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!>:U!.!CK.i!AI'IIIC DATA
SIITF.T
EPA-540/9-75-027
2.
Alternative Futures for r^vironmental Policy
Planning: 1975-2000
3. Krcipirm's Acci'ssmn Ni».
S. KepiMI Dale
October. 1075
6.
.iu!i,..,<::> rjuane Si Elgin, David C. MacMichael, Peter Schwartz
8. IVHonninj; Oir.anii'.ation l\c(-i.
No.
?. rcrhu'.iin;.- < >r >:aui/at inn Name- ami Ail.lic-ss _ - , ^ , ,.
Stanford Research Institute
Center for the Study of Social Policy
10. I'liiject/Task/'lliirl: Unii No.
11. (.untract Aitam
68-01-2698
12' s "'"""'• "^•'"'••••'"»" x-"- ' A-IJ»-- Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Pesticide Programs, Strategic Studies Unit, Washingto
D.D. 20460
Project Officer -- Frederick W. Talcott
13. Type o( Ki-
(Covered
i \p IVrioJ
15. Siij'p'tr.n-i.taiy Notes
This report covers the next twenty-five years -- 1975 to 2000, essentially
from the perspective of possible futures for the United States placed within a world
context. By exploring the uncertainty of the near-term future and placing boundaries
on it, the authors believe they have provided the environmental policy planner with an
important tool for anticipating issues and gauging the utility of policies designed to
meet them. The approach to the construction of the alternative futures entailed the
projection of certain driving, or key, trends over the next 25 years and estimating the
^u'-j.cij. , <_V_UIU-MIU.I_, cuiu j«jj.j.Li(_ai (.ujibequfuces or a varying comoinauion or tneir impacts.
Certain key policy questions provided by EPA were placed in the context of these future
and conclusions were drawn therefrom.
17. K; y V.oni;. ;ir:.i Uocumcn; AnalvMS. 17o. Dcsciiptors
Planning health risks
environmental policy monitoring
alternatives mini-scenarios
future trends
trend analysis
skeletal futures
futures literature
policy factors
policy issues
analysis
lnW«friiiifiris/Cpcii-KndcJ Tc
17c. < OSATI l-icld Group
1C. Av.ul.i|i:liiy .--lalciinrn!
gaming
growth
survival
climate
values
food
famine
rms
19. Sixnriiy ( la:.s (This 21. No. of 1'af.rs
Kcpori) -K <~
I.:.N<..L:\^]I 'I.' -0 ^' "
20. SciiiiiiyC !.!•.•. (Ihcs 22. 1'iirt:
''ViNCI. A'.'-ll- II !• /•><-• J
t4 1 '-'*- «~. I Kl. V. 1(1- / .11
» HV A\: I AM) i:\l-.Sf (>.
MI'S I-' >i^l MAY I'.l. HI-.l'l;i il'l
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PREFACE
Tliis report, Alternative Futures for Environmental Policy Planning,
was prepared by the Center 1'or the Study of Social Policy, Stanford Research
Institute, for .he Office of Pesticide Programs of the Environmental
Protection Agene.'. The final report contains the scenarios of the
alternative futures, tho policy conclusions drawn therefrom, and recom-
mendations for the continuing use of the alternative futures method in
the EPA planning process. A second volume contains the informal working
papers used in the development of the scenarios.
The report covers the next twenty-five years--1975 to 2000, essentially
from the perspective of possible futures for the United States placed
within a world context. By exploring the uncertainty of the near-term
future and placing boundaries on it, the authors believe they have
provided the environmental policy planner with an important tool for
anticipating issues and gauging the utility of policies designed to meet
them. The approach to the construction of the alternative futures entailed
the, projection of certain driving, or key, trends over the next twenty-
five years and estimating the social, economic, and political consequences
of a varying combination of their impacts. Certain key policy questions
provided by EPA \\cre placed in the context of these futures and conclusions
were drawn therefrom.
Willis W. Harman, Director of the Center for the Study of Social
Policy, was in overall charge of the study. David C. MacMichael, Project
Leafier; Duane Elgin; and Peter Schwartz; all of the Center, were the
principal authors. Thomas Blue, Manager of Agrochemical Research, and
Peter Stcnt, Agricultural Economist, provided the main technical, pesticide
related inputs. Research Assistants David Gilt, Michael Reynolds, and
Elsie Garficlcl gave important assistance.
iii
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Conclusion
As a conclusion to chis introduction we must reemphasize that this
study is, and claims to be, no more than a methodical exploration of the
uncertain. The ten future scenarios developed and the policy implications
derived therefrom represent at most the considered judgments of the re-
search team. Although, the research team is convinced that the scenarios
and the methodology used to produce them are valid, we reiterate that.
these views of the future are gained from the perspective of today, from
analysis of the data available today.
The policy planner who employs the results of this study tomorrow,
or next year, or five years hence must realize that the perspective will
have changed, that more data will be available, that events will cither
confirm or render false certain of the trend projections on which the
forecasts were based. The planner must revise and adapt the scenarios
and the policies based on them in accordance with developing real it}'.
Futures forecasting is a dynamic process to be incorporated within the
planning system; it is not a rigid predictive device to lock the planner
into either self-fulfilling prophecy or into programs incongruent witii
reality. The last section of this report offers suggestions on how EPA
can revise these scenarios or write new ones as conditions change.
In other words, these alternative futures forecasts are slates writ-
ten in chalk, not tablets graved on stone. Given that the tools of the
planner are more likely to be blackboard and chalk than marble slab and
chisel, we believe they are all the more useful for being presented in
this form.
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it proved possible and desirable to raise the retirement age to 70. How-
ever, despite advances in geriatric medicine that allowed the very afflu-
ent in the more advanced countries to extend their lives greatly, more
and more of the nonaffluent elderly chose to reject life-prolonging tech-
nology and even to accept forms of geriu:;ric euthenasia as a socially ac-
ceptable means of terminating existence.
With fewer and fewir people in the advanced countries and in the
modern sectors of the developing nations engaged directly in primary and
secondary occupations, and with full employment ensured in the burgeoning
service and quaternary sectors, a more or less sensate and hedonistic
lifestyle became widespread. While the nuclear family remained the norm,
permanence in the arrangement was expected only during the raising of the
children. This, combined with the lacer marriage age, produced a society
with large numbers of young and older ".-.ingles." For these, efficiency
in living arrangements was a priority, contributing to the growth of
aparfmenc dwelling. Sociologists agreed th;jt willingness of the elderly
to depart life was at least paitly a function of the loneliness of the
unmarried elderly. Although groups of people organized into societies
for specific purposes were a feature of the time, neither communal living
experiments nor traditional communities were of much importance.
As great corporations became ever more dominant in the economy, their
societal role expanded. The Japanese model of lifetime employment in-
creasingly came to be the norm.
International relations—after a relatively stormy period in the
early 1980s while the changes of the 1970s forced some adjustments — sta-
bilized within a complex system of trade relationships in which the multi-
national corporations increasingly played the lead role. To a great
extent, governments merely endorsed and enforced the terms of these ar-
rangements after the fact. The state trading corporations of Eastern
25
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easy and smooth, continuous change. The disarray of the mid-1970s, marked
by oil, food, monetary, diplomatic, and military crises provided an un-
promising beginning for this change. An apparent world movement in the
early 70s toward a more homogeneous and cooperative system, with detente
and normalization of relations being its hallmarks, almost overnight re-
verted to a competitive situation in which each nation looked to its own
interests and the securing of advantage.
Since the watchword for the 1970s almost everywhere was caution,
crises did not produce rny tendency toward bold and daring actions.
Within the United States and elsewhere, full consensus was- react.ed on
the need to maintain international peace, to avoid economic or social
breakdown (even during a time of recession and only partial recovery),
and to cut back on high levels of ind-'.vidual consumption. Systems of
rationing or of materials allocation were accepted. Credit controls,
wage and profit limitations, and similar measures were imposed and ac-
quiesced in.
By 1980, though, and especially in the United Scates, public patience
with watching and waiting for the new dawn had begun to wear thin. Ration-
ing and control systems were being evaded, and the promised breakthroughs
in new energy technologies—viewed as the key to all problems—seemed as
far away as ever. A sharp rise in the number of "survivors" was signaled
by the revival of "welfare rights" groups and ''gray power" organizations;
strikes and demonstrations increased. Concurrently, the frugal ethic also
began to attract more recruits. Efforts that had been devoted to main-
taining the industrial system through a difficult period began to be di-
verted to the establishment of alternative, intermediate technology econ-
omies. This apparent shift began to dominate intellectual discussions,
but in the mid-1980s, favored by consistently good weather worldwide and
lowered food prices, the achievement sector was able to demonstrate
111
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"USSR Tries to Boost Its Farm Productivity for Its Own Purposes," The
Wall Street Journal (October 11, 1974).
Van Den Bosch, R., "The Toxicity Problem—Comments by an Applied Insect
Ecologist," Chapter 6 in Chemical Fallout. Miller and Bergs, eds.,
(Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1969).
Vicker, R., "The Problem That Won't Go Away,".The Wall Street Journal
(August 23, 1974).
"Voter Views Vary on the Environment," The New York Times (November 10,
1974).
Walters, H., "The World Food Situation." a speech published by the
Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Decem-
bar 9, 1974).
Ward, B., "A "People1 Strategy of Development," Communique on Development
Issues, Overseas Development Council, Pamphlet No. 23.
"Warmth Endangers Grain Crop," The Washington Post (January 24. 1975).
"Weather and Business Planning," Executive Summarv, Long Range Planning
Service Report No. 541, SRI, Menlo Park, California (February 1975).
"The Weather as a Weapon of Modern War," Snn Francisco Chronicle and
Examiner, Sunday Punch (October 20, 1974).
"Were Northwest Firms Saved from Moth or Did DDT's Harm Outweigh Any
Gain?" The Wall Street Journal (January 7, 1975).
West, Q. M., "Research Tasks in World Food Economics," a speech published
by the Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture
(May 7, 1974).
, "World Food Uncertainty—Policy Issues for the United States,"
a speech published by the Economic Research Service, U.S. Department
of Agriculture (January 21, 1974).
"When the Next Ice Age Comas, Don't Say We Didn't Warn You," San Fran-
cisco Chronicle and Examiner, Sunday Punch (December 22, 1974).
"Widespread Shortages May Pit 'Have Nots' Against the 'Haves'," The Wall
Street Journal (October 3, 1974).
249
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Will, G. F., "A Change in the Weather," The Washington Post (January 24,
1975).
Willett, J. W., "The Ability of the Developing Countries to Meet Their
Own Agricultural Needs in the 1980s," a speech to the Agricultural
Institute of Canada (August 6, 1974).
Wilson. C. L., and C. Williams, "Toward the Biological Control of Insect
Pests," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist.-; (March 1973).
"Winners and Losers," Newsweek (September 30, 1974).
World Bank. "Trends in Developing Countries," statistical summary (1973).
"World Bee Population Crisis," Harper's Weekly (January 24, 1975).
"World Famine Threatens Peace. Hatfield Tells Stanford Audience," Palo
Alto Times (August 12, 1974).
"World Fertilizer Situation 1975, 1976. and 1980," F.conomic Research
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (October 1974).
"World Food Conference: Amid Politicking, Some Progress," Science
(December 6. 1974) .
"The World Food Situation and Prospects to 1985," Economic Research
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Foreign Agricultural
Report No. 98.
"World Hunger: What Must Be Done?" The Christian Science Monitor
(October .'!!, 1974) .
"World Population nnd Food Supply and Demand Situation," hearings before
the Subcommittee on department operations of the Committee on Agri-
culture. House of Representatives, July 23-25, 1974.
"World Seen Near a Food Disaster — Rockefel ler Fund Head Asks for New
Ethic of Austerity," The New York "imes (March 15, 1974).
Wylie, P., The End of the Dream (Daw Books, Inc., New York, 1972).
Zuvekas, C., "Determining Agricultural Sector Growth Rate in Less De-
veloped Countries: The Case of Ecuador," Inter-American Economic
Affairs (Autumn 1973).
250
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Clearly,, the foregoing areas do not exhaust all importrint trend
categories. Given limits to resources nnd time,, the ten selected areas
seemed an adequate trend base from which to proceed. We acknowledge
that some important trend elements almost surely have been overlooked
or considered too briefly. These omissions will be ameliorated as this
planning tool is used and refined in the future.
'The trend summaries that follow provide a brief overview of the full
trend papers. T!,e complete trend papers (with references) arc- contained
in the working papers in Volume II.
254
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Table A-3
CLIMATE IMPLICATIONS FOR PEST CONTROL AND PESTICIDES
I. tern
Remarks
Crop value
Pest incidence
Examples given in the Cexc show that wo really may ho in the beginning
stages of a declining weather cycle that, among other things, will grad-
ually affect yield characteristics of certain agriculturally productive
regions anJ crop varieties. At the least we may expect r.iore irregular-
ity in futme. weather patterns -fron year to year than we experienced
over the past half century. If this occurs, then the chance for weather-
related yield reductions and crop failures is greater; the iced for other
compensating yield-increr.se factors is greater and the trend in par-acre
crop values should increase. Even in the a ismm of potential yield-
diminishing effects of climate, recent trends in per-acre crop values has
been upward because of increasing world demand for food.
With regard to the relationship between crop value 3 and dr;.i,-.nd for pest
control, it has been almost axiomatic that the greater tlio L'er-a;-r; value
of the crop, the greater the justification for: (1) optimizing yields
per acre (e.g.. by reducing competition from weeds with herbicides) and
(2) protecting the crop from insect and pathogen damage..
Pest incidence is often related to weather characteristics. Factors re-
lated to a declining weathor patlvrn in agricultural areas chat might in-
crease pest i.ncidonc •, particularly for insects and pathogen;, would of
course depend on the- crop grown; hut it might be expected that weather
stress on specific crop varieties nay make them more susceptible to in-
festations, particularly disease. On the other hand, weather-related
reductions in per-acre crop yields may m;'!;e crops less attractive to in-
sects.
Changes in crop
mix
Utilization of
weather in pest
management sys-
ten-s
Identifiable changes in weather patterns may bring about certain changes
in crop mixes that will aifect demand lor pe.-t control. If drought or
even drier conditions hit Certain regions, crops more suited to dry-land
farming could be substituted for other varieties. In many cases this
would represent only the substitution of one set of problems with an-
other. However, if cotton acreage dropped significantly, certainly there
would be a sizable not national decrease in the consumption of chemical
insecticides (asr.uning that cotton currently accounts for close to 50 £
of the agricultural consumption of insecticides).
Although this i'jetrr does not precisely fit the discussion of the effects
of changing weather patterns on domand for pest conTol, it is worthy of
mention. As suggested above under "Pest Incidence." weather conditions
are an important determinant in the evolution of post infestations up to
or exceeding economic damage levels, and ^ti.'.'ies are under w.iy to corre-
late daily weather conditions with variations in bovh the vitality of
plants (hence, their innate resistance characteristics) anc the vitality
of post populations. Periods of weather likely to lead to high pest
levels can then be more readily Identified so that timely a.iJ nonexc.es-
sive suppression measures cm be taken.
260
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SUPPLY OF FOOD AND FIBER
AND THE DEMAND FOR PEST CONTROL
The demand for the economical control of crop pests, including in-
sects, weeds, micro-organisms, and the like, will undoubtedly increase
over the next 25 years. The significant trends that define this demand
and have been analyzed include:
• Acreages, yields, and values of crops selected for their
significant usage of pesticide materials in the past.
• Historical consumption of pesticide materials.
• Saturation iev?ls of usage for specific classes of pesti-
cides in important crops.
The historical time series of data defining the above trend compo-
nents and the projection of those time series data result in the general
conclusion that the demand lor pest control will not abate. It is possi-
ble that the absolute consumption of pesticide materials could level off
and perhaps decline, but this possibility is predicated upon several break-
throughs i'n technology and a significant change in grower practices. The
increasing resistance of many pests to currently used pesticides, plus
the apparent inability in the short run of new generation of pest control
methods to reduce the absolute level of the pesticide applied, lends cre-
dence to our conclusion that the demand for pest control will certainly
not decrease and will probably increase slightly each year.
Although we do not see a significant change in the acres to which
pesticides are appled, we do sec the yields and/or value of the crops
on these acres increasing and costs of production increasing at least
as rapidly. To remain financially viable, the farmer will be forced to
optimize his combination of inputs to maximize his net return. The
251
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marginal productivity and value of pesticides is certainly very high
relative to the other inputs of the farmer's total controllable input
mix. Hence, from trend analysis and current issue analysis, we can see
only an upward pressure on the demand for pest control out to the year
2000, assuming extrapolation from the present state of the world. This
could be altered by the assumptions of the various scenarios that have
been developed.
262
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THE DEMAND FOR FOOD A\'D FIBER
Food Demand
In estimating food demand we must distinguish between actual con-
sumption (effective demand) and nutritional need (adequate demand). Poor
people in both developed and developing countries may not have the pur-
chasing power to make their effective demand correspond to their nutri-
tional need; conversely, the rich will likely have sufficient purchasing
power to make their effective demand exceed their nutritional need.
Since projections of aggregate demand and supply tend to mask these sub-
stantial disparities in purchasing power, the future demand for food is
discussed in conns of both effective and adequate demand. The effective
demand lor food is primarily a function of three factors: the number of
people i:; the world, individual levels of income, and individual prefer-
ences ant; customs.
Not only has the total number of people increased throughout his-
tory, but the rate of increase of our global population has accelerated.
The world population is now graving approximately at the rate of 2% per
year. Population forecasts indicate that global population v.ill likely
fall between the high projection of 7.1 billion and the low projection
of 6.0 billion people by the year 2000. The rate of population growth
in the United Scaces, Europe, and the USSR has slowed considerably,
thereby leaving die bul ; of the world's population growth concentrated
in three n-.ajor regions: Africa, Latin Americ... and Asia. Although
population growth rate is high in Latin America and Africa, these, re-
gions have substantial amounts of unexploited natural resources
263
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(primarily land and water). Thus there is some hope that intervention
by developed nations with appropriate technology (pesticides, fertilizers,
equipment) could begin to foster food self-sufficiency. The most critical
problems are in Asia, where populations are already large (relative to
available resources) and continue to increase rapidly.
The food problem has become more than a race between aggregate pop-
ulation growth and aggregate food supply—rising affluence has become a
major new claimant on the world's food resources. For example, it is
estimated that Americans'consume more than five times as much food per
capita as do Asian Indians because of their ability to enforce, through
the market place, a disproportionate amount of indirect consumption of
grains. In 1973 GKP per capita ranged from more than $5,000 in North
America to less than $200 in many Asian and Central African countries.
Even these striking regional disparities mask the low purchasing power
of the very poor in many developing countries. Inequities in income
distribution are even more pronounced in developing countries than in
developed countries.
The distribution of world food supplies will likely remain a more
serious problem than total production of crops and animals to meet grow-
ing demand. However, given vast differentials in purchasing power be-
tween and within regions, the world food dilemma will continue: there
will be malnutrition and starvation in some areas while food surpluses
accumulate in other regions. Adverse climatological changes could of
course bring total production below anticipated levels and thereby trans-
late the food problem into one of both production and distribution.' In
either event, although food shortages will likely be centered in the de-
veloping regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the problem will
manifest itself on a worldwide scale.
264
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In summary, a brief sampling of expert opinion regarding the world
food problem reveals a striking degree of unanimity. Even those who are
optimistic about prospects for feeding the world's population consider
the problem one of crisis proportions and view it as a continuing one,
likely to endure at least to the year 2000. Solution or even ameliora-
tion of the problem will likely require heroic efforts and sacrifices on
the part of the developed nations. Increasingly, the role of changing
climatological patterns is seen as removing the element cf predictability
from food planning policy, thus requiring contingency planning for po-
tentially volatile supply changes from year to year, depeuding on the
vagaries of changing weather patterns.
Fiber Demand
The demand for fibers is related to the demand for food, not only
because both food and natural fibers must be produced on a finite amount
of crop land, but also because the same variables--population. income,
consumer preferences—affeet both food and fiber demand. Several addi-
tional components also affect fiber demand. In recent years dramatic
shifts in two components, cost of petrochemical feedstocks and food crop
acreage, have caused a turnaround in the rather sharp increases in fiber
demand and left considerable uncertainty about future trends.
U.S. demand for textile goods in general and natural fibers in par-
ticular is shrinking. Synthetic fiber, which once represented only a
miniscule share cf total fiber production, claimed 70% of the market in
1974 and is expected to gain an 85%.market rhare. by 1980. Continued de-
cline in the market share of natu-al fibers can be expected through the
1980s because substantial improvements in the price competitiveness of
natural fibers seems unlikely.
265
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Of the natural fibers, it is particularly important to "onsider
cotton. Cotton is this country's only widely produced vegetable fiber
and the only natural fiber requiring significant amounts of pesticides,
often as much as a third of the total pesticide production. A sharp de-
cline in cotton acreage is likely in view of current relatively low
profit expectations for cotton and very attractive price prospects for
cotton's main competitors: soybeans, corn, and grain sorghums. With '
cotton production costs likely to increase further, farmers are turning
to lower risk food crops that offer a far greater profit potential. Thus,
the combined impact of synthetic fiber competition in the market place
and food ('"op competition in the field means further decline in cotton
production. The nearly record production level of 6.2 billion pounds
of cotton in 1973 should level off to an average of 4 billion to 3 billion
pounds per year over the next decade.
266
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VALUES
This trend paper examines U.S. society in terras of six life ways.
These life ways are called "Makers."'"Preservers," "Changers," "Takers,"
"Seekers," and "Escapers." Each is defined as a unique constellation of
motives and values in.such domains as life goals, psychological needs,
belief systems, morality patterns, and time orientations.
The population of the United States in the mid-1970s appears to be
composed of about a third Preservers and about a fifth eacli of Makers
and Takers. Combined, the three smaller groups of Changers, Escapers,
and Suckers make up about a quarter of the population. This profile
suggests that about three-quarters of the population (Preservers, Mak-
ers, and Takers) -ire reasonably in tune with cultural norms while a
fourth of the people basically desire a change.
An analysis is presented to suggest that changes in national pro-
files of life ways is a useful way of looking at societies. Some obser-
vations are offered on the role of values in societal change. Values
appear to be both the creators of change and the result of shifts in
the extern.-il environment •
These comments are generalized to show how national life profiles
may be interpreted to explain, key events of a society's history. In a
cursory review. U.S. history from 1776 to 1975 is examined f«jr shifting
life way patterns.
The paper concludes by indicating three plausible kinds ol futures
for the United States, each witli a distinctive life way profile and
hence Mith unique patterns of values. A brief scenario is postulated
as the route to a "transformational future." An outstanding feature of
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