IP
EPA-5 20/6-74-002
EVACUATION RISKS-AN EVALUATION
Ill
•••••
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Office of Radiation Programs
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EVACUATION RISKS-AN EVALUATION
I
(9
**J&
SR
Joseph M.Hans,Jr.
Thomas C. Sell
June 1974
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Office of Radiation Programs
National Environmental Research Center-Las Vegas
Las Vegas, Nevada 89114
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FOREWORD
The Office of Radiation Programs carries out a National
program designed to evaluate the exposure of man to ionizing
and non-ionizing radiation and to promote development of
controls necessary to protect the public health and safety
and assure environmental quality-
Within the Office of Radiation Programs, problem areas
have been defined and assigned a priority in order to deter-
mine the level of effort expended in each area. One of these,
the Accident Problem Area, has been assigned a high priority
and requires the participation and cooperation of several
Federal agencies. Each agency has been assigned specific
tasks as outlined in an interagency agreement. This report is
directed at a specific Environmental Protection Agency task
of establishing action guidelines based on radiation exposure
levels which might result from nuclear incidents. Other reports,
recommendations, and state assistance will be developed and
executed to fulfill EPA obligations under the interagency
agreement.
I encourage users of this report to inform the Office of
Radiation Programs of any omissions or errors. Your additional
comments or requests for further information are also solicited.
W. D. Rowe, Ph.D.
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Radiation Programs
iii
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PREFACE
In the event of an incident at a fixed nuclear facility
which can cause or potentially cause radiation exposure to
the public in the vicinity of the facility, appropriate pro-
tective measures must be identified which will substantially
reduce or avert the exposures. One of these protective meas-
ures is to evacuate the public from the affected area.
Evacuation, like radiation exposure, can impose risks
upon the affected population group. These risks should not
exceed the risks from radiation exposure that would otherwise
occur if no evacuation took place. Although the risks from
radiation exposure can be estimated to some degree, no evacu-
ation risk studies have been available to provide a basis for
decisions concerning the application of this protective action.
This report was initiated to provide a needed assessment
of evacuation risks in order that the Office of Radiation
Programs can promulgate Protective Action Guides for evacuation
based on risk analysis. Parts of the report and ensuing guides,
along with other useful information, will be incorporated into
a manual for those who have responsibilities for the management
of radiation incidents.
Charles L. Weaver
Director, Field Operations Division
Office of Radiation Programs
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors acknowledge the information, assistance, and
cooperation provided by members of the Headquarters of the
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), DCPA Regional Offices,
State Civil Defense and Emergency Services, and especially
those persons on the local civil defense level without whose
support this document could not have been prepared.
Many other organizations on the Federal, state, and local
levels have contributed information and data used throughout
the report. These include; American Red Cross, U.S. Army
National Guard, Salvation Army, National Academy of Sciences,
Office of Emergency Preparedness, Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.,
Disaster Research Center of The Ohio State University, Depart-
ment of Commerce, Department of Transportation, Systems Develop-
ment Coporation, National Safety Council, U.S. Coast Guard,
Institute for Defense Analysis, and Stanford Research Council.
Special acknowledgement is given to Donald L. Lambdin,
Office of Radiation Programs—Las Vegas, for his assistance
in preparing this report.
vi
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CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD iii
PREFACE V
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT vi
ABSTRACT X
INTRODUCTION 1
OBJECTIVES 2
PROCEDURES 3
RESULTS 6
Risk of death 8
Risk of inj ury 11
Cost of evacuation 11
Estimation of costs 12
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 13
Risk of death 13
Deaths from motor vehicle accidents 14
Deaths from all accidents 17
Deaths from major cardiovascular diseases 17
Deaths involving helicopters 17
Estimating the risk of death 17
Risk of injury 19
Reliability of data 19
Deaths 23
In j uries 23
Comparison of predicted and observed risk of injury
and death 24
Approximating evacuation costs 27
Cost to evacuees 27
Cost to evacuators 29
Salaries and wages 29
Farm area evacuations 30
Urban area evacuations 32
Accuracy of estimating cost 37
OTHER ASPECTS OF EVACUATION 39
Time required to evacuate population groups 39
Panic or hysteria associated with catastrophes 43
Motivation to evacuate 48
Emergency plans ; 48
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Page
Problems encountered in various evacuations 50
Special evacuations 52
Schools 52
Hospitals 53
Penal institutions 53
Nursing homes 54
CONCLUSIONS 54
REFERENCES 55
BIBLIOGRAPHY 61
FIGURE
Figure 1. Population Density vs. Evacuation Time 41
TABLES
Table 1. Incident Investigated by Category and Number
of People Investigated 7
Table 2. Meteorological Conditions During Evacuation. 9
Table 3. Time of Day During Which Evacuation Took
Place 9
Table 4. Conditions of Roads During Evacuation 10
Table 5. Size of Population Evacuated and Number of
Events 10
Table 6. Comparison of National Motor Vehicle Death
Rate and Study Death Rate 15
Table 7. National and Study Motor Vehicle Death Rate. 16
i
Table 8. National and Study Daily Death Rates from
all Accidents 16
Table 9. Comparison of National Motor Vehicle Injury
Rate and Study 20
Table 10. National Health Survey 1968-70 Average Non-
Fatal Injuries 21
viii
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Table 11.
Table 12.
Table 13.
Table 14.
Table 15.
National Safety Council—1971 Disabling
Injuries
Comparison of Predicted and Observed Deaths
and Injuries in Hurricane Carla
Estimates of Costs of Food, Shelter, and
Transportation for Evacuees ,
Farm Information in the United States
United States by Regions and States in
Regions ,
Table 16. Values to Use for Evacuation Cost Estimates
22
25
28
33
34
36
Appendix A.
Appendix B.
Appendix C.
Appendix D.
Appendix E.
Appendix F.
Appendix G.
APPENDIXES
Questionnaire—Evacuation Statistics
Summary of Evacuation Questionnaires
Information Bases Computer Searched for
Evacuation References
National Contacts ,
Regional Contacts ,
State and Local Contacts
Listing of Events Requiring Evacuation
from 1960 to 1973 ,
77
83
91
93
97
99
101
Appendix H. Chi Square Test of Table 1 Data 155
ix
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ABSTRACT
A study was conducted to assess the risk of death, injury,
and cost associated with an evacuation of population groups
affected by an incident at a fixed nuclear facility. Data and
information were obtained by contacting persons and organizations
involved with previous evacuations precipitated by natural or
man-made causes and from available literature on the subject.
Frequencies of 8 .9 x 10-8 deaths per person-mile and 4.4 x 10~8
injuries per person-mile were derived from data representing
vehicle evacuations involving approximately (5.5 x 1()5 persons.
National Safety Council (NSC) data for motor vehicle accidents
indicate frequencies of 2 .4 x 10 ~8 deaths per person-mile and
9.0 x 10-7 injuries per person-mile. Because of the small number
of deaths and injuries derived from the study of evacuations,
no statistical comparison with NSC information could be made;
however, strong subjective information suggests that NSC data
can be used for estimating the risk of injury or death.
Only some fragmentary costs related to the evacuation
process were obtained from data sources, and total costs had to
be constructed from available literature. Aspects, other than
risk and cost, concerning evacuations are also discussed in
the report.
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EVACUATION RISKS—AN EVALUATION
INTRODUCTION
Considerable attention has been given to methods of
protecting the general public from radiation exposure in the
event of accidents at nuclear power plants . In the power
plant licensing process, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
requires an evaluation of the consequences of a series of
postulated accidents. This involves the determination, with
the use of appropriate assumptions, of the dose equivalent
(H) that potentially could be received by members of the pub-
lic as a result of the postulated accidents. A proposed site,
from an accident viewpoint, is considered acceptable by the
AEC if the calculated H does not exceed the H criteria speci-
fied in 10-CFR-lOO (1) .
License applicants are required to submit detailed plans
for coping with emergencies and accidents which could affect
members of the public around power plant sites.
The licensees are also required to make contacts and
arrangements for emergency support with local, state, and
Federal agencies that have responsibilities for responding
to the emergencies.
In order to provide a more formalized, coordinated Fed-
eral approach for emergency response planning for fixed nuclear
facilities, the Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
(OEP) issued, in the Federal Register, an agreement among
Federal agencies which delegated to each participating agency
certain responsibilities (20 . The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) is responsible for the following:
1. Establishing action guidelines based on projected
radiation exposure levels which might result from nuclear
incidents.
2. Recommending appropriate protective measures which
can be taken by governmental authorities to minimize the con-
sequences of an incident and reduce the potential population
exposure.
3. Assisting state health departments and other state
agencies that have responsibilities for radiological response in
developing their emergency plans, following the AEC guidelines.
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Some guidance applicable to items 1 and 2 is available
from the former Federal Radiation Council (FRC) in its Reports
5 and 7 (3., 4J . The guidance is in terms of Protective Action
Guides (PAG) and Protective Actions (herein often called pro-
tective measures). A PAG is defined as "The projected absorbed
dose to individuals in the general population that warrants
protective action following a contaminating event."
The PAG's were presented as numerical values of absorbed
dose to the whole body and some body organs . The application
of the guides requires that absorbed dose be projected or
estimated before it is actually received. If absorbed dose
projections exceed the numerical guides, a protective action
is warranted. Such a protective action is an action that
would avert most of the absorbed dose that a potentially
affected population group would receive.
Many considerations, including health, were used by
the FRC in setting the numerical values of the PAG's. Also,
the application of protective actions were to be based
upon a risk-versus-benefit analysis which was not numerically
defined. The approach in setting Protective Action Guides
should be based initially on biological risk and, then, adjust-
ments of the guides or protective actions made on a cost-risk-
benefit analysis. Contemporary epidemiological and radio-
biological research has provided information and data which
permit the estimation of health risks associated with radiation
exposure. Any protective measures that may be initiated will
also present some risks which, at present, have not been fully
assessed. An evaluation of protective action risks can lead
to methodology for the comparison of these risks with the risks
of radiation exposure. This comparison could provide a basis
for decisions concerning the application of protective actions.
OBJECTIVES
A variety of protective measures (j>) are available to
minimize absorbed dose to the population in the event of a
nuclear accident which would release radioactivity to the
environment. In general, the selection of a particular pro-
tective action or a combination of actions will be dependent
upon characteristics of the area and population at risk as
well as the nature of the incident.
One protective action that may be applied is evacuation
of the threatened area. There are two types of evacuations.
The first is to evacuate people from unprotected outdoor areas
to indoor locations within the potentially affected geograph-
ical area. This type of evacuation will not completely avoid
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a projected absorbed dose but will reduce it by "shielding"
and by reducing the amount of inhaled radioactivity. Estimates
of protection factors for various structures based upon the
expected radionuclide content of an accidental reactor release
are under study as a separate investigation.
The second type of evacuation is to move persons outside
the boundaries of the potentially affected geographical area.
If this is done promptly and correctly, a substantial reduction
of dose should result.
The Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for
protecting public health and insuring the quality of the
environment. Under this broad charter, the EPA's Office of
Radiation Programs (ORP) has the authority and the responsi-
bility to establish radiation exposure criteria for the general
public in the event of a nuclear incident. This responsibility
was further solidified by the OEP agreement (2) . As a part of
its overall radiation protection plan, ORP will develop Pro-
tective Action Guides to supplement those already promulgated
by the former FRC. Interim Protective Action Guides for Evacu-
ation have been issued by ORP (6).
The objectives of this study are to determine: the risk
of death, major injury, and cost associated with an evacuation;
what parameters in an evacuation affect risk; and, if such
parameters exist, can they be used to prognosticate risk.
The monetary risk of an evacuation cannot be considered
on an equal basis with health risks; however, it should be
considered when establishing evacuation criteria. For example,
higher permissible dose levels may be warranted for segments
of the population whose evacuation would produce significantly
increased total evacuation costs. This economic impact must
be weighed against radiation dose savings. For this purpose,
cost of evacuation is included in this report as a risk to be
considered along with health risks. However, this does not
imply that monetary values are being assigned to death or
injury.
PROCEDURES
The initial phase of the study was to determine if evacu-
ation risks had previously been established or were in the
process of being established and, if so, were they applicable
to this study. Two approaches were taken. The first was
to review research in progress through the Smithsonian Science
Information Exchange, Incorporated (SSIE) , a national register
of ongoing research. The second was to interrogate various
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national organizations (appendix D) to determine if they had
made or were making any similar studies, or if they were aware
of any organizations that had done so.
From these two major sources of information, it was
learned that, although numerous studies, somewhat related to
evacuations, had been conducted by different organizations,
none had dealt directly with risks associated with evacuation.
Apparently, in past evacuations, the risk from the immediate
or potential emergency was obviously much greater than the
assumed risk of evacuation. Consequently, there was no need
to have evacuation risk information.
An additional literature search was requested for relevant
information through the National Environmental Research Center—
Cincinnati. This was a computer search of various information
bases listed in appendix C. Personal visits were also made
with personnel from the following organizations: Office of
Emergency Preparedness, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency,
U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Hazardous Materials (Department
of Transportation), and Institute for Defense Analysis. These
visits were made to discuss the study; to survey and borrow
available literature or bibliographies; to be briefed on emer-
gencies, disasters and planning for such events; and to
receive general background information on the subject.
The acquired literature and information received from
personal contacts provided much ancillary material on disas-
ters and evacuations, but little was directly useful for
the risk study. Based upon the fact that the risks asso-
ciated with the evacuation of people had not been quantified
and no information existed about the subject, it was determined
that it would be necessary to investigate individual events of
the past which required evacuations and to estimate the risks
associated with the movement of these people.
Since no national register for disasters could be identi-
fied, it was necessary to compile a working list of various
types of incidents that had occurred in the past which precip-
itated an evacuation. It was decided to include in the search
only those events which occurred in the United States after
1960. Limiting the events to the United States would eliminate
conditions in other countries which do not closely approximate
circumstances in this country. It was also thought that if
enough events occurred after 1960, events prior to this date
would not be used. The basis for this decision was: 1) with
the rapidity of changing conditions since 1960, events prior
to this time would not approximate future situations as closely,
and 2) it would be more difficult to locate people familiar
with events prior to 1960.
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Identification and compilation of a list of events requiring
evacuation which occurred after 1960, regardless of the cause,
was accomplished by searching available literature and contacting
various organizations. From previous discussions with the
Federal Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, it appeared that
its Regional Offices would be an excellent source of informa-
tion on occurrences within states in each region. Personnel
in all eight Defense Civil Preparedness Agency Regional Offices
were asked if they could provide a list of the events that
occurred in their region which required an evacuation of 25
or more people and any supplemental information that was
available concerning the events.
Overall, a list of about 500 events was compiled (appendix G)
Although this is not a complete listing of all the events in
the United States after 1960 which required an evacuation, it
provided a sufficient number for survey purposes. There were
also enough different causes for evacuations—floods, fires,
hurricanes, explosions, toxic substances, etc.—to provide
potentially useful comparisons.
The second phase of the study was to collect data on
selected evacuation events. Not only was information desired
on the deaths, injuries, and costs connected with each event,
but also enough additional information was needed to deter-
mine what relationships might exist between various factors
and what bearing these factors might have on risk. Param-
eters, such as weather, time, road conditions, etc., establishing
the conditions under which an actual evacuation occurred, could
also be related to the conditions which might exist at a nuclear
power plant. A questionnaire was developed (appendix A) listing
these parameters and the information needed in establishing the
environment of a particular evacuation event.
From preliminary inquiries, it was determined that the
best sources of information for most events would be the persons
directly involved with the incident. Personnel associated with
the incident were located and contacted by telephone and, in
most cases, all information required on the questionnaire was
completed. In some instances, where the information was not
readily available, or persons could not be contacted by tele-
phone, the questionnaire was mailed. Requests were also made
for any reports which existed for the event. Not all key
information was available or obtainable for some incidents;
however, enough was obtained to permit analysis.
Since it was not possible to obtain a statistically random
sample because of the many variables potentially involved, the
selection of events was based primarily on judgment. The
determination of which incidents to select for questionnaire
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completion was based on information initially available, such
as the type of event, the number of evacuees, and the
geographic location. In some cases, additional data in the
form of reports was available to aid selection. All trans-
portation accidents involving hazardous materials and an
evacuation of more than 500 persons were investigated since
it was thought their occurrence without warning would more
closely approximate reactor accidents. Questionnaires on
other events which had potentially short warning times were
completed. A number of incidents involving floods and/or
hurricanes were selected on the basis of numbers of people
involved. Events were selected to cover a wide range of
population sizes.
A summary of the information collected is presented in
appendix B.
RESULTS
A list of incidents, which required the evacuation of
people (appendix B), was collected covering the period from
January 1960 until February 1973. Fifty-nine of these inci-
dents were selected for investigation and a questionnaire
completed on each. On seven of the incidents, multiple types
of evacuations occurred and/or extremely large areas were
involved. In these cases, multiple questionnaires were com-
pleted on the same incident in order to obtain more detailed
information. A total of 70 questionnaires were completed.
Table 1 is a listing of the incidents categorized by the
disaster agent and the total number of people evacuated for
each category.
After examining the data collected, it was decided that
six questionnaires and the information they contained would
not be utilized in the summarization and data analysis. On
event numbers 1, 2, and 3, involving 12 evacuees, not enough
ancillary data was available. Event number 24, involving
101,000 persons evacuated, was a civil defense drill conducted
prior to 1960. Event numbers 30a and 30b, totaling 100 evacuees,
involved one hospital evacuated during a hurricane and are
discussed separately, later in the report. Eliminating these
events reduced the total number of incidents used for analysis
to 54; questionnaires completed reduced to 64; and the total
number of people evacuated reduced from 1,243,448 to 1,142,336.
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Table 1
Incident Investigated by Category
and Number of People Evacuated
Incident by Number Number of
Category Investigated People Evacuated
Flood 33 93,340
Hurricane 14 735,858
Transportation 12 215,850
Tidal Wave 3 4,000
Dam Break 3 89,500
Nuclear Test 1 300
Landslide 1 150
Tornado (Flood) 1 3,400
Fire 1 50
Civil Defense Test 1 101,000
Total: 70 1,243,448
Note: Includes all incidents investigated; in subsequent
data analysis six events, totaling 101,112 people,
were not used.
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Tables 2, 3, and 4 are a summary of the meteorological
conditions, time of day, and road conditions of the evacuations.
A sufficient number of events of approximately the same magni-
tude occurred in each of the two major divisions in each table,
such that their effect on evacuation risks could be compared.
In analyzing the results of the questionnaire, it appeared
that enough data was collected with sufficient variety of
environmental conditions to determine the risk of death, injury,
and cost and to determine the parameters which effect these
risks.
With approximately 1,140,000 people evacuated in 64 events
(a breakdown of size of population evacuated is given in table
5), the data should be a reasonable representation of the total
incidents requiring evacuations which have occurred since 1960
in the United States . Although no estimate is available for
the total number of evacuations and evacuees that have resulted
from all contemporary disasters, it seems highly unlikely that
the total number of people evacuated in recent times could be
any higher than a factor of three or four over the study
population. Although the total number of incidents requiring
evacuation may be in the thousands, the number of people per
evacuation is probably small (]7,£) .
Assuming that a 25 percent evacuation population sample
was randomly obtained, the data collected should be represen-
tative of the total population and the information on the
parameters likewise representative. Although more data could
be obtained by investigating more incidents, it is not likely
that the additional information collected would approximate
risks more closely than the sample.
Risk of death
In the 64 events involving the evacuation of 1,142,336
persons, there were ten deaths reported attributed to the
evacuation process. The incidents and circumstances under
which the deaths occurred follow:
1. Hurricane Camille, Gulfport, Mississippi, August 1969.
Ten thousand persons were evacuated from a fifteen-square-mile
area in Harrison County, Mississippi, during the hurricane.
One person had a heart attack during the evacuation process
and died in a shelter.
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Table 2
Meteorological Conditions
During Evacuation
Condition
Rain
Clear
Cloudy
Fog
Snow
No Data
Number of Events
26
20
7
1
5
5
Total: 64
Table 3
Time of Day During Which
Evacuation Took Place
Time
Day
Night
Day and Night
No Data
Number of Events
27
22
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4
Total: 64
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Table 4
Conditions of Roads
During Evacuation
Condition Number of Events
Wet 30
Dry 21
Ice 1
Varied (Wet and Dry) 2
No Data (Includes Boat Evacuation) 10
Total: 64
Table 5
Size of Population Evacuated and
Number of Events '
Size of Population
Evacuated Number of Events
5-99 18
100 - 999 16
1,000 - 9,999 17
10,000 - 99,999 9
100,000 3
No Data 1
Total: 64
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2. Collapse of the Baldwin Hills Reservoir, Los Angeles,
California, December 14, 1963. An earthen dam collapsed and
inundated an area of 10x13 city blocks. Of the 8,500 persons
evacuated, two were drowned in the process. It was emphasized,
by the individual who completed the questionnaire, that "The
deaths occurred because, for some unknown reason, the persons
did not follow evacuation directions and drove the wrong way
into deep water."
3. Flood, Humbolt County, California, December 22, 1964.
In a flood postulated to occur once in 100 years, 200,000
persons, over an area of 450 square miles, were affected under
adverse weather conditions. One hundred and eighty-three of
the persons were airlifted by helicopter to safer places. In
the process, one helicopter crashed killing seven persons.
Two other helicopters were lost without loss of life.
Risk of injury
There were only two injuries reported in the evacuation
of 1,142,336 persons;
1. Flood, Ferndale, Washington, January 8, 1971. Approx-
imately 200 persons were evacuated from an Indian Reservation
due to a flood which eventually covered 30 square miles. One
broken arm was reported as a result of an accident incurred
during the evacuation.
2. Tidal Wave, Cannon Beach, Oregon, March 28, 1964.
Thirty-one hundred persons were evacuated in one and one-half
hours after a three-minute warning of a tidal wave which
flooded an area of 3.5 square miles. One accident (a heart
attack) was attributed to the evacuation.
Cost of evacuation
No information concerning the complete cost of an evacu-
ation was obtained from either personal contacts made during
the study or data collected during the individual investigations
of the 54 incidents.
Fragmentary cost figures were collected from a few differ-
ent organizations for their activities related to different
specific events. These could only be useful for making estima-
tions of total incident costs, and had no significance, viewed
alone, for evacuation costs.
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A number of reasons are suggested for the paucity of
information:
1. There is not a centralized group—Federal, state,
or local—which collects information about evacuation costs,
and there is not a centralized group which is concerned with
the total cost of a disaster or emergency situation.
2. Although, in a major disaster situation, a total
dollar value may be placed on the economic effect of the
incident, this figure may or may not be a reasonably true
estimate of the real impact, and generally does not include
all the cost incurred. This value usually includes property
damage, agricultural losses, business and industrial losses,
clean-up costs, cost of temporary housing, and other major
financial aid.
3. Even in the incidents which have a total dollar value
attributed to them, the cost for the evacaution—moving people
out, providing for them while they are away from home, and
getting them back—is not identifiable as a separate item.
4. In an incident of sufficient magnitude which requires
much manpower and equipment from many different organizations,
both governmental and private, and in which the participating
groups keep records of their costs, the cost for the evacua-
tion alone is not a separate, identifiable number. Another
complicating factor is that not only is the total number of
people not generally known but, at any one time, the number
fluctuates. To further complicate the attempts to ascertain
these costs; a) many people are volunteers who receive no
compensation for their efforts, and b) others such as police-
men, firemen, and civil defense personnel would be paid
regardless of whether they participated or not.
Estimation of costs
The total cost of an evacuation could not be obtained
from the surveys that were made, from existing literature, or
from private conversations with people representing a number
of different organizations. Estimates of the cost of evacuation
would have to be made based upon a combination of: 1) costs
incurred during an evacuation, whenever applicable figures
and 2) synthesized values based on certain assumed conditions.
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Utilizing derived costs based upon the latter figures to
estimate future evacuation costs is less exact and subject to
a larger degree of error than estimating and projecting costs
based upon real numbers from actual events; however, judicious
use of the data should allow a reasonable estimate of the cost
of an evacuation.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The purpose of the study was to determine the risk of
evacuating people, in terms of deaths, injuries, and costs,
and any relationship between these risks and the parameters
of the evacuation. If the risks attributed to the evacuation
process are greater than the risk from a specified radiation
exposure, then other counter-measures are advised or guidelines
for radiation exposure are set for a more favorable radiation
risk/evacuation risk ratio. Likewise, if relationships could
be demonstrated between risk of death, injury, or cost and
any parameters of the evacuation, particularly increasing
evacuation population size, they might have an influence on
the selection of radiation guides for evacuation.
The parameters thought to have an effect on evacuation
risks and which formed the basic questionnaire (appendix A)
that was developed include:
1. Disaster agent (flood, fire, earthquake, etc.)
2. Number of persons evacuated
3. Size of area evacuated
4. Type of area evacuated (rural, urban, suburban, etc.)
5. How evacuated (private vehicle, boat, bus, etc.)
6. Types of roads (rural, expressway, etc.)
7. Average length of evacuation route
8. Weather conditions at time of evacuation
9. Road conditions during evacuation
10. Evacuation plans available and, if so, used
11. Time between evacuation and onset of incident
12 . Time required to evacuate
13 . Time people were in an evacuated status
Risk of death
Ten deaths attributed to the evacuation process were
reported by the responders to the 64 questionnaires completed
on the 54 incidents utilized in the study. These incidents
involved the evacuation of 1,142,336 people under a wide
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variety of environmental conditions. Seven of the deaths were
due to a helicopter crash; two drowned in an automobile; and
one death was due to a heart attack. The deaths occurred in
three separate incidents caused by floods involving 183,
8,500, and 10,000 persons evacuated, respectively.
Because of the low number of deaths reported (ten), it
was not possible to make valid conclusions which could be
used as a basis for predicting the risk of death. The low
number of deaths also does not allow comparison of the evacu-
ation parameters and their effect on the risk of death.
Furthermore, a valid statistical analysis is precluded.
In collecting information relative to the study, it was
frequently expressed, either in published reports(16.,17j or in
the personal opinions of people interviewed, "that there were
no deaths or injuries and the accident rate was lower than
normal." It was also the opinion of those interviewed, who
have been involved in evacuations, that they expected deaths,
injuries, and/or accidents to be "lower than normal." However,
a definition of normal was not given.
To define normal risks and to compare deaths reported
from evacuations to this norm, a number of data sources were
reviewed and analyzed. Relevant data was used to allow compar-
isons to be made. It is emphasized that, because of the low
number of observations (ten deaths) reported in the study,
no valid statistical comparisons can be made or conclusions
derived.
Deaths from motor vehicle accidents
Since most of the evacuees (more than 99 percent) in the
study were evacuated by motor vehicles, a comparison was made
between the motor vehicle death rate observed in the study
and the National Motor Vehicle Death Rate (27). Although there
is a question as to whether or not the deaths reported (two
persons in an automobile did not follow the evacuation direc-
tions and were drowned in high waters) are deaths due to
vehicle accidents, it was arbitrarily decided that they would
be classified as such.
Based on the numerical comparison from table 10, the risk
of death per person-mile would be four times higher during
an evacuation than the death rate during normal driving
conditions.
14
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Table 6
Comparison of National Motor Vehicle
Death Rate and Study Death Rate
National5
Vehicle-Miles 1.17 x 1012 N.A.
Registered Vehicles 1.15 x 108 N.A.
Persons/Vehicle 1.9 N.A.
Persons at Risk 2.2 x 108 5.2 x 105
Person-Miles 2.22 x 1012 2.24 x 107b
Miles/Person-Day 27 43^
Deaths 5.47 x 104 2
Deaths/Person-Mile 2.4 x 10~8 8.9 x 10~8
Notes:
a — Accident Facts, National Safety Council, 1972.
b — Computed from evacuation mileage times population
evacuated for each evacuation incident.
c — Computed based on assumption that evacuation travel
occurs over 24-hour interval.
N.A. — Not available.
15
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Table 7
National and Study Motor Vehicle
Death Rates (Per Day)
National3 Study*3
Persons at Risk N.A. 5.2 x
Deaths N.A. 2
Daily Death Rate/ .07 .39
100,000
Notes:
These numbers can be compared since the average miles
traveled per day is about the same in both cases.
a — Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972.
(Based on 1970 data.)
b — Assumes average time at risk is one day.
N.A. — Not available.
Table 8
National and Study Daily Death
Rates from all Accidents
National^ Study
Persons at Risk N.A. 1.13 x
Deaths N.A. 10
Daily Death Rate/ .15 .90
100,000
Notes:
a — Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972.
(Based on 1970 data.)"~~
N.A. — Not available
16
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Deaths from all accidents
Since all causes of death attributed to accidents incurred
during the evacuation were considered, a comparison was made
between the daily death rate from all accidents in the United
States and the daily death rate per 100,000 persons in the
evacuation.
From tables 11 and 12, the rates for evacuation-caused
accidents are three and six times higher than the national
figures.
Deaths from major cardiovascular diseases
One death was reported from a heart attack which occurred
during an evacuation. From major cardiovascular diseases,
494 deaths occur per 100,000 persons a year (19). The study
shows one death per 381 persons a year and scales up to 262
deaths per 100,000 persons a year, approximately half that
expected.
Deaths involving helicopters
No comparisons were made between deaths caused by a
helicopter crash as reported in the study and national heli-
copter crash statistics. The probability of an evacuation by
helicopter is so unlikely as to make any predictions or compar-
isons invalid.
Estimating the risk of death
A chi square test (appendix H) was made on the data pre-
sented in table 10. Although the results of the test show that
a real difference exists between the national average death
rate and that of the evacuees, the small numbers of deaths
(two) observed in the study does not permit a valid applica-
tion of the chi square test.
In order to provide an estimate of the deaths which may
occur because of an evacuation and until substantial evidence
proves otherwise, it would appear a reasonable predictive
value would be the National Motor Vehicle Accident Death Rate.
This is 2.4 x 10-8 deaths per person-mile or .07 deaths per day
per 100,000 persons.
Although no statistically valid comparison or test can
be made to confirm these values, there is some subjective
evidence, based on opinions and reports received, that the use
17
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of the National Motor Vehicle Accident Death Rate to estimate
the risk of death in an evacuation permits a reasonable
approximation of the risk. Furthermore, there does not seem
to be any activity with a risk of death, other than motor
vehicle transportation, that can be more closely related.
Other justifications for basing risk estimations on the
National Motor Vehicle Accident Death Rate follow:
1. Since more than 99 percent of the movement of people
in an evacuation is by motor vehicle, the probability is great
that accidents could occur involving vehicles.
2. Accident rates at home or work are not comparable
to situations encountered away from home at motels or recep-
tion centers.
3. A state of "panic" does not exist during an evacuation
which would result in reckless and high-speed driving (18). The
evacuations were very orderly and vehicle traffic tends to
move at relatively low speeds (35 mph is the average). Nation-
nally, 74 percent of traffic accident fatalities occur at speeds
greater than 40 mph (18). At least 50 percent of the National Motor
Vehicle fatalities have been attributed to drinking (18), whereas
drunk-driving has not been observed in evacuations (iTT. From
published reports(16 ,20) and observations of personnel familiar
with evacuation, traffic moves at a much slower rate, and
cannot even be compared to commuter traffic leaving a city.
The slowdown is caused both by the fact that there is more
traffic on the highways and feeder routes and that more person-
nel are involved in traffic control.
4. The daily death rate per 100,000 persons from all
accidents (0.15) is about two times higher than the daily death
rate per 100,000 persons from motor vehicle accidents (0.07).
All accidents include many situations such as poisoning, rail-
road deaths, industrial accidents, etc., which would be dissim-
ilar to circumstances in an evacuation. The dissimilarities
of conditions of death rate calculated for all accidents with
evacuation conditions seem to justify using the lower motor
vehicle death rate for predictions of evacuation death risk.
However, with the other uncertainties that exist, a factor of
two higher in the predictions would not be unreasonable.
18
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Risk of injury
Only two injuries requiring medical attention were
reported in the study. One heart attack (the victim recov-
ered) and one broken arm were attributed to the evacuation.
Since only two injuries were reported in the survey of
1,142,336 persons who were evacuated, it was not possible
to demonstrate any relationship between injury and evacaution
parameters.
Assuming the broken arm occurred in an automobile acci-
dent (the responder to the questionnaire could not remember
how it happened), a comparison is made in table 13 .
The figures that are given in tables 13, 14, and 15, and
the comparisons that can be made between national figures and
non-fatal accident rates and the rates obtained based on data
collected in the study, are useful only for a perspective or
relative view. No valid statistical comparison or correlation
can be made between the two sets of data since the number of
observations, one (the heart attack is not included), from the
study is well below the number of observations necessary for
valid statistical analysis .
For purposes of estimating non-fatal injuries which might
occur during an evacuation, it would appear appropriate to
use the United States rates for injuries due to motor vehicle
accidents of 9.0 x 10-7 injuries per person-mile, or 2.7 per
100,000 persons per day.
Although non-fatal accident rates from causes other than
motor vehicle accidents could be used to predict evacuation
risks, a larger error might be introduced in the predictions.
This error could be due to comparing values obtained under a
particular set of circumstances to a situation where the con-
ditions are dissimilar. Utilizing the total accident rate,
which includes accidents occurring at home, work, in motor
vehicles, and in miscellaneous situations, or using home or
work accident rates alone does not approximate evacuation
conditions as closely as motor vehicle rates.
Reliability of data
The question arises as to how reliable the figures for
deaths (ten) and injuries (two) reported in the study are.
Do they accurately reflect the true number of the deaths and
19
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Table 9
Comparison of National Motor Vehicle
Injury Rate and Study
National5
Study
Vehicle-Miles
Persons Per Vehicle-Mile
Person-Miles
Injuries0
Injuries Per Person-Mile
Injuries Per Day Per
100,000 Persons
1.17 X 1012 N.A.
1.9 N.A.
2.22 x 1012 2.28 x lQ7b
2.0 x 106 1
9.0 x 10
2.7
-7
4.4 x 10
0.09
~8
Notes:
a — Accident Facts, National Safety Council, 1972.
b — Computed.
c — An injury which prevents a person from performing
any of his usual activities for a full day beyond
the day of the accident.
N.A. — Not applicable.
20
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Table 10
National Health Survey 1968-70 Average
Non-Fatal Injuries3
Total Injuries*3 Requiring
Medical Attention Per Year 51,229,000
Injury Rate Per Day Per
100,000 Persons 69
Motor Vehicle Injuries Requiring
Medical Attention Per Year 3,551,000
Injury Rate Per Day Per
100,000 Persons 4.8
Injuries Other Than Motor Vehicle
Requiring Medical Attention Per Year 47,678,000
Injury Rate Per Day Per
100,000 Persons 64.2
Notes:
a — Accident Facts, National Safety Council, 1972.
b — NHS definition of injury: Medical attention injuries
include bed disabling injuried (confining a person to
bed for more than half of the daylight hours on the day
of the accident or the following day), restricted
activity injuries (causing a person to cut down on his
usual activities for a whole day), and non-restrictive
but medically attended injuries.
21
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Table 11
National Safety Council — 1971
Disabling Injuries3
All Accidents Per Year 11,200,000
Disabling Injury Rate**
Daily Per 100,000 15
Motor Vehicle Accidents Per Year 2,000,000
Disabling Injury Rate
Daily Per 100,000 2.7
Accidents Other Than Motor
Vehicle Per Year 9,200,000
Disabling Injury Rate
Daily Per 100,000 12.3
Notes:
a — Accident Facts, National Safety Council, 1972.
b — National Safety Council definition of injury: a
disabling injury is defined in the American Standard
Z16.1 as an injury which prevents a person from
performing any of his usual activities for a full
day beyond the day of an accident. The American
Standard applies to work injuries, but the Council
had adapted this definition to injuries in other
categories.
22
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injuries that occurred in the events investigated? Most of
the questionnaires were completed by persons on a local level
who were intimately involved with the particular incidents
and their recall of the events was generally very good. Some
documentation of the deaths and injuries associated with an
evacuation has occurred. These have been reported in "Carla"
involving the largest evacuation studied (500,000 persons) (16).
Verbal confirmation that no injuries or deaths have resulted
from evacuations in one state has been obtained (21) . This
can be further confirmed because no compensation claims
(permissible under law) have been filed to this effect (21) .
Deaths
It seems reasonable to conclude that the number of deaths
is a fairly accurate number. In most of the incidents investi-
gated, the number of evacuees was less than a few thousand.
Because of the relatively small number of people involved, a
few deaths would attract sufficient attention, so that the
cause of death would be ascertained, recorded, and the results
reported. This may not be as true in a large disaster where
hundreds of people are killed. That is, in these situations,
whether the person died because of something that occurred
during the evacuation or for some reason initiated by the
disaster probably has less certainty. However, the numbers of
these types of disasters are small. Other events which were
investigated during the study, although involving the evacua-
tion of a relatively large number of people, had few or no
deaths due to the disaster agent. In these situations, again,
one or two deaths would stand out.
The general conclusion is that the number of deaths
reported during the study is reasonably accurate. It is
unrealistic to believe that the reported ten deaths could
be low by a significant factor.
Injuries
Although the number of deaths reported appears to be a
reasonably accurate reflection of the true number, the reported
number of injuries (two) attributed to the evacuation process
seems low. This conclusion is based only upon reasonable
doubt and cannot be substantiated. The definition of an
injury used in the study was an injury serious enough to require
medical attention. Even though it is believed that the non-
fatal injuries due to vehicle accidents witnessed in the study
is lower than normal, it seems logical to assume that other
types of injuries do occur that may not have if the people
were not evacuated. This is not to imply this rate is higher
or lower than normal, but the study data (two injuries) probably
has a higher degree of inaccuracy than the death rate.
23
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It is thought that the lack of credibility is not due
to the numbers reported by the responders, but that there is
no reporting system for injuries comparable to the registry
for death. There is not a reliable, established mechanism
for collecting injury statistics, unless they are traffic-
connected or needed for legal liability. Consequently,
unless occurring in significant number and degree, they may
be overlooked.
Comparison of predicted and observed risk of injury and death
As an example of an estimation of prediction of death
and injury during an evacuation, based on the application
of the National Highway Statistics, Hurricane Carla was
chosen. This evacuation was not included in the estimate
of risk (tables 10, 11, and 13) because the number of persons
involved, the average number of miles evacuated, and other
details were not known with the desired accuracy. It is used
here as a disaster to which a projection of the risk of death
and injury might be applied for certain assumptions and com-
pared with actual results which did occur.
Hurricane Carla(16,22,23) affected the states of Texas
and Louisiana from September 3 to 14, 1961, and caused the
largest evacuation in American History. It was estimated that
between 50,000 and 80,000 persons were evacuated in Louisiana
and between 300,000 and 800,000, with the most reasonable
estimate of 500,000, persons were evacuated in Texas.
The Head of the Texas Department of Public Safety called
it "the wettest dry run in mass evacuation in the history of
America " (16) In the movement in Texas there was not a single
fatality attributable to the evacuation. There was not even
a reported major accident (16) .
Based upon data obtained from Hurricane Carla and the
recommended death and injury prediction, table 16 was derived.
As observed in table 16, using the National Motor Vehicle
Accident Death and Injury Rate (tables 10 and 13), more deaths
and injuries were predicted than observed in one incident
only—Hurricane Carla.
If the same rationale were applied to the 63 other events
investigated, in all but four, the results would be approxi-
mately the same as for Hurricane Carla. The predicted values
24
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Table 12
Comparison of Predicted and Observed
Deaths and Injuries in Hurricane Carla
Predicted Observed
Number of Deaths Per
Person-Milesa 1.20 0
Number of Deaths Per Day
Per 100,000 Persons** 0.35 0
Number of Injuries Per
Person-Miles 45.0 0
Number of Injuries Per
Day Per 100,000 Persons 13.5 0
Notes:
a — Distances traveled in the evacuation, one way,
varied anywhere from a few miles to 350 miles;
an assumed 100 miles per person is used in the
above calculations. Person-miles is the product
of the number of people evacuated (500,000) times
the average distance evacuated/person (100).
b — Assumes evacuation to and from is no longer than
one day.
25
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would be higher than the observed values when the 1) population
or 2) person-miles evacuated is large enough to project whole
numbers of deaths and would approximate zero when the popula-
tion or person-miles is small.
In the three incidents where deaths were reported and the
two incidents where two injuries were reported, the projected
deaths or injuries would be zero.
Based on the foregoing, the following is concluded:
1. For a specific incident, when the population times the
miles evacuated is large, predicting risk using the National
Motor Vehicle Accident Death and Injury Rates may lead to an
overestimation of expected injuries and deaths.
2. When the incident population evacuated or the person-
miles traveled is small, using the National Motor Vehicle
Accident Death and Injury Rates would produce fractional
values which would not be observable.
3. The projected value of 1.20 deaths does not imply
that at least one death would be expected. The projected one
death is due to the determination of person-miles based on a
widely divergent estimate of persons evacuated and miles
traveled. In other words, the standard deviation is not
known and cannot be determined.
4. The projected number of injuries, while having no
known standard deviation, is large enough to allow implication
that fewer injuries were observed than would have been expected
This was presumably due to the low vehicle velocity and greater
traffic control.
5. In most cases, the observed values may be lower than
calculated and, in a few cases (four out of sixty-four events
in the study), unpredictable deaths and/or injuries may occur.
It would appear, based on this study, the probability is low
that the actual number of deaths or injuries occurring in a
specific event would be higher than that predicted using the
National Motor Vehicle Accident Death and Injury Rate.
6. Projections of deaths and injuries are not statis-
tically valid for population sizes likely to be encountered
in single evacuation events. Only for several evacuations
involving perhaps tens of millions of persons would death
risk projections be reasonable.
26
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Approximating evacuation costs
The total dollar outlay which results from an evacuation
is a combination of: 1) costs, defined here as the money
involved in the movement and care of people, and the security
of the evacuation area, and 2) the financial losses, which
are the monies lost because people are removed from the area;
consequently, income is lost and the economy of the area is
affected. Costs are primarily determined by the number of
evacuees, distances traveled, length of time of the evacuation,
etc., whereas financial losses are a reflection of the economics
of the area (farm, industry, manufacturing, etc.).
For ease in determining evacuation costs, four categories
for estimations of costs were used: 1) costs involving evacuees,
2) costs involving evacuators. 3) financial losses of farm
areas, and 4) financial losses of urban and industrial areas.
Cost to evacuees
The costs of an evacuation which are related directly to
the people who are being evacuated are: 1) expenses involved
in providing shelter, food, and the other necessities for
health and welfare, and 2) the financial losses the evacuees
may incur if their income sources are closed down or access is
not available to them, or if their property is affected by
disuse.
A most important consideration in any evacuation is
not only to remove the people safely from the area but to
provide for their food and shelter needs elsewhere. The cost
of providing these basic requirements are initially borne by
the people themselves, by governmental or volunteer organiza-
tions, or by a combination thereof. Ultimately, these costs
might be repaid by others, such as insurance companies or those
who have been shown to be liable.
Costs were obtained for food and housing based on two
situations. First, that food and housing were made available
on a mass shelter basis. Second, that evacuees would utilize
motels, hotels, and restaurants, if they were available.
The major cost to the evacuees is the financial loss
incurred if conditions are such that the person is in an evacu-
ated status for a long enough period of time that property is
affected and loss of income results, or if the contaminating
incident is of a magnitude which affects either of these two
factors.
27
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Table 13
Estimates of Costs of Food, Shelter, and
Transportation for Evacuees^
Cost/Person/Day
Minimum Average Maximum
Commercial
Food $ 1.00b $ 3.00 $ 7.00
Housing0 4.00 8.00 10.00
Food & Housing^ 5.00 11.00 17.00
Transportation6 .85 1.00 1.20
Mass Care
Food $ 1.00 $ 1.75 $ 2.50
Housing — — —
Food & Housing .20 to 5.00
.70f
Transportation^ .40 — .55
Notes:
a — References 9-15.
b — Assumes food is self-prepared.
c — Assumes two or more per room.
d — Sum of Food and Housing.
~ o
e — Privately-owned vehicle; assumes average round trip
of 30 miles; three or four passengers per vehicle;
12£/mile operating costs.
f — Based on mass shelter/feeding during hurricanes; also
includes personnel management costs.
g — Based on mass transportation costs of 65$ to 80$ per
mile for 45-50 persons per vehicle; average distance
equals 30 miles.
28
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Based upon the Statistical Abstract of the United States
for 1972,(19) the per capita personal income in the United States
for 1971 was $4,138. The median money income of all families
for 1971 was $10,300. Utilizing these figures, loss of wages
can be computed per day per evacuee.
The other major financial loss would occur when conditions
were such that property (housing) and personal belongings were
affected. The gross private domestic investment in residential
structures in 1970 was $10,241 per capita (19). Hosehold
equipment and furniture is valued at $5,000 per family (24).
These figures would be used to calculate losses if long-term
evacuations occurred.
Cost to evacuators
Costs incurred by organizations, private and governmental,
assisting with an evacuation fall into four generalized
categories: 1) salaries and wages of the personnel involved,
2) transportation costs, both for their own personnel and
transportation provided for evacuees, 3) food and lodging
costs for their own personnel and evacuees, and 4) costs for
special equipment and supplies such as radios, helicopters,
boats, etc.
Within any of the categories, not only do costs vary
according to the circumstances of the evacuation situation,
but by the fact that voluntary contribution of help in the
form of personnel, food, shelter, clothing, and equipment is
generally available. Although this is free for the event,
ultimately someone pays for it. No attempt is made to place a
dollar value on this free service.
Salaries and wages
Since National Guardsmen are frequently used in disaster
situations, several incidents involving National Guard activi-
ties were reviewed to determine the average cost per man-day
for the guardsmen (2J5) . Analysis of the incident indicates
that the cost per man-day is $28, corrected to the present day
pay scale.
Average policemen and firemen cost per man-day was deter-
mined to be approximately $36 for each group (19).
Based upon the median family income in 1971 of $10,300(19)
and assuming it is earned by one individual, this would amount
to about $40 per man-day.
29
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It appears reasonable for a first-cost figure to use an
average of the above values of $35 per man-day to estimate
evacuators' cost.
Transportation, food, and shelter would be the same as
shown under Cost to evacuees .
Information derived from references and private communi-
cations was used to estimate the number of persons required
to evacuate and secure the affected area as a function of the
number of evacuees (1£, 26^3.1). The values ranged from 0.4
percent to 5 percent of the number of evacuees with an average
value of 2 percent.
Farm area evacuations
The evacuation of people from a land area used predomi-
nantly or partially for agriculture presents complex problems
and incurred costs. In general, the major cost is the monetary
loss which would be suffered because of the non-availability
of the marketable products and, on a long-term basis, the
removal of the land from farm use. Not only does this result
in the direct loss of income to the producer, but, depending
on how many farms are involved, it could have an extensive
impact on the overall economy of the area.
There are a great many factors which affect the cost of
a rural evacuation. The factors which would have major impact
on costs would be:
1. The type(s) of farm(s) in the area
2. The size of farms
3. Income realized from sale of product(s)
4. The number of farms
5. The values of farm land, equipment, property, etc.
6. The length of time of the evacuation
7. The time of year the evacuation occurs
Widespread variation and ranges, within the first five
items exist, not only between regions within the United States,
but within the regions or even narrower geographic boundaries.
Superimposed on these variations are the two conditions imposed
30
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by the initiating incident: 1) the length of time people
are in evacuation status, and 2) the time of year that it
occurs. Crop losses would occur if the evacuation status is
imposed over a long time or in short-term evacuations if they
occurred at critical time during the year.
Assuming no decontamination was eventually needed, the
greatest loss of income would occur when the land could not be
used for an extended period of time. This would probably occur
primarily when evacuation status is long.
However, if the evacuation time is relatively short (a
few days to a few weeks), then the financial loss would, to a
large degree, depend on the time of year. This would relate
to the harvesting or planting periods of crops. For dairy
farms or farms used principally for poultry or livestock pro-
duction, the season of the year is not as important. Here,
the main loss would be caused by the absence of personnel if
a complete evacuation was effected; consequently, no one would
remain to take care of the stock and a permanent loss of stock
could occur.
The direct costs attributed to evacuating farms are depen-
dent upon the exact nature of the particular situation. Costs
are so variable, depending on the circumstances, that it is
unrealistic and virtually impossible to assign costs for all
the permutations that might exist for one farm, let alone the
combinations which would exist for two or more farms. Addi-
tionally, as the number of farms in an area increases, then
the total economy of the area becomes more directly dependent
upon the farm income and more affected by agricultural losses.
Not only is the immediate geographic area affected, but this
can, because of intricate marketing and area interdependence,
have an impact on areas far removed.
Regardless of other factors, the major determinant of the
cost range—from minimum to maximum—for an evacuation is
the length of time of the evacuation, assuming a complete
evacuation, it is obvious that livestock or poultry could be
left unattended for only a few days, whereas predominantly crop
farms could be left for longer periods of time depending on
the season.
If the conditions were such that: 1) the length of time
of an evacuation was 48 hours or less for a farm with livestock,
or 2) longer in the case of a farm with no livestock, but
31
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occurring in a non-critical period in the crop cycle, then
the cost of the evacuation would be primarily the cost of
housing, food, and transportation for the evacuees and costs
incurred by the evacuators.
It is not realistic to base the costs of the evacuation
on the worst possible situation—which would indicate a cata-
strophic initiating event—although this would, in fact,
establish an upper limit for a particular area (24). Rather,
it seems more logical to establish, as an average evacuation
cost for a farm, only the additional cost of the loss of income
based on the value of the farm product on a yearly basis .
Based on table 7, to estimate the cost of evacuating a
farm, assuming a complete loss of income, the average
United States values of products sold per farm ($17,000)
should be.used. This assumes that the contaminating event
is not of sufficient magnitude to affect the value of land,
buildings, and equipment which, based on the United States
average, would add about $87,000 (19) ($76,000 for land and
buildings; $12,000 for farm implements and machinery) . The
$17,000 estimate also does not include replacement cost of live-
stock or poultry. Livestock replacement could add considerably
more to farm costs.
Urban area evacuations
Since the economy of an area is based upon receiving money
for goods produced or services rendered and the subsequent
use of the money (income), the major cost or potential cost
of an evacuation is the financial losses incurred when the
work force is not available. For other than a short-term
evacuation, the disruption in productivity results in a loss
of wages for the people employed by the activity affected.
The inability of the activity to deliver goods and services
thereby affects their financial balance.
In addition to the loss of income caused by the lack of
productivity, there are other attributable costs such as, the
closing down processes, losses of inventory and vital equipment,
and activities which require personal attention.
Not only would the closing of businesses, industry, manu-
facturing , etc., affect the economics of the particular area
evacuated, but it would cause an adverse financial impact on
other areas which are dependent as suppliers or purchasers
such that, depending on the circumstances, a mushrooming effect
occurs.
32
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Table 14
Farm Information in the United States (19)
Average Value Percent
Area
US
NE
MA
ENC
WNC
SA
ESC
WSC
Mt
Pac
Number of
Farms x(1000)
2730
29
123
513
639
371
392
399
120
145
Average
Acreage
Per Farm
390
196
163
184
437
184
155
511
2139
516
Average*
Value Per
Farm (Dol.)
76000
62000
59000
71000
77000
55000
37000
37000
87000
166000
Value of
Farm Products
Sold (Mil. Dol.)
45609
683
2138
7544
12553
4874
2749
5731
3839
5498
of Farm
Products Sold
Per Farm (Dol.)
16700
23550
17380
14700
19640
13140
7010
14360
31990
37920
of Farms
With Sales of
$10/000 or More
35
47
42
40
50
24
14
25
47
40
*Value of land and buildings.
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Table 15
United States by Regions and
States in Region
New England (NE)
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
Middle Atlantic (MA)
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
East North Central (ENC)
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Wisconsin
West North Central (WNC)
Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
West South Central (WSC)
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
South Atlantic (SA)
Delaware
Maryland
Virginia
West Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
East South Central (ESC)
Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Mountain (Mt)
Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
Pacific (Pac)
Washington
Oregon
California
Alaska
Hawaii
34
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The problem of determining the cost or financial losses
which would accrue to the industrial, manufacturing, business,
and service community on a national basis due to an evacuation
is very complex. Given the tremendous range of variables
directly related to the production of goods and services and
their impact on each other and the community, superimpose the
variables connected with the circumstances of the evacuation,
an infinite number of cost possibilities can be derived. The
nearness of any particular cost derived to the true costs would
be dependent upon the similarity of assumptions used to derive
the postulated costs and the conditions of the real situation.
Another approach would be to use, as a first approximation
of cost, average values of costs or losses which could be applied
across the Nation. Although average values may also have a
large degree of error when applied under a specific set of
circumstances, it does not seem that this error warrants a more
critical approach unless the specifics for a certain geographic
area are needed.
It would appear that the most meaningful indicator of the
productive values of an area would be the gross productive
value of the area per capita. Scaled to the national level,
this would be the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita.
The Gross National Product is the total national output
of goods and services valued at market prices (19). Estimates
of local goods and services produced by business and industry
located in potential impact areas may be determined by using
the methods of computing the GNP.
The product of the GNP per capita, the number of people
evacuated, and the length of time of the evacuation in years or
fraction thereof would give an estimate of the cost in terms of
financial losses in goods or services in the area. Implied in the
above estimate is that these revenue-producing sources closed down
due to the evacuation of the personnel necessary to operate them.
In utilizing the GNP per capita as an estimate of part
of the total cost of an evacuation, the loss of wages or salary
to the evacuee should not be included because the GNP per capita
includes wages and salaries. Also, farm income would not be
listed separately as using the GNP would reflect these losses.
Based on the 1970 data (19), the Gross National Product
per capita was $4,670.
35
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Table 16
Values to Use for Evacuation Cost Estimates
1. Evacuee Cost
Food and Housing
Commercial (Private)
Mass Care
Transportation
Private
Commercial
Loss of Income
(if applicable)
Loss of Structures
Loss of Personal Property
2. Evacuator Cost
Ancillary Personnel*
Food, Housing, Transportation
*Number of personnel needed
2% of population evacuated
3. Farm Area Evacuations
Loss of Farm Products
4. Urban Area Evacuations5
Value of Products or Services Lost
$11/Person/Day
$ 5/Person/Day
$I/Person/Day
55^/Person/Day
$4,200/Person/Year
(or appropriate
yearly fraction)
$10,24I/Person/Year
$ 4 0 0/Person/Year
$ 3 5/Person/Day
Same as Evacuee Cost
$17,000/Farm
a—If farm losses are computed as
a separate item, deduct $200
from yearly GNP/capita.
b—When using this figure (GNP/capita),
loss of income should not be
included as a separate item.
$4,70 0/Per son/Year13
(or appropriate
yearly fraction)
36
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Accuracy of estimating cost
Dollar values have been derived based on information col-
lected during the study and on existing published information
which could be used as a first approximation of evacuation
costs. In any specific aspect of the evacuation which incurs
a cost, the variation can be so great as to invalidate any
projected number. Given the many aspects which affect cost
and financial losses, each with its own set of variables, a
wide range of costs can be postulated.
It is not possible or practical to attempt, on a nation-
wide basis, to do a complete cost analysis for all aspects of
an evacuation. Even if all the data could be collected on a
specific past event, its applicability to a future event may
be marginal. Thus, it seems more reasonable for purposes of
cost assessment on a national basis to use those values which
account for the greater cost as a first estimation of risk.
More accurate estimates of the cost/financial losses
incurred in an evacuation, under a given set of circumstances,
can be obtained if the focus is narrowed to a more limited
area. At a particular site, the various parameters which would
affect cost can be ascertained with more exactness . Conditions
can be varied which would affect the parameters and the costs
postulated for the parameters, under the stipulated conditions,
with a higher degree of accuracy.
Parameters to be determined
Area
Size of area affected
Location of area affected
Population
Number
Distribution
Makeup
Institutions (hospitals, jails, colleges, nursing homes, etc.)
Type
Population
Care required
37
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Farms
Size
Type
Product values
Business and industry
Type
Size
Work force
Product value
Evacuation
Mode(s)
Number of evacuators required
Shelters needed
Security of affected area
Duration of evacuation
By obtaining information for these and other pertinent
parameters, various simulated accident situations can be
modeled and costs obtained for the evacuation for the specified
conditions. On a national basis, this same approach is valid
but more assumptions are necessary, thereby making the results
less accurate.
It was specifically pointed out by both the responders
to the questionnaires and in personal discussions with others
responsible for disaster services at the state level, that the
potential cost involved in an evacuation would not be a factor
in the decision to advise an evacuation. These opinions were
based on the fact that in their experiences with various types
of disasters requiring an evacuation, it was obvious that to
not remove people from the area would result in loss of life
and many injuries. It is probably also true that the expenses
involved in the evacuation were relatively small. Even in
the worst modern disaster situation in terms of numbers of
people involved and cost (Hurricane Agnes) (32), evacuation costs
constituted a small percentage of the total cost of the storm.
Additionally, it was pointed out that the person usually
responsible for ordering an evacuation is a political figure
and the decision to evacuate is difficult to make, especially
when the disaster agent is not obvious or imminent. It would
appear that the cost of evacuation would be a minor considera-
tion in the decision to call an evacuation, especially if there
were any risk at all from the disaster agent.
38
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OTHER ASPECTS OF EVACUATIONS
While collecting data pertinent to evaluating the risks
of evacuation, other relevant information was accumulated,
both from reports received and from discussions with many
people concerning disasters, emergencies, and evacuations.
Generally, these are various types of problems or situations
that can have some effect on evacuations.
Time required to evacuate population groups
In the event of a nuclear incident, the population in
the affected area may receive a dose commitment because
evacuations require a finite time to accomplish. Ideally,
it would be advantageous to be able to determine beforehand,
the time required to evacuate a population group. Knowledge
of the time will permit a comparison of the projected dose
to the dose savings by evacuation.
Attempts were made in the study to collect data to
ascertain what factors, if any, would have a significant
influence on the time require to evacuate a population group
from an area. Factors which were assumed to influence the
time required for evacuation include: time lapse before
onset of the incident, warning time, plans, time of day,
weather conditions, population size, area size, area type
(rural, urban, or suburban), population density, conditions
of roads, and nature of the incident.
Data analysis and literature reviewed in the bibliography
do not reveal any correlation between time of day, weather
conditions, population size, area size, area type, road con-
ditions, time lapse before onset of incident, use of plans,
or the nature of the incident and the time required to
evacuate a population group.
Warning time or the time required to notify the affected
population was included in the time required for evacuation
and no quantitative evaluation of this aspect can be made.
However, some time element is required to warn the affected
population to evacuate. Warnings have been issued through
newspapers, television, radio, telephone, public address, and
"door knocking." The method or combination of methods used
for warning was dependent upon the nature of the incident and
its time until onset. In slowly developing incidents such as
floods and hurricanes, warnings were generally given through
39
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the news media. In potentially fast or fast-developing
incidents, the news media was generally augmented by tele-
phone, public address, and door knocking (16_,2_7_). Each poten-
tial impact area should be studied to determine an optimum
warning system. New innovations such as computer telephoning,
planes with loudspeakers, etc., should be explored (22,33) .
A correlation was made between population density and
the time required to evacuate the affected area (figure 1)
from information received on questionnaires. The data are
for private vehicles which were the predominant mode for
evacuation (more than 99 percent) . Evacuations were selected
which involved urban, suburban, or rural areas only, and not
mixtures. Population density ranged from approximately 15
persons per square mile to 20,000 persons per square mile.
The evacuation time ranged from approximately two to
eighteen hours. Regression analysis up to a fourth degree
polynomial provided the best curve fit and is indicated by the
line through the data points (34). The line is described by
the following equation: log (hours) = 1.30571 - 0.21243 log
(persons/square miles) with a standard deviation of 1.5 hours
and a correlation coefficient of -0.71.
The data indicates that more time is required for evacu-
ation as population density decreases. Several reasons may
be postulated for this:
1. The evacuation times reported in the questionnaire
include the warning times as well as the time required to move
the population out of the affected area. Warning times may
lengthen as the population density decreases because of
increasing distances between persons and more individual con-
tacts may have to be made.
2. More time is required to prepare farms for a "shut
down" than for residential dwellings.
3. Road networks generally decrease as the population
density decreases; therefore, more time may be required for
evacuation because of limited choice and direction of roads.
Some evacuation investigated occurred in high density
urban and suburban areas approaching the population density
of New York City and Los Angeles which have 26,000 and 6,000
persons per square mile, respectively (8). Two such cities,
40
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Figure 1
Population Density vs. Evacuation Time
10.000
1,000
M
0>
in
§
•o
100
10
• 17
• •42
i EVENT NUMBER
•25
• 22
• 28
• 53
10
-I 1 1
Time required to cvncuntc affected area (hours)
41
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Baton Rouge, Louisiana (150,000 persons) and Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania (75,000 persons) were almost totally evacuated
in two and five hours, respectively. The metropolitan busi-
ness district of downtown Portland, Oregon, with a population
of 101,000 persons and a population density of 25,200 persons
per square mile, was evacuated in less than one hour during
a Civil Defense test exercise (35). Although no correlation
could be determined relating the total number of persons
evacuated with evacuation time, two theoretical evacuation
studies for large populations (more than 1,000,000 persons)
show that such evacuations are possible within a reasonable
time span. One study concluded that 4,300,000 persons could
be evacuated from the Los Angeles Basin area in less than five
hours (36) . The other study, concerning the evacuation of
approximateIty 2,200,000 children from the New York City
metropolitan area, indicated that the evacuation could be
accomplished in one to three days without disturbing normal
weekday metropolitan activities (37) . If the evacuation occurred
on a Sunday, it could be accomplished during daylight hours.
A statistical comparison was made on the events used in
figure 1 to determine if the use of a plan for an evacuation
reduced the time required to evacuate the affected area. Based
on the information collected, no significant difference between
the evacuations utilizing a plan and those in which no plan
was used could be determined.
An approximation can be made of the time required to
evacuate affected areas based on the load capacity of roads .
Several studies have been made on evacuation times related
to road capacities (2£,33^26_,3_8) . Estimates indicated that
1,000 vehicles cculd be moved per lane per hour (36). In
observations during evacuations, 1,100 to 4,080 cars per lane
per hour were observed (20^,35,38) . The average of actual
observations was approximately 2,600 cars per lane per hour.
The average vehicle occupancy observed during a large evacu-
ation was four persons (35). Assuming 2,600 cars per lane
per hour with an occupancy of four persons each, about 10,000
persons can be evacuated per lane per hour. Vehicle speeds
observed ranged from 25 to 45 mph (with an average of 35 mph)
during the evacuation (2Q_,35^,3Q) . In addition to the time
calculated, based on flow rate and vehicle occupancy, more
time must be allowed for the warning period and for the aver-
age time required to drive out of the impact area.
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Panic or hysteria associated with catastrophes
It appears that to the unknowing, a catastrophe often con-
jures a vision of mass confusion, panic, and a complete breakdown
of private and public services. Normal processes are com-
pletely disrupted to a point that the functioning and inter-
relationships which exist between mankind, its society, and
human values are disregarded and chaos exits. In this situ-
ation, people are unable to rationalize, follow directions,
or relate to one another. The image, fostered by television,
movies, and the press, is that people react to a calamity
by panic and hysteria.
Numerous studies, both in other countries and in the
United States (39^,40) , which have investigated the reactions
of people in many types of emergency situations, have essen-
tially dispelled the so-called "myths of panic." The Disaster
Research Center of The Ohio State University, which is the
only group in the United States now devoted solely to research
on disasters and associated problems, had carried out 202
different field studies as of July 1972. These have included
many investigations of peoples ' reactions to various crises
due to man-made or natural disasters.
In a recent publication entitled "Images of Disaster
Behavior: Myths and Consequences " (40) the authors enumerate
the following popular, but incorrect, images of disaster
behavior:
1. People when faced with great threat or danger
will panic. This takes the form of either
wild flight or hysterical breakdowns. Even
if the response is not intrinsically self
destructive, it will generally involve giving
little consideration to the welfare and safety
of others. Persons cannot be depended upon
to react intelligently and non-selfishly in
situations of great personal danger.
2. Those who do not act irrationally are often
immobilized by major emergencies. Thus, disas-
ter impacts leave large numbers of persons
dazed, shocked and unable to cope with the new
realities of the situation, the longer run
personal effects are rather severe emotional
scars and mental health disturbances. Para-
lyzing shock is followed by numbing symptoms
of personal trauma.
43
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3. Partly because of widespread individual patho-
logical reactions and partly because of the
overwhelming damage to the resources of disaster -
affected communities, the ability of local organ-
izations to perform effectively in handling
emergency tasks is severely limited. Not only
do such organizations have to cope with the
irrationality of others, but their own personnel
are so immobilized by threat and damage that
they cannot fulfill their necessary occupational
tasks. Therefore, local organizations are inef-
fective agents to handle local emergency problems.
4 . The social disorganization of the community
which is a product of disaster impact provides
the conditions for the surfacing of anti-social
behavior. Since social control is weak or absent,
deviant behavior emerges and the dazed victims
in the disaster area become easy targets for loot-
ing and other forms of criminal activity. Crime
rates rise and exploitative behavior spreads as
Mr. Hyde takes over from Dr. Jekyll.
5. Community morale is very low in disaster stricken
areas. Since impact localities are filled with
irrational, disorganized and helpless persons and
immobilized groups, the future of such communities
appears bleak and problematical. Residents, even
those not directly impacted, prepare to leave and
there is a reluctance to reopen and rebuild shat-
tered businesses and industries.
6. A descent into total personal and social chaos is
possible in such stricken communities. Immediate
and firm and unequivocal measures are necessary to
prevent such a deterioration. But in general local
and established community officials lack the resources
and are so shaken by the disaster that they cannot
take the drastic steps required.
The paper then explains why these "truths" prevail and the
negative impact and implications they may have on policy and
emergency planning.
The greater portion of the paper is devoted, based on the
extensive work done by the Disaster Research Center, to demon-
strate that these popular images are, in fact, myths and
44
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completely unrelated to actual fact. A generalization that
can be made is that peoples' reactions and behavior under
adverse, abnormal situations are diametrically contrary to
popular myths.
Based on the Disaster Research Center report, "Images of
Disaster Behavior," peoples' behavior during an emergency is
characterized by:
1. The idea that people will panic in the face
of great threat or danger is very widespread.
However, it is not borne out in reality. Inso-
far as wild flight is concerned, the opposite
behavioral pattern in most disaster is far
more likely. People will often stay in a poten-
tially threatening situation rather than move
out of it. This really should be expected.
Human beings have very strong tendencies to
continue on-going lines of behavior in prefer-
ence to initiating new courses of action.
2. Just as the panic image of disaster behavior is
generally incorrect, so is the view that disas-
ters leave victims dazed and disoriented both
at time of impact and in the recovery period.
Those who experienced disasters are not immo-
bilized by even the most catastrophic of events.
They are neither devoid of initiative nor pas-
sively dependent or expectant that others,
especially relief and welfare workers, will take
care of them and their disaster created needs .
In fact, disaster victims sometimes insist on
acting on their own even contrary to the expressed
advice of the public authorities and formal agencies.
3. The assumption that local organizations are unable
to cope with disasters is based both on the notion
that these organizations and the communities in
which they are located are overwhelmed by disaster
impact, and also by the fear that the employees
of these organizations are so affected by disaster
impact that their efficiency is reduced. Neither
of these notions stand up well under close observation,
4 . The idea that disaster aftermath creates the con-
ditions for the development of anti-social behavior
is widespread. In particular, there is the assump-
tion that widespread looting takes place. The
term looting has military roots, implying invading
45
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armies take property by force, generally when
the rightful owner cannot protect it. During
disasters, according to common belief, invad-
ing armies of opportunists take property left
unguarded when the rightful owner is forced out
by disaster. Because of the expectation that
looting will occur, one does find that there is,
within disaster-impacted communities, anxiety
about the possibilities of looting and also
reports of looting which confirm the initial
expectation. On the other hand, those who have
done disaster research have found it difficult
to cite many authenticated cases of actual
looting.
Contrary to popular image, morale in disaster-
impacted communities is not destroyed. Partly
as a result of the generation of altruism and
the reaffirmation of equality . . . the result
over time is an increase in collective morale.
Such an increase may seem implausible since
disasters create to a greater or lesser degree
those who have immediate personal losses —
the death of a family member, injury to them-
selves or damage to their property. Victims,
however, are always outnumbered by non-victims.
Even in a community with a large number of
"victims," their losses do not necessarily
have a cumulative effect in lowering morale.
Individual suffering is always experienced in
reference to the plight of others. Suffering
in the disaster context is not an isolated
experience and, therefore, it does not become
an isolating experience.
Patterns of leadership and of authority in
disaster-impacted communities are very complex.
Their complexity, however, is usually misin-
terpreted as confusion and the panacea of
"strong leadership" is frequently offered as
a solution without understanding the nature of
the problem. Perhaps the beginning of under-
standing is to start with the observation that
communities are not organized to cope with
disasters. This is true even in communties
with extensive pre-disaster planning since
there is a considerable difference in antici-
pating problems and facing them. What disasters
46
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do is to create a series of new problems for
the community and in doing this, they necessitate
new relationships among its parts. Disasters
force the development of a new structure which
reflects the current involvement of various
parts of the community which, in turn, can make
decisions "for" the community.
Although the studies done by the Disaster Research Center
and others (17_,4Q) have dispelled the myths associated with
peoples' behavior during a disaster, if the causative agent
of the incident were radiation, would peoples' reactions be
substantially different? The conclusion drawn by many is
that because radiation is largely an unknown quantity, imper-
ceptible to the ordinary senses, inherently, the fear of the
unknown and its consequences would cause a different behavior
pattern—perhaps similar to popular notions. This would, in
turn, have a dramatic effect on evacuation involving a release
of radioactivity.
Dr. Russell R. Dynes (41), Co-Director of the Disaster
Research Center, was asked if he thought people would react
differently—panic—because of a radiation threat. Dr. Dynes'
reply was that there has been an overemphasis placed on the
qualitative difference between radiation and other threats by
both public officials and anti-nuclear groups, "What was assumed
was that the nuclear advent represented some new juncture in
human history and, therefore, it would evoke and demand a quite
different level of human behavior." Dr. Dynes continued, "As
I read history, there is not reason to suggest that because
of the presence of a new 'order1 of threat that human behavior
would disintegrate into 'uncivilized1 behavior."
The summation of Dr. Dynes' reply is that there is not
reason to expect that people will react any differently because
the disaster agent is radiation than they would for a flood,
fire, or any other type of causative agent. This "normal"
behavior is amply documented (3T_,39) and does not include panic.
Dr. Dynes further states:
If your concern is primarily with evacuation, there
is good reason to suggest that the problem in evacu-
ation is not one of panic flight but the problem of
getting people to move at all. The question of the
perception of threat is a very complicated one and
is not as obvious as many people assume it to be.
47
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Based upon Dr. Dynes' response to the specific question
of behavior to radiation versus other threats, corroborated
by the research (40) that reveals the true behavior of people
during a disaster as opposed to the panic conception, there
is no reason to believe or assume that the risk of injury or
death should be any higher due to an evacuation than the normal
accident or injury rate.
"... one fact is borne out by various data of past
disasters: the freedom to escape from threat of death or
injury has a calming effect on the population." (37)
Motivation to evacuate
In many cases, even when presented with a grave threat,
people refuse to evacuate (16_,2_3_,^8_,40_) . Many reasons have been
given both by persons who have not evacuated (IT_,23) , and persons
conducting the evacuation as to this reluctance to leave. To
some degree, it is the individual's impressions and interpre-
tation of the seriousness of the situation based on the official
or unofficial information he/she receives. An individual
evaluation is made and a positive or negative action elicited.
It cannot be taken for granted that an official order to evacu-
ate will be followed, even if it is a mandatory rather than a
voluntary order. Results of this study indicate that approxi-
mately six percent of the total population refused to evacuate.
Other reports indicate this figure can run higher than 50
percent (23).
There is no reason to believe that because the disaster
agent is radiation rather than some other agent, that is, in
itself, will provide sufficient motivation to leave. Rather,
the opposite viewpoint should be taken—people will be hesitant
to leave. Cognizance should be given in the planning stage
to this problem and appropriate thought given to its remedy.
Warning systems and communication systems between evacuee-
evacuator, evacuator-evacuator, and evacuator-news media-
population play a significant role in the emergency and/or
evacuation process (r7/4_2,4_3_) . it is not only important that
pretested, workable systems be available, but that an under-
standing of peoples' response and behavior to warning systems
be recognized and be advantageously used.
Emergency plans
There have been many documents published on emergency and
disaster planning (44-£8_) , some of which are listed in the
bibliography. It was not the intent of this report to go into
48
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this aspect; however, a number of thoughts and suggestions were
expressed by individuals contacted concerning emergency plans
that are most appropriate for evacuations.
Some of these thoughts and suggestions follow:
1. To keep it workable in practice, an emergency plan should
be kept as simple as possible for the particular situation under
study. The language should be kept on a level commensurate with
the training and experience of those who must execute it.
2. Scheduled periodical reviews of the plan are needed in
order to correct it for changing conditions, technology, and
personnel.
3. Continual testing of the plan, as authentically as
possible, is needed to determine whether it will work practically
and to determine needed adjustments.
4. Many times emergency plans are written by individuals
who have no real experience in emergencies and little or no
knowledge of how people behave during an emergency. Consequently,
plans are written that are contrary to peoples ' behavior patterns.
As an example, people will not evacuate an area, regardless of
the danger, if their family group is separated, unless they know
that members of their family are safe, accounted for, and that
arrangements have been made for them to evacuate.
5. Some plans are written delegating responsibilities to
persons or organizations that have not been informed of these
responsibilities. In some cases, responsibilities are not
transferred to new personnel involved in normal turnovers and
position changes.
6. Two instances in the literature (1£,22J are reported
where delegated responsibilities were given to personnel, who,
for various reasons, were not available during the disasters .
Other studies do not cite this as a problem (39). Serious con-
sideration, however, should be given to the selection of personnel
who would be responsible for an evacuation. Pre-disaster arrange-
ments should be made for the families of those responsible for
the evacuation such that they are assured that their families
are safe and they can devote full time to the emergency without
concern for the safety of their families.
49
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7. It is important that all personnel who will be involved
in the evacuation have adequate training commensurate with their
responsibilities during an incident. Training in radiological
health and protection is especially important for the ancillary
personnel needed to help with the evacuation, but who will not
be doing actual health physics work. Their familiarity with
the subject will assist them in their communications with the
evacuees and will help them understand the situation themselves.
Problems encountered in various evacuations
Some of the problems encountered in the evacuations which
were investigated, which may or may not be typical, are worthy
of mention since they demonstrate situations that have occurred
and will probably occur again.
It was mentioned by the Illinois Civil Defense (21) that
one of the problems that they seem to routinely encounter in
emergencies and subsequent evacuations is premature childbirth.
In Illinois prior arrangements are made in evacuation plans for
this problem.
It was pointed out by a number of individuals contacted
and in literature reviewed, that problems occur in the pre- and
post-evacuation (l£f2J2r.2_3) • In a number of instances, where an
evacuation was imminent but not announced, traffic congestion
and confusion existed as people rushed to gas-up and stock-up
on food. This, in turn, has interfered with movement of traf-
fic such that emergency vehicles have been impeded. Inbound
traffic moving towards the impact area was diverted to relieve
congestion in one situation (.35_,4JO .
Post-evacuations, depending upon location, pose problems
of preventing unwanted people from coming into the impact area
while permitting access to the inhabitants and emergency workers.
Some personnel control was exercised by the use of passes.
Residents, in some cases, became angry at roadblocks when denied
access to their homes and businesses. Many persons have evacu-
ated some distances from the impact area and the local news
media where they were sheltered did not broadcast information
concerning reentry advice. Therefore, the evacuees stayed
away longer than necessary.
In many types of emergency situations, a convergence behav-
ior has been amply demonstrated (41). Peoples' curiosity over-
rides their fear of danger. Consequently, this results in the
people not leaving the area promptly or in people outside the
affected area coming in to sightsee. This convergence on a
50
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disaster interferes with the movement of people out of the area
(evacuees) and interrupts and interferes with the movement of
official traffic—impeding evacuation efforts.
Sightseeing from aircraft has also interfered with
necessary aerial missions over an impact area. In several
instances, Federal Aviation Administration Regulations were
invoked to limit the airspace to air traffic associated with
the incident.(50) In most evacuations, people use their private
vehicles. Traffic moves in an orderly fashion, and slower, due
to crowded roads. Minor accidents, mechanical problems, and
lack of gasoline may cause congestion and slow the evacuation.
In some of the evacuations, tow trucks and gasoline trucks
were spaced along the evacuation route, along with good police
patrol, to keep traffic flowing smoothly. Cars with mechanical
breakdowns were pushed off the road and their occupants were
absorbed in other evacuating vehicles .
In one evacuation investigated, a problem was encountered
with a non-English-speaking population group. Not only was time
lost in obtaining an interpreter, but the people would not evac-
uate to the shelter area because it was established for a dif-
ferent ethnic group; therefore, they had to be directed to
another location (51) .
The security of the area must be firmly established and
people living in that area must be positively aware that, if
an evacuation occurs, their property will be protected against
fire, theft, and other hazards and wanton destruction. This
knowledge helps persuade people to evacuate when necessary.
Looting is frequently reported during disaster situations.
In the cases that have been investigated (16^4JDO , even though
extensive looting had been reported, it generally turned out
that the reports were mainly rumors. In other than civil dis-
turbances, it has been difficult to verify cases of looting (40,52)
In many events, crime rates actually decrease. It is conjectured
that, to some degree, the absence of looting is due to increased
security of the area.
Frequently, there is an over-response of voluntary help
in disaster assistance. Many volunteers from different organi-
zations present themselves at scenes of incidents. Judicious
use of their talents and equipment may help relieve some of
the evacuation problems. In one instance, so many volunteers
presented themselves that they actually caused logistic problems.
51
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Shelters and evacuation centers are usually quickly estab-
lished and manned; they are generally located in public build-
ings, especially schools. Although they are readily available,
relatively few people use these centers, preferring to find
their own accomodations either commercially or with friends
or relatives. In a California flood, only 9,260 out of
50,000 persons evacuated registered in the 38 Red Cross
shelters; during Hurricane Carla, 75 percent of the evacuees
went to other than public shelters; and during Hurricane Betsy,
only 20 percent requested assistance (2j3,£0_) . Generally, shelter
centers are used only if nothing else is available or if one
cannot financially care for himself.
It is necessary, in an evacuation called due to a radiation
threat, to be able to warn all citizens in the affected area
and to account for them later. Accounting for people at a
shelter may prove impractical since the probability is that
only a small percent will use public shelters. Therefore, some
other accountability systems will need to be devised.
Aside from adequate, redundant communication systems, the
helicopter was mentioned as a most valuable assest in disas-
ter situations. Not only does it make quick movement available,
but, as a movable observation point, a helicopter is invaluable.
Special evacuations
In the event of a nuclear incident, some institutions,
public and private, may have to be evacuated. Each institution
will have its own particular characteristics and will require
different procedures for handling the evacuees.
Schools
In most of the evacuations observed, more than 99 percent
of the evacuees utilized private vehicles for the evacuations
and evacuated as family units. If schools are evacuated, it
may result in the separation of families. Parents are reluctant
to be separated from their children and may attempt to retrieve
them, causing additional congestion and, subsequently, may slow
down the evacuation process. In order to minimize the congestion,
plans should be developed whereby school children would be
returned to their respective residences or evacuated to a spe-
cific location. The location could be schools located out of
the impact area since they would present a somewhat familiar
environment and generally have food service facilities and ade-
quate supervision. The choice of either action would be dependent
52
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upon an appraisal of the affected area. In either case, the
parents should be advised of the type of action to be taken
in order that appropriate family plans can be made.
Hospitals
Five hospital evacuations were recorded on the question-
naires with no injuries or deaths reported. One hospital under-
went "vertical evacuation" where the patients were moved to
higher floors because of a tsunami and four were evacuated
to other areas. Specific data on numbers of patients moved
were available for only three hospitals and involved 550
patients.
The general procedures used during the hospital evacuations
were to discharge the ambulatory patients and transport the
nonambulatory patients by police-escorted ambulances to other
receiving hospitals. In one case/ nonambulatory patients were
moved to a 200-bed disaster hospital and those that were in
intensive care were moved to another regular hospital.
Two problems arose during one evacuation. These were:
failure to send records with patients and failure to provide
at least 24 hours of medication. It was strongly emphasized/
by the respondees during telephone interviews, that the hospital
evacuations could not have been accomplished smoothly without
injury or loss of life without detailed planning and coordination
Penal institutions
Several penal institutions were evacuated in the incidents
investigated and involved a state penitentiary/ a county jail/
and a city jail. The city jail underwent "vertical evacuation,"
while the county jail and state penitentiary inmates were
evacuated by buses, designed for prisoner transfer, to other
areas. The state penitentiary prisoners were evacuated to a
football field, while the county prisoners were absorbed into
other correctional institutions.
It appears that jails and prisons may be effectively evac-
uated if adequate planning and reception centers are available.
If, however, evacuation is not feasible or desirable, the
shielding effects provided by buildings of the institution should
be determined. Dose equivalence may be set at higher levels for
prisoners and guards than for the general public if the risk
associated with evacuation is unacceptable.
53
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Nursing homes
One nursing home evacuation was documented from the
incidents. A special train was provided which moved and housed
the occupants 50 miles from the point where a possible chlorine
release could have occurred.
It appears that private and public institutions can be
evacuated safely, with little risk, in the event of a nuclear
incident provided adequate planning has been made and a recep-
tion or care center has been designated out of the impact area.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the study of individual evacuations and consul-
tation with persons having experience in managing and studying
various aspects of evacuations, some general conclusions can
be made:
1. Advanced planning is essential to identify potential
problems that may occur in an evacuation.
2. The risk of injury or death to evacuees does not change
as a function of the numbers of persons evacuated.
3. The risk of injury or death to evacuees can be approxi-
mated by the National Highway Safety Council statistics for
motor vehicle accidents, although subjective information sug-
gests that the risks will be lower.
4. Most of the evacuees utilize their own personal trans-
portation during an evacuation.
5. Most of the evacuees assume the responsibility of
acquiring food and shelter for themselves.
6. Evacuation costs are highly area-dependent and should
be computed based on local demographic, economic, and geographic
conditions.
7. No panic or hysteria has been observed in evacuations.
In summary, large or small population groups can be effec-
tively evacuated from impact areas with minimal death and injury
risks and, in most cases, they can take care of themselves pro-
vided adequate plans are developed and executed to minimize
potential problems that may occur peculiar to the impact area.
Costs would probably not be a deterrent in initiating an evacuation
54
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Lambdin and Robert Nieman, Disaster Services, Los Angeles
County, Los Angeles, CA, May 7, 1973.
Personal Communication. Conversation between Donald L.
Lambdin and George F. Goehler, Southern California Rapid
Transit District, 1060 South Broadway, Los Angeles, CA,
May 8, 1973. Telephone: 213-749-6977 x338.
Personal Communication. Conversation between Donald L.
Lambdin and Edward Russell, Disaster Services, American
Red Cross, Los Angeles Chapter, 1200 S. Vermont Avenue,
Los Angeles, CA 90006, May 7, 1973. Telephone: 213-384-5261
Personal Communication. Conversation between Donald L.
Lambdin and Mrs. Hall, Salvation Army, Los Angeles, CA,
May 10, 1973.
Pers.ona1 Communi c a t i on. Conversation between Donald L.
Lambdin and Mrs. Gart, Cooperative Extension Service,
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 300 Las Vegas Boulevard South,
Las Vegas, NV 89109, May 1973. Telephone: 702-385-6411.
Personal Communication. Conversation between Donald L.
Lambdin and Sergeant Dahlberg, Technical Operations, Los
Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles, CA, May 7, 1973.
Personal Communication. Conversation between Joseph M.
fians, Jr. and Herbert H. Miller, Director, Whatcom County
Emergency Services, Whatcom County Courthouse, Bellingham,
WA 98225, April 12, 1973.
Personal Communication. Conversation between Joseph M.
Bans, Jr. and Civil Defense Director,- Morgan City, LA,
June 11, 1973.
Personal Communication. Conversation between Joseph M.
nans, Jr. and Civil Defense Director, Le Flore County,
MS, June 11, 1973.
Personal Communication. Conversation between Joseph M.
Hans, Jr. and Civil Defense Director, Harrison County,
MS, June 11, 1973.
69
-------
Personal Communication. Conversation between Joseph M.
Hans, Jr. and Director, Radiological Health, Georgia
Department of Public Health, Atlanta, June 23, 1973.
Personal Communication. Conversation between Joseph M.
Hans, Jr. and Everett Blizzard, Office of Emergency Services,
California, March 30, 1973.
Personnel Communication. Letter to Thomas C. Sell from
Russell R. Dynes, Co-Director, Disaster Research Center,
Ohio State University, 127-129 West 10th Avenue, Columbus,
OH, 43201. Telephone: 614-422-5916.
Personal Communication. Conversation between Thomas C. Sell
and G. Day, Illinois State Civil Defense, March 21, 1973.
Personal Communication. Letter to Thomas C. Sell from
Meyer Mathis, Director, Office of Systems Analysis, Infor-
mation and Statistics, National American Red Cross,
Washington, DC, May 2, 1973.
Prelicensing Antitrust Review of Nuclear Power Plants.
Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Congress
of the United States, 91st Congress, Part 1, November 18-20,
1969.
Preliminary Impressionistic Field Comparisons of Hurricane
Camllle on the Mississippi Gulf Coast and the WiIkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania Flood—Tropical Storm Agnes.July 1, 1972.
Protection of the Public in the Event of Radiation Accidents.
World Health Organization, Geneva, 1965.
Publications Catalog. Department of Defense, Office of Civil
Detense, February 1972.
Publications Index. Department of Defense, Office of Civil
Defense, January 1967.
Publications of the International Civil Defense Organization.
Geneva, Switzerland. ~~
Quarantelli, E. L. "Images of Withdrawal Behavior in Disas-
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1960.
Quarantelli, E. L. and R. R. Dynes. Images of Disaster
Behavior; Myths and Consequences. Preliminary Paper #5,
DRC, Ohio State University, 1972.
70
-------
Quarantelli, E. L. and R. R. Dynes. Operational Problems
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Reprint #9(reproduced from "1967 Emergency Operations
Symposium," Santa Monica, CA, 1967, pp. 151-175).
Quarantelli, E. L. and R. R. Dynes. Property Norms and
Looting; Their Patterns in Community Crises.1968 Annual
Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Boston, MA.
Quarantelli, E. L. and R. R. Dynes. "When Disaster Strikes."
Psychology Today. DRC, Ohio State University, February 1972.
Radiation Accidents and Emergencies in Medicine, Research,
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Radiation Emergency Response Committee, Fourth Quarterly
Meeting, January 18, 1973, at Orlando, Florida.
Railroad Accident Report, Crete, Nebraska, February 18,
J969.National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC.
Railroad Accident Report, Illinois Central Railroad Company,
Derailment at Glendora, Mississippi, September 11, 1969.
National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC.
Railroad Accident Report, Pennsylvania Railroad, Derailment
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National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC.
Railroad Accident Report, Southern Railway Company, Derail-
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Rainey, Charles T. Nuclear Emergency Operations Planning
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Menlo Park, CA, October 1970.
Report of the Panel on Evacuation and Shelter (Panel III).
Hurricane Preparedness Conference, Miami, Florida, May 9-11,
1972.
71
-------
Report of the Special New York Senate Committee to Inves-
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William T. Smith, Elmira, NYf Chairperson, September 15,
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Report of Operation Chlorine. DHEW, PHS, 1963.
Report of Tropical Storm Agnes, 1972. Allan R. Zenowitz,
Regional Director, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency,
Region I, Maynard, MA (unpublished).
Responsibilities of Federal Agencies for Fixed Nuclear
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Resume of the Critique on Hurricane Carla. Baytown.
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Risk Model for the Transport of Hazardous Materials, A.
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Rules and Regulations, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Title
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72
-------
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Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors (LWC) and Related Facili-
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San Fernando Earthquake, February 9, 1971. Report of the
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San Fernando Earthquake of February 9, 1971, and Public
Policy.special Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on
S-
TEc
seismic Safety, California Legislature, July 1972.
Save a Rad — 4th Annual National Conference on Radiation
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Standard Operating Procedures for Radiological Assistance.
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State Foresters Report , The . California State Board of
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73
-------
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Fall 1969. -
Study of the Advantages and Disadvantages of a Strategic
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Survival . Defense Civil Preparedness Agency/ Region II,
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Symposium on Emergency Operations. Robert C. Brictson, ed.,
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1966.
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City, California From Alaska Earthquake of March 27, 1964.
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November 1964 .
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74
-------
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Ohio State University, December 1969.
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75
-------
APPENDIX A
QUEST IONNAI RE—EVACUATI ON STATISTICS
REQUESTING ORGANIZATION:
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Radiation Programs
P.O. Box 15027
Las Vegas, NV 89114
Telephone: 702-736-2969, x305
PURPOSE:
This questionnaire has been prepared to obtain information from past evacu-
ations that can be utilized in assessing risks of evacuations that may occur
in the event of an incident at a fixed nuclear facility. The risks that need
to be determined are cost- injury, and death which may take place as a result
of evacuations associated with different scenarios.
INCIDENT OR DISASTER DESCRIPTION:
Flood ( ) Flash Flood ( ) Fire ( ) Hurricane ( ) Storm ( )
Transportation ( ) Earthquake ( ) Tsunami ( ) Other ( ) please
describe
Date(s) of occurrence:
Day Month Year
Location:
City, Town or Vi11 age County/Parish State
Brief description of incident or disaster
77
-------
II. ADMINISTRATIVE:
Person Completing Questionnaire:
Name
Address
Telephone
Person or Organization Ordering or Requesting Evacuation:
Name/Title •
Address
TeIephone
Person or Organization which Supervised Evacuation:
Name/Title
Address
Telephone
Other Persons or Organizations which may Provide Additional Information:
Name/Title
Address
Telephone
Name/Title
Address
Telephone
Was the evacuation . . . voluntary (advised) ( ) or involuntary (ordered) ( )
Were evacuation plans available? Yes ( ) No ( )
Were evacuation plans followed? Yes ( ) No ( )
Was there a previous evacuation
since I960? Yes ( ) No ( )
78
-------
I. DESCRIPTION OF AREA EVACUATED:
Rural-Farming ( ) Rural-Residential ( ) Suburban ( ) Urban ( )
Industrial ( ) Commercial-Fishing ( ) Recreation ( )
Other ( ) please describe
Areas or buildings posing special problems during evacuation, such as
hospitals, prisons, rest homes, etc.:
Comments
Approximate size of area evacuated:
Number of square miles or city blocks
IV. NUMBER OF PERSONS EVACUATED:
Number:
V. NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO DID NOT EVACUATE ALTHOUGH ADVISED TO DO SO:
Number:
VI. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT TIME OF EVACUATION:
Rain ( ) Snow ( ) Clear ( ) Cloudy ( )
Cold, 0-32° ( ) Moderate, 32-50° ( ) Warm, 50-100°
Day ( ) Night () Dawn ( ) Dusk ( )
79
-------
VII. ROADS USED FOR EVACUATION
Primary Evacuation Routes
(Privately Owned Vehicles Only)
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Expressway
Expressway
00
o
Length of Route Used
(miles) ( ) ( ) ( )
Number of Deaths
Caused by Evacuation ( ) ( ) ( )
Number of Injuries (Re-
quiring Medical Attention)
Caused by Evacuation ( ) ( ) ( )
Road Conditions During
Evacuation
Dry ( ) ( ) ( ) •
Wet ( ) ( ) ( )
Snow/Ice ( ) ( ) ( )
Comments :
Unlimited Access Limited Access
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
-------
VIM. ROADS USED FOR EVACUATION
Primary Evacuation Routes
(Supplied Vehicles Only)
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Expressway
oo
Length of Route Used
(miles) ( )
Number of Deaths
Caused by Evacuation ( )
Number of Injuries (Re-
quiring Medical Attention)
Caused by Evacuation ( )
Road Conditions During
Evacuation
Dry ( )
Wet ( )
Snow/ 1 ce ( )
Comments :
Unl i mi ted Access
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) . ( )
( ) ( > ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
Expressway
Limited Access
-------
IX. OTHER KINDS OF EVACUATIONS:
Number of Persons Distance Injuries Caused Deaths Caused
Evacuated (MIles) by Evacuation by Evacuation
Boat
Airplane
He 1 i copter
(
(
(
)
)
)
(
(
(
)
)
)
(
(
(
) ( )
) ( )
) ( )
X. TIME ELEMENTS:
Time between evacuation and onset of incident or disaster
Approximate time required to complete evacuation
Approximate time persons were in evacuation status
Additional comments or explanations:
hours
hours
hours
XI. COST OF EVACUATION:
Approximate cost of the evacuation
do Ilars
Evacuation cost breakdown (if available) — for example:
city police, Red Cross shelters, loss of wages, etc.
National Guard,
XII.
Have any reports been written on this evacuation? If so, please forward
a copy (if available) to us.
82
-------
APPENDIX B
SUMMARY OF EVACUATION QUESTIONNAIRES
oe
UJ
I §ii!
Z < Ul Ul U
Ul -J O S Ul
* •
1 Clatsop Co.,
OR; 1/11/72;
Flood
2 Clatsop Co.,
OR; 5/8/71;
Flood
00 3 Clatsop Co.,
10 'OR; 12/22/64;
Flood
4a Okanogan Co.,
WA; 5'72;
Flood
'
0
oc 3 i/>
«£ O o ul
Ul < _l
U. t- > —
O < ul X
u u < •
Ov tf Ul O'
>- 3 a. at
K Ul < -*
Rural N.D.
Farming
Surburban 0.02
Rural N.D.
Farming
Rural 5.0
Farming;
Rural
Residen-
tial;
Urban
NUHBER OF
PERSONS
EVACUATED
N.D.
10 of
300
2 of
120
740
*\
V)
Ul
DISTANCE (M
EVACUATED
N.O.
N.D.
N.O.
1.0
EVACUATION
TIME (HOURS
DEATHS
N.D. N.O.
N.D. 0
0.5 0
1.25 0
*^
O OC
V. — 3
O >- 0
Irt < Z
1/1 « 3 •-*
Ul Ul U
S °-S!3
3 Ul Ul h-
~> I <
Z — Z 1-
— (- — I/I
N.D. N.D.
0 N.D.
0 16
0 240
i/>
UJ
Z UJ -»
2 i E
^s i
_J •• . Cl'l
3 l/> O' irt O
O. Z i/> OC —
SUJ V. Ul
o t» o. x
N.D. N.O.
15,000 N.D.
N.D. N.O.
N.D. 740
s| § .
ui z ^ en
Ul K "" Z Z —
« < ° ui < ^
UJ O UJ ^ O O
5SzS Si
H Ul O ^ OC U
N.D. Wet.
N.O.
N.D. Wet
USR
N.D. Wet
N.D.
N.D. Wet
R
WEATHER
Rain
Rain
Rain
Rain
I
u.
o
Ul
Day
Night
Day
Night
Day
Day
Night
z
EVACUATION
REMARKS
P Some moved to higher
ground
PU Private
PU Private
to neighbors
vehicles
vehicles
PU Mixed areas;
Private
vehicles
4b Okanogan Co.,
WA; 5/7,*;
Flood
4c Okanogan Co.,
WA; 5/72;
Flood
5 Douglas Co.,
WA; 9/6/72;
Flash Flood
5.0
N.D.
Suburban 2.0
450
48
50 of
3000
1.0 1.25 0 0 240 N.D. 450
0.1 tl.D. 0 0 240 N.D. 4.8
1.0 2.0 0 0 24 1000 50
N.D. Wet Rain Day PU Supplied vehicles
R Night
N.D. N.A. Rain Day PU Boat evacuation
Night
Wet Rain Night N.D. Private vehicles
S
ROAD ANC CONDITIONS * U - Urban Road
S - Suburban Road
R - Rural Rcod
|U • Express Way (Unlimited Access)
Et - E«P'ess Way (Limited Access)
EVACUATION PLANSt P - Plan Available (Not Used)
PU - Plan Used
NP - No Plan
N.D. - No Data
N.A. - Not. Applicable
-------
00
ec
UI
to
z
£
UI
9
UI
6a
6b
6c
7
8
LOCATION.
DATE AND
CAUSE FOR
EVACUATION
Ferndale, WA;
1/8/71;
Flood
Ferndale, WA;
J/3/71;
Flood
Ferndale, WA;
i/8/71 ;
Flood
Chehalls
Indian Reser-
vation, WA;
12/22/72;
Flood
Shorel Ine
WA; 3/64;
Tsunami
_- UI
fa SS
:e 35
o < ui r
UI U < .
o. < 23 &
Es ss
Rural 30
Farming;
Fishing
30
" 30
Rural 8.0
Farming
Recrea- 35
tlon
3
•— ^%
u. o £o g§
o ui ui ui 2 o
si! II i5
SS? & |E
Z 0. UI 0 UI u K
60 10 4.0
140 8.0 4.0
25 1.0 4.0
38 25 2
900 20 1.0
1/1
2i
o
0
0
0
0
0
INJURIES
1
0
0
0
0
TIME PERSONS
IN EVACUATION
STATUS (HOURS)
288
288
288
84
6.0
POPULATION
DENSITY
f/SO,. MILE
6.7
6.7
6.7
N.D.
69
in
UI
_i
So
82
£«
600
1.12k
25
950
18,000
o of
2< 1 *
UJ Z SX (/|
?2u._ Og
UI 1- O Z Z —
-3,-S 0 < Z
— > z z o o
1- ui o — a: o
72 Wet
R
72 Wet
R
72 N.A.
3 Wet
R
1.25 Dry
R
WEATHER
Rain
Rain
Rain
Rain
Clear
I
S
UI
p
Day
Dusk
Day
Dusk
Day
Dusk
Night
Night
EVACUATION PLAI
PU
PU
PU
PU
PU
S
1
Private vehicles;
Indian Reservation;
Heart attack
Suppl led vehicles
Boat evacuation
Private vehicles
Private vehicles;
Coast 1 Ine evacu-
ated; 1500 tran-
9 Port Angeles. Suburban 1.0
WA; 6/16/61;
Flood
10 Port Angeles, Urban 0.01
WA; 10/1/71;
Fire
11 Prairie City, Rural 0.5
OR; 6/69; Res Iden-
Flash Flood tlal
100
SO
30
0.5
1.0
N.D. 0
N.D. N.D. 50
N.D. N.D. SO
40
Wet
U
slents; Vacation-
ers present
Rain Night F Private vehicles
1.0 N.D. 0 0 720 60 N.D.
0 Dry Clear Night NP Private vehicles
U
Wet Rain Night NP Drive-out; Walk-
R out; Boat; No
Breakdown
12 Down Ington,
PA; 2/5/73;
Transportation
Suburban 0.2S
700 of 1.0 2.0 0 0 6.S 3200 700 1.0 Dry Cloudy Night PU Private vehicles
800 S
ROAD AND CONDITIONS * U - Urban Road
S - Suburban Road
R - Rural Road
CU - Express Way (Unlimited Access)
fk - Exoress U»y (Limited Access)
EVACUATION PLANSt P - Plan Available (Not Used)
PU - Plan Used
NP - No Plan
N.D. - No Data
N.A. - Not Applicable
-------
of
Ul
z
t-
z
Ul
13
14
15
16
GO
Ul
17
z'ogl
O Z U. h-
< ui tn u
Crystal City,
CA; 3/28/64;
Tsunami
Cannon Beach
and Seaside,
OR; 3/28/64;
Tidal Wave
Logansoort,
LA; 5/16/69;
Transportation
Creve Coeur.
IL; 8/1/61;
Transportation
W I'kes Barre.
PA; 6/23/72;
S
- a o
Ul 1- O Z Z —
w u ui — o o
I— ui o — ce u
0.75 Dry
U
0 Wet
USR
0.3 Dry
S
0 Dry
S
5 Wet
U
I
x u.
S £
» i-
Clear Night
Cloudy Night
Clear Day
Fog Night
Rain Dawn
Day
WCUATION PLi
Ul
PU
N.D
NP
PU
PU
1
ae
Private vehicles;
Jail & Hospital
evacuated to
higher floors
. Mostly walk-out;
Part of town not
alerted due to
short warning
Private vehicles
Private vehicles
Hospitals and
Jail evacuated
Flood
18 Chadbourne,
NC; 1/13/68;
Transportation
19 Port Aransas,
TX; 9/61;
Hurricane
70 Robes town,
TX: 7/3/70;
Hurricane
21 Payson, AZ;
9/70; Flesh
Flood
Suburban 0.5 350 1.0 5.0 0 0 48 700 350
Urban 1.3 2,800 of SO 2.0 0 0 N.D. 3.100 140.000 48
4.000
Urban 0.08 450 3.5 1.5 0 0 168 5.600 1,575 0
Rural 20
Reslden-
160
1.0 12 0 0 N.D. 8
160
Dry Cloudy Dusk NP Private vehicles
S Night
Dry Cloudy Day PU Private vehicles
R
Wet Rain Dusk PU Supplled vehicles
R
Wet Rain Day PU Private vehicles
R
Recrea-
tion
ROAD AKD CONDITIONS * U - Urban Road
S - Suburban Road
R - Rural Road
JU - Express Way (Unlimited Access)
Et - Express Way (Limited Access)
EVACUATION PLANSt P - Pl»" Available (Not Used)
PU - Plan Used
NP - No Plan
N.D. - No Data
N.A. - Not Applicable
-------
oe
Ul
IS
z
Ul
Ul
22
23
24
25
00 26
ON
27a
27b
28
29
z
• ee o
M£i
I- uj B
•< UJ t/l CJ
sliui
Chambers Co. ,
TX; 9/3/71;
Hurricane
Greely, CO;
4/12/73;
Dam Break
Portland, OR;
12/7/55;
CD Test
Evacuation
Isleton, CA;
6/21/72;
Flood
Humbol t Co. ,
CA; 12/22/64;
Flood
Glenn Co.,
CA; 2/73;
Flood
Glenn Co.,
CA; 2/73;
Flood
King Co. ,
WA; 3/59;
Flood
Kelso. WA;
1/18472;
Flood
TYPE OF AREA
EVACUATED
Rural
Farming
Rural
Residen-
tial
Urban
Suburban
Rural
Residen-
tial
Rural
Farming
Rural
Farming
Rural
Farming
Rural
Residen-
tial
a
UJ
fc~
3 vi
$2
ui X
Sc*
cc in
< »*
336
3.0
4
11
450
20
20
20
10
NUHBER OF
PERSONS
EVACUATED
10,000 of
10,200
1,000
101,000
1,200
183
30
20
500 of
512
70
***
IA
UJ
_J
DISTANCE (HI
EVACUATED
50
1.0
1.5
40
25
6
6
10
5
EVACUATION
TIHE (HOURS)
DEATHS
7.5 0
3.5 0
0.5 0
11 0
N.D. 7
4.0 0
N.D. 0
18 0
48 0
*•«.
z *3 in
2° £ !3
iii 1 2 i1
ee 3 ^ !_>.«• i
^ tfSi-i5S.fr.
| i-Sf 2SS: 82
i p-£ £S* *«
0 72 30 500,000
0 24 330 1,000
0 N.O. 25.000 151.500
0 2,160 109 48,000
0 N.D. N.O. 4,600
0 N.D. N.D. 180
0 N.D. N.D. 120
0 192 26 5,000
0 2,160 7 350
zl 1 ,
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l_ ui o — oe «J
48 Wet
UR
7.5 Dry
S
N.A. wet
U
14 Dry
EU
N.D. N.A.
N.O. N.A.
N.D. Wet
R
72 Wet
R
24 Wet
R
WEATHER
Rain
Gale
Clear
Rain
Clear
Rain
Rain
Rain
Rain
Rain
•i
UJ
Day
Night
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day
Night
Dawn
Dusk
ii
Day
Dusk
Night
Night
2
EVACUATION
PU
PU
PU
NP
P
N.O
N.D
PU
PU
!
Private vehicles
Private vehicles
Private vehicles
Private vehicles
Helicopter evacu-
ation
. Hel (Copter evacu-
ation
. Suppl Led vehicles
Private vehicles
Private & Suppl led
vehicles; No
breakdown on use
30a Port Arthur,
TX; 9/3/61;
Hurricane
Hospital N.D.
80
20
4 0 0 72 N.D. 1.600 48
Dry Clear Day PU Hospital evacuation;
R ambulatory by
private vehicles
ROAD AND CONDITIONS * U - Urban Road
S - Suburban Road
R - Rural Road
£U - Express W»y (Unllnlted Access)
O. - Express Way (Limited Access)
EVACUATION PLANSt F - Plan Available (Not U*«d)
PU - Plan Used
NP - No Plan
N.D. - No Data
N.A. - Not Applicable
-------
00
£
z
UJ
u
30b
31
32
33
Jh
35
36
37
38
z
P* ui3
< UJ I/I U
_i S 5 u
Port Arthur.
TX; 9/3/61;
Hurricane
Jefferson Co.,
TX; 9/3/61;
Hurricane
Hagerstown,
MD; 2/27/68;
Transportation
Wetanka, OK;
•4/4/69;
Transportation
Louisville,
KY; 3/19/72;
Transportation
Urbana, OH;
8/13/63;
Transportation
Baton P.O'ige,
LA; 8/65;
Transportation
St. Karys
Parish. LA;
9/64;
Hurricane
Morgan City,
LA; 1/19/73; '
2
TYPE OF Al
EVACUATED
Hospital
Subu rban;
Urban;
Indus-
trial
Suburban
Rural
Residen-
tial
Urban
Suburban
Urban
Rural
Residen-
tial;
Urban
Urban
o
u
§~
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< — I
uj X
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945
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CO I/I U
x tc <
5 ui3
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20
108,600 of
113,600
2,500
2,000
4,000
4,000
150,000
40,500 of
45.000
3,000 of
3,300
i/i
i
§
DISTANCE
EVACUATED
20
80
N.D.
25
1
0.75
30
150
2
^
Z£
EVACUATIO
TIME (HOU
DEATHS
4 0
7.5 0
N.O. 0
8 0
3 0
3.5 0
2.0 0
8 0
4 0
INJURIES
0
0
0
0
0
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0
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120 8,688,000 48
42,000 N.D. 0
667 50,000 0
11,400 4,000 N.D.
1.300 3,000 0
19,000 4.500,000 N.D.
43 6.075.000 12
1,800 6,000 6
ji
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Ice
U
WEATHER
Clear
Clear
Clear
Cloudy
Rain
Clear
Clear
N.D.
Snow
I
Ul
X
P
Day
Day
Night
Day
Day
Dawn
Day
N.D.
Day
*J
2
z
o
i i
Ul PC
PU Hospital [non-
ambulatory; ambu-
lance evacuation
PU Private vehicles;
Predominantly
large scale urban
evacuation
NP Private vehicles
PU Private vehicles
PU Private vehicles;
Chlorine barge;
No chlorine release
N.D. Private vehicles
PU Private vehicles;
Chlorine barge;
No chlorine release
PU Private vehicles
PU Private vehicles
Chlorine barge;
Transportation
39 Texarkana, <
TX; 8/27/67
Transportation
Suburban 9.0
5,000
4.0 550 15,000 1
No chlorine release
Dry Clear Night NP Private vehicles
U
ROAD AND CONDITIONS * U - Urban Road
S - Suburban Road
R - Rural Road
E'J - Express Way (Unlimited Access)
EL - Express Way (Limited Access)
EVACUATION PLANSt P - Plan Aval I able (Not Used)
PU - Plan Used
NP - No Plan
N.D. - No Data
N.A. - Not Applicable
-------
£
00
K
Ul
S
§
Ul
>
Ul
40
41
42
43
44
45a
45b
46a
. *§
zoo =
OX U. »-
P* ui3
< ui in u
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Grand Volley,
CO; 9/10/69;
Nuclear Det-
onation
(Plowshare)
Grand Isle,
LA. 9/3/61;
Hurricane
Los Angeles,
CA; 2/9/71;
Earthquake
Seabrook IS,
SC; 1/19/59;
Hurricane
Glendora.
MS; 9/15/69;
Transportation
Anderson,
SC; 7/9/68;
Flash Flood
Anderson,
SC; 7/9/68;
Flash Flood
TX; 9/3/61;
Hurricane
—
55 -k 5 w>
*s I"
K§ SJ2
Rural 20
Farming,;
1 ndus-
trlal
Rural 1.8
Residen-
tial;
Indus-
trial
Suburban 12
Suburban 4.5
Rural 1,200
Farming;
Rural
Residen-
tial;
Suburban ;
Urban
Suburban 0.09
Suburban 0.09
All N.D.
types
2 ~ sii a z* I *
o S «S 2§ ^ SgS 2 =! 2 ?lu.H ag
§11 P i5 s i *1 J §£• L «s:S IE
ill |s $i 1 i *:§ ss^ s2 sstsi ii
Z 0. Ul Out UIK 0 — »- — M 0.0* O.X l-uo— KO
300 of S 1.0 0 0 7.0 15 1.500 4 Dry
307 R
2.700 of 70 3.5 0 0 N.D. 1.300 154,000 82 Wet
2,300 R
80.000 N.D. 7 0 0 240 6,700 N.D. 3 Dry
U
208 0.6 400 12 46 125 10 N.A.
35,000 20 400 9.0 29 700,000 S Dry
S
60 0.06 2 0 0 24 1,700 3.6 0 N.A.
ISO 0.75 2 0 0 24 1,700 200 0 Wet
U
501,000 N.D. N.D. 0 0 N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.
>
0
i *
1 I
Cloudy Day
Rain Day
Dusk
Clear Day
Rain Day
Dusk
Night
Cloudy Night
Rain Night
Rain Night
N.D. N.D.
2
z
o
P
i
Ul
PU
NP
N.O.
PU
P
NP
NP
N.D.
S
I
1U
Private vehicle;
Heavily planned
and supervised
Private vehicles
Private vehicles
Boat evacuation
Private vehicles
Boat evacuation
Supplied vehicles
Persons from
events # 22 & 31
subtracted from
total
ROAD AND CONDITIONS * U - Urban Road
S - Suburban Road
R - Rural Road
EU - Express Way (Unlimited Access)
Et. - Express Way (Limited Access)
EVACUATION PLANSt P - Plan Available (Not Used)
PU - Plan Used
NP - No Plan
N.D. - No Data
N.A. - Not Applicable
-------
00
vo
Z
I « «:o
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TVPE OF AREA
EVACUATED
AREA EVACUAH
(SQ. MILES)
All
types
N.D.
Rural 100
Farming
Urban 7.7
46b Plequemlnes
Parish. LA;
9/3/61;
Hurricane
47 Lafourche
Parish. LA;
9/11/61;
Hurricane
48 Biloxl, MS;
9/11/61;
Hurricane
49 Gulfport, MS; Urban; IS
8/69; lndus>
Hurricane trial
SO Cane Run, Urban; 9
KV; 7/20/71; Rural;
Flash Flood Farming
SI Cumberland, Urban; 0.5
KY; 12/14/72; Suburban
Landslide
U. 0
O Ul
—5
O Ul
<£
Ul »- O
22.000 N.D. H.O. 0 0 N.D. N.D. H.O. N.D
23.000 of SO
37,000
15.000 of 5 5 0 0 12 2600 75,000 20
20,000
10.000 of I01-200 7.5 I 0 24 700 204,000 12
10,500 901-0.5
I,500 of 13
1.515
36 0
48 167
ISO
S.S 1.0 0 0 N.D. 300 823
52 Los Angeles, Urban 0.49 8,500 N.D. 220 N.O. 17,300 N.D
CA; 12/14/73;
0am Brenk
53a Florence Co., Rural 6
SC; 2/3/73; Res Iden-
Flood tlal
53b Florence Co., Rural 6
SC: 2/3/73; ResIden-
Flood tlel
90
N.D. 0
4.0 IS
4.0 IS
a s< I
- ?Su.Z
L "i*§
82 wuw-
of X J^ ui o —
H.O. N.D.
1.025,000 13
75,000 20
204,000 12
19.500 0
825 0
N.D. 4
540 N.D.
*
a|
< C
o o
Is
N.D.
Wet
R
Dry
S
Wet
Dry
U Eu
Wet
Dry
R
Wet
R
Dry
S
Wet
R
WEATHER
N.D.
Rain
Clear
Clear
Clear
Rain
Snow
Clear
Clear
I
&
in
X
N.D.
Night
Dawn
Dusk
Day
Day
Night
Dawn
Dusk
Day
Night
K
X
o
i 2
i s
Ul ft
N.D. Private vehicles
PU Private vehicles
PU Private vehicles
PU Private vehicles;
Death resulted from
heart attack during
evacuation; died In
shelter
NP Private vehicles;
Slowly developing
Incident; evacua-
tion occured In
stages
PU Private vehicles
NP Private vehicles;
Deaths due to
driving wrong way
Into deep water
PU Private vehicles
N.O.
N.A. Clear Night PU Boat evacuation
ROAD AND CONDITIONS * U - Urban Road
S - Suburban Road
R - Rural Road
CU - Express Way (Unlimited Access)
EL - Express Way (Limited Access)
EVACUATION PLANSt P - Plan Available (Not Used)
PU - Plan Used
NP - No Plan
N.D. - No Data
N.A. - Not Applicable
-------
o ui ^* a: a
« - s- =: «oS a s* 1
u u « *•» X wi * ~ 3 » iu _3 ui z C
a je ee. 3i/i O z « o >- o S zl — so
§ - «eo « x 2 = 7 P - u. t-
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z o z u. »- u. 1- >— in i- u 1- K- X ui ui«j £ C x z B< u
— < < o5 uix «ez< z< <>- «i - o-SK: 3- . &1 SHO
k- H- iu 3 3 w o 3 < 3 3 z oe > ^ =! ui ey 5i O ui u
ui aPSS o. < do* c ae < vi< I < ow>. £ =5zz
> 5 < < > >> KM =>ui> — > > — u) z r-z|-£oiS.K t-Sio —
ui _i o u if »-ui <>-' zo.ui o ui ui K o — H — t"^
54 Mlnot, NO; Urban 5.0 12,000 1 N.p. 0 0 N.O. 2.400 12,000 N.D.
5/69;
Flood
S5a Grand Forks, Rural 0.25 190 2 N.D. 0 0 N.D. 760 380 N.D.
NO; 4/65; Res I den- ,
Flood tl*l
SSb Grand Forks, Rural 0.25 20 1.0 N.D. 0 0 N.D. 760 20 N.D.
NO; 4/65; Res) den-
Flood tlal
10 56a Jamestown, Urban 1.0 350 of 1.0 24 0 0 72 354 350 N.D.
O NO; 4/69; 354
Flood
•ft •
| g
x So
: 1" I * 1 ?
0 0 P Ul 0 <
gg S 5 % S
SS » 1- ui at
Vet N.D. Day f"j Private and
U Dusk . supplied transpor
Night tat Ion; No break-
down
Vet Snow Day NP Private vehicles
R
N.A. Snow Day NP Boat evacuation
Vet Clear Day NP Private' and
U supplied transpor-
tation; No break-
S6b Jamestown. Urban 1.0 12
HO; 4/69;
Flood
0.5 N.D. 0 0 72 354 6
57 KY; 7/65 to N.D. N.D.
12/72; Floods;
Tornadoes
3,400 n.D. N.O. 0 0 N.D. N.O. N.D.
58 AI ken, SC; Suburban 0.05 35
4/15/69;
Flood
59 Hilton, FL; Suburban N.D. 68
6/70;
Flood
0.25 0.45 0 0 12 700 8.8
N.D. N.D. 0 0 N.D. N.D. N.O.
down
N.D. N.A. Clear Day NP Boat evacuation
N.D. N.D. N.D. H.D. N.D. Summary sheet data;
No breakdown on
evacuation modes
0.5 Vet Rain Night NP Very small area
S evacuated; Private
vehicles
N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. Private vehicles
ROAD AND CONDITIONS * U - Urban Road
S - Suburban Road
R - Rural Road
|U - Express vay (Unlimited Access)
EL - Express Vay (Limited Access)
EVACUATION PLANSt P - Plan Available (Not Used)
PU - Plan Used
NP - No Plan
N.D. - No Data
N.A. - Not Applicable
-------
APPENDIX C
INFORMATION BASES COMPUTER SEARCHED
FOR EVACUATION REFERENCES
1. Environmental Information Retrieval, On-Line (ENVIRON)
2. Institute for Scientific Information (ISI)
3. Machine Readable Catalog (MARC II)
4. National Technical Information Service (NTIS)
5. Current Index to Scientific and Technical Literature (PANDEX)
6. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA)
7. Office of Emergency Preparedness (DCPA)
8. Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP)
9, National Safety Council (NSC)
10. American Red Cross (ARC)
11. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW)
91
-------
APPENDIX D
NATIONAL CONTACTS
1. Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association
New York, NY
2. Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.
New York, NY
3. National Association of Independent Insurers
Des Plaines, IL
4. American National Red Cross
Washington, DC
5. Radiological Hygiene Section
Tennessee Valley Authority
Muscle Shoals, AL
6. National Hurricane Center
Coral Gables, FL
7. Disaster Project
Council of State Governments
Washington, DC
8. Highway Safety Research
University of Michigan
9. Traffic Instruction
Northwestern University
Evanston, IL
10. Systems Development Corporation
Santa Monica, CA
11. Highway Users Federation for Safety and Mobility
Washington, DC
12. National Safety Council
Chicago, IL
13. Advisory Committee on Emergency Planning
NAS, Washington, DC
14. Environmental Protection Agency
EOCC, Durham, NC
93
-------
15. U.S. Coast Guard
Cargo and Hazardous Materials Division
16. Environmental Protection Agency
OHM
17. Institute for Defense Analysis
Arlington, VA
18. Research Division
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Washington, DC
19. Center for Short-Lived Phenomena
Cambridge, MA
20. Dr. John A. Hammes
University of Georgia
Atlanta, GA
21. Engineering Systems Division
Stanford Research Institute
Menlo Park, CA
22. Dr. G. Hoyt Whipple
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI
23. Disaster Preparedness Division
Washington, DC
24. Support Systems Research Division
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Washington, DC
25. Department of Transportation
Washington, DC
26. Hazardous Materials Branch
OMP, Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, DC
27. Division of Behavioral Sciences
National Academy of Sciences
Washington, DC
28. Institute of Behavioral Sciences
University of Colorado
Boulder, CO
29. Inquiry Unit
National Bureau of Standards
Washington, DC
94
-------
30. Southern Interstate Nuclear Board
Atlanta, 6A
31. United Services Automobile Association
San Antonio, TX
32. Disaster Research Center
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH
33. Earthquake Planning Group
Disaster Preparedness Division
Office of Emergency Preparedness
Washington, DC
34. Division of Emergency Services
U.S. Public Health Service
Washington, DC
35. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Pentagon
Washington, DC
95
-------
APPENDIX E
REGIONAL CONTACTS
1. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Region VIII
Bothell, WA
2. Disaster Assistance Support Team
Environmental Protection Agency
Region VIII
Denver, CO
3. Environmental Protection Agency
Region VIII
Denver, CO
4. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Region VI
Denver, CO
5. Environmental Protection Agency
Region III
Philadelphia, PA
6. Environmental Protection Agency
Region X
Seattle, WA
7. Environmental Protection Agency
Region V
Chicago, IL
8. Field Operations
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Region IV
Battle Creek, MI
9. Environmental Protection Agency
Region II
New York, NY
10. Field Operations
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Region V
Denton, TX
97
-------
11. Environmental Protection Agency
Region IV
Atlanta, GA
12. Field Operations
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Region I
Maynard, MA
13. RADEF
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Region II
Olney, MD
14. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Region VI
Denver, CO
15. Field Operations
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Region VII
Santa Rosa, CA
16. Environmental Protection Agency
Region VI
Dallas, TX
17. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Region III
Thomasville, GA
18. Environmental Protection Agency
Region VII
Kansas City, MO
19. Office of Emergency' Preparedness
Region IX
20. Office of Emergency Preparedness
Region IV
Atlanta, GA
21. Regional Field Office
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Region V
Denton, TX
22. Office of Emergency Preparedness
Region IX
98
-------
APPENDIX F
STATE AND LOCAL CONTACTS
1. Salvation Army
Las Vegas, NV
2. Operations and Training
Civil Defense, State of Ohio
Columbus, OH
3. Civil Defense, State of Louisiana
Baton Rouge, LA
4. Civil Defense, State of Kentucky
Frankfort, KY
5. Civil Defense, State of Illinois
Springfield, IL
6. Nevada Safety Council
las Vegas, NV
7- Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
Denton Federal Center
Denton, TX
8. Civil Defense
Carson City, NV
9. Pennsylvania State Council for Civil Defense
Harrisburg, PA
10. U.S. Civil Defense Council
Portsmouth, VA
99
-------
APPENDIX G
LISTING OF EVENTS REQUIRING EVACUATION
FROM 1960 TO 1973
HURRICANES*
Number Evacuated
1. DONNA No Data
September 4-12, 1960
2. CARLA 300,000-
Texas to Louisiana 800,000
September 11, 1961
3. CINDY No Data
Texas
September 16-19, 1963
4. CLEO No Data
Florida, Georgia, and Virginia
August 20 - September 5, 1964
5. DORA 50,000
Florida, Georgia, and Virginia
August 28 - September 16, 1964
6. HILDA 150,000
Louisiana
September 28 - October 5, 1964
7. BETSY No Data
Florida and Louisiana
August 27 - September 12, 1965
8. ALMA No Data
Florida and North Carolina
June 4-14, 1966
9. INEZ No Data
Florida
September 21 - October 11, 1966
10. BEULAH No Data
Texas
September 5-22, 1967
11. ABBEY No Data
Florida
June 1-13, 1968
101
-------
12. GLADYS No Data
Florida
October 13-21, 1968
13. CAMILLE No Data
Mississippi and Virginia
August 5-22, 1969
14. BECKY No Data
Florida
July 1970
15. CELIA No Data
Texas
July 3, 1970
16. FERN No Data
Texas
September 3-13, 1971
17. EDITH No Data
Louisiana
September 5-17, 1971
18. GINGER No Data
North Carolina
September 5 - October 5, 1971
19. AGNES No Data
Florida to Pennsylvania
June 19-29, 1972
*Taken from Climatological Data, National Summary, 1964-1971.
102
-------
TRANSPORTATION
CHLORINE BARGE INCIDENTS*
Number Evacuated
1. Sunk Chlorine Barge No Data
March 1961
Mississippi
2. Sunk Chlorine Barge during Hurricane 150,000
August 1965
Louisiana
3. Chlorine Barge Jammed in Bridge 4,000
March - April 1972
Kentucky
4. Chlorine Barge Jammed in Bridge 2,000
January 1973
Louisiana
*Data obtained from U.S. Coast Guard
103
-------
RAILROAD INCIDENTS
8
10
11
12
13
14
August 24, 1964
Chillicoathe, Missouri
February 23, 1965
Southern Toinette, Alabama
September 26, 1965
Westfire, Oregon
November 9, 1965
Monticello, Indiana
November 12, 1965
Frazer, Pennsylvania
December 4, 1965
Cambden, Arkansas
August 28, 1966
Verona, Kentucky
November 11, 1966
Homer, Michigan
November 11, 1966
Cedar, Mississippi
March 5, 1967
Litchfield, Illinois
March 19, 1967
Albany, New York
May 28, 1967
Switzer, South Carolina
August 27, 1967
Texarkana, Texas
November 18, 1967
Waterford, Alabama
Number Evacuated
No Data
No Data
300 Persons
/
No Data
44 Persons
1,000 Persons
No Data
No Data
No Data
30-40 Persons
No Data
No Data
5,700 Persons
2,800 Persons
104
-------
15. October 28, 1967
Danbury, Texas
16. January 1, 1968
Dunreith, Indiana
17. January 1, 1968
Geary, Oklahoma
18. January 13, 1968
Chadbourne, South Carolina
19. February 14, 1968
Lamison, Alabama
20. February 27, 1968
Hagerstown, Maryland
21. March 4, 1968
Shattuck, Oklahoma
22. April 21, 1968
Kelley, Iowa
23., May 7, 1968
Lilesville, North Carolina
24. May 21, 1968
McHenry, Kentucky
25. August 13, 1968
Urbana, Ohio
26. November 5, 1968
Provo, Utah
27. January 15, 1969
Springville, Alabama
28. January 23, 1969
Brantham, Pennsylvania
'••ii- •
29. January 25, 1969
Laurel, Mississippi
30. February 18, 1969
Crete, Nebraska
1,200 Persons
236 Persons
15 Persons
1,500 Persons
No Data
2,500 Persons
No Data
240 Persons
No Data
No Data
4,000 Persons
No Data
No Data
No Data
1,000 Persons
400 Persons
105
-------
31. March 17, 1969
Powder Springs, Georgia
32. April 4, 1969
Wetamka, Oklahoma
33. April 16, 1969
Lobdell, Louisiana
34. April 16, 1969
Allentown Plant, Louisiana
35. April 15,. 1969
Allentown, Wisconsin
36. April 21, 1969
Engle, Texas
37. April 25, 1969
Pershing, Indiana
38. May 7, 1969
Alhambra, Illinois
39. May 15, 1969
Palmdale, California
40. July 13, 1969
Preston, Louisiana
41. July 13, 1969
Rexburg, Idaho
42. July 17, 1969
Fackler, Alabama
43. August 24, 1969
Piedmont, West Virginia
44. September 3, 1969
Wellington, Alabama
45. September 11, 1969
Glendora, Mississippi
46. September 10, 1969
Butler, Illinois
No Data
1,800 Persons
No Data
150 Persons
400 Persons
No Data
400 Persons
No Data
No Data
50 Persons
No Data
12 Persons
150 Persons
200 Persons
10,000 Persons
700 Persons
106
-------
47. October 18, 1969
Troup, Texas
48. May 16, 1969
Logansport, Louisiana
49. November 30, 1969
Crew Lake, Louisiana
50. November 26, 1969
Rockwell, Texas
51. January 25, 1970
Elmira, New York
52. January 21, 1970
Belle, West Virginia
53. February 4, 1970
Sarah, Missouri
54. February 5, 1970
Calallen, Texas
55. March 3, 1970
Danbury, Texas
56. March 11, 1970
Aurora, Nebraska
57. April 9, 1970
New Athens, Illinois
58. May 24, 1970
Jasper, Alabama
59. June 21, 1970
Crescent City, Illinois
60. July 6, 1970
:j^' Scotland, Illinois
61. July 30, 1970
Walker, Louisiana
62. August 14, 1970
Melvern, Kansas
100 Persons
600 Persons
250 Persons
200 Persons
30 Families
30 Families
1 Family
1 Family
300 Persons
No Data
1,500 Persons
500 Persons
600 Persons
No Data
No Data
50 Persons
107
-------
63. October 25, 1970
Farmers, Kentucky
64. November 9, 1970
Batavia, New York
65. December 2, 1970
Clay City, Illinois
66. February 10, 1971
Ashkum, Illinois
67. March 2.7, 1971
Panther Burn, Mississippi
68. May 2, 1971
Eden, Mississippi
69. May 5, 1971
Meridian, Mississippi
70. August 18, 1971
Dudley, Iowa
71. July 30, 1971
Bogota, New Jersey
72. August 17, 1971
Dudley, Iowa
73. August 28, 1971
Cylon, Wisconsin
74. September 18, 1971
Weston, Illinois
75. December 3, 1971
Wheatfield, Indiana
76. December 3, 1971
Thomasvilie, Alabama
77. December 11, 1971
Corbin, Louisiana
78. January 31, 1972
Staples, Louisiana
1,000 Persons
No Data
100 Persons
2,500 Persons
250 Persons
200 Persons
No Data
No Data
No Data
Few Families
No Data
150 Persons
700 Persons
112 Persons
500 Persons
1 Family
108
-------
79. February 17, 1972
McKees Rock, Pennsylvania
80. February 16, 1972
Inverness, Texas
81. March 18, 1972
Hammond, Pennsylvania
82. May 29, 1972
Ashmore, Illinois
83. May 14, 1972
Isleta, Ohio
84. June 1, 1972
Dallas, Texas
85. August 13, 1972
Huben, Oklahoma
86. August 24, 1973
Columbus, Ohio
87. September 5, 1972
College Park, Georgia
88. October 2, 1972
Luka, Illinois
89. October 24, 1972
Inman, California
90. November 11, 1972
Burden, Kansas
91. December 4, 1972
Edwardsville, Illinois
92. December 12, 1972
LaFollette, Tennessee
93. December 21, 1972
Luke, Maryland
94. January 7, 1973
Page, Oklahoma
95. February 5, 1973
Downington, Pennsylvania
6 Families
No Data
3 Families
25 Families
1,100 Persons
100 Persons
No Data
No Data
No Data
85 Persons
30 Persons
No Data
3fr -Families
-
1 Family
18 Persons
31 Persons
700 Persons
109
-------
FLORIDA
Number Evacuated
1. Tropical Storm Debbie 1,600
Escambia, Santa Rosa, and Gulf
Counties, FL
1965
2. Flood 68
Santa Rosa County, FL
1970
3. Flood 8 f
Okaloosa County, FL
1970
4. Flood 21
Lafayette County, FL
August 27-28, 1970
5. Chlorine Gas Incident 20+
Duval County, FL
December 1967
6. Flood 20+
Clay County, FL
1969
7- Flood 20+
Clay County, FL
1971
8. Chemical Accident 20+
Lake County, FL
Unknown
f — family
110
-------
ALASKA
Number Evacuated
1. Earthquake 20+
Ketchikan, AK
March 27. 1964
2. Windstorm 20+
Ketchikan, AK
November 28, 1968
3. Earthquake; Tsunami 20+
Kodiak, AK
March 27, 1964
4. Flood 20+
Anchorage, AK
October 4, 1960
5. Flood 20+
Anchorage, AK
January 30, 1961
6. Floods 20+
Anchorage, AK
April 1962
7. Flood 20+
Anchorage, AK
January 23, 1963
8. Fire 20+
Anchorage, AK
February 21, 1963
9. Fire 20+
Cordova, AK
May 1, 1963
10. Floods 20+
Anchorage, AK
May 1963
111
-------
11. Flood 20+
Anchorage, AK
October 3, 1963
12. Floods 20+
Anchorage, AK
May 31, 1964
13. Wind Disaster 20+
Anchorage/ AK
October 30, 1964
14. Flood 20+
Anchorage, AK
September 5, 1964
15. Floods 20+
Anchorage, AK
November 12, 1965
16. Earthquake 20+
Anchorage, AK
March 27, 1964
17. Floods 20+
Anchorage, AK
December 19, 1964
18. Fire 20+
Anchorage, AK
September 12, 1966
19. Floods 20+
Anchorage Borough, AK
May 21, 1964
20. Floods 20+
Anchorage Borough, AK
May 17, 1968
21. Flood 20+
Kenai, AK
January 18, 1969
112
-------
22. Flood 20+
Anchorage, AK
August 8, 1971
23. Earthquake 20+
Cordova, AK
March 27, 1964
24. Fire 20+
Cordova, AK
May 10, 1969
25. High Winds 20+
Cordova, AK
October 7, 1969
26. Earthquake 20+
Seward, AK
March 27, 1964
27. Earthquake 20+
Valdez, AK
March 27, 1964
28. Floods 20+
Fairbanks, AK
May 4, 1960
29. Floods 20+
Fairbanks
June 27, 1961
30. Windstorms; Floods 20+
Fairbanks, AK
August 1962
31. Floods 20+
Fairbanks, AK
April 1962
32. Floods 20+
Fairbanks, AK
May 1963
33. Floods 20+
Fairbanks, AK
June 1964
113
-------
34. Floods 20+
Fairbanks, AK
May 27, 1965
35. Floods 20+
Tanana and Fairbanks, AK
July 19, 1969
36. Apartment Fire 20+
Fairbanks, AK
July 30, 1971
37. Floods 20+
St. Marys Area, AK
June 1, 1972
38. Floods 20+
Kuskokwin-Bethal Area, AK
May 1972
39. Floods 20+
Matanuska Area, AK
August 13, 1971
40. Floods 20+
Fairbanks, AK
June 9, 1971
114
-------
CALIFORNIA
Number Evacuated
1. Dam Collapse 8,000-
Baldwin Hills, CA 9,000
December 14, 1963
2. Fires 5,300
San Diego County, CA
1970
3. Los Angeles Earthquake
Los Angeles, CA
February 9, 1971
(Van Norman Dam Evacuation) 85,000
115
-------
COLORADO
Number Evacuated
1. Flood 250
Brighton, OC
June 1965
2. Civil Disturbance 100
Brighton, CO
July 1972
3. Flood 60
Englewood, CO
June 1965
4. Flood 250
Littleton, CO
June 1965
5. Flood 200
Sheridan, CO
June 1965
6. Flood 85
Unincorporated Area, Arapahoe County, CO
June 1965
7. Flood 125
Unincorporated Area, Jefferson County, CO
May 1969
8. Flood 90
Golden, CO
June 1966
9. Flood 50+
Unincorporated Area, Jefferson County, CO
June 1965
10. Wind Storm 240
Boulder, CO
January 1972
116
-------
11. Flood 25-
Boulder, CO 50
May 1969
12. Flood 125
Denver, CO
June, 1965
117
-------
IDAHO
Number Evacuated
1. Floods 20+
Bannock County, ID
February 10, 1962
2. Floods 20+
Bannock County, ID
February 1, 1963
3. Fire 20+
Bannock County, ID
November 1963
4. Floods; Storms 20+
Bannock County, ID
December 22, 1964
5. Floods; Storms - 20+
Benewah County, ID
December 22, 1964
6. Floods 20+
Bingham County, ID
February 10, 1962
7. Floods 20+
Ada County, ID
June 1967
8. Floods 20+
Bonnevilie County, ID
February 10, 1962
9. Floods 20+
Bonnevilie County, ID
December 22, 1964
10. Floods 20+
Bonnevilie County, ID
December 20, 1968
118
-------
11. Floods 20+
Caribou County, ID
February 10, 1962
12. Floods 20+
Caribou County, ID
February 1, 1963
13. Floods 20+
Clearwater County, ID
June 1964
14. Floods; Storms 20+
Elmore County, ID
December 22, 1964
15. Flood 20+
Fremont County, ID
February 10, 1962
16. Floods 20+
Gooding County, ID
February 1, 1963
17. Fire 20+
Idaho County, ID
September 8, 1963
18. Floods 20+
Idaho County, ID
June 1964
19. Floods 20+
Jefferson County, ID
February 10, 1962
20. Flood 20+
Kootenai County, ID
February 22, 1961
21. Floods 20+
Lemhi County, ID
January 20, 1962
119
-------
22. Floods 20+
Lemhi County, ID
February 1, 1963
23. Floods 20+
Lemhi County, ID
January 15, 1973
24. Floods 20+
Nez Perce County, ID
February 1, 1963
25. Floods; Storms 20+
Nez Perce County, ID
December 22, 1964
26. Floods; Storms 20+
Asotin County, ID
December 22, 1964
27. Flood 20+
Madison County, ID
February 10, 1962
28. Flash Flood 20+
Oneida County, ID
August 28, 1961
29. Apartment Fire 20+
Shoshone County, ID
January 7, 1960
30. Apartment Fire 20+
Shoshone County, ID
February 22, 1964
31. Floods; Storms 20+
Shoshone County, ID
December 22, 1964
32. Floods 20+
Power County, ID
February 10, 1962
120
-------
33. Floods 20+
Power County, ID
February 1, 1963
34. Ice Jams; Floods 20+
Bingham County, ID
December 18, 1972
35. Floods 20+
Latah County, ID
January 1972
36. Ice Jams; Floods 20+
Bonneville County, ID
January 24, 1969
37. Ice Jams; Floods 20+
Payette County, ID
December 20, 1972
121
-------
KANSAS
Number Evacuated
1. Tornado 60
Salina, KS
June 21, 1969
2. High Wind 35
Sundowner East Trailer Court, Salina, KS
April 30, 1972
3. Tornado 50
Simpson and Asherville, KS
June 7, 1967
4. Anhydrous Ammonia Tank Burst at Seam 300
Beattie, KS
August 19, 1968
5. Flood 500-
Newton, KS 600
June 1965
122
-------
KENTUCKY
Number Evacuated
1. Flood 200 f
Middlesboro, KY
July 24, 1965
2. Flood 60 f
Middlesboro, KY
July 25, 1967
3. Flood 150 f
Harlan, KY
March 7, 1967
4. Flood 200 f
Russellville, KY
April 4, 1968
5. Tornado 40 f
Jessamine and Mason, KY
April 23, 1968
6. Flood 50 f
Allen and Logan, KY
June 23, 1969
7. Flood 357
Harlan County, KY
December 30, 1969
8. Flood 1,500
Cane Run Dam, KY
July 20, 1971
9. Tornado 50
Adair and Ohio, KY
May 24, 1971
10. Barge Accident 4,266
Louisville, KY
April 24, 1972
123
-------
11. Flood 250 f
Frankfort, KY
April 15, 1972
12. Mud Slide 32 £
Cumberland, KY
December 14, 1972
124
-------
MONTANA
Number Evacuated
1. Floods 20+
Beaverhead County, MT
January 20, 1962
2. Floods 20+
Blaine County, MT
March 18, 1969
3. Flood 20+
Blaine County, MT
April 20, 1965
4. Floods 20+
Dawson County, MT
February 19, 1971
5. Apartment Fire 20+
Butte County, MT
October 2, 1967
6. Explosion; Fire 20+
;Butte County, MT
February 28, 1972
7. Ice Jams; Floods 20+
Gallatin County, MT
January 30, 1969
8. Floods 20+
Cascade County, MT
June 1964
9. Floods 20+
Cascade County, MT
March 18, 1969
10. Apartment Fire ' 20+
Cascade County, MT
January 8, 1971
125
-------
11. Snowstorms; Winds 20+
Cascade County, MT
February 10, 1972
12. Floods 20+
Custer County, MT
March 18, 1969
13. Floods 20+
Dawson County, MT
March 18, 1969
14. Floods 20+
Fergus County, MT
June 1964
15. Flood 20+
Wheatland County, MT
July 16, 1962
16. Floods 20+
Wheatland County, MT
February 1, 1963
17. Floods 20+
Flathead County, MT
June 1964
18. Floods 20+
Glacier County, MT
June 1964
19. Snowstorms; Winds 20+
Glacier County, MT
February 10, 1972
20. Hotel Fire 20+
Lewis & Clark County, MT
April 28, 1965
21. Apartment Fire 20+
Lewis & Clark County, MT
December 23, 1967
126
-------
22. Hotel Fire 20+
Lewis & Clark County, MT
March 13) 1968
23. Floods 20+
Lewis & Clark County, MT
June 1964
24. Floods 20+
Big Horn County, MT
February 27, 1962
25. Floods 20+
Big Horn County, MT
May 21, 1962
26. Floods 20+
Big Horn County, MT
June 1967
27. Floods 20+
Big Horn County, MT
March 18, 1969
28. Apartment Fire 20+
Yellowstone County, MT
January 23, 1971
29. Explosion; Fire 20+
Mineral County, MT
March 29, 1962
30. Train Wreck 20+
Mineral County, MT
June 10, 1962
31. Bus Wreck 20+
Mineral County, MT
December 31, 1962
32. Apartment Fire 20+
Missoula County, MT
September 5, 1965
33. Apartment Fire 20+
Missoula County, MT
June 6, 1965
127
-------
34, Flood 20+
Phillips County, MT
April 20, 1965
35. Floods 20+
Pondera County, MT
June 1964
36. Floods 20+
Powell County, MT
June 1964
37. Floods 20+
Teton County, MT
June 1964
38. Floods 20+
Toole County, MT
June 1964
39. Floods 20+
Toole County, MT
June 16, 1965
40. Fire; Forest Fire 20+
Valley County, MT
September 12, 1971
41. Floods 20+
Ravelli County, MT
June 12, 1972
42. Floods 20+
Rosebud County, MT
April 16, 1971
128
-------
NORTH DAKOTA
Number Evacuated
1. Flood 12,000
Minot, ND
April 1969
2. Flood 40
Belfield, ND
1970
3. Flood 400
Velva, ND
1962
4. Flood 50
Mandan, ND
1971
5. Flood 70
Glen Ullin, ND
1966
6. Flood 50
Glen Ullin, ND
1967
7. Flood 50
Hebron, ND
1971
8. Flood 60
Hebron, ND
1972
9. Flood 40
Pembina, ND
1969
10. Flood 60
Grafton, ND
April 1965
129
-------
11. Flood 200
Grand Porks, ND
April 1965
12. Flood 300
Grand Forks, ND
1966
13. Flood 30
Hillsboro, ND
1967
14. Flood 30
Hillsboro, ND
1968
15. Flood 60
Fargo, ND
April 1965
16. Flood 60
Fargo, ND
March 1966
17. Flood 60
Fargo, ND
April 1969
18. Flood 280
Jamestown, ND
April 1966
19. Flood 350
Jamestown, ND
April 1969
20. Flood 50
Enderlin, ND
1969
21. Flood 35
Enderlin, ND
1970
130
-------
22. Flood 35
Fairmont, ND
1964
23. Flood 40
Mott, ND
1972
24. Flood 35
Neche, ND
1969
25. Flood 30
Mayvilie, ND
1967-1968
26. Tornado 40
Courtney, ND
June 1967
131
-------
OHIO
Number Evacuated
1. Truck Fire
Sharonville, OH
July 27, 1968
Unknown
2. Tornadoes
Northern Ohio
July 4-5, 1969
Unknown
3. Oil Line Rupture
Lima, OH
January 13, 1969
2,000
4. Toxic Fume — Burning Freight Car
Coshocton, OH
May 16, 1972
100 f
5. Storm on Lake Erie; Hurricane Agnes
Belmont, Cuyahoga, Jefferson, Lake,
Lorain, Ashtabula, and Monroe Counties
June 23-27, 1972
185
Severe Rainstorms; Flash Flooding
Hicksville, OH
September 13, 1972
38-
80 f
Severe Storms; Flooding
Ashtabula, Cuyahoga, Erie, Lake,
Lorain, Lucas, Ottawa, and Sandusky Counties
November 14-16, 1972
2,500
8. Train Derailment — Explosion and Fire
Harrod, OH
January 4, 1973
100
9. Severe Storms; Flooding
Ashtabula, Cuyahoga, Erie, Lake, Lorain,
Lucas, Ottawa, and Sandusky Counties
March 17-19, 1973; April 9-10, 1973
1,000
132
-------
OREGON
Number Evacuated
1. Flood 20+
Baker County, OR
February 1, 1963
2. Windstorm 20+
Benton County, OR
October 12, 1962
3. Floods; Storms 20+
Benton County, OR
December 22, 1964
4. Storms 20+
• Clatsop County, OR
October 1962
5. Tidal Wave 20+
Clatsop County, OR
March 28, 1964
6. Floods; Storms 20+
Clatsop County, OR
December 22, 1964
7. Windstorms 20+
Clatsop County, OR
December 2, 1967
8. Floods 20+
Clatsop County, OR
January 8, 1971 •
9. Floods; Windstorms 20+
Clatsop County, OR
January 11, 1972
10. Fire 20+
Coos-Curry County, OR
February 20, 1960
133
-------
11. Tugboat Disaster 20+
Coos-Curry County, OR
February 20, 1960
12. Storms 20+
Coos-Curry County, OR
October 1962
13. Tidal Wave 20+
Coos-Curry County, OR
March 28, 1964
14. Floods; Storms 20+
Coos-Curry County, OR
December 22, 1964
15. Hotel Fire 20+
Coos-Curry County, OR
December 16, 1970
16. Floods; Storms 20+
Crook County, OR
February 22, 1964
17. Floods; Storms 20+
Deschutes County, OR
December 22, 1964
18. Floods 20+
Douglas County, OR
February 12, 1961
19. Floods 20+
Douglas County, OR
December 22, 196,4
20. Floods 20+
Douglas County, OR
January 3, 1966
21. Floods 20+
Grant County, OR
December 23, 1964
134
-------
22. Rainstorms 20+
Grant County, OR
June 1969
23. Floods; Storms 20+
Harney County, OR
December 22, 1964
24. Floods; Storms 20+
Hood River County, OR
December 22, 1964
25. Freeze 20+
Hood River County, OR
January 21, 1969
26. Floods 20+
Jackson County, OR
December 1, 1962
27. Storms 20+
Jackson County, OR
October 1962
28. Hailstorm 20+
Jackson County, OR
July 13, 1964
29. Floods; Storms 20+
Jackson County, OR
December 22, 1964
30. Windstorms 20+
Josephine County, OR
October 1962
31. Floods; Storms 20+
Jefferson County, OR
December 22, 1964
32. Floods; Storms 20+
Josephine County, OR
December 1964
135
-------
33. Floods; Storms 20+
Klamath County, OR
December 22, 1964
34. Floods; Storms 20+
Lake County, OR
December 22, 1964
35. Hotel Fire 20+
Lane County, OR
March 2, 1960
36. Floods 20+
Lane County, OR
February 10, 1961
37. Storms; Floods 20+
Lane County, OR
December 22, 1964
38. Storms; Floods 20+
Lane County, OR
February 10, 1962
39. Freeze; Floods 20+
Lane County, OR
December 26, 1968
40. Floods 20+
Lane County, OR
February 1973
41. Floods; Storms 20+
Lincoln County, OR
March 8, 1960
42. Storms 20+
Lincoln County, OR
October 1962
43. Floods; Storms 20+
Lincoln County, OR
December 22, 1964
136
-------
44. Floods; Storms 20+
Lincoln County, OR
January 11, 1972
45. Storms 20+
Linn County, OR
October 1962
46. Floods; Storms 20+
Linn County, OR
December 22, 1964
47. Rainstorms 20+
Morrow County, OR
June 1969
48. Flash Flood 20+
Morrow County, OR
May 24, 1971
49. Floods 20+
Clackamas County, OR
November 24, 1960
50. Floods 20+
Clackamas County, OR
February 12, 1961
51. Storms; Winds 20+
Columbia County, OR
October 1962
52. Floods 20+
Multnomah County, OR
November 24, 1960
53. Apartment Fire 20+
Multnomah County, OR
January 12, 1962
54. Apartment Fire 20+
Multnomah County, OR
January 6, -1963
137
-------
55. Apartment Fire 20+
Multnomah County, OR
March 12, 1965
56. Apartment Fire 20+
Multnomah County, OR
January 20, 1963
57. Storms 20+
Multnomah County, OR
December 22, 1964
58. Freeze; Floods 20+
Multnomah County, OR
December 20, 1968
59. Fire 20+
Multnomah County, OR
July 15, 1971
60. Apartment Fires 20+
Multnomah County, OR
October 1972
61. Apartment Fire 20+
Multnomah County, OR
January 1973
62. Storms; Winds 20+
Washington County, OR
October 1962
63. Hotel Fire 20+
Washington County, OR
January 1963
64. Apartment Fire 20+
Washington County, OR
January 1963
65. Floods 20+
Washington County, OR
January 22, 1970
66. Apartment Fire 20+
Washington County, OR
November 4, 1969
138
-------
67. Storms; Winds 20+
Yamhill County, OR
October 1962
68. Windstorms; Floods 20+
Yamhill County, OR
December 1964
69. Windstorms; Floods 20+
Sherman County, OR
December 1964
70. Windstorms; Floods 20+
Tillamook County, OR
December 1964
71. Floods 20+
Tillamook County, OR
December 8, 1971
72. Floods; Rainstorms 20+
Tillamook County, OR
January 1972
73. Fire 20+
Umatilla County, OR
January 18, 1960
74. Apartment Fire 20+
Umatilla County, OR
May 13, 1963
75. Storms; Floods 20+
Umatilla County, OR
December 22, 1964
76. Storms; Floods 20+
Union County, OR
December 22, 1964
77. Fire 20+
Wasco County, OR
August 19, 1962
78. Floods; Storms 20+
Wasco County, OR
December 22, 1964
139
-------
79. Floods 20+
Marion County, OR
November 24, 1960
80. Storms; Rain 20+
Marion County, OR
October 1962
81. Floods; Rainstorms 20+
Polk County, OR
December 22, 1964
140
-------
SOUTH CAROLINA
Number Evacuated
1. Ice Storm
Pee Dee Area, SC
February 15, 1971
Unknown
2. Train Wreck
Uliners, SC
May 30, 1964
Unknown
3. Snow Storm
Allendale County, SC
February 1973
Unknown
4. Tornado
Allendale County, SC
1970
Unknown
5. Hurricane
Allendale County, SC
1959-1960
Unknown
Hurricane
Seabrook Island, SC
September 19, 1959
52 f
Flood
Horry County
March 1, 1973
10 f
8. Chemical Accident
Newberry County, SC
December 8, 1972
2 f
9. Chemical Accident
Carlisle, SC
December 29, 1969
400-
450
10. Flood
Aiken, SC
April 16, 1969
20-
25 f
141
-------
11. Flash Flooding
Anderson, SC
July 9, 1968
50 f
12. Tropical Storm Flooding
Beaufort County, SC
August 19, 1971
Unknown
13. Snow Storm
Beaufort County, SC
February 10, 1973
Unknown
14. Ruptured Gas Main
Charleston, SC
February 19, 1973
570 f
15. Tank Car of Ammonia Ruptured
Daniel Jenkins Homes, SC
20 f
16. Hurricane
Bennetts Point, SC
Fall of 1963 or 1964
Unknown
17. Flooding
Darlington County, SC
January 10, 1973
7 f
18. Fire — Gasoline Tanker
Harleyville, SC
November 19, 1971
19. Flooding
Florence County, SC
February 3-4, 1973
5 f
20. Heavy Rains; Flooding
Conway and Garden City, SC
August 1971
20-
30 f
21. Heavy Rains; Flooding
Conway and Garden City, SC
February 1973
50 f
142
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22. Chemical Accident 30
Lancaster County, SC
April 28, 1973
23. Flooding 12 f
Brittons Neck and Sellers Area, SC
September 1969
24. Flooding 6 f
Little Pee Dee River, Nichols, SC
October 1968
25. Chemical Accident 2 f
Newberry, SC
December 8, 1972
26. Train Wreck Unknown
Whitmire, SC
Unknown Date
27. Gas Line Break 200
Richland County, SC
1966
28. Trailer-Truck Fire — TQxic Chemicals 10
Richland County, SC
1972
29. Train Wreck 30 f
Switzer, SC
July 1967
30. Railway Chemical Tank Leak 25 f
Inman, SC
October 1972
31. Propane Gas Fire 50 f
Sumter County, SC
November 2, 1971
32. Fire 8 f
Sumter County, SC
February 10-12, 1973
143
-------
33. Flood 8 f
Kingstree, SC
July 1965
34. Flash Flooding 10 f
Rock Hill, SC
April 1969
35. Chemical Accident 10 f
Rock Hill, SC 1,000
August 16, 1971
144
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WASHINGTON
Number Evacuated
1. Forest Fire 20+
Apple Valley, WA
August 8, 1968
2. Hotel Fire 20+
Benton County, WA
December 3, 1970
3. Freeze; Floods 20+
Franklin County, WA
December 20, 1968
4. Flash Flood 20+
Franklin County, WA
February 12, 1969
5. Flood 20+
Clallam County, WA
January 16, 1961
6. Explosion; Fire 20+
Clallam County, WA
October 1, 1971
7. Storms 20+
Clark County, WA
October 1962
8. Storms; Floods 20+
Clark County, WA
December 22, 1964
9. Tornado 20+
Clark County, WA
April 5, 1972
'.
10. Storms; Floods • 20+
Columbia County, WA
December 22, 1964
145
-------
11. Storms; Floods 20+
Cowlitz County, WA
December 1962
12. Storms; Floods 20+
Cowlitz County, WA
December 22, 1964
13. Floods 20+
Cowlitz County, WA
January 22, 1972
14. Flash Flood 20+
Garfield County, WA
September 13, 1966
15. Floods 20+
Garfield County, WA
January 8, 1971
16. Explosion 20+
Grant County, WA
September 25, 1963
17. Flood; Windstorms 20+
Grant County, WA
January 11, 1972
18. Fire 20+
Grays Harbor County, WA
July 1, 1967
19. Apartment Fire 20+
Grays Harbor County, WA
October 22, 1967
20. Apartment Fire 20+
Grays Harbor County, WA
June 9, 1971
21. Floods; Windstorms 20+
Grays Harbor County, WA
January 11, 1972
146
-------
22. Floods 20+
Grays Harbor County, WA
December 22, 1972
23. Explosion 20+
Spokane County, WA
July 13, 1962
24. Apartment Fire 20+
Spokane County, WA
November 19, 1964
25. Hotel Fire 20+
Spokane County, WA
July 8, 1965
26. Fire 20+
Spokane County, WA
July 1967
27. Apartment Fire 20+
Spokane County, WA
April 10, 1970
28. Fire (Washington State University) 20+
Spokane County, WA
April 14, 1971
29. Fire 20+
Spokane County, WA
April 23, 1971
30. Hotel Fire 20+
Spokane County, WA
June 9, 1971
31. Rainstorms? Windstorms 20+
Kitsap County, WA
October 1962
32. Hotel Fire 20+
Kitsap County, WA
March 30, 1965
147
-------
33. Earthquake 20+
Kitsap County, WA
April 29, 1965
34. Floods 20+
Kitsap County, WA
January 3, 1966
35. Explosion; Fire 20+
Kittitas County, WA
April 2, 1962
36. Hotel Fire 20+
Kittitas County, WA
November 24, 1967
37. Floods; Windstorms 20+
Klickitat County, WA
December 22, 1964
38. Rain; Windstorms 20+
Lewis County, WA
October 1962
39. Floods; Windstorms 20+
Lewis County, WA
January 11, 1972
40. Floods 20+
Okanogan County, WA
May-June 1972
41. School Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
March 2, 1962
42. Hotel Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
January 29, 1963
43. Earthquake 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
April 29, 1965
148
-------
44. Hotel Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
October 19, 1966
45. Apartment Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
October 18, 1963
46. Hotel Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
November 17, 1967
47. Apartment Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
December 15, 1967
48. Apartment Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
July 31, 1969
49. Hotel Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
December 8, 1969
50. Apartment Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
October 17, 1969
51. Tornado 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
December 12, 1969
52. Apartment Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
January 8, 1970
53. Rooming House Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
March 22, 1970
54. Hotel Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
March 20, 1970
149
-------
55. Apartment Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
June 14, 1970
56. Apartment Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
April 25, 1971
57. Apartment Fire 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
January 8, 1972
58. Apartment Explosion 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
February 17, 1972
59. Floods 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
March 5, 1972
60. Floods; Windstorms 20+
Seattle-King County, WA
January 11, 1972
61. Hotel Fire 20+
Skagit County, WA
July 9, 1969
62. Floods 20+
Snohomish County, WA
December 24, 1967
63. Floods 20+
Snohomish County, WA
January 8, 1971
64. Apartment Fire 20+
Snohomish County, WA
September 26, 1971
65. Floods; Windstorms 20+
Snohomish County WA
January 11, 1972
150
-------
66. Apartment Fire 20+
Pierce County, WA
July 25, 1960
67. Hotel Fire 20+
Pierce County, WA
December 7, 1964
68. Earthquake 20+
Pierce County, WA
April 29, 1965
69. Apartment Fire 20+
Pierce County, WA
May 2, 1969
70. Apartment Fire 20+
Pierce County, WA
May 10, 1971
71. Floods 20+
Pierce County, WA
March 5, 1972
72. Earthquake 20+
Thurston County, WA
April 28, 1965
73. Apartment Fire 20+
Thurston County, WA
February 12, 1968
74. Floods 20+
Thurston County, WA
March 5, 1972
75. Floods; Windstorms 20+
Thurston County, WA
January 11, 1972
76. Floods 20+
CheIan County
June 13, 1972
151
-------
77. Floods; Flash Floods; Rain 20+
Douglas County, WA
June 1972
78. Floods; Storms 20+
Walla Walla County, WA
December 22, 1964
79. Flood 20+
Whatcom County, WA
January 15, 1961
80. Apartment Fire 20+
Whatcom County, WA
August 18, 1963
81. Floods 20+
Whatcom County, WA
December 13, 1966
82. Floods 20+
Whatcom County, WA
December 24, 1964
83. Hotel Fire 20+
Whatcom County, WA
November 4, 1968
84. Freeze; Floods 20+
Whatcom County, WA
December 20, 1968
85. Apartment Fire 20+
Whatcom County, WA
June 14, 1969
86. Floods 20+
Whatcom County, WA
January 8, 1971
87 - Floods 20+
Whitman County, WA
February 1, 1963
88. Windstorms 20+
Whitman County, WA
January 11, 1972
152
-------
89. Floods; Storms 20+
Yakima County, WA
December 22, 1964
90. Freeze; Floods 20+
Yakima County, WA
December 20, 1968
91. Hotel Fire 20+
Yakima County, WA
December 20, 1970
92. Floods 20+
Yakima County, WA
January 8, 1971
93. Hotel Fire 20+
Yakima County, WA
January 1972
153
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WYOMING
Number Evacuated
1. Flooding 25+
Fremont County — Lander and Shoshone
February and March 1963
2. Flooding 25+
Uinta County — Mountain View, Fort Bridger,
Lone Tree, and Evanston
1963, 1965, and 1968
154
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APPENDIX H
CHI SQUARE TEST OF TABLE 1 DATA
The Chi Square Test is made since it can be shown
that the miles driven per day per person is essentially
the same during an evacuation and during everyday normal
driving.
CHI SQUARE TEST
DEATHS NON-DEATHS TOTAL
National 5.47 x 104 2.19 x 108 2.19 x 108
EPA 2 1.13 x 106 1.13 x 106
Totals: 5.47 x 104 2.20 x 108 2.20 x 108
2 _ (6.18 x 1010 - 4.38 x 108) (2.20 x 108)
(2.19 x 108) (5.47 x 104)(2.20 x 108)(1.13 x 10*)
X2 = 8.28 x 1029
2.98 x 1027
X2 = 278
Null Hypothesis: probability of deaths during an evacuation
is not different from the normal probability of traffic
deaths.
For one degree of. freedom, the critical value of x2 for
3.84146. Since the observed value of x2 is
278, we reject the null 'hypothesis.
155
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Although it appears that there is a real difference
between the national average death rate and that of evacuees,
the small number of deaths (two) observed in the evacuation
study is low enough to cast some doubt on the validity of
applying any statistical operation. Furthermore, the circum-
stances surrounding the two deaths suggest they are not typ-
ical highway incidents. In order to be able to meaningfully
apply a statistical analysis, the study should be expanded
by one or two orders of magnitude. In other words, we should
observe 20 to 200 deaths in order to compare the two death
rates. If the observed death rate is correct, it would be
necessary to study an additional 10? to 108 persons during
evacuation. It is very unlikely that any population approach-
ing this magnitude has been evacuated — certainly not within
the past 13 years. It is therefore recommended that the
estimated death rates not be considered different from the
normal death rates, or at least that a great deal of precau-
tion be taken to make clear the doubtfullness of their valid-
ity.
, c, -tt u.ieovmiiiaiTpiiiHTiN« OFFICE IOT-
IDO
-------
THE ABSTRACT CARDS
accompanying this re-
port are designed to
facilitate informa-
tion retrieval. They
provide suggested key
words, bibliographic
information, and an
abstract. The key
word concept of ref-
erence material fil-
ing is readily adapt-
able to a variety of
filing systems rang-
ing from manual-visual
to electronic data
processing. The cards
are furnished in trip-
licate to allow for
flexibility in their
use.
EVACUATION RISKS—AN EVALUATION, EPA-520/6-74-002, June
1974. Joseph M. Hans, Jr. and Thomas C. Sell.
ABSTRACT: A study was conducted to assess the risk of
death, injury, and cost associated with an evacuation
of population groups affected by an incident at a
fixed nuclear facility. Data and information were
obtained by contacting persons and organizations in-
volved with previous evacuations precipitated by
natural or man-made causes and from available litera-
ture on the subject. Frequencies of 8.9 x 10~8 deaths
per person-mile and 4.4 x 10"8 injuries per person-
mile were derived from data representing vehicle evac-
uations involving approximately 5.5 x 105 persons.
National Safety Council (NSC) data for motor vehicle
accidents indicate frequencies of 2.4 x 10~8 deaths
(over)
EVACUATION RISKS—AN EVALUATION, EPA-520/6-74-002, June
1974. Joseph M. Hans, Jr. and Thomas C. Sell.
ABSTRACT: A study was conducted to assess the risk of
death, injury, and cost associated with an evacuation
of population groups affected by an incident at a
fixed nuclear facility. Data and information were
obtained by contacting persons and organizations in-
volved with previous evacuations precipitated by
natural or man-made causes and from available litera-
ture on the subject. Frequencies of 8.9 x 10"8 deaths
per person-mile and 4.4 x 10~8 injuries per person-
mile were derived from data representing vehicle evac-
uations involving approximately 5.5 x 10 persons.
National Safety Council (NSC) data for motor vehicle
accidents indicate frequencies of 2.4 x 10~8 deaths
(over)
EVACUATION RISKS—AN EVALUATION, EPA-520/6-74-002, June
1974. Joseph M. Hans, Jr. and Thomas C. Sell.
ABSTRACT: A study was conducted to assess the risk of
death, injury, and cost associated with an evacuation
of population groups affected by an incident at a
fixed nuclear facility. Data and information were
obtained by contacting persons and organizations in-
volved with previous evacuations precipitated by
natural or man-made causes and from available litera-
ture on the subject. Frequencies of 8.9 x 10~8 deaths
per person-mile and 4.4 x 10""8 injuries per person-
mile were derived from data representing vehicle evac-
uations involving approximately 5.5 x 105 persons.
National Safety Council (NSC) data for motor vehicle
accidents indicate frequencies of 2.4 x 10"8 deaths
(over)
-------
per person-mile and 9.0 x 10~7 injuries per person-
mile. Because of the small number of deaths and in-
juries derived from the study of evacuations, no
statistical comparison with NSC information could be
made; however, strong subjective information suggests
that NSC data can be used for estimating the risk of
injury or death.
Only some fragmentary costs related to the evacua-
tion process were obtained from data sources, and total
costs had to be constructed from available literature.
Aspects, other than risk and cost, concerning evacua-
tions are also discussed in the report.
KEY WORDS: Accident; benefits vs. risks; costs of evac-
uation; evacuation; risk.
per person-mile and 9.0 x 10~7 injuries per person-
mile. Because of the small number of deaths and in-
juries derived from the study of evacuations, no
statistical comparison with NSC information could be
made; however, strong subjective information suggests
that NSC data can be used for estimating the risk of
injury or death.
Only some fragmentary costs related to the evacua-
tion process were obtained from data sources, and total
costs had to be constructed from available literature.
Aspects, other than risk and cost, concerning evacua-
tions are also discussed in the report.
KEY WORDS: Accident; benefits vs. risks; costs of evac-
uation; evacuation; risk.
per person-mile and 9.0 x 10~7 injuries per person-
mile. Because of the small number of deaths and in-
juries derived from the study of evacuations, no
statistical comparison with NSC information could be
made; however, strong subjective information suggests
that NSC data can be used for estimating the risk of
injury or death.
Only some fragmentary costs related to the evacua-
tion process were obtained from data sources, and total
costs had to be constructed from available literature.
Aspects, other than risk and cost, concerning evacua-
tions are also discussed in the report.
KEY WORDS: Accident; benefits vs. risks; costs of evac-
uation; evacuation; risk.
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