United States            National Enforcement
             Environmental Protection       Training Institute
             Agency               Washington, DC 20460
vvEPA
                         CASE DIGEST:
                         •  Clean Water Act
         A Supplement to LITIGATING CIVIL PENALTIES

-------
      This Digest grew out of a simple list of cases on the Clean Water Act that I started
      years ago.  Whenever I researched a subject or ran across a new case, I saved it in
      my "CWA Case List."  Over the years the list grew large, but was never truly
      comprehensive.  Consequently, this Digest does not attempt to present all the
      cases and other authorities for each subject. In some instances, such as the
      groundwater section, the universe of case law is well represented. In other
      subjects, such as citizen suits, I have included only a portion of that large body of
      case law.

      I have not read every case cited in this Digest.  Many of the parenthetical case
      summaries come from court decisions, law review articles and briefs, or were
      provided to me by other EPA lawyers.  I've checked many, but not all, for
      accuracy. Like all research aides, the Digest should not be treated as gospel, and
      all citations should be checked before relying on them.

                                              Mark Ryan
                                              October 8, 1999
                                              Boise, Idaho
       My very first enforcement assignment when I joined the EPA was a $1,200 Clean
 Water case involving the Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure regulations;
 requirements designed to keep oil and hazardous substances from reaching navigable waters in
 the event of a spill or accident. Since that time in 1978,1 have handled or supervised hundreds
 of actions under all media. The Clean Water Act, one of our foundation statutes at EPA has
 seen decades of enforcement litigation, raising issues that have broad precedential application
 across all of our enforcement programs. Mark Ryan has done an enviable and tireless job of
 compiling, indexing and summarizing cases, issues and concepts involving the Clean Water
 Act into a user-friendly, plain language desk reference. This compilation is an outstanding
 companion to our earlier desk reference LITIGATING CIVIL PENALTIES. We are grateful
    *                                                                          t/
 to him for his commitment, dedication and substantial contribution to the practice of federal
 civil penalty litigation.

                                                     Michael J.Walker
                                                     Senior Enforcement Counsel
Washington, D.C.                                    for Administrative Litigation

-------
                                   Table of Contents









ANTI-BACKSLIDING 	 1




ANTIDEGRADATION	 2




BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES	 2




BEST PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT (BPJ)	 3




BYPASS	 3




CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS (§ 301(f))	 5




CITIZENS1 SUITS (§ 505)	 5




       A.     Generally	 5




       B.     60-Day Notice Requirement 	 7




       C.     Administrative and Judicial Bars to Citizens' Suits	 8




       D.     Administrative Procedure Act	  10




       E.     Attorney's Fees	  11




       F.     Continuing Violations (Gwaltney Test)	  11




       G.     "Effluent Standard or Limitation"	  13




       H.     Federal Facilities	  14




       I.      Intervention 	  14




       J.      Mootness  	  14




       K.     Nondiscretionary Duties 	  15




       L.     Penalty Must Be Paid to Treasury	  16




       M.     Standing	  17




       N.     States, Suits Against 	  19




       O.     Statute of Limitations 	  19






                                          i

-------
 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT	 20




 COMBINED SEWER OUTFALLS (CSOs)	 20




 COMMERCE CLAUSE 	 21




 COMPLIANCE ORDERS (§ 309(a)) 	 23




 COMPLIANCE SCHEDULES	 24




 CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS (CAFOs)	 24




 CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION ("CBI") 	 27




 CONSTRUCTION GRANTS 	 28




 CONTRACTOR SUSPENSION/DEBARMENT	 28




 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (§ 304(b)(l)(B))	 28




 CREDENTIALS  	 28




 CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS (§ 309(c)) 	 29




      A.    Generally	 29




      B.    Parallel Proceedings	 31




 DAIRIES  	 31




 DAMS 	 32




 DELEGATED STATES  	 34




 DISCHARGE MONITORING REPORTS (DMRs)	 35




      A.    Defendant's Challenges to Accuracy of DMRs	 35




      B.    DMRs Are Admissions of Liability	 37




"DISCHARGE OF POLLUTANTS" (§ 502(12))	 39




DISCHARGE WITHOUT A PERMIT (§ 301(a))	 42




      A.    Generally	 42
                                    11

-------
      B.    Application for a Permit As a Defense 	 44




EFFLUENT GUIDELINES (§ 304(b))	 45




      A.    Generally	 45




      B.    Best Available Technology ("BAT") 	 47




      C.    Best Practicable Control Technology Currently Available ("BPT")	 48




      D.    New Sources 	 48




"EFFLUENT LIMITATION" (§ 502(11))  	 48




EMERGENCY POWERS (§ 504)	 49




ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT	 49




ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 	 51




FEDERAL FACILITIES (§ 313)	 52




FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FACTORS ("FDF") 	 53




GENERAL PERMITS	 53




GRANTS	 54




GREAT LAKES (§118)	 55




GROUND WATER, DISCHARGES TO  	 55




GUIDANCE	 60




HISTORY/PURPOSE OF CLEAN WATER ACT	 60




HYDROLOGIC CONNECTION  	 62




IMMINENT AND SUBSTANTIAL ENDANGERMENT	 62




IMPAIRED WATER BODIES (§ 303(d))  	 62




INDIAN TRIBES	 63




INDIVIDUAL CONTROL STRATEGY ("ICS")	 64




INFORMATION REQUESTS/INSPECTIONS (§ 308)	 64






                                    iii

-------
MFUNCTIVE RELIEF  	  66




JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY	  68




JUDICIAL REVIEW (§ 509)	  68




LOG TRANSFER FACILITIES ("LTF's")	  70




MARINE SANITATION DEVICES ("MSDs")	  71




MARPOL	  71




MINING	  72




MIXING ZONES	  75




MONITORING/REPORTING REQUIREMENTS	  77




NATIONAL TOXICS RULE 	  78




"NAVIGABLE WATERS" (§ 502(7)) 	  78




NEPA	  84




NEW SOURCES	  86




NONPOINT SOURCES 	  86




NOTICE OF VIOLATION 	  88




NPDES PERMITS	  88




      A.     Administrative Extensions	  88




      B.     Appeals 	  89




      C.    Challenges to Permit in Enforcement Proceeding	  91




      D.    Compliance Schedules	  93




      E.    Evidentiary Hearings	  95




      F.    Exclusions from NPDES Permit Requirement  	  96




      G.    General Conditions/Non-Numeric Limits	  96
                                      IV

-------
       H.     Internal Waste Streams 	 97




       I.     Mandatory Duty to Issue Permit 	 98




       J.     Modifications	 98




       K.     Prohibitions 	 99




       L.     Public Hearings 	 100




       M.    Public Notice/Comment	 100




       N.     State Certification 	 101




       O.     Stays	 101




NUCLEAR MATERIALS	 102




OCEAN DISCHARGES (§ 403)	 102




OCEAN DUMPING  	 103




OIL AND GAS  	 104




OIL SPILLS (§311)  	 105




OWNER/OPERATOR LIABILITY 	 109




       A.     Generally	 109




       B.     Consultant/Contractor Liability	 Ill




       C.     Joint and Several Liability	 112




       D.     Lessor/Lessee Liability 	 112




       E.     Lender Liability	 112




PENALTIES (§ 309)	 113




       A.     Generally	 113




       B.     Appeals/Scope of Review 	 115




       C.     Calculation of Penalty/Statutory Penalty Factors  	 117




             1.     Generally	 117

-------
               2.     Daily Max & Monthly Avg: Double Counting	  117




               3.     Economic Benefit	  118




               4.     Economic Impact (Ability to Pay) 	  124




               5.     Good Faith Efforts to Comply (Culpability)  	  127




               6.     History of Violations	  128




               7.     Monthly Average Violations 	  129




               8.     Other Matters as Justice Requires 	  130




               9.     Seriousness of Violation	  132




               10.    Top-Down/Bottom-Up	  135




        D.     Collateral Estoppel	  137




        E.     Enforcement Discretion	  137




        F.     EPA Guidance	  138




        G.     EPA Not Limited to One Remedy	  139




        H.     Equitable Estoppel	  139




        I.      Mandatory Assessment  	  143




        J.      Mootness  	  144




        K.     Penalties Assessed by Courts	  144




        L.      Penalties Assessed in Administrative Cases 	  149




        M.     Penalty Policy 	  151




        D.      Preemption	  152




       E.      Retroactivity	  154




PERMIT AS A SHIELD (§  402(k))	  154




"PERSON" (§ 502(5))	  157
                                             VI

-------
"POINT SOURCE" (§ 502(14)) 	 158




"POLLUTANT" (§ 502(6))	 162




POTWs	 165




PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW	 166




PRETREATMENT 	 167




      A.    Generally (§ 307(b)) 	 167




      B.    Categorical	 169




      C.    Criminal	 170




      D.    Failure to Implement	 170




      E.    Interference/Pass-Through	 171




      F.    Local Limits	 172




PRIMA FACIE CASE	 172




REAUTHORKATION  	 173




SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT (SDWA)	 174




SECONDARY TREATMENT STANDARDS	 176




SECONDARY TREATMENT WAIVERS (§ 301(h))	 177




SINGLE OPERATIONAL UPSET (§ 309(c)(5)/(d)/(g)(3))	 177




SLUDGE (§ 405)	 178




SPCC (§ 311(j)(l)(Q)	 179




STATE CERTIFICATION (§ 401)	 180




      A.    Generally	 180




      B.    Challenges to State Certification Should Be in State Court  	 183




      C.    Compliance Schedules	 184




      D.    Interjurisdictional Water Bodies	 184






                                      vii

-------
       E.    Questioning State Certification	




       F.    3-Mile Limit to State Certification 	  186




       G.    Waiver of Right to Certify	  186




 STATE JURISDICTION	  187




 STATE LIABILITY FOR JUDGEMENTS (§ 309(e))	  187




 STATE NOTIFICATION OF ENFORCEMENT ACTION	  187




 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS	  I88




       A.    Generally	  188




       B.    Citizen's Suits	  188




       C.    Discovery Rule 	  188




       D.    Injunctive Relief 	  189




 STORM WATER	  189




 STRICT LIABILITY	  192




       A.    Generally	  192




       B.    Accidents	  194




       C.    Act of God Defense	  194




       D.    De Minimis Defense 	  195




       E.    Impossibility  	  195




TAKINGS 	  196




TECHNOLOGY-BASED STANDARDS	  196




TERRITORIAL SEAS	  196




THERMAL DISCHARGES (§ 316)	  196




TMDLs	  197
                                       Vlll

-------
TOXICITY LIMITS	200
                                                    f


UIC	  201



UPSET DEFENSE	  201



WATER QUALITY RELATED EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS  	  203



WATER QUALITY STANDARDS	  204



       A.     Generally	  204



       B.     Antidegradation	  205



       C.     Compliance Schedules	  207



       D.     Designated Uses	  207



       E.     EPA Review of State Standards (§ 303(c))	  208



       F.     "Fishable, Swimmable"	  209



       G.     Indian Tribes 	  210



       H.     Interstate Jurisdiction	  210



       I.     Narrative Standards	  210



       J.     Need to Incorporate into Permit as Effluent Limit 	  210



       K.     Notice and Comment	  212



       L.     Reclassification 	  212



       M.     Site Specific Criteria	  212



       N.     State Authority (§ 510)  	  212



WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES	  213



WETLANDS (§404)	  213



       A.     Generally	  213



       B.     Adjacent Wetlands	  216



       C.     After-the-Fact Permits	  218





                                         ix

-------
        D.     Alternatives Analysis	 218




        E.     Compliance Orders  	 220




        F.     Criminal Violations	 221




        G.     Delegations 	 222




        H.     Delineation Manual	 222




        I.      Draining Wetlands	 222




        J.      Dredge and Fill  	 223




        K.     Exemptions (§ 404(f))	 228



        L.     Injunctive Relief  	 230




        M.     Isolated Wetlands	 231




        N.     Nationwide Permits	 232




        O.     Penalties	 233




        P.      Public Hearings	 235




        Q.     Statute of Limitations  	 235




        R.      Takings	 236




        S.      "Tulloch" Rule	 239




        T.     EPA Veto of Corp.-Issued Permits (404(c))  	 240




       U.     Wetlands Determinations	 241




WHOLE EFFLUENT TOXICTTY (WET)  	 242

-------
ANTI-BACKSLIDING

        33 U.S.C. § 1342(o) (note definition of "effluent limitation" in § 502(11); note also exceptions
        under subpart (2))

        33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (Standard Attained) (allows for backsliding "where the quality of the
        waters equals or exceeds levels necessary to protect the designated use for such waters" only if
        consistent with antidegradation)

        40 C.F.R. § 122.44(1) (anti-backsliding regulations for BPJ permits)

        Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 863 F.2d 1420,1427, 28 ERG 1609 (9th Cir.
        1988) (antibacksliding amendment to the CWA is designed to prevent "backsliding" from
        limitations in BPJ permits to less stringent limitations which may be established under the
        forthcoming national effluent limitation guidelines. It prohibits a permit containing effluent
        limitations issued under a BPJ determination from being "renewed, reissued, or modified on the
        basis of effluent guidelines promulgated under [the national rulemaking]... subsequent to the
        original issuance  of such permit.")

        Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil. 861 F. Supp. 889, 900, 39 ERC 1393,1400
        (N.D. Cal. 1994)  (cease and desist order issued to Unocal did not modify Unocal's permit
        because, inter alia, modification would have violated anti-backsliding provisions of the CWA)

        Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. NJ. Expressway Auth.. 822 F. Supp. 174,  185, 37 ERC
        1423, 1432 (D. N.J. 1992) (an MOU that provided for less stringent effluent limitations than in
        NPDES permit could not constitute a modification of the permit because that would  violate anti-
        backsliding provisions)

        In re City of Hollywood. Fla.. 5 E.A.D. 157, 167 n.13 (EAB 1994) (state must act on mixing zone
        request prior to Region's decision on remand in order to avoid anti-backsliding concerns)

        InreCitvofTulsa. OK. 3 E.A.D. 505, 507 (CJO 1991) (Region did not wrongfully rely upon
        anti-backsliding exception provided in § 303(d)(4(A)(i) when  issuing the renewed permit
        because waste load allocation that formed the basis for the effluent limitation in the renewed
        permit was revised ans was in effect prior to the issuance of the renewed permit)

        In re City and County of San Francisco. 4 E.A.D. 559 (EAB 1993) (no anti-backsliding where
        subject permit was held  not be a "renewed, reissued, or modified" version of a "previous permit."
        There was no "previous  permit" because the first permit issued was challenged and never became
        final before the subsequent (and less stringent) permit became effective)

        In re Star-Kist Caribe. Inc.. 2 E.A.D. 758 (CJO 1989) (anti-backsliding regulation does apply to
        permit limits based on BPJ)

        H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1004, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 1986, at 155 (Congress intended "to  preserve
       pollution control levels achieved by dischargers by prohibiting the adoption of less stringent
       treatment or control limitations, standards, or conditions than those already contained in a

-------
       permit.")

       EPA, "Interim Guidance on Implementation of Section 402(o) Anti-backsliding Rules for Water
       Quality-Based Permits"


ANTIDEGRADATION

       See WATER QUALITY STANDARDS


BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

       33 U.S.C. § 1314(e) (Best Management Practices for Industry)

       33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) ("The Administrator shall prescribe conditions for such permits to assure
       compliance with the requirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection, including conditions on
       data and information collection, reporting, and such other requirements as he deems
       appropriate.")

       40 C.F.R. § 122.44(k)(2), (3) (BMPs are to be used "to control or abate the discharge of
       pollutants when ... (n)umeric effluent limitations are infeasible ... or .. .(t)he practices are
       reasonably necessary to achieve effluent limitations and standards or to carry out the purposes
       and intent of the [CWA].")

       40 C.F.R. § 125.100 et seq. (Subpart K - Criteria and Standards for Best Management Practices
       Authorized under Section 304(e) of the Act)

       40 C.F.R. § 130.2(m) ("Methods, measures or practices selected by an agency to meet its
       nonpoint source control needs. BMPs include but are not limited to structural and nonstructural
       controls and operation and maintenance procedures. BMPs can be applied before, during and
       after pollution-producing activities to reduce or eliminate the introduction of pollutants into
       receiving waters.")

       Rvbachek v. EPA. 904 F.2d 1276,1283, 1287 , 31 ERC 1585 (9th Cir. 1990) ("EPA is authorized
       to establish best management practices ("BMPs") 'to control plant site runoff, spillage or leaks,
       sludge or waste disposal, and drainage from raw material storage' in order to diminish the
       amount of toxic pollutants flowing into receiving waters.")

       In re Arizona Municipal Storm Water NPDES Permits. 7 E.A.D. 646 (EAB 1998) (petition for
       evidentiary hearing rejected on multiple grounds; held that no numeric effluent limits needed to
       meet  state water quality standards where effective BMPs are employed)

      EPA GCO 72 (October 20, 1978) ("EPA has authority under 402(a) of the CWA and under
      Natural Resources Defense League v. Costle. 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977) to include BMP
      requirements in permits when suitable numeric effluent limitations based on the application of
      the BMP control technology currently available cannot be set.")

-------
BEST PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT (BPJ)

        33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(l)(B)

        40 C.F.R. § 125.3(a)(2)(i)(B) ("For effluent limitations established on a case-by-case basis based
        on Best Professional Judgment (BPJ) under section 402(a)(l)(B) of the Act in a permit issued
        after February 4,1987, compliance as expeditiously as practicable but in no case later than three
        years after the date such limitations are established and in no case later than March 31,1989.")

        40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(2) ('Technology-based treatment requirements may be imposed through
        one of the following three methods:... (2) On a case-by-case basis under section 402(a)(l) of
        the Act, to the extent that EPA-promulgated effluent limitations are inapplicable. The permit
        writer shall consider ...")

        Texas Oil & Gas Assoc. v. EPA. 161  F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998) ("In situations where EPA has not
        yet promulgated any [effluent guidelines] for the point source category or subcategory, NPDES
        permits must incorporate 'such conditions as  the Administrator determines are necessary to carry
        out the provisions of the Act.' ... In practice, this means that the EPA must determine on a
        case-by-case basis what effluent limitations represent the BAT level, using its "best professional
        judgment." 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)-(d). Individual judgments thus take the place of uniform
        national guidelines, but the technology-based standard remains the same.")

        Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co.. 73 F.3d 546,41 ERG 1897  (5th Cir. 1996),
       cert, denied. 519 U.S. 811 (1996) ("We see nothing impermissible with allowing the Government
        to enforce the Act by invoking § 131 l(a), even if no effluent limitations have been promulgated
        for the particular business charged with polluting.")

        In re Citv of Port St. Joe and Florida Coast Paper Co.. 7 E.A.D. 275, 291 n.24 (EAB 1997) ("The
        authority to exercise BPJ in prescribing permit conditions is found inferentially in Section
        402(a)(l) of the Clean Water Act, which authorizes the Administrator to issue a permit
        containing 'such conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the
        provisions of this Act...'  BPJ is specifically referred to in the NPDES implementing
        regulations. See, e.g., 40 CFR 125.3.")
BYPASS
        40C.F.R. § 122.41(m)(l)(i) ("Bypass means the intentional diversion of waste streams from any
        portion of a treatment facility.")

        40 C.F.R. § 122.41(m)(2) ("Bypass not exceeding limitations. The permittee may allow any
        bypass to occur which does not cause effluent limitations to be exceeded, but only if it also is for
        essential maintenance to assure efficient operation. These bypasses are not subject to the
        provisions of paragraphs (m)(3) and (m)(4) of this section.")

        40 C.F.R. § 403.17(a)(l) ("Bypass means the intentional diversion of waste streams from any
        portion of an Industrial User's treatment facility.")

-------
 Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Interior Dept.. 20 F.3d 1418, 38 ERC 1393, 1401 (6th Cir. 1994)
 ("Because a state may adopt permit conditions more stringent than federally required, 33 U.S.C.
 § 1370(1), it may choose to not include a bypass provision in a permit. Where it does include a
 bypass provision, such provision must meet the standards set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(m).")

 United States v. Weitzenhoff. 1 F.3d 1523, 1532, 38 ERC 1365 (9th Cir. 1993) ("In establishing
 the guideline prohibiting bypass except where necessary for essential maintenance ... the EPA
 explained that '[generally, maintenance is that which is necessary to maintain the performance,
 removal efficiency and effluent quality of the pollution control equipment. However, for the
 purposes of this section, it is necessary to distinguish between  maintenance that is 'essential' and
 that which is routine.' 49 Fed. Reg. 38,037 (1984).... [I]f it is possible to perform the
 maintenance 'with no loss in treatment plant performance,' the maintenance is not considered
 'essential' for purposes of the bypass exception.")

 Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 822 F.2d 104, 122-123, 26 ERC
 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Permit condition  prohibiting bypass falls within broad statutory authority
 of EPA;  countering industries' argument that they should be allowed to bypass unneeded
 equipment, the court wrote:  "In the context of a statute which  seeks the elimination of pollution,
 it is difficult to believe that Congress intended that dischargers be entitled to shut off their
 treatment facilities and 'coast' simply because they were momentarily not in danger of violating
 effluent limitations."  (emphasis in original)).

 United States v. Citv of Toledo. Ohio. Docket No. 3:91CV7646 (N.D. OH Aug. 8,  1999) (held
 that bypass due to inadequate capacity in the POTW is unauthorized to the extent there were
 feasible alternative, including placement or construction of additional treatment units or storage
 equipment)

 United States v. Penn Hills. 6 F. Supp. 2d 432,46 ERC 1279 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (municipality held
 liable on summary judgment for discharges of raw sewage; bypass defense rejected on grounds
 that defendant had viable, albeit expensive, options to bypassing its treatment equipment during
 high flows)

 United States v. Citv of Toledo. 867 F. Supp.  603, 608, 38 ERC 1964 (W.D. Ohio 1994) (city
 held liable for discharges were notice given to EPA of "unintentional bypass" in NPDES permit
 application was not specific or timely)

 Save our Bays & Beaches v. Citv & Cntv of Honolulu. 904 F. Supp. 1098, 1134, 26 ELR 20595
 (D. Hawaii 1994) (defendant held liable for large number of unpermitted bypass events)

 Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Honolulu. 821 F. Supp. 1368, 1378, 37 ERC 1398 (D. Hawaii
 1993) (municipality found liable for unlawful bypasses of POTW)

 Public Interest Research Group v. U.S. Metals Ref.. 681 F. Supp. 237, 26 ERC 2004 (D.N.J.
 1987) (bypass defense defeated on summary judgment motion  on grounds that defendant did not
 meet bypass requirements of permit)

Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.. 652 F. Supp. 620, 631, 25 ERC (BNA)

-------
       1684 (D. Md. 1987) (reliance on 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(m) misplaced where state-issued permit
       contained stricter bypass provision)

       Student Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Hercules. Inc.. 1986 LEXIS 28723, 23 ERC
       2081 (D.N.J. 1986) (bypass defense held not to apply)

       In re Ketchikan Pulp Co.. Docket No. CWA-1089-12-22-309(g) (ALJ Head Nov. 22, 1995),
       affd. 7 E.A.D.	 (EAB 1998) (discharge of sludge from aeration basin held to be illegal
       bypass because the maintenance that led to the bypass was routine and not essential and because
       reasonable alternatives to bypass existed other than dumping contents of basin into receiving
       water)

       45 Fed. Reg. 33290, 3339 (1980) ("In general, bypass will not be excused except in extreme
       situations, and the lack of adequate backup equipment for downtime periods will not be a defense
       unless the permittee could not have anticipated the need for such equipment at the time the
       facility was constructed.")

       44 Fed. Reg. 32854 (1979) ("The bypass provision is intended to provide relief from permit
       limitations during unusual circumstances; it is not intended to allow limitations to be routinely
       exceeded.")

       See also UPSET DEFENSE
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS (§ 301(0)

       33 U.S.C. § 131 l(f) ("Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter it shall be unlawful to
       discharge any radiological, chemical, or biological warfare agent, any high-level radioactive
       waste, or any medical waste, into the navigable waters.")

       Chemical Weapons Working Group. Inc. v. Army. Ill F.3d 1485,44 ERC 1683, 1686-87 (10th
       Cir. 1997) (31 l(f) does not apply to stack emissions from chemical weapons destruction facility;
       "Plaintiffs' broad construction of the phrase 'discharge ... into the navigable waters' under
       § 311(f) would necessarily result in regulation under § 301 (a) of any air emission that might
       possibly result in atmospheric deposition into navigable waters... [CJommon sense dictates that
       Tooele's stack emissions constitute discharges into the air - not water- and are therefore beyond
       the reach of § 301(f)'s reach.")
CITIZENS' SUITS (§ 505)

       A.     Generally

              33 U.S.C. § 1365 (citizen suit provisions)

              33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) ("For the purposes of this section the term "citizen" means a person
              or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected.")

-------
 United States Department of Energy v. Ohio. 112 S. Ct. 1627,118 L. Ed. 2d 255, 34
 ERC 1489 (1992) (a state is a citizen for the purposes of § 505 of the CWA)

 Gwaltnev of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bav Foundation. Inc.. 484 U.S. 49,108 S. Ct.
 376, 384,98 L. Ed. 2d 306, 26 ERC 1857 (1987) (The CAA and CWA citizens' suits
 provisions "share the common central purpose of permitting citizens to abate pollution
 when the government cannot or will not command compliance.")

 Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A.. Inc.. 834 F.2d 1517, 27 ERC 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 1987)
 ("Our own review of the legislative history indicates only that citizen suits should be
 handled liberally, because they perform an important public function: 'It is the
 Committee's intent that enforcement of these control provisions be immediate, that
 citizens should be unconstrained to bring these actions, and that the courts should not
 hesitate to consider them." S. Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess. reprinted in 1972 U.S.
 Code Cong. & Admin. News 3746.")

 Friends of the Earth v. Carev. 535 F.2d 165, 172, 8 ERC 1933 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Congress
 [has] made clear that citizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances or troublemakers,
 but rather as welcomed participants in the vindication of environmental interests."
 (CAA))

 Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Chevron Chemical Co.. No. 1:94CV434 (E.D. Tex. May 12,
 1995) (offer of judgment by defendant under local rale held inconsistent with citizen suit
 provisions of CWA on grounds that it would have a "chilling effect" on citizen's bringing
 enforcement actions)

 Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. N.Y. Citv Dept. of Sanitation. 772 F. Supp. 162,  33 ERC
 1932 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citizen  suits can proceed where federal and state entities are not
 fulfilling their enforcement duties)

 Student Public Interest Research Group v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.. 615 F. Supp. 1419,23
 ERC 1338 (D.N.J. 1985) (citizen suits are required most where an agency encourages a
 polluter to believe its unlawful behavior will go unpunished)

 S. Rep. 414,2nd Cong., 1st Sess. 80, Leeis. History, p. 1498 ("If the court viewed the
 agency action as inadequate, it would have jurisdiction to consider the citizen action
 notwithstanding a pending agency action.")

 Statement of Sen. Bayh on the Conference Report on S. 2770, Leeis. History, p. 217
 ("[C]itizen suits can be a very important a tool for keeping industry and Government
 alike from letting standards and enforcement slip.")

 S. Rep. No. 28 (1985) ("Citizen suits ...  operate  as Congress intended - to both spur
 and supplement government enforcement actions.")

 Comment, Slowing the Net Loss of Wetlands: Citizen Suit Enforcement of Clean Water
Act 404 Permit Violations, 27 Envtl. L. 245 (1997)

-------
       David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System:
       Can Three Not Be a Crowd when Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States,
       the States and Their Citizens?, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1552, 1577 (1995)

B.     60-Day Notice Requirement

       33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) ("No action may be commenced ... prior to sixty days after the
       plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State
       in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard,
       limitation, or order,...")

       40 C.F.R. Part 135 (Prior Notice of Citizen Suits)

       Hallstrom v. Tillamook County. 493 U.S. 20,107 L. Ed. 2d 237,110 S. Ct. 304 (1989)
       (60-day notice is mandatory precondition for a citizen suit; "[Decisions will further
       congressional purpose of giving agencies and alleged violators a 60-day non-adversarial
       period to achieve compliance with RCRA regulations." 493 U.S. at 32)

       Atlantic States Legal Found, v. Stroh Die Casting. 116 F.3d 814,44 ERC 1897 (7th Cir.
       1997), cert, denied. 118 S. Ct. 442 (1997) ("[T]he key to notice is to give the accused
       company the opportunity to correct the problem," and that based upon the factual record,
       which included Stroh securing a permit, building a wastewater treatment system,
       redirecting the wastewater to a new outfall, and its admission of May 29,1990 that it was
       not in compliance, there was sufficient evidence that Stroh was on notice; held that the
       April 1989 notice satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the statute)

       New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air and Water v. Espanola Mercantile Co.. Inc.. 72 F.3d
       830, 833 (10th Cir. 1996) (the purpose of the pre-suit notice is to "allow parties time to
       'resolve their conflicts in a non-adversarial time period.'")

       Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Hercules. Inc.. 50 F.3d 1239 ,40 ERC 1385
       (3d Cir. 1995) (notice not required for violations of same parameter from same outfall
       identified in earlier notice when discovered after filing of original notice; "In deciding
       whether to initiate an enforcement action, the EPA and the state must be provided with
       enough information to enable them intelligently to decide whether to do so.  At the same
       time, the alleged violator must be provided with enough information to be able to bring
       itself into  compliance. We will judge the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' 60-day notice
       letter in terms of whether it accomplishes these purposes." 50 F.3d at 1249)

       Washington Trout v. McCain Foods. Inc.. 45 F.3d 1351,40 ERC 1123 (9th Cir. 1995)
       (held that 60-day notice letter did not comply with § 505 and 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a)
       because it failed to identify those who would become plaintiffs)

       Greene v. Reillv. 956 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1992) (60-day required in order to bring citizens'
       suit under CWA;  lack thereof grounds for dismissal)

       Community Assoc. for Restoration of the Environment v. Bosma Dairy. No. CY-98-

                                       7

-------
       3011-EFS (E.D. Wash. May 21,1999) (held that notice letter sufficiently apprized
       defendant of location and nature of violations)

       Haves v. Browner. No. 97-CV-1090-BU (N.D. Okla. Oct. 28,1998) (case dismissed for
       failure to abide by 60-day non-adversarial notice requirement)

       Cedar Point Oil Co. v. EPA. Civ. No. 3:93-cv-58WS (S.D. Miss. Sept. 30,1996) (suit by
       permit applicant for mandamus ordering EPA to issue him a permit while a citizen suit
       for unpermitted discharge is pending against him rejected for lack of jurisdiction; held
       that no private right of action exists under the CWA and plaintiff failed to allege cause of
       action under 505(a)(2) and failed to provide requisite 60-day notice; also held that CWA
       does not impose any duty on EPA to act on a pending NPDES application within any
       prescribed time period)

       Sierra Club v. Ravtheon Co.. 22 ERC 1050 (D. Mass. 1984) (notice held sufficient where
       sent to president of company and plant manager, but not to registered agent)

       S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 80 (1971), 92nd Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted in 2 Legislative History
       of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 at 1498 (1973), U.S. Code &
       Admin.  News 1972, pp. 3668, 3745 ("[S]uch regulations should reflect simplicity,
       clarity, and standardized form. The regulations should not require notice that places
       impossible or unnecessary burdens on citizens but rather should be confined to requiring
       information necessary to give a clear indication of the citizens'  intent. These regulations
       might require information regarding the identity and location of the alleged polluter, a
       brief description of the activity alleged to be in violation, and the provision of law
       alleged to be  violated.")

C.     Administrative and Judicial Bars to Citizens' Suits

       33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(B) ("No action may be commenced ...  if the Administrator or
       State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of
       the United States, or a state to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order,
       but in any such action in a court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a
       matter of right.")

       33 U.S.C.  § 1319(g)(6)(B) ("Applicability  of limitation with respect to citizen suits")

       Jones v. Citv of Lakeland. 175 F.3d 410,48 ERC 1353 (6th Cir. 1999) (district court
       lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an FWPCA citizen suit against a city for
       discharging pollutants in violation of its NPDES permit when the state environmental
       agency is diligently prosecuting the city under State law)

       Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Investment Co.. 94 F.3d 514,  43 ERC 1161 (9th Cir.
       1996) (property owner's CWA citizen suit against owner of neighboring sewage
       treatment plant for violations of plant's discharge limit held not barred by consent order
       plant owner entered into with state authorities setting interim effluent limits and calling
       for plant upgrade; CWA bars citizen suits only where state is diligently prosecuting
       action against violator under law comparable to CWA administrative penalty provision;

                                       8

-------
here, order was finalized before suit was filed, and state law was not comparable)

Citizens for a Better Environment v. UNOCAL. 83 F.3d 1111,42 ERC 1737 (9* Cir.
1996) ("because UNOCAL has not paid a 'penalty,'  the § 309(g)(6)(A(iii) bar to citizen
suits does not apply.")

Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas. Inc..  29 F.3d 376, 382 (8th Cir. 1994)
(injunctive relief as well as civil penalties foreclosed by comparable state action;
administrative action filed before 60-day notice preempts citizens suit even if amended
after notice was filed; first and amended order considered to be parts of the same action
which commenced before the filing of the 60-day notice)

Washington Public Interest Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills. Inc.. 11 F.3d
883, 37 ERC 1806,1808 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Our conclusion that WashPublic Interest
Research Group's citizen suit is not barred is compelled by the language of the state
which unambiguously bars suits only when the EPA has instituted an administrative
penalty action.")

Student Public Interest Research Group. Inc. v. Fritzsche. Dodge & Olcott. Inc.. 759 F.2d
1131 (3d Cir. 1985) (citizens free to bring suit because previous EPA administrative
enforcement action was not a "court" proceeding under § 505(b)(l)(B))

The Old Tinier. Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation Dist.. 51 F. Supp.2d 1109 (D.
Colo. 1999) ("Viewing the CWA enforcement scheme as a whole, and considering
certain statements made during § 1319(g)'s enactment, I conclude Congress intended to
preclude citizen suits only when the EPA or the state has already commenced an
'administrative penalty action' against a polluter.")

Long Island Soundkeeper Fund. Inc. v. New York City Dep't of Envtl. Protection. 27 F.
Supp. 2d 380, 383-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding language of CWA made it clear that
"state prosecution of the same claims, no matter how diligent, will not preclude a
properly filed private action, or require its dismissal.")

Sierra Club v. Hyundai American Inc.. 46  ERC 1582 (D. Or. 1997), adopted, motion
denied. 23 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 46 ERC  1585 (D. Or. 1997) (motion to dismiss denied; no
preemption of citizens complaint for injunctive relief (no penalty) where 60-day notice
was filed after state issued notice of violation, but before state assessed penalty)

California Sportfishing Protection Alliance v. City of West Sacramento. 905 F. Supp.
792, 801-802,42 ERC 1131 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (held that 309(g)(6)(B) "has no application
to state enforcement actions.")

Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Investment Co.. 41 ERC 1117 (D.  Or. 1995), rev'd. 94
F.3d 514, 43 ERC 1161 (9th Cir. 1996) (operator of cattle feeding and breeding business
may not pursue CWA citizen suit against owner of private sewage treatment facility that
serves neighboring trailer park, because citizen suits under Act are barred if state is
diligently prosecuting action against alleged violator under comparable state law)
                                9

-------
       Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co.. 852 F. Supp. 1476, 1484 n.ll, 38 ERC 1700 (D.
       Co. 1994) (administrative action filed after 60-day notice does not preempt citizen suit as
       long as citizens complaint filed within 120 days)

       Washington Public Interest Research Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills. Inc.. No. C91-
       5143T(Z) (W.D. Wash. Dec. 12, 1991), rev'd. 11 F.3d 883, 37 ERC 1806 (9th Cir. 1993)
       (EPA diligent prosecution of an administrative enforcement action against Pendleton
       Woolen Mills sufficed to bar a citizen suit under CWA, even though no penalties were
       involved)

       North and South Rivers Watershed Association v. Town of Scituate. 755 F. Supp. 484,
       32 ERC 1954 (D.Mass. 1991), affd. 949 F.2d 552, 34 ERC 1006 (1st Cir. 1991)
       (discussion of 309(g)(6) bar and "comparable state law" and "diligent prosecution")

       Mass. Public Int. Research v. ICI Americas Inc.. 777 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (D. Mass.
       1991) (citizens group is not barred if it files its 60-day notice prior to EPA bringing an
       administrative action)

       Atlantic States Legal Foundation. Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co.. 735 F. Supp.
       1404 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (state administrative proceeding not a bar to citizens' suit because
       not a "court" action)

       Wiconisco Creek Watershed v. Kocher Coal Co.. 641 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 1986)
       (state administrative proceeding not a bar to citizens' suit because not a "court" action)

       See also PENALTIES: Preemption

D.     Administrative Procedure Act

       Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Service. 834 F.2d 842, 851
       (9th cir. 1987) ("Where the plaintiffs may otherwise proceed under the citizen suit
       provision, they should not be allowed to bypass the explicit requirements  of the [CWA]
       established by Congress through resort to  ... the APA.")

       Allegheny County Sanitary Auth. v. EPA. 732 F.2d 1167, 1177 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The
       Water Pollution Control Act provides an adequate remedy for plaintiff in  the
       circumstances here ... [Thus,] preclusion of the APA remedy is proper.")

       American Canoe Assoc.. Inc. v. EPA. 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 915,47 ERC 2100 (E.D. Va.
       1998) ("[D]uplicative causes of action cannot lie under both the Clean Water Act and the
       Administrative Procedure Act.")

       Environmental Defense Fund v. Tidwell. 837 F. Supp. 1344,1356 (E.D.N.C. 1992) ("If a
       plaintiff can bring suit against the responsible federal agencies under the CWA, this
       action precludes an additional suit under the APA.")
                                      10

-------
E.     Attorney's Fees

       33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Litigation costs)

       Armstrong v. Asarco Inc.. 138 F.3d 382,46 ERG 1471 (8th Cir. 1998) (after the 60-day
       period lapsed, citizens filed in federal court two weeks before EPA did for the same
       violations; EPA settled with Asarco and a consent decree was entered; citizen plaintiff
       held to be prevailing party even though it was not a party to the consent decree, and was
       awarded attorney fees in case involving unpermitted lead discharges; "In a nutshell, the
       magistrate judge concluded that plaintiffs are prevailing parties in this litigation as a
       whole because of their impact as a catalyst and their success in achieving essentially
       what they had sought to accomplish.")

       Comfort Lake Assoc. Inc. v. Dresel Contracting Inc.. 138 F.3d 351,46 ERC 1289 (8th
       Cir. 1998) (attorney's fees denied where case was dismissed as moot; held that citizen
       suit did not act as "catalyst" to get state to act)

       Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Air Force Department. 51 F.3d 1179,
       40 ERC 1577 (3d Cir.  1995) (trial court erred when it reduced plaintiffs att. fee award by
       50%  because it had prevailed on only 50% of the issues; rather, it should have calculated
       lodestar figure and then adjust amount of that figure to reflect degree of success obtained
       by plaintiff)

       Atlantic States Legal Found.. Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.. 933 F.2d 124, 127-28 (2d Cir.
        1991) ("We believe that when the polluter's settlement with state authorities follows the
       proper commencement of a citizen suit, one can, absent contrary evidence, infer that the
       existence of the citizen suit was a motive for the polluter's settlement and that the citizen
       suit plaintiff is therefore a prevailing party.")

       Idaho Conservation League. Inc. v. Russell. 946 F.2d 717, 33 ERC 2076 (9th Cir. 1991)
       (environmental group not entitled to attorneys fees from EPA when it settled with
       defendant and EPA was not a party to the settlement even  though EPA was a defendant
       in the lawsuit)

       Environmental Defense Fund v. Hankinson. No. 5:91-CV-467-F2 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 24,
        1997) ($337,162.73  in attorneys fees award to plaintiffs in challenge to EPA
       determination that Weyerhauser silviculture facility did not need 404 permit)

       Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Romer. 796 F. Supp. 457 (D. Colo. 1992) (plaintiff
       entitled to attorneys' fees for negotiating settlement of citizen suit even when complaint
       was not filed until time of filing of consent decree)

F.     Continuing Violations (Gwaltney Test)

       Gwaltnev v. Chesapeake Bav Foundation. 484 U.S. 49, 98 L. Ed. 2d 306, 108 S. Ct. 376
       (1987) (CWA does not permit citizen suits for wholly past violations, and for the
       plaintiffs to have standing, they must have shown the existence of ongoing violations or
       the reasonable likelihood of continuing future violations)

                                        11

-------
 Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOO. Inc.. 149 F.3d 303, 46
 ERC 2025 (4th Cir. 1998) (held that defendant who came into compliance with CWA
 after plaintiffs filed their citizen suit was not liable for penalties and dismissed the case;
 court reasoned that since plaintiff was in compliance, there was no possible injunctive
 relief, and since all penalties get paid to the Treasury, plaintiff could seek no relief)

 Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n v. Remington Arms. 989 F.2d 1305, 1313, 36
 ERC 1251 (2nd Cir. 1993) ("The present violation requirement of the [CWA] would be
 completely undermined if a violation included the mere decomposition of pollutants.")

 Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co.. 853 F.2d 667, 671, 28 ERC 1333 (9th Cir. 1988)
 (intermittent violations "do not cease to be ongoing until the date when there is no real
 likelihood of repetition.")

 Pawtuxet Cove Marina. Inc. v. Ciba-Geiev Corp.. 807 F.2d 1089, 1094, 25  ERC 1425,(lst
 Cir. 1986) (there was no reasonable likelihood of recurring violation where the facility
 has shut down)

 Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.. 756 F.2d 392, 397, 22 ERC 1826 (5* Cir.
 1985) ("[C]ontinuing residual effects resulting from a discharge are not equivalent to a
 continuing discharge.")

 Informed Citizens United. Inc. v. USX Corp..  1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1600 (S.D. Tex.
 1999) (past fill of wetlands held to be continuing violation of CWA on grounds that fill
 had not yet been removed; case dismissed on other grounds (defendant held a valid COE
 permit for the fill))

 Wilson v. AMOCO Corp.. 46 ERC 1998, 2001 (D. Wy. 1998) (dismissing the case, held
 that "migration of residual contamination from previous releases does not constitute an
 ongoing discharge."; "Although Gwaltney settled that 'wholly past' violations are not
 cognizable under the CWA's citizen suit provision, it offered little explanation as to
 when a violation ceases to be ongoing and becomes 'wholly past.'")

 San Francisco Bavkeeper v. Tidewater Sand & Gravel Co.. 46 ERC 1780,1786 (N.D.
 Ca. 1997) (possibility of continuing violations found where sand & gravel operator had
 installed storm water control devices, but had "not demonstrated that there  is no real
 likelihood that its past noncompliance will recur.")

 Russian River Watershed Protection Comm. v. City of Santa Rosa. 1997 U.S. Dist.
 LEXIS  145 (N.D. Cal.  1997), affd. 142 F.3d 1136,46 ERC 1498 (9th Cir. 1998) (held
 that the plaintiffs had not established intermittent or continuing violations of the NPDES
 permit that would give  the plaintiffs standing to bring a CWA citizen suit against the
 City; court stated that the plaintiffs had shown no violations that had continued on or
 after the complaint in the case was filed, had shown no pattern of violations in the past,
 and had not proven the  continuing likelihood of a reoccurrence in intermittent or
 sporadic violations)

Frisco v. New York. 902 F.  Supp. 374,26 ELR 20415 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (no continuing

                                12

-------
       violation found where defendant discharged to wetland in distant past, but had not
       continued to do so for years)

       Friends of Sante Fe Co. V. LAC Minerals. 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1354 (D.N.M. 1995)
       ("migration of residual contamination resulting from previous releases is not an ongoing
       discharge within the meaning of the [CWA].")

       Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co.. 838 F. Supp. 1428,1434, 38 ERG 1171 (D. Colo.
       1993) (CWA violation occurs if a refinery continues to discharge pollutants into soils
       and tributary groundwater which then makes its way into water body)

       Bettis v. Town of Ontario. 800 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)  (no continuing violation
       found where defendant had filled wetland in past, but had ceased fill activities, but had
       not removed material)

       North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Woodburv. 29 ERC 1941 (E.D.N.C. 1989)
       (because defendants had failed to remove illegal fill from wetlands, they could not argue
       that the violations were "wholly past" and thereby avoid a citizen's suit; "if citizens suits
       were  barred merely because any illegal ditching and drainage of a wetland tract was
       completed before it might reasonably be discovered, violators would have a powerful
       incentive to conceal their activities from public and private scrutiny - which would lead
       to serious problems in public and private enforcement of the Clean Water Act.")

       Sierra Club v. Ravtheon Co.. 22 ERC 1050 (D. Mass. 1984) (plaintiff may seek civil
       penalties for past violations of the Act)

G.     "Effluent Standard or Limitation"

       Oregon Natural Resources Council v. U.S. Forest Service. 834 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir.
       1987) (citizens may file suit to enforce permit limitations derived from water quality
       standards, but not water quality standards themselves "[E]ffluent limitations may be
       derived from state water quality standards and may be enforced  when included in a
       discharger's permit. We agree  with defendants that it is not the  water quality standards
       themselves that are enforceable...")

       Northwest Environmental Advocates v. Portland. 56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995), cerL
       denied. 116 S. Ct. 2550,135 L. Ed 2d 1069 (1996) (citizen suits may enforce state-
       established standards)

       Atlantic States Legal Foundation. Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.. 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir.
       1993), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 811,130 L. Ed 2d 19, 115 S. Ct. 62 (1994) (private citizens
       have no standing to enforce broader state regulations contained  in NPDES permits)

       Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund. Inc. v. City of Atlanta. 953 F. Supp. 1541,44
       ERC  1251, 27 ELR 20830 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (conditions imposed pursuant to state  law
       into NPDES permit are enforceable by citizen suits)
                                       13

-------
H.     Federal Facilities

       See FEDERAL FACILITIES (§ 313)

I.      Intervention

       Sierra Club v. EPA. 995 F.2d 1478, 36 ERC 2092 (9th Cir. 1993) (City of Phoenix has
       right to intervene in lawsuit against EPA by S.C. brought to require EPA to change the
       permits issued to the city for two of its POTWs)

J.     Mootness

       Gwaltnev of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bav Foundation. Inc.. 484 U.S. 49, 66,108 S. Ct.
       376,98 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1987) ("In seeking to have a case dismissed as moot,... the
       defendant's burden 'is a heavy one.' The defendant must demonstrate that it is
       'absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected
       to recur.' Mootness doctrine thus protects defendants from maintenance of suit under
       the Clean Air Act based solely on violations wholly unconnected to any present or future
       wrongdoing, while it also protects plaintiffs from defendants who seek to evade sanction
       by predictable 'protestations of repentance and reform.'")

       Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOO. Inc.. 149 F.3d 303,46 ERC
       2025 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Applying the reasoning of fSteel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
       Environment. 118 S. Ct. 1003,  140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998)], we conclude that this action is
       moot because the only remedy available to Plaintiffs - - civil penalties payable to the
       government - - would not redress any injury Plaintiffs have suffered.")

       Comfort Lake Assoc. Inc. v. Dresel Contracting Inc.. 138 F.3d 351,46 ERC 1289 (8*
       Cir. 1998) (citizen group may not pursue injunctive relief claim in citizen suit brought
       against real estate developers under CWA for alleged violations of discharge permit
       issued for construction of retail store because  alleged violation ceased during suit; claim
       is moot as long as there is no reasonable expectation that wrong will be repeated; also,
       plaintiffs' claim became moot when state environmental agency terminated developer's
       discharge permit and approved stipulation agreement assessing penalties for permit
       violations)

       Atlantic States Legal Foundation. Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co.. 116 F.3d 814, 820,44
       ERC 1897 (7th Cir. 1997), cert, denied. 118 S. Ct. 442 (1997) ("If the violation [of the
       CWA] is cured at some point while the suit is pending ... the case nevertheless does not
       become moot.")

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg. Inc.. 2 F.3d 493,503
       (3d Cir.  1993) (holding'"once a citizen plaintiff establishes an ongoing violation of a
       parameter at the time the complaint is filed, the court is obliged to assess penalties for all
       proven violations of that parameter")

       Atlantic States Lepal Found.. Inc.  v. Pan Am.  Tanning Corp.. 993 F.2d 1017,1021 (2d
       Cir. 1993) ("We hold ... that a defendant's ability to show, after suit is filed but before

                                       14

-------
        judgment is entered, that it has come into compliance with limits on the discharge of
        pollutants will not render a citizen suit for civil penalties moot")

        Carr v. Alta Verde Indus. Tnc.. 931 F.2d 1055,1065 n.9 (5th Cir.  1991) ("Even had
        [defendant's post-complaint] improvements mooted the plaintiffs' action for injunctive
        relief, it would not necessarily have mooted the plaintiffs' action for civil penalties")

        Atlantic States Legal Found.. Inc. v. Tvson Foods Inc.. 897 F.2d 1128, 1135 (11th Cir.
        1990) (holding "the mooting of injunctive relief will not moot the request for civil
        penalties as long as such penalties were rightfully sought at the time the suit was filed")

        Pawtuxet Cove Marina. Inc. v. Ciba-Geigv Corp.. 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1986)
        ("A plaintiff who makes allegations warranting injunctive relief in good faith, judged
        objectively, may recover a penalty judgment for past violations even if the injunction
        proves unobtainable.")

        The Old Timer. Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation Dist. 51 F. Supp.2d 1109 (D.
        Colo. 1999) (distinguishing Laidlaw. held that plaintiffs case was not moot despite
        defendant's upgrades to treatment system that brought it into compliance with permit
        because ongoing violations caused direct injuries to its business and property)

        Stone v. Naperville Park Dist.. 38 F. Supp.2d 651,49 ERC 1019 (N.D. HI.  1999)
        (operation of a trap-shooting facility where lead shot and clay targets are discharged into
        water without  an NPDES permit violates CWA; held that plaintiffs claim for penalties
        not moot ever  though defendant stop trap shooting and applied for permit)

        Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine Inc.. Civ. No. 96 CV 1492-B
        (AJB) (S.D. Cal. 1999) (reaffirming prior decision that citizens have standing to seek
        civil penalties)

        Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine Inc.. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
        18703 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (distinguishing Laidlaw. held that plaintiffs claim for penalties
        not moot where assessment of penalty might have effect of halting future violations;
        plain language of Article HI gives courts jurisdiction over "cases or controversies"- - it
        does not require individualized, microscopic analysis of what remedies, such as civil
        penalties, citizen suits plaintiffs are seeking)

        Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey. Inc. v. Elf Atochem N. America. Inc.. 817
        F. Supp. 1164, 1181, 36 ERC  1855 (D. N.J. 1993) (motion to dismiss on mootness
        grounds denied because although penalty had already been paid to state, additional
        penalties were available to citizens plaintiffs, creating a sufficient case or controversy)

K.      Nondiscretionary Duties

        33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) ("[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf.
        .. against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
        perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the
        Administrator.")

                                        15

-------
 Sierra Club v. Train. 557 F.2d 485,488, 10 ERC 1433 (5th Cir. 1977) (suit against EPA
 for failure to enforce under § 309 dismissed because enforcement is a discretionary duty)

 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train. 510 F.2d 692,700, 7 ERC 1209 (D.C. Cir.
 1975) (in authorizing citizen suits under § 505, "Congress did not fling the courts'  door
 wide open," but rather confined such suits to "clear-cut" failures to perform mandatory
 duties)

 Cedar Point Oil Co. v. EPA. Civ. No. 3:93-cv-58WS (S.D. Miss. Sept. 30,1996) (suit by
 discharger against EPA for failure issue it an NPDES permit dismissed on grounds that
 CWA does not impose any duty on EPA to act on a pending NPDES application within
 any prescribed time period)

 J.E. Brenneman Co. v. Schramm. 473 F. Supp. 1316,1318, 14 ERC 1173 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
 (suit by contractor against EPA for failure to exercise a nondiscretionary duty to
 withhold funds for a wastewater treatment plant dismissed for lack of standing)

 Oliato Chanter of Navaio Tribe v. Train. 515 F.2d 654, 663, 7 ERC 2190 (D.C. Cir.
 1975) (CAA case; Congress intentionally drafted citizens' suit provision so as "to limit
 suits against the Administrator to a chosen few" to enforce a specific duty clearly
 mandated by statute)

 Annotation, Citizen's action against Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency
 to compel performance of nondiscretionary duty under § 505(a)(2) of Federal Water
 Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (33 USCS § 1365(a)(2)), 57 A.L.R. Fed. 851,
 sees. 2, 7

 Penalty Must Be Paid to Treasury

 Gwaltnev of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation. Inc.. 484 U.S. 49, 53, 108  S. Ct.
 376, 379, 98 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1987) (civil penalties imposed by a court under the CWA
 must be made payable to the U.S. Treasury)

 Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n. 453 U.S.  1,14
 n. 25,101 S. Ct. 2615, 2623 n.  25, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1981) ("Under the [CWA], civil
 penalties, payable to the Government, also may be ordered by the court.")

 Sierra Club v. Electronic Control Design. 909 F.2d 1350,1355 (9th Cir.  1990) ("While it
 is clear that a court cannot order a defendant in a citizens' suit to make payments to an
 organization other than the U.S. treasury [sic], this prohibition does not extend to a
 settlement agreement whereby the defendant does not admit liability and the court  is not
 rendering non-consensual monetary relief.")

 Sierra Club v. Chevron. USA. Inc.. 834 F.2d 1417, 1522 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[AJny
 penalties recovered from [a citizens' suit] are paid into the Untied States Treasury")

Atlantic States Legal  Foundation. Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co.. Inc.. 786 F.
Supp. 743 (N.D. Ind.  1992) (despite requests of both plaintiff and defendant that penalty

                                16

-------
       be paid to an environmental group, court held that it must be paid to treasury, relying on
       Tyson Foods. Gwaltney. and Roll Coater)

       Chesapeake Bav Foundation v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.. 608 F. Supp. 440,449 (D. Md.
       1985) ("any penalties recovered from [a citizens' suit] are paid into the Untied States
       Treasury")

       S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
       News 3668, 3745 ("One modification would allow the Court to impose civil penalties
       provided as a result of actions brought by citizens.  It should be noted that any penalties
       imposed would be deposited as miscellaneous receipts [in the Treasure] and not be
       recovered by the complainant.")

       H. Rep. No, 92-911, A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act
       Amendments of 1972 at 820 ("[T]he courts are authorized to apply appropriate civil
       penalties ... The penalties imposed would be deposited as miscellaneous receipts in the
       treasury  and not be recovered by the citizens bringing the suit.")
M.    Standing
       Luian v. Defenders of Wildlife. 500 U.S. 915 (1991) (citizens did not have standing to
       sue under Endangered Species Act where third parties, not plaintiffs, were ones who
       suffered harm)

       Gwaltnev of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bav Foundation. Inc.. 484 U.S. 49, 108 S. Ct.
       376, 98 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1987) (citizens may not sue under the Clean Water Act for purely
       past violations of the Act)

       Vallev Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State.
       Inc.. 454 U.S. 464,472, 102 S. Ct. 752,758, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1982) ("[A]t an
       irreducible minimum, Art. HI requires the party who invokes the court's authority to
       'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
       putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' ... and that injury 'fairly can be traced to
       the challenged action' and 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.'")

       Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.. 179 F.3d 107,48 ERC 1641 (4th
       Cir. 1999) (citizen's group lacks standing to sue for smelting company violations of
       CWA where evidence failed to establish that the waters they recreated in or used were
       actually or in imminent threat of being adversely affected by pollution, or that the
       waterway contained effluents of the type that the smelting facility discharges; mere
       violation of permit effluent limits  does not give rise to inference that plaintiffs were
       harmed)

       Sierra Club  v. Cedar Point Oil Co.. 73 F.3d 546,41 ERC 1897, 1903 (5th Cir. 1996)
       ("injury in fact" found where members of plaintiff s organization, who lived near point
       of discharge of produced water, claimed to use those waters and be concerned about
       pollution in  them; "That this injury is couched in terms of future impairment rather than
       past impairment is of no moment.  The Supreme Court has expressly held that a

                                       17

-------
 'threatened injury' will satisfy the 'injury in fact' requirement for standing.")

 Save Our Community v. EPA. 971 F.2d 1155, 35 ERG 1937 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying 3-
 part standing test from Vallev Forge, held that citizens group has standing to challenge
 draining of wetlands without a 404 permit)

 Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. Inc.. 913
 F.2d 64,71, 31 ERC 1905 (3d Cir.  1990), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 1109 (1991) (finding
 sufficient injury where plaintiff organization submitted affidavit of member who stated
 that he was offended by brown color and bad odor of water body adjacent to part where
 he went bird watching)

 United States v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist.. 883 F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1989)
 (finding sufficient injury where complainant alleged that defendant had discharged
 pollutants into Mississippi River without a permit, that many of the intervenor
 organization's members used the river for recreational purposes , and that pollution of
 the water adversely affected this recreational interest)

 Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries. 847 F.2d 1109, 27 ERC 1881 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
 denied. 491 U.S. 904, 109 S. Ct. 3185 (1989) (finding injury to aesthetic and
 environmental interests sufficient where pollution would affect river along which a
 single group member hiked)

 Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp.. 768 F.2d 57, 61, 22 ERC 2224 (2d Cir.
 1985) (holding that two affidavits testifying to the recreational use of the river and
 finding the pollution offensive to aesthetic values sufficient to demonstrate injury)

 Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp.. 768 F.2d 57, 61, 22 ERC 2224 (2d Cir.
 1984) (finding sufficient injury where organization submitted affidavit of member who
 regularly drove on bridge over river and was offended by pollution in the river)

 Public Interest Research Group v. Magnesium Electron. Inc.. 123 F.3d 111, 119,45 ERC
 1001 (3d Cir. 1977) ("Congress' power to authorize suits [under the CWA] and draft
 citizens as private attorneys general is inherently limited by the 'case or controversy'
 clause of Article ffl of the Constitution.")

 Ecological Rights Fdn. V. Pacific Lumber Co.. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13518 (N.D.Cal.
 1999) (plaintiffs in CWA citizen suit failed to show standing where plaintiffs' only visits
 to affected water were for purpose of preparing lawsuit)

 Piney Run Preservation Ass'n v. Carroll County. Md.. 50 F. Supp.2d 443 (D. Md.  1999)
 (at least one member of the plaintiffs group has standing, therefore the group as a whole
 has standing; in denying request to take deposition of affiant, held that "courts have often
 relied on affidavits to establish standing in citizen suits.")

 San Francisco Bavkeeper v. Valleio Sanitation & Flood Control Dist.. 36 F. Supp. 2d
 1214, 29 ELR 21041 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (environmental group has standing to seek civil
penalties for present and future NPDES permit violations; rejects  argument that Steel Co.

                                18

-------
       v. Citizens for Better Rnvirnnm^nt 523 U.S. 83 (1998) precludes CWA cases that
       otherwise comply with the Gwaltney standard)

       American Canoe Assoc  Tnc. v. EPA. 30 F. Supp. 2d 908,47 ERC 2100 (E.D. Va. 1998)
       (in challenge to EPA failure to write TMDLs where state had failed to do so, claim by
       plaintiffs that EPA violated CWA § 106 grant procedures dismissed on grounds that
       citizens lacked standing to bring the claim; no standing found because of no causation
       and no redressability)

       Sierra Club v. Ravtheon Co.. 22 ERC 1050 (D. Mass. 1984) (plaintiff found to have
       standing where plaintiffs' members live near the receiving water, recreate in and near it
       and plaintiffs are willing to disclose those members' names)

       J.E. Brenneman Co. v. Schramm. 473 F. Supp. 1316, 1318, 14 ERC 1173 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
       (suit by contractor against EPA for failure to exercise a nondiscretionary duty to
       withhold funds for a wastewater treatment plant dismissed for lack of standing)

       John D. Echeverria and Jon T. Zeidler, Barely Standing: The Erosion of Citizen
       "Standing" to Sue to Enforce Federal Environmental Law, Environmental Policy
       Project, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington D.C. (1999)

N.     States, Suits Against

       Froebel v. Mever. 13 F. Supp. 2d 843,47 ERC 1359 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (citizen suit
       against State of Wisconsin alleging unpermitted discharges of sediment from
       decommissioned dam dismissed on grounds that CWA did not waive  State's sovereign
       immunity)

O.     Statute of Limitations

       Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A.. Inc.. 834 F.2d 1517, 1521,1523-24 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1987)
       (5-year statute also applies to citizen's actions;  statute is tolled by filing of 60-day letter)

       Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Mobil Corp.. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4513 (N.D.N.Y.
       March 31, 1998) (Mobil gas truck mistakenly pumped 750 gallons of gas into a
       monitoring well, thinking it was a fill pipe for an UST; held that SOL accrues not when
       the violations occur, but when citizen plaintiffs discover them)

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Fox. 909 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. December
       12, 1995) ("[A] citizen suit to enforce a failure by the Administrator to perform a non-
       discretionary duty under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) is not subject to any  statute of
       limitations.")

       Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp.. 635 F. Supp. 284,
       287, 24 ERC 1506 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (held that CWA claim accrues not when the
       violations occur, but when citizen plaintiffs discover them)

       Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey. Inc: v. Tenneco Polymers. Inc..

                                       19

-------
              602 F. Supp. 1394, 1400, 22 ERC 1327, 1331 (D.NJ. 1985) ("in the context of the
              FWPCA, it could not have been the intent of Congress to have the federal courts borrow
              statutes of limitation and certainly not statutes as short as two years for the bringing of
              citizen suits.")

              See also STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT

       16 U.S.C.§§ 1451-1464

       § 307(c)(3)(A) ("No licence or permit shall be granted by the Federal agency until the state or its
       designated agency has concurred with the applicant's certification or until, by the State's failure
       to act, the concurrence is conclusively presumed")

       40 C.F.R. § 122.49(d) (The [CZMA] and implementing regulations (15 C.F.R. Part 930) prohibit
       EPA from issuing a permit for an activity affecting land or water use in the coastal zone until the
       applicant certifies that the proposed activity complies with the State Coastal Zone Management
       program, and the State or its designated agency concurs with the certification (or the Secretary of
       commerce overrides the State's nonconcurrence))

       Clare F. Saperstein, State Solutions to Nonpoint Source Pollution: Implementation and
       Enforcement of the 1990 Coastal Zone Amendments Reauthorization Act Section 6217, 73 B.U.
       L. Rev. 889, 890 (1995)

       See al§o40C.F.R. §§ 124.10(c)(l) and 125.59(a)(3)
COMBINED SEWER OUTFALLS (CSOs)

       Northwest Environmental Advocates v. Citv of Portland. 56 F.3d 979, 40 ERC 1801 (9th Cir.
       1995), request for rehearing en bane denied. 74 F.3d 945,42 ERC 1286 (9* Cir. 1996) (permit
       that did not specifically list 54 CSOs as permitted outfalls, but which referred to CSO discharges,
       held to authorize such discharges)

       Northwest Environmental Advocates v. Citv of Portland. 11 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 1993), vacated. 56
       F.3d 979, 40 ERC 1801 (9th Cir. 1995). cert, denied. 518 U.S. 1018 (1996) (city not liable for
       CSO discharges that violated state water quality standards)

       Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Costle. 646 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("CSOs are
       point sources subject to NPDES permit requirements including both technology-based and water
       quality-based requirements of the CWA. CSOs are not subject to secondary treatment
       regulations applicable to publicly owned treatment works.")

       Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper v. Atlanta. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20334 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
       (held that City of Atlanta's CSO discharges violated state water quality standards for fecal and
       metals, and violated the CWA)

                                             20

-------
       Georgia v. Citv of East Ridee. Tenn.. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18862 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (held that
       sewer overflow via manhole violates CWA and that penalty must be imposed once CWA liability
       is established)

       Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeoer v. Atlanta.4fi ERC 1135 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (three of Atlanta's
       CSOs found to violate fecal and heavy metals limits during storm overflows)

       In re District of Columbia. 6 E.A.D. 470 (EAB 1996) (held that combined sewer overflow
       conditions in city's NPDES permit are not "attributable to State certification" and, therefore, are
       appealable to the Regional Administrator)

       National Combined Sewer Overflow Control Strategy, 54 Fed. Reg. 37370, 37371 (1989)
       (proposed regulations to "control effluents from combined systems which are not regulated under
       the sanitary system standards nor as discharges from separate storm sewer regulations")


COMMERCE CLAUSE

       United States v. Riverside Bavview Homes. Inc.. 474 U.S. 121, 133-34 (1985) (in defining
       "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States," Congress intended "to exercise its powers
       under the Commerce Clause to regulate classical understanding of that term.... Congress
       evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on federal regulation by earlier water
       pollution control statutes and to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at
       least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding of that
       term.")

       Model v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n. 452 U.S. 264, 282, 16 ERC 1027 (1981)
       ("[W]e agree with the lower federal courts that have uniformly found the power conferred by the
       Commerce Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or
       water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one State.")

       Kaiser Aetna v. United States. 444 U.S. 164, 173-174, 100 S. Ct. 383, 389, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332
       (1979) (discusses Congress' power to regulate navigable waters under the Commerce Clause;
       Commerce Clause may reach water-related activities apart from those affecting navigable
       waterways)

       United States v. Rands. 389 U.S. 121,122-23 (1967) ("The Commerce Clause confers a unique
       position upon the Government in connection with navigable waters. The power to regulate
       commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the
       navigable waters of the United States...'")

       United States v.Edison. 108 F.3d 1336,44 ERC  1550 (11th Cir. 1997), cert, denied. 118 S. Ct.
       248 (1997) (discharge of sludge from truck to storm water ditch that led to drainage canal to
       emptied into Tampa Bay held to be discharge to navigable waters; held that it is "well established
       that Congress intended to regulate the discharge of pollutants into all waters that may eventually
       lead to waters affecting interstate commerce.")

       United States v. Wilson. 133 F.3d 251,45 ERC 1801 (4th Cir. 1997) (criminal conviction for

                                              21

-------
 unlawful dredge and fill overturned and remanded; court held that Corps definition of wetlands,
 which forbade activities that "could affect" interstate commerce, was invalid; "The regulation
 [33 CFR 328.3(a)(3)] requires neither that the regulated activity have a substantial affect on
 interstate commerce, nor that the covered waters have any sort of nexus with navigable, or even
 interstate, waters. Were this regulation a statute, because, at least at first blush, it would appear
 to exceed congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.")

 Hoffman Homes. Inc. v. EPA. 999 F.2d 256, 36 ERC 2098 (7th Cir. 1993) (EPA regulations on
 isolated wetlands upheld; migratory bird test O.K., although held that there was not substantial
 evidence on the record to support a conclusion that the wetland in question was likely to be used
 by migratory birds; the court agreed with the CJO that the "regulation covers waters whose
 connection to interstate commerce may be potential rather than actual, minimal rather than
 substantial... It is reasonable to interpret the regulation as allowing migratory birds to be the
 connection between a wetland and interstate commerce.")

 Rueth v. EPA. 13 F.3d 227, 230,24 ELR 20214 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Decisions such as Hoffman
 Homes, give full effect to Congress' intent to make the Clean Water Act as far-reaching as the
 Commerce Clause permits.")

 Leslie Salt Co. v. United States. 896 F.2d 354, 358, 31 ERC 1139 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The
 commerce clause power, and thus the Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extend the Corps'
 jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered
 species.")

 Swanson v. United States. 789 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The public right of navigation
 follows the stream... and the authority of Congress goes with it.")

 Utah v. Marsh. 740 F.2d 799, 804, 21 ERC 2142 (10th Cir. 1984) (held that discharge of dredged
 or fill material into Utah lake could well have a substantial economic effect on interstate
 commerce; water from lake is used to irrigate crops that are used in interstate commerce, etc.;
 "[T]he power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power  to regulate the
 local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and destination,
 which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce. This is so irrespective of
 whether such an effect is what at some earlier time was defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'
 Moreover, the triviality of an individual's act is irrelevant so long as the class of such acts might
 reasonably be deemed nationally significant in their aggregate economic effect."  (citations
 omitted))

 United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co.. 504 F.2d 1317, 1325,7 ERC 1114 (6th Cir. 1974)
 (holding that pollution of non-navigable waterways can be properly regulated by  Congress under
 the Commerce Clause)

 United States v. Hartz Construction Co.. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9126 (N.D. HI. 1999) (held that
 recent Supreme Court decision in Lopez did not overrule law of 7th Cir. that "other  waters"
 provision in regulations falls within authority to regulate interstate waters: constitutionality of
 wetlands regulations upheld)

Jackson, Wetlands the Commerce Clause: The Constitutionality of Current Wetland Regulation

                                        22

-------
       Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 1 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 307 (1988)

       See also WETLANDS: Isolated Wetlands


COMPLIANCE ORDERS (§ 309(a))

       33U.S.C. § 1319(a) (3) ("Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the
       Administrator finds that any person is in violation of section 1311 ..., or is in violation of any
       permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in a [402 or 404] permit..., he
       shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with such section or requirement, or he shall
       bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.")

       5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(l)  (judicial review may be obtained for final agency action under the APA
       "except to the extent that... statutes preclude judicial review ...")

       Abott Laboratories v. Gardner. 387 U.S. 136,139-40, 87 S. Ct. 1507,1510-11,18 L. Ed. 2d 681
       (1967) (in determining whether to review a regulation that had not been enforced, the Court first
       considered whether or not Congress intended to forbid pre-enforcement review)

       United States v. Chapman. 146 F.3d 1166,1170,46 ERC 1968 (9th Cir. 1998) (CERCLA case;
       held that an order issued by EPA is an agency action subject to review on the "arbitrary and
       capricious" standard)

       Laguna Gatuna. Inc.  v. Browner. 58 F.3d 564,40 ERC 2054 (10th Cir. 1995), cert, denied. 516
       U.S. 1071 (1995) (administrative cease and desist order to prevent brine discharges to salt playa
       not reviewable in federal court because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction (no pre-enforcement
       review))

       Southern Ohio Coal v. Office of Surface Minine. 20 F.3d 1418,1426 (6th Cir. 1994) (district
       court lacks jurisdiction to review EPA compliance order prior to commencement of enforcement
       proceedings; court was "persuaded that Congress meant to preclude judicial review of
       compliance orders under the CWA." )

       Southern Ohio Coal v. Office of Surface Mining. 831 F. Supp. 1324, 1335  (S.D. Ohio 1993),
       rev'd. 20 F.3d 1418,  1426 (6th Cir. 1994) (EPA enjoined from issuing compliance order to mine
       to halt bypass of treatment facility)

       Rueth v. EPA. 13 F.3d 227, 24 ELR 20214 (7th Cir. 1993) (jurisdiction over isolated waters
       upheld; complaint seeking injunction against enforcement of compliance order to cease
       discharges to wetlands dismissed for lack of jurisdiction)

       Southern Pine« Assocs. v. United States. 912 F.2d 713,715-16 (4th Cir. 1990) (district court
       lacks jurisdiction to review EPA compliance order prior to commencement of enforcement
       proceedings; "The structure of [CWA, CAA and CERCLA] indicates that Congress intended to
       allow EPA to act to address environmental problems quickly and without becoming immediately
       entangled in litigation.")


                                              23

-------
       Hoffman Group Inc. v. EPA. 902 F.2d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1990) ("In drafting the Clean Water
       Act, Congress chose to make assessed administrative penalties subject to review while at the
       same time it chose not to make a compliance order judicially reviewable unless the EPA decides
       to bring a civil suit to enforce it...  Having provided a detailed mechanism for judicial
       consideration of a compliance order via an enforcement proceeding, Congress has impliedly
       precluded judicial review of a compliance order except in an enforcement proceeding.")

       Solid State Circuits. Inc. v. United States EPA. 812 F.2d 383, 391-92, 25 ERC 1617 (8th Cir.
       1987) (CERCLA 106 case; held that an order issued by EPA is an agency action subject to
       review on the arbitrary and capricious standard)

       In re Marshall C. Sasser. 3 E.A.D. 703 (CJO 1991) (EPA may, but need not, issue a compliance
       order prior to bringing a penalty action)

       See also PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW;  WETLANDS: Compliance Orders
COMPLIANCE SCHEDULES

       See NPDES PERMITS; STATE CERTIFICATION


CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS (CAFOs)

       33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) ("The term point source means ... concentrated animal feeding
       operation.")

       40 C.F.R. § 122.21(i) (NPDES permit application requirements for CAFOs)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.23(a)(3) and Appendix B to Part 122 (definition of CAFO)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.23(c) (Case-by-case designation of concentrated animal feeding operations (aka
       significant contributor of pollutants or "SCP" status))

       40 C.F.R. Part 412 (Feedlot Point Source Category)

       40 C.F.R. § 412.1 l(c) ("The term process waste water shall mean any process generated waste
       water and any precipitation (rain or snow) which comes into contact with any manure, litter or
       bedding, or any other raw material or intermediate or final material or product used in or
       resulting from the production of animals or poultry or direct products (e.g. milk, eggs).")

       40 C.F.R. §§ 412.12 & 412.13 ("There shall be no discharge of process waste water pollutants to
       navigable waters" under BPT and BAT, respectively)

      Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm. 34 F.3d 114, 39 ERC 1385
      (2d Cir. 1994), cert denied. 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995) (held that dairy farm with 700 cattle that
      lived in barns was a CAFO and the runoff from the fields to which their manure was applied was
      not nonpoint source runoff)

                                           24

-------
Can- v. Alta Verde Industries. Inc.. 931 F.2d 1055, 33 ERC 1361 (5th Cir. 1991) (discharge from
a feedlot holding pond that was designed for 25-year/24-hr storm made the lot subject to NPDES
permit requirements because the "design" criteria set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 412.13(b) effect only
discharge criteria and not whether a discharge has occurred under 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 that
renders the feedlot a CAPO)

United States v. Rockview Farms. Inc.. No. CRF 98-5331 OWW (E.D. Ca. Apr. 26,1999) (dairy
farm ordered to pay criminal fine of $250,000 for discharging 1.7 million gallons of wastewater
from waste pond into the desert for 2 days, from where it ran overland for 8 miles to the
Amargosa River)

Community Assoc. for Restoration of the Environment v. Bosma Dairy. No. CY-98-3011-EFS
(E.D. Wash. July 29,1999)  (clarifying earlier May 21 ruling, held that "it is correct to define a
CAFO as the confinement area including the milk production area, cow pens, feeding area, truck
wash area, calf pens, and fields therein on which manure is stored and any ditches therein...
This would include, but not be limited to, trucks, wheel lines, center pivot irrigation, and spray
guns. Any discharge therefrom would be a violation of the NPDES permit and the CWA.  By
'discharge therefrom', the Court means an over application of manure or animal wastewater in
violation of the [Dairy Waste Management Plan] which causes a discharge to the waters of the
United States"; also held that irrigation canal to which a CAFO was discharging is waters of the
U.S.)

Community Assoc. for Restoration of the Environment v. Bosnia Dairy. No. CY-98-3011-EFS
(E.D. Wash. May 21, 1999) (held that notice letter sufficiently apprized defendant of location
and nature of violations; held that plaintiffs had standing)

Community Association for Restoration of the Environment v. Sid Koopman Dairy. 48 ERC
1763 (E.D. Wash. 1999) ("The Defendants CAFOs include not only the ground where the
animals are confined but also the lagoons and systems used to transfer the animal wastes to the
lagoons and systems as well as equipment which distributes and/or applies the animal wastes
produced at the confinement area to fields outside the animal confinement area.")

State v. DeCoster. No. 148/97-666 (Iowa July 8, 1999) (upholding $59,000 civil penalty imposed
against owner of several hog confinement facilities where state water pollution and animal waste
control requirements were violated)

American Canoe Ass'n v. Murphv Farms. Inc.. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21402 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 21,
1998) (pig farm must apply for permit because it is a CAFO and there have been two
unauthorized discharges)

Cross Timbers Concerned Citizens v. Saginaw and Johnson. No.3-97-CV-1564-H (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 16, 1997)  (EPA dismissed from a lawsuit brought by a citizens group in Texas concerning
discharges of animal wastes from CAFOs; plaintiff challenged EPA for failing to take action
against the State's program and for allegedly supporting that program with grants; held that there
is no jurisdiction for a citizen suit that simply alleges faulty administration of a statute;
addressing various  provisions of the CWA in detail, the court found that the citizens also could
not allege that EPA had violated a nondiscretionary duty for failing  to rein in the allegedly faulty
Texas program)

                                       25

-------
 Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm and Richard Popp. 834 F.
 Supp. 1410 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd on other grounds. 34 F.3d 114 (2d cir. 1994), cert denied,
 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995) (argument rejected that manure is not a pollutant because it was not
 "discarded" but is instead used as a fertilizer)

 Hiebee v. Starr. 598 F. Supp. 323,21 ERC 2215 (E.D. Ak. 1984) (in suit by neighbor against hog
 farm, CWA held not to apply to hog farm, which was not a CAFO, because it was  "no discharge"
 system)

 In re Luis Bettencourt. 1994 EPA RJO LEXIS 5 (Region 10 RJO Hamill 1994) (only CAFO's
 that submit NOI are covered under GP; manure is a pollutant; lateral is waters of U.S.)

 In re Donald J. Aardema and Joe Pacheco. 1992 EPA RJO LEXIS 17 (Region 10 RJO Hamill
 1992) (CAFO general permit for Idaho applies  to all CAFOs even if they do not submit an NOI)

 S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 100 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.  3668, 3761 (Sen. Dole)
 ("Animal and poultry waste, until recent years, has not been considered a major pollutant... The
 picture has changed dramatically, however, as development of intensive livestock and poultry
 production on feedlots and in modern buildings has created massive concentrations of manure in
 small areas.  The recycling capacity of the soil and plant cover has been surpassed.... The
 present situation and the outlook for future developments in livestock and poultry production
 show that waste management systems are required to prevent waste generated in concentrated
 production areas from causing serious harm to surface and ground waters.")

 64 Fed. Reg. 15158 (1999) (announcement by EPA of preliminary study of aquiculture industry)

 63 Fed. Reg. 50192 (1998) (proposed joint strategy  on CAFO between EPA and Dept. of
 Agriculture); discussed at Environmental Law Reporter, Vol. 29, No. 21 at 1064 (September 25,
 1998)

 62 Fed. Reg. 20177, 20180 (1997) (EPA Region 10, Idaho CAFO General Permit,  Response to
 Comments: "Canals and laterals which  empty into (or connect with) waters of the United States
 such as rivers, streams, lakes, etc. are themselves waters of the United States in accordance with
 the definition of waters of the United States in 40 CFR 122.2(e). As a result, discharges into
 canals and laterals are considered point source discharges which must be regulated under the
 NPDES permitting program.")

 41 Fed. Reg.  11303 (1976) (Final CAFO regulations)

 41 Fed. Reg. 11458 (1976) (Final storm water regulations)

 41 Fed. Reg. 7963 (1976) (proposed regulations for agricultural activities (irrigation return
 flow))

40 Fed. Reg. 56932 (1975) (proposed storm water regulations)

40 Fed. Reg. 54182 (1975) (proposed CAFO regulations)
                                      26

-------
       38 Fed. Reg. 1800 (1973) (Form and Guidelines for agricultural and silvicultural activities)

       38 Fed. Reg. 10960 (1973) (proposal of Form and Rulemaking regarding agricultural,
       silvicultural activities addressing CAFO's)

       EPA, Efforts to Improve Controls on Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) (1998)
       (results of 1998 Survey of States and Regions compiled by Office of Water)

       NRDC, American's Animal Factories: How States Fail to Prevent Pollution from Livestock
       (1998)

       Pendergast, "Applicability of the NPDES Program to Discharges of Storm Water Associated
       with Construction Activity at, or Construction of, Livestock Feeding Facilities" (February 5,
       1998)

       Office of Inspector General, EPA, "Animal Waste Disposal Issues" (Apr. 21,1997)

       Larry C. Frarey and Staci J. Pratt, Environmental Regulation of Livestock Production
       Operations, 9 Nat. Resources & Env't. 8 (1995) ("The character of livestock production in many
       parts of the world, however, is changing rapidly and dramatically.  Economies of scale,
       specialization, and regional concentration in all major livestock production sectors  have fueled a
       trend toward fewer, larger operations that confine thousands of animals on limited acreage.")

       Agena, Ubbo, Animal Waste Control Programs of Iowa and Eight Other States, Iowa
       Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division (1994)

       EPA Office of Water, The Report of the EPA/State Feedlot Workgroup (1993)

       EPA General Counsel Opinion No. 21 (June 27,1975) (discussion of whether irrigation return
       flows are waters of U.S. or point sources)

       gee also DAIRIES; POINT SOURCES; NONPOINT SOURCES
CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION ("CBI")

       40 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart B (Confidentiality of Business Information)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.7 (Confidentiality of information submitted in an NPDES permit application)

       RSR Corp. v. Browner. 924 F. Supp. 504,42 ERC 2146 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (EPA did not act
       arbitrary or capricious in finding average monthly production data submitted by co. under CWA
       was subject to disclosure in response to FOIA request, because, even though company claimed
       data constituted CBI, agency reasonably determined that data was effluent data subject to
       disclosure)
                                             27

-------
CONSTRUCTION GRANTS

       See GRANTS


CONTRACTOR SUSPENSION/DEBARMENT

       33 U.S.C. § 1368 ("No federal agency may enter into any contract with any person, who has been
       convicted of any offense under section 1319(c) of this title, for the procurement of goods,
       materials, and services if such contract is to be performed at any facility at which the violation
       which gave rise to such conviction occurred, and if such facility is owned, leased, or supervised
       by such person.")

       40 C.F.R. Part 32 (Government wide Debarment and Suspension (Nonprocurement)... Clean
       Water Act Ineligibility of Facilities in Performance of Federal Contracts, Grants and Loans)


COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (§ 304(b)(l)(B))

       33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(l)(B) ("Factors relating to the assessment of best practicable control
       technology currently available to comply with subsection (b)(l) of section 1311 of this title shall
       include consideration of the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent
       reduction benefits to be achieved from such application ...")

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 822 F.2d 104, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (CWA
       requires EPA to undertake a cost-benefit calculus in establishing effluent limitations guidelines)

       118 Cong. Rec. 33,696 (1972), reprinted in 1972 Legislative History at 169-170

       See also EFFLUENT GUIDELINES


CREDENTIALS

       33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) ("the Administrator or his authorized representative (including an
       authorized contractor acting as a representative of the Administrator), upon presentation of his
       credentials -
              (i) shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any premises in which an effluent
              source is located or in which any records required to be maintained under clause (A) of
              this subsection are located, and
              (ii)  may at reasonable times have access to and copy any records, inspect any monitoring
              equipment or method required under clause (A), and sample any effluents which the
              owner or operator of such source is required to sample under such clause." (emphasis
              added))

       United States v. Shaffer Equipment Co..  11 F.3d 450, 37 ERC 2078 (4th Cir.  1993) (failure to
       timely disclose to court that EPA inspector may have lied about college degree considered
       "egregious" breach of duty of candor to the court; lower court dismissal of action reversed and

                                            28

-------
       remanded for trial on merits)

       United States v. Shaffer Equipment Co.. 796 F. Supp. 938 (S.D. W.Va. 1992) (superfund cost
       recovery action dismissed for failure of DOJ attorneys to timely disclose false college degrees of
       EPA inspector)

       See also INFORMATION REQUESTS
CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS (§ 309(c))

       A.      Generally

               United States v. M/G Transport. 173 F.3d 584,48 ERC 1603 (6th Cir. 1999) (barge
               company can be criminally liable for discharge without an NPDES permit without
               violating due process, even though the company never could have received a permit for
               its discharges)

               United States v. TGR Corp.. 171 F.3d 762, 29 ELR 21059 (2nd Cir. 1999) (conviction for
               unpermitted discharge of slurry from asbestos removal project affirmed; held that brook
               into which slurry was discharged is waters of U.S.; rejected defendant's argument that
               brook is a "municipal storm sewer" and therefore not waters of the U.S. because
               testimony at trial showed that the brook was not "owned or operated" by a public body as
               required under 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8))

               United States v. Cooper. 173 F.3d 1192, 48 ERC 1477 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding
               conviction for illegal disposal of sludge; sludge regulations do not supersede NPDES
               permits; non-permittees can be liable for violations of NPDES permit)

               United States v. Ellis. 48 ERC 1168 (4th Cir. 1999) (district court's failure to instruct
               jury about appropriate mens rea required for a CWA conviction for discharge of asbestos
               without a permit was harmless error - it was uncontested that the Baltimore Harbor
               constituted a water of the United States & defendant knew he was violating the Act)

               United States v. Iverson. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 31062 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming jury
               convictions of the president of a chemical company for unlawfully discharging
               wastewater into a municipal sewage system; a corporate officer can be held responsible
               for the violation if he "has authority to exercise control over the corporation's activity
               that is causing the discharges."; held that local water laws prohibit the discharges and do
               not require the  government to prove that the discharges affected water)

               United States v. Moore. 46 ERC 1350 (4th Cir. 1998) (individual was properly convicted
               of knowing violations of NPDES permit issued for residential subdivision because
               district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding financial records as evidence
               where individual's financial ability to maintain plant was irrelevant; court did not err in
               declining to instruct jury of lesser offense  of negligently discharging pollutants where no
               evidence showed individual simply may have been negligent)
                                              29

-------
 United States v. Hartsell. 127 F.3d 343,45 ERC 1356 (4* Cir. 1997) (conviction for
 illegal discharges to sewer system in violation of pretreatment standards lupheld,
 holding that sewer systems fall within the jurisdiction of the CWA)

 United States v. TGR Corp.. 171 F.3d 762, 29 ELR 21059 (D. Conn. 1998) (criminal
 liability found for unpermitted discharge to navigable waters found where contractor
 dumped asbestos wastes down a storm drain in the basement of a school building, and
 the storm drain emptied into a tributary of a navigable waterway; held that the tributary
 constituted navigable waters even if it was man-made, and constructed for the purpose of
 carrying water from the storm water system to the natural creek)

 United States v. Wilson. 133 F.3d 251, 262 (4th Cir. 1997) (held that "the Clean Water
 Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A)  requires the government to prove the defendant's
 knowledge of facts meeting each essential element of the substantive offense, but need
 not prove that he knew his conduct to be illegal.")

 United States v. Sinskev. 1997 U.S. Appeals LEXIS 17353 (8th Cir. 1997) (convictions
 of two Morrell Ham workers for falsifying DMRs and knowingly discharging in excess
 of permit limits upheld; argument that defendants did not knowingly violate the CWA
 reject; court held that it is enough for defendants knew they engaged in the underlying
 conduct)

 United States v. Hopkins. 35 F.3d 1275, 38 ERC 1365 (2d Cir. 1995) (conviction
 affirmed under 309(c)(2)(A) and (c)(4) for knowingly falsifying monitoring reports and
 knowingly violating a wastewater discharge permit)

 United States v. Michael Weitzenhoff and Thomas Mariani. 35 F.3d, 38 ERC 1365 (9th
 Cir. 1994) (POTW plant managers convicted conspiracy to violate CWA for discharging
 sludge out the plant's outfall at night;  court held that conviction did not require proof that
 the defendants knew that their conduct violated the permit; CWA is a public welfare
 statute)

 United States v.  Curtis. 988 F.2d 946, 36 ERC 2062 (9th Cir. 1993) (federal employees
 are not immune from being prosecuted criminally for violations of the CWA, even if the
 alleged violations have occurred in the course of the defendant's federal employment)

 United States v. Schallom. 998 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1993). cert, denied. 510 U.S. 902,114
 S. Ct. 277,126 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1993) (contractor held criminally liable  for dumping waste
 concrete into creek below bridge construction project)

 United States v. Strandquist. 993 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1993) (manager of campground
 found guilty for discharging raw sewage into a storm grate; court upheld government's
use of dye test to prove sewage reached waters of U.S.)

United States v. Law. 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992) (owners of coal preparation plant
found criminally liable for discharge of leachate from slag pile without a permit; water
treatment system is not waters of U.S., but is a point source)
                                30

-------
               United States v. Rockview Farms. Inc.. No. CRF 98-5331 OWW (E.D. Ca. Apr. 26,
               1999) (dairy farm ordered to pay criminal fine of $250,000 for discharging 1.7 million
               gallons of wastewater from waste pond  into the desert for 2 days, from where it ran
               overland for 8 miles to the Amargosa River)

               United States v. Haeberg. No. CR 98-79-BLG-JDS (D. Mont. Feb. 12,1999) (dismissing
               indictment against person charged with dumping domestic septage onto a county road -
               septage is not "sludge" under section 405(e) of the CWA)

               United States v. Darling International. No. CR 4-96-162 (B.C. Minn. April 7,1998)
               (company assessed fine of $4 million and employee sentenced to six months in prison for
               falsifying effluent samples at rendering plant)

               United States v. Pasquariello. 40 ERC 1009 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (developer held criminally
               liable for unpermitted fill of two small lakes with construction debris; "[T]he scienter
               element of the violation ... is satisfied if the Government proves beyond a reasonable
               doubt that the Defendant acted voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake
               or accident.  In other words, the Government need not prove that the Defendant knew
               that h is conduct was illegal.")

               United States v. Frezzo Bros.. Inc.. 461 F. Supp. 268,12 ERC 1481, affd. 602 F.2d
               1123,1125-1126,13 ERC 1403 (3d Cir.  1979) (there are no civil or notice prerequisites
               to maintenance of criminal proceedings under the CWA)

               29 Envir. Rptr. 2375, 2376 (April 2,  1999) ($36,171,595 in criminal penalties assessed
               by EPA under the CWA in 1998)

               See also WETLANDS: Criminal Violations

        B.     Parallel Proceedings

               Barrv Farm Resident Council v. U.S. Department of the Naw. 45 ERC 1599 (D.D.C.
               1997) (District court denies motion to stay civil proceedings pending the conclusion of
               criminal investigations regarding contamination of the Anacostia River by the U.S.
               Navy; following factors should be used to decide if a stay should be allowed:  1) a
               balancing of the interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously and the prejudice
               to them from delay; 2) the pubic interest in the pending civil and criminal suit; 3) the
               interests and burdens on the defendant; 4) the interests of people not party to the suit;
               and 5) judicial efficiency)
DAIRIES

       40 C.F.R. Part 405 (Dairy Products Processing Point Source Category)

       United States v. Municipal Authority of Union Township & Dean Dairy Products. Inc.. 929 F.
       Supp. 800 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (penalty of $4,031,000 based on ill-gotten profits during period of
       non-compliance; defendant violated BOD and TSS limits 54 of 68 months)

                                              31

-------
       United States v. Municipal Authority of Union Township & Dean Dairy Products. Inc.. No. 1-94-
       621 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14,1995) (summary judgment granted to U.S. on interference case, rejecting
       lU's arguments that there were QA/QC problems with the lab causing potentially incorrect results
       to be reported on their DMRs; also rejected argument that conventional pollutants cannot
       interfere with a POTW and that problems at the POTW were caused by operation of the POTW
       not by the IU)

       United States v. Tillamook Co. Creamery Association, consent decree (D. Or. 1992) ($260,000
       plus $160,000 SEPs & promises to construct new WWTP at cheese plant; DMR violations  -
       mostly BOD and TSS; penalty reduced based on inability to pay)

       United States v. Western Dairymen Cooperative. Inc.. 1983 EPA Consent LEXIS 22, No. C-83-
       1227A (D. Utah 1983) ($12,000 penalty paid for whey discharges in violation of NPDES permit)

       United States v. Consolidated Dairies of Lake Co.. Inc.. No. CV-76-119BU (D. Mont. 1976)
       ($1,000 paid for whey discharges to creek)

       See also CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS
DAMS
       33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(l)(B) ("Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the discharge
       of dredged or fill material... for the purposes of maintenance, including emergency
       reconstruction of recently damaged parts, of currently serviceable structures such as dikes, dams,
       levees,... is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation under this section or section
       131 l(a) or 1342 of this title...)

       Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill. 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978) (decision halting construction and
       operation of a dam which would jeopardize the existence of endangered species of fish;
       "Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest priorities.")

       Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bav Municipal Utility Dist.. 13 F.3d 305, 38 ERC
       1001 (9th Cir. 1993), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 873 (1994) (mine drainage into impoundment
       behind hydropower dam held to be covered by CWA)

       National Wildlife Federation v. FERC. 912 F.2d 1471,1483, 20 ELR 21098 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (a
       401 certification is needed only from the state in which the discharge originates, not affected
       downstream states)

       Keating  v. FERC. 927 F.2d 616, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (§ 401(a)(3) "creates a presumption that a
       state certification issued for purposes of a federal construction permit will be valid for purposes
       of a second federal license related to the operation of the same facility.")

       Fredericksburg v. FERC.  876 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1989) (license issued by FERC to hydroelectric
       co. to build powerhouse at dam was invalid, since co. never submitted required application to
       state water control board, and thus did not "request" certification within meaning of
       Commission's  regulations)

                                             32

-------
National Wildlife Fed, v. Consumers Power Co.. 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1988) (in case
involving discharge of dead fish entrained in dam turbine water, court held that "discharge" as
used in the definition of "point source" required a facility must "add" pollutants to navigable
waters)
        Cf Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck.  151 R3d 945,46 ERC 1993 (9th Cir.
        1998) (held that 401 certification does not apply to nonpoint source pollutants, such as
        manure from grazing on public lands; distinguished dam cases (Consumers Power et al.)
        on grounds that dams are point sources but they don't discharge pollutants)

National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch. 693 F.2d 156,18 ERC  1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (pipes
and spillways of dams are "point sources" under the CWA, and therefore subject to the Act
discharge permit requirements. Id. at 165 n.22; "addition from a point source occurs only if the
point source itself physically introduces a pollutant into water from the outside world. Id. at 175)
        Cf. United States v. Sinclair. 767 F. Supp. 200, 203 (D. Mont. 1990) (defendant moved
        cobbles around in stream; held that redeposition of indigenous materials in a streambed
        constitutes discharge of pollutants)

Missouri ex rel. Ashcraft v. Department of the Armv. 672 F.2d 1297,1304,17 ERC 101 (8* Cir.
1982) (district court did not err in holding that operation of dam did not result in discharge of
pollutant as discharge requires "addition" of pollutant  from "point source" and neither term
applied to soil erosion or oxygen content of water)

Appalachian  Power Co. v. Train. 545 F.2d 1351, 1377 (4th Cir. 1976) (regulations struck down
that required power plant operators to remove naturally-occurring pollutants in addition to
pollutants added during power generation; "Those constituents occurring naturally in the
waterways, or occurring as a result of other industrial discharges, do not constitute an addition of
pollutants by a plant through which they pass.")

American Rivers. Inc. v. FERC. 129 F.3d 99,45 ERC  1563 (2nd Cir. Nov. 5, 1997) (court
rejected the position of FERC that it  has authority to decide whether conditions of a state
certification under § 401 of the CWA are unlawful and, therefore, not include such conditions as
part of a hydropower license. The court held, instead, that FERC "is bound by the language of
§ 401 to incorporate all state-imposed certification conditions into hydropower licenses and that
the legality of such conditions can only be challenged  by the licensee in a court of appropriate
jurisdiction." slip  op. at 6)

Froebel v. Mever. 13 F. Supp. 2d 843,47 ERC 1359 (E.D.  Wis. 1998) (citizen suit alleging
sediment discharges from former impoundment area after dam was removed dismissed;
"Whether or not a dam qualifies as a point source appears to turn on the existence of the other
disputed element in this case - an addition of pollutants to the water	[T]he continuing
sediment transfer through Frank's Dam cannot be considered an 'addition' of a pollutant from a
point source, requiring a § 402 permit.")

EPA, "The Control of Pollution from Hydrographic Modifications" (1973), EPA Doc. No. 403/9-
73-017

EPA, "Impact of Hydrologic Modifications on Water Quality" (1975), EPA Doc. No. 600/2-75-
007

                                        33

-------
       Michael T. Pyle, Beyond Fish Ladders: Dam Removal as a Strategy for Restoring American's
       Rivers, 14 Stan. Envt'l LJ. 97, 107-17 (1995)

       See also "DISCHARGES OF POLLUTANTS;" "POINT SOURCE"
DELEGATED STATES

       33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) ("It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the
       primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution ...")

       33 U.S.C. § 1318(c) (Records and reports; inspections - Application of State law)

       33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (State enforcement; compliance orders)

       33 U.S.C. § 1370 (States are free to adopt and enforce limitations on the discharge of pollutants
       more stringent than those established by the CWA)

       33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (State permit programs)

       33 U.S.C. § 1344(h) (Determination of State's authority to issue permits under State program;
       approval; notification; transfers to State program)

       American Forest and Paper Ass'n v. EPA. 137 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1998) (held that EPA cannot
       condition delegation of CWA program to State of Louisiana on adherence to ESA consultation
       procedures)

       American Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 21396 (10th Cir. 1998) (petition
       for review of EPA approval of Oklahoma NPDES program dismissed for lack of standing)

       Southern Ohio Coal v. Office of Surface Mining. 20 F.3d 1418, 1428 (6th Cir. 1994) (EPA
       retains independent enforcement authority in primacy states)

       National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co.. 862 F.2d 580, 582 (6th Cir. 1988) (the CWA
       authorizes EPA to delegate authority to a state to implement its own NPDES program under the
       Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), although EPA retains oversight and enforcement authority. 33 U.S.C.
       § 1342(i))

       Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A.. Inc.. 834 F.2d 1517,1519, 27 ERC 1001 (9th Cir. 1987) (under
       §§ 1319(a)(l) and (a)(3), the EPA is empowered to commence enforcement actions if the
       delegated state has failed to fulfill its obligations under the delegation)

       United States v. Puerto Rico. 721 F.2d 832, 838 (1st Cir. 1983) ("states are the prime bulwark in
       the effort to abate water pollution")

      Aminoil U.S.A.. Inc. v. Cal. State Water Resource Contr. Bd.. 674 F.2d 1227,1229-1230,17
      ERC 1702 (9* Cir. 1982) (under §§ 1319(a)(l) and (a)(3), the EPA is empowered to commence
      enforcement actions if the delegated state has failed to fulfill its obligations under the delegation)

                                            34

-------
       United States v. UT Ravonier. 627 F.2d 996, 1000-1001 (9th Or. 1980) (§ 1342(i) preserves
       federal enforcement authority despite state permit-issuing power)

       Shell Oil Co. v. Train. 585 F.2d 408, 12 ERC 1547, 1548 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Under § 1342(b), a
       state may submit to the EPA a proposed permit program governing discharges into navigable
       waters within its borders. If the state can demonstrate that it will apply the effluent limitations
       and the amendments' other requirements in the permits it grants and that it will monitor and
       enforce the terms of those permits, then, unless the Administrator of the EPA determines that a
       state program does not meet the requirements, he must approve the proposal.")

       Southern Ohio Coal v. Office of Surface Mining. 831 F. Supp. 1324,1335 (S.D. Ohio 1993),
       rev'd. 20 F.3d 1418,1426 (6th Cir. 1994) (EPA has authority to act in delegated states only
       where state has failed to act)

       United States v. Sharon Steel Corp.. 30 ERC 1778,1779 (N.D. Ohio  1989) (EPA must take
       independent enforcement action in the event that the state fails to fulfill its enforcement
       responsibility)

       District of Columbia v. Schramm. 203 U.S. App. D.C. 272, 631 F.2d 854, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
       (legislative history of CWA reflects congressional desire to "put maximum responsibility for the
       permit process in the States.")

       Froebel v. Mever. 13 F. Supp. 2d 843,47 ERC 1359 (E.D. Wis. 1998) ("Inarguably, Congress
       intended states to play the leading role in administering and enforcing the NPDES permit
       programs.")

       United States v. Colorado Springs. 455 F. Supp. 1364,1366 (D.C. Colo. 1978) (EPA
       Administrator may unilaterally enforce a NPDES permit under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)
       notwithstanding that  the enforcement action takes place in a state to which NPDES permit
       authority has been delegated)

       Chesapeake Bav Foundation v. Va. State Water Control Bd.. 453 F. Supp. 122, 11 ERC 1897
       (E.D. Va 1978) (no NEPA review required for NPDES permit issued in delegated state; held that
       failure of EPA to object to permit does not constitute a federal action necessary to invoke NEPA)

       Senate Report No. 92-414, 92nd congress, 2nd Session (1972), U.S. Code cong. & Amin. News
       1972, p. 3668 (where the approved state agency has already taken action, Congress intended for
       EPA to act only "in cases where states and other appropriate enforcement agencies are not acting
       expeditiously and vigorously to enforce control requirements.")
DISCHARGE MONITORING REPORTS (DMRs)

       A.     Defendant's Challenges to Accuracy of DMRs

               United States v. Ward. 448 U.S. 242, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742 (defendant's
               report of oil spill compiled in compliance with Clean Water Act could be used to
               establish liability for civil penalties under Act)

                                              35

-------
 Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co.. 813 F.2d 1480, 1492, 25 ERC 1801 (9th Cir. 1987),
 vacated on other grounds.  108 S. Ct. 1102-03 (19881. judgment reinstated. 853 F.2d 667,
 28 ERC 1333 (9th Cir. 1988) (permittee may not challenge the accuracy of the data it
 submitted in the DMR; self-monitoring reports constitute conclusive evidence of an
 exceedance of a permit limitation; self-monitoring is critical to effective operation of the
 Act)

 United States v. Union Township. Civil Action No. l:CV-94-0621 (M.D. Pa. 1995)
 (court rejected defendant's argument that a factual issue involving the accuracy of its
 reported data (which sampling was conducted under contract with the municipality) so as
 to defeat summary judgment; court deemed defendant's DMRs to be accurate and granted
 summary judgment for plaintiff)

 Public Interest Research v. Elf Atochem. 817 F. Supp. 1164,177-78, 36 ERC  1855
 (D.N.J. 1993) ("It is well-established that DMRs and laboratory reports may be relied on
 in Clean Water Act cases to establish liability on summary judgment... .[I]f a defendant
 wishes to contest the accuracy of its DMRs, it 'has a heavy burden to establish faulty
 analysis.'"; discusses legislative history at 1178)

 United States v. Aluminum Co.  of America. 824 F. Supp. 640, 648-49 (E.D. Tenn. 1993)
 (a reported exceedance of an effluent limitation is a violation of the CWA no matter
 what the potential for statistical error in the sampling and analysis methodology)

 Public Interest Research Group v. Rice. 774 F. Supp. 317, 325 (D.N.J. 1991) (DMRs,
 laboratory reports, and supplemental operating logs showing violations of NPDES permit
 used to establish liability under CWA)

 Connecticut Fund for the Environment v. Upjohn Co.. 660 F. Supp. 1397, 26 ERC 1495,
 1510 (D. Conn.  1987) ( "Congress did not intend the courts to be the forums for
 determining the adequacy  or inadequacy of scientific measurements ... Defendant was
 required to monitor its discharges ... and attest to the accuracy of its reports ... In
 fulfillment of those obligations it chose to rely on the GC/CD testing system.  It may not
 now refute its own report on the results of its testing. Accordingly, although a basis for
 defendant's challenge of the accuracy of its reports may exist as a matter of fact, that
 defense has no basis as a matter of law.")

 Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp.. 635 F. Supp. 284,
 289, 24 ERC 1506 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (claim of measurement error is insufficient to defeat
 summary judgment "for the simple reason that a defendant could always claim that [its]
 reports... were inaccurate")

 Student Public Interest Research Group v. P.D. Oil & Chemical Co.. 627 F. Supp. 1074,
 1089 (D.N.J. 1986) ("Defendants may not avoid summary judgment as to liability under
 the Act simply by challenging the accuracy of the data set forth in the DMRs.")

Student Public Interest Research Group v. Georgia-Pacific. 615 F. Supp.  1419, 1429
(D.N.J. 1985) ("[T]here can be no question that the data disclosed in [a] defendant's
DMRs may be accepted as true.")

                                36

-------
       Chesapeake Bav Foundation v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.. 608 F. Supp. 440,452-53 (D.
       Md. 1985) ("Given the heavy emphasis on accuracy in the Act and the clear
       Congressional policy that DMRs should be used for enforcement purposes, the Court
       will not accept claims of inaccurate monitoring as a defense to this action...")

       United States v. City of Moore. 24 ERC 1542 (W.D. Okl. 1985) (defendant's claims of
       testing inaccuracies in its own DMRs enough to defeat summary judgment motion by
       plaintiff)

       Student Public Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche. Dodge & Olcott. Inc.. 579 F. Supp.
       1528, 1538-39 (D.N.J. 1984), affd. 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Defendant's last
       minute claims that it may have been erroneously overzealous in documenting its own
       transgressions will not deter our entering  an order of summary judgment in favor of
       plaintiffs on the issue of liability.")

       Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enterprises.  618 F. Supp. 532, 536 (W.D.N.Y. 1984)
       (defendant's "multitude of justifications for the alleged violations, along with convincing
       argument why many ... should not actually constitute violations (e.g. typographical
       mistakes in the DMRs)" sufficient to defeat summary judgment)

       In re City of Salisbury. Maryland. Docket No. CWA-ffl-219 (ALJ Biro July 30,1999)
       (motion for accelerated decision on liability for violations reported in sludge reports
       denied on grounds of disputed issues of material facts regarding accuracy of sludge
       report submitted to EPA)

       In re Battelle Memorial Inst.. Inc.. Docket No. CWA-IV 94-509  (ALJ Vanderheyden July
       1,1995) (respondent's attempt to impeach it's own DMR data to show that no discharge
       of pollutants occurred rejected)

       See also MONITORING/REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

B.     DMRs Are Admissions of Liability

       United States v. Ward. 448 U.S. 242, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742, 14 ERC 1673
       (1980) (notification to EPA that discharge of oil had occurred could be used against
       defendant without implicating the 5th Amendment because penalty assessed was civil not
       criminal penalty)

       Garner v. United States. 424 U.S. 648,  665, 96  S. Ct. 1178,47 L. Ed. 2d 370, (1976) (tax
       case:  records required to be kept by law may be deemed admissions for purposes of
       establishing liability)

       Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries. 847 F.2d 1109,1112 n.8, 27 ERC 1881 (4th Cir. 1988),
       cert, denied. 491 U.S. 904, 109 S. Ct. 3185 (1989) ("Required reports such as DMRs
       may be used as admissions in court to establish a defendant's liability.")

       Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co. of California. 813 F.2d 1480, 1492,25 ERC 1801 (9th Cir.
       1987), vacated on other grounds. 108 S. Ct. 1102-03 (1988), judgment reinstated. 853

                                       37

-------
 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1988) ("We conclude that when a permitee has exceeded permit
 limitations, the permitee may not impeach its own reports by showing sampling error.")

 Public Interest Research Group v. N.J. Dept. Env. Prot. and Energy. 37 ERC 1317
 (D.N.J. 1993) ("Whether or not the DMRs/laboratory reports relied upon by plaintiffs
 were required by defendant's permit, we find that they do establish liability unless
 defendant can present direct evidence of inaccuracies.")

 Public Interest Research Group v. GAP Corp.. 770 F. Supp. 943, 952 (D.N.J. 1991) ("It
 is well established that records required to be kept by law, such as DMRs, may be
 deemed admissions for purposes of establishing civil liability.")

 Public Interest Research Group v. Yates Industries. Inc.. 757 F. Supp. 438,447 (D.N.J.
 1991) (DMRs may be deemed admissions when establishing liability for discharge
 violations; "Mere verbal representations by officials that certain portions of a permit will
 not be enforced, without formal modifications in the permit, will not excuse the holder
 from the terms of the permit."  Id. at 445)

 United States v. CPS Chemical Co.. 779 F. Supp. 437 (E.D.Ark. 1991) ("For
 enforcement purposes, a permittee's DMRs constitute admissions regarding the levels of
 effluents that the permittee has discharged.")

 United States v. Citv of Hoboken. 675 F. Supp. 189,192 (D.N.J. 1987) (for enforcement
 purposes, a permittee's DMRs constitute admissions regarding the levels of effluents that
 the permittee has discharged)

 Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Texaco Refining. 719 F. Supp. 281, 289 (D.
 Del. 1989), vacated in part on unrelated grounds. 906 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1990)
 (undisputed DMRs constitute sufficient evidence of a permit holder's liability under the
 Act to warrant granting a motion for summary judgment on that issue)

 Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey. Inc. v. P.P. Oil & Chemical
 Storage. Inc.. 627 F. Supp. 1074,1090, 23 ERC 1894 (D.N.J. 1986) ("Here, defendant
 admitted in official reports that its discharges have exceeded the effluent limitations in
 its permit.  The courts have long approved the use of report or records which the law
 requires to be kept as admissions in establishing civil liability.")

 Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey. Inc. v. Monsanto Co.. 600 F.
 Supp. 1479,1485, 22 ERC 1137 (D.N.J. 1985) ("Reports or records which are required
 to be kept by law (such as DMRs and NCRs) may be used as admissions to establish a
 defendant's civil liability.")

 Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey. Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific
Corporation. 615 F. Supp.  1419, 1429-30, 23 ERC 1338 (D.N.J. 1985) ("It is long
established that records required to be kept by law, such as DMRs, may be deemed to be
admissions for purposes of establishing civil liability.")

United States v. Town of Lowell. Indiana. 637 F. Supp. 254, 257, 24 ERC 1184 (N.D.

                                38

-------
              Ind. 1985) ('The DMRs submitted by [defendant] show the effluent which passed
              through the treatment plant consistently violated the acceptable permit parameters.")

              Chesapeake Bav Foundation v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.. 608 F. Supp. 440,451-53, 22
              ERG 1894,1904 (D. Md. 1985) ("Generally, reports or records which are required to be
              kept by law, such as DMRs, may be used to establish a defendant's liability.")

              Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey. Inc. v. Tenneco Polymers. Inc..
              602 F. Supp. 1394,1400,22 ERG 1327,1332 (D.N.J. 1985) (DMRs may be used to
              establish liability)

              Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enterprises. Inc.. 618 F. Supp. 532, 536, 22 ERG 1143
              (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (summary judgment inappropriate when defendant disputes DMRs)

              United States v. Alcoa. 824 F. Supp. 640, 648-49 (E.D. Tenn. 1993) (held that DMRs are
              admissions of liability after thorough review of case law)

              S. Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess. 64, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
              News 3668, 3730 ("The bill... establishes and makes precise new requirements
              imposed on persons and subject to enforcement.  One purpose of these new requirements
              is to avoid the necessity of lengthy fact finding, investigations, and negotiations at the
              time of enforcement. Enforcement of violations of requirements under this Act should
              be based on relatively narrow fact situations requiring a minimum of discretionary
              decision making or delay.")
"DISCHARGE OF POLLUTANTS" (§ 502(12))

       33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) ("The term "discharge of a pollutant1 and the term 'discharge of pollutants'
       each means (A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, (B) any
       addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source
       other than a vessel or other floating craft.")

       40 C.F.R. § 401.1 l(h) ("The term "discharge of pollutant(s)' means: (1) The addition of any
       pollutant to navigable waters from any point source and (2) any addition of any pollutant to the
       waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other
       floating craft.  The term "discharge1 includes either the discharge of a single pollutant or the
       discharge of multiple pollutants.")

       Dubois v. USDA. 102 F.3d 1273,43 ERC 1824 (1st Cir. 1996) (water taken from creek for use in
       snow-making equipment with excess discharged to pond on other side of ridge held to be
       discharge of pollutants; court rejected EPA's position that moving the creek water to the pond
       without adding pollutants was not a discharge of pollutants to waters of U.S.)

       United States v. Law. 979 F.2d 977, 978-79, 23 ELR 20466 (4th Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 507
       U.S. 1030,  113 S. Ct. 1844 (1993) (defense that Act does not impose liability "upon persons over
       whose property preexisting pollutants are passed along to flow finally into navigable waters"
       specifically rejected; distinguishing the dam cases, court held that "Unlike the river and later

                                              39

-------
 waters diverted in Consumers Power. Gorsuch. and Train, appellants' water treatment system
 collected runoff and leachate subject to an NPDES permit under the CWA, and therefore was not
 part of the v waters of the United States.1")

 National Wildlife Fed, v. Consumers Power Co.. 862 F.2d 580, 583, 28 ERC 1572 (6th Cir.
 1988) (in case involving discharge of dead fish entrained in dam turbine water, court held that
 "discharge" as used in the definition of "point source" required a facility must  "add" pollutants to
 navigable waters)

 United States v. Huebner. 752 F.2d 1235, 1243 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[t]he redeposit of materials
 excavated from a wetland is the addition of pollutants under the CWA.")

 United States v. M.C.C. of Florida. 772 F.2d 1501,23 ERC 1318 (llth Cir. 1985) (barge
 propellers churning up river bottom constitute discharge of pollutants)

 Avovelles Sportsman's League. Inc. v. Marsh. 715 F.2d 897, 19 ERC 1841, 1864 (5th Cir. 1983)
 (defendant held liable for filling wetlands with debris cleared from the wetlands; "The word
 'addition', as used in the definition of the term 'discharge,' may reasonably be understood to
 include  'redeposit.'")

 National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch. 693 F.2d 156,18 ERC 1105 (D.C.  Cir. 1982) (pipes
 and spillways of dams are "point sources" under the CWA, and therefore subject to the Act
 discharge permit requirements.  693 F.2d at 165 n.22;  "addition from a point source occurs only
 if the point source itself physically introduces a pollutant into water from the outside world."
 693 F.2d at 175)

 Appalachian Power Co. v. Train. 545 F.2d 1351, 1377 (4th Cir. 1976) (regulations struck down
 that required power plant operators to remove naturally-occurring pollutants in addition to
 pollutants added during power generation; "Those constituents occurring naturally in the
 waterways, or occurring as a result of other industrial discharges, do not constitute an addition of
 pollutants by a plant through which they pass.")

 Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps, of Engineers. ?? (E.D.  Cal. June 9, 1998) (held
 that redeposit of earth during plowing and discing operation in wetland can constitute the
 "addition of a pollutant" and that the purpose of the activity is irrelevant)

 San Francisco Bavkeeper v. Tidewater Sand & Gravel Co.. 46 ERC 1780, 1784 (N.D. Ca. 1997)
 (defendant held liable for violations of storm water permit; discharge of a pollutant not a
 predicate to a CWA violation so long as a permit has been violated)

 Citv of New York v. Anglebrook Ltd. Partnership. 891 F. Supp. 900, 903-04, 40 ERC  1813
 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (permit violation constitutes violation of the CWA even in the absence of a
 discharge of pollutants)

 United States v. Sinclair. 767 F. Supp. 200, 203 (D. Mont. 1990) (defendant moved cobbles
around in stream; held that redeposition of indigenous materials in a streambed constitutes
discharge of pollutants)
                                       40

-------
Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries. Inc.. 617 F. Supp. 1120,23 ERC 1018 (D. Md. 1985), affd.
847 F.2d 1109, 27 ERC 1881 (4th Cir. 1988), cert, denied. 491 U.S. 904 (1989) (permit violation
constitutes violation of the CWA even in the absence of a discharge of pollutants)

State of Missouri ex rel. Ashcroft v. Department of the Armv Corns of Engineers. 526 F. Supp.
660, 678 (W.D. Mo. 1980), affd. 672 F.2d 1297,1304,17 ERC 1001 (8th Cir. 1982) (erosion of
soil as a result of releases of water is not a discharge regulated by the CWA)

In re Slineer Drainage. Inc..8 E.A.D.	(EAB 1999) (rejecting NMA case as inapplicable, held
that fall-back from drain tile laying machine to be "addition of pollutants" subject to regulation
under CWA, and not "incidental fallback"; distinguished NMA on grounds that discharge in
NMA was merely incidental to removal  of materials from wetlands, whereas in Slinger. the
discharge was part of the operation to remove wetlands material, insert a drain pipe, then
redeposit all of the excavated material)

In re J & L Specialty Products Corp.. 5 E.A.D. 333 (EAB 1994) (held that respondent
"discharged" cyanide because it collected storm water containing cyanide and diverted it for use
in its industrial process before discharging to the receiving water via its  wastewater outfall;
surface runoff is subject to NPDES permitting requirements where it is collected and channeled
by man)

In re General Motors Corp.. No. CWA-A-O-011-93 (ALJ Hoya June 28,1996), affd. 7 E.A.D.
465 (EAB 1997), affd. 168 F.3d 1377,48 ERC 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (held that metals found in
respondents storm water that leached from surfaces of respondent's buildings by rainwater to
constitute addition of pollutants)

In re Battelle Memorial hist. Inc.. Docket No. CWA-IV 94-509 (ALJ Vanderheyden July 1,
1995) (respondent, who's NPDES permit had expired, held to discharge  without a permit where  it
ran sea water over paint samples to develop less-toxic anti-fouling agents and discharged
seawater to river; argument rejected that no discharge of pollutants occurred because respondent
did not add pollutants to flow-through seawater, held that pollutants picked up off paint chips
were added to waste stream)

1 A Legis. Hist, of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (January  1973)
at 255 (remarks of Cong. Dingell, Oct. 4,1972) ("It is quite clear that section 502(12) of the bill,
in defining the term 'discharge of pollutants,' does not in any way contemplate that the discharge
be directly from the point source to the waterway. The situation is analogous to the court's
holding in United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co. of Puerto Rico. 375 F.2d 621 (CA 3,1967)
[Refuse Act], where a discharge from a shore facility flowed 'indirectly,' that is by force of
gravity over land into a waterway.")

See also POINT SOURCE; POLLUTANT; DAMS; WETLANDS: Dredge and Fill
                                       41

-------
DISCHARGE WITHOUT A PERMIT (§ 301(a))

       A.      Generally

               33 U.S.C. § 131 l(a) ("Except as in compliance with this section and section 1312, 1316,
               1317,1328,1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person
               shall be unlawful.")

               33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b) ("The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil action for
               appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, for any violation for
               which he is authorized to issue a compliance order under subsection (a) of this section..
               ")

               33 U.S.C. § 131 l.(g) ("Whenever on the basis of any information available -
                      (A) the Administrator finds that any person has violated section 1311,1312,
               1316,1317,1318,1328, or 1345 of this title, or has violated any permit condition or
               limitation implementing any of such section in a permit issued under section 1342 of this
               title by the Administrator or by a State, or in a permit issued under section 1344 of this
               title by a State, or
                      (B) the Secretary of the Army .... finds that any person has violated any permit
               condition or limitation in a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by the
               Secretary,
               the Administrator or Secretary , as the case my be, my, after consultation with the state in
               which the violation occurs, assess a class I civil penalty or a class n civil penalty under
               this subsection.")

               40 C.F.R. § 122.21(b) ("it is the operator's duty to obtain a permit.")

               Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo. 456 U.S. 305, 319, 72 L. Ed. 2d 91,103 (1982)
               (discharge without a permit is illegal)

               Milwaukee v. Dlinois. 451  U.S. 304, 310-11, 68 L. Ed. 2d 114,122,15 ERC 1912
               (1981) (it is illegal for anyone to discharge pollutants into the Nation's waters except
               pursuant to a permit)

               EPA v. California State Water Resources Control Bd.. 426  U.S. 200, 205, 96 S. Ct. 2022,
               2025,48 L. Ed. 2d 578 (1976) ("it is unlawful for any person to discharge a pollutant
               without obtaining a permit and complying with its terms.")

               United States v. M/G Transport. 173 F.3d 584, 48 ERC 1603 (6th Cir. 1999) (barge
              company can be criminally liable for discharge without an NPDES permit without
              violating due process, even though the company never could have received a permit for
              its discharges)

              Amigos Bravos v. Molvcorp Inc.. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28576 (10* Cir. 1998) (suit
              against mine for discharging without a permit dismissed on grounds that claim should
              have been brought as a challenge to the permit; mine had disclosed to EPA that it had
              seeps draining from its waste rock pile, and EPA chose not to regulate the discharges in

                                             42

-------
the reissued permit)

Missouri v. Citv of Glasgow. 152 F.3d 802,47 ERC 1241 (8th Cir. 1998) (city liable for
discharge of sludge from its drinking water treatment facility without a permit; city was
denied permit when it refused to pay a state-required permit fee which the city claimed
violated the Missouri Constitution)

United States v. Schallom. 998 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1993), cert, denied. 510 U.S. 902, 114
S. Ct. 277,126 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1993) (contractor held criminally liable for dumping waste
concrete into creek below bridge construction project)

American Petroleum Institute v. EPA. 787 F.2d 965, 969 24 ERC 1233 (5th Cir. 1986)
(the CWA makes it unlawful to discharge any pollutant from any point source without an
NPDES permit)

Natural Resource Defense Counsel v. Costle. 568 F.2d 1369,1374-1376 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
("Any discharge of a pollutant without a permit.. .is unlawful.  Any discharge of a
pollutant not in compliance with the conditions or limitations of such a permit is also
unlawful... .There are innumerable references in the legislative history [of the CWA] to
the effect that the Act is founded on the 'basic premise that a discharge of pollutants
without a permit is unlawful and that discharges not in compliance with the limitations
and conditions for a permit are unlawful.' Even when infeasibility arguments were
squarely raised, the legislature declined to abandon the permit requirement." (quoting
118 Cong. Rec. 10215 (1972))

United States v. TGR Corp.. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9354 (D. Conn. 1998), affd. 171
F.3d 762, 29 ELR 21059 (unpermitted discharge to navigable waters found where
contractor dumped pollutants down a storm drain in the basement of a school building,
and the storm drain emptied into a tributary of a navigable waterway; held that the
tributary constituted navigable waters even if it was man-made,  and constructed for the
purpose of carrying water from the storm water system to the natural creek)

Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Baver Corp.. 964 F. Supp. 1300,1318,44 ERC 2031 (S.D.
Iowa 1997) ("The CWA prohibits the unpermitted discharge by  any person of any
pollutant into navigable waters in the absence of an NPDES permit.")

Long Island Soundkeeper Fund v. New York Athletic Club. 42 ERC 1421, (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (CWA does not require any showing that a pollutants cause environmental damage
to enforce permitting requirement; CWA requirement for a permit is unconditional and
absolute)

Buchholz v. Davton International Airport. 41 ERC 2000 (D. Ohio 1995) (injunction
issued against airport to prevent unpermitted discharges of de-icing fluids to surface
waters)

Orange Environment. Inc. v. County of Orange. 811 F.  Supp. 926, 934, 36 ERC 1974
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (held that EPA § 309(a) compliance order does not relieve operator of
need to acquire a § 404 permit in order to place fill  in a wetlands as part of a landfill

                                43

-------
       expansion project; '"[T]he CWA's requirement that all discharges covered by the statute
       must have a NPDES permit "is unconditional and absolute. Any discharge except
       pursuant to a permit is illegal.'"")

       Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation v. Hodel. 586 F. Supp. 1163,1169 (E.D.
       Tenn. 1984) (discharge from a point source not specifically listed as an outfall in the
       facility's NPDES permit is discharging without a permit)

       Kitlutsisti v. Arco Alaska. Inc.. 592 F. Supp. 832, 839 (D. Ak. 1984) (CWA's
       requirement that all discharges covered by the statute must have a NPDES permit is
       "unconditional and absolute;" "[W]hen an action is illegal absent an agency-issued
       permit, the agency has a mandatory duty to act promptly upon license applications.")

B.     Application for a Permit As a Defense

       Driscoll v. Adams. 181 F.3d 1285, 48 ERC 2093 (11th Cir.  1999) (defendant undertook
       extensive tree cutting and construction project that resulted in large sediment runoff into
       neighboring property owners' ponds; defendant applied for storm water GP, but none
       could be issued where GP had been challenged in court; held that Hughey 4-part
       exception to CWA prohibition against discharging without a permit not met in this case)

       Huehev v. IMS Dev. Corp.. 78 F.3d 1523,42 ERC 1449 (4th Cir. 1996) (defendant
       developer held not liable for storm water unpermitted discharges from construction site
       where storm water permit was not available from state; court reasoned it would be
       absurd to hold developer liable when it was impossible for it to obtain a permit because
       the state had not begun issuing storm water permits; four-part test established for
       exception to prohibition of discharging without a permit: 1) compliance with the
       zero-discharge standard was factually impossible because there would always be  some
       storm water runoff from an area of development; 2) there was no NPDES permit
       available to cover such discharge; 3) the  discharger was in  good-faith compliance with
       local pollution control requirements, which substantially mirrored the proposed NPDES
       discharge standards; and 4) the discharges were minimal. 78 F.3d at 1530)

       Weber v. Trinity Meadows Raceway. Inc.. 42 ERC 2063 (N.D.Tex. 1996) ("A pending
       permit application ... is insufficient to avoid the consequences of the Act.")

       Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines. 904 F. Supp. 1168 (D. Mont. 1995)  (held that
       the fact that defendants had applied to the state for a general storm water permit,  did not
       relieve defendants from liability under the Act)

       United States v. Sharon Steel Corp.. 30 ERC 1778, 1780-1781 (N.D. Ohio 1989)  (EPA
       can levy a penalty for discharge without a permit when the discharger has applied for,
       but not received its NPDES permit)

       United States v. Tom-Kat Development.  Inc.. 614 F. Supp. 613,614 (D.C. Ak.  1985) ("In
       concluding that Tom-Kat's act of applying for the requisite federal permit did not
       statutorily prevent EPA from instituting this action against Tom-Kat, the  court  does not
       mean to imply it countenances EPA's apparent failure to process Tom-Kat's application

                                      44

-------
               in an expeditious manner. Had Tom-Kat petitioned the court for mandamus to require
               EPA to reach a determination on Tom-Kat's permit request, I may well have concluded
               such an action had merit.")

               S. Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
               News 3668, 3730 ("It should be noted that the Administrator is partially limited in acting
               under Section 301 (a). The Administrator is precluded from acting where the allegation
               is for failure to acquire a necessary permit under Section 402, if the owner or operator of
               a discharge has filed an application for such required permit... The distinction between
               enforcement for violation of an unlawful discharge and enforcement for operating
               without a required permit under Section 402 is intended  to cause the Administrator to act
               expeditiously to issue permits under Section 402 ...")
                      Note: this legislative history was rejected as not  controlling in United States v.
                      Sharon Steel Corp.. 30 ERC 1778 (N.D. Ohio 1989)

               See also NPDES PERMITS: Mandatory Duty to Issue Permit
EFFLUENT GUIDELINES (§ 304(b))

       A.     Generally
              33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (requires EPA to issue "regulations providing guidelines for effluent
              limitations.")

              33 U.S.C. § 1314(m)(l)(C) (requires the EPA to identify and categorize all point sources
              warranting effluent guidelines)

              40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c) (Methods of imposing technology-based treatment requirements in
              permits)

              EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association. 449 U.S. 64, 101 S. Ct. 295,66 L. Ed. 2d
              268, 15 ERC 1209 (1980) (discusses the bases of effluent guidelines to limit the
              discharge of pollutants)

              DuPont v. Train. 430 U.S. 112, 97 S. Ct. 965, 51 L. Ed. 2d 204, 9 ERC 1753 (1977)
              (upheld EPA's authority to promulgate effluent guidelines under §§301 and 304)

              Texas Oil & Gas Assoc. v. EPA. 161 F.3d 923 (5* Cir. 1998) (upholding EPA's BAT
              determination for produced sands from coastal oil & gas producers; the CWA was
              designed to achieve its goals of cleaning the nation's waters through a system of effluent
              limit guidelines and NPDES permits)

              American Paper Institute v. EPA. 996 F.2d 346, 350, 36 ERC 2025 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (the
              "rubber hits the road" only when effluent limit guidelines are incorporated into NPDES
              permits)

              Carr v. Alta Verde Industries. Inc.. 931 F.2d 1055, 33 ERC 1361, 1363 (5th Cir. 1991)

                                            45

-------
 ("Among other conditions, an NPDES permit must incorporate effluent limitations for
 point sources based on guidelines 'promulgated by EPA on an industry-by-industry basis
 under 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 l(b), 1314.' ... The guidelines do not specify the use of a
 particular technology.  Rather, they establish effluent limitations that can be achieved
 only through the use of a certain quality of technology.")

 Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA. 859 F.2d 156, 200-201 (D.C. Cir.  1988)
 ("[N]othing in all this specifies that the EPA must apply these uniform guidelines
 uniformly to all point sources within industry categories, no matter what	[Although
 exalting the value of uniformity, the statute simply does not require uniformity in all
 circumstances.")

 Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 822 F.2d 104, 126  (D.C. Cir. 1987)
 (CWA requires EPA to undertake a cost-benefit calculus in establishing effluent
 limitations guidelines)

 American Petroleum Institute v. EPA. 787 F.2d 965, 24 ERC 1233,1235 (5th Cir. 1986)
 ("NPDES permits must incorporate applicable technology-based effluent limitations
 guidelines promulgated by EPA on an industry-by-industry basis under [sections 301(b)
 and 304]. Where EPA has not promulgated applicable technology-based effluent
 limitations guidelines, the permits must incorporate, on a case-by-case method, 'such
 conditions as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of
 the Act.'")

 American Petroleum Institute v. EPA. 661 F.2d 340, 344, 16 ERC 1690 (5th Cir. 1981)
 (NPDES permits "transform... generally applicable effluent limitations ... into
 obligations (including a timetable for compliance) of the individual discharger.")

 American Meat Institute v. EPA. 526 F.2d 442,450, 8 ERC 1369 (7* Cir. 1975)
 (challenge to effluent guidelines for meat packers and slaughterhouse rejected, holding
 that EPA has authority under § 301 to promulgate effluent limitations guidelines for
 existing point sources; the language in 304(b)(2)(A) "is difficult to reconcile with the
 view that individual effluent limitations are to  be set when each permit is issued.")

 Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. No. 89-2980 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1991)
 (consent decree requires EPA to promulgate effluent guidelines for iron and steel
 industry by December, 1998)

 Congressional Research Service, A Legislative History of Water Pollution Control
 Amendments of 1972 (1973) at 172 ("the factors described in section 304(b) [cost, age of
 equipment, type of manufacturing process, engineering aspects of pollution control
 techniques] be considered only within classes or categories of point sources and that
 such factors not be considered at the time of the application of an effluent limitation to
 an individual point source within such a category or class.")

 57 Fed. Reg. 19748 (1992) (Effluent Guidelines Plan)

EPA Memo from R. Perry to B. Barrett, "Basic Legal Requirements Concerning Effluent

                                46

-------
       Guidelines Under the Clean Water Act" (October 19,1981)

       EPA General Counsel Opinion 74 (January 10, 1979)

       See also "EFFLUENT LIMITATION"

B.     Best Available Technology ("BAT")

       33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(A) (by 1983 "effluent limitations for categories and classes of
       point sources" are to be achieved which will require "application of the best available
       technology economically achievable for such category or class.")

       33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) ("Factors relating to the assessment of best available
       technology shall take into account the age of equipment and facilities involved, the
       process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types of control
       techniques, process changes, the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, non-water
       quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such other factors as
       the Administrator deems appropriate ....")

       40 C.F.R. §  125.3(d)(3) (EPA shall take into account (or apply) certain factors in making
       a BAT determination, including "the age of equipment and facilities involved.")

       EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association. 449 U.S. 64, 69-71,  101 S. Ct. 295,66 L.
       Ed. 2d 268,  15 ERC 1209 (1980)("in assessing BAT total cost is [not] to be considered
       in comparison to effluent reduction benefits")

       Texas Oil & Gas Assoc. v. EPA. 161 F.3d 923 (5* Cir. 1998) (upholding EPA's BAT
       determination for produced sands from coastal oil & gas producers; "BAT is the CWA's
       most stringent standard ... EPA has significant leeway in determining how the BAT
       standard will be incorporated into final [effluent limit guidelines].")

       Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA. 870 F.2d 177, 226,29 ERC 1273 (5th Cir. 1989)
       ("Congress intended these limitations to be based on the performance of the single
       best-performing plant in an industrial field.")

       American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA. 858 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[A] direct
       cost/benefit correlation is not required [for BAT], so even minimal environmental impact
       can be regulated, so long as the prescribed alternative is 'technologically and
       economically achievable.'")

       Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle. 590 F.2d 1011,1045 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Congress left the
       EPA "discretion to decide how to account for the [BAT] factors, and how much weight
       to give each factor.")

       State Water Control Bd. v. Train. 559 F.2d 921, 925-27 (4th Cir. 1977) ("... EPA must
       act quickly in determining whether particular point sources must satisfy the technology-
       base standards of Section 301(b)(l)(A) and (B) or more stringent water quality-based
       effluent limits under Section 301(b)(l)(A).... [I]n the exercise of its prosecutorial

                                      47

-------
               discretion, EPA will decline to bring enforcement proceedings against [municipalities
               that are economically or physically unable to comply with the 1977 deadline.")

               American Iron & Steel List, v. EPA. 526 F.2d 1027,1048 (3d Cir. 1975). cert, denied.
               435 U.S. 914 (1978) (remanding agency rule to EPA where EPA failed to.consider a
               statutory age factor (under BAT) as it bore on the cost or feasibility of retrofitting certain
               older steel mills)

               American Meat Institute v. EPA. 526 F.2d 442, 8 ERC 1369,1384 (7* Cir. 1975) ("No
               formal cost-benefit analysis is required in determining the 'best available' technology,
               though the Administrator is to take cost into consideration.")

               See also COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (§ 304(B)(1)(B))

        C.     Best Practicable Control Technology Currently Available ("BPT")

               33U.S.C. §1311(b)(l)(BPT)

               Texas Oil & Gas Assoc. v. EPA. 161 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998) ("BPT is the CWA's least
               stringent standard.")

        D.     New Sources

               33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(l)(B) (EPA is to promulgate "regulations establishing Federal
               standards of performance for new sources.")

               DuPont v. Train. 430 U.S. 112,97 S. Ct. 965, 51 L. Ed. 2d 204, 9 ERC 1753, 1764
               (1977) (reversing court of appeals ruling requiring EPA to provide variance procedure to
               new source performance standards, held:  "It is clear that Congress intended these
               regulations to be absolute prohibitions... In striking contrast to § 301(c), there is no
               statutory provision for variances, and a variance provision would be inappropriate in a
               standard that was intended to insure national uniformity and 'maximum feasible control
               of new sources.'")

               See also NEW SOURCES
"EFFLUENT LIMITATION" (§ 502(11))

       33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) ("effluent limitation" is "any restriction ... on quantities, rates, and
       concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged
       from point sources ...")

       Texas Oil & Gas Assoc. v. EPA. 161 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998) (effluent limitations described in
       502(11) are "are technology-based rather than harm-based; that is, they reflect the capabilities of
       available  pollution control technologies to prevent or limit different discharges rather than the
       impact that those discharges have on the waters.")
                                             48

-------
        See also EFFLUENT GUIDELINES
EMERGENCY POWERS (§ 504)

        33 U.S.C. § 1364 ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the Administrator upon
        receipt of evidence that a pollution source or combination of sources is presenting an imminent
        and substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to the welfare of persons where such
        endangerment is to the livelihood of such persons, such as inability to market shellfish, may
        bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate district court to immediately restrain
        any person causing or contributing to the alleged pollution to stop the discharge of pollutants
        causing or contributing to such pollution or to take such other action as may be necessary.")

        Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo. 456 U.S. 305, 317-318 (1982) ("The [CWAJ directs the
        Administrator of the EPA to seek an injunction to restrain immediately discharges of pollutants
        he finds to be presenting ^an imminent and substantial endangerment' to the health of persons or
        to the welfare of persons. 33 USC § 1364(a) (1976 ed, Supp IV). This rule of immediate
        cessation, however, is limited to the indicated class of violations. For other kinds of violations,
        the FWPCA authorizes the administrator of the EPA 'to commence a civil action for appropriate
        relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, for any violation for which he is
        authorized to issue a compliance order	'  33 USC §  1319(b). This provision makes clear that
        Congress did not anticipate that all discharges would be immediately enjoined.  Consistent with
        this view, he administrative practice has not been to request immediate cessation orders. "Rather,
        enforcement actions typically result, by consent or otherwise, in a remedial order setting out a
        detailed schedule or compliance designed to cure the identified violation of the Act.'"

        United  States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.. 749 F.2d 968, 21 ERC 1961,1970 (2nd Cir.
        1984) ("The district judge held that a suit brought under the emergency powers provisions is not
        one that a citizen could have commenced, and thus is not one in which he is given a  statutory
        right to intervene... Our analysis of the language, structure and legislative history of these acts
        leads us to agree with Chief Judge Curtin that neither the CWA nor the SDWA nor the RCRA
        affords NEA a statutory right to intervene in a government initiated action under the emergency
        provisions of those acts.")

        Pawtuxet Cove Marina. Inc. v. Ciba-Geigv Corp.. 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  16623 (D.R.1.1984)
        (no cause of action for citizens under § 504)

        See also INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

        16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2) (EPA must "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out.
       is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species.")

        16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b) (biological opinion from DOI required "detailing how the agency action
       affects the species or its critical habitat")
                                              49

-------
 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(3)(A) (if the proposed action is likely to jeopardize a listed species or
 adversely modify its habitat, the agency must evaluate what reasonable and prudent alternatives
 are available to avoid such a result)

 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(l)(B), (C) ("takes" of endangered species generally prohibited)

 40 C.F.R. § 6.605(b)(3) (an EIS is required for a new source NPDES permit if "[a]ny major part
 of the new source will have significant adverse effect on the habitat of threatened or endangered
 species")

 40 C.F.R. § 122.49(c) (requirement to adhere to requirements of ESA, where applicable, when
 issuing an NPDES permit)

 40 C.F.R. § 132.5(h) (submission by a Great Lake State must show compliance with ESA)

 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25 ("To the fullest extent possible, agencies shall prepare draft environmental
 impact statements concurrently with and integrated with environmental impact analyses and
 related studies required by the ... Endangered Species Act.")

 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h) (the biological opinion is to include: "(1) A summary of the information
 on which the opinion is base; (2) A detailed discussion of the efforts of the action on listed
 species or critical habitat; (3) The Service's opinion on whether the action is likely to jeopardize
 the continued existence of a listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
 critical habitat...; or, the action is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed
 species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.")

 50 C.F.R. § 404.02 (an action would "jeopardize" a species if it "reasonably would be expected
 to reduce the reproduction, numbers or distribution of a listed species to such an extent as to
 appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of that species in the wild.")

 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill. 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978) (decision halting construction and
 operation of a dam which would jeopardize the existence of endangered species of fish;
 "Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest priorities.")

 American Forest and Paper Association v. EPA. 137 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1998) (held that EPA
 cannot condition delegation of CWA program to State of Louisiana on adherence to ESA
 consultation procedures)

 American Forest & Paper Assoc. v. EPA. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 21396 (10th Cir. 1998)
 (challenge to EPA approval of Oklahoma NPDES program that was conditioned upon ESA
 consultation dismissed for lack of standing)

 American Iron & Steel tost, v. EPA. 115 F.3d 979, 44 ERC 1769 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (challenge to
EPA's Great Lakes Guidance on grounds that it cannot require states to protect endangered
species; held that Guidance has authority to protect endangered species under authority of CWA
 § 118(c)(2), so ESA need not be considered)

Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clarke. 57 F.3d 1517, 40 ERC 1961,1965 (9th Cir. 1995) (held

                                        50

-------
       that EPA-issued TMDL for dioxin on the Columbia River "satisfied any obligation the EPA had
       under the [ESA] and was sufficiently protective of wildlife.")

       Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission v. EPA. 684 F.2d 1041, 1056, 17 ERC
       2023, 2028-35 (1st Cir. 1982) (challenge to EPA issuance of NPDES permit upheld on grounds
       that EPA did not comply with ESA requirements; good discussion of applicability of ESA to
       NPDES permitting)

       American Canoe Assoc.. Inc. v. EPA. 30 F. Supp. 2d 908,927,47 ERC 2100 (E.D. Va. 1998)
       (cause of action against EPA for failure to comply with ESA when approving state water quality
       standards dismissed on grounds that APA does provide grounds for review of agency action
       where specific provision in ESA already provides adequate remedy through its citizen's suit
       provision)

       Natural Resources Defense Council v. Walker. No. 98-CV-0560 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 11,1998)
       (challenge to nationwide permits on grounds that the permitting program violates the ESA as
       well as other statutes)

       Idaho Rivers United v. NMFS. No. C94-1576R (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8,1995) (review of agency
       action under the ESA is governed by the arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA;
       government not entitled to presumption that compliance with an NPDES permit will
       automatically meet the requirements of the ESA; remanded to  agency for determination as to
       whether compliance with relevant permits will ensure that the  no-jeopardy standard of the ESA is
       met)

       Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt. 539 F. Supp. 841,17 ERC 1801 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff d in part.
       rev'd in part. 703 F.2d 576,19 ERC 1602 (9th Cir. 1983) (held that EPA could not release
       construction grant for pilot project at wastewater treatment plant without first complying with
       consultation requirements of ESA)

       In re Dos Republicas Resources Co.. Inc.. 6 E.A.D. 643, 665 (EAB 1996) (in upholding denial of
       evidentiary hearing on issuance of NPDES permit, held that "[i]f the project would have violated
       the ESA, the Region would have been required to deny the permit.")

       In re The Pittston  Co.. 1 E.A.D. 677 (Administrator 1981) (motion by NOAA to reopen
       evidentiary hearing re NPDES for oil refinery denied on grounds that new study re the effects of
       oil pollution on species of endangered whale would not be likely to change the outcome of the
       appeal)

       64 Fed. Reg. 2741 (1999) (draft MOA between EPA and Services re coordination of ESA and
       water quality efforts)
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

       See NEPA
                                             51

-------
FEDERAL FACILITIES (§ 313)

       33 U.S.C. § 1323 (federal facilities provisions)

       United States Department of Energy v. Ohio. 112 S. Ct. 1627, 118 L. Ed. 2d 255, 34 ERC 1489;
       1992 US LEXIS 2547 (1992) (a state is a citizen for the purposes of § 505 of the CWA; Congress
       did not intend to waive sovereign immunity for penalties in section 1323(a) of the CWA)

       EPA v. California. 426 U.S. 200, 222 n.37, 8 ERC 2098 (1976) ("Section 301 (a) simply makes it
       'unlawful' for 'any person' not to have the required permit. That federal agencies, departments,
       and instrumentalities are not 'persons' within the meaning of § 301(a) and the Amendments ...
       does not mean either that federal dischargers are not required to secure NPDES permits, or that
       their obligation  to secure an NPDES permit derives from a different provision of the
       Amendments. A federal discharger without a permit is no less out of compliance with § 402 than
       a nonfederal discharger; the federal discharge is however not 'unlawful.'")

       Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources v. U.S. Postal Service. 13 F.3d 62 (3d Cir.
       1993) (U.S. Postal Service is not immune from imposition of civil penalties by Pennsylvania
       environmental agency under State's Clean Streams Law)

       United States v. Curtis. 988 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1993) (federal employees are not immune from
       being prosecuted criminally for violations of the CWA, even if the alleged violations have
       occurred in the course of the defendant's federal employment)

       Sierra Club v. Luian. 972 F.2d 312, 35 ERC  1684, 23 ELR 20079 (August 7, 1992) (federal
       facilities section of the CWA does not allow imposition of punitive penalties)

       Marble Mountain Audubon Society v. Rice. 914 F.2d 179, 32 ERC 1249,1253, 21 ELR 20023
       (9th Cir. 1990) (the CWA requires the Forest Service to comply with all state water quality
       requirements)

       Oregon Natural  Resources Council v. U.S. Forest Service. 834 F.2d 842, 27  ERC 1068,18 ELR
       20450 (9* Cir. 1987) (held that citizen suit alleging that timber sale (a non-point-source
       discharge) would violate state water quality standards, while not enforceable under § 505 of the
       CWA, was actionable under the APA)

       Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson. 565 F. Supp. 586,19 ERC 2115,13
       ELR 20793 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff d in part, vacated in part. 764 F.2d 581,15 ELR 20682 (9th Cir.
       1985) (under § 313, federal agencies must comply with state water quality standards)

       Fisheries Association v. Callawav. 387 F. Supp. 292, 306 (D.R.I. 1974) ("Congressional intent
       that the permit issuance procedures apply to Corps projects is ... clear from Section 301(a) of
       the FWPCA.")

       National Wildlife Federation v. Bureau of Land Management. No. EA A2-026-92-24 (Dept. of
       Interior, Interior  Board of Land Appeals Nov. 18, 1996) (administrative stay of proposed grazing
       based on potential impacts on "outstanding natural resource water")
                                             52

-------
FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FACTORS ("FDF")

       33 U.S.C. § 131 l(n) (Fundamentally different factors)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.21(m)(l) (Fundamentally different factors variance requests by non-POTWs)

       40 C.F.R. § 124.63 (procedures for ruling on FDF requests)

       40 C.F.R. § 124.64(b) or 124.114(b) (procedures for appeal of Administrator's final decision on
       an FDF request)

       40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(l) (FDF variance available to dischargers subject to EPA-promulgated
       effluent limitations)

       40 C.F.R. Part 125, Subpart D (Criteria and Standards for Determining Fundamentally Different
       Factors Under Sections 301(b)(l)(A), 301(b)(2)(A) and (E) of the Act)

       Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council. 470 U.S. 116,120,105 S. Ct. 1102,
       1105 (1984) (Court approved the fundamentally-different-factor ("FDF") variance procedure "as
       a mechanism for insuring that [the EPA's] necessarily rough-hewn categories do not unfairly
       burden atypical plants.")

       EPA v. National Crushed Stone. 449, U.S. 64,77,101 S. Ct. 295, 66 L. Ed. 2d 268, 279 (1980)
       ("In terms of the scheme implemented by BPT limitations, the factors that the Administrator
       considers in granting variances do not suggest that economic capability must also be a
       determinant.")

       Texas Oil & Gas Assoc. v. EPA. 161 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998) ("There are only two way for an
       individual discharger to avoid the incorporation of applicable [effluent guidelines] into an
       NPDES permit: first, where the discharger is operating under a permit that was issued prior to the
       promulgation of the ELGs; or second, in rare cases, where EPA grants the discharger a variance
       based on the discharger's demonstration that it is 'fundamentally different' from other
       dischargers in the category or subcategory.")

       Alton Box Board v. EPA. 592 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1979) (EPA's permit denial (on grounds of 401
       certification denied by state) reversed and Agency ordered to grant a hearing to Alton Box Board
       on its request for an FDF variance from BPT guidelines)

       William funk, The Exception That Approves the Rule; FDF variances under The Clean Water
       Act, 13 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1  (1985)


GENERAL PERMITS

       33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(l)(F) (appeal of permit is to Court of Appeals within 120 days of final
       agency action)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.28 (conditions for issuing a general permit)

                                             53

-------
       40 C.F.R. § 124.58 (notice to Deputy Assistant Administrator for Water Enforcement required
       upon issuance of draft general permit)

       40 C.F.R. § 124.71(a) ("A formal hearing is available to challenge any NPDES permit issued
       under § 124.15 except for a general permit.  Persons affected by a general permit may not
       challenge the conditions of a general permit as of right in further agency proceedings. They may
       instead challenge the general permit in court, or apply for an individual NPDES permit under
       §  122.21...")

       Texas Oil & Gas Assoc. v. EPA. 161 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998) (challenge to EPA-issued general
       permit for oil & gas facilities dismissed as moot after court upheld effluent guidelines upon
       which the permit was based; "NPDES permits may be either individual or general; that is, either
       site-specific or generally applicable to a whole category or subcategory of point sources. General
       NPDES permits are permissible only where the point sources 1) all involve the same or similar
       types of operations, 2) discharge the same types of wastes, and 3) require the same or similar
       monitoring. 40 C.F.R. § 122.28. The EPA frequently uses such general permits for the oil and gas
       industry.")

       Kitlutsisti v. Arco Alaska. Inc.. 592 F. Supp. 832, 839 (D. Ak. 1984) (general permits cannot be
       administratively extended under the APA)

       Alaska Center for the Environment v. West. 47 ERC  1225 (9* Cir. 1998)  (general wetlands
       permit upheld in part on grounds that the activities it  covered were similar in nature and would
       have minimal impact on the environment)

       In re Donald J. Aardema and Joe Pacheco. Docket No. 1091-08-06-309(g) (Order Granting
       Partial Summary Determination, June 24, 1992, J. Hamill) (terms of the CAFO general permit
       apply to CAFO owners regardless of whether they filed a notice of intent to be covered, as
       required by the general permit)
GRANTS

       33 U.S.C. § 1263 (Grants to Alaska to improve sanitation in rural and Native Villages)

       33 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. Subchapter n - Grants for Construction of Treatment Works

       40 C.F.R. Part 35 (Grants for Construction of Treatment Works - Clean Water Act)

       Michigan v. Allen Park. 954 F.2d 1201, 34 ERC 1501 (6th Cir. 1992) (EPA ordered to fund 80%
       of sewer evaluation study as part of grant awarded to municipality)

       Town of Oraneetown v. Ruckelshaus. 740 F.2d 185, 21 ERC 1765, 1766 (2d Cir. 1984)
       (allegations that grant impermissibly given to town for sewer construction based on political
       influence unfounded, and challenge to grant dismissed; "To support a claim of improper political
       influence on a federal administrative agency, there must be some showing that the political
       pressure was intended to and did cause the agency's action to be influenced by factors not
       relevant under the controlling statute.")

                                             54

-------
       Town of Oraneetown v. Gorsuch. 718 F.2d 29, 20 ERC 1125 (2d Cir. 1983), cert, denied. 465
       U.S. 1099 (1984) (EPA not arbitrary and capricious for deciding to not to prepare EIS prior to
       granting construction grant for sewer project because there would be no adverse effects on
       waterways or land use and is not controversial)

       American Canoe Assoc.. Inc. v. EPA. 30 F. Supp. 2d 908,47 ERC 2100 (E.D. Va. 1998) (in
       challenge to EPA failure to write TMDLs where state had failed to do so, claim by plaintiffs that
       EPA violated CWA § 106 grant procedures dismissed on grounds that citizens lacked standing to
       bring the claim)

       Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt. 539 F. Supp. 841,17 ERC 1801 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff d in part.
       rev'd in part. 703 F.2d 576,19 ERC 1602 (9th Cir. 1983) (held that EPA could not release
       construction grant for pilot project at wastewater treatment plant without first complying with
       consultation requirements of ESA)
GREAT LAKES (§118)

       33 U.S.C. § 1268 (Great Lakes provisions)

       40 C.F.R. Part 132 (Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System)

       American Iron & Steel List, v. EPA. 115 F.3d 979,44 ERC 1769 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (in lengthy
       decision involving multiple challenges to final rule, court struck down in part and upheld in part
       EPA's Final Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes)

       64 Fed. Reg. 2490 (1999) (Pennsylvania's efforts to comply with provisions of the Great Lakes
       Water Qaulity Initiative will not receive federal approval until the state modifies certain elements
       of its program)


GROUND WATER, DISCHARGES TO

       40 C.F.R. § 130.6(c)(9) (Water Quality Management Plans: Groundwater)

       Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Davton Hudson Corp.. 24 F.3d 962, 38 ERC 1760 (7th Cir.
       1994) (discharges to artificial pond connected only to groundwater are not regulated under Act)

       Town of Norfolk v. Corp. Engineers. 968 F.2d 1438,1451, 35 ERC 1013 (1st Cir. 1992) (held
       that CWA's permitting provisions do not apply to any groundwater, deferring to Corps
       definition, which limited CWA coverage to surface waters)

       Hoffman Homes. Tnc. v. Administrator. U.S. E.P.A.. 961 F.2d 1310,34 ERC 1865 (7th Cir.
       1992), vacated. 975 F.2d 1554, 35 ERC 1328 (7* Cir. 1992) (isolated wetlands with non
       hydrologic connection to navigable waters fall nevertheless within jurisdiction of CWA because
       of effect on interstate commerce)

           ie Salt Co. v. United States. 896 F.2d 354, 358, 31 ERC 1139 (9th Cir. 1990) (CWA

                                             55

-------
 jurisdiction existed over salt flat even though hydrologic connection between salt flat and
 navigable waters was man-made; "The fact that third parties, including the government, are
 responsible for flooding Leslie's property is irrelevant.  The Corps'jurisdiction does not depend
 on how the property at issue became a water of the United States. Congress intended to regulate
 local aquatic ecosystems regardless of their origin.")

 Inland Steel Co. v. EPA. 901 F.2d 1419, 1422-23, 31 ERG 1527 (7th Cir. 1990) ("the legal
 concept of navigable waters might include ground waters connected to surface waters — though
 whether it does or not is an unresolved question... [AJ well that ended in such connected ground
 waters might be within the scope of the Act.")

 Ouivira Mining Co. v. United States EPA. 765 F.2d 126,129-130, 22 ERC 2003 (10th Cir.
 1985), cert, denied. 474 U.S. 1055 (1986) (affirmed EPA's decision that a CWA permit was
 required for discharges of pollutants into surface arroyos which, during storms, channeled
 rainwater both directly to navigable-in-fact streams and into underground aquifers that connected
 with such streams)

 United States v. Citv of Fort Pierre. S.D.. 747 F.2d 464,466-67, 21 ERC 2054 (8* Cir. 1984)
 (Corps had no jurisdiction over slough that was completely separate from (although formerly a
 side channel of) the Missouri R. and was not hydrologically connected to the river; although
 some river water got into the slough, it was the result of Corps activities, which could not act to
 extend the Corps jurisdiction)

 United States v. Bvrd. 609 F.2d 1204, 1209-1211, 13 ERC 1954 (7th Cir. 1979) (a well that
 ended in such connected groundwaters might be within the scope of the Act, but the waters at the
 bottom of these wells are not connected to surface waters)

 United States  v. Earth Sciences. Inc.. 599 F.2d 368, 373,13 ERC 1417 (10th Cir. 1979)  (held that
 unpermitted leach mining waste escaping into the Rito Seco Creek through overflow of a reserve
 sump and through groundwater seeps violated the CWA which "was designed to regulate to the
 fullest extent possible those sources emitting pollution into rivers, streams and lakes.")

 Exxon Corp. v. Train. 554 F.2d 1310,1329,10 ERC 1289 (5th Cir.  1977) (EPA does not have
 the authority to regulate discharges into deep  wells as a condition to a permit that regulates
 discharges into navigable waters; case limited to isolated groundwaters)

 Patterson  Farm. Inc. v. Citv of Britton. 22 F. Supp.2d 1085 (D.S.D.  1998) (held that court lacked
 subject matter jurisdiction over alleged discharges into  groundwater because groundwater not
 included within CWA definition of "navigable waters")

 Wilson v. AMOCO Corp.. 46 ERC  1998, 2001 (D. Wy. 1998) (dismissing case on Gwaltney
 grounds, held that "migration of residual contamination from previous releases [at an oil
 refinery] does  not constitute an ongoing discharge.")

Alleeanv Evt'l Action v. Westingfaouse Elec. Corp.. 1998 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 1838 (W.D. Pa.
 1998) (claim of unpermitted discharge from groundwater to lake dismissed on grounds that
groundwater is not a point  source; relied on Umatilla)
                                       56

-------
Mutual Life Insurance Co. y. Mobil Corp.. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4513 (N.D.N.Y. March 31,
1998) (Mobil gas truck mistakenly pumped 750 gallons of gas into a monitoring well, thinking it
was a fill pipe for an UST; upholding jurisdiction over groundwater, court held "It is now well
established that Congress intended to regulate the discharge of pollutants into all waters that may
eventually lead to navigable waters.")

Potter v. ASARCO. Inc.. (D. Neb. Mar. 3,1998) ("in light of judicial precedent, Congress'
remedial purpose, the absence of any specific legislative intent pertaining to hydrologically
connected groundwater and the informal pronouncements of EPA, any pollutants that enter
navigable waters, whether directly or indirectly through a specific hydrological connection, are
subject to regulation by the CWA")

Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Baver Corp.. 964 F. Supp. 1300,1318 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (held that
hydrologically-connected groundwater covered by the CWA)

Friends of the Coast Fork v. Co. of Lane. OR. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22705 (D. Or. 1997) (held
that defendant had "violated  the CWA by discharging pollutants in the form of leachate and
condensate into navigable waters" and that this discharge resulted in part "from leaking of the
leachate from the pile of garbage and lagoons into the groundwater which is hydrologically
connected to the surface waters of the Camas Swale Creek." Id. at 6)

Umatilla Water Quality Protective Assoc.. Inc. v. Smith Frozen  Foods. Inc.. Civ. No. 96-657-AS
(D. Or. Apr. 9, 1997) (CWA does not regulate discharges to groundwater even where hydrologic
connections exists; held, however, had EPA opined on the issue, court would consider the
Agency's position persuasive)

United States v. ConAgra. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21401 (D. Id. 1997) (ConAgra discharged in
one summer 45 million gallons of wastewater to a 4-acre field with a high water table on a hill
next to a creek; relying on Umatilla. held that discharges to surface waters via groundwater
outside jurisdiction of CWA; french drain discharges of groundwater, however, may be point
sources)

United Anglers v. East Bav Municipal Utility. No. C-95-2671 SI (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 1996) (court
held that plaintiffs had not met burden of proof for Summary judgment on issue of hydrologic
connection between defendant's impoundment and surface waters)

Friends of Sante Fe Co. V. LAC Minerals. 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1357-58 (D.N.M. 1995) (held that
Ouivira Mining Co. v. EPA. 765 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1985) forecloses "any argument that the
CWA does not protect groundwater with  some connection to surface waters" because the 10th
Cir. has expansively interpreted the CWA's jurisdictional reach in a non-groundwater context)

Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining Co.. 870 F. Supp. 983,40 ERC 1134 (E.D.
Wash. 1994) (disagreed with Oconomowoc and ruled, after surveying the case law that the  "logic
of these cases is compelling:  since the goal of the CWA is to protect the quality of surface
waters, any pollutant which enters such waters, whether directly or through groundwater, is
subject to regulation	")

Sierra Club v. Colorado Refining Co.. 838 F. Supp. 1428 (D. Col. 1993) ("[The] Clean Water

                                       57

-------
 Act's preclusion of the discharge of any pollutant into "navigable waters' includes such discharge
 which reaches "navigable waters' through groundwater.")

 Slaele v. U.S. by and through Baldwin. 809 F. Supp. 704, 709 (D. Minn. 1992) (wetland is
 adjacent where there is no dispute that hydrologic connection exists between wetland and river)

 Martin v. Kansas Board of Resents. 32ERC 1944 (D.Kan. 1991) ("Groundwater ... that is
 naturally connected to surface waters constitute 'navigable waters' under the Act.")

 Werlein v. United States. 746 F. Supp. 887, 897 (D.Minn. 1990) (citing MESS with approval for
 the proposition that determinations of discharges to waters of the U.S. through a direct
 hydrological connection are factual)

 McClellan Ecological Seepage v. Weinberger. 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (EPA
 has no statutory authority to regulate discharges to isolated wetlands; the legislative history of
 the CWA also demonstrates that "Congress did not intend groundwater and navigable waters to
 be synonymous", however, NPDES permit may be required)

 McClellan Ecological Seepage v. Chenev. 763 F. Supp. 431,437 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (held that
 groundwater was isolated and does not presently discharge pollutants to American R. or
 Sacramento R. and has not done so since 1968; the legislative history of the CWA also
 demonstrates that "Congress did not intend groundwater and navigable waters to be
 synonymous.")

 Kellev v. United States. 618 F. Supp.  1103,1107, 23 ERC 1494 (W.D. Mich 1985) (discharges
 of toxic chemicals into migrating groundwater that "eventually" would reach the bay not illegal;
 "Congress did not intend the [CWA] to extend federal regulatory and enforcement authority over
 groundwater contamination.")

 United States v.  GAP Corp.. 389 F. Supp.  1379,1383, 7 ERC 1581,1583 (S.D. Tex. 1975) ("The
 disposal of chemical wastes into underground waters which have not been alleged to flow into or
 otherwise affect surface waters does not constitute a "discharge of a pollutant1 within the meaning
 of § 131 l(a)	The question before the Court is whether, in its breadth, the FWPCA applies to
 subsurface wells. The legislative history shows conclusively that it does not.")

 Preamble, NPDES Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water Discharges, EPA Final Rule,
 55 Fed. Reg. 47990,47997 (1990) ("[T]his rulemaking only addresses discharges to waters of the
 United States, consequently discharges to ground waters are not covered by this rulemaking
 (unless there is a hydrological connection between the ground water and a nearby surface water
 body)")

 NPDES General  Permit and Reporting Requirements for Discharges from Concentrated Animal
 Feeding Operations, EPA Region 6 Public Notice of Final Permitting Decision, 58 Fed. Reg.
 7610, 7631 (1993) (feedlots required to obtain NPDES permit for discharges to groundwater
unless permittee  can demonstrate lack of hydrologic connection to surface water)

Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulations that Pertain to Standards on Indian
Reservations, Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64892 (1991) ("Notwithstanding  the strong

                                       58

-------
language in the legislative history of the Clean Water Act to the effect that the Act does not grant
EPA authority to regulate pollution of groundwaters, EPA and most courts addressing the issue
have recognized that... the Act requires NPDES permits for discharges to groundwater where
there is a direct hydrological connection between groundwater and surface waters. In these
situations, the affected groundwaters are not considered "waters of the United States" but
discharges to them are regulated because such discharges are effectively discharges to the
directly connected surface waters.")

Senate Report No. 92-414, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (1972) p. 3739 ("Several bills
pending before the Committee provided authority to establish Federally approved standards for
groundwaters which permeate rock, soil, and other subsurface formations. Because the
jurisdiction regarding groundwaters is so complex and varied from State to State, the Committee
did not adopt this recommendation.")

118 Cong. Rec. 10668 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Harsha) ("[T]his amendment purports to require
water-quality standards for groundwater.")

118 Cong. Rec. 10666 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Aspin) ("If we do not stop pollution of ground
waters through seepage and other means, ground water gets into navigable waters, and to control
only the navigable water and not the ground water makes no sense at all.")

EPA, "President Clinton's Clean Water Initiative," (aka "Greenbook") EPA doc. No. 800-R-94-
001 (1994) (Clinton administration's proposals for amendments to the CWA; would clarify that a
point source discharge to groundwater or to water that has a hydrologic connection with surface
waters is subject to regulation as an NPDES point source discharge if (1) a reasonably
foreseeable direct hydrologic connection to surface water in the proximity of the release exists,
(2) a significant quantity of the pollutant must reasonably be able to reach the surface water, and
(3) no other Federal statute directly addresses the activity causing the release)

General Counsel Opinion (December 13, 1973) (disposal of pollutants into a well O.K. because
EPA has no statutory authority to regulate discharges to isolated wetlands)

62 Fed. Reg.  20177, 20178 (1997) ("The EPA agrees that groundwater contamination is a
concern around CAFO facilities. However, the Clean Water Act does not give EPA the authority
to regulate groundwater quality through NPDES permits. The only situation in which
groundwater may be affected by the NPDES program is when a discharge of pollutants to surface
waters can be proven to be via groundwater... [T]he EPA agrees that the Clean Water Act does
not give EPA the authority to regulate groundwater quality through NPDES permits. However,
the permit requirements  ... are not intended to regulate groundwater. Rather, they are intended
to protect surface waters which are contaminated via a groundwater (subsurface) connection.")

60 Fed. Reg. 44489,44493 (1995) (in promulgating proposed draft CAFO permit, EPA stated:
"[Discharges that enter surface waters indirectly through groundwater are prohibited")

58 Fed. Reg. 7610, 7631 (1993) (feedlots required to obtain NPDES permit for discharges to
ground water unless permittee can demonstrate lack of hydrologic connection to surface water)

56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64892 (1991) (Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulations

                                       59

-------
       that Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, Final Rule:  "Notwithstanding the strong
       language in the legislative history of the Clean Water Act to the effect that the Act does not grant
       EPA authority to regulate pollution of groundwaters, EPA and most courts addressing the issue
       have recognized that... the Act requires NPDES permits for discharges to groundwater where
       there is a direct hydrological connection between groundwater and surface waters. In these
       situations, the affected groundwaters are not considered "waters of the United States" but
       discharges to them are regulated because such discharges are  effectively discharges to the
       directly connected surface waters.")

       55 Fed. Reg. 47990,47997 (1990) (Preamble, NPDES Permit Application Regulations for Storm
       Water Discharges, EPA Final Rule: "[T]his rulemaking only  addresses discharges to waters of
       the United States, consequently discharges to ground waters are not covered by this rulemaking
       unless there is a hydrological connection between the ground  water and a nearby surface water
       body.")

       Comment,  Groundwater Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act: The Tributary Groundwater
       Dilemma, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 603 (1996)

       Mary Christina Wood, Regulating Discharges into Groundwater: The Crucial Link in Pollution
       Control under the Clean Water Act, 12 Harv.  Envtl. L. Rev. 569 (1988)

       See also NAVIGABLE WATERS; WETLANDS: Adjacent Wetlands; UIC
GUIDANCE

       American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA. 115 F.3d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (held that CWA § 118 gave
       the EPA authority to issue EPA's water quality guidance for the Great Lakes in the form of
       regulations)

       See individual sections in this Digest for specific guidance documents.


HISTORY/PURPOSE OF CLEAN WATER ACT

       33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (the CWA is intended to "maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
       integrity of the Nation's waters.")

       EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association. 449 U.S. 64, 101 S. Ct. 295, 66 L. Ed. 2d 268,15
       ERC 1209 (1980) (discussion of statutory framework of CWA)

       EPA v. California. 426 U.S. 200, 202-209, 96 S. Ct. 2022 48 L. Ed. 2d 578, 8 ERC 2089 (1976)
       (good summary of history of Act)

       Texas Oil & Gas Assoc. v. EPA. 161 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Congress enacted the CWA in
       1972 'to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
       waters.' 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a). As part of this mission, the Act declared a national goal that the
       discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985. 33 U.S.C.  § 1251(a)(l).

                                             60

-------
It was designed to achieve this goal through a system of effluent limitations guidelines ("ELGs")
and National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits that set
technology-based discharge limits for all categories and subcategories of water pollution point
sources.")

Dubois v. U.S.D.A., 102 F.3d 1273,43 ERC 1824,1840 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The Clean Water Act
was 'a bold and sweeping legislative initiative,' enacted to 'restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.'  'This objective incorporated a broad,
systemic view of the goal of maintaining and improving water quality; as the House Report on
the legislation put it, 'the word "integrity" ... refers to a condition in which the natural structure
and function of ecosystems [are] maintained.'  In contrast to NEPA's focus on the process, the
CWA is substantive, focusing upon the 'integrity of the Nation's Waters, not the permit  process."
(citations omitted))

Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Administrator. 836 F.2d 1482, 27 ERC 1249,1254 (5th Cir.
1988) ("The CWA is strong medicine.")

United States v. Akers. 785 F.2d 814, 823 (9th Cir. 1986). cert, denied. 479 U.S. 828 (1986)
("public interest requires strict enforcement of the Act to effectuate its purpose of protecting
sensitive aquatic  environments.")

Trustees for Alaska v. EPA. 749 F.2d 549, 552-554, 21 ERC 2222,2223 (9th Cir. 1984) (good
short review of history and summary of CWA)

American Petroleum Institute v. EPA. 661 F.2d 340, 16 ERC 1690 (5th Cir. 1981) (detailed
discussion of statutory framework of CWA)

Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Costle. 646 F.2d 568,15 ERC 1118,1119-21 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (good summary of history of Act)

American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train. 539 F.2d 107, 8 ERC 1993 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (good
discussion of history and intent of the CWA — long opinion)

H.Rep. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legislative History, 753,
763-764 ("Subsection (a) of section 101 declares the objective of this legislation to be the
restoration and maintenance of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters. The word 'integrity' as used is intended to convey a concept that refers to a condition in
which the natural structure and function of ecosystems is maintained.

Although man is a 'part of nature' and a production of evolution, 'natural' is generally defined as
that condition in existence before the activities of man invoked perturbation which prevented the
system from returning to its original state of equilibrium.
This definition  is in no way intended to exclude man as a species from the natural order of
things, but in this technological age, and in numerous cases that occurred before industrialization
man has exceeded nature's homoeostatic ability to respond to change. Any change induced by
man which overtaxes the ability of nature to restore conditions to 'natural' or 'original' is an
unacceptable perturbation.")
                                        61

-------
       "A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972," Congressional
       Research Service, Library of Congress (January 1973), Serial No. 93-1, Committee Print

       "A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977, a Continuation of the Legislative History
       of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act," Congressional Research Service, Library of
       Congress (October 1978) Serial No. 95-14, Committee print

       "A Legislative History of the Water Quality Act of 1987," Congressional Research Service,
       Library of Congress (November 1988), Committee Print
HYDROLOGIC CONNECTION

       See GROUNDWATER, DISCHARGES TO


IMMINENT AND SUBSTANTIAL ENDANGERMENT

       See EMERGENCY POWERS


IMPAIRED WATER BODIES (§ 303(d))

       33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) ("Each State shall identify those waters within its boundaries for which the
       effluent limitations required by section 1311(b)(l)(A) and section 1311(b)(l)(B) of this title are
       not stringent enough to implement any water quality standard applicable to such waters.")

       40 C.F.R. Part 130 (Water Quality Planning and Management)

       Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clarke. 57 F.3d 1517,40 ERC 1961 (9th Cir. 1995) (held that
       303(d) allows EPA to establish TMDLs for waters contaminated with toxic pollutants without
       prior development of BAT limitations; distinguished with NRDC v. EPA. 915 F.2d 1314,
       holding that it dealt only with the question of whether waters contaminated by toxics had to be
       listed under 303(d), not whether they may be listed)

       Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA. 915 F.2d 1314,1322 n.9, 31 ERC 2089 (9* Cir.
       1990) ("Section 1313(d) ... requires States to identify only those waters for which limitations
       based on the best practicable technology would not be stringent enough to implement the water
       quality standards.  Those waters for which limitations based on the more demanding best
       available technology - the required level of technology to control toxics - were insufficient did
       not have to be listed.")

       EPA, "National Clarifying Guidance for 1998 State and Territory Section 303(d)  Listing
       Decisions" (Aug. 17,1997)

      See also INDIVIDUAL CONTROL STRATEGIES ("ICS"), TMDLs and WATER QUALITY
      STANDARDS
                                           62

-------
INDIAN TRIBES
       33 U.S.C. § 1377(a) ("Indian tribes shall be treated as States for purposes of such § 1251(g) of
       this title) and (e) (Treatment as States)

       40 C.F.R. Part 35, Subpart Q (General Assistance Grants to Indian Tribes)

       40 C.F.R. § 130.6(d) (Water Quality Mangement Plans: Indian Tribes)

       40 C.F.R. § 130.15 (Water Quality Planning and Management: Processing application for Indian
       Tribes)

       40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (Requirements for Indian Tribes to administer a water quality standards
       program)

       40 C.F.R. § 131.35 (federally-promulgated water quality standards for the Colville Confederated
       Tribes Indian Reservation)

       Montana v. EPA. 137 F.3d 1135,46 ERC 1161 (9th Cir. 1998) (under § 518 of the CWA, EPA
       may authorize Indian tribes to set water quality standards that regulate activities of non-Indians
       who own property within reservations)

       Montana v. EPA. 42 ERC 1922 (D.  Mont. 1996), affd. 137 F.3d 1135,46 ERC 1161 (9th Cir.
       1998) (Montana's challenge to EPA's approval of the Flathead TAS application was dismissed;
       because the Tribes had explicitly asserted that impairment of tribal waters by activities of non-
       members would have serious and substantial effect on the health and welfare of the Tribes, and
       because that assertion corresponded to the EPA's generalized findings, the EPA found that the
       Tribes' possessed inherent authority to set water quality standards for all surface waters within
       the reservation; since EPA found sufficient facts to support the Tribes' claims that pollution of
       the surface waters traversing or appurtenant to non-member land would have serious and
       substantial impact on the Tribe's health and welfare, that fact finding is due substantial deference
       by the court)

       Citv of Albuquerque v. Browner. 865 F. Supp. 733 (D. N.M. 1993), 38 ERC 2062 affd, 97 F.3d
       415, 43 ERC 1276 (10th Cir. 1996)  (court upheld EPA's regulations for treating Indian Tribes in
       the same manner as States for purposes of the water quality standards program; rejected city's
       argument that Tribe may not develop water quality standards that are more stringent then Federal
       standards)

       64 Fed. Reg. 37072 (1999) (Proposed 40 C.F.R. Part 131, EPA Review of State and Tribal Water
       Quality Standards)

       58 Fed. Reg. 67980 (1993) (new definitions for "Federal Indian reservation" and "Indian Tribe"
       added to § 122.2 definitions)

       See also WATER QUALITY STANDARDS: Indian Tribes
                                             63

-------
INDIVIDUAL CONTROL STRATEGY ("ICS")

        33 U.S.C. § 1314(1)(1)(D) (for each point sources listed in 304(1) list, the state must devise an
        individual control strategy calculated to bring about compliance with the water quality standards
        within three years of the adoption of the ICS)

        40 C.F.R. § 123.46(c) (an ICS is to be submitted in the form of a final NPDES permit)

        Roll Coater Inc. v. EPA. 932 F.2d 668, 33 ERC 1313 (7th Cir. 1991) (court may not review EPA
        decision approving ICS that state proposed for company identified as source of toxic water
        pollution because: (1) CWA requires strategies developed by states, and approved by EPA, to be
        included in state-issued discharge permit for each source; (2) act only allows federal court review
        if strategies are issued by EPA directly to source in federal discharge permit; and (3) source may
        obtain review of its claims in state court after state includes specific strategy in revising permit)

        Boise Cascade Corp. v. EPA. 942 F.2d 1427, 33 ERC 1693 (9th Cir. 1991) (challenges to EPA
        approval of Calif, and Or. ICSs dismissed for lack of jurisdiction)

        Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 915 F.2d 1314, 31 ERC 2089 (9th Cir. 1990)
        (EPA rule requiring listing of only point sources on some portions of polluted water body held
        under inclusive under 304(1); regulations had to include requirement that states identify all
        sources discharging any pollutant believed to be impairing water quality into a listed body of
        water)

        Westvaco Corp. v. EPA. 899 F.2d 1383, 1385, 20 ELR 20816 (4th Cir. 1990) (good summary of
        ICS program)

        In re J & L Specialty Products Corp.. 5 E.A.D. 333 (EAB 1994) (held that EAB can consider
        petitioner's collateral attack on the Agency's actions in implementing CWA § 304(1) as part of the
        NPDES permit review, where the listing decision is material to the permit condition at issue)

        Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based Regulation
        Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ELR 10329 (1997) ( "By July of 1994 states had converted 588
        ICSs into permit limitations	As of 1997 ... more than 675 ICSs had been completed under
        the toxic hotspot program.")
INFORMATION REQUESTS/INSPECTIONS (§ 308)

       33 U.S.C. § 1318(a) ("Whenever required to carry out the objective of this chapter, including but
       not limited to (1) developing or assisting in the development of any effluent limitation, or other
       limitation, prohibition, or effluent standard, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance
       under this chapter; (2) determining whether any person is in violation of any such effluent
       limitation, or other limitation, prohibition or effluent standard, pretreatment standard, or standard
       of performance; (3) any requirement established under this section; or (4) carrying out sections
       [305, 311,402,404 (relating to State permit programs), 405,405, and 504] of this title -
                     (A)  the Administrator shall require the owner or operator of any point source to
              (i) establish and maintain such records, (ii) make such reports, (iii) install, use, and

                                              64

-------
       maintain such monitoring equipment or methods (including where appropriate, biological
       monitoring methods), (iv) sample such effluents (in accordance with such methods, at
       such locations, at such intervals, and in such manner as the Administrator shall
       prescribe), and (v) provide such other information as he may reasonably require; and
               (B)  the Administrator or his authorized representative (including an authorized
       contractor acting as a representative of the Administrator), upon presentation of his
       credentials -
       (i)  shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any premises in which an effluent
       source is located or in which any records required to be maintained under clause (A) of
       this subsection are located, and
       (ii) may at reasonable times have access to and copy any records, inspect any monitoring
       equipment or method required under clause (A), and sample any effluents which the
       owner or operator of such source is required to sample under such clause.")

Oscar Maver & Co. v. Evans. 441 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1979) (the CWA's section 308(a) was
explicitly modeled after 1 14(a)(2) of the CAA)

Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries. Inc.. 847 F.2d 1109, 27 ERC 1881,  1882 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied. 491 U.S. 904, 109 S. Ct. 3185 (1989) ("Section 308 of the Clean Water Act ...
authorizes the EPA Administrator or his or her authorized representatives a right of entry to an
effluent source location or to premises where required records or monitoring equipment are
kept.")

Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA. 716 F.2d 1187, 19 ERC 2043, 2046 (7th Cir. 1983) (giving due
deference to EPA's interpretation of § 308, held that EPA did not violate Mobil's 4* Amendment
rights when it collected effluent sample because § 308 expressly authorizes EPA to collects such
samples; "Policing compliance with EPA pollution standards is critical to the achievement of
[the CWA's goal of eliminating the discharge of pollutants], and Section 308(a) eliminates any
doubts on that score by expressly authorizing the EPA to check whether someone, such as Mobil,
holding a permit to pollute is complying with the pollution limits set forth in its permit. .  .
Section 308(a) also  expressly authorizes the EPA to collect samples whenever required to
develop new permit limits on the discharge of pollutants.")

United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co.. 684 F.2d 1 174, 17 ERC 1753 (6th Cir. 1982) (held that
"words 'authorized representative' in section 114(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act . . . means officers
or employees of the EPA, and cannot include employees of private contractors;" Stauffer
Chemical was proper in denying access during inspection to EPA contractors)

Bunker Hill Co. Lead & Zinc Smelter v. EPA. 658 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1981) (under § 308,
the EPA has the authority to seek an ex parte administrative search warrant)

United States v Tivian Laboratories. Inc.. 589 F.2d 49, 12 ERC 1568 (1st Cir.  1978), cert,
denied. 442 U.S. 942 (1979) (information request by EPA under CWA § 308 does  not violate
the 4th Amendment protections against unlawful search and seizure)
United States v. Harfz Construction Co.. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9126 (N.D. 111. 1999)
(defendants motion to dismiss claims for failure to respond to § 308 information request denied
   grounds that EPA had properly alleged cause of action; rejected argument that EPA could not
on

                                       65

-------
        request information about wetlands fill until it proved it had jurisdiction over wetland; "Hartz's
        interpretation frustrates the purposes of the CWA and the plain language of the statute. Section
        308 provides that 'whenever required to carry out the objective of [the CWA]' the EPA, in
        'determining whether any person is in violation' of the Act, 'shall require the owner or operator
        of any point source to ... provide such ...  information as he may reasonably require.' 33 U.S.C.
        § 1318(a). The government has alleged that Hartz is a point source as a discharger of pollutants
        (fill dirt) and Hartz has not disputed this assertion in its motion. Thus, on its face, Section 308
        gives EPA jurisdiction to determine whether the point source is in violation of the Act.")

        Gersh & Danielson v. U.S.. 871 F. Supp. 407,41 ERC 1286 (D. Colo. 1994) (held that
        information given to EPA by defendant in settlement negotiations is FOIAable; held that FOIA
        exemptions are not applicable to information that EPA could have obtained under § 308;
        acknowledges EPA's broad authority under § 308 to obtain information re economic benefit)

        Alameda County Assessor's Parcel Nos. 537-801-2-4 And 537-850-9. 672 F. Supp. 1278, 26 ERC
        (BNA) 1119 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (held that EPA properly obtained warrant under § 308 to
        investigate whether land farmer was filling was jurisdictional wetlands)

        In re Simpson Paper Co. and Louisiana-Pacific Corp.. 3 E.A.D. 541, 549 (CJO 1991) ("Section
        308(a) is an information gathering tool that is not oriented exclusively towards permittees: it
        applies to any owner or operator of a point  source, without reference to whether such person has
        a permit. The Agency may issue orders pursuant to CWA § 308(a) to aid enforcement, to
        develop permit limitations and effluent standards, and to generate whatever information  it needs
        to carry out its statutory responsibilities...  The authority conferred by the section may be
        exercised by the Agency  at any time, and the lawfulness  of orders issued pursuant thereto is
        subject only to a reasonableness standard.")

        S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
        News 3668, 3729 ("It should also be noted that the  authority to enter [under 308], as under the
        Clean Air Act, is reserved to the Administrator and his authorized representatives which such
        representatives must be full time employees of the Environmental Protection Agency. The
        authority to enter is not extended to contractors with the EPA in pursuit of research and
        development.")

        See also CREDENTIALS
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

       33 U.S.C. § 1319(f) (Administrator may bring an action in district court "for appropriate relief,
       including, but not limited to, a permanent or temporary injunction, against the owner or operator
       of such treatment works ... Such court shall  have jurisdiction to restrain such violation and to
       require the owner or operator of the treatment works and the owner or operator of the source to
       take such action as may be necessary to come into compliance with this title.")

       33 U.S.C. § 1364 ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the Administrator upon
       receipt of evidence that a pollution source or combination of sources is presenting an imminent
       and substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to the welfare of persons where such

                                              66

-------
endangerment is to the livelihood of such persons, such as inability to market shellfish, may
bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate district court to immediately restrain
any person causing or contributing to the alleged pollution to stop the discharge of pollutants
causing or contributing to such pollution or to take such other action as may be necessary.")

United States v. Romero-Barcelo. 456 U.S. 305, 307 (1982) (held that CWA does not require a
district court to enjoin immediately all discharges of pollutants that violate the Act's permit
requirements)

Sierra Club v. Georgia Power Co.. 180 F.3d 1309,48 ERC 2119 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding
denial of preliminary injunction against continued violations of temperature limit in NPDES
permit; public interest not served by requiring power plant to cut production to comply)

United States v. Banks. 115 F.3d 916, 918 45 ERC 1281 (11th Cir. 1997) (held that the five year
statute of limitations under 28 USC § 2426 did not apply to injunctive relief requested by the
United States in its sovereign capacity; § 2426 on its face applies only to penalties and similar
relief, but defendants had argued for application of the concurrent remedy rule, under which
equitable relief is barred if a statute of limitations would bar a concurrently sought penalty; held
that the concurrent remedy rule was inapplicable to claims for injunctive relief brought by the
U.S. in enforcing the CWA)

Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. Inc.. 913 F.2d 64,
31 ERC  1905 (3d Cir. 1990), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 1109 (1991) (no  statute of limitations for
injunctive relief under CWA)

United States v. Akers. 785 F.2d 814, 823 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied. 479 U.S. 828 (1986)
("public interest requires strict enforcement of the Act to effectuate its purpose of protecting
sensitive aquatic environments.")

Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Texaco Refining and Marketing Inc.. 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14941  (D. Del. 1998) (held that refinery owner must conduct environmental sampling to
determine the impact of past and future discharges to the river in excess of the limits in the
refinery's NPDES permit)

United States v. Roll Coater. Inc.. 21  ELR 21073 (S.D. tod. 1991) (EPA is not limited to one
remedy and may seek both penalties for past violations and prevention of future violations)

United States v. Ciampitti. 615 F. Supp. 116,122 (D.N.J.  1984), affd, 772 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.
1985) ("There can be no doubt that his court has the power under the Clean Water Act to order
the restoration proposed by the government.")

United States v. Robinson. 20 ERC 1181 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (judgment requiring defendants to
restore filled wetlands)

Weiszmann v  District Engineer.  United States Corps of Engineers. 545 F. Supp. 721 (S.D. Fla.
1982) (judgment requiring developer to restore canal)

   ifftri States v. Carter. 18 ERC 1810, 1813  (S.D. Fla. 1982) ("Review of the purpose of

                                       67

-------
       Congress in fashioning the Clean Water Act, plus the above body of case law, leads this Court to
       the conclusion that restoration is an authorized and appropriate remedy under the Clean Water
       Act.")

       United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.. 18 ERC 2020,2026-27 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
       (distinguishing Romero Barcelo. held that "even if the lack of evidence of harm to water quality
       from defendant's discharges is a factor to be considered in this case, it does not outweigh the
       overwhelming equities in favor of an injunction.")

       United States v. Outboard Marine Corp.. 549 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. HI. 1982) (court discussed the
       difference between injunctions that are intended to prevent future violations, and injunctions that
       are intended to remedy the harm caused by past violations; held that both types of injunctions are
       available under the CWA, and denied Outboard Marine's motion to dismiss)

       See also COMPLIANCE ORDERS; WETLANDS: Injunctive Relief
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY

       See  OWNER/OPERATOR LIABILITY


JUDICIAL REVIEW (§ 509)

        33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(l) ("review of the Administrator's action ... (E) in approving or
       promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section 1311,1312, or 1316 of this
       title ... may be had by any interested person in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United
       States.")

       33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(l)(F) (appeal of permit is to Court of Appeals within 120 days final agency
       action)

       American Forest & Paper Assoc. v.  EPA. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 21396 (10* Cir. 1998)
       (challenge to EPA approval of Oklahoma NPDES program dismissed for lack of standing; held
       that plaintiff had not established "injury in fact" required by Article HI; "Although the
       Association has asserted that its members include current NPDES permit holders in Oklahoma, it
       has not alleged that any of its members hold permits to discharge into sensitive waters nor has it
       alleged that any of its members intend to apply for such a permit	'It is a long-settled
       principle that standing cannot be inferred argumentatively from [the party's] averments ... but
       rather must affirmatively appear in the record.'")

       American Forest & Paper Assoc. v.  EPA. 137 F.3d 291,46 ERC 1385 (5th Cir. 1998) (held that
       plaintiff had standing - - contrary to 10th Cir. - - and EPA exceeded its authority in making ESA
       consultation a condition of approval of Louisiana NPDES program)

       Maier v. EPA. 114 F.3d 1032,44 ERC 1705 (10th Cir. 1997) (EPA may control nitrogenous
       oxygen demand on a case-by-case basis through  the permitting process rather than through a
       generally applicable rule.  EPA's denial of a petition for a rulemaking to establish secondary

                                             68

-------
NOD treatment standards was not arb. or capricious.  CWA § 301(b)(l)(B) does not require EPA
to promulgate secondary treatment regulations for every pollutant that can be controlled by
secondary treatment, and EPA's position is a reasonable and permissible reading of the statute, to
which the court must defer)

South Holland Metal Finishing Co. v. Browner. 97 F.3d 932, 27 ELR 20325 (7th Cir. 1996)
(citing American Paper, case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction where co. sought judicial review
of EPA position that co. that moved old pretreatment equipment from previous site to new one
was subject to the new source standards in 40 CFR 433.17; court held that Region's interpretative
ruling here was not a decision by the Administrator, was never promulgated, and was not an
effluent standard or other limitation under § 509(b)(l)E))

Loneview Fibre Co. v. Rassmussen. 980 F.2d 1307, 23 ELR 20454 (9th Cir. 1993) (challenge to
EPA's dioxin TMDL by pulp mills and citizens' groups dismissed on jurisdictional grounds; held
that TMDLs may not be challenged in the Courts of Appeals, since § 509(b) of the CWA does
not specifically list EPA actions under § 303(d) as reviewable in those courts)

Spokane River Assoc. v. EPA. CA No. 90-70672 (9th Cir. 1990) (motion for leave to adduce
additional evidence in permit appeal granted pursuant to § 509(c) of the CWA)

American Paper Institute v. EPA. 882 F.2d 287, 30 ERC 1177 (7th Cir. 1989) (challenge to
Region V "policy statement concerning the tolerances for dioxin in new and renewed permits of
paper mills using chlorine bleaching" dismissed on grounds that 509(b)(l)(E) does not cover
policy statements)

American Paper Institute. Inc. v. EPA. 890 F.2d 869,  30 ERC 1313 (7th Cir. 1989) (challenge to
antidegradation regulation through CWA § 509 failed where court held that 509(b)(l)(E) did not
provide an avenue for judicial review of antideg. regulations because they are not "effluent
limitations" within the meaning of 509)

Texas Municipal Power Agency v. EPA. 836 F.2d 1482, 27 ERC 1249,1251 (5th Cir. 1988)
("Congress did not intend petitions for modification to provide a second chance for full review of
an NPDES permit after the statute of limitations [§ 509] has run from the issue or renewal of the
permit.")

Texas Municipal Power Agency v. EPA. 799 F.2d 173,  25 ERC 1062 (5th Cir. 1986) (failure to
contest permit condition within 120 time limit set out in 509(b)(l) is fatal to later challenge;
"Statutory time limits on petitions for review of agency  actions are jurisdictional in nature...")

Trustees for Alaska v. EPA. 749 F.2d 549, 558, 21 ERC 2222 (9th Cir. 1984) (the CWA
establishes a bifurcated system of judicial review. Section 1365 "confers jurisdiction on the
federal district courts, not courts of appeal, to review  any action 'where there is alleged a failure
of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary with the
Administrator.'")

r.itv of Baton Rnnpe v. EPA. 620 F.2d 478,480 (5th Cir. 1980) (§ 509 review provisions are very
specific)


                                       69

-------
        Montgomery Envt'l Coalition v. Costle. 646 F.2d 568, 577-78, 15 ERC 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
        (§ 509 of the CWA incorporates injury-in-fact rule for standing)

        Exxon Corp. v. Train. 554 F.2d 1310,1315-17,10 ERC 1209 (5th Cir. 1977) (§ 509(b)(l) gives
        the court jurisdiction, if timely petitioned, to review directly EPA denial of a requested
        modification)

        Lubrizol Corp. v. Train. 547 F.2d 310, 318-19 (6th Cir. 1976) (§ 509(b) vests exclusive
        jurisdiction in the federal courts of appeals to review specified final actions of the EPA)

        Sun Enterprises. Ltd, v. Train. 532 F.2d 280, 287 (2d Cir. 1976) (§ 509(b) vests exclusive
        jurisdiction in the federal courts of appeals to review specified final actions of the Administrator)

        DuPont  v. Train. 528 F.2d 1136,1142 (4* Cir. 1975), affd. 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (§ 509(b) vests
        exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts of appeals to review specified final actions of the
        Administrator)

        American Petroleum Inst. v. Train. 526 F.2d 1343, 1344 (10th Cir.  1975) (jurisdictional grant in
        § 1369 is exclusive)

        United States v. Gulf States Steel Inc.. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8834 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (when
        State issues NPDES permit  state law, not CWA § 509, governs availability of review of permit
        terms in enforcement action)

        United States v. Avatar Holdings Inc.. & Florida Cities Water Co..  No. 93-281-21 (M.D. Fla.
        June 21, 1995) (held that 509(b) of the CWA precludes the defendants from challenging a permit
        denial in the context of an enforcement action)

        Public Interest Research Group v. Circuit Foil USA. Inc.. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4875,4945
        (D.N.J. 1993) (§ 509(b)(2) bars evidence concerning the propriety of defendant's permit
        limitations)

        S.Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 85, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
        3668, 3751 (discussing § 509 limits on judicial review of EPA action and the limited use of
        petitions for modification)

        Annotation, What Constitutes  "Issuing or Denying" Permit for Discharge of Pollutants within
        Meaning of§ 509(b)(l)(F) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 67 A.L.R.Fed. 365
        (1984)

        See also  NPDES PERMITS: Appeals; Modifications
LOG TRANSFER FACILITIES ("LTF's")

       § 407 of the CWA as Amended by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Public Law 100-4,100th
       Cong., 2d Sess, Committee Print (March 1988) at 202.  Note comment on p. 197: "The following
       provisions of Public Law 100-4 do not amend the Clean Water Act."

                                             70

-------
       CitvofAngoonv.Hodel. 803 F.2d 1016,25 ERC 1235 (9th Cir. 1986). cert, denied. 484 U.S.
       870 (1987) (EIS for LTF permit was adequate, despite its failure to consider in detail alternative
       that ANVC could exchange its holding for land elsewhere, where exchange alternative was too
       remote and speculative)

       United States v. Kennebec Log Driving Co.. 399 F. Supp. 754, 8 ERC 1026 (D. Me. 1975), affd.
       530 F.2d 446 (1st Cir. 1976), cert, denied. 429 U.S. 821 (1976) (court interpreted term "refuse"
       as used in Refuse Act to specifically include "peeled bark and sunken logs" from log driving
       activities)

       In re Shee Atika. Inc.. 2 E.A.D. 487 (CJO 1988) (issues whether EPA has regulatory authority
       over log sorting and storage area and whether permit condition requiring three-fps log entry
       speed is reasonable; further briefing ordered)

       Congressional Record - Senate (June 13,1985) (comments of Senators Stevens and Murkowski
       re §407 of the CWA)


MARINE SANITATION DEVICES ("MSDs")

       33 U.S.C. §  1322 (Marine sanitation devices)

       33 U.S.C. §  312(b)(2) (vessel discharges are not subject to NPDES)

       33 U.S.C. §  312(f)(l)(B) (houseboat exemption)

       40 C.F.R. Part 140 (EPA regulations)

       33 C.F.R. Part 159 (Coast Guard regulations)

       United States v. West Indies Transport Inc.. 127 F.2d 299,45 ERC 1417, 1424 (3d Cir. 1997)
       (untreated sewage discharges from barge housing construction workers held subject to § 301, and
       not § 312, because barge was not a "vessel" and § 312 only regulates "sewage from vessels";
       held that the barge, which was permanently moored to the shore, was used to house workers and
       was not used for transportation)

       64 Fed. Reg. 25126 (1999) (proposed regulations by EPA and DOD  to control discharges from
       naval vessels)


MARPOL

       33 U S.C. §  1901-1911 ("Marine Plastic Pollution Research and Control Act of  1987")

       33 C.F.R. §  151.66 ("No person on board any ship ... may discharge garbage into the navigable
       waters of the United States.")

       33 C F R.  §  151.05(3) ("garbage" is defined as "all kinds of victual, domestic and operational

                                              71

-------
       waste excluding fresh fish and parts thereof, generated during the normal operation of the ship
       and liable to be disposed of continuously or periodically...")

       Chevron U.S.A.. Inc. v. Hammond. 726 F.2d 483, 20 ERC 1505 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105
       S. Ct. 2686, 22 ERC 2071 (oil-contaminated ballast water discharged from tankers; cites
       MARPOL as the genesis for the Alaska oil spill regulation at issue in the case; no preemption by
       federal statute found)
MINING
       33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(G) (area wide waste management plans shall include "a process to (i)
       identify, if appropriate, mine-related sources of pollution including new, current, and abandoned
       surface and underground mine run-off and (ii) set forth procedures and methods (including land
       use requirements) to control to the extent feasible such sources")

       33 U.S.C. §§  1342(1)(2) (Storm water runoff from oil, gas and mining)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(10) (storm water regulation definition of overburden)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(iii)("Facilities classified as Standard Industrial Classifications 10
       through 14 (mineral industry) including active or inactive mining operations ...")

       40 C.F.R. § 130.6(c)(4)(iii)(D) ("BMPs shall be identified for the nonpoint sources identified in
       section 208(b)(2)(F)-(K) of the Act and other nonpoint sources as follows:... Identification of
       procedures to control mine-related sources of pollution in accordance with section 208(b)(2)(G)
       of the Act.")

       40 C.F.R. Part 440 (Effluent Guidelines and Standards for Ore Mining and Dressing Point
       Source Category)

       Rith Energy Inc. v. United States. 44 Fed. Cl. 108,48 ERC 1951 (Fed. Cl. 1999) (takings claim
       by coal mining company for denial of mining permit denied where acid mine drainage from mine
       was contaminating drinking water supplies because under Tennessee law, such contamination is
       considered a nuisance)

       Amigos Bravos  v. Molvcorp Inc.. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28576 (10th Cir. 1998) (suit against
       mine for discharging without a permit dismissed on grounds that claim should have been brought
       as a challenge to the permit; mine had disclosed to EPA that it had seeps draining from its waste
       rock pile, and EPA chose not to regulate the discharges in the reissued permit)

       Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Interior Dept. 20 F.3d 1418, 38 ERC 1393 (6th Cir. 1994) (reversed
       district court decision blocking EPA enforcement of CWA in delegated state where state had
       given coal mine permission to discharge large quantities of contaminated groundwater from mine
       shafts into local river)

       Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Util.. 13 F.3d 305, 309, 38 ERC 1001 (9th Cir.
       1993). cert, denied. 513 U.S. 873 (1994) (acid mine drainage is sufficient to satisfy the definition

                                              72

-------
of "pollutant" under the CWA; reliance on historical pollution to evade current liability
misapprehends the focus of the CWA; the CWA does not impose liability only where a net
increase in the level of pollution from a point source discharge is present. Rather, the CWA
categorically prohibits any discharge of a pollutant from a point source without a permit)

Ackels v. EPA, 7 F.3d 862, 37 ERC 2118 (9th Cir. 1993) (court upheld EPA's placer mining
permit after challenges to turbidity and arsenic limits)

United States v. Law. 979 F.2d 977, 978-79, 23 ELR 20466 (4th Cir. 1992), cert, denied. 507
U.S. 1030,113 S. Ct. 1844 (1993) (criminal conviction for unpermitted acid mine drainage)

American Mining Congress v. EPA. 965 F.2d 759, 35 ERC 1032 (9th Cir. 1992) (upheld
provision of EPA's  storm water rule which classifies storm water discharges from inactive mines
as "associated with industrial activity" and thus subject to NPDES permitting under § 402(p) of
the CWA)

West Virginia Coal Assn. v. EPA. 932 F.2d 934, 33 ERC 1353,1355-56 (4th Cir. 1991) (court
rejected argument that Corps, not EPA should regulate discharge of mining wastes into navigable
waters.  "Generally, the Army has authority over the discharge [of] fill while the EPA has
authority over the discharge of pollutants... Appellants analysis falls short, however, since the
Army regulations, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e), provide evidence that it did not intend to regulate the
disposal of mining related spoil since the primary purpose of such fills and treatment ponds is to
dispose of waste and treat sediment-laden water, not to create dry land or to change the bottom
elevation of the water.")

Rvbachek v. EPA. 904 F.2d 1276, 31 ERC 1585 (9th Cir. 1990) (challenge to EPA placer mining
effluent guidelines turned down on several grounds)

Ouivira Mining Co. v. EPA. 765 F.2d 126, 130, 22 ERC 2003 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied. 474
U.S. 1055 (non-navigable creeks and "arroyos" affect interstate commerce because during times
of "intense rainfall" there could be a surface connection between these waterways and navigable
streams)

Trustees for Alaska v. EPA. 749 F.2d 549, 21 ERC 2222 (9th Cir. 1984) (appeal of placer mining
permits on various grounds; held that EPA erred by failing to establish effluent limit for
turbidity; held that placer mines are point sources)

Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle. 604 F.2d 239, 250,13 ERC 1289 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'don
other grounds sub nom EPA v. National Crushed Stone  Association. 449 U.S. 64,100 S. Ct.
1011, 62 L. Ed. 2d 750,15 ERC 1209 (1980) (challenge to regulations on mining wastewater that
is "pumped, siphoned or drained from coal storage" rejected on grounds that definition of point
source "excludes unchanneled and uncollected surface waters.")

United States v Rarth Sciences. Inc.. 599 F.2d 368, 18 ERC 1105 (10th Cir. 1978) (liability
found where recirculation  sumps at gold leaching operation were overwhelmed by greater-than-
expected snow melt runoff, causing cyanide discharges; court noted that Congress rejected an
amendment that would have regulated mining discharge from point sources on the ground that it
duplicated the Act's general regulatory provisions, citing Staff of Senate Comm. On Public

                                       73

-------
 Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act
 Amendments of 1972, 530-535 (Comm. Print 1973))

 Bragg v. Robertson. 54 F. Supp.2d 653,48 ERC 1913 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (settlement agreement
 on valley fills requiring U.S. to prepare programmatic EIS concerning mountaintop coal mining
 fair and reasonable; also contains discussion of need for 404 permits)

 Bragg v. Robertson. No. 2:98-0636 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 3, 1999) (issuing preliminary injunction
 against operation of mountain top coal mine in West Virginia due to possible CWA, SMCRA,
 and NEPA violations)

 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 998 F. Supp.
 946 (N.D. HI. 1998) (upheld CWA 404 jurisdiction over a complex of isolated, intrastate waters
 in a former gravel mining pit)

 Waste Action Project v. Dawn Mining Co.. No. CV-96-00106-AAM (E.D. Wa. Aug. 30, 1996),
 affd. 137 F.3d 1426,46 ERC 1257 (9* Cir. 1998)  (held that discharges from uranium mine
 tailings piles exempted from definition of "pollutant" under CWA, citing Atomic Energy Act and
 EPA's regulation, 40 C.F.R. § 122.2)

 Idaho Rivers United v.  NMFS. No. C94-1476R (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 1995) (biological opinion
 issued by NMFS inadequately considered the impacts of the mining operation on salmon; FS and
 EPA ordered to reinitiate consultation with regard  to the impacts of the Beartrack Gold Mine on
 2 species of Snake R. salmon, which are classified as threatened)

 Friends of Santa Fe v. LAC Minerals. Inc.. 892 F. Supp. 1333, 26 ELR 20135 (D.N.M. July 14,
 1995) (Dolores Arroyo, an intermittent stream bed, held to be waters of U.S.; seeps and springs
 at the mine site containing acid mine drainage held to  be non-point source pollution; overburden
 material discharged to Arroyo held not be "dredge" or "fill" within meaning of 33 C.F.R.
 § 323.2(c); argument that state-issued permit at mine for overburden management rejected on
 grounds that § 309(g)(6)(A)(ii)  bar applies only when administrative penalty has been collected)

 United States v. Iron Mountain  Mines. 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1435,41 ERC 1042 (E.D. Cal. 1995)
 (noting in CERCLA context that acid mine drainage is "a pollutant harmful to fish")

 Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co.. Inc.. 620 F.2d 41,45,14 ERC 1984 (5th Cir. 1980)
 (sump pits into which miners channeled contaminated runoff and which sometimes overflowed
 into U.S. waters were point sources)

 Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines. 904 F. Supp. 1168, 26 ELR 16853 (D. Mont. 1995)
 (historic discharges from adits and pits that were exacerbated by recent exploration work held to
 be point source discharges, not storm water)

 Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining Co.. 870 F. Supp. 983,40 ERC 1134 (E.D.
 Wash. 1994) (held that a tailing pond is a point source and that groundwater discharges from the
pond that enter navigable waters come under jurisdiction of the CWA)

United States v. Rvbachek. No.  F86-059 (D. Ak. July 20,1992) (no estoppel to enforce for

                                       74

-------
       violation of DMR where EPA inspector allegedly told miners that DMRs, which formed basis of
       liability, would not be used as basis for enforcement because no affirmative misconduct shown)

       United States v. Rvbachek. 643 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Ak. 1986) (change of venue requested by
       Rybacheks in EPA enforcement action granted)

       In re Dos Republicas Resources Co.. Inc.. 6 E.A.D. 643 (EAB 1996) (EAB denied request for
       evidentiary hearing on NPDES permit issued to coal mine, holding that the Region had
       sufficiently considered alternatives and nothing in NEPA provides EPA with authority to put
       conditions into an NPDES permit that have nothing to do with discharges to the receiving water)

       In re Miners Advocacy Council. 4 E.A.D.40 (EAB 1992) (review granted on issue of whether 40
       C.F.R. § 125.3 precludes Region from dividing the integrated placer mining process and
       authorizing discharges from one part of that process (sluicing) while not authorizing discharges
       from another part of the process (hydraulic overburden)

       In re Miners Advocacy Council. 4 E.A.D. 230 (EAB 1992) (permit must consider the entire
       process, including the use of hydraulic removal of over burden, if any permit applicant so
       requests; actual terms of the permit would depend on a site-specific factual analysis)

       In re Homestake Mining Co.. 2 E.A.D. 195 (CJO 1986) (EPA may not look behind a State
       certification issue pursuant to § 401 of the CWA for the purpose of relaxing a requirement of
       certification)

       In re 446 Alaska Placer Mines. 2  E.A.D. 102 (CJO 1985) (Region erred when it excluded legal
       questions from consideration at the evidentiary hearing)

       In re NPDES Permit Systems for  170 Alaska Placer Mines. More or Less. 1 E.A.D. 616 (CJO
       1980) (5th Amend, challenge to NPDES permit not proper for EPA to hear; remanded to Region
       for evidentiary hearing on  issue of whether recycling constitutes BPT)

       Kinross Cooper Corp. v. State. 1999 Ore. App. LEXIS 760 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (State's denial of
       a copper company's application for an NPDES permit to discharge mining wastes into state
       waters did not effect a taking of private property; in order for the company to have a private
       property right to discharge wastewater into state waters, the right must have come into existence
       separately after compliance with state law regarding the creation and recognition of state water
       rights)
MIXING ZONES
       40 C.F.R. § 131.35(d)(8) (definition of mixing zone for water quality standards issued for
       Colville Confederated Indian Tribes Reservation: "Mixing zone or dilution zone means a limited
       area or volume of water where initial dilution of a discharge takes place; and where numeric
       water quality criteria can be exceeded but acutely toxic conditions are prevented from
       occurring.")

       Cf 40 C.F.R. § 125.58(dd) (zone of initial dilution [for 301(h) waivers] means the region of

                                              75

-------
 initial mixing surrounding or adjacent to the end of the outfall pipe or diffuser ports, provided
 that the 7JD may not be larger than allowed by mixing zone restriction in applicable water
 quality standards.")

 American Iron and Steel Institute v. EPA. 115 F.3d 979,44 ERC 1769,1780-83 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
 (held that mixing-zone provisions in Great Lakes Water Qaulity Guidance, which eliminated
 mixing zones for bioaccumulative chemicals went beyond agency's authority)

 Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA.  8 F.3d 73, 37 ERC 1729 (1st Cir. 1993) (whether a mixing zone
 is allowed is a question of state law)

 Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA. 830 F.2d 1346,26 ERC 1907 (5th Cir. 1987) (mixing zone is a
 cost/benefit judgment, not a scientific one)

 In re Ketchikan Pulp Co.. 6 E.A.D. 675 (EAB 1996) (held that absent state certification EPA
 properly concluded that it lacked  authority to include mixing zone in an NPDES permit where
 state regulations reserve discretion over mixing zones to the State)

 In re City of Hollywood. Florida. 5 E.A.D. 157 (EAB  1994) (where admin, record does not
 indicate what action, if any, State has taken in response to mixing zone request, there is no legal
 basis for mixing zone)

 In re Broward County. Florida. 4 E.A.D. 705 (EAB 1993) (40 C.F.R. § 122.44, requires that the
 permit contain effluent limitations which are at least as stringent as state water quality  standards;
 however, Region must grant evidentiary hearing on factual question regarding the 40 C.F.R.
 § 122.44(d)(l)(iv) reasonable potential calculation is valid and supports effluent limits)

 In re Star-Kist Caribe. Inc.. 2 E.A.D. 758 (CJO 1989) (whether State should have approved
 mixing zone and included it in the water quality certification is a matter of state law and must be
 challenged in state proceedings, not on appeal to the Administrator)

 EPA, "Mixing Zones - Water Quality Standards Criteria Summaries:  A Compilation of
 State/Federal Criteria" (September 1988) ("Whether to establish such a mixing zone policy is a
 matter of State certification.")

 EPA, "Mixing Zone Guidance" (draft January 17,1995) ("[M]ixing zones cannot be of a size or
 location that, when the segment is taken as a whole, the designated use is not fully attained.")

 EPA, "Guidance on Application of State Mixing Zone Policies in EPA-Issued NPDES Permits"
 (August 6,1998)

 EPA, "Technical Support Document For Water Quality-based Toxics Control," § 2.2.2 (Mixing
 Zones) (March 1991) at 33-34

 63 Fed. Reg. 36741 (1998) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking re mixing zones)

See also STATE CERTIFICATION
                                       76

-------
MONITORING/REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

       40 C.F.R. §,122.41(j) (Monitoring and records)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.41(1) (Reporting requirements)

       Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries. 847 F.2d 1109, 27 ERC 1881 (4th Cir. 1988). cert, denied. 491
       U.S. 904 (1989) ($977,000 penalty upheld against defendant pulp mill who failed to monitor or
       submit DMRs for over two years; "Simkins' monitoring requirements were not designed to be a
       mere academic exercise. Simkins was bound by the reporting and records retention requirements
       of the NPDES permit that are central to adequate administration and enforcement of limits on
       substantive discharges under the Clean Water Act. Unless a permit holder monitors as required
       by the permit, it will be difficult if not impossible for state and federal officials charged with
       enforcement of the Clean Water Act to know whether or not the permit holder is discharging
       effluent in excess of the permit's maximum levels." 27 ERC at 1885)

       Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOO. Inc.. 956 F. Supp. 588, 603,44
       ERC 1232 (D.S.C. 1997), vacated and remanded on other grounds. 149 f.3d 303,46 ERC 2025
       (4* Cir. 1998) ("monitoring violations.. .not considered serious unless they are found to have
       been in bad faith")

       United States v. Smithfield Foods. Inc.. 972 F. Supp. 338 ,45 ERC 1387 (E.D. Va. 1997),
       affirmed in part, reversed in part.	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22092 (4th Cir. 1999)
       (monitoring violations "do impact the effectiveness of the self-reporting scheme set up by the
       Act.  When a permittee falsifies DMRs, fails to maintain supporting records, or destroys records,
       the permittee may be covering up serious violations of effluent limitations. Thus, the court
       cannot assume that violations of monitoring and reporting requirements in a permit are trivial.
       Since the Clean Water Act relies on self-reporting of permittee, such violations undermine the
       Act and are considered serious by this court, despite the fact that they are not discharge
       violations.")

       Public Interest Research Group v. Elf Atochem. 817 F. Supp. 1164, 36 ERC 1855 (D.N.J.  1993)
       (summary judgment entered against defendant for both failure to monitor and failure to report
       violations on DMRs)

       Tn re Citv of Port St. Joe and Florida Coast Paper Co.. 7 E.A.D. 275 (EAB 1997) (challenge to
       permit condition requiring sampling for pollutant for which  there was no state water quality
       standard rejected; EPA has wide discretion under CWA to require effluent sampling and
       monitoring)

       Tn re Anthony J. Tavlor. Andover Water Corporation. Docket No. PWS-NJ-CFP-03 (Order for
       Accelerated Decision, Aug. 14, 1992) ("The self-submission of data is critical to the success of
       our public water supply program under the SDWA.  Without this data, EPA and the State of New
       Jersey cannot know whether a drinking water supply is safe. Therefore, any failure to submit
       data significantly undermines the fundamental mechanism of the public water supply program
       and requires the use of Agency enforcement resources." Id-  at 3)

       EPA, Interim Guidance for Performance-Based Reduction of NPDES Permit Monitoring

                                              77

-------
        Frequencies (April 1996)

        See also DISCHARGE MONITORING REPORTS


 NATIONAL TOXICS RULE

        40 C.F.R. § 131.36 (Toxics criteria for those states not complying with Clean Water Act
        § 303(c)(2)(B))

        American Paper Institute v. EPA. 996 F.2d 346, 352, 36 ERG 2025 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (held that
        EPA properly issued regulation requiring methods for translating narrative criteria into chemical
        specific effluent limits; Section 303(c)(2)(B) "required states, in their next triennial reviews, to
        formulate numeric criteria for certain priority toxic pollutants listed in the EPA guidelines. If
        numeric criteria for those listed toxics were "not available," the provision mandated that states
        enact criteria based on biological monitoring technique.")

        Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 915 F.2d 1314, 1318, 31 ERC 2089 (9th Cir.
        1990) ("CWA section 303(c)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B), requires states to adopt
        'specific numerical criteria' for toxics for which the EPA has published criteria pursuant to
        section 304(a).... Those criteria are to be adopted when the state first reviews its water quality
        standards following the enactment of the 1987 amendments. The requirement of  numerical
        criteria for toxics makes it easier for permit writers to incorporate the water quality standards
        into NPDES permits. Permit writers thus no longer have an excuse for failing to impose water-
        quality-based limitations on permit holders.")

        American Forest & Paper Assoc. v. EPA. No. 93-cv-0694 (RMU) (D.D.C. 1996) (challenge to
        NTR largely rejected (two procedural defects remanded for further record development); court
        upheld EPA's decision to promulgate dioxin criteria even though the Agency had not completed
        its re-assessment of dioxin: held that the EPA had "recognized the diversity of scientific opinion
        concerning dioxin's health risks" and that it is "not the court's role to decide between conflicting
        scientific evidence, especially where the agency appears to have considered all the available
        evidence.")

        Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 806 F. Supp. 1263,1276, 35 ERC 1947 (E.D.
        Va. 1992) ("[T]he Clean Water Act allows narrative criteria for some uses and numeric criteria
        for others.  See Section 303(c)(2)(B).")

        60 Fed.  Reg. 22228 (1995) (Stay of Federal Water Quality Criteria for Metals)

        Note Fed. Reg. cites at end of § 131.36.

       See also TOXICITY LIMITS; WHOLE EFFLUENT TOXICITY TESTING


"NAVIGABLE WATERS" (§ 502(7))

       33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) ("'navigable waters' means the waters of the United States, including the

                                             78

-------
  territorial seas")

  40 C.F.R. § 122.2 ("Waters of the United States or waters of the U.S. means:
                 (a) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past or may be
         susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are
         subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
                 (b) All interstate waters, including interstate 'wetlands;'
                 (c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
         intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, 'wetlands,' sloughs, prairie potholes, wet
         meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds the use, degradation, or destruction of which
         would affect or could effect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
                 (1) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational
         or other purposes;
                 (2) From which fish or shell fish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or
         foreign commerce; or
                 (3) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in
         interstate commerce;
                 (d) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United
         States under this definition;
                (e) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this
         definition;
                (f) The territorial sea: and
                (g) 'Wetlands' adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves
         wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a) through (f) of this definition.
         Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet the
         requirements of CWA (other than cooling ponds as defined in 40 CFR 423.1 l(m) which
         also meet the criteria of this definition) are not waters of the United States. This
         exclusion applies only to manmade bodies of water which neither were originally created
         in waters of the United States (such as disposal area in wetlands) nor resulted from the
         impoundment of waters of the United States [See Note 1 of this section] Water of the
         United States do not include prior converted cropland....")

 International Paper Co. v. Ouellette. 479 U.S. 481,484 (1987) ("[navigable waters] has been
 construed expansively to cover waters that are not navigable in the traditional sense.")

 United States v. Riverside Bavview Homes. 474 U.S. 121,  131, 23 ERC 1561 (1985)
 (defendant's property is a wetland adjacent to a navigable waterway; hence it is a part of the
 waters of the U.S. as defined in 33 C.F.R.  § 323.2)

 United States v. TGR Corp.. 171 F.3d 762, 29 ELR 21059 (2nd Cir. 1999) (conviction for
 unpermitted discharge of slurry from asbestos removal project affirmed; held that brook into
 which slurry was discharged is waters of U.S.; rejected defendant's argument that brook is a
 "municipal storm sewer" and therefore not waters of the U.S. because testimony at  trial showed
 that the brook was not  "owned or operated" by a public body as required under 40 C.F.R.
 § 122.26(b)(8))

United States v. Edison. 108 F.3d 1336,44 ERC  1550 (11th Cir. 1997), cert, denied. 118 S. Ct.
248 (1997) (discharge of sludge from truck to storm water ditch that led to drainage canal to

                                        79

-------
 emptied into Tampa Bay held to be discharge to navigable waters; held that it is "well established
 that Congress intended to regulate the discharge of pollutants into all waters that may eventually
 lead to waters affecting interstate commerce.")

 United States v. Wilson. 133 F.3d 251,45 ERG 1801 (4th Cir. 1997) (criminal conviction for
 unlawful dredge and fill overturned and remanded; court held that Corps definition of wetlands,
 which forbade activities that "could affect" interstate commerce, was invalid; "The regulation
 [33 CFR 328.3(a)(3)] requires neither that the regulated activity have a substantial affect on
 interstate commerce, nor that the covered waters have any sort of nexus with navigable, or even
 interstate, waters. Were this regulation a statute, because, at least at first blush, it would appear
 to exceed congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.")

 United States v. Hartsell.  127 F.3d 343,45 ERC 1356 (4th Cir. 1997) (conviction for illegal
 discharges to sewer system in violation of pretreatment standards upheld; court rejected
 defendants'  argument that sewer system was not "navigable waters" and therefore not within the
 jurisdiction of the CWA)

 Leslie Salt Co. v. United States. 55 F.3d  1388, 1391,40 ERC 1865 (9th Cir. 1995), cert, denied.
 516 U.S. 955 (1995) (salt pond held to be navigable waters requiring a 404 permit to develop;
 navigable waters defined as "waters of U.S."; Corps, regulations define "waters of U.S.")

 York Ctr. Park Dist. v. Krilich. 40 F.3d 205, 206 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Navigable waters includes
 wetlands.")

 West Virginia Coal Assoc. v. Reillv. 33 ERC 1353,22 ELR 20092 (4th Cir. 1991) (lower court
 decision reported at 728 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.W.Va. 1989) (in-stream treatment ponds and the
 waters above such ponds fall within the definition of "waters of the United States" found in Part
 122.2, and do not fall within the excluded "waste treatment systems."  Dischargers may not
 appropriate a section of a river for treating their wastes)

 Conant v. United States. 786 F.2d  1008, 24 ERC 1343 (11* Cir. 1986) (cease and desist order to
 stop unpermitted fill of adjacent wetlands to create a fish pond upheld; wetlands held to be
 navigable waters)

 Ouivira Mining Co. v. EPA. 765 F.2d 126,130 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied. 474 U.S. 1055, 88
 L. Ed. 2d 769, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986) (holding that non-navigable and frequently dry arroyo and
 creek governed by the Act)

 United States v. Texas Pipeline Co.. 611 F.2d 345, 347, 14 ERC 1120 (10th Cir. 1979)
 (intermittent tributary to navigable water is water of the U.S.)

 Leslie Salt Co. v. Froelke. 578 F.2d 742,11 ERC 1729 (9th Cir. 1978) (diked salt water
 evaporation pond held to be navigable waters; navigable waters includes manmade  structures and
 other waterways holding water from, or carrying water to, waters of the U.S.; the term "navigable
 waters" as used in the CWA is "to be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation."
 578 F.2d at 755)

Pacific Legal Foundation v. Costle. 586 F.2d 650,655-56, 11 ERC 2125 (9th Cir. 1978). rev'd on

                                        80

-------
other grounds, 445 U.S. 198, 100 S. Ct. 1095, 63 L. Ed. 2d 329 (1980) (navigable waters do not
include the "contiguous zone" or the "ocean," which both occupy areas beyond the territorial
seas)

Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. EPA. 511 F.2d 963, 964 n.l, 7 ERC 1667 (9th Cir.
1975), rev'd on other grounds. 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (by defining "navigable waters" to include
"the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas," Congress indicated it clearly
meant to extend the jurisdiction of the 1972 CWA amendments to the constitutional limit to
include all tributaries to navigable waters)

United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co.. 504 F.2d 1317,7 ERC 1114 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding
that the Act covered a waterway which was a tributary of a waterway that eventually flowed into
a navigable river, 504 F.2d at 1325; "It would, of course, make a mockery of [Congress' power to
abate pollution under its interstate commerce powers] if its authority to control pollution was
limited to the bed of the navigable stream itself. The tributaries which join to form the river
could then be used as open sewers as far as federal regulation was concerned. The navigable part
of the river could become a mere conduit for upstream waste." Id. at 1326)

Community Assoc. for Restoration of the Environment v. Bosma Dairy. No. CY-98-3011-EFS
(E.D. Wash. July 29,1999) (held that irrigation canal to which a CAFO was discharging is
waters of the U.S.)

United States v. TGR Corp.. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9354  (D. Conn. 1998), affd. 171 F.3d 762,
29 ELR 21059 (unpermitted discharge to navigable waters found where contractor dumped
pollutants down a storm drain in the basement of a school  building, and the storm drain emptied
into a tributary of a navigable waterway; held that the tributary constituted navigable waters even
if it was man-made, and constructed for the purpose of carrying water from the storm water
system to the natural creek)

Marathon Oil Co. v. U.S. EPA. No. 97-CV-267-D (D. Wyo. Aug. 20, 1998) (CWA Class I
penalty order upheld - dry arroyos are "waters of the U.S." if there is sufficient evidence to show
water flows at some time; the court stated that the central question before it, therefore, was
whether water had actually flowed through the gulch, not whether the gulch is entitled to
protection under the CWA in the event water flows through it)

United States v.Appel. Case No. CV 94-7824 LGB (C.D.  Cal. Feb. 2,  1996) (held that Ventura
River and its tributary San Antonio Creek constitute "waters of the United States" within
meaning of 33 C.F.R. § 328.3)

Dubois v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16608 (D.N.H. 1995), affd in part,
rev'd in part.  102 F.3d 1273, 43 ERC 1824 (1st Cir. 1996)  (water need not be actually navigable
to qualify as "navigable waters"; pumping of water from river to pond not considerable addition
of pollutants to waters of U.S. because the definition of navigable waters as a singular entity, the
"waters of the U.S.", explains that the bodies of water are not to be considered individually in
this context)

Friends of Sant? ^ v T.AC Minerals. Inc.. 892 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1995) (Dolores Arroyo,
an intermittent stream bed, held to be waters  of U.S.)

                                       81

-------
  United States v. Zaneer. 767 F. Supp. 1030, 22 ELR 20231 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (Congress intended
  the term "waters of the U.S." be interpreted as broadly as constitutionally possible under the
  commerce clause)

  Save our Community v. EPA. 741 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd on other grounds. 971
  F.2d 1155, 35 ERC 1937 (5th Cir. 1992) (artificial ponds held to be navigable waters)

  United States v. Saint Bernard Parish. 589 F. Supp. 617, 620, 21 ERC 1950 (E.D. La. 1984)
  ("[T]his Court believes that the Forty Arpent Canal is a tributary of the adjacent wetlands. 40
  C.F.R. § 122.2(e). Congress intended to control both the discharge of pollutants directly into
  navigable waters and the discharge of pollutants into non-navigable tributaries which flow into
  navigable waters. . .. The scope of the Act's control extends to discharges into any waterway
  where any water which might flow therein could reasonable end up in any body of water, to
  which or in which there is  some public interest.")

  United States v. Oxford Roval Mushroom Products. Inc.. 487 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.  Pa. 1980)
  (navigable waters, as defined in §502(7), does not require navigability in fact)

  United States v. Weisman. 489 F. Supp. 1331,1343,17 ERC  1580 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (wetlands
  are "navigable waters" under the CWA; the Corps'  wetlands regulations "are in keeping with the
  purpose of the FWPCA as  revealed in its legislative history. Congress fully intended that the
  waters subject to regulatory control of the United States under the FWPCA be given the
  'broadest possible constitutional interpretation.' The scope is not limited to the traditional tests
  of navigability,  but rather is defined in Section 502, which defines 'navigable waters' under the
  FWPCA as 'waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.'  This definition
  effectively excludes from consideration any concept of navigability in law or in fact." (citations
  omitted).)

 United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.. 438 F. Supp. 945, 948-49 (W.D. Tenn. 1976) (holding
 that where the defendant knew or should have known that city sewers, into which it discharged
 pollutants, led directly into the Mississippi River, that was sufficient to constitute a  discharge
 into "waters of the United States" as that term is used in the CWA)

 United States v. Phelps Dodge. 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975) (the scope of the  CWA
 extends to all waterways, wet or dry, if water flowing therein could reasonably end up in a body
 of water in which there is some public interest)

 United States v.  GAP Corp.. 389 F. Supp. 1379, 7 ERC 1581,1583 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (definition
 of navigable waters "effectively excludes  from consideration any concept of navigability, in law
 or in fact.")

 United States v. Holland. 373 F.  Supp. 665, 673, 6 ERC 1388 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (man-made water
 body used to convey pollutants is water of the U.S.; water body need not be navigable in fact to
 be within jurisdiction of the CWA)

 In re Pepperell Associates. Docket No. CWA-2-I-97-1088 (ALJ Gunning Oct. 9,1998)  (SPCC
regulations held to apply to tanks that could discharge to man-made retention basin that was
connected to surface waters via a sewer conduit; these facts rendered the retention basin a

                                        82

-------
"navigable waterway.")

In re Luis Bettencourt,1994 EPA RJO LEXIS 5 (RJO Hamill 1994) (lateral is waters of U.S.
despite intermittent flow and there were no irrigation waters flowing in canal at time of
discharge)

In re Donald J. Aardema and Joe Pachecn. 1992 EPA RJO LEXIS 17 (Region 10 RJO Hamill
1992) (discharge from CAFO to irrigation lateral held to be discharge to waters of U.S.)

H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1972); H.R. Rep. No. 92-1465, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 144 (1972) (the term "navigable waters" as defined in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) is to be given
the broadest possible interpretation)

2 Legislative History of the Water Quality Act of 1987, at 1495 ("The control strategy of the Act
extends to navigable waters. The definition of this terms means the navigable waters of the
United States, portions thereof, and includes the territorial seas and the Great Lakes.  Through
narrow interpretation of the definition of interstates waters the implementation [of the] 1965 Act
was severely limited. Water moves in hydrological cycles and it is essential that discharge of
pollutants be controlled at the source.  Therefore, reference to the control requirements must be
made to the navigable waters, portions thereof, and their tributaries.")

62 Fed. Reg. 20177, 20180 (1997) (EPA Region 10, Idaho CAFO General Permit, Response to
Comments: "Canals and laterals which empty into (or connect with) waters of the United States
such as rivers, streams, lakes, etc. are themselves waters of the United States in accordance with
the definition of waters of the United States in 40 CFR 122.2(e). As a result, discharges into
canals and laterals are considered point source discharges which must be regulated under the
NPDES permitting program.")

57 Fed. Reg. 45037 (1993) (definition of "waters of the United States" amended by adding 3 new
sentences at end)

53 Fed. Reg. 20765 (1988) (preamble to EPA 404  regulations; "For clarification it should be
noted that we generally do not consider the following water to be 'Waters of the United States.'
However, EPA reserves the right on a case-by-case basis to determine that a particular water
body within these categories of waters is a water of the United States.  Pursuant to agreements
with EPA, the permitting authority also has the right to determine on a case-by-case basis if any
of these waters are 'waters of the Untied States.'
(a) Non-tidal drainage and irrigation ditches excavated on dry land.
(b) Artificially irrigated areas which would revert to upland if the irrigation ceased.
(c) Artificial lakes or ponds created by excavating and/or diking dry land to c9ollect and retain
water and which are used exclusively for such purposes as stock watering, irrigation, settling
basins, or rice growing.
(d) Artificial reflecting or swimming pools or other small ornamental of water created by
excavating and/or diking dry land to retain water for primarily aesthetic reasons.
(e) Water filled depressions created in dry land incidental to construction activity and pits
excavated in dry land for the purpose of obtaining  fill, sand, or gravel unless and until the
construction or excavation operation is abandoned and the resulting body of water meets the
definition of waters of the United States.")

                                        83

-------
       51 Fed. Reg. 41217 (1986) (preamble to 33 C.F.R. Part 328, Corps' definition of "Waters of the
       United States;" almost identical language to language quoted above in 53 Fed. Reg. 20765)

       George K. Chamberlin, Annotation, What Are 'Navigable Waters' Subject to the Provisions of
       the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 52 ALR Fed 788 (1981)

       See also STATE JURISDICTION; GROUND WATER, DISCHARGES TO; NPDES PERMITS:
       Internal Waste Streams
NEPA
       42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (NEPA requires that all agencies of the federal government shall "include in
       ever recommendation or report on proposals for legislation or other major federal actions
       significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the
       responsible official on ... the environmental impact of the proposed action.")

       33 U.S.C. § 1371(c) ("Except for the provision of the Federal financial assistance for the purpose
       of assisting the construction of publicly owned treatment works ... and the issuance of a permit
       under [§ 402] for the discharge of any pollutant by a new source ... no action of the
       Administrator taken pursuant to this chapter shall be deemed a major Federal action significantly
       affecting the quality of the human environment within the  meaning of the National
       Environmental Policy Act of 1969.")

       40 C.F.R. § 6.605(b)(3) (an EIS is required for a new source NPDES permit if "[a]ny major part
       of the new source will have significant adverse effect on the habitat of threatened or endangered
       species")

       40 C.F.R. § 122.29(g) ("The National Environmental Policy Act... may require preparation of
       an Environmental Impact Statement and consideration of ElS-related permit conditions (other
       than effluent limitations) as provided in 122.29(c))

       40 C.F.R. § 1502.25 ('To the fullest extent possible, agencies shall prepare draft environmental
       impact statements concurrently with and integrated with environmental impact analyses and
       related studies required by the ... Endangered Species Act.")

       Dubois v. USDA. 102 F.3d 1273,43 ERC 1824 (1st Cir. 1996) (held that NEPA requires the
       Forest Service to identify in its EIA all federal permits that the ski area expansion needed to
       comply with federal law, e.g., NPDES permit; water taken from creek for use in snow-making
       equipment with excess discharged to pond on other side of ridge held to be discharge of
       pollutants; court rejected EPA's position that moving the creek water to the pond without adding
       pollutants was not a discharge of pollutants to waters of U.S.; held that Forest Service was
       obligated to obtain an NPDES permit before permitting the expansion on Forest Service land)

             Cf. Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Forest Service. 141 F.3d 803, 46 ERC 1694,1698
             (8th Cir. 1998), reh'gen bane denied. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16225 (1998) (suit
             challenging logging sale by Forest Service dismissed; 'The Wildlife Association cites no
             authority for the proposition that the Forest Service needs an NPDES permit before

                                             84

-------
        contracting to allow others to harvest timber and build roads	EPA's regulations
        expressly provide, 'it is the operator's duty to obtain a permit.'  40 C.F.R. § 122.21(b)")

Adams v. EPA. 38 F.3d 43, 55 n. 11 (1st Cir. 1994) (no requirement under NEPA that EPA
consider alternative outfall locations because plant is not a new source)

Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 859 F.2d 156,168, 28 ERC 1401 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (good discussion of EPA's authority to regulate dischargers under authority of NEPA)

Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 822 F.2d 104,127, 26 ERC 1153 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (EPA may not ban construction of facility before it has applied for NPDES permit; until
facility applies for permit, EPA's NEPA responsibility is not triggered )

Northwest Indian Cemetarv Protective Ass'n v. Peterson. 795 F.2d 688, 24 ERC 1775 (9* Cir.
1986), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.. Lvng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n.
485 U.S. 439,108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988) (held that EIS prepared for Forest Service road was
inadequate in that it did not adequately address effects on water quality)

Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch. 718 F.2d 29, 20 ERC 1125  (2nd Cir. 1983), cert, denied. 465
U.S. 1099 (1984) (EPA not arbitrary and capricious for deciding  to not to prepare EIS prior to
granting construction grant for sewer project because there would be no adverse effects on
waterways or land use and is not controversial)

Roosevelt Campobello Intern. Park v. EPA. 684 F.2d 1041,1047,17 ERC 2023 (1st Cir. 1982)
(challenge to NPDES permit based on NEPA and ESA; held that agency consideration of
alternatives need only be reasonable)

Bragg v. Robertson. 54 F. Supp.2d 653, 48 ERC 1913 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (settlement agreement
on valley fills requiring U.S. to prepare programmatic EIS concerning mountaintop coal mining
fair and reasonable; also contains discussion of need for 404 permits)

Sierra Club v. Alexander. 484 F. Supp. 455, 14 ERC 1465 (N.D.N.Y.  1980), aff d without
opinion. 633 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1980) (Corps failure to engage in alternatives analysis because it
believed impact of construction of shopping center was insignificant held to be violation of its
obligation to perform alternatives analysis under 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E))

Chesapeake Bav Foundation v. Va. State Water Control Bd.. 453 F. Supp.  122, 11  ERC 1897
(E.D. Va 1978) (no NEPA review required for NPDES permit issued in delegated state; held that
failure of EPA to object to permit does not constitute a federal action necessary to invoke NEPA)

In re Dos Renublicas Resources Co.. Inc.. 6 E.A.D. 643 (EAB 1996) (EAB denied request for
evidentiary hearing on NPDES permit issued to coal mine, holding that the Region had
sufficiently considered alternatives and nothing in NEPA provides EPA with authority to put
conditions into an NPDES permit that have nothing to do with discharges to the receiving water)

Tn re Louisville- Has and Electric Co.. 1 E.A.D. 687, 694-95 (CJO 1981) (an EIS drafted for an
NPDES permit for a power plant was challenged for inadequate attention to an alternative
smaller plant, based upon an additional season's power consumption data; held that the agency

                                       85

-------
        was reasonable in not waiting for another season's worth of data before issuing the EIS)

        Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Environmental Impact Statements Under sec. 102(2)(c)
        of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)) in Cases Involving
        Water and Water Works Projects, 67 A.L.R. Fed. 54, supp. sec. 4

        See also NEW SOURCES
 NEW SOURCES
        33 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2) ("new source" means "any source, the construction of which is
        commenced after the publication of proposed regulations prescribing a standard of performance
        under this section which will be applicable to such source, if such standard is thereafter
        promulgated in accordance with this section.")

        40 C.F.R. § 122.2 ("New Source means any building, structure, facility, or installation from
        which there is or may be a "discharge of pollutants," the construction of which commenced:
               (a) After promulgation of standards of performance under section 306 of the CWA
        which are applicable to such source, or
               (b)  After proposal of standards of performance in accordance with section 306 of the
        CWA which are applicable to such source, but only if the standards are promulgated in
        accordance with section 306 within 120 days of their proposal.")

        40 C.F.R. § 122.29(b) (definition of new sources for purposes of preparing environmental
        assessment's)

        Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA.  822 F.2d 104, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (EPA's new
        source definition and ten-year grace period provisions were harmonious with CWA; cites
        legislative history)

        Manasuta-88. Inc. v. Thomas. 799 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1986) (EPA finding that construction at
        existing site was not "new source" not arbitrary and capricious)

        See also EFFLUENT GUIDELINES; NEPA
NONPOINT SOURCES

       33 U.S.C. § 1288 (Area wide waste treatment management)

       33 U.S.C. § 1329 (Nonpoint source management programs)

       40 C.F.R. § 130.6(c)(4)(Nonpoint source management and control)

       Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck. 151 F.3d 945,46 ERC 1993 (9th Cir. 1998) (held that
       401 certification does not apply to nonpoint source pollutants, such as manure from grazing on
       public lands; distinguished dam cases (Consumers Power et al.) on grounds that dams are point

                                              86

-------
sources but they don't discharge pollutants)

Marble Mountain Audubon Society v. Rice. 914 F.2d 179, 32 ERC 1249,1253,21 ELR 20023
(9th Cir. 1990) ("The judicial review provisions of the [APA], permits private citizens to sue for
alleged state water quality control violations from nonpoint sources.")

Oregon Natural Resources Council v. U.S. Forest Service. 834 F.2d 842, 27 ERC 1068,1074,18
ELR 20450 (9th Cir. 1987) (Congress did not intend for section 301 to apply to nonpoint sources;
"Nonpoint source pollution is not specifically defined in the Act, but is pollution that does not
result from the 'discharge' or 'addition' of pollutants from a point source. Examples of nonpoint
source pollution include runoff from irrigated agriculture and silvicultural activities." Id. at n.9)

Idaho Conservation League v. Caswell. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21980 (D. Id. 1996) (held that
Forest Service approval of the construction of two logging roads in a National Forest was not
subject to state certification under § 401 on grounds that roads are nonpoint sources; "Section
401 is only intended to encompass those projects which resulted in a 'point source discharge.'")

Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas. 940 F. Supp. 1534,43 ERC 1257 (D. Or. 1996), rev'd.
remanded sub nom.. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck. 151 F.3d 945,46 ERC 1993 (9th
Cir. 1998) (in challenge to grazing permits issued by Forest Service, court held that § 401 applies
to all federally permitted activities that may result in a discharge, including discharges from
nonpoint sources; court concluded that definition of point source in § 502 was not limited to
discrete conveyances)

S. Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 7-8 (1985) (pollution of navigable waters can result from
diffuse precipitation, percolation, or runoff, e.g.. agricultural chemicals from farmlands, urban
runoff, runoff from construction activities, and other substances washed by unchanneled rain into
navigable waters)

Envtl L. Instit., Almanac of Enforceable State Laws to Control Nonpoint Source Water Pollution
(Jan. 7,1999) (summary of laws of 50 states governing nonpoint source pollution)

Note, Agricultural Nonpoint Source Runoff- The Effects Both On and Off the Farm: An Analysis
of Federal and State Regulation of Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollutants, 5 Wise. Envt'l L.J.
43 (1998)

EPA, Clean Water Action Plan (1998) (good discussion of nonpoint source pollution problem)

Oliver A Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based Regulation
Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ELR 10329 (1997) 10342 ("Congress added § 309 to the Act to
fund and stimulate state nonpoint programs. This was the epitome of a voluntary program, and it
produced about the same results as its predecessor had in 1972: a volume of studies, a number of
voluntary programs, and little noticeable cleanup of nonpoint source pollution.")

Envtl L.  Instit., Enforceable State Mechanisms for the Control of Nonpoint Source Water
Pollution (1997)

Clare F. Saperstein, State Solutions  to Nonpoint Source Pollution: Implementation and

                                        87

-------
       Enforcement of the 1990 Coastal Zone Amendments Reauthorization Act Section 6217, 73 B.U.
       L. Rev. 889, 890 (1995)

       EPA, "Nonpoint Source Guidance" (1987) at 3 ("nonpoint source pollution does not result from a
       discharge at a specific single location (such as a single pipe) but generally results from land
       runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, or peculations.")

       V. Novotny & G. Chesters, Handbook of Nonpoint Pollution 2 (1981) (nonpoint sources account
       for more than 50% of total water quality problem)

       See also "POINT SOURCE;" TMDLs; CAFOs
NOTICE OF VIOLATION

       United States v. Citv of Colorado Springs. 455 F. Supp. 1364, 1366-67 (D. Colo. 1978) (a notice
       under § 309(a)(l) is not a condition precedent to federal enforcement)

       See also COMPLIANCE ORDERS
NPDES PERMITS

       33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) ("(1).. .[T]he Administrator may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue
       a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants ... upon condition that
       such discharge will meet either (A) all applicable requirements [of the Act], or (B) prior to the
       taking of necessary implementing actions relating to all such requirements, such conditions as the
       Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
              (2) The Administrator shall prescribe conditions for such permits to assure compliance
       with the requirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection, including conditions on data and
       information collection, reporting, and such other requires as he deems appropriate.")

       33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (State permit programs)

       A.     Administrative Extensions

              5 U.S.C. § 558(c) ("When the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for a
              renewal or a new license in accordance with agency rules, a license with reference to an
              activity of a continuing nature does not expire until the application has been finally
              determined by the agency.")

              40 C.F.R. § 122.6 (Continuation of Expiring Permits)

              40 C.F.R. § 124.60(c) (for permit renewals, if request for formal hearing is granted, then
              the entire permit is stayed pending review)

              Texas Oil & Gas Assoc. v. EPA. 161 F.3d 923, n.3 (5th Cir. 1998) ("No NPDES permit,
              however, may be issued for a term exceeding five years. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3),

-------
       (b)(l)(A). This ensures that all newly reissued permits will incorporate the most recent
       [effluent guidelines].")

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. F.PA 859 F.2d 156, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
       (administrative extension regulations upheld)

       In re General Motors Corporation. Pontiac Fiero Plant. 7 E.A.D. 465 (EAB 1997),
       affd,168 F.3d 1377,48 ERC 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (respondent argued that the permit
       expired by operation of law in  1990 when Respondent did not file a timely request for
       renewal; held that by requesting renewal of the 1988 permit prior to its expiration,
       behaving as if the permit remained in effect, and failing to file a timely objection to
       continuation of the permit, Respondent cannot now be heard to deny that the permit
       continued in effect beyond October 1, 1990)
B.     Appeals
       33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(l)(F) (appeal of permit is to Court of Appeals within 120 days final
       agency action)

       40 C.F.R. § 124.84 (any party to an evidentiary hearing may move "for summary
       determination in its favor upon any of the issues being adjudicated on the basis that there
       is no genuine issue of material fact for determination.")

       40 C.F.R. § 124.91(a) (regulations do not confer an automatic right of review; rather, the
       petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that review should be granted)

       Spokane River Assoc. v. EPA. CA No. 90-70672 (9th Cir. 1990) (motion for leave to
       adduce additional evidence in permit appeal granted pursuant to § 509(c) of the CWA)

       Sinclair Oil Corp. v. EPA. (10th Cir. 1989) (permit applicant must first appeal permit to
       chief judicial officer before seeking judicial review)

       Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation. Inc. v. Bay County. Florida. Civil Action
       No. 88-50142-LAC (March 9, 1993) (citizens' suit based on violation of permit
       dismissed where court held that permit had never become effective because permittee
       had requested a public hearing and that request had never been granted or denied by
       EPA; held that under EPA regulations all contested conditions of the permit are stayed
       until the hearing process is complete)

       In re City of St. Joe and Florida Coast Paper Co.. 7 E.A.D. 275 (EAB 1997) ("There is
       no administrative appeal as of right from a Regional Administrator's denial of an
       evidentiary hearing request." Slip op. at 11; "On appeal to the Board, a petitioner has the
       burden of demonstrating that the Region has made a clearly erroneous decision or an
       exercise of discretion or policy that is important and therefore should be reviewed." Slip
       op. at 12)

       Tn re Florida Pulp and Paper Ass'n & Buckeve Florida. L.P.. 6 E.A.D. 49. 51  (EAB


                                       89

-------
 1995) (no administrative appeal as of right from a Regional Administrator's denial of an
 evidentiary hearing request; "Ordinarily a petition for review is not granted unless the
 Regional Administrator's decision is clearly erroneous or involves an exercise of
 discretion or policy that is important and should therefore be reviewed by the
 Environmental Appeals Board.")

 In re J & L Specialty Products Corp.. 5 E.A.D. 31,41 (EAB 1994) (no appeal as of right
 from the Regional Administrator's decision)

 In re Citv of Hollywood. Fla.. 5 E.A.D. 157,159 (EAB  1994) (no administrative appeal
 as of right from a Regional Administrator's denial of an evidentiary hearing request)

 In re General Electric Co. Hooksett. New Hampshire. 4 E.A.D. 468 (EAB 1993) (under
 the rules governing an NPDES proceeding, there is no appeal as of right from the
 Regional Administrator's decision; ordinarily a petition for review is not granted unless
 the Regional Administrator's decision is clearly erroneous or involves an exercise of
 discretion or policy that is important and should therefore be reviewed by the
 Environmental Appeals Board; petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that review
 should be granted; with respect to appeals under Part 124 regarding NPDES permits,
 Agency policy is that most permits should be finally adjudicated at the Regional level,
 citing 44 Fed. Reg. 32,887 (1979); while the Board has broad power to review decisions
 in NPDES permit cases, the Agency intended this power to be exercised "only
 sparingly." Id.; see 57 Fed. Reg. 5320, 5336 (1992))

 In re Citv & County of San Francisco. 4 E.A.D. 559 (EAB 1993) (no appeal as matter of
 right from decision by RA; "Ordinarily, a petition for review is not granted unless the
 Regional Administrator's decision is clearly erroneous or involves an exercise of
 discretion or policy that is important, and should therefore be reviewed by the EAB."
 citing Sequoyah)

 In re Puerto Rico Sun Oil. Inc.. 4 E.A.D. 302 (EAB 1992), vacated. 8 F.3d 73 (1st Cir.
 1993) (there is no appeal as a right from the RA's decision to issue a final permit;
 ordinarily a petition for review is not granted unless the RA's decision is clearly
 erroneous or involves an exercise of discretion or policy that is important, and should
 therefore be reviewed by the EAB. Id at 5)

 In re Sequovah Fuels Corporation. 4 E.A.D. 215 (EAB 1992) (under the rules governing
 an [sic] NPDES permit proceeding, there is no appeal as of right from the Regional
 Administrator)

 In re Miners Advocacy Council. 4  E.A.D. 40 (EAB 1992) (no appeal as matter of right
 from decision by RA; the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that review should
 be granted)

In re Adcom Wire, d/b/a Adcome Wire Co.. 4 E.A.D. 221, 228-29 (EAB 1992) ("[M]ere
incorporation of hearing request in petition for review, without statement of 'supporting
reasons' as required by Section 124.91(a)(l), is not sufficient to demonstrate clear error
or important policy considerations.")

                                90

-------
       In re Lone Star Steel Co., 3 E.A.D.713 (CJO 1991) ("[A]  petition for review of a permit
       is not normally accepted unless the decision is clearly erroneous or involves an exercise
       of discretion or policy that is important and therefore should be reviewed as a
       discretionary matter.")

       In re Mavaeuez Water Treatment Co.. 4 E.A.D. 772, 779 (EAB 1993), aff d sub nom.
       Puerto Rico Aauadcut & Sewer Auth. v. EPA. 35 F.3d 600 (1st Or. 1994), cert, denied.
       513 U.S. 1148 (1995) (review is discretionary)

       In re 1989 NPDES Permits for Alaska Placer Miners et al.. 1990 EPA App. LEXIS 61 at
       n.2 (CJO Sept. 4,1990) ("[A] request alone cannot serve as a statement of the
       'supporting reasons' for reviewing the Regional Administrator's decision ... It is
       incumbent upon Petitioner in its petition to state why the denial of the request was
       improper.")

       In re Star-Kist Caribe. Inc..  2 E.A.D. 758 (CJO 1989) (a petition for review is usually
       not granted unless the RA's decision is clearly erroneous or involves an important policy
       issue or exercise of discretion)

       In re Georgetown Kentucky Municipal Water and Sewer Services. 1987 U.S. EPA App.
       LEXIS 21 (CJO 1987) (review is discretionary)

       In re Champion International Corp.. NPDES Docket No. NC0000272 (ALJ Yost Feb. 12,
       1992) (Whether or not the permitting Agency complied with this regulation is a
       procedural one to be determined by an examination of the facts in the record; where the
       Agency has made a prima facies case on any issue, the burden shifts to the one who
       raised it to prove his case pursuant to 40 CFR § 124.85(a)(3))

       See also JUDICIAL REVIEW; NPDES PERMITS: Stays; Evidentiary Hearings

C.     Challenges to Permit in Enforcement Proceeding

       33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2) (dischargers may not challenge the conditions of a valid NPDES
       permit in an enforcement proceeding)

       General Motors v. EPA. 168 F.3d 1377, 48 ERC 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upheld ruling by
       EAB that General Motors violated its storm water permit and General Motors cannot
       collaterally attack the state-issued permit in an EPA enforcement proceeding;
       "[Precluding collateral attacks ensures that 'the States [have] the opportunity as a
       threshold matter to address objections' to the permits they issue	If the EPA cannot
       preclude a collateral attack upon a state-issued permit, then it will find enforcement
       proceedings burdened by all manner of objections to the state proceedings leading up to
       issuance of the permit.  Enforcement  will become a protracted rather than an expedited
       undertaking.")

       Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. Inc.. 913
       F.2d 64, 77-78 (3d Cir.  1990) (§ 309(b)(2) prohibits judicial review in any  civil

                                      91

-------
 enforcement proceeding of any action of the administrator for which review could have
 been obtained in an NPDES permit proceeding; "By failing to challenge a permit in an
 agency proceeding, PDT has lost "forever the right to do so, even though that action
 might eventually result in the imposition of severe civil or criminal penalties.1")

 Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA. 836 F.22d 1482, 1484-85, 27 ERC 1249 (5th Cir.
 1988) ("Congress intended that anyone wishing to challenge the terms of an NPDES
 permit must do so within the period prescribed by section 509(b)(l) or 'lose forever the
 right to do so, even though that action might eventually result in the imposition of severe
 civil or criminal penalties.' The rule is 'now or never.' If no timely challenge is filed,
 the permit stands until its expiration-at most, five years.")

 Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co.. 813 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1987),  vacated on other grounds.
 485 U.S. 931 (1988), opinion reinstated. 853 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1988)  (defendant could
 not challenge the terms of its permit in the enforcement lawsuit brought against it by
 Sierra Club because it had not exhausted its administrative remedies with the State of
 California, which had issued the permit)

 United States v. Gulf States Steel Inc.. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8834 (N.D. Ala. 1999)
 (held permit limits on internal waste streams enforceable and should have been
 challenged when the permit was issued, not in the action to enforce the permit)

 United States v. Avatar Holdings Inc.. 42 ERC 1902 (M.D. Fla. 1995)  (owner may not
 challenge stringency of discharge limits in context of enforcement action)

 Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Circuit Foil USA. Inc.. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
 4875,4945, 37 ERC 1331  (D.N.J. 1993) (§ 509(b)(2) bars evidence concerning the
 propriety of defendant's permit limitations)

 California Public Interest Research Group v. Shall Oil Co.. 840 F. Supp. 712,718 (N.D.
 Cal. 1993) ("any challenge to effluent limits in an NPDES permit presents  a matter for
 the [Calif.] Water Board, not this Court, to address")

 Public Interest Research Group of N.J.. Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron. Inc.. 34 ERC 2077,
 2084 (D.NJ. 1992) (defendant should have challenged measurement procedures as
 inappropriate within 30 days of issuance of permit through administrative process and
 state courts)

 United States v. Citv of Beaumont.  786 F. Supp. 634, 35 ERC 1106 (E.D. Tex. 1992)
 (city ordered to pay $400,000 for failure to implement pretreatment program; city cannot
 challenge pretreatment program provisions in discharge permit in context of enforcement
 action)

 Public Interest Research Group v. Yates Indus.. Inc.. 757 F. Supp. 438, 445-46 (D.N.J.
 1991) (defendant may not challenge permit provision except through administrative
review)

Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation. Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of

                                92

-------
       Bav County. PL. Civ. No. 88-50142-RV (Oct. 30,1989) (dischargers may not challenge
       the conditions of a valid NPDES permit in an enforcement proceeding)

       Connecticut Fund for the Environment v. Ravmark Industries. 631 F. Supp. 1283, 1285
       (D. Conn. 1986) (granting summary judgment against defendant where defendant had
       failed to pursue state administrative appeals to challenge permit conditions)

       Connecticut Fund for the Environment v. Job Plating Co.. 623 F. Supp. 207, 216 (D.
       Conn. 1985) ("defendant did not commence an administrative challenge to the NPDES
       permit within 30 days of its issuance" as allowed by state law and was therefore
       precluded from doing  so in later citizen suit)

       United States v. Metropolitan District Commission. 23 ERC 1350 (D. Mass. 1985) ("A
       reviewing court, presented with alleged violations, need not inquire into the wisdom of
       particular effluent limits or other conditions of an NPDES permit... The court need
       only ascertain that a permit has issued, and then compare the quantities of pollutants
       permitted by the permit with those listed on the DMRs.")

       In re General Motors Corporation. Pontiac Fiero Plant. 7 E.A.D. 465 (EAB 1997),
       affd.168 F.3d 1377,48 ERC 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (respondent argued that the permit
       was void ab initio because the State of Michigan lacked the authority to issue  the permit;
       EAB ruled that GM failed to exhaust its administrative remedies under State law and
       may not now raise objection to the permit; whatever Respondent's arguments  as to any
       alleged lack of state authority, such assertions should have been raised to the State entity
       that issued the permit  and not years later in the context of this enforcement proceeding)

       In re General Motors Corp.. No. CWA-A-O-011-93 (ALJ Hoya June 28,1996), affd. 7
       E.A.D. 465 (EAB  1997), affd.168 F.3d 1377,48 ERC 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1999)  (in
       enforcement action for 93 reported violations of permit on DMRs, defense rejected that
       permit was void ab initio because of mutual mistake by permit holder and the  delegated
       state)

       In re Easco Aluminum Corp.. CWA-AO-V-13-89 (ALJ Harwood Aug. 16,1991)
       (respondent may not defend in enforcement action on grounds that permit limits are
       wrong; recourse is to challenge permit when issued, slip op. at n. 9, citing Powell
       Duffrvn)

       Craig N. Johnston, Don't Go Near the Water: The Ninth Circuit Undermines Water
       Quality Enforcement.  24 Envt'l L. 1289, 1302-03 (1994) ("Federal enforcement
       proceedings are not the proper forum for determining the validity or appropriateness of
       permit conditions as it is well established that only state courts may review the validity
       of state-issued NPDES permits. Moreover, the time for such challenges is when the
       permit is issued.")

D.     Compliance Schedules

       33 U.S.C. § 1362(17) ("The term 'schedule of compliance'  means a schedule  of remedial
       measures including an enforceable sequence of actions or operations leading to

                                       93

-------
 compliance with an effluent limitation, other limitation, prohibition, or standard.")

 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 ("schedule of compliance" means a "schedule of remedial measures
 included in a 'permit,' including an enforceable sequence of interim requirements (for
 example, actions, operations, or milestone events) leading to compliance with the CWA
 and regulations")

 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(1)(5) ("Reports of compliance or noncompliance with, or any
 progress reports on, interim and final requirements contained in any compliance schedule
 of this permit shall be submitted no later than 14 days following each schedule date.")

 40 C.F.R. § 122.47 (Schedules of Compliance)

 40 C.F.R. § 125.3 (for existing sources, no compliance schedules for technology-based
 effluent limits if deadline for implementation of technology is past)

 In re City of Ames. Iowa. 6 E.A.D. 498 (EAB 1996) (EPA argument that where city
 already mostly in compliance with renewed permit, no compliance schedule is allowed
 under 40 CFR § 122.47, which requires compliance "as soon as possible,"rejected by
 EAB; remanded for factual determination of whether city is in compliance with newer
 stricter permit limits)

 In re City of Haverhill. Wastewater Division. 5 E.A.D. 211 (EAB  1994) (permit cannot
 include compliance schedule for water quality limits attributable to state water quality
 certification)

 In re Citv of Hollywood. Fl.. 5 E.A.D. 157, 163 n.8 (EAB 1994) ("A schedule of
 compliance, suggested by the City in its evidentiary hearing request, cannot be utilized in
 a permit to defer compliance 'beyond the applicable statutory deadline under the [Clean
 Water Act].' 40 C.F.R. § 122.47(a). Under the Act, no publicly owned treatment works
 may receive an extension of the deadline for compliance with secondary treatment
 standards beyond July 1, 1988. CWA §  301(i), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(i). Whether a schedule
 of compliance is appropriate as an enforcement matter is a separate question that we
 leave to the Region.")

 In re Star Kist Caribe. Inc.. 3 E.A.D. 172, 177 (CJO 1990), affd. (EAB 1992, Order
 Denying Modification Request) (CWA does not allow EPA to authorize unlawful
 discharges of pollutants by establishing compliance schedules in permits; "EPA may add
 a schedule of compliance to a permit when EPA is the permit issuer if a State has laid the
 necessary groundwork in its standards or regulations. In such circumstances, the
 schedule would be meeting the requirements of the State water quality standards, and
 therefore no basis would exist for challenging its validity.")

In re Star Kist Caribe. Inc.. 2 E.A.D. 758, 762 (CJO 1989) (interpreting 40 CFR
 122.47(a)(l), held that EPA does have authority to extend statutory deadlines for
compliance with water-quality-based limits)

See also STATE CERTIFICATION: Compliance Schedules

                               94

-------
E.     Evidentiary Hearings

       40 C.F.R. Part 124, Subpart E (Evidentiary Hearing for EPA-issued NPDES Permits and
       EPA-Terminated RCRA Permits)

       Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Browner. 35 F.3d 600, 39 ERC 1269 (1st
       Cir. 1994) (upheld EPA's denial of request for evidentiary hearing on grounds that the
       request did not present any genuine issues of material fact)

       In re Portland Water District. 7 E.A.D.	(EAB 1997) (EAB upholds Regional
       Administrator's denial of an evidentiary hearing request on grounds that permit limit was
       attributable to State certification)

       In re City of Port St. Joe and Florida Coast Paper Co.. 7 E.A.D. 275 (EAB 1997) ("There
       are three threshold criteria [a request for an evidentiary hearing] must satisfy. First, it
       must meet the pleading requirements of Section 124.74(b)(l), which include the
       requirement that 'requests shall state each legal or factual question alleged to be at issue,
       and their relevance to the permit decision.' If an evidentiary hearing is based solely on
       an issue of law, the Regional Administrator must deny it; however, a hearing may be
       held if it is to resolve issues of law and fact that are interconnected ... Second, the
       factual issues identified in the request [for a hearing] must be material issues of fact
       relevant to the issuance of the permit... Third, the petitioner ordinarily must have
       afforded the Regional Administrator a prior opportunity to resolve the issue for which an
       evidentiary hearing is requested."  Slip Op. at 12-14 (citations omitted))

       In re Ketchikan Pulp Co.. 6 E.A.D. 675, 688  (EAB 1996) (held that KPC not entitled to
       an evidentiary hearing on TMDL issue because it was not properly raised during the
       public comment period; "Under 40 C.F.R. Part 124, in order to contest a final permit
       determination in an evidentiary hearing or to preserve an issue for review by the Board,
       "all reasonable ascertainable issues" must be raised by the close of the comment period.
       See 40 C.F.R. § 124.13.  In addition, 40 C.F.R. § 124.76 provides that '[n]o issues shall
       be raised by any party that were not submitted to the administrative record ... as part of
       the preparation of and comment on a draft permit unless good cause is shown for the
       failure to submit them.'")

       In re Broward County Florida. 6 E.A.D. 535, 547-548 (EAB 1996) (to contest a final
       permit determination in an evidentiary hearing  or to preserve an issue for review by the
       Board, all reasonably ascertainable issues must be raised by the close of the comment
       period)

       Tn re Florida Pulp and Paper Ass'n & Buckeve  Florida. L.P.. 6 E.A.D. 49 (EAB 1995)
       ("[A]dherence to [the § 124.76] requirement is  necessary to ensure that the Region has
       an opportunity to address potential problems with the draft permit before the permit
       becomes final...")

       TnreTownofSeabrook. 4 E.A.D. 806 (EAB 1993), aff d sub nom.. Adams v. EPA. 38
       F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 1995) (unsupported assertions are not material  issues of fact for
       purposes of granting an evidentiary hearing request)

                                       95

-------
       In re Boise Cascade Corp.. 4 E.A.D. 474,485 (EAB 1993) (where a legal issue is
       "interlaced with" a factual issue, both issues may be decided at an evidentiary hearing)

       In re Mavasuez Regional Sewage Treatment Plant. 4 E.A.D. 772 (EAB 1993), aff d sub
       nom. Puerto Rico Aquadcut & Sewer Auth. v. EPA. 35 F.3d 600 (1st Cir. 1994), cert.
       denied. 513 U.S. 1148 (applicant did not raise a genuine issue of material fact to support
       the granting of an evidentiary hearing)

       See also NPDES PERMITS: Appeals; Public Hearings; Stays

F.     Exclusions from NPDES Permit Requirement

       40 C.F.R. §  122.3 (activities not requiring NPDES permit)

       Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm. 34 F.3d 114,120, 39
       ERC 1385 (2d Cir. 1994) (agricultural storm water runoff has always been considered
       nonpoint source pollution)

       Lake v. Kiebert. 790 F. Supp. 998,1012 (D. Id. 1992) (discharge to wetland does not
       need an NPDES permit)

       In re Ketchikan Pulp Co.. 7 E.A.D. 605, 637 n. 53 (EAB 1998) (EPA knew how to
       specifically exclude discharges from permitting requirements of § 402 - see 40 C.F.R.
       § 122.3; since spills of conventional pollutants from stationary sources are not excluded
       under 122.3, those discharges are subject to the permit requirements)

       In re Sequovah Fuels Corp.. 4 E.A.D. 215, 216 (EAB 1992) (land application of fertilizer
       as plant nutrient or nutritional chemical is an agricultural activity which is not covered
       by the NPDES program)

G.     General Conditions/Non-Numeric Limits

       PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Co. v.  Washington State Deot. of Ecology. 511 U.S. 700,715,
       114 S. Ct. 1900,1911,128 L. Ed. 2d 716, 38 ERC 1593 (1994) ("As the Solicitor
       General points out, even 'criteria' are often expressed in broad, narrative terms, such as
       "there shall be no discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts." .... In fact, under the
       Clean Water Act, only one class of criteria, those governing "toxic pollutants listed
       pursuant to section  1317(a)(l)," need be rendered in numerical form.  See 33 U.S.C.
       § 1313(c)(2)(B) ; 40 CFR § 131.11(b)(2) (1993).")

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 673 F.2d 400,403 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
       (the definition of effluent limitation in § 502(11) refers to any restriction on amount of
       pollution discharged, thus including  all restrictions, not only numeric ones)

       EOF v. Costle. 568 F.2d 1369,1380 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (when it is  infeasible for EPA to
       derive numeric limitations to include as permit conditions, agency may issue permits
       with conditions designed to reduce the level of effluent discharges to acceptable levels)
                                      96

-------
       United States Steel Corp. v. Train. 556 F.2d 822, 840 (7th Cir. 1977) (narrative, non-
       numeric water quality based permit condition which prohibited discharges causing
       receiving waters to exceed temperatures permissible under state water quality standards
       was valid and enforceable)

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 806 F. Supp. 1263,1276, 35 ERC 1947
       (E.D. Va. 1992) ("[T]he Clean Water Act allows narrative criteria for some uses and
       numeric criteria for others.  See Section 303(c)(2)(B).")

       United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.. No. C 78-0567, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
       26,1990) (the Act precludes defendant from objecting to a narrative water quality based
       permit condition during an enforceable action, and thus the only question is whether
       condition was violated)

       See also WATER QUALITY STANDARDS: Need to Incorporate into Permit as
       Effluent Limit

H.     Internal Waste Streams

       American Iron and Steel Inst.  v. EPA. 111 F.3d 979, 996,44 ERC 1769 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
       ("The statute is clear: The EPA may regulate the pollutant levels in a waste stream that is
       discharged directly into the navigable waters of the United States through a "point
       source"; it is not authorized to regulate the pollutant levels  in a facility's internal waste
       stream.")

       Public Service Co. of Colorado v. EPA. 949 F.2d 1063, 34 ERC 1273 (10th Cir. 1991)
       (permissible for EPA to require the monitoring of internal waste streams where it would
       be impractical or infeasible to monitor the effluent at the point of discharge to waters of
       the U.S., citing due deference cases)

       Texas Municipal Power Agency v. EPA. 836 F.2d 1482,1486-90, 27 ERC 1249 (5th Cir.
       1988) (internal waste stream regulation falls within EPA's authority under the CWA to
       monitor and impose limitations on pollutants which eventually will be discharged into
       the waters of the United States)

       Mobil Oil Co. v. EPA. 716 F.2d 1187, 1190,19 ERC 2043 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The only
       interest Mobil could possible have in preventing EPA officials from sampling its
       untreated waste water is that Mobil might want to keep the EPA in the dark as much as
       possible about what pollutants are present in the water it dumps into the Des Plaines
       River and about how efficient its  treatment processes are at cleaning its waste water of
       pollutants.")

       United States v. Gulf States Steel Inc.. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8834 (N.D. Ala.  1999)
       (held permit limits on internal waste streams enforceable and should have been
       challenged when the permit was issued, not in the action to enforce the permit; defendant
       is liable because all internal outflow limitations were part of the permit to discharge to
       Black Creek, which is waters of the U.S., and defendant is required to comply with all
       terms of the permit)

                                       97

-------
I.     Mandatory Duty to Issue Permit

       Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy. 805 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1986)
       (Kitlutsisti superceded by statute)

       Garcia v. Cecos Int'l. Inc.. 761 F.2d 76, 22 ERC 2018 (1st Cir. 1985) (disapproves of
       Kitlutsisti)

       Cedar Point Oil Co. v. EPA. Civ. No. 3:93-cv-58WS (S.D. Miss. Sept. 30,1996) (suit by
       permit applicant for mandamus ordering EPA to issue him a permit while a citizen suit
       for unpermitted discharge is pending against him rejected for lack of jurisdiction; held
       that CWA does not impose any duty on EPA to act on a pending NPDES application
       within any prescribed time period; "The Administrator has discretion either to issue an
       NPDES permit or to leave the discharger subject to the total proscription of § 131 l(a).")

       United States v. Tom-Kat Development. Inc.. 614 F. Supp. 613, 614 n. 2 (D.C. Alaska
       1985) ("In concluding that Tom-Kat's act of applying for the requisite federal permit did
       not statutorily prevent EPA from instituting this action against Tom-Kat, the court does
       not mean to imply it countenances EPA's apparent failure to process Tom-Kat's
       application in an expeditious manner. Had Tom-Kat petitioned the court for mandamus
       to require EPA to reach a determination on Tom-Kat's permit request, I may well have
       concluded such an action had merit.")

       Kitlutsisti v. Arco Alaska. Inc.. 592 F. Supp. 832, 839 (D. Alaska 1984), appeal
       dismissed without opinion. 772 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1985) (CWA's requirement that all
       discharges covered by the statute must have a NPDES permit is "unconditional and
       absolute;" "[WJhen an action is illegal absent an agency-issued permit, the agency has a
       mandatory duty to act promptly upon license applications.")

       See also DISCHARGE WITHOUT A PERMIT

J.     Modifications

       40 C.F.R. § 122.62 (Modification or revocation and reissuance of permits)

       40C.F.R. § 122.63 (Minor Modifications)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.46(b) ("Except as provided in § 122.6, the term of a permit shall not be
       extended beyond the maximum duration specified  in this section.")

       5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (limits modifications to permit that have not expired)

       Texas Municipal Power Agency v. EPA. 836 F.2d 1482, 27 ERC 1249 (5th Cir. 1988)
       ("Congress did not intend petitions for modification to provide a second chance for full
       review of an NPDES permit after the statute of limitations [§ 509]  has run from the
       issue or renewal of the permit." Id. at 1251 (emphasis in original); "The language of
       both CWA section 402 and 40 C.F.R. § 122.62 make it clear that the EPA is not required
       to modify any  NPDES permit." Id. at 1252)

                                      98

-------
       Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority. 784 F.2d 1200,1208 (4th Cir.
       1986) (Sewer Authority not entitled to a retroactive modification of its NPDES permit)

       Menzel v. County Utilities Corp.. 712 F.2d 91,19 ERC 2193 (4th Cir. 1983) (permit,
       once issued, will not be applied retroactively to insulate against past violations of the
       CWA)

       Exxon Corp. v. Train. 554 F.2d 1310,1315-17,10 ERC 1209 (5th Cir. 1977)
       (§ 509(b)(l) gives the court jurisdiction, if timely petitioned, to review directly EPA
       denial of a requested modification)

       Natural Res. Def. Council v.  Outboard Marine Corp.. 692 F. Supp. 801, 811 (N.D. Dl.
       1988) (the court is obliged to enforce all permit restriction that remain in effect, without
       regard to the possibility that the Illinois Pollution Control Board will retroactively
       modify the 1983 permit)

       Student Pub. Int. Res. Group v. Monsanto Co.. 600 F. Supp. 1479, 1483 (D. N.J. 1985)
       (the pendency of a modification proceeding does not excuse violations of a permit prior
       to actual modification)

       In re Borough of Chambersburg Wastewater Treatment Plant. Docket No. CWA-IE-063
       (ALJ Lotus, Feb. 4,1994) (held that letter from delegated state to city requiring it to add
       a pretreatment program to its NPDES permit constituted a minor permit modification and
       the pretreatment program was enforceable)

       S.Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Ses. 85, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
       News 3668, 3751 (discussing § 509 limits on judicial review of EPA action and the
       limited use of petitions for modification)

K.     Prohibitions

       40 C.F.R. § 122.4 (conditions under which no NPDES permit may be issued)

       Arkansas v. Oklahoma. 503 U.S. 91, 34 ERC 1193 (1992) ("Since 1973, EPA regulations
       have provided that an NPDES permit shall not be issued 'when the imposition of
       conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of
       all affected States."1)

       Oklahoma v. EPA. 908 F.2d 595, 31 ERC 1741 (10th Cir. 1990) ("40 C.F.R. § 122.4 (d)
       expressly provides: 'No permit may be issued:... (d) When the imposition of conditions
       cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected
       States.'")

       West Virginia Coal Assn. v. Reillv. 728 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D. Va.  1989) ("Permits may
       not be issued by a state under conditions that would violate applicable state water quality
       standards.")
                                       99

-------
L.     Public Hearings

       40 C.F.R. § 124.12(a) ("(l)The Director shall hold a public hearing whenever he or she
       finds, on the basis of requests, a significant degree of public interest in a draft permit(s);
       (2) The Director may also hold a public hearing at his or her discretion, whenever, for
       instance, such a hearing might clarify one of more issues involved in the permit decision.
       In re Citv of Fort Worth. 6 E.A.D. 392, 406-407 (EAB 1996) (denial by Region of public
       hearing request upheld; respondent failed to show that Region "clearly erred or abused
       its discretion in declining not to hold a public hearing.")

       In re Genesse Power Station. 4 E.A.D. 832, 841 (EAB 1993) (no public hearing is
       required unless the permit issuer determines that there is strong public interest)

       In re Averv Lake Property Owners Association. 4 E.A.D. 251, 252 (EAB 1992) ("The
       decision to hold a public hearing under 40 C.F.R. 124.12(a) is "largely discretionary.")

       See also NPDES PERMITS: Evidentiary Hearings

M.    Public Notice/Comment

       40 C.F.R. § 124.10(a)(l)(ii) ("The Director shall give public notice that the following
       actions have occurred: ... A draft permit has been prepared under § 124.12.")

       40 C.F.R. § 124. 10(b) ("Public Notice of the preparation of a draft permit . . . shall allow
       at least 30 days for public comment.")

       40 C.F.R. § 124.13 (Obligation to raise issues and provide information during the public
       comment period.)

       Amigos Bravos v. Molycorp Inc.. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28576 (10th Cir. 1998)
       ("Anyone who believes that any condition of a draft permit is inappropriate must raise all
       reasonably ascertainable issues and arguments in support of his position before the end
       of the comment period.")

       Adams v. EPA. 38 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 1994) (good summary of public notice
       provisions; the procedural regulations governing the public comment period "are
       intended to alert the EPA to potential problems with the draft permit and to ensure it has
       an opportunity to address those problems before the permit becomes final."  In
       promulgating the regulations, EPA "anticipated that most policy and technical  issues
       would be decided as part of the public  comment period, which is the most open,
       accessible forum possible and which comes at a stage where the Agency has the greatest
       ability to modify a draft permit.")

       Shell Oil Co. v. E.P.A.. 950 F.2d 741, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("The relationship  between
       the proposed regulation and the final rule determines the adequacy of the notice.  A
       difference between the two will not invalidate the notice so long as the final rule is a

                                     100

-------
       logical outgrowth' of the one proposed. If the deviation from the proposal is too sharp,
       the affected parties will not have had adequate notice and opportunity for comment.")

       Manasuta-88. Inc. v. Thomas. 799 F.2d 687, 690 n.6 (llth Cir. 1986) (explanation of
       public notice provisions)

       Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA. 705 F.2d 506, 546-47 (D.C. Cir.
       1983) (final rules need only be a "logical outgrowth" of the proposed regulations)

N.     State Certification

       See STATE CERTIFICATION; WATER QUALITY STANDARDS

O.     Stays

       40 C.F.R. § 124.16 (Stays of Contested Permit Conditions) (general stay provision for
       various statutes)

       40 C.F.R. § 124.60(c) (specific stay provision for NPDES permits; "If a petition for
       review of the denial of [an evidentiary hearing request]... is timely filed ... the force
       and effect of the contested conditions  of the final permit shall be stayed.")

       Del Ackels v. EPA. 7 F.3d 862, 868, 37 ERC 2118 (9th Cir. 1993) (EPA lacks authority
       to stay conditions imposed by state cert)

       Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation. Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of
       Bay County. Florida. Civ. No. 88-50142-RV (Oct. 30, 1989) (the CWA does not provide
       that permit conditions are stayed by a  mere request for an evidentiary hearing; on  the
       contrary, the CWA clearly states that disputed conditions in a permit are stayed if the
       EPA grants a discharger's formal request for a hearing)

       In re: GMC Delco Remv. Anderson. Indiana. 7 E.A.D. 136,144 n.22 (EAB 1997)
       (challenge to termination date in permit may render all conditions in the permit stayed
       because all conditions arguably are tied to the expiration date, but the permit would
       remain in effect, albeit stayed, if the expiration date is challenged; "There is no
       suggestion in the cited regulations that the mere  staying of permit provisions, or even all
       of them, renders the permit void and therefore legally nonexistent.")

       In re Citv of Fort Worth. 6 E.A.D. 392,403 n.10 (EAB 1996) ("Because Arlington has
       not challenged any condition  contained in the permit, there is no reason to believe that
       any portion of the permit has  been stayed pending resolution of this petition for review.
       See 40  C.F.R. § 124.60(c) (1))

       Tn re Citv and County of San Francisco. 4 E.A.D. 559, 583 (EAB 1993) ("Under the
       unique procedures involving NPDES permits, §  124.15(b)(2) provides that an NPDES
       permit is simply not effective pending a request for an evidentiary hearing. Once the
       Regional Administrator acts on the hearing request it is possible that certain uncontested
       conditions may go into effect. However, the regulations contemplate that before any

                                      101

-------
              uncontested conditions become enforceable, the Regional Administrator must clarify
              which conditions will become effective. ")

              In the Matter of: Simpson Paper Company. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.. 3 E.A.D. 541, 547
              (EAB 1991) (effluent limit should be stayed where monitoring requirement is challenged
              because the two are inextricably intertwined)

              61 Fed. Reg. 65268, 65281 (1996) (interpreting 40 C.F.R. § 124.16(c)(2))
NUCLEAR MATERIALS

       40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (definition of "pollutant" exempts those substances "regulated under the
       Atomic Energy Act of 1954")

       Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group. 426 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (held that "the
       'pollutants' subject to regulation under the [CWA] do not include source, byproduct, and special
       nuclear material, and that the EPA Administrator has acted in accordance with his statutory
       mandate in declining to regulate the discharge of these materials.")

       Waste Action Project v. Dawn Mining Co.. No. CV-96-00106-AAM (E.D. Wa. Aug. 30,1996),
       affd. 137 F.3d 1426,46 ERC 1257 (9th Cir. 1998) (held that discharges from uranium mine
       tailings piles exempted from definition of "pollutant" under CWA, citing Atomic Energy Act and
       EPA's regulation 40 C.F.R. 122.2)

       See also "POLLUTANT"
OCEAN DISCHARGES (§ 403)

       33 U.S.C. § 1343(a) and (c)(l) (an NPDES permit for discharge into a territorial sea or the ocean
       must incorporate Ocean Discharge Criteria)

       40 C.F.R. Part 125 (Ocean Discharge Criteria)

       Adams v. EPA. 38 F.3d 43, 47, 25 ELR 20396 (1st Cir. 1994) (EPA can rely on the presumption
       that by complying with state water quality standards, there will be no unreasonable degradation
       of the marine environment)

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 863 F.2d 1420,28 ERC 1609 (9th Cir. 1988)
       (if there is no way of ascertaining to what extent the discharge may result in the degradation of
       the environment, including the effect of disposal of pollutants on human health, marine life,
       aesthetic, recreational, and economic values as well as other considerations, then a permit should
       be denied)

       American Petroleum Institute v. EPA. 787 F.2d 965, 38 ERC 1529 (5th Cir. 1986) (EPA is
       required by the CWA and its regulations to certify that any ocean discharge allowed by its permit
       will not cause an unreasonable degradation of the marine environment; there was insufficient

                                            102

-------
       evidence to identify the impacts on environmentally important areas including foraging areas in
       the near shore zone for fish, birds, and mammals; area was also a critical habitat for "spawning,
       migration, and/or overwintering of the major subsistence species;" fish found near the shore
       migrate from fresh water streams to the sea, and thus find the near shore area an essential feeding
       zone; court found these conditions sufficient to justify denying a permit)

       Pacific Legal Foundation v. Ouarles. 440 F. Supp. 316,10 ERC 1369 (D. Cal. 1977),  aff d sub
       nom.. Kilrov v. Ouarles. 614 F.2d 225, 14 ERC 1111 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The ocean's waters are in
       constant circulation, so that any discharge beyond any arbitrary limit, such as 3 or 12  miles, may
       reach the beaches of the United States. Thus, in considering the discharge effects, the
       Administrator [of the EPA] must consider the effect that the discharge may have elsewhere on
       the integrity of the marine systems. [The] Committee wishes to emphasize the need to preserve
       the ocean in as natural a state as possible at least until we understand its tolerances and
       characteristics, so that discharges permitted today will not irreversibly modify the oceans for
       future uses.")

       45 Fed. Reg. 65942 (1980) (§ 403 is intended to "prevent unreasonable degradation of the marine
       environment and to authorize imposition of effluent limitations, including a prohibition of
       discharge, if necessary, to ensure this goal."

       See also OCEAN DUMPING; SECONDARY TREATMENT WAIVERS
OCEAN DUMPING

       33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seau (Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972)

       40 C.F.R. Subchapter H (Ocean Dumping)

       Clean Ocean Action v. York. 57 F. 3d 328,40 ERC 1025 (3d Cir. 1995), affg. 861 F. Supp.
       1203 (D.N.J. 1994) (Corps did not act arb. or cap. by issuing a permit to dump dredge spoils into
       ocean; plaintiffs failed to show that irreparable injury would result from dumping)

       United States v. American Global Line. No. CR-94-0416 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 1994) ($100,000
       penalty paid by cruise ship owner for discharging over five tons of debris into the Pacific Ocean)

       United States v. Reillv. 827 F. Supp. 1076, 24 ELR 20097 (D. Del. 1993), affd, 1994 U.S. App.
       LEXIS 19256 (3d Cir. 1994) (held that MPRSA's criminal provisions are general intent rather
       than specific intent crimes; government must prove that Reilly consciously  engaged in the acts
       alleged; it need not prove that Reilly had knowledge of the statutes at issue)

       S. Rep. No. 451, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in  1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4234,4249 (in MPRSA,
       "The term 'knowingly violates' refers to a conscious act or conscious omission of the offender
       which amounts to a violation of the law, regulation or permit.")

       See also OCEAN DISCHARGES
                                             103

-------
OIL AND GAS

       33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(1)(2) (Storm water runoff from oil, gas and mining)

       40 C.F.R. Part 435, Subpart D (coastal subcategory effluent limitation guidelines)

       Texas Oil & Gas Assoc. v. EPA. 161 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998) (EPA's effluent limit guidelines
       setting zero discharge limits for produced water and produced sand in Gulf and less strict
       standards in Cook Inlet upheld)

       Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil Co. of Calif.. 83 F.3d 1111,42 ERC 1737 (9th
       Cir. 1996) (held that conditions under which UNOCAL settled its state court challenge to its
       NPDES permit did not preclude a citizen suit to enforce the permit; the $780,000 settlement did
       not constitute assessment and payment of a penalty under a state law comparable to the CWA's
       administrative penalty provisions)

       Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co.. 73 F.3d 546,41 ERC 1897 (5th Cir. 1996) (produced water
       held to be a pollutant; argument rejected that only EPA, not the courts, can determine what is a
       pollutant)

       BP Exploration & Oil v. EPA. 66 F.3d 784,41 ERC 1225 (6th Cir. 1995) (court upheld in total
       EPA's effluent limitation and new source performance standards for the offshore oil and gas
       industry; held that EPA made a reasonable decision based on empirical data in determining the
       appropriate method; "The overriding principle in our review of the final rule is that the agency
       has broad discretion to weigh all relevant factors during rulemaking.  The CWA does not state
       what weight should be accorded to the relevant factors; rather, the Act gives EPA the discretion
       to make those determinations.")

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 863 F.2d 1420 (9th Cir. 1988) (EPA decision to
       not require reinjection held not arb. & cap.; state jurisdiction for 401 certification purposes ends
       at 3 miles off shore)

       Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA. 830 F.2d 1346,26 ERC 1907 (5th Cir. 1987) (permit requirement that
       outfalls be submerged not  arbitrary or capricious)

       American Petroleum Institute v. EPA. 661 F.2d 340, 16 ERC 1690 (5th Cir. 1981) (API
       challenge to final effluent guidelines for oil and gas extraction point source category)

       Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil Co. of California. 861  F. Supp. 889, 904-905,39
       ERC 1393 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 83 F.3d 1111,42 ERC 1737 (9th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff held not
       preempted by no action assurance issued to defendant by state because state law was not
       comparable to § 309(g), i.e., it did not include penalties)

       Natural Resources Defense Council, he. v. EPA. 781 F. Supp. 806, 34 ERC 1471 (D.D.C. 1992)
       (action to enforce consent decree rendered moot by subsequent proposal to comply by EPA
       which substantially complied with decree; consent decree set deadlines for agency to propose
       CWA regulations for offshore oil and gas industry)
                                             104

-------
       64 Fed. Reg. 5487 (1999) (proposed effluent guidelines for synthetic muds)

       61 Fed. Reg. 66,085 (1996) (final effluent guidelines for the Coastal Subcategory; set zero
       discharge limit on produced water and drilling wastes)

       60 Fed. Reg. 9,428 (1995) (proposed effluent guidelines for the Coastal Subcategory)

       58 Fed. Reg. 6964 (1993) (solicitation of public comments on 3-year compliance schedule for
       meeting zero discharge limit in Gulf)

       57 Fed. Reg. 60,926 (1992) (proposed general permit for oil and gas facilities in coastal
       Louisiana and Texas; set a zero discharge limit on produced water and drilling wastes for all
       coastal oil and gas facilities except those located in Cook Inlet, Alaska; also set a zero discharge
       limit on produced sand for all coastal oil and gas facilities, including those located in Cook Inlet)

       44 Fed. Reg. 22,069 (1979) (effluent limit guidelines for coastal subcategory based on BPT)

       41 Fed. Reg. 12454 (1993) (Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source Category; Offshore
       Subcategory Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards)
OIL SPILLS (§ 311)

       33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (6) (administrative penalty provisions)

       33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (7) (civil penalty provisions: "Any person who is the owner, operator, or
       person in charge of any vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from which oil or hazardous
       substance is discharged in violation of paragraph (3), shall be subject to a civil penalty in an
       amount up to $25,000 per day of violation or an amount up to $1,000 per barrel of oil or unit of
       reportable quantity of hazardous substances discharged.")

       33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (11) ("Civil penalties shall not be assessed under both this section and
       section 1319 of this Title for the same discharge.")

       40 C.F.R. Part 109 (Criteria for State, Local and Regional Pollution Contingency Plans)

       40 C.F.R. Part 110 (Discharge of Oil)

       40 C.F.R. Part 112(Oil Pollution Prevention)

       40 C.F.R. Part 116 (Designation of Hazardous Substances)

       40 C.F.R. Part 117 (Determination of Reportable Quantities of Hazardous Substances)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.28(c) (Offshore oil and gas facilities) (EPA shall issue general NPDES permits
       to cover discharges from offshore oil and gas facilities)

       40 C.F.R. Part 138 (Financial Responsibility for Water Pollution)

                                              105

-------
 33 C.F.R. Part 133 (Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund: State Access)

 33 C.F.R. Part 136 (Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund: Claims Procedures; Designation of Source;
 and Advertisement)

 United States v. Ward. 448 U.S. 242, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742 (defendant's report of oil
 spill compiled in compliance with CWA could be used to establish liability for civil penalties
 under Act)

 Gatlin Oil Co. v. United States. 169 F.3d 207,48 ERC 1208 (4th Cir. 1999) (recovery from Oil
 Spill Liability Trust Fund limited to cleanup from Discharge or threat to navigable waters or
 shoreline)

 United States v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co.. 172 F.3d 1187,48 ERC 1385 (9th Cir. 1999)
 (held that ship owner liable for Coast Guard $1.7 million in response costs to potential oil spill
 from beached ship even though no  major oil spill occurred; since the beaching "contained the
 seeds of a major ecological disaster," the court reasoned, "it was only prudent for the government
 to rush personnel and equipment to the scene and maintain them there until the threat was over.")

 Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Uodeeraff. 147 F.3d 1344,47 ERC 1353 (11th Cir. 1998) (once state
 submits itself to jurisdiction of federal court for cost-recovery purposes, it has waived it 11th
 Amendment immunity from countersuit by ship owners for liability under maritime limitation of
 liability)

 International Assoc. of Independent Tanker Owners v. Washington. 148 F.3d 1053,46 ERC 1956
 (9th Cir. 1998) (two of 16 Washington State oil spill regulations pertaining to oil tanker design
 and construction held to be preempted by OPA)

 Bouchard Transo. Co. v. Florida PEP. 91 F.3d 1445 (11th Cir. 1996) (held that dist. court abused
 its discretion by failing to address Florida's 11th amendment immunity defense before ordering
 the state and shipowners to mediate claims arising from a petroleum spill)

 Montauk Oil Transportation Corp.  v. Tug El Zorro Grande. 54 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1995) (held that
 owner of a barge from which oil spilled is entitled to indemnification from the responsible party
 for a $3,500 civil penalty assessed under 31 l(b)(6); §  311(h) provides for indemnification for
 "liabilities," which include 311(b)(6) civil penalties)

 Boca Ciega Hotel v.  Bouchard Transp. Co.. 51 F.3d 235 (llth Cir. 1995) (before a private
 lawsuit can be filed under OPA, it is mandatory that all claims for removal costs or damages be
 presented first to parties responsible for the spill)

 Union Petroleum Corp. v.  United States. 651 F.2d 734, 744 & n.27, 16 ERC 1339 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
 (train yard operator not liable for cleanup costs of Coast Guard in response to spill caused by
 vandals where train yard took reasonable precautions to prevent spill; the term "actual costs
 incurred"  establishes liability for "the full amount of the Coast Guard's costs, even if those costs
 were unreasonable.")

United States v. Massachusetts Bav Transportation Authority. 614 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1980) (for

                                       106

-------
purposes of § 311, municipalities fall within the definition of "person," and therefore can be
"owners or operators" liable for violations of § 311, even though the definition of "person" in
§ 311 includes corporations and individuals but not municipalities or other government entities;
the broader definition of "person" that is contained in § 502 of the Clean Water Act applies to
§ 311, and the narrower definition in § 311 itself is not intended to be restrictive)

United States v. Chevron Oil Co.. 583 F.2d 1357,12 ERC 1726 (5th Cir. 1978) (penalty action
based on sheen test to show discharge of oil in "harmful quantity" struck down on grounds that
sheen test exceeded statutory authority)

United States v. Tex Tow. 589 F.2d 1310,1313,12 ERC 1593 (7th Cir. 1978) (refusing to read a
third-party defense into § 311's civil penalty provisions because they impose absolute liability
and the cause of the spill is the polluting enterprise, not the conduct of a third party)

Aoex Oil Co. v. United States. 530 F.2d 1291,1293, 8 ERC 1906 (8th Cir. 1976), cert denied,
429 U.S. 827 (1976) (oil co. that failed to report spills into Miss. R. violated 31 l(b)(5) which
requires "person in charge" of facility to report such spills, since "person in charge" encompasses
corporations as well as individuals; an entity is an operator of a facility where it has the power or
capacity to (i) make timely discovery of discharges, (ii) direct the activities of persons who
control the mechanisms causing the pollution, and (iii) prevent and abate damage)

United States v. Mobil Oil Corp..  464 F.2d 1124, 1127,4 ERC 1405 (5th Cir. 1972) (interpreting
definition of "owner or operator" in 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(6), corporate owner of oil facility is
considered "person in charge"  within meaning of 33 U.S.C. § 1161(b)(4) for purposes of
enjoying immunity from criminal prosecution for self-reported oil discharges to waters of U.S.)

BP Exploration v. U.S. Dep't of Transportation. 44 F. Supp.2d 34 (D.C. 1999) (the Coast Guard
administratively assessed a $5,000 penalty for an oil spill. The Respondent argued that the Coast
Guard's reliance on its Marine Safety Manual in support of the penalty amount was
impermissible because the Manual was an invalid rule or regulation that was not promulgated in
accordance with the APA's notice and comment requirements; court found that the Manual was
not a rule or regulation, but was merely agency guidance, and therefore did not trigger the APA
requirements.  The basis of this conclusion was that the Manual did not purport to be binding on
the Coast Guard, respondents,  or courts, but purported to be merely As a guide for consistent and
uniform administration of agency activities.)

Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA. No. 97-CV-267-D (D. Wyo. Aug. 20, 1998) (EPA not limited to
enforcement of oil spills under CWA § 311; Agency is entitled to due deference in its
interpretation that the CWA allows enforcement under either 309 or 311, but not both)

United States v. Murphv Exploration and Production Co.. 939 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. La. 1996) (held
that trust fund can recover costs of monitoring a responsible party that is conducting the oil spill
removal; costs incurred that are arb. & cap. are not recoverable, rejecting government argument
that "all" costs are recoverable)

United States v. V-l  Oil Co.. No. CIV96-0454-E-BLW (D. Id. 1996) (under authority of § 311
and RCRA §§ 6973 and 699Id court granted TRO to allow EPA to conduct site assessment on
property of underground storage tank owner to determine cause and extent of gasoline

                                       107

-------
 contamination that had infiltrated sewer system and was discharging ultimately from POTW)

 Complaint of Ballard Shipping Co.. 772 F. Supp. 721 (D. R.I. 1991) (where State of Rhode
 Island asserted a cause of action for recovery of costs under § 31 l(f) for its cleanup of a heating
 oil spill, court held that CWA does not give individual states a cause of action to recover cleanup
 costs pursuant to § 311; only federal government can sue)

 Kvoei Kaiun Kaisha. Ltd, v. M/V Berine Trader. 760 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Wa. 1991) (where the
 U.S. initiated a § 311 action to recover the costs of cleanup from an oil spill, and alleged
 common law theories of negligence, maritime negligence, unseaworthiness, nuisance, and quasi-
 contract, the court held that the government could recover expenses only under § 311 because it
 preempts the common law and Refuse Act Claims)

 Quaker State Corp. v. U.S. Coast Guard. Civ. A. No. 87-55 ERIE,  1990 Westlaw 272708 (W.D.
 Pa.  1990) (§31 l(g) third party liability attaches only when  the third party is the sole cause of an
 oil discharge)

 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni. 456 F. Supp. 1327,1374 (D. P.R. 1978),
 aff d in part, vacated in part. 628 F.2d 652, 15 ERC 1675 (1st Cir. 1980) (recovery under the
 CWA is measured by the actual costs regardless of their reasonableness), quoting Burgess v.
 M/V Tamano. 564 F.2d 964, 983 (1st Cir. 1977)

 United States v. Beattv Inc.. 401 F. Supp. 1040, 1045, 6 ELR 20119 (W.D. Ky. 1975)
 (government can recover actual costs even if expenses are not reasonable or if fines are
 "excessive or overkill on the part of the government")

 63 Fed. Reg. 9464 (1998) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Consolidated Rules of Practice
 Governing the Administrative Assessment of Civil Penalties, Issuance of Compliance or
 Corrective Action Orders, and the Revocation, Termination or Suspension of Permits)

 62 Fed. Reg. 63811 (1997) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Oil Pollution Prevention and
 Response; Non-Transportation Related Onshore and Offshore Facilities)

 62 Fed. Reg. 13514 (1997) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation
 Adjustment Rule)

 61 Fed. Reg. 69359 (1996) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation
 Adjustment Rule)

 61 Fed. Reg. 7419 (1996) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Oil Discharge Program; Editorial
 Revision of Rules)

 59 Fed. Reg. 49005 (1994) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Oil Pollution Prevention; Non-
 Transportation-Related Onshore Facilities)

59 Fed. Reg. 47383 (1994) ( Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution  Contingency Plan)
                                      108

-------
       59 Fed. Reg. 34069 (1994) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Oil Pollution Prevention; Non-
       Transportation-Related Onshore Facilities)

       58 Fed. Reg. 54702 (1993) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: National Oil and Hazardous
       Substance Pollution Contingency Plan)

       58 Fed. Reg. 19030 (1993) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Oil Pollution Prevention; Non-
       transportation-related Onshore Facilities)

       58 Fed. Reg. 8824 (1993) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Oil Pollution Prevention; Non-
       transportation-related Onshore Facilities)

       56 Fed. Reg. 54612 (1991) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Oil Pollution Prevention; Non-
       transportation-related Onshore and Offshore Facilities)

       56 Fed. Reg. 29996 (1991) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Administrative Assessment of
       Penalties Where Hearing on Record under APA § 554 Is Not Required)

       52 Fed. Reg. 10711 (1987) (Notice of Final Rulemaking: Water Programs; Discharge of Oil)

       38 Fed. Reg. 34163 (1973) (Notice of Final Rulemaking: Oil Pollution Prevention;
       Nontransportation Related Onshore and Offshore Facilities

       Oil Pollution Act Deskbook, Environmental Law Institute (1991)

       Liability, under sec. 31 l(b)(6) of Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.S.
       § 1321(b)(6)), of owner, operator, or person in charge of onshore or offshore facility, or vessel,
       for discharge of oil or hazardous substance, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 141, sees. 4,9,12,13,16,18

       See also SPCC
OWNER/OPERATOR LIABILITY

       A.      Generally

               33 U.S.C. § 1319(f) (Administrator may bring an action in district court "for appropriate
               relief, including, but not limited to, a permanent or temporary injunction, against the
               owner or operator of such treatment works ... Such court shall have jurisdiction to
               restrain such violation and to require the owner or operator of the treatment works and
               the owner or operator of the source to take such action as may be necessary to come into
               compliance with this title.")

               33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(6) (definition of "owner or operator" under § 311)

               United States v. Bestfoods. 118 S. Ct. 1876,141 L. Ed. 2d 43,46 ERC 1673 (interpreting
               CERCLA, held that parent corporation can be liable for acts of subsidiary - - without
               piercing the corporate veil - - if the parent directly controls the operation of the

                                              109

-------
 subsidiary, and is therefore an "operator")

 San Francisco Bavkeeper v. City of Saratoga. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3942 (9th Cir.
 1998) (City may be liable for storm water discharges from storm drain owned by
 CALTRANS, but which was located on City property, if it is found that city was an
 operator of the drain under 40 C.F.R. 122.26(a)(3)(vi))

 Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Util.. 13 F.3d 305, 309 (9th Cir. 1993)
 (defendant held to be "operator" of mine despite lack of ownership interest where
 wholly-owned and financially-dependent subsidiary performed all work at mine)

 Apex Oil Co. v. United States. 530 F.2d 1291, 1293, 8 ERC 1906 (8th Cir.  1976), cert.
 denied. 429 U.S. 827 (1976) (oil co. that failed to report spills into Miss. R. violated
 311(b)(5) which requires "person in charge" of facility to report such spills, since
 "person in charge" encompasses corporations as well as individuals; An entity is an
 operator of a facility where it has the power or capacity to (i) make timely discovery of
 discharges, (ii) direct the activities of persons who control the mechanisms causing the
 pollution, and (iii) prevent and abate damage)

 United States v. Mobil Oil Corp.. 464 F.2d 1124,1127,4 ERC 1405 (5th Cir. 1972)
 (interpreting definition of "owner or operator" in 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(6), corporate
 owner of oil facility is considered "person in  charge" within meaning of 33 U.S.C.
 § 1161(b)(4) for purposes of enjoying immunity from criminal prosecution for self-
 reported oil discharges to waters of U.S.)

 United States v. Avatar Holdings Inc.. No. 93-282-CIV-FTM-21 (D.Fla. 8/20/96) (parent
 corporation that owned three WWTP's held not liable for violations at the plants; "The
 evidence as a whole shows that Avatar Holdings' role in the operations of the three
 Florida Cities' facilities was limited to overall financial review and long-term strategic
 planning, as Avatar Holdings' officials were concerned with the large costs and
 budgetary planning... The fact that Avatar Holdings officials were informed of
 environmental compliance issues and discussed the costs of large projects that would
 eventually eliminate  violations does not amount to the type of action or direction for
 which liability arises under the Clean Water Act.")

 Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra. 738 F. Supp. 623, 32 ERC 1157,1161-1164, 21 ELR
 20055 (D.N.J. 1990) (homeowners discharged to private wastewater treatment system
 installed by developers on land subsequently  bought by third party; no permit every
 obtained for discharge from wastewater treatment system; developers held liable for
 discharges - decision turned on interpretation of point source)

 State of Idaho v. Bunker Hill. 635 F. Supp. 665, 672, 24 ERC  1524 (D. ID  1986)
 (Delaware company held liable for costs of clean up under CERCLA even though site
 was operated by  subsidiary in Idaho because: (1) Del. co. controlled economic and
managerial operations of Idaho sub., and (2) Delaware co. owned Idaho sub., and
controlled sub.'s  disposal activities at waste site)

United States v. Ciampitti. 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.N.J. 1984) (Ciampitti was the designated

                                110

-------
       agent and representative for the corporate defendant charged with illegally filling
       wetlands; held that Ciampitti had both control of the filling activities and knowledge of
       the CWA violations)

       United States v. Frezzo Brothers. Inc.. 461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D.Pa. 1978), affd. 602 F.2d
       1123 (3d Cir. 1979) (the ability to control the facility, coupled with knowledge of the
       violation, is sufficient to impose liability under the CWA)

       In re Urban Drainage and Flood Control District and Kemp & Hoffman. Inc.. Docket No.
       CWA-Vm-94-20-Pn (ALJ Vanderheyden, February 14, 1995)  (EPA sued City, which
       owned site, Irrigation District that organized unpermitted fill of wetlands on behalf of
       City, and contractor who actually performed work; dismissed this action against City
       upon EPA's failure to establish a prima facie case; held that liability will attach under
       § 301 if the Respondent is the legal cause of the discharge; causation requirement is
       fulfilled if Respondent had responsibility, control or authority over the discharges; EPA
       failed to establish that the City was the legal cause of the discharge) Cf. later decision by
       ALJ Pearlstein)

B.     Consultant/Contractor Liability

       United States v. Lambert.  1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1343 (S.D.W.Va. Jan. 31, 1996)
       (owner of property and contractor who performed work liable for illegal dredge and fill;
       "The CWA imposes  liability on the party who actually performed the work and on the
       party with responsibility for or control over performance of the work.")

       United States v. Sareent County Water Resources Dist.. 876 F. Supp. 1081,40 ERC
       1710 (D.N.D. 1992)  (engineering consultant held not liable for unpermitted work on
       ditch because of insufficient involvement in alleged violation)

       United States v. Van Leuzen. 816 F. Supp. 1171, 1175, 36 ERC 1993 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
       (contractor held liable for discharging fill into a wetland without a permit although he
       had been told by the  landowner that the Corps permit had been obtained)

       United States v. Board of Trustees of Fla. Kevs Community College. 531 F. Supp. 267,
       274, 18 ERC 1188 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (college and contractor that filled slough without a
       permit both held liable for unpermitted fill; defense of contractor that it relied in good
       faith on owner's representation that permits were in place not a defense to unpermitted
       filling of slough; "[CJivil liability under the [CWA and Rivers and Harbors Act] is
       predicated on either (1) performance, or (2) responsibility for or control over
       performance of the work, in the absence of the necessary federal permits.")

       United States v. Weisman. 489 F. Supp. 1331, 17 ERC 1580 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (property
       owner and consultant held liable under CWA and RHA for work on road project without
       404 permit; consultant had applied for permit on behalf of owner, but work went ahead
       before permit was issued)

       Tn re Urban Drainage and Flood Control District: Kemp & Hoffman. Inc.: and Citv of
       Lafavette. Docket No. CWA-VIU-94-20-Pn (ALJ Pearlstein June 24,1998) (held that

                                       111

-------
        contractor who performed work in stream channel for flood control district is strictly
        liable along with district)

 C.     Joint and Several Liability

        United States v. Lambert.  1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1343 (S.D.W.Va. Jan. 31,1996)
        (owner of property and contractor who performed work liable for illegal dredge and fill;
        "The CWA imposes liability on the party who actually performed the work and on the
        party with responsibility for or control over performance of the work.")

        United States v. Board of Trustees of Fla. Keys Community College. 531 F. Supp. 267,
        274, 18 ERC 1188 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (college and contractor that filled slough without a
        permit both held liable for unpermitted fill; defense of contractor that it relied in good
        faith on owner's representation that permits were in place not a defense to unpermitted
        filling of slough; "[C]ivil liability under the [CWA and Rivers and Harbors Act] is
        predicated on either (1) performance, or (2) responsibility for or control over
        performance of the work, in the absence of the necessary federal permits.")

        In re Corporacion  para el Desarrollo Economico v Future de la Isla Nena. (ALJ Biro July
        15,  1998) ($75,000 awarded jointly and severally against three defendants for CWA
        violations after one settled for  $40,000 and the other two failed to file an answer to the
        complaint; EPA had only asked for $35,000 against the remaining two in its default
        motion, giving them credit for  the $40,000 settlement)

        Jji Re Friendswood Development Co.. USEPA NPDES Permit Op. No. 43 (1976) (EPA
        as statutory authority to provide in NPDES permit that industrial users of waste water
        treatment plant be jointly and severally responsible with plant for compliance with
        provisions of permit issued for treatment plant)

 D.     Lessor/Lessee Liability

        40 C.F.R. § 122.21(b) ("When  a facility or activity is owned by one person but is
        operated by another person, it is the operator's duty to obtain a permit.")

        In re Donald J. Aardema and Joe Pacheco. Docket No. 1091-08-06-309(g) (Order
        Granting Partial Summary Determination, June 24,1992, J. Hamill) (if a lessee is in
        possession and control of real property from which pollutants are discharged in violation
        of the CWA, then an owner who did not participate in the activity giving rise  to the
        discharge is not liable for the CWA violation merely by reason of ownership of the land)

E.      Lender Liability

        Rhode Island v. O.L.C.R.I.. 32  ERC  1661 (D.N.J. 1990) (court denied motion to dismiss
        where  credit union, which  is mortgagee of property where CWA violations are occurring,
        was  held to have influence and control over actors principally responsible for violations
        because the credit union knew  of the possible pollution problem at the site and could
        have conditioned the mortgage on the fixing of the problem)
                                       112

-------
               See also "PERSON"
PENALTIES (§ 309)

       A.     Generally
               33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b) ("The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil action for
               appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, for any violation for
               which he is authorized to issue a compliance order under subsection (a) of this section..


               33 U.S.C. § 131 l(g) ("Whenever on the basis of any information available -
                      (A) the Administrator finds that any person has violated section 1311,1312,
               1316,1317,1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title, or has violated any permit condition or
               limitation implementing any of such section in a permit issued under section 1342 of this
               title by the Administrator or by a State, or in a permit issued under section 1344 of this
               title by a State, or
                      (B) the Secretary of the Army .... finds that any person has violated any permit
               condition or limitation in a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by the
               Secretary,
               the Administrator or Secretary, as the case my be, my, after consultation with the state in
               which the violation occurs, assess a class I civil penalty or a class H civil penalty under
               this subsection.")

               Tull v. United States. 481 U.S. 412,422-23, 107 S. Ct. 1831,1838, 95 L. Ed. 2d 365
               (1987) ("The legislative history of the Act reveals that Congress wanted the district court
               to consider the need for retribution and deterrence, in addition to restitution, when it
               imposed civil penalties." 123 Cong. Rec. 39191 (1977) (Sen. Muskie citing EPA
               memorandum outlining enforcement policy); a court can require retribution for wrongful
               conduct based on the seriousness of the violations, the number of prior violations, and
              the lack of good faith efforts to comply with the relevant requirements; purpose of civil
              penalties under the Act is threefold: retribution, deterrence and restitution)

              Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries. Inc.. 847 F.2d 1109,1113 (4th Cir. 1988), cert, denied.
              491 U.S. 904 (1989) (imposing civil penalties on one polluter "can be an important
              deterrence against future violations.")

              United States v. Gulf Park Water Co.. 972 F. Supp. 1056,46 ERC 1877 (S.D. Miss.
              1997) ("Enforcement of the CWA is designed to be simple, speedy and
              straightforward.")

              United States v. Harrison Warehouse Services Co.. Inc.. No. 1:90CV82 (N.D. W.V.
              1995) slip op. at 22 (CAA; "The primary purpose of the penalty is to deter future
              violations.  Accordingly, the Court should impose a fine substantial enough to hurt both
              [defendants] but not so great as to obliterate them.")

              Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Honolulu. 821 F. Supp. 1368,1394, 37 ERC 1398 (D.

                                             113

-------
 Haw. 1993) (penalty must be high enough to ensure that the discharger cannot absorb
 penalty as cost of doing business)

 Atlantic States Legal Foundation. Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co.. Inc.. 786 F.
 Supp. 743, 753, 35 ERC 1308, 1316 (N.D. Ind. 1992) ("To further the objective of the
 Act, the amount of the civil penalty must be high enough such that the penalty does not
 merely become a cost of doing business. If not, it becomes more profitable to pay the
 penalty rather than incur the costs of compliance.")

 United States v. A.A. Mactal Construction. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21790 (D.Kan. 1992)
 (CAA case; "deterrence is effective only to the extent that the risk of incurring
 significant civil penalties for noncompliance is real and substantial." )

 United States v. CPS Chemical Co..  Inc.. 779 F. Supp. 437,442 (E.D. Ark.  1991)
 (enforcement of the CWA is designed to be simple, speedy and straightforward)

 Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. Inc.. 720 F. Supp. 1158,
 1166 (D.NJ. 1989), affd in part, rev'd in part. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Civil
 penalties seek to deter pollution by discouraging future violations. To serve this
 function, the amount of the civil penalty must be high enough to insure that polluters
 cannot simply absorb the penalty as  a cost of doing business. Otherwise, a rational profit
 maximizing company will choose to pay the penalty rather than incur compliance costs.
 Additionally, the probability that a penalty will be imposed must be high enough so that
 polluters will not choose to accept the risk that non-compliance with [sic] go
 unpunished." (citations omitted))

 Student Public Interest Research Group v. Hercules. Inc. 29 E RC 1417 (D.NJ. 1989)
 (civil penalties seek to deter pollution by discouraging future violations)

 United States v. Ohio Edison. 725 F. Supp. 928, 934 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (even assuming
 the defendant is without fault in this matter, the statute does not require fault to support a
 penalty; once it has been determined that the terms of a permit have been violated,
 § 309(d) provides substantial discretion to the Court in determining the amount of
 penalties)

 Student Public Interest Research Group of NJ. Inc. v. AT&T Bell Laboratories. 617 F.
 Supp. 1190, 1201 (D.N.J. 1985) (civil penalties seek to deter pollution by discouraging
 future violations; "There is little doubt that Congress intended deterrence as a purpose of
 sanctions under the FWPCA.")

 Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltnev of Smithfield. 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1557 (E.D.
 Va. 1985), affd 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded on other grounds.
 100 S. Ct. 376 (1987), on remand. 844 F.2d  170 (4th Cir. 1988) (civil penalties seek to
deter pollution by discouraging future violations)

Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Bethlehem Steel. 608 F. Supp. 440,452 (D. Md. 1985)
(enforcement of the CWA is designed to be simple, speedy and straightforward)
                                114

-------
      Sierra Club v. Hanna Furnace. 23 ERG 1910,1911-12 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (unless faced
      with the fear of being penalized, "the potential polluter verging upon bankruptcy or
      shutdown for any reason would be tempted to disregard restrictive effluent controls,
      lured perhaps by an added incentive to maximize profits or reduce losses of an ailing
      business.")

      United States v. CF Industries. Inc.. 542 F. Supp. 952 (D.Minn. 1982) ("[T]he public
      policies embodied in the CWA are stronger and more important than those embodied in
      the [admiralty-related] Limitation Act" and "if the government's claim for a civil penalty
      must be brought in the limitation action, it will have no deterrent effect.")

      United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.. 12ERC 1417, 1421 (W.D. Tenn. 1978) (civil
      penalties seek to deter pollution by discouraging future violations)

      EPA, "Civil Penalty Assessment for Clean Water Act Wastewater Discharge Violations:
      A Review of the Law" (1992)

       David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System:
       Can Three Not Be a Crowd when Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States,
       the States  and Their Citizens?, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1552, 1577 (1995)

       Thompson, Citizen Suits and Civil Penalties Under the Clean Water Act, 85 Michigan
       Law Review 1656,1665 n. 51 (1987)  ("Congress would not have included the civil
       penalty authorization at all if it were not to have some effect as a deterrence
       mechanism.")

       Environmental Law - Assessment of Penalties for Violations of Compliance Prescribed
       by a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit, 12 Cap. Univ. L. Rev.
       335 (1982)

       Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal
       Administrative Agencies, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1435, 1456 (1979)

       Comment, The Use of Civil Penalties  in Enforcing the Clean Water Act Amendments of
       1977, 12 Univ. of San. Fran. L. Rev. 437,451-52 (1978)

B.     Appeals/Scope of Review

       33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(8) ("Any person  against whom a civil penalty is assessed ... may
       obtain review of such assessment - (A) in the case of assessment of a class I civil penalty,
       in the United Stated District Court for the District of Columbia or in the district in which
       the violation is alleged to have occurred, or (B) in the case of assessment of a class H
       civil penalty, in United States court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or for
       any other  circuit in which such person resides or transacts business, by filing a notice of
       appeal in such court within the 30-day period beginning on the date the civil penalty
       order is issued and by simultaneously sending a copy  of such notice by certified mail to
       the Administrator... and the Attorney General... Such court shall not set aside or
       remand such order unless there is not  substantial evidence in the record, taken as a

                                       115

-------
 whole, to support the finding of a violation or unless the Administrator's ... assessment
 of a penalty constitutes an abuse of discretion ...")

 Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co.. 411 U.S. 182, 185, 93 S. Ct. 1455, 1458, 36 L.
 Ed. 2d 142 (1973) ("[T]he relation of the remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter of
 administrative competence.")

 B.J. Carnev Industries. Inc. v. EPA.	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23005 (9th Cir.
 1999) (appeal of ALJ decision dismissed as untimely; held that appeal must be filed
 within 30 days of date of "issuance" of penalty order, not within 30 days of "finality" of
 penalty order as Carney had argued; strong dissenting opinion)

 United States v. Smithfield Foods. Inc..	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22092 (4th
 Cir. 1999) ("Because of the difficulty of determining an appropriate penalty in a complex
 case such as this one, we give deference to the 'highly discretionary calculations that
 take into account multiple factors [that] are necessary in order to set civil penalties under
 the Clean Water Act.' ... [T]he Supreme Court has emphasized that under the CWA,
 the highly discretionary calculations necessary to assess civil penalties are particularly
 within the purview of trial judges, see Tull. 481 U.S. at 426-27, and we have continually
 given these determinations wide  deference, reviewing them only for abuse of
 discretion.")

 General Motors v. EPA. 168 F.3d 1377,48 ERC 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("We review the
 EPA's findings of violations of a permit under the Clean Water Act for lack of
 'substantial evidence in the record, taken as a whole,' and the assessment of an
 administrative penalty for 'abuse of discretion'")

 Sasser v. EPA. 990 F.2d 127,130 (4th Cir. 1993) (the amount of the penalty is reviewed
 under the abuse of discretion standard)

 Hoffman Homes. Inc. v. EPA. 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993) (liability issues are
 reviewed under the substantial evidence  standard)

 All Regions Chemical Labs. Inc. v. EPA. 932  F.2d 73, 75 (1st Cir. 1991) (court must
 give deference to agency penalty determinations)

 Kaulkin v. Bergland. 626 F.2d 181,184 (1st Cir. 1980) ("Generally, administrative
 remedies or sanction are subject to a very limited judicial review.")

 Buxton v. United States. 961 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1997) (District court upholds
 administrative penalty, finding the filling of wetlands and the failure to restore the
 wetlands in timely manner to be a serious violation; court found that the RA committed
 no clear error of judgment, and, therefore, the penalty must be upheld; The abuse of
 discretion standard under § 309(g)(8) should be read consistently with the interpretation
 of the same standard in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §706. Accordingly,
 the Court should "consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of all the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." This standard is
"narrow," and courts may not insert their judgments for those of the agencies.  Absent a

                                116

-------
        clear error of judgment, EPA's penalty must be upheld)

C.      Calculation of Penalty/Statutory Penalty Factors

        1.      Generally

               33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (".. .In determining the amount of a civil penalty the court
               shall consider the seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit
               (if any) resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, any good-
               faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of
               the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice may require.")

               33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3) ("In determining the amount of any penalty assessed
               under this subsection, the Administrator or the Secretary, as the case may be,
               shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the
               violation, or violations, and, with respect to the violator, ability to pay, any prior
               history of such violations, the degree of culpability, economic benefit or savings
               (if any) resulting from the violation, and such other matters as justice may
               require...")

               42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c)(4)(B) (SDWA: "In assessing any civil penalty under this
               subsection, the Administrator shall take into account appropriate factors,
               including (i) the seriousness of the violation; (ii) the economic benefit (if any)
               resulting from the violation; (iii) any history of such violations; (iv) any good-
               faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements; (v) the economic
               impact of the penalty on the violator; and (vi) such other matters as justice may
               require.")

               40 C.F.R. Part 19 (Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties for Inflation)

               40 C.F.R. § 22.27(b) ("[T]he Presiding Officer shall determine the dollar amount
               of the recommended penalty to be assessed in the initial decision in accordance
               with any criteria set forth in the Act relating to the proper amount of a civil
               penalty, and must consider any civil penalty guidelines issued under the Act.")

        2.      Daily Max & Monthly Avg: Double Counting


               United States  v. Smithfield Foods. Inc..	F.3d	1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
               22092 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Far from double counting, the district court's decision to
               treat each violation of the 1992 Permit as a separate infraction for purposes of
               penalty calculation  makes sense. This structure  gives courts considerable
               flexibility to tailor penalties to the unique facts  of each case. As noted by the
               district court, a permittee who violates a single effluent limit one time is less
               culpable than one who violates the limits of several different pollutants in one
               day. Such a structure is reasonable considering the first violator causes less
               overall harm to the  environment. In the same vein, a permittee who violates a
               monthly average limit is less culpable and causes less harm than a permittee who

                                        117

-------
        violates daily maximum and monthly average limits in the same month."
        (citations omitted))

        Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. Inc..
        913 F.2d 64, 78-79 (3d Cir. 1990) (counting single reported exceedance for a
        pollutant as a violation of both the average concentration limit and the maximum
        concentration limit for the pollutant did not amount to double counting of permit
        violations; good discussion of application of statutory penalty factors)

        United States v. Smithfield Foods. Inc.. 972 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1997),
        affirmed in part, reversed in part. _ F.3d _ , 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22092
        (4th Cir. 1999) ("[I]f multiple violations of the Permit occur on the same day,
        defendants are liable for a separate day for each violation of the Permit,
        including the daily maximum, monthly average concentration, and monthly
        average loading limits for each pollutant.  This determination is consistent with
        Section 309(d) of the Act, which specifically provides for a "civil penalty not to
        exceed $25,000 per day for each violation" (emphasis added) rather than a
        statutory maximum of $25,000 per day. The different pollutants, and their daily
        maximum, monthly average concentration, and monthly average loading limits,
        are included in the Permit for different reasons. Each limit is a separate, distinct
        requirement in the Permit which can be violated. Accordingly, where multiple
        violations of defendants' Permit occur on one day, the maximum penalty on that
        day may exceed $25,000.")

        Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City and County of Honolulu. 821 F.  Supp. 1368,
        37 ERC 1398 (D. Hawaii 1993) (counting simultaneous 7-day and 30-day
        average violations constitutes impermissible duplicative penalties)

        In re Amvac Chemical Corp. (HI- 16, 1.F.R, Doc. No.  K-98C, Final  Decision
        1976) (separate civil penalties may be assessed only if (1) each violation results
        from an independent act or failure to act and (2) is  substantially distinguishable
        from any other charge; otherwise there is double jeopardy)

3.      Economic Benefit

        33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) and (g) ("In determining the amount of the civil penalty the
        court  shall consider ... the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation
       United States v. Smithfield Foods. Inc.. _ F.3d _ , 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
       22092 (4th Cir. 1999) ("the precise economic benefit a polluter has gained by
       violating its effluent limits may be difficult to prove, so '[reasonable
       approximations of economic benefit will suffice.'"; "The cost-avoided method is
       not in conflict with the CWA or basic economic principles. On the contrary, it
       represents a logical method by which a violator in Smithfield's position can be
       disgorged of any profits it attained through its non-compliance. Finding no fault
       with the district court's choice to apply the cost-avoided method in this case, we
       reject Smithfield's claim that its application was in error."; upheld use of WACC

                               118

-------
rate over "risk-free" rate; refused to credit expenditures made to come into
partial compliance)

Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co.. 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996) (process of
weighing the statutory factors in calculating civil penalties under the CWA is
"highly discretionary" with the trial court and that a court need only make a
"reasonable approximation" of economic benefit when calculating a penalty
under the CWA)

Sierra Club. Lone Start Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co.. Inc.. 73 F.3d 546, 574
(5th Cir. 1996) (upholding trial court's decision to calculate the economic
benefit "by reference to the money [the violator] saved by not" complying)

Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Tvson Foods. 897 F.2d 1128,1141-42 (11th
Cir. 1990) (reasonable approximation of economic benefit will suffice; "There
was one simple and straightforward way for Tyson to avoid paying civil
penalties for violations of the Clean Water Act: After purchasing the plant,
Tyson could have ceased operations until it was able to discharge pollutants
without violating the requirements of its NPDES permit. Tyson chose not to do
this and it must now bear the consequences of that decision.")

Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals. Inc..
913 F.2d 64, 80 (3d Cir. 1990)  (determination of economic benefit does not
require elaborate evidentiary showing; reasonable approximations will suffice)

United States v. ConAgra. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21401 (D. Id. 997) (proof of
economic benefit is limited by  5-year SOL)

S.E.C. v. Jakubowski. 1997 WL 598108 (N.D. HI. Sept. 19,1997) (the primary
purpose of disgorgement as a remedy for violation of the securities  laws is to
deprive violators of their ill-gotten gains, thereby effectuating the deterrence
objectives of those laws)

United States v. Smithfield Foods. Inc.. 972 F. Supp. 338, 349  (E.D. Va. 1997),
affirmed in part, reversed in part.	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22092
(4th Cir. 1999) ("Courts use economic benefit analysis to level  the playing field
and prevent violators from gaining an unfair competitive advantage. The
analysis provides an approximation of the  amount of money a company has
gained over its competitors by failing to comply with the law.  Since it is
difficult to prove the precise economic benefit to a polluter, a reasonable
approximation of economic benefit is sufficient	[T]he court finds the
avoided and/or delayed cost of compliance, and the weighted average cost of
capital (WACC) as a discount/interest rate in the economic benefit  calculation,
to be both the best and the appropriate method to determine how much money
defendants made on the funds they did not spend for compliance.")

S.RC. v. Moran. 944 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y.  1996) (disgorgement  is designed to
deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment and to deter others from violating

                        119

-------
the securities laws, citing S.E.C. v. First Citv Fin. Corp. Ltd.. 890 F.2d 1215,
1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989))

S.E.C. v. Bilzerian. 814 F. Supp. 116 (D.D.C. 1993) (a reasonable approximation
of defendant's illicit profits from defendant's untimely and inaccurate schedule
13D filing was $33,140,787.07 plus interest), affd. 29 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

United States v. Municipal Authority of Union Township and Dean Dairy
Products Co.. 929 F. Supp. 800,433 ERC 1377 (M.D. Pa. 1996), affd. 150 F.3d
259,46 ERC 1977 (3d Cir. 1998) (held that revenue earned by not reducing flow
to come into compliance with pretreatment limits constituted economic benefit,
in this case $2,015,000; "it is in the nature of [economic benefit calculation] that
its quantification will be imprecise... .It would eviscerate the Act to allow
violators to escape civil penalties on the ground that such penalties cannot be
calculated with precision.")

United States v. Shevenne Tooling & Mfg. Co.. 952 F. Supp. 1420 (D.N.D.
1996)  (court considered 10 year period in calculating economic benefit, but held
that" the principal requiring that persons at fault must be held to a 'level playing
field' means that the defendant must be held to the conditions of his field, not
that of a larger or more wealthy players ... the defendant's playing field was a
small playing field in a sparsely-settled community.")

Public Interest Research Group of N.J.. Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron. Inc.. 40
ERC 1917, 1929 (D.N.J. 1995) ("The penalty must at least reflect the proven
economic benefit... That is the starting point. Then the other § 309(g) factors
are used to increase the amount which reflects  the economic benefit, except that
economic impact of the penalty in extraordinary circumstances may serve to
reduce the amount found to reflect the economic  benefit to the violator of non-
compliance. If the penalty arrived at by calculation of the economic benefit
exceeds the statutory maximum penalty, the penalty will be reduced to the
statutory maximum.")

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envt'l Serv's. 890 F. Supp. 470, 517,40 ERC
2063 (D.S.C. 1995), vacated. 149 F.3d 303,46 ERC 2025 (4th Cir. 1998) (failure
of state to recover economic benefit deemed evidence of failure to diligently
prosecute - prior penalty paid to state therefore not a 309(g)(6) bar to citizens
suit; good discussion of economic benefit including discount rates)

Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt'l Serv's (TOO. Inc.. 956 F. Supp. 588
(D.S.C. 1995), rev'd on other grounds. 149 F.3d 303, 46 ERC 2025 (4th Cir.
1998) (court assessed penalty of $405,800 despite proof at trial of economic
benefit in excess of $1 million; judge reduced penalty reasoning that defendant's
attorneys fees together with the penalty awarded, provides an adequate deterrent)

Gersh & Danielson v. United States. Civ. No. 94-C-1575 (D. Colo. 1994)
(acknowledges EPA's broad authority under § 308 to obtain information re
economic benefit)

                        120

-------
Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Citv and County of Honolulu. 821 F. Supp. 1368,
37 ERC 1398 (D. Haw. 1993) (City enjoyed economic benefit beginning from
the date of noncompliance)

United States v. Citv of Beaumont 786 F. Supp. 634, 35 ERC 1106 (E.D. Tex.
1992) (city ordered to pay $400,000 for failure to implement pretreatment
program; penalty amount is appropriate where city saved over $300,000 by
failing to implement according to schedule)

United States v. A.A. Mactal Construction. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21790
(D.Kan. 1992) (CAA case; "deterrence is effective only to the extent that the risk
of incurring significant civil penalties for noncompliance is real and substantial..
. [T]he recovery of economic benefit essential and that economic benefit should
serve as the floor below which the maximum civil penalty should not be
mitigated.")

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Texaco Refining and Marketing. Inc.. 800
F. Supp. 1,17, 35 ERC 2095 (D. Del. 1992), afFd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds. 2 F.3d 493 (3d Cir.  1993) (on basis that NPDES permit requires
permittee to "take affirmative steps to ascertain and mitigate any adverse impacts
of its nonconforming discharges," court held that defendant avoided $900,000 in
receiving water monitoring costs)

Atlantic States Legal Foundation. Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co.. Inc..
786 F. Supp. 743, 749 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (court rejected plaintiffs estimation of
economic benefit and used average return on equity of 16.1 % to calculate the
time value of spending avoided; "[UJnless the [defendant] is fined an amount at
least as great as the economic gain in not complying with the regulations, the
statute serves little deterrent value.")

United States v. Roll Coater. Inc.. 21 ELR 21073 (S.D.Ind. March 22,1991)
("unless the company is fined an amount at least as great as the economic gain in
not complying with the regulations, the statute serves little deterrent value.")

Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals. Inc.. 720 F. Supp.
1158, 30 ERC 1201,1204 (D.N.J. 1989), aff d in part, rev'd in part. 913 F.2d 64,
31 ERC 1905 (3d Cir. 1990). cert, denied. 498 U.S. 1109 (1991) (economic
benefit found to be in excess of statutory maximum penalty; "Needless to say,
those numbers compel this Court to gravitate towards the higher end of the
penalty range, if not the maximum.")

Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey. Inc. v. Hercules. Inc.. 19
ELR 20903, 29 ERC 1417 (D.N.J. 1989) (it is hi the nature of [economic benefit
calculation] that its quantification will be imprecise; nevertheless, the court must
endeavor to reach a "rational estimate of [the violator's] economic benefit,
resolving uncertainties in  favor of a higher estimate.")

Student Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Monsanto. 29 ERC 1078, 1090

                        121

-------
 (D.N.J. 1988) ("To simply equalized the economic benefit with the penalty
 would serve ill the possibility of discouraging other and future violations. Some
 additional penalty should be imposed as a sanction.")

 United States, v. Mac's Muffler Shoo. Inc.. 25 ERC 1369 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 4,
 1986) (the economic benefit estimate "must encompass every benefit that
 defendants received from violation of the law."; penalty imposed based on
 wrongful profits earned by violations of CAA)

 Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey. Inc. v. A.T.&T. Bell
 Laboratories. 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1200-1202 (D.N.J. 1985) (reasonable
 approximation of economic benefit will suffice)

 Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey. Inc. v. American
 Cvanamid Co.. 23 ERC 2044, 2049 (D.N.J. 1985) (the recapture of the economic
 benefit of noncompliance is essential to provide "economic equity" to those
 members of the regulated community who have spent the money to remain in
 compliance)

 Chesapeake Bay Foundation. Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield. Ltd.. 611 F. Supp.
 1542,1558 (E.D. Va. 1985), affd. 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), cert, granted.
 479 U.S. 1029 (1987), vacated on other grounds. 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (There are
 at least three distinct types of economic benefit: "First, by delaying the
 expenditure of funds on compliance, a violator obtains the use of the money for
 other purposes in the meantime. Second, a violator may also avoid some costs
 altogether — for example, the costs of maintaining and operating the pollution
 control system until it is implemented.  Third, a violator may, in addition, obtain
 a competitive advantage as a result of its violation — for example, it may be able
 to offer goods at a lower price, thereby possibly increasing its sales and profits.")

 Tull v. United States. 615 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Va. 1983), affd. 769 F.2d 182 (4th
 Cir. 1985), cert, granted. 476 U.S. 1139 (1986), rev'd and remanded on other
 grounds. 481 U.S. 412, 423 (1987) (basing the penalty on its economic impact
 may deter future violations)

 United States v. Reserve Mining Co.. 412 F. Supp. 705,709 (D. Minn. 1976),
 affd on penalties and remanded on injunctive relief. 543 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.
 1976) ("[I]n this business venture, the record shows it returned very substantial
 profits to its corporate owner-parents, Republic and Armco. [citation omitted].
 It is reasonable to conclude that some of those profits are attributable to
 operations made less costly by discharging tailings in Lake Superior rather than
 on land, as is done by its competitors.")

 Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Davton Malleable. Inc.. 1 Ohio St. 3d 151, 438 N.E.2d 120
 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (reasonable approximation of economic benefit will suffice)

In re B&R Oil Co.. Inc..	E.A.D.	(EAB 1998) (RCRA case: EAB rejected
Respondent's argument that the economic benefit component should have been

                        122

-------
offset by the payments made to the state fund; to allow such an offset would
"subvert a primary purpose of the Penalty Policy, which is to remove the
competitive advantage that violators gain through noncompliance"; the cost of
upgrading and replacing tanks were also not allowed as setoffs to economic
benefit)

In re BJ. Carnev Industries. Inc.. 7 E.A.D. 171 (EAB 1997), appeal dismissed.
__ F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23005 (9th Cir.  1999) (the "recapture of a
violator's economic benefit of noncompliance is the cornerstone of the Agency's
civil penalty program;" based on record, EAB held that 16% discount rate used
by EPA was not unreasonably high)

In re A.Y. McDonald Industries. Inc.. 2 E.A.D. 402,423 (CJO 1987) ("the
economic benefit component serves to remove any incentive to violate the [law]
by requiring the violator to pay the expenses avoided  or deferred through
noncompliance.")

In re Alaska's Fishing Unlimited Lodges. Docket No. 10-97-0062 OPA (RJO
Anderson Feb. 22,1999) (held that no penalty should be assessed against tank
owner who violated SPCC regulations on grounds that none of the local
competitors complied either, so no economic benefit accrued, and EPA should
not have filed a penalty action when it was attempting to encourage Respondent
to comply with the law)

In re Urban Drainage and Flood Control District. Docket No. CWA-VJH-94-20-
PH (ALJ Pearlstein June 25, 1998) ("Civil penalties should, at a minimum,
recoup any economic benefit the violator has accrued as a result of the
violation.")

In re BJ. Carnev Industries. Inc.. Docket No. 1090-09-13-309(g) (ALJ
Kuhlmann  1998), appeal dismissed.	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23005
(9th Cir. 1999) (on remand from EAB $125,000 awarded based on economic
benefit)

In re B.J. Camev Industries. Inc.. Docket No. 1090-09-13-309(g) (ALJ Head
1996), aff d in part, rev'd in part. 7 E.A.D. 171 (EAB 1997), appeal dismissed.
	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23005 (9* Cir. 1999) (economic benefit
calculations may not begin prior to statute of limitations; discount rate of 16%
argued by government was unreasonably high)

60 Fed. Reg. 66706, 66707 (1995) (recovering economic benefit of
noncompliance provides an incentive for regulated entities to comply on time;
EPA's ability to recoup a violator's economic benefit "protects responsible
companies from being undercut by their noncomplying competitors, thereby
preserving a level playing field.")

60 Fed. Reg. 16875, 16876 (1995) (economic benefit  of noncompliance
component of the penalty helps "ensure a level playing field by ensuring that

                        123

-------
        violators do not obtain an economic advantage over their competitors who made
        the necessary investment in environmental compliance."

        60 Fed. Reg. 66706, 66707 (1995) ("Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery,
        Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations") (gravity portion of penalty
        can be reduced or waive for self-disclosure, but economic benefit must be
        recovered)

        S. Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1985) ("The amendment would also
        expressly require the courts to consider a number of factors, including, in
        particular, the economic benefit gained as a result of the violation. Violators
        should not be able to obtain an economic benefit vis-a-vis their competitors due
        to their noncompliance with environmental laws. The determination of
        economic benefit or other factors will not require an elaborate or burdensome
        evidentiary showing. Reasonable approximations of economic benefit will
        suffice.")

        EPA, "Interim Clean Water Act Settlement Penalty Policy" at 4 (Mar. 1, 1995)
        ("The objective of the economic benefit calculation is to place violators in the
        same financial position as they would have been if they had complied on time.")

        EPA, "Policy on Civil Penalties, EPA General Enforcement Policy #GM-21"
        (Feb. 16,1984), p. 3 (violator should pay a penalty that recovers economic
        benefit)

        EPA, "Penalty Policy for Civil Settlement Negotiations" (Feb. 11, 1986)
        (economic benefit must be recovered)

        Wise, Kolbe & Maniatis, EPA's BEN Model: A Change for the Better?, Toxics
        Law Reporter (February 24, 1993)

        Fuhrman, Penalty Assessment at the Environmental Protection Agency: A View
        From the Outside, Environment Reporter (October 18, 1991)

        Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal
       Administrative Agencies, 79 Coluni. L. Rev. 1435, 1466-68 (1979) ("Mere
       removal of economic benefit will usually be insufficient by itself to secure
       compliance with regulatory standards.")

4.     Economic Impact (Ability to Pay)

       United States v. Municipal Authority of Union Township and Dean Dairy
       Products Co.. 150 F.3d 259,46 EEC 1977 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Dean Dairy contends
       it was legal error for the  district court to consider the financial condition of Dean
       Foods because the parent corporation was not a party to the action, it did not
       violate the Clean Water Act, and there was insufficient evidence to pierce the
       corporate veil. We reject its contention... [I]t is important to remember that it
       was not Dean Foods, but only Dean Dairy, the violator, who was penalized. The

                               124

-------
reference to Dean Foods' financial statement merely assured that the penalty
would not be set at a level above Dean Dairy's ability to pay. If the subsidiary
does not retain its revenues, as the evidence showed in this case, then its parent's
financial resources are highly relevant.")

United States v. Municipal Authority of Union Township and Dean Dairy
Products Co.. 929 F. Supp. 800,43 ERG 1377,1381 (M.D. Pa.  1996), affd. 150
F.3d 259,46 ERG 1977 (3d Cir. 1998) (wealth of corporate parent corporation
considered in determining ability to pay; "It would constitute a  serious injustice
to allow Dean Foods to profit from Fairmont's violations of the Act, which
occurred while Dean Foods retained control over Fairmont's wastewater problem
and failed to take timely remedial action, and at the same  [sic] allow Dean Foods
to escape liability for the violations. Judicial sanction of such an arrangement
would surely encourage violation of the Clean Water Act.")

United States v. Harrison Warehouse Services Co.. Inc.. No. 1:90CV82 (N.D.
W.V. 1995) at 23-24 (CAA; reduction from statutory max based on inability of
highly-leveraged business empire to pay; however, "the Court is not precluded
from finding that the defendants can pay some penalty simply because doing so
might require Wilfong to sell or otherwise encumber a personal or business
interest.")

Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City and County of Honolulu. 821 F. Supp. 1368,
37 ERG 1398 (D. Haw. 1993) ("The impact of a penalty on the  city will be a
slight increase in the monthly rates paid by users of the  sewer system.
Therefore, economic impact is not a mitigating factor.")

Atlantic States Legal Foundation. Inc.  v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co.. Inc..
786 F. Supp.  743,753 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (OK to look to assets and finances of the
violator's parent in evaluating the economic impact of the penalty on the
violator)

United States v. Citv of San Diego. 21 ELR 21,223,21,225 (S.D. Gal. 1991)
("Contrary to the position advocated by the City, the court finds that plaintiffs'
analysis of economic benefit is valid as to municipalities.  While it is difficult to
quantify precisely the savings realized by the City as a result of its intransigence,
plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the  evidence that the City
has saved in excess of $300 million dollars [sic] overs approximately the last
thirty years by failing  to invest in capital improvements. Residents living here in
those years earned "dividend" in the form of lower sewer  rates.  A direct parallel
to corporate operations is apparent.")

United States v. Roll Coater. Inc.. 21 ELR 21073 (S.D. Ind. 1991) at *22 (no
reduction in penalty based on ability to pay because defendant introduced no
evidence to support the defense)

United States v. Confederate Acres Sanitary Sewer and Drainage System. Inc..
767 F. Supp. 834, 840 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (the court recognized that a civil  penalty

                        125

-------
 would work a severe hardship on the defendant, and limited the civil penalty to
 the recapture of economic benefits because the company was going out of
 business and no further deterrence was required)

 Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. Inc.. 720 F. Supp.
 1158,1166 (D.N.J. 1989), aff d in part, rev'd in part. 913 F.2d 64, 31 ERC 1905
 (3d Cir. 1990), cert, denied. 498 U.S.  1109 (1991) (court considered EPA's
 penalty policy (which it held was not binding on the court), which places the
 burden of proving inability to pay on the defendant; "Defendant has failed to
 demonstrate that assessing a severe penalty would jeopardize defendant's
 continued operation... Defendant claims that it is in a relatively poor economic
 position. The Court is not persuaded that this is the case."  OK to look to assets
 and finances of the violator's parent in evaluating the economic impact of the
 penalty on the violator)

 Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. CP Chemicals. Inc.. 26 ERC 2017,
 2022 (1987) ("Congress anticipated that the [environmental] regulations 'would
 cause economic hardship and plant closings' because they would impose in a
 x substantial number of point sources' within each industrial category additional
 costs which "must be borne or the point source eliminated.'")

 Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltnev. 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1562 (E.D. Va.
 1985), affd. 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded on other
 grounds. 484 U.S. 49, 108 S. Ct. 376,  98 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1987) (the Court was
 "unpersuaded that any penalty warranted by Gwaltney's violations would
 jeopardize Gwaltney's continued operation)

 United States v. Eureka Pipeline Co.. 401 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. W.V. 1975) (civil
 penalties should be tailored to the ability of the defendant to pay)

 In re James C. Lin and Lin Cubing. Inc.. 5 E.A.D. 595  (EAB 1994) (once
 respondent asserts that it cannot afford to pay the penalty, the burden of
 persuasion shifts to EPA as part of its prima facie case)

 In re New Waterburv. Ltd.. 5 E.A.D. 529, 538-539 (1994) ("[Although the
 Region bears the burden of proof as to the appropriateness of the penalty it does
 not bear a separate burden on each of the TSCA § 16 factors. More specifically,
 the burden of proof goes to the appropriateness of the penalty tanking all factors
 into account. Thus, for the Region to  make a prima facie case on the
 appropriateness of its recommended penalty, the Region must come forward with
 evidence to show that it, in fact, considered each factor identified in [TSCAJ
 Section 16 and that its recommended penalty is supported by its analysis of those
 factors. The depth of consideration will vary in each case, but so long as each
 factor is touched upon and the penalty is supported by the analysis a prima facie
 case can be made. Once this is accomplished, the burden of going forward shifts
 to the respondent... In view of the foregoing, New Waterbury's contention that
the Region must specifically and separately prove that a respondent has the funds
necessary to pay a proposed penalty before a penalty can be assessed is

                        126

-------
       erroneous and must be rejected."; ability to pay is merely one of the factors to
       consider in assessing a penalty and should not require a zero penalty on its own)

       In re Dr. Marshall C. Sasser. 3 E.A.D. 703, 708 (CJO 1991) (burden is on
       respondent to prove inability to pay)

       In re Helena Chemical Co.. 3 E.A.D. 26, 35-39 (CJO 1989) (FIFRA case;
       inability to pay is an affirmative defense; burden of proof is on respondent)

       In re Central Paint and Body Shop. Inc.. 2 E.A.D. 309 (CJO 1987) (RCRA case;
       inability to pay is an affirmative defense; burden of proof is on respondent)

       Diver, The Use of Civil Penalties in Enforcing the Clean Water Act Amendments
       of 1977, 12 Univ. San. Fran. L. Rev. 437,460-62 (1978)

5.     Good Faith Efforts to Comply (Culpability)

       United States v. Smithfield Foods. Inc..	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
       22092 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Section 309(d) of the CWA requires a district court to
       consider 'any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements' as a
       mitigating factor in the penalty calculation. 33 U.S.C.A.§ 1319(d). In practice, a
       court evaluates the evidence to determine whether the permittee took any actions
       to reduce the number of violations or  attempted to lessen the impact of their
       discharges on the environment.")

       Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City and County of Honolulu. 821 F. Supp. 1368,
       37 ERC 1398 (D. Hawaii 1993) (city's good faith reliance on DOH interim
       standards must be a significant factor in assessing a penalty for the secondary
       treatment violations)

       Atlantic States Legal Foundation. Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co.. Inc..
       786 F. Supp. 743  (N.D. rnd. 1992) (despite finding that defendant could have
       been more expeditious in installing pollution control equipment, court found no
       calculated effort to avoid compliance; the courts may consider the defendant's
       efforts to comply  with the law, the difficulties of compliance and the reasons for
       the defendant's lack of compliance in  assessing a penalty)

       United States v. Roll Coater. Inc.. 21 ELR 21073  (S.D. Ind. 1991) (the courts
       may consider the defendant's efforts to comply with the law, the difficulties of
       compliance and the reasons for the defendant's lack of compliance in assessing a
       penalty)

       United States v. Kev West Towers. Inc.. 720 F. Supp. 963, 965-966 (S.D. Fla.
       1989) (no good faith effort to comply  found were defendant violated earlier
       administrative orders to stop filling wetlands)

       TTnited States v Velsicol Chemical Corp.. 12 ERC 1417, 1421 (W.D. Tenn.
       1978) (a showing  of willfulness or negligence is not necessary to impose a civil

                               127

-------
       penalty)

       Chesapeake Bav Foundation v. Gwaltnev of Smithfield. 611 F. Supp. 1542,1564
       (E.D. Va. 1985), affd. 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded on
       other grounds. 100 S. Ct. 376 (1987), on remand. 844 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1988)
       (the courts may consider the defendant's efforts to comply with the law, the
       difficulties of compliance and the reasons for the defendant's lack of compliance
       in assessing a penalty)

       United States v. Municipal Authority of Union Township and Dean Dairy
       Products Co.. Civil No. l:CV-94-0621 (M.D. Pa. July 10,1996) at 19
       ("Fairmont's lengthy delay in meaningfully confronting its IU permit violations,
       and its unwillingness to reduce production volume until its wastewater problem
       was under control, do not speak highly of its good faith in this matter.")

       In re Rofor Plating Co.. Inc.. Docket No. CWA-2-I-91-1112,1993 TSCA LEXIS
       257 (ALJ Head, September 16, 1993) (high  culpability found where Respondent
       failed to provide DMRs and it would have been relatively easy for Resp. to
       comply)

6.     History of Violations

       United States v. Srnithfield Foods. Inc.. 972 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1997),
       affirmed in part, reversed in part.	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22092
       (4th Cir. 1999) ("In determining the 'history of such violations,' courts
       considered the duration of defendants' current violations, whether defendants
       have committed similar violations in the past, and the duration and nature of all
       of the violations, including whether the violations are perpetual or sporadic.")

       United States v. ConAgra. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21401 (D. Id. 1997) (only
       adjudicated violations can be used as prior history prior to 5-year SOL)

       Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v.  Hercules Inc.. 830 F. Supp.
       1525, 1549, 36 ERC 1833 (D.N.J. 1993), affd in part,  rev'd in part. 50 F.3d
       1239,40 ERC 1385 (3d Cir. 1995) (evidence of violations at another facility
       relevant and admissible in a CWA penalty hearing because evidence is relevant
       to the defendant's good faith and history of violations)

       Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City and County of Honolulu. 821 F. Supp. 1368,
       37 ERC 1398 (D. Hawaii  1993) (history of violation inapplicable since there was
       inconclusive evidence regarding other bypass incidents)

       Atlantic States Legal Foundation. Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co.. Inct.
       786 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Lid. 1992) (since violations stretched back to 1975, court
       did not reduce penalty based on this factor (starting from stat. max.))

       United States v. City of San Diego. No. CIV 88-1101-B, 1991 WL 163747 (S.D.
       Cal. Apr. 28, 1991)

                               128

-------
       United States v. Roll Coater. Tnc.. 21 ELR 21073 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (ongoing
       violations not part of history of violations, which must be previous unrelated
       violations)

       Student Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Hercules. Inc.. 29 ERG 1417
       (D.N.J. 1989) (past unpunished violations considered as part of "history of
       violations" factor used in penalty assessments)

       Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. Inc.. 720 F. Supp.
       1158, 1163, 30 ERC 1201,1204 (D.N.J. 1989), aff d in part, rev'd in part. 913
       F.2d 64, 31 ERC  1905 (3d Cir. 1990). cert, denied. 498 U.S. 1109 (1991) ("The
       Court finds that defendant's 386 violations spanned an 11 year period from 1977
       to 1988. Defendant has violated its permit in each of those 11 years.")

       Student Public Interest Research Group of N.J.. Inc. v. Monsanto Co.. 29 ERC
       1078,1091 (D.N.J. 1988) (where the defendant has been sued before, or where it
       has had prior notice of the problems giving rise to the case and failed to take
       action, the courts will generally refuse to mitigate the penalty)

       In re Ketchikan Pulp Co.. Docket No. CWA-1089-12-22-309(g) (ALJ Head Nov.
       22,1995), affd. 7 E.A.D. 605 (EAB 1998) (ALJ considered violations by
       respondent at same facility in all media when considering prior history. Id. at
       41)

7.     Monthly Average Violations

       Natural Resources Defense  Council. Inc. v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg. Inc.. 2 F.3d
       493, 507, 37 ERC 1508 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Since the daily average limit is
       computed by averaging effluent levels only for days on which the facility
       operated, it seems only logical and fair to assess penalties for a violation of this
       limit based on the number of days the facility was in operation.")

       EPA v. Citv of Green Forest. Arkansas. 921 F.2d 1394,1407, 32 ERC 1508 (8th
       Cir. 1990), cert, denied.  112 S. Ct. 414 (1991) (where a NPDES permit provides
       an effluent limitation measured in terms of an average over a number of days,
       such as a monthly average, a violation of the average results in a violation for
       each day of the period)

       Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Tvson Foods. 897 F.2d 1128, 1139-40, 31
       ERC 1201 (11th Cir. 1990)  (monthly average violation counts as 30 violations;
       court cannot impose penalties for violations of daily max and monthly average
       for same pollutant)

       Chesapeake Bav Foundation v. Gwaltnev. 791 F.2d 304, 314,24 ERC 1417 (4th
       Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded on other grounds. 484 U.S. 49,108 S. Ct. 376,
       98 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1987)  (for purposes of penalty calculation, a monthly average
       violation equals the number of days in the month; CWA "speakjs] in terms of

                               129

-------
        penalties per day of violation, rather than penalties per violation.... This
        language strongly suggests that where a violation is defined in terms of a time
        period longer than a day, the maximum penalty assessable for that violation
        should be defined in terms of the number of days in that time period.")

        United States v. Aluminum Co. of American. 824 F. Supp. 640, 649 n.15 (E.D.
        Tex. 1993) ("The term 'daily average' is often referred to as a 'monthly
        average.' The terms may be used interchangeably.")

        Atlantic States Legal Foundation. Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co.. Inc..
        786 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Bid. 1992) (monthly average violations equals 30)

        United States v. Roll Coater. Inc.. 21 ELR 21073 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (citing Tyson,
        held that in calculating the statutory maximum, each monthly violation
        constitutes a violation for each day of that month)

        United States v. Amoco Oil Co.. 580 F. Supp. 1042,1045 (W.D. Miss. 1984)
        ("[W]here effluent limitations are set on some basis other than a daily limit -
        that is, for example, where they are set as ... a monthly maximum or monthly
        average limit, etc. - - a 'violation' necessarily encompasses all the days involved
        in the time period covered by the limitation.")

        United States v. Phelps Dodge Industries. Inc.. 589 F. Supp. 1340, 1367
        (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (violation of monthly average results in a violation for each day
        of the period)

        United States v. Swingline. Inc.. 371 F. Supp. 37,47 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (violation
        of monthly average results in a violation for each day of the period)

        In re Easco Aluminum Corp.. CWA-AO-V-13-89 (ALJ Harwood Aug. 16,1991)
        (monthly average counts as thirty violations, citing Tyson Foods: "Counting a
        violation of a monthly average as a single violation does not adequately take
        account of the nature of the violation and its potential gravity.")

8.      Other Matters as Justice Requires

        Tull v. United States. 481 U.S. 412,426-27, 95  L. Ed. 2d 365,107 S. Ct. 1831
        (1987) ("Congress [made the] assignment of the determination of the amount of
        the civil penalties to trial judges	Since Congress itself may fix the civil
        penalty, it may delegate that determination to trial judges. In this case, highly
        discretionary calculations that take  into account multiple factors are necessary in
        Order to  set civil penalties under the Clean Water Act.")

       United States v. Marine Shale Processors. 81  F.3d 1329,42 ERC 1481 (5th Cir.
        1996) (court must recalculate $3,000,000 fine because it failed to support its
       conclusion that operator increased volume of thermal pollution discharges in
       Order to maximize profit)
                               130

-------
Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co.. 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996) (process of
weighing the statutory factors in calculating civil penalties under the CWA is
"highly discretionary" with the trial court)

Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries. Inc.. 847 F.2d 1109,1113,27 ERC 1881 (4th
Cir. 1988), cert denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989) ($977,000 penalty upheld)

San Francisco Bavkeeper v. Tidewater Sand & Gravel Co.. 46 ERC 1780, 1789
(N.D. Ca. 1997) (court declined to hold that each day of violation of a storm
water general permit as a separate violation of the CWA; "The violations at issue
in this motion concern failures to meet regulatory requirements by specific
deadlines. They do not concern discrete discharges by [defendant].")

Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Hercules. Inc.. 970 F. Supp. 363, 364
(D.N.J. 1997) ("In assessing a penalty under the Clean Water Act, a district court
has a great amount of discretion.")

United States v. Shevenne Tooling & Mfg. Co.. 952 F. Supp. 1420,1422-23
(D.N.D. 1996) ("It must be understood, however, that despite the directional aid
and guidance that the six enumerated factors in § 1319(d) provide, the
calculation of a final penalty may often be imprecise and approximate at best.
Indeed, the accuracy of the final calculations, and the figure of penalty that they
produce, is as dependant, or even more so, upon the provision of complete and
accurate evidence, as introduced, developed, and explained at trial, as it is upon
a good evaluation of this information by the court.")

United States v. Harrison Warehouse Services Co.. No. 1:90CV82, Slip op. at 18
(D. W. Va., Mar. 6,1995) (CAA case holding that failure to give notice is a
continuing violation; defendant liable for 25 days of violation were 10 day prior
notice required and construction lasted 15 days)

United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp.. No. C92-10250, Slip. op. at 5-6 (W.D.
Wash., Dec. 13, 1993) (CAA case rejecting the notion that noncompliance with
the notice requirement should be treated as a single violation of a single day)

Atlantic States  Legal Foundation. Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co.. Inc..
786 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (court rejected plaintiffs estimation of
economic benefit;  substantially reduced penalty for lack of significant
environmental harm; recognized civil penalties as deterrent; assessed $450,000
based on stat. max. of $25.8 million)

Tn re Catalina Yachts. Inc.. 8 E.A.D. __(EAB 1999) (EPCRA case; held that use
of the "other matters" factor inappropriate where penalty had already been
adjusted downward for good faith efforts to comply; rejected application of
"other matters" factor to SEP in this case)

 Tn re B.J. Camev Industries. Inc.. 7 E.A.D. 171 (EAB 1997), appeal dismissed.
	p.3d	,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23005 (9* Cir. 1999) ("Adjustment under

                         131

-------
       the 'justice' factor may be warranted only if the evidence of those good deeds is
       'clear and unequivocal, and the circumstances must be such that a reasonable
       person would easily agree that not giving some form of credit would be a
       manifest injustice.'" Slip op. at 81 n. 82)

        In re Spang & Co.. 6 E.A.D. 226 (EAB 1995) ( "[U]se of the justice factor
       should be far from routine, since application of the other adjustment factors
       normally produces a penalty that is fair and just.")

       In re Puerto Rico Urban Renewal & Housing Corp.. Docket No. CWA-H-89-249
       (ALJ Nissen June 29, 1993) ("other matters as justice may require" counseled
       reduction in penalty where owner of sanitary collection system held strictly
       liable for unpermitted discharges of untreated wastewater to river
       notwithstanding that the discharges resulted from illegal connections to system
       by third parties)

       In re Rofor Plating Co.. Inc.. Docket No. CWA-2-I-91-1112,  1993 TSCA LEXIS
       257 (ALJ Head, September 16, 1993) (application of 309(g)(3) factors to
       administrative case)

       In re Easco Aluminum Corporation. Docket No. CWA-AO-V-13-89,1992 TSCA
       LEXIS 349 (ALJ Harwood, December 8, 1992) (good discussion of penalty
       appropriate for DMR and reporting violations - reduced from $125,000
       requested to $45,000)

       S. Rep. No. 92-414, 2nd Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1971) ("The threat of sanction must
       be real... abatement orders [and] penalty provisions ... should accomplish the
       objective of compliance.")

9.     Seriousness of Violation

       Chevron U.S.A. v. Yost. 919 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1990) (violation of oil sheen
       regulations that declare all oil sheens to be environmentally harmfully cannot be
       rebutted by specific evidence regarding actual harm)

       Public Interest Research Group of N.J.. Inc. v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. Inc..
       913 F.2d 64, 31 ERG 1905 (3d Cir. 1990). cert, denied. 498 U.S. 1109 (1991) (a
       "particularized showing of the harm" is not required and proof of the overall risk
       of the pollutants is sufficient)

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Texaco Refining and Marketing Inc..
       No. 88-263 (D. Del. Sept. 1,1998) (held that refinery owner  must conduct
       environmental sampling to determine the impact of past and future discharges to
       the river in excess of the limits in the refinery's NPDES permit)

       Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOO. Inc.. 956 F. Supp. 588,
       602 (D.S.C. 1997), rev'd on other grounds. 149 F.3d 303,46 ERC 2025 (4th Cir.
       1998) ("presence or absence of environmental harm is relevant" to the penalty

                               132

-------
assessment)

United States v. Smithfield Foods. Inc.. 972 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1997),
affirmed in part, reversed in part.	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22092
(4th Cir. 1999) (may justifiably impose a significant penalty if it finds there is a
risk or potential risk of environmental harm, even absent proof of actual
deleterious effect)

United States v. Gulf Park Water Co.. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12802 (S.D. Miss.
1997) (in assessing $1.5 million penalty, held that potential harm to the
environment enough to justify substantial penalty; actual harm need not be
shown)

United States v. Municipal Authority of Union Township and Dean Dairy
Products Co.. 929 F. Supp. 800,43 ERC 1377, 1382-83 (M.D. Pa. 1996) ("It
must be emphasized, however, that because actual harm to the environment is by
nature difficult and sometimes impossible to demonstrate, it need not be proven
to establish that substantial penalties are appropriate  in a Clean Water Act
case.")

United States v. Avatar Holdings. Inc.. 1996 WL 479533, at *6 (M.D. Fla. 1996)
(the seriousness of the violations is determined by considering "the number,
duration and degree of the violations as well as the actual or potential harm to
human health and the environment," "[a] substantial  reduction in the maximum
statutory penalty is warranted where the violations caused minimal
environmental damage")

Public Interest Research Group of N. J.. Inc. v. Magnesium Electron. Inc.. 40
ERC 1917,1995 WL 461252, *17 (D.N.J. March 9, 1995) (environmental harm
need not be proven to collect penalty under the CWA)

United States v. Harrison Warehouse Services Co.. Inc.. No.  1:90CV82 (N.D.
W.V. 1995) at 24 (CAA; "The release of asbestos fibers into the environment
necessarily puts the entire community at risk of contracting diseases which can
be fatal. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the instant violations are serious
as a matter of law.")

Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City and County of Honolulu. 821 F. Supp. 1368,
37 ERC 1398 (D. Hawaii 1993) (lack of measurable material harm was a
mitigating factor)

Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Texaco Refining & Marketing. Inc..
800 F. Supp. 1, 21 (D. Del. 1992) (court may justifiably impose a significant
penalty if it finds there is a risk or potential risk of environmental harm, even
absent proof of actual deleterious effect)

Atlantic States Legal Foundation. Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stampine Co.. Inc..
786 F. Supp. 743, 747 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (3-year study of receiving waters showed

                        133

-------
 no measurable environmental harm; the complete absence of environmental
 damage may be considered by the Court in mitigating a civil penalty)

 Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Texaco. 800 F. Supp. 1, 35 ERC
 2095, 2114 (D. Del. 1992), aff d in part and reverse in part. 2 F.3d 493, 37 ERC
 1305 (3d Cir. 1993) (plaintiff put on proof of theoretical environmental harm;
 "We therefore reject Texaco's contention that no penalty is appropriate because
 the plaintiffs have failed to prove actual adverse impact.  Congress has stated
 that the objective of the [CWAJ is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
 and biological integrity of the nation's waters... So as long as the plaintiffs have
 proved that there is at least a potentially destructive impact on the waterway,
 penalties are not inappropriate... [I]f we required specific proof that particular
 violating discharges caused discrete, identifiable harms, we would encourage a
 permittee to ignore the requirements of its permit vwith impunity so long as it
 discharge into already polluted waters.'")

 United States v. Roll Coater. Inc.. 21 ELR 21073 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (held that lack
 of proven environmental damage a mitigating factor, rejecting government's
 argument that court should accept, without evidence, that all violations involving
 toxic pollutants are serious; distinguishes Powell Duffrvn on grounds that it was
 not a pretreatment case)

 United States v. Roll Coater. Inc.. 21 ELR 21073, 21075 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (lack
 of environmental damage is a mitigating factor)

 All Regions Chemical Labs. Inc. v. EPA. 932 F.2d 73, 76 (1st Cir. 1991) (TSCA
 failure-to-report case, where court held that ALJ was correct to hold that EPA
 has the power to assess penalties in terms of what might have happened rather
 than what did happen)

 International Union. UAW v. Amerace Corp. Inc.. 740 F. Supp. 1072,1081,32
 ERC 1790, 21 ELR 20097 (D.N.J. 1990) (discharges of prohibited substances to
 the POTW are presumed to pass through in unacceptable amounts; Because
 categorical standards and local limits established by the POTW incorporate a
 causation element (i.e., a determination has been made that concentrations or
 loadings exceeding certain numerical limits will interfere with or pass through
 the POTW), both types of limitations are enforceable without direct evidence
 that a particular discharge caused pass  through or interference)

 Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. Inc.. 720 F. Supp.
 1158,1163 (D.N.J. 1989), aff d in part, rev'd in part. 913 F.2d 64, 31 ERC 1905
 (3d Cir. 1990), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 1109 (1991) ("The Court finds that the 386
 violations were very serious in nature.  A significant number of the violations
 exceeded the permit limitations by large amounts. Significantly, some of the
 defendant's effluent was toxic to marine organisms because defendant's
violations involved toxic pollutants and pollutants with potential to cause
environmental harm to the waters into  which they were discharged. Moreover,
the Court attaches significance to the large number of violations at issue.")

                         134

-------
       Student Public Interest Research Group of N.J.. Inc. v. Hercules. Tnc.. 29 ERC
       1417, 1421 (D.N.J. 1989) (courts recognize that it is usually impossible to
       determine the precise effect of a violation on ambient water quality, and
       accordingly they do not permit protracted litigation over the issue in civil penalty
       proceedings)

       Public Interest Research Group V. C.P. Chemicals. 26 ERC 2017, 2021 (D.N.J.
       1987) ("if the Court were to adopt defendant's view,... any permittee could
       ignore the requirements of its permit with impunity so long as it discharged into
       already heavily polluted waters. Clearly, any argument that toxic discharges fail
       to make the receiving waters measurably worse frustrates the Act's intent to
       improve the quality of our nation's waters.")

       Mumford Cove Assoc. v. Groton. 640 F. Supp. 392 (D. Conn. 1986)
       ("enforcement of the Clean Water Act does not depend upon establishing a direct
       causal link between violations of NPDES permit and pollution.")

       United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.. 12 ERC 1417, 1421 (W.D. Tenn.
       1978) (Civil penalties are "not tied to damages actually suffered	")

       In re Labarge. Inc.. Docket No. CWA-VH-91-W-0078 at 7 (ALJ Greene Feb. 5,
       1996) ("[E]vidence of measurable environmental harm in connection with a
       violation is not required in order to support the assessment of a substantial
       penalty under the Act.")

10.    Top-Down/Bottom-Up

       United States v. Smithfield Foods. Inc..	F.3d	,  1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
       22092 (4* Cir. 1999) (rejecting defendant's argument that CWA does not allow
       trebling of the penalty, appeals court affirmed trial court's use of bottom-up
       method, beginning with economic benefit as lowest possible penalty; "When
       calculating Smithfield's penalty, the district court took into account all six of the
       statutorily mandated factors and sufficiently detailed it findings as to whether the
       evidence in each area had a mitigating or aggravating impact on the total penalty.
           We find that the court's analysis was complete and in line with what is
       required under the statute... But even if the court had simply trebled the
       economic benefit to determine the appropriate penalty, that was within its
       discretion, as long as it was below the statutory maximum of $174.55 million.")

       Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co.. 73 F.3d 546,41 ERC 1897 (5th Cir. 1996),
       cert, denied. 519 U.S. 811 (1997) (held that trial court's use of top-down
       approach of Tyson Foods appropriate)

       Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Tvson Foods. 897  F.2d 1128, 1137-40,31
       ERC 1201 (11th Cir. 1990) (monthly average violation counts as 30 violations;
       the statutory maximum penalty is the point of departure in assessing a penalty
       under the CWA; court cannot impose penalties for violations of daily max and
       monthly average for same pollutant)

                               135

-------
United States v. Gulf Park Water Co.. 972 F. Supp. 1056,46 ERC 1877 (S.D.
Miss. 1997) (in assessing $1.5 million penalty adopted Tvson approach of top-
down penalty calculation)

United States v. Smithfield Foods. Inc.. 972 F. Supp. 338,45 ERC 1387 (E.D.
Va. 1997), affirmed in part, reversed in part.	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22092 (4th Cir. 1999) ("As the statute does not require either the 'top-
down' or the 'bottom-up' method, the court exercises its discretion and elects to
use the 'bottom-up' method when calculating the appropriate penalty for
defendants' violations of their Permit;" court began with econ. benefit ($4.2
million) and adjusted upward to account for other factors to arrive at $12.6
million)

United States v. Municipal Authority of Union Township and Dean Dairy
Products Co.. Civil No. l:CV-94-0621 (M.D. Pa. July 10, 1996) (rejects top-
down approach in favor of starting with economic benefit and working up)

Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey. Inc. v. Magnesium Electron. Inc..
40 ERC 1917 (D.N.J. March 9, 1995) (economic benefit is the starting point and
the other § 309(d) factors are used to increase it)

Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City and  County of Honolulu. 821 F. Supp. 1368,
37 ERC 1398 (D. Hawaii 1993) (start with statutory max and work down)

United States v. Roll Coater. Inc.. 21 ELR 21073 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (start with
statutory max and work down; cites Tvson Foods)

Student Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Monsanto. 29 ERC 1078,1091
(D.N.J. 1988) (court refused to first set the penalty at statutory max and then
place the burden on the defendant to establish facts justifying a reduction)

Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey. Inc. v. Monsanto Co.. 18 ELR
20999 (D.N.J. 1988) (rejects top-down  approach)

In re B.J. Carney Industries. Inc.. Docket No. 1090-09-13-309(g) (ALJ Head
1996), aff d in part, rev'd in part. 7 E.A.D. 171 (EAB 1997), appeal dismissed.
	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23005 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejected Tvson
Foods: ALJ ruled that penalty should be calculated from bottom up)

In re Mahoning Valley Sanitary Dist.. 1996 CWA LEXIS 7 (ALJ Head 1996)
(rejecting top-down approach to calculation of penalty)

In re Ketchikan Pulp Co.. Docket No. CWA-1089-12-22-309(g) (ALJ Head Nov.
22, 1995), affd, 7 E.A.D. 605 (EAB 1998) (rejecting Tvson Foods as not
applicable to administrative cases, ALJ calculated penalty from bottom up
applying penalty factors)
                        136

-------
D.      Collateral Estoppel

        Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore. 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649 n.5, 58 L. Ed.
        2d 552 (1979) (Under collateral estoppel principles, once an issue is actually litigated
        and necessarily determined, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on
        a different cause of action but involving a party or privy to the prior litigation.)

        Brown v. Felsen. 442 U.S. 127,139, n.10, 99 S. Ct. 2205, 2213, n.10, 60 L. Ed. 2d 767
        (1979) (In the absence of countervailing statutory policy, collateral estoppel bars
        relitigation of factual questions or mixed questions of law and fact.)

        United States v. ITT Ravonier. Inc.. 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980) (EPA collaterally
        estopped to enforce for violations of CWA by pulp mill where mill had already litigated
        liability in state court against Washington State Department of Ecology for same
        violations)

        United States v. City of Erie. Pa.. No. 94-281 (W.D. Pa. July 21,1995) (motion to
        dismiss denied  in case against city for failure to enforce pretreatment violations; court
        rejected collateral estoppel argument, among others)

        In re Marine Shale Processors. Inc.. 5 E.A.D. 751 (EAB 1995) (collateral estoppel
        argument rejected where permit applicant argued that tentative finding of jury in
        enforcement case was binding on Region in permitting matter; good analysis of elements
        of collateral estoppel)

 E.     Enforcement Discretion

        Heckler v. Chanev. 470 U.S. 821, 831,105 S. Ct. 1649,1656, 84 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1985)
        ("[A]n agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal
        process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion." Agency
        non-enforcement decisions should generally not be subject to judicial review because
        such decisions  involve the balancing of various factors, including "whether a violation
        has occurred,... whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another,
        whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular action requested
        best fits the agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough
        resources to undertake the action at all.")

        Greene v. Reillv. 956 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1992) (district court held that CWA does not
        impose a mandatory duty on EPA to take enforcement action under § 309 when the
        Agency learns of a violation of § 301; court did not reach this question, ruling on
        grounds that plaintiff failed to give 60 days notice)

        Cnker v. Sullivan. 902 F.2d  84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Unless Congress has provided
        meaningful standards for defining limits of agency's discretion to enforce statutory
        provisions entrusted to agency supervision, the APA does not permit courts to interfere.
        "This court should not steer  the Department's resources and shape its priorities when we
        lack knowledge of the matters competing for the Department's attention.")
                                        137

-------
        Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Thomas. 885 F.2d 1067,1073 (2d Cir. 1989)
        (mandatory duty exists only when EPA fails to perform a duty due by a date certain)

        Harmon Cove Condominium Ass'n v. Marsh. 815 F.2d 949, 952-53 (3d Cir. 1987)
        (Corps's responsibilities in enforcing CWA requirements are discretionary)

        Dubois v. Thomas. 820 F.2d 943, 946-47 (8th Cir. 1987) (the Administrator of the EPA
        has discretion to enforce violations of the Clean Water Act)

        Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Costle. 630 F.2d 754, 766 (10th Cir. 1980), cert
        denied. 450 U.S. 1050 (1981) (citizen suit can only challenge  specific, nondiscretionary
        statutory requirements)

        Sierra Club v. Train. 557 F.2d 485,491, 10 ERC 1433 (5th Cir. 1977) (§ 309(a)(3) and
        (b) duties are discretionary)

        Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Costle. 568 F.2d 1369,1375 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
        ("The use of the word xmay' in § 402 means only that the Administrator has discretion
        either to issue a permit or to leave the discharger subject to the total proscription of
        § 301. This is the natural reading, and the one that retains the fundamental logic of the
        statute.")

        State Water Control Board v. Train. 559 F.2d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 1977) (EPA has power
        to exercise enforcement discretion and not bring penalty action when municipality is
        making good faith effort to comply)

        Cross Timbers Concerned Citizens v. Sasinaw and Johnson. 991 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Tex.
        1997) (citizen suit against EPA for alleged failure to  force Texas to enforce CAPO
        regulations dismissed on grounds that enforcement is not a non-discretionary duty)

F.      EPA Guidance

        EPA, "Supplemental Guidance on Section 309(g)(6)(A) of the Clean Water Act" (March
        5,  1993)

       EPA, "New Administrative Penalty Procedures" (October 29,1991)

       EPA, "Guidance on Division of CWA Administrative Penalties with State and Local
       Governments" (September 27,1991)

       EPA, "Final Rules of Practice Governing Administrative Assessment of Class II Civil
       Penalties under the Clean Water Act," (June 12, 1990), published at 55 Fed. Reg. 23838
       (1990)

       EPA, "Use of Administrative Penalty Orders (APO's) in FY 89" (March 13,1990)

       EPA, "Final Clean Water Act Section 404 Civil Administrative Penalty Settlement
       Guidance" (December 14,1990)

                                      138

-------
        EPA, "Guidance on Class I Clean Water Act Administrative Penalty Procedures" (July
        27, 1987), noted at 52 Fed. Reg. 30730 (1987)

        EPA, "Relationship of Section 309(a) Compliance Order to Section 309(g)
        Administrative Penalty Proceedings" (1987)

        EPA, "Guidance on Choosing Among Clean Water Act Administrative, Civil and
        Criminal Enforcement Remedies" (August 28, 1987)

        EPA, "Guidance on State Action Preemption Civil Penalty Actions under the Federal
        Clean Water Act" (August 28, 1987)

        EPA, "Guidance on 'Claim Splitting' in Enforcement Actions under the Clean Water
        Act" (August 28, 1987)

        EPA, "Guidance on Retroactive Application of New Penalty Authorities under the Clean
        Water Act" (August 28, 1987)

        EPA, "Addendum to the Clean Water Act Civil Penalty Policy for Administrative
        Penalties" (August 28, 1987)

        EPA, "Guidance on Notice to Public and Commentors in Clean Water Act Class H
        Administrative Penalty Proceedings" (August 28, 1987)

        EPA, "Guidance Regarding Regional and Headquarters Coordination on Proposed and
        Final Administrative Penalty Orders on Consent under New Enforcement Authorities of
        the Water Quality Act of 1987" (August 28, 1987)

G.      EPA Not Limited to One Remedy

        United States v. Roll Coater. Inc.. 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8790 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (EPA is
        not limited to one remedy and may seek both penalties for past violations and prevention
        of future violations)

        United States v. Earth  Sciences. Inc.. 599 F.2d 368, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1979) (rejecting
        argument that EPA is limited to only one remedy)

H.      Equitable Estoppel

        33 U.S.C.  § 1342(i) ("Nothing in this section [pertaining to NPDES permits] shall be
       construed to limit the authority of the [EPA] Administrator to take [enforcement] action.
       QPM v. Richmond. 496 U.S. 414, 110 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1990) ("Since [Heckler], federal
       courts have continued to accept estoppel claims under a variety of rationales and
       analyses. In sum, courts of appeals have taken our statements as an invitation to search
       for an appropriate case in which to apply estoppel against the Government, yet we have
       reversed every finding of estoppel that we have reviewed. Indeed, no less than three of

                                     139

-------
 our most recent decisions in this area have been summary reversals of decisions
 upholding estoppel claims... .Summary reversal of courts of appeals are unusual under
 any circumstances. The extraordinary number of such dispositions in this single area of
 the law provides a good indication that our approach to these cases has provided
 inadequate guidance for the federal courts and served only to invite and prolong needless
 litigation." 110 L. Ed. 2d at 398.)

 Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County. Inc.. 467 U.S. 51, 60
 (1984). ("[w]hen the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its
 agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience
 to the rule of law is undermined." The court, however, "hesitant," despite "substantial"
 arguments to the contrary, to hold that "there are no cases in which the public interest in
 ensuring that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel might be
 outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of
 decency, honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government."  467 U.S.  at 60-
 61. See also Rehnquist concurring opinion ("I think that the Court's treatment of [the
 question of estoppel against the government]... gives an impression of hospitality
 towards claims of estoppel against the Government which our decided cases simply do
 not warrant."  W. at 68.)

 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Miranda. 459 U.S. 14, 16-17 (1982) (per curiam)
 (affirmative defense of estoppel may only be asserted upon a showing that the
 complainant is "guilty of intentional conduct while knowing the Respondent should be
 misled into detrimental reliance.")

 Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co.. Inc.. 326 U.S. 249, 257 (1945) (estoppel cannot
 serve as the "means of successfully avoiding the requirements of legislation enacted for
 the protection of a public interest.")

 United States v. Boccanfusco. 882 F.2d 666, 671-72, 30 ERC 1292 (2d Cir. 1989)
 (government not estopped to enforce CWA for violation arising out of construction of
 seawall despite owner's contention that government representative made a misstatement
 as to government's jurisdiction over the seawall and that the government failed to timely
 process owner's application)

 United States v. Tull. 764 F.2d 182, 24 ERC 1495 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other
 grounds and remanded. 481 U.S. 42, 25 ERC 1857 (1987) (no estoppel where Corps.
 allegedly misled defendant into believing he did not need a 404 permit to fill wetlands)

 United States v. Ven-Fuel. Inc.. 758 F.2d 741, 761 (1st Cir. 1985) ("The possibility of
 harm to a private party inherent in denying equitable estoppel its wonted reach is often
 (if not always) grossly outweighed by the pressing public interest in the enforcement of
 congressionally mandated public policy... [N]either carelessness, nor a reluctance to be
 of assistance are tantamount to affirmative misbehavior." (citations omitted))

 Deltona Corp.  v. Alexander. 682 F.2d 888, 892,18 ERC 1009 (llth Cir. 1982) ("the
actions of the government to implement the [Clean Water] Act are unquestionably  an
exercise of the government's sovereign power  to protect the public interest")

                                140

-------
United States v. City of Toledo, 38 ERG 1955 (W.D. Ohio 1994) (city failed to show that
EPA engaged in affirmative misconduct that would prevent agency from bringing
enforcement action against City for unpermitted discharges from sewer system)

United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.. 829 F. Supp. 1023, 1035, 37 ERC 1925 (N.D.
Ind. 1993) (no affirmative misconduct found in RCRA case involving decade-long delay
by EPA in acting on delisting petition)

United States v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  10340, at *17.
(N.D. 111. 1993) (no estoppel in CWA case where there was no evidence found of
affirmative misconduct by EPA)

United States v. Winward Properties. Inc.. Civil No. l:91-CV-348-RLV (N.D. Ga. Mar.
31,1993) (EPA's motion to strike granted on estoppel defense grounds that Defendant
had failed to show affirmative misconduct and "[b]ecause the act of granting a § 404
permit is "unquestionably an exercise of the government's sovereign power to protect the
public interest.'")

Slasle v. United States. 809 F. Supp. 704, 710, 23 ELR 20615 (D. Minn.  1992) (estoppel
defense rejected in wetlands case for lack of affirmative misconduct by Corps and no
reasonable reliance by defendant)

United States v. Rvbachek. No. F86-059 (D. Ak. July 20,1992) (no estoppel to enforce
for violation of NPDES permit where EPA inspector allegedly told miners that DMRs,
which formed basis of liability, would not be used as basis for enforcement because no
affirmative misconduct shown)

United States v. CPS Chemical Co.. 779 F. Supp. 437,452-453 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (court
rejected estoppel defense stating that "[i]n the absence of affirmative misconduct, the
government may not be estopped by misrepresentation given by its agents."  "As a
general rule,vthose who deal with the government are expected to know the law and may
not rely on the conduct of government agents to the contrary.'" (quoting Hecklert
"[N]oncompliance with an effluent limitation is a violation of the law, and CPA could
not reasonably have relied on statements to the contrary.")

United States v. Eastern of N.J.. Inc.. 770 F. Supp. 964, 983-987, 34 ERC 1114 (D.N.J.
1991) (no estoppel in RCRA case where defendant failed to show alleged
misrepresentations by EPA were affirmative misconduct; "Eastern contends the
Government engaged in affirmative misconduct when it failed both to apprise Eastern of
the regulations promulgated under RCRA and to assist Eastern in complying with the
regulations... The Government, however, does not have a duty to apprise the public of
regulations which are readily available to the public." 34 ERC at 1131)

United States v. Roll Coater. Inc.. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8790 (S.D. Ind. 1991)
(government may be estopped from asserting claims against a party that it has wronged;
in this case, however, estoppel only goes to amount of penalty rather than liability
because CWA is a strict liability statute)
                               141

-------
 United. States v. Pennzoil Exploration and Production Co.. (W.D. Pa. Apr. 18,1991)
 (motion to strike affirmative defense of estoppel granted on grounds that it is not
 available against the United States acting in its sovereign capacity)

 United States v. Quaker State Corp.. Civ. No. 88-306-Erie (W.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 1991)
 (liability under § 309 of the CWA is strict; therefore, defenses going to intent, good
 faith, estoppel or the like are irrelevant to the question of liability)

 United States v. Crown Cork de Puerto Rico. Inc.. (D. Puerto Rico Jan. 31,1991) (EPA's
 delay in issuing NPDES permit does not  constitute the basis for estopping the
 government from enforcing against a discharger for CWA violations that occur during
 the period of delay)

 United States v. FMB-First Mich. Bank.  1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8114 (W.D. Mich. 1990)
 (estoppel defense stricken on motion for  summary judgment in RCRA enforcement
 action; "In this case, the government is seeking enforcement of health and safety
 regulations. This role is well recognized as one of the characteristic' sovereign activities
 traditionally not subject to estoppel.")

 United States v. Chevron. 757 F. Supp. 512, 515-516, 32 ERC 467 (E.D.Pa. 1990) (EPA
 not estopped to enforce despite four-year delay in instituting action and despite alleged
 representations by EPA staff that defendant was in compliance)

 United States v. Menominee. Mich.. 727  F. Supp. 1110,1121-22,20 ELR 20509 (W.D.
 Mich. 1989) (EPA's failure to enforce known NPDES permit violation while defendant
 sought state and federal approval for new permit authorizing discharges was not grounds
 for estoppel in subsequent enforcement action; "No right exists to pollute our nation's
 waters. The burden is on the polluter to comply with the CWA, not on USEPA to ensure
 compliance.")

 United States v. Vanguard Corp.. 701 F. Supp. 390,392 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (government's
 participation in negotiations over proposed consent decree allowing defendant 18 months
 to come into compliance with Clean Air Act did not estop government to seek civil
 penalties for violations where no agreement was ever reached)

 United States v. Arkwright. Inc.. 690 F. Supp. 1133,  1143, 27 ERC 2258 (D.N.H. 1988)
 (where defendant entered into consent agreement with state, defendant applied to EPA
 for incorporation of the consent decree into a SIP (a state implementation plan) and EPA
 took more than a year to reject proposed SIP amendment, EPA was not estopped to seek
 civil penalties for violation of existing SIP; "If EPA cannot penalize companies which
 violate approved air quality standards, then the general populace will suffer from
 unhealthy air pollution  levels.")

 In re B.J. Carnev Industries. Inc.. 7 E.A.D. 171 (EAB 1997), appeal dismissed.	F.3d
	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23005 (9th Cir. 1999) (EAB rejected Respondent's
equitable estoppel argument and held that Respondent failed to make the requisite
showing that the Region's conduct amounted to affirmative misconduct; also fatal to an
equitable estoppel claim was the fact that, rather than suffering the requisite detriment,

                               142

-------
       Respondent actually benefitted from the EPA's conduct by operating for five years
       without making the expenditures necessary to comply with the law)

       In re Britton Construction. Docket No. CWA-IH-096 (ALJ Pearlstein 1997), affd. 8
       E.A.D.	(EAB 1999) (due to the lack of affirmative misrepresentation by government
       as well as the Respondent's lack of detrimental reliance, Respondents' claim of estoppel
       as a bar to liability was rejected; however, ALJ used the "such other factors as justice
       may require" statutory factor to reduce the penalty dramatically)

       In re Borden Chemicals & Plastics Co.. Docket No.  [CERCLA] EPCRA-003-1992 (ALJ
       Vanderheyden 1/18/93) (estoppel defense rejected where defendant could not show
       reasonable reliance to its detriment, and where ALJ  found no affirmative misconduct:
       "neither carelessness nor a reluctance to be of assistance constitute affirmative
       misconduct." Id. at 17.)

       In re Willis Pvrolizer Co.. RCRA-83-H-002 (ALJ Jones 1983) ("When an agency of the
       United States government is performing a regulatory function pursuant to an act and
       regulations designed to protect or enforce a public interest or right, it may not be
       estopped.")

       Annotation, Modern  Status of Applicability of Doctrine of Estoppel Against the Federal
       Government and Its Agencies, 27 A.L.R. Fed. 702 (1998)

I.      Mandatory Assessment

       Leslie Salt Co. v. United States. 55 F.3d  1388 (9th Cir. 1995) cert, denied sub nom.
       Cargill. Inc. v. United States. 516 U.S. 955 (1995) (were a violation of the CWA is
       found, assessment of a penalty is mandatory, however, court retains discretion to assess
       only a nominal penalty)

       United States v.  Winchester Municipal Utilities. 944 F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 1991)
       (assessment of a penalty is mandatory once liability is established)

       Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Tvson Foods. 897 F.2d  1128,1142 (11th Cir. 1990)
       (language of 309(d) makes clear that once a violation has been established, some penalty
       is required)

       Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltnev of Smithfield. 890 F.2d 690, 697 (4th Cir.
       1989) (§ 309(d)'s statement that a violator "shall" be subject to civil penalties meant that
       "the court is virtually obligated to assess penalties.")

       Stnddard v. Western  Carolina Regional Sewer Authority. 784 F.2d 1200,1208 (4th Cir.
       1986) (reversing the district court for failing to assess a penalty for proven violations of
       the Act)

       n^nrpi,. v.  Citv of East Ridge. Tenn.. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18862 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 20,
       1996) (held that  sewer overflow via manhole violates CWA and that  penalty  must be
       imposed once CWA liability is established)

                                       143

-------
       United States v. Roll Coater. Inc.. 21 ELR 21073 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (when the CWA is
       violated, a penalty is mandated)

       Conservation Law Foundation of New England. Inc. v. Citv of Fall River. (D. Mass. June
       13,1991) (CWA mandates the imposition of civil penalties against one who has violated
       the terms of an NPDES permit)

       Conservation Law Foundation of New England. Inc. v. Citv of Fall River. Civ. No. 87-
       3067-N (D. Mass. June 13,1991) (CWA mandates the imposition of civil penalties
       against one who has violated the terms of an NPDES permit)

J.     Mootness

       United States v.Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n. 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S. Ct. 361,
       364, 21 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1968) ("Mere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct
       does not moot a case.")

       Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Tvson Foods. 897 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1986)
       (even where a claim for injunctive relief is mooted by  discontinuance of the challenged
       conduct, claims for civil penalties survive)

       Powtuxet Cove Marina v. Ciba-Geigv Corp.. 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir.  1986), cert.
       denied. 484 U.S. 975, 108 S. Ct.  484, 98 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1987) (compliance does not
       moot penalty action)

       Public Interest Research Group v. Elf Atochem. 817 F. Supp. 1164,1171, 36 ERC 1855
       (D.N.J. 1993) (penalty action not rendered moot by compliance of defendant with act
       after action filed; "This position makes sense from a policy standpoint, since the opposite
       position would encourage polluters to wait until they get sued to take corrective action in
       compliance with the Act.")

       See also CITIZENS SUITS: Mootness

K.     Penalties Assessed by Courts

       Sierra Club v. Cedar Oil Co.. 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996) ($186,070 awarded for
       unpermitted produced water discharges into Galveston Bay based on economic benefit)

       United States v. Citv of Green Forest. 921 F.2d.  1394 (8th Cir. 1990) (combined appeals
       of EPA enforcement action and citizen's suit from judgments against City for failure of
       city to pretreatment and IU violations as to Tyson Foods; court assessed penalty of
       $43,000 against Tvson-Work v. Tvson Foods. Inc.. 720 F. Supp. 132 (W.D. Ark. 1989);
       found that Tyson's purchased the plant with  the knowledge that it had CWA compliance
       problems, Tyson steadily increased production at the plant, and Tyson was the principal
       loader to the POTW; penalty affirmed)

       Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. Inc.. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir.
       1990) (District Court's reduction  of the penalty by $1 million was not justified by the

                                      144

-------
District Court's findings)

Student Public Interest Research Group y. P.P. Oil and Chemical. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir.
1989) (statutory max. ($4,085,000) for 386 effluent violations)

United States v. Buckner. No. 96-CR-9-S (D. Colo. Dec. 18, 1998) ($20,000 criminal
penalty plus five year probation for two men convicted of conspiracy to violate CWA at
Summetville Mine in Colorado)

United States v. Smithfield Foods. Inc.. 927 F. Supp. 338,45 ERC 1387 (E.D. Va. 1997),
affirmed in part, reversed in part.	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22092 (4th Cir.
1999) ($12,500,000 for 6,982 total days of violations (DMR and reporting violations);
economic benefit held to be $4,253,070)

United States v. Gulf Park Water Co.. 927 F. Supp. 1056,46 ERC 1877 (S.D. Miss.
1997) (in assessing $1.5 million penalty, held that potential harm to the environment
enough to justify substantial penalty; actual harm need not be shown)

United States v.Avatar Holdings Inc.. No. 93-282-CIV-FTM-21  (D.Fla. Aug. 20, 1996)
($309,710 for various CWA violations  at three WWTPs - $5,610 at Barefoot Bay for
BPD, TRC, and chronic toxicity; $14,675 at Carrollwood for phosphorus, carbonaceous
BPD, nitrogen, TRC, TSS and fecal; $289,425 at Waterway Estates for permit
exceedances and unpermitted discharges)

United States v.Municipal Authority of Union Township and Dean Dairy Products Co..
Civil No. l:CV-94-0621 (M.D. Pa. July 10, 1996), affd. 150 F.3d 259 ,46 ERC 1977
(3d Cir. 1998) (held that revenue earned by not reducing flow to come into compliance
with pretreatment limits constituted economic benefit, in this case $2,015,000;  court then
doubled the economic benefit to arrive  at the penalty)

Weber v. Trinity Meadows Raceway. Inc.. 42 ERC 2063 (N.D.Tex. 1996) ($230,000 for
unpermitted discharges of animal wastes)

United States v. Shevenne Tooling. 952 F. Supp. 11420 (D.N.D. 1996), affd, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 20855 (per curiam) ($60,150 for violations of categorical standards for
metal finishers; $10,000 for "failure to  obey regulations" + $4,600 for economic benefit
over 10 yrs + $500 for continuing to electroplate for 1 week after receiving compliance
order + $1.00/day for each day of violation; judge found that "the principle of requiring
that persons at fault must be held to a 'level playing field' means that the defendant must
be held to the conditions of his field, not that of a larger or more wealthy players ... the
defendant's playing field was a small playing field in a sparsely-settled community.")

Friends of the Earth. Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOO. Inc.. 956 F. Supp.
588 (D.S.C.  1995), rev'd on other grounds. 149 F.3d 303,46 ERC 2025 (4th Cir. 1998)
(court assessed penalty of $405,800 despite proof at trial of economic benefit in excess
of $1 million; judge reduced penalty reasoning that defendant's  attorneys fees together
with the penalty awarded, provides an adequate deterrent)
                               145

-------
 United States v. Perdue-Davidson Oil Co.. (E.D. Ky. 1994) ($3,867,590 ($4 million stat.
 max.) awarded in multimedia case (CWA, SDWA (UIC), EPCRA) arising out of
 discharges from POTW treating oil wastes from oil production facility that severely
 contaminated ground water)

 Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Citv and County of Honolulu. 821 F. Supp. 1368, 37 ERC
 1398 (D. Hawaii 1993) ($718,000 ($156,000 for 52 days of bypass, $312,000 for 52
 reporting violations and $250,000 for secondary treatment violations) and $1 million to
 the Mania Bay Study Commission for additional monitoring of the effects of sewage
 discharges on public health and the marine environment; Court found:  1) lack of
 measurable material harm was a mitigating factor as to seriousness of violations; 2) city
 had negligible economic benefit; 3) history of violations factor not applicable for
 mitigation; 4) city relied on state and EPA standards, and thus the city's good faith
 reliance served as a partial mitigating factor; 5) a penalty will cause only a minor
 increase in the amount paid by  sewer customers)

 United States v. Van Leuzen. 816 F. Supp. 1171, 36 ERC 1992 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (§ 309
 requires that a court impose some fine on each defendant and that the duty to restore
 intentionally filled wetlands is mandatory, absent equities; court ordered defendant to
 restore the entire wetland, including the area under the house, within 8 years, or a trustee
 would be appointed to remove the house and restore the wetland; based on ability to pay,
 $900 penalty assessed)

 Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co..  786 F. Supp. 743
 (N.D. tad. 1992) ($450,000 violations of NPDES permit prior to installing new
 equipment; Court found: 1) 1,977 violations; 2) statutory maximum is $25,830,000, 3)
 court started with the statutory maximum and applied "six mitigating factors" to reduce
 the penalty; 4) sheer number of violations caused minimal environmental damage
 constitute a significant mitigating factor; 5) battle of the experts over economic benefit
 resulted in court's use of equity rate of return; 6) economic benefit equaled $85,000; 7)
 history of violations established from those at issue and the fact that defendant had been
 in noncompliance since 1975; 8) defendant showed that it had been proceeding in good
 faith to come into compliance with the permit; 9) No economic impact on the violator;
 10) court considered the ability of the company (an employer of "400") to continue in
 business had a net income of $1,351,506 from  1986-1989)

 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Texaco Refining and Marketing. Inc.. 800 F.
 Supp. 1, 17, 35 ERC 2095 (D. Del. 1992), aff d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds. 2
 F.3d 493 (3d Cir. 1993) ($1,680,000 awarded in citizen's suit against private entity for
 NPDES violations. Court found: 1) 3360 violations; 2) violations included flow, pH, oil
 and grease, BOD, TOC, phenols, sulfides, bioassay; 3) court calculated the penalty
 beginning at the statutory maximum and then analyzes "qualitative factors" to come to a
 final penalty; 4) violations were serious-level of exceedance, poor internal procedures at
Texaco, threatened harm to river ecosystem; 5) court divided the difference in economic
benefit expert's opinion in half, finding economic benefit to be $900,000, 6) Texaco had
a declining history of violation which served to mitigate history of violations factor; 7)
Texaco demonstrated good faith efforts to comply; 8) Texaco did not demonstrate that a
large penalty would have an adverse impact on the company.

                               146

-------
Public Interest Research Group v. Magnesium Elecktron. Inc.. 32 ELR 20362 (D.N.J.
1992) ($2,625,000 awarded (statutory max.) in citizen suit: 1) discharge violations were
regarded as non-serious due to lack of environmental impact; non-discharge violations
were deemed serious; 2) figure of $5,330,000 will be used to calculate economic benefit;
3)Penalty must at least reflect economic benefit; 4) if economic benefit exceeds statutory
maximum, then the penalty is the statutory maximum; 5) court referred to the EPA
penalty policy to apply a dollar amount to the seriousness of the violations; 6) court
looked to economic benefit obtained by defendant inured to its parent since defendant is
a wholly owned subsidiary; 7) parent's ability to pay should be examined, not sub.'s; 8)
parent could pay a penalty of $10 million)

United States v. Beaumont. 786 F. Supp. 634, 35 ERC 1106 (E.D. Tex 1992) ($400,000
awarded in enforcement action for failure to implement pretreatment program.  Court
found: 1) statutory maximum is $8,000,000; 2) economic benefit was $316,000; 3) City
ran in operating debt of $4 million per year; 4) City's investment loss of $20 million was
not why pretreatment program was not implemented; 5) city had 800 violations; 6)
environmental harm caused by toxic pollutant may have occurred in the Hillebrandt
Bayou; 7) city is now in compliance)

United States v. Roll Coater. Inc.. 21 ELR 21073 (S.D. Ind. 1991) ($2,093,750 awarded
for violations of pre-treatment standards; Court found: 1) Start at statutory maximum and
reduce the penalty by statutory factors; 2) Statutory maximum equaled $52,945,000; 3)
Violations were-248  chromium, 248 zinc, 908 zinc, 31 cyanide,  91 cyanide;
4)Seriousness "considerable-1,000% exceedances, but no environmental harm traceable
to Defendant; 5) Court adjusted date of first violation to June, 1986 from December 1,
1985; 6) Court found EPA was sending mixed signals; 7) Roll Coater had a history of
violations, 8) the state recognized and excused noncompliance;  9) Roll Coater acted in
good faith; 10) Roll Coater made no evidentiary showing that a  large civil define would
adversely affect it, 11) Roll Coater could not have compiled prior to October 1987,
because it took 18 months to construct a treatment facility;  12) the revised statutory
maximum is $16,750,000; 13) lack of environmental damage reduced penalty by 50%;
14) good faith reduced penalty by another 75%)

United States v. Citv of San Diego. 33 ERC 1256, 21 ELR 21223 (S.D. Cal. 1991) ($3
million awarded for effluent violations, despite economic benefit of $300 million
because city showed  good faith; $500,000 paid to Treasury, $2.5 mill devoted to water
conservation program; court found: 1) statutory maximum = $229 million; 2) City has
been in violation of CWA from 1972 to 1991; 3) City had violations which constituted
violations of substantial  seriousness, 4) no damage cause by failure to enforce
pretreatment; 5) effluent violations caused significant injury to the marine environment
but were not of "epidemic proportions"; 6) city had $300 million economic benefit; 7)
history of violations established by those set forth in the case, 8) City demonstrated good
faith in trying to correct the problem; 9) city did not claim poverty; 10) taxpayers would
have to pay the penalty-and that they would be the only victim of the penalty 11) EPA
and State sent conflicting messages to the City; 12) penalty calculation started at
statutory maximum and then the applications of the six factors brought it down)

       States v Confederate Acres. 767 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Ky. 1990) ($17,000

                                147

-------
 awarded in enforcement action against a privately owned sewage treatment works; court
 found: 1) 4,000 violations over 12 years are serious; 2) 17,00 economic benefit;
 3)injunction that court intends to put in place will put them out of business so there is no
 need for a deterrence factor in the penalty; 4) defendant has high indebtedness 5)
 defendant has demonstrated that a severe economic penalty is beyond defendant's ability
 to pay)

 Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. 720 F. Supp. 1158 (D.N.J.
 1989), aff d in oart. rev'd in part. 913 F.2d 64, 31 ERC 1905 (3d Cir. 1989) ($3,205,000
 awarded in citizen's suit against private entity for violations of NPDES permit; court
 found: 1) 386 violations-363 committed when statutory maximum was $10,000/day, 23
 were $25,000/day; 2) violations were 8-TOC, 63-pH, 66-TSS, 1-bioassay, oil and grease
 48-1, hexavalent chromium-2, methylene chloride-9, phenol-1, BOD-80, COD-81; 3) 286
 violations exceeded permit limit by 100%; 4) 195 violations exceeded permit by 200%;
 4) 127 violations exceeded permit by 400%; 5) 86 violations exceeded the permit by
 1,000%; 6) violations were very serious-exceedances were large, and were toxic to
 marine organisms, and the sheer number of violations were significant; 7) economic
 benefit was difficult to quantify, however, court thought it was a lot; 8) defendant's 386
 violations over 11 years established a history of violations; 9) Powell Duffryn's
 purchased all the stock of the company when it was subject to an enforcement action for
 water pollution; 10) defendant did not act in good faith, however, EPA, and NJ DEP
 approved of defendant's actions;  11) no economic impact - court looked to parent, and
 parent's parent; 12) economic benefit is in excess of statutory maximum;  13) court
 deducted $1 million because of DEP/EPA malfeasance)

 Student Public Interest Research Group v. Hercules. Inc.. 29 ERC 1417 (D.N.J. 1989)
 ($1,680,000 statutory max for failure to install wastewater treatment equipment from
 1978 to 1986)

 Work v. Tvson Foods. 720 F. Supp. 132 (W.D. Ark. 1989) ($43,000 (10% of statutory
 max) for discharging wastewater to POTW that caused POTW to violate its NPDES
 permit)

 Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries. Inc.. 617 F. Supp. 1120, 23 ERC  1018  (D. Md. 1985),
 affd. 847 F.2d 1109, 27 ERC  1881 (4th Cir. 1988), cert, denied. 491 U.S. 904 (1989)
 ($977,000 statutory maximum imposed for failure to file DMRs for 977 days)

 Student Public Interest Research Group v. Monsanto. 29 ERC 1078,1092 (D.N.J. 1988)
 ($380,000 for delayed installation of treatment facility that did not work properly even
 when installed)

 Chesapeake Bav Foundation v. Gwaltnev of Smithfield. 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1557 (ED.
Va. 1985), affd 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded on other grounds.
 100 S. Ct. 376 (1987), on remand. 844 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1988) ($289,822 against pork
processor for violations of permit resulting from problems with biological treatment and
chlorination systems)

Raymond Profitt v. Lower Bucks County Joint Municipal Authority. Civil Action 86-

                               148

-------
       7220 (E.D. Pa. May 12,1988) ($0 penalty assessed; citizen's suit against municipal
       POTW. 596 violations, BOD, TSS, Percentage Removal of Oxygen Demand, Percentage
       Removal of Suspended Solids and Oxygen Demand. Court found: 1) violations serious;
       2) POTW suffered economic detriment; 3) POTW had a history of violations (the 596);
       4) POTW demonstrated much good faith in that it had commenced construction to
       improve the POTW/bring POTW into compliance; 5) POTW had not been willfully
       noncompliant; 6) the taxpayers would pay the penalty; 7) POTW is not a commercial
       entity)

       United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.. Civ. No. CA3-85-1621H (N.D. Tex. 1985)
       ($350,000 for 22 violations at 10 offshore oil and gas production platforms)

       Ohio ex rel. Brown v. K & S Circuits. Civ. No. 79-950, C.P.  (Montgomery Co., Ohio,
       Sept. 5, 1983) ($800,000 based on penalty policy)

       State ex rel. Brown v. Davton Malleable. Inc.. 13 ERC 2189  (C.P., Montgomery Co.,
       1979) ($493,500 against manuf. of iron castings for violations of permit resulting from
       failure to construct adequate wastewater treatment facilities)

       United States v.Velsicol Chemical Corp..  12 ERC 1417 (W.D. Tenn. 1978) ($30,000 for
       permit violations)

       United States v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. Keys Comm. College. 531 F. Supp. 267, 274, 18
       ERC 1188 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (wetland site covered with riprap ordered restored and
       $15,000 fine imposed; penalty reduced because not intentional violation and public
       entity involved)

       29 Envir. Rptr. 2375, 2376 (April 2, 1999) ($18,582,253 in civil judicial penalties by
       EPA under the CWA in 1998)

L.     Penalties Assessed in Administrative Cases

       In re Dr. Marshall C. Sasser. 3 E.A.D. 703 (CJO 1991), affd, Sasser v. EPA. 990 F.2d
       127 (4th Cir.  1993) ($125,000 for illegal fill of wetlands)

       Tn re Pepoerell Associates. No. CWA-2-I-97-1088 (ALJ Gunning Feb. 26, 1999)
       ($24,876 assessed for heating oil spill that violated OPA and SPCC regulations; the spill
       originated from an UST that leaked in a basement and entered navigable waters via the
       drain system; some oil also entered the POTW)

       Tnm Condor Land Co.. No. CWA-404-95-106 (ALJ Pearlstein Dec. 8, 1998) ($32,160
       (full amount proposed) assessed for unpermitted fill of wetlands when respondent used
       bulldozers and plows to clear land; held that land in question was jurisdictional wetlands,
       "redepositing" of dredge material constitutes a "discharge," and farm exemption does not
       apply)

       Tn re Slinger Drainage. Inc.. Docket No. 5-CWA-97-022 (ALJ Kuhlmann Sept. 14,
       1998), affirmed. 8 E.A.D.	(EAB 1999) ($90,000 (full amount of proposed penalty)

                                      149

-------
 assessed for unpermitted fill of wetlands while installing tile drains)

 In re Corporacion para el Desarrollo Economico v Future de la Isla Nena. (ALJ Biro July
 15,1998) ($75,000 awarded jointly and severally against three defendants for CWA
 violations after one settled for $40,000 and the other two failed to file an answer to the
 complaint; EPA had only asked for $35,000 against the remaining two in its default
 motion, giving them credit for the $40,000 settlement)

 In re Urban Drainage and Flood Control Dist.. and Kemp & Hoffman. Inc.. Docket No.
 CWA-Vm-94-PH (ALJ Pearlstein June 24,1998) ($80,000 assessed for unpermitted
 stream channel alteration in violation of 404; Region requested $125,000; penalty
 reduced penalty for lack of environmental impact; penalty was split: $75,000 against
 District and $5,000 against Kemp)

 In re B.J. Camev Industries. Inc.. Docket No. 1090-09-13-309(g) (ALJ Kuhlmann 1998),
 appeal dismissed.	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23005 (9th Cir. 1999) (on
 remand from EAB $125,000 awarded based on economic benefit)

 In re Paul L. Smith. 1998 EPA RJO LEXIS 9 (RJO Hankinson 1998) ($12,000 assessed
 for unpermitted clearing of 0.43 acres of wetlands for new road)

 In re Britton Construction.  Docket No. CWA-JJJ-096 (ALJ Pearlstein May 21,1997),
 affd. 8 E.A.D.	(EAB 1999) ($2,000 award ($125,000 proposed) for illegal dredge
 and fill of wetland; ALJ Pearlstein found that the statutory factors of CWA § 309(g)(3)
 warranted a "drastic reduction" from the $125,000 civil penalty proposed by the Region
 to $2000. Among the factors discussed were Respondents' reasonably prompt
 completion of the successful mitigation plan and the small, nonpristine ("trash-strewn")
 wetland at issue; buttressed by the lack of economic benefit and ability to pay the
 proposed penalty and "other matters.")

 In re Labaree. Inc.. Docket No. CWA-VU-91-W-0078 (ALJ Greene Feb. 5,1996)
 ($125,000 for pretreatment violations by circuit board manufactured; exceeded DM 18
 for copper times, six of which exceeded standard by more than 100% and 3 more than
 1000%; violated MA for copper 11 times, with six more than 100% over limit; no actual
 environmental harm shown; culpability high; economic benefit not considered)

 In re General Motors Corp.. Docket No. CWA-A-O-011-93 (ALJ Hoya Oct. 31,1996X
 affd. 7 E.A.D. 465 (EAB 1997), affd.  168 F.3d 1377,48 ERG 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
 ($62,500 for discharge of storm water in excess of permit limits; size and number of
 violations and toxicity of pollutants justified the max. penalty of $125,000, but fine was
 reduced by half because  the violations stemmed from good-faith efforts  to comply with
 CWA when other storm water discharges were unregulated)

In re B.J. Camev Industries. Inc.. Docket No. 1090-09-13-309(g) (ALJ Head 1996), affd
in part, rev'd in part and remanded. 7 E.A.D. 171 (1997), appeal dismissed.	F.3d
	,  1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23005 (9*  Cir. 1999) ($9,000 for 18 violations of
pretreatment standards (PCP discharges to POTW); $1,000 per violation assessed, then
reduced by 50% for "other  matters as justice so requires")

                               150

-------
       In re Mahonine Vallev Sanitary Dist. Docket No. CWA-AO-08-90 (ALJ Head May 14,
       1996) ($24,000 awarded ($125,000 requested in complaint) for unpermitted lime
       discharges from municipal water treatment system; 24 days of violation @ $750/day;
       10% added for prior history (10 years prior sued for same discharge) and 10% added for
       culpability); respondent's ability to pay argument rejected)

       In re Donna Heotner East Penn Trucking Co.. 1996 EPA RJO LEXIS 4 (RJO McCabe
       1996) ($19,000 assessed against four respondents for filling total of less than one acre of
       wetlands at 3 sites)

       In re Ketchikan Pulp Co.. Docket No. CWA-1089-12-22-309(g) (ALJ Head Nov. 22,
       1995), affd, 7 E.A.D. 605 (EAB 1997) ($23,000 awarded for three illegal discharges:
       $10,000 each for 2 and $3,000 for one; environmental harm and prior history played
       large parts in the analysis)

       In re Rofor Plating Co.. Inc.. Docket No. CWA-2-I-91-1112,1993 TSCA LEXIS 257
       (ALJ Head, September 16, 1993) ($30,000 for reporting violations - full amount
       requested by EPA)

       In re Easco Aluminum Corporation. 1992 TSCA LEXIS 349 (ALJ Harwood 1992)
       ($45,000 for 476 DMR (TSS, pH and o&g) and 1078 reporting violations - reduced from
       $125,000 requested; ALJ considered equitable arguments regarding when the permit
       limits went into effect (muddled record on the effective date of the permit) and good
       faith efforts of respondent to comply prior to violations)

       29 Envir. Rptr.  2375, 2376 (April 2, 1999) ($4,822,104 in administrative penalties
       assessed by EPA under the CWA in 1998)

M.    Penalty Policy

       40 C.F.R. §  22.27(b) ("[T]he Presiding Officer shall determine the dollar amount of the
       recommended penalty to be assessed in the initial decision in accordance with any
       criteria set forth in the Act relating to the proper amount of a civil penalty, and must
       consider any civil penalty guidelines issued under the Act.")

       In re Great Lakes Division of National Steel Corp. 5 E.A.D. 355, 374 (EAB 1994) ("The
       Agency has issued penalty policies to create a framework whereby the decisionmaker
       can apply his discretion to the statutorily-prescribed penalty factors, thus facilitating the
       uniform application of these factors	As we stated in the Genicom decision, a penalty
       policy  'reasonably implements the statutory criteria, with a range of penalties to reflect
       differing circumstances.' ... Therefore, a presiding officer may properly refer to such a
       policy as a means of explaining how he arrived at his penalty determination	Agency
       regulations require that a presiding officer consider any penalty policy issued under the
       Act, although they do not mandate that he adhere to it.")

       Tn re Gallagher & Henry. Docket No. CWA-A-012-93 (ALJ Pearlstein Nov. 29,1995) (in
       motion to compel by respondent, held that Agency was not required to disclose the
       document setting forth its internal CWA penalty settlement calculation)

                                      151

-------
       In re B.J. Carnev Industries. Inc.. Docket No. [CWA] Docket No. 1090-09-13-309(g)
       (ALJ Head Jan. 28,1993) (in denying motion to compel production of CWA penalty
       policy calculation, ALJ stated: "Materials prepared for settlement purposes are not
       admissible at hearing and their production does not advance the hearing process.")

       In re Clark Refining & Marketing Corp. Docket No. CAA-05-93 (ALJ Vanderheyden
       Mar. 9, 1995) (rejected respondent's argument that the penalty policies should not be
       applied because they were not subject to the rulemaking procedures of the APA §553;
       held that the policies serve as guidelines only and do not rise to the level of binding
       regulations)

D.     Preemption

       33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) ("Action taken by the Administrator... under this subsection
       shall not affect or limit the Administrator's ... authority to enforce any provision of this
       chapter; except that any violation  ... (i) with respect to which the  Administrator  ... has
       commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under this subsection, (ii) with
       respect to which a State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under a
       State law comparable to this subsection,  ... shall not be the subject of a civil penalty
       under subsection (d) of this section or section 1321(b) of this title or section 1365 of this
       title.")

       Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil Co. of Calif.. 83 F.3d  1111,42 ERC 1737
       (9th Cir. 1996) (held that conditions under which UNOCAL settled its state court
       challenge to its NPDES permit did not preclude a citizen suit to enforce the permit; the
       $780,000 settlement did not constitute assessment and payment of a penalty under a state
       law comparable to the CWA's administrative penalty provisions)

       Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Pan American Tanning Corp..  993 F.2d 1017, 36
       ERC 1960 (2d Cir. 1993) (penalty action by municipality in pretreatment case did not
       preempt citizen suit under § 505; "In general, the Act accords the enforcement actions of
       local agencies less deference than it does those of state and federal agencies.")

       United States v. Smithfield Foods. Inc.. 972 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1997), affirmed in
       part, reversed in part.	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22092 (4th Cir. 1999) (no
       309(g)(6)(A) preemption where state issued special orders re compliance,  but the orders
       were not incorporated into the permit in any way and the enforcement scheme used by
       the state was not sufficiently comparable to § 309)

       Culbertson v. Coats American Inc.. 42 ERC 1162 (N.D.  Ga. 1996) (no preemption in
       citizens suit for violations of copper and zinc limits and  state water quality color
       standard where state action was limited to compliance order)

       Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui. Inc.. 891 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Haw. 1995), affd,
       58 F.3d 35 (2nd Cir. 1995) (notice from state that failure to comply may result in penalty
       action held not to constitute commencement of an action)

       Friends of Santa Fe v. LAC Minerals. Inc.. 892 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1995) (argument

                                      152

-------
that state-issued permit at mine for overburden management rejected on grounds that
§ 309(g)(6)(A)(ii) bar applies only when administrative penalty has been collected)

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Ent'l Serv's. 890 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995) (failure of
state to recover economic benefit deemed evidence of failure to diligently prosecute -
prior penalty paid to state therefore not a 309(g)(6) bar to citizens suit)

Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil Co. of California. 861 F. Supp. 889, 904-
907 (N.D. Cal.  1994), affd, 83 F.3d  1111 (9th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff held not preempted
by no action assurance  issued to defendant by state because state law was not
comparable to § 309(g), i.e., it didn't include penalties; "The Court can easily imagine
that Congress, realizing that state enforcement agencies can be susceptible to regulatory
'capture' by the industries they regulate, might have feared that state agencies might
consent to inappropriately lax compliance agreements.")

Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co.. Civ. No.
1:92CVO217 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29,1992) (citizens group held not preempted under §
309(g)(6) where only prior agency action was the filing of a compliance order by EPA
and no administrative penalty had been assessed)

Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. Bekaert Corp.. 791 F. Supp. 769,771-775 (W.D. Ark.
1992) (citizen suit not barred by administrative action that did not involve a penalty)

Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co.. No. 1:92CV0217
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 29,1992) (no preemption of citizen's suit where EPA had issued
compliance order prior to initiation of lawsuit)

North and South Rivers Watershed Association v. Town of Scituate. 755 F. Supp. 484
(D.Mass. 1991), affd. 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991) (discussion of 309(g)(6) bar and
"comparable state law" and "diligent prosecution")

Wash PIRG v. Pendleton Woolen Mills. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19383 (W.D. Wash,
Dec. 13,1991) (motion to dismiss citizens' suit granted on grounds that defendant was
already subject to EPA compliance order, citing Scituate with approval); rey'd. 11 F.3d
883, 37 ERC 1806 (9th Cir. 1993) (held that § 309(a) enforcement order did not preempt
§ 505 citizen's suit)

New York Coastal Fisherman's Assoc. v. New York Sanitation Dep't. 752 F. Supp. 162
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (held that citizen's suit brought under the CWA could continue because
the state of N.Y. was not diligently prosecuting N.Y.C. to clean up a landfill that emitted
leachafe into Eastchester Bay)

Public Interest Research Group v. GAP. 770 F. Supp. 943 (D.N.J. 1991) (citizen's suit
held not preempted under 309(g)(6) by previous payment of penalty to state; state action
found to be "not comparable"; good analysis of statutory language)

TnreLabarge.Inc.. Docket No. CWA-VH-91-W-0078 (ALJ Greene Mar. 26,1997)
(§ 309(d) does not bar assessment of civil penalties pursuant to § 309(g)(l))

                                153

-------
               S. Rep. No. 99-50 at 28, reprinted in 2A Legislative History of the Water Quality Act of
               1987 at 1449 ("This limitation applies only to an action for civil penalties ... for the
               same violations which are the subject of an administrative civil penalties proceeding.
               [T]his limitation would not apply to .. an action seeking relief other than civil penalties
               (e.g., an injunction or declaratory judgment)!.]"

               H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-1004 at 135, Legislative History at 822.

               EPA, "Guidance on State Action Preempting Civil Penalty Actions Under the Federal
               Clean Water Act"

               EPA, "Supplemental Guidance on Section 309(g)(6)(A) of the Clean Water Act (March
               5,1993)

               David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System:
               Can Three Not Be a Crowd when Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States,
               the States and Their Citizens?, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1552, 1577 (1995)

               "Overview of the Water Quality Act of 1987" (BNA) at 56-57. (discussion of reasons for
               amending CWA to add § 309(g)(6))

               See also CITIZENS1 SUITS

        E.     Retroactivity

               Sasser v. EPA. 990 F.2d 127, 129, 36 ERC 1421  (4th Cir. 1993) (challenge to
               jurisdiction of EPA administrative proceeding on grounds that violation began prior to
               "87 amendments rejected;  "Since Dr. Sasser's violations continued long after the
               enactment of the 1987 amendment,  the Administrator acted within the jurisdiction that
               Congress conferred on him in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g), and this court has jurisdiction to
               review the Administrator's assessment.")

               In re Universal Circuits. Inc.. EPA Docket No. CWA-IV-88-001 (ALJ Vanderheyden
               Aug. 22,1988) (administrative remedies under the 1987 Clean Water Act amendments
               apply retroactively to acts  that occurred prior to the date of the amendments as long as
               the penalty sought does not exceed  the sum that would have been available under the old
               statute)
PERMIT AS A SHIELD (§ 402(k))

       33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) ("Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed
       compliance, for purposes of sections 1319 and 1365 of this title, with sections 1311,1312,1316,
       1317, and 1343 of this title, except any standard imposed under section 1317 of this title for a
       toxic pollutant injurious to human health....")

       40 C.F.R. § 122.5(a) (compliance with NPDES permit constitutes compliance with the CWA;
       note exceptions to this rule)

                                             154

-------
40 C.F.R. §122.13(1980)

40C.F.R. § 125.22(a) (1972)

40 C.F.R. § 122.42 (reporting requirements for non-routine discharges)

DuPontv. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n. 28, 51 L. Ed. 2d 204, 223 n. 28, 97 S. Ct. 965,980 n.28
(1977) ("The purpose of [402(k)] seems to be ... to relieve [permit holders] of having to litigate
in an enforcement action the question whether their permits are sufficiently strict.")

EPA v. Calif, ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. 426 U.S. 200, 223 (1976) ("For
enforcement purposes § 402(k) deems a permit holder who is in compliance with the terms of its
permit to be in compliance with sections 301, 3021, 306, 307, and 403, except any standard
imposed under section 307 for a toxic pollutant injurious to human health. Thus, the principle
means of enforcing the pollution control and abatement provisions of the Amendments is to
enforce compliance with a permit.")

Atlantic States Legal Foundation. Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.. 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied. 115 S. Ct. 62, 130 L. Ed. 2d 19 (1994) (held that discharge of pollutants not listed in
NPDES permit is not unlawful; "Viewing the regulatory scheme as a whole, however, it is clear
that the permit is intended to identify and limit the most harmful pollutants while leaving the
control of the vast number of other pollutatns to disclosure requirements.  Once within the
NPDES or SPDES scheme, therefore, polluters may discharge pollutants not specifically listed in
their permits so  long as they comply with the appropriate reporting requirements and abide by
any new limitations when imposed on such pollutants.")

Ohio v. U.S. D.O.E.. 904 F.2d 1058, 1061 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Once a state water pollution law is
approved, compliance with the state law is compliance with the CWA.")

Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. Inc.. 913 F.2d 64,68,  31
ERC 1905 (3d Cir. 1990), cert, denied. 498 U.S.  1109 (1991) ("A person who complies with the
permit parameters is deemed to comply with the Act.")

Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co.. 817 F.2d 1169, 1173, 25 ERC 2061 (5th Cir. 1987), cert, denied.
484 U.S. 985 (1987) ("If a discharger is in compliance with the  effluent limitations contained in
its NPDES permit, it is deemed to be in compliance with the CWA.")

Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Eastman Kodak Co.. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20358
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[W]hen an alleged polluter is subject to a pollution discharge permit issued
pursuant to the [CWA], a citizen suit under the Act against the polluter may only address
discharges of pollutants expressly regulated by such permit.")

United States v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21698 (W.D. La. 1991)  (in
denying motion to dismiss based on permit as a shield, court held that fact that defendant did  not
apply for PCP discharges makes defense inapplicable to charge  of discharging PCBs without  a
permit; "TGPL has not demonstrated that the language section 402(k) ("in compliance with the
permit") was intended to protect permittees who discharge pollutants not declared on the permit;
neither has TGPL shown that it properly applied for the permit." Id. at 5)

                                       155

-------
  McClellen Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Weinberger. 707 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Cal.
  1988) (discharge of volatile organic compounds not specifically addressed in the permit, not
  prohibited where permit holder complied with applicable disclosure requirements)

  Student Public Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Fritzche. Dodge & Olcott. Inc.. 759 F.2d 1131,
  1133, 22 ERC 1721 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Under section 402(k) of the Act, if a discharger is in
  compliance with its NPDES permit, it is generally deemed to be in compliance with the Act.")

  United States v. Tom-Kat Development. Inc.. 614 F. Supp. 613 (D. Ak. 1985) ("Any discharge
  except pursuant to a permit is illegal."  Id. at 614; "Plain reading of § 402 ... reveals a
  congressional intent to create a limited liability shield for alleged violators of the Act who
  properly applied for the required NPDES permit..." Id. at 616)

  People v. General Motors Corp.. No. B093432 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 4,, 1996) (permittee did not
  violate state-issued NPDES permit by discharging a pollutant not specifically listed in the permit,
  because it promptly reported the discharge to the permitting authority)

  In re Ketchikan Pulp Co.. Docket No. CWA-1089-12-22-309(g) (ALJ Head Nov. 22, 1995),
  affd. 7 E.A.D. 605 (EAB 1998) (held that cooking acid and flocculent discharges to be
  unpermitted discharges because they were not addressed in the permit and were not identified in
  the permit application; "[T]he conclusion that seems most reasonable is that an analysis of the
 NPDES permit and permit application is critical in determining whether the shield defense
 applies. If the discharge can reasonably be considered as part of the operation for which the
 permit application was made, then grant of the permit would shield the discharges [not
 specifically set out in the permit] from being illegal."  II at 23)

 In  re Star-Kist Caribe. Inc.. 2 E.A.D. 758, 761 (CJO 1989) ("During  the term of the permit,
 compliance with the permit and effluent limitations in its constitutes compliance with § 301.")

 1 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (Environmental Policy Div.,
 Congressional Research Serv. ed., 1973) at 274 ("Section 402(k) states that until December 31,
 1974,  a discharge shall not be in violation of law if a permit has been applied for, and the
 applicant has furnished all information reasonably required or requested.")

 H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 402(1) (1972); S. 2770,92 cong.,  2d Sess § 402(1) (1972)

 EPA Clean Water Act Compliance/Enforcement Guidance Manual (1985), Chapter 11, § 3, pp.
 11-13  ("To obtain the shield, permittees must provide all information on their discharge
 requested by EPA during the permit application process.")

 2 William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law, Air & Water § 4.30 at 441 (1986) ("The more
 interesting  question is the extent to which approximate information in an application can buy an
 immunity in the permit. The answer seems to be that the immunity extends to the extent of the
 application disclosure and no further. Section 402(a) of the Act authorizes EPA to issue "a
permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding" the
generic prohibition against all discharges in section 301(a). There is nothing in Section 402(a) to
suggest that pollutants not named, or those undiscovered or unknown, are approved by the mere
issuance of a permit. Nor is it plausible that the absolutist  prohibition on discharges carried over

                                       156

-------
       from the Refuse Act is limited to effluent that can be discovered by prevailing analytical
       techniques. An Act that stacks the deck so deliberately against continuing discharge would be
       unlikely to sanction a category of inadvertently approved discharges. It is thus a reasonably safe
       bet that the discharge of any pollutant not specifically permitted is unlawful.")

       "Policy Statement on Scope of Discharge Authorization and Shield Associated with NPDES
       Permits" (My 11,1994)
'TERSON" (§ 502(5))

       33 U.S.C. § 1352(5) ("person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State,
       municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.")

       33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) ("For the purpose of this subsection, the term "person" means, in addition
       to the definition contained in section 1362(5) of this tittle, any responsible corporate officer.")

       33 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(8) ("'person' means an individual, partnership, firm, corporation,
       association, or agency of the United States, but does not include an individual on board a public
       vessel")

       Citv of Milwaukee v.  Illinois. 451 U.S. 304, 339, 15 ERC 1908 (1981) ("The Act specificially
       defines 'person' to include States, and thus embraces respondents Illinois and Michigan.")

       EPA v. California. 426 U.S. 200, 222 n.37, 8 ERC 2098 (1976) ("Section 301(a) simply makes it
       'unlawful' for 'any person' not to have the required permit.  That federal agencies, departments,
       and instrumentalities are not 'persons' within the meaning of § 301(a) and the Amendments ...
       does not mean either that federal dischargers are not required to secure NPDES permits, or that
       their obligation to secure an NPDES permit derives from a different provision of the
       Amendments. A federal discharger without a permit is no less out of compliance with § 402 than
       a nonfederal discharger; the federal discharge is however not 'unlawful.'")

       United States  v. Curtis. 988 F.2d 946, 36 ERC 2064  (9th Cir. 1993) (Air Force employee
       convicted of discharging jet fuel into creek; court rejected argument that since CWA did not
       specifically define "person" to include federal employees, as other statutes do, Congress did not
       intend to subject federal employees acting within the scope of their employment to criminal
       prosecution)

       United States v. Brittain. 931  F.2d  1413,1418-19, 32 ERC 2084 (10th Cir. 1991), cert denied,
       HIS. Ct. 1307 (1991) (public utilities director, who was convicted for falsifying DMRs
       submitted to EPA by the utility, held to be a "person" under the act, even though the city was the
       permit holder)

       Mass, v. Veterens Admin.. 541 F.2d 119,121 n.l, 9 ERC 1507 (1st Cir. 1976) ("Under § 502(5)
       of the [CWA], a state  is  a 'person'  within the meaning of § 505(g) ... which defines a 'citizen'
       as a 'person ... having an interest which is or may be adversely affected.'")

       TTnitP,H States v. Smithfield Foods. 965 F. Supp. 769,781,44 ERC 1792 (D. Va. 1997), affirmed

                                               157

-------
        in part, reversed in part.	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22092 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Under
        502(5)... a corporation is considered a 'person' within the meaning of the Act.")

        United States v. Gulf Park Water Co.. 972 F. Supp. 1056, 1063 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (defendant
        found to be alter ego of discharging corporation; § 309 also provides for individual liability in
        appropriate cases; "This section states that 'any  person'  violating specific provisions of the Act
        may be subject to an enforcement action.  The statutory definition of 'person' specifically
        includes 'individuals.'  ... Individuals can be liable for violations of the Act where they
        participated in or were responsible for the violations, even when the individuals purport to act
        through a corporate entity."; the court examined the following factors to determine whether the
        subsidiary functioned as the alter ego of its parent and, thus, liability should be imposed on the
        parent company: 1) was there common stock ownership; 2) were there common directors or
        officers; 3) did the companies share common business departments; 4) did the companies file
        consolidated financial statements and tax  returns; 5) whether the parent financed the subsidiary;
        6) whether the parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary; 7) if the subsidiary operated
        with grossly inadequate capital; 8) whether the parent paid the salaries and other expenses of the
        subsidiary; 9) whether the subsidiary's sole source of business was the parent company; 10)
        whether the parent used subsidiary's property as its own; and 11) whether the subsidiary did not
        observe basic corporate formalities)

        See also OWNER/OPERATOR LIABILITY
"POINT SOURCE" (§ 502(14))

       33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) ("The term 'point source' means any discernible, confined and discrete
       conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete
       fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other
       floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include
       agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.")

       40 C.F.R. § 122.2 ("Point source means any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance,
       including but not limit to, any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
       container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, landfill leachate collection
       system, vessel or other floating craft from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term
       does not include return flows from irrigated agriculture or agricultural storm water runoff.")

       40 C.F.R. § 122.23(a) ("Concentrated animal feeding operations are point sources subject to the
       NPDES permit program.")

       Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck. 151 F.3d 945,46 ERC 1993 (9th Cir. 1998) (held that
       401 cert, applies only to point sources and not nonpoint sources as plaintiffs had argued in their
       challenge of grazing permit issued by Forest Service)

       Newton County Wildlife Assoc. v. Rogers. 141 F.3d 803 (8th Cir.  1998) ("EPA regulations do
       not include the logging and road building activities cited by the Wildlife Association in the
       narrow list of silvicultural activities that are point sources requiring NPDES permits.")
                                              158

-------
United States v. West Indies Transport Co.. 127 F.3d 299,45 ERC 1417 (3d Cir. 1997) (barge
that broke up during a hurricane and its wreckage purposefully sunk considered a point source
discharge)

Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm. 34 F.3d 114, 39 ERC 1385
(2d Cir. 1994), cert, denied. 514 U.S. 1082 (1995) (held that the runnoff from the fields to which
manure from 700 cattle was applied was not nonpoint source runoff)

Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bav Municipal Utility Dist.. 13 F.3d 305, 308-309,
38 ERC 1001 (9th Cir. 1993). cert, denied. 513 U.S. 873 (1994) (spillway and valve of dam that
channels acid mine runoff from abandoned mine site considered to be point source)

United States v. Plaza Health Labs. Inc. and Geronimo Villeeas. 3 F.2d 3d 643, 37 ERC 1265 (2d
Cir.  1993). cert, denied. 512 U.S. 1245 (1994)  (man who threw vials of blood into river was not a
point source within meaning of statute and therefore was not criminally liable for unlawful
discharges to waters of U.S.; "Human beings are not among the enumerated items that may be a
point source." "The words used to define the term and the examples given ... evoke images of
physical structures and instrumentalities that systematically act as a means of conveying
pollutants from an industrial source to navigable waterways.")

United States v. Law. 979 F.2d 977, 23 ELR 20466 (4th Cir. 1992) (water treatment system is not
waters of U.S., but is a point source)

Carr v. Alta Verde Industries. Inc.. 931 F.2d 1055, 33 ERC 1361,1363 (5th Cir. 1991) (the CWA
defines "point source" to include "concentrated animal feeding operations)

Dague v. Citv of Burlington. 935 F.2d 1343, 33 ERC 1559 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd in part on other
grounds. 505 U.S. 557 , 34 ERC 1857 (1992) (culvert containing landfill leachate is a point
source; "The touchstone of the regulatory scheme is that those needing to use the waters for
waste distribution must seek and obtain a permit to discharge that waste, with the quantity and
quality of the discharge regulated. The concept of a point source was designed to further this
scheme by embracing the broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance from which
pollutants might enter waters of the United States.")

Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 915 F.2d 1314, 1316, 31 ERC 2089 (9th Cir.
1990) ("The Act focused on point soruce polluters presumably because they could be identified
and regulated more easily than nonpoint source polluters.")

National Wildlife Fed, v. Consumers Power Co.. 862 F.2d 580, 583,28 ERC 1572 (6th Cir.
1988) (in case involving discharge of dead fish entrained in dam turbine water, court held that
"discharge" as used in the definition of "point source" required a facility must "add" pollutants to
navigable waters)

Oregon Natural Resources Council  v. U.S. Forest Service. 834 F.2d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1987)
(construction of logging road and bridge not point source discharges subject to regulation)

United States v M.C.C. of Florida.  772 F.2d 1501,23 ERC 1318 (llth Cir. 1985), vacated on
other grounds. 481 U.S. 1034 (1987), readopted in relevant part on remand. 848 F.2d 1133 (llth

                                       159

-------
 Cir. 1988) (tugs used in construction project that discharged vegetation and sediment held to be
 point sources because the CWA specifically includes "vessels" within the meaning of the term
 "point source")

 Trustees for Alaska v. EPA. 749 F.2d 549, 21 ERG 2222 (9th Cir. 1984) (placer mines held to be
 point sources; "point and non-point sources are not distinguished by the kind of pollutant they
 create or by the activity causing the pollution, but rather by wether the pollution reaches the
 water through a confined, discrete conveyance.")

 Avovelles Sportman's League. Inc. v. Marsh. 715 F.2d 897, 923,19 ERC 1841 (5th Cir. 1983)
 (bulldozers and backhoes constitute point sources within the meaning of the CWA)

 Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co.. Inc.. 620 F.2d 41, 45, 14 ERC 1984 (5th Cir.  1980)
 (sump pits into which miners channeled contaminated runoff and which sometimes overflowed
 into U.S. waters were point sources; "Gravity flow, resulting in a discharge of a pollutant into a
 navigable water, may be a point source discharge if miner at least initially collected or channeled
 the water and other materials.")

 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle. 604 F.2d 239, 250, 13 ERC 1289 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd on
 other grounds sub nom. EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association. 449 U.S. 64,100 S. Ct.
 1011, 62 L. Ed. 2d 750, 15 ERC 1209 (1980) (challenge to regulations on mining wastewater
 that is "pumped, siphoned or drained from coal storage" rejected on grounds that definition of
 point source "excludes unchanneled and uncollected surface waters."

 United States v. Earth Sciences. Inc.. 599 F.2d 368, 373, 13 ERC 1417 (10th Cir. 1979) (every
 identifiable point that emits pollution is a point source which must be authorized by a NPDES
 permit issued by EPA;  "it contravenes the intent of [the CWA] and the structure of the statute to
 exempt from regulation any activity  that emits  pollution from an identifiable point.")

 Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Costle. 568 F.2d 1369,1382,10 ERC 2025 (D.C.
 Cir. 1977) ("the power to define point and nonpoint sources is vested [initially] in EPA")

 Appalachian Power Co. v. Train. 545 F.2d 1351, 1373, 9 ERC 1033 (4th Cir. 1976) (EPA may
 regulate channeled runoff, but not unchanneled runoff)

 United States v. Rockview Farms. Inc.. No. CRF 98-5331 OWW (E.D. Ca. Apr. 26,1999) (dairy
 farm ordered to pay criminal fine of $250,000 for discharging 1.7 million gallons of wastewater
 from waste pond  into the desert for 2 days, from where it ran overland for 8 miles to the
 Amargosa River)

 Stone v. Naperville Park Dist.. 38 F. Supp.2d 651, 49 ERC 1019 (N.D. HI. 1999) (operation of a
 trap-shooting facility where lead shot and clay  targets are discharged into water without an
 NPDES permit violates CWA)

 Mamo v. Galiher. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18924 (D. Haw.  1998) (construction of farming access
 roads does not require a storm water permit because it is a nonpoint source activity)

San Francisco Baykeeper v. Tidewater Sand & Gravel Co.. 46 ERC 1780,1784 (N.D. Ca. 1997)

                                       160

-------
(storm water discharges from settling ponds via a drainage pipe at sand & gravel yard held to be
point source discharges; prior to construction of ponds, water simply ran off yard - this was also
held to constitute a point source discharge)

Friends of the Coast Fork v. Co. of Lane. OR. Civ. No. 95-6105-TC (D. OR. Jan. 31, 1997)
(municipal landfill and associated lagoons are points sources for purposes of CWA)

Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas. No. 94-522-HA (D. Or. 1996) (in challenge to grazing
permits issued by Forest Service, court held that § 401 applies to all federally permitted activities
that may result in a discharge, including discharges from nonpoint sources; court concluded that
definition of point source in § 502 was not limited to discrete conveyances)

United Anglers v. East Bay Municipal Utility. No. C-95-2671 SI (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24,1996) (court
rejected defendant's argument that there had been no addition of pollutants because defendant
collected, piped, and redeposited contaminated groundwater; held that "defendants cannot escape
liability by arguing that pollution was not added because they merely transported historical
pollution at the site, and channeled it elsewhere.")

RSR Com, v. Browner. 924 F. Supp. 504,42 ERC 2146 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (court rejected
plaintiffs argument that the treatment of the facility's wastewater at the POTW prior to being
discharged into "navigable waters" precluded a "point source," holding that a facility that
discharges into a POTW is a "point source."

Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines. 904 F. Supp. 1168, 28 ELR 20639 (D. Mont. 1995)
(historic discharges from adits and pits that were exacerbated by recent exploration work held to
be point source discharges, not storm water)

Friends of Santa Fe v. LAC Minerals. Inc.. 892 F. Supp. 1333, 26 ELR 20135 (D.N.M. 1995)
(seeps and springs at the mine site containing acid mine drainage held to be non-point source
pollution)

Long Island Soundkeeoer Fund v. New York Athletic Club. 42 ERC 1421, (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (held
that shot gun pellets and clay pigeons hurled into the water from a trap shooting facility are a
point source discharge)

Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining Co.. 870 F. Supp. 983, 988,40 ERC 1134
(E.D. Wash. 1994) (held that a tailing pond is a point source; the "touchstone for finding a point
source is the ability to identify a discrete facility from which pollutants have escaped.")

Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra. 738 F. Supp. 623, 32 ERC 1157,1161-1164 21 ELR 20055
(D.N.J. 1990) (homeowners discharged to private WWT system installed by developers on land
subsequently bought by third party; no permit every obtained for discharge from WWT system;
developers held liable for discharges - decision turned on interpretation of point source)

Fishel  v. Westipyhnnse Electric Corp.. 640 F. Supp. 442, 23 ERC 1329,1636 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (a
hazardous waste site is a point source where it contained a lagoon from which there were
discharges of unchanneled and uncollected surface water into a stream)
                                       161

-------
        United States v. Tom-Kat Development. Inc.. 614 F. Supp. 613, 614 (D.C. Alaska 1985) (every
        identifiable point that emits pollution is a point source which must be authorized by a NPDES
        permit issued by EPA)

        OLearv v. Mover's Landfill. Inc.. 523 F. Supp. 642,20 ERC 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (liquid
        leachate from a landfill which entered a nearby creek by natural phenomena such as rainfall and
        gravity, once channeled or collected, constitutes discharge by a point source; intent of operator
        irrelevant)

        United States v. Oxford Roval Mushroom Products. Inc.. 487 F. Supp. 852,14 ERC 1321 (E.D.
        Pa. 1980) (waste water sprayed onto the surface of an irrigation field, which then entered a
        nearby stream through a break in the berm of a canal was a discharge from a point source)

        United States v. Weisman. 489 F. Supp. 1331,1343, 17 ERC 1580 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (manure
        spreading truck and bull dozer held to be point sources)

        Barcelo v. Brown. 478 F. Supp. 646, 13 ERC 2105 (D.P.R. 1979), rev'd on other grounds. 643
        F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom.. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo. 456 U.S. 305 (1982)
        (dropping of bombs into ocean and  shooting at marine targets by navy considered a point source
        discharge; "It would be a strained construction of unambiguous language for the Court to
        interpret that the release or firing of ordnance from aircraft into the navigable waters of Vieques
        is not... any addition of any pollutant... from any point source... particularly  in view of the
        broad rather than narrow interpretation given to this type of statue.")

        United States v. Holland. 373 F. Supp. 665, 668, 6 ERC  1388 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (bulldozers are
        point sources)

        In re Paul L. Smith. 1998 EPA RJO LEXIS 9 (RJO Hankinson 1998) (bulldozers are point
        sources)

        54 Fed. Reg. 254 (1989) (NPDES permit regulations, revised definition of "point source.")

        Annotation, What Constitutes a "Point Source" of Pollution Subject to Control by Provisions of
        Water  Pollution Control Act, as amended, 52 ALR Fed 885, supp. sec. 3

        2 William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law: Air and Water 4.10 at 150 (1986) ("The
        statutory 'discernable, confined and discrete conveyance' ... can be understood as singling out
        those candidates suitable for control-at-the-source.")

        See also "POLLUTANT;" "DISCHARGE OF POLLUTANTS;" GROUNDWATER,
        DISCHARGES TO; NONPOINT SOURCES; DAMS; CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING
        OPERATIONS
"POLLUTANT" (§ 502(6))

       33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) ("'pollutant' means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage,
       garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials,

                                            162

-------
 heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and
 agricultural waste discharged into water.  This term does not mean (A) Sewage' from vessels'
 within the meaning of section 1322 of this title; or (B) water, gas, or other material which is
 injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with oil
 or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the well used either to facilitate production or
 disposal purposes is approved by authority of the State in which the well is located, and if such
 State determines that such injection or disposal will not result in the degradation of ground or
 surface water resources.")

 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) ("discharge of pollutants")

 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) ("pollution")

 40 C.F.R. § 401.11(f) ("pollutant")

 40 C.F.R. § 401.11(h) ("discharge of pollutants")

 40 C.F.R. § 401.11(g) ("pollution")

 United States v. Standard Oil Co.. 384 U.S. 224, 229-30, 86 S. Ct. 1427, 16 L. Ed. 2d 492,1 ERG
 1033 (1966) (oil is a pollutant; the commercial value of a product does not change its status as
 waste when dumped into the water)

 Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group. 426 U.S. 1, 25, 8 ERC 2057 (1976) (held that
 "the ^ pollutants' subject to regulation under the [CWA] do not include source, byproduct, and
 special nuclear material, and that the EPA Administrator has acted in accordance with his
 statutory mandate in declining to regulate the discharge of these materials.")

 United States v. Edison. 108 F.3d 1336,44 ERC 1550 (llth Cir. 1997X cert, denied.  118 S. Ct.
 248 (1997) (held that although definition of "pollutants" is broad, it is not unduly vague, since it
 is based on the definiton an ordinary person should have been able to understand that petroleum-
 based, sludge-like substance  was a pollutant within the meaning of the Act)

 Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co.. 73 F.3d 546,41 ERC 1897 (5th Cir. 1996). cert, denied. 519
 U.S. 811 (1996) (produced water held to be a pollutant; argument rejected that only EPA, not the
 courts, can determine what is a pollutant)

 Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bav Util.. 13 F.3d  305, 309, 38 ERC  1001 (9th Cir.
 1993), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 873 (1994) (acid mine drainage is sufficient to satisfy the definition
 of "pollutant" under the CWA; reliance on historical pollution to evade current liability
 misapprehends the focus of the CWA; the CWA does not impose liability only where a net
 increase in the level of pollution from a point source discharge is present. Rather, the CWAs
 categorically prohibits any discharge of a pollutant from a point  source without a permit)

 Connecticut Coastal Fisherman's Ass'n v. Remington Arms. 989  F.2d 1305,1313, 36  ERC 1251
(2d Cir. 1993) ("The [Clean Water] Act's definition of'pollutant' does not distinguish between
lead and steel shot; both are pollutants.")
                                        163

-------
 National Wildlife Fed, v. Consumers Power Co.. 862 F.2d 580, 583, 28 ERG 1572 (6th Cir.
 1988) (court held that fish entrained in discharge from hydroelectric dam turbines were
 "pollutants" within meaning of Act because they constituted "biological material")

 Reynolds Metal Co. v. EPA. 760 F.2d 549, 551 n.3, 22 ERC 1794 (4th Cir. 1985) ("The
 pollutants sought to be removed from the nation's waterways are divided into three types: (1)
 "conventional pollutants'...  (2) Atoxic pollutants' which are subject to regulations if they are
 contained in the list of 65 "priority1 toxic pollutants listed in ... 40 C.F.R. § 401.5; and (3) "non-
 conventional pollutants'...")

 Minnehaha Creek Watershed District v. Hoffman. 597 F.2d 617, 627, 13 ERC 1009 (8th Cir.
 1979) (the act provides no justification for the determination "that whether the discharge of a
 particular substance listed in 502(6) constitutes the discharge of a "pollutant"... depends upon
 the purpose for which the discharge is made.")

 United Satets v. Hamel. 551 F.2d 107, 9 ERC 1932 (6th Cir. 1977) (gasoline is a pollutant even
 though not specifically listed in the statutory definition)

 Pinev Run Preservation Ass'n v. Carroll County. Md.. 50 F. Supp.2d 443 (D. Md. 1999)
 (county's sewage treatment plant violated the FWPCA by discharging heat into a stream located
 near environmental group members' homes; held that heat is a pollutant under § 502(6))

 Waste Action Project v. Dawn Mining Co.. No. CV-96-00106-AAM (E.D. Wa. Aug. 30, 1996),
 affd. 137 F.3d 1426,46 ERC 1257 (9* Cir. 1998) (held that discharges from uranium mine
 tailings piles exempted from definition of "pollutant" under CWA, citing Atomic Energy Act and
 EPA's regulation 40 CFR 122.2)

 Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines. 904 F. Supp. 1168,26 ELR 20639 (D. Mont. 1995)
 (acid mine drainage held to be a pollutant)

 Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm and Richard Popp. 834 F.
 Supp. 1410, 36 ERC 2005 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd on other grounds. 34 F.3d 114, 39 ERC 1385
 (2d Cir. 1994), cert, denied. 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995) (argument rejected that manure is not a
 pollutant because it was not "discarded" but is instead used as a fertilizer)

 United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.. 755 F. Supp. 531, 538, 32 ERC 1826 (N.D.N.Y. 1991),
 modified. 990 F.2d 711, 36 ERC 1321 (1993) (CERCLA liability for clean held where "'copper
 and compounds,' 'lead and compounds,' and 'zinc and compounds,'  are expressly so included in
 the 'list of toxic pollutants designated pursuant to section 307(a)(l) of the Act.'")

 Hudson River Fisherman's Ass'n v. Citv of New York. 751 F. Supp. 1088,1101, 32 ERC 1862
 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd without op.. 940 F.2d 649  (2d Cir. 1991) ("pollutant" interpreted to cover
 chlorine to fulfill Congress' purpose in enacting the CWA of eventually achieving zero pollution;
 "It is indisputable that a pollutant is a pollutant no matter how useful it may earlier have been.")

Dague v. Citv of Burlington. 732 F. Supp. 458,469-70 30 ERC 1815 (D.Vt. 1989), affd. 935
F.2d 1343, 33 ERC 1559 (2nd Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds. 505 U.S. 557,34 ERC 1857
(1992) (held that chemical wastes leaching from a landfill were "pollutants" under § 502(6)

                                       164

-------
       because water samples "indicate[d] the presence of various chemical wastes specifically listed as
       toxic pollutants under 40 C.F.R. § 401.15.")

       In re J&L Specialty Products Corp.. 5 E.A.D. 31,1994 NPDES LEXIS 1 (EAB 1994) (held that
       copper and nickel, two pollutants discharged by respondent, were on a list "derived from the 65
       classes of compounds identified as 'toxic' under CWA § 307(a)(l) ... and therefore are Atoxic
       pollutants.1")

       In re General Motors Corp.. No. CWA-A-O-011-93 (ALT Hoya June 28,1996), affd. CWA
       Appeal No. 96-5, 7 E.A.D. 465 (1997), affd. 168 F.3d 1377,48 ERC 1257 (B.C. Cir. 1999)
       (copper, lead and zinc held to be pollutants under CWA)

       In re Chevron U.S.A.. Inc.. Docket No. DC-FY88-54, at 4 (May 3,1990) (oil is a pollutant even
       though not specifically named as such)

       S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess. 76 (1971), 2 Legis. History at 1494 ("[B]efore any
       material can be added to the navigable waters, authorization must first be granted by the
       Administrator, or a state.")

       2 William H.  Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law: Air and Water (1986) at 144 ("This laundry list
       of 'bads' endorses an understanding of a pollutant as a 'resource out of place.' The congressional
       purpose was to identify expansively and anticipate all the physical 'stuff that could end up in the
       wrong place to the detriment of water quality.... Despite the absence of an indisputable catch-
       all (e.g., 'any other waste whatever'), there is little doubt that the recitation of categories in the
       definition of "pollutant" is designed to be suggestive not exclusive.  In the 1972 amendments,
       Congress  meant to carry on the tradition of the Refuse Act, and that tradition was to construe the
       word "refuse" as condemning each and every variation of damage-inducing wastes that changing
       technologies could invent.  This interpretation is endorsed by United States v. Hamel, [551 F.2d
       107 (6th Cir. 1977),] which condemns a discharge of gasoline as within a generic understanding
       of 'pollutant,' rather than stretch the less inclusive 'biological materials'  to cover organically-
       based petroleum compounds.  That the definition of 'pollutant' is meant to leave out very little is
       confirmed by the statutory definition of 'pollution,' which means nothing less than the "man-
       made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity
       of water."  33 U.S.C. § 1362(19).]")

       See also PRMA FACIE CASE, DISCHARGE OF POLLUTANTS, NUCLEAR MATERIALS
POTWs

       33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(l)(B) (POTWs shall meet secondary treatment standards by July 1,1977)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.2 ("Publicly owned treatment works ('POTW') means any device or system used
       in the treatment (including recycling and reclamation) of municipal sewage or industrial wastes
       of a liquid nature which is owned by a 'State' or 'municipality.' This definition includes sewers,
       pipes, or other conveyances only if they convey wastewater to a POTW providing treatment.")

       State Water Control Bd. V. Train. 559 F.2d 921, 927 n.34, 10 ERC 1321 (4th cir. 1977) (deadline

                                              165

-------
       for municipalities to comply with secondary treatment standards upheld despite lack of federal
       funding for treatment plant upgrades)

       In re City of St. Joe and Florida Coast Paper Co.. 7 E.A.D. 275 (EAB 1997) (held that a
       municipally-owned industrial wastewater treatment facility that received mostly influent from
       industrial process wastes rather than municipal sewage is still a POTW under NPDES)

       64 Fed. Reg. 42434 (1999) (Final Rule: National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit
       Application Requirements for Publicly Owned Treatment Works and Other Treatment Works
       Treating Domestic Sewage)

       See also SECONDARY TREATMENT STANDARDS
PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW

       Michigan Peat v. EPA. 175 F.3d 422,48 ERC 1817 (6th Cir. 1999) (EPA approved of state-issued
       404 permit on condition that certain changes were made; applicant refused to sign permit as
       changed and state issued "state only" permit that was less strict to avoid takings claim; when
       applicant sued to have EPA held to the terms of the state-issued permit and EPA defended on
       grounds that pre-enforcement review not allowed under CWA; held that no pre-enforcement
       review issued involved because EPA's approval of state-issued permit constituted final agency
       action)

       Rueth v. EPA. 13 F.3d 227, 24 ELR 20214 (7th Cir. 1993) (no preenforcement review of 309(a)
       order requiring respondent to remove fill from wetland; "[I]f Agency compliance orders are not
       reviewable until the enforcement stage, an agency's initial determination that it has the authority
       to either require  permitting or issue orders in the absence of a permit application must also be
       unre viewable.")

       Southern Pines Associates v. United States. 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990) (no pre-enforcement
       review)

       Hoffman Group. Inc. v. EPA. 902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990) (Congress intended to preclude
       judicial review of an EPA compliance order unless the government initiated enforcement action
       in U.S. Dist. Ct.)

       Inn of Daphne. Inc. v. United States.  1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13991 (S.D. Al. 1998) (Corps'
       cancellation of § 404 permit application for failure to respond to Corps' request to investigate
       presence of historical sites held not reviewable  becuase is not final agency action; plaintiff
       needed to reapply and have the permit actually denied before seeking relief from the court)

       Michigan Peat v. EPA. 7 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Mich. 1998), affd in part, rev'd in part. 175 F.3d
       422,48 ERC 1817 (6th Cir. 1999) (held that peat mining co.'s challenge to EPA's disapproval of
       state's proposed  404 permit was premature since permit never was issued and pre-enforcement
       review is not allowed; claims against State of Michigan also dismissed under llth Amendment
       grounds)
                                            166

-------
       Charfoos and Co. v. West. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7112 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (no pre-enforcement
       review of Corps decision to exercise jurisdiction over wetland; plaintiff argued that Corps had
       delegated authority to regulate wetland in question to state)

       South Fork of the Eel River Envt'l League v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 1997 U.S. Dist.
       LEXIS 9260 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (plaintiffs' alleged that the USAGE failed to enforce the terms of a
       404 permit; court dismissed this issue as unreviewable based on the principle that an agency's
       decision not to take enforcement action is presumed to be immune from judicial review under 5
       U.S.C. §701(a)(2))

       Mulberry Hills Development Corp. v. United States. 772 F. Supp. 1553 (D. Md. 1991)
       (defendant not entitled to pre-enforcement review of Corps § 404(s) cease and desist order)

       See also COMPLIANCE ORDERS; WETLANDS: Compliance Orders
PRETREATMENT

       A.      Generally (§ 307(b))

               33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (pretreatment authority) and (d) (unlawful to violate pretreatment
               reg)

               33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3) and (b)(8) (authority to delegate to municipalities)

               33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(l) (removal credits)

               33 U.S.C. § 1319(f) (Wrongful introduction of pollutants into treatment works)

               40 C.F.R. Part 403 (General Pretreatment Regulations for Existing and New Sources of
               Pollution)

               South Holland Metal Finishing Co. v. Browner. 97 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
               American Paper, case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction where company sought judicial
               review of EPA position that co. that moved old pretreatment equipment from previous
               site to new one was subject to the new source standards in 40 CFR 433.17; court held
               that Region's interpretative ruling here was not a decision by the Administrator, was
               never promulgated, and was not an effluent standard or other limitation under §
               509(b)(l)E))

               Modine Manuf- Corp. v. Kav. 791 F.2d 267, 24 ERC 1449 (3d Cir. 1986) (challenge to
               applicability of bright dipping standards to plaintiffs facility rejected on grounds that
               record showed that EPA intended its pretreatment regulations to apply to bright dipping
               operations)

               Cerro Cooper Products Co. v. Ruckelshaus. 766 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1985) (challenge to
               pretreatment standards for wastewater rejected; discussion of removal credits)


                                             167

-------
 Modine Manuf. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus. 770 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1985), cert,  denied. 106 S.
 Ct. 525 (1986) (petition for review of its challenge to pretreatment regulations as
 promulgated summarily denied)

 National Association of Metal Finishers v. EPA. 719 F.2d 624, 648, 19 ERC 1785 (3d
 Cir. 1983X rev'd on other grounds sub nom.. Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. NRDC.
 470 U.S. 116, 105 S. Ct. 1102, 84 L. Ed. 2d 90,22 ERC 1305 (1985) (comprehensive
 discussion of pretreatment regulations in context of industry and environmentalist
 challenges to them; includes analysis of "interference" and "pass through" provisions,
 definition of "new source," FDFs and variances for toxics, removal credits, etc.;
 discussion of meaning of § 402(b)(8))

 RSR Corp. v. Browner. 924 F. Supp. 504,  42 ERC 2146 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (court rejected
 plaintiffs argument that the treatment of the facility's wastewater at the POTW prior to
 being discharged into "navigable waters" precluded a "point source," holding that a
 facility that discharges into a POTW is a "point source.")

 United States v. Citv of Detroit. No. 89-72937 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 1996) (summary
 judgment entered in favor of City holding  that State's failure to incorporate the City's
 approved pretreatment program as an express condition of the City's NPDES permit
 precluded EPA and Michigan from enforcing the requirements of the program against the
 City)

 Metal-Cote. Inc. v. Citv of Detroit.789 F. Supp. 235  (E.D. Mich. 1992)  (held that Detroit
 had authority to enforce pretreatment ordinance against outside the city limits that was
 discharging to the city's POTW; jurisdiction exists under 40 C.F.R. §§ 403.11,403.8(f)
 and local ordinances)

 Int'l Union. UAW v. Amerace Corp.. Inc..  740 F. Supp. 1072, 1079, 32 ERC 1790
 (D.N.J. 1990) ("The purpose of these pretreatment standards is to 'prevent the discharge
 of any pollutant through [POTWs]... which pollutant interferes with, passes through or
 otherwise is incompatible with such works.")

 United States v. Alley. 755 F. Supp. 771, 33  ERC  1319 (N.D. El. 1990) (constitutionality
 of pretreatment regulations upheld in criminal enforcement case)

 United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp..  438 F. Supp. 945, 948, 9 ERC 1723 (W.D.
 Tenn. 1976) (defense rejected that EPA lacked jurisdiction over discharge to sewer
 system; defendant argued its discharges were not point source discharges under the
 CWA; court held that defendant was discharging to the Mississippi R. through the city
 sewer system)

 S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
 News 3668, 3727 ("Comprehensive water  pollution abatement requires that controls
 should be extended to any industrial discharge into municipal waste treatment works in
 order to prevent pollutants from entering such works if they would impair the
effectiveness of the waste treatment works or if they would pass untreated or
inadequately treated waste through the treatment works into navigable waters.")

                                168

-------
       64 Fed. Reg. 39564 (1999) (Proposed Rule: Streamlining the General Pretreatment
       Regulations for Existing and New Sources of Pollution)

       55 Fed. Reg. 30107 (1990) ("[Industrial users must comply with all applicable
       pretreatment requirements under federal law, whether or not they are contained in the
       permit or equivalent individual control mechanism.  As a corollary, compliance by the
       industrial user with the terms of a permit does not shield it from liability for failure to
       comply with federal requirements not set forth in the permit.")

       Gold, EPA's Pretreatment Program, 16 B.C. Envrtl Aff. L. Rev. 459 (1989)

B.     Categorical

       40 C.F.R. Part 413 (Electroplating Point Source Category - several pretreatment
       requirements contained in subparts)

       40 C.F.R. Part 414 (Organic Chemicals, Plastics, and Synthetic Fibers - several
       pretreatment requirements contained in subparts)

       40 C.F.R. Part 415 (Inorganic Chemicals Manufacturing Point Source Category - several
       pretreatment requirements contained in subparts)

       United States v. Clark Equip. Co.. 42 ERC 1734 (D.N.D. 1996) (discharges from "wash
       booth" associated with equipment manufacturing operations are subject to pretreatment
       standards because: (1) discharges from ancillary activities of metal finishing processes
       are subject to regulation under CWA, (2) "testing" operations are among ancillary
       activities listed in EPA regulation, and (3) court determines wash booth activities are
       testing operations)

       United States v. Shevenne Tooling & Mfg. Co.. 952 F. Supp.  1420  (D.N.D. 1996)
       ($60,150 penalty assessed against metal finisher held liable for violations of categorical
       pretreatment standards)

       United States v. Alley. 755 F. Supp. 771, 33 ERC 1319 (N.D. 111. 1990) (motion to
       dismiss criminal indictment denied; held that general prohibitions of 403 are in addition
       to, not a substitute for, the specific categorical standards found in 413)

       Public Int. Res. Grp. of N.J. v. Ferro Merchandising Equipment Corp.. 1989 US DIST
       LEXIS 16958, 29 ERC 202 (D.N.J. 1989) (28 violations of average nickel and chromium
       limits; motion for reconsideration denied)

       In re Labarge. Inc.. Docket No. CWA-VH-91-W-0078 (ALJ Greene Feb. 5, 1996)
       ($125,000 for pretreatment violations by circuit board manufactured)

       Tn re ICPC Etched Cirucuits. Inc.. Docket No. CWA-IX-FY94-47, 1996 CWA LEXIS 18
       (ALJ Nissen August 29, 1996) (accelerated decision  entered for plaintiff that respondent
       violated categorical standard at 40 C.F.R. § 433.17 by discharging to POTW copper in
       excess of categorical standard)

                                      169

-------
        In re B.J. Camev Industries. Inc.. Docket No. 1090-09- 13-309(g) (ALJ Head 1996),
        aff d in oart. rev'd in part. 7 E.A.D. 171 (EAB 1997), appeal dismissed.	F.3d	,
        1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23005 (9th Cir. 1999) (PCP-contaminated groundwater pumped
        from pole-treating facility to POTW held to be process wastewater within meaning of 40
        CFR § 401.1 l(q); discharges violated no discharge standard of 40 CFR § 429.75)

        63 Fed. Reg. 71054 (1998) (request for comments on proposed categorical standards for
        industrial laundries)

        62 Fed. Reg. 66182 (1997) (proposed pretreatment standards for laundries)

        52 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1987) (national categorical standards regulate industries in a manner
        separate from General Pretreatment regulations)

        47 Fed. Reg. 38,462 (1982) (proposed Metal Finishing pretreatment regulations, which
        established BAT for most indirect discargers)

 C.     Criminal

        United States v. Hartsell. 127 F.3d 343,45 ERC 1356 (4th Cir. 1997) (conviction for
        illegal discharges to sewer system in violation of pretreatment standards lupheld; court
        rejected defendants' argument that sewer system was not "navigable waters" and
        therefore not within the jurisdiction of the CWA)

        United States v. Iverson. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 31062 (9* Cir.  1998) (affirming jury
        convictions of the president of a chemical company for unlawfully discharging
        wastewater into a municipal sewage system; held that local water laws prohibit the
        discharges and do not require the government to prove that the discharges affected water)

        United States v. Sun-Wise Inc.. No. 97-40019 (D.S.D. Apr. 6,1998)  (2 employees
        sentenced to prison and company fined $30,000 for dumping metal treating wastes into
        sewer line in violation of no-discharge requirement)

        United States v. Aluminum Color Industries. Inc.. No. 4:94CR-264 (N.D. Ohio) (plea
        agreement for illegal discharges (low pH) to sewer system)

D.      Failure to Implement

        United States v. City of Erie. Pa.. No. 94-281 (W.D. Pa.  July 21, 1995) (motion to
        dismiss denied in case against  city for failure to enforce  pretreatment violations; court
        rejected collateral estoppel argument, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and argument
       that prayer for injunctive relief was too general)

       Elinois Public Int. Res. Group  v. PMC. Inc.. 835 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. 111. 1993)
       (penalties for alleged failure to comply with pretreatment standards and local limits;
       motion to dismiss denied)

       United States v. Citv of Beaumont. 786 F. Supp. 634, 35 ERC 1106 (E.D. Tex. 1992)

                                      170

-------
       (city ordered to pay $400,000 for failure to implement pretreatment program; city did not
       identify SIUs, issue pretreatment permits, require self-monitoring or bring enforcement
       actions for 3 years; city's failure to implement may have resulted in significant toxic
       pollutant discharges; city cannnot challenge pretreatment program provisions in
       discharge permit in context of enforcement action; and penalty amount is appropriate
       where city saved over $300,000 by failing to implement according to schedule)

       In re Borough of Chambersburg Wastewater Treatment Plant. Docket No. CWA-ffl-063
       (ALT Lotus, Feb. 4,1994) (in case for alleged failure to enforce against SIUs, ALJ held
       that letter from delegated state to city requiring it to add a pretreatment program to its
       NPDES permit constituted a minor permit modification and the pretreatment program
       was enforceable)

E.     Interference/Pass-Through

       40 C.F.R. §  403.3(n) (definition of pass through) and (i) (definition of interference)

       Arkansas Poultry Federation v. EPA. 852 F.2d 324,329 (8th Cir. 1988) (rejected
       constitutional and APA challenges to EPA's pass through and interference regulations;
       "EPA argues that under the Act the industrial user has an 'implicit duty, if not an express
       legal duty, to determine what level of [pretreatment] is needed to avoid causing POTW
       noncompliance with these requirements.'  52 Fed. Reg. at 1595. Under the 1987
       definitions,  the industrial user has an additional incentive to contact its local POTW
       about the POTW's NPDES permit limits, sludge handling requirements and, if any,
       applicable local limits - compliance with local limits is an affirmative defense.")

       United States v. Municipal Authority of Union Township & Dean Dairy Products. Inc..
       No. 1-94-621 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14,1995) (summary judgment granted to U.S. on
       interference case, rejecting lU's arguments that there were QA/QC problems with the lab
       causing potentially incorrect results to be reported on their DMRs; also rejected
       argument that conventional pollutants cannot interfere with a POTW and that problems
       at the POTW were caused by operation of the POTW not by the IU)

       Int'l Union.  UAW v. Amerace Corp.. Inc.. 740 F. Supp. 1072,1081, 32 ERC 1790
       (D.N.J. 1990) (discharges of prohibited substances to the POTW are presumed to pass
       through in unacceptable amounts)

       TnreCitvofYankton. 5 E.A.D. 376  (EAB 1994) (interpreting 40 C.F.R. § 403.8(a), held
       that Region  VIE failed to meet its burden of proving a nexus between nature and
       character of City's influent and role city-run pretreatment program would play in
       preventing interferences or pass throughs)

       Tn re Citv of Yankton. S.D.. Docket No. NPDES-SD-0023396 (ALJ Nissen Jan. 21,
       1993) (in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 403.8(a), the permitting authority may require
       implementation of a pretreatment program by POTW's having a design flow of 5 mgd or
       less, only if  the deciding official makes findings that a pretreatment program is
       warranted in order to prevent "interference" with the POTW or "pass through."; In
       accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 124.85(a)(2), EPA has the burden of supporting any

                                       171

-------
               challenged permit conditions. A pretreatment program has not been shown to be
               warranted in order to prevent "interference" with the POTW or "pass through" and the
               requirement will be deleted from the permit)

        F.      Local Limits

               40 C.F.R. § 122.21(j)(4) ("written technical evaluation of need to reissue local limits")

               40 C.F.R. § 403.5(c)(l) ("Each POTW developing a POTW Pretreatment Program
               pursuant to § 403.8 shall develop and enforce specific limits to implement the
               prohibitions listed in paragraphs (a)(l) and (b) of this section.")

               40 C.F.R. § 403.5(d) (local limits are enforceable as federal standards)

               40 C.F.R. § 403.8(f)(4) (local limits requirement for POTWs)

               United States v. Mastex Industries. Inc.. No. 90-30202-F (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 1992)
               (despite lack of clear authority under CWA, EPA may enforce city pretreatment
               standards which are stricter than EPA standards)

               United States v. Revlon. Inc.. 1987 EPA Consent LEXIS 87 (Jul. 21, 1987) (defendant
               agrees to comply with local limits)


PRIMA FACIE CASE

       United States v. Law. 979 F.2d 977, 978-79 (4th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1844 (1993)
       (plaintiff need only establish prima facie elements: "The origin of pollutants in the treatment and
       collection ponds is therefore irrelevant. The proper focus is upon the discharge from the ponds
       into [navigable waters].")

       Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Municipal Utility Dist.. 13 F.3d 305, 309, 38
       ERC 1001,1003 (9th Cir. 1993X cert, denied. 513 U.S. 873 (1994) ("To establish a violation of
       the Act's NPDES requirements, a plaintiff must prove that defendants (1) discharged, i.e., added
       (2) a pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from (5) a point source.")

       National Wildlife Fed, v. Consumers Power Co.. 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1988) (NPDES
       permits are required for any given set of circumstances if five elements are present: "(1) a
       pollutant must be (2) added (3) to navigable waters (4) from (5) a point source.")

       National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch. 693 F.2d 156,165, 18 ERC 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (five
       elements of NPDES requirements are "(1) a pollutant  must be (2) added (3) to navigable waters
       (4) from (5) a point source.")

       Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Baver Corp.. 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1318 (S.D. Iowa 1997) ("To establish
       a CWA violation, plaintiffs must show the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters from a
       'point source."')
                                             172

-------
       Long Island Soundkeeoer Fund. Inc. v. New York Athletic Cluh. 94 Civ. 0436 (RPP) (S.D.N.Y.
       Mar. 20,1996) ("A violation of the effluent limitations of the Act is demonstrated where a
       person discharges a pollutant into navigable waters from a point source without a permit as
       required by the Act." Id. at 27, citing VelsicoD

        Student Public Interest Research Group v. P.D. Oil and Chem. Storape. Tnc 627 F. Supp. 1074,
       1090 (D.N.J. 1986) (in order to establish the liability of a defendant for its effluent limit
       violations, the United States must prove that the Defendant (1) is a "person" (2) who is or was
       "in violation of any permit condition ... in a permit" issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act and
       (3) does not have a valid defense)

       Michigan v. Citv of Allen Park. 501 F. Supp. 1007,1014,19 ERC 2163 (E.D. Mich. 1980), affd.
       667 F.2d 1028 (6th Cir. 1981) (in order to establish a prima facie case, EPA must show that (1)
       the discharger (2) discharged (3) a pollutant (4) from a point source (5) into Waters of the United
       States)

       United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.. 438 F. Supp. 945, 948, 9 ERC 1723 (W.D. Tenn.
       1976) (the 301 prohibition of discharge without a permit "applies when all of the following
       elements are present:
               1.      a person
               2.      discharge of a pollutant to
               3.      navigable waters
               4.      through a point source
               5.      while not in compliance with certain other provisions of the FEPCA...")

       In re General Motors Corp.. No. CWA-A-O-011-93 (ALJ Hoya June 28, 1996), affd. 7 E.A.D.
       465 (EAB 1997), affd. 168 F.3d 1377,48 ERC 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (once prima facie
       elements are established, complainant has met burden of proof; not necessary to show where the
       pollutants came from as long as shown that they were discharged)

       In re Urban Drainage and Flood Control District: Kemp & Hoffman. Inc.: and Citv of Lafavette.
       Docket No. CWA-Vffl-94-20-PII (ALJ Vanderheyden Feb. 14,1995) (dismissed this action
       against one respondent upon EPA's failure to establish a prima facie case; held that liability will
       attach under § 301 if the Respondent is the legal cause of the discharge; causation requirement is
       fulfilled if Respondent had responsibility, control or authority  over the discharges; EPA failed to
       establish that the dismissed respondent the legal cause of the discharge)

       See also "POLLUTANT;"  "DISCHARGE OF POLLUTANTS"
REAUTHORIZATION

       S. 2093, "Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1994"

       H.R. 3948 Substitute (4-21), "Water Quality Act of 1994"

       EPA, "President Clinton's Clean Water Initiative," (aka "Greenbook") EPA doc. No. 800-R-94-
       001 (1994) (Clinton administration's proposals for amendments to the CWA)

                                             173

-------
SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT (SDWA)

       Trinity American Corp. v. EPA. 150 F.3d 389,47 ERC 1071 (4th Cir. 1998) (court rejected
       several challenges to EPA order requiring chemical plant to test near-by home owners' drinking
       water wells; held that Trinity was not an innocent landowner because record was clear that
       releases had occurred to the ground from the Trinity plant; SDWA emergency powers very broad
       to allow EPA to issue order)

       Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation. Inc.. v. EPA. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20992 (llth
       Cir. Aug. 7,1997) (held that EPA's interpretation of the term "underground injection" as
       excluding hydraulic fracturing activities associated with methane gas production was
       inconsistent with Part C of the SDWA, and petition granted for review of EPA order denying
       citizens' petition requesting withdraw of Alabama UIC program)

       Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA. 46 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (dismissal of challenge to EPA's final
       rule setting MCL and MCLG for atrazine)

       American Water Works Ass'n v. EPA. 40 F.3d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (various holdings on
       review of the EPA's final rule under the SDWA promulgating a national primary drinking water
       regulation for lead)

       Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. EPA. 4 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 1993) (emergency order vacated because
       EPA lacked jurisdiction over canal company; canal not considered "piped" water within meaning
       of42U.S.C. §300f(4))

       Arco Oil and Gas Co. v. EPA. 14 F.3d 1431 (10th Cir. 1993) (EPA's finding that ARCO obtain a
       Class I EPA permit pursuant to SDWA for operation of an injection well which was regulated as
       a Class n well by the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission is (1) in EPA's narrow
       interpretation of "natural gas" under SDWA, and (2) not arbitrary or capricious)

       United States v. Wright. 988 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1993) (Defendant convicted for making a
       false written report "in any matter      within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
       the US" after falsifying water quality data required by SDWA)

       Mattoon v. Citv of Pittsfield. 980 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992) (Summary judgment granted to City for
       citizens failed to demonstrate "ongoing" violation, a prerequisite to recovery under SDWA;
       SDWA preempted federal common-law nuisance and civil rights claims)

       National Wildlife Federation v. EPA. 980 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (EPA cannot refuse to
       initiate proceedings to withdraw primacy once it has made determination that state no longer is in
       compliance with SDWA)

       Western Nebraska Resources Council v. EPA. 943 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1991) (EPA's exemption of
       3,000 acres of an aquifer from the state's UIC program is permissible under the SDWA)

      National Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 824 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (EPA's
      decision not to establish recommended level for vinylidene chloride based on compound's
      carcinogenicity did not violate SDWA)

                                            174

-------
National Resources Defense Council. Tnc  v. F.PA 812 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (dismissal of
challenge to EPA's rule establishing recommended maximum contaminant level for fluoride
under the SDWA)

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA. 803 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1986) (dismissal of oil company's
challenge to EPA's regulation establishing underground injection control program for Indian
mineral reserve)

Montgomery County v. EPA. 662 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1981) (EPA acted rationally within SDWA
when designating seven drainage basins in the Piedmont as a single aquifer)

United States v. Mass. Water Res. Auth.. No. 98-10267 (D. Mass. May 3,1999) (defendant held
in violation of surface water filtration rule, but judge put request for injunctive relief on hold
while defendant construction  $261 million ozone treatment plant; held that EPA's interpretation
of the  surface water filtration rule as "when in doubt, filter," is fair; "In sum, while the issue is by
no means open and shut, I agree with the MWRA that the SDWA does not deprive a court of
discretion in fashioning remedies for a violation of the surface water treatment rule.")

United States v. Selleck. Inc.. (W.D. WA. 1993) (TRO granted for violations of MCL limits for
coliforms and for failure to monitor)

United States v. Hydrocarbon Resources. Inc.. Civ. No. 92-115 (E.D. KY. 1993) (summary
judgment granted to U.S. in enforcement of $125,000 administrative order for violation of
SDWA relating to injection wells)

United States v. North Adams. Civ. No. 89-30048-F (D. Mass. May 18, 1992)  (monthly average
violation equals 30; two-day average violation equals 2; violations at disparate water sources on
any one day are treated as distinct violations; failure to monitor considered serious violations;
size of service area (16,000) weighed in favor of imposition of penalty; economic benefit equals
several million dollars; good faith efforts and ability to pay considered; awarded penalty of
$67,200)

United States v. Citv of North Adams. MA. No. 89-30048-F (D. Mass. March  28,1991) (court
rejected defendant's jurisdictional challenge on grounds that concurrent states  action had not
been filed, as required by the Act, within 30 days of the notice from EPA and the EPA suit was
more comprehensive)

United States v. Citv of North Adams. MA. 777 F. Supp. 61, 33 ERC 2005 (D. Mass. 1991)
(summary judgment entered on behalf of U.S. for violation of federal turbidity standards for
drinking water, violation of federal coliform standards and monitoring provisions)

Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle. 578 F.2d 337, 11 ERC 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (EPA did
not abuse its discretion in setting maximum contaminant levels for fluoride and in failing to
require monitoring of sodium and sulphates)

Narrapansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v. Narrapansett Electric Co.. 878 F. Supp. 349, affd
in part, rev'd in part. 89 F.3d 908 (1st Cir. 1996) (D.R.I. 1995) (application of state's regulations
in furtherance of SDWA are preempted on tribe-owned property)

                                       175

-------
        Environmental Coalition v. Romer. 796 F. Supp. 457, 35 ERC 1867 (D. Colo. 1992) (attorney
        fees awarded to prevailing party who forced state's compliance with SDWA)

        United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.. 829 F. Supp. 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (corporation ordered
        to pay administrative penalty for violating RCRA and SDWA by failing to perform the corrective
        action program required by Underground Injection Control (UIC) Permits)

        United States v. Midway Heights County Water District. 695 F. Supp. 1072, 27 ERC 2185 (E.D.
        Cal. 1988) (stay of preliminary injunction requiring the water district to come in compliance with
        SDWA denied)

        Western Nebraska Resources v. Wyoming Fuel Co.. 641 F. Supp. 128 (D. Neb. 1986) (district
        court does not have the jurisdiction under the citizen suit provision of SDWA to review claims of
        overall inadequacy of EPA's action in prepromulgation notice and in approval of Nebraska
        underground injection control program provision)

        In re Federated Oil & Gas of Traverse City. Michigan. 7 E.A.B.	(EAB 1997) (petition denied
        challenging UIC permit granted by Region V under the rationale that petitioners concerns did not
        raise issues over which the EAB has review authority; "[I]n order to obtain review of a contested
        permit condition, a petitioner must demonstrate why the Region's response to a particular
        objection or set of objections is clearly erroneous or otherwise warrants review.")

        In re Paul Durham. 1997 SDWA LEXIS  1 (Apr. 14,1997) (ALJ holds testimony based on the
        Safe Drinking Water Information System is sufficient to support finding that system is public
        water system)

        In re Anthony J. Taylor. Andover Water Corporation. Docket No. PWS-NJ-CFP-03 (Order for
        Accelerated Decision, Aug. 14, 1992) at 3 ("The self-submission of data is critical to the success
        of our public water supply program under the SDWA. Without this data, EPA and the State of
        New Jersey cannot know whether a drinking water supply is safe. Therefore, any failure to
        submit data significantly undermines the fundamental mechanism of the public water supply
        program and requires the use of Agency enforcement resources.")

        64 Fed. Reg. 23397 (1999) (proposal to have public waters systems monitor for 10 unregulated
        chemical substances and one unregulated  microbial contaminant)
SECONDARY TREATMENT STANDARDS

       33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)(B) (POTWs shall meet secondary treatment standards by July 1,1977)

       40 C.F.R. Part 133 (Secondary Treatment Regulation)

       Maier v. EPA. 114 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 1997) (EPA may control nitrogenous oxygen demand on
       a case-by-case basis through the permitting process rather than through a generally applicable
       rule; EPA's denial of a petition for a rulemaking to establish secondary NOD treatment standards
       was not arb. or capricious; CWA § 301(b)(l)(B) does not require EPA to promulgate secondary
       treatment regulations for every pollutant that can be controlled by secondary treatment, and

                                             176

-------
       EPA's position is a reasonable and permissible reading of the statute, to which the court must
       defer)

       In re Metropolitan Dade Co.. Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Auth.. 1996 EPA ALJ LEXIS 80
       (ALJ Pearlstein 1996) (EPA motion for summary determination on challenge to calculation of
       alternative percent removal requirements denied on grounds that genuine issues of material fact
       exist)

       In re City of Hollywood. Fla.. 5 E.A.D. 157 (EAB 1994) (held that City of Hollywood had failed
       to demonstrate its eligibility for an adjustment of the 85% removal requirement)

       50 Fed. Reg. 23382, 23386 (1985) ("Under this final rule, NPDES permitting authorities would
       be allowed to modify the percent removal requirement in existing secondary treatment permits on
       a case-by-case basis, based on the removal capability of the treatment plant, influent wastewater
       concentration and the III situation.")

       See also POTWs
SECONDARY TREATMENT WAIVERS (§ 301(h))

       33 U.S.C. § 131 l(h) (Modification of secondary treatment requirements)

       40 C.F.R. § 124.54 (Special provisions for State certification and concurrence on applications for
       section 301(h) variances)

       40 C.F.R. Part 125, Subpart G (Criteria for Modifying the Secondary Treatment Requirements
       Under Section 301(h) of the Clean Water Act)

       Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Browner. 35 F.3d 600, 39 ERC 1269 (1st Cir.
       1994) (upheld EPA's reject of request for 301(h) waiver on grounds that applicant had not
       provided sufficient evidence to show that its discharge would not "interfere  ... with the
       attainment or maintenance of that water quality which assures protection and propogation of a
       balanced, indiginous population of shellfish, fish, and wildlife ... ")

       In re Mavaguez Regional Sewage Treatment Plant. 4 E.A.D. 772 (EAB 1993), aff d sub nom.
       Puerto Rico Aguadcut & Sewer Auth. v. EPA. 35 F.3d 600 (1st Cir. 1994), cert, denied. 513 U.S.
       1148 (request for evidentiary hearing following RA's denial of application for 301(h) permit
       denied)

       gee also OCEAN DISCHARGES


SINGLE OPERATIONAL UPSET (§ 309(c)(5)/(d)/(g)(3))

       33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(5),  (d) and (g)(3) ("For purposes of this subsection, a single operational
       upset which leads to simultaneous violations of more than one pollutant parameter shall be
       treated as a single violation.")

                                             177

-------
        Public tot. Research of N.J. v. Powell Duffrvn. 913 F.2d 64, 76-77 (3d Cir. 1990). cert, denied.
        498 U.S. 1109 (1991) (in order to take advantage of SOU defense, an upset must be involved;
        SOU is a defense to penalty, not liability)

        United States v. Gulf States Steel Inc.. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8834 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (held that
        single operational upset defense does not apply to multiple days of violations, but to multiple
        violations on the same day; court rejected defendants argument that violations caused by hot
        weather should equate an entire summer's worth of permit violations to one violation of the Act)

        United States v. Smithfield Foods. Inc.. 972 F. Supp. 338 , 342 n.7,45 ERC 1387,1390 n.7 (E.D.
        Va. 1997), affirmed in part, reversed in part.	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22092 (4th
        Cir. 1999) (single operational upset not an affirmative defense, but rather a limiting factor on the
        calculation of the number of days of violation under § 309(d))

        Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey. Inc. v. Elf Atochem N. America. Inc.. 817 F.
        Supp. 1164, 36 ERC 1855,1868 (D. N.J. 1993) (3 violations occurring as a result of a single
        operational upset treated as a single violation)

        Allen County Citizens for the Environment. Inc. v. BP Oil Co.. 762 F. Supp. 733, 21 ELR 21204
        (W.D. Ohio 1991) (the single operational upset defense, which was added in the '87
        amendments, shows Congress' intent to "treat a single upset as a single violation.")

        EPA, "Guidance Interpreting Clean Water Act Sections 309(c)(5), 309(d), and 309(g)(3): Single
        Operational Upset"  (Sept. 27,1989) ("An exceptional incident which causes simultaneous,
        unintentional, unknowing (not the result of a knowing act or omission), temporary
        noncompliance with more than one Clean Water Act effluent discharge pollutant parameter.
        Single operation upset does not include Clean Water Act violations involving discharge without
        an NPDES or locally issued permit or noncompliance to the extent caused by improperly
        designed or inadequate treatment facilities.")

        See also  UPSET DEFENSE
SLUDGE (§ 405)

       33 U.S.C. § 1345 (Disposal or use of sewage sludge)

       40 C.F.R. Part 501 (State sludge management plans regulations)

       40 C.F.R. Part 503 (Standards for the use or disposal of sludge)

       United States v. Cooper. 173 F.3d 1192,48 ERC 1477 (9* Cir. 1999) (upholding conviction for
       illegal disposal of sludge; sludge regulations do not supersede NPDES permits; non-permittees
       can be liable for violations of NPDES permit)

       Missouri v. Citv of Glasgow. 152 F.3d 802,47 ERC 1241 (8th Cir. 1998) (city liable for
       discharge of sludge from its drinking water treatment facility without a permit; city was denied
       permit when it refused to pay a state-required permit fee which the city claimed violated the

                                              178

-------
       Missouri Constitution)

       Scalamandre & Sons. Inc.. v. Kaufman. 113 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 1997) (award of damages for
       defamation reversed, court finding no actual malice in broadcast addressing sludge land
       application; "defamation lawsuit should not be used as a threat to force individuals to muzzle
       their truthful, reasonable opinions and beliefs.")

       Leather Industries of America. Inc. v. EPA. 40 F.3d 392,39 ERG 1865 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (§ 405
       regulations on metals content of sludge used for land application remanded for modification or
       additional justification)

       Welch v. Rappahannock County Board of Supervisor.  888 F. Supp. 753,40 ERC 2135 (W.D. Va.
       1995) (county ordinance banning land application of sludge by superseded by CWA)

       In re Citv of Salisbury. Maryland. Docket No. CWA-DD[-219 (ALJ Biro July 30,1999) (motion
       for accelerated decision on liability for violations reported in sludge reports denied on grounds of
       disputed issues of material facts regarding accuracy of sludge report submitted to EPA; motion
       granted re counts for failure to submit reports to EPA on all sampling events; held that 40 C.F.R.
       § 503.17(a) is clear and gives respondent fair notice of reporting requirement)

       64 Fed. Reg. 52551 (1999) (monitoring requirements relaxed and other changes to regulations
       made)

       64 Fed. Reg. 42552 (1999) (Final Rule: Standards for the Use or Disposal of Sewage Sludge)

       54 Fed. Reg. 18781 (1989) (NPDES sewage sludge permit regulations)
SPCC(§311(j)(l)(C))

       33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(l)(C) (requirement for promulgation of regulations re oil spills)

       40 C.F.R. Part 112 (Oil Pollution Prevention)

       In re Ashland Oil. Inc.. 4 E.A.D. 235 (EAB 1992) (Respondent's amendment of its SPCC plan
       five months after replacement of tank violated § 112.5; EAB affirmed $55,125 penalty for SPCC
       violations based on inadequacy of existing SPCC plan; penalty was calculated on basis of $750
       per day of violation)

       Tn re 1836 Realty Corp.. No. CWA-2-I-98-1017 (ALJ Gunning Mar 23, 1999) (SJ motion by
       Respondent denied, rejecting argument that SPCC does not apply because facility not located in
       an "environmentally sensitive area" and because there was no "reasonable expectation" that
       discharged oil could reach navigable waters)

       Tn re Pepperell Associates. No. CWA-2-I-97-1088 (ALJ Gunning Feb. 26,1999) ($24,876
       assessed for heating oil spill that violated OPA and SPCC regs; the spill originated from an UST
       that leaked in a basement and entered navigable waters via the drain system; some oil also
       entered the POTW; held that once one tank was disconnected, it could no longer be counted in

                                             179

-------
       calculating whether the SPCC regs applied to the respondent)

       In re Alaska's Fishing Unlimited Lodges. Docket No. 10-97-0062 OPA (RJO Anderson Feb. 22,
       1999) (held that no penalty should be assessed against tank owner who violated SPCC regs on
       grounds that none of the local competitors complied either, so no economic benefit accrued, and
       EPA should not have filed a penalty action when it was attempting to encourage Respondent to
       comply with the law)

       In re Pepperell Associates. Docket No. CWA-2-I-97-1088 (ALJ Gunning Oct. 9,1998) (SPCC
       regulations held to apply to tanks that could discharge to man-made retention basin that was
       connected to surface waters via a sewer conduit; these facts rendered the retention basin a
       "navigable waterway.")

       See also OIL SPILLS
STATE CERTIFICATION (§ 401)

       A.     Generally

              33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(l) ("Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any
              activity including, but not limited to, the construction or operation of facilities, which
              may result in any discharge into navigable waters" shall obtain a certification from the
              State where the discharge originates "that any such discharges will comply with the
              applicable provisions of section 301, 303, 306, and 307" of the CWA)

              33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) (state certifications shall "set forth any effluent limitations and other
              limitations, and monitoring requirements necessary to assure that any applicant for a
              Federal license or permit will comply with any applicable effluent limitations and other
              limitations, under section 1311 or 1312 of this title, standard of performance under
              section 1316 of this title, or prohibition, effluent standard,  or pretreatment standard
              under section 1317 of this title, and with any other appropriate requirement of State law
              set forth in such certification .  ..")

              33 U.S.C. § 1344(t) ("Noting in [§ 404] shall preclude or deny the right of any State ...
              to control the discharge of dredged or fill material in any portion of the navigable waters
              within the jurisdiction of such State...")

              40 C.F.R. §  124.55(e) ("Review and appeals of limitations and conditions attributable to
              State certification shall be made through the applicable procedures in [Part 124].")

              40 C.F.R. §  131.4(c) (an Indian Tribe which is treated in the same manner as a State for
              purposes of the water quality standards program is the certifying agency for discharges
              on Indian lands)

              PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Co. v. Washington State Dept. of Ecology. 511 U.S. 700,114 S.
              Ct. 1900, 128 L. Ed. 2d 716, 38 ERC 1593, 24 ELR 20945 (1994) (401(d) requires the
              state to assure compliance with state water quality standards in light of the permitted

                                              180

-------
"activity" not just the "discharge"; thus Washington's minimum stream flow requirement
is a permissible condition of a section 401 certification)

Citizens Interested in Bull Run v. R.L.K. & Co.. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3926 (9* Cir.
1998) (dismissal of suit against ski area for discharge of road salt upheld; held that salt in
snow that runs off during spring not an "activity" within the meaning of 401(a), so F.S.
permit need not be certified)

Howard W. Heck & Assoc. v. U.S.. 134 F.3d 1468,46 ERG 1381,1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
("The CWA specifically  makes submission by the applicant of certification by the state
in which the discharge will originate a prerequisite for issuance by the Corps of a section
404 permit	Should the state refuse to give its approval, the provisions of 33 C.F.R.
§ 320.4(j) grant the Corps discretion to deny the permit without prejudice.")

Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas. 151 F.3d 945,46 ERC 1993 (9th Cir. 1998)
(held that 401 certification does not apply to nonpoint source pollutants, such as manure
from grazing on public lands; distinguished dam cases (Consumers Power et al.) on
grounds that dams are point sources but they don't discharge pollutants)

North Carolina v. FERC. 112 F.3d 1175,45 ERC 1443 (D.C. Cir.  19971. cert, denied.
118 S. Ct. 1036 (1998) (held that the withdrawal of water resulting in a decrease in the
volume of a pre-existing  discharge is not an activity that "results in a discharge" for
purposes of § 401(a)(l) because the term "discharge" contemplates "the addition, not the
withdrawal, of a substance or substances." In reaching this conclusion, the majority
relied on the definition of "discharge of pollutant" at § 502(12) of the CWA ("an
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source") to give meaning to
the separately defined term "discharge.")

Ackels v. EPA. 7 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 1993) (EPA has authority to accept State
certification beyond the 60-day period specified in the regulations)

United States v. Marathon Dev. Corp.. 867 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1989) (if state determines
that discharges from certain category of activity will not meet state water quality
requirements, federal government is prohibited from authorizing activity by federal
permit)

Fredericksburg v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com.. 876 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1989)
(license issued by FERC  to hydroelectric co. to build powerhouse at  dam was invalid,
since co. never submitted required application to state water control board, and thus did
not "request" certification within meaning of Commission's regulations)

Roosevelt Campobello International Park Commission v. EPA. 684F.2d 1041, 1056, 17
ERC 2023 (1st Cir. 1982) ("Section 401 (a) of the Clean Water Act empowers the state to
certify that a proposed discharge will comply with the Act and  'with any other
appropriate requirement of state law.' Any such requirement 'shall become a condition
on any Federal license or permit.'")

Orepon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas. No. 94-522-HA (D. Or. 1996), revM 151 F.3d

                                181

-------
 945, .46 ERC 1993 (9th Cir. 1998) (in challenge to grazing permits issued by Forest
 Service, court held that § 401 applies to all federally permitted activities that may result
 in a discharge, including discharges from nonpoint sources)

 Idaho Conservation League v. Caswell. No. CV 95-394-S-MHW (D. Idaho 199J (held
 that Forest Service approval of the construction of two logging roads in a National Forest
 was not subject to state certification under § 401 on grounds that roads are nonpoint
 sources; "Section 401 is only  intended to encompass those projects which resulted in a
 "point source discharge.'")

 Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forest v. Site Evaluation Committee. 115
 N.H. 163, 337 A.2d 778 (1975) (to discharge heated water and waste into Atlantic Ocean
 from Seabrook facility, public service co. would need both permit from Water Supply
 and Pollution Control Commission, and finding from Site Evaluation Committee that
 discharge would not adversely affect water quality)

 In re American Cvanamid Co.. 4 E.A.D. 790, 801 n.l 1 (EAB 1993) (the certification
 process does not allow a state to block the issuance of an EPA permit on the grounds that
 state law allows a less stringent condition than one EPA proposes to include)

 In re Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Auth. Dept.. 4 E.A.D. 133,144 n.10 (EAB 1992)
 ("While a State may not condition or deny a certification on the grounds that State law
 allows a less stringent permit  condition, 40 CFR § 124.55(c), a State is required to
 include in the certification a 'statement of the extent to which each condition of the draft
 permit can be made less stringent without violating the requirements of State law,
 including water quality standards.'  40 CFR § 124.53(e)(3).")

 In re Shell Oil Co.. 3 E.A.D. 324 (CJO 1990) (EPA must include all necessary limits
 based on state standards even if state certifies without the limits in the permit)

 In re Champion International Corporation. 3 E.A.D. 309 (CJO 1990) (state's failure to
 notify the applicant of its certification under 40 C.F.R. § 124.53(d) is not a basis to reject
 the certification, and is an issue to be addressed by the state)

 44 Fed. Reg. 32,930 (1979) (commenting on the language of (now) 124.55(c)) ("State
 certification rights proceed from the authority under section 510 of the Act to set more
 stringent limitation than those required by the Act. States may not require EPA to
 disregard or downgrade Federal requirements.")

 EPA, "A Primer on CWA Section 401" (Nov. 30,1993)

 USEPA GCO 76-12 (State may not withdraw certification under 401 on basis that while
 effluent limitations contained  in NPDES permit are sufficient to meet state thermal water
 quality standards actual discharge is not meeting such water quality standards)

 1 Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law § 303, at 30129  (1983) ("The certification
requirement provides the states with a first line of defense against federally licensed or
permitted activities that may have adverse effects on the State's waters.")

                               182

-------
       Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, Ecology L O
       201, 278-79 (1996)

       See also WATER QUALITY STANDARDS: State Authority (§ 510)

B.     Challenges to State Certification Should Be in State Court

       40 C.F.R. § 124.55(e) ("Review and appeals of limitations and conditions attributable to
       state certification shall be made through the applicable procedures of the state and may
       not be made through the procedures in this part.")

       Dubois v. U.S.D.A.. 102 F.3d 1273,43 ERC 1824 (1st Cir. 1996) (challenge to F.S.
       special use permit as not in compliance with antidegradation requirements of state water
       quality standards rejected on grounds that proper forum for challenging state certification
       is in state, rather than  federal court)

       Scott v. Citv of Hammond. Indiana. 741 F.2d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The only
       recognized avenue for challenge to  the substance of EPA's actions taken with respect to
       state submissions [under CWA § 303] is a suit for judicial review under the [APAJ.")

       Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Commission v. EPA. 684 F.2d 1041,1056 (1st Cir.
       1982) ("[T]he proper forum to review the appropriateness of a state's certification is the
       state court and ... [F]ederal courts  and agencies are without authority to review the
       validity of requirements imposed under state law or in a state's certification.")

       Dubois v. U.S. Deot. of Agriculture. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16608 (D.N.H. 1995), rev'd.
       102 F.3d 1273,43 ERC 1824 (1st Cir. 1996) (claim that Forest Service accepted an
       erroneous state certification in violation of the APA rejected, holding that F.S. is not
       required under the CWA to independently determine whether the proposed activity will
       comply with state water quality requirements, which is the State's duty;  plaintiffs cannot
       circumvent state administrative remedies by raising a  claim for the first  time in federal
       court to challenge a stat's certification)

       TownofSummersville. 60 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 161,291, at 61,990
       (1992) (review of the appropriateness of § 401 conditions is solely within the purview of
       state courts)

       Carex Hydro. 52 Fed.  Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) I 61,216 at 61,769 (1990)
       (review of the appropriateness of § 401 conditions is solely within the purview of state
       courts)

       Central Maine Power Co.. 52 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 161,033 at 61,172
       (1990)  (review of the appropriateness of § 401 conditions is solely within the purview of
       state courts)

       Mobile Oil Corp. v. Kellev. 426 F. Supp. 230,235 (S.D. Ala. 1976) (401 certifications
       are to be reviewed in state, not federal courts)
                                      183

-------
        In re Portland Water District. 7 E.A.D.	(EAB 1997) (Regional Administrator's
        denial of an evidentiary hearing request upheld on grounds that permit limit was
        attributable to State certification)

        In re District of Columbia. 6 E.A.D. 470 (EAB 1996) (combined sewer overflow
        conditions in city's NPDES permit are not "attributable to State certification" and,
        therefore, are appealable to the RA)

        In re Citv of Fitchburg. 5 E.A.D. 93 (EAB 1994) (challenges to permit limits attributable
        to state certification must be made through state procedures)

        In re General Electric Co.. Hookset New Hampshire. 4 E.A.D. 468,470-71 (EAB 1993)
        ("Challenges to permit limitations and conditions attributable to State certification will
        not be considered by the Agency... .[T]he person seeking a relaxation of the
        requirement must look to the State for relief.... Permit conditions are 'attributable to
        State certification' when, inter alia, the State indicates (in writing) that these conditions
        are necessary in order to comply with State law and cannot be made less stringent and
        still comply with State law.")

 C.     Compliance Schedules

        In re Citv of Haverhill. Wastewater Division. 5 E.A.D. 211 (EAB 1994) (permit cannot
        include compliance schedule for water quality limits attributable to state water quality
        certification)

        In re Star Kist Caribe. Inc.. 3 E.A.D. 172 (CJO 1990), affd. (EAB 1992, Order Denying
        Modification Request) (schedules of compliance in permits are only allowed where the
        State clearly authorizes such schedules through statute or regulation)

 D.     Interjurisdictional Water Bodies

        Arkansas v. Oklahoma. 503 U.S. 91, 34 ERC 1193 (1992) ("Since 1973, EPA regulations
        have provided that an NPDES permit shall not be issued 'when the imposition of
        conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of
        all affected States."1)

        National Wildlife Federation v. FERC. 912 F.2d 1471, 1483, 20 ELR 21098 (D.C. Cir.
        1991) (a 401 certification is needed only from  the state in which the discharge originates,
        not affected downstream states)

        Lake Erie Alliance for the Protection of the Coastal Corridor v. U.S. Army Corps of
        Engineers. 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1075,18 ERC 1050 (W.D. Pa. 1981), affd. 707 F.2d
        1392 (3d Cir. 1983) (if a facility is in one state, but he discharge point is in the other, the
        401 certification comes from the state where the facility is located)

E.      Questioning State Certification

        American Rivers, he. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 129 F.3d 99,45 ERC

                                      184

-------
1563 (2nd Cir. 1997) (court rejected the position of FERC that it has authority to decide
whether conditions of a state certification under § 401 of the CWA are unlawful and,
therefore, not include such conditions as part of a hydropower license; held, instead, that
FERC "is bound by the language of § 401 to incorporate all state-imposed certification
conditions into hydropower licenses and that the legality of such conditions can only be
challenged by the licensee in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.")

Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA. 8 F.3d 73, 37 ERC 1729 (1st Cir. 1993) (permit
issuance overturned where permit was based on stayed water quality standards that state
had found to be in error)

American Paper Inst. v. EPA. 996 F.2d 346, 352, 36 ERC 2025 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (a state
may refuse to certify if the permit limits do not "comply" with the state's own
interpretation of its water quality standards)

United States Deo't of the Interior v. FERC. 952 F.2d 538, 548,22 ELR 20546 (D.C. Cir.
1992) ("FERC may not alter or reject conditions imposed by the states through section
401 certificates.")

In re Boise Cascade Corp.. 4 E.A.D. 474 (EAB 1993) (to comply with 124.53(d), and
thus make any resulting permit condition "attributable to state certification" under
124.55(e), the state certification letter must make clear that the requirement cannot be
made less stringent and still comply with the state water quality standards)

In re General Electric Co.. Hookset New Hampshire. 4 E.A.D. 468,470 (EAB 1993) ("It
is well established that the Agency may not 'look behind' a State certification issued
pursuant to § 401 of the Clean Water Act,... for the purpose of relaxing a requirement
of that certification.")

In re American Cvanamid Co.. 4 E.A.D. 790, 801 n. 12 (EAB 1993) (to impose more
stringent limits than specifically certified by the state, "the Region would have to provide
a compelling reason for rejecting the State's interpretation of the standard.")

In re Citv of Jacksonville. 4 E.A.D. 150, 157-158 (EAB 1992) ("The Region's duty under
CWA § 401 to defer to considerations of State law is intended to prevent EPA from
relaxing any requirements, limitations, or conditions imposed by State law	When the
Region reasonably believes that a state water quality standard requires a more stringent
permit limitation than specified by the State, the Region has an independent duty under
CWA § 301(b)(l)(C) to include the more stringent permit limitation.")

In re Lone Star Steel Co.. 3 E.A.D. 713 (CJO 1991) (Agency may not look behind a State
certification issue pursuant to § 401 of the CWA for the purpose of relaxing a
requirement of certification; general reference to state law in certification is sufficient to
meet requirement of providing cites to state law supporting certification)

In re Champion International Corporation. 3 E.A.D. 309 (CJp 1990) (Agency may not
look behind a State certification issue pursuant to § 401 of the CWA for the purpose of
relaxing a requirement of certification; state's failure to notify the applicant of its

                               185

-------
        certification under 40 C.F.R. § 124.53(d) is not a basis to reject the certification, and is
        an issue to be addressed by the state)

        In re Homestake Mining Co.. 2 E.A.D. 195, 197 n.4 (CJO May 19,1986) (EPA may not
        look behind a State certification issue pursuant to § 401 of the CWA for the purpose of
        relaxing a requirement of certification)

        In re Ina Road Water Pollution Control Facility. 1 E.A.D. 99 (CJO 1985) (where the state
        adopts a less stringent condition based on an interpretation of the state's water quality
        standards that is not a clear error, EPA may not substitute its own interpretation;
        however, if the state commits clear error in issuing its certification, e.g., by failing to
        include limits which are a part of the state's standards, EPA must, pursuant to
        301(b)(l)(C), include the necessary limits)

        Lisa M. Bogardus, State Certification of Hydroelectric Facilities Under Section 401 of
        the Clean Water Act. 12 Va. Envtl. L.J. 43, 95 (1992) (summarizing Keating, in part, to
        hold that "neither a federal agency nor a federal court may review the appropriateness of
        conditions  attached to the certificate or review the grant or denial of a certificate")

F.      3-Mile Limit to State Certification

        Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 863 F.2d 1420, 1434-1436, 28 ERC
        1609 (9th Cir. 1988) (state jurisdiction for 401 certification purposes ends at 3 miles off
        shore)

        See also STATE JURISDICTION

G.      Waiver of Right to Certify

       40 C.F.R. § 124.53(c)(3) (for NPDES permits, the "reasonable period of time" for the
       state to certify is 60 days from the issuance of a draft permit, unless the RA finds "in rare
       circumstances" that longer period of time is necessary)

       Caribbean Petroleum Corp. v. EPA. 28 F.3d 232, 39 ERC 1250 (1st Cir. 1994) (EPA
       issuance of a NPDES permit pending state review of state Water quality standards
       certification appropriate; "We decline to visit on EPA the responsibility for unexplained,
       if not inexplicable, EQB delays in undertaking or completing its promised
       reconsideration [of the Water quality standards], nor to compromise in  the meantime the
       important public interests served by the Clean Water Act.")

       Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA. 8 F.3d 73, 37 ERC 1729 (1st Cir. 1993) (EPA may, in
       its discretion, accept certification after expiration of the "reasonable period;" that is the
       right to certify is waived, but the certification itself is valid even if submitted late)

       Ackles v. EPA. 7 F.3d 862, 37 ERC 2118 (9th Cir. 1993) (if state fails to specify which
       conditions may be made less stringent, the certification is still valid, but the state waives
       its right to object to less stringent conditions)
                                      186

-------
              In re Ketchikan Pulp Co.. 6 E.A.D. 675 (EAB 1996) (where state failed to certify permit
              with time frame set out by Region, state was deemed to have waived certification, and
              Region was correct to no include mixing zones, which must be certified by the state)

              In re American Cvanamid Co.. 4 E.A.D. 790, 801 (EAB 993) (where the State waives
              certification, the Region's interpretation of the State's water quality standards will be
              upheld if "reasonable")
STATE JURISDICTION

       33 U.S.C. § 1370 (except as where expressly provided, the Act should not "be construed as
       impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the
       waters (including boundary waters) of such States.")

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 863 F.2d 1420, 1434 (9th Cir. 1988) (state
       jurisdiction for purposes of NPDES permits is 3 miles off shore; based on definition "navigable
       waters" used in §§ 401 and 402 of CWA)

       S. Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 42 (1971), reprinted in Leg. Hist, at 1495 ("The [Senate]
       Committee [on Public Works] has added definitions of the terms territorial seas, contiguous
       zone, and ocean to describe clearly the jurisdictional limits of the Act, and provide a basis for its
       relationship to other laws of the United States as well as to international law.")

       See also "NAVIGABLE WATERS"
STATE LIABILITY FOR JUDGEMENTS (§ 309(e))

       33 U.S.C. § 1319(e) ("Whenever a municipality is a party to a civil action brought by the United
       States under this section, the State in which such municipality is located shall be joined as a
       party. Such State shall be liable for payment of any judgment, or any expenses incurred as a
       result of complying with any judgment, entered against the municipality in such action to the
       extent that the laws of that State prevent the municipality from raising revenues needed to
       comply with such judgment.")

       United States v. Citv of Geneva. No. 85 C 3917 (N.D. HI., June 27,1986) at 14 (joining the state
       as a party under § 309(e) is mandatory, regardless of whether the Federal government has alleged
       that a specific State law prevents a municipality from raising revenues to comply with a
       judgment)

       United States v. Citv of Guvmon. Oklahoma and the State of Oklahoma. No. 84 C 2368 (W.D.
       Okla., March 18, 1985) (order denying State's motion to dismiss)


STATE NOTIFICATION OF ENFORCEMENT ACTION

       33 U.S.C. §  1319(b) ("Notice of the commencement of [a civil judicial action] shall be given

                                             187

-------
       immediately to the appropriate State.")

       33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(l) ("... the Administrator... may, after consultation with the State in
       which the violation occurs, assess a class I civil penalty or a class n civil penalty under this
       subsection.")

       United States v. Pennzoil Exploration and Production Co.. (W.D. Pa. April 18, 1991) (notice to
       the state under § 309(b) is not a condition precedent to federal enforcement of the CWA; failure
       to notify the state must not result in dismissal of the subsequent federal CWA lawsuit)

       United States v. Citv of Colorado Springs. CO. 455 F. Supp. 1364, 1366 (D. Colo. 1978) (notice
       to the state under § 309(b) is not a condition precedent to federal enforcement of the CWA;
       failure to notify the state must not result in dismissal of the subsequent federal CWA lawsuit)
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

       A.      Generally

               28 U.S.C. § 2462 (bars suits for civil penalties "unless commenced within five years
               from the date when the claim first accrued.")

               E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis. 264 U.S. 456,462, 68 L. Ed. 788,44 S. Ct. 364
               (1924) ("an action on behalf of the United States in its governmental capacity ... is
               subject to no time limitation, in the absence of congressional enactment clearly imposing
               it.")

               United States v. Telluride Co.. 146 F.3d 1241,46 ERG 1897  (10th Or. 1998)
               ("historically,  'statutes of limitation are not controlling measures of equitable relief")

               Bertha Building Corp. v. National Theatres Corp.. 269 F.2d 785, 788-789 (2d Cir. 1959)
               (28 U.S.C. § 2462 covers civil-penalty suits by the United States)

               United States v. SCM Corp.. 667 F. Supp. 1110,  1123 (D. Md. 1987) (5-year statute
               applies to § 113(b) of the CWA)

               See also WETLANDS: Statute of Limitations

       B.     Citizen's Suits

              See CITIZEN SUITS: Statute of Limitations

       C.     Discovery Rule

              Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. Inc.. 913 F.2d 64,31 ERC
              1905 (3d Cir. 1990), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 1109  (1991) (five-year statute of limitations
              for citizen suits under CWA begins to run when defendant files its discharge monitoring
              reports rather than at time of discharge since responsibility for monitoring effluent rests

                                             188

-------
              with defendant and public cannot reasonably be deemed to have known about any
              violation until permit holder files its DMRs)

              United States v. Material Service Corp.. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14471 (N.D. HI. 1996)
              (court held that 404 violations accrued for statute of limitations purposes when the
              government discovered the violation in March 1993, and therefore, none of the
              government's claims were barred by the statute of limitations; court looked to self-
              reporting structure of CWA and general public policy concerns)

              United States v. Telluride Co.. 884 F. Supp. 404 (D. Colo. 1995), rev'd in part.  146 F.3d
               1241,46 ERC  1897 (10th Cir. 1998) (404 penalty case barred by 5-year statute of
              limitations; held that discharge of fill in violation of 301 is not  a continuing violation and
              the 5-year statute of limitations begins to ran from the date of discharge)

              United States v. Winward Properties. Inc.. Civil No. l:91-CV-348-RLV (N.D. Ga. March
              31,1993) (wetlands case; statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
              government knew or should have known of violation; statute of lim. applies to both legal
              and equitable relief)

              United States v. Aluminum Co. of American. Civ. No. 6:92CV564 (E.D. Tex. 1993)
              (statute of limitations does not begin to run until EPA receives  DMR)

       D.    Injunctive Relief

              United States v. Banks. 115 F.3d 916, 918 45 ERC 1281 (llth Cir. 1997) (held that the
              five year statute of limitations under 28 USC § 2426 did not apply to injunctive relief
              requested by the United States in its sovereign capacity; § 2426 on its face applies only
              to penalties and similar relief, but defendants had argued for application of the
              concurrent remedy rule, under which equitable relief is barred if a statute of limitations
              would bar a concurrently sought penalty; held that the concurrent remedy rule was
              inapplicable to claims for injunctive relief brought by the United States in enforcing the
              CWA)

              Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffrvn Terminals. Inc.., 913
              F.2d 64, 31  ERC  1905 (3d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991) (no statute of
              limitations for  injunctive relief under CWA)


STORM WATER

       33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(1)(2) (Storm water runoff from oil, gas and mining)

       33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(p) (Municipal & Industrial Storm water Discharges)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.26 (Storm water discharges)

       TVfenrWs of Wildlife v. Browner. _ F.3d _, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22212 (9* Cir. 1999)
       (held that EPA not arbitrary and capricious by not requiring municipal  stormwater permits to

                                              189

-------
 include numeric effluent limits designed to ensure compliance with state water quality standards;
 EPA has discretion to use BMPs instead; "the Water Quality Act [of 1987] did not require
 municipal stormsewer discharges to comply strictly with 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(l)C)... [I]dustrial
 dischargers must comply strictly with state water-quality standards. Congress chose not to
 include a similar provision for municipal storm-sewer discharges.")

 San Francisco Bavkeeoer v. Citv of Saratoga. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3942 (9th Cir. 1998) (City
 may be liable for storm water discharges from storm drain owned by CALTRANS, but which
 was located on City property, if it is found that city was an operator of the drain under 40 C.F.R.
 122.26(a)(3)(vi))

 Huehev v. IMS Dev. Corp.. 78 F.3d 1523,42 ERC 1449 (4th Cir. 1996) (defendant developer
 held not liable for storm water unpermitted discharges from construction site where storm water
 permit was not available from state; good summary of history of storm water regulation)

 Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm and Richard Popp. 34 F.3d
 114, 39 ERC 1385 (2d Cir. 1994). cert, denied. 115 S. Ct. 1793 (1995) (runoff of manure applied
 to farm field during storm events held not to be storm water; "[W]e must uphold the verdict to
 the extent that the jury had a reasonable basis to find that the discharges ... were not the result
 of rain, but rather simply occurred on days when it rained.")

 American Mining Congress v. EPA. 965 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1992) (upheld provision of EPA's
 storm water rule which classifies storm water discharges from inactive mines as "associated with
 industrial activity" and thus subject to NPDES permitting under § 402(p) of the CWA)

 Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 966 F.2d 1292, 34 ERC 2017 (9th Cir. 1992)
 (EPA  ordered to meet statutory deadlines for compliance with requirement for promulgation of
 storm water regulations; EPA definition of "municipal separate storm sewer systems serving"
 based on rational connection; portion of rule exempting various types of "light industry" from the
 definition of "discharge associated with industrial activity" was arbitrary and capricious; etc.)

 Waste Action  Project v. Clark County. No. C98-5271RJB (W.D.  Wash.  Jan. 13,1999) (county
 liable for storm water discharges without a permit where state notified county that storm water
 outfall required a permit)

 Mamo v. Galiher. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18924 (D. Haw. 1998)  (construction of farming access
 roads does not require a storm water permit because it is a nonpoint source activity)

 San Francisco Bavkeeper v. Tidewater Sand & Gravel Co.. 46 ERC 1780, 1784 (N.D. Ca. 1997)
 (defendant held liable for violations of storm water general permit; discharge of a pollutant not  a
 predicate to a CWA violation so long as a permit has been violated; discharges from defendant's
 sand & gravel  operation held to be "associated with industrial activity" under 40 C.F.R.
 § 122.26(c)(l))

Buchholz v. Davton Int'l Airport. 1995 U.S. Dist.  LEXIS 9490 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (storm water
discharges from airport containing de-icing operations held to violate storm water permit; given
public  interest in airline safety, defendant given time to bring discharges under control)
                                       190

-------
Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui. Inc.. 891 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Haw. 1995), affd. 58 F.3d
35 (2nd Cir.1995) (defendant held liable for construction of a pipeline without first recieving
notice of coverage under the storm water GP and where state had not notified defendant of the
state's acceptance of the BMP plan)

Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines. CV 93-154-BLG-JDS (D. Mont. Oct. 13,1995)
(historic discharges from adits and pits that were exacerbated by recent exploration work held to
be point source discharges, not storm water)

Citv of New York v. Anelebrook Ltd. Partnership. 891 F. Supp. 900, 903-04,40 ERC 1813
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (motion to dismiss citizen's complaint alleging storm water violations denied;
permit violation constitutes violation of the CWA even in the absence of a discharge of
pollutants)

Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Van Loben Sels. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20061 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (held that Cal. Transp. Dept. violated its storm water permit by failing to adopt a
permit compliance plan and properly training and supervising its employees regarding
compliance; also held that defendant did not take adequate precautions to prevent contaminated
water from entering the storm water drainage system)

In re Arizona Municipal Storm Water NPDES Permits. 7 E.A.D. 646 (EAB 1998) (petition for
evidentiary hearing rejected on multiple grounds; held that no numeric effluent limits needed to
meet state water quality standards where effective BMPs are employed)

In re General Motors Corp.. No. CWA-A-O-011-93 (ALJ Hoya June 28, 1996), affd, 7 E.A.D.
	(EAB 1998), affd. 168 F.3d 1377,48 ERC 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (held that manufacturer
violated CWA by discharging from its plant storm water containing lead, copper and zinc in
excess of NPDES permit requirements; rejected argument that EPA must show that the source of
the metals was not rainfall or the corrosive effect of rainfall on the plant's buildings)

64 Fed. Reg. 15158 (1999) (proposal to develop rule to address storm water management for
construction activities)

60 Fed. Reg. 40230 - 40235 (1995) (Storm Water Discharges; Amendment to Requirements for
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permits;  Final Rule)

55 Fed. Reg. 47990 - 48091 (1990) (NPDES permit application regulations for storm water
discharges; in promulgating the storm water regulations, EPA intended "to embrace the broadest
possible definition of point source consistent with the legislative intent of the [CWAJ and court
interpretations to include any identifiable conveyance from which pollutants might enter the
waters of the United States." Id at 47997)

53 Fed. Reg. 4158 (1988) (in amending §  122.21, deletion  of existing storm water discharge
permit regulations and permit application deadlines for Group I and Group E storm water
discharges)

Pendergast, "Applicability of the NPDES Program to Discharges of Storm Water Associated
with Construction Activity at, or Construction of, Livestock Feeding Facilities" (February 5,

                                       191

-------
        1998)


STRICT LIABILITY

        A.      Generally
               Atlantic States Legal Foundation. Inc. v. Tvson Foods. 897 F.2d 1128 (11th Cir. 1990)
               ("There was one simple and straightforward way for Tyson to avoid paying civil
               penalties for violations of the Clean Water Act: after purchasing the plant, Tyson could
               have ceased operations until it was able to discharge pollutants without violating the
               requirements of its NPDES permit. Tyson chose not to do this and it must now bear the
               consequence of that decision.")

               Chemical Mfrs Ass'n v. EPA. 870 F.2d 177,229 (5th Cir.  1989) (petitioners argued that
               a statistical model used by EPA to establish 95th percentile effluent limits "demonstrates
               that a well-operated plant... can be expected to perform within the ... monthly effluent
               limitations only 95 percent of the time." The court held that petitioners' argument was
               "based on an apparent misunderstanding of the EPA statistical model." It relied on the
               Agency's explanation that permit limits based on a 95th percentile value "should result
               in compliance at all times apart from instances of upsets...")

               Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority. 784 F.2d 1200,1208 (4th Cir.
               1986) (liability under the CWA is a form of strict liability)

               United States v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co.. 643 F.2d 1125, 1127,15 ERC 2105
               (5th Cir. 1981). cert, denied. 454 U.S. 835, 70 L. Ed. 2d 114,102 S. Ct. 136,16 ERC
               1512 (1981) (there are no defenses to liability in a claim for penalties under the CWA)

               Minnehaha Creek Watershed District v. Hoffman. 597 F.2d 617, 627, 13 ERC 1009 (8th
               Cir. 1979) (the act provides no justification for the determination "that whether the
               discharge of a particular  substance listed in 502(6) constitutes the discharge of a
               ^pollutant1... depends upon the purpose for which the discharge is made.")

               United States v. Earth Sciences. Inc.. 599 F.2d 368,  374,13 ERC 1417 (10th Cir.  1979)
               (Clean Water Act is a strict liability statute; "The regulatory provisions of the FWPCA
               were written without regard to intentionality,... making the person responsible for the
               discharge of any pollutant strictly liable ... Willful or negligent violations of the  Act are
               separately punishable by criminal penalties under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(l). The Act
               would be severely weakened if only intentional acts were proscribed.")

              United States v. Tex-Tow. Inc.. 589 F.2d 1310,1313,12 ERC 1593 (7th Cir. 1978)
              (owners and operators are liable for civil penalties with no provision for any defenses)

              California Public Interest Research Group v. Shell Oil Co.. 840 F. Supp. 712,714-715
              (N.D. Cal. 1993) (CWA "makes dischargers, such as Shell, 'strictly liable' for any
              violation of a NPDES permit.  Thus, neither good faith,  impossibility, nor data reporting
              errors, are accepted as valid defenses to liability, although such factors may be relevant

                                              192

-------
to the penalty phase." (citations omitted))

Public Interest Research Group v. Yates Industries. Inc.. 757 F. Supp. 438,445 (D.N.J.
1991) ("Mere verbal representations by officials that certain portions of a permit will not
be enforced, without formal modifications in the permit, will not excuse the holder from
the terms of the permit.")

United States v. Quaker State Corp.. Civ. No. 88-306-Erie (W.D. Pa. April 2, 1991)
(liability under § 309 of the CWA is strict)

United States v. Ohio Edison. 725 F. Supp. 928, 934 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (even assuming
the defendant is without fault in this matter, the statute does not require fault to support a
penalty)

Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Mazurkiewicz. 712 F. Supp. 1184,
1192, 30 ERC, 1480, 1486 (M.D. Pa. 1989) ("The individuals or entities responsible for
the discharge of a pollutant in violation of the terms of a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System permit are strictly liable; no intent or  negligence need be shown.")

Fishel v. Westinehouse Electric Corp.. 640 F. Supp. 442,16 E.L.R. 20634 (M.D. Pa.
1986)  (Clean Water Act is a strict liability statute)

Mumford Cove Assoc. v. Groton. 640 F. Supp. 392, 395 (D. Conn. 1986) (defense of
reasonable effort to comply with permit not acceptable because CWA is strict liability
statute; "enforcement of the Clean Water Act does not depend upon establishing a direct
causal link between violations of NPDES permit and pollution.")

United States v. Tom-Kat Development.  Inc.. 614 F. Supp. 613, 614 (D.C. Alaska 1985)
(good  faith not a defense)

United States v. St. Bernard Parish. 589 F. Supp. 617,  619, 21 ERC 1950 (E.D. La. 1984)
("liability imposed for permit violations under the Clean Water Act is a variety of strict
liability where neither fault nor intent is relevant to determination thereof.")

United States v. Amoco Oil Co..  580 F. Supp. 1042, 1050 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (liability
imposed under civil penalty provision of § 309(d) is variety of strict liability, and neither
fault nor intent are relevant thereto, except in connection with amount of penalty
imposed)

United States v. Board  of Trustees of Fla. Keys Community College. 531 F. Supp. 267,
274, 18 ERC 1188 (S.D. Fla.  1981) (defense of contractor that it relied in good faith on
owner's representation that permits were in place  not a defense to unpermitted filling of
slough; "[C]ivil liability under the [CWA and Rivers and  Harbors Act] is predicated on
either (1) performance, or (2) responsibility for or control over performance of the work,
in the absence of the necessary federal permits.")

United States v. General Motors Corp.. 403 F. Supp. 1151,1157, 8 ERC 1707 (D. Conn.
1975) (refusing to consider whether third party was sole cause in CWA penalty action

                               193

-------
        because this defense is not in the penalty provision and Court cannot "legislatively graft
        a defense embodied in some subsections of Sec. 1321, into a Subsection of the Act from
        which Congress clearly omitted it.")

        In re Dr. Marshall C. Sasser. 3 E.A.D. 703, 707 (CJO 1991) ("[G]ood faith is not a
        defense to an alleged violation of § 301.")

        In re Citv of Port St. Joe and Florida Coast Paper Co.. 7 E.A.D. 275 (EAB 1997) ("We
        assume that Petitioners believe that the Region estimated 5% noncompliance with the
        TSS limit because the Region calculated the TSS limit from the City's data using a '95th
        percentile value.'  That argument rests on a misconception.  A limit based on a 95th
        percentile value is not a limit that necessarily will be exceeded 5% of the time. Rather, a
        95th percentile value is the value that is exceeded by 5% of the sampels in a given
        distribution." (emphasis in original))

        InreTownofLurav. Docket No. CWA-ffl-185 (ALJ Kuhlman Nov. 4,1997)
        (accelerated decision granted in favor of EPA; ALJ ruled that CWA is a strict liability
        statute, therefore Respondent's assertion that it had "done all that could be humanly
        expected" had no relevance in determining liability)

        In re Puerto Rico Urban Renewal & Housing Corp.. Docket No. CWA-H-89-249 (ALJ
        Nissen June 29,1993) (owner of sanitary collection system strictly liable for unpermitted
        discharges of untreated wastewater to river notwithstanding that the discharges resulted
        from illegal connections to system by third parties)

B.      Accidents

        United States v. Earth Sciences. Inc.. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1978) (liability found
        where recirculation sumps at gold leaching operation were overwhelmed by greater-than-
        expected snow melt runoff, causing cyanide discharges)

        O'Learv v. Mover's Landfill. Inc.. 523 F. Supp. 642, 655 (M.D. Pa. 1986) ("The essence
        of a point source discharge is  that it be from a "discernible, confined, and discrete
        conveyance.'... Contrary to  defendants' assertions, this has nothing to do with the intent
        of the operators....")

        In re Chevron U.S.A.. Inc.. Docket No. EX-FY88-54 (May 3,1990) (Class I proceeding
        in which Chevron discharged  104,000 gallons of aviation fuel into Pearl Harbor from a
        ruptured pipeline. Defense that this was exclusively a § 311 case denied and Agency
        allowed to proceed under 309(g). Hearings Officer also rejected argument that
        "discharges" under § 301(a) must be expected or anticipated, and that a NPDES permit is
        a prerequisite to § 309 enforcement)

C.      Act of God Defense

        United States v. ConAgra.  1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21401 (D. Id. 1997) (CWA is a strict
        liability statute and act of God is not a defense to liability)
                                       194

-------
D.     De Minimis Defense

       Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co.. 813 F.2d 1480,1490-91, 25 ERG 1801 (9th Cir. 1987),
       vacated on other grounds. 108 S. Ct. 1102-03 (19881 Judgment reinstated. 853 F.2d 667
       (9th Cir. 1988) ("The Clean Water Act and the regulations promulgated under it make no
       provision for 'rare' violations.")

       United States v. Alcoa. 824 F. Supp. 640, 649 (E.D. Tenn. 1993) (a "violation is a
       violation no matter how statistically insignificant.")

       International Union v. Amerace Corp.. Inc.. 740 F. Supp. 1072,1083, 32 ERC 1790
       (D.N.J.1990) ("The Clean Water Act recognizes neither a good faith nor a de minimis
       defense.")

       Mumford Cove Assoc. v. Groton. 640 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (enforcement of
       CWA does not depend upon establishing direct causal link between violations of NPDES
       permit and pollution of freshwater stream, and violations are not be excused on ground
       that they were "technical" or insignificant in nature)

       Connecticut Fund for the Environment v. Upiohn Co.. 660 F. Supp. 1397,1416,26 ERC
        1495, 1510 (D. Conn. 1987) (court rejected defendant's argument that no violation
       occurred "when defendant discharged only a de minimis amount of wastewater into the
       river. The FWPCA does not distinguish between small discharges and large discharges.
       To the extent, in whatever amount of wastewater was discharged to the river, defendant
       exceeded the effluent limitations on a given day, a violation occurred.")

       In re Shell Chemical Co.. 2 E.A.D. 158 (CJO 1986) (rejects Shell's argument that 100%
       compliance policy is not required by CWA; EPA relies on upset defense to provide relief
       to industry from 100% compliance rule)

E.     Impossibility

       Driscoll v. Adams. 181 F.3d 1285,48 ERC 2093 (11th Cir. 1999) (defense of
       impossibility for discharge without a permit limited to where defendant shows minimal
       discharge and good faith attempts to comply)

       United States v. Boldt. 929 F.2d 35,41 (1st Cir. 1991) (CWA does not recognize defense
       of economic or business necessity)

       United States v. CPS Chemical Co.. Inc.. 1991 Dist. Ct. LEXIS 17670  (E.D. Ark. 1991)
       ("... impossibility is not, as a matter of law, a valid defense to CWA liability.")

       United States v. Citv of Hoboken. 675 F. Supp. 189,198 (D.N.J. 1987) ("impossibility is
       not,  as a matter of law, a valid defense to Clean Water Act liability.")

       Prnffitt v. Lower Bucks County Joint Mun. Auth.. 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8085 (E.D. Pa.
       1987) ("While difficulty or impossibility of complying with the Act and the permit
       issued thereunder may be appropriate considerations in fashioning a remedy for a

                                       195

-------
               violation, such matters are irrelevant in determining whether a violation occurred.")

 TAKINGS

        Rith Energy Inc. v. United States. 44 Fed. Cl. 108,48 ERC 1951 (Fed. Cl. 1999) (takings claim
        by coal mining company for denial of mining permit denied where acid mine drainage from mine
        was contaminating drinking water supplies because under Tennessee law, such contamination is
        considered a nuisance)

        Kinross Cooper Corp. v. State. 1999 Ore. App. LEXIS 760 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (State's denial of
        a copper company's application for an NPDES permit to discharge mining wastes into state
        waters did not effect a taking of private property; in order for the company to have a private
        property right to discharge wastewater into state waters, the right must have come into existence
        separately after compliance with state law regarding the creation and recognition of state water
        rights)

        See also WETLANDS: Takings


 TECHNOLOGY-BASED STANDARDS

        See EFFLUENT GUIDELINES


 TERRITORIAL SEAS

        33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) ("[Territorial Seas means the belt of the seas measured from the line of
        ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open  sea
        and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters, and extending seaward a distance of
        three miles.")

        Pacific Legal Foundation v. Ouarles. 440 F. Supp. 316 (C.D. Cal. 1977), affd. 614 F.2d 225 (9th
        Cir. 1980). cert, denied. 449 U.S. 825, 101 S. Ct. 88,66 L. Ed. 2d 29 (general demarcation line
        between jurisdiction of FWPCA and Marine Protection Act with exception of pipes or outfalls, is
        three-miles limit of territorial seas)


THERMAL DISCHARGES (§ 316)

       33 U.S.C. § 1326 (Thermal Discharges)

       40 C.F.R. § 124.66 (Special procedures for decisions on thermal variances under section 316(a))

       Sierra Club v. Georgia Power Co.. 180 F.3d 1309,48 ERC 2119 (11* Cir. 1999) (upholding
       denial of preliminary injunction against continued violations of temperature limit in NPDES
       permit; public interest not served by requiring power plant to cut production to comply)

       National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch. 693 F.2d 156  n. 48,18 ERC 1105  (D.C. Cir. 1982)

                                            196

-------
       ("Congress recognized that heat was different in kind than the other listed pollutants. The House
       bill contained a separate definition for "thermal discharge." H.R. 11,896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
       § 502(17) (1972), reprinted in 1 Congressional Research Service, Environmental Policy Division,
       93d Cong., 1st  Sess., A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
       1972, at 893, 1071 (Comm. Print 1973)... This definition does not appear in the Act as
       enacted, but Congress did make special provision for thermal discharges in § 316(a), 33 U.S.C.
       § 1326 (a), which permits EPA to relax the § 402 technology-based effluent limits so long as the
       discharge will not prevent the "propagation of a balanced, indigenous population of shellfish,
       fish, and wildlife." )

       Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle. 587 F.2d 306, 308, 13 ERC 1001 (1st Cir. 1979) (EPA
       finding that nuclear power plant discharges won't violate § 316 upheld as supported by
       substantial evidence)

       Cronin v. Browner. No. 93 Civ. 0314 (ACS) (S.D. N.Y. July 24,1995) (in citizen suit seeking to
       compel EPA to promulgate regulations pursuant to § 316(b) of the CWA, held that federal courts
       have jurisdiction to enter a proposed consent decree where plaintiffs have made a substantial
       allegation that EPA has failed to fulfill a mandatory duty; jurisdiction is not dependent on a
       finding on the merits, i.e., that EPA does, in fact, have a mandatory duty that is  unfulfilled)

       See also POLLUTANT (definition of "pollutant" under § 502(6) includes "heat")
TMDLs
       33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(l)(C) (requires each state to develop total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs")
       for each water body that cannot meet water quality standards after point sources are subject
       technology-based effluent standards)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (no permit shall be issued to a new source or new discharger where the
       discharge will cause or contribute to violations of water quality standards unless applicant can
       prove the TMDL provides a sufficient load allocation and no net decrease in water quality will
       result)

       40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i) ("Total maximum daily load (TMDL). The sum of the individual WLAs for
       point sources and LAs for nonpoint sources and natural background. If a receiving water has
       only one point source discharger, the TMDL is the sum of that point source WLA plus the LAs
       for any nonpoint sources of pollution and natural background sources, tributaries, or adjacent
       segments. TMDLs can be expressed in terms of either mass per time, toxicity, or other
       appropriate measure. If Best Management Practices (BMPs) or other nonpoint source pollution
       controls make more stringent load allocations practicable, then wasteload allocations can be less
       stringent. Thus, the TMDL process provides for nonpoint control tradeoffs.")

       40 C.F.R. § 130.7 (Total maximum daily loads (TMDL) and individual water quality-based
       effluent limitations)

       Mirenrnkee Tribe v. United States. 105 F.3d 599, 601 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying § 303(d)
       regarding state promulgation of water quality standards and concluding that "even it a state fails

                                              197

-------
 to submit new or revised standards [to the EPAJ, a change in state water quality standards could
 invoke the mandatory duty imposed on the Administrator to review new or revised standards.")

 Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clarke. 57 F.3d 1517,40 ERC 1961 (9th Cir. 1995) (court
 rejected challenges by environmental group that TMDL did not comply with Water quality
 standards and by industry that no TMDL for dioxin could be established because there are no
 technology-based effluent guidelines for dioxin)

 Longview Fibre Co. v. Rassmussen. 980 F.2d 1307, 23 ELR 20454 (9th Cir. 1992) (challenge to
 EPA's dioxin TMDL by pulp mills and citizens' groups dismissed on jurisdictional grounds; held
 that TMDLs may not be challenged in the Courts of Appeals, since § 509(b) of the CWA does
 not specifically list EPA actions under section 303(d) as reviewable in those courts)

 Scott v. Hammond. 741 F.2d 992, 21 ERC 1474 (7th Cir.  1984) (If state fails over long periodof
 time to submit proposed TMDL, prolonged failure may amount to "constructive submission" by
 state of no TMDLs, and EPA may be under duty to either approve or disapprove "submission.")

 Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle. 657 F.2d 275, 294-95,  11 ELR 20459, 20469-70 (D.C.
 Cir. 1981) (EPA did not identify salinity as a pollutant until December 28,1978 and thus the
 states' duty to submit TMDL calculations did not arise until June 28,1979; EDF's claim was
 premature since EPA did not have the occasion to approve or disapprove the state the state
 TMDL submissions before the EDF filed its motion for summary judgment)

 Defend the Bav v. Marcus. No. 97-3997 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (in consent decree, EPA agrees to set a
 schedule for TMDLs for 156 waterways in Los Angeles and Ventura counties)

 American Canoe Assoc.. Inc. v. EPA. 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 47 ERC 2100 (E.D. Va. 1998) (motion
 to dismiss granted in part, denied in part; held that state's failure to  submit TMDLs for water
 bodies on 303(d) list a "constructive nonsubmission," which triggers EPA requirement to write
 TMDLS itself)

 Sierra Club v. Hankinson.No. l:97-CV-3683 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 22,1998) (in consent decree, EPA
 agrees to ensure that TMDLs be prepared for 702 segments of the Mississippi over 10 years)

 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Fox. 30 F. Supp. 2d 369 (S.D. N.Y. 1998) (citizen suit
 CWA claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; held that CWA "does not provide any particular
 date by which EPA must intervene [when a state fails to prepare TMDLs]. Therefore, EPA has
 at least some discretion to determine at what point it is appropriate to deem state inaction a
 'constructive submission' meriting intervention."; APA claims, however, upheld: "[W]hile EPA
 has some discretion as to when to deem stae inaction a 'constructive submission', that discretion
 is not unfettered	In the context of the Act's overall scheme and the provisions concerning
 TMDLs in particular (including the specific deadlines for initial implementation of some, if not
 most, TMDLs), it is clear that TMDLs are to be established promptly by the states or, if they are
 dilatory, by EPA.  Promptly, in this context, means within months or, perhaps, with a very few
 years.  Promptly does not mean over the span of decades.")

Hayes v. Browner, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21677 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (held that EPA has a
nondiscretionary duty to issue TMDLs when state fails to submit TMDLs over an 18-year period;

                                      198

-------
case nevertheless dismissed for failure to abide by 60-day notice requirement; also discussion
and rejection of APA causes of action by citizen plaintiffs)

Sierra Club v. Hankinson. 939 F. Supp. 865, 868 (N.D. Ga. March 25,1996) (EPA found to be
arbitrary and capricious in failing to disapprove two Georgia TMDLs; "If a state fails to submit a
WQLS list or TMDL determinations over a long period of time, this prolonged failure may
amount to the 'constructive submission' by that state of no WQLS list or TMDLs, thus triggering
EPA's mandatory duty to approve or disapprove of the constructive submissions and, upon
disapproval, to promulgate a WQLS list or TMDL determinations.")

Idaho Sportsmen's Coalition v. Browner. 951 F. Supp. 962,43 ERG 1289 (W.D. Wash. 1995)
(EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving schedule giving Idaho until 2021 to
establish TMDLs)

Sierra Club v. Hankinson. 939 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (summary judgment entered against
EPA, holding that 2 TMDLs submitted by Georgia "clearly do not satisfy the requirements of
§ 303(d) because they do not provide daily limits for priority pollutants on identified WQLSs."
"EPA's failure to disapprove of Georgia's inadequate TMDL submissions was arbitrary and
capricious in violation of the [APA] and that EPA's failure to promulgate TMDLs for Georgia
violates the [CWA].")

Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. Fox. 909 F. Supp. 153,42 ERC  1935 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (EPA summary judgment motion denied; held that state's intent re TMDL is irrelevant;
"Mere objective failure to submit TMDLs for water-quality-limited segments is enough to trigger
the non-discretionary duties of the EPA." question remained whether  state's waste load
allocations constituted TMDLs)

Idaho Sportsmen's Coalition v. Browner. No. C93-943WD (W.D. Wash.  1995) (EPA has no
mandatory duty under § 303(d) to develop TMDLs for Idaho because no "constructive
submission of no TMDLs" had occurred (in fact the state had done 2 in 15 years); court held,
however, that EPA had violated a duty under the CWA and EPA's regulations and was arb. &
cap. in failing to determine, with Id., a reasonable schedule for the development of TMDLs for
all 303(d)-listed waterbodies)

Sierra Club v. Browner. 843 F. Supp. 1304, 38 ERC  1234 (D. Minn. 1993) (summary judgment
in EPA's favor where court held that state of Minn, had not made a "constructive submission of
no water quality limited segments" or "no" TMDLs by failing to promulgate TMDLs)

Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Longview Fibre Co.. Civ. No. C93-33D (W.D. Wash. August
10, 1993) (court upheld EPA's TMDL for dioxin in the Columbia River against attacks by
environmental organizations and industry)

Alaska Center for the Environment v. Reillv. 762 F. Supp. 1422, 32 ERC 2110 (W.D. Wash.
1991), affd. 20 F.3d 981 (1994) (EPA must promulgate TMDL water quality standards under
§ 303(d) where state failed to submit proposal for more than decade, because failure amount to
"constructive submission" of no limits and thus EPA's mandatory duty is triggered; "Congress'
repeated use of the term 'shall' in section 303(d) clearly places a mandatory duty upon the EPA
to take affirmative action after disapproving a state's unacceptable submission.  Read in light of

                                      199

-------
        commom sense and the fact thatCongress set out such short time lines in this section,...
        Congress intended that EPA's affirmative duties be triggered upon a state's failure to submit a
        list or any TMDL at all." 762 F. Supp. at 1427.)

        Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA. 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1288 (D.S.D.1979)(EPA had not identified
        the pollutants at the time of the Cheyenne River Basin Plan's adoption; although South Dakota
        had not established TMDLs as required by §303(d), the court held that they were not yet required
        until 180 days after EPA's identification of pollutants).

        In re Ketchikan Pulp Co.. 6 E.A.D. 675,688 (EAB  1996) (held that KPC not entitled to an
        evidentiary hearing on TMDL issue because it was not properly raised during the public
        comment period)

        InreCitvofTulsa.OK. 3 E.A.D. 505, 507 (CJO 1991) (Region did not wrongfully rely upon
        anti-backsliding exception provided in § 303(d)(4(A)(i) when issuing the renewed permit
        because waste load allocation that formed the basis for the effluent limitation in the renewed
        permit was revised ans was in effect prior to the issuance of the renewed permit)

        50 Fed. Reg. 1774-1784 (1985)

        Draft Memorandum of Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator for Water, EPA, "New
        Policies for Developing and Implementing Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) (Mar. 21,
        1997)

        EPA, "Guidance to Water Quality-based Decisions: The TMDL Process" (April 1991)

        GAO, "Water Pollution; More EPA Action Needed to Improve the Quality of Heavily Polluted
        Waters" (January 1989)  (Chapter 2: EPA Region X States Have Just Begone to Set TMDL's)

        Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs III: A New Framework for the Clean Water Act's Ambient Standards
        Program, 28 ELR 10415 (1998)

        Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water Qaulity-Based
        Regulation Under the  Clean Water Act, 27 ELR 10391 (1997)

        Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based Regulation
        Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ELR 10329 (1997)

       Note, TMDL Litigation: So What Now?, 17 Va. Envt'l L.J. 83 (1997)

       See also WATER QUALITY STANDARDS; NONPOJJSfT SOURCES
TOXICITY LIMITS

       40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(4) (limits may be expressed, where appropriate, in terms of toxicity)

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 859 F.2d 156,28 ERC 1401 (D.C. Cir. 1988)

                                            200

-------
UIC
       (although toxicity appears to be an attribute of pollutants rather than a pollutant itself, the CWA
       authorizes the use of toxicity as a measure to regulate effluents)
       Arco Oil and Gas Co. v. EPA. 14 F.3d 1431, 37 ERG 2125 (10th Cir. 1993) (EPA decision to
       reclassify a UIC well from Class n oil and gas well to a Class I hazardous, industrial or
       municipal waste well as a permissible construction of the SDWA)

       Western Nebraska Resources Council v. EPA. 943 F.2d 867, 33 ERC 1992 (8th Cir. 1991) (No.
       90-2158) (EPA approval of exemption of 3000-acre aquifer from protection in Nebraska upheld)

       Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United States E.P.A.. 803 F.2d 545, 547 n.2 (10th cir. 1986)
       ("Underground injection is defined by the SDWA to mean the Subsurface emplacement of fluids
       by well injection.' Underground injection is a potentially widespread hazardous waste disposal
       practice that poses serious threats to groundwater sources of drinking water.")

           also GROUNDWATER, DISCHARGES  TO
UPSET DEFENSE

       40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n) ("Upset means an exceptional incident in which there is unintentional and
       temporary noncompliance with technology based permit effluent limitations because of factors
       beyond the reasonable control of the permittee. An upset does not include noncompliance to the
       extent caused by operational error, improperly designed treatment facilities, inadequate treatment
       facilities, lack of preventative maintenance, or careless or improper operation.")

       Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals. Inc.. 913 F.2d 64,
       31 ERC 1905 (3d Cir. 1990X cert, denied. 498 U.S. 1109 (1991) (upset defense is not available
       to a defendant who has not fulfilled the reporting requirements of the permit, 913 F.2d at 76
       n.20; "it is disingenuous at best for [the defendant] to argue that it was in a near continual state
       of operation upset for the six years of violations involved in this suit," id. at 77)

       Oklahoma v. EPA. 908 F.2d 595, 613 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Significantly, an industry-proposed
       defense for violation of water-quality-based permit limits was deleted in the final rule.")

       Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Tvson Foods. Inc.. 897 F.2d 1128, 1139 n. 19, 31 ERC 1201
       (11* Cir. 1990) ("NUpset' is a term of art referring to an exceptional incident and does not include
       noncompliance due to improperly designed or inadequate treatment facilities.")

       Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA. 870 F.2d 177, 230 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussion of
       relationship between upset defense and the creation of technology-based standards)

       Natural Resources Defense Council.  Inc. v. EPA. 859 F.2d  156, 206-211 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (CWA
       does not require EPA to allow upset defense for water-quality-based effluent limits, although
       regulation denying defense for water-quality-base effluent limits held arb. & cap. on grounds that

                                              201

-------
 EPA did not provide grounds for conclusions that upset defense was unworkable for water-
 quality-based effluent limits)

 Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co.. 813 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds. 485 U.S.
 931 (1988), opinion reinstated. 853 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1988) (upset not a defense if state-issued
 permit doesn't include it)

 Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA. 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977) (upset defense for technology-based
 limits held required; upset provision required because BPCT assumes 97.5% compliance, yet
 permit requires 100% compliance)

 United States v. ConAgra. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21401 (D. Id. 1997) (upset defense not
 applicable to water-quality-based effluent limit violations; court rejected argument that Natural
 Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA required that EPA apply upset defense to wq-based
 violations)

 United States v. City of Toledo. 867 F. Supp. 598, 602 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (upset defense rejected
 on grounds that defendant had not complied with notice or other requirements of defense;
 Summary judgment entered for plaintiff)

 California Public Interest Research Group v. Shell Oil Co.. 840 F. Supp. 712, 714-715 (N.D. Cal.
 1993) (upset defense not available if not in the permit)

 International Union. UAW v. Amerace Corp. Inc.. 740 F. Supp. 1072, 1082-83, 32 ERC 1790,
 1799, 21 ELR 20097 (D.N.J.  1990) (upset defense rejected for failure to show that it complied
 with the conditions necessary to prove an upset)

 Public Interest Research Group v. U.S. Metals Refining Co.. 681 F. Supp. 237, 244, 26 ERC
 2004 (D.NJ. 1987) (holding that violations that occurred "winter after winter after winter," were
 not upsets and that to hold otherwise would not encourage the defendant "to examine the
 treatment facility and to take steps to prevent future noncompliance")

 Student Public Interest Research of N.J. v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.. 642 F. Supp. 103,
 108, 24 ERC 1627,  1631 (D.N.J. 1986) (no upset found where violations were numerous and
 longstanding)

 Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp.. 635 F. Supp. 284, 287, 24
 ERC 1506 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (upset defense not available for violations of water-quality-based
 effluent limits)

 In re Shell Chemical Co.. 2 E.A.D. 158 (CJO  1986) (rejects Shell's argument that 100%
 compliance policy is not required by CWA; EPA relies on upset defense to provide relief to
 industry from 100% compliance rule)

49 Fed. Reg. at 38,038 (1984) (upset defense rejected for WQ-based effluent limits on grounds
that continuous monitoring would be required to ensure Water quality standards are not violated;
 "although the proposal would seemingly allow permitees to claim an upset defense, the costs,
burdens, and technical difficulties of establishing that water quality standards were not violated

                                      202

-------
       would make the defense nearly impossible to establish.")

       47 Fed. Reg. 52,089 (1982) (EPA propsed to extend upset defense to WQ-based limits)

       44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,863 (1979) ("violations of... water quality based effluent limitations
       are not subject to a defense of upset.")

       See also SINGLE OPERATIONAL UPSET; BYPASS


WATER QUALITY RELATED EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS

       33 U.S.C. § 1312 (when a permitting authority determines that "discharges of a pollutant from a
       point source ... would interfere with the attainment or maintenance of [applicable] water quality
       standards,... effluent limitations (including alternative effluent control strategies) for such point
       source ... shall be established which can reasonably be expected to contribute to the attainment or
       maintenance of such water quality.")

       Oklahoma v. EPA. 908 F.2d 595, 614, 31 ERG 1741 (10* Cir. 1990) ("effluent limits more
       stringent than those required by [§ 301(b)(2)] must, if feasible, be established by EPA and
       imposed on any sources responsible for interfering with the desired water quality in a specific
       stream segment.")

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 859 F.2d 156, 28 ERC 1401 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
       ("Under § 302(a), the Administrator must impose these more stringent limits when necessary to
       'assure public water supplies, agricultural and industrial uses,' and the protection and* propagation
       of a balanced population of shellfish, fish and wildlife, and allow recreational activities in and on
       the water.'")

       Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co. of Ca.. 813 F.2d 1480, 25 ERC 1801 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated on
       other grounds. 108 S. Ct. 1102-03 (1988). judgment reinstated. 853 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1988)
       ("Water quality standards are designed to ensure the survival of wildlife in navigable waters and
       to protect recreational activities in and on the water.  33 U.S.C. § 1312(a).  In contrast with
       technology-based standards, which are based on the feasibility of limiting effluent levels, water
       quality-based limitations relate to the environmental effects of different effluent levels.")

       In re Perfect Packed Products Co.. NPDES Permit Op. No. 37 (1976) (requirement of meeting
       water quality standards exists independent of § 302; accordingly, effluent limitations designed to
       meet water quality standards are not subject to cost-benefit analysis of § 302 even where such
       limitations are more stringent than those represeting best available technology economically
       achievable)

       In re United States Pipe & Foundry Co.. NPDES Permit Op. No. 2 (1974) (permit issued in  1974
       and scheduled to expire in 1979 should contain conditions to meet requirement of § 301 as
       related to § 303 standards or to meet effluent limitations established pursuant to § 302
       procedures)

       S. Rep. No. 414, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3668, 3712-13 ("The

                                             203

-------
       limitations necessary to achieve a given level of water quality in one reach of a waterway may
       require more control of effluents than that attainable through application of the best available
       technology. Where that is desirable to implement the policies of the Act, and feasible, [this
       section] provides the authority to impose controls based on water quality	The concept of
       'alternative effluent control strategies' is necessary to account for [certain] difficulties in simply
       setting more stringent effluent limitations.... Further reduction of the level of effluent entering
       the affected waters may not be possible through control technology, yet essential to water
       quality.  Alternative effluent control strategies, such as the transportation of effluents to other less
       affected waters or the control of in-plant processes would have to be developed.")

       EPA General Counsel Opinion No. 58 (1977) (EPA has an independent obligation to calculate
       water quality-based effluent limits under 122.44(d) and include those limits in the permit,
       whether or not the state certifies to those limits)

       See also STATE CERTIFICATION; WATER QUALITY STANDARDS
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS

       A.     Generally

              33 U.S.C. § 1313 (Water quality standards and implementation plans)

              40 C.F.R. Parts 130 (Water Quality Planning and Management) and 131 (Water Quality
              Standards)

              PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Co. v. Washington State Dept. of Ecology. 511 U.S. 700,114 S.
              Ct.  1900, 128 L. Ed. 2d 716, 38 ERC 1593,1593, 24 ELR 20945 (1994) (state "water
              quality standards provide 'a supplemental basis ... so that numerous point sources,
              despite individual compliance with effluent limitations, may be further regulated to
              prevent water quality from falling below acceptable levels.'")

              Adams v. EPA. 38 F.3d 43,47 (1st Cir. 1994) (EPA can rely on the presumption that by
              complying with state water quality standards, there will be no unreasonable degradation
              of the marine environment)

              American Paper Institute v. EPA. 996 F.2d 346, 36 ERC 2025, 2026 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
              (§ 301 "mandates that every permit contain (1) effluent limitations that reflect the
              pollution reduction achievable by using technologically practicable controls ... and (2)
              any more stringent pollutant release limitations necessary for the waterway receiving the
              pollution to meet 'state water quality standards.'")

              Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 16 F.3d 1395, 37 ERC 1953,1955 (4th
              Cir. 1993) ("Water quality standards are a critical component of the CWA regulatory
              scheme because such standards serve as a guideline for setting applicable limitations in
              individual discharge permits.")

              Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co. of Calif.. 813 F.2d  1480,1489 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated on

                                             204

-------
       other grounds. 485 U.S. 931 (1988) ("States establish water quality standards that specify
       the uses to be made of a body of water and the maximum levels of pollutants allowable
       in view of those uses.  Water quality standards are designated to ensure the survival of
       wildlife in navigable waters and to protect recreational activities in and on the water. 33
       U.S.C. § 1312(a)... [W]ater quality-based limitations relate to the environmental effects
       of different effluent  levels.")

       Northwest Indian Cemetarv Protective Ass'n v. Peterson. 565 F. Supp. 586, 19 ERC
       2115,13 ELR 20793 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff d in part, vacated in part. 764 F.2d 581, 15
       ELR 20682 (9th Cir. 1985) (under § 313, federal agencies must comply with state water
       quality standards)

       In re Star-Kist Caribe. Inc.. 2 E.A.D. 758,1989 NPDES LEXIS 10 (CJO 1989) (whether
       State should have approved mixing zone and included it in the water quality certification
       is a matter of state law and must be challenged in state proceedings, not on appeal to the
       Administrator)

       Western Carolina Regional Sewer Auth. v. DHEC. No. 98-ALJ-07-0267-CC (S.C.
       DHEC June 21,1999) (held that S.  Carolina improperly placed its water bodies on a
       CWA list of impaired waters based on phosphorus enrichment and violated notice-and-
       comment procedures in the process)

       H.R. 999, "The Beaches Environmental Awareness, Cleanup, and Health Act of 1999"
       (requires EPA to establish national  standards for testing and monitoring coastal
       recreational water and notifying visitors of health concerns related to those waters)

       64 Fed. Reg. 2741 (1999) (draft MOA between EPA and Services re coordination of
       ESA and water quality efforts)

       Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based
       Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ELR 10329 (1997) (good summary of history
       of water quality  standards)

       See also TMDLs

B.     Antidegradation

       33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (statutory authority for antidegradation regulations)

       33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (water quality standards may be revised only where consistent
       with antidegradation policy)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (no permit shall be issued to a new source or new discharger where
       the discharge will cause or contribute to violations of water quality standards unless
       applicant can prove the TMDL provides  a sufficient load allocation and no net decrease
       in water quality  will result)

       40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (Antidegradation Policy)

                                       205

-------
 PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Co. v. Washington State Dent, of Ecology. 511 U.S. 700, 731-
 732 114 S. Ct.  1900,128 L. Ed. 2d 716, 38 ERC 1593, 24 ELR 20945 (1994) ("States
 must interpret their antidegradation policy in a manner 'consistent' with existing uses of
 the stream ... the State's minimum stream flow condition is a proper application of the
 state and federal antidegration regulations, as it ensures that an 'existing instream water
 use' will be 'maintained and protected.'")

 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States. 105 F.3d 599,44 ERC 1765
 (11th Cir.  1997) (if Everglades Forever Act is a water quality standard, EPA would have
 a nondiscretionary duty to review it to determine whether, among other things, the
 antidegradation provisions met minimal federal standards)

 Dubois v. U.S.D.A.. 102 F.3d 1273,43 ERC 1824 (1st Cir. 1996) (challenge to F.S.
 special use permit as not in compliance with antidegradation requirements of state water
 quality standars rejected on grounds that proper forum for challenging state certification
 is in state,  rather than federal court)

 Manasota-88. Inc. v. Tidwell. 896 F.2d 1318, (llth Cir. 1990) ("Each state must adopt as
 part of its water quality standards an 'antidegradation policy1 consistent with and at least
 as stringent as the federal antidegradation rule. For outstanding national resource waters
 OONRWs') such as national or state parks, wildlife refuges, and waters of exceptional
 recreational or ecological significance, the quality of the waters must be maintained and
 protected under all circumstances.")

 American Paper Institute. Inc. v. EPA. 890 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1989) (challenge to
 antideg. regulation through CWA § 509 failed where court held that 509(b)(l)(E) did not
 provide an avenue for judicial review of antideg. regulations because they are not
 "effluent limitations" within the meaning of 509)

 The Raymond Proffitt Foundation v. EPA. 930 F. Supp. 1088,42 ERC 1702 (E.D. Pa.
 1996) (rejecting Defenders. § 1313(c)(4) held to be nondiscretionary duty; EPA ordered
 to "immediately" prepare and publish proposed regulations establishing a revised
 antidegradation policy for Pennsylvania; held that EPA had violated a mandatory duty to
 promptly propose an antidegradation policy for Pa., and that EPA also had unreasonably
 delayed in proposing such regulations.  The court concluded that "a nineteen-month
 delay in preparing and publishing proposed regulations is not fulfilling a public duty
 promptly,1 as commanded by Congress." Op. at 31)

 Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner. 888 F. Supp.  1005,  1008-09 (D. Ariz. 1995)
 (§ 1313(b)(4) held to be discretionary)

 West Virginia Coal  Assoc. v. Reillv. 728 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D. W.V. 1989) (courted
 rejected plaintiffs challenge to EPA's objections to State-issued permits that allowed for
 in-stream treatment; EPA objected on grounds that allowing in-stream treatment would
 violate State's antidegradation policy)

Big Fork Mining Co. v.Tennessee Water Quality Control Bd.. 620 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn.
App. 1981) (court rejected challenge to state antideg. regulation as unconstitutionally

                                206

-------
        vague; terms "high quality water" and "waters of exceptional recreational or ecological
        value" have commonly understood meaning and are not impermissibly vague)

        64 Fed. Reg. 46058 (1999) (proposed change to anti-degradation regulations: new or
        expanding facilities that discharge into impaired waters would have to offset their
        releases of a pollutant on a one-and-one-half to one ratio; applies only to those waters for
        which no TMDL has been set)

        48 Fed. Reg. 51,402 (1983)

        2 W. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law: Air and Water, § 4.17 at 265 ("The first [policy
        choice of the 1983 amendments] is the decision to restate the antidegradation policy in
        terms of protecting existing uses not physical parameters, a tactic that accommodates
        some formal decline as being within the range of popular acceptance." (footnotes
        omitted))

        Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts:  The Erratic
        Pursuit of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 643, 658-660 (1977)

C.      Compliance Schedules

        40 C.F.R. § 122.47 (requires that compliance schedules (whether WQBELs or other
        effluent limits) require compliance as soon as possible but no later than any statutory
        deadline; new sources and new dischargers are eligible for compliance schedules only
        with respect to requirements issued or revised after commencement of construction of
        the facility but less than three years before commencement of discharge)

        In re Star-Kist Caribe. Inc.. 4 E.A.D. 33 (EAB 1992) (held that EPA may not include a
        compliance schedule in a NPDES permit for coming into compliance with state water
        quality standards unless the state standards expressly permit such a compliance schedule)

D.      Designated Uses

        40 C.F.R. § 131.10 (designation of uses)

        PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Co. v. Washington  State Dept. of Ecology. 511 U.S. 700, 114 S.
        Ct. 1900,128 L. Ed. 2d 716, 38 ERG 1593, 24 ELR 20945 (1994) ("A  state water quality
        standard 'shall consist of the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and the
        water quality criteria for such waters based  upon such uses.'")

       Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fl. v. EPA.  105 F.3d 599, 602, 44 ERC 1765 (llth Cir.
        1997) ("The Administrator must determine whether [state] standards are scientifically
       defensible and protective of designated uses.")

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v.  EPA. 16 F.3d 1395, 37 ERC 1953,  1956 (4th
       Cir. 1993) ("[T]he following three factors are considered when adopting or evaluating a
       water quality standard: (1)  one or more designated uses of the state waters involved; (2)
       certain water quality criteria, expressed as numeric pollutant concentration levels or

                                      207

-------
       narrative statements representing a quality of water that supports a particular designated
       use; and (3) an antidegradation policy to protect existing uses and high quality waters.")

E.     EPA Review of State Standards (§ 303(c))

       33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (Review; revised standards; publication)

       40 C.F.R. § 131.5(a) ("Under section 303(c) of the Act, EPA is to review and to approve
       or disapprove State-adopted water quality standards	")

       40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (Minimum requirements for water quality standards submissions)

       40 C.F.R. § 131.21(c) ("A State water quality standard remains in effect, even though
       disapproved by EPA, until the State revises it or EPA promulgates a rule that supersedes
       the State water quality standard.")

       National Wildlife Federation v. Browner. 127 F.3d 1126,45 ERC 1577 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
       (EPA has no mandatory duty to reject Michigan's decision to not elevate Lake Superior
       to a Tier HI waterbody; EPA's state water quality standards review provision, 40 CFR
       § 131.20(c), requires only that EPA review state revisions, not existing state standard;
       held the EPA's  interpretation of its regulations was neither "plainly erroneous," nor
       "inconsistent with the regulations.")

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 16 F.3d  1395, 37 ERC 1953 (4th Cir.
       1993) (states have primary role in establishing water quality standards, and EPA's sole
       function is to review those standards for approval and determine whether the state's
       decisions are scientifically defensible and protective of designated uses; held EPA not
       arbitrary in approving state standards for dioxin)

       District of Columbia v. Schramm. 631 F.2d 854, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (primary duty of
       compiling water quality standards rests with the state and the EPA merely retains a
       supervisory role)

       Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15838
       (S.D. Fla. 1998) (held that State law that suspends enforcement of narrative nutrient
       water quality standards altered State water quality standards sufficiently to trigger EPA
       duty to review revised standards and approve or disapprove of such standards)

       Alaska Clean Water Alliance v. Clark. No. C96-1762R, 1997 U.S. District LEXIS
       11144 (W.D.Wash. July 8,1997) (new or revised state water quality standards become
       effective only after EPA has completed its review process and approved the standards
       under the CWA)

       Idaho Conservation League v. Browner. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9548 (W.D. Wash.
       1997) (held that where EPA disapproves state water quality standards under 303(c), EPA
       has mandatory duty to promulgate standards; 2-year delay by EPA before disapproving
       state water quality standards was arb. & cap.)
                                      208

-------
       Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner 41 ERC 1769 (D. Ariz. 1995) (EPA unreasonably
       delayed issuance of water quality standards for State of Arizona where it had
       disapproved state standards in 1993; § 303(c)(4) directs EPA to propose federal
       standards "promptly" where a state fails to revise its standards within 90 days of EPA
       disapproval)

       Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States. No. 95-0533-CIV-DAVIS (S.
       D. Fla. July 25,1995) (held that EPA had no mandatory duty to review new state
       legislation that tribe argued was a change in state water quality standards because the
       state had never submitted to EPA any proposed changes that would trigger 303(c)(2) and
       (3))

       Citv of Albuquerque v. Browner. 865 F. Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993), affd. 97 F.3d 415
       (10th Cir. 1996) ("The EPA, however, reviews proposed water quality standards only to
       determine whether they are stringent enough to comply with the EPA's recommended
       standards and criteria. If the proposed standards are more stringent than necessary to
       comply with the [CWA's] requirements, the EPA may approve the standards without
       reviewing the scientific support for the standards.")

       Idaho Conservation League v. Rusell. 946 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1991) ("There is no
       case law suggesting Section 303(c) leaves the Administrator any discretion to deviate
       from this apparently mandatory course.")

       64 Fed. Reg. 37072 (1999) (Proposed 40 C.F.R. Part 131, EPA Review of State and
       Tribal Water Quality Standards)

       See also STATE CERTIFICATION

F.     "Fishable, Swimmable"

       33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) ("it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal
       of water quality which provides for the protection and propogation of fish, shellfish, and
       wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983")

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 16 F.3d 1395, 37 ERC 1953,1956 (4th
       Cir. 1993) (each submission by a state of its water quality standards to EPA for approval
       must "contain six elements ...  (6) general information to assist EPA in determining the
       adequacy of the scientific basis for standards that do not include the
       "fishable/swimmable" uses as set forth in 33 U.S.C. §  1251(a)(2).  40 C.F.R. § 131.6.")

       H.R. 999, "The Beaches Environmental Awareness, Cleanup, and Health Act of 1999"
       (requires EPA to establish national standards for testing and monitoring coastal
       recreational water and notifying visitors of health concerns related to those waters)

       GCO No. 78-6 "Oklahoma Water Quality Standards - Demonstration Necessary for
       ^Downgrading' Use Classification" (April 11,1978)
                                      209

-------
 G.     Indian Tribes

        Montana v. EPA. 137 F.3d 1135,46 ERC 1161 (9th Cir. 1998) (under § 518 of the
        CWA, EPA may authorize Indian tribes to set water quality standards that regulate
        activities of non-Indians who own property within reservations)

        Citv of Albuquerque v. Browner. 865 F. Supp. 733 (D. N.M. 1993), affd. 97 F.3d 415,
        43 ERC 1276 (10th Cir. 1996), cert, denied. 118 S. Ct. 410 (1997) (court upheld EPA's
        regulations for treating Indian Tribes in the same manner as States for purposes of the
        water quality standards program; rejected city's argument that Tribe may not develop
        water quality standards that are more stringent then Federal standards)

        64 Fed. Reg. 37072 (1999) (Proposed 40 C.F.R. Part 131, EPA Review of State and
        Tribal Water Quality Standards)

        See also INDIAN TRIBES

 H.     Interstate Jurisdiction

        Arkansas v. Oklahoma. 503 U.S. 91, 34 ERC 1193 (1992)  (EPA has authority to apply
        water quality standards of downstream state in issuing permit to point source in upstream
        state)

 I.      Narrative Standards

        Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 673 F.2d 400,403 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
        (the definition of effluent limitation in § 502(11) refers to any restriction on amount of
        pollution discharged, thus including all restrictions, not only numeric ones)

        EOF v.  Costle. 568 F.2d 1369, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (when it is infeasible for EPA to
        derive numeric limitations to include as permit conditions, agency may issue permits
        with conditions designed to reduce the level of effluent discharges to acceptable levels)

        United States Steel Corp. v. Train. 556 F.2d 822, 840 (7th  Cir. 1977) (narrative, non-
        numeric water quality based permit condition which prohibited discharges causing
        receiving waters to exceed temperatures permissible under state water quality standards
        was valid and enforceable)

        In re Champion International Corp.. NPDES Docket No. NC0000272 (ALJ Yost Feb. 12,
        1992) (where the states only water quality standard for a particular pollutant is
        articulated in a narrative fashion, the permit writer is obliged to translate such standard
        into numerical limit on a case-by-case basis)

J.      Need to Incorporate into Permit as Effluent Limit

        Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner.	F.3d	, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22212 (9th Cir.
        1999) (held that EPA not arbitrary and capricious by not requiring municipal stormwater
       permits to include numeric effluent limits designed to ensure compliance with state water

                                      210

-------
quality standards; EPA has discretion to use BMPs instead; "the Water Quality Act [of
1987] did not require municipal stormsewer discharges to comply strictly with 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(b)(l)C)... [industrial dischargers must comply strictly with state water-quality
standards. Congress chose not to include a similar provision for municipal storm-sewer
discharges.")

Northwest Environmental Advocates v. Citv of Portland  56 F.3d 979,40 ERC  1801
(9th Cir. 1995), rehearing denied. 74 F.3d 945,42 ERC 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1018 (1996) (citizens can enforce narrative standard in permit that
prohibits the violation of state Water quality standards)

American Paper Institute v. EPA. 996 F.2d 346,36 ERC  2025, 2027 (D.C. Cir.  1993)
("[W]ater quality standards by themselves have no effect on pollution; the rubber hits the
road when the state-created standards are used as the basis for specific effluent
limitations in NPDES permits... [O]nce a water quality standard has been promulgated,
section 301 of the CWA requires all NPDES permits for  point sources to incorporate
discharge limitations necessary to satisfy that standard.")

Oregon Natural Resources Council v. U.S. Forest Service. 834 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir.
1987) (citizens may file suit to enforce permit limitations derived from water quality
standards, but not water quality standards themselves "[E]ffluent limitations may be
derived from state water quality standards and may be enforced when included  in a
discharger's permit. We  agree with defendants that it is not the water quality standards
themselves that are enforceable...")

Trustees for Alaska v. EPA. 749 F.2d 549, 552-554, 21 ERC 2222, 2223 (9th Cir. 1984)
("Effluent limitations are a means of achieving water quality standards."  (emphasis
added))

Northwest Environmental Advocates v. Citv of Portland. CV No. 91-339-PA (D. Or.
Dec. 13, 1991), rev'd. 56 F.3d 979,40 ERC 1801  (9th Cir. 19951. rehearing denied. 74
F.3d 945, 42 ERC 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 518 U.S. 1018 (1996) ("Given the
distinction between effluent limitations and water quality standards ... and the problems
with analyzing violations of water quality standards as opposed to effluent limitations,
[McClellanl is best interpreted to mean that state water quality standards can constitute
effluent standards, violations of which may be actionable in a citizen suit, only  if they
are incorporated into an NPDES permit through effluent  limitations." Id. at 15. "[M]ere
reference to water quality standards in a permit does not  make them 'effluent standards
or limitations' for purposes of sections 1365(a)(l) and (f)."  Id at 16)

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger. 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1200 (E.D.
Cal. 1988) ("[A] state water quality standard can constitute an effluent standard or
limitation enforceable under [§ 1365(a)(l)] only if it has been incorporated into an
NPDES permit.")

S. Rep. No. 98, 92nd Cong.,  1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1972  U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
3675 ("Under this Act the basis of pollution prevention and elimination will be the
application of effluent limitations.  Water quality will be a measure of program

                               211

-------
       effectiveness and performance, not a means of elimination and enforcement.")

K.     Notice and Comment

       Citv of Albuquerque v. Browner. 865 F. Supp. 733 (D. N.M. 1993), aff'd. 97 F.3d 415
       (10th Cir. 1996) (unlike standards promulgated by EPA under 303(b), no notice and
       comment period is required for EPA approval of state or tribe-issued water quality
       standards; "Congress clearly intended the EPA to have limited, non-rulemaking role in
       the establishment of water quality standards by states and tribes, and, consequently, no
       statement of basis or purpose for its actions was necessary.")

L.     Reclassification

       Alaska DEC v. Rvbacheck. 42 ERC 1572 (AK Sp. Ct. 1996) (State's rejection of petition
       to reclassify receiving water to downgrade water use classifications for which agency
       had insufficient information upheld; State regulation governing reclassification
       procedures is reasonable where state adopted EPA reclassification regulation)

M.     Site Specific Criteria

       40 C.F.R. § 131.1 l(b)(l)(ii) (states have the opportunity to adopt water quality criteria
       that are "... modified to reflect site-specific conditions.")

       EPA, Water Quality Standards  Handbook (2nd Ed. 1993), Chapter 3.7 at 3-38 - 45 (Site-
       Specific Aquatic Life Criteria)

N.     State Authority (§ 510)

       33 U.S.C. § 1370 (states may not impose standards that are less strict than federal
       standards, but nothing in the CWA shall limit the state's authority to promulgate water
       quality standards that are stricter than minimum federal standards)

       33 U.S.C. § 1344(t)  ("Noting in [§ 404] shall preclude or deny the right of any State ...
       to control the discharge of dredged or fill material in any portion of the navigable waters
       within the jurisdiction of such State...")

       Citv of Albuaueraue v. Browner. 865 F. Supp. 733 (D. N.M. 1993), affd. 97 F.3d 415
       (10th Cir. 1996) (§ 510 is ambiguous as applied to Indian Tribes because it is not
       specifically referenced in § 518; deference given to EPA's construction that § 510 applies
       to tribes as well as states)

       New Hanover Township v. Corps of Engineers.  992 F.2d 470, 37 ERC 1189, 1192 (3d
       Cir. 1993) ("Pennsylvania is empowered by the  Clean Water Act to set more stringent
       water quality standards than those set by the Act and its regulations.")

       United States v. Marathon Development Corp.. 867 F.2d 96, 99-100, 29 ERC 1145,1147
       (lsl Cir.  1989) (states may deny certification of a nationwide wetlands permit in order to
       enforce their more stringent water quality standards)

                                      212

-------
              S. Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
              News 3668, 3735 ("This section is substantially section 21(b) of existing law... It
              should also be noted that the Committee continues the authority of the State ... to act to
              deny a permit and thereby prevent a Federal license or permit from issuing to a discharge
              source within the State.")

              See also STATE CERTIFICATION
WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES

               See NAVIGABLE WATERS


WETLANDS (§ 404)

       A.     Generally

               33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Permits for dredged or fill material)

               33 U.S.C. § 1344(t) ("Noting in [§ 404] shall preclude or deny the right of any State ...
               to control the discharge of dredged or fill material in any portion of the navigable waters
               within the jurisdiction of such State...")

               40 C.F.R. § 122.2 ("Wetlands" means those areas that are inundated or saturated by
               surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under
               normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
               saturated soil conditions.  Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and
               similar areas)

               40 C.F.R. Part 230 (Section 404(b)(l) Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for
               Dredged or Filled Materials)

               40 C.F.R. Part 231 (Section 404(c) Procedures)

               40 C.F.R. Part 232 (404 Program Definitions; Exempt Activities Not requiring 404
               Permits)

               40 C.F.R. Part 233 (404 State Program Regulations)

               33 C.F.R. Part 320 (General Regulatory Policies)

               33 C.F.R. Part 321 (Permits for Dams and Dikes in Navigable Waters of the United
               States)

               33 C.F.R. Part 322 (Permits for Structures or Work in Or Affecting navigable Waters of
               the United States)
                                             213

-------
 33 C.F.R. Part 323 (Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill Material into Waters of
 the United States)

 33 C.F.R. Part 324 (Permits for Ocean Dumping of Dredged Material)

 33 C.F.R. Part 325 (Processing of Department of the Army Permits)

 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (Corps' definition of "wetlands")

 Michigan Peat v. EPA. 175 F.3d 422,48 ERC 1817 (6th Cir. 1999) (EPA approved of
 state-issued 404 permit on condition that certain changes were made; applicant refused to
 sign permit as changed and state issued "state only" permit that was less strict to avoid
 takings claim; when applicant sued to have EPA held to the terms of the state-issued
 permit and EPA defended on grounds that pre-enforcement review not allowed under
 CWA; held that no pre-enforcement review issued involved because EPA's approval of
 state-issued permit constituted final agency action)

 Alaska Center for the Environment v. West. 47 ERC 1225 (9th Cir. 1998) (general
 wetlands permit upheld in part on grounds that the activities it covered were similar in
 nature and would have minimal impact on the environment)

 Friends of the Crystal River v. EPA.  35 F.3d 1073 (6th Cir. 1994) (EPA cannot give back
 permitting authority to state once revoked because that authority lies with Corps)

 Buttrev v. United States. 690 F.2d 1170,1180, 18 ERC 1241 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
 denied. 461 U.S. 927 (1983) ("It would hardly be putting the case too strongly to say that
 the Clean Water Act and the applicable regulations do not contemplate that wetlands will
 be destroyed simply because it is more convenient than not to do so.")

 Bragg v. Robertson. 54 F. Supp.2d 653,48 ERC 1913 (S.D. W. Va.  1999) (settlement
 agreement on valley fills requiring U.S. to prepare programmatic EIS concerning
 mountaintop coal mining fair and reasonable; also contains discussion of need for 404
 permits)

 Inn of Daphne. Inc. v. United States. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13991 (S.D. Al. 1998)
 (Corps' cancellation of § 404 permit application for failure to respond to Corps'  request
 to investigate presence of historical sites held not reviewable becuase  is not final agency
 action; plaintiff needed to reapply and have the permit actually denied before seeking
 relief from the court)

 United States v. Hallmark Construction Co.. 14 F. Supp.2d 1065 (N.D. m. 1998) (on
 motion for reconsideration, held that § 404 does grant Corps authority to bring an
 enforcement action in instances of a permitless discharge, and that the United States was
 a proper party plaintiff; upheld migratory bird rule)

United States v. Hallmark Construction Co.. 46 ERC 2117 (N.D. Dl. 1998), vacated. 14
F. Supp.2d  1065 (N.D. 111. 1998) (Corps enforcement authority applies only in instances
where it has issued a § 404 permit; while EPA has enforcement authority over

                               214

-------
discharges, the Corps does not unless it issued a permit)

Michigan Peat v. EPA. 7 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Mich. 1998), affd in part, rev'd in part.
175 F.3d 422,48 ERG 1817 (6th Cir. 1999) (.held that peat mining co.'s challenge to
EPA's disapproval of state's proposed 404 permit was premature since permit never was
issued and pre-enforcement review is not allowed; claims against State of Michigan also
dismissed under 11th Amendment grounds)

United States v. Telluride Co.. CV 93-K-2181 (D. Co. April 20,1994) (court rejected
consent decree as being too lenient toward defendant in wetlands enforcement action for
illegal fill;  to sign consent decree without careful review would not be in the public
interest)

United States v. Torres. 656 F. Supp. 251,25 ERC 1785 (D. P.R. 1987) (the Corps may
enforce the provisions of the CWA in Puerto Rico)

Commenwealth of Puerto Rico v. Alexander. 438 F. Supp. 90,96,10 ERC 1575 (D.D.C.
1977) (§ 404 applies to Puerto Rico)

Executive Order No. 11990, "Protection of Wetlands" (1978), codified at 3 C.F.R. § 121,
as amended by Executive Order No. 12608, 3 C.F.R. § 245 (1988)

Margaret N. Strand, Wetlands Deskbook, 2nd Ed., ELR (1997)

Comment, Slowing the Net Loss of Wetlands: Citizen Suit Enforcement of Clean Water
Act 404 Permit Violations, 27 Envtl. L. 245 (1997)

Note, Wetlands Permitting Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Do Proposals for
an Administrative Appeals Process Have Any Appeal?, 13 Va. Envtl. L.J. 639 (1994)

Comment, Purchaser Liability for the Restoration of Illegally Filled Wetlands Under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (1991)

Blumm and Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection under the Clean Water Act:
Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 Univ.
Colo. L. Rev. 695(19)

Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America's Coastal Zone, 47 Md. L. Rev. 358
(1988)'

Jackson, Wetlands the Commerce Clause: The Constitutionality of Current  Wetland
Regulation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 1 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 307
(1988)

Tripp & Herz, Wetland Preservation and Restoration: Changing Federal Priorities, 7
Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 221 (1988)

U.S.  General Accounting Office, Wetlands: The Corps of Engineers' Administration of

                                215

-------
        the Section 404 Program (1988)

        Conservation Foundation, Protecting America's Wetlands: An Action Agenda - The Final
        Report of the National Wetlands Policy Forum (1988)

        Comment, Restoration of Wetlands Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: An
        Analytical Synthesis of Statutory and Case Law Principles (1988)

        Rosenbaum, The Supreme Court Endorses a Broad Reading of the Corps' Wetlands
        Jurisdiction Under FWPCA § 404, 16 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,0008 (1986)

        Nagle, Wetlands Protection and the Neglected Stepchild of the Clean Water Act: A
        Proposal for Shared Custody of Section 404, 5 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 227 (1985)

        Tripp, Judicial Review of§ 404 Wetlands Protection Actions: A Reaction, 14 Envt'l L.
        Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,096 (1985)

        Want, Federal Wetlands Law: The Cases and the Problems, 8 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1
        (1984)

        Tomesello, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Risks of Regulatory Reform, 58 Fla. Bar.
        J. 232 (1984)

        Liebesman, The Role of EPA's Guidelines in the Clean Water Act Section 404 Permit
        Program Judicial Interpretation and Administrative Application, 14 Envt'l L. Rep.
        (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,272 (1984)

        President's Task Force on Regulatory Reform, Administrative Reforms to the Regulatory
        Program Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Section 10 of the Rivers and
        Harbors Act (May 7, 1982)

        Parish & Morgan, History, Practice, and Emerging Problems of Wetlands Regulation:
        Reconsidering Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 17 Land & Water L. Rev. 43 (1982)

        Myhrum, Federal Protection of Wetlands Through the Legislative Process, 1 B.C. Envt'l
        Aff. L. Rev. 567 (1979)

        Note, The Clean Water Act of 1977: Midcourse Corrections in the Section 404 Program,
        57 Neb. L. Rev. 1092 (1978)

        Thompson, Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
        1977: Hydrologic Modification, Wetlands Protection, and the Physical Integrity of the
       Nations' Waters, 2 Harv. Envt'l L. Rev. 264 (1977)

B.     Adjacent Wetlands

       33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (The term "adjacent" means bordering, contiguous,  or neighboring.
       Wetlands separated from other waters of the United States by manmade dikes or barriers,

                                      216

-------
natural river berms, beach dunes and the like are adjacent wetlands)

United States v. Riverside Bavview Hnme.s 424 U.S. 121,133-134, 106 S. Ct. 455, 88 L.
Ed. 2d 419 (1985) (upheld the Corps' application of § 404 permit requirements to
adjacent wetlands; "the landward limit of Federal jurisdiction under section 404 must
include any adjacent wetlands that form the border or are in reasonable proximity to
other waters of the United States.")

United States v. Wiknn 133 F.3d 251,45 ERC 1801 (4th Cir. 1997) (criminal
conviction for unlawful dredge and fill overturned and remanded; court held that Corps
definition of wetlands, which forbade activities that "could affect" interstate commerce,
was invalid; "The regulation [33 CFR 328.3(a)(3)]  requires neither that the regulated
activity have a substantial affect on interstate commerce, nor that the covered waters
have any sort of nexus with navigable, or even interstate, waters. Were this regulation a
statute, because, at least at first blush, it would appear to exceed congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause.")

Hobbs v. United States. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27696, 22 ELR 20331 (4th Cir. 1991)
(land held to be adj. wetland even though not directly abutting waters of U.S.)

Conant v. United States. 786 F.2d 1008, 24 ERC 1343 (11th Cir. 1986) (cease and desist
order to stop unpermitted fill of adjacent wetlands to create a fish pond upheld; wetlands
held to be navigable waters)

United States v. Tilton. 705 F.2d 429,431 (llth Cir. 1983) (even without direct or
indirect surface connection between wetlands in question and adjacent river, area cam
under wetlands definition)

United States v. Banks. 873 F. Supp. 650,40 ERC  1689 (S.D. Fla. 1995), affd. 115 F.3d
916 (11th Cir. 1997) (wetlands located 1/2 mile from navigable water were deemed
adjacent rather than isolated; court used evidence of ecological links with neighboring
navigable waters in determining the classification of wetlands)

United States v. Pozseai. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8255 (E.D. Penn. 1991), affd. 999 F.2d
719 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) held that "[T]he courts have broadly
construed the adjacency requirement to find that the wetlands in question are covered by
the CWA even when the wetlands were separated by some distance or by barriers from
the water body.")

United States v, Malibu Beach. Inc.. 711 F. Supp. 1301, 1311, 29 ERC  1920 (D.N.J.
1989) (because the pool was subject to the ebb and flow of the tide from the harbor inlet,
which is Waters of the U.S., the wetland was held to be adjacent)

United States v. Ciamoitti. 583 F. Supp. 483,494 (D.NJ. 1984), affd, 772 F.2d 893 (3d
Cir. 1985), cert, denied. 475 U.S. 1014 (1986) ("[T]he existence of an artificial barrier,
in this case a railroad embankment, which may prevent tidal flow to a site is not
determinative of the limits of [sic] Corps'jurisdiction.")
                               217

-------
        United States v. Citv of Fort Pierre. 580 F. Supp. 1036, 20 ERC 1796 (D. S.D. 1984)
        (defense that slough is not an adjacent wetland because there is no hydrological
        connection between the Miss. R. and the slough rejected because the CWA does not
        require hydrological connection between waters of the U.S. and the adjacent wetland)

 C.     After-the-Fact Permits

        33 C.F.R. § 326.3(e) (After-the-fact permit applications)

        United States v. Cumberland Farms of Connecticut. 826 F.2d 1151,1157,26 ERC 1393
        (1st Cir. 1987) (defendant bears the burden of proving the facts showing the applicability
        of the nationwide permit)

        Friends of the Eartch v. Hintz. 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming a Corps after-the-
        fact permit where alternative sites  were rejected as either too costly or logistically
        infeasible)

        Salt Pond Associates v. Army Department. 38 ERC 2098 (D. Del. 1993) (challenge to
        Corp's denial of after-the-fact permit rejected; Corps had authority to issue cease and
        desist order where inspector had witnessed fill material placed on jurisdictional
        wetlands;  due deference given to Corps' wetlands determination)

        United States v. Boccanfuso. 695 F. Supp. 693,700 (D. Conn. 1988) (Corps should
        process an afer-the-fact permit rather than issue a restoration order based on a five-year-
        old environmental assessment)

        United States v. Cumberland Farms of Connecticut. 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1183 (D. Mass.
        1986), affd. 826 F.2d 1151, 26 ERC 1393 (1st Cir. 1987) (discusses when Corps may
        deny an after-the-fact permit request; "When [defendant] refused to comply with the
        Corps remedial order, and instead continued further destruction of the wetland, the Corps
        was within its rights, and indeed was left with no other recourse, but to seek judicial
        enforcement of the remedial restoration order, rather than to process administratively an
        after-the-fact permit.")

        Ouinones Lopez v. Coco Lagoon Devel. Corp.. 562 F. Supp. 188,191-92 (D.P.R. 1983)
        (sustaining the issuance of an after-the-fact permit without public hearings or a state
        coastal zone certificate)

        United States v. Allevne. 454 F. Supp. 1164, 1172-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that a
        defendant in an illegal discharge suit was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issues
        of whether he should be issued an afer-the-fact permit, despite the fact that he never
        applied for such a permit)

D.      Alternatives Analysis

        33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (requires development of guidelines that consider, among other
        things, "economic impact of the site on navigation and anchorage.")
                                       218

-------
40 C.F.R. Part 230 (Section 404(b)(l) Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for
Dredged or Fill Material)

40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (where "there is a practicable alternative ... which would have
less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem," the Corps cannot issue a dredge or fill
permit)

40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) ("no discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted which
will cause or contribute to significant degradation of the waters of the United States.")

B&B Partnership v. United States 133 F.3d 913,45 ERC 1922 (4th Cir. 1997) (upheld
Corps decision to deny 404 permit on grounds that environmental impacts to land
outweighed public benefits of proposed landfill; held that evidence in the record
provided a rationale basis for the Corps' denial of appellant's permit application)

National Wildlife Federation v. Whistler. 27 F.3d 1341 (8th Cir. 1994) (held that
wetlands permit alternatives analysis may be limitsd to a severable portion of a
development project when the portion of the development not requiring a permit would
proceed regardless of permit and there is little or no net loss of wetlands)

James Citv County. VA v. EPA. 955 F.2d 254 (4th Cir. 1992) (remand  ordered where
district court reversed EPA veto of Corps 404 permit on grounds that EPA had not
proved  that the City had an alternate water source; court order district court to find
whether EPA could have denied on environmental impact alone)

Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Engineers. 968 F.2d 1438, 35 ERC 1013 (1st Cir.
1992) (basic proposition of CWA law is that if mitigation measures are insufficient, the
permit should be denied)

Sylvester v. U.S. Corps of Ene'rs. 882 F.2d 407,409 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Obviously, an
applicant cannot define a project in order to preclude the existence of any alternative
sites and thus make what is practicable appear impracticable.")

Bersani v. Robichaud. 850 F.2d 36,44 (2d Cir. 1988), cert, denied. 489 U.S. 1089 (1989)
(the presumption of alternatives creates "an incentive for developers to avoid choosing
wetlands when they could choose an alternative upland site.")

Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n v. York. 761 F.2d 1044 (5* Cir. 1985) (affirming six Corps
general permits against charges that the Corps limited its consideration to alternatives
that would fulfill the applicant's avowed purpose of increasing soybean production and
failed to consider alternative economic uses not envisioned by the applicant, reasoning
that the guidelines imposed a duty to take into account the objectives of the applicant;
not all requested fills were permitted, some mitigating measures were included, and EPA
did not  object)

Buttrev v. United States. 690 F.2d 1170,1180,18 ERC 1241 (5th Cir. 1982), cert
denied.  461 U.S. 927 (1983) (404 permit denied where Corps determined that total
adverse effects of the proposal were outweighed the benefit to the public; the

                                219

-------
        presumption of practicable alternatives "is very strong." (emphasis in original))

        Water Works and Sewer Board City of Birmingham v. U.S. Armv Corps of Engineers.
        983 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Al. 1997) (held that Corps regulation do not require Corps to
        consider impacts of water withdrawal on water supply in its 401(b)(l) review, only
        impacts on water supply from the addition of fill into the water)

        Conservation Law Foundation v. Federal Highway Administration. 827 F. Supp. 871
        (D.R.I. 1993), affd. 24 F.3d 1465 (1st Cir. 1994) (challenge to 404 permit for highway
        construction defeated where court held that nothing more was required of the Corps in
        evaluating practicable alternatives)

        Fox Bay Partners v. U.S. Armv Corps of Engineers. 831 F. Supp. 605, 37 ERC 1684
        (N.D. HI. 1993) (upheld Corps's denial of 404 permit where Corps found that proposed
        marina would contribute to significant degradation of environment through
        overcrowding; "[T]he Corps will deny a permit application if the discharges would not
        comply with the § 404 guidelines.")

        Friends of the Earth v. Hall. 693 F. Supp. 904,  907 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (significant
        additional cost of an alternative may not by itself eliminate that alternative)

        Louisiana Wildlife Fed'n.. Inc. v. York. 603 F.  Supp. 518, 528 (W.D. La. 1984) (Corps
        "must take into account the objectives of the applicant's project.")

        National Audubon Soc'v v. Harz Mountain Devel. Co.. 14 ELR 20,724 (D.N.J. 1983)
        (feasible alternatives not available because other sites would offer a less attractive
        marketing package to purchasers; project incorporated mitigating measures but those
        were deemed insufficient by EPA and federal fish  and wildlife agencies)

        Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of the Clean
        Water Act and Similar Environmental Statutes, 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 773 (1989)

E.      Compliance Orders

       Rueth v. EPA. 13 F.3d 227, 24 ELR 20214 (7th Cir. 1993) (EPA issued 309(a) order
       instructing developer to cease all discharges into wetlands and to commence restoration
       of the wetlands; complaint seeking injunctive relief and declaratory judgment against
       EPA's unauthorized issuance of 309(a) order dismissed because EPA had not issued a
       final appealable order)

       Southern Pines Asoc. v. United States. 912 F.2d 713, 717 31 ERC 2020 (4th Cir. 1990)
       (developer challenged EPA's jurisdiction over  an isolated wetland, arguing that it was
       not challenging EPA's compliance order, but EPA's jurisdiction over the wetlands;
       "allowing the parties to challenge the existence of EPA's jurisdiction would delay the
       agency's response in the same manner as litigation contesting the extent of EPA's
       jurisdiction.  [The plaintiffs]  can contest the existence of EPA's jurisdiction if and when
       EPA seeks to enforce the penalties provided by the Act.")
                                      220

-------
       Hoffman Group. Inc. v. EPA. 902 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1990) (Corps issued cease and
       desist order and EPA issued 309(a) order to developer; held that Congress intended to
       preclude judicial review of an EPA compliance order unless the government initiated an
       enforcement action in the U.S. Dist. court)

       Aminoil U.S.A.. Inc. v. California Water Rd.. 674 F.2d 1227, 17 ERC 1702 (9th Cir.
       1982) (plaintiff filed suit in state court challenging Board determination that property
       was wetland and joined EPA on grounds that it had issued to plaintiff a 309(a) order re
       the wetlands; held: judicial review of EPA action, whether under the Act or § 10 of the
       APA, must await final EPA action and must be initiated in federal court)

       Sharp Land Co. v. United States. 956 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. La. 1996) (Corps and EPA's
       motion to dismiss complaint granted on grounds that 309(a) orders issued to plaintiff
       regarding illegal fill of wetlands were not reviewable in federal court; plaintiff had
       sought judicial review of the compliance orders, a declaratory judgment that the
       government had "taken" land without compensation, and damages for slander; and
       alleged civil rights violation (interference with right to sell property))

       Howell v. Armv Corps of Engineers. 794 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (D.N.M. 1992) ("forcing
       the agency into litigation before it completes its wetlands delineation and permitting
       process will frustrate the statutory scheme that allows the agency to resolve violations in
       a flexible manner without judicial interference.")

       Leslie Salt Co. v. United States. 789 F. Supp. 1030,1033-34 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("issuance
       of cease and desist orders are not sufficient to create jurisdiction in this court.")

       Mulberry Hills Dev. Corp. v. United States. 772 F. Supp.  1553, 1557-58 (D. Md. 1991)
       (CWA does not allow for pre-enforcement review of cease and desist orders)

       See also COMPLIANCE ORDERS, PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW

F.     Criminal Violations

       United States v. Wilson. 133 F.3d 251,45 ERC 1801  (4th Cir. 1997) (criminal
       conviction for unlawful dredge and fill overturned and remanded; court held that Corps
       definition of wetlands, which forbade activities that "could affect" interstate commerce,
       was invalid; held also that 309(c)(l)(A) "requires the government to prove the
       defendant's knowledge of facts meeting each essential element of the substantive
       offense, but need not prove that the defendant knew his conduct to be illegal." )

       United States v. Raoanos. 115 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 1997), cert, denied. 118 S. Ct. 304,139
       L. Ed. 2d 234 (1997) (developer convicted of fillings  wetlands without permit; open
       fields exception negates reasonable expectation of privacy; district court's granting of
       new trial based on use of testimony asserting Fourth Amendment rights reversed)

       United States v. Pasauariello. 40 ERC 1009 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (developer held criminally
       liable for unpermitted fill of two small lakes with construction debris)
                                       221

-------
        Mills v. United States. 36 F.3d 1052 (llth Cir. 1994), cert, denied. 514 U.S. 1112 (1995)
        (conviction for continuing to fill a wetland for a driveway after two cease & desist orders
        from Corps; court rejected argument that Congress lacked constitutional authority to
        delegate definition of wetland to Corps)

        United States v. Burnett. (W.D. Wash. 1994) (defendants convicted of filling wetland
        after being told by USCOE and SCS that site was a wetland)

 G.     Delegations

        Johnson v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 6 F. Supp.2d 1105, 47 ERC 1311 (D. MN.
        1998) (rejecting Mango, held that CWA does not specifically address subdelegation of
        § 404 permit issuance authority and that Corps' construction of the statute in delegating
        permit issuance authority by regulation from the Chief Engineer to the District Engineer
        was permissible)

        United States v. Mango. 46 ERC 1294 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (held that Corps issued 404
        permit was invalid and unenforceable because CWA did not authorize redelegation of
        authority to issue permits from CEO Chief of Engineers to District Engineer)

        Charfoos and Co. v. West. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7112 (E.D. Mich. 1998)  (no pre-
        enforcement review of Corps decision to exercise jurisdiction over wetland; plaintiff
        argued that Corps had delegated authority to regulate wetland in question to state)

H.     Delineation Manual

        United States v. Ellen. 961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1992) (criminal conviction for filling
        wetlands not void on ex post facto principle just because the wetlands manual used to
        determine that filled land was wetland was not in effect at time of filling)

        Hobbs v. United States. (4th Cir. 1991)  (unpublished) (EPA's wetlands delineation
        manuals are interpretive, not substantive rules and are not, therefore, subject to the
        public notice and comment requirements of the APA)

I.       Draining Wetlands

        33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(l)(A) ("[T]he discharge of dredged or fill material.. from normal
        farming ... minor drainage .. is not prohibited...")

       40 C.F.R. § 232.3(d)(3)(ii) ("Minor drainage in waters of the United States is limited to
       drainage within areas that are part of an established farming or silviculture  operation .  It
       does not include drainage associated with the immediate or gradual conversion of a
       wetland to a non-wetland (e.g., wetland species to upland species not typically adequate
       to lief in saturated soil conditions), or conversion from one wetland to another (for
       example, silviculture to farming).")

       Orleans Audubon Soc'v v. Lee. 742 F.2d 901, 21 ERC 1984 (5th Cir. 1984) (installation
       of drainage culverts at issue did not involve a discharge regulated under the CWA)

                                      222

-------
       Save Our Community v. EPA. 971 F.2d 1155, 35 ERC 1937 (5th Cir. 1992) (challenge to
       draining of wetlands dismissed on grounds that draining is not a dredge and fill subject
       to regulation and therefore requires no permit;  "We must conclude that without the
       existence of an effluent discharge of some kind, there is no coverage under section 404."
       35 ERC at 1944)

       American Mining Congress v. U.S. Army Corps, of Engineers. No. 93-1754 SSH
       (D.C.C. Jan. 23,1997) (Corps, regulations to prohibit draining of wetlands set aside by
       court)

       In re Slineer Drainage.  Inc..8 E.A.D.	(EAB 1999) (rejecting NMA case as
       inapplicable, held that fall-back from drain tile laying machine to be "addition of
       pollutants" subject to regulation under CWA, and not "incidental fallback";
       distinguished NMA on  grounds that discharge in NMA was merely incidental to removal
       of materials from wetlands, whereas in Slinger. the discharge was part of the operation to
       remove wetlands material, insert a drain pipe, then redeposit all of the excavated
       material)

       S. Rep. No. 95-370, at 76 (1977), reprinted in  1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326 ("Minor
       drainage is intended to  deal with situations such as drainage in Northwestern forests or
       other upland areas.  The exemption for minor drainage does not apply to the drainage of
       swampland or other wetlands.")

       58 Fed. Reg.45008 (1993) (proposed regulations re draining of wetlands)

       40 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,025 (1993) ("The excavation of wetlands to place drainage tiles
       is currently regulated under Section 404 unless such activities qualify for a Section
       404(f) exemption. Activities that involve replacing existing field drainage tiles where
       the replacement does not increase the extent of drainage beyond that provided by the
       original tiling would generally qualify for such an exemption.")

       Kevin O'Hagen, Pumping with Intent to Kill: Draining Wetlands, 40 DePaul L.Rev.
       1059 (1991)

J.     Dredge and Fill

       33 U S C § 1344(a) ("The  Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for
       public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
       specified disposal sites.")

       33 U S C § 1344(t) ("Noting in [§ 404] shall preclude or deny the right of any State ...
       to control the discharge of dredged or fill material in any portion of the navigable waters
       within the jurisdiction  of such State...")

       33 C F.R. § 323.2(c) ("The term dredged material means material that is excavated or
       dredged from waters of the United States.")

       33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d) (definition of "discharge of dredged material")

                                       223

-------
 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) ("The term fill material means any material used for the primary
 purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of
 a waterway. The term does not include any pollutant discharged into the water primarily
 to dispose of waste, as that activity is regulated under Section 402 of the CWA.")

 40 C.F.R. Part 230 (Section 404(b)(l) Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for
 Dredged or Fill Material)

 40 C.F.R. § 230.l(c) ("Fundamental to these Guidelines is the precept that dredged or fill
 material should not be discharged into the aquatic ecosystem, unless it can be
 demonstrated that such a discharge will not have an unacceptable adverse impact either
 individually or in combination with known and/or probable impacts of other activities
 affecting the ecosystems of concern.")

 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (Definitions)

 United States v. Riverside Bavview Homes. Inc.. 474 U.S. 121,133 (1985) (holding
 wetlands property to be subject to Corps' § 404 permitting authority after Corps sought
 to enjoin placement of fill materials on wetland area)

 Resource Investments Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 151 F.3d 1162,47 ERC
 1065 (9th Cir. 1998) (Corps does not have authority under 404 to stop proposed landfill
 because refuse to be disposed of in the landfill does not constitute "dredge and fill
 material;" the landfill does not meet the test of the Corps regulations for "material that is
 excavated or dredged from the waters of the United States;" authority to regulate solid
 waste rests with EPA)

 Rueth v. EPA. 13 F.3d 227, 229,24 ELR 20214 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Individual [dredge and
 fill] permits are only issued after extensive administrative proceedings and investigation
 which include site-specific documentation, public notice and consideration of all public
 comments on the specific activity.")

 Save Our Community v. EPA. 971 F.2d 1155, 35 ERC  1937 (5th Cir. 1992) (challenge to
 draining of wetlands dismissed on grounds that draining is not a dredge and fill subject
 to regulation and therefore requires no permit; "We must conclude that without the
 existence of an effluent discharge of some kind, there is no coverage under section 404."
 35 ERC at 1944)

 West Virginia Coal Assn. v. EPA. 932 F.2d 934, 33 ERC 1353, 1355-56 (4th Cir. 1991)
 (court rejected argument that Corps, not EPA should regulate discharge of mining wastes
 into navigable waters. "Generally, the Army has authority over the discharge [of] fill
 while the EPA has authority over the  discharge of pollutants... Appellants analysis falls
 short, however, since the Army regulations, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e), provide evidence that
 it did not intend to regulate the disposal of mining related spoil since the primary
 purpose of such fills and treatment ponds is to dispose of waste and treat sediment-laden
 water, not to create dry land or to change the bottom elevation of the water.")

Conant v. United States. 786 F.2d 1008, 24 ERC 1343 (11th Cir. 1986) (cease and desist

                               224

-------
order to stop unpermitted fill of adjacent wetlands to create a fish pond upheld; wetlands
held to be navigable waters)

United States v. Akers. 785 F.2d 814, 24 ERC 1121 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied. 479
U.S. 828 (1986) (plowing, discing and seeding of farmland constitutes "dredge and fill")

United States v. M.C.C. of Florida. 772 F.2d 1501,23 ERC 1318 (llth Cir. 1985),
vacated on other grounds. 481 U.S. 1034 (1987), readooted in relevant part on remand.
848 F.2d 1133 (llth Cir. 1988) (boats used in construction project discharged vegetation
and sediment without a permit)

Orleans Audubon Soc. v. Lee. 742 F.2d 901,21 ERC 1984 (5th Cir. 1984) (where on-
sight investigator's report reflected the fact that he found no evidence that dredged or fill
material had been deposited, the court found no basis to hold the Corps' decision that it
did not have jurisdiction under section 404 to be arbitrary or capricious and thus the
Corps handling of the  matter was not actionable under the APA)

Save Our Wetlands. Inc. v. Sands. 711 F.2d 634, 647,19 ERC 1710 (5th Cir. 1983) (held
that "materials" produced by the clearing of wooded swampland did "not qualify as
dredged or fill materials under [the Corps'] definitions.")

Avovelles Sportsman's League. Inc. v. Marsh. 715 F.2d 897, 922,19 ERC 1841 (5th Cir.
1983) (operation of a bulldozer in a wetlands constitutes a point source, subject to
regulation under 404)

United States v. Tilton. 705 F.2d 429,430,19 ERC 1109 (11* Cir. 1983) (enjoining the
further discharge of fill material "consisting of wood-chips, pine bark and soil" without
§ 404 permit)

Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman. 597 F.2d 617, 13 ERC 1009 (8th Cir.
1979) (construction of dams and riprap involved placement of material such as rock,
sand and cellar dirt into jurisdictional waters)

United States v. Bav-Houston Towing Co.. 33 F. Supp.2d 596, 29 ELR 21011 (E.D.
Mich.  1999) (peat bog operator's use of indigenous bog vegetation and clays to create
haul roads and windrow foundations can constitute the discharge of "fill materials"
under the Act)

Froebel v. Mever. 13 F. Supp. 2d 843,47 ERC 1359 (E.D. Wis.  1998) (citizen suit
alleging sediment discharges from former impoundment area after dam was removed
dismissed; held that no unpermitted dredge and fill occurred because sediment released
from former impoundment behind deactivated dam was not "dredged" or "excavated")

United States v. Deaton. No. MJG-95-2140 (Court??, June 23,1998) (following, but
question validity of Wilson,  held that sidecasting of material into wetland next to ditch
that was being excavated was not "fill" and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the
CWA)
                               225

-------
 United States v. Material Service Corp.. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14471 (N.D. HI. 1996)
 (court held that 404 violations (filling wetlands with mine tailings) accrued for statute of
 limitations purposes when the government discovered the violation in March 1993, and
 therefore, none of the government's claims were barred by the statute of limitations;
 court looked to self-reporting structure of CWA and general public policy concerns)

 United States v. Lambert. 915 F. Supp. 797, 26 ELR 21116 (S.D.W.Va. 1996) (owner of
 property and contractor who performed work liable for illegal dredge and fill; "The
 CWA imposes liability on the party who actually performed the work and on the party
 with responsibility for or control over performance of the work.")

 United States v. Appel. 42 ERC 1822 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (defendant's operation of a
 bulldozer in the river channel was a point source discharge subject to regulation under
 § 404; prima facie case for illegal dredge and fill: "government must show: (1) that it has
 jurisdiction over the subject waters, (2) that the defendant discharged a pollutant into
 those waters, and (3) that the defendant did so without a permit from the Corps.")

 Long Island Soundkeeper Fund v. New York Athletic  Club. 42 ERC 1421, (S.D.N.Y.
 1995) (motion to dismiss granted re unpermitted dredge and fill  claim for lead shot from
 shotguns; no evidence that activity of defendant was intended to "raise the bottom
 elevation" of the receiving waters)

 Friends of Santa Fe v. LAC Minerals. Inc.. 892 F. Supp. 1333, 26 ELR 20135 (D.N.M.
 1995) (Dolores Arroyo, an intermittent stream bed, held to be waters of U.S.; overburden
 material discharged to Arroyo held not be "dredge"  or "fill" within meaning of 33 C.F.R.
 § 323.2(c))

 United States v. Sargent  County Water Resource District. 876 F. Supp. 1090,40 ERC
 1718 (D.N.D. 1994) (cleaning drainage ditch does not require 404 permit because the
 work was "maintenance" not "improvement")

 Salt Pond Associates v. Army Department. 38 ERC 2098 (D. Del.  1993) (Corps had
 authority to issue cease and desist order where inspector had witnessed fill material
 placed on jurisdictional wetlands; due deference given to Corps' wetlands determination)

 Orange Environment. Inc. v. County of Orange. 811 F. Supp. 926, 934, 36 ERC 1983
 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (held that EPA § 309(a) compliance order does not relieve operator of
 need to acquire a § 404 permit in order to place fill in  a wetlands as part of a landfill
 expansion project)

 United States v. Zaneer.  767 F. Supp. 1030,1033, 22 ELR 20231 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
 (prima facie elements for dredge and fill case)

 United States v. Sinclair. 767 F. Supp. 200, 203, 21  ELR 21323  (D. Mont. 1990)
 (defendant moved cobbles around in stream; held that redeposition of indigenous
materials in a streambed  constitutes discharge of pollutants)

Golden Gate v. U.S. Armv Corps of Engineers. 717 F. Supp. 1417,1422 (N.D. Cal.

                               226

-------
1988) ("permitless discharges of fill material that are in violation of the [CWA] may not
be used to establish the normal circumstances of a site.")

United States v. Larkins. 657 F. Supp. 76, 85, 25 ERC 1911 (W.D. Kent. 1987), affd.
852 F.2d 189, 28 ERC 1001 (6* Cir. 1988), cert, denied. 489 U.S. 1016 (1989)
(operation of a bulldozer in a stream river channel constitutes a point source, subject to
regulation under 404)

United States v. Torres. 656 F. Supp. 251, 25 ERC 1785 (D. P.R. 1987) (preliminary
injunction granted against wetlands owner in Puerto Rico for unpermitted fill of
wetlands; held that area in question was jurisdictional wetlands)

United States v. TulL 615 F. Supp. 610,622, 20 ERC 2198 (E.D. Va. 1983), affd. 769
F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds. 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (operation of a
bulldozer in a stream river channel constitutes a point source, subject to regulation under
404)

United States v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. Kevs Comm. College. 531 F. Supp. 267, 274,18
ERC 1188 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (site covered with riprap ordered restored and $15,000 fine
imposed)

State of Missouri ex  rel. Ashcroft v. Department of the Army Corps of Engineers. 526 F.
Supp. 660, 678 (W.D. Mo. 1980), affd. 672 F.2d 1297,1304,17 ERC 1001 (8th Cir.
1982) (erosion of soil as a result of releases of water is not a discharge regulated by the
CWA)

In re Condor Land Co.. No. CWA-404-95-106 (ALJ Pearlstein Dec. 8,1998) ($32,160
assessed for unpermitted fill of wetlands  when respondent used bulldozers and plows to
clear land; held that land in question was jurisdictional wetlands, "redepositing" of
dredge material constitutes a "discharge," and farm exemption does not apply)

In re Slinger Drainage. Inc.. Docket No. 5-CWA-97-022 (ALJ Kuhlmann Sept. 14,
1998), affirmed. 8 E.A.D.	(EAB 1999) ($90,000 (full amount of proposed penalty)
assessed for unpermitted fill of wetlands  while installing tile drains; held that
redeposition of side cast material generated during drenching to install drains constituted
an "addition of pollutants under the CWA")

Tn re Urband Drainage and Flood Control Dist.. and  Kemp & Hoffman. Inc.. Docket No.
CWA-Vm-94-PII (ALJ Pearlstein June 24, 1998) ($80,000 assessed for unpermitted
stream channel alteration in violation of 404; Region requested $125,000; penalty
reduced penalty for lack of environmental impact; penalty was split: $75,000 against
District and $5,000 against Kemp)

Tn re Rritton Construction Co.. Docket No. CWA-JJI-096 (May 21,1997), affd, 8 E.A.D.
    (EAB 1999) (discharge of fill material into regulated wetlands  without a permit is a
continuing violation that tolls the statute of limitations so long as the illegal fill remains
in place)
                               227

-------
       In re Urban Drainage and Flood Control District and Kemp & Hoffman. Inc.. Docket No.
       CWA-Vffl-94-20-Pn (ALJ Vanderheyden, February 14, 1995) (EPA sued City, which
       owned site, Irrigation District that organized unpermitted fill of wetlands on behalf of
       City, and contractor who actually performed work; dismissed this action against City
       upon EPA's failure to establish a prima facie case; held that liability will attach under
       § 301 if the Respondent is the legal cause of the discharge; causation requirement is
       fulfilled if Respondent had responsibility, control or authority over the discharges; EPA
       failed to establish that the City was the legal cause of the discharge) Cf. later decision by
       ALJ Pearlstein

       In re Belcastro. Docket No. CWA-Vm-94-Ol-PI (Mar. 3, 1995) (discharge of fill
       material in the form of 2200 used tires into Hunter Wash held to violate § 301)

       Annotation, What Constitutes "Discharge of Dredge or Fill Material" Into  Navigable
       Waters, So As to Be Subject to Permit Requirements Under § 404(a) of the FWPCA, 72
       ALR Fed. 703, supp.

K.     Exemptions (§ 404(f))

       33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(l)(A) ("the discharge of dredged or fill material from normal
       farming, silviculture, and ranching activities such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor
       drainage, harvesting for the production of food, fiber, and forest products, or upland soil
       and water conservation  practices ... is not prohibited or otherwise subject to regulation .
       33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(l)(E) ("the discharge of dredged or fill material . . .for the purposes
       of construction or maintenance of farm roads or forest roads, or temporary roads for
       moving mining equipment, were such roads are constructed and maintained, in
       accordance with best management practices, to assure that flow and circulation patterns
       and chemical and biological characteristics of the navigable waters are not impaired, that
       the reach of the navigable waters is not reduced, and that any adverse effect on the
       aquatic environment will be otherwise minimized ... is not prohibited by or otherwise
       subject to regulation . . .")

       33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(8) (defines prior converted wetlands as those areas "that before
       December 23, 1985, were drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or otherwise manipulated . . .
       for the purpose, or to have the effect of, or making production of an agricultural
       commodity possible and an agricultural commodity has been produced as least once
       before December 23, 1985.")

       Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Forest Service. 141 F.3d 803, 46 ERC 1694, 1698 (8th
       Cir. 1998), reh' gen bane denied. 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16225 (1998) (suit challenging
       logging sale by Forest Service dismissed; "[L]ogging and associated road building are
       exempt from dredge and fill permit requirements so long as construction and
       maintenance  comply with best management practices. . . The administrative record
       contains no evidence those practices have not been followed.")

       Gunn v. USDA. 118 F.3d 1233, 45 ERC  1091 (8th Cir. 1997) (held that SCS's

                                      228

-------
determination that plaintiffs farmland was converted wetlands reasonable and therefore
not eligible for farm benefits program)

United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversed lower court holding that
defendant's activities were exempt under 404(f); held that activities that bring an area
into farming are not part of an established operation; any established farming activity
must be on the wetland site itself)

United States v. Akers. 785 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1986), cert, denied. 479 U.S. 828 (1986)
(farming exemption from permit requirement of CWA inapplicable to proposed upland
farming)

United States v. Huebner. 752 F.2d 1235,1240-41 (7th Cir. 1985) (farmer's widening of
roads through wetland violated BMP requirements and he failed to notify the Corp of the
widening and obtain a permit; "It is clear that the amendments that create the subsection
(f) exceptions on which defendants rely were not intended to exempt all farming
operations from the permit requirements, but only those whose effect upon wetlands or
other waters was  so minimal as not to warrant federal review and supervision...
.Congress intended that Section 1344(f) exempt from the permit process only ~ narrowly
defined activities ... that cause little or no adverse effects either individually or
cumulatively [and which do not] convert more extensive areas of water into dry land or
impede circulation or reduce the reach and size of the water body.'")

Avovelles Sportsmen's League. Inc. v. Marsh. 715 F.2d 897, 926 (5th Cir. 1983) (activity
that resulted in substantial alteration of the wetland did not fall within 404(f) exemption
because it brought "an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was not
previously subject,  where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or
the reach of such waters be reduced.")

Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Armv Corps, of Engineers. ?? (E.D. Cal. June 9,1998)
(plowing and discing operation in wetland held to be unpermitted fill; court rejected
argument that activities fell within exemption  for "normal farming activities" because
purpose of discing was to bring wetlands into production, not to maintain existing
farming operation)

United States v. Appel. 42 ERC 1822 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (prior converted wetlands
exemption considered abandoned after five years without tillable crop production and
such abandoned prior converted croplands revert to wetlands; prior converted wetlands
exemption applies to wetlands, but not to rivers, streams and tributaries, which is where
EPA claimed defendant had discharged pollutants; sheep grazing is not considered
tillable agriculture)

Tn re Condor Land Co.. No. CWA-4Q4-95-106 (ALJ Pearlstein  Dec. 8, 1998) ($32,160
assessed for unpermitted fill of wetlands when respondent used bulldozers and plows to
clear land; held that land in question was jurisdictional wetlands, "redepositing" of
dredge material constitutes a "discharge," and farm exemption  does not apply)

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of the Army and the Environmental

                                229

-------
 Protection Agency Concerning the Determination of the Geographic Jurisdiction of the
 Section 404 Program and the Application of the Exemptions Under Section 404(f) of the
 Clean Water Act (Jan. 19, 1989)

 3 Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977 at 474 (Senate Debate, Dec. 15,
 1977) (comments by Sen. Muskie, primary author of legislation) ("New subsection
 404(f) provides that Federal permits will not be required for those narrowly defined
 activities that cause little or no adverse effects either individually or cumulatively.
 While it is understood that some of these activities may necessarily result in incidental
 filling and minor harm to aquatic resources, the exemptions do not apply to discharges
 that convert extensive areas of water into dry land or impede circulation or reduce the
 reach or size of the water body.")

 Injunctive Relief

 Rueth v. EPA.  13 F.3d 227, 24 ELR 20214 (7th Cir. 1993) (jurisdiction over isolated
 waters upheld;  complaint seeking injunction against enforcement of compliance order to
 cease discharges to wetlands dismissed for lack of jurisdiction)

 United States v. Bavshore Associates. Inc.. 934 F.2d 1391 (6th Cir. 1991) (upheld
 restraining order by lower court that prevented defendant from dredging at its boat club
 because the disposal site included wetlands)

 Conant v. United States. 786 F.2d 1008, 24 ERC 1343 (11*  Cir. 1986) (cease and desist
 order to stop unpermitted fill of adjacent wetlands to create  a fish pond upheld; wetlands
 held to be navigable waters)

 United States v. Sexton Cove Estates. 526 F.2d 1657, 8 ERC 1657  (5th Cir. 1976) (when
 ordering restoration of a wetlands under Rivers and Harbors Act, court must consider
 degree and kind of environmental disturbance caused by dredging as well as practicality
 of proposed restoration plan that will confer maximum environmental benefits)

 United States v. Van Leuzen.  816 F. Supp. 1171, 36 ERC 1993, 2000 (S.D. Tex. 1993)
 ("The duty to restore an intentionally filled wetlands is mandatory, absent equities.")

 United States v. Cumberland Farms of Connecticut. 647 F. Supp. 1166, 25 ERC 1077,
 1089, (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd. 826 F.2d 1151, 26 ERC 1393 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Any such
 restorative mandatory injunction must meet three criteria. First, it must confer maximum
 environmental benefits; second, it must be achievable as a practical matter; third, it must
 bear an equitable relationship to the degree and kind of wrong which it is intended to
 remedy.")

 United States v. Robinson. 570 F. Supp. 1157,1164-65, 20 ERC 1181 (M.D. Fla. 1983)
 (defendant ordered to restore wetland where unpermitted fill occurred to create space for
patio; "When it appeared, however, that he might not be granted a permit, he resorted  to
what has been termed 'self help for the impatient.'" 20 ERC at 1188)

United States v. Bradshaw. 541 F. Supp. 880,18 ERC  1611  (D. Md. 1981) (defendant

                               230

-------
       ordered to restore wetlands by submitting proposed restoration plan which plaintiff can
       oppose or offer alternatives to)

       United States v. Weisman. 489 F. Supp. 1331,1343, 17 ERG 1580 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (a
       wetlands restoration plan must: (1) confer maximum environmental benefits, (2) be
       achievable as a practical matter, and (3) bear an equitable relationship to the degree and
       kind of wrong which it is intended to remedy.)

       See also INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

M.    Isolated Wetlands

       Leslie Salt Co. v. United States. 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995) cert, denied sub nom.
       Cargill. Inc. v.  United States. 516 U.S. 955 (1995) (held that man-made salt pits that
       were frequented by migratory birds  were jurisdictional waters of the U.S.; strong dissent
       by Justice Thomas in denial of cert, by S. Ct.)

       Hoffman Homes. Inc. v. EPA. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993) (EPA regulations on isolated
       wetlands upheld; migratory bird test O.K., although held that there was not substantial
       evidence on the record to support a conclusion that the wetland in question was likely to
       be used by migratory birds; the court agreed with the CJO that the "regulation covers
       waters whose connection to interstate commerce may be potential rather than actual,
       minimal rather than substantial... It is reasonable to interpret the regulation as allowing
       migratory birds to be the connection between a wetland and interstate commerce.")

       Hoffman Homes Inc. v. EPA. 961 F.2d  1310 (7th Cir. 1992), vacated. 999 F.2d 256 (7th
       Cir. 1993) (en bane) (EPA lacks authority to regulate intrastate wetlands that are not
       adjacent to waters of the United States. EPA claimed jurisdiction because migratory
       birds used the wetland.  But the court held: "Since creation (of the states), migratory
       birds have flown interstate.  But this annual traverse by itself does not affect commerce.
       The birds obviously do not engage in commerce. Until they are watched, photographed,
       shot at (or, we  suppose, have potential to) engage in interstate commerce, migratory birds
       do not ignite the Commerce Clause.")

       Leslie Salt Co. v. United States. 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990), cert denied. 498 U.S.
       1126 (1991) (district court ruling that Corps, lacked jurisdiction over isolated wetlands
       remanded for determination whether presence of migratory birds  created a sufficient
       connection to interstate commerce to sustain Corps, jurisdiction)

       United States v. Krilich. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4191 (N.D. II. 1999) (in challenge to
       jurisdiction of court to enforce consent decree, held that isolated wetlands are subject to
       regulation under CWA)

       United States v- Hallmark Construction Co.. 14 F. Supp.2d 1065 (N.D. HI. 1998) (upheld
       migratory bird rule, rejecting argument that it exceeded bounds of Commerce Clause)

       Solid Waste Apencv of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Armv Corps of Engineers. 998 F.
       Supp. 946 (N.D. Dl  1998) (upheld CWA 404 jurisdiction over a complex of isolated,

                                       231

-------
       intrastate waters in a former gravel mining pit; isolated wetlands provide habitat to
       migratory birds whose existence supports interstate commerce)

       National Wildlife Fed'n v. Laubscher (Pond 12). 662 F. Supp. 548, 549 (S.D. Tex. 1987)
       ("[A] wetland visited by migratory birds is a wetland within the jurisdiction of the [EPA
       and the Corps].")

       Priolo, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: The Case for Expansion of Federal
       Jurisdiction Over Isolated Wetlands, 30 Land & Water L. Rev. 91 (1995)

       See also COMMERCE CLAUSE

N.     Nationwide Permits

       33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (general wetlands permits)

       33 U.S.C. § 1344(t) ("Nothing in [§ 404] shall preclude or deny the right of any State ...
       to control the discharge of dredged or fill material in any portion of the navigable waters
       within the jurisdiction of such State...")

       33 C.F.R. § 330.5 (nationwide permits)

       New Hanover Township v. Corps of Engineers. 992 F.2d 470, 37 ERC 1189 (3d Cir.
       1993) (challenge to a nationwide permit determination by the Corps of Engineers is not
       ripe for judicial review until the applicant receives a § 401 water quality certification
       from the state)

       United States v. Marathon Development Corp.. 867 F.2d 96, 99-100, 29 ERC 1145, 1147
       (1st Cir. 1989) (affirming a criminal conviction on the ground that a nationwide permit
       did not authorize the discharge because Mass. Had denied water quality certification;
       states may deny certification of a nationwide wetlands permit in order to enforce their
       more stringent water quality standards)

       United States v. Cumberland Farms. 826 F.2d 1151,1157 (1st Cir. 1987) (possession of a
       Nationwide permit is an affirmative defense)

       United States v. Wichard. 718 F.2d 1094 (4th Cir. 1983) (held discharges ineligible for
       authorization under the "headwaters" nationwide permit)

       Natural Resources Defense Council v. Walker. No. 98-CV-0560 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 11,
       1998) (challenge to nationwide permits  on grounds that the permitting program violates
       the ESA as well as other statutes)

       United States v. Kev West Towers. 696 F. Supp. 1467,  1468-69 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
       (possession of a Nationwide permit is an affirmative defense)

       United States v. Lambert. 589 F. Supp. 366 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (held discharges ineligible
       for authorization under the "headwaters" nationwide permit)

                                     232

-------
       61 Fed. Reg. 65874 (1996) (Corps of Engineers Final Notice of Issuance, Reissuance,
       and Modification of Nationwide Permits)

       Note, Environmental Law - Nationwide Permits for Categories of Waters Issued by the
       Corps of Engineers Under FWPCA Section 404: A Legitimate Interpretation Ratified by
       Congress?, 61 N.C.L. Rev. 904 (1983)
O.     Penalties
       United States v. Krilich. 126 F.3d 1035, 45 ERC 1385 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding $1.3
       million in stipulated penalties for failure to complete wetlands mitigation project in time
       frame specified in consent decree; decree assessed $185,000 penalty for original
       unpermitted fill violation, and provided for $2,500/day stipulated penalty for failure to
       meet deadlines set out in the decree)

       3M v. Browner. 17 F.3d 1453, 38 ERC 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (5-year statute of
       limitations applies to EPA administrative penalty actions)

       Sasser v. Administrator. 990 F.2d 127, 129 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Each day the pollutant
       remains in the wetlands without a permit constitutes an additional day of violation.")

       Informed Citizens United. Inc. v. USX Corp.. 36 F. Supp.2d 375, 29 ELR 2466 (S.D.
       Tex.  1999) (past fill of wetlands held to be continuing violation of CWA on grounds that
       fill had not yet been removed; case dismissed on other grounds (defendant held a valid
       COE permit for the fill))

       United States v. Reeves. 923 F. Supp. 1530, 1534, 42 ERC 1283 (M.D. Fla.  1996) (each
       day fill remains in a wetland is a continuing violation,  therefore statute of limitations did
       not begin to run when wetlands were filled in 1981)

       United States v. Smith. Civil No. 3:94-2693-19 (D.S.C. 1996), affd. 46 ERC 2114 (4th
       Cir. 1998)  (finding defendant's violations to be "intentional, flagrant, egregious and
       openly defiant," court fined defendant $35,000 ordered him to remove fill from 2.2 acres
       of wetlands; appeal of removal requirement rejected on grounds that district court had
       properly weighed the environmental benefits and costs when ordering removal of the fill
       material)

       United States v. Telluride Co.. 884 F. Supp. 404, 41 ERC 1273 (D. Colo. 1995), reyM,
       146 F.3d 1241, 46 ERC 1897 (10th Cir. 1998) (held that discharge of fill in violation of
       301 is not a continuing violation and the 5-year statute of limitations begins  to run from
       the date of discharge)
       P™™ v. New York. 902 F. Supp. 374, 26 ELR 20415 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (no continuing
       violation found where defendant discharged to wetland in distant past, but had not
       continued to do so for years)

       United States v- Van Leuzen. 816 F. Supp. 1 171, 36 ERC 1992 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (§ 309
       requires that a court impose some fine on each defendant and that the duty to restore
                                      233

-------
 intentionally filled wetlands is mandatory, absent equities; court ordered defendant to
 restore the entire wetland, including the area under the house, within 8 years, or a trustee
 would be appointed to remove the house and restore the wetland; based on ability to pay,
 $900 penalty assessed)

 Bettis v. Town of Ontario. 800 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (no continuing violation
 found where defendant had filled wetland in past, but had ceased fill activities, but had
 not removed material)

 North Carolina Wildlife Assoc. v. Woodburv. 29 ERC [BNA] 1941 (E.D.N.C. 1989)
 (court determined that violation was "continuing" and "not wholly past" thus allowing a
 citizen suit)

 United States v. Ciamoitti. 669 F. Supp. 684 (D.NJ. 1987) (a day of violation constitutes
 not only a day that the violator actually placed the fill into the wetland, but also every
 day he allowed the illegal fill material to remain therein)

 United States v. Cumberland Farms of Connecticut. 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1183, 25 ERC
 1077 (D. Mass. 1986), affd. 826 F.2d 1151, 26 ERC 1393 (1st Cir. 1987) (a penalty for
 the violation of § 404 is assessed for each day the illegal fill material remains in the
 wetland)

 United States v. Tull. 615 F. Supp. 610, 626, 20 ERC 2198 (D.C. Va.  1983), affd. 764
 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1983) (a day of violation  constitutes not only a day that the violator
 actually placed the fill into the wetland, but  also every day he allowed the illegal fill
 material to remain therein)

 In re Dr. Marshall C. Sasser. 3 E.A.D. 703 (CJO 1991), affd. Sasser v. EPA. 990 F.2d
 127 (4th Cir. 1993) ($125,000 for illegal fill of wetlands)

 In re Condor Land Co.. No. CWA-404-95-106 (ALJ Pearlstein Dec. 8,1998) ($32,160
 assessed for unpermitted fill of wetlands when respondent used bulldozers and plows to
 clear land; held that land in question was jurisdictional wetlands, "redepositing" of
 dredge material constitutes a "discharge," and farm exemption does not apply)

 In re Slineer Drainage. Inc.. Docket No. 5-CWA-97-022 (ALJ Kuhlmann Sept. 14,
 1998), affirmed. 8 E.A.D.	(EAB 1999) ($90,000 (full amount of proposed penalty)
 assessed for unpermitted fill of wetlands while installing tile drains)

 In re Urband Drainage and Flood Control Dist.. and Kemp & Hoffman. Inc.. Docket No.
 CWA-Vm-94-Pn (ALJ Pearlstein June 24,1998)  ($80,000 assessed for unpermitted
 stream channel  alteration in violation of 404; Region requested $125,000; penalty
 reduced penalty for lack of environmental impact; penalty was split: $75,000 against
District and $5,000 against Kemp)

In re Paul L. Smith. 1998 EPA RJO LEXIS 9 (RJO Hankinson 1998) ($12,000 assessed
for unpermitted clearing of 0.43 acres of wetlands for new road)
                               234

-------
       In re Britton Construction. Docket No. CWA-IH-096 (ALJ Pearlstein May 21,1997),
       affd, 8 E.A.D.	(EAB 1999) ($2000 award ($125,000 proposed) for illegal dredge
       and fill of wetland; ALJ Pearlstein found that the statutory factors of CWA § 309(g)(3)
       warranted a "drastic reduction" from the $125,000 civil penalty proposed by the Region
       to $2000. Among the factors discussed were Respondents' reasonably prompt
       completion of the successful mitigation plan and the small, nonpristine ("trash-strewn")
       wetland at issue; buttressed by the lack of economic benefit and ability to pay the
       proposed penalty and "other matters.")

       In re Donna Heptner East Penn Trucking Co.. 1996 EPA RJO LEXIS 4 (RJO McCabe
       1996) ($19,000 assessed against four respondents for filling total of less than one acre of
       wetlands at 3 sites)

P.     Public Hearings

       Water Works and Sewer Board City of Birmingham v.  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
       983 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Al. 1997) (held that § 404 does not require public hearing prior
       to making decision on permit application)

       Sierra Club v.Alexander. 484 F. Supp. 455,471,14 ERC 1465 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), affd
       without opinion. 633 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1980) ("A federal agency is not required to
       conduct public hearings before making a threshold determination as to the need for an
       EOS  so long as members of the public are given the opportunity to submit facts which
       might bear upon the agency decision.")

Q.     Statute of Limitations

       United States v. Telluride Co.. 146 F.3d 1241,46 ERC 1897 (10th Cir. 1998) (injunctive
       relief claim for restoration of wetlands not barred by statute of limitations because
       § 2462 applies only to penalties)

       United States v. Banks. 115 F.3d 916 (llth Cir. 1997) (held that 28 USC  § 2462 does not
       bar Corps suit seeking injunctive relief against a landowner who filled wetlands without
       a permit; § 2462 does not apply to equitable remedies,  and the concurrent remedy rule
       does  not apply against the government when it is acting to vindicate a sovereign or
       public interest)

       United States v Fisher Sand & Gravel. No. 2-98-CV-00276 (D. Wyo. May 17, 1999)
       (held that 5-year SOL in wetlands cases is tolled until any continuing violation is
       remedied.")

       United States v. Reeves. 923 F. Supp. 1530,1534,42 ERC 1283 (D.Fla. 1996) (404
       enforcement action not barred by SOL because violation is continuing one for as long as
       fill remains, so 5-year SOL had not begun to run)

       United States v. Telluride Co.. 884 F. Supp. 404,41 ERC 1273 (D. Colo. 1995), rev^m
       part.  146 F.3d 1241, 46 ERC 1897 (10th Cir. 1998) (404 penalty  case barred by 5-year
       statute of limitations; held that discharge of fill in violation of 301 is not a continuing

                                      235

-------
       violation and the 5-year statute of limitations begins to run from the date of discharge;
       concurrent remedy rule also bars injunctive relief)

       United States v. Windward Properties. Inc. 821 F. Supp. 690,695-96 (N.D. Ga. 1993)
       (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment because a genuine question of fact
       existed as to whether plaintiff "knew or reasonably should have known" that defendant
       was violating the CWA more than five years prior to bring the action)

       In re Britton Construction Co.. Docket No. CWA-m-096 (May 21,1997), affd. 8 E.A.D.
       	(EAB 1999) (discharge of fill material into regulated wetlands without a permit is a
       continuing violation that tolls the statute of limitations so long as the illegal fill remains
       in place)

       See also STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; WETLANDS: Penalties

R.     Takings

       U.S. Const, amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property
       without due process of law; nor shall property be taken for public use, without just
       compensation.")

       Good v. United States. 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20826 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (held no  taking
       where wetland permit was denied at recommendation of Fish & Wildlife because of
       threat to endangered species; court held that claimant lacked reasonable investment-
       backed expectations both at the time of purchase and at the time he actually initiated
       development activities)

       Florida Rock Industries. Inc. v. United States. 1999 U.S. Claims LEXIS 215 (Fed. Cl.
       1999) (held that 1980 wetlands permit denial led partial regulatory taking compensable
       under the 5th Amend.; court awarded $752,444 plus interest as result of claimant not
       being able to mine limestone on property purchased before wetlands laws were  passed)

       Robbins v. United States. 46 ERC 1505 (Cl. Ct. 1998) (takings claim denied where
       Corps found wetlands to be present because (1) cancellation of sales contract for site by
       prospective buyer did not constitute government taking, (2) assertion of regulatory
       authority over site did not constitute taking, (3) diminution of value of property did not
       amount to deprivation of all economically beneficial or productive use of site, (4) owners
       did not show their investment-backed expectations for developing site were reasonable,
       and (5) takings claims based on denial of 404 permit is not ripe for review where owners
       did not apply for permit)

       Norman v. United States. 38 Fed. Cl. 417 (Cl. Ct. 1997) (summary judgment granted in
       favor of government for taking where Corps delineated wetland prior to sale of proper
       then redelineated after sale to find more wetlands on property; held that owner must be
       able to show a legally-cognizable property interest at the time of the alleged taking)

       Good v. United States. 39 Fed. Cl. 81,45 ERC 1518 (Cl. Ct. 1997) (held no taking of
      real property where property retained economic value after denial of § 404 permit and

                                     236

-------
plaintiff was aware of restrictive regulations prior to purchase and during investment in
property)

Heck and Assoc. v. United States. 37 Fed. Cl. 245, 44 ERC 1642 (Cl. Ct. 1997), affd.
134 F.3d 1468, 46 ERC 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (after plaintiff applied for a 404 permit',
Corps requested additional information re alternative analysis - plaintiff challenged
agency's need for additional information and did not provide it; Corps subsequently
canceled the permit application as incomplete; held that takings claim not ripe for
adjudication because no substantive determination by  federal government had been made
regarding plaintiffs 404 permit application)

Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States. 46 ERC 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Corps
prohibition on development of 12 of 51 lots within development does not constitute a
categorical taking requiring compensation under the 5th Amendment; remanded for
determination of whether a partial regulatory taking has occurred; court held that it
would rarely consider each lot of a residential subdivision a separate parcel because
doing so would cause the Corps' protection of wetlands to "constitute a taking in every
case where it exercises its statutory authority.")

Bayou des Families Development Corp. v. United States. 1996 U.S. Claims LEXIS 226
(Cl. Ct. 1996), affd. 130 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (takings claim held time barred
where private project was denied 404 permit in  1979 to build levee and local government
finally received permit, but for levee that would not protect the private development)

Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States. 42 ERC 1831  (Cl. Ct.  1996) (court
determined that plaintiffs loss in value due to Corps, cease and desist order was 28-44%,
and held that this was insufficient to constitute a taking; also held that taking claim is
limited to property owned at time of takings claim (owner bought a parcel for $592K,
sold part of it for $900K before claim made)

Citv National Bank of Miami v. United States. 33 Fed. Cl. 759 (1995) (takings claim
denied where local zoning laws would have prohibited the development even if the
Corps had granted the 404 permit; the mere "fact that the federal government shares a
common goal with states and localities ... [is not sufficient to] openthe Federal
Government to liability for hte effects of state actions)

Plantation Landing Resort v. United States. 30 Fed. Cl. 63, affd 39 F.3d 1 197, cert
denied 514 U.S. 1095, 115 S. Ct. 1822 (1995) (held that denial of dredge and fill permit
not a taking)
         United States. 34 Fed. Cl. 387 (1995) (no takings claim for order to stop filling
lands below high water mark because such property is within the navigational servitude
of the U.S. and are subject to the exclusive control of the federal government; also held
that government's actions did not leave the plaintiffs land devoid of economic value, a
prerequisite for a takings claim)
       Rndc fairies. Inc. v. United States. 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), rehtf
denied and suggestion OT bancdeclined, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS  16257 (June 21, 1994)
                               237

-------
 ("the amount of just compensation should be proportional to the value of the interest
 taken as compared to the total value of the property, up to and including total
 deprivation, wether the taking is by physical occupation for the public to use as a park, or
 by regulatory imposition to preserve the property as a wetland so that it may be used by
 the public for ground water recharge and other ecological purposes." To determine this
 the court stated:  "[A]re there direct compensating benefits accruing to the property, and
 others similarly situated, flowing from the regulatory environment? Or are benefits, if
 any, general and widely shared through the community and the society, while the costs
 are focused on few? Are alternative permitted activities economically realistic in light of
 the setting and circumstances, and are they realistically available?  In short has the
 government acted in a responsible way, limiting the constraints on property ownership to
 those necessary to achieve the public purpose and not allocating to some number of
 individuals, less than all, a burden that should be borne by all?")

 Creppel v. United States. 41 F.3d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (takings claim against EPA and
 Corps held barred by statute of limitations (28 U.S.C. § 2401; claim arose from flood
 control project begun in the  1960's, that was significantly altered upon EPA's demand to
 retain wetlands in question rather than drain them)

 Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. United States. 27 F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994), affd. 28 F.3d
 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (in 404 permit denial case, held that value of other land developed
 or sold before current regulatory environment existed should not be considered in
 determining regulatory taking of land at issue)

 Tabb Lakes. Ltd, v. United States.  10 F.3d 769 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (held that issuance of
 cease and desist order requiring that plaintiff obtain a wetlands permit does not
 constitute temporary taking)

 Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. United States. 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 31 ERG 1847 (1990) (denial of
 fill permit held to constitute a taking where wetland was purchased in 1956 and denial
 resulted in near complete loss of economic value of land)

 Florida Rock Industries. Inc. v. United States. 791 F.2d 893, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
 denied. 479 U.S.  1053 (1987) (denial by Corp of permit to fill wetland held to be a
 taking where property was purchased in 1972, prior to promulgation of wetlands
 regulations, and fair market value of property fell substantially as a consequence of the
 wetlands classification)

 Avovelles Sportman's League. Inc. v. Marsh. 715 F.2d 897, 923, 19 ERG 1841 (5th Cir.
 1983) (resolution of takings claim delayed because "there had not yet been a
 determination whether landowners can put their property to uses they desire")

 Jenteen v. United States. 657 F.2d  1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (court rejected takings claim
 based on denial of permits to fill Florida mangroves because the upper range of the
 estimated value of the property's uplands  (20 acres) and those wetlands that the Corps
offered to permit (20 of the 80 acres applied for) was equal to the amount Jentgen
originally paid for the property.")
                                238

-------
       Allain-Lebreton Co. v. Deot. of Armv. 670 F.2d 43, 17 ERC 1169 (5* Or. 1982) (since
       Corps' rejection of plaintiffs land as a site for flood control levee because land enclosed
       a tract of wetlands was not a taking, and in fact was a refusal to take, there was no case
       or controversy and complaint was properly dismissed)

       United States v. Bvrd. 609 F.2d 1204,13 ERC 1954 (7th Cir. 1979) (takings claim
       dismissed as premature because claimant had not yet applied for Corps permit; argument
       rejected that requirement to obtain a permit was tantamount to a taking of property)

       Executive Order No. 12630, "Government Actions and Interference With
       Constitutionally Protected Property Rights" (1989), codified at 3 C.F.R. § 554

       Comment, A Developer's Dream: The United States Claims Court's New Analysis of
       Section 404 Takings Challenges, 18 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 319 (1991)

       Note, The Taking of Wetlands under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 17 Envtl L. 111
       (1988)

       See also TAKINGS

S.     "Tulloch" Rule

       National Mining Assoc. v. Armv Corps of Engineers. 145 F.3d 1399,46 ERC 1769 (D.C.
       Cir. 1998) (Tulloch rule invalidated on grounds that "statutory term 'addition' cannot
       reasonably be said to encompass the situation in which material is removed rom the
       waters of the United States and a small portion of it happens to fall back. Because
       incidental fallback represents a net withdrawal, not an addition, of material, it cannot be
       a discharge.")

       National Mining Assoc. v. Armv Corps of Engineers. No. 97-5099 (D.C.Cir. 1997)
       (granted a motion by EPA and  the Army Corps of Engineers to stay a lower court
       decision invalidating the wetlands "Tulloch" rule; rule, promulgated in 1993, expanded
       the activities regulated under § 404 of the Clean Water Act to include any discharges
       caused by land clearing and excavation that destroy or degrade waters of the U.S.; lower
       court had held that the regulation exceeded the agencies' authority under the Clean
       Water Act, invalidated the rule and issued an injunction forbidding the agencies from
       applying or enforcing the regulation)

       United States v. Bav-Houston Towing Co.. 33 F. Supp.2d 596, 29 ELR 21011 (E.D.
       Mich. 1999) (Tulloch rule held inapplicable where co. was dredge peat bog, moving peat
       to other part of bog and redepositing it in large quantities for drying; case involved much
       more than incidental fall back, and side-casting has always been regulated under 404)

              grates v. Feinstein. No.  96-232-CIV-FTM-24 (D) (??, Fla.? June 12, 1998)
                American Mining Conf.. held that incidental fallback constitute a redeposit or
       addition of pollutants to  waters of the U.S.; gave due deference to Corps interpretation of
       CWA)
                                      239

-------
        National Mining Association v. Army Corps of Engineers. 962 F. Supp. 2,44 ERC 1417
        (D.D.C. 1997) (motion to amend order declaring Tulloch rule invalid denied on grounds
        that rule is invalid toward everyone not just the plaintiffs as the government argued)

        National Mining Association v. Army Corps of Engineers. 951 F. Supp. 267,43 ERC
        2057 (D.D.C. 1997) (Corps exceeded its statutory authority  when it promulgated Tulloch
        rule: (1) § 404 authorizes Corp. to issue permits for addition of pollutants into navigable
        waters at  specified disposal sites, (2) incidental fallback does not constitute addition of
        pollutants, and (3) excavation sites are not specified disposal sites)

        North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Tulloch. Civ. No. C90-713-CIV-5-BO (E.D.N.C.
        1992) (challenge to 404 permit that allowed incidental discharges; case settled, resulting
        in tightening of rule)

        In re Slinger Drainage. Inc..8 E.A.D.	(EAB 1999) (rejecting NMA case as
        inapplicable, held that fall-back from drain tile laying machine to be "addition of
        pollutants" subject to regulation under CWA, and not "incidental fallback";
        distinguished NMA on grounds that discharge in NMA was  merely incidental to removal
        of materials from wetlands, whereas in Slinger. the discharge was part of the operation to
        remove wetlands material,  insert a drain pipe, then redeposit all of the excavated
        material)

        64 Fed. Reg. 25119 (1999) (term "incidental fallback" removed from regulatory
        definition of dredge material by both Corps and EPA; "Deciding when a particular
        redeposit is subject to CWA jurisdiction will require a case-by-case evaluation.")

        51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,232 (1986) (exempted from regulation "de minimis, incidental
        soil movement occurring during normal dredging operations.")

T.      EPA Veto of Corp.-Issued Permits (404(c))

        33 U.S.C. 1344(c) (Denial or restriction of use of defined areas as disposal areas)

       40 C.F.R.  Part 231 (Section 404(c) Procedures )

       Friends of the Crystal River v. EPA. 35 F.3d 1073, 39 ERC  1833 (6th Cir.  1994)
       (withdrawal of objection by EPA to 404 permit held invalid  because it came after 90
       period, which irrevocably passed jurisdiction over decision to Corps)

       James Citv County v. EPA. 12 F.3d 1330,1331, 37 ERC 2104 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
       denied. 513 U.S. 823, 115 S. Ct. 87 (1994) (EPA decision to veto Ware Creek Reservoir
       Project under § 404(c) upheld; court relied heavily on due deference standard to
       determine  that "adverse environmental  impacts alone" would justify EPA's veto)

       Hoffman Homes Inc. v. EPA. 961 F.2d 1310,1312 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992), vacated. 999 F.2d
       256 (7th Cir. en bane 1993) ("The EPA ...  has a veto power over the issuance of permits
       when it determines, after consulting with the Corps, that the dredging or fill materials
           have  an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds ...

                                      240

-------
       wildlife, or recreational areas."')

       Holv Cross Wilderness Fund v. Madipan. 960 F.2d 1515, 1525, 23 ERL 20067 (10th Cir.
       1992) ("The EPA may veto the issuance of a permit which will have an "unacceptable
       adverse effect" on, inter alia, a wetland ecosystem.")

       National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson.  859 F.2d 313, 28 ERC 1560(4th Cir. 1988)
       (404(c) "authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to block or override a Corps' permit
       decision.")

       Alameda Water & Sanitation Orders Dist. v. EPA. Civil No. 93-1032 (D. Colo. 1996)
       (challenge to EPA veto of "Two Forks Dam" permit upheld by finding that plaintiffs had
       no standing because permit applicant had no intention of building dam even if EPA veto
       overturned; also upheld EPA's determination that river involved is a unique and
       irreplaceable resource and that other alternatives to the dam would be far less damaging
       to the environment)

       Friends of the Crystal River v. EPA. No. 1:92:CV:325 (W.D. Mich June 23, 1992)
       (conditional withdrawal of EPA objection to Michigan's issuance of a state wetlands
       permit is an unlawful attempt to revoke the Corps' statutory authority pursuant to
       § 4040))

       Reid v. Marsh. 20 ERC 1337,1345 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 1984) ("The statutory language
       [of section 404(c)] indicates that the EPA's authority in this regard is discretionary.")

       Newport Galleria Group v. Deland. 618 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (D.D.C. 1985) ("In short
       then, Congress gave the EPA wide discretion to determine when to initiate proceedings
       under section 404(c).")

       44 Fed. Reg. 58,078 (1979) ("[S]ection 404(c) does not require a balancing of
       environmental benefits against non-environmental costs such as the benefits of the
       foregone project. This view is based on the language of 404(c) which refers only to
       environmental factors. The term "unacceptable" in EPA's view refers to the significance
       of the adverse effect - e.g. is it a large impact and is it one that the aquatic and wetland
       ecosystem cannot afford.")

       S.Conf. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1972) (conference committee report
       explaining that § 404 grants EPA the power to veto project that will adversely affect the
       listed resources)

       Note, Bersani v. EPA: The EPA's Authority Under the Clean Water Act to Veto Section
       404 Wetland-Filling Permits,  19 Envtl. L. 389 (1988)

U.     Wetlands Determinations

       National Wildlife F^p-ration v. Hanson.  859 F.2d 313, 316 (4th Cir. 1988) (Corps and
       EPA have non-discretionary duty to make "reasoned wetlands determination" and
       citizens may sue the agencies to enforce)

                                       241

-------
              Cascade Conservation League v. Segale. No. C95-781Z (W.D.Wa. Apr. 2, 1996) (motion
              to dismiss granted: disagreeing with Tidwell. Court held that EPA has a nondiscretionary
              duty to review Corps.' wetlands determination; also held that EPA's failure to reverse the
              Corps.1 determination not re viewable under the APA because "agency inaction is
              presumed to be unreviewable under the APA.")

              Environmental Defense Fund v. Tidwell. 837 F. Supp. 1344 (E.D.N.C.  1992) (EPA has
              non-discretionary duty to regulate dredged or fill material under § 1344)

              National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson. 623 F. Supp. 1539 (E.D.N.C. 1985), affd. 859
              F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988) (Corps determination that property was not a wetlands is
              arbitrary and capricious)
WHOLE EFFLUENT TOXICITY (WET)

       33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B) (if numeric limits are not available for toxic pollutants, state shall
       adopt criteria based on biological monitoring or assessment methods)

       40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(l)(iv) ("When the permitting authority determines, using the procedures in
       paragraph (d)(l)(ii) of this section, that a discharge causes, has potential to cause, or contributes
       to an in-stream excursion above the numeric criterion for whole effluent toxicity, the permit must
       contain effluent limits for whole effluent toxicity.")

       40 C.F.R. § 122.44(i)(l)(iv) and 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(j)(4) (use "test procedure specified in the
       permit for pollutants with no approved methods [as is the case with WET testing].")

       Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. EPA. 859 F.2d 156, 28 ERC 1401 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
       (EPA has authority to express permit limitations in terms of toxicity as long as the limits reflect
       the appropriate requirements of the CWA, as provided in 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(4))

       In re Arizona Municipal Storm Water NPDES Permits. 7 E.A.D. 646 (EAB 1998) (petition for
       evidentiary hearing rejected on multiple grounds; no WET testing required in storm water permit
       where state's approved toxicity implementation guidelines called for no toxicity testing in the
       relevant cycle of MS4 storm water permits while toxicity testing program appropriate for arid
       environments was being developed)

       In re Florida Pulp and Paper Association & Buckeye Florida. L.P.. 6 E.A.D. 49, 65 (EAB 1995)
       ("[Tjhe issue of whether a permit's designated test species are suitable surrogates for indigenous
       species is a genuine issue of material fact which, if adequately raised, requires an evidentiary
       hearing.")

       In re Citv of Hollywood. Florida. 5 E.A.D. 157 (EAB 1994) (upheld permit provision based on
       state water quality standard, rejecting argument that the results of the WET were statistically
       invalid)

      In re Broward County. Florida. 4 E.A.D. 705 (EAB 1993) (remanded to Region for factual
      determination of "whether the test species specified in the permit are significant to the

                                             242

-------
indigenous aquatic community and, if not, whether they will accurately predict how indigenous
species would fare when exposed to Broward's effluent.")

In re American Cvanamid Co.. 4 E.A.D. 790 (EAB 1993) (challenge to permit provision that
prohibited any single toxicity test failure rejected; permittee had argued that EPA erred by
including this provision when it knew that WET tests do not always yield accurate results; Board
upheld Region's decision because it was based on 401 certification)

In re Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Authority Department. 4 E.A.D.  133 (EAB 1992) ("The
range of variability of toxicity testing was obviously acceptable to the State of Florida, and that is
what is determinative. Under CWA § 301(b)(l)(C), the Region is required to incorporate
limitations into the permit as necessary to implement the State standard, without reviewing the
scientific basis for the standard.")

In re City of Jacksonville. District n Wastewater Treatment Plant. 4 E.A.D. 150 (CJO 1992)
(denial or request for evidentiary hearing on biomonitoring requirements in permit on grounds
that no genuine issue of material fact raised in appeal)

In re Metropolitan Dade Co.. Miami-Dade Water and Sewer Auth.. 1996 EPA ALJ LEXIS 80
(ALJ Pearlstein 1996) (EPA motion for summary determination on challenge to WET testing
requirements in permit denied on grounds that genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the permittee's effluent reasonable could be considered toxic enough to require WET
monitoring in the permit)

60 Fed. Reg. 53529 (1996) (final rule setting uniform WET test procedures)

54 Fed. Reg. 23,868, 23,875 (1989) ("Some commentors said EPA should use whole effluent
toxicity testing only as a trigger for further investigation into the cause of the toxicity, and should
not use whole effluent toxicity as an enforceable effluent limit. EPA cannot incorporate these
suggestions.  EPA requires whdle effluent toxicity limits where necessary to meet water quality
standards.  EPA does not believe that a whole effluent toxicity trigger alone is fully effective
because it does not, by itself, restrict the quantity, rate or concentration of pollutants in an
effluent. Whole effluent toxicity limitations are enforceable in the same way as any other
effluent limitation in an  NPDES permit. Section 309 of the CWA provides that any single
violation of an effluent limitation can be subject to an enforcement action, and section 309
applies to whole effluent toxicity limits in the same way as any other effluent limitation.")

EPA, "National Policy Regarding Whole Effluent Toxicity Enforcement" (August 14,1995)
                                       243

-------