BACKGROUND DOCUMENT
RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT
SUBTITLE C - HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT
SECTION 3004 - STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO
OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
TREATMENT, STORAGE, AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES
PARTS 264 AND 265
SUBPART B - GENERAL FACILITY STANDARDS
SECTION 264.14 STANDARDS FOR SECURITY
SECTION 265.14 INTERIM STATUS STANDARDS FOR SECURITY
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE
29, 1980
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paqe
FOREWORD iv
INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE FOR THE REGULATION 1
I. RCRA Authority for the Regulation 1
II. Damage Cases 2
III. State Regulations 3
ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS FOR SECURITY,
ORGANIZED BY SUBJECT , 7
I. Subject: CONTROLLED ACCESS 8
A. Summary of Proposed Standards ..... 8
B. Rationale for the Proposed Standards 8
C. Summary of and Response to Comments 11
Issue #1: Design vs. general performance
standards 11
Issue #2: Exemptxohs to the requirements for
controlled access 13
Issue #3: The requirement for a six foot
fence 17
Issue #4: The security requirements at the
entrance to the active portion of
a facility 20
Issue #5: New vs. existing facilities 22
Issue f6: Special requirements for urban areas ... 24
D. Final Regulation Language 25
II. Subject: SIGNS 27
A. Summary of Proposed Standard 27
B. Rationale for the Proposed Standard 27
C. Summary and Response to Comments 29
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Issue #1: The requirement for
bxlinguai signs 29
Issue #2: The content of the signs 30
Issue #3: The placement of the signs ........ 32
D. Final Regulation Language 34
III. Subject: GENERAL COMMENTS 35
Issue #1: Special Waste Facilities 35
Issue #2: Interaction with the Regional
Administrator 39
Issue #3: Integration with the U.S. Coast
Guard's waterfront facility
regulations 39
Issue #4: Integration with EPA's SPCC Plan 40
References 42
Appendix I State Regulations 43
Appendix II Final Regulation Language 44
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FOREWORD
This is one of a series of documents providing support
and background information for regulations issued under
Section 3004 of the Resource. Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA). This Background Document is divided into two parts.
The first part contains introductory material which addresses
the Congressional authority for the regulation, key definitions
used in the regulation, examples of damage incidents which
illustrate the need for the regulation, and a description of
precedents set for the regulation by state and/or other Federal
statutes. The second part of this document describes the
regulation as originally proposed, summarizes and responds
to comments received that relate to the proposed regulation,
and indicates the Agency's rationale for the final regulation.
On December 18, 1978, in §250.43-2 of the RCRA Section
3004 regulations, the Agency proposed standards for security
at hazardous waste facilities. As specified in §250.40(c)(2)(i)
of the proposed rules, the. proposed §250.43-2 standards also
applied to facilities with interim status. This document
•addresses these proposed security standards.
The text of the final standards for security is contained
in Appendix II of this document.
IV
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INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE FOR THE REGULATION
I. RCRA Authority for the Regulation
In Section 3004 of Subtitle C of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act, as substantially amended by the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§6901
et seq., the Congress of the United States mandates the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to
establish such standards for hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities as may be necessary to pro-
tect human health and the environment. Performance standards
which include the control of access to hazardous waste
facilities certainly are authorized by Section 3004 of RCRA.
The discussion of "open dumps" in the House Report on
RCRA,1 describes the potential hazards of "open dumping".*
These hazards include harm to the environment (e.g., from
fire and injury to people who enter these disposal sites
without authorization)-^ The Legislative History describes
an incident in which several Indian children were injured
while playing at a dump.3 Clearly, if such incidents are
to be prevented, access to solid waste facilities must be
controlled.
To fully comply with the Section 3004 mandate to promul-
gate standards which will protect human health and the envi-
ronment, EPA believes that regulations are necessary which
* Although the House Report's discussion on "open dumps" deals
with solid waste, because hazardous waste is a subset of
solid waste, the discussion applies here.
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will ensure that access to hazardous waste management faci-
lities is controlled. EPA is promulgating these regulations
jointly under the authority of Section 3004 and under Section
2002(a)(l) of RCRA, which authorizes the Administrator to
"prescribe...such regulations as are necessary to carry out
his functions under this Act (RCRA)".
II. Damage Cases
The Agency believes that the following damage incidents
are good examples of the types of damage that can result when
access to.hazardous waste is not controlled. They provide
part of the rationale for controlling access onto hazardous
waste management facilities:
(l) In 1972, an unsuspecting farmer found mercury-
treated grain at the Wilson Creek dump in Grant
County, Washington. He hauled it to his farm for
livestock feed. The episode was discovered just
before the farmer planned to use the grain.4
(2) In 1969, about 100 bags of grain treated with
methyl mercury type seed dressing were discovered
at a community dump in New Mexico. Public health
authorities established that some of this dumped
grain had been scavenged and used as animal feed in
the area. As a result, a large number of hogs,
chickens, and other animals had to be quarantined.5
Damage incidents (l) and (2) illustrate the need to
control access to hazardous waste facilities in order to
prevent unauthorized scavenging and resulting public health
problems.
(3) Several sheep and cattle and a foxhound died, and
many cattle became seriously affected, on two farms
close to a factory producing rodenticides and
pesticides in Great Britian. The drainage from the
factory led into a succession of ponds to which the
animals had unrestricted access, and from which
they apparently drank.6
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This damage incident illustrates the need to control
access of livestock, as well as people, onto hazardous waste
facilities. This control is needed, not only to protect the
health of the livestock, but also to protect the health of
the people who may consume the livestock.
(4) A large number of barrels containing flammable
chemical residues are stored in an unfenced area
adjacent to a low-income housing project in
Washington, D.C. An alley separates the site
from an elementary school and adjoining play-
ground. Chemical-laden surface water run-off
travels from the storage site .to the school
property. In the mid-1970's, school children
set fire to the drums, sending flames high into
the sky. School employees told EPA officials
that children often play in/on the drums after
school, and that children scatter the drums onto
the school property almost every weekend.^ in
October, 1979, the Department of Environmental
Services for the District of Columbia advised
the owner of the site that (among other things)
the inadequate security system at the site should
be corrected.^
This damage incident illustrates the potential dangers
that exist when hazardous waste facilities are not segregated
from the public. Although no one was hurt as a result of the
fire which the children set, if a similar incident occurs
again, the outcome may not be as fortunate.
III. State Regulations
EPA reviewed the solid waste management regulations of
15 States, listed in Table 1, to assess the State governments'
perceived need to control access to solid and/or hazardous
waste management facilities. The fifteen States chosen for
this review are geographically representative of those States
which either generate the largest amount of hazardous waste
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or have well-established regulations for managing solid and/or
hazardous waste.9 Many of the fifteen States meet both of
these criteria.
TABLE 1
STATES CHOSEN FOR REGULATION* ANALYSIS
(By EPA Region)
Region
I
II
III
IV
V
State
Connecticut
Rhode Island
New York
Maryland
Tennessee
Illinois
Minnesota
Region
VI •
VII
VIII
IX
X
State
Arkansas
Oklahoma
Iowa
Montana
California
Hawaii
Oregon
Washington
* Citations for these regulations are contained in
Appendix I.
All of the 15 States' regulations that were reviewed
dealt with security at solid and/or hazardous waste facilities
Seven of the States' regulations take the form of general
performance standards, and all seven require that access
to facilities be controlled. Many of the seven suggest ways
to do this, but none require any one particular method to
control access.
FENCING; On the other hand, nine States require that faci-
lities be surrounded by fences, although none of these states
specify the height, or the construction materials.
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GUARDED ENTRANCES; Three of the nine States also require that
entrances to facilities be locked or guarded when facilities
are not in operation. One of the nine requires that entrances
to facilities be locked or guarded 24 hours a day.
In addition, tv/o of the States which don't specifically
require fencing, do require that access to the facility be
prevented during non-operating hours. However, they do
not specify how this is to be done.
SIGNS; Seven States require that signs be posted at facil-
ities. Six of these States require that the signs be posted
at the entrance(s) to facilities. One State also requires
that signs be posted around the periphery of disposal areas,
while another State doesn't specify any location for the
signs.
Three of the seven States require that these signs
provide a warning of the presence of hazardous waste. However,
none of the States specify the size of the sign or the letters
on the sign, although one State does require that the sign
be legible from a distance of at least 25 feet.
LIVESTOCK; Two States specify that the entry of livestock
should be controlled at facilities.
From this review, the Agency concluded that, although
there is widespread agreement that access to facilities needs
to be controlled, these States have chosen various ways of
proceeding. There seems to be an even split between those
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States whose regulations for security are performance-oriented
vs. those whose regulations are design-oriented.
What is clear, however, is that controlling access to
hazardous waste facilities is viewed as an important part of
each of the fifteen States' regulatory program for solid
and/or hazardous waste.
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ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS FOR SECURITY, ORGANIZED BY SUBJECT
Standards for security applicable to owners or operators
of hazardous waste facilities were specified in §250.43-2 of
the RCRA Subtitle C regulations proposed on December 18, 1978.
As specified in §250.40(c)(2)(i) of the proposed rules, these
standards also applied to owners or operators of facilities
with interim status.
Some of the proposed security standards contained "Notes"
which provided conditions for variances to the standards.
Obtaining a variance to these standards, required the owner or
operator to demonstrate to the Agency that his facility met
the conditions for a variance to the standard. To avoid the
necessity of interacting with the Agency during the interim
status period, the final security standards applicable to
facilities with interim status are slightly different than
those standards applicable to permitted facilities. The
final interim status standards are written so that an owner or
operator is allowed to use his judgment as to whether or not
a variance to a standard is applicable to his facility. The
standards applicable to permitted facilities, on the other
hand, require that the owner or operator demonstrate to the
Agency why a variance to a standard should be granted to his
facility. These differences are highlighted in the discussion
of the final standards for security, as applicable.
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Subject: CONTROLLED ACCESS
A. Summary of Proposed Standards
The proposed standards required that:
1. The active portion of a facility be surrounded
by a six foot fence, unless the active portion was
segregated by a natural or artificial barrier that
was capable of preventing the unauthorized or
unknowing entry of persons and livestock onto the
active portion of the facility; and
2. The entrance to the active portion of a facility
be:
guarded (either mechanically or by an attendant)
when the facility is in operation, and
- locked when the facility is not in
operation.
B. Rationale for the Proposed Standards
The purpose of the proposed standards was to prevent
the unknowing or unauthorized entry of people or livestock
onto the active portions of facilities. The Agency is
concerned about this type of entry because it could
result in:
- injury to people or livestock which come into
physical contact with the wastes or equipment
within the active portion, or
damage to human health and the environment if
people or livestock disturb the waste or equip-
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ment within the active portion. This distur-
bance could be malicious (e.g., overturning
containers, with the resulting leakage of
waste), or unintentional (e.g., removal of
waste from a facility and use of the waste
for purposes for which it is unsuitable, as in
damage incident (2)).
The proposed standards focused on protecting the
active portion* of the facility. It is this part of the
facility that is vulnerable to disturbance, since it is
here that wastes are treated, stored, or disposed of.
The proposed security standards did not apply to
closed portions** of facilities because the requirements
for closure (e.g., final cover for landfills) eliminate
the need to control access to these portions of facilities
However, in some cases, compliance with the closure stan-
dards (e.g., the requirement to ensure that the final
cover is not disturbed) indirectly required facilities
to control access to the closed portions of facilities.
* "Active portion" is defined in Part 260 as "that por-
tion of a facility where treatment, storage, or disposal
operations are being or have been conducted after the effec-
tive date of Part 261 of this Chapter and which is not a
closed portion.
** "Closed portion" is defined in Part 260 as "that por-
tion of a facility which an owner or operator has closed in
accordance with the facility closure plan and all applicable
closure requirements.
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The damage cases described in Section II of this
document illustrate that, in the past, unknowing or
unauthorized entry onto facilities has led to the poisoning
of people and livestock. In order to guard against
similar occurrences, the proposed rules required that
the active portions of facilities be surrounded by a six
foot fence. The selection of six feet as the required
height of the fence was based on the Agency's belief
that most people or livestock would not attempt to scale
a six foot fence. However, the Agency also recognized
that such a fence may be unnecessary at facilities which
are segregated by other types of barriers (e.g., a cliff)
which could achieve the same effect as a six foot fence.
Therefore, the proposed rules contained a "note" which
allowed a variance from the six foot fencing requirement
for facilities which were surrounded by equivalent
barriers.
Of course, a fence will not prevent people or live-
stock from entering the active portion of a facility if
the gate to the facility is open or unlocked. Therefore,
the proposed rules also specified requirements for the
entrance to the active portion of a facility. The intent
of the proposed standards was to monitor and control the
entry of non-facility personnel onto the active portion
of a facility during the facility's operating hours,
and to prevent them from entering during the facility's
non-operating hours.
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C. Summary and Response to Comments Received on this
Subject
Issue #1: Design vs. general performance standards
a. Summary of Comments;
1. The standards should be written in terms
of performance standards because the proposed
standards:
- are too restrictive
- may result in ineffective control to
facilities in some circumstances (e.g.,
where facilities are located next to
playgrounds).
2. The implicit performance standard in the
proposed rules, which required that unauthorized
people be prevented from entering a facility,
should be changed to require that unauthorized
people be deterred from entering a facility,
because anyone who is determined to enter a
facility can climb a fence or sneak by a guard.
b. Analysis of and Response to Comments:
As was pointed out by the commenters, the
proposed rules contained the implicit performance
standard that the facility's security system must
prevent unauthorized and/or unknowing entry of
people or livestock onto the active portions of the
facility. However, the Agency agrees that the
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level of performance that is expected from a
facility's security system should be made explicit
in the final rules. Therefore, the security stan-
dards have been rewritten to include an explicit
general performance standard.
In response to comments received, the level
of performance expected of a facility's security
system has been modified from that specified in
the proposed rules. The Agency agrees with the
commenters that it is impossible to design a security
system which ensures that absolutely no unauthorized
people will enter a facility. Accordingly, the
general performance standard in the final rules
requires that a facility's security system be
designed to prevent the unknowing entry, and to
minimize the possibility for unauthorized entry of
people or livestock onto the active portions of
facilities.
While responding to the commenters' criticism
that the standards are too restrictive, the addition
of the general performance standard to the final
rules should also answer the concerns of those
commenters who believe that the proposed standards
will not always guarantee their intended result.
For example, in the proposed rules, if a facility
were surrounded by a six foot fence, the permit
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writer would have had a difficult time requiring a
higher fence if he thought that the circumstances
required it. However, in the revised rules, the
height of the fence is not specified (as is explained
later under Issue #3). Thus, if the circumstances
do warrant special precautions to deter unauthorized
entry (e.g., where the facility is located next to
a playground), the permit writer will be expressly
authorized to require a more imposing barrier than
a six foot fence around the active portion of a
facility -
Issue #2; Exemptions to the requirements for con-
trolled access.
a. Summary of Comments';
Facilities should not have to comply with the
standards if:
- physical contact with the wastes that are
present in the active portion of the facility
will not-injure humans or livestock
- the facility or plant which contains the active
portion itself, meets the standards for con-
trolled access
- the facility is located in a remote area, so
that it is unlikely that people or livestock
will enter the facility.
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k* Analysis of and Response j.o Comments;
The Agency believes that an exemption to the
requirement for controlled access is justified only
if the waste is sufficiently benign so that people
do not need to be kept away from the site because
(l) unauthorized and unknowing entry will not injure
people (or animals) who might enter the facility,
and (2) such unauthorized entry will not injure
people, livestock, or the environment. Since these
two conditions are rarely concurrently satisfied,
the Agency does not expect that many sites will be
exempt from the security requirements. For example,
at a shallow landfill where the emplaced waste is
covered each day, the chances are minimal that
anyone will injure themselves from contact with
the waste if they unknowingly walk over the active
portion. However, damage to the environment could
result if heavy foot traffic, or the use of dirt
bikes on the active portion, decreased the integrity
of the daily cover, thereby exposing the emplaced
wastes. Thus, while controlled access to the active
portion would not always be needed to protect persons
or livestock from injury, it would be necessary to
protect the environment. Therefore, the revised
rules contain two conditions for an exemption from
the requirement to control access onto the active
portion of a facility:
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(l) physical contact with the waste, structures, or
equipment within the active portion of the facility
will not injure unknowing or unauthorized persons
or livestock which may enter the active portion
of a facility, and
(2) disturbance of the waste or the equipment, by
the unauthorized or unknowing entry of persons
or livestock onto the active portion of the
facility, will not cause a violation of the
Section 3004 requirements.
EPA agrees that the active portion of a facility
need not be protected by an additional fence, or other
means specified in the proposed rules, if it is
located within a facility or plant which already
meets the security requirements. The Agency believes
that to erect a fence or other barrier around the
active portion, when the facility is already pro-
tected, would be unnecessarily expensive, and
would not provide additional protection to human
health and the environment. Accordingly, EPA has
modified the regulations so that an owner or operator
can demonstrate that the active portion of his
facility complies with the security regulations,
based upon the security system of the facility (or
manufacturing operation) within which the active
portion is located.
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The Agency does not agree that facilities
located in remote areas should be exempt from the
requirement to control access onto the active
portions of their facilities because, whether a
facility is accessible to ten people or to one
thousand people, the potential still exists for a^
person or animal to physically harm himself, or to
endanger human health and the environment, by wan-
dering onto the active portion of a facility. The
automobile makes virtually all areas of the country
accessible to travellers, so that the remoteness
of a facility cannot guarantee that a non-resident
will not enter an unprotected facility.
Furthermore, the remoteness of the area in
which the facility is located may increase the
likelihood of people unknowingly entering an
unprotected facility because most people would not
expect to encounter hazardous waste in remote areas.
Although the requirement for signs (as described
later in this document) will decrease the potential
for people to unknowingly enter a facility, the
Agency believes that additional precautions are
warranted because signs can be stolen or defaced.
Therefore, the revised rules require that access
to facilities be controlled in both remote and
populated areas.
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Issue #3: The requirement for a six foot fence.
a. Summary of Comments:
The standards should allow methods other than
a six foot fence to prevent the unauthorized or
unknowing entry of people and livestock onto the
active portions of facilities. The alternate
methods suggested by the commenters included:
- for a continuously operating facility, keeping
the active portion in view of the facility
personnel at all times;
- an around-the-clock security system;
- the use of fences of some height other than 6
feet;
locating the facility in unpopulated areas, in
order to reduce the accessibility of the site;
- locating the facility along natural barriers,
in order to reduce the accessibility of the
site;
- keeping the waste inaccessible, by covering
it daily.
b. Analysis and Response to Comments;
The Agency agrees with the general thrust of
the commenters' argument that the standard should
allow means other than a six foot fence (or the
alternatives specified in the "note" to the stan-
dards) to prevent entry onto a facility.
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Specifically, the Agency agrees that if the
active portion of a facility is monitored by an
around-the-clock security system, or if the facility
is operated continuously, so that the active portion
is always within view and control of the facility's
personnel, these means would adequately control
entry onto the active portion. In either case,
entry onto the active portion of the facility can
be regulated, so that when an unauthorized person
approaches the active portion, the facility guards
or other facility personnel can ensure that the
person does not enter the active portion. The
Agency believes that this approach is particularly
appropriate for small facilities, because the area
that would need to be subject to surveillance would
probably be relatively small. However, the revised
rules also allow this approach for large facilities,
as long as there are enough people monitoring the
active portion to ensure that the entire active
portion of the facility is always within the view
and control of the facility guards or other facility
personnel.
The Agency also agrees that fences of height
other than six feet, may be used to deter the unau-
thorized entry of persons or livestock onto the
active portion of a facility. For example, a four
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foot barbed-wire fence may be enough to deter
unauthorized entry onto a facility, and thus may
provide the level of protection required in the
proposed standard. Therefore, the standard has
been revised so that an owner or operator who chooses
to surround or partially surround his facility with
a barrier in order to deter unauthorized entry onto
his facility (as opposed to using a 24-hour sur-
veillance system) may use an artificial barrier
(e.g., a fence) or a natural one (e.g., a cliff).
The revised standard does not specify the height or
construction materials of the barrier. However,
the final rules do require that, whatever the type
of barrier used, it must be aŁ>le to prevent the
unknowing entry, and minimize the potential for the
unauthorized entry, of people or livestock onto the
active portion of the facility.
As explained on page 16, the Agency does not
agree that simply locating a facility in a sparsely
populated area provides adequate protection from
the potential hazards of unknowing and unauthorized
entry onto a facility.
The Agency also disagrees with the suggestion
that covering the waste daily will adequately assure
that unauthorized people (or animals) will not hurt
themselves if they enter the active portion of a
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facxlity- Since most facilities only use about six
inches of soil to cover waste emplaced in a landfill,
the emplaced waste can become uncovered if people
(or animals) are allowed to walk freely on this
cover material, especially if this traffic is
uncontrolled. Furthermore, landfills usually are
quite deep and have heavy equipment (e.g., bulldozers)
either in them or beside them. Although a person
(or animal) entering a landfill may not come into
contact with waste which has been covered, such
individuals may hurt themselves by falling into a
landfill cell, or by starting a piece of machinery
which they don't know how to operate. Therefore,
the Agency rejects the suggestion that access to
facilities need not be controlled if the waste is
covered daily-
Issue #4: The security requirements at the entrance
to the active portion of a facility.
a. Summary of Comments;
1. The standards should allow alternatives
to the use of attendants or electromechanical
devices for controlling the entry of unauthorized
or unknowing people or livestock through the
entrance(s) to the active portion of a facility
during operating hours. The alternate methods
suggested by the commenters included:
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- closing or locking the gate
allowing access only by controlled roadways
2. The standard should require that mechanical
or electromechanical devices be connected to
the security fence, and that these devices be
in operation at all times.
b. Analysis of and Response to Comments:
The Agency does not believe that simply closing
the gate to the active portion of a facility is
enough to deter unauthorized entry, since unau-
thorized people can easily open an unlocked gate.
However, the Agency does agree that owners or operators
should have the option of locking the entrance to
the active portion of a facility in order to control
access to the active portion during the facility's
operating hours. Therefore, the revised standards
allow owners or operators to lock the gates to the
active portions of facilities, rather than use the
methods specified in the proposed standard.
The Agency also agrees that, if the active
portion of a facility can only be approached by
roadways which are controlled, it is unnecessary to
monitor the entrance to the active portion.
Therefore, the revised standards also allow the use
of controlled roadway access to control access
through the entrances to the active portions of
facilities.
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The standards do not require that all active
portions of facilities be surrounded by fences; nor
do they require that all entrances to facilities be
monitored with mechanical or electromechanical
devices. For this reason, the Agency believes that
it would be inappropriate to require that these
devices be connected to the security fence.
Furthermore, even where fences and electromechanical
devices are used to control access to the active
portions of facilities, the Agency does not agree
that these devices need to be active at all times,
since a locked gate can provide comparable protection
from unauthorized and unknowing entry when the
electromechanical device is turned off. Therefore,
the revised rules do not contain a requirement to
connect the mechanical or electromechanical device
to the security fence.
Issue #5; New vs. existing facilities.
a. Summary of Comments;
1. The proposed standards should not apply
to, or should be phased in for, existing
facilities because complying with these
standards will require owners or operators of
existing facilities to replace or retrofit
existing, expensive security measures.
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2. The standards should only apply to new
facilities unless EPA demonstrates that an
existing facility's security system is
inadequate.
b. Analysis of and Response to Comments;
Compliance with the proposed standards may have
required owners or operators to replace or retrofit
security measures at some existing facilities (e.g.,
to install a guard or an electromechanical device at
the entrance to the facility). However, the Agency
believes that the revised standards provide suffi-
cient flexibility, so that most existing facilities
should not have to expend vast sums to ensure that
their security measures are in compliance.
Section 3010 of RCRA provides that the hazardous
waste regulations become effective six months after
the date on which they are promulgated. Because the
Agency does not believe that implementation of the
security standards requires complex technical
analysis, no special provisions have been added to
the final rules concerning a phased-in compliance
schedule for these standards at existing facilities.
The Agency disagrees with the comment suggesting
that the security standards should only apply to new
facilities unless EPA demonstrates that an existing
facility's security system is inadequate. These
regulations are designed to ensure that hazardous
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waste facilities do not pose a threat to human
health and the environment. Potential hazards are
certainly not posed uniquely by new facilities.
Because existing facilities may also pose a threat
to human health and the environment, they too must
bear the burden of demonstrating to the Agency that
they meet the requirements of the security standards.
Thus, the burden of proof is on the facility, be
it new or existing, to demonstrate compliance with
these regulations; the burden of proof is not on
the Agency.
Issue #6; Special requirements for urban areas.
a. Summary of Comments;
The standards should require that facilities
located within one mile of incorporated urban areas
provide minimum security of a six foot chain link
fence.
b. Analysis of and Response to Comments;
Although the Agency recognizes that unautho-
rized or unknowing entry onto a facility is more
likely to occur in a populated area than in an
unpopulated one, the Agency believes that the
general performance standard which requires preven-
ting unknowing entry and minimizing the potential
for unauthorized entry onto the active portions of
facilities, provides for adequate control of access
onto facilities in urban as well as in rural areas.
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Thus, for example, if a facility is located
next to a schoolyard, the owner or operator is required
to desxgn a security system which will deter school-
children from entering the facility- This may
include, for example, a presentation to incoming
students at the beginning of each academic year,
which warns the students of the presence of hazar-
dous waste at the neighboring facility. Therefore,
because the owner or operator is required to design
a system capable of dealing with the particular
threats to his facility, no additional security
requirements need be specified for facilities
located in urban areas.
Final Regulation Language
(a) The owner or operator must prevent the
unknowing entry, and minimize the possibility for
the unauthorized entry, of persons or livestock
onto the active portion of his facility, unless
he can demonstrate to the Regional Administrator
that:
(1) Physical contact with the waste, struc-
tures, or equipment within the active portion
of the facility will not injure unknowing or
unauthorized persons or livestock which may
enter the active portion of a facility; and
(2) Disturbance of the waste or equipment, by
the unknowing or unauthorized entry of persons
or livestock onto the active portion of a
facility, will not cause a violation of the
requirements of this Part.
CComment: Part 122, Subpart B, of this Chapter
requires that an owner or operator who wishes to
make the demonstration referred to above must do
so with Part B of the permit application.]
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(b) Unless the owner or operator has made a
successful demonstration under paragraphs (a)(l)
and (a)(2) of this Section, a facility must have:
(1) A 24-hour surveillance system (e.g., tele-
vision monitoring or surveillance by guards
or facility personnel) which continuously
monitors and controls entry onto the active
portion of the facility; or
(2)(i) An artificial or natural barrier (e.g.,
a fence in good repair or a fence combined with
a cliff), which completely surrounds the active
portion of the facility; and
(ii) A means to control entry, at all times,
through the gates or other entrances to the
active portion of the facility (e.g., an
attendant, television monitors, locked entrance,
or controlled roadway access to the facility).
HComment; The requirements of paragraph (b) of this
Section are satisfied if the facility or plant within
which the active portion is located itself has a sur-
veillance system, or a barrier and a means to control
entry, which complies with the requirements of paragraph
(b)(l) or (b)(2) of this Section.]
During the interim status period, the variance
demonstration to the Regional Administrator in paragraph
(a) does not apply. Consequently, it has not been
included in the final interim status standards, which
are otherwise identical to the above standards. However,
during the interim status period, owners and operators
who determine that their facilities meet the conditions
of the variance to the security standards, must be able
to provide the facts and rationale supporting this deter-
mination when requested to do so by the Regional
Administrator.
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II. Subject: SIGNS
A. Summary of Proposed Standard
The proposed standard required that, at each entrance
to the active portion of a facility, a sign must be
posted which
1. says: "WARNING - Unauthorized Personnel Keep
Out"
2. is printed in letters which are at least four
inches high
3. is written in English and in any other pre-
dominant language of the area surrounding the
facility -
A "note" to the standard allowed an owner or operator
to use alternate wording, or different size lettering
than that specified in the standard, if the resulting
sign adequately warns unauthorized people to stay away-
In addition, the "note" provided that the requirement
for a sign could be relaxed where no danger would result
from the unauthorized entry of people onto the active
portion of a facility.
B. Rationale for the Proposed Standard
The purpose of the proposed standard was to prevent
people from unknowingly entering a facility, by alerting
them, with a sign, that the area which they are approaching
is dangerous. The purpose of the requirement for bilingual
signs (in areas where a language other than English is
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spoken by a high percentage of the population), was to
minimize the chance that people who do not understand
English will unknowingly enter a facility, and possibly
hurt themselves or cause an incident adversely affecting
human health and the environment outside the facility,
because they cannot read the warning on the sign to
keep out.
The Agency specified the wording to be used on the
sign, in order to give owners or operators an idea of the
type of message that the Agency believes adequately
informs the public that entry onto a facility is dangerous.
The Agency also specified the height of the letters that
should be used to print the sign, in order to give
owners or operators some idea of how large letters ought to
be for the words on the sign to be legible to people
approaching a facility.
However, recognizing that many facilities already
have signs which provide adequate warning to people to
stay away, but which are not printed in four inch letters
or do not contain the exact wording that is specified
in the standard, the standard contained a "note" which
allowed the use of alternate wording or lettering.
In addition, because unauthorized entry at some
facilities would not result in injury either to people
(or animals) who entered the facility, or to the environ-
ment, the "note" included a provision which relaxed the
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requirement for a sign at these facilities. For example,
the Agency believed that a warning sign at piles of
certain slags covered by a tarpaulin would be not only
unnecessary, but might be undesirable, because such a
sign could foster unnecessary anxiety about the safety
of the waste management operations that are conducted
at the facility.
C. Summary and Response to Comments Received on this
Subject
Issue #1; The requirement for bilingual signs.
a. Summary of Comments:
The requirement that the warning signs be
written in both English and French in all States
bordering Canada is unnecessarily stringent because
French is the predominant language in only one
Canadian province, Quebec. Therefore, the word
"Quebec" should be substituted for the word "Canada"
in the standard.
Furthermore, the word "States" should be
replaced by the word "communities" or "counties"
because, if interpreted literally and used for
enforcement purposes, the parenthetical example
used in the standard would require facilities in
New York City (a city located in a state bordering
Canada) to use both English and French on their
warning signs.
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b. Analysis of and Response to Comments:
The Agency agrees that the suggested word
changes tailor the requirement for bilingual signs
to those areas where they are truly needed. There-
fore, the Agency has incorporated these changes
into the final rules.
Issue #2: The content of the signs.
a. Summary of Comments;
A universal sign symbol should be developed
which means "Warning - Unauthorized Personnel Keep
Out", to be accompanied by the message printed in
English. Multi-lingual signs tend to get cluttered
up, and hence lose effectiveness.
b. Analysis of and Response to Comments;
The Agency has not developed such a symbol,
and until one is developed, the intent of the
standard sign will have to be accomplished by using
bilingual signs. However, the Agency does not believe
that the sign which is required in these rules will
be wordy, and therefore ineffective, if it is
written in two or more languages, because the message
of the sign is short. For example, in a community
bordering Mexico, the proposed warning sign would
read as follows:
WARNING - Unauthorized Personnel Keep Out
CUIDADO - Prohibida La Entrada A Personas No Autorizadas
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The Agency believes that because the "note" to
the proposed standard provided a variance to the re-
quirement for the statement: "Warning - Unauthorized
Personnel Keep Out" on the sign, no comments were
received on this aspect of the standard. The Agency
believes that a variance to the wording requirement
should be retained in the final rules for existing
signs because it would be unnecessarily expensive
to replace signs at facilities which do not contain
the exact wording specified in the proposed standard,
but nonetheless, provide adequate warning to
unknowing people to stay away. However, to provide
uniformity to the signs posted at hazardous waste
facilities, the Agency believes that all new signs
should contain the wording specified in the proposed
standard. Therefore, in the final rules, the
variance to the message on the sign only applies to
existing signs.
In addition, the Agency has substituted the
word "danger" for "warning" in the legend required
on signs in the final rules. The reason for this
change is that the word "danger", more so than
"warning", clearly indicates that the potential for
exposure to harm is associated with entering a
facility.
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Issue #3; The placement of the signs.
a. Summary of Comments;
Because the standard only requires signs to be
posted at the gates to the active portion of the
facility, the proposed standard could result in
inadequate warning to unauthorized persons approaching
a facility where fences will not be required. The
standard should be reworded to require signs to be
posted:
- in sufficient numbers to be seen from any
approach to active portions of the facility, or
- at the corners of the facility and at intervals
of 120 meters (400 feet) or less.
The Agency agrees that every reasonable attempt
should be made to ensure that people are adequately
warned that the area which they are approaching is
dangerous. Posting warning signs is a relatively
inexpensive and effective means to prevent people
from unknowing1y entering a potentially dangerous
area. In light of the change to the proposed
security standards which allows the use of fences
less than six feet high, the Agency believes that
signs should be posted along the periphery of the
active portion to minimize the possibility that people
will think that the secured area is not dangerous.
Accordingly, the final rules require that a warning
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sign be posted at each entrance to the active
portion of the facility, and at other locations,
in sufficient numbers to be seen from any approach
to the active portion. The Agency believes that
this requirement is preferable to the commenter's
suggestion that signs be placed "at the corners of
the facility and at intervals not to exceed 120
meters (400 feet)" because the requirement to post
the signs in sufficient numbers to be seen from any
approach to the active portion is more in keeping
with the Agency's decision to write performance-
oriented security standards.
Because the purpose of the sign is to prevent
people from unknowingly entering the active portion
of a facility, the sign serves as an auxiliary
measure to the security systems previously described
(i.e., a barrier or a surveillance system) to ensure
compliance with the general performance standard.
Therefore, the revised requirement for a sign is
prefaced by the phrase "Unless the owner or operator
has made a successful demonstration under paragraphs
(a)(l) and (a)(2)". By linking the requirement
for a sign to the general performance standard in
paragraph (a), the revised rules need not include a
separate exemption to the requirement for a sign
(which is comparable to that contained in the "note"
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to the proposed standard), because this is covered
by the blanket exemption to the general performance
standard.
Although the Agency received no criticism of
the four-inch lettering requirement, the underlying
theme of the majority of the comments was that the
proposed security standards are too specific. Because
the Agency believes that the four-inch lettering
requirement is more inflexible than necessary, this
requirement has been substituted, in the final rules,
by a more performance-oriented provision which
requires that the warning on the sign be legible from
a distance of at least twenty-five feet. The selection
of twenty-five feet as the distance from which the
sign must be legible is based on the State of
California's requirements for signs, as described
in Section III of the Introduction to this document.
D. Final Regulation Language
(c) Unless the owner or operator has made a
successful demonstration under paragraphs (a)(l) and
(a)(2) of this Section, a sign with the legend, "Danger -
Unauthorized Personnel Keep Out", must be posted at each
entrance to the active portion of a facility, and at
other locations, in sufficient numbers to be seen from
any approach to this active portion. The legend must
be written in English and in any other language predomi-
nant in the area surrounding the facility (e.g., facil-
ities in counties bordering the Canadian province of
Quebec must post signs in French; facilities in counties
bordering Mexico must post signs in Spanish), and must
be legible from a distance of at least 25 feet. Existing
signs with a legend other than "Danger - Unauthorized
Personnel Keep Out" may be used if the legend on the
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sign indicates that only authorized personnel are allowed
to enter the active portion, and that entry onto the
active portion can be dangerous.
III. Subject: GENERAL COMMENTS
Issue #1: Special Waste Facilities
a. Summary of Comments;
Facilities which manage "special waste'1 (e.g.,
mining waste, fly ash, FGD sludge) should be exempted
from the security requirements, or less stringent/specific
standards should be written for these facilities because:
- physical contact with the waste will not harm humans
or livestock. In many cases, the waste is no more
hazardous than the surrounding countryside.
- the waste is not a likely target for theft.
most facilities are located in remote, sparsely
populated areas.
- the cost of the fencing requirement would be
exorbitant because it would require the fencing of
thousands of acres of land.
the fences would restrict wildlife migration.
most farmers provide their own fencing, so livestock
are not apt to roam onto a facility's active portion.
controlling access with security personnel, television
monitors, key cards, etc. is not practical at these
locations.
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t>. Analysis of and Response to Comments;
As discussed on page 14 of this document, the
Agency agrees that if a waste is sufficiently benign so
that people do not need to be kept away from the site,
then access to the site need not be controlled. For
this reason, the Agency included a variance procedure
to the final security standards which may apply to some
of the wastes identified as "special wastes" in the
proposed rules. In addition, it should be noted that
the change in the Section 3001 rules — whereby wastes
will be considered toxic only when pollutant levels in
the extract from the waste (using the Extraction Procedure)
exceed the Interim Primary Drinking Water Standards by
a factor of 100, instead of the proposed factor of 10
— may decrease the number of proposed "special wastes"
subject to the final Subtitle C rules.
The Agency believes that the commenter who stated
that his waste should be exempt from the security
standards because it is an unlikely target for theft,
misunderstood the purpose of the proposed security
requirements. The intent of the proposed standards was
not only to prevent waste from being stolen but, also,
to prevent people (or animals) from hurting themselves,
or human health and the .environment by entering an area
containing hazardous waste.
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The issue of the remoteness of a facility as a
factor to be considered in determining the need to
control access to facilities is discussed on page 16 of
this document.
RCRA does not allow variances to the regulations
based on economic considerations. Thus, the cost of the
security requirements cannot be included in the factors
to be considered in granting variances from the require-
ment to control access to facilities.
The Agency believes that the final security standards
will apply to few facilities large enough to restrict
wildlife migration if the active portion is surrounded
by a fence. However, if a very large facility does not
qualify for an exemption to the final security standards,
the revised rules allow means other than a fence to
control access to the site. Thus, the Agency believes
that the final security standards provide sufficient
flexibility so that wildlife migration will not be signi-
ficantly restricted because facilities are required to
comply with the standards for security.
The purpose of the proposed security standards was
to protect humans, as well as livestock, from the
potential dangers associated with uncontrolled access to
hazardous waste facilities. Thus, although neighboring
farmers may segregate their farms with fences, the
potential still exists for people to hurt themselves, or
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human health and the environment, if they enter a
hazardous waste facility- Therefore, the Agency rejects
the suggestion that the security system provided by a
neighboring farmer provides the level of protection
needed to comply with the RCRA mandate to protect human
health and the environment.
As discussed on pages 21-22 of this document, the
final rules allow means other than those specified in
the proposed rules to control entry through the gates of
the facility. The Agency believes that the revised rules
are sufficiently flexible so that an owner or operator
of a facility, which does not qualify for an exemption
to the security standards, can devise a practical means
to control entry through the gates of his facility.
Issue #2: Interaction with the Regional Administrator
a. Summary of Comments;
Because of unique situations that will arise, the
Administrator of the Hazardous Waste Program should have
the authority to waive portions of the security require-
ments which are impractical or whose cost is prohibitive.
The commenter offered no example of what he considered
to be a "unique situation".
b. Analysis of and Response to Comments;
The Agency believes that the final security standards
are as flexible as they can be made and still protect
human health and the environment. The Agency can think
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of no "unique situation" (other than that provided for
in the variance to paragraph (a)) which would warrant
the Regional Administrator to waive portions of the
security standards and, therefore, no such provision
has been added to the final rules. As explained in the
response to the comments addressing "special waste",
RCRA does not allow the Agency to grant variances to
standards based on economic considerations^ Therefore,
the fact that compliance with the security standards
may be costly for some facilities does not justify
their exemption from the requirement to control access
to the facility.
Issue #3; Integration with the U.S. Coast Guard's water-
front facility regulations.
a. Summary of Comments:
The regulations should state that the security
requirements of the forthcoming U.S. Coast Guard regu-
lations for waterfront facilities are sufficient for a
facility to which they apply, if the facility generates
only minimal amounts of waste.
b. Analysis of and Response to Comments;
EPA's authority under Subtitle C of RCRA extends to
all facilities which treat, store, or dispose of hazardous
waste. Therefore, where the security requirements under
Subtitle C are more stringent than those contained in
the forthcoming U.S. Coast Guard's regulations, waterfront
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facilities which treat, store, or dispose of hazardous
waste will have to comply with both the security require-
ments promulgated by EPA, and by the U.S. Coast Guard.
However, because most of the specific requirements
that were contained in the proposed security require-
ments (e.g., the requirement for a six foot fence) have
been deleted from the revised rules, the Agency believes
that its revised security standards for hazardous waste
management facilities will be no more stringent than
those specified by the U.S. Coast Guard for waterfront
facilities.
Issue #4: Integration with EPA's SPCC Plan
a. Summary of Comments;
The security requirements should be consistent with
the Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC)
Plan adopted under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act.
b. Analysis of and Response to Comments;
The Agency believes that because the revised rules
for security are performance-oriented rather than design-
oriented, EPA's standards for security, promulgated under
Subtitle C of RCRA, are consistent with its revised
security requirements soon to be promulgated under
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act. In stating that
the two sets of security standards are consistent, the
Agency does not mean that the standards are identical.
Rather, the Agency is simply saying that facilities in
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compliance with the revised security standards promulgated
under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act will require no
major alterations to their security systems to comply
with the final security standards promulgated under
Subtitle C of RCRA.
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References
1. RCRA Legislative History in U.S. Code: Congressional
and Administrative News. 94th Congress, 2nd Session,
Volume 5, 1976. U.S. Congress. House Report on the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. House
Document 94-1941, p. 37.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Report to Congress, Disposal of Hazardous Wastes, 1974,
p. 44.
5. House Report No. 94-1491, Part I, p. 23.
6. Op. Cit. Disposal of Hazardous Wastes, p. 45.
7. Memorandum from Steve Caldwell, Environmental Protection
Specialist, EPA, to Russel H. Wyer, Deputy Director,
Oil and Special Materials Control Division, EPA,
October 5, 1979.
8. Memorandum from Charles W. Howard, U.S EPA, Region III,
to the EPA file, November 2, 1979, Subject: Warring Drum
Recovery Facility, Washington, D.C.
9. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Status of State
Programs for Hazardous and Solid Waste Management; 1978.
Office of Water and Waste Management, SW-796, September,
1979.
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Appendix I
State Regulations which were reviewed:
Arkansas Solid Waste Disposal Code (June 1973)
California: Title 22 (Register 77, No. 42 - 10-15-77)
Division 4, Chapter 2. Minimum Standards for Management
of Hazardous and Extremely Hazardous Wastes, Section 60249.
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection Solid Waste
Management Regulations; Section 19-524-1 through 19-524-12;
Adopted January 10, 1975; Amended January 4, 1978.
Hawaii Environmental Laws and Regulations, Volume II, Chapter 46
Solid Waste Management Control; Effective July 30, 1974.
Illinois Solid Waste Rules and Regulations (July 27, 1973),
Rule 314.
Iowa Departmental Rules 1973, Environmental Quality - Solid
Waste, Title IV, Chapter 27 Permits, Section 28.2(2)(e).
Maryland Hazardous Waste Regulations (July 28, 1978).
Minnesota Hazardous Waste Management Rules (June 11, 1979),
6 MCAR §4.9004 HW 4, Location, operation, and closure
of a hazardous waste facility.
Montana Solid Waste Disposal Laws and Rules (1969).
New York State, Part 360, Solid Waste Management Facilities
(May 17, 1977), Section 360.8 Security landburial facility.
Oklahoma Solid Waste Management Rules and Regulations (July 1,
1973). Section 5.4.3. Disposal of Hazardous Waste -
Security.
Oregon Solid Waste Control (1977), Chapter 459.545.
Rhode Island Hazardous Waste Disposal Facility Rules and
Regulations (December 21, 1978) Rule 11. ACCESS.
Tennessee Regulations Governing Solid Waste Processing and
Disposal (1971).
Washington Hazardous Waste Regulations (July 12, 1978)
WAC 173-302-290 Security Requirements.
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Appendix II
§264.14 Security
(a) The owner or operator must prevent the unknowing entry,
and minimize the possibility for the unauthorized entry, of
persons or livestock onto the active portion of his facility,
unless he can demonstrate to the Regional Administrator that:
(l) Physical contact with the waste, structures,
or equipment within the active portion of the facility
will not injure unknowing or unauthorized persons or live-
stock which may enter the active portion of a facility;
and
(2) Disturbance of the waste or equipment, by the
unknowing or unauthorized entry of persons or live-
stock onto the active portion of a facility, will not
cause a violation of the requirements of this Part.
[Comment: Part 122, Subpart B, of this Chapter requires that an
owner or operator who wishes to make the demonstration referred
to above must do so with Part B of the permit application.]
(b) Unless the owner or operator has made a successful
demonstration under paragraphs (a)(l) and (a)(2) of this
Section, a facility must have:
(l) A 24-hour surveillance system (e.g., television
monitoring or surveillance by guards or facility personnel)
which continuously monitors and controls entry onto the
active portion of the facility; or
(2)(i) An artificial or natural barrier (e.g., a
fence in good repair or a fence combined with a cliff),
which completely surrounds the active portion of the
facility; and
(li) A means to control entry, at all times, through
the gates or other entrances to the active portion of
the facility (e.g., an attendant, television monitors,
locked entrance, or controlled roadway access to the
facility).
CComment: The requirements of paragraph (b) of this Section
are satisfied if the facility or plant within which the
active portion is located itself has a surveillance system,
or a barrier and a means to control entry, which complies
with the requirements of paragraph (b)(l) or (b)(2) of this
Section.J
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(c) Unless the owner or operator has made a successful
demonstration under paragraphs (a)(l) and (a)(2) of this
Section, a sign with the legend, "Danger - Unauthorized
Personnel Keep Out", must be posted at each entrance to the
active portion of a facility, and at other locations, in
sufficient numbers to be seen from any approach to this active
portion. The legend must be written in English and in any
other language predominant in the area surrounding the facility
(e.g., facilities in counties bordering the Canadian province
of Quebec must post signs in French; facilities in counties
bordering Mexico must post signs in Spanish), and must be
legible from a distance of at least 25 feet. Existing signs
with a legend other than "Danger - Unauthorized Personnel
Keep Out" may be used if the legend on the sign indicates
that only authorized personnel are allowed to enter the
active portion, and that entry onto the active portion can
be dangerous.
GPO 868-064
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