United States
   Environmental Protection
   Agency
Region 4
345 Courtland Street. ME
Atlanta GA 30308
November 1980
904/9-80-063
   L&N Train Derailment
   Molino, Florida

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                          PREFACE
     This report reflects the activities of the Environ-

mental Emergency Branch (EEB) Region IV, EPA, as it was

concerned with the captioned event.  The report outlines

the key actions of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, the

Regional Response Team (RRT), and state, local, and Federal

members of the RRT.  It reflects the complexity of respond-

ing to environmental emergencies and the need to coordinate

and plan in advance for a major incident such as this event,

     This report is intended to satisfy the requirements of

the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution contin-

gency Plan and to help others learn from our experiences.
                             Al J.Smith, Chief
                             Environmental Emergency Branch

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                          TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section                                                       Page





   1.     SUMMARY	    1-1





   2.     THE SITUATION	    2-1





   3.     PHOTOGRAPHS	    3-1
                           LIST OF FIGURES
Figure                                                        Page





 2-1      	    2-2
                                 ill

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                             1.  SUMMARY
     On November 11, 1979, the United States  Environmental  Protection
Agency (EPA) received a report from the National  Response  Center  of  a
train derailment near Molino, Florida.  The accident  involved  22  of  a
105-car train of the L & N Railroad.  Of those 22,  the  ones  of primary
concern were six containing liquid propane gas and  one  each  of cars
holding ethyl alcohol, styrene monomer, and acetone.  There  were  sev-
eral tank cars of sulfur near the derailment  that were  not  involved.
Approximately 200 people were evacuated from  the  area as several  of
the liquid propane gas cars burned.
     Ray Wilkerson of EPA Region IV in Atlanta was  designated  On-Scene
Coordinator for the incident.  The Regional Response  Team  (RRT) was
activated and several options were discussed:

     1.  Keep the area evacuated and  let the  cars burn  out  on
         their own;
     2.  Vent the cars or destruct them by ground team  placement  of
         charges;
     3.  Conduct an air strike;
     4.  Wait for boiling liquid expanding vapor  explosion  (BLEVE).

     A federal response was declared  under Section  311  of  the  Clean
Water Act.  It was decided to vent all nine cars  at the same time.
Jet Research Company was hired to perform the detonation on  November
13, with technical assistance from the Army Explosive Ordnance Dis-
posal team.
                                  1-1

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     The area was evacuated for five miles.  After  detonation,  a
fireball 3,000 feet high and one-fourth mile in diameter  was  observed.
No shock wave or audible explosion was  detected  at  the command post,
approximately 2.5 miles from the site.  The fireball  lasted  15-30
seconds.
     Dn November 14, an inspection of the cars revealed that  all the
cars had vented except one liquid propane gas car that had a  frost
line and was suspected to be an explosion hazard.   The fire  department
reported that there were no significant fires outside the site,  and
no accounts of damage to structures or animals in the area.   It was
decided to vent the remaining car.
     Later inspection of the area and the stream  revealed that  one
liquid propane gas car was still burning and that one styrene car was
smoking.  Some burning styrene had flowed down Pretty Branch  Creek
about one-fourth mile.  There was no evidence of  styrene  left in the
strecjn.
     After a thorough investigation of the area by  the OSC and  a state
representative, it was decided that any contaminated soil could  be
disposed of on-scene and that the threat of pollution from the  remain-
ing material was insignificant.
     In conclusion, the situation presented by the  L & N  derailment
was extremely dangerous to the public and the environment.  After
careful consideration of the options, the RRT decided that venting the
cars was the most efficient way to resolve the matter.  All nine sus-
pect cars were successfully vented.  In this operation, one car  was
completely destroyed and another, partially; all  the others had  small
holes in them.
                                 1-2

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                           2.   THE SITUATION
     At 1:30 a.m. on  November  11,  1979,  22 of a 105-car train of the
L & N Railroad  derailed  while  enroute from Louisiana to Pensacola,
Florida.  The cars  left  the  track  approximately two miles west of
Molino, Florida,  at what railroad  officials said was a roadbed washout
over Pretty Branch  Creek (Figure 2-1).   The cars of primary concern
were six containing liquid propane gas  and one each of others holding
acetone, styrene monomer, and  ethyl  alcohol.   Other derailed cars were
box- and tote cars  containing  foodstuff  and nonhazardous substances.
There were several  tank  cars of sulfur near the derailment, but they
were not involved.
     An extremely hazardous  situation existed because several of the
liquid propane  gas  cars  were burning  and in danger  of a boiling liquid
expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE);  the acetone car  was nearby and the
ethyl alcohol car was  leaking.
     By 2:00 a.m.,  local  law enforcement,  Civil  Defense, and the Red
Cross had evacuated about 70 families.   An evacuation shelter was set
up at Molino Elementary  School.

Response and Observations:   Chronological  Events

November 11, 1979

     Ray Wilkerson  of  EPA Region IV  in Atlanta was  notified at 5:00
a.m.  of the L & N derailment near  Molino,  Florida.   Shortly afterward,
Mr. Wilkerson, who  had been  designated On-Scene  Coordinator (OSC) for
                                  2-1

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'66
                                 FLORIDA-ALABAMA
                         MUSCOGEE QUADRANGLE    v
                             15-MINUTE SERIES     ^
                    .-.«       j    (570000   .       Atc      «7°iR'
                    '72       I    Vrci.jiii, R in w  *75      °' ' =
                                                                                         30° 45'

                                                                                            COMMAND
                                                                                            POST
                                                                                         3397 SECONDAfl
                                                                                            DERAILME
                                                                                            SITE      i
                                                                                            FIRST    J
                                                                                            DERAILMB
                                                                                            SITE      I
                               SCALE 1:62500

 1       *       U_- -=	'	2	    _^J	
                                         '<*\^?^<~2---
                                         ^&--:fe:*^-
                                            Contour interval 10 feet
                                       4 Mitts   Datum la mean HUH level
   3000       0       300(>      6000
    SCJ-I b-j:,l— T-l .: I=-i.  .l?ri=tr^^
  9000
3 • -r—
  liuKO
-t~— -T -'  J
                             Figure 2-1  SITE OF L&N DERAILMENT
                                                2-2

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the  incident,  called  L &  N official  Charlie  Gatton  to  verify the
products  involved.  Mr. Gatton  provided  a  list  of the  cars  that  were
suspected to have been involved:

     6  liquid  propane gas (several burning)
     1  styrene
     1  solvent no.  8
     1  acetone
     10  liquid  sulfur  (some burning)
     1 methyl ethyl ketone
     7  anhydrous ammonia
     1  phenol
     5  boxcars
     At 5:30 a.m., the OSC briefed Al  Smith,  Chief  of  EPA  Region  IV
Environmental Emergency Branch.  Mr.  Smith told  the OSC  to  contact
Sanford Harvey to activate the Regional Response Team  (RRT).
     Al Smith arrived on-scene at 8:30 a.m.   The OSC,  accompanied by
Jan Rogers of EPA, arrived at 11:45 a.m.  and  was briefed by Mr.  Smith.
The burning liquid propane gas cars were  the  major  problem.   L &  N
officials Peter Gill and Charlie Owens visited the  site  and,  upon
their return to the command post, informed the EPA  officials  that it
was their opinion that a BLEVE from one of the liquid  propane gas cars
was imminent.
     An RRT meeting was set for 1:00  p.m.
attended, including:
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Approximately 35 people
Department of Interior (DOI)
Department of Transportation (DOT)
State Office of Disaster
Preparedness (OOP)
State Department of Environmental
Regulation (DER)
   Al Smith
   Ray Wilkerson
   Jan Rogers
   Waynon Johnson
   Captain D.F. Smith,
   Robert Smith

   George Hoffman
USCG
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     The organizational structure was  set  up  as  follows:

     Al Smith, RRT Chairman
     Ray Wilkerson, Federal OSC
     Robert Smith, State OSC
     M. K. Renfroe (Civil Defense),  Local  OSC

     Al Smith explained the National Oil and  Hazardous  Material  Con-
tingency Plan and the regional Contingency Plan  and  related  that all
decisions would be made by the RRT.  After  this  was  established, dis-
cussion of the situation began.  Mr. Renfroe  reported  that  about 70
families had been evacuated and most of them  were  being sheltered at
the Mo lino school.
     Mr. Gill and Mr. Owens were asked to  brief  the  RRT on  the situa-
tion at the wreck site.  Mr. Gill stated that there  was a possibility
of three BLEVES because of the three burning  liquid  propane  gas  cars
and the leaking alcohol car.  Mr. Gill said they would  like  to remove
all the sulfur cars and then look at the possibility of getting  the
Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team to blow  up  the  remaining
cars.  It was decided that the EOD team would be put on alert, and Mr.
Gill would present any other alternatives  at  the next meeting.  At
this time, there was some discussion about  the press;  it  was agreed
that Tommy Tate, Civil Defense Coordinator, would  be the  media
contact.
     The RRT meeting adjourned at 1:50 p.m.   Captain D.F. Smith  re-
turned to Mobile, Alabama.
     At 2:00 p.m., the USCG Gulf Strike Team  arrived.   At 3:00 p.m.,
the CSC, accompanied by Messrs. Gill and Owens and several  local
officials, flew over the site.
     Afterward, the OSC informed the RRT Chairman  that  the  burning
liquid propane gas cars presented a classic pre-BLEVE condition.  The
cars were piled one on top of the other at  about a 20°  angle;  the top
car had fire coming from the dome area and  flames  from  another car
were impinging on the elevated end or  vapor area of  it.
                                  2-4

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      Because of the extreme danger near the cars, the possibility of
 an  air  strike was discussed at this time.  This was considered a
 viable  solution.
      At 6:30 p.m., another RRT meeting convened.  Mr. Gill stated that
 the fire was intensifying and that L & N's contractor, OH Materials,
 could do nothing.  He asked the owner of the product to state an opin-
 ion.   It was stated that if the cars were not insulated, a BLEVE would
 have  occurred by this time.  The opinion was that one of the cars
 would BLEVE  within six hours.  It was felt that if the cars were left
 to  burn out, it could take seven days or longer.
      As a result  of this discussion, the evacuation area was increased
 to  two  miles.  Mr. Gill  said that undamaged sulfur cars would be re-
 moved within two-to-four hours.
      There were four options discussed at this meeting:
      1.   Keep the area evacuated and let the cars burn out on
          their own;
      2.   Activate the EOD team to vent the cars or destruct them;
      3.   Conduct  an air  strike;
      4.   Wait for a BLEVE.                     '
      The RRT meeting adjourned at 7:30 p.m.  Jim Littell of EPA Air
 Monitoring hand-carried  film taken on the overflight to Eglin Air
 Force Base.
      At  8:00 p.m., all  of the people being sheltered at the Molino
 school  were  moved outside the two-mile perimeter to the Jim Allen
 school.
      The OSC and  the RRT Chairman met with Rod Kendig, County Admin-
 istrator,  and  Messrs.  Tate,  Renfroe,  and R. Smith to discuss the
 situation  and to  bring  Mr.  Kendig up-to-date.
      The OSC left the  scene  at midnight.   John Cwiek of EPA remained
 on-scene to  monitor the  situation.

 November  12,  1979

      When the  OSC arrived on-scene at 7:00 a.m., Major Tom Salter and
the EOD  team  had  arrived  and  assessed  the  situation.  A meeting  was
held  with Major Salter,  L &  N, Civil  Defense,  and  EPA representatives.
                                 2-5

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Major Salter advised that his  staff  was  checking  with  the Department
of Defense on the possibility  of  an  air  strike.   Explosives  were en-
route to the scene.  Major  Salter  discussed  in  detail  how charges would
be placed on the cars.
     At 9:00 a.m.,  an RRT meeting  was  held.   Major  Salter briefed the
members on the method of applying  the  charges.  At  this  time,  it was
decided to vent  all nine cars.  The  Major  and the EOD  team left to
make an overflight  of the area.   L & N had expressed  some concern about
hand-placement of the charges.  They preferred  an air  strike because of
the hazc.rds involved.  Another burning liquid propane  gas car  had been
observed.
     Several members of the news  media came  to  this meeting  but were
asked to leave by the RRT Chairman.  It  was  later learned that because
of the state Sunshine Law,  Mr. Kendig  had  given his permission for the
press to attend.  They were assured  that they would be advised on the
course of action that the RRT  was  taking.
     The meeting adjourned  at  9:20 a.m.
     Majcr Salter returned  from the  overflight  disturbed that  there
were railroad people in the immediate  vicinity of the  tank car.  The
OSC contacted Peter Gill and advised him of  the situation.  Major
Salter called his superiors to get permission for the  EOD team to con-
duct the venting operation.  At 1:00 p.m., Major  Salter  received orders
that the iiOD team should not participate in  the detonation,   but could
remain on-scene  to  provide  technical assistance.   During this  time the
RRT Chairrtan was informed that a  private company, Jet  Research, had the
capability to conduct the venting  operation.
     At 2:00 p.m.,  an RRT meeting  convened to inform  its members of the
Army's decision  and to discuss bringing  in a private  contractor to con-
duct the vesting operation.  This  meeting  was open  to  the press.  Mr.
Kendig explained the status of the situation  since  the EOD would not
be able to proceed  with the operation.  At this time,  Mr. Kicliter, an
expert from the  Liquid Propane Gas Association, was introduced and
offered a solution  to the problem:   go in  with  dry  chemicals and put
out all the fires;  attach a two-inch pipe  to  valves on the leaking
liquid propane gas  car, reignite  the gas and  allow  it  to burn  out.
This idea wjs rejected by the  RRT  as not being  feasible  because of the
                                    2-6

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 numerous  fires  in  the  area.   At  this  time,  the chairman introduced the
 proposal  to  bring  in a private contractor  to  vent  the cars.   Mr.  Gill
 was  advised  to  discuss the related  liability  with  his company.   Don
 Jensen of the Atlantic Strike Team  was  instructed  to contact the
 Eighth Coast Guard  District  and  advise  them of a possible "311" action
 in case the  company refused  to take appropriate steps.
     At this time,  further discussion took  place on  how long the  cars
 would continue  to  burn if they were allowed to burn  out.   In this
 meeting there were  three county  commissioners and  the school board
 chairman.  The  consensus was  that the liquid  propane gas  cars would
 burn for  a week or  longer.   Mr.  Kendig  asked  the commissioners  for
 their opinions.  One commissioner said  he  thought  the liquid propane
 gas expert had  a viable solution.   The  other  two commissioners  and the
 school board chairman  did not agree with this because they did  not
 want to keep the school closed or the evacuees away  from  their  homes
 any longer than necessary.   At this time,  keeping  the residents out of
 the evacuation  area had become a problem and  it was  necessary for the
 governor  to  issue  an order to the sheriff giving him authority  to
 arrest anyone found inside the area.  Venting the  cars  would allow the
 evacuation to be lifted the  next day  if  it  were successful.
     There was  a unanimous decision by  the  RRT members  to use the pri-
vate contractor to  vent the  cars as soon as possible.   L  & N agreed to
 hire the  Jet Research  Company (JRC) to  come on-scene and  evaluate the
 situation.
     The  RRT meeting adjourned at 4:30 p.m.
     Mr.  Rogers contacted Wayne  Rutledge of JRC to request that he
proceed to the  scene as soon  as  possible.

November  13, 1979

     At 7:00 a.m.,  Mr.  Rogers and the OSC arrived  on-scene.   Mr.
Rogers was given the task of  arranging for  aerial  photography of  the
venting operation.  Lt. Col.  Andrews, Department of  Defense  represen-
tative, arrived on-scene.
     The evacuation area was  extended to 2.5  miles.
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     At 11:00 a.m., JRC personnel  arrived  on-scene  and  were  briefed on
the situation.  They proceeded to  make  a ground  inspection  of the
cars.
     After Mr. Rutledge made  an overflight of  the  cars, he  recom-
mended to L & N that all nine tank cars be vented.   At  this  time, K.C.
Dufford, Vice President of  Operations for  L &  N, was present.  Mr.
Dufford asked if the company  could have a  private meeting  to discuss
the proDosal.  The RRT agreed.
     Mr. Rutledge and Major Salter were in agreement that  all nine
tank cars should be vented  at the  same  time.   It was believed that
unless ill 1 nine cars were vented  at  once,  the  extreme heat  generated
by the vented cars could damage the  other  hazardous chemical cars,
increasing the environmental  risks involved.
     The RRT Chairman asked Lt. Col. Andrews  and the EOD team to
assist JRC in transferring  explosives to the  scene.  Mr. Rutledge
advised that it would be necessary for  him to  start placing  charges by
2:00 p.n;. so that the operation could be completed  before  dark.
     At 1:15 p.m., the L &  N  officials  had not returned from their
meeting.  It was discovered that  they had  returned  to the  scene of the
tank cars.  L & N was advised by  radio  of  the  2:00 p.m. deadline.
Shortly afterward, L & N officials returned to the  command  post with
the proposal to hire JRC to vent  the three burning  liquid  propane gas
cars and, after they had burned out, reinspect the  remaining cars and
vent then as necessary.
     At 1:58 p.m., the RRT  convened  and the proposal was presented and
rejected by all members of  the RRT.  A  unanimous decision  was reached
to declare a federal response under  Section 311 of  the  Clean Water Act
because of the imninent threat to  navigable waterways;  the  suspicion
that the styrene car was leaking  into Pretty  Branch Creek;  and the
failure of L & N Railroad to  take  action deemed  appropriate  by the
RRT and the OSC.  JRC would proceed  with venting all nine  tank cars.
L & N refused to participate  in any  of  the venting  operations, includ-
ing the JRC inspection costs.
     At ^00 p.m., JRC went to the scene to start  placing  charges.
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     The  Coast  Guard  National  Strike  Team  was  instructed to assist the'
 local  Civil  Defense  in  extending  the  evacuation  perimeter to five
miles  to  ensure that  no one  would be  injured.   The command post re-
ceived word  from personnel at  one of  the roadblocks that there were
some people  trying to get  into the restricted  area.  The officer at
the roadblock was advised  to escort the people to  the command post.
They introduced themselves as  T.  A. Phemister, R.  J.  Holden, and Frank
Stanley with the Association of American Railroads.  They stated that
they were concerned  about  the  way the cars  were  to be vented and did
not think it was necessary.  Al Smith asked  why  they had not voiced
their  opinion before  this, since  Mr.  Stanley had attended all of the
RRT meetings.   Mr. Smith advised  them that  the decision to vent the
cars had  been reached by the entire RRT after  evaluating all alter-
natives.
     At 3:30 p.m., Civil Defense  completed  the evacuation to five
miles.
     The  OSC and Rod  Kendig made  an overflight to  ensure that all
personnel were  clear  of the  area.
     At 5:07 p.m., the  RRT Chairman received word  at the command post
that the charges were ready.   At  5:12 p.m.,  he gave the order to
detonate  the tank cars.  A fireball 3,000 feet high by one-fourth mile
in diameter was observed.  No  shock wave or  audible explosion was
detected  at the command  post,  approximately  2.5  miles from the site.
Duration of the fireball was 15-30 seconds.
     At 5:30 p.m., the  fire chief made an overflight  to check for
structural damage and to determine the extent  of the  fire.  He re-
ported that the fire  was primarily restricted  to a one-fourth-mile
diameter area.
     At 5:50 p.m., Mr.  Rutledge made  an overflight to inspect the
cars; he reported that  eight cars  were burning and one was in ques-
tion.  He reported no damage to structures  in  the  area.  Some small
spot fires were  observed about  three-fourths mile  from the fire.
     At 6:00 p.m., Mr.  Littell  reported from one mile downwind that
there was no odor from  the fire and the plume  was  dispersing.
     At 7:00 p.m., operations  were secured for the night.
                                 2-9

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November 14, 1979

     At 3:30 a.m., an inspection of the cars revealed that  all cars
had venbed except one liquid propane gas car, which had a frost  line
and was suspected to be an explosion hazard.
     At 10:15 a.m., an RRT meeting was held to discuss the  operation
and to nake a decision on the remaining car.  The fire department
reported that there were no significant fires outside the burn area,
and no damage to structures or animals in the area.  The decision  was
made to have JRC vent the remaining car.
     At 12:18 p.m., the last car was vented.  JRC also detonated
excess sxplosives.
     At 1:00 p.mi, the RRT Chairman made an overflight of the area and
determined it was safe for workmen to enter.
     Afterward, Jan Rogers, Ray Wilkerson, Don Jensen, and  Charlie
Gatton vant to the scene to make an inspection of the area  and the
stream.  One liquid propane gas car was still burning and the styrene
car was smoking.  The railroad crew began removing derailed cars and
debris.  Some styrene liquid had leached into the soil adjacent  to
Pretty Branch Creek.  A small quantity of burned styrene residue was
found one-fourth mile downstream.  There was no evidence of styrene
left in the stream.
     After a thorough inspection of the area with a state representa-
tive, it was decided that any contaminated soil could be disposed  of
on-scen2 and that the threat of pollution from the remaining material
was insignificant.  The group returned to the command post  and secured
the operation.
     At 3:00 p.m., the RRT was deactivated.
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3.  PHOTOGRAPHS
       3-1

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DERAILMENT SITE THE FOLLOWING DAY

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SBRH


                         VENT HOLE IN ALCOHOL CAR
                         MADE BY EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

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RESIDUAL STYRENE BURNING INSIDE TANK CAR

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LIQUID PROPANE GAS TANK
AND BURNED VEGETATION

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PRODUCT BURNING OFF TANK CARS

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SMOLDERING REMAINS AFTER ALL TANKS HAD BEEN VENTED.
        SOME PRODUCT CONTINUED TO BURN OFF

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• •
                                        LIQUID PROPANE GAS CAR
                                   THAT BLEW APART DURING VENTING

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BLACK ASH FROM BURNING STYRENE
       ON STREAM BANK

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  BURNED-OUT VEGETATION
ALONG DRAINAGE TRIBUTARY

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