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Although farmers may become aware (i.e., "hear
something") of a pesticide regulatory action near
the time Federal decisions are made via the news
media, they do not necessarily act on this infor-
mation (i.e., take the message seriously, attend
to it, solicit arid receive detailed information, etc. ).
Indeed, the regulatory restriction does not become
problematic until carry-over supplies of the banned
pesticide become scarce;- - Thus, little experiment-
ing with alternatives is done prior to this time and
no preparatory or anticipatory adjustments are made.
The initial user adjustment response amongst farmers
is usually an attempt to maintain their current pest
control practice and hence they continue using the
banned pesticide. Indeed>- many farmers augment
their supply by stockpiling and are encouraged to do
so through advice received in the community-based
institutional service network.
User adjustment responses that simply entail the
substitution of the banned pesticide with a new
chemical are also fairly common, but the adoption
of new pest control practices not utilized in the
past (e.g., alternate crops, intensive use of scout-
ing with contingent use of rescue insecticides, etc. )
are met with greatest resistance by the farmer and
are usually-only adopted by the larger, more esta-
blished and higher resource farmers in the short
-term.
These user adjustment responses are not without
their reported difficulties by farmers. Most of their
•concerns center around matters that could inhibit
-yield and profit; less concern for health or environ-
mental side effects is apparent. The following user
-concerns are in evidence: pesticide shortages,
increased cost and reduced efficacy of alternate
chemicals (the latter partially caused by improper
application) resulting in increased production costs,.
reduced yields, reduced income and increased debt;
allergic reactions and the lack of institutional ser-
vices for alternate crops; and the lack of institutional
services for adjustment responses involving new
pest control practices (e.g. , intensive use of scouting).
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Farmers look to an institutional service network in
their surrounding community for alternate courses
of action when faced with replacing a banned pesti-
cide (e.g., the extension, service, the agricultural
experiment stations-, chemical companies, pesticide
dealers, lending organizations, professional scouts,
neighbors, friends and relatives, etc. ). However,
institutional constraints which impede responsive-
ness to the pesticide regulatory action can preclude
otherwise possible responses by the farmer.
A farmer's past practices (i. e. , tradition) and Ms
beliefs about wha> kinds of pest control strategies
are effective for a particular pest, influence his
adjustment 'responses 'in the sense that they restrain
the range of attractive options.
Financial resources (e.g. , cash and/or credit) also
constitute a significant attribute with respect to a
farmer's response and problems associated there-
with. That is, those farmers that can weather one
support institutions seek viable alternatives to the
banned pesticide are least likely to have serious
adjustment problems.
Noncontrollable confounding conditions ,such as
inflation, the weather, fluctuating market conditions
for alternate crops, prior and expected -levels of pest
infestation, and pesticide shortages caused by raw
material shortages (e.g. , a petroleum crunch), all
influence both a farmer's response to a pesticide
regulatory decision and the subsequent problems that
may develop. Nevertheless;, the nature ,of the rela-
tionships between the farmer and the various support
organizations will, to varying degrees, mitigate or
soften the effects of these otherwise uncontrollable
conditions in the production operating. environment.
Hence, the magnitude or seriousness :of a farmer's
adjustment problems (i. e. , the degree to which a
particular adjustment problem- affects .his ability to
adapt to a new pest control option with -confidence)
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is influenced by both his personal resources (i. e.,
past practices to pest control, financial resources,
information seeking activities, managerial skills,
and friendship ties with pesticide dealers) and the
ability-of the institutional service network to pro-
vide timely, supplementary resources for respond-
ing to a regulatory action. Curiously, the
interphase of these two resource factors means
that adjustment problems can be equally serious
for different farmers in""the same geographical
locality.
-..'.- 'In summary, a period of three years appears to be a reasonable
definition for describing '"short term" transitional user adjustment
problems. This study found that during the first growing season
affecte'd by a regulatory action, many farmers will attempt to "buy
time" by stockpiling the banned pesticide! For some farmers, such
stockpiles may be sufficient to carry them through the second growing
;s.ea:sbn as well. However, in the third growing season affected by a
regulatory action, few carry-over supplies of a banned pesticide exist
•and, thus, most, if not all, farmers are forced to make an additional
.adjustment response. Nevertheless, the available response options
..'(i.'.e*-„,-£alternate pest control strategies), the extent to which each is
chos-'en,; and the difficulties anticipated in adopting each option are, of
course, influenced by a complex set of personal and community institu-
tional resource conditions. Therefore, the response options open to the
:farmer'and'adopted by him in the "short term" (i. e. , three years) will
vary-both between farmers of the same commodity sector, as well as
between farmers of different commodity sectors.
XI
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1. 1 Rationale for the Study
Under Public Law 92-516, the Environmental Protection
Agency is charged with the protection of man.and the environment
from deleterious effects of pesticide use. However, the amended
FIFRA (PL 92-516) requires that decisions the Administrator makes
governing the use of pesticides determined to produce "unreasonable,
adverse" environmental effects shall be made with an awareness of the
prospects for "unreasonable, adverse" social, economic.and environ-
mental effects resulting from the decision. Thus, if the substitute
pest control procedures available present different health hazards or,
if there are no substitutes available to maintain food and fiber produc-
tion, then one problem is merely substituted for another. : -\-
Congress, in desiring to minimize the occurrence of such Out-
comes, has provided funds for the evaluation of prqblem-p-esticide'-s'.
and the consequences of various decision options fp.r their uisie1. ; The
review program associated with the Substitute Chemical.Propram .is a
pivotal component of lhis> policy thrust. Funds have been targeieq'uri
this program for the purpose of identifying pest control procedures
that can feasibly substitute for problem pesticides, and for the o~mr-
pose of evaluating evidence pertaining to probable short and long term
effects of their use. However, information is not. always' available.for
certain classes of problems. . •;. •..-: . J • ..•
Data documenting short-term (i.e., tentatively defined for pur-
poses of this study as three years*) transitional problems experienced ,
by farmers faced with the problem of replacing a cancelled or sus-
pended pesticide is one of the areas in which more knowledge is needed. **
Short-term, user problems can become long term problems for society,
*Chosen because the DDT decision was three years old when this
study was undetaken.
**This problem has been alluded to in past research and in pre-
vious pesticide regulatory decisions. For example, see RvR Consultants,
Farmer's Pesticide Use Decisions and Attitudes on Alternate Crop Pro-
tection Methods, Report prepared for the CEQ and the EPA, Contract
Number EQC 325, July, 1974; National Academy of Sciences, Pest
Control; An Assessment of Present and Alternative Technologies, (5
volumes), 1975; and Opinion of the Administrator', EPA, on the Suspen-
sion of Aldrin and Dieldrin, FIFRA Dockets Numbers 145 et. al. , October
1, 1974.
1.1
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especially if major regulatory decisions are made without an adequate
understanding of the scope and magnitude of problems.
The type and magnitude of farmer adjustment problems experi-
enced were not well understood at the time the study was initiated, but
were thought to possibly include shortages of substitute supplies,
problems associated with the attainment of application skills, occupa-
tional health problems stemming from the use of unfamiliar products,
etc.
Therefore, in order to upgrade the Environmental Protection
Agency's capacity for identifying and understanding post-regulatory
.agricultural user adjustment problems and in order to provide direc-
tion to EPA in areas having optimal policy benefit, this study was
undertaken.
1.2 Project Objectives and Constraints
; "s Within the -limits imposed by the relative lack of knowledge
*•«*»»•• 'fi3 V.I/T ncjg'*' •>• a e»"»ori o o fn TIO c H r*ir\ o \vith'"'1"5>TV^1 S . t-"b ' -S S fal fl V W?S P
^ **&"—— *"* O — --A-fc^---A-- •• - - - , - .
developmental one and was viewed as one of discovery and exploration.
That is, the objectives of this study were to identify the representative
range of "on the farm" user adjustment problems associated with major
pesticide regulatory decisions, as well as to establish a testable theo-
retical framework for explaining user.problems and responses to those
problems.
'• Tn'e primary focus of the study was on farmers of select com-
modities and the scope of work stipulated that two major crops be
selected "t'o'further focus the study effort. Moreover, the contract
stipulated that the study should be targeted to, but not necessarily con-
fined to adjustment problems associated with decisions to cancel aldrin/
dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor. Overall farmer adjustment prob-
lems were to encompass a range of issues including managerial prob-
lems, resource shortages, poor results with substitute pest control
procedures, new pest problems, crop failure, safety problems, etc.
Finally, the contract specified that the sampling design and data
.collection procedures be sufficiently flexible to permit development of
a policy understanding of the user adjustment problems specific to
various crop production systems, without sacrificing the precision
1.2
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necessary to identify response profiles of the most serious problems.
In addition, the relationship between user behavior and the influence
of local and extra-local institutional conditions to pesticide use and
response to regulatory decisions were to be identified.
1.3 Organization of the Report : . •
Chapter 2. 0 provides a detailed description of the study approach
utilized. First, information concerning the selection of corn and cotton
as study crops, the selection of counties (or parishes) for in-depth field
work and the nature of the crop/pesticide/pest relationship of primary
focus to the study effort is presented. A description of the data father-
ing and analysis methodology used in each study site is then-provided.
Included are discussions .of the methodological orientation, the field
manual used, the selection, training, and oversight of the field per-
son, the installation of the-field person, the initial codingj- analysis
and debriefing activities and the final analysis activities undertaken.
The report is then divided into three major parts;.-r ;the first
describes the field corn case study results, the second describes the
cotton case study results, and the third .summarizes key si imparities
and differences between the two case studies. _f
Parts I and II are written in a similar fashion and each contains
five chapters. The first chapter-in each part (i. e. , Chapters. 3..0 and
8. 0 for corn and cotton, .respectively) provides a description of the
corn (or cotton) crop production systems and pest control strategies
exhibited by the farmers in the study site. The factors influencing a
farmer's decision to grow a particular crop and to use particular pesti-
cides are first discussed, followed by a typology of different crop pro-
duction systems (based upon insecticide use strategy) exhibited-by the
farmers in the study site. Chapters 4. 0 and 9- 0 describe the influence
of local and extra-local institutions on the corn and cotton crop pro-
duction systems and pest control strategies, respectively. These
institutions are categorized based on whether they impact on the input
side or the output side of the crop production proeess. Each institu-
tion is discussed with respect to the types of farmers that use the
institution, the role that the institution and institutional representatives
play in dictating pest control strategies to the farmer, the mechanisms
of interaction used by the institution, the interaction the institution has
with other institutions within the community, and the extra-local
1.3
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institutional relationships between the local institution and its counter-
part at the state, regional or federal level. The influence of the federal
regulatory timetable on the crop production systems and pest control
strategies exhibited by the farmers in the study site are next described
in Chapters 5. 0 and 10. 0 for corn and cotton, respectively. A brief
review of the aldrin/dieldrm and chlordane/heptachlor (or DDT) regula-
tory decision(s) is first given, followed by the initial reaction of farmers
"..:to the knowledge of the pending and then actual suspension (or cancella-
tion) of these pesticides. The user adjustment response patterns are
discussed in the fourth chapter of each part (i. e. , Chapter 6.0 and 11.0
for corn and cotton, respectively). Included are descriptions of the
various responses, the types of farmers exhibiting the response,
whether the response is problematic (and if so for whom), and the rea-
son why the response is o'r is not problematic. Chapters 7. 0 and 12. 0,
the final chapter in each part, provide conclusions relative to the corn .
and cotton field work, respectively, including a description of the .
influential forces in the user adjustment response process.
Part III, which summarizes the results and conclusions presented
'.in Parts I and II, consists of three chapters. Chapter 13. 0 presents a
cross commodity comparison analysis and focuses on key similarities
and differences in the corn and cotton crop production practices and
iiia titulj.Or"i<3.i eti" rcUigciVieil'lS ctiXCl
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2.0 STUDY APPROACH
2. 1 Overview
As stipulated in the project objectives, the focus of the present
study was to identify the range of "on the farm" user adjustment prob-
lems associated with major pesticide regulatory decisions, as well"/as to
explain user problems and responses to those problems. The /"'
existing knowledge base relative to these phenomena was not one' whi'ch
could support a rigorous, quantitative study. - "•
Not knowing the potential problems or the explanatory mechanisms
which could emerge required that the data collection activities be
extremely flexible and utilize a case study ("ethnographic") approach.
As distinct from the standard social science survey in which all questions
are known prior to initiation of field work, the case study of "ethno-
graphic" approach adopted here was one in which field activities for the
second week were planned by the field observer and field director on.the
basis of data collected and interpreted during the first week (and. so on
throughout the field work phase). In addition, the effect of two-. c.g.s-e
studies ^oij.e for each iiiajOi crop selected to locus the study) on the-~
dynamic nature of the project is significant for it allowed insights '
derived from one commodity to be explored through similar data acquisi-
tion procedures on the other.
Conjoined with this emphasis on flexibility was a planning approach
which indicated a set of procedures and initial data sources: Of-partic-
ular importance was the enumeration of non-farm sources of informa-
tion. This methodological approach was supported by the overall con-
ceptual orientation -- that the farmer exists within an institutional
context which can serve as an important explanatory basis regarding
the farmer's responses. A wholistic view of the social structure and
process pertinent to the farmer's use of pesticides and exposure to the
banning of a pesticide was sought. That is, those conditions (including
the various institutional structures enmeshed in the agricultural com-
munity) that either alleviate or aggrevate the user adjustment process
•were of concern to the study.
It should also be emphasized that this study is based on what
respondents (farmers and others) reported, given that the thrust of the
study was to discover and explain user adjustment responses and
problems. These reports are, in turn, based on respondents' perceptions,
2.1
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Thus, the study is reporting on the perceptual world's of various actors
in the crop production system. The implications should be clear: this
report was not to address the "real" or "objective" consequences of
specific pesticide regulatory decisions and therefore, this study was
not to be an assessment of the "real" impact experienced by farmers
when faced with the banning of a particular pesticide. However, the
important point to be recognized here is that "real" behavior and deci-
sions are based on perceptions, whether valid or not, and thus are of
utmost concern, in policy decision making and program implementation.
In order to implement the: above approach and fulfill the project
requirements, a three phased effort was utilized. Pre-field work
activities were first undertaken to select study crops and study sites
in order to focus the field work phase. Utilizing the "ethnographic"
approach, the field work phase was then implemented and involved the
development of a field manual to guide the data collection activities,
the selection, training, and installation of field observers, as well as
the actual field work, i. e. , data collection activities which began in
early January, 1976 and lasted ten weeks. Once the field work was
completed, post field work activities took place including an initial
coding, analysis and debriefing session, an analysis plan meeting, field
analysis, and the writing of the final report.
Each of these phases are discussed in detail in the sections below.
2.2 Pre-Field Work.Activities
2.2. 1 .Selection of Study Crops
2.2.1.1 Crop Selection Criteria
The primary concern in choosing crops for focusing the study was
to insure that the broadest possible spectrum of short term user adjust-
ment problems likely to be experienced by farmers when faced with the
banning of a pesticide would be found. Upon consideration of the types
of short term probems likely to result from such a decision, and with
expert advice provided by project consultants, it was believed that the
problems, for the most part, would be either crop production cost .
related or managerial skill related. Crop production cost related prob-
lems are those factors that cause the cost of producing the crop to
change. Managerial skill related problems are those factors related
2.2
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to the skills required to use pest control alternatives and the issue of
whether alternative pesticides, or other means of pest control, do in
fact exist for those pesticides that are banned. • ,
These types of problems revolve around the economic institutions
of agriculture (e.g., lending institutions, pesticide dealers, marketing
outlets, etc. ) although they do impact and are impacted by other insti-
tutions (e.g., extension service, agricultural" experiment stations, etc.).
Therefore, in structuring the commodity selection criteria, those
criteria that focus on the economic institutions and involve either crop
production cost related or skill related issues were used. In consulta-
tion with project consultants, it was decided that criteria relevant for
describing managerial skill related and crop production cost related
problems can be delineated on the following dimensions:
Availability of alternatives (chemical and other-
wise) for those pesticides that are banned;
Input/output crop production relationships (e.g. ,
technological inputs, contractual arrangements
between grower and buyer, etc. ); and
i'OWcr Ci'Op pi"Ou.UCliCU i'cxatiOiio UipS \e.'g. ,
grower cooperatives, political strength, etc. ).
Moreover, the consultants suggested that variations between crops on
these dimensions in the crop production relationships could be important
conditions or contingencies of user adjustment.
Therefore, in order to insure that the representative range of
problems would be found, it was desirable to choose crops where alter-
natives for those pesticides that are banned might not be readily avail-
able. Moreover, it was desirable to consider crops where there are
basic differences in crop production relationships, e.g., in the input/
output crop production relationships. In addition, the data collection
and sampling design aspects of the study (i. e. , the field work phase
activities) had to be considered in the crop selection process. These
thoughts are further supported in the following paragraphs.
In the initial selection of any crop for study, a determination had
to be made as to what crops were treated with the study pesticides and
if the study pesticides were perceived by farmers as being indispensable
to the production of these crops, i.e. , does the farmer think suitable
2.3
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pest control alternatives are not available for the study pesticides?
If the farmer believes that no alternative exists to control the pest
problems as well as the study pesticides (i. e., without a reduced yield
and at a similar cost), he will perceive the study pesticides as being
indispensable to the production of his crop. This suggests two initial
interrelated criteria for selecting crops for study: those crops on which
the study pesticides were used and those crops where the farmer per-
ceived the study pesticides as being indispensable. It was thought that this
is where the user adjustment problems are more likely to be found and
where a comprehensive picture of the range of impacts resulting from
such problems can be obtained.
Basic differences in the input/output crop production relationships
also had to be represente-d in the crops selected. Input/output relation-
ships are defined to mean various* factors involved in the production
and sale of the crop, i. e. :
. Technological inputs used in the production of the crop
(e.g., level of capital investment in mechanical equip-
ment, level of pesticide use, level of labor intensive -
ness, etc. );
. Typeb of crop output pl-ouu»_ed (e.g., for fresh market,
for processing, etc.);
. Contractual arrangements between the producer/seller
and buyer;
. Credit arrangements; and
. . Government regulations on crops sold (e.g., residue
levels, intrastate regulations, interstate regulations,
etc, ).
By including crops with basic differences in input/output crop produc-
tion relationships, one can delineate the various user adjustment prob-
lems for these differently structured relationships. Moreover, one
can explore the extent to which institutional structures alleviate or
aggrevate the user adjustment process and how differently structured
forms of crop production cope with user adjustment problems. Some
of these basic differences can be found both within the production of the
same crop and between the production of different crops because of dif-
ferences in factors such as:
2.4
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Climatic, soil and pest infestation characteristics;
Variations in economic institutional structures;
Size of the farm operation and financial resources
of the farm firm;
Types of output produced; and
Preferences of the farm operators.
A second way for delineating crop production relationships is the
matter of intergrower relationships. These differences can be mea-
sured by such factors as:
Political strength (e.g. , formalization of grower
organizations, trade associations lobbying for the
crop producers);
Cooperative buying or using of crop production inputs,
(e.g., materials, equipment, farm management
services, etc. ): and
Cooperative selling of the crop.
By including basic differences along this dimension of the crop produc-
tion process as well, the possible influence of grower organization on
the types of user adjustment problems can be detected. Once again,
these differences can be found both within the production of the same
crop and between the production of different crops for similar reasons
as outlined above.
Finally, the crop selection process had to consider the data col-
lection and sampling design aspects of the study. That is, to insure
the success of obtaining pertinent information in a timely fashion and
within the available resources, both the geographic locations where the
crop is grown and the ability to locate farmers growing the crop and
having used the study pesticides had to be reviewed. If this were not
done, the resources allocated to this phase of the study could have
become insufficient and resulted in an inadequate understanding of the
user adjustment process.
The application of these criteria is discussed in the next section.
2.5
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2.2. 1.2 Selection of Corn and Cotton
As indicated above, the application of the criteria must begin with
a determination of those crops where the use of the study pesticides is
deemed to be "indispensable" to the production of the crop (as perceived
by farmers). Therefore, the selection of study pesticides was first
necessary in the crop selection process.
The three major pesticide regulatory decisions affection agri-
cultural production to date were chosen as study pesticides for this
study, i. e. , DDT, aldrin/dieldrin, and chlordane/heptachlor. The DDT
decision was chosen because: (1) it was the first major pesticide deci-
sion to affect the agricultural community, and (2) since it has been in
effect since December 21, 1972, it was thought that farmers would be
able to relate some real adjustment experiences. The aldrin/dieldrin
and chlordane/heptachlor decisions were chosen because: (1) they pro-
vided a contrast to DDT in that the decisions have not been in effect
for as long (i.e. , aldrin/dieldrin were suspended effective August 2,
1974 and chlordane/ heptachlor were suspended effective July 29, 1975
for most uses and August 1, 1976 for corn), (2) given this fact, it was
thought that these decisions would provide an opportunity to study early
phases of the adjustment, process directly in order to rapture tne for-
mulative ingredients therein, and (3) aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/
heptachlor were used by many farmers as substitutes for one another
(hence the reason for including both decisions).
In the selection of two major crops, one crop was chosen in which
the use of DDT was perceived by farmers as being indispensable and
one crop was chosen in which the use of aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/
heptachlor were perceived by farmers as being indispensable.
In further study of the use of aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/
heptachlor, it was found that field corn is the crop where the majority
of all aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor applied to crops were
applied (see Exhibit 2. 1 on the following page). The use of these
pesticides has been as a soil insecticide to protect field corn primarily
against rootworms, wireworms, and cutworms, although it'was also
registered for use against other pests such as grubs, seed corn mag-
gots and seed corn beetles. Alternatives to aldrin/dieldrin are chlor-
dane/heptachlor and although there are EPA registered alternatives to
chlordane/heptachlor-(e.g. , Bux, carbaryl, carbofuran. Dasanit, dia-
zinon, Dyfonate, Mocap, parathion, phorate, toxaphene). manv state
entomologists, and farmers in particular, feel that all four are
2.6
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'Exhibit 2.1:
Major and Minor Crops Treated with Aldrin/Dieldrin and Chlordane/Heptachlor in 1971
Pesticide
A Id r in
Dieldrin
Heptachlor
«
Pounds Acres
Applied Treated
Crop (thousands) (thousands)
corn . 7,759 7,540
other grains* 67 57
citrus 35 '11
other field crops 31 39
soybeans 11 9
all crops 7,907 7,658
bfhcr field crops2 118 50
cotton 65 174
other vegetables^ 64 123
other fruits and nuts 47 103
citrus 15 17
nursery and greenhouse crops 6 na
apples . 5 4
all crops 321 480
corn 1,104 1,901 .
other vegetables .34 10
alfalfa 3 14
all crops . 1,143 1,927
corn - 842 533
apples . 373 10
nursery and greenhouse crops 133 na
other grains1 41 78
Irish potatoes -33 55
other field crops2 29 16
citrus 18 10
other vegetables * 16 7
other fruits and nuts" 7 4
tobacco 2 1
all crops 1,496 717
* Includes sorghum, rice, oats, -mixed grains, barley, rye.
2 Includes sugar beets, shammer fallow, mung beans, peppermint,
spearmint, rutabagas, sesame, spelt, sunflowers, velvet beans,
grass and hayseed, buckwheat, castor beans, hops, lenlnls, millet,
dry beans, dry field peas, flax, popcorn, broomcora., cowpeas,
sugarcane, sweet potatoes.
3 Includes cabbage, carrots, celery, lettuce, onions, inmatoes,
•watermelons, sweet corn, snap beans, spinach, artichokes, aspar-
agus, broccoli, cauliflower, cucumbers, beets, green peppers.,
.peas, cranberries, other vegetables.
Includes grapes, avacados, figs, blackberries, blueberries, boysen-
berries, currants, gooseberries, loganberries, raspberries, straw-
berries, almonds, filberts, pecans, walnuts, olives, tang nuts.
Source: P. A. Andrelinas, Farmers' Use of Pcsticide.s in 1971t Quantities
USDA, ERS, July 1974.
2.7
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indispensable to the control of the various corn soil insects, particularly
the black cutworm, as suitable alternatives did not exist. *
In further study of the use of DDT, it was found that cotton is the
crop where the majority of all DDT applied to crops has been applied
(see Exhibit 2.2 on page 2. 9). The use of DDT has been as an insecticide
to control a variety of cotton insects, primarily the boll weevil, boll-
worm and tobacco budworm. The USDA considered the use of DDT
essential for controlling these pests and at the 1972 Annual Conference
on Cotton Insect Research and Control, DDT was recommended for
control of the bollworm and tobacco budworm. Numerous alternatives
to DDT are registered and recommended, but entomologists and other
experts argue that all are not equally efficacious or economically
feasible in all areas due to pest resistance and other factors.** This
was highlighted in 1975 when the State of Louisiana submitted a petition
to EPA for emergency use of DDT on cotton to control the tobacco bud-
worm, stating that the currently available pesticides or combinations
of pesticides have not controlled the tobacco budworm and that farmers
have not controlled this pest effectively since DDT was banned for use
on cotton.
T.. _ JJ :<.:_.. , _,— __._:_„., _r :.,_...j. /_.,4._.,_f _ ,. j : „«.„ .,_,._,,.. -, *. „,.-.„ _N*-^_
AA.I Ck*-lt>A^hiJ»W*.lj WVSA.L.LL/Cb.i..l.OWk I* IV / W W *£* ^k •* ul •».»<_* ***l»w*.^«wi*w*b v *. •-• p* £».~«-
duction relationships for corn and cotton production shows that varia-
tions do exist between the two crops, a characteristic deemed desirable
in the crop selection process (see Exhibit 2. 3 on page 2. 10).
Moreover, the use of aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor on
corn has been concentrated in the Midwest states of Iowa, Missouri,
Illinois, Indiana and Ohio (i. e. , the Corn Belt), although the crop is
grown in every region of the United States. Similarly, the use of DDT
on cotton has been concentrated in the Southeast, Delta, Appalachian,
and Southern Plains states, although cotton is grown in other regions
as well. Therefore, the data collection process could be concentrated
and the ability to locate farmers was deemed to be nonproblematic for
both corn and cotton.
*Based on telephone conversations with corn producing counties
in the Corn Belt. For a more detailed discussion, see EPA Cancella-
tion of Chlordane/Heptachlor; Economic and Social Implications, Eco-
nomic Analysis Branch, Criteria and Evaluation Division, Office of
Pesticide Programs, EPA, May, 1975, Part III, pp. 23-83.
**EPA, DDT: A Review of Scientific and Economic Aspects of the
Decision to Ban Its Use as a Pesticide, Washington, D.C., July, 1975,
pp. 163-173.
2.8
-------
Exhibit 2. 2: Major and Minor Crops Treated with DDT in 1971
1.
Crop
"Cotton
~f
Corn
Y/heat
Other grains'
Soybeans
Tobacco
Peanuts
2
Other field crops
Other hay and pasture
Irish potatoes
Other vegcUiLltis .
Citrus
e
All other fruits and nuts"
• Nursery and greenhouse
crops
All crops
Pounds
Applied
(thousands)
13,158
4
9
91
197
7
62
47
1
' 77
330
5
16
1
Acres
Treated
(thousands)
2,383
4
16
262
247
6
22
49
.1
38
te
2
8
not
. available
14,005
3, 106
1 Includes sorghum, rice, oats, mixed grains, barley, rye.
^ Includes sugar beets, summer fallow, mung beans, peppermint,
spearmint, rutabagas, sesame, spelt, sunflowers, velvelt beans,
grass and hayseed, buckwheat, castor beans, hops, lentils, millet, dry
beans, dry field peas, flax, popcorn, broomcorn. cowpeas, sugarcane,
sweet potatoes.
Includes all hay (other than alfalfa) and rangeland.
4 Includes cabbage, carrots, celery, lettuce, onions, tomatoes,
watermelons, sweet corn, snapbeans, spinach, artichokes, asparagus,
broccoli, cauliflower, cucumbers, beets, green peppers, green peas,
cranberries, other vegetables.
^Includes grapes, avacados, figs, blackberries, blueberries,
boysenberries, currants, gooseberries, loganberries, raspberries,
strawberries, almonds, filberts, pecans, walnuts, olives, tung nuts.
Source: P.A. Andrelinas, Farmer's Use of Pesticides in 1971:
Quantities. USDA, ERS, July 1974.
2.9
-------
-------
Hence, given the fact that: (1) corn is a major crop where the
majority of all aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor applied to
crops was used and these pesticides are perceived by farmers as being
indispensable to corn production, particularly for controlling the black
cutworm, (2) cotton is a major crop where the majority of all DDT
applied to crops was used and DDT is perceived by farmers as being
indispensable to cotton production, particularly for controlling the
tobacco budworm, (3) the input/output and intergrower crop production
relationships are sufficiently varied for corn and cotton for exploring
the effect of such relationships on the user adjustment process, and
(4) the ability to locate farmers having used aldrin/dieldrin and
chlordane/heptachlor in corn production, or DDT in cotton production,
was deemed nonproblematic, field corn and cotton were chosen as the
two major crops on which to focus the study.
2.2.2 Selection of Study Sites
2.2.2.1 County Selection Criteria
The county selection criteria had to be developed to insure'that
those counties chosen (at most two for each crop given the project's
resources) would indicate Lae range ul agj.iculLu.ral uicj.' «vlju.strident
problems, as well as the role the institutional structures play in
alleviating or aggrevating the adjustment process. Moreover, given •
that the study was primarily interested in learning about differences in
response that were behavioral in nature, climatic and geographic influ-
ences between counties had to be minimized within a given crop as well.
In attempting to insure that the range of agricultural user adjust-
ment problems would be found during the field work phase of the study,
it was necessary to select counties that had characteristics pertinent
to the pesticide and crop affected by the particular regulatory action.
More specifically, considering that the current study was to focus on
those adjustment problems associated with corn production due to the
aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor suspensions and those adjust-
ment problems associated with cotton production due to the DDT can-
cellation, two initial county selection criteria emerged, i.e.:'
2.11
-------
. • For corn, a history of aldrin/dieldrin use* and for
cotton, a history of DDT use; and
. Corn (cotton) counties should show high land use
allocation (i.e., acreage) to corn (cotton) produc-
tion and this production should also be represented
by various farm size operations. **
Furthermore, the potential for user adjustment problems was
thought "to be greater in corn counties that have the black cutworm
problem,*** and in cotton counties that have the tobacco budworm
problem.**** Thus, another county selection criteria emerged for each
crop, i.e. :
. Corn counties must have shown a relatively high inci-
dence of black cutworm problems in the last two growing
seasons;***** and
. Cotton counties must have shown a relatively high inci-
dence of tobacco budworm problems in the last two
growing seasons.
*For the corn sites, a history of chlordane/heptachlor use was
not deemed necessary since they are viewed as alternatives to aldrin/
dieldrin and thus, may only be used if no aldrin/dieldrin can be found.
** The notion of various farm size operations was included because
it was thought that'user adjustments, and any problems associated with
them, may differ :because of the different institutional constraints con-
fronting various farm size operations.
***See EPA Cancellation of Chlordane/Heptachlor: Economic and
Social Implications, Economic Analysis Branch, Criteria and Evalua-
tion Division, Office of Pesticide Programs, EPA, May, 1975.
****For example, see the State of Louisiana's emergency request
for DDT. _ .
*****rhe last two growing seasons (i. e. , the 1974 and 1975 growing
seasons) were chosen so that the pest problems would be present both
before and after at least one of the two regulatory decisions being
studied were made. (The aldrin/dieldrin suspension applies to all pro-
ducts formulated after August 2, 1974 and the chlordane/heptachlor
suspension applies to all products formulated after July 29, 1975. )
****** The last two growing seasons (i.e. , the 1974 and 1975 growing
seasons) were chosen so that the pest problems would be present after
the DDT decision had time to impact (the DDT decision became effec-
tive December 3 1, 1972).
2.12
-------
Further criteria to be applied in the county selection process
relate to the underlying institutional structures and other conditions of
crop production that could potentially effect the farmer's adjustment
process, i. e. :
. Corn (cotton) counties in two different states should be
considered if possible, in order to explore the effect,
if any, of government structure on the adjustment
process;
. For each crop, counties should be selected in which
the perceived difficulty of the adjustment process (as
viewed by the state and local agriculturists) varies,
if at all possible, so that the underlying conditions
and processes causing these differences can be
explored; and
The opinions of state extension specialists and county
agents concerning a particular county should coincide
and these people should have a "feel" for whether the
user transitions have been problematic in nature or
not.
•
Finally, given the resource constraints of the project and the
.desire to minimize climatic and geographical influences between coun-
ties for a given crop, the following criteria were important:
The county should have a relatively complete mailing
list (either through the extension office or the ASCS),
and the county agent should be able to assist Ln the
initial selection of a balanced sample of farmers;
The two counties for each crop should be adjacent to
one another, if possible; and
. The county should not have special local problems
unrelated to the regulatory decision (e. g. , rapid
urbanization, large scale industrialization, natural
phenomena such as a drop in the water table, etc. )
that may impact upon a farmer's crop production
practices or his decision to continue farming.
2.13
-------
In order to apply the above criteria, the following steps were
utilized:
Published information and EPA "in-house" information
on current use patterns of aldrin/dieldrin, and chlordane/
heptachlor and DDT and on current pest problems in
various localities were first reviewed to help narrow
the number of states (and, in certain instances, counties
within states) to be contacted.
State extension specialists in those selected states were
then contacted to help obtain a concise list of counties
worthy of further screening, given the criteria set forth
above.
County extension agents in those selected counties were
then contacted to verify the information obtained from
the above sources.
Other knowledgeable sources of information at the county
level (e.g., area extension agents, ASCS county execu-
tjv«5 r) i r^rt.orf. «*f".c. ) WPT-<=> Hi*?" rontar fp<5 *"<"> vo-rifv t.Vip
information obtained from the above sources.
The results of this information seeking effort are described below for
each of the two crops.
2.2.2.2 Selection of Corn Counties
A review of published information* indicated that the ten leading
corn growing states, in terms of acreage planted in 1973, were as
follows:
Iowa (11,800,000)
Illinois ( 9, 980, 000)
Nebraska . ( 6,400,000)
Minnesota ( 6,200, 000)
Indiana ( 5,400, 000)
South Dakota ( 3,760,000)
Ohio ( 3,300,000)
#USDA, Agricultural Statistics, 1974, Table 39, p. 29.
2.14
-------
Wisconsin ( 3,200,000)
Missouri ( 2, 800, 000)
Michigan ( 2, 100, O'OO)
Furthermore, EPA in-house data* indicated that five of these states
-- Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Ohio and Missouri, (i. e. , The Corn Belt
States) -- have had relatively severe black cutworm problems and have
used aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor, among other insecticides,
to control corn soil insects. A summary of the pertinent information
appears in Exhibits 2.4 and 2. 5. Further review of this data indicated
that the three leading states, in terms of the number of farms reporting
and treating for black cutworm problems, are Illinois, Iowa and Missouri.
In addition, these three states have treated the most acres with aldrin/
dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor. Therefore, these three states were'
used to limit the further search for two appropriate counties.
Contacts were made with state extension entomologists in each of
the three states.** In each case, the state entomologist was asked to
indicate a number of representative counties where corn production is
relatively high, where the black cutworm is a typical problem, where
aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor were used in the past couple
of years, and where the adjustments being made by farmers, due to the
CL-ff*. jTlli, / *J.iO-k.>~i. J. iil CL^A^fc G i-AJLW JL ^-k CL ^ ^ / i^O'O h>CkO L~i.L W ± V_LO<^>loi.W.l..LO« Cl X C L> C iiiii Ct O O Olll ~~
Jk * C3
plished with varying degrees of difficulty. The resultant list of counties
was as follows:
Macoupin County, Illinois
Shelby County, Illinois
Appanoose County, Iowa
Fremont County, Iowa
Mills County, Iowa
Warren County, Iowa
Atchison County, Missouri
Knox County, Missouri
Lincoln County, Missouri
*Data supplied by Doane Agricultural Service under contract to
the Criteria and Evaluation Division, OPP, EPA.
'**Included in these contacts were Dr. Harold Stockdale, Iowa State
University; Dr. George Thomas, University of Missouri; and Dr. John
Wedberg, University of Illinois, who consulted with Drs. Steve Moore
and D. Kuhlman, University of Illinois.
2.15
-------
Exhibit 2.4: Number of corn farms reporting cutworms as a major problem on a farm,
percent treating, and percentage of total commercial farms and acreage
treated, 1973/74 average*
o
Farms Reporting Cutworm Problem
Number
% of Total Farms
Farms Treating
Number
% of Total Farms
Treated Acreage
Per Farm
Total Acres (000)
% Total Acres Grown
Illinois
10,059
11.5
7, 065
8.1
140
989-8
9.7
Indiana
5, 083
8. 8
2,808
4.9
155
436.4
7/9
Ohio
3,077
5.6
1, 374
2.5 .
102
' 140.7
3.9
Iowa
9,760
8.4
6,755
5.8
99
665.4
5.4
Missouri
5,826
12.3
4, 570
9.6
85
387.5
13.3
* Data supplied by Doane Agricultural Service under contract to the
Criteria and Evaluation Division, OPP, EPA.
-------
Exhibit 2.5: Acreage of corn insecticide treatments on commercial
farms, by chemical, in major corn states, 1975*
to
Illinois
Indiana
Ohio
Iowa
Missouri
Acreage (003)
Aldrin
Belt/Chlordane
Heptachlor
547
339
380
454 .
242
112
257
123
- -
Percent of Total
Aldrin
Belt/Chlordane
Heptachlor
5.0
3.1
3.5
7.9
4. 2
2.0
7.2
3.4
— —
422
40
504
Acreage
3.3
0.3
3.9
523
109
245
17.9
3.7
8.4
* Data supplied by Doane Agricultural Service under contract to the
Criteria and Evaluation Division, OPP, EPA.
-------
Considering that black cutworm problems are most susceptible
on low lying, poorly drained, heavy river bottom soils subject to flood-
ing (i. e. , alluvial or gumbo type soil), * the geographic location of these
counties is of importance. Atchison County, Fremont County and Mills
County all border on the Missouri River, Lincoln County borders on the
Mississippi River, and Knox County is adjacent to a county that borders
on the Mississippi River. The other counties are at least 100 miles
away from either river, except for Macoupin County, which is about 50
miles away from Mississippi.
In terms of corn production, the following information was com-
piled concerning the number of corn acres planted for all purposes in
1974 and the yield per planted acre in 1974:**
Corn Acres Yield per Planted
County Planted Acres (in bushels)
Macoupin County, Illinois 146,800 92.0
Shelby County, Illinois 164...300 87.0
Appanoose County, Iowa . 39, 100 74. 7
Fremont County, Iowa 114,700 43.0
Mills Connt-y. low? 100,200 54.4
Warren County, Iowa 72,500 71.5
Atchison County, Missouri 122,000 46.0
Knox County, Missouri 39,300 68.3
Lincoln County, Missouri 59,000 61.2
In order to learn more about what was occurring in each of these
counties and in order to verify the information supplied by the state
extension entomologists, the county extension agents in most of the
counties were contacted. *** Information obtained from these phone
conversations provided some additional insights, i. e. , :
*EPA Cancellation of Chlordane/Heptachlor: Social and Economic
Implications, op. cit. , p. 3 1.
**Information obtained from Statistical Reporting Service, USDA.
:##;#Appanoose County, Iowa was not contacted because information
received from the Statistical Reporting Service, USDA indicated that
the corn acres planted in the county in 1974 (39, 100 acres) was signifi-
cantly lower than in the other counties in the state. Therefore, it was
deleted from the list of potential counties. Mills County, Iowa was also
not contacted directly because the county agent for Fremont County
(which is directly south of Mills County) indicated that the situation in
Mills County was similar.
2.18
-------
Both Macoupin County, Illinois and Shelby County,
Illinois indicated that the adjustment has not been
too difficult because the black cutworm problem has
not been that serious in the past couple of years.
In most cases those farmers that wanted aldrin,
chlordane or heptachlor were able to get it. How-
ever, indications were received that the farmers
are concerned about what would happen if a bad
infestation occured because they knew of no alterna-
tive with the same cost and .effectiveness as aldrin.
Fremont County, Iowa indicated that 10-15 percent
of its 114,700 corn acres were affected with black
cutworm in 1975. Aldrin was said to be heavily used
in 1973, but in 1974 and 1975, it was said to be
unavailable and the same was true of chlordane and
heptachlor. A Sevin bait was.said to be used by some
instead and other farmers had to replant their crop.
Many farmers were reported as simply suffering with
the problem, although no farmer had all of his acreage
affected. However, all farmers were voicing concern
about the aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor
'siispcncicns.
Warren County, Iowa indicated that the corn rootworm
was the major problem at the present time and that no
major concern was being voiced about the aldrin/
dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor suspensions.
Atchison County, Missouri indicated that the cutworm
problem was relatively bad in 1975 and that 45 percent
of their corn acreage was treated for cutworm preven-
tion. Aldrin was used the most, then heptachlor, and
then chlordane. Nevertheless, approximately 8000 acres
were said to be "hit hard" with the problem, where the
farmers involved did suffer economic loses due to lost
.production. Those farmers not yet "hit hard" are con-
cerned about what will happen in the next growing sea-
son.
Knox County, Missouri indicated that one third of the
county's 30,000 - 40,000 corn acres had some cutworm
problem in 1975 and that 80 percent of all corn acres
wejre treated with either aldrin, chlordane or heptachlor.
2.19
-------
Nevertheless, approximately seven to eight percent of
the corn acres were replanted and 7, 500 acres were
left with a 60 percent stand. The adjustment was said
to be hard (i. e. , costly in terms of lost production and
income) for many of those farmers having serious cut-
worm problems.
Lincoln County, Missouri indicated that the adjustment
was not too difficult yet, but that the farmers are con-
cerned about the suspensions. Most farmers have not
switched to an alternative pesticide and no one has been
severely damaged.
Based on these results, three of the counties -- Fremont County,
Iowa, Atchison County, Missouri*, and Knox County, Missouri--
appeared to have the more severe black cutworm problems. Due to
the desire to have each county in a different state, further considera-
tion was given to Fremont County, Iowa and Atchison County, Missouri,
since they are adjacent to one another (.a county selection criteria) and
would, in terms of manageability, be more desirable. In addition, both
are located adjacent to the Missouri River, thus having the type of soil
most amenable to corn cutworm problems.
In making the final decision, the following additional factors were
considered carefully for the two counties:
Different conditions, each possibly affecting the diffi-
culty in adjusting to the aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/
heptachlor decisions, were noticed in the two counties
(i. e. , Atchison County appeared to have a more severe
cutworm problem; Fremont County appeared to have
no available aldrin, chlordane and heptachlor).
The county extension agents in each of the two counties
appeared to be knowledgeable about the cutworm problem
and how farmers were reacting to it in light of the
aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor decisions. In
addition, they were quite cooperative in supplying infor-
mation requested of them and both indicated that they
would cooperate in any way they could if their counties
were selected for in depth field work. Obtaining the
necessary clearance at the state level had been investi-
gated and no difficulty was anticipated in getting the
states to authorize the county agents to cooperate.
2.20
-------
A complete listing of farmers in each county was avail-
able through the county ASCS office. Clearance to
obtain these records was received and discussions with
the county executive director in each county indicated
that full cooperation would be obtained. Verification
was also received that a wide range of farm size opera-
tions are present in each of the two counties.
In the final analysis of all the above information, Atchison County,
Missouri and Fremont County, Iowa were believed to possess the
characteristics likely to reflect a range of the most important user
adjustment problems because of the aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/
heptachlor suspensions. Moreover, in view of the resource constraints,
they were also desirable since.they were adjacent to one another. There-
fore, they were determined to have sufficiently satisfied the county
selection criteria and, hence, were selected as the two field corn coun-
ties for in depth field work.
A brief demographic and agricultural profile of these two counties
is provided in Appendix A for the interested reader.
2223 o I •• ••iior *' •'"* *•i*' ~ i r" ~''" *~! ~ ~
A review of published information* indicated that the ten leading
states, in tern-is of upland cotton acreage planted in 1974, were as follows:
Texas (5,200,000)
Mississippi (1,780,000)
California (1,250,000)
Arkansas (1,200,000)
Louisiana ( 650,000)
Alabama ( 600,000)
Oklahoma ( 570, 000)
Tennessee ( 540,000)
Georgia ( 423,000)
Missouri ( 400, 000)
^Economic Research Service, Cotton and Wool Situation, USDA,
September, 1975, p. 7.
2.21
-------
In terms of tobacco budworm problems, the pest first originated in
Mexico and began moving to the northeast. It "periodically reeked
destructive blows on cotton production in the Rio Grande Valley of
Texas, and in the past two years (i. e. , 1973 and 1974) left a crippling
mark on some of the most productive cotton farms of the Red River
Valley of Louisiana ... In addition, late maturing crops of the Macon
Ridge and Northeast Louisiana suffered serious losses from the tobacco
budworm".* In 1975, the tobacco budworm was more sporadic and
and localized with moderate infestations in Louisiana and heaviest infes-
tations and the greatest damage in Arkansas, Mississippi and South
Carolina.
Given the extent of the tobacco budworm problem in Louisiana in
1973, 1974 and 1975 and -the State's petition to use DDT on an emergency
basis in 1975, further effort was 'concentrated in Louisiana in order to
find two appropriate parishes.
Initial contacts were made with the Agricultural Experiment Sta-
tion at Louisiana State University and with the Louisiana Cooperative
Extension Service.** Results from these conversations indicated three
geographical areas worthy of consideration, i. e. :
The western area of the state (e.g. , Caddo Parish);
The lower Red River Valley area of the.state (e.g.,
Rapides Parish); and
The northeast area of the state (e.g. , Richland and
Franklin Parishes).
More specifically, it was learned that the tobacco budworm
problem originated in the western part of the state in the early seventies
and that this area continues to be the most heavily infested area. A
DDT-toxaphene mixture was used with good success until 1973 when
DDT no longer was available. No alternative crop can really be grown
*Roussel, J.S., The Bollworms: An Up-dated Status Report
(Draft); December 1975 paper presented at the 1976 Annual Conference
on Cotton Insect Research and Control.
**Contacts were made with Dr. Dale Newsom, Head, Department
of Entomology, LSU; Dr. John Roussel, Assistant Director and
Coordinator of Cotton Research, Agricultural Experiment Station, LSU;
and Dr. Norvel Thames, Associate Director, Louisiana Cooperative
Extension Service.
2.22
-------
in the area and cotton production in the area has drastically been
reduced over the last couple of years (other factors, such as climate
and market conditions, have also contributed to the decline of cotton
production).
The lower Red River Valley area of the state had severe tobacco
budworm problems in 1973 and 1974 and fair tobacco budworm problems
in 1975. Many farmers have switched from cotton production to grow-
ing other crops, such as soybeans, corn, and sugarcane, because
climatic and soil conditions are conducive to such changes. As a result,
there have also been some cotton gin closings.
The northeast area of the state presently represents the majority
of cotton production in the state. Roughly 70 percent of all cotton acreage
is in this area and Richland and Franklin Parishes are the two leading
cotton growing parishes in the state. Furthermore, they are adjacent
to one another. The tobacco budworm was severe in the area in 1974,
but milder in 1975. Alternative crops are somewhat limited in this area
(more so in Franklin Parish than in Richland Parish) and therefore, the
growers are forced to find alternative pest control strategies, more so
than in other parishes of the state. Consequently, user adjustments to
the DDT cancellation were said to have been hard (i. e. , increased pest
control cccts, reduced yields, etc. ) in the pc.st couple of years in these
two parishes. Franklin Parish is characterized by mostly small growers
(50-60 acres) although there are a few 300-400 acre operations. Rich-
land Parish, on the other hand, .has a better mixture of both small and
large growers.
Contacts with the extension personnel in both of the above parishes
confirmed what was learned at the state level and all were cooperative
and willing to help in any way that they could. /
The ASCS offices were also contacted and it was learned that a/ '
complete listing of farmers was available. Clearance to utilize th<-
records was received and full cooperation was indicated.
Therefore, given that Richland and Franklin Parishes " '
leading cotton producing parishes in the state, given that t1 -
severe tobacco budworm infestations, given that they sh' .
in farm size and variation in the ability to switch to a]''
and given that they were adjacent to one another, 'thr
were deemed preferable as the choice for the stud' .
2,23
-------
However, before the final decision was made, visits were made
to all four areas (given the relative proximity to each other) at the
beginning of the field work phase of the effort. At this time, it was
further learned that although quantitative differences may exist between
these parishes in terms of user response to the DDT decision, qualita-
tively, responses would be similar. For example, the percentage of
farmers switching crops may vary across these parishes, but switching
crops does occur in all four parishes.
Hence, in the final analysis of all the above information, the
decision was made to focus the field work effort in Richland and Franklin
Parishes, Louisiana because they were believed to sufficiently satisfy
the county selection criteria,and thus, possess the characteristics likely
to manifest the most troublesome user adjustment problems because of
the DDT cancellation.
Appendix B contains a brief demographic and agricultural profile
of these two parishes for the interested reader.
2.3 Field Work Activities
Within this section the overall orientation of the field work activi-
ties will be discussed and, in turn, the mechanisms used to implement
that orientation.
2.3.1 The Field Manual
Given the style of the research that was undertaken, i. e. , the
case study ("ethnographic") type approach, the preparation of a field
manual was necessary to assure common understanding of the field-
related tasks to be undertaken by the field staff. A draft manual was
prepared by the field director and circulated to various consultants and
others concerned with the project. A revised manual, responsive to
comments received, was prepared with the following table of contents:
1. 0 Purposes of the Study
2.0 Some General Methodological Views
3.0 Specific Data Sources and Their Uses
4.0 Phasing of the Field Work
5. 0 Data Recording Procedures
6. 0 Some Final, Specific, Suggestions
2.24
-------
Each of these sections will be briefly described to further present the
methodological orientation as it was communicated to the field staff;
however, the full manual is included as Appendix C for the interested
reader.
2.3. 1. 1 Purposes of the Study
This section comprised a brief (2. 5 pages) discussion of the EPA
mandate to protect man and the environment from deleterious effects of
pesticide use with knowledge concerning "unreasonable, adverse" social,
economic and environmental effects resulting from bans of such pesti-
cides. Further, the relative lack of knowledge concerning the responses
and problems of farmers confronted with a pesticide ban was empha-
sized. Indeed, it was the existence of this gap which prompted the cur-
rent effort. Finally, a discussion of research questions was presented
in order to assure proper understanding of the purposes of the field
work.
2.3. 1.2 Some General Methodological Views
While it was presumed that the field staff would be .composed of
sophisticated persons with a social science background, this section
v."C.c considered d'~"^~c'pric.tc -0 c^icTt ^"hc ^icld T^->.~—ir» *-,,..,,.,,.,3 *v^, ^,,____j.
project's rationale. The summary to this section is instructive:
To summarize the relevance of all this for the current effort, we
may make the following points:
Data do not speak for themselves, however, the
observer can enter a situation with more or less
structure through which events are filtered.
At certain stages in the field-observation proce-ss,
certain insights or "working hypotheses" may
emerge. These should be articulated and the evidence
for them explicated and thought through.
As hypotheses are developed, one should resist the
temptation to invest self or ego in them; rather, one
ought continue searching for alternatives.
At an advanced stage in the field work, the field
observers in cooperation with other project staff,
should begin developing a full-blown model of the
adjustment process.
2.25
-------
2.3. 1.3 Specific Data Sources and Their Uses
It was anticipated that three broad classes of information would
be necessary to fulfill the objective of the project:
The nature of the institutional context for agri-
cultural activities;
The nature of the social and political environments
of the counties to be studied; and
Views and activities of individual farmers.
Specific contacts were indicated (e.g. , newspaper editor, school princi-
pal, county extension agent, etc. ) for varying sorts of information and
the manner in which the field interviewer should present himself and
the study, i. e. ,
The overall problem is to convey to the person you
wish to interview, in a quick and concise communica-
tion, who you are, what you are doing, and why.
2.3. 1.4 Phasing of the Field Work
The initial paragraph of this section stated:
Whereas a "lock-step" approach to the sort of theo-
retical field work intended here may seem inappro-
priate, the period of two months* allocated for field
work needs some agreed upon schedule. Moreover,
it would be unfair to the field staff were they to be
instructed simply to "find out what's going on".
The balance of this two page section specifies -- broadly -- the activi-
ties to be undertaken on a week-by-week basis.
*Ten weeks, rather than the anticipated two months, were actually
spent in the field.
2.26
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2.3. 1.5 Data Recording Procedures
Given that the study was viewed as largely "ethnographic" and
flexible in design., the primary means of data acquisition was to be (and
was, in fact) non-participant observation and the unstructured interview.
Indeed, during the ten weeks on site, the field worker's casual contacts
became extensive and conversations over morning coffee could be con-
sidered "interviews". Therefore, the field operative was instructed to
take notes during an interview, where appropriate, and "flesh out" such
notes following the interview (using a tape recorder if considered worthwhile)
•when fully writing up each interview. Data recording procedures were
suggested to encourage some commonality of format in writing up field
notes; however, data recording forms were not developed since the study
had been predicated on the lack of sufficient knowledge to design a
thoroughly structured data acquisition scheme.
An additional point needs to be emphasized with respect to the
functions assigned to (and expected of) the field person:
A major concern with the sort of field work being
employed in this project is that the field staff will
dcvclc*"* "^v*n"^~***~ ^""""*o**^'-»e /•» 2 ^^•^^rv^Hi-si »-v»r\A**i c
etc. These are given very high priority although
they should be kept separate from, data recording.
As a mechanism for reporting hunches, etc. as
well as summarizing data acquisitive activities,
a weekly report will be required.
Thus, the field person was expected to fill all functions in the" loop of
data acquisition, data analysis, reconceptualization, data acquisition,
etc. .
2.3.1.6 Some Final, Specific, Suggestions
This concluding section concerned the "craft" of quality field
work with discussions of such topics as, the field person as intruder,
don't be a "blabbermouth", the role of informants, etc. In sum, the
field workers were instructed in the role of non-participant observers.
2.27
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2.3.2 Selection, Training, and Oversight
of the Field Person
The recruitment of the high quality field persons required by the
selected, "ethnographic", design entailed a fair level of effort with
much help coming from project consultants. Following telephone inter-
views with both project director and field director, the field director
personally interviewed and approved the final choice. Prior to entering
the field, the field person came to CONSAD's central (Pittsburgh)
offices for a period of training and orientation. Following installation
(see Section 2. 3. 3), the field director or (in one instance) the project
director visited the field person on a. bi-monthly schedule. In addition,
during those weeks when a central staff person was not in the field, an
extensive, end of the week telephone report and discussion occurred.
Through these means, the. "flexible" design was maintained under con-
trol. Moreover, the project director held weekly telephone briefings
for the EPA contract monitor in order to ensure a commonality of under-
standing as the project evolved.
2.3.3 Installation of the Field Person
For the field corn field work, thfi field director accompanied the
field person in early January, 1976 into his county of residence for
several days and during that period interviewed and introduced various
prominent individuals to the field person (e.g. , county agents,
county ASCS directors, local college faculty, etc. ).
For the cotton field work, the field director and field person
arrived in Baton Rouge the Sunday night before the first week of field
work (i. e. , the week of January 12, 1976), and went over materials
relative to cotton culture and the DDT decision. Monday and Tuesday
they met with State Extension Service and Research Station staff mem-
bers for an overview of the post cancellation environment-and reactions
thereto. Additionally, further documentation, including yearly pest
control pamphlets, were acquired. The two days of discussions with
state level staff members were followed by one day of meetings with
extension agents in two "non-sample" parishes (Rapides and Caddo
Parishes). The last two days of the work week were spent in the two
sample parishes (Richland and Franklin Parishes) acquainting local
Extension, ASCS and other "influentials" with the purposes of the
CONSAD study and gaining initial perspectives on the local situation.
2.28
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In each, case, this mechanism served several purposes:
The field director served as a role model in the
interview situation;
The visible involvement of a senior project member
. served to legitimate the project in the eyes of the
local individuals contacted; and
The field director was able to observe the operating
style of the field person and offer suggestions for
improvement.
2.4 Post Field Work Activities
2.4.1 Initial Coding, Analysis, Debriefing
At the completion of field work in mid March, 1976, the field per-
son and field director met for several days, intensively, in order to
organize data files, code interview write-ups, note and fill data gaps,
and ''pull out1' a series of descriptive propositions. The entire1 process
proceeded as follows:
Daylong discussion with shared orientation as the
purpose;
Development of propositions, both regarding farmers
and the relations among various institutions;
Refine a previously developed taxonomy of farmer
types; and
Develop a thesaurus relating propositions to data
file elements.
An important function served by this end-of-field work meeting was -
to capture insights which might have gone unrecorded. Furthermore,
occasional data gaps could be identified and filled through phone calls.
The products of this process provided a major basis for the analysis
plan meeting (see Section 2. 4..2).
2.29
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2.4.2 Analysis Plan Meeting
A two day meeting was held at C*ONSAD, involving all project
staff members (including field people from both sites), several project
consultants and the EPA project monitor. It was on this occasion that
commonalities of language were hammered out and previously unarticu-
lated insights explicated. The outcome of this meeting was the intended
analysis plan and structure of the final reports to be undertaken by the
project and field directors.
2.4.3 Final Analysis
.Ultimate responsibility for analysis and report preparation rested
with the project and field directors who further refined the file structure
and analysis thereof.
The existance of two sites with different pests, crops, institu-
tional frameworks, general practices, and time since the relevant regu-
latory decisions were made, is of powerful significance for this study.
Differences in the time since the relevant regulatory decisions were
made constitutes a double-edged sword in that the pessimist can well
point out that the data derived from different stages of the sidjustmp.nt
cycle are nun-comparable, whereas the optimist can point out the sig-
nificance of observations on different portions on the cycle without
spending several years in the field.
As mentioned earlier, certain of the comparative analyses occurred
during the actual field wo.rk with insights derived from one commodity
applied to data acquisition procedures on the other. Comparative analy-
ses during the post-field work phase were based on contrasts of individiaal
responses, institutional factors, and historical practices. Some of the
most important contrasts for understanding different user responses
occurred in the institutional domain. In summary, the cross-commodity
analyses proved at least as powerful in generating understanding of adjust-
ment problems as the within commodity contrasts among farmers.
2.4.4 A Note Concerning the Nature of Evidence
As has been repeatedly noted, the project staff, in conjunction
with EPA staff, settled on a largely non-quantitative, ethnographic
approach for this study. This technique depended upon the skills, craft-
man ship and insight of those involved, to a degree greatly in excess
of that associated with conventional survey resea-rch techniques. For
2.30
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this reason, selection of field personnel and their monitoring posed a
very important task. This is so because much of the evidence produced
is the result of the interpretations made in the process of data acquisi-
tion. It should be emphasized that no structured interview schedule
was used, no readily defined population was sampled, and the initial
research questions were very broad. While most of the substantive
statements made in this report can be referenced to "data" (and in the
exceptional cases they are so designated), the relative importance
attributed to various "facts" is in large degree based on the informed
judgment of field staff. In short, the professional integrity of the
researchers needs to be explicitly asserted. This, CONSAD feels con-
fident in doing.
It is again important to note that this study is based on what
respondents (farmers and others) reported given that the thrust of the
study was to discover and explain user adjustment responses and prob-
lems. These reports are, in turn, based on respondents' perceptions.
Thus, it must be emphasized that the study is reporting on the per-
ceptual world's of various actors in the crop production system. The
implications should be clear: this report was not to address the "real"
of "objective" consequences of pesticide regulatory decisions and there-
ut cf th.o "rcc.1" im"^z.ct czr"'
by farmers when yields were reduced in 1974 relative to other years
is taken by some as attributable to the DDT ban, though others mention
weather and infestation levels as causative factors. The important
point to be recognized here is that "real" behavior and decisions are
based on perceptions, whether valid or not, and this should be of utmost
concern to the EPA in their policy decision making and program imple-
mentation.
A further note concerning quantification needs to be made. The
study's charge was to determine the kinds of adjustment problems experi-
enced by farmers. In pursuit thereof, the field observers sought out those
said to have problems or focused their efforts in areas known to have
experienced problems with some severity. Having done so, of course,
it is inappropriate to. make any estimates of the incidence (or rates) of
the various farmer adjustment responses. Moreover, attempts to
generalize to other populations or locations are doomed except in a some-
what abstract or structural manner. Even here, CONSAD would urge
that the results of this research be used to sensitize decision-makers
and future investigators as to the classes of phenomena to be looked for.
Because of this orientation, a single instance of a problematic phenomenon
is of significance as it has been evidenced as a "possible" phenomenon,
although we would not presume to remark on its "probability. "
2.31
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Part I - FIELD CORN CASE STUDY RESULTS
-------
3.0 CORN CROP PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
AND PEST CONTROL STRATEGIES
In order to appreciate the user adjustment process exhibited by
corn farmers faced with the suspension of aldrin, heptachlor and chlor-
dane, it is necessary to first have an understanding of the factors bear-
ing on their decisions to produce corn. Once this is accomplished, it
is important to look at the strategies (i. e. , production systems) used
by different farmers in growing corn, paying particular attention to
their insecticide use strategies prior to these regulatory actions.
3. 1 Factors Determining Corn
Production by Farmers
A number of components enter into the farmer's decision of •
whether or not to grow corn in certain fields that they farm. The first
determinant is the farmer's rotation plan. Most farmers have developed
a rotation plan (involving corn and soybeans primarily) that is suited to
the soil tvoe of the land and the pest problems experienced by them.
Therefore, barring any addition prcblenis, the rcts.ticii plan usually
dictates what crop they will grow in each field each year. For example,
many farmers used to put their cutworm susceptible land into the Soil
Bank when this program was in effect. Since this program has been
repealed, they can no longer do this and have had to put this land into
the rotation plan by planting either corn or soybeans, and in some cases,
wheat or milo.
However, there are other considerations of importance impinging
on the farmer's final decision to grow a particular crop. A most
important consideration is the weather which is, of course, uncontroll-
able. Ideally, corn should, be planted in late April and early May. *
However, if weather conditions are unfavorable (e. g. , if cold weather
or heavy rains in the spring do not allow one to get into the fields), then
a change in crops may be necessary. Drought, also, has been a prob-
lem during the past two to three growing seasons and has contributed
*Benson, G.O. andH.E. Thompson, Corn Planting Dates, PM
595, Iowa State Extension Service, July, 1974.
3. 1
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to some farmers switching to crops such as wheat or milo which are
drought resistant. Wheat also allows the farmer to spread'the work
load since wheat is planted in September and harvested in July.
The price and availability of fertilizer and pesticides also play a
part in the crop decision process, as does the price of the crop itself.
For example, in recent years (i.e. , 1974 and 1975), there have been
shortages of pesticides and with the suspension of aldrin, chlordane
and heptachlor, many farmers have been unable to get suitable cutworm
insecticides. Therefore, although some of these farmers have taken a
chance with no cutworm insecticides, others have switched to alternate
crops (e.g. , soybeans, wheat, and/or milo) because the prices of these
crops have been favorable.
•
In addition to these factors dictating a farmer's decision to grow
a particular crop, farmers can receive messages from a number of
sources, which in some way may affect their crop decision and subse-
quently their pesticide use decisions. As our field work discovered,
these sources may include:*
Family members (i. e. , tradition);
Neighbors an^. ^r^'jfi'^s 'i, e. otTr?T f?.Trn.e7*s in th
-------
Some of these sources are more influential than others and most -
farmers do not receive messages from all of the above sources, but
rather some subset of them.
In order to give an indication of when farmers would receive infor-
mation from these various sources vis-a-vis the production of corn, a
one year timeline of crop production can be developed with these sources
superimposed on that timeline. Such a timeline appears in Exhibit 3.1.
As shown in the timeline, farmers receive much information concerning
pesticides during the winter months, when farming activities are at a
minimum.
A further discussion of these sources of information and their
influence and impact on the user adjustment process appears in subse-
quent chapters.
3.2 Corn Crop Production Systems
Specifically related to the pesticide use decision, three factors
alluvlcu L^ abcvi - the rotation plan, icil type =.nd' previous p?.rt prob-
lems -- have played important roles in the initial decision to use vari-
ous types of pesticides. For example, many farmers indicated that they
do not use cutworm insecticides because they never had or do not cur-
rently have a cutworm problem.' These farmers are .typically located in
the hills and do not have any gumbo soil (i. e. , low lying, poorly drained,
heavy river bottom soils subject to flooding).
' Moreover, the rotation plan can promote various kinds of pest
problems and consequently the need for various types of insecticides.
That is, fields planted to corn every year (i. e. , continuous corn) are
susceptible to corn rootworm problems, and if the field has gumbo soil,
cutworms may be a problem as well. Crop rotation with soybeans will
alleviate the rootworm problem, but on gumbo soil has been found to
produce a greater chance for cutworm problems, especially if minimum
tillage is used.
In addition, control of the cutworm using resistant corn varieties
is in its infancy. Some research by seed corn companies was suggested
by a couple of farmers who sold seed for various companies, but no
such variety is on the market. Thus, the use of chemical insecticides
to control the cutworm problem is part of the culture, whereas the
varietal one is not.
3.3
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Exhibit 3. 1: Timeline of Crop Production
December
January
F ebruary
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Four month storage —I
period expires and
grains sold; chemical
shows; local chemical
promotions; seed corn
promotions; most
operational loans repayed
from last year
c*> Radio, television, magazine^
,K ads for seeds and pesticides
Operational loan negotiated-
for coming year ($anks and
FHA review cash and loan
status); Agricultural night
classes
Spring Tilling-
Corn planted
Soybeans and-L
Milo planted%
Cutworm probluns
develop
•Chemicals
and seed
bought for
tax break and
discount by
some farmers
(others not
until spring)
-Regional extension meeting
for pesticide dealers to
present extension recom-
mendations
-— Corn harvested, then
sold or stored
Fall plowing
.-Soybeans harvested, then •
sold or stored
Milo harvested, then sold or stored
l-Wheat planted
Wheat harvested, then gold or stored;
some operational loans repayed when
wheat sold
-------
For those farmers that do use cutworm insecticides (or other
pesticides for that matter), a number of sources were continually indi-
cated for helping them decide what particular pesticides to use and how
to use them, i. e. :
Pesticide dealers;
Farm magazines;
Pesticide label; and
Neighbors, friends and relatives.
The relative importance of each source can vary among farmers, with
some choosing a particular pesticide simply because their father had
used it, and others choosing a pesticide because their pesticide dealer
or a neighbor recommended it. Past research also indicated these
same four sources as being used most often by corn farmers to obtain
information about what pesticides to use and how to use them. *
In order to distinguish between different types of farmers, or
crop production systems, a typology of farmers, based upon their
insecticide use strategy during the 1972 -1974 growing seasons, was
developed. This distinction was used in light of the purpose of the
s'h.ir'y. i. <=>., to assess ar'nistTient: responses and nrohlerns assori ar.p.d
major pesticide regulatory restrictions, such as the suspension of
aldrin/dieldrin (affirmed October 1, 1974) and chlordane/heptachlor
(affirmed December 24, 1975 and effective August 1, 1976 for corn).
Since a farmer's adjustment responses and problems are related, in
part, to his insecticide use patterns prior to the regulatory actions,
e.g., during the 1972-1974 growing seasons, this distinction was deemed
a logical one. Four types of farmers (i. e. , crop production systems)
were identified from those interviewed, i. e. :
Type I - non-contingent users of aldrin and/or heptachlor;
Type II - contingent users of aldrin and/or heptachlor;
Type III - insecticide users, but non-users of aldrin
and heptachlor;
Type IV - non-insecticide users.
*For example, RvR Consultants, op.cit. . pp. 101-114.
3.5
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Each type appeared to be stable with no farmers switching between
types over this 3 year period.
Type I farmers, non-contingent users of aldrin and/or heptachlor,
were found to exhibit the following characteristics:*
Used aldrin or heptachlor regularly before the
aldrin suspension as a preventive or prophylactic
measure, and this will continue even if no cutworm
damage is found;
Use of aldrin has been habitual, even traditional
across generations, from father to son;
Are loc'ated on the flats with gumbo soil;
Has had actual cutworm damage or can cite someone
who has when aldrin was not used;
Are large land owners and/or renters (total crop acreage)
during this time ranged from 240 acres to 1, 700 acres
with ?.n averae of 813
Had corn yields ranging from 50 to 115 bushels per
acre during this time; and
Were and still are rotating their crops.
Type II farmers, contingent users of aldrin and/or heptachlor,
were found to exhibit the following characteristics:**
Used aldrin or heptachlor as needed, that is, on
replanting after cutworm damage was noticed in
the first planting;
Stated that aldrin or heptachlor was used only in
emergencies;
*Based on interviews with 28 farmers designated as of this type.
**Based on interviews with 4 farmers designated as of this type.
-------
. . Has occasional cutworm damage and usually cites
problem spots in their fields;
Are located on the flats with gumbo soil;
Cites crop rotation as a solution for less of a problem;
Are relatively large land owners and/or renters (total
crop acreage during this time ranged from 345 to
1,700 acres, with an average of 745 acres); and
Had corn yields ranging from 40 to 125 bushels per acre
during this time.
• •
Type III farmers, insecticide users, but non-users of aldrin or
heptachlor, were found to exhibit the following characteristics:*
Uses insecticides for rootworms, and cites rotation
as a way to handle any cutworm problems;
Has not typically had cutworm problems;
Are primarily located in the hills with relatively little
or no gumbo soil;
Are both landowners and/or renters (total crop acreage
during this time ranged from 69 to 1, 025 acres, with
an average of 554 acres);
Had corn yields ranging from 43 to 105 bushels per acre
during this time; and
Some farms had and still have livestock operations.
Type IV farmers, non-insecticide users, were found to exhibit
the following characteristics:**
*Based on interviews with 18 farmers designated as of this type.
**Based on interviews with 10 farmers designated as of this type.
3.7
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Some had an altruistic attitude for the non-use of
insecticides (i. e. , they kill birds and fish and upset
the natural order of things);
Are located in the hills with no gumbo" soil;
Has not had cutworm damage;
Cites crop rotation to prevent rootworm and cutworm
damage;
Are both land owners and renters (total crop acreage
-during this time ranged from 90 to 620 acres, with
an average of'281 acres);
Had corn yields ranging from 20 to 90 bushels per acre
during this time; and
Had and still have livestock,operations.
As. indicated above, a wide variation of productivity (i. e. , corn
yield) "-3.2 exhibited in ec.eh of the four crcp production systems. This
variation can be explained, in part; by the resources available to,
utilized by, and inherent in the individual farmer in the production of
his crop. For descriptive purposes, three general resource levels --
high, medium, and low -- can be used to describe the farmers inter-
viewed in this study. *
"High level resource farmers" typically:
Own land;
Have good management skills resulting in a high
net return and stable production system;
Have an established position both in and out of the
local community;
*The descriptions that follow have been found to be consistent
with past research. For example, see: Rogers, Everett M. and
F. Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations: A Cross Cultural
Approach, The Free Press, New York, 1971; and Iowa State Coopera-
tive Extension Service, "The Diffusion Process", Special Report No.
18, Ames, Iowa, November, 1972.
3.8
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Have direct access to information sources (e.g. ,
university extensive service, chemical corporations
and seed corn companies);
Have established credit and assets in and outside of
the community;
Have an updated progressive operation vis-a-vis
extra-local standards; and
Are innovative.
"Medium level resource farmers" typically:
*
Own and/or rent land;
Have good management skills;
, Utilize local sources of information (e.g. , county
extensive agents, local pesticide dealers, neighbors,
etc. );
Have an established position within the local community;
Have established credit and assets within the local
community;
Have an updated progressive operation vis-a-vis
local standards; and .
Are somewhat innovative.
"Low level resource farmers" typically:
Own and/or rent a small amount of land not adaptable
to a good crop rotation plan;
Have poor management skills resulting in a low net
return and unstable production;
Do not utilize outside or local educational resources;
3.9
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Have little established credit inside the local com-
munity;
Cite themselves as the "problem-solver";
Have a traditional pattern of operation; and
Are least innovative.
The majority (65-80 percent) of the farmers interviewed would
fall into the medium level resource category, with 5-10 percent being
high level resource farmers, and 15-25 percent being low level resource
farmers.
These crop production systems will-be further discussed in sub-
sequent chapters when talking about farmers' responses to thesis regula-
tory actions.
3. 10
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4. 0 INFLUENCE OF LOCAL AND EXTRA-LOCAL
INSTITUTIONS ON CORN CROP PRODUCTION
SYSTEMS AND PEST CONTROL STRATEGIES
Institutions, which represent an integrated set of ideas (i. e.,
goals, values, norms, etc. ) can prescribe, to a given audience on a given
subject, what should be done and how it should be done. In Chapter 3. 0,
a number of sources representing various institutions were indicated
as having an influence on a farmer's crop production practices, and
more specifically, his pest control strategies. In this chapter, these
institutional structures are further described.
These institutions can be broken down into two general types -
those having an influence on the input side of the crop production pro-
cess and those having an influence on the'output side. Each type is
described with the relationships between institutions explored, as well
as some implications for farmer adjustment responses and problems
to the aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor suspensions.
4. 1 Crop Production Input Factors
In addition to the influence of neighbors, friends and relatives, a
number of institutions were shown to have a. bearing on the input side of
the corn production systems and pest control strategies practiced by the
farmers interviewed in this study. Most important among these institu-
tions are: the extension service, the agricultural experiment station,
chemical companies, pesticide dealerships, loan institutions, Federal
Crop Insurance, professional scouting and the mass media. Each is
discussed below.
4. 1. 1 Extension Service
. The extension service's primary role is one of education, and in
the area of pest control, it is a most demanding one. The primary
goals are to make available the recommendations of pest control spe-
cialists and to disseminate general educational material in this area.
Each year, the university extension service supplies pesticide
recommendations for the control of insects and weeds on various crops,
with particular attention paid to corn and soybeans (as opposed to corn,
soybeans, wheat, milo, etc. ). They have recognized the close relation-
ship that exists between the pesticide dealer and farmer regarding
information about pesticides and have geared their activities accordingly.
4.1
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In Iowa, the university extension insecticide recommendations
are usually first distributed to area pesticide dealers at the various
regional university extension meetings, held in the middle of November
for the upcoming growing season. These regional meetings are then
followed up by a statewide meeting. This year (i. e. , 1976), the meet-
ing was held in January in Des Moines and was attended by 4, 000 dealers,
University extension, university research and chemical formulating
personnel were all on the program. In Missouri, similar activities
are undertaken.
At the local level, the county extension agent disseminates the
university extension recommendations as well, with supervision and
assistance provided by an area agent. Their job is a most difficult one
as described below:
"County agents and area specialists are not salesman
for products or services, yet they must know the
relative characteristics and performance of commercial
products. They are not usually farmers themselves,
yet their traditional role has long emphasized service
to farmers in their production activities. They are not
usually well traiiieu iu ecology or cnvi.i-oviiviciita.j. pro-
tection, yet they are often asked about the ecological
aspects of various products and techniques. Those
extension agents closely involved in pest control or
related problems are not often sociologists or rural
social scientists, yet they may be accused of helping
only large, efficient producers rather than small,
inefficient, part-time farmers struggling along with
low incomes. "*
The county agent maintains contact with the pesticide dealers and
is available to assist any farmer with any particular pest problem that
he may have. In Fremont County, Iowa, the mass media, educational
programs, and personal contact are used to disseminate extension
information. The county agent felt that he came into direct contact
with half the farmers over a year's time period and further felt most
farmers had access to university extension information either directly
through him. or indirectly through their pesticide dealers.
^National Academy of Sciences, Pest Control: An Assessment
of Present and Alternative Technologies, Volume II: Corn''Soybeans
Pest Control. National Academy of Sciences, 1975, p. 128.
4.2
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Turning to the characteristics distinguishing a farmer who uses
the extension service from one who does not, our interviews would indi-
cate that the low resource, lower educated farmer, especially those
who grew up on the farm and continued to farm the way their father had
farmed, are less likely to utilize the extension service. For example, some
older farmers rejected the idea of using the extension service, saying
they had been farming longer than the extension agent had been alive !
There are exceptions in that some lower educated farmers realize
their lack of knowledge and realize that farming technology is changing.
These farmers will seek out advice from the extension service when
special problems arise.
The farmers who utilize the county extension office the most are
the medium resource farmers who have in some way become acquainted
with the material available, either through 4-H or some other activity.
This group may also depend on the extension office for social activities,
as well as a source of information.
Finally, there is a small group of farmers who are college edu- ;
cated and can utilize literature straight "from the landgrant university /
or technical journals, should they so desire. These.'would tend to be
the large, land-owning, high resource farmers.
4. 1.2 Agricultural Experiment Station
The agricultural experiment stations at the landgrant universities
play an important role in dictating pest control strategies for farmers
to follow, although they usually do not have any direct contact with
farmers. Rather, by working closely with the extension service, per-
ceptions of problems are transmitted from the farm level through the
extension service to the research entomologists. In turn, their recom-
mendations get transmitted to the farmer through the extension service
recommendations.
Entomologists and other specialists at these experiment stations
•pursue research in a number of areas related to corn pest control
including:*
*NAS, op. cit. . p. 111.
4.3
-------
Basic research on biology of pests and hosts. Both
chemical and nonchemical segments of pest control are
included in this category.
Breeding for disease and insect resistance and eval-
uating the resistance of existing varieties and hybrids.
Comparisons and evaluations of new and old pesticides
supplied mainly by private industry. In some cases,
economic analyses are performed along with the
scientific studies.
The development of alternative strategies for pest
control based on local farming systems, local and
national regulations, economic factors, and the im-
portant regional pest problems and environmental
conditions.
Specifically related to the black cutworm problem, research has
only recently begun on understanding its life cycle and where cutworm
infestations are located. Currently, the five Corn Belt states are
working together on the problem. Funding first became available in
1973 frcrn the Cooperative State Research ^ervice of th.p. US.I)A ?.n
-------
infestations are likely to occur. The problem is that weather and soil
type must be considered and compound the problem of researching the
cutworm. Consequently, an effective pest management control system,
utilizing rescue insecticides* for cutworm control, is still years away
according to this source. **
These feelings are evidenced in the Iowa and Missouri extension
recommendations that continue in 1976 to recommend the use of any
carry-over supplies of aldrin, heptachlor and chlordane to combat the
cutworm. Rescue insecticides (e.g., Sevin bait) are recommended,
but in a conversation with an extension entomologist at Iowa State, he
conceded that because there is still no clear understanding about the
life cycle of the cutworm, or its predictability, he felt that pest manage-
ment strategies are hard to develop and the rescue method cannot be
used effectively. Thus, until a pest management control system for
cutworms is further developed, it appears that these extension services
feel the need for a preventive type insecticide for cutworms (such as
aldrin, heptachlor, etc.). Otherwise, farmers will have to resort to
the rescues and learn to accept a certain level of crop damage (possibly
higher than would normally be expected since the rescue method can-
not, as yet, be used effectively according to certain experts).
4. 1. ? Oh'srnic**. 1 Corn.T?3?T'.?s
The role of chemical companies in pest control strategies and
their relationship to other institutions, has been very well described in
the NAS study on pest control technologies, i. e. :
"In general, the primary synthesis and initial testing
of pesticides to control weeds, diseases, and insects
is done by private companies. Once a product has
shown effectiveness with regard to field performance
against a pest in a major commodity, it is introduced
*Rescue insecticides are insecticides applied after cutworms are
noticed on the corn plants, as a means to save the present crop. This
differs from preventive type insecticides which are soil insecticides
applied prior to planting to prevent cutworm infestations from occurring.
**Other experts may disagree on these conclusions and those that
follow in the paragraph below.
4.5
-------
to university and government scientists at experiment
stations and extension services. These researchers,
given the material on an experimental basis, field test
it. If those tests are positive, it will go into additional
large scale field experiments sponsored by government
and private firms. Labeling and registration efforts
then will proceed.
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act, as amended in 1972 Federal Environmental Protec-
tion Control Act (FEPCA), adds a new dimension to the
pesticide situation. It provides authorityfor the regula-
tion of pesticide application and use. If a pesticide is
not labeled for a particular use, then it cannot legally be
recommended and used for that pest problem. Before
the FEPCA amendments of 1972, federal regulations
provided for the registration of products, the establish-
ment of efficacy, and the definition of permitted residues
and tolerances. If research..demonstrated that the
pesticide controlled pest X, then it could be recommended
for that use. However, under the current FEPCA (1972),
th^ •*^v^ ^ •*• o •** i -^ ^ vv^-'j^c't- T^ tfN l-'^Qlr*'^ fc**" US~* ^"0 CO**t**"C^ ""^ *~ ^ t X
before it can be recommended for that use. This is
especially important in view of the high costs for
registering pesticides for specific uses. Several chemi-
cal companies estimate that it now costs 7-10 million
dollars to register and market a new pesticide. With
costs in this general range, companies primarily will
proceed to register products for major market use.
Registration may not be attempted for effective chemi-
cals against pests of secondary importance, those
occurring sporadically, or those affecting only minor
commodities. "* . •
As is evident, cooperation between the extension service, agricultural
experiment station and the chemical companies has occurred in the past.
In recent years, this cooperation has become strained as the extension
service and research entomologists look for ways to reduce pesticide
use and promote integrated pest management, while the chemical com-
panies continue to promote the chemical solution to pest problems.
*NAS, o_p_. _cit., pp. 108-109.
4.6
-------
Of particular importance to this study is the fact that develop-
ment of preventive type insecticide products for cutworm control is
minimal at the present time, because the cutworm problem is a sporadic
one not affecting large numbers of farmers. Interviews with a number
of sales representatives from major chemical companies indicate that
many of them are less than interested in cutworms. Mobil will be test-
ing an organo-phosphate and one or two more indicate that they are
researching the area. However, the sales representatives seemed to
indicate an attitude of disgust on the part of the chemical companies,
because the chemical world had an answer to the cutworm problem and
it was then taken away by the Environmental Protection Agency. An
air of frustration would explain their feelings about devoting manpower
and money to any more research on the cutworm problem and so most
are content •with marketing already registered rescue insecticides and
preventive type insecticides, although the. latter does not amount to much.
Thus, the farmer is in a dilemma because the extension service is
more confident in recommending a preventive type insecticide (e.g.,
carry-over supplies of suspended pesticides and the hope for a new
preventive type insecticide) until they (the extension service) learn how
to more effectively recommend the use of rescue insecticides, while
the chemical companies are content to market rescues and not research
new preventive type insecticides for the cutworm.
At the local level, the chemical company conveys information ori
its products through sales pamphlets and other literature, through field
demonstrations, promotional meetings and expositions, through adver-
tisements in farm journals, in newspapers, on radio and on television
and through personal contacts between their sales representatives and
parties involved in distributing pesticides and pesticide information,
particularly pesticide dealers. Only a very small percentage of farmers,
those with a better education and higher resources, will come into con-
tact with sales representatives directly. Most others will receive
chemical company information through their pesticide dealer.
4. 1.4 Pesticide Dealerships
The primary role of the pesticide dealer is to supply the farmer
with pesticides. However, as alluded to above, the pesticide dealer
is also one of the most important sources of information to the farmer
about insecticides. Seventy to eighty percent of the farmers indicated
that they go to the dealer to find out what is available for a particular
pest problem. Many indicate that it did not matter what the university
extension recommendations were, but rather what the dealer had avail--
able for the problem when he went to him.
4.7
-------
Pesticide dealers recognize that farmers depend upon them for
information and advice. According to pesticide dealers, farmers relied
upon them for information about insecticides much more so than for
herbicides. Some dealers suggested that since farm magazines printed
comparative studies of herbicides, farmers felt more confident in
deciding which herbicides to use, compared to insecticides where no
comparative studies seem to be available.
Contact with the farmer is usually on a face to face basis although
the local media is also used in advertising. During the winter months,
some local dealers will sponsor promotional dinners where they invite
their regular customers. A chemical company representative may be
the invited speaker and the extension agent may also attend. Pesticide
literature will usually be disseminated at the meeting. Farmers will
then usually contact the dealer when they want to buy their pesticides
or when they have a particular problem. In recent years, due to pesti-
cide shortages and marked variability in prices, farmers have begun
to shop around, rather than going to the "family dealer" as in the past.
As indicated in above sections, dealers receive their information
from both the university extension service -- via extension publications
-- and the chemical companies through their company representatives. .
Thfci'e.LOre, cue dealer does attempt to/aaiiclie those pesticides chat are
.recommended for the pest problems particular to their service area.
However, some dealers have typixzally handled either Shell products
(i. e. , aldrin) or Velsicol products (i. e. , heptachlor and chlordane),
rather than both at any one time.
Pesticide dealers are showing concern over the suspension of
aldrin, heptachlor and chlordane, more so than their customers, .saying
that they just did not know what they could recommend to the farmer
once supplies of these pesticides are gone, since no new preventive
type insecticide was available and since rescues were not typically
stocked by them. * Indications were received that all remaining supplies
of aldrin were received by the dealer and sold during the 1975 growing
season. Some dealers who typically sold heptachlor had problems with
shortages in 1975 also. All dealers had ordered heptachlor and chlor-
dane for the 1976 growing season and some say that they ordered enough
*See bottom of page 4. 9 and top of page 4. 10 for more discussion
on this point.
4.8
-------
to have carry-over supplies available for 1977. Some say that they
will have enough for their customers and others point out that their
entire supply was completely sold back in Jaunary, 1976. Most dealers
indicate that they will only sell to their regular customers and when
other customers come in, they have been refused. Our interviews also
noted that dealers who typically ordered aldrin may experience more
problems getting heptachlor, than those who have ordered heptachlor in
the past, due to ties with the chemical companies.
Unitl recently, dealers would order their supplies in February
and March, receive delivery in early April and sell to farmers in mid
to late April. The dealer was not billed by the chemical company until
the close of harvest and did not bill his customers until after harvest.
However, due to the "petroleum crunch" and pesticide shortages in
recent years, many dealers now begin ordering their supplies in July
to insure that they will get what they want (e.g. , many dealers ordered
heptachlor in July, 1975 for the 1976 growing season). The chemical
company now bills the dealer on delivery (usually January 1) and the
dealer in turn has been forced to bill the. farmer on a 30 day basis. The
dealer has also been offering the farmer a 1. 5 percent discount for each
month of early delivery, i.e., taking.delivery before April, to induce
the farmer to buy earlier and reduce his (the dealer's) storage costs.
Some farmers (i. e. , thoae with high resources) have been uuiug ilii=> Lo
insure that they would get what they wanted. In addition, the transition
year of early delivery also offers the opportunity to double the chemical
bill for a given tax year.
In the past, the releasing of university extension recommendations
between November and January has not been a problem for the dealer
or the farmer, because dealers did not place their orders until February
or March and farmers received what they wanted. In the last two or
three years, dealers have had to place orders in the middle of the sum-
mer or in the fall, before the recommendations have come out. There
have been no cited problems by dealers, but there have also been no
basic changes in the recommendations for the last few years.
Nevertheless, one conflict already has been noticed between the
dealers' practices and university extension recommendations. Rescue
insecticides have been recommended in the past and are currently
recommended as an emergency treatment for cutworms. However,
dealers have been reluctant to stock large amounts of rescue insecti-
cides for four reasons: (1) it is hard to predict how much would be used
in any one growing season, (2) there are many different types of rescues,
4.9
-------
each useful under different circumstances, (3) the shelf life of the
rescues is at most one growing season, and (4) there is no local distri-
butor for Union Carbide, the manufacturer of the Sevin bait rescue
insecticide. Thus, the dealer does not want to get stuck with pesticides
he cannot sell the following year, and which may have been difficult for
him to obtain. As a result of this behavior, the use of rescues by farmers
has been precluded as an adjustment response due to their very limited
availability.
4.1.5 Loan Institutions
In order to farm today, large sums of money are needed both for
machinery and equipment and for yearly operational expenses. Partic-
ularly for bottomland farming, these expenses can run as high as
$150, 000 for machinery and equipment and $100, 000 for yearly opera-
tional expenses.
Virtually every producer must obtain a yearly operational loan to
pay for some or all of the cost of producing and harvesting a crop, i. e. ,
seed, fertilizer, pesticides, fuel and labor. These operational loans
may total from a few thousand dollars to $100, 000 mentioned above and
In order to borrow the money to operate today, it is necessary
for a farmer to have land and/or machinery to use as collateral, or a
proven credit rating. The building of credit is done much as it is done
in the larger city but with the added feature that the bank.or other insti-
tutions loaning money most likely knows more about the farmer's
family background which adds another dimension. One basically is
allowed to borrow small sums of money and if there are no problems
with returning the loans, credit ratings increase and larger sums are
permitted in future years. The additional dimension prevalent in the
smaller, rural towns is that the credit rating does not necessarily
reflect the ability of the individual as much as it reflects the individual's
family and their position and ability to meet loan commitments.
A number of sources are available for yearly operational loans
including local banks, production credit associations and the Farmer's
Home Administration.
For those'farmers who have been successfully farming for a num-
ber of years (i. e. , high and medium resource farmers) or for those
farmers who own or inherit land, go into partnership with a relative,
or have a good family background (i.e., come from families who are
respected in the community, who have good credit ratings, etc. ), a loan '
may be secured either from-a local bank or a production credit association.
4. 10
-------
Local banks vary in their exact requirements but usually require
a financial statement showing the assets (i. e. , land, machinery, live-
stock, Federal Crop Insurance, etc. ) covering the loan and any out-
standing liabilities (see Exhibit 4. 1 for a typical financial statement •
required). Family background, including the farmer's credit rating, is
always considered and for the younger farmer, the bank will consider
his family's assets when determining the loan limit. Banks usually ask their
their regular customers to come to the bank beginning in December to
fill out a new financial statement for the upcoming year and to negotiate
a loan. The current lending rate is about 8. 5 percent per year. Loan
officers usually do not ask about specific pest problems, but they do
expect the farmer to use insecticides and herbicides to protect their
crop. For example, one banker said he would turn down an application
if a farmer did not include pesticides in his crop production practices.
The loan limit also varies amongst banks, with some banks having
a $50,000 limit and others basing the limit on the'farmers net worth.
One banker indicated that the average size loan is $50, 000 and would
typify a farmer with 750 acres and some livestock. For the bottomland
farmers, loan amounts average $70,000 to $100,000. Thus, banks with
$50,000 limits cannot accomodate bottomland farmers, whereas those
The production credit associations will only make loans to farmers
and one must be a stockholder to borrow money. One becomes a stock-
holder by purchasing stock, and his loan limit is based on his financial
statement and the value of the stock he owns (i. e. , the farmer must
have enough shares to cover 3. certain percentage --e.g., 5 percent --
of the loan). He will also be evaluated on his credit rating, character
references and a visit to the farm by the loan officer. For younger
farmers, a co-signer may be required. The current lending rate is
also 8. 5 percent and the loan is negotiated in the winter months and
made in quarterly payments. One production credit association also
requires the farmer to submit a cash flow budget and an actual cash
flow each quarter which is reviewed with the loan officer. Farmers
are told to use "good management practices" (presumably which would
include pesticides if past history indicated the need to) and are encour-
aged to utilize the extension service and other educational resources,
which production credit officers also keep in touch with. Both high and
medium resource farmers in the hills and on the -bottomland are mem-
bers of production credit associations, although older farmers tend not
to borrow from this source due to the bookkeeping requirements.
4.11
-------
Exhibit 4. 1
Af I—I Alfl.'l II
111 LA.'I'l M 'tVir.r. IMC
AI.I.I'.Afl. MICHIGAN 4'JOIO
FARMER FINANCIAL STATEMENT
NAME
19
UUGINESS
TO -
ADDRESS
INAMC OF HANK)
row TUT PUPPO^F. OF OBTAINING ADVANCES FROM TIME: TO TIME ON nn i.s. NOTF^ ANO OTHF.R COMMF.RCIAL
PAI'l-H ^if,HU> OK ENOOIVSr.D tlY TI-IE UNUEIKSIGNLD. AND OF OnrAIN'NG CREDIT GENERALLY. THE UNDERSIGNED
MAKES THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL CONDITION AS OF THE CLOSE OK BUSINESS ON THE
PAY Of' f> AND CERTIFIES TO THE AHOVE NAMED HANK THAT THF. INFORMATION HCRE-
JNACH-'I* ".LT FORTH IS IN AIL HESI'F' TS TRUE. ACCUKATT. ANC.I COMI'l. F.1 F. AND CORRECTLY REFLECTS THE
i INAUCIAL r.ouomcN or THE UNUCUSIGNLD ON THE DAIJ: AI CJULMLNTIONCO.
i TILL IT-I ALL BLANKS. WRITING "NO" OR "NONE" WHCRf: NECESSARY TO COMPLETE INFORMATION)
A_S^S_ETS
CASH ON HAND AND IN BANKS
NOTES RECEIVABLE SECURED
NOTES RECEIVABLE-UNSECURED
ACCOUNTS
GOVERNMENT
OTHER STOCKS AND BONDSucc S;H
LIVE STOCK .ice .C-CD^O
FARM PRODUCTS ON HANp.»« 3e.raui.ci
CASH VALUE OF LIFE INSURANCE.-.
OTHER CURRENT ASSETS _
LIABILITIES
NOTES PAYABLE TO BANK-SECURED S
. -UNSECURED
NOTES PAYABLE TO OTHERS . . _
NOTES PAYABLE TO RELATIVES AND —
FRIENDS
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
ON LIVE STOCK
ON MACHINERY.
CROP MORTGAGES
ACRFS
TOTAL. CURRENT ASSETS-
FARM LAND (»
IN
_CO.
DELINQUENT
DELINQUENT REAL ESTATE TAXES.... _.
DELINQUENT PERSONAL TAXES
DUE
CITY REAL ESTATE i.cr .c-to-j. t>
FAnr*'. MACKiNEr\Y. AUTO3. TRUCKc
TRACTORS « OTHER EQUIP. i»cc •«.».
STOCKS & BONOS.c:.c »^c.^tm« « ;^
OTHER
TOTAL
OTHER CURRENT LIABILITIES-
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES.
CN REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGES ON CITY PROPERTY
TO
ALL OTHER DEBTS
. LlABi
NET WORTH.
TOTAL
1 WAVE ENDOR^FO NOTF=; FO"
II AM POND^MAN FOR OTHFP^
LIVE STOCK
ut^n^^<=. is 5 _PITR W(=-AO S
Mtjl.£? * . . PER HFAO
_ u COLT? , . . . 6 . . ,PFR HFAn
COWS. STOCK '
<;HFFP „ a1 pF.R HFAP
FWFIS _ -s p(£R HF AD
1 AMRS , , « . . p?TR WP-AO
TOTAL S
GRAIN AND FARM PRODUCTS
ON HAND
Rll rORN . w 5 <
, . nil WHFAT ... :i ., .
nil nATc; *
TOM5 HAY
. ,. BALFS COTTON . .. '* .
_ LDS. TOBACCO . .-.<•(....'
... . PU flAlll.tTY . . . j
TOTAL 5
IISC -wL'KC AI.
L r-o
r.i-ui i
•.i 1.-N
GROWING CROPS CONDITION
AOnrs r.onw «
AC»F^ X.VMFAT
ACRFS OAT=;
A<-nr'iHt:i; V-IIM: ANL i u i ( o ui.iri
'4T12-
-------
Exhibit 4. 1 (continued)
SCHEDULES
ne sunc TO INCLUDE EVERY ITEM 'jnorr» EACH SOIEOULC
FARM MACHINERY. AUTOS. TnUCKS. TRACTORS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT
uMtrt
j
.
1
MAKC
*CC
CONDITION
MAHKCT V*l' 1
•
TOTAL !s
s
IN WHO^P MAMP 1C T,TI ff TO B FAI P«VTATP R frf. O P3 D P O •>
IS REAL ESTATE HELD IN FEE SIMPLE OR LEASEHOLD?
TAXES PAID TO
LAND UNDER LEASE: ACRES OF
BPFM pAin TO 19 , „.
I ANin TH
E RENTAL PRICE BE
Nf. S
WHIf
:H HAS
REAL ESTATE
ocscnipnoN
XCIIIS
UOCATION
I
. NATUKC Of
V*
LUC
TOTALI S
COUITY
"S" " IS IS
1
HAVE YOU ANY PARTNERS IN YOUR BUSINFS*;? IP =,n, e;TATC PART|-lll AR=;
HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ADJUDGED A BANKRUPT?
JUDGMENTS OR SUITS PENDING AGAINST YOU AT THIS TIME S
F SO. STATE PARTICULARS.
NAMES OF PEOPLE WITH WHOM YOU HAVE HAD BUSINESS RELATIONS AND WHO ARE ACQUAINTED WITH YOUR
PERSONAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION ;
LIFE INSURANCE
.PAYABLE TO_
BUILDINGS INSURED FOR S-
_GRAIN INSURED FOR S-
_CATTLE AND HOGS INSURED FOR S
OTHER INSURANCE (ITEMIZE).
POST OFFICE ADDRESS
(TOWN!
I HAVE RESIDED AT ABOVE .LOCATION.
-YEARS..
MONTHS FORMERLY HC.StOm . ... .
PROCEEDS OF LOAN MADE BY YOUR BANK ARE TO BE USED (OR HAVE SEEN USED! OY Mr rc«
I EXPECT TO RETIRE THIS INDEBTEDNESS FROM.
DY
.19
IftTATC SOUMCCI
IN SUBMITTING. THE FOREGOING STATEMENT THE UNDERSIGNED GUARANTEES H :; A<'.CU"AC V \\iln TIM -NTC'lT
THAT IT DE RELICD UPON BY THE AFORESAID BANK IN CX TENDING CREDIT TO THC UNPCKSii -Nl r A';:« V. ••.'•" Af; : ',
THAT ----- HAS NOT KNOWINGLY WITHHELD ANY INFORMATION THAT MIGHT AD (T.T CHI ft I. ••». Ar.:- t,(|
UNDERSIGNED EXPRK5SLY AC.HCES TO NOTIFY IMMEDIATELY SAID BANK IN WUlTlNi.'. CX AfJV VA:'. '-'Ai . ••*.•;..(
IN FINAM.'I.M. rciNIHTlON WHttTHTH Al'l'l 1C. ^TIC1^I !•<«» TUUTHI'K CrfJmiT !'> '.'Ai'
sr.NCT Of SII.'M vvi»i n I:N NOIUT IT is cxruo--1! Y AI'.KI i.D THAT *-A:|' iA1L AOL'limr^AL CKI..ni I Ib I{LU(.ILV< I LU OK LMi.llNo CKL'LuT IMLNl'LO i'i.' . • >r. ; r.i:l :•
. r.i %•.
sic.Nrn AT
IMI'j DAY Of
-------
For most farmers starting out who do not own or inherit land or
go into partnership with a relative, and for those farmers who cannot
secure a loan by any other means, * it may be necessary for them to
get a loan from the Farmer's Home Administration, an agency within
USDA, which will tolerate the higher risk. FHA operational loans are
given to family farms and can be up to a maximum of $50, 000. The
current lending rate is about 8. 5 percent. FHA loan recipients are
expected to show improved management skills" and increased net income
and therefore are expected to build-up a good credit rating and become
a feasible risk to the local lending institutions within an average of six
years. FHA tries to accomplish these purposes by close supervision
of cash flow (see Exhibit 4.2 for statement required) and by encourag-
ing the farmer to attend local extension programs and agricultural
night classes. If the farmer does not utilize the local educational
resources and FHA directives and if progress isn't made, the next
year's loan may not be made and the FHA supervisor may advise the
farmer to liquidate. Bottomland farmers do not usually borrow from
FHA because of the $50, 000 loan limit and because they do not qualify
for FHA credit since they are usually in. partnership with a relative.
Usually the young (18-30 year old) farmer with low credit and assets,
and the older (55 years and older) farmer with low education and poor
A
In recent years, the average size of the operational loan has
increased as more financial burdens have been put on the farmer, e.g. ,
because pesticide dealers no longer extend credit until after harvest,
farmers must increase their loan amount to buy pesticides. The num-
ber of carry-over loans (i. e. , loans made in one year and carried into
subsequent years) have also increased due to a number of factors, e. g. ,
drought, poor prices for crops and possibly cutworm problems. The
production credit association expects carry-overs and will continue to
back the farmer until his loan limit is reached. Many bankers indicate
that if some farmers have another bad year, they will have to foreclose
on them. Other bankers say that they are not looking for new borrowers
because of the drought and the carry-overs, which are presently rang-
ing from $12, 000 to $25, 000.
Specifically related to the suspension of aldrin, heptachlor and
chlordane, one banker said that the ban represents something new to
them in considering loans. They will not be able to react to the ban on
aldrin or heptachlor until they have a case where someone cannot meet
^Included may be farmers who used to go to the local banks or
production credit associations, but due to a series of bad crop years,
were forced to return to the FHA.
4. 14
-------
Exhibit 4. 2
DSDA-FHA
Form FHA 431-2
(Rev. 12-1-72)
MA14C Of HUSBAND
fmatnn I
FARM AND HOME PLAN
[HAMS Of Wlfl
F.OMM AWIIOVt'O
OMU NU. 40-RIO/7
COUNTY
i AOORCSS
A«ts of FT MOM
IN HOOSINOIO
HUMS Of llASt
:HUSOAHO
SONS
. 1"
lOAUCHURS OIMfRS I 10TAI AC9ES • CROPACRfS Ml*.
| [• j (OwmOI.IBINHD) [OWilD) (HINIIO)
I ' _ I I .
RATIO M
r MKM fj
iA*r YIAH>
"rcsioo 01 HAS:
YtS WRIITtfll"! YfS
NO IIASC" L J NO
10
A. FINANCIAL STATEMENT AS OF
PROPERTY OWNED
, 19
ocnrs ov/fo
RIAL FSTATE (LOCATION):
FARM
•
OTHER REAL ESTATE
ACXIS
vAiuc
i
t . .. . _
TOTAL REAL ESTATE ; [s
LIVESTOCK:
1 • • '-'
LIVESTOCK HELD FOR SALE
DAIRY COWS
-BEEF COWS
OTHER CATTLE
BROOD SOWS ANO GILTS
OTHER HOGS
EWES
OTHER SHEEP
POULTRY
TOTAL LIVESTOCK
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT:
TRUCK(S):
NO.
VALUE
J
i
!
YR* "'* MAKE J
S
*
MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT 1 ;
1
OTHER FARM MACHINERY I
TOTAL MACMINE8T AMU EQUIPMENT !
OTHER PERSONAL PROPERTY:
CROPS HELD FOR SALE
(JUAN.
OH NO.
GROWING CROPS
FEED
SEED ANO SUPPLIES
AUTO: YR MAKE 1
HOUSEHOLD GOCOS j
CASH ON HAND
$
VALUE
$
BONOS AND INVESTMENTS j |
ACCTS. CWIO US— COUECIIBLE
TOTAL OTHER PERSONAL PROP.
TOTAL PROPERTY OWNED i
s
s
NAMC ANO Annorss oi FINAI r>ut IN HUM AMUKI A*"I»NI
CREOI10R OA1E RAIf INSIAI. blMNQ
LIENS ON nEAL ESTATE: [ j . J j
t I
, i T
i
lill'Ali)
OAlANCt
I
!
TOTAL LIENS ON R. E. ft
(JEMS OH CHATTELS ANO CBOrS: \ j
1
i ' J : S
i !
" I i i .
1
i
1 !
! i . ! :
' i 1
ill-:
• i • i • !
! . ! ;
s . i r i :
TOTU HENS CHATTtLS t WOPS . | ' J is
S
JUDGMENTS: ! | i f
I ! ! !
TOTAL JUDGMENTS: j i S • J
TAXCS DUE- REAL ESTATE $! PERSONAL S
iNtnuF A social <;FCLIRITY ? TOTJ.I. TAHFJS OUF-
ALL OTHER DEBTS (DOCTOR. STORE. ETC.. DESCRIBE):
1
$
i
TOTAL OTHER DEBTS
TOTAL ALL DEBTS
t
\
1. TOTAL OF CASH ON HAND. CROPS AND LIVESTOCK HEiO FOR IMMEDIATE SALE. AND INCOME TO BE RECEIVED IN '
IMMEDIATE FUTURE . | $
Z. OEOTS ANO EXPENSES WE WILL PAY FROM AUOvE CASH ANO INCOME (It.mut:)
J. CASH CARRY-OVER FOR NEXT YEAR'S OPERATIONS AFTER PAYING THESE DEBTS
ttCIKNIHC OF TEAR
«. NCT WORTH (TOTAL PROPERTY OWNED MINUS TOTAL ALL DEBTS)
i. TOTAL LAND OEOT
t. TOTAL OEUTS OTHCH THAN LAND
PERIOD COVERED BY PLAN: '(ROM it 10
(NO OF YEAR
INC««C OR OlCRtASt .
$
FHA 431-2 (H.». I2-1-/.')
4. 15
-------
Exhibit 4. 2 (continued)
KTt: All "xtttil"
B. CROPS, PASTURE, ETC.—PRODUCTION AND SALES
PLANNED
MOPS. PASTURE.
JIT WIRE PROGRAM
PATMIHTS. UC.
1.
2.
3.
4.
S.
c.
7.
1.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
.)4. FARMSTEAD.
GARDEN A«O ROADS
ACRES
PER
ACRE
OPERATOR'S SHAKE
UNITS fOH:
f*RU
USE
SALE
9
*
OOLUS
SALES
%
ACSC:
ACTUAL
YlflO
PER
ACXe
OPERATOR'S SHAAE
UNITS
FA£M
USE
ME 1.0
FOR SALE
.
SOLO
9
'.
CASH
INCOME
i
1J. TOTAL ICNTER TADLE J. LINE 1)
1$
Is
C. LIVESTOCK AND PRODUCTS—PRODUCTION AND SALES
PLANNED
IIYISTOCX »NO PRODUCTS
«S3 WOOL-MOHAIR
PROGRAM PATMEN1S
1.
2.
3.
«.
i.
t. '
7.
fi.
».
JO.
U.
NO.
"• !
n. UIIK (ins)
14. tCCS (002.) i
n TOTAL ICSUR TACJU J. LINC J)
1
PER
ANIMAL
OPERATOR'S SHARE
UNITS FOR:
FARM
USE
SALE 1
e>
s
—
DOLLAR
SALES
S
S '
ACTUAL
NO.
PER
ANIMAL
OPERATOR'S SHARE
UNITS
FARM
USE
HELD
fOR SALE
.
SOLO
e
s
"7
CASH
INCOME
S
s
4.16
-------
Exhibit 4. 2 (continued)
D. IMPROVEMENTS AND KEY PRACTICES— FARM, HOME. AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
CROPS: SOU" UVf STOCK1 riMAACIAL UAKtf,l»(H1- MAINTENANCE: REPAIRS: fOOO PRODUCTION
AND CONSERVATION; HEALTH. HOME. ENYIROIIMINTAI.. COMMUNITY AHO RURAL DEVELOPMENT
ACTIVITIES; ETC.
•
•
TYPE OF ANALYSIS t . ,1 MONTH
WHEN TO
00 IT
SOURCE OF
tunos
•
]
ACTUAL
ACCOHPIISHWENTS
' E. FAMILY LIVING AND INSURANCE
WE PLAN TO PRODUCE. PROCESS. AND USE FOR OUR FAMILY:
•
UILK (GAL.)
ECCS (DOZJ
POULTRY (NO.)
PORK' (LIVE WT.-LB.)
BEEF (LIVE WT.-LB.)
OTHER MEATS (LIVE WT..LD.)
PUN
ACTUAL
ITEM
GARDEN (SIZE)
CANNED AND FROZEN:
VEGETABLES (QTJ
FRUITS (QT.)
DRY STORED VEGETABLES (BUJ
DRY STORED FRUITS (BU.)
PLAN
ACTUAL
TOTAL CASH VALUE OF FOOD ACTUALLY PRODUCED AND/OR PROCESSED FOB HOME USE t-
Tin 01 INSURA.lCt
DWELLING
OTHER REAL ESTATE
CHATTELS
FARM LIABILITY
CHECK IF
YOU HAVE
fAC£. VA1.UC
PRESENT
*
PIA«
*
ACTUAL
S
TYPt OF I«UBA«C£
LIFE
HEALTH
HOUSEHOLD COOOS
•
AUTO
fACE VALUE
PRESEta
t
Pl>«
*
'
ACTUAL
*
D WATER*0 D "FRICERATOR Q MACHINE D TCLEPHONC • Q SEWING MACHINE
DFULL I—I HOME (—1 ORYEB (—1 TELEVISION (— 1 «,.,,„ ur,Tro
BATH LJ FREUCR LJ DRTER |_J SET LJ W*TER HEATER
4. 17
-------
Exhibit 4.2 (continued)
f. CASH FAMILY LIVING
EXFEKSES
HOUSE REPAIR AND SANITATION
•
OTIICR
CKtOIT
NEEDED
FHA
CIUOIT
NEIOED
J
r i
TRANSPORTATION f 1...:
FtJBNIII/Bf L OTMfB
TOTAL
t, CASH FARM OPERATING
EXPENSES
HIRED LABOR „
MACHINERY REPAIR.. . ..
fARU BUILOIlia k FENCE RCfAIR
INTEREST..
mm
SEED
FERTILIZER .......... .. ... ..
PESTICIDES I SPRAY MATERIALS. ..
OTHER SUPPLIES
LIVESTOCK EXPENSE
MACHINERY HIRE_ '....,
IUEI ANO OIL . .....
PERSONAL PROP. TAX..
REAL ESTATE TAXES
WATT8 CHARGES
••
PlANnrO
EXPENSES
—
ACIUAL
EXPENSES
•J
j i; : t i J
OTKtR
CREDIT
NEEDED
J
,
r**
i
FH»
CREDIT
NEEDED
J .
PLANNED
EXPENSES
J... ...
•
ACTUAL
EXPENSES
J
«
T
• i „ .1 .
L _i
• 1
i i
T r
PROPERTY "INSURANCE - 1
AUTO t TRUCX EXPENSE
UTILITIES „._.. ..._
i
i • .i
! 1
tURRIKT OPN5. BILLS (TABLE A)
TOTAL
; 'I
i :
l« -- <
S .J
H. CAPITAL EXPENDITURES <"%» -'"*. PUNHIO
CRT Oil CRI Oil FYPf Mlh th« Counly Supervisor
-------
their loan obligations which apparently has not occurred. He is very
concerned about the situation because it does increase the risk, but to
what degree, they cannot predict. He wishes he did know, since those
farmers who are directly affected by the pesticide decisions are his
larger borrowers.
4. 1. 6 Federal Crop Insurance
The basic purpose of Federal Crop Insurance is to promote the
general welfare by providing crop insurance against loss from unavoid-
able causes, such as weather, insects and plant disease. In the two
counties studied, an all risk crop insurance policy.is sold and insures
against all natural hazards beyond the farmer's control including:
drought, excess moisture, hail, insects, frost, freeze, plant disease,
flood, fire, hurricane, winter kill, and wind. It guarantees a specific
amount of bushels and pays a loss when the bushels fall below the guaran-
tee, i. e. , claims are based on the number of acres and actual yield
compared to the yield set by a 5 year ASCS average.
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation requires that "good farm-
ing practices" be used, and in Fremont and Atchison Counties, there
are also fertilizer requirements. These are determined from data
received from the university extension service and are minimum
' amounts 01 tlie rt:cuiiiiiieuu.eu Attics. ± ctrrncio iia.Vi.iig iiuluo prciiC. to
cutworm problems must also show that they took precautions, e. g. , .
used insecticides, rotated corn with crops not prone to cutworms, etc.
The "good farming practices" are determined by the adjuster if
a claim'is made. If the adjuster believes-that the farmer did not use
good management compared to his neighbors, he will notify his super-
visor and they will seek the opinion of the local extension agent to deter-
mine whether good practices were utilized.
The adjusters are part time (3 or 4 months) workers who are
either local small farmers who can handle the extra work or school
teachers or someone else with a farm background.
Every year, each county is reassessed to see if there is a signifi-
cant shift in the yields, such as during an extended drought period of
more than 5 years. If there is a shift, they will either adjust the yield
or discontinue insuring crops in that county, because the loss over the
areas insured must equal no more than 90 percent of the premiums.
Currently, corn, oats and soybeans can be insured in Fremont County,
and corn, oats, soybeans, and wheat in Atchison County indicating that
some alternative crops, e.g., milo, cannot be insured (see Exhibit 4. 3
for insurance application form).
4. 19
-------
Exhibit 4. 3
,i,cd UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Federal Cop Insurance Corporation
N S I 0 T X APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE FOR 19 AND SUCCEEDING CROP YEARS
(Contract N
-------
In 1975, there were 314 all risk insurance policies written in
Fremont County and 164 in Atchison County. .Claims collected on these
policies have been increasing because of the drought conditions experi-
enced in these counties. However, Federal Crop Insurance data indi-
cated that no claims were paid for cutworm damage in recent years
(see Exhibits 4.4 and 4.5 for claim forms).
One farmer who was interviewed stated that he may use his
Federal Crop Insurance as insurance against cutworm damage. That
is, if he cannot get aldrin or heptachlor in 1977, he may increase his
payment limits and take a chance and plant corn. If he incurs cutworm
damage, he would then collect and replant with soybeans. The risk of
doing this a number of times is that if his claims become excessive,
his Federal Crop Insurance may be withdrawn, which in turn may affect
his ability to get operational loans, since Federal Crop Insurance can
be u-sed as collateral. Therefore, farmers who may have cutworm
damage every year (i. e. , those planting corn on gumbo soil), may have
a problem if they use their insurance in this manner, because claims
may be filed yearly (unless some effective alternative becomes available)
which may cause an investigation by the Federal Crop Insurance Cor-
poration and which may result.in a farmer's insurance being cancelled.
4.1.7 Professional Scouting
Until the suspension of aldrin, farmers had a relatively inexpen-
sive means to control cutworms and in their opinion, it was always 100
percent effective. Therefore, there was never a need to scout their
fields for cutworm damage because they believed it never occurred. As
many farmers noted, when they were able to use aldrin, they never had
a cutworm problem and never had to replant.
Now that aldrin is out of the pipeline, many farmers have switched
to heptachlor. Some feel it is as good as aldrin, while others feel that
it does not give the 100 percent control that they thought aldrin did.
However, both types would agree that the control is sufficient so that
scouting is unnecessary and replanting is usually not necessary.
Once these preventive type pesticides are completely used, and
barring the registration of a new preventive insecticide for cutworm
control, farmers will have to use rescue insecticides if they want to
use a chemical insecticide to control the cutworm in the production of
their corn crop. However, associated with the use of rescues is the
need to scout the fields in order to determine when the rescues should
4.21
-------
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE CORPORATION
NOTICE OF DAMAGE OR LOSS
I v« or INJURED
r
~1
L
. J
1. &lol* ond Cownly Cod* ond Conlioct Number
2. C-oo
jC.op
Yeor
3. Nor»e> ol Person la lie Conlocted I Phon* No.
4. Days ond Tim* Contact con be Mod*
3. Location Wheic Contact can be Mude
6. On
.19 , notice of substantial damage or loss under the above-identified contract was received
with respect to the units identified in Column (A) below:
Unit
Numb.rd)
(A)
til
,
Ul
111
Ml
IS I
<
Tl
HI
.*•!
101
Cowie of Oama9O
(B)
•
•
Dal* of
Damage
(C)
It
Appr jttal
Reqve*!-
ed?
(D)
If Appraisal Requested,
Sho> Dale Land Needed
and Intended Use
(E)
Is Harvest
Completed?
If "Yes."
SKow Date
-------
Exhibit 4. 5
JAMVMBT !»«•
UNITED STATES
• MOII«I e«
CLAI1
4. Nocaa of loa«r«Q 64 othvr claimant
T. Oou Nodoi of Oana(a of U.. t.
oV rrUDAfyXkoM 10, *rt/oor]r C
DEPARTMENT OF ACRICUITUBE
or iNsuiANCi eoeronnoN
WFOa INDEMNITY
(COIN)
K«m Aporo.rd Rud >••
wua
»m-n«»c3;
rfw«li««
0«l>li
!l.,5,t
OoJgcUon
Tor
liudi
Hulk
^acior
TCT!
W,,,ni
X
5hdl
C
Ground
Shdlcd
iUr. or
ZU«ct
H
Shan
1
-
Bufh«l»
»r
WXfKI
J
I
Moll&ift
K
%
Otmift
L
Afr*«d
Factor
M
Product^*
not to
Count
N
i tn «*lu*o O. Ptri L Wn«ri • .'»«tw
b B«k« tut pradueiua mo)«t ta q
FAt! » CIirUlCAnON Of ADIUS1II
1 OPtflff fhaft, (0 lh« IMH o/ ny hna«Ud|t and bcllrf. thi 4*la tn Part U
tfxbl *»• Wl*| f*«t to AAadltf W«.
•
Cflfl.MCJ.nON. CIAIM. ANO III! At ( IT ClAIMANI
(*) II U h«ctoy «vmA!•(. iy mod* for tndmniir n»mp«r«»i 9<.c*u«ni lo irrtnt of th« liv
(C) PkymcM r«r«»«d by (1«lm«ni In *«MAnjRt o/ in&uMto on or»*cR CLMMAMT jo*r«
\
NATIONAL SERVICE OFFICE
in/oc
-------
be applied. This type of practice is something new to most farmers,
and only the better managers and more successful farmers have scouted
their fields in the past to determine if they should replant because of
cutworm damage. This practice however has not been without some
problems. Recognizing cutworm damage is sometimes difficult and
sometimes mistaken for rootworm damage in continuous corn situations.
In addition, damaged (young) plants will dry up and blow away rapidly.
Thus, unless a stand count is undertaken, a farmer may not realize
small amounts of damage because none would^visibly be present. Conse-
quently, a 40 percent loss in stand may result before the farmer realizes
what has happened. This has implications for professional scouting as
well (e.g. , stand counts and worm counts may be necessary).
•
Nevertheless, if the use of rescues is to be widely used in an
effective manner by farmers, more scouting of fields will be necessary
and the farmers will either have to learn how to detect insect damage
and the point at which pesticides should be applied or hire someone to
do this for them. At the present time, most farmers themselves do not
have this capability because they never felt the need to have it.
Private industry has only recently seen a market for professional
scouting in this area of the countrv and this study located two sources
for professional scouting in the study area -- one in Indianoia, Iowa
and one in Lincoln, Nebraska. *
One of the firms is a pesticide distributor and applicator. This
particular company has hired an entomologist to develop a pest manage-
ment control system that can be used by their pesticide dealers. At
present, the system is primitive and consists of a scouting network
that would be used to try and spot the cutworm and other pests as they
approach the economic threshold level. The company will try to con-
vince dealers to contact their area farmers and enlist them in the pro-
gram. The dealer or his employee would be trained by the company to
identify pest problems. When a pest problem is cited, the local scout
would call the company's entomologist, who would then advise the dealer
•what to recommend to his customers. The chemical company also has
planes for aerial application if requested. Attempts to use this system
^However, publicly funded research on scouting has occurred in
other Corn Belt states, e.g. , Indiana.
4.24
-------
will be made for the first time in 1976 and therefore no information
could be obtained as to dealer participation, farmer cooperation, and
cost to either the dealer or farmer. The entomologist in the company
indicated that the suspension of aldrin, chlordane and heptachlor pre-
cipitated the need for a pest management control system and profes-
sional scouts.
The second firm, headed by a Ph.D. entomologist, is a pest
management control firm with professional scouts. Their program will
identify the pest, the economic threshold level and the insecticide and
application necessary for control. A spokesman for the firm stated
that in order to put a scout in a particular area, he must have about
35 to 50 fields or about 4, 000 acres. Each scout, who is usually an
entomology or agronomy major, must sample each field at least once a
week, and if a problem is developing, the field will be sampled twice a
week. As of March, 1976., the firm does not have any clients in the
study area.
Thus, what remains to be seen is:. (1) whether or not the farmers
in the area will utilize rescues and scout the fields themselves or use pro-
fessional scouts, and (2) whether professional scouting services will suf-
f\ p ^ ^^ +-!».- ^ A-«r^1 o*^ *T» "U-»*->^1o TtrV. -^ +• o-rro *• *3 c» *-v^-a •-•/3 ? es *~ £» t^ ^ t- -> 4- o *-l T T v^ 4-I i f V, o
--u----"—J —*-* f <•*-> -±~--^.-- --.--i.-. J. .. -3 0^ _ . . ..i . . _I
present time, these services have not been widespread because the eco-
nomic incentives for private crop protection advice were non-existent
since chemical crop protection methods were quite economical. As all
carry-over supplies of aldrin, heptachlor and chlordane are exhausted
and as more reliance on a pest management control system, possibly
involving rescues, is need'ed, professional scouting may no doubt
become economically viable (as it has in other parts of the country), and
increase to meet the demand.
4.1.8 Mass Media
Previous sections have alluded to the use of mass media to dis-
seminate information about pesticides and pest control strategies. As
indicated, newspapers, radio, television, farm magazines and other
publications are all used by both the extension service as well as chemi-
cal companies and pesticide dealers. Below, some additional insights
about the local radio stations, the local newspapers, and farm maga-
zines are given.
The radio is an important information source for the farmer, as
suggested by an implement dealer who stated that all farmers order
4.25
-------
one -- at an extra cost -- in their tractors. A discussion with a local
radio station stated that the sponsors for their "farm reports" were
primarily chemical companies. All the major formulators and distri-
butors of aldrin and heptachlor advertised on the radio. The average
advertiser would have 12 one minute spots per week at $25 a spot during
the season. This translated into a yearly income of $12, 000-$15, 000
for the radio station. However, advertising for aldrin was discontinued
in 1974 and heptachlor will not be advertised in 1976. The station
expected that the reason for this was the fact that supplies would be
low and there would be no use in increasing demand. Currently, the
station does not have anything to advertise for cutworms. In the past,
the radio station would review the weekly insect reports put out by the
university extension service and check with the university extension
service recommendations and then advertise the appropriate product of
their advertisers. Presently, the radio station feels their advertisers
will advertise rescue operations in 1976 if cutworm infestations result.
The extension service also uses the local radio station to dis-
seminate information about educational meetings and other pertinent
information, as discussed previously.
the area in which this study took place is not represented by a daily
newspaper, but rather a weekly newspaper. Fremont County residents
rely either on the D-es Moines Register or the Omaha Herald. Residents
of Atchison County must get thei'r daily newspaper from St. Joseph,
Missouri. None of these newspapers include any specific news about
Fremont or Atchison Counties and a person may be buried before the
weekly newspaper comes out. Thus, for everyday local information,
the radio is more useful. However, in the local weekly newspaper,
extension service articles may appear and local pesticide dealers do
advertise.
For national news (e.g. , suspension of a pesticide such as aldrin,
heptachlor, or chlordane), the major network affiliations on the radio
and television are relied upon in the area. Farm magazines also dis-
seminate the national farm news to their readers. Wallace's Farmer,
Successful Farming and the Farm Bureau News Letter were read,
among others, by farmers in the area, and carried word of the decisions
(including editorial comments), as well as advertisements by the chemi-
cal companies, market forecasts, etc.
4.26
-------
4.2 Crop Production Output Factors
On the output side of the crop production process, i. e. , in the
marketing of the crop, institutions were also found to be influential.
One important factor found in this study was the grain elevators as dis-
cussed below.
4. 2. 1 Grain Elevators
In deciding to grow a particular crop, a farmer must consider the
facilities available to store and then sell the product. If a local elevator
will not handle a particular crop, then that crop may not be a viable
alternative for the farmer, even if there are no problems in actually
growing the crop. For example, *in this study, one found that although
wheat and milo were being suggested as alternative crops to corn
because of the drought and cutworm problems, many grain elevators
either could not or would not handle two grains at one time (i. e., corn
and milo are harvested at the same time). There was one grain elevator
in the area that could and would handle the two grains and thus this
problem did not arise in the study area. However, in areas where local
elevators will not accept a Particular croo, the farmer would then be
forced to ship the crop to the nearest buying market or depot which.
could quickly make the crop too expensive to grow.
Therefore, the marketing outlets for a crop must be considered
in the crop production practices of farmers when looking for viable
alternatives to growing a particular crop.
4.27
-------
5.0 INFLUENCE OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY
TIMETABLE ON CROP PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
AND PEST CONTROL STRATEGIES
In this chapter, brief reviews of the federal regulatory timetable
for the aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor decisions are first
given, including the mechanisms used to disseminate this information
to the local level and particularly to the farmer. With this as a back-
ground, the initial reaction of farmers to the knowledge of the pending
and the actual suspension of these pesticides will be discussed.
5. 1 The Aldrin/Dieldrin Decision^
The first public widespread indication that the Environmental
Protection Agency wanted to take regulatory action against aldrin/dieldrin
came in March of 1971 when the Administrator issued a notice of intent
to cancel all registrations of aldrin/dieldrin products. In response to
a request by 84 companies whose products were affected by the cancella-
tion ui-Jcr, a oclentLric advisory cciva—ittcc rcvic'.vcd the matter and
issued a report in March, 1972. They recommended that the following
uses be disallowed: all applications by aircraft; all folia spraying or
dusting; mothproofing by any methods-in which residues are discharged
into waterways or settling ponds'; all use on turf except as controlled
by individuals trained or licensed in pest-control; any use involving
application in aquatic environments.
In June, 1972, an EPA order withdrew cancellation notices for
aldrin and dieldrin uses in deep ground insertions for termite control,
nursery dipping of roots and tops of non-food plants, and fabric moth-
proofing when there is no wastewater discharge. Notices of intent to
cancel all other major uses of these chemicals were reaffirmed.
*Much of this description was taken from EPA press releases and
Environmental Facts on Aldrin and Dieldrin compiled in January, 1975
by the EPA.
5. 1
-------
Six months later, in December, 1972, EPA issued an order which
elaborated on its action of June, 1972, announcing that the Agency would
continue to permit use of aldrin and dieldrin for the protection of corn,
citrus and certain other crops pending the outcome of a public hearing
scheduled to begin in April, 1973. This order followed the voluntary
withdrawal by industry of such controversial registered uses as those
involving aerial applications, dust formulations, products for fire ant
control, and granules for termite control.
The cancellation hearing on the benefits and risks of aldrin and
dieldrin began on August 7, 1973 in Washington, D. C. Primary partici-
pants in the hearing were the Shell Chemical Company, sole manufac-
turer of aldrin and dieldrin; USDA; Environmental Defense Fund (EDF);
and EPA. Regional hearings were also held in Davenport, Iowa and in
Kansas City, Missouri and a number of farmers from the study area
(i. e;, type I farmers with medium to high resources) indicated that they
testified at these regional hearings.
One year after the cancellation hearings began, on August 2, 1974,
EPA issued a notice of intent to suspend registrations of those uses of
aldrin and dieldrin under investigation in the cancellation hearing, based
primarily on evidence that the pesticides are potential carcinogens and
thus pose an Mimminent hazard" to human health. The cancellation
hearing was temporarily adjourned when Shell appealed the suspension
and requested an expedited hearing on the question of "imminent hazard. "
The expedited hearing took place in Washington, D. C. and was concluded
on September 12, 1974.
On October 1, 1974, following the recommendation of the Admini-
strative Law Judge at the close of the hearing, the EPA Administrator
reaffirmed his earlier notice of intent to suspend and prohibited the
further production for use of all aldrin and dieldrin products not speci-
fically exempted in the June, 1972 order. The October order, however,
permitted continued sale and use of the very limited existing stocks of
the pesticides formulated prior to issuance of the notice of intent to
suspend on August 2, 1974. The suspension order was appealed in the
U.S. Court of Appeals by Shell and USDA. EDF, which supported the.
suspension, appealed the Administrator's decision to permit the use of
existing stocks of the pesticides. On April 4, 1975 the U.S. Court of
Appeals upheld the EPA suspension order as originally stipulated.
Throughout this long proceeding, EPA kept the public informed
through periodic press releases issued in Washington and through
5.2
-------
notices issued in the Federal Register. Major news sources -- news-
papers, national news on television and radio, weekly news magazines,
etc. -- all covered these developments and disseminated the informa-
tion in a timely fashion. Therefore, it is likely that many farmers and
those institutions concerned and affected by the decision, first heard
about the final suspension order through the mass media. In addition,
some farmers were aware that hearings on the cancellation of aldrin/
dieldrin had taken place since they testified at the regional hearings.
Furthermore, certain institutions (e. g. , the extension service and
chemical companies), through their involvement in the legal proceed-
ings, were aware of the regulatory actions; however, they typically
follow these developments through the Federal Register as well.
Secondary sources -- e.g., farm magazines, pesticide dealers,
extension service newsletters, etc. -- also provided information and
more details about the de.cision, tailored to the particular interests of
their clientele. In fact, for some farmers, the pesticide dealer was
the initial source of such information.
Finally, neighbors, friends and relatives, when they got together
socially, at meetings, or at the local "hangouts" (i.e., pesticide dealers
IT — r>4 >~ £^ CTratr>T" 2 S^C. ) °lsO Served ? S ?. FO'^rC? Of dl?'?e>Tni riaH'nrr fViio
information to those farmers who did not hear about the decision through
the typical mass media channels.
Further details about how news of the regulatory decision filtered
down to the local level, e. g. , time lag from the EPA news releases to
the actual knowledge of the regulatory action (which was not necessarily
obtained via the mass media) cannot be given due to the limited data
that was received and the lack of recall on the part of the respondents.
However, some thoughts are suggested in Section 5. 3 below.
5.2 The Chlordane/Heptachlor Decision*
On March 18, 1971 the Administrator of the EPA announced that
active internal review was being initiated on a number of pesticide
products, including those containing chlordane and heptachlor. Approxi-
mately three and one half years later, on November 18, 1974, the EPA
*Much of this description was taken from EPA press releases
5.3
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Administrator issued a notice of intent to cancel the majority of uses
of these two pesticides. Excluded from this notice were the following
uses: subsurface ground insertion for termite control and the dipping
of roots or tops of non-food plants. Among the cases affected by the
notice were: heptachlor for use on corn, other vegetables, cereals,
forage crops, seed crops, and seed treatments; chlordane for house-
hold and commercial applications, including crabgrass and indoor pest
uses, and uses on corn, grain, fiber and forage crops, certain fruits
and vegetables, seed treatments and summertime use in sewage treat-
ment plants for control of certain larvae.
A public hearing to provide an opportunity for all affected parties
to air their views was requested within the thirty day limit by a number
of parties, including the Velsicol Chemical Corporation of Chicago,
Illinois, the principal U.S. manufacturer of chlordane and heptachlor.
Written testimony for the cancellation hearings was taken beginning in
January, 1975.
However, before this public hearing actually got underway, the
EPA Administrator on July 29, 1975 issued a notice of intent to suspend
the registrations of products containing these pesticides for most house-
hold an'"' ?orriciilHiT?^ use*5 citin^ ~n imminent'humc~ CS.TICCT hc.~s.vd.
The only uses excluded from this notice were those excluded in the can-
cellation notice.
The expedited suspension hearings began on August 6, 1975 in
Washington, D. C. before an Administrative Law Judge and were con-
cluded on December 5, 1975. On December 24, 1975 the EPA Admini-
strator reaffirmed his earlier notice of intent to suspend and announced
an immediate ban on approximately 85 percent of the uses of heptachlor
and 70 percent of the uses of chlordane. However, for those uses now
suspended, existing stocks of chlordane/heptachlor products produced
prior to July 29, 1975 may be used up according to label directions.
Continued use of chlordane/heptachlor on corn was allowed
through August 1, 1976. However, the Velsicol Chemical Corporation
voluntarily agreed to stop producing heptachlor for-many uses, including corn.
The Administrator found that while chlordane and heptachlor are used
on only 1. 5 and 1. 3 percent of farms on which corn is grown, respec-
tively, no major economic or crop loss would occur if chlordane were
unavailable for that use. However, because the need for these pesti-
cides is concentrated in certain areas of comparatively wet land, and
because the farmers in those areas need time to develop operating
5.4
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experience and familiarity with insect scouting and other techniques
as alternatives to chlordane, the Administrator will continue to permit
that pesticide to be used for the 1976 growing season only, with a cut-
off on August 1', 1976.
The Administrator's December 24, 1975 decision has been chal-
lenged in two separate law suits -- one by the Velsicol Chemical Cor-
poration and one by the Environmental Defense Fund. Velsicol1 s
petition requested the court to set aside all portions of the Administra-
tor's order that suspend any registrations of heptachlor and chlordane,
and EDF charges that the Administrator violated FIFRA by failing to
suspend immediately all uses of the pesticides.
Whether the suspended and allowable uses of heptachlor and
chlordane will remain will depend on the outcome of more in-depth can-
cellation hearings. The cancellation hearings were interrupted by the
suspension action and were resumed in Washington, D. C. on June 22,
1976.
As was the case with the aldrin/dieldrin regulatory action, EPA
has kept the public informed through periodic press releases and through
noticcc :n the Fcd^r^l 5,p'^icfp«'*< 'T'Ua ?£.*mp SOY*.Tf'aa t^""?.^ d' ^ e<=>T-nin«<•«>(-)
the information aboxit the aldrin/dieldrin decision were found to be at
work during this regulatory action as well; however, some farmers
affected by the decision had no knowledge of the chlordane/heptachlor
regulatory action as is further discussed below.
5.3 The Reaction of Farmers
A farmer's reaction to a pending or actual decision to restrict
the use of a pesticide is, of course, first contingent upon knowing that
some kind of regulatory action has taken place. The current study
found that a farmer's knowledge about the aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/
heptachlor regulatory actions was correlated to his current use of these
pesticides. Those farmers who never used or have not used the pesti-
cides in recent years -- i. e. , type III and IV'farmers -- either knew
nothing or very little about the regulatory actions, other than they
thought they had heard something about it but were unsure of when or
how. F-or them, the decisions did not have any real effect on their
crop production practices, and thus there was no need to "keep up" on
the decisions.
5.5
-------
For those farmers that do. use these pesticides -- i. e. , primarily
type I and in emergencies, type n farmers -- most were aware that
aldrin/dieldrin had been suspended. Knowledge about chlordane/
heptachlor being suspended was more limited, but some of these farmers
did know that some regulatory action was being taken against these two
pesticides. Accounting for the fact that the aldrin/dieldrin decision
was rendered in October, 1974 and the chlordane/heptachlor decision
in. December, 1975 (i.e., the aldrin/dieldrin decision has had more
time to filter down), two additional factors explain these differences --
contact with pesticide dealers and supplies of the pesticides. Although
many farmers heard "something" about these regulatory actions via the
news media or in farm magazines, the aldrin decision, for example,
did not "hit home" until they then came into contact with their pesticide
dealer, in December, 1974 and January, 1975 for some farmers, and in
the spring of 1975 for most farmers. This is where they again heard
about the decision (or for some heard about it for the first time), and
where the decision first affected them, if carry-over supplies of the
banned pesticides were tight or unavailable. That is, most farmers
did not become fully knowledgeable of the aldrin decision (i. e. , receive
detailed information, take the messages seriously and attend to it) and
really view it as problematic until they contacted their dealer and found
tha^ they had or would hav<= difficulty buyincr what they used to use.
Therefore, prior to the time when carry-over supplies became scarce,
farmers tended to do little experimenting with alternatives and did not
actively seek information about alternatives. For example, many
farmers said that they did not know of an alternative pesticide as effec-
tive as aldrin and were concerned when the supplies ran out; however,
they also said that they just did not know what to do because they never
had to face a situation of this sort before.
Nevertheless, for some farmers who had heard about the regula-
tory action through the national news or through some other form of
the news media, their first reaction was to contact their pesticide dealer.
In some cases, dealers contacted their long time customers to tell
them about the decision and to come in early to order their pesticides
due to the shortages that were apparent. Upon contacting their dealer,
these farmers reacted by stockpiling carry-over supplies of the banned
pesticide. This reaction was exhibited by the larger higher resource
type I farmers who depended upon aldrin year after year. Other farmers,
unaware of the decisions or unable to afford the cost of stockpiling,
waited until they normally bought their insecticides and either took what
their dealer had to offer or shopped around looking for supplies of the
banned pesticide.
5.6
-------
Hence, it appears that pesticide supply is the primary stimulus
for the farmer to change his previous production practices, and not
awareness of the regulatory action itself (i.e., "hearing" something
about the pesticide regulatory action). Thus, because carry-over sup-
plies of aldrin/dieldrin had been banned and they began adjusting to the
situation. However, for chlordane/heptachlor, adequate supplies were
still available in 1975 and few farmers interviewed in January and
February of 1976 realized that production of heptachlor had been dis-
continued by Velsicol in July, 1975 and that u'seof chlordane/heptachlor
was allowed only until August 1, 1976 on corn. It can be assumed that
as more farmers went to their dealers to order their pesticides for the
1976 growing season, they became knowledgeable that chlordane/
heptachlor have also been suspended on corn effective August 1, 1976,
and that they began to react to this suspension due to the tight carry-
over supplies that would result.
The user adjustment response patterns to the aldrin/dieldrin and
chlordane/heptachlor regulatory actions are described in the next chap-
ter.
5.7
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6. 0 USER ADJUSTMENT RESPONSES
AND PROBLEMS
Adjustments to date (i.e.', as of March, 1976) have been minimal
on the part of corn farmers. Overall, there had been a great deal of
stability of approach to pest control prior to the regulatory actions
against aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlbr (indeed, sufficient
stability that a fourfold typology of pest management strategies has been
developed which adequately typifies individual farmers over time -- with
very few moving across group boundaries). Moreover, the most strik-
ing finding amongst corn farmers is that this stability carried over into
the 1975 growing season (i.e., the first growing season affected by the
aldrin/dieldrin decision) such that it minimized user adjustment
responses. Nevertheless, some trends have been noted and are antici-
pated and these will be discussed under the following categories:
No response to the regulatory action;
No change in current pest control practices;
Use of new chemical pesticides;
"Take a chance"; and
Use of early to moderate maturing varieties
and/or early planting;
Reallocation of crop acreage; and
. . Intensive use of scouting. .
These categories, it should be emphasized, are not necessarily dis-
joint empirically. Rather, they are offered as a means of conceptually
organizing data from corn farmers. That is, farmers may have simul-
taneously exhibited more than one adjustment response described above
or may have switched from one response to another. Moreover, it
should be emphasized that the responses observed (except for the no
response observation) are by and large on behalf of type I farmers, and
to some extent type II farmers (according to the typology previously
developed), -as these are the ones who primarily use aldrin, chlordane
and heptachlor and' have cutworm problems.
6.1
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6. 1 No Response to the Regulatory Action
For many farmers (L. e. , type El and type IV farmers), the regu-
latory actions taken against aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor
had no effect on their crop production practices. These farmers did
not have the cutworm problem and therefore, never had the need to use
these insecticides. Hence, when asked about what effect the banning
of these pesticides had in 1975, many were not even aware that these
pesticides had been banned ! Their reply was that it had no impact on
them and no effects or changes in their practices were foreseen in future
growing seasons. That is, they perceived that their practices would
continue as they had been performed in the past, with no problems
whatsoever.
6.2 No Change in Current Pest
Control Practices .
For those farmers who had heavily relied upon aldrin prior to
ji'tfij uicttoi* y accLon \i. c. , type j. iiai'iii^rij/, i"iia.n.y 1'oojjOi'j.tiviC*. 111 A / • -> oy
continuing to use aldrin. This response was contingent upon obtaining
aldrin which implied that carry-over supplies of aldrin had to be already
in hand or found early enough in the season. This required some mone-
tary resources and therefore, only the medium to high resource type I
farmers exhibited this .response in 1975.
Additional adjustments or responses which can be understood
largely as a function of this transition period (i. e. , the time between
the banning of the pesticide and when all carry-over supplies are gone)
were also noted. For example, shopping around for available supplies
and lowest prices appears to be more frequent now than in the past.
Y/hile this change from sole reliance on "the family dealer" is no doubt
based on several changes (shortages due to the petroleum crunch and
higher prices due to inflation, among others) in the operating environ-
ment, the "scramble" for available supplies seems at least partially
due to EPA bans. Stockpiling and use of "anti-termite aldrin" were
also noted and can be viewed as transitional adjustments, in that they
simply "buy time" for the farmer and delay the necessity of some more
profound adjustment.
6.2
-------
During the current growing season (i. e. , 1976) only a few high
resource type I farmers indicated that they would continue to respond
to the pesticide ban in this manner. The primary reason for this is
that these are the only farmers who still have carry-over supplies of
aldrin! This again supports the finding that until carry-over supplies
of a banned pesticide are no longer available, the first adjustment has
been to expend extra efforts to obtain the banned chemical, as opposed
to any change in agricultural practices.
The occurrance of this response, may, to some extent, be due to
the messages received by the farmers from the institutional setting.
For example, the extension services in Iowa and Missouri (and conse-
quently pesticide dealers) continue to recommend carry-over supplies
of the banned pesticides, dealers have tried to stockpile the banned
pesticides, and some financial lenders expect pesticides to be used in.
the crop production process.
6.3 Use of New Chemical Pesticides
A change from aldrin to heptachlor (and sometimes chlordaae) in
1975 was exhibited by those farmers who were, for the- most part, unable
to get aldrin. Primarily low and medium resource type I farmers and
medium resource type II farmers switched to this alternative, enabling
these farmers to continue their basic approach to growing corn. That
is, the type I farmers continued their non-contingent preventive type
strategy with no change in other pest management practices and the
type II farmers were able to continue their contingent use of a preventive
type insecticide with no additional changes in pest control strategy.
However, the shift from aldrin to heptachlor or chlordane did
entail several other adjustments. First, these pesticides were in short
supply* and farmers did have difficulty obtaining adequate supplies of
*This is partially due to the fact that in the past, pesticide dealers
in the area primarily dealt with the aldrin distributor rather than the
heptachlor distributor and thus experienced some problems in having
their heptachlor orders filled. The petroleum crunch of 1974 may have
also contributed to this problem.
6.3
-------
this alternative pesticide. Many farmers, as a result, took early
delivery but by doing so had to pay for them earlier since dealers now
require payment within thirty days. This has increased the need for
credit and may be seen as a stress in the farmer's operating environ-
ment.
In addition, the lower concentration of heptachlor formulations
and the higher application rate required with chlordane (both relative to
aldrin) required that the application equipment be recalibrated. This is
an "empirical" task requiring a trial and error approach, sometimes
entailing several "trials". For example, one farmer applied chlordane
as if it were aldrin, obtained poor control and had to replant his crop.
Moreover, farmers indicated that because of the greater volume
which must be handled, increased trips to the dealer may be required,
greater storage capacity is needed (particularly significant in light of
the previously mentioned trend to early delivery), and an increased
number of containers must be disposed.
The farmers also indicated that the cost of these alternatives were
greater than aldrin and some farmers did not feel that heptachlor and
chlordane gave as good control as aldrin.
Nevertheless, this response is seen as one that will continue with
greater frequency in.1976 (and in 1977 if carry-over supplies are still
obtainable). Those farmers that used aldrin in 1975 and could not get
any for 1976, had either put in orders for heptachlor or chlordane or
were planning to. In addition, one type IV farmer, who never used
pesticides before, planned on using chlordane in 1976 since he experi-
enced some cutworm damage in 1975.
6.4 "Take a Chance"
Some farmers who tried and were unable to get either aldrin or
heptachlor in 1975 decided to "take a chance" and used no cutworm
insecticide in their pest management strategy. Others decided to "take
a chance" because they could not get aldrin. They did not seek out a
source of heptachlor because they either: (1) did not know that heptachlor
was an alternative, (2) thought that it was also banned, or (3) did riot
think it was as good as aldrin. Farmers exhibiting this "take a chance"
response tended to be low to medium resource type I farmers, although
one high resource farmer took a chance because he did not think
heptachlor was as good as aldrin.
6.4
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Associated with this response were a number of considerations
for the farmer. Should he incur cutworm damage, he must then decide
if he will replant, and if so, what crop. Some farmers said that they
would replant corn. However, weather and the time of year are im-
portant. If the weather is unfavorable and it gets too late in the season
(e.g., June 15), corn is not desirable to plant. Moreover, some
farmers said that the time it takes to plant the first crop is also a
factor; that is, some of the larger farmers are still planting their first
corn crop in early June and thus would not have time to replant with
corn. Others said that they would not risk planting corn a second time
unless some preventive type insecticide could be found before replant-
ing. For these reasons, soybeans may become an alternative crop on
replanting. However, if this is done, farmers must be sure not to use
Atrazine (a corn herbicide) on their corn crop because it will kill the
replanted soybean crop. In addition, the farmer must weigh the addi-
tional cost of replanting and the expected income to be derived, versus
the reduced income caused by the reduced yield he would get if he did
not replant.
Indications were received that this "take a chance" strategy may
increase during the 1976 growing season, as well as during subsequent
growing seasons. .As one farmer put it, "everyone will take a chance
until they get wiped out once". Thus, the frequency of replanting may
' also increase as a result of this strategy.
6. 5 Use of Early to Moderate Maturing
Varieties and/or Early Planting
Only a few farmers interviewed indicated the use of early to
moderate maturing corn varieties or early planting as a mechanism
to minimize cutworm damage. These were high resource type I and
type II farmers and it is significant that this adjustment is not widely
discussed and may not be perceived as "available" by many farmers.
Part of this explanation may come from the fact that the Iowa and
Missouri extension services do not promote this response as a way to
specifically minimize cutworm problems. Another factor is the weather.
Gumbo soil drains very poorly and a crop cannot be planted until the
soil sufficiently drains. Thus, if the soil is still wet in early spring,
a delay in planting the crop may result.
6.5
-------
No indication was received as to whether this strategy will in-
crease in popularity in future years.
6.6 Reallocation of Crop Acreage
A number of medium to high resource type I and type II farmers
indicated that in 1975 they reallocated their crop acreage as a result
of not being able to get adequate quantities of aldrin or heptachlor.
For example, alternative crops to corn, such as soybeans, wheat, or
milo, were planted in fields having gumbo soil (i.e., fields that were
believed to have somewhat predictable propensities for cutworm damage)
and could not be treated with aldrin or heptachlor due to shortages.
It should be noted that these same areas were frequently placed in the
Soil'Bank before this program was repealed.
Although no major obstacles were indicated in switching to these
crops, it was indicated that growing milo and wheat are not as common
as growing corn or soybeans-. As a result, the local institutions are not
as familiar with milo and wheat as they are with corn and soybeans.
For example, milo cannot be insured in Fremont County, Iowa, where-
.as the other crops can, and the extension service in both counties pro-
vides more detailed information on corn and soybean production prac-
tices in comparison to the others. Thus, some farmers may need to
acquire some skills prior to growing these crops and may encounter
some difficulties in doing so.
In addition, milo can also be irritating to the eyes and skin and
some farmers said they could not grow milo because of prior allergic
reaction. Moreover, it is important that it be harvested within three
days after a freeze, with one grain elevator suggesting that a farmer
not plant milo unless he has his own harvesting equipment. Finally, the
farmer must be sure to find an elevator that will handle these alternate
crops. This latter problem, however, was not found in the study site
but was merely suggested as one constraint on the viability of wheat and
milo.
Some type I and type II farmers indicated that in 1976 and par- •
ticularly in later years, more shifting of crops away from corn could
be likely if no alternative to aldrin and heptachlor was available. That
is, many said that wheat, milo, or soybeans would be planted in their
problem areas (those fields susceptible to cutworm problems) and they
6.6
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would "take a chance" with corn on the rest of their crop acreage.
However, a number of farmers indicated that they would not grow corn
unless an alternative as effective as aldrin came along, or unless the
risk warranted it (i.e., the price was favorable), while one farmer
took an opposite view and said he would grow continuous corn and feed
it to his cattle.
6. 7 Intensive Use of Scouting
It is important to make the point that intensive use of scouting,
leading to contingent use of rescue insecticides, has not been found in
the study area nor was it'suggested as a possibility for future years,
although the Iowa and Missouri extension services do include rescues
in their recommendations. A number of reasons are available to explain
this phenomenon in this area.
Corn farmers are accustomed to using aldrin, a preventive type
insecticide they believe to be 100 percent effective. With this insecti-
cide, farmers never expected nor experienced cutworm damage and
therefore never saw the need to scout their fields. Thus, it is a prac-
tice that is without history or institutional basis and foreign to them.
Consequently, they currently lack the knowledge to effectively scout
their fields, and in addition, may not be willing to accept a given level
of cutworm damage that is necessarily associated with the use of scout-
ing.
Furthermore, the successful use of rescues was reported by
several research entomologists to be contingent upon not only scouting,
but an understanding of the cutworm's life cycle. Thus, the extension
services' and research institutions' admittance that they lack knowledge
concerning the cutworm's life cycle makes the appropriate use of res-
cues uncertain to these institutions.
Finally, pesticide dealers are reluctant to stock rescues because
their shelf life is at most one growing season and it is difficult to antici-
pate demand. Thus, they are not available to the farmer as a viable
alternative.
6.7
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS
In light of the schedule of the aldrLn/dieldrin and chlordane/
heptachlor suspensions relative to the time period of field work, the
rather minimal adjustment responses observed as of March, 19*76 (i. e. ,
primarily continuing to use aldrin for as long as possible and after that,
changing from aldrin to heptachlor or chlordane) are quite important for
they indicate that very little in the way of preparatory or anticipatory
adjustment has been undertaken on the part of the individual farmer.
Indeed, supporting this contention are several indicators:
Unusual efforts have been expended to obtain aldrin,
including stockpiling on the part of farmers as well
as pesticide dealers and the use of aldrin labeled for
anti-termite use; and
Little or no knowledge that heptachlor and chlordane
have been suspended was found to exist amongst
farmers.
A number of factors can be delineated to explain the responses
and problems described in Chapter 6. 0. Knowledge that a regulatory
action is pending or has actually occurred is, of course, a precondition
to the response process. As already discussed, the current study
found that the corn farmers in the study site may become aware (i. e. /
hear ("something") of a regulatory action via the news media. However,
they do not become fully knowledgeable of a regulatory action (i. e. ,
receive detailed information, take the messages seriously, and attend
to it) and view it as problematic until they come into contact with their
pesticide dealer and find that carry-over supplies of the banned pesti-
cide are or will be tight. Indeed, pesticide supply appears to be the
primary stimulus for the farmer to change his pest control and pro-
duction practices and not awareness of a regulatory action itself, i.e. ,
learning "something" about a pesticide regulatory action.
An important consideration for the individual farmer in determining
his response is his personal resources e.g., his past practices to pest
control (i.e., tradition), his financial resources (cash and/or credit),
his information seeking activities, his managerial skills and his contact
with pesticide dealers. For example, those farmers who heard of the
aldrin ban through the news media and stay in contact with information
sources such as the extension service, have good dealer contacts, and
7.1
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have adequate financial resources,- were best able to stockpile aldrin
in order to maintain their current pest control practices. Indeed,
some dealers contacted their long time better customers shortly after
the ban was announced to warn them that carry-over supplies were
tight and to urge them to place their orders early.
Those unable to stockpile or locate a source of aldrin when the
1975 growing season approached, were forced to adopt an alternate
strategy. A farmers personal resources and his ability to absorb a
succession of poor crop years, i.e., poor crop yields, are again
important considerations in the response chosen. The lower resource
farmers tend to respond in the way that is least costly and/or least
risky to their overall crop production process. Thus, simply a pesti-
cide substitution, e.g., aldrin to heptachlor, was one response if
heptachlor could be found. For many who could not get heptachlor, a
"take a chance" strategy was utilized. The higher resource farmers,
on the other hand, who can more easily absorb a poor crop year will,
on occasion, utilize strategies that may be more costly and/or more
risky in that they depart somewhat from their past practices. For
example, crop substitution (assuming no allergic reaction to the alter-
nate crop) or the use of earlier maturing varieities were practiced by
a limited numberof such farmers. However, the'high resource farmers,
who may be more likely to take risky alternatives than the low resource
farmers, also tend to' have access to a wider range of information
sources and so are more likely than the low resource farmers to adapt
in a fashion they regard as successful, regardless of the response
alternative chosen.
However, the study found that the institutional network -within
which the corn farmer has to operate is most critical, both for dictating
available response options as well as alleviating associated problems.
When faced with replacing a banned pesticide, the farmer looks to the
institutional setting to provide an answer just as he does when he is faced
with a pest resistance situation. That is, the buildup of pest resistance
to a particular pesticide has, in the past, initiated cooperative research
activity from numerous institutions (e.g., agricultural experiment sta-
tions, extension services, chemical companies, etc. ) to develop alter-
native pest control strategies (chemical or other) for the problem
pesticide and to disseminate these alternatives to the farmer through
his local information sources (e. g., the pesticide dealer). In addition,
pest resistance to certain pesticides has created new institutions (e.g. ,
professional scouting, professional pesticide application, etc. ) to help
in this adjustment process, when necessary.
*This description fits those who are typically the higher resource
farmers.
7.2
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The withdrawal of a pesticide calls for this same type of respon-
siveness from these same institutions; however, the time factor can be
more critical with a pesticice regulatory action, in that pest resistance
to a pesticide is noticeable and usually evolves over a long period of
time, whereas the knowledge of a pesticide regulatory action may not be
known far in advance and will impact in a shorter time period. More-
over, the removal of a pesticide may sufficiently increase the risk of
growing the crop to warrant a crop substitution. In this case, the ability
of the institutions to provide services similar to those that they provide
for other crops (e.g., educational information, operational loans, crop
insurance, markets to sell the crop), is important if crop substitution
is to be a viable alternative.
Consequently, the available response options open to a farmer
and the ease with which he can adjust to a pesticide regulatory action
are-, most definitely, dictated by institutional responsiveness and insti-
tutional foresight vis-a-vis EPA regulatory decisions. In the corn study
site, the above mentioned institutions were found to be unprepared to
meaningfully help the farmer cope with .the regulatory actions and conse-
quently, they were slow to react. As a result, the individual activities
and resources of farmers became that much more important. Moreover,
the viability of new pest control practices, particularly alternative crops
and intensive use of scouting with contingent use of rescue insecticides,
were hindered or even precluded, largely due to these institutional con-
straints, as already detailed in Sections 6.6 and 6. 7.
Finally, the user adjustment response process is contingent upon
uncontrollable and/or confounding conditions unrelated to the regulatory
decision. For example, pesticide supply shortages caused by a petro-
leum crunch, weather, market conditions and levels of pest infestation,
all had an influence on both the response options open to corn farmers
and the subsequent problems, as already described in Chapter 6.0.
7.3
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Part II - COTTON CASE STUDY RESULTS
-------
8. 0 COTTON CROP PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
AND PEST CONTROL STRATEGIES
In order to appreciate the user adjustment process exhibited by
cotton growers faced with the cancellation of DDT, it is necessary to
first have an understanding of the factors bearing on their decision to
produce cotton. Once this is accomplished, it is important to look at
the strategies (i. e. , production systems) used by different farmers in
growing cotton, paying particular attention to their insecticide use
strategies.
8. 1 Factors Determining Cotton
Production by Farmers
A number of factors enter into the farmer's decision of whether
or not to grow cotton in certain fields that they farm. One important
factor is tradition, i. e. , farmers who have grown cotton all of their
lives will continue to do so and make a go of it because they feel it is
prestigious to grow cotton. Many of the farmers that were interviewed
grew nothing but cotton, and those that grew both cotton and soybeans
stated that their better land would be planted to cotton and the rest of
their land (or most of it) to soybeans, indicating that these farmers have
designated their land as either 1fcotton land" or "soybean land".
However, there are other important factors that the farmer con-
siders before making a final decision to grow a particular crop. Two
inter-related factors are the price of the crop and the cost of produc-
ing the crop. For example, over the last 2. 5 years, cotton prices were
at their lowest in late 1974 and early 1975* and the cost of producing
the crop had increased significantly during the 1974 growing season due
to various factors, including the weather, inflation, pesticide shortages
and the ban of DDT. As one farmer who dropped producing cotton in
SUSDA, ERS, Cotton and Wool Situation, CWS-4, March 1976,
12.
8.1
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1975 put it: "The cost of raising cotton changed my mind more than
anything else. It's too damn expensive!" Thus, for some farmers, the
low cotton prices, coupled with high production costs, led them to grow
alternate crops in 1975.
Another important factor that the farmer must consider is the
weather, which he has no control over. Ideally cotton should be planted
around May 10. * Peak yields can be expected from cotton planted
around this time. Furthermore, reductions from full yield will be
less for cotton planted before May 10 than for cotton planted after May
10. Therefore, if farmers cannot get their cotton crop planted by May
10 or soon thereafter, i. e. , by June 1, alternative crops may be
planted by farmers.
In addition to these factors dictating a farmer's decision to grow
a particular crop, farmers can receive messages from a number of
sources, which in some way may affect their crop decision and subse-
quently their pesticide use decisions. As our field work uncovered,
these sources may include:
' Neighbors and friends (i. e. , other farmers in the
community);
Landlord (if a tenant);
County extension agents;
University extension publications;
Agricultural chemical dealers;
Implement.and supply dealers;
Trade and promotional meetings;
Pesticide manufacturers' representatives;
Professional scouts;
Professional applicators;
Cotton ginners;
Cotton buyers;
Pesticide label;
Radio;
Television;
Farm magazines; and
Local bankers, production credit association, or
Farmers Home Administration.
*Burch, T.A. , When to Plant Cotton in Louisiana, Cooperative
Extension Publication Number 1743, Louisiana State University,
January, 1973.
8.2
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Some of these sources are more influential than others and most
farmers do not receive messages from all of the above sources, but
rather from some subset of them.
In order to give an indication of when farmers would receive infor-
mation from these various sources vis-a-vis the production of cotton,
a one year timeline of crop production can be developed with these
sources superimposed on that timeline. Such a timeline appears in
Exhibit 8. 1.
Assuming the weather conditions are proper, ground preparation
begins in January. If any stalks are left in the field to be cut and
disked, this would be carried out first. During all of February and
into March, crops, equipment and other agricultural components are
financed. As a general rule most farmers have decided what crops
they will be raising and how they will be financed by March 1st. Some
farmers have also purchased their pesticides by the end of February.
Extension meetings and chemical promotions also occur during the first
part of the new year.
In theory, planting can begin as early as April 10th, although this
is regarded by most as only an "acceptable" time of planting. April
20th is a much preferred date of planting since by now, ground tempera-
tures are rising. May 10th is perceived as an ideal time for planting,
in terms of obtaining a peak yield since ground temperatures are now
most favorable.
All throughout April and early May, trap-cropping* (although not
practiced primarily due to the increase in production costs) could be
carried on (in theory) as an insect control measure. By late May and
early June, most crops will have reached the two leaf stage or hopefully
will have matured even more so. When plants average at least three
half grown or larger squares per plant, boll weevil control is recom-
mended if 25 percent of the squares have been punctured by boll weevils.
*Trap-cropping refers to the practice of planting strips of 8 to
16 rows of cotton along field borders in known boll weevil "hot spots"
to attract and concentrate overwintered weevils. This should be done
3 weeks before planting the main cotton crop. When the plants are at
the "pinhead" square stage, 5 applications of a boll weevil insecticide
are to be applied at 5 day intervals to kill the overwintered weevils
before they spread over entire fields.
8.3
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Exhibit 8. 1: Timeline of Crop Production
Jecember January February March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Pesticides bought by
some farmers (others
buy in the spring and
summer as needed)
Chemical company promotional meetlngs;-
pesticide advertising on radio, television.
etc. ; ground preparation begins; held over
cotton sold; booking of cotton takes place
Extension service meetings (statewide
and regional) to supply recommendations;
scouting contracts negotiated;
operational loans negotiated for upcoming
year (FHA. PCA and banks review
applications)
cotton
. Cotton planted
1
»
sr
i
g
itlng for '
r~
-.,
1- '
I
LCotton harvested, sent to
gin and then sold or held;
stalks destroyed
-Soybeans harvested and
then sold or stored;
diapause control for
cotton
-Chemical pesticides applied on cotton crop for
bollweevil, bollworm and tobacco budworm
control
—Professional scouting takes place
Soybeans planted
-------
However, most farmers are more conservative and begin applying
insecticides when 10 to 15 percent damage occurs. In the early part of
July, preferably around the 10th, bollworm and tobacco budworm treat-
ments can also begin, according to extension service recommendations.
At this time the cotton squares are at least one third grown and plants
are setting bolls. Bollworm and budworm treatment as such is dictated
if 15 percent of these squares or bolls, are damaged. Also around
July 10th, plantbug and fleahopper treatments can begin with generally
an unspecified terminal date. However, pest control via means of
beneficial insects, is encouraged by the extension service into late
July and possibly August, all factors permitting, because as soon as
chemical pesticides are used, they must be continued because the first
chemical pesticide application will kill the beneficials. All growing
season insect control methods extend up until approximately the end of
August or early September.
Diapause control should begin at the'time growing season insecti-
cide control ends; this control generally being a reapplication of "grow-
ing season insecticides" based upon a 10-14 day cycle, rather than a 5-
day cycle. Diapause application should continue, in theory, until the
stalks are cut or killed, or the end of October. Many farmers indicated
that they could not afford diapause control. Others who would have
applied diapause treatments did not do so, saying that it would not be
effective unless their neighbors also participated in diapause control.
The picking of cotton can be intermingled with the diapause
sequence, for those who practice it. Stalk destruction should proceed
immediately after picking but is sometimes delayed until the latter part
of the year or early the following year, as indicated previously. One
reason given by some farmers for never destroying all of their stalks
immediately after picking is that they allow their cattle to graze on the
land. Some landlords insist on this and many believe that cotton land
is excellent grazing land for cattle. Non-farmers in the community
said some farmers would rather go hunting and fishing than chop the
stalks, indicating that this practice may interfere with their (the farmers')
leisure activities.
Therefore, the end of October is a terminal date for that year's
cotton growth, but it may or may not be for the picking, ginning, stor-
ing and marketing of cotton. In short, once the growing season has
terminated, the sequence from the picking of cotton to the selling of it
is more variable and not subject to the schedules which are followed
during the growing season.
8.5
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A further discussion of these sources of information and their
influence and impact on the user adjustment process appears in subse-
quent chapters.
8.2 Cotton Crop Production Systems
Before one can begin to make distinctions between various crop
production systems, it is important to note that all farmers growing
cotton in northeast Louisiana, the geographic location where this study
took place, have been plagued with tobacco budworm problems and they
were particularly severe during the 1974 growing season. In addition,
inflation was noted as a problem, as well as the weather and pesticide
shortages. Thus, all in all, the situation was described as one of
desperation. For example, one farmer said "we were just guessing",
when referring to the insecticides to use to control the tobacco budworm.
This was confirmed by a professional scout when he summed up the
situation by saying "the farmers did not.know what the hell to use!"
Moreover, it is important to under stand-that the use. of-insecticides
in cotton production is a way of life with the cotton farmer. That is,
in northeast Louisiana, cotton farmers have a long history of using
insecticides, particularly DDT, and their practices indicate.that when
cotton is grown, insecticides are always used. Moreover, the "chemical
solution" orientation is such that among farmers, one expects "24 hour
-kill". Hence, no cotton farmer has sugge.sted total termination of
insecticide use, although different farmers have different philosophies
about their insecticide use strategy.
Farmers were found to frequently utilize a number of sources for
helping them decide what particular pesticides to use, i. e::
Extension service;
Pesticide dealers; fS '•
Professional scouts; . .
Aerial applicators; and
Neighbors, friends, and relatives.
The relative importance of each source can vary arr>'. " .
some choosing a particular pesticide because the'
it, and others choosing a pesticide because it '••••
through their dealer.
8.6
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In order to distinguish between different types of farmers, or
crop production systems, a typology of farmers, based upon their
insecticide use strategy during the 1975 growing season, was developed.
It would have been preferable to distinguish between different types of
farmers based upon their insecticide use strategy prior to the DDT
decision (i. e. , during 1970-1972) in order to see how this affected their
subsequent adjustment. However, such a distinction was not possible
because almost all cotton farmers had used DDT prior to its cancella-
and their recall vis-a-vis their use of other pesticides and pest control
practice's prior to the DDT cancellation was limited. Nevertheless, the
distinction that was used (i. e. , their 1975 insecticide use strategy) is
a useful one in that it represents various strategies that were adopted
by the end of the short term (i. e. , three year) adjustment period once
carry-over supplies of DDT were no longer available. Three types of
farme'rs (i. e. , crop production systems) were identified from those
interviewed, i.e.:
Type I - adopters of "new" pest control approaches
to cotton production;
Type II - users of the more "traditional" approaches
to cotton production; and
Type III - those who dropped cotton production in the
1975 growing season (i.e., "marginal producers").
Type I farmers, .adopters of "new" pest control approaches to
cotton production, had become more innovative over the past couple of
years since the DDT cancellation and were found to exhibit the follow-
ing characteristics:*
Many own and/or rent a large amount of land
(e.g., up to 2500 acres);
Cotton acreage in 1974 usually exceeded 500
acres;
*Based on interviews with 30 farmers designated as of this type.
8.7
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Reduced cotton acreage from 1974 to 1975 but
1976 plans indicate cotton acreage will be similar
or greater than 1974 cotton acreage;
Had stockpiled EPN - methyl parathion and DDT,
if possible;
Used EPN - methyl parathion in 1974 and/or 1975
or tried to obtain it;
Lines up (ahead of time) his insecticide either by
reserving it or by buying it;
Seeks information from extension service, scouts,
etc. ;
Beefed un scouting in one way or another with outside
information (i. e. , a rriore intensive and higher quality
of scouting utilized);
Adjusts insecticide schedule to match scouting, i. e. ,
tends to apply insecticide only when scouting indicates
the need to;
Indicates tendency to plant earlier;
Tends to defoliate;
Practices diapause control, but not extensively;
Practices stalk destruction, with many of the larger
farmers cutting stalks right behind the cotton picker;
and
Cotton yields ranged from 0.44 to 1.3 bales /acre in
1974 and from 0. 62 to 1. 7 bales/acre in 1975.
Type II farmers, those taking a more "traditional" approach to
cotton production, were found to exhibit the following characteristics:*
*Based on interviews with 9 farmers designated as of this type.
8.8
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Owns and/or rents various amounts of land (e.g. ,
100 to 1000 acres);
Cotton acreage in 1974 ranged from 50-500 acres;
Some reduce*d cotton acreage from 1974 to 1975 but
1976 plans indicate cotton acreage will be similar to
1974 cotton acreage;
No stockpiling of insecticides and generally no pre-
purchasing (i. e. , appears to buy insecticides "as
needed", one or two applications at a time);
Seemed to remain with "old standbys", i. e. , toxaphene-
methyl parathion and endrin;
Less motivated in seeking out new information;
No change or only a small increase in level of scouting;
Sets insecticide schedule, (e.g. , every 5 to 7 days)
and 'sticks to it in a firm or nearly firm manner,
, weather oermitting;
No change in olanting dates in recent years;
Tends not to defoliate;
Does not practice diapause control;
Stalk destruction is not practiced at all; and
Cotton yields ranged from 0. 75 to 1. 5 bales/acre
in 1974 and from 0. 5 to 1. 25 bales/acre in 1975.
Type III farmers, those who dropped cotton in the 1975 growing
season, were found to exhibit the following characteristics:*
*Based on interviews with 7 farmers designated as of this type.
8.9
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Most own and/or rent a small amount of land (e.g. ,
under 350 acres);
Tends to be the smaller cotton farmer with only 50-
250 acres of cotton olanted in 1974;
Planted all their cropland to soybeans in 1975 rather
than to cotton and soybeans, citing" the excessive
costs of cotton production;
Indicated that they would be planting cotton in 1976; and
Cotton yields ranged from 0. 5 bales/acre to 1.4 bales/
acre in 1974.
These crop production systems will be further discussed in subse-
quent chapters when talking about farmers' responses to these regulatory
actions.
8. 10
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9. 0 INFLUENCE OF LOCAL AND EXTRA-LOCAL
INSTITUTIONS ON COTTON CROP PRODUCTION
SYSTEMS AND PEST CONTROL STRATEGIES
Institutions, which represent an integrated set of ideas (i.e.,
goals, values, norms, etc. ), can prescribe, to a given audience on a
given subject, what should be done and how it should be done. In
Chapter 10.0, a number of sources representing various institutions,
were indicated as having an influence on a farmer's representing vari-
ouse crop production practices, and more specifically, his pest control
strategies. In this chapter, these institutional structures are further
described.
These institutions can be broken down into two general types -
those having an influence on the input side of the crop production process
and those having an influence on the output side. Each type is described
with the relationships between institutions explored, as well as some
implications for farmer adjustment responses and problems to the DDT
cancellation.
9. 1 Crop Production Input Factors
In addition to the influence of neighbors, friends and relatives,
a number of institutions were shown to have a bearing on the input side
of the cotton production systems and pest control strategies practiced
by the farmers interviewed in this study. Most important among these
institutions are: the extension service, the agricultural experiment
station, chemical companies, pesticide dealerships, professional
scouting, aerial application, loan institutions, and the mass media.
Each is discussed below.
9. 1. 1 Extension Service
The extension service's primary role is one of education and in
the area of pest control, they play a most active role. The primary
goals are to make available the recommendations of pest control spe-
cialists and to disseminate general educational material in this area.
Every year, a number of regional and statewide meetings are
sponsored by the Louisiana State University (LSU) Extension Service
to keep cotton farmers and others informed about the latest advances
in cotton production and pest control strategies. For example, in mid
January, 1976, a "Cotton Growers Marketing Day" was held in Monroe,
9.1
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Louisiana and a "Cotton Growers Research Day" was held in Alexandria,
Louisiana. Each were well attended by farmers. In late March and
early April, a four day Pest Management'Workshop was held in Alex-
andria, Louisiana sponsored by LSU. The purpose of this workshop
was to instruct farmers, potential scouts, pesticide dealers and others
Involved with cotton production. The program included topics such as
insect identification, proper scouting techniques, herbicides and insec-
ticides, proper application of pesticides, etc.
In addition, each year, in the spring, the university extension
service supplies pesticide recommendations for the control of insects
'and weeds and this information is distributed to pesticide dealers, pro-
fessional scouts, farmers and others interested in cotton pest control.
The local extension agents in Richland and Franklin Parishes are
responsible for disseminating this information to the farmers they serve
in their respective parishes. They receive support and supervision
from an assistant district agent located in Monroe, Louisiana, who in
turn reports to a district agent located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
In Richland Parish, this educational material is mailed out to all
cotton farmers, pesticide dealers, scouts and anyone else who requests
to be on the parish mailing list. Besides the yearly p?.mphl
-------
As indicated above, the extension service is utilized by many
farmers and it has been very active in educating the farmer and others
in the proper control of cotton insects.* Extension specialists from
LSU travel throughout the state and many are personally known by the
larger cotton growers. At least as early as 1971, the extension service
began warning the farmer that pest resistance to DDT was already
becoming a problem, as well as the fear that DDT would not continue
to be available. In addition, they began supporting the notion of scout-
ing, use of beneficial insects, and diapause control as a part of an
integrated pest management strategy and they began participating in a
pilot pest management program in 1972, designed to promote these
concepts.
The pest management program recommendations for the 1976
cotton growing season further illustrates their commitment to an inte-
grated pest management strategy and includes:
Planting trap crops to kill overwintered weevils;
Planting cotton as early as possible (before mid May);
Avoiding excessive nitrogen rates;
Hiring a competent scout;
Letting beneficial insects combat pests in June and
early July;
Using either EPN-methyl parathion or toxaphene-
methyl parathion for bollworm and tobacco budworm
control;
Practicing diapause control; and
Destroying stalks immediately after harvesting.
However, at the present time, the extension service's primary
concern vis-a-vis insecticide recommendations is to have something
to recommend to the farmer for tobacco budworm control in the upcom-
ing growing seasons, as the currently registered pesticides are inade-
quate for optimum cotton production under moderate to heavy bollworm-
budworm pressure. Much hope is put on having the new synthetic
pyrethrolds developed by Shell and FMC and the new organo-phosphates
developed by Bayer, registered for the 1977 growing season.
*Part of this may result from the fact that no agricultural night
classes appear to be available at the local level. The only option appears
to be at Northeast Louisiana University Ln Monroe, Louisiana, but
these courses are all standard degree oriented courses.
9.3
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9. 1.2 Agricultural Experiment Station
The agricultural experiment station at LSU plays a most important
and active role in dictating pest control strategies for farmers to follow.
By working closely with the extension service, perceptions of problems
are transmitted from the farm level through the extension service to
the research entomologists. In addition, the research entomologists
themselves stay well in tune with the localized problems by having
experiment stations throughout the. state (two of which are in the north-
east part of the State; one at St. Joseph and one at Winnsboro), and by
maintaining contact with local farmers as described above in Section
9*1.1.
Over the years, a great deal of research has been focused on the
tobacco budworm problem, not only in Louisiana but in other states as
well. In recent years, it has intensified since it has become the domi-
nant species in cotton fields during mid August into September and it
is the most feared pest of cotton growers, since adequate insecticides
for its control are not currently available.
Each year, in January, a conference on cotton insect research
.,..'' _ . .. * _ -1 : -, i- -1 ,j r. — s ;-.»•-11 - *•*- - — J - J V-- '— *-V «—*-....-:-— __J — —v,
Ctll^A C *•* 1.L V X W 0. J. O LJ.OJ.U. CLllv-1 1 O >»v CJ.JL ei w I»O AIVA C>-& tJ y **> V Wil C-rt. w^*.l £5 I w &* 0.1*1* J. \* fc- \~ ^ J. *- *. 1
entomologists. The latest information available from the various state
agricultural experiment stations is disseminated and pest control strate-
gies for various cotton insects are discussed. Recommendations for
controlling the cotton insect complex are made, along with future
promising control procedures outlined.
In Louisiana, tobacco budworm research has been adequately .
funded over the years according to one research entomologist. Research
is continual and ongoing every summer at the various experiment sta-
tions throughout the state. Research in 1974 and 1975 was the most
intensive ever, in several years at LSU. In handling the tobacco bud-
worm infestation, the state legislature appropriated funds which became
available in late 1974 and throughout 1975. This funding continues and
has allowed for the hiring of two full time entomologists allocated to
two experiment stations.
Generally, LSU likes to have experimented with an insecticide
(i. e. , screened it) for at least two years, and preferably three years,
before recommending it to cotton growers. They have not done any
major research on the recently registered bollworm-budworm virus
insecticide "Elcar", and it will not be recommended for use by cotton
farmers.
9-4
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Currently, the LSU research entomologists are looking ahead
five to ten years toward the development of resistant cotton strains and
earlier maturing cotton varieties to cope with the tobacco budworm and
other cotton insect infestations. Registration of the new synthetic
pyrethroids and new organo-phosphates mentioned earlier is viewed only
as a short run solution for the next few years, enabling farmers to sur-
vive until the new cotton strains are available, since they have recog-
nized cross pesticide class resistance problems. Thus, use of scouting
techniques is highly recommended and dependence on insecticides, they
feel, must be discontinued.
In all, a sophisticated research entomology operation appears to
be at work in Louisiana with an adequate level of resources allocated
thereto. They are aware'of the farmer's problems and, although they
do not have the "cure all" for the tobacco budworm problem, they
appear to be capable of responding to emerging pest problems such as
the tobacco budworm.
9. 1. 3 Chemical Companies
The role of chemical companies in pest control strategies and
their relationship to other institutions, has been very well described
in an NAS study on pest control technologies, i. e. :
"In general, the primary synthesis and initial testing
of pesticides to control weeds, diseases, and insects
is done by private companies. Once a product has
shown effectiveness with regard to field performance
against a pest in a major commodity, it is introduced
to university and government scientists at experiment
stations and extension service?. These researchers,
given the material on an experimental basis, field test
it. If those tests are positive, it will go into additional
large scale field experiments sponsored by government
and private firms. Labeling and registration efforts
then will proceed.
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act, as amended in 1972 Federal Environmental Pro-
tection Control Act (FEPCA), adds a new dimension
to the pesticide situation. It provides authority for the
regulation of pesticide application and use. If a pesti-
cide is not labeled for a particular use, then it cannot
9.5
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legally be recommended and used for that pest problem.
Before the FEPCA amendments of 1972, federal regulations
provided for the registration of products, and establish-
ment of efficacy, and the definition of permitted residues
and tolerances. If'research demonstrated that the pesti-
cide controlled pest X, then it could be recommended
for that use. However, under the current FEPCA
(1972), the material must be labeled for use to control
pest X before it can be recommended for that use. This
places a constraint on pest control practices. This is
especially important in view of the high costs for register-
ing pesticides for specific uses. Several chemical com-
panies estimate that it now costs 7-10 million dollars to
register and market a new pesticide. With costs in this
general range, companies primarily will proceed to
register products for major market use. Registration
may not be attempted for effective chemicals against
pests of secondary importance, those occurring
sporadically, or those affecting only minor commodities. "*
As is evident, cooperation between the extension service, agricultural
experiment station, ?.n.d the chemical companies has occurred in the
past and continues with relative success today.
With respect to the tobacco budworm problem, a number of chemi-
cal companies have been doing research on developing alternative pesti-
cides to those now registered and a number are being field tested at
agricultural experiment stations. Many are very promising based on
tests conducted at the Louisiana agricultural experiment stations and
it is hoped that they will be registered for use in 1977, as indicated
previously. Thus, chemical companies are taking an active role in
helping to find an alternative pesticide to control the tobacco budworm
to those now registered.
At the local level, the chemical company conveys information on
its products through sales pamphlets and other literature, through
field demonstrations, promotional meetings and expositions, through
advertisements in farm journals, in newspapers, on radio and on
*National Academy of Sciences, Pest Control: An Assessment of
Present and Alternative Technologies, Volume II: Corn/Soybeans Pest
Control, National Academy of Sciences, 1975, p. 108-109.
9.6
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television, and through personal contacts between their sales repre-
sentatives and parties involved in distributing pesticides and pesticide
information, particularly pesticide dealers. Only a very small per-
centage of farmers, typically those with larger operations, will come
into contact with sales representatives directly. Most others will
receive chemical company information through their pesticide dealer.
9.1.4 Pesticide Dealerships
The primary role of the pesticide dealer is to supply the farmer
with pesticides. However, the pesticide dealer has also been mentioned
as an important source of information to the farmer about pesticides
and is as influential as the extension service, particularly during the
growing season. Dealers estimate that over 50 percent and up to 90
percent of the farmers consulted them in deciding what pesticide to use.
Although many farmers tentatively decide what to use based on infor-
mation received from their scout and/or the extension service, the
determining factor is the supply, i. e. , what is available from the dealer
for the problem. This was particularly true during 1974 when pesti-
cide shortages were a real problem. Many farmers simply went to
their dealers and asked them what they had left. For example, indica-
^ Q*^ o "' r* -* /-» "**o^^^"od ^'""C*"v"t ^Q*^^r* •" -~ f^f ^ o o i QT^ -• 1 o^/^TTfr- £ V* ** f cjQr^^ d"**^rt"**S
sold farmers what they (the scouts) would call "gimmick insecticides",
and that this may have played a role in the 1974 and 1975 pest control
difficulties.
Some pesticide dealers are also local formulators and in addition
to selling pesticides in drums, they maintain 1, 000 gallon bulk tanks
at the local flying fields (given the popularity of aerial application)
where the farmer can purchase a pre-mixed pesticide formulation, if
he does not want to carry his pesticide out to the field or wants to have
a particular formulation made up by the applicator. These tanks are
metered and a ticket is printed for each batch dispersed for application,
so that each farmer can be billed separately. Farmers who use the
bulk tanks buy pesticides as they use them and cannot reserve pesticides
out of the bulk tanks in advance. This is in contrast to those farmers
that can stockpile pesticides by buying drums.
In addition to selling pesticides, some dealers also offer their
customers free scouting services. This is usually for their older
established customers and is done by request only. No formal scouting
programs are usually offered. The study did find one individual who
was both an active scout and a pesticide dealer; however, pesticides
9.7
-------
were not sold to his scouting customers, but rather on a walk in basis
and not as a part of any scouting package which the farmer paid for.
During 1974, these dealer supplied scouting services were widely used
due to the disastrous year farmers were having. These arrangements
have continued, particularly with the "loyal" customers of a single dealer.
In 1976, one dealer (who is an ex-scout) will begin offering the
farmer a program he terms "programmed planting" (presumably for a
fee). In this program he will assist the farmer in selecting cotton seed,
herbicides, insecticides and will, if the farmer wishes, suggest com-
petent scouts.
Contact with the farmer is usually on a face-to-face basis although
the local media is also used in advertising. During the winter months,
some local dealers, including those that are also local chemical com-
pnay formulators, host promotional "catfish dinners" for their regular
customers by invitation only. These are thought to be very influential
with respect to the pest control strategies utilized during the growing
season. A chemical company representative may be the invited speaker
and the extension agent may also attend. Pesticide literature will
usually be disseminated at the meeting as well. The large farmers (or
LiiObc Having rfcictLAVfeS WClrCiij.^ o.\, ILJ.O piSCiCiGc! G.C
-------
summer) to insure that their order will be filled. * One large dealer
indicated that they did not have any problems with having their orders
filled. They did say that they "have come close" to not receiving an
order but that this has not yet occurred. Smaller pesticide dealers
apparently have had some problems in getting their orders filled.
The buying habits of farmers have also changed. More and more
farmers that buy pesticides by the drum (as opposed to out of the bulk
tank), are placing all or part of their orders in the fall or in the early
part of the following year to insure adequate supplies. One dealer indi-
cated that 25 to 35 percent of his insecticide sales within the last two
.years occurred in December, January and February. Prior to this,
most of the buying of insecticides took place just prior to the season or
during the season. However, there are many farmers who continue to
buy pesticides as they need them, .i. e. , one or two applications at a
time.
Billing procedures have also changed in recent years. Chemical
companies no longer will carry dealers, but demand payment when the
shipment is received. As a result, the dealers are now requiring their
customers to pay within 30 days or incur finance charges. Some excep-
tions are made, i. e. , large dealers with long time customers having
larg1? volvne accounts will carry these people longer than 2>0 days. In
addition, discounts for buying early (i. e. , in the fall or early part of
the year) are given by dealers. ^
9. 1. 5 Aerial Application
As alluded to above, aerial application of insecticides is a popular
method used by cotton farmers for having their insecticides applied.
One local pesticide dealer estimated that 90 percent of the insecticides
applied, are applied aerially.
Numerous aerial applicators were found in the study area to pro-
vide this service and the farmer-pilot relationship appeared to be rela-
tively stable with most farmers reporting at least three years with the
*One extension agent noted that pesticides are channeled into
Texas earlier in the year and cited this as contributing to the pesticide
shortages in 1974 and 1975.
9.9
-------
current flying service. Some farmers have one half day access to
their applicators, while others do not. The former group are typically
large growers and/or have relatives working for the aerial applicator.
Some aerial applicators are seasonal in that they enter an area just
prior to the growing season whereas others maintain residence in the
area year round.
Most farmers do not rely on the applicator for pesticide advice
in any major way, but rather go to the applicator with their decision
already made. Nevertheless, some small scale growers (black farmers
in particular) did say that they utilized their flying service for advice
on what .to apply and when to apply it. This phenomena may have
occurred more in 1974 when farmers were asking everybody for advice
on what to do.. Furthermore, aerial applicators in Richland and Franklin
Parishes do not personally sell insecticides, although this practice was
reported in other areas of the state (e.g. , in Rapides and Caddo
Parishes).
Each applicator, however, maintains a relationship with one local
chemical formulator and has his bulk tanks out at his flying field.
Approximately 50 percent of the farmers go through the bulk tank and
the other 50 percent either carry their pesticides out to the flying field
from their dealer or their home or have it delivered to the flying field
by their pesticide dealer. Farmers usually stay with one or the other
over the years. Those that go through the bulk tank cannot request
certain pesticide mixtures because the bulk tank contains pre-mixed
pesticides, e.g., EPN-methyl parathion (6-3), etc. Those that bring
a drum of an insecticide can and do state the mixture they want and
many usually stay and watch the insecticide being mixed.
Aerial applicators usually fly the mixtures at a rate of one or
two gallons per acre based on what their customer wants, although many
professional scouts and the extension service feel that mixtures at the
rate of 2 to 3 or 5 gallons per acre are necessary for adequate control.
Typical application costs range anywhere from $0. 75 - 0. 90 per acre
for a one gallon mixture per acre and $0. 85 - 1. 00 per acre for a two
gallon mixture per acre. Furthermore, flagging of fields (i.e. , place-
ment of flags in the field to aid the applicator in insuring that the pesti-
cides are properly applied), which is recommended by both the exten-
sion service and many professional scouts, is not practiced to any great
degree by farmers. Many applicators said that they know the fields
quite well and also can use landmarks just as well as flags.
9. 10
-------
Overall, the biggest change that has occurred in application as a
result of the DDT cancellation, has been the fact that more farmers
now come in with their own "individualized orders". Whereas the
applicator used to be able to load up and move from farmer to farmer,
he now has to do more individual loading; for example, load up with one
type of mixture for a 60 acre plot and then return and reload with a dif-
ferent chemical for another farmer's acreage. In short, this has added
much more work to the application business and inherently, more respon-
sibility. One applicator stated he has not increased his prices to adjust
for this new "specialization", possibly due to the competitive nature of
the application business in the area he serves.
Another big change for the applicator has been his involvement
with professional scouts. Many professional scouts make a point of
telling the applicator how they would like the pesticides applied (e.g. ,
application rate, use of flags, etc.). Some applicators have voiced
concern over this, with one applicator stating that "too much scouting
can cause difficulties for the applicator also", implying that the appli-
cators, are not happy with the professional scouts telling them what to
do and that professional scouts are not happy with some of the practices
used by applicators.
V.1.6 Professional Scouting
The primary role of the professional scout -- or pest manage-
ment consultant -- is to provide individualized information to the farmer
concerning insect identification, insect damage, and pest control proce-
dures.
According to one professional scout, professional scouting in the
area first began in 1948-1949. The extension service for a long time
has pointed out the need to scout fields on a weekly basis, in order to
determine what insects are present and when insecticide applications
should begin. In recent years, the extension service has strongly sup-
ported and recommended that cotton farmers hire competent scouts to
Identify insects and insect damage. Many of the professional scouts
operating in Louisiana hold degrees in entomology from LSU and in some
sense can be viewed as an arm of the extension service.
In September, 1975, the Louisiana Pest Control Act of 1975 was
passed which requires among other things, that professional scouts be
9. 11
-------
certified and licensed.* Certification can only be received if the proper
education and/or experience is obtained and a scout must be licensed
to practice in the state. The law also requires that if scouts supply
recommendations, they must be in writing to the farmer and a copy
must be retained for their files. Furthermore, the law defines several
classes or levels of scouts ranging from the checker to the pest manage-
ment consultant. More details of the specific requirements are given
in Exhibit 9. 1, which excerpts the section of the Act pertinent to profes-
sional scouting.
The phenomenon of "paid for" scouting is widespread throughout
the State of Louisiana and throughout the study site. A large applica-
tor estimated that 50 percent of the planted, acreage is professionally
scouted in the study area. Usually the larger cotton farmers utilize
the service, although some large farmers' insist on doing, their o.vvn
scouting, since they have not been sold that the professionals do any - •.
better a job.
Some may feel this way given the fact that the quality of scouting
has not been consistent in the past. When truly professional scouts
were employed, there seems to have been no problems. However,
i.hci'e WC.TC tiiosc wiio 5cugi.it OU.L scoukir^ CLO a p3.rc (.inio jCu in ..^0 sum-
mer and possibly had a limited interest in quality scouting. In addition,
reports of scouts drinking alcoholic beverages in the field were given
by some farmers.
A farmer usually gets associated with a scout by contacting a
scout or by having a scout contact him. Thus, it is a two way process
and negotiations usually take place in the early part of each year.
Scouting costs range from $1. 50 - 2. 00 per acre for the season which
usually begins around June 15 and ends around Spetember 30. The
scout will usually check a client's fields once a week and more often
if a problem develops or if the farmer requests that they be checked
more often. Some scouts limit their business to acreages of at least
a certain size (e.g. , 200 acres) and others have no minimum, require-
ments .
*The law was passed with unanimous approval of the agricultural
experts at LSU and was highly lauded by the Farm. Bureau and other
farm organizations. It is administered by the Bureau of Technical Ser-
vices, State Commission of Agriculture.
9. 12
-------
Exhibit 9. 1: Louisiana Pest Control Act of 1975, Section 1629
§ 1629. Certification of pest management
consultants; categories; exemptions; require-
ments; licensing; field employees; recommen-
dations
A. An individual shall not act or offer
to act as a pest management consultant
unless he is certified as such. The commis-
sioner shall certify an applicant who satis-
factorily demonstrates by written exam or
other means authorized by rule or regula-
tion his competence in the specific field
of pest management for which he desires
certification. This certification shall
be valid for one year unless revoked, sus-
pended, or cancelled by the commission, and
shall be renewable under rules established
therefor.
B. Applicants for certification as pest
management consultants shall elect to be
examined for certification in one or more
of the following categories:
(1) Control of insects, ndtes,
nematodes, or other invertibrates.
(2) Control of plant pathogens.
(3) Control of weeds.
The commissioner may by rules and regu-
lations establish such other categories or
subcategories as are necessary to effec-
tuate the purposes of this Subpart.
C. No application for a pest management
consultant's certificate shall be accepted
unless the applicant furnishes satisfac-
tory evidence that he meets one of the
following requirements:
(1) He is currently licensed in the
field of entomology, plant pathology, cotton
insect control, or su>;a.r cane borer control
under R.S. 37:1967:
(2) He holds a masters or PhD. degree
from an accredited college or university
in an appropriate discipline;
(3) He holds a bachelors degree '• '
from an accredited college or university
in an appropriate discipline and one year
of experience in the field for which he is
requesting certification;
(4) He holds a bachelors degree
from an accredited college or university
•with at least twelve semester hours credit
or its equivalent in appropriate discip-
lines and has one year's experience in the .
field for which he is requesting certifi-
cation; or
(5) He has three years of experience
in the field for which he is requesting
certification.
: 9.13
-------
Exhibit 9. 1: (continued)
D. A person shall not engage in the
business of pest management consulting
without first having secured a pest manage-
ment consultant license. The commissioner
shall issue the license upon receipt of an
application containing such information on
the applicant's qualifications and proposed
operations as he may require by rule or
regulation. This license shall be valid
for one year unless revoked, cancelled or
suspended by the commissioner and shall be
renewable under rules established therefor.
E. Every field employee of a licensed
pest management consultant shall be regis-
tered with the D°r=>rtr:?nt of A.rricultur-3.
iiiis registration snail be valid only as
long as the individual is employed by the
licensed pest management consultant indi-
cated on the face of the registration certi-
ficate.
F. Pest ranagetnent cc.-isuitants shall
put all recommendations in writing, with
two copies each. One copy shall be signed,
dated, and furnished to the person for
whom the recommendation is being made, and
consultants shall retain, one copy which
shall be furnished to the commissioner
upon his request. Where a pesticide use is
recommended uae recuim
-------
Each week, the scout will leave a written report containing infor-
mation on insect counts in each field, i. e. , boll weevil counts and
tobacco budworm counts. In addition, most professional scouts have
their own pest management strategies and will provide insecticide
recommendations, including the insecticides to be used, the recom-
mended rate of application, the applicator sequence and the area to be
treated. Professional scouts keep abreast of extension service recom-
mendations and, in most cases, their strategies are consistent.
Professional scouts feel that most farmers now follow their
advice because they have shown that they know how to produce a good
cotton crop.* That is, most of the top notch professional scouts do not
sell their service as a way to save on insecticide costs, but rather as
a way to increase yields which will, in turn, more than pay for the
scouting costs. Moreover, some professional scouts require that
their clients follow their recommendations or they will refuse to do
business with them.
In cases where the recommendations are not followed, it is
•usually the application schedule that is altered, due to a difficulty in
scheduling the application with the aerial applicator, since their ser-
pesticides will also be changed if the farmer cannot get a particular
pesticide from his pesticide dealer.
9. 1. 7 Loan Institutions
In order to farm today, large sums of money are needed both for
machinery and equipment and for yearly operational expenses. Vir-
tually every producer must obtain a yearly operational loan to pay for
some or all of the cost of producing and harvesting a crop, i. e. , seed,
fertilizer, pesticides, fuel and labor. In addition, equipment loans
are also necessary from time to time in order to buy necessary
machinery.
In order to borrow the money to operate today, it is necessary for
a farmer to have land and/or machinery to use as collateral, or a
*The implication here is that, in the past^ professional scouts
have had difficulty getting the farmer, the pesticide dealer and the pro-
fessional applicator to follow his recommendations to the letter. This
may indicate that a role conflict existed between the applicator and the
scout (also see page 9. 11); however, it did not appear that the adjust-
ment process was significantly hindered by this.
9. 15
-------
proven credit rating. The building of credit is done much as it is done
in the larger city but with the added feature that the bank or other
institutions loaning money most likely knows more about the farmer's
family background which adds another dimension. One basically is
allowed to borrow small sums of money and if there are no problems
with returning the loans, credit ratings increase and larger sums are
permitted in future years. The additional dimension prevalent in the
smaller, rural towns is that the credit rating does not necessarily
reflect the ability of the individual as much as it reflects the individual's
family and their position and ability to meet loan commitments.
A number of sources are available for yearly operational loans
and equipment loans, including local banks, production credit associa-
tions and the Farmer's Home Administration. All institutions have
competitive lending rates. For real estate loans, the Federal Land
Bank Association is usually used.
For those farmers who have been successful in farming for a
number of years, or for those farmers who own or inherit land, go into
partnership with a relative or have a good family background (i. e. ,
come from families who are respected in the community, who have
good credit ratings, etc. ), a loan may be secured either from a local
bfLnk or ^ '"reduction '""Trec'.it 9 ssocis-tion^ •
Local banks vary in their exact requirements but all stress that
a good credit record and the farmer's production capabilities are of
utmost importance. That is, a farmer's credit record is reviewed and
his ability to make loan payments in the past is considered. Further-
more, the banks stated that they have been in the area for a long time
and most of their customers have been borrowing from the same bank
for a good number of years. Thus, they know each customer very well,
including his land, soil type, and production capabilities. One bank
said that sometimes a pound of lint per acre average for the farmer is
used in determining anticipated production. No specific loan limits
were mentioned and it appeared that the loan amount was based on the
farmer's past credit record and production capabilities. The loan
officers do not usually require that their customers diversify their
crop and most do not discuss a farmer's pest management strategy or
production practices. Most farmers are felt to be knowledgeable and
up to date on the latest practices and are left independent. For example,
at one bank, the Board of Directors wanted to hire a farm consultant
to help their borrowers in seed selection, planting practices, insecti-
cides, etc. The bank president strongly opposed this, saying it would
be an infringement upon a farmer's right to make his own management
9. 16
-------
decisions and the policy was not adopted. Loans are usually negotiated
in the early part of the year, and usually the more established farmers
borrow from the local banks, although younger farmers and farmers
with small operations are also handled by the banks.
The production credit association (PCA) is cooperatively owned
and will only make loans to farmers and one must be a stockholder to
borrow money. Loans can be made for crop production, equipment,
cars, trucks, etc. One becomes a stockholder by purchasing, stock and
his loan limit is partially governed by how much stock he owns, i. e. ,
the farmer must own enough stock to cover 10 percent of the loan
amount. Potential borrowers are evaluated in some detail on both pro-
duction qualities and personal qualities, e.g.:
Land size or size of the operation;
Quality of the farmer's soil;
Security with which to cover the amount loaned;
Production record (past and projected);
Credit record; and
Personal qualities (e.g., responsibility, morals,
attitudes, etc. ).
One loan officer said that it is seldom that the farmer has both a strong
production record and credit record. If the farmer is just starting out
or has incomplete production records, the PCA will rely on his credit
record and his personal qualities. If a farmer's credit is questionable,
they will rely on 'bhe other factors.
The production credit association determines ,the farmer's loan
limit based on a formula (subject to owning enough stock). For cotton,
they use a base yield of one bale or 500 pounds of lint per acre (soil
permitting), and a price of $0.45 per pound of lint. Thus, given this
projected yield, the farmer should be able to earn $225 per acre. If
the farmer is going to plant 100 acres of cotton, his expected return
would be $22, 500. If the farmer wants to borrow this amount, it is
referred as a 100 percent loan. If the farmer is established, he can
borrow the full amount and possibly more based on any additional
security he has (e.g. , land ownership). If the farmer is just entering
9.17
-------
agriculture or rents entirely, the amount loaned is termed an 80 percent
loan and is 80 percent of the expected income. A similar type formula
is used for soybeans based on a yield of 12-15 bushels per acre (soil
factors considered) and a projected market price of $4. 00 per bushel.
The PCA advises their borrowers to diversify their crops and
to draw up carefully considered budgets. One PCA loan officer also
advises his borrowers to book cotton in advance. * Loans are negotiated
in the winter months and farmers of all sizes are handled through the
PCA. A major portion of the cotton crop in the area is financed through
the PCA (estimates of 60-70 percent of the cotton crop were given).
For most farmers starting out who do not own or inherit land or
go into partnership with a relative, and for those farmers who cannot
secure a loan by any other means, ## it may be necessary for them to
get a loan from the Farmer's Home Administration, an agency within
USDA, which will tolerate the higher risk. Usually FHA loans are
given to family based operations under 300 acres and FHA operational
loans can be up to a maximum of $50, 000.. FHA loan recipients are
expected to show improved management skills and increased net income
and therefore are expected to build-up a good credit rating and become
p rl I •"» rr Ir^ffi fvi f i ^*^ C \TM fVi T*-I *^ t-» ** irt* -~~* rr f* nf CI'V
years. FHA tries to accomplish these purposes by close supervision
of cash flow (see Exhibit 9.2 for statement required) and by encourag-
ing the farmer to attend local extension programs. If the farmer does
not utilize the local educational resources and FHA directives and pro-
gress isn't made, the next year's loan may not be made and the FHA
supervisor may advise the farmer to liquidate.
In assessing a farmer to determine the loan amount, a formula
similar to that used by the PCA is applied. For cotton they usually
xise an average yield between 600-700 Ibs. of lint per acre and a pro-
jected market price of $0.45 pound with the cost of production being
*Booking of cotton is the pre-season contract selling of cotton
where the farmer contracts the future delivery of a certain amount of
cotton (i. e. , number of bales) at an agreed upon price.
**Included may be farmers who used to go to the local banks or
production credit association, but due to a series of bad crop years
were forced to return to the FHA.
9. 18
-------
Exhibit 9.2
USDA-FHA • rtuii*m t 'OMB NO. «o~Rta/;
Form FHA 431-2 mimr* ' "
(Rev. 12-1-72) FARM AND HOME PLAN CDUI""M'. '.
i S
TOTAL OTHER DEBTS 1
TOTAL ALL DEBTS I
i. TOTAL OF CASH ON HAND. CROPS ANO LIVESTOCK HELD FOR IMMEDIATE SALE. ANO INCOME TO BE RECEIVED IN
IMMEDIATE FUTURE t
2. DEBTS ANO EXPENSES WE WILL PAY FROM A3OVE CASH ANO INCOME (Itomii.)
J. CASH CARRYOVER FOR NEXT YEAR'S OPERATIONS AFTER PAYING THESE DEBTS
4. NET WORTH (TOTAL PROPERTY OWNED MINUS TOTAL ALL DEBTS)
S. TOTAL LAND DEBT
S. TOTAL DEBTS OTHER THAN LANO
PERIOD COVERED BY PLAN: FROM
BEGINNING OF TEAK
i
t
l» TO
ENO OF YEAR
t
I
S
INCREASE
OR OECRCAU
t
t
FHA 431-1 (R.v. U-J-?
9,19
-------
Exhibit 9. 2 (continued)
WTl: HI <
B. CROPS, PASTURE. ETC.—PRODUCTION AND SALES
PLANNED
CHOPS. PASTURE.
SET-ASIDE PROGRAM
PAYMENTS. tIC.
I.
«• .. o
J.
4.
S.
«.
7.
L
».
10.
11.
12.
13.
1«. FARMSTEAD.
GARDEN AND ROAOS
AOJtS
PCR
AUt
OPERATOR'S SHARE
UNITS FOR:
FARM
USE
SALE
9
S
•
DOLLAR
SALES
*
IS. TOTAL (ENTER TABLE J. LINE 1) ' U
ACTUAL
ACRES
.
TIEIB
P£H
ACRE
OPERATOR'S SHASE
UNITS
FA>tM
USE
HELD
fOf» SA1.E
.
SOL9 Q
S
\
i
1
.
CASH
INCOME
I
•
y ">^^~ - < ••,,"- , - ,--— > | j
C. LIVESTOCK AND PRODUCTS—PRODUCTION AND SALES
PLANNED
LIVESTOCK AXO PRODUCTS
AND WOOL-MOHAIR
• PXOSRAM PAYMENTS
1.
2.
X
4.
i. •
t
7.
t.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13. MILK (LBS.)
U. EGGS (OOZ.)
NO.
PER
ANIMAL
OPERATOR'S SHAKE
UNITS FOR:
FARM
USE
.
SALE
9
$
I"
15. TOTAL (ENTER TABLE J. LINE 2)
DOLLAR
SALES
}
$
NO.
PER
ANIMAL
ACTUAL
OPERATOR'S SHARE
UNITS
FASM
USE
FOR^LEl SOLO ®
S
f
CASH
INCOME
%
_
$
9.20
-------
Exhibit 9-2 (continued)
D. IMPROVEMENTS AND KEY PRACTICES—FARM. HOME. AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
CHOPS: SOU: IIVESTOCX- fm*HCIAl MANAGEMENT: MAINTENANCE' REPAIRS: fOOO PRODUCTION
Am CONSCAVATION; HDu.ru, HOME. ENVIRONMENTAL. COMMUNITY ANO RURAL OEVELOPMENr
ACTIVITIES; ETC.
-
•
TtPf Of ANALYSIS 1 1 MONTH
WHEN TO
00 IT
f
SOURCE OF
FUNDS
1
ACTUAL
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
»
.
E. FAMILY LIVING AND INSURANCE
WE PLAN TO PRODUCE. PROCESS. AND USE FOR OUR FAMILY:
ITEM
UILX (GAU
EGGS (OOZJ
POULTRY (NO.)
PORK (LIVE WT.-LS.)
BEEF (LIVE WT.-LB.)
OTHER MEATS (LIVE WT..LB.)
PLAN
ACTUAL
ITEM
GARDEN (SIZE)
CANNED AND FROZEN:
VEGETABLES
-------
Exhibit 9. 2 (tontinued)
F. CASH FAMILY LIVING
EXFO1SES
HOUSEHOLD QPN£
FOOO INCL. LUNCHES
HEALTH „_____-.___
HOUSE REPAIR AND SANITATION
fUlfOOl KCBfATIOM
MM |WSUBA»CE
TRANSPORTATION
FURNITURE & OTHER
TOTAL
C. CASH FARM OPERATING
EXPENSES
NIXED 1A80R
MACHINERY R£PAIR.._ „__ .
/AMI BUILDING 1 FENCE REPAIR
OTHER
CREDIT
NEEDED
FHA
CREDIT
NEEDED
s Is
OTHER
CREDIT
NEEDED
t
FHX
CSEOIT
NEEDED
\ \
--'--•-•" ••" • •" 7
nrn L
PLANHED
EXPENSES
S
PLANNED
EXPENSES
$.»_.....
ACTUAL
EXPENSES
S
ACTUAL
EXPENSES
!.„„
L 1
i
mu.. _ __..__._ .-.. , .
SEED ! L '
FERTILIZER J. |. '
PESTICIDES I SPRAY MATERIALS i ' - -- - - -
t
nrxrg si-ppiic; | ,-,,--
|
; i ~T " 1
HACHINERY HIRE 1 1 ' :
1 1
PERSONAL PROP. TAX..
ftAl, KTATC TA1ES r
WATER CHARGES
T
r
i
AUTO I TRUCK EXPENSE . ( - -
llTIUTIfS
CDRXENT OPNC. BILLS (TABLE AJ
TOTAL
1 _ L,.
1
' — -r~- - -
-
s It Is .is
H. CAPITAL DPENDITURIS
.
DEBTS REFINANCED (TABU A)
TOTAL
OTHER FHA pUHN| 0
NEEDED NUOED EXPENStS
, , ,... 1
r --"•'
ACTUAI
V
~ _...": "iu4
i
*
i •
. i . j .
t - - -t
s ; 5 J
1. CREDIT PCS: ; OTHER ; FHA TOTAL
FAMILY LIVING _ . _ _ i ' t '• t
FARM OPERATING . 1
- - |- '-- -----
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES.
: TOTAL Ts. . . .1..
). SUMMARY OF YEAR'S BUSINESS PLAN
1. CROP INCOME if-i.', 3)
2. LIVESTOCK INCOME ( T *kt< C) i
3. CONSERVATION FAfMtNIS ANO OThiR rAr.M in^uMe .
4. TOTAL CASH FAP..M INCOME (I. 1 ,,J li i
S. CASH FARM OPERATING SXPENSiS |T".J.« ..
S. NET CASH FARM INCOME M M:
',. Mii FARM .dCO.iE
8. TOTAL NET CASH /ARM & NON.FA
9. CASH FAMILY LIVING EXPENSES
10. NET CASH INCOME (1 .MiVi.j 9)
11. CASH CARRY-OVER (fjgi I. U*
12. LOANS ANO OTHES CREDIT (7ji
13. INTEREST (Tji.V C)
14. TOTAL AVAILASLE (10, //. 13 •"
15. CAPITA! EXPENDITURES 1 f.i//
IS. BALANCE AVAILABLE ( 14 Al/i»j
RM INCOU: |o ftui •• ' 4..
1, li {
d Ij) J
IJ) J J._
17. CROSS CASH INCOME (4 />'.< 71 J J
y,-. • "•;
" "ACTUAL"
j
* . !
I....
t .
$
I
t
K. DEBT REPAYMENT
TO WHOM OWED
INCOME ANO SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES
TOTAL
AMOUNT DUE
THIS YEAR
(PRIN. A/10 INT.)
j
.. "" ;.
*
PRIN. ANO INT.
TO BE PAID
j
•
[' '
J. .
DATE
r
'
PLAN i
AMOUNT
SOURCE OF FUNGS > PAID
i,
i-
i
i
i
t -
f ™
>
'
I, "- !
i *g'«* to follow thi* pUn jnd tu 4i«cu>s with th« County Swp«rvi»or any important cnjngit thai nuy b«cani« i
""""""VoMi) " uwinrnxj
(WlfE)
\ CflKL I«M_MMI*
9.22
-------
$100. 00 per acre as a minimum. For soybeans, FHA uses a cost of
$45. 00 per acre with a projected market price of $4. 50 per bushel and
a projected yield of 20-25 bushels per acre. If a farmer wishes to
borrow money for equipment, FHA can loan him 100 percent of the
appraised value of his equipment. Usually in the evaluation procedure,
FHA makes a complete credit check on the individual and uses a complete
financial statement, if one is available. After this, the FHA County
Committee (comprised of three retired successful farmers) reviews
the application for approval. Generally the amount of equity required
can be less for FHA loans than for PCA or bank loans. FHA requires
that the farmer diversify his crops (e. g. , 50 percent cotton and 50 per-
cent soybeans) which is only a recent policy in light of the poor cotton crops
and prices in recent years. In 1974 and 1975, crop diversification was
not necessary. In general, loans are made late in the year extending
into January and February of the following year. Usually there is only
a certain amount available to be loaned to all borrowers. Because of
this, a list of least-risk farmers is drawn up and then a letter is sent
out to each individual reminding each to visit the FHA office in the near
future. Usually the young farmer (18-20 years old) with low credit and
assets and the older farmer (55 years and older) with a poor production
record and management skills utilize the FHA. Most black farmers
• „ 1.V - , .,1,.. .,
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9. 1. 8 Mass Media
In previous sections, the use of mass media to disseminate infor-
mation about pesticides and pest control strategies has been discussed.
As indicated, newspapers (including the Delta Farm Press), radio.
television, farm magazines and other publications are all used by the
various institutions and are all utilized by farmers to keep up on the
latest information.
The Delta Farm Press, published every Friday, will usually carry
articles prepared by the extension service on a variety of topics ranging
from cotton varieties to insecticide recommendations to market fore-
casts. In addition, all the major chemical companies advertise their
products in the newspaper. Local newspapers, published weekly, will
also contain advertisements by local pesticide dealers.
Radio and television are also used extensively both to advertise
products and to disseminate information by the extension service. In
addition, because the area is only represented by a weekly newspaper,
the national news on television is used as a means to keep up to date on
what is happening of national significance (e.g. , cancellation of a pesti-
,.:j^ V T>T^rr\
i»liA<; o u.^. IA do •*-> ••-' -i- / .
Farm magazines and other publications -- e.g. , extension litera-
ture -- are also mechanisms by which the farmer can receive informa-
tion.
Thus, the mass media, as indicated here and above, does provide
information relative to a farmer's crop production and pest control
decision process.
9. 2 Crop Production Output Factors
On the output side of the crop production process, i. e. , in the
marketing of the crop, institutions were also found to be influential.
Two important factors worthy of discussion are the cotton ginning pro-
cess and the cotton buying process. Each is discussed below.
9.24
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9.2.1 Cotton Ginning
V
In deciding to grow a particular crop, the farmer must consider
the facilities available to get his product to the market place. Between
the farm and the textile mill door, a most important consideration is
the ginning of the cotton, i. e. , separating the cotton seed from the lint
and packaging the lint into 500 pound bales. This is a most important
process because due to the cotton grading process, the price received
by the farmer can differ based upon the quality of the ginning.
In the study area, approximately one half of the gins are coopera-
tively owned, with the other half being comprised of single independent
owners or a cluster of owners. The average gin size, in terms of the
number of bales produced in a year, is around 6, 000 - 7, 000 bales per
year, 'although new gins have a capacity for producing up to 22, 000 bales
per year. There are fewer gins in operation today than 10 years ago,
but overall capacity has been maintained or slightly increased. For
example, in Richland Parish, 14 gins were in operation in 1965 each with
a capacity of 5, 000 bales per year. As of 1976, 8 gins were in opera-
tion which were more centrally located and could in some cases pro-
duce 22, 000 bales per year. Generally the smaller gins are combining
to form larger more efficient gins. The cost of building gins has
increased from. $100, 000 in 1955 to one million dollars at present.
A farmer selects his gin in the following way. If he is a member
of a cooperative gin, he goes to the cooperative gin. If he is not a mem-
ber of any cooperative gin, he selects the best gin according to how well
the ginning is done, how efficiently the cotton is obtained from his field,
ginning costs, etc. The cotton seed extracted from the cotton pays for
the ginning and also allows for a profit to the farmer. Once the cotton
is ginned, it is graded and the farmer receives a bonded receipt from
the gin which he can use as collateral.
In recent years, a number of gins have closed due to the lack of
cotton to be ginned, as well as being unable to handle the required modi-
fications to meet the new EPA regulations of gin trash burning. In
particular, one cooperative gin closed in 1975 because the majority of
its members had switched to soybeans and thus there was very little
cotton to be ginned. For 1976, the membership is hopeful of reopening
since they anticipated planting cotton.
Nevertheless, the closing of particular gins has not been men-
tioned as a factor in deciding on whether or not to produce cotton. Thus,
ginning capacity appears adequate.
Q.25
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9.2.2 Cotton Buying
The final step in the crop production process is the selling of the
crop to a cotton buyer. Once the cotton has been ginned and graded, the
farmer has two choices if he has not already booked the crop. That is,
he may either sell the crop right a.wgy or hold it over until the next
year hoping for a better price later on. Booking cotton is the pre-
season contract selling of cotton where the farmer contracts the future
delivery of a certain amount of cotton (i. e. , number of bales) at an
agreed upon price. If a farmer decides to hold over a portion of the
crop, he must be prepared to pay storage costs of approximately $1. 00
per bale per month, in addition to having the credit to do this.
«•
A recent marketing notion for cotton is to book one third of the
expected crop, hold one third of the expected crop and sell one third
of the expected crop. One advantage of doing this is that if a farmer's
expected yield is lower than anticipated, he.will still be able to meet
his contract. Not all farmers agree with booking, selling and holding.
Some farmers said that they never have held over a crop into the follow-
ing year.
.til 19 i'->, oo.
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10.0 INFLUENCE OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY
TIMETABLE ON CROP PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
AND PEST CONTROL STRATEGIES
In this chapter, a brief review of the federal regulatory timetable
for the DDT decision is first given, including the mechanisms used to
disseminate this information to the local level. With this as a back-
ground, the initial reaction of farmers to the knowledge of the pending
and the actual cancellation of this pesticide will be discussed.
10. 1 The DDT Decision*
Regulatory action on DDT goes back to the late 1950's prior to the
formation of the Environmental Protection Agency. For example, in
1957, as a matter of policy, the Forest Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), prohibited the spraying of DDT in specified protec-
tive strips around aquatic areas on lands under its jurisdiction. In
1958, after having applied approximately 9. 5 million pounds of the
CficHli C->l>a.i uCgall
to phase out its use of DDT. They reduced spraying of DDT from 4. 9
million acres in 1957 to just over 100, 000 acres in 1967 and used per-
sistent pesticides thereafter only in the absence of effective alternatives.
The major uses of DDT by the Forest Service have been against the
gypsy moth and the spruce budworm. The development of alternative
pesticides such as Zectran, which was in operation in 1966, contributed
to further reduction in DDT use by the Department.
In 1964, the Secretary of the Interior issued a directive stating
that the use of chlorinated hydrocarbons on Interior lands should be
avoided unless no other substitutes were available. This regulatory
measure, as well as others which followed, was reaffirmed and extended
in June, 1970, when the Secretary issued an order banning use of 16
types of pesticides, including DDT, on any lands or in any programs
managed by the Department's bureaus and agencies.
*Much of this description was taken from EPA press releases and
Environmental Facts on DDT compiled July, 1974 by the EPA.
10. 1
-------
Between November, 1967 and April, 1969, USDA cancelled DDT
registrations for use against house flies and roaches, on foliage of more
than 17 crops, in milk rooms, and on cabbage and lettuce. In August,
1969, DDT usage was sharply reduced in certain areas of USDA's
cooperative Federal-State pest control programs following a review of
these programs in relation to environmental contamination. In November,
1969, USDA initiated action to cancel all DDT registrations for use
against pests of shade trees, aquatic areas, the house and garden, and
tobacco. USDA further announced its intention to discontinue all uses
nonessential to human health and for which there were safe and effective
substitutes.
In August, 1970, in another major action, USDA cancelled Federal
registrations of DDT products used as follows:
On 50 food crops, beef cattle, goats, sheep, swine,
seasoned lumber, finished wood products and buildings;
Around commercial, institutional, and industrial
establishments including all non-food areas in food
processing plants and restaurants; and
- ei ----- .„„
UL X.LO Vv O J. hJ
On December 2, 1970, major responsibility for Federal regulation
of pesticides was transferred to- the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
In January, 1971, under a court order following a suit by the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), EPA issued notices of intent to
cancel all remaining Federal registrations of products containing DDT.
The principal crops affected by this action were cotton, citrus, and
certain vegetables.
In March, 1971, EPA issued cancellation notices for all registra-
tions of products containing TDE, a DDT metabolite. The EPA Admini-
strator further announced that no suspension of the registration of DDT
products was warranted because evidence of imminent hazard to the
public welfare was lacking. Because of the decision not to suspend,
companies were able to continue marketing their products in interstate
commerce pending the final resolution of the administrative cancella-
tion process. After reconsideration of the March order, in light of a
scientific advisory committee report, the Administrator later reaffirmed
10.2
-------
his refusal to suspend the DDT registrations. The report was requested
by Montrose Chemical Corporation, sole remaining manufacturer of the
basic DDT chemical.
In August, 1971, upon the request of 3 1 DDT formulators, a hear-
ing began in Washington, D. C. on the cancellation of all remaining
Federally registered uses of products containing DDT. Regional hear-
ings were also held in Dallas, Texas. The he'aring ended in March,
1972 and the transcript of 9, 3 12 pages contained testimony from 125
expert witnesses and over 300 documents. The principal parties to the
hearings were various formulators of DDT products, USDA, the EDF,
and EPA.
On April 25, 1972, the Hearing Examiner issued his ruling, stat-
ing that the intent to cancel all remaining Federal registrations of
products containing DDT be upheld. The Administrator of EPA heard
oral argument on the Hearing Examiner's ruling on May 16, 1972 and
on. June 14, 1972, the EPA Administrator announced the final cancella-
tion of all remaining crop uses of DDT in the U.S. effective December
31, 1972. The order did not affect public health and quarantine uses,
or exports of DDT. The Administrator based his decision on findings of
persistence, transport, biomagnification, toxlcolopical effects and on
the absence of benefits of DDT in relation to the availability of effective
and less environmentally harmful substitutes. The effective date of
the prohibition was delayed for six months in order to permit an orderly
transition to substitute pesticides. In conjunction with this transition,
EPA and USDA jointly developed "Project Safeguard", a massive pro-
gram of education in the use of highly toxic organo-phosphate'substitutes
for DDT.
Immediately following the DDT prohibition by EPA, the pesticides
industry and EDF filed appeals contesting the June order with several
U.S. courts. Industry filed suit to nullify the EPA ruling while EDF
sought to extend the prohibition to those few uses not covered by the
order. The appeals were consolidated in the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia.
On December 13, 1973, the Court ruled that there was "substan-
tial evidence" in the record to support the EPA Administrator's bah on
DDT.
However, since the cancellation of DDT, numerous requests have
been made to use DDT on an emergency basis. Use of a cancelled
10.3
-------
pesticide is made possible by FIFRA, as amended, which permits EPA
to exempt any Federal and State Agency from any provisions of the Act
if emergency conditions exist. All such requests are considered on a
case by case basis.
One such request having direct relevance to the current study was
a request by the State of Louisiana in January, 1975, to use 2. 25 million
pounds of DDT to protect cotton crops from an outbreak of tobacco bud-
worms. Although FIFRA, as amended, did not require an extensive
balancing of risks and benefits or a determination of "no unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment", EPA decided to hold public hear-
ings and to request public comment on the State's application. The
agency said that some~consideration of risks and benefits is "desirable"
when a significant quantity of a cancelled pesticide is proposed for use.
Therefore, EPA held hearings in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on February
27 and 28, 1975 and in Washington, D.C. on March 3, 4, and 5, 1975.
In a March 14, 1975 order, the EPA Administrator denied the
State's request, saying that there "is no new substantial evidence on
the benefits of DDT". The Administrator said such factors as national
overplanting of cotton, cotton subsidies, and changing weather condi-
tions tend to have a greater impact on reduced cotton yields in Louisiana
tb?.r> do ral^oTnaHir^s
as Galecron, EPN and.methyl parathion, coupled with proper applica-
tion, timing, and integrated pest management. The State appealed the
ruling, but was unsuccessful in having the EPA ruling reversed.
Throughout the entire cancellation procedure, as well as the
specific request by the State of Louisiana, EPA kept the public informed
through periodic press releases issued in Washington, D. C. and through
notices issued in the Federal Register. Major news sources -- news-
papers, national news on television and radio, weekly news magazines,
etc. -- all covered these developments and disseminated the informa-
tion in a timely fashion.
Many farmers and those institutions concerned and affected by the
decision indicated that the decision was highly publicized and that these
major news sources provided them with information about the regulatory
action. In addition, some farmers were aware of the DDT cancellation
hearings since they testified at the regional hearings. Furthermore,
certain institutions (e.g., the extension service and chemical companies),
through their involvement in the legal proceedings, were aware of the
regulatory actions. However, they typically follow these developments
through the Federal Register as well.
10.4
-------
Secondary sources -- farm magazines, farm newspapers, pesti-
cide dealers, extension service newsletters, gin meetings, chemical
meetings, etc. -- provided additional information and more details about
the decision, tailored to the particular interests of their clientele. The
extension service, in particular, was cited by farmers and professional
scouts as providing much information about the decision.
Neighbors, friends and relatives also served as a source of further
disseminating this information when they got together socially, at meet-
ing, or at the local "hangouts", e.g., pesticide dealers, gins, cotton
buying offices, etc. Some farmers also said they were "on the look out"
for the decision, given the previous restrictions imposed on dairy
farmers.
Further details about how the news of the regulatory decision
filtered down to the local level (e.g., time lag from the EPA news
release to the actual knowledge of the regulatory action) cannot be given
due to the limited data that was received and the lack of recall on the
part of the respondents. However, some thoughts are suggested below.
1 0. 2 The Reaction of Farrrers
A farmer's reaction to a pending or actual decision to restrict the
use of a pesticide is, of .course, first contingent upon knowing that some-
kind of regulatory action has taken place. Furthermore, knowledge of
a particular regulatory action was found to be highly correlated to the
current use of the pesticide affected by the action. Due to the fact that
all farmers in the study area had used DDT in cotton production, all
were affected by the decision and all said that they had heard about it.
This finding must be viewed in light of the fact that the decision was
three years old when the field interviewing took place and all farmers
have since made adjustments to it.
Nevertheless, even prior to the regulatory action, the extension
service had been warning about insect resistance to DDT and the fear
that DDT may no longer be available for use. A small number of •
farmers in the area (with large cotton acreages) had been experiment-
ing with alternatives to DDT (e.g. , EPN-methyl parathion), some as
early as 1966. However, this was largely because of insect resistance
problems to DDT and it appeared that none of them found anything better
or as good as DDT. Indeed, when the regulatory action was announced,
DDT was still an important and vital element.of the pest control strategy
for cotton production in the area.
10.5
-------
Therefore, once the farmers learned of the decision, they still
did not know what the next best alternatives were or what they would
use to replace DDT. Some farmers, particularly the larger type I
farmers, said that shortly after they heard about the decision, they con-
tacted the extension service, their pesticide dealers, their scouts and/
or fellow farmers to learn what could be a good alternative. Thus, it
appears as if some farmers were attempting to seek out information on
the alternatives prior to the time when all carry-over supplies of DDT
would no longer be available.
For the most part, however, farmers did not view the regulatory
action as truly problematic until the carry-over supplies of DDT became
scarce. For example, one farmer said that he "heard it from several
sources, but realized it when DDT could not be bought. " Thus, the
switch to an alternative seemed to be correlated to the DDT supply. That
is, farmers did not wholeheartedly switch to an alternative until their
DDT supply ran out. For instance, use of carry-over supplies of DDT
that were stockpiled by some farmers was reported during the 1973
growing season and as recently as the 1974 growing season, according
to some farmers and pesticide dealers.
s> TXO <^ a T <• to be the T>
the farmer to change his production practices, and not awareness of the
regulatory action itself (i.e., hearing "something" about the regulatory
action). Nevertheless, awareness of the regulatory action did prompt
some to seek out more knowledge (i. e. , new information) and alterna-
tives were being suggested to some of the farmers. Consequently,
when the switch had to come (i. e. , all of the stockpiled DDT was used),
some farmers had done some thinking and planning about what to do.
However, for the most part, no preparatory adjustments were made.
The user adjustment response patterns to the DDT cancellation
are described in the next chapter.
10.6
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11. 0 USER ADJUSTMENT RESPONSES
AND PROBLEMS
In the case of cotton, three years have past since the DDT deci-
sion became effective. Thus, sufficient time had elapsed in order to
view both the evolution and range of adjustments and problems associ-
ated therewith. These will be discussed under the following categories:
No change in current pest control practices;
Use of new chemical pesticides; and
New practices to pest control; e. g. :
.. Use of early to moderate maturing varieties
and/or early planting;
Reallocation of crop acreage; and
Intensive use of scouting. •
These categories, it should be emphasized, are not necessarily dis-
joint empirically. Rather, they are offered as a means of conceptually
organizing data from cotton farmers. That is, farmers may have
simultaneously exhibited more than one adjustment response described
above or may have switched from one response to another.
11.1 No Change In Current Pest
Control Practices
Indications were received from both farmers and pesticide dealers
that many farmers continued to use DDT for as long as the carry-over
supplies still remained. Therefore, although the study did not find
anyone currently using DDT, it appears that carry-over supplies of DDT
were used during the 1973 growing season (and during the ] 974 growing
season,, but with far less frequency) as an adjustment response to the
DDT decision.
This response, however, involved additional activities not prac-
ticed by farmers prior to the DDT cancellation. Most notable was the
practice of stockpiling. That is, farmers who utilized this approach
had to buy adequate supplies of DDT before the chemical could no longer
be legally sold. This implies that between June 14, 1972 (when the
DDT decision was made final) and December 31, 1972 (when the DDT
11. 1
-------
decision went into effect) many farmers presumably stockpiled DDT
for use in 1973 and for as long as it would last. Adequate financial
resources were required (e.g. , either cash in hand or the ability to
borrow the money from a lending institution), as well as a good relation-
ship with a local pesticide dealer (e.g. , a loyal customer with a large
volume account or a farmer having a relative at the dealer's).
Thus, it is assumed that only the larger farmers with adequate
financial resources (e.g. , cash and/or credit) and contact's with pesti-
cide dealers were able to utilize this approach. These farmers would
now be found as either type I or type II farmers according to the typology
previously developed.
11.2 Use of New Chemicals
One response to the lack of DDT on the part of many farmers was
(and still is for many farmers) to continue prior agricultural practices
in cotton production and to use the remaining two ingredients in the
popular "triple kill" formulation; that is, toxaphene and methyl para-
thion with the DDT removed. The use of endrin was also mentioned.
This approach is also associated with a non-contingent insecticide
application style. That is, the farmer sets- an insecticide spraying
schedule (e.g. , every 5 to 7 uay=>) arid slicks to it in a firm or nearly
firm manner. Professional scouting is also used as it was prior to the
DDT cancellation. Overall then, the approach is the more "traditional"
one and did not involve new and innovative pest management practices
such as early planting, trap cropping, diapause control, and stalk
destruction after harvesting.
Farmers who did not stockpile DDT may have utilized this strategy
beginning with the 1973 growing season. Others who did stockpile pos-
sibly began this strategy beginning in 1974. Those that continued to
utilize this strategy in 1975 were designated as type II farmers.
This strategy was not without some reported problems and con-
cerns. Farmers noted that these alternatives to DDT (e.g., toxaphene,
methyl parathion) were much more toxic and required more precautions
in their handling.* Also, the timing of the application was reported as
being more critical. However, pesticide shortages and the lack of
tobacco budworm control, culminating in increased production costs
(particularly insecticide costs, including both cost per pound and
^However, no accidents were indicated because farmers and others
were made aware of the hazards of the DDT substitute through "Project '
Safeguard", a joint effort of EPA and USDA to educate the pesticide
applicator in the use of highly toxic organo-phosphate substitutes for DDT.
11.2
-------
increased number of applications), reduced yields and consequently,
reduced incomes and increased debt were noted as primary problems,
particularly in 1974. However, most farmers did realize that the
cause for this situation was not solely the DDT cancellation. They
recognized that weather conditions were such that heavy levels of
tobacco budworm infestation (more so than normal) resulted. In addi-
tion, they noted that the petroleum crunch created shortages of the
DDT alternatives and that this, coupled with the inflation rate, resulted
in higher insecticide prices. Thus, although all farmers felt that this
alternative strategy to the DDT cancellation created problems for them,
the entire blame was not put just on the cancellation. As one farmer
stated, "we haven't had a good year to test the alternatives".1
Nevertheless, the result of these confounding factors in 1974 was
a financial squeeze on some type II farmers, particularly the younger
less, established ones, eventuating in:
Carrying 1974 debt into the 1975 growing season;
Growing relevance of the significantly lower cash
requirements of planting soybeans as compared to
cotton; and
Use of rising land values to serve as collateral for
mortgages as a source of cash.
11.3 Use of Early to Moderate Maturing
Varieties and/or Early Planting
A number of farmers interviewed indicated that they were begin-
ning to plant their cotton crop earlier so that when tobacco budworm
infestations would occur (i.e. , in late June and again from mid August
into September), the cotton plants would be stronger and would be able
to better withstand such an infestation. This response was found
amongst numerous type I farmers (particularly the larger ones) and
appears to be a recent change (i.e. , the 1975 growing season may have
been the first season where this -was done).
Use of earlier maturing varieties is still not an option open to
Louisiana cotton farmers. The LSU agricultural experiment stations
11.3
-------
are working on the development of such varieties but feel it is still five
to ten years away.
No major problems were noted in adopting this strategy, although
it is dependent upon weather conditions; if they are unfavorable (e.g. ,
a wet spring), planting may be delayed.
11.4 Reallocation of Crop Acreage
The reallocatLon of crop acreage was a very common response
during the 1975 growing season. Prior to this time, the shifting of
crop acreage was not seen as a response solely because of the DDT
cancellation. That is, this response can be viewed primarily as a
result of the disastrous cotton year of 1974 (partially a result of the
DDT cancellation) and the depressed cotton prices (relative to soybeans)
in early 1975.
Thus, in 1975, many farmers, reallocated some of their land to
soybeans and planted less cotton than in 1974. This shift was found
both in type I and type II farmer"; primarily amongst those farmprs
who had grown soybeans before. Thus, in effect the soybean to cotton"
crop acreage ratio increased from 1974 to 1975 for these farmers.
Some farmers (i.e. , type III farmers) totally dropped cotton in 1975
and planted 100 percent soybeans rather than cotton and soybeans.
Again this'was in response to the increased cotton production costs and
reduced cotton prices. As the experience of 1974 recedes and as the
price ratio between cotton and soybeans becomes more favorable to
cotton, many of those who dropped cotton in 1975 (either partially or
totally) indicated that they would grow more cotton or at least return to
cotton in 1976.
It should be noted that the adoption of a mixed strategy (i. e. ,
cotton and soybeans) is encouraged by various lending institutions (in
particular, the Farmers Home Administration (FHA) and production
credit associations) in the hope of minimizing risk of total loss. This
is a recent trend and will be a requirement by the FHA in 1976. Thus
those who utilize the FHA must now diversify their crops and those that
use the production credit associations will most likely have to as well.
It should also be noted that the operating costs associated with an acre
of soybeans are drastically lower than that for an acre of cotton (about
half according to the FHA); therefore, there may have been a tendency
for the financially troubled, in particular, to. adopt this strategy.
11.4
-------
There was some concern amongst those farmers who shifted to
more soybeans and less (or no) cotton. Some older farmers indicated
that they would rather grow cotton because they had been doing this for all
of their lives. Others were not happy planting their better "cotton land"
to soybeans. Still others noted that with the shift to more soybeans,
some of their cotton equipment was sitting idle. However, no serious
problems were noted by those farmers shifting to more soybeans and
less (or no) cotton. Since most of these farmers had been growing soy-
beans, no new skills were required and the local institutional structures
(e.g., extension service, pesticide dealers, lending institutions, etc.)
were familiar with this crop. New equipment (or new crop production
arrangements) may have been necessary if the acreage shift was signifi-
cant, but no major problems were noted.
11.5 Intensive Use of Scouting
One response to the lack of DDT on the part of many farmers has
been to put additional emphasis on the scouting of fields. Associated
with this relatively intensive program of scouting is "discretionary
"
the farmer adjusts his insecticide schedule to match the information
he receives from his scouting report and .tends to apply insecticides
only when the scouting indicates the need to.
In addition, the farmer who adopted this strategy also tended to
plant earlier, practice diapause control, defoliate, and destroy cotton
stalks after harvesting. Information was also sought through the exten-
sion service, their professional scout, etc. Overall then, he was an
adopter of the new and innovative pest management strategies advocated
by the extension service for cotton production.
The use of the strategy just described was highly noticeable
during the 1975 growing season (i.e. , all type I farmers utilized this
strategy) and it is suspected that this strategy may have taken a number
of growing seasons to fully evolve. That is, during the 1973 and 1974
growing seasons, some larger farmers may have slowly begun to lean
towards more scouting and more contingent use of insecticides, but it
was not until 1975 that the strategy fully evolved into what it currently
is. Indeed, by 1975 many more farmers reported the use of profes-
sional scouts and those already using professional scouts noted increased
contacts with them.
11.5
-------
As was the case with those farmers who simply utilized new
chemicals (i.e., the strategy described in Section 11.2), a number of
difficulties were noted by farmers in utilizing this strategy. One
important factor was a farmer's access to a flying service to have the
insecticides applied. Those farmers that had "same day" access to a
flying service (usually the larger ones) could wait until the last minute
to decide on the insecticide application, and with this strategy, this is
preferable. That is, if a farmer does not have this arrangement, he
may have to anticipate when he would apply the insecticide and then let
his applicator know, or he can let his applicator know when he decides
he wants his fields treated and hope that the applicator will respond
quickly. Either course of action is admittedly less desirable than having
"same day" access when discretionary use of insecticides is being
utilized.
•
Moreover, the same concerns and problems voiced by those
utilizing new chemicals were noted here as well, i.e. , the alternatives
were more toxic and required careful handling, the timing of the applica-
tion was critical, supplies of EPN/methyl parathion were in short sup-
ply and were very expensive relative to DDT (more so than toxaphene/
methyl parathion utilized by type II farmers), pest management control
costs were significantly higher due to increased scouting, diapause
control, defoliation and stalk destruction, efficacy was a problem for
those utilizing this strategy in 1974 when heavy tobacco budworm infes-
tations resulted, reduced yields and incomes were noted, and increased
debt occurred in 1974. Consequently, a financial squeeze, with results
similar to those described in Section 11.2, was noted amongst the
smaller and less established type I farmers who utilized this approach.
However, with this strategy too, the farmers did realize that bad
weather, inflation, and the petroleum crunch were contributing factors.
11.6
-------
12.0 CONCLUSIONS
Given the 3 year time interval between the DDT decision and.the
field interviewing in this study, it is not surprising to find that all
cotton farmers interviewed had made some adjustment to the regulatory
action. However, what is interesting is the variety of adjustment
responses and problems described in the previous chapter, and more
importantly those factors influential in the farmer user adjustment pro-
cess.
A precondition to the response process is, of course, knowledge
that a regulatory action is pending or has actually occurred. As dis-
cussed previously, the current study found that the cotton farmers in
the study site may become aware (i.e., hear "something") of a regula-
tory decision via the news media. However, they do not become know-
ledgeable (i.e., receive detailed information, take the message seri-
ously and attend to it) and view it as a problem until they find that carry-
over supplies of the banned pesticide are or will be hard to get. Although
some experimenting with alternatives had occurred prior to the decision,
this was primarily as a response to insect resistance to DDT and not
extension service and research station warnings that DDT may be can-
celled. Hence, pesticide supply appears to be the primary stimulus
for the farmer to change his pest control and production practices and
not simply awareness of a regulatory action itself (i.e. , hearing
"something" about a pesticide regulatory action).
An important consideration for the individual farmer in deter-
mining his response is his personal resources, e.g., his past prac-
tices (i.e., tradition), his financial resources (cash and/or credit),
his information seeking activities, his managerial skills, and his con-
tact with pesticide dealers. Those farmers who heard of the ban through
the news media and stay in contact with information sources such as
the extension service, have good dealer contacts, and have adequate
financial resources, * were best able to stockpile DDT in order to main-
tain their current pest control practices.
Those unable to stockpile DDT for the next growing season (i. e. ,
1973), were forced to adopt an alternate strategy, A farmer's personal
resources and his ability to absorb a succession of poor crop years,
i.e. , poor crop yields, are again important factors in the response
chosen. The smaller, lower resource farmers tend to respond in the
*This description fits those who are typically the larger, more
established, and higher resource farmers.
12. 1
-------
way that is least costly and least risky to their overall crop production
process. This may involve simply a pesticide substitution or in some
cases a crop substitution (e.g., cotton to soybeans). The latter response
occurs if the crop production costs are significantly lower with another
crop and if growing the alternate crop is less risky than growing the
former crop without the banned pesticide. The larger, higher resource
farmers, on the other hand, who can more easily absorb a poor crop
year will utilize alternate pest control strategies (e.g., intensive use
of scouting) which are more costly and possibly more risky. However,
the high resource farmers are not only more likely to take risky options
.than the low resource farmers, but also tend to have access to a wider
range of information sources and so are more likely than their less
affluent neighbors to adapt in a fashion they regard as successful,
regardless of the response option chosen.
However, the study found that the institutional network within
which the farmer has to operate is critical both for dictating available
response options as well as alleviating associated problems. When
faced with replacing a banned pesticide, the farmer looks to the institu-
tional setting to provide an answer just as he does when he is faced with
a pest resistance situation. That is, the buildup of pest resistance to a
particular pesticide has, in the:past. initiated cooperative research
activity from numerous institutions (e.g. , agricultural experiment sta-
tions, extension services, chemical companies, etc. ) to develop alterna-
tive pest control strategies (chemical or other) for the problem pesti-
cide and to disseminate these alternatives to the farmer through his local
information sources (e.g., the pesticide dealer). In addition, pest
resistance to certain pesticides has created new institutions (e.g.,
professional scouting, professional pesticide application, etc. ) to help
in this adjustment process, when necessary. :
The withdrawal of a pesticide calls for this same type of respon-
siveness from these same institutions; however, the time factor can be
more critical with a pesticide regulatory action, in that pest resistance
to a pesticide is noticeable and usually evolves over a long period of
time, whereas the knowledge of a pesticide regulatory action may not be
known far in advance and will impact in a shorter time period. More-
over, the withdrawal of a pesticide may increase the risk of growing
the crop sufficiently to warrant a crop substitution. In this case, the
ability of the institutions to provide services similar to those that they
provide for other crops (e.g., educational information, operational
loans, crop insurance, markets to sell the crop), is important if crop
substitution is to be a viable alternative.
12.2
-------
Consequently, the available response options open to a farmer
and the ease with which he can adjust to a pesticide regulatory action
are, most definitely, dictated by institutional responsiveness and insti-
tutional foresight vis-a-vis EPA regulatory decisions. This was evident
in the cotton study site where the institutional network described above
was cognizant of expected EPA regulatory actions, was responsive to
the farmer's needs, and was able to provide viable alternates to the lack
of DDT. * Indeed, well supported and responsive research station pro-
grams and extension service staffs had developed. In turn, a sophisti-
cated knowledge base relative to cotton pests and their control had been
developed and diffused to farmers and others.
For example, the existence of a "preparatory" response on the
part of state extension and research station staffs was apparent both
from interviews and documentation. Everi before cancellation hearings,
state recommendations warned against overuse of DDT and the con-
commitant prospects for the development of resistance, and further
cautioned that farmers ought not assume the continued availability of
DDT, while emphasizing the need for scouting and the protection of
beneficial insects. Because the importance of scouting had been a major
thrust of extension se'rvice recommendations prior to the DDT cancella-
tion, a c?dre of professional entomologists had develoned and wqs
• * «-» b
utilized by farmers. Thus, a receptive attitude towards intensive use
of scouting was apparent among many farmers.
In addition, a long term perspective seems to guide work at the
agricultural experiment station in which work on solving this year's
problem occurs in parallel with research having a five to ten year goal
horizon (e.g. , development of resistant varieties of cotton). Thus, a
fairly extensive knowledge base relative to the tobacco budworm and its
control was in existence when the DDT decision became effective.
Finally, the existance of a realistic alternative crop (at least in
the two parishes studied, soybeans constitute an economically realistic
alternative commodity), with appropriate knowledge and institutional
base, has supplied one potential adjustment response, although soybeans
do not convey the status of cotton for many long time cotton growers who
are reluctant to pursue this alternative.
*Three factors can be suggested in understanding why this institu-
tional responsiveness may have resulted: (I) cotton has major economic
importance for Louisiana; (2) cotton production has a history of pest
adversity; and (3) control of cotton pests has never been simple.
12.3
-------
Nevertheless, the previous chapter did note some adjustment
problems to the DDT cancellation. However, noncontrollable and/or
confounding conditions unrelated to the regulatory decision were noted
as contributory factors. For example, pesticide supply shortages
caused by a petroleum crunch, inflation, weather, market conditions,
and levels of pest infestation, all had an influence on both the response
options open to cotton farmers and the subsequent problems, as already
described in Chapter 11.0.
12.4
-------
Part HI - SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
-------
13.0 CROSS COMMODITY COMPARISONS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of some key
similarities and differences found in the two case'studies performed,
i. e. , corn and cotton. First, pertinent crop production factors affect-
ing user adjustment are discussed. This is then followed by a presenta-
tion of various institutional arrangements and activities found in the
two study sites, including some implications for possible adjustment
responses and problems.
13. 1 Crop Production Factors Affecting User Adjustment
In comparing the two crop-pesticide-pest combinations that were
utilized to focus the effort in this study (L.e. , corn - aldrin/dieldrin and
chlordane/heptachlor - black cutworm, and cotton - DDT - tobacco bud-
worm), a number of significant differences emerge. First, not all corn
farmers in the study site had black cutworm infestations and those that'
did have the problem typically did not have it on all of their corn crop
since soil type is a key factor, i. e. , black cutworms are found pre-
u.oiiiiii3.iiLiy iii guivioo \.c/r aj.j."iivi5.j./ soil, J.-LI.J. cOi.i.on ^arrnc^rc, .»c"'cvcrf
were or had been plagued with the tobacco budworm over the past three
years. Moreover, black cutworm control traditionally involved the use
of preventive type insecticides, whereas_toba_c£LO—bu-dworm contol was
addressed with a series of rescue treatments once a given level of
infestation was evident. Finally, in general insect problems and the
control of them have typically been more severe in cotton production;
that is, a long history of pest control problems (e.g., insect resistance
to pesticides) can be found in cotton production (of particular interest
is tobacco budworm resistance to DDT), more so than in corn produc-
tion.
Consequently, the chemical solution appeared to be the primary
means of control by those corn farmers having black cutworm infesta-
tions as various preventive type insecticides were always available and
were regarded as a highly effective means of control. In contrast,
cotton farmers have found__tliat_sote-reliance on insecticides djd not
adequately control their insect problems (e. g. , the tobacco budworm)
and pre'venfiye_tvpe_inse_c_ticides-.co:uld_aot be used. Rather, rescue type
insecticides had to be used in conjunction with other crop production
practices designed to determine and minimize insect populations (e.g. ,
scouting, diapause control, use of beneficial insects, stalk destruction,
etc.).
13. 1
-------
Weather conditions in each study site deserve mention as well as
they affect the level of insect infestation. Dry weather for the past two
years in the two corn counties studied has reportedly somewhat reduced
the black cutworm infestation levels (and caused another problem -
drought), whereas wet spring weather in the cotton counties in 1974
delayed planting and summer rains induced regrowth, thus making cotton
extremely attractive to the tobacco budworm from mid August into
September when their control is most critical. Moreover fall rains
reportedly delayed harvesting and reduced pesticide efficiency. Thus,
weather conditions in the cotton study site appeared to favor tobacco
budworm infestations whereas this was not the case with black cutworm
infestations in the corn study site.
Another area of variation lies in the mechanism utilized by farmers
to determine the crops that they will grow. In the corn study site, a
rotation plan of corn and soybeans (which dictates each crop in each
field each year) appears to be a common practice, * although continuous
corn is also grown. Alternative crops such as wheat and milo have also
been planted recently, partially due to the aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/
heptachlor suspensions, but also because of the dry weather conditions
(i.e., these crops are drought resistant). Thus, the rotation plan, the
prire and availability of fertilv/.er and pesticide?, and the weather all
play a part in the crop selection process. In the cotton study site, how-
ever, farmers reported that little crop rotation occurred. Some farmers
grew nothing but cotton (i. e. , they have grown cotton all of their lives
and it is somewhat traditional), while others appeared to designate their
better land as cotton land and the rest of their land (or most of it) as
soybean land. However, shifting of crops (e.g. , to less cotton and more
soybeans) was reported, particularly in 1975, due to the favorable prices
for soybeans compared to cotton, production costs of the two crops
(soybeans are about half that of cotton according to the FHA), the price
and availability of cotton insecticides, and the previous bad weather for
cotton production.
Finally, it is important to note that many cotton farmers and
others in the cotton site reported that once use restrictions on DDT
were instituted (e. g. , the use of DDT around dairy cattle was restricted
by USDA in the late 1960's), they anticipated that further regulatory
action against DDT would be likely. Such anticipation amongst corn
farmers was not found to be present in the corn site for the aldrin/
dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor decisions, although use restrictions
pertaining to milk and meat products were imposed by USDA in the late
1960's. A possible explanation is that a larger number of restrictions
*An important reason for this is that a corn-soybean rotation plan
reduces the likelihood of corn rootworm problems, a common occurrance
when continuous "corn is grown.
-------
were imposed on the use of DDT than on the use of aldrin/dieldrin or
chlordane/heptachlor prior to EPA regulatory action to cancel and/or
suspend these pesticides. Also, more publicity about the DDT use
restrictions and DDT's harmful effects may be factors to explain this
variation.
13.2 Institutional Arrangements and Activities
In each of the two study sites, a number of institutions were found
to have an influence on a farmer's crop production practices, and more
specifically his pest control practices. Moreover, comparison between
these two sites indicated a number of significant differences related to
the kinds and amount of information received by farmers from each
source, which in turn have implications for adjustment responses and
problems.
For example, the extension service in the cotton study site was
found to play a very active role in the area of cotton insect control and
sought to maintain direct contact with the farmer through the local exten-
sion activities. Thus, in addition to state and regional meetings for
"^csticidc dealers fs.rm.2rs nnd other? in.*"°r?st?cl in. cotton in.0?'"'" 001-
trol, local agents hold special meetings for area farmers and maintain
contact with them throughout the growing season via the local media.
In contrast, the extension services in the corn study site, having recog-
nized the close relationship that exists between the pesticide dealer and
farmer regarding information about pesticides, .hold regional and state-
wide meetings for pesticide dealers to distribute their pest control
recommendations to them. At the local level, the county agents also
work with the area pesticide dealers and are available to assist any
farmer with any particular problem. They also coordinate educational
activities through the local media. Emphasis is put on corn and soy-
bean production (the two leading crops in the study area) and no massive
efforts are made to reach every farmer; rather reliance is put on the
pesticide dealer to transmit the university extension recommendations,
Closely related to the extension service activity is the agricultural
experiment station activity. Indications were received that the aldrin/
dieldrin suspension precipitated funding for black cutworm research
and that prior to the suspension notice, little research was underway.
Moreover, research entomologists did not think that heptachlor, an
alternative to aldrin, would be suspended so soon after aldrin, leaving
no preventive cutworm alternative to the farmer. Thus, the life cycle
13.3
-------
of the cutworm is still not well understood and some feel they are still
three or four years away. As a result, although alternatives to pre-
ventive cutworm insecticides are available (i. e. , rescues), many
experts in the study site feel they cannot be used effectively. In con-
trast to this situation, a rather sophisticated research entomology
operation appears to be at work in Louisiana. Funding over the years
has been adequate (including funds supplied by the state legislature in
late 1974) for tobacco budworm research and the experiment station
appears to have adopted a long range (5 to 10 year) perspective to cotton
insect control with the hope of developing resistant cotton strains and
earlier maturing varieties. Moreover, the experiment station, as well
as the extension service, warned the farmer of pest resistance to DDT
and its likely cancellation, as early as 1971.
•Variations in the research activities undertaken by the chemical
companies were also noted. For the black cutworm, little research
was found to be underway on developing new preventive type insecticides
as the chemical companies appeared to be content in marketing already
registered rescue insecticides. For the tobacco budworm, however,
development of a number of promising new pesticides to replace DDT .
and other tobacco budworm insecticides is underway by the chemical
companies. These products are also being field tested at agricultural
experiment stations and the extension service hopes that they will be
registered for the 1977 growing season. Thus, cooperation between the
extension service, agricultural experiment station and chemical com-
panies (with the farmer benefiting as a result) appeared greater in the
cotton study site than in the corn study site. That is, in the corn study
site the farmer was placed in a dilemma, with the extension service and
agricultural experiment station indicating that rescues could not be
used effectively as yet and desiring a new preventive type insecticide
as an interim solution. However, the chemical companies remained idle on
further cutworm research and content with marketing the already regis-
tered rescue products and preventive type insecticides, although the
latter did not amount to much.
As previous research has shown* and as indicated above, pesti-
cide dealers in both study sites were found to be an important source
of information to the farmer regarding pesticide usage and they (the
dealers) too were in close contact with the chemical companies, (as
#For example, see RvR Consultants, Farmer's Pesticide Use
Decisions and Attitudes on Alternate Crop Protection Methods, Report
prepared for the CEQ and the EPA, Contract Number EQC 325, July,
1974.
13.4
-------
well as the extension services) for information, so that their product
line and advice reflected the latest recommendations.* In both study
sites, promotional dinners were held in the winter for their regular
customers to present their product line for the upcoming season and
these meetings were thought to be very influential with respect to xthe
pest control strategies utilized during the growing season. Moreover,
in the cotton study site, some dealers offered informal scouting ser-
vices to their long time customers if requested to do so.
In addition, the phenomenon of formal scouting by professionals
(which included pesticide recommendations and application schedules)
was widespread throughout the cotton study site. These consulting
entomologists can be seen as links between state research entomologists
and the individual farmer, as well as an arm of the extension service,
since they are commonly former students of the LSU entomology depart-
ment and have earned the respect and friendship of the state experiment
staff. Moreover, the State of Louisiana has taken legislative cognizance
of these professionals and regulates their activities. In contrast,
scouting as an institution does not exist in the corn study site and few
farmers were found to have a great deal of knowledge about scouting
because they never felt the need to scout their fields given the insect
problems and the availability of preventive insecticides, which were
J.1~-..-~1-J- 4.,. Vo 'm.-'UI., ~f£s*~i-;-,-n TV,.-, r* VU^-vr-. ^ c- OTI-T r3
-------
the farmer to attend local extension programs. In the cotton study site,
the production credit associations strongly recommended that their
customers diversify their crops (i.e. , plant both cotton and soybeans)
and the FHA made this a requirement for the 1976 growing season in
light of the poor cotton crops in previous years. Specifically related
to the pesticide regulatory actions, the lending institutions have not
yet reacted because they will continue to carry the farmer so long as
loan limits are not reached and payments are received.
Farmers can use their Federal Crop Insurance (FCI) as collateral
when securing a loan, although FCI was not commonly bought by cotton
farmers in the study site. In the corn study site, it was utilized but
was not obtainable for certain crops such as milo, making this alterna-
tive crop less desirable than others.
Other institutions (e.g., marketing institutions - grain elevators,
cotton buying, etc. ) were found to have little influence on a farmer's
pest control strategy and consequently on his adjustment response
because the farmer did not have difficulty finding a local elevator to
handle any particular alternative crop. Nevertheless, this is an
important consideration vis-a-vis the viability of alternate crops.
Finally, the mass media (i.e., radio, television, farm magazines,
farm newspapers, etc. ) was heavily relied upon by the farmer in both
study sites for information and, consequently, was used by the various
institutional representatives. In particular, farm magazines were
utilized by farmers for pesticide recommendations.
Overall then, it was observed that the components of the institu-
tional network providing the farmer with information are quite different
for each study site. In the corn study site, pesticide dealers, the
pesticide label, farm magazines, and neighbors, friends and relatives
were utilized most often for pesticide information. In the cotton study
site, pesticide dealers, professional scouts, professional applicators,
the extension service, and neighbors, friends and relatives were widely
mentioned for obtaining information concerning which pesticides to use
and how they should be applied. Indeed, cotton farmers receive infor-
mation from a larger number of professional sources and this informa-
tion is tailored to their specific pest control problems. Whereas the
pesticide dealer in the corn study site was found to be the farmer's
primary institutional source of information for pesticide recommenda-
tions supplied by the extension service and chemical companies, a
number of institutions (as indicated above) were found to provide the
cotton farmer with this information and at a .more detailed level and
on a more personal basis.
'13.6
-------
14. 0 THE USER ADJUSTMENT
' RESPONSE PROCESS
In the previous chapter, a number of crop production factors and
institutional arrangements and activities were described which have an
underlying influence on the farmer's user adjustment response process.
In this chapter, a comparison of the user adjustment responses for each
of the two case studies is first presented followed by a discussion of
those forces influential in the adjustment process. The final section
highlights those issues evolving from the analysis which should be of
special concern to EPA.
14, 1 Comparison of User Adjustment
Responses and Problems
Presenting a comparative analysis of the user adjustment responses
for the two crops and sites is made difficult by the phase difference
between the two. In the case of cotton, three years have past since the
DDT decision became effective. Thus, sufficient time had. elapsed in
order to view both the evolution and range of adjustments and problems
associated therewith. For the'corn farmers, the full impact of the
EPA regulatory decisions has yet to be felt in that carry-over supplies
of similar products (i. e. , aldri-n/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor)
had not run out and therefore adjustment responses to date (i. e. , as of
March, 1976) had been minimal.
The problematic nature of this contrast should not be overdrawn,
however, as the phase difference allows the delineation of response
problems at different stages in the post-regulatory decision period.
Moreover, similar user adjustment response trends that have occurred
over the three year period since DDT was cancelled appear to be
beginning for the aldrin/dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor decisions.
More specifically, the user adjustment responses to these regulatory
actions can be categorized as follows:
No response to the regulatory action (i. e. , no reaction
to the regulatory decision because the affected
pesticides were not used);
No change in current pest control practices (i. e. ,
continued use of the banned pesticide);
14.1
-------
. Use of new chemical pesticides (i.e. , switch to
alternatives to the banned pesticide);
. "Take a Chance" (i.e., attempt to grow the study
crop without the use of any insecticides for the
problem pest); and
. New practices to pest control, e.g. :
.. Use of early to moderate maturing varieties,
and/or early planting to reduce the damage
from th'e problem pest;
. . Reallocation of crop acreage (i. e. , switch to
alternate crops); and
. . Intensive use of scouting with contingent use of
rescue insecticides when necessary and use of
other practices designed to minimize pest popu-
lations (such as beneficials, stalk destruction,
etc.).
It should be emphasized that these categories are not necessarily dis-
joint empirically, but rather are offered as a means of conceptually
organizing data from corn and cotton farmers. That is, farmers may
have simultaneously exhibited more than one adjustment response
described above or may have switched from on? response to another.
Exhibit 14. 1 on the following page presents a summary of the
adjustment responses and key problems voiced by farmers and other
community sources as adjustment response concerns. Also presented
are the derived resource contingencies underlying these response con-
cerns, the types of farmers (from both a production/pest control orien-
tation and a resource class orientation) exhibiting each user adjustment
response and the institutional inducements for each user adjustment
response. The reader should also note that throughout the exhibit, the
phrases utilized were chosen so that they would (hopefully) succinctly
summarize, and be reflective of, the key similarities and differences
found in the two study sites.
In reviewing this exhibit, it is significant to point out that an
attempt is made to associate a production planning management orienta-
tion with a pest control orientation. Although this combined orienta-
tion offers some explanation to user adjustment responses and problems,
14.2
-------
EXHIBIT 14. li Summ»ry o( R.juUtoiy Adju>tm*nl R««f>oni« tad Probl.m Porc«ly«d by PotUU. U««r«
LT*«jr Adjustment
*c*porv*e to EPA
^tfluUtory Action
*No change" In cur-
rent pttJt control
corn-use of aid r in;
'or cotton-use oC
DOT),
"Nevr chemicals"
cotton-use of
and aid r in).
"Take * chance"
(i. e,. do not treat
pest in question
practices"
1) Reallocaiion of
(e.g.. eora shift
shifting to «oy-
b«tnj).
2) Pest avoidance
planting prac-
tices (use of
early to
moderate matur-
ing varieties
and/or planting
earlier).*
3) Intensive m«
of scouting.
Corn Study Site
Consensus of Key
Problems Voiced
by Farmers and
Other Community
Sources aa User
Adjustment
Resoonse Concerns
Supply shortages
and higher prices
duct (i.e., aldrin).
Supply shortages,
increased debt/
tion and storage
problems. Recall-
bra tion of equip*
ment. Compara-
tive efficacy.
Replanting may be
necessary U
Planting schedule
planting. Weather
may preclude
replanting. The
inability to replant
or the production
cost* of replanting
may increase debt
liability.
duction technology
of alternate crops.
Land must bo
drained sufficient-
ly by early «pring
before planting car
proceed.
Not applicable.
Derived Resource
Contingencies
Underlying Con*
cerns Attending
Us«r Adjustment
Resoonaes
Personal resource
limitations: in-
aldrin. Confound-
ing conditions:
petroleum crunch;
Inflation.
Personal resource
limitations:
Institutional con-
ing payment within:
30 days of ship-
ment; pesticide
dealerships having
difficulties in
getting new chemi-
cals from distri-
butors. Confound -:
ing conditions:
petroleum cmnch;
inflation.
Personal resource
limitations:
deficiencies; time
founding condi-
tion*; weather.
limitations: time
available for
deficient skill
crop insurance
and marketing
facilities.
Confounding con-
ditions; weather
(spring rain
levels).
Practice Is with-
out history or Incti
tutlonal bails In
Study site. Rescue
Insecticides are
not stocked. The
value of the
approach Is ques-
tioned by the exten-
• frlcultural
experiment
station*.
Exhibiting User
Adjustment
Response: Pro-
duction/Pest
Control
Orientation
Non-contingent
users of the
duct.
*f on -contingent
isers of the
duct.
S' on- contingent
users of the
duct.
Both oon-
contingent and
contingent users
of the restricted
product.
Both noa-
contingent and
of the restricted .
product.
No farmer*
anticipated mak-
ing this response
nor had any made
it previously.
of Farmer* Select-
ing User Adjust-
ment Response and
Institutional Induce
ment* for User Ad-
justment Response
Resource classes:
medium to hi^h
Institutional induce
service recom-
mendation* to u««
any carry-over
supplies; knowledge
of dealers stock-
piling tldrin;
credit sources
expectations that
pesticides will be
used.
Resource classes:
low and medium
Institutional induce
ment*: advice
dealer stacking
alternate" chemical
(e.g., heptachlor);
credit sources
expectations that
pesticides will be
used.
Resource classes:
Institutional induce
ment: dealer
rescue insect!.
cides; lack of
suggested alterna-
tive*.
medium to high
resource farmers.
Institutional induce
report* of supply
shortages of the
cidc; knowledge of
drought conditions
Not applicable.
Problem* Voiced
by Farmers and
Olh'er Community
Sources As User
Adjustment
Itcsponse Concern!
Supply shortages
and hiyher prices
product {i. e..
DOT).
Supply shortages
and Increased cost
Critical timing of
applications.
c&cy. Handling
complications due
to acute toxic ity of
alternatives.
Increased debt.
Not applicable.
planters". Cotton
production equip-
and possibly
deteriorating.
ly by early ipring
before planting cai
proceed*
Supply ihortages
and Increased
costs of new pesti
tion*. Handling
problem* due to
acutely toxic sub-
•tltute*. Com-
parative efficacy.
Increased debt.
Derived Resource
Contingencies
Underlying Con-
cern* Attending
User Adjustment
Responses
Personal resource
limitations:
tion for stock-
piling insecticides
Personal resource
limitations:
deficiencies.
Confounding con-
petroleum
crunch; inflation:
weather.
Advice from the
professional
scouts, and some
dealers.
operating capital
deficiencies.
prestige implied
in not producing ,
cotton; credit
availability.
Confounding con*
(spring rain
level.).
Personal
resource limi-
tations:
Institutional con-
- straints: access
to "jama-day"
crop dusting
services. Con-
founding condi-
tion* i petroleum
crunch; inflation;
w* *.t her.
Adjustment
Response: Pro-
duction/Pest
Control
Orientation
Doth adopters of
p
tionalist.
Pest control
traditionalists.
No farmers
exhibited On*
response.
ducera and pest
control tradl- •
ti ana list. Also,
practice* tem-
porarily shifted
some (not all)
cotton-acreage to
soybeans due to th<
market slump In
the poor cotton
yield* In recent
years, and the
lower production
vith soybeans.
'Adopters of new
practices.
pest control
practice*.
Ing U«er Adjust-
ment Rej^^^^^knd
Instituti^^^^^Ke-
ments fo^^^^^F
Ad ju s imefflBPToon a i-
Resource class:
personal ties to
dealer* with sup-
plies of the fc*
restricted product.
lower resource
farmers. Institu-
advice from pesti-
cide dealers,
application services
and scouts.
Not applicable.
high and low
resource farmers.
Institutional ir/iuce
requiring crop
diversification as a
loan condition.
Resource class:
farmers. Institu-
emen'3'
sion service agent i
and professional
ICOulS.
higher resource
farmers. Institu-
advice from pesti-
cide dealer*, extr*
sion »cri^cj»»gcn: •
profcs^^^^^cout .
and pi^^^^Ai
applic^^V
LoultUu cortoo Urmeri,
to mod«r»t«
v»ri«tl««
-------
a farmer's resource class is also a necessary (and it appears a more
powerful) explanatory variable. That is, a farmer's personal resources
-- past practices to pest control (i.e., tradition), level of financial
resources (i.e., cash and/or credit), information seeking activities,
sophistication (i.e., managerial skills), and friendship ties with pesti-
cide dealers -- are linked to adjustment responses and problems.
Moreover, it is important to note that various institutional activities
either preclude or alleviate various responses and problems. Indeed,
the magnitude or seriousness of a farmer's adjustment problems (i.e.,
'the degree to which a particular adjustment problem affects his ability
to adapt to a new pest control option with confidence), was found to be
influenced by both his personal resources and the ability of the institu-
tional network to supply timely supplementary resources for responding
to a regulatory action. Thus, different problems and/or concerns
voiced by farmers in adapting to a particular response can be equally
serious for different farmers. For example, a farmer with good pesti-
cide dealer contacts but poor credit may find the higher prices of
alternative pesticides more serious than the limited supplies. A
farmer who has good credit but lacks pesticide dealer contacts, may
find the reverse to be true.
It is also significant tc note that intensive uce of scouting v/as not
a response found by farmers in the corn study site nor was it suggested
for future years largely because of institutional constraints and no prior
use of the practice. In 1975 (the first growing season affected by the
aldrin decision) most farmers interviewed either maintained current
pest control practices, (i. e., used carry-over supplies of aldrin) or
used a new chemical (e.g. , heptachlor) in a similar way. Some
responded by "taking a chance" and few responded by adopting new pest
control practices. However, many farmers indicated that the use of
new pest control practices, specifically reallocation of crop acreage
and/or "taking a chance", would increase in the 1976 growing season
and in subsequent years as carry-over supplies of heptachlor and
chlordane become exhausted.
In the cotton study site, those with adequate financial resources
and pesticide contacts were able to stockpile DDT and maintain their
current pest control strategies for at least the first growing season
affected by the ban (i.e., the 1973 growing season). Once these sup-
plies ran out, they tended to become more innovative and had by 1975
(3 years after the decision), adopted a strategy based on a more inten-
sive use of prior scouting practices. Other farmers unable to stock-
pile DDT, simply began to use the ne'w chemicals in 1973 with little
14.4
-------
other changes and are continuing this more traditional practice today.
In 1975, reallocation of crop acreage was employed by almost all farmerg
particularly those plagued by financial problems. However, this
response was not solely because of the DDT decision as indicated in
Exhibit 14. 1.
Thus, it is significant to note that the use of a banned pesticide
tends to persist until the supply runs out and the supply may have been
augmented by the individual farmer (i.e., stockpiling of the banned
pesticide is common). When the favored (banned) pesticide is no longer
available, a common first adjustment has been to simply substitute an
alternative pesticide for the banned pesticide. Less likely is the adop-
tion of new pest control practices, e. g. , a major change in pest manage-
ment strategy (such as intensive scouting if not used before) or a change
in the crop grown.
14.2 Influential Forces in the User
Adjustment Response Process
In the above section, ? number of factors were indicate^ P.? having
a key influence on the user adjustment response process.
Knowledge that a regulatory action is pending or has actually
occurred is, of course, a precondition to the response process. More-
over, the current study found that such knowledge is highly correlated
to the current use of the pesticide affected by the decision (e.g. , aldrin/
dieldrin, chlordane/heptachlor or DDT). Farmers who have never
used or have not used the pesticide in recent years tend to know nothing
or very little about the pending or actual regulatory action; this phenom-
enon was found in the corn study site but not in the cotton study site for
reasons cited earlier. Those who have used the pesticide tend to know
little about a pending regulatory action (unless information is supplied
to them by knowledgeable sources with whom they come into contact
with, e.g. , the extension service); rather they hear and learn about the
actual regulatory action via the news media, in farm magazines and
(more so) when they come into contact with their pesticide dealer and
find that carry-over supplies of the pesticide are or will be scarce.
That is, farmers do not become fully knowledgeable of a regula-
tory action (i.e., receive detailed information, take the message
seriously and attend to it) and view it as being problematic until they
14.5
-------
have difficulty in getting what they used to use (i. e., the banned pesti-
cide). Therefore, farmers tend to do little experimenting with alterna-
tives until carry-over supplies run out. Some pre-cancellation experi-
menting with alternatives to DDT was indicated in the cotton site, but
primarily as a result of insect resistance to DDT and not the knowledge
of a pending regulatory action. Hence, pesticide supply appears to be
the primary stimulus for the farmer to change his pest control and
production practices and not awareness of a regulatory action itself
(i.e., hearing "something" about a pesticide regulatory action).
The various changes in production practices (i. e. , responses)
that the farmers employed have been described in Section 14. 1. Again,
important considerations for the individual farmer in determining his
response are his personal resources, e, g., his past practices to pest
control (i.e., tradition), his financial resources (cash and/or credit),
his information seeking activities, his sophistication (i.e., managerial
skills), and his friendship ties with pesticide dealers. Those farmers who
heard of the ban through the news media and stay in contact with infor-
mation sources such as the extension service, have good dealer contacts,
and have adequate financial resources,* were best able to stockpile
the banned pesticide in order to maintain their current pest control
practices. Indeed, some dealers contacted their long time better cus-
tomers shortly after the ban was announced to warn them that carry-
over supplies were tight and to urge them to place their orders early.
Those unable to stockpile.or locate a source of the banned pesti-
cide when the growing season approached was forced to adopt an alter-
nate strategy. A farmer's personal resources and his ability to absorb
a succession of poor crop years, i.e., poor crop yields, are again
important considerations in the response chosen. The smaller, lower
resource farmers tend to respond in the way that is least costly and fi
least risky to their overall crop production process. This may involve •
simply a pesticide substitution (e. g. , aldrin to heptachlor), or in some/-.
cases a crop substitution (e.g., cotton to soybeans). The latter /
response occurs if the crop production costs are significantly lower
with another crop and if growing the alternate crop is less risky th'-'
growing the former crop without the banned pesticide. The large?
higher resource farmers on the other hand, who can more easily-
a poor crop year will utilize alternate pest control strategies (f.
*This description fits those who are typically the larf'
established and higher resource farmers. • .
14.6
-------
intensive use of scouting) which are more costly and possibly more
risky. However, the high resource farmers, who are more likely to
take risky options than the low resource farmers, also tend to have
access to a wider range of information sources and so are more likely
then their less affluent neighbors to adapt in a fashion they regard as
successful, regardless of the response option chosen.
However, the study found that the institutional network within
which the farmer has to operate is critical both for dictating available
response options as well as alleviating associated problems. When
faced with replacing a banned pesticide, the farmer looks to the insti-
tutional setting to provide an answer just as he does when he is faced
with a pest resistance situation. That is, the buildup of pest resistance
to a particular pesticide has, in the past, initiated cooperative research
activity from numerous institutions (e.g., agricultural experiment
stations, extension services, chemical companies, etc. ) to develop
alternative p.est control strategies (chemical or other) for the problem
pesticide and to disseminate these alternatives to the farmer through
his local information sources (e. g. , the pesticide dealer). In addition,
pest resistance to certain pesticides has created new institutions (e.g. ,
professional scouting, professional pesticide application, etc.) to help
in this adjustment process when necessary.
The .withdrawal of a pesticide calls for this same type of respon-
siveness from these same institutions; however, the time factor can be
more critical with a pesticide regulatory action, in that pest resistance
to a pesticide is noticeable and usually evolves over a long period of
time, whereas the knowledge of a pesticide regulatory action may not
be known far in advance and will impact in a shorter time period.
Moreover, the withdrawal of a pesticide may increase the risk of grow-
ing the crop sufficiently to warrant a crop substitution. In this case,
the institutions' ability to provide services similar to those that they
provide for other crops (e.g., educational information, operational
loans, crop insurance, markets to sell the crop), is important if crop
substitution is to be a viable alternative.
Consequently, the available response options open to a farmer
and the ease with which he can adjust to a pesticide regulatory action
are, most definitely, dictated by institutional responsiveness and insti-
tutional foresight vis-a-vis EPA regulatory decisions. Indeed, it
appears that certain historical production conditions bearing on produc-
tion related institutions of each study crop, have rendered farmers
for one study crop (e.g.., cotton) better able to cope with pesticide
regulatory actions than farmers for the other study crop (e.g., corn).
14.7
-------
Finally, the user adjustment response process is contingent upon
noncontrollable and/or confounding conditions unrelated to the regulatory
decision and the actions of farmers and organizations at the community
level. For example, pesticide supply shortages caused by a petroleum
crunch, inflation, weather, market conditions and levels of pest infesta-
tion, all influence both the response options open to farmers and the
subsequent problems, that may develop. Nevertheless, the nature of the
relationships between the farmer and the various institutions will, to
varying.degrees, mitigate or soften the effects of these otherwise
uncontrollable conditions in the production operating environment.
14. 3 Important Concerns for EPA
In reviewing the farmer adjustment responses and problems and
the influential forces associated therein, .a number of conclusions are
pertinent for providing EPA with a better understanding of the process
associated with replacing a banned pesticide in the short-term (i.e.,
within a three year time period):
Although farmers may become aware (i.e. , "hear
something") of a pesticide regulatory action near
the time Federal decisions are made via the news •
media, they do not necessarily act on this infor-
mation (i.e., take the message seriously, attend
to it, solicit and receive detailed information, etc. ).
Indeed, the regulatory restriction does not become
problematic until carry-over supplies of the banned
pesticide become scarce. Thus, little experiment-
ing with alternatives is done prior to this time and
no preparatory or anticipatory adjustments are made.
The initial user adjustment response amongst farmers
is usually an attempt to maintain their current pest
control practice and hence they continue using the
banned pesticide. Indeed, many farmers augment
their supply by stockpiling and are encouraged to do
so through advice received in the community-based
institutional service network.
User adjustment responses that simply entail the
substitution of the banned pesticide with a new
14.8
-------
chemical are also fairly common, but the adoption
of new pest control practices not utilized in the
past (e.g., alternate crops, intensive use of scout-
ing with contingent use of rescue insecticides, etc. )
are met with greatest resistance by the farmer and
are usually only adopted by the larger, more esta-
blished and higher resource farmers in the short
term.
These user adjustment responses are not without
their reported difficulties by farmers. Most of their
concerns center around matters that could inhibit
yield and profit; less concern for health or environ-
mental side effects is apparent. The following user
concerns are in evidence: pesticide shortages,
increased cost and reduced efficacy of alternate
chemicals (the latter partially caused by improper
application) resulting in increased production costs,
reduced yields, reduced income and increased debt;
allergic reactions and the lack of institutional ser-
vices for alternate crops; and the lack of
institutional services for adjustment responses
involving new pest control practices (e.g., intensive
use of scouting).
Farmers look to an institutional service network in
their surrounding community for alternate courses
of action when faced with replacing a banned pesti-
cide (e.g., the extension service, the agricultural
experiment stations, chemical companies, pesticide
dealers, lending organizations, professional scouts,
neighbors, friends and relatives, etc. ). However,
institutional constraints which impede responsive-
ness to the pesticide regulatory action can preclude
otherwise possible responses by the farmer.
A farmer's past practices (i. e., tradition) and his
beliefs about what kinds of pest control strategies
are effective for a particular pest, influence his
adjustment responses in the sense that they restrain
the range of attractive options.
14.9
-------
Financial resources (e.g., cash and/or credit) also
constitute a significant attribute with respect to a
farmer's response and problems associated there-
with. That is, those farmers that can weather one
or two poor crop years while the community based
support institutions seek viable alternatives to the
banned pesticide are least likely to have serious
adjustment problems.
•
Noncontrollable confounding conditions such as
inflation, the weather, fluctuating market conditions
for alternate crops, prior and expected levels of pest
infestation, and pesticide shortages caused by raw
material shortages (e.g. , a petroleum crunch), all
influence both a farmer's response to a pesticide
regulatory decision and the subsequent problems that
may develop. Nevertheless, -the nature of the rela-
tionships between the farmer and the various support
organizations will, to varying degrees, mitigate or
soften the effects of these otherwise uncontrollable
conditions in the production operating environment.
Hence, the magnitude or seriousness of a farmer's
adjustment problems (i. e. , the degree to which a
particular adjustment problem affects his ability to
•adapt to a new pest control option with confidence)
is influenced by both his personal resources (i. e.,
past practices to pest control, financial resources,
information seeking activities, managerial skills,
and friendship ties with pesticide dealers) and the
ability of the institutional service network to pro-
vide timely, supplementary resources for respond-
ing to a regulatory action. Curiously, the
interphase of these two resource factors means
that adjustment problems can be equally serious
for different farmers in the same geographical
locality.
In summary, a period of three years appears to be a reasonable
definition for describing "short term" transitional user adjustment
problems. This study found that during the first growing season
affected by a regulatory action, many farmers will attempt to "buy
time" by stockpiling the banned pesticide. For some farmers, such
14.10
-------
stockpiles may be sufficient to carry them through the second growing
season as well. However, in the third growing season affected by a
regulatory action, few carry-over supplies of a banned pesticide exist
and, thus, most, if not all, farmers are forced to make an additional
adjustment response. Nevertheless, the available response options
(i.e. , alternate pest control strategies), the extent to which each is
chosen, and the difficulties anticipated in adopting each option are, of
course, influenced by a complex set of personal and community institu-
tional resource conditions. Therefore, the response options open to the
farmer and adopted by him in the "short term" (i. e. , three years) will
vary both between farmers of the same commodity sector, as well as
between farmers of different commodity sectors.
14. 11
-------
15.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
15. 1 Procedural Recommendations for
Pesticide Regulatory Actions
In light of the discussion in the preceeding two chapters, a num-
ber of activities should be incorporated into EPA's benefit/risk analy-
ses (particularly those performed as part of the rebuttable presumption
against registration (RPAR) process), in order to determine the local-
ized (i. e. , county level) potential short-term adjustment problems
when an EPA regulatory action is contemplated.
Initially, the knowledge bases relative to the target pest, alter-
native pest control strategies and alternative crops in question need to
be assessed as these are the critical areas that dictate adjustment
responses and problems. Key factors related to the target pest are the
degree to which the basic etiology and epidemiology of the pest is known
by the research institutions. In addition, the real viability of alterna-
tive pest control strategies needs to be viewed in terms of:
. The financial, and skill requirements lor activities
contrary to past practices (e.g., scouting of fields
for insect damage when the practice is without
history or institutional basis, use of rescue insecti-
cides when preventive type insecticides were com-
monly used previously, planting of early maturing
crop varieties, etc. );
The need for services in the local institutional setting
that are currently unavailable (e.g., professional
scouting, professional pesticide application, chemical
company incentives to market pesticides for alterna-
tive pest control strategies, stocking of pesticides
not previously carried by pesticide dealers, .etc..); and
. . The conditions under which control of the target pest
is tenuous (e.g., heavy pest infestations, pest resistance
to alternative pesticides, etc. ).
Furthermore, the real viability of alternative crops needs to be viewed
relative to:
15.1
-------
Requisite skills and knowledge;
. Machinery;
Educational information services;
. Marketing structure;
. Lending institutions;
. Crop insurance; and
"Other" (e.g., potential for allergic reaction).
•
That is, in reviewing the real viability of alternative pest con-
trol strategies and alternative crops in terms of the above dimensions,
an overall assessment of the existing institutional service network and
the interrelationships between its components must be made vis-a-vis
their activities on these dimensions, since farmers rely on this net-
work when seeking alternate courses of action when faced with replac-
ing a banned pesticide. Indeed, regulatory decisions must be contem-
picLieCi vviull 1 fcCOgi'iiLiOll GJ. LJ.IC luCC uiiC.L ulCl'C CXI'C l"£5.x Cj.I-i~i.CT C11C C C in
institutional and, therefore, farmer coping capacities. It is also
particularly important to assess the ability for low resource farmers
to adopt alternative pest control strategies or alternative crops since
financial resources and the ability to weather one or two poor crop
years appear important in reducing serious adjustment problems.
Once all the above assessments are made, appropriate "signals"
will need to be sent to the various institutions impinging on the' local
agricultural community (particularly the educational and research
components) when, if, and where the knowledge bases or existing
activities are found lacking, so that corrective action can begin. That
is, contacts in and services to the various components of agricultural
institutions, including these at the county level, should be developed,
so that information on impending decisions can go directly to financial
institutions, county extension agents, pesticide dealers, etc. , as well
as to state educational and research organizations.
In addition, if "signals" have to be sent, this should be noted in
the RPAR risk/benefit analysis because sufficient lead time and intensity
of the "signal" are also important. For example, research on new
pest control strategies for a. banned pesticide can take 5-10 years
15.2
-------
.(according to estimates received in this study) if little work prior to
the ban has taken place. In this instance, much lead time would be
needed and a strong signal must be sent to the appropriate institutions.
On the other hand, if an alternative crop is not viable simply because
crop insurance is unavailable, this may be corrected much more readily.
However, simply sending these "signals" may not be sufficient
to counteract a "business as usual" attitude on the part of the institu-
tions. Thus, consideration must also be given to providing financial
and technical resources to these institutions to insure that they can and
will react in a way that will serve the best interests of the farmer.
Finally, in view of the 1975 amendments to FIFRA and the
corresponding FY '77 appropriations in pesticide to USDA, it is not
appropriate to imply that EPA "should consider doing everything"
indicated here. Rather the EPA, the USDA and the appropriate state
agencies should cooperatively effect the re'commendations indicated
above. Additional comments in this area are provided in Section 15.2
below.
15.2 Areas for Future Work
The preceding topics may be viewed as potential components of
a model of the local agricultural system and its processes. In order to
better understand the potential impact of future regulatory decisions,
the development of such simulation models would be highly instructive.
Indeed, the exercise of developing such a model could be as useful a's .
the operating model itself. In sum, the learning experience during
the empirical phase of this study indicates the need for further theo-
retical work.
More specifically, in light of the user adjustment responses and
problems found in this study, a number of areas for future work that
would have optimal policy benefit to EPA can be suggested:
. An understanding of why certain institutional service
networks can be more responsive than others in facili-
tating the user adjustment response process should be
determined. This study has implied that historical
production conditions involving a pest that is a wide-
spread threat to an economically significant crop for
15.3
-------
which control has never been simple, tends to
stimulate the appropriate institutional responses.
This hypothesis should be further explored (e. g. ,
a comparative study of agencies operating in vari-
ous commodity sectors would be appropriate). In
so doing, ways to make institutional networks more
responsive can be delineated, including technical
assistance and financial assistance.
. Mechanisms to promote experimentation (amongst
farmers) with alternatives (chemical and other) to a
pesticide that is likely to be banned should be explored
so that some preparatory or anticipatory adjustments
can be hoped for, rather than simply attempts to "buy
time" by stockpiling the banned pesticide once the
regulatory action has been taken.
Ways to assist farmers in adjusting to the impacts of
a regulatory decision (particularly those farmers with
limited resources) should be explored, including tech-
nical assistance as well as financial assistance.
In pursuit of these activities, it is again not appropriate to imply
that EPA should consider doing everything mentioned above. EPA, in
cooperation with the USDA and the appropriate state agencies, should
embark on these areas. Furthermore, to insure that each agency is
participating in an optional way, additional research may be appro-
priate to determine the capabilities, resources and preferences of
each. Thus, EPA should explore, with the USDA and the appropriate
state agencies, the responsibilities each should take in mitigating short-
term agricultural user adjustment problems.
15.3 Methodological Concerns
In addition to the preceding recommendations, the following
methodological discussion is of worth. The experience gained in the
contrasting styles of work during the first week of field work in the
cases of cotton and corn is instructive. That is,, in the cotton case
study, the two days of meetings with state level people in both the
extension service and research station prior to entering the study site
were very helpful for various reasons:
15.4
-------
The "quick education" regarding cotton culture and
pest problems gave depth to information previously
gained through readings;
Having met with the "elite" served to legitimate the
field team in the eyes of people at the county level;
and
Subsequent contacts with state people elicited respon-
sive cooperation on numerous occasions.
Hence, the overall style of the first week's effort in Louisiana seems
worthy of emulation in future efforts.
•
Moreover, the use of a very flexible ethnographic design in the
current effort seems well justified in terms of two points:
If a traditional survey research undertaking had been
utilized, an understanding of the user adjustment
response process would have been obscured due to
the rigid nature of the research questions and the
design that would have necessarily been dictated;
and
Much of the most important information (in terms of
the conclusions generated) came from people other
than farmers.
The conjunction of the above two points makes clear that the num-
ber of respondents will not be predictive of the quality of the results.
What is important is the depth and mix of relevant data sources (includ-
ing personal interviews), such that the production system and its
operating environment are understood. Hence, an emphasis on gather-
ing data concerning relevant institutions is appropriate -- which is not
to say, for example, that every banker in a county needs to be inter-
viewed.
CONSAD is confident that sufficient learning has been accrued in
the process of the current study that significant efficiencies can be
effected in similar, future studies.
15.5
-------
APPENDIX A: Demographic and Agricultural Profile
of the Corn Study Site Counties
A. 1
-------
1. Fremont County, Iowa*
Fremont County, Iowa is located in the extreme southwest corner
of the state, bordered by the Missouri River on the west and the State
of Missouri to the south. It has a total land area of approximately
335,232 acres or 525 square miles. Sidney, the county seat, is located
40 miles south of Council Bluffs, Iowa.
The population of Fremont County was 10,282 in I960 (5,296 town
and 4,986 rural) and 9,282 in 1970 (5, 155 town and 4, 127 rural), and is
.99. 8 percent white. Coupled with a natural increase of 150 persons
during the decade (i. e. , births exceeded deaths by 150 persons), a net
out migration of 1, 150 persons occurred, not uncommon in this region
of Iowa. An age-sex breakdown of.the county population iri 1970 appears
below:
Age Male Female Total
0-17 1,514 1,3-99 2,913
18-64 2,327 2,480 4,807
65 .and over 696 866 1,562
ToUl 4,537 4,745 9,282
The dependency ratio (i. e. , number of persons under 18 and over 65
per 100 persons between 18 and 65) in 1970 was 93. 1 compared to 92. 1
in I960. For the State of Iowa, dependency ratios were 91.2 in I960
and 88.4 in 1970.
There are four school districts in Fremont County. The average
daily membership for the school year 1970-1971 was 2, 288 pupils.
^Information for this section taken from: 1969 Census of Agri-
culture-State and County Data; Iowa Crop and Livestock Reporting Ser-
vice, Iowa Annual Farm Census 1972, Bulletin No. 92-AH, Iowa Dept.
of Agriculture and USDA; Iowa State Cooperative Extension Service,
The Council Bluffs Area: Past, Present, and Future, CRD 93,
September 1973; and data obtained from field work performed in this
study, e.g., conversations with extension service personnel and others.
A.2
-------
The median family income in I960 and 1970 for Fremont County
was $3,762 and $7,805, respectively. This cpmpares to $5,069 in I960
and $9, 018 in 1970 for the State of Iowa.
Employment in Fremont County has been strong over the last six
years with the unemployment rate ranging from, a low of 2. 6 percent in
1974 to a high of 5.2 percent in 1975.
Farming is the main enterprise in the county and in 1969, farm
land accounted for 95.4 percent of the total land area in the county or
approximately 320,000 acres. Total cropland was 276, 123 acres and
harvested cropland totaled 165,425 acres in 1969. Corn and soybeans
have been the two major crops grown in the county, comprising over
90 percent of the harvested acreage in the county. The remaining
acreage is devoted to hay, alfalfa, clover, wheat, popcorn, white corn,
oats-and sorghum. Both cash-grain and general farming are dominant.
The principal livestock are beef cattle and hogs.
Approximately 20 percent of the land in Fremont County can be
described as gumbo type soil, i. e. , soil characterized by poor drainage,
dark in color, located along river and creek beds and subject to flood-
ing. * Large cash-grain operations are typically found on this type of
soil, where the black cutworm has been a. continual problem. Smaller
sized farms are found in the hills and typically have livestock operations.
However, in cool wet weather, cutworms can also be found in these
lighter soils. This has not occurred in the past couple of years, as the
area is experiencing a.drought. However, cutworm problems have also
been found to be more susceptible on gumbo soil if corn is planted
after soybeans and if minimum tillage is used.
The farming trends in Fremont County during the decade from
1959 to 1969 have been similar to those in the State of Iowa. In this
ten year period, larger and fewe-r farms have been the results. In
1959, Fremont County has 1, 198 farms in all and 1, 110 commercial
farms (i. e. , farms with over $2, 500 in yearly product sales). In 1969,
*Clark, L.A. et al. , Soil Survey of Fremont County, Iowa, USDA
Soil Conservation Service in cooperation with Iowa Agriculture and Home
Economics, Experiment Station, Iowa Cooperative Extension Service
and Iowa Department of Soil Conservation, July, 1975.
A.3
-------
there were 976 farms total and 876 commercial farms and in 1972,
there were 872 commercial farms. Approximately 18.6 percent of the
commercial farms are class 1 farms (i. e. , farms with yearly product
sales of $40, 000 and over), 24. 1 percent are class 2 farms (i. e. , farms
with yearly product sales of $20, 000 - $39, 999), 28. 8 percent are class
3 farms (i. e. , farms with yearly product sales of $10, 000 - $19, 999), .
16. 7 percent are class 4 farms (i. e. , farms with yearly product sales
of $5, 000 - $9, 999), and 11.9 percent are class 5 farms (i. e. , farms
with yearly product sales of $2, 500 - $4, 999). The average size of all
farms in Fremont County was 301. 1 acres in 1964, 327. 6 acres in 1969
and 357 acres in 1972.
In 1969, 39.4 percent of all farm operators were full land owners,
30. 7 percent were part land owners and part renters and 29. 8 percent
were tenants. In terms of farmland, 22.4 percent of the land was
farmed by full land owners, 44.2 percent by part land owners and part
renters, and 33. 4 percent by tenants.
The average age of the farm operator in Fremont County, was
50. 6 years in 1969, with 11.9 percent under 34 years of age, 73. 0 per-
cent between 35 and 64 years of age, and 15. 1 percent 65 years or older.
2. Atchison County, Missouri* . .
Atchison County, Missouri is located in the extreme northwest
corner of the state, bordered by the Missouri River on the west and the
State of Iowa to the north (i. e. , Fremont County, Iowa and Atchison
County, Missouri are adjacent to one another). It has a total land area
of approximately 351,488 acres or 549 square miles. Rock Port, the
county seat, is located approximately 55 miles north of St. Joseph,
Missouri.
The population of Atchison County was 9,213 in I960 (4, 740 town
and 4, 483 rural) and 9, 240 in 1970 (5, 401 town and 3, 839 rural) and is
98.9 percent white. Coupled with a natural increase of 257 persons
^Information for this section taken from: 1969 Census of Agri-
culture-State and County Data; Denney, Hugh (editor), Northwest Missouri
Regional Profile, MP 362, Extension Division, University of Missouri-
Columbia, 1974; and data obtained from field work performed in this
study, e.g., conversations with extension service personnel and others.
A.4
-------
during the decade, a net out migration of 230 persons occurred, which
was the lowest net out migration in the northwest region of the state.
An age-sex breakdown of the county population in 1970 appears below:
Male Female Total
0-17 1,364 1,276 2,640
18-64 2,615 2,526 5,141
65 and over '614 845 1,459
Total 4,593 4,647 9,240
The dependency ratio in 1970 was 79. 7 compared to 86. 8 in I960. For
the State of Missouri, the dependency ratio was 82. 5 in 1970.
•
Atchison County has four school districts. In 1971-1972, 2, 099
pupils were enrolled in the schools. As of 1970, the median school
year completed was 12. 1 for males 25 years and older and 12.3 for
females 25 years and older. This compares to 11. 7 years for males
and 11.8 years for females, for the state overall.
The median family income in I960 and 1970 for Atchison County
---- r • w.**^* T* ' , ~ « -> , j-^C/^JWv*.-..,^-.^. .i.*!. ;.*! v- — ll* _^* ~> JL ~.~^Vv-v~~«-9 -.»' -- . ~
figures were $5, 127 and $8,914, respectively.
Atchison County has been described as a good healthy county as
far as employment goes. The unemployment rate has been consistently
low over the last 30 years, ranging from 4.9 percent in 1940 to 1.3
percent in 1950 and most recently 2. 0 percent in November, 1975.
As is the case with Fremont County, farming is the main enter-
prise in Atchison County. According to the 1969 Census of^ Agriculture,
farm land accounted for 104. 0 percent* of the total land area in the
county or approximately 365,608 acres. Total cropland was 304,272
.acres and 16 1,706 acres were harvested in 1969. Corn and soybeans
have been the two major crops grown in the county and comprised
approximately 85 percent of the harvested average in 1969. Other
crops grown in the county include wheat, hay, sorghum, oats and other
small grains. Cash-grain and general farming are practiced in the
county and the principal livestock are beef cattle and hogs.
*This is not a typographical error. This is the fi'gure given in
the Census !
A.5
-------
As in Fremont County, much of the soil In Atchison County can be
designated as gumbo type soil, susceptible to black cutworm infestations,
which occur annually. This soil is predominant in the bottomland areas
of the county, along the Missouri River and the Tarkio River, where
the farm operations tend to be large and are cash-grain. Smaller farm
operations are in the hills and typically contain livestock operations.
Atchison County, as well as the northwest region of Missouri has
experienced a decline in the number of farms coupled with an increase
in the size of the farms. For example, in 1959, there were 1, 004 farms
in Atchison County, compared to 946 in 1969, of which 821 are com-
mercial farms. Approximately 22.3 percent of the commercial farms
are class 1 farms, 27. 8 percent are class 2 farms, 22. 8 percent are
class 3 farms, 14. 7 percent are class 4 farms, and 12.4 percent are
class 5 farms. The average size of all farms in Atchison County was
369.2 acres in 1964 and 386.4 acres in 1969.
In 1969, 46. 1 percent of all farm operators were full land owners,
' 25. 4 percent were part land owners and part renters and 28. 5 percent
were tenants. In terms of farmland, 29. 8 percent of the land was
farmed by full land owners, 38.4 percent by part land owners and part
and 31.8 percent by tenants.,
The average age of the farm operator in Atchison County was
49.5 years in 1969, with 15.9 percent under 34 years of age, 68.8 per-
cent between 35 and 64 years of age, and 15.3 percent 65 years or older.
A.6
-------
APPENDIX B: Demographic and Agricultural Profile
of the Cotton Study Site Parishes
B. 1
-------
1. Richland Parish, Louisiana*
;
Richland Parish, Louisiana is located in the northeast part of the
state bordered by Franklin Parish to the south. It has a total land area
of approximately 368, 832 acres or 576 square miles. Rayville, the
parish seat, is located approximately 20 miles east of Monroe, Louisiana.
The population of Richland Parish was 23, 824 in I960 (72. 4 per-
cent urban and 27.. 6 percent rural) and 21, 774 in 1970 (68.5 percent
urban and 31.5 percent rural). The parish is approximately 60 percent
white and 40 percent non-white. A net out migration of 5, 672 persons
occurred during the decade from I960 to 1970, of which 1,434 were
white and 4,238 were non-white. The greatest numbers were in the 20-
29 age group for both whites and non-whites. An age-sex breakdown of
the parish population in 19~0 appears below:
Age Male Female Total
0-17 4,419 4,228 ' . 8,647
18-64 4,849 5,636 10,485
65 and over 1,177 1,465 2,642
«- t i •• « J J r* * •* ** *> r\ *%t*TT«l
TOVal iC, *rrtJ il,-><-7 L, i, < (T
The dependency ratio (i. e. , number of persons under 18 and over 65
per 100 persons between 18 and 65) in 1970 was 107. 7, compared to
115.3 in I960.
School attendance in 1970.numbered 6,551 persons in the parish.
The median years of school completed in 1970 was 8.9, compared to
10. 8 for the state.
^Information for this section taken from: 1969 Census of Agricul-
ture-State and County Data; Louisiana Crop and Livestock Reporting
Servic_e, Louisiana Cotton: Acreage, Yield, and Production (various
years), Louisiana State University; Public Affairs Research Council of
Louisiana, Inc. , Statistical Profile of Richland Parish, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, 1973; Bowles, G.K. et al. , Net Migration of the Population,
1960-1970. by Age, Sex, and Color-Part 5: West South Central States,
USDA (ERS), University of Georgia (Institute for Behavioral Research),
and NAS (RANN) cooperating, December, 1975; and data obtained from
field work performed in this study, e.g. , conversations with extension
service personnel and others.
B.2
-------
The median family income in 1959 and 1969 for Richland Parish
was $2,286 and $4,868, respectively. This compares to $4,272 in 1959
and $7, 530 in 1969 for the State of Louisiana.
Unemployment in the parish increased in the ten year period from
I960 to 1970. In 1970, the unemployment rate was 6. 0 percent com-
pared to 2. 7 percent in I960.
Farming is the main enterprise in the parish, and in 1969i farm
land accounted for 71. 5 percent of the total land area in the parish or
.approximately 264, 000 acres. Total cropland was 187, 751 acres and
harvested cropland totaled 136, 316 acres in 1969. Soybeans and cotton
have been the two major crops grown in the parish, comprising over
90 percent of the harveste'd acreage in the parish. Other crops grown
in small quantities include field corn, sorghum, wheat, hay and vege-
tables. Both cash-grain and general farming are dominant. The princi-
pal livestock are beef cattle and hogs.
Cotton acreage increased over the. last ten years in the parish
until 1975, when cotton acreage was drastically reduced and replaced
with soybeans. For example, in 1964, 49, 553 acres of cotton were
harvested sn^ in ]^^4. 88 ?00 P^T^S "rer? hsrve.^^ed. H^W^V^T fc\r
1975, exact figures are not known, but based on planted acreage, which
was reduced significantly (i.e., 25 to 35 percent), harvested acreage
would be similarly affected. Factors influencing this reduction included
poor weather conditions, pesticide shortages, cotton prices and tobacco
budworm problems. For 1976, indications were received that more
cotton would be planted given the return of cotton prices.
The farming trends in Richland Parish in recent years have been
to fewer and larger farms. In 1964, Richland Parish had 1,417 farms
in all and 791 commercial farms (i. e. , farms with over $2, 500 in yearly
product sales). In 1969, there were 1, 146 farms total and 686 com-
mercial farms. Approximately 7. 9 percent of the commercial farms
are class 1 farms (i. e. , farms with yearly product sales of $40, 000
and over), 10. 5 percent are class 2 farms (i. e. , farms with yearly pro- •
duct sales of $20, 000 - $39, 999), 17. 9 percent are class'3 farms (i. e. ,
farms with yearly product sales of $10, 000 - $19, 999), 21.4 percent
are class 4 farms (i. e. , farms with yearly product sales of $5, 000 -
$9, 999), and 42. 3 percent are class 5 farms (i. e. , farms with yearly
product sales of $2,500 - $4,999). The average size of all farms in
Richland Parish was 175. 1 acres in 1964 and 230. 2 acres in 1969.
B.3
-------
In 1969, 53.2 percent of all farm operators were full land owners,
32. 1 percent were part land owners and part renters, and 14. 7 percent
were tenants. In terms of farmland, 27. 0 percent of the land was
farmed by full land owners, 60. 0 percent by part land owners and part
renters and 13. 0 percent by tenants.
Black operated farms comprised 15.4 percent of all farms and
4.3 percent of all farm acreage in 1969. For"black operated farms
only, in 1969, 54. 0 percent of all farm operators were full land owners,
12. 5 percent were part land owners and part renters, and 33. 5 percent
were tenants. In terms of farm land, 37. 8 percent of the land was
farmed by full owners, 40. 3 percent by part land owners and part renters,
and 21.8 percent by tenants.
The average age of the farm operator in Richland Parish was
52. 1 years in 1969, with 11.3 percent under 34 years of age, 74. 2 per-
cent between 35 and 64 years of age, and. 14. 4 percent 65 years or older.
For black farm operators only, the average age was 54. 1 years, with
7. 9 percent under 34 years of age, 73. 9. percent between 35 and 64
years of age, and 18. 2 percent 65 years or older.
2. Franklin Parish. Louisiana.*
Franklin Parish, Louisiana is located in the northeast part of the
state bordered by Richland Parish to the north. It has a total land area
of approximately 414,528 acres-or 648 square miles. Winnsboro, the
parish seat, is located approximately 35 miles southeast of Monroe,
Louisiana.
The population of Franklin Parish was 26, 088 in I960 (83. 0 per-
cent urban and 17. 0 percent rural) and 23, 946 in 1970 (77. 7 percent
urban and 22.3 percent rural). The parish is approximately 65 percent
^Information for this section taken from: 1969 Census of Agricul-
ture-State and County Data; Louisiana Crop and Livestock Reporting
Service, Louisiana Cotton: Acreage, Yield, and Production (various
years), Louisiana State University; Public Affairs Research Council of
Louisiana, Inc. , Statistical Profile of Franklin Parish, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, 1973; Bowles, G.K. et al. , Net Migration of the Population,
1960-1970, by Age, Sex, and Color-Part 5: West South Central States,
USDA (ERS), University of Georgia (Institute of Behavioral Research)
and NAS (RANN) cooperating, December, 1975; and data obtained from
field work performed in this study, e. g. , conversations with extension
service personnel and others.
B.4
-------
white and 35 percent non-white. A net out migration of 5,343 persons
occurred during the decade from I960 to 1970, of which 1, 181 were
white and 4, 162 were non-white. As in Richland Parish, the greatest
numbers were in the 20-29 age group for both whites and non-whites.
An age-sex breakdown of the parish population in 1970 appears below:
Age Male Female Total
0-17
18-64
65 and over
Total
•
The dependency ratio in 1970 was 107. 8, compared to 1 16. 5 percent in
I960.
School attendance in 1970 numbered 7, 024 persons in the parish.
The median years of school completed in 1970 was 8.9 compared to
10. 8 for the state. . .
The median family income in 1959 and 1969 for Franklin Parish
-—.J o
•
4,994
5,384
1,229
11,607
4,710
6, 140
1,489
12,339
9,704
11,524
2,718
23,946
Parish. This also compares to $4,272 in 1959 and $7,530 in 1969 for
the State of Louisiana.
Unemployment in the parish slightly increased over the ten year
period from I960 to 19.70. In 1970, the unemployment rate was 6.9
percent compared to 5. 9 percent in I960.
Farming is the main enterprise in the parish, and in 1969, farm
land accounted for 78. 8 percent of the total land area in the parish or
approximately 327, 000 acres. Total cropland was 252, 722 acres and
harvested cropland totaled 187, 002 acres in 1969. Soybeans and cotton
have also been the two major crops grown in the parish, comprising
over 90 percent of the harvested acreage in the parish. Other crops
grown in small quantities include field corn, sorghum, wheat, hay and
vegetables. Both cash-grain and general farming are dominant. The
principal livestock are beef cattle and hogs.
As in Richland Parish, cotton acreage had increased over the
last ten years until 1975, when cotton acreage was also drastically
reduced and replaced with soybeans. For example, in 1964. 59.849
acres of cotton were harvested and in 1974, 84, 000 acres were harvested.
B,5
-------
However, for 1975, exact figures are not known, but based on planted
acreage, which, was reduced as in Richland Parish, harvested acreage
would be similarly affected. Factors similar'to those in Richland Parish
caused this reduction, but for 1976, indications were received that more
cotton would be planted, again due to rising cotton prices.
The farming trends in Franklin Parish in recent years have been
to fewer and larger farms as in Richland Parish. In 1964, Franklin
Parish had 2,094 frams in all and 1,254 commercial farms. In 1969,
there were 1,701.farms total and 1,032 commercial farms. Approxi-
mately 4. 5 percent of the commercial farms are class 1 farms, 9. 9
percent are class 2 farms, 19. 8 percent are class 3 farms, 26. 9 per-
cent are class 4 farms, and 39. 0 percent are class 5 farms. The
average size of all farms in Franklin Parish was 146. 0 acres in 1964
and 192. I acres in 1969, lower than the average size in Richland Parish.
In 1969, 52.4 percent of all farm operators were full land owners,
32. 1 percent were part land owners and part renters, and/15. 5 percent
were tenants. In terms of farmland, .32. 3 percent of the land was
farmed by full land owners, 53. 1 percent by part land owners and part
renters and 14.6 percent by tenants.
/"
Black operated farms comprised ii.3 percent 01 ail farms and
3.4 percent of all farm acreage in 1969. For black operated farms
only in 1969, 45. 6 percent of all farm operators were full land owners,
24. 9 percent were part land owners and part renters, and 29. 5 per-
cent were tenants. In terms of farmland, 33. 8 percent of the land was
farmed by full owners, 43. 8 percent by part land owners and part
renters, and 22.3 percent by tenants.
The average age of the farm operator in Franklin Parish was 51.5
years in 1969, with 11.5 percent under 34 years of age, 75.5 percent
between 35 and 64 years of age, and 13. 0 percent 64 years or older.
For black farm operators only, the average age was 52. 9 years, with
6. 2 percent under 34 years of age, 81. 3 percent between 35 and 64
years of age, and 12.4 percent 65 years or older.
B.6
-------
APPENDIX C: The Field Manual
C. 1
-------
FIELD MANUAL FOR
SHORT TERM AGRICULTURAL
USER ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS
ASSOCIATED WITH MAJOR PESTICIDE
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS
Contract Number 68-01-1917
Prepared by:
CONSAD Research Corporation
121 North Highland Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15206
December 17, 1975
-------
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION iii
1.0 Purposes of the Study 1.0
2. 0 Some General Methodological Views 2. 0
3. 0 Specific Data Sources and Their Uses 3. 0
4. 0 Phasing of the Field Work ' 4. 0
5. 0 Data Recording Procedures" 5. 0
6. 0 Some Final, Specific, Suggestions . 6. 0
11
-------
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this field manual is to assure common
understanding of the field-related tasks to be undertaken as
a crucial portion of CONSAD's study—Short Term Agricultural
User Adjustment Problems Associated with -Major Pesticide
Regulatory Restrictions for the Environmental Protection
Agency (Contract Number 68-01-1917). The set of persons
for whom this manual is prepared, therefore, includes the
field staff and field director, as well as other project staff,
CONSAD consultants and Enivornmental Protection Agency
staff. Finally, this field manual will supply the consumer of
the final report with an appreciation of the operations which
eventuated in the field data on which that report will be based.
The organization of the manual tends to be from the
general to the specific. In an opening statement (Purposes of
the Study) we articulate a set of objectives along with their
relative priority rankings. This section is of particular !
importance to the field personnel who have not shared in the
development of the project and are joining in "late. " The second
section addresses some overall methodological issues and will
serve to orient the reader to the bias or stance adopted vis a vis
knowledge in general and, more particularly, the processes by
111
-------
which social science information and knowledge are accrued. Section
three is a discussion of specific data sources and their uses. Field
persons ought pay special attention to the multiple uses a single data
source may have in determing an efficient route through the real-
world maze. The fourth section, Phasing of the Field Work, supplies
a time-defined guideline for field activities as well as exemplifying the
temporal ordering of these activities. Section five, Data Recording
Procedures, deals with the mundane (and oft overlooked) issue of trans-
ferring the insights and intuitions (as well as perceptions) onto paper
by means of which these idea elements may be stored reliably and
shared to the degree such things can be shared. In conclusion, section
six offers specific suggestions for field personnel.
-------
Additional Materials
The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Barney Glaser and Anselm
Strauss: Chicago, Aldine Publishing, 1967.
Chapter Ill—Theoretical Sampling
Chapter XI--Insight and Theory Development
Analyzing Social Settings, John Lofland: Belmont, CA, Wadsworth,
1971. pp. 101-108--Field Notes.
The Research Act, Norman Denzin
Chapter 4--Problems of Sampling
\
Information Packet:
1. Opinion of the Administrator, EPA, on the Suspension
of A Id r in/DI eld r in.
2. EPA Cancellation of Chlordane/Heptachlor: Economic
and Social Implications (prepared by Criteria and
Evaluation. Division.. OPP, EPA, May 1975) - selected
sections. ...
3. Environmental Reporter, excerpts on Aldrin/Dieldrin,
Chlordane/Heptachlor and DDT decisions.
4. Selected "Environmental Facts" on the pesticide regula-
tory process and on the regulatory decisions and use
histories of the above pesticides.
5. Selected Federal Register excerpts on the above regula-
tory decisions.
-------
1. 0 PURPOSES OF THE STUDY
Under law, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is
charged with the protection of man and the environment from deleteri-
ous effects of pesticide use. The law requires, however, that decisions
the Administrator makes governing the use of pesticides determined
to produce "unreasonable, adverse" environmental effects, shall be
made with an awareness of the prospects for "unreasonable, adverse"
social, economic and environmental effects resulting from that deci-
sion.
Data documenting short-term (i. e. , less than three year period)
transition?. 1 problem? experienced by agricultural firrnc faced v/ith the
problem of replacing a suspended pesticide is one of the areas in which
more knowedge is needed. Short-term user problems can become long
term problems for society, especially if major regulatory decisions are
made with out an adequate understanding of the scope and .magnitude of
problems.
The type and magnitude of adjustment problems experienced is
unknown, but they may include shortages of substitute supplies, pro-
blems associated with the attainment of application skills, occupational
health problems stemming from the use of unfamiliar products, etc.
Preliminary inquiry, by CONSAD, into the types of short term
agricultural user adjustment problems experienced by farmers when
1. 1
-------
faced with the situation of replacing cancelled or suspended pesticides,
has indicated that all farmers do have to make some adjustments in
the production of their crop when faced with such a situation.
Additionally, while some of these adjustments appear to cause
little problem for the farmer, others appear to be of great concern.
Moreover, an adjustment which is problematic for one farmer can
•
be relatively easy for another. Consequently, answers to questions
such as, "What makes some adjustments easy for farmers and other
adjustments difficult? " and "What causes a given adjustment to be.
difficult for one farmer but easy for another? " also become import-
ant. These questions suggest the need to explore the'nature of the
adjustment process and the need to determine those conditions
(including the imbedding social and other institutional contexts) that
ameliorate or intensify the adjustment problems. Because of these
considerations we would emphasize "reason analysis. " That is to say,
we are very much concerned with understanding the perceptual set and
.dynamic logic which guide the producer through the real-world maze of
alternatives. Such analysis requires an understanding of the "reasons"
given for decisions and actions on the part of respondents, independent
of the interviewer's views of the world.
Thus, given the limits imposed by the relative lack of knowledge
regarding user responses to pesticide withdrawals and the reasons for
1.2
-------
those responses, the focus of the present study is to identify the
representative range of "on the farm" user adjustment problems assoc-
iated with major pesticide regulatory decisions, as well as to create a
testable theoretical framework for explaining user adjustment problems
and responses to those problems.
There are essentially three major descriptive questions that are
key to the process of discovering "short term user adjustment problems"
and understanding their behavio ral basis. The first question is one of the
timing of the response patterns of various classes of users to major
regulatory actions. At what point vis a vis the schedule of Federal
regulatory decision do producers become aware of regulatory action,
and at what point are decision for various responses reached? The
second major question should focus on the target producers (firms)
problem definition process. That is, at what point do various producers
come to define their production process vis a vis a new pest control
regulation as problematic? The third question of major desc riptive con-
cern is the identity of user adjustment problems from the point of view
of the user. That is, just what are the problems users feel are a func-
tion of the regulatory decision in question?
In sum, the purposes of the field work can be summarized as:
I) identification of use r adjustment responses -- particularly those
which are problematic and (2) development of an understanding concerning
1. 3
-------
the problematic responses in terms of user type, user group-network,
and institutional factors.
1.4
-------
2. 0 SOME GENERAL METHODOLOGICAL VIEWS
Within this section, a general orientation of healthy skepticism
and doubt is, hopefully, to be fostered. Put another way, we wish
to argue:
a: hypotheses are not necessary to research, and
b: pure objectivity is pure bunk.
To start, let us examine a statement by the historian of
science, Thomas Kuhn, who uses the term "paradigm" to denote
a set of shared (and largely unarticulated) assumptions about the
world by the members of a "scientific community":
Examining the record of past research from the
vantage of contemporary historiography, the historian
of science may be tempted to exclaim that when
pcirciG.igm.3 change, tiic wcr^c itsci-i changes witu. tiieivi.
'Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments
and look in new places. Even more important, during
revolutions scientists see new and different things
when looking with familiar instruments in places they
have looked before. It is rather as if the professional
community had been suddenly transported to another planet •
where familiar objects are seen in a different light and
are joined by unfamiliar ones as well. Of course, nothing of
quite that sort does occur: there is no geographical
transplantation; outside the laboratory everyday affairs usually
continues as before. Nevertheless, paradigm changes do
cause scientists to see the world of their research-
engagement differently. In so far as their only recourse
to that world is through what they say and do, we may
want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding
to a different world. (T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 111).
Kuhn's argument, then, is that with a change in the assumption-set
(paradigm) the object of the scientist's inquiry is changed and with it
2. 1
-------
the type of questions posed. Moreover, elsewhere, Kuhn typifies
"mature" sciences as those with a single paradigm whereas
"immature" sciences are those with numerous, competing,
paradigms — if any at all. With respect to the social sciences,
then, we must generally classify ourselves as "immature" in that
we are lacking in a single, dominant, paradigm or assumption
set. It is not without reason, then, that those who differ in
terms of basic assumptions about people and their societies
also tend to differ in terms of what are termed "important
issues," appropriate research techniques and modes of data
reduction and analysis. Put another way, just as questions
constrain the range of-acceptable answers so too do the assump-
tions and research tools.
Coombs, who focuses on information, data, and analytic models
argues this point persuasively:
The method of analysis, then defines what the information
is and may.or may not endow this information with certain
properties. A "strong" method of analysis endows the data
with properties which permit the information in the data to
be used, for example, to construct a unidimensional scale.
Obviously, again, such a scale cannot be inferred to be a
characteristic of the behavior in question if it is a necessary
consequence of the method of analysis.
2.2
-------
It therefore becomes desirable to study methods of collecting
data with respect to the amount and kind of information each
method contains about the behavior in question as distinct
from that imposed. Similarly, it becomes desirable to study
the various methods of analyzing data in terms of the character-
istics or properties each method imposes on the information
as a necessary preliminary to extracting it. (C. Coombs, ,.
"Theory and Methods of Social Measurement, " in L. Festinger
and D. Datz (eds. ), Research Methods in the Behavioral
Sciences, New York: Dryden, 1953, pp. 471-472.
A few pages later, Coombs goes on to become even more specific
with respect to this concern over distinguishing between what is dis-
covered and what is imposed and closes with an admirably pithy state-
ment of the sort all too rare in the literature of social science:
Almost, anyone is wi.Hinp to say that ?,ny giver, set of data
contains some error, but just what is to be classified as
error depends a good deal on the level of measurement
assumed to hold in the data.
The social scientist is faced by his dilemma when he chooses
between mapping his data into a simple order and asking his
data whether they satisy a simple order. By selecting a strong
enough system, the social scientist can always succeed in
constructing an unidimensional scale of measurement, commonly
an interval scale, thus requiring a portion of the data to
be classified as error. By not requiring a strong system,
the social scientist permits the data to determine whether
a simple unidimensional solution is adequate. Unidimension-
ality, obtained by a method of analysis which guarantees it,
obviously cannot thereby be shown to be a characteristic
of the behavior in question. This is merely- a special
case of a more general principle that no property of data can
be said to hold unless the methods of collecting and of analyzing
the data permit alternative properties to exhibit themselves.
The problem of the social scientist, in blunt terms, is whether
he knows what he wants or whether he wants to know. (Coombs,
op. cit. . pp. 486-487) ' -
2.3
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To summarize the relevance of all this for the current effort,
we may make the following points:
Data do not speak for themselves, however, the observer
can enter a situation with more or less structure through
which events are filtered.
At certain stages in the field-observation process, certain
insights or "working hypotheses" may emerge. These
should be articulated and the evidence for them explicated
and thought through.
As hypotheses are developed, one should resist the tempta-
tion to invest self or ego in them; rather, one ought continue
searching for alternatives.
At an advanced stage in the field work, the field observers,
in cooperation with other project staff, should begin deveop-
ing a full-blown modelof the adjustment process.
The observer's running field notes* will serve as a chronological
record of the process by which the observer moves from initial stages
to fruition. ' .
# Discussed in Section 5. 0.
2.4
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3. 0 SPECIFIC DATA SOURCES AND THEIR USES
Three broad classes of information are required by this project:
the nature of the institutional context for agricultural
activities,
the nature of the social and political environments of the
counties to be studied, and
views and activities of individual farmers.
During the first few weeks of the field work, in particular,
emphasis is to be placed on documenting the (county) environments
and the institutional context for agricultural activities. While field
staff will also make contact with individual producers (i. e. , farmers)
sources of information.
The social and political environments may be assessed through
contacts with such persons as:
newspaper editors,
radio station personnel,
local elected officials (e.g., mayor, sheriff),
post master,
librarian,
school principal,
social welfare workers,
3. 1
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county commissioners,
ministers,
service clubs,
chamber of commerce officials, and
directors of voluntary organizations (Red Cross, Boy Scouts).
•In addition to this "a priori" list, field staff must be sensitive to other
--perhaps unique--source.s of information in their respective counties.
The newspaper editor and librarian may be particularly helpful in
identifying local influentials and information sources. Those persons
who seem most helpful upon initial contact should be contacted on an
ongoing basis and can serve as a check upon other information sources.
Indeed, the utilization of multiple data sources as a basis for "triangula-
tion " is crucial to the success of this field effort.
The nature of the institutional context for agricultural activities
is assessed by establishing contacts with the various "institutions" or
collectivities oriented toward agriculture. An understanding of the
nature of this context will factilitate both recognition of adjustment
problem areas as well as serve to qualify certain conclusions which
may be reached (i. e. , the formulation of boundary conditions or
scope statements). Specifically, the following types of people should
3.2
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two areas, greater emphasis will be placed on farmer interviews.
Initially, contacts with farmers may well be little more than self-
introductions to inform the producer community of your presence and
purpose while acquiring some initial feeling for the range of diversity in
in producers (size of operation, nature of equipment, general practices,
individual "sophistication"). Subsequently, producer interviews will
become far more focused.
In summary, all the data to be generated during the field effort
should mesh to yield an understanding of the producer's responses to
a dynamic environment, specifically with respect to EPA pesticide
decisions. We should emphasize that by collecting data in three con-
ceptually defined domains we hop1? to le"ve ooery the nossiHi li.tv ot
substantive conclusions about adaptation mechanisms at several levels
--i.e. , we have not "over-determined" the nature of the answers to
our questions.
Some further comments are now in order concerning how the
field interviewer should present himself and the study , and how he
should conduct each interview. The overall problem is to convey to
the person you wish to interview, in a quick and concise communication,
who you are, what you are doing, and why. Although a more business-
like approach might be to tell the prospective interviewee first exactly
3.4
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what kind of information you are after, there are some problems with
such an approach. First, that approach might tend to give you the image
of a poll-taker or an investigator for an insurance company, or a CIA
agent. One of the objectives of an informal interview process is to
.encourage openness on the part of the respondent. One way to do this
is to give same evidence of openness on your (the interviewer) part.
Another problem with the direct, businesslike approach is that it
tends to raise questions in the respondent's mind, such as "Who is
this guy? " or "How can I get rid of him?" An alternative approach
should be possible which conveys the impression that you need help
and thay you would be grateful for the respondent's cooperation, and
that you are aoL a con-artist, crack-pot, cr panhandler. It is highly
desirable to convey the impression that you are legitimately employed
in a rational endeavor which is part of doing your job - i. e. , what you
make a living at, and that you have no need to be defensive about it.
Moreover, while some of the most angry respondents are likely to
inform you that they don't wish to talk on the topic of their ire, you
can usually elicit their cooperation by pointing out that their non-
participation can lead to a "whitewash. " Thus, be sure to point out
that you wish to hear all types of opinions and experiences, particularly
the negative ones.
3.5
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In devising and using such an approach, in which you convey
some notion of what you are doing and why, there is a serious danger
of overdoing your presentation. The respondent is not likely to be
sympathetic or responsive to the underlying sociologic theory behind
your research, nor is he likely to care about the various bureaucratic,
legal, contractual, and organizational mechanisms which have combined
to thrust you into his presence. In other words, the statement of
•
what you are doing and why probably should be down-to-earth in terms
of what the study is about and how it is being conducted.
Before presenting the idea of what the study is about, you may
want to identify yourself. Although you will be carrying project identi-
fication (see page 6. 3), it is probably not necessary to show this
unless you are requested to provide documentation of your authenticity.
To begin with, you may want to give your name and idenfity yourself
as a "consultant", field consultant", or field interviewer", employed
by a consulting company, a research company, or an economic con-
sulting firm. Terms such as "observer" and "reporter" are less
accurate and convey the image of a prober, investigator, or axe-to-
grinder. Be careful of the term "field representative" which may
connote someone from a farm machinery or pesticide company.
3.6
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This kind of identification, especially your name, is really
enough. You may want to add some elaboration, either as part of
your introduction, or during the interview. This kind of elaboration
might include the fact that you go around and talk to different people as
part of your research. Other facts about you that would help to give
you an identity would include what your hometown is, some fact about
where you are presently '.'staying" (county, town, street, rooming house,
•
etc. ), how long you have been on this project, the fact that you were
previously a student, /or worked on a farm, /or worked in a dairy, /
or were unemployed etc.) and what branch of the military service
you were in, if any.
*
A more immediate kind of identification might be given by a
few remarks about how you operate and what kind of project organiza-
tion you are in. You talk to various people in the community, the
county, and other counties, including those involved in farming, and/
or livestock, plus other community people such as school-teachers,
car dealers, and ministers. You make notes about life in the community,
especially about economic conditions, and you send reports to your
supervisor, not about people in particular, but about how life is in
the town (county, area, valley).
3.7
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For each interview, you will need to think about how-to explain
why you are talking to the particular respondent, particularly when
they are individual farmers. If you can say that he was suggested by
the county agent or the college extension specialist, and give the names
of these people, then the problem is solved. For some respondents,
you may have advance information that you should reference one of
these officials, but not ce-rtain others, and from some respondents,
you will have advance word not to mention any connection with any of
the farm advisory officials. The rule is to try to hold as closely ;as
possible to the exact truth, since the respondent is going to hear
some of it anyway, from someone. If you did use a random list,-, or
did in fact "just happen to be driving by", * say so, but be prepared to
give a few more facts about where you got your random list, or who
some other people you have interviewed are.
After a fifteen to thirty second introduction of yourself, you will
probably find it useful to give some description of the overall ^project
you are working on. Do not be in a hurry to mention any title.s or
names of agencies, since you are not trying to impress anyone. . You
will probably want to mention that you are part of a team-assigned to
three states; Missouri, Iowa, and Louisisana. Each.field interviewer
""Dropping in" on farmers, and others for that matter, should
be avoided. Arrangements to talk with these people should be made in
advance, whenever possible.
3. 8
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has several communities in a region to study, and you all send your
reports back to your supervisor, who then sends them or a summary
of them, to the Environmental Protection Agency.
You can say further that your project team, including your super-
visor, are employed by a private company in Pennsylvania, under
contract to EPA. This project is a research study to obtain general
(overall, background) information about farm and community life in
areas where insects are a serious problem and pesticides often have
to be used. The EPA needs to be able to tell how important any one
pesticide is to a community, and how the cancellation of a pesticide
might impact on the community, since Congress has given EPA a
major role in pesticide approval and disapproval decisions.
During this project description, which should take no more than
thirty seconds, you should try to communicate three specific points
to the respondent:
1. You, the interviewer, are part of a team working for
CONSAD, a private consulting company.
2. The company is under contract to EPA, who is paying
for the study,
3. The purpose of this information is to enable EPA to
understand the effects on farm and community life of
approvals and disapprovals of pesticides.
3.9
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There.are many ways of conveying the above information without making
such bad mistakes as emphasizing company or agency names, imply-
ing that a devastating decision is imminent, or indicating that you
want to know the name and address of anyone who is complaining.
Below is a sample introductory statement that may prove useful when
talking with farmers:
Good afternoon, I am Tom Jones, and I've been assigned to this
area as part of a research, study on how people's lives-in-farm-
ing areas are changing, and what are some of the problems and
impacts related to recent changes, and in particular, the cancell-
ation and/or suspension of chemical pesticides. I'll be in this
area for several weeks, and I've got an apartment over in
Nowheresville. I'm part of a team and we are going around to
different parts of the U. S. We talk to people in farming areas,
but not just to people on farms. We also talk to other people in
f ^ £» ~ - -l-f^"-,-* -• •--> -. 4-> - -, J-V -*• -— -v ,.-1.. ,-i. - V — -v - '1 -^ -i-,-«^— IT-- *~ * ±1- r* -\££ - -*•*• —
IhLLC \^V^iIj_liJ.LAJ.iXuy , OO UL.LU.U WO *_CJ..L1 £ ^ k, d. Ol.OclCI L/J. I-WU.JT V» O-l. W4.J.C WXJL.^W^>J
of recent pesticide decisions on peoples' lives. I work for CONSAD
Research, an economic research company, but the study'is actually
paid for by a Federal agency, the Environmental Protection Agency.
The agency is studying farming areas because it has to ensure
that people have a healthful environment, and the agency is
required by Congress to help approve and disapprove'pesticides.
Mr. Silas Marner, the county agent, have me your name as
someone who was concerned about pesticide decisions and their
economic and environmental effects.
3.10
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In order to explain the nature of the research project further,
you may wish to take another minute to elaborate on the types of
changes, or effects, of pesticide approvals or disapprovals which EPA
seeks to understand. You do not need to explain the EPA mechanisms
of approval and disapproval, although you should be prepared to
answer basic questions about pesticide registration, notices to suspend
and cancel, and suspension and cancellation processes. You should
also, incidently, be familiar with the chronology and current status of
Aldrin, Dieldrin, Chlordane, Heptachlor, and DDT, as well as have a
good knowledge of the farm production technology used for either field
corn or cotton, whichever is applicable. *
t
The above will probably lead the respondent to comment on some
of the types of changes (effects) which he has observed or which he
expects to occur. In other words, the introductory description of
the study will contain implied questions for the respondent. The
responses to these implied questions are the information desired for
this research, at least as an initial data set. The introductory
remarks of the interviewer should thus lead to discussion of a series
^Background material concerning these topics has been supplied
to the field interviewers.
3.11
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of general topics including the respondent's occupation, family circum-
stances, and community activities. It will be difficult, but 6'f consider-
able importance, for the interviewer to detect recent or current changes
in these variables. • ::
To this end, the interviewer should have a facility for encou'fag-
ing the respondent to discuss changes, impacts, and effects," without
making the respondent think that he is being pshtfehQanalyze'd. You',
the interviewer, may want to use phrases such as MSo you ' did'h'V
used to do that? " or "So you don't do it that way any mo're'?-" to '
encourage the respondent to elaborate on how his life has been- chang-
ing. You should not act as a trial lawyer by trying to pin the witness
down on specific points. Conclusive statements are not necessary
for you to develop your data, so that you don't need to, and1 should not,
say things such as "So.therefore your selling your farm was directly
due to the pesticide suspension? " or "So that means that the heavier
pest infestation directly caused you to sell your car? "
An entire series of topics ("probes") specifically related to the
pesticide issue is available for discussion:
. In what quantities and on what crops had -tne- pesti*'"-.- i
cides been used?
What was the price paid for the pesticides and the
resultant cost per acre or per unit of output?
. How long had the farmer utilized the pesticides in •' •-.-.
question?
3. 12
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Where had the farmer purchased the pesticides?
.What storage precautions or procedures were followed
in utilizing the pesticide?
What application equipment was utilized and what did
the equipment cost?
How efficacious was the pesticide application in the
farmer's opinion? To simultaneously measure the
product's strength in terms of user demand for the
particular pesticide in question, we would provide
appropriate scaling for responses.
Did the farmer know that the pesticide being cancelled
was under review by EPA?
How did the. farmer first learn of EPA's decision to
cancel the pesticide?
Where did the farmer receive information on the pesti-
cide -- ncwspc.pci'3, magazines, fuel dealers/distri-
butors, county extension agents, other advertising,
manufacturers representatives, other farm organiza-
tions? What other information channels provide the
farmer with information on the pesticide in question?
Did the farmer utilize the pesticide right up until the
notice of cancellation was given or did he make an
effort to find alternative pesticides or means for
maintaining crop yeilds prior to cancellation?
Prior to the time of cancellation, did the farmer
know of other pesticides which could be used to
control the pest in question?
What portion of the farmers total cost of production
was accounted for by the pesticide, i. e., one per-
cent or less, 2-5 percent, etc. ?
3.13
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What crop losses or yields were attainable in the
farmers mind, with the pesticide in question,
assuming infestation and no infestation?
Was the decision to use the pesticide in question
mandated due to crops insurance requirements?
What reaction did the farmer have upon lea'rning of
* (
the decision to cancel the pesticide, i.e., wrote to
his local Congressman, complained to local news-
papers, was simply disgusted, felt this was one more
example of the government's meddling in the affairs
of private citizens, etc., etc., etc.?
What steps did the farmer follow in selecting an
alternative pesticide or production pattern once
he had learned of the pesticide cancellation? Did"
he consult local entomologists, agricultural exten-
sion service agents, university sources, product
catalogues, or information provided by pesticide
producers?
What information or factors primarily influenced
his present course of action?
Is the new material/pesticide purchased fr'om the
same supplying source? If not, what changes were
made? ' .
What is the differential effectiveness of the new
alternative pesticide as compared with the cancelled
pesticide? Actual experience will permit such
comments;'however, if the product chang'e-over is
recent and the crop yields are still uhproven, the
users comment on anticipated results, can be1 solicited.
Has the use of the new pesticide or alternative pro-
duction techniques affected changes in the types of
crops grown and the acreage devoted to such crops?
If so, why, and in what manner? "!'"''
Has the farmers crop yields, or net income changed
appreciably as a consequence of EPA's registration/
cancellation decision? How and in what manner?
3.14
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. Has the economic impact of the cancellation decision
forced or created other life style changes, i.e.,
sold the farm, changed jobs, divorce, etc. ?
. . .. What application equipment is required for the next
best alternative pesticide?
Do you own such equipment? Can you rent it?
. How difficult is it to set the application equipment
up to properly dispense the new pesticide relative
to the pesticide being cancelled?
. Are there significant differences in the timing of
'" :. .. ~ application of the pesticide being cancelled and
alternative pesticides?
. Were there any problems' in making the change-over?
Did the farmer correctly applythe new product?
. . Is the new product more toxic to humans than the
cancelled product in the farmer's opinion?
. Did changes in pesticides being applied result in
. . any other technical costs or impacts? Are crop
losses due to technical factors?
. Has there been any evidence of new pests as a
consequence of changing pesticides or production
techniques?
During some interviews, you will have difficulty deciding
whether the respondent is wandering hopelessly far from the informa-
tion you wish to obtain.. For example, he may be talking about how
the EPA is bringing about a change in the weather or climate because
of its decisions, or about how the EPA uses the CIA to implant root-
worms in his fields. This information should be recorded, but sooner
-3.15
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or later you will need to bring the respondent back to changes .in his
own opinions and activities. You can use phrases such as "How is
the hired help situation here?" or "Do you think your .town has grown
much in the past few years? "
f
Some respondents will want to know what you actually do with the
things they tell you. They will want to know what kind' of information
you write down, and how accurate they have to be in what they tell you.
'-> • : - .'.
(Their own judgments or estimates are close enough'.c).- You should
emphasize that EPA is interested in an overall picture of life in the
region and how it is changing, rather than in the details of any one
family's activities and attitudes. Your reports will describe .how
"most people" are thinking and planning, and how various groups or
- - -V ..
segments of the population are different from other's "In their attitudes
and plans. ' .
Sooner or later you will have to make a specific'concrete response
to the question of whether an individual respondent's name will be
* ^ • ..- -.-•--.!-,-./•
reported with his answers to your questions. You should point out
that you do not use a questionnaire form, that you take only an occasi-
.'•;.. '"•-.. • e + -•: '.•:•• •.••:••••• -->'.•
onal note during the interview, and that you are not tape-recording any-
one's statements. You can also repeat that you are. mainly interested
in developing general reports on how various groups are thinking. If
'-• " • -Vi' v..i n I . \ :•.;• <. ;•..; •: '••;•.
the respondent presses you about the confidentiality of what he is saying,
•' :3.16
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you should be prepared to describe in a clear simple way exactly how
you keep your respondent lists, interview records, and other materials,
and .what form they are in when you submit them. * Furthermore, point
out that EPA will not see any individual responses associated with
their sources.
You can also mention that although CONSAD is under contract to
EPA, the company is a private firm which has conducted field surveys
and .research for nearly fifteen years, and has always been able to
keep the identities of respondents separate and unconnected from
their answers and statements. You will have to admit, if asked, that
the Privacy Act, now in effect, perhaps requires you to obtain a
signed .release from him before obtaining personal information, but
you can also mention that you are not a government official, and that
he does not have to discuss any topic with you which he prefers not to
•.discuss. If he does give you any personal information, it will not
become part of any pers.onal file or record connected -with his name.,
which is what the Privacy Act relates to.
^Section 5. 0 deals with these issues more fully.
3.17
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Finally, the following two pages contain some variables of poten-
tial utility in typifying farms, farmers and communities. 'They af6
offered, not in the role of a mandatory checklist, but as example's of
some of the dimensions along which variability may" occur" and'thus^
this may prove fruitful for an explanatory scheme of user adjustment
responses.
1. Farm situation
a. Farm size in acres
b. Acres allocated to specific crops, by year
c. Annual cost per acre per crop, and cost •Component's ;"e.: g. ,
labor, machinery, seed, pesticides, fertilizer, fuel
d. Marketing costs, including storage, shipping, grading1
e. ' Financing data: amounts of loans, mortgages, interest
rates and payment sizes, sources of loans, collateral
used
f. Revenues from crops and other sources, and. non-money
income
g. Livestock data, sizes of herds, growth rate's) feed costs,
losses due to illness, reproductive failures, strays
h. Membership and use of cooperatives- -—••
2. Family situation, farm and farming community
a. Family living costs: food, clothing, recreation, transporta-
tion, education, home repairs and mortgage payments
b. Family characteristics: number living -at home, "hurriber of
non-immediate dependents, such as grandparents, uncles,
aunts, former wives or husbands, step^childreh, 'children
by previous marriages, and where they are living
c. Dependents in college, if any, and where
d. Travel patterns, both daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly,
including method of travel, duration, and costs^-w.ho .went
e. Recreational activities, and costs
f. Visits to neighbors, especially if1 they are'farfriers, and
frequency
g. Illnesses: type, length, costs of treatment, time of occur-
rence, possible source of contagion
3.18
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h. Accidents or other misfortunes, costs of treatment, damages
to car'or other household items, rats, termites, snakes,
snakebites, roaches, and costs of treatments
3. Community business and economic situation
a. Employment, farm and non-farm, in county and communities
b. Labor force characteristics, including ages of people work-
ing and lookingfor work, sex of people working and looking for
work, heads of households, farm and non-farm, who are
employed off the farm, marital status of women who are
employed
c. Number of fir,ms other than farm, and other than farm-
related, and business •volume and employment of each
type, including service, retail, wholesale, manufacturing
d. Clientele and service areas of. retail and service businesses,
expectations of growth and expansion
e. Capital investment of the community and county, road
improvements, water supply and sewerage improvements
planned, needed, or recently in progress
f. 4 Public services and facilities; size of hospital and recent
improvements, number of people on welfare, livi'n? in.
institutions, amount of medicare and medicaid payments,
infant death rate, number of midwives, public transporta-
tion, police, fire department, farm and other insurance
rates
g. Property tax rates, real property valuations, turnover
rates, monthly real estate sales, acreage converted to
and from farm use
4. . C'ommunity and farm social structure and attitudes
a. Occupations of relatives of farm owners, community and
•county officials
b. Occupations . and relatives of owners and managers of
newspapers and radio stations
c. Distribution of wealth by number of families and size of
family
d. Facts about the environment and other issues published
in media
e. Types of attitudes toward Federal government, and fre-
quency expressed
3.19
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f. Household saving and investment.activity; amount invested
in U.S. savings bonds, stock market, etc.. .
g. Indicators of racial and religious prejudice^-;
h. Attitudes toward growth and change, ratings of media items,
and frequency of various types of attitudes expressed in
interviews
3.20
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4. 0. PHASING OF THE FIELD WORK
Whereas a "lock-step" approach to the sort of theoretic field
work intended here may seem inappropriate, the period of two months
allocated for field work needs some agreed upon schedule. Moreover,
it would be unfair to the field staff were they to be instructed simply
"to find out what's going on. "
In week one, you will be involved with setting up house keeping
and this process should not be overlooked as a means for introducing
yourself to the community. Your land lady ( or lord), grocer, rester-
anteur, etc. are contacts within the social system which you intend to
explore. Therefore you should introduce yourself for what you are,
a social researcher concerned with ^the general dynamics of an agricul-
tural community specifically interested in adjustment problems associa-
ted with pesticide cancellations and /or suspensions. Additionally, you
should seek out some of the contacts specified in section 3. 0 of this manual.
During week two, you will make further contacts with those
prominent persons in the community concerned with the production of
the target commodity (county extension agents, farm equipment and
pesticide dealers, etc. ) as well as influential^ (elected officials,
bankers, journalists, etc. ). In addition, during week two you will
begin to interview producers of the target commodity and make your
presence known.
-------
Weeks three through six should find you focusing your efforts on
interviews with producers while continuing contacts with—local "influen-
tials and others representing the institutional context within which
i = , :.• ,->•> -: --v:
producers operate. This period is the most important phase of the
field work and the study itself, as it is the producer's (i.e., farmer's)
adjustment process which is the focus of our efforts.
'. .-:."'." ' • V
Weeks seven and eight are available for "mopping up". It will
- - - *,•..(
also be useful during this final phase to produce a completed set of
field notes with hunches and hypotheses clearly presented and the
evidence in their support -- as well as counter examples -- organized.
4.2
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5.0 DATA RECORDING PROCEDURES
Various sorts of information covering broad conceptual areas,
as indicated in section 3. 0, are requested from the field staff. Given
some admittedly open-ended requests for information (i. e. , "Deter-
mine the social and political environments of the counties to be
studied"), something akin to a questionnaire is not feasible. The
emphasis, instead, has been placed on the formation of a high calibre
field unit .with common understandings of the goals and strategies of
the study. Certain standardized data recording practices are here
presented in order to" aid commonality and quality data.
with one exception to be discussed below. Identification of interviewees
j •'•-.- ; • . .
in terms' of name, address, telephone number, producer/non-producer*
status, should be obtained and the date of acquisition should always
be supplied so that record linkage over time may be effected, as well
"as insuring the possibility of additional probing of an area later on.
-producers include contacts with all people other than
farmers.
5. 1
-------
The exception to the rule of identifying information directly'wi'th
its source occurs in the area of sensitive data (e.g., illicit use of a
pesticide). Rather than assuring confidentiality of all interview informa-
tion, * it is more practical, within the confines of the current project;
:'. -. '.. V -i £)*,' ' •' , ."vy-% ^ • v' >•> •
\- - ..•!• ^ . C .
to omit any sensitive information from inclusion in a particular inter-
. view write-up. ' This information should, instead,, be noted in a
notebook containing your running field notes in a manner to insure the
respondent's anonymity. ...--,,
You are being supplied a portable cassette recorder for field,
use. It is not our intent that interviews be recorded, although in some
rare cas.es you may feel this to be worthwhile. The purpose of the
recorder is as your "memo pad" for use immediately following an
interview, when writing out extended notes would be too time consum-
ing. Thus, during a relatively brief period (i. e.,. a day) you might4
conduct a series of interviews, dictating a completeTsurnmary of each
interview upon its completion based upon notes taken during the interview.
Later, at home, you can then use the tape to enable you to fully write
up each interview. In short, the recorder is supplied in order to assist
you. If it is of no assistance, don't use it. .
*It is CONSAD's understanding that under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, confidentiality can n£tbe completely assured to the res-
pondent. However, it is CONSAD's intention to keep all information
confidential in the sense that the EPA will not receive individual
information with its source named. This should be so stated to the
respondents.
5.2
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A major concern with the sort of field work being employed in
this project is that the field staff will develop hunches, hypotheses,
conceptual models, etc. These are given very high priority although
they should 'be kept separate from data recording. As a mechanism
for reporting hunches, etc. as well as summarizing data acquisitive
activities, a weekly report will be required.
Legibility of field notes and interview write-ups is, of course, crucial.
When in doubt you may wish to type. Moreover, timelieness is very
:. ' f-' '•
important both because recall is fallible and morale--particularly out
in the field--can be severely affected by. a back log. For further elabora-
tion on the topic of field notes, see the pages excerpted from John
Lof land's 'Analyzing Social Settings.
When alternative interpretations or ambiguities arise, please
communicate them as rapidly as possible by telephone to the field
director or project director.
,.5. 3
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6. 0 SOME FINAL, SPECIFIC, SUGGESTIONS
.'"':- ''':"••'• *. .
Successful field work is a craft which is dependent upon
•'Xy •.'; .••-'-'.'"?'•;•',•'"••.•?' «v-'^'i''r,
sensitivity and good judgment as much as anything which can
be articulated within the confines of a "hard copy" manual.
What follows is a series of suggestions which may assist the
field operative to appreciate that craft.
That you are an "intruder" into a pre-existing social'system
with certain values and patterns of behavior is an important
recognition. The "pushy" outsider is almost certainly doomed
to failure within this context. Development of an understanding
for the indigenous culture is both a necessary means for the
"' • ' • •••-• ' V : ~S '-' "<-.••;$ 0;v .'.
successful conduct of the field work and constitutes an important
product or outcome of that work. Moreover, your role as an
.' • • -~i •:• >'..:'i'?- ••-1 •-. rV$;-i"V
outsider does not end with the work day.
c - • ' •• • •. .- -
You cannot completely guarantee confidentiality for the bulk of the
• •"•"" :---r • •'••'- i.OT'7 •.... v... >t. i.:-.
information you receive from respondents ( the previously discussed
sensitive .information, aside) but you should be unwilling to facilitate
information transfer, among the members of the community— i. e. ,
don't be a blabbermouth. - • • , .
Within any community, you are likely to encounter the town
malcontent who is quite willing to talk, should he have an available
listener. The use of such informants can be quite productive, although
-6. 1
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you should take care that other community members do not come
to identify you with such persons.
..Taking care of certain practical matters can greatly simplify
your life .and streamline the field work process. CONSAD will supply
you'with mailing envelopes, memo pads, etc. Should you feel the need
for other such items please express them directly to the field director
or project director so, that we may assist you.
Y6u. should remember that you are part of an organized
research effort: rather than a "stand-alone" inquirer. Thus when
the unanticipated occurs, you should immediately report it to
the field director or project director. Crises may revolve about
personal-arid •familial affairs,." natural disasters or a sudden unwilling-
ness on the part of respondents to participate. Most such problems,
particularly when caught early enough, can be handled by reallocation
of project resources.
You have been supplied with project identification (facsimile
on following page) which you should always have with you. Indeed,
the statement on the card that anyone is welcome to check either
with CONSAD or EPA is an important one for your purposes.
6.2
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FIELD OPERA TIVES'S IDENTIFICATION
CONSAD Research Corp. is under : •
contract to the Environmental
Protection Agency to study., producer'.l
problems associated with pesticide
suspensions. . .^ _ ...',-
is a CONSAD employee working* ' '"•
on this project. Should questions
arise, please contact: . ^ .,.-•: '••• -.-.. -.
Dr. Douglas Stewart, Field Director,
Mr. Alan Bernstein, Project Director,
or Mr. Peter'Clark, Vice'Pre;s'id^nt- '•-'
(412-363-5500).
The EPA contract numbervis : '••>•'•&
68-01-1917 and the project
monitor is Dr. Robert-Reynolds; ,'-.'--4
(703-557-7346). • '"
YOUR COOPERATION PN-THIS"" '-^-:
EFFORT IS SINCERELY
APPRECIATED
'6.3
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