-------
TAHI.K '6.5
CUMI1UINIIS MUCH VIOLENTLY REACT WITH UATgi
Hdl.TlUI
Ho. of Spilla/Total Gallon*
Phyalcal Description
1976 1977
1978
1979 1980
Toiicity '
(L-local, 3-iyatenlc;
A-aquat lc>
Hacard
A<:eiyl
Uiloi idu
1/500 riamable liquid; violent
reaction with water
L -eitreaiely Irritative
to eyea. akin and
•ucoua aieaibranea
S -eitrenely toiic
(hydrocyanic acid)
A -ei I ready toilc
(hydrocyanic acid)
a
•eapirator and
protective clothing
Sul |>liuric
Acid
21/4138) 19/11713 7/40480 11/17768 I2/24SIS
Denae oily liquid, color-
lea* to dark brown;
•iacible with water.
concentrated, react*
violently with water
ot
I
CO
00
L -extreaely irritating
vapor, liquid cauae*
aevere burna
8 -corroaivc poiaon
A -Moderate to high
-------
Because of the limited scope of this paper, not all compounds spilled
in amounts greater than 42 gallons are listed. Compounds that have low
human and aquatic toxicity or were not spilled frequently and in large
volumes are not shown.
As indicated in Taole 6.5, the variety of materials and their proper-
ties is quite large. The decision as to when and how to use divers/ROVs
in response to releases of these chemicals will necessarily involve many
considerations.
Table 6.6 makes a comparison of priority hazardous substances that are
.encountered in the water environment.
•
Source ana Cause of Spills
The functions a aiver/RUV will perform in response to spills will
aepend not only on the material ana its properties but also on the source
of tne spill ana its relatea cause. This section briefly discusses some cf
the major sources and causes of both petroleum spills and hazardous
chemical spills.
The following list shows tne various sources and numbers of spills of
hazaraous chemicals curing tne perioa 1977 through 1980 in the same format
as that for petroleum spills.
Source Number of Spi11s
Vessels (total) • 133
- Tank ship '35
- Tank barge 77
- Other 21
Marine Facility 61
Vehicle Transportation 30
Transportation-Kelated Facility 16
Transportation Pipeline (total) 8
- Offshore Pipeline 0
Non-transportation-Relatea Facility (total) 168
- Offshore Production Platform 0
Miscellaneous 48
The breakdown of sources above is very significant in terms of
diver/ROV response. Spills from vessels account for about 29 percent of
the total number of spills, and another 13 percent are at marine facilities
(port or harbor). As indicated, the majority of spill sources are the non-
transportation-related facilities (primarily storage, production, and
processing facilities).
6-3'S
-------
TABLE 6-6
COMPARISON OF PRIORITY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES IH HATFRHAYS
I
£>
O
U.S. COAST GUARD
POLLUTtOTTlHCIDENT DATA BASE
Acetic Acid
Acetic Anhydride
Acetone Cyanohydrtn
Acetyl Chloride
Ac rylonltrite
Alunlnua Sulfate
Ammonia
Aauonlm Compound (Nitrite I Sulfatel
Benzene
Broulne
Carbon Tetrachlorlne
Chlordane
Chlorine
ChroBlm Coapounds
(Chroalc Salts (CrH) t Chronous Salts (CrCl))
Chroalua Salts (netals 4 Insolubles)
Copper Coapounds (Nitrate i Sulfate)
Cresol
Olchloropropane
Oloethytanlne
Epichlorohydrln
Ethyl Alcohol
Ethyl Benzene
Ethylene Glycol
Glycol Sallcylate
Hydrochloric Acid
Hydrofluoric Acid
Lead Acetate
Lead Arsenate
Lead Chloride
Lead Nitrate
Lead Sulfate
Lead Tetraethyl
Lead
Halelc Acid
Malelc Anhydride
Methyl Alcohol (Hethanol)
Methyl Ethyl Ketone
Methyl Hethacrylate
Methyl Parathlon
Hethylene Chloride (Dlchlorooethanel
Napthalene
Nitric Acid
Nitrogen Dioxide
Perchloroethylene (Tetrachloroethylene)
Phenol
Polychlorlnated Blphenyls (PCBl
Potasslua Permanganate
n-Propyl Alcohol
Sodiun Olsulftte
Sodluo Hydroxide
Sodlun Hypochlortte
Sodluu Sulflde
Styrene
Sulfurlc Acid
Toluene
Trlchloroethylene
Turpentine
"•nyl Acetate
U.S. NAVY CONTRACT
Acety) Chloride
Acrylonltrlle
Aqueous Flln Foralng Foaa
Benzene
1.2-Butylene Oxide
Chlorine
Carbon Olsulflde
Olethylether
DS-2
Ethyl aalne
Ethyl ene Glycol
Ethyl Hethacrylate
Foraaldehyde
Fonalc Acid
Hexane
Hydrochloric Acid
Methyl Ethyl Ketone
Nitrobenzene
Oil. Gasoline
Oil. JP-4
Organo-TIn Paint
Polychlorlnated Blphenyls
(SOI Solution with
Trlchlorobenzene)
Sulfurlc Acid
Super Tropical Bleach
Trlchloroethylene
MOAA HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
RESPONSE PnnJfET
Acetone
Anmonla
Annoniun Nitrate
Anyhdrous Anmonla
Benzene
Butyraldehydes
Dlchloronethane (llethylene Olchlorlde)
Ethanol (Ethyl Alcohol)
Hydrochloric Acid (Muriatic Acid)
Isopropanol (Isopropyl Alcohol)
Hethanol (Methyl Alcohol, tiood alcohol)
Methyl Ethyl Ketone (HFK)
Methyl Parathlon
Perchloroethylene (Tetrachloroethylene)
Phenol
Phosphoric Acid
Propane (Liquified Propane fi»s)'
Sodlun Hydroxide (Caustic Soda)
Styrene (Vinyl Benzene)
SuUurlc Acid (Oleum. Ail of Vitriol)
Tetraethyl Lead
Toluene (Methyl Benzene)
Xylenes
ENVIROMXtHT C*N«OA
Acetic Acid
Acetic Anhydride
Aonnnla
AuDonliia Nitrate
Amnnnlin Phosphate
Bnnzene
CM c I IK Chlnrlde
r.Alclm Oxide/Hydroxide
Carbon Dioxide
Chlorine
fyclohexane
Ft.hylbenzene
Ethylene Dlchloride
(1.2-Olrh)oroei.hrtne)
Ethylene Glycnl
Fthylene Oxide
Fthylene
Ferric Chlnrlde
Formaldehyde
Hydrogen Chloride/Acid
Hydrogen Flunrlde/Acld
Hydrogen Sulflde
Mercury
Methanol
Horphollne
Naphtha
Natural Gas
HUMc Acid
Phenol
Phosphoric Acid
Phosphorous
Potash (Potasslira Chloride)
Propylene Oxide
PropyIene
Sodiiin Chlorate
Sndiiu Chloride
Sodfita Hydroxide
Sodlio Hypochlorlte
Sndlua Siilfate
Styrene (Mnnoaer)
Sulfur Dioxide
Sulfurlc Acid (and Oleum)
Sulfur
Tetraethyl Lead
Toluene
Urea
Vinyl Chloride
Xylenes
Zinc Sulfate
2-f.thylhexano!
-------
The causes of these spills are more varied than those with petroleum
spills. Tank overflows are the most frequent cause, regardless of the
source. The secono most common cause is, once again, pipeline or hose
ruptures and leaks. Leaks from the hulls or tank compartments of vessels
as a result of grounding or collision was the third leading cause with 25
incidents. Other causes include various equipment failures, improper
handling of equipment, personnel error, and unknown causes.
"Typical" Spill Environment
The foregoing analysis has provided the information necessary to draw
conclusions ana make certain assumptions about the types of spill environ-
ment in which divers/ROV's would most commonly be placed in response to
spills. The following is a summary of the range of typical spill site
conditions. These conditions will apply to both petroleum and hazardous
chemical spills unless otherwise noted.
Location of Spi 1 Is
Based on our previously determined criteria (spill volume and exclusion
of beaches/non-navigable), the distribution of spills requiring underwater
activity will be oased on where the largest number of spills occur. Rivers,
primarily the Mississippi and all of its tributary systems, and ports and
harbors serving the inland areas and the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, will
undoubtedly be the most common waterbodies to receive spills.
This fact is very significant because these areas allow the most im-
mediate and direct pollutant exposure to large concentrations of people
through (1) contact recreation, (2) drinking water supplies, (3) bioaccumu-
lation of toxics in fish and shellfish harvested from rivers, and (4)
occupational exposure. Spills into open coastal waters, while potentially
serious, will not occur as often and probably will not be complicated by
tne intense human contact present in rivers, ports, and harbors.
Depth
The full range could be from a few feet to several hundred feet. An
assumption of 20 to 100 feet would be appropriate for typical spill areas.
Currents
A current in these areas can almost always be expected. Occasionally,
it will complicate diving operations and be a major factor in dispersal
of a spilled compound. Currents could become severe in an area that is
flow restricted (e.g., narrow channel). A current of 0.5 to 3 knots would
be common. Up to 7-8 knots are possible in certain areas. In areas of
tidal currents, pollutant transport and dispersal monitoring will become
complicated.
Underwater Visibility
The areas identified in the "Location of Spills" section are known for
their murkiness and lack of visibility. Zero visibility will undoubtedly
• 5-41
-------
be common and is a critical and limiting factor in performing underwater
activity in a chemically-contaminated environment. Spills in open coastal
waters and the Great Lakes will likely have better visibility.
bottom Conditions
Mud will be the most common substrate. Some coastal ports and harbors
may have sand or sand/rock bottoms. Open coastal spills will probably have
sand bottoms. In most of these areas, especially ports and harbors, a great
deal of debris ana junk will often be littering the bottom. Oiver/ROV
entanglement or tearing of a suit is a potential problem.
Sea State
Unly a fraction of one percent of the spills occur in the open ocean
(outside of bays, estuaries*, sounds, etc.). Since almost all spills occur
in protected waters, the sea state will rarely exceea six to eight feet.
kough seas will be important when considering effective and safe surface
support activities and underwater surge. Kough seas could be a limiting
factor for underwater activity.
Shore Facilities Available
Since most spills occur in or near major shipping areas, a wide range
of shore and marine facilities will usually be convenient to the spill site.
This is significant in terms of being able to respond rapidly with equipment
and personnel. Problems encountered with equipment or divers/surface
support persons can also be addressed more quickly with shore facilities
close at hand. Another factor is that many spills occur at the dock or
terminal during loading and unloading procedures.
The above conditions typify the more common spill environment. These
typical spill environments also offer some of the most difficult problems
spill response teams will face. Exposure of the general public, potential
contamination of public water supplies, currents, poor visibility, bottom
suostrate and debris, and other factors indicate the seriousness of these
spills both from a public health viewpoint and the difficulty encountered
in diver/cleanup, personnel protection. Spills in open coastal waters will
probably be more easily addressed in many instances but, as indicated,
there are few spills in these areas.
6-42
-------
t/1
CO
n
-------
SECTION 7
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
INTRODUCTION
At an incident, response personnel may be exposed to a number of sub-
stances that are hazardous because of their chemical, biological, or radio-
logical characteristics.
Radiological hazards present a problem for response personnel. Radio-
active materials can emit alpha or beta particles or gamma waves, all of
which can have a harmful effect on health if workers are exposed to excessive
amounts.
Biological agents are living organisms (or their products) that can
cause 'sickness or death to exposed individuals.
Chemical hazards are classified into several groups, including fire,
toxic, corrosive, and reactive hazards. A material may generate more than
one chemical hazard during an incident, for example, toxic vapors can be
released during chemical fires. The hazards can be a result of the physical
/chemical properties of a material or of its chemical reactivity with
other materials or the environment to which, it is exposed.
Many hazards may be present at any one incident. It is important to
understand the fundamentals of each and their relationships so that effective
safety practices may be employed to reduce the risk to the public and response
personnel.
BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS
Biological hazards can cause infection or disease in persons who are
exposed. Biological hazards may involve plants or animals including micro-
organisms. They are divided into five categories: viral, rickettsial/
chlamydial, bacterial, fungal, and parasitic.
Biological hazards, such as disease-causing agents, may be present at a
hazardous waste site or involved in a spill. Like chemical hazards, they may
be dispersed throughout the environment via wind and water.
Many biological agents require a carrier to inoculate a host. Hence,
controlling the agent may require controlling the carrier. For instance,
rabid rodents at a landfill may be a biological hazard. Rocky Mountain
Spotted Fever, which is carried by ticks, is also in this category.
7-1
-------
The same personel protective requirements of a response to a chemical
hazard apply to biological hazards. Body coverings and respiratory protetive
"equipment should be utilized. Especially important is the need to maintain
personal cleanliness. Showering after removing protective clothing and
thoroughly washing exposed body parts, including hands and face, should help
remove any residual contamination.
RADIATION HAZARDS
Radioactive materials that may be encountered at a site can emit three
types of harmful radiation: alpha particles, beta particles, and gamm waves.
All three forms harm living organisms by imparting energy which ionizes
molecules in the cells. Hence, the three are referred to as ionizing radia-
tion, lonization may upset the normal cellular function, causing disfunction
or death.
An alpha particle is postively charged. The beta is an electron posses-
sing a negative charge. Both particles have mass and energy. Both are
emitted from the nucleus. They travel short distances in material before
interactions with the material causes them to lose their energy. The outer
layers of the skin and clothing generally protect against these particles.
Therefore, they are considered hazardous primarily when they enter the body
through inhalation or ingestion.
Gamma radiation is pure electromagnetic energy and is wavelike, rather
than particulate, in nature. Gamma waves pass through all materials to some
degree. Clothing, including protective gear, will not prevent gamma radiation
from interacting with body tissue.
Unlike many hazards that possess certain properties to alert response
personnel (odor, irritation, or taste), radiation does not warn. Hence,
preventing the radioactive material from entering the body or protecting
against external radiation is the best protection. As with biological and
chemical hazards, the use of respiratory and personnel protective equipment,
coupled with scrupulous personal hygiene, will afford good protection against
particulate radiation.
CHEMICAL HAZARDS
Fire Hazards
Combustibi lity—
is,
Combustibility is the ability of a material to act as a fuel, that
to burn. Materials that can be readily ignited and sustain a fire are
considered to be combustible, while those that do not are called noncom-
bustible. Three elements are required for combustion to occur: fuel, oxygen,
and heat. The concentration of the fuel and the oxygen must be high enough
to allow ignition and maintain the burning process. Combustion is a chemical
reaction that requires heat to proceed:
heat
fuel + oxygen
•> products
7-2
-------
Heat is supplied by the ingition source and is maintained by the
combustion, or it must be supplied from an external source. The relationship
-of these three fire components is illustrated as a triangle in Figure 7.1.
Most fires can be extinguished by removing one of these components. For
example, water applied to a fire removes the heat, thereby extinguishing the
fire, when a material by itself generates enough heat to self-ignite and
combust, spontaneous combustion occurs, either as a fire or explosion.
Flammability--
Flammability is the ability of a material (liquid or gas) to generate a
sufficient conentration of combustible vapors under normal conditions to be
ignited and produce a flame. It is necessary to have a proper fuel-to-air
(oxygen) ration (% fuel in air) to allow combustion. There is a range of fuel
concentrations in air for each material where it can be ignited and sustain
combustion. This is called t^ie Flammable Range. The lowest concentration
of fuel in this range is the Lower Flammable Limit (LFL). Concentrations
less than the LFL are not flammable because there is too little fuel - that
is, the mixture is too "lean". The highest ration that is flammable is the
Upper Flammable Limit (UFL). Concentrations greater than the UFL are not
flammable because there is too much fuel displacing the oxygen (or too little
oxygen). This mixture is too "rich". Fuel concentrations between the LFL
and UFL are optimum for starting and sustaining fire. Example: The LFL for
benzene is 1.3% (13,000 ppm), the UFL is 7.1% (71,000 ppm), thus the flammable
range -is 1.3% to 7.1%.
A flammable material is considered highly combustible if it can burn at
ambient temperatures (68"F). But a combustible material is not necessarily
flammable, because it may not be ignited easily or the ignition maintained.
Pyrophoric materials will ignite at room temperature in the presence of a
gas or vapor or when a slight friction or shock is applied.
Note: The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), and the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) have established strict definitions
for flammability based on the flash point of a material.
Gas or Vapor Explosions--
A gas or vapor explosion is a very rapid, violent release of energy. If
combustion is extremely rapid, large amounts of kinetic energy, heat, and
gaseous products are released. The major factor contributing to the explosion
is the confinement of a flammable material. When vapors or gases cannot
freely dissipate, they enter the combustion reation more rapidly. Confinement
also increases the energy associated with these molecules, which enhances the
explosive process. Pborly ventilated buildings, sewers, drums, and bulk
liquid containers are examples of places where potentially explosive atmo-
spheres may exist.
Explosive gases/vapors exhibit an explosive range, which is the same as
the flammable range. The upper explosive limit (UEL) and lower explosive
limit (LEL) are the UFL and LFL but in confined areas. Most reference books
list either limits or flammable limits which are identical.
7-3
-------
FUEL
HEAT
OXYGEN
Figure 7.1. The fire triangle. Each side of the triangle rep-
resents one of the necessary elements of a fire. The optimum
situation, position number 1, is the best fuel-to-oxygen ratio,
with sufficient heat to ignite the fuel and support its combustion.
Each corner illustrates the removal of one component: in number 2
there is insufficient fuel (concentrations below the Lower Flammable
Limit), in number 3 there is not enough oxygen (concentrations
above the Upper Flammable Limit), and in number 4 the heat source
is not adequate. A fire can be defined as a self-sustaining,
flaming combustion.
7-4
-------
Summary: Practical Considerations--
Fires and explosions require fuel, air (oxygen), and an ignition source
(heat). At a hazardous materials incident, the first two are not easily
controlled. Consequently, while working on-site where a fire hazard may be
present, the concentration of combustible gases in air must be monitored, and
any potential ignition source must be kept out of the area.
Most dangerous flammable substances:
are easily ignited (e.g., pyrophorics).
require little oxygen to support combustion.
have low LFL/LEL and a wide Flammable/Explosive
range.
Hazards related to fires and explosions:
physical destruction due to shock waves, heat, and
flying objects
initiation of secondary fires or creation of flammable
conditions.
release of toxic and corrosive compounds into the
surrounding environment.
Explosive Hazards
Explosives--
An explosive is a substance which undergoes a very rapid chemical
transformation, producing large amounts of gases and heat. The gases pro-
duced, for example, nitrogen, oxygen, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and
stream, due to the heat produced, rapidly expand at velocities exceeding the
speed of sound. This creates both a shock wave (high pressure wave front)
and noise (brisance).
Types of Explosive Hazards —
High or detonating—Chemical transformation occurs very rapidly with
detonation rates as high as 4 miles per second. The rapidly expanding gas
produces a shock wave which may be followed by combustion.
Primary high explosive: detonating wave produced in an extremely short
period of time. May be detonated by shock, heat, or friction. Examples are
lead azide, mercury fulminate, and lead styphnate.
Secondary high explosive: generally needs a booster to cause it to
detonate. Relatively insensitive to shock, heat, or friction. Examples are
tetryl, cyclonite, dynamite, and TNT.
Low or deflagrating—Rate of deflagration up to 1000 feet per second.
Generally combustion followed by a shock wave. Examples are smokeless powder,
magnesium, and Molotov cocktail.
7-5
-------
Practical Considerations--
High or low does not indicate the explosion hazard (or power) but only
the rate of chemical transformation.
Explosions can occur as a result of reactions between many chemicals not
ordinarily considered as explosives. Ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer, can
explode under the right conditions. Alkali metals and water explode; as will
water and peroxide salts. Picric acid and certain ether compounds become
highly explosive with age. Gases, vapors, and finely divided particulates,
when confined, can also explode if an ignition source is present.
Toxic Hazards
.. Toxicity--
*
Toxic materials cause local or systemic detrimental effects in an
organism. Exposure to such materials does not always result in death, although
that is often the most immediate concern. Types of toxic hazards can be
categorized by the physiological effect they have on the organism. A material
may induce more than one physiological response.
Types of Toxic Hazards--
Systemic poisons--Systemic poisons are chemical agents which act on
specific target organs or organ systems (Table 7.1). A subgroup includes
anesthetics and narcotics, which' may not be toxic in the classical sense
because they dfl not necessarily cause irreversible harm. However, for re-
sponse personnel, these agents can be extremely hazardous because they can
impair judgment and the thought processes. Anesthetics and narcotics depress
the central nervous system, resulting in loss,.of sensation or in stupor. If
concentrations are great enough, coma and death can occur.
Asphyxiants--Asphyxiants are agents which deprive the tissues of oxygen,
a condition called anoxia. This group is divided into simple and chemical
asphyxiants (Table 7.2). The simple asphyxiants act by diluting or displacing
atmospheric oxygen, which lowers the concentration of oxygen in air.
Breathing air with low oxygen concentration causes insufficient oxygen
in blood and tissues. This can cause headache, unconsciousness, and even-
tually death. Inert gases can be simple asphyxiants.
Chemical asphyxiants act in one of two ways. Some prevent the uptake of
oxygen in the blood. Carbon monoxide, for example, interferes with the
transport of oxygen to the tissues by strongly binding with hemoglobin to
form carboxyhemoglobin, which leaves inadequate hemoglobin available for
oxygen transport.
A second type of chemical asphyxiant does not permit normal oxygen
transfer either from the blood to the tissues or within the cell itself.
Hydrogen cyanide is an example of this type.
7-6
-------
A common, and extremely toxic, example of a compound that is both a
chemical and simple asphyxiant is hydrogen sulfide. The chemical action,
actually that of a neurotoxic systemic poison, stops oxidation of the
respiratory issues, paralyzing the lungs. The result is that no air enters
the lungs, which causes simple asphyxiation. Oxygen concentrations in the
lungs drop, causing death.
TABLE 7.1. SYSTEMIC POISONS
Compounds Damaging
Anesthetics/Narcotics the Nervous System
Olefins Methanol
Ethyl ether Carbon disulfide
Isopropyl ether. Metals
Paraffinic hydrocarbons Organometallics
Aliphatic ketones
Aliphatic alcohols Compounds Damaging
Esters Liver Function
Carbon tetrachloride
Tetrachloroethane
Compounds Damaging Compounds Damaging
Kidney Function Blood-Circulatory System
Halogenated hydrocarbons Aniline
Toluidine
Nitrobenzene
Benzene
Phenols
TABLE 7.2. ASPHYXIANTS
Simple Asphyxiants Chemical Asphyxiants
Aliphatic hydrocarbons Aniline
Helium Methyl aniline
Nitrogen Cyanogen
Hydrogen hydrogen cyanide
Nitrous oxide Toluidine
Carbon dioxide Carbon monoxide
Methane
7-7
-------
Irritants—Irritants are materials that cause inflammation of membranes.
The mechanism of irritation is either by corrosive or drying action, and may
affect the eyes, skin, respiratory membranes, or gastrointestinal tract. The
irritant must come in direct contact with tissue to cause an inflammation
reaction. Consequently, skin, eye, and respiratory irritants are the greatest
concern for response personnel (Table 7.3).
TABLE 7.3. IRRITANTS
Skin Irritants Respiratory Irritants
Acids Aldehydes
Alkalies Ammonia
Solvents . Hydrogen chloride
Metallic salts Ozone
Detergents Nitrogen dioxide
Skin exposure to irritating materials, in high enough concentrations,
may result in contact dermatitis, characterized by redness, itching, and
drying of the skin. These dermatitis-causing materials are called primary
irritants. Organic solvents are examples of primary irritants, eliciting a
response in hours. Strong (or absolute) irritants are the acids and alkalies,
producing observable effects within minutes. Extremely corrosive agents can
cause skin ulceration and destroy tissues.
If respiratory tissues are insulated by irritant gases or fumes, they
constrict in a reflex fashion, accompanied by involuntary coughing. Tra-
cheitis and bronchitis are inflammations of the major air passages. Examples
of irritant gases are chlorine, ammonia, ozone, and sulfur dioxide. More
insidious irritating agents can reach the terminal respiratory passages
(alveoli) deep in the lungs and may result in pulmonary edema, pneumonia, and
eventually death.
It is important to note that many particulates such as dusts, although not
chemically active hazards, can be severly irritating.
Allergic Sensiti2ers--A sensitization to a chemical involves immune
mechanisms.When a foreign substance called an antigen enters body tissue,
it triggers production of antibodies, which react with the antigen to make it
innocuous. Upon first exposure to a specific chemical, there are no antibodies
in the body. After subsequent exposures, the concentration of antibodies
increases until a threshold is reached. At this point, the antibody level is
high enough so that upon exposure to the chemical, the antigen-antibody
reaction, also called an allergic reaction, is severe enough to manifest
itself in one or more symptoms. The body has become "sensitized" to that
chemical.
Skin and respiratory sensitizers may show the same symptoms as irritants
(for example, dermatitis, bronchitis, and conjunctivitis) and can range from
discomfort from poison ivy to a fatal reaction from isocyanates (Table 7.4).
7-8
-------
TABLE 7.4. ALLERGIC SENSITIZERS
Skin Sensitizers Respiratory Sensitizers
Poison ivy Sulfur dioxide
Poison oak Isocyanates
Epoxy monomers
Nickel
Formaldehyde
Toluene di-isocyanate
Mutagens, Teratogens, and Carcinggens--An agent that can cause cancer in
an organism is called a carcinogen. • Cancer occurs in the organism exposed to
the carcinogen. This differs, from a mutagen, which changes a gene in a sperm
or egg cell of the parent. The parent is not affected, but the offspring
suffer the consequences. Teratogenesis is also manifested in offspring but
differs from mutagenesis in that if results from exposure of the embryo or
fetus to the agent itself. While some teratogens and carcinogens have been
identified-, it is not possible to accurately "pinpoint" mutagens because of
the difficulty in observing mutagenic action in cells. Table 7.5 lists some
teratogens and classes of carcinogens. •
TABLE 7.5. CARCINOGENS AND TERATOGENS
Carcinogens Teratogens
Halogenated hydrocarbons Oiethylstilbestrol (OES)
Polynuclear aromatics Thalidomide
Aromatic amines
Routes of Exposure--
There are only three pathways for substances to enter the body:
Through contact with skin, eyes, and hair
Inhalation
Ingestion
The primary function of the skin is to act as a barrier against entry of
foreign materials into the body. If this protective barrier is overcome,
toxic chemicals enter. The barrier is greatly diminished by lacerations and
abrasions. Also, many organic solvents greatly increase the permeability of
the skin to materials that would otherwise not pass through it. Another
factor is that the skin provides a large surface area for contact with toxic
agents.
Inhalation is the most rapid route, immediately introducing toxic
chemicals to respiratory tissues and the bloodstream. Once admitted to the
blood through the lungs, these chemicals are quickly transported throughout
the body to contact all of the organs.
7-9
-------
Health hazards to personnel from ihgestion of materials are a lesser
concern than skin and respiratory hazards. The number of substances that can
"be ingested are limited—that is, it is difficult to swallow vapors and gases.
Also, ingestible materials only get to the mouth through hand-to-mouth con-
tact. Even then, toxicity by mouth is of a lower order because of the acids,
alkalies, and enzymes in the gastrointestinal tract. But these same condi-
tions may enhance the toxic nature of a compound. While ingestion of toxic
chemicals is not a great concern on-site, studies have shown that gum and
tobacco chewers can absorb significant amounts of gaseous substances during
an 8-hour day.
Measurement of Toxicity--
Generally, a given amount of a toxic agent will elicit a given type and
intensity of response. Called a dose-response relationship, it is the basic
for .measurement of the relative harmful ness of a chemical. Because humans
cannot be used as test organisms, almost all toxicological data are derived
from other mammalian species, and results are extrapolated to humans. The
test organism is chosen for its ability to simulate human response. For
example, most skin tests are performed on rabbits because their skin response
most closely resembles that of humans.
In much toxicological testing, the response measured is death. The test
data are plotted on a dose-response curve. From this curve the dose, measured
in milligrams (mg) of test agent per kilogram (kg) body weight of test
organism, that killed a certain percentage of test organisms can be calculated.
This dose is called the lethal dose. Most often, experiments are designed to.
measure the dose that kills 50% of the test organisms. This is the lethal
dose 50, or LDcq, and is a relative measurement of toxicity. If compound A
has an LD5Q = 1000 mg/kg and compound B has an 1050 = 500 mg/kg, compound B
is more toxic than compound A at that dose (Figure 7.2). A value similar
to the LD5Q used for inhalation exposures is the lethal concentration 50, or
LC5Q, and is measured as parts per million of toxic agent per exposure time
(ppm/hr). Table 7.6 illustrates the use of 1050 values as a relative index
of toxicity.
Another important factor to consider when determining the toxicity of a
material is the relationship between concentration and exposure time.
Generally, and an acute exposure refers to a large single dose received over
a short period of time. A chronic exposure is several small doses over a
longer period of time. The difference (in terms of deleterious effects) is
that a small acute exposure may result in no effect on an organism, while a
chronic exposure to the same dose may show an additive effect; that is, the
cumulative dose may be harmful. On the other hand, a large single dose in a
short period of time might be much more hazardous than the same dose
administered over a longer time.
7-10
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100 -I-
Ol
•o
UJ >«
1/1
Z 01
o >
a. -r-
Q_ •>-
UJ >o
OC. •—
I 20
50
DOSE (mg/kg)
From this illustration, compound C could be assumed to be
more toxic than compound D, based on LDijQ. This could be
misleading because at lower doses the situation is reversed:
at LDjQ, D is more toxic than C.
FIGURE 7.2. DOSE - RESPONSE CURVES
7-11
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The rate at which a chemical reaction occurs depends on the following
factors:
Surface area of reactants available at reactions site -- for example,
a large chunk of coal is combustible, but coal dust is explosive.
Physical state of reactant - solid, liquid, or gas
Concentration of reactants
Temperature
Pressure
Presence of a catalyst
TABLE 7.6. RELATIVE INDEX OF TOXICITY
Probable»0ral Lethal Dose for Humans
Toxicity Rating or Class Dose For Average Adult
1. Practically nontoxic
2. Slightly toxic
3. Moderately toxic
4. Very toxic
5. Extremely toxic
6. Supertoxic
Source: Toxicology: The
Casarret and Dou
>15 g/kg
5-15 g/kg
0.5-5 g/kg
50-500 mg/kg
5-50 mg/kg
>5 mg/kg
Basic Science Of
11 (eds.), 1975.
More than 1 quart
Between pint and quart
Between ounce and pint
Between teaspoonful and ounce
Between 7 drops and teaspoonful
A taste (less than 7 drops)
Poisons, 2nd ed.
Compatibi1ity—
If two or more hazardous materials remain in contact indefinitely without
reaction, they are compatible. Incompatibility, however, does no necessarily
indicate a hazard. For example, acids and bases (both corrosive) react to
form salts and water, which may not be corrosive.
Many operations on waste or accident sites involve mixing or unavoidable
contact between different hazardous materials. It is important to know ahead
of time if such materials are compatible. If they are not, then any number
of chemical reactions could occur. The results could range from the formation
of an innocuous gas to a violent explosion. Table 7.7 illustrates what
happens when some incompatible materials are combined.
The identity of unknown reactants must be determined by chemical analysis
to establish compatibility. On the basis of their properties, a chemist then
should be able to determine any chemical reactions resulting from mixing the
reactants. Judging the compatibility of more than two reactants is very
difficult and should be judged on a one-to-one basis.
7-12
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Response personel who must determine compatibilities should refer to "A
Method for Determining the Compantibility of Hazardous Wastes" (EPA 600/2-80-
-076), published by EPA's Office of Research and Development.
Sometimes the identity of a waste is impossible to ascertain due to
money and time constraints. In this event, simple tests must be performed to
determine the nature of the material or mixture. Tests such as pH, oxidation-
reduction potential, and flash point are useful. In addition, very small
amounts of the reactants may be carefully combined to determine compatibility.
Practical Considerations--
If materials are compatible, they may be stored together in bulk tanks
or transferred to tank trucks for ultimate disposal. Bulk containment of
wastes for transport requires only one" chemical analysis, whereas one is
required for each drum or container transported.
Compatibility information is also very important in evaluating an ac-
cident involving several different hazardous materials. The ultimate handling
and treatment of the materials may be partially based on such information.
TABLE 7.7. HAZARDS DUE TO CHEMICAL REACTIONS (INCOMPATIBILITIES)
Generation heat - e.g., acid and water
Fire - e.g., hydrogen sulfide and calcium hypochlorite
Explosion - e.g., picric acid and sodium hydroxide
Toxic gas or vapor production - e.g., sulfuric acid and plastic
Flammable gas or vapor production - e.g., acid and metal
Formation of a substance with a greater toxicity that the reactants •
e.g., chlorine and ammonia
Formation of shock - or friction-sensitive compounds
Pressurization of closed vessels - fire extinguisher
Solubilization of toxic substances - e.g., hydrochloric acid and
chromium
Dispersal of toxic dusts and mists
Violent polymerization - e.g., ammonia and acrylonitrile
7-13
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Practical Considerations--
The most immediate concern for response personnel is how the health of
site workers and the public can be protected. The following factors must be
considered:
- What toxic agent is present?
- How will it enter the body?
- How will it affect the human body?
- How toxic is it?
Answers to these and related questions will dictate how the public is
protected (e.g., a warning or evacuation of an area), how personnel are
protected (types of respiratory and protective gear employed), and what
monitoring (e.g., continuous or intermittent) is required.
*
Corrosive Hazards
Carrosion--
Corrosion is a process of material degradation. Upon contact, a cor-
rosive material may destroy body tissues, metals, plastics, and other mat-
erials. Technically, corrosivity is the ability of material to increase the
hydrogen ion or hydronium ion concentration of a material., or to transfer
electron pairs to or from itself or another material. A corrosive material
is a reactive compound or element that produces a destructive chemical charge
in the material it is acting upon. Common corrosives are the halogens,
acids, and bases (Table 7.8). Skin irritation and burns are typical results
when the body contacts an acidic or basic material.
The corrosiveness of acids and bases can be compared on the basis of
their ability to dissociate (form ions) in solution. Those that form the
greatest number of hydrogen ions (4+) are the strongest acids, while those
that form the most hydroxide ions (OH") are the strongest bases. The H+ ion
concentration in solution is called pH. Strong acids have a low pH (many H+
in solution), while strong bases have a high pH (few H+ in solution; many OH"
in solution). The pH scale ranges from 0 to 14 as follows:
<— increasing acidity neutral increasing basicity—>
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
pH Measurements are valuble because they can be done quickly on-site, providing
immediate information about the corrosive hazard.
7-14
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TABLE 7.8. CORROSIVES
Halogens
Acids
Bromine
Chlorine
Fluorine
Iodine
Oxygen (ozone)
Bases (Caustics)
Potassium hydroxide
Sodium hydroxide
Acetic acid
Hydrochloric acid
Hydrofluoric acid
Nitric acid
Sulfuri acid
Practical Considerations--
When dealing with corrosive materials in the field, it is imperative to
determine:
How toxic is the corrosive material?
cause severe burns?
Is it an irritant or does it
What kind of structural damage does it do, and what other hazards
can it lead to? For example, will it destroy containers holding
other hazardous materials, releasing them to the environment?
Hazards Due to Chemical Reactivity
Reactivity Hazards--
A reactive material is one that can undergo a chemical reaction under
certain specified conditions. Generally, the term "reactive hazard" is used
to refer to a substance that undergoes a violent or abnormal reaction in the
presence of water or under normal ambient atmospheric conditions. Among
these types of hazards are the pyrophoric liquids which will ignite in air at
or below normal room temperature in the absence of added heat, shock, or
friction, and the water-reactive flammable solids which will spontaneously
combust upon contact with water (Table 7.9).
Chemical Reactions--
A chemical reaction is the interaction of two or more substances,
resulting in chemical changes. Exothermic chemical reactions, which give off
heat, can be the most da/igerous. A separate source of heat is required to
maintain endothermic chemical reactions. Removing the heat source stops the
reaction.
7-15
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Chemical reactions usually occur in one of the following ways:
Combination A + 8 —> AB
Decomposition AB --> A + 8
Single replacement A + BC --> B + AC
Double replacement AB + CD --> AD + CB
TABLE 7.9. FLAMMABLE COMPOUNDS AND ELEMENTS
Flammable Liquids Flammable Solids
Aldehydes Phosphorus
Ketones Magnesium dust
Amines Zirconium dust
Ethers Titanium dust
Aliphatic hydrocarbons Aluminum dust
Aromatic hydrocarbons Zinc dust
Alcohols
Nitroaliphatics
Water-Reactive Flammable Solids Pyrophoric Liquids
Potassium Organometallic compounds
Sodium Dimethyl zinc
Lithium Tributyl aluminum
Physical Properties of Chemicals
Chemical compounds possess inherent properties which determine the type
and degree of the hazard they represent. Evaluating risks of an incident
depends on understanding these properties and their relationship to the
environment.
Solubility—
The ability of a solid, liquid, gas, or vapor to dissolve in a solvent
is solubility. An insoluble substance can be physically mixed or blended in
a solvent for a short time but is unchanged when it finally separates. The
solubility of a substance is independent of its density or specific gravity.
The solubility of a material is important'when determining its react-
ivity, dispersion, mitigation, and treatment. Solubility is generally given
in parts per million (ppm).
Density/Specific Gravity—
The density of a substance is its mass per unit volume, commonly expressed
in grams per cubic centimeter (g/cc). The density of water is 1 g/cc since 1
cc has a mass of 1 g.
7-16
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Specific gravity (SpG) is the ratio of the density of a substance (at a
given temperature) to the density of water at the temperature of its maximum
'density (4°C).
Numerically, SpG is equal to the density in g/cc, but is expressed as a
pure number without units. If the SpG of a substance is greater than 1 (the
SpG of water), it will sink in water. The substance will float on water if
its SpG is less than 1. This is important when considering mitigation and
treatment methods.
Vapor Density—
The density of a gas or vapor can be compared to the density of the
ambient atmosphere. If the density of a vapor or gas is greater than that of
the ambient air, then it will tend to settle to the lowest point. If vapor
density is close to air densUy or lower, the vapor will tend to disperse in
the atmosphere. Vapor density is given in relative terms similar to specific
gravity.
In settling, dense vapor creates two hazards. First, if the vapor
displaces enough air to reduce the atmospheric concentration of oxygen below
16%, asphyxia may result. Second, if the vapor is toxic, then inhalation
problems predominate even if the atmosphere is not oxygen deficient. If a
substance is explosive and very dense,, the explosive hazard may be close to
the ground rather than at the breathing zone (normal sampling heights).
Vapor Pressure—
The pressure exerted by a vapor against the sides of a closed container
is called vapor pressure. It is temperature dependent. As temperature
increases, so does the vapor pressure. Thus, more liquid evaporates or
vaporizes. The lower the boiling point of the liquid, the greater the vapor
pressure it will exert at a given temperature. Values for vapor pressure are
most often given as millimeters of mercury (mm Hg) at a specific temperature.
Boiling Point—
The boiling point is the temperature at which a liquid changes to a
vapor - that is, it is the temperature where the pressure of the liquid equals
atmospheric pressure. The opposite change in phases is the condensation
point. Handbooks usually list temperatures as degrees Celsius (°C) or Fahren-
heit (°F). A major consideration with toxic substances is how they enter the
body. With high-boiling-point liquids, the most common entry is by body
contact. With low-boiling-point liquids, the inhalation route is the most
common and serious.
Melting Point—
The temperature at which a solid changes phase to a liquid is the melting
point. This temperature is also the freezing point, since a liquid can change
phase to a solid. The proper terminology depends on .the direction of the
phase change.
7-17
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If a substance has been transported at a temperature that maintains a
jsolid phase, then a change in temperature may cause the solid to melt. The
particular substance may exhibit totally different properties, depending on
phase. One phase could be inert while the other could be highly reactive.
Thus, it is imperative to recognize the possibility of a substance changing
phase due to changes in the ambient temperature.
Flash point
If the ambient temperature in relation to the material of concern is
right, then it may give off enough vapor at its surface to allow ignition by
an open flame or spark.
The minimum temperature at which a substance produces sufficient flam-
mable vapors to ignite is its flash point. If the vapor does ignite, com-
bustion can continue as long .as the temperature remains at or above the flash
point.
The relative flammability of a substance is based on its flash point. An
accepted relation between the two is:
Highly flammable: Flash point less than 100'F
Moderately flammable: Flash point greater than 100°F
but less than 200°F
Relatively inflammable.: Flash point greater than 200'F
7-18
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ro
a
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SECTION 8
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS
INTRODUCTION
Hazardous materials are stored and transported in large quantities.
Frequently, some stored or transported material is released, presenting a
potential hazard to the public and environment. Such an incident can be
managed more expeditiously when the hazardous material is specifically
identified and characterized. Unfortunately, the contents of storage tanks
or trucks may not be identified specifically or properly. Records or shipping
papers may be inaccessible. Even with such information, an experienced person
is needed to define the hazards and their seriousness.
Because of the immediate need for information concerning a hazardous
material, two systems for hazard identification have been developed. Both
help responders to deal with a hazardous material incident quickly and safely,
and both were devised for persons untrained in chemistry.
The first is the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 704 M
System, which is used mostly on storage tanks and smaller cotainers. The
second system is used exclusively on containers and tanks transported in
interstate commerce. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) is respon-
sible for this system. Its use, by way of placards and labels, is required
under DOT regulations found in the Code of Federal Regulations 49 (49 CFR).
NEPA 704 M HAZARD IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
Description
The NFPA is a standardized system which used numbers and colors on a
sign to define the basic hazards of a specific material. The three, Health,
Flammability, and Reactivity, are identified and rated on a scale of 0 to 4
depending on the degree of hazard presented (Figure 8.1).
The ratings for individual chemicals can be found in the NFPA "Guide to
Hazardous Materials". Other references such as the U.S. Coast Guard manual,
CHRIS Volume 2, and the National Safety Council's "Fundamentals of Industrial
Hygiene" contain the NFPA ratings for specific chemicals. Such information
can be useful not only in emergencies but also during long-term remedial
activities when extensive evaluation is required.
8-1
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Flammability
Hazard
(WHITE)
Special
nformation
FIGURE 8-1. NFPA 704 M HAZARD IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
Summary of Hazard Ranking System
Health Hazard (Blue) —
Rank Number
Description
Materials that on very short
exposure could cause death or
major residual injury even
though prompt medical treatment
was given.
Materials that on short exposure
could cause serious temporary or
residual injury even though
prompt medical treatment was
given.
Materials that on intense or
continued exposure could cause
temporary incapacitation or
possible residual injury unless
prompt medical treatment was
given.
Materials that on exposure would
cause irritation but only minor
residual injury even if no treat-
ment was given.
Materials that on exposure under
fire conditions would offer no
hazard beyond that of ordinary
combustible material.
Examples
Agrylonitrile
Bromine
Parathion
Aniline
Sodium hydroxide
Sulfuric acid
Bromobenzene
Pyridine
Styrene
Acetone
Methanol
8-2
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Flammability Hazard (Red)--
-Rank Number
1
0
Description
Materials that (1) rapidly or
completely vaporize at atmos-
pheric pressure and normal
ambient temperatures and burn
readily or (2) are readily
dispersed in air and burn
readily.
Liquids and solids that can be
ignitied under almost all ambient
temperature conditions.
Materials that must b'e moderately
heated or exposed to relatively
high ambient temperatures before
ignition can occur.
Materials that must be preheated
before ignition can occur.
Materials that will not burn.
Reactivity Hazard (Yellow)--
Rank Number
Description
Materials that in themselves are
readily capable of detonation or
of explosive decomposition or
reaction at normal temperatures
and pressures.
Materials that (1) in themselves
are capable of detonation or
explosive reaction but require
a strong initiating source or
(2) must be heated under confine-
ment before initiation or (3)
react explosively with water.
Materials that (1) in themselves
are normally unstable and
readily undergo violent chemical
change but do not detonate or (2)
may react violently with water
or (3) may form potentially
explosive mixtures with water.
Examples
1, 3-Butadiene
Propane
Ethylene oxide
Phosphorus
Acrylonitri le
2-Butanone
Kerosene
Sodi urn
Red phosphorus
Examples
Benzoyl peroxide
Picric acid
TNT
Diborane
Ethylene oxide
2-Nitropropane
Acetaldehyde
Potassium
8-3
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Rank Number Description Examples
1 Materials that in themselves are Ethyl ether
normally stable but which can Sulfuric acid
(1) become unstable at elevated
temperatures or (2) react with
water with some release of
energy but not violently.
0 Materials that in themselves are
normally stable, even when
exposed to fire, and that do not
react with water.
Special Information (White)—
The white block denotes special information about the chemical. For
example, it may indicate that, the material is rad-ioactive by displaying the
standard radioactive symbol, or unusually water-reactive by displaying a
large W with a slash through it (14). For a more complete discussion of these
various hazards, consult the NFPA Standard 704 M.
DOT HAZARD INFORMATION SYSTEM
The DOT's Hazardous Materials Transportation Administration regulates
over 1,400 hazardous materials. The regulations require labels on small
containers and placards on tanks and trailers. These placards and labels
indicate the nature of the hazard presented by the cargo. The classification
used for the placards and labels is based on the United Nations Hazard Classes
(Table 8.1). The UN hazard class number is found in the bottom corner of a
DOT placard or label.
The various hazards are defined in Table 8.2.
TABLE 8.1. UN HAZARD CLASS SYSTEM
United Nations
Hazard
Class Number Description
1 Class A, 8, and C Explosives
2 Nonflammable and flammable compressed gases
3 Flammable liquids
4 Flammable solids, spontaneously combustible
substances, and water-reactive substances
5 Oxidizing materials, including organic
peroxides
6 Class A and 8 poisons, irritants, and etiologic
(disease-causing) materials
7 Radioactive materials
8 Corrosive materials (acids, alkaline liquids,
and certain corrosive liquids and solids)
9 Miscellaneous hazardous materials not covered
^ by any of the other classes
8-4
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To facilitate handling a hazardous material incident, some placards are
being altered to accept a 4-digit identification number (Figure 8.2). This
number comes from the Hazardous Material Table in the DOT regulations, 49 CFR
172.101. This ID number also must be written on the shipping papers or
manifest. In the event of an incident, the ID number on the placard will be
much easier to obtain than the shipping papers. Once the number is obtained,
the DOT's "Emergency Response Guide Book" can be consulted. This book des-
cribes the proper methods and precautions for responding to release of each
hazardous material with an ID number. The DOT system goes one step further
in aiding response personnel than the NFPA system. However, using both
systems when responding to hazardous material incidents will help to identify
and characterize the materials involved properly.
hazard symbol
ID number
UN Hazard Class Number
Figure 8.2. MODIFICATION OF DOT HAZARD IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
8-5
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TABLE 8.2. Hazardous Materials Definitions
USOeporfment
Of •uTUQOrlQIsOrt
AdrnMttratton
HAZARDOUS MATEKlALS TKAiXSPOKTATlON
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS DEFINITIONS
The following definitions have been abstracted from the Code of Federal
Regulations, Tlcl« 49-Transportation. Parts 100-177. Refer to
referenced sections for complete details. NOTE: Rulemaking propolis are out-
standing or are contemplated concerning some of these definitions.
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL - Means a substance or material which has been determined
by the Secretary of Transportation to be capable of posing an unreasonable risk
to health, safety, and property when transported in commerce, and which has
bean so designated. (Sec. 171.3)
MULTIPLE HAZARDS - A material meeting the definition of more than one hazard
class is classed according to the sequence given in Sec. 17}. 2.
HAZARD CLASS
CLASS A
EXPLOSIVE
CLASS B
EXPLOSIVE
CLASS C
EXPLOSIVE
BLASTING
ACEJfT
COMBUSTIBLE
UQUIP
CORKOSIVB
MATERIAL
FLAMIABtg
LIQUID
DEFINITIONS
An Explosive - Any chemical compound, mixture, or device, Che
primary or comnon purpose of which la Co function by explosion,
I.e., with substantially instantaneous rsleass of gas and heat,
unless such compound, mixture, or davlcs Is otherwise specifi-
cally classified in Parts 170-177. (See. 173.50)
Detonating or otherwise of maximum hazard. The nine types of.
Class A explosives are defined in Sec. 173.53.
In general, function by rapid combustion rather than detonation
and include 'SOM explosive devices such as special fireworks.
flash povders, ecc. Flammable hazard. (Sec. 173.88)
Certain types of manufactured articles containing Class A or Class
B explosives, or both, as components buc in restricted quantities,
and certain types of fireworks. Minimum hazard. (Sec. 173.100)
A material designed for blasting which hss been tested in accord-
ance with Sec. 173.114a(b) and found to be so insensitive thst
there Is very little probability of accidental initiation to
explosion or of transition from deflagration EO detonation.
(Sec. 173.144a(a)]
Any liquid having a flash point above 100*7. and below 200*7. as
determined by tests listed In Sec. 173.115(d). Exceptions are
found In Sec. 173.115(b).
Any liquid or solid that causes visible destruction of human skin
tissue or a liquid that has a severe corrosion rate on steel. (See
Sec. 173.240(a) and (b) for details]
Any liquid having a flash point below 100*7. as determined by
tsscs listed in Sec. 173.115(d). For exceptions, see Sec. 173. US(a)
Pyroforle Liquid - Any liquid that ignites spontaneously in dry or
moist air at or below 130*7. [Sec. 173.115(c)l
Compressed Caa - Any material or mixture having in the container a
pressure exceeding 40 psla at 70*F. , or a pressure exceeding
104 psla ac 130*7.; or any liquid flammable material having a
vaoor oreasure exceeding 40 osla at 100'F. [Sec. 173.300(a)1
8-6
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TABLE 8.2 (Continued)
HAZARD CLASS
FLAMMABLE CAS
NONFLAMMABLE
CA£
FLAMMABLE
SOLID
ORGANIC
PEROXIDE
OXIDIZgH
POISOH A
POISON B
IRRITATING
MATERIAL
ETIOLOCIC
ACEMT
RADIOACTIVE
MATERIAL "*** '
ORM-OTHEB
PECULATED
MATERIALS
ORM-A
DEFINITIONS
Any compressed gaa msec Ing the requirements for lower flaomability
limit, flammabllity limit range, flame projection, or flame pro-
pagation criteria aa specified In Sec. 173.300(b)
Any compressed gas other than a flammable compressed gas.
Any solid material, other than an explosive, which Is liable to
cauae firas through friction, retained heat from manufacturing
or processing, or which can be Ignited readily and when ignited
burns to vigorously and persistently as to create a serious trans-
portation hazard. (Sac. 173.150)
An organic 'compound containing Che bivalent -0-0 structure and
which may be considered a derivative of hydrogen peroxide where
one or more of Che hydrogen atoms have been replaced by organic
radicals must be classed as an organic peroxide unless— [Se«
Sec. I73.131(a) for details]
A substance such as chlorate, permanganate, inorganic peroxide,
or • nitrate, that yields oxygen readily to stimulate the com-
bustion of organic matter. (See Sec. 173.151)
Extremely Dangerous Poisons - Poisonous nases or liquids of such
nature that a very small amount of the gas, or vapor of the
liquid, mixed with air is dangerous to life. (Sec. 173.326)
Less Dangerous Poisons - Substances, liquids, or solids (including
paates and semi-solids), other than Class A or Irritating mater-
ials, which, are known to be so toxic to man as to afford a hazard
to health during transportation; or which, in the absence of
adequate data on human coxiclty. are presumed to be toxic to man.
(Sec. 173.343)
A liquid or solid substance which upon contact with fire or whea
exposed to air gives off dangerous or intensely irritating fumes,
but not Including any poisonous material , Class A. (Sec. 173.381)
An "etlologic agent" means a viable micro-organisa, or its toxin
which causes or may cause human disease-. (Sec. 173.386)
Any material, or combination of materials, chat spontaneously
tmits ionizing radiation, and having a specific activity greater
than 0.002 microcurles per gram. (Sec. 173.389) NOTE: See Sec.
173.389(a) through (1) for details.
(1) Any material that may pose an unreasonable risk to health and
safety or property when transported in commerce; end (2) Does not
meet any of the definitions of the other hazard classes specified;
or (3) Has been reclassed an ORM (specifically or pemissively)
according to this subchapcer [Sec. 173.500(a)]
NOTE: A material with a flashpoint of 100*7. to 200*7. may not be
classed as an ORM it it is a hazardous waate or is offered In a
packaging having a tated capacity of more than 110 gallon*.
A material which haa an anesthetic, irritating, noxious, toxic, or
other similar property and which can cause extreme annoyance or
discomfort to passengers and crew in the event of leakage during
tranaportatlon. [Sec. 173.500(b) (1) ]
8-7
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TABLE 8.2 [Continued)
HAZARD CLASS
ORM-B
ORM-C^
ORM-D
ORM-g
DEFINITIONS
A material (including a solid whan wee with water) capable of
causing algnificanc damage to a transport vehicle or vessel from
leakage during transportation. Materials meeting one or both of
Che following criteria are ORM-B materials: (1) A liquid substance
that has a corrosion rate exceeding 0.2SO inch per .year (IPT) on
aluminum (nonclad 7075-T6) at a test temperature of 130*7. An
acceptable test is daacribed in NACE Standard TM-01-69, and (11)
Specifically designated by name in Sec. 172.101. [Sec. 173.300
(b)(2)]
A material which has other Inherent characteristics noc described
as an ORM-A Sr ORM-S but which makes it unsuitable for shipment,
unless properly Identified and prepared for transportation. Each
ORM-C material Is specifically named in Sec. 172.101. [Sec.
173.500(b)(3)]
A material such as a consumer commodity which, though otherwise
subject to the regulations of this subchapter, presents a limited
hazard during transportation due to its form, quantity and packag-
ing. They oust be materials for which exceptions are provided in
Sec. 172.101. A shipping description applicable to each ORM-D
Material or category of ORM-D materials is found in Sec. 172.101.
[Sec. 173.5bO(4)]
A material that is not Included in any other hazard class, but is
subject to the requirements of this subchapter. Materials In this
class include (1) Hazardous wastes and (11) Hazardous substances
as defined in Sec. 171.8. [Sec. 173.50000 (3) )
THE FOLLOWING AR£ OFFERED TO EXPLAIN ADDITIONAL TERMS USED IN PREPARATION OF
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS FOR SHIPMENT. (Sec. 171.3)
CONSUMER
COMMODITY
(See ORM-D)
Means a material that is packaged or distributed in s fora In-
tended and suitable for sale through retail sales agencies or
Instrumentalities for consumption by individuals for purposes of
personal care or household uae. This term also includes drugs and
medicines. (Sec. 171.3)
PLASH POIMT
Means the minimum cerperature ac which a substance gives off flan
•able vapors which in contact with a spark or flam* will ignite.
For liquids, see Sec. 173.113; for solids, see Sec. 173.120.
Means that the material is prohibited from being offered or accepted
for transportation. NOTE: This prohibition does not spply if these
materials are diluted, stabilized, or incorporTtTTTn device*
and they are classed la accordance with the definitions of haz-
ardous materials. [Sec. 172.101(d)(1)]
HAZARDOUS
aU3STAMCgS
For transportation purposes, means a material, and its mixtures
or solutions, that is identified by the letter "E" in Column 2
of che Hazardous Materials Table to Sec. 172.101 when offered for
transportation in one package, or in one transport vehicle If not
packaged, and when the quantity of the material therein equals
or exceeds che reportsble quantity (RQ). For details, refer to
Sec. 171.8 and Sec. 172.101. Hazardous Materials table.
8-8
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TABLE 8.2 (Continued)
HAZARDOUS
WASTES
LIMITED
QUANTITY
REPORTABLE
QUANTITY
SPONTANEOUSLY
COMBUSTIBLE
MATERIAL
(SOLID)
WATER SEACTIVE
MATERIAL
(SOLID)
For transportation purposes. Man* any material that la subject
to cha hazardous waste man! feat requirements of cha Environmental
Protection Agency la CFR. Title 40. Pare 123. Chapter F. (Sec. 171.3)
For dacalla on the Hazardous Uaata and Consolidated Permit Regulations
refer to CFR. Title 40, Parts 260-267 and Parta 122-123. Quest lona
regarding theae regulations, call Toll Free: (800) 424-9346 or
(202) 354-1404
leans the maximum amount of a hazardous material; aa specified in
those lections applicable to the particular hazard class, for which
there are specific exceptions from the requirements of this sub-
chapter. See Sec. l?3.llfl, J.73.118(a), 173.133, 173.244, 173.306,
173.343 and 173.364.
For transportation purposes, means the quantity of hazsrdoua substance
and/or hazardoua waste specified In the Hazardous Material Table,
Column 2 and Identified by the letter "E" In Column 1. (Sec. 171.8)
Means a solid substance (including sludges and paates) which may
undergo spontaneous heating or aelf-lgnltion under conditions normally
incident to transportation or which may, upon contact with the atmo-
aphere, undergo an increase la temperature and ignite. (Sec. 171.8)
Means any solid substance (Including sludgea and paates) which, by
interaction with water, la likely to become spontaneously flammable
or to give off flammable or toxic gases In dangeroua quantities.
(Sec. 171.8)
KOTE: This handout la designed as a training aid for all Interested parties who may
become Involved with hazardous materials. It does not relieve persona) froti complying
with the Depertmenc of Transportation Hazardous Materials Regulations. Final author-.
for use of these hazard classes and definitions is found In CTH, Title 49, Parts
100-177. •
Information Services Division, DMT-11
Office of Operations and Enforcement
Materials Transportation Bureau
Research and Special Programs Administration
Department of Transportation
Washington, D.C. 20390
NOTJj This material may be reproduced without special permission from this
Bureau and any questions) or comments concerning this Handout should be directed
to the address ebo-r*.
REVISED FEBRUARY 1981
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SECTION 9
USE OF THE HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DATA SHEET
INTRODUCTION
A hazardous substance data sheet is an effective means of presenting
data on a particular compound and- the related incident. It is much easier
for response personnel to have the necessary information in one place than
continually to consult different sources which may or may not have the desired
data. Condensing the information on physical, chemical, and toxicological
properties of the compound and incident onto two pages also speeds briefing
of any personnel arriving on site when time is important. As many sources as
possible should be used to fill out the sheets as some information on the
same property may vary from one reference to another.
FILLING OUT THE HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DATA SHEET
Under "Name of Substance," list both the common name and the name approved
by the International Union for Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC). Both
should be entered, since it may be necessary to look up information under
different names. If a compound uses more than one common name, list all
synonyms. Write in the formula after the chemical name, because some ref-
erences index chemicals by their formulas.
Part I lists the physical/chemical properties of the compound. In the
far rightcolumn labeled "Source," enter the reference from which the
information was obtained. If the information is found later to be incorrect
or conflicting, it may be corrected. It also makes it easier to refer back
to a particular source if additional information is needed. The properties
included in the data sheet are:
Normal Physical State: Check the appropriate space for the physical
state of the chemical at normal ambient temperatures (20*C-24°C).
Molecular Weight: Usually expressed in grams per gram-mole. Thi-s
information is essential because neutralization or any other chem-
ical treatment would require the number of moles of chemical
present.
Density and Specific Gravity: Only one is required. Density is
usually expressedfngrams per milliliter. Specific gravity is
dimensionless. Indicate the temperature at which specific gravity
is measured and circle the appropriate letter- corresponding to
degrees Fahrenheit(*F) or Celsius(°C).
9-1
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Solubility: Uater: Usually expressed in parts per million or
milligrams perTTter, which are equivalent (that is, 1 ppm =
1 mg/L). Solubility is temperature dependent.
Solubility: Enter any other material for which solubility data are
needed. For instance, recovering a spilled material by solvent
extraction may require solubility data for any one of a number of
organic compounds.
Boiling Point: Expressed in degrees Fahrenheit or Celsius. It is
the temperature at which the vapor pressure of the compound equals
atmospheric pressure (760 mm mercury at sea level). The boiling
point is raised if any impurities are present.
Melting Point: Same as freezing point. Melting point is lowered
if any impurities a/e present.
Vapor Pressure: Usually expressed in millimeters of mercury or
atmospheres at a given temperature. Strongly temperature dependent.
Vapor Density: Oimensionless quantity. Expressed relative to air.
Flash Point: Expresed in degrees Fahrenheit or Celsius. Indicate
whether the figure is based on an open cup or closed cup test.
Other: Enter any miscellaneous data, for example biochemical oxygen
demand, autoignition temperature, or odor threshold concentrations.
Part II is a compilation of five types of hazardous charcteristics. In the
far right column labeled "Source", enter the reference from which the
information was obtained.
Section A list toxicological hazards:
Inhalation: Under "Concentrations," enter the current TLV (Thres-
hold Limit Value) concentration. This is important for selecting
levels of protection for workers who will be in the area.
Ingest ion: Enter the toxicity level in milligrams per kilogram
(mg/kg) of the body weight.
Skin/Eye Absorption - Contact: Determine from the references
whether these hazards exist.
Carcinogenic, Teratogenic, Mutagenic: It is difficult to obtain
concentration dataonthese hazards, since very little is known
about the mechanisms which cause these effects.
Aquatic: Usually expressed in parts per million (ppm) for a
particular species.
Other: Enter an IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health)
concentration, or any other pertinent miscellaneous information.
9-2
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Section 8 contains fire hazard data:
Combustibility: Applies to any compound which can be oxidized in
air.Almost every organic compound is combustible.
Toxic By-products: If the compound is combustible, enter yes,
because all combustion processes yield some carbon monoxide. List
the particular toxic by-products in the spaces below.
Flammability/Explosiveness Limits: Expressed as a percentage by
volume in air. Usually flammable limits and explosive limits are
synonymous.
Section C contains reactivity data:
Reactivity Hazard: .If the material is reactive, indicate the
substances which are incompatible with the material.
Section D contains corrosivity data:
pH: Some references give the pH of an aqueous solution at a given
concentration. For instance, the pH of 0.5% solution of sodium
hydroxide is 13. There is also space for listing the types of
materials known to be corroded by the compound in question.
Neutralizing Agent: Some references list neutralizing materials
which may help at an incident by bringing the pH of the • affected
area to neutral (pH of 7).
Section E contains radioactivity data:
Background: List a background level. Background is usually on the
order of 0.01 milliroentgens per hour (mR/hour). See Part 2, "Field
Monitoring".
Alpha, Beta, Gamma: Exposure rates on some elements may be found
in the"Radiological Health Handbook," published by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services.
Parts III, IV, and V of the sheet describe the specific incident and recommend
safety measures. Sometimes, parts of the following sections will be left
blank, simply because of a lack of accurate information. Enter available
incident information as promptly as possible, however, so that mitigation
measures can start.
Part III describes the incident:
Quantity Involved: Usually express in gallons, barrels, or liters for a
liquid, and pounds or kilograms for a solid.
Release Information: Indicate if the container(s) is (are) still leak-
ing, and if possible, the rate of discharge.
9-3
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Mom'toring/Sampling Recommended: Indicate what type(s) of monitoring
should be initiated to completely characterize an incident and if on-
site samples are necessary. See sections on Sampling and Field Moni-
toring.
Part IV, Recommended Protection, covers:
Public: Based on the data obtained in the first three parts and the
proximity of the incident to populated areas, make an initial public
hazard evaluation. The OHMTAOS reference segment Number 111, "Degree of
Hazard to Public Health," is helpful in recommending action to protect
public health.
Environment: Depending on the type of release and potential pathways of
dispersion, propose potential activities such as booming, skimming, or
chemical/physical treatment. OHMTADS segments 113, "Action Levels," and
114, "In Situ Amelioration," can help determine initial response activ-
ities.
Worker: Decide on levels of protection for response personnel, once
again based on the physical, chemical, and toxicological properties of
the materials in question. OHMTADS segment 108, "Personal Safety
Precautions," aids in this decision. See also "Standard Operating Safety
Guides," Part 5.
Part V, Recommended Site Control, covers:
If enough information is available, establish three work zones (See
Standard Operating Procedures, Part 6):
- Exclusion Zone (contaminated)
- Contamination Reduction Zone
- Support Zone (non-contaminated)
Hotline: Establish site boundary.
Any person who crosses the Hotline (the outer boundary of the Exclusion
Zone) must be in the proper level of protection predesignated by the
site safety officer.
Decontamination Line: Based upon the toxicity of the compound(s) in-
volved, establish a decontamination system in the Contamination
Reduction zone. "See Standard Operating Safety Guides," Part 7.
Command Post Location: Locate the command post. This decision is usu-
ally constrained by wind direction, accessibility, and logistical con
siderations. It should also be a safe distance from the Hotline.
9-4
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EXAMPLE OF DOCUMENTATION NEEDED TO COMPLETE A HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DATA
SHEET (PARTS I AND II)
Benzene has been chose as an example. For purposes of illustration,
seven sources of information were utilized:
- "Condensed Chemical Dictionary" by Gessner G. Hawley
- "The Merck Index"
- "Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials" by N. Irving Sax
- "NIOSH/OSHA Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards"
- "Documentation of the Threshold Limit Values (TLV)"
- CHRIS, Volume 2
- OHMTADS
9-5
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V. HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DATA SHEET
SUBSTANCE:
COMMON:
CHEMICAL:
PHYSICAL/CHEMICAL PROPERTIES
Normal Physical State:
Molecular Weight
Density
Specific gravity
Solubility: Water
Solubility:
Boiling Point
Melting Point •
Vapor Pressure
Vapor Density
Flash Point
Other:
Gas
Liquid
irrnHg
II. HAZARDOUS CHARACTERISITICS
A. TOXICOLOGICAL HAZARD
Inhalation
Ingestion
Skin/Eye Absorption
Skin/Eye Contact
Carcinogenic
Teratogenic
Mutagenic
Aquatic
Other:
SOURCE
Solid
B. FIRE HAZARD
Combustibility
Toxic Byproducts:
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
HAZARD
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
CONCENTRATIONS
g/ml
•°F/°C
^F/°C
•"F/'C
•°F/°C
"*F/°C
""F/'C
^F/°C
""F/'C
Yes
Yes
CONCENTRATIONS
No
No
SOURCE
SOURCE
Fl arnmab i 1 i ty
LFL
UFL
Explosiveness
LEL
UEL
C. REACTIVITY HAZARD
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No CONCENTRATIONS
SOURCE
9-6
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HAZARD
CONCENTRATIONS
SOURCE
D. CORROSIVITY HAZARD
PH
Yes No
Neutralizing agent:
E. RADIOACTIVE HAZARD Yes No
Background
Alpha Particles
Beta Particles
Gamma Radiation
III. DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT:
Quantity Involved
Release Information
EXPOSURE RATE
SOURCE
Monitoring/Samp!ing Recommended
IV. RECOMMENDED PROTECTION:
Public
Environment
Worker
V. RECOMMENDED SITE CONTROL:
Hotline
Decontamination Line
Command Post Location
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IV. EXAMPLE -- COMPLETED
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE DATA SHEET
-SUBSTANCE:
COMMON:
( ZBNZOL, Cr
No
No
A3
. %
.
No CONCENTRATIONS
SOURCE
9-8
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D.
CORROSIVITY
PH
HAZARD
Yes (No
Neutralizing agent:
III.
E. RADIOACTIVE HAZARD Yes
Background
Alpha Particles
Beta Particles
' Gamma Radiation
INCIDENT RELATED:
*
Quantity Involved
Release Information
CONCENTRATIONS
SOURCE
EXPOSURE RATE
SOURCE
Monitoring/Sampling Recommended
V. RECOMMENDED PROTECTION:
Public
Environment
Worker
V. RECOMMENDED SITE CONTRQL;
Hotltne
Decontamination Line
Command Post Location
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SECTION 10
DIVING PHYSIOLOGY
Kouyhly 80 percent of the Earth's air is the inert gas nitrogen.
This inert gas is aosorbed by body tissues when air is breathed under
pressure. The same also is true when another inert gas, such as helium,
is substituted for nitrogen on deeper dives. Each body tissue absorbs
this gas at its own characteristic rate. Upon ascent, these tissues give
up their absorbed gas at a rate that can be determined experimentally.
The actual physiological processes involved are complicated ana not yet
completely understood; however, the body's reaction to this off-gassing
can oe understood witnout this knowledge.
If decompression is too rapid, small bubbles of inert gas will form
in the tissues, causing a condition called Decompression Sickness yDCS J
or the bends. The diver experiences excruciating pain in his joints, and
the condition can lead to serious complications if not immediately and
properly treated. This treatment usually involves placing the patient
under pressure in a recompression chamber as a major part of the overall
remedy.
A volume of gas descending in water halves its volume approximately
every 33 feet. The inverse is true upon ascent. If the volume of air in
question is in a diver's lungs, and if he does not expel the air as he
ascends, the expanding air will force its way through the walls of the
alveoli , causing bubbles to form in the blood vessels. This condition is
known as a gas embolism and can occur in as shallow as four feet of
water. Should one of these bubbles block the flow of blood, and thus
oxygen, to a vital organ (especially the brain), serious and immediate
consequences would result. If the situation is not immediately and
properly treated, the victim probably will die. As the treatment for
DCS, treatment for embolism also involves recompression.
For the diver, a controlled ascent is extremely important. As impor-
tant, is allowing sufficient time for the dissolved gasses to come out of
solution without forming the dangerous bubbles. The U.S. Navy Decom-
pression Tables (U.S. Department of the Navy, 197T] were designed to
assist the diver in this task and can be found in most diving references.
There are many other aspects of diving physiology, however, that are
not pertinent to the subject or this manual. DCS and gas embolism are
risks associated with every dive, risks easily exacerbated by unfamiliar
equipment, or equipment that fails to function correctly.
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SECTION 11
DIVING MODES AND EQUIPMENT
Diving has its roots in antiquity, but most significant developments
have occurred during the last 400 years. With the invention of the two-
stage demand regulator in 1943, diving became not only a work tool, but
also a sport currently practiced by millions of enthusiasts around the
world.
There are two basic div*fng modes. In one atmosphere diving the diver
is encased in a rigid container or suit which contains air at the surface
pressure of 14.7 pounds per square inch (psi). Some development was done
on suits like this in the 1930's. Recently, much work, has been done with
the titanium JJM Suit, shown in Fig. 11.1, which is capable of allowing a
diver to do functional work in a one atmosphere environment at depths
exceeding 1,000 feet. The MANTIS, as shov/n in Figure 11.2, is a one person
submersible vehicle which also operates at one atmosphere.
In ambient diving the diver is subjected to the ambient pressure of
the water at the depth to which he is diving. Ambient diving consists of
two major subgroupings, surface supplied diving and self-contained diving
using some form of Self-contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus (SCUBA).
Surface supplied diving is that mode generally used by commercial diving
activities. SCUBA diving, while primarily a sporting activity in terms of
numbers of participants, is widely used in the scientific community for
data collection and research support, and to some extent in the military as
well.
Surface supplied diving. Surface supplied diving is the direct descen-
dant of the Siebe diving dress discussed in the foregoing section. There
are three modern, applications. Modern hard-hat rigs are most similar in
appearance to the original Siebe unit. Basically, they consist of some
sort of rigid helmet (made of anything from brass to fiberglass) attached
to some sort of waterproof suit. Fig. 11.3 shows both the new Navy MK-12
deep diving system and the original MK5 hard-hat rig used for decades. The
suit is protected by appropriate one-way valving and is weighted to maintain
neutral buoyancy when submerged. Air and communications are brought to the
diver through an umbilical which also contains a strength member. When
diving in a hard-hat rig, the diver can be considered isolated from his
environment except for the effects of ambient pressure. A thorough
description of specific equipment and procedures associated with surface
supplied diving can be found in Sections 14, 15, and 22.
Diving from a Personnel Transfer Capsule (PTC) can be thought of as
second order surface-supplied diving.Divers enter a recempression chamber
at the surface. This chamber is large enough for them to live inside for
11-1
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Figure 11.1 One Atmosphere JIM Suit
11-2
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L/ne drawing of the Mantis submersible
Figure 11.2 - MANTIS One-Man Submersible Vehicle
. 11-3
-------
ii
New Navy MK-12 Rig
Former Navy MK-5 Rig
Figure 11.3 Current Navy MK-12 (Left) and Former
MK-5 (Right) Deep Water Diving System.
11-4
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several days. The whole chamber is pressurized to the working depth of the
dive. After about twelve hours the divers are saturated. When it is tine
to dive, they don their equipment and enter the PTC which is mated to the
recompression chamber in some pressure-tight fashion. The PTC is sealed
and lowered to diving depth. Usually a PTC is fed air, power, and communi-
cations through an umbilical from the surface. Occasionally it is self-
sufficient for some period of time, except for the cable which suspends it
at depth. Upon reaching depth, the divers open the PTC which remains dry
because internal gas pressure balances outside water pressure. The divers
wear band masks supplied through umbilicals from the PTC in the performance
of their work outside the PTC.
Self-contained diving. Self-contained diving has two major sub-
divisTons"!Closed-circuit diving is the direct descendant of the work done
in the late 1800's by Fleuss, Siebe, and Gorman. Open-circuit diving has
changed very little since the invention of the open-circuit demand regulator
by Cousteau and Gagnan in J 943. Equipment has kept pace with technology,
but changes have been mere refinements of the original which still is
acceptable for use under most circumstances today.
Closed circuit diving uses the principle that metabolically-produced
carbon dioxide can be removed from the breathing gas mixture with pure
oxygen and so eliminate the problem of maintaining the delicate balance
between oxygen .and the inert gas being used. When pure oxygen is being
used, the diver normally is limited to a depth of 25 feet because of
physiological complications that arise when oxygen is breathed at higher
partial pressures. A tightly fitting mask must be worn to prevent the
escape of gases around the rebreather mask. The unit has a bag into and
from which the diver breathes. Exhaled gasses pass over a chemical (such
as barium hydroxide) that absorbs carbon dioxide, and in the case of the
more sophisticated units, the gas is monitored continuously to ensure that
there is always sufficient, but not too much, oxygen present in the gas.
Rebreather units leave no telltale trail of bubbles, so they are
ideally suited for clandestine military diving. When, for operational
reasons, a diver on a deep dive cannot be anchored to an umbilical, he can
dive for a longer period of time using a rebreather instead of open-circuit
because his tank can be filled with pure oxygen instead of a very small
percentage of oxygen mixed with a large amount of useless inert gas.
Since the rebreather is a self-contained unit, exhausting no gases, it
may be suited for a polluted water diving dress which fully encapsulates
not only the diver but the breathing apparatus as well. Further investiga-
tion is required in this area of equipment modification. Figure 11.4
illustrates an example of a closed-circuit diving system.
Open-circuit diving, commonly called SCUBA diving, and shown in
Fig. 11.5, is r,he predominant form of noncommercial diving in the world
today. It normally consists of one to three tanks of compressed air
carried on the diver's back, feeding a regulator which reduces the tank
pressure to some fixed pressure above ambient (usually between 120 and 140
psi). This first stage regulator feeds a second stage regulator which is
attached to a mouthpiece through which the diver breathes. This second
11-5
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Full Face Mask
Oral Nasal Cavity
'Manifold Assembly*
Mouthpiece and Snutoft Valve Assemoly
Check valvej/Crieck Valve
Exhalation Hose **"** innalatlon Hose
Primary
Display"
Diluent
Addition
Valve--
Diluent Bypass
Valve
Regulator—
Hi Pressure
Shutoft
Valve
Diluent Bottle
Primary
Electronics
Scrubber Bed
Moisture Trap
Breathing Diaphragm
Assembly
Oxygen
Solenoid
Accumulator
Flow Control Orifice
Filter
Regulator
Pressure
Gauge
"hutofl
Valve
Bottle
Figure 11.4 Closed-Circuit Mixed Gas SCUBA
11-6
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c
Figure 11.5 Upen-circuit self contained underwater
breathing apparatus (SCUBA)
11-7
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stage regulator reduces the intermediate pressure to ambient and opens only
when the diver inhales. The diver exhales into the second stage regulator
where the exhaled air passes through a check valve into the surrounding
water.
The diver's eyes and nose are covered with a face mask which normally
consists of a tempered glass plate mounted in a soft rubber frame held
against the face with a rubber strap. An alternate face mask consists of a
full face covering with some means of attaching the second stage regulator.
This attachment generally takes one of two forms. In some full face masks
the regulator mouth piece is removed and the regulator is attached directly
to a port in the mask. Air is fed either to the complete mask or to an
oral-nasal mounted inside the mask. In other full face masks, after the.
second stage regulator is mounted to the mask, the mouth piece is reattached
to the part of the regulator that protrudes into the mask. Most masks in
use allow the diver access to his nose without flooding the mask so he is
able to pinch his nostrils trj equalize pressure against his ear drums.
The self-contained diver generally weighs slightly more than the water
he displaces and, therefore, is negatively buoyant. To control this
situation, he wears a weight belt and a buoyancy compensator (RC). The BC
is a sophisticated life vest, capable of oral andautomatic inflation
underwater. The diver inflates the BC sufficiently to bring himself to
neutral buoyancy. Upon descent he must add air and upon ascent he must
vent air to remain so.. The purpose of the weight belt is to extend his
buoyancy dynamic range (and to give him negative buoyancy if he is one of
those individuals who is naturally positively buoyant).
Diving Dress
The two basic categories of diving dress are functions of the kind of
diving being performed. Underwater work falls into either a non-swimming
or a swimming mode. What the diver wears is, therefore, dependent upon
whether or not he is swimming.
Non-swimming diving dress. The non-swimming diver is usually involved
with heavy underwater work.Heavy work almost always is associated with
massive structures where the diver's primary consideration is protection
from abrasion and other physical injuries resulting from his coming into
contact with what he is working on. The usual diving dress in these
circumstances is a heavy, rubberized canvas outfit as shown in the MK-5 rig
in Fig. 11.3. Weighted boots and a heavy harness are usually part of this
outfit. Gloves may or may not be attached. Where they are not, rubber
cuffs seal the wrists. In some cases the neck of the suit is attached to a
heavy collar that is attached to the helmet, allowing free communication of
air between suit and helmet. Otherwise, there is a rubber seal at the neck
and a snap-ring device that connects the helmet neck to the suit neck. In
this version, air from the helmet does not enter the suit, and air for the
suit must be supplied separately.
The constant volume suit is distinguished from the variable volume suit
by what happens to the suit when it receives air. Upon being filled with
air, the rubberized canvas suit discussed above will distend to whatever
11-8
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its normal dimensions are. The suit becomes somewhat rigid at this point,
and overpressurizing the suit will make it more so. Because the internal
volume of this suit does not change, it is called a constant volume suit.
A variable volume suit is made of a material that stretches. It usually is
much more pliable than a constant volume suit. In normal use enough air is
injected into the suit to lift it off the body sufficiently to allow the
diver to be comfortable. Because the suit stretches and shrinks with
increasing and decreasing internal pressure, it requires much less attention
on the diver's part and generally is much more comfortable to wear. A
variable volume suit must always be supplied with a source of air. There
is a third type of suit that falls between the two just discussed. These
suits are somewhat stretchy, and thus not constant volume suits, but not
nearly so stretchy as variable volume suits. Suits in this category are
called variously by either name, depending upon the manufacturer.
In practice the constant volume suit usually is used with the heavier
(and normally older) hard-hai rigs. The variable volume suit is found more
often with the newer, lightweight hardrhat rigs and with band masks.
Swimming diving dress. The swimming diver's primary clothing consid-
eration is mobility, and his diving dress reflects this. Where conditions
allow, the swimming diver will wear no diving dress at all. Environmental
conditions determine what he wears when the water is not warm and pleasant.
There are two basic categories, the wet suit and the dry suit.
The wet suit' is constructed of a formfitting, closed-cell foam neo-
prene rubber material which usually is sandwiched between an inner and an
outer layer of nylon fabric. Some suits have the nylon on the inside only,
and some do not use the nylon fabric. Although the nylon protects the
suit's outer layer and eases donning the suit, it also makes the suit less
flexible. Suit material ranges in thickness from 1/16-inch to 3/8-inch.
The thicker the material, the warmer the suit is. Suits generally have one
to three pieces, not counting foot, hand, and head covering. The two- and
three-piece styles consist of pants which may stop at the waist or be
bibbed, an optional inner vest, and a jacket. The one-piece suit is like a
jumpsuit with a slide fastener up the front or across the shoulders. Suits
may have attached or separate boots, always have separate gloves or mitts,
and may have a separate or an attached hood. The wet suit offers time
limited protection against cold only.
The dry suit originated as a watertight rubber suit worn over a
diver's insulating garment. The air inside it would compress with depth
and the diver could experience suit squeeze, a condition where his skin is
severely pinched between clothing folds.A recent development is an out-
growth of the variable volume non-swimming dress discussed above. As in
the above case, there are constant volume, variable volume, and halfway
between versions.
The constant volume dry suit is a lightweight suit constructed of
rubberized material designed to retain the flexibility required by a
swimming diver. These suits are designed with an inlet air valve controlled
11-9
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by the diver and an exhaust valve. The exhaust valve always can be manually
operated, but in some suits there is also a provision for automatic opera-
tion so that the suit will vent as the diver ascends from deeper to
shallower depths. These suits usually have boots attached; however, they
can be obtained with ankle seals and separate boots. Gloves are always
separate, but in some versions the gloves can be attached to cuffs on the
sleeves via rings so they form an integral part of the suit. There are
rubber seals at the wrists. Hoods may or may not be attached. Where they
are not, the suit has a rubber neck seal. Where they are, the suit may or
may not have a neck seal, depending upon the design of the hood. In some
versions the hood can be attached to the suit in a manner similar to
attachable gloves, by clamping the suit and hood material between a rigid
under-ring and a clamp ring, giving the suit greater versatility in use.
The variable volume dry suit can be constructed of the same closed-cell
foam neoprene as wet suits. As in the non-swimming, dress previously
discussed, they differ from,the constant volume suits in that they stretch
when filled with air. Since they are constructed of the same material as
wet suits, they have all the insulating characteristics of the wet suit
without the discomfort of being wet. And since the diver remains, for the
most part, dry, body temperature is not lost as quickly to the surrounding
water.
Newer variable volume dry suits are now being manufactured that are
constructed of crushed foam neoprene. This type of suit has fewer insul-
ating qualities, but is much tougher and more flexible than the older style
suit. In cold water, insulating garments must be worn underneath this suit.
Another variety of variable volume dry suit is constructed of rubber.
(See Figure 11.6) It has no insulating qualities at all and requires that
insulating garments be worn beneath the suit even in moderately cool water,
but it is the most flexible of the suits.
Seals at neck and wrist of the variable volume dry suits are the same
as for constant volume suits. Design of boots and hood is also the same
for both types of suits. The only distinguishable difference between these
suits is the inherent stretch of the variable volume dry suit, and in the
case of the neoprene suit, its inherent insulating ability.
Most of the dry suits have in common some form of waterproof slide
fastener with a very few where entry is made through a very stretchy neck
opening. Regardless of whether the suits are constant or variable volume
(or one of the halfway versions), they tend to be either bulky in design
with a lot of internal volume, or snug-fitting in design. The snug-fitting
suits usually have an across-the-shoulder entry. The bulky suits have
several different entries. Some start near the crotch in front and go up
around the neck and back down to the crotch in front. Some begin -it the
middle of the back and go through the crotch to the chest. Many have an
across-the-shoulder entry just as in the snug fitting suits. And a few are
entered through the neck opening which stretches sufficiently, with the
help of two or three tenders, to allow the suit to be pulled up over the
diver's legs and torso.
11-10
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Figure 11.6 - Viking Variable Volume Heavy Duty Dry Suit
with Surface Supplied AGA Mask
11-11
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oo
CD
o
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SECTION 12
PROTECTION USING SELF-CONTAINED APPARATUS
The small group and the sport diver are left with only one option if
they woula dive in contaminated water--SCUBA. Unfortunately, neither
standard SCUBA equipment nor availaole hyorids can adequately protect the
free-swimming aiver, and so he risks the consequences of becoming
contaminated. •
The limitations of standard SCUBA are self-evident. The diver's air
is supplied through a second stage regulator mouthpiece clenched between
his teeth, his mouth regularly is exposed to the water. Even if he takes
great pains to preclude water entry into his mouth, the action of inhalation
creates a slight negative pressure in his mouth, making it nearly
impossible to keep water out. As in the band mask, small droplets are
formed which the diver then inhales. The only way a SCUBA diver can clear
condensation • from the inside of his mask is to flood it with surrounding
water, so his nose and eyes also become exposed to contamination. The
standard SCUBA rig simply is inadequate for protecting the SCUBA diver from
the effects of diving in contaminated water.
Hybrid arrangements of equipment offer little better protection. A
full face mask mated to a second stage regulator eliminates the problem of
water entering the mouth directly, but the droplet problem still exists.
The mask negative pressure at each inhalation still is a regular source of
water. Most full face masks still require condensation removal by flooding.
A SCUBA diver can protect his body and head (including ears) with a dry
suit; but at best, his neck, face, stomach, and lungs will still be exposed
to whatever is in the water, with the subsequent risk of contracting one of
the diseases listed in Table 5.1 on page 5-2.
Protection Requirements for SCUBA Diving
in Biologically Contaminated water
A surface-supplied diver can be protected from contaminated water when
the need arises. Simply stated, he is completely isolated from the water
ana so protected from it. The SCUBA diver has not had this option available
to him, but essentially his requirements are the same.
The SCUBA diver's air supply must be isolated from the surrounding en-
vironment. From the time the air leaves the diver's tank until it reaches
his alveoli, it must not come into contact with the surrounding water.
Since the SCUBA diver's air supply is limited, the open circuit or free-flow
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method of pressurizing his mask cannot be used; however, a method must be
aevisea to prevent the influx of water into the mask. This is the primary
"requirement. Should the diver inhale droplets of contaminated water, all
other efforts of containment would be futile.
The diver's entire body not covered by the face mask must be isolated
from the surrounding environment. There are circumstances where the hands
may be exposed (so long as they can be decontaminated later); however, this
should be an option—full body coverage capability is necessary. This body
covering should not unduly restrict the diver's ability to move and work
underwater.
The diver must have the ability to adjust his buoyancy, either with
the suit directly, with an auxiliary buoyancy device, or with a combination
of both. Th.is buoyancy mechanism must not restrict the diver's ability to
move and work underwater. •
Tne equipment should be available off the shelf with little or no
modification required to make it functional for use in Biologically-
contaminated water. Ideally, it should be within a reasonable price range
affordable by the small group or the sport diver. It should be simple in
design for ease of maintenance, and simple in use for ease in training.
And finally, the equipment must not pose a greater threat to the diver
than would exposure to the contaminated water.
In summary, the diver's air supply and his body must be isolated, he
must be able to work competently ana safely in the equipment, and the
equipment must be simple, convenient, inexpensive, and available.
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CO
05
n
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SECTION 13
SELECTION OF SPECIFIC SELF-CONTAINED EQUIPMENT
AND PROCEDURES FOR BIOLuGICAL HAZARDS
The selection of this self-contained equipment to protect divers from
biological hazards was based upon a series of rigorous tests, together with
the stipulations that the diver be able to perform work tasks competently
ana safely in the equipment, and that the gear also be relatively simple
ana convenient to service, wear, ana operate.
Specific controlled tests were run for the Poseidon Unisuit, the
Imperial Bubble Suit, the Poseidon Jet Suit, ana the Viking Suit.. A total
of 1,140 recorded dives were made during the NOAA study (4) along with
approximately 60 unrecorded aives. Helmets evaluatea were the AGA uivator
System, the Kirby-Norgan tiana Mask, and the Superlite 17.
The AGA Divator Rig. A significant portion of the testing was per-
formed to gain an understanding of how the complete AGA Divator rig would
be suited for polluted water diving. The rig is adaptable to a surface
supply umbilical, so this aspect also was tested.
The AGA Divator full face mask, as shown in Figure 13.1, is outfitted
with a skirt and inner oral nasal manufactured of a special rubber that is
soft, rugged, ana light-weight, yet impervious to seawater and to extremes
of cold and limited chemical concentrations. It has a built-in second
stage regulator equipped with a safety pressure device that creates a
safety pressure inside the mask, when the safety pressure is turned on by
rotating the valve cover toward the diver, a pressure of about one inch of
water column over ambient pressure is maintained within the mask. This
safety pressure seals a reverse lip at the skirt of the mask, creating a
positive and comfortable seal against the facial contours. It also
precludes in-leakage and, according to the manufacturer, assures that the
mask is self-purging should it become necessary to remove it and put it on
underwater. With the safety pressure on, it is nearly impossible to
accidentally have the mask removed underwater, making it unlikely that it
would ever be knocked off by bumping into an object or by a high current.
The faceplate consists of an extremely wide-angle, high-impact poly-
carbonate having the same refractive index as water. Peripheral vision is
exceptional; however, there is a pronounced "aquarium effect" where the side
panels meet the front plate. Some of the masks used during these tests had
the side panels rouyhened up with sandpaper on the inside to eliminate this
effect. The mask accommodates wireframed glasses without modification. It
has a removable o-ring sealed cover plate for installation of a microphone.
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ORAL-NASAL
EXHALATION
CHANNEL
SECOND STAGE
DIAPHRAM AND
SAFETY VALVE
ASSEMBLY
SECOND STAGE
REGULATOR
MECHANISM
QUICK
RELEASE
BUCKLE
MUSHROOM
VALVE
DEFROSTER
PORT
INHALATION
CHANNEL
AIR INLET
Figure 13.1 AGA Full Face Mask
13-2
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The AGA Divator also incorporates separate inhalation and exhalation
channels to minimize carbon dioxide build-up inside the mask. Inhaled air
crosses the faceplate, becoming moisturized as it clears the faceplate, and
.enters the oral-nasal through mushroom valves. Exhaled air passes directly
tnrough the oral-nasal into the exhalation channel, and through a one-way
valve into the water. Because of the positive pressure inside the mask,
water is unlikely to backflow through the one-way valve. This feature,
more than any other, was why the NOAA Report considered the AGA Divator
such a good prospect for biologically-polluted water diving use.
SCUBA second stage regulators normally are supplied with air from the
first stage regulator at about 140 psi above ambient. The AGA first stage
supplies tne mask with only 90 psi. This first stage regulator is specifi-
cally designed to mount beneath two small inverted air tanks and is not
well-suitea for mounting on standard SCUBA tanks. Most of the testing,
therefore, was accomplished^with standard tanks using first stage regulators
that had their secondary pressures reduced to 90 psi. The AGA first stage
regulator, nowever, also accommodates a surface-supplied umbilical, so tests
were run with the complete AGA Divator rig. In addition to reducing the
secondary output pressure of these standard first stage regulators, they
were freeze protected. This amounts to filling the pressure-sensing
mechanism with silicone fluid and sealing the opening with a flexible
rubber cap. In this way the pressure sensing mechanism is isolated from
contact with the water, but it can still transmit a pressure signal to the
control mechanism. Kits for making this modification usually are supplied
by the regulator manufacturer.
There is a pressure sensing mechanism inside the AGA Divator first
stage regulator that will keep the diver breathing umbilical air so long as
it is supplied at a pressure greater than 90 psi. As discussed in the prev-
ious section, however, pressure greater than 110 psi will break the
pressure-oalancing diaphragm inside the second stage mechanism, when the
umbilical pressure drops below 90 psi, the regulator automatically switches
to the tanks, and the diver does not know this is happening. During field
tests in this mode, occasionally a diver found his tank pressure much lower
than it should have been when he switched to his tanks. The reason was
traced to this phenomenon. To prevent this during the tests, the AGA tanks
were secured by the diver until he actually needed them. This turned out
to be practical and easy to do.
During early dives with the complete AGA Divator rig, divers found they
were excessively heavy. It was determined that when the AGA tanks are
filled with air they are 19 pounds negative in fresh water. This implies
that a wet-suited diver needs no extra weight when diving with this rig,
and a dry-suited diver can use 19 pounds less than he normally would use.
This results in an extremely comfortable dive, especially when diving in a
non-neoprene suit.
During an evaluation dive, the diver descended on surface supply and
at depth he switched from umbilical to tanks. Very shortly thereafter he
experienced heavy breathing resistance. He commenced immediate ascent to
the surface, dy the time he had reached the surface, he could get no air
at all from the mask, yet his tank gauge showed nearly 4,000 psi in the
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tanks. In the field this could have been a potentially disasterous problem,
although it was easily handled under the controlled circumstances of the
in-depth study.
A detailed look at this problem determined that water from a previous
dive which had found its way inside the AGA first stage regulator had not
been completely removed by the five minutes of free-flow. It had penetrated
around the main valve spring where it was isolated from umbilical air
flowing through the regulator, when the diver Disconnected his umbilical
and switched to his tanks, water around the main spring was distributed
throughout the regulator oy the high-pressure tank air flowing past the
spring.. The adiabatic pressure change dropped the regulator body tempera-
ture below freezing, and the entire regulator became-clogged with ice.
This seems to be a design defect of the AGA Divator first stage
regulator, since there appears to be no way to get water away from the main
spring without using tank air which immediately freezes up the regulator.
This problem effectively precludes its use for combined surface-supply ana
SCUbA operations except under carefully controlled circumstances where
there is absolutely no chance of water getting into the first stage.
AGA Divator and dry suit compatibility. The AGA Givator seats against
the face witn a broad, turned inward skirt. The internal safety pressure
assists in making the seal. Dives were made with the mask seal against the
face and the hood seal against the mask, and the other way round.. Some
face seals had been modified so that they made a good seal with the outer
side of the AGA Divator mask. Some of the face seals were designed with a
smooth rubber surface facing out so that the mask could make a good seal
against it. Thus, the two basic configurations were mask outside of hood,
and hood outside of mask.
The AGA Uivator conformed well to most facial contours and so generally
made a good seal against the face. In cases where the diver's facial
contours or his facial hair interfered with a complete seal, air leaked out
from around the mask. With the hood outside the mask, the hood filled with
air. For divers experiencing this problem, it was found that the hood made
a better seal against the face than the mask did . These divers were more
satisfied with the mask against the outside of the hood seal. In cases
where the hood seal outer surface was nylon, there was a continual stream
of air leaking from around the mask. Where the hood seal outer surface was
smooth rubber, the mask made an effective seal against the hood and there
was no leakage of air.
Future suits should be obtained with a smooth rubber outer surface on
the face seal, and the mask normally should be worn against this surface.
The AGA Divator mask can be made compatible with all types of dry suit
hoods. The ideal arrangement, however, is a hood face seal with a smooth
rubber outer surface against which the mask seals.
The summary of the AGA Divator evaluation and testing is as follows:
13-4
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1. Any first stage regulator from the top list in the Navy Experi-
mental Uiving Group regulator study (Middleton, 1980) can be used to supply
the AGA Divator mask. Care must be taken to ensure that the regulator,
.adaptor fitting (if any), ana hose are compatible. The regulator must have
its seconaary output pressure reduced to 90 psi, and the pressure sensing
mechanism must be freeze-protected.
2. The complete AGA Livator rig, including mask, first stage regu-
lator, tanks, and backpack, is compatible for polluted water diving, but
there are certain drawbacks. The unit cannot be used in the combined
surface supply-SCUbA mode without very special precautions. The suit air
supply must be thought out in advance, and care must be exercised to ensure
chat fittings are compatible. An appropriate charging source for the tanks
also must be available for full utilization of the rig.
3. A flooded AGA Dilator mask will dewater itself automatically if
proper procedures are used; however, the diver should be trained and
practiced in these procedures. It is unlikely that the mask will become
dislodged or knocked off accidentally.
4. The AGA Divator mask can be made compatible with all types of dry
suit hoods. The ideal arrangement, however, is a hood face seal with a
smooth rubber outer surface against which tne mask can seal.
5. When used with an AGA Divator, snug-type dry suits consume about
one-thiro less air than do bulky-type suits. Bulky-type non-neoprene suits
consume about one-third more air than do bulky-type neoprene suits.
The Kirby-Morgan Band Mask
The lightweight diving outfit is surface-supplied with air for
breathing, but unlike the deep-sea outfit, it does not admit air into the
diving dress for buoyancy control. Diving which uses lightweight equipment
is limited in depth, depending upon the equipment being used.
If the KM Band Mask.or USN MK 1 shown in Fig. 13.2 is used, depths are
limited to 130 feet (39.6 meters) without the support of an open bell and
190 feet (57.9 meters) with a bell. The basic components of a lightweight
outfit are:
The mask group which includes all valving. There are two different
models of lightweight masks—the standard or "Jack Browne" rig, which
is not suitable for polluted water operations, or the KMB Mask and USN
MK 1.
The diving dress group, which includes the diving dress (with two
styles, wet or dry, available), and gloves, shoes, chafing pants,
weighted belt, and knife.
The hose group, which includes the air hose and fittings, lifeline,
communications cable (if applicable) and the pneumofathometer.
13-5
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Figure 13.2 Pathogenically Protected Diver with Heavy Duty Viking Dry
Suit and Surface Supplied Kirby Morgan Band Mask
13-6
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The Band has* is an improved version of the standard lightweight mask.
It permits two-way voice communication between the diver ana the surface,
and it has features that minimize the aangers of flooding, face squeeze,
ana CL)2 builaup. The mask is oasically a demand breathing apparatus, but
incorporates an emergency free flow capability for defogging the faceplate.
This free flow may also be used as an emergency breathing mode or for clear-
ing the mask when floodea. The aemana regulator is manually aajusted during
a dive to accommodate changing overbottom pressures supplied to the mask.
It can be adjusted to proviae continuous flow through the oral-nasal mask
should a specific operational dive scenario require this. The mask, how-
ever, is basically a demand mask and provides all the air required by the
aiver when used in the aemana mode; the above "dial-a-breath" and emergency
free flow are not routinely utilized. For addea safety beyond 60-foot
depth usage, the mask is equippea with a backup air supply bottle commonly
referred to as a "come home oottle," or "pony Dottle."
*
The band mask is built around a molaed plastic frame upon which are
mounted a ruober face seal, a heaa harness, a faceplate lens made of
1/4-inch acrylic plastic, a siae block assembly, a demana regulator and a
moveable nose pad, which can be used by the aiver as an aid in clearing his
ears ana sinuses.
-- Siae Block Assembly -- This assembly functions as a manifold. It
is fittea with an on/off defogger valve, which controls a steady
air flow into the mask and across the inside of the faceplate.
This feature is also usea as an emergency breathing mode in the
event of demand regulator failure. The emergency breathing supply
valve for the come home bottle is located on the rear of the side
block. The non-return valve is located within the side block
assembly.
-- Demand Regulator -- The demand regulator is set into the mask in
front of the diver's mouth. This regulator is similar to the
second stage of a single hose SCUBA regulator. Air passes to the
oemand regulator from the side block assembly through a hard pipe;
the flow of air is controlled by the diver's breathing rate. A
manual purge button permits .the aiver to establish a free flow
through the regulator. The regulator is adjusted by a knob on its
siae to accommodate air supplied at overbottom pressures as
necessitated by operational requirements. The knob can be opened
slightly to permit a free flow through the oral-nasal mask as
aiscussed previously.
-- Emergency Air Supply -- The emergency breathing supply valve
provides an air supply path parallel to the non-return valve.
Threads on the inlet of this valve permit attachment of the "come
home bottle" whip. The "come home bottle" is equippea with a
SCUBA type first stage regulator.
-- Frame Exhaust Valve --. This is a mushroom-type valve which is
located in the mask frame under the demand regulator. The exhaust
valve is at the lowest point in the mask; therefore, when the mask
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is upright, the discharge through the valve automatically purges
water from the mask. Under ordinary conditions, this valve
accommodates the steady defogger flow.
— Oral-Nasal nask -- This unit is mounted inside the main body of the
mask, an arrangement which reduces both dead space within the mask
ana the potential for CO^ build-up. In normal demand operation,
the air flows directly into the oral-nasal mask and is directed
through the regulator exhaust. When emergency free flow,
defogging, or venting is executed by opening the defogger valve,
part of the flow enters the oral-nasal mask through a check valve
in its wall and passes out through the regulator exhaust valve.
The oral-nasal mask is a vital component of the MK 1 mask ana must
never be removed.
— Communications — %Earphone and microphone assemblies are installed
in the mask. Communication wires pass through a watertight fitting
in the mask frame ana are appropriately connected to internal
terminal posts. Standard Navy amplifiers are compatible with this
equipment.
The aiving dress which has been utilized with the oand mask
includes the Unisuit, Viking Dry Suit, and stanaard wet suit.
A summary of.tne band mask test evaluations is as follows:
1. Uemand mode, normally used for band mask operations, cannot be
used for polluted water aiving.
2. Open circuit mode is effective for polluted water diving, but only
should be used with surface supply because of high air consumption.
3. Both hoa J_ and Hod 2, when coupled to a polluted water-modified
hood, can be used for polluted water diving in either SCUBA or surface-
supply mode.
Modification one (Mod Ij consisted of placing U.S. Divers' exhalation
flutter valves over the exhaust tee ends to prevent backflow of water into
the second stage regulator attached to the mask. The standard hood, which
has a slide fastener from the top of the head down the back for ease of
entry, was replacea with a hood minus the slide fastener. This was
aesigned specifically for ease of mating to the neck seal using Viking neck
clamps, hod 1 was intendea for SCUBA use in demand mode only except for
occasional use of the defogger valve to clear the faceplate. During
surface-supplied tests, both demand and open circuit were used.
Modification two (Mod 2) consisted of removing the second stage exhaust
valve entirely, blanking off the opening, and reversing the mushroom valve
through the oral-nasal so that air flow was from the oral-nasal to the mask
instead of the other way around. In this configuration, breathing air
could be obtained only through the demand valve. Air from the defogger
valve coula be used to clear the faceplate, but was not available for
13-8
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breathing. Hood modifications were identical to those for Mod 1.
The band mask is supplied from a first stage regulator just as standard
SCU8A regulators are. The first stage regulator must be freeze protected
as with the AGA Divator. During tnese tests, the U.S. Divers Conshelf and
the Scubapro hark 5 were used, but it must be remembered that the Mark 5 is
difficult to freeze protect. The test dives were i.n clean water, so freeze
protection was not critical, and the available supply of freeze protected
first stage regulators was augmented by the NARK 5 regulators present.
During normal use, most divers put a small hole in the top of their dry
suit and band mask hooas. While diving, air often escapes around the neck
seal or face seal and accumulates in the hood. This hole serves to let that
air out. This hole also lets water in, so this practice is unacceptable for
diving in contaminated water. A provisional solution to this problem was
found during the field studjes. A Sea Quest BC overpressurization valve was
installed in the hoods. The valve was fitted with the lightest spring
available from Sea Quest, but when this proved to be too stiff, it was
further reduced by clipping off various lengths until an apparently satis-
factory size was found. 6C overpressurization valves aajusted in this
fashion were installed in all suit and band mask hoods.
4. when the modified hood is mated to a dry suit, care must be taken
to ensure that the whole arrangement is not too tight. Removal of thick
neoprene hoods from the dry suit, leaving enough material to mate with the
band mask hood, appears to be the best solution where thick hoods cause
excessive tightness.
5. Effective hood relief valve cracking pressure experimentally is
less than 0.2 psi. The position of the spring within valve housing, or the
valve housing used, is not a significant factor. Relief valve findings are
sketchy, however, and more work is needed before further definitive
statements can be made.
Recommended Diving Dress for Microbiological hazards
The recommended system presented here is not the only solution to the
problem of protecting a SCUBA diver from the hazards of polluted water. It
certainly is not the best solution, for gaps still exist, and research still
goes forward; but it is a working solution, one that the findings of this
study clearly show adequately protects the SCUBA diver. It can be
considered an interim solution for biologically-contaminated water, one
that can be, and already is being used around the world where standard
SCU8A techniques are inadequate, and where surface supply cannot be used.
One of the basic premises of this undertaking was that the final solu-
tion had to include equipment that was available off-the-shelf with little
or no modification required to make it functional for use in contaminated
water. Also, it had to be reasonably priced, simple in design, and easy to
use.
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There were two elements specifically required, a suit and a mask. The
research turnea up a generalized suit solution, and two mask solutions, one
.generalized, and the other brand specific, the preferred solution being the
latter. Uilliscraft (15) went to great lengths to avoid specific brand
endorsement or disparagement during this study, and the inclusion of a
specific mask in the recommended solution should not be considered as an
endorsement of the manufacturer's product; rather, it should be considered
as an endorsement of the underlying principles the manufacturer chose to
apply in the production of this particular mask. Any future mask appearing
on the market which would possess similar characteristics would be equally
acceptable after a suitable series of tests to ensure that it did not
compromise the essential requirement—absolute exclusion of the outside
environment.
The suit. The recommended suit is a "smooth skin" dry suit having the
following characteristics:. It must 'have an attached hood and attached
boots, altnough the hood may be removaole so long as it can be mated to the
suit with a waterproof seal as in tne Viking Suit. It must have a means of
inflation from either the diver's air tanks or from an external "pony
bottle." Care must oe taken to ensure that any adaptors used in the
inflation hose are flow matched to the hose. It must have a aiver-
controllable exhaust valve that keeps water out of the suit. The hood must
have an installed relief valve that relieves automatically to vent off any
air accumulating-in the hood. And above all, the suit must keep the diver
completely dry on a test dive in clean water.
A diver requiring hand protection can ado special cuffs to his dry
suit and attach heavy-duty rubber gloves with long cuffs to these suit
cuffs. Attachment can be accomplished by slipping a short piece of plastic
pipe over hand and wrist, and clamping the glove and suit cuff to this pipe
section with a hose clamp. Care should be taken to ensure that the seams
where the cuffs attach to the suit are genuinely waterproof.
The mask. The recommended mask is the AGA Civator mask coupled to any
standard first stage regulator noted in the top listing of the Navy
Experimental Diving Group regulator study (Middleton, 1980). This first
stage regulator must have its secondary output pressure reduced to 90 psi,
and it must be freeze-protected. Since the AGA uivator is manufactured to
metric standards, and most of the first stage regulators on the Navy list
are manufactured to U.S. standards, it may oe necessary to use adaptors to
connect the two items, where possible, the AGA Divator hose should have
its metric fittings removed and an appropriate fitting attached. Otherwise,
care must be taken to ensure that the adaptors are flow matched to the hose.
In use, the mask safety pressure must always be turned on.
The complete AGA uivator rig also is acceptable, provided appropriate
means are used to supply air for suit inflation. This complete outfit,
however, is quite expensive, especially when one considers the required
ancillary equipment, so this solution does not really meet the originally-
stipulated cost requirements.
It is possible that other manufacturers will choose to produce mask*
that, like the Divator, are internally pressurized to prevent in-leakage of
-------
water, when produced, such masks also will be acceptable provided in-
leakage is absolutely prevented. A particular point to watch out for is
back-seepage around the exhaust diaphragm. In the Divator, this problem is
-circumvented by separating the inhalation and exhalation channels. Any new
mask must solve this problem with equal success.
The other recommended mask solution is a band mask, Mod 1 or Mod 2.
Mod 1 consists of attaching flutter valves to both sides of the mask exhaust
tee. Moa 2 consists of removing the second stage regulator exhaust dia-
phragm ana housing, blanking off the opening, and reversing the mushroom
valve in the oral-nasal. For both modifications, the hood is replaced with
one having no slide fastener and having a straight neck designed-for attach-
ment to the suit neck with a ring and clamp similar to the Viking Suit ring
and clamp. The hood also must have a relief valve near the top set to
release at no more than 0.2 psi.
*
The bana mask is not the solution of choice, because, like the complete
AGA uivator rig, it is quite expensive and, therefore, outside the origi-
nally stipulated cost requirements. Many diving organizations, however,
already possess one or more such masks, and in this case, this solution is
much less expensive than any other. It must be stressed that diver comfort
is lower than with the AGA Divator, and the band masx configured for
polluted water diving is more cumbersome to put on and take off. Diver
abandonment of his breathing equipment underwater also is much more
difficult with this equipment, but this action always should be considered
as the very last resort in polluted water.
A final consideration when using a modified band mask for polluted
water diving is tnat it may be necessary to remove neoprene dry suit hoods
in order to make the rig sufficiently comfortable. Should this be done,
enough suit hood material must be left to allow for mating of the band mask
hood to the dry suit.
13-11
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oo
fD
n
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SECTION 14
MODIFIED SURFACE-SUPPORTED DIVING SYSTEMS
Draeger Constant Volume Suit
The Draeger Constant Volume Suit with neck entry emerged as a likely
candidate for providing adequate protection in polluted water. Its thick,
smooth neoprene surface can be decontaminated more readily than other dry
suits. The hood fully encloses the diver's head, has the demand regulator
built in, and seals to the suit at the neck entry point in a simple,
reliable fashion, thereby eliminating the need for a water-tight zipper.
Early in the evaluation program, it became apparent that most exhaust
valves in demand regulators allow a few small droplets of water to enter
during the exhaust cycle. When the demand valve is activated, the jet of
incoming air breaks up the droplets into a mist which is then inhaled by
the diver. This normally is not noticed by the diver, and in clean water
it is of no significance. Failure of the exhaust valve was also of
concern.
To compensate for these weak points, the exhaust valve of a Scubapro
MarTC 5 demand regulator was eliminated and the valve port "blanked off"
(Fig. 14.1). The pathway of breathing gas was then "in only" through the
demand regulator and into the Draeger oral mask. A separate exhaust
valve was mounted in the port which formerly contained the Draeger demand
regulator. To eliminate "splash back" and to provide greater
reliability, two exhaust valves were mounted in series, separated and
sealed at each end by large "0" rings. Fig; 14.2 shows a breakdown of
this series exhaust valve (SEV). Test dives with, these jodifications
showed a slight but acceptable increase in exhalation resistance. The"
demand regulator will also freeflow slightly when the outlet of the SEV
is higher in the water column than the demand regulator diaphragm.
To provide communications, a microphone and electrical penetrator
were mounted in the plug provided on the right side of the Draeger hood.
The earphone is mounted 1n an existing pocket on the outside of the
hood. This configuration (Fig. 14.3) provides excellent communications
with a minimum of penetrations into the suit. It can be used with hard
wire or wireless systems.
Some divers experience difficulty in equalizing their ears during
descent when using this apparatus. To assist divers in ear clearing, an
ear equalization pad (Gaudiosi pad), made of foam neoprene, was glued
into the lower portion of the mask. Fig. 14.4 shows the Draeger hood
with all of the above-mentioned modifications and additions.
14-1
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Suit-Under-Suit
Thermo regulation is a common problem in diving. Normally, hypothermia
is the problem, and diving suits are designed to keep divers warm, either
passively with insulation, or actively by passing hot water through
specially constructed suits. NOAA divers have encountered situations in
which significant overheating of the diver has occurred due to warm water
and the necessity of wearing a dry suit for protection against polluted
water. The "suit-under-suit" (SUS) was developed to allow heating or
cooling of the diver, and to reduce the probability of contamination of the
diver's body in the event of damage to the suit. (See Figure 14.5)
Dry suits containing air have significant internal/external pressure
differentials, depending upon the position of the diver in the water.
Since both a pressure differential and a hole are required for entry of
water into a dry suit, elimination of one of these factors will eliminate
entry of outside water. If the inside of a dry suit is filled with water,
the internal/external pressute differential can be reduced or eliminated.
This same water can be used for diver thermoregulation.
Fig. 14.6 shows the SUS. A tight-fitting foam neoprene undersuit with
attached feet and neck entry makes up the innermost portion of this system.
The neck of this suit seals to the neck ring of the Draeger suit. A neck
dam provides a seal between the neck ring and the diver's neck (Fig. 14.7).
The Draeger suit and hood seal is then made in a normal fashion over the
SUS and neck dam. Clean water is pumped into the area between the SUS and
the Draeger suit via the umbilical from the surface, and the water exits
through the exhaust valves near the ankle of the Draeger suit. The neck
dam prevents entry of this water into the hood.
The suit is filled with water while the diver is at the surface of the
water with his feet in an elevated position to allow the escape of air
through the exhaust valves. The diver must exit from the water slowly at
the end of the dive to allow adequate time for water to drain from the
suit. A two-way valve is provided to allow the diver to control the rate
of flow through the suit, and to provide discharge of pumped water in order
to maintain a rapid flow through the hose. The latter is sometimes
necessary to maintain proper water temperature.
Test dives with this system proved to be significantly more comfortable
for the diver than an air-filled dry suit. No pressure differentials exist,
thereby eliminating suit squeeze. Buoyancy changes due to compression and
expansion of air and air shifting within the suit are also eliminated.
Another feature of the Draeger hood that NOAA has modified is the
hinged faceplate. The hinge normally allows the faceplate to be opened on
the surface for the diver's comfort. It was felt that the danger of an
accidental opening in the polluted water or leaks through the seal out-
weighed this short-term convenience. A new Lexan faceplate was machined to
replace the original and is fitted into a recessed groove behind the opening
for the original. This faceplate is held in place by the original clamp.
This configuration has comfort drawbacks for divers with long noses.
14-2
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Demand Regulator Mod. II
SIDE VIEW
rubber
gasket
/ A \
1
1
1
L
I
1
1
J.
exhaust
plug
regulator cover
diaphram
regulator body
mouth piece
adapter
Figure 14.1
14-3
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Series Exhaust Valve Mod. I (Breakdown)
1. Exhaust valve body
2. O-RIng (OD= 1 tt", W = Vu )
3. Check valve body
4. O- Ring (OD= 1 Vt" W = '/•")
5. Check valve body
6. O- Ring (OD = 1'/.',' W = V," )
7. Cap
8. Exhaust valve body cap
Figure 14.2
-------
Drager Communication Mod. II
• marsh marine
connector
earphone
marsh marine
connector
earphone & marsh
marine connection
Drager
communication
mounting plug
8 ohm noise
canceling
microphone
Figure 14.3
14-5
-------
Dra'ger Polluted Water Diving Hood Mod.
adjustable
exhaust valve
Microphone Mod. II
ear equalization
pad
Series Exhaust Valve
Demand Regulator Mod. It
Figure 14.4
14-6
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Standard Draeger
Hood and Suit
Draeger Hood w/Modified Viking
"Suit-Under-Suit" Dress
Figure 14.5 - Draeger System
14-7
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Suit Under Suit (S.U.S.)
Orager neck ring
clamp
outer layer suit
2-way water
inlet valve
inside water
water inlet whip
attached
boots
Orager ankle
exhaust valve
Figure 14.6
14-8
-------
S.U.S. Neck Assembly
neck dam
Drager
neck ring
neck yokev r-- ,--
Orager neck ring
clamp
Figure 14.7
14-9
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The MK-12 Surface-Supplied Diving System (SSDS)
The MK-12 SSDS as shown in Figure 14.8, consists of four major assem-
blies, the helmet assembly, the recircular assembly, the dress assembly and
support equipment. The helmet may be used with air or mixed gas as the
breathing medium, with the use of the recirculator as a modular, add-on
component for mixed gas operation. The normal diving dress consists of a
crushed foam neoprene nylon dry suit, outer chafing garment, jocking
harness, lightweight diving boots, and gloves. Two-, four-, and five-pound
lead weights (to a maximum of 60 Ibs) fit into the calf, thigh, and hip
pockets of the outer garment. The swimming dress consists of either a wet
suit or swim trunks with jocking harness, fins, scuba weight belt or outer
garment, and weights and the neck-dam with exhaust valve in the ambient
configuration. All dress configurations require the use of the jocking
harness to provide helmet stability.
The MK-12 SSOS air operations will support a diver performing tasks
varying from light to heavy *ork to depths of 250 FSW. Operating the MK-12
SSDS with console overbottom pressure determined by hose length and dive
depth provides the means of ensuring adequate airflow through the helmet.
The MK-12 is an open circuit system in air operations. The air is supplied
from the surface by the umbilical hose through a non-return valve within
the air supply adapter, through stainless steel tubing to the air supply
valve, and out into the helmet by means of the air supply diffuser. The
air is directed up across the front viewport and toward the diver's face,
exiting the helmet via the exhaust valve. In the adjustable configuration,
the normal operating range of the exhaust valve provides a helmet pressure
differential of 0.3 _+ 0.05 psi to 2.0 + 0.3 psi with a flow of 6 ACFM.
The helmet shell is laid up with fiberglass cloth and polyester resin
for a strong, light, impact-resistant structure. The shell is coated with
a highly visible yellow gel coat to provide the U/W definition. A cast
lead weight is cut to fit into the crown of 'the helmet, then laminated with
fiberglass and resin. The weight is sized and located to make the helmet
neutral in buoyancy and to counterbalance the weight of the base and breach
rings. This makes the centers of gravity and buoyancy coincide, resulting
in a stable comfortable helmet in all positions.
The standard diving dress is a commercially available drysuit modified
to accept the MK-12 lower breach ring. It is made of 1/4-inch closed cell
neoprene rubber-backed on both sides with nylon fabric. The seams curve
around the legs to produce minimum stretching of the seams, reducing tension
and consequently reducing the chance of leaks. The seams are butt-fitted,
glued with neoprene cement, and covered on the inside surface with seal
tape.
The outer nylon chafing garment serves several purposes. It provides
protection for the dry suit against snagging, tearing, and abrasion;
provides inflation restraint to prevent inadvertent flow-up, has pockets
for installing diver weights, and aids in maintaining the jocking harness
in place.
The standard MK-12 SSDS diving dress is virtually impossible to
decontaminate and does not provide a dry suit/glove interface. As a result
14-10
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r;
MK-12 SSDS and Modified
Viking Suit w/Weight Pockets
MK-12 SSDS and Modified Viking
Suit wo/Weight Pockets
MK-i2 SSDS and Standard
Issue Foam Neoprene Suit and Chafing Garment
Figure 14.8 Navy MK-12 Surface-Supplied Diving System (SSDS)
14-11
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of this situation, Viking Technical Rubber has produced two variations of
the MK-12 diving dress as shown in Figure 14.8 which are very suitable for
contaminated water operations. Each is delivered with the lower MK-12
helmet breach ring attached.
The first Viking suit model is an exact duplicate of the standard MK-12
outer chafing garment. This Viking dress provides all necessary weight
pockets to accept the 60 pounds of lead bars, blocks, and rods required for
diver buoyancy control. This suit also includes the compress, calf, and
thigh straps to prevent diver "blow-up" or overpressurization.
The second Viking MK-12 model suit is a smooth dress with no weight
pockets or compressive straps. This model requires the utilization of the
standard outer chafing overalls.
The Viking suits are made of very heavy weight 1.1 mm thick natural
rubber .bonded onto polyester tricot fabric. The rubber provides the
waterproofing but no insulation. The diver wears either clothing or
insulated underwear for warmth. The thickness of these undergarments can
vary with the water temperature expected. For especially cold water,
Viking offers a jumpsuit made of 10 mm thick polyester foam, lined on two
sides with nylon. This thermal underwear can be worn over a pair of long
cotton underwear.
The design of the Viking suit has a number of advantages. Neoprene
compresses at depth, becoming thinner and providing less insulation. The
Viking, however, relies upon the air inside it and, especially, the under-
garments, to keep you warm. As the air in the suit is compressed at depth
and the suit begins to 'cling, you merely add air into it until comfortable.
The Viking Suit has also been modified to function in the SUS mode as shown
in Figures 14.9 and 14.10 and to mate with the MK-12 helmet.
The rubber surface of the Viking is smooth and not likely to snag on
rocks and other sharp objects. It is also easy to decontaminate. The
fabric-reinforced rubber doesn't stretch easily and won't balloon when air
is added to the suit. The suit material is thinner than neoprene and takes
up less space when rolled up. The entire suit fits into a carrying bag the
size of the average knapsack (eight inches in diameter and 24 inches long).
Any suit is only as waterproof as its seams and seals. The seams of
the Viking suits are sewn and then vulcanized under a rubber tape, making
the whole suit basically one piece of rubber. This provides not only
waterproofing but strength.
There are only four openings in the Viking suit: the neck, each wrist,
and the back zipper. The boots are attached to the suit and are of the same
material, only reinforced and bonded to a tough rubber sole complete with
molded tread. An additional layer of rubber is bonded to the front of each
leg running from just above to just below the knee as added chafing
resistance.
The wrists of the suit are sealed by stretchy latex cuffs. These are
cemented to the arms under rubber tape but can be replaced easily if
damaged. Cuff rings are hard slipped inside the sleeve of each arm which
14-12
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Donning Outer
Viking Suit Over
Inner 1/8" Suit
Mating Neck Ring For Inner
and Outer Suits
Figure 14.9 Modified Viking "Suit-Under-Suit" for MK-12 System
14-13
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Figure 14.10 Outer Chaffing Garment for MK-12 Viking
"Suit-Under-Suit" Dress
14-14
-------
allows for a multiple gloving system to be attached to the suit as shown in
Fig. 14.11. A latex chemical-resistant glove is worn followed by a cotton
work glove to detect any leakage from outer gloves and for warmth. Over
the cotton glove is a heavy neoprene rubber glove which is covered by an
o'uter cotton chafing glove for abrasion resistance.
The neck or collar of the suit is a tapered latex rubber tube. The
tube can be trimmed as necessary for different neck sizes. This is
important as excess pressure around the neck, even if bearable, can have
adverse effects on a diver. Trimming the tapered neck tube should be done
carefully to avoid accidentally over-enlarging it. The latex collar is
surrounded by a latex hood and both are attached to the suit in the same
manner as the cuffs.
The diver dons the Viking Sport through a heavy metal zipper on the
back of the suit at the shoulders. When closed, the zipper is watertight.
*
The Viking suit can be adjusted easily for buoyancy by adding or
venting air. Insulation is provided by undergarments. Air is added by a
power inflator. A low pressure hose (provided with the suit) connects the
regulator first stage to a valve on the left breast of the suit, allowing
the diver to add air when this valve is pressed. Another valve, on the
upper left arm, releases air from the suit. The outlet can be adjusted to
maintain a desired internal pressure. Thus, when air expands in the suit
during ascent, it vents automatically.
The SuperLite-17B Helmet
The SuperLite-17A/B Commercial Diver's Helmet is constructed of molded
fiberglass as shown in Fig. 14.12 and weighs approximately 24 pounds dry.
The helmet system consists of two pieces: the neck dam-yoke and the
hat. The diver slips on the neck dam with the attached yoke hinging into
place. The neck clamp is then slipped onto the hat and locked. The lock
system not only seals the neck dam to the hat but also secures the front of
the yoke, eliminating any extra steps.
The SuperLite-17B is designed for the requirements set forth by
government agencies. The design anticipates future safety requirements by
providing a system for prevention of accidental removal , complete head
protection, a demand breathing system for gas economy without absorption
canisters, antiflooding features, rapid emplacement (even with thick
gloves), rapid removal, and a neck dam clamp that breaks a low pressure
lock mechanically .
Modifications to the SuperLite-17B include the use of a series exhaust
system in which exhaust gases exit from the dive hat through a minimum of
two in-line exhaust valves. This valve system eliminates small amounts of
water back-flushing into the helmet before a single exhaust can completely
close. Secondly, isolation of the second stage diaphragm by a brass cap as
shown in Figure 14.13, has been done-to protect the diaphragm from poten-
tially dangerous contaminants. Ambient pressure reference is achieved
through a tube running from the brass cap to the inside of the helmet
14-15
-------
Inner Latex Glove
Outer Heavy Neoprene Glove
Hose Clamp to Secure
Neoprene Glove
Outer Cotton Chafing Glove
Figure 14.11 Multiple Gloving System
14-16
-------
Modified Lower Breach
Ring on Viking Suit for
Super!ite - 178
Figure 14.12 Superlite 17-B Helmet w/Modifications
14-17
-------
Figure 14.13 Superlite 17-B Diaphragm Protection Cap
14-18
-------
through existing openings which are located in the helmet shell which were
previously used for communications.
By reduction of internal dead air space, the SuperLite-178 requires
"only 24 pounds of total weight. Placing the weights on the exterior of the
hat allows this reduction. This reduction of total weight (30% or more) is
very noticeable under water—the hat acts more as part of the diver's head.
Most of the hardware on the forward part of the helmet is interchange-
able with the HeliOx-18A/B masks. Because of this interchangeability, spare
parts inventories need very little enlargement to handle servicing and
maintenance.
The SuperLite-17B was mated with a specially cut Viking heavy duty
commercial dry suit as shown in Figure 14.14. The collar of the Viking was
arranged so that the bottom "toilet" seat collar was covered by suit
material and secured by a^ drawstring. . This created a totally dry seal
between the helmet and the suit.
The Helmax SS-20 Model B
The design of the Helmax SS-20 Model B Helmet, shown in Fig. 14.15, by
Safety Sea Systems, Inc., is that of a "clam shell" type mask with a hinge-
up head protector equipped with locking levers that seal a one-half inch
thick stainless steel hood ring between the hull section and the head
protector when in the closed and locked position. The mechanical
arrangement allows very quick donning and removal of Helmax by the diver in
either a standing or sitting position. The hull and the head protector
frame are manufactured from stainless steel. The view port is 3/8" thick
tuffak (polycarbonate) and is coated with a permanent anti-fog compound.
The system is intended for use with an umbilical that will supply the
breathable gas and the communication cable.
Helmax is equipped with a demand regulator with an adjustable
tensioning device that allows pressure between 80 psi to 180 psi over
ambient diver pressure to be adjusted to proper demand sensitivity. Also
mounted to the same manifold as the demand regulator is a one-quarter turn
free flow valve that is designed for metering a steady flow to the diver.
The exhaust valve for the Helmet incorporates a series design utilizing two
"mushroom" valves to prevent any contaminated backwatering into the helmet.
The Helmax helmet was mated with a specially modified Viking commercial
heavy duty dry suit. The attached hood of the Viking received the Helmax
helmet ring which allowed for a totally dry seal to be made.
The Desco Diving Hat
The Desco Diving Hat is of simple, rugged, all-metal construction,
that rests on and turns with the diver's head as shown in Figure 14.16. It
has approximately neutral buoyancy under water. Its low center of gravity
and excellent fore-and-aft balance hold it comfortably and securely on the
diver's head in all working positions.
14-19
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Figure 14.14 Modified Viking Suit for Superlite-17B,
14-20
-------
Figure 14.15 Helmax SS-20 Model B Helmet
14-21
-------
Figure 14.16 Oesco Diving Hat w/Modifications
14-22
-------
The neck ring seal is of a new and unique design, providing two inde-
pendent and complementary waterproof seals. It is designed so that the
diver can put the hat on or take it off quickly, in close quarters, without
assistance from a tender, and even while wearing heavy gloves.
Unlike the SuperLite-17B, which is a demand air supply system, the
Desco Diving Hat is a free air flow system. Air is continually introduced
into the helmet to maintain a positive pressure. The only modification
made to this system is the addition of the series exhaust which is similar
to that mentioned in the SuperLite-17B modifications.
The construction of the neck ring insert permits the hat to be used
either with a neck gasket or with an inflatable diving dress having a
stretchable rubber collar. In either instance, the dress or neck gasket
material can be easily assembled to the neck ring insert without the use of
screws and without perforation of the material.
*
The entire hat may be readily and completely disassembled in the field
using only a wrench and screwdriver. Neck gaskets can be changed, or the
hat converted to use with a dress or dry suit, without use of tools.
The liner is adjustable to fit various head sizes, and can be removed
for cleaning.
A specially modified Viking heavy duty commercial suit was utilized
with the Desco Hat. The lower breach ring of the helmet is attached to the
Viking suit, providing for a totally dry seal.
14-23
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fD
o
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SECTION 15
USING SURFACE-SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT
All personnel, divers, and surface tenders should perform a thorough
check of equipment. (If a diving operation is staged from a vessel, the
ship's captain must be notified that divers are about to enter the water,
and clearance should be obtained before the diving operation commences.)
*
Tne water should be entered using a ladder as shown in Figure 15.1.
jump entries are discouraged from a height of more than 10 feet above the
water.
The air supply system, helmet or mask, and communications should be
checked to ensure they are functioning properly. If not, corrections must
be mace prior to descent.
A descent line should be. used at all times in depths greater than
20 feet. Descent rate will depend upon' the diver; generally, however, it
should not exceed 75 feet per minute.
If
to the
Currents
operations
descending in a tideway or current, divers should keep their backs
current so that they will be forced against the descent line.
in excess of three knots generally will preclude all diving
when the bottom is reached, the surface tender should be notified and
the diver should proceed to the work site. The surface tender also should
keep the diver constantly informed of bottom time. The diver should always
be notified a few minutes in advance of termination time so there is time
to complete the task and prepare for ascent.
Divers and surface tenders should review thoroughly line pull signals.
Although voice is the primary means of communication between divers and
surface tenders when surface-supplied equipment is used, the line is the
backup communication should the voice system fail.
When work is completed, the diver should return to the ascent line and
signal the surface tender that he is ready for ascent. The surface tender
should pull in excess umbilical line slowly and steadily. The diver should
never release the ascent line, but may assist the tender by climbing the
line. The surface tender or dive master must inform the diver well in
advance of decompression requirements. A diving stage may be required for
long decompressions. When decompression is completed, the diver should
return on board ship via the ladder or diving stage, with assistance as
required from the surface tenders.
15-1
-------
Figure 15.1 Surface-Supplied MK-12 Entry Procedure
15-2
-------
Protecting the Diver
Although the contaminated water problem has been brought sharply into
"focus during the last decade, the basic nature of the problem has been
understood for a long time. Since the inception of diving, part of the
development effort has been directed towards solutions to this problem.
Protection Usinsj Surface Supply
The hard-hat diving rig is ideally suited for diving in polluted water.
A suit with built-in or attachable gloves covers the diver's complete body.
T-he suit is matea to a Dreastplate or lower breach ring that is mated to
the helmet, and the complete unit is waterproof. The diver's only contact
with the environment is ambient pressure through the suit. If the suit has
no leaks, ana if it is properly cleaned before the diver takes it off, he
will be completely protected from contact with the water and anything it
contains.
Modern equivalents of the old hard-hat rig do equally well. The main
consideration is isolation of the diver. So long as the suit is completely
dry, and so long as the mating between suit and hat does not leak, the
diver remains unexposed to the contamination. In fact, his tenders are at
greater risk than he is because of their exposure to the contaminants while
handling the diver and his equipment.
A commercial firm requiring diving 'in polluted water generally will
perform that diving with new equipment to ensure that the diver remain dry
and protected. hore careful attention is paid to procedure. Equipment
repair is more carefully controlled. A firm not willing or able to go to
these lengths should contract the job out to another firm that can and will.
Some salvage firms have specialized teams who contract out for these jobs.
NuAA found that band masks can be used for diving in biologically
polluted water so long as they are used on open circuit instead of demand
mode. The effect of using open circuit, oy flowing air through the
aefogyer valve while securing the demand valve completely, is to put a
slight positive pressure in the mask so that any leakage is from the mask
into the water instead of the other way round, w.hen the mask is used in
demand mode, the diver's inhalation develops a slight negative pressure
inside the mask that causes a slow accumulation of water in the mask. The
source of this water is the exhaust check valve in the demand valve and
other small leaks throughout the mask. Each inhalation breaks this water
into fine droplets which then are inhaled by the diver along with any
contamination the water contains. Thus, the contamination problem is
compounded by having the diver aspirate the pathogens directly into his
lungs.
Band masks are considerably less expensive than hard hats, and they
can be used in SCUBA mode without a surface umbilical. Nevertheless, air
consumption using a band mask in open circuit is high enough to preclude
its being used in SCUBA mode, and so the band mask is limited to surface
supply for polluted water use.
15-3
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There are other limitations to the use of surface-supplied equipment
for diving in polluted water. These limitations are especially critical
-for the research and sport diving groups. The logistics of surface-supplied
diving are considerable. Air for the divers can be supplied by one of two
means. Either enough large bottles of high pressure air are Drought to the
dive site to support the required diving, plus a safety factor, plus an
emergency supply, or a compressor capable of meeting the same requirements
is located at the dive site. It must be noted that in response to a
chemical spill, if little volatile organic vapors are present at the dive
site, a compressor intake would pump high pressure contaminated air either
to the diver or into the cascade system. The utilization of off-site filled
cascade bottles is the only acceptable way to supply Dreathing air to divers
at chemical spills. But should the compressor become aisabled, there also
should be another compressor or a set of emergency high pressure air bottles
available. Standard procedure when making surface-supplied dives also calls
for the presence of a recowpression chamber as shown in Figure 15.2 (NOAA
Diving Office, 1981). The presence of a chamber calls for the presence of
personnel trained in its use, and for the additional presence of a
hyperbarically trained Emergency Medical Technician or a physician, if
possible.
The logistics for a safely run surface-supplied diving operation can
overwhelm the small organization and are completely out of reach of the
individual sport diver.
Required training for diving with surface supplied equipment is not
more difficult than that required for SCUBA, but it is different. The U.S.
Navy teaches surface-supplied diving before introducing SCUBA when surface-
supplied diving is part of the curriculum. This is done to ensure that the
required habits for surface-supplied diving are adequately ingrained before
the diver familiarizes himself with the independence of SCUBA diving. NOAA
teaches SCUBA techniques first because most diving within NOAA is SCUBA.
However, selected divers are trained in surface-supplied techniques at a
later date. Teaching the SCUBA diver to adjust to the surface-supplied
tether has been a continuous problem, as a SCUBA diver does not immediately
adjust to the requirements of surface-supplied diving.
If the logistics hurdle can be overcome, the problem of training still
must be faced. The research group with adequate funding to handle the
logistics could probably also accomplish the training, as the NOAA Diving
Office has done. Once again, however, the small group and the sport diver
are left out.
There is yet a third problem that must be solved before polluted water
can be tackled with surface supplied gear. Surface-supplied equipment is
intrinsically more expensive than SCUBA equipment. The state of repair of
equipment used for diving in contaminated water is much more critical than
that of routinely used equipment. This adds to the cost. Routine opera-
tions in polluted water require more frequent replacement of equipment
which again increases the cost. As before, the small group and the sport
diver have little recourse to this method.
15-4
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Figure 15.2 48" Diameter, Two Person Recompression Chamber
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Surface-Supplied Giver's umbilical
The lightweight diving air hose used with the standard mask is a
5/16-inch I.Li, oxygen hose manufactured per ZZ-H-461. This hose is designea
to withstand a working pressure of 250 psi and a proof pressure of 700 psi
held for two minutes. After two years lightweight diving hose shall be
hydrostatical ly tested to 375 psi ana held for one minute, with retesting
every six months thereafter, until it is retired from service after five
years.
hose usea for diving with the standard lightweight mask is supplied in
lengths of 50 feet, with a female coupling at each end. Two standard length
hoses may be coupled together with a double male fitting if a longer umbili-
cal is required.
In operations utilizing a surface-supplied mask, a leader hose is
provided. This leader hose is approximately 30 inches long with a 3/8-inch
internal diameter. It leads from the side block assembly to the umbilical
attachment at the diver's waist, where it attaches to the umbilical. Either
3/8-inch or 1/2-inch I.U. diver umbilical hose will be used with the mask.
The lifeline serves three purposes: it removes strain from the air
hose; it permits tending the diver and assisting him in descent and ascent;
and it provides a means for maintaining communications with the diver. The
lifeline is made up by the diving unit, using 1-1/4" line of equal strength
(300 pound working load minimum). If a surface-supplied mask is to be used,
the communications c'able should be sized to the lifeline. The lifeline is
secured to the diver using either a slip bowline, snap ring, or custom-made
harness, and in such a manner as not to interfere with the emergency
ditching of the weight belt. The new Navy MK-12 umbilical incorporates the
lifeline or "strength" member in the communication line which is made of
Kevlar, a material used in bulletproof vests.
A pneumofathometer hose is the final component of the umbilical. It
should be adjusted so that the open end will terminate at the diver's chest.
This hose gives surface tending personnel the diver's exact depth at all
times.
Accessory Equipment for Surface-Supplied Diving
Accessory equipment which are often useful in lightweight diving
operations include the following:
— hand leadline for measuring depth.
-- descending line to guide the diver to the bottom and for use in
passing tools and equipment. This 3-inch line is cable-laid to
prevent twisting and to facilitate easy identification by the
diver on the bottom. In use, the end of the line may be fastened
to a fixed underwater object, or it may be anchored with a weight
heavy enough to withstand the force of the current.
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-- distance line made of 60 feet of 15-thread cable-laid manila. The
distance line is attached to the bottom end of the descending line
and is used by the diver as a guide for searching as well as a
means for relocating the descending line.
-- decompression stage, constructed to carry one or two divers, is
used both for putting divers into the water and for bringing them
to the surface, especially when decompression stops must be made.
The stage platform is made in an open grill work pattern to reduce
resistance from the water and may include seats. Guides for the
descending line, and several eyebolts for attaching tools,
steadying lines or weights, are provided. The frames of the
stages are collapsible for easy storage.
-- stage line for raising and lowering the decompression stage. It
is made up from 3" or 4" manila, nylon or polypropylene rope and
marked off at 10-foot intervals to assist in placing the stage at
the proper decompre*ssion stops. The first "10-foot" mark is placed
so that the diver's chest will be maintained at an average depth
of 10 feet at his 10' stop. The stage will have to be adjusted
slightly depending on surface conditions at the time of each dive.
— diving ladder used when entering the water from the side of a
small boat. The ladder is made of galvanized steel, and when in
use, it is held at the correct angle by a pair of struts which
hold the ladder out from the side of the boat. These struts may
be folded for storage.
-- cast-iron weights are provided in two sizes: 50 pounds and 100
pounds. Both sizes are used as descending line weights.
— canvas toolbag for carrying tools. The bag may be looped over the
diver's arm, or it may be sent down the descending line.'
— underwater lights, if conditions permit, may improve the diver's
range of vision. A variety of lights are available. A medium
pressure light, satisfactory, to a depth of 150 feet, uses a normal
100-watt photoflood bulb;or,any other bulb with a medium base.
All underwater lights must1'be submerged.before they are turned on
and be turned off before being taken out of the water to prevent
breakage due to thermal shock.
-- a stopwatch for timing the total dive time, decompression stop
time, travel time, etc.
Surface Supply Air Systems
All surface supply air systems that are to be utilized for polluted
water diving are thoroughly described in Section 6.2.1 of the U.S. Navy
Diving Manual (1973) NAVSEA C994-LP-001-9010. Figure 15.3 illustrates both
a dockside mobile surface supply system and a workboat modified bank for
limited space use.
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Trailer Mounted Air Rack
w/Communications Box
Shipboard 01 Deck Mounted Air Rack
w/Communications Box
Figure 15.3 Surface Supply Air Systems
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GO
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SECTION 16
HEAT STRESS IN ENCAPSULATED DIVERS
Encapsulated divers who must work in warm contaminated waters are in
thermal difficulty. The water need not be hot. People are surprised that
lukewarm can be dangerous. Past experiences show surprising results in
thermal stress which came from seemingly bland surroundings.' The central
thread running through these varied experiences is that in all cases there
was a restriction of the normal pathways of heat loss from the body,
especially the ability to lo*se heat by evaporation.
Then there are the examples of men who are severely limited by protec-
tive clothing. Soldiers in chemical warfare gear can just tolerate warm
climatic conditions at rest, but are unable to run, dig, and march; either
they collapse from heat stress or they tear off their masks, hoods, and
gloves which are completely impermeable. Rocket fuel handlers must wear
impermeable coveralls, and it is evident that they cannot work long if it
is hot. Various"means of cooling have been tried. Similarly, workers in
the chemical industry may have to enter a tank to clean or repair it, and
their protective clothing and respirators become thermally intolerable if
there is no way to cool them underneath the suit. In the nuclear in-
dustry, workers in hot zones, hot from radiation, wear complete coveralls
for protection, and in many cases they are generously ventilated with clean
air through flexible supply and return ducts. Fresh air is vital, both
because we must consume oxygen and dump C02, and because we have to
dissipate metabolic heat.
Losing Heat from the Body
Thermal balance in air environments is well studied. We are accus-
tomed to being able to regulate heat loss in a wide range of temperatures,
and for a wide range of activities that vary the internal heat production
enormously. When air temperature is well below skin temperature of 33°C
(91 op), enough heat flows to the cold air so that we lose internally-
generated heat readily. But as soon as either the air is warm or the heat
production is high, or both, not enough heat is lost by convective transfer
alone. The result is that skin temperature rises, and at 35°C (950F)
sweating begins. As the sweat evaporates, it cools the skin, and thermal
balance is restored. Without this physiological response, man would not be
able to live in summer, or inhabit the deserts and tropics.
The metabolic heat to be dissipated ranges from around 100 kcal/hr at
rest to 300 and 600 kcal/hr during normal physical work. In heavy effort a
fit man can sustain levels like 900 or 1,000 kcal/hr. In comfortable air
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temperatures, surface heat loss by convection is around 50 kcal/hr, and
insensible water loss accounts for another 50 or so by evaporation. The
cooling from evaporation of sweat is a powerful addition. If a liter of
sweat evaporates in an hour, it takes 580 kcal of heat with it, A man who
cannot evaporate his sweat is in trouble unless you arrange to chill the air
where he works, or supply him with some other form of direct cooling.
Tolerance Limits
When you cannot lose heat as fast as you make it, you store it. The
question then is, how much storage is tolerable? The quick answer is: 150
to 200 kcal. So, considering the heat generation rate, it does not take
long to accumulate too much if heat loss pathways are sharply restricted.
Thermal tolerance for heat is defined in a number of ways. There is
to-lerance for heat defined by the person's ability to think, remember, and
solve problems. As heat storage accumulates, this sort of cognitive be-
havior degrades first, then psychomotor performance. As a rule of thumb,
these performance limits are reached at about three-fourths the amount of
heat storage which defines physiological tolerance. Physiological tolerance
for non-compensable heat storage causes, in a resting subject, anxiety, high
heart rate, rising rectal temperature, heavy sweating, pallor around the lips
and eyes, extreme restlessness, and then loss of consciousness. This used
to be called impending heat stroke. It happens when about 150 kcal of heat
has been stored and rectal temperature is 39° to 39.5°C (about 103°F).
If the man cannot be extracted from the heat exposure, he progresses into
clinical heat stroke, a lethal medical emergency. There have been cases of
heat stroke in the diving industry, usually in compression chambers, but
also in divers in the water. Divers working in the cooling canals and reac-
tor cores of a nuclear generating plant are subjected to water temperatures
in excess of 430C (HOOF).
Despite the absence of documented information, it is still possible to
speculate on how a diver in complete waterproof encapsulating dress gets too
hot in mildly warm water. If he were nude, his skin temperature would be
the same as water temperature, and water-skin temperatures from about 280
to 330C would be comfortable and allow heat dissipation even during hard
work. Water in contact with the skin has a high capacity to carry off
heat. However, if a suit is placed between the skin and the water, the
thermal situation changes remarkably. Because of contaminants in the water,
the dive -must be totally isolated from it.
Heat transfer from skin to water is hampered by the loss of free con-
vective transfer from skin to moving water because of the physical barrier
interposed by the suit. So now the body heat must pass by conduction from
skin to suit, by conduction through the suit material, and then to the water.
The thicker the suit material, the slower the conduction through it. If
underwear is worn, it further slows heat transfer.
The diver moves about and does some work. This requires muscle work,
and the temperature in major muscles rises from around 34QC to 380C.
Therefore, the skin overlying thigh and arms and torso gets warmer than its
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usual 33QC, and soon is warm enough to initiate sweating. It is assumed
that the waterproof suit and underwear, however thin, have significantly
decoupled the man from the water, and direct heat dissipation is seriously
restricted. Now, as sweating fails to cool because there is no way for it
to evaporate, the skin is not cooled, and its temperature rises even more.
Meanwhile, heat generation continues quickly from work as well as the
metabolism needed for just being alive. There is nowhere for the heat to
go, so it is stored.
Stored heat can be tolerated only to a certain level—a level which
remains to be established for this particular condition of work and thermal
restriction. As a guess, it is 200 kcal for the beginning of performance
changes.
Stored heat causes the body temperature to rise. Once the surface
tissues have risen to near the internal temperature, it takes only 60 kcal
to cause a degree of rise ui core temperature. If the diver is working at
an expected rate of 300 kcal/hr, the time to go from 37° 38°C rectal
temperature is only 12 minutes. In 36 minutes he would have reached 400C.
Too hot. Of course there is a buildup time of 10 or 20 minutes before this,
so the total time is probably .45 minutes. It is further assumed that the
water temperature is not so high that it contributes directly to the
thermal burden. This means that the scenario should apply for water
temperatures between 250 and 370C.
If a man had to work in water warmer than 370C, he would have to
store not only his own metabolic heat but that which leaked in through the
suit as well. So his time to tolerance would be even shorter.
The great difference between the encapsulated diver and a man doing
the same work in warm air 1s that the diver cannot lose heat by sweating,
though sweat he will.
Heat Stress Monitoring
For monitoring the body's recuperative ability to excess heat, one or
more of the following techniques should be used as a screening mechanism.
In the monitoring of personnel, both divers and surface support tenders,
wearing impervious clothing should commence when the ambient temperature is
7QOF or above. Frequency of monitoring should increase as the ambient
temperature increases or as slow recovery rates are indicated. When
temperatures exceed 850F, workers should be monitored for heat stress
after every work period.
1. Heart rate (HR) should be measured by the radial pulse for 30
seconds as early as possible in the resting period. The HR at the
beginning of the rest period should not exceed 110 beats per
minute. If the HR is higher, the next work period should be
shortened by 10 minutes (or 33?), while the length of the rest
period stays the same. If the pulse rate is 100 beats per minute
at the beginning of the next rest period, the following work cycle
should be shortened by 33%.
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2. Body temperature should be measured orally with a clinical
thermometer as early as possible in the resting period. Oral
temperature (OT) at the beginning of the rest period should not
exceed 99°F. If it does, the next work period should be
shortened by 10 minutes (or 33$), while the length of the rest
period stays the same. However, if the OT exceeds 99.7°F at the
beginning of the next period, the following work cycle should be
further shortened by 33%. OT should be measured again at the end
of the rest period to make sure that it has dropped below 99°F.
3. Body water loss (BWL) due to sweating should be measured by weigh-
ing the worker in the morning and in the evening. The clothing
worn should be similar at both weighings; preferably the worker
should be nude. The scale should be accurate to plus or minus 1/4
Ib. BWL should not exceed 1.5% of the total body weight. If it
does, the worker should be instructed to increase his daily intake
of fluids by the weight lost. Ideally, body fluids should be main-
tained at a constant level during the work day. This requires
replacement of salt lost in sweat as well.
4. Good hygienic standards must be ma-intained by frequent change of
clothing and daily showering. Clothing should be permitted to dry
during rest periods. Persons who notice skin problems should
consult medical personnel immediately .
Real Time Heat Stress Monitoring
Environmental conditions of underwater operations can not only vary
with the degree of contamination but also with temperature. Severely cold
conditions in the vicinity of 280F are not unusual for winter or Arctic
operations, but the utilization of "hot water" suits have dramatically
extended the diver's duration against cold exposure.
However, the water in the cooling pools that surround nuclear reactors
and in the canals at nuclear generating facilities that are used for
cooling process waters is extremely hot, between 11C°F and 120°F.
The use of the SUS suit, described on page 14-2, provides total
cooling for the diver in these extremely hot conditions. During tests at
the NOAA Diving/Hyperbaric Training Center in Miami, Fla., in December 1983
and February 1984, divers descended into a tank of water that was gradually
heated up to 112°F. Each diver's condition was constantly monitored by
electrocardiogram and core temperature probes; helmet conditions were
monitored by additional temperature probes.. At each increase in the water's
temperature, the divers were to execute a 20-minute series of exercises.
In the first series of tests, three divers dove without benefit of the
SUS suit's cooling system. After performing one 20-minute exercise cycle
in 107° water, heart rate increased from 70 to 180 beats per minute, and
body core temperature jumped from 98.6° to 102°. All three divers
suffered severe heat exhaustion symptoms and had to be helped out of the
test tank. Wearing a SUS suit with surface supplied cool water, the divers
were able to stay underwater over an hour and complete three 20-minute
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exercise routines with no evidence of heat stress. What's more, they did
so in 112° water, even hotter than the day before, and still emerged
"feeling fine."
By this time, the SUS suit and modified versions of two commercially
available suits and two helmets had been identified as effective for diving
in contaminated waters. The SUS suit will have a working range of 100
degrees: it will warm divers in below freezing water as cold as 30° and
water as hot as 130°.
Figures 16.1 and 16.2 show the development and use of a real time heat
sensor system incorporated into the diver's medical monitoring harness.
The rectal thermal probe gives an accurate reading of body core tempera-
tures of the diver under various work loads and environmental conditions.
An additional set of thermal sensors within the helmet monitor heat buildup
within the diver's head area, which can be controlled by venting the hat
more frequently. All sensors have hard wire telemetry through the surface
supported umbilical to a YSI 400 tele-thermometer.
Effects of Heat Stress
If the body's physiological processes fail to maintain a normal body
temperature because of excessive heat, a number of physical reactions can
occur ranging from mild (such as fatigue, irritability, anxiety, and
decreased concentration, dexterity, or movement) to fatal. Standard
reference books should be consulted for specific treatment.
Heat-related problems are:
Heat rash: caused by continuous exposure to heat and humid air
and aggravated by chafing clothes. Decreases ability to tolerate
heat as well as being a nuisance.
Heat cramps: caused by profuse perspiration with inadequate fluid
intake and chemical replacement (especially salts). Signs: muscle
spasm and pain in the extremities and abdomen.
Heat exhaustion: caused by increased stress on various organs to
meet increased demands to cool the body. Signs: shallow breath-
ing; pale, cool, moist skin; profuse sweating; dizziness and
lassitude.
Heat stroke: the most severe form of heat stress. Body must be
cooled immediately to prevent severe injury and/or death. Signs
and symptoms are: red, hot, dry skin; no perspiration; nausea;
dizziness and confusion; strong, rapid pulse; coma.
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3-EKG Pick-Ups, Helmet and Rectal
Temperature Probes
Figure 16.1 Medical Monitor Harness
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Medical Monitoring
Harness Interface
w/tlmbilical
YSI 400 Tele-Thermometer
Figure. 16.2 Surface Body Temperature Monitoring
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SECTION 17
MEDICAL MONITORING
Perspectives on Response Team Exposure Potential
Hazardous materials response personnel, both the diver and surface
support personnel, can be exposed to conditions that are typical of normal
occupational exposures. Therefore, special attention should be given when
developing medical surveillance programs for this type of worker. The team
member can be exposed to thousands of toxic chemicals that may or may not
be identifiable at the time of response. Even if the substances are identi-
fied, potential health effects of exposure to these chemicals or mixtures
of the chemicals may not be known. Some other differences between the
normal industrial worker and the response team member are as follows:
1. Usually the response team member's exposure to hazardous substances
is relatively short in duration and dependent primarily on the
length of the cleanup operation.
2. Industrial exposures are controlled by engineering and industrial
hygiene practices. However, the response team member's source of
protection from exposure to hazardous substances is usually proper
work practices and proper utilization of personal protective
equipment, e.g., gloves, respirators, coveralls, chemical suits,
boots, etc.
3. Generally, industrial exposures evolve from known substances and
sources, whereas the response team member may be exposed to
substances that are unknown in type, quantity, concentration, etc.
Preplacement/Pre-employment Examinations
Preplacement examinations serve an essential function in health
surveillance by providing a historical record of previous exposures,
information on the state of health prior to joining the team, and a
baseline for comparisons with later health observations. Preplacement
examinations are used to ensure that workers are physically able to use
personal protective equipment. Employment and medical history, a physical
examination, and biological monitoring are elements of the preplacement
examination and should be tailored to the specific hazards of the job under
consideration.
Hazardous material response personnel may be required to utilize
protective respirator equipment. Occupational Health and Safety Standard
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29 CFR 1910, Part 134, requires that no employee be assigned to a task that
requires the use of a respirator unless it has been determined that the
person is physically able to perform under such conditions. The baseline
evaluation should determine whether a team member can utilize respiratory
equipment. Once a determination has been made as to the physical ability
to wear a respirator and perform the work task, a periodic review of the
employee's "health status" should be made. Annual evaluations are common
practice. It is recommended that a physician with knowledge of pulmonary
disease and respiratory protection practices should determine what medical
factors are pertinent.
Potential respirator wearers should be examined for any evidence of
respiratory impairment such as emphysema, obstructive lung disease, and
bronchial asthma. These conditions may justify forbidding a person to wear
a respirator that restricts inhalation and exhalation, but would allow the
individual the ability to perform adequately in a continuous-flow supplied
air device. Other medical „conditions that may prevent an employee from
wearing a respirator might include: diabetes, epilepsy, use of certain
drugs, skin sensitivities, emphysema, chronic pulmonary obstructive
disease, and coronary artery disease.
The primary element of any baseline medical evaluation is the comple-
tion of a comprehensive medical health history form. In addition, an
occupational history questionnaire should be completed so that possible
pre-existing exposure to chemicals can be traced. Table 17.1 gives
examples of basic parameters that could be considered in an occupational
and medical history assessment.
The current general EPA Medical Monitoring Program recommendations are
to provide a comprehensive baseline examination for participants in the
program. Specific medical monitoring for hazardous materials response
personnel 'is under development and is due for release in the fall of 1983.
Periodic monitoring should include, as a minimum, an interim medical
and occupational history review, a screening physical examination, basic
blood and urine laboratory tests, and a physician's evaluation. The
monitoring examination should be supplemented by procedures and special
tests only as warranted by exposure to specific significant hazards or
stresses.
Each individual should receive a basic panel of blood counts and
chemistries to evaluate blood-forming, kidney, liver, and endocrine/
metabolic function. The following blood tests are considered to be the
minimum desirable:
o White blood cell count and differential cell count
o Hemoglobin and/or hematocrit
o Albumin, globulin, and total protein
o Serum glutamic oxalacetic transaminase (SGOT)
o Lactic dehydrogenase (LDH)
o Alkaline phosphatase
o Calcium
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TABLE 17.1 OCCUPATIONAL AND MEDICAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT
Occupational History
1. Previous Employers
2. Occupation/Position
3. Industrial Processes
4. Possible Chemical Exposures
Medical History
1. Basic Physical Parameters, e.g., age, sex, height
2. Genetic History .Studies (maternal/paternal/siblings), e.g.,
diabetes, hypertension
3. Personal Health History
a. Past injuries/illnesses
b. Allergies
c. Hypersensitizations
d. Current medical therapy
4. Exercise Habits
5. Personal Habits
a. Cigarette smoking
b. Alcohol
c. Drug use
o Phosphorus
o Uric acid
o Creatinine
o Urea nitrogen
o Cholesterol
o Glucose
Each response team .member should have a routine urinalysis that
consists of the following:
o Specific gravity
o pH
o Microscopic examination
o Protein
o Acetone
o Glucose
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X-Ray-
A baseline chest X-ray should be a standard 14 x 17-inch P-A
(posterior-anterior) exposure. The lateral view is not necessary for
routine screening purposes. The X-ray may be obtained from the examining
physician, a local radiologist, or a local hospital. The film should be
read or reviewed by a board-certified radiologist or other competent
medical specialist. Subsequent periodic chest X-rays should be performed
only when clinically indicated and not as a routine measure.
Electrocardiogram—
An electrocardiogram should be included in the baseline examination.
Ordinarily it should be of the standard 12-lead resting type and interpreted
by an internist or cardiologist. Subsequent periodic electrocardiograms
should be obtained only when rec.ommended by the examining physician, and not
as a routine measure. Figure 17.1 shows a three lead EKG pickup and a
Lifepak 4 heart monitor for real time tracking of work stress.
%
Pulmonary function--
Pulmonary function testing is desirable as a part of the baseline
examination. It may be indicated periodically for employees at respiratory
system risk, such as those with significant exposure to toxic dusts and
irritants. As a minimum, it should consist of simple tests of lung
ventilation: forced expiratory volume in one second (FEV^ ) and forced
vital capacity (FVC).
Workers who are significantly exposed to certain designated materials
may require additional special procedures in addition to the basic panel of
tests. The physician should determine who. is in need of special tests
after reviewing the history forms and after consulting with supervisors
and/or medical monitoring coordinators and health and safety designees.
Provision should be made for repeating tests when necessary. Consultative
assistance is available from the EPA Occupational Health and Safety Staff
regarding special tests.
Ambient air monitoring—
While not a true medical monitoring function, it is desirable to
monitor the helmet atmosphere of the diver for contamination. Figure 17.2
shows the use of a battery operated air sampling pump known as a Poly Meter
which is worn under the divers dress. This unit pulls a measured air flow
through a specific chemical detector tube which will measure the concen-
tration by discoloration. The diver and tenders are able to measure any
contamination just by visual observation. Based upon prior knowledge of
what contamination is present, the appropriate detector tube can be
selected.
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Figure 17.1 Three Lead EKG Pickup and Lifepak 4 Heart Monitor
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Poly Meter Air
Sampling Pump
Specific Chemical
Detector Tube
Position of Helmet Mounted
Detector Tube
Figure 17.2 Ambient Helmet Air Monitoring
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SECTION 18
PERSONNEL PROTECTION FOR
SURFACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
A major area of consideration that has not been addressed previously
is the protection of surface tenders and support personnel. Previous
commercial operations have shown that the recovery of sunken chemical
drums and containers onto work barges will lead to some degree of
contamination of the ship's deck and surrounding equipment. Umbilical
and line tenders handling *the divers' support hosas will come into
intimate contact with the contaminated water. Appropriate levels of
personnel protection must be defined for these special situations. The
limited deck area will not allow for large "clean areas" for personnel
decontamination and changing of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
air tanks. Depending on the level of hazardous material toxicity, this
could dictate the need for airline-supplied respirators for surface
support personnel functioning in the high-contamination areas. Also,
appropriate considerations and procedures need to be developed for
decontamination of surface support personnel. "Clean" locations must be
developed for suiting up divers, and procedures for moving divers and
their gear back to decontamination stations. Specific procedures need to
be developed for umbilical, helmet, and diver dress decontamination
operations.
Evaluating the hazards associated with toxic chemical spill incidents
involves various degrees of complexities. The release of a single known
chemical compound does not represent as difficult a problem to assess as
an incident involving multiple compounds. Likewise, it becomes progres-
sively more difficult to determine hazardous effects as the number of
compounds increase.
The most important first step though is to insure the safety of all
personnel involved in the spill incident.
Routes of Exposure
Only three natural pathways of chemical exposure to the body exist:
1. Through body contact (skin, including eyes and hair),
2. inhalation, and
3. by ingestion.
The primary function of the skin is to act as a barrier against entry
of foreign materials into the body. However, this protective barrier can
be overcome, permitting chemical toxins to enter. The protective nature
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of the skin can be greatly diminished by lacerations, abrasions, and moisture.
Also, many organic solvents can greatly increase the permeability of the skin
to materials that would otherwise not pass through it. Another factor is
that the skin provides a large area for surface contact of the toxin.
Inhalation is the most rapid exposure route. Toxins are introduced to
respiratory tissue and the boodstream immediately. Once admitted to the
blood through the lungs, these toxic chemicals are quickly transported
throughout the body providing contact with all organs.
Health hazards to personnel from ingestion of materials are of minimal
concern relative to skin and respiratory hazards. The number of substances
that can be ingested are limited; i.e., it is difficult to swallow vapors and
gases. Also, contact with ingestible materials is limited in that they only
get to the mouth through hard contact. Even when ingested, toxicity by mouth
is of a lower order due to subjection to acidic, alkaline, enzymatic conditions
of the gastrointestinal tract. However, these same conditions may enhance
the toxic nature of a compound. It should also be noted that gum and tobacco
chewers can absorb appreciable amounts of gaseous substances during an eight-
hour work shift.
The establishment and execution of personnel protection programs when
responding to hazardous chemical spills or releases find their basis in the
letters "IOLH".
The definition of' IDLH provided in 30 CFR 11.3(t) is as follows:
"Immediately dangerous to life or health" means conditions that
pose an immediate threat to life or health or conditions that
pose an immediate threat of severe exposure to contaminants,
such as radioactive materials, which are likely to have adverse
cumulative or delayed effects on health."
The purpose of establishing an IDLH exposure concentration is to ensure
that the worker can escape without injury or irreversible health effects from
an IDLH concentration in the event of failure of the respiratory protective
equipment. The IDLH is considered a maximum concentration above which only
highly reliable breathing apparatus providing maximum worker protection is
permitted. Since IDLH values are conservatively set, any approved respirator
may be used up to its maximum use concentration below the IDLH.
Levels of Protection
It is important that personnel protective equipment and safety require-
ments be appropriate to protect against the potential or known hazards at an
incident. Protective equipment should be selected based on the types(s),
concentrations(s), possibilities, and routes of personnel exposure from
substances at a site. In situations where the type of materials and
possibilities" of contact are unknown or the hazards are not clearly identifi-
able, a more subjective determination must be made of the personnel protective
equipment required for initial safety. Level B protection is the minimum
level recommended on initial entries until the hazards have been further
identified and defined through monitoring, sampling, and other reliable
methods for analysis; and personnel protection equipment corresponding with
those findings can be utilized.
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The appropriate level of protection shall be determined prior to the
initial entry on-site based on best available information. Subsequent
information may suggest changes in the original level selected. Recommended
levels of protection are:
1. Level A
L~e"vel A protection should be worn when the highest available
level of respiratory, skin, and eye contact protection is needed..
While Level A provides the maximum available protection, it does
not protect against all possible airborne or splash hazards. For
example, suit material may be rapidly permeable to certain chemicals
in high air concentrations or heavy splashes. (See Figure 18.1)
2. Level B
L~e~vel B protection should be selected when the highest level
of respiratory protection is needed, but cutaneous or percutaneous
exposure to the sn\all unprotectec areas of the body (i.e. neck and
back of head) is unlikely, or where concentrations are known within
acceptable exposure standards. (See Figure 18.1)
3. Level C
L~e~vel C protection should be selected when the type(s) and
concentration(s) of respirable material is known, or reasonably
assumed to be not greater than the protection factors associated
with air-purifying respirators; and exposure to the few unprotected
areas of the body (i.e. neck and back of head) is unlikely to cause
harm. Continuous monitoring of site and/or individuals should be
established. (See Figure 18.1)
4. Level D
Level D is the basic work uniform and should be worn for all
site operations. Level D protection should only be selected when
sites are positively identified as having no toxic hazards. (See
Figure 18.1)
Respiratory Hazards and Protection:
The lungs do not have defenses which are 100% effective against toxic
gases, vapors or particul ates. Such hazards may impair or destroy portions
of the respiratory tract or they may be absorbed directly into the bloodstream.
Those hazards in the blood may eventually affect the function of other organs
and tissues. The lungs must be protected from toxic hazards. This can be
accompl ished by avoiding or minimizing exposure. Engineering controls such as
ventilation will help decrease exposure. However, when such controls are not
practical or feasible, protection can be afforded by the use of respirators.
There are respirators which filter gases, vapors, and particulates in
the ambient atmosphere. When concentrations are too high, respirators are
available which will- supply a clean source of breathable air to the wearer.
Oxygen Deficiency:
The body requires oxygen to maintain the various ongoing process. If
the oxygen concentration decreases, the body will react by exhibiting various
symptoms. Dealth will occur when the concentration reaches only 6%. The
effects of oxygen deficiency are listed on the following table.
18-3
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Level "C"
Level "B"
Level "A"
. Experimental 2 1/2 Hour Level "A1
Figure 18.1 Levels of Personnel Protection
18-4
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0? Vol % Physiological Effect
At Sea Level
16-12. Increased breathing volume, accelerated
heartbeat, impaired attention and think-
ing, impaired coordination.
14-10 Very faulty judgment, very poor muscular
coordination, muscular exertion causes
rapid fatigue that may cause permanent
heart damage, intermittent respiration.
10-6 Nausea, vomiting, inability to perform
vigorous movement, or loss of all move
ment, unconsciousness, followed by
death.
Less than 6 Spasmotic breathing, convulsive movements,
death in minutes.
Aerosols
Aerosol is a term used to describe particulates in air without regard to
their origin. Particulates are collected on the walls of the nasal cavities
and conducting tubes. Particulates ranging in size from. 5 to 30 microns are
deposited in the nasal and pharnygeal passages. The trachea and smaller
conducting tubes collect particulates 1-5 microns in size. Any particulates
which travel into the conducting tubes are carried by force of inhalation.
For particulates to reach the alveolar spaces they must diffuse from the
smallest conducting tubes into the alveolar spaces. Only particulates less
than .5 microns in diameter diffuse into the alveoli. Larger particles do
reach the alveolar spaces due to gravity and settling. The smallest parti-
culates may never be deposited in the alveoli and so may diffuse back into
the conducting tubes to be exhaled.
Gaseous Contaminants
Gases and vapors are filtered to some degree by the respiratory tract.
If soluble, gases and vapors will be absorbed into the walls of the passages
to the alveolar spaces. Not all will be absorbed and so they will finally
diffuse into the alveolar spaces. Here, the gases or vapors can be directly
absorbed into the bloodstream.
Respiratory Protective Devices
Respiratory apparatus can be divided into two general types: Air
Purifying and Atmosphere Supplying. These two categories can be further
divided into groups based on their construction and operation.
All respirators are composed of two main components: the facepiece and
the device which supplies or purifies air. The facepiece comes in three
configurations which is directly related to the amount of protection afforded
by the respirator:
1) Quarter Mask (Type 8 - Half Mask) fits from nose to top of chin and
utlizes two-or four-point suspension.
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2) Half Mask (Type A - Half Mask) fits under chin and over the nose.
To be approved it must have four-point suspension.
3) Full Facepiece covers all of the face from under the chin to the
forehead.
The full facepiece provides the best protection because it is more easily
fitted on the face than either the half or quarter mask.
Equipment Classification - General Considerations
Air Purifying Respirators--
The use of air purifying respirators is predicted on several factors.
The atmosphere that the respirator is to be used in must have at least 19.5%
oxygen. The concentration ,of the contaminant must be at IDLH levels.
Mechanical filters are used for particulate hazards and chemical sorbents
are used for gases and vapor hazards. Respirators are approved for use up to
predesignated concentrations. The respirator is also limited by its length
of service which is based on the contaminant concentration.
Another important requirement is that the .contaminant being filtered
have warning properties which will alert the user to the exhaustion of service
capacity of the respirator.
Atmosphere Supplying Respirators--
There are four types of respirators which supply breathing air to the
user. Atmosphere-supplying respirators provide from five minutes to several
hours of breathing air. The first type and the oldest is the oxygen genera-
ting respirator. This type of respirator has a canister which converts car-
bon dioxide to oxygen. Oxygen generating respirators have been used in the
mil itary and for escape purposes in mines.
The hose mask is another type of atmosphere-supplying respirator. It
utilizes a remote source of a clean atmosphere. The clean air is drawn
through the hose by the user or by a blower. The airline respirator is
similar to the hose mask except that the source of air is compressed.
Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) uses a cylinder to hold com-
pressed air or oxygen and allows the wearer to carry it with him/her without
the confinement of a hose or airl ine. SCBA's and airl ine respirators operate
in one of several modes, continuous demand or pressure demand.
The amount of protection an atmosphere-supplying respirator gives is
based on two factors: the type of facepiece and its mode of operation. As
was indicated earlier, the full face mask provides the best protection. Of
the three modes of operation, continuous, demand, and pressure demand, the
pressure demand mode provides the best protection. Airl ine respirators may
use any one of the three operational modes. SCBA's will operate in either
demand or pressure demand. Hose masks are considered to be demand operated.
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An escape SCBA must have at least 5 minutes of breathing air available.
From 5-15 minutes of air supplies are found with escape devices. This escape
supply is stored in a small cylinder or coiled stainless steel tubes.
Escape devices are not to be used for entry into hazardous atmospheres
under any circumstances.
To beat the major limiting factor of SCBA's, air supply, combination
airline and SCBA's have been manufactured. The SCBA may be used to enter and
retreat from the site if there is enough air (greater than 15 minutes). The
airline is used to supply air while the person is working on-site.
This outline is not complete by any means.
Protective Clothing
*
The hazardous properties of chemical substances necessitates the use of
protective clothing. The degree of protection required is dictated by the
predominant physical, chemical, or toxic property of the material. For
example, protection required for a corrosive compound is different from that
of a compound which releases a highly toxic vapor. The type of activity,
such as work or observation around the substance, must also be considered
when assigning protective clothing. As with the selection of proper respir-
atory protective apparatus, a thorough assessment of the encountered hazards
must be completed before any decision making.
Once the specific hazard has been identified, the appropriate clothing
can be selected. Several factors must be considered in the selection of
clothing. The most important is the safety of the individual. The level of
protection assigned must match' the hazard confronted. It is also very
important that the individual be well-trained in the use of procedures for
site activities. Other factors include cost, availability, compatibility
with other equipment, suitability, and most important, performance.
Performance Requirements
The primary safeguard of any protective clothing is the material from
which it was manufactured. In selecting a suitable piece of protective
clothing, the following characteristics of the protective material should be
considered: strength, flexibility, thermal limits, cleanability, lifetime,
and chemical resistance.
The strength of a material is based on four specific requirements. It
must be resistant to tears, punctures, and abrasions, and it must possess
suitable tensile strength.
For ease of movement and to facilitate work activity in protection
clothing, the material should be flexible enough to allow such activity.
Dexterity is especially important in materials used in the manufacture of
gloves.
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The ability of clothing to maintain its protective capacity in temper-
ature extremes is advantageous. Also to be considered is the allowance of
mobility in cold temperatures and transfer of heat to the wearer in hot
climates.
Decontamination can be difficult and expensive if the protective cloth-
ing is not launderable. Some materials are nearly impossible to clean suffi-
ciently under any circumstances. Because of these problems, much protective
clothing is being considered disposable.
Some types of clothing are more durable than others when subjected to
severe conditions over time. The ability to resist aging and the initial
cost 'of the garment should be considered before procurement. Here again is
an advantage of disposables.
The final and most important consideration is the chemical resistance of
the protective material. When clothing comes in contact with a hazardous
liquid or vapor, it must maintain its structural integrity and protective
qualities.
Chemical Resistance
Resisting chemical attack by a protective material is not a simple task.
The material must be able to avoid degradation, penetration, and permeation
by the insult chemical. Any or all of these actions may result upon contact,
especially when prolonged. .
A protective material may or may not be affected by a chemical agent.
If the material is inert to that substance, then it will not be degraded.
However, this does not preclude penetration or permeation of the material by
the agent. Any level of degradation of the protective material may occur if
it is reactive with the chemical agent. Damage to the material may be as
severe as complete deterioration of the protective material. Contact with
the agent and subsequent permeation may result in the swelling or shrinking
of the material or a change in its structure and chemical makeup. Changes
such as these may serve to enhance or restrict permeation by the chemical
agent.
The penetration by a chemical through a protective material is the result
of design and construction imperfections. Penetration is not affected by the
actual protective material. Stitched seams, button holes, porous fabric and
zippers will allow a hazard to penetrate the protective garment. A protective
suit with self-sealing zippers and lapped seams made of nonporous elastomeric
material will prevent penetration because of its design and construction.
However, as soon as that suit is ripped or punctured, its ability to avoid
penetration is lost. Again the suit with the finest design and manufacture
may still be permeable and degradable while maintaining impenetrability.
The ability of a protective material to resist permeation is a character-
istic of that material. When a chemical agent comes in contact with the
protective material, a concentration gradient is established. The concen-
tration of the agent opposing the outside wall of the material is high, and
the concentration inside the material is low (or zero). Because the tendency
18-8
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is to establish equilibrium, diffusion and other molecular forces "drive" the
agent into the material. When the agent passes completely through the mat-
erial, it will condense on the inside wall and/or diffuse into the atmosphere
opposing this inside wall. The process of permeation will continue as long
as te concentration gradient remains greater in the outside atmosphere. The
amount of time required for this sorption process to begin is the initial
breakthrough point.
The permeation rate is based upon several factors. These include the
concentration of the attack chemical and the thickness of the protective
material. The rate is inversely proportional to the thickness of the material
while the conceatration is directly proportional to the permeation . rate.
The amount or degree of permeation is related to the exposure conditions:
which include temperature and contact time. The contact time will ultimately
dictate how much of the che/iical will successfully permeate the protective
material.. The use of protective clothing warrants a conscious effort to
avoid prolonged exposure or contact with any hazardous chemical.
It is important to be cognizant of the fact that no material will resist
permeating by all agents. Some degree of permeation can be expected in most
cases. The various types of protective materials usually possess the ability
to protect only against certain classes of chemicals. The other classes of
compounds may readily permeate the material.
Once a 1 iquid or vapor is sorbed by the material , there is a need for
laundering. The ability to be completely decontaminated is an advantageous
characteristic of protective material. Most materials, no matter how resis-
tant to strength loss, will allow permeation. With many of .these materials
it is impossible to remove al contamination completely. Materials such as
butyl rubber and viton, which will desorb most contamination upon cleaning,
are available but' also expensive. This is where the use of disposable
clothing may be advantageous.
The Naval Surface Weapons Center, Dahlgren, VA is currently conducting
extensive chemical permeation tests on the various materials found in diving
suits, helmets and exhaust assemblies. Once this data has been released to
the public it will be incorporated into this section under the final protocol.
Chemical Resistance Charts
In choosing protective materials based on a selected hazard, various
tables are available which indicate relative effectiveness. It is important
to recognize that such tables reflect only the material's ability to resist
degradation by the agent. This is not the same as resistance to permeation.
A material may be physically unaffected by a substance, but may still be very
permeable to that agent. T:-.is is not to say that such charts are not useful.
They can be so long as the seriousness of the hazard is properly considered.
If the hazard is extremely toxic, then any activity involving that agent
should be reevaluated. The potential risk involved must be weighed against
the potential gain.
18-9
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Table 18.1 provides an illustration of available data usually presented
by the manufacturer. (This information is general and indicates effective-
ness by generic classes of chemical compounds). Upon studying this table, it
is apparent that the protective capabilities of these materials are variable.
1. Tyvek - a OuPont product described as a spun bonded olefin which is made
of nonwoven polyethylene fibers. In this form, Tyvek has reasonable
tear, puncture and abrasion resistance and is excellent in holding out
particles. Another desirbale quality of this material is its resistance
to static build-up. Once laundered, it loses that property. Tyvek is
inexpensive and suitable as a disposable garment. Its melting point is
270'F.
2. Nomex - This is another DuPont product. Nomex is composed of an aromatic
polyamide fiber. It is noncombustible and has flame-resistance up to
220"C, thus providing gqpd thermal protection. It is also very durable
and acid-resistant. Nomex is easily laundered.
3. Polyethylene - This is an inert yet permeable material. It is sometimes
used as a coating or Tyvek garment which gives them resistance to acids,
bases, and salts. Polyethylene will absorb organic solvents.
4. Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) - This material is used to manufacture many
types of protective clothing. It is resistant to acids but will also
allow permeation. Upon decontamination, PVC will retain traces of the
contamination. PVC has been coated on Nomex to develop a strong pro-
tective material. Fully encapsulating suits such as the Wheeler Acid
King and the MSA Rocket Fuel Handlers suits are examples of such a
combination. These suits cost in the neighborhood of $600.00.
5. Neoprene - This synthetic elastomer provides very good protection aganist
many chemicals. Keep in mind that a material which will not degrade may
still be permeated. Neoprene provides better protection than PVC but as
with PVC, it will retain contaminants upon decontamination. Many
respirator facepieces and breathing hoses are also made of neoprene.
6. Chlorinated Polyethylene (CPE) or Chloropel - This material is manufactured
by IIC Dover and used in the manufacture of splash suits and fully
encapsultating suits. The U.S. Army is currently testing prototype
suits as protection against nerve agents and the U.S. Coast Guard is
also conducting tests with suits made of CPE. The manufacturer supplies
chemical resistance information but no data on permeability. it is
considered to be a good all-around protective material. Four hundred
dollars will be sufficient to buy a suit made of CPE.
7. Butyl Rubber - This material is especially resistant to permeation by
gases. It is used in the manufacture of boots, gloves, splashsuits,
aprons, and fully encapsulating suits. The Army has been using butyl
rubber garments against toxicological agents for many years. Butyl
Rubber is resistant to many compounds except halogenated hydrocarbons
and petroleum compounds, which is a common deficiency of most protective
materials. One advantage Butyl Rubber does have is its ability to
release all contamination upon laundering.
18-10
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Table 18.1. CLOTHING MATERIALS CHEMICAL PROTECTION BY GENERIC CLASS
Generic Class
Alcohols
Aldehydes
Ami nes
Esters
Ethers
Fuels
Halogenated
Hydrocarbons
Hydrocarbons
Inorganic Acids
Inorganic Bases
and Salts
Ketones
Natural Fats
and Oils
Organic Acids
E - Excellent
G - Good
Source: Survey
Butyl
Rubber
E
E-G
E-F
G-F
G-F
F-P
G-P
F-P
G-F
E
E
G-F
E
F - Fair
P - Poor
of Personnel Protect!
Poly Vinyl
Chloride
E
G-F
G-F
P
G
G-P
G-P
F
E
E
P
G
E
ve Clothing
Neoprene
E
E-G
E-G
G
E-G
E-G
G-F
G-F
E-G
E
G-F
E-G
E
and Respiratory
Natural
Rubber
E
E-F
G-F
F-P
G-F
F-P
F-P
F-P
F-P
E
E-F
G-F
E
Apparatas.
September 1974, (JOT, USCG, Office of Research and Development.
18-11
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Chem-Pro of East Wind, Inc. manufactures fully encapsulating suits and
other Butyl Rubber garments. Their fully encapsulating suit is used a great
deal by EPA and its contractors. A Butyl Rubber suit is available for nearly
$1,000.00.
8. Viton - This is a DuPont fluoroelastomer which has recently been employed
in a fully encapsulating suit. The suit is manufactured by Chem-Pro of
East Wind, Inc. Viton has been tested for permeability and it has been
shown that its overall protective capabilities, especially with liquids,
surpasses that of butyl rubber and neoprene. There are chemicals which
Viton is not as effective as other materials such as the ketones and
aldehydes. Viton also has the ability to extricate all contaminants
upon thorough cleaning which is an advantage over other materials which
do not. A fully encapsulating Viton suit costs about $3,000.00.
9. Others:
a) Natural rubber - used in the manufacture of boots and gloves. It
resists degradation by alcohols and caustics.
b) Nitrile - This material is being used in protective boots and gloves
because of its resistance to petroleum products.
c) Poly Vinyl Alcohol (PVA) - This is an excellent protective material
for use against aromatic and chlorinated hydrocarbons. The major problem
with PVA is the fact that it is soluble in water. •
It is evident that there are protective materials available for specific
chemical hazards. Yet, there is really no one material good for all types of
hazards; thus, selection can be difficult. Because protection can be limited
by the protective material employed in the suit or gloves, several layers of
protection should bq considered. Disposable boots and gloves and PVC rain-
suits serve such a purpose. They can be used to provide an extra layer of
protection and then discarded. This also lessens the amount of decontam-
ination required for the inside layer of garments.
Types of Protective Clothing
As has been emphasized, the selection of appropriate protective gear is
based on the protection required. Appropriate protection is achieved by
assembling a complete set of gear. This includes hardhat, safety glasses or
faceshield (preferably both), body covering (coveralls or pants and jacket),
gloves, and safety shoes (steel toe and shank). If one item is omitted, the
safety of the individual is compromised.
Heat Stress & Body Cooling
With any clothing which provides protection aganist hazardous substances,
it is important to recognize the hazards created by wearing such clothing.
Because the body is shielded from normal circulation of air, it is not allowed
to carry out its functions normally. Perspiration generated does not evap-
orate, thus eliminating the body's main mechanism of cooling. With that
13-12
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gone,, the body is prone to heat stress which can be exhibited as heat stroke
or hea't exhaustion. This is very common as the ambient temperature rises
above 65-70°F. Work schedules in fully encapsulated clothing must be regu-
lated very conservatively as heat stress may become more of a threat than the
chemical hazard itself.
The best way to combat any heat stress is to allow the body to perform
its normal cool ing functions. The most efficient body cool ing process is by
evaporation. While in protective clothing that has no ventilation, profuse
perspiring occurs. If the perspiration is left in contact with the skin, it
has a better chance of evaporating and cool ing the body surface. When the
perspiration is allowed to run off the body quickly, evaporation will not
occur as much as is desirable. This will happen when only shorts are'worn
under a fully encapsulating suit. Another hazard when dressed minimally in a
suit is the temperature of the suit itself. On a hot day the suit material
can become very hot and causa severe burns to the person inside.
When wearing a fully encapsulating suit, it is advisable to wear long
underwear. It will cling to the body when soaked with perspiration, thus
allowing the greatest possible amount of cooling by evaporation. This will
also protect the body from burns from the suit itself. The best way to
prevent heat illness is to limit the amount of work in the suits.
When extended periods of work in fully encapsulated suits is required,
some sort of cool ing must be provided to the worker. The best method is by
allowing frequent rest periods. Sometimes this is not enough so a cooling
device must be employed. There are effective cooling units available for use
with supplied air units. The cool air is directed to all parts of the body.
A vortex tube is used to generate the cool air. Actually, the vortex tube
separates the supplied air into warm and cool components and releases the
warm air. When self-contained air is used for breathing, the cooling device
must also be self-contained. Vests have been designed to carry ice packs for
cooling. There are several other commercial devices available to combat heat
generated by fully encapsulating suits.
Heat stress symptoms should be observed for all levels of protection,
but especially in Levels A and B. For example, Army personnel wearing the
military M3 toxicol ogical suit (a two-piece butyl rubber suit) are required
to follow these guidelines:
Ambient Temperature Maximum Wearing Time (Hours)
Above 90°F 1/4 hour
85-90°F 1/2 hour
80-85°F 1 hour
70-80°F 1-1/2 hours
60-70°F 2 hours
50-60°F 3 hours
30-50°F 5 hours
Below 30°F 8 hours
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Worker Monitoring
Besides normal safety monitoring, the use of fully encapsulating suits
requires special monitoring of the wearer. Normally, monitoring is required
when any respiratory apparatus is in use. But, because the use of fully
encapsulating is warranted due to potential exposure to extremely toxic vapor
atmospheres, it is especially important to assure that the wearer is properly
protected. There are two methods of monitoring an individual in a fully
encapsulating suit, biological monitoring and personal monitoring.
Biological monitoring is useful because it indicates what the actual
exposure was to the worker. Prior to going on-site, a urine sample is taken.
Its contents are compared to .a sample after activity has ceased for the work
period. The analysis should indicate any absorbed exposure due to hazard
permeations or penetrations through the suit.
*
The use of personal monitoring measures the atmospheric concentrations
within the suit. This gives an indication of potential body exposure.
Personal sampling pumps equipped with charcoal tubes may be used to collect
organic vapors. This type of pump must be worn underneath the encapsulating
suit. If cotton socks or gloves are worn, their contents may be analyzed
directly. Also, this will give an indication of potential exposure to the
atmospheric hazard. This type of measurement is a qualitative indicator
wheras use of the personal sampling pumps is quantitative.
Any exposure data is valuable when working with hazardous materials.
Such data confirms or contradicts the criteria initially used in decision
making for the selection of protective clothing.
Equipment List by Hazard Level
The following lists provide an inventory of necessary equipment needs in
order to function in hazardous chemical environments:
Level A
Personal Protection Equipment
o Positive Pressure SCBA (MESA/NIOSH approved)
•o Totally Encapsulating Suit (boots & gloves attached)
o Gloves - Inner (tight-fitting & chemical-resistant)
o Boots - Chemical protective, steel toe and shank. Depending on
o suit boot construction; worn over suit boot.
o Gloves - Outer, chemical protection. Depending on suit construction
worn over suit gloves. May be replaced with tight-fitting, chemical-
resistant gloves worn inside suit gloves.
o Underwear - Cotton, long John type*
o Hard hat* (under suit)
o Disposal protective suit, gloves, and boots. (Worn under or over
encapsulating suit)*
o Coveralls* (under suit)
o 2-way Radio Communications
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Level B
Personal Protective Equipment
o Positive Pressure SCBA (MESA/NIOSH approved)
o Two-piece chemical-resistant suit
o Chemical-resistant hood*
o Coveralls (fire-resistant) under splash suit*
o Gloves - Outer, chemical protective
o Gloves - Inner, tight-fitting, chemical resistant
o Boots - Outer (chemical-protective heavy rubber throw aways)
o Boots - Inner (chemical-protective, steel toe and shank)
o 2-way Radio communications
o Hard-hat*
o Face Shield*
Level C
Personal Protective Equipment
o Fullface, air-purifying respirator (MESA/NIOSH approved)
o Chemical-resistant clothing: overalls & long sleeved jacket or
coveralls, hooded 2-piece chemical splash suit, when applicable -
hooded disposal coveralls*
o Gloves - Outer (chemical-protective)
o Gloves - Inner (surgical type)*
o Cloth Coveralls - Fire-resistant (inside chemical protective cloth-
ing)*
o Escape Mask
o Hard-hat* (face shield, optional)
o Boots - Outer (chemical-protective heavy rubber throw aways)*
o Boots - Inner (chemical-protective, steel toe & shank)
o 2-way Radio communications
Level D
Personal Protective Equipment
o Coveralls - Fire-Resistant
o Boots/Shoes - Safety or chemical-resistant steel toed boots
o Boots - Outer (chemical-protective heavy rubber throw aways)*
o Escape Mask
o Safety Glasses
o Hard-hat* (face shield optional)
o Gloves*
*0ptiona1 Equipment
13-15
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(V
o
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SECTION 19
INCIDENT EVALUATION
INTRODUCTION
The primary objective, in responding to incidents involving hazardous
substances is to prevent or reduce any actual or potential damage to public
health or the environment. To accomplish this objective, it is necessary to:
•
- Identify the substance(s) involved.
- Evaluate its behavior in the environment and effects on public health
and the environment.
- Initiate actions to ameliorate the effects.
Throughout a .hazardous material incident, from inception to final
disposition, a high priority activity is obtaining the necessary information
to assess its impact. This process of identifying the actual or' potential
impact of the material(s) on public health, environment, and response person-
nel, and determining the most effective methods for preventing or reducing
the associated hazards, is known as incident evaluation.
In those incidents where the substance(s) involved is known or easily
identified, the media affected clearly ascertained, and the environmental ef-
fects recognized, the characterization of the incident is relatively straight-
forward. For example, the effects of a discharge of vinyl chloride into a
small stream are relatively easy to evaluate. More complex are incidents
such as an abandoned waste site where there is not enough initial information
to identify the hazards and evaluate their impact.
Evaluating a hazardous substance incident is generally a two-phase
process, Phase I, and initial evaluation, and Phase II, a comprehensive
evaluation.
PHASE I: INITIAL EVALUATION
The first phase is an initial or preliminary evaluation based on
information that is readily available - or can be collected fairly rapidly
- to determine if emergency protective measures are necessary. During this
initial phase, a number of key decisions must be made regarding:
- Imminent or
environment.
potential hazard and risk to public health and/or the
19-1
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- Immediate need for protective actions to prevent or reduce the impact
on public health and/or the environment.
- Health and safety of response personnel.
After emergency measures have been taken, other measures to restore the
situation to environmentally acceptable conditions start. If there is no
emergency, more time is available for acquiring data to evaluate hazards and
design plans for cleanup, additional considerations for the health and safety
of response personnel. Information for characterizing the hazards can be
obtained in a variety of ways, depending upon the nature of the event and the
amount of time available. The following outlines an approach for collecting
the information needed to evaluate the impact of a hazardous materials
incident. Not every incident requires following all the steps. The informa-
tion below, provides a relatively detailed guide which could be adapted to meet
a specific situation. »
Data Gathering and Review/Preliminary Assessment
Upon notification, discovery, or investigation of an environmental
episode, obtain as much of the following information as possible:
Brief description.
Exact location.
Date and time of occurrence.
Current weather and forecast.
Terrain - include topographic map.
Geology and hydrology - include appropriate maps.
Aerial photographs.
Habitation - population centers, proximity of people, population at
risk.
Communications.
Accessibility by air and roads.
Waterways.
Detailed description of incident and circumstances.
Pathways of dispersion.
Hazardous materials involved and their physical/chemical
properties.
Any other related background information.
19-2
-------
Present status of incident and who has responded.
Environmentally sensitive areas - endangered species, delicate
ecosystems.
Economically sensitive areas - industrial, agricultural.
Information about an incident, especially abandoned waste sites, may
also be available from:
Other Federal agencies
•
State and local health or environmental agencies.
Company records.
•
Court records.
Water departments, sewage districts.
State and local authorities.
Off-Site Reconnaissance
At responses in which the hazards are largely unknown or there is no
need to go on-site immediately, make visual observations and monitor atmos-
pheric hazards near the site. Also collect various types of off-site samples
that may indicate on-site conditions. As an additional precaution, approach
from upwind direction.
In addition to collecting information not included in the preliminary
survey or needed to verify or supplement available information, off-site
reconnaissance would include:
General layout and map of the site.
Monitoring ambient air for:
-- organic vapors, gases, and particulates.
-- oxygen deficiency.
-- specific materials, if known.
-- combustible gases.
-- inorganic vapors, gases, and particulates.
-- radiation.
Placards, labels, markings on containers, or transportation vehicles.
Types and numbers of containers, buildings, and impoundments.
19-3
-------
Leachate or runoff.
Biological indicators - dead vegetation, animals, insects, and fish.
Unusual odors or conditions.
Visual observation of vapors, clouds, or suspicious substances.
Off-site samples.
-- surface water
-- drinking water
-- site runoff
•
-- groundwater (wells)
Interviews with inhabitants and indications of medical problems.
On-Site Survey
A more thorough evaluation of the hazards leading to remedial operations
generally necessitates personnel entering the defined site. Prior to going
on-si-te, develop an entry plan addressing what will be accomplished initially
and prescribe the procedures to protect the health and safety of response
personnel. Upon .entering the site, collect the following information and
observations:
Monitoring ambient air for:
-- organic vapors, gases, and particulates.
-- oxygen deficiency.
-- specific materials, if know.
-- combustible gases.
— inorganic vapors, gases, and particulates.
-- radiation.
Types of containers, impoundment, or other storage systems.
-- numbers, types, and quantities of material
-- condition of storage systems, state of repair, or deterioration
Physical condition of material.
-- solids, liquids, gases
19-4
-------
— color, turbidity
-- behavior - foaming, vaporizing, corroding
Leaks or discharges from containers, tanks, ponds, vehicles, etc.
Potential pathways of dispersion.
-- air
-- surface water
-- groundwater
-- land surface
•
-- biological routes
Labels, markings, identification tags, or other indicators of
material.
Samples.
-- standing water
-- soil
-- wells
-- storage containers
-- drainage ditches
-- streams and ponds
PHASE II: COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION
The second phase, comprehensive evaluation, which may not be needed in
all responses, is amore methodical program designed to collect data to enhance,
refine, and enlarge the initial data base. This phase would provide more
comprehensive information for characterizing the environmental hazards assoc-
iated with incident response operations and for making decisions. As a
continuously operating program, the second phase also reflects environmental
changes resulting from response activities.
Available information and/or information obtained through initial site
entries may be sufficient to identify and assess thoroughly the human and
environmental effects of an incident. If not, additional monitoring and
sampling are required. Phase II, an environmental surveillance program, will
need to be designed and implemented to allow a complete evaluation of all the
effects of the incident on all media. Also, since mitigation and remedial
measures taken at the site may cause changes in the original conditions, a
19-5
-------
surveillance program must be maintained to identify any changes at the site.
Phase II (which may not be required on all responses) is to refine, supplement,
or. complement information obtained through initial investigations and to
maintain the surveillance program throughout the lifetime of the incident.
SUMMARY
Evaluating the hazards associated with an incident involves various
degrees of complexities. The release of a single, known chemical compound
may represent a relatively simple problem. It becomes progressively more
difficult to determine harmful effects as the number of compounds increases.
Evaluation of the hazards associated with an abandoned waste site, storage
tanks, or lagoons holding vast amounts of known or unknown chemical substances
is far more complex than a single release of an identifiable substance.
Effectively accomplishing the major responsibility of response personnel,
which is the protection of public health-and the environment, requires a
thorough characterization of the chemical compounds involved, their dispersion
pathways, concentrations in the environment, and deleterious effects. A base
of information is developed over the lifetime of the incident to assess the
harmful effects and ensure that effective actions are taken to mitigate the
release.
19=6
-------
GO
0>
o
-------
SECTION 20
FIELD SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS
Prior to deploying diving personnel at a hazardously contaminated
water site, the OSC or MSO must obtain information as to the nature and
concentration of materials and assess the risk to underwater divers. As
was described in Section 16 on "Incident Evaluation", sample acquisition
forms the basis for any response action.
At present, there are numerous accepted standardized methods for
collecting environmental samples, toany of these methods are specified by
industrial, governmental, or scientific organizations such as the American
Society of Testing Materials (ASTM). Common publications which spell out
specific sampling requirements for a particular analysis are Standard
Hethoos for the Examination of water and hastewater and Methods for Chemical
Analysis of water and waste. Sampling procedures can also be found in the
Federal Register. If there is conflicting information, employ the most
recent U.S. Government method.
Personnel collecting hazardous samples 'Should use protective clothing
and equipment to minimize exposure. The use of special collection equipment
presents a problem. Limited information is available, and no universally
accepted standardized methods have been devised for the collection of
hazardous samples.
Sampling Equipment
Equipment to collect and contain hazardous samples should be:
Disposable or easily decontaminated. A collection device may be
reused again only after thorough cleaning.
Inexpensive, especially for disposable items.
Easy to operate, because personnel may be wearing cumbersome
safety clothing and respiratory equipment.
Non-reactive, so that it does not contaminate samples.
Safe to use.
All information pertinent to field activities will be recorded in
20-1
-------
various forms: logoooks, sample tags, photographs, etc. Proper documenta-
tion-' ana document control are crucial to enforcement actions, since the
.government 's case in a formal hearing or criminal prosecution often hinges
on evidence gathered by the Science Coordinator. Therefore, each field
worker must keep detailed records of inspections, investigations, photo-
graphs taken, etc., and review all notes thoroughly before leaving the site.
The purpose of document control is to assure that all documents for a
specific project are accounted for when the project is completed. Account-
able documents include items such as logbooks, field data records, analyti-
cal records, and photos. Each document should bear a serial number and
should be listed, with tne number, in a project document inventory assembled
at the project's completion. .Waterproof ink must be used in recording all
data in documents bearing serial numbers.
The first area of sampjing is air monitoring for:
Organic vapors, gases, and particulates,
oxygen deficiency,
Specific materials U'f known),
Combustible gases,
Inorganic vapors, gases, and particulates,
Radiation.
Samples must also be taken of tne contaminated water surface, mid-depth and
bottom.
Allowing for free head space in the top of the water sample container,
a number of air monitoring tests can be run on the aqueous sample.
A number of field instruments which are currently used analyze
"ambient" air for percentage of the lower flammability limit of a vapor or
gas in air, concentration of oxygen, or concentration of toxic vapors/gases.
These devices come in two categories, general survey and specific survey,
based on the type of sampling performed.
General survey instruments include:
Combustible gas indicators
Ultraviolet photoionization detector
Flame ionization detection
Century Systems Organic Vapor Analyzer
Infrared Spectrophotometer
Mi ran Infrared Spectrophotometer
. survey instruments are devices that measure a specific
mater. ;;. Oxygen meters and direct-reading colorimetric tubes are virtually
always used at incidents involving hazardous substances.
Appendix b entitled "Air Monitoring and Survey Instruments" presents
information on the cnaracteristics of field instruments along with detailed
20-2
-------
explanations on the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of these
units.
A number of different types of devices and techniques are utilized for
sampling at incidents involving hazardous substances. Using the correct
liquid and solid materials samplers, selecting sample containers ana clos-
ures, and preserving samples, are all critical in obtaining the necessary
analytical aata that will provide the USC and NSO with the true perspective
on the condition of the incident. Appendix c describes various sampling
equipment and methods.
Hazardous Materials Spills Detection Kit
In oraer to facilitate rapid detection, a Hazardous Materials Spills
Detection Kit, shown in Fig. 20.1, for performing non-specific tests with a
broad response to many contaminants has been developed by the EPA. The kit
is designed for use at spills when the identity of the contaminant is known
and the important consideration is tracing the spill plume until counter-
measures can be taken.
The hazardous Materials Detection Kit can be carried Dy one person and
is versatile enough to be modified for special applications. It contains a
ph meter, conductivity meter, spectrophotometer, filter assembly, efferves-
cent jar, miniature chromatographic columns, enzyme "tickets", and data
sheets. The instrument components are battery-powered for field use,
although the spectrophotometer and conductivity meter can be modified for
120- or 240-V a.c. operation using the adapter and cable that are 'provided.
The kit has all the necessary instrumentation, equipment, and reagents that
may be needed by a field investigator to detect and trace contaminants in
waterways.
Hazardous Materials Detection Kits, which are commercially available,
have oeen used during emergency responses to hazardous materials spills.
Additional information about the kits may be found in the t:PA report,
EPA-600/2-78-055.
Hazardous Materials Identification Kit
There are nearly 300 materials classified as hazardous sub-stances by
EPA (Federal Register, February 16, 1979), and a field kit capable of
rapidly and accurately identifying each of these substances would be too
unwieldy to be practical. Thus, thirty-six representative hazardous
materials (toxic metals, anions, organic compounds) were selected and a
field kit was designed by the EPA to identify these and related substances.
The identification (ID) kit, shown in Fig. 20.1, consists of two major
components: (1) an inverter/shortwave UV lamp unit for photochemical and
thermal reactions and (2) a package with reagents and auxiliary equipment,
including test papers, detector tubes, spray reagents, spot test supplies,
and thin-layer chromatography apparatus. Equipment to facilitate the
recovery of contaminants from water and soil is also included. The field
20-3
-------
identification Kit contains aetailea operating instructions and data cards
for each of the 36 representative hazardous substances.
laentification of groups of contaminants, rather than quantification
of specific substances, is the intended use of the iaentification kit. The
ID kit can be used in conjunction with the hazardous Materials Detection
Kit, which contains a pH meter, spectrophotometer, conductivity meter, and
other analytical equipment. utilization of both kits can improve
identification capability, particularly for inorganic materials. For
example, cyanide and fluoride cannot be distinguished by the ID kit alone;
nowever, when the kits are used concurrently, identification becomes
possiole.
Spills or discharges of toxic pesticides in waterways pose a serious
threat to the aquatic environment and municipal water supplies, with the
increased use of organophojsphate pesticides, which are toxic at very low
levels, precautions are needed to reduce this threat. Because of the
stability of toxic organophospnate pesticides under "normal" environmental
conditions, it is imperative to detect these hazardous compounds rapidly .
Cnolinesterase Antagonist Monitor
Automatic systems have been developed to monitor water for the presence
of organophosphate and carbamate insecticides. The principle used for
detecting these cnolinesterase-inhibiting toxic substances is based upon:
(1) the collection of enzyme inhibitors on immobilized cholinesterase, (2)
the chemical reaction of immobilized cholinesterase with a substrate,
butyrylthiocholinesterase, in the presence of enzyme inhibitors, and (3)
the electrochemical monitoring of substrate hydrolysis products.
The Cholinesterase Antagonist Monitor (CAM-4), shown in Fig. 20.2
(developed by EPA) is a rugged instrument that is designed for rapid
detection of toxic materials in a river, stream, or pond. The portable
apparatus can be used from alongside the banks of a stream or from a boat.
An operator is needed to note the presence of enzyme inhibitors when the
baseline voltage increases 10 or more millivolts in one sampling cycle, as
indicated on the printout of a strip chart recorder. The CAM-4 can operate
continuously--with little maintenance—for an eight-hour period when using
a 12-V automobile battery or a 110-V a.c. power source.
Cyclic Colorimeter
The Cyclic Colorimeter, shown in Fig. 20.2, (developed by the EPA] is
useful for field monitoring of heavy metal spills. It incorporates
hydraulic, optical, and electronic components that are designed for the
automatic detection of most heavy metal pollutants, when an indicator,
sodium sulfide, is injected dropwise into a sample stream, the presence of
a heavy metal contaminant causes cyclic variations in optical transmittance
at the indicator injection frequency. These variations are detected by a
lamp and photocell, coupled to an electronic subsystem, which produces
either a quantitative indication of the pollutant or an alarm when a
threshold level is exceeded.
20-4
-------
The Cyclic Colorimeter is capable of detecting low levels of many heavy
metals in water of widely varying temperatures. The detector maintains
adequate sensitivity for a period of about two weeks without maintenance.
'Scale buildup and stream turbidity do not affect its performance.
The Cyclic Colorimeter is commercially available. Instrument design
specifications and descriptions of laboratory and field tests are included
in the final report, EPA-600/2-79-064.
20-5
-------
Hazardous Materials
Detection Kit
Hazardous Materials
Identification Kit
Figure 20.1
-------
CAM-4
Pesticide Detection
Apparatus
Cyclic Colorimeter
Figure 20.2
-------
re
o
-------
SECTION 21
HAZARD EVALUATION:
"GO" OR "NO-GO"
Introduction
The utilization of encapsulating suits ana helmets by diving personnel
will permit underwater operations to be conducted in contaminated environ-
ments. There will, however, be response situations in which the hazardous
substance(s) involved will present such a risk as to preclude the deployment
of diving personnel except in dire emergency, for short periods of exposure,
or not at all.
It is recognized that much of the toxicity data available today is
based upon "pure product" contact. A diver in an underwater response
operation will normally have the beneficial protection of his surrounding
environment as an added buffer between him and the pure contaminant
dilution.
In most large waterbodies currents, tides, and winds provide for water
column "turnover" or mixing. A pure chemical product emanating from a
point source, such as a drum, barge, ship discharge line, etc., will
experience as rapid dilution from its original strength from even as close
as a few feet from its origin. This is not to indicate that the diver or
OSC should assume that "dilution is the solution."
Table 6.5 includes a number of hazardous substances which are
"slightly soluble and insoluble sinking compounds." Materials such as
these will accumulate in "pockets" and bottom depressions under no or low
current conditions. Situations of diver response with the presence of
these chemicals requires extra caution due to the "pure product" condition
they can be encountered in underwater. A brief listing of these materials
is as follows:
Acetic Anhydride
Acrylonitrile
Bromine
Cresol
Epichlorohydrin
Carbon Tetrachloride
Turpentine
Naphthalene
Hydrogen Sulfide
Methylene Chloride
Perchloroethylene
Dichloropropane
21-1
-------
Methyl Parathion
Polycnlorinatea biphenols
Trichloroetnylene
Chloraane
Special caution shoula be exercised by diving personnel operating in
"natural" polluted waterways which receive sewage and industrial runoff as
opposed to a point source discharge of hazardous material. Hydrogen
sulfide is a substance which is produced due to polluted and decomposing
bottom benthos sediment. h2S is a slightly soluble sinking compound
which will accumulate in bottom depressions and which a diver can enter
into easily without prior warn'ing. The material exhibits a very high skin
penetration and an extreme systemic hazard as well. Full encapsulation of
tne diver is required with as limited exposure as possible being exercised.
The second area in which a diver will come into contact with "pure
product" is with "insoluble or slightly soluble floating" compounds which
will be at the water surface and will coat the diver upon entry and exit
from the operation site, examples of such compounds are:
benzene
Methyl Methacrylate
Styrene
Toluene
Chromium Salts
Ethylbenzene
Glycol Salicylate
Methyl ethyl Ketone
Xylene
I
The use of a fire hose on the surface cnemical slick will disperse the
contaminant for the diver upon entering and leaving the water.
Of the 58 hazardous chemicals list in Table 6.6 of the U.S. Coast
Guard's Pollution Incident Response System uata Base, 30 are listed in
Table 21.1 entitled "Dermal Toxicity," and are noted by '"K"'. Materials
identified by the Navy and environment Canada are identified by "•$£" and
"-){•-" respectively. All materials of concern identified by NOAA in Table
6.6 are incorporated in the other lists.
The approximately 350 chemicals listed in Table 21.1 are identified in
the Oil and Hazardous Materials Technical Assistance System (OHMTADS) as
being dermally active. Since OHMTADS contains only about 2100 chemicals,
or may not indicate a listed chemical as a skin hazard, other reference
sources should also be consulted.
Use of Tables
A. Categories
Taole 21.1 divides chemicals into two categories:
21-2
-------
Category 1 (more serious) which includes:
Gases having a systemic dermal toxicity rating of moderate to
extremely hazardous and a skin penetration ranking of moderate to
high.
Liquids and solias having a systemic dermal toxicity rating of
extremely hazardous and a skin penetration ranking of moderate to
high.
Gases having a local dermal toxicity rating of moderate to
extremely hazardous.
Liquids and solids having a local dermal toxicity rating of
extremely hazardous.
*
Category 2 "(less serious) which includes:
Gases having a systemic dermal toxicity rating of slightly
hazardous and a skin penetration ranking of slight.
Liquids and solids having a systemic dermal toxicity rating of
slightly hazardous and a skin penetration ranking of moderate to
slight..
- Gases having a local dermal toxicity rating of slightly hazardous.
Liquids and solids having a local dermal toxicity rating of
moderate to slightly hazardous.
8. Physical State
The physical state of the chemicals listed is their normal state. In
a fire, some listed as solids or liquids could vaporize and represent
a greater hazard to the skin. The chemicals listed also may be found
mixed with other substances, which could change how they affect the
skin.
C. Skin Penetration
Negligible Penetration (solid - polar)
+ Slight Penetration (solid - nonpolar) -
•H- Moderate Penetration (liquid/solid - nonpolar)
+++ High Penetration (gas/liquid - nonpolar)
21-3
-------
D. Potency (Systemic)
Letha] amount for
+++
1 a^ 70-kl logram man
Extreme Hazard (1059: 1 mg/kg-50 mg/kg) drops to 20 ml
Moderate Hazard
Slight Hazard
50-500 mg/kg)
500-15,000 mg/kg)
1 ounce - 1 pint
(1 pound)
1 pint - 1 quart
(2.2 pounds)
E.
Potency (Local)
•H-+ Extreme - Tissue distruction/necrosis
++ Moderate - Irritation/inflammation of skin
+ Slight - Keaaeninc, of skin
Relation of Taole 21.1 and Levels of Protection
The purpose of Taole 21.1 is to provide, data that a qualified person
can use in conjunction with other site-specific knowledge to select protec-
tive clothing. Tne data relate to skin toxicity only and should not be
used to select respiratory protection equipment.
The known or suspected presence and/or measured concentration of
Category 1 chemicals at or above the listed concentrations warrants wearing
a fully encapsulating suit (Level A). The known or suspected presence
and/or measured concentration of Category 2 chemicals at or above the
listed concentrations suggests that a lesser level of skin protection
(Level B or C) is needeo.
There is no decision-logic for choosing protective clothing as there
is for choosing respiratory protective equipment. The use of a fully
encapsulating suit over other types of chemical-resistant clothing is
generally a judgment maoe by a qualified individual based on an evaluation
of all pertinent information available about the specific incident. Other
guidance and criteria for selecting personnel protection equipment are
contained in Appendix U, Interim Standard Operating Safety Guide.
Other References
Table 21.1 does not include all substances affecting the skin. Other
standard references should be consulted, in particular:
Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents in
the workroom Environment With Intended Changes for 1982, American
6500 Glenway Avenue,
Conference of
Building U-5,
Governmenta
Cincinnati,
I Industrial Hygienists,
OH 45211 (1982).
21-4
-------
Table 21.1. CHEMICAL DERMAL TOXICITY DATA
Chemical
2.2 Olchtoroproptontc acid
2.4.5 - T Add
2.4.5 - T Aitnes
2.4,5 - T Esters
2.4.5 - TP Acid
2.4.5 - TP Acid Esters
2.4.5 - T Stlts
2.4 - 0 Acid
2,4 - Olchlorophenol
2.4 - 0 - Esters
2 - Ethylheiyl Acrylate
2 - Methyl - 5 - ethyl pyrl-
dlne
2 - Mapthol
3.5 - Xylenol
AcetaUrtyd*
Acetic Anhydride
Acetont
Acetone Cyinohydrln
Ac«ta*c«ton«
Acetyl Broil de
Acetyl Chloride
Acrldlnt
Acroletn
AcrylonttMle
Physical
State
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
liquid *
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
fuming
liquid
fuming
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Pene trail or
>
»
»
»
t
«-»
»
+
*
»+
4-f
*»
»
»
»
»
***
»-»
**
«+»
*4-»
»
»
**+
Oernul
To>ic1ty
local
systemic
local
systentc
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systentc
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
seosttlzer
local
sensltlzer
systemic
local
Potency
+4
*
++
*
+•*
+
+
»
*-*
+
»
»
+
•
4-f
*
» +
»
t
***
»
«•»
**
»
V»
•
**
»
**
*+»
**
**»
**-»
«-»»
*++
**-»
**
Permissible
Concentration
-
10 mg/m3/8h
10 mq/m3/8h
10 rag/m3/8h
10 mg/m3/8h
10 mg/n3/8h
10 mg/m3/8h
10 ag/m3/8h
-
10 mg/m3/8h
-
-
-
-
200 ppit/Bh
360 mg/m3/8h
5 ppn/811
20 mg/mj/8h
1.000 pp*/8h
2,400 mgAr>/Bh
10 ppm/8h
-
S ppm/15 -In
5 ppm/15 aln
-
0.1 ppmyah
.25 mq/m3/8h
2 ppm/8n
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
- U.S. NAVY CONTRACT N60921-S2-B-A052
ENVIRONMENT CANADA
- U.S. COAST GUARD POLLUTION INCIDENT DATA 3ASE
(Continued)
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
Cheatcil
Adlplc Acid
Adlponltrlle
Alkyldlmethyl 3,4 -
01 ch lorobenzyl aonon 1ua
Chloride
Allyl Alcohol
Allyl Chloride
Amonla
'•nonlua Bicarbonate
AononluB Blchroaate
Amonlua Blfluorlde
Aimoniuni Bisulfite
A«aontua Carbaaate
AomontuM Carbonate
AoaonluB Citrate
(Dibasic)
AcHnnlu* Ferrocytnlde
AMonlua Hydroxide
AoBonlu* Phosphate
(Dibasic)
Ajaontua SulfaMte
AsBonfuB Sulflde
AoBonliM SuUUe
AiMMituB Tartrate
Awontui Thtocyanate
Aanontua TMosulfate
AnIMne
AntlBony
Physical
State
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
gas
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
solid
Skin
Penetration
+
**-»
»
«-»
«-»
*
* *
»
t
+
•
+
»
»
«-»
»
»
+
»
»
*+
»
«-»
»
Dermal
ToilcUy
local
systole
local
systeaic
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
systeatc
local
local
systeate
local
Potency
»
•»•»-»
>
**
**
++
>**
**
**
**
•»-»-»
»
. **
***
•
*4-»
**
*-»
*+
*»
«"»
**-»
**
**
**
«->
«-»
Permissible
Concentration
-
18 nq/n3/8h
-
2 pp«/Bh
5 moVm-van
1 ppm/8h
3 mg/o-VSh
25 pp*/8h
IS oq/»-J/8h
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
10 Bg/B3/8h
-
•
-
-
-
S ppa/8h
0.5 «s/B3/8h
Category
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
(Continued)
21-6
-------
Table 21.1. (Continued)
Choilcal
Antimony Pentachlorlde
Argon - 37 (radioactive)
Arslne
Arsenic
Arsenlc-74 (radioactive)
Arsentc-76 (radioactive)
Anenlc-77 (radioactive)
Arsenic Acid
Arsenic OlsulHde
Arsenic Pentoilde
Arsenic Trlbromide
Arsenic Trichloride
Arsenic Trloilde
Arstnlc Trlsulflde
Barium
Benzene
Benzophenone
Benzoyl Chloride
Senzoyl Peroxide
Benzyl Alcohol
Benzyl Benzoate
Benzyl Bromide
Benzyl Chloride
Beryl HIM Nitrate
Physical
State
liquid
gas
gas
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
•
solid
solid
liquid
solid
liquid
solid
liquid
110AI14
liquid
liquid
solid
Skin
Penetratlor
**
***
*-f+
«->
**
**
• «•»
**
**
«•»
t*
«-f
**
•»-»
»
**
»
**
*+
**
**
«-»
**
»
Denial
Toilcity
local
systenlc
systemic
local
systemic
systenlc
systemic
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
mtenlc
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
Potency
«-»-»
<•*»
***
*+*
+*-»
+**
•»-»*
***
**»
**-»
«-»-»
»*+
«**
»**
***
*-»-»
/
•»-»-»
»**
***
***
4-t-»
»*-*
*+
**
»•»"»
*+
«-»-»
**+
**
•
**
»*
«-»*
«->
Permissible
Concentration
-
-
O.OS «9/«3/8h
.25 ng/mJ/Bh
-
-
-
O.S og/n3/8h
-
-
O.S *J/«3/8h
O.S «9/«3/8h
.25 m9/m3/8h
O.S mg/«3/8h
O.S mg/»3/8h
75 ppm/30 Bin
-
S mg/m3/8h
S «g/«3/ft
-
-
-
1 ppm/8h
0.2S mg/m3/8h
Category
2 '
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
21-7
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
*
*
*
*
Chemical
Brombenzyl cyanide
Calcium Hypochlorlte
Calcium Oiide
Calcium Phosphide
Camphor
Ciptan
Carbaryl
Carbofuran
Carbon Olsulflde
Carbon Honoilde
Carbon Tetrachlorlde
Cetyldloethytbenzyl-
amonlum Chloride
Chlortcetophenone
Chlordane
Bromine
Butyl amtne
Butyl Here to tan
Butyric Acid
Calcium Arsenate
Calcium Arsentte
Calcium Carbide
Calcium Cyanide
Chlorine
Chlorine - 36 (radioactive)
Physical
State
liquid
<77 F-solld
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
9"
liquid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
(fining)
liquid
liquid
liquid
Mild
solid
solid
solid
gas
9«
Skin
Penetration
«-»
»
»
»
»
«-f
a
*-»
»
**
»-»->
*++
»
»
»
«-»
**
»»
**
»
»
»
«-»
***
**-»
Dermal
Toxlclty
local
systemic
local
local
local
.local
systemic
local
systenlc
local
systemic
local
systenlc
local
systenlc
systemic
systemic
local
local
local
systemic
local
syitentc
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
local
Potency
**
*•»+
«->
*+
«-»
**
**
4-»
*^
»
+ +
**»
*-»»
**
«•+ +
*»»
***
»
»
**
4-f
«-»
**
»**
**
t-t-t
4-»
**
«-»
++*
»»
«-»*
**
«-»-»
»+
«-•-»
«-•->
Permissible
Concentration
-
-
10 oq/ffl3/30 mln
-
2 ppm/8h
S mq/m3/8h
5 »g/in3/8h
0.1 nq/ra3/8h
20 ppm/8h
60 mq/ra-J/8h
SO ppm/8h
10 ppm/Bh
-
.OS ppm/Bh
.5 mq/m3/8h
.1 ppm/8h
S ppm/8h
.5 ppm/8h
-
1 mq/m3/8h
-
• -
S mq/m3/10 mln
1 ppm/8h
1 mq/m3/8h
-
Category
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
Chemical
Chlorotcetic Acid
Chlorobenzene
Chlorobutadlene
Chloroaethane
Chloroptcrtn
Chlorosulfontc Acid
Chlorthlon
Chronyl Chloride
CMI
Copper Naphthenate
Coiaaphos
Cresyldtphenyl Phosphite
Crotonaldenyde
Cia«ene
Cuprlc Acetate
Cuprlc Acetoarsenate
Cuprlc Sulfate. Anonlated
Cyanogen
Cyanogen Bromide
Cyanogen Chloride
Cyclohexanol
Cyclohexanone
Cyctoneiylaalne
Occaboran*
Physical
State
solid
liquid
liquid
gas
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
gas
solid
gas
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
Skin
Penetration
*»
«-»
«-»
***
**
+•»
• «-f
**
»
**
»
**
*»
**
»
•
»
»*-»
*»
***
•
*
**
»
Oernal
Toxlclty
local
local
systenlc
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
systemic
local
systenlc
local
systenlc
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
syttealc
local
jystenlc
local
systenlc
local
syiteale
local
systeatc
local
local
systeMlc
local
systemic
local
systole
local
systenlc
local
systole
local
srstemlc
Potency
++
**
*-*
«->
+
»*
*++
***
**-»
+
«-»»
^*
»
+
i-*
«-»
**
***
4-t
«-»
*-»
**
•
**+
»*
**
*-»
*+
***
«-»
***
**
+*
»*
t*
*
**
»
**
**
**
4-»
Permissible
Concentration
-
75 ppm/8h
350 mq/m^/Bh
25 ppa/8h
100 ppm/8h
0.1 ppa/8h
5 ppa/8h
-
.1 mg/m3/8h
-
500 ppm
-
-
2 ppWBh
SO ppWSh
0.1 »g/«3/8h
0.1 ag/a3/8h
2 •g/m'/Sh
10 pp«/8h
0.5 ppo/Bh
10 ppa/15 «tn
5 «Q/M3/8h
50 pp«/8h
SO pp^Sh
10 ppa/8h
.05 pp«/8h
Category
2
2
2
1
1
1
Z
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
Chemical
Decanal
01 acetone Alcohol
01«mylam1ne
Otborane
Olcantta
Olchlobinll
Oichlon*
Olchlorodlflouromethane
Olchloroethyl Ether
Olchloronethane
Olchloropropane
Olchloropropene
Olchloropropene. Olchloropro-
pane
Otchlorvos
Otcyclopentadtene
Otethanolamlne
Dlethylamine
01 ethyl cut Slycol
Olethylenetrlamlne
Oiethyl Phthalate; Ethyl
Formate
OloMthylamtne
N,N - dimethyl aniline
Olmethylsulfate
Oloxane (p-dtoxane)
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
liquid
gas
solid
solid
solid
gas
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
oily
liquid
oily
liquid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
"
**
-
-
*
*
-
-
~
-
-
**
-
-
*
-
*
*
-
-
*»»
-
-
Dermal
Tox4city
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
.systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
local
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
systemic
Potency
"
4-t
^
-
:+
^
-
-
*-»
<-f
-
n
-
-
~
-
-
*
***
*
***
**
t
***
r
Permissible
Concentration
-
SO ppm/Sh
-
.1 ppm/8h
-
-
-
1,000 ppm/Bh
5 ppm/8h
200 porn/Sh
75 ppm/Sh
-
-
.1 ppm/8h
1 oq/o^/Sh
5 ppm/8h
-
25 ppm/8h
-
1 ppm/3h
-
10 ppm/Bh
18 mq/nr/3h
5 ppm/8b
25 nq/«3/8h
1 ppm/8h
SO ppm/8h
Category
2
2
1
2
2
2 •
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
•*
*
CheaUal
01 phosgene
01qu4t
Olsulfotone
Oluron
ONBP
ONBP-«H4-ialt
l-0odec*nol
Endosulfan
Endothal
EptChlorohydHn
Ethlon
Ethyl Acetate
Ethyl Aery late
Ethyl Benzene
Ethyl Ch'orlde
£ thy lent
Ethylene Cyanohydrln
Ethylent Olbroalde
Ethylene Otchlorlde
Ethylene Slycol 01 acetate
Ethylene Glycol Nonoethyl
Ether Acetate
Ethylene Glycol Honoethyl
Ether
Ethylene Oxide
Ethyl Ether
Physical
State
gas
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
9"
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
«-»
*-»
«•»
«•»
«-»
«-»
»
«->
4-»
**
**
**
**
**
**
V>
*+
«-»
*»
**
**
»
»
Dermal
Toxlclty
local
local
systemic
systealc
local
systeaic
systealc
systemic
local
systealc
local
local
systenlc
systemU
local
local
systevlc
local
jyste»tc
local
frostbite
local
frostbit*
lystealc
local
syste«1c
local
systemic
systealc
systealc
local
systealc
local
local
Potency
+*•»
**
*+
***
«->
»+
«-•-»
*+»
+
***
**
»
4-t
+*
*-f
**
**
**
**
«-f
**
»
**
**
**
**
»
»
•
»
***
**-»
Permissible
Concentration
-
O.S «9/m3/8h
.1 og/a^/ah
-
-
-
-
0.1 *g/a3/8h
5 ppa/8b
19 mq/grV8h
-
400 ppoi/Sh
1400 M/a-Vah
25 ppa/Bb
100 nq/a^/Sh
100 ppayBh
1.000 ppa/Bh
-
-
20 ppa/8h
SO ppn/S aln
10 ppo/Bh
200 poa/5 «1n
-
100 ppWBh
25 ppa/8h
SO ppa/8h
400 ppa/8h
Category
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
Cheated
Ferbam
Ferric Hydroxide
Ferric Nitrate
Ferric Sulfate
Ferrous Sulfate
Ferrous Hydroxide
Ferrous SulfUe
Fish 011
Fluorine
Formaldehyde
Formic acid
Furfural
Gas oils
Slyoial
Suthlon
Heptachlor
Kept ant
Heptanol
HETP
HoaboraiM
Hex ammthy 1 ened 1 Mi n«
Hexane
Hex «no 1
Htxylene Slycol
Physical
State
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
gas
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetration
+
-
-
-
-
-
t
«-»
*+•»
«*
**
*»
«-»
+
«•»
«•»-»
»*
**
**»
«•»
**
**
.**
«-»
Derma 1
Toxlclty
local
systenlc
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
allergen
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
systemic
systeolc
local
local
systeaic
local
systemic
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
Potency
»
»
*+
**
4->
«-»
**
«-»
»
«-•-»
***
*+
•»-^»
***
+
»
**
«-»
•
»
»»
»
*-»
«-»->
4-»
«-»
**»
4-»
»
*-»
***
**
«•»
+
Permissible
Concentration
IS ng/m3/8h
-
1 «q/ra3/8h
-
•
-
-
-
.1 ppm
3 ppm/8h
5 ppWBh
S ppm/8h
-
-
-
.5 m9/m3/8h
500 ppW8h
-
-
-
-
500 ppm/Sh
-
25 pp«/8b
125 nq/«3/8h
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
Chemical
Hydrazlne
Hydrochloric Acid
Hydrofluoric Acid
3H (Tritium) (Radioactive)
Hydrogen Cyanide
Hydrogen Fluoride
Hydrogen Sulftde
Hydroqutnone
Hypochlorous Acid
Indole
Iron Oust
Isobutyl Alcohol
Isoootyr aldehyde
Isobutyrlc Acid
Isophoronc
Isophtluloy) Chloride
Iiopropyl Acetate
Isopropylamlne
Iiopropyl Ether
Kepoae
Krypton 85 (radioactive)
Lead Artenate
Lead fluoborate
Ltndane
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
liquid
gas
gas
gas
gas
solid
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
Hqold
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
gas
solid
solid
solid
Skin
Penetrattor
**
**
**•
«-f+
«-»-»
***
«-»•»
«->
«•»
**
-
*»
«-»
+
**
*
«-f
«-»
+*
**
•»**
»
»
«-»
Dermal
Toxlclty
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
systealc
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
snteatc
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
Potency
***
**
+**
»
*++
*
«-»-»
***
*-»-»
***
*->
**
***
***
»+
»
«-»
***
»
***
*
«•>
**
»*
t
+
»
4-*
«-»
**
»
»
«-»
***
*
4-t
**
«-»
**
Permtsstble
Concentration
1 ppm/8h
S ppoi/ah
3 ppm/Sh
-
10 ppa/8h
3 ppm/8h
10 ppm/8h
2 ag/ni3/8h
-
-
-
100 ppm/8h
-
-
25 ppmysh
-
250 ppm/Bh
5 ppm/8h
250 pom/Sh
-
-
.5 mg/m3/8h
-
.5 mg/«3/8h
Category
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Z
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
21-13
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Chealctl
Malathlon
HCP
Mercaptodtmethur
Mercuric Cyanide
Mercuric Nitrite
Methacrylonttrlle
Methyl Aery late
Methyl A»yl Acetate
Methyl Amy! Alcohol
Methyl Broil de
Methyl'Chlorlde
Methyl ene Chloride
Methyl Ethyl Retone
Methyl Isobutyl Ketone
Methyl Her cap tan
Methyl Methacrylate
Methyl Parathton
Mcxacaroate
Noooch loroacetone
Monoch lorod 1 f 1 uoroMthanc
MonocthylMlne
Monolsopropanolamln*
Menoaethy 1 Mi ne
MorpfioMne
Phyitcal
St*te
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
or gas
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
9«S
liquid
liquid
wild
liquid
liquid
9"
liquid
gis
Mould
Skin
Penetration
**
«-»
»
»
**
» **
4-f
#*
»
»
**
t*
»4
***
«-»
**»
*-»
4-»
**
•»**
**
**-»
**
Dermal
Toxlclty
syitaiic
local
systemic
srstoiic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
local
systentc
local
systmic
local
systeafc
local
systemic
local
systenlc
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
(frostbite)
systemic
local
local
local
local
systemic
Potency
+++
+-»*
++
**
**
¥++
+^
***
»
»*
«-»-»
*-f
*
4->
++
»
**+
***
«-»
4-»
+
**
»
*
4-»
**
<-•->
»**
»
***
**
>•
•»-»
«•»»
«-»
«-**
**
«-»
Permissible
Concentration
10 og/ra3/8h
-
-
.01 mq/m3/8J-
.OS «q/m3/8h
1 ppm/8h
10 ppo/Sh
SO ppa/8h
ZS ppH/8h
20 ppa/8h
100 ppWSh
500 ppWBh
590 mg/m3/8h
100 pom/ail
10 pp«/8h
100 pp«/8h
ZOO ug/-3
-
-
1.000 pom/a
10 ppWSh
-
10 ppm/Oi
20 ppm/Bh
Category
Z
Z
2
Z
2
2
Z
Z
2
1
2
2
2
Z
Z
Z
1
2
Z
2
1
2
1
Z
21-M
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
Chemical
Mustard Sas
m-xylene
••*ylyl Broil de
Nabaa
Haled
n-Myl Acetate
Naphthalene
Naphthenlc Acid
n -butyl Acetate
n-butyl Acrylate
n-butyl Alcohol
n-butyraldehyde
Nickel AmontiM Sulfate
Nickel Carbonyl
Nitric Acid
Nitric Oxide
Nltrllotrl acetic Acid
Nitrogen Dioxide
Nitrobenzene
Nitrogen Chloride
Nitroglycerine
Ozone
Nitrous Oilde
Nonan*
Physical
State
gas
liquid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
9"
solid
9
«"»
**
»
*+
»
4-»
»
**
**
*-»
**
»
**
**
Dermal
Toilclty
local
local
lystenlc
local
systnlc
local
systemic
local
systenlc
local
local
systenlc
local
local
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
local
systealc
local
local
systeaic
local
syste»lc
local
local
Potency
+•»+
*+
»
*»
++
**
+•
•
«-+
*»
»+
»+
++
+
•«-«-»
**
+
***
**
«-»
*-»
«-»*
«-»-»
*->
*+
•«-»
**
**
**
4-f
**
**
*+*
*-»
Permissible
Concentration
-
100 ppn/Sh
-
-
3 i»q/ra3/8h
100 ppm/8h
10 ppa/8h
SO mg/mJ/Sh
-
ISO ppn/8h
710 mq/m3/8h
-
SO ppo/8h
-
1 «g/m3/8h
.05 pp«/8h
z ppwati
25 pp>/8h
-
5 pp«/15 rntn
1 ppn/Bh
5 •q/»3/8h
-
2 •g/*3/8h
.1 pp«/Bh
25 ppWSfc
-
Category
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
21-15
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
*
*
*
*
Chemical
Itonyl Phenol
n-propyl Alcohol
Omazene
o-flitrophenol
o-nttro aniline
Oxydlproptonitrile
o-xylene
para-nttroantline
Pent tail
Perchlorooethyl mercaptan
Phenolcarbylovtne Chloride
Phenolmercuric Acetate
Phosgene
White Phosphorous (yellow)
Phosphorous Oxychlorlde
Phosphorous Pentasulflde
Phosphorous Trichloride
Pntlul1c-Ac1d-01ethyl-Ester
Phthallc Anhydride
p-Altrophenol
Potassium Arsenate
Potassium Arsenlte
Potassium Permanganate
Propane
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
gas
solid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
gas
Skin
Penetration
*+
«•»
»
**
»
**
h
»*
+
**
*++
«•»
»
*
+
4-»
»
+*
**
•f
+
•f
+
*
**
Derail
Toxlctty
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
frostbite
Potency
+++
*
»
++
«-»
***
»
»
**»
**
»
+
»
**
t-t
*-»
+
**
**
**
»
***
«-»-»
«->-»•
**
***
*-»
**+
**
***
•»-»
»
•«-»
»
**
**
**
«-»-»
+*
**+
*+*
***
Permissible
Concentration
-
200 ppm/8h
-
-
-
-
100 ppm/8h
1 ppm/8h
-
.1 ppm/8h
"
-
.1 ppm/fBi
-
-
1 mg/m3/8h
.5 ppm/8h
3 mq/«3/Bh
-
1 ppm/8h
-
.5 mg/«3/8h
-
-
1.000 ppmVSh
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
-*-
-*-
*
Chemical
cVoparglte
Proplonaldehyde
Proptontc Acid
Proplonlc Anhydride
Propyl Acetate
Propyl amlne
Propylen*
Propylene Oxide
p-*ylene
PyrethMn I
Pyrethrln II
Pyrelhrum
PyHdlne
Pyrocatechol
Qulnhydrone
Quinine
Qulnolene
Qulnone
Retard no 1
Sallcyaldehyde
tec-8utylM+
***
+*
»
«->
+*
»
«•
*
+
»
«->
/
++
»*
»
**
»
**
»
»
*
**
*>
+*
«-»
***
«-»
*»
•
«-!-»
**
*»
4-t
•«-»
•»-»-»
**
Permissible
Concentration
-
-
10 ppm/8h
-
200 ppm/8h
-
4.000 ppmysh
100 ppra/8h
100 ppm/8h
-
-
S mg/m3/8h
S ppm/8h
1 ppm/8h
-
-
-
.1 pom/eh
10 ppWSh
-
IS mo/m3/8h
-
-
-
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
t
2
Z
2
2
2
2
Z
2
2
t
-1 7
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
*
*
*
*
ChealCal
Silver Nitrate
Slmaztne
Sodium Anthraqulnone
Sulfonate
Sodium Arsenate
Sodium Anenlte
Sodlua BliuIfUe
Sodlun Borate
Sodlua Butyldlphenyl
Sulfonate
Sodlua Decylbenzene Sulfonati
Sodium Fluortde
Sodlua Fluorostllcate
Sodlua Hydrosulflte
Sodtua Hypochlorlte
Sodlua lauryl Sulfate
Sodlua Methylate
Sodtua Naphthalene
Sulfate
Sodtua Nitrite
Sodlua Oetylsulfate
Sodlua Selentte
Strychnine
Styrene
Sulfoilde
Sulfur
Sulfur Otoilde
Physical
State
solid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
solid
solid
9"
Skin
Penetratlor
»
«-»
»
»
»
»
• »
«-»
»
»
»
**
**
•
t
»
•
»
»
»
**
•
»
***
Dermal
Toilclty
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
local
systenlc
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
systemic
local
systentc
local
local
syitenlc
local
systeatc
local
systealc
local
local
local
Potency
++
**
»
+
+*
**
***
+*
**+
**
4-*
+
4-f
»
4-»
4-t
*•«-»
**
**»
***
«-»
«-»
»
**
«-»
«-»
*
**
»*
**
***
•«-»
**
*
**
***
Pernlsslble
Concentration
-
-
-
.5 aq/a3/8h
.5 og/«3/8h
-
-
-
-
2.5 ng/ra3/8h
2.5 •q/«3/8h
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
.2 »q/«3/8h
.15 nq/a^/Bh
.4$ BQ/a3/15
ain
100 ppa/8h
125 ppa/8h
-
-
5 ppWtt
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
j
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
Chcvlcal
-Sulfurlc Acid
Sulfur Nonochlorlde
TBA
T-ButylhydroperoxIdi1
TCA
TOE
Tert-butylaalde
Tetraboran*
Tetrad ecanol
Tetnethylene Pentalne
Tetraethyl Pyrophosphata
Dull tin
Thallous Nitrate
Thlopnosgene
Thlrw
Tltantu* 44
Tltantui Cnlorldt
TolMM
Taluent dllsocyanate
Toxaphen*
Trlehlorfon
Trlchlorocthane
Trlcresyl Phosphate
TrlethylaluBlnui
Physical
St4t« I
llqotd
liquid
solid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
llqold
solid
solid
solid
11q»14
11<»1d
solid
solid
llqold
\1qo1d
liquid
Skin
Penttrittor
**
*+
V
»
»
**
»
**
»
»
<-»
*
»
»
•f*
+
•
•
*
«•»
**
**
4-*
•
DenMl
Toxleltjr
loc*l
loctl
loc*l
systemic
loctl
systolic
local
systetlc
sjntoilc
local
systoitc
local
systemic
local
systolic
local
systolic
local
systolic
syitoilc
systolic
local
local
syttoile
local
local
local
systoric
local
systolic
local
systcilc
systolic
local
systolic
local
systolic
local
Potency
**»
**»
»
4-»
»
**
«-»
**
•
»
*
«-•-»
*-*->
»
+
**
**
•»
v»*
+++
*4-»
*4-»
«->
**
•f
**
»
»
**
**
•
«-»
**
+*
*+
»
**
***
Permissible
Concentration
1 «g/«3/8h
1 ppWSh
-
-
- •
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.1 •g/«3/8h
0.1 «9/«3/8h
-
S •9/«3/8n
-
-
100 PP-/8X
37S »q/«3/atl
.02 ppWBh
.14 •q/MJ/8h
.5 •«/M3/8h
-
10 ppwn
45 «j/«J/8h
-
. -
Category
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
-------
Table 21.1 (Continued)
Cnealcal
Trlethylene filycol
Trtethylenetetranlne
TrlMthylMlne Gas
TrlMthylMlne Solution
Trinitrotoluene
Oranyl Nitrite
Vanadlua Oxytrlchlorlde
VapaM
Vinyl Acetate
Vinyl Bronlde
Vinyl Chloride
Vinyl Ether
Xtnon 133 (rad1oact1»«)
Zinc Borate
Zinc Chloride
Zinc Cyanide
Zinc Hydrosulflte
Zinc Phenolsulfonate
Zinc Phosphide
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
gas
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
gas
gas
liquid
gu
(Olid
solid
solid
solid
solid
Mild
Skin
Penetration
«•+
**
»*
**
4-»
»
«•»
**
«•»
«-f»
*4^
»*
**«
»
•f
»
•
•
»
Denial
Toilclty
local
systflitc
local
local
local
local
systealc
local
syitoitc
local
lyjtoile
local
syste*tc
local
local
systenlc
local
systealc
local
• systeatc
systemic
local
local
local
systealc
local
local
local
srsteatc
Potency
«•
*->
***
***
***
**
•»
++
**
***
*-»
«-»
»
**
***
»++
***
***
**
»*
***
**
>*
»
***
***
>**
«-»
**
Pervtsstble
Concentration
-
-
25 pp>/8h
25 pp>/8h
1.5 «g/«3/ah
.25 •g/D3/8h
5 ppa/lS «1n
-
10 pp»/8h
30 «q/B3/8h
200 pp«/8h
200 ppa/8h
-
-
10 »g/-3/8h
1 pp-/8h
-
-
-
-
Category
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
-70
-------
NIQSH/OSHA Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards. U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC 20402 (August 1981).
Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 (1980).
Whenever possible, data in one reference should be cross-checked with other
references.
"No-Go" Scenarios
The utilization of diving personnel in contaminated environments is to
always be the "last resort" to get "the job done." Application of remotely
operated samplers, bottom dredges, remotely operated underwater video
systems, etc. are all to be considered prior to deploying divers. However,
even if divers are the ogly means for accomplishing an underwater task,
there are some instances in which the contaminates involved preclude the
use of divers under extreme emergency conditions for either short durations
of exposure, or not at_ al 1!
Based upon the chemical/water interface of materials found in the U.S.
Coast Guard list in Table 6.6, and the Dermal Toxicity Data presented in
Table 21.1, umbilical support encapsulated diver exposure to the following
chemicals should be for as short a period of time as possible, and only in
response to protection of public health, or massive environmental damage:
Cresol (Phenols)
Carbon Tetrachloride
Naphthalene
hydrogen Sulfide
Methylene Chloride
Perchloroethylene
Dichloropropane
Polychlorinated Biphenyls
Trichloroethylene
Benzene
Methyl Methacrylate
Styrene
Toluene
Ethyl benzene
Xylene
The classification of the above chemical substances is based upon
their insolubility in water, and a permissible level of concentration of
between 10 PPM/8-hour period to 100 PPM/8-hour period. This list is by no
means meant to be a complete categorization. Each chemical substance
encountered at a spill site must be evaluated for solubility, permissible
concentrations, and propensity to attack diving dress materials.
21-21
-------
Examples of insoluole chemical substances in which a diver should never
be allowed to operate are as follows:
Acetic Anhydride
Acrylonitrile
Bromine
Epichlorohydrin
Methyl Parathion
Chlordane
Again, this list is not complete! Selection of these chemicals are
based upon their insolubility and permissible concentrations being less
than 10 PPM/8-hour perioa.
The OSC and diving officer must consult specific chemical charac-
teristics references in order to make an educated on-site decision on
whether or not to deploy diving personnel.
21-22
-------
00
re
-------
SECTION 22
GENERAL DIVING AND EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
Adherence to established aiving procedures and recognition of any
special precautions that may be needed because of local conditions will
enhance the safety of diving operations. Diving personnel should have a
thorough understanding of the procedures described in this section. Poor
procedures result not only, in unnecessary and costly delays, but also may
affect the success of a project and increase the probability of accidents.
PLANNING THE DIVING OPERATION
Definition of Mission and Goals
A clear definition of the mission ana its goals is the first step. To
establish an operational plan, all parties engaged in the project should
participate* including those who will be diving and those engaged in non-
diving roles. Resources, including aiversi diving equipment, surface or
underwater support platforms, and support equipment, should be determined.
The data or samples to be gathered, work to be performed, or observations
to be made should be identified, and the bottom time should be estimated as
closely as possible.
DIVE TEAM ORGANIZATION
Dive Master
Dive masters have total responsibility for the safe and efficient con-
duct of diving operations. They must be experienced divers qualified to
handle the requirements of the proposed dive. No diving should be conducted
when the dive master is not present. The dive master's responsibilities are
many, and include but may not be limited to:
Overall responsibility for the aiving operation
Safe execution of all diving
Preparation of a basic plan of operation
Liaison with other organizations
Selection of equipment
Proper maintenance, repair, ana stowage of equipment
Selection, evaluation, and briefing of divers and other personnel
Monitoring the progress of the operation and updating requirements
as necessary
Maintaining the diving log
Monitoring of decompression (when required)
22-1
-------
The aive master is responsible for the assignment of all divers to an
operation and for ensuring that their qualifications meet the requirements
-of the aive. The dive master shall ensure that all divers are briefed
thorougnly on the missions and goals of the operation. Individual respon-
sibilities will be assigned each diver by the dive master. Where special
tools or techniques are to be used, the dive master shall ensure that each
diver is familiar with tneir application.
Training and proficiency dives should be made as necessary to ensure
safe and efficient operations. During operations involving a large number
of divers or in very complex dives, aive masters should perform no actual
diving, but instead should aevote their efforts to directing the operation.
Uiving Medical Officer/Medical Technician
Though there are obvious advantages to having a qualified diving
meaical officer on site, this may not always oe practical. As an alterna-
tive to a divine, medical officer, an Emergency Medical Technician trained
in the care of diving casualties may be utilized. An individual so trained
is able to respond not only to emergency meaical situations, but also is
capable of communicating effectively with a physician locatea at a distance
from tne diving site. There are specialized courses available designed to
train Emergency hedical Technicians in tne care of diving casualties.
In the event that neither a physician nor a trained technician is
available, the dive master should obtain the names and phone numbers of at
least three diving medical specialists who can be reached for advice in an
emergency. Emergency consultation is available on 24-nour call at the Navy
Experimental Diving Unit, Panama City, FL 32407, telephone (904) 234-4351,
4353; the National Naval Medical Center, Naval Medical Research Institute,
Sethesda, MU 20014, telephone (301) 295-0283; Brooks Air Force Base, San
Antonio, Texas 78235, telephone (512) 536-3278; ana the Dining Accident
Network (Dan), Durham, North Carolina, telephone '(919) 684-8111. Each of
these services is referred to as a "bends watch," and is available to
provide advice on the treatment of diving casualties. Diving personnel
should be sure to obtain and keep the phone numbers of these facilities,
especially if diving operations are to be conducted in remote areas.
Science Coordinator
On missions where diving is performed in support of scientific pro-
grams, a science coordinator may be needed. The science coordinator is the
prime point of contact for all scientific aspects of the program, including
scientific equipment, its use, calibration, and maintenance. Working with
the aive master, the science coordinator briefs divers on upcoming missions
ana supervises the debriefing and sample or data accumulation after a dive.
Divers
Although the aive master is responsible for the overall diving opera-
tion, each diver is responsible for being in proper physical condition, for
checking out personal equipment prior to the dive, and for thoroughly under-
22-2
-------
standing the purpose and the procedures to be used for the dive. Divers also
are responsible for using safe diving procedures and for knowing all emergency
procedures. A clean water "dip" tank should be utilized prior to entering
contaminated waters to assure proper seals and that no suit leaks are present.
(•See Figures 22.1 and 22.2)
Tenders for Surface-Suppl ied Diving
The tender must be qual ified to tend divers independently and to operate
all surface-support equipment. To use manpower efficiently, the tender may
be a qual ified diver used in a diver-tender rotation system. Though there is
no specific requirement that tenders be qualified divers, they should be
trained in theory and operational procedures by the divers and diving supervi-
sors. Ideally, tenders should be trained by instructors and assigned to
diving operations by the diving supervisors. A tender-assistant may assume a
tender's responsibilities when he is under the direct supervision of fully
qual ified diving and tending personnel , and he may receive instruction in
proper tending procedures during field operations. Another tender, diver, or
qualified person should be assigned as communications person, console opera-
tor, timekeeper, record keeper, and diver's assistant. Tenders must also be
adequately protected against chemical hazards both from splash and respiratory
aspects as shown in Figure 22.3.
It is recommended that one qualified person be designated as standby
diver, ready to enter the water promptly in an emergency. The standby diver
may accept tender responsibilities in routine operations; in more complicated
diving operations, however, the standby diver must be freed of all other
duties.
Support Divers and Other Support Personnel
In most diving operations the number and types of support divers depend
upon the size of the operation and the type of diving equipment used. As a
general rule, those surface-support personnel working directly with the diver
al so shoul d be qual ified divers.' Using unqual ified personnel who do not under-
stand diving techniques and terminology may cause confusion and unnecessary
complications. Persons not qualified as divers can be used when the need
arises only after they have demonstrated an understanding of diving procedures
to a standard acceptable to the dive master.
Small-Seal e Operations
For self-contained diving operations, a minimum of two divers should be
used. In a small-scale operation where the complexity of the assigned task
is minimal, the dive master may dive, and no surface support is required.
For an operation of increased scope, or if the tasks to be performed under
water become more complex, standby divers and even tenders may be required.
Selection of Surface-Support Platform
During the course of operations, divers will enter the water from
platforms of various sizes and descriptions, ranging from samll, inflatable
rubber boats to large research vessels. Barges, specially outfitted for
diving, also may be used. (See Figure 22.3)
22-3
-------
Figure 22.1 1000 Gallon "Dip" Tank for Leak Detection of
Draeger Suit - OHMSETT
22-4
-------
\
Figure 22.2 300 Gallon "Dip" Tank for Leak Detection of MK-12 Suit
22-5
-------
Dockside Operations
Diving Stage
Platform
Shipboard Operations
Figure 22.3 Surface-Support Platforms
22-6
-------
Generally, the operational requirements, type of diving equipment,
magnitude of the diving task, and prevailing and predicted environmental
conditions will dictate the best surface-support platform to use. For
.example, nearshore aiving which uses self-contained equipment in relatively
calm water may be accomplished without much difficulty from a small boat.
More extensive offshore diving operations, using self-contained or
umbilical-supplied equipment, would be undertaken from a large vessel with
adequate aeck space.
Environmental Conditions
Environmental conditions at a dive site should be considered in
planning a aiving operation. Generally, environmental condition's can be
divided into surface environmental conditions and underwater environmental
conditions. Surface conditions include weather, sea state, and ship
traffic. Underwater conditions include depth, bottom type, currents, water
temperatures, and visibility.
Surface Conditions--
weather conditions are an important factor to consider in planning a
dive, whenever possible, diving operations should be cancelled or delayed
during bad weather. Current and historical weather data should be reviewed
to determine if proper conditions will prevail or are predicted for a suf-
ficient amount of time to complete the mission. Critical weather changes
and wind shifts may jeopardize the safety of personnel and platforms. All
boaters should avail themselves of the continuous marine weather broadcasts
provided by NuAA on the following frequencies: 162.40 MHz, 162.475 MHz, or
162.55 MHz, depending on the local area. These oroadcasts can be heard in
most areas of the U.S., and require only the purchase of a VHP radio
receiver. VHP equipment comes in three levels of sophistication,, ranging
from the one- or two-band weather radios to multi-band radios and two-way
sets. The weather radios are the least expensive and are designed to pick
up NOAA radio broadcasts only.
Whenever possible, avoid or limit diving in moderate seas. Do not
attempt scuba or surface-supplied diving in rough seas for a graphic
representation of the various sea states. Sea state limitations depend to
a large degree on the type and size of the diving platform. Diving
operations may be conducted in rougher seas from properly moored larger
platforms such as diving barges, ocean-going ships, or fixed structures.
Divers using self-contained equipment should avoid entering the ocean in
heavy surf. If bad weather sets in after a diving operation has commenced,
appropriate recall signals should be employed.
Since many diving operations are conducted in harbors, .rivers, or
major shipping channels, other ships often present serious problems. At
times, it may be necessary to close off an area or limit the movement of
other ships. Ship traffic should be taken into consideration during dive
planning and, if time permits, a local "Notice to Mariners" should be
issued. Any time that diving operations are to be conducted in the vicinity
of other ships, the other vessels should be notified of the diving by
22-7
-------
message or signal. For information on proper lights, shapes, and flags to
oe displayed during diving operations, see U.S. Coast Guard (1977).
If the operation will be carried on in the middle of an active fishing
ground, small boats operated by people with various levels of experience
and competence must be anticipated. The diving team should assume that
these operators are not acquainted with the meaning of any diving signals,
and should take the necessary precautions to ensure that they remain clear
of the area.
Visibi lity--
• •
Divers frequently are required to dive in water where visibility is
minimal and sometimes at the zero level. Special precautions are
appropriate when visibility is at zero or severely limited. If scuba is
usea, a buddy line or other reference system and float is recommended. A
convenient way'to attach a buddy line is to use a rubber loop that can be
slipped on ano off the wrist easily. This is preferable to tying a line,
which would prevent rapid removal.
heavy concentrations of plankton often accumulate at the thermocline,
especially during the summer in the mid-Atlantic states. Divers may find
that plankton absorb most of the light at the thermocline or that even
though the water below the thermocline is clear, a light may still be
required for visibility. Thermoclines in clear water diffuse light within
the area of greatest temperature change, causing a significant decrease in
visibility.
A sense of touch is extremely important to a diver or scientist working
in low or zero visibility. The ability to use touch cues when handling
tools or instruments in a strange work environment is valuable to a diver
in the dark. Rehearsing work functions on the surface while blindfolded
will increase proficiency in underwater tasks.
Underwater low-light-level closed-circuit television has been used
successfully when light levels are reduced, because a television camera
"sees" more in these conditions than does the human eye. This is true
mainly when the reduced visibility is caused by the absence of light; in
cases where the problem is caused by high turbidity, the TV camera does not
offer a significant advantage. Uhen the purpose of the dive is inspection
or observation and a closed-circuit television system is used, the diver
serves essentially as a mobile underwater platform. The monitor is watched
by surface support personnel who, in turn, direct the movements of the
diver. Underwater television cameras are available that are either
handheld or mounted on a helmet.
Loss of Surface Air Supply —
A diver using umbilical-supplied equipment who experiences a loss of
air supply usually has a limited amount of usable air left in the helmet or
constant-volume suit. If the supply of air to the mask does not resume
again quickly, the diver should signal the tenders, requesting to be
22-8
-------
brought to the surface, or should make a controlled ascent. The diver
should not discard the diving equipment unless it is hopelessly fouled.
A self-contained emergency air supply system (come-home or bailout
cylinder; may be used in conjunction with surface-supplied diving equipment.
Such a system consists of a scuba cylinder assembly, a reduction regulator
(first stage of a standard single hose regulator), and a backpack/harness
assembly. Although the capacity of the scuba cylinder may vary from 10 to
140 cubic feet, many divers prefer to use a 40 to 50 ft^ cylinder, rather
than a large 72 ft^ cylinder, for an emergency supply.
The first stage regulator used with the emergency air supply is fitted
with a relief valve in the auxiliary low-pressure port to prevent over-
pressure of the regulator to the mask hose in the event of regulator
malfunction. Self-contained emergency air may be fed directly into the
mask through a special attachment on the side valve or directly into the
diver's air hose assembly. In tne latter case, the check valve should .be
located between the intersection of the emergency gas supply hose and the
primary surface supply hose.
For total redundancy, a completely separate scuba unit also may be
used as a oackup system. In this case the diver would ditch the helmet or
mask in an emergency and insert the scuba regulator mouthpiece. This
procedure is useful if the surface-supplied hose is badly tangled or the
helmet or mask is not adapted for self-contained emergency air systems.
Another method commonly used by commercial divers is to have a standby
diver with a spare hose available.
Flying after Diving at Sea Level —
Since specialized governmental diving units capable of hazardous
response operations will not be located throughout the United States, it is
fair to expect that dive team members will utilize air transportation as a
means of arriving at the dive site. Flight planning following the comple-
tion of a dive operation must take into account the following information:
The elimination of inert gas from body tissues after an exposure to
pressure continues for a period of 24 hours or more after the dive before
equilibration with the ambient partial pressure of nitrogen in the air at
the surface is completed. During this period, reducing the ambient pressure
further will create a condition identical to that which occurs during
decompression after a dive. After diving, divers should exercise caution
when traveling in mountainous terrain as well as when flying. The cabin
atmosphere in modern pressurized aircraft usually is maintained at an
altitude of 8,000 feet (0.74 atmosphere), and this reduction in pressure
may be sufficient to cause inert gas dissolved in a diver's tissues to come
out in the form of bubbles, causing decompression sickness. This has
occurred, with severe symptoms, in divers who fly after diving. Flying
after diving is a recognized hazard that should be av.oided. Termination of
the flight, which increases the ambient pressure to 1 atmosphere, does not
necessarily cause the gas bubbles to decrease sufficiently in size to stop
22-9
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causing symptoms. Recompression treatment may be required to relieve
symptoms. Since a aiver may have left the vicinity of a recompression
-chamber, it may oe difficult to find a chamber in which treatment can be
instituted. Tne delay that results may cause permanent tissue damage and
extend treatment time.
If it is necessary to fly immediately after a decompression dive, a
series of repetitive oives, or recompression treatment (as with an injury
that requires medical capability beyond that available at the dive site),
the diver should oe transported at low altitude by helicopter or aircraft,
or in a pressurized aircraft at a cabin atmosphere of not more than 800
feet of altitude. If it is necessary to transport by air a aiver suffering
from decompression sickness, the flight should be conducted at the lowest
safe altitude possiole or in a pressurized aircraft in which the cabin
atmosphere does not exceed 800 feet of altitude. In addition, the victim
should breathe pure oxygen ^ntil arrival at a recompression chamber.
defore flying in an aircraft in which the' cabin atmosphere is less
than 8,000 feet (usually the case in most flights), a diver who has
completed any number of dives on air and been decompressed according to the
U.S. Navy Standard Air Decompression Tables should wait at sea level,
Dreathing air, for the computed surface interval that allows him to be
classified as a Group D diver in the U.S. Navy Repetitive Diving Table.
Before flying, the diver should check with the flight engineer to
ascertain the maximum planned cabin altitude and to inform him that divers
will be aboard.
To shorten the necessary surface interval before flying, oxygen may be
breathed instead of air. Table 22.1 lists the length of oxygen-breathing
time necessary before flying is allowed, for the various Repetitive Dive
Group classifications.
Table 22.1
Optional uxygen-Breathing Times
Before Flying After Diving
Oxygen Time
Repetitive bive Groups Before Flying
(Hr:Min)
Groups M through Z 1:30
Groups H through L 1:00
Groups £ through G 0:30
Groups A through D 0:00
22-1 0
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m
o
o
ro
u>
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SECTION 23
ADDITIONAL UN-SCENE RESPONSE CONSIDERATIONS
Access
The access for memoers of the news media into the operations must be
determined by the OSC or MSO. A specific individual sh.ould be selected
as the spokesperson for the release of all official information. All
response team personnel are to direct inquiries from the news media to
this inaividual. News people will generally go to any lengths to get a
shot of site operations even if operations are in a hot contaminated
area. For safety reasons, nonessential response team individuals and the
public are to be kept away from the site during operations. Any
"official" visitor must be accompanied at all times by a response team
member while on-site. At the discretion of the OSC, the site and
surrounding area may be evacuated of all personnel, work with local law
enforcement authorities. They are on your side (usually).
Physical Examinations
Only inaividuals who have received a complete physical examination
within the past year should be permitted within "hot" contaminated
operational work areas.
Weather
Consideration must be made as to sea state for any diving operation.
Deployment and recovery of both diving personnel, gear, equipment, and
salvaged items are greatly complicated by high seas. Diving personnel
working in relatively shallow waters (10-15 feet) can also be susceptible
to air embolism due to wave depth variances as small as four feet.
wind and temperature should be closely monitored and wind chill
calculations made every hour during cold weather. Surface-support
personnel will be particularly prone to frostbite and exposure once they
become wet.
Respiratory Protection
No individuals will be allowed inside the "hot" operational site
without appropriate respiratory protection. Respirators, except during
donning and removal, shall be either positive pressure SCBA's, umbilical
airlines, or air purifying canister full-face mask units. All personnel
23-1
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wearing respirators must shave at the start of each work day to prevent
leakage at the facepiece-to-face-seal.
"Personal Hyyiene
No one will be. permitted to eat, drink, or smoke inside the fenced
area. Outsiae the fence, they will thoroughly wash hands and face with
soap ana water before aoing so. Individuals must wash hands with soap and
v»ater oefore urinating. All footwear worn inside the fence must remain on
site until the field work is completed. At the end of each day, disposable
clothing will be removed and disposed of in 55-gallon metal drums, which
will remain inside tne fence. Individuals are expected to shower promptly
and thoroughly after leaving the site at the end of each day.
Personnel txposure
If clothing is ripper or torn, it is to be removed and replaced as
soon as possible. Disposable clothing contaminated with an observable
amount of chemical residue is to be removed and replaced immediately.
Residue on "moon suits" is to be washed off as soon as possible. In the
event of direct skin contact, the affected area is to be washed immediately
with soap and water and the person taken to a hospital. A person will be
stationed in the decontamination area to assist in the removal of
protective gear.
hospital & Emergency Services
•One response team member, stationed outside the "hot" operational
area, must know the quickest route to local medical facilities. Contact
should be made, prior to operations commencing, with the local first aid
squad, hospital emergency room, and nearest operational recompression
chamoer. Contact with the area Coast Guard station is necessary if
air/helicopter evacuation of injured divers must be made. Phone numbers of
all emergency response and service organizations must be prominently
displayed next to the command post telephone.
Fire
If the response operation involves flammable material, the local Fire
Department must be contacted to assist in standing a "fire watch" just off-
site during operations. Fire personnel must have had training in SC8A and
should be prepared to spread .foam (light water) in the event of a fire.
23-2
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o
-H
i—*
O
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SECTION 24
DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES
As part of the system to prevent or reduce the physical transfer of
contaminants by people and/or equipment from on-site, procedures must be
instituted for decontaminating anything leaving the Exclusion Area and
Contamination Reduction Area. These procedures include the decontamination
of personnel, protective equipment, monitoring equipment, clean-up
equipment, etc. Unless otherwise demonstrated, everything leaving the
Exclusion Area should be considered contaminated and appropriate methods
established for decontamination.
In general, decontamination at the site consists of rinsing equipment,
personnel, etc., with copious amounts of water and washing same with a
detergent/water solution. If contaminants are known, then a specific
detergent and/or solvent can be used to decontaminate. Fig. 24.1 illus-
trates the maximum physical layout for personnel decontamination during a
worst case situation. Fig. 24.2 illustrates the minimum physical layout
for personnel decontamination for a relatively small well-identified
situation. Each site requires special consideration and the decontamin-
ation procedures should be modified from the maximum to minimum layout
based on known information.
Decontamination (Decon) and Rinse Solutions
The decon solutions should be solutions of water and chemical compounds
designed to react with and neutralize the specific contaminants. The tem-
perature and contact time also should be considered in order to insure
complete neutralization. An excellent unit for applying decon and surfac-
tant solutions is a La-Pressure Washer, Model 914. The washer delivers
4 GPM at 1000 psi and can withdraw decon solutions via a siphon feed hose.
The contaminants will not always be known in a majority of cases and
it will be necessary to use a decon solution that is effective for a
variety of contaminants. Two of these general decon solutions are listed
below:
o Decon Solution A - A solution containing S% Sodium Carbonate
(NagCOs)and5% Trisodium Phosphate (Na3P04). Mix four
(4) pounds of commercial grade Na2C03 plus four (4) pounds
commercial grade Na3?04 with each ten (10) gallons of water.
These chemicals are available at most hardware stores.
24-1
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Equipment
Drop
\PI
SI
B
Oecon
Outer
Garment
Decon JA
Solution ^P
Wind Diieclion
20° >^.
islic
leet c |
J i
o\
*! c
Remove
Bool
^ Covers ^
Htj!\>
Can
:^^^
JU*O^-
Tank Chanye Over Point
D
Oecon
Boots
and
Gloves
^
E
Rinse
Boots ,
and -JV\
v^v
Gloves ^^
^
Oecon Solution Water
(Wash Tubs) po gallon) (10 gallon) (10 (jallon)
F
Remove
Boots
*• and ^^
Outer
Garments
i5
Can
(32 gallon)
\
r
1
W Hemova
1-1 SCOA
V
i
G
Muni
Im
^^ Glox
ovu
er
/us.
Socks, and
COI 1041
'laslic Clullius
Sluttti ,„
>
1 J
Fluid
•^ bliuwoi
Kudfuss
^ Fust
Aid
\ Field
E HIM
^
\~\ Can
V_y (32 gallon)
Maximum layout of personnel decontamination
station. (Lev/els A & B Protection)
-------
Wind Oliaciion
Equipment
Drop
i
GO
Decon
Solution
Water
Plastic
Sheet
Decon
Garments
Remove __
Boot Covers
''and Outer Gloves
w
Can
(10 gallon)
Tank
Change-Over
Point
Remove
Boots/Gloves
and
Outer
Garments
(For Disposal and
* Off Site
Decontamination)
b
Can
(32 gallon)
1
.^M.
Remove
SCBA
__^te-
Plastic
Sheet
Figure 24.2 Minimum layout of the PDS.
(Level A. B & C Proluction)
-------
o Decon Solution B - A solution containing 10% Calcium Hypochlorite
(Ca(C10)2).Mix eight (8) pounds of Ca(ClO)? with each ten
(10) gallons of water. Calcium Hypochlorite (HTH) is available at
most hardware or pool supply stores.
The rinse solutions used in decon should have the ability not only to
remove the decon solution physically, but also to neutralize excess decon
solution.
A general purpose rinse solution, used for both decon solutions listed
above consists of a five (5) percent solution of Trisodium Phosphate. Mix
four (4) pounds Na3?04 with each ten (10) gallons of water.
A final rinse of liquid Ivory soap solution is recommended on all decon
procedures followed by fresh water. (See Figures 24.3 and 24.4)
Operational Considerations «
The decontamination procedures illustrated in Fig. 24.1 are for Level A
protection which more often than not requires a detailed decontamination
process during a worst case situation (i.e., Dioxin contamination, chemical
fire, immediately dangerous to life or health atmospheres). Fig. 24.2
illustrates the minimum physical layout for personnel decontamination
during a relatively small, well-defined situation (i.e., pesticide spill,
solvent spill, etc.).
Less extensive procedures for decontamination can be subsequently or
initially established when the type and degree of contamination through
analysis becomes known or the potential for transfer is judged to be
minimum. These procedures generally involve one or two washdowns only, and
fewer precautionary measures in doffing equipment. These procedures would
not involve additional decontamination of the protective clothing which is
removed. Table 24.1 lists general decon solutions and their applications.
In extreme situations when there may be a question of the efficacy of
decontamination to known or strongly suspect substances of a highly toxic
nature, protective clothing may have to be discarded after use or tested
after decontamination.
Consideration must also be given to the protective equipment worn by
those personnel operating the decontamination line. In most cases, chemical
protective clothing, boots, and gloves should suffice. Unless it is suspec-
ted and/or confirmed that personnel needing decontamination are highly
contaminated, air-purifying respirators with suitable canisters can be worn
(Level C Protection).
Decontamination solutions should be designed to react with and
neutralize the specific potential contaminants involved in an incident.
However, since the contaminants at an uncontrolled waste site will be
unknown in the majority of cases, it is necessary to use a decontamination
solution that is effective for a variety of contaminants. Several of these
24-4
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Dockside Decon of
Superlite 17 Rig
Gross Initial Washdown
of MK-12 Rig
Final Decon of
MK-12 Rig
Figure 24.3 Dockside Decon Operations
24.5
-------
Initial Gross In-Water
Contaminant Washdown
of Superlite 17
Final Shipboard
D.econ of MK-12 Rig
Pressure Washer w/
Concentrated Decon
Solutions
Figure 24.4 Shipboard Decon Operations
M.6
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Table 24.1 USES OF GENERAL PURPOSE DECON SOLUTIONS
TYPE OF HAZARD SUSPECTED
SOLUTION
INSTRUCTIONS
1. Inorganic acids, metal processing wastes.
2. Heavy metals: mercury, lead, cadmium, etc.
3. Pesticides, fungicides, chlorinated
phenols, dioxins, and PCB's.
4. Cyanides, ammonia, and other non-acidic
inorganic wastes.
5. Solvents and organic compounds, such as
trichloroethylene, chloroform, and toluene.
6. PBB's and PCB's.
7. Oily, greasy unspecified wastes.
8. Inorganic bases, alkali, and caustic waste.
A
A
B
B
C (or A)
C (or A)
C
D
To 10 gallons of water, add 4 pounds of sodium
carbonate (soda lime) and 4 pounds of trisodium
phosphate.
Stir until evenly mixed.
Same as 01 above.
*
To 10 gallons of water, add 8 pounds of calcium
hypochlorite. Stir with wooden or plastic
stirrer until evenly mixed.
Same as #3 above.
To 10 Gallons of water, add 4 pounds of
trisodium phosphate. Stir until evenly mixed.
Same as #5 above.
Same as #5 above.
To 10 gallons of water, add 1 pint of
concentrated hydrochloric acid. Stir with
a wooden or plastic stirrer.
-------
general purpose decontamination solutions (some ingredients are available
at hardware or swimming pool supply stores) are listed below:
o Decon Solution A
o Decon Solution B
o Decon Solution C
- A solution containing 5% Sodium Carbonate
(Ma2C03) and 5% Trisodium Phosphate
(Ma3P04).
- A solution containing 10% Calcium Hypochlorite
(Ca(C10)2).
- A solution containing 5% Trisodium Phosphate
(Ma3P04). This solution can also be used as
a general purpose rinse.
o Decon Solution D - A dilute solution of Hydrochloric Acid (HC1).
All diving helmets, jocking harnesses, weight belts, and umbilicals must
thoroughly scrubbed, deconne'd, and rinsed after each operational day.
be
Insofar as possible, measures should be taken to prevent contamination
of sampling and monitoring equipment. Sampling devices become contaminated,
but monitoring instruments, unless they are splashed, usually do not. Once
contaminated, instruments are difficult to clean without damaging then. Any
delicate instrument which cannot be decontaminated easily should be protec-
ted while it is being used. It should be bagged, and the bag taped and
secured around the instrument. Openings are made in the bag for sample
intake.
The following are specific areas of concern in decontamination
operations:
1. Sampling devices
Sampling devices require special cleaning. The EPA Regional
Laboratories can provide information on proper decontamination
methods.
2. Tools
Wooden tools are difficult to decontaminate because they absorb
chemicals. They should be kept on site and handled only by
protected workers. At the end of the response, wooden tools
should be discarded. For decontaminating other tools, Region
Laboratories should be consulted.
3. Respirators
Certain parts of contaminated respirators, such as the harness
assembly and leather or cloth components, are difficult to
decontaminate. If grossly contaminated, they may have to be
discarded. Rubber components can be soaked in soap and water and
scrubbed with a brush. Regulators must be maintained according to
manufacturer's recommendatons. Persons responsible for decontami-
nating respirators should be thoroughly trained in respirator
maintenance.
24-8
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4. Heavy Equipment
bulldozers, trucks, oack-hoes, bulking chambers, and other heavy
equipment are difficult to decontaminate. The method generally
usea is to wash them with water under high pressure ana/or to
scrub accessible parts with detergent/water solution under
pressure, if possible. In some cases, shovels, scoops, and lifts
have been sand blasted or steam cleaned. Particular care must be
given to those components in direct contact with contaminants such
as tires and scoops. Swipe tests should be utilized to measure
effectiveness.
5. Sanitizing of Personnel Protective Equipment
Respirators, reusable protective clothing, and other personal
articles not only.must be decontaminated before being reused, but
also sanitized. The inside of masks and clothing becomes soiled
due to exhalation, boay oils, and perspiration. The manu-
facturer's instructions should be used to sanitize the respirator
mask, If practical, protective clothing should be machine washed
after a thorough decontamination; otherwise it must be cleaned by
hand.
6. Persistent Contamination
In some instances, clothing and equipment will become contaminated
with substances that cannot be removed by normal decontamination
procedures. A solvent may be used to remove such contamination
from equipment if it does not destroy or degrade the protective
material. If persistent contamination is expected, disposable
garments should be used. Testing for persistent contaminaton of
protective clothing and appropriate decontamination must be done
by qualified laboratory personnel.
7. Disposal of Contaminated Materials
All materials and equipment used for decontamination must be
disposed of properly. Clothing, tools, buckets, brushes, and all
other equipment that is contaminated must be secured in drums or
other containers and labeled. Clothing not completely decontami-
nated on-site should be secured in plastic bags before being
removed from the site.
Contaminated wash and rinse solutions should be contained by using
step-in-containers (for example, child's wading pool) to hold
spent solutions. Another containment method is to dig a trench
about 4 inches deep and line it with plastic. In both cases the
spent solutions are transferred to drums, which are labeled and
disposed of with other substances on site.
24-9
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Appendix F, Annex 1, 2, ana 3 describe Dasic decontamination procedures for
a worker wearing Level LA, 8, or C protection. The basic decontamination
-lines (Situation 1), consisting of approximately 19 stations, are almost
identical except for changes necessitated by different protective clothing
or respirators. For each annex, three specific situations are described in
which the basic (or full decontamination) procedure is changed to take into
account differences in the extent of contaminaiton, the accompanying
changes in equipment worn, and other factors. The situations illustrate
decontamination setups based on Known or assumed conditions at an incident.
Many other variations are possible.
Annex 4 describes a minimum layout for personnel decontamination. The
number of individual stations ahve been reduced. Although the decontami-
nation equipment and amount of space required is less than needed in the
procedures previously described, there is also a much higher probability of
cross-contamination.
24-10
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*
ro
en
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SECTION 25
SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND RESPONSE ASSISTANCE
In a hazardous spill situation, the OSC or MSO must swiftly assess site
conditions, not only prior to allowing diving personnel to enter a contam-
inated water environment, but also to whatever hazards his/her surface
response workers face.
Many sources of information and organizations can provide response
personnel witn technical data ana physical assistance regarding both the
hazards associated with an incident and methods of dealing with them. It
is necessary to be aware of these resources and to know how to use them.
The information, which may include data on sites, topography, meteor-
ology, physical/chemical properties of the material, applicable treatment
methods, ana available cleanup resources, can be. provided by various
agencies, maps, reference books, and manuals. It is advisable to get data
from at least two sources and to use the latest eaition of any reference,
especially when searching for hygienic standards or toxicological data.
Access to on-line computer files may be possible at the site if a
telephone, portable terminal, and 120-volt outlet are available. Aerial
photographs can also proviae useful information when interpreted properly.
NOAA Hazardous Materials Response Project
NOAA's Hazardous Materials Response Project (HAZMAT) is a member of
one of the groups of special forces available upon request to Federal On-
Scene Coordinators (OSC) for response to actual or potential releases of
pollutants, such as oil and hazardous materials, as well as for contingency
planning, when responding to a potentially hazardous spill, HAZMAT relies
upon four main groups for quick reliable information. The functions of
these groups are outlined below.
Trajectory Analysis/Physical Oceanography
Dr. Jerry Gait
NOAA/OMPA
7600 Sand Point way, N.E.
Seattle, Washington 98115
(206J527-6317
The trajectory analysis/physical oceanography group is concerned with
the movement and spreading of pollutants in the marine environment. Their
goal is to define trajectories for both waterborne and airborne contaminants
in a timely manner. In order to achieve this objective, Or. Gait has
developed a sophisticated computer model. Field equipment such as cameras,
25-1
-------
portable darkrooms, and current measuring equipment help to verify their
predictions in the field.
Research Planning Institute
The environmental sensitivity analysis group is concerned with environ-
mental resources at risk from a pollutant discharge. Advance mapping of
coastal areas develop reference maps availaole for immediate referral in
the event of a spill. The Kesearch Planning Institute has a staff of pro-
fessionals in tne areas of chemistry, geology, biology, marine ecology, and
geocnemistry which lends its support to the development of these valuable
references.
Environmental Sensitivity Analysis
Dr. tried Gundlach
Or. Jacqui Michel
Research Planning 'Institute
925 Gervais Street
Columoia, SC 2S201
(803)256-7322
Chemical Support and Safety
The Chemical Support and Safety group works closely together to define
the hazard and make appropriate safety recommendations. The chemistry/
safety problem is best defined by consulting a number of reference sources.
HAZMAT routinely uses the following references along with a computer-based
information system known as the Chemical Information System (CIS).
Chemical Support Safety and Health
Chemistry; Dr. Ed Overton
Center for Bio-Organic Studies
University of New Orleans
New Orleans, LA 70122
1504)283-6640)
Safety and Health;
David Kummerlowe
NOAA/OMPA
7600 Sand Point Uay, N.E.
Seattle, Washington 98115
1206)527-6326
Center for Disease Control
The Center for Disease Control provides detailed technical assistance
in human toxicology and in the evaluation and monitoring of health risks.
CDC has experts located in all coastal regions to assist with safety-related
and human exposure problems.
National Center for Disease Control
Dr. Georgia Jones
COC-Center of Environmental Health
1600 Clifton Road, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30333
Appendix F contains a listing of basic references, On-Line Computer
Systems, remote sensing ana map interpretation information, and a list of
-------
REFERENCES
1. Lindsay, D. B., and K. S. Stn'coff. "A feasibility Study of the State
of the Art of Personnel Monitors." U.S. Coast Guard Report No.
CG-D-30-79, November 1978.
2. Craven, J. P. et al. "Marine Technology Society Journal." Volume 15
- No. 2, 1981.
3. McLellan, S. A., and R» F. Busby.. "Evaluation of the Use of Divers
and/or Remotely Operated Vehicles in Chemically Contaminated Waters."
USEPA Contract No. 68-03-3113 IMS #3 Task 42-3, November 1982.
4. Coolbaugn, J. C., and R. R. Colwell. "Microbial hazards Associated
with Diving in Pollutea Uaters." NOAA Contract No. 04-8-M01-71,
September 1981.
5. Hardick, S. F., ana P. Slaton. "Hazardous Materials and the Search
and Recovery Team," 1982.
6. Caldwell, w. E. "Polluting Incidents In and Around U.S. Waters."
U.S. Coast Guard.
7. Pernice, J. "USEPA tdison Facility Manual," 1982.
8. Turpin, R. D.. "EPA Interim Standard Operating Safety Guides,"
September 1982.
9. USEPA Occupational Health & Safety Manual. Chapter 10. EPA Diving
Safety Policy, February 11, 1982.
10. McCracken, E., and J. A. Rogers. "Response to Spills of Hazardous
Materials: Development of Spills Response Kit, Remedial Actions,
Procedures and Response Concepts," September 1982. Naval Sea Systems
Command.
11. Schwope, A.D., P. P. Costas, J. 0. Jackson, and D. V. Weitman.
"Guidelines for the Selection of Chemical Protective Clothing."
Volumes I and II. USEPA Office of Occupational Health and Safety.
12. Shaver, U. K., and R. L. Berkowitz. "Guidelines Manual - Post
Accident Procedures for Chemicals and Propellants." Air Force Rocket
Propulsion Laboratory Report #AFRPL TR-82-077, January 1983.
R-l
-------
13. wells, J. M., ana M. Keeb. "Protection of Divers in Water Containing
hazaraous Chemicals, Pathogenic Organisms & Radioactive Material."
unaersea Medical Society Report No. CK 60(CWj February 2, 1983.
14. U.S. Army Corp. of Engineers. "Superfund Overview Course." Volumes I
& II. huntsville Division, January 1983.
15. williscroft, K. b. "A System for Protecting SCUBA Divers from the
Hazards of Contaminated Water." Doctoral Dissertation, California
Coast University, January 1983.
16. Sell, T. "hazardous Materials Incident Response Operations Manual."
USEPA Oil & Special Materials Control Division & U.S. Coast Guard,
January 1983.
17. Nash, J. "Chemical Tagk' Testing of Modified Commercial Diving Helmets
and Dress." EPA Contract No. 68-3-3056, May 1983.
18. tiotzum, J. R. "New EPA/NOAA Project on Hazardous Diving Techniques."
Ocean Science News, volume 25, No. 4, January 24, 1983.
19. U.S. Navy. "U.S. Navy Diving Manual - Volume 1, Air Diving." Navy
Department, Washington, b.C. NAVSEA 0994-LP-001-9010, 1973.
20. U.S. Coast Guard-. "Polluting Incidents In and Around U.S. Waters."
COMuTINST Ml6450.2D, 1982.
21. Levine, M.ivi., "The Epidemiology of Aquatic Infections and a Program of
study for Determining Microbial Hazards," Undersea Medical Society
Report No. CK 60(Cw) February 1, 1983.
22. Campell, S.D., "Nuclear Diving Safety, Proceeding of Protection of
Divers in Water Containing Hazardous Chmeicals, Pathogenic Organisms,
ana Radioactive Material," Undersea Meaical Society Report No.
CK 60lCw), February 1, 1983.
R-2
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APPENDIX A
OHMSETT
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency operates the Oil and Hazardous
Materials Simulated Environmental Test Tank (OHMSETT) located in Leonardo, New
Jersey. This facility provides an environmentally safe place to conduct testing and
development of devices and techniques for the control and clean-up of oil and
hazardous material spills.
The primary feature of the facility is a pile-supported, concrete tank with a
water surface 203 metres (667 feet) long by 20 metres (65 feet) wide and with a water
depth of 2.4 metres (8 feet). The tank can be filled with fresh or salt water. The tank
is spanned by a bridge capable of exerting a horizontal force up to 151 kilonewtons
(34,000 pounds) while towing floating equipment at speeds to 3.3 metres/second (6.5
knots) for at least 40 seconds. Slower speeds yield longer resr runs. The towing bridge
is equipped to lay oil or hazardous materials on the surface ot the water several
metres ahead of the device being tested, so that reproducible thicknesses and widths
of the test slicks can be achieved with minimum interference bv wind.
A-l
-------
The prinicipal systems of the tank include a wave generator, a beach, and a
filter system. The wave generator and absorber beach can produce regular waves to
0.6 metre (2 feet) high and to 45 metres (147 feet) long, as well as a series of 0.7
metres (2.3 feet) high reflecting, complex waves meant to simulate the water surface
of a harbor. The tank water is clarified by recirculation through a 410 cubic
metre/hour (1800 gallon per minute) diatomaceous earth filter system to permit full
use of a sophisticated underwater photography and video imagery system and to
remove the hydrocarbons that enter the tank water as a result of testing. The towing
bridge has a built-in oil barrier which is used to skim oil to the North end of the tank
for cleanup and recycling.
When the tank must be emptied for maintenance purposes, the entire water
volume of 9800 cubic metres (2.6 millon gallons) is filtered and treated until it meets
all applicable State and Federal water quality standards before being discharged.
Additional specialized treatment may be used whenever hazardous materials are used
for tests. •
Testing at the facility is served from a 650 square metres (7,000 square feet)
building adjacent to the tank. This building houses offices, a quality control laboratory
(which is very important since test fluids and tank water are both recycled), a small
machine shop, and an equipment preparation area.
This government-owned, contractor-operated facility is available tor testing
purposes on a cost-reimbursable basis. The operating contractor, Mason & Hanger-
Silas Mason Co., Inc., provides a permanent staff of eighteen multi-disciplinary
personnel. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency provides expertise in the area
of spill control technology and overall project direction.
For acd;*iona: ir^'omanon, contact:
Richard A. Griffiths
OHV'^ETT Project Officer
U.i. Environmental Protection Agency
Research and Development, MERL
Edison, New Jersey 08817
Telephone: 201-321-6629.
LA GUARDIA
AIRPORT
H. A. 0. EARLE |
WEAPONS LAB.
NEXT RI9HT
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APPENDIX B
AIR MONITORING AND SURVEY INSTRUMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Response to an environmental incident requires careful preparation
and prompt action to reduce the hazards. Concurrently, the health
and safety of response personnel and the general public must be
protected. Air monitoring and survey instruments provide
information to determine how these requirements are being met.
The purpose of this part is to:
- List field instrument^ useful for on-site work.
- Describe the operating theories and principles of these instru-
ments.
- Illustrate the proper interpretation and limitations of the
data obtained.
Used correctly, these instruments provide data that help response
personnel to determine:
- Potential or real effects on the environment.
- Immediate and long-term risks' to public health, including the
health of response workers.
- Appropriate personnel protection and respiratory equipment to
be used on-site.
- Actions to mitigate the hazard(s) safely and effectively.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF FIELD INSTRUMENTS
To perform effectively in the field, air monitoring
Instruments must be:
- Portable
- Able to generate reliable and useful results
- Sensitive and selective
- Inherently safe
All of these traits may or may not be present 1n any one
Instrument.
B-l
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A. Portability
A prime consideration that determines the usefulness of a
field instrument is portability. Transporation shock
resulting from the movement from one place to another,
together with unintentional abuse, ranks high in
shortening the usable life of an instrument. To reduce
this trauma, instruments should be selected that have
reinforced shells or frames, shock-mounted electronic
packages, or padded containers for shipment.
Exposure to the elements and the test atmosphere itself is
of concern for those instruments repeatedly used in
adverse conditions or as long-term monitors. Anodized or
coated finishes, weather-resistant packaging and remote
sensing are effective in reducing downtime and increasing
portability.
In short, a portable unit should possess ease in
mobility, the ability to withstand the rigors of use,
quick'assembly, and short check out and calibration time.
B. Reliable and Useful Results
Response time, the interval between an instrument
"sensing" a contaminant and generating data, is important
to producing reliable and useful results 1n the field.
Response time depends on: test(s) to be performed, dead
time between sample periods (the time for analysis, data
generation, and data display), and the sensitivity of the
Instrument. Response time establishes the pace of the
overall survey and the individual tests.
Another consideration is that the instrument must give
results that are immediately useful. Instruments should
be direct reading, with little or no need to interpolate,
Integrate, or compile large amounts of data.
C. Sensitivity and Selectivity
A third requirement of a good field instrument 1s the
ability to sample and analyze very low contaminant levels,
and to discern among contaminants exhibiting similar
characteristics.
-------
Sensitivity defines the lowest concentration an
instrument can accurately and repeatedly analyze. In the
strictest sense, it is a function of the detecting ability
of the instrument, and does not address the electronic
amplifier, if the unit has one. The operating range
establishes the upper and lower use limits of the
instrument. It encompasses the sensitivity limit at its
lower end and the overload point at its upper.
Selectivity establishes what contaminants will elicit a
response on the instrument. Additionally, selectivity
mandates which, if any, interferences may produce a
similar"response. Selectivity and sensitivity must be
reviewed and interpreted together. Many devices have high
selectivity but widely varying sensitivities for a given
family of chemicals, for example aromatics, aliphatics,
and amines.
Amplification, often used synonymously (and incorrectly)
with sensitivity, deals with an electronic amplifier's
ability to increase very small electrical signals
emanating from the detector. This capacity may be fixed
or variable. However, changing the amplification of the
detector does not change its sensitivity. For optimum
field usefulness, an instrument should possess high
sensitivity, wide range, high selectivity, and the ability
to vary the amplification of detector signals.
D. Inherent Safety
One of the greatest concerns when using an electrically
operated Instrument is Its potential to Ignite a flammable
atmosphere. The sources of this Ignition could be: an
arc generated by the power source Itself or the associated
electronics, and/or a flame or heat source Inherent 1n the
instrument and necessary for Its proper functioning.
Several features can be added to an instrument to
eliminate Ignition sources while allowing the Instrument
to perform as designed.
8-3
-------
1. Controls
Three methods exist to prevent a potential ignition
source from igniting a flammable atmosphere:
- Encase the ignition source in a rigidly built container.
"Explosion-proof" instruments allow the flammable
atmosphere to enter. If and when an arc is generated,
the ensuing explosion is contained within the specially
designed and built enclosure. Within it, any flames or
hot gases are cooled prior to exiting into the ambient
flammable atmosphere so that the explosion does not
spread into the environment.
•
- Reduce the potential for arcing among components by
encasing them in a solid insulating material. Also,
reducing the instrument's operational current and
voltage below the energy level necessary for ignition of
the flammable atmosphere provides equal protection. An
"intrinsically safe" device, as defined by the National
Electrical Code, is incapable "of releasing sufficient
electrical or thermal energy under normal or abnormal
conditions to cause ignition of a specific hazardous
atmospheric mixture in its most easily ignited
concentration. Abnormal conditions shall Include
accidental damage to any—wiring, failure of electrical
components, application of over-voltage, adjustment and
maintenance operations and other similar conditions."
- Buffer the arcing or flame-producing device from the
flammable atmosphere with an inert gas. In a pressurized
or "purged" system, a steady stream of, for example,
nitrogen or helium 1s passed by the potential arcing
device, keeping the flammable atmosphere from the
Ignition source. This type of control, however, does
not satisfactorily control analytical devices that use a
flame or heat for analysis.
-------
Hazardous Atmospheres
Depending upon the response worker's background, the term
"hazardous atmosphere" conjures up situations ranging from
toxic air contaminants to flammable atmsopheres. For our
purposes, an atmosphere is hazardous if it meets the following
criteria:
- It is a mixture of any flammable material in air (see Class
and Group below) whose composition is within this material's
flammable range.
- A critical volume of the mixture is sufficiently heated by an
outside ignition source.
- The resulting exothermic reaction propagates the flame
beyond'where it started.
Hazardous atmospheres can be produced by one of three general
types of materials: *
- Flammable gases/vapors
- Combustible dusts
- Ignitable fibers
Whereas the flammable material may define the hazard associated
with a given product, the occurence of release, (how often the
material generates a hazardous atmosphere) dictates the risk.
Two types of releases are associated with hazardous
atmospheres:
- Continuous: Those existing continuously in an open
unconfined area during normal operating conditions.
- Confined: Those existing in closed containers, systems or
piping, where only ruptures, leaks, or other failures result
in a hazardous atmosphere outside the closed system.
There are six possible environments in which a hazardous
atmosphere can be generated. However not every type of control
will prevent an ignition in every environment. To adequately
describe the characteristics of those environments and what
controls can be used, the National Electrical Code defines each
characteristic:
- Class is a category describing the type of flammable material
that produces the hazardous atmosphere:
-- Class I is flammable vapors and gases, such as gasoline,
hydrogen. Class I is further divided into groups A.B.C.and D
on the basis of similar flammability characteristics (Table
1-1).
-- Class II consists of combustible dusts like coal or grain and
is divided into groups E,F, and G.
-- Class III is ignitable fibers such as produced by cotton
mi 11i ng.
B-5
-------
- Division is the term describing the "location" of generation
and release of the flammable material.
-- Division 1 is a location where the generation and release are
continuous, intermittent, or periodic into an open,
unconfined area under normal conditions.
— Division 2 is a location where the generation and release are
in closed systems or containers and only from ruptures, leaks
or other failures.
Using this sy.stem, a hazardous atmosphere can be routinely and
adequately defined. As an example, a spray-painting operation
using acetone carrier would be classified as a Class I,
Division 1, Group D environment. Additionally, an abandoned waste
site containing*intact closed drums of methyl ethyl ketone,
toluene, and xylene would be considered a Class I; Division 2,
Group D environment. Once the containers begin to leak and produce
a hazardous atmosphere, the environment changes to Class I,
Division 1, Group D.
III. CERTIFICATION PROTOCOLS
A given ignition control device is selected for a specific Class,
Division, and Group, per the manufacturer's specifications and the end
user's requirement. There are no guarantees however, that the device
will prevent ignition of a hazardous atmosphere, unless 1t has been
, tested. The test should Include the worst case sltuatlon(s) this device
could encounter in the field.
A. Primary Certification Groups
Several engineering, Insurance, and safety Industries standardized
test protocols, established Inclusive definitions, and developed codes
for testing electrical devices used In hazardous locations. The
National F1re Protection Association (NFPA), a forerunner in this
endeavor, created minimum standards in Us National Electrical Code
(NEC), published every 3 years.
This code spells out among other things:
- Types of controls acceptable for use 1n hazardous atmospheres, that
1s, explosion-proof, Intrinsically safe, or purged.
- Types of areas in which flammable atmospheres can be
generated-Division 1 or Division 2.
- Types of materials that generate these atmospheres, that is, Class
I, II, or III and their associated groups.
-------
TABLE B-l
CLASS I CHEMICALS BY GROUPS
Group A Atmospheres
Acetylene*
Group 3 Atmospheres
Butadiene
Ethylene oxide
Hydrogen
Manufactured gases containing more
than 30% hydrogen (by volume)
Propylene oxide
Group C Atmospheres
Acetaldehyde
Crotonal denyde
Cyclopropane
01 ethyl ether
Ethylene
Unsyraraetrlcal dimethyl hydrazlne
(UOMH, 1-, l-d1methyl hydrazlne)
Group 0 Atmospheres
Acetone
Acrylonitrlle
Ammonia
Benzene
Butane
1-Butanol (butyl alcohol)
2-Butanol (secondary butyl alcohol)
2-Butyl acetate
n-Butyl acetate
Isobutyl acetate
Ethane
Ethanol (ethyl alcohol)
Ethyl acetate
Ethylene dlchlorlde
Gasoline
Heptanes
Hexanes
Isoprene
Methane (natural gas)
Methanol (methyl alcohol)
3-Methyl-l-butanol (Isoamyl alcohol)
Methyl ethyl ketone
• Methyl Isobutyl ketone
2-Methyl-1-propanol (Isobutyl alcohol)
2-Methyl-2-propanol (tertiary butyl
alcohol)
Octanes
Petroleum naphtha1
Pentanes
1-Pentanol (amyl alcohol)
Propane
l-Propanol(propyl alcocol)
2-Propanol dsopropyl alcohol)
Propylene
Styr«ne
Toluene
Vinyl acetate
Vinyl chloride
Xylenes
Source: National Electrlcal Code. Vol. 70, Table 500-2. National F1r« Protection
Association, 470 Atlantic Ave., Boston MA 02210 (1975).
*A saturated hydrocarbon mixture boiling In the range 20°-135°C
(68°-275°F). Also known by the synonyms benzine, 11 groin, petroleum
ether, or naphtha.
B-7
-------
Other national groups such as Underwriters Laboratories (in.),
Factory Mutual (FM), and the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI), together with NFPA, developed test, protocols
for certifying explosion-proof, intrinsically safe, or purged
devices to meet minimum standards of acceptance.
An electrical device certified under one of these test
protocols carries a permanently affixed plate showing the logo
of the laboratory granting certification and the Classes),
Division(s), and Group(s) it was tested against.
Certification means that if a device is certified as
explosion-proof, intrinsically safe, or purged for a given
Class, Division, and Group, and is used, maintained, ami
serviced according to the manufacturer's instructions, it
will not contribute* to ignition.
Any manufacturer wishing to have an electrical device
certified by FM or UL must submit a prototype for testing.
If the unit passes, it is certified as submitted.
However the manufacturer agrees to allow the testing
laboratory to randomly check the manufacturing plant at any
time, as well as any marketed units. Furthermore, any change
in the unit requires the manufacturer to notify the test
laboratory, which can continue the certification or withdraw
it until the modified unit can.be retested.
B. Selection of Certified Devices
On a site generating a hazardous atmosphere (or having the
potential to), the use of certified equipment gives response
personnel a margin of safety. The following points will
assist in selection of equipment that will not contribute to
ignition of a hazardous atmosphere:
- In an area designated Division 1, there is a greater
probability of generating a hazardous atmosphere than in
Division 2. Therefore, the test protocols for Division 1
certification are more stringent than those for Division
2. Thus a device approved for Division 1 is also
permitted for use in Division 2, but not vice versa.
- There are so many Groups, Classes, and Divisions that
it is impossible to certify an all-inclusive instrument.
Therefore, select a certified device based on the
chemicals and conditions most likely to be encountered.
For example a device certified for a Class II, Division 1,
Group E (combustible metal dust) would offer little
protection around a flammable vapor or gas.
-------
The use of a certified instrument in an environment other
than what it has been certified for provides no better
protection than use of a noncertified device.
An instrument certified as intrinsically safe for a given
Group in a Class I, Division 1 area carries
"non incendiary" certification for Division 2.
An intrinsically safe* certification contains requirements
for redundant systems and provides protection under normal
and abnormal or faulty conditions, while a non incendiary
certification does not. Instead, ignition protection 1s
offered only when the certified device is used according
to the manufacturer's instructions and under the
environmental conditions expected in a Division 2 area.
This certification may also be awarded to Instruments that
are Incapable of releasing sufficient electrical or
thermal energy to Ignite flammable gases or vapors of a
Division 2, Class I location (Figure l-l).
.
?"T?T7TfcL-i»-s*» *?• *.»»«•• ^»»^*"^Xj-L.r •-- — - •. -i
FIGURE S.I
EXAMPLE OF INSTRUMENT CERTIFICATION
B-9
-------
A unit may he certified either by UL, FM or both. Both
laboratories follow test protocols established by NFPA and
ANSI. Therefore one certification is no better or worse
than the other. The important consideration is that the
device is approved for the Class(es), Division(s) and
Group(s) it will be used in.
The mention of FM or UL in the manufacturer's equipment
literature does not guarantee certification. All certified
devices that are used in hazardous (flammable) locations must
be marked to show Class, Division, and Group, per NEC Table
500-2(b).
C. Other Certifications
Other organizations such as the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA), Canadian Standards Association (CSA),
National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA), and the
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) have developed their own testing and
certification schemes for electrical devices in hazardous
locations common to their jurisdiction.
MSHA tests and certifies electrical equipment to be used in
hazardous atmospheres associated with underground mining.
These atmospheres usually contain methane gas and coal dust;
hence the tests and certification are specific to those two
contaminants.
Often the same testing equipment is used 1n the mines as well
as above ground and therefore carrying both certifications:
MSHA and FM or UL (Figures 1-2 and 1-3). Note that FM
certifies the pump for Class II, Group G, grains, dusts, and
flours, which are not found underground.
nd Hvsptae apply only so
as tha'dactrical unrts and wiring an
aio?jj;%l ittondance' with Mine 't
FIGURE 5.2
ESIlPortable Pump
vswmsis^*3&>&;
Ipart DOi 46611a*&>^-& r
-------
A device with only an MSHA certification does not offer the
same protection in hazardous atmospheres generated from other
materials in the same Class and Group as methane (Class I,
Group 0) or coal dust (Class II, Group F). Only when the
device is approved by MSHA and UL and/or FM for a specific
Class and Group does the certification offer the same
protection for all members of that Class and Group.
IV. FIELD INSTRUMENTS
A. Introduction
Several field instruments in use today analyze ambient air
for:
- Percentage of thejower flammabil ity limit of a vapor or
gas 1n air.
- Concentration of oxygen.
- Concentration of toxic vapors/gases.
There are no formalized schemes separating one type of
instrument from another. However, to facilitate training,
the Instruments, can be divided into two categories - general
survey acid specific survey - based on the type of sampling
performed.
8. General Survey Instruments
General survey instruments are devices capable of measuring a
number of compounds or materials via a specific test. All
must be calibrated and given their pre-operat1onal checks 1n a
noncontamlnated atmosphere. General survey Instruments
Include the combustible gas Indicator, ultraviolet
photolonlzatlon detector, gas chromatograph, and Infrared
spectropnotometer. They provide Information to the trained
operator on the next "step" to take, be 1t additional
sampling, monitoring, or evacuation of personnel from the
site.
1. Combustible Gas Indicators (CGI's)
The Combustible Gas Indicator (CGI) 1s one of the first
Instruments to be used to survey a site.. It measures the
concentration of a flammable vapor or gas 1n air,
Indicating the results as a percent of the Lower Explosive
Limit (LED of the calibration gas or vapor. Depending on
the manufacturer and model, a meter needle indicating 1.0
or 100% reveals that the test atmosphere contains a
concentration of flammable material 1n air at the LEL.
This environment could Ignite or explode 1n the presence
of an Ignition source. A meter reading of 0.5 or 50%
Indicates that the air contains approximately 1/2 of the
LEL.
B-ll
-------
In addition, the needle rapidly can climb to 1.0 (100%),
pass it, and then fall to zero, or below. This does not
indicate that the CGI is malfunctioning or that the
atmosphere contains no vapors. It indicates that the
concentration of vapor- or gas-in-air exceeds the Upper
Explosive Limit (UEL) of the calibration gas. Such a
situation calls for rapid evacuation of the area because
this atmosphere can quickly become highly flammable.
a. Theory
Most combustible gas indicators operate on the "hot wire"
principle. In fhese detectors, a filament is heated by
the burning of the vapor or gas. The heat increases the
electrical resistance of the wire thereby decreasing the
current passing through it. The current in this filament
is compared to that of a reference filament, and the
percent of the LEL (for the calibration gas) is
displayed.
b. Limitations
As with any instrument based on an electrochemical
reaction, all CGI's have several limitations:
- The reaction is temperature dependent. Therefore, the
measurement is only as accurate as the Incremental
difference between calibration and ambient (sampling)
temperatures.
- Sensitivity is a function of physical and chemical
properties of the calibration gas versus those of the
unknown contaminant.
The hot wire CGI suffers from these additional
drawbacks:
- For accurate measurements, the oxygen content must be
at the concentration at which the manufacturer
calibrated the unit.
- Several chemicals can poison or shorten the life of
the filament, among them tetraethyl lead, sHlcones,
and halides.
B-12
-------
ultraviolet (UV) Photoionization Detector
a. Theory
The light from the sun when passed through a prism is
dispersed into the many colors that make up the white
light spectrum. The hues of colors from the deep reds
through the deep purples are a relatively small
segment in the overall electromagnetic (e-m) spectrum.
The e-m spectrum covers long wavelengths such as radio
waves through the ul.trashort wave gamma radiation
(Figure 1-4). As the wavelengths decrease in size
(higher frequencies), the wave energy increases. This
relationship between energy and frequency is based
upon Planck's equation.
All atoms and molecules are composed of particles:
electrons, protons, and neutrons. Electrons,
negatively charged particles, rotate in orbit around
the nucleus, the dense inner core. The nucleus
consists of an equal number of protons (positively
charged particles) as electrons found in the orbital
cloud. The interaction of the oppositely charged
particles and the laws of quantum mechanics keep the
electrons in orbits outside the nucleus.
The energy required to remove the outermost electron
from the molecule is called the ionlzation potential
(IP) and is specific for any compound or atomic
species. IP is measured in electron volts (eV). High
frequency radiation (ultraviolet and above) is capable
of causing ionization and is hence called ionizing
radiation.
When a photon of ultraviolet radiation strikes a
chemical compound, it Ionizes the molecule 1f the
energy of the radiation is equal to or greater than
the IP of the compound. Since Ions are capable of
conducting an electrical current, they may be
collected on a charged plate. The measured current
will be directly proportional to the number of ionized
molecules.
8-13
-------
NON IONIZING RADIATION
IONIZING RADIATION
RADIO FREQUENCIES
HEAT
GAMMA RAYS
CO
i
MICROWAVES
VISIBLE
. LIGHT
INFRARED
X
-RAYS
ULTRAVIOLET
IO10
IO6
IO5 IO4
10'
IO3
10*
IO2
JO1
10*
10°
10*
ID'1
10*
JO'2
io»-
10- 3
,0°
.o-4
10'1 10'2 10"3 10'4 10~5 IO"6 10'7
in'5 ,o-6 io-7 in'8 .o-9 in"10 in-"
uin
cm
WAVELENGTH (uni/cm)
FREQUENCY (Hz) x3
INCREASING ENERGY CONTENT
1 ^
10" 2 10" l
1 i
i
10°
1
,
IO1
1
1 1 1 1 II
IO2 IO3 IO4 IO5 IO6 IO7
1 1 > ' 'I 1
1
IO8
1
1
IO9
1
1 1
IO10 IO11
1 1
,
IO12
1
1 1
10i3 IO14
1 1
.1. ,
IO15
1
FIGURE B-4
THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
-------
b. Practical Considerations
The HMD is typical of field photoionization units now
available. It consists of two parts connected via a
signal-power cord (Figure 1-5):
- A probe consisting of the UV light source, pump,
ionization chamber, and a preamplifier.
- A readout unit^ consisting of amplifier and electri-
cal circuits,*a display meter, and
battery pack.
An electrical pump pulls the air stream past a
10.2-eV UV source. The radiation produces an ion pair
for each molecule of contaminant ionized. The free
electrons produce a current directly proportional to
the number of ions produced. The current is
amplified, detected, and displayed on the meter.
Normally, the HNU is used with a 10.2-eV source that
ionizes many of the common air contaminants. A probe
using a 9.5-eV source and another using a 11.7-eV
source are also available.
The 11.7-eV source should be used to initially
investigate an area. However, 1t requires constant
maintenance and frequent replacement. Thus, except 1n
rare situations, the 10.2-eV lamp/probe should be
used. It offers relatively high radiation levels
without time-consuming maintenance and costly
equipment.
Parallel use of the 9.5-eV and 10.2-eV lamp/probe sets
allows semi quantitative analysis. Assume a mixture
consisting of two materials, one with an IP of 9.2-eV,
the other with 10.2-eV. Both will be measured by the
10.2-eV lamp/probe, but only the 9.2-eV contaminant on
the 9.5-eV lamp/probe. Substractlng the second
reading from the first gives the concentration of the
10.2-eV contaminant.
B-15
-------
READOUT UNIT
Meter
Readout
Battery
Lamp Power
Supply
ton Chamber
n
\
J
PROBE
, Ion Chamber
/
\
Pump
Preamp
Lamp
•Sample
FIGURE S-5
PORTABLE PHOTO I ON IZATION ANALYZER
B-16
-------
c. Limitations
Although the HMD photoionization unit is an excellent
instrument for survey, there are very important
limitations.
- The response to a gas or vapor may radically
change when the gas or vapor is mixed with other
materials. As an example, a HNU calibrated to
ammonia and analyzing an atmosphere containing 100
ppm would indicate 100 on the meter. Likewise, a
unit calibrated to benzene would record 100 in an
atmosphere containing 100 ppm concentration.
However, in an atmosphere containing 100 ppm of
each, the unit could indicate considerably less or
more than 200 ppm, depending on how it was
calibrated.
- Electromagnetic interference from pulsed DC or AC
power lines, transformers, and high voltage
equipment may produce an error as will nearby
transmissions.
- The lamp window must be periodically cleaned to
ensure ionization of the air containments.
- Although the HNU measures concentrations from 1 ppm,
the response (to benzene) is linear from 0 to about
600 ppm. This means the HNU reads a true
concentration of benzene only between 0 and 600.
Greater concentrations may be "read" at a higher or
lower level than the true value.
d. Use at sites
The HNU is a good choice to determine the proper lever
of protection 1n evaluationg a hazardous waste site oe
spill. The need to properly Interpret the HNU's data
cannot be overemphasized. Equally Important is the
need to understand the limitations of this
Instrument.
8-17
-------
','np partifiularly important limitation for on-site use
is hew M!».> IINU responds toward mixtures containing
chemicals vnth ver-y similar IP's. In a typical
industrial nlant, usually only one gas or vapor must
be n
-------
When the span pot is set at 0 (fully CCw) mid t.hr
function switch to the 0-20 range, the scale <••••• tli-..
meter face reads 0-2 ppm. This expansion, v-hirh is
valid only for materials that have a relative
sensitivity of 10, allows measurements in the
parts-per-bi11 ion range (ppb).
In most circumstances, using the HNU on the lu^est
setting (span pot 9.8, function switch 0-20) provides
adequate data to select the proper protection (Levels
A, B, C, D) for*on-site workers. Unfortunately,
several chemicals- for example, acrolein-exhibit
medium to low sensitivity (0-5), while their
toxicological effects place their threshold limit
value (TLV) at a very low level. If these chemicals
are indicated by the HNU (on its lowest setting)
response could select too low a protection level.
Consider this scenario:
The air in an unknown hazardous environment must
be sampled. Response personnel survey the site
with an HNU, which indicates 2.0 ppm (instrument
set to highest sensitivity). Level C protection
may be worn based upon the instrument's data.
Later, the air contaminant 1s found to be
acrolein with a TLV of 0.1 ppm (100 ppb) and an
immediate dangerous to life or health (IDLH)
level of 5 ppm.
Thus total reliance to the HNU data without regard for
the chemical makeup of the sample can be a problem.
3. Flame lonization Detection (FID)
a. Theory
The FID uses ionization as the detection method, much
the same as in the HNU, except that the ionization is
caused by a hydrogen flame, rather than by a UV light.
This flame has sufficient energy to Ionize any organic
species with an IP of 15.4 or less. The ions are then
passed between two charged plates. The conductivity
change is measured, the current charge is displayed on
an measured, the current charge is displayed on an
external meter, and read in parts per million.
B-19
-------
b. Century Systems Organic Vapor Analyzer (OVA)
The Century Systems Organic Vapor Analyzer (OVA) is a
portable FID unit. This package consists of two major
parts,
- A 9-pound package containing the sampling pump,
battery pack, support electronics, flame ionization
detector, hydrogen gas cylinder, and an optional
gas chromatography (GO column.
- A hand-held meter/sampling probe assembly.
The OVA can operate in two modes:
- Survey mode: A sample of ambient air is routed
through the OVA into the detector, allowing all
organic species to be ionized and detected at the
same time. Based on the sensitivity of the
instrument to various compounds, a concentration
is displayed on the meter. The OVA 1s calibrated
to methane.
- Gas chromatography mode: Gas chromatography (GO
is a technique for separating volatile substances
by percolating a gas stream over a stationary
phase. The components to be separated are carried
through a column packed with an Inert solid. A
liquid 1s spread as a thin film over this solid and
is the basis for separation. The different
components of the sample migrate through the column
at different rates. The component bands then leave
the column and are measured by the detector. In
this fashion, individual components of the
ambient atmosphere may be analyzed. More complete
Instructions on the use of the Century Systems OVA
can be found in the owner's manual.
B-20
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c. Limitations
As with HNU Photoionizer, the OVA responds
differently to different compounds. Below is a
list, provided by the manufacturer of the relative
sensitivities of the OVA to some common organic
compounds. Since the instrument is factory
calibrated to methane, all relative responses are
given in percent, with methane at 100.
Compound Relative Response
Methane 100
Ethane 90
Propane* 64
n-Butane 61
n-Pentane 100
Ethylene 85
Acetylene 200
Benzene 150
Toluene 120
Acetone 100
Methyl ethyl ketone 80
Methyl isobutyl ketone 100
Methanol 15
Ethanol 25
Isopropyl alcohol 65
Carbon tetrachloride 10
Chloroform 70
Tn'chloroethylene 72
Vinyl chloride 35
4. Infrared Spectrophotomer
a. Theory
The atoms of which molecules are composed are held
together by bonds of various types and lengths.
These arrangements, as in the classical ball and
spring configurations often presented in
introductory chemistry, establish finite locations
and discrete movements for each atom (ball) and
bond (spring). These movements can be either
vibrational-rotational stretching or bending of
the chemical bonds. The frequencies of these
movements are on the order of Infrared radiation
(IR). A given bond movement can be Initiated by
stimulating the molecule with IR of varying
frequency. As the bond moves, it absorbs the
characteristic energy associated with that
movement. The frequencies and intensity of IR
absorbed are soecific for a compound and its
concentration, providing a "fingerprint" which can
be used as an analytical tool.
B-2T
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b. Miran Infrared Spectrophotometer
The Miran (acronym for miniature infrared
analyzer) is a line of field IR spectrophotometers
used to measure concentrations of vapors in
ambient air.
It uses a variable-path gas cell. Several movable
mirrors permit repeated passes,, producing paths
from several centimeters .to several meters.
Field analysis^presents problems not normally
encountered in*spectrophotometry in the
laboratory. With lab instruments, the analyst can
control the concentration of material entering the
sample cell. To analyze uncontrollable gas the
Miran must make repeated passes to achieve
reliable results. Liquid or solid samples are
preferable to gas samples because they possess
more- molecules than a gas of the same volume.
Additionally, the spectra of analyses of the same
chemical in the liquid phase and gaseous phase are
markedly different'. In the gaseous state, the
molecules are free to rotate, and inter molecular
actions are at a minimum. The liquid state
"locks" the molecules in a given structure.
Limitations
The Miran is designed for industrial hygiene work
in occupational settings where known types of
materials are generated and where 120-volt AC
power is available. At hazardous waste sites,
neither of these conditions Is common, making
Mlrans of questionable value. They also have not
been recognized by any approving agencies as being
safe for use in a hazardous location. Basically,
the Miran is designed for quantifying simple
one-or two-component mixtures. They should be
used on a hazardous waste site with another
analytical procedure such as gas chromatography.
B-22
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C. Specific Survey Instruments
Specific survey instruments are devices that measure a
specific material. Oxygen meters and direct-reading
colorimetric tubes are often used at incidents involving
hazardous substances.
1. Oxygen Meters
The oxygen content in a confined space is of prime concern
to anyone about tp enter that space. Removal of oxygen
by combustion, reduction reactions, or displacement by
gases or vapors i% a hazard that response personnel cannot
detect. Consequently, remote measurements must be made
before anyone enters any confined space.
a. Theory
An oxygen detector uses an electrochemical sensor to
determine the oxygen concentration in air. The sensor
consists of: two electrodes, a sensing and a counting
electrode; a housing containing a basic electrolytic
solution; and a semipermeable Teflon membrane (Figure
1-6).
Oxygen molecules (02) diffuse through the membrane
into the solution. Reactions between the oxygen and
the electrodes produce a minute electric current which
1s directly proportional to the sensors's oxygen
content. The current passes through the electronic
circuit. The resulting signal is shown as a needle
deflection on a meter, which 1s usually calibrated to
read 0-10%, 0-25%, or 0-100% oxygen.
O. O.O. O. 0
FIGURE 8-6
OXYGEN DETECTOR
B-23
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b. Limitations
The operation of oxygen meters depends on the absolute
atmospheric pressure. The concentration of natural
oxygen (to differentiate it from manufactured or
generated oxygen) is a function of the atmospheric
pressure at a given altitude.
At sea level, where the weight of the atmosphere above
is greatest, more 02 molecules are compressed into a
given volume than at higher elevations. As elevation
increases, this compression decreases, resulting in
fewer 03 molecules being "squeezed" into a given
volume. Consequently, an 02 indicator calibrated at
sea level and operated at an altitude of several
thousand feet will falsely indicate an oxygen-
deficient atmosphere (less than 19.5%).
High concentrations of carbon dioxide (C02) shorten
the useful life of the oxygen detector cell.
Therefore, the unit can be used in atmospheres greater
than 0.5% C02 only with frequent replacing or
rejuvenating of the oxygen detector cell.
Although several instruments can measure an
oxygen-enriched atmosphere (02 greater than 21%),
no testing or other work should ever be performed
under such conditions because a spark, arc or flame
could lead to fire or explosion. Oxygen measurements
are most informative when paired with combustible gas
measurements. Together, they provide response
personnel with quick and reliable data on the hazards
they may encounter.
2. Direct-Reading Colorimetric Indicator Tubes
In evaluating hazardous waste sites, the need often arises
to quickly measure a specific vapor or gas. Direct-reading
colorimetric indicator tubes can successfully fill that
need.
a. Theory
The interaction of two or more substances may result
in chemical changes. This change may be as subtle as
two clear liquids producing a third clear liquid, or
as obvious as a colorless vapor and colored solid
producing a differently colored substance. Indicator
tubes use this latter phenomenon to estimate the
concentration of a gas or vapor in air.
B-24
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Colorimetric indicator tubes consist of an impregnated
glass tube with an indicating chemical (Figure 1-7).
The tube is connected to a piston cylinder- or
bellows- type pump. A known volume of contaminated
air is pulled at a predetermined rate through the
tube. The contaminant reacts with the indicator
chemical in the tube, producing a stain whose length
is proportional to the contaminant's concentration. A
preconditioning filter may precede the substrata to:
- Remove contaminants (other than the one in question)
that may interfere with the measurement.
- React with a contaminant to change it into a
compound that reacts with the indicating
chemical.
- Completely change a nonindicating contaminant
into an indicating one.
b. Limitations
Several indicating chemicals may be able to measure
the concentration of a particular gas or vapor, each
operating on a different chemical principle and each
affected in varying degrees by temperature, air volume
pulled through the tube, and interfering gases or
vapors. A "true" concentration versus the "measured"
concentration may vary considerably among and between
manufacturers. To limit these sources of error,
control the numerous types and manufacturers of tubes,
and provide a degree of confidence to users, the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
tests and certifies Indicator tubes. Certified tubes
have an accuracy of _+ 25% at 1/2 the TLV of the
chemical and +25% at the TLV.
To Improve performance of all tubes, they should be:
- Refrigerated prior to use to maintain shelf life of
approximately 2 years.
- Calibrated and used at the same temperature.
- Calibrated with the pump prior to sampling
(pressure test) and on a quarterly basis
(volumetric test).
8-25
-------
COITON PLUG
GLASS VIAL
-------
Undoubtedly the greatest source of error is how the operator
"reads" the endpoint. The jagged edge where contaminant
meets indicator chemical makes it difficult to get accurate
results from this seemingly simple test. A diligent and
experienced operator should be able to accurately read the
endpoint.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Combined Instruments
Several instrument packages combine two or more detectors.
For example, a combined hot wire detector for combustible
gases and an oxygen sensor use a common pump, battery, and
electronic circuit. Normally, each detector operates
independently, thereby allowing one to be used even if the
other is not working properly.
Combination units afford response personnel several
advantages over single units, chiefly portability.
Additionally, combined instruments may incorporate an
adjustable alarm circuit that alerts the user to potentially
hazardous conditions. This capacity frees the user of the
need to take frequent meter readings and focuses attention
on other hazards.
8 Other Useful Instruments
Several manufacturers of micro-miniature electronic circuits
and fuel cells have entered the field of specific
contaminant analysis. These devices analyze the ambient
atmosphere for the more insidious gases and vapors, such as
hydrogen sulfide and carbon monoxide. Although their use
is limited, they may be useful 1n certain situations.
B-27
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REFERENCES
1. National Electrical Code, Vol. 70, National Fire Prevention
Association, 470 Atlantic Ave., Boston, MA 02210 (1975).
2. Clayton, George D. (ed.), The Industrial Environment - Its
Evaluation and Control. 3rd ed., Public Health Sen/fees
Publication (1973).
*
3. Clayton, G.D., and F.E. Clayton (ed.), Patty's Industrial Hygiene
and Toxiciology, 3rd revised ed., Vol. 1: General Principles,
John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY (1978)
4. Klinslcy, Joseph (ed.), Manual of Recommended Practice, for
Combustible Gas Indicators and Portable Direct Reading '
Hydrocarbon Detectors, 1st ed., American Industrial Hygiene
Association, Akron, OH (1980).
5. Conley, Robert, Infrared Spectroscopy, 2nd ed., Allyn and Bacon,
Inc., Boston, MA (1972).
B-28
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APPENDIX C
SAMPLING EQUIPMENT AND METHODS
I. INTRODUCTION
A variety of equipment and techniques are used for sampling at incidents
involving hazardous materials. Using liquid and solid materials samplers,
selecting sample containers and closures, preserving samples, and all are
important to obtaining' analytical data that give a true picture of
conditions of the incident.
II. SAMPLERS
The various samplers currently available can be applied 1n certain
situations, but they have limitations that must also be recognized (Table
3-1).
A. Liquids
1. Open-Tube/Drum Sampler
A glass open-tube is the most versatile of hazardous liquid
samplers because of its wide range of applications, relatively low
cost, and ease of operation.
Description: The open-tube sampler is made of hollow glass (or
plastic tubing), usually 4 feet (ft.) long. The inside diameter
(1.0.) is generally 1/4 - 1/2 inch (1n.), depending on viscosity of
sample. Open tubes made specifically for sampling (called drum
samplers) can be purchased. The only difference is that drum
samplers have a constricted orifice at the top to facilitate
plugging the opening to maintain a vacuum in the tube.
Procedure for use
a. Slowly lower tube into the liquid to the desired depth. It may
be desirable not to mix the contents of the container so that a
more representative sample can be collected.
b. At desired depth, stopper tube with a rubber stopper or thumb
or crease a piece of flexible tubing attached to the open end
of the sample tube. Stoppering establishes a vacuum in the
tube, enabling withdrawal of the sample from the container.
c. Slowly, withdraw tube from vessel and expel sample into
appropriate sample container. Avoid handling the portion of
sampler that was in the liquid.
d. Dispose of tube on site by placing it back into the container
that was sampled.
C-l-
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TABLE 3-1
SAMPLERS FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
Saapler Applications
Ooen-tube/COLIHASA Liquids. 1 lurries
Elastic
Glass
Pond (dtp) sanpler Liquids, sludges
Manual pu*o
•Jelgnted bottle
laapler
Extended bottle
sampler
leimtnr saapler
Grain ia*}ler
Sampling trier
TrOMl/scoop/
spoon
uaste pile
Liquids
Liquids
Liquids
Liquids
Granular solids
Solids
SoMds. soil
Mil-face
LOOK tollds
Soil auger (eiaiwal) Soil deeper than
102-126 cm
(J-4 In.)
Limitations
Not for containers over l.S meters (m.I
(S ft.) deep
Not for Materials containing ketones,
nitrobenzene, dlmethylfoniianlle. -iwsityl
oxide, tetrahydrofuran, or nany comon
solvents sucn as acetone
Not for Materials containing hydrofluoric
acid. and.concentrated alkali solutions
COLIUASA may be difficult to decontaminate
and may cause cross-contaninatlon of samples
Not for sampling Deyond 3.5 a. 111.5 ft.)
Requires large mounts of disposable tubing
tnat nist be conpattble « pipe
Ueyco Distribution.
Sacramento. CA
r-?
-------
2. Composite Liquid Waste Sampler (COLIWASA)
The composite liquid waste sampler (COLIWASA) is a valuable tool in
some applications. In sampling hazardous liquids, however, it is
difficult to decontaminate and may cause cross-contamination.
Description: The main parts of the COLIWASA are sampling tube,
closure-locking mechanism, and closure system (Figure 3-1). The
sampling tube consists of 5 ft. by 1 5/8 in. I.D. translucent
pipe, usually polyvinyl chloride (PVC) or borosilicate glass
plumbing tube. The closure-locking mechanism consists of a
short-length, channeled aluminum bar attached to the sampler's
stopper rod by an adjustable swivel. An aluminum bar serves both
as a T-handle and lock for the sampler's closure system.
Procedure for Use:
a. Put sampler in open position by placing stopper rod handle in
T-position and pushing rod handle until it sits against
sampler's locking block.
b. Slowly lower sampler into liquid so that liquid inside and
outside the tube are about the same. If the level inside the
sampler tube is lower than outside sampler, sampling rate is
too fast, resulting in a nonrepresentative sample.
c. When sampler stopper hits bottom of waste container, push the
tube downward against stopper to close sampler. Lock sampler
in close position by turning T-handle until it is upright and
one end rests tightly on locking block.
d. Slowly withdraw the sampler from container.
e. Carefully discharge sample into a suitable sampler container by
opening sampler. This is done by slowly pulling lower end of
T-handle away from locking block, while lower end of sampler is
positioned in a sample container.
3. Pond (Dip) Sampler
The pond (dip) sampler can be used to collect liquids or sludges
from ponds, pits, lagoons, or open vessels, but only as far as its
limited reach.
Description: The pond (dip) sampler consists of a container in an
adjustable clamp attached to the end of a telescoping pole 8-15 ft.
long. The pole can be of wood, plastic, or metal because the
sample is collected in a jar or beaker which is secured in the
clamp (Figure 3-2).
Procedure for use: Ladle liquids from into sample containers.
C-3
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Stopper
JLI5 era (2 V)
/ k
T handle
Locking
block
152 cm (60")
IK— 2.86 en (1 1/8")
.8 cm (7")
•I
10.16 cm U")
Pipe. PVC, translucent,
4.13 cm (1 5/8") I.D.,
4.26 cm (1 7/8") O.D.
Stopper rod, PVC,
0.55 cm (3/8") O.D.
SAMPLING POSITION
CLOSE POSITION
•Stopper, neoprene, 09, capered
0.95 cm.13/8") PVC lock nut
and wather
FIGURE 3-1
COMPOSITE LIQUID WASTE SAMPLER (COLIWASA)
C-4
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o
I
CJ1
Verigrip clamp
Bolt hole
Beaker, polyprop-
ylene, 250 ml
(1 qt)
Telescoping pole, 250-450 cm (96-180")
FIGURE 3-2
POND (DIP) SAMPLER
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4. Manual Pumps
The principal drawback of manual pumps is that they require large
amounts of disposable tubing, which must be compatible with the
waste being sampled.
Description: Manual pumps most commonly operate by peristalsis,
bellows, diaphragm or siphon. They are available in various sizes
and configurations (Figure 3-3).
Procedure for use: Operate according to manufacturer's
instructions. In most cases this involves placing sample inlet
hose into liquid, then manually activating a crank or bellows. To
avoid contamination of the pump, a li.quid trap is inserted in the
sample inlet hose whgre the sample is collected. The compatability
of the plastic inlet hose with the sample must be determined to
avoid sample contamination.
5. Weighted Bottle Sampler
Weighted bottle samplers are difficult to use in very viscous
liquids. In addition, the outside of the bottle is exposed to the
waste. This is undersirable if the bottle is used as the sample
container.
Description: The weighted bottle sampler consists of a glass
sinker, a bottle stopper, and a line for opening the bottle and
lowering and raising the sampler during sampling (Figure 3-4).
There are variations of this sampler, as illustrated in the
American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM) methods 0 270 and E
300. This sampler can be either fabricated or purchased.
Procedure for use:
a. Gently lower sampler into liquid to desired depth so as not to
remove stopper prematurely.
b. Pull out stopper with a sharp jerk or sampler line.
c. Allow bottle to fill completely until air bubbles stop.
d. Raise sampler and cap bottle.
e. Wipe bottle, which can be used as sampler container.
Alternatives to the weighted bottle sampler are the Kemmerer
sampler and the extended bottle sampler.
C-5
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-o
O
o
I
Manual
pump
'Pump inlet
Vacuum
flask
Hazardous
liquid
container
sample
FIGURE 3-3
MANUAL PUMP
-------
HGURt 3-4
WEIGHTED BOTTLE SAMPLER
C-8
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B. Solids
1. Grain Sampler
Grain samplers are best used for collecting granular or loose
solids. Moist, compressed, and large particle solids are
di fficult to collect.
Description: The grain sampler consists of two slotted
telescoping tubes, usually made of brass or stainless steel
(Figure 3-5). The.outer tube has a conical, pointed tip on one
end that permits the sampler to penetrate the material being
sampled. The sampler is opened and closed by rotating the
inner tube. Grain samplers are generally 24 to 40 in. long by
1/2 to 1 1/2 in. in diameter.
Procedure for use:
a. Insert sampler (in the close position) into material being
sampled from a point near a top edge or corner, through
center, and to a point diagonally opposite point of entry.
b. Rotate inner tube into open position.
c. Wiggle sampler a few times to allow materials to enter open
slits.
d. Place sampler in close position and withdraw.
e. Place sampler in a horizontal position, if possible, with
slots facing upward.
f. Rotate and slide out outer tube from the inner tube.
g. Transfer sample in inner tube into a suitable sample
container. If inner tube is not removable, turn sampler
upside down and pour contents out of an opening in end of
the tube.
h. Store sampler in a plastic bag until decontamination.
2. Sampling Trier
Sampling triers are used to sample compressed solids. One
difficulty, however, is the removal of the core sample cut with
the trier.
Description: A typical sampling trier is a long tube about 24
to 40 in. long and 1/2 to 1 in. in diameter, with a slot that
extends almost its entire length (Figure 3-6). The tip and
edges of the tube slot are sharpened to allow the trier to cut
a core when rotated in a solid material. Sampling triers are
usually made of stainless steel with wooden handles.
C-9
-------
o
I
o
61-100 em,
(24-40")
1.J7-2.54 c»
-------
Procedure for use
a. Insert trier into solid material at 0 to 45° angle from
horizontal to minimize spillage from sampler. Tilt containers
if necessary.
b. Rotate trier once or twice to cut a core of material.
c. Slowly withdraw trier, making sure that slot is facing upward.
d. Transfer sample into suitable container with aid of a spatula
and/or brush.
e. Store sampler in a plastic bag until decontamination.
3. Waste Pile Sampler
The waste pile sampler is used to sample wet and large-diameter
sol ids.
Description: A waste pile sampler is essentially a large sampling
trier (Figure 3-7). It is commercially available, but it is easy
to fabricate from sheet metal or plastic pipe. Polyvinyl chloride
plumping pipe 5 ft. long by 1 1/4 in. 1.0. with 1/8 in. wall
thickness is adequate. The pipe is sawed lengthwise (about 60/40
split) until the last 4 in. The narrower piece is sawed off,
leaving a slot in the pipe. The edges of the slot and the tip of
the pipe are sharpened to permit the sampler to cut into the
material being sampled. The unsplit 4 in. of the pipe serves as
the handle.
Procedure for use:
a. Insert sampler into material being sampled at 0 to 45° from
horizontal, tilting container if necessary.
b. Rotate sampler two or three times in order to cut a core of
material.
c. Slowly withdraw sampler making sure that the slot is facing
upward.
d. Transfer sample into a suitable container with the aid of a
spatula and/or brush.
e. Store sampler in a plastic bag until decontamination.
4. Trowel/Scoop/Spoon
Trowels, scoops, and spoons are inexpensive, but they can sample
only to a depth of 4-5 in.
C-ll
-------
.122-183 cm
(48-72")
5.08-7.62 cm
(2-3") I.D.
FIGURE 3-7
WASTE PILE SAMPLER
FIGURE 3-8
TROWEL
C-12
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Descri£ti_on: A garden-variety trowel looks like a small shovel.
Ttie~Ma3e is usually about 3 by 5 in. with a sharp tip (Figure
3-8). A laboratory scoop is similar, but the blade is usually more
curved and has a closed upper end to contain material. Scoops come
in different sizes and materials. Stainless steel or polypropylene
scoops with 2 3/4 by 6 in. blades are preferred. Another
alternative for small samples is a stainless steel table spoon.
Procedure for use:
a. Collect small, equal portions of sample from surface or near
the surface or material to be sampled.
b. Deposit samples in a suitable container.
c. Dispose of sampler or place in a plastic bag until
decontamination*.
5. Soil Auger (Manual)
A manual soil auger can sample deeper and more compacted soils and
solids than other samplers, but it is difficult to get the sample
in a container.
Description: The soil auger consists of a hard metal central shaft
and sharpened spiral blades. When the tool is rotated clockwise by
its handle, it cuts the soil as it moves downward and deposits most
of the loose soil upward. Augers are available in various sizes
and configurations.
Procedure for use: Follow manufacturer's instructions.
C. Cleaning and Storage Procedures
All samplers must be clean before use. After use, they must be washed
with warm detergent solution (for example, Liquinox or Alconox), rinsed
several times with tap water, rinsed with distilled water, drained of
excess water, and air dried, dried with a stream of warm, dry air, or
wiped dry. Samplers used on petroleum products and oil residues may
first have to be wiped with absorbent cloth to eliminate the residues.
The equipment is then rinsed with an organic solvent, followed by
washing with detergent solution and rinsing with water. A necessary
piece of equipment for cleaning the tube of a COLIWASA is a bottle
brush that fits tightly in the tube. The brush is connected to a rod
long enough to reach the entire length of the sampler tube.. This
ramrod and fiber-reinforced paper towels clean the COLIWASA tube
quickly.
Improper cleaning of sampling equipment will cause cross contamination
of samples. Such contamination is particularly important in samples
taken for legal or regulatory purposes. Also, contamination becomes
important when sampling wastes from different sources at the same time.
If samples are to be taken for legal or regulatory purposes, or if they
are expected to contain low concentrations of hazardous substances, a
clean, unused sampler is needed.
C-13
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If the cleaning process has the potential for producing toxic fumes,
ensure adequate ventilation. If the washings are hazardous, store
them in closed waste containers and dispose of them properly in
approved disposal sites. Names of nearby sites may be obtained by
calling the agency in the State responsible for regulation of
hazardous wastes. Store clean samplers in a clean and protected area;
polyethylene plastic tubes or bags are usually adequate.
III.. CONTAINERS, CLOSURES/CLOSURE LINERS
A. Containers
The most imporant factors to consider when chosing containers for
hazardous material sampjes are compatibility, resistance to breakage,
and volume. Containers* must not melt, leach, rupture, or leak as a
result of chemical reactions with constituents of a sample. Thus it
is important to have some idea of the composition of the sample. The
containers must have walls thick enough to survive sample collection
and transport to the laboratory. Containers with wide mouths make it
easier to transfer samples from samplers. Also, the containers must
be large enough to contain the required volume of the sample or the
entire volume" of a sampler.
Plastic and glass containers are generally used for collection and
storage of hazardous material samples. Commonly available plastic
containers are made of high-density or linear polyethylene (LPE),
convential polyethylene, polypropylene, polycarbonate, Teflon FEP
(fluorinated ethylene propylene), polyvinyl chloride (PVC), or
polymethylpentene. Teflon FEP is the most Inert, giving it the
widest range of application. Plastic containers are used only when
the constituents of the material are known not to react with the
plastic.
Glass containers are relatively inert to most chemicals and can be
used to collect and store almost all hazardous material samples. Two
exceptions are strong alkali solutions and hydrofluoric acid. Glass
bottles with wide mouths (to faciliate sample collection) are
recommended for samples containing petroleum distillates, chlorinated
hydrocarbons, pesticides, solvents, and other substances incompatible
with plastic.
Several types of glass containers are available. Flint glass bottles
are cheap and available in various shapes and sizes. Borosilicate
glass is more inert, but the selection of containers 1s smaller.
Also, it is more expensive.
3. Closures/Closure Liners
Sample containers must have tight, screw-type lids. Plastic bottles
are usually provided with screw caps made of the same material as the
bottles. Cap liners usually are not required. Glass containers
usually come with glass or rigid plastic screw caps. Caps often have
paper liners coated with wax. Other-liner materials are polyethylene,
polypropylene, neoprene, and Teflon FEP.
-------
For- Kintaining hydrocarbons, pesticides, and petroleum residues, caps
with IcfIon liners are recommended for use with amber glass bottles.
lefldii liners may be purchased from plastic specialty supply houses.
I he election of containers, closures, and linings must be coordinated
with the laboratory, which may require specific containers for certain
Iyses.
i tai tier s (type and size) must comply with DOT regulations.
PHRSKHVAF ION AND STORAGE OF SAMPLES
Samples should be analyzed immediately after collection for best results.
Hazardous wastes are such complex mixtures that it is difficult to predict
exactly the physical, biological, and chemical changes that occur in the
samples. The pH may change significantly in a matter of minutes, sulfides
and cyanides may be oxidized or evolve as gases, and hexavalent chromium
may slowly be reduced to the trivalent state. Certain cations may be
partly lost as they are adsorbed on the walls of the sample containers.
Microorganisms may grow in certain constituents. Volatile compounds may
be rapidly lost.
In a number of cases, such changes may be slowed down or prevented by
refrigeration at 4 to 6°C, or by adding preservatives. However, these
treatments may be only partially effective. Refrigeration may reduce loss
of volatile components and acid gases such as hydrogen sulfide and
hydrogen cyanide, but it also introduces the possibility that some salts
may precipitate at lower temperatures. On warming to room temperature for
analysis, the precipitates may not redissolve, thus giving inaccurate
results. Preservatives may retard constituents to stable hydroxides,
salts, or compounds, but they may also convert other forms (such as the
products of nitration, sulfonation, and oxidation, of organic components).
Thus, subsequent analyses may not identify the original components or
concentrations.
Safety must also be considered because a preservative may be highly
reactive with the sample. Addition of a preservative may change the DOT
packaging, labeling, and shipping requirements for a sample. Shipping
hazardous samples packed in ice may not be permitted by DOT regulations
(Refer to Part 5: Hazardous Material Sample Packaging, Labeling, and
Sh ippinq).
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STANDARD OPERATING SAFETY GUIDES
PART 1
ENVIRONMENTAL INCIDENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
An environmental Incident involves a release or threat of a release
of hazardous substances that pose an imminent and substantial danger
to public health and welfare or the environment. Each incident pre-
sents special problems. Response personnel must evaluate these prob-
lems and determine an effective course of action to mitigate the
incident.
Any incident represents a potentially hostile situation. Chemicals
that are combustible, explosive, corrosive, toxic, or reactive, along
with biological and radioactive materials can affect the general pub-
lic or the environment as well as response personnel. Workers may
fall, trip, be struck by objects, or be subject to danger from elec-
tricity and heavy equipment. Injury and Illness may also occur due
to physical stress and climate. While the response activities needed
at each incident are unique, there are many similarities. One is
that all responses require protecting the health and ensuring the
safety of the responders.
II. EXPOSURE TO TOXIC SUBSTANCES
Toxic (including radioactive material and etiologlcal agents) or
chemically active substances present a special concern because they
can be Inhaled, Ingested, absorbed through the skin, or destructive
to the skin. They may exist 1n the air or due to site activities
become airborne or splash on the skin. The effects of these sub-
stances can vary significantly. Ingested or Inhaled the substances
can cause no apparent Illness or they can be fatal. On the skin they
can cause no demonstrable effects. Others however can damage the
skin, or be absorbed, leading to systemic toxic effects.
Two types of potential exposure exist:
- Acute: Exposures occur for relatively short periods of time,
generally hours to 1-2 days. Concentrations of toxic air contam-
inants which may be Inhaled are high relative to their protection
criteria. In addition, substances may contact the skin directly
through splashes, Immersion, or air with serious results.
- Chronic: Exposures occur over longer periods of time, generally
.Tionths to years. Concentrations of toxic air contaminants which
may be Inhaled are relatively low. Direct skin contact by Immer-
sion, splash, or air involves substances exhibiting^ low dermal
activity.
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In general, acute exposures to chemicals in air are more typical in
transportation accidents, fires, or releases at chemical manu-
facturing or storage facilities. Acute air exposures do not persist
for long periods of time. Acute skin exposures occur when workers
must be close to the substances in order to control the release
(patching a tank car, off-loading a corrosive material, etc.) or
contain and treat the spilled material. Once the immediate problems
have been alleviated, exposures tend to become more chronic in nature
as cleanup progresses.
Chronic exposures usually are associated with longer-term remedial
operations. Contaminared soil and debris from emergency operations
may be involved, soil and ground water may be polluted, or impound-
ment systems may contain diluted chemicals. Abandoned waste sites
represent chronic problems. As activities start at these sites,
however, personnel engaged in sampling, handling containers, bulking
compatible liquids, etc. face an increased risk of acute exposures
fo splashes, or the generation of vapors, gases, or particulates.
At any specific incident, the hazardous properties of the materials
may only represent a potential threat. For example, 1f a tank car of
liquified natural gas Involved in an accident remains intact, the
risk from fire and explosion is low. In other Incidents, hazards are
real and risks high as when toxic or flammable vap-ors are being re-
leased. The continued health and safety of response personnel
requires that the hazards - real or potential - at an episode be
assessed and appropriate preventive measures instituted.
III. HEALTH AND SAFETY OF RESPONSE PERSONNEL
To reduce the risks to workers responding to hazardous substance
incidents, an effective health and safety program must be implemented.
This would include, as a minimum:
- Safe work practices.
- Engineered safeguards.
- Medical surveillance.
- Environmental and personnel monitoring.
- Personnel protective equipment.
- Education and training.
- Standard operating safety procedures.
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As part of a comprehensive program, standard operating safety pro-
cedures provide instructions on how to accomplish specific tasks in a
safe manner. In concept and principle, standard operating safety
procedures are independent of the type of incident. Their appli-
cability at a particular incident must be determined and necessary
modifications made to match prevailing conditions. For example,
personnel protective equipment, in principle, is an initial con-
sideration for all incidents; however, its need and the type of
equipment required is based on a case-by-case evaluation. Likewise,
someone -must make the first entry onto a site. The exact entry
procedure to be used can only be determined after assessing the
conditions prevailing at that incident.
The purpose of this document is to provide standard operating safety
guides related to site control and entry. The guidance included is
not meant to be a comprehensive treatment of the subjects covered.
Rather, it is meant to be used to complement professional training,
experience, and knowledge.
IV. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY POLICY
EPA's Occupational Health and Safety staff is responsible for
developing, supporting, and evaluating a program to protect the
health and safety of EPA employees. The Standard Operating Safety
Guides complement, and supplement the policies, procedures, and
practices contained in EPA's Occupational Health and Safety Manual,
in particular, with Chapter 9 - Hazardous Substances Responses, EPA
Order 1440.2 - Health and Safety Requirements for Personnel Engaged in
Field Activities, and 'EPA Order 1440.3 - Respiratory Protection.
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PART 2
STANDARD OPERATING SAFETY PROCEDURES
I. GENERAL
There are many guides or procedures for performing the variety of
tasks associated with responding to environmental episodes involving
hazardous substances. These may be administrative, technical, or
management-oriented. All these procedures are Intended to provide
uniform instructions for accomplishing a specific task. In addition
to other types of procedures, safety-oriented operating procedures
are needed. The purpose of this document is to provide selected
standard operating safety guides which can be used to develop more
specific procedures.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARD OPERATING SAFETY PROCEDURES
A major consideration in responding to accidental releases of hazard-
ous substances or Incidents involving abandoned hazardous waste sites
is the health and safety of response personnel. Not only must a
variety of technical tasks be conducted efficiently to mitigate an
Incident, but they must be accomplished 1n a manner that protects the
worker. Appropriate equipment and trained personnel, combined with
standard operating procedures, help reduce the possibility of harm to
response workers.
For procedures to be effective:
They must be written In advance. Developing and writing safe,
practical procedures 1s difficult when prepared under the stress
of responding to an Incident.
They must be based on the best available Information, operational
principles, and technical guidance.
They must be field-tested, reviewed, and revised when appropriate
by competent safety professionals.
They must be understandable, feasible, and appropriate.
All personnel Involved 1n site activities must have copies of
the safety procedures and be briefed on their use.
- Response personnel must be trained and periodically retrained
in personnel protection and safety.
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III. RESPONSE ACTIVITIES
Many of the procedures involved in response activities are primarily
concerned with health and safety. In concept and principle, these
are generic and independent of the type of incident. They are adapted
or modified to meet site-specific requirements. Each hazardous
materials incident must be evaluated to determine its hazards and
risks. Various types of environmental samples or measurements may be
needed initially to determine the hazards or to provide additional
information for continuing assessment. Personnel must go on-site to
accomplish specific tasks. Efforts are required to prevent or reduce
harmful substances from migrating from the site due to natural or
human activities. Containment, cleanup, and disposal activities may
be required. Each of these activities requires that safety procedure
be developed or existing procedures be adapted so that response
personnel are protected.
IV. OPERATING GUIDES
The-standard operating safety guides that follow cover primarily site
control and entry. These guides illustrate technical considerations
necessary in developing standard instructions. For a given incident,
the procedures recommended should be adapted to conditions imposed by
that specific situation.
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PART 3
SITE ENTRY - GENERAL MEASURES AND REQUIREMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Personnel responding to environmental episodes involving chemical
substances encounter conditions that are unsafe or potentially unsafe.
In addition to the danger due to the physical, chemical, and toxico-
logical properties of the material present, other types of hazards
electricity, water, heavy equipment, falling objects, loss of balance,
or tripping, for example - can have an adverse effect on personnel.
This part discusses safety measures and precautions associated only
with the hazardous nature of chemical compounds.
II. SAFETY PRACTICES
A. Personal Precautions
1. Eating, drinking, chewing gum or tobacco, smoking, or any
practice that increases the probability of hand-to-mouth
transfer and Ingestion of material Is prohibited In any area
designated contaminated.
2» Hands and face must be thoroughly washed upon leaving the
work area.
3. Whenever decontamination procedures for outer garments are in
effect, the entire body should be thoroughly washed as soon
as possible after the protective garment is removed.
4. No facial hair which Interferes with a satisfactory fit of
the mask-to-face-seal is allowed on personnel required to
wear respirators.
5. Contact with contaminated or suspected contaminated surfaces
should be avoided. Whenever possible, do not walk through
puddles, leachate, discolored surfaces, kneel on ground, lean,
sit, or place equipment on drums, containers, or the ground.
6. Medicine and alcohol can potentiate the effects from exposure
to toxic chemicals. Prescribed drugs should not be taken by
personnel on response operations where the potential for
absorption, Inhalation, or ingestion of toxic substances
exists unless specifically approved by a qualified physician.
Alcoholic beverage Intake should be minimized or avoided
during response operations.
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8. Site Safety Plans
1. A Site Safety Plan must be developed for all phases of site
operations and made available to all personnel. Unless time
precludes it, the plan must be written and posted.
2. All personnel must be familiar with standard operating safety
procedures and any additional instructions and information
contained in the Site Safety Plan.
3. All personnel must adhere to the information contained in the
Site Safety Plan.
C. Operations
1. All personnel going on-site must be adequately trained and
thoroughly briefed on anticipated hazards, equipment to be
worn, safety practices to be followed, emergency procedures,
and communications.
2. Any required respiratory protective devices and clothing must
be worn by all personnel going into areas designated for
wearing protective equipment.
3. Personnel on-site must use the buddy system when wearing
respiratory protective equipment. As a minimum, a third
person, suitably equipped as a safety backup, is required
during initial entries.
4. Visual contact must be maintained between pairs on-site and
safety personnel. Entry team members should remain close
together to assist each other during emergencies.
5. During continual operations, on-site workers act as safety
backup to each other. Off-site personnel provide emergency
assistance.
6. Personnel should practice unfamiTlar operations prior to
doing the actual procedure.
7. Entrance and exit locations must be designated and emergency
escape routes delineated. Warning signals for site evacuation
must be established.
8. Communications using radios, hand signals, signs, or other
means must be maintained between Initial entry members at all
times. Emergency communications should be prearranged in
case of radio failure, necessity for evacuation of site, or
other reasons.
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9. Wind indicators visible to all personnel should be strate-
gically located throughout the site.
10. Personnel and equipment in the contaminated area should be
minimized, consistent with effective site operations.
11. Work areas for various operational activities must be estab-
lished.
12. Procedures for leaving a contaminated area must be planned
and implemented prior to going on-site. Work areas and
decontamination procedures must be established based on
expected site conditions.
III. MEDICAL PROGRAM
To safeguard the health of response personnel, a medical program must
be developed, established, and maintained. This program has two
essential components: routine health care and emergency treatment.
A. Routine Health Care
Routine health'care and maintenance should consist of at least:
1. Pre-employment medical examinations to establish the Indi-
vidual's state of health, baseline physiological data, and
ability to wear personnel protective equipment. The fre-
quency and type of examination to be conducted thereafter
should be determined by medical personnel knowledgeable In
the area of toxicology.
2. Arrangements to provide special medical examinations, care,
and counseling in case of known or suspected exposures to
toxic substances. Any special tests needed depend on the
chemical substance to which the individual has been exposed.
B. Emergency Medical Care and Treatment
The Medical Program must address emergency medical care and
treatment of response personnel, including possible exposures to
toxic substances and injuries resulting from accidents or physical
hazards. The following items should be included in emergency
care provisions:
1. Name, address, and telephone number of the nearest medical
treatment facility. This should be conspicuously posted.
A nap and directions for locating the facility, plus the
travel time, should be readily available.
2. The facility's ability to provide care and treatment of
personnel exposed or suspected of being exposed to toxic (or
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otherwise hazardous). If the facility lacks toxicological
capability, arrangements should be made for consultant
services.
3. Administration arrangements for accepting patients.
4. Arrangements to quickly obtain ambulance, emergency, fire,
and police services. Telephone numbers and procedures for
obtaining these services should be conspicuously posted.
5. Emergency showers, eyewash fountains, and first aid equipment
readily available on-site. Personnel should have first aid
and medical emergency training.
*
6. Provisions for the rapid identification of the substance to
which the worker has been exposed (if this has not previously
been done). This information must be given to medical person-
nel.
7. Procedures for decontamination of injured workers and pre-
venting contamination of medical personnel, equipment, and
facilities.
IV. EDUCATION AND TRAINING
All personnel involved in responding to environmental incidents must
be trained to carry out their response functions. Training must be
provided in the use of all equipment, including respiratory protective
apparatus and protective clothing; safety practices and procedures;
general safety requirements; advanced first aid; and hazard recogni-
tion and evaluation.
Safety training must be a continuing part of the total response
program. Periodic retraining and practice sessions not only create
a high degree of safety awareness, but also help to maintain profi-
ciency in the use of equipment and knowledge of safety requirements.
V. QUALIFIED SAFETY PERSONNEL
Personnel responding to chemical incidents must make many complex
decisions regarding safety. Making these decisions correctly re-
quires more than elementary knowledge. For example, selecting the
most effective personnel protective equipment requires not only
expertise in the technical areas of respirators, protective clothing,
air monitoring, physical stress, etc., but also experience and profes-
sional judgment. Only a competent, qualified person (specialist) has
the technical judgment to evaluate a particular incident and determine
the appropriate safety requirements. This individual, through a
combination of professional education, on-the-job experience, special-
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ized training, and continual study, acquires expertise to make sound
decisions.
VI. STRESS
A. Introduction
Both physiological and psychological stress effect response
personnel. Under certain conditions, stress contributes signif-
icantly to accidents and harms workers in other ways. To reduce
the potential for abnormal physical stress or mental anxiety:
1. Workers must be periodically examined by medical authorities
to determine if they are physically, and if possible, psycho-
logically fit to perform their jobs.
2. Continual practice and training must be provided in using
personnel protective equipment, especially the self-con-
tained breathing apparatus and chemical-resistant protective
clothing.
3. An effective safety program must be implemented and a con-
certed effort made to protect the worker. These actions
help assure personnel that their health and safety will be
protected now and in the future.
8. Weather
Adverse weather conditions are Important considerations in plan-
ning and conducting site operations. Hot or cold weather can
cause physical discomfort, loss of efficiency, and personal
Injury. Of particular Importance Is heat stress resulting when
protective clothing decreases natural body ventilation. Heat
stress can occur even when temperature are moderate. One or more
of the following recommendations will help reduce heat stress:
1. Provide plenty of liquids. To replace body fluids (water and
electrolytes) lost due to sweating, use a 0.1% salt water
solution, more heavily salted foods, or commercial mixes. The
commercial mixes may be preferable for those employees on a
low-sodium diet.
2. Provide cooling devices to aid natural body ventilation.
These devices, however, add weight, and their use should be
balanced against worker efficiency. Long cotton underwear
act as a wick to help absorb moisture and protect the skin
from direct contact with heat-absorbing protective clothing.
It should be the minimum undergarment worn.
3. Install mobile showers and/or hose-down facilities to reduce
body temperature and cool protective clothing.
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4. In extremely hot weather, conduct nonemergency response
operations in the early morning or evening.
5. Ensure that adequate shelter is available to protect personnel
against heat, cold, rain, snow, etc., which decrease physical
efficiency and increase the probability of accidents.
6. In hot weather, rotate workers wearing protective clothing.
C. Heat Stress Monitoring
For monitoring the body's recuperative ability to excess heat,
one or more of the following techniques should be used as a
screening mechanism. Monitoring of personnel wearing protective
clothing should commence when the ambient temperature is 70
degrees Fahrenheit or above. Frequency of monitoring should
increase as the ambient temperature increases or if slow recovery
rates are indicated. When temperatures exceed degrees F workers
must be monitored for heat stress after every work period.
1. Heart rate (HR) should be measured by the radial pulse for 30
seconds as early as possible in the resting period. The HR
at the beginning of the rest period should not exceed 110
beats per minute. If the HR is higher, the next work period
should be shortened by 10 minutes (or 33%), while the length
of the rest period stays the same. If the pulse rate is 100
beats per minute at the beginning of the next rest period,
the following work cycle should be shortened by 33%.
2. Body temperature should be measured orally with a clinical
thermometer as early as possible in the resting period. Oral
temperature (OT) at the beginning of the rest period should
not exceed 99 degrees Fahrenheit. If it does, the next work
period should be shortened by 10 minutes (or 33%), while the
length of the rest period stays the same. However, if the OT
exceeds 99.7 degrees Fahrenheit at the beginning of the next
period, the following work cycle should be further shortened
by 33%. OT should be measured again at the end of the rest
period to make sure that It has dropped below 99 degrees
Fahrenheit.
3. Body water loss (BHL) due to sweating should be measured by
weighing the worker In the morning and in the evening. The
clothing worn should be similar at both weighings; preferably
the worker should be nude. The scale should be accurate to
plus or minus 1/4 Ib. BWL should not exceed 1.5% of the
total body weight. If It does, workers should be Instructed
to increase their daily intake of fluids by the weight lost.
n-n
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Ideally, body fluids should be maintained at a constant level
during the work day. This requires replacement of salt lost
in sweat as well.
4. Good hygienic standards must be maintained by frequent change
of clothing and daily showering. Clothing should be permitted
to dry during rest periods. Persons who notice skin problems
should Immediately consult medical personnel.
D. Effects of Heat Stress
If the- body's physiological processes fail to maintain a normal
body temperature because of excessive heat, a number of physical
reactions can occur ranging from mild (such as fatigue, irrita-
bility, anxiety, and decreased concentration, dexterity, or
movement) to fatal. Standard reference books should be consulted
for specific first aid treatment. Medical help must be obtained
for the more serious conditions.
Heat-related problems are:
- Heat rash: caused by continuous exposure to heat and humid air
and aggravated by chafing clothes. Decreases ability to
tolerate heat as well as being a nuisance.
- Heat cramps: caused by profuse perspiration with Inadequate
fluid intake and chemical replacement- (especially salts).
Signs: muscle spasm and pain in the extremities and abdomen.
- Heat exhaustion: caused by Increased stress on various organs
to meet Increased demands to cool the body. Signs: shallow
breathing; pale, cool, moist skin; profuse sweating; dizziness
and lassitude.
- Heat stroke; the most severe form of heat stress.
Body mustbe cooled Immediately to prevent severe Injury
and/or death. Signs and symptoms are: red, hot, dry skin; no
perspiration; nausea; dizziness and confusion; strong, rapid
pulse; coma. Medical help must be obtained Immediately.
E. Effects of Cold Exposure
Persons working outdoors 1n temperatures at or below freezing may
be frostbitten. Extreme cold for a short time may cause severe
Injury to exposed body surfaces, or result 1n profound generalized
cooling, causing death. Areas of the body which have high surface
area-to-volume ratio such as fingers, toes, and ears, are the
most susceptible.
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Two factors influence the development of a cold injury: ambient
temperature and the velocity of the wind. Wind chill is used to
describe the chilling effect of moving air in combination with
low temperature. For instance, 10 degrees Fahrenheit with a wind
of 15 miles per hour (mph) is equivalent in chilling effect to
still air at -18 degrees Fahrenheit.
As a general rule, the greatest incremental increase in wind
chill occurs when a wind of 5 mph increases to 10 mph. Addi-
tionally, water conducts heat 240 times faster than air. Thus,
the body cools suddenly when chemical-protect!ve equipment is
removed if the clothing underneath is perspiration soaked.
Local injury resulting from cold is included in the generic term
frostbite. There are several degrees of damage. Frostbite of
the extremities can be categorized into:
- Frost nip or incipient frostbite: characterized by suddenly
blanching or whitening of skin,
- Superficial frostbite: skin has a waxy or white appearance
and fs firm to the touch, but tissue beneath is resilient.
- Deep frostbite: tissues are' cold, pale, and solid; extremely
serious injury.
Systemic hypothermia is caused by exposure to freezing or rapidly
dropping temperature. Its symptoms are usually exhibited in five
stages: 1) shivering, 2) apathy, lis'tlessness, sleepiness, and
(sometimes) rapid cooling of the body to less than 95 degrees
Fahrenheit, 3) unconsciousness, glassy stare, slow pulse, and
slow respiratory rate, 4) freezing of the extremities, and
finally, 5) death.
Standard reference books should be consulted for specific first
aids treatments. Medical help must be obtained for the more
serious conditions.
F. Indicators of Toxic Exposure Effects
- Observeable
— changes in complexion, skin discoloration
— lack of coordination
— changes in demeanor
-- excessive salivation, pupillary response
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-- changes in speech pattern
Non-Observeable
— headaches
— dizziness
— blurred vision
— cramps
— irritation of eyes, skin, or respiratory tract
VII. SUMMARY
The health and safety of response personnel are major considerations
in all response operations. All site operation planning must incor-
porate an analysis of the hazards involved and procedures for pre-
venting or minimizing the risk to personnel. The Site Safety Plan
establishes the safety practices and procedures to be followed so
that the welfare and safety of workers are protected. The plan must
evaluate both the nature of the chemical compounds present.and other
hazards that could affect response personnel.
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PART 4
SITE ENTRY - SURVEY AND RECONNAISSANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The team initially entering the site is to accomplish one or more
of the following objectives:
- Determine the hazards that exist or. potentially exist affecting
public health, the environment and response personnel.
- Verify existing information and/or obtain information about the
incident.
•
Evaluate the need for prompt mitigation.
- Collect supplemental information to determine the safety require-
ments for personnel initially and subsequently entering the site.
Before the team enters the site, as much information as possible
should be collected, depending on the time available, concerning the
type of hazards, degree of hazard(s), and risks which may exist.
Based upon available .information (shipping manifests, transportation
placards, existing records, container labels, etc.) or off-site
studies, the team assesses the hazards, determines the need to go on-
slte, and identifies initial safety requirements.
II. PRELIMINARY ON-SITE EVALUATION
The Initial on-s1te survey is to determine, on a preliminary basis,
hazardous or potentially hazardous conditions. The main effort is to
rapidly Identify the Immediate hazards that may affect the public,
response personnel, and the environment. Of major concern are the
real or potential dangers - from, fire, explosion, airborne contam-
inants and to a lesser degree raiatlon and oxygen deficient atmos-
pheres.
A. Organic Vapors and Gases
If the type of organic substance Involved 1n an Incident 1s known
and the material 1s volatile or can become airborne, air measure-
ments for organlcs should be made with one or more appropriate,
properly calibrated survey Instruments.
When the presence or types of organic vapors/gases are unknown,
Instruments such as a photolonlzer (HNU Systems*) and/or a por-
table gas chromatograph (Foxboro Systems OVA*), operated in the
total readout mode, should be used to detect organic vapors.
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Until specific constituents can be identified, the readout indi-
cates total airborne substances to which the instrument is
responding. Identification of the individual vapor/gas consti-
tuents may permit the instruments to be calibrated to these
substances and used for more specific and accurate analysis.
Sufficient data should be obtained during the initial entry to
map or screen the site for various levels of organic vapors.
These gross measurements may be used on a preliminary basis to:
1) determine levels of personnel protection, 2) establish site
work zones, and 3) select candidate areas for more thorough
qualitative and quantitative studies.
Very high readings on the HNU or OVA may also indicate the dis-
placement of oxygeti or the presence of combustible vapors.
B. Inorganic Vapors and Gases
The number of direct reading instruments with the capability to
detect and quantify nonspecific inorganic vapors and gases is
extremely limited. Presently, the HNU photoionizer has very
limited detection capability while the Foxboro OVA has none.
(See Appendix I for characteristics). If specific inorganics are
known or suspected to be present, measurements should be made
with appropriate Instruments, if available. Color1metr1c tubes
are only practical 1f substances present are known or can be
narrowed to a few.
C. Radiation
Although radiation monitoring 1s not necessary for all responses,
1t should be incorporated 1n the initial survey where radioactive
materials may be present - for example, fires at warehouses or
hazardous material storage facilities, transportation Incidents
involving unknown materials, or abandoned waste sites.
Normal background exposure-rate for gamma radiation is approx-
imately 0.01 to 0.02 milliroentgen per hour (mR/hr) on a gamma
survey instrument. Work can continue with elevated radiation-
exposure rates; however, If the exposure-rate Increases to 3-5
times above gamma background, a qualified health physicist should
be consulted. At no time should work continue with an exposure
rate of 10 mR/hr or above without the advice of a health physicist.
EPA's Office of Air, Noise and Radiation has radiation specialists
in each Region, as well as at Headquarters, Montgomery, Alabama,
and Las Vegas, Nevada, to assist. The absence of gamma readings
above background should not be Interpreted as the complete absence
of radioactivity. Radioactive materials emitting low-energy gam-
*The use of any trade names does not imply their endorsement by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.
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ma, alpha, or beta radiation may be present, but for a number of
reasons may not cause a response on the instrument. Unless
airborne, these radioactive materials should present minimal
hazard, but more thorough surveys should be conducted as site
operations continue to completely rule out the presence of any
radioactive material.
D. Oxygen Deficiency
Normal air contains about 20.5% by volume of oxygen. At or
below 19.51 oxygen air-supplied respiratory protective equipment
is needed. Oxygen measurements are of particular importance for
work in enclosed spaces, low-lying areas, or in the vicinity of
accidents that nave,produced heavier-than-air vapors which could
displace ambient air. These oxygen deficient areas are also prime
locations for taking further organic vapor and combustible gas
measurements, since the air has been displaced by other sub-
stances. Oxygen-enriched atmospheres increase the potential for
fires.
E. Combustible Gases
The presence or absence of combustible vapors or gases must be
determined. If readings approach or exceed 10% of the lower
.explosive limit (LEL), extreme caution should be exercised in
continuing the investigation. If readings approach or exceed 251
LEL, personnel should be withdrawn immediately." Before resuming
any on-s1te activities, project personnel 1n consultation with
experts 1n fire or explosion prevention must develop procedures
for continuing operations.
F. Visual Observations
While on-site, the Initial entry team should make visual obser-
vations which would help 1n evaluating site hazards, for example,
dead fish or other animals; land features; wind direction; labels
on containers Indicating explosive, flammable, toxic, or corrosive
materials; conditions conducive to splash or contact with uncon-
flned liquids, sludges, or solids; and other general conditions.
G. Direct-Reading Instruments
A variety of toxic air pollutants, (Including organic and In-
organic vapors, gases, or partlculates) can be produced at, for
example, abandoned waste sites; fires at chemical manufacturing,
storage,.reprocessing, or formulating facilities; or fires invol-
ving pesticides. Direct-reading field instruments will not
detect or measure all of these substances. Thus, negative
readings should not be Interpreted as the complete absence of
airborne toxic substances. Verification of negative results can
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only be done by collecting air samples and analyzing them in a
laboratory.
III. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
A. Initial Surveys
In general, the initial entry is considered a relatively rapid
screening process for collecting preliminary data on site hazards.
The time needed to, conduct the initial survey depends on the
urgency of the situation, type of incident, information needed,
size of site, availability of resources, and Level of Protection
required for initial entry personnel. Consequently, initial
surveys may need hours or days to complete and consist of more
than one entry.
B. Priority for Initial Entry Monitoring
Of immediate concern to initial entry personnel are atmospheric
conditions which could affect their immediate safety. These
conditions are airborne toxic substances, combustible gases or
vapors, lack of oxygen, and to a lesser extent, -ionizing radia-
tion. Priorities for monitoring these potential hazards should
be established after a careful evaluation of conditions.
When the type of material involved in an incident 1s identified
and Its release Into the environment suspected or known, the
material's chemical/physical properties and the prevailing weather
conditions may help determine the order of monitoring. An unknown
substance OP situation presents a more difficult monitoring
problem.
In general, for poorly ventilated spaces - buildings, ship's
holds, boxcars, or bulk tanks - which must be entered, combustible
vapors/gases and oxygen-deficient atmospheres should be monitored
first with team members wearing, as a minimum, Level B protective
equipment (Levels of Protection are described 1n Part 5). Toxic
gases/vapors and radiation, unless known not to be present,
should be measured next.
For open, well-ventHated areas, combustible gases and oxygen
deficiency are lesser hazards, and require lower priority.
However, areas of lower elevation on-site (such as ditches and
gulleys) and downwind areas may have combustible gas mixtures, in
addition to toxic vapors or gases, and lack sufficient oxygen to
sustain life. Entry teams should approach and monitor whenever
possible from the upwind area.
0-18
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C. Periodic Monitoring
The monitoring surveys made during the initial site entry phase
are for a preliminary evaluation of atmospheric hazards. In some
situations, the information obtained may be sufficient to preclude
additional monitoring - for example, a chlorine tank determined
to be releasing no chlorine. Materials detected during the
initial site survey call for a more comprehensive evaluation of
hazards and analyses for specific components. A program must be
established for monitoring, sampling, and evaluating hazards for
the duration of -site operations. Since site activities and
weather conditions -change, a continuous program to monitor atmos-
pheric changes must be implemented utilizing a combination of
stationary sampling equipment, personal monitoring devices, and
periodic area monitoring with direct-reading instruments.
D. Off-Site Monitoring and Sampling
Whenever possible, atmospheric hazards in the areas adjacent to
the on-site zone should be monitored with direct-reading instru-
ments, and air samples should be taken before the initial entry
for on-s1te Investigations. Negative instrument readings off-
site should not be construed as definite Indications of on-site
conditions, but only another piece of information to assist in
the preliminary evaluation.
E. Monitoring Instruments
It 1s Imperative that personnel using monitoring Instruments be
thoroughly familiar with their use, limitations, and operating
characteristics. All instruments have inherent constraints in
their ability to detect and/or quantify the hazards for which
they were designed. Unless trained personnel use Instruments and
assess data readout, air hazards can be grossly misinterpreted,
endangering the health and safety of response personnel. In
addition, only Instruments approved for use 1n hazardous locations
should be used, unless combustible gases or vapors are absent.
F. Ambient Atmospheric Concentrations
Any Indication of atmospheric hazards - toxic substances, combus-
tible gases, lack of oxygen, and radiation should be viewed as a
sign to proceed with care and deliberation. Readings Indicating
nonexploslve atmospheres, low concentrations of toxic substances,
or other conditions may increase or decrease suddenly, changing
the associated risks. Extreme caution should be exercised 1n
continuing surveys when any atmospheric hazards are Indicated.
D-19
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TABLE 4-1
ATMOSPHERIC HAZARD GUIDELINES
Monitoring Equipment
Hazard
Ambient Level
Action
Combustible gas indicator Explosive
atmosphere
< 10S LEL Continue investigation
with cautions.
101-251 Continue on-site
monitoring with extreme
caution as higher levels
are encountered.
25J
LEL Explosion hazard; withdraw
from area immediately.
Oxygen concentration meter Oxygen
Radiation survey
Radiation
< 19.51 Monitor wearing SCBA.
NOTE: Combustible gas
readings are not valid
in atmospheres with
< 19.51 oxygen.
19.5J-25i Continue investigation wit
caution. SCBA not needed,
based on oxygen content
only.
> 25.0% Discontinue Inspection;
fire hazard potential.
Consult specialist.
< 1 mR/hr Continue investigation.
If radiation is detected
above background levels,
this signifies the presence
of possible radiation.sources;
at this level, more thorough
monitoring is advisable.
Consult with a
health physicist.
> 10 mR/hr Potential radiation hazard;
evacuate site. Continue moni-
toring only upon the advice
of a health physicist.
D-2Q
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TABLE 4-1 (Cont'd.)
Monitoring Equipment
Hazard
Ambient Level
Action
Colorimetric tubes
Photoionization
detector (PID)
Organic and
inorganic
vapors/gases
Organic
vapors/gases
Flame ionization
detector (FID)
vapor/gses
Depends on
chemical
1) Depends on
species
2) Total
response
mode
1) Depends on
chemical
2) Total
response
mode
Consult standard
reference manual for
air concentrations/
toxicity data.
Consult standard
reference manuals
for air concentrations/
toxicity data.
Consult EPA Standard
Operating Safety Guides.
Consult standard reference
manuals for air concen-
trations/toxicity data.
Consult EPA Standard
Operating Safety Guides.
D-21
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PART 5
SITE ENTRY - LEVELS OF PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Personnel must wear protective equipment when response activities
involve known or suspected atmospheric contamination, when vapors,
gases, or particulates may be generated by site activities, or when
direct contact with skin-affecting substances may occur. Full face-
piece respirators protect lungs, gastrointestinal tract, and eyes
against airborne toxicants. Chemical-resistant clothing protects the
skin from contact with skin-destructive and -absorbable chemicals.
Good personal hygiene limits or prevents ingestion of material.
*
Equipment to protect the body against contact with known or antici-
pated toxic chemicals has been divided into four categories according
to the degree of protection afforded:
- Level A: Should be worn when the highest level of respiratory,
skin, and eye protection is needed.
- Level B: Should be worn when the highest level of respiratory
protection is needed, but a lesser level, of skin protection.
- Level C: Should be worn when the criteria for using air-purifying
respirators are met.
- Level D: Shou1d.be worn only as a work uniform and not on any
site with respiratory or skin hazards. It provides no protection
against chemical hazards.
The Level of Protection selected should be based on:
- Type and measured concentration of the chemical substance
in the ambient atmosphere and Its toxicity.
- Potential for exposure to substances 1n air, splashes of liquids,
or other direct contact with material due to work being done.
In situations where the type of chemical, concentration, and
possibilities of contact are not known, the appropriate Level of
Protection must be selected based on professional experience and
judgment until the hazards can be better Identified.
While personnel protective equipment reduces the potential for contact
with toxic substances, ensuring the health, and safety of responders
requires, in addition, safe work practices, decontamination, site
entry protocols, and other safety procedures. Together, these provide
an Integrated approach for reducing harm to workers.
0-22
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II. LEVELS OF PROTECTION
A. Level A Protection
1. Personnel protective equipment
- Supplied-air respirator approved by the Mine Safety. and
Health Administration (MSHA) and National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).
Respirators may be:
— pressure-demand, self-contained breathing apparatus
(SC8A)
or
-- pressure-demand, airline respirator (with escape bottle
for Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) or
potential for IDLH atmosphere)
- Fully encapsulating chemical-resistant suit
- Coveralls*
- Long cotton underwear*
- Gloves (Inner), chemical-resistant
- Boots, chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank. (Depending
on suit construction, worn over or under suit boot)
- Hard hat* (under suit)
- Disposable gloves and boot covers* (Worn over fully encap-
sulating suit)
- Cooling unit*
- 2-Hay radio communications* (Inherently safe)
2. Criteria for selection
Meeting any of these criteria warrants use of Level A
Protection:
- The chemical substance has been Identified and requires
the highest level of protection for skin, eyes, and the
respiratory system based on:
— measured (or potential for) high concentration of
*0pt1onal
D-23
-------
atmospheric vapors, gases, or participates
or
— site operations and work functions involves high
potential for splash, immersion, or exposure to un-
expected vapors, gases, or particulates of materials
highly toxic to the skin.
- Substances with a high degree of hazard to the skin are
known or suspected to be present, and skin contact is
possible.
- Operations must be conducted in confined, poorly venti-
lated areas until the absence of substances requiring
Level A protection is determined.
- Direct readings on field Flame lonization Oectors (FID) or
Photoionizatlon Detectors (PID) and similar instruments
Indicate high levels of unidentified vapors and gases in
the air. (See Appendixes I and II.)
3. Guidance on selection
a. Fully encapsulating suits are primarily designed to
provide a gas or vapor tight barrier between the wearer
and atmospheric contaminants. Therefore Level A 1s gen-
erally worn when high concentrations of airborne sub-
stances are known or thought to be present and these
substances could severely effect the skin. Since Level A
requires the use of a self-contained breathing apparatus,
the eyes and respiratory system are also more protected.
Until air surveillance data are available to assist in the
selection of the appropriate Level of Protection, the use
of Level A may have to be based on Indirect evidence of
the potential for atmospheric contamination or other means
of skin contact with severe skin affecting substances.
Conditions that may require Level A protection Include:
- Confined spaces: Enclosed, confined, or poorly ventilated
areas are conducive to build up of toxic vapors, gases, or
participates. (Explosive or oxygen-deficient atmospheres
also are more probable 1n confined spaces.) Confined space
entry does not automatically warrant wearing Level A pro-
tection, but should serve as a cue to carefully consider
and to justify a lower Level of Protection.
- Suspected/known highly toxic substances; Various sub-
stances thatare highlytoxicespecially through skin
D-24
-------
absorption for example, fuming corrosives, cyanide com-
pounds, concentrated pesticides, Department of Tran-
sportation Poison "A" materials, suspected carcinogens,
and Infectious substances may be known or suspected to be
Involved. Field Instruments may not be available to
detect or quantify air concentrations of these materials.
Until these substances are Identified and concentrations
measured, maximum protection may be necessary.
- Visible emissions: Visible air emissions from leaking
containers orrailroad/vehicular tank cars, as well as
smoke from chemical fires and others, indicate high
potential for concentrations of substances that could be
extreme respiratory or skin hazards.
•
- Job functions: Initial site entries are generally walk-
throughs inwhich Instruments and visual observations-
are used to make a preliminary evaluation of the hazards.
In Initial site entries, Level A should be worn when:
— there is a probability for exposure to high con-
centrations of vapors, gases, or partlculates.
— substances are known or suspected of being extremely
toxic directly to the skin or by being absorbed.
Subsequent entries are to conduct the many activities needed
to reduce the environmental Impact of the Incident. Levels
of Protection for later operations are based not only on data
obtained from the Initial and subsequent environmental moni-
toring, but also on the probability of contamination and ease
of decontamination.
Examples of situations where Level A has been worn are:
- Excavating of soil to sample burled drums suspected of
containing high concentrations of dloxln.
- Entering a cloud of chlorine to repair a value broken 1n a
railroad accident.
- Handling and moving drums known to contain oleum.
- Responding to accidents Involving cyanide, arsenic, and un-
diluted pesticides.
The fully encapsulating suit provides the highest degree of
protection to skin, eyes, and respiratory system 1f the suit
material resists chemicals during the time the suit 1s worn.
While Level A provides maximum protection, all suit material
may be rapidly permeated and degraded by certain chemicals
0-25
-------
from extremely high air concentrations, splashes, or immersion
of boots or gloves in concentrated liquids or sludges. These
limitations should be recognized when specifying the type of
fully encapsulating suit. Whenever possible, the suit
material should be matched with the substance it is used
to protect against.
B. Level B Protection
1. Personnel protective equipment
- Suppliedrair respirator (MSHA/NIOSH approved).
Respirators may be:
— pressure-demand, self-contained breathing apparatus
*
or
-- pressure-demand, airline respirator (with escape bottle
for IDLH, or potential for IDLH, atmosphere)
- Chemical-resistant clothing (overalls and long-sleeved
jacket; hooded, one or two-piece chemical-splash suit;
disposable chemical-resistant, one-piece suits)
- Long cotton underwear*
- Coveralls*
- Gloves (outer), chemical-resistant
- Gloves (Inner), chemical-resistant
- Boots (outer), chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank
- Boot covers (outer), chemical-resistant (disposable)*
- Hard hat (face shield)*
- 2-Way radio communications* (intrinsically safe)
2. Criteria for selection
Meeting any one of these criteria warrants use of Level B
protection:
- The type and atmospheric concentration of toxic substances
has been Identified and requires a high level of respira-
tory protection, but less skin protection than Level A.
These would be atmospheres:
*0ptional
n-25
-------
with concentrations Immediately Dangerous to Life and
Health, but substance or concentration in the air
does not represent a severe skin hazard
or
that do not meet the selection criteria permitting the
use of air-purifying respirators.
- The atmosphere contains less than 19.51 oxygen.
It 1s highly unlikely that the work being done will generate
high concentrations of vapors, gases or partlculates, or
splashes of Material that will affect the skin of personnel
wearing Level B protection.
- Atmospheric concentrations of unidentified vapors or gases
are indicated by direct readings on Instruments such
as the FID or PID or similar Instruments, but vapors and
gases are not suspected of containing high levels of
chemicals toxic to skin. (See Appendixes I and II.)
3. Guidance on selection
a. Level 8 does not afford the maximum skin (and eye) pro-
tection as does a fully encapsulating suit since the
chemical-resistant clothing 1s not considered gas, vapor,
or particulate tight. However, a good quality, hooded,
chemical-resistant, one-piece garment, with taped wrist,
ankles, and hood does provides a reasonable degree of
protection against splashes and to lower concentrations in
air. At most abandoned hazardous waste sites, ambient
atmospheric gas or vapor levels have not approached concen-
trations sufficiently high to warrant Level A protection.
In all but a few circumstances (where highly toxic mater-
ials are suspected) Level B should provide the protection
needed for Initial entry. Subsequent operations at a site
require a revaluation of Level B protection based on the
probability of being splashed by chemicals, their effect
on the skin, the presence of hard-to-detect air contaim-
Inants, or the generation of highly toxic gases, vapors,
or partlculates, due to the work being done.
b. The chemical-resistant clothing required 1n Level B 1s
available 1n a wide variety of styles, materials, construc-
tion
detail, and permeability. One or two-piece garments are
available with or without hoods. Disposal suits with a
variety of fabrics and design characteristics are also
available. Taping joints between the gloves, boots and
suit, and between hood and respirator reduces the pos-
slbHty
n.->7
-------
for splash and vapor or gas penetration. These factors
and other selection criteria all affect the degree of
protection afforded. Therefore, a specialist should
select the most effective chemical-resistant clothing
based on the known or anticipated hazards and job function.
Level B equipment does provides a high level of protection
to the respiratory tract. Generally, if a self-contained
breathing apparatus is required for respiratory protection,
selecting chemical-resistant clothing (Level B) rather than
a fully encapsulating suit (Level A) is based on needing
less protection against known or anticipated substances
affecting the skin. Level B skin protection is selected
by:
- Comparing %the concentrations of known or identified
substances in air with skin toxicity data.
- Determining the presence of substances that are destruc-
tive to or readily absorbed through the skin by liquid
splashes, unexpected high levels of gases, vapor, or
particulates, or other means of direct contact.
- Assessing the effect of the substance (at its measured
air concentrations or potential for splashing) on the
small areas left unprotected by chemical-resistant
clothing. A hooded garment taped to the mask, and
boots and gloves taped to the suit further reduces area
of exposure.
c. For Initial site entry and reconnaissance at an open site,
approaching whenever possible from upwind, Level B protec-
tion (with good quality, hooded, chemical-resistant cloth-
Ing) should protect response personnel, providing the
conditions described in selecting Level A are known or
judged to be absent.
C. Level C Protection
1. Personnel protective equipment
- Air-purifying respirator, full-face, canister-equipped
(MSHA/NIOSH approved)
- Chemical-resistant clothing (coveralls; hooded, one-piece
or two-piece chemical splash suit; chemical-resistant hood
and apron; disposable chemical-resistant coveralls)
- Coveralls*
- Long cotton underwear*
- Gloves (outer), chemical-resistant
-------
- Gloves (Inner), chemical-resistant*
- Boots (outer), chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank
- Boot covers (outer), chemical-resistant (disposable)*
- Hard hat (face shield*)
- Escape mask*
- 2-Way radio communications* (inherently safe)
2. Criteria for selection
Meeting all ot these criteria permits use of Level C protec-
tion:
- Oxygen concentrations are not less than 19.5i by volume.
- Measured air concentrations of identified substances will
be reduced by the respirator below the substance's thres-
hold limit value (TLV) and the concentration is within
the service limit of the canister.
- Atmospheric contaminant concentrations do not exceed IDLH
levels.
- Atmospheric contaminants, liquid splashesj or other
direct contact will not adversely affect any body area
left unprotected by chemical-res1stant clothing.
- Job functions do not require self-contained breathing
apparatus.
• Direct readings are a few ppms above background on In-
struments such as the FID or PID. (See Appendices I and
II.)
3. Guidance on selection
a. Level C protection 1s distinguished from Level B by the
equipment used to protect the respiratory system, assuming
the same type of chemical-resistant clothing 1s used. The
main selection criterion for Level C 1s that conditions
permit wearing air-purifying respirators.
The a1r-pur1fy1ng device must be a full-face respirator
(MSHA/NIOSH approved) equipped with a canister suspended
from the chin or on a harness. Canisters must be able to
*0ptional
-------
remove the substances encountered. Quarter-or half-masks
or cheekcartridge, full-face masks should be used only with
the approval of a qualified individual.
In addition, a full-face, air-purifying mask can be used
only if:
Substance has adequate warning properties.
Individual passes a qualitative fit-test for the mask.
Appropriate cartridge/canister is used, and its service limit
concentration is not exceeded.
b. An air surveillance program is part of all response opera-
tions when atmospheric contamination is known or suspected.
It is particularly important that the air be thoroughly
monitored when personnel are wearing air-purifying
respirators.
Periodic surveillance using direct-reading instruments and
air sampling 1s needed to detect any changes in air quality
necessitating a higher level of respiratory protection.
c. Level C protection with a full-face, air-purifying respi-
rator should be worn routinely 1n an atmosphere only after
the type of air contaminant 1s Identified, concentrations
measured and the criteria for wearing air-purifying respi-
rator met. To permit flexibility 1n precriblng a Level of
Protection at certain environmental Incidents, a specialist
could consider using a1r-pur1fy1ng respirators 1n uniden-
tified vapor/gas concentrations of a few parts per million
above background as indicated by a needle deflection on the
FID or PID. However a needle deflection of a few parts per
million above background should not be the sole criterion
for selecting Level C. Since the Individual components may
never be completely Identified, a decision on continuous
wearing of Level C must be made after assessing all safety
considerations, Including:
The presence of (or potential for) organic or Inorganic
vapors/gases against which a canister Is Ineffective or
has a short service life.
The known (or suspected) presence 1n air of substances with
low TLVs or IDLH levels.
The presence of partlculates 1n air.
The errors associated with both the Instruments and monitoring
*0ptional
0-30
-------
procedures used.
The presence of (or potential for) substances in air which do
not elicit a response on the instrument used.
The potential for higher concentrations 1n the ambient
atmosphere or in the air adjacent to specific site
operations.
d. The continuous use of air-purifying respirators (Level C)
must be based on the Identification of the substances
contributing to the total vapor or gas concentration and
the application of published criteria for the routine use
of air-purifying devices. Unidentified ambient concen-
trations of organic vapors or gases 1n air approaching or
exceeding a few ppm above background require, as a minimum,
Level B protection.
0. Level 0 Protection
1. Personnel protective equipment
- Coveralls
- Gloves*
- Boots/shoes, leather or chemical-resistant, steel toe and
shank
- Safety glasses or chemical splash goggles*
- Hard hat (face shield)*
2. Criteria for selection
Meeting any of these criteria allows use of Level D protection:
- No contaminants are present.
- Work functions preclude splashes, Immersion, or potential for
unexpected Inhalation of any chemicals.
Level D protection 1s primarily a work uniform. It can be
worn only In areas where there 1s no possibility of
contact with contamination.
III. PROTECTION IN UNKNOWN ENVIRONMENTS
In all Incident response, selecting the appropriate personnel pro-
tection equipment 1s one of the first steps in reducing health
effects from toxic substances. Until -the toxics hazards at an
environmental incident can be identified and personnel safety
-------
measures commensurate with the hazards instituted, preliminary
measures will have to be based on experience, judgment, and
professional knowledge. One of the first concerns in evaluating an
unknown situation is atmospheric hazards. Toxic concentrations (or
potential concentrations) of vapors, gases, and particulates; low
oxygen content explosive potential and, to a lesser degree, the
possibility of radiation exposure all represent immediate
atmospheric hazards. In addition to making air measurements to
determine these hazards, visual observation and review of existing
data can help determine the potential risks from other materials.
Once immediate hazards, other than toxic substances have been
eliminated, the initial on-site survey and reconnaissance, which
may consist of more than one entry, continues. Its purpose is to
further characterize toxic hazards and, based on these findings,
refine preliminary safety requirements. As data are obtained from
the Initial survey, the Level of Protection and other safety pro-
cedures are adjusted. Initial data also provide information on
which to base further monitoring and sampling. No one method can
determine a Level of Protection in all unknown environments. Each
situation must be examined individually.
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SELECTING LEVELS OF PROTECTION
Other factors which should be considered 1n selecting the appro-
priate Level of Protection are:
A. Heat and Physical Stress
The use of protective clothing and respirators Increases
physical stress, 1n particular heat stress, on the wearer.
Chemical protective clothing greatly reduces body ventilation
and diminishes Its ability to regulate Its temperature. Even
1n moderate ambient temperatures the diminished capacity of the
body to dissipate heat can result 1n one or more heat-related
problems.
All chemical protective garments can cause heat stress. Some-
what less stress 1s associated with Level B or C when the
protective clothing does not require the use of a hood, tightly
fitted against the respirator face piece, and taped glove,
boot, suit Interfaces, since more body ventilation and evapora-
tion may occur. As more body area 1s covered, the probability
of heat stress Increases. Whenever any chemical-protective
clothing is worn, a heat stress recovery monitoring program
must occur (see Part 3, Section V).
Hearing protective equipment also increases the risk of acci-
dents. It is heavy, cumbersome, decreases dexterity, agility,
Interferes with vision, and is fatiguing to wear. These
0-32
-------
factors all increase physical stress and the potential of
accidents. In particular the necessity for selecting Level A
protection, should be balanced against the increased probability
of physical stress and accidents. Level B and C protection
somewhat reduces accident probability, because the equipment is
lighter, less cumbersome, and vision problems less serious.
B. Air Surveillance
A program must.be established for routine, periodic air surveil-
lance. Without an air surveillance program, any changes coy Id
go undetected and jeopardize response personnel. Surveillance
can be accomplished with various types of air pumps and fil-
tering devices followed by analysis of the filtering media;
portable real-time monitoring Instruments located strategically
on-s1te; personal dosimeters; and periodic walk-throughs by
personnel carrying direct-reading instruments. (See Part 8)
C. Decision - Logic for Selecting Protective Clothing
No adequate criteria, similar to the respiratory protection
decision-logic, are available for selecting protective clothing.
A concentration of a known substance 1n the air approaching a TLY
or permissible exposure limit for the skin does not automa-
tically warrant a fully encapsulating suit. A hooded, high
quality, chemical-resistant suit may provide adequate pro-
tection. The selection of Level A over Level B 1s a judgment
that should be made by a qualified Individual considering the
following factors:
- The physical form of the potential contaminant. Airborne
substances are more likely for body contact with personnel
wearing non-encapsulating suits, since they are not consid-
ered to be gas or vapor tight.
- Effect of the material on skin:
— highly hazardous substances are those that are easily
absorbed through the skin causing systemic effects, or
that cause severe skin destruction. Sfcln contact with
liquids are generally more hazardous than vapors, gases
and particulates.
— less hazardous substances are those that are not easily
absorbed through the skin causing systemic effects, or
that do not cause severe skin destruction
- Concentration of the material - the higher the concentration,
the higher the risk of harm.
0-33
-------
The potential for contact with the material due to work
function and the probability of direct exposure to the small
area of skin unprotected by Level B or C chemical-resistant
clothing.
D. Chemicals Toxic to Skin
The chemicals listed in Appendix III are identified in the Oil
and Hazardous Materials Technical Assistance Data Base System
(OHMTAOS) as having adverse skin effects ranging from irritation
to absorption into the body. Knowledge concerning the presence
or absence of these materials could be useful in selecting the
necessary Level of Protection. Other substances affecting the
,skin, but not listed 1n OHMTADS, may be present. Therefore, a
major effort should be made to identify all substances.
E. Atmospheric Conditions
Atmospheric conditions such as stability, temperature, wind
direction, wind velocity, and barometric pressure determine the
behavior of contaminants in air or the potential for volatile
material getting Into air. These parameters should be consid-
ered 1n determining the need for and Level of Protection.
required.
F. Work in Exclusion Zone
For operations 1n the Exclusion Zone (area of potential con-
tamination), different Levels of Protection may be selected,
and various types of chemical-resistant clothing worn. This
selection would be based not only on measured air concen-
trations, but also on the job function, reason for being in the
area, the potential for skin contact or Inhalation of the
materials present, and ability to decontaminate the protective
equipment used. (See Part 6)
G. Escape Masks
The use of escape masks 1s an option in Level C protection. A
specialist should determine their use on a case-by-case basis.
Escape masks could also be strategically located on-site in areas
that have higher possibilities for harmful exposure.
VAPOR OR GAS CONCENTRATIONS AS INDICATED BY DIRECT-READING INSTRUMENTS
Instruments such as the FIO and PIO can be used to detect the presence
of many organic vapors or gases either as single compounds or mixtures.
Dial readings are frequently referred to, especially with unidentified
substances, as total vapor and gas concentrations (1n ppm). More
D-34
-------
correctly they are deflections of the needle on the dial indicating
an instrument response and does not directly relate to total concen-
tration in the air. As a guide to selecting Level of Protections,
based on dial readings response, the following values could be used.
They should not be the sole criteria for selecting Levels of Pro-
tection.
Dial Reading Level of Protection
Background to 5 ppm C
above background
5 ppm above background 8
to 500 ppm
500 ppm above Background A
to 1000 ppm
Vapor or gas concentration, as indicated by the readout on instruments
such as the FIDs or PIDs are a useful adjunct to professional judgment
In selecting the Level of Protection to be worn 1n an unknown envi-
ronment. It should not be the single selection criterion, but should
be considered with all other available Information. Total vapor or
gas concentration as selection criteria for Levels of Protection
should only by used by qualified persons thoroughly familiar with the
Information contained 1n Appendices I and II.
0-35
-------
PART 6
SITE CONTROL - WORK ZONES
I. INTRODUCTION
The activities required during responses to incidents involving
hazardous substances may contribute to the unwanted movement of con-
taminants from the site to uncontaminated areas. Response personnel
and equipment may become contaminated and transfer the material into
clean areas. Material may become airborne due to Its volatility or
the disturbance of contaminated soil may cause it to become wind-
blown. To minimize the transfer of hazardous substances from the
site, contamination control procedures are needed. Two general
methods are used: establishing site work zones (discussed here) and
removing contaminants from people and equipment (discussed in Part
7).
II. CONTROL AT THE SITE
A site must be controlled to reduce the possibility of: 1) contact
with any contaminants present and 2) removal of contaminants by per-
sonnel or equipment leaving the site. The possibility of exposure or
translocation of substances can be reduced or eliminated In a number
of ways, including:
- Setting up security and physical barriers to exclude unnecessary
personnel from the general area.
- Minimizing the number of personnel and equipment on-site consistent
with effective operations.
- Establishing work zones within the site.
- Establishing control points to regulate access to work zones.
• Conducting operations in a manner to reduce the exposure of person-
nel and equipment and to eliminate the potential for airborne
dispersion.
- Implementing appropriate decontamination procedures.
III. WORK ZONES
One method of preventing or reducing the migration of contaminants
is to delineate zones on the site 1n which prescribed operations occur.
Movement of personnel and equipment between zones and onto the site
D-36
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HOT LINE
EXCLUSION
ZONE
ACCESS CONTROL \
POINTS
WIND DIRECTION
CONTAMINATION
REDUCTION
CORRIDOR
CONTAMINATION /
REDUCTION ZONE //
.CONTAMINATION
CONTROL LINE
I COMMAND I
POST |
SUPPORT
ZONE
DIAGRAM OF SITE WORK ZONES
FIGURE 6-1
J
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itself would be limited by access control points. By these means,
Three contiguous zones (Figure 6-1) are recommended:
- Zone 1: Exclusion Zone
- Zone 2: Contamination Reduction Zone
- Zone 3: Support Zone
A. Zone 1: Exclusion Zone
The Exclusion Zone, the innermost- of three areas, is the zone
where contamination does or could occur. All people entering the
Exclusion Zone must wear prescribed Levels of Protection. An
entry and exit check point must be established at the periphery
of the Exclusion Zone to regulate the flow of personnel and
equipment into and out of the zone and to verify that the proced-
ures established to enter and exit are followed.
The outer boundary of Zone 1, the Hotline, is initially estab-
lished by visually surveying the immediate environs of the
Incident and determining where the hazardous substances Involved
are located; where any drainage, leachate, or spilled material
1s; and whether any d.1scolorations are visible. Guidance in
determining the boundaries 1s also provided by data from the
Initial site survey Indicating the presence of organic or in-
organic vapors/gases or particulates in air, combustible gases,
and radiation, or the results of water and soil sampling.
Additional factors that should be considered include the distances
needed to prevent fire or an explosion from affecting personnel
outside the zone, the physical area necessary to conduct site
operations, and the potential for contaminants to be blown from
the area. Once the Hotline has been determined it should be
physically secured, fenced, or well-defined by landmarks. During
subsequent site operations, the boundary may be modified and
adjusted as more Information becomes available.
B. Subareas Within the Exclusion Zone
All personnel within the Exclusion Zone must wear the required
Level of Protection. Personnel protective equipment 1s designated
based on site-specific conditions Including the type of work to
be done and the hazards that might be encountered. Frequently
within the Exclusion Zone, different Levels of Protection are
Justified. Subareas are specified and conspicuously marked as to
whether Level A, B, or C protection 1s required (Figure 6-2). The
Level of Protection 1s determined by the measured concentration
of substances in air, potential for contamination, and the known
or suspected presence of highly toxic substances.
0-38
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Different Levels of Protection in the Exclusion Zone might also
be designated by job assignment. For example, collecting samples
from open containers might require Level B protection, while for
walk-through ambient air monitoring, Level C protection might be
sufficient. The assignment, when appropriate, of different
Levels of Protection within the Exclusion Zone generally makes
for a more flexible, effective, and less costly operation while
still maintaining a high degree of safety.
C. Zone 3: Support Zone
The Support Zone, the outermost part of the site, is considered a
noncontaminated or clean area. Support equipment (command post,
equipment trailer, etc.) is located in the zone; traffic is
restricted to authorized response personnel. Since normal work
clothes are appropriate within this zone, potentially contaminated
personnel clothing, equipment, and samples are not permitted, but
are left in the Contamination Reduction Zone until they are
decontaminated.
The location of the command post and other "support facilities in
the Support Zone depends on a number of factors, including:
Accessibility: topography; open space available; locations of
highways, railroad tracks; or other limitations.
Wind direction: preferably the support facilities should be
located upwind of the Exclusion Zone. However, shifts in
wind direction and other conditions may be such that an ideal
location based on wind direction alone does not exist.
- Resources: adequate roads, power lines, water, and shelter.
0. Zone 2: • Contamination Reduction Zone
Between the Exclusion Zone and the Support Zone 1s the Contamina-
tion Reduction Zone which provides a transition between contam-
inated and clean zones. Zone 2 serves as a buffer to further
reduce the probability of the clean zone becoming contaminated or
being affected by other existing hazards. It provides additional
assurance that the physical transfer of contaminating substances
on people, equipment, or in the air 1s limited through a combina-
tion of decontamination, distance between Exclusion and Support
Zones, air dilution, zone restrictions, and work functions.
Initially, the Contamination Reduction Zone 1s considered to be a
noncontaminated area. At the boundary between the Exclusion and
Contamination Reduction Zones, Contmlnation Reduction Corridors
(decontamination stations) are established, one for personnel
and one for heavy equipment. Depending on the size of the opera-
tion, more than two corridors may be necessary. Exit from the
0-39
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Exclusion Zone is through a Contamination Reduction Corridor. As
operations proceed, the area around the decontamination station
may become contaminated, but to a much lesser degree than the
Exclusion Zone. On a relative basis, the amount of contaminants
should decrease from the Hotline to the Support Zone due to the
distance involved and the decontamination procedures used.
The boundary between the Support Zone and the Contamination Reduc-
tion Zone, the Contamination Control Line, separates the possibly
low contamination area from the clean Support Zone. Access to
the Contamination Reduction Zone from the Support Zone is through
a control point. Personnel entering there would wear the pre-
scribed personnel protective equipment, if required, for working
in the Contamination Reduction Zone. Entering the Support Zone
requires removal of any protective equipment worn in the Contami-
nation Reduction Zone.
IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
A. Modifications
The use of a three-zone system, access control points, and exac-
ting decontamination procedures provides a reasonable assurance
against the translocation of contaminating substances. This site
control system 1s based on a worst case situation. Less string-
ent site control and decontamination procedures may be utilized
if more definitive Information 1s available on the types of
substances Involved and hazards they present. This Information
can be obtained through air monitoring, Instrument survey and
sampling, and technical data concerning the characteristics and
behavior of material present.
B. Area Dimensions
The distance between the Hotline, Contamination Control Line, and
command post and the size and shape of each zone have to be based
on conditions specific to each site (Figures 6-2 and 6-3). Con-
siderable judgment 1s needed to assure that the distances between
zone boundaries are large enough to allow room for the necessary
operations, provide adequate distances to prevent the spread of
contaminants, and eliminate the posslbllty of injury due to ex-
plosion or fire. Long-term operations would Involve developing
reasonable methods (for example, air surveillance, swipe testing,
and visible deterioration) to determine 1f material 1s being
transferred between zones and to assist 1n modifying site bound-
aries.
The following criteria should be considered 1n establishing area
dimensions and boundaries:
0-40
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- Physical and topographical features of the site.
- Weather conditions.
- Field/laboratory measurements of air contaminants and environ-
mental samples.
- Air dispersion calculations.
- Potential for explosion and flying debris.
- Physical, chemical, toxicological, and other characteristics of
the substances present.
- Cleanup activities required.
- Potential for fire.
- Area needed to conduct operations.
- Decontamination procedures.
- Potential for exposure.
- Proximity to residential or industrial areas.
C. Monitoring and Sampling
To verify that site control procedures are preventing the spread
of contamination, a monitoring and sampling program should be
established. The Support Zone should be periodically monitored
for air contaminants using direct-reading instruments and col-
lecting air samples for partlculate, gas, or vapor analysis.
Analysis of soil samples collected in the most heavily trafficked
area would Indicate contaminants being carried from the Exclusion
Zone by personnel, equipment, or wind. Occasslonal swipe tests
should be taken in trailers and other areas used by personnel.
These same types of samples should be collected and air monitored
1n the Contamination Reduction Zone. Increased concentrations in
air or other environmental media may Indicate a breakdown in
control over the Contamination Reduction Corridor, Ineffective
decontamination procedures, or failure to restrict site access.
-------
\
CONTAMMATION REDUCTION
ZONE .
EXCLUSION ZONE
(LEVEL c)
LEGEND
ACCESS CONTROL
POINT
DECONTAMINATION
STATION
0 ACRE,
EXCLUSION ZONE
NEW HAMPSHIRE WASTE 8ITE
FIOURE 0 - 2
-------
LEOEND
RAK.ROAD TRACK
ACCESS CONTROt POINT
DECONTAMTNATION STATION
8 1/2 ACRE FENCED EXCLUSION
ZONE
• CONTAMMATIOM REDUCTION
ZONE
LOCK HAVEN WASTE SITE
FIGURE 0-3
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PART 7
SITE CONTROL - DECONTAMINATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Personnel responding to hazardous substance incidents may become
contaminated in a number of ways Including:
- Contacting vapors, gases, mists, or particulates in the air.
- Being splashed by materials while sampling or opening containers.
- Walking through puddles of liquids or on contaminated soil.
«
- Using contaminated instruments or equipment.
Protective clothing and respirators help prevent the wearer from
becoming contaminated or inhaling contaminants; while good work
practices help reduce contamination on protective clothing, instru-
ments, and equipment.
Even with these safeguards, contamination may occur. Harmful mate-
rials can be transferred into clean areas, exposing unprotected
personnel. In removing contaminated clothing, personnel may contact
contaminants on the clothing or inhale them. To prevent such occur-
rences, methods to reduce contamination, and decontamination proced-
ures must be developed and established before anyone enters a site
and must continue (modified when necessary) throughout site opera-
tions.
Decontamination consists of physically removing contaminants or
changing their chemical nature to Innocuous substances. How extensive
decontamination must be depends on a number of factors, the most
Important being the type of contaminants Involved. The more harmful
the contaminant, the more extensive and thorough decontamination must
be. Less harmful contaminants may require less decontamination.
Combining decontamination, the correct method of doffing personnel
protective equpment, and the use of site work zones minimizes cross-
contamination from protective clothing to wearer, equipment to
personnel, and one area to another. Only general guidance can be
given on methods and techniques for decontamination. The exact
procedure to use must be determined after evaluating a number of
factors specific to the Incident.
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Initial Planning
D-44
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The initial decontamination plan assumes all personnel and equip-
ment leaving the Exclusion Zone (area of potential contamination)
are grossly contaminated. A system is then set up for personnel
decontamination to wash and rinse, at least once, all the pro-
tective equipment worn. This is done in combination with a
sequential doffing of protective equipment, starting at the first
station with the most heavily contaminated Item and progressing
to the last station with the least contaminated article. Each
piece precedure requires a separate station.
The spread of contaminants during the washing/doffing process is
further reduced by separating each decontamination station by a
minimum of 3 feet. Ideally, contamination should decrease as a
person moves from one station to another further along 1n the
line.
While planning site operations, methods should be developed to
prevent the contamination of people and equipment. For example,
using remote sampling techniques, not opening containers by hand,
bagging monitoring Instruments, using drum grapplers, watering
down dusty areas, and not walking through areas of obvious con-
tamination would reduce the probability of becoming contaminated
and require a less elaborate decontamination procedure.
The Initial decontamination plan 1s based on a worst-case situ-
ation or assumes no information 1s available about the Incident,
Specific conditions at the site are then evaluated, Including:
- Type of contaminant.
- The amount of contamination.
- Levels of protection required.
- Type of protective clothing worn.
The Initial decontamination plan 1s modified, eliminating unneces-
sary stations or otherwise adapting 1t to site conditions. For
Instance, the Initial plan might require a complete wash and
rinse of chemical protective garments. If disposable garments
are worn, the wash/rinse step could be omitted. Wearing dis-
posable boot covers and gloves could eliminate washing and
rinsing these Items and reduce the number of stations needed.
B. Contamination Reduction Corridor
An area within the Contamination Reduction Zone 1s designated the
Contamination Reduction Corridor (CRC). The CRC controls access
Into and out of the Exclusion Zone and confines decontamination
activities to a limited area. The size of the corridor depends
on the number of stations 1n the decontamination procedure,
D-45
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HEAVY EQUIPMENT
DECONTAMINATION
AREA
EXCLUSION
ZONE
EXIT
PATH
CONTAMINATION
REDUCTION
ZONE
<2o
l
LEGEND
HOTLINE
CONTAMINATION
CONTROL LINE
ACCESS CONTROL
POINT - EXTOANCS
ACCESS CONTROL
POINT . EXIT
ORESSOUT i
AREA
SUPPORT
ZONE
T
ENTRY
PATH
CONTAMINATION REDUCTION ZONE LAYOUT
FIGURE 7-1
-------
overall dimensions of work control zones, and amount of space
available at the site. A corridor of 75 feet by 15 feet should
be adequate for full decontamination. Whenever possible, it
should be a straight path.
The CRC boundaries should be conspicuously marked, with entry and
exit restricted. The far end is the hotline - the boundary
between the Exclusion Zone and the Contamination Reduction Zone.
Personnel exiting the Exclusion Zone must go through the CRC.
Anyone 1n the CRC should be wearing the Level of Protection
designated for the decontamination crew. Another corridor may be
required for heavy equipment needing decontamination. Within the
CRC, distinct areas are set aside for decontamination of person-
nel, portable fjeld equipment, removed clothing, etc. These
areas should be marked and personnel restricted to those wearing
the appropriate Level of Protection. All activities within the
corridor are confined to decontamination.
Personnel protective clothing, respirators, monitoring equipment,
and sampling supplies are all maintained outside of the CRC.
Personnel don their protective equipment away from the CRC and
enter the Exclusion Zone through a separate access control point
at the hotline.
III. EXTENT OF DECONTAMINATION REQUIRED
A. Modifications of Initial Plan
The original decontamination plan must be adapted to specific
conditions found at Incidents. These conditions may require more
or less personnel decontamination than planned, depending on a
number of factors.
1. Type of Contaminant
The extent of personnel decontamination depends on the effects
the contaminants have on the body. Contaminants do not ex-
hibit the same degree *f toxldty (or other hazard). When-
ever 1t 1s known or suspected that personnel can become
contaminated with highly toxic or skin-destructive substances,
a full decontamination procedure should be followed. If less
hazardous materials are Involved, the procedure can be down-
graded.
2. Amount of Contamination
The amount of contamination on protective clothing 1s usually
determined visually. If 1t 1s badly contaminated, a thorough
decontamination 1s generally required. Gross material remain-
Ing on the protective clothing for any extended period of
time may degrade or permeate 1t. This likelihood Increases
0-47
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with higher air concentrations and greater amounts of liquid
contamination. Gross contamination also increases the proba-
bility of personnel contact. Swipe tests may help determine
the type and quantity of surface contaminants.
3. Level of Protection
The Level of Protection and specific pieces of clothing worn
determine on a preliminary basis the layout of the decontamin-
ation line. Each Level of Protection incorporates different
problems in decontamination and doffing of the equipment. For
example: decontamination of the harness straps and backpack
assembly of the self-contained breathing apparatus is dif-
ficult. A butyl rubber apron worn over the harness makes
decontamination easier. Clothing variations and different
Levels of Protection may require adding or deleting stations
1n the original decontamination procedure.
4. Work Function
The work each person does determines the potential for contact
with hazardous materials. In turn, this dictates the layout
of the decontamination line. For example, observers, photo-
graphers, operators of air samplers, or others 1n the Ex-
clusion Zone performing tasks that will not bring them in
contact with contaminants may not need to have their garments
washed and rinsed. Others 1n the Exclusion Zone with a
potential for direct contact with the hazardous material will
require more thorough decontamination. Different decontamin-
ation lines could be set up for different job functions, or
certain stations in a line could be omitted for personnel
performing certain tasks.
5. Location of Contamination
Contamination on the upper areas of protective clothing poses
a greater risk to the worker because volatile compounds may
generate a hazardous breathing concentration both for the
-worker and for the decontamination personnel. There 1s also
an Increased probability 'of contact with skin when doffing
the upper part of clothing.
6. Reason for Leaving Site
The reason for leaving the Exclusion Zone also determines the
need and extent of decontamination. A worker leaving the
Exclusion Zone to pick up or drop off tools or Instruments
and Immediately returning may not require decontamination. A
worker leaving to get a new air cylinder or to change a
respirator or canister, however, may require some degree of
decontamination. Individuals departing the CRC for a break,
lunch, or at the end of day, must be thoroughly decontaminated.
D-48
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8. Effectiveness of Decontamination
There is no method to immediately determine how effective decon-
tamination is in removing contaminants. Oiscolorations, stains,
corrosive effects, and substances adhering to objects may in-
dicate contaminants have not been removed. However, observable
effects only Indicate surface contamination and not permeation
(absorption) Into clothing. Also many contaminants are not
easily observed.
A method for determining effectiveness of surface decontamination
1s swipe testing. Cloth or paper patches - swipes - are wiped
over predetermined surfaces of the suspect object and analyzed in
a laboratory. Bath the Inner and outer surfaces of protective
clothing should be swipe tested. Positive indications of both
sets of swipes would indicate surface contamination has not been
removed and substances have penetrated or permeated through the
garment. Swipe tests can also be done on skin or Inside clothing.
Permeation of protective garments requires laboratory analysis of
a piece of the material. Both swipe and permeation testing
provide after-the-fact Information. Along with visual obser-
vations, results of these tests can help evaluate the effec-
tiveness of decontamination.
C. Equipment
Decontamination equipment, materials, and supplies are generally
selected based on availability. Other considerations are ease of
equipment decontamination or dlsposability. Host equipment and
supplies can be easily procured. For example, soft-bristle scrub
brushes or long-handle brushes are used to remove contaminants.
Water 1n buckets or garden sprayers 1s used for rinsing. Large
galvanized wash tubs or stock tanks can hold wash and rinse
solutions. Children's wading pools can also be used. Large
plastic garbage cans or other similar containers lined with
plastic bags store contaminated clothing and equipment. Contam-
inated liquids can be stored temporarily 1n metal or plastic cans
or drums. Other gear Includes paper or cloth towels for drying
protective clothing and equipment.
0. Decontamination Solution
Personnel protective equipment, sampling tools, and other equip-
ment are usually decontaminated by scrubbing with detergent-water
using a soft-bristle brush followed by rinsing with copious
amounts of water. While this process may not be fully effective
1n removing some contaminants (or 1n a few cases, contaminants
may react with water), 1t 1s a relatively safe option compared
with using a chemical decontaminating solution. This requires
that the contaminant be Identified. A decon chemical is then
needed that will change the contaminant Into a less harmful
substance. Especially troublesome are unknown substances or
D-49
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mixtures from a variety of known or unknown substances. The
appropriate decontamination solution must be selected in consul-
tation with an experienced chemist.
E. Establishment of Procedures
Once decontamination procedures have been established, all person-
nel requiring decontamination must be given precise instructions
(and practice, if necessary). Compliance must be frequently
checked. The time It takes for decontamination must be ascer-
tained. Personnel wearing SCBA's must leave their work area with
sufficient air to walk to CRC and go through decontamination.
IV. DECONTAMINATION DURING MEDICAL EMERGENCIES
A. Basic Considerations
Part of overall planning for incident response is managing medical
emergencies. The plan should provide for:
- Some response team members fully trained 1n first aid and CPR.
- Arrangements with the nearest medical facility for transporta-
tion and treatment of Injured, and for treatment of personnel
suffering from exposure to chemicals.
- Consultation services with a toxlcologlst.
- Emergency ey.e washes, showers, and/or wash stations.
- First aid kits, blankets, stretcher, and resuscitator.
In addition, the plan should establish methods for decontaminating
personnel with medical problems and Injuries. There 1s the
possibility that the decontamination may aggravate or cause more
serious health effects. If prompt I1fe-sav1ng first aid and
medical treatment 1s required, decontamination procedures should
be omitted. Whenever possible, response personnel should accom-
pany contaminated victims to the medical facility to advise on
matters Involving decontamination.
B. Physical Injury
Physical Injuries can range from a sprained ankle to a compound
fracture, from a minor cut to massive bleeding. Depending on the
seriousness of the Injury, treatment may be given at the site by
trained response personnel. For more serious Injuries, additional
assistance may be required at the site or the victim may have to
be treated at a medical facility.
0-50
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Life-saving care should be instituted immediately without consid-
ering decontamination. The outside garments can be removed
(depending on the weather) if they do not cause delays, Interfere
with treatment, or aggravate the problem. Respirators and back-
pack assemblies must always be removed. Fully encapsulating
suits or chemical-resistant clothing can be cut away. If the
outer contaminated garments cannot be safely removed, the Individ-
ual should be wrapped 1n plastic, rubber, or blankets to help
prevent contaminating the Inside of ambulances and medical person-
nel. Outside garments are then removed at the medical facility.
No attempt should be made to wash or rinse the victim at the
site. One exception would be 1f It 1s known that the Individual
has been contaminated with an extremely toxic or corrosive
material whlctx could also cause severe Injury or loss of life.
For minor medical problems or Injuries, the normal decontamination
procedure should be followed.
C. Heat Stress
Heat-related Illnesses range from heat fatigue to heat stroke,
the most serious. Heat stroke requires prompt treatment to
prevent Irreversible damage or death. Protective clothing may
have to be cut off. Less serious forms of heat stress require
prompt attention or they may lead to a heat stroke. Unless the
victim 1s obviously contaminated, decontamination should be
omitted or minimized and treatment begun Immediately.
0. Chemical Exposure
Exposure to chemicals can be divided Into two categories:
- Injuries from direct contact, such as add burns or Inhalation
of toxic chemicals.
- Potential Injury due to gross contamination on clothing or
equipment.
For Inhaled contaminants treatment can only be by qualified
physicians. If the contaminant 1s on the skin or 1n the eyes,
Immediate measures must be taken to counteract the substance's
effect. First aid treatment usually 1s flooding the affected
area with water; however, for a few chemicals, water may cause
more severe problems.
When protective clothing 1s grossly contaminated, contaminants
may be transferred to treatment personnel or the wearer and
cause Injuries. Unless severe medical problems have occurred
simultaneously with splashes, the protective clothing should be
washed off as rapidly as possible and carefully removed.
D-51
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V. PROTECTION FOR DECONTAMINATION WORKERS
The Level of Protection worn by decontamination workers is determined
by:
- Expected or visible contamination on workers.
- Type of contaminant and associated respiratory and skin hazards.
- Total vapor/gas concentrations in the CRC.
- Participates and specific inorganic or organic vapors ,in the CRC.
- Results of swipe tests.
A. Level C Use
Level C includes a full-face, canister-type air-purifying
respirator, hard hat with face shield (if splash is a problem),
chemical-resistant boots and gloves, and protective clothing.
The body covering recommended 1s chemical-resistant overalls with
an apron, or chemical-resistant overalls and jacket.
A face shield 1s recommended to protect against splashes because
respirators alone may not provide this protection. The respirator
should have a canister approved for filtering any specific known
contaminants such as ammonia, organic vapors, add gases, and
partlculates.
B. Level B Use
In situations where site workers may be contaminated with un-
knowns, highly volatile liquids, or highly toxic materials,
decontamination workers should wear Level B protection.
Level B protection Includes SC8A, hard hat with face shield,
chemical-resistant gloves, and protective covering. The clothing
suggested 1s chemical-resistant overalls, jacket, and a rubber
apron. The rubber apron protects the SCBA harness assembly and
regulator from becoming contaminated.
VI. DECONTAMINATION OF EQUIPMENT
Insofar as possible, measures should be taken to prevent contamination
of sampling and monitoring equipment. Sampling devices become con-
taminated, but monitoring Instruments, unless they are splashed,
usually do not. Once contaminated. Instruments are difficult to
clean without damaging them. Any delicate Instrument which cannot be
easily decontaminated should be protected while it 1s being used. It
0-52
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should be placed in a clear plastic bag, and the bag taped and secured
around the instrument. Openings are made in the bag for sample
intake.
A. Decontamination Procedures
1. Sampling devices
Sampling devices require special cleaning. The EPA Regional
Laboratories can provide Information on proper decontamination
methods.
2. Tools
Wooden tools are difficult to decontaminate because they
absorb chemicals. They should be kept on site and handled
only by protected workers. At the end of the response,
wooden tools should be discarded. For decontaminating
other tools, Regional Laboratories should be consulted.
3. Respirators
Certain parts of contaminated respirators, such as the harness
assembly and leather or cloth components, are difficult to
decontaminate. If grossly contaminated, they may have to be
discarded. Rubber components can be soaked 1n soap and water
and scrubbed with a brush. Regulators oust be maintained
according to manufacturer's recommendations. Persons respon-
sible for decontaminating respirators should be thoroughly
trained 1n respirator maintenance.
4. Heavy Equipment
Bulldozers, trucks, back-hoes, bulking chambers, and other
heavy equipment are difficult to decontaminate. The method
generally used 1s to wash them with water under high pressure
and/or to scrub accessible parts with detergent/water solution
under pressure, 1f possible. In some cases, shovels, scoops,
and lifts have been sand blasted or steam cleaned. Particular
care must be given to those components 1n direct contact with
contaminants such as tires and scoops. Swipe tests should be
utilized to measure effectiveness.
B. Sanitizing of Personnel Protective Equipment
Respirators, reusable protective clothing, and other personal
articles not only must be decontaminated before being reused, but
also sanitized. The Inside of masks and clothing becomes soiled
due to exhalation, body oils, and perspiration. The manufac-
turer's Instructions should be used to sanitize the respirator
mask. If practical, protective clothing should be machine washed
after a thorough decontamination; otherwise it must be cleaned by
hand.
0-53
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C. Persistent Contamination
In some instances, clothing and equipment will become contamin-
anted with substances that cannot be removed by normal decontamin-
ation procedures. A solvent may be used to remove such contamin-
ation from equipment if it does not destroy or degrade the pro-
tective material. If persistent contamination is expected,
disposable garments should be used. Testing for persistent
contamination of protective clothing and appropriate decon-
tamination must be done by qualified laboratory personnel.
0. Disposal of Contaminated Materials
All materials and equipment used for decontamination must be
disposed of properly. Clothing, tools, buckets, brushes, and
all other equipment that is contaminated must be secured in drums
or other containers and labeled. Clothing not completely decon-
taminated on-site should be secured in plastic bags before being
removed from the site.
Contaminated wash and rinse solutions should be contained by
using step-in-containers (for example, child's wading pool) to
hold spent solutions. Another containment method 1s to dig a
trench about 4 Inches deep and line ft with plastic. In both
cases the spent solutions are transferred to drums, which are
labeled and disposed of with other substances on site.
VII. ANNEXES
Annex 1, 2, and 3 describe basic decontamination procedures for a
worker wearing Level A, B, or C protection. The basic decontamination
lines (Situation 1), consisting of approximately 19 stations, are
almost Identical except for changes necessitated by different pro-
tective clothing or respirators. For each annex, three specific
situations are described in which the basic (or full decontamination)
procedure 1s changed to take Into account differences 1n the extent
of contamination, the accompanying changes 1n equipment worn, and
other factors. The situations Illustrate decontamination setups
based on known or assumed conditions at an Incident. Many other
variations are possible.
Annex 4 describes a minimum layout for Level A personnel decontamin-
ation. The number of Individual stations have been reduced. Although
the decontamination equipment and amount of space required 1s less
than needed in the procedures previously described, there 1s also a
much higher probability of cross-contamination.
3-54
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ANNEX 1
LEVEL A DECONTAMINATION
A. EQUIPMENT WORN
The full decontamination procedure outlined is for workers wearing
Level A protection (with taped joints between gloves, boots, and
suit) consisting of:
- Fully encapsulating suit.
- Self-contained breathing apparatus.
- Hard hat (optional).
- Chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank boots.
- Boot covers.
Inner and outer gloves.
B. PROCEDURE FOR FULL DECONTAMINATION
Station 1: Segregated Equipment Drop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, sampling devices and containers,
monitoring Instruments, radios, clipboards, etc.) on plastic drop
cloths or 1n different containers with plastic liners. Each will be
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the drop reduces
the probability of cross-contamination.
Equipment: various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop cloths
Station 2: Boot Cover and Glove Wash
Scrub outer boot covers and gloves with decon solution or detergent/
water.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
D-55
-------
Station 3: Boot Cover and Glove Rinse
Rinse off decon solution from Station 2 using copious amounts of
water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 4: Tape Removal
Remove tape around boots and gloves and deposit In container with
plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 5: Boot Cover Removal
Remove boot covers and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 6: Outer Glove Removal
Remove outer gloves and deposit 1n container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 7: Suit/Safety Boot Wash
Thoroughly wash fully encapsulating suit and boots. Scrub suit
and boots with long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brush and copious
amounts of decon solution or detergent/water. Repeat as many
times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent/water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
0-56
-------
Station 8: Suit/Safety Boot Rinse
Rinse off decon solution or detergent/water using copious amounts
of water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 9: Tank Change
If worker leaves Exclusion Zone to change air tank, this is the
last step in the decontamination procedure. Worker's air tank is
exchanged, new outer globes and boots covers donned, and joints
taped. Worker then returns to duty.
Equipment: air tanks
tape
boot covers
gloves
Station 10: Safety Boot Removal
Remove safety boots and deposit 1n container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
boot jack
Station 11: Fully Encapsulating Suit and Hard Hat Removal
With assistance of helper, remove fully encapsulating suit (and
hard hat). Hang suits on rack or lay out on drop cloths.
Equipment: rack
drop cloths
bench or stool
Station 12: SCBA Backpack Removal
While still wearing facepiece, remove backpack and place on table.
Disconnect hose from regulator valve and proceed to next station.
Equipment: table
0-57
-------
Station 13: Inner Glove Wash
Wash with decon solution or detergent/water that will not harm
skin. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: basin or bucket
decon solution
or
detergent/water
small table
Station 14: Inner Glove Rinse
Rinse with water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: water basin
basin or bucket
small table
Station 15: Faceplece" Removal
Remove faceplece. Deposit 1n container with plastic liner. Avoid
touching face with fingers.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 16: Inner Glove Removal
Remove Inner gloves and deposit 1n container with plastic Uner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 17: Inner Clothing Removal
Remove clothing soaked with perspiration. Place 1n container with
plastic Uner. Inner clothing should be removed as soon as possible
since there 1s a possibility that small amounts of contaminants might
have been transferred 1n removing fully encapsulating suit.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 18: Field Wash
Shower 1f highly toxic, skin-corrosive or skln-absorbable materials
are known or suspected to be present. Wash hands and face 1f shower
1s not available.
0-58
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Equipment:
water
soap
small table
basin or bucket
field showers
towels
Station 19: Redress
Put on clean clothes. A dressing trailer is needed in inclement weather,
Equipment: tables
chairs
lockers
clothes
C. FULL DECONTAMINATION (SIT. 1) AND THREE MODIFICATIONS
S
I
T
1
2
3
4
STATION NUMBER
1
X
X
X
X
2
X
X
3
X
X
4
X
X
5
X
X
6
X
X
7
X
X
X
X
8
X
X
X
X
9
X
X
10
X
X
11
X
X
12
X
X
13
X
14
X
15
X
X
16
X
X
17
X
X
18
X
X
19
X
Situation 1: The Individual entering the Contamination Reduction
Corridor is observed to be grossly contaminated or extremely toxic
substances are known or suspected to be present.
Situation 2: Same as Situation 1 except individual needs new air tank
and wil1 return to Exclusion Zone.
D-59
-------
Situation 3: Individual entering the CRC is expected to be minimally
contaminated. Extremely toxic or skin-corrosive materials are not
present. No outer gloves or boot covers are worn. Inner gloves are
not contaminated.
Situation 4: Same as Situation 3 except individual needs new air tank
and wi11 return to Exclusion Zone.
0-60'
-------
ANNEX 2
LEVEL 8 DECONTAMINATION
A. EQUIPMENT WORN
The full decontamination procedure outlined is for workers wearing
Level B protection (with taped joints between gloves, boot, and suit)
consisting of:
- One-piece, hooded, chemical-resistant splash suit.
- Self-contained breathing apparatus.
- Hard hat.
- Chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank boots.
- Boot covers
Inner and outer gloves.
B. PROCEDURE FOR FULL DECONTAMINATION
Station 1: Segregated Equipment Drop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, sampling devices and containers,
monitoring instruments, radios, clipboards, etc.) on plastic drop
cloths or 1n different containers with plastic liners. Each will be
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the drop reduces
the probability of cross-contamination.
Equipment: various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop cloths
Station 2: Boot Cover and Glove Wash
Scrub outer boot covers and gloves with decon solution or detergent/
water.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
D-61
-------
Station 3: Boot Cover and Glove Rinse
Rinse off decon solution from Station 2 using copious amounts of
water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 4: Tape Removal
Remove tape around boots and gloves and deposit 1n container with
plastic liner. *
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 5: Boot Cover Removal
Remove boot covers and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 6: Outer Glove Removal
Remove outer gloves and deposit 1n container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons
plastic liners
Station 7: Suit/Safety Boot Wash
Thoroughly wash chemical-resistant splash suit, SCBA, gloves, and
safety boots. Scrub with long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brush
and copious amounts of decon solution or detergent/water. Wrap
SCBA regulator (1f belt-mounted type) with plastic to keep out
water. Wash backpack assembly with sponges or cloths.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent/water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
small buckets
sponges or cloths
0-62
-------
Station 8: Suit/SCBA/Boot/Glove Rinse
Rinse off decon solution or detergent/water using copious amounts
of water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
small buckets
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
sponges or cloths
Station 9: Tank Change
If worker leaves Exclusion* Zone to change air tank, this is the last
step in the decontamination procedure. Worker's air tank is
exchanged, new outer gloves and boots covers donned, and joints
taped. Worker returns to duty.
Equipment: air tanks
'tape
boot covers
gloves
Station 10: Safety Boot Removal
Remove safety boots and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
boot jack
Station 11: SCBA Backpack Removal
While still wearing facepiece, remove backpack and place on table.
Disconnect hose from regulator valve and proceed to next station.
Equipment: table
Station 12: Splash Suit Removal
With assistance of helper, remove splash suit. Deposit in container
with plastic liner.
Equipment: container' (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
0-63
-------
Station 13: Inner Glove Wash
Wash inner gloves with decon solution or detergent/water that will
not harm skin. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: decon solution
OP
detergent/water
basin or bucket
small table
Station 14: Inner Glove Rinse
Rinse Inner gloves with water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: water
basin or bucket
small table
Station 15: Facepiece Removal
Remove faceplece. Avoid touching face with gloves. Deposit in
container with plastic Uner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 16: Inner Glove Removal
Remove Inner gloves and deposit In container with plastic Uner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 17: Inner Clothing Removal
Remove clothing soaked with perspiration. Place 1n container with
plastic Uner. Do not wear Inner clothing off-site since there 1s
a possibility small amounts of contaminants might have been
transferred 1n removing fully encapsulating suit.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 18: Field Wash
Shower If highly toxic, skin-corrosive, or skln-absorbable materials
are known or suspected to be present. Wash hands and face if shower
1s not available.
0-64
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Equipment: water
soap
small tables
basins or buckets
field showers
Station 19: Redress
Put on clean clothes. A dressing trailer is needed in- inclement
weather.
Equipment: tables
chairs
lockers
clothes
C. FULL DECONTAMINATION (SIT. 1) AND THREE MODIFICATIONS
s
I
T
1
2
3
4
STATION NUMBER
1
X
X
X
X
2
X
X
3
X
X
4
X
X
5
X
X
6
X
X
7
X
X
X
X
8
X
X
X
X
9
X
X
10
X
X
11
X
X
12
X
X
13
X
14
X
15
X
X
16
X
X
17
X
X
18
X
X
19
X
X
Situation1; The Individual entering the Contamination Reduction
Corridor is observed to be grossly contaminated or extremely toxic
substances are known or suspected to be present.
Situation 2: Same as Situation 1 except Individual needs new air tank
and will return to Exclusion Zone.
D-65
-------
Situation 3: Individual entering the CRC is expected to be minimally
contaminated. Extremely toxic or skin-corrosive materials are not
present No outer gloves or boot covers are worn. Inner gloves are
not contaminated.
Situation 4: Same as Situation 3 except individual needs new air tank
and will return to Exclusion Zone.
0-66
-------
ANNEX 3
LEVEL C DECONTAMINATION
A. EQUIPMENT WORN
The full decontamination procedure outlined is for workers wearing
Level C protection (with taped joints between gloves, boots, and
suit) consisting of:
- One-piece, hooded, chemical-resistant splash suit.
- Canister equipped, full-face mask.
- Hard hat.
- Chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank boots.
- Boot covers.
Inner and outer gloves.
8. PROCEDURE FOR FULL DECONTAMINATION
Station 1: Segregated Equipment Drop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, sampling devices, and containers,
monitoring instruments, radios, clipboards, etc.) on plastic drop
cloths or in different containers with plastic liners. Each will be
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the drop reduces
the probability of cross-contamination.
Equipment: various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop cloths
Station 2: Boot Cover and Glove Wash
Scrub outer boot covers and gloves with decon solution or detergent/
water.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
0-67
-------
Station 3: Boot Cover and Glove Rinse
Rinse off decon solution from Station 2 using copious amounts of
water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle, soft bristle scrub brushes
Station 4: Tape Removal
Remove tape around bqpts and gloves and deposit 1n container with
plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 5: Boot Cover Removal
Remove boot covers and deposit In container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 6: Outer Glove Removal
Remove outer gloves and deposit 1n container with plastic Hne'r.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 7: Suit/Safety Boot Wash
Thoroughly wash splash suit and safety boots. Scrub with long-
handle, soft-bristle scrub brush and copious amounts of decon
solution or detergent/water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent/water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 8: Suit/Safety Boot Rinse
D-68
-------
Rinse off decon solution or detergent/water using copious amounts
of water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 9: Canister or Mask Change
If worker leaves Exclusion Zone to change canister (or mask), this
is the last step in the decontamination procedure. Worker's canister
is exchanged, new outer gloves and boots covers donned, and joints
taped. Worker returns to duty.
*
Equipment: canister (or mask)
tape
boot covers
gloves
Station 10: Safety Boot Removal
Remove safety boots and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
boot jack
Station 11: Splash Suit Removal
With assistance of helper, remove splash suit. Deposit in container
with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
bench or stool
Uner
Station 12: Inner Glove Wash
Wash inner gloves with decon solution or detergent/water that will
not harm skin. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: decon solution
or
detergent/water
basin or bucket
0-69
-------
Station 13: Inner Glove Rinse
Rinse Inner gloves with water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: water
basin or bucket
small table
Station 14: Facepiece Removal
Remove facepiece. Avoid touching face with gloves. Deposit
facepiece in container with plastic Hner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 15: Inner Glove Removal
Remove Inner gloves and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 16: Inner Clothing Removal
Remove clothing soaked with perspiration. Place in container with
plastic Uner. Do not wear Inner clothing off-site since there 1s
a possibility small amounts of contaminants night have been
transferred 1n removing splash suite. >
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 17: Field Wash
Shower 1f highly toxic, skin-corrosive or skln-absorbable materials
are known or suspected to be present. Wash hands and face if shower
1s not available.
Equipment: water
soap
tables
wash basins/buckets
field showers
Station 18: Redress
Put on clean clothes. A dressing trailer is needed 1n Inclement weather.
0-70
-------
Equi pment:
tables
chai rs
lockers
clothes
C. FULL DECONTAMINATION (SIT. 1) AND THREE MODIFICATIONS
s
I
T
1
2
3
4
STATION NUMBER
*
1
X
X
X
X
2
X
X
3
X
X
4
X
X
5
X
X
6
X
X
7
X
X
X
X
8
X
X
X
X
9
X
X
X
10
X
X
11
X
X
12
X
13
X
14
X
X
15
X
X
16
X
X
17
X
X
18
X
Situation 1: The individual entering the Contamination Reduction Corridor
is observed to be grossly contaminated or extremely skin corrosive substances
are known or suspected to be present.
Situation 2: Same as Situation 1 except Individual needs new canister or
mask and will return to Exclusion Zone.
Situation 3: Individual entering the CRC is expected to be minimally
contaminated. Extremely skin-corrosive materials are not present. No
outer gloves or boot covers are worn. Inner gloves are not contaminated.
Situation 4: Same as Situation 3 except individual needs new canister or
mask and will return to Exclusion Zone.
0-71
-------
ANNEX 4
LEVEL A DECONTAMINATION, MINIMUM LAYOUT
A. EQUIPMENT WORN
The decontamination procedure outlined is for workers wearing Level A
protection (with taped joints between gloves, boots, and suit) consisting
of:
- Fully encapsulating suit with integral boots and gloves.
- Self-contained breathing apparatus.
- Hard hat (optional).
- Chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank boots.
- Boot covers.
- Inner and outer gloves.
B. PROCEDURE FOR FULL DECONTAMINATION
Station 1: Segregated Equipment Drop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, sampling devices and containers,
monitoring Instruments, radios, clipboards, etc.) on plastic drop
cloths or 1n different containers with plastic liners. Each will be
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the .drop reduces
the probability of cross-contamination.
Equipment: various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop clothes
Station 2: Outer Garment, Boots, and Gloves Wash and Rinse
Scrub outer boots, outer gloves, and fully-encapsulating suit with
decon solution or detergent water. Rinse off using copious amounts
of water.
Equipment: containers (30-50 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent water
D-72
-------
rinse water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 3: Outer Boot and Glove Removal
Remove outer boots and gloves. Deposit 1n container with plastic
liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 ga-llons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 4: Tank Change
^^^^^^^^^~" *
If worker leaves Exclusion Zone to change air tank, this is the last
step in the decontamination procedure. Worker's air tank is exchanged,
new outer gloves and boot covers donned, joints taped, and worker
returns to duty.
Equipment: air tanks
tape
boot covers
gloves
Station 5; Boot, Gloves, and Outer Garment Removal
Boots, fully-encapsulating suit, and Inner gloves removed and deposited
in separate containers lined with plastic.
i
Equipment: containers (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 6: SC8A Removal
SCBA backpack and faceplece 1s removed. Hands and face are thoroughly
washed. SCBA deposited on plastic sheets.
Equipment: plastic sheets
basin or bucket
soap and towels
bench
Station 7: Field Wash
Thoroughly wash hands and face. Shower as soon as possible.
D-73
-------
Equipment: water
soap
tables
wash basin/bucket
0-74
-------
PART 8
AIR SURVEILLANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Accidents involving hazardous materials or remedial actions at aban-
doned waste sites can release a variety of substances into the air.
Chemical fires, transportation accidents, open or leaking containers,
wind-blown dust, and site cleanup activities produce emissions which
can rapidly affect the health and safety of response workers and the
public. Hazardous atmospheres can involve:
- Flammable or explosive vapors, gases, and aerosols (explosive
atmosphere). •
- Displacement of breathable air (oxygen-deficient atmosphere).
- Radioactive materials (radioactive environment).
- Toxic vapors, gases, and aerosols (toxic atmosphere).
The presence of one or more of these hazards determines subsequent
actions to protect people or the environment, operations to mitigate
the incident, and safety considerations for response workers.
Airborne hazards can be predicted 1f the substance Involved, Its
chemical and physical properties, and weather conditions are known.
But air surveillance Is necessary to confirm predictions, to identify
or measure contaminants, or to detect unknown air pollutants.
This part provides guidance primarily on longer-term air sampling for
toxic substances. Information 1s given 1n Part 4, Initial Site Entry
Survey and Reconnaissance, regarding Initial determination of airborne
hazards.
II. OBJECTIVE OF AIR SURVEILLANCE
A1r surveillance consists of air monitoring (using direct-reading
Instruments capable of providing real-time Indications of air
contaminants) and air sampling (collecting air on an appropriate
media or in a suitable sampling container followed by analysis.)
The objective of air surveillance during response 1s to determine the
type of chemical compound (and associated hazard) and quantity of
airborne contaminants on-site and off-site and changes in air contami-
nants that occur over the lifetime of the Incident.
0-75
-------
The data obtained are used to help establish criteria for worker
safety, document potential exposures, determine protective measures
for the public, evaluate the environmental impact of the incident,
and determine mitigation activities. To accomplish this requires
establishing an effective air surveillance program, tailored to meet
the conditions generated by each incident.
III. TYPES OF INCIDENTS
As part of Initial hazard evaluation, direct-reading instruments
(DRIs), visible Indicators (signs, labels, placards, type of con-
tainer, etc.), and other Information (manifests, consists, inven-
tories, Agency records, etc.) are used to evaluate the presence or
potential for air contaminant release. Limited air sampling may also
be conducted if time 1s available. Based on an assessment of this
preliminary information, a more comprehensive air surveillance
strategy 1s developed and Implemented.
Two general types of incidents are encountered:
- Environmental emergencies, Including chemical fires, spills, or
other releasesof hazardous materials which occur over a rela-
tively short period of time. Since contaminants may be released
rapidly, there may be no time for air surveillance. In Incidents
where the "released material can be quickly Identified (and suffi-
cient time Is available), direct-reading, hand-held monitoring
Instruments can be used to provide Information on some types of
hazards. A1r sampling generally 1s limited unless the release
continues long enough for appropriate equipment to be brought 1n.
- Longer-term cleanup, Including planned removals and remedial
actions at abandoned waste sites as well as restoration after
emergency problems have been controlled. During this period,
especially at waste sites, workers and the public may be exposed
to a wide variety of airborne materials over a much longer period
of time. Since cleanup activities require more time (and planning)
to accomplish, appropriate equipment for air monitoring and samp-
ling can be secured, and an air surveillance program established.
IV. GENERAL SURVEILLANCE METHODS
During site operations, data are needed about air contaminants and any
changes that nay occur. Surveillance for vapors, gases, and partl-
culates 1s done using ORIs and air sampling systems. DRIs can be
used to detect many organlcs and a few Inorganics and provide approxi-
mate total concentrations. If specific organlcs (and Inorganics)
have been Identified, then ORIs, calibrated to those materials,
can be used for more accurate on-s1te assessment. In many Instances
D-76
-------
however, only air sampling (and laboratory analysis) can be used for
detection and quantification.
The most accurate method for evaluating any air contaminant is to
collect samples and analyze them at a reliable laboratory. Although
accurate, this method has two disadvantages: cost and the time re-
quired to obtain results. Analyzing large numbers of samples in
laboratories is very expensive, especially if results are wanted
quickly. On-site laboratories tend to reduce the turn-around time,
but unless they can analyze other types of samples, they also are
costly. In emergencies, time is often not available for laboratory
analysis of samples either on-site or off-site.
To obtain air monitoring data rapidly at the site, instruments uti-
lizing flame 1onizat1on detectors (FIDs) photoionization detectors
(PIDs) and other similar Instruments can be used. These may be used
as survey instruments (total concentration mode) or operated as gas
chromatographs (gas chromatograph mode). As gas chromatographs,
these instruments can provide real-time, qual1tative/quantative data
when calibrated with standards of known air contaminants. Combined
with selective laboratory analysis of samples, they provide a tool
for evaluating airborne organic hazards on a realtime basis, at a
lower cost than analyzing all samples in a laboratory. An example of
an air surveillance program used by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's Environmental Response Team 1s contained In Annex 1.
V; AIR SAMPLING
For more complete Information about air contaminants, measurements
obtained with DRIs must be supplemented by collecting and analyzing
air samples. To assess air contaminants more thoroughly, air sampling
devices equipped with appropriate collection media are placed at var-
ious locations throughout the area. These samples provide air quality
Information for the period of time they operate, and can Indicate con-
taminant types and concentrations over the lifetime of site operations.
As data are obtained (from the analysis of samples, ORIs, knowledge
about materials Involved, site operations, and potential for airborne
toxic hazards), adjustments are made in the type of samples, number
of samples collected, frequency of sampling, and analysis required.
In addition to air samplers, area sampling stations may also Include
DRIs equipped with recorders and operated as continuous air monitors.
Area sampling stations are located in various places Including:
- Upwind - Because many hazardous Incidents occur near Industries or
highways that generate air pollutants, samples must be taken upwind
of the site to establish background levels of air contaminants.
- Support zone - Samples must be taken near the command post or other
support facilities to ensure that they are in fact located in a
clean area, and that the area remains clean throughout operations
at the site.
0-77
-------
- Contamination reduction zone - Air samples should be collected
along thedecontaminationline to ensure that decontamination
workers are properly protected and that on-slte workers are not
removing their protective gear in a contaminated area.
- Exclusion zone - The exclusion zone presents the greatest risk of
exposure to chemicals and requires the most air sampling. The
location of sampling stations should be based upon hot-spots
detected by DRIs, types of substance present, and potential for
airborne contaminants. The data from these stations, 1n con-
junction with Intermittent .walk-around surveys with DRIs, are used
to verify the selection of proper levels of worker protection and
exclusion zone boundaries, as well as to provide a continual
record of air contaminants.
- Downwind - One or more sampling stations are located downwind from
the site to indicate if any air contaminants are leaving the site.
If there are Indications of airborne hazards in populated areas,
additional samplers should be placed downwind.
VI. MEDIA FOR COLLECTING AIR SAMPLES
Hazardous material Incidents, especially abandoned waste sites,
Involve thousands of potentially dangerous substances - gases, vapors,
and aerosols that could become airborne. A variety of media - liquids
and solids - are used to collect these substances. Sampling systems
typically include a calibrated air sampling pump which draws air into
selected collection media. Some of the most common types of samples,
and the collection media used for them are:
- Organic vapors - Activated carbon is an excellent adsorbent for
most organicvapors. However, other solid adsorbents (such as
Tenax, silica gel, and Florisil) are routinely used to sample
specific organic compounds or classes of compounds that do not
adsorb or desorb well on activated carbon. To avoid stocking a
large number of sorbents for all substances anticipated, a smaller
number chosen for collecting the widest range of materials or for
substances known to be present generally are used. The vapors are
collected using an Industrial hygiene personal sampling pump with
either one sampling port or a manifold capable of simultaneously
collecting samples on several sorbent tubes, for example, a mani-
fold with four sorbent tubes (or as Individual pumps with varying
flow rates). The tubes night contain:
— Activated carbon to collect vapors of materials with a boiling
point above 0 degrees centigrade. These materials Include
most odorous organic substances, such as solvent vapors.
— A porous polymer such as Tenax or Chromosorb to collect sub-
stances (such as high-molecular-weight hydrocarbons, organo-
D-78
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phosphorous compounds, and the vapors of certain pesticides)
that adsorb poorly onto activated carbon. Some of these porous
polymers also adsorb organic materials at low ambient tempera-
tures more efficiently than carbon.
A polar sorbent such as silica gel to collect organic vapors
(aromatic amines, for example) that exhibit a relatively high
dipole moment.
-- Another specialty adsorbent selected for the specific site.
For example, a Florisil tube could be used if polychlorinated
biphenyls are expected.
- Inorganic gases - The inorganic gases present at an incident would
primarily be polar compounds such as the haloacid gases. They can
be adsorbed onto silica gel tubes and analyzed by ion chromato-
graphy. Impingers filled with selected li-quid reagents can also
be used.
- Aerosols - Aerosols (solid or liquid particulates) that may be en-
countered at an incident include contaminated and noncontaminated
soil particles, heavy-metal particulates, pesticide dusts, and
droplets of organic or inorganic liquids. An effective method for
sampling these materials is to collect them on a particulate
filter such as a glass fiber or membrane type. A backup impinger
filled with a selected absorbing- solution may also be necessary.
Color1metr1c detector tubes can also be used with a sampling pump
when monitoring for some specific compounds. Passive organic vapor
monitors can be substituted for the active system described 1f passive
monitors are available for the types of materials suspected to be
present at a given site.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health's (NIOSH)
Manual of Analytical Methods, Volumes 1-7, contains acceptable
methods forcollecting and analyzing air samples for a variety of
chemical substances. Consult 1t for specific procedures.
VII. COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Samples are analyzed to determine types and quantities of substances
present. The following provides additional guidance on sample col-
lection and analysis.
- Aerosols
Samples for aerosols should be taken at a relatively high flow rate
(generally about 2 liters/minute) using a standard industrial
hygiene pump and filter assembly. To collect total particulates,
0-79
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a membrane filter having a 0.8 micrometer pore size is common.
The sample can be weighed to determine total particulates, then
analyzed destructively or non-destructively for metals. If the
metals analysis is done nondestructlvely or if the filter is
sectioned, additional analyses (for example, organlcs, Inorganics,
and optical particle sizing) can be performed.
- Sorbent Samples
The sorbent material chosen, the amount used, and sample volume
will vary according to the types and concentrations of substances
anticipated at a particular site. Polar sorbent material such
as silica gel will collect polar substances which are not adsorbed
well onto activated carbon and some of the porous polymers. The
silica gel sample can be split and analyzed for the haloadd gases
and aromatic amines.
Activated carbon and porous polymers will collect a wide range of
compounds. Exhaustive analysis to identify and quantify all the
collected species 1s prohibitively expensive at any laboratory and
technically difficult for a field laboratory. Therefore, samples
should be analyzed for principal hazardous constituents (PHCs).
The selection of PHCs should be based upon the types of materials
anticipated at a given site, from generator's records, and from
Information collected during the Initial site survey. To aid in
the selection of PHCs, a sample could be collected on activated
carbon or porous polymer during the initial site survey and ex-
haustively analyzed off-site to Identify the major peaks within
selected categories. This one thorough analysis, along with what
Is already known about a particular site, could provide enough
Information to select PHCs. Standards of PHCs could then be
prepared and used to calibrate Instruments used for field analysis
of samples. Subsequent, routine off-site analysis could be limited
to scanning for only PHCs, saving time and money. Special adsor-
bents and sampling conditions can be used for specific PHCs 1f
desired, while continued multimedia sampling will provide a base
for analysis of additional PHCs that nay be Identified during the
course of cleanup operations.
- Passive Dosimeters
A less traditional method of sampling 1s the use of passive dosi-
meters. The few passive dosimeters now available are only for
gases and vapors. Passive dosimeters are used primarily to monitor
personal exposure, but they can be used to monitor areas. Passive
monitors are divided Into two groups:
— Diffusion samplers, 1n which molecules move across a concentra-
tion gradient, usually achieved within a stagnant layer of air,
between the contaminated atmosphere and the Indicator material.
0-80
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-- Permeation devices, which rely on the natural permeation of a
contaminant through a membrane. A suitable membrane is select-
ed that is easily permeated by the contaminant of interest and
impermeable to all others. Permeation dosimeters are therefore
useful in picking out a single contaminant from a mixture of
possible interfering contaminants.
Some passive dosimeters may be read directly, as are DRIs and
colorimetric length-of-stain tubes. Others require laboratory
analysis simlliar to that done on solid sorbents.
VIII. PERSONNEL MONITORING
In addition to area atmospheric sampling, personnel monitoring - both
active and passive - can»be used to sample for air contaminants. Repre-
sentative workers are equipped with personal samplers to indicate con-
taminants at specific locations or for specific work being done.
Placed on workers, generally within 1 foot of the mouth and nose, the
monitors indicate the potential for the worker to inhale the con-
taminant.
IX. CALIBRATION
As a rule, the total air sampling system should be calibrated rather
than the pump alone. Proper calibration is essential for proper
operation and for accurate interpretation of resultant data. As a
minimum, the system should be calibrated prior to and after use. The
overall frequency of calibration will depend upon the general handling
and use of a given sampling system. Pump mechanisms should be recali-
brated after repair, when newly purchased, and following suspected
abuse. Calibration methods can be found 1n the NIOSH Manual of
Analytical Methods (Volumes 1-7).
METEOROLGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Meteorological Information is an Integral part of an air surveillance
program. Data concerning wind speed and direction, temperature,
barometric pressure, and humidity, singularly or in combination,
are needed for:
- Selecting air sampling locations.
- Calculating air dispersion.
- Calibrating instruments.
- Determining population at risk or environmental exposure from
airborne contaminants.
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Knowledge of wind speed and direction is necessary to effectively
place air samplers. In source-oriented ambient air sampling
particularly, samplers need to be located downwind (at different
distances) of the source and others placed to collect background
samples. Shifts In wind direction must be known and samplers re-
located or corrections made for the shifts. In addition, atmodpheric
simulation models for predicting contaminant dispersion and concen-
tration need wlndspeed and direction as inputs for predictive calcu-
lations. Information may be needed concerning the frequency and
Intensity with which that winds blow from certain directions (wind-
rose data), consequently, the wind direction must be continually
monitored.
A1r sampling systems need to be calibrated before use and corrections
in the calibration curves made for temperature and pressure. After
sampling, sampled air volumes are also corrected for temperature and
pressure variations. This requires knowing air temperature and
pressure.
A1r sampling is sometimes designed to assess population exposure (and
frequently potential worker exposure). Air samplers are generally
located 1n population centers Irrespective of wind direction. Even
1n these Instances, however, meteorological data 1s needed for air
dispersion modeling. Models are then used to predict or verify
population-oriented sampling results.
Proper data Is collected by having meteorological stations on site or
obtaining it from one or more of several government or private
organizations which routinely collect such data. The choice of how
Information 1s obtained depends on the availability of reliable data
at the location desired, resources needed to obtain meteorological
equipment, accuracy of Information needed, and use of Information.
0-82
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ANNEX 5
GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE TEAM'S
AIR SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
I. APPROACH
A variety of long-term air surveillance programs can be designed to
detect a wide range of airborne compounds. To implement any program
a number of factors must be considered, including type of equipment,
costs, personnel required, accuracy of analysis, time required to
obtain results (turn-around-time), and availability of analytical
laboratories.
One approach to air surveillance, developed and used by the USEPA
Environmental Response Team (ERT), is described here. This program
achieves a reasonable balance between cost, accuracy, and time in
obtaining data using a combination of direct reading instruments
(DRIs) and air sampling systems to:
- Rapidly survey for airborne organic vapors and gases.
Identify and measure organic vapors and gases.
- Identify and measure particulates and inorganic vapors and gases.
The approach 1s based on:
- Using flame 1onizat1on detectors (FIDs) and/or photoionlzation
detectors (PIDs) for initial detection of total organic gases and
vapors and for periodic site surveys (for total organics). Equip-
ped with strip chart recorders, the detectors are used as area
monitors to record total organic concentration and changes in
concentration over a period of time. Calibrated to specific
organic contaminants, they are used to detect and measure those
substances.
- Collecting area air samples using personal pumps and organic gas/
vapor collection tubes. Samples are analyzed using the gas chroma-
tograph (GC) capabilities of field Instruments. Selected samples
are also analyzed In laboratories accredited by the American
Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA).
- Using PIDs and/or FIOs (as a survey Instrument or GC) to provide
real-time data and to screen the number of samples needed for
laboratory analysis.
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Sampling for particulates, inorganic acids, aromatic amines, halo-
genated pesticides, etc., when they are known to be involved or
when there are indications that these substances may be a problem.
II. EQUIPMENT
At present, the following equipment 1s used for organic gas/vapor
monitoring however, other equivalent equipment can be substituted:
- HNU Systems Photoionlzer (PID)
- Foxboro OVA (FID)
- MDA Accuhaler 808 Sampling Pump
- Gillian Model Number HFS-UT113 Sampling Pump
- Tenax adsorption.tubes (metal)
- Carbon-packed adsorption tubes (metal)
- Carbon-packed adsorption tubes (glass)
— 150 milligram and 600 milligram sizes
III. PROCEDURE
This procedure 1s generally applicable to most responses. However,
since each Incident is unique, modifications may be needed.
Organic Gases and Vapors. The sequence for monitoring organic gases
and vapors consists of several steps.
- Determine total background concentrations.
- Determine total concentration on-s1te.
- Collect on-s1te area samples.
- Identify specific contaminants.
Background concentrations. Background readings of total organic gases
and vapors, using DRIs (FID/PID), are made upwind of the site 1n areas
not expected to contain air contaminants. If Industries, highways, or
other potential sources contribute to concentrations on.site, these
contributions should be determined. Depending on the situation and
the time available, additional monitoring should be done nearby to
determine If contaminants are leaving the site.
Concentrations on-s1te. The on-s1te area 1s monitored (using DRIs)
for totalgas/vaporconcentrations, measured at both ground and
breathing zone levels. The Initial walk-throughs are to determine
general ambient concentrations and to locate h1gher-than ambient
concentrations (hot-spots).
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Transient contributors on-site, for example, exhausts from engines,
should be avoided. Concentrations are recorded and plotted on a site
map. Additional DRI monitoring is then done to thoroughly define any
hot-spots located during the survey.
Area samples. Sampling stations are located throughout the site. The
number and locations depend on evaluating many factors, including hot-
spots (by ORI), active work areas, potentials for high concentrations,
and wind direction. As a minimum, stations should be located in a
clean off-site area (control or background station), exclusion zone,
and downwind of the site. As data are accumulated, location, number
of stations, and frequency of sampling can be adjusted.
Routinely, two 4-hour samples are collected, in the morning and after-
noon respectively, using personal sampling pumps equipped with Tenax
and/or carbon-packed, m^tal adsorption tubes. Total gas/vapor concen-
tration (using DRI) should also be determined at the start and finish
of each sampling run. The readings obtained may show an approximate
relationship (depending on organics present) which will be helpful
later 1n placing samplers.
Samples are desorbed with a thermal desorber and analyzed on the OVA-GC
for total organic concentration and number of peaks. Chromatograms
of samples taken at the same location but at different times or from
different stations can be compared. Differences in heights of "total"
peak, number of independent peaks, and relative peak heights, if
judiciously interpreted, are useful for making preliminary judgments
concerning air contaminant problems. Page A5-6 shows a suggested
format for calculating total gas/vapor concentration.
If relatively high concentrations are detected by the Initial DRI
surveys samplers equipped with carbon-packed collection tubes (glass)
are run next to Tenax/carbon-packed, metal equipped samplers. The
latter samples are analyzed in the field. The carbon-packed collec-
tion tubes are analyzed by an AIHA accredited laboratory.
Area surveys using DRI are continued routinely two-four times daily.
These surveys are to monitor for general ambient levels, as well as
levels at sampling stations, hot-spots, and other areas of site activ-
ities. As Information 1s accumulated on airborne organics, the
frequency of surveys can be adjusted.
Specific contaminants. Personal monitoring pumps with carbon-packed
collection tubes (glass) are run on the first afternoon, concurrent
with samplers equipped with Tenax/carbon-packed, metal collection
tubes. Generally, when total gas/vapor readings are low and only a
few peaks seen (from the field GC analysis of morning samples),
100-150 mg carbon-packed tubes (glass) are used and operated at a
flow rate of 100 cubic centimeters/minute until approximately 30
liters of air have been collected. Depending on suspected contam-
inants and their concentrations, higher flow rates and/or volumes may
0-35
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be needed. When total gas/vapor readings are high and there are many
peaks (from the morning samples), then larger glass carbon collection
tubes (600 mg) are operated at a flow rate from 0.5 to 1 Hters/minute
to collect 90 to 150 liters of air.
The results from laboratory analysis of glass carbon tubes are used
for a number of different purposes, including:
- To Identify and measure organic gases and vapors collected during
the sampling period.
- To compare laboratory chromatograms and field chromatograms. If
only a few peaks (but the same number) are seen on each chromatogram
(and Identified on the laboratory chromatogram) from samples
collected at the* same location, It may be reasonable to assume,
until standards are run on the field GC, that the two chromatograms
are identifying the same materials.
- To Identify major contaminants on laboratory chromatograms and
determine what standards to prepare for the field GC. Field GC's
can then be used to identify and measure air contaminants against
laboratory prepared standards.
- To use the field GC as a screening device for determining when
samples should be collected for laboratory analysis, or when
samples previously collected should be analyzed. Changes In the
number of peaks on the field chromatograms from samples collected
at the same location Indicate changes In the air, suggesting the
need for collecting additional samples for laboratory analysis.
If desorption equipment 1s not available for on-s1te sample analysis,
glass collection tubes should be collected dally. Only samples
collected every third to fifth day are sent to AIHA accredited labora-
tories for analysis; the remaining samples are stored 1n a cool place
(preferably refrigerated). Selected stored samples are analyzed if
third to fifth day samples Indicate changes 1n air contaminant pat-
terns. If dally on-s1te surveys detect low contaminant(s) levels,
then 100-150 mg glass carbon columns are used. If the survey reveals
relatively high levels of contaminants, then 600 mg glass carbon
tubes are used.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health P&CAM Analy-
tical Method No. 127 (see Annex 6) should be followed as closely as
possible. Flow rates and collection tubes described 1n this guide
are primarily for organic solvents. If other than organic solvents
are suspected, then the NIOSH Manual of Analytical Methods (Volume
1-7) should be consulted for the appropriate collection media and
flow rates. Table 1 lists the organic solvents Identified by the
NIOSH P&CAM No. 127, many of which are found at hazardous waste
sites. These are Identified for possible gas chroraatography/mass
spectrometry analysis.
D-86
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Participates and Inorganic Gases and Vapors. Sampling for particu-
lates is not done routinely.If these types of air contaminants are
known or suspected to exist, a sampling program is instituted for
them. Incidents where these contaminants might be present are:
fires involving pesticides or chemicals, incidents involving heavy
metals, arsenic, or cyanide compounds, or mitigation operations that
create dust (from contaminated soil and excavation of contaminated
soil).
Sampling media and analytical methods for these air contaminants
should follow guidance given in the NIOSH Manual of Analytical
Methods.
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SAMPLE CALCULATION
1. Volume sampled by MOA Accuhaler 808 Personal Sampling Pump:
Volume sampled (cc) * (final stroke count - initial stroke count)
X (cc's/stroke*) X (multiplier factor for orifice used**)
•Specified on pump itself.
"Specified in pump operations manual and Table 2. (for MOA Accuhaler)
Calculation:
At beginning of sampling period, Accuhaler stroke counter reads
16292.9. At end Desampling period, it reads 16632.9. What is the
volume of air sampled?
Volume, sampled (cc) » 16632.9 (final stroke count) - 16292.9 (initial
stroke count) X 5.7 (cc/pump stroke) X 1.1 (multiplier for orifice)
Volume sampled » 2131.8 cc or 2.1 Hters.
2. Reporting-Format (for OVA GC Thermal Desorber)
a. Total GC Mode: Total concentration determined » 22 ppm as
CH4 (methane)
b. Time weighted » volume desorbed (liters) X concentration (ppm)
average (ppm) volume collected (liters)
» 0.300 (liter) X 22 (ppm) - 3.14 ppm as Cfy (methane)
2.1 (liters)
c. Peaks: GC mode
4 peaks observed
d. Survey Concentration (total organics by DRI)
Start of sampling period ppm, time
End of sampling period ppm, time
ATTACH CHROMATOGRAM
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TABLE 1
Organic Solvents Identified by P£CAM Analytic Method No. 127
Organic Solvent
Molecular Weight
Acetone
Benzene
Carbon tetrachloride
Chloroform
Dichloromethane
p-Dioxane
Ethylene dichloride
Methyl ethyl ketone
Styrene
Tetrachloroethylene
Toluene
l',l ,2-TMchloroethane
1,1,1-Trlchloroethane
(methyl chloroform)
Trlchloroethylene
Xylene
58.1
78.1
154.0
U9.0
84.9
88.1
99.0
72.1
104.0
166.0
92.1
133.0
133.0
131.0
106.0
Reference: Manual of Analytical Methods
U.S. Department of Health Education & Welfare,
Public Health Service, Center for Disease Control
National Institute of Occupational Safety & Health,
DHEW (NIOSH) Publication No. 77-157-A
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TABLE 2
Multiplier Factor for MOA Accuhaler 808
Personal Sampling Pumps
Volume/Stroke
Orifice Color Normal Flow Rate - cc/m1n MultiplieT"
Calibration Yellow 100 1.1
at 20 cc/min
Orange 50 1.06
«
Red 20 1.00
Brown 10 0.99
Purple 5 0.97
Blue 2
Green 1
Black 0.5
Reference: Instruction Manual, Accuhaler, Personnel Sampling Pump
Models 808 and 818
MOA Scientific, Inc., Elmdale Avenue,.
Glenview, IL 60025
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ANNEX 6
ORGANIC SOLVENTS IN AIR
Physical and Chemical Analysis Branch
Analytical Method
Analyte
Matrix:
Procedure:
D*ie Issued:
Date Revised:
Organic Solvents
(See Table 1)
Air
Adsorption on charcoal
desorption with carbon
disulfide, GC
9/15/72 .
2/15/77
Method Nou
Range:
P&CAM 127
For the specific
compound, refer
to Table 1
Precision: 10.5% RSD "
Classification: See Table 1
1. Principle of the Method
1.1 A known volume of air is drawn through a charcoal tube to trap the organic vapors present.
1.2 The charcoal in the tube is transferred to a small, graduated test tube and desorbed with
• carbon disulfide.
1.3 An aliquot of the desorbed sample is injected into a gas chromatograph.
1.4 The area of the resulting peak is determined and compared with areas obtained from the
injection of standards.
2. Range and Scositirity
The lower limit in mg/sample for the specific compound at 16 x 1 attenuation on a gas chromato-
graph fined with a 10:1 splitter is shown in Table I. This value can be lowered by reducing the
attenuation or by eliminating the 10:1 splitter.
3. Interferences
3.1 When the amount of water in the air is so great that condensation actually occurs in the tube,
organic vapors will not be trapped. Preliminary experiments indicate that high humidity
severely decreases the breakthrough volume.
3.2 When two or more solvents are known or suspected to be present in the air. such information
Oncluding their suspected identities), should be transmitted with the sample, since with dif-
ferences in polarity, one may displace another from the charcoal.
3.3 It must be emphasized that any compound which has the same retention time as the speci5c
compound under study at the operating conditions described in this method is an interference.
Hence, retention time data on a single column, or even on a number of columns, cannot be
considered as proof of chemical identity. For this reason it is important that a sample of
the bulk soivent(s) be submitted at the same time so that identity(ies) can be established by
other means.
127-1
0-91
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3.4 If the possibility of interference exists, separation conditions (column packing, temperature-
etc.) must be changed to circumvent the problem.
4. Precisioa and Accuracy
4.1 The mean relative standard deviation of the analytical method is 3% (11.4).
4.2 The mean relative standard deviation of the analytical method plus field sampling using an
approved personal sampling pump is 10% (11.4). Pan of the error associated with the
method is related to uncertainties in the sample volume collected. If a more powerful vacuum
pump with associated gas-volume integrating equipment is used, sampling precision can be
unproved.
4.3 The accuracy of the overall sampling and analytical method is 10% .(NIOSH-unpublished
data) when the personal sampling pump is calibrated with a charcoal cube in the line.
5. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Method
S.I The sampling device is small, portable, and involves no liquids. Interferences are minimal,
and most of those which do occur can be eliminated by altering chromatographic conditions.
The tubes are analyzed by means of a quick, instrumental method. The method can also be
used for the simultaneous analysis of two or more solvents suspected to be present in the
tame sample by simply changing gas chromatographic conditions from isothermal to a tem-
perature-programmed mode of operation.
5.2 ' One disadvantage of the method is that the amount of sample which can be taken is l;""f"^
by the number of milligrams that the tube will hold before overloading. When the sample
value obtained for the backup section of the charcoal tube exceeds 25% of that found on
the front section, the possibility of sample loss exists. During sample storage, the rnr
volatile compounds will migrate throughout the tube until equilibrium is reached (33%
the sample on the backup section).
5.3 Furthermore, the precision of the method is limited by the reproducibUicy of the pressure
drop across the tubes. This drop will -affect the flow rate and cause the volume to be im-
precise, because the pump is usually calibrated for one tube only.
o. Apparatus
6.1 An approved and calibrated personal sampling pump for personal samples. For an area
sample, any vacuum pump whose flow can be determined accurately at 1 liter per minute
or le
6.2 Charcoal tubes: glass tube with both ends flame sealed. 7 cm long with a'6-mra O.D. and a
4-oun LD., containing 2 sections of 20/40 mesh activated charcoal separated by a 2-mm
portion of urethane foam. The activated charcoal is prepared from coconut shells and is
fired at 600*C prior to packing. The absorbing section contains 100 mg of charcoal, the
backup section 50 mg. A 3-mm portion of urethane foam is placed between the outlet end of
the tube and the backup section. A plug of silylated glass wool b placed in front of the
absorbing section. The pressure drop across the tube must be less than one inch of mercury
at a flow rate of I 1pm,
6.3 Gas chromatograph equipped with a flame ionization detector.
6.4 Column (20 ft x Vfc in) with 10% FFAP stationary phase on 80/100 mesh, acid-washed
DMCS Chromosorb W solid support. Other columns capable of performing the required
separations may be used.
127-2
0-92
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6.5 A mechanical or electronic integrator or a recorder and some method for determining peak
area.
6.6 Microcemrifuge tubes, 2.5 ml, graduated.
6.7 Hamilton syringes: 10 ^1, and convenient sizes for making standards.
6.8 Pipcts: 0.5-ml delivery pipets or 1.0-mJ type graduated in 0.1-ml increments.
6.9 Volumetric flasks: 10 ml or convenient sizes for making standard solutions.
7. Reagents
7.1 Spectroquality carbon disutfide (Matheson Coieman and Bell).
7.2 Sample of the specific compound under study, preferably chrotnatoquality grade.
7.3 Bureau of Mines Grade A helium.
7.4 Prepurified hydrogen.
7.5 Filtered compressed air.
8. Procedure
8.1 Geaaiog of Equipment: All glassware used for the laboratory analysis should be detergent
washed and thoroughly rinsed with tap water and distilled water.
8.2 Calibration of Personal Pumps. Each personal pump must be calibrated with a representa-
tive charcoal tube in the line. This will minimize errors associated with uncertainties in
the sample volume collected.
8.3 CoUectxM and Shipping of Samples
8.3.1 Immediately before sampling, the ends of the tube should be broken to provide an
opening at least one-half the internal diameter of the tube (2 mm).
8.3.2 The small section of charcoal is used as a back-up and should be positioned nearest
the tampling pump.
8.3.3 The charcoal tube should be vertical during sampling to reduce channeling through
toe charcoal
8.3.4 Air being sampled should not be passed through any hose or tubing before entering
the charcnal tube. s
8.3.5 The flow, time, and/or volume must be measured as accurately as possible. The sam-
ple should be taken at a flow rate of I 1pm or less to attain the total sample volume
required. The minimum and maximum sample volumes that should, be collected for
each solvent are shown in Table I. The minimum volume quoted must be collected if
the desired sensitivity is to be achieved.
8.3.6 The temperature and pressure of the atmosphere being sampled should be measured
and recorded.
8.3.7 The charcoal tubes should be capped with the supplied plastic caps immediately
after sampling. Under no circumstances should rubber caps be used.
8.3.8 One tube should be handled in the same manner as the sample tube (break, seal, and
transport), except that no air is sampled through this tube. This tube should be
labeled as a blank.
8.3.9 Capped tubes should be packed tightly before they are snipped to minimize tube break-
age during shipping.
127-3
D-93
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8.3.10 Samples of the suspected solvent(s) should be submitted to the laboratory for qual
tative characterization. These liquid bulk samples should not be transported in the
same container as the samples or blank tube. If possible, a bulk air sample (at least
50 1 air drawn through tube) should be shipped for qualitative identification purposes.
3.4 Andys* of Samples
8.4.1 Preparation at Samples. la preparation for analysis, each charcoal rube is scared
with a file in front of the first section of charcoal and broken open. The glass wool is
removed and discarded. The charcoal in the first (larger) section is transferred to a
small stoppered test tube. The separating section of foam is removed and discarded;
the second section is transferred to another test tube. These two sections are analyzed
separately.
8.4.2 Oesorption of Samples. Prior to analysis, one-half ml of carbon disulfide is pipetted
into each test tube. (All work with carbon disulfide should be performed in a hood
because of its high toxicity.) Tests indicate that desorption is complete in 30 min-
utes if theJ to separate the solvent flush from
the sample with a pocket of air to be used as a marker. The needle is then immersed
in the sample, and a 5-/J aliquot is withdrawn, taking into consideration the volume
of the needle, since the sample in the needle will be completely injected. After the
needle is removed from the sample and prior to injection, the plunger is pulled back
a short '*•«*""•* to minimize evaporation of the sample from the tip of the needle.
Duplicate injections of each sample and standard should be made. No more than a
3% difference in area is to be expected.
8.4.5 Measurement of area. The area of the sample peak is measured by an electronic
integrator or some other suitable form of area measurement, and preliminary results
are read from a standard curve prepared as discus ted below.
8J DeterataaikM of Desocptioa Efficiency
8J.I Importance of determination. The desorption efficiency of a particular compound can
vary from one laboratory to another and also from one batch of charcoal to another.
Thus, it is necessary to determine at .least once the percentage of the specific compound
that is removed in the desorption process for a given compound, provided the same
batch of charcoal is used. NIOSH has found that the desorption efficiencies for the
compounds in Table 1 are between 31% and 100% and vary with each batch of
charcoal.
127-4
0-94
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8.5.2 Procedure Tor determining dcsorption efficiency. Activated charcoal equivalent to
the amount in the first section of the sampling tube (100 mg) is measured ir.io a
5-cm, 4-mm I.D. glass tube, flame-scaled at one end (similar to commercially avail-
able culture tubes). This charcoal must be from the same batch as that used in ob-
taining the samples and can be obtained from unused charcoal tubes. The open end
is capped with Parafilm. A known amount of the compound is injected directly
into the activated charcoal with a microliter syringe, and the tube is capped with more
Parafilm. The amount injected is usually equivalent to that present in a 10-liter sam-
ple at a concentration equal to the federal standard.
At (east five tubes are prepared in this manner and allowed to stand for at least over-
night to assure complete absorption of the specific compound onto the charcoal. These
five tubes are referred to as the samples. A parallel blank tube should be treated in
the same manner except that no sample is added to it. The sample and blank tubes
are desorbed and analyzed in exactly the same manner as the sampling tube described
in Section 3.4.
Two or three standards are prepared by injecting the same volume of compound into
0.5 ml of CS? with the same syringe used in the preparation of the sample. These
are analyzed with the samples.
The dcsorption efficiency equals the difference between the average peak area of the
samples and the peak area of the blank divided by the average peak area of the
standards, or
. • - • Area sample — Area blank
desorption efficiency = —— —
Area standard
9. Calibration tnd Standards
It is convenient to express concentration of standards in terms of mg/0.5 ml CS? because samples
are desorbed in this amount of CS?. To minimize error due to the volatility of carbon disulfide,
one can inject 20 times the weight into 10 ml of CS?. For example, to prepare a 0.3 mg/0.5 ml
standard, one would inject 6.0 mg into exactly 10 ml of CS. in a glass-stoppered flask. The
density of the specific compound is used to convert 6.0 mg into microliten for easy measurement
with a microliter syringe. A series of standards, varying in concentration over the range of
interest, a prepared and analyzed under the same GC conditions and during the same time period
as the unknown samples. Curves are established by plotting concentration in mg/0.5 mi versus
peak area.
NOTE: Since no internal standard is used in the method, standard solutions must be analyzed
at the same time that the sample analysis is done. This will minimize the effect of known day-
to-day variations and variations during the same day of the FID response.
10. Calculation
10.1 The weight, in mg. corresponding to each peak area is rend from the standard curve for the
particular compound. No volume corrections are needed, because the standard curve is
based on mg/0.5 ml CS; and the volume of sample injected is identical to the volume of Che
standards injected.
10.2 Corrections for the blank must be made for each sample.
Correct mg ~ mg. — mg,.
127-5
0-95
-------
where:
ing. a mg found in front section of sample tube
mgfc » mg found in front section of blank tube
A similar procedure is followed for the backup sections.
10.3 The' corrected amounts present in the front and backup .sections of the same sample cube
are added to determine the total measured amount in the sample.
10.4 This total weight is divided by the determined desorption efficiency to obtain the corrected
mg per sample.
10.3 The concentration of the analyte in the air sampled can be expressed in mg per nr1.
, . m Corrected mg (Section 10.4) X 1000 (liters/m3)
Air volume sampled (liters)
10.6 Another method «f expressing concentration is ppm (corrected to standard conditions of 25"C
and 760 mm Hg).
/ i ^ 24.45 v 760 v (T +'273)
ppm - oii/oi* x__ x _ x 208
where:
P ™ pressure (mm Hg) of air sampled
T « temperature ("Q of air sampled
24.45 » molar volume (liter/mole) at 25 9C and 760 mm Hg
MW » molecular weight
760 * standard pressure (mm Hg)
298 • standard temperature (°K)
11. References
1 l.l White, L. D., D. G. Taylor, P. A. Mauer. and R. E Kupei, "A Convenient Optimized Method
for the Analysis of Selected Solvent Vapors in the Industrial Atmosphere", Am lad Hyg
Assoc J 31:225. 1970.
11.2 Young, D. M. tod A. D, Crowell, Physical Adsorption of Cases, pp. 137-146, Butterwoiths.
London. 1962.
11.3 Federal Register. 37:202:22139-22142, October 13, 1972.
11.4 NIOSH Contract HSM-99-72-98, Scott Research Laboratories, Inc, "Collaborative Testing
of Activated Charcoal Sampling Tubes for Seven Organic. Solvents", pp. 4-22, 4-27, 1973.
127-6
0-06
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TABLE t
Parameters Associated With P&CAB Analytical Method No. 127
Method
Organic Soireot Claaiflcalloo
Acetone
Benzene
Carbon tetrachJoride
Chloroform
Oichloromethane
p-Dioxane
Ethylene dichloride
Methyl ethyl ketone
Styrene
Tctrachloroethylene
1 , 1 ,2-
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PART 9
SITE SAFETY PLAN
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the site safety plan is to establish requirements for
protecting the health and safety of responders during all activities
conducted at an incident. It contains safety information, instruc-
tions, and procedures.
A site-safety plan must be prepared and reviewed by qualified personnel
for each hazardous substance response. Before operations at an
incident commence, safety requirements must be written, conspicuously
posted or distributed to all response personnel, and discussed with
them. The safety plan must be periodically reviewed-to keep it
current and technically correct.
In non-emergency situations, for example, long-term remedial action
at abandoned hazardous waste sites, safety plans are developed
simultaneously with the general work plan. Workers can become
familiar with^ the plan before site activities begin. Emergency
response generally requires verbal safety Instructions and reliance
on existing standard operating procedures until, when time permits,, a
plan can be written.
The plan must contain safety requirements for routine (but hazardous)
response activities and also for unexpected site emergencies. The
major distinction between routine and emergency site safety planning
1s the ability to predict, monitor, and evaluate routine activities.
A site emergency 1s unpredictable and may occur anytime.
II. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
The site safety plan must:
- Describe the known hazards and evaluate the risks associated with
the Incident and with each activity conducted.
- List key personnel and alternates responsible for site safety,
response operations, and for protection of public.
- Describe Levels of Protection to be worn by personnel.
- Delineate work areas.
- Establish procedures to control site access.
- Describe decontamination procedures for personnel and equipment.
- Establish site emergency procedures.
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- Address emergency medical care for injuries and toxicological
problems.
- Describe requirements for an environmental surveillance program.
- Specify any routine and special training required for responders.
- Establish procedures for protecting workers from weather-related
problems.
III. SITE SAFETY PLAN SCOPE AND DETAIL
The plan's scope, detail, and length 1s based on:
- Information available about the Incident.
- Time available to prepare a site-specific plan.
- Reason for responding.
Three general categories of response exist - emergencies, character-
izations and remedial actions. Although considerations for personnel
safety are generic and Independent of the response category, In
scope, detail, and length safety requirements and plans vary consid-
erably. These variations are generally due to the reason for
responding (or category of response) , Information available, and the
severity of the Incident with Its concomitant dangers to the respon-
der.
A. Emergencies
1. Situation:
Emergencies generally require prompt action to prevent or
reduce undesirable affects. Immediate hazards of fire,
explosion, and release of toxic vapors or gases are of prime
concern. Emergencies vary greatly 1n respect to types and
quantities of material, numbers of responders, type of work
required, population affected, and other factors. Emergencies
last from a few hours to a few days.
- Information available: Varies from none to much. Usually
Information about the chemicals Involved and their associ-
ated hazards 1s quickly obtained 1n transportation-related
Incidents, or Incidents Involving fixed facilities.
Determining the substances Involved 1n some Incidents,
such as mysterious spills, requires considerable time and
effort.
- Time available: Little time, generally requires prompt
action to bring the Incident under control.
- Reason for response: To Implement prompt and Immediate
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actions to control dangerous or potentially dangerous
situations.
2. Effects on Plan
In emergencies, time is not available to write lengthy and
detailed safety plans. Decisions for responder safety are
based on a continual evaluation of changing conditions.
Responding organizations must rely on their existing written
standard operating safety procedures or a generic plan, and
verbal safety instructions adapted to meet site-specific
conditions. Since heavy reliance is placed on verbal safety
instructions an effective system to keep all responders
informed must be established. . Whenever possible, these
incident-specific instructions should be written.
8. Incident Characterization
1. Situation:
In non-emergency responses,for example, preliminary inspec-
tions at abandoned wastes sites or more comprehensive waste
site investigations the objective is to determine and charac-
terize the chemicals and hazards involved, the extent of
contamination, and risks to people and the environment. In
general, Initial inspections, detailed Investigations, and
extent of contamination surveys are limited 1n the activities
that are required and number of people Involved. Initial or
preliminary Inspections generally require 1-2 days. Complete
investigations may last over a longer time period.
- Information available: Much background Information.
Generally limited on-s1te data for Initial inspection.
On-s1te Information more fully developed through additional
site visits and investigations.
- Time available: In most cases adequate time 1s available
to develop written site-specific safety plan.
- Reason for response: To gather data-to verify or refute
existing Information, to gather Information to determine
scope of subsequent Investigations, or to collect data for
planning remedial action.
2. Effects on Plan:
Sufficient time is available to write safety plans. In scope
and detail, plans tend to be brief containing safety require-
ments for specific on-site work relevant to collecting data.
As information is developed through additional Investigations,
the safety plan is modified and, if necessary, more detailed
and specific requirements added.
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C. Remedial Actions
1. Situation:
Remedial actions are cleanups which last over a long period
of time. They commence after more immediate problems at an
emergency have been controlled, or they involve the mitigation
of hazards and restoration of abandoned hazardous waste
sites. Numerous activities are required Involving many
people, a logistics and support base, extensive equipment,
and more Involved work activities. Remedial actions may
require months to years to completely accomplish.
- Information available: Much known about on-site hazards.
Time available: Ample time for work planning.
- Reason for response: Systematic and complete control,
cleanup, and restoration.
2. Effects on Plan:
Since ample time is available before work commences, site
safety plan tends to be comprehensive and detailed. From
prior Investigations much detail may be Icnown about the
materials or hazards at the site and extent of contamination.
IV. SITE SAFETY PLAN DEVELOPMENT
To develop the plan as much background Information as possible should
be obtained, time permitting, about the Incident. This would Include,
but not be limited to:
- Incident location and name.
- Site description.
- Chemicals and quantities Involved.
- Hazards associated with each chemical.
- Behavior and dispersion of material Involved.
- Types of containers, storage, or transportation methods.
- Physical hazards.
- Prevailing weather condition and forecast.
- Surrounding populations and land use.
- Ecologically sensitive areas.
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- Facility records.
- Preliminary assessment reports.
- Off-site surveys.
- Topographic and hydrologic information.
The information initially available or obtained through subsequent
characterization provides a basis for developing a site-specific safety
plan. Information is needed about the chemicals and hazards involved,
movement of material oh and off the site, and potential contact with
responders or the public. This type of information is then used along
with the reason for responding (and work plan) to develop the safety
plan. The plan is tailored to the conditions imposed by the Incident
and to its environmental'setting. As additional information becomes
available the safety plan is modified to protect against the hazards
discerned and to provide for site emergencies that may occur.
V. ROUTINE OPERATIONS
Routine operations are those activities required in responding to an
emergency or a remedial actton at a hazardous waste site. These
activities may Involve a high degree of risk, but are standard opera-
tions that all incident responses may require.
Safety practices for routine operations closely parallel accepted
industrial hygiene and Industrial safety procedures. Whenever a
hazardous Incident progresses to the point where operation's become
more routine, the associated site safety plan becomes a more refined
document. As a minimum, the following must be Included as part of the
site safety plan for routine operations.
- Describe the Known Hazards and Risks
This must include all known or suspected physical, biological,
radiological, or chemical hazards. It Is Important that all health
related data be kept up-to-date. As air, water, soil, or hazardous
substance monitoring and sampling data becomes available, 1t must
be evaluated, significant risk or exposure to workers noted, poten-
tial Impact on public assessed, and changes made in the plan.
These evaluations need to be repeated frequently since much of the
plan Is based on this Information.
- List Key Personnel and Alternates
The plan must identify key personnel (and alternates) responsible
for site safety. It should also Identify key personnel assigned
to various site operations. Telephone numbers, addresses, and
organizations of these people must be listed In the plan and
posted 1n a conspicuous place.
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- Designate Levels of Protection to be Worn
The Levels of Protection to be worn at locations on-site or by
work functions must be designated. This includes the specific
types of respirators and clothing to be worn for each level.
No one shall be permitted in areas requiring personnel protective
equipment unless they have been trained in its use and are wearing
it.
- Delineate Work Areas
Work areas (exclusion zone, contamination reduction zone, and
support zone) need to be designated on the site map and the map
posted. The size of zones, zone boundaries, and access control
points Into each %zone must be marked and made known to all site
workers.
,- List Control Procedures
Control procedures must be implemented to prevent unauthorized
access. Site security procedures - fences, signs, security
patrols, and check-in procedures - must be established. Procedures
must also be established to control authorized personnel Into work
zones where personnel protection Is required.
- Establish Decontamination Procedures
Decontamination procedures for personnel and equipment must be
established. Arrangements must also be made for the proper
disposal of contaminated material, solutions, and equipment.
- Address Requirements for an Environmental Surveillance Program
A program to monitor site hazards must be implemented. This would
Include air monitoring and sampling, and other kinds of media
sampling at or around the site that would Indicate chemicals
present, their hazards, possible migration, and associated safety
requirements.
- Specify Any Routine and Special Training Required
Personnel must be trained not only 1n general safety procedures and
use of safety equipment, but in any specialized work they may be
expected to do.
. Establish Procedures for Weather-Related Problems
Weather conditions can affect site work. Temperature extremes,
high winds, storms, etc. impact on personnel safety. Work
practices must be established to protect workers from the effects
of weather and shelters provided, when necessary. Temperature
extremes, especially heat and Its effect on people wearing protec-
tive clothing, must be considered and procedures established to
monitor for and minimize heat stress.
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VI. ON-SITE EMERGENCIES
The plan must address site emergencies - occurrences that require
immediate actions to prevent additional problems or harm to respon-
ders, the public, property, or the environment. In general, all
responses present a degree of risk to the workers. During routine
operations risk is minimized by establishing good work practices and
using personnel protective equipment. Unpredictable events such as
fire, chemical exposure, or physical injury may occur and must be
anticipated. The plan must contain contingencies for managing them.
Establish Site Emergency Procedures
— List the names and emergency function of on-site personnel
responsible for emergency actions along with the special
training they have.
-- Post the location of nearest telephone (if none at site).
— provide alternative means for emergency communications.
— Provide a list of emergency services organizations that may be
needed. Names, telephone numbers, and locations must be
posted. Arrangements for using emergency organizations should
be made beforehand. Organizations that might be needed are:
- Fire
- Police
- Health
- Explosive experts
• Local hazardous material response units
• C1v1l defense
• Rescue
-- Address and define procedures for the rapid evacuation of
workers. Clear, audible warnings signals should be estab-
lished, well-marked emergency exits located throughout the
site, and Internal and external communications plans devel-
oped. An example of codes that could be used for emergency
operations based on direct-reading Instruments 1s contained In
Annex 7.
— A complete list of emergency equipment should be attached to
the safety plan. This list should Include emergency equipment
available on-s1te, as well as all available medical, rescue,
transport, f1re-f1gnt1ng, and m1t1gat1ve equipment.
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- Address emergency medical care.
Determine location of nearest medical or emergency care
facility. Determine their capability to handle chemical
exposure cases.
— Arrange for treating, admitting, and transporting of injured
or exposed workers.
— Post the medical or emergency care facilities location, travel
time, directions, and telephone number.
-- Determine local physician's office location, travel directions,
availability^ and post telephone number 1f other medical care
1s not available.
-- Determine nearest ambulance service and post telephone number.
~ List responding organization's physicians, safety officers, or
toxicologlsts name and telephone number. Also Include nearest
poison control center, if applicable.
— Maintain accurate records on any exposure or potential exposure
of site workers during an emergency (or routine operations).
The minimum amount of Information needed (along with any
medical test results) for personnel exposure records is
contained in Annex 8.
- Advise workers of their duties during an emergency. In particular,
It 1s Imperative that the site safety officers, standby rescue
personnel, decontamination workers, and emergency medical techni-
cians practice emergency procedures.
- Incorporate Into the plan, procedures for the decontamination of
Injured workers and for their transport to medical care facilities.
Contamination of transport vehicles, medical care facilities, or
of medical personnel may occur and should be addressed 1n the
plan. Whenever feasible these procedures should be discussed with
appropriate medical personnel in advance of operations.
- Establish procedures 1n cooperation with local and state officials
for evacuating residents who live near the site.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SITE SAFETY PLAN
The site safety plan, (standard operating safety procedure or a
generic safety plan for emergency response) must be written to avoid
misinterpretation, ambiguity, and mistakes that verbal orders cause.
The plan must be reviewed and approved by qualified personnel. Once
the safety plan 1s implemented, Its needs to be periodically examined
and modified, if necessary, to reflect any changes in site work and
conditions.
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All agencies and organizations which have an active role at the incid-
ent must be familiar with the plan. If possible the plan should
be written in coordination with the organizations involved. Lead
personnel from these organizations should sign the plan to signify
they agree with it and will follow its provisions.
All personnel involved at the site must be familiar with the safety
plan, or the parts that pertain to their specific activities.
Frequent safety meeting should be held to keep all informed about
site hazards, changes in operating plans, modifications of safety
requirements, and for exchanges of information. It is the responsi-
bility of personnel involved at the site as workers or visitors to
comply with the requirements in the plan.
Frequent audits by the incident manager or the safety designee should
be made to determine compliance with the plan's requirements. Any
deviations should be brought to the attention of the incident manager.
Modifications in the plan should be reviewed and approved by appropri-
ate personnel.
VIII. SAMPLE SAFETY PLANS
Annex 9 and 10 are two examples of Site Safety Plans. Since no one
sample plan or plan format can adequately address all safety require-
ments for the variety of incidents that occur, they should be used
as a guide to help develop an Incident-specific plan-. They can also
be used, with necessary adaptation, as generic plans for emergency
response.
In some Incidents, the sample plans contained in Annex 9 and 10 might
be satisfactory to use by themself. By filling 1n the blanks an
effective safety plan 1s available. In many incidents they should
only be considered as a check list (which does not exhaustively cover
every condition) which must be addressed. Users of these sample
plans and any other type examples must realize their application to
any one incident may not be acceptable. Therefore they must be used
with discretion and tempered by professional judgement and experi-
ence. They are not meant to be all Inclusive but examples of consid-
erations, requirements, and format which should be adapted for
Incident-specific conditions.
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ANNEX 7
Emergency Operation Codes
Real-Time Monitor
(suggested minimum action plan)
(Site Name)
CODE DESIGNATIONS
1. GREEN
A. Normal operations
2. YELLOW A
A. Cessation of specific work activity on-site because of:
(1) Continuous organic readings on direct-reading instrument of
* ppm above background (measured 20-30 ft. from point of
suspected release), and
(2) Current or projected meterological conditions indicate
a probable impact on work activity.
8. If background readings -above * ppm are obtained during
cessation of activity, redesign activity to lower releases
and/or delay that on-site activit until off-site air monitoring
indicates accepted off-site concentration.
C. Site personnel will immediately notify EPA/State of site condi-
tion.
3. YELLOW B
A. Termination of all work on-site because of:-
(1) Continuous organic readings on direct-reading instrument
above * ppm: (measured approximately 1,000 ft. from work
area or site property limits), and
(2) Current or projected meteorologic conditions indicate a
potential impact on inhabited areas.
B. Site personnel will immediately notify EPA/State of site
conditions.
C. EPA/State will modify off-site air monitoring to meet the
needs of contingency plan.
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4. RED
A. Termination of all work on-site because of:
(1) Continuous organic readings on direct-reading instruments
above * ppm (measured downwind at the nearest occupied
area off-site, and
(2) Current or projected meteorologic conditions indicate a po-
tential Impact on inhabited areas.
8. Site personnel will immediately notify EPA/State of site condi-
tions.
C. Local officials oaking evacuation/public health decisions will be
advised by EPA/State to:
(1) Release a public health advisory to potentially affected
areas since on-s1te control methods will not reduce the
source of contamination; and/or
(2) Implement a temporary relocation plan because on-site activi-
ti-es indicate a potential for continuous above background/
acceptable readings at the nearest .Inhabited area(s).
Concentration should be determined by appropriate
response personnel.
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RESPONSE SAFETY CHECK-OFF SHEET
(minimum required data)
BEFORE RESPONSE
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Incident: Site
a. Response Dates
Type of Response: Sp
Incident Safety Plan:
Suspected chemical (s)
(c)
Protective Level (s) i
(a) If Level C - 1. •
2.
ill
Region
involved
nvol ved:
Identify
Describe
City
Fire Site
ERT
: (a)
(d)
A B
Canister
air monitoring source(s
Emp ] oyee
State
Train Other
Not Developed
(b)
C D
(b) If Level D JUSTIFY (1n comments section at bottom of page).
6. SCBA-Identify Buddy: Name/Organization
7. Last Response: (a) Level Used: A B
(b) Medical Attention/Exam Performed: Yes No
II. AFTER RESPONSE
1. Protective Level Used: A B C D
a. Level C - Identify cannister: b. Level D (comment below)
c. Level B or C skin protection: Tyvek/Saran Acid/Rain Other
2. List possible chemical exposure: Same as above: (a)
(b) (c) TdT~
3. Equipment Decontamination: (a) clothing (b) respirator (c) monitoring
Disposed:
Cleaned:
No Action:
4. Approximate time in exclusion area: hours per day for days
5. Was medical attention/exam required for this response: Yes No
Part I: DATE PREPARED: Reviewed by Date .
Part II: DATE PREPARED: Reviewed by Date
COMMENTS: .
D-109
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ANNEX 9
(Suggested format for minimum site safety plan)
SITE SAFETY PLAN
(Name of Hazardous Waste Site/Spill)
I. General Information
As a minimum, all personnel involved with emergency response, waste
site cleanup, drum handling and opening, sampling, site investigations,
etc., will follow the applicable Federal/State rules and regulations. In
addition, all site personnel will follow, as a minimum, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, Hazardous
Response Support Division's, Standard Operating Safety Guides and Chapter
9 Hazardous Substance Response, from the EPA Occupation Health and Safety
Manual.
In the event of conflicting plans/requirements, personnel must imple-
ment those safety practices which afford the highest personnel protection.
If site conditions change and 1t 1s necessary .to modify Levels of
Protection A, B, or C the safety deslgnee on-site shall notify the On-Scene
Coordinator before making recommendations to site personnel.
II. APPROVALS
(SIGNATURE) (SIGNATURE)
On-Scene-Coordinator (OSCJDATE Safety OfficerDATE
(SIGNATURE) ; (SIGNATURE)
REVIEW COMMITTEE DATE OTHERSDATE
III. Summary of Minimum Requirements
A. The safety offlcer/designee shall:
1. Describe chemicals, hazards, and risk Involved
2. List key personnel
a. Response manager (OSC)/alternate
b. Safety off1cer(s)/alternate
c. Other responsible site personnel/alternate
3. Prescribe Levels of Protection
4. Designate work zones: Support area, contamination reduction
area, exclusion area.
5. Implement procedures to control site access.
D-110
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6. Define decontamination procedures.
7. Delineate entry and escape routes.
8. Identify/contact medical facility, etc.:
a. F1 re
b. Ambulance
c. Police .
d. Health
e. Etc.
9. List responsible parties and emergency contacts:
a. Federal Government EPA/USCG/CDC/OSHA
b. State Government Environmental/Health Agency
c. County/City Government
10. Establish personnel air monitoring.
11. Specify routine and special training needed
12. Establish procedures for managing weather-related problems.
B. Levels of Protection
1. Level C protection should be used for those job functions
listed belowwhere there 1s no potential for personnel
contact with either hazardous materials or gases, vapors, or
partlculates exceeding requirements for wearing a1r-pur1fy1ng
respirators.
(Identify job functions 1n this paragraph:
e.g. - monitoring/surveillance, supervisors,
observers, etc.)
(Identify specific type of respirator 1n this paragraph:
e.g. - approved respirator and type of canister.)
(Identify skin protection 1n this paragraph:
e.g. - double boots, double gloves, tyvek/saran hooded,
disposable coveralls, etc.)
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2. Level B protection should be used for those job functions
1isted below which based either on potential or known
site conditions and/or vapor and gas concentrations,
Level C is unsatisfactory.
Identify job functions in this paragraph:
(.e.g. - Heavy equipment operations, samplers, equipment/
drum handlers, etc.)
Identify specific respiratory protection in this paragraph:
(e.g. - self-contained breathing apparatus (SC8A), air-line
respirator)
Identify skin protection in this paragraph:
(e.g. - double boots, double gloves, type of chemical re-
sistant garment, etc)
3. If Level A protection is applicable, write a paragraph in
plan listing where and when it is to be worn.
4. Level D is not adequate protection for any work on-site
where potential for exposure is possible.
5. Levels C and B may be modified based on monitoring and
sampling data collected on-site. Safety designee should
not make any modification to the Level of Protection
without discussing it with the On-Scene-Coordinator.
C. Air monitoring - Refer to, Standard Operating Safety
Guides, Part 8, Air Surveillance.
D. Training
Personnel will have either formal training or prior on-the-
job-tra1ning for those tasks they are assigned to at the
Incident. All unfamiliar activities will be rehearsed
beforehand.
E. Respiratory Protection Program
All contractor and government personnel involved in on-site
activities shall have a written respiratory protection pro-
gram. All personnel wearing a1r-pur1fy1ng respirator on-s1te
are required to be fit-tested. All personnel wearing respir-
ators must have been properly trained in their use. All
respirators are to be properly decontaminated at the end of
each workday.
Persons having beards or facial hair must not wear a respir-
ator If a proper mask-to-face-seal can not be demonstrated by
a fit test. A log of all individuals wearing personnel
protective equipment shall be maintained including time in
the exclusion zone.
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F. All contractor and government personnel who are exposed to
hazardous levels of chemicals must be enrolled in a medical
monitoring program.
G. General Safety Rules and Equipment
1. There will be no eating, drinking, or smoking in the ex-
clusion or contamination reduction zone.
2. All personnel must pass through the contamination reduc-
tion zone to enter or exit the exclusion zone.
3. As a minimum, emergency eye washes will be on the hot side
of the contamination reduction zone and/or at the work
station *
4. As a minimum, an emergency deluge shower/spray cans are to
be located on the clean side of the contamination reduc-
tion area.
5. At the end of the work day, all personnel working 1n the
exclusion area shall take a hygienic shower.
6. All supplied breathing air shall be certified as grade 0 or
better.
7. Where practical, all tools/equipment will be spark proof,
explosion resistant, and/or bonded and grounded.
8. fire extinguishers will be on-slte for use'on equipment
or small fires only.
9. Since site evacuation may be necessary 1f an explosion,
fire, or release occurs, an Individual shall be assigned
to sound an alert and notify the responsible public
offlcals 1f required. For example, the evacuation signal
may be two long blasts every 30 seconds until all person-
nel are evacuated and accounted for.
10. An adequately stocked first-aid kit will be on-scene at
all times during operational hours. It 1s suggested that
an oxygen inhalator respirator be available and a quali-
fied operator present. The location of these Items and
the operator shall be posted.
H. Morning Safety Meeting
A morning safety meeting will be conducted for all site per-
sonnel and they will sign a dally attendance sheet and should
sign a master sheet Indicating they have read the site safety
plan and will comply. The safety procedures, and the day's
planned operations should be discussed.
D-113
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ANNEX 10
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OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY MANUAL
APPENDIX A - SAMPLE SAFETY PLAN
Assistance in preparing the safety plan can be obtained from
the OHS
Designee ___________ located in Room of Building ^^^
or by telephoning .
REVIEW
Response Safety Committee Chairperson
APPROVALS
OSC/SFC
OHS Designee
OIC
PROJECT LEADER
Branch
Building
Room
Phone
DATE OP PLAN PREPARATION
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE RESPONSE
Site Name Site No.
HAZARDOUS/SUBSTANCES (known or suspected, contaminated media
or in storage container, etc.):
D-114
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OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY MANUAL
HAZARD ASSESSMENT (toxic effects, reactivity, stability,
flammability, and operational hazards with
sampling, decontaminating, etc.):
MONITORING PROCEDURES (If required by the Project Leader)
Monitoring the site for identity and concentration of
contamination in all media:
Medical monitoring procedures for evidence of personnel
exposure:
Personnel monitoring procedures:
0-115
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OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY MANUAL
DECONTAMINATION AND DISPOSAL
Decontamination Procedures (contaminated: personnel
surfaces, materials, instruments,
equipment, etc):
Disposal Procedures (contaminated equipment, supplies,
disposable, washwater):
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
In event of overt personnel exposure (skin contact,
inhalation, ingeation)
In event of personnel injury:
0-116
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OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY MANUAL
In event of potential or actual fire or explosion:
In event of potential or actual ionizing radiation exposure
In event of environmental accident (spread of contamination
outside cites) :
EMERGENCY SERVICES (complete here or have separate list available
on-site)
Location Telephone
Emergency Medical Facility
Ambulance Service
0-117
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1440 TNI 2
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OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY MANUAL
Location Telephone
Fire Department
Police Department
Poison Control Center
PERSONNEL POTENTIALLY EXPOSED TO HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
Personnel Authorized to Enter site
1. _
2.
3.
4.
5.
0-118
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OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY MANUAL
Other Personnel Assigned to Handle Hazardous Substances
(decontaminate, analyze samples)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
ALTERNATIVE WORK PRACTICES
(Describe alternative work practices not specified in this
Chapter. Indicate work practices specified in the
Chapter for which proposed alternative work practices
will serve as substitute.)
APPROPRIATE LITERATURE CITATIONS
LEVEL OF PROTECTION
SITE MAP
(Attach a cite map in advance of a response, if possible, or
at an early stage of an emergency response. Map should be
properly scaled and keyed to local landmarks.)
D-119
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APPENDIX I
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HNU PHOTOIONIZER
AND
• ORGANIC VAPOR ANALYZER
I. INTRODUCTION
The HNU Photdionizer and the Foxboro Organic Vapor Analyzer (OVA) are.
used in the field to detect a variety of compounds in air. The two
instruments differ in their modes of operation and in the number and
types of compounds they detect (Table 1-1). Both instruments can be
used to detect leaks of volatile substances from drums and tanks,
determine the presence of volatile compounds in soil and water, make
ambient air surveys, and collect continuous air monitoring data. If
personnel are thoroughly trained to operate the instruments and to
interpret the data, these instruments can be valuable tools for
helping to decide the levels of protection to be worn, assist in
determining other safety procedures, and determine subsequent moni-
toring or sampling locations.
II. OVA
The OVA operates in two different modes. In the survey mode, 1t can
determine approximate total concentration of all detectable species
1n air. With the gas chromatograph (GC) option, individual components
can be detected and measured independently, with some detection
limits as low as a few parts per million (ppm).
In the GC mode, a small sample of ambient air is Injected into a
chromatographic column and carried through the column by a stream of
hydrogen gas. Contaminants with different chemical structures are
retained on the column for different lengths of time (known as reten-
tion times) and hence are detected separately by the flame 1on1zat1on
detector. A strip chart recorder can be used to record the retention
times, which are then compared to the retention times of a standard
with known chemical constituents. The sample can either be Injected
Into the column from the air sampling hose or injected directly with
a gas-tight syringe.
In the survey mode, the OVA 1s Internally calibrated to methane by
the manufacturer. When the Instrument 1s adjusted to manufacturer's
Instructions 1t Indicates the true concentration of methane 1n air.
In response to all other detectable compounds, however, the Instrument
reading may be higher or lower than the true concentration. Relative
0-120
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TABLE 1-1
COMPARISON OF THE OVA AND HNU
OVA
HNU
Response
Applicatlon
Detector
Limitations
Calibration gas
Ease of
operation
Detection limits
Response time
Maintenance
Useful range
Service life
Responds to many organic gases
and vapors.
In survey mode, detects total
concentrations of gases and
vapors. In GC mode, identifies
and measures specific compounds,
Responds to many organic
and some inorganic gases
and vapors.
In survey mode, detects
total concentrations of
gases and vapors. Some
identification of compounds
possible, if more than one
probe 1s used.
Flame 1on1zation detector (FID) Photo1on1zation detector (PID)
Does not respond to inorganic
gases and vapors. Kit available
for temperature control.
Methane
Requires experience to Inter-
pret correctly, especially
1n GC mode.
0.1 ppm (methane)
2-3 seconds (survey mode)
for CH4
Periodically clean and Inspect
particle filters, valve rings,
and burner chamber. Check
calibration and pumping system
for leaks. Recharge battery
after each use.
0-1000 ppm
8 hours; 3 hours with strip
chart recorder.
Does not respond to methane.
Does not detect a compound i f
probe has a lower energy than
compound's 1on1zat1on potential
Benzene
Fairly easy to use and
Interpret.
0.1 ppm (benzene)
3 seconds for 901 of
total concentration of benzene.
Clean UV lamp frequently.
Check calibration regularly.
Recharge battery after each
use.
0-2000 ppm
10 hours; 5 hours with
strip chart recorder.
0-121
-------
response ratios for substances other than methane are available. To
correctly interpret the readout, it i-s necessary to either make
calibration charts relating the instrument readings to the true
concentration or to adjust the instrument so that it reads correctly.
This is done by turning the ten-turn gas-select knob, which adjusts
the response of the instrument. The knob is normally set at 3.00 when
calibrated to methane. Calibration to another gas is done by mea-
suring a known concentration of a gas and adjusting the gas select
knob until the instrument reading equals that concentration.
The OVA has an inherent limitation in that it can detect only organic
molecules. Also, it should not be used at temperatures lower than
about 40 degrees Fahrenheit because gases condense 1n the pump and
column. It has no column temperature control, (.although temperature
control kits are available) and since retention times vary with
ambient temperatures for a given column, determinations of contam-
inants are difficult. Despite these limitations, the GC mode can
often provide tentative information on the identity of contaminants
In air without relying on costly, time-consuming laboratory analysis.
III. HNU
The HNU portable photoionlzer detects the concentration of organic
gases as well as a few inorganic gases. The basis for detection is
the ionizatlon of gaseous species. Every molecule has a character-
istic 1onizat1on potential (I.P.) which Is the energy required to
remove an electron from the molecule, yielding a positively charged
Ion and the free electron. The Incoming ^as molecules are subjected
to ultraviolet (UV) radiation, which 1s energetic enough to Ionize
many gaseous compounds. Each molecule Is tranformed Into charged ion
pairs, creating a current between two electrodes.
Three probes, each containing a different UV light source, are avail-
able for use with the HNU. Ionizing energies of the probe are 9.5,
10.2, and 11.7 electron volts (eV). All three detect many aromatic
and large molecule hydrocarbons. The 10.2 eV and 11.7 eV probes, 1n
addition, detect some smaller organic molecules and some halogenated
hydrocarbons. The 10.2 eV probe 1s the most useful for environmental
response work, as it 1s more durable than the 11.7 eV probe and
detects more compounds than the 9.5 eV probe.
The HNU factory calibration gas 1s benzene. The span potentiometer
(calibration) knob 1s turned to 9.8 for benzene calibration. A knob
setting of zero Increases the response to benzene approximately
tenfold. As with the OVA, the Instrument's response can be adjusted
to give more accurate readings for specific gases and eliminate the
necessity for calibration charts.
0-122
-------
While the primary use of the HNU is as a quantitative instrument, it
can also be used to detect certain contaminants, or at least to
narrow the range of posslblities. Noting instrument response to a
contaminant source with different probes can eliminate some conta-
minants from consideration. For instance, a compound's ionlration
potential may be such that the 9.5 eV probe produces no response, but
the 10.2 eV and 11.7 eV probes do elicit a response. The HNU does
not detect methane.
The HNU is easier to use than the OVA. Its lower detection limit
1s also 1n the low ppm range. The response time is rapid; the meter
needle reaches 901 of the Indicated concentration 1n 3 seconds for
benzene. It can be zeroed 1n a contaminated atomospnere and does
not detect methane.
IV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Both of these Instruments can monitor only certain vapors and gases
1n air. Many nonvolatile liquids, toxic solids, partlculates, and
other toxic gases and vapors cannot be detected. Because the types
of compounds that the HNU and OVA can potentially detect are only
a fraction of the chemicals possibly present at an incident, a zero
reading on either Instrument does not necessarily signify the absence
of air contaminants.
The Instruments are non-specific, and their response to different
compounds Is relative to the calibration setting. Instrument readings
may be higher or lower than the true concentration. This can be an
especially serious problem when monitoring for total contaminant
concentrations 1f several different compounds are being detected at
once. In addition, the response of these Instruments 1s not linear
over the entire detection range. Care must therefore be taken when
Interpreting the data. All Identifications should be reported as
tentative until they can be confirmed by more precise analysis.
Concentrations should be reported In terms of the calibration gas and
span potentiometer or gas-select-knob setting.
Since the OVA and HNU are small, portable Instruments, they cannot be
expected to yield results as accurate as laboratory Instruments.
They were originally designed for specific Industrial applications.
They are relatively easy to use and Interpret when detecting total
concentrations of Individually known contaminants in air, but
Interpretation becomes extremely difficult when trying to quantify
the components of a mixture. Neither Instrument can be used as an
Indicator for combustible gases or oxygen deficiency.
The OVA (Model 128) 1s certified by Factory Mutual to be used 1n
Class I, Division 1, Groups A,8,C, and 0 environments. The HNU 1s
certified by Factory Mutual for use 1n Class I, Division 2, Groups,
A, B, C, and D.
0-123
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APPENDIX II
RATIONALE FOR RELATING TOTAL ATMOSPHERIC VAPOR/GAS CONCENTRATIONS
TO THE SELECTION OF THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of using total* atmospheric vapor/gas concentrations for
determining the appropriate Level of Protection is to provide a
numerical criterion for selecting Level A, B, or C. In situations
where the presence of vapors or gases is not known, or if present,
the individual components are unknown, personnel required to enter
that environment must be protected. Until the constituents and
corresponding atmospherfc concentrations of vapor, gas, or particulate
can be determined and respiratory and body protection related to the
toxicological properties of the identified substances chosen, total
vapor/gas concentration, with judicious interpretation, can be used
as a guide for selecting personnel protection equipment.
Although total vapor/gas concentration measurements are useful to a
qualified professional for the selection of protective equipment,
caution should be exercised 1n Interpretation. An Instrument does
not respond with the same sensitivity to several vapor/gas contam-
inants as It does to a single contaminant. Also since total vapor/
gas field instruments see all contaminants 1n relation to a specific
calibration gas, the concentration of unknown gases or vapors may be
over or under-estimated.
Suspected carcinogens, participates, highly hazardous substances, or
other substances that do not elicit an Instrument response may be
known or believed to be present. Therefore, the protection level
should not be based solely on the total vapor/gas criterion. Rather,
the level should be selected case-by-case, with special emphasis on
potential exposure and chemical and toxicological characteristics of
the known or suspected material.
II. FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION
In utilizing total atmospheric vapor/gas concentrations as a guide
for selecting a Level of Protection, a number of other factors should
also be considered:
- The uses, limitations, and operating characteristics of the
monitoring instruments must be recognized and understood.
Instruments such as the HNU Photoionizer, Foxboro Organic Vapor
*See Part VII for explanation of term.
0-124
-------
Analyzer (OVA), MIRAN Infrared Spectrophotometer, and others do
not respond identically to the same concentration of a substance
or respond to all substances. Therefore, experience, knowledge,
and good judgement must be used to complement the data obtained
with instruments.
- Other hazards may exist such as gases not detected by the HNU or
OVA, (i.e. phosgene, cyanides, arsenic, chlorine), explosives,
flammable materials, oxygen deficiency, liquid/solid particles, and
liquid or solid chemicals.
- Vapors/gases with a very low TLV or IDLH could be present. Total
readings on Instruments, not calibrated to these substances, may
not indicate unsafe conditions.
- The risk to personnel entering an area must be weighed against
the need for entering. Although this assessment is largely a
value judgment, it requires a conscientious balancing of the
variables involved and the risk to personnel against the need to
enter an unknown environment.
- The knowledge that suspected carcinogens or substances extremely
toxic or destructive to skin are present or suspected to be present
(which may not be reflected In total vapor/gas concentration)
requires an evaluation of factors such as the potential for ex-
posure, chemical characteristics of the material, limitation of
Instruments, and other considerations specific to the Incident.
- What needs to be done on-s1te must be evaluated. Based upon total
atmospheric vapor concentrations. Level C protection may be judged
adequate; however, tasks such as moving drums, opening containers,
and bulking of materials, which Increase the probability of liquid
splashes or generation of vapors, gases, or partlculates, may
•require a higher level of protection.
- Before any respiratory protective apparatus 1s Issued, a respir-
atory protection program must be developed and Implemented ac-
cording to recognized standards (ANSI Z88.2-1980).
III. LEVEL A PROTECTION (500 to 1,000 PPM ABOVE BACKGROUND)
Level A protection provides the highest degree of respiratory tract,
skin, and eye protection 1f the Inherent limitations of the personnel
protective equipment are not exceeded. The range of 500 to 1,000
parts per million (ppm) total vapors/gases concentration in air was
selected based on the following criteria:
- Although Level A provides protection against air concentrations
greater than 1,000 ppm for most substances, an operational re-
striction of 1,000 ppm 1s established as a warning flag to:
0-125
-------
— evaluate the need to enter environments with unknown
concentrations greater than 1,000 ppm
— identify the specific constituents contributing to the total
concentration and their associated toxic properties
— determine more precisely concentrations of constituents
-- evaluate, the calibration and/or sensitivity error associated
with the Instrument(s)
-- evaluate instrument sensitivity to wind velocity,- humidity
temperature, etc.
- A limit of 500 ppm total vapors/gases in air was selected as the
value to consider upgrading from Level B to Level A. This concen-
tration was selected to fully protect the skin until the constit-
uents can be identified and measured and substances affecting the
skin excluded.
- The range of 500 to 1,000 ppm Is sufficiently conservative to pro-
vide a safe margin of protection if readings are low due to instru-
ment error, calibration, and sensitivity; if higher than antici-
pated concentrations occur; and 1f substances highly toxic to the
skin are present.
With properly operating portable field equipment, ambient air
concentrations approaching 500 ppm have not routinely been encoun-
'tered on hazardous waste sites. High concentrations have been
encountered only 1n closed buildings, when containers were being
opened, when personnel were working 1n the spilled contaminants,
or when organic vapors/gases were released 1n transportation
accidents. A decision to require Level A protection should also
consider the negative aspects: higher probability of accidents due
to cumbersome equipment, and most importantly, the physical stress
caused by heat buildup in fully encapsulating suits.
IV. LEVEL 8 PROTECTION (5 to 500 ABOVE BACKGROUND)
Level 8 protection 1s the minimum Level of Protection recommended
for Initially entering an open site where the type, concentration,
and presence of airborne vapors are unknown. This Level of Protection
provides a high degree of respiratory protection. Skin and eyes are
also protected, although a small portion of the body (neck and sides
of head) may be exposed. The use of a separate hood or hooded,
chemical-resistant jacket would further reduce the potential for
exposure to this area of the body. Level B impermeable protective
clothing also Increases the probability of heat stress.
0-126
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A limit of 500 ppm total atmospheric vapor/gas concentration on
portable field Instruments has been selected as the upper restriction
on the use of Level 8. Although Level B personnel protection should
be adequate for most commonly encountered substances at air concen-
trations higher than 500 ppm, this limit has been selected as a
decision point for a careful evaluation of the risks associated with
higher concentrations. These factors should be considered:
- The necessity for entering unknown concentrations higher than 500
ppm wearing Level B protection.
- The probability that substance(s) present are severe skin hazards.
- The work to be done and the increased probability of exposure.
- The need for qualitative and quantitative identification of the
specific components.
Inherent limitations of the Instruments used for air monitoring.
- Instrument sensitivity to winds, humidity, temperature, and other
factors.
V. LEVEL C PROTECTION (BACKGROUND TO 5 PPM ABOVE BACKGROUND)
Level C provides skin protection identical to Level B, assuming the
same type of chemical protective clothing 1s worn, but lesser pro-
tection against Inhalation hazards. A range of background to 5 ppm
above ambient background concentrations of vapors/gases 1n the atmos-
phere has been established as guidance for selecting Level C pro-
tection. Concentrations 1n the air of unidentified vapors/gases
approaching OP exceeding 5 ppm would warrant upgrading respiratory
protection to*a self-contained breathing apparatus.
A full-face, air-purifying mask equipped with an organic vapor can-
ister (or a combined organic vapor/partlculate canister) provides
protection against low concentrations of most common organic vapors/
gases. There are some substances against which full-face, canister-
equipped masks do not protect, or substances that have very low
Threshold Limit Values or Immediately Dangerous to Life OP Health
concentrations. Many of the latter substances are gases or liquids
In their normal state. Gases would only be found 1n gas cylinders,
while the liquids would not ordinarily be found In standard con-
tainers OP drums. Every effort should be made to identify the in-
dividual constituents (and the presence of particulates) contributing
to the total vapor readings of a few parts per million. Respiratory
protective equipment can then be selected accordingly. It Is ex-
ceedingly difficult, however, to provide constant, real-time Iden-
tification of all components 1n a vapor cloud with concentrations of
a few parts per million at a site where ambient concentrations are
constantly changing. If highly toxic substances have been ruled out,
0-127
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but ambient levels of a few parts per million persist, it is unreas-
onable to assume only self-contained breathing apparatus should be
worn. The continuous use of air-purifying masks in vapor/gas concen-
trations of a few parts per million gives a reasonable assurance that
the respiratory tract is protected, provided that the absence of
highly toxic substances has been confirmed.
Full-face, air-purifying devices provide respiratory protection
against most vapors at greater than 5 ppm; however, until more
definitive qualitative information is available, concentration(s)
greater than 5 ppm indicates that a higher level of respiratory
protection should be used. Also, unanticipated transient excursions
may increase the concentrations in the environment above the Vimits
of air-purifying devices. The increased probability of exposure due
to the work being done may require Level 8 protection, even though
ambient levels are low.
VI. INSTRUMENT SENSITIVITY
Although the measurement of total vapor/gas concentrations can be a
useful adjunct to professional judgment in the selection of an appro-
priate Level of Protection, caution should be used in the inter-
pretation oTthe measuring instrument's readout. The response of an
instrument to a gas or vapor cloud containing two or more substances
does not provide the same sensitivity as measurements involving the
individual pure constituents. Hence the Instrument readout may
overestimate or underestimate the concentration of an unknown com-
posite cloud. This same type of Inaccuracy could also occur 1n
measuring a single unknown substance with the Instrument calibrated
to a different substance. The Idiosyncrasies of each Instrument must
be considered 1n conjunction with the other parameters in selecting
the protection equipment needed.
Using the total vapor/gas concentration as a criterion used to deter-
mine Levels of Protection should provide protection against concen-
trations greater than the Instrument's readout. However, when the
upper limits of Level C and B are approached, serious consideration
should be given to selecting a higher Level of Protection. Cloud
constltuent(s) must be identified as rapidly as possible and Levels
of Protection based on the toxic properties of the specific sub-
stance(s) identified.
VII. EXPLANATION OF PHRASE TOTAL ATMOSPHERIC VAPOR/GAS CONCENTRATION
The phrase total atmospheric vapor/gas concentration 1s commonly
used to describe the readout, in ppm, on PIOs and FIDs. More
correctly it should be called a dial reading or needle deflection.
In atmospheres that contain a single vapor/gas or mixtures of
vapors/gases that have not been Identified, the instruments do not
D-128
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read the total vapors/gases present only the instrument's response.
This response, as indicated by a deflection of the needle in the
dial , does not indicate the true concentration. Accurate dial
readings can only be obtained by calibrating the instrument to the
substance being measured.
-------
APPENDIX III
DERMAL TOXICITY DATA
I. SELECTION OF CHEMICALS
The approximately 350 chemicals listed in Table III-l, at the end of
this appendix, are identified in the Oil and Hazardous Materials
Technical Assistance System (OHMTADS) as being dermally active.
Since OHMTADS contains only about 1200 chemicals, or may not indicate
a listed chemical as a skin hazard, other reference sources should
also be consulted.
The data in Table III-l were compiled by a toxicologist through a
special project with th£ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. As
with any source of information, the data should be cross-checked
against other standard references.
II. USE OF TABLES
A. Categories
Table III-l divides chemicals into two categories:
Category 1 (more serious), which includes:
- Gases having a systemic dermal toxlcity rating of moderate to
extremely hazardous and a skin penetration ranking of moderate
to high.
- Liquids and solids having a systemic dermal toxlcity rating of
extremely hazardous and a skin penetration ranking of moderate
to high.
- Gases having a local dermal toxlcity rating of moderate to
extremely hazardous.
- Liquids and sol Ids having a local dermal toxlcity rating of
extremely hazardous.
Category 2 (less serious), which includes:
- Gases having a systemic dermal toxlcity rating of slightly
hazardous and a skin penetration ranking of slight.
• Liquids and sol Ids having a systemic dermal toxlcity rating of
slightly hazardous and a skin penetration ranking of moderate
to slight.
0-130
-------
- Gases having a local dermal toxicity rating of slightly haz-
ardous.
- Liquids and solids having a local dermal toxicity rating of
moderate to slightly hazardous.
8. Physical State
The physical state of the chemicals listed is their normal state.
In a fire, some listed as solids or liquids could vaporize and
represent a greater hazard to the skin. The chemicals listed may
also be found mixed with other substances, which could change how
they affect the skin.
«
C. Skin Penetration
Negligible Penetration (solid - polar)
•*• Slight Penetration (solid - nonpolar)
•M- Moderate Penetration (liquid/solid - nonpolar)
+-M- High Penetration (gas/11qu1d - nonpolar)
D. Potency (Systemic)
Extreme Hazard
Moderate Hazard
1 mg/kg-50 mg/kg)
: 50-500 mg/kg)
+ Slight Hazard (LQ$Q: 500-15,000 mg/kg)
E. Potency (Local)
Extreme - Tissue destruction/necrosis
Moderate - Irr1tatlon/1nfTarnation of skin
Slight - Reddening of skin
Lethal amount to
a 7Q-k1logram man
drops to 20 ml
1 ounce - 1 pint
(1 pound)
1 pint - 1 quart
(2.2 pounds)
III. RELATION OF TABLE III-l AND LEVELS OF PROTECTION
The purpose of Table III-l 1s to provide data that a qualified person
can use In conjunction with other site-specific knowledge to select
protective clothing. The data relate to skin toxicity only and
should not be used to select respiratory protection equipment.
0-131
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The known or suspected presence and/or measured concentration of
Category 1 chemicals at or above the listed concentrations warrants
wearing a fully encapsulating suit (Level A). The known or suspected
presence and/or measured concentration of Category 2 chemicals at or
above the listed concentrations suggests that a lesser level of skin
protection (Level B or C) is needed.
There is no decision-logic for choosing protective clothing as there
is for choosing respiratory protective equipment. The use of a fully
encapsulating suit over other types of chemical-resistant clothing is
generally a judgment made by a qualified individual based on an
evaluation of all pertinent information available about the specific
incident. Other guidance and criteria for selecting personnel pro-
tection equipment are contained in Part 5, Site Entry - Levels of
Protection and in Append** II.
IV. OTHER REFERENCES
Table III-l does not include all substances affecting the skin.
Other standard references should be consulted, in particular:
- Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents
In the Workroom Environment With Intended Changes for1982,
American Conferenceo?GovernmentalIndustrialHygienists, 6500
Glenway Ave., Building 0-5, Cincinnati, OH 45211 (1982).
- NIOSH/OSHA Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC20402 (August 1981).
- Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC20402 (1980).
Whenever possible, data In one reference should be cross-checked with
other references.
0-132
-------
TABLE III-l
DERMAL TOXIC1TY
Chemical
1,2 Olchloroproplonlc acid
2,4,5 - T Acid
2.4,5 • T Amines
2.4,5 - T Esters
2.4.5 - TP Acid
2.4.5 - TP Acid Esters
2.4.5 - T Salts
2.4 - D Acid
2,4 - Olchlorophenol
2.4 - 0 - Esters
2 - Ethylhexyl Acrylate
2 - Methyl - 5 - ethyl pyrl-
dine
Physical
State
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
+
+
+
+
+
•f+
*•
«•
*
'.**
++
++
Oemal
Toxlclty
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
local
Potency
4+
4-
44
4-
44
•*•
+
+
+ *
+
4
*
•»•
*•
+ +
•»•
+ +
•»•
•«•
*» +
4-
Perntsslble
Concentration
-
10 mg/oi3/8h
10 »g/m3/8h
10 mg/ma/8h
10 mg/m3/8h
10 mg/m3/8h
10 mg/m3/8h
10 mg/m3/8h
-
10 ug/ra3/8h
-
-
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
o
I
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
2 - Napthol
3.5 - Xylenol
Acet aldehyde
Acetic Anhydride
Acetone
Acetone Cyanohydrln
Acetoacetone
Acetyl Bromide
Acetyl Chloride
Acrtdlne
Acroleln
Acrylonltrlle
Physical
State
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
fuming
liquid
fuming
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetration
4-
4-
4-
4-
4+4-
44
4*
4-44-
4+4
+
+
4-f4
Dermal
Toxic Ity
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
sensltlzer
local
sensltlzer
systemic
local
Potency
4+
4+
4
++
+ •
•»-«•
*
++
**+
*+
•f+*
i-f*
+++
4^4-
++*
44
Permissible
Concentration
-
-
200 ppm/flh
360 mg/mj/8h
5 ppm/Sh
20 mg/m3/8h
1.000 ppm/Bh
2,400 mg/m3/8h
10 ppm/8h
-
S ppm/15 mln
5 ppm/15 mln
-
0.1 ppm/flh
.25 mg/mj/8h
2 ppm/8h
Category
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
o
I
CO
-c*
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXIC ITT
Chemical
Adlplc Acid
Adlponltrlle
Alkyl dimethyl 3,4 -
Dlchlorobenzyl ammonium
Chloride
Allyl Alcohol
Allyl Chloride
Anmonla
Ammonium Bicarbonate
Ammonium Bichromate
Ammonium Blfluorlde
Ammonium Bisulfite
Ammonium Carbamate
Ammonium Carbonate
Physical
State
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
gas
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
Skin
Penetratloi
4
444
4
44
44
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Dermal
Toxlclty
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
Potency
4
444
4
44
44
44
444
44
44
44
444
4
44
Permissible
Concentration
-
18 mg/m3/8h
-
2 ppm/Bh
5 mg/m3/8h
1 pp«/8h
3 mg/m3/8h
25 ppm/Bh
18 mq/m3/8h
-
-
-
-
-
-
Category
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
OJ
01
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Ammonium Citrate
(Dibasic)
Anmonlum Ferrocyanlde
Anmonlum Hydroxide
Ammonium Phosphate
(Dibasic)
Ammonium Sulfamate
Anmonlum Sulflde
Ammonium Sulflte
Ammonium Tartrate
Ammonium Thlocyanate
Ammonium Thlosulfate
Aniline
Antimony
Physical
State
solid
solid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
solid
Skin
Penetration
+
+
•M-
+
+
*
*
+
++
•f
++
+
Dermal
Toxic Ity
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
Potency
•M+
+
+++
•
•Hf
4-+
••-f
++
•ft
iH-+
•M-
*-f
4-*^
+*
+t
Permissible
Concentration
-
-
-
-
10 mg/m3/8h
-
-
-
-
-
5 ppm/8h
0.5 mg/m3/8h
Category
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
o
I
CO
cr>
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITr
Chealcal
Antiauny Pentachlorlde
Argon - 37 (radioactive)
Arslne
Arsenic
Arsentc-74 (radioactive)
Arsenlc-76 (radioactive)
Arsentc-77 (radioactive)
Arsenic Acid
Arsenic Dtsulflde
Arsenic Pentoxlde
Arsenic Trlbromlde
Arsenic Trichloride
Physical
State
liquid
gas
gas
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
Skin
Penetratlor
4+
•H+
4+4
4-4
++
4+
4-4
4+
4>
4+
4>
4-f
Dermal
Toxiclty
local
systenlc
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
systemic
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
Potency
+++
•H+
o+
•»-»+
+**
4-f*
4++
*-»-+
•l-f*
•»* +
4-» +
+ 4+
•M-f
+*+
4^ +
* + *
++ +
*f*
Permissible
Concentration
-
-
* 0.05 •g/M3/8h
.25 ng/m3/8h
-
'
-
0.5 mg/m3/8h
-
-
0.5 mg/ra3/8h
0.5 ng/m3/8h
Category
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Arsenic Trloxlde
Arsenic Trlsulflde
Barium
Benzene
Benzophenone
Benzoyl Chloride
Benzoyl Peroxide
Benzyl Alcohol
Benzyl Benzoate
Benzyl Bromide
Benzyl Chloride
Beryllium Nitrate
Physical
State
solid
solid
solid
liquid
solid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
Skin
Penetratlor
++
•M-
+
4+
4-
4+
44
4+
4-f
4+
4-f
4-
Dermal
Toxlclty
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
Potency
4+4
+44
+++
+++
++
»
+*
+*+
•Hf
•»-f +
4-^ +
++
-»•
4^+
++
4-H-
4 +
Permissible
Concentration
.25 mg/m3/8n
0.5 mg/m3/8h
0.5 mg/m3/8h
75 ppm/30 mln
-
5 mg/m3/8h
5 mg/m3/8h
-
-
-
1 ppm/8h
0.25 mg/m3/8h
Category
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
CO
00
-------
TABLE UNI (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Brombenzylcyanlde
Calcium Hypochlorlte _
Calcium Oxide
Calcium Phosphide
Caophor
Captan
Carbaryl
Carbofuran
Carbon Dlsulflde
Carbon Monoxide
Carbon Tetrachlorlde
Cetyldlaiethylbenzyl-
ammonlura Chloride
Physical
State
liquid
<77 F-solle
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
gas
liquid
solid
Skin
Penetratlor
++
*
•f
+
*
++
**
4-f
**
4+f
+*+
+ .
Dermal
Toxlclty
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
systemic
local
local
Potency
*+
*t+
4-f
*+
4-f
4+
*+
**
*+
+
*+
*-*+
+**
++
i-t*
+t*
*4*
•»•
+
Permissible
Concentration
-
-
IP rg/«3/30 Kin
-
2 ppn/8h
5 ng/m3/8h
5 «g/«3/8h
0.1 mg/m3/8h
20 ppm/flh
60 mg/mj/8h
50 ppra/fih
10 ppm/8h
Category
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Chloracetophenone
Chlordane
Bromine
Butyl anlne
Butyl Hercaptan
Butyric Acid
Calcium Ar sen ate
Calcium Arsenlte
Calcium Carbide
Calcium Cyanide
Chlorine
Chlorine - 36 (radioactive)
Physical
State
solid
solid
liquid
(fuming)
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
solid
gas
. ga*
Skin
Penetration
4
+
44
44
44
44
4
4
4
44
444
444
Dermal
Toxlclty
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
local
Potency
44
44
*+
44
444
44 '
444
44
44
44
444
4*
4+4
4+
f44
+ t
+4*
444
Permissible
Concentration
.05 ppm/Sh
.5 mg/ra3/8h
.1 ppm/Bh
5 ppm/Bh
.5 ppm/8h
-
1 mg/m3/8h
-
-
5 mg/nr/10 rain
1 ppm/flh
3 mg/mj/8h
-
Category
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
o
I
-------
TABLE III-1 (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Chloroacetlc Acid
Chlorobenzene
Chlorobutadlene
Chlorooiethane
Chloroplcrln
Chlorosulfonlc Acid
Chlorthlon
Chronyl Chloride
CHU
Copper Naphthenate
Coumaphos
Cresyldlphenyl Phosphate
Physical
State
solid
liquid
liquid
gas
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
liquid
solid
liquid
Skin
Penetratloi
4-f
**
++
+++
«+
++
•M-
++
+
++
4-
*+
Dermal
Toxlclty
local
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
Potency
**
++
*~f
*+
+
t*
***
*-»*
•»-M
+
++t
++
+
•»•
*+
++
**
+**
+*•
Permissible
Concentration
-
75 ppm/Bb
350 mg/mj/8h
25 ppm/8h
100 ppm/6h
0.1 pp«/8h
5 ppa/8h
-
.1 «g/m3/8h
-
500 ppm
-
-
Category
2
2
2
I
I
I
2
1
2
2
2
2
o
I
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Crotonaldehyde
Curaenc
Cuprlc Acetate
Cuprlc Acetoarsenate
Cuprlc Sulfate, Ammonlated
Cyanogen
Cyanogen Bromide
Cyanogen Chloride
Cyclohexanol
Cyclohexanone
Cyclohexylamlne
"•caborane
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
gas
solid
gas
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
Skin
Penetratlor
++
++
+
•«•
* -
*-f*
++
•M-4-
+
+
*+
4-
Dermal
Toxlclty
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
Potency
-M^
+*
++
+
+++
*+ '
++
*f
^+
***
»+
*+*
* +
*-f
+*
•»-*
•»•
^+
*•
•»-*
++
*+
**
Permissible
Concentrat Ion
2 ppm/8h
50 ppm/8h
0.1 mg/m3/8h
0.1 mg/m3/8h
2 mg/m3/8h
10 ppm/8h
0.5 ppm/8h
10 ppm/15 min
5 mg/m3/8h
50 ppm/8h
50 ppm/8h
10 ppm/8h
.05 ppm/8h
Category
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
-I
o
I
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Decanal
Di acetone Alcohol
Dtanylaalne
Dlborane
Olcamba
Olchloblnll
Olchlone
Oichlorodlflouromethane '
Dlchloroethyl Ether
Dichloromethane
Dfchloropropane
Dichloropropene
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
liquid
gas
solid
solid
solid
gas
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetrattor
4-f
4+
4>
++
*
4-
4-
4+
44-
4+
4+
4+
Dermal
Toxtclty
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
Potency
+4
4+
+
++
+-*
++
++
*
++
+
+
*+
++
+*
•f*
++
++
++
+
4-+
4*
Permissible
Concentration
-
50 pp0/8h
»
.1 ppm/Sh
-
-
-
1,000 ppm/Bh
5 ppra/8h
200 ppm/Bh
75 ppn/8h
-
Category
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERHAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Dlchloropropene Dlchloropro-
pane
Dlchlorvos
Dfcyclopentadlene
Dlethanolaalne
Olethylamine
Dlethylene Glycol
Dlethylenetrl amlne
Olethyl Phthalate; Ethyl
Formate
Dimethyl ami ne
N,N • dimethyl aniline
Dlmethylsulfate
"'•^xane (p-dloxane)
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
' liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
oily
liquid
oily
liquid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
++
4+
+-f
+
4+
4-
4-
+*
+f
+4*
+*•
*-f
Dermal
Toxiclty
local
systemic
systemic
local
local
•local
systemic
local
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
systemic
Potency
44
44
44
4++
•
44
4-f
4
+44
4-
4*4
44
4
4+4
44
4
Permissible
Concentration
-
.1 ppm/8h
1 mg/m-Veh
5 ppm/8h
-
25 ppm/Sh
-
1 ppm/8h
•
10 ppm/8h
18 mg/mj/8h
5 ppm/8b
25 mg/mj/8h
1 ppm/8h
50 ppm/8h
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
I
(—•
-p.
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Dlphosgene
Dlquat
Dlsulfotone
Dturon
DN8P
ONBP-NH4-salt
1-Dodecanol
Endosulfan
Endothal
Eplchlorohydrln
Ethlon
Ethyl Acetate
Physical
State
gas
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
44
44
44
44
44
44
4
44
44
44
4-f
Dermal
Toxlclty
local
local
systemic
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
systemic
local
Potency
44*
44
44
444
44
44
444
444
4
444
44
4
44
44
44
Permissible
Concentration
-
0.5 »g/«3/8h
fl mg/M3/8h
-
-
-
-
0.1 ng/n3/6h
5 ppm/8h
19 mg/m3/8h
-
400 ppm/flh
1400 mg/ra3/8h
Category
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
-------
TABLE 1II-1 (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Ethyl Acrylate
Ethyl Benzene
Ethyl Chloride
Ethyl ene
Ethyl ene Cyanohydrln
Ethylene Dlbrorolde
Ethylene Dlchlorlde
Ethylene Glycol 01 acetate
Ethylene Glycol Monoethyl
Ether Acetate
Ethylene Glycol Monoethyl
Ether
Ethylene Oxide
r*hy1 Ether
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
liquid
gas
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
++
++
*4
++
++
++
•»-*
++
++
++
*
+
Dermal
Toxlclty
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
frostbite
local
frostbite
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
Potency
++
++
++
++
++
»
-Hf
•»•
*^
++
**
+ 4
•f
+
*•
+
4 + +
+-f*
Permissible
Concentration
25 pp
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXIC ITY
Chemical
Per bam
Ferric Hydroxide
Ferric Nitrate
Ferric Sulfate
Ferrous Sulfate
Ferrous Hydroxide
Ferrous Sulflte
Fish Oil
Fluorine
Formaldehyde
Formic acid
Furfural
Physical
State
solid
solid
' solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
gas
liquid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
+
-
'
-
-
-
-
4+
4+4
4+
4+
4+
Dermal
Toxlclty
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
local
local
local
allergen
local
local
systemic
local
local
Potency
*•
+
4+
4>
4-4
4+
*-«•
44
4
4+4
^**
+*
0+
4t+
Peralsslble
Concentration
15 »g/m3/8h
-
f Bg/«3/8h
-
-
-
-
-
.1 pp«
3 ppm/8h
5 ppm/Sh
5 ppm/8h
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Gas oils
Glyoxal
Guthlon
Heptachlor
Heptane
Heptanol
HETP
Hexaborane
Hexamethyl ened 1 anl ne
Hexane
Hexanol
"^xylene Glycol
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
44
4
44
- 444
44
44
444
44
44
44
44
44
Denial
Toxlclty
loctl
local
systemic
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
Potency
•*•
*
4+
»
4-f
•f
•f
•M-
•»•
+*
444
44
44
444
44
4
44
444
44
44
4
Permissible
Concentration
-
-
-
.5 ng/nVBh
500 ppm/8h
-
-
-
-
500 ppm/8h
-
25 ppm/8h
125 mq/m3/8h
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
o
I
oo
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXIC in
Chemical
Hydraxlne
Hydrochloric Acid
Hydrofluoric Acid
3H (Tritium) (Radioactive)
Hydrogen Cyanide
Hydrogen Fluoride
Hydrogen Sulflde
Hydroqulnone
Hypochlorous Acid
Indole
Iron Dust
Isobutyl 'Alcohol
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
liquid
gas
gas
gas
gas
solid
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
44
4+
44
444
444
444
444
44
44
44
-
44
Deraal
ToKlclty
local
systenlc
local
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
systemic
local
.systemic
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
systemic
Potency
•M-f
+4
+++
+
+++ •
+ '
*4*
4~*~f
44*
44+
44
44
444
444
44
4
44
Permissible
Concentration
1 ppm/6h
5 ppm/6h
3 ppm/6h
-
10 ppm/8h
3 ppm/6h
10 ppm/8h
2 mg/m3/8h
-
-
4 -
100 ppm/8h
Category
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
i
2
2
2
o
I
-------
TABLE I1I-1 (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITT
Chemical
I sobutyr aldehyde
Isobatyrlc Acid
Isophorone
Isophthaloyl Chloride
Isopropyl Acetate
Isopropyl Mine
Isopropyl Ether
Kepone
Krypton 85 (radioactive)
Lead Arsenate
Lead Fluoborate
"•ulane
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
gas
solid
solid
solid
Skin
Penetration
44
•
44
•
44
44
44
44
444
4
4
44
Denial
Toxlclty
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
Potency
444
*
444
4
44
+4 *
44
4
+
+
«•
++
4-f
+
•f
**
4-M-
•f '
i-f
•l-f
44
44
Permissible
Concentration
-
-
25 pp«/8h
-
250 pp«/8h
5 ppm/8h
250 pp«/8h
-
-
.5 «g/ra3/8h
-
.5 mg/«3/8h
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
o
I
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOX1CITY
Chemical
Malathton
HCP
Mercaptodlmethur
Mercuric Cyanide
Mercuric Nitrite
Methacrylonltrlle
Methyl Acrylate
Methyl Amyl Acetate
Methyl A»y1 Alcohol
Methyl Bromide
Methyl Chloride
Methylene Chloride
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
•
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
or gas
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetratloi
44
44
• *
4
44
44
44
44
4
4
44
Deraal
Toxlclty
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
local
systemic
Potency
+4*
«+f
**
44
4+
444
44
444
4
44
444
44
4
44
44
4
444
444
44
4*
Permissible
Concentration
10 mg/m3/8h
-
•
.01 mg/m3/Bh
.05 mg/m3/8h
1 ppm/Sh
10 ppm/8h
50 ppm/8h
25 ppm/8h
20 ppm/6h
100 ppn/8h
500 ppm/8h
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
o
I
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOKICITY
Chealcal
Methyl Ethyl Ketone
Methyl Isobutyl Ketone
Methyl Mercaptin
Methyl Methacrylate
Methyl Parathlon
Mexacarbate
Monochloroacetone
Monochlorodlfluonmethane
Monoethyl urine
Mono 1 soprop anol ami ne
Monomethylaalne
Morphollne
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
gas
liquid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
gas
liquid
gas
liquid
Skin
Penetration
44
44
444
44
444
44
44
44
444
44
444
44
Denial
Toxlclty
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
(frostbite)
systemic
local
local
local
local
systemic
Potency
4
44
4
4
++.
44
444
444
4
444
44
44
444
44
444
44
444
44
44
Permissible
Concentration
590 ng/«3/8h
100 pp«/8h
10 ppn/8h
100 pp*/fih
200 ug/M3
-
.
1.000 pp«/8h
10 ppM/8h
-
10 ppm/8h
20 ppm/Bh
Category
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITV
Che*1ct)
Hustard Gas
•-xylene
•-xylyl Broalde
Nabaa
Haled
n-aayl Acetate
Naphthalene
Naphthenfc Acid
n-butyl Acetate
n-butyl Acrylate
n-butyl Alcohol
n-butyraldehyde
Physical
State
gas
liquid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
. 44
44
4>
++
*+
^*
4-
•»
4+
*+
4^
4-f
Denial
Toxic Ity
local
local
systolic
local
systealc
local
systemic
local
systetiic
local
local
systealc
local
local
local
local
systemic
local
Potency
4-ff
*+
+
++ *
4+
44
4+
4-
44
44
44
44
44
4 :
444
44
4
444
Permissible
Concentration
-
100 ptweh
-
-
3 «g/«3/8h
100 ppa/Bh
10 ppa/ah
SO »q/«3/8h
^
150 ppM/Bh
710 »q/«3/8h
-
50 ppa/eh
-
Category
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
01
CJ
-------
TABLLE III-l (CONTINUED)
OERNAL TOXICITT
Chailctl
Nickel Amonlua Sulfate
Nickel Carbonyl
Nitric Acid
Nitric Oxide
NltrllotrUcetlc Add
Nitrogen Dioxide
Nltrobeniene
Nitrogen Chloride
Nitroglycerine
Ozone
Nitrous Oxide
Hr '-Mi
Physical
State
solid
liquid
liquid
gas
solid
gas
liquid
liquid
liquid
gas
gas
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
*
++
*•
+*
•••
*4
•H-
4-f
«-f
*
++
**
Demal
Toxlclty
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
Potency
••+
4-f
t+
++4
4-f*
4-f
++
4*
4-f
**
**
+*
«-f
4*
*+*
++
Permissible
Concentration
1 •g/«3/8h
.OS ppm/8h
2 ppm/8h
25 ppm/8h
-
5 ppm/15 mln
1 ppm/8h
5 mg/m3/8h
-
2 mg/B3/8h
.1 pom/Sh
25 ppn/8h
•
Category
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
-------
TABLE IH-1 (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXIC1TT
Chemical
Nonyl Phenol
n-propyl Alcohol
Omazene
o-nltrophenol
o-nltroanlllne
Oxydlproplonltrlle
o-xylene
para-nltroanlUne
Pent anal
Perchloromethyl mere apt an
Phenolcarbylamlne Chloride
Phenolmercurlc Acetate
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
Skin
Penetratlor
•H-
+*
*
+f
•
•f*
•M-
+
*+
*>*
*+
+
Denial
Toxlclty
local
local
systemic
local
systeatc
local
systemic
local
systemic
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
Potency
4-f+
+
+
*+ •
+*
*>4
+
+
+*+
*+
+
+
•«•
«~f
4-f
**
*
4-f
*+
**
*
+<-f
Permissible
Concentration
-
200 ppm/6h
-
-
-
•
100 ppm/8h
1 ppm/8h
-
.1 ppm/8h
-
-
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
i
2
2
2
o
I
en
01
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Phosgene
White Phosphorous (yellow)
Phosphorous Oxychlorlde
Phosphorous Pent asul fide
Phosphorous Trichloride
Phthal 1c-Ac1d-D1 ethyl -Etter
Phthallc Anhydride
p-nltrophenol
Potassium Arsenate
Potassium Arsenlte
Potassium Permanganate
Propane
Physical
State
gas
solid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
gas
Skin
Penetratlor
+
+
4+
4
4+
44-
*
+
4
4
4
4+
Dermal
Toxlclty
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
frostbite
Potency
444
44+
44
•I-H-
*+*
4-H-
•H-
•H-f
4-f
4-
4-f
4
44
4+
44
444
44-
444
444
444
Permissible
Concentration
.1 ppm/8h
-
-
1 mg/m3/8h
.5 ppm/8h
3 mg/m3/8h
-
1 ppm/Bh
-
.5 mg/m3/8h
-
-
1.000 ppm/8h
Category
1
1
2
2
2-
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
o
I
en
m
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chealcal
Proparglte
Prop Ion aldehyde
Proplonlc Acid
Proplonlc Anhydride
Propyl Acetate
Propyl aalne
Propyl ene
Propyl ene Oxide
p-xylene
Pyrethrln I
Pyrethrln II
PyrethriM
Physical
State
11qa1d
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
gas
liquid
liquid
liquid
liquid
solid
Skin
Penetratlor
44
44
44
44
44
444
44
44
44
44
. 4
Denial
Tox1c1ty
systealc
local
local
local
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
systolic
local
(allergen'
systemic
local
(allergen
systemic
local
(allergen
systemic
Potency
44
444
44 •
444
44
1
444
44
4
44
44
4
4
4
4
4
44
44
Permissible
Concentration
-
-
10 po»/8h
-
200 pp«/8h
-
4,000 ppa/8h
100 ppa/8h
100 pp«/6h
-
-
5 •g/M3/6h
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITT
Chealcal
/
Pyrldlne
Pyrocatechol
Qulnhydrone
Quinine
Qulnolene
Qulnone
Resorclnol
Sallcyaldehyde
sec-Butyl Mine
SelenluM
Selenium 75
(Radioactive)
cesone
Physical
State
liquid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
Skin
Penetratlor
4-f
+
«•
+
++
+
•f
++
+
•f
•
+
Denial
Toxlclty
local
systeulc
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systeNlc
local
systemic
Potency
++
+
4-f
+
«~f
*
+
*
•f+
++
++
4-f
4-M-
4-f
«•
4-
4-M-
**
**
++
+4
*+4
4-f
Pemlsslble
Concentration
5 ppa/6h
1 pp«/8h
-
-
-
.1 ppM/Bh
10 ppn/Bh
-
15 Mg/ii3/6h
-
-
-
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
o
I
en
00
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXIC in
Chealcal
Silver Nitrate
Slaazlne
Sodlw Anthraqalnone
Sulfonate
Sodliw Arsenate
Sodli* ArsenKe
SodliM Blsalflte
Sod t UN Borate
SodtiM Butyldlphenyl
Su If on ate
SodltM Decylbenzene Sulfonatc
SodltM Fluoride
Sodlua Fluoroslllcate
Sodium Hydrosulftte
Physical
State
solid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
•••
44
+
+
4
4
•f
4-f
+
+
4
44
Denial
To xl city
local
systemic
local
syst&xlc
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
local
systealc
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
Potency
44
44
4
4
44 »
44
444
44
444
44
44
4
44
4
44
44
444
44
444
Permissible
Concentration
-
-
-
.5 •g/»3/8h
.5 ajg/«3/6h
-
-
-
-
2.5 «g/«3/eh
2.5 •g/»3/6h
-
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
o
I
LT1
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Sodlw Hypochlorlte
SodliM Ltaryl Sulfate
Sodlun Methyl ate
SodluM Naphthalene
Sulfate
SodluM Nitrite
Sodlua OctyUulfate
SodliM Selenlte
Strychnine
Styrene
Sulfoxlde
Sulfur
Sulfur Dioxide
Physical
State
liquid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
solid
solid
gas
Skin
Penetration
44
4-
+
+
4
+
4-
4-
44
4
4-
444
Denial
Toxlclty
local
local
local
local
systealc
local
systemic
local
local
systemic
local
systolic
local
systemic
local
local
local
Potency
444
44
44
»
4-
44
44
44
4 '
44
44
44
444-
44
44
4-
44
444
Perwlsslble
Concentration
-
-
-
-
-
-
.2 »g/«3/8h
.15 mq/mJ/Bl\
.45 mg/**/lS
•In
100 ppM/8h
125 ppm/8h
-
-
5 ppn/8h
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
I
I—•
o
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITT
Cheatcal
Su If uric Acid
Sulfur Honochlorlde
TBA
T-ButylhydroperoxIde
TCA
TOE
Tert-butylMlde
Tetraborane
Tetradecanol
Tetraethylene Pentaalne
Tetraethyl Pyrophosphate
Thallium
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
solid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
solid
liquid
liquid
solid
Skin
Penetratlor
4+
++
+
4-
•
*+
•
4+
4-
4-
4+
4-
Denial
Toxlclty
local
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
systealc
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systealc
local
systenlc
local
systemic
systemic
Potency
*++
*>f
+ »
•H-
+
4-f
*+
*+
4-
4-
4-
4++
4-»+
4-
4
4-f
44
4-
44->
4+4
Permissible
Concentration
1 •g/M3/8h
1 ppa/Bh
-
-
•
-
-
•
-
-
-
0.1 «g/«3/8h
Category
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
t
2
2
2
o
I
crv
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITY
Chemical
Thallous Nitrate
Thlophoigene
Thlra*
Tltanlua 44
TltanliM Chloride
Toluene
Toluene dllsocyanate
Toxaphene
Trlchlorfon
Trlchloroethane
Trlcresyl Phosphate
T-1 ethyl aluminum
Physical
State
solid
liquid
solid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
*
•
+4-
+
+
• *
+
**
•M-
+4
4+
4-
Dermal
Toxlclty
systemic
local
local
systealc
local
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
syst&ilc
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
Potency
4+f
4-f+
** .
4^
•*•
*>
+
+
+4
++
•f
f*
++
<~f
•»-f
+
4*
4-M-
Pernlsslble
Concentration
0.1 mg/n3/8h
-
5 ng/m3/8h
-
-
100 ppn/Bh
375 •g/«3/fih
.02 pp«/Bh
.14 tng/m3/8h
.5 Mg/m^Sh
-
10 ppm/8h
45 mq/mj/8h
-
-
Category
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
o
I
ro
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOX1CITY
Chemical
Trlethylene Gljrcol
TrlethylenetetrMlne
Trlmethylamlne Gas
TrlMthylMlne Solution
Trinitrotoluene
Uranyl Nitrate
Vanadium Oxytrlchlorlde
Vapa*
Vinyl Acetate
Vinyl Bromide
Vinyl Chloride
Vinyl Ether
Physical
State
liquid
liquid
gas
liquid
solid
solid
liquid
liquid
liquid
gas
gas
liquid
Skin
Penetratlor
44
44
44
44
44
4
44
44
44
444
444
44
Denial
Toxlclty
local
systemic
local
local
local
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systemic
local
systaalc
local
local
systemic
local
systavlc
local
systemic
Potency
4
.44
444
444 »
444
44
4
44
44
444
44
44
4
44
444
+44
444
444
44
44
Permissible
Concentration
•»
-
25 ppWBh
25 ppm/Sh
1.5 «g/«3/6h
.25 •g/M3/8h
5 pp«/15 mln
•»
10 ppa/Bh
30 Mg/M3/Bh
200 pp«/8h
200 ppa/8h
-
Category
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
I
I—'
OJ
-------
TABLE III-l (CONTINUED)
DERMAL TOXICITT
Chemical
Xenon 133 (radioactive)
Zinc Borate
Z1nc Chloride
Zinc Cyanide
Zinc Hydrosulflte
Zinc Phenol sulfonate
Zinc Phosphide
Physical
State
i
gas
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
solid
Skin
Penetration
•M-f
*
*'
+
*
+
+
Denial
Toxic Ity
systemic
local
local
local
systemic
local
local
local
systemic
•
Potency
4-H-
•M-
4+
•f
•M-f
44-f
4+4
4+
4+
Permissible
Concentration
-
10 mg/m3/8h
,1 ppm/6h
-
-
-
-
Category
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
i
-------
APPENDIX E
MANUAL
CHAPTER 10
EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
L. ETJRPOSE. This Chanter establishes Agency policy regarding
commercial diving operations in accordance with Department of Labor,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration reoulations at 2^ CFR
1910, Subcart T. Its purpose is to assure that all divina operations,
performed under the auspices of EPA, are conducted in a safe manner,
accordina to uniform procedures, and by sufficiently trained personnel.
This Chapter establishes Agency procedures for developing and admini-
ster inn such standard safety practices.
2. SCOPE. The requirements and procedures specified in this Chapter
shall apply to all diving operations involving any project of the
Agency and carried out by any employee, either temporary or permanent,
of the Agency during the course of his/her employment. In addition,
these requirements shall also apply to any visitinc non-Aaency errployee
engaged in a joint divina operation at, or under the auspices of, any
Agency facility to the extent that this person is not aovetned by
comparable requirements of the Agency or institution that he/she
represents. This Chanter applies regardless of cwnershin of ecruirnrent,
and any eguipment used in conjunction with Aaencv divine owr^tions
regardless of ownership, shall conform to the provisions of this
Chapter. This Chapter shall apply to any type of open circuit SCTRA
diving operation, inc.ludina but not limited to: research projects,
monitoring projects, samole collections, or eouifment naintenance, 'with
the only exception beina the handling of an actual emeraency situation.
It is not the intent of these provisions to delay or hamper an act'ial
rescue operation; therefore, it is the responsibility of the Unit
Diving Officer or Dive Supervisor at the scene to determine the
ultimate course of action during a particular emergency and by doing
so, must not aggravate the situation or jeopardize the safety of
additional personnel.
3. ADMINISTRATION . TVie Assistant Administrator for Administration
shall, broadly administer the Aaency's Divina Safety Prooram
the '^cupational Health and Safety Staff (OHSS).
a. Designation. The Occupational Health and Safety Stafp, upon
the advice of the EPA Diving Safety Committee, shall administer the
Agency's Diving Safety Program and coordinate safety policy and
procedures.
b. EPA Diving Safety Committee.
(1) Composition. The EPA Diving Safety Committee shall be
composed of the following msnbers:
-------
MANUAL CHAPTER 10
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
(a) Chairman selected or voted on by Ocmnittee Nfembers;
(b) Active EPA Diving Officers; and
(c) OHSS Safety Programs Onager.
(2) Revisions. All recommendations for revisions of the re-
gulations rust be agreed upon- by EPA Diving Safety Committee.
(3) Responsibilities. The EPA Divina Safety Committee shall
be responsible for:
(a) Recommending policy and changes in operating pro-
cedures within EPA that will ensure a safe and efficient diving program?
fb) Reviewing existina policies, procedures, and training
needs to ensure a continually high level of technical skills and know-
ledoe throughout the EPA diving program;
Planning, orooramnina, and directing, in -cooperation
with the OHSS, matter of policy pertaining to the initial certif-
ication of new divers and refresher training of experienced divers;
(d) Recommending chanaes in operating policy to the
Director, Ocupational Health and Safety Staff and the Assistant
Administrator for Research and Development, and Regional Administrators;
(e) Serving as an appeal board in cases where a diver's
certification has been suspended;
(f) Planning* programming, and developing diver vork-
shops, seminars, and other activities considered essential to maintaining
a hicrh level of competency among divers;
(g) Reviewing EPA divine accidents or potentially
dangerous experiences and reporting on preventive measures to ensure the
avoidance or reoccurrence of incidents; and
(h) Meeting, at least, annually to discuss recommen-
dations and proposed actions.
In addition, members may participate in the Safety Officer/Designees
Annual Meetina.
CHAP 10 TH
PAR 3 2
E-2
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MANUAL
CHAPTER 10
EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
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HEALTH ANO SAFETY
c. Diving Safety Committee Chairman. The Committee will select or
vote for a chairman to represent them and act as focal point on all
EPA diving activities.
(1) Qualification. The Chairman shall:
(a) Be a trained diver with a wide range of experience;
(b) Be a currently certified EPA diver;
(c) Have*a least 5 year's experience as a diver; and
(d) Have successfully completed a nationally recognized
instructors certification course or it's equivalent.
(2) Responsibilities.
(a) Issue through CHSS, EPA Diver Certification to quali-
fied employees based on recemendations and data from the unit diving
officer;
(b) Coordinate with OHSS, and Diving Safety Committee
training certification and other safety programs for divers;
(c) Confer with CHSS Industrial Hygienist Manager on the
approval and use of specialized breathing apparatus or mixture of gases;
(d) Review and initiate through CHSS, appropriate action
on recommendations made by the Diving Safety Committee; and
(e) Remain abreast of new diving techniques, procedures
and equipment.
d. Unit Diving Officer.
(1) Designation. Unit Diving Officers shall be selected from
various EPA installations which conduct diving operations. These
diving officers shall be appointed by the installation director.
(2) Qualifications. The Unit Diving Officer shall be a
trained,.currently certified diver experienced in the types of diving
conducted by the organizational unit.
(3) Responsibilities. The Unit Diving Officer shall be re-
sponsible, within the unit, for:
(2/11/82) CHSFuT
3 PAR 3
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MANUAL CHAPTER 10
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(a) Ensuring that all diving gear and accessory equipment
be maintained in a safe operating condition;
(b) Ensuring the maintenance of equipment files at the
reporting unit levels, to include type, brand name, serial number, and
repairs completed on compressors, tanks, regulators, depth gauges,
pressure gauges, vetches, helmets, hoses, pneunoneters and decompression
meters;
(c) Ensuring that a competent Dive Supervisor is in charge
of the diving operations conducted by the unit's various operations.;
(d) Reporting immediately all diving related accidents
which occur within his unit on EPA Form 1440-9 and other appropriate
accident reports as outlined in Chapter 3 of this Manual to the
Occupational Health and Safety Staff through the local Safety Officer/
Designee;
(e) Maintaining a file of each diver in the unit, or de-
legating the responsibility to the Dive Supervisor. Files shall in-
clude but not be limited to: diving physical exams (subject to the
requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974), training records, letters
of certification, and monthly dive logs, etc; and
(f) Dive plan/log information.
e. Dive Supervisor.
(1) Designation. Depending on the unit organization, a Dive
Supervisor will be assigned for each operation by the Unit Diving
Officer.
(2) Qualification. The Dive Supervisor shall be a currently
certified diver experienced in that specific type of diving.
(3) Responsibilities. The Dive Supervisor shall be in complete
charge of the individual diving operation as a member of the dive
team at the location of the dive, and shall be responsible for and
ensure that:
(a) All diving operations are conducted safely in accord-
ance with prescribed EPA diving safety rules and regulations;
CHAP 10 TN (2/II/82)
PAR 3 4
E-4
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MANUAL
CHAPTER LO
EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
(b) All divers are certified, properly trained, and
physically fit to perform the required diving, and that the prescribed
files on the divers are maintained if the responsibility has been
delegated by the Unit Diving Officer;
(c) All equipment is in a safe operating condition, and
that th«3 required maintenance records are maintained as directed by
the Unit Diving Officer^
(d) Dives are terminated when, in his/her opinion, signif-
icant envirorunental, personal, or equipment problems are encountered and
emergency aid is summoned;
(e) Emergency procedures are. understood by all personnel
prior to diving;
(f) ML divers are monitored after each dive for symptoms
of decomtJrcssion sickness; and
(g) He/she is knowledgeable in dive plan and overall
operation to be performed.
f. Individual Diver.
(1) Designation. Individual divers shall be certified by the
EPA Diving Safety Committee Chairman upon recommendation from the Unit
Diving Officer.
(2) Qualifications. Divers shall be sufficiently trained to
undertake the assigned diving tasks.
(3) Responsibilities. The individual diver shall be respon-
sible for and ensure that:
(a) A good physical condition and a high level of diving
proficiency are maintained;
(b) The equipment is in a safe operating condition;
(c) Diving conditions are safe; and
(d) The dictates of training or diving regulations are not
violated.
(2/11/3:) 5 CHAP 10
£-5
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MANUAL
CHAPTER 10
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
g. Tender.
(1) Designation. The Dive Supervisor will select the Tender
to be used for a specific dive. His/her name will appear on the Dive
Plan/Log and will, therefore, be approved beforehand by the Unit Diving
Officer.
(2) Qualifications. The Tender need not be a currently EPA
Certified diver, but must, in the opinion of the Dive Supervisor and the
Unit Diving Officer, have sufficient knowledge of basic first aid,
swimming, life saving, boat operation and other procedures to be used in
an emergency.
(3) Responsibilities. The Tender will perform the following:
(a) Assist the divers, as requested, in putting on or
taking off equipment;
(b) Record in writing the "down" and "up" times of all
divers on the team;
(c) Maintain a constant visual observation of the diver's
exhaust bubbles and,
_1 warn off boat traffic which may pose a hazard to
the submerged divers;
2 in larger vessels, advise the vessel operator as
to the location of the divers and their readiness for being retrieved;
(d) Assist the divers, as requested, in exiting the water;
and
(e) Perform no other concurrent function which will inter-
fere with the conduct of the above duties.
4. POLICIES.
a. Individual Diver Responsibility. Each diver has the responsi-
bility and privilege to refuse to dive if diving conditions are unsafe
or unfavorable; if at any specific time, the diver feels that he or she
is not in good physical or mental condition for diving; or if by diving,
CHAP LO 6 TN (2/11/82)
^ E_fi
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CHAPTER 10
EPA 01VING SAFETY POLICY
MANUAL
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AflD SAFETY
the diver would violate the dictates of training or these regulations.
The conditions and reasons for refusing to dive may be required to be
documented. If requested, the incident will be reviewed by the officer
in charge of the Reporting Unit with the Unit Diving Officer
and diver, and appropriate action may be taken. Any action resulting
from this review may be appealed to the EPA Diving Safety Committee.
b. SCUBA Diving Teams. Except under emergency conditions, the
buddy system of at Least two (2) divers will always be required. In
the event that diving is shallow within a restricted area, with water
conditions of low velocity and turbidity, the buddy diver may remain at
the surface fully equipped, maintaining visual, verbal and/or physical
contact with the working diver at all times. A surface attendant shall
hf in the immetliatff area any time diving conditions rfsquire it.
c. Diver Proficiency. EPA certified divers should log an average
of at Least two (2) diving days per month. Any time six (6) weeks or
more elapses without a dive, the diver should complete a requalifyirn
program. Any time three (3) months or more elapses without a dive, the
diver must complete a requalifying prcgran before resuming -work dives.
The EPA Diving 'Safety Committee Chairman, -with the advice of the Diving
Officer or designee, shall specify the requalifying program. This re-
quiranent may be waived by the official in charge of the project,
program, or Reporting Unit during emergency conditions. A report of
such waiver must be submitted to the Office of Occupational Health and
Safety Staff through the Unit Diving Officer for review by the EPA
Diving Safety Ccmnittee. Supervisors will authorize the necessary
time and payment for qualifying dives if diving is required for
official progran activities. Diving equipment will be available
.'luring nonduty hours for purposes of maintaining diver proficiency.
5. DIVER TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION.
a. Training.
(1) Basic. All prospective EPA divers must have successfully
completed a basic diver training course offered by one of the nationally
recognized private agencies (e.g. NAUI, PADI, YMCA. NASDS) or by the
U.S. Navy. 'Training courses givey by colleges or universities must be
approved for content by the EPA Diving Officer before being accepted
for this requirement.
(2/11/32) 7 CHAP in
PAB 4
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MANUAL CHAPTER 10
EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
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(2) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Training. All workincr divers, senior divers and divina instructors
shall attend the NDAA "Hiving Accident Management" class within 1 year
of adoption of this Chapter.
b. Medical Requirements.
(1) Prior to acceptance for initial diver trainina or cert-
ification, and annually thereafter, each diver shall he required to
underqo a diving physical examination. The individual diver shall
provide the examinina physician with the following listed NOAA
medical forms, as appropriate, in order to ensure an examination
appropriate to diving activities:
(a) NDAA Form 64-5, Part I, Medical Evaluation Criteria:
- (b) NOAA Form 64-5, Part II, Hiving Fitness Medical
Evaluation Report:
(c^ SF-7P, Certification of Medical Examination (Civilian
Personnel):
(d) SF-8P, Report of Medical Examination (Commissioned
Personnel); and
(e) ?JF-93, Report of Medical History.
(These forms are available from the local Sa.fetv Officer/Hesi-
gnee.)
(21 Upon receipt of the completed medical documents from the
examining physician/ the individual diver is responsible for distribu-
tion of these fonts as follows:
(a) Forward signed originals of SF-78 to the EPA Divina
Safety Committee Chairman throudh the Unit Hivina Officer, with copies
to OHSS:
(b) Forward a signed copy of NOAA Form 64-5, Dart II,
only, to the Unit Diving Officer for retention in the employee's
filer and
CHAP 10 TN (2/11/82)
PAR 5 8
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(c) Retain a copy of all forms for personal records and to
provide additional copies should the originals be lost in transmittal.
(3) Signed copies of NCAA 64-5, Part II, marked "Approved"
shall, upon screening of documents for completeness, substantiate
medical qualifications for diving.
(4) In any instance where an employee does not neet
established physical standards, or in any instance where there is a
question about en employee's medical qualifications for diving, the
EPA Diving Safety Committee Chairman may consider a waiver based on
a review of the case by an expert selected by the EPA Medical
Monitoring Program Manager, who shall render its. medical opinion
and recommendations in a timely manner.
(5) Based upon the opinion and recommendations of the medical
expert selected by the Medical Monitoring Program Manager, the EPA
Diving Safety Committee Chairman shall:
(a) Refuse waiver;
. (b) Approve waiver and certify fitness for full diving
duty; or
(c) Approve waiver and restrict diving duty as appro-
priate.
This designation shall only be made for conditions that are not signi-
ficantly disabling and do not constitute a significant threat to the
employee or fellow divers.
(6) No waiver of any portion of established medical evalua-
tion criteria shall be granted without further consultation with the
Medical Monitoring Manager. If, after consultation, a waiver is
granted, the Diving Safety Committee Chairman shall be notified in
writing 30 days prior to the commencement of the waiver, stating
the reasons for granting the waiver.
c. Certification. The Unit Diving Officer submits the prospective
diver's record of qualifications to the EPA Diving Safety Committee
Chairman for final review. Copies of the following should be included:
TN( 2/11/32) 9 CHAP 10
r.o
PAP 5
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MANUAL
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
CHAPTER 10
EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
(1) Present certificate;
(2) The physician's Diving Fitness Medical Evaluation Report;
(3) The results of other tests conducted by the Unit Diving
Officer;
(4) A -written statement of the Unit Diving Officer's evaluation
of the overall qualifications and performance of the prospective diver;
(5) An EPA certification issued by the Unit Diving Officer
in one of the following categories:
(a) Trainee Diver. A diver who has completed a basic
SCUBA diver training course but has performed fewer than 15 open -water
dives. Diver Trainees may not be paired together to form a dive team nor
may they perform 'working dives. They may accompany a world.ng diver as a
buddy on dives involving a simple task, at the discretion of the Unit
Diving Officer.
(b) Working Diver. A diver who has completed a least
15 open water di<
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MANUAL
CHAPTER 10
EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
6. DIVING OPERATIONS.
a. Certification. Each diver who is an employee of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency must have an EPA certification at the
level of the dive being conducted. Each non-EPA diver engaged in a dive
under the auspices of any EPA facility must have a certification compar-
able to EPA certification from the institution he/she represeats on file
with the Unit Diving Officer.
b. Limits.
(1) All dives shall employ open circuit SCUBA using compressed
air unless otherwise specifically approved by the Unit Diving Officer
in writing.
(2) All dives shall be within the no decompression limits as
specified in the U.S. Navy Decompression Tables. r.vhen there is a need
for dives beyond this limit the dives must be approved in advance
by the Diving Safety Committee.
(3) No solo diving will be permitted.
(4) No diving will be conducted without the submittal and
authorization of a Dive Plan.
(5) No dive exceeding the 130 foot depth will be permitted in
the absence of a wodcing decompression chamber attended by trained
personnel.
(6) Cave and under ice diving will generally not be permitted.
Submit ail requests to the Unit Diving Officer and forward copies to the
Diving Safety Committee Chairman.
(7) Dives in waters of great depths, where the diver is not in
visual contact with the bottom (over bottom dives) and -where a diver
could lose his/her orientation or descend beyond safe limits, will be
conducted with some provision for direct contact with the surface such
as a buoyed weighted line with depth markings.
c. Dive Teams. A standard SCUBA diving team shall consist of a
minimum of -3 members: the Dive Supervisor, the diver buddy, and the
Tender. Some situations may require a third diver in the water, but at
TN (2/11/32) CHAP 10
PAR 6
E-ll
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MANUAL
CHAPTER 10
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OCCUPATIONAL '
HEALTH AND SAFETY
no time shall any diver in the water lose visual or tactile contact
with at least one other diver. If such contact is lost, all divers
must immediately surface. In the situation requiring diving from a
boat, the vessel operator's principle responsibility is for the
safety of his/her vessel and its occupants. Hence, depending on the
size of the vessel and the conditions, it may be deemed inappropriate
by the Unit Diving Officer, the Dive Supervisor, or the vessel operator,
for the latter to serve«alsb as the Tender, when this is the case,
the Dive Supervisor will advise the vessel operator as to the safety
precautions specified in this Chapter. At the discretion of the unit
Diving Officer, a single diver may enter the water if line tended
from the surface. However, a fully equipped stand-by diver must be
at the dive site ready to give immediate assistance.
d. Equipment. All items of equipment shall be visually and opera-
tionally inspected before each actual use and must be in.proper operating
condition. All dive team members shall be familiar with their use. The
following equipment shall be present at the dive site for all dives.
(1) Personal equipment.
(a) Flotation/Buoyancy Compensation Device - Each diver
must wear an adequate flotation device capable of being filled by at
least two methods.
(b) Tank Harness and Weight Belts - must have a quick
release mechanism.
(c) Tank Pressure Gauge - must be worn at all times and
monitored frequently.
(d) Depth Gauge - shall be worn by each diver when diving
in unfamiliar territory, at unknown depth, in areas of great tidal
fluctuation, in areas of uneven bottom, or under any other conditions
which might cause the diver to exceed his/her planned depth. It is
reccmnended that a depth gauge be worn during all diving operations.
(e) Diving fcfetch - shall be worn by each diver in situa-
tions where there is any likelihood of exceeding the no decompression
limit.
(f) Decompression Meter - shall not be used in lieu of
proper planning of the dive and timekeeping at the dive site.
CHAP 10 i? ™ (2/11/82)
6
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MANUAL
CHAPTER 10
EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
(g) Compass - shall be worn by each diver. Divers can
become disoriented in direction at any depth.
(2) Support Equipment.
(a) Dive Flag - an appropriate dive flag shall be shown at
all times. This is especially critical while actively diving in areas
subject to boating or other hazardous traffic or when required by local
regulation. An appropriate dive flag is a squaro red flag with a white
diagonal stripe at least 12" .square (depending on the size of the
vessel) in all waters except those frequented by international traffic.
In this case, the international code flag "Alpha" will be also used.
In any case, divers will make every effort to avoid diving in areas
in which traffic would cause a safety hazard.
(b) First Aid Kit - shall be approved by the Unit's
physician who performs the annual physicals. A copy of the American
iJational Red Cross publication, Standard First Aid and Personal
Safety shall be included and a copy of the NOAA/Sea Grants Book,
First Aid for Boaters and Divers. Also emergency oxygen should be
on board.
(c) Ladder - shall be provided when diving from a vessel,
dock or other surface where elevation above the surface of the water
presents a difficulty to the diver. The ladder must extend sufficiently
below the surface of the water to support the diver while still in the
water.
(d) Safety Plan - a copy of this Diving Safety Chapter,
the U.S. Navy Decompression Tables and emergency aid information shall
be present at each dive site.
(e) Communications - at each dive site, shore or vessel,
located beyond the range of other reasonable voice communication, a
2-way radio will be provided for use in summoning emergency aid.
(f) Additional support tanks-should be on board and be
ava ilable.
(g) Underwater transporter/communicator should be on
board.
(2/11/82) 13 CHAP 10
E-13 PAR 6
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MANUAL
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
CHAPTER 10
EPA DIVING SAFETY POLICY
e. The Dive Plan/Log. Divers are required to log all dives. The
EPA Diving Plan/Log will be initiated by the prospective Dive Super-
visor desiring to conduct a dive and submitted to the Unit Diving
Officer for approval. After the dive is completed, details of the
dive will be recorded and the Dive Supervisor will certify that the
regulations of the Manual were adhered to and submit it each month to
the Unit Diving Officer.
Q1AP 10
PAR 6
14
E-14
TN
(-/H/S2)
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
APPENDIX A
OCCUPATIONAL
EPA DIVING SAFETY RULES
MANUAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
1. Certification. Each diver must have a valid EPA certifiation or EPA
equivalent.
2. Solo Diving. Ho one may dive unattended.
3. Depth Limits. Dives shall not exceed 130 feet. Proposals for
planned dives to depths greater than 130 feet will require written
approval by the Unit Diving Officer or designee.
4. Decompression Tables. Decompression tables should be copied for use
by a'photographic method which reproduces an exact copy. If this
method is not available, then the hand copied schedules should be
checked for accuracy and signed by several persons.
5. Decompression Dives. Diving activities which exceed the limits of
no-decompression must be approved in advance by the EPA Diving Committee.
6. Over-Bottom Dives. Dives in waters where a diver could sense a loss
of orientation or descend below safe diving depths are to be considered
over-bottom dives. i^Jo over-bottom dives shall be made unless some direct
contact with the surface is maintained, such as net web, a marked line
suspended from a surface float, or depth gauges for all participants,
which permits the diver to determine whether ascension or descension
occurs. .All such divers must be equipped with a buoyancy compensating
device.
7. Boat Tending. During dives beyond swimming distance fron shore or
those in areas of strong currents, a small boat with a qualified
operator will tend the diver.
8. Recompression Chamber. The location, availability and telephone
number of all accessible and operable recompression chambers shall be
maintained by the dive supervisor who instructs the dive team.
9. Emergency Procedures. The Unit Diving Officer, with the approval
of the EPA Diving Safety Committee, will prescribe emergency procedures
to be used in handling diving-related accidents in the operational
area, and all divers shall be familiar with these procedures. All
emergency-lists and procedures shall be available at the dive
location.
10. First Aid Training. All divers should have appropriate First Aid
and CPR training.
LO-A-1
f-vn/s:.) .
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MANUAL
APPENDIX A
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY POLICY
HEALTH AND SAEETY
11. Equipment.
a. Life Support. Open circuit SCUBA using ccmpressed air shall
he standard. Other types of equipment (i.e., surface-supplied diving
equipment, closed-circuit rebreathers,. semiclosed units or other types
of diving apparatus utilizing gas mixtures) may be approved for use
by the Diving Safety Committee Chairman. Individuals requesting use of
closed-circuit rebreathers, semiclosed units, or other types of equip-
ment must have been trained and qualified in the use of such equipment.
Dive supervisors shall also be trained in the use of such equipment
and shall be ready to assist in case of an emergency.
b. Harness and Weight Belt. All harness and weight belts must
have a quick release, operable by a single motion by either hand.
c. Flotation Device. Each diver shall wear an adequate in-
flatable vest or other flotation device.
d. Compass. An underwater compass shall be carried by each diver
when, in the opinion of the Dive Supervisor, lack of underwater
orientation is likely to occur and may create a hazard.
e. Depth Gauge. One underwater depth gauge shall be carried by
each diver when diving in an area of unknown depth or an area of uneven
bottom contours when a diver might reasonably exceed the planned dive
depth. "
f. Decompression Meter. Use of decompression meters will be
authorized only by the Diving Safety Committee Chairman. Decom-
pression meters will not be used for dives which require decompression
stops. Decompression meters can be used as an alternative method of
determining the allowable time at depths before a decompression stop is
required. In all cases at least two meters must be used simultaneously
with the more conservative meter used to determine the allowable dive
time. Decompression meters must be recalibrated every eighteen (18)
months by a qualified technician.
g. Diving Match. A diving watch shall be worn by each member of a
diving team.
h. Diving Flag. A diving flag shall be shown while actively diving
in areas subject to boating or other hazardous traffic.
10-A-2 TN (2/11/82)
E-16 .
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MANUAL
'APPENDIX A
EPA DIVING SAFETY RULES
OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY
i. Air Compressor. No person shall operate a SCUBA air compressor
without having first read the instructions and assisted an operator
experienced in its operation. An operational log shall be maintained
for all EPA SCUBA compressors.
12. ' Equipment Maintenance. All diving gear and accessory equipment
shall be maintained in a safe operating condition. Manufacturers recom-
mended servicing policy shall be followed. Equipment in questionable
condition shall be repaired, overhauled, or discarded. All regulatory
valves, depth gauges, and decompression meters must be critically
examined, calibrated, or checked for accuracy by a competent mechanic
or appropriate specialist every eighteen (13) months. A record of
the inspection and repair will be filed with the Unit Diving
Officer.
13. Air Tank Inspection and Testing. The interior of all cylinders must
be visually inspected annually by a trained person; cylinders shall be
hydrostatically tested at least every three (3) years. The date of the
last test must be recorded on the tank.
14. Air. Tanks shall be charged only with air certified as meeting
established air standards.
TN
(.2/11/82) 10-A-3
£-17
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i UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH LABORATORY
'•l ••o't.0 S A 3 IN E ISLANO
GULF BREEZE. FLORIDA 32561
EPA Diving Physical Examination Checklist
Jim Patrick
Diving Supervisor
Name of Diver Date
Organization
A copy of all physical examination reports will be submitted to the Unit Diving
Officer.
Physical examinations should*be reported on the following:
[~] 1. . Report of Medical Examination, SF-88.
[J 2. Report of Medical History, SF-93.
All reoorts should be COMPLETE as described by MOAA Diving Medical Evaluation
Criteria (keyed to SF-88), with PARTICULAR ATTENTION to:
Q 3. 12 Lead Resting EKG - Required for initial certification and
.annually after age 35.
[~] 4. Audiogram - Required for initial certification and every 5 years
~ thereafter.
[J 5. Chest X-ray - Required for initial certification, bi-annually
until age 40, and annually thereafter.
Q 6. Blood Pressure - Required for all examinations.
Q 7. Height and Weight - Required for all examinations.
[~] 8. SF-88 Item #77A marked qualified for diving.
[~] 9. Date of Physical - Required on all report forms.
[~] 10. Signature - Required on ALL report forms; all signature blocks
for both the examining physician and the examinee should be
completed.
I have reviewed the attached physical examination report and consider it to be
complete. There are no obvious omissions nor obvious inconsistencies with the
NOAA Diving Medical Evaluation Criteria.
Signature of UDO Date
E-18
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NDO DIVER INFORMATION SUMMARY
NOAA
NOS
NMFS
HQ
ERL
Non-NOAA:
Name of Agency
Name of Diver
Name of UDO
Date of Birth
Blood Type & RH Factor
TRAINING 4 CERTIFICATIONS:
Operational:
Dry-Suit:
Divemaster:
Chamb. Oper:
EMT:
DATE OF LAST:
Physical
Certification Level
Date of Certification
Pol luted Water:
Surface Supplied:
Mixed Gas:
Open Sell:
Other:
Chest X-ray
EKG
Audiogram
NOTES:
E-19
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DIVER RESUME
Name
Oate_
1. Formal Training (date, location, certification):
2. Special qualifications (ex. UOT, EOO, instructor):
3. Other Training (ex. mixed gas, rebreather, saturation):
4. Types of diving-equipment used (ex. rebreather, diving bell,- ful1-face mask)
5. Diving conditions experienced (ex. ice, cave, low visibility):
6. For each year you have been diving, list the approximate total number of
dives and total bottom time you have completed (ex. 1970 - 20 dives - 10 hrs.)
7. Name and address of persons who can attest to your diving ability and
experience:
3. Other relevant information:
E-20
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PART!
MEDICAL EVALUATION CRITERIA
These criteria arc to be used by the examining physician in evaluating in applicant's physical fitncs* for diving.
Clinical Evaluation: The applicant should be free of chronic disabling disease or disability. Hii hutory should be free of disease or disability of the type
which could recur under diving condition*, or strenuous physical activity. Any disease which might prevent active exercise should disqualify the
applicant. There should be no bleeding tendency.
Ean: Individual* with acute or chronic ear infection should not dive. Scarring from otitis is not a contraindication to diving. Individuals with
perforation of the drum should be disqualified. Haled perforation* of the drum of at least two months duration will not be disqualifying. Special care
should be taken to keep the ears well cleared during the dive. Acute or chronic otitis externa with discharge, or moderate amounts of cerumen m the
external canal, should be considered harmful in diving until the canals are dear. Cheek tympanic movement with Valsalva, There should be no disease
of the masloids or disturbances in equilibrium.
Audiograra Tracing: This should be done on each applicant to rule out preexisting hearing loan in frequency ranges which could be further impaired
by diving. Damage to (he drum from diving could further compromise a hearing loo. Qvonic octris extern*, a common infection in divers, may thicken
the ear drum and thereby increase the hearing tost. This examination should be done as a baseline and repeated every five yean if diving routinely. It
should be done often if injury occurs lo the ears or symptoms referable to any ear structures develop.
Note and Sinuae*: Persons having acute or chronic until trouble should not dive unless free drainage of the sinuses is assured. Congestion, jeuondary to
upper respiratory infection or hay fever, is a contraindication to diving until free passage of air is possible. Persons with acute upper respiratory
infections may be passed, but should be slnctly cautioned against diving until the upper respiratory infection has completely cleared.
Mouth and Throat: Bridgework or dentures should fit solidly. The applicant ihould be capable of retaining a diving mouthpiece. Acute infectious
diseases of [he soft tissue of the oral cavity are disqualifying until remedial treatment is completed.
Vascular: Peripheral vascular disease which might interfere with gas exchange in an extremity should disqualify the applicant. Varicose veins or
hemorrhoids Jiould be minimal or absent.
Heart: Thrust, size, rhythm, and sounds should be normal.
EKC: Divers should have on record an initial normal exercise electrocardiogram. Beyond age 40. an exercise electrocardiogram should be performed
annually.
Blood Pressure: Blood pressure ihould not exceed 145 millimeters systolic, or 90 millimeten diastolic on repeated examinations for unrestricted
diving.
Pulse: Pulse should be normal.
Lungs and Chest: Persons with evidence of chronic lung disease, interference with free iir passage, or with poor zas exchange, should be disqualified. A
Hiaiory of asthma, with no attacks in ihe preceding three years, should not disqualify the applicant from diving, as long is there is no residual evidence
of the disease. A vital capacity test is necessary only when the examiner is clinically suspicious of a disease. A hutory of pneumothorax or thoracotomy
Jiall disqualify the applicant.
Chest X-ray: A report nl J II \ 17 chest x-ray, taken within 12 months pnor to this phvsiral. .-hall be normal and the results reported with this
'•(aminatton.
Cjitroinlntinal: PIT.XMIS hj«mg .tmpfomanc joutr i»r chronic ::i}tromfrjfiiij| dis
-------
h'urm 88
Ktviico IU/71
Gcnenl Ser*icci Admmntfition
Imcriijcncy Comm. on Medical Record!
FPJMR 101-11..106-8
REPORT OF MEDICAL EXAMINATION
1. LAST (tAMf-flMT FllMt-MIOOLC »•«(
4 HOUC iOOOfSS (A'umwr. axil or /?/•/). n/p or lotrn. 5?o/» onj _?W Corf«)
7. SCX | 1. "ACt
I
>2. otrt or II*TM
». TOTAL YSA« cov(RMMtnr smvict
MIUTANT
CIVILIAN
1). XL/ICC Of 9IMTM
t
I], EXAMINING FACILITY 0* CXAMINIH. ANO AOORtSS
2. GJIAOC AND COMMON
tnr on KMITOI
$ XJHTOSI of EXAMINATION
10. AGENCY
I lOfNTiriCATIOM NO.
*. OATI 0» CXAHINATIOH
H. omuMiZAriOH UNIT
14. I»MC. H(LAT«MSHIf. AND *OO*BS O» MXT Of Km
i». oTMm inro«>«»Tx>i«
'7 airiNC on SP(Ci*i.rr
IN rMij CAMCITV (Talall
LAST SIX
CLINICAL EVALUATION
flOTSS
ftch ittm in topfoonmtf cot'
in d*l*il Sntt
U 'OSC
21.
E.ts--ct«..L
t ••wifti'4 omrmtt*
!..•«•.5 >io C»t5: :t«,ludr l
i? -fiQ' 7>f.J«l Jl.'f
(0
:' • *!-•.••• ••
12 •«. ••. •-(.
)] iiaoc'iNi
U -. , '.r'.l
16 FEET
SPINC. OTM(R uuSCULOSKCUTAk
31 lOiNnrYiNG aoor MAKKS sow. rArroos
«0. SKIN. LYMPHATICS
II xcumxocic .»:...!.-...„«. ..«. .,._ .-/, i
G VAGIN
(Comma* in if*m
*C»A*KS »KO AOOITIONAL
OirtCTS AND OISCASIS
I _i_ 2_ 3 4 i 6 T a ; t 10 11 it 11 14 H 16 £
H 12 it 30 5 a a a a i « "o 22 21 "5 !» It ~f
Luoitroir nioi«at
«5. uaixAL^JIS • SPECIFIC SUAVITY
1. ILIUMIN
C SUGA.
0 MICKMCOnC
it. CxEST X.RAY (Ptirt. <«u. A<™ n««fr •*< '"WO
'7 VCKOLOCY i.\p»i>i lilt (lira an< r»iijll ! 41. (KG
«. KOOO TYPt ANO •" I 50. OTHtR HSTS
FACTO"
E-22
98-•14
-------
MEASUREMENTS ANO OTHER FINDINGS
51. Mcicxr
U. wflCHT | SI. COCO* MAID
i
54. COLOM IT 13
57. tLOOO ntUJUKC (Aim
ts* tx« ». M UN. PWISM wv. 'OHM CONV. PC
CT
ML ACCOMMODATION
•(GMT i.irr
M. FIIL3 or VISION
ti. coio* vmoN ( TV« u<4 •«< rown
O. KIGMT VISION (Tut MT4 ••< irarx
U. OCfTM PCRCXPYION UNCOiraCCTCD
COmfLIlD
H. MO U»3 TUT 0. INTIAOOlUk
PO
II TENSION
Tfl.
1UOIO-CTCK
RIGHT WV /t) 5V /H
urr «v i» sv ;i»
DIGMT
LIFT
tao
n»
'
BY
MO
1
1000 ***>
1
MOO
4000
aooo
•000
74. SUMMARY O' OCFtCTJ «»0 OlAGAQSCS (Li*
-------
STANDARD FORM 93
REV. OCTOBER 197«
GSA FPMH 101-11.8
APPROVED
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT «NQ aUOCET No. 29- R0191
REPORT OF MEDICAL HISTORY
(THIS INFORMATION IS FOR OFFICIAL AMD MEDICALLY-CONFIDENTIAL USE ONLY AND WILL NOT BE RELEASED TO UNAUTHOUIZS) PERSONS)
1. LAST NAME— FIRST NAME — MIDDLE NAME
3. HOME ADDRESS (No. •!(•••« or »FO. eify or town, Se«t». «nd ZIP COOC)
3. PURPOSE OF EXAMINATION
6. DATE OF EXAMINATION
2. SOCIAL SECURITY OR IDENTIFICATION NO.
4. POSITION rrrMe. ^rade. comoonenf)
7. EXAMINING FACILITY OR EXAMINER. AND ADDRESS
flncJud* £>P Co4*J
». HAVE rou EVER <•«•«• cn»c* tten .
lOON-Ti
YES! NO |KNOW|
ScarUI
. Rheumatic
Swollen Of painful j
' Frwqu»nf or ««v«r«
Oixzm*«« or fainunf
Ey« iroubU
i C*r. no««. or ttiroal trowbl*
| M««rin( loii
YE
1 loON'T1
S NO KNOW-
i i DON'T!
'v.--. -J-- rfNQW'
'•f»c-
"! ~1 n^ml
F'«uj«"t ..-lines'..
Slomirn "««f j- .fie
Foot
Adv«n« r«actK>
or m*Oion«
Srokan bon«<
| FVaquant trouOla slavping
0*ora«tion or aic**iiva worry
or fr«qu«nt cold*
Tumor, growth, cymt. cancar
Lo»m of mamory or amna«l«
tootft or fum troutH*
Ruptura/hamia
Stnuiitt*
1 PHa* or ractal di*aa*a
\
Narvout troubl* of any tort
' Pahodt of uncontcJoutnvma
H«y fvvvr
' Fr«quant or oamfui urination
Shin 0 !»«•»•«
Thyroid trouOl*
Kidnay itona or 0titton or poundlnf h«rt
Hl(n or low blood or*«iur«
Loi» o' fingir or roa
Racurrant Dae* o*»n
12. FEMALES ONLY HAVE YOU EVER
I 9«an trMtad for • fwnda ditomvr
"T"
: MM i cflanf* m miMfruil amttm
13. v*«AT tS YOUR USUAL OCC'JPATIQNf
( I* «>.-F 'OU -C.1tC» On»,
: -.« -r,^ ; <•':
-------
r£S NO
CHECK EACH ITEM YES OR NO. EVERY ITEM CHECKED YES MUST BE FULLY EXPLAINED IN BLANK SPACE ON RIGHT
15. Have you been refused ampioyment or
been unable to nold • 100 or itay in
school because of:
A. Sensitivity to chemicals, dun. sun-
light, etc.
9. Inability ta perform cinain motions. |
C. Inaoillty to assume ctrtam positions. '
0. Other medical reasons (It yea. five
reasons.)
16. Have you ever 0««n treated lor a mental
condition? (II yea. ipecrfy «f»en. »n«re.
and give detaife).
17. Have you ever been denied life intur- |
ancef (II ye«. «t»ie reason and «rv« >
deteila.) |
I 18. Haw* you had. or havo you b«*n advitad |
to hava. any oparattont/ (It y«f. daacr.O* |
i and fiv« a«« ar -men occurrad.J
j 19. Haw* you avar Oaan « oalivnt In any tyo* I
of hospital.i* (It y«t. io«ci/y "-nan. «rft«r*.
•vfty, and nama of doctor «nd como'ata
addraavj of noao'fal.;
: 20. Hava you «v«r ftad any illnaai of in/ury '
| oth*>r than thosa .iraady naiad.1 (t9 /«•. '
i •oocify -»n,n. «/na/a. «nd «i*a datajJ«.> I
< 21. Hava you consuttad or Saan traatad by
Ctinics. pnyticians. naaiari. or gtfiar
• practitionan within :h« gast S /aan for
othar than minor lUnaisaii* iff /•-, fiva
i como'ata addraaa of doctor, noapifat. [
i cJin>c. and datai/a,J
; 22. Hav* you av«r baan ratacta»d for military !
I larv.ca Dacau.a of onyiical. m«ntal. or '
otfiar raaion«/ (It yaa. ftva data and
raaton tor '•••crion.J i
23. Hawa /ou avar Oaan dl«chan|«d Crom
military sarvica oacauia of onyaical.
man I at. or otnar raatant/ f" y«s. fiva
j dara. raaton. *nd tyoa of diacA«rfa: ;
i tvnarhar honorao'a. orhar tnan honoraoia. '
for unfifna-a or untuiraOi'ity.) :
r*4. H«v«> you «w«r r«caiv*K]. |« th*r« pending.
or hava you -OO'»«O for oannon or
compensation 'or tnt'ing ditaOiiftom.
ceTify thet I have reviewed the foregoing Information supplied by me and that If is true and complete to trie best at my
aumorite any of the doctors, hospital*, or Clinics mentioned aoove to furnish the Government a complete tnanscrtpt of my medical record for puri
of processing my application for fhia employment or service.
TYPES ON PRINTED NAME Of EXAMINEE
SIGNATURE
NOTE; HAND TO THE DOCTOR OR NURSE. OR If MAILED MARK ENVELOP* "TO 8E OPINED BY MEDICAL OFFICER ONLY."
29. Ptryeicjan's summary and elaooraOoo of all pertlnerrt data (Pfiyeic/e« a he/1 comment on a/I poerthre ane»»ey» In rtema 9 tftrougfi 24. Pfiymjclawi mar
by Interview any additional medical niatory he deem* Important, and record any significant finding* Here..)
TYPED OR PRINTED NAME OF PHYSICIAN OR
EXAMINER
DATE
SIGNATURE
NUMBER OF
ATTACHED SHEETS
xrvcmc OF JTANOAHO FORM 9)
> U.3.GPO: 19B2-OO81-4JB/ 80-.2
-------
APPENDIX F
BASIC DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES
ANNEX 1
LEVEL A DECONTAMINATION
A. EQUIPMENT WORN
The full decontamination procedure outlined is for workers wearing
Level A protection (with taped joints between gloves, boots, and suit)
consisting of:
- Fully encapsulating suit with integral boots and gloves.
Self-contained breathing apparatus.
- Hard hat (optional).
- Chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank boots.
- Boot covers.
Inner and outer gloves.
B. PROCEDURE FOR FULL DECONTAMINATION
Station 1: Segregated Equipment Drop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, sampling devices and containers,
monitoring instruments, radios, clipboards, etc.) on plastic drop cloths
or in different containers with plastic liners. Each will be
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the drop reduces the
probability of cross-contamination.
Equipment: various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop cloths
Station 2: Boot Cover and Glove Wash
Scrub outer boot covers and gloves with decon solution or detergent/
water.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
F-l
-------
Station 3: Boot Cover and Glove Rinse
Rinse off decon solution from Station 2 using copious amounts of water.
Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 4: Tape Removal :
Remove tape around boots and gloves and deposit in container with plastic
liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 5: Boot Cover Removal
Remove boot covers and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 6: Outer Glove Removal
Remove outer gloves1 and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 7: Suit/Safety Boot Wash
Thoroughly wash fully encapsulating suit and boots. Scrub suit and boots
with long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brush and copious amounts of decon
solution or detergent/water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent/water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 8: Suit/Safety Boot Rinse
Rinse off decon solution or detergent/water using copious amounts of
water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
F-2
-------
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 9: Tank Change
If worker leaves Exclusion Zone to change air tank, this is the last step
in the decontamination procedure. Worker's air tank is exchanged, new
outer gloves and boots covers donned, and joints taped. Worker then
returns to duty.
Equipment: air tanks^
tape
boot covers
gloves
Station 10: Safety Boot Removal
Remove safety boots and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
boot jack
Station 11: Fully Encapsulating Suit and Hard Hat Removal
With assistance of helper, remove fully encapsulating suit (and hard hat)
Hang suits on rack or lay out on drop cloths.
Equipment: rack
drop cloths
bench or stool
Station 12: SCSA Backpack Removal
While still wearing facepiece, remove backpack and place on table.
Disconnect hose from regulator valve and proceed to next station.
Equipment: table
Station 13: Inner Glove Wash
Wash with decon solution or detergent/water that will not harm skin.
Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: basin .or bucket
decon solution
or
detegent/water
small table
F-3
-------
Station 14: Inner Glove Rinse
Rinse with water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: water
basin or bucket
small table
Station 15: Facepiece Removal
Remove facepiece. Deposit in container with plastic liner. -Avoid
touching face with fingers.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plasticjiners
Station 16: Inner Glove Removal
Remove inner gloves and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 17: Inner Clothing Removal
Remove clothing soaked with perspiration. Place in container with plastic
liner. Oo not wear inner clothing off-site since there is a possibility
that small amounts of contaminants might have been transferred in removing
fully encapsulating suit.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 18: Field Wash
Shower if highly toxic, skin-corrosive or skin-absorbable materials are
known or suspected .to be present. Wash hands and face if shower is not
available.
Equipment: water
soap
small table
basin or bucket
field showers
towels
Station 19: Redress
Put on clean clothes. A dressing trailer is needed in inclement weather.
Equipment: tables
chairs
lockers
clothes
F-4
-------
C. FULL DECONTAMINATION (SIT. 1) AND THREE MODIFICATIONS
s
I
T
1
2
3
4
STATION NUMBER
1
X
X
X
X
2
X
X
3
X
X
4
X
X
5
X
X
6
X
X
7
X
X
X
X
8
X
X
X
X
9
«
X
X
10
X
X
11
X
X
12
X
X
13
X
14
X
15
X
X
16
X
X
17
X
X
18
X
X
19
X
Situation 1: The individual entering the Contamination Reduction
Corridor is observed to be grossly contaminated or extremely toxic
substances are known or suspected to be present.
Situation 2: Same as Situation 1'except individual needs new air tank
and. will return to Exclusion Zone.
Situation 3: Individual entering the CRC is expected to be minimally
contaminated. Extremely toxic or skin-corrosive materials are not
present. No outer gloves or boot covers are worn. Inner gloves are not
contaminated.
Situation 4: Same as Situation 3 except individual needs new air tank
and wi11 return to Exclusion Zone.
F-?
-------
EXCLUSION
ZONE
OUTER GLOVE
REMOVAL
TANK CHANGE
BOOT COVER
GLOVE RINSE
SEGREGATED
EQUIPMENT
DROP
— HOTUNE —«
SUIT/SAFETY BOOT
WASH
SUIT/SAFETY BOOT
RINSE
SAFETY BOOT
REMOVAL
CONTAMINATION
REDUCTION
ZONE
13
FULLY ENCAPSULATING SUIT
AND HARD HAT REMOVAL
SC3A BACKPACK
REMOVAL
INNER GLOVE
WASH
DECONTAMINATION LAYOUT
LEVEL A PROTECTION
FIGURE A1-1
INNER GLOVE
RINSE
FACE piece
REMOVAL
MS
INNER CLOVE
REMOVAL
INNER CLOTHING
REMOVAL
CONTAMINATION
CONTROL LINE
FIELD
WASH
[19] REDRESS
SUPPORT
ZONE
F-6
-------
ANNEX 2
LEVEL B DECONTAMINATION
A. EQUIPMENT WORN
The full decontamination procedure outlined is for workers wearing
Level B protection (with taped joints between gloves, boot, and suit)
consisting of:
- One-piece, hooded, chemical-resistant splash suit.
*
- Self-contained breathing apparatus.
- Hard hat.
- Chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank boots.
- Boot covers
Inner and outer gloves.
B. PROCEDURE FOR FULL DECONTAMINATION
Station 1: Segregated Equipment Drop
Deposit equipment 'used on-site (tools, sampling devices and containers
monitoring instruments, radios, clipboards, etc.) on plastic drop cloths
or in different containers with plastic liners. Each will be
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the drop reduces the
probability of cross-contamination.
Equipment: various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop cloths
Station 2: Boot Cover and Glove Wash
Scrub outer boot covers and gloves with decon solution or detergent/
water.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
F-7
-------
Station 3: Boot Cover and Glove Rinse
Rinse off decon solution from Station 2 using copious amounts of water.
Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 4: Tape Removal
Remove tape around boots and gloves and deposit in container with plastic
liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Statio.n 5: Boot Cover Removal
Remove boot covers and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 6: Outer Glove Removal
Remove outer gloves and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 7: Suit/Safety Boot Wash
Thoroughly wash chemical-resistant splash suit, SCBA, gloves, and safety
boots. Scrub with long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brush and copious
amounts of decon solution or detergent/water. Wrap SCBA regulator (if
belt-mounted type) with plastic to keep out water. Wash backpack
assembly with sponges or cloths.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent/water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
small buckets
sponges or cloths
F-8
-------
- Station 8: Suit/SCBA/Boot/Glove Rinse
Rinse off decon solution or detergent/water using copious amounts of
water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
smal-1 buckets
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
sponges or cloths
Station 9: Tank Change
If worker leaves Exclusion Zone to change air tank, this is the last step
in the decontamination procedure. Worker's air tank is exchanged, new
outer gloves and boots covers donned, and joints taped. Worker returns to
duty.
Equipment: air tanks
tape
boot covers
gloves
Station 10: Safety Boot Removal
Remove safety boots and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
boot jack
Station 11: SC8A Backpack Removal
While still wearing facepiece, remove backpack and place on table.
Disconnect hose from regulator valve and proceed to next station.
Equipment: table
Station 12: Splash Suit Removal
With assistance of helper, remove splash suit. Deposit in container with
plastic liner. -
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
F-9
-------
Station 13: Inner Glove Wash
Wash inner gloves with decon solution or detergent/water that will not
harm skin. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: decon solution
or
detergent/water
basin or bucket
small table
Station 14: Inner Glove Rinse
Rinse inner gloves with water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
•
Equipment: water
basin or bucket
small table
Station 15: Facepiece Removal
Remove facepiece. Avoid touching face with gloves. Deposit in container
with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 16: Inner Glove Removal
Remove inner gloves and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 17: Inner Clothing Removal
Remove clothing soaked with perspiration. Place in container with plastic
liner. Do not wear inner clothing off-site since there is a possibility
small amounts of contaminants might have been transferred in removing
fully encapsulating suit.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 18: Field Wash
Shower if highly toxic, skin-corrosive, or skin-absorbable materials are
known or suspected to be present. Wash hands and face if shower is not
available.
Equipment: water
soap
F-10
-------
small tables
basins or buckets
field showers
Station 19: Redress
Put on clean clothes. A dressing trailer is needed in inclement weather.
Equipment: tables
chairs
lockers
clothes
C. FULL DECONTAMINATION (SIT. 1) AND THREE MODIFICATIONS
s
I
T
1
2
3
4
STATION NUMBER
1
X
X
X
X
2
X
X
3
X
X
4
X
X
5
X
X
6
X
X
7
X
X
X
X
8
X
X
X
X
9
X
X
10
X
X
11
X
X
12
X
X
13
X
14
X
15
X
X
16
X
X
17
X
X
18
X
X
19
X
Situation 1: The individual entering the Contamination Reduction
Corridor is observed to foe grossly contaminated or extremely toxic
substances are known or suspected to be present.
Situation 2: Same as Situation 1 except individual needs new air tank
and will return to Exclusion Zone.
Situation 3: Individual entering the CRC is expected to be minimally
contaminated. Extremely toxic or skin-corrosive materials are not
present. Mo outer gloves or boot covers are worn. Inner gloves are not
contaminated.
Si tuatiorr 4: Sane as Situation 3 except individual needs new air tank
and will return to Exclusion Zone.
F-ll
-------
OUTER GLOVE
REMOVAL
EXCLUSION
ZONE
TAPE
REMOVAL
aoor COVER
1
GLOVE WASH
0—O-€—0—0—0 "
aoor COVER BOOT COVER *
TANK CHANCE
CONTAMINATION
REDUCTION
ZONE
12
13
CLOVE RINSE
SEGREGATED
OUIPWENT
DROP
• •-HOTLINE- «-
SUIT/SAFETY BOOT
WASH
SU1T/SC3A/8OOT/GLOVE
RINSE
SAFETY 9OOT
REMOVAL
SC3A 8ACXPACX
REMOVAL
SPLASH SUIT
REMOVAL
INNER GLOVE
WASH
DECONTAMINATION LAYOUT
LEVEL 3 PROTECTION
FIGURE A3-1
INNER GLOVE
RINSE
FACE PIECE
REMOVAL
[19 I
INNER GLOVE
REMOVAL
INNER CLOTHING
REMOVAL
CONTAMINATION
' CONTROL UNE
FIELD
WASH
REDRESS
SUPPORT
ZONE
F-12
-------
AMNEX 3
LEVEL C DECONTAMINATION
A. EQUIPMENT WORN
The full decontamination procedure outlined is for workers wearing
Level C protection (with taped joints between gloves, boots, and suit)
consisting of:
One-piece, hooded, chemical-resistant splash suit.
•
- Canister equipped, full-face mask.
- Hard hat.
Chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank boots.
- Boot covers.
Inner and outer gloves.
8. PROCEDURE FOR FULL DECONTAMINATION
Station I: Segregated Equipment Drop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, sampling devices and containers,
monitoring instruments, radios, clipboards, etc.) on plastic drop cloths
or in different containers with plastic liners. Each will be
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the drop reduces the
probability of cross-contamination.
Equipment: various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop cloths
Station 2: Boot Cover and Glove Wash
Scrub outer boot covers and gloves with decon solution or detergent/
water.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
F-13
-------
Station 3: Boot Cover and Glove Rinse
Rinse off decon solution from Station 2 using copious amounts of water.
Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 4: Tape Removal
Remove tape around boots and gloves and deposit in container with plastic
liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 5: Boot Cover Removal
Remove boot covers and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 6: Outer Glove Removal
Remove outer gloves and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 7: Suit/Safety Boot Wash
Thoroughly wash splash suit and safety boots. Scrub with long-handle,
soft-bristle scrub brush and copious amounts of decon solution or
detergent/water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent/water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 8: Suit/Safety Boot Rinse
Rinse off decon solution or detergent/water using copious amounts of
water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
F-14
-------
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
or
high-pressure spray unit
water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
Station 9: Canister or Mask Change
If worker leaves Exclusion Zone to change canister (or mask), this is the
last step in the decontamination procedure. V/orker's canister is
exchanged, new outer gloves and boots covers donned, and joints taped.
Worker returns to duty.
Equipment: canister *(or mask)
tape
boot covers
gloves
Station 10: Safety Boot Removal
Remove safety boots and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
boot jack
Station 11: Splash Suit Removal
With assistance of helper, remove splash suit. Deposit in container with
plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
bench or stool
plastic liner
Station 12: Inner Glove Wash
Wash inner gloves with decon solution or detergent/water that will not
harm skin. Repeat as many times as necessary.
Equipment: decon solution
or
detergent/water
' basin or bucket
Station 13: Inner Glove Rinse
Rinse inner gloves with water. Repeat as many times as necessary.
F-15
-------
Equipment: water
basin or bucket
small table
Station 14: Facepiece Removal
Remove facepiece. Avoid touching face with gloves. Deposit facepiece in
container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 15: Inner Glove Removal
«
Remove inner gloves and deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (20-30 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 16: Inner Clothing Removal
Remove clothing soaked with perspiration. Place in container with plastic
liner. Do not wear inner clothing off-site since there is a possibility
small amounts of contaminants might have been transferred .in removing
fully encapsulating suit.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
Station 17: Field Wash
Shower if highly toxic, skin-corrosive or skin-absorbable materials are
known or suspected to be present. Wash hands and face if shower is not
available.
Equipment: water
soap
tables
wash basins/buckets
field showers
Station 18: Redress
Put on clean clothes. A dressing trailer is needed in inclement weather.
Equipment: tables
chairs
lockers
clothes
F-lfi
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C. FULL DECONTAMINATION (SIT, 1) AND THREE MODIFICATIONS
s
I
T
1
2
3
4
STATION NUMBER
1
X
X
X
X
2
X
X
3
X
X
4
X
X
5
X
X
6
X
X
7
X
X
X
X
8
X
*
X
X
X
9
X
X
10
X
X
11
X
X
12
X
13
X
14
X
X
15
X
X
16
X
X
17
X
X
18
X
Situation 1: The individual entering the Contamination Reduction
Corridor is observed to be grossly contaminated or extremely skin-
corrosive substances are known or suspected to be present.
Situation 2: Same as Situation 1 except individual needs new canister
or mask and will return to Exclusion Zone.
Situation 3: Individual entering the CRC is expected to be minimally
contaminated. Extremely skin-corrosive materials are not present. No
outer gloves or boot covers are worn. Inner gloves are not
contaminated.
Situation 4: Same as Situation 3 except individual needs new canister
or mask and will return to Exclusion Zone.
F-17
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OUTER GLOVE
REMOVAL
EXCLUSION
ZONE
TAP«
REMOVAL
3OOT COVER
*
GLOVE WASH
CANISTER OR
MASK CHANGE
8OOT COVER;*
GLOVE RINSE
SEGREGATED
EQUIPMENT
DROP
•••HOTLINE-«-
SUIT/SAFETY BOOT
WASH
SUIT/SAFETY 3OOT
RINSE
10
SAFETY 3OOT
REMOVAL
CONTAMINATION
REDUCTION
ZONE
12
i 13
SPLASH surr
REMOVAL
INNER GLOVE
WASH
INNER GLOVE
RINSE
DECONTAMINATION LAYOUT
LEVEL C PROTECTION
FIGURE A3-1
FACE PIECE
REMOVAL
INNER CLOVE
REMOVAL
INNER CLOTHING
REMOVAL
FIELD
WASH
REDRESS
CONTAMINATION
~ CONTROL UNE
SUPPORT
ZONE
F-18
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ANNEX 4
LEVEL A DECONTAMINATION, MINIMUM LAYOUT
A. EQUIPMENT WORN
The decontamination procedure outlined is for workers wearing Level A
protection (with taped joints between gloves, boots, and suit) consisting
of:
- Fully encapsulating suit with integral boots and gloves.
*
- Self-contained breathing apparatus.
- Hard hat (optional).
- Chemical-resistant, steel toe and shank boots.
- Boot covers.
- Inner and outer gloves.
B. PROCEDURE FOR FULL DECONTAMINATION
Station 1: Segregated Equipment Drop
Deposit equipment used on-site (tools, sampling devices and containers,
monitoring instruments, radios, clipboards, etc.) on plastic drop cloths
or in different containers with plastic liners. Each will be
contaminated to a different degree. Segregation at the drop reduces the
probability of cross-contamination.
Equipment: various size containers
plastic liners
plastic drop clothes
Station 2: Outer Garment, Boots, and Gloves Wash and Rinse
Scrub outer boots, outer gloves, and fully-encapsulating suit with decon
solution or detergent water. Rinse off using copious amounts of water.
Equipment: containers (30-50 gallons)
decon solution
or
detergent water
rinse water
2-3 long-handle, soft-bristle scrub brushes
F-19
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Station 3: Outer Boot and Glove Removal
Remove outer boots and gloves. Deposit in container with plastic liner.
Equipment: container (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 4: Tank Change
If worker leaves Exclusion Zone to change air tank, this is the last step
in the decontamination procedure. Worker's air tank is exchanged, new
outer gloves and boot covers donned, joints taped, and worker returns to
duty.
Equipment: air tanks
tape
boot covers
gloves
Station 5: Boot, Gloves, and Outer Garment Removal
Boots, fully-encapsulating suit, and inner gloves removed and deposited
in separate containers lined with plastic.
Equipment: containers (30-50 gallons)
plastic liners
bench or stool
Station 6: SC8A Removal
SCBA backpack and facepiece is removed. Hands and face are thoroughly
washed. SCBA deposited on plastic sheets.
Equipment: plastic sheets
basin or bucket
soap and towels
bench
Station 7: Field Wash
Thoroughly wash hands and face. Shower as soon as possible.
Equipment: water
soap
tables
wash basin/bucket
F-20
-------
EXCLUSION
ZONE
SEGREGATED EQUIPMENT
DROP
OUTER GARMENT, SOOTS. ANO
CLOVES WASH ANO RINSE
TANK
CHANGE
0-
CONTAMINATION
REDUCTION
ZONE
OUTER BOOT ANO
GLOVE REMOVAL
3OOTS. GLOVES. ANO
OUTER GARMENT
REMOVAL
MINIMUM
DECONTAMINATION LAYOUT
LEVEL A PROTECTION
FIGURE .
3C9A REMOVAL
CONTAMINATION
CONTROL UN6
F1EL3 WASH
SUPPORT
ZONE
F-21
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APPENDIX G
SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND RESPONSE ASSISTANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Many sources of information and organizations can provide response
personnel with technical data and physical assistance regarding both the
hazards associated with an incident and methods to deal with them. It is
necessary to be aware of these resources and know how to use them.
The information, which may include data on sites, topography, meteorology,
physical/chemica-1 properties of the material, applicable treatment methods,
and available cleanup resources, can be provided by various agencies, maps,
reference books, and manuals. It is advisable to get data from at least
two sources and use the latest addition of any reference, especially when
searching for hygienic standards or toxicological data.
Access to on-line computer files may be possible at the site if a
telephone, portable terminal, and 120-volt outlet are available. Aerial
photographs can also provide useful information when properly Interpreted.
II. BASIC REFERENCES
A. OHMTADS: 011 and Hazardous Materials Technical Assistance Data System,
developed by the EPA. Access through EPA Regional Offices.
OHMTAOS 1s a computerized data retrieval system available in the form
of a computer print-out, manuals, or microfiche. For each of more than
1,000 oil and hazardous substances, there are 126 possible Information
segments on, for example, toxidty and associated hazards, personal
safety precautions, cleanup and disposal methods, materials handling,
and fire fighting. However, not all Information 1s available for all
materials.
B. CHRIS: Chemical Hazard Response Information System, developed by the
U.S. Coast Guard. Access through the National Response Center,
telephone 800/424-8802
CHRIS consists of four manuals, a regional contingency plan, a Hazard
Assessment Computer System (HACS), and an organizational entity at
Coast Guard Headquarters. Volume 1 (CG-446-1) 1s designed to be used
by the first responders at an Incident. Volumes 2, 3, and 4 (CG-446-2,
CG-446-3, and CG-446-4, respectively) are Intended for use by the
On-Scene Coordinator's (OSC) office along with the Regional and
National Response Centers. Coast Guard stations, especially those In
major parts, will usually have these manuals.
-------
1. volume 1: "Condensed Guide to Chemical Hazards"
Volume 1 is intended for use by the first responders on the scene
of an incident. The chemicals involved must be known, however,
before the appropriate information can be obtained from the manual.
This volume also contains a list of questions needed to access
Volume 3. All information in this volume can be found in
Volume 2.
2. Volume 2: "Hazardous Substance Data Manual", (also available from
the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402, GPO
stock number 050-012-00147-2)
Volume 2 is probably the most useful in responding to spills/waste
sites. Containing information on hazardous chemicals shipped 1n
large volume by water, it is intended to be used by port security
personnel and others who may be first to arrive at the scene. The
easily understood information about chemical, physical, and
toxicological properties can help quickly determine the actions to
be taken immediately to safeguard life, property, and the
environment.
3. Volume 3: "Hazard Assessment Handbook"
Volume 3 describes methods of estimating the quantity of chemicals
which may be released during an Incident, their rate of dispersion,
and the methods for predicting any potential toxic, fire, and
explosive hazards.
Volumes 2 and 3 are designed to be used together. The hazard
assessment code in Volume 2 for each chemical 1s used in Volume 3
to select the appropriate procedures to calculate hazard
assessment.
4. Volume 4: "Response Methods Handbook"
Volume 4 contains Information on existing methods for handling
spills of hazardous materials. The appendix lists manufacturers of
equipment which may be useful. It also describes methods of spill
(primarily oil), containment. This volume 1s Intended for use by
Coast Guard OSCs with some training or experience 1n hazard
response.
C. "Documentation of the Threshold Limit Values (TLV)", fourth edition
(1980), ACGIH Publications Office, 6500 Glenway Ave., Building 0-5,
Cincinnati, OH 45221
This book gives pertinent scientific Information, with references to
literature sources used to determine each TLY. Each documentation also
defines the type of toxic response for which the Hm1t 1s used. This
book should be consulted for a better understanding of TLY's.
G-2
-------
(See Part 5, "Threshold Limit Values and Other Guidelines.")
D. National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health/Occupational
Safety and Health Administration Resources
1. "NIOSH/OSHA Pocket Guide' to Chemical Hazards," U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
Information in this pocket guide comes from the NIOSH/OSHA
Occupational Health Guidelines. Presented in a tabular format, it
is a.reference for industrial hygiene and medical surveillance
practices. Included are chemical names and synonyms, permissible
exposure limits, chemical and physical properties, signs and
symptoms of ov^rexposure, environmental and medical monitoring
procedures, recommended respiratory and personal protective
equipment, and procedures for treatment.
2. "NIOSH/OSHA Occupational Health Guidelines for Chemical Hazard's,"
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
This three-volume document provides technical data for most of the
substances listed in the "NIOSH/OSHA Pocket Guide." The
information is much more detailed and is designed primarily for use
by industrial hygienists and medical surveillance personnel. In
addition to the information found in the "Pocket Guide,"
"Occupational Health Guidelines" includes recommended medical
surveillance practices, air monitoring and measurement procedures,
personnel sanitation, and spill and disposal techniques.
E. "Fire Prevention Guide on Hazardous Materials," National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA), Quincy, MA 02269
The NFPA has combined five manuals into one comprehensive guide on
hazardous materials. These five present Information on:
1. Flashpoint of oils, together with more than 8,800 trade-name
chemicals, their flashpoints, manufacturers, and principal uses.
The flammablHty hazard can be determined from this information.
2. F1re hazards of 1,300 flammable liquids, gases, and sol Ids are
listed in alphabetical order with appropriate f1re-f1ght1ng
information. Various properties listed include flashpoint,
specific gravity, water solubility, hazard Identification, and
boiling point.
3. Toxlcity data on 416 chemicals.
4. Hazardous reactions of over 3,550 chemicals. Reactions may involve
two or more chemicals and cause fires, explosions, or other
problems. A chemical is listed, followed by those chemicals which
can cause a hazardous reaction.
G-3
-------
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-------
2. Expanded definitions of chemical entities, phenomena, and
terminology.
3. Description or identification of a wide range of trade-name
products used in the chemical industry.
III. ON-LINE COMUPTER SYSTEMS
1. OHMTADS: Access through EPA Regional Offices
OHMTADS, EPA's computerized information retrieval system, can help
identify material from observations (smell, color, etc.) made at each
site. The information *1n the 126 segments covers a variety of
physical, chemical, biological, toxicological, and commercial data,
with the emphasis on the effects on water quality.
OHMTAOS has a random access provision which enables the user to solve
problems involving unidentified pollutants by inputting physical/
chemical characteristics or other factors observed on-site. The system
automatically takes each word and processes It into an inverted index
file, making each word a search component of the data base. The search
1s made using Boolean logic, and the system responds with a 11st of the
compounds meeting the input characteristics. The output is displayed
on the user's terminal. The user can then refine the search 1f
necessary to narrow the list of possible materials.
2. MACS: Hazard Assessment Computer System. Access through the National
Response Center, telephone 800/424-3802.
MACS, the computerized counterpart of Volume 3 of the CHRIS manuals,
makes it possible to obtain very detailed hazard evaluations through
the computer at Coast Guard Headquarters. The system 1s Intended
primarily for use by the OSC.
3. SKIM: Spill Clean-Up Inventory System, developed by the U.S. Coast
Guard.
The U.S. Coast Guard's Office of Marine Environment and Systems,
Pollution Response Branch, developed SKIM, a computer-based inventory
of equipment available for pollution response in the United States
(Including Puerto Rico and Guam). The Inventory Includes public
equipment, such as that owned by the Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, and other
agencies, as well as equipment maintained by contractors, cooperatives,
and private'companies.
The Information is readily available to Interested parties through a
network of computer terminals with access to the system. SKIM was
designed with a variety of potential uses in mind. It can:
G-5
-------
- Provide up-to-date information to OSC's. When a spill occurs and
the predesignated OSC in that area is notified of the specific
details, he is responsible for bringing the best combination of
response resources to bear on the problem. SKIM helps make such
decisions.
- Provide updates to equipment listings in local contingency plans.
While many of these plans now are out of date, SKIM enables local
and Regional Response Teams to obtain up-to-date listings.
Serves as an informational aid for Coast Guard Marine Safety
Offices, captains of the ports, and district and headquarters
managers. This enhances the decision-making capability of those
concerned with budgeting, resources allocation, and planning for
pollution response.
- Be used by all Federal agencies involved with the National or
Regional Response Teams.
4. Private Firms Offering Access to Data Banks
- SDC: System Development Corp., telephone 800/352-6689 (California),
800/421-7229 (Continental U.S., except California)
The SDC Search service is one of the most comprehensive on-Hne
retrieval services in the world. It provides easy, convenient access
to one of the largest families of on-line literature and reference
data bases obtainable anywhere - most of them available only through
SDC. Its services include: ENVIROIINE, which contains citations on
all areas of environmental studies and covers such subjects as air
pollution, chemical and biological contamination, energy,
environmental education, environmental design and urban ecology,
population planning, and geographical changes. The use of modern
telecommunications, SDC's computers, and ORBIT, its advanced,
field-tested retrieval system, permits retrieving the necessary
Information quickly, precisely, and efficiently. Because of ORBIT'S
quick response characteristics, an effective search from start to
finish can often be completed 1n as little as 5-10 minutes.
- Sigma Data Computing Corp., 926 Wayne Ave., Silver Spring, MD 20910,
telephone 301/589-6101.
This company provides computer services and products to governmental
and commercial clients.
- Sigma Data Services, Corp., same address as above, telephone
301/565-3773.
This company operates computer facilities and provides analysis and
programming services for government agencies.
-------
IV. REMOTE. StNSlNG AND MAP INTERPRETATION
A. Aerial Photography
1. Environmental Photograph Interpretation Center, Warrenton, VA 22L86,
telephone 703/557-3110 (EPA Regions I-IV)
Environmental Monitoring and Support Laboratory, Las Vegas, NV 89114,
telephone 702/798-2237 (EPA Regions V-X)
Aerial photography can be useful in a spill response in that a plane
can fly over the area the time of the spill recording its extent.
Subsequent flights can show the dispersion. Also, .nany different
types of photography^, including infrared, can help describe waste
sites and plume dispersion. Historical photos can trace a facility
from its inception to the present, pin-pointing past activities that
may mark trouble spots.
Aerial photography has another use, monitoring facilities that
produce or store chemicals. Spill and spill-threat conditions that
exist in many such facilities may also be photographically
documented. Aerial photographers can assist with the monitoring of
chemical facilities for compliance with the spill prevention
regulations issued under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
as amended in 1977. Aerial reconnaissance missions effectively and
economically augment compliance monitoring efforts of EPA Regions or
other regulatory agencies. An airplane can fly over a large number
of areas and facilities in a brief period of time. Once the
photographs have been interpreted, spill prevention personnel can use
the results to inspect areas or facilities in a minimum amount of
time because they can concentrate on those areas with the spill
problem.
2. EROS Data Center, User Services, Sioux Falls, SO 57198, telephone
504/594-6511, ext. 151
The EROS system, run by the U.S. Geological Survey, uses remote-
sensing techniques to inventory, monitor, and manage natural
resources. EROS includes research and training in the interpretation
and application of remotely sensed data and provides these data at
nominal cost.
At the heart of the EROS Data Center is a central computer complex
which controls a data base of over 6 million images and photographs
of the earth's surface features, searches for geographic data on
areas of interest, and serves as a management tool for the entire
data reproduction process. The computerized data storage and
retrieval system is based on latitude and longitude, supplemented by
information about image quality, cloud cover, and type of data.
6-7
-------
Information received from the EROS Data Center can be used in much
the same way as information received from the Environmental
Monitoring and Support Laboratory. EROS data provide a chronological
overview of an area, thereby establishing the extent of damage over
time.
B. U.S. Geological Survey Maps
1. Topographic quandrangle maps
Topographic maps are useful in that they show the contours of the
land, the network of water features, and elevations. They also show
cities and urban areas and, in the case of a spill or waste site,
they tell how close a spill or waste site is to a lake, river,
stream, or population centers.
2. Hydrologic maps
Hydrologic maps show water in or beneath the land surface. They are
very useful when evaluating water supply and water-related hazards
such as flooding. They also show drainage areas, depth to ground
water, and the thickness of water-bearing formations. In the case of
a spill or waste site, a hydrologic map 1s can Indicate any possible
contamination of the ground water and/or drainage area.
3. Land use and land cover maps
Land use and land cover maps have been prepared by using the standard
topographic quadrangle maps or larger-scale low-altitude aerial
photographs as a base. These maps provide detailed Information about
the way people use the land or about the vegetation cover. This
information could be useful at a spill or waste site. For example,
if chemicals enter an area being used for crops, authorities should
be advised of the chemical(s) Involved and their possible effects.
4. Sources of maps
Maps are available 1n areas east of the Mississippi River, Including
Minnesota, Puerto R1co, and the Virgin Island, from:
Branch of Distribution
U.S. Geological Survey
1200 South Eads St.
Arlington, VA 22202
Telephone: 703/557-2751
Areas west of the Mississippi River, Including Alaska, Hawaii,
Louisiana, Guam, and American Somoa, should order from:
G-a
-------
Branch of Distribution
U.S. Geological Survey
Box 25286, Federal Center
Denver, CO 80225
Telephone: 303/234-3832
V. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS
A. Federal
1. IRAP: Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan. Access through
CHEMTREC (see section B), telephone 800/424-8306 (24 hours), or
202/483-7616 in Washington, DC. Also through Regional Offices of
EPA and Department*of Energy (DOE).
IRAP is designed to assist in coping with radiation emergencies. It
operates through DOE, but works closely with other Federal, State,
military, and regional groups. Upon receiving an emergency call,
the regional coordinator of IRAP investigates the situation, getting
as much information as possible as to the type of material. If the
spill or leak appears serious, a technical response team is
dispatched and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is notified. The
main functions of the response team are to assess the hazard, Inform
the public, and recommend emergency actions to minimize the hazard.
The responsibility for cleanup rests with the shipper or carrier of
the material at the time of the spill.
2. Coast Guard National Strike Force. Access through the National
Response Center, telephone 800/424-8801.
The National Strike Force (NSF) Is a part of the National Response
Team established under the authority of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act as amended 1n 1977. It consists of high seas oil
cleanup equipment and trained personnel available to assist the OSC
upon request during Phase III (Containment and Countermeasures),
Phase IV (Cleanup, Mitigation, and Disposal), and Phase V
(Documentation and Cost Recovery), as defined 1n the National
Contingency Plan. A Coast Guard Strike Team 1s located on the East,
West, and Gulf Coasts. Each 1s capable of responding to a pollution
Incident in its area with four or more men within 2 hours and be at
full strength 1n 12 hours. The teams can provide communication
support, assistance, and advice on ship salvage, diving, and removal
techniques.
3. U.S. Army Technical (Escort Center). Chemical Emergency Response
Team. Access through the Department of the Army, Operations Center,
telephone 7-3/521-2185.
i
This center maintains, on standby, a 14-man alert team at Aberdeen
Proving Ground, MD, trained and experienced in handling chemical
G-9
-------
•in--. •••... !..••;. It has readily available equipment such as
<.. .,,Uin.i fiau'on trucks, air monitoring equipment, and protective
'..thing. This team can respond in 2 hours to a chemical emergency
i.i-ii directed to do so by the Army. Although it responds mainly to
'•ipr.jencies involving Department of the Army chemicals, it assists
other agencies such as the Coast Guard and EPA.
4. Environmental Response Team (ERT)
The National Contingency Plan directed EPA to establish the ERT to
advise OSC's and Regional Response Teams on environmental issues
related to spill containment, cleanup, and damage assessment. The
team, established in October 1978, provides expertise in biology,
chemistry, and engineering for environmental emergencies, as well as
special equipment to control and clean up chemical discharges.
The ERT makes it possible for EPA to provide around-the-clock
support to the Regional Offices through personnel whose sole
responsibility is to respond to environmental emergencies. The Team
is EPA's focal point for technical assistance to the Regions and
Program Offices during emergency episodes involving toxic and
hazardous wastes. The Team has two locations: Edison, NJ,
and Cincinnati, OH. Usually, requests for help from the Team comes
from each Region's Emergency Coordinator, once the conclusion has
been reached that technical assistance is needed. The Team consists
of 11 individuals with long experience in dealing with various types
of environmental emergencies and in responding to requests for
assistance at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites.
The Team is responsible for coordinating the Environmental Emergency
Response Unit (EERU), a cooperative effort between the Team, the
Office of Research and Development's 011 and Hazardous Materials
Spills Branch, and contractor personnel. Services available through
the Response Unit include prototype spill control equipment such as
the mobile physical/chemical treatment system, a mobile
flocculatlon/sedimentation system, contract laboratory analytical
services, and pilot plant treatment studies.
B. Private
1. CHEMTREC: Chemical Transportation Emergency Center. Access via
telephone, 800/424-9300 or 202/483-7616 1n Washington, DC.
CHEMTREC 1s a clearinghouse providing a 24-hour telephone number for
chemical transportation emergencies. It covers over 3,600 chemicals
which fiave been submitted by manufactuers as the primary materials
they ship. CHEMTREC is sponsored by the Chemical Manufacturers
Association, although nonmembers are also served. The emergency
telephone number is widely distributed to emergency service
personnel, carriers, and the chemical Industry. The number 1s
usually given on the bill of lading.
G-10
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When an emergency call is received by CHEMTREC, the person on duty
writes down the essential information. As much information as
possible is obtained by phone. The person on duty gives the caller
information on hazards of spills, fire, or exposure that the
manufacturers of the chemicals involved had furnished. The person
on duty then notifies the shipper of the chemical by phone of the
situation. At this point, responsiblity for further guidance passes
to the shipper.
CHEMTREC's function is basically to serve as the liaison between the
person with the problem and the chemical shipper and/or the
manufacturer, the people who know the most about the product and its
properties.
2. CHLOREP: Chlorine Emergency Plan. Accesss through CHEMTREC.
CHLOREP was established by the Chlorine Institute to handle chlorine
emergencies in the U.S. and Canada. The system operates through
CHEMTREC. Upon receiving an emergency call, CHEMTREC notifies the
nearest manufacturer in accordance with a mutual aid plan. This
manufacturer then contacts the emergency scene to determine if a
technical team should be sent to assist. Each participating
manufacturer has trained personnel and equipment available for
emergencies.
3. National Agricultural Chemicals Association, Pesticide Safety Team
Network. Access through CHEMTREC.
The National Agricultural Chemicals Association operates a national
pesticide information and response network providing advice and
on-site assistance when a spill warrants it. The network operates
through CHEMTREC. Upon receiving notification of an emergency
involving a pesticide, CHEMTREC contacts the manufacturer, who
provides specific advice on handling the spill. If necessary, spill
response teams are available on a geographical basis.
4. TEAR: Transportation Emergency Assistance Plan, Canadian Chemical
Producers Association. Access 24 hours a day through three regional
control centers:
- British Columbia, 604/929-3341
- Prairie Provinces, 403/477-8339
- Northern Ontario, 705/682-2881
TE.--~> functions in Canada in a similar fashion to CHEMTREC in the
U.3. It provides emergency advice, gets knowledgeable personnel
(usually the manufacturer) in touch with responsible people at the
scene of the emergency, and sees that on-the-scene assistance is
provided if needed. When the regional control center receives a
call, the attendant records basic information, obtains a call-back
number, and perhaps gives preliminary information from standard
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references if the name of the product is known. The attendant then
calls one of the center's technical advisors, who calls the scene of
the accident to get as much detail as possible and perhaps provides
additional advice on coping with the emergency. The advisor then
tries to contact the producer. If the producer cannot be reached,
or if distances are great, the regional control center contacts a
company familiar with the product. The center is also prepared to
send personnel and equipment to the scence if necessary. Once
contact has been established between producer and local authorities
on the scene, the technical advisor assumes a follow-up role and
notifies the Canadian Chemical Producers Association of the
accident.
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REFERENCES AND RESOURCES
I. INTRODUCTION
This reference list is meant to provide the titles of books which may be of
value to those responding to hazardous material incidents. Many more books
are available which are not named here. This list can be expanded based on
personal preferences and requirements.
The references are categorized by subject. The title, author, publisher,
and place of publication age given for each. The year of publication is not
always given because many are revised annually. The user should attempt to
obtain the most recent edition.
The last section lists sources of these references as well as other
information that might be useful. Usually, these agencies or associations
will provide a catalogue on request. Where available, phone numbers are
also listed.
II. REFERENCES
A. Industrial Hygiene (Air Sampling and Monitoring, Respiratory Protection,
Toxicology)
1. Air Sampling Instruments for Evaluation of Atmospheric Contaminants,
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists,
Cincinnati, OH.
2. Basic Industrial Hygiene. Richard Brief, American Industrial Hygiene
Association, Akron, OH.
3. Direct Reading Colorimetric Indicator Tubes Manual. American
Industrial Hygiene Association, Akron, OH.
4. Documentation of the Threshold Limit Values (TLV), American
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, Cincinnati, OH.
5. Fundamentals of Industrial Hygiene. National Safety Council,
Chicago, IL.
6. The Industrial Environment - Its Evaluation and Control. National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Rockville, MO.
7. Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology, Frank A. Patty, John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., New York, NY.
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8. Manual of Recommended Practice for Combustible Gas Indicators and
Portable Direct Reading Hydrocarbon Detectors, American Industrial
Hygiene Association, Akron, OH.
9. Occupational Health Guidelines for Chemical Hazards, National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Rockvilie, MD.
10. Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances, National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health, Rockville, MD.
11. Respiratory Protective Devices Manual, American Industrial Hygiene
Association, Akron, OH.
12. Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents
in the Workroom Environment, American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists, Cincinnati, OH.
8. Chemical Data
1. Chemical Hazard Response Information System, Volume 2: Chemical
Data, U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, DC.
2. Chemistry of Hazardous Materials, Eugene Meyer, Prentice-Hall,
Engiewood Cliffs, NJ.
3. The Condensed Chemical Dictionary, 6. Hawley, Van Nostrand Reinhold
Co., New York, NY.
4. CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL.
5. Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials. M. Irving Sax, Van
Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York, NY.
6. Fire Protection Guide to Hazardous Materials. National Fire
Protection Association, Boston, MA.
7. Hygienic Guides. American Industrial Hygiene Association, Akron,
UFT
8. The Merctc Index. Merck and Co., Inc., Rahway, NJ.
9. Toxic and Hazardous Industrial Chemicals Safety Manual. The
International Technical Information Institute, Tokyo, Japan.
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8. Manual of Recommended Practice for Combustible Gas Indicators and
Portable. Direct Reading Hydrocarbon Detectors. American Industrial
Hygiene Association, Akron, OH.
9. Occupational Health Guidelines for Chemical Hazards. National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Rockville, MO.
10. Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances. National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health, Rockville, MD.
11. Respiratory Protective Devices Manual, American Industrial Hygiene
Association, Akron, OH.
12. Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents
in the Workroom Environment. American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists, Cincinnati, OH.
B. Chemical Data
1. Chemical Hazard Response Information System, Volume 2: Chemical
Data, U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, DC.
2. Chemistry of Hazardous Materials. Eugene Meyer, Prentice-Hall,
Engiewood Cliffs, NJ.
3. The Condensed Chemical Dictionary. G. Hawley, Van Nostrand Reinhold
Co., New York, NY.
4. CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics. CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL.
5. Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials, N. Irving Sax, Van
Nostrand Reinhold Co., New York, NY.
6. Fire Protection Guide to Hazardous Materials. National Fire
Protection Association, Boston, MA.
7. Hygienic Guides, American Industrial Hygiene Association, Akron,
UTT
8. The Merck Index, Merck and Co., Inc., Rahway, MJ.
9. Toxic and Hazardous Industrial Chemicals Safety Manual. The
International Technical Information Institute, Tokyo, Japan.
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C. EPA Methods Manuals for Sampling and Analysis
1. Biological Field and Laboratory Methods for Measuring the Quality of
Surface Mater and Effluents. EPA-670/4-73-QQ1 (July 1973).
2. EPA Solid Waste Manual. Test Methods for Evaluating Solid Waste,
Physical/Chemical Methods. SW-846 (May 1980).
3. Handbook for Analytical Quality Control in Water and'Wastewater
Laboratories. EPA-6QO/4-79-Q19 (March 1979)."
*
4. Methods of Chemical Analysis of Water and Wastes. EPA-600/4-79-020
(March 1979).
5. Microbiological Methods for Monitoring the Environment-', Water and
Wastes. EPA-600/8-78-Q17 (December 1978).
6. Procedures Manual for Groundwater Monitoring at Solid Wastes
Disposal Facilities. EPA-53Q/SW-611 (August 1977).
0. Safety - '-.•'• -,: '•'
1. Best's Safety Directory. A.M. Best Co., Oldwick, NJ.
2. CRC Handbook of Laboratory Safety, Norman V. Steere, CRC Press, Boca
Raton, Ft. . 'L f '
3. Fire Protection Handbook, National F1re Protection Association,
Quincy, MA.
4. FM Approval List, Factory Mutual, Hoi-wood, MA. / "*'.;'
5. National Safety Council Safety Sheets. National Safety Council ,
Chicago, IL.
6. Underwriters Laboratories Testing for Public Safety, Annual
Directory, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., Nortnbrook. II..
III. AGENCIES AND ASSOCIATIONS
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
6500 Glenway Ave. - Building D-5
Cincinnati, OH 45211
513/661-7881
American Industrial Hygiene Association
475 Wolf Ledges Parkway
Akron, OH 44311-1087
216/762-7294
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American National Standards Institute, Inc.
1430 Broadway
New York, NY 10018
212/354-3300
Compressed-Gas Association
1235 Jefferson Oavis Highway
Arlington, VA 22202
703/979-0900-
CRC Press, Inc. - ••-
2000 Corporate-Blvd., JI.W.—.-.. '
Boca Raton, FL 33431' *"
305/994-0555, Ext. 330
EPA Office of Research & Development
Publications - CERI
Cincinnati, OH.-45268
513/684-7562
EPA "Office-of Soi id Waste-(WH-562) ~
401 M. St., S.W.
Washington, OC 20460
800/424-9346
— • r . 'j : ;..
Materials Transportation Bureau
Department of Transportation
Research and Special Programs-Administration
Washington, OC 20590
202/426-2301 . .
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Department of Labor
4015 Wilson Blvd. Room 600
Arlington, VA 22203
703/235-1452 ••:--
Nationa-1 Fire Protection Association
Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02269
617/328-9290
National Safety Council
444 North Michigan Ave.
Chicago, II 60611
312-527-4800
NIOSH Publications Dissemination
4676 Columbia Parkway
Cincinnati, OH 45226
513/684-4287
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Occupational Safety 4 Health Administration
Department of Labor
200 Constitution Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20210
202/523-6138
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.
333 Pfongsten Rd.
Northbrook, IL 60062
312/272-8800
Superintendent of Documents*
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, DC 20402
202/783-3238
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