United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Region 4
345 Courtland Street. ME
Atlanta GA 30308
November 1980
904/9-80-063
L&N Train Derailment
Molino, Florida
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PREFACE
This report reflects the activities of the Environ-
mental Emergency Branch (EEB) Region IV, EPA, as it was
concerned with the captioned event. The report outlines
the key actions of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, the
Regional Response Team (RRT), and state, local, and Federal
members of the RRT. It reflects the complexity of respond-
ing to environmental emergencies and the need to coordinate
and plan in advance for a major incident such as this event,
This report is intended to satisfy the requirements of
the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution contin-
gency Plan and to help others learn from our experiences.
Al J.Smith, Chief
Environmental Emergency Branch
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Page
1. SUMMARY 1-1
2. THE SITUATION 2-1
3. PHOTOGRAPHS 3-1
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
2-1 2-2
ill
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1. SUMMARY
On November 11, 1979, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) received a report from the National Response Center of a
train derailment near Molino, Florida. The accident involved 22 of a
105-car train of the L & N Railroad. Of those 22, the ones of primary
concern were six containing liquid propane gas and one each of cars
holding ethyl alcohol, styrene monomer, and acetone. There were sev-
eral tank cars of sulfur near the derailment that were not involved.
Approximately 200 people were evacuated from the area as several of
the liquid propane gas cars burned.
Ray Wilkerson of EPA Region IV in Atlanta was designated On-Scene
Coordinator for the incident. The Regional Response Team (RRT) was
activated and several options were discussed:
1. Keep the area evacuated and let the cars burn out on
their own;
2. Vent the cars or destruct them by ground team placement of
charges;
3. Conduct an air strike;
4. Wait for boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE).
A federal response was declared under Section 311 of the Clean
Water Act. It was decided to vent all nine cars at the same time.
Jet Research Company was hired to perform the detonation on November
13, with technical assistance from the Army Explosive Ordnance Dis-
posal team.
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The area was evacuated for five miles. After detonation, a
fireball 3,000 feet high and one-fourth mile in diameter was observed.
No shock wave or audible explosion was detected at the command post,
approximately 2.5 miles from the site. The fireball lasted 15-30
seconds.
Dn November 14, an inspection of the cars revealed that all the
cars had vented except one liquid propane gas car that had a frost
line and was suspected to be an explosion hazard. The fire department
reported that there were no significant fires outside the site, and
no accounts of damage to structures or animals in the area. It was
decided to vent the remaining car.
Later inspection of the area and the stream revealed that one
liquid propane gas car was still burning and that one styrene car was
smoking. Some burning styrene had flowed down Pretty Branch Creek
about one-fourth mile. There was no evidence of styrene left in the
strecjn.
After a thorough investigation of the area by the OSC and a state
representative, it was decided that any contaminated soil could be
disposed of on-scene and that the threat of pollution from the remain-
ing material was insignificant.
In conclusion, the situation presented by the L & N derailment
was extremely dangerous to the public and the environment. After
careful consideration of the options, the RRT decided that venting the
cars was the most efficient way to resolve the matter. All nine sus-
pect cars were successfully vented. In this operation, one car was
completely destroyed and another, partially; all the others had small
holes in them.
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2. THE SITUATION
At 1:30 a.m. on November 11, 1979, 22 of a 105-car train of the
L & N Railroad derailed while enroute from Louisiana to Pensacola,
Florida. The cars left the track approximately two miles west of
Molino, Florida, at what railroad officials said was a roadbed washout
over Pretty Branch Creek (Figure 2-1). The cars of primary concern
were six containing liquid propane gas and one each of others holding
acetone, styrene monomer, and ethyl alcohol. Other derailed cars were
box- and tote cars containing foodstuff and nonhazardous substances.
There were several tank cars of sulfur near the derailment, but they
were not involved.
An extremely hazardous situation existed because several of the
liquid propane gas cars were burning and in danger of a boiling liquid
expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE); the acetone car was nearby and the
ethyl alcohol car was leaking.
By 2:00 a.m., local law enforcement, Civil Defense, and the Red
Cross had evacuated about 70 families. An evacuation shelter was set
up at Molino Elementary School.
Response and Observations: Chronological Events
November 11, 1979
Ray Wilkerson of EPA Region IV in Atlanta was notified at 5:00
a.m. of the L & N derailment near Molino, Florida. Shortly afterward,
Mr. Wilkerson, who had been designated On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) for
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'66
FLORIDA-ALABAMA
MUSCOGEE QUADRANGLE v
15-MINUTE SERIES ^
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'72 I Vrci.jiii, R in w *75 °' ' =
30° 45'
COMMAND
POST
3397 SECONDAfl
DERAILME
SITE i
FIRST J
DERAILMB
SITE I
SCALE 1:62500
1 * U_- -= ' 2 _^J
'<*\^?^<~2---
^&--:fe:*^-
Contour interval 10 feet
4 Mitts Datum la mean HUH level
3000 0 300(> 6000
SCJ-I b-j:,l— T-l .: I=-i. .l?ri=tr^^
9000
3 • -r—
liuKO
-t~— -T -' J
Figure 2-1 SITE OF L&N DERAILMENT
2-2
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the incident, called L & N official Charlie Gatton to verify the
products involved. Mr. Gatton provided a list of the cars that were
suspected to have been involved:
6 liquid propane gas (several burning)
1 styrene
1 solvent no. 8
1 acetone
10 liquid sulfur (some burning)
1 methyl ethyl ketone
7 anhydrous ammonia
1 phenol
5 boxcars
At 5:30 a.m., the OSC briefed Al Smith, Chief of EPA Region IV
Environmental Emergency Branch. Mr. Smith told the OSC to contact
Sanford Harvey to activate the Regional Response Team (RRT).
Al Smith arrived on-scene at 8:30 a.m. The OSC, accompanied by
Jan Rogers of EPA, arrived at 11:45 a.m. and was briefed by Mr. Smith.
The burning liquid propane gas cars were the major problem. L & N
officials Peter Gill and Charlie Owens visited the site and, upon
their return to the command post, informed the EPA officials that it
was their opinion that a BLEVE from one of the liquid propane gas cars
was imminent.
An RRT meeting was set for 1:00 p.m.
attended, including:
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Approximately 35 people
Department of Interior (DOI)
Department of Transportation (DOT)
State Office of Disaster
Preparedness (OOP)
State Department of Environmental
Regulation (DER)
Al Smith
Ray Wilkerson
Jan Rogers
Waynon Johnson
Captain D.F. Smith,
Robert Smith
George Hoffman
USCG
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The organizational structure was set up as follows:
Al Smith, RRT Chairman
Ray Wilkerson, Federal OSC
Robert Smith, State OSC
M. K. Renfroe (Civil Defense), Local OSC
Al Smith explained the National Oil and Hazardous Material Con-
tingency Plan and the regional Contingency Plan and related that all
decisions would be made by the RRT. After this was established, dis-
cussion of the situation began. Mr. Renfroe reported that about 70
families had been evacuated and most of them were being sheltered at
the Mo lino school.
Mr. Gill and Mr. Owens were asked to brief the RRT on the situa-
tion at the wreck site. Mr. Gill stated that there was a possibility
of three BLEVES because of the three burning liquid propane gas cars
and the leaking alcohol car. Mr. Gill said they would like to remove
all the sulfur cars and then look at the possibility of getting the
Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team to blow up the remaining
cars. It was decided that the EOD team would be put on alert, and Mr.
Gill would present any other alternatives at the next meeting. At
this time, there was some discussion about the press; it was agreed
that Tommy Tate, Civil Defense Coordinator, would be the media
contact.
The RRT meeting adjourned at 1:50 p.m. Captain D.F. Smith re-
turned to Mobile, Alabama.
At 2:00 p.m., the USCG Gulf Strike Team arrived. At 3:00 p.m.,
the CSC, accompanied by Messrs. Gill and Owens and several local
officials, flew over the site.
Afterward, the OSC informed the RRT Chairman that the burning
liquid propane gas cars presented a classic pre-BLEVE condition. The
cars were piled one on top of the other at about a 20° angle; the top
car had fire coming from the dome area and flames from another car
were impinging on the elevated end or vapor area of it.
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Because of the extreme danger near the cars, the possibility of
an air strike was discussed at this time. This was considered a
viable solution.
At 6:30 p.m., another RRT meeting convened. Mr. Gill stated that
the fire was intensifying and that L & N's contractor, OH Materials,
could do nothing. He asked the owner of the product to state an opin-
ion. It was stated that if the cars were not insulated, a BLEVE would
have occurred by this time. The opinion was that one of the cars
would BLEVE within six hours. It was felt that if the cars were left
to burn out, it could take seven days or longer.
As a result of this discussion, the evacuation area was increased
to two miles. Mr. Gill said that undamaged sulfur cars would be re-
moved within two-to-four hours.
There were four options discussed at this meeting:
1. Keep the area evacuated and let the cars burn out on
their own;
2. Activate the EOD team to vent the cars or destruct them;
3. Conduct an air strike;
4. Wait for a BLEVE. '
The RRT meeting adjourned at 7:30 p.m. Jim Littell of EPA Air
Monitoring hand-carried film taken on the overflight to Eglin Air
Force Base.
At 8:00 p.m., all of the people being sheltered at the Molino
school were moved outside the two-mile perimeter to the Jim Allen
school.
The OSC and the RRT Chairman met with Rod Kendig, County Admin-
istrator, and Messrs. Tate, Renfroe, and R. Smith to discuss the
situation and to bring Mr. Kendig up-to-date.
The OSC left the scene at midnight. John Cwiek of EPA remained
on-scene to monitor the situation.
November 12, 1979
When the OSC arrived on-scene at 7:00 a.m., Major Tom Salter and
the EOD team had arrived and assessed the situation. A meeting was
held with Major Salter, L & N, Civil Defense, and EPA representatives.
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Major Salter advised that his staff was checking with the Department
of Defense on the possibility of an air strike. Explosives were en-
route to the scene. Major Salter discussed in detail how charges would
be placed on the cars.
At 9:00 a.m., an RRT meeting was held. Major Salter briefed the
members on the method of applying the charges. At this time, it was
decided to vent all nine cars. The Major and the EOD team left to
make an overflight of the area. L & N had expressed some concern about
hand-placement of the charges. They preferred an air strike because of
the hazc.rds involved. Another burning liquid propane gas car had been
observed.
Several members of the news media came to this meeting but were
asked to leave by the RRT Chairman. It was later learned that because
of the state Sunshine Law, Mr. Kendig had given his permission for the
press to attend. They were assured that they would be advised on the
course of action that the RRT was taking.
The meeting adjourned at 9:20 a.m.
Majcr Salter returned from the overflight disturbed that there
were railroad people in the immediate vicinity of the tank car. The
OSC contacted Peter Gill and advised him of the situation. Major
Salter called his superiors to get permission for the EOD team to con-
duct the venting operation. At 1:00 p.m., Major Salter received orders
that the iiOD team should not participate in the detonation, but could
remain on-scene to provide technical assistance. During this time the
RRT Chairrtan was informed that a private company, Jet Research, had the
capability to conduct the venting operation.
At 2:00 p.m., an RRT meeting convened to inform its members of the
Army's decision and to discuss bringing in a private contractor to con-
duct the vesting operation. This meeting was open to the press. Mr.
Kendig explained the status of the situation since the EOD would not
be able to proceed with the operation. At this time, Mr. Kicliter, an
expert from the Liquid Propane Gas Association, was introduced and
offered a solution to the problem: go in with dry chemicals and put
out all the fires; attach a two-inch pipe to valves on the leaking
liquid propane gas car, reignite the gas and allow it to burn out.
This idea wjs rejected by the RRT as not being feasible because of the
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numerous fires in the area. At this time, the chairman introduced the
proposal to bring in a private contractor to vent the cars. Mr. Gill
was advised to discuss the related liability with his company. Don
Jensen of the Atlantic Strike Team was instructed to contact the
Eighth Coast Guard District and advise them of a possible "311" action
in case the company refused to take appropriate steps.
At this time, further discussion took place on how long the cars
would continue to burn if they were allowed to burn out. In this
meeting there were three county commissioners and the school board
chairman. The consensus was that the liquid propane gas cars would
burn for a week or longer. Mr. Kendig asked the commissioners for
their opinions. One commissioner said he thought the liquid propane
gas expert had a viable solution. The other two commissioners and the
school board chairman did not agree with this because they did not
want to keep the school closed or the evacuees away from their homes
any longer than necessary. At this time, keeping the residents out of
the evacuation area had become a problem and it was necessary for the
governor to issue an order to the sheriff giving him authority to
arrest anyone found inside the area. Venting the cars would allow the
evacuation to be lifted the next day if it were successful.
There was a unanimous decision by the RRT members to use the pri-
vate contractor to vent the cars as soon as possible. L & N agreed to
hire the Jet Research Company (JRC) to come on-scene and evaluate the
situation.
The RRT meeting adjourned at 4:30 p.m.
Mr. Rogers contacted Wayne Rutledge of JRC to request that he
proceed to the scene as soon as possible.
November 13, 1979
At 7:00 a.m., Mr. Rogers and the OSC arrived on-scene. Mr.
Rogers was given the task of arranging for aerial photography of the
venting operation. Lt. Col. Andrews, Department of Defense represen-
tative, arrived on-scene.
The evacuation area was extended to 2.5 miles.
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At 11:00 a.m., JRC personnel arrived on-scene and were briefed on
the situation. They proceeded to make a ground inspection of the
cars.
After Mr. Rutledge made an overflight of the cars, he recom-
mended to L & N that all nine tank cars be vented. At this time, K.C.
Dufford, Vice President of Operations for L & N, was present. Mr.
Dufford asked if the company could have a private meeting to discuss
the proDosal. The RRT agreed.
Mr. Rutledge and Major Salter were in agreement that all nine
tank cars should be vented at the same time. It was believed that
unless ill 1 nine cars were vented at once, the extreme heat generated
by the vented cars could damage the other hazardous chemical cars,
increasing the environmental risks involved.
The RRT Chairman asked Lt. Col. Andrews and the EOD team to
assist JRC in transferring explosives to the scene. Mr. Rutledge
advised that it would be necessary for him to start placing charges by
2:00 p.n;. so that the operation could be completed before dark.
At 1:15 p.m., the L & N officials had not returned from their
meeting. It was discovered that they had returned to the scene of the
tank cars. L & N was advised by radio of the 2:00 p.m. deadline.
Shortly afterward, L & N officials returned to the command post with
the proposal to hire JRC to vent the three burning liquid propane gas
cars and, after they had burned out, reinspect the remaining cars and
vent then as necessary.
At 1:58 p.m., the RRT convened and the proposal was presented and
rejected by all members of the RRT. A unanimous decision was reached
to declare a federal response under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act
because of the imninent threat to navigable waterways; the suspicion
that the styrene car was leaking into Pretty Branch Creek; and the
failure of L & N Railroad to take action deemed appropriate by the
RRT and the OSC. JRC would proceed with venting all nine tank cars.
L & N refused to participate in any of the venting operations, includ-
ing the JRC inspection costs.
At ^00 p.m., JRC went to the scene to start placing charges.
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The Coast Guard National Strike Team was instructed to assist the'
local Civil Defense in extending the evacuation perimeter to five
miles to ensure that no one would be injured. The command post re-
ceived word from personnel at one of the roadblocks that there were
some people trying to get into the restricted area. The officer at
the roadblock was advised to escort the people to the command post.
They introduced themselves as T. A. Phemister, R. J. Holden, and Frank
Stanley with the Association of American Railroads. They stated that
they were concerned about the way the cars were to be vented and did
not think it was necessary. Al Smith asked why they had not voiced
their opinion before this, since Mr. Stanley had attended all of the
RRT meetings. Mr. Smith advised them that the decision to vent the
cars had been reached by the entire RRT after evaluating all alter-
natives.
At 3:30 p.m., Civil Defense completed the evacuation to five
miles.
The OSC and Rod Kendig made an overflight to ensure that all
personnel were clear of the area.
At 5:07 p.m., the RRT Chairman received word at the command post
that the charges were ready. At 5:12 p.m., he gave the order to
detonate the tank cars. A fireball 3,000 feet high by one-fourth mile
in diameter was observed. No shock wave or audible explosion was
detected at the command post, approximately 2.5 miles from the site.
Duration of the fireball was 15-30 seconds.
At 5:30 p.m., the fire chief made an overflight to check for
structural damage and to determine the extent of the fire. He re-
ported that the fire was primarily restricted to a one-fourth-mile
diameter area.
At 5:50 p.m., Mr. Rutledge made an overflight to inspect the
cars; he reported that eight cars were burning and one was in ques-
tion. He reported no damage to structures in the area. Some small
spot fires were observed about three-fourths mile from the fire.
At 6:00 p.m., Mr. Littell reported from one mile downwind that
there was no odor from the fire and the plume was dispersing.
At 7:00 p.m., operations were secured for the night.
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November 14, 1979
At 3:30 a.m., an inspection of the cars revealed that all cars
had venbed except one liquid propane gas car, which had a frost line
and was suspected to be an explosion hazard.
At 10:15 a.m., an RRT meeting was held to discuss the operation
and to nake a decision on the remaining car. The fire department
reported that there were no significant fires outside the burn area,
and no damage to structures or animals in the area. The decision was
made to have JRC vent the remaining car.
At 12:18 p.m., the last car was vented. JRC also detonated
excess sxplosives.
At 1:00 p.mi, the RRT Chairman made an overflight of the area and
determined it was safe for workmen to enter.
Afterward, Jan Rogers, Ray Wilkerson, Don Jensen, and Charlie
Gatton vant to the scene to make an inspection of the area and the
stream. One liquid propane gas car was still burning and the styrene
car was smoking. The railroad crew began removing derailed cars and
debris. Some styrene liquid had leached into the soil adjacent to
Pretty Branch Creek. A small quantity of burned styrene residue was
found one-fourth mile downstream. There was no evidence of styrene
left in the stream.
After a thorough inspection of the area with a state representa-
tive, it was decided that any contaminated soil could be disposed of
on-scen2 and that the threat of pollution from the remaining material
was insignificant. The group returned to the command post and secured
the operation.
At 3:00 p.m., the RRT was deactivated.
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3. PHOTOGRAPHS
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DERAILMENT SITE THE FOLLOWING DAY
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SBRH
VENT HOLE IN ALCOHOL CAR
MADE BY EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
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RESIDUAL STYRENE BURNING INSIDE TANK CAR
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LIQUID PROPANE GAS TANK
AND BURNED VEGETATION
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PRODUCT BURNING OFF TANK CARS
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SMOLDERING REMAINS AFTER ALL TANKS HAD BEEN VENTED.
SOME PRODUCT CONTINUED TO BURN OFF
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• •
LIQUID PROPANE GAS CAR
THAT BLEW APART DURING VENTING
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BLACK ASH FROM BURNING STYRENE
ON STREAM BANK
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BURNED-OUT VEGETATION
ALONG DRAINAGE TRIBUTARY
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