United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Region 4
345 Courtland Street. NE
Atlanta GA 30308
November 1980
904/9-80-060
L&N Train Derailment
Crestview, Florida
' ;J
Y
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PREFACE
This report reflects the activities of the Environmental Emer-
gency Branch (EEB) Region IV, EPA, as it was concerned with the
captioned event. The report outlines the key actions of the Federal
On-Scene Coordinator, the Regional Response Team (RRT), and state,
local, and Federal members of the RRT. It reflects the complexity of
responding to environmental emergencies and the need to coordinate and
plan in advance for a major incident such as this event.
This report is intended to satisfy the requirements of the
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan and
to help others learn from our experiences.
Al J/Smith, Chief
Environmental Emergency Branch
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Page
1. SUMMARX 1-1
2. THE SITUATION 2-1
3. PHOTOGRAPHS 3-1
4. SUPPORTING INFORMATION 4-1
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1. SUMMARY
An L & N Railroad train derailment involving 22 cars occurred on
April 8, 1979, at 8:00 a.m. near Crestview, Florida.
The area was evacuated and the responding agencies included:
Okaloosa County Civil Defense
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (DER)
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Army
U.S. Coast Guard
Department of Interior Fish and Wildlife Service
Allen Bartlett of EPA Region IV in Atlanta was designated On-
Scene Coordinator (OSC) and arrived in Crestview at 5:30 p.m.
The U.S. Air Force Bioenvironmental Engineering Services provided
initial air monitoring and DER had taken samples from the Yellow River.
The derailment had been isolated by the time the OSC arrived.
There were no cars in the river. A fire on the railroad trestle was
threatening the structure of the bridge.
On April 9, 1979, an acetone car was found to still be burning.
The chlorine car and several anhydrous ammonia cars were venting. A
white vapor cloud, believed to be a reaction between the ammonia and
chlorine, was forming over the area. EPA Air Monitoring was testing
for ammonia and chlorine; the only positive reading was within sight of
the derailment and registered 30 ppm ammonia.
1-1
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Carbolic acid was considered the major aquatic environmental
hazard, It had been involved in the original fire and had leaked into
the Yellow River.
The Regional Response Team (RRT) was activated.
It was decided that a solidification procedure would be used on
the carbolic acid. Liquid pollution potential existed from the carbon
tetrachloride, methanol, and acetone cars, but the major concern was
the air.
In addition to the solidification procedure on the carbolic acid,
resolution of the incident included neutralized of the chlorine,
construction of dikes to contain runoff, and transfer of the contents
of several cars so that the empty cars could be moved.
Communication problems between local agencies and federal and
state agencies led to confusion over who was in charge and problems
with evacuation security.
By April 13, 1979, all air tests for chlorine and ammonia were
negative. Water samples continued to show background levels. Sediment
samples were also taken. The evacuation was lifted at 4:00 p.m. on
that date.
1-2
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2. THE SITUATION
At 8:00 a.m. on April 8, 1979, an L & N Railroad train derailed
east of the Yellow River and west of Crestview, Florida. The follow-
ing is a list of the number of cars and their contents:
11 anhydrous ammonia
3 methanol
3 acetone
1 sulfur
1 carbon tetrachloride
1 chlorine
1 carbolic acid
1 urea
It was believed that two boiling liquid expanding vapor explo-
sions had occurred involving an anhydrous ammonia and an acetone car.
The resulting fire and fumes prevented personnel from going on-site.
Okaloosa County Civil Defense evacuated a large area because of
the chemicals, dense smoke, and strong winds. In view of the air
problems and the proximity of the derailment to the Yellow River,
Civil Defense notified the Florida Department of Environmental Regula-
tion (DER) and the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). The U.S. Air Force Bioenvironmental Engineering Services: pro-
vided initial air monitoring for analyzing phenols and sulfates.
2-1
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Response and Observations: Chronological Events
April 8, 1979
EPA received the derailment report at 9:40 a.m. Allen Bartlett
of the EPA Environmental Emergency Branch (EEB) in Region IV, Atlanta,
was designated On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) and arrived in Crestview at
5:30 p.m.
Mr. Bartlett met Robert Smith, Civil Defense area coordinator,
and BOD Hawlfield and Jeff Taylor of DER. The OSC also established
contact with Major Richard Hartman of the Air Force, the Coast Guard
Gulf Strike Team (GST), and railroad officials. The area had been
evacuated and DER had taken samples from the Yellow River. The de-
railment had been isolated by this time. There were no cars in the
river. A fire on the railroad trestle was threatening the structure
of the bridge.
F-refighting efforts ceased at 7:00 p.m., while air monitoring
continued through the night. Arrangements were made with Eglin Air
Force base for an EPA aerial photographic flight to take place the
next dcy.
April 9. 1979
At 11:15 a.m., the helicopter overflight took the OSC, DER per-
sonnel, and Charlie Owens of L & N to view the derailment. Hulcher,
L & N's contractor, was preparing to unload the contents of the two
methanol cars located on the railroad trestle so that the empty cars
could ba removed and the trestle rebuilt. An acetone car was burning.
A white vapor cloud forming over the area was believed to be a reac-
tion between ammonia and chlorine.
Jim Littell of EPA Air Monitoring was testing for chlorine and
ammonia along Interstate 10. The only positive reading was within
sight of the derailment and registered 30 ppm ammonia.
Governor Bob Graham visited the site at 2:30 p.m. and held a
press conference at 4:30. Kenneth Dufford, L & N Vice President of
Operations, discussed the railroad's efforts and the OSC and Mr.
Hawlfield presented the environmental aspects of the derailment.
2-2
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Hulcher's crew was being affected by fumes. Work was stopped
until the acetone car burned out and a decision was made on the
chlorine car.
A Regional Response Team (RRT) meeting was held at 8:45 p.m.
The following agencies were represented: EPA, the Coast Guard, Air
Force, Army, Civil Defense, Fish and Wildlife Service, DER, and L & N.
Railroad officials summarized the situation. They were considering
carbolic acid the major aquatic environmental hazard. It was involved
in the original fire and had leaked into the Yellow River; railroad
officials had decided to pump water through the outer shell to solid-
ify the carbolic acid. There was still a fire on one of the acetone
cars and the chlorine car and several anhydrous ammonia cars were
still venting. The white vapor cloud, which was probably ammonium
chloride, caused concern about personnel protection.
Major Hartman described the Air Force's air monitoring capabil-
ity. The Air Force was monitoring for chlorine, phenol, sulfates,
and phosgene, and had detected 0.5-1 ppm phenol and 0.1 ppm phosgene
during the early morning.
The next RRT meeting would be at the Coast Guard command post
the following morning.
April 10, 1979 '. _
Al Smith, Chief of EPA EEB, arrived on-scene at 8:00 a.m. Mr.
Smith had received confirmation that Section 311 monies could be used
to clean up the derailment. However, the funds expended could not be
recovered. No Section 311 monies were spent because the railroad
assumed all responsibility. Mr. Smith would be chairman of the RRT.
Jim Littell took air samples for chlorine and ammonia in the
evacuation area during the evening of April 9 and the early morning
of April 10. Nothing was detected.
The OSC accompanied Mr. Owens to the derailment site. The
solidification procedure on the carbolic acid was continuing. Liquid
pollution potential existed from the carbon tetrachloride, methanol,
and acetone cars. The major concern was still the air.
The shefiff chaired a meeting that was held at the Civil Defense
command post. Its purpose was to inform local agencies that the sher-
iff would be the source of all news releases. There was concern
2-3
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expressed about the confusion over who was in charge. The OSC in-
formed the sheriff of the environmental responsibilities of the RRT
and explained that the OSC was in charge of the RRT. The OSC further
explained that Ben Eason was EPA's Public Information Officer.
Al Smith chaired the RRT meeting held at 11:25 a.m. It was
agreed that Civil Defense or the Sheriff's Department would be given
the air data, the most important of which were positive readings.
The sheriff conducted a news conference at 4:30 p.m.
April 11, 1979
The acetone fire went out at 4:15 a.m. Railroad officials were
assured that the product was completely gone.
The Coast Guard Gulf Strike Team supported the Hulcher crew by
refilling the air pack bottles. They had set up at the working peri-
meter at 6:30 a.m.
vDR Roger Bing, Eighth Coast Guard District, requested that LCDR
James Paskewich represent the Coast Guard at future RRT meetings.
%i RRT meeting was held at 8:00 a.m. There were no local repre-
sentatives at the meeting although they had been invited. Ben Eason
would disseminate news concerning operations that pertained to RRT
recommendations or decisions. It was learned that the Sheriff's
Department had changed the time span of the evacuation without con-
sulting the RRT. The evacuation zone was one mile in radius and two
miles downwind. Air monitoring during the previous night had not
detected any chlorine or ammonia outside the one mile. The railroad
representatives informed the RRT of a breakdown in communications with
the county commissioners. They requested that Mr. R. Smith convey
information to the commissioners regarding responsibilities. Hulcher
was having equipment problems and work had slowed. Additional equip-
ment and parts had been requested.
The RRT agreed to the neutralization of the chlorine with caustic
soda. The neutralization would take place in a lined pit. Once the
procedure started, there would be constant air monitoring.
The phenol car would not be moved until more information could be
obtained. Decisions on the methanol and carbon tetrachloride cars
were also deferred.
2-4
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The safety of the railroad's and Hulcher's crews was still a
concern. The railroad officials stated that adequate protection was
being used. Another RRT meeting was scheduled for 2:00 p.m.
b
The OSC visited the derailment site and returned to the command
post at 12:30 p.m. Some of the ammonia cars had been moved to allow
easy passage of the chlorine car. One of the ammonia cars had the
largest leak. The carbon tetrachloride and a methanol car still con-
tained some product. The chlorine neutralization pit had been dug to
below the water table. Since the liner could only withstand 150°F, it
was decided, with DER consensus, to leave water in the bottom and add
ice to the caustic for additional cooling. A dike would be constructed
along the low side of the riverbank to contain any runoff. Georgia-
Pacific, the chlorine shipper, would monitor the neutralization.
Prior to the RRT meeting, there was a radio news bulletin of a
change in the evacuation area as ordered by the sheriff because of
changing winds. The RRT had not been alerted to the evacuation change.
The 2:00 p.m. RRT meeting was held at the Civil Defense command
post. The chlorine car was being moved. The carbon tetrachloride and
methanol would be unloaded before the cars were moved. A dike would
be built around the carbolic acid car before it was moved. DER wanted
a turbidity screen to be in place before the dike was built. The RRT
would evaluate the situation. The ammonia cars would be patched before
their contents were offloaded.
At 3:00 p.m., the Air Force detected 0.5 ppm chlorine at the High-
way 90 bridge, which was downwind.
During the afternoon, railroad personnel asked Mr. Littell to
estimate a safe distance for a helicopter overflight. Mr. Littell
stated that the helicopter should stay above 500 feet. At 5:30 p.m.,
Fire Chief Barrow of Eglin Air Force base served as ground coordinator
for the flight. Once the helicopter was in a holding pattern, Chief
Barrow asked the L & N officials about any restrictions. Railroad
personnel told him of the recommendation of a 500-foot distance. The
helicopter, which was reported to have Philip Hogue of the National
Transportation Safety Board and Senator Lawton Chiles on board, made
three passes, each successively lower. The third pass was reported
to be about 250 feet. The downdraft from the helicopter stirred the
2-5
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venting chlorine and blew it toward some people who were upwind of the
tank car and unprotected. Most of the on-scene personnel were hit by
the chlorine; two people were taken to the hospital.
At 7:00 p.m., the demand for air bottles was greater than the
ability of the GST to refill them. It was decided that the bottles
would he.ve to be taken elsewhere to be refilled.
At 8:35 p.m., the chlorine bleeding operation started. Mr.
Littell was monitoring the air for chlorine downwind of the derailment
and all readings were negative. Weather was exceptional for good dis-
persion. At 9:30 p.m., Mr. Owens reported that all the chlorine that
would have drained form the tank car, but approximately 500 gallons
remained. There were two alternatives: dump the remaining chlorine
or pump caustic soda into the tank car. The decision to dump the chlo-
rine was made by EPA, the Coast Guard, Civil Defense, Hulcher, and the
railroad.
April 12, 1979
The chlorine was dumped at 12:15 a.m. A vapor cloud, thought to
be chlorine, started moving upriver. The wind had died down. The
evacuation zone was not tight, and Mr. Littell found people within it.
He manned a roadblock to secure the western side of the derailment
site.
The OSC and Mr. Littell checked the derailment area at 5:00 a.m.
Chlorine was still venting from the tank car. The OSC informed L & N
officials and Civil Defense at 5:45 a.m.
An RRT meeting was held at 8:00 a.m. The events of the night
before were explained. Since there was still some chlorine in the
tank car, the RRT decided that caustic soda should be pumped into the
car. This would begin at 12:30 p.m.
At 9:00 a.m., a congressional hearing concerning post-derailment
activities was conducted at the courthouse. AT Smith and the OSC
appeared at 11:30 a.m. Mr. Smith testified to the existence of the
OSC log iind the activities of the RRT at Crestview in response to
comments about confusion on-scene.
The neutralization in the chlorine tank car proceeded smoothly and
with good reaction. Air monitoring readings were negative. The
2 - 6
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neutralization was completed at 3:30 p.m.
An RRT meeting was held at 3:35 p.m. A decision to reduce the
evacuation zone was deferred to await more air monitoring results.
The Fish and Wildlife Service was tasked to monitor the derailment
area for long-term effects on wildlife. It and the Army were released.
Further decisions were deferred until the next meeting at the command
post.
The RRT met again at 5:30 p.m. at the Civil Defense command post.
The evacuation zone would remain as it was because cargo transfer
would go on most of the night. The carbon tetrachloride was ready to
be transferred into a tank truck.
DER had a turbidity screen scheduled to arrive at 8:00 a.m. the
following morning. The dike around the carbolic acid would not be
constructed until the screen, an oil boom, was in place.
April 13, 1979
The tubidity screen was in place by 9:00 a.m.
Arrangements were being made to pump out the neutralization pit.
The neutralized chlorine in the tank car had leaked out onto the
ground. One ammonia car was still leaking, so the railroad crew put
dirt over it to suppress the fumes.
There was an RRT meeting at 10:00 a.m. at the Civil Defense com-
mand post. All air tests for chlorine and ammonia were negative. The
water samples continued to show background levels. The evacuation
would be lifted at 4:00 p.m. this date.
The acetone and carbon tetrachloride cars would be trans!oaded
and the carbolic acid car would be moved during the day.
Sediment samples of the derailment area were taken during the
afternoon. The samples were split among EPA, DER, and L & N. The
samples were taken in the chlorine dump area, the phenol (carbolic
acid) area, the carbon tetrachloride and acetone area, and the burned
area north of the railroad tracks.
The RRT was deactivated at 2:00 p.m. At 4:00 p.m., the evacuation
was lifted and ERT, the air monitoring teams, and the GST were also
deactivated.
2-7
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April 1*. 1979
Three ammonia cars were trans!oaded during the evening. The
neutralizing pit had been filled in. More dirt had been piled around
the leaking ammonia car.
April 16. 1979
The ammonia car that had been covered with dirt blew its outer
shell because too much pressure had built up. Four more people were
sent to the hospital. This option should not be considered in the
future.
2-8
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3. PHOTOGRAPHS
3-1
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DERAILMENT SITE BEFORE ANY CARS WERE MOVED
-------
METHANOL CARS DERAILED ON TRESTLE;
PHENOL CAR ON BRIDGE SUPPORT
-------
BURNING ACETONE CAR ON SECOND DAY
AFTER DERAILMENT
-------
VIEW OF THE WRECKAGE ON THE HEAVILY BURNED
NORTH SIDE OF TRACK
-------
A VIEW TOWARD THE TRESTLE. WHITE CARS
CONTAINED AMMONIA
-------
PREPARING TO MOVE CARBOLIC ACID CAR
3-7
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AMMONIA CARS DURING MOVING OPERATIONS
-------
AN EMPTY AMMONIA CAR
-------
CHLORINE CAR AFTER IT WAS DUMPED
AND CAUSTIC SODA PUMPED IN
-------
INFRARED PICTURE SHOWING VEGETATION DAMAGE
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4. SUPPORTING INFORMATION
4-1
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Region IV, Athens, GA
DATE: May 3, 1979
SUBJECT: Analytical Data for Crestview, Florida Train Wreck
FROM: Chief
Analytical Services Section
TO: Allen Bartlett
Environmental Emergency Branch
Summary
The analytical data is attached for the soil samples submitted
April 16, 1979. Acetone and carbon tetrachloride were analyzed
by gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/MS) system using the
purge and trap technique. Phenol was prepared by solvent extrac-
tion of the soil followed by analysis by gas chromatograph/flame
ionization detection.
Action
Transmittal of data.
Background
Telephone request for analytical assistance by you to Bobby Carroll.
Tom B. Bennett, Jr.
EPA Form 1320-4 (Rev. 3-74)
4-2
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OATKl U4/16/7V
SUUHCEl THA1N Wr,c.(,n.
CITY I CHfcSTView
CHEMISTj Lawless & Loy
Sl-
SAO NO.- tt'P STATION!
US (SPA UetilON IV S6A DIVISION
bAIIORATIJRX SPhVICES PHAUCH
DATA KKPOHTlNG 5KKKT
79C094S - 79C0953
STATE J
SAMPLE Mtctiven GATE: & TIMKJ 04/10/79
COMPLETED! April 24, 1979
DATE fi.
SAHPlp:
TYPE ANALYSES TH
KUN
79COy45 11 BLANK, BOTTLE EMPTY 00/00/00 0- AIH :NH3 hu;/|, |VOA
i NA (
1 1
1 1
TiCO~i 12. CONTKGL, 100' UP FROIt 00/00/00-' 0- 8EOIM : taol/ M^/KG l VOA
« 5 «
t (
i :
79CO*47 »J, APPHUX 30' FR 'CHLORIN 00/00/00- 0- .SKDIM | NH3— / MG/KG I VOA
i :
t t
7VC094H »4, APPHOX 30' FH RK BRIO 00/00/00- n- SEIU'M t MH 3-' MO/ KG S VUA
« 10 :
1 'I
: :
79C0949 |b, 200' K OF BKIDUE, 15'. - OO/OO/OO- 0- SEDIM i Nlu!/Kti/KG : VOA
1 A tone I/ 1 Carbon- 2/ «_/, Phenol?''
: NA « NA ' NA '
: i i i
: t i i
, Acetone 2/. Carbon- 2? , Phenol?'' f
tfS^fe- tetrachloride Mg/Kg
1 0.79 : {J|/Kg . 1 'ND(O.l) 5
I t 1 I
i l.l :
Acetone 2^/( Carbon 2/. Phenol-' (
'25 ' MB/Kg « ND /0 i> '
. . JAR, .... - i . _ J. . .
I 1 1 1
1 t 1 I
Acetone 2J , Carbon- 2V, Plienol?/"
Me/Kg ' tetrachloride Mg/Kg
: 0.10 :Mg/Kg ND(0 0^} ND(0.l) '
: i ' i i
l l : ;
j Acetone 2/f Carbon- 2/;pheno1 2/ 1' |
» 1.8 i MS/KB : i
i
i
i
t
i
i
i
i
t
«'
i
i
t
i
i
i
i
i
CO
JY - Calculated on a wet weight basis
"it - Calculated on a dry weight basis
J»/ - Analyzed by CC/MS
ND - None' Detected, (Number in parenthesis is the minimum detection limit).
NA - Not analyzed
NR - No value recorded based on quality 'control data
-------
OATCl 04/16/79
US KPh KF.UICIN TV S(.Jk DIVISION
LAHliKATliklf SKHVtCES 8H/.HCH
OfiTA Kf.PnR'CIHC SHKKT
79COU45 - V9C0953
SOUHCfcj THA1M '
CITY I CHKS'
Lawless & Loy
ElATfl FU
SAM'Lt KECtlVKD DfcTK t. TlMEl
COMPLtiTKOl April 24. 1979
9 JO
SAD NO. KPH STAT1UM
?9CO*bO »6, 250' K OK UftlDCE 20< '
SU OK TRACK, CARBON T CAK
79C09S1 (7, JOO' E Of UR1DCK 4U-5
0' NO OF 1HACK, KIHE ARFA
79C09b tetrachloride
"l » M8/"Ke 1
1 0.62 NR
1 1 1
! I <
Acetone 2/ Carbon 'il
^B^^K. tetrachloride
.Mg/Kg
* 0.86 fi_?_2_
1 1 t
1 1 1
pTienol^~ (
ND (l.OJ '
1
1
?hcnol^~ t
!iP 1Q JJ
I
1
Acetone _£/ .Carbon ^/jPhenol-' .
___«S^KS Ile.trach_o_rj.dgjli4yj(i!
. 1..1.9 1__NR._ _ ..I
t I t
s :
, Acetone ^/j Carbon 2/ (
, , Me/i ,
_NJ_(_>_1.) 1
i
s
Phenol?7' j
t
'
1
1
1
I
«
t
t
1
1
1
1
1
,
__;__NI\. __ju_ ; ;
I/ - Calculated on a wet weight basis
"if - Calculated on a dry weight basis
V - Analyzed by GC/MS
NA - Not analyzed
ND - None Detected (number in parenthesis is the minimum detection limit).
NR - No value recorded based on quality control data.
-------
BOB GRAHAM
160 GOVERNMENTAL CENTER /$£, — -,-^-^Vv GOVERNOR
PENSACOLA, FLORIDA 32501 fj. -- ^'^T^^ JACOB D. VARN
SECRETARY
ROBERT V. KRIEGEL
DISTRICT MANAGER
STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
NORTHWEST DISTRICT
May 3, 1979
Mr. Allen Bartlett
Environmental Protection Agency
345 Courtland Street, N. E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30308
Dear Allen:
Attached for your information are copies of our daily activities
reports, water sampling analysis and biological assessment covering
the recent L & N Railroad derailment near Crestview.
In the event I can provide additional information, please do not
hesitate to contact me at my Pensacola Office on telephone (904)
436-8328.
Sincerely,
George E. Hoffman, Jr.
District Enforcement Officer
GEH/c
Attachments
4-5
-------
Sola ol Florid*
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM
fot flouting To Oinrici Otficn
And/Or To Ottw Th.n Th» Addr
To:
To:
To:.
Locin.
Locin..
Loctn..
From:
TO: Robert V.
THROUGH: Robert J. Brazzell
FROM: William T. Young
DATE: April 25, 1979
SUBJECT: Biological Assessment of the Effects of the L & N
Derailment on the Yellow River
On April 17, 1979, a biological survey was conducted in the Yellow
River near Milligan, to assess the effects of the L & N derailment
on the waters of the State. This survey addresses the discernible
direct effects only. It makes no attempt to determine possible
sub-lethal effects that the spill may have had on the Yellow
River - Blackwater Bay ecosystem.
In that the analyses of the previous weeks' sampling indicated
no significant or widespread contamination of the river by the
substances spilled, our investigation was limited to the immediate
downstream area from the spill site. We reasoned that if signifi-
cant damage had occurred, it would be confined to the small area,
immediately downstream that would receive the impact before the
dilution effect of the existing high flow conditions would render
the substances ineffective.
In view of the rational indicated above, our sampling was limited
to the stations listed below:
Station No.
33.04.0004(1)
33.04.0004(2)
33.04.0004(3)
33.04.0004 (4)
Description
Background, Yellow River 500 yards upstream
from the L & N trestle.
250 yards downstream from the L & N trestle,
east bank.
250 yards downstream from the L & N trestle,
west side.
1,000 yards downstream from the L & N trestle,
east side.
Conclusions, methods and results are provided as an attachment to
this memorandum.
WTY/rbc
MS-Rev 7/76 Attachments
4-6
-------
U S HIGHWAY <)0
Biological Assessment
Sampling Station Locations
April 17, 1979
= SUBSTANDARD BOTTOM LIFE
4-7
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Investigation Report of Florida Department
of Environmental Regulation
Northwest District
April 17, 1979
Investigators: William T. Young
Donald H. Ray
Conclusions
1. Substantial damage to the bottom life community in approximately
eleven acres of the Yellow River below the L & N derailment is
indicated by this assessment.
2. The close proximity of the significantly reduced benthic com-
munity to the derailment, the presence of dead organisms in
dredge samples of this community, and other observations of
DER investigators indicates the biological damage resulted
from the L & N derailment.
Methods
Natural substrate macrobenthos (bottom life) samples were taken at
one meter depth using a 0.25 ft. Ponar dredge. Three (3) sample
replicate.-s were sieved and washed in the field for each station
and brought to the laboratory in two (2) liter widemouth bottles
of water. The samples kept cool to permit picking of living or-
ganisms. Each organism was identified to species. Data cal-
culations include, Species Diversity Indices (d)and Florida
Indices.
Results
The Yellow River was 3 to 4 feet above its normal level during
this assessment. The flow rate was a swift 2.5 to 3 f/s providing
maximum dispersion and dilution to any chemical entering the river
from the I, & N derailment.
Effects of the derailment on sampled fauna are determined by com-
paring the Species Diversity Index of each station below the spill
with that of the background station in Table I.
4-8
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TABLE 1: Biological Assessment Parameters for the Yellow
River below the L & N Derailment.
_ Background Effected Station Biological
d No. Species d No. Species Integrity %
(250 yds. east
bank)
3.46 19 0.62 6 18
(250 yds. west
bank)
3.46 19 2.10 8 61
(1,000 yds. east
bank)
3.46 19 2.97 14 86
4-9
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The bottom fauna at background Station (1) is composed of 19
macroinvertebrate species with a diversity index (d) of 3.46.
Five of these are clean water species.
Station (2) is 250 yards below the derailment on the east side
of the river (derailed tank cars were all on the east side of
the river). The bottom fauna at this station is reduced to six
species at this station with a d of 0.62. All six species are
pollution tolerant. Although this survey was made the 9th day
after the derailment, one dead larval fish and two dead gastropods
were found in dredge samples. Biological integrity at station
(2) is 13% as compared to background. (Biological integrity of
less tha.i 75% indicates substantial damage.)
Although reduction of the west bank fauna at Station (3) is less
than the east side, biological integrity is still substandard.
Considerable less effect on the bottom fauna occurred at Station
(4), 1,000 yards downstream from the spill, which showed a bio-
logical integrity of 86%.
The above findings indicate that a measurable reduction of the
Yellow River bottom fauna occurred in the 1,000 yard long survey
area below the L & N derailment.
The Chapter 17-3 biological integrity criterion for Class III waters
states that a Shannon-Weaver diversity index (d) of less than 75%
of established background indicates substantial damage. Reduction
of the (d) to 86% at a distance of 1,000 yards downstream shows
that the major portion of the surveyed area is below the biological
integrity level. Assuming a resaonably constant (d) recovery rate
from Station (2) to Station (4) (ref. map), the downstream extent
of the s\ibstantial damage is interpolated to be approximately
882 yards; downstream from the spill site. With an average width
of approximately 60 yards, 10.9 acres of the Yellow River below
the derailment is calculated to have a substandard benthic com-
munity .
4-10
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Sui* oil-Mid. StationNo. 33^04 ._0004 ( 4 )
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION Date izJ.TlZ9..
BIOLOGICAL SURVEY STATION DESCRIPTION Cou'"v ?k-a-^°°s-a
Location: Yellow River, 1.000 yds, below L & N derailment-
Sources of Pollution: L & N derailment
Nearby Land Use: Woodlands
Type Body of Water:
Water Depth: 1-1.5 m Stage: 3-4 feet high Water Temp.: 20 .0
Velocity: \'5 fps Color (Visual): Turbidity (Visual): muddy
Salinity: ppt Secchi: 1 m
Aquatic Plants: Emergent:
Submerged:
Bottom Type: silty sand, twig, leaves
Bottom Sediment: Size (dry wt. %) )> 2mm 0.5-2 mm
0.125-0.5 mm 0.625-0.125 mm < 0.0625 mm
dry wt. — ash wt.
X 100 = (% volatile)
dry wt.
Comments: Twigs, and limbs picked up by Ponar. Terrestrial vegetation
blackened ;
SAMPLES TAKEN
Type Sampling Mechanism No. Replicates
Natural substrate Pnnar B-14, B-47, B-50
3/3 grabs
O6ft Form PERM 21 2 (Apr 76) Page 1 ol 1
4-11
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Slalc ol I lor ul;>
DEPARTMENT CF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
BIOLOGICAL SURVEY STATION DESCRIPTION
Station No. 33.04.0004(2) (3)
Date 4-17-79
County . QkalOOS a _
Location:
Yellow River - 250 yds, below L & N spill east and west sites
Sources of Pollution:
L & N derailment
Nearby Land Use:
woodlands
Type Body of Water: river
Water Depth: :.-1.5 m Stage: 3-4- feet high
Velocity: 2 . 5 fps Color (Visual):
Salinity:
Water Temp.:
20.0
Turbidity (Visual): muddy
ppt Seech i:
Aquatic Plants: (Emergent:
Submerged:
Bottom Type: mud and sand, limbs, twigs, leaves
Bottom Sediment: Size (dry wt. %) } 2mm
0.125-0.5 mm 0.625-0.125 mm
dry wt. — ash wt.
0.5-2
< 0.0625 mm
dry '
X 100 =
(% volatile)
Comments: A dull film covers the water in eddy areas. Vegetation
(terrestrial) is blackened, and some denuded, apparently by chemical
fumes.
TYI>C
Natural substrate
SAMPLES TAKEN
Sampling Mechaniim
Ponar
No. Replicates
2/3 grabs
B-37, B-9, B-2,
1/2 grabs - B-37
f. R Form PERM 21 2 (Am 76! P
-------
State ul I lundj
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
*
BIOLOGICAL SURVEY STATION DESCRIPTION
Station No
Date ...i
33-04 .00 0 4
Countv Okaloosa
Location:
Yellow River - L & N background, 500 yds. upstream from spill
Sources of Pollution:
L & N derailment
Nearby Land Use:
woodlands
Type Body of Water:
Water Depth: 1-1.5 m Stage: high 3-4 feet
Velocity: 3 fps Color (Visual):
Salinity:
Water Temp.:
21.0
Turbidity (Visual): muddy
ppt Seech i:
<1
m
Aquatic Plants: Emergent:
Submerged:
Bottom Type: Silty Sand
Bottom Sediment: Size (dry wt. %) > 2mm
0.125-0.5 mm 0.625-0.125 mm
dry wt. — ash wt.
0.5-2 mm
< 0.0625 mm
dry wt.
X 100
(% volatile)
Comments: Shallow, sandy-silt bottom. No limbs and twigs, such as
those found below the spill. Terrestrial vegetation blackened,
apparently by derailment fumes.
Type
Natural substrate
SAMPLES TAKEN
Sampling Mechanism
Ponar
No. Replicates
3/3 grabs
B-39. B-26. B-41
.ft Form PERM 21 2 (Apr 76) Pag* 1 ol 1
4-13
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SUMMARY OF BIOENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING
ASSISTANCE
CRESTVIEW TRAIN DERAILMENT ACCIDENT
1. £ioenvironmental Engineering assistance • to local officials
durir.g clean-up of the accident primarily consisted of monitor-
ing the air and water to assess the degree of contamination
resulting from leaking chemical tank cars. . Sampling data was
provided to the Eglin Fire Chief, Regional Civil Defense Direc-
tor,, Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, and the
Environmental Protection Agency On-scene Coordijiatojr thereby
enabling them to make decisions concerning evacuation require-
ments, decontamination, etc. Chemicals involved consisted of
chlorine, carbon tetrachloride, carbolic acid, anhydrous
ammonia, acetone, methanol and sulfur.
2. A break-down of workload factors, days involved, personnel,
manhours devoted, water and air analysis performed, and mater-
ials/equipment used are as follows:
a. DAYS INVOLVED: 6 days and 2 nights
b. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED: >ive the first day, four
the second, and three for each of the remainding days.
4
c. TOTAL MANHOURS DEVOTED: 414 hours
d. WATER SAMPLES: Water samples were collected from the
yellow river in the up-wind area and field analysis performed
for pH and dissolved oxygen content. Samples were subsequently
given to the Florida Department of Environmental Regulations
for further analysis.
e. AIR SAMPLES: Air samples were performed constantly for
the following chemicals:
(1) Sulfur
(2) Phenols
(3) Carbon Tetrachloride
(4) Phosgene
(5) Ammonia
(6) Hydrocarbons
(7) Chlorine
4-14
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F. MATERIALS/EQUIPMENT USED:
(1) Scott Air-Paks
(2) MSA Universal Tester
(3) Miran Infrared Spectrometer
(4) Water Test Kit
(5) Midget Impingers
(6) Field Generator
(7) Vacuum Pumps
(8) Oxygen Meter
(9) Vehicles - Three vehicles were used the first
day and two each of the remainding days. A 12' Air Force
boat assigned to this section was also used the first day.
3. Bioenvironmental Engineering activities were terminated
on 13 Apr 79 at 1700 hours.
4-15
-------
DATE TIME
8 Apr 79 1656
1800
9 Apr 79 1800
V
0200
0220
0300
V
0330
0400
\/
0600
0600
s/
1100
10 Apr 79 1200
1300
1335
1400
1430
1200
1300
LOCATION SAMPLE TYPE
Command Post #1 Phenol
Sulfur
Sulfur
Phenol
Garden City Phenol
Sulfur
Command Post #1 Chlorine
Phenol
Sulfur
Ammonia
Command Post 02 Carbon
Tetrachloride
Phosgene
cci4
Pho sgene
Ammonia
Sulfur
Phenol
Hwy 90 Ammonia
Ammonia
Ammonia
Ammonia
Ammonia
Chlorine
Chlorine
RESULTS
^ .'5 ppm
< . 5 ppm
< . 5 ppm
.5 to 1.0
-------
DATE
10 Apr 79
11 Apr 79
12 Apr 79
13 Apr 79
TIME
1335
1400
1430
0600
1800
0930
0945
1000
1030
1130
1525
1545
1645
1700
0600
4
1400
LOCATION
Hwy 90
A
3
C
D
E
A
E 5 W of Bridge
A
A
General
Area
SAMPLE TYPE
Chlorine
Chlorine
Chlorine
Chlorine- neu-
tralization of
began with pit
Chlorine
Chlorine
Chlorine
Chlorine
Chlorine
Chlorine
Chlorine
Chlorine
Chlorine
Ammonia
RESULTS
0.0
0.0
Trac
ppm
ppm
e
to .5 ppm
C12
0.35
0.1
.25
.25
0.0
0.1
0.1
<0.1
0.0
0.0
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppm
ppm
4-17
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