United States Environmental Protection Agency Region 4 345 Courtland Street. ME Atlanta GA 30308 November 1980 904/9-80-063 L&N Train Derailment Molino, Florida * jf* ------- PREFACE This report reflects the activities of the Environ- mental Emergency Branch (EEB) Region IV, EPA, as it was concerned with the captioned event. The report outlines the key actions of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, the Regional Response Team (RRT), and state, local, and Federal members of the RRT. It reflects the complexity of respond- ing to environmental emergencies and the need to coordinate and plan in advance for a major incident such as this event, This report is intended to satisfy the requirements of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution contin- gency Plan and to help others learn from our experiences. Al J.Smith, Chief Environmental Emergency Branch ------- TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page 1. SUMMARY 1-1 2. THE SITUATION 2-1 3. PHOTOGRAPHS 3-1 LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 2-1 2-2 ill ------- 1. SUMMARY On November 11, 1979, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) received a report from the National Response Center of a train derailment near Molino, Florida. The accident involved 22 of a 105-car train of the L & N Railroad. Of those 22, the ones of primary concern were six containing liquid propane gas and one each of cars holding ethyl alcohol, styrene monomer, and acetone. There were sev- eral tank cars of sulfur near the derailment that were not involved. Approximately 200 people were evacuated from the area as several of the liquid propane gas cars burned. Ray Wilkerson of EPA Region IV in Atlanta was designated On-Scene Coordinator for the incident. The Regional Response Team (RRT) was activated and several options were discussed: 1. Keep the area evacuated and let the cars burn out on their own; 2. Vent the cars or destruct them by ground team placement of charges; 3. Conduct an air strike; 4. Wait for boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). A federal response was declared under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act. It was decided to vent all nine cars at the same time. Jet Research Company was hired to perform the detonation on November 13, with technical assistance from the Army Explosive Ordnance Dis- posal team. 1-1 ------- The area was evacuated for five miles. After detonation, a fireball 3,000 feet high and one-fourth mile in diameter was observed. No shock wave or audible explosion was detected at the command post, approximately 2.5 miles from the site. The fireball lasted 15-30 seconds. Dn November 14, an inspection of the cars revealed that all the cars had vented except one liquid propane gas car that had a frost line and was suspected to be an explosion hazard. The fire department reported that there were no significant fires outside the site, and no accounts of damage to structures or animals in the area. It was decided to vent the remaining car. Later inspection of the area and the stream revealed that one liquid propane gas car was still burning and that one styrene car was smoking. Some burning styrene had flowed down Pretty Branch Creek about one-fourth mile. There was no evidence of styrene left in the strecjn. After a thorough investigation of the area by the OSC and a state representative, it was decided that any contaminated soil could be disposed of on-scene and that the threat of pollution from the remain- ing material was insignificant. In conclusion, the situation presented by the L & N derailment was extremely dangerous to the public and the environment. After careful consideration of the options, the RRT decided that venting the cars was the most efficient way to resolve the matter. All nine sus- pect cars were successfully vented. In this operation, one car was completely destroyed and another, partially; all the others had small holes in them. 1-2 ------- 2. THE SITUATION At 1:30 a.m. on November 11, 1979, 22 of a 105-car train of the L & N Railroad derailed while enroute from Louisiana to Pensacola, Florida. The cars left the track approximately two miles west of Molino, Florida, at what railroad officials said was a roadbed washout over Pretty Branch Creek (Figure 2-1). The cars of primary concern were six containing liquid propane gas and one each of others holding acetone, styrene monomer, and ethyl alcohol. Other derailed cars were box- and tote cars containing foodstuff and nonhazardous substances. There were several tank cars of sulfur near the derailment, but they were not involved. An extremely hazardous situation existed because several of the liquid propane gas cars were burning and in danger of a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE); the acetone car was nearby and the ethyl alcohol car was leaking. By 2:00 a.m., local law enforcement, Civil Defense, and the Red Cross had evacuated about 70 families. An evacuation shelter was set up at Molino Elementary School. Response and Observations: Chronological Events November 11, 1979 Ray Wilkerson of EPA Region IV in Atlanta was notified at 5:00 a.m. of the L & N derailment near Molino, Florida. Shortly afterward, Mr. Wilkerson, who had been designated On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) for 2-1 ------- '66 FLORIDA-ALABAMA MUSCOGEE QUADRANGLE v 15-MINUTE SERIES ^ .-.« j (570000 . Atc «7°iR' '72 I Vrci.jiii, R in w *75 °' ' = 30° 45' COMMAND POST 3397 SECONDAfl DERAILME SITE i FIRST J DERAILMB SITE I SCALE 1:62500 1 * U_- -= ' 2 _^J '<*\^?^<~2--- ^&--:fe:*^- Contour interval 10 feet 4 Mitts Datum la mean HUH level 3000 0 300(> 6000 SCJ-I b-j:,l— T-l .: I=-i. .l?ri=tr^^ 9000 3 • -r— liuKO -t~— -T -' J Figure 2-1 SITE OF L&N DERAILMENT 2-2 ------- the incident, called L & N official Charlie Gatton to verify the products involved. Mr. Gatton provided a list of the cars that were suspected to have been involved: 6 liquid propane gas (several burning) 1 styrene 1 solvent no. 8 1 acetone 10 liquid sulfur (some burning) 1 methyl ethyl ketone 7 anhydrous ammonia 1 phenol 5 boxcars At 5:30 a.m., the OSC briefed Al Smith, Chief of EPA Region IV Environmental Emergency Branch. Mr. Smith told the OSC to contact Sanford Harvey to activate the Regional Response Team (RRT). Al Smith arrived on-scene at 8:30 a.m. The OSC, accompanied by Jan Rogers of EPA, arrived at 11:45 a.m. and was briefed by Mr. Smith. The burning liquid propane gas cars were the major problem. L & N officials Peter Gill and Charlie Owens visited the site and, upon their return to the command post, informed the EPA officials that it was their opinion that a BLEVE from one of the liquid propane gas cars was imminent. An RRT meeting was set for 1:00 p.m. attended, including: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Approximately 35 people Department of Interior (DOI) Department of Transportation (DOT) State Office of Disaster Preparedness (OOP) State Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) Al Smith Ray Wilkerson Jan Rogers Waynon Johnson Captain D.F. Smith, Robert Smith George Hoffman USCG 2-3 ------- The organizational structure was set up as follows: Al Smith, RRT Chairman Ray Wilkerson, Federal OSC Robert Smith, State OSC M. K. Renfroe (Civil Defense), Local OSC Al Smith explained the National Oil and Hazardous Material Con- tingency Plan and the regional Contingency Plan and related that all decisions would be made by the RRT. After this was established, dis- cussion of the situation began. Mr. Renfroe reported that about 70 families had been evacuated and most of them were being sheltered at the Mo lino school. Mr. Gill and Mr. Owens were asked to brief the RRT on the situa- tion at the wreck site. Mr. Gill stated that there was a possibility of three BLEVES because of the three burning liquid propane gas cars and the leaking alcohol car. Mr. Gill said they would like to remove all the sulfur cars and then look at the possibility of getting the Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team to blow up the remaining cars. It was decided that the EOD team would be put on alert, and Mr. Gill would present any other alternatives at the next meeting. At this time, there was some discussion about the press; it was agreed that Tommy Tate, Civil Defense Coordinator, would be the media contact. The RRT meeting adjourned at 1:50 p.m. Captain D.F. Smith re- turned to Mobile, Alabama. At 2:00 p.m., the USCG Gulf Strike Team arrived. At 3:00 p.m., the CSC, accompanied by Messrs. Gill and Owens and several local officials, flew over the site. Afterward, the OSC informed the RRT Chairman that the burning liquid propane gas cars presented a classic pre-BLEVE condition. The cars were piled one on top of the other at about a 20° angle; the top car had fire coming from the dome area and flames from another car were impinging on the elevated end or vapor area of it. 2-4 ------- Because of the extreme danger near the cars, the possibility of an air strike was discussed at this time. This was considered a viable solution. At 6:30 p.m., another RRT meeting convened. Mr. Gill stated that the fire was intensifying and that L & N's contractor, OH Materials, could do nothing. He asked the owner of the product to state an opin- ion. It was stated that if the cars were not insulated, a BLEVE would have occurred by this time. The opinion was that one of the cars would BLEVE within six hours. It was felt that if the cars were left to burn out, it could take seven days or longer. As a result of this discussion, the evacuation area was increased to two miles. Mr. Gill said that undamaged sulfur cars would be re- moved within two-to-four hours. There were four options discussed at this meeting: 1. Keep the area evacuated and let the cars burn out on their own; 2. Activate the EOD team to vent the cars or destruct them; 3. Conduct an air strike; 4. Wait for a BLEVE. ' The RRT meeting adjourned at 7:30 p.m. Jim Littell of EPA Air Monitoring hand-carried film taken on the overflight to Eglin Air Force Base. At 8:00 p.m., all of the people being sheltered at the Molino school were moved outside the two-mile perimeter to the Jim Allen school. The OSC and the RRT Chairman met with Rod Kendig, County Admin- istrator, and Messrs. Tate, Renfroe, and R. Smith to discuss the situation and to bring Mr. Kendig up-to-date. The OSC left the scene at midnight. John Cwiek of EPA remained on-scene to monitor the situation. November 12, 1979 When the OSC arrived on-scene at 7:00 a.m., Major Tom Salter and the EOD team had arrived and assessed the situation. A meeting was held with Major Salter, L & N, Civil Defense, and EPA representatives. 2-5 ------- Major Salter advised that his staff was checking with the Department of Defense on the possibility of an air strike. Explosives were en- route to the scene. Major Salter discussed in detail how charges would be placed on the cars. At 9:00 a.m., an RRT meeting was held. Major Salter briefed the members on the method of applying the charges. At this time, it was decided to vent all nine cars. The Major and the EOD team left to make an overflight of the area. L & N had expressed some concern about hand-placement of the charges. They preferred an air strike because of the hazc.rds involved. Another burning liquid propane gas car had been observed. Several members of the news media came to this meeting but were asked to leave by the RRT Chairman. It was later learned that because of the state Sunshine Law, Mr. Kendig had given his permission for the press to attend. They were assured that they would be advised on the course of action that the RRT was taking. The meeting adjourned at 9:20 a.m. Majcr Salter returned from the overflight disturbed that there were railroad people in the immediate vicinity of the tank car. The OSC contacted Peter Gill and advised him of the situation. Major Salter called his superiors to get permission for the EOD team to con- duct the venting operation. At 1:00 p.m., Major Salter received orders that the iiOD team should not participate in the detonation, but could remain on-scene to provide technical assistance. During this time the RRT Chairrtan was informed that a private company, Jet Research, had the capability to conduct the venting operation. At 2:00 p.m., an RRT meeting convened to inform its members of the Army's decision and to discuss bringing in a private contractor to con- duct the vesting operation. This meeting was open to the press. Mr. Kendig explained the status of the situation since the EOD would not be able to proceed with the operation. At this time, Mr. Kicliter, an expert from the Liquid Propane Gas Association, was introduced and offered a solution to the problem: go in with dry chemicals and put out all the fires; attach a two-inch pipe to valves on the leaking liquid propane gas car, reignite the gas and allow it to burn out. This idea wjs rejected by the RRT as not being feasible because of the 2-6 ------- numerous fires in the area. At this time, the chairman introduced the proposal to bring in a private contractor to vent the cars. Mr. Gill was advised to discuss the related liability with his company. Don Jensen of the Atlantic Strike Team was instructed to contact the Eighth Coast Guard District and advise them of a possible "311" action in case the company refused to take appropriate steps. At this time, further discussion took place on how long the cars would continue to burn if they were allowed to burn out. In this meeting there were three county commissioners and the school board chairman. The consensus was that the liquid propane gas cars would burn for a week or longer. Mr. Kendig asked the commissioners for their opinions. One commissioner said he thought the liquid propane gas expert had a viable solution. The other two commissioners and the school board chairman did not agree with this because they did not want to keep the school closed or the evacuees away from their homes any longer than necessary. At this time, keeping the residents out of the evacuation area had become a problem and it was necessary for the governor to issue an order to the sheriff giving him authority to arrest anyone found inside the area. Venting the cars would allow the evacuation to be lifted the next day if it were successful. There was a unanimous decision by the RRT members to use the pri- vate contractor to vent the cars as soon as possible. L & N agreed to hire the Jet Research Company (JRC) to come on-scene and evaluate the situation. The RRT meeting adjourned at 4:30 p.m. Mr. Rogers contacted Wayne Rutledge of JRC to request that he proceed to the scene as soon as possible. November 13, 1979 At 7:00 a.m., Mr. Rogers and the OSC arrived on-scene. Mr. Rogers was given the task of arranging for aerial photography of the venting operation. Lt. Col. Andrews, Department of Defense represen- tative, arrived on-scene. The evacuation area was extended to 2.5 miles. 2-7 ------- At 11:00 a.m., JRC personnel arrived on-scene and were briefed on the situation. They proceeded to make a ground inspection of the cars. After Mr. Rutledge made an overflight of the cars, he recom- mended to L & N that all nine tank cars be vented. At this time, K.C. Dufford, Vice President of Operations for L & N, was present. Mr. Dufford asked if the company could have a private meeting to discuss the proDosal. The RRT agreed. Mr. Rutledge and Major Salter were in agreement that all nine tank cars should be vented at the same time. It was believed that unless ill 1 nine cars were vented at once, the extreme heat generated by the vented cars could damage the other hazardous chemical cars, increasing the environmental risks involved. The RRT Chairman asked Lt. Col. Andrews and the EOD team to assist JRC in transferring explosives to the scene. Mr. Rutledge advised that it would be necessary for him to start placing charges by 2:00 p.n;. so that the operation could be completed before dark. At 1:15 p.m., the L & N officials had not returned from their meeting. It was discovered that they had returned to the scene of the tank cars. L & N was advised by radio of the 2:00 p.m. deadline. Shortly afterward, L & N officials returned to the command post with the proposal to hire JRC to vent the three burning liquid propane gas cars and, after they had burned out, reinspect the remaining cars and vent then as necessary. At 1:58 p.m., the RRT convened and the proposal was presented and rejected by all members of the RRT. A unanimous decision was reached to declare a federal response under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act because of the imninent threat to navigable waterways; the suspicion that the styrene car was leaking into Pretty Branch Creek; and the failure of L & N Railroad to take action deemed appropriate by the RRT and the OSC. JRC would proceed with venting all nine tank cars. L & N refused to participate in any of the venting operations, includ- ing the JRC inspection costs. At ^00 p.m., JRC went to the scene to start placing charges. 2-8 ------- The Coast Guard National Strike Team was instructed to assist the' local Civil Defense in extending the evacuation perimeter to five miles to ensure that no one would be injured. The command post re- ceived word from personnel at one of the roadblocks that there were some people trying to get into the restricted area. The officer at the roadblock was advised to escort the people to the command post. They introduced themselves as T. A. Phemister, R. J. Holden, and Frank Stanley with the Association of American Railroads. They stated that they were concerned about the way the cars were to be vented and did not think it was necessary. Al Smith asked why they had not voiced their opinion before this, since Mr. Stanley had attended all of the RRT meetings. Mr. Smith advised them that the decision to vent the cars had been reached by the entire RRT after evaluating all alter- natives. At 3:30 p.m., Civil Defense completed the evacuation to five miles. The OSC and Rod Kendig made an overflight to ensure that all personnel were clear of the area. At 5:07 p.m., the RRT Chairman received word at the command post that the charges were ready. At 5:12 p.m., he gave the order to detonate the tank cars. A fireball 3,000 feet high by one-fourth mile in diameter was observed. No shock wave or audible explosion was detected at the command post, approximately 2.5 miles from the site. Duration of the fireball was 15-30 seconds. At 5:30 p.m., the fire chief made an overflight to check for structural damage and to determine the extent of the fire. He re- ported that the fire was primarily restricted to a one-fourth-mile diameter area. At 5:50 p.m., Mr. Rutledge made an overflight to inspect the cars; he reported that eight cars were burning and one was in ques- tion. He reported no damage to structures in the area. Some small spot fires were observed about three-fourths mile from the fire. At 6:00 p.m., Mr. Littell reported from one mile downwind that there was no odor from the fire and the plume was dispersing. At 7:00 p.m., operations were secured for the night. 2-9 ------- November 14, 1979 At 3:30 a.m., an inspection of the cars revealed that all cars had venbed except one liquid propane gas car, which had a frost line and was suspected to be an explosion hazard. At 10:15 a.m., an RRT meeting was held to discuss the operation and to nake a decision on the remaining car. The fire department reported that there were no significant fires outside the burn area, and no damage to structures or animals in the area. The decision was made to have JRC vent the remaining car. At 12:18 p.m., the last car was vented. JRC also detonated excess sxplosives. At 1:00 p.mi, the RRT Chairman made an overflight of the area and determined it was safe for workmen to enter. Afterward, Jan Rogers, Ray Wilkerson, Don Jensen, and Charlie Gatton vant to the scene to make an inspection of the area and the stream. One liquid propane gas car was still burning and the styrene car was smoking. The railroad crew began removing derailed cars and debris. Some styrene liquid had leached into the soil adjacent to Pretty Branch Creek. A small quantity of burned styrene residue was found one-fourth mile downstream. There was no evidence of styrene left in the stream. After a thorough inspection of the area with a state representa- tive, it was decided that any contaminated soil could be disposed of on-scen2 and that the threat of pollution from the remaining material was insignificant. The group returned to the command post and secured the operation. At 3:00 p.m., the RRT was deactivated. 2-10 ------- 3. PHOTOGRAPHS 3-1 ------- DERAILMENT SITE THE FOLLOWING DAY ------- SBRH VENT HOLE IN ALCOHOL CAR MADE BY EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ------- RESIDUAL STYRENE BURNING INSIDE TANK CAR ------- LIQUID PROPANE GAS TANK AND BURNED VEGETATION ------- PRODUCT BURNING OFF TANK CARS ------- SMOLDERING REMAINS AFTER ALL TANKS HAD BEEN VENTED. SOME PRODUCT CONTINUED TO BURN OFF ------- • • LIQUID PROPANE GAS CAR THAT BLEW APART DURING VENTING ------- BLACK ASH FROM BURNING STYRENE ON STREAM BANK ------- BURNED-OUT VEGETATION ALONG DRAINAGE TRIBUTARY ------- |