program is specifically intended to
supplement the efforts and available resources of the States, their
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political subdivisions, and private relief organizations.
Examples of assistance to individuals include temporary housing,
emergency food and water, unemployment payments, and disaster
loans. Assistance to municipalities includes debris removal and
the restoration of roads, public utilities, buildings, and water
control facilities. In administering the disaster assistance pro-
gram, FDAA coordinates the relief activities of all other Federal,
State and private disaster relief agencies. In addition, FDAA is
authorized to direct any Federal agency to utilize its available per-
sonnel, supplies, facilities, and other resources to support the
response effort.
A sequence of actions is involved in the determination to
declare an emergency or major disaster. The key step involves
a request from the State Governor to the President through FDAA.
After the Presidential declaration, FDAA establishes field offices
in the affected area. These offices are under the supervision of
the Federal Coordinating Office (FCO), and are staffed with
representatives of appropriate Federal agencies. On-scene
responsibility for the disaster assistance program is divided
between the Regional Director, FDAA, and the FCO appointed by
the FDAA Administrator for each declaration. In the Johnstown
flood, EPA's damage assessments were under the direction of
the Regional FDAA Director, and its spill response under the
FCO.
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The FDAA may establish priorities for the response effort.
Generally, the first priority is to provide assistance to individuals
in the affected population. Emergency work includes work neces-
sary to protect public health and safety and the general cleanup of
the affected area. Permanent work includes a detailed assessment
of damages to and the restoration of public facilities. Damaged
facilities are surveyed by a team consisting of Federal and State
inspectors and a local representative. Federal inspectors are
selected from Federal agencies with specific expertise for various
categories of work (i.e., roads, buildings, utilities, etc). The
damage eligible for Federal assistance is documented on a Damage
Survey Report (DSR). Once approved, the DSR s form the basis
for submitting a project application for Federal assistance.
After the project application is approved, FDAA monitors the
progress of the work. FDAA may request assistance from the
Federal agencies to perform interim inspections and a final inspec-
tion after the restoration work is completed. These inspections
are to ensure that the work is performed to required standards,
and that the scope of the project is consistent with the approved
damage survey. FDAA monitors the program until all eligible
facilities are restored and all the bills are paid.
Federal Water PoUution Control Act of 1972
PL 92-500 provides EPA with comprehensive authority to
develop and manage the nation's water pollution control program.
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Section 311 of the Act deals specifically with the control of oil and
hazardous substances. The intent of Congress is expressed in
Section 311(b)(l), which states: "The Congress hereby declares
that it is the policy of the United States that there should be no
discharges of oil or hazardous substances into or upon the navi-
gable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into
or upon the waters of the contiguous zone. " Other provisions
included in Section 311 are spill prevention, notification, and
recovery, liability requirements, and penalty schedules.
The spill response authorities of Section 311 have been dele-
gated to EPA and the Coast Guard (USCG) in Executive Order
11735. By mutual agreement, EPA has assumed responsibility
for spills on inland waters, while the USCG is responsible for
harbors, coastal waters, and the Great Lakes. Spill response
procedures are guided by the National Oil and Hazardous Sub-
stances Pollution Contingency Plan. The purpose of the Plan is
to provide a coordinated Federal response capability to a dis-
charge of oil or a hazardous substance. The Plan authorizes a
National Response Team (NET) and a series of Regional Response
Teams (RRT), and also assigns specific responsibilities to
member agencies. After a spill has been reported, either EPA
or the USCG will activate the Plan by designating an On-Scene
Coordinator (OSC). The initial responsibility of the OSC is to
encourage the spiller to take appropriate removal actions, in
which case, the OSC assumes the role of a monitor. If,
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however, the spiller refuses to take appropriate removal actions,
or the spill remains unknown, or the spill is caused by an "act of
God, " the OSC can declare a Federal removal action. During
these situations, the OSC is empowered to take whatever actions
are necessary to contain and remove the spilled material. Tech-
nical and administrative support is available to the OSC from the
RRT and the NRT. Costs incurred during a Federal removal
action are paid from the Revolving Pollution Fund authorized by
Section 311(k).
The following provisions of Section 311 were pertinent to the
Johnstown Flood:
o Under the provisions of the National Contingency Plan,
EPA declared a Federal Removal Action and assumed
the role of Federal OSC.
o The oil and hazardous substances spills were caused
by "an act of God, " thereby precluding spill enforce-
ment and liability actions.
o Oil spill response costs were paid from the Section
311(k) Revolving Pollution Fund.
o The regulations designating the hazardous substances
as required by Section 311(b)(2) were not promulgated,
thereby precluding the use of the Revolving Pollution
Fund for the hazardous substances recovery work.
During December 1977, Congress passed a series of amend-
ments to the Water Pollution Control Act. The amendments
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included revisions to Section 311; however, the changes would not
have had any impact on the Johnstown spill response. Congress
also enacted amendments to Section 504 of the Act authorizing the
EPA Administrator "... to provide assistance in emergencies
caused by the release into the environment of any pollutant or other
contaminant including, but not limited to, those which present, or
may reasonably be anticipated to present, an imminent and sub-
stantial danger to the public health or welfare. " A $10 million
contingency fund is authorized to carry out the provisions stated
above. However, there are at present no funds to implement
Section 504, placing EPA in a more difficult position than during the
Johnstown flood because FDAA will not fund operations where an
agency has the authority to take mitigating action.
Had the new Section 504 provisions been in effect and fully
promulgated at the time of the Johnstown Flood, the Administrator
could have made the decision to use the contingency fund to per-
form the hazardous substances removal work. This point is still
speculative, because the criteria for determining "... an immi-
nent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare" have
not been established.
State Authority
Information on State authorities is included in "State Emer-
gency Powers for Hazardous Substances, " prepared under another
part of EPA's study on environmental emergencies.
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FEDERAL RESPONSE
The Federal response to the Johnstown Flood disaster was very
comprehensive, as dictated by the variety of emergency situations
generated by the disaster. FDAA, EPA, and other Federal agen-
cies had statutory responsibility for specific parts of the Federal
response. Additional support was provided by COE, FHWA, and
USCG.
Federal Disaster Assistance Program
On July 21, 1977, President Carter declared the following
Pennsylvania counties a major disaster: Bedford, Blair, Cambria,
Clearfield, Indiana, Jefferson, Somerset, and Westmoreland. The
declaration was occasioned by "... severe storms and flooding
beginning about July 19, 1977. " The disaster declaration qualified
the eight counties for Federal assistance under the Disaster Relief
Act of 1974. The FDAA Administration designated an FCO and
immediately initiated a disaster relief program.
The Johnstown Flood was a typical flash flood. The 9 to 12
inches of rain that fell in the Johnstown area within a 12-hour
period caused the Conemaugh River and its numerous tributaries
to overflow their banks. Johnstown was the hardest hit by the
flood, but at least 24 other smaller communities were also badly
damaged. As a result of the flood, 51 people died; 50, 000 people
were temporarily displaced; 1, 200 people were left homeless;
communications were cut off; electric power was out in many
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areas; roads, buildings, and other facilities were severely damaged;
and the entire flood area was inundated with mud and debris. (See
Figure 1-2.)
Federal Disaster Response
Two field offices were established to direct the Federal disaster
response operation. The Civil Defense Director for Pennsylvania
was located on the campus of the University of Pennsylvania at
Indiana, while the FCO and the FDAA Regional Director were located
in Johnstown.
The three Federal agencies participating in the response opera-
tion had primary areas of responsibility in FDAA's nine damage
assessment categories (Table 1-1).
Table 1-1. Federal Agencies assigned responsibilities for Preparing
Damage Survey Reports During the Johnstown Flood
Response.
Categories Agency
A - Debris clearance Corps of Engineers
B - Protective measures (emergency work) Corps of Engineers
C - Road systems Federal Highway
Administration
D - Water control facilities Corps of Engineers
E - Public buildings and related equipment Corps of Engineers
F - Public utilities (water, sewage
treatment facilities, etc.) EPA
I/
G - Facilities under construction
H - Priva
I - Other
H - Private, nonprofit facilities—
_!/ Assigned to one of the three agencies based on expertise required
and availability of personnel.
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EPA Response
Five EPA Region El personnel reported on-scene on July 21
to make preliminary damage assessments ("windshield surveys")
for water and sewage treatment facilities. The assessments
ranged from minor damage to selected lift stations to extensive
damage to reservoirs, pipeline networks, and treatment facilities.
On July 23, FDAA requested EPA assistance to perform detailed
damage surveys for these facilities. An EPA response team
consisting of one Disaster Assistance Coordinator and five inspec-
tors reported on July 25 and established a base of operations at
the University of Pennsylvania at Indiana. Three more inspectors
reported on August 2 to help expedite the damage assessments.
Each of the eight EPA inspectors worked with a State and a local
representative. The teams were then assigned to survey damaged
facilities identified by prospective applicants for Federal aid and
prepare DSRs. The EPA DAC directed the activities of the eight
teams. Specifically, the DAC assigned inspection priorities,
scheduled the inspection teams, reviewed completed DSRs, main-
tained a log of overtime hours, prepared status reports, and
maintained liaison with FDAA. The EPA response team processed
more than 100 Federal aid applicants and prepared apprxoimately
400 DSRs with an estimated damage value of $9 million.
The EPA damage assessment continued until August 24, when
the DAC and the last inspector were released by FDAA. By that
time, approximately 2, 028 man-hours had been spent on the
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response operation. This estimate will increase over the next year
as FDAA requests Region El to perform followup damage surveys
and prepare final inspection reports as the applicants complete their
restoration projects.
FDAA Region in indicated that it was very pleased with the work
of the EPA response team. Team operations were well-coordinated,
and the DSRs were accurately prepared. The EPA personnel were
highly motivated despite bleak working conditions, and they executed
their assignments in a competent and professional manner.
Oil and Hazardous Substances Response
Initial Spill Report
During the afternoon of July 20, EPA Region HI was notified of
an oil spill in the Johnstown area. The report was made by a
representative of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources. The flood had caused the discharge of oil from many
sources into the Conemaugh River. Oil was reported to be "bank-
to-bank" in many areas. Initial estiamtes of spillage were placed
at 10, 000 gallons -- enough to be designated a major spill under
the National Contingency Plan.
Oil Spill Response
Upon receiving the spill report, EPA Region HI dispatched an
OSC to the spill site to start the removal operation. The spill was
caused by an "act of God, " and was of sufficient size to warrant a
Federal removal action under Section 311. Concurrently, EPA
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Region IH also took the following actions:
o A third party contractor was hired to conduct the spill
removal work under the direction of the OSC.
o The Regional Response Team was activated.
o The USCG 3rd District was contacted regarding use of
the Revolving Pollution Fund (Federal Project Number
1-7-0056 was assigned with an initial funding ceiling of
$40,000).
The criteria used by EPA Region El to select a spill recovery
contractor included rapid response capability, size of the equip-
ment inventory, number of trained response personnel, and level
of available technical expertise. The primary objective for large
spills is the selection of a contractor large enough (equipment and
trained personnel) to limit sub-contracting and with sufficient
technical expertise to minimize direct supervision by the OSC.
Clean Venture, Inc., a cooperative venture of six oil spill con-
tractors, was selected by Region HI for the Johnstown spill. The
3rd District, USCG, negotiated a time and materials contract with
Sealand Restoration, a member of the Clean Venture cooperative.
Negotiations were based on standard rates included in a Basic
Ordering Agreement between Sealand and USCG.
The EPA OSC arrived at the Johnstown airport during the
evening of July 20. All modes of communication in the Johnstown
area were inoperative, precluding contact with other disaster
response officials. The spill recovery work officially began on
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July 21. The EPA OSC established a Command Post in Somerset,
Pennsylvania, 20 miles south of Johnstown. (Somerset was selec-
ted because telephone communications were available.) The spill
recovery contractor arrived on scene on the 21st. At the direction
of the OSC, the contractor established a base of operations in down-
town Johnstown. After initial meetings and a surveillance flight
over the area, the contractor's cleanup teams were dispatched to
the critical spill sites.
The EPA OSC requested operational support from the USCG and
from EPA's Environmental Photographic Interpretation Center,
Warrenton, Virginia. The USCG Atlantic Strike Team arrived on
scene on July 21, and, at the direction of the EPA OSC, established
a base of operations at the Johnstown airport. The team set up a
mobile cmmunications van and established a communications net-
work for the spill recovery operation. The team also assisted the
EPA OSC by monitoring the performance of the spill recovery
teams and by providing other technical and administrative support
as requested by the OSC. Aerial photographs were taken of the
entire spill area. The photos were analyzed by experts at the EPA
lab and then hand-carried to the OSC, who used them to develop
cleanup strategies, establish priorities, and plan access routes.
Aerial photos and interpretation services were also provided to
FDAA to assist with its relief effort.
As directed in the National Contingency Plan, the EPA OSC
was responsible for all decisions pertaining to the spill recovery
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operation. The OSC established overall cleanup strategies,
assigned priorities, solved problems, and directed the recovery
contractor. The OSC also spent many hours in meetings with
officials of other Federal, State, and local agencies to coordinate
EPA's spill recovery role with other disaster assistance work.
Routine status reports were provided to the FDAA's FCO, who
had lead responsibility for coordinating the various Federal
response programs.
Hazardous Substances Spill and Explosive Vapors
During the oil spill recovery operation, numerous propane
cylinders and drums containing various unidentified liquids were
found in the flood area. Because the liquids were later identified
as hazardous substances and not oil, they could not be removed
under the Section 311(k) Revolving Pollution Fund. Compounding
this situation was the presence of explosive vapors throughout the
flood area. An explosion at the Royal plate Glass Co. killed one
employee.
To cope with the hazardous substances and explosive vapors
problems, the EPA OSC requested a Mission Assignment from
FDAA and received verbal authorization to proceed on July 26.
This was subsequently confirmed by an official letter dated
August 22 and specifying a funding ceiling of $350, 000. FDAA
initially was hesitant to fund the hazardous substances response
because FDAA regulations require that agencies fund work within
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the limits of their own statutory authority. FDAA argued that the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act authorized EPA to respond to
hazardous substances spills, and that the lack of regulations desig-
nating hazardous substances was an EPA administrative problem.
EPA's position was that the hazardous substances response had to
be performed, and that the only feasible vehicle for accomplishing
the work was via a Mission Assignment.
To expedite the hazardous substances response and minimize
coordination problems, the OSC retained the same contractor to
perform the recovery work. Split accounting procedures segre-
gated costs charged to the Section 311(k) Pollution Fund and the
Mission Assignment. It was initially assumed that both the con-
tracting and the coordination of final payments could be handled
by Region HI, and commitments were made to the contractor to
initiate the work. This assumption later proved incorrect because
the dollar amount commitment exceeded the emergency contracting
authority of the Region. As a result, a contract had to be
negotiated between EPA Headquarters and the cleanup company.
The OSC was required to solicit a proposal from the contractor
three months after the work was actually completed. In addition,
a justification for a noncompetitive procurement had to be prepared.
These documents were subsequently reviewed and processed by the
EPA Headquarters contract staff. A fixed price contract was
awarded to Sealand on February 17, 1978, six months after the
completion of the cleanup work. This situation is currently being
reviewed within EPA, and an emergency contracting procedure
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will be developed for future EPA-funded response operations.
To deal with hazardous substances, the EPA team took a number
of concurrent actions. The spill recovery contractor collected and
removed the drums of hazardous substances. The drums were
stockpiled at a temporary staging area located at the Bethlehem
Steel facility. The State of Pennsylvania was tasked by FDAA to
identify the unknown liquids and dispose of them in an acceptable
manner. Some drums were returned to their owners, while others
that could not be traced were placed in industrial waste landfills.
The cost incurred by Pennsylvania were reimbursed by FDAA based
on a project application.
After the Royal Plate Glass explosion, EPA and Johnstown
officials took steps to prevent any more such incidents. Sixty-five
commercial and industrial sites were identified within the flood
area that might have hazardous materials present. Each site was
subsequently inspected to see that no problems existed. Where
needed, recommendations were made to the facility owners. In
addition to the prevention program, a procedure was established
to investigate reports of explosive vapors. In coordination "with the
Fire Department, each report was investigated with explosive
meters. When positive readings were obtained, the problem was
traced to its source and corrected. One such report lead to the
discovery of a gasoline spill; 1, 300 gallons were recovered and a
storage tank was excavated and thoroughly flushed. At least 100
reports were investigated under this program.
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A chemist from the EPA Industrial Environmental Laboratory
in Edison, New Jersey, was dispatched to Johnstown to assist the
OSC with the hazardous materials response. This individual
directed the work discussed above and also maintained close
coordination with State and local officials. This organizational
feature again freed the OSC to direct and coordinate the entire
response effort.
Spill Response Summary
The oil and hazardous materials response was completed on
August 9, 1977. As many as 80 people (Federal, State, local, and
contractor employees) were directly involved during the peak of the
cleanup effort. A total of 176, 000 gallons of oil, 120 cubic yards
of compacted oily debris, 500 drums of hazardous liquids, and 500
propane cylinders were recovered. Of the costs of the response,
$191, 000 was charged to the Revolving Pollution Fund and $265, 000
was charged to FDAA. A total of 1, 295 man-hours was expended
by EPA during the response operation.
The total spill response effort was very complex. Although the
various response operations (oil spill response, explosive vapors
inspections, etc.) can be divided into categories in a report to
improve clarity, it does not reflect the real world. The EPA OSC
and the operations team were required to deal with these problems
on a daily basis. Compounding the problem was the extensive
damage in the area which often precluded routine communications
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and accessibility to problem areas. As a result, the spill response
program required close coordination and careful directions to get
the job done while minimizing the risk to personnel.
STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE
State Actions
Disaster assistance coordination within the State of Pennsylvania
is the responsibility of the State Council on Civil Defense. When a
disaster occurs, the Council is responsible for:
o Performing preliminary damage assessments.
o Compiling information to support a State request for a
Federal disaster declaration.
o Providing orientation to State applicants for Federal
disaster assistance.
o Coordinating the activities of other State agencies.
o Providing State representatives for Federal/State damage
survey teams.
o Submitting project applications.
o Supplying long-term coordination of the relief effort.
In addition, the Council prepares and activates disaster operations
plans, and maintains a network of Civil Defense coordinators in
local municipalities.
Disaster Response
During the Johnstown Flood, the Council on Civil Defense per-
formed the general functions listed above. The State Disaster
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Operations and Recovery Plans were both activated.
Operational support was provided by the Pennsylvania National
Guard, the State Department of Environmental Resources (DER),
the State Police, and a number of other agencies. The National
Guard and State Police were involved in enforcing the Martial Law
declared by the Governor and providing emergency assistance to
the affected population. DER had the most active relationship with
EPA during the disaster response. DER officials participated in
the damage survey teams for water and sewage treatment facilities,
and one DER representative was assigned to the OSC's spill opera-
tions team. This helped coordination between the OSC and the State
and local governments. Finally, DER was responsible for identi-
fication and disposal of the hazardous materials recovered by the
spill contractor.
State Response Critique
Eight days after the flood, the Speaker of the State House of
Representatives appointed an "Ad Hoc Committee on the Eight
County Flood of July 19-20, 1977. " The Committee was charged
to "secure whatever information you can concerning how the House
of Representatives may be helpful in alleviating the suffering
caused by this flood. " This was subsequently broadened to include
recommendations to reduce the burden of future disasters. The
Committee went to the scene for an evaluation of the situation. In
addition, it conducted three days of hearings with testimony from
State Cabinet Officers.
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The Committee determined that a severe lack of coordination
and cooperation plagued the State response effort. Other problems
cited included communications, failure to carry out disaster plans,
and the unavailability of disaster relief funds. The Committee's
review has resulted in a "legislative package" that will be intro-
duced in the legislature during the 1978 session. The proposed
bills include establishment of emergency funds to provide financial
relief to disaster areas. The State has also taken a more active
role in COE's flood control program and has initiated a State
program for management of flood plains. These efforts should
have the dual impact of reducing the probability of flood-related
disasters and improving the State's capability to respond when a
disaster does occur.
The Ad Hoc Committee Report did not mention the Johnstown
oil spill incident. Apparently, the spiill lost its significance when
compared to the damage caused by the flood. For this reason, it
is doubtful that the Johnstown Flood will provide any impetus for
new oil spill legislation.
Local Actions
The response of the local municipalities was severely limited
by the damage caused by the flood. For example, the City of
Johnstown lost much of its communications and fire-fighting
equipment. Despite this, the municipalities did help coordinate
the disaster assistance programs within their areas. Each
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municipality provided inspectors for the damage survey teams
within their areas. In addition, the Johnstown Fire, Health, and
Police Departments played an active role in investigation of the
explosive vapors problem. Local personnel took the reports of
hazardous substances and explosive vapors at a Command Post in
the Mayor's office. The reports were sent to the OSC's operations
teams and given priorities on a "most-urgent-need" basis. Each
report was then investigated by teams of EPA and local personnel.
Close coordination was maintained throughout the operation with
FDAA and DER officials.
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR RESPONSE
The response efforts of the private sector were primarily
directed at providing emergency services for displaced residents.
Top priority was given to locating missing relatives, making
arrangements for the dead, and salvaging homes and personal be-
longings. Placed in this perspective, the EPA roles of spill
control and damage assessment were of minimal importance to the
local populace.
Many of the local businesses did get involved in the hazardous
substances/explosive vapors program. Whenever possible,
chemical drums and propane cylinders recovered in the flood were
returned to their owners. Other businesses took advantage of the
explosive vapors inspection program. The gas and electric utility
companies worked closely with the EPA team. Both utilties had
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shut off service to the Johnstown area. Service was restored only
after areas had been certified to be vapor-free by the Fire Depart-
ment. In addition, the gas company investigated all reports of
natural gas odors. This systematic procedure helped to minimize
the risk of explosion.
RESOURCES AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS
Total Resources
Considerable resources were expended as a direct result of
the Johnstown Flood. Included are personnel and equipment from
the numerous Federal, State, and local agencies involved in the •
response, personnel and equipment of private contractors, and the
local populace who worked to restore their homes and businesses.
Records documenting the total resources expended as a result of
the flood were not obtained. However, it is assumed that the
total could easily exceed 1 million man-hours.
EPA Resources
The EPA expended about 3, 300 man-hours in its response to
the Johnstown Flood, of which 30 percent were for hazardous duty.
(Table 1-2.) The EPA Disaster Assistance Program is executed
by the Regions on a collateral duty basis. Personnel are selected
based on their familiarity with the design and construction of
water and sewage treatment facilities. For the Johnstown Flood,
response team members were selected from various operating
divisions within Region DI. The oil and hazardous materials spill
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TABLE 1-2. EPA Resources Committed to the Johnstown Flood
Man-Hours Committed Spill Response
Regular
Overtime
Total
Hazardous Duty
Percent of Total
520
775
1295
(962)
75%
Disaster Assistance Total
1216
812
2028
(13)
0.6%
1736
1587
3323
(975)
30%
Man-Hours Committed by Division:
Surveillance & Analysis
Enforcement
Water
I/
Other
1110 •
0
0
185
500
910
618
0
1610
910
618
185
!_/ Edison Laboratory and Public Affairs Division
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response was conducted by the Environmental Emergency Branch,
Surveillance and Analysis Division, EPA Region El. Support was
provided by the Wheeling Field Office, Surveillance and Analysis
Division, and the Edison Laboratory. It should be noted that the
spill response severely depleted the resources of the Environ-
mental Emergency Branch of the Surveillance and Analysis
Division. Had another major spill occurred within Region III, it
is doubtful that an effective response could have been organized
without outside assistance.
Financial Aspects
Flood Damage Costs
The total damage caused by the flood is reported by the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives to be in excess of $300
million. Financial relief to defray these losses will come pri-
marily from flood insurance and Federal grants and loans.
According to the Pennsylvania House of Representatives' Report,
these benefits are estimated at $25 million and $263 million, re-
spectively. The public assistance grants approved by FDAA total
$56 million, of which about $13 million were for water and sewage
treatment facilities processed by EPA inspectors (Table 1-3). A
review of individual DSRs showed repair estimates ranging from
less than $100 to more than $1 million. These costs are indica-
tive of the types of facility restoration costs which could be
encountered during a Section 504 action.
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In addition, the State and local municipalities incurred
considerable expense in mounting the relief effort, but these figures
are not readily available.
Table 1-3. Summary of FDAA Public Assistance Grants as
of July 1978.
Category Dollars
A $ 7, 310,000
B $ 3,813,000
C 10,700,000
D 7,554,000
E . 4,976,000
F 13,624,000
G 115,000
H 7,400,000
I 854,000
Total public assistance $56, 346, 000
Finally, FDAA reimbursed the expenses of the Federal agencies
asked to participate in the response. Except for EPA, these figures
were not obtained. However, it can be assumed that the expenses
of FHWA are roughly the same as those for the EPA disaster assist-
ance response. COE had a larger role, and its expenses might be
equal to the EPA disaster response plus the hazardous substances
response.
EPA Response Costs
EPA response costs total about $500, 000 (Table 1-4). The
normal salaries of the response personnel are not eligible for reim-
bursement, the rationale being that the agency would have incurred
the cost regardless of the response. The cost is included in the
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Nonreimbursi b ! e costs:
Regular Hours
Reimburs i b le costs
Overtime
Hazardous duty pay
Per Diem
Travel
Other
Subtota 1
EPA expenses to be reim-
bursed by Oil Spill Pollution
Fund or by FDAA
Total amount charged to Oil
Spill Pollution Fund and to
FDAA.
Total response costs
Oil Spi 1 1 Response
Hazardous Substances
Spill Response
$6,760-^
$ 7,669
2,175
3,204
1,1
9
479
$14,646
$5,858-/
$191 ,000-S
$8,788-/
$271 , I65-/
Disaster Assistance
$15, 808-/
$ 9,524
29
7,596
1 ,217
976
$19,342
$19,342
$19,342
Totr- 1
$22,568
$17,193
2,204
10,800
2,336
1 ,455
$33,988
$33,988
$481 ,507
$504,075-/
I
Li-1
Notes: J_/ Based on salary for GS-12, Step 5, with a 10$ escalator for fringe benefits,
Equivalent to $13 per hour.
27 Based on 60-40$ split between FDAA and Oil Spill Pollution Fund.
3_/ Includes reimbursible expenses plus contractor costs.
4/ Summation of $22, 568 and $481,507.
TABLE 1-4. EPA Resoonse Costs for the Johnstown Flood.
-------
this cost regardless of the response. The cost is included in the
$500, 000 as an estimate of the value of the normal work that was
not accomplished because of the response. In tabulating the
reimbursible costs for the spill response, it was virtually impos-
sible to differentiate between the oil and the hazardous substances
work. For billing purposes, FDAA agreed to a 60/40 split, which
was based on the percentage of the direct spill removal costs
charged to the MA and Section 311(k) Pollution Fund.
PROBLEMS, ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS
The Johnstown Flood required a comprehensive response effort
by EPA. Neither the oil spill response nor the disaster assistance
response in themselves was very large. But when the two were
combined, and added to the hazardous substances/explosive vapors
response and the general conditions prevailing in Johnstown, the
6
total problem presented a significant challenge to Region EH
response personnel. Although on the whole the response was well
executed, it was not without problems.
The Johnstown Flood was unique for EPA, in that it involved a
variety of response actions. Because of this, a number of new
problems were encountered. These are highlighted below so that
solutions can be developed and implemented in anticipation of
future response actions.
Hazardous Substances Response
Perhaps the most serious issue encountered during the
1-32
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Johnstown Flood concerned funding for the hazardous substances
response. Because the hazardous substances regulations required
by Section 311 were not promulgated, EPA was forced to negotiate
with FDAA for an MA. FDAA was initially reluctant to provide the
MA because the hazardous substances response was within EPA's
statutory authority. Had FDAA not provided the MA, EPA would
have had to fund the response out of its operating budget.
Even if the hazardous substances regulations had been in effect,
they might not have been adequate for the Johnstown response.
Under the regulations, the use of the 311(k) Pollution Fund for spill
response may be limited to designated substances. During
Johnstown, many of the substances were unknown, and were not
identified until after they were recovered. This raises the fol-
lowing questions:
o Who pays for analysis to identify unknown substances ?
o Who pays for analysis once it is known that the materials
are not on the designated list ?
o Who pays for the recovery of materials subsequently
determined not to be on the designated list?
o How will an OSC coordinate the recovery of hazardous
substances drums when some contain materials on the
list while others contain materials not on the list ?
During the Johnstown Flood, the following types of materials
were recovered: propane cylinders, acetylene cylinders, and drums
of potassium permanganate, sulfuric acid, auto paint, motor oil,
1-33
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chlorine-containing powders, and degr easing solutions. Of the
1, 000 drums and cylinders recovered, less than 50 percent
contained materials included on the list of designated hazardous
substances. Applying this percentage to the hazardous sub-
stances recovery costs, $135, 000 may not have been eligible for
funding under the 311(k) Pollution Fund. This total does not
include the cost of chemical analyses to identify the unknown
materials, which was done by the State under an MA.
This case illustrates the need for negotiations between USCG
and EPA regarding use of the Pollution Fund prior to implemen-
tation of the hazardous substances regulations. The regulations
were promulgated on March 13, 1978, and were scheduled to go
into effect on September 11, 1978, for vessels and on June 12,
1978, for all other facilities. However, on August 12, 1978, the
hazardous substances regulations were ruled to be invalid in a
decision rendered by the U. S. District Court for the Western
District of louisiana. This case also illustrates the importance
of implementing the emergency provisions of Section 504. These
provisions might have been applicable in Johnstown to finance the
recovery and analysis of the non-designated materials. Together,
the hazardous substances regulations and the Section 504 provi-
sions would give Regional OSCs maximum flexibility to respond
quickly to environmental emergencies.
1-34
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Emergency Contracting Procedures
When FDAA verbally agreed to finance the hazardous substances
work, the EPA OSC immediately initiated actions to contract with
the firm performing the oil spill recovery work. An EPA contract
was required because the FDAA funds were transferred directly to
EPA. A misunderstanding regarding proper EPA contracting pro-
cedures resulted in a six-month delay in formalizing the contract
and paying the firm for the recovery work.
An EPA OSC normally uses USCG contracting procedures for
response actions funded by the Section 311(k) Pollution Fund. This
is possible because the USCG is charged with the responsibility of
administering the Fund. Under the procedure, OSCs have "obli-
gation authority" up to $50, 000, which is sufficient to engage a
contractor and start the cleanup operation. Concurrent with this
action, the OSC will contact the appropriate USCG District Office.
Within a specified period, a USCG contracting officer will contact
the contractor and negotiate a time and materials contract, there-
by, formalizing the OSC's initial agreement. Contractor selection
procedures will vary depending on the situation. In areas where
a number of qualified contractors are available, selection may be
done on a rotational basis. In most cases, however, the selection
will be dictated by the size, location, or complexity of the spill
the availability of qualified contractors. In all cases, the author-
ity for sole-source, negotiated contracting is based on the "public
exigency" exception in Federal Procurement Regulations.
1-35
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The EPA has no comparable procedure. The EPA OSC has no
authority to obligate EPA funds for an emergency response. The
Regional Offices may initiate emergency procurements for $10, 000
or less, using small purchase procedures. However, for larger
procurements, Headquarters must be notified. This requirement
could cause unnecessary delays during normal duty hours and is
totally unacceptable during off-duty hours.
With the advent of the emergency funds in the 1977 Amendments
to FWPCA and the Safe Drinking Water Act, it is imperative that
EPA develop a streamlined procedure. The USCG procedure has
proven effective in actual use and is well understood by EPA
response personnel. Accordingly, strong consideration should be
given to adopting it for EPA use.
EPA Disaster Assistance Response Organization
During discussions with FDAA officials, some minor problems
were noted in obtaining response commitments through the EPA
Region El DAC. Responsibilities for disaster assistance coordi-
nation are placed too low in the organizational hierarchy to commit
resources and effectively mobilize a response. Consequently, the
FDAA request must be relayed up the chain-of-command for action.
To resolve this problem, EPA Regions should appoint a DAC
with sufficient authority to commit resources immediately and to
mobilize a response. In addition, the Regions should consider
appointing selected personnel to serve on a Disaster Response
1-36
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Team. Team alternates should also be designated to cover for
personnel on travel or leave. The alternates could supplement
primary members during major response actions or provide
rotational relief during extended field operations. Finally, the
Region should establish procedures to ensure that Response Team
members can be issued travel authorizations and advances on
very short notice. Further guidance on these issues will be
included in the EPA Disaster Operations Manual, to be published
during Fiscal Year 1978.
1-37
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E. PCB EPISODE — DITTMER, MISSOURI/WILSONVILLE, ILLINOIS
CASE STUDY SUMMARY
The Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCB) episode involving Dittmer
Missouri, and Wilsonville, Illinois, (Figure n-1) is an example
of a timely environmental incident that raises the issue of local
resistance to the proper disposal of hazardous materials, partic-
ularly those that originate in another State. The study involves
two separate problems. The first was the technical issue of proper
cleanup once the environmental contamination was known to exist.
This was largely an engineering problem that was handled by the
Environmental Emergency Branch of the Region VIZ Office in
Kansas City, Missouri. Subsequent to the cleanup operation, dis-
posal of the Dittmer waste material (soil contaminated with PCBs,
«
oil, and other chemicals) become an issue. The soil was sealed
in steel drums and shipped to a site in Wilsonville. In a highly
emotional atmosphere, the citizens of Wilsonville filed suit against
the owner of the facility to prevent disposal of PCB-contaminated
soil.
In March 1977, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources
(MDNR) began investigating citizen complaints concerning the
dumping of oil and other unknown materials into an open pit near
Dittmer. In early April, MDNR requested the assistane of EPA
Region VII. In its initial inspection of the site, EPA deter-
mined that an unreported oil spill had occurred; in addition,
E-1
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ST. LOUISA WILSONVILLE
,/•
DITTMER
FIGURE 11-1. AREA INVOLVED IN THE DITTMER, MO.,/
WILSONVILLE, ILL., |PCB EPISODE
-------
samples taken at the site showed high concentrations of PCBs.
The Regional Response Team (RRT), activated under the
National Contingency Plan, inspected the site and discovered
sufficient evidence to declare a Federal action to remove oil
contamination under authority of Section 311 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, (FWCA).
Inspection showed that oil and other chemicals had spilled
from the open pit and were leaching into a nearby stream. Use
of the Environmental Emergency Response Unit (EERU) in
Edison, New Jersey, was, therefore, requested for treatment
of the stream. The stream was dammed above the spill site
and the clean water diverted through plastic pipe and released
downstream of the pit. Water continuing to seep through con-
»
taminated soil into the stream was contained below the pit by a
second dam and treated by the EERU. A mobile lab was set up
for monitoring the treatment operation and to analyze various
samples. The contaminated pit soil was then excavated and placed
in steel drums, which were sealed and transported to Wilsonville
for disposal. Safety precautions were necessary throughout the
operation to prevent exposure to the hazardous substances.
Excavation of the contaminated soil and treatment of the
stream water solved the environmental problem posed by the
Dittmer dump site. The disposal of the material, however,
created an additional and unanticipated problem. Earthline Co. had
been authorized by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency to
E-3
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accept the Dittmer wastes at its disposal site. When citizens
of Wilsonville learned of the action, they obtained a temporary
restraining order from a local judge to prevent disposal of the
waste at the Wilsonville site. After a lengthy court trial a
permanent injunction preventing hazardous wastes disposal at
the Wilsonville site was granted.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Date
March 24, 1977
April 4, 1977
April 5', 1977
April 7, 1977
April 8, 1977
April 11, 1977
April 12, 1977
April 13, 1977
April 18, 1977
April 22, 1977
April 25, 1977
April 29, 1977
Cleanup
Event
Missouri Department of Natural Resources
(MDNR) begins Dittmer investigation.
Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) detected.
MDNR requests EPA assistance.
EPA inspects Dittmer pit.
Regional Response Team (RRT) meets for
first time; On-Scene Coordinator (OSC)
appointed. Pit owner denies permission
for EPA to reinspect site.
Search warrant obtained.
Environmental Emergency Response Unit
(EERU) arrives; cleanup begins.
Disposal contract signed with Earthline Co.
First wastes shipped.
Waste shipments halted.
RRT meets for second time.
Removal of stream debris begins.
Waste shipments resume.
H-4
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May 7, 1977
May 11, 1977
May 29, 1977
June 1, 1977
June 3, 1977
Date
April 12, 1977
April 13, 1977
April 15, 1977
April 18, 1977
April 19, 1977
April 21, 1977
April 26, 1977
April 27, 1977
April 29, 1977
May 26, 1977
May 28, 1977
May 29, 1977
May 31, 1977
June 6, 1977
EERU released.
Mobile lab released.
Final wastes shipped.
Dittmer pit repairs completed.
Final RRT meeting; cleanup completed.
Disposal
Event
Disposal contract signed.
First waste shipment delivered.
Wilsonville citizens meet.
Wilsonville Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) granted. Wilsonville citizen suit
filed. Waste shipments halted.
Earthline Co. moves to dissolve TRO.
Earthline motion denied; Earthline appeals
denial.
Stay of injunction filed; TRO temporarily
lifted.
Stay of injunction amended to allow disposal
under certain conditions.
Waste shipments resumed.
Illinois Attorney General files suite against
Earthline.
Governor of Illinois issues moratorium on
disposal of out-of-State wastes.
Final Dittmer wastes shipped.
Final delivery of wastes attempted.
Wilsonville trial begins.
E-5
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June 8, 1977 EPA inspects Earthline facility.
June 21, 1977 Final waste delivery completed.
July 19, 1977 First draft of Earthline evaluation
completed.
October 15, 1977 Earthline evaluation completed.
December 16, 1977 Earthline evaluation submitted to court.
December 22, 1977 Earthline evaluation rejected.
August 14, 1978 Wilsonville trial ends; Permanent injunc-
tion granted.
FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY
Section 311(c) of FWPCA authorizes removal of any oil or
hazardous substances that have been discharged into the navigable
waterways of the United States.
Section 311(k) of the FWPCA authorizes expenditure of funds
to eliminate the environmental insult caused by the discharge.
Furthermore, the party responsible for the discharge must either
assert that he will not initiate proper mitigating activities, or
determination must be made that the responsible party is in-
capable of initiating those activities. The Dittmer episode
satisfied both of these criteria. First, oil within the disposal
pit was observed leaching into a nearby creek, a tributary of the
Meramec River. Oil originating in the pit ultimately worked its
way into the river, navigable waterway as defined by FWPCA.
Secondly, EPA determined that the owner of the pit was incapable
of initiating proper mitigating activities. Consequently, Federal
n-s
-------
cleanup was declared and the action financed by the Revolving
Pollution Fund provided by Section 311(k).
With regard to the litigation surrounding the disposal aspect
of the case, the original complaint filed by Wilsonville citizens
was based upon a common law nuisance doctrine. They argued
that the disposal of PCBs constituted a nuisance in that it repre-
sented an unreasonable hazard to the health of the community.
The Illinois Attorney General based his action on General Illinois
Statutes, Section 101 (d), Chapter 111, 1/2, Illinois Revised Statutes,
which prohibit depositing on land any material that may ultimately
case water pollution.
FEDERAL RESPONSE
In March 1977, MDNR received a citizen complaint concerning
the untidy operation of a disposal pit. Located in Dittmer, the
pit was used for solid waste disposal conducted in conjunction with .
a container reconditioning business. The complaint, about odors,
fire, obnoxious smoke, and the deteriorating water quality of an
adjacent stream, was investigated by MDNR beginning on March
24. The investigation determined that various containers were
being emptied into a pit adjacent to an intermittent branch of
Calvey Creek, a tributary of the Meramec River. The containers
were then prepared for resale. MDNR took several samples of
material within the pit and forwarded them to EPA Region "VTI,
where analysis showed high concentrations of PCBs (1. 8 percent).
E-7
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On April 4, MDNR requested EPA's assistance in resolving the
situation.
On April 5, EPA Region "VH officials inspected the site and
found that a coverup of the disposal operation had begun. All
containers had been removed, the top layer of soil had been
removed, the pit had been filled in, and the area had been covered
with straw. However, the inspectors did observe miscellaneous
dead aquatic life below the dump area. The stream adjacent to the
pit contained puddles of black oil, and oil films and sheens were
visible through an extensive section of the stream below the pit
area. Stream sediment was observed, and an objectionable odor
pervaded the entire area.
An emergency meeting of the RRT was held on April 7. The
U.S.* Coast Guard (USCG), MDNR, and Illinois EPA representatives
were also in attendance. After discussion of observations made
at Dittmer, an On-Scene Coordinator was appointed and charged to
ameliorate the environmental insults caused by the Dittmer disposal
site.
That afternoon, the RRT attempted to reconvene at the Dittmer
site to develop a response plan. The owner of the property, how-
ever, denied entry to the site. A search warrant was, therefore,
requested and obtained the evening of April 8. In the meantime,
an experienced contractor was retained to dig exploratory trenches.
On April 9, search warrant in hand, the OSC returned to the
site with a backhoe operated by the contractor. Although the
H-8
-------
area had been freshly covered with straw and dirt, there was
visual evidence that oil had entered the creek bed. Three ex-
ploratory trenches were then dug, yielding overwhelming evidence
of the existence of the disposal pit and further entry of oil into
the creek. On the basis of these findings and the fact that the
site owner was incapable of a proper cleanup, a Federal removal
action was declared by the OSC. The response plan called for:
o Installing a carbon absorption unit to remove the con-
taminants continuing to enter the stream through springs
and washing from debris and sediment.
o Building two dams. The upper dam was to contain the
clean, uncontaminated stream water, which would then
be diverted around the pit and released downstream.
» The lower dam was to contain the contaminated water
for treatment by the EERU.
o Assembling, through a contractor, an experienced crew
with equipment to excavate and package the contaminated
soil in the pit.
o Locating a secure landfill, with proper permits from MDNR,
accept the contaminated soil.
Cleanup began on April 11 as personnel and equipment, in-
cluding EEHU, arrived. On April 12, a contract was signed with
Earthline for disposal of the waste; and on April 13, the first
truckload of contaminated soil was sent to the company's landfill
in Wilsonville.
H-9
-------
The soil was contaminated with a complex mixture of many
materials. An oily substance was evident in the pit, floating
in the stream, and retained by debris and sediment in the
stream. PCBs had already been identified as a major contami-
nation in the mixture of oil and solvents. As the work pro-
ceeded it became apparent that the original estimate for the
cleanup ($50, 000) would be greatly exceeded. This was due to
the large amount of soil that had to be excavated and the need to
remove contaminated debris from the stream.
A second RRT meeting was held at the site on April 22 to
consider expanding the cleanup effort. Team members viewing
the site realized the disposal pit operator supplied misleading
information. The area was much larger than originally reported;
the sdil in places was so saturated with oily materials that oil
collected in pools in the pit, and drums buried in the pit ruptur-
ed when handled during removal attempts. Although the dam/
by-pass arrangement was effectively reducing the amount of water
requiring treatment, the debris continued to contaminate the
stream water, and had to be removed. On the basis of these
observations, it was agreed that the Revolving Pollution Fund would
apply until all oil was removed.
On April 25, removal of stream debris began. This material
was incorporated into the pit soil and packaged for landfill dis-
posal. The EERU had to be released for other work so the OSC,
designed a filtration and carbon absorption unit for installation on the
H-10
-------
stream bank; construction of the unit was completed on May 6 and
the EERU was released the next day. First analysis of effluent
from the filter unit indicated that 98 percent of the contaminants
were removed. The operation was then routine, and the mobile
lab was released on May 11. The last drums of contaminated
soil were removed on May 29. A total of 4, 318 55-gallon drums
of excavated material were removed during the operation.
Repairs to the pit were begun by filling it with clay exca-
vated from a nearby bank. The clay was firmly packed, then
covered with bentonite, which was stabilized with another layer
of firmly packed clay. These repairs were completed on June 1.
On June 3, a final RRT meeting was held to affirm the completion.
STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE
4
State and local involvement in the Dittmer episode was minimal.
In response to a citizen complaint, MDNR initiated an investigation
into the activities at the Dittmer disposal site. MDNR quickly
determined that the scope of the problem was beyond its capabil-
ity and requested the assistance of EPA. Once EPA assessed the
problem and determined that a Federal cleanup action was neces-
sary, the operation was conducted totally under Federal auspices.
Missouri's assistance in the operation was limited to locating a
suitable site for disposal of the contaminated soil.
During the disposal stage, both the Village of Wilsonville
and the State of Illinois became actively involved in attempts to
prevent the disposal of the Dittmer wastes at Wilsonville. These
n-n
-------
activities took the form of legal action and are described in de-
tail in the following section.
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR RESPONSE
The primary public response to the activities surrounding the
Dittmer episode came in the form of citizen opposition to the
disposal of the excavated Dittmer wastes. Earthline (a subsidiary
of SCA Services, Inc., Headquartered in Boston) owns and operates
a landfill for chemical wastes in Wilsonville, a village of 700 located
in downstate Illinois, approximately 50 miles northeast of St. Louis.
earthline was selected because if was a duly permitted site that
could safely contain chemical wastes and it was close to the Dittmer
pit.
On April 13, the first truckload of excavated waste was
shipped to Earthline for disposal. When the citizens of Wilsonville
learned of this, they became enraged. The leader of the oppo-
sition was a local minister who had been preaching about the
danger posed to the community byPCBs. The Wilsonville resi-
dents learned that PCBs were a highly toxic material and regarded
disposal in their community as unacceptable. On April 15, a public
meeting organized by the minister attracted particially the entire
village, as well as residents from the surrounding area. The meeting
focused on the health hazards posed both by transporting PCBs
through Wilsonville en route to Earthline and by disposing of the wastes
at the nearby Earthline facility. The atmosphere of the meeting was
highly emotional; the participants became very vocal in their oppo-
E-12
-------
sition to the PCB disposal. This fervor was translated into a legal
reality by two actions taken on April 18. First, the citizens of
WilsonvUle requested and obtained a temporary restraining order
(TRO) from a local judge to halt the disposal of PCB wastes at the
Earthline facility. At the same time the citizens and other parties
filed suit against Earthline for the same purpose. The suit charged
that the Earthline disposal operation constituted a nuisance and repre-
sented a hazard to the health of the Wilsonville community. The
plaintiffs in the case are the citizens of Wilsonville, Macoupin
County, and the Macoupin County Farmers Association. The defend-
ant is the Earthline Company. The Illinois EPA and U.S. E'PA
were granted status as amicus curiae, friends of the court.
Earthline responded on April 19 with a motion to dissolve the
TRO. 'On April 21, the motion was denied and Earthline appealed
the decision in an appellate court. On April 27, the appellate
court amended the-TRQ and allowed shipment of the wastes to
continue with certain restrictions. Earthline was required to post
a $1 million bond to cover the costs of removal of the PCB wastes
in the event it lost the Wilsonville citizen suite; waste deliveries
were allowed only between the hours 8:00 a. m. and 4:30 p. m.,
with Saturday and Sunday deliveries prohibited; and Earthline was
not permitted to bury the wastes normally but only to cover them
temporarily. This latter restriction was lifted on July 18. Waste
shipments resumed on April 29 and the Wilsonville trial was
scheduled to begin June 6.
H-13
-------
These events generated a substantial amount of publicity.
The situation was reported on a national evening news broadcast.
Illinois officials came under increasing pressure to protect the
public from what was perceived as a serious threat to the public
safety in the form of hazardous waste disposal facilities located in
the State. On May 26, the Illinois Attorney General (who had been
representing the Illinois EPA in its position as amicus) filed suit
against Earthline to terminate its waste disposal operation com-
pletely. This was a broader action than that of the Wilsonville
citizens; their suit was restricted to PCB disposal. The Attorney
General's action was based on an Illinois statute prohibiting
depositing materials on land which may cause water pollution; the
suit contends materials buried at the Earthline facility leach into
and p611ute ground water. This suit was combined with the
citizen suit, and the combined action was to be argued before the
same local judge who had granted th original TRO. On May 31,
the Governor of Illinois imposed a 45-day moratorium on impor-
tation of hazardous wastes into the State for disposal in Illinois
facilities.
These events further impeded the disposal of the Dittmer
wastes. The last shipment arrived at Earthline on May 31.
The recent action of the Attorney General and Governor of Illinois
had no bearing on the legality of the disposal of the Dittmer wastes,
which had been duly permitted a month earlier. That, however,
was not the understanding of the citizens of Wilsonville. As the final
H-14
-------
delivery was attempted, Wilsonville residents blocked the entrance
to the Earthline facility and demanded that the trucks turn around.
The OSC was supervising this delivery; an he decided it would
be in the best interests of all concerned to accede to the demands
and store the wastes elsewhere. Final delivery was subsequently
made on June 21 without incident.
Trial Issues
The central issue at the trial focused on the technical ability
of the Earthline facility to dispose of hazardous materials in a
safe and environmentally sound manner. The basic arguments of
the plaintiffs were:
o The possibility of adverse chemical reactions between
incompatible wastes accepted for disposal by Earthline
presents a danger to the Wilsonville community. Specific-
ically, they have raised the prospect of explosion and
chemical fire that would generate toxic fumes.
o The geological character of the soil underlying the Earthline
site is not suitable for safe disposal of hazardous wastes.
The argument focuses on the danger of leaching, which
would lead to ground water contamination.
o Through its permit procedure, the Illinois EPA did not
properly evaluate the geological suitability of the Earthline
facility as a site for safe disposal of hazardous wastes.
o Odors and dust from the daily activities performed at
Earthline are hazardous to local health.
E-15
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To support its contentions, the plaintiffs relied heavily on
expert testimony to defend their arguments scientifically. Pre-
senting their own expert witnesses, the defendants argued that the
Earthline disposal permits were granted through proper administra-
tive procedures and based upon adequate technical analysis. In
addition, EPA personnel have testified on various technical issues.
EPA Involvement
The case is of concern to EPA primarily due to the impact
it may'have on the implementation of Subtitle C of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which addresses proper
disposal of hazardous wastes. Successful public opposition to
new or existing hazardous waste disposal facilities could impede
development of an environmentally acceptable disposal system,
%
a major RCRA goal.
An EPA strategy in the case has been slow to emerge, and
EPA involvement has been restrained. This is due primarily to the
peculiar circumstances of the affair. First, the entire political/
emotional atmosphere surrounding the trial indicates that it is
likely that Earthline will lose the case. Since Earthline will surely
appeal an adverse decision, EPA rejected active involvement at
the trial level in favor of a possibly more active role in an appellate
proceeding.
Second, although the continued operation of proper hazardous
waste disposal facilities is in the interests of EPA, stating that
n-16
-------
interest with regard to Earthline is awkward. Any statemet con-
cerning the technical adequacy of the Earthline facility must be
based on criteria defining how "proper" hazardous waste disposal
facilities must operate. Those criteria are to be specified in
regulations promulgated under RCRA Subtitle C. However, prom-
ulgation is not expected until July 1978. Therefore, EPA has no
official criteria upon which to base a technical evaluation of
Earthline for the purpose of determining its adequacy as a dis-
posal site.
This particular problem has been partially overcome. On June
8, 1977, at the request of Illinois EPA, U.S. EPA inspected the
Earthline facility. This inspection, coordinated by the Office of
Solid Waste in Headquarters, included representatives from the
Office«of Toxic Substances, the Solid and Hazardous Waste Research
Division, EPA Region V and VTX, the Illinois State Geological
Survey, and Earthline. The inspection formed the basis of report
(Technical Evaluation Team Report) which evaluated the technical
ability of Earthline dispose of Dittmer's PCB wastes adequately.
The criteria used by the evaluation team were those contained in
the PCB Marking and Disposal Regulation published in proposed
form on May 24, 1977. As defined by that regulation, Dittmer
wastes constitute a PCB mixture.
The first draft of the report was completed on July 19, with
the final report released in mid-October, 1977. That report
endorsed the ability of the Earthline facility to dispose of PCB-
contaminated soil in an environmentally acceptable manner,
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although it identified several operational shortcomings. On
December 16, EPA, in its amicus capacity, made a motion to
enter the report into the Wilsonville trial record. That motion
was denied. It should be noted that the report evaluated Earthline
solely on operational criteria specified in the proposed PCB
Regulation. The issue in Wilsonville, however, had broadened
from PCB disposal to hazardous waste disposal.
On August 14, 1978, the Wilsonville trial concluded. A per-
manent injunction was granted preventing Earthline from disposing
hazardous wastes at its Wilsonville site. In addition, Earthline
was ordered to remove all hazardous wastes currently buried at
the site. ' •
RESOURCES AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS
The Revolving Pollution Fund provided about $500, 000 for the
«
cleanup at Dittmer:
Administrative costs
RRT meeting $ 2,328.80
EPA I/ 18,205.81
Gulf Strike Team, USCG 9, 409. 59
Contractor^/ 331,331.13
Earthline fee 105, 253. 53
EERU 44,326.80
Miscellaneous 845.00
$511,700.66
_!/ Lab work, per diem, and overtime expenses incurred at Dittmer.
2j Charges for excavating equipment, safety equipment and 20
men at Dittmer site throughout cleanup.
E-18
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_2/ Charges for excavating equipment, safety equipment, and 20
men at Dittmer site throughout cleanup.
PROBLEM, ISSUES, AND CONCLUSIONS
The Dittmer episode involved a discharge into a navigable
waterway of both oil and hazardous substances, primarily PCBs.
At the time for the episode, however, EPA had not yet developed,
as required by Section 311 of FWPCA, a list of hazardous sub-
stances. Therefore, the 311(k) fund could finance a cleanup
action only in the event of oil contamination. Ironically, the
presence of PCBs in.high concentrations, not the presence of oil,
made the timely cleanup of the Dittmer contamination particularly
desirable. Had the quantity of oil present been insufficient to
invoke a Section 311 response, while at the same time high con-
4
centrations of PCBs were present, it is questionable whether EPA
could have responded properly. The owner of the Dittmer pit had
neither the resources nor the expertise to cleanup properly and
dispose of PCBs; the State of Missouri had no resources to deal
with the problem; and in the absence of hazardous substances reg-
ulations on oil, EPA had neither the authority nor the financial
resources to initiate cleanup activities.
Another issue emerging during the episode involved USCG's
role as comptroller of the Section 311(k) fund. Whenever EPA
requests fund to finance a cleanup, USCG must approve the expen-
diture based upon criteria contained in Section 311, particularly
that an oil discharge has occurred. In the Dittmer case and on
E-19
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other occasions, the presence of hazardous substances has been a
more critical factor than the presence of oil. On those occasions,
USCG has "stretched" the oil criteria to allow cleanup of a
hazardous substance discharge, although EPA has had to argue
convincingly to allow use of the revolving fund. After the
initial cost estimate of $50, 000 had been expended in the
Dittmer cleanup, USCG was reluctant to authorize additional
funds to complete the operation, believing that Dittmer was
more a PCB contamination problem than an oil spill problem.
The primary purpose of the second RRT meeting was to convince
USCG that sufficient quantities of oil had been spilled to auth-
orize use of the Section 311(k) fund. Although that meeting
demonstrated that an oil spill had occurred, it was clear to all
parties'that the hazardous substances contamination was the factor
requiring timely cleanup.
Wilsonville
The highlight of this case focuses on the power of citizenry
aroused by the prospect of disposal of hazardous wastes within
its community. Subtitle C of RCRA relies of establishment of a
hazardous waste "cradle-to-grave" management system. An
important element of that system is the "grave, " or disposal
facility. A shortage of technically adequate hazardous waste
disposal facilities now exists in the United States. Therefore,
it is in EPA's interest to provide a climate wherein new facilities
will be built and existing facilities will upgraded to meet standards
E-20
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promulgated under RCRA. This climate can be seriously eroded
by successful public opposition to the use of properly permitted
disposal sites. The situation in Wilsonville must be understood
within the context. In addition, it is generally agreed that Earth-
line operates one of the better facilities of its kind and that Illinois
EPA oversees one of the better State waste disposal programs;
yet a legal decision adverse to Earthline has been made raising the
further possibility of similar actions in the future. Continued local
opposition to the siting of disposal facilities could thwart a major
goal of RCRA and materially increase the difficulty in properly
implementing and enforcing the Act.
H-21
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III. TRAIN DERAILMENT — RUSH, KENTUCKY
CASE STUDY SUMMARY
About 6 a.m. on October 30, 1973, 15 cars of a 50-unit train
derailed in a rural area aboutjfour miles west of Rush, Kentucky,
in Carter County near the Boyd County line (Figure ni-1). Two
tank cars containing acrylonitrile and five containing coke caught
fire. Two families were evacuated from the area near the
wreakage, and 500-foot-long strips at both ends of the little valley
where the accident occurred were cordoned off.
Shortly after the derailment, State policemen at the site
reported that acrylonitrile from one of the cars leaked into adja-
cent Williams Creek. Vegetation along Williams Creek, a
tributary of the Little Sandy River, was burned away near the
wreakage, and firemen reported, "at one time the .creek was even
on fire. " Members of the Boyd County Rescue Squad canvassed
the area about two miles below the stream to warn residents not
to consume water and to keep livestock away from the stream.
U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) officials were the first Federal
officials on scene and concurred with the railroad's proposal to
construct a dam on Williams Creek to prevent further contamina-
tion. Initially, the USCG was unsure what the effects would be on
water life downstream.
Railroad officials traced the beginning of the derailment to a
tank car laden with an oil product. According to a railroad
III-l
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representative, a bearing box overheated and caused the axle to
malfunction. The 15 derailed cars were about in the middle of
the train. Other cars were loaded with dog food, aluminum
sheets, coke, caustic soda, and metallic sodium.
At 7:00 a.m. on October 30, the Chesapeake and Ohio Rail-
road Co. in Ashland, Kentucky, informed EPA's Region IV
Office in Atlanta, Georgia, of the derailment. The initial call
suggested that the materials spilled were petroleum products,
coke, and metallic sodium. Later during the day, EPA contacted
the railroad office in Ashland, but did not receive .adequate infor-
mation on the exact products spilled. An EPA representative
arrived at the derailment at 10:00 p.m. and assumed the role of
On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) in accordance with the National
t
Contingency Plan.
It was clear to the OSC, after quick evaluation of the problem,
that the situation was extremely hazardous. Sodium exposed to
rain, burning and fuming acrylonitrile, and thousands of gallons
of caustic soda soaked in the ground - all threatened catastrophe
to the nearby community. The OSC requested that railroad offi-
cials and police keep the people as far away as possible from the
scene of the incident until additional information was obtained on
the spilled products.
At 11:15 p.m., the OSC requested that Region IV alert the
Regional Response Team and warn the municipalities along
Williams Creek, Little Sandy River, and Ohio River of the
IH-2
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\LITTLE SANDY RIVER
FIGURE 111-1. AREA INVOLVED IN THE RUSH, KY., TRAIN DERAILMENT
-------
possibility of hazardous chemicals entering their water systems.
The OSC advised the local Civil Defense representative to
evacuate the immediate area until the fire in the acrylonitrile tank
cars could be extinguished and the remaining product unloaded, and
until the ruptured car containing sodium was repaired. Between
•o
1:30 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. on October 31, Civil Defense authorities
evacuated families in the immediate area. The families returned
to their homes on the afternoon of October 31, contrary to advice
provided by the OSC. The OSC further asked Region V, in Chicago,
to sample the Ohio River and to coordinate its activities with the
State of Ohio's officials who were concerned about contamination
of drinking water along portions of the Ohio River. The OSC called
the Kentucky Department of Natural Resources and Environmental
«
Protection to discuss EPA's sampling plan and request assistance.
After the cars containing acrylonitrile and sodium were
removed from th6 scene, the immediate threat was over. Within
the next two days, EPA's actions concentrated on cleanup and
monitoring of Williams Creek and disposal of caustic soda near
the road side. Kentucky's Division of Solid Waste advised the
railroad on methods for disposing of the large quantities of caustic
soda mixed with coke. The State's sampling of local wells
revealed no acrylonitrile in drinking water. The EPA samples of
Williams Creek and Little Sandy River indicated 190 milligrams
per liter (mg/1) of acrylonitrile behind the dam, 15 mg/1 less than
a mile downstream, and no detectable amount at the confluence of
IH-3
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Williams Creek and Little Sandy River. The concentration dropped
steadily as filtration, aeration, and dilution factors took effect.
Samples taken by Region V and the State of Ohio along portions of
the Ohio River detected no acrylonitrile. EPA and the State of
Kentucky continued to monitor and sample Williams Creek until
acrylonitrile was no longer detected. No enforcement actions were
taken, and the case was closed on November 9, 1973.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Date
October 30, 1973
October 31, 1973
(a.m.)
Events
Fifteen railroad cars derail near Rush,
Ky., discharging acrylonitrile to
Williams Creek. Civil Defense and
Kentucky Highway Patrol evacuate two
families and cordon off portions of the
valley. Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad
Co. notifies EPA Region IV of derail-
ment. County Rescue Squad warns
local residents not to use water and
keep livestock away from creek. U. S.
Coast Guard representative arrives on
scene and as first Federal official
assumes role of OSC. Official of
Kentucky Department of Fish and Game
observes dead fish in Williams Creek.
EPA representative arrives on scene
and assumes role of OSC as per
National Contingency Plan.
Upon advice of OSC, Civil Defense
evacuates 150 people within 11/2 miles
of derailment. Regional Response
Team alerted. OSC requests EPA air
and water monitoring experts. OSC
meets with County Health Department
and Kentucky Air Pollution officials
and requests assistance in air moni-
toring. Neither office has monitoring
equipment.
IE-4
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October 31, 1973
(p.m.)
October 31, 1973
November 1, 1973
November 2, 1973
November 9, 1973
State Fire Marshal overrules OSC and
orders Civil Defense to return evacuees.
OSC meets with Kentucky Air and Water
officials who agree to assist with water
monitoring experts arrive on scene.
EPA air expert recommends reevacu-
ation of one family nearest acrylonitrile
car. Civil Defense representative agrees.
Fire in acrylonitrile car is extinguished
and unloading starts. Water monitoring
plan and cleanup methods established for
Williams Creek.
Emergency Response Section of Ohio
EPA hears of derailment via commercial
radio broadcast.
EPA and Kentucky start to sample wells
and streams. Activated carbon, peat
moss, and aeration used to start cleaning
stream. Ohio EPA notifies Ohio Office
of Public Water Supply to advise City of
Portsmouth to apply activated carbon.
Ohio National Guard flies activated carbon
to Portsmouth. Ohio EPA predicts 1, 000
mg/1 acrylonitrile to reach Ohio River
and pass Portsmouth water intake by noon
on November 2. EPA Region V notified
of incident and possible need to monitor
Little Sandy River and Ohio River for
acrylonitrile. Local laboratories unable
to handle water samples. Arrangements
made to send samples to EPA Athen Lab-
oratory. All railroad cars removed from
scene and track repaired. Stream cleanup
continues. Kentucky's Division of Solid
Waste agrees to bury caustic soda and
coke in railraod right-of-way. EPA
reports 190 mg/1 of acrylonitrile at dam
and none where Williams Creek and
Little Sandy River meet.
Carbon placed in filters in Portsmouth.
No acrylonitrile detected in stream
samples. Railroad notified to terminate
cleanup operations.
IE-5
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FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AUTHORITY
Federal
The EPA and USCG response actions were carried out in
accordance with the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollu-
tion Contingency Plan (40 CFR 1510).
The procedures for on-scene coordination are contained in
Section 1510-36 of the National Contingency Plan. EPA is
responsible for furnishing OSC's for inland waters, while the
USCG is responsible for coastal waters and the Great Lakes. In
this particular case, the USCG provided the initial OSC. After
arrival of the predesignated EPA OSC, the response actions were
turned over to EPA. The procedure is consistent with Section
1510. 36(a)(l) which specifies that the first official on the site from
«
an agency responsible under the Plan shall assume coordination of
the activities until arrival of the predesignated OSC.
At the time of the incident, the key regulations for hazardous
substances under Section 311 of the FWPCA were not promulgated.
Therefore, even though EPA took actions under the National
Contingency plan and statutory authority existed, the lack of regu-
lations restricted the authority of the EPA OSC.
State and Local Authority
Information on State authorities is included in "State Emer-
gency Powers for Hazardous Substance, " prepared under another
part of EPA's study on environmental emergencies. In practice,
IH-6
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the Kentucky State Police are generally the first to respond to
the scene of an accident. The troopers secure the scene and call
the Fire Marshal. When the Fire Marshal arrives, the troopers
turn over control. The Marshal convenes local police and fire
personnel, troopers, and other emergency staff in temporary
command post. If a local community needs assistance, it calls
on the Kentucky Department of Emergency Services. The depart-
ment provides shelter, food, medical care, and other necessities
where evacuation or major damage has occurred, and also coordi-
nates efforts whenever two State agencies cooperate in disaster
response.
Personnel from Kentucky's Division of Water Quality in the
Bureau of Environmental Protection have traditionally taken the
*
lead environmental role. However, in some cases, the closest
representative of the Bureau will be dispatched to evaluate the
scene regardless of division. The Bureau has no comprehensive
contingency plan for environmental emergencies. The Division
of Hazardous Materials and Waste Management, new in the
Bureau, has no contingency fund, and personnel have no special
equipment, protective clothing, or breathing apparatus. Person-
nel on site usually defer to the Fire Marshal until the immediate
danger has passed, then generally arrange for disposal.of spilled
material and supervision of cleanup efforts by the spiller.
Kentucky has no approved hazardous waste disposal site.
m-7
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FEDERAL RESPONSE
Spill Response
At 7 a.m. on October 30, 1973, an official of the Chesapeake
and Ohio Railroad Co. informed EPA's Region IV Office of a train
derailment in the vicinity of Rush at 6 a. m. The initial informa-
tion received was sketchy, suggesting minor problems associated
with spillage of petroleum products, coke, and metallic sodium.
The caller also mentioned some fire in the area, apparently due
to burning coke on the ground. Later during the day, EPA con-
tacted railroad officials to obtain additional information. A
railroad official indicated that some personnel were on scene,
but could not furnish any additional information.
At 2 p.m., in accordance with the National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, EPA dispatched a Federal
On-Scene Coordinator to investigate and to initiate any actions
deemed necessary. At 6:08 p.m., the OSC left Atlanta's airport
for Lexington, and then drove from Lexington, a distance of some
130 miles, to Rush. After three hours, due to heavy fog and rain,
the OSC reached Morehead, about half-way to Rush. Region IV
informed him that the principal product spilled near Rush was
acrylonitrile, a highly poisonous and flammable material. Due
to the late hour, Region IV did not have access to EPA's data
bank, OHMTAD, to provide the OSC with detailed information on
toxicity and other pertinent data related to acrylonitrile.
m-8
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The OSC arrived at the train derailment at Grant Station, a few
miles outside the small community of Rush at 10 p.m. The State
Police blocked off the county road paralleling the railroad track a
few hundred yards before the derailment area. From this point,
great quantities of smoke and fire were visible at the accident
site. Walking the remaining distance, the OSC noted many parked
vehicles belonging to the local Police Department, Highway Patrol,
Highway Department, C&O, and Fire Department. A rescue squad
car was also in the vicinity. Closer to the derailment area were
fire engines and large earth-moving equipment. Many people, in-
cluding several firemen, were standing near the derailment area.
One car containing acrylonitrile was on fire and smoking. Other
derailed cars were on both sides of the railroad track, some
smoMhg. A peculiar odor similar to caustic soda mixed with
burning coke was noticeable in the air. During the evening, there
was light steady wind; rain mixed with snow fell occasionally.
The first impression of the situation was one of general con-
fusion, with people milling around, rather than urgency. The
first order of business was to assemble as many informed people
as possible and to assess the problem thoroughly. The OSC
managed to locate and ask representatives of the USCG, C&O,
Civil Defense, and Fire Department to meet with him immediately
in the railroad telegraph office approximately two miles from the
scene. This small, one-room office with a wood-burning stove
had the only telephone in the area. Railroad officials allowed the
HI-9
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OSC to share this office with the dispatcher and to use the phone
whenever it was free.
During the initial meeting, the USCG described a massive fish
kill that occurred on Williams Creek at approximately 3 p.m. of
the day of the derailment. The USCG and railroad officials had
constructed an underflow dam across Williams Creek during the
afternoon, thereby containing come of the spilled materials. This
dam proved to be extremely helpful during the containment and
removal phases.
Railroad officials provided a list of derailed cars and the
quantity and type of materials spilled (Table EEI-l).
Table EI-1
Materials Lost in Rush, Kentucky, Derailment
Car Number Contents Quantity Lost
1 Oil Negligible
2 Antiknock materials None
3 Empty
4 76, 400 pounds of coke All
5 74, 600 pounds of coke All
6 81, 800 pounds of coke All
7 400 pounds of coke All
8 99, 900 pounds of coke All
9 Scrap aluminum None, later salvaged
10 Metallic sodium None, car punctured
11 Liquid caustic soda All, but not to stream
12 41, 682 gallons of All burned or spilled
acrylonitrile
13 41, 356 gallons of 3, 683 gallons burned
acrylonitrile or spilled
14 Dog food None
15 Empty
in-10
-------
The acrylonitrile and metallic sodium belonged to E.I. duPont de
Nemours and Co. in Memphis, Tennessee. The company sent two
technical experts to the scene.
The debriefing made it clear that the situation was extremely
hazardous. Sodium exposed to rain, burning and fuming acryloni-
trile, and thousands of gallons of caustic soda soaked in the ground
- all threatened the entire community. The OSC requested techni-
cal information on toxic properties of acrylonitrile from the
participants in the meeting. The only information available was a
page out of the CHEM CARD Manual and a page from the USCG
handbook. Railroad and other officials were advised to keep the
people as far away as possible from the scene until additional
information could be obtained on the spilled products.
At 11:15 p.m., the OSC called the Region IV Environmental
Emergency Branch and requested that the Regional Response Team
be advised of the incident but the team would not need to report to
the scene. The OSC also recommended that Region IV warn the
municipalities along Williams Creek, Little Sandy River, and
Ohio River of the possibility of hazardous chemicals entering their
water systems. Region IV advised that this had already been done
via telegram and TWX messages to appropriate offices. At 11:30
p. m., the OSC called the Chief of Operations Branch of the
Division of Oil and Hazardous Materials of EPA Headquarters and
requested that the National Response Team be advised of the inci-
dent. A printout of data from OHMTADS was also requested.
IE-11
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The Chief of Operations Branch called back about midnight after
consulting the data bank and two EPA chemists. The consensus
of opinion was that acrylonitrile in open burning state could
combine with other gases in the atmosphere, releasing a cyanide
gas. EPA's Air Emergency Group in Athens, Georgia, was con-
sulted and concurred with the EPA Headquarters data and offered
additional suggestions.
Between midnight and 1 a.m. on October 31, the OSC
reassembled the group in the railroad telegraph office and stated
that under present circumstances it would be advisable to evacuate
the immediate area until the fire in the acrylonitrile tank was
extinguished, the remaining product unloaded, and the ruptured
car containing sodium repaired. Although the OSC strongly
«
recommended evacuation to Civil Defense representatives, the
immediate reaction of C&O and DuPont officials was negative.
After consulting with an EPA air expert in Athens, the OSC again
advised Civil Defense of the hazards and suggested that the DuPont
representative assume full responsibility for the safety of the
local people. The DuPont representative refused to do so.
Between 1:30 a.m. and 4:00 a.m., Civil Defense evacuated
families in the immediate area. Later, some of the evacuated
families indicated that they were happy to leave the area, and
most spent the night with friends or relatives with minimum
inconvenience.
IH-12
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During the early hours of the morning, the OSC met again with
C&O and DuPont officials to plan how to contain and remove the
spilled materials. The OSC expressed concern over the lack of
protective clothing, masks, and similar apparatus for the cleanup
crew and responding firemen. Someone said that there was no
reason to worry because the crew was experienced. Finally, the
group decided that the immediate priority was to extinguish the
fire, repair the sodium car, and remove the remaining acrylo-
nitrile and the sodium car from the area. Later, as soon as
personnel could safely approach the creek, the dam would be rein-
forced and treatment of contaminated water started by filtering
it through peat moss.
At 7:30 a.m., the OSC returned on the site. In the daylight,
he saw that the fire on the previous day had burned both banks
of Williams Creek for a distance of approximately 75 yards. The
surface of the water looked greenish-white, with blotches of oil
floating on top. The dam was firmly in place, but the rain during
the night had added water to the creek. Puddles of a thick
brownish liquid of caustic soda mixed with coke were on the side
of the railroad track parallel to the road. The acrylonitrile car
was still aflame; a tarpaulin was wrapped around the sodium
protruding from the ruptured car.
Shortly after 7:30, railroad personnel and the cleanup crew
began to arrive. A decision was made to obtain peat moss, acti-
vated carbon, and several large pumps for filtration and aeration
IE-13
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of the creek. The OSC called Region IV to discuss the possibility
of contamination of Little Sandy River and Ohio River, as well as
water wells in the immediate area. The OSC decided to start
extensive and systematic sampling of water. Further, Region V
in Chicago was requested to sample the Ohio River and to coordi-
nate its activities with Ohio officials who were concerned about
possible contamination of drinking water along portions of the
Ohio River. The sampling plan was discussed with the Kentucky
Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection.
The State provided excellent support and assistance, both for
sampling and other field activities, throughout the incident. The
OSC requested the assistance of a biologist, a chemist, and an
air pollution specialist from EPA in Athens. Additional assist-
»
ance was requested from EPA Headquarters, which provided
two people, one a biochemist. They arrived on scene in the after-
noon via a chartered flight, bringing with them the much needed
OHMTADS printout of data related to the spilled materials.
The OSC also handled a large number of inquiries from con-
tractors, some as far away as Illinois, who were interested in
cleanup activities, insurance agents, members of the press, and
local authorities wanting to know when the evacuation would end.
During mid-afternoon, the OSC explained to a Civil Defense
official that as soon as EPA's experts arrived from Athens, they
would evaluate the air pollution problem and recommend a safe
time for evacuees to return. At this time, two local officials
HI-14
-------
informed the OSC that, in spite of an extreme hazard in the area,
they had asked Civil Defense to move the people back to their
homes, some of which were only 500 yards from the scene. The
discussion soon turned to philosophical topics such as State's
rights vs. government interference in local affairs. Further dis-
cussion would have been useless and harmful to the morale of the
dedicated crew, some of whom had been working round-the-clock
under adverse conditions. The OSC left the scene immediately and
notified Region IV of the latest problem. The Regional Office con-
tacted a high State official to explain EPA's concern for the safety
of local people. The State official quickly intervened and the OSC
was asked to return on scene.
Later in the afternoon of .the 31st, EPA's team of experts from
«
Georgia and Washington arrived on scene. Their survey of the
area revealed that:
o The fire in the acrylonitrile car was extinguished.
o The sodium car, which had a hole approximately 1 foot
in diameter, was smoking.
o Within a few feet was a car leaking acrylonitrile into
the roadway. The entire upper side of the car was
steaming, apparently because the acrylonitrile was
reacting. Unless the pressure building up in the
tank was relieved, it could explode within a few hours.
o Within a few feet of the leaking acrylonitrile car, a
caustic soda car was leaking.
EI-15
-------
o Damage was extensive within a radius of approximately
100 yards. The paint was blistered on the front of the
house across the street from the derailment. The
front windows were cracked, and some had melted from
the heat.
o A car and pickup truck parked approximately 10 feet
from the train were destroyed from the heat of burning
acrylonitrile.
The EPA air pollution air expert recommended reevacuation of
the immediate area. This was. discussed with the Civil Defense
representative who asked one of the returning families in the
immediate area to stay away until conditions were safer.
Early in the evening, the crew started unloading of the leaking
«
acrylonitrile car.
During the evening and early morning hours, State, EPA, and
railroad officials met several times to arrange the sampling
program and to devise methods to clean up Williams Creek.
The next morning, November 1, State and EPA personnel
began to sample Williams Creek, Little Sandy River, and the wells
in the immediate area. Several farmers along Williams Creek had
been warned earlier not to allow their livestock to drink from the
creek. Samples were taken twice a day, and the farmers were
advised of the findings. EPA attempted to locate a gas chromato-
graph (GC) in a nearby university for analysis of the samples.
However, EPA chemists on scene questioned the reliability and
III-16
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accuracy of this GC. Finally, it was decided to send the samples
to Athens every day for analysis and evaluation. EPA and the
State of Kentucky continued sampling and monitoring the affected
areas until November 9.
Large quantities of peat moss and activated carbon for the
cleanup of Williams Creek were hard to find in the immediate
area. However, C&O officials managed to purchase the entire
stock from a local nursery. Large quantities of peat moss were
placed behind the dam as the filtering agent. The contaminated
peat moss was removed periodically and replaced. Several large
pumps and hoses placed at intervals along the creek sprayed water
up into the air and on the sides of the creek to aerate the water.
These, operations continued for several days.
The unloading of the acrylonitrile tank car required several
additional hours. Close examination of the tank car revealed
some startling features. The upper side was highly oxidized due
to the high temperature inside. Approximately one-third of the car
was normal in shape. The middle third was approximately three
inches wider in diameter than normal. The last part next to the
sodium tank was even more distorted. It was obvious that if the
car had not been unloaded during the night, it would have exploded
in the early morning hours.
With removal of acrylonitrile and sodium cars from the scene,
the immediate threat was over. Within the next two days, efforts
were concentrated on cleanup and monitoring of Williams Creek
m-17
-------
and removal and disposal of caustic soda mixed with coke. The
State sampling of local wells revealed no acrylonitrile contami-
nation of drinking water. The EPA samples of Williams Creek
.*
and Little Sandy River indicated 190 mg/1 of acrylonitrile behind
the dam, 15 mg/1 less than a mile downstream, and no detectable
amount at the confluence of Williams Creek and Little Sandy River.
The concentration dropped steadily as filtration, aeration, and di-
lution factors took effect. Samples taken by Region V and the
State of Ohio along portions of the Ohio River detected no acrylo-
nitrile. EPA and the State of Kentucky continued to monitor and
sample the Williams Creek until no acrylonitrile was detected.
Air Pollution Response
On,October 31 at about 1:00 a.m., an EPA air pollution
expert at Athens received a telephone call at his home from the
OSC. The.expert recommended that residents within a 1/2 to 1-
mile radius be evacuated. At 9:00 a.m., the OSC called again to
explain that the State Fire Marshal and the DuPont people were
uncooperative and he would appreciate assistance on the scene.
The EPA air expert arrived at the site about 6:00 p.m. and was
concerned that no DuPont experts were available to discuss inter-
mediate combustion products from open burning of acrylonitrile.
Also, a representative of the Association of American Railroads
tried to convince the EPA expert that acrylonitrile was absolutely
not dangerous and that the best experts were on hand to handle the
m-18
-------
situation. Further discussions were unfruitful.
After a discussion with the OSC, the EPA expert recommended
that the area be evacuated again. Advised of the hazards, the
Assistant Chief of Civil Defense, who was also Assistant Fire
Marshal for the State of Kentucky, was cooperative but confused.
He wanted to protect the local people, but the State Fire Marshal
and the railroad people assured him there was no danger. The
local residents had already returned to their homes, one of which
was within 300 yards of the derailment. The people within approx-
imately I/2'mile were asked to evacuate the area again until the
acrylonitrile car was under control.
On November 1, the EPA air representative met with a DuPont
expert, who was cooperative but noncommittal. However, a repre-
«
sentative of the Chief Engineer's Office of the C&O Railroad in
Huntington, West Virginia, who toured the area, commented that
he would not want to be in Huntington (17 miles away) when one of
the acrylonitrile cars exploded.
During the night, one tank truck had been loaded with acrylo-
nitrile and loading of a second had started. At approximately 2:00
p.m., an employee of Hulcher Emergency Railroad Service, Inc.,
was splashed in his face with acrylonitrile while loading a tank
truck. Although he wiped it off and then washed his face with water,
he shortly became so sick that he could hardly walk. When this
was called to the attention of the C&O personnel, no one seemed
concerned.
HI-19
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After this incident, a minister who supplemented his income
as a truck driver for Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., became
very sick when his truck was being loaded. He asked the EPA
representative if the acrylonitrile would hurt him. He said the
DuPont people and the railroad people had told him that it would not.
The EPA air representative was very concerned by the attitude
of the people on the scene. Protective clothing and breathing appa-
ratus were not being used. Within a very few minutes after one
man walked past the leaking caustic soda car, the soles came off
both his shoes. The workers were unaware of the potential danger
of acrylonitrile. the railroad, contractors, and DuPont were not
providing public information, needlessly jeopardizing many
people's lives and promoting a poor working relationship among all
»
parties concerned.
Biological Survey
On October 31, an EPA biologist arrived at the site of the
derailment and met with Kentucky State personnel. A repre-
sentative of the Kentucky Department of Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection said he had arrived on the scene around
noon. Following Williams Creek downstream for about a mile
from the spill site, he saw numerous dead minnows and other
small fish, as well as dead crayfish and worms.
The EPA biologist also met with two fishery biologists from
the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources who had
IH-20
-------
arrived at the spill site around 3:00 p.m. They had checked
Williams Creek at several points downstream from the spill site,
the last point being Little Sandy River about 1/2 mile downstream
from Williams Creek. They had seen a number of dead minnows
and small longear sunfish. On the morning of November 1, checking
the Little Sandy River at several points further downstream, they
observed no fish. They said the local conservation officer, who had
investigated the spill during the morning of October 31, had seen
small fish struggling in Williams Creek downstream from the derail-
ment. The fishery biologists believed that the small number of dead
fish they had observed did not warrant a fish Mil count.
The EPA biologist accompanied the State fishery biologists on a
survey of Williams Creek downstream to its junction with the Little
Sandy River. Since acrylonitrile is soluble in water and dangerous
to the skin, the survey was limited to visual means. No fish, alive
or dead, were seen in the stream.
From all indications, the spill of acrylonitrile killed all aquatic
life in Williams Creek downstream from the spill site. It would be
difficult to assess the effect further downstream in Little Sandy
River, but dilution should reduce the toxicity of the material.
To assess properly the biological effects of a spill, it is of
utmost importance to survey the water body during the time the
spill is affecting the aquatic organisms. In this case, the delay
made sampling unfeasible.
m-21
-------
Enforcement
No enforcement actions were taken since the railroad took some
measures to protect the environment. In addition, since hazardous
substances had not been designated, penalties under Section 311 of
the FWPCA were not applicable.
STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE
State Highway Patrol
The Kentucky State Highway Patrol was the first on scene and
immediately set up traffic control, notified appropriate local agen-
cies, and assisted with evacuation of two families living near the
derailment. The Highway Patrol had initially planned to evacuate
more families, but was advised by a chemist from Ashland Oil Co.
that, based on his on-scene observation, there was no imminent
threat to the other homes in the area.
Boyd County Rescue Squad
The Boyd County Rescue Squad warned downstream residents
not to use water from their wells and to keep livestock away from
Williams Creek.
Civil Defense
At 3:30 a.m. on October 30, the local representative of Civil
Defense had his personnel evacuate 150 people within all/2 mile
radius of the incident. This evacuation was undertaken as a
result of recommendations of the OSC; however, representatives
HI-22
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of DuPont, the Association of American Railroads, and Hulcher
Emergency Railroad Service were opposed to this course of action.
In the afternoon of October 31, the Civil Defense representative
was ordered by the State Fire Marshal to return all evacuated fami-
lies. During the evening, the Civil Defense representative was
advised by the OSC and EPA's air pollution expert that families in
the immediate area of the derailment should be reevacuated. He
concurred with the recommendation but was apprehensive because
of the conflict with the State Fire Marshal's orders. It was clear
that only he could make the decision and that EPA's role was purely
advisory. The Civil Defense representative decided to reevacuate
the families.
Ashlanti Regional Office, Kentucky Division of Air Pollution
Representatives of the Ashland Regional Office and Boyd County
•Health Department arrived on scene on October 31 and offered
assistance. The OSC asked if they had air monitoring equipment
or if they could determine the level of toxic pollutants in the air
surrounding the derailment. The response was negative but both
stayed on scene to assist.
Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife and Kentucky
Air and Water Office
Representatives from these State agencies surveyed Williams
Creek and the Little Sandy River on October 30 and 31. They
reported a large fish kill downstream from the derailment. The
HI-2 3
-------
State assisted EPA on the cleanup procedures and the stream
sampling program. The State continued to monitor the stream and
cleanup operations until November 9.
Kentucky State Health Department
A representative from the State Health Department sampled and
analyzed the water from about 50 wells in the immediate area.
Kentucky State Solid Waste Office
On November 2, two representatives from the Kentucky Solid
Waste Office arrived on scene and advised railroad officials on pro-
cedures to follow in disposing of the residual caustic soda and coke
within the railroad right-of-way.
State of Ohio
The Emergency Response Section, Ohio EPA, was notified of
the spill at 9:00 a..m., November 1, and immediately forwarded
the information to the Office of Public Water Supply, Ohio EPA.
The Office of Public Water Supply notified the Director of
Utilities, City of Portsmouth, of the spill and recommended that
immediate steps be taken to apply activated carbon.
Preliminary calculations by Ohio EPA staff indicated that the
acrylonitrile concentration at the Portsmouth water intake would
be about 100 parts per billion (ppb).
Ohio EPA personnel, flown to Portsmouth by the Ohio National
Guard, collected samples of the Ohio River, the water intake, and
HI-24
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water distribution system. The samples were flown to Columbus
at 2:00 p.m. for analyses in the laboratory of the Ohio Department
of Health.
Chemists of the Ohio Department of Health, with automated ana-
lytical equipment, were transported to the Portsmouth water plant.
Laboratory equipment was set up by 10:00 p.m., and analyses were
conducted at hourly intervals.
When it was determined that activated carbon was needed for
removal of acrylonitrile, 400 pounds of powdered activated carbon
were immediately flown to Portsmouth by the Ohio National Guard.
The carbon arrived by noon on November 1.
Action was also taken to obtain granular activated carbon.
Arrangements were made with Calgon Corp. for delivery of suffi-
cient carbon to provide an 18-inch depth in the sand filters. The
material arrived at Portsmouth and was placed in the filters during
the early hours of November 2.
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR RESPONSE
C&O Railroad
The railroad did the major part of the cleanup. The following
account is based on the railroad's assessment, which at times dif-
fers markedly from EPA's assessment.
A dam with a carbon-sorbent top (peat moss) was built across
the creek; a secondary filter dam built of rock and covered with
peat moss was placed approximately 20 feet further downstream.
HI-25
-------
On November 13, after EPA advised that the acrylonitrile concen-
tration was 1 part per million 1 mile downstream, the dams were
removed.
To take advantage of acrylonitrile's high volatility, the rail-
road used three pumps to spray the trapped, contaminated water
•n
high on the bank, maximizing aeration and evaporation. To further
(
degrade and strip the product, an air compressor with a perforated
header was also employed in the pool behind the dam.
On the advice of EPA, powdered carbon was applied to the water
surface and stirred into the stream. This created another problem
-- black water. However, the filter dam removed the carbon,
allowing only clear water to pass.
The caustic soda was buried under the rebuilt tracks, where it
«
was neutralized by pickle liquor (HC1).
The EPA OSC visited the site from behind a Volunteer Fire
Department blockade (some four blocks away from where the work
was being done). The OSC made several phone calls and returned
to the scene, indicating to railroad officers at the site that he was
taking complete control of the situation at that time (some 16 hours
into the incident). The OSC directed the Assistant State -Fire
Marshal to evacuate everyone within a 2-mile radius and to stop
all work at the site. In the early morning hours, the Assistant
Fire Marshal had evacuated five homes within a 2, 000-yard radius
of the site. He later reduced the evacuation area to 1 1/2 miles.
HI-26
-------
A meeting was held with railroad personnel, a representative
of the American Association of Railroad's Bureau of Explosives,
the OSC, and DuPont's experts on acrylonitrile. The OSC was ad-
vised of the properties of the chemical and was deeply interested
in only that single product. The OSC was not the least concerned
with the metallic sodium, which presented the most danger to the
personnel in the immediate area, as it was showering intermit-
tently. (Note: The OSC was equally concerned about the metallic
sodium.)
After the discussion, the OSC changed his mind and said that
cleanup could continue. However, the personnel had already been
secured until 8:00 a.m. the following day, October 31. This inci-
dent delayed, the railroad's cleanup efforts by about eight hours and
permitted the polllution problem to continue unabated.
The Assistant Fire Marshal's first order of priority was to
protect the property and the citizens. He did this by evacuating all
personnel directly involved with the railroad to a distance of
2, 000 yards. Finally, over the objections of the EPA, both State
and Federal, he extinguished the major fire. (Note: This is incor-
rect, the OSC was concerned about the method of fire-fighting —
that is, water versus foam — and not whether to extinguish the
fire.)
On October 31, the Emergency Response Section of the Ohio
EPA received information via commercial radio broadcast that a
train derailment had occurred in Kentucky. While the broadcast
m-27
-------
did not specify the exact location, volumes, or compounds lost,
it did imply that the derailment was significant. On about
November 1, Kentucky confirmed the derailment to Ohio EPA.
No mention of on-scene containment or cleanup was made, proba-
bly because that specific information was not requested, or
•!>
perhaps the Kentucky people were satisfied with what the railroad
t
was doing.
After being informed that indeed acrylonitrile had been spilled,
and without specific knowledge of on-scene activities, Ohio EPA
informed the Portsmouth Water Treatment Plant that there was
grave danger from the oncoming "spill". Ohio EPA requested
assistance of the U.S. EPA in evaluating the public health signifi-
cance of the spill. By TWX, the State was informed that there
«
had been an accident, and that "clouds of hydrogen cyanide gas are
limiting the control and contaiment of stream contamination" and
that a U.S. EPA OSC was at the scene. Actually, the clouds were
smoke and steam observed by the OSC when he first arrived at a
distance of 2, 000 feet behind barricades manned by firemen.
At least 32 hours had elapsed since the derailment and it was
assumed that the tank that ruptured inundated Williams Creek with
its cargo, reported as "53, 000 gallons". (The car contained
41, 682 gallons, the major portion of which was consumed in the
coke bed fire; "clouds of hydrogen cyanide gas" actually were car-
bon dioxide, water, and nitrogen dioxide, all nontoxic.) Based on
already bad assumption, the Ohio EPA made a stream model and
HI-28
-------
predicted that a concentration of 1, 000 mg/1 would reach the Ohio
River. There were 17 miles of stream (the Ohio) left to go to
Portsmouth's water intake, in a stream that is 2, 600 feet wide
with an average depth of 9 feet and flowing at an established
2, 609, 143 cubic feet per. minute. The model also disregarded the
natural aeration from the water surface and the Greenup Locks
and Dam, which would help evaporate the volatile chemical. The
Ohio EPA ordered that the Portsmouth Water Treatment Plant
apply activated carbon to one-half of its sand filters at an undis-
closed depth; 60, 000 pounds of activated carbon were used.
Using its "stream model, " the Ohio EPA's "experts" indicated
that the trailing edge of the spill passed the Portsmouth water
intakes before noon, November 2. However, during the entire
«
time, with its portable laboratory and technicians, it detected no
acrylonitrile in either raw or finished water before or after apply-
ing activated carbon to the filters and raising the chlorine dosage.
E. I. duPont de NeMours and Company
When the accident occurred, DuPont's emergency response
program immediately went into action, providing three employees
4
from a nearby plant to assist in emergency efforts. Also, an
expert in the manufacturing and handling of acrylonitrile was im-
mediately flown from Memphis to assist in handling of the fire,
curtailment of spillage into the nearby stream, and efforts to
protect against any possible air polllution threat.
HI-29
-------
RESOURCES AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS
The cost figures are limited to those actions taken relating to
the environment and public safety aspects and exclude the track-
clearing operations and fire-fighting. Actual dollar costs are not
available at this time; however, based on a breakdown of man-
days, the Federal cost was less than $5, 000, about two-thirds of
it by Region IV. None of the Federal expenses were chargeable
to Section 311(k) revolving fund because hazardous substances had
not been designated.
The State of Kentucky's costs were probably about-the same as
those of the Federal government. The railroad estimates the
environmental cleanup costs at about $200, 000. The OSC for this
incident believes this figure is high and may include salvage
expenses.
PROBLEMS,- ISSUES, AND CONCLUSIONS
The major problems and issues emerging from a review of
this incident are:
o Conflict between EPA's assessment that there was an
imminent threat to public health and safety and the
general attempt by the railroad and DuPont to downplay
the incident.
o Uncooperative attitudes toward EPA by railroad, DuPont,
and railroad salvage representatives.
IH-30
-------
o Lack of enforcement authority, which reduced the effec-
tiveness of the EPA OSC.
o Conflict between EPA s advisory role and State Fire
Marshal's authority.
o Desirability of EPA advising local authorities on specific
courses of action in areas where EPA is not expert --
for examples of explosion hazards, fire-fighting proce-
dures, and structural integrity of tank cars.
o Complete lack of safety equipment for salavage crew and
EPA on-scene personnel.
o Inadequate communication with the State of Ohio regarding
potential threat to Ohio water supplies.
o Lack of local equipment to monitor the air and laboratory
*
facilities to analyze water samples at 1. 0 mg/1 detection
level.
o Inability to determine amounts of toxic chemical in
ambient air.
o Lack of knowledge on toxic combustion product resulting
from open burning of acrylonitrile and advisability of
allowing acrylonitrile to burn.
This incident occurred during the initial years of the spill
response program. A number of the issues and problems have
been corrected, although some remain. However, the National
Contingency Plan was very effective, with the USCG and EPA
working very well together. EPA's relationship with Kentucky
m-31
-------
representatives was excellent, with the exception of the Fire
Marshal.
Another derailment on January 30, 1978, at Leon, Kentucky,
illustrates that the Rush incident is not an. isolated case. Of 14
cars derailed, four containing acrylonitrile, one containing liqui-
•n
fied petroleum gas, three containing coke, one containing wood pulp,
and one empty car caught fire. When the Fire Department arrived,
the Chief decided to let the fire burn.
An OSC from Region IV arrived at Leon on the same day, and
the Regional Response Team was activated. Kentucky Department
of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, DuPont, and
EPA water and air personnel were all called to the scene and, as
in Rush, worked with the railroad in meeting the emergency. The
«
Disaster and Emergency Services, Kentucky's equivalent of Civil
Defense, evacuated the area within two miles, including the com-
munities of Leon and Kitchens. Drainage ditches leading to the
Little Sandy River from the wreck were dammed. However, some
acrylonitrile entered the river. The Corps of Engineers increased
the flow of the River to help flush it of contamination.
The City of Grayson, which has a water intake on the River
about six miles downstream from the wreck, closed its intakes as
a precaution on the first day, as did Greenup 40 miles downstream.
The Kentucky National Guard and the Corps of Engineers hauled in
drinking water.
HI-32
-------
The next day, when the fire was out, the evacuated families
returned, and the railroad's contractor started the cleanup. Soil
was analyzed to help pinpoint areas requiring cleanup. Drainage
from the derailment site was treated with carbon, and the samp-
ling of the Little Sandy River continued for two weeks. Cleanup
required about a month.
IE-33
-------
IV. CARBON TETRACHLORIDE EPISODES -- OHIO RIVER
CASE STUDY SUMMARY
The carbon tetrachloride (carbon tet) case study involves three
Ohio River (Figure IV-1) can be seen as a single environmental
emergency.
Carbon tet was first discovered in raw and finished water from
the Ohio River in April 1975. In the course of conducting the
National Organics Reconnaissance Survey of Drinking Water,
intended to determine the extent and composition of organic chem-
ical contamination of drinking water supplies of 80 cities, EPA
discovered a level of three parts per billion (ppb) in drinking
water from the Ohio River. The only other major area in which
carbon tet was found in some quantity was the Mississippi River.
In a September 1976 survey, EPA found that the level of carbon
tet in drinking water at Huntington, West Virginia, had increased
to 10 ppb. Of 80 cities surveyed, 34 contained carbon tet in their
drinking water. Based on the National Organics Monitoring Survey
(NOMS), which covered 113 cities, EPA estimated that the national
average for carbon tet in raw and processed water was less than
1 ppb.
Additional sampling along the Ohio River in 1976 indicated that
the source of the carbon tet contamination was probably above
where the Ohio and Kanawha Rivers meet. After reviewing the
permits for chemical discharges for the plants in this area, EPA
IV-1
-------
CINCINNATI
•
KENTUCKY
FIGURE IV-1. AREA INVOLVED IN THE OHIO RIVER
CARBON TETRACHLORIDE EPISODE
-------
notified four companies -- Allied Chemical Corp., PPG Industries,
FMC Corp., and Diamond Shamrock -- that it would require them to
participate in a survey to monitor their discharges for carbon tet
under Section 308 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA).
During February 1977, EPA was monitoring carbon tet in raw
and finished water of Cincinnati, Ohio, as part of research on water
supply treatment. The data collected indicated that the carbon tet
content was increasing.
On February 18, 1977, EPA determined, based upon the sample
information analyzed at that time, that a huge "slug" containing an
estimated 70 tons of carbon tet and stretching some 75 miles south-
west from the Kanawha River was quickly moving down the Ohio.
4
Based upon the levels reported and the best available information
on the acute and chronic toxicity of carbon tet, EPA concluded that
the levels of carbon tet in the water presented a threat to human
health. As a result, EPA began to take action under the Safe
Drinking Water Act.
To protect the public from further exposure to this potentially
dangerous level of carbon tet in the water, EPA took several steps.
First, it calculated the velocity of the slug and the approximate
location of the main body of contaminated water. Consumers of
Ohio River drinking water were notified by EPA of the approximate
time the slug would arrive in their area. The EPA notified State
authorities about the slug and issued a health advisory informing
IV-3
-------
consumers about adverse health effects possibly resulting from
consumption of contaminated water. The EPA indicated that
people facing more risks -- including those with kidney, liver,
or gallbladder conditions -- and senior citizens should stockpile
clean water. The EPA also advised that those people forced to
drink contaminated water should boil it for 5 minutes to remove
most of the carbon tet.
Additional data, analyzed on the afternoon of February 18,
indicated that EPA's original estimation of the location of the slug
was incorrect. That evening, EPA determined that the slug had,
in fact, already passed Cincinnati. The EPA held a press con-
ference in Cincinnati to announce that it had miscalculated the
location of the slug and issued new health advisories.
«
On February 24, FMC reported to the State of West Virginia
a spill of 2 to 3 tons of carbon tet into the Kanawha River. The
EPA carefully monitored the progress of this spill as it made its
way down the Kanawha. State and local entities were quickly
informed of the spill and advised about precautionary measures.
After inspecting the FMC plant, examining documents
concerning FMC's past history of carbon tet spills, and asses-
sing the possible danger to consumers of additional carbon tet
discharges or spills into the river, EPA, through the Justice
Department, filed a civil action in the U. S. District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia on March 9, 1977, to
restrain FMC from discharging additional carbon tet into the
IV-4
-------
Kanawha River. A temporary restraining order was granted,
barring FMC from manufacturing carbon tet at its South Charleston
plant until measures were taken to prevent further discharges.
While the order was in effect, EPA and the U.S. Attorney's Office
negotiated with FMC the terms of a Consent Order designed to
minimize future discharges from the South Charleston plant.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Initial Carbon Tetrachloride Incident
Date
1975
September 29, 1976
Octobe^ 6, 1976
October 22, 1976
November 15, 1976
February 1, 1977
February 7 -
March 25, 1977
February 7, 1977
February 8, 1977
Event
Carbon tet first discovered in Ohio
River.
10 ppb carbon tet detected in
Huntington drinking water.
4 ppb of carbon tet detected in
Huntington drinking water.
Inquiries under Section 308 of Federal
Water Pollution Control Act sent to
PPG Industries, FMC Corp., Allied
Chemical Corp., and Diamond
Shamrock.
Region Hi meets with four companies.
FMC indicates it will not participate
in 308 Survey.
PPG, Allied, and Diamond Shamrock
conduct 308 Surveys.
FMC refuses admittance to EPA
sampling team.
EPA team again refused, then allowed
in.
IV-5
-------
February 10, 1977
February 9-12, 1977
February 18, 1977
February 18 -
March 25, 1977
EPA requests injunction regarding
FMC's refusal to conduct 308 Surveys.
Region m informed by Technical
Support Division of high carbon tet
levels in Ohio River at Cincinnati;
sampling conducted.
Court hearing on injunction request
ends with consent order.
FMC conducts 398 Survey.
70-Ton Slug
Date
February 9, 1977
February 10, 1977
February 11-13, 1977
February 16-18, 1977
February 19, 1977
February 20 -
March 2, 1977
Events
High carbon tet levels detected in
Ohio River at Cincinnati.
Possible dischargers investigated
and survey designed.
Carbon tet samples collected from
Ohio and Kanawha Rivvers.
Analytical results received from
2/11 and 2/12 survey. 70-ton slug
detected. States and municipalities
notified. News release issued.
Press conference at Cincinnati
corrects error in news release.
Slug tracked downstream. States
notified daily.
FMC-Reported Spill of Carbon Tetrachloride
Date Events
February 24, 1977
(a.m.)
FMC announces spill of 2 to 3 of
carbon tet. States and utilities
notified. Regional Response Team
activated.
IV-6
-------
V. CHEMICAL WASTE IN SEWERS — LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY
CASE STUDY SUMMARY
Sometime during March 1977, an unidentified toxic material
began entering the Morris Forman Sewage Treatment Plant in
Louisville, Kentucky (Figure V-l). The plant has a capacity of
105 million gallons per day, making it the third largest on the
Ohio River. The Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) operates the
plant, which treats about 97 percent of the sewage generated by the
City of Louisville and Jefferson County.
On Saturday, March 26, four MSD employees were using steam
to clean a highly viscous material, which had a strong odor, off the
bar screen and associated equipment in the plant. The cleaning
operation released into the atmosphere a blue haze that irritated
the eyes, nose, throat, lungs, and skin. The supervisor on duty
halted all work in the area and sent three employees to the hospital
for examination. Eventually, 32 employees were placed under med-
ical care. All subsequently returned to full-time duty, apparently
with no after-effects.
On Sunday afternoon, following a heavy rain, the operating per-
sonnel noticed a blue haze hovering over the primary sedimentation
basins and an objectionable odor both in the primary treatment area
and in the basement of the buildings that contain sludge-pumping
equipment. After an investigation, the plant manager ordered that
50 million gallons of raw sewage be discharged directly to the Ohio
V-l
-------
ILLINOIS
KENTUCKY
FIGURE V-1. AREA INVOLVED IN DUMPING OF WASTES INTO THE
LOUISVILLE, KY., SEWER SYSTEM
-------
River upstream of the plant. The plant manager declared the
entire primary treatment facility a restricted area, and entry was
strictly controlled.
On the afternoon of Monday, March 28, having failed to identify
the material causing the problems, MSD officials telephoned for
EPA s Region IV Office in Atlantia, Georgia, for assistance. The
Kentucky Department of Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection (KDNREP) was also notified. Region IV sent a representa-
tive from its Enforcement Branch to Louisville and arranged for
samples of the suspected material to be flown to the EPA labora-
tory in Athens, Georgia.
During the early morning hours of March 29, the contaminants
were identified as hexachlorocyclopentadiene ("hexa") and octa-
chlorocyclopentene ("octa"). Both of these substances are toxic
when inhaled or absorbed through the skin. At 10:15 a.m., MSD
ordered that all sewage be discharged into the river and evacuated
the plant.
Aside from danger to workers at the plant, the primary con-
cerns were for the residents of the area and the cities downstream
that use the river as a source of water. Monitoring of ambient air
in the Louisville area indicated that there was no hazard to the
general public. Several downstream cities had to use activated
carbon to remove the contaminants from their water supplies until
the danger period passed.
V-3
-------
EPA and MSB personnel began systemically sampling the
sewers to find the source of the contaminants. The easily identi-
fiable odor of the hexa-octa mixture helped search teams to trace
the path of the material. Within a few days, the entry point was
identified. About four miles of the Louisville sewer system were
found to be contaminated.
Meanwhile, all local, State, and Federal records were
examined to determine if anyone in the Louisville area produced
hexa, used it in any manufacturing process, or received it for
disposel of in waste. Hexa is used in the manufacture of insecti-
cides, fire retardants, polymers, resins, dyes, fungicides, and
Pharmaceuticals. Octa, a waste by-product from the manufacture
of hexa, has no known commercial uses. The investigators soon
found that there were no manufacturers or users of hexa in the
area and, therefore, no local source of the waste. The hexa-octa
mixture must have been brought to Louisville for disposal, or a
vehicle passing through must have discharged its wastes or
cleaned its tanks into the sewers.
Examining national data, other investigators found the Hooker
Chemical Co. had ceased manufacture of hexa several months
earlier at a plant in Michigan, leaving only one plant, in Memphis,
Tennessee, operated by Velsicol Chemical Co. The ratio of hexa
to octa in the material contaminating the Louisville sewer system
proved similar to that of waste products from the Velsicol manu-
facture of hexa. Representatives of the Enforcement Branch of
V-4
-------
Region IV went to Memphis to review records on disposal, haulers,
and methods of waste treatment. The check showed that the Chem-
Dyne Corp. of Hamilton, Ohio, was the hauler and disposer for
Velsicol. In reviewing Chem-Dyne records, an attorney from
Region IV found a link to Louisville. Following that lead, State and
Federal officials on April 4 (a. week after the Morris Forman plant
closed) inspected and sampled five waste disposal sites operated in
the Louisville area by Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc. On June 7,
1977, a Federal grand jury returned three indictments of five counts
each against the two owners and one employee of the company. The
indictments included counts of polluting a Federal waterway and
interferring with the operation of a sewage treatment plant. The
trial date, originally set for October 24, 1977, was rescheduled
for November, 1978.
The response team in Louisville decided that it was critical
to get the Morris Forman Sewage Treatment Plant back into opera-
tion. These efforts started on April 9. A careful survey of the
plant revealed that most of the contaminants were in channels and
the bottom of basins. This was as expected, because chemicals
are slightly soluble in, and heavier than water. Hexa levels in the
plant were as high as 17 million parts per billion (ppb) or 1. 7
percent. To contain the hazardous material, as much of the sludge
as possible was transferred to three digesters on the plant site.
About 25, 000 tons were transferred, including about six tons of hexa.
The contaminated sewers also had to be cleaned out so that
they would not recontaminate the plant. One short section, a
V-5
-------
semiellipse 11 feet in diameter, was cleaned. The task was
extremely difficult; conditions were hazardous for workers, and
there were no proven methods available. By putting men and
machines down into the sewers, MSD succeeded in decontami-
nating sections, permitting the plant to reopen on June 18, 1977.
However, about 15 million gallons of raw sewage are still dis-
charged directly to the river each day because MSD has not yet
found a way to decontaminate the remaining four miles of sewers.
One line is small, making it difficult for men and machines to
work effectively and safely. The other line, though larger, is
under a major street. Because homes, businesses, and factories
are connected directly to the line, there is a possibility that hexa-
octa fumes would reach occupied areas during cleanup operations.
MSD has solicited proposals from experienced contractors but has
not yet received an acceptable proposal to decontaminate the
sewers.
The contaminated sludge in the three digesters then became
the major disposal problem. After considering several approaches
that would have involved transporting the sludge to other locations,
at considerable expense, tests indicated that it could probably be
dried and then incinerated in facilities at the plant. No air pollu-
tion would be produced, and the remaining ash was found to be free
of contaminants, permitting its disposal in a local landfill. By the
end of 1977, essentially all the contaminated sludge in the digesters
had been destroyed. About 1, 000 tons of contaminated material
V-6
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such as grit and debris, along with the material removed from the
sewers, was loaded into sealed containers and shipped to a Class I
disposal site in Wilsonville, Illinois.
To date, about $1.3 million has been spent on decontamination
of the Louisville treatment plant and some of the sewers.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Date
March 1977
March 26, 1977
March 27, 1977
March 28, 1977
March 29, 1977
March 30, 1977
Events
Unknown toxic materials begin entering
Morris Porman Sewage Treatment Plant
in Louisville, Ky.
Four employees of the Metropolitan
Sewer District (MSD) become ill when
cleaning a mechanical screen. Work
is halted in the area. Three employees
are sent to the hospital.
Blue haze hovers over primary treat-
ment area. MSD diverts 50 million
gallons of sewage directly to the Ohio
River.
MSD asks for assistance from EPA's
Region IV and the Kentucky Department
of Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection (KDNREP).
Region IV s laboratory identifies con-
taminants as a mixture of hexa and octa,
both considered hazardous. Plant is
evacuated. EPA sampling team from
Athens, MSD, and KDNREP begin plan-
ning sampling program. U.S. Army
43rd Ordnance Detachment arrives to
assist in sampling.
Downstream water suppliers advised to
add carbon to their raw waters and
sample raw and finished water. Only
manufacturer of hexa, Velsicol Chemi-
cal Co., and its waste contractor,
Chem-Dyne Corp., are identified.
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March 31, 1977 Personnel from Center for Disease
Control, National Institute of Occupa-
tional Safety and Health (NIOSH),
Occupational Safety and Health Admini-
stration (OSHA), and Kentucky OSHA
arrive in Louisville. NIOSH finds no
public health hazard.
April 1, 1977 EPA attorney examining Chem-Dyne
records find that hexa wastes had
recently been shipped to Kentucky
Liquid Recycle, Inc., of New Albany,
Ind. Mt. Vernon, Lid., issues ban on
drinking water.
April 2 and 3, 1977 Heavy rainfall flushes additional hexa
from combined sewage system into the
Ohio River.
April 4, 1977 EPA, KDNREP, and MSD inspect five
disposal sites operated by Kentucky
Liquid Recycle.
April 5, 1977 EPA, MSD, OSHA, Kentucky OSHA,
and NIOSH make plans for cleanup and
consider disposal alternatives.
April 6, 1977 Region IV concludes it has exhausted
EPA's investigative resources.
KDNREP assumes sole responsibility
for collecting river and water supply
samples. Mt. Vernon stops with-
drawing water from Ohio River until
hexa slug passes. Mayor of Louisville
requests a Federal coordinator.
April 7, 1977 Region IV Administrator arrives to
coordinate Federal effort. FDA
advised of river monitoring results for
use in determining possible effects on
food processors.
April 8, 1977 FBI assumes responsibility for investi-
gating sources of contamination.
Governor of Kentucky requests emer-
gency funds from Federal Disaster
Assistance Administration to aid in
cleanup.
April 9, 1977 Cleanup of plant begins.
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April 14, 1977
April 15, 1977
May 2, 1977
June 7, 1977
June 18, 1977
June 30, 1977
June 1978
NIOSH assumes responsibility for all
medical investigations.
EPA makes $200, 000 available to
Region IV for technical assistance to
MSB.
Initial report on disposing of con-
taminated sludge using the plant's
Zimpro units is encouraging.
Federal grand jury brings three indict-
ments of five counts each against
owners and one employee of Kentucky
Liquid Recycle. Among the charges:
polluting a Federal waterway and inter-
ferring with operation of a sewage
treatment plant.
Morris Forman Sewage Treatment Plant
reopens, providing primary treatment
for 80 million gallons of sewage daily.
EPA and Jefferson County Air Pollution
Control Board advise MSD that contami-
nated sludge may be disposed of in the
Zimpro units.
Trial of defendants indicted in Louisville
hexa incident schedules to begin.
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AUTHORITY
Federal Authority
EPA became involved in the Louisville incident on March 28
when MSD notified Region IV that it was diverting half the flow of
the Morris Forman Sewage Treatment Plant to the Ohio River.
This was required by the provisions of the waste discharge permit
issued to MSD in accordance with Section 402 of the FWPCA. MSD
also requested technical assistance from Region IV to identify the
unknown toxic chemical contaminating the plant. EPA's response
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to the request was carried out in accordance with Section 104(a) of
FWPCA, which requires the EPA Administrator to establish a
national program to, among other things, provide technical services
to States and local agencies to conduct investigations, surveys, and
studies.
Once the magnitude of the problem was known, the initial esti-
mate to clean up and dispose of the contaminant was about $4
million, which exceeded MSD's capabilities. MSB and State, after
the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) denied
funding, requested that EPA prvide the funds for removal.
FDAA's denial was based upon EPA's authority to provide such
assistance under FWPCA. A review of EPA authority indicated
that no specific section of FWPCA was applicable; however, parts
of Section 104, 106, 115 and 311 could provide the authority for
expenditure of funds to assist MSB. The Office of Management
and Budget expressed reservation about EPA's authority and the
precedent-setting nature of the funding assistance. EPA allo-
cated $200, 000 to assist MSB under Section 104; however, further
funding and resolution of the authority issue was not necessary
since the costs of removal and disposal were significantly less
than initial estimates.
Even though Section 311 of FWPCA was not applicable in this
case, the U. S. Army 43rd Ordnance Betachment was activated to
provide assistance in accordance with the provisions of the
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan.
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The enforcement actions taken by the Department of Justice,
FBI, and EPA were undertaken in accordance with Section 309(e)
of FWPCA. The dischargers were arrested and indicted by a
Federal grand jury for violating the FWPCA on June 7, 1977.
State Authority
Information on State authorities is included in "State Emer-
gency Powers for Hazardous Substances, " prepared under another
part of EPA's study on environmental emergencies.
FEDERAL RESPONSE
EPA became aware of the events in Louisville on March 28
when MSD, as required by the discharge permit, notified Region IV
that it was diverting about half of the flow of the Morris Forman
Sewage Treatment Plant to the Ohio River. MSD also requested
technical assistance in identifying the unknown toxic agent contami-
nating the plant. Region IV informed the Ohio River Valley
Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO), KDNREP, Region V, and EPA
Headquarters of the situation. A Region IV representative left on
the same day for Louisville, and a sample of the suspected mate-
rial was tentatively identified late that evening by Region IV's
Surveillance and Analysis Division laboratory in Athens. Eventu-
ally, Athens analyzed 3, 200 samples of air and water; an additional
1, 300 samples were analyzed by various other laboratories.
On March 29, an EPA sampling team arrived in Louisville from
Athens, and began planning a sampling program in cooperation with
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MSB and KDNREP. Because of the highly toxic nature of the
material, the U. S. Army 43rd Ordnance Detachment at Fort Knox,
Kentucky, was called in to assist in sampling. An Army helicopter
was provided for sampling the river. In response to Region IV's
request, the Center for Disease Control in Athens, the National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Kentucky
OSHA were sent to the site. The Food and Drug Administration
was kept advised of the results of river monitoring so that any
possible effects on food proceessing could be assessed.
Safety Monitoring
By the end of the first week, about 100 local, State, and
Federal employees (including ten from EPA) were involved in the
hexa incident in Louisville. The air quality monitoring stations,
set up around the plant and along the major sewer lines, indicated
that there was no hazard to the general public. Nonetheless, the
public needed repeated assurances that hexa odors from the sewers
were below toxic levels. An epidemiological study of 212 residents
by the Center for Disease Control confirmed the fact that there was
no danger.
Region IV's Water Supply Branch advised KDNREP and Region
V of the potential water supply problems. After consultation with
the Health Effects Research Laboratory in Cincinnati, Ohio, the
level of concern was set at 1 ppb of the hexa-octa mixture in
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drinking water. Although there was no direct experience with
removal of the contaminant from water with powdered activated
carbon, the Municipal Environmental Research Laboratory in
Cincinnati recommended advising water suppliers to add carbon
at their maximum capability as a precautionary measure and to
sample raw and finished water. A sampling system was set up
to provide early warning to downstream water suppliers.
The waste material moved down the river as a slug, arriving
first at the Evansville, Indiana, intake in about three days.
This was the time that had been calculated from flow times
supplied by the Technical Support Division of the Office of Water
Supply in Cincinnati. While the concentration of hexa-octa
exceeded 2 ppb in raw water, concentrations in treated finished
water were below the detectable limit. Henderson, Kentucky,
was also able to treat water successfully. However, Mt. Vernon,
Indiana, and Golconda, Illinois, were not as successful, apparently
because they were using a different brand of carbon, and Mt.
Vernon had to ban the use of drinking water between April 1 and
April 3.
On April 2 and 3, heavy rainfall in the Louisville area flushed
additional material from the combined sewage system into the Ohio
River. Evansville again removed the contamination with powdered
activated carbon. Mt. Vernon decided to shut off its water intake,
rather than risk having to flush its system, as had been necessary
with the first slug. Water was trucked in temporarily.
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Investigation of Source of Contamination
EPA and MSD personnel systematically sampled the Louisville
sewers to locate the point where the toxic material was entering
the system. EPA guided the effort, providing containers and
furnishing analyses to guarantee quality assurance, while MSD
supplied the knowledge of the system and manpower.
Within a week after the closing of the plant, 41 points had been
sampled. The Athens laboratory, by placing its organic section
on a round-the-clock work shift and shifting all its gas chroma-
tographic equipment to the analysis of hexa samples, was able to
report results in about 24 hours. The analytical results, along
with the odor of the contaminant, made it clear that the waste had
come into the sewage treatment plant through the Western Inter-
ceptor, which generally collects sewage north of the plant.
Because the contaminant was apparently a waste product
brought to Louisville, all rail car and truck-cleaning facilities
were inspected to confirm their reports that they had no contact
with hexa. Meanwhile, the Region IV Enforcement Branch scanned
the nation for manufacturers and users of hexa. Hooker Chemical
reported that it had discontinued making hexa in February and that
prior to that time, it had shipped hexa through, but not to,
Louisville. The company also reported that it disposed of its
waste products under contract with Chem-Dyne. Examination of
Chem-Dyne records by an EPA attorney on April 1 showed that
wastes had been shipped in the first three weeks of March to
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Kentucky Liquid Recycle, a firm in New Albany, Indiana, which
is located across the river from Louisville.
The information gathered from Velsicol and Chem-Dyne by
April 3 strongly suggested examination of the facilities of the
local disposal company. EPA's Enforcement Branch, KDNREP,
and MSB met and planned simultaneous inspections and sampling
of the five sites believed to be used by Kentucky Liquid. Four
sites were in Kentucky—one was formerly a tobacco warehouse,
one was formerly a brick-manufacturing plant, one an open field,
and the fourth the home of the owner. The fifth site in New Albany,
was formerly an oil tank farm. EPA's Region V and the Indiana
Stream Pollution Control Board were advised of the inspections.
Coordination was a paramount concern, becuase of the involve-
ment of a number of agencies, some of which could not be fully
apprised of the action until one hour before the inspections. At
10:00 a.m., April 4, all five locations were inspected simultane-
ously by teams of State, Federal, and local officials. The owner
was located at his home and accompanied the inspectors to the
New Albany site. Company records showed that hexa-octa wastes
had been delivered to the New Albany site by Chem-Dyne from
February 24 to March 25.
When the samples collected from the suspected sites confirmed
the existence of hexa at more than one location, the Enforcement
Branch informed the U. S. District Attorney for the Western Dis-
trict of Kentucky. The Attorney obtained a search and seizure
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warrant from a Federal Judge and directed that more samples be
obtained from the sites. Senior personnel of Kentucky's Division
of Water Quality and Division of Hazardous Material and Waste
Management took part in the two-day effort, along with eight EPA
personnel from Athens and FBI agents.
To provide sufficient legal evidence, a 5 percent sample
of all drums and containerized materials was taken at each site
using identical procedures. Sampling was difficult and hazardous.
Each team was outfitted with protective gear consisting of face
shields, lab aprons, elbow-length rubber gloves, and respirators
with selective filter packs. The U. S. Army at Fort Knox supplied
a back hoe and bulldozer to dig up buried barrels at one site. Fork-
lift trucks were needed to sample drums stacked five high at another
site. Some barrels and tanks with unknown contents were leaking,
while others buldged from internal pressure. About 200 individual
samples were taken and sent to Athens for analysis.
On April 6, after reviewing all records and reports, Region
IV's Enforcement Branch concluded that EPA had exhausted its
investigative resources and was still not able to determine who had
been at fault. It requested the FBI be broght into the investigation,
and on April 8 turned over all information to the FBI.
The FBI investigation, along with information from a witness,
revealed that the hexa had entered the Louisville sewer system at
Lewis Avenue near Broadway and 20th Streets where an old dis-
tillery was being demolished.
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Following presentation of the evidence by the U. S. Attorney,
a Federal grand jury on June 7, 1977, returned three indictments
of five counts each against the two owners and an employee of
Kentucky Liquid. The indictments included: two counts of
discharging a pollutant into a Federal waterway, one count of
conspiring to pollute a Federal waterway, one count of interfer-
ring with operation of a sewage treatment plant, and one count of
conspiring to interfere with a sewage treatment plant.
Because this was only the second criminal case to be tried
under FWPCA in which a jail sentence was sought, the judge
granted extra time to the defendants' attorneys to prepare the
case. The trial date, originally set for October 24, 1977, was
rescheduled for November 1978.
Cleanup
Returning the sewage treatment plant to normal operating
status was critical since 100 million gallons of raw sewage per
day were being discharged into the Ohio River. First, however,
procedures had to be established for worker safety. NIOSH,
OSHA, Kentucky OSHA, EPA, and MSB worked together to develop
the necessary procedures and to train the workers in the use of life
support equipment.
On April 14, NIOSH assumed responsibility for all medical
investigations, and on April 19 took over all air sampling in the
plant. The cleaning operation itself was carried out and funded
largely by MSB.
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On April 8, the Governor of Kentucky requested emergency
funds from FDAA to aid in the cleanup. FDAA denied the request,
and on April 15, EPA made $200, 000 available to Region IV and
requested the Region to develop a plan to solve the problem and
provide estimates of the funds needed. EPA was to be responsi-
ble for disposal of contaminated material, while MSB was to be
responsible for the cleanup.
Coordination
With more than 100 people representing many agencies directly
involved in the Louisville hexa incident, there were problems of
coordination. The 17 agencies represented included EPA, KDNREP,
OSHA, Kentucky OSHA, Kentucky Department of Emergency Ser-
vices, 43rd Ordnance Department, NIOSH, Center for Disease
Control, FDAA, Department of Justice, FBI, U. S. House of Repre-
sentatives Subcommittee on Investigaitons and Review, Louisville -
Jefferson County Health Department, Jefferson County Air Pollution
Control Board, Louisville Police Department, Louisville Mayor's
Office, and Civil Defense.
Elected Louisville officials were concerned that the Federal
agencies, at the top levels, were not giving adequate attention to
the problem, and they perceived a lack of coordination. As a
result, the Mayor of Louisville made requests for a Federal
coordinator to President Carter, the EPA Administrator, and the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. On April 7, the
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chairman of the Federal Regional Council, who was, c©incidentally,
the Administrator of EPA's Region IV, was sent to Louisville to
coordinate actions of the Federal agencies present and to provide
a leadership support role to MSD. A simiar request to the Gov-
ernor of Kentucky resulted in assignment of a coordinator for State
agencies.
Assignment of Federal and State coordinators had a positive
effect on the management of the incident. In particular, the
presence of a ranking Federal official provided focus, leadership,
and a single voice for the Federal agencies. Aso, he took care of
inquiries, information, and action with other State, EPA Regions,
and Federal agencies not on the scene. He was able to provide
assistance at a higher level and in a manner not otherwise avail-
able to MSD or State officials. For example, when incineration
of the sludge at sea was being considered, he was able to deter-
mine the legal requirements for barge shipment of the material
down the Ohio and Misissippi Rivers, make preliminary arrange-
ments with the Coast Guard and U. S. Navy, and determine the
availability of the two incinerator ships.
STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE
The State of Kentucky became involved in the hexa incident
when KDNREP was notified that raw sewage was being diverted to
the Ohio River. KDNREP assisted in collection of samples and
coordinated their shipment by air to Athens using the State's
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aeronautical motor pool, which the Governor had made available,
with backup from commercial services. On April 6, KDNREP
assumed sole responsibility for collecting river and water supply
samples.
On April 8, the Governor formally requested that FDAA
declare the Louisville sewage system a major emergency. He
also requested a Federal mission be assigned to EPA for removal
and disposal of contaminated sludge. Later, at the request of the
Mayor of Louisville, the Governor appointed a coordinator for
State agencies. He chose a coordinator from the Bureau of
Environmental Protection because three of its divisions were
deeply involved in the hexa incident and because the Bureau nor-
mally took a coordinating role in environmental emergencies.
KDNREP helped plan and took part in the inspections and
sampling of the five sites of Kentucky Liquid Recycle. Both
State and local authorities knew that the company stored liquid
industrial wastes in the Louisville area, including New Albany,
although it had not been known to be handling hexa. The comp-
any had received no disposal permits from either Kentucky or
Indiana. KDNREP and the Fire Marshal's Office had made spot
checks of the company, as had the Jefferson County Health De-
partment. Citizens had also complained about odors and safety.
Following the April 4 inspections, State police maintained
surveillance on all five sites to make sure no material was
shipped in or out. When the existence of hexa was confirmed at
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several locations, more samples were required to provide legal
evidence. Senior personnel of KDNREP participated in the two-
day effort.
Kentucky OSHA played a major role in ensuring worker safety,
since Federal OSHA had delegated the responsibility to the State.
With the assistance of OSHA, NIOSH, EPA, and MSD, Kentucky
OSHA developed procedures for decontaminating the plant and
cleaning the sewers. Protective clothing was specified, including
boots, disposable coveralls and gloves, full vinyl suits, half or
full face respirators, self-contained breathing apparatus, and, as
appropriate, the use of a fresh air supply. Worker safety was a
major factor in the long period of time required to get the plant
back into operation. Despite the many hazards, no workers were
injured during cleanup operations.
As the operator of the Morris Forman Sewage Treatment Plant
and the sewer system, MSD was involved throughout all phases of
the hexa incident. It promptly notified Region IV and KDNREP
that it was discharging raw sewage into the Ohio River. Once its
chemists were unable to identify the agent responsible, it asked
for technical assistance from EPA. As State and Federal repre-
sentatives arrived, MSD set up a coordinating center at its
administrative offices. Additional telephones were installed, and
working and meeting space provided. Daily briefings were held
at 5:00 p.m. to keep all agencies current.
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MSD participated in the monitoring efforts, especially in the
plant and sewer lines, where its knowledge was essential. Trying
to develop leads in the investigation, MSD asked the public to
report any recent unusual occurrences regarding tank trucks.
Several leads resulted, but all were fruitless. Eventually, a wit-
ness did report that several times in March he had seen the
owners of Kentucky Liquid Recycle driving a semitrailer truck
into a demolition site. This lead helped to identify the point in
the sewer system where the waste had entered.
Cleanup of Plant and Sewers
Returning the sewage treatment plant to operational status
was accomplished largely by MSD. In the plant, the toxic mate-
rials were concentrated in the sludge and grit. Once the area
became safe to enter, on April 9, the noncontaminated waters
from the plant were released to the Ohio. On the same date,
MSD started transferring the contaminated sludges from the pri-
mary clarifiers to the digesters. About 25, 000 tons of sludge,
including some 6 tons of hexa, were transferred. Grit and debris
were placed in sealed containers and transported to the approved
landfill.
At first, disposal of the sludge was expected to be very expen-
sive, since the disposal schemes being considered involved
transporting the sludge from the plant, then either burying it or
burning it at sea. However, it was determined that the sludge
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could be disposed of on-site using wet air oxidation units installed
during a $56 million upgrading of the plant from primary to secon-
dary treatment. Preliminary studies conducted in Rothschild,
Wisconsin, by Zimpro, Inc., the manufacturer of the units, indi-
cated that the sludge could be heated in the units, then vacuum
filtered and incinerated. All contaminated material in the diges-
ters was processed by the end of 1977.
Three major sections of the sewer were contaminated with an
asphalt-like layer of sludge that was as deep as 1 1/2 feet in
places. Unless the sludge was stirred up, water flowing through
the sewers into the river was not a public hazard. Because of a
variety of factors, removing the sludge from the sewers proved
to be more of a problem than had been anticipated. Among the
complicating factors were the requirements for worker health and
safety, the necessity to modify equipment so it could work in the
sewers, the effect of the contaminated sludge on rubber boots and
tires, and, for a period, the presence of hydrogen sulfide and
hexa fumes.
The Ohio River Interceptor—a semielliptical line 11 feet in
diameter and about 3, 500 feet long--was cleaned first because this
would permit reopening the plant. The sewer has a flat, smooth
concrete base, so that it could be cleaned with small tractors
equipped with special blades and men wearing protective clothing.
On June 18, 1977, the treatment plant was returned to operational
status, providing primary treatment to about 90 milion gallons of
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sewage per day. While the plant was closed, mo're than seven
billion gallons of raw sewage were discharged to the Ohio River.
Fortunately, it was at a time when water temperature was rela-
tively low and oxygen content high, so that the damage to water
quality was minimal. Secondary treatment, which was just being
started when the hexa incident occurred, was resumed about a
month later. However, MSB is operating the new and complex
facilities with many inexperienced workers. Thus, it expects it
will be mid-1978 before the numerous mechanical and control
problems have been solved and the plant is able to consistently
discharge an effluent that meets permit requirements. The
monitoring of air, solids, and sludge will probably have to con-
tinue for at least two years.
The two remaining sewer lines have not been decontaminated.
Considerable work was done on the Western Interceptor, which is
7,000 feet long and varies from four to six feet in diameter. The
amount of contaminated hexa in the sewer is not large--only about
20 cubic yards--but the concentration of hexa-octa has been as
high as 1. 5 million ppb. Because of its size, men and machines
could not work in the sewer. Early efforts involved trying to
dissolve the contaminants, then flushing the sewer and trapping
the contaminants. Specially designed flushing equipment,
operating at thousands of pounds per square inch, was used
along with mechanical drags. However, the sewer has not yet
been decontaminated.
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The third sewer—the Broadway—poses the greatest challenge
of all. The contaminated section is 10, 200 feet long; some parts
are 91/2 feet in diameter and others 10 1/2. Installed more
than 100 years ago, it runs down the center of a major four-lane
road on which residential, commerical, and industrial buildings
connect directly to the sewer. Therefore, gases could be expected
to back into occupied areas during cleanup. It is a combined sewer
and so it can't be shut off and drained. In the event of heavy rains,
men and equipment would have to be evacuated quickly. The line
where the hexa entered the sewer system contains 250 to 300
cubic yards of contaminated sludge.
MSB considered the possibility of decontaminating the two
sewer lines by using a strong oxidizing agent such as chlorine,
ozone, ultraviolet light, or a combination of these agents. Unfor-
tunately, the pilot work had to be stopped when it became apparent
that a toxic gas such as phosgene might be generated. A major
advantage of a successful reaction process is that the public would
not be exposed to the toxic material, and the cost would probably
be less than for removing the material, placing it in containers,
and disposing it at a distant location. MSB solicited proposals
for decontaminating the two interceptors, but has not yet received
an acceptable proposal.
In addition to MSB, numerous local agencies were involved in
the hexa incident, including Louisville-Jefferson County Health
Bepartment, Jefferson County Air Pollution Control Board,
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Louisville Police Department, Louisville Mayor's Office, and
Civil Defense.
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR RESPONSE
The manager of Velsicol's Memphis plant provided information
on personnel precautions and safety requirements necessary in
handling hexa. When the ratio of hexa to octa became known, he
verified that their waste products from the manufacture of hexa
were in the same general proportions. He joined the search for
the source of the wastes and began with his own records. Chem-
Dyne also cooperated by making its records available.
Hooker Chemical, a former manufacturer of hexa provided
safety data and identified the only firm manufacturing hexa.
RESOURCES AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS
Costs for responding to incidents of the size of the Louisville
hexa incident are not budgeted for by any agency. However, MSD
did have a contingency fund of $7 million set aside to take care of
specific breakdowns in its system. MSD also has two insurance
policies, one covering the primary treatment plant, the other the
secondary plant. Negotiations are still underway with the insur-
ance companies.
Early estimates for disposal of the material, when incinera-
tion at sea was being considered, ran as high as $8.6 million.
Disposal costs are not estimated to run only about $240, 000;
$135, 000 has already been spent, with the remainder earmarked
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for disposal of material from the two remaining sewers.
Expenses to date are:
Disposal $135,000
MSB cleanup 665, 000
EPA (including contract and 341, 800
personnel costs)
Other Federal (OSHA, NIOSH, Army, 47,100
Center for Disease Control)
Kentucky Department for Natural 53, 000
Resources and Environmental
Protection
Water supplies (additional 33, 000
treatment for downstream
cities)
TOTAL $1, 274, 900
Costs for decontaminating the remaining sewers may be as
high as $5 million.
PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND CONCLUSIONS
The most significant issue raised by the Louisville chemical
waste incident is what should be the Federal role in mitigation of
environmental emergencies that are not covered by Section 311,
FWPCA. Even though major funding support by the Federal gov-
ernment was not ultimately needed, the following points are worth
reviewing since similar cases could arise in the future.
o FDAA withdrew consideration of Federal support after
EPA determined it had the authority to provide assist-
ance.
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o EPA Region IV was of the opinion that on-site
decontamination should be funded by MSD; however,
Federal assistance should be provided for costs of
ultimate disposal if it involved transport to locations
other than the State of Kentucky.
o Cost for disposal was initially estimated at $4 million,
which was assumed to exceed the capability of MSD;
however, MSD had a $7 million emergency fund.
o EPA's authority to provide funding assistance was
vague, since FWPCA and other acts administered
by EPA did not cover this type of situation.
o Federal funding of the Louisville incident would have
established a precedent and significantly expanded
the Federal role in environmental emergencies.
o The EPA funds that were made available were pri-
marily to provide technical assistance for solving
the problem and not for removal or disposal of the
substance.
The question concerning what the Federal role should be is still
unresolved; however, amendments to FWPCA passed in December
1977 include authority to provide support for such incidents. Under
Section 504, a $10 million contingency fund is authorized to provide
assistance in environmental emergencies presenting a danger to
public health or welfare. However, funds to carry out the authority
have not been appropriated.
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VI. KEPONE CONTAMINATION - HOPEWELL, VIRGINIA
CASE STUDY SUMMARY
Kepone, a chlorinated hydrocarbon used as an ant and rodent
poison, was produced at Hopewell, Virginia, (Figure VI-1) by Allied
Chemical Corp. from 1966 to 1973. Toxicity information submitted
when it was registered with the U. S. Department of Agriculture in
1959 indicated that it caused "DDT-like tremors" in people exposed
to it.
In February 1974, Life Science Products, Inc., a company in-
corporated in Virginia in 1973 by two former Allied employees,
started Kepone production under contract to Allied. The raw
materials were supplied by Allied and the product sold exclusively
to Allied. This arrangement, in which a contractor processes a
material for a fee or "toll" and then returns the material, is a
common practice in the chemical industry. Over the years, Ke-
pone never amounted to more than 0.1 percent of U. S. pesticide
production, of which upwards of 90 percent of the Kepone was
exported.
In July 1975, the Center for Disease Control at Atlanta, Georgia,
found Kepone in blood samples of a Life Science employee. The
samples were submitted by a Hopewell physician. The employee's
complaints included tremors, loss of weight, quickened pulse, un-
usual eye movements, and a tender, enlarged liver. Notified of
the results of the blood analyses, the Virginia Department of Health
VI-1
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closed the plant. Eventually, more than 70 individuals developed
ailments ranging from slurred speech and loss of memory to liver
damage. A study by the Medical College of Virginia found that 14
individuals probably are sterile. A study by the National Cancer
Institute found that Kepone is carcinogenic.
In early August 1975, the State of Virginia asked EPA's Health
Effects Research Laboratory at Research Triangle Park, North
Carolina, for a sampling program to determine the extent and
effects of Kepone contamination in the residents and environment
of Hopewell. In December, EPA reported that Kepone residues
were found in blood and skin samples of 29 hospitalized patients—
28 Life Science workers and one worker's wife. Kepone was found
in the James River as far as 40 miles from Hopewell, as well as
in fish and shellfish, some collected as far as 64 miles from Hope-
well. Bottom sediments from the James River contained significant
Kepone concentrations, as did sludge from Hopewell's sewage treat-
ment plant. Prior to the closing of the Life Science plant, the City's
sludge digesters malfunctioned several times because of the toxic
effects of Kepone. Soils around the plant site had high Kepone resi-
dues. Air samples gathered between March 1974 and April 1975
from a State sampling station located about 200 meters from the
plant contained significant Kepone residues. Traces of Kepone
were also found in the air 16 miles from Hopewell.
In August 1975. EPA's Region HI Office in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, issued an order to Life Science Products to stop
VI-3
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sale, use, or removal of Kepone from its premises. As a result
of Kepone contamination, the Governor of Virginia closed the James
River to fin and shellfishing in December 1975, and in 1977, the
lower part of the Chesapeake Bay was closed to taking of blue male
crabs. In February 1976, Region HI issued a stop sale order to
Allied Chemical's Baltimore facility, which served as the distri-
bution point for Kepone produced at Hopewell. On October 5, 1976,
Allied Chemical was fined $13.2 million on its no contest plea to
940 criminal charges of discharging pesticide wastes into the James
River.
Major State and Federal activities, from December 1975 on,
emphasized cleanup actions and assessing the extent of Kepone
contamination. The Life Science plant was dismantled, and the
contaminated remnants buried in a clay-filled pit at the sewage treat-
ment plant. The land around the Life Science plant was scraped, and
the excavated material removed and stored in drums at the sewage
treatment plant. The contaminated sludge was stored in a specially
constructed lagoon at the plant.
At the same time, the State of Virginia moved ahead with develop-
ment of a large-scale program to sample and monitor water, soil,
and sediments. In addition, the river and fish market were sampled
to evaluate contamination of plant and animal life. Protocols were
developed, and a Kepone Task Force was set up to coordinate
Virginia's efforts. The State of Maryland also undertook sampling
VI-4
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in areas of its jurisdiction.
Efforts then shifted to two long-range issues:
o Evaluating methods for destroying Kepone wastes stored
at the sewage treatment plant.
o Assessing the contamination of the Hope well/James
River area and evaluating the possible methods for
mitigating the contamination.
Neither of these long-term issues has been resolved. Incin-
eration appears to be the method that will be used to dispose of the
stored wastes. Two public hearings have been held in Hopewell,
and further hearings will be held before a decision is reached.
At the request of the Governors of Virginia and Maryland, EPA
has undertaken a Kepone Mitigation Feasibility Project to assess the
problem of contamination of Hopewell and the James River. A report
was published in June 1978 and indicates that the contamination is so
widespread that it will be very costly and may prove impossible to
mitigate. Land areas around Hopewell still contain high concentra-
tions of Kepone. The James River is contaminated from Hopewell
to near its mouth, and there is no evidence that Kepone levels are
dropping. Cleanup of the river may require billions of dollars and
entail a further difficult problem of disposing of contaminated sedi-
ments. Without such cleanup, the James River may have to be
closed to fishing and shellfishing for decades.
One aspect of the Kepone incident, however, appears to be
improving. A recently-discovered drug, cholestyramine, hastens
VI-5
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elimination of Kepone from the body. That suggests that the human
victims may recover more quickly than had been thought.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Date
1959
1966-1973
October 10, 1973
February 21, 1974
February 1974
April 1974
September 1974
Events
Allied Chemical Corp. registers
Kepone as a pesticide with the U. S.
Dept. of Agriculture. Toxicity in-
formation included in registration
indicates that Kepone causes "DDT-
like tremors. "
Allied Chemical manufactures Kepone
in Hope-well, Va.
The City of Hope well applies to
Virginia Water Control Board for a
permit to discharge municipal waste-
water to James River. City claims
no industrial discharges enter sewage
treatment plant.
Life Science Products, Inc., (LSP)
begins production of Kepone in
Hopewell under contract to Allied
Chemical.
Virginia Air Pollution Control Board
cites Life Science Products for failure
to obtain air pollution permit for sulfur
oxides and particulates. Company
applies for and receives permit.
Sewage treatment plant malfunctions
because bacteria in sludge digesters
are decimated by Kepone.
Former employee of LSP files a
complaint on working conditions with
the Occupational Safety and Health and
Administration (OSHA). OSHA's tox-
icological information does not in-
dicate severe hazard, so complaint
is handled as discrimination case.
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October 1974
October 31, 1974
November 22, 1974
November 26, 1974
March 1975
April 1975
April 11, 1975
May 1975
Following repeated violations of the
air quality standard for particulates,
LSP installs baghouse.
Water Control Board grants Hopewell
waste water permit with no requirement
for monitoring or limit on Kepone dis-
charges, but asks Region El for recom-
mendations for treatment of Kepone
c ontamination.
Hopewell News publishes account of
Kepone-induced breakdown of digesters.
Region El provides information on
Kepone toxicity requested by Water
Control Board, recommending a limit
of 0. 4 parts per billion in discharges
into a municipal system.
Region HI begins to investigate whether
LSP has violated requirement of Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) as amended that all pesticide
products and producers must be regis-
.tered with EPA.
In a letter to Region HE, Allied Chemical
asserts that under existing regulations
Kepone produced by LSP is a pesticide
component and, therefore, LSP is not
required to register as a pesticide pro-
ducer.
After a meeting with the Water Control
Board, Hopewell agrees to construct an
asphalt-sealed lagoon to contain Kepone-
contaminated sludge from the digester,
and LSP agrees to pretreat waste water
before discharging it into the sewer
system.
State Water Control Board repots to the
State Health Dept. that LSP has dumped
hexachlorocyclopentadiene, a raw material
in the manufacture of Kepone, into Hope-
well's sewer system. City closes LSP
plant because worker at sewage treatment
plant becomes ill from fumes carried to
the plant.
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June 1975
July 1975
July 23, 1975
July 24, 1975
August 19, 1975
August 20, 1975
August 1975
September 1975
September 9, 1975
Water Control Board amends Hopewell
wastewater permit to require pretreat-
ment of wastes from LSP.
Health.Dept. is notified by Center for
Disease Control, Atlanta, Ga., that
Kepone has been detected in blood
sample of LSP employee.
Health Dept. examines 10 employees of
LSP; seven have symptoms of neuro-
logical illness, several severe enough
to require hospitalization. Inspection
of plant reveals that the building, air,
and ground are contaminated with Kepone
and its precursors; procedures for pro-
tecting personnel are found to be inade-
quate and operating conditions unsafe.
Health Dept. orders LSP to cease pro-
duction of new Kepone and to begin
immediately to clean up the site.
OSHA officials visit Hopewell plant for
the first time and find that limited pro-
cessing of raw materials on hand con-
tinues, as per cleanup agreement with
the City of Hopewell. OSHA cites the
company for four violations, including
failure to prevent employee exposure
to harmful levels of Kepone. Fines
totaling $16, 500 are imposed.
EPA's Region HI issues an order to
LSP under FIFRA to stop the sale or use
of Kepone, as well as its removal from
the premises.
Virginia asks that EPA's Health Effects
Research Lab, Research Triangle Park,
N. C., sample residents and the environ-
ment in Hopewell to determine the extent
and effects of Kepone contamination.
EPA informs the Food and Drug Admini-
stration (FDA) of James River Contami-
nation.
An Ad Hoc Committee consisting of mem-
bers of the State Water Control Board,
VI-8
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November 11, 1975
December 5, 1975
December 16, 1975
December 18, 1975
January 1976
February 3, 1976
February 1976
February 25, 1976
March 1976
State Health Dept., and the City of Hope-
well is established to determine the meth-
ods and costs of cleaning up the LSP plant
site and disposing of any waste material.
Cleanup of the LSP plant begins under
the direction of an Allied Chemical in-
dustrial hygienist.
Virginia establishes an interagency
Kepone Task Force to coordinate all
its activities related to Kepone.
Results of EPA sampling program
show that Kepone is present in workers
of LSP, as well as in the air, sewage
sludge, and James River water, bottom
sediment, fish, and shellfish.
Governor of Virginia closes more than
100 miles of the James River and its trib-
utaries to commercial fishing until at
least July 1, 1976.
State Water Control Board starts long-
range program for monitoring contami-
nation of the James River. OSHA re-
opens 1974 complaint of former employee
of LSP.
EPA's Region IH issues a stop-sale order
to Allied Chemical's Baltimore plant,
which serves as the distribution point to
Kepone produced at Hopewell.
Medical College of Virginia reports that
14 former employees of LSP are prob-
ably sterile. National Cancer Institute
releases study indicating Kepone is car-
cinogenic.
EPA recommends action levels to FDA
for seizure of Kepone-contaminated fish
and shellfish.
FDA establishes action levels for seizure
of Kepone-contaminated fish and shellfish.
EPA sends formulators of Kepone-contain-
ing products a notice of presumption against
VI-9
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registration of such products.
May 1976
August 19, 1976
August 30, 1976
September 1976
October 5, 1976
March 31, 1977
July 6, 1977
August 31, 1977
October 18, 1977
Allied Chemical, LSP, the City of
Hopewell, and several individuals are
indicated in Federal court on criminal
counts, including conspiracy to defraud
EPA and violation of Federal water
pollution laws.
Allied Chemical pleads no contest
to 940 criminal charges of dis-
charging pesticide wastes from the
production of Kepone into the James
River.
Governors of Virginia and Maryland
request EPA to undertake a study of the
feasibility of mitigating Kepone con-
tamination in Hopewell and the James
River.
EPA agrees to undertake a Kepone
Mitigation Feasibility Project.
Allied Chemical is fined $13. 2 mil-
lion on its no contest plea of 940 counts
of pollution. The fine is later reduced
to $5 million after Allied sets up the
Virginia Environmental Endowment
with an initial donation of $8 million.
EPA starts Kepone Mitigation Feasi-
bility Project with funding of$l. 4
million.
Health Dept. contracts with Flood and
Associates, Inc., for study of dis-
posal of Kepone-contaminated wastes
at Hopewell.
Public meeting is held at Hopewell pre-
ceeding initial screen of alternatives
for ultimate disposal of Kepone-
contaminated wastes.
Second public meeting is held at Hope-
well to present final alternatives for
disposal of Kepone-contaminated
wastes.
VI-10
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December 30, 1977 Governor of Virginia extends fishing
ban for 1 year.
June 9, 1978 Report of Kepone Mitigation Feasi-
bility Project is scheduled to be
completed.
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AUTHORITY
Federal
Several Federal statutes are relevant to the Kepone incident at
Hope-well: Federal Water Pollution Control Act (PL 92-500), Clean
Air Act of 1970 (PL 91-604), Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act as amended (PL 94-140), Occupational Safety and
Health Act (PL 91-596), and Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act as amended.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) limits dis-
charges into the Nation's waters, requiring the best practicable
technology by 1977. The program is developed around a permit
system that focuses on point sources of discharge such as industrial
plants and municipal sewage treatment facilities. Industries dis-
charging into municipal sewage systems must pretreat their effluents
to ensure compatibility with the processes used by the sewage treat-
ment plant. The Act also includes a section providing for special
limits on effluents containing toxic materials that pose special
hazards.
FWPCA authorizes EPA to delegate the responsibility for major
parts of the water pollution control program—including the entire
VI-11
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permit program—to the States. EPA is then responsible for over-
seeing the State program. At the time the Kepone problem surfaced,
Virginia was in the process of receiving the permit authority.
Clean Air Act of 1970
The Clean Air Act establishes two kinds of air pollution controls.
For the common, widespread, multiple-source pollutants, the Act
sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards. Particulates, carbon
monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, oxidants, and hydro-
carbons are covered by such standards. For hazardous air pol-
lutants, the Act provides for national emission standards, which
have been set for mercury, asbestos, and beryllium, and proposed
for vinyl chloride.
The Act is primarily carried out by the States. Each State
prepares a State Implementation Plan, which sets forth schedules
for abating sources of the major air pollutants and also establishes
procedures for enforcing the hazardous emission standards. EPA
had approved Virginia's plan, thus making the State responsible for
enforcing the plan, including monitoring air quality to determine that
the standards are met.
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),
as amended in 1972, requires EPA to register pesticide products if
it is shown that they will be effective and will not pose a risk of
unreasonable adverse effects to man or the environment when they
VI-12
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are used as directed. The registration process is intended to pro-
tect health and the environment by requiring appropriate premarket
testing, packaging, and adequate label directions and warnings.
FIFRA requires that all plants producing pesticides after
October 1974 be registerered by EPA, and that such establishments
provide EPA with production figures and make other books and records
accessible. Inspection authority is limited to areas where books and
records are kept and to areas where inspectors can take samples
and check labels of pesticides that are packaged, labeled, and ready
for shipment. FIFRA does not regulate the working conditions in
pesticide establishments and provides no authority to inspect manu-
facturing processes.
Occupational Safety and Health Act
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has the responsibility for
assuring, as far as possible, that every worker in the United States
is provided by his employer with safe and healthful working con-
ditions. The Act requires employers to comply with job safety and
health standards issued by OSHA. In administering the law, OSHA
is empowered to inspect workplaces. When violations are dis-
covered, employers are issued appropriate citations, subjected to
proposed monetary civil penalties, and notified of periods allowed
for correcting the alleged violations.
In addition, OSHA assists and monitors those States wishing to
administer their own job safety and health plans. OSHA must
VI-13
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approve State plans, and the plans must be implemented during a trial
period. Although a State without an approved plan can act in a con-
sulting capacity, it is preempted from enforcement on any issue for
which Federal standards exist. At the time of the Kepone incident,
Virginia's plan had not been approved.
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended, provides in
part for limiting pesticide residues in food. A food is defined as
adulterated if it bears or contains a pesticide residue that is in
excess of allowable levels specified under the Act, and thus becomes
unlawful and subject to regulatory action by the Food aand Drug
Administration (FDA). Besides having the authority to seize inter-
state shipments of adulterated foods, FDA may seek an injunction
against a firm and invoke criminal penalties. FDA has the authority
to inspect food production, processing, storage, and distribution
firms to determine if any pesticides used are registered with EPA
and if their use is consistent with that registration.
FDA's enforcement actions are based on legally permissible
levels (tolerances), as established by EPA, for pesticides residues
in food. These tolerance levels may be set to permit levels of un-
avoidable pesticide contamination; to establish a maximum level for
residues from pesticides applied to food crops; to limit levels for
pesticides as food additives when used on processed foods; and for
pesticides used on raw agricultural commodities when their level
of residue concentration would be increased by processing.
VI-14
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In the absence of a promulgated tolerance level, FDA may adopt
an informal "action level" based upon EPA recommendations. This
has been done in cases where residues occur from indirect contam-
ination by substances for which EPA has not set any tolerance.
State
Water Pollution
In June 1973, Virginia enacted legislation to qualify the State as
the delegated authority for control of water pollution within its
boundaries; formal delegation was made March 31, 1975. In the
interim period, Virginia assembled the required information and
in effect approved permits; EPA confined its activities to reviewing
any permit it received from the State.
Air Pollution
Since Virginia's Implementation Plan had been approved, the State
was responsible for protecting the quality of the air outside the Hope-
well plant. In effect, the Clean Air imposed on Life Science the
responsibility to limit its emissions so that ambient air quality
standards would be met. This responsibility, as implemented by
Virginia, meant that Life Science had to have a permit allowing the
facility to operate and describing the manufacturing process, the
name of the product, and its physical and chemical properties, as
well as the limits on emissions. The hazardous emissions stand-
ards did not apply to Life Science since it did not use or produce
any of the substances for which standards had been set.
VI-15
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Occupational Safety and Health
The Virginia Department of Labor and Induustry is responsible
for compliance inspections and enforcement of the State safety and
health regulations. However, since Virginia's plan had not been
approved by OSHA, the Department's program was not operational.
Furthermore, it did not have a close working relationship with
OSHA.
Section 32-12 of the Code of Virginia
Emergency authorities in Section 32-12 of the Code of Virginia
(1954), as amended, permit the State Board of Health to suppress
nuisances that are dangerous to public life and health but not covered
by general rules.
Local
According to the FWPCA requirements for permits, EPA and
the State must be notified when new waste materials are introduced
into a publicly-owned sewage treatment plant. The City of Hopewell
was obligated to provide "information on the quality and quantity of
the effluent to be introduced into such treatment works and any antic-
ipated impact of such change" to the State and EPA before allowing
Life Science to connect to the municipal sewers.
FEDERAL RESPONSE
Environmental Protection
EPA's first direct involvement in the Kepone incident occurred
in October 1974 when Region m was asked for information on Kepone
VI-16
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by the Water Control Board. The Board informed Region III that
Kepone was being discharged to Hopewell's sewage treatment plant,
and that it was concerned about its effect on the plant. However,
the Board apparently did not indicate that the Hopewell digesters
had actually broken down. In November 1974, Region El provided
background data on Kepone, told the Board of the toxic nature of
Kepone, and suggested a limit of 0.4 parts per billion (ppb) in
discharges into a municipal system. From then until July 1975,
when Kepone was discovered in workers at the Hopewell plant,
there were numerous contacts between the Water Control Board
and Region IE. During one of these contacts, about March 18,
1975, EPA told the Board that Kepone was similar to the pesticide
Mirex, that it did not degrade quickly, that EPA had no information
on pretreatment levels, and that EPA could probably not back up a
zero discharge limitation. In general, however, because there was
no indication that Virginia's program was substandard and because
Region El had only one person to review Virginia's water pollution
control activities, including the permit program, the problem of
the Hopewell sewage plant was handled primarily by the Water
Control Board.
Following closing of the Life Science plant on July 24, 1975,
the Water Control Board notified Region III, but it did not indicate
the scope of the problem. Region El investigated as a result of
newspaper stories. In August, Virginia asked EPA to undertake a
health and environmental sampling program. Almost 3 months
VI-17
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were required to develop standardized analytical test procedures,
so it was December before EPA's Health Effects Research Labora-
tory in Research Triangle Park was able to show that Kepone con-
tamination was widespread. About this time, in response to a
request from the Governor of Virginia, EPA appointed the Region
HI Administrator to coordinate all activities relevant to the Kepone
incident.
From September 1975 on, EPA gathered evidence on the Kepone
incident and consulted with the Department of Justice through the
U.S. Attorney on possible legal actions. EPA informed FDA of
the James River contamination and later recommended action levels
to FDA for seizure of Kepone-contaminated fish and shellfish. On
January 13, 1976, in response to an inquiry from the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, EPA advised the Corps to halt further main-
tenance dredging and disposal in the James River because of Kepone
contamination of river sediments.
In September 1976, responding to a request from the Governors
of Virginia and Maryland, EPA agreed to undertake a study of the
feasibility of mitigating Kepone contamination in Hopewell and the
James River. With $1.4 million, the Kepone Mitigation Feasibility
Project began on March 31, 1977. Its report was completed in
June 1978.
Product Control—Pesticides
In 1959, Kepone was registered with the U.S. Department of
Agriculture as a technical material. Other companies then
VI-18
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purchased and formulated the material into end-products that also
had to be registered. About 40 different products have been regis-
tered by 26 companies, including Allied Chemical.
The 1972 Amendments to FIFRA require that any plant producing
a pesticide after October 1974 be registered with EPA. In March
1975, EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs learned that an
unregistered company. Life Science, was producing a pesticide
in Hopewell. This information came from an EPA representative
who was investigating the water pollution problems involving Life
Science. A few days later, an EPA pesticide inspector visited Life
Science, telling company officials that if the product was indeed a
pesticide, it would have to be registered to travel in interstate com-
merce. However, in April, Allied Chemical wrote to EPA, con-
tending that Kepone was a pesticide component because it underwent
further formulation by grinding and dilution at Allied's Baltimore
plant and, therefore, under existing regulations Life Science did
not have to be registered as a pesticide producer. EPA delayed
responding, while awaiting for revision of the regulations under the
1972 amendments. In the meantime, on March 29, Allied applied
for registration of the technical grade Kepone produced at Life
Science. Under the new regulations, promulgated in July 1975,
Kepone was classified as a pesticide subject to FIFRA. In August,
after the Life Science plant was closed, Region HE issued an order
to the company to stop the sale, use, and removal of all Kepone
from its premises. In February 1976, a similar order was issued
VI-19
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to Allied Chemical's plant in Baltimore, which served as the dis-
tribution point for Kepone produced at Hopewell.
Although FIFRA gives EPA regulatory control over the use of
pesticides, it had little applicability to the Hopewell incident
because EPA cannot enter the manufacturing area of a pesticide
plant or regulate working conditions. Nevertheless, EPA took two
steps in its pesticides operations to tighten control over this type of
situation. EPA Regional Administrators are now required to direct
inspectors and enforcement personnel to look for adverse effects on
water and air during their periodic pesticide inspections. The sec-
ond step is reviewing the registrations of certain pesticides. FIFRA
requires that EPA reregister all pesticides by October 1977. Under
EPA regulations, chemicals that fall into certain categories--car-
cinogens, for example—will be presumed to be inappropriate for re-
registration. The manufacturer has the opportunity to "rebut" this
presumption by providing information showing that the risks are
small or are outweighed by the benefits of use.
Occupational Safety and Health
OSHA was first notified of the working conditions at the Life
Science plant in September 1974 through a complaint filed in its
Richmond office by a former employee of Life Science. The em-
ployee asserted that he was fired when he refused to work in
unhealthy working conditions. He was told that OSHA could not pro-
cess the complaint as a regular safety complaint because he was a
former employee; however, OSHA could handle the case as one of
VI-20
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discrimination because he had been fired. The complaint was closed
out when Life Science stated that the employee had been fired for re-
fusing to follow orders.
The health charge was turned over to the only industrial hygienist
in OSHA's area office. He was responsible for 37, 000 establishments,
including 200 chemical plants. After a survey of literature avail-
able at OSHA, which consisted of information on effects of Kepone
at its application strength, the hygienist concluded that an inspection
of Life Science plant did not warrant a high priority because Kepone
was one of the safest pesticides in terms of human hazard.
OSHA officially closed the file on the complaint on January 1,
1975, without an onsite inspection. OSHA reopened the file after
the Virginia Department of Health closed the plant. OSHA's failure
to inspect the plant was unfortunate because the conditions at the
plant were such that greater protection to workers and better house-
keeping procedures were needed regardless of Kepone's toxicity.
Assuming that no employees were being exposed to workplace
hazards and still unaware of the very serious nature of Kepone ex-
posure, OSHA did not inspect the Life Science plant until a month
after the Virginia Department of Health ordered it closed. OSHA
found that under the "cleanup" agreement negotiated with the State,
limited processing of raw material on hand was continuing. This
operation was actually producing a more concentrated form of
Kepone, rather than simply cleaning up the plant. As a result,
OSHA imposed further measures to protect the workers engaged
VI-21
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in cleanup and returned in early September to see they were being
carried out. In addition, OSHA issued four fines against the com-
pany totaling $16, 500.
Since the Kepone incident, OSHA has beefed up its inspection
forces, issued new directives for handling discrimination and
health hazard complaints, established procedures to obtain more
toxicological data, and improved coordination with other public
agencies.
Food Quality Protection
In September 1975, FDA was informed by EPA of the contami-
nation of the James River. Because of problems related to adopting
an analytical method, it was December before FDA was informed
that shellfish were contaminated with Kepone. The most difficult
task facing FDA was development of valid analytical methods for
detecting Kepone residues at low levels and with a high degree of
accuracy. This point is crucial since the analytical methods FDA
uses to support an enforcement action must be validated by several
FDA laboratories and be shown to produce reliable quantitative
results.
On February 25, 1976, EPA recommended action levels to FDA
for seizure of Kepone-contaminated fish and shellfish, and in March
1976, FDA established the levels. As a result of the Kepone inci-
dent, FDA has asked EPA for information relevant to several major
reviews it is making to determine if its procedures for regulating
pesticides in foods are adequate or should be substantially revised.
VI-2 2
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Legal
The Federal Government in May 1976 indicted Allied Chemical,
Life Science, the City of Hopewell, and several individuals on 1, 097
criminal counts of violating Federal antipollution laws. In October,
after entering a no-contest plea, Allied Chemical was fined $13. 2
million on the counts of discharging Kepone to the James River.
However, the Government was unable to obtain convictions against
Allied on conspiracy charges and on charges that Allied used Life
Science as a means of circumventing pollution laws. Government
attorneys have long sought to establish a precedent that tolling or
its equivalents in other industries should not enable a corporation
to avoid liability for any violations of law that may occur.
The Allied fine was later reduced to $5 million after Allied set
up the Virginia Environmental Endowment with an initial donation of
$8 million. Life Science Products was fined the maximum amount
permitted by law. However, neither the company nor its two owners
have any assets. In another action, a Federal court fined the City
of Hopewell $10, 000 for failing to notify the State that it had per-
mitted Life Science to connect to its sewer system.
STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE
Before Closing of Life Science Plant
Water Pollution
While the Life Science plant was being built, the Virginia State
Water Control Board was evaluating the City of Hopewell's appli-
cation for a permit to discharge effluents from its sewage treatment
VI-23
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plant to the James River. The permit application, filed in October
1973, stated that no industries discharged into the municipal sewage
system; at the time, each of the four major chemical plants in
Hopewell had its own treatment facility. The City later gave Life
Science permission to discharge into the municipal sewage system
but did not inform the Water Control Board of the addition of this
industrial discharge. As early as March 1974, shortly after Life
Science began operation, the digesters at the sewage treatment
facility were shut down by the Kepone-contaminated wastes, but the
City informed neither EPA nor the State. By August, the City
required the plant to install pretreatment measures to reduce
Kepone discharges.
The State Water Control Board first became aware of the problem
when one of its engineers visited Hopewell in early September 1974 to
review the permit for its sewage treatment plant. Told that the Life
Science plant was causing a problem but that it was being remedied,
he decided to give Hopewell two weeks to make corrections. In
October, a State Water Control Board representative visited the Life
Science plant and found that Kepone contamination was serious--
68, 000 ppb in the digesters and 3, 200 ppb in discharges from the
Life Science plant. Nonetheless, on October 31, the State Water
Control Board granted Hopewell a wastewater permit with no
requirement for monitoring or limiting Kepone discharges. On the
same day, however, at a metting with the State Water Control
Board, the State Health Department, and the City of Hopewell, Life
VI-24
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Science agreed to implement a continuous monitoring system and to
establish levels of Kepone and related wastes that would be nontoxic
to the digesters.
Efforts to gather information expanded. The State Water Control
Board asked EPA for information on Kepone. Because much of
Hopewell's industrial wastewater recycles into a drinking water
intake, the Health Department tested drinking water for pesticides,
but found no Kepone.
By the end of November, the Hopewell problem became public
knowledge when the Hopewell News published an account of the
Kepone-induced breakdown of the digesters. Meanwhile, the State
Water Control Board and the Department of Health had decided
that the Kepone level in the receiving waters of the municipal plant
should be limited to 0. 0167 pounds per day (equivalent to 0. 5 ppb),
with a maximum concentration of 100 ppb. The sewage treatment
plant effluent would be limited to 0. 5 ppb, and the water of Bailey's
Creek near the treatment plant discharge should have less than 0. 4
ppb. The decision was presented at a December 11 meeting attended
by representatives of the State Water Control Board, State Depart-
ment of Health, the City of Hopewell, and Life Science. At the
meeting, a decision was reached to amend the Hopewell permit by
setting Kepone effluent limitations and pretreatment and monitoring
requirements; these amendments would be proposed for formal
adoption after a 30-day public notice period. Actually, the process
of amending Hopewell's permit took several months. On April 9,
VI-25
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1975, the State Water Control Board formally recommended amend-
ments to be effective in June to probide time for negotiations among
concerned parties, a 30-day public notice period, and EPA approval.
At a meeting on April 11, the Board became convinced of the need
to speed up action on the continuing problems at Hopewell and set
a. May 16 deadline for Life Science to build an asphalt-lined lagoon
to hold the contaminated sludge and to pretreat wastes before dis-
charging them into the sewer system. In addition, during this
time, the Board sought further information on Kepone, worked with
the City and Life Science, and tried to find out what should be done
with the accumulated contaminated sludge.
Life Science made a number of modifications during this period
to reduce discharges of Kepone. Nonetheless, in June it still was
violating the limits set in the amended permit.
Although Life Science was required under the Clean Air Act to
have an operating permit that set limits its emissions, it did not
obtain a permit. Shortly after it began operating, the plant released
sulfur trioxide when equipment malfunctioned. The Virginia Air
Pollution Control Board learned of the emission and cited the company
for failing to obtain a permit.
Occupational Safety and Health
State air and water inspectors, as well as Hopewell officials,
went inside the Life Science plant and inspected operating procedures.
However, their primary focus was on air and water pollution problems.
VI-26
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and they made no connection of operating conditions with the health of
plant workers.
Two industrial hygienists from the Health Department's Bureau
of Industrial Hygiene were also on the premises in June 1975 as part
of a group that was investigating the plant's dumping of hexachloro-
cyclopentadiene into the Hope well sewer system in May. The City
had closed the Life Science Plant because fumes carried through the
sewer had caused a worker at the sewage treatment plant to require
medical attention. Apparently, this incident did not trigger concern
over possible danger to workers at the Life Science plant. The
question remains why no one recognized the hazard. More than 75
people were affected by Kepone in varying degrees over the 16 months
the Life Science plant was in operation. The first worker was affected
apparently within three weeks of the startup. As many as 20
employees had gone to physicians, and many had been placed tranqui-
lizers or other drugs for fatigue or nervousness. Much of the
difficulty may have stemmed from the fact that the disease is unusual,
and that the workers tended to go to their own private physicians,
many of whom were outside the Hopewell area. The company doctors
reportedly had found no evidence of systemic problems in any of the
workers they treated. Only one physician suspected occupational
exposure and took the initiative to find a laboratory, at the Center
for Disease Control in Atlanta, capable of testing for Kepone and to
submit a blood sample with specific instructions to test for Kepone.
VI-27
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When the State Health Department was notified of the Kepone
poisoning, it inspected the Life Science plant a few days later, on
July 23, 1975. There was a massive Kepone contamination of the
building, air, and ground. The odor of hexachlorocyclopentadiene
was strong enough to cause eye irritation. The only personnel pro-
tective equipment in evidence were three respirators, which appeared
not to have been used in some time, and some hard hats. In the dryer
area, there was a thick layer of dust everywhere. An examination of
the employees found seven with symptoms of neurological illness,
several severe enough to require hospitalization.
These findings led the Health Department to close the plant under
autority of Section 32-12 of the Code of Virginia and to order the
company to begin immediately to clean up the site. Under terms
of the agreement, the company was allowed to continue to process
any raw material on hand.
After Closing of Plant
In August, the State asked EPA for help in determining the extent
and effects of Kepone contamination, and in September set up an Ad
Hoc Committee consisting of members of the State Water Control
Board, State Health Department, and the City of Hope well to deter-
mine the methods and costs of cleaning up the plant site and disposing
of any waste materials. Later in December, the State set up an inter-
agency Kepone Task Force, with the Health Department as lead
agency, to coordinate the State's acitivities. When the State received
EPA's monitoring results in December, the Governor closed the
VI-28
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James River to fishing until at least July 1, 1976; subsequently the
ban was extended through 1978. The Governor also asked EPA to
assign a top level coordinator to oversee the cleanup.
In January 1976, the State Water Control Board started a long-
range program for monitoring the contamination of the James River.
It involves extensive sampling of water and sediments at 48 locations
and of fish in seven zones. At the same time, Virginia's Division
of Consolidated Laboratory Services developed and implemented pro-
tocols and analytical methods for measuring the amount of Kepone
in the air, water, soil, sediment, plants, and animals. The proto-
cols are used in the State's fish market sampling and seed oyster
sampling programs, as well as the other continuing Kepone moni-
toring programs.
In July 1977, the Virginia Health Department signed a contract
with Flood and Associates, Inc., to investigate methods of disposing
of Kepone-contaminated wastes. Public meetings were held in
August and October to discuss the alternatives under consideration.
The State of Maryland also began to assess impacts of Kepone.
Its efforts included the containment and safe storage of Kepone at
Allied's facility in Baltimore. Residents near the plant were
screened for Kepone; none was found to have detectable levels in
blood samples. A playing field next to the Allied plant showed trace
levels of Kepone along a common fence; the park was closed, and
the land stripped and resoded with clean material.
VI-29
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were tested for Kepone. Amounts varying from low to nondetectable
were found, but only one oyster bed had amounts exceeding the FDA
action levels. It was closed for a year then reopened after no Kepone
was detected. Kepone was not near the action levels in blue crabs or
bluefish sampled on the Maryland side of Chesapeake Bay, nor was
it detected in the sediments. Maryland has a continuing fish market
sampling program for Kepone, and the Maryland State Health De-
partment requires that Virginia certify that seed oysters are free
from Kepone before they can be transplanted in Maryland waters of
the Bay.
The routine maintenance dredging of the James Riveer for navi-
gational purposes posed an additional problem. Since it might dis-
perse Kepone downstream, creating more widespread contamination
and threatening the Bay, the Corps of Engineers, in cooperation with
the Virginia Water Control Board and EPA, undertook experimental
dredging of selected shoal areas in July 1976 and found that increased
water and sediment contamination was confined to the dredge areas.
The next routine dredging is scheduled for 1979.
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR
In response to the Kepone incident. Allied Chemical provided the
State with considerable toxicological data on Kepone. How much of
this information had been transmitted to Life Science or properly
brought to its attention is unclear. In November 1975, Allied Chem-
ical cleaned up the Life Science plant site. The plant was dismantled,
and contaminated materials were put in steel drums. All wastes were
VI-30
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taken to the sewage treatment plant where, with the contaminated
sludge, they await ultimate disposal. Also, the company has under-
taken in-house and contractual research into certain aspects of the
Kepone contamination problem, but little information has been
released because litigation is still pending.
In addition to the $5 million fine and the $8 million donated to
set up the Virginia Environmental Endowment, Allied Chemical paid
the Virginia government $5. 2 million to settle all but two major
environmental damage claims. The money covers the costs incurred
to October 1977 by the State and the City of Hopewell. The company
also has settled many of the personal injury claims made against it
by about 75 persons affected by Kepone, most of whom were pro-
duction workers at Life Science and members of their families. Still
to be settled or decided by a court are some additional personal injury
claims, claims by 400 watermen who make their living by fishing the
lower James River, and claims by larger commercial fishing com-
panies that operate in the James River and the Chesapeake Bay. The
State and Allied Chemical agreed to postpone settlement of any claims
for removing Kepone from the James River for up to 3 years to give
more time for study. Settlement of claims for disposal of contam-
inated material has also been postponed.
RESOURCES AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS
As in most environmental emergencies today, an accurate assess-
ment of the resources and disruptions occasioned by the Kepone
incident is impossible. Of necessity, actions were carried out in
VI-31
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without chargeable accounts and designated resources. Also, many
of the facts in the Kepone incident are still not public because of
continuing litigation. In addition to these problems, any account-
ability of resources applied would have to evaluate the impact on
other programs deferred because of the environmental emergency.
The best that can be done in assessing the financial aspects of
the Kepone incident is to cite those documents and communications
that give partial estimates and make appropriate corrections and
extrapolations. The most comprehensive account, an internal docu-
ment prepared by Virginia, lists costs of $4. 8 million from July 1975
to June 30, 1976, and estimates costs of $4. 1 million for the rest of
1976. The estimated costs are subject to revision. The $8. 9 million
is divided as follows:
o Federal Government: $22. 3 million
EPA's costs totalled $525,000; costs for workmen's compen-
sation and under the Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act were also about a half million each. The largest amount,
$750, 000, is an estimate for the remainder of the site clean-
up (for example, the sludge lagoon).
o State of Virginia: $923, 000
About 80 percent of expenditures was for agency costs, with
the remainder for cleanup efforts.
o City of HopeweU: $151,000
The bulk of the City's Kepone-related expenses--such as per-
sonnel costs and repair of the sewage treatment plant--could
VI-3 2
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not be estimated. The largest itemizable cost was $125, 000
for cleanup operations.
o Allied Chemical: $200,000
The only cost listed was for cleanup of the Life Science plant.
o Former Life Science employees: $1,670,000
The major economic cost to the majority of former employees
has been lost wages, which are estimated at $1.9 million.
Income from other sources, including unemployment insurance
compensation and disability insurance for injured employees,
has been deducted from this total. No adjustment was made
for workers who minimized their losses by finding other
employment.
o Losses to fishing and related industries: $3.7 million Har-
vesters lost $1.1 million, processors $1.4, and marinas and
liveries $1.2 million. Long-term developments could make
these short-term losses appear minor.
EPA made a separate analysis of its expenditures in response
to a request from the Department of Justice. From July 1975 to
September 1976, EPA estimated expenditures at $1.9 million.
During 1977, EPA's efforts continued and new activities were under-
taken, including the Kepone Mitigation Feasibility Project, which
has an in-house staff of three and $1.4 million in contract support
for the 1-year period starting March 31, 1977. Another major
expenditure is the continued funding for the Gulf Breeze Environ-
mental Research Laboratory. Considering these two efforts alone,
VI-33
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EPA's costs in 1977 were at least an additional $1 million. Thus,
it appears that EPA's costs to date may be about $3 million.
Virginia's costs through September 1977 may be recovered from
its settlement with Allied Chemical. This $5. 2 million settlement
was intended to cover the State's expenses in the Kepone incident.
None of these figures includes the extensive legal costs incurred
by all litigants or the internal costs to Allied Chemical. The com-
pany has already paid out $18. 7 million, and all settlements have not
been made.
While no estimates exist for the total resources and costs of the
incident to date, various sources unofficially estimate that 200 man-
years of effort have been expended, primarily in the immediate
actions. No appreciable effort or money has been spent for the final
cleanup of the widespread andd persistent contamination of the land
and the James River.
PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND CONCLUSIONS
Life Science's production of Kepone raises questions about the
operation's compliance with requirements of four Federal laws—
FWPCA, Clean Air Act, FIFRA, and OSHA. In the case of FWPCA,
the firm obtained permission from Hope well to discharge into the
municipal sewer system, but the City failed to obtain State approval
of the connections to its sewers system and did not inform the State
of subsequent problems. In the case of the Clean Air Act, the firm
failed to obtain a proper permit and had excessive emissions re-
quiring control. In the case of FIFRA, the firm was required to
VI-34
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register as a pesticide-producing establishment but did not do so.
In the case of OSHA, the firm did not make reasonable efforts to
provide a safe workplace; sanitation was inadequate and contamination
gross.
A fifth Federal law, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, came
into play when the environmental contamination was discovered and
Kepone residues were detected in fish and shellfish intended for
human consumption.
It is not clear why Life Science operated without taking better
sanitation measures and without obtaining an air pollution control
permit. Under its contract with Allied Chemical, Life Science was
responsible for meeting any governmental requirements, including
environmental regulations, and any costs to meet requirements would
be passed through to Allied. Hence, avoidance of costs per se does
not seem to be a motive for any negligence in sanitation. Alternative
explanations for Life Science's failure to meet requirements include
management ignorance and negligence or disregard of accepted sani-
tation practices it was concentrating on increasing production.
Once the plant began operation, efforts to bring the firm into
compliance occurred under local, State, and Federal laws. Each
Federal law has its own requirements for compliance and mandates
a separate enforcement mechanism. These efforts proceeded almost
entirely independently, with differing degrees of success, until dis-
covery of Kepone-induced illness among workers led to the abrupt
closing of the plant. The Interagency Regulation Liaison group,
VI-35
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(EPA, FDA, OSHA, and Consumer Product Safety Commission) is
developing a plan to coordinate monitoring for compliance with
with Federal laws by establishment of common criteria for planning
program activities, and coordinating inspection, sampling, analytical
and enforcement activities. This will result in referral inspections,
joint inspections, and crossover inspections. A checklist will be
developed to be used by investigators of each agency to identify
possible violations of laws enforced by other agencies.
Particularly pertinent is the question of whether the information
available on Kepone should have alerted water pollution control ex-
perts to the potential magnitude of the environmental hazard. The
characteristics of Kepone were associated with those of Mirex,
another chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticide. This class of chemicals
has long been considered particularly hazardous to the environment
because they tend to be persistent, to bioconcentrate, and to have
chronic effects at low levels. While the environmental effects of
Mirex are the subject of vigorous controversy, it is generally
agreed that contamination of water is to be avoided. Thus, it seems
that someone should have recognized the danger to the James River
sooner. The problem with the sewage treatment plant, however,
may have tended to focus concern on this more immediate matter.
The regulatory efforts under the various laws followed a similar
pattern, highlighting crucial issues that must be considered to help
prevent such incidents. Identifying the problem, correctly assessing
its possible magnitude, and bringing regulatory authorities to bear
VI-36
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are three critical issues. Coordination of the actions under these
laws is a fourth major issue. A fifth issue involves the relationship
between Federal agencies and the State agencies that may have been
delegated regulatory activities under Federal laws. A sixth issue
raised by the Kepone incident is whether adequate procedures exist
to ensure that persons adversely affected through no fault of their
own are somehow assisted.
VI-37
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VE. TACONITE TAILINGS/ASBESTOS CASE -- DULUTH,
MINNESOTA
CASE STUDY SUMMARY
In June 1973, EPA announced that unusually high concentrations
of asbestiform fibers had been found in the western end of Lake
Superior, as well as in the drinking water supplies of Duluth,
Minnesota, and other communities using water from that part of the
Lake (Figure Vn-1). Analyses showed the fibers were the same
composition as fibers slurried into the Lake by Reserve Mining Co.,
and could only have come from that source. For that reason, the
Reserve cases* will be discussed here.
The State of Minnesota, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the U. S.. Army Corps of
Engineers (COE) and EPA were the primary participants in working
to resolve the problem of asbestiform-fiber contamination of the
Duluth water supply.
At the request of EPA, in 1972, the United States had sued
Reserve Mining Co. for violating the Refuse Act and water quality-
standards at its taconite beneficiation (processing of low-grade
iron ore into a higher grade industrial raw material) plant in Silver
Bay, Minnesota. The State of Minnesota intervened in the litiga-
tion, raising the issue of violation of State air pollution control
^Reserve Mining Co.. et al., v. EPA, et. al., consolidated cases
argued in U.S. District Court, Minnesota, and U. S. Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit; Reserve Mining Co., et al., v. Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency, et al., consolidated cases argued before the Sixth
Judicial Circuit and Supreme Court, State of Minnesota.
-------
• BEACH
TWO HARBORS
FIGURE VIM. AREA INVOLVED IN THE
DULUTH, MINN., ABESTOS CASE
-------
regulations set under the Federal Clean Air Act. A series of
Federal court decisions found Reserve to be in violation of these
air and water quality provisions and ordered the company to
institute abatement activities. These remedies are still pending.
Reserve's wastes had been known to contain asbestiform fibers
for some time, but they were not considered to present a health
hazard until studies showed that asbestiform fibers in air caused
several adverse health effects, including cancer. The fiber in
taconite were characterized as being similar, but not identical, to
the fibers that presented an inhalation hazard. No evidence that
ingested asbestiform fibers were a health hazard had appeared in
the scientific literature. Some studies have been started, but their
preliminary results are not expected before late 1978. Epidemic-
logical studies have been inconclusive. In late spring 1973, after
EPA analyses revealed that Duluth's water supply contained asbesti-
form fibers, the Water Supply staff of EPA's Region V Office, in
Chicago, Illinois, established the Duluth Asbestos Study Team, to
recommend possible solutions. The COE, USGS, and CEQ also
participated. On June 15, 1973, the Team's finding of asbestiform
fibers was announced, and on June 27, its recommendations were
released. The State had conducted its own study, also completed
and released before the end of June.
Between June 1973 and January 1975, several studies were
conducted for EPA by COE. In late 1973, COE evaluated filters for
interim use and conducted pilot tests to evaluate the technical and
VII-3
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financial requirements for filtering Duluth's water supply. In early
1974, COE also provided filters to the city for installation at fire
stations and schools. In April 1974, under provisions of the Public
Health Service Act, EPA declared Duluth's water supply unfit for
interstate carrier use. At about this time, Duluth officials enacted
an ordinance requiring restaurants to post notices advising if their
water was filtered or not, installed the filters at fire stations and
schools, and encouraged citizens to obtain water for drinking and
cooking at such locations. With enactment of the Safe Drinking
Water Act in 1974, demonstration grants became available for new
treatment technology in crises areas^ A special appropriation
provided Federal funds to help build a filtration plant in Duluth.
Construction of the plant began in mid-1975, and it began operations
on November 29, 1976. Between mid-1974 and the completion of
the plant, COE supplied filtered water to the citizens of Duluth.
Two other Minnesota communities. Silver Bay and Two
Harbors, which draw water from western Lake Superior are con-
structing filtration plants. Cloquet, Minnesota, and Superior are
obtaining their water from other sources, but one small town,
Beaver Bay, Minnesota, continues to draw its drinking water from
the Lake. Reserve Mining Company is seeking State permits
needed to construct its land-disposal facility, which is scheduled
to be in operation to meet a court-ordered deadline of 1980.
VH-4
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Date
December 1947
1956
1960
April 1969
May 1969 -
January 1977
February 3, 1971
April 23, 1971
Events
Minnesota State agencies grant per-
mission to Reserve Mining Co. to
take 130,000 gallons per minute from
Lake Superior and discharge it with
taconite tailings in suspension back
into the Lake. Permits specify that
this activity must not result in any
adverse effects on public water
supplies.
Reserve begins its first full year of
commercial operations at Silver Bay.
Permits are amended to permit
260,000 gallons per minute uptake and
discharge.
Permits are again amended to allow
cycling of 502,000 gallons per minute.
The U.S. Department of the Interior
reports that some fine tailings are not
carried to the bottom of the Lake by
the current, as had been originally
believed. The report concludes that
Reserve should be given 3 years to
begin constructing on-land waste dis-
posal facilities.
The Department of the Interior
convenes sessions of the Lake Superior
Enforcement Conference to address
contamination of the Lake, primarily
by Reserve.
Reserve rejects the on-land disposal
recommendation and proposes deep-
pipe discharge 150 feet below the Lake
surface.
Technical Committee of Lake Superior
Enforcement Conference rejects deep-
pipe proposal as not complying with
pollution abatement regulations.
vn-5
-------
April 28, 1971
October 25, 1971
February 2, 1972
April 1973
*June 15, 1973
:
-------
* August 24, 1973
^January 1974
* March 13. 1974
* April 1974
* April 19, 1974
April 20, 1974
April 22, 1974
*May 8, 1974
June 4, 1974
June 9, 1974
August 3, 1974
EPA recommends building a pilot plant
to determine methods for and costs
of filtering Duluth's drinking water,
and initiates an Inter agency Agreement
for COE to build the plant at Duluth's
water intake and to provide add-on units
in the interim for use in fire stations
and schools.
Duluth fire stations begin distributing
filtered drinking water.
Filtration units are supplied to all
Duluth schools.
EPA rules that Duluth water is unfit
for interstate use as drinking water.
U. S. District Court orders COE to
supply filtered drinking water to Duluth
and other affected communities.
U. S. District Court orders Reserve to
cease dumping tailings into the Lake.
Reserve shuts down.
8th Circuit Court of Appeals stays the
order until a hearing can be held.
Reserve re-opens.
Duluth approves ordinance requiring
restaurants to post notices whether or
not their water is filtered.
8th Circuit Court of Appeals continues
the stay for 70 days, based on May 15
hearing.
The U.S. Supreme Court denies an
appeal by the State of Minnesota.
The U.S. District Court rejects
Reserve's compliance plan as unreason-
able.
^Relate solely to the Duluth water supply problems. Others relate
to the Reserve case or to activities relevant to both matters.
VH-7
-------
October 18, 1974
^January 23, 1975
March 14, 1975
*May 1975
^December 1975
October 28, 1976
"November 29, 1976
May 26, 1977
April 8, 1977
U. S. District Court rules Reserve to
be in violation of the Refuse Act and
Minnesota's air pollution control regu-
lations and permit requirements.
Decision is appealed by Reserve.
EPA and COE release studies
recommending a new water filtration
plant for Duluth.
8th Circuit Court of Appeals finds
Reserve in violation of Minnesota air
pollution control laws, Section 1160 of
the 1970 Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, and the Refuse Act.
Court orders Reserve to initiate appro-
priate abatement activities.
U. S. Congress and the State of
Minnesota approve $4 million and $2. 5
million, respectively, for construction
of Duluth filtration plant.
Duluth1 s mayor announces a $3 million
COE program to provide free drinking
water to residents until the filtration
plant begins operating.
8th Circuit Court of Appeals imposes
fines and penalties against Reserve.
Duluth water filtration plant, only
facility of its kind in the United States,
opens.
U.S. District Court issues order per-
mitting Reserve to discharge tailings
into Lake Superior, so long as the
company remains on an established
schedule of compliance with water pol-
lution abatement requirements.
Minnesota Supreme Court affirms a
lower court ruling that Reserve can use
on-land disposal of wates 7 miles up the
railroad line from Silver Bay, and sets
^Relate solely to the Duluth water supply problems. Others relate
to the Reserve case or to activities relevant to both matters.
VH-8
-------
forth conditions under which the
permits are to be issued.
June 1977 Reserve begins a 3-year project to
phase out dumping wastes in Lake
Superior and deposit them 7 miles
inland.
November 1, 1977 Minnesota Supreme Court rules on
Reserve's petition for clarification
of terms governing permits relating to
air emission controls and orders State
agencies to issue the permits within
10 days.
February 7, 1978 Minnesota Supreme Court hears argu-
ments by Reserve that permits should
be issued as previously ordered.
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
argues that monitoring conditions are
inadequate to protect public health and,
thus, the permits should be withheld.
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AUTHORITY
Because the Duluth water-supply problem involved more than reg-
ulatory issues, agencies and laws authorizing assistance appropriate
to the situation are also included. Laws germane to the violations by
Reserve are cited.
Federal
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Water PoUution Control Act (FWPCA) (1965)
o Establishes Federal-State water quality standards and authorizes
river basin plans for meeting such standards.
FWPCA Amendments (1972)
o Establishes a national policy of non-degradation of water quality
in primitive areas.
VH-9
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o Requires State plans for achieving water quality.
fStates issue implementing regulations]
o Establishes the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permits. Conditions not described in
effluent guidelines may be incorporated to resolve special
problems.
o Provides for suits to restrain polluters from discharges in
the event of imminent and substantial risks to health and
welfare.
FWPCA Amendments (1977)
o Authorizes assistance in emergencies involving release of
contaminants and establishes a fund for this purpose.
Clean Air Act (1970)
o Requires State Implementation Plans to achieve primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards. States issue regu-
lations based on their plans.
o Establishes National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants (NESHAPS), some of which apply to asbestos
activities, but not to taconite beneficiation. A draft regu-
lation applicable to this activity is being prepared, largely
as a result of this incident.
Public Health Service Act (1944)
o Authorizes establishment of standards for interstate
carrier water. In 1974, Duluth's water supply was
declared unfit for this use. (This provision was
VH-10
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superseded by the following.)
Safe Drinking Water Act (1974)
o Authorizes demonstration grants for new treatment tech-
nology in crisis areas. The first such grant was made to
Duluth.
o Requires setting of drinking water standards.
Toxic Substances Control Act (1976)
o Authorizes collection of data to determine and document
hazards related to commercial chemicals.
o Provides for regulations to minimize or eliminate unrea-
sonable risks to health or the environment.
All the above statutes provide for research and technical support
activities.
Army Corps of Engineers (COE)
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (also known as the Refuse Act)
o Requires permits, based on navigational and health considera-
tions, for discharges into navigable waterways. This authority
has been partially superseded by FWPCA, but COE still issues
permits for dredge-and-fill operations.
General authorities
o Authorizes civilian construction projects. Under this authority,
COE performed pilot plant studies under interagency agreement
with EPA.
VH-11
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Department of Agriculture Consolidated Farm and Rural
Development Act (1921)
o Authorizes funding of community facilities in rural areas.
Department of Interior
28 Stat 398 (1894)
o Authorizes studies and evaluations of water resources; other
Federal agencies may use the data in implementing their
programs. (U. S. Geological Survey)
"Organic Act of May 16, 1910"
o Authorizes reserach on environmental problems associated
with minerals. (Bureau of Mines.)
General
The Common Law of Nuisance is often cited and occasionally rec-
ognized in Federal litigation relating to hazards and/or environmental
degradation.
State
State statutes and regulations cited in litigation before State and
Federal courts include:
Administrative Procedure Act.
Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 105.41, forbidding unlawful appropri-
ation of water resources.
Minnesota Statutes, Chapters 115 and 116. Enabling Acts relating
to water pollution, and to air and solid wastes, respectively.
o MFC 1, 11 — Regulations requiring candor in dealing with
VII-12
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the State Pollution Control Administration and the De-
partment of Natural Resources.
o APC 5, 6 -- Regulations establishing particulate stand-
ards for emissions.
o APC 17 -- Regulation establishing standards relating to
asbestos in air emissions.
o APC 1, 31 -- Regulations setting standards relating to
ambient air quality and requiring permits for operating
emission control facilities.
o WPC 15 -- Regulation establishing discharge standards.
o WPC 26 — Regulation applying discharge standards to
Lake Superior.
o WPC 51 -- Regulations forbidding any activity making a
water supply unfit to drink.
Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 116B.02, the Environmental Rights Act.
Common Law of Nuisance.
County and community ordinances relating to provision of drinking
water to residents.
County and community development, zoning, and/or planning ordi-
nances.
FEDERAL RESPONSE
Between 1966 and 1969, various citizens' and environmental
organizations objected to the Federal Water Quality Administration
(FWQA), U.S. Department of the Interior, about Reserve Mining's
VII-13
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practice of dumping waste tailings into Lake Superior, claiming
that it was degrading the water quality. Several studies were con-
ducted by FWQA's National Water Quality Laboratory in Duluth --
now the Environmental Research Laboratory (ERL), Duluth
during this period to characterize the wastes and to determine their
effects. These studies resulted in a report by the Department of
the Interior that the tailings were not being deposited on the Lake
bottom by currents as Reserve had claimed, and that certain dis-
solved components contributed to algae blooms, which were toxic
to fish. This report, released in April 1969, recommended that
Reserve be given 3 years to begin land-disposal of the taconite
tailings. When Reserve failed to respond to this finding of degra-
dation of water quality (in violation of FWPCA, 1966), FWQA called
the First Lake Superior Enforcement Conference, convened in May
1969. Further sessions were held during the next year-and-a-half.
In April 1970, Reserve prepared a report to the Enforcement
Conference Technical Committee describing possible on-land dis-
posal sites and several possible modifications of the company's
discharges to the Lake. Seven of the sites were rejected without
specific arguments; 19 options were developed around the four
remaining on-land sites and discharge modifications.
On December 7, 1970, EPA was created, subsuming FWQA
proposal to pipe the tailings 150 feet below the surface of the Lake.
In April, the Enforcement Conference Technical Committee rejected
this counter-proposal. The EPA then issued a Notice of Violations
VII-14
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to Reserve, requiring remedial action to be taken or a plan for
abatement to be filed within 180 days. At the end of the 180 days,
Reserve had done neither (as required by FWPCA-1966). The
EPA then requested the Department of Justice (through the U. S.
Attorney) to sue Reserve for violating FWPCA.
In February 1972, the suit was filed in the U.S. District Court
for Minnesota. Reserve and its parent companies (Republic Steel
and Armco Steel) were named as defendants. The charges included
violations of the Refuse Act and FWPCA-1970 (33 U.S. C. 1160,
specifically). Various environmental groups, development associ-
ations, and communities were joined in the proceedings during the
first year of litigation. In April 1973, the U.S. District Court
ordered Minnesota to join in the suit.
During the Enforcement Conference proceedings and the pre-
parations for litigation, the staff of ERL-Duluth continued its
characterization and effects studies. In late 1972, optical micro-
scope examinations (as recommended by the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health at that time) revealed that Reserve's
tailings contained asbestiform fibers, as did the water supplies of
Duluth and several towns on Western Lake Superior. Prior to this,
certain environmentalists had contended that asbestos-like fibers
were a component of Reserve's tailings, but had not been able to
document the charges. The ERL findings were circulated in EPA
in early 1973, during which time further studies were made to
determine if the fibers in the water suppplies definitely originated
Vn-15
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with the tailings or had come from other sources.
In March and April of 1973, stories about the increased risk of
cancer to asbestos workers and their families, particularly in New
Jersey, began to appear in the news media. Although the hazards
of inhaled asbestiform fibers appeared to be well documented, it
was not clear if ingested asbestiform fibers presented similar
hazards. Animal feeding studies were begun, but results are not
expected before late 1978, largely because of the length of time
involved in developing testing protocols. At that time, two conflict-
ing concerns were at work. First, many (but not all) toxic sub-
stances present risks by more than one exposure routej thus, there
was a strong indication of a hazard, even if its extent could not be
documented. Second, little was known about removal of asbestiform
fibers from water or about the safety of other possible sources of
drinking water, and there was reluctance to reveal problem without
knowing what could be done about it. The ERL-Duluth and COEtook
on this latter question during the spring.
On June 15, 1973, EPA released the report on asbestiform
fibers in the Duluth water supply, indicating that the fibers prob-
ably came from Reserve's tailings. The Duluth Asbestos Study
Team (DAST) was assembled by EPA, at the request of the White
House. Membership included representatives from CEQ, COE,
USGS, the State of Minnesota, two county health departments,
and Headquarters and field organizations of EPA. The State of
Wisconsin agreed to participate if any of its water supplies were
VH-16
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affected. Extensive sampling was done by DAST and by EPA's
Region V Surveillance and Analysis Division and Water Supply staff
to identify more clearly the source of the fibers and to evaluate
well and ground water that might be used as alternate sources.
The USGS analyzed many samples, both from Duluth and possible
alternate sources. The Environmental Support Laboratory in
Research Triangle Park and several contractors provided analyti-
cal support. The ERL-Duluth established chain-of-custody for
samples to preserve their value as evidence in the litigation.
On June 27, DAST released its report identifying available
fiber-free water sources and recommending studies to develop fil-
tration technology to meet the long-range water needs of the area.
On June 28, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources re-
leased a similar report, detailing State capabilities and authori-
ties.
After these studies had been released, EPA entered into an
Inter-agency Agreement (IAG) with COE, whereby COE would
evaluate various filtration technologies and establish the costs
for applying the most effective methods to Duluth1 s problem. In
February 1974, CEQ advised the residents of Duluth not to drink
the municipal water or use it for cooking. The COE was asked to
supply filters for use by fire stations and schools, and citizens
were encouraged to obtain water at these sites or from wells. In
April, the pilot plant studies began, and EPA declared Duluth's
water supply unfit for inter state-carrier use, based on the
VH-17
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then-existing water supply authorities of the Public Health Service
Act. A few days later, the U.S. District Court ordered COEto
provide filtered water to the citizens of Duluth, which was done
until the filtration plant opened in November 1976.
On April 20, 1974, the U.S. District Court ruled that Reserve's
discharges into the air and water were in violation of State and
Federal regulations, contained asbestiform fibers, and presented a
substantial health hazard. The Court issued an injunction ordering
the discharges to be halted immediately. Reserve shut down and
appealed to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals. This Court post-
poned the injunction until arguments on the appeal could be heard,
and Reserve reopened on April 22. The appeal was argued on
December 9, 1974.
The Safe Drinking Water Act, approved in December 1974, in-
cluded a provision for grants to demonstrate new treatment tech-
nologies in crisis areas. Duluth submitted an application in early
1975, based on the recommendations of EPA and COE, which had
been released on January 23. This report, the end-product of the
IAG studies, recommended a new multiple-filter system for the
city's drinking water. A special Federal appropriation of $4 mil-
lion permitted approval of the application.
On March 14, 1975, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on
Reserve's appeal. In essence, the Court upheld the findings relative
to air emissions of asbestiform fibers, and reversed, in part, the
findings related to water pollution. Reserve was found to be in
VH-18
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violation of water quality standards (33 U.S. C. 1160, FWPCA -
1970) and its Refuse Act permit. Although imminent-hazard argu-
ments had been raised, the Court held that information concerning
the hazards of ingested asbestiform fibers was speculative, rather
than substantive. Thus, the Court's opinion concluded that Re-
serve's tailings did present a potential hazard and that abatement
actions should be taken within a reasonable time. The decision also
provided that, should Reserve and the State of Minnesota come to an
impasse over the necessary permits and conditions for abatement,
Reserve would be given 1 year to phase out operations. However,
the court directed that Minnesota and Reserve make every effort to
come to agreement.
In autumn of 1975, construction of the Duluth filtration plant
began.
After the State agencies had refused to issue the needed permits
by July 1976, the U. S. District Court ordered Reserve to abate its
discharges or close down by July 1977. Reserve appealed this
order, and, in September 1976, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals
approved the abatement order, but provided that it could be extended
if circumstances changed. In October, this Court ruled on the fines
imposed against Reserve for violating the State water use permits,
and ordered Reserve to reimburse the COE for costs in providing
filtered water to Duluth.
On November 29, 1976, the Duluth water treatment facility was
dedicated and opened.
VH-19
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In the months before and after the opening of the filtration plant,
ERL-Duluth analyzed urine samples from Duluth residents for as-
bestiform fibers. Positive findings were the first ever recorded
in the literature. Asbestiform fiber levels were found to have been
lower several months after the citizens began drinking the filtered
water.
In June 1976, Reserve applied for dredge-and-fill permits under
Section 404, FWPCA - 1972. These permits have not been issued
because the Environmental Impact Statements are considered inade-
quate. Because Reserve's final plans have not yet been drawn up
(see State and Local Response discussion), the Statements have not
been revised.
The Farmers Home Administration has provided funding for
water filtration plants in Silver Bay and Two Harbors.
STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE
Minnesota's Water Pollution Control Commission and Depart-
ment of Conservation issued permits to Reserve Mining to use
water from Lake Superior and return it to the Lake with taconite
tailings in suspension. These permits provided that this activity
not result in discoloration outside the delineated return zone nor
any adverse effects on fish life and public water supplies. The
permits were issued in December 1947, authorizing cycling of up
to 130, 000 gallons per minute (gpm), and revised in 1956 (260, 000
gpm) and 1960 (502,000 gpm).
VE-20
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at fire stations and schools. On May 8, the City adopted an ordi-
nance requiring restaurants to post notices advising patrons if
their water was filtered or not. Based on the January 23, 1975,
EPA-COE study report, the City contracted for engineering studies
to develop plans for the filtration plant, applied for demonstration
grant funds, and supervised the work of two contractors construc-
ting the facility. These contracts were designed to permit rapid
construction yet impose quality controls. Had normal practices
been used, the filtration facility would have opened a year-and-a-
half later than the November 29, 1976, startup date.
In early 1975, the Minnesota State legislature appropriated
$2. 5 million for the State's share of the costs of constructing
water treatment/filtration facilities -- $2 million going for the
Duluth system, and the remaining . 5 million being shared by Two
Harbors and Silver Bay in conjunction with Farmers Home Adm-
inistration funds.
Subsequent State Court litigation addressed the permits gov-
erning Reserve's use of Lake Superior water, the company's
emissions and effluents, and certain land-use issues involved in
the disposal of the tailings. Once the idea of land disposal had
been adopted, siting questions remained in conflict. Reserve
wanted to use an area at Milepost 7 along its rail line to Babbitt;
DNR and PCA were adamant that a Milepost 20 site be used. In
April 1977, the State Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Milepost
7 site and on conditions to be incorporated into the permits, and
VII-23
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ordered that the permits be issued "forthwith. "
When DNR and PCA refused to issue the permits on the
grounds that the State Supreme Court conditions were inadequate
to protect health and welfare, Reserve sued in State Court. The
decision, filed in November, clarified certain permit conditions
and ordered that the permits be issued within 10 days. The per-
mits were not issued and Reserve petitioned the State Supreme
Court for an order of issuance. These hearings were held in early
February 1978. The decision is pending.
The State permits have been withheld because PCA and DNR
could not incorporate monitoring conditions they felt were neces-
sary to enforce compliance and improve environmental quality,
health, and safety under the terms of the two decisions. Reserve
has not implemented its land-acquisition plans, which had been
based in part on a trade of land with the State. The Minnesota sites
State Land Review Commission has refused to approve any of the
sites that the company is willing to trade for the State-owned land
needed to develop the Milepost 7 site. Corporate financing
questions similarly remain unsettled.
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR RESPONSE
Private Sector
Reserve Mining and the two firms owning it (Armco Corp. and
Republic Steel Corp.) were the primary private sector responders
of record. All three have sued and countersued on administrative
VII-24
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actions, and appealed each decision in State and Federal courts
as far as possible. Their record of obedience to court orders is
marginal, and it has been necessary for those receiving favorable
judgments to institute further litigation to recover awards. Indi-
cations are that Reserve is not in compliance with abatement
deadlines, but is making enough progress to avoid being declared
in contempt. The latest complications are dicussed under State
and Local Response.
The Northeastern Minnesota Development Association, Duluth
Area Chamber of Commerce, Range League of Municipalities and
Civic Associations, Silver Bay Chamber of Commerce, and Lax
Lake Property Owners Association intervened on behalf of Reserve
in the matters argued before the 8th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals.
The Arrowhead Development Commission (concerned with eco-
nomic development of a seven-county port of northeastern Minnesota)
has conducted studies of the impact of environmental regulations and
enforcement actions. Concerned that a shutdown of Reserve will
depress the entire North Shore economy, the Commission is at-
tempting to develop alternatives to maintain economic viability in
the area. This group believes that Reserve and Minnesota will be
unable to come to terms and that Reserve will close.
Public Sector
The Minnesota Environmental Law Institute, Northern Minnesota
Environmental Council, Save Lake Superior Association, Michigan
VE-25
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Table VII-1. Costs Incurred in Duluth, Minnesota, Asbestos Case.
EPA
Field activities, including initial investigations by the Duluth Asbestos Study Team: $112, 500
Monitoring costs, including acquisition of major equipment, and contracts for some analyses:
$405, 750 j./
Estimated EPA staff review and administrative support costs for filtration and pilot plant studies
by COE: $223,000
Demonstration plant, including a grant (under appropriation) and review costs: $4, 004, 000
COE
Filtration and pilot plant studies: $41, 250
Provision of filters and filtered water to Duluth ($1.1 million recovered from Reserve): $3, 000, 000
< CEQ
H
co Salaries and travel expenses for on-scene investigators and advisors: $70,000
State of Minnesota
Oppropriation for demonstration project: $2, 500, 000
Study expensies (estimated): $100,000
City of Duluth
Costs in providing filtered water (recovered from Reserve): $27, 920
Total: $10,484,420
_!_/ Includes $60, 000 for an x-ray diffractometer. These items were procured because of the
Duluth episode, although they have been used for other work since then. Thus, costs may be
somewhat high. Since other cost estimates are conservative, the total is probably accurate.
-------
A major problem, particularly in the early phases, was
acceptance by local authorities that asbestiform fibers in drinking
water were a problem. In a 1975 interview, the Mayor of Duluth
indicated a belief that the filtration proposals were an overreaction
to a non-existent problem. Although the City of Duluth had taken
various actions on recommendations of EPA, CEQ, and COE, there
was skepticism about the extent of the problem. In part, this may
have been attributed to a sense that no solutions seemed imminent.
Despite the fact that demonstration grants had been approved and
the special appropriation had been made, at that time (early 1975)
it appeared to Duluth officials that the filtration plants would not be
operating before mid 1978. It is to their credit that they did accept
the problem as a problem and moved to resolve difficulties, in-
cluding expediting the engineering studies and construction of the
plant.
Two elements are needed to encourage local acceptance when
EPA identifies a problem:
o EPA must be careful in identifying problems, so that
when it announces a problem, the announcement is taken
seriously.
o Once a problem has been identified, local authorities
must be brought into the resolution process.
EPA's track record in this regard has not always been good.
These studies indicate EPA's willingness to learn from past exper-
ience. A second problem was the length of time (3 years) involved
VE-28
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in getting the solution on line. Since much of the delay was
occasioned by the need to develop filtration technology, future
asbestiform-fiber episodes will probably be resolved far more
rapidly. Most of the groundwork has been laid.
The remaining problem, highlighted by the fact that Beaver Bay
is still drawing its drinking water from Lake Superior, is one of
economies of scale. Whether a town with a population of about 500
could afford to avail itself of the new filtration technology is ques-
tionable. Further refinements in filtration or additional sources of
funding may be needed to prevent potential hazards to residents of
small towns.
Reserve Mining Co.
The Reserve Mining case raises additional problems and issues.
Asbestos in drinking water has been assumed to be an imminent
health hazard, because many other toxic materials are known to pre-
sent risk by oral as well as inhalation exposure. Feeding studies are
in progress, but preliminary data will not be available before late
1978. The courts concluded that a potential hazard existed, and that
abatement was needed. (See discussion under Federal Response.)
The adequacy of existing laws to address the Reserve Mining case
is another question. The inability of the FWPCA and CAA to cover
this and similar problems has been identified by EPA and the Con-
gress. Amendments in 1972 and 1977 to FWPCA, and in 1977 to CAA,
were designed to meet these deficiencies. There has not been enough
VII-29
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experience with either of the 1977 amendments to evaluate their
effectiveness.
Reserve did not meet the September 1977 air emission abate-
ment deadline and has indicated it will not be in compliance before
October 1978. Further, Reserve has not been able to file sufficient
information to determine if its negotiated on-land disposal deadline
of 1980 will be met. (The complications are discussed under State
and Local Response.) It appears that CAA and FWPCA enforcement
and penalty provisions may not be adequate to ensure compliance
(in this case, by Reserve or Minnesota) with regulatory or court-
ordered deadlines.
In June 1976, Reserve applied for dredge-and-fill permits from
COE. These permits are required before the land-disposal site may
be developed. The delay in issuance concerns the adequacy of the
required Environmental Impact Statements, and Reserve's inability
to agree with Minnesota over terms and conditions. Thus, the State
has been unable to revise the Statements.
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) may have provided an
improved mechanism for addressing the Reserve case, particularly
because it provides a greater variety of control mechanisms than
has any previous law. Thus, there is a strong potential for devel-
oping regulations with sufficient specificity to address a particular
problem. Further information is needed to determine if TSCA con-
trols would be appropriate or exactly how they might be applied.
VII-30
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However, Congress declared in Section 2(c) that adverse
economic impacts of actions under TSCA be considered in making
decisions. Given the international iron and steel market, stringent
regulations could force Reserve to close down, thus weakening the
economy of northeastern Minnesota. This shut-down possibility
appears likely, even in present circumstances. A general problem
is to balance the need for environmental quality and health safety
with the demand for raw materials, products, and jobs. In this
case, the Arrowhead Development Commission has conducted
studies on the impacts of options, assuming a shut-down of the
Reserve plants. These options ranged from an employee takeover
of the plant, to a relocation-resettlement effort. The Commission
is pessimistic about the likelihood of an agreement between Reserve
and Minnesota that would reduce present pollution and retain em-
ployment in the area.
VII-31
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VIH - CHLORINE BARGE INCIDENT -- LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY
CASE STUDY SUMMARY
On March 19, 1972, a nine-barge tow on the Ohio River struck
Shippingport Island near Louisville, Kentucky, (Figure VIII-1) and
five barges broke loose. One barge loaded with chrome ore sank
in the lower pool of Gate Bay #1 at the McAlpine Dam, part of the
Louisville Gas and Electric hydroelectric plant. Two other barges
were caught by tugboats. A fourth barge carrying sulfuric acid
drifted downstream and lodged in a protective structure of the plant.
The fifth barge with four tanks, each containing 160 tons of liquid
chlorine, also drifted down-river and became lodged in the Bay of
Tainter Gate #2 of the McAlpine Dam. The wing compartments and
the forward hopper were breached upon initial impact, and three
more compartments were subsequently ruptured as the barge
shifted and swung into the lower pool. During the first two days,
it was difficult to get to the chlorine barge because it was in the
middle of the river and the river was running at a high level.
The U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Corps of Engineers
(COE) responded immediately, with the USCG assuming the role
of On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) for river operations. The Office
of Emergency Preparedness (the predecessor of the Federal Dis-
aster Assistance Administration) coordinated efforts of other
Federal, State, and local agencies to cope with the threat of
chlorine gas being released. On April 1, the Mayor of Louisville
vin-i
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INDIANA
McALPINE DAM
LOUISVILLE
KENTUCKY
OHIO RIVER
FIGURE VIII-1. AREA INVOLVED IN THE CHLORINE BARGE
INCIDENT ON THE OHIO RIVER NEAR LOUISVILLE, KY.
-------
ordered an evacuation of 4, 266 residents near the scene. He
requested a voluntary evacuation in an adjacent area, and approxi-
mately 50 percent of the citizens did evacuate. Indiana officials
asked for voluntary evacuation, and again about half of the citizens
of three affected communities complied. Evacuation lasted until
the barge was stabilized -- about 24 hours.
The COE and USCG decided that the best course of action would
V,
be to stabilize the chlorine barge in position and unload the cargo.
A catamaran salvage rig consisting of two World War n patrol craft
hulls with a heavy beam joining their foredecks was used to pass
a sling under the bow of the barge to lift and support it. To unload
the liquid chlorine, piping was laid along the length of the power
plant, out onto the dam structure, over the top of the dam and down
to the barge. Unloading started on April 3 and had to be halted on
April 9 when high water threatened the barge's stability. Unloading
resumed on April 11 and was completed on April 14. The barge
was then pulled free of the dam and the water pumped out.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Date Events
March 19, 1972 Chlorine barge lodges in Tainter Gate
# 2 of Me Alpine Dam on the Ohio River
near Louisville, Ky.
March 22, 1972 Decision made to stabilize chlorine
barge in place, then transfer the
chlorine barge to a standby empty
chlorine barge.
March 23, 1972 National Response Team meets and
Regional Response Team is activated.
Vin-3
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March 24, 1972
March 23, 1972
(Cot'd)
March 25, 1972
March 30, 1972
April 1, 1972
April 2, 1972
April 3, 197
April 9, 1972
April 11, 1972
April 14, 1972
April 16, 1972
At request of Kentucky and Indiana
Governors, Director of the Office of
Emergency Preparedness (OEP) in-
vokes Section 221, PL 91-606, to
authorize Federal assistance, coord-
inated by OEP, to avert an imminent
major disaster.
OEP Field Office established in
Louisville. Regional Directors,
OEP Regions IV and V, plus Region
staff personnel arrive. Regional
Director, OEP Region IV, is desig-
nated Coordinator of Federal Activities.
Personnel from the Emergency Opera-
tions Control Center of EPA's Office
of Air Programs start continuous
monitoring of the air in Louisville.
Additional personnel from EPA start
water sampling near the chlorine barge
and downstream.
Restraining lines placed on barge.
Mandatory evacuation of Portland area
ordered. Voluntary evacuation of ad-
jacent area of Louisville and several
Indiana communities requested.
Chlorine barge stabilized. Evacuees
return to their homes.
Transfer of chlorine to empty chlorine
barge starts.
High water requires catamaran to back
off, stopping removal of chlorine.
Removal of chlorine resumes.
Unloading of barge completed.
Barge removed.
vm-4
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FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AUTHORITY
The USCG Captain of a Port can take actions to protect vessels,
harbors, and waterfront facilities under the Magnuson Act ("the
Espionage Act") as implemented by Executive Order 10173. The
National Response Team determined that the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act (FWPCA) did not provide sufficient authority to
institute actions to protect the public from this threat to health and
safety.
At the request of the Governors of Kentucky and Indiana, the
Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) invoked
PL 91-606 to coordinate Federal assistance to avert an imminent
major disaster.
FEDERAL RESPONSE
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on March 19, 1972, the M/V James
F. Hunter with its nine-barge tow was about one mile upstream of
the Louisville and Portland Canal. The pilot blew for the Pennsyvania
Railroad bridge to raise. As he neared the bridge, the pilot began
backing the two because the bridge had not been raised. The current
evidently swung the tow into Shippingport Island and it broke. The
USCG Captain of the Port of Louisville was notified. At 5:15 a.m.,
the lock leader at McAlpine Locks and Dam called USCG to provide
details of the incident and identify the towboat. The USCG and COE
responded immediately, with USCG assuming the role of OSC. Local
civil defense, local law enforcement agencies, and superiors in the
USCG chain-of-command were notified.
VHI-5
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The COE and personnel from the Louisville Gas and Electric
(LG&E) hydrooelectric plant monitored progress of the barges drifting
downstream. The sulfuric acid barge lodged in part of the power
plant. COE tied it to the tower bases of the power plant to prevent
it from being freed by the eddy effect.
When the chlorine barge lodged in the McAlpine Dam, where
access was difficult because of high water levels, representatives
from COE, Stauffer Chemical Co. (receivers of the chlorine), and
Louisville Police Department maintained continuous surveillance
from atop the LG&E plant to detect movement of the barge or re-
lease of gas. A 24-hour command center was established at
McAlpine Dam by USCG and COE.
Initial appraisal of the situation indicated there was no immedi-
ate danger, providing the barge did not move. There was concern
that further movement through the Gate Bay would endanger the pro-
jecting domes that housed the gas valves. During the afternoon, a
transit site was established to detect movement of the barge. Hourly
readings indicated no movement was occurring.
EPA Headquarters was notified of the incident by CHEMTREC,
the emergency operations center run by the Manufacturing Chemists
Association. The information was relayed to EPA's Region V Office
in Chicago, Illinois, which sent a representative to the scene. USCG
and COE officials on the scene advised EPA that everything was being
done to maintain the stability of the barge and that planning was under-
way for the salvage operations.
VHI-6
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On March 20, representatives of the COE, USCG, towboat
operator, chemical industry, and marine salvage operators met to
discuss possible solutions. The Chlorine Institute was asked for
technical advice and to send representatives to the scene. The
meeting continued on March 21 to explore methods of removing the
chlorine barge. The first suggestion explored was to remove the
barge from the dam in the manner normally used to release stuck
barges, namely "flushing through" by manipulation of the Tainter
Gates. All experts and consultants agreed that they could not
guarantee that the barge or the chlorine tanks would remain intact
if the barge were forced through the dam. The risks and feasibil-
ity of each suggested method were discussed, with emphasis on
public safety. The group finally agreed on a plan to secure the
barge in position, unload the cargo, and then remove the barge.
The Chlorine Institute indicated that the cargo could be unloaded
only by providing a dry platform around the center of the barge
to provide access to the four valve domes.
At a meeting on March 22, a salvage contractor suggested use
of its unusual catamaran, which could be brought to the site from
Point Pleasant, West Virginia, in about 32 hours. The USCG
agreed. Its plan was to use the catamaran to pass a sling under
the bow and then lift and support it. After this, water shields or
lowering of the upper pool could allow unloading the cargo.
The Chlorine Institute agreed to provide an empty chlorine
barge. A contractor was hired to construct the piping required
vni-7
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to transfer the chlorine. It would run the length of the hydro-
electric plant out onto the dam structure, over the top of the
dam to Bay #2, and down to the barge. USCG technical personnel
double checked the condition of the barge from plans and photo-
graphs. On March 23, the OSC activated the Regional Response
Team, and COE agreed to negotiate salvage activities, subject to
final approval by USCG.
Actions at the scene were monitored and reviewed by staff
members of the Commandant, USCG. USCG concluded that the
chlorine barge was a significant and imminent threat to public health
and safety. USCG further concluded that it had authority to cope with
the barge and salvage operations, but not with the actions needed to
protect the public. The similarity between the threat generated by
this incident and disasters as defined in PL 91-606 led the Comman-
dant to request the OEP Director to take measures to prevent loss
of life should a chlorine discharge occur. The OEP Director re-
sponded by calling a meeting of the National Response Team, as
specified by the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency
Plan under FWPCA. At this meeting NRT determined that:
o FWPCA did not provide sufficient authority to institute
protective actions for the public in this case.
o Section 221 of PL 91-606 could be invoked by the Director
of OEP upon receipt of a formal request from the Governors
of the affected States.
VHI-8
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o The National Contingency Plan and the National Response Team
could provide a coordinating mechanism.
o The OSC would supervise and coordinate waterside operations
in conjunction with the COE salvage representatives.
o OEP would provide a Federal coordinating officer to coordi-
nate actions at all levels of government to protect the public.
At a meeting on March 23, attended by representatives from
COE, USCG, and DuPont (the shipper of the sulfuric acid), prelimi-
nary plans for removing the sulfuric acid barge from the southwest
corner of the power plant were reviewed. Results of the meeting
were:
o The need to remove the barge was confirmed.
o DuPont retained Beatty, Inc., as consultants to aid in form-
ulating plans for safe removal. Beatty,"Inc., would position
a derrick barge to turn the sulfuric acid barge and pull it up-
stream. American Commercial Barge Lines was retained to
furnish a towboat to push the barge upstream to a safe point
for mooring. The second boat would assist passage under
Penn Central Railroad bridge.
o USCG would inspect the barge and determine if it was fit for
the planned movement.
o USCG would inspect the barge at a safe mooring and determine
if it was fit to move to the destination for unloading.
o All agencies would have representatives at the lock and dam
for final approval.
VIII-9
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The USCG Cutter Obion was stationed at the upper entrance to
the Louisville and Portland Canal to control marine traffic and
provide assistance if necessary. An emergency operations center
was established, operating with an around-the-clock security watch
at the vehicular entrance to the McALpine Lock and Dam.
At a meeting on March 25, the piping arrangement for the system
to spray water over the chlorine barge was discussed. The system,
requested by EPA to cope with any accidental chlorine discharge,
involved spraying a water curtain above the barge to protect the
salvage crew and to reduce the effects of a major discharge on the
local population. The system would supply enough spray in a fog to
dissolve most of the chlorine that might be released by a fracture
of the valves or separation of the transfer lines during unloading.
The water screen would also help to contain a release long enough
to allow the evacuation of personnel in the immediate area and evac-
uation of the general population.
On March 26, Beatty, Inc., towed the sulfuric acid barge out of
the chute area and moved it around Shippingport Island.
The flooded forward starboard compartments of the chlorine
barge were pumped dry to increase flotation. The sunken chrome
ore barge was removed from the upper gate site and tied up on the
Indiana side of the river. Federal agencies remained in close con-
tact with local and State agencies. A communications network was
established to alert the public during the critical operations to
stabilize the chlorine barge, and Army medical personnel were on
hand.
vm-io
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In the afternoon of March 29, all upper gates were closed
because the river level fell. The pool elevation was controlled by
the lower gates. The water fell to a level that permitted better
examination of the barge. A crack was found in the deck that ran
from the indentation where the initial impact occurred to the raised
rim of the hopper. To prevent the crack from enlarging, the bow
was secured by mooring lines to the gate structure, and the water
level was carefully controlled. Security measures were increased.
COE began rigging and fabrication of materials for the chlorine
transfer on March 30. The splash shields were constructed and in-
stalled on March 31. In preparation for the stabilization operations,
USCG curtailed all river traffic between Mile 599 and 611 on the Ohio
River. On April 1, communities in the area were evacuated.
The barge had been carefully monitored during the preparation
period, but no movement was detected. On April 2, the catamaran
secured the sling under the bow of the barge, thus stabilizing it.
Traffic on the river was allowed to resume, and the evacuees re-
turned home. During the period of evacuation, the American Red
Cross set up shelters and provided meals. Cots and blankets were
received from the Public Health Service.
Experts from the Chlorine Institute fabricated a double yoke
so that any two tanks could be unloaded at the same time. Because
of the dangers involved in case any of the couplings should break,
they advised against unloading more than two tanks at the same
time.
vin-n
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Chlorine is a very reactive chemical and it is unloaded by
pushing it out with nitrogen gas at approximately 200 pounds per
square inch. The piping consisted of three lines — two to receive
liquid chlorine and the third to introduce nitrogen into the top of
each tank. The maximum unloading rate was estimated at approx-
imately 10 tons per tank per hour.
In discussions prior to unloading, there was concern that:
o The stern would lift away from the baffle blocks as the
cargo was removed.
o The bow would become excessively buoyant as weight was
removed from the bow tanks and tear away in the heavy
river current, leaving the stern free to ramble over the
falls.
o The port side (upstream side) would become lighter than
the starboard side, allowing the barge to roll on its side.
To make sure the barge would not overturn, a special unloading
sequence was used. About 20 tons would be unloaded from the star-
board tank before the port tank was unloaded. The bow was sup-
ported only by the river current. USCG feared that unloading the
stern tanks first would cause a lifting and freeing of the stern.
Therefore, the bow tanks would unloaded first in a sequence that
kept the starboard tank lighter than the port.
Installation of the splash shields and pressure tests of the
chlorine piping were completed on April 3, and unloading began
the next day. Approximately 100 tons of cargo were left in each
VHI-12
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of the stern tanks because the material could not be pushed off
due to the angle of the barge and the lack of a low pipe suction in
the tanks.
Chlorine Institute engineers proposed construction of a large
tank on the dam to "scrub" the remaining 100 tons of chlorine by
mixing it with caustic soda, thereby changing it chemically to
bleach, which is relatively harmless. The bleach would easily
dissipate in the fast river current. This proposal was adopted.
The salvage crew then had to wait for the rest of the chlorine
to boil off naturally. The Chlorine Institute people estimated that
the gas would flow at a maximum of approximately one tone per hour
from each tanko Thus, the wreck had to be maintained in position
for another eight to ten days. Boil off was completed by April 15.
The River level began rising on April 9. By April 15, the
higher water level made the barge easier to remove. After cargo
removal, the barge was buoyant enough to float if it could be pulled
free of the concrete pier. The barge was pulled free on april 16.
Throughout the operations, representatives from EPA's National
Field Investigation Center, Cincinnati, Ohio, maintained a water
monitoring program. The program consisted of hourly transects
across the river below the Kentucky and Indiana Terminal Railroad
bridge -- abouut one mile below the barge. The operation was con-
ducted on a 24-hour basis during barge stabilization, and the first
gaseous transfer. Otherwise it was conducted only during daylight
hours.
VIII-13
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In discussions held to determine appropriate courses of action,
the emphasis was on public safety. OEP coordinated the efforts of
all agencies in responding to the air pollution threat. USCG air-
lifted air monitoring equipment to the site. EPA's Emergency Air
Quality Team from Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, set
up four chlorine detectors and three wind direction and velocity .
instruments. Wind speed, wind direction, and chlorine concentra-
tion were measured hourly until the barge was stabilized. USCG
and local officials assisted in monitoring the equipment. As support
for local Civil Defense and municipal governments, the team pre-
dicted the direction, speed, and severity of any chlorine cloud that
might form. This work was coordinated with COE predictions con-
cerning propagation of the gas cloud.
STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE
The Governors of Kentucky and Indiana requested the OEP Di-
rector to invoke PL-606 authorizing Federal assistance.
As barge stabilization activities reached the operational phase,
local governments evacuated nearby areas. The Louisville-Jefferson
County Civil Defense and Federal agencies assisted in the evacuation
operations. Louisvlle officials selected shelters for those evacuated.
They also coordinated with the Red Cross to provide support for these
shelters.
City and Federal representatives participated in radio programs
to answer questions on salvage operations. Federal and local of-
ficials worked with the news media to keep the public informed.
VIE-14
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Information was given to citizens about what to do in the event
of a chlorine discharge. If a discharge did occur and sirens
sounded, people were advised to turn on their radio or TV sets
for specific instructions.
The Jefferson County Air Pollution Control District worked with
EPA on the air pollution monitoring program; the Louisville Fire
Station also assisted by monitoring equipment in the station.
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR RESPONSE
The Louisville Gas and Electric hydroelectric plant provided a
platform for continuous surveillance of the barge.
The Chlorine Institute, DuPont and its contractor, and Manu-
facturing Chemists Association also assisted in various ways.
Stauffer Chemical, which was to receive the chlorine, provided rep-
resentatives who assisted in the continuous barge watch. Its repre-
sentatives also participated in discussions on barge stabilization
and cargo unloading.
The Teamsters Union assisted in distribution of cots and blankets
to evacuation shelters.
RESOURCES AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS
The total Federal cost for response and removal actions was $1.3
million. This does not include the cost of evacuation or other actions
taken by the State or local governments. The case was taken to court,
and the judge ruled in favor of the Government, permitting recovery
of the total Federal cost from those responsible for the incident.
VHI-15
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PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND CONCLUSIONS
The generalizations that can be made regarding the chlorine
barge incident include:
o The question of who had the ultimate authority to order an
evacuation was unclear.
o There is a need for predisaster planning at the Federal,
State, and local levels. Also, the various levels of govern-
ment should identify executive authority to ensure proper and
timely responses.
o The value of preparedness was demonstrated by the effective
manner in which the evacuations were carried out and the
high degree of cooperation. Planning identified the threat,
the peak time of danger, and the areas of greatest hazard,
as well as facilitating installation of a warning system and
the implementation of emergency measures.
o There was no formal mechanism for timely assessment of
toxic material spills.
o OEP's working relationship with other involved Federal
agencies in coping with threats to the public caused by
imminent major disasters, when acting under the authority
of PL 91-606,, was unclear.
VIII-16
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IX. AIR POLLUTION EPISODE -- ALLEGHENY COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA
CASE STUDY SUMMARY
At noon, on November 17, 1975, a division of the Pittsburgh
Weather Service issued an Air Stagnation Advisory (ASA) for the
Pittsburgh, Pa., area (Figure IX-1). The air problem was caused
by a stationary high pressure system in the Eastern third of the
country coupled with a strong double-layered temperature inver-
sion and very light winds. Hardest hit was the Liberty Borough -
Clairton area, which had been put on air Alert at 9 p. m. on
November 16 (Figure DX-2). The major sources of particulates
that contributed to the Alert appeared to be the Clairton Coke
Works of U. S. Steel (USS) and the Elrama Generating Station of
Duquesne Light Co.
At 1 p.m. on November 17, the EPA Region HI Office in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, was notified about the Pittsburgh ASA.
On November 18, meteorological conditions remained unchanged,
and air Alerts were declared in the Hazelwood, downtown, and
North Braddock sections of the Pittsburgh metropolitan area.
Abatement procedures went into effect under the supervision of
air pollution personnel of the Allegheny County Board of Health.
On November 19, with weather conditions remaining constant, con-
centrations of particulate matter in the Clairton area warranted
declaring an Air Warning and eventually an Air Emergency. An
EPA team arrived in Pittsburgh prepared, if necessary, to
IX-1
-------
OHIO
W.VA.
PITTSBURGH
CLAIRTON
PENNSYLVANIA
FIGURE IX-1.
AREA INVOLVED IN THE ALLEGHENY COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA, AIR EPISODE
-------
24 HOUR Coh READINGS 9:00 PM. NOV. 16, TO MIDNIGHT, NOV. 20. 1975
SUBSTANTIAL ENDANGERMENT
8.0-1
7.0 -,
6.0-
Coh 5.0 -
4.0 -
3.0 -
EMERGENCY CRITERION
Peak 7.80 Coh
8:00 PM
Air Alert Declared 9:00 PM. November 16
Alert Criterion
Site: Liberty Borough — Clairton
Air Emergency
Declared
Air Warning Declared
Air Alert Terminated
,
24 12
November 17th, 1976
-H-
12
18th
^ , 1-
24
24
12
19th
Time
24
12
20th
24
-------
activate Section 303 of the Clean Air Act of 1970 to control air
pollution. A team of seven people remained at the Region III
Office on 24-hour call. Epidemiologists and meteorologists were
dispatched from the labs in Research Triangle Park (RTF), North
Carolina, to help gather information needed for action under Section
303.
After meetings between EPA and USS officials, the Clairton
Coke Works shifted to a 48-hour coking cycle by midnight of
November 19. * Legal papers were prepared to force curtailment
of electricity generation by boiler #3 of the Elrama Station.
However, they were not implemented because the most serious
problems were from other sources.
On November 20, a cold front combined with a low pressure
system was moving into the Pittsburgh area. Eventually it lowered
particulate concentrations to normal levels. By 10 p.m. that
night, the episode was over, warnings and alerts were lifted and
the Regional EPA personnel returned to Philadelphia. Epidemi-
ologists from RTP began to conduct respiratory tests to see if they
could observe health effects of the episode. USS began to return
the coking cycle to normal operations.
It would be presumptious to state that the Allegheny County
crisis was totally resolved by the various Federal, State, and
*Coking is a process of "roasting" coal to drive off the volatile
organics. Emissions from the process also include sulfur dioxide
and particulates. Extending the coking cycle, which is the period
of roasting, from 18 hours, for example, to 28 hours substantially
reduces rates at which air pollutants are omitted.
IX-4
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local agencies. There can be no doubt that the primary factor
was the frontal passage and change of meteorological conditions,
improving the atmospheric ventilation of the area. Nevertheless,
the actions taken by the appropriate agencies in encouraging major
sources to curtail their emissions unquestionably had a strong
mitigating influence on the crisis. The authority vested in EPA
by Section 303 of the Clean Air Act is judged to have been the major
bargaining tool in convincing USS to rapidly change to the 48-hour
coking cycle.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Date
November 16, 1975
November 17, 1975
November 18, 1975
Events
Air Alert is declared by Allegheny
County Health Department; USS is
ordered to initiate emisssion abate-
ment actions at its Clairton Coke
Works.
An ASA is issued for western
Pennsylvania. EPA Region
advised of the ASA.
is
An air Alert is declared for downtown
Pittsburgh and North Braddock. Air
deterioration continues, and EPA
sends two teams to Pittsburgh to begin
collecting data for possible actions
under Section 303 of the Clean Air
Act. County Commissioner advises
the public that an air Emergency level
has been reached. The Region El
Administrator arrives at Pittsburgh to
coordinate EPA actions. USS agrees
to further reduce emission by going
on a 48 -hour coking cycle.
IX-5
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November 20, 1975 Air Quality begins to improve, and
the ASA is terminated at noon on
November 20.
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AUTHORITY
The legal framework for reacting to an air pollution episode is
contained in the Clean Air Act of 1970. An air pollution episode
occurs when adverse weather conditions, usually low winds and a
temperature inversion, combine with pollutant source emissions
and local topography to produce a noticeable deterioration in the
ambient air quality. State and local agencies have the prime
responsibility for controlling the episode. If the local response
is not effective, or if it appears that the air quality presents an
imminent and substantial endangerment" to human health, EPA
can intervene by taking emergency action to control the episode.
The Regional Office of EPA coordinates all Federal activity and
works with local and State personnel in resolution of an episode.
The seriousness of an episode is a function of the concen-
tration of pollutants in the air. Episode stages, in order of
increasing severity, are Alert, Warning, Emergency, and Sub-
stantial Endangerment. The specific concentration criteria
defining each stage often vary from state to state. Allegheny
County, Pennsylvania, has regulations similar to those sug-
gested by the Federal Government. Abatement procedures are
designed primarily to prevent pollution from reaching the
Substantial Endangerment level.
IX-6
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The State and local authority comes from Chapter 137 of the
Pennsylvania State Implementation Plan and the master plan of
Allegheny County's Air Pollution Emergency Episode System.
FEDERAL RESPONSE
At 3:00 a.m. on November 18, an Alert was declared in the
Hazelwood area of Allegheny County. That afternoon, the EPA
Region El Office was informed by Allegheny County officials that
air pollution was approaching Warning levels in the Pittsburgh
area. The EPA Regional meteorologist informed other key offices
that a serious episode was developing. Allegheny County contacted
the meteorologist at 8:30 a.m. the next day, informing him that
the air quality was rapidly deteriorating and that visibility in the
Clairton Valley was so poor that driving was impossible. It
became apparent that EPA action would be necessary, so the U. S.
Attorney's office in Pittsburgh was called about implementing
Section 303 of the Clean Air Act. Action by the U. S. Attorney
would empower EPA to file suit on behalf of the United States to
restrain immediately all sources from emitting pollutants. This
action could be taken if the air quality presented an "imminent
and substantial endangerment" to human health and if appropriate
State and local authorities did not act to abate such sources.
At 9:30 a.m., the Regional Administrator was briefed on the
status of the episode. Allegheny County then informed EPA the
Clairton area had a 24-hour reading of 6. 9 coefficient of haze
IX-7
-------
(COH) and the County had asked USS to reduce emissions by
increasing coking time to 27 hours. The County also had asked
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER)
to order reduction of emissions at power plants in Elrama
(Duquesne Light Co.) and Mitchell (West Penn Power Co.) in
adjacent Washington County. During a meeting on the morning
of November 19, the EPA staff concluded that abatement pro-
cedures should be increased by having USS change to a 48-hour
coking cycle by midnight.
Anticipating the need for legal action, the EPA mobilized the
Emergency Operation Control Center team. Part of the team
went to Pittsburgh, and another team remained at the Regional
Office on 24-hour call. Research Triangle Park was called,
and another five-man team was assembled there.
On the morning of November 19, EPA advised the County, by
phone, that USS should reduce its coking process to a 48-hour
cycle by midnight, spray leaking oven doors with a sealant, and
stop scarfing operations. (Scarfing, the removal of surface
defects on the initial steel product by the use of a torch, causes
the emission of particulates.) However, during this conversation,
County officials stated that they did not believe USS could achieve
such a coking cycle within the proposed time period. Clairton
also had to switch to gas firing for all boilers. (Alert plans allow
for two boilers to remain on coal.)
IX-8
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During the afternoon of November 19, Regional personnel in
Philadelphia attempted to convince USS to change to a 48-hour
coking cycle and also discussed the possibility of cutbacks of
other processes.
At 4:00 p.m., the EPA Regional team arrived at the U. S.
Attorney's office and learned that the Regional Administrator
would arrive in the Pittsburgh area to coordinate EPA emergency
actions. The Region also supplied the Pittsburgh EPA team with
a list of sources to consider for reductions if the episode continued.
DER personnel informed EPA on the status of Elrama and Mitchell
Power Stations, Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, and J&L Steel, as
well as the latest pollutant readings. EPA then briefed the U. S.
Attorney, who informed USS about the possibility of a Section 303
action.
As the RTP team flew into Pittsburgh, it noticed a significant
reduction in visibility from the yellow-brown and grey-brown
cloudiness in the air above Clairton. The air over the rest of
the area was clear, however. While driving from Pittsburgh
through the Clairton area and eventually farther south, a member
of the Region El team noticed the same pattern observed by the
RTP personnel from the air. Thus, during this air episode,
pollutant concentrations were not uniform throughout the County.
Clairton area readings, for example, were two to three times
higher than EPA Region El found that Duquesne's Elrama Station
was operating at 18% of load and that USS had extended its coking
K-9
-------
time to 38 hours. By 6:00 p.m., 20 out of 21 boilers had been
switched from coal to gas or else shut down; Mitchell Power
Plant was operating at 85% capacity and in full compliance with
the State Implementation Plan. The J&L Steel Plant in the
Hazelwood area had gone to a 24-hour coking time and had
ceased all other operations, and all other Monongahela Valley
sources had curtailed operations by 15 to 25%.
At 7:00 p. m., RTP Region m personnel were informed that
a Federal judge was standing by and ready to institute Section
303 proceedings. RTP personnel were advised that scientific
experts should be prepared to make statements similar to those
made in the Birmingham, Alabama, case of U.S. vs. USS et al.
of November 18, 1971.
The Regional Administrator met with DER, representatives of
a vice president of USS, two other USS representatives, and the
U.S. Attorney's office to discuss further abatement procedures.
Discussion focused on the rate of extending the coking time at
Clairton Works. EPA insisted that by the end of the 4:00 p.m.
to midnight shift, the coking cycle should be 48 hours. USS in-
sisted the plant was already at 38 to 42 hours before 8:00 a.m.
and the limiting factors were damage to the oven brick work and
safety of the coke oven gas pipeline.
At 11:30 p.m., one EPA team, driving from downtown
Pittsburgh to Clairton, noted that the high air pollution was the
result of a plume-like dispersion that was distributed unevenly.
IX-10
-------
In some deep valleys, the air quality was particularly poor,
while at other areas it was not as bad. Visibility was about 1/4
mile at the Clairton automatic monitoring station. At the
monitoring station located at South Allegheny High School, the
COH values had been so high, greater than 10. 51, that a backup
instrument was required to make the reading. The EPA team
advised the Regional Office of those observations and reported
that the power plants south of Clairton had little effect on the
Clairton air quality.
In Pittsburgh, the Regional Administrator was investigating
the Elrama situation. At 1:00 a.m. on November 20, the Regional
Administrator asked for a telegram stating why Duquesne Light
had not cut back on the operation of boiler #3, which had pollution
control equipment that did not comply with regulations. Even at
the low power rating of 30 megawatts, the boiler was emitting 500
pounds of particulate an hour. Duquesne responded that it could
mean the loss of system reliability. At 1:30 a.m., EPA began
to prepare the pleadings for a suit against Duquesne if more
cutbacks were needed. Throughout the night, there was frequent
communication between the Pittsburgh group and the episode unit
at the Regional Office.
At 2:00 p.m., following termination of the ASA, the episode
shifted from Emergency to Alert status. EPA began a study of
the health effects of the episode. During the afternoon, the EPA
Regional personnel left. At 10:00 p.m. on November 20, all
IX-11
-------
alerts were terminated, and at midnight of the following day,
USS resumed its normal coking cycle.
STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE
At 9:00 p.m. on November 16, an air Alert was declared for
the Liberty Borough-Clairton area of Allegheny County. As a
result of the Alert, the Allegheny County Health Department
ordered the Clairton Coke Works, the largest coke oven complex
in the world and a major source of particulates in the area, to
begin plans to abate its emissions. The coking time was extended
from the normal 18-hour to a 20-hour cycle. At midnight of the
same day, USS was ordered to extend its coking cycle to 24 hours
because air quality was deteriorating rapidly. Hourly readings
for fine.particulate measurement increased from 7. 03 COH to a
high of 9. 93 COH.
The first ASA for western Pennsylvania was declared at noon
on November 17. From 10:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on November 17,
the Allegheny County Health Department inspected the coke works
to confirm that the 24-hour coking cycle was being used. At 10:00
p.m., Alerts were declared in downtown Pittsburgh and North
Braddock.
At 1:00 a.m. on November 19, air quality had deteriorated to
such a degree that the COH readings were off the scale of the in-
strument, which was calibrated for a maximum reading of 10. 51.
Around 2:00 a.m., USS voluntarily switched #2 boiler to 95% gas
and shut down its ammonia plant to make clean fuel available.
IX-12
-------
At 3:00 a.m. of the same morning, Allegheny County notified
Region HI that the Alert I level had been reached and that appro-
priate Warning level abatement procedures had been put into
effect, including a 28-hour coking cycle at USS and cessation of
rolling mill operations.
At 2:30 p.m., the County Commissioners held a press con-
ference to inform the public that the Emergency level had been
reached at Liberty Borough.
At 9:30 p.m., Allegheny County agreed to recontact the
sources to ensure that cutback procedures had been implemented.
Also, two County inspectors were sent to the Clairton Coke Works.
During November 19 and 20, County inspectors monitored USS
closely. On November 19 between 1:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., they
noted that operation of the ovens was resulting in dense clouds
of smoke and was reducing the effect of extending the coking cycle.
USS personnel accompanying the inspectors also noticed this situ-
ation so the company did not have to be notified formally. Prom
12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. on November 20, the 48-hour cycle was
being used. The inspectors again monitored the plant from noon
to 4:00 p.m., by which time USS had been allowed to shorten the
coking cycle to 42 hours. Because of fog the works were moni-
tored for only 4 hours. It appeared that the cycle was slightly
shorter than 42 hours, but the weather conditions made accurate
readings difficult.
IX-13
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At 9:00 a.m., the County, in violation of established procedures
for termination of the Emergency stage and without consulting EPA,
permitted USS to reduce its coking cycle and increase emissions.
At 10:30 a.m., Allegheny County, DER, and EPA held a press
conference to announce that the emergency would possibly be lifted
that day because the 24-hour average COH readings had gone below
the emergency level at 4:00 a.m.
PRIVATE SECTOR AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
In general, private groups responded well when their cooperation
was requested. Their actions are detailed in earlier sections of
this report.
RESOURCES AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS
Resource estimates were difficult to obtain 21/2 years after
the episode. The only estimate was from EPA's Region El, which
listed 10 man-days, $2200 in labor costs, and $500 for travel.
PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND CONCLUSIONS
Under the circumstances, the agencies involved in this episode
generally responded in an appropriate manner. Nonetheless, some
problems were encountered. There were technical problems in-
volving monitoring systems, problems related to local and Federal
agency procedures, and problems of gathering evidence for legal
proceedings before, during, and after the episode. A number of
actions could be taken to increase the speed and effectiveness of
responses to future episodes:
IX-14
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o State and local agencies should develop adequate
individual source curtailment plans and incorporate
them into a master plan. Allegheny County was unable
to respond adequately to an episode of this severity
because of inadequate source curtailment plans. USS
is the major air pollution source in the Monongahela
Valley, yet no approved curtailment plans for portions
of its facilities were on file with the County for various
stages of air pollution episodes. This required meetings
and discussions to increase curtailment efforts during
the episode, delayed the reduction in USS emissions,
and diverted personnel from other duties. Curtailment
plans should contain specific mandated reductions at
each stage of an episode that comply with the require-
ments of the approved implementation plan.
o Local officials should implement the requirements of
the episode regulations applicable to termination of
the emergency stage. The 1975 episode was the first
in Allegheny County that reached the emergency stage
since the adoption of the regulations defining the several
stages of an episode and establishing the criteria for
initiation and termination of each stage. County officials
did not properly implement the termination procedures.
First, the County allowed USS to decrease its coking
time from 48 to 42 hours on the morning of November 20,
IX-15
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before there were sufficient findings to warrant
termination of the Emergency. The two requirements
to terminate the Emergency stage of an episode are:
1) the ambient air readings must be below the Emergency
stage values for the time period specified in the regu-
lations and 2) an official weather forecast must be
received that indicates improved dispersion conditions
are expected in the next 24 hours. Early in the afternoon
of November 20, the County was about to terminate the
Emergency stage of the episode without the official fore-
cast.
o EPA should conduct followup studies to aid in developing
source curtailment capabilities. The studies should
determine: 1) the impact on emissions of the curtail-
ment measures taken at the Clairton Coke Works and
examine the possibility of further and more expeditious
reductions in emissions, 2) the validity of Duquesne
Light's contention that it could not shut down boiler #3
at the Elrama Station because of system reliability, and
3) how emissions should be reduced in future episodes.
o Special provisions should be made for closing of all
schools in the affected area when Emergency levels are
reached or are predicted. The South Allegheny High
School is located in a valley often affected by the plume
from the Clairton Coke Works. This school was in the
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area worst hit by the episode, yet the only curtailment
of school activities occurred because people could not
see well enough to get to school. Consequently, the
school opened one hour late.
o EPA should develop a procedure to monitor total
suspended particulate with the speed of response of
the tape sampler. Allegheny County uses the tape
sampler system during an episode because it produces
hourly results. However, there is no simple way to
relate tape results to readings from the high-volume
sampler. The high-volume sampler provides reliable
results, but it takes up to 24 hours to collect an air
sample and additional time to process and analyze
the data.
o The local agency should report high-volume sampler
readings acquired during an episode in order to
assure accurate annual data. The Allegheny County
Board of Health did not report 24-hour high volume
sampler data during the episode because the filters
became clogged before 24 hours had elapsed. Data
from shorter-term filter runs should be used to
derive 24-hour data, and they should be reported to
avoid downward bias in annual data.
In Region HI, the general area around Pittsburgh is the most
prone to air episodes. The reasons are obvious. This area contains
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the greatest concentration of heavy industry operating from very
old facilities with inadequate pollution control. The steel industry,
in particular, is operating in substantial noncompliance with State
and local regulations and is strongly resisting attempts to bring it
into compliance. This situation exacerbates the severity of poor
air quality during periods of air stagnation.
It is not unusual to observe measured particulate values in
the area twice the primary ambient standard. Hence, episode
planning and implementation are vital to air quality management
in Allegheny County.
Unquestionably, full compliance of the major sources would
have reduced the severity of the November 1975 episode, although
actions taken by the control agency officials did substantially miti-
gate the effects.
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