JANUARY 1972
ACCIDENTAL
EPISODE
MANUAL
A/
prepared for
Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Air Programs
Research Triangle Park
North Carolina 27711
Under Contract No. 68-02-0029
RESOURCES RESEARCH, INC.
A SUBSIDIARY OF TRW INC
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JANUARY 1972
ACCIDENTAL
EPISODE
MANUAL
prepared for
Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Air Programs
Research Triangle Park
North Carolina 27711
Under Contract No. 68-02-0029
RESOURCES RESEARCH, INC.
A SUBSIDIARY OF TRW INC.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT xiii
FOREWORD xvii
PART I
1. INTRODUCTION 1-1
1.1 DEFINITION OF ACCIDENTAL EPISODE 1-1
1.2 APC AGENCY INITIATIVES 1-3
1.3 REQUIREMENTS FOR STATIONARY SOURCES 1-4
2. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY CONTINGENCY ACTION 2-1
2.1 A GROWING ROLE FOR AIR POLLUTION CONTROL (APC) AGENCIES . 2-1
2.2 CONTINGENCY PLAN PARTICIPATION 2-1
2.3 APC AGENCY TECHNICAL SUPPORT 2-2
2.4 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) FOR
APC AGENCY PARTICIPANTS 2-4
2.4.1 Readiness 2-4
2.4.2 Alert Procedures 2-5
2.4.3 Post-Event Procedures 2-12
3. APC CHEMICAL DETECTION TECHNIQUES 3-1
3.1 DETECTION KITS 3-1
3.1.1 Principle of operation 3-1
3.1.2 Sensitivity Requirement 3-1
3.1.3 Priority List of Chemicals 3-3
3.2 OTHER ON-THE-SPOT TESTING EQUIPMENT 3-4
3.3 CHEMICAL ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 3-7
ill
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Table of Contents (Continued): Page
4. HAZARD AREA ESTIMATES 4-1
4.1 DEFINITION OF HAZARD AREA 4-1
4.2 THE PREDICTION MODEL 4-1
4.3 TOXICITY FACTOR 4-2
4.4 HAZARD AREA TEMPLATES 4-4
4.5 SOURCE STRENGTH CONSIDERATIONS ... 4-5
4.5.1 Source Strengths Other Than 1 kg/sec 4-5
4.5.2 Release Duration 4-6
4.5.3 Spillage of Volatile Liquids 4-7
4.6 WIND SPEED CONSIDERATIONS 4-9
4.7 ADJUSTMENTS FOR TERRAIN 4-10
4.8 ADJUSTMENTS FOR FIRE 4-11
APPENDIX A A-l
A.I RATING SYSTEM A-l
A.1.1 Rating System Derivation A-2
A.1.2 Stationary Sources A-4
A.1.3 Mobile Sources A-6
.- •"""*" A. 1.4 Combined Scores A-8
A.2 TECHNIQUES FOR CHEMICAL DETECTION A-l4
APPENDIX B . "READY REFERENCE" SHELF B-l
IV
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Table of Contents (Continued): Page
PART II
5. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR COMMUNITY ACTION 5-1
5.1 CONTINGENCY PLAN CONCEPT 5-1
5.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN AN ACCIDENTAL
EPISODE CONTINGENCY PLAN 5-2
5.3 LEGAL AUTHORITY 5-6
5.3.1 Federal Law . 5-6
5.3.2 Sample Cooperative Agreement to Establish
the Accidental-Episode Contingency
Plan Organization 5-7
5.4 ALERT STAGES 5-10
5.5 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC) 5-11
5.5.1 Location 5-11
5.5.2 Communications 5-12
5.5.3 Visual Aids 5-12
5.5.4 Space Requirements 5-13
5.6 SUPPORT DOCUMENTATION 5-14
5.6.1 Texts of Pertinent Legislation,
Regulations, Executive Orders, etc 5-14
5.6.2 Disaster Manuals 5-14
5.6.3 Mutual Aid Programs and Specialty Services . . . 5-15
5.6.4 Glossary 5-15
5.6.5 Forms 5-15
5.6.6 Technical Literature 5-15
5.6.7 Slide Rules 5-16
5.6.8 Inventory of Hazardous Chemicals 5-17
5.6.9 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 5-18
5.6.10 Directories 5-18
5.7 CHECK LISTS 5-21
5.7.1 Emergency Operations Center 5-21
5.7.2 Emergency Supplies and Assistance 5-21
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Table of Contents (Continued): Page
6. CONTINGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION: ORGANIZATION 6-1
6.1 OFFICERS OF THE CONTINGENCY PLAN ORGANIZATION 6-1
6.1.1 Executive Authority 6-1
6.1.2 Administration 6-4
6.1.3 Candidates for Office 6-6
6.2 ADVISORY BOARD 6-7
6.2.1 Board Membership 6-8
6.2.2 Meetings 6-8
6.2.3 Staff 6-8
6.2.4 Budget 6-9
6.3 ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP 6-10
6.4 CHECK LIST FOR ACCIDENTAL-EPISODE READINESS 6-13
6.4.1 Contingency Plan 6-13
6.4.2 Contingency Plan Organization 6-13
7. CONTINGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION: STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURES 7-1
7.1 READINESS STAGE 7-1
7.1.1 Routine Surveillance 7-1
7.1.2 Practice Drills 7-2
7.1.3 Readiness Periodic Check List 7-4
7.1.4 Immediate Response 7-4
7.1.5 Readiness Task Assignment Details 7-7
7.2 FIRST STAGE ALERT: PARTIAL ACTIVATION 7-11
7.2.1 Sequence of Activity 7-11
7.2.2 Task Assignment Details 7-13
7.2.3 Emergency Operations Center Manning 7-14
7.2.4 Contingency Operation Teams 7-14
7.3 SECOND STAGE ALERT: FULL ACTIVATION 7-14
7.3.1 Sequence of Activity 7-15
7.3.2 Manning and Description of Duties 7-18
7.3.3 Emergency Information Sources 7-20
VI
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Table of Contents (Continued): Page
7.4 THIRD STAGE ALERT: EMERGENCY ACTIVATION 7-24
7.4.1 Sequence of Activity 7-24
7.5 CHECK LIST WHEN AN EPISODE OCCURS 7-26
7.5.1 Priority Actions 7-26
7.5.2 Emergency Operations Center 7-26
7.5.3 Public Information 7-27
7.5.4 Mutual Aid and Other Assistance 7-28
7.5.5 Governing Authority . 7-28
7.5.6 Keep Records 7-29
7.5.7 Continuing Direction and Coordination 7-29
7.6 CHECK LIST FOR POST-EPISODE RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION . 7-30
7.6.1 Safety and Security 7-30
7.6.2 Public Information and Assistance 7-30
7.6.3 Administrative Matters 7-30
7.6.4 Return to Normal 7-30
7.6.5 Reports 7-31
8. COMMUNICATIONS 8-1
8.1 EMERGENCY RADIO NETWORK 8-1
8.2 NETWORK DISCIPLINE AND "NET CONTROL" STATION 8-2
8.3 RULES AND REGULATIONS 8-2
8.4 WEATHER REPORTS 8-4
8.5 EMERGENCY RADIO PROCEDURES 8-4
8.5.1 Daily Drill 8-4
8.5.2 Standby Alert 8-5
8.5.3 Assistance Call 8-5
8.5.4 All-Out Call 8-6
8.5.5 Response to Calls 8-7
Vll
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Table of Contents (Continued): Page
8.6 MOBILE RADIOS 8-7
8.6.1 Vehicles 8-7
8.6.2 Hand Sets 8-7
8.7 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CHECK LIST 8-8
APPENDIX C. CASE HISTORIES AND STATISTICS ON ACCIDENTAL
EPISODES C-l
C.I CASE HISTORIES . C-l
C.2 STATISTICS ON ACCIDENTAL EPISODES C-l3
APPENDIX D. LIST OF INDUSTRIAL MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATIONS . D-l
APPENDIX E. SAFETY AIDS E-l
E.I MCA CHEM-CARDS E-l
E.2 LABELS AND PLACARDS . E-6
E.3 SAFETY DATA SHEETS E-14
E.3.1 MCA Chemical Safety Data Sheets E-14
E.3.2 National Safety Council (NSC)
Industrial Safety Data Sheets E-31
E.3.3 RSMA Safety Data Sheets E-45
APPENDIX F. OTHER USEFUL DOCUMENTS F-l
APPENDIX G. PARTICIPATING AGENCIES AND EQUIPMENT .... G-l
G.I PARTICIPATING AGENCIES OF A LOCAL CONTINGENCY PLAN . G-2
G.2 SOURCES FOR EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES G-8
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
Number Title Page
PART I
2-1 Panorama of Accidental-Episode Events 2-3
2-2 Typical Contingency Plan Participation of APC Agency
During Accidental Episode 2-6
3-1 Example of a Chemical Detector Tube Kit 3-2
3-2 Portable Field Testing Equipment 3-6
4-1 Template: Unstable Atmospheric Conditions Inside
Back
Cover
4-2 Template: Neutral Atmospheric Conditions Inside
Back
Cover
4-3 Template: Stable Atmospheric Conditions Inside
Back
Cover
4-4 Vapor Source Strength, Expressed as a Percentage
of Liquid Spillage Rate 4-8
PART II
5-1 Sample of Combined Working Directory Showing
Half-page Foldovers 5-20
6-1 Model Contingency Plan Organization 6-2
6-2 Schematic Representation of a Contingency Response
Team 6-3
7-1 Sample of Notification 7-3
7-2 Readiness Procedures on Initial Notification of an
Accidental Episode 7-8
7-3 Sequence of Activity During First Stage ALERT:
Partial Activation 7-12
7-4 Additional Sequence of Activity during Second and
Third ALERT Stages: Full and Emergency Activation 7-16
ix
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List of Figures (Continued):
Figure
Number Ti tl e Page
7-5 Total ALERT Sequence of Activity 7-17
C-l Typical Press Report of an Accidental Episode .... C-2
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LIST OF TABLES
Table
Number Title Page
PART I
3-1 Contaminants which can be Tested in the Field
With Portable Devices 3-5
4-1 Hazard Area Limits for the Fifteen Highest Rated
Chemicals . 4-3
A-l List of 20 leading chemicals involved in
accidental episodes from stationary sources . . . A-5
A-2 List of 20 leading chemicals potentially involved
in accidental episodes from mobile sources . . . A-7
A-3 Combined Scores for Stationary and Mobile Sources
and Final Ranking of Hazardous Chemicals .... A-9
A-4 Volatility Ratings of Hazardous Materials A-10
A-5 Data on Hazardous Material A-ll
Part II
G-l Typical Participating Agencies of a Local
Contingency Plan Organization G-2
xi
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LIST OF EXHIBITS
PART II
Exhibit
Number Title Page
7-1 Truck Placarding Chart 7-21
7-2 Department of Transportation Classification and
Marking of Hazardous Materials 7-22
7-3 Sample MCA • 7-23
C-l Table I, Types of Accidents C-14
C-l Table II, Property Jamage C-l5
C-l Table III, Type of Cargo C-16
C-l Table IV, Accidents by State C-17
C-2 Department of Transportation Hazardous Incident
Report C-18
E-l List of Available Chem-Cards E-2
E-2 Sample MCA Chem-Card E-4
E-3 Sample MCA Chem-Card E-5
E-4 Hazardous Materials Labels and Placards E-7
E-5 MCA List of Safety Data Sheets E-l5
E-6 MCA Chemical Safety Data Sheet on Ethylene Oxide . . E-l6
E-7 NSC Safety Data Sheet on Anhydrous Ammonia E-35
E-8 Priority-Risk Worksheet E-46
E-9 RSMA Safety Data Sheet on Anhydrous Ammonia .... E-48
E-10 RSMA Safety Data Sheet on Phosgene E-50
E-ll RSMA Safety Data Sheet on Vinyl Chloride E-52
xn
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This manual was prepared under contract to the Environmental
Protection Agency, Office of Air Programs, sponsored by the Emergency
Operations Control Center (EOCC), Research Triangle Park, N.C. Project
Officer for the EPA was Charles W. Whitmore. Project Manager and princi-
pal author for the contractor, Resources Research, Inc., a subsidiary of
TRW Inc., was Fredric C. Hamburg, Project Engineer and Acting Manager
for Program Development. Key contributors have been Edward J. Largent
and Alfred T. Barnard. Mr. Largent, a specialist 1n the field of
Occupational Health and Safety, is currently with the U. S. Department of
Labor. Special thanks are accorded to Edward C. Hickey, Chief Health and
Safety Officer, TRW Systems Group, Redondo Beach, California.
The manual could not have been developed without the cooperation of
individuals, public and private, who share the common interest of public
health and safety. Within their midst is the family of hazardous
materials people, whose efforts are particularly relevant to our purpose.
To those of us whose attention has been pre-empted by the common air
pollutants (carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, et al.), the progress of our
disciplinary kin is impressive. We appreciate the knowledge and enthusiasm
for their subject they have so freely shared with us, and hope some day to
reciprocate in equal measure. Their names are many, their affiliations
varied, their assistance unstinting. Hopefully, the following lists them
all.
Name Affiliation
F. G. Stephenson Manufacturing Chemists Association
J. C. Zercher do
A. C. Clark do
C. Harvison National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.
J. J. Fitzpatrick Office of Civil Defense
C. R. Siebentritt, Jr. do
R. L. Mitchell, Jr. The Chlorine Institute, Inc.
E. M. Graziano Association of American Railroads,
Bureau of Explosives
xm
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Name
F. W. Parsons
L. J. Llekhus
C. S. Loucks
W. F. Mitchell
H. J. Sonnenberg
W. F. Black
T. H. Styles
W. E. McConnaughey
M. Woodworth
H. H. Fawcett
S. Smith
J, B. Ol1sh1fski
H. R. Neumark
G. W. Collins
G. C. Vletsch
D. G. Lederman
A. V. Jensen
R. D. Slewert
J. B. Stone
E. N. Henry
D. Haley
J. E. Byrne
W. P. Holland
A. Wiley
N. Hauret
Affiliation
Orange County, California Department
of Agriculture, A1r Pollution and
Weights and Measures
do
U. S. Department of Transportation,
Office of Hazardous Materials
do
do
U. S. Department of Transportation,
Federal Rail Administration
U. S. Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety
U. S. Department of Transportation,
Coast Guard
National F1re Prevention Association
National Research Council, National
Academy of Sciences
National Safety Council
do
Consultant
National Defense Transportation Association
Railway Systems and Management Association
Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Emergency Health Services and Mental Health
Administration
Applied Physics Laboratory, Chemical Pro-
pulsion Information Agency
National Aeronautics and Space Agency,
Lewis Research Center
Union Carbide Corporation
State of West Virginia, Department of
Natural Resources
National Agricultural Chemicals Association
do
City and County of Los Angeles Air Pollution
Control District
do
City and County of Los Angeles, Division of
Environmental Health and Consumer Protection
xiv
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Name Affiliation
M. Feldstein Bay Area Air Pollution Control District
J. Sandberg do
S. Duckworth State of California A1r Resources Board
E. Blizzard State of California Office of Emergency
Services
L. Fields do
Cdr. W. E. West U. S. Coast Guard, Houston Ship Channel
J. Green New York State Division of F1re Safety
H. Verhulst U. S. Department of Health, Education &
Welfare
National Clearinghouse for Poison Control
Centers
F. Sandlin Sinclair Refining Company
E. E. Atteberry Sinclair Petrochemicals
Of these, special thanks are due to Mssrs. Zercher, Harvlson, Stone
Fitzpatrick, Olishifski, Lederman, Vietsch, Siewert, Sandlin and Holland
for providing substantive contributions of material for this manual.
xv
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FOREWORD
Scarcely a week passes without news reports of another incident in
which the escape of hazardous material into the atmosphere necessitates
wholesale evacuation of people from their homes and places of business.
In most cases there is a precedent traumatic or catastrophic event, such
as a highway or railroad accident, a fire, a windstorm or other natural
disaster. Sometimes, however, the cause lies with the breakdown of normal
safeguards in factories, even in private dwellings. For whatever reason,
the result is often a large-scale threat to life and property.
The hazardous substances are characterized by varying degrees of
toxicity, flammability, and reactivity (tendency to combine chemically
with other material, resulting in corrosion, explosion, or physiological
irritation). Accidental episodes involving such material should be
handled only by individuals and teams that are especially trained and
equipped for the purpose.
Responsibility for action to protect the health and welfare of the
community during such an event normally rests with the local department
of public safety (police and fire), and in a more serious crisis, with
the chief executive of the community and ultimately with the governor of
the state. Many states and local communities have organized emergency
response teams in accordance with contingency plans.* These teams usually
include public health specialists and engineers to provide guidance on
technical problems surrounding the event. More and more, Air Pollution
* The word "contingency" is in common usage throughout the Environmental
Protection Agency and elsewhere to denote an unforeseen or unexpected
event, particularly one associated with undesired or harmful effects such
as an accidental episode. A "contingency plan" is a formal, documented
program to provide for readiness in advance of contingencies by assigning,
defining and coordinating the responsive action of participating teams and
individuals.
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Control (APC) Agency officials are sought out because advice on the
nature and behavior of atmospheric contaminants and Interactions seems
like a logical extension of their background and responsibilities. An
Increasing number of APC officials 1n turn have looked to higher technical
authority for guidance and support on these issues.
Many have expressed a need for a manual that will spell out 1n
simple and direct language what the APC agency can or ought to do during
an event to help minimize its impact upon the people and economic life of
the community. This manual would Include a standard operating procedure
developed from the cumulative experiences of public officials and the
scientific and technical community from all parts of the country. Further-
more, 1t would contain Important background on hazardous material,
probabilities of occurrence, probable mechanisms and causes, prediction
of danger and safety zones, and typical case histories.
Manuals for contingency action have been produced by a number of
organizations, and others are in preparation at this time. Disaster Plan
Manuals have been prepared for every State in accordance with the Disaster
Relief Act of 1970 (PL 91-606) and precedent legislation. Disaster Manuals
and related documents have been developed by:
• Public Health Service
(Health Services and Mental Health Adm., U. S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare)
• American National Red Cross
• Office of Civil Defense
•
• City or County Disaster and Civil Defense
Offices (e.g., Los Angeles)
and others. These documents generally cover the entire spectrum of
natural and man-made disasters, from earthquakes and floods to nuclear
attacks. The attention given to chemical spills is necessarily limited.
xviii
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In general, these documents provide planning guides and procedures that
are common to all emergencies and leave further details on specific types
of events to specialty teams and organizations. Their principal aim is to
assist in establishing such organizations and making existing ones more
effective. At the other extreme are Standard Operating Procedures for
specialty teams such as those of the Chlorine Institute, the National
Agricultural Chemists Association, and industrial Mutual Aid groups, which
focus narrowly upon a specific family of chemicals or a limited geographical
area.
In the main, existing manuals make no provision for formal partici-
pation of ARC agencies on contingency teams, except when agency responsi-
bilities include radiological monitoring. Certain ARC agencies have
themselves taken the initiative in developing a contingency organization
in which they exercise a vital supporting role if not leadership itself.
As currently viewed, the legitimate role of an ARC agency in accidental
episodes is that of support through its capabilities in the following areas:
1. Air quality surveillance
2. Estimate of hazard area
As contingency response teams are presently constituted, no other members
have responsibility for or access to both capabilities.
The manual herewith focuses upon the ARC agency role in these areas.
And yet, it is not intended for the exclusive use of these agencies; others
like department of public safety, civil defense and disaster organizations,
industries, common carriers, and mutual aid groups should find it applicable
to their own activities. To these all, the manual may serve as a guide
toward developing and implementing a contingency plan for effective action
following an accidental release or spillage of airborne hazardous substances.
Accordingly, the manual is presented in two related but self-contained parts:
Part I. Contingency Action Guide for Air Pollution Control Agencies
Part II. Contingency Action Guide for Local Communities.
xix
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PART I.
CONTINGENCY ACTION GUIDE FOR AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCIES
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It INTRODUCTION
1.1 DEFINITION OF ACCIDENTAL EPISODE
An accidental air pollution episode is defined as an unexpected
event during which contaminants are released into the air in amounts
that are potentially hazardous to public health and welfare under
circumstances which do not require a prolonged and widespread mete-
orological stagnation condition. It usually occurs when a relatively
massive quantity of contaminant is released into the air and transported
over inhabited areas. It is often the result of unawareness or
unavoidable causes, through mechanisms such as:
a. Industrial process error
b. Plant equipment failure
c. Transport accident
d. Consumer error
e. Secondary effects of fire, flood, explosion, windstorm or other
catastrophic events.
For the purposes of this work, events that do not affect the general
public are excluded. These include accidents in the following activities.
a. Agriculture (e.g., field dusting)
b. Mining
c. Military activity
Also excluded are accidents that do not produce hazardous airborne
contaminants.
Several factors which will differ in their relationship to an accidental
episode in comparison with a natural episode are:
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a. Time
• Shorter warning
• Shorter duration
b. Pollutants
t More varied
• More toxic
• More concentrated
• Possibly flammable, explosive, or corrosive
i
c. Meteorology
t Not restricted to poor dispersion conditions such as those
requiring an Atmospheric Stagnation Advisory
d. Geography
t Smaller affected area
• Often specific for types of pollutants
e. Effects
• Potentially catastrophic 1n affected area
• Often deleterious to other animals, plants and Inanimate
materials
f. Responsibilities
• Public safety officials or emergency response team in primary
role
• A1r Pollution Control (APC) agency in a supporting role
Although the manual deals with all aspects of accidental-episode
response activity, 1t alms particularly to define the role of the local APC
agency. Response to this situation 1s quite different from action taken
during a prolonged episode that results from meteorological stagnation.
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This manual should also be useful to industries where hazardous
materials are handled or produced. However, in order that the document
have wide appeal, detailed engineering treatment of specific hazardous
chemicals is reserved for the Appendices.
1.2 ARC AGENCY INITIATIVES
State and local ARC agencies are urged to review existing capabilities
and procedures for response to accidental episodes within their respective
jurisdictional areas. An APC agency can best provide services by partici-
pating in a Contingency Plan. A Contingency Plan is a formal arrangement
whereby the personnel and resources of numerous community organizations,
public and private, civil and military, are marshalled and employed in
accordance with prescribed organization and procedures to minimize and
counteract the effects of an accidental episode. The following actions are
recommended:
• If no Contingency Plan or organization to handle chemical
spills exists, take the initiative in getting one started.
As a start, recommend to government executives and public
safety officials that a meeting be held for discussion on
the need for such a plan and organization.
• If contingency responsibilities are recognized, but are
placed entirely in the hands of public safety officials,
recommend that a more broadly based organization be
developed that incorporates scientific and technical experts,
and that a documented Plan be implemented.
• If both Plan and organization exist, review them for adequacy
and recommend additions or modifications that serve to
improve effectiveness. In particular, ascertain if there
is a need for APC participation and if so, recommend that
appropriate provision therefor be incorporated into the
modifications.
Ir3
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t If both Plan and organization appear to be satisfactory,
recommend that their effectiveness be tested by holding
periodic drills with simulated random spills of different
hazardous materials.
1.3 REQUIREMENTS FOR STATIONARY SOURCES
With regard to stationary sources, recommendations by an ARC office
carry added weight as a consequence of the Federal Clean Air Act Amendments
and State Implementation Plans. Emission inventories, permit systems, and
emergency episode plans required by this legislation can help to bring APC
agencies into closer working relationship with local industries on matters
of air quality.* APC agencies should take the opportunity to encourage
industries that handle hazardous material to coordinate their respective
safety programs with public and private emergency organizations in their
community, and where possible, to join them under a formal Contingency Plan.
The material in this manual is expected to provide support for these
recommended actions.
* See Regulations for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation
Plans, Part 420, Chapter IV, Title 42, Code of -Federal Regulations, published
in Federal Register. Vol. 36, No. 158, August 14, 1971. See especially
420.16 Prevention of air pollution emergency episodes, (c), which requires
each stationary source emitting 100 tons per year or more of a common
pollutant to file a contingency plan that includes emission control actions
in the event of a general or single source episode.
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2. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY CONTINGENCY ACTION
2.1 A GROWING ROLE FOR AIR POLLUTION CONTROL (ARC) AGENCIES
Air Pollution Control agencies in several of the more heavily indus-
trialized States are presently geared to respond to accidental episodes
and have done so on many occasions. In several cases the APC official
was the highest ranking State official on the scene, and he found himself
directing the actions of police, firemen, and others dispatched to the area.
This involvement contrasts sharply with the minimal role exercised by most
APC agencies around the country. Of the 260 or so State and local APC
offices throughout the United States, the overwhelming majority could
provide only meager support if requested. However, even the smaller agencies
are rapidly being strengthened pursuant to recent legislation. In time,
all agencies may be prepared for active involvement in contingency action.
They have already become better known in their communities as they under-
take a wider range of responsibility in air quality control programs. More
and more they will be consulted for expertise.on atmospheric contamination
problems of whatever origin.
2.2 CONTINGENCY PLAN PARTICIPATION
Within the framework of a Contingency Plan, the APC agency should have
responsibilities that are consistent with its technical capabilities.
Public safety responsibilities should be executed only by the participating
members that are legally constituted for these functions, principally the
departments of police, fire, civil defense, and emergency (disaster)
services. An effective Contingency Plan should provide for two main
centers of activity:
• The Emergency Operations Center (EOC), which serves as semi-
permanent headquarters for the Chief Operations Authority,
who plans and directs the coordinated overall activities of
all Contingency Plan participants.
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• The accidental episode site, at which all direct measures
are applied to contain, neutralize, and dispose of the
hazardous emission and carry on evacuation and recovery
operations, all under the direction of the On-Scene Commander.
A conceptualized view of an accidental episode is shown in Figure 2-1.
Details on the development and implementation of a Contingency Plan are
provided in Part II of this manual.
2.3 APC AGENCY TECHNICAL SUPPORT
The most common questions on accidental episodes that APC agencies are
asked are of the two following types:
1. What are the physical, chemical, and physiological characteristics
of the released chemical, and what is the nature of the threat?
2. What areas will be affected by the spread of material, and what
is the required timetable for responsive action?
A principal aim of this manual is to enable APC offices to provide
useful answers to these questions. To answer the first question, an agency
will utilize its resources for field monitoring and detection and chemical
analysis. For the second, it will apply techniques for estimating the
extent of downwind hazard. While other Contingency Plan participants could
provide one or the other of these services, only the APC agency can provide
both and should therefore be assigned these responsibilities. Furthermore,
the legitimate role of the APC agency should be limited to this area of
technical support.
As described in this manual, capabilities for field monitoring, chemical
analysis, and hazard area prediction are presently available only at the
larger APC agencies. However, they are cited as desirable goals for smaller
agencies as well, even in communities with populations of 50,000 or less.
It is hoped the manual will spur an increasing number of them to gear for
these emergency services.
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i
oo
DISASTER
SERVICES
COORDINATOR
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER
Figure 2-1. Panorama of Accidental-Episode Events
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2.4 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) FOR APC AGENCY PARTICIPANTS
The following outlines typical Standard Operating Procedures for APC
agency participants in a Contingency Plan. It is designed to be part of
an overall SOP for all Contingency Plan participants, which is presented
in Part II of the manual. The following three phases are covered:
• Readiness
• Alert procedures
• Post-event procedures
2.4.1 Readiness
The APC office should maintain a state of readiness in order to
respond upon notification of an accidental episode for which APC services
are required. Readiness should not impose inordinate requirements upon
the agency, since in most areas accidental episodes that could involve the
agency are relatively infrequent events. A well-run organization with good
housekeeping practices will find itself prepared for emergency services
with very little additional effort. The following items are of particular
importance for accidental-episode readiness. Daily use of check lists will
help to keep these items in order.
2.4.1.1 Duty Roster
Provision should be made for a Duty Officer to be available at all
times outside of regular office hours. This assignment, which should be
rotated among members of the scientific and technical staff, does not
require a physical presence at the office, but only a point of contact. The
names and telephone numbers of all on the Duty Officer assignment list,
along with the latest duty roster, should be on file at the local Emergency
Operations Center.
2-4
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2.4.1.2 Equipment
All equipment should be maintained in good working order. Equip-
ment that is particularly required for use during an accidental episode
includes:
• Vehicles (official and personal)
• Detection kits (see Sec. 2.5)
• Meteorological sensors, principally for wind direction and speed
• Protective gear: clothing, masks, gloves, etc.
• Communications equipment as required by the Contingency Plan
• Chemical laboratory equipment and supplies, especially for a
mobile laboratory if available.
2.4.1.3 Documentation
The following are required:
§ A "Ready Reference Shelf" consisting of recommended reference
sources on accidental episodes
• Set of templates for estimating hazard area (provided herewith)
• Log book to record events and action taken.
2.4.2 Alert Procedures
Figure 2-2 shows a diagram of typical Contingency Plan procedures
for APC agency participants during an accidental episode.
2.4.2.1 Activation
APC agency participation may be enlisted only when an accidental
episode poses an imminent or potential threat to persons, or when the
released hazardous material requires further identification. The
Contingency Plan described in Part II of the manual defines three Alert
stages according to the severity of the event, and provides for APC agency
2-5
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Figure 2-2. Typical Contingency Plan Participation of APC Agency During Accidental Episode
-------
activation during a Second or Third Stage Alert. When the Alert is declared,
the EOC notifies the ARC Duty Officer by telephone or shortwave radio, as
prearranged. The Duty Officer contacts the agency chief and the staff
members who are designated accidental-episode participants. These include
a field inspector, a chemical analyst, a meteorologist/engineer, or their
equivalents. The Duty Officer may himself be one of these specialists, or
he may assist the staff as required.
2.4.2.2 Detection and Monitoring
The first persons on the scene of an accidental episode may be
able to furnish a preliminary estimate of the dimensions of the toocic
cloud and the direction and speed of its movement. In many cases the
hazardous material itself may be identified. However, when these attempts
to identify and monitor the emission have failed, the EOC may declare a
Second or Third Stage Alert and request the aid of APC agency specialists.
ARC field inspectors and chemists will be assigned to handle the
duties of detection, monitoring, and chemical analysis. Smaller agencies
may have only one person to do all the field monitoring, detection, and
chemical analysis, while in larger agencies half a dozen or more chemists,
sanitary engineers, and industrial hygienists may be on tap, in addition
to field inspectors. Equipment items of a few agencies include portable
gas chromatographs, ultraviolet and infrared analyzers, and spectrometers,
transported to the scene in a mobile laboratory.
When dispatched to the accidental-episode site, APC participants
will proceed as follows:
1. Drive to the site in an equipped APC vehicle (car, utility
van, station wagon, trailer, or mobile laboratory).
2. Receive instructions from the On-Scene Commander
3. Observe the toxic cloud and its features, noting especially:
2-7
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a. Whether gas is escaping directly from its container or
evaporating from a liquid spill
b. If a liquid spill, the approximate area covered by the
spillage
c. The approximate rate of gas generation into the atmosphere
d. The type and size of container from which the material
is emanating (for an estimate of duration of spillage)
e. Location of an intended sampling point, and coordinates
of the point with reference to the source and center line
of the cloud.
f. The approximate rate of movement downwind, by timing an
identifiable puff within the toxic cloud
g. Atmospheric stability estimated from cloud behavior
(e.g., vertical transport) or other indications.
4. Don protective gear.
5. Carry grab sample collectors such as mylar bags, absorbent
material, or evacuated bulbs.
6. If mylar bags or absorbent material, carry a high-volume
aspirator that is powered by automobile or self-contained
battery.
7. Obtain an adequate amount of sample.
8. Return to the ARC vehicle near the Command Post.
9. Analyze the sample (See Section 3).
10. Obtain essential data on the hazardous material (toxicity,
f1ammabi1ity, reactivity with air, water, and extinguisher
solutions, countermeasures, disposal methods, etc.) from
reference material in the ARC vehicle or by communication
with the participant at the EOC or the ARC agency office
who has access to the Ready Reference Shelf.
11. Relay above information to the On-Scene Commander. (The
Chief Operations Authority at the EOC will receive the data
simultaneously.)
2-8
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12. Relay data from Step 3. to the ARC meteorologist at the EOC
or ARC agency office. If time permits, use a hand-held or
tripod-supported wind set to obtain readings of wind direction
and speed. If possible, obtain a 5-minute average from six
readings of each parameter taken at 1-minute intervals. Relay
data to the meteorologist (See Sec. 2.4.2.3).
13. Repeat Steps 5 through 11 as required.
14. Enter all data and related information into an engineering
notebook.
Grab samples of the toxic cloud are analyzed in the APC vehicle
parked near the Command Post. One or more of the following techniques may
be utilized:
1. Detection kit (See Section 3.1).
2. Gas chromatograph or other equipment utilizing physical
principles.
3. Other fast-detection laboratory techniques described in
reference texts such as Ruch's "Chemical Detection of Gaseous
Pollutants" (See Appendix A.£).
These techniques help to establish the identification and ambient
concentration of contaminants at the sampling point. The data will be
relayed to the APC meteorologist, who may then be able to estimate maximum
concentrations along the center line.
The detection kit is limited to a small number of unknown materials
that can be analyzed. By the other methods a much larger number of chemicals
can be analyzed, and measurements are more accurate than those provided by
the kit. The rise and fall of concentration can be closely followed by
repeated sampling at the same spot.
2-9
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2.4.2.3 Hazard Area Estimates
Providing estimates of the downwind hazard area ("exclusion area")
that results from the atmospheric dispersion of hazardous material is a
specialty of the ARC agency. This duty is assigned to an ARC specialist
such as a meteorologist or other professional (e.g., chemist, engineer,
industrial hygienist, toxtcologist) who has acquired added meteorological
capability. When his assistance is requested during an Alert, he will
proceed in accordance with the Contingency Plan to his assigned place of
operation, which may be either the EOC or the APC agency office. There
he wi11:
1. Be briefed by the Chief Operations Authority.
2. Communicate directly with observers at the accidental-episode
site (APC field inspectors, etc.) to receive current meteoro-
logical and hazardous emission data.
3. Refer to posted 1:24,000 U. S. Geological Survey maps of the
local area to note location of the accidental episode,
character of terrain downwind from the site, and major
obstructions to wind flow.
4. Telephone the nearest National Weather Service forecaster to
discuss reports and predictions on weather, wind, and stability
for the general area.
5. Determine which template to use for estimating the hazard
area (See Sec. 3.2 and templates inside back cover of the
manual).
6. Superimpose appropriate template over the posted USGS map and
outline the hazard area in accordance with instructions in
Sec. 3.2.
7. Advise Chief Operations Authority of results.
8. Repeat above for all updated observational data.
2-10
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9. If more accurate wind information is available through the
use of instrumentation on the scene, prepare a more accurate
estimate of the hazard area if desired, using the method
shown in Turner's Workbook (See Appendix B, Ref. 16),
page 55, Problem 26.
10. Advise Chief Operations Authority that decisions on the
evacuation of persons from the hazard area need not await
completion of the more accurate estimate. Evacuation in
progress could be modified in line with the updated informa-
tion.
2.4.2.4 Meteorological Data
For best results in predicting downwind hazard area, on-the-scene
meteorological observations should be taken. While the first estimates
could be provided by the On-Scene Commander (or an assistant), more accurate
data may be obtained by APC field personnel upon arrival on site. As en-
visioned, ARC field personnel will utilize portable wind sets and other
meteorological equipment. More likely, the mobile laboratory will have
this equipment already installed, and need only deploy it in a representa-
tive location. Coupled with expert visual observations of cloudiness,
visibility, and other parameters associated with atmospheric stability, the
data will be communicated to APC specialists assigned to headquarters for
the purpose of providing hazard area estimates.
In the absence of on-site measurements, the nearest office of the
National Weather Service should be contacted for an estimate or prediction
of required parameters. Prior arrangement should be made for use of an
emergency or unlisted telephone number. At a number of smaller stations,
it may be necessary for special requests to be relayed to the Regional
Forecast Center, but resulting delays in providing required information
should be minimal.
In many air pollution prone cities, the National Weather Service
operates or plans to operate an Environmental Meteorological Support Unit
2-11
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(EMSU), which provides special types of observations and predictions in
support of the local ARC agency*. More precise hazard area forecasts can
be made by the ARC specialist with the use of high resolution data provided
by a nearby EMSU unit. None of these data can be considered more than
second best to that obtained by direct observation at the scene of the
accidental episode, and that responsibility can best be handled by ARC
field personnel.
2.4.2.5 Coordination
The chief of the ARC agency may be a team participant either as
one of the technical specialists or as an ex-officio Contingency Plan
coordinator of the efforts of his staff members. The extent of partici-
pation will depend upon the need for his active assistance during the
event. Even in a less active role, however, he should plan to be present
in order to observe:
• The individual performances of ARC specialists
t Their effectiveness as members of a larger team
• Overall performance and results of the Contingency
plan effort.
2.4.3 Post-Event Procedures
Several days after the accidental episode, when the events are still
fresh in mind yet sufficiently removed to be viewed in perspective, a
critique should be made of all aspects of the ARC agency effort. Of
particular interest are the timeliness, accuracy, responsiveness, and
usefulness of data and recommendations provided by ARC team members. The
following sources of information will be used:
• Individual debriefings by ARC agency participants, including
the agency chief.
• Logbooks and engineering notebooks maintained during the event
*As of September, 1971, EMSU programs are installed in 14 cities: New York,
tfashingtor, Philadelphia, Chicago, Denver, St. Louis, Louisville, Cleveland,
San Francisco, Los Angeles, Boston, Houston, Seattle, and Pittsburgh.
2-12
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• News media accounts, including comments by survivors and evacuees
• Comments of other Contingency Plan participants, particularly
the Chief Operations Authority and the On-Scene Commander.
Findings and recommendations of the critique should be documented,
along with data on manpower and finances charged to the event.
2-13
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3. APC CHEMICAL DETECTION TECHNIQUES
3.1 DETECTION KITS
It is assumed that a multiple-purpose detection kit will be one of
the standard items of equipment for an APC field inspector or chemist on
an accidental-episode assignment. Kits of this sort could be prepackaged
on order from any of several manufacturers, including Mine Safety Appliances
Company, Gelman Instruments Company, National Environmental Instruments, Inc.
(UNICO), Kittegawa (Japan) and Draeger (Germany). A separate reagent-filled
tube is used for the detection of each chemical. For certain chemicals,
pyrolyzers and other accessories are required. A summary data sheet issued
by one company lists close to 80 gaseous or vaporous chemicals for which
detection tubes are available.
3.1.1 Principle of Ooeration
A typical gas detector kit contains a single-stroke hand pump of
100 ml capacity, and one or more sets of micro-orifice tubes mounted in a
case. The gas sample is aspirated into the pump, the amount drawn in being
measured by calibrations on the handle. A prescribed amount of sample
is forced back through a hollow needle into a detector tube. Analysis is
based on the chemical reaction of the detector tube reagent to the presence
of the gas being sampled. A positive response is indicated by a pronounced
color change in the reagent. Gas concentration is estimated by comparison
of the tube with a reference chart calibrated either by color intensity or
length-of-stain. Figure 3-1 shows a typical detector kit.
3.1.2 Sensitivity Requirement
Each detector tube is designed for sensitivity to a specified range
of concentrations. At the low concentration end of the scale, concentra-
tions below the Threshold Limit Value (TLV) are detected. This is the
highest concentration to which the average employee can be exposed over
an 8-hour period without deleterious physiological effects. For use in
accidental episodes, the range should begin just below the Emergency
Exposure Limit (EEL) or the Public Exposure Limit (PEL), which are defined
3-1
-------
GJ
ro
Figure 3-1. Example of a Chemical Detector Tube Kit
-------
on the basis of permissible concentration excursions lasting 60 minutes or
less. For most hazardous chemicals, proposed EEL and PEL concentrations
have not been agreed upon by various committees on standards, and it is
far from the present intent to enter into this area of uncertainty. However,
highly simplified estimates proposed by the 1970 edition of Threshold Limit
Values, which are published and selectively revised annually by the American
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, have been adopted for
the purposes of this manual because errors, if any, tend to be on the side
of conservatism. The following relations are used:
If the TLV Lies Between: Multiply it by the following factor
to get EEL:
0 and 1 3
1 and 10 2
10 and 100 1.5
100 and 1000 1.25
Threshold Limit Values published and selectively revised annually
by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists include
"Celling Values" for certain substances, indicated by a reference letter "C."
For a substance to which it applies, the Ceiling Value is a concentration
that should not be exceeded. Below the Ceiling Value, time-weighted
average concentrations produce little physiological effect. Above this
value, the substance is fast-acting even for short period excursions.
3.1.3 Priority List of Chemicals
Obviously, the detection kit recommended for use to identify and
measure concentrations of unknown material in a chemical spill would have
to be limited in size, hence in the number of chemicals that could be
detected. For the purposes of this manual, a rating system was developed
that led to an order of priority for hazardous chemicals to be considered.
The final list of fifteen chemicals is as follows:
3-3
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Hydrogen sulfide Acetaldehyde formaldehyde
Vinyl chloride Hydrogen cyanide Acetone
Ethylene oxide Acrylonitrile Butane(s)
Chlorine Methanol Propane
Anhydrous ammonia Benzene Ethyl chloride
In addition, the ARC agency should become familiar with hazardous
chemicals that are frequently encountered either through manufacture in
the local area or transport through it.
The rating system and development of the foregoing list, along with
basic data on more than 50 of the most commonly used chemical products
appear in Appendix A.
3.2 OTHER ON-THE-SPOT TESTING EQUIPMENT
A variety of test equipment and techniques is presently in use by
some APC agencies for on-the-spot testing. Noxious gases, odors, vapors
and phenomena for which tests can be made in the field and which require
no laboratory analysis are:
Aldehydes Organic halides (vinyl, ethyl chloride)
Ammonia Hydrogen cyanide
Aromatic hydrocarbons Hydrogen sulfide
(benzene, etc.
Chlorine
Combustible gases and vapors
(propane, butane, etc.)
Several types of equipment are utilized for these tests. They
include sensitized papers or crayons, squeeze bulbs and ampules, burettes,
titration cylinders, explosimeters, midget impingers and gas absorption
cells, and other devices. Some are shown in Table 3-! and Figure 3-2.
which are taken from Chapter XI of the Air Pollution Control Field Operations
Manual, PHS Publication No. 937. However, it would be more practical if
a simple identification kit for field use in accidental episodes were
available, as described in Section 3.1.
3-4
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CONTAMINANT
Aldehydes
Ammonia
Aromatic
Hydrocarbons
(Benzene)
Chlorine
Combustible
Gases
Hydrocyanic
Acid Gas
Hydrogen
Sulfide
REAGENT OR
EQUIPMENT USED
Absorption in
Sodium
Bisulfite
M.S. A. Midget
Impinger
Red Litmus & Stop
Watch
M.S. A. Aromatic
Hydrocarbon:
Detector
0 - Tolidine in
the M.S. A. Midget
Impinger
M.S. A. Model 40
Combustible Gas
Indicator
M.S. A. Hydro-
cyanic Acid Gas
Detector
M.S. A. H2S
Detector
TREATMENT OR
REACTION OBSERVED
lodometric
Titration
Color Change to
Blue
Colors Treated
Granules. Stain
Length Measured.
Color Intensity
Compared to
Standards
Direct Reading
Instrument
Treated Granules
Orange Color
Treated Granules
Change Color
a. Preparation in minutes
b. Test
or Sampling
-
TIME REQUIRED CONCENTRATION EIGHT-HOUR
a b c RANGE OF TEST THRESHOLD LIMIT
10 5 10 0 - 1000
110 10-100
10 2 0 0-100
10 5 2 0-70
1 22 0 - 20 x
10 2 0 0-50
120 0-50
c. Calculation and
ppm .5 to 5.0 ppm
ppm 100 ppm
ppm 25 ppm
ppm 1 ppm
LEL
ppm 10 ppm
ppm 20 ppm
Interpretation
SUFFICIENT WARNING
WITHOUT TESTING
Yes - Eye
Irritation
Yes - Odor
Yes - Odor
Yes - Odor for
Immediately Danger-
ous Levels. No -
for Low Cone.
Some Yes - Odor
Yes - Odor - by
Trained Personnel
No - Odor is not
Reliable
Table 3-1. Contaminants Which Can Be Tested
in the Field with Portable Devices
-------
D.
F.
Figure 3-2. Portable field-testing equipment: A. Tutweiler apparatus;
B. explosimeter; C. halide leak detector; D. squeeze bulbs and
ampules for H2S testing; E. squeeze bulbs and ampules, from left to right:
CO, S02 (also used for HCN and aromatic hydrocarbons), and HF testers;
F. test papers
3-6
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3.3 CHEMICAL ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
Procedures for determining the identification and concentration of
sampled airborne contaminants are detailed in a number of cited reference
texts, and summarized in Ruch's "Chemical Detection of Gaseous Pollutants"*.
The latter lists accepted tests for over 150 substances including all
fifteen on the priority list (Sec. 3.1.3). They are described in Appendix
A, Sec. A.2.
* See Appendix B , Reference 4.
3-7
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4. HAZARD AREA ESTIMATES
4.1 DEFINITION OF HAZARD AREA
The hazard area that results from a release of contaminant into the
atmosphere is an area downwind of the source where ambient concentrations
endanger the health and safety of persons exposed to the material for a
relatively short period of time, on the order of an hour or less. It is
also called an "exclusion area" since all persons within its delineated
boundaries should be evacuated as quickly as possible.
4.2 THE PREDICTION MODEL
The basic expression for maximum (center line) concentration downwind
from a source of airborne contaminant is:
XCL ~ TTO O H
where xri = the concentration, usually expressed in micrograms of contam-
3
inant per cubic meter of air (yg/m )
Q = source strength or rate of contaminant generation, expressed
as grams of airborne contaminant (gas or vapor) per second
(g/sec)
a = standard deviation of concentration crosswind through the
toxic cloud, given in meters (m)
a = standard deviation of concentration vertically through the
toxic cloud, given in meters (m)
u = wind speed averaged over a discrete period of time, say
30 seconds, expressed in meters per second (1 m/sec = 2.3 mph)
IT = 3.1416
The two standard deviations increase as the cloud spreads during
downwind movement. Hence, the computed concentration, XCL refers to a
given point downwind at which the cloud measurements are considered.
4-1
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Downwind cloud dimensions also depend upon the intensity of turbu-
lence in the atmospheric layers in which the cloud is moving. Turbulence
results when the air is heated by the sun (thermal turbulence) or when it
blows over rough ground or around obstacles (mechanical turbulence). On
a typical sunny afternoon with gentle to moderate winds, the lower layer
of the atmosphere exhibits pronounced turbulence, and is said to be
unstable. Under these conditions a cloud of contaminants is buffeted
laterally and vertically by turbulent gusts. It becomes diluted by the
ambient air so that concentrations diminish rapidly downwind. On a
typically clear, quiet night, the atmosphere is said to be stable, marked
by the absence of turbulence. Under these conditions, a cloud of contami-
nants is carried by a light wind as a narrow plume in which concentrations
at considerable distances from the source are still comparable with those
near the source.
4.3 TOXICITY FACTOR
For hazard area estimates, the additional factor of toxicity must be
considered. Given two gaseous contaminants, for example, acrylonitrile
and hydrogen cyanide, escaping into the atmosphere at the same rate and
traveling downwind over a given terrain under identical atmospheric
conditions, the pattern and values of ambient concentration will be the
same but the more toxic substance, hydrogen cyanide, will be a threat to
health and safety farther downwind and over a larger area than will acrylo-
nitrile. For the fifteen chemicals that rated highest in potential hazard,
the concentrations listed in Table 4-1 were considered to define the
hazard area boundaries.
4-2
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Threshold Limit Hazard Area
Value (1970) Value
Chemical (mg/m3)* (mg/m3)
Formaldehyde 3c 3
Chlorine 3 6
Hydrogen cyanide 11 (skin) 17
Hydrogen sulfide 12 18
Anhydrous ammonia 18 27
Acrylonltrile 45 (skin) 68
Benzene 80c (skin) 80
Ethylene oxide 90 135
Methanol 260 315
Acetaldehyde 360 450
Vinyl chloride 770c 770
Propane (L.P.G.) 1800 2250
Butanes (estimated) 2000 2500
Acetone 2400 3000
Ethyl chloride 2600 3250
Table 4-1. Hazard Area Limits for the Fifteen Highest Rated Chemicals,
*American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienlsts; includes
intended changes for 1970.
c = ceiling value
4-3
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4.4 HAZARD AREA TEMPLATES
For a first approximation of potential hazard area downwind from
the site of an accidental episode, the use of templates is recommended.
Three templates labeled Figures 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3 will be found inside
the back cover of this manual. They are designed for Unstable, Neutral,
and Stable atmospheric conditions, respectively, and for use as overlays
on 1:24,000 U. S. Geological Survey maps. They assume a source strength,
Q, of 1 kg/sec and, downwind speed u" of 3 m/sec (7 mph). The templates
will be easier to handle and maintain if they are mounted onto plexiglass
or similar hard, transparent surface.
Downwind concentrations were computed from Turner's Workbook* for
Pasquill stability categories B, D, and F, respectively. For each case,
wind direction variability was considered in accordance with the following
total angular range:
• For Category B, 80 degrees
• For Category D, 30 degrees
• For Category F, 15 degrees
These are approximately four standard deviations of the lateral wind
fluctuations that are observed for each typical case**
To use the template, simply place the zero distance point over the
accidental-episode location and rotate the template so that its center line
is oriented in the downwind direction. Trace onto the base map the hazard
area identified by the name of the chemical Involved, Including all of the
delineated area between zero distance and the labeled isopleth.
* See Appendix B , Reference 16
** See Slade, D. H. (ed.), "Meteorology and Atomic Energy." U. S. Atomic
Energy Commission, TID 24190, July 1968; p. 130. Table 4-5 refers to
near-equivalent stability categories of the Brookhaven Trace Type System.
4-4
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4.5 SOURCE STRENGTH CONSIDERATIONS
4.5.1 Source Strengths Other Than 1 kg/sec.
The templates have been constructed on the basis of an assumed value
for Q, source strength, of 1 kg/sec, (about 4 tons per day). This emission
rate is typical of what has been observed or calculated for rocket fuel
spills. It is used here because no other estimates are available, and
because exclusion areas based on a more accurately known value of source
strength can readily be determined by means of the templates. If source
strength in a given accidental episode is known or estimated to be other
than 1 kg/sec., the shape of the appropriate template would not be altered
but the downwind distance would have to be adjusted accordingly. The
method is as follows:
1. From Table 4-1, read the Hazard Area Value for the chemical
of interest.
2. Divide this value by the actual emission rate in kg/sec.
Call this quotient the equivalent concentration.
3. Select the template for the actual stability condition.
4. Find the isopleth position for the equivalent concentration.
5. Trace the hazard area out to the isopleth of equivalent
concentration.
EXAMPLE:
Hydrogen sulfide is released at the rate of 3 kg/sec, under
Neutral Conditions. To what distance from the source does
the actual hazard area extend?
PROCEDURE:
1. From Table 4-1, the Hazard Area Value for Hydrogen Sulfide
is 18 mg/m .
2. Divide that value by 3 (kg/sec), giving an equivalent concentra-
tion of 6 mg/m .
4-5
-------
o
3. On Figure 4-2, for Neutral Conditions, the 6 mg/m isopleth
is found by interpolation to lie directly downwind at about
the 4.0 km mark.
4, The hazard area is all that is enclosed by the template out
to 4.0 km.
NOTE: It is incorrect:to estimate the actual area by applying the
factor of 3 to the downwind distance. In the example, the
downwind distance for 1 kg/sec, is about 2.2 km, for 3 kg/sec.
about 4iO km.
The relation between concentration and downwind distance is not
linear. Concentration is linearly related to source strength, Q, and is
inversely proportional to wind speed, u. If the values of these parameters
are different from those used in constructing the templates, the effect
on concentration must first be determined and the downwind distance then
located on the basis of where the limiting isopleth would be drawn for
conditions as given. See other examples that follow.
4.5.2 Release Duration
From an assumed value of source strength it is possible to estimate
how long it will take for all the toxic material to flow out of its container.
For example, chlorine is shipped as a liquid under pressure in steel con-
tainers. Cylinders normally hold 100 to 150 pounds, larger containers hold
2000 pounds, and single-unit tank cars hold 16, 30, and 55 tons. Newer
tank cars that hold 85 tons and 90 tons are now in use as well. Chlorine
is also shipped in multitank barges, up to 1100 tons, and in tank trucks
holding approximately 6 tons. Excess flow valves are designed to keep the
flow rate under 0.9 kg/sec, from tank cars and tank trucks, and under 1.9
kg/sec, from barges. A tank car that holds 30 tons of chlorine releasing
at a uniform rate of 1 kg/sec, will take about 7.5 hours for all the chlorine
to be released. The gas may empty much more rapidly in the event the container
is deeply ruptured. In general, the emission rate is seldom uniform over a long
period of time.
4-6
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4.5.3 Spillage of Volatile Liquids
Hazardous substances that are transported as liquids may have been
either liquid or gaseous at normal pressure and temperature. In the latter
case, the gases are liquefied and pressurized to several atmospheres within
their container. When vented to the atmosphere, pressurized liquid rapidly
returns to the gaseous state, carrying along aerosolized liquid particles
that vaporize in a few seconds. In such cases, the source strength may
be assumed to be 100% of the material emitted.
However, other hazardous substances that are liquid though volatile
at normal pressure and temperature may spill from their container to the
ground, and enter the atmosphere only through vaporization. In such cases
the source strength for the same quantity of spill as a liquefied gas will
be somewhat less than that of the gas by a factor that depends on its rate
of evaporation. The rate of evaporation is not constant; it depends upon
the temperature, pressure, and wind speed of interfacing ambient air, and
in the case of hygroscopic material like anhydrous ammonia, on the relative
humidity as well. It also depends upon its vapor pressure curve. Figure
4-4, adapted from Siewert*, shows the relation between source strength and
vapor pressure as determined for a variety of rocket fuels, some of which are
transported under cryogenic conditions. His original chart gives source
strength in pounds per second for a liquid spill that covers 600 square feet,
assuming a wind of 10 mph (4.3 m/sec.), air temperature of 80°F, and no
absorption or heating by the ground.
In the event of a volatile liquid spillage, vapor source strength,
Q, may be determined by the following procedure:
1. Estimate the rate of liquid spillage, expressed in kg/sec.
2. From Appendix A , Table A-5, read the vapor pressure at 20°C
for the chemical in question (last column).
*R. D. Siewert, personal communication, 1971
4-7
-------
VAPOR SOURCE STRENGTH @ 20 °C
of Liquid Spillage Rate (g/sec)
VAPOR
50 PRESSURE
0 20 aC
% of
30 760 mm Hg,
20
Figure 4-4. Vapor Source Strength, expressed as a Percentage
of Liquid Spillage Rate, shown as a function of
Vapor Pressure at 20 C (adapted from Siewert)
4-8
-------
3. Express the vapor pressure as a percentage of 760 mm. of Hg.
4. From Figure 4-4, find this percentage along the ordinate,
move left to where this value intersects the curve, and read
the abscissa.
5. Determine vapor source strength from the percentage of liquid
spillage rate.
EXAMPLE:
A tank truck filled with acetone at ambient pressure is ruptured,
and the chemical spills to the ground at an estimated rate of
1 gal/sec. Specific gravity of acetone is about 0.8. What is
the vapor source strength, Q?
PROCEDURE:
1. Spillage rate of 1 gal/sec. = 3.8 liters/sec. = 3.8 x 0.8,
or about 3 kg/sec.
2, Table A-5 gives vapor pressure of acetone at 20°C as 175
mm Hg.
3. Acetone vapor pressure is therefore 175/760 = 23%, for
ordinate value.
4. From Figure 4-4, abscissa is 56%.
5. Vapor source strength, Q, is 56% of 3 kg/sec, or 1.7 kg/sec.
4.6 WIND SPEED CONSIDERATIONS
As previously noted, the templates are constructed on the basis of
a mean wind speed, u, of 3 m/sec. (7 mph). Should the reported wind be
other than 3 m/sec., the hazard area estimate is adjusted as follows:
1. From Table 4-1, read the Hazard Area Value for the chemical of
interest.
2. Divide this value by 3.
4-9
-------
3. Multiply the quotient by the reported wind speed. Call this
product the equivalent concentration.
4. Select the template for the actual stability condition.
5. Find the isopleth position for the equivalent concentration.
6. Trace the hazard area out to the isopleth of equivalent
concentration.
EXAMPLE:
Anhydrous ammonia is released under Stable Conditions at the rate
of 1 kg/sec. The wind speed is measured as 2 m/sec. To what
distance from the source does the actual hazard area extend?
PROCEDURE:
1. From Table 4-1, the Hazard Area Value for Anhydrous Ammonia is
27 mg/m3.
2. Dividing 27 by 3 gives 9.
3. Multiplying 9 by 2 gives 18 mg/m^, which is the equivalent
concentration.
4. The appropriate template is Figure 4-3.
o
5. The isopleth position for 18 mg/m is approximately 5.5 km
downwind.
6. The hazard area is the total area inside the template between
zero distance and 5.5 km.
NOTE: At 2 m/sec., the vaporous cloud will reach the 5.5 km
downwind distance in 2750 sec., or about 46 min.
4.7 ADJUSTMENTS FOR TERRAIN
Predicted hazard areas represented by the templates may require
adjustment for variations of terrain. This task can only be approached
subjectively, guided by the analyst's familiarity with the threatened area.
Nevertheless, the following generalities may be stated.
4-10
-------
1. Winds under 5 m/sec (11 to 12 mph) tend to follow paths
of least resistance: river channels, valleys, city avenues,
etc.
2. Winds are diverted by obstacles such as prominent hills, and
in cities by large buildings. With stronger winds that are
forced upward, around, and over these obstacles, reverse
eddies tend to appear on the lee side in which there are
zones of increased and decreased concentrations of airborne
contaminants. Hence, the lee side of a hill or building
may not necessarily provide temporary safety from a toxic
cloud.
3. If the wind travels upslope, gases that are significantly
heavier than air may not be transported as far as the template
shows. The pattern of concentration would be foreshortened,
and contamination in the valley would be heavier than indicated
by the template.
This correction may be required for all of the 15 gases on the
priority list with the exception of ammonia and hydrogen cyanide
4. If the wind travels downslope, gases that are significantly
lighter than air, chiefly ammonia and to a lesser extent hydro-
gen cyanide, would appear in lower concentrations downwind
than shown by the template.
4.8 ADJUSTMENTS FOR FIRE
The fire hazard has not been considered in construction of the templates.
Many of the hazardous chemicals are highly flammable. In some cases ignition
caused by a spark or open flame some distance downwind may flash back to
the source, resulting in an initial explosion or fire of wide dimensions.
Atmospheric dispersion models that include this phenomenon would have to
consider the "stack effect" of the fire and the local atmospheric instability
condition that rapidly develops near the source. Once in progress the fire
tends to be concentrated at the source only, and the emanating cloud consists
4-11
-------
of combustion products that may or may not be toxic but are usually
suffocating or highly Irritating. Evacuation of people from an area
farther than about 1 km downwind of the fire 1s seldom required.
4-12
-------
APPENDIX A
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
A.I RATING SYSTEM
Specific hazardous chemicals that are treated in detail in this
manual have been selected on the basis of a rating system. The rating
system developed in the Battelle Report*, which was applied to the
analogous spillage problem into a water medium, serves as a model for
this purpose. In the transfer of methodology to the problem of airborne
hazards, so much of the details have had to be altered that to all intents
and purposes a new rating system has emerged.
Unlike the Battelle system, this system covers accidental episodes
from stationary as well as mobile sources. The approach to scoring is
different for the two types of sources. Accidental-episode potential for
stationary sources has been assessed entirely on the basis of case
statistics with the assumption that what is past is prologue. For mobile
sources, the Battelle methodology and data have been adapted to present
purposes by the addition of the hazardous chemical grading system used
by the National Fire Protection Association** and an analogous grading
scheme for volatility. Ratings for mobile sources are developed only
partially from case statistics (accident probabilities for rail, truck,
and water carriers), the other parameters being the total annual production
and physical, chemical, and toxicological properties of transported
materials.
Details of the rating system follow.
* See Appendix F, Reference 8.
**See Appendix B, Reference 8.
A-l
-------
A.1.1 Rating System Derivation
House Document No. 92-70, P. 11-65, gives an expression for hazard
risk of a spillage into a body of water. Neglecting the parameters that
apply exclusively to water usage, the expression adapted for airborne
contaminants may be stated as follows:
R = f(P, H, Q, E, T, M) (1)
*
where: R = degree of risk
P = probability of a spill
H = product hazard
Q = quantity of the product
E = environmental conditions
T = time to detect release and begin response
M = mitigation factor (effectiveness of countermeasures)
Distinguishing stationary sources, s, from mobile sources, m:
R = f(H, E){gs[Ps,Qs,Ts,Ms] + gra[Pm,^J|n,Hn]}(2)
For a rigorous analysis, data for the independent variables could be
obtained from a statistical analysis of all case histories on record,
provided the required information were fully reported. However, full
reporting has been done in only a handful of cases, including the more
well known events recounted in Appendix C. In any event, for the purposes
of this study it is not essential to have an absolute value for the rating
of each chemical, but only a set of relative standings on the basis of
major criteria. For example, we may assume that T = T = constant; and
that MS = Mf = another constant. The equation can then be divided through
by these constants and simplified to read:
R =f(H,E)tgs[Ps,Qs] + g^P.-H,])
A-2
-------
E is another parameter which would require intensive research to
evaluate. It could be determined, but is it worth the effort, especially
when its influence is felt in the good, hard statistics on accident
probability? For the rest, there are several data sources that could be
used, viz.:
H = H (Toxicity, Flammability, Reactivity, and Volatility)
Numbers for each of these properties could be derived
from sources like MCA Safety Data Sheets, the Battelle
Report (Dawson, et al.), HD 92-70, NFPA Manuals, Handbook
of Chemistry and Physics, and "Ready Reference Shelf"
textbooks.
P : Could be determined from the more than 1000 case studies
published by the MCA.
Qg: Listed for over 200 chemicals in the Battelle report, taken
from a study by Booz, Allen and Hamilton quoted in that
report.
Q : Apparently not available for each chemical despite an
extensive literature search. Obviously Q is included in
Q , that is, not all of a chemical that is manufactured gets
to be transported. In-house use varies with each commodity
and manufacturer. Again, since only a relative standing is
needed, the assumption had to be made that Q = Q = kQm,
with k > 1 and the same for each commodity.
As for f, g , g , R was assumed to have a power function relation of
the following type:
f*(R) = A log S + B log M,
Where f*(R) = a relative value for R
S = a score obtained by evaluating all MCA stationary source
cases that involved the given commodity
A-3
-------
M = a score obtained by evaluating the probability statistics
listed in the Battelle report, multiplied by H, a number
that expressed the combined hazard from toxicity, etc.
A,B = arbitrary constants that enable the entirely dissimilar
scoring systems used for S and M to be made comparable
A.1.2 Stationary Sources
As mentioned, the basic reference for stationary sources is "Case His-
tories of Accidents in the Chemical Industry," which is a compilation of rep
resentative events from the year 1951 to date. Indices, which are cumula-
tive from the beginning of record, include a breakdown of cases by specific
chemical. Accidents that were not associated with airborne spread of
hazardous material were excluded from the rating system, which arbitrarily
scores events as follows:
No injuries or minor structural damage, score 1 point for each
person exposed to the hazard.
Minor injuries (no lasting impedimentary effects) or moderate
structural damage, points = number of injured persons times 2.
Major injuries or major structural damage, points = number of
injured persons times 5,
Fatalities (direct or indirect), points = number of deaths
times 10.
For example, Case 792, in which ethylene oxide was involved, re-
sulted in 1 fatality, 3 major injuries, 6 minor injuries, and 12
exposures with no injuries. Points are (1 x 10) + (3 x 5) + (6 x 2) +
(12 x 1) = 49. The twenty leading chemicals and their respective scores
are listed in Table A-l.
A-4
-------
Table A-l
List of 20 leading chemicals involved in accidental episodes
from stationary sources.
Rank Chemical Score
1. Hydrogen sulfide 411
2. Chlorine 113
3. Vinyl chloride 110
4. Methyl parathion 91
5. Xylol 64
6. Ethylene oxide 60
7. Acetaldehyde 50
8. Nitrogen (compressed) 48
9. Hydrogen cyanide 44
10. Hydrogen (compressed) 39
11. Anhydrous ammonia 38
12. Oxygen (compressed) 31
13. Aniline 25
14. Methanol 22
15 Acrylonitrile 20
Sulfur dioxide 20
17. Hydrogen peroxide 19
18. Carbon monoxide 18
19. Ethyl ether 17
20. Benzene 15
A-5
-------
A.1.3 Mobile Sources
Hazardous chemicals were scored 1n accordance with the following
formula, which is based upon estimates of relative significance for the
given parameters:
M =
where M =
Pm =
Q =
V =
H =
3PmQ1/2(VH)2
score
Probability of accidental spillage during transport (see below)
total annual production (in 10 tons)
volatility rating
hazard rating
= .0028R
.0011R
.019Rt>
W .r
where R = percentage of material transported by water
R = percentage of material transported by rail
Rt = percentage of material transported by truck
and the coefficients are probabilities of accidental spillage by the
respective carrier mode.
Probability and cargo loading data are extracted from the Battelle
report*. The hazard rating, H, is the sum of NFPA ratings on a scale of
0 - 4 for each of three parameters, toxicity, flammability, and reactivity**.
The volatility rating has been similarly developed on a scale of 1- 4 on the
basis of vapor pressure at 20°C. The twenty leading chemicals and their
respective scores, M, are listed in Table A-2.
* For mobile sources, total annual amount of chemical transported would
have been preferred to total annual output, but data for all chemicals
were not available. See Appendix F, Reference 8.
** See Appendix B, Reference 8.
A-6
-------
Table A-2
List of 20 leading chemicals potentially involved in accidental
episodes from mobile sources.
Rank Chemical Score
1. Ethylene oxide 19584
2. Butadiene 14240
3. Vinyl chloride 12628
4. Ammonia (anhydrous) 10000
5. Acetaldehyde 5856
6. Ethylene dichloride 4215
7. Formaldehyde 4144
8. Fluorine 3976
9. Propane 3920
10. Hydrogen sulfide 3808
11. Hydrogen cyanide 2970
12. Acrylonitrile 2700
13. Chlorine 2560
14. Butane 2336
15. Ethyl chloride 2328
16. Benzene 2280
17. Acetone 2220
18. Methanol 2196
19. Sulfuric acid 2152
20. Butenes 2144
A-7
-------
A.1.4 Combined Scores
Since the scoring system for stationary sources produces numbers
that are orders of magnitude below those for mobile sources, compati-
bility for combination into a single rating is achieved by the use of
a power function of stationary source scores. All scores are first
expressed in logarithmic form. The logarithms of stationary source
scores are multiplied by 1.5, which scales them up to make them more
comparable with the logarithms of mobile source scores. Addition of
logarithmic scores from stationary and mobile sources for each chemical
results in the final scores and ranking, as shown in Table A-3.
A-8
-------
Table A-3
Combined Scores for Stationary and Mobile Sources and Final Ranking of
Hazardous Chemicals.
Rank Chemical Score (log)
Stat. Mob. Total
1. Hydrogen sulfide 3.920 3.581 7.501
2. Vinyl chloride 3.060 4.105 7.165
3. Ethylene oxide 2.664 4.292 6.956
4. Chlorine 3.080 3.408 6.488
5. Anhydrous ammonia 2.370 4.000 6.370
6. Acetaldehyde 2.548 3.768 6.316
7. Hydrogen cyanide 2.465 3.473 5.938
8. Acrylonitrile 1.950 3.431 5.381
9. Methanol 2.010 3.342 5.352
10. Benzene 1.762 3.358 5.120
Runners-up
11. Formaldehyde 1.500 3.617 5.117
12. Acetone 1.671 3.346 5.017
13. Butanes 1.431 3.368 4.799
14. Propane 1.049 3.593 4.642
15. Ethyl chloride 0.903 3.367 4.270
A-9
-------
Table A-4
VOLATILITY RATINGS OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
1. Gases at 20°C, Rating 4
LPG (including propane)
NH3
Formaldehyde
Vinyl chloride
HC1
Ethylene oxide
Butadiene
Butanes
Butenes
Fluorine - F2
HF
H2S
Freon-12
Ethyl chloride
C12
S02
2. Vapor pressure >100mm @ 20°C, Rating 3
Ethylene dichloride
Acetaldehyde
Acetone
CS?
HCR
3. Vapor pressure 10 4 p 4 100 mm @ 20°C, Rating 2
Benzene Acrylonitrite Methyl methaerylate
Toluene CC14 Trichlorocthane
Methanol Vinyl acetate
Ethanol Perchlorethylene
Isopropanol Trichloroethylene
Cyclohexane Methyl ethyl ketone
4. Vapor pressure < 10mm @ 20°C, Rating 1
H2S04 Acetone cyanohydrin
Styrene Aniline
Xylene Parathion
Acetic anydride Butyl alcohol
Phenol Perchloric acid
Cumene Chlorosulfonic acid
Phthalic anhydride Hexamethylene diamine
Dodecyl benzene (subl. solid)
Tetraethyl lead
A-10
-------
Hazardous Material
Acetone
Cumene (Isopropyl benzene)
Butane
Butenes
Acrylonitrile
Carbon tetrachloride
Vinyl acetate
Carbon disulfide
Phthalic anhydride
Fluorine
Hydrogen Fluoride
Perchloroethylene
Hexamethylenediamine
Hydrogen sulfide
Dodecyl benzene
Trichloroethylene
Tetraethyl lead
Acetone cyanohydrin
Methyl ethyl ketone
Methyl met'nacrylate
Annual
Output ,
(tons x 10°)
1.62
1.60
1.38
1:16
1.15
.97
.83
.82
.76
} .70
.68
.65
.64
.58
.53
.50
.48
.44
.f.O
i
Percentage
Transported by
.0028
Water
47.0
79.6
47.8
47.8
47.8
47.8
47.8
47.8
79.6
} '-1
47.8
47.8
1.1
79.6
47.8
47.8
47.8
47.8
0.1
.0011
Rail
40.3
14.8
40.3
40.3
40.3
40.3
40.3
40.3
14.8
\85.7
40.3
40.3
85.7
14.8
40.3
40.3
40.3
40.3
85.4
.019
Truck
11.9
5.6
11.9
11.9
11.9
11.9
11.9
11.9
5.6
J12.9
11.9
11.9
12.9
5.6
11.9
11.9
11.9
11.9
14.5
Toxidty
1
TLV (ppm)
.001
skin
.02
skin
.05
skin
.10
*.to
skin
.05
.50
F2-10.0
HF.33
.01
mdtC
.01
unkn
.01
high
mdt high
.005
.010
TLV
2400
245
45
65
*30
60
12
0.2
2.0
670
mdt^
15
unkn
535
.10 skin
mdt 1owc
590
410
i 1
.
Flantm
React
NFPA Rating
lc
Oc
4
2C
2
2
1s
4
4
lc
2s
3
0C
lc
3
4
2
2
3C
4C
3
0C
3
3
1
0
0
oc
1s
4
lc
lc
2
1
2
3
1C
0C
2
Oc
2
0
2s
3
0
lc
1s
0
oc
lc
3
2
4
2
Volatility
Rating
3
1
4
4
2
2
2
3
1
4
4
2
1
4
1
2
1
1
2
2
Vapor
Press
orjoC
175 mm
3 mm
Cilj
Gases
93 mm
87 mm
83 mm
295 mm
1 mm
Gas
Gas
13.5mm
subl.-
sol id
Gas
58 mm
1 mm
est. -
•j mm
71 mm
3i) mm
Table A-5. DATA ON HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
-------
ro
Hazardous Material
Sulfuric acid (fumes)
LPG (see propane)
Ammonia
Nitric acid (fumes)
Benzene
Ethylene dichloride
Toluene
Styrene
Ethyl benzene
Methyl alcohol
Formaldehyde
Vinyl chloride
Hydrogen chloride
Propane
Xylenes (Xylols)
Ethylene oxide
Butadiene (inhibited)
Ethyl alcohol (Ethanol )
Isopropyl alcohol (isopropanol )
Cyclohexane
Chlorine
Acetic anhydride
Phenol
Acetaldehyde
Annual
Output K
(tons x 10°)
57.5
2G.80
12.50
8.50
6.80
5.80
4.85
4. CO
4.60
4.35
4.30
4.06
3.90
3.90
3.78
3.20
2.40
2.10
2. CO
l.'J6
1.70
1.70
i.yo
Percentage
Transported by
.0028
Water
46.1
42.7
46.1
79.6
47.8
79.6
47.8
79.6
8.6
47.8
47.8
1.1
47.8
79.6
47.8
47.8
8.G
8.6
79.6
9.8
0.1
79.6
47.8
.0011
Rail
32.3
47.9
32.3
14.8
40.3
14.8
40.3
14.8
86.2
40.3
40.3
85.7
40.3
14.8
40.3
40.3
G6.2
66.2
14.8
76.4
85.4
14.8
40.3
i
.019
Truck
21.4
9.2
21.4
5.6
11.9
5.6
11.9
5.6
24.8
11.9
11.9
12.9
11.9
5.6
11.9
11.9
24.8
24.8
5.6
13.7
14.5
5.6
11.9
Toxicity
1
TLV (ppm)
mdt hi oh c
(.001)
*.04
.'JO
.04
.02
.005
.01
.01
.005
*.50
*.005
.20
.001
.01
.02
.001
.001
.0025
.0033
1.0
.20
skin
.20
.05
TLV
mg/m3
1
(1800)
*18
5
80
200
750
420
435
260
*3
*770
7
1800
435
90
2200
1900
980
1050
3
20
19
350
Flanm
React
NFPA Rating
3
Oc
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2C
2
2
3
Oc
2
2
2
lc
lc
lc
3
2
3
2
i i
0
4C
1
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
4
0
4C
3
4
4
3C
3C
3C
0
2
2
4
3C
Oc
0
0
0
ti
0
2
C
lc
0
1
0
oc
0
3
2
lc
1C
0
1
2
0
2
Volatility
Ratine
1
4
4
1
2
3
?
1
1
2
4
4
4
4
1
4
4
2
2
2
4
1
1
i
*>
Vapor
Press
?n°c
'< 1 mm
Gr.s
Gas
76mm
172mm
2i mm
5.2mm
•7
' mm
9i>mm
Gai
Gas
Gil 5
fas
6 mm
Ge.s
Gas
43 mm
33 mm
74 mm
Has
3.:> mm
-' 1 mm
7 LI mm
!
1
Table A-5. DATA ON HAZARDOUS MATERIAL (Continued)
-------
CA>
Hazardous Material
Aniline
Insecticides (Parathion), etc.
Butyl alcohol
Dichloro difluorome thane
Hydrogen cyanide
Trichloro - ethane
Ethyl chloride
Perchloric acid
Chlorosulfonic acid
Sulfur dioxide
Annual
Output ,
(tons x 10°).
.39
.35
.33
.30
.30
.29
.26
.23
.23
.18
Percentage
Transported by
.0028
Water
79.6
7.2
8.6
47.8
1.1
47.8
47.8
1.1
1.1
1.1
.0011
Rail
14.8
80.7
66.2
40.3
85.7
40.3
40.3
85.7
85.7
85.7
.019
Truck
5.6
11.8
24.8
11.9
12.9
11.9
11.9
12.9
12.9
12.9
Toxlclty
1
TLV (ppm)
skin
0.20
.010
.001
skin
.10
skin
.10
.001
mdt high0
mdt hiqhc
.20
TLV
mq/m3
19
0.1
300
4950
11
(45)
2600
mdt lowc
1
13
Flann
React
NFPA Ratin-i
3
(4)
lc
Oc
4
lc
2
3
3
3
2
(D
3C
Oc
4
lc
4
0
0
0
0
(0)
lc
Oc
2
Oc
0
3
2
0
Volatility..
Rating
1
1
1
4
3
2
4
1
1
3
Vapor
Press
20° c
< 1 mm
< 1 mm
5.5 mm
Gas
620 mm
18 mm
Gas
1 mm
< 1 mm
Gas
* Change intended for 1970
c Estimated from other reference
( )Estimate for typical compound of family
Table A-5. DATA ON HAZARDOUS MATERIAL (Continued)
-------
A. 2 Techniques for Chemical Detection
The following pages are selected reproductions from the bibliography
by Walter E. Ruch* on "Chemical Detection of Gaseous Pollution." This
publication is generally held to be authoritative on the subject. It will
be noted, however, that detection techniques are often not specific for a
particular chemical to the exclusion of all others. Interferences are a
problem especially in the case of rapid detection techniques.
Not listed in this section are optical techniques that are in limited
use. One such technique utilizes the principle of Frustrated Multiple
Internal Reflection (FMIR) or Attenuated Total Reflection (ATR), in which
an infrared beam is passed through a prism surrounded by contaminant and
the emerging beam is analyzed spectrographically. The FMIR technique is
particularly useful in identifying organophosphates, the signatures of
which all show a spike in 9.2 to 9.4 micron band. Many pesticides are in
this family of compounds.
*See Appendix B, Reference 4.
A-14
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Aldehydes
l-USE OF SPOT TESTS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS. VIII. DETECTION OF ALDEHYDE
WITH A PERMANENT TEST PAPER
Frehden, O. and K. Fuerst. Mikrochemie 26, 39-40
(1939); CA33. 3526 (1939).
The test paper is prepared by dissolving 0.8 g of malachite
green and 3 g sodium sulfite, to this is added 3 more
grams of sulfite and the resulting solution is filtered.
Strips of filter paper are dipped into the solution and air
dried. When an aldehyde contacts the impregnated paper
malachite green is reformed. In order for the test to be
successful the test solution used must be neutral and the
test paper white. Approximately 20 aldehydes were tested
by this method and concentration in the range of 0.02 to
0.3 could be detected.
7-SPOT TEST DETECTION AND COLORIMETRIC DETER-
MINATION OF ALIPHATIC ALDEHYDES WITH 2-HY-
DRAZINOBENZOTHIAZOLE. APPLICATION TO AIR
POLLUTION
Sawicki, Eugene and Thomas R. Hauser. Anal.
Chem. 32, 1434-1436 (1960).
All the modifications of a versatile new procedure for the
detection and determination of alipathic aldehydes are
especially sensitive for formaldehyde. On the spot plate
0.01 fig of formaldehyde, 0.3 /ug of acetaldehyde, and
0.3 /zg of propionaldehyde can be detected; on paper
0.05 fJ.g of formaldehyde, 1 fJ.g of acetaldehyde, and 1
fj.g of propionaldehyde are detectable, and with proper
standards, the amount of formaldehyde can be estimated.
A tube containing silica gel impregnated with 2-hydrazino-
benzothiazole solution can detect or estimate formalde-
hyde in the air or in auto exhaust gases. In all the modi-
fications a brilliant blue color is easily seen.
5-DETECTION AND ESTIMATION OF LOW CONCEN-
TRATIONS OF ALDEHYDE IN AIR
Hughes, Ernest E. and Sharon G. Lias. Anal. Chem.
32, 707-708 (1960).
Aldehyde is adsorbed from an air stream on purified
silica gel, which is contained in glass tubes 5 mm in inter-
nal diameter and 7 cm long. The tubes, filled about half
full, are plugged with a wad of cotton at the outlet end
only. The air sample is drawn with a syringe or pump
through the gel with the tube vertical, after which the
remainder of the tube is filled carefully with clean silica
gel and closed with a second cotton plug. The gel added
after exposure filters out the dark oxidation products of
the developing reagent, which interfere with the color
detection. The tube is dipped into developing reagent
(saturated solution of p-phenylenediamine in water, mixed
with 3% hydrogen peroxide in the ratio of 1:2 just before
use) inlej end down. A dark band from impurities in the
reagent appears at the inlet end of the tube, but ndlehyde
catalyzes oxidation of the p-phenylenediamine and pro-
duces a second dark band, colored from pale purple-
brown to deep purple-brown or black, at the boundary
of the two layers of gel, the depth of color on the gel
being measured by the quantity of aldehyde adsorbed.
Standard tubes can be prepared. As little as 0.0001 ppm
can be detected in less than 10 liters of sample, with a
flow rate as high as 0.7 liter per minute. Nitriles, alde-
hyde ammonia, oximes, and aldehyde bisulfite compounds
interfere; ketones do not. Pure gum rubber tubing should
be used for connections in the apparatus, because certain
kinds of plastic tubing contain detectable quantities of
aldehyde. Add. Ref.: IHD 24, 596 (1960).
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Aromatic Hydrocarbons
1-METHODS FOR THE DETECTION OF TOXIC GASES
IN INDUSTRY. BENZENE VAPOR
Anon. Dept. of Scientific and Industrial Research,
London, England. Leaflet No. 4 (1938) 7 pp.; Ibid.,
2nd Edition (1955) 5 pp.
Benzene produces an orange-brown color with formalde-
hyde-sulfuric acid reagent. The reagent is prepared by
adding 0.5 ml of 40% formaldehyde to a bubbler and
diluting to 10 ml with concentrated sulfuric acid. Air is
bubbled through the solution with a hand pump and the
color formed is compared with that of standards made
from sodium nitroprusside. With 18 strokes the sensitivity
is 1 part in 10,000. Naphthas, toluene, and xylene react
only qualitatively. Naphthalene interferes by producing a
black film on the surface of the reagent. Thiophene and
unsaturated hydrocarbons also interfere, but can be de-
tected by bubbling the air through sulfuric acid alone.
Add. Refs.: CA 33, 4159 (1939); IHD 20, 1066 (1956).
9-GAS ANALYSIS BY MEANS OF GAS DETECTORS.
II. RAPID METHOD FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE
MINUTE QUANTITY OF BENZENE IN AIR
Kobayashi, Yoshitaka. J. Chem. Soc. Japan, Ind.
Chem. Sect. 55, 544-546 (1952); CA 48, 3852 (1954).
The author describes a method for the determination of
benzene in air. A glass detector tube is filled with silica
gel impregnated with a solution of sulfuric acid and for-
madlehyde. The benzene concentration is determined by
the length of stain produced. The average error in the
determination was found to be 5%. Add. Ref.: IHD 18,
561 (1954).
13-RAPID METHOD OF BENZENE OR BENZENE HO-
MOIOGS DETERMINATION WITH THE USE OF INDI-
CATORS
Yavorovskaya, S. F. Khim. Prom. 1956, 366-367; CA
51, 3371 (1957).
The author describes a chromatographic method for the
determination of benzene and its homologs. Silica gel is
impregnated with sulfuric acid and formaldehyde. Air is
aspirated through the column; the color produced is orange
yellow which changes after 2 to 3 minutes to a violet,
gray, brown and violet-brown depending upon the homo-
log present. The sample column is compared with standards
prepared by vaporizing known amounts of benzene, to-
luene, or xylene in acetone. The results obtained with this
method differ little from the results of tests conducted by
nitration or catalytic combustion.
20-DETERMINATION OF BENZENE IN THE PRESENCE
OF ITS HOMOLOGS IN THE ATMOSPHERE
Vlasak, Rudolf. Pracovni lekarstvi 11, 418-422
(1949); CA 54, 12440 (1960).
A description of a method for the determination of ben-
zene, where the air sample is nitrated and the resulting
nitrogen dioxide compound reacted with methyl ethyl ke-
tone in pyridine to produce a violet color, is given. Ben-
zene is adsorbed on silica gel and desorbed with a stream
of nitrogen at 100-110°. Adequate sensitivity is achieved.
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Ammonia
3-A NEW AND SENSITIVE TEST FOR AMMONIA
AAakris, Konstanfin G. Z. anal. Chem. 81, 212-214
(1930);CA24, 4731 (1930).
A freshly prepared mixture of 2 cc of 20% silver nitrate
solution mixed with 1 cc of a 5% tannin solution provides
a sensitive reagent for the detection of ammonia. One drop
of the mixture is placed on a watch glass and 0.1 cc of
the test solution is contacted witn the reagent. If ammonia
is present a silver ring will appear rapidly. An alternate
procedure is to impregnate a wad of cotton with the re-
agent and bring it close to a solution containing ammonia.
Heat the ammonia containing solution and a silver deposit
will form on the cotton if at least .005 g of ammonia is
present.
6-DETECTION OF AMMONIA IN AIR
Korenman, I. AA. Z. anal. Chem. 90, 115-118 (1932).
Aniline, sulfanilic acid, benzidine, phenylhydrozine, "ursol
D.W.", ''ursol D. S.", alhpa- and beta-naphthylamine,
para-am.nobenzearsonic acid salt and p-nifraniline were
diazotized by sodium nitrite and hydrochloric acid. The
products formed were sensitive agents for the defection of
ammonia. Filter paper impregnated with one of the dia-
zotized amines will detect fractions of a milligram of am-
monia. Add. Ref.: CA 27, 43 (1933).
Chlorinated Hydrocarbons
j_AN APPARATUS FOR THE DETECTION AND ESTI-
MATION OF CHLORINATED HYDROCARBON VAPORS
IN AIR
Timmis, L. B. J. Soc. Chem. Ind. 63, 380-382 (1944);
CA 39, 1786(1945).
A test paper is attached to the front of a glass tube con-
taining a centrally located filament which can be heated.
The sample is passed over the heated filament to decom-
pose the chlorinated hydrocarbon into products which yield
o color on the test paper.
Acetone
1 -RAPID DETERMINATION OF ACETONE IN AIR
Bulycheva, A. I. Gigiena i Sanit. 13, 30 (1948); CA
43, 8974 (1949).
The outhor describes a colorimetric determination for
acetone which is based upon the reaction with hydro-
lylamine hydrochloride and bromophenol blue. The error
it lets than 16% using 10 to 15 minute air samples.
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00
J-CAS ANALYSIS BY MEANS OF DETECTOR TUBES.
IV. RAPID METHOD FOR THE DETERMINATION OF
ACETONE VAPOR
Kobayashi, Yoshitaka. J. Chem. Soc. Japan, Ind.
Chem. Sect. 56, 174-175 (1953); CA 48, 9271
0954).
The detector tube for the determination consists of a
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Chlorine
4-FREE CHLORINE IN AIR. A COLORIMERIC METHOD
FOR ITS ESTIMATION
Porter, Lyman E. Ind. Eng. Chem. 18, 730-731
(1926).
A rapid method for estimating free chlorine in air uses a
reagent of 1 g of o-tolidine dissolved in 100 cc of concen-
trated hydrochloric acid and diluted to 1 liter. Pass a
measured volume of the air to be tested through 10 cc of
the reagent in an absorption tube. Transfer quantitatively
to a Messier tube, dilute to mark, let stand 2 minutes, then
compare the color with those in a set of permanent stand-
ards made from copper sulfate and potassium dichromate
solutions. Add. Ref.: CA 20, 2800 (1926).
Ethylene Oxide
7-RAPID METHOD FOR THE DETERMINATION OF
ETHYLENE OXIDE VAPOR BY MEANS OF A DETECTOR
TUBE
Kitagawa, Tetsuzo and Yoshitaka Kobayashi. J.
Chem. Soc. Japan, Ind. Chem. Sect. 58, 514-517
(1955); CA 49, : 5634 (1955).
The authors describe a detector tube for the analysis of
ethylene oxide. The detector tube consists of a glass tube
(2 mm in diameter) filled with 0.2 g of silica-gel granules
on which potassium dichromate acidified by sulfuric acid
has been adsorbed and dried. The working curves to inter-
polate the ethylene oxide concentration from measuring
(a) color changed length of detecting column (from orange-
yellow to dark yellow-green) after 100 cc of gas is allowed
to flow at a rate of 1 cc per second, or (b) volume of gas
needed to change the color up to a certain length of the
detecting column. At the procedure (a), the calibration for
temperature is carried out by a given diagram. The range
of concentration of ethylene oxide to be analyzed with an
accuracy of ± 5% is: (a) 0 to 4.0%; (b) 0.003 to 0.5%.
Interfering materials include alcohols, aldehydes, diethyl
ether, sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, acetone, benzene,
aniline, petroleum, carbon disulfide, nitrous oxide, and
hydrochloric acid.
-------
Formaldehyde
Hydrocarbons
ro
o
7-THE DETERMINATION OF SMALL AMOUNTS OF
FORMALDEHYDE IN AIR
Kersey, R. W., J. R. Maddocks, and T. E. Johnson.
Analyst 65, 203-206 (1940.)
The article details an application of Schryver's method (see
above). Prepare a 1 % phenylhydrazine hydrochloride solu-
tion by suspending 1 g of phenylhydrazine in about 5 ml
of water, adding 2 ml of concentrated hydrochloric acid
(sp. gr. 1.16) and diluting to about 80 ml. Filter and dilute
the filtrate to 100 ml with water. An intense magenta color
is formed when dilute solutions of formaldehyde phenyl-
hydrazone are treated with potassium ferricyanide in pres-
ence of an excess of hydrochloric acid, the depth of color
(between certain limts) being proportional to the concen-
tration of formaldehyde present. The working range of the
test is approximately 1 to 5 parts of formaldehyde per mil-
lion of solution, although 0.5 ppm is detectable. Add. Ref.-.
CA M, 4016 (1940).
1-COMPOSITION FOR THE DETECTION OF HYDRO-
CARBONS
Grosskopf, Carl (to Otto H. Draeger). U. S. (Pat. No.)
2,800,460, July 23, 1957; CA 51, 16212 (1957).
A carrier, preferably silica gel, is impregnated with selen-
ious acid and charged with sulfud trioxide. The reagent, in
contact with vaporous hydrocarbons, changes color from
yellow to brown.
2-ANALYZING FOR HYDROCARBONS
Anon. Chem. and Eng. News 35, No. 21, 82-83
(1957).
A simple field apparatus, which can be operated by un-
trained personnel, will determine in 5 minutes the concen-
tration of aliphatic or alicyclic hydrocarbons in the range
0 to 5000 ppm, with a maximum error of ± 20%. A spe-
cial calibration scale is fitted to a standard squeeze bulb
assembly, a tube containing iodine pentoxide and 65%
fuming sulfuric acid on silica gel is placed in the holder
beside the scale, and an air sample is drawn through the
tube with 1 squeeze of the bulb. The hydrocarbon con-
centration, read directly from the scale, is proportional to
the length of the brown iodine stain in the tube. Olefins,
aromatics, aldehydes, alcohols, and carbon monoxide do
not interfere.
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ro
HYDROGEN CYANIDE
HYDROCYANIC ACID
31-A SENSITIVE, PORTABLE, SELF-CONTAINED PHO-
TOTUBE COLORIMETER FOR THE FIELD DETERMINA-
TION OF CYANIDE IN AIR
Lester, David and Philip F. Ordung. J. Ind. Hyg.
Toxicol. 26, 197-200 (1944).
The colorimeter measures the change in light absorption
of a methemoglobin solution in which a part of the
methemoglobin is transformed to the cyanide derivative.
Draw the cyanide-containing gas sample through the
solution of methemoglobin with an aspirating pump; read
the light absorption of the solution .before and after pas-
sage of the gas. (See previous reference for preparation
of the methemoglobin solution.) Add. Ref.: CA 38, 5114
(1944).
32-A RAPID AND SIMPLE METHOD FOR MEASURING
SMALL AMOUNTS OF CYANIDE GAS IN AIR
Robbie, W. A. and P. J. Leinfelder. J. Ind. Hyg.
Toxicol. 27, 136-139 (1945).
Bubble a known volume of the gas-air sample through a
mixture of 3 parts of 0.005 M dibasic (hydrous) sodium
phosphate and 1 part of a reagent made by adding 1 ml
of 0.5% phenolphthalein in absolute ethanol to 99 ml of
0.01% copper sulfate (pentahydrate) solution. Add 1 part
of 0.1% potassium hydroxide and after 1 minute measure
the red color with a photoelectric colorimeter at 550 mu.
Calculate the amount of hydrogen cyanide in the sample
from a curve of readings of standard potassium cyanide
solutions. The method is rapid, simple, and sensitive to 1
part of hydrogen cyanide in 50,000,000 reproducibly, and
1 gamma in 20 ml with a maximum error of 5%. Free
halogen gases, hydrogen sulfide, and phenol interfere.
The sample must not contain a higher concentration of
hydrogen cyanide than the reagent can handle. Add. Ref.:
CA 39, 4813 (1945).
34-RAPID METHOD FOR THE DETERMINATION OF
HYDROCYANIC ACID IN AIR
Fomicheva, N. I. Zavodskaya Lab 13, 172-174 (1947)
(in Russian); CA 42, 1151 (1948).
A reagent for the determination of hydrogen cyanide is
prepared by mixing equal volumes of (A) a solution of
0.2 g benzidine in 100 ml water, heated with a few drops
of acetic acid, and (B) a 0.3% solution of copper acetate.
20 grams of silica gel are stirred into the liquid and then
dried. The reagent should be used within a few hours after
preparation. Owing to rapid change of the color, com-
parison standards are preferably prepared in water colors
on paper; air should be sucked through the silica gel at a
rate of 600-700 ml per minute. The method is suitable for
the determination of 0.0004 to 0.05 mg hydrogen cyanide
per liter.
49-A FIELD METHOD FOR THE RAPID DETERMINA-
TION OF HYDROGEN CYANIDE IN AIR
Dixon, B. E., G. C. Hands, and A. F. F. Bartlert.
Analyst 83, 199-202 (1958).
A field test for determining specifically small amounts of
hydrogen cyanide in industrial atmospheres is based on the
formation of permanent Prussian blue stains on 4" by 3"
Whatman No. 50 filter paper strips impregnated with 10%
aqueous ferrous sulfate and 20% aqueous sodium hy-
droxide, then dried. Draw the test air through the paper
at not more than 6 ml per second until 360 ml have been
drawn, then immerse the paper in 30% sulfuric acid in a
dish. Hydrogen cyanide turns the paper blue in from 30
seconds to 1 minute. Determine the amount of hydrogen
cyanide by comparing the test stain with the stains on a
standard stain chart. The test can detect up to about 500
ppm and is sensitive to slightly less than 1 ppm with an
error of plus or minus 10% to 20%. Properly prepared and
stored test papers remain active for about 10 months. Add.
Refs.: IHD 22, 1175 (1958); AA 5, 3175 (1958); CA 52,
13527 (1958).
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I
l\3
ro
Hydrogen Sulfide
5-A DETECTOR FOR LOW CONCENTRATIONS OF
HYDROGEN SULFiDE
Littlefield, J. B., W. P. Yant, and L. B. Berger. Bur.
Mines, Rept. of Investigations No. 3276, 13 pp
(1935); CA 29, 5382(1935).
A rubber bulb or hand pump aspirates air to be tested
for hydrogen sulfide through sensitized granules in a glass
tube. Granules of activated aluminum trioxide (20-24
mesh) coated with silver cyanide or lead acetate satisfac-
torily estimated 0.0025 to -f 0.05% by volume of hydro-
gen sulfide, at temperatures from —22 to -(-25°. Tubes
filled with silver cyanide-coated granules retained their
sensitivity and usefulness after 18 months' storage. The
detector indicates the amount of hydrogen sulfide either
by the length of the dark stain produced by a constant
sample volume, or by the volume of sample required to
produce a standard length stain. Carbon monoxide, car-
bon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, chlorine, hydrogen chloride,
natural gas, gasoline, benzene, ethyl and methyl alcohols
do not react. Mercaptans interfere.
24-RAPID METHOD FOR DETERMINING HYDROGEN
SULFIDE IN AIR
Verokhobin, I. G. and E. 0. Filyanskaya. Zavod-
skaya Lab. 14, 106-107 (1948); CA 43, 971 (1949).
The authors describe an apparatus for the determination of
hydrogen sulfide in air. The apparatus consists of a 100
ml capacity pump with a scale graduated in mg hydrogen
sulfiide per liter. Glass tubes filled with porcelain par-
ticles treated with a 10% solution of lead acetate in 1.0%
acetic acid are used. Hydrogen sulfide concentrations from
0.05-0.3 mg per liter can be detected within ±3-4% of
the true value.
Methanol
l-A SIMPLE AND RELIABLE METHOD FOR THE DETER.
MINATION OF METHYL ALCOHOL AND FORMALDE-
HYDE IN AIR
Ackerbauer, C. F. and R. J. Lebowich. J. Lab. Clin.
Med. 28, 373-377(1942).
Draw air through a series of 4 bubblers containing, in the
first bubbler, 75 ml of 1% phosphoric acid and 75 ml of
2% barium chloride, mixed; in the second bubbler, 200
ml of an alkaline solution of potassium permanganate,
which removes by oxidation all of the methanol; in the
third, 225 ml of modified Schiff's reagent of Wright; and
in the fourth bubbler (which may be eliminated in the
field) 200 ml of 2 N sodium bisulfite. Decolorize the per-
manganate in the second bubbler with oxalic-sulfuric acid
mixture, and add Schiff's reagent. Compare the color with
those in a set of standards, either visually, or, preferably,
in a Hellige colorimeter. Add. Ref. CA 37, 6592 (1943).
Propane
1-DETERMINATION OF SOLVENT VAPORS IN AIR. V.
PROPANE
Kobayashi, Yoshitaka. J. Soc. Org. Synthet. Chem.,
Japan 12, 360-363 (1954); CA 51, 952 (1957).
Silica gel impregnated with a mixture of sulfuric acid and
chromic acid was used for the determination of solvent
vapors. The effective range is 0.1 to 10.0 per cent.
-------
APPENDIX B
"READY REFERENCE" SHELF
Recommended Reference Sources on Accidental
Episodes
(See also: Appendix F)
1. Patty, F. A., (Ed.) Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology, Volume 1,
Second Edition. Interscience Publishers, Inc.,
New York, 1958. Volume 2, Second Edition. Inter-
science Publishers, Inc., New York, 1962.
2. Fairhall, L. T., Industrial Toxicology, Second Edition. The
Williams and Wilkins Company, Baltimore, 1957.
3. Browning, Ethel. Toxicity and Metabolism of Industrial Solvents.
American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., New
York, 1965.
4. Ruch, W. E., (Ed.) Chemical Detection of Gaseous Pollutants, 1966;
or Quantitative Analysis of Gaseous Pollutants, 1970.
Ann Arbor Science Publishers, Inc., Ann Arbor.
5. Gleason, M. N., Gosselin, R. E. and Hodge, H. C. Clinical Toxicology
of Commercial Products. The Williams and Wilkins
Company, Baltimore, 1957.
6. Chemical Safety Data Sheets. Manufacturing Chemists' Associations,
Inc., Washington, D. C.
7. Sax, N. I. Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials.
Reinhold Book Corporation, New York, N. Y.; third
edition, 1968.
8. Hazardous Chemicals Data 1968; National Fire Protection Association,
Boston, Mass. 02110, NFPA No. 49.
9. Manual of Hazardous Chemical Reactions 1968; National Fire Protection
Association, Boston, Mass. 02110, Third Edition, NFPA
No. 491M.
10. Dangerous Articles Emergency Guide: Recommended Good Practice for
Handling Fires or Spills Involving Explosives and
Other Dangerous Articles. Bureau of Explosives,
Association of American Railroads, New York, N.Y.;
B. E. Pamphlet No. 7A, March 1970.
11. Fire Hazard Properties of Flammable Liquids, Gases, Volatile Solids,
1965. National Fire Protection Association, Boston,
Mass. 02110; NFPA No. 325M.
B-l
-------
12. Johns, W. E., (Director) Dangerous Article Handling: A Guide for
the Proper Handling and Transportation of Hazardous
Material by Motor Carrier. American Trucking
Associations, Inc., Washington, D. C. 20036, Re-
vision January 1970.
13. MCA Chem-Card Manual: A Compilation of Guides for the Safe Handling
of Chemicals Involved in Highway Emergencies. Manu-
facturing Chemists' Association, Washington, D. C.
20009, through August 1965.
14. Planning Emergency Operations for Disasters in Small Communities.
Manual scheduled for release in 1971 by Office of
Civil Defense, Department of the Army, U. S. Depart-
ment of Defense, Washington, D. C.
15. Kahn, R. B., (Ed.) Directory of Industrial Mutual Aid Associations,
Directorate of Procurement and Production (MCPM),
Headquarters, Air Force Logistics Command, U. S. Air
Force, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, April 1961 (revision
in preparation).
16. Turner, B. D., Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates,
U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
National Air Pollution Control Administration,
Public Health Service Publication No. 999-AP-26,
Revised 1969.
B-2
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PART II.
CONTINGENCY ACTION GUIDE FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES
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5. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR COMMUNITY ACTION
5.1 CONTINGENCY PLAN CONCEPT
The preceding discussion in Part I, which is focused upon the role
of an Air Pollution Control Agency in response to accidental episodes,
has noted that action is most effective when coordinated by a community-
wide Contingency Plan. In Part II of this manual, the elements of a
Contingency Plan are presented. The manual should provide guidelines to
communities that intend to establish a Contingency Plan tailored to local
needs.
A comprehensive Contingency Plan is the key element for advance
preparation. It should specify who is to be alerted and in what sequence,
how communications are handled, how the public is notified and if necessary
evacuated, and when to terminate the emergency. It should describe the
particular kind of event for which it is designed. (The definition of
accidental episode given in Sec. 1.1 may serve this purpose.) This does
not preclude availability of participating teams and individuals for other
kinds of emergencies. On the contrary, a number of response teams or
elements thereof are geared for action in all kinds of natural and man-made
disasters that are covered by a general Disaster and Civil Defense Plan.
Indeed, the Accidental Episode Contingency Plan may be but one section of
the general Disaster Plan in accordance with the Disaster Relief Act of
1970.
5-1
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5.2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN AN ACCIDENTAL EPISODE CONTINGENCY PLAN
• Accidental Episode
An unexpected event during which contaminants are released into
the air in quantities that are potentially hazardous to public
health and welfare, as by transport over inhabited areas.
e Hazardous Material
Chemical substances which, through intrinsic properties of
toxicity, flammability, corrosivity, or explosivity, or combina-
tions thereof, adversely react upon persons or property whether
through contact or proximity.
• Contingency Plan
A formal arrangement whereby the personnel and resources of
numerous organizations, public and private, civil and military,
are marshalled and employed in accordance with prescribed
organization and procedures to minimize and counteract the effects
of an accidental episode.
• Contingency Plan Organization
The association formed by all participants of the Contingency Plan
that have formally agreed to exercise designated functions through
specified working relations and lines of command.
• Contingency Plan Administration
The body of officers and assistants that is responsible for general
policy and day-to-day execution of all executive, clerical, and
fiscal management functions of the Contingency Plan Organization.
• Contingency Plan Advisory Board
A group of authorities responsible for independent evaluation of
Contingency Plan performance with recommendations on measures,
including research, to improve effectiveness during accidental
episodes.
5-2
-------
• Contingency Response Team
The total organized group of Contingency Plan participants who
are under formal agreement jointly or severally to be available
for prescribed operational or support duties in the event of an
accidental episode. The Contingency Response Team consists of an
Operations Team and a Support Team.
• Contingency Operations
Actions executed at or near the site of an accidental episode in
implementation of the Contingency Plan, and line functions and
direction exercised from remote headquarters.
• Contingency Operations Team
The organized group of Contingency Plan participants who are
charged with expeditious travel to the accidental-episode scene
and performance of assigned duties aimed at combatting the hazard
to personal life and property; also, the headquarters personnel
who are in communication with on-scene participants and provide
line authority and direction.
• Mobile Source Team
The Contingency Response Team element that specializes in containing,
neutralizing, and disposing of hazardous material emanating from
a carrier (rail, motor vehicle, or barge) during an accidental
episode.
• Stationary Source Team
The Contingency Response Team element that specializes in containing,
neutralizing, and disposing of hazardous material emanating from
a permanent installation (plant, storage facility, etc.) during
an accidental episode.
5-3
-------
• Team Captain
The Mobile or Stationary Source Team member who directs and may
participate in action taken on the source of emanating hazardous
material.
t Contingency Support
Furnishing of resources such as technical expertise, legal
counsel, and special personnel, equipment and material to
guide or facilitate action taken during an accidental episode.
• Contingency Support Team
The organized group of Contingency Plan participants who perform
functions described above under Contingency Support.
• Chief Operations Authority (COA)
The person charged with the responsibility and delegated commensurate
authority, 'including command of specified law enforcement units,
for planning and directing the coordinated overall operations of
all Contingency Plan participants, public and private.
• On-Scene Commander (OSC)
The person charged with the responsibility and delegated commensurate
authority for directing the overall operations of Contingency
Operations Team members at the site of an accidental episode, and
for alerting and if necessary directing the evacuation of inhabi-
tants that are threatened by the spread of hazardous material.
• Operations Duty Officer
The person responsible for receiving and validating reports of
accidental episodes, and notifying the Chief Operations Authority
and others as provided by this Plan.
5-4
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t Warning Controller
One of several Police and Fire Department personnel who assist the
Operations Duty Officer through receipt and validation of accidental-
episode reports and notification of others following declaration
of an alert.
t Disaster Service Coordinator
Official designated to serve as liaison for the On-Scene Commander
and Chief Operations Authority to furnish or locate sources of
emergency equipment or services as required.
t Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
Operational headquarters for information gathering and analysis,
decision-making, communications, public relations, determination
and acquisition of resources needs, and general direction and
coordination of activity in response to an accidental episode.
• Command Post
A temporary site near the release point of hazardous material
selected by the On-Scene Commander as a vantage point from which
his operations are to be directed.
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5.3 LEGAL AUTHORITY
In a preamble or similar section, the legal authority for setting up
and implementing the Contingency Plan should be cited. Detailed verbiage
is not required, only accurate references to enabling legislation, executive
orders, ordinances, resolutions, rules and regulations. A complete set of
relevant legal instruments should be on file at the cognizant Emergency
Operations Center (EOC).
5.3.1 Federal Law
Pertinent Federal legislation includes the following:
• Disaster Relief Act, Dec. 31, 1970; PL 91-606, and
provisions of precedent laws, PL 89-769 and PL 81-875.
• Occupational Safety and Health(William-Steiger) Act
of 1970; PL 91-596.
• Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, PL 91-84.
• Clean Air Act, amendments of 1970, PL 91-604. See footnote,
p. 1-5 on requirement for internal Emergency Action Plans
for all stationary sources emitting 100 tons or more of
pollutant.
• National Contingency Plan, PL 91-224, June 2, 1970.
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5.3.2 Sample Cooperative Agreement to Establish the Accidental-Episode
Contingency Plan Organization
THIS AGREEMENT by and between the undersigned Member agencies, and
acknowledged by other signatory organizations, will establish Contingency
Operating and Supporting Organizations for the coordination of activities
to effectively secure, contain and abate disastrous releases of airborne
hazardous materials in and about the communities of ( specify ).
WITNESSETH: Each of the parties hereto has interest, authority and/or
responsibility concerning the effects of a massive release of hazardous
chemicals in and about ( specify ), and each desires to
cooperate in the employment of the forces, equipment, material and exper-
tise in their various establishments, districts, regions and agencies in
the event of a release that threatens to constitute a disaster.
The land, districts or regions of the parties hereto are concurrent,
adjacent or contiguous so that cooperative action in combatting an acci-
dental episode is feasible, and the jurisdiction and authority of some of
the parties over certain areas is concurrent.
In the interest of the safety and well-being of the citizens of these
jurisdictions it is the policy of the parties hereto and of their governing
bodies to conclude such agreements whenever practicable, and it is mutually
deemed sound, desirable, practicable and beneficial for the parties to
this agreement to act in cooperation with one another in accordance with
these terms.
THEREFORE BE IT AGREED THAT:
1. Whenever an uncontrolled release of airborne hazardous material occurs
in and about the area of reference such that there is created or
threatened a widespread hazard to human life, natural resources, or
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public or private property, each of the parties hereto will proceed
In accordance with the "Accidental-Episode Contingency Plan for
(- - - specify - - -)" attached hereto.
2. In taking coordinated or cooperative action in accordance with the
Plan, the parties assume no responsibility for failure of equipment
or personnel in any particular instance where action 1s taken.
3. Unless funding arrangements have been stipulated between parties,
the costs incurred by a party in responding to any actual or
potential disaster for or on behalf of another party shall be
borne by the responding party.
4. The obligations of the parties hereto shall be subject to statutory
limitations on their authority and the availability of funds,
personnel, equipment and material.
5. The organizations, agencies or forces of the parties to this
agreement are invited and encouraged, on a reciprocal basis, to
exchange Information and to witness, participate in, or jointly
conduct tests and demonstrations of procedures and techniques for
the development, application and use of products and equipment
which may be employed 1n response to an airborne release of
hazardous material.
6. Each of the parties hereto shall review this plan at least once
each year. Suggested changes thereto or supplementary detailed
plans and procedures of operations necessary to more effectively
Implement the purposes of this agreement shall be submitted to the
Chief Operations Authority. Amendments or additions to the plan
as recommended shall be circulated and become effective upon
ratification by the signatory parties.
7. Member agencies party hereto shall assist in planning and conducting
such exercises designed to test this Contingency Plan as the Chief
Operations Authority may request. Other organizations signatory
hereto shall cooperate in such exercises to the extent permitted
by their regular duties and other obligations.
8. This agreement shall remain in full force and effect until can-
celled by mutual agreement of the parties hereto or by written
notice by one party to the other parties, giving thirty (30) days
notice of said cancellation.
9. This agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts and,
for all practical purposes hereof, all such counterparts shall be
considered as one agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Member agencies have executed and
are bound by this agreement subject to the provisions herelnabove; and
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the Associates signatory hereto hereby acknowledge this plan, approve
Its purposes and agree to distribute copies hereof to their respective
members with the request that each member, or regional groups of members,
prepare Its or their local contingency plan, compatible herewith, and
forward a copy thereof to the Chief Operations Authority on or before
( date ).
List of signatory organization follows, with date, signature and title
of the representative for each organization.
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5.4 ALERT STAGES
In order that the use of manpower and equipment be restricted to
what is realistically required for effective countermeasures, several
alert stages should be defined. The following are suggested:
Readiness
First Stage Alert:
Second Stage Alert:
Third Stage Alert:
Minor release of hazardous material,
minimal threat to persons.
Moderate release of hazardous material,
positive threat to persons, evacuations
required, material may require further
identification.
Substantial release of hazardous material,
some casualties reported, material highly
toxic, flammable, or explosive, threat to
persons imminent, wholesale evacuations
required.
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5.5 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC)
Coordination of responsive action through the Emergency Operations
Center 1s basic to the effective implementation of a Contingency Plan.
The Emergency Operations Center or EOC label may be used in a generic
sense to designate the headquarters site, which in small communities may
be nothing more than a desk or working area at the county sheriff's
office. However, in medium or large size communities, say on the order
of 100,000 population or more, the EOC should be a separate, clearly
identified room that is otherwise not used for routine purposes. It
should be equipped with a sufficient number of outlets, plugs, telephone
lines, etc., to handle the full complement of communication and other
gear required in a Third Stage Alert. It should have permanent wall
maps of at least two scales, one that shows the entire jurisdictional
area and surroundings, the other that shows enlargements of major
inhabited areas. Special purpose maps should be available for posting
to show population densities, topography, location of team members,
facilities, and equipment, power networks, storm drains and sewers, water
supply, etc. There should be an adequate supply of office and map-posting
materials. See Section 5.5.3.
If a local EOC already exists in accordance with a general Disaster
Plan or Civil Defense Plan, it will normally provide facilities for handling
hazardous chemical events. If a local EOC does not exist, an effort should
be made to establish one and provide it with adequate funds, staffing, and
equipment to bring it to a state of readiness.
5.5.1 Location
. The EOC should be situated in a building such as the following:
t Headquarters of the Police or Fire Department
• Headquarters of the agency that handles disaster or emergency
services
• A government or community building that is accessible to key
personnel 24 hours a day.
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One or more alternate sites should also be designated, preferably at
facilities that have telephone switchboards with several outside lines
plus enough space for additional communications equipment. Examples
Include:
• Radio stations
t Hospitals, Including preposltloned sites of Public Health
Service Packaged Disaster Hospitals
• Motels
Proximity to the APC office could be useful but is not an
Important consideration as long as a reliable communications link exists
between the EOC and the APC agency.
5.5.2 Communications
Adequate communications for emergency action may be provided
with existing facilities. One practical approach Is to make an Inventory
of all existing communications systems 1n the community, and develop a
simple plan to tie in the EOC to these facilities without overloading
them. The inventory should Include telephone switchboards, radio base
stations, mobile units (one and two-way) and portables ("walkie-talkies"),
whether owned by government, businesses, or private citizens. Local
broadcast stations (radio and TV), particularly those with emergency
power resources, can provide extensive one-way emergency Information to
the public. Police, fire, and public works "emergency service" communications
can be augmented with back-up from commercial or amateur radio systems. If
existing facilities are inadequate, the Plan should provide for appropriate
procurement.
5.5.3 Visual Aids
Within the EOC, maps, charts, and supplementary information should
be prominently displayed on walls, counters, desk or table tops, etc. It
1s recommended that detailed and wide-area county and town maps be perma-
nently mounted, with provision for removable or erasable clear plastic
overlays. Grease pencils and colored pins, disks, arrows, or similar
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markers should be used to delineate the predicted and last reported hazard
area (See Section 4.4) and the deployment of field manpower and equipment.
Color coding will be found useful for keeping display information clear
and simple.
Additional display material could include the following special
purpose maps and charts provided with clear plastic overlays:
• Population distribution or densities
• Highlighted topographic features
• Locations of team members, facilities, and equipment
t Power networks
• Storm drains, sewers, water supply
• Evacuation routes
• Detailed duty roster at the scene, the EOC, and supporting
agencies
Additional support documentation needs are discussed in Section
5.*.
5.5.4 Space Requirements
The EOC should be spacious enough to provide working space for
a complement of three to eight assigned personnel plus accommodation for
representatives of the news media. It should have adequate wall and
floor space to house the visual aids described in 5.5.3.
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5.6 SUPPORT DOCUMENTATION
In addition to items recommended for Inclusion in the Contingency
Plan, a variety of documents should be on hand for reference when and
if needed. The following are examples.
5.6.1 Texts of Pertinent Legislation. Regulations. Executive Orders, etc.
Duplicate copies should be on file at the EOC and executive quarters
of the Contingency Plan Organization (preferably, the office of the Executive
Secretary; see 6.1.2.3), in addition to participating State and local govern-
ment offices. Key personnel should become familiar with the content of
these documents. Periodic review and discussion of their provisions are
recommended.
5.6.2 Disaster Manuals
Existing manuals for civil defense and general disaster contingencies
are useful information sources on:
• Organizations, resources, and operational procedures
established for response to related natural and man-
made disasters
t The position of an Accidental Episode Contingency Plan
within the general framework of emergency plans
• Facilities and manpower that could be shared
Manuals that may be available include:
• Disaster Manual, U. S. Public Health Service, Division
of Health Mobilization (via Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, Health Services and Mental Health
Administration)
• Planning Emergency Operations for Disasters in Small
Communities. Office of Civil Defense (may be available
through regional or local office)
5-14
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t Disaster Relief Manual (if available) for the city and/or
county; the one for Los Angeles could serve as a model.
5.6.3 Mutual Aid Programs and Specialty Services
Mutual aid agreements and manuals of specialty services such as
those provided by the Manufacturing Chemists Association, the Chlorine
Institute, the National Fire Protection Association, the National Agri-
cultural Chemists Association, and Mutual Aid Associations (see Appendix D)
may provide input or serve as models for Contingency Plan development.
Furthermore, where these programs operate in the Contingency Plan locality,
they should be formally integrated into the plan by common agreement.
5.6.4 Glossary
A glossary of terms should be included among the supporting docu-
ments to ensure that the language used in the Contingency Plan and its
implementation during an accidental episode mean the same thing to all
participants. Illustrations and synonyms should be used to clarify terms
that could have other meanings in common usage.
5.6.5 Forms
In addition to forms that are designed for general administrative
use, such as contract, requisition, and purchase order forms, a supply of
the following special forms is recommended:
• Model Alert Stage Proclamation forms
• Permit forms, to pass police lines
• Official forms to identify individuals and vehicles
• Activity log forms for staff and services
§ Posters and signs to warn or direct the public
("Danger," "Keep Out," "Detour," etc.)
5.6.6 Technical Literature
At least two kinds of technical literature should be on hand:
5-15
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• A "Ready Reference Shelf" on hazardous materials for immediate
availability during an accidental episode (see Appendix B).
• Data manuals, indexes, and slide rules (see 5.6.7).
• Other relevant books, documents, reports, etc.
Duplicate reference shelves on hazardous materials should be on the
premises of the EOC and the participating ARC office. A recommended list
of technical literature is given in Appendix F.
5.6.7 Slide Rules
Slide rules that provide quick access to information on hazardous
chemicals are available at nominal cost. They are useful additions for
the "Ready Reference Shelf." The following two are recommended:
(1) Chemical Safety Slide Rule, published by the National Safety
Council, 425 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60611.
Information provided on about 165 chemicals:
(1) Flash point
(2) Severity and type of hazard
(3) Precautions to take
(4) First aid
(5) Health hazards*
(6) Flammability*
(7) Reactivity (Instability) Hazards*
(8) Oral toxicity rating
(9) Action on skin
(10) References to detailed safety information
* As defined by the National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA). See
Appendix B, Reference 8
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(2) Chemical Transportation Safety Index, published by the Railway
Systems and Management Association, (RSMA) 181 Lake Shore Drive,
Chicago, 111. 60611.
Information provided on about 200 chemicals:
(1) Classification
(2) Degree of Risk
(3) Precautions
(4) Hazard to Life
(5) First Aid
(6) Danger of fire
(7) Control of fire
(8) Stability (reactivity with water)
(9) Clean-up precautions
Chemicals are listed by generic name. A 4-d1g1t code 1s used to
identify each chemical and to cross-reference synonyms and trade names,
which are listed in a manual that comes as a companion piece to the slide
rule within a vinyl cover. Some of the information provided by the manual
on placards and labels for hazardous cargoes is reproduced here in
Appendix E.
b.6.8 Inventory of Hazardous Chemicals
Every facility that manufactures, stores, utilizes, or transships
bulk quantities of hazardous chemicals is required by State and/or Federal
laws to meet Federal standards on occupational health and safety*. Provisions
of the law cover standards for containers and carriers of the material,
nozzles and valves for use in transfer, identifying labels and markers,
handling procedures, protective equipment required, emergency first aid,
procedures for response to accidental release, and methods for neutrali-
zation and disposal. Hence, the following additional documents are
recommended for the EOC "Ready Reference Shelf":
*PL 91-596, supra.
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• A directory of all plants, laboratories, etc., within the
jurisdictional area that have on their premises hazardous
materials in sufficient quantity as to pose a threat to people
on or off the premises if the material is accidentally released.
• An inventory of hazardous material listed alphabetically and
cross-indexed with the directory above.
• A copy of the safety maintenance program for each facility, if
available, including the internal Emergency Action Plan
required by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. See footnote,
Section 1.2.
5.6.9 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)
The manner in which team members interact to execute their
responsibilities under the Contingency Plan is spelled out in documented
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). This subject is further'treated in
Section 7.
5.6.10 Directories
Two types of directories are recommended:
• "Working Directories," which are listings of people, services,
and equipment that are to be contacted or called for at
specified Alert stages in accordance with Standard Operating
Procedures. Two forms of Working Directories are recommended:
* A listing of team members and officials to be contacted
in a given sequence or order of priority, in accordance
with the Alert stage and developments at the accidental -
episode site.
* An alphabetical cross-index of services and equipment
listing all team members from whom they are available.
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Both Working Directories could be combined into a two-
dimensional matrix by the use of overlays, foldouts, or
half-page inserts, as in Figure 5-1.
A "Master Directory," which is an alphabetical combined
listing of all team members (agencies, companies, consultants,
etc.) that includes names, addresses, and telephone numbers of
key personnel and alternates during work week, night, and
weekend duty hours; also available services and equipment for
each member.
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tn
ro
O
IIO.
PL 5-3361
Viscose Core
cnemicaj. i piastica
Div. - PMC
General Chemical Dlv.
T. Martin
PA 7-3115
H. A. Roger
PL 5-1366
Allied Cheialcala
Hdnaanto Chemical
Container Division -
Remibllc Steel
Ooodrich-Gulf Chemical
Union Carbide jCheraieala
FIRE FTOHTIin
True.Temper Corporation
coiumola soutnern
Cbemlcals
Bava_ Ordnance Plant
neatvaco Cblor-Al
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5.7 CHECK LISTS
Check lists are useful tools in emergency situations. They serve as
reminders of all tasks to be performed, and thereby ensure that no essential
task is omitted. In episode-prone localities their use should be made
mandatory.
Check lists should be detailed, terse, and precise. They should be
employed in a manner similar to the challenge and response of pilot and
co-pilot in the cockpit of an aircraft.
Check lists adapted from the "Los Angeles County and Cities Disaster
Relief Manual, 1970" have been incorporated into sections of this manual
where applicable. As a check list in operational use, it may serve as a
guide to other communities as they develop Contingency Plans.
5.7.1 Emergency Operations Center
Designate Emergency Operations Center site
Designate alternate EOC sites
Provide reliable land line communications
Arrange emergency radio communications
Designate initial personnel cadre staffing
Assign headquarters space, by function
Assign records and reports functions
Provide situation maps and charts
Provide EOC equipment, supplies and forms
5.7.2 Emergency Supplies and Assistance Check, as
Applicable
a. Disaster Procurement
Have on hand:
Complete, current commodity price list
or index
Purchase order forms
Requisition forms
Standard contract forms
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Check, as
Applicable
Establish system to account for and report
non-recurring, unbudgeted disaster and
emergency costs as they occur (separate
from normal day-to-day expenses)
b. Pre-Stock Emergency Supplies
Activity log forms, for staff and services
Model disaster proclamation forms
Official forms to identify Individuals and
vehicles
Permit forms, to pass police lines
Special purpose maps showing storm drains,
sewers, water supply, etc.
Office supplies and map-posting materials
Posters and signs to warn or direct the
public ("Danger," "Keep Out," "Detour,"
etc.)
c. Pre-Plan Additional Needs
Arrange prompt centralized release of
Information and Instructions to the public
and close cooperation with news media
(radio, TV and newspapers)
Arrange photographic coverage to document
the disaster situation and operations
Have current directory of local, state
and Federal disaster relief resources
and contacts.
Understand, coordinate and pre-plan
emergency roles of the American Red Cross
and other local private and public welfare
. agencies
Encourage school Districts to sign agreements
with Red Cross authorizing emergency use of
school facilities as mass care centers
Pre-plan emergency use of any other
appropriate resources
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Check, as
d. Mutual Aid and Other Assistance Applicable
Have copies of the following on hand:
Contingency Plan
General Disaster Manuals
Local Mutual Aid Agreements
Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP)
Circular 4000.5B, Natural Disaster
Assistance Program
Insure that key personnel understand:
Roles and functions of agencies concerned
Principles of self-help and mutual aid
Sources of assistance
Mutual Aid to assist other jurisdictions
State and Federal assistance that
generally is requested only when local
resources are inadequate
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6. CONTINGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION: ORGANIZATION
Effective implementation of an Accidental Episode Contingency Plan
requires the establishment of a Contingency Plan Organization and the
adontion of Standard Operating Procedures for utilizing the available
resources of the Organization and its component units. The Contingency
Plan Organization is the total combination of agencies and individuals
who exercise assigned narticipant roles in accordance with a functional
structure that defines responsibilities, interrelations, and lines of
command within the Contingency Plan.
The Contingency Plan Organization shown in Figure 6-1 is offered as
a guide. An appropriate organizational structure should be tailored to
the needs and resources of each community that establishes a local
Contingency Plan. As shown, the total organization is comprised of the
following functional groups.
• Of fi cers
• Advisory Board
9 Contingency Operations Team
• Contingency Support Team
The interrelation of these groups is shown schematically in Figure 6-2. Details
on duties, responsibilities, and Standard.Operating Procedures are the subjects
of Chapters 6 and 7.
6.1 OFFICERS OF THE CONTINGENCY PLAN ORGANIZATION
6.1.1 Executive Authority
6.1.1.1 Governor
The Governor of the State (or Commonwealth) has ultimate responsi-
bility for the protection of life and property of all individuals
residing within or in transit through his jurisdiction. As such, he is
6-1
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ro
CH
OPERA!
EMERGENCY
OPERATIONS
CENTER
1
| .
EF
riONS
3RITY
DISASTER
SERVICES
COORDINATOR
1
1
1
1 ON-SCENE 1
! COMMANDER
1
I
1
1
1 KJV/CCTIf™* ATlf^KJ inf Ktwl^ Avjt
RR TRUCKERS COMMUNICATIONS CLEARANCE
A.«M lisr? CIVIL DEFENSE CONTRACTORS
A»IN, UMO ASSOCIATIONS
1
1
1 COUNTERMEASl
•
CONTINGENCY
PLAN OFFICERS
AND STAFF
\—
REGIONAL
BOARD
1 1
METEOROLOGY
AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL
1
X -
1
TRANSPORTATION
SAFETY
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 \ \
TRAFFIC AND
EVACUATION
POLICE, FIRE
NAT'L GUARD
MONITORING
AND ANALYSIS
ARC AGENCY
MEDICAL
PUBLIC HEALTH
RED CROSS
IRES AND RECOVERY 1 1 REHABILITATION 1
i 1 1 1
WATERBORNE NEWS MEDIA FIRE, SOME *^^c MUTUAL AID
HAZARDS PUBLIC CHEMICALS CHEMICALS MUIUALAIO
USGS INFORMATION FIRE DEPT. ASSOCIATIONS ASSOCIATIONS
RED CROSS
SALVATION
ARMY
STATE DEPT.
OF HUMAN
RESOURCES
Figure 6-1. Model Contingency Plan Organization
-------
CONTINGENCY
SUPPORT TEAM
1. OFFICERS OF C.R
ORGANIZATION
2. LEGAL STAFF
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
CENTER
3. TECHNICAL
SUPPORT
CHIEF
OPERATIONS
AUTHORITY
(COA
INNER CORE
EMERGENCY
Figure 6-2. Schematic Representation of a Contingency Response Team
6-3
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ex-officio Supreme Operations Authority for all Contingency Plan
Organizations within the State. In practice he may delegate the
responsibility to an appointee of his choosing, subject to ratifi-
cation by the senior State legislative body, or to the chief executive
of cities and counties in his State. However, he may temporarily suspend
this delegated authority and himself exercise line command over the
Organization if, in his judgment, such action is warranted by the
state of emergency..
6.1.1.2 Chief Operations Authority (COA)
The Chief Operations Authority (COA) is the appointee to whom
the Governor may delegate the authority, including command of specified
law enforcement units, for planning and directing the coordinated
operations of all Contingency Plan participants, public and private.
6.1.1.3 COA Alternates
To ensure that the functions of Chief Operations Authority are
always available, offices of First Alternate and Second Alternate may also
be filled by Governor's appointment. In the event that the COA is unable
to reach the Emergency Operations Center promptly after an accidental
episode occurs, command should be taken over by the First Alternate or
the Second Alternate, in that order, until the COA arrives at headquarters.
The names and telephone numbers of the COA and designated First and
Second Alternates should be included on any notices issued by
the Organization.
6.1.2 Administration
It is recommended that administrative officers include at least
a Chairman and an Executive Secretary. The office of Chairman might be
rotated every two years among a list submitted by participating members.
The Executive Secretary should be elected for a minimum of five years,
preferably longer, to provide continuing services for the organization.
6-4
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Additional administrative officers may be elected if so warranted by the
size of workload of the Organization.
The following are Illustrative sections that could be used as
a model to define the duties and responsibility of Organization officers.
Calendar dates and terms of office shown herein are optional.
6.1.2.1 Chairman
The Chairman will serve as spokesman for the Organization, sign
all external correspondence, call meetings, and arrange practice drills.
The Chairman will be elected by majority vote of all signatory Members,
each member organization being entitled to one (1) vote. If no candidate
has a majority, a run-off election will be held between the candidates
having the highest and second highest number of votes. The Chairman's
term of office shall begin on July 1, and continue for a period of three
(3) years. The Incumbent Chairman may not succeed himself, except under
conditions of Section 6.1.2.2.
6.1.2.2 Vice-Chairman
The Vice-Chairman will assist the Chairman in the performance of
his duties and serve as Chairman during his absence. His term of office
and manner of election shall be coincident with those of the Chairman.
If a Chairmanship vacancy occurs during a term, the Vice-Chairman will
automatically assume that office. A Vice-Chairmanship vacancy will be
filled by the Advisory Board, by majority vote of Board Members present.
A Vice-Chairman who has succeeded to the Chairmanship and will have
served at least two full years by July l*of an election year may not be
a candidate for the next full term as Chairman.
6.1.2.3 Executive Secretary
The Executive Secretary will carry on the routine business of
the Organization, which includes all internal correspondence, and
*Dates are optional.
6-5
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responsibility for keeping manpower and material lists current, pro-
curing maps and supplies for the EOC, obtaining Civil Defense Identification
cards for Contingency Response Team members, and issuing quarterly reports
on activities and events that have involved the Organization. The
Executive Secretary 1s also responsible for providing quarterly financial
statements. He is authorized to engage part-time secretarial and auditor
services to assist him in these efforts.
The Executive Secretary shall be elected 1n the same manner as
the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, except that the term of office for the
Executive Secretary shall be five (5) years. The incumbent may run for
reelection at the end of his term, and if elected, serve no more than the
second term. If the office 1s vacated prior to term expiration, the
appointee to the unexpired term of two years or less is eligible to serve
two additional full terms, a total of twelve (12) years.
6.1.3 Candidates for Office
On January 15* of each election year, the Chairman will appoint a
nominating committee consisting of one person from each of three (3)
Member units. This committee will recommend three other representatives
as candidates for each of the offices to be vacated, and will receive
other nominations that have at least five (5) valid signatures, that 1s,
signatures of representatives from Member units. All candidates should
be contacted by the nominating committee for their consent to permit their
names to be listed on the ballots.
The nominating comnittee will have ballots complete and 1n the mail
to each Member unit by April 15 of the election year. The Members will
complete their respective ballots and return them to the designated
*
address of the nominating committee by May 15, one month later.
* Dates are optional.
6-6
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Newly elected officers will automatically assume their responsi-
bilities on July 1 following their election without Installation ceremony.
Official announcement of the newly elected officials will be made by letter
from the outgoing Chairman to all Members of the Organization.
6.2 ADVISORY BOARD
An Advisory Board is recommended in order that a mechanism be provided
for Independent critical review of Contingency Plan Organization effective-
ness. Additional responsibilities should include the following:
(1) Establishing and maintaining liaison with Federal, State,
local, and regional public and private organizations devoted
to accidental episodes.
(2) Reviewing the Contingency Plan at least once yearly to con-
sider effects of newly enacted legislation, to consider
suggested amendments and additions, and to circulate these
suggestions to Contingency Plan members for comment and
recommendation.
(3) Reviewing contingency plans of other organizations for Ideas
and procedures that could be beneficial.
(4) Maintaining a permanent file of emergency action plans of
all industries in the cognizant area where hazardous
materials are manufactured, used, stored, or transported.
(5) Recommending necessary research, development, and testing by
appropriate organizations of materials, equipment, and methods
for the prevention and control of accidental episodes.
(6) Evaluating simulation drills and making recommendations
based on these results.
*Dates are optional.
6-7
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6.2.1 Board Membership
The Advisory Board should consist of at least five members, such
as the following:
t One or two members appointed by the Chief Executive of
each participating County government.
• One or two members appointed by the mayor or city manager
of each participating municipal government.
• Ex-off1c1o, Chairman and Executive Secretary of the
Contingency Plan Organization, on a non-voting basis.
The Board chairmanship could be filled by the voting members
either through election or rotation for a specified period of time.
6.2.2 Meetings
The Board should meet periodically on a prescribed schedule
(e.g., quarterly) and at any other time at the request of the Chairman
or of any two Board members.^ In the event the Chairman of the Contingency
Plan Organization vacates the office before his term expires, the Vice-
Chalrman shall thereupon become Chairman of the Organization and ex-officio
member of the Advisory Board. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the
<_•
Board shall hold a special meeting to fill the vacated Vice-Chairmanship.
See Section 6.1.2.2. in the event the office of Executive Secretary 1s
vacated before term expiration date, the Board should hold a meeting
within thirty (30) days to elect a successor.
6.2.3 Staff
The Board should be authorized to engage a secretary and an
administrative assistant to assist them 1n performance of their duties.
In addition, the Board should be authorized to engage legal consulting
service as required.
6-8
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6.2.4 Budget
The Board shall also have the responsibility of constructing
(1) a budget, and (2) a schedule of assessments for participating Members.
A fiscal committee will prepare these items for presentation to the
Board at its last regular meeting before the fiscal year ends. Upon
endorsement by the full Board, the items will be submitted to the
Organization Members for a vote. In the event either or both Hems are
rejected by majority vote of ballots received, a plenary meeting of
Board and Organization Members will be held to reconcile differences
before the fiscal New Year. The budget shall include annual compensation
for the Executive Secretary and his staff, for members of the Advisory
Board staff and consultant services, and daily compensation Including
reimbursement of expenses for the Chief Operations Authority and the
On-Scene Commander, 1f these individuals are not already receiving
compensation from Organization Members.
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6.3 ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP
Two kinds of affiliation with the Organization are recommended,
namely, Membership and Association. All affiliating agencies, public
and private, that meet specified conditions would be eligible for Member-
ship; those that do not would remain Associates. These conditions are:
(1) Each Member agrees to maintain personnel and equipment
of sufficient capability to control fires or releases
of hazardous chemicals of the type and magnitude that
are likely to occur most often in their facilities.
(2) Each Member agrees to provide an Emergency Plan for
activating these personnel and equipment within their
facilities. Included in this plan, each Member also
agrees to provide instructions for properly requesting
and receiving aid from the Contingency Plan Organization
in the event a fire or emergency develops, or has the
potential of developing beyond the control of the 1n-
plant personnel and or material.
(3) Each Member agrees to provide current lists of manpower
and materials which, under most circumstances, could be
furnished to the scene of an accidental episode as the
Chief Operations Authority requests. In this connection,
each Member also agrees to furnish lists of their respon-
sible officials, including home addresses and telephone
numbers, and an order of priority for their notification.
(4) Each Member agrees to appoint a representative and one
alternate representative, at least one of whom will attend
all meetings of the Organization Insofar as practicable.
(5) Each Member agrees to participate in all practice drills
of the Organization to the minimum extent of having one
of their representatives present as an observer.
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(6) Each Member agrees to replace material and/or equipment
used or damaged 1n the control of a fire or emergency
situation within Its own facilities, replacement being
1n kind or 1n cash at current prices, provided the
material and/or equipment was furnished by another
Member or Associate or by members of a cooperating Con-
tingency Plan Organization in response to a properly
placed request.
The chief characteristics of Members are that:
t They are located 1n the general community
• They have capabilities and/or experienced personnel to
participate in action responsive to an accidental episode
or other disaster.
e They are professionally concerned with public safety, health,
and welfare.
The chief characteristics of Associates are that:
t They are usually not located 1n the general community, although
they may be.
t Their charter or tradition does not provide for signatory
Involvement in local agreements.
• They nevertheless have professional concern in supporting
local agreements to promote public safety, health, and
welfare, and can provide certain types of emergency services
through their special capabilities.
To illustrate, the local F1re Department and Civil Defense Office
would be Members; the Manufacturing Chemists Association of Washington,
D. C. would be an Associate; the local offices of National Weather
Service and the U. S. Coast Guard may elect either status. The local
6-11
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Air Pollution Control agency should become a Member if 1t is not already
so. Table G-l in Appendix G shows a typical list of agencies that may be
expected to participate as Members (M) or Associates (A) of a local
Contingency Plan Organization. During any particular event, only specified
ones will provide on-the-scene service, while others may be alerted to be
on tap if needed. (See Section G.2.) The degree of participation will
depend upon the nature and severity of the event. Special services are
noted as appropriate.
For agencies that provide nationwide services through a central
telephone number, that number is provided. For local and regional
agencies, or local branches of a national agency, space is provided for
entry of the local telephone contact. This form could be incorporated
into the Master Directory recommended in 5.6.10. A cross-indexed list
of equipment and services with their respective sources is presented in
Appendix G, Section G.2.
6-12
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6.4 CHECK LIST FOR ACCIDENTAL-EPISODE READINESS
Check, as
6.4.1 Contingency Plan Applicable
Basic plan prepared and current
Appendices and annexes current
Provides for mutual aid by signatories to the Plan
Reviewed by the local Disaster and Civil Defense
Commission, or equivalent
Approved by State
Copies furnished to Commission and the State
6.4.2 Contingency Plan Organization
Plan effective use of existing staff
Provide clear lines of direction and coordination
Designate key personnel assignments
Designate sufficient alternates to key personnel
Assign emergency duties
Insure that personnel understand disaster duties
Properly register volunteer disaster service
workers
Fill vacant key positions
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7. CONTINGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
The second requirement for Contingency Plan Implementation is a set of
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). This is the document that specifies what
steps are to be taken when an accidental episode occurs. It states who
is to receive the initial report of the event, how it is verified, what
key personnel are notified, where they report, what their duties and
responsibilities are, how the public is notified and if necessary
evacuated, what measures are taken to neutralize and remove the hazard,
and when emergency measures are terminated.
This chapter presents guidelines for an SOP that is based upon four
operational stages, the Readiness Stage and three Alert Stages. To each
stage there is a corresponding sequence of activity, personnel assignments,
and Operational Mode for the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The
Operational Modes are designated as follows:
ALERT STAGE OPERATIONAL MODE
First Partial Activation
Second Full Activation
Third Emergency Activation
7.1 READINESS STAGE
The Readiness Stage covers three types of activity.
• Routine Surveillance
• Practice Drills
0 Immediate Response
7.1.1 Routine Surveillance
7.1.1.1 Officials on Duty
During the day-to-day activity of those responsible for public
safety, mainly the police and fire departments, patrols are routinely on
7-1
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the lookout for all types of emergency events. Weeks, months, perhaps
years may pass without involvement of a given locality in a hazardous
chemical event. Nevertheless, few localities are immune. Should an
unexpected disaster of this type occur, damage and casualties can be kept
to a minimum through a preplanned response effort.
During routine surveillance, physical manning of the EOC is
normally not required. However, responsibilities for receiving the initial
report of an accidental episode and initiating prompt action thereto
should be assigned to the Operations Duty Officer. He will be one of the
senior police officers at headquarters during daytime working hours. At
night, these duties might be delegated to the headquarters desk sergeant.
The Operations Duty Officer may be assisted by one or more Warning
Controllers. These are lower rank police or fire department personnel
whose normal duties include receiving and screening incoming telephone and
radio calls.
7.1.1.2 Public Awareness
The public at large should be made aware of procedures to follow
if one discovers an accidental release of potentially hazardous material.
Posters should be prominently displayed and warnings should be periodi-
cally disseminated over popular news media. Figure 7-1 illustrates a
typical notice.
7.1.2 Practice Drills
The manner in which Contingency Plan Organization Teams respond to
simulated alerts is a measure of their effectiveness during an actual event.
Practice drills should therefore be held periodically, at least once every
six months, preferably more often. Drills scheduled in advance may serve as
the occasion for instruction and teamwork development. Once the teams have
performed smoothly on several scheduled drills, they should be tested on
unscheduled drills in which different hazardous commodities, carriers, epi-
sode sites, and release mechanisms are simulated. Designated Board members
7-2
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NOTIFICATION
OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCI DENTAL EPISODE
I F YOU SEE QUANTISES OF POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS VAPORS
ESCAPING FROM A BUILDING, TRUCK, TANK CAR, OR VESSEL:
1. WARN OTHER PEOPLE IN THE AREA IMMEDIATELY.
2. TELEPHONE "OPERATOR ", ASK FOR "EMERGENCY" OR
CALL EMERGENCY NUMBER DIRECT.
3. INTERCEPT RESPONDING UNITS AT A SAFE DISTANCE
FROM THE SCENE.
4. HELP THEM LOCATE THE SPILLAGE. THEN LEAVE THE AREA
OR FOLLOW THEIR INSTRUCTIONS.
Figure 7-1. Sample of Notification
7-3
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should observe and evaluate the practice drills, and report their findings
and recommendations to the Contingency Plan Organization Chairman.
7.1.3 Readiness Periodic Check List
Insure that:
SOP's for each service are prepared and current
SOP or manual for staff and EOC operations
are prepared and current
Key personnel are trained in emergency
functions
Emergency communications are adequate
Alert notification lists are current
Sources of aid and assistance are known
7.1.4 Immediate Response
Once an accidental episode occurs, quick action on everyone's part
may help to save lives. Responsive action must not await the formal
declaration of an Alert Stage by the Chief Operations Authority. The few
things that are done in the earliest moments oafter hazardous material
escapes into the air could be critical to the source of ensuing events.
7-4
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7.1.4.1 Initial Report
An accidental episode may be discovered by a plant employee, a
truck driver, a Highway Patrol car, or other passerby. That person should
Immediately contact police or fire department headquarters by calling the
operator or a well-publicized emergency telephone number. Highway Patrol
contact would normally be over police radio. In either case, the report
would be received by a Warning Controller, who immediately notifies the
Operations Duty Officer.
The individual reporting the event should be asked for the
following information:
1. Location of the release or spillage of hazardous material
2. An estimate of the quantity being released, and the speed
and direction 1n which it is heading
3. Inhabited structures in the path of the moving cloud
4. Identification and description of the source: stationary
or mobile, type of plant or vehicle, numbers involved,
persons on the scene, etc.
5. Identifying labels if any, such as:
a. Warning placards
b. Name of the chemical
c. Other
7-5
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7.1.4.2 Response Procedure
(1) The Warning Controller or Operations Duty Officer receiving
the initial report from an Individual other than a Highway
Patrolman or other Contingency Team member will request him
to alert persons who are 1n the apparent path of the cloud,
unless his own personal safety could be jeopardized. Other-
wise, he will be advised to leave the scene without delay.
(2) If the initial report has been sent from a Highway Patrol
car, the Operations Duty Officer or Warning Controller will
request it remain on the scene to provide emergency
assistance and further information as needed. Otherwise,
the Operations Duty Officer will dispatch a patrol car to
the scene for verifying information, and one or more addi-
tional patrol cars for emergency assistance.
(3) In the meantime, the Warning Controller will notify the
Chief Operations Authority and the On-Scene Commander.
(4) The Operations Duty Officer will seek to acquire as much
information as possible on how to handle the escaping material.
If the source 1s a vehicle in transit and essential Information
1s not readily provided by eyewitnesses and local Information
sources, the Operations Duty Officer should call the toll-free
CHEMTREC number:
(800) 424-9300; 1n the Washington, D.C. area, 483-7616
From fragments of information provided them, the specialists
who man the telephone on a 24-hour per day basis may Identify
and notify the shipper or carrier and determine the exact
nature of the cargo and how a spillage is to be handled. If
the material 1s Identified at the scene, CHEMTREC will advise
directly on its handling.
(5) When the Initial report is confirmed by police officers on
the scene, the Operations Duty Officer prepares the EOC for
activation. The Disaster Services Coordinator and the news
media are notified.
7-6
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(6) The Operations Duty Officer serves as Acting Chief Operations
Authority until the designated Chief Operations Authority
arrives. At the episode site, the first police unit reaching
the scene will take charge of activity until relieved by a
higher ranking officer or by the designated On-Scene Commander.
Each designated official should reach his respective post
within fifteen minutes after notification.
(7) The Chief Operations Authority will assess the situation,
determine which Alert Stage, if any, is called for, and make
the appropriate declaration.
The overall pre-Alert Stage activity is shown schematically in
Figure 7-2.
7.1.5 Readiness Task Assignment Details
7.1.5.1 Duty Hours: Three Eight-hour Shifts, as Follows;
Shift A: 0000 to 0800 hours
Shift B: 0800 to 1600 hours
Shift C: 1600 to 0000 hours
7.1.5.2 Operations Duty Officer
This assignment should be rotated on a shift basis among Headquarters
police officers holding the rank of sergeant or above.
Duties include:
. Inspecting the HOC (morning shift only) to ensure availability
and operational condition of all equipment.
. Securing the EOC when it is not in use.
. Assigning Warning Controllers.
. Receiving the first reports that an accidental episode may have
occurred.
. Notifying mobile units nearest to the reported event to validate
the reports on-scene.
7-7
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00
ACC.
EPISODE
REPORT
M DISPATCH
ORE PATROLS
WARNING
CONTROLLER
OPERATIONS
DUTY OFFICER
EVENT
VERIFIED
RESUME ROUTINE
SURVEILLANCE
-* CHEMTREC
NOTIFY
CHIEF
OPERATIONS
AUTHORITY
PREPARE
MAN
ON-SCENE
COMMANDER
EMERGENCY
OPERATIONS
CENTER
Figure 7-2. Readiness Procedures on Initial Notification of an Accidental Episode
-------
. Obtaining as much Initial data as possible about the event and
hazardous chemical from eyewltnessed, local Information sources
and CHEMTREC.
. Notifying the Chief Operations Authority and the On-Scene
Commander.
. Communicating with as many units as appear to be needed to move
to the scene without delay to render assistance.
. Disseminating the following WARNING:
DO NOT ENTER OR MOVE ABOUT INSIDE OF A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS
CLOUD WITHOUT PROPER PROTECTION GEAR IN PLACE (gas masks,
protective clothing). FORBID SMOKING, SPARKS, AND OPEN FLAMES.
. Opening, preparing, and manning the EOC.
. Contacting news media for aid in disseminating warnings.
7.1.5.3 Warning Controllers
This assignment should be rotated on a shift basis among personnel
on duty at each Public Safety station, including Headquarters and local
stations of the Police and F1re Departments, County Police, Highway Patrol,
Volunteer Fire Departments, and guards at local airports.
Duties include:
r
. Maintaining radio contact with mobile patrols on routine police
surveillance.
. Receiving first notice that an accidental episode may have
occurred.
. Immediately notifying the Operations Duty Officer and providing
assistance to him by obtaining information on:
a. LOCATION and TIME of the occurrence.
b. NATURE of the Source: STATIONARY (industrial plant,
government installation, other) or MOBILE (railroad tank
car, truck, barge, etc.; type of vehicle and container)
c. NATURE of the SPILLED MATERIAL, 1f readily identifiable
from labels or direct information from the handler
(plant engineer, tank truck driver, etc.)
7-9
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d. ESTIMATED AMOUNT and apparent MOVEMENT of the spilled
material.
e. NEED for ADDITIONAL SUPPORT: police, fire, special units,
ambulances, medical personnel.
Note: If the hazardous material can not be Identified, the
reported Information should Include, 1f available:
1. NAME of the plant or carrier (truck, railroad car, etc.)
2. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS of the hazardous cloud: color,
smell, physical effects on people.
. Advise mobile unit to take full charge of all activity until
relieved by an official of higher rank or by the On-Scene
Commander (OSC) of the Contingency Response Team.
Upon validation of episode occurrence, Warning Controller(s) at
Police Headquarters will take assigned positions at the EOC.
7-10
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7.2 FIRST STAGE ALERT: PARTIAL ACTIVATION
7.2.1 Sequence of Activity
On the basis of information received and verified during the Readi-
ness Stage, the Chief Operations Authority may proclaim a First Stage ALERT
and call for Partial Activation of the EOC if the following conditions
apply:
1. The amount of released material is not large enough to pose
a threat to persons outside the property limits or right-of-
way where the event has occurred.
2. Responsive efforts by persons on the scene, whether public
safety units, tank truck, railroad, or barge personnel, or
the cognizant Mutual Aid Association, are expected to
eliminate the hazard within a reasonable period of time.
Figure 7-3 is a flow chart of the activity sequence. At the First
Stage ALERT Declaration, represented by ( A J , the EOC is in operation
and the On-Scene Commander is at or near the episode site. The Chief
Operations Authority then activates the Disaster Services Coordinator
and notifies the Stationary or Mobile Source Contingency Response Team
to be on stand-by.
The On-Scene Commander takes charge of activities at the site,
relieving the Acting On-Scene Commander of this responsibility. If the
spill was found to be on one of the navigable waterways, the On-Scene
Commander as prearranged would be the Commander, U.S. Coast Guard, who
assumes direction of all activities on water.
In either case, since the spill is minor, persons connected with
the installation or vehicle usually require little or no outside assistance
to eliminate the hazard. If the on-scene resources are adequate, the
Response Team members will stand-by, render assistance upon request, then
notify the Chief Operations Authority that normal conditions have been
7-11
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CHIEF
OPERATIONS
AUTHORITY
n
W ACTIVATE
<
DISASTER
SERVICES
COORDINATOR
^- f( FURNISH J i »
ADDITIONAL
MATERIEL
ADDITIONAL
MANPOWER
EMERGENCY
OPERATION
CENTER
ON-SCENE
COMMANDER
STATIONARY
SOURCE
TEAMS
©
Figure 7-3. Sequence of Activity during
First Stage ALERT: Partial Activation
-------
restored. When satisfied that this 1s so, Indicated by ( C ) , the
Chief Operations Authority will announce ALERT TERMINATION:
However, the On-Scene Commander may decide that the "1n-house"
response is inadequate. Or, he may be apprised that conditions are chang-
ing and could develop an Increasing threat to populated areas. The Chief
Operations Authority may then decide to proclaim a Second ^tage ALERT with
the EOC 1n Full Activation, represented 1n Figure 7-3 by ( B J .
7.2.2 Task Assignment Details
(1) Operations Duty Officer: assignment described in 5.2.
Duties on ALERT status include:
. Ascertaining that the EOC premises are open only to
authorized Contingency Response Team members
. Furnishing additional supplies that might be required
at the EOC
. Coordinating internal communication among EOC members
(2) Chief Operations Authority: assignment described in 5.2.
. i
(3) On-Scene Commander: assignment described in 5.2.
(4) Disaster Services Coordinator: assignment described in 5.2.
Additional duties on ALERT status at the EOC include:
. Maintaining an up-to-the-minute checklist on all man-
power and equipment that are engaged in response to the
episode
. Alerting or activating reserves of manpower and/or
material as required
. Supervising all visual displays in the EOC, including
maps and overlays used in locating units, equipment,
populations, and the spread of hazardous material
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. Maintaining periodic communication with the On-Scene
commander
. Clearing major decisions with the Chief Operating
Authority
(5) Commander, U. S. Coast Guard; the designated On-Scene
Commander if the accidental episode occurs on or along
any of the navigable waterways within the jurisdictlonal
area. The captain of a Harbor Patrol boat that may reach
the site first will serve as Acting OSC until the designated
OSC arrives.
7.2.3 Emergency Operations Center Manning
In addition to the Chief Operations Authority, the Disaster
Services Coordinator, the Operations Duty Officer, and the Warning Control-
lers, manning will include representatives from:
. Department of Highways
. Department of Public Works
. Fire Department of city or county where event occurred
. County Civil Defense Team
. News media
7.2.4 Contingency Operation Teams
During Partial Activation the Stationary or Mobile Source Teams,
as the case may be, are not dispatched to the accidental episode site.
The Stationary Teams Captain and the Mobile Team Captain are notified by
telephone, and each in turn will alert his respective Team Leaders. All
will await further radioed Instructions.
7.3 SECOND STAGE ALERT: FULL ACTIVATION
When the report of an accidental episode has been verified, the Chief
Operations Authority may declare a Second Stage ALERT 1f the following
conditions apply:
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1. A First Stage ALERT that has been In effect, with Partial
Activation, appears to be Inadequate for restoring normal
conditions. The spillage 1s seen to be larger than originally
estimated, and countermeasures by "1n-house" personnel are not
effective.
2. The airborne spread of hazardous material endangers populated
areas, and some evacuations may be required.
3. The substance has not been identified, and the nature and
degree of hazard can not be assessed for the present.
The Chief Operations Authority may then call for full activation of the
Contingency Response Team. At his discretion, selected units whose
services do not appear to be essential for the particular event may simply
be notified, to await further radioed instructions.
7.3.1 Sequence of Activity
In Figure 7-4, the symbol MM is used to represent the proclamation
a Second Stage ALERT, with Full Activation. The diagrammed events shown
previously in Figure 7-3 apply to a Full Activation as well as a Partial
Activation, except that either the Stationary or the Mobile Source Team,
as appropriate, is activated instead of being only notified. Additional
actions are taken as diagrammed 1n Figure 7-4. The complete schedule of
activity is diagrammed in Figure 7-5.
In addition to the participants under Partial Activation, the Chief
Operations Authority notifies the Governor and local government officials
and orders the activation or the notification of the following, as he deems
necessary:
. Red Cross, Salvation Army, Public Health, Public Works, and
Highway teams: to provide emergency services as required.
. Air Pollution Control Agency: for on-scene monitoring and
analysis of atmospheric contamination, and for hazard area
estimates.
7-15
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;FULL OR /
MERGENCY /
ACTIVATION/
/
"^ fc
J *
GOVERNOR
(MAYOR, CITY
COUNCIL, ETC.)
CHIEF
OPERATIONS
AUTHORITY
i
o>
NEWS MEDIA
CIVIL DEFENSE
RED CROSS,
SALVATION
ARMY, PUBLIC
HEALTH TEAMS
MUTUAL AID
ASSN, SPECIALTY
CHEMICALS,
FIRE, ETC.
APC
AGENCY
<
EMERGENCY
SERVICES
ANALYSIS
APC, MET
POLICE,
NAT'L GUARD,
AGCA
MEASURES
TRAFFIC,
EVACUATION
LEGAL,
TRANSPOR-
TATION,
SAFETY
<
TECHNICAL
SUPPORT
<
ADVISORY
FUNCTIONS
Figure 7-4. Additional Sequence of Activity during
Second and Third ALERT Stages: Full and
Emergency Activation
-------
-••—••^Li^M^
(RESTORE T
-------
. Industrial Mutual Aid Associations, special F1re Department
Units, for countermeasures (the set of actions taken to contain,
neutralize, and eliminate the spillage of hazardous material);
also, upon request of the On-Scene Commander, specialty teams
for handling chlorine, pesticides, etc.
. Police, U. S. Army Engineers, Associated General Contractors of
America: to evacuate endangered persons, clear obstacles to
traffic, etc.
. Legal, Transportation, and Safety offices: for support as required.
The countermeasures to be employed 1n each particular event will depend
upon the cause of the accident, the condition of the container and carrier,
and the characteristics of the hazardous material. The use of countermeasures
1s assigned exclusively to experienced and trained personnel. These persons
will know what protective gear to wear and counteractive measures to employ
1n each event.
7.3.2 Manning and Description of Duties
(1) Operations Duty Officer: assignment described 1n 5.2.
(2) Chief Operations Authority: assignment described 1n 5.2.
(3) On-Scene Commander: assignment described in 5.2
(4) Disaster Services Coordinator: assignment described in 7.2.2.
Additional duties under Full Activation include:
. Contacting the listed sources of additional or specialty man-
power and/or equipment as requested by the On-Scene Commander
and endorsed by the Chief Operations Authority. See below under
Sequence of Activity.
(5) Commander, U. S. Coast Guard: assignment described 1n 7.2.2.
Additional duties under Full Activation Include:
. Directing countermeasures and emergency services in combatting
a marine spillage.
7-18
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(6) Stationary Teams Captain
This post is assigned to an individual who has been jointly
recommended or elected by the stationary source team members
and endorsed by the On-Scene Commander, to whom he reports.
Duties include:
. Mustering Contingency Operations Team members that are
especially trained and equipped to eliminate the hazard
and to provide for the safety of persons in the affected
area.
. Calling up only those units that in his judgment are
sufficient to perform the job. (Too often, on-scene
operations are hampered instead of facilitated by the
presence of redundant personnel.)
. Directing countermeasures and if necessary personally
participating therein.
. Keeping the On-Scene Commander fully informed of the
progress of his teams' efforts.
. Providing the On-Scene Commander with information required
for decisions on additional needs such as identification,
monitoring, and analysis of spillage material, or the
emergency call-up of a chemical specialty team (chlorine,
pesticide, etc.).
(7) Mobile Teams Captain
This post is assigned to an individual who has been jointly
recommended or elected by the transportation members of the
Plan and endorsed by the On-Scene Commander, to whom he reports.
He is familiar with regulations, practices, and problems of all
carrier modes. Duties are the same as for Stationary Teams
Captain (see above).
Additional duties include:
. Reporting all possible information to the On-Scene Commander
that can help determine required particulars concerning
7-19
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the cargo, including the name and telephone number of
the shipper.
. Stationing police units to maintain security about the
site (to prevent looting, unnecessary casualties, etc.)
. Requesting special assistance from wrecking crews, welders,
etc., that in his judgment are required to clear roads or
tracks, contain the spillage, free couplings, etc.
7.3.3 Emergency Information Sources
Situations where released material is unidentified seldom occur
at fixed sites, since persons at each industrial plant usually know what
hazardous substances are handled there. However, in many accidental
episode cases from mobile sources, the escaping material is not immediately
identified, since the tank truck driver, barge captain or railroad engineer
may have fled the scene or may himself be overcome by the vapors. The
following actions should be taken to help identify the material.
. If the vehicle can be approached with safety from upwind,
look for identifying labels of all kinds that might give
the name of the carrier or shipper, vehicle registration
number, and warnings on cargo characteristics and handling.
Look for placards that carry cargo identification and
warning. Exhibits 7-1 and 7-2 show'the ktnds-of placards
displayed on trucks in accordance with Department of
Transportation regulations. A more complete set of placards
is included in Appendix E.
. If the cab is accessible, look for a Chem-Card (Exhibit 7-3 and
Appendix E) that accompanies most vehicles that carry hazardous
material.
. If no cargo identification can be found, radio as much in-
formation as is available to the On-Scene Commander. He will
relay the information to the EOC. The EOC, in turn, may
telephone the Manufacturing Chemists' Association CHEMTREC
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TRUCK PLACARDING CHART
PLACARDING INSTRUCTIONS TO COMPLY WITH
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION REGULATIONS
1. Placard tour sides of vehicle. Front placard nuy be on cab
or cargo body.
2. Placard it lent three Inches from other marking!, lettering.
or graphic displays, except — when required, two different
placards should be next to each cither.
3. On combinations of vehicles containing explosives or other
dangerous articles, placard each vehicle as to its contents
as iltuitrated try the chart brio*.
4. Remove placards when dangerous articles ere removed from
vehicle.
5. Dangerous shipments can be identified br Labels on pack-
ages, markings, type of packages, shipper or shipping
name. Check tariff commodity list to determine class of
commodity if shipment ts not labelled n if there is doubt
about classification.
6. No pliurd ii required for Clan "C" Ciploilvn 01 Cliu
"C" Poiun (Tear Gil).
7. Pleurds meeting DOT requirements are available from
American Trucking Associations. Inc., 1616 P St, N. W..
Washington, 0. C. 20038.
EXPLOSIKESA
Plaurrj iny quantity of Explosives "A". For
mixed loads, tee DANGEROUS.
EXPLOSIVES B
Placard any quantity of Explosives "B". If mind
with BplosKa "A*, useEXPlOSIVES "A" pla-
urd. For mixed loads, see DANGEROUS.
POISON
Plaurrj any quantity d Polun Clau "A"
or a combination of Point) Class "A" anil
"9". Plaurrj 1,000 pounds or more iron
weight of Polun Class "B". For mixed
loads, see DANGEROUS.
FLAMMABLE
Flammable
liquids
Placard 1,000 pounds or more, gross
might: Flammable solids. Flammable
liquids, or combination of both.
NOTE: Velio* label is also used on oxidizing materials. Chech ship-
ping papers for identifiub'on of contents for proper plaurd-
mj.
OXIDIZERS
Plaurrj 1 000 pounds or more trail
weight. Oxidizing Materials.
NOTE: This label is also used for Flammable Solids. Check shipping
papers for identification of contents and placard accordingly.
FLAMMABLE
RADIOACTIVE
No plaurd required for material bearing
"radioactive — white I" or "radioactive
yellow II" labels.
Plaurd any quantity of
shipments bearing
radioactive yellow
III label.
Plaurd 1,000 pounds or more gross weight. Flammable Compressed Gas.
COMPRESSEO
GAS _
For mixed luds, see DANGEROUS.
CARGO FtHEiVOID WATER
Placard 1,000 pounds or more grots nlclrt, Non-Flammable Compressed Gas.
Use when specified on shipping papers or when appropriate.
CORROSIVES
DANGEROUS
Plaurd 1,000 pounds or more gross weight. Corrosives.
When commodities requiring different pliurds are loaded on the
same unit and have a combined gross weight of 1,000 pounds or more,
use Dangerous plaurd.
Double plaurdlng: When loads requiring Dangerous plaurd Include
any of the following, use the appropriate placard with the Dangerous
Explosives "A" Poison "A"
Explain "B" Radioactive (requiring radlucttro
yellow 111 label as
shown above)
Exhibit 7-1. Truck Placarding Chart
7-21
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HAZARD
EXPLOSIVES A
EXPLOSIVES B
POISON (A & B)
FLAMMABLE
OXIDIZERS
COMPRESSED GAS
CORROSIVES
FLAMMABLE GAS
RADIOACTIVE III
DANGEROUS
SIGNS (TRUCKS)
WHITE BACKGROUND
RED LETTERS
WHITE BACKGROUND
RED LETTERS
WHITE BACKGROUND
BLUE LETTERS
WHITE BACKGROUND
RED LETTERS
BLACK BACKGROUND
YELLOW LETTERS
WHITE BACKGROUND
GREEN LETTERS
WHITE BACKGROUND
BLUE LETTERS
WHITE BACKGROUND
RED LETTERS
YELLOW BACKGROUND
BLACK LETTERS
WHITE BACKGROUND
RED LETTERS
PLACARD & LABEL
RED LABEL
BLACK LETTERS
RED LABEL
BLACK LETTERS
WHITE LABEL
RED LETTERS
RED LABEL
BLACK LETTERS
YELLOW LABEL
BLACK LETTERS
GREEN LABEL
BLACK LETTERS
WHITE LABEL
BLACK LETTERS
RED LABEL
BLACK LETTERS
YELLOW & WHITE LABEL
BLACK LETTERS
WHITE LABEL
BLACK LETTERS
Exhibit 7-2. Department of Transportation
Classification and Marking of
Hazardous Materials
7-22
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MCA CHEM-CARD —Transportation Emergency Guide
ETHYLENE OXIDE
Colorless liquid under slight pressure; sweet, ether-like odor
HAZARDS
I
j Extremely flammable. May be ignited by heat, sparks or
FIRE °Pen Home. Keep tank coo/; overheating or fire may cause
I violent rupture of tank.
I
j Vapor harmful. Liquid absorbed into clothing, par-
EXPOSURE t''eu/or/y shoes, causes delayed burns. Water so/u-
j f/ons of liquid or vapor cause immediate burns.
IN CASE OF ACCIDENT
IF THIS HAPPENS
DO THIS
EXPOSURE
Shut off ignition. No smoking or flares. Keep upwind from small leaks
and evacuate area in case of large leaks or tank rupture. Shut off leak
if without risk. Wear self-contained breathing apparatus and full protec-
tive clothing including rubber boots. Do not enter high concentrations
of gas, and dp not approach spills of liquid. Flood spill with water spray.
Dike run-off if entry to sewer is likely. Run-off to sewer may create
explosion hazard; notify authorities.
••••^•MM^M^lMHIiM^MMiHMBMBB^BMBl^^MBi^^MI
Let fire burn. Use water spray to protect surrounding property. Cool
tank with water if exposed to fire. After fire burns out, flush area
with water; re-ignition may occur.
•^••^^•^•^MHiMH^B^MHB^BHB^BBH^HBiMB^BMHM^BMMHi
Remove to fresh air and call a physician at once. If not breathing, apply
artificial respiration, oxygen. If breathing is difficult, administer oxygen.
In case of contact, immediately flush skin or eyes with plenty of water
for at least 15 minutes; remove contaminated clothing and shoes at once.
Discard shoes if contaminated or suspected of contamination. Keep
patient at rest and under observation for 24-48 hours; effects may ba
delayed.
O Minuiieturint. Chemiitl' Allocution, Inc., 182! Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Wiihinjton, 0. C. 20009. 1965. While preoered from tourcei
believed relllble, the Aitociition mihei no werrenty thet the informition it, in ill ceiet, correct or sufficient. Printed in USA
Exhibit 7-3. Sample MCA CHEM-CARD
7-23
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number, (800) 424-9300, which provides 24-hour a day
telephone assistance on hazardous materials 1n transport.
. If no Information of the type described above 1s available,
the local A1r Pollution Control Agency may be able to assist
1n field monitoring and identification. A few ARC agencies
may have a mobile laboratory with field personnel who are
trained in air sampling and analysis.
. Once the substance is identified, further information may be
available through the ARC Agency or the CHEMTREC number re-
garding characteristics of the hazardous material, including
data on toxldty, flammabiHty, and reactivity. Reference
material on hand also provide details on countermeasures to
be used.
. Using on-site meteorological data provided by the APC Agency
field crew, or as a substitute, data from the cooperating
National Weather Service station, the APC Agency may be able
to delineate the "exclusion area" for which significant
hazardous conditions are predicted.
7.4 THIRD STAGE ALERT: EMERGENCY ACTIVATION
7.4.1 Sequence of Activity
When the report of an accidental episode has been verified, the
Chief Operations Authority may declare a Third Stage ALERT if any of the
following conditions apply:
1. Hazardous material 1s being released into the atmosphere
in substantial amounts for which immediate and possibly
massive countermeasures may be required.
2. Some casualties have been reported, and a threat to other
persons 1s Imminent, such that wholesale evacuations may
be urgently needed.
7-24
-------
3. The hazardous material 1s known or believed to be highly
toxic, flammable, corrosive, or explosive.
4. A First Stage ALERT with Partial Activation, or a Second
Stage ALERT with Full Activation that has been 1n effect
appears to be inadequate for restoring normal conditions.
The Governor of the State or designated alternates to whom special
emergency authority has been delegated in his absence, may decide to take
over the post of Chief Operations Authority, in order to expedite
emergency actions for which resources on hand still appear Inadequate,
e.g., special assistance from adjoining States or the Federal Government.
Manning, Sequence of Activity, and Emergency Information Sources
described in 7.3, Second Stage ALERT, apply also to the Third Stage ALERT.
The Third Stage ALERT differs only in requiring larger amounts of addi-
tional material and manpower. Furthermore, some functions and team members
that often remain on call during a Second Stage ALERT will most likely be
activated during a Third Stage ALERT.
7-25
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7.5 CHECK LIST WHEN AN EPISODE OCCURS
7.5.1 Priority Actions Check, as
Applicable
First Contingency Plan participants on the scene
immediately assume overall control until relieved
by designated Chief Operations Authority or
On-Scene Commander
In accordance with SOP, the COA will:
Mobilize public safety services
Quickly determine nature and extent of
disaster
Alert the American Red Cross
Alert others who may be needed
Activate Emergency Operations Center
(7.5.2, below)
Initiate public information activities
(7.5.3, below)
Survey the disaster scene and estimate
the situation
Insure adequate crowd and traffic control
measures
Notify the following of the general situation:
Governor, Mayor, County executive, as
appropriate
Civil Defense Area Organization, if applicable
Disaster Services Coordinator
State Disaster Office
Announce instructions or restrictions on procuring
mutual aid or assistance from outside sources
(7.5.4, below)
Exercise emergency authority if necessary
(7.5.5, below)
7.5.2 Emergency Operations Center
Activate and man
7-26
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Check, as
Applicable
Insure adequate communications with:
On-Scene Commander
Red Cross and other disaster services
Participating Support agencies
Orient key personnel and issue initial instructions:
Confirm emergency assignments; stress teamwork
Announce primary tasks and stress government
responsibility to:
Save lives and property
Keep the public informed (7.5.3, below)
Start and maintain activity logs indicating time and
nature of information received, messages received and
sent, actions taken, instructions issued, and requests
and reports made
Develop the situation and anticipate needs:
Collect and evaluate situation reports
Identify and anticipate critical problem areas
Compare needs to available resources
Determine if assistance may be needed (7.5.4, below)
Insure adequate manning of EOC:
Continuously, 24 hours per day, if necessary
Overlap briefings of relief personnel
7.5.3 Public Information
Promptly establish a central information service to:
Answer public inquiries
Verify data with services concerned
Provide liaison with and facilities for
news media
Coordinate releases through news media
Assist news media in obtaining information
Meet with news media representatives and
Establish mutual cooperation in public interest
Stress necessity of authenticating facts
before release
7-27
-------
Check, as
Applicable
In releasing information to the general public:
Present a factual picture of the situation
and operations
Stress teamwork among the disaster services
Issue clear, simple instructions for the public
e.g.:
Stay away from disaster area
Monitor local radio or TV for information
Use telephone only for emergency calls
Release names of disaster dead only through
designated Chief Medical Examiner-Coroner
Issue information or instructions as the situation
requires: evacuation of danger areas, location of
mass care centers, water supply, use of highways, etc.
7.5.4 Mutual Aid and Other Assistance
First, use own resources, the Red Cross and other
emergency, welfare or contract services to the
maximum. If available resources appear inadequate:
Alert agencies from whom assistance may be requested
Coordinate and determine actual assistance needed
Make specific requests to appropriate sources
7.5.5 Governing Authority
Issue local disaster proclamation, when warranted
Request State/Federal disaster proclamations
if necessary
Impose emergency curfew, if necessary
Suspend liquor sales, if advisable
Forbid verbal contracts, authorize use of
predrawn standard contracts and establish or
confirm authority for signing contracts
If the president has declared a "major disaster"
and Federal assistance under Public Laws 81-875
and 89-769 is involved/adopt appropriate reso-
lutions (see OEP Circular 4000.5B, Natural
Disaster Assistance Program)
7-28
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Check, as
Applicable
For financial assistance, designating the
individual authorized to act for the juris-
diction. See sample: OEP Circular 4000.5B,
Page 23
For direct assistance, requesting OEP to
arrange emergency work. See sample, OEP
Circular 4000.5B, Page 47 (original and
4 copies to Civil Defense office)
7.5.6 Keep Records
Insure that accurate records are maintained to ducument
the disaster situation, its effects, actions taken and
reasons therefor, including:
Chronological staff and service activity logs
Estimates of damage
Resources employed
Contracts made
Mutual aid or assistance requested/provided
Financial expenditures and obligations
Photographs
7.5.7 Continuing Direction and Coordination
The situation may change rapidly until it is stabilized.
Be alert and flexible; expect the unexpected. Utilities
may be disrupted suddently, partially or gradually; fires
or explosions may be triggered. Incorrect reports may
cause panic or diversion of needed resources
Maintain a firm position of leadership
Direct and coordinate inter-service activities
Depend on service chiefs and key personnel
Delegate tasks and avoid minor details
Hold staff conferences, as necessary
Insure that objectives are being reached
Insure that resources are correctly applied
Analyze current and potential problem areas
Maintain liaison and coordinate with other
jurisdictions involved
7-29
-------
Check, as
Applicable
Verify reports of new or worsening situations
Adjust resources to most critical needs
Keep disaster services, other agencies and the
public informed
7.6 CHECK LIST FOR POST-EPISODE RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION
7.6.^1 Safety and Security
Continue emergency and relief operations
Maintain surveillance of disaster area
Maintain controlled access to disaster area
Initiate public health and building inspections
Permit reoccupation of areas only after safety
1s verified and other inspections are completed
7.6.2 Public Information and Assistance
Continue to keep the public informed
Establish a center where individuals and
business representatives can obtain informa-
tion on claims, rehabilitation and financial
assistance (Red Cross, Small Business
Administration, etc.)
7.6.3 Administrative Matters
Continue activity logs until disaster is officially
declared terminated
Maintain complete and factual records (they may
be needed for state or Federal assistance)
7.6.4 Return to Normal
As soon as they become marginal or unnecessary:
Release volunteer help and outside assistance
Phase down emergency services
Return equipment and supplies
7-30
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Check, as
Applicable
Withdraw restrictive ordinances and resolutions
Reduce or remove restrictions on disaster area
7.6.5 Reports
Report, by month, any non-budgeted disaster or
emergency costs to the appropriate State office
(Emergency Services or equivalent)
Analyze disaster operations objectively and
Prepare a summary report for official records
Initiate appropriate measures to improve
readiness
7-31
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8. COMMUNICATIONS*
Most communications between established locations (EOC to Public Health
Service, ARC agency, Red Cross, Governor's office, etc.) will utilize
commercial telephone lines. Unlisted numbers may be reserved for emer-
gency purposes of this type. Several large urban areas may even be
operating emergency teletype of facsimile networks. However, for the
two-way communications between the Chief Operations Authority and the On-
Scene Commander, and between the On-Scene Commander and the variety of
Response Team units deployed about the accidental episode site, radio is
the best medium.
8.1 EMERGENCY RADIO NETWORK
The radio network established for the State Disaster Plan, 1n
accordance with Public Law 91-606, may provide for usage of one or more
of its frequency bands for local Contingency Plan communications. If
none 1s available, the Contingency Plan Organization should apply to the
Federal Communications Commission for a dedicated frequency assignment.
Any Contingency Plan participant may then operate base and/or mobile
transmitted on this band subject to the following conditions:
1. The user purchases (or leases), installs, and maintains the
installation.
2. Each transmitter must be leased to the licensee, the Disaster
and Civil Defense Commission, by the user.
3. The user agrees to observe applicable FCC regulations and
Contingency Plan procedures.
Any person, agency, or company may operate a receiver on the above
frequency without need for leasing or licensing.
*NOTE: The following section has been adapted from the Channel Industries
Mutual Aid (CIMA) Manual, September 1961. A radio frequency of 47.54 MH
1s assigned to the City of Houston, Texas Department of Municipal Defense
for use by the CIMA organization. Applications for frequency assignments
should be filed with the Federal Communications Commission.
-------
Since the need for the radio network would be greatest 1n event of
telephone failure, and since conditions leading to telephone failure might
well cause power failure also, all units should have alternate emergency
power sources.
8.2 NETWORK DISCIPLINE AND "NET CONTROL" STATION
All stations 1n the radio network transmit and receive on the same
frequency. Therefore, all calls made are received by all units on the
system. An orderly manner of operation is necessary to prevent confusion.
For this reason, the EOC station must always act as "Net Control." So
that operators will be familiar with the proper procedure, frequent drills
are necessary. In the event of any actual alert call as described under
"Types of Calls", the station originating the alert will automatically
become the "Net Control" until the EOC station, or another station designated
by the Chief Operations Authority, assumes the position.
Under network operation, no station 1n the system may originate
a call to or answer a call from, any station in the network except the
"Net Control" unless granted specific permission to do so by the "Net
Control."
8.3 RULES AND REGULATIONS
In addition to "network discipline" outlined above, the following
rules must be observed if the full utility of the system 1s to be realized
and violations of Federal Communications Commission rules are to be avoided.
1. This communications system may be used only in the event of
an emergency or for scheduled training drills as Indicated
in the "Classification of Calls" section. The system may
never be used for routine business affairs.
2. All calls, announcements, and conversation must be brief as
possible consistent with good Intelligibility. With 20 or
more "party-line" stations, air time 1s valuable.
8-2
-------
3. An operator of a station signifies that he has temporarily
finished transmitting and 1s awaiting a reply by use of the
word "over" at the end of his transmissions and concluded
Ms message, he uses the word "out" to signify that he 1s
through and does not expect a reply. Always wait until both
or all stations engaged In communications use the word "out"
before you originate a call, unless you are the station being
called and a reply from you 1s expected.
4. Always listen before transmitting. Never Interrupt commu-
nications between other stations unless you have a real and
immediate emergency. This frequency might not be assigned
exclusively to this system and it is possible that licensees
of the same frequency in other areas may be heard at times.
When this occurs, every effort, except in the event of a
genuine emergency, should be made to avoid Interference with
the other system.
5. Call signs officially assigned by the FCC must be used at
least once, either at the beginning or end of a series of
transmissions. At other times location codes and agency
names may be used.
6. No profane or obscene language may be transmitted over the
communications system. This is prohibited by federal law.
7. Only persons so authorized by competent authority at each
agency may use the communications system.
8. A complete log book must be maintained at each base station.
An entry must be made when each shift operator goes on and
off duty and when another base station 1s contacted. At
Intervals not to exceed six months measurements of the
transmitter frequency, modulation deviation and power Input
must be made and the results entered in the log book. These
measurements should be made, and the log book entries signed,
by a qualified technician holding a Second Class Radio-
telephone or higher class license.
8-3
-------
9. All pertinent rules and regulations of the Federal Communications
Commission, as well as the instructions of the licensee and
his duly authorized representative must be observed at all
times.
8.4 WEATHER REPORTS
The radio network operated by the State Highway Police usually
schedules routine weather reports, and broadcasts of special weather
reports and warnings as they become available. Reports are usually
received at Police Headquarters via telephone or direct teletype from
the National Weather Service. These weather bulletins do not serve
the purposes of on-scene meteorological observations, but they are
useful to the extent that they describe the general weather picture
in which responsive action to an accidental episode must be executed.
8.5 EMERGENCY RADIO PROCEDURES
8.5.1 Daily Drill
"Net Control" will announce:
CALL SIGN
NAME OF AGENCY
LOCATION NUMBER
DAILY DRILL
"Net Control" will then call all stations by name in sequence,
with each station replying with the information above.
"Net Control" will respond to each answering station with:
NAME OF ANSWERING COMPANY
and one of the following:
RECEIVED LOUD AND CLEAR
RECEIVED WEAK or
RECEIVED CUTTING OUT
This information should be entered in the "Net Control" station log book.
8-4
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After all stations have been called, "Net Control" will then announce:
STAND BY FOR WEATHER REPORT
GO AHEAD
KPDQ 969 (use appropriate Identification)
Upon completion of the weather report, "Net Control" will announce the
dally drill 1s over and proceed to close the net.
8.5.2 Standby Alert
Station originating report of an accidental episode will announce:
CALL SIGN
NAME OF AGENCY
NAME OF OFFICIAL AUTHORIZING THIS REQUEST
LOCATION NUMBER
STANDBY ALERT
(Repeat the above twice)
Describe briefly the reported nature of the emergency and advise Operations
Duty Officer that validation is awaited.
Sign off by announcing:
CALL SIGN
NAME OF AGENCY
NAME OF OFFICIAL AUTHORIZING THIS REQUEST
LOCATION NUMBER
STANDBY ALERT
OUT
8.5.3 Assistance Call
Station originating call (Net Control) will announce:
CALL SIGN
NAME OF OFFICIAL AUTHORIZING THIS REQUEST
LOCATION NUMBER
8-5
-------
ASSISTANCE CALL
(Repeat the above twice.)
Describe nature of emergency and type of assistance needed.
Request that locations sending assistance reply as soon as possible.
Then call and get a reply from at least one other station as a check to
make sure call has been received.
Sign off by announcing:
CALL SIGN
NAME OF OFFICIAL AUTHORIZING THIS REQUEST
LOCATION NUMBER
ASSISTANCE CALL
OUT
Advise as soon as possible when assistance call 1s over.
8.5.4 All-Out Call
Station originating call will announce:
CALL SIGN
NAME OF AGENCY
NAME OF OFFICIAL AUTHORIZING THIS REQUEST
LOCATION NUMBER
ALL-OUT CALL
(Repeat the above twice.)
Describe nature of emergency.
If at all possible, state specific types of assistance known to be needed.
Then call and get a reply from at least one other station as a check to
make sure call has been received.
8-6
-------
Sign off by announcing:
CALL SIGN
NAME OF AGENCY
NAME OF OFFICIAL AUTHORIZING THIS REQUEST
LOCATION NUMBER
ALL-OUT CALL
OUT
As soon as actual requirements can be determined, issue a second call to
request specific types of assistance required.
8.5.5 Response to Calls
Operators receiving calls should notify appropriate officials
according to prearranged plans. Responding team members should instruct
their operators to advise the EOC what type of assistance is being dis-
patched and, if possible, the estimated time of arrival.
8.6 MOBILE RADIOS
8.6.1 Vehicles
All vehicles in use by Contingency Response Teams should be
equipped with two-way radios that can operate on the emergency network
bands. Broadcast procedures are as described above.
8.6.2 Hand Sets
Portable radios ("walkie-talkies") used for communication among
on-scene individuals will not use an emergency network band; they will be
operable only on available citizen's bands.
8-7
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8.7 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CHECK LIST
It will be necessary to reach many people
quickly. Normal telephone service may
fa1l» or key personnel may be away from
their offices or homes.
Prescribe a telephone fan-out system
Base 1t on a 24-hour office or
service
Include alternate key personnel
Prescribe alternate system of notification
Instruct key personnel to report promptly
when Information of a local disaster 1s
received by radio, TV or other means
Test and Improve the emergency notification
system
8-8
-------
APPENDIX C
CASE HISTORIES AND STATISTICS ON ACCIDENTAL EPISODES
C.I. CASE HISTORIES
The following are typical reports of accidental episodes that have
occurred in recent years. Accounts of stationary source episodes are
taken from the Manufacturing Chemists' Association three-volume compilation
entitled "Case Histories of Accidents in the Chemical Industries." Names
and dates are not given in these accounts. Reports of mobile source epi-
sodes are condensed from press stories or from official government post-
accident analyses. A typical press report is shown in Figure C-l.
C-l
-------
Top of the news
FIREMEN BATTLE chemical tank-car
blaze after derailment in Houston.
Figure C-l. Typical
of an Accidental
Press Report
Episode
VCM tank cars explode
Two tank cars carrying vinyl chloride
monomer (VCM) exploded and burned
last week when 18 cars of an 83-car Mis-
souri Pacific freight train derailed in
Houston. One fireman was killed and 36
other persons, including several newsmen
and photographers, were injured. The
VCM was being transported from Dow
Chemical's Oyster Creek, Tex., plant to
Union Carbide at Texas City. The two ex-
plosions, an hour apart, produced a fire-
ball, which charred houses 600 yds. away.
Dow Chemical said there were six
VCM cars in the train and that only two
were affected. Other cars contained ace-
tone, butadiene, caustic soda, formal-
dehyde (one car each) and fuel oil (all the
rest). The accident will not substantially
affect Carbide's supply of VCM, since its
inventories and alternative sources are
sufficient.
The U.S. Dept. of Transportation's Of-
fice of Hazardous Chemicals in coopera-
tion with the Federal Railroad Adminis-
tration, has begun an investigation into
the mishap. One fire truck was destroyed
and a residential area was evacuated.
Railroad crews had been working in the
area where the derailment occurred be-
fore the accident.
A Dow spokesman says there were 12
cars carrying Dow's products, including
the 48,000-gal. VCM tank cars, but none
of them belonged to Dow. The company
does not know >vhat caused the accident.
The cars of several other chemical com-
panies also were involved.
20 CHEMICAL WEEK October 27, 1971
C-2
-------
Acetaldehyde
An explosion occurred In a pilot plant operation where a reaction
was being conducted Involving acetaldehyde.
The equipment Included an oxidation column, acetaldehyde supply tank,
and nitrogen and oxygen supply lines. The explosion occurred in the 55-
gallon supply tank. In operation, the system was first purged with nitrogen.
Acetaldehyde was supplied to the column with nitrogen pressure on the supply
tank. The oxidation was conducted by introduction of controlled amounts of
oxygen into the column.
The piping was arranged so nitrogen could be used to purge the column
and a portion of the oxygen piping. This arrangement did not exclude the
possibility of a higher oxygen pressure feeding into the nitrogen lines 1n
case of leaking valves or improper operation of the valves.
The operator noticed a leak in the acetaldehyde drum. Supervision
requested the operator to shut down the operation. The explosion occurred
a few minutes later resulting in eventual death of four employees and burns
to two others.
The investigation of the accident leads to the assumption that oxygen
leaked into the acetaldehyde drum through the nitrogen purge line and valve.
Ethylene Oxide and Ammonia
A feed storage tank containing several thousand gallons of ethylene
oxide exploded killing an employee, Injuring a number of others and causing
extensive property damage.
Process equipment and buildings in the vicinity of the explosion
were either destroyed of severely damaged. The blast caused destruction
throughout the plant, and to buildings 1n the neighborhood.
The explosion occurred 1n an ethanolamine manufacturing area which
had been 1n operation for several years. In the process, ammonia and
C-3
-------
ethylene oxide were fed Into a horizontal, tubular reactor using pumps
which were interlocked to assure the desired proportion of reactants.
Immediately prior to the explosion we experienced unusual variations
of pressure in the unit and there are indications that during a period
of high pressure, unreacted ammonia got back into the process feed tank
containing ethylene oxide, resulting in a chemical reaction which caused
the explosion.
Property damage 1s estimated at several million dollars.
Chlorination Explosion — Eight Lives Lost
A chlorinator exploded, without warning, killing eight employees and
causing property damage loss of approximately one million dollars.
The accident occurred in the chlorlnation step of methyl parathion
production. The batch under process was only partially chlorinated at
the time of the explosion.
The chlorine feed valve was closed manually but it 1s probable that
prior to this it was wide open for approximately one-half hour, while the
temperature controller was calling for more chlorine. This would have
resulted in adding chlorine faster than a normal rate at this stage of the
chlorlnation. Subsequent research work has shown that this amount of
chlorine would have raised the temperature of the batch rapidly, since the
agitator had been stopped and brine shut off while the faulty thermocouple
was being replaced.
On the basis of research work, when high temperatures are reached,
and almost instantaneous decomposition occurs accompanied by the type of
pressure release which was experienced. The chlorinator released this
pressure build-up by blowing its cover through the roof.
Immediately following the explosion, chlorine and ammonia from ruptured
feed lines united to form gaseous ammonium chloride. Since the plant
C-4
-------
management feared that more toxic fumes might be released, the state
police were asked to warn 1500 residents in nearby homes. The police
used loudspeakers on their cars and alerted the area to the possible danger.
The plant 1s a member of the local Industrial Emergency Planning
Council. This emergency plan went into action immediately after the
explosion. Within 10 minutes, all access roads Into the area were blocked
by state police, city police and civil defense volunteers. Five minutes
later ambulances began arriving.
All IEPC member plants went on a stand-by basis, prepared to send
1n rescue material and emergency crews. Two neighboring chemical plants
sent their plant nurses and oxygen masks for rescue operations.
Company headquarters sent to the scene production officials, the
company medical director, and a member of the public relations staff.
Local radio, TV, and newspaper reporters were kept fully informed of every-
thing connected with the disaster, which was an important factor in
keeping news as favorable as possible 1n a disaster of this type.
Sulfides in Acid Sewer
The accident occurred in a large chemical plant at which operations
Include the production benzyl polysulfide. Normally, liquid sodium
sulfhydrate 1s delivered to the plant in large tank cars and transferred
through completely enclosed pumping systems to a 5,000 gallon storage tank.
From this tank the sulfhydrate is moved further through another closed
pumping system to a mixing tank containing sodium hydroxide to form sodium
sulfide solution for later use in the manufacturing process. Hydrogen
sulflde is not formed at any stage of the process and has never been a
problem. The sewer drains 1n the area where this process takes place
connect with the general sewage system of the plant. Ordinarily, wastes
from other processes in the plant render the sewer contents somewhat acid.
On the morning of the accident, the pump leading from the storage
tank which contained sodium sulfhydrate to the mixing tank containing
C-5
-------
sodium hydroxide was started. When the gauge did not show adequate flow,
live steam under 120 pounds pressure per square Inch was applied to the
pump to clear the lines. The housing of the pump broke and the adjacent
pipe leading from the sulfhydrate tank promptly ruptured. Liquid sodium
sulfhydrate poured onto the ground and into a nearby sewer where it
immediately reacted with the acid sewage, releasing excessive amounts of
hydrogen sulfide gas from several sewer openings with a radius of 150 feet.
Some of the gas was spread further by natural air movement so that a
faint odor of the hydrogen sulfide gas was detectable 500 feet downwind
from the damaged pump.
Evacuation and rescue operations began immediately. Within a few
minutes the nature and source of the exposure were recognized, and several
tons of caustic were dumped into the sewer to terminate the generation of
the hydrogen sulfide gas.
Vinyl-Chloride
Glendora» Miss. - On September 11, 1969, an Illinois Central freight
train engineer applied the brakes in full emergency 1n an attempt to
avoid striking a pedestrian. The 149-car train buckled at the 108th car.
The resulting derailment Involved 15 cars, including eight tank cars
loaded with vinyl chloride. The cars separated in the derailment and the
coupler of one of the cars punctured one of the tank cars, spilling its
contents on the ground.
Initially, the breeze dispersed the vapor; however, the vapor
accumulated in low places and was ignited by an unknown source. The
ignition was followed by several explosions.
An estimated 17,000 to 21,000 persons were evacuated because of an
alleged danger from phosgene.
The following morning a fire-impinged tank car of vinyl chloride
exploded violently. Buildings, automobiles, and equipment were destroyed
and damaged by fire.
C-6
-------
The derailment was caused by the buckling of the underframe of the
108th car when the engineer made a full emergency brake application.
The car buckled because of excessive and uncontrollable compression 1n
the train which developed when the full emergency brake application
created greater braking force on the head of the train than on the rear.
The absence of Interlocking couplers and other means of preventing
separation and jackknlflng allowed the cars to jam up together.
C-7
-------
Liquid Petroleum Gas
Laurel, Miss. - On January 25, 1969, 15 tank cars of liquified
petroleum gas in a Southern Railway Train were derailed. A wheel on
the 62nd car broke and caused this car and 14 behind to derail. Damage
to the cars caused them to burst into flame and/or explode. Residents
were evacuated over an area of 100 square blocks. Fifty-four homes were
destroyed and 1,350 more were damaged. Schools, churches and businesses
were also damaged. Two fatalities, 33 hospitalizations and numerous .
minor injuries resulted.
The wheel was in a tread-worn hollow condition. Lateral loading
of the wheel due to the out-of-level condition of the track crossing
caused a fracture in a roughly machined area.
Anhydrous Ammonia
Crete, Neb. - On February 18, 1969, a CB & 0 freight train had a
number of its cars derailed as it entered Crete. The derailed cars
struck standing cars on sidings next to the main track. A tank car was
completely fractured by the derailed cars and released 29,200 gallons of
anhydrous ammonia into the atmosphere. A gas cloud was formed and, due
to the weather conditions, blanketed the surrounding area for a considerable
time. Six people were killed and 53 were injured as result of exposure
to the cloud of ammonia. The derailment was caused by track having align-
ment and surface deficiencies.
Propane Gas
A frameless type MC-330 tank trailer was transporting 6876 gallons
of propane gas as liquid under pressure. The tank ruptured and its cargo
of propane exploded, resulting in 10 deaths and 17 injuries. Property
damage was estimated to exceed $200,000. Nine dwellings, one church,
one garage, one house trailer, six outbuildings, two school buses, four
trucks and five passenger vehicles were totally destroyed and two other
houses were damaged. The accident occurred on a county highway approx-
imately 560 feet northeast of the center of town. It appears that the
C-8
-------
vehicle tipped, or was at least partially out of control just prior to
the rupture, which occurred at a weld. The sharp turning of the vehicle
back to the right side of the road at the bottom of the hill may have
applied an additional stress factor to the weld in question.
Ethylene Oxide
Dunreith, Ind. - On January 1, 1968, a westbound freight had its
88th car derailed by a broken rail. The derailed empty tank car became
disengaged from its trailing truck when it struck the crossing boards
at a grade crossing. One or more cars collided with cars carrying hazardous
materials in an eastbound train on an adjacent track. A Large-scale fire
ensued followed about 45 minutes later by a violent explosion of a tank
car of ethylene oxide. The entire population of Denreith was evacuated.
The fire and explosion destroyed a cannery, several residences,
and businesses in the vicinity. Firefighters were hampered by a lack of
information regarding these type materials and the necessary equipment
to extinguish the resulting fire.
A car of acetone cyanohydrin, a powerful poison which was punctured
and set afire became the source of cyanides contaminating a stream and
causing the loss of several farm animals.
Inadequate track maintenance resulted in an unsupported rail joint
which caused a break in the rail. Lift-off design of center-pin connection
allowed truck to separate from the derailed car.
Anhydrous Ammonia
Creve Coeur, 111. - Shortly before midnight on August 1, 1961, a
four inch discharge hose on an anhydrous ammonia barge ruptured, necessi-
tating the evacuation of 13,000 people from the southern suburbs of
Peoria, Illinois.
C-9
-------
Chlorine
Toxic chlorine fumes escaped near a District Heights Md., swimming pool
and sent 36 persons to hospitals for treatment of breathing problems.
The seepage occurred at the private swimming pool of 01de Towne Village,
a complex of apartments and row houses.
Seepage of the pungent, colorless gas, was caused by an improper
mixing by the pool's lifeguard of chlorine powder and muriatic acid, a
substance used for washing the pool side concrete.
Prince George's Hospital had to declare a disaster and call in
additional nurses and doctors to treat 34 persons, all but eight of
them children, who came to the hospital with "respiratory problems."
Fumes began to waft through the area when a lifeguard was preparing
the greenish-blue dry chlorine in a 50-gallon plastic for siphoning into
the pool inside a brick shed about 15 feet away from the pool. The mixing
of the chlorine with the concrete-cleaning acid was apparently a mistake.
The fumes spread only about 30 feet from the pool and did not seep into
surrounding houses. The fire company was able to suppress the fumes in
a half-hour.
First attempts to suppress the fumes by diluting the mixture in
the plastic drum w.ith water and setting up a "rain curtain" to vaporize
the fumes were unsuccessful. Firemen finally eliminated the fumes by
waving rags soaked with household ammonia over the plastic drum.
Hydrogen Sulfide
Hydrogen sulfide gas evolved during several reactions is absorbed
in caustic solution scrubbers. The resulting sulfhydrate solution from
the scrubbers is sometimes discharged to the drainage ditch outside the
building. Improper scheduling of the "ditching" permitted the sulfhydrate
and a solution with approximately 8% hydrochloric acid content to mix in
this ditch. Hydrogen sulfide fumes were evolved for a period of from
C-10
-------
two to three minutes. Operators from the building had been evacuated
as a precautionary measure when a slight detection of a gas odor was
noticed. Two employees entered the open area where fumes were being
generated. Others affected were assisting in rescue efforts. Of the
twenty-two men exposed seven were overcome to the extent that resuscitation
was necessary. One died and three others required hospitalization.
Hydrogen Sulfide Gas
Eleven company employees were exposed to hydrogen sulfide gas; 2
died; 6 were hospitalized and 3 received first aid treatment at the
hospital. In addition, a non-company ambulance driver died while attempt-
ing to revive the striken employees.
Three pipe fitters were attempting to install a blind in a 20" line
on an alkylation depropanizer tower. They were working on a permanent
steel platform about 14 feet above the ground. Two of the men were over-
come from the gas and later died. The third pipe fitter was able to get
down the ladder and inform the unit operators of the problem. In the
rescue attempt, the other employees were exposed to the gas.
The source of the hydrogen sulfide gas was a hydrogen sulfide
absorbing system on a catalytic cracking unit. The gas was inadvertently
released into a low pressure vent gas system and during the depressuring
operation reached the depropanizer tower.
Vinyl Chloride
On August, 1961, an explosion broke out at the Minamata Plant of the
New Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer Co., claiming four lives and injuring ten
people in or around its premises.
The plant produces varieties of chemical fertilizers and plastics
including polyvinyl,chloride, and the explosion occurred in the vinyl
chloride polymerization plant, a building containing 18 pressure vessels,
in which polyvinyl chloride is produced from vinyl chloride monomer.
C-ll
-------
A foreman and three employees set to work to discharge the contents
according to directions from the controller's room but in error they
opened vessel No. 4 instead of No. 3. The gaseous vinyl chloride monomer
just in the process of polymerization burst out of the vessel, filled
the room and shortly afterwards exploded.
The foreman was found dead at the top of No. 3 tank and one of the
two workers at the bottom was dead on arrival at the hospital. An employee
in the controller's room died instantly and another worker in the burner
plant, a building next to the polymerization plant, died after two days.
Within the premises of the factory, 8 additional persons were injured,
most of them not seriously, and outside the factory two persons were
injured slightly by flying glass.
Inside the building, the steel frame was dented or buckled by the
shock of the explosion; iron floor plates in particular were seriously
damaged, some of them severed, others blown away. Glass panes on the
doors and the windows were blown off.
C-12
-------
C.2 STATISTICS ON ACCIDENTAL EPISODES
At this time there appear to be no available statistics on accidental
episodes by specific commodity or even family of commodity. An exhaustive
search in the files of all known repositories of data on the subject has
uncovered no statistical analysis that gives the following data and combined
probabilities in detail for each chemical:
1. Total number of accidental releases: stationary and mobile
2. Total weight of material lost: stationary and mobile
3. Number of mobile accidents per number of hauls
4. Weight of material lost in transit per weight hauled
5. Geographical distribution of accidents
6. Number of accidents and weight of material lost by geographical
distribution
7. Accident frequency and weight of lost material per type of
carrier, as compared with number of hauls and total weight
of material hauled by each type.
8. Breakdown by primary cause of accident (collision, etc.)
9. Breakdown by material release mechanism (rupture, valve
malfunction, etc.)
At present, the only report found to have a breakdown even remotely
resembling this type is the annual Engineering and Safety Bulletins issued
by the National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. Exhibit C-l, Tables I-IV
reproduced from the report issued in December 1970 for the year 1969, are
typical of the available statistics. Exhibit C-2 shows a blank form that
is now required by the Department of Transportation Offices of Hazardous
Materials, which began a new data bank on accidental episodes in January
1971. None of the forementioned data items is as yet available, but should
be after at least a year's worth of reports are analyzed.
C-13
-------
FOR-HIRE TANK TRUCK ACCIDENTS REPORTED TO
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DURING 1969
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF ACCIDENTS
Type of Accident
Collision With:
Passenger Car
Other Truck
Train
Fixed Object
Pedestrian
Animal
Misc. Objects
Jackknite
Ditched
Fire Only
Miscellaneous
Combination Ditch/Overturn
Cargo Tank Punctured
Explosion
Cargo Tank Ruptured
Hose Failure
Cargo Spilled
Overturned
Valve Failure
Dome Cover Failure
Loading or Unloading
TOTAL
SECONDARY RESULTS
Passenger ( 'ar
Other Truck
Fixed Object
Jackknit'e
Ditched
Miscellaneous
Combination Ditch/Overturn
Cargo Tank Punctured
Cargo Tank Ruptured
Cargo Spilled
Overturned
Number of
Accidents
1632
455
38
215
28
35
35
161
165
0
68
142
1
0
0
2
12
119
2
0
3
3113
8
4
58
106
21
1
12
1
1
8
19
Fatalities
54
12
1
1
8
0
3
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
.0
85
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
Injuries
973
220
10
36
""20
5
25
17
78
0
28
80
0
0
0
0
1 -
44
2
0
0
1539
10
9
32
53
9
1
13
0
1
3
14
Property Damage
$2,169,148
1,154,814
140,649
467,666
25
73,017
46,840
255.961
740,936
0
75,291
879,026
1,024
0
0
1,380
13,198
744,214
0
0
8,600
$6,771,789
Exhibit C-l, Table I
C-14
-------
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF ACCIDENTS BY EXTENT OF PROPERTY DAMAGE
Type of Accident
Collision With:
Passenger Car
Other Truck
Train
Fixed Object
Pedestrian
Animal
Misc. Objects
Jackknife
Ditched
Fire Only
Miscellaneous
Combination Ditch/Overturn
Cargo Tank Punctured
Explosion
Cargo Tank Ruptured
Hose Failure
Cargo Spilled
Overturned
Valve Failure
Dome Cover Failure
Loading or Unloading
Less
Than
$500
641
129
6
72
28
11
16
29
13
0
35
4
0
0
0
1
7
6
2
0
1
$500 $1000
to to Over
$1000 $5000 $5000
466
119
10
55
0
9 '
10
40
28
0
14
12
0
0
0
0
3
8
0
0
1
446
148
14
61
0
II
8
87
70
0
15
62
1
0
0
1
1
50
0
0
0
W^BHMM
79
59
8
27
0
4
1
5
54
0
4
64
0
0
0
0
1
55
0
0
1
Accidents
1632
455
' 38
215
28
35
35
161
165
0
68
142
1
0
0
2
12
119
2
"" 0
3
Property
Damage
$2,169,148
1. 154.814
140,649
467,666
25
73,017
46,840
255,961
740,936
0
75,291
879,026
1,024
0
0
1,380
13,198
744,214
N/A
0
8.600
Average
Property
Damage
$1,329
2.538
3,701
2,175
1
2.086
1.338
1,590
4,491
0
1.107
6,190
1,024
0
0
690
1.100
6,254
N/A
0
2.867
TOTAL
SECONDARY RESULTS
Passenger Car
Other Truck
Fixed Object
Jackknife
Ditched
Miscellaneous
Combination Ditch/Overturn
Cargo Tank Punctured
Cargo Tank Ruptured
Cargo Spilled
Overturned
1001 775 975 362
32.2% 24.9% 31.3% 11.6%
3113
$6.771.789 $2.175
2
0
7
II
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
2
1
9
17
2
0
0
0
0
2
0
2
2
29
53
13
0
2
1
0
2
8
2
1
13
25
5
0
10
0
1
4
9
Exhibit C-l, Table II
C-15
-------
TABLE in
DISIUIUTION OF ACCIDENTS BY TYFE OF CARGO
TypeofCdfo
Empty
C«ta0iMtf OwMM
lilkutcofSoda
Sulphur
Food & kindred Products
Com Siarch. Syrup. Oil.
Sugar & By- Products
(Wet Prix-ess)
Whiskey
Unidentified
Cottonseed Oil
Soybean Oil (Crude & Refined)
Vegetable & Nut Oils &
Byproducts. Except Cotton
Seed & Soybean
Shortening. Table Oils.
Margarine & Other Edible
Fats
Sodium Silicate
Industrial Gases (Compressed
& l.iuucfied)
Aluin.CataKst. Uran
Misc. Industrial Organic
Chemical*
Alcohols
sulphuric Acid
Plastic Materials &
Synthetic Resins.
Synthetic Rubber & Fibers
Soap & Other Detergents
Except Specialty
Cleaners
Ink. Paint & Varnish
Fertilizer
Unidentified
Misc. Chemical Products
Benzene it Heptane
treosote
Products of Petroleum
Refining — Gasoline.
Jet Fuels. Other High
Volatile Petroleum
Fuels. Except Natural
Gasoline
Fuel Oils & Kerosene
Lubricating & Similar
Oils A Derivatives
Grease & Lubricants
Asphalts
Refined Products
Liquefied Pel. Gases and
Coal Gases
Unidentified
Cement. Kly Ash. Soda
Ash
Lime
TOTALS
TOTALS MINUS KMI'TY
KKiUKKS
NvBber
or
Accidents
1.331
I
2
19
9
65
1
1
2
8
II
7
5
12
8 •
117
16
29
55
9
10
51
1
91
3
3
487
251
7
4
81
1
KM)
1
284
••— ii
3.113
1.782
Fate*
or
AccldcaU
42.75%
.03%
.06%
.61%
.28%
2.08 %
.03%
.03%
.06%
.25%
.35%
.22%
.16%
.38%
.25%
3.75%
.51%
.93%
1 .76%
.28%
.32%
1.63%
.03%
2.92%
.09%
.09%
15.64%
8.06% .
.22%
.12%
2.60%
.03%
3.21%
.(13%
9.12%
.96%
FlUlllle*
2»
0
0
2
2
5
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
8
0
1
4
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
9
5
0
0
0
0
3
(I
8
1
85
*
56
Injuries
704
1
0
II
7
34
0
1
1
3
4
2
3
6
4
66
7
20
45
5
4
20
1
38
2
1
217
105
3
4
34
0
39
0
126
21
1,539
835
Property
$2.183.567
1.300
900
64,440
36.175
160.490
1,000
950
2,893
34.899
37,101
11,804
7.011
46.207
18.630
337.033
45.590
58,683
116.146
32,985
27.919
177.755
4,800
210,451
9,400
3.884
1.228.396
662.561
12.102
37.750
253.042
1,600
346.734
1,060
535.967
59.664
$6,771.789
$4.588.222
Avenft
Property
DMu«e
$1.640
1.300
450
3,391
4,019
2,469
1,000
950
1,446
4,362
3.372
1,686
1.402
3.850
2,328
2.888
2.849
2.023
2,111
3,665
2.791
3.485
4.800
2.312
3.133
1,294
••..522
2,639
1.728
9.437
3,123
1,600
34M
1.060
1,887
1.988
$2.175
$2.574
Exhibit C-l, Table III
C-16
-------
TABLE IV
DISTRIBUTION OF ACCIDENTS BY STATE
State
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
. Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
( Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Canada
N/A
Motor Vehicles
Registered
1 ,887,000
980,000
1.055,000
1 1 ,432,000
1,358,000
1,688,000
297,000
245.000
3.812,000
2,473,000
480,000
5.136,000
2,834,000
1,750,000
11,550,000
1,736,000
1,720,000
506,000
1,787,000
2,423,000
4,445,000
2,185,000
1,094,000
: 388,000
472,000
931,000
315,000
362,000
3,448,000
607,000
6,534,000
2,698,000
421,000
5,631,000
1,661,000
1,303,000
5,756,000
466,000
1,310,000
421,000
1,985,000
6.4? c 000
59.1.000
214,000
2,121.000
2.08K.OUO
839,000
2.082,000
236,000
N/A
N/A
Number of
Accidents
101
5
32
70
8
26
9
1
174
104
5
207
121
71
46
57
85
14
33
26
85
67
50
60
21
17
2
4
188
40
171
63
10
202
37
14
246
7
35
14
91
239
19
9
50
37
50
61
12
5
12
Tula!
Damage
$ 269,560
17,875
110,405
127.279
16,185
44.552
9,400
1,000
385,594
176,429
7.010
507.5 !«
210.447
163.007
181.482
171.213
1 3 1 ,64 1
29.500
91.863
43,335
139,461
133,226
118,612
146,742
57,250
19,841
4,038
7,325
299.413
97,921
329,039
175,706
56,840
495.275 '
109.813
33,151
488.891
12,149
95.585
79.092
140,501
402. W
51.210
18.375
149.721
117,977
115,354
91,395
3 1 ,760
21,550
36.98."
Injuries
95
3
16
16
2
12
4
1
109
44
0
92
71
29
22
34
5h
4
12
8
45
31
26
26
5
3
0
1
68
22
100
29
4
110
22
5
112
4
17
4
31
PO
8
3
28
14
26
28
4
5
8
Fatalities
3
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
7
7
1
3
7
4
1
-\
1
0
2
0
3
2
1
2
0
0
"o
0
-\
3
3
2
1
6
0
1
3
0
0
0
2
H
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
I)
1
TOTALS
104.702.000
3113
S6.77I.7K9
1539
85
Exhibit C-l, Table IV
C-17
-------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
form AppfQ»«d OMB M«. 04.5«I3
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENT REPORT
INSTRUCTIONS: Submit this report in duplicate to the SeereUry. Hazardous Materials Regulations Board. Department of
Tranaportalion. Washington. D.C. 20590. (ATTN: Opr. Div.). If space provided for any item is inadequate, complete that
item under Section H, "Remarks", keying to the entry number being completed. Copies of Ihia form, in limited quantities,
may be obtained from the Secretary, Hazardous Materials Regulations Board. Additional copies in this prescribed format
may be reproduced and used, if on the same siie and kind of paper.
A INCIDENT
I. TYPE Or OPERATION FREIGHT OTHER
iQAIR Jd HIGHWAY 3d RAIL «d WATER 5 £] FORWARDER *O°dmn,,lr
2. DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT (Month • D*y • Y*mr>
_a.m.
p.m.
1. LOCATION OF INCIDENT
REPORTING CARRIER. COMPANY OR INDIVIDUAL
4. FULL NAME
5. ADDRESS f/Vumter. Sir../. City. Sfala and Zip Cod.)
6. TYPE OF VEHICLE OR FACILI TY
SHIPMENT INFORMATION
7. NAME AND ADDRESS OF SHIPPER (Orlfin •ddrmn)
a. NAME AND ADDRESS OF CONSIGNEE fD.ilm.lion .
-------
PACKAGING INFORMATION • II man *an ant tin or trtt p*e*ejJn« It Involved In lott ol mtltrttl *kow ttctatlnl inlcrmmilan
tai Mrfi. II man taaet it ntaOtd, u«« taeilan H "Hamatlit" balaw Itjlnt (• Me Ham mmatr.
ITEM
• 1
TVPC OF PACKAGING INCLUDING INNER
RECEPTACLES (tlatl dnmt, moadan 6o«,
crllndtr. tie.)
CAPACITY OR WEIGHT PCR UNIT
'II gallant, tl Ib,.. tie.)
PACKA2CS FMOM DMlCN
MATeHIAL CICAPCO
NUMMM OF PACKAGES OF (AMI TVPf
IN JMIPMCNT
DOT SPCCIFICATION NUMeCMII) ON
PACKAOH 'IIP. lit. J44. .1C., or nan*J
31
SHOW ALL OTHCfl DOT PACKAGING
MARKINGS (fan lit)
NAMB. SYMBOL, OR REGISTRATION NUM-
BER OF PACKAGING MANUFACTURER
SHOW SERIAL NUMBER OF CYLINDERS.
CARGO TANKS, TANK CANS. PORTABLE
TANKS
TYPE DOT LABCLISI APPLIED
IF RECONDITIONED
OR
<*£OUALIFIEO. SHOW
REGISTRATION
NO. OR SYMBOL
OATEOF LAST
TEST or INSPCC
TION
10
IF «M|PMEHT IS u'.wCR DOT OR U3CG
SPECIAL PERMIT. ENTER PERMIT MO.
H REMARKS • Describe •••entUI (ecu of incident Including but not limited to defect!, demefe. probable CAuee. itowage,
ection teken et the tine discovered, end ectlon teken to prevent future incidents. Include eny recoramendellont to improve
peckefini, htndllnf. or traoipomttoa of heiirdout meterialt. Photofrtpbi end dii(r*m« should be submitted when
necesssry for clarification.
tl. NAME OF PERSON PREPARING REPORT fT>p» or print)
SI. SIGNATURE
II. TELEPHONE NO. (tncluOt Ana Cadt)
14. OATC REPORT PREPARED
Reverse of Fora DOT P MOO.I (10-70)
Exhibit C-2, page 2
C-19
-------
The National Tank Truck Carriers data have become more comprehensive
from year to year since they were first reported about 1956. The categories
in current use show data consistency for at least the past three reporting
years. Initial inferences may therefore be made from the December 1970
report, as follows:
1. For accidents involving all kinds of cargo (including empty
container), the most common cause is collision with another
truck or passenger car. The number of cases where malfunction
of cargo transfer mechanism (valve, hose, etc.) and structural
damage to the container are too few for conclusions to be based
on statistical analysis.
2. Most accidents occur with tanks empty. Of the others, it 1s
not practical to determine probabilities for each type of
commodity even according to the broad groupage used, because
there are no parallel figures on the total number of hauls
made without accidents.
3. The states of Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas
(underlined) show the highest number of accidents (all
commodities). However, if the number of accidents 1s divided
by the number of motor vehicles registered (assuming this is
related to the total number used within the state), Alabama,
New Jersey, and West Virginia show the highest ratios, over 5
accidents per 100,000 registered vehicles. All of these states
have concentrations of heavy industry.
C-20
-------
APPENDIX D
LIST OF INDUSTRIAL MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATIONS
The following was extracted from the "Directory of Industrial Mutual
Aid Associations," prepared and published by the Directorate of Procure-
ment and Production (MCPM), Headquarters, Air Force Logistics Command,
USAF, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Robert B. Kahn, Editor, April
1961. An updated directory is reported to be in preparation.
State
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Illinois
Name of Association
(F indicates a formal agreement)
Southwest Power Pool
Inter-Refinery Fire Prevention
and Disaster Committee of North
Contra Costa Counta
Santa Clara County Industrial
Mutual Aid Committee
Location of Participants
Little Rock
Martinez, Oleum, Associated,
Pittsburgh, Richmond
Tri-District Fire Executives
Association
San Diego Area Industrial
Mutual Aid Association
Groton Industrial Mutual Aid
Association (F)
Greater Wilmington DuPont
Mutual Aid Group (F)
Port Everglades Oil and Re-
lated Industries Association
(Peoria) (F)
Monsanto Industrial Area
Mutual Aid Organization
Tri-Cities Industrial Area
Industrial Mutual Aid Group
East Side Associated Indus-
tries (F)
Los Altos, Mountain View, San
Jose, San Francisco, Santa
Clara, Sunnyvale
Sacramento
San Diego
Groton, New London
Carneys Point, N.J., Newport,
Penns Grove, N.J., Wilmington
Port Everglades
Monsanto
Madison, Granite City
Washington Park
D-l
-------
Indiana
Lemont Mutual Aid Association
Cicero Manufacturers Assn.
Mutual Aid Program
Refinery Mutual Aid Group
Eastgate Mutual Aid Associ-
ation
Eastend Mutual Aid Associ-
ation
Westslde Mutual Aid Associ-
ation
Southside Mutual Aid
Association
Henry County Civil and
Industrial Defense Association
Lemont
Cicero
E. Chicago, Whiting
Indianapolis
Indianapolis
Indianapolis
Indianapolis
New Castle
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Richmond Mutual Aid
Association
Alcoa
South Bend Industrial Mutual
Aid Association
Industrial Mutual Aid Associ-
ation of Liberal
Sedgwick County Fire Control
Council
Wichita Mutual Aid Associa-
tion
Kyova Industrial Mutual Aid
Committee (KIMAC)
Rubbertown Mutual Aid Com-
mittee
Baton Rouge Mutual Aid
System
Southwest Louisiana Mutual
Aid Association
Richmond
Richmond
South Bend
Kansas
Wichita
Wichita
Ashland, Ironton, Ohio,
South Point, Ohio
Huntington, W. Va,
Kenova, W. Va.
Louisville
Baton Rouge, Geismar,
Brookhaven, Miss.
Lake Charles
D-2
-------
A-l Area Mutual Aid System
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Woodberry Industrial Mutual
Aid Association (F)
North Shore Industrial Mutual
Aid Organization
Springfield Safety Council
Meriden-WalUngford Manu-
facturers Association
Everett Industrial Mutual Aid
Council (EIMAC)
Worcester Industrial Mutual
Aid Group
Route No. 128 Industrial
Mutual Aid Association
Saglnaw Valley Law Enforce-
ment Officers Mutual Aid
Pact (F)
Minneapolis Mutual Aid Pro-
gram
Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Mutual Aid
Remington Rand Mutual Aid
See Baton Rouge Mutual Aid
System under the state of
Louisiana
Industrial Mutual Aid Group
New Orleans, Algiers, Arabl,
Avondale, Belle Chasse,
Chalmette, Empire, Good Hope,
Gramercy, Gretna, Hahnvllle,
Harahan, Harvey, Kenner,
LaPlace, Lullng, Marrero,
Meraux, Metairie, Michoud,
Norco, Paradls, Po1nte-a-
la-Hache, Port Sulpher,
St. Rose, Westwego
Baltimore
Arlington, Beverly, Boston,
Danvers, Lynn, North
Andover, Peabody, Salem,
Saugau, South Boston, West
Lynn
Springfield
Meriden
Everett
Worcester
Waltham
Bay City, Flint, Midland,
Saginaw
Minneapolis
St. Paul
St. Paul
St. Louis
D-3
-------
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Bloomfield Industrial Mutual
Aid Council (BIMAC)
Carteret Industrial Mutual
Aid Council
West Hudson Industrial Mutual
Aid Council
Linden Industrial Mutual Aid
Council
Edison Township Mutual Aid
Council
New Brunswick Mutual Aid
Council (BIMAC)
Pennsauken Industrial Mutual
Aid Group (F)
Parlln Industrial Mutual Aid
Council
Piscataway Township Mutual Aid
Council
Perth Amboy Industrial Mutual
Aid Council
Salem County Industrial Mutual
Aid Council (F)
Consolidated Erie County Civil
Defense Organization
Niagara Industrial Emergency
Council
Rochester Industrial Manage-
ment Council (F)
Onondaga County Industrial
Mutual Aid Council (OCIMAC)
(F)
Greater Troy Industrial Mutual
Aid Council
Alliance Mutual Aid Organiza-
tion (F)
Bloomfield
Carter
Harrison
Linden
Edison, Fords, Iselln,
Menlo Park, Metuchen,
New Brunswick, Nixon,
So. Plainfield, Stelton
New Brunswick
Pennsauken
Parlln, Sayreville
Middlesex
Fords, Perth Amboy
Carneys Point, Penns Grove,
Salem County
Buffalo
Niagara Falls, North Tonawanda,
Uheatfield
Rochester
Syracuse
Troy
Alliance
D-4
-------
Akron Mutual Aid Organiza-
tion
Ashtabula Township Industrial
Mutual Aid Organization (F)
Barberton Mutual Aid Associa-
tion (F)
Blue Ash, Montgomery and
Rossmoyne C1v1l Defense and
Mutual Aid Organization (F)
Mutual Aid Group - Industrial
Canton (MAGIC) (F)
Cleveland Northeast Indus-
trial Mutual Aid Organization
Cuy-New Heights Industrial
Mutual Aid Organization (F)
Southeast Industrial Mutual
Aid Organization (F)
Central Ohio Valley Indus-
trial Emergency Organization
(COVIEO)
Lake County Industrial Mutual
Aid Organization (F)
Euclid Industrial Mutual Aid
Association (F)
Evendale Industrial Mutual Aid
Association (F)
Reading Mutual Aid Association
(F)
Akron
Ashtabula
Barberton, Cleveland
Blue Ash, Rossmoyne,
Montgomery
Canton, Cleveland
Cleveland
Cleveland, Cuyahoga
Heights, Newburgh Heights
Bedford, Bedford Heights,
Cleveland, Maple Heights,
Solon, Warrensvllle Heights
Marietta, Parkersburg, W.Va.
Sistersville, W. Va., South
Parkersburg, W.Va,, St.
Marys, W.Va., Vienna, W.Va.
Washington, W.Va., Williams-
town, W.Va., Willow Island,
W.Va., Belpre
Willoughby, Cleveland
Euclid, Cleveland
Cincinnati, Evendale, Sharon-
ville
Cincinnati, Evendale, Lockland,
Reading
Sandusky Mutual Aid Association Sandusky, Cleveland
Sharonville Industrial Mutual
Aid Council
Toledo Mutual Aid Organization
(F)
Cincinnati, Newtown, Sharonville,
St. Bernard
Toledo
D-5
-------
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Texas
Tulsa Mutual Aid Association
Oklahoma City Mutual Aid
Association
Beaver County Industrial
Defense Council
New York-Pennsylvania Group
of National Petroleum
Association of F1re and
Safety Marshals (F)
Danville Mutual Aid Council
Erie Mutual Aid
Philadelphia Industrial
Mutual Aid Organization (F)
National Petroleum Associ-
ation and Fire & Accident
Prevention Group (F)
Berks County Industrial
Mutual Aid Organization
Montgomery County Mutual
Aid Association (F)
Kingsport Industrial Mutual
Aid Organization
Houston Ship Channel Indus-
tries Disaster Aid Group (F)
Fort Worth Mutual Aid Associ-
ation
Victoria-Calhoun Counties
Mutual Aid Organization
Corpus Christi Terminal Fire
Company
Sabine-Neches F1re Chiefs
Association (F)
Tulsa
Oklahoma City
Aliquippa, Ambridge, Beaver,
Freedom, Beaver Falls, Junction
Park, Midland, Monaca
Bradford, Buffalo, N.Y., Farmers
Valley, Warren
Danville
Erie
Philadelphia
Emlenton, Franklin, Freedom,
011 City, Petrolia, Rousseville
Reading, Laurel dale
Conshohocken, Norristown,
Plymouth Meeting
Kingsport
Baytown, Channel view, Deer
Park, Freeport, Galena Park,
Houston, LaPorta, Miller Cut
Off, Pasadena
Ft. Worth, White Settlement
Point Comfort, Seadrift,
Victoria
Corpus Christi
Beaumont, Groves, Nederland,
Orange, Port Acres, Port
Arthur, Port Neches, San
Antonio
D-6
-------
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Texas City Industrial Mutual
Mutual Aid Association (F)
Central Virginia Industries
Association
Kanawha Valley Industrial
Emergency Planning Council
(KVIEPC) (F)
Welrton Industrial Emergency
Organization
Northern Ohio River Indus-
trial Mutual Aid Council
(NORIMAC)
Milwaukee Industrial Mutual
Aid Association
Cudahy Industrial Mutual Aid
Association
Elkhorn National Mobilization
Program
Texas City
Lynchburg
Alloy, Belle, Charleston,
East Charleston, South
Charleston, Corton, Dunbar,
Institute, Longacre, Nitro
Welrton
Moundsville
Milwaukee
Kenosha, Barrington, 111
Elkhorn
D-7
-------
APPENDIX E
SAFETY AIDS
Safety aids presented in this section include descriptions and
examples of MCA Chem-Cards, standard labels and placards, and chemical
safety data sheets of three types.
E.I MCA CHEM-CARDS
Exhibit E-l lists the chemicals for which Chem-Cards.are available as
of November 1971. The list is periodically augmented as. cards for addi-
tional chemicals are approved. Exhibits E-2 and E-3 are representative
Chem-Cards. The entire compilation is available from the Manufacturing
Chemists' Association, 1825 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C.,
Zip Code 20009, for about $1.00 per manual. Representative Chem-Cards
follow.
E-l
-------
Contents
Chem-Card Cham-Card
Chemical Number Chemical Number
A Acetaldehyde 49 C CTF 2
Acetone 23 Cyclohexane 20
Acetone Cyanhydrin 34 D Diethylamine (Anhydrous) 27
Acetomtrlle M Diethylenetriamine 72
Acrolem (Inhibited) 76 Dimethylamine (Anhydrous) . 26
Acrylonitnle 15 Dimethylamine (Aqueous) 84
Aerozme 50 9 Dimethyl Ether 61
Allyl Alcohol 35 Dimethyl Sulfate 55
Allyl Chloride 63 _ _ . .. ' . .. „
Ammonia, Anhydrous 44 E Epichloronydrin 29
Ammonia, Aqua ,.. 66 ^ttianol ™
Ammonium Hydroxide 66 Ski" A""*"*" : 10
Anhydrous Ammonia 44 ™y , , f ol
Anhydrous Hydrazine 7 |*y Acrylate 85
Aniline Oil (Liquid) 51 ^y Alcohol 70
M Ethyl Aldehyde 49
B Benzene 17 Ethyl Chloride 24
Benzol 17 Ethylene Dichloride 62
Benzyl Chloride ZZ. 54 Ethylene Oxide 36
Bromine 59 Ethy' Ether 16
Bromomethane 38 p Fluorine, Liquid 10
Butadiene (Inhibited) 81 Formic Acid 83
Butanol 80 Fuming Sulfuric Acid (Oleum) 68
6° H Hydrazine Anhydrous 7
fs fflffi== 82
S Hydrofluoric Acid
50 (Anhydrous or Aqueous) 42
C Carbolic Acid 48 Hydrogen, Liquid 12
Caustic Potash (Liquid) 32 Hydrogen Peroxide
Caustic Soda (Liquid) 33 (H|8h Strength) 14
Chlorine 53 | IRFNA 3
Chlorine Trifluoride 2 Isopropanol 71
Chlorosulfonic Acid 73 Isopropyl Alcohol 71
Cresol 77 Isopropylamine 56
Cresylic Acid 77 Isopropyl Ether 58
Exhibit E-l. List of Available Chem-Cards
E-2
-------
Contents
Chemical
Chem-Card
Number
L Liquid Fluorine 10
Liquid Hydrogen 12
Liquid Nitrogen 6
Liquid Oxygen 13
M "Methanol 69
Methyl Acrylate 74
Methyl Alcohol 69
Methylamines (Anhydrous) .... 26
Methylamines (Aqueous) 84
Methyl Bromide (Liquid) 38
Methyl Chloride 67
Methyl Ethyl Ketone 22
Methyl Isobutyl Ketone 57
Methyl Methacrylate 43
Mixed Acid 65
Monomethylamine
(Anhydrous) 26
Monomethylamine (Aqueous) 84
Monomethyl Hydrazine 11
Motor Fuel Antiknock
Compound 30
Muriatic Acid 82
N Nitrating Acid 65
Nitric Acid 47
Nitric Acid, Red Fuming 3
Nitrobenzene 79
Nitrobenzol (Liquid) 79
Nitrogen, Liquid 6
Nitrogen Tetroxide 1
N-Two-0-Four 1
O Oil of Vitriol 25
Oleum 68
Oxygen, Liquid 13
p Pentaborane 5
Perchloryl Fluoride 4
Chemical
Chem-Card
Number
PF
Phenol
Phosphorus Oxychloride
Phosphorus Pentasulfide
Phosphorus Trichloride ..
Phosphorus, White or
Yellow, in Water
Potassium Hydroxide
R Red Fuming Nitric Acid
RFNA
Sodium Hydroxide
S-O-Two
Sodium (Metallic).
Sulfur Dioxide
Sulfuric Acid
Sulfur Trioxide
(Stabilized)
T Tetraethyl Lead, Liquid
Toluene
Toluol
Trimethylamine (Anhydrous)
Trimethylamine (Aqueous) ..
U UDMH
Unsymmetrical Dimethyl
Hydrazine
V Vinyl Acetate
Vinyl Chloride
Vinylidene Chloride
(Inhibited)
White Phosphorus, in Water
X Xylene
Xylol
Y Yellow Phosphorus, in Water
4
48
39
41
40
37
32
3
3
33
78
31
78
25
52
30
19
19
26
84
8
8
21
46
75
37
45
45
37
Exhibit E-l. List of Available Chem-Cards (cont.)
E-3
-------
MCA CHEM-CARD —Transportation Emergency Guide
VINYL CHLORIDE
Compressed, liquefied gas; sweet odor
HAZARDS
| Extremely flammable. May be ignited by heat, sparks or
FIRE open flame. Burning releases irritating gas. Fire may cause
I violent rupture of tank.
CYDHCI IDC1 V°P°r harmful. Liquid may cause skin or eye injury
tXKUbUKt ..
fo
IN CASE OF ACCIDENT
IF THIS HAPPENS
DO THIS
i'r Shut off ignition. No smoking or flares. Keep people
away. Shut off leak if without risk. Wear self-contained
breathing apparatus and full protective clothing. Flush
area with water spray. Liquid draining to sewer may
create explosion hazard; notify authorities.
Do not put out fire unless leak can be shut off immediately.
On small fire use dry chemical or carbon dioxide. On
large fire use water spray or foam. Wear self-contained
breathing apparatus. Cool tank with water if exposed
to fire. .
Remove to fresh air. If unconscious, call a physician.
If not breathing, apply artificial respiration, oxygen. In
case of contact with liquid, thaw frosted parts with water.
In case of exposure to gas from fire, administer oxygen
if breathing is difficult.
Published by the Manufacturing Chemists' Association, Inc. in cooperation with the Compressed Gas Association, inc. While prepared from sources
believed reliable, the Associations make no warranty that the information is. in all cases, correct or sufficient.
-------
MCA CHEM-CARD —Transportation Emergency Guide
ASYMMETRICAL DIMETHYL HYDRAZINE
(UDMH)
A clear water-white liquid with sharp, strong odor
HAZARDS
r————————————————————————————__———_——_——
I
FIRE Flammable. Easily ignited.
I
I Vapor may cause lung and eye injury. Liquid may
EXPOSURE cause skin and eye burns and may be absorbed
I through skin.
I
IN CASE OF ACCIDENT
IF THIS HAPPENS
DO THIS
off ignition. No smoking or flares. Evacuate area.
Keep public upwind. Use self-contained breathing ap-
paratus and impermeable full protective clothing to enter
spill area. Flush spill with water. Shut off leak if without
risk.
Use water spray, "alcohol" foam, or dry chemical. Cool
tank with water if exposed to fire.
-'f:-'- Remove to fresh air. If not breathing, apply artificial res-
a1 piration, oxygen. Immediately flush affected parts with
plenty of water; remove contaminated clothing and shoes.
Get prompt medical attention for any exposure. Effects
may be delayed.
O Minulactuiinf Ctiemitts' Associltion, Inc., 1S2S Connecticut Avenue. N-W.. Washington, D. C. 20009, 1965. While prepared Iron tourcet
believed reliable, tne Association makes no warranty that the information is, in ill cases, correct or sufficient. Printed in USA
Exhibit E-3. Sample MCA Chem-Card
E-5
-------
E.2 LABELS AND PLACARDS
Examples of identifying placards and labels that are posted on the
exterior of carriers hauling hazardous material were shown in Figure
on page 7-21. The following, Exhibit E-4, is a more complete set furnished
by the Railway. Systems and Management Association. It appears in the RSMA
"Manual, Commodity Safety System," which is part of the Chemical Transporta-
tion Safety Index slide rule set (see page
E-6
-------
WHITE (Air)
WHITE
Required on packages containing acids, alkaline
caustic liquids and other corrosive liquids for air
shipment.
Required on packages containing acids for rail,
truck or water shipment.
WHITE
WHITE
'LEAKING Pickiiti>
'w«ib Add Off with V
CAUTION
DO NOT
DROP
CORROSIVE LIQUID
Do not load with EipIoslTu or nor article*
bearing YELLOW label*
'UAKMO •«*!*.^
Wok JUkotlM Caulk '
limit Oil with WoUr
'CAUTION
ALKALINE CAUSTIC LIQUID
Do not load with Eiplotlra or near irddet
bearing YELLOW label*
Required on packages containing corrosive liquids
for rail, truck or water shipment.
Required on packages containing alkaline caustic
liquids for rail, truck or water shipment.
Exhibit E-4. Hazardous Materials Labels and Placards
E-7
-------
YELLOW (Air)*
DOME PLACARD
AVOID ACCIDENTS
DO NOT REMOVE THIS DOME COVER
WHILE GAS PRESSURE EXISTS IN TANK
KEEP LIGHTED LANTERNS AWAY
Required on packages containing flammable solids
or oxidizing materials for air shipments.*
Required on tank car domes when the tank car
contains flammable liquids that build up relatively
high pressures inside the tank (vapor pressures
greater than 16 and less than 40 psi absolute at
100'F).
YELLOW *
KEEP
AWAY
Fran FIRE. HEAT,
•nd OPEN-flam. LIGHTS
Required on packages containing flammable solids
or oxidizing materials for rail, truck or water ship-
ment.*
CAUTION: Allhoiii
mnhlr ,,.li,l, Hirt-r
i- lnrr™»• Inhrl* nrr Ihr >nm^, lht> tlnKnr>t» rif flnm.
rh<«r (». 1hi-i> ci>»»ull Siifcty linlrx (ur prulicr
Exhibit Er4. Hazardous Materials Labels and Placards (cont.)
E-8
-------
RED and RED-GAS
(Air)
Required on packages containing flammable liq-
uids or gases lor air shipment.
RED
Keep
AWAY
From FIRE.
HEAT and OPEN.fl.m.
LEAKING Packagcn Mutt to Rtmovxl to a Sal. PI
Required on packages containing flammable liq-
uids for roil, truck or water shipment.
RED GAS
KEEP COOL
CAUTION
FLAMMABLE—COMPRESSED CAS
Kttp >w*r from FIRE. Hal lad Opcn-Bmrat Lllata
Required on packages containing flammable gases
for -rail, truck and water shipment.
Exhibit E-4. Hazardous Materials Labels and Placards (cont.)
E-9
-------
BUNG LABEL
EXPLOSIVES—B
CAUTION u™0™;Bun'
Do not anscrvw entirely ontll *U Interior pro-
nro hu escaped thrwfh the lootened thmdi.
REMOVE BUNG IN OPEN AIR. Keep >U open
Bin. Ilibtl uid Orel iw«j. Encloud Electric LUhti
•r* ufe.
Required near the bung on merol drums or bar-
rels containing flammable liquids that build up
relatively high pressures when contained (specifi-
cally with vapor pressures greater than 16 and less
than 40 psi absolute at 100'F). This label is in
addition to the red label required for flammable
liquids.
EXPLOSIVES
CLASS I
HANOll CAIEFULLY
Km Fill AWAY
00 NOT DIOP OR THBOW
TMi package mutt not be loaded o
•toted near ttcam pipei or
other source of heat
.1 I* .->J, (Ktl f«* c**r«, pi lfc.1 Mttlfl ft pr*>nt»
t b> "•*• »j HI PKhfJ *rf Wll4 i^ MI ia pwn
tit llmoBllho* ll<0(«*e !• It* ItfJll^nt plncifcltf
'
EMPTY
Required on emptied con-
tainers upon which the
old label has not been
removed, obliterated or
destroyed; it should cover
the old label.
EMPTY
EXPLOSIVES—DESCRIPTION OF CLASSES
Class A explosives are detonating or other types of maximum
hazard, and do not have a specific label. Packages contain-
ing Class A explosives hove specific markings as required in
D.O.T. regulations, such os "HIGH EXPLOSIVES—DANGER-
OUS," "DETONATING PRIMERS—HANDLE CAREFULLY,"
etc.
Class B explosives are flammable hazard types of explosives
which, generally, combust rapidly, rather than detonate.
Class C explosives are of minimum hazard ond generally are
those containing small amounts of Class A or B explosives,
ond some types of fireworks. Class C explosives, other than
special fireworks, require no label, but may require specific
markings as specified in D.O.T. regulations.
EXPLOSIVES (Air)
Required on packages containing Class B explo-
sives, Class C explosives, special fireworks or sam-
ples of explosives for oir shipment.
Required on packages containing Class B explo-
sives for rail, truck or water shipment.
SPECIAL FIREWORKS
SPECIAL
FIREWORKS
HANDLE CAREFULLY
KEEP FIRE AWAY
DO NOT DROP NOR THROW
This package must not he loaded or
Itorcd near Mcam pipes or
other tvoLKve of heat
Required on packages containing special fireworks
for roil, truck or water shipment.
EXPLOSIVES-SAMPLE
EXPLOSIVE
Sample for Laboratory
Examination
HANDLE CAUEKULLY
KEEI" MHE AWAY
Thin IB to certify Ihnl the eontcnla of Ihfi
parknge are property described by name and
ar« packed and marked and arc in proper con-
ditlon for tmnsportntion according to th* rtfu-
lations preirribrd by the Intcmtnte Commerce
CommfMlon.
(Shipper1! Name)
Required on pockoges containing samples of ex-
plosives for laboratory examination for rail, truck
or water shipment.
Exhibit E-4. Hazardous Materials babels a'rirf Placards (corit.)
E-10
-------
POISON-GAS
WARNING!
BEWARE OF FUMES
POISON GAS
POISON-TEAR GAS
Required on packages containing Class A poison
gases or liquids (a small amount of the gas or
vapor of the liquid is dangerous to life) for ship-
ment on any mode. A Class A poison that is also
a flammable (gas, liquid or solid), corrosive liq-
uid, oxidizing material or compressed gas must
bear the additional label showing the other haz-
ardous characteristic.
POISON (Air)
DO NOT DROP
BREAKING Or PACKAGE LIABLE
TO PRODUCE IRRITATING FUMES
Required on packages containing Class C poisons
for rail, truck or water shipment.
GREEN (Ai
Required on packages containing Class B poisons
(liquid or solid poisons, less dangerous than Class
A) or Class C poisons (tear gas or irritating sub-
stances) for air shipment.
POISON
Required on packages containing non-flammable
gases for air shipment.
GREEN
Required on packages containing Class B poisons
for rail, truck or water shipment.
KEEP COOL
CAUTION
Nonflammable—Compressed Gas
DO NOT DROP
Required on packages containing non-flammable
gases for rail, truck or water shipment.
Exhibit E-4. Hazardous Materials Labels and Placards (cont.)
E-ll
-------
POISON GAS PLACARD
17 Inchti .
"FLAMMABLE POISON GAS—EMPTY" PLACARD
DO NOT REMAIN ON OR NEAR THIS
CAR UNNECESSARILY
malt not bo tmufnred en roat* onto uir eoidlUon.
•hlppor ud Bureau of Ezplodrto •» notUd.
POISON GAS
Name of Contest
This car ranit not b« next to * ear placarded
Bmrar* of liquid and of CM leaking from tank or flttlnn
WHEN LADING IS REMOVED
THIS PLACARD MUST
BE REVERSED
Required on tank cars containing Class A poison
gases, except hydrocyanic acid.
"POISON GAS—EMPTY" PLACARD
POISON GAS OR RESIDUE
DANGEROUS
EMPTY
Required on tank cars that have been emptied of
Class A poison gasses, except hydrocyanic acid.
FLAMMABLE POISON GAS PLACARD
DO NOT REMAIN ON OR NEAR
THIS CAR UNNECESSARILY
FLAMMABLE
POISON GAS
WHEN LADING U RBMOVED
THIS PLACABO MUST BE BCVEUED
Required on tank cars containing hydrocyanic
acid, a highly flammable Class A poison gas.
EOT 1JCHT3 AID FDU3 AWAT
THD CAJ CONTAM
CAS
01 RZSDUE
DO NOT
DO NOT ALLOW UQIKD OB
INHALE CAS SOLID RESDtX TO
TOUCH SUN
K£ZT MANWAT MKHT COVER St
DO NOT DTITJt
TANK UNTIL TT HAS BUR CLCAKED
(N ACCORDANCE WTTH THE
SHIPPCJU atrreucnoNs
Required on tank cars that have been emptied of
hydrocyanic acid.
"DANGER—FUMIGATED OR TREATED"
PLACARD
DANGER
Th> bain* of dill cu an been
FUMIGATED or
TREATED
B1FOU UNLOADING COM bott doon ttd DO NOT KOTYR
OH at k to> 0) m ROIOVS AU. POISONOUS HATDUAL
Required on cars with ladings that have been fu-
migated or treated with a poisonous solid, liquid
or gas.
RESIDUAL PHOSPHORUS PLACARD
Thit car contains residual
phosphorus and must be kept
Required on tonk cars emptied of white or yellow
phosphorous and being shipped back filled with
water or inert gas.
Exhibit E-4. Hazardous Materials Labels and Placards (cont.)
E-12
-------
RADIOACTIVE-I
DANGEROUS RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
PLACARD
Required on packages containing certain classes
of radiocotive materials for shipment on any
mode.*
RADIOACTIVE-I I
Required on cars containing packages with Radio-
active-Ill labels, on carload lots of low specific
activity materials, carload lots above certain radi-
ation levels and carload lots of radioactive mate-
rials loaded by a shipper in containers assigned for
his sole use.
Required on packages containing certain classes
of radioactive materials for shipment on any
mode.*
RADIOACTIVE-I 11
Required on packages containing certain classes
of radioactive materials for shipment on any
mode.*
The number* I. II and til on the labels above connote progreaalvelr
hither radiation haiarda. A radioactive material that la atao a
fUmmable
-------
E.3 SAFETY DATA SHEETS
Chemical safety data sheets are copyrighted information summaries on
individual hazardous chemicals. They vary in size and content from the
comprehensive multi-page discussions of the Manufacturing Chemists'
Association (MCA) to the two-page highlights of the Railway Systems and
Management Association (RSMA). This section presents samples of each
type, along with intermediate-sized safety data sheets published by the
National Safety Council (NSC). Information on obtaining these publications
follows.
Safety data sheets published by still another organization, the
American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA), are not shown here.
Entitled "AIHA Hygienic Guides," these data sheets summarize toxicological
data for establishing relative health hazard and recommend control
measures to minimize exposure. They may be obtained from the American
Industrial Hygiene Association, 14125 Prevost Street, Detroit, Michigan
48827.
E.3.1 MCA Chemical Safety Data Sheets
MCA safety data sheets provide detailed information on the physical
properties and safe storage, handling, transportation, use, and disposal
of hazardous chemicals. Exhibit E-5 presents a list of available MCA
Chemical Safety Data Sheets and the address where they may be obtained.
They are priced at $0.50 per sheet (November 1971). Exhibit E-6 is the
MCA safety data sheet for Ethylene Oxide.
E-14
-------
For Trea Publication* list and prices, write or phone
Publications Department
MANUFACTURING CHEMISTS ASSOCIATION
1825 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C. 20009
Phone: 202-483-6126
OTHER CHEMICAL SAFETY DATA SHEETS AVAILABLE IN THIS AREA
(Date of lotett available edition, as of July 1969. given In parenthetet)
Acetaldehyde
Acetic Acid
Acetic Anhydride .
Acetone
Acetylene
Acroleln _.
Acrylonitrile
Aluminum Chloride
Ammonia Anhydrous
Ammonia Aqua
Ammonium Dichromate
Aniline
Antimony Trichloride
(Anhydrous)
Arsenic Trloxide
Benzene
Benzoyl Peroxide
Benzyl Chloride
Betanaphthylamine
Boron Hydrides
Bromine
Butadiene
..(1952)
..(1951)
.(1962)
..(1962)
.(1957)
..(1961)
.(1964)
..(1956)
..(I960)
(1947)
..(1952)
-(1963)
SD-43
SD-41
SD-15
SO-87
SO-7
SD-85
SD-31
SD-62
SD-8
SD-13
SD-45
SD-17
..(1957) SD-66
..(1956) SMO
..(I960) SD-2
. (1960) SD-81
..(1957) SD-69
.(1949) SD-32
..(1961) SD-84
.(1968) SD-49
.(1954) SD-55
n-Butyllithiui.i in
Hydrocarbon Solvents
Butyraldehydc*
Calcium Carbide
Carbon Oisulfide
Carbon Tetrachloride
Caustic Potash
Caustic Soda
Chlorine
Chloroform
Chlorosulfonic Acid
Chromic Acid
.(1966)
..(I960)
.(1967)
-(1967)
..(1963)
..(1968)
.(1968)
.(I960)
.(1962)
.(1968)
..(1952)
SD-91
SD-78
SD-23
SD-12
SD-3
SD-10
SD-9
SD-80
SD-89
SD-33
SD-44
Cresol
Cyclohexane
Diethylenetriamine .
Dimethyl Sulfate ....
Dinitrotoluenes
Ethyl Acetate
Ethyl Chloride
Ethyl Ether
Ethylene Dichloride
Ethylene Oxide
Formaldehyde
Hydrochloric Acid ...
Hydrocyanic Acid
Hydrofluoric Acid
Hydrogen Peroxide _...
Hydrogen Sulfide
Isopropylamine
Lead Oxides
Malcic Anhydride
Methanol
Methyl Acrylate and
Ethyl Acrylate
Methylamlnoi
Methyl Bromide
Methyl Chloride
Methylene Chloride _
Methyl Ethyl Ketone .
Mixed Acid
_(1952) SIMS
...(1957) SD-68
_(1959) SD-76
_(1966) SD-19
-(1966) SD-93
-.(1953) SD-51
.(1953) SO-50
-.(1965) SD-29
_ (1947) SD-18
..(1951) SD-38
-(I960) SD-1
..(1951) SD-39
-(1961) SD-67
-(1957) SD-25
-(1969) SD-53
..(1968) SD-36
-(1959) SD-72
..(1956) SD-64
..(1962) SO-88
-(1948) SD-22
Naphthalene
Nitric Acid
paraNitroaniline
Nitrobenzene
.(I960)
-(1955)
_(1968)
-(1951)
-(1982)
-(1961)
..(1956)
-(1956)
-(1961)
..(1966)
-(1967)
SD-79
SD-57
SD-35
SD-40
SO-86
SD-83
SD-65
SD-58
SD-5
SD-94
SD-21
Ortho-Dlchlorobenzene .
Paraformaldehyde
Perchloroethylene
Perchloric Acid Solution..
Phenol
Phosgene
Phosphoric Acid
Phosphoric Anhydride ._
Phosphorus, Elemental .
Phosphorus Oxychloride
Phosphorus Pentasulfide
Phosphorus Trichloride _
Phthalic Anhydride
Propylene
Sodium Chlorate
Sodium Cyanide
Sodium, Metallic
Sodium and Potassium
Dichromatcs
Styrene Monomer
Sulfur
Sulfur Chlorides
Sulfur Dioxide
Sulfuric Acid
Tetrachloroethane
Toluene
Tolutdine
Tolylene Diisocyanate
1,1,1-Trichloroethane
Trichloroethylene
Vinyl Acetate
Vinyl Chloride
Zirconium and Hafnium
Powder _
.(1953)
.(I960)
(1948)
.(1965)
.(1964)
(1967)
(1958)
(1948)
.(1947)
.(1968)
.(1958)
.(1948)
(1956)
.(1956)
.(1952)
(1967)
.(1952)
.(1952)
.(1951)
(1959)
.(I960)
.(1953)
(1963)
(1949)
(1956)
(1961)
.(1959)
(1965)
(1956)
(1959)
(1954)
SD-54
SD-6
SD-24
SD-11
SD-4
SD-95
SD-70
SD-28
SD-16
SD-26
SD-71
SD-27
SD-61
SD-59
SD-42
SD-30
SD-47
SD-46
SD-37
SD-74
SD-77
SD-52
SD-20
SD-34
SD-63
SD-82
SD-73
SD-90
SD-14
SD-75
SD-56
(1966) SD-92
Exhibit E-5. MCA List of Safety Data Sheets
E-15
-------
CHEMICAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
ETHYLENE OXIDE
SUMMARY
Ethylene oxide is a chemical widely used both in the chemical industry
and research laboratories. Its use involves a variety of hazards. These are
clearly set forth in this Chemical Safety Data Sheet. Requisite precautions are
outlined with regard to its flammable vapors and explosion hazards arising
from its variable physical state, as well as when the chemical is subjected to poly-
merization conditions, particularly when in contact with certain catalytic influ-
ences. Likewise the common hazards involved in handling; loading and unload-
ing of tank cars and drums; storage conditions, and buildings, including waste
disposal, are placed in proper safety perspective with respect to pertinent safe-
guards.
Utmost care and diligence have been exercised in pointing out the hazards
that might occur if adequate protection and safety precautions are not followed.
In view of the extreme care necessary to protect handlers, considerable space
has been devoted to the proper choice of protective equipment, suitable cloth-
ing, eye protection, masks, etc.
It is important that the suggestions given for first aid in case of exposure
be followed. No cases of chronic poisoning by ethylene oxide have been re-
ported, but exposure to excessive concentrations may result in distressing acute
effects, including skin burns, injury to the eyes, and irritation of the mucous
membranes of the nose and throat. Nausea and vomiting also may occur.
To avoid all dangers and hazards, particular stress is placed on thorough
education of employees. In order to appreciate fully the respective danger
signals it is urgent that each part and specific section of the Safety Data Sheet
on ethylene oxide be carefully examined.
Exhibit E-6. MCA Chemical Safety Data Sheet
on Ethylene Oxide
E-16
-------
Chemical Safety Data Sheet
Manual
Sheet
SD-3*
ETHYLENE OXIDE
Adopted February, 1951
1. NAME
Chemical Names: Ethylene oxide, 1,2-epoxyethane; oxirane;
dimethylene oxide
Common Names: Ethylene oxide
Formula: CH:-CH2
V
2. PROPERTIES
2.1 Grades and Strength
Commercial, substantially 1007".
2.2 Important Physical and Chemical Properties.
Boiling Point (760 mm):
Coefficient of Expansion,
20C C (68° F):
55° C (130° F):
73.9° C (165° F):
Color:
Corrosivity:
Critical Pressure; Ib./sq. in. abs.:
Critical Temperature:
Explosive Limits: See 2.3.3; 6.2.2 and 8.3.2(d)
Per cent by volume in air;
Upper Limit:
Lower Limit:
Flash Point; Liquid Ignition Temp.
(decomposition)
Tag Glass Open Cup:
Heat of Combustion; Kgm.cal./gm mol:
Heat of Decomposition; Kgm.cal./gm mol:
Heat of Vaporization; 1 atm., BTU/lb.:
Hygroscopicity
Ignition Temperature; In air, 1 atm.:
Ignition Temperature, (Auto-ignition); 1 atm.:
Melting Point:
Liquid Gas
10.73° C (51.3° F) —
0.00161 per °C
0.00170 per fC
0.00205 per °C
Colorless
Noncorrosive
Non-explosive
<0.° F
245
Slight
Colorless
Noncorrosive
1043
195.8° C (384.4° F)
Explosive
°° See 8.3.2(d)
308.7
20.0
—111.3'C(—168.3'F) —
429° C (804.2° F)
571° C (1060.8° F)
E-17
-------
Manual
Sheet
SD-38
Manufacturing Chemista' Aisociation, Inc.
Ethylene Oxide
Odor:
Reactivity, Chemical:
Specific Gravity, apparent; 20/20° (68° F):
Specific Heat:
Solubility in Water:
Vapor Density, Air—1 at 40° C (104° F):
Vapor Pressure; 20° C, Ib./sq. in. abs.:
Volatility
Characteristic ether-
like odor, but irri-
tating in high con-
centration.
Dangerously reac-
tive ; some reactions
uncontrolled.
0.8711
0.44 BTU/lb.
per degree F
Complete
Very volatile
Characteristic ether-
like odor, but irri-
tating in high con-
centration.
Dangerously reac-
tive ; some reactions
uncontrolled.
0.268 Cal/gram per
°C (1 atm. 34° C)
1.49
21.2 (see following
table)
Temperature
°C
—57.0
—30.4
—10.5
0.0
10.73
20.0
30.0
69.8
109.8
°F
—70.6
—22.7
—14.9
32.0
51.3
68.0
86.0
157.6
229.6
Vapor Pressure
Vapor Pressure of Ethylene Oxide
mm Mercury abs. Inches mercury abs.
19.6
110.6
312.7
493.1
760.0
1095.0
1560.0
5141.0
12,720.0
2.3 Hazardous Properties
2.3.1 HEALTH HAZARDS
Ethylene oxide vaporizes rapidly at atmos-
pheric temperatures and pressures. Its vapor
is moderately toxic by inhalation, and is irri-
tating to the eyes and mucous membranes.
Ethylene oxide as pure liquid, or in solution,
can produce burns of the skin and eyes. (See 8.
HEALTH HAZARDS AND THEIR CON-
TROL.)
2.3.2 FIRE HAZARDS
Ethylene oxide is an extremely flammable
liquid and, as such, introduces a potential fire
hazard when it is stored, handled or used.
Ethylene oxide fires will continue to burn until
the liquid is diluted with approximately 22 vol-
umes of water to one volume of oxide. Most
small fires may be extinguished with carbon
dioxide or dry chemical agents, if properly
applied. (See 6.2.1 Fire Hazards.)
2.3.3. EXPLOSION HAZARDS
Liquid ethylene oxide itself is quite stable to
detonating agents, but the vapor will explode
0.76
4.35
12.31
19.41
29.92
43.11
61.42
202.4
500.8
Psig abs.
14.7
21.2
30.0
96.5
245.0
when exposed to an electric spark, static elec-
tricity, excess heat, an open flame, decomposing
acetylides, or detonating agents. Vapor and air
mixtures are more explosive than the vapor
alone and must be handled accordingly. In a
confined space the explosion pressure developed
may be in the range of 16 to 50 (plus) times
the initial pressure depending on the initial
pressure and the volume-to-surface ratio of the
container. As the volume-to-surface ratio of the
container is increased pressures might be devel-
oped in excess of 50 times the initial pressure.
Explosions from internal sources may be pre-
vented by proper dilution with an inert gas such
as nitrogen. Ignition from outside sources
should be guarded against by adequate insula-
tion and water spray systems. (See 6.2.2
Explosion Hazards.)
2.3.4 POLYMERIZATION HAZARDS
Ethylene oxide may rearrange chemically
and/or polymerize violently when in contact
with highly active catalytic surfaces such as
anhydrous iron, tin, and aluminum chlorides;
pure iron and aluminum oxides; and alkali
metal hydroxides. (See 6.2.3 Polymerization
Hazards.)
E-18
-------
Ethylene Oxide
Manufacturing Chcmfat*' Auociatlon. Inc.
Manual
Sheet
SD-38
Ethylene oxide may also react with other
materials and thus create enough heat to accel-
erate polymerization of unreacted oxide (See
5.2.3).
3. USUAL SHIPPING CONTAINERS
3.1 Type and Size
Cylinders, steel; one pound capacity; ICC-
3B300
Cylinders, steel; one-gallon capacity; ICC-
4B400
Lagged steel drums; not over 61 gallon ca-
pacity; ICC-5P (maximum filling capacity
for 61 gallon drum must not exceed 55
gallons of ethylene oxide at 60° F).
Tank Car, insulated; ICC 104A; 104A-W, or
ARA-IVA.
3.2 Label or Identification
3.2.1 The Manufacturing Chemists' Associ-
ation recommends the following label in addi-
tion to, or in combination with, any label warn-
ing required by statutes, regulations, or ordi-
nances :
3.2.2 ICC Regulations require the ICC red
label for flammable liquids.
3.2.3 Tank cars and railroad cars carrying
one or more containers of ethylene oxide must
bear the ICC "DANGEROUS" placard.
3.3 Disposal and Return Precautions
3.3.1 Small containers (ICC-3B300 and ICC-
4B400) should be drained free of liquid ethyl-
ene oxide and the valves closed tightly before
they are returned to the supplier. No air should
be permitted to enter the container.
3.3.2 Insulated Drums and Tank Cars:
When all of the liquid ethylene oxide has been
removed from the insulated drum or car, the
valves should be closed and the valve plugs
replaced. No air should be permitted to enter
the vessel. The inert gas used for the unloading
procedures (See 4. UNLOADING AND EMP-
TYING) should be left in the drum or tank car
at a pressure not in excess of 35 psig at 70° F.
A pressure of 35 psig is felt advisable because
the resulting partial pressure of ethylene oxide
will be low enough to be outside the detonable
range. A residual pressure of 35 psig is defi-
nitely indicated as a safety measure.
3.3.3 Ethylene oxide containers should not
be used for any other product.
3.3.4 As soon as a tank car is completely
unloaded, all valves must be made tight, the
unloading connections must be removed and all
ETHYLENE OXIDE
DANGERI EXTREMELY FLAMMABLE
VAPOR HARMFUL
MAY CAUSE BURNS
Keep away from heat, sparks, and open flame.
Keep container closed.
Avoid breathing vapor.
Avoid contact with skin, eyes, and clothing.
In case of contact, immediately remove all contaminated clothing,
including shoes, and flush skin or eyes with plenty of water
for at least 15 minutes; for eyes, get medical attention. Wash
clothing before re-use. Discard contaminated shoes.
E-19
-------
Manuil
Sheet
8D-J8
Munfectorinf ChcmUti' AMocUUon. Inc.
Ethylent Oilde
other closures made tight, except that heater
coil inlet and outlet pipes (if any) must be left
open for drainage. Heater coils must never be
used in unloading ethylene oxide. Empty tank
cars, drums, and other containers should be
returned as promptly as possible, in accordance
with instructions received from the shipper.
Shipper's routing instructions should always be
followed strictly. (See 4.8.4)
3.3.5 Follow ICC Regulations regarding the
replacement of closures; condition and labeling
of empty containers; condition of empty cars,
and placard requirements before returning to
the shipper. The ICC "DANGEROUS" plac-
ards on sides and ends of tank cars must be
removed, or reversed (if in metal placard hold-
ers) , by the party discharging the tank car. The
empty tank car must be offered to the receiving
carrier either without placards, or preferably
with four (4) "DANGEROUS — EMPTY"
placards. Placards must be removed from empty
railroad cars of other types.
4. UNLOADING AND EMPTYING
4.1 Health Hazards
Ethylene oxide vaporizes rapidly at ordinary
temperatures, and its vapor is moderately toxic
by inhalation and is irritating to the eyes and
mucous membranes. Ethylene oxide as pure
liquid, or in solution, can produce burns of the
skin and eyes. (See 8. HEALTH HAZARDS
AND THEIR CONTROL.)
4.2 Fire Hazard
Ethylene oxide is an extremely flammable
liquid and, as such, introduces a potential fire
hazard where it is stored, handled, or used.
(See 2.3.2 and 6.2.1 Fire Hazards.)
4.2.1 EXPLOSION HAZARDS
Ethylene oxide vapor may explode when
exposed to static electricity, electric -sparks,
excess heat or detonating agents. Dilution of
the vapor phase with an inert gas is a recom-
mended safety precaution. (See 2.3.3 and 6.2.2
Explosion Hazards.)
4.3 Tank Cars
Detailed instructions for unloading tank cars
containing flammable liquids are set forth in
MCA Manual Sheet TC-4. (Also see ICC regu-
lations, Sec. 74.560 to 74.563 inclusive, for
unloading tank cars.) A few instructions which
are specific for tank cars in ethylene oxide serv-
ice are given below.
4.3.1 Shipper's instructions should always
be followed and all caution markings on both
sides of tank and dome should be read and
observed.
4.3.2 In the event of a tank car or fitting
failure or leak, the shipper should be telephoned
or wired immediately for instructions. (See 6.3
Spills and Leakage.)
4.3.3 Tank cars should be electrically
grounded to dissipate static or induced light-
ning charges.
4.3.4 No heat should be applied to the tank
car. An inert gas line should be attached to vent
connection of the tank car to provide a pressure
of 35 psig and not over 65 psig for transfer of
the oxide from tank car to receiving tank.
Cylinder nitrogen is often used as the pressur-
ing medium in the event a suitable inert gas
is not available within the plant. When con-
verted ICC-104 or ARA-IV cars are used under
authority of ICC Regulations, Sec. 73.124(5),
transfer pressure must not exceed 50 psig. If
a pump is utilized, a pressure of 35 psig must
be maintained to keep the vapor phase of the
tank car in a non-explosive range. (See Figure
I for details of unloading arrangement.)
4.3.5 Tank cars in ethylene oxide service
are equipped with excess flow check valves. A
too rapid opening of the discharge valves will
cause the check valves to close. If this should
occur, the outlet valve should be closed until
the pressure is equalized and the excess flow
valve opens.
,4.3.6 No air should be allowed to enter the
car. The inert gas at 35 psig pressure should
be left in the car for the return of the empty
tank car. (See 3.3 Disposal and Return Pre-
cautions.)
4.4 Insulated Drums (See 4.3.4)
Detailed instructions are supplied by the
shipper. (See 4.3.4 Figure I.)
4.4.1 Drums should be unloaded carefully
to prevent damage. Drums containing ethylene
oxide should be set upright during storage and
for unloading.
4.4.2 If any leaking drums are found, they
should be removed to a safe location where the
E-20
-------
1 Ethylene Oxide
Manufacturing Chemliti' Aiioclttlon. Inc
Manual
Sheet
8D-38
leaking can be stopped or the contents trans-
ferred. It should always be remembered that
"*
4.4.3 If it is not practical to locate the insul-
ated drum outdoors during unloading, a vent
stack or hood equipped with an exhauster should
be installed over the drum.
4.4,4 An inert gas is used to empty a drum
of its contents. Heating increases the explosion
hazard (See 2.3.3 and 6.2.2 Explosion Hazards).
In addition, heating may cause polymer forma-
tion.
4.4.5 If ethylene oxide vapor is required by
the user, it will be necessary to provide a
vaporizer. The size and arrangement of such
will be dependent upon the requirements of the
user. The vaporizer, however, should be de-
signed to contain a minimum volume of ethylene
oxide and to have a maximum surface. (See
6.2.2 Explosion Hazards.) If possible, the va-
porizer should be located outside of buildings
to prevent the accumulation of ethylene oxide
vapors in case of any leakage.
4.4.6 When unloading liquid ethylene oxide
from an insulated drum, a total gas pressure
of 35-40 psig at 70° F. should be maintained in
the drum through the vent connection, and the
flow of liquid regulated by the discharge valve.
All piping and equipment should be made of
steel and properly grounded. (See 6. HAND-
LING.)
4.4.7 Check valves should be installed in the
discharge line to prevent reactants from enter-
ing a drum. (See 6. HANDLING.)
4.4.8 If more than 60 psig pressure is
desired by the user in a manufacturing process,
it will be necessary to install a pump because
the safe working pressure of the insulated drum
is only 50 psig.
4.4.9 When the drum has been emptied of
its contents, an inert gas pressure of 35 psig at
70°F. should be left in the drum for return to
the shipper. No air should be allowed to enter
the drum. (See 8.8.2)
4.4.10 If the drum is emptied only partially
of its contents at any one usage, total gas pres-
sure of 35 psig at 70° F. should be left in the
drum for storage. (See 5. STORAGE.)
4.5 Small Cylinders
4.5.1 Precautions generally applied to use
of small cylinders (ICC-3B300 and ICC-4B400)
of flammable liquids should be used.
4.5.2 A water bath heated to a maximum of
50° C. (122° F.) may be used to empty a small
uninsulated container by means of the vapor
pressure of the ethylene oxide.
4.5.3 Check valves must be installed in feed
lines from the cylinder to prevent the reactants
from entering the cylinder.
4.5.4 When the cylinder is empty, the valve
should be closed. Air should not be allowed to
enter the container.
5. STORAGE
5.1 Hazards
5.1.1 HEALTH HAZARDS
Ethylene oxide vaporizes rapidly at ordinary
temperatures, and its vapor is moderately toxic
by inhalation and is irritating to the eyes and
mucous membranes. Ethylene oxide as pure
liquid, or in solution, can produce burns of the
skin and eyes. (See 8. HEALTH HAZARDS
AND THEIR CONTROL.)
5.1.2 FIRE HAZARDS
Ethylene oxide is an extremely flammable
liquid and, as such, introduces a potential haz-
ard where it is stored, handled, or used. (See
2.3.2 and 6.2.1 Fire Hazards.)
5.1.3 EXPLOSION HAZARDS
If not diluted with an inert gas, ethylene
oxide vapor may explode when ignited within
a confined space. (See 2.3.3 and 6.2.2 Explosion
Hazards.)
5.1.4 CORROSION
Ethylene oxide is noncorrosive.
5.1.5 VOLATILITY
Ethylene oxide is very volatile and should
be stored under pressure with adequate cooling.
(See 2.2 Important Physical and Chemical Prop-
erties and 5.2 Conditions of Storage.)
5.1.6 TEMPERATURE REQUIREMENTS
Ethylene oxide in storage tanks should be
maintained at a temperature not exceeding
30° C. (86° F.). Ethylene oxide in insulated
drums or small containers should be stored in
a cool, well-ventilated area. (See 5.2 Conditions
of Storage and 6.2.2 Explosion Hazards.)
5.2 Conditions of Storage
5.2.1 MATERIAL
STRUCTION.
AND TYPE OF CON-
E-21
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Manual
Sheet
SD-38
tUnuftcturinf ChemUu' Auoelition, Inc.
Ethylcne Oilde
All piping (including instrument leads),
storage tanks, relief devices and equipment em-
ployed to handle ethylene oxide should be of
steel or stainless steel and designed to have a
working pressure of at least 50 psig with a
safety factor conforming to the A.S.M.E. Code.
Shut-off valves and control valves should be of
steel or stainless steel designed for working
pressures of 150 psig or over. Copper or other
acetylide-forming metals, such as silver, mag-
nesium and their alloys should not be used as
materials of construction for equipment hand-
ling ethylene oxide. Mercury-filled instruments
should be provided with mercury traps and an
inert gas purge which is free of acetylene and
carbon dioxide. All-welded construction is pre-
ferred to riveted construction. Storage tanks
should be equipped with cooling coils and should
be well insulated. All liquid inlet lines should
enter or lie extended to the bottom of the vessel
to prevent the generation of static electricity.
All equipment should be properly grounded and
an efficient water spray system should be in-
stalled. Adequate diking and drainage should
be provided in the tank area to confine and
dispose of the liquid in case of tank rupture.
5.2.2 ISOLATION
Local building codes should be followed
strictly. Ethylene oxide storage tanks should be
isolated from continuous ignition sources such
as boiler houses. If possible, storage tanks
should be located outside of buildings. Insulated
drums containing ethylene oxide should be
stored always in a vertical position, outside of
buildings, and in an isolated and well-ventilated
area. It is preferable to store the containers
in the open, but provision should be made to
shield them from the direct rays of the sun and
to prevent accumulation of dirt, snow, water,
or ice on valves or safety devices. The use of
an open-sided storage shed is suggested.
5.2.3 COMPATIBILITY WITH OTHER
MATERIALS
Storage tanks in ethylene oxide service
should be used only for ethylene oxide unless
thoroughly cleaned and purged. (See 6.8 Tank
and Equipment Cleaning and Repair.) Ethylene
oxide reacts exothermically with such com-
pounds as alcohols, amines, ammonia, and or-
ganic and mineral acids. Before a tank is placed
in ethylene oxide service, it should be cleaned
thoroughly, flushed with water and dried.
Before ethylene oxide is placed in the tank, the
vessel should be purged with an inert gas until
free of air.
5.2.4 VAPOR-PROOF OR EXPLOSION-
1'KOOF REQUIREMENTS
All electrical equipment, motors, lights,
and flashlights used in an area in which oxide
is stored or handled should conform to the
National Electrical Code and should be vapor-
tight
5.2.5 EXPLOSION VENTING REQUIRE-
MENTS
An adequate system for normal and emer-
gency venting should be installed. All vent lines
should extend to a safe area. The point of outlet
should be equipped with an approved flame
arrester. Relief valves should be installed in
pairs to facilitate periodic testing and repair-
ing. The vent line should be equipped with a
connection for emergency purging with steam,
nitrogen or carbon dioxide for the extinguish-
ment of any fire occurring on the outlet side of
the flash arrestor.
5.2.6 VENTILATION
All storage areas should be provided with
continuous ventilation. Pits, depressions and
basements should be avoided.
5.2.7 PROTECTION FROM ELECTRICAL
STORMS
Storage tanks for ethylene oxide should be
protected from electrical storms and induced
static electricity by grounding of all equipment.
5.2.8 PROTECTION FROM INTERNAL
IGNITION
Storage tanks and other equipment should
be maintained under an inert atmosphere in a
non-flammable range during all transfers, as
well as during stationary conditions, to prevent
possible ignition in the vapor phase within the
vessel. Vessels should be provided with bottom
inlets under the liquid, or tangented nozzles to
prevent static sparks. (See 5.2.1) (See 6.2.2
Explosion Hazards.)
6. HANDLING
6.1 Health Hazards
Ethylene oxide vaporizes rapidly at ordinary
temperatures, and its vapor is moderately toxic
by inhalation and is irritating to the eyes and
mucous membranes. Ethylene oxide as pure
liquid, or in solution, can produce burns of the
skin and eyes. (See 8. HEALTH HAZARDS
AND THEIR CONTROL.)
E-22
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Ethylene Oxide
Minufaeturinr ChemliU' Allocation. Inc.
Manuel
Sheet
8D-38
6.2 Fire, Explosion, and Polymerization Haz-
ards
6.2.1 FIRE HAZARDS
Ethylene oxide should be handled with all
precautions generally observed in handling
flammable liquids. Fires involving large quan-
tities of liquid are difficult to extinguish,
although ethylene oxide is soluble in water. The
fire will continue to burn until the liquid is
diluted with approximately 22 volumes of water
to one of oxide. Most small fires can be extin-
guished with carbon dioxide or dry chemical
agents if properly applied. Adequate fire extin-
guishing equipment, fixed and portable, should
be provided. Diking and drainage should be pro-
vided for confining and disposing of the liquid
in case of tank rupture.
6.2.2 EXPLOSION HAZARDS
Liquid ethylene oxide is quite stable to
explosion initiators but, as a vapor, ethylene
oxide may undergo rapid decomposition if an
explosion is initiated. This action is accompa-
nied by the liberation of a considerable amount
of energy (See 2.2 Important Physical and
Chemical Properties) and, if in a confined space,
will produce an increase in pressure of 16 to 50
(plus) times the initial pressure. The pressure
ratio varies with the ratio of volume to surface
of the containing vessel. Detonating acetylides,
static electricity, excess heat, "hot spots," open
flames, or other detonators may explode ethylene
oxide vapors. If a vessel containing ethylene
oxide is not insulated or protected by a film of
water and becomes enveloped by fire, the vapor
may be heated quickly above the auto-ignition
temperature of 571° C. (1060° F.). (See 2.2
Important Physical and Chemical Properties.)
Ignition within a vessel containing ethylene
oxide may be prevented by proper dilution of
the vapor phase with an inert gas. Any inert
gas selected should be free of such impurities
as air, acetylene, sulfur, hydrogen sulfide, water,
ammonia, or carbon dioxide. (Dilution data,
composition versus temperature and pressure,
are available for common inert gases.) Ignition
from fire exposure should be guarded against by
adequate insulation and automatic water spray
systems. Storage tanks and processing equip-
ment handling ethylene oxide should be free
from air because air reduces the percentage of
oxide vapor required for an explosive mixture.
6.2.3 POLYMERIZATION HAZARDS
Ethylene oxide may rearrange and/or poly-
merize violently, liberating large quantities of
heat. A few of the most notable catalysts for this
type of reaction are: anhydrous iron, tin, and
aluminum chlorides; pure iron and aluminum
oxides; metallic potassium; alkali metal hydrox-
ides ; acids and organic bases. The speed of the
reaction varies with the purity of the reactants,
the temperature, the relative amount of each
reactant, and the method of application.
6.3 Spills and Leakage
6.3.1 Frequent inspections of equipment
and vessels containing ethylene oxide should be
made to detect or prevent leaks.
6.3.2 If leaks or spills occur, only properly
protected personnel should remain in the area
(See 8.3 Personal Protective Equipment).
6.3.3 All spills should be flushed away
promptly with a large quantity of water (See
6.2.1 Fire Hazards). All openings in sewer sys-
tem should be trapped for segregation and ex-
tinguishment. All sources of ignition should be
removed.
6.3.4 If possible, increased ventilation
should be provided. Inhalation of vapors should
be avoided. (See 8. HEALTH HAZARDS AND
THEIR CONTROL.)
6.3.5 All articles of clothing, including
shoes, wet with ethylene oxide or exposed to
oxide vapors should be removed immediately
and the body washed to remove any of the
ethylene oxide which has penetrated the cloth-
ing. Clothing should be washed before re-use.
6.3.6 A leaking container should be removed
to an isolated, well-ventilated area and the con-
tents transferred to other suitable containers.
Unloading rules set forth in Section 4 should
be observed.
6.3.7 In the event of a tank car leakage,
dilute leakage with large quantity of water, and
make necessary repairs, if possible. The supplier
should be telephoned or wired immediately for
specific instructions.
6.4 Employee Education and Training
6.4.1 Workers who handle ethylene oxide, or
may be exposed to it in any form, should be
instructed carefully in accepted methods of
handling and be familiar with the protective
equipment required for safe handling. Instruc-
tion should stress the hazard for any fire or
explosion and contact of the material with the
skin and eyes, and avoiding inhalation of the
vapors.
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Manual
Sheet
8D-38
Manufacturing ChcmtiU* AMoeittlon, Inc.
Ethylene Oxide
6.4.2 All workers should be familiar with
the location of safety showers, alarm boxes,
emergency ventilation system and hose lines.
6.4.3 Each employee should be reinstructed
periodically in the hazards involved and proper
emergency measures to take.
6.5 Personal Protective Equipment
6.5.1 AVAILABILITY AND USE
Personal protective equipment is not an
adequate substitute for good, safe, working
conditions, adequate ventilation and intelligent
conduct on the part of employees working with
ethylene oxide. Such equipment may protect
the individual wearing it while others in the
area may be exposed to danger. The correct
usage of personal protective equipment requires
the education of the worker in the proper em-
ployment of the equipment available to him.
(See 6.4 Employee Education and Training.)
Under conditions which are sufficiently hazar-
dous to require protective equipment, the use
of it should be supervised.
The following personal protective equip-
ment should always be used for the purposes
mentioned, and as specified in 8. HEALTH
HAZARDS AND THEIR CONTROL and in
other sections of this publication.
6.5.2 EYE PROTECTION
6.5.2.1 Chemical Safety Goggles: Cup-
type or rubber-framed, vapor proof goggles,
equipped with approved impact resistant glass
or plastic lenses, should be worn whenever there
is danger of the material (in liquid or vapor
form) coming in contact with the eyes. Goggles
should be carefully fitted by adjusting the nose
piece and head band to insure maximum pro-
tection and comfort.
6.5.3 RESPIRATORY PROTECTION
Respiratory protective equipment must be
carefully maintained, inspected, cleaned and
sterilized at regular intervals, and always be-
fore use by another person. Personnel wearing
.such equipment must be carefully instructed as
to its operation and limitations.
6.3.5.1 Air-supplied masks, equipped with
full face pieces, must be worn for protection
under the following conditions:
(a) In emergencies, when the vapor concen-
centration is not definitely known.
(b) When the harmful vapor concentration
is over 2 per cent by volume.
(c) When the oxygen content of the air may
be less than 16 per cent by volume.
(d) When the exposure period is to be over
30 minutes' duration.
(e) In tank and equipment cleaning and re-
pair work, when (a), (b), (c) and (d)
apply.
6.5.3.2 Only masks approved by the
Bureau of Mines should be used, and the manu-
facturers' instructions must be carefully fol-
lowed. Types generally available include:
(a) Air-line .masks supplied by plant com-
pressed air are suitable for use only
where conditions will permit safe escape
in case of failure of the compressed air
supply. Such masks should be used only
in conjunction with a suitable reducing
or demand-type valve and filter, and with
excess pressure relief valve. The com-
pressed air should be checked frequently
to make certain that harmful gases such
as from the decomposition of the lubri-
cating oil used in the compressor or im-
pure air supply are not present.
(b) Positive-pressure hose masks supplied
by externally lubricated blowers are
usually preferred to the air-line type.
Since these masks also depend on a re-
mote air supply, they should be used only
where conditions will permit safe escape
in the event of air supply failure. Care
must be taken to locate the source of the
blower air in an area which is free of
air contaminants.
(c) Self-contained breathing apparatus
which permits the wearer to carry a sup-
ply of air in the cylinder allows for
greater mobility. The length of time a
self-contained breathing apparatus pro-
vides protection varies according to the
amount of air supply carried. In tank
work, where small manholes are encoun-
tered, a self-contained breathing appara-
tus is usually unsuitable because of its
bulk.
6.5.3.3 Industrial canister-type gas masks,
approved by the Bureau of Mines, fitted with
the proper canister for absorbing ethylene oxide
vapor, (or gas), and equipped with full face
pieces, will afford protection against concen-
trations not exceeding 2 per cent by volume
when used in accordance with the manufac-
turer's instructions. The oxygen content of the
air must be not less than 16 per cent by volume.
The masks should be used for relatively short
E-24
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Ethylene Oxide
Manufacturing ChembU* Allocation, Inc.
Manual
Sheet
SD-38
exposure periods only, i.e., less than 30 minutes.
They may not be suitable for use in an emer-
gency since, at that time, the actual vapor con-
centration is unknown and it may be very high.
The wearer must be warned to leave the con-
taminated area immediately on detecting the
odor of a harmful vapor. This is an indication
that the mask is not functioning properly or
that the vapor concentration is too high.
. NOTE: When carbon monoxide may be en-
countered in addition to ethylene oxide, the
mask should be equipped with an all-purpose
canister and a timing device as approved by the
U.S. Bureau of Mines.
6.5.4 HEAD PROTECTION
6.5.4.1 Safety or "hard" hats will provide
protection against accidental liquid leaks, fall-
ing tools and other objects.
6.5.4.2 Brimmed felt hats may be substi-
tuted for a safety hat where the danger of fall-
ing objects is remote.
6.5.5 FOOT PROTECTION
Leather or rubber safety shoes with built-
in steel toe caps are recommended. Rubbers may
be worn over leather safety shoes.
NOTE: Ethylene oxide may penetrate leather
and rubber, but up-to-date rubber is probably
the best available protective material.
6.5.6 BODY, SKIN AND HAND PROTEC-
TION
6.5.6.1 Suits made of a suitable protective
material, and properly designed should be used
to provide complete body protection, when nec-
essary.
6.5.6.2 Aprons made of suitable protec-
tive material should be used for protection
against accidental contact.
6.5.6.3 Gloves made of suitable protective
material should be worn to protect the hands
from ethylene oxide.
6.5.6.4 Sleeves made of suitable protec-
tive material should be worn when the need
for complete arm protection is indicated.
6.5.6.5 Life harness and life line should
be worn by men working in tanks or other con-
fined spaces to facilitate rescue.
6.5.6.6 Whenever necessary, facilities for
personal cleanliness should be provided and
time allowed for thorough washing before lunch
and at the end of the work day.
6.6 Engineering Controls
6.6.1 Because ethylene oxide is an extremely
flammable liquid and the vapor is explosive and
toxic under certain conditions, processes should
not be located near open flames, high tempera-
tures or congested areas. (See 5.2 Conditions
of Storage.)
6.6.2 Processes should be designed so that
the operator is not exposed to direct contact
with ethylene oxide or its vapor. The technical
problems of designing equipment, providing
adequate ventilation, and formulating opera-
tional procedures which promise maximum se-
curity and economy, can be handled best by
engineers or other competent personnel. The
manufacturers of ethylene oxide, and of the
equipment in which it is to be used, are always
prepared to help with these problems.
6.6.3 For each installation, a written set of
operating instructions should be prepared and
posted adjacent to the operation. The procedure
should be checked frequently by the supervisor
in order to maintain proper controls.
6.6.4 In the handling of ethylene oxide or
operation of any type of ethylene oxide system,
all valves, pipe lines, vents, safety devices, etc.,
should be so located that they can be readily
inspected and cleaned periodically to prevent
plugging and should always be in proper order
and condition before the operation is started.
All handling and storage equipment should be
located away from all possible source of sparks,
flames and heated surfaces. All charging and
discharging pipes should enter through, or
extend to, the bottom of all containers to mini-
mize vaporization of the liquid and possible gen-
eration of static electricity. (See also 5.2.7 and
5.2.8.)
6.6.5 It is essential for safety that equip-
ment be used and maintained as recommended
by the manufacturer and that a periodic test
schedule of the equipment, including safety
devices, should be followed.
6.6.6 The manufacturer's recommendation
as regards the unloading and loading of ship-
ping containers should be followed with caution
to avoid static from streams in tanks.
6.6.7 Due to the tendency of ethylene oxide
to leak through even the smallest opening.
welded rather than threaded connections are
recommended on all equipment containing this
chemical.
E-25
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Manual
Sheet
SD-38
Mtnufaclurlnc Chcmisu' Auoeiitlon. Inc.
Ethylene Oxide
6.7 Ventilation
6.7.1 If the workroom or operating area is
separate from ethylene oxide storage or process-
ing equipment, general ventilation is adequate.
For emergencies, however, the area should be
provided with mechanical exhaust ventilation.
6.7.2 In the processing or storage area, if
outside location is impracticable, special emer-
gency equipment for ventilation is necessary
under abnormal conditions, such as leaks or
spills.
6.7.3 Twelve changes of air per hour are
considered adequate for buildings housing stor-
age or processing equipment for flammable
liquids, vapors, or gases under pressure.
6.7.4 Buildings of substantial construction
should have at least 1 sq. ft. of door, window,
or non-rigid roof area for each 35 cu. ft. of
volume to prevent serious structural damage
in the event of explosion within the building.
6.7.5. A remote manual control should be
provided for forced ventilation systems, to be
used in the event of an emergency.
6.8 Tank and Equipment Cleaning and Repairs
6.8.1 Cleaning or making repairs inside of
equipment in which ethylene oxide is contained
is particularly hazardous because of its toxicity
and flammability. (See 8. HEALTH HAZARDS
AND THEIR CONTROL.)
6.8.2 Safety respiratory apparatus, protec-
tive clothing, spark-proof tools, and explosion-
proof lights should be provided for repair or
cleaning crews.
6.8.3 Written approval of supervisor should
be procured by the repair or cleaning crews.
6.8.4 The liquid ethylene oxide should be
pumped out or transferred. Any pressure on the
equipment should be vented to a safe area or
through a scrubber. The equipment should be
filled with water, drained, and thoroughly
washed before it is entered for any inspection
or repairs.
6.8.5 All connections to vessels should be
blanked off and the air in the tank tested with
a combustible gas indicator approved for ethyl-
ene oxide. Gas tests should be repeated from
time to time if continued work within the equip-
ment is necessary.
6.8.6 A "watcher" supplied with the speci-
fied safety equipment should be stationed out-
side the equipment entrance to keep the men
inside under constant observation. Additional
men should be available for rescue work. (See
8.3.2)
6.8.7 Special ventilation is recommended
during the entire time men are cleaning, repair-
ing, or inspecting the equipment.
6.8.8 Before the equipment is returned to
ethylene oxide service, an inert gas should be
used to purge out all of the air. If the gas used
for purging forms a flammable gas-air mixture,
the equipment should be filled with water and
then blown with the gas, vented to a safe loca-
tion, until dry.
6.9 Repackaging
This entire manual should be carefully re-
viewed by the repacker so that he may become
familiar with the hazardous properties of ethyl-
ene oxide and the safeguards which should be
taken to handle it safely. Only ICC specifica-
tion containers should be used (See 3.1 Type
and Size). The containers should be cleaned
thoroughly and dried, and they should be labeled
properly (See 3.2 Label or Identification).
6.10 Use in Chemical Reactions
6.10.1 Because of the explosive characteris-
tics of ethylene oxide vapor and the generally
exothermic nature of the reaction of the liquid
with various materials, precautions are required
when feeding it into a reaction mixture.
6.10.2 The vapor phase of reactions under
pressure should be diluted or blanketed with an
inert gas. (See 6.2.2 Explosion Hazards.)
6.10.3 Proper agitation to assure constant
and complete mixing should be provided.
6.10.4 Because the control of temperature
and pressure is important, proper instrumenta-
tion and some means of cooling the reaction
should be provided.
6.10.5 Normal and emergency venting of
adequate capacity should be provided.
6.10.6 Check valves should be installed in
feed lines in an effort to prevent the reactants
from entering a cylinder, vaporizer, or any
vessel containing pure ethylene oxide.
6.10.7 All piping and equipment should be
made of steel. Dp not use copper, silver, mag-
nesium, and their alloys as materials of con-
struction for equipment handling ethylene
oxide.
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Ethylene Oxide
Manufacturing Chemiiti* Atiociatton. Inc.
Manual
Sheet
SD-38
7. WASTE DISPOSAL
7.1 Waste mixtures containing ethylene oxide
should not be allowed to enter drains or sewers
where there is danger of the vapors becoming
ignited. All openings in sewer systems should be
trapped for segregation and extinguishment.
(See 6.2 Fire, Explosion, and Polymerization
Hazards and 6.3 Spills and Leakage.)
7.2 When it becomes necessary to dispose of
ethylene oxide as such, it is preferable to do so
as a vapor, venting to a safe location. (See 5.2.5
Explosion Venting Requirements.)
7.3 All polymeric wastes are water soluble
and, as such, present no major problem. Dis-
posal of these materials, however, depends to
a great extent upon local conditions. All Fed-
eral, State, and local regulations regarding
health and pollution should be followed.
8. HEALTH HAZARDS AND THEIR
CONTROL
This section includes a description of the
principal health hazards of ethylene oxide, rec-
ognized first aid procedures and information of
interest to laymen and physicians.
8.1 Hazards
8.1.1 GENERAL
The usual contact that occurs in handling
ethylene oxide is by inhalation of its vapor.
Exposure to low concentrations of vapor often
results in delayed nausea and vomiting. Expo-
sure even to low concentration, if continuous,
will result in a numbing of the sense of smell;
thus harmful concentration may be reached,
without warning because of odor. High con-
centrations of ethylene oxide can produce edema
of the lung and irritation of the eyes and mu-
cous membranes.
Liquid ethylene oxide can produce eye
burns but when spilled on exposed skin, is gen-
erally not immediately irritating, but continued
contact may cause burns. When it is spilled on
clothing or in the shoes, it is capable of produc-
ing a delayed burn of the skin if the wet cloth-
ing and shoes are not removed promptly. Rapid
evaporation of ethylene oxide on the skin is
capable of producing an effect like frostbite.
8.1.2 ACUTE TOXICITY
8.1.2.1 Systemic Effects
When excessive amounts of ethylene
oxide are inhaled, they have a general anes-
thetic effect as well as causing coughing, due
to irritation of the respiratory system. The
victim may become nauseated and vomit.
8.1.2.2 Local Effects
The vapor will cause eye and nasal irri-
tation when present in excessive amounts. The
liquid or solutions on the exposed skin do not
cause skin irritation immediately, but when
spilled in the shoes or on the clothing, delayed
skin burns can occur if the clothing and shoes
are not promptly removed. The liquid or solu-
tions may cause severe eye burns. Vapor has
been known to produce skin irritation and burns
from its absorption by perspiration in areas of
heat and moisture about the body. (See 8.4.2.2
Skin Contact and 8.4.2.3 Contact With Eyes.)
8.1.3 CHRONIC TOXICITY
No cases of chronic poisoning due to ethyl-
ene oxide have been reported.
8.2 Prevention and Control
Ethylene oxide does not present a serious
industrial health hazard provided workers are
effectively instructed and adequately supervised
in the proper handling of the chemical.
8.2.1 EMPLOYEE EDUCATION
(See 6.4 Employee Education and Train-
ing.)
8.2.2 VENTILATION
A maximum allowable concentration of 100
parts per million of ethylene oxide by volume
in air has been proposed for an eight-hour work-
ing day exposure. Ventilation should be ade-
quate to keep atmospheric concentration below
100 parts per million in places where ethylene
oxide is being handled and employees are ex-
posed.
8.2.3 PRE-EMPLOYMENT PHYSICAL
EXAMINATION
Those who are to work with ethylene oxide
should be given a thorough physical examina-
tion. In general, asthmatic individuals and those
suffering from acute or chronic chest infections
should not be exposed to ethylene oxide.
8.2.4 PERIODIC PHYSICAL EXAMINA-
TIONS
Workers exposed to ethylene oxide need no
special type of specific examination except that
attention should be directed to the lungs.
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Manual
Sheet
SD-38
Manufacturing Ch«nlit*' Auoelatlon, Inc.
Ethylene Glide
8.3 Personal Protective Equipment
8.3.1 Personal protective equipment is not
an adequate substitute for safe working condi-
tions and intelligent conduct on the part of
employees who work with ethylene oxide. The
employees should be carefully trained and care-
fully supervised in the correct use of personal
protective equipment.
8.3.2 Severe exposures to ethylene oxide
may occur in tank and equipment cleaning and
repairs, in extensive spillage of the material,
or in cases of failure of piping and equipment.
Employees who may be subject to such expo-
sures should be provided with proper eye, res-
piratory, skin, and mucous membrane protec-
tion as follows:
(a) Suitable gas-tight chemical safety gog-
gles.
(b) Rescue harness and lifeline for those
entering the tank or enclosed storage
space. (An assistant provided with indi-
cated protective equipment should be
present when such equipment is used.)
(c) Hose mask with hose inlet in vapor-free
atmosphere. Air-line masks with proper
reducing valve and filter, suitable for use
only where conditions will permit safe
escape in case of failure of compressed
air supply.
(d) Where the period of exposure is not
longer than 30 minutes, and when the
oxygen content of the atmosphere is
above 16 per cent by volume, and con-
centration of ethylene oxide does not
exceed 2 per cent by volume in the air,
workers may wear full-faced industrial
gas masks approved by the United States
Bureau of Mines, with canisters ap-
proved for use in the presence of ethyl-
ene oxide. Note: 2% is dangerously near
the lower explosive limit of 3% for
ethylene oxide.
(e) Rubber gloves and apron.
(f) Rubber shoes or boots.
8.3.4 Reliable safety equipment manufac-
turers can supply appropriate protective equip-
ment if they are informed accurately of the
particular product in use. (See 6.5 Personal
Protective Equipment.)
8.4 First Aid
8.4.1 First aid should be started at once
in cases of contact with excessive amounts of
ethylene oxide. Workers presenting symptoms
or signs of ethylene oxide poisoning should be
removed at once from the contaminated area.
A physician should be called at once, notifying
him of nature of case and location of the patient.
8.4.2 SPECIFIC ACTIONS
8.4.2.1 Inhalation
In case breathing has stopped, effective
artificial respiration such as that obtained by
the prone pressure or by the Eve rocking
method* should be started immediately. If oxy-
gen inhalation apparatus is available, oxygen
should be administered, but only if one familiar
with the operation of such apparatus is present
to administer it. A physician should be called
at once. In order to prevent the development of
severe lung congestion (pulmonary edema), 100
per cent oxygen should be administered as soon
as possible after a severe exposure. Oxygen ad-
ministration is most effective if expiration is
made against a positive pressure of 4 cm. (about
H4 inches) of water. This may be accomplished
readily by use of a rubber tube connected to the
outlet valve of a snugly fitting face mask and
inserted to a depth of not more than 4 cm. below
the surface of water in a suitable container.
(Special masks are obtainable with adjustable
gauges which regulate the positive pressure
from 1 to 4 cm.) The pressure resisting exhala-
tion should be adjusted to the patient's toler-
ance by varying the depth of the end of the tube
below the water's surface. Oxygen inhalation
must be continued as long as necessary to main-
tain the normal color of the skin and mucous
membranes. In cases of severe exposure, the
patient should breathe 100% oxygen under posi-
tive exhalation pressure for one-half hour peri-
ods every hour for at least three hours. If there
are no signs of lung congestion at the end of
this period, and if breathing is easy and the
color is good, oxygen inhalation may be discon-
tinued. Throughout this time, the patient should
be kept comfortably warm, but not hot.
Milder exposures to ethylene oxide vapors
at times produce nausea and vomiting. In cases
presenting such symptoms, they should be
placed in bed and given warm water in sufficient
amounts to aid in washing out their stomachs.
A physician should be called.
•See F. C. Eve, Journal of American Medical Association (April !, 1944).
E-28
-------
Ethylene Oiide
MinuUcturini ChrniUU' Anoel«tton, Inc.
Manual
Sheet
BD-38
8.4.2.2 Skin Contact
All clothing contaminated with liquid
ethylene oxide should be removed at once.
Clothing, including shoes, should not be worn
again until free from ethylene oxide. Shoes can
seldom be decontaminated. All affected areas
of skin should be thoroughly washed with soap
and water.
It has been noted that if shoes are worn
which have been soaked in ethylene oxide, de-
layed skin burns can occur. Even weak solu-
tions which contaminate clothing can produce
the same effect, particularly in such areas as
the genital region. These burns form blebs or
water blisters out of proportion to the amount
of skin damage and are usually healed in a week
or 10 days if properly treated. (See 8.6)
8.4.2.3 Contact With Eyes
Ethylene oxide, as liquid or vapor, is
capable of producing eye damage. Should it
reach the eyes, the eyes should be irrigated im-
mediately and copiously with water for fifteen
minutes. The eyelids should be held apart during
the irrigation to insure contact of the water
with all the tissues of the surface of the eyes
and lids. Should eye irritation persist, the eyes
should be irrigated for a second period of 15
minutes and a physician, preferably an eye
specialist, should be called in attendance.
8.4.2.4 Taken Internally
Due to the nature of ethylene oxide, it
is very unlikely that any of it could be taken
internally, but if a person has swallowed liquid
ethyiene oxide or its solutions, he should be
made to vomit, if conscious, by having him drink
a glassful or more of lukewarm water in which
a teaspoonful of salt to the glassful has been
dissolved; or a similar amount of warm soapy
water may be used. If necessary, the patient
should be encouraged to stick his finger down
his throat to induce vomiting. When possible,
vomiting should be induced at least three times.
Following this, a tablespoonful of Epsom salt
dissolved in a glass of water should be given.
A physician should be called at once.
8.5 Suggestions for Medical Treatment
Through unpublished reports, it has been
found that for persistent nausea and vomiting
which may result from inhalation of ethylene
oxide, an intramuscular injection of sodium
phenobarbital gr. ii is very helpful in controlling
such symptoms.
For skin burns resulting in the formation of
blebs, if the blebs are evacuated and solid petro-
latum dressings are applied, the healing is
usually quite prompt. The bleb formation is out
of proportion to the actual damage to tissue as
the burns are, as a general rule, quite super-
ficial.
The medical information in this publication has been supplied by the Medical Advisory
Committee of the Manufacturing Chemists' Association, Inc.
E-29
-------
Minutl
Sheet
SD-S8
Manufacturing ChtmitU' Auoelition. Inc.
Ethylene Oxide
FIGURE I.
UNLOADING LIQUID ETHYLENE OXIDE
2 LIQUID LINE
VENT TO SCRUBBER
M
B
L-
N!
MK\
R )
I] °
11 -
1
— pw-
^
r 1
Ki
t 4
x«x
_ r
^2" VAPOR UNI
^2" CONNECTION I
ON TANK CAR V
UNLOADING WIT
OPEN LIQUID
CLOSE LIQUI
OPEN VAPOR
Q
Y
k TR A MQPF D
PUMP
— \ OH OTHER
SAFE
LOCATION
$•« G H--*5'
STORAGE TANK
H TRANSFER PUMP
VALVES A-D-E-0
D VALVE C
VALVES B- F
PRESSURE GAU6E
•2" LIQUID LINE
SAFETY VALVE SET TO
RELIEVE AT 70 LBS.
PRESSURE
»
X—TO INERT GAS SUPPLY ! /
REGULATOR SET AT 69 I
MAXIMUM PRESSURE
VENT TO SCRUBBER
OR OTHER SAFE
LOCATION
H—»;:
STORAGE TANK
UNLOADING WITH INERT GAS
OPEN LIQUID VALVES A a G
OPEN VALVE B AND APPLY INERT
GAS PRESSURE
OPEN VALVE H AS PRESSURE
BUILDS UP
MOTf. THC PMtlURIS SHOWN APPLY TO IOC-I04A, I04A-* • AMA-IVA TAHR OARS.
E-30
-------
E.3.2 National Safety Council (NSC) Industrial Safety Data Sheets
Safety data sheets published by the National Safety Council,
425 Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60611, are available at a cost of
$0.45 per sheet (discounts for quantities of 10, 100, and 1000; NSC
members receive an additional 20% discount and government agencies an
additional 102>). The chemicals for which safety data sheets are available
are the following. Order copies by name and file number, as shown.
Exhibit E-7 is an NSC safety data sheet for Anhydrous Ammonia.
E-31
-------
CHEMICALS
Acetic Add 410
Acetone 398
Acetylene 494
Add Plant, The 210
Acrolein 436A
Ad1p1c Acid 438
Ammonia (Anhydrous) 251
Ammonium Nitrate Fuel as Blasting Agents 536
Ammonium Nitrate/Fuel 011 Mixtures
1n Underground Mines 604
Amyl Acetate 208
Anhydrous Aluminum Chloride 435
Aniline 409A
Antimony and Its Compounds 408
Arsenic and Its Inorganic Compounds 499
Asphalt 215
Benzene (Benzol) 308A
Beryllium 562
Beta Ray Sealed Sources 461
Bleaching Compounds, Textile 343
Boron Hydrides 508A
Bromine 313
Cadmium ..... ... 312
Carbon Bisulfide (Carbon D1sulf1de) 341
Carbon Dioxide (Dry Ice) 397
Carbon Monoxide 415A
Carbon Tetrachloride 331
Caustic Liquor Room, The 214
Caustic Soda 373
Chemical Safety References 486A
Chlorates 371
Chlorine 207
Chlorine Dioxide 525
Cleaning Compounds Used in Meat Packing 593
E-32
-------
Dlchloromethane (Methylene Chloride) 474
Epoxy Resin Systems 533A
Ethyl Alcohol, Industrial ..391
Ethyl Ether (D1ethyl Oxide) 396
Ethylene D1chlor1de 350
Fluorides, Inorganic 442
Formaldehyde 342
Hydrofluoric Add 459
Hydrogen Sulflde 284
Iodine 457A
Isocyanates (TDI and MDI) 489A
Lead 443
L1me 241
Lithium 566
Manganese 306
Magnesium 426
Mercury 203
Mercury, Fulminate of 309
Metal Hydrides 462
Methanol 407A
Methylene Chloride (Dlchloromethane) 474
Naphthalene (Crude and Refined) 370
Nitrate-Nitrite Salt Baths for Heat Treating 270
Oxalic Acid 406
Oxides of Nitrogen, The 206
Oxygen, Gaseous 472
Perchloric Add . 311
Phenol (Carbolic Acid) 405A
Phosphorus (White) . . . : 282
Picric Acid 351A
Pyridine 310A
Selenium and Its Compounds 578
Sodium 231
Sulfur, Handling and Storage of Solid 612
Sulfur, Handling Liquid 592
E-33
-------
Tetryl 218
1,1, 1-THchloroethane 456A
Trichloroethylene 389
Trinitrotoluene (TNT) 314
Turpentine 367
Xylene and Toluene 204
Z1nc and Z1nc Oxide 267
Zirconium Powder 382
E-34
-------
Data Sheet 251
Revision A
(Extensive)
ANHYDROUS AMMONIA
This data sheet was revised by the Petroleum Section,
National Safety Council, 425 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago,
III. 60611, and is published by the Council.
LAZARDS WHICH surround
the handling and use of anhy-
drous ammonia* create a hazard
sometimes taken too lightly. Sub-
sequent paragraphs of this data
sheet will spell out the various haz-
ards involved when working with or
using anhydrous ammonia, and dis-
close the measures to follow to avoid
personal impairment.
Physical properties
2. Under normal conditions of
temperature and pressure anhydrous
*The term anhydrous ammonia refers to
the compound formed by the combina-
tion of two gaseous elements, nitrogen
and hydrogen, in the proportion of one
part nitrogen to three parts hydrogen
by volume. It is not to be confused with
aqua ammonia which is a solution of
ammonia gas in water.
ammonia is a stable compound and
a colorless gas having a strong
unmistakable odor. The physical
properties of anyhydrous ammonia
are listed in Table I.
3. The relation between temper-
ature and vapor pressure, density,
specific gravity, and latent heat of
vaporization of liquid anhydrous
ammonia is given in Table II. Under
ordinary conditions ammonia is a
very stable compound. At tempera-
tures of 840 to 930 F (450 to 500
C), it'begins to decompose to form
nitrogen and hydrogen.
Containers
4. Tank cars: Some ammonia is
moved in tank cars (ICC 106A500)
which are multi-unit cars consisting
of a number of cylinder-type con-
tainers which are removed from the
car for filling and emptying.
5. The largest movement by tank
car is in single unit tank cars. These
.cars are practically identical to those
used in LP-gas service, except they
have no brass or bronze fittings.
However, there are many of these
cars in "dual" service, that is, they
may be used either for anhydrous
ammonia or LP-gas. The dual serv-
ice cars have fittings suitable for an-
hydrous ammonia and must be thor-
oughly purged after having been used
for anhydrous ammonia before be-
ing placed in LP-gas service, to pre-
vent any ammonia from passing into
LP-gas systems which have brass or
bronze valves or fittings.
6. These welded tank cars have
no dome in the usual sense of the
word, and have no bottom outlet.
All valves and fittings for loading
COPYRIGHT© I97O NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Exhibit E-7
NSC Safety Data Sheet on Anhydrous Ammonia
E-35
-------
TABLE I
PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF ANHYDROUS AMMONIA
Molecular symbol NH3
Molecular weight 17.032
Boiling point at one atmosphere
(one atmosphere — 14.7 psi) —28 F (—33.4 C)
Melting point at one atmosphere —107.9 F (—77.4 C)
Critical temperature 271.4 F (133.0C)
Critical pressure 1657 psia
Latent heat at —28 F and one atmosphere ... 589.3 Btu per Ib
Relative density of vapor compared to dry air
at 32 F (0 C) and one atmosphere 0.5970
Vapor density at —28 F (—33.4 C) and
one atmosphere 0.05555 Ib percu ft
Specific gravity of liquid at —28 F (—33.4 C)
compared to water at 39.2 F (4 C) 0.6819
Liquid density at —28 F and one atmosphere . 42.57 Ib per cu ft
Specific volume of vapor at 32 F
and one atmosphere 20.78 cu ft per Ib
Flammable limits by volume in air
at atmosphere pressure 16 to 25 per cent
Ignition temperatures
(in a standard quartz bomb) 1562 F (850.0 C)
and unloading are attached to a
manhole COUT plate located on the
top of the tank.
7. A steel dome-like housing pro-
tects the valves and fittings from
physical damage. A designated
vapor space is one-foot above the
liquid level for expansion in case
the liquid temperature rises after
loading. The fittings on each tank
generally include:
a. Two liquid eduction lines extending to
the bottom of the car;
b. one line to the vapor space; and
c. a relief valve.
Most cars (all of those in dual
service) also have:
a. One sampling line;
b. a gauging device for determining the
liquid level in the tank; and
c. a thermometer well.
8. On most of the cars (those in
dual service), all inlet and outlet
connections are equipped with ex-
cess flow valves (or a remotely
operated, quick-closing valve) ex-
cept the relief valve is never equip-
ped with an excess flow valve, as it
prevents proper functioning of this
safety device. The relief valve is
spring-loaded and reseats itself after
the excess pressure has dissipated.
9. Tank trucks: More and more
anhydrous ammonia is being trans-
ported in tank trucks. The tanks
are built in accordance with ASME
Code requirements. All loading and
unloading connections arc provided
with cither an excess flow valve or
an automatic quick-closing internal
valve. The tanks are protected from
excessive pressncs by spring-loaded
safety relief valves and all valves
and fittings are protected from
physical damage by a suitable steel
guard.
10. Cylinders: Cylinders should
be maintained, filled, packaged,
marked, labeled, and shipped to
comply with current ICC regulations
(Title 49 and ANSI 48, "Standard
Method for Marking Portable Com-
pressed Gas Containers") to identify
the material contained.
11. Cylinders should be stored in
an area free from combustible ma-
terial and in a manner so as to pre-
vent external com.sion, and to pro-
tect them from moving vehicles or
external damage. Any cylinder
which is designed to have a valve
protection cap should have the cap
securely in place when the cylinder
is not in service. A rack or chain
should be used to hold cylinders in
place. There are two types of cylin-
ders: bottle type, and tube type.
Cylinders filled in accordance with
ICC regulations will become liquid
full at 145 F (62.8 C). Cylinders
should be protected from radiant
heat, steam piping, and open flame.
Unloading procedure*
12. Unloading lank trucks: The
steps to follow when unloading an-
hydrous ammonia tank trucks will
vary depending on the plant and
the size of the truck. The proced-
TABLE II PROPERTIES OF LIQUID A
VARIOUS TEMPERATURES
Hold Omltr
Tmiiritirt
IM
—28
—20
—10
0
10
20
30
40
SO
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
9t9 IIDTi
C*l. 1
0.0
3.6
9.0
15.7
23.8
33.5
45.0
58.6
74.5
92.9
114.1
138.3
165.9
197.2
232.3
271.7
315.6
364.4
(Hi. pir
n. 11.)
til. 1
42.57
42.22
41.78
41.34
40.89
40.43
39.96
39.49
39.00
38.50
38.00
37.48
36.95
36.40
35.84
35.26
34.66
34.04
(III. Ptf
UJ. pi.)
C.I. 1
5.69
5.64
5.59
5.53
5.47
5.41
5.34
5.28
5.21
5.14
5.08
5.01
4.94
4.87
4.79
4.71
4.63
4.55
(III. per
6.83
6.77
6.70
6.63
6.56
6.49
6.41
6.33
6.26
6.18
6.10
6.01
5.93
5.84
5.75
5.66
5.56
5.46
LMMONI>
Ittclllc Cr»lt]
•f muitf
(Compint
te wiitr
H4CJ
Cil. 8
0.682
.675
.669
/i63
.656
.648
.641
.633
.625
.617
.609
.600
.592
.583
.573
.565
.555
.545
ii AT
.
lltlSt
Milt
(Its pir lit.)
589.3
583.6
576.4
568.9
561.1
553.1
544.8
536.2
527.3
518.1
508.6
498.7
488.5
477.8
466.7
455.0
443
430
From Comprrfiftrd GHP A.-.-'H'Intlon. Inc., Pamphlet G-2.
•(Data for Column* 1. 2 nnd 6 taken from Bureau of Standard* Circular
No. H2. Vulut'M for <'oluninn J. 4 and & calculated fmm Column 2.)
E-36
-------
CLOSED
I2SO LB. BURSTING
STRENGTH
AMMONIA HOSE
I ] VAPOR
FLOW CHART
FOR UNLOADING
LIQUID AMMONIA
-DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE
1290 LB. BURSTING
STRENGTH
, AMMONIA HOSE
CHECK
VALVE
rALVE CLOSE!
VM & .
CLOSED
VAPOR
VAIYE LIQUID
VALVE
TANK CAR
LIQUID
I 1 VAPOR
FLOW CHART
FOR RECOVERING
GASEOUS AMMONIA
-DIRECT SUCTION
Figure 1. Typical unloading selup uting differential preuure. Upper drawing ihowi orfangemenl of open and doted valvei for differential
preisure unloading; lower drawing—valve arrangement for unloading reiidual vapor by direct suction, lypan valve between the liquid and
vapor linei to Ihe lank car it normally kept cloied. It li opened only when pretiure on either tide of the tank car check valve ii to be eqwaliied.
E-37
-------
•
Figure 2. Typical refrigerated storage containers for anhydrous ammon
ures listed here apply to all facilities
and are recommended safe practices.
ICC regulations state the minimum
design pressure for tank motor vehi-
cles, and also that the following
steps be taken:
a. Attended during loading and unload-
ing operations.
b. That the shell or head thickness be
not less than 3/16 of an inch.
c. Only qualified and thoroughly trained
personnel should operate the truck
and perform the unloading operations.
d. When the truck has been properly
spotted the engine ignition should be
shut off before connections have been
made for unloading. The truck should
not be started again until unloading
operations are complete, unless it be-
comes necessary to operate the un-
loading pump or compressor by power
from the truck.
e. The truck parking brakes must he se-
curely set. At least two chock blocks
should be provided. These blocks
should be placed to prevent the veh-
icle froni moving wherever and when-
ever it is parked during loading 01
unloading operations.
f. Personnel should be provided with
necessary protective equipment.
g. The storage tank should be gauged
prior lo unloading.
13. The detailed sequence of con-
necting the hoses to the plant piping,
opening and closing valves, etc., will
vary depending on the physical ar-
rangements of the particular plant,
its facilities, and whether the trans-
fer is done with a vapor compressor
or liquid pump.
14. The attendant should super-
vise the actual unloading and in the
event any difficulty arises, such as a
leak, the operation should be halted
until the difficulty is corrected or
eliminated.
15. If the unloading is done by
a vapor compressor, the valving
arrangement should be switched at
the end of the liquid-transfer opera-
tion so the vapor can be recovered
from the tank truck to allow the
pressure to be reduced to the proper
level.
16. When the operation is com-
pleted, the unloading valves should
be closed and the pump or compres-
sor stopped.
17. The hose connections should
then be vented before the hose is
disconnected. The operator should
stand on the upwind side during the
venting operation and disconnect
the hose and store it to avoid dam-
age. Then he should remove the
chock blocks (Refer to Paragraph
I2c).
18. Each tank motor vehicle
should be provided with properly at-
tached bumpers or chassis extension
arranged to protect the tank, piping,
valves, and fittings from damage in
the event of a collision. Hoses
should have a minimum bursting
pressure of 1750 psig.
19. Containers. Equipment even-
tually used for the direct application
of anhydrous ammonia consists of
(a) a container with a shell or head
thickness of 3/16 of an inch that is
designed for a working pressure of
250 psig; and (b) flow-regulating
equipment, interconnecting piping,
and applicator, which may be a sep-
arate implement or an attachment
for a towing tractor and mounted
directly on it.
20. The container is normally
small (250 gallons or less) and is
equipped with the necessary shutoff
valves, excess flow valves, safety re-
lief valve, etc. It must be securely
mounted on the applicator imple-
ment.
21. The flow regulation is accom-
plished by the use of one or more
multiple outlet ammonia How regu-
lators, or by the use of a variable
stroke, piston-type metering pump.
Thus, the rate of application of am-
monia to the soil can be accurately
controlled.
22. The basic considerations for
this application equipment are the
same as for the transportation and
storage equipment, that is, the com-
ponents should be suitable for am-
monia service and the unit properly
maintained. The primary consider-
ation is. of course, that no brass or
bronze be used within the system.
Chemical safety goggles and gloves
should be available and used when
and where necessary.
23. When lank cars are being un-
loaded, shipper's instructions should
be observed and carried out by fully
instructed reliable employees under
adequate supervision. They should
be connected to permanent plant
piping with a 1750 psi bursting
strength ammonia hose. The hose
should meet all RMA hose
standards with a working pressure
of 350 psi. Hose assemblies should
be hydrostatically tested and capable
of withstanding a test pressure of
500 psig at one year intervals. The
hose should always be protected
with a No. 350 hydrostatic relief
valve in line. All connections
should be made with high pressure
screws or flanged fittings, of black
iron or forged steel.
24. The standard ICC regula-
tions governing the unloading of
tank cars should be followed when-
ever ammonia is being unloaded.
Before the car is connected, the blue
flag (or a light-blue sign 12 by 15
inches with the legend STOP—TANK
CAR CONNECTED) should be set out
at least 25 feet from the switch end
of the car. One sign will be neces-
sary for blind sidings and two for a
siding which may be entered from
either end. Switches should be
E-38
-------
Figure 3. Diagram flefl) of hose moik with air supplied by hand-operated blower. Air line hose mask (righl).
locked closed. "Derails" may be set
out at least one car length from the
switch end of the car being un-
loaded. Hand brakes should be set
and the wheels chocked. The car
can then be connected after com-
pleting these procedures.
25. Anhydrous ammonia is usual-
ly unloaded from a tank car by
differential pressure (Figure 1).
The usual practice is to connect the
liquid discharge valve in the car
dome directly to the storage con-
tainer and a vapor valve in the car
dome to compressor (275 psig work-
ing pressure) taking suction from
the storage container. Pressure built
up above the liquid in the tank car
forces the liquid ammonia into the
storage container.
26. Any saturated ammonia vap-
ors which are left in the car after
the liquid has been withdrawn, can
be partially removed by closing the
liquid valves on the car and the con-
tainer and withdrawing the vapors
through the compressor by reversing
the 4-way control valve.
Shipping regulations
27. The ever-increasing demand
for anhydrous ammonia has dictated
development of safe and efficient,
large volume transportation facili-
ties. Curr tly, these transportation
facilities include cylinders, tank cars,
tank trucks, portable (skid) tanks,
barges, and ships.
28. All this transportation equip-
ment is similar to that used for LP-
gas, except the valves, fittings, and
the like, are made of iron or steel
on the equipment for anhydrous am-
monia, while brass and bronze fit-
tings are quite commonly used on
LP-gas equipment.
29. The requirements for these
transportation units moving inter-
state are specified by the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC). Any
movement of anhydrous ammonia
by water (barge or portable tanks
on vessels, etc.) is regulated by the
U.S. Coast Guard.
Storage
30. Non-refrigerated storage: All
containers for non-refrigerated bulk
storage of ammonia should be built
of steel with a minimum working
pressure of 250 psi and constructed
and tested according to the latest
edition of the ASME Unfired Pres-
sure Vessel code (and subsequent
amendments thereto), or under the
rules of the authority having juris-
diction where the tank is installed.
31. Containers should be visual-
ly inspected at least once a year.
Hydrostatic testing should be 1 V4
times the working pressure of the
tank. Other nondestructive testing
may be done as required.
32. All tanks must be equipped
with one or more spring-loaded re-
lief valves in the vapor phase of the
tank set to relieve at 250 psi. If
the valves are mounted on a mani-
fold which allows the changing of
the valve without the emptying of the
tank in case of valve failure, it will
not be necessary to test the valves
more than once every 5 years. If in-
ternal valves are used, they should
be tested every year. (ICC requires
every 5 years, but experience has
shown that stress, corrosion, and
cracking still occur in the springs in
a shorter amount of time. Many
tanks have leaked at relief valves
in less than 5 years.)
33. The discharge from these
valves should be vented upward into
the atmosphere in such a way as not
to contaminate the area near by or
endanger workers or others passing
by. The discharge pipe should be
fitted with rain caps or some other
device to prevent the accumulation
of moisture. Provisions should be
made to drain any condensation
which may accumulate in the vent
lines.
34. The filling densities for stor-
age containers that are not refriger-
ated should not exceed the follow-
ing:
Type of Per cent Per cent
container by n-eight hy volume
Above ground
uninsulated 56
Above ground
uninsulated 87.5
Above ground
insulated 57 83.5
Underground
uninsulated 58
ICC Follow ICC regulations
E-39
-------
35. Magnetic, or rotary gauges
are preferred to gauge glasses. Where
glasses are used they should be pro-
tected against accidental breakage
by a guard which will confine flying
glass if they burst. As a further
precaution, the two shut-off valves
should be kept closed except when
a gauging is made.
36. Bulk storage containers
should preferably be located above
ground, and rest on firm supports,
preferably of concrete.
37. Storage containers should be
protected from the direct rays of the
sun by a white enamel reflecting
paint. Exposed piping should also
be protected in the same manner.
38. Ammonia and LP-gas have
similar characteristics and the tanks
used to handle them are similar. Be-
fore tanks can be interchanged, it
must be determined that it is pos-
sible to safely do so. If so, the fol-
lowing steps should be taken:
a. Openings should be opened satis-
factorily.
b. All fittings must be changed to
steel.
c. Tanks must be thoroughly purged
of NH, before going to LP use.
Interchange of service should not
be attempted unless supervised by
qualified personnel.
39. Refrigerated storage: Refrig-
erated storage containers with a de-
sign pressure exceeding 15 psig
should be constructed in accordance
with appropriate sections of the cur-
rent ASME Code, Unfired Pressure
Vessels and API Standard 620,
Recommended Rules for Design and
Construction of Large, Welded, Low
Pressure Storage Tanks, latest edi-
tion. Local ordinances could modify
these requirements (Figure 2).
40. At least two compressors
should be provided for a refrigerated
system, either one of which has suf-
ficient capacity to handle the entire
load. An emergency power supply
of sufficient capacity to handle the
load should be provided unless fa-
cilities are available to safely dis-
pose of the vapor while the refriger-
ation system is not in operation.
41. If refrigerated storage systems
and compressor rooms are unat-
tended, they should be equipped
with automatic alarms.
42. The filling connections should
be fitted with a remote-controlled
valve as should all openings except
relief valves. Excess How or back-
Figure 4. Emergency shower enclosure.
pressure check valves should also
be installed in the filling connection.
43. There should be at least two
safety relief valves on every storage
container, each set to open at the
design working pressure and to
maintain the pressure at not more
than 120 per cent of the design
working pressure. The discharge
should be vented well upward into
the air where there will be no con-
tamination problem. Discharge pipes
should be fitted with rain caps or
some other weather protection to
prevent the accumulation of mois-
ture. Provisions should be made to
drain the condensatc from the safety
relief discharge lines.
44. Portable storage containers
such as those commonly used in di-
rect application to the soil or to
transport ammonia from supply sta-
tion to the farm, if not under ICC
jurisdiction, should be constructed
to comply with the latest ASME
Code, with a 250 psi working pres-
sure. •
45. These storage containers
should be securely fastened to the
carrying vehicle so that even under
unusual strain they will not shift on
their mountings. All fittings, valves
and gauges should be protected
against accidental damage by sub-
stantial steel guards. Filler openings
should be protected by a back-
pressure or excess-flow valve. All
other openings except those connect-
ing with the safety relief valves
should be protected by excess-flow
valves.
46. Storage containers with a ca-
pacity under 1200 gallons should
be protected by a spring loaded safe-
ty relief valve set to discharge at
250 psig. Those of greater capacity
require two or more spring loaded
safety relief valves. The discharge
cap of these valves should meet the
requirements of ASME Code (Table
III).
47. The following equipment
should be ready at all times for
emergency use:
a. One pair of protective gloves,
either plastic or rubber.
b. One pair tight-fitting safety goggles.
c. Container with not less than 5 gal-
lons of clear water.
Over-the-road type transports should
have, in addition, full face gas mask
with anhydrous ammonia canisters.
48. Cleaning storage containers:
When storage containers are to be
cleaned, a section of the supply pip-
ing should be removed. Blanking
flanged unions are not recom-
mended.
49. Storage tanks should be
purged with water and steam.
Petroleum solvents should not be
used.
50. Each workman entering a
storage tank should wear respiratory
protective equipment (hose mask
with a blower or self-contained
breathing apparatus). He should
also be equipped with a safety har-
ness attached to a lifeline that is
tended by a helper similarly equip-
ped and stationed immediately out-
side the point of entry.
51. Piping and fitting.'!: Shutoff
valves, relief valves, and pressure
reducing valves should be made of
extra-heavy black iron or forged
steel to withstand a working pres-
sure of 250 psi. Monel or resilient
valve seats may be used. Lead seats
are satisfactory in some service.
Copper or copper bearing fittings or
valve seats should not be used.
NOTE: Galvanized pipe should
never be used. Welded
joints are preferred to
threaded joints. Under
no circumstances should
brazed joints be used,
because they deteriorate
rapidly.
E-40
-------
52. All refrigerated piping should
conform to American National
Standard B31.S or latest revision.
53. Where threaded connections
must be made, only Schedule 80
pipe should be made. All connec-
tions should be made tight, using a
pipe joint compound that is resistant
to NH,.
54. Ammonia-type forged steel,
raised-face flanges should be used.
If flanges are used, they should be
at least of the four-bolt type.
55. Wherever there is a possibil-
ity that an ammonia line may be
closed at both ends while liquid
filled, the line should be protected
by a hydrostatic relief valve.
56. Leaks: Ammonia leaks can
be located by moving an open bottle
of hydrochloric acid along the am-
monia piping. A cloud of white
ammonium chloride will be gener-
ated near the leak. Also a small
amount of sulfur dioxide can be re-
leased along the suspected leak. A
white fog of ammonium sulfate will
be formed. (Burning of sulfur tap-
ers is not recommended.)
57. Leaks arourd cylinder valve
stems can generally be corrected by
tightening the packing gland nut
which has a lefthand thread. It is
particularly important that only the
tools recommended by the ammonia
supplier be used on cylinders, ton
tanks, and tank car valves. The
leverage obtainable with longer
wrenches may damage the valve and
make a leak worse.
58. When leaks at valve stems or
connections do not respond to or-
dinary tightening, the service depart-
ment of the ammonia supplier
should be called at once. Emergency
leak kits are unavailable for am-
monia similar to those available for
chlorine containers.
59. If a serious leak in the con-
tainer develops and cannot be con-
trolled, the container should be
discharged into water. If there is no
danger of contaminating an area or
endangering employees, the ammo-
nia can be discharged into the at-
mosphere where it will rapidly
dissipate. Water from a hose may
be directed upon the leak and a
considerable portion of the escaping
ammonia absorbed. If possible, the
container should be turned so that
the leak is uppermost. In this way
fi
a.
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
20
13
10
SOLUBILITY
or
ANHYDROUS AMMONIA
WATER
140
135
130
125
120
iis
I 10
105
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
33
30
u
K
D
r-
K
U
o.
u
m 14 .U .91 .40 .44 .4« .U 94 BO .44 .(I .71 .T« JO ,*4 M
GRAMS OF AMMONIA PER GRAM OF WATER
Figure 5. Chorl thowi lh» relotlonihlp between might of oxmenla In hundredtht el gram per
gram of woltr lo the temperature. Sine* lh« rtlotionihlp ihown Ktt« it (hot of unit weight p«r
unit weight III* voluei thewn or* the iome lor poundi ol onmonlo per hundred poundi ol water.
TABLE III
Relief valve discharge rate for containers of circular cross sections
CMtilnir
Hit*
10
15
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
100
120
140
Dltduni
«it««f
419
634
842
1248
1649
2055
2450
2845
3225
4040
4820
5590
im
160
180
200
220
240
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
lit*
6340
7050
7345
7695
7935
8240
8530
8825
9125
9420
9720
lOOHO
Mil
400
420
440
460
480
500
520
540
560
580
600
620
tit*
10300
10600
10890
11190
11500
11775
12075
12370
12665
12965
13250
13550
•This figure represents product of outside diameter and length (feet) for
cylindrical containers or the square of the outside diameter (feet) for spheri-
cal containers.
••Discharge rate given in cubic feel of air per minute measured at 16 C
(60 F) and one atmosphere pressure (14.696 psig).
E-41
-------
only gas will be discharged and the
water will have a better chance of
absorbing the ammonia.
60. Water which has been used
to absorb ammonia should not be
discharged into municipal or con-
fined sewers.
61. Under no condition should
liquid amnonia be neutralized with
an acid. This proccduio would gen-
erate a great amount of heat and
increase the volume of liberated
gaseous ammonia.
62. Whenever a leak develops in
an ammonia line or ammonia con-
tainer, all personnel in the immedi-
ate vicinity should be evacuated,
upwind of the leak. Only trained
personnel with proper protective
equipment should be allowed to ap-
proach an ammonia leak.
Personal protective equipment
63. Men who regularly work with
ammonia and are therefore vulner-
able to exposure to cither the liquid
or the gas should be provided with
rubber or neoprcnc gloves, and
tight-fitting safety goggles. They
should wear cotton clothing and un-
derwear. A ventilated safety goggle
gives protection against direct
splashes of ammonia in the eyes. A
small amount of contamination
within the atmosphere affects the
nose before eye injury would occur
from vapor and indicates a need for
full-face mask. Vented safety goggles
do not fog up and are much more
comfortable to wear.
64. Gas masks (approved for
ammonia by the U. S. Bureau of
Mines) with a full facepiece and
green ammonia canisters (C) or a
red universal (N) should be avail-
able in case of emergency (Figure
3). Under conditions of extreme ex-
ertion these gas masks will provide
respiratory protection for only about
five minutes in concentrations of 3
per cent, or fifteen minutes in a
concentration of 1 per cent, if there
is no deficiency of atmospheric oxy-
gen. A gradually increasing odor of
ammonia in the inspired air will
warn that the canister is becoming
exhausted.
65. The poinis in an ammonia
system where leaks may develop
can be aniicipmcd and gas masks
located accordingly. Respiratory
protection devices should be located
just outside areas of possible con-
tamination so workmen can reach
respiratory protective equipment.
66. No one can remain in an at-
mosphere with a concentration
higher than 1.5 or 2 per cent of am-
monia for more than IS minutes
without developing severe skin burns
and blisters. For this reason res-
piratory protection alone is not
enough.
67. Maintenance men and others
who must work for more than a few
minutes in concentrations higher
than 1.5 or 2 per cent should be
equipped with a well-ventilated, one-
piece rubber or neoprene suit, im-
pervious to gas and sealed at the
ankles, wrists, and around the face.
68. The suit plus the full-face-
piecc gas mask will give complete
protection for the life of the can-
ister in atmospheres up to 3 per
cent of ammonia. However, none of
this equipment will protect against
the freezing effects of evaporating
ammonia.
69. Supplied air respirators, or
oxygen breathing apparatus should
be worn, along with the suits men-
tioned above, in unknown concen-
trations or in connections of ammo-
nia above 3 per cent. Their useful
life is determined by the size of the
supply unit. A hose mask with
blower is useful in high or unknown
concentrations. Its usefulness is lim-
ited by the length (150 foot maxi-
mum) of the hose which connects
the mask with the blower unit. The
blower unit must be located to
supply uncontaminated air.
70. For prolonged work in con-
taminated atmospheres a hose mask
with blower will probably be most
comfortable to wear. The resistance
to normal breathing of this equip-
ment is probably much less than
with other types.
71. Workers should be thorough-
ly trained in the use of personal
protective equipment and should
automatically report any that is de-
fective. This equipment must be
inspected at regular intervals and
maintained in first class condition.
72. Atmospheric ammonia will
dissolve readily in perspiration.
Therefore, persons who work long
periods in contaminated areas can
expect some irritation due to ab-
sorbed ammonia at the crotch, arm-
pits, feet, and wherever clothing is
tight. Petroleum jelly spread at these
places may provide some protec-
tion.
Fire and explosion hazards
73. The gas, if mixed with air
in the proper proportion, will burn.
The flammable limits of this mix-
ture is 16 to 25 per cent by volume
in air at atmospheric pressure. The
presence of oil or other combustible
materials will increase the fire haz-
ard.
74. In the presence of iron the
ammonia-air mixture will ignite at
1203.8 F (651 C). When iron is
not present the ignition temperature
is much higher: above 1562 F
(850 Q. For instance, oil vapor, in-
troduced through compressors will
increase the fire hazard somewhat.
Ammonia-air mixtures arc difficult
to ignite. They require both a large
and an intense source of ignition
and a relatively high concentration
of the gas. However, there have been
several severe flash fires and a few
very bad explosions at breaks in
compressors, receivers, and conden-
sers. Repairs on ammonia contain-
ers should only be performed by
qualified welders, and all repair
work must be done to conform with
requirements given in the appli-
cable ASME Code under which the
tank was constructed. Any welding
or cutting on a tank which has con-
tained ammonia, must not be done
without first thoroughly purging the
tank of all ammonia vapors. The
heat of the welding or cutting torch
could cause an explosion.
75. Most common metals are not
affected by anhydrous ammonia;
however, when mixed with very little
water or water vapor, both gaseous
and liquid ammonia will attack vig-
orously, copper, silver, zinc, and
their alloys. It will combine readily
with cither silver oxide or mercury
to form explosive fulminating com-
pounds. Iron or steel will not react
readily with either dry or moist
ammonia.
76. Ammonia will dissolve read-
ily in water to form ammonium hy-
droxide. At 32 F (0 C), one vol-
ume of water will dissolve 1176
volumes of gaseous ammonia, or
100 Ib of water will dissolve 89.5
Ib of ammonia. At 68 F (20 C)
one volume of water will dissolve
700 vol of ammonia (53.1 Ib am-
E-42
-------
monla per 100 Ib water) (Figure
5).
Electrical equipment
77. Electrical equipment in open
air installations need not be explo-
sion-proof. When installed inside a
building, all electrical installations
should be explosion-proof. Ground-
ing of the tanks is no longer re-
quired.
Symptoms of poisoning
78. The conventional symptoms
of developing pulmonary edema
should be observed regularly. Any-
one exposed to ammonia who
breathes in short, rapid shallow
breaths should be immobilized. In
most cases twenty-four hour bed
rest, under the observation of a
physician, will be necessary before
it can be determined that the vic-
tim is out of danger.
79. Anyone who accidentally has
been exposed to high or unknown
concentrations of ammonia and who
has ammoniacal breath, tightness of
the chest, bloodshot eyes with swol-
len lids, and a cough which may dis-
charge bloody mucous is seriously
ill. Medical assistance should be
summoned immediately. Such a per-
son should be immobilized at once,
his eyes washed, and oxygen ad-
ministered by a physician.
80. If it is necessary to move the
patient he should be carried on a
litter or an improvised stretcher.
Any sort of movement on his part
will aggravate the developing edema
and may result in death.
First aid
81. Ammonia which has come in
contact with the skin should be
removed as soon as possible. Con-
taminated clothing should be' re-
moved and the affected skin areas
flooded with large amounts of water
for at least 15 minutes. The patient
should see a physician as soon as
possible. Extreme care should be
exercised in removing clothing
which has become frozen.
CAUTION: Forcible removal of
frozen clothing may
tear the skin badly.
Therefore, proper
thawing is a must.
82. Safety showers should be
conveniently located for people who
are vulnerable to exposure of am-
monia, but they should not be lo-
Figure 6. Eye-wash fountains should be lo-
cated wherever there is a danger of ammonia
entering the eyes.
cated where an ammonia leak may
make them unusable. Showers
should operate by pressure on valve
arm or platform and should supply
a gentle flood of water at a rate of
about 30 gallons per minute (Fig-
ure 4). High-pressure needle-spray
showers may irritate a severe am-
monia burn.
83. Ammonia must be removed
from the eyes immediately. Treadle-
or brow-operated eye wash fountains
or non-refrigerated bubblers should
be available wherever there is the
danger of ammonia entering the eyes
(Figure 6). The eye should be
forced open, with the lids turned
back and flooded for 15 or 20 min-
utes. If this is not done a serious
loss of vision may result.
84. After the eyes have been
flooded for 15 or 20 minutes the
patient should be taken at once to
a physician or hospital. No oil or
other non-water-soluble preparation
should be placed into the eyes.
85. Anyone overcome by an am-
monia atmosphere should be re-
moved to fresh air at once. He
should be kept warm; artificial res-
piration (back-pressure, armlift, or
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation)
should be started at once if breath-
ing is labored or has stopped. Oxy-
gen should be administered as soon
as possible by a physician.
86. Symptoms of developing res-
piratory difficulty are hard to spot.
Anyone who has been under a con-
centration of ammonia for over half
an hour without respiratory protec-
tion should be assumed to be in
danger and should be seen by a
physician at once. If a man encoun-
ters strong concentrations he should
remove himself from the vicinity of
the exposure immediately.
87. Definite first aid instruction
should be given to all men who
work with ammonia. This should be
done by approved instructors. He
should also determine what proce-
dures should be done by employees
until medical assistance is obtained.
Treatment of burns
88. When the ammonia has been
removed from the skin, the burned
area should be treated in the same
fashion as any chemical burn.
Toxicity
89. Ammonia is not a poison. It
has no cumulative toxic effect, as
lead or mercury have. However,
it has a powerful corrosive action
when it makes contact with skin
tissue. Exposure to atmospheric
concentrations of ammonia above
5000 parts ammonia per million
parts of air (0.5 per cent by vol-
ume) will produce death by suffo-
cation within minutes. Atmospheric
ammonia in concentrations above
2000 ppm (0.2 per cent) will burn
and blister the skin after a few
seconds of exposure.
90. Liquid ammonia in contact
with the skin will produce severe
burns not only because of its strong
corrosive action, but also through
the freezing effect produced by its
rapid evaporation. Dehydration is a
serious effect.
91. Concentrations above 700
ppm (0.07 per cent) will cause
severe eye irritation,- hemorrhages,
swollen eyelids, and if not treated
immediately may lead to partial or
total loss of eyesight. Prolonged ex-
posure to atmospheric ammonia
above this concentration (700 ppm)
may produce severe scarring of the
exposed eye tissue, especially the
cornea.
92. The mucous tissue lining the
mouth, throat, nose, and lungs is
particularly sensitive to atmospheric
ammonia. Ammonia attacks the
E-43
-------
mucous tissue of the lungs and up-
per respiratory tract quite violently.
93. Exposure to concentrations
above 1700 ppm (0.17 per cent)
may produce serious lung edema (a
copious discharge of blood scrum
into the alveolar spaces of the lungs)
and unless properly treated, death
will result.
Threshold limit values
94. The threshold limit value
(TLV), as established by the Amer-
ican Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygicnists, represents a
concentration to which workers may
be exposed repeatedly without ad-
verse effect. This concentration is a
time-weighted value averaged over
a normal workday. For anhydrous
ammonia, the threshold limit value
is 50 ppm. Since ammonia serves as
its own warning agent, a person will
not remain in concentrations which
are hazardous.
95. There are several reliable
analytic schemes for checking the
atmospheric concentration of am-
monia. Ten parts of amm>.':ia per
million of air will affect moist com-
mercial litmus paper in about 6.5
seconds and moist commercial phc-
nolphthalein paper in about five
seconds. One-hundred ppm of am-
monia will affect moist phenolph-
thalein paper as soon as it is exposed
and moist litmus paper in about
one second.
96. Contaminated air may be
collected in O.IN sulphuric acid and
titrated against 0.1N sodium hy-
droxide using methyl red as the
indicator. A very accurate deter-
mination should be made. The
Folin-Ncssler reaction will give ac-
curate determinations even in low
concentrations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This data sheet was revised by Ihc
Pclrolcum Scclion, National Safely Coun-
cil. 425 N. Michigan Ate., Chicago, III.
60611, and is published by the Council.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
• J. H. Wealherby. "Chronic To.xicity
of Ammonia Fumes by Inhalation," The
Proceedings of the Society for Experi-
mental Biology in Medicine, October
1952. pp. 300-301.
• "The Comparative Life. Fire and
Explosion Hazards of Common Refriger-
ants," the Underwriters' Laboratories,
November, 1933.
• H. A. J. Pietcrs, J. W. J. Hovers.
and P.. J. Rietveld. "Determination of
the Explosion Limits of Gases," Fuels in
Science anil Practice. Vol. 26 No. 3,
1947, pp. 80-81.
• H. F. Coword and G. W. Jones.
"Limits of Flammahility of Gases and
Vapors," Bulletin 503, U. S. Bureau of
Mines. 1952.
• L. Silverman. et M.. "The Physiolog-
ical Response of Man to Ammonia in
Low Concentrations." The Journal a]
Industrial Hygiene, March 19-19, pp. 74-
78.
• T. C. George's Tariff No. 23, Pub-
lishing Interstate Commerce Commission
Regulation for the Transportation of Ex-
plosives anil Other Dangerous Articles
by Land and Water in Kail Freight, and
by Motor Vehicle (Highway) and Water,
Including Specifications for Shipping Con-
tainers, (1968) issued by the Bureau of
Explosives, 63 Vesey Street, New York,
N. Y. 10007.
• "Tables of ihe Thermodynamic
Properties of Ammonia," Information
Circular No. 142, U.S. Bureau of Stand-
ards.
• T. A. Wilson, 'The Total and Par-
tial Pressure of Aqueous Ammonia Solu-
tions," Bulletin No. 146', University of
Illinois.
• E. C. King, 'The Toxicity of Am-
monia," Science, July 21, 1951, p. 91,
• J. A. Houghton. "Personal Com-
munication." Industrial Hygiene Field
Services, Liberty Mutual Insurance Com-
pany.
• "Ammonia," American Pclrolcum
Institute, Toxicological Review.
• "Anhydrous Ammonia," Chemical
Data Sheet SD-8, Manufacturing Chem-
ists' Association of Ihe United States.
"Aqua-Ammonia," Chemical Safe-
ly Data Sheet SD-13.
• R. J. Quinn and Ralph L. Carr, "An-
hydrous Ammonia: Its Storage, Feeding
and Safe Handling," Water Works and
Sewage.
• "Anhydrous Ammonia Bulletin F-
31," Phillips Petroleum Company.
• "Analytical Chemistry of Industrial
Poisons, Hazards and Solvents," Inler-
science Publishers. Inc.
• H. R. Krueger. "Safe Handling of
Ammonia Solutions." Agricultural Chem-
icals. November. 1951, p. 46.
• W. L. Nelson. "Safely in Ihe Use
and Handling of Ammonia," Oil and Gas
Journal, September 16. 1948, p. 1053.
• "Safe Handling of Compressed
Gases." The Compressed Gas Associa-
tion, Inc., New York.
• "Standards for Slornge and Han-
dling of Anhydrous Ammonia." Agri-
cultural Nitrogen Institute.
• "Anhydrous Ammonia and Aqua-
Ammonia Chemical Safely Chart," Chem-
ical Safely Chart No. 3, Bureau of Labor
Standards, 1952.
• Rubber Manufacturers Association
(RMA). 444 Madison Ave., New
York. N. Y. 10022.
An Alphobetici.l Index of all
Industrial Safety Data Sheets
(Stock No. 123.09) is available
from the Council on request.
i*«M>in*d in Ih't publication
MvrtOI b*fi**«d >0 b« r«liabl« O"d *O
M *• tvbj«(i. No
Th« MifarnaiioH «
"OK b*«lt (Onpil
r»«f«i*M !*• b» . .
•MraM**. «r **p*«ti'iioiM« n M«4« br **• Natio«ol Sttfaf Cow*-
fit «i 10 *• ab»o4vM cO"»(iK*n 0> ivffit«»>fy 01 9*1 »p>*i«i>ta-
tton co«r*iH»d w *it and oth«f public a ho ni, O"d rh» National
Safety Council OH«M«I KO reipemibiliry M w»«B thai »t) a*•»•>•« •<• to*-
Mined in Iti'i land orh«, p«blrtoti*Mi). o* *ot •*», o* ado^onal
E-44
-------
E.3.3 RSMA Safety Data Sheets
Safety data sheets that have recently been issued by the Railway
Systems and Management Association, 181 Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Illinois
Zip Code 60611, assign a priority number to each commodity. The carrier
lists cargo items onto a Priority-Risk Worksheet. A blank worksheet with
instructions is shown as Exhibit E-8, and safety data sheets for
Anhydrous Ammonia, Phosgene, and Vinyl Chloride are shown as Exhibits E-9
through E-ll, respectively.
E-45
-------
PRIORITY-RISK WORKSHEET
The Priority-Risk Worksheet gives the man in con- the other data sources in the Handling Guide, he can
trol of an accident scene the initial organization logically direct the most effective, safe and expeditious
needed when faced with an emergency involving plan for handling the situation.
more than one hazardous commodity. With this and
PRIORITY-RISK WORKSHEET INSTRUCTIONS
Highest number indicates greatest hazard. 3. Enter actions shown for handling commodity
c . r-tr>r i_ j on work sheet.
F=senous FIRE hazard
H=serious HEALTH hazard 4. Check for conflicting instructions between
, _. , .. , - . r .. .. commodities.
1. Find commodity in Data Form section, noting
the rating number in the upper left corner of 5 H(jnd|e ^ h|ghcst ^ commodity f|rst<
the p°fle- UNLESS an immediate greater hazard from
2. Enter name of commodity on work sheet next a lower rated commodity exists.
to proper rating number.
Exhibit E-8. Priority-Risk Worksheet
E-46
-------
PRIORITY-RISK WORKSHEET
For use in organizing order of actions in transportation emergencies.
RATING COMMODITY ACTION
24FH
23FH
22FH
21FH
20F
19F
18F
17F
16F
15F
14H
13H
12H
11H
10H
09H
08
07
06
05
04
03
02
01
00
Exhibit E-8 (continued)
-------
7JH
- PRIORITY-RISK
RATING
When not burning, a major health threat, but gas
lighter than air, so disperses. Although gas, fairly
hard to ignite; once ignited, a major fire danger.
CODE 0457
COMMODITY AMMONIA (ANHYDROUS)
SYNONYMS:
Anhydrous Ammonia
1. CLASSIFICATION—RISK: N. G.
• Non-flammable compressed gas
• GREEN label required.
• Juit barely outside criteria for Flammable
Compraued gat, Ammonia hoi been afire
in numerout accident!.
2. DEGREE OF—RISK: W-3, 1
Severity of risk from exposure to material
as normally shipped. Mixture upon spillage
and local conditions may alter this rating.
• Warning-moderate, intermediate, harmful
toxic material—can injure through breath-
ing or touching.
• Also flammable material.
• Strong irritant to eyes, ikin, reipiratory
tract.
• Cauiei severe burns In liquid form.
• Can blind if exposed to Vi% by volume In
air for Vi hour.
3. PRECAUTIONS—RISK: 3, 1, 2
To minimize hazards, take precaution Indi-
cated:
• Avoid breathing mists, gases.
• Keep away from heat, sparks, open flames.
• Avoid contacting skin, eyes, clothing.
LEAKS
• Sharp penetrating odor in area indicates
leak; clear area.
• Gas leaks found by dipping rag on stick in
hydrochloric (muriatic) acid; when placed
near leak by protected person, white cloud
will form.
• Do not approach or contact liquid spills;
form dikes to contain them.
• Spray large leaks directly with large vol-
umes of water.
• Isolate leaking cylinders or tanks from fire
or flammable or hazardous materials, espe-
cially oil, liquid oxygen, calcium, acids,
chlorine, bromine or hypochlorites of sodi-
um or calcium.
EYES
• Gas-tight chemical goggles, running water
to flush eyes.
• Ammonia has affinity for moisture, so crit-
ical level can be reached in unprotected
eyes before other symptoms show.
BREATHING
• Self-contained breathing apparatus where
gas causes violent coughing.
• Chemical cartridge respirator where gas
only irritating.
Filter-type respirator is ineffective.
BODY
• Rubber or protective gloves, rubber apron
and/or cotton clothes, long sleeves and col-
lar buttoned.
• Shower and change clothes if exposed di-
rectly, or if perspiration present, as it ab-
sorbs Ammonia.
4. HAZARD TO—LIFE: 3
Type of injury from material beyond heat
of fire or force of explosion:
• Short exposure could seriously injure, even
if promptly treated.
• Although contact with liquid can cause seri-
ous burns, main threat is inhalation of gas,
which can lead to death.
5. FIRST-AID—LIFE: C
First-aid instructions in case of contact or
exposure:
• Immediately flush skin with plenty of water.
Flush eyes with water for at least 15 min-
utes. Get prompt medical attention.
BODY
• Use no salves or ointments on burns for 24
hours.
BREATHING
• If violent coughing occurs, remove from
area.
Exhibit E-9. RSMA Safety Data Sheet on Anhydrous Amnonia
E-48
-------
• If brief exposure, normally no further eld
required.
• If prolonged exposure, administer oxygen.
SUGGESTIONS TO PHYSICIANS
EYES
• Wash with Boric Acid solution (1 part with
29 parts water).
• 2-3 drops Vt% pontocaine solution or other
aqueous topical anesthetic.
INHALATION
• If prolonged moderate exposure, 100% oxy-
gen at atmospheric pressure, not to exceed
one hour continuous. Best to use face mask
with non-breathing type reservoir bag. Re-
institute as conditions indicate.
• If severe exposure, use oxygen under ex-
halation pressure not to exceed 4 cm (about
1 9/16") water, for '/a hour periods out of
each hour, until symptoms subside or other
clinical indications for interruption appear.
• Caution: oxygen under pressure may be in-
advisable in presence of pending or existing
cardiovascular failure.
• Observe for laryngeal spasm; perform tra-
cheotomy if needed.
6. DANGER—FIRE: 1
Conditions under which material might ig-
nite:
• Must be preheated before ignition can oc-
cur.
• As liquid, may flow to source of fire, in-
creasing fire risk.
• As gas, is lighter than air; will disperse up
unless wind blows it to fire source.
7. CONTROL—FIRE: E
The amount, rate and method of using the
Fire Extinguishing Agent in relation to the
size and type of fire must be carefully con-
sidered.
• Stop flow of gas.
• If leak cannot be stopped, let burn; cool
container with water to prevent further
failure.
• If not on fire, dilute liquid with large
amounts of water; this keeps concentration
of resultant gas down.
• Use water spray in air to remove gas from
air and to keep temperature below Ignition.
• Will react with substances cited in 3 above.
8. STABILITY—AREA: 0
Reaction of material alone or with water.
Does not include reaction with other ma-
terials:
• Normally stable, even under exposure to
fire.
9. CLEAN-UP—AREA: —
Toxicity of materials to be considered for
clean-up and disposal. Index: Amount to
produce death when swallowed by an aver-
age (150 Ib.) man:
• Information not available.
• Gas; oral toxicity not apply.
• However, it is highly toxic and irritating;
can cause severe bums or death.
• In open area where safe, let disperse, being
lighter than air.
• If above not permitted or safe, use water
spray to remove gas from air.
• If permitted, dilute liquid waste with large
amount water & wash into sewer.
• If sewer disposal not possible, contain waste
by dikes, dilute with large amount water.
Later pump into salvage tank or neutralixe
with suitable acid under supervision.
0. GENERAL PROPERTIES
AS SHIPPED—Liquified gas under pressure.
COLOR—Colorless.
FLAMMABILITY—Moderate, limits 16-
25% by volume in air.
AUTOIGNITION—1,204'F.
CORROSIVITY—Corrosive to body tissue,
copper & copper alloys & galvanized sur-
faces.
ODOR—Intensely pungent.
VAPOR DENSITY—0.597 X as heavy as
air.
FORMULA—NHs
USE—Very important in production of fer-
tilizer. Also in manufacture of synthetic
fibers, explosives and nitric acid, and as
a refrigerant. Used in many processes in
chemical industry.
Exhibit E-9 (continued)
E-49
-------
79H
PRIORITY-RISK
RATING
Ranked at top of group with high health and mod-
erate to low fire risk because non-flammable poi-
sonous gas that is heavier than air and relatively
easy to breath in fatal amounts. Shipped In heavy
cylinders or tank cars without safety devices (pre-
venting release of gas until complete tank failure),
so release of gas tends to be all-or-nothing situa-
tion. If leaking, moves to near top of PRIORITY-
RISK Table, indicated by appended "H."
CODE 7003
COMMODITY PHOSGENE
SYNONYMS:
Carbon Oxychloride; Carbonyl Chloride;
Chloride, Carbonyl; Chloride, Chloroformyl;
Chlorformyl Chloride; Choking Gas; Diphos-
gene; D-Stoff; Gas, Choking; Oxychloride,
Carbon
1. CLASSIFICATION—RISK: P.A.
• Poison gas, Class A.
• POISON-GAS label required.
2. DEGREE OF—RISK: D-3
Severity of risk from exposure to material
as normally shipped. Mixture upon spillage
and local conditions may alter this rating.
• Danger—Serious, severe, extremely hazard-
ous toxic material—can injure through
breathing or touching.
• Breathing is main risk, potentially fatal.
3. PRECAUTIONS—RISK: 3, 2, 5
To minimize hazards, take precaution in-
dicated:
• Avoid breathing mists, gases.
• Avoid contacting skin, eyes, clothing.
• Minimize handling until safety precautions
are completely understood.
LEAKS
• If leak suspected, clear Immediate area,
especially downwind or downhill.
• Gas heavier than air; collects In low areas.
• Find leak by tying rag soaked In ammonia
water on end of stick; protected person
holds rag near suspected leak. White cloud
forms if Phosgene leaking.
• If cannot stop leak, Isolate and direct water
spray at leaking gas, away from hole.
• Personnel should be upwind, uphill and In
breathing apparatus. If passible, place leak
under water.
• If odor detected or leak suspected, poten-
tially exposed persons must be treated as
soon as possible as in Section 5 below.
BREATHING
• Self-contained breathing apparatus.
4. HAZARD TO—LIFE: 4
Type injury from material beyond heat of
fire or force of explosion:
• Brief exposure could cause death or perma-
nent injury, even if treated promptly.
• Gas easy to inhale, has non-offensive odor
like new-mown hay.
• Can desensitise sense of smell, making It
harder to detect.
• Effects may be delayed several minutes to
24-72 hours, depending on exposure.
5. FIRST-AID—LIFE: A
First-aid instructions in case of contact or
exposure:
• Carry victim to fresh air. Have him lie down.
Remove contaminated clothing, but keep
him warm. Start first-aid procedures. Call
physician.
GENERAL
• Remove from area. Rescue worker must be
protected.
• Do not let exposed persons walk; main-
tain absolute rest.
BREATHING
• If breathing stepped, give artificial respir-
ation. Do no use mouth to mouth resuscita-
tion. If breathing, give oxygen: Fire De-
partment likely to have oxygen.
EYES
• Flush with large amount running water for
15 minutes.
BODY
• Place under shower, remove clothes under
shower.
Exhibit E-10. RSMA Safety Data Sheet on Phosgene
E-50
-------
NOTE
• If person with eye or body exposure olio
breathed got, do not delay oxygen treat-
ment.
SUGGESTIONS TO PHYSICIANS
SYMPTOMS
• May begin anytime within 72 hour*, include
burning sentation in throat, tightness in
chest, feeling of oppression, dyspnea and
' cyanosis, with rapid progression to severe
pulmonary edema and death from circula-
tory and/or respiratory failure.
Caused by hydrolyiing of gas with moisture
in lungs, forming hydrochloric acid, with
resultant pulmonary edema.
SEE MEDICAL SUPPORTIVE PROCEDURES
for procedure on treating PULMONARY
EDEMA.
TISSUE RESPONSE
• To reduce tissue response to injury, admin-
ister cortisone acetate (1 mg/kg orally
1-3 times daily) or other steroid.
PROGNOSIS
• Complete recovery has resulted when pa-
tient survived first 48 hours.
6. DANGER—FIRE: 0
Conditions under which material might ig-
nite:
• Will not burn.
7. CONTROL—FIRE: E
The amount, rate and method of using the
Fire Extinguishing Agent in relation to the
size and type of fire must be carefully con-
sidered.
• Stop flow of gas.
• This is for life-hazard reasons; it does not
burn or support combustion.
8. STABILITY—AREA: 0
Reaction of material alone or with water.
Does not include reaction with other ma-
terials:
• Normally stable, even under exposure to
fire.
9. CLEAN-UP—AREA: —
Toxicity of materials to be considered for
clean-up and disposal.
Index: Amount to produce death when swal-
lowed by an average (150 Ib.) man:
• Information not available.
• Gas; oral toxicity not apply.
• If leaking, clear area as in 3 above; if safe,
let gas dissipate, or use water spray in air
to absorb gas.
• Workers must have self-contained breath-
ing apparatus.
• Trained protected personnel should deter-
mine safety of area before re-entry by un-
protected personnel.
• Waste from spraying leak with water should
be diked. Neutralize with soda ash or lime
or available alkaline material, if removal
by pumping into salvage tanks not feasible.
• If permitted, neutralized liquid waste may
be disposed in sewers or drainage ditches,
if highly diluted.
• Do not allow liquid waste on cultivated land.
0. GENERAL PROPERTIES
AS SHIPPED—Liquified gas under pressure.
COLOR—Colorless gas, colorless to light
yellow liquid.
FLAMMABILITY—Not
CORROSIVITY—Not, until exposed to
moisture, forming highly corrosive hydro-
chloric acid.
ODOR—Sweet, like new-mown hay (little);
Sharp, pungent (lot).
VAPOR DENSITY—3.4 X heavier than air.
FORMULA—COC12
USE—Formerly as a war gas. Now used in
preparation of many organic chemicals;
examples are urea (used in fertilizers),
poly-carbonates (new plastics) and ure-
thane foam.
Exhibit E-10 (continued)
E-51
-------
PRIORITY-RISK
RATING
Extreme fire threat; highly flammable gas, heavier
than air.
Health risk minor; mildly anesthetic.
CODE 9206
COMMODITY VINYL CHLORIDE
SYNONYMS:
Chloride, Vinyl; Chloroethylene; Chloroethene
1. CLASSIFICATION—RISK: F.L
• Flammable liquid.
• RED label required.
2. DEGREE OF—RISK: D-l, 3
• Danger—serious, severe, extremely hazard-
ous flammable material.
• Also toxic material—can injure through
breathing or touching.
• Will ilowly qneithetize person if enough
breathed.
• Can freeze body tissue if held in contact
by clothing.
3. PRECAUTIONS—RISK: 1, 3
To minimize hazards, take precaution in-
dicated:
• Keep away from heat, sparks, open flames.
• Avoid breathing mists, gases.
LEAKS
• Use flammable gas indicator. If not avail-
able, detect by odor (sweet smelling gas) or
presence of frosting where leak occurs.
• Make repairs to stop leak if possible; take
care not to cause sparks with tools.
• If leaking and not on fire, turn off all Igni-
tion sources in area, especially downwind
and downhill.
• If fire in area, isolate and cool by hosing
container with water.
EYES
• Where exposure is great, gas-tight chemical
goggles, running water available to flush
eyes.
BREATHING
• Self-contained breathing apparatus.
SKIN
• Do not contact liquid; can cause freeze
burns, especially if held to skin by clothing.
4. HAZARD TO—LIFE: 2
Type injury from material beyond heat of
fire or force of explosion.
• Intense or prolonged exposure could inca-
pacitate, unless promptly treated.
• Breathing can anesthetize.
• Liquid can cause freeze burns.
S. FIRST-AID—LIFE: A
First-aid instructions in case of contact or
exposure:
• Carry victim to fresh air. Have him lie
down. Remove contaminated clothing, but
keep him warm. Start first-aid procedures.
Call physician.
• If deep anesthesia occurs, lay person down
with head lowered slightly. Call physician.
• If breathing stopped, give artificial respir-
ation, then oxygen if needed.
EYES
• Flush with large amount running water for
15 minutes. If eye damaged, continue for
additional IS minutes. Call physician.
SKIN
• Remove clothing, wash area with large
amount running water and soap.
Cover areas that were frozen with sterile
gauze or clean towel. Call physician.
SUGGESTIONS TO PHYSICIANS
SYMPTOMS
• Slowly produces drowsiness, blurring of vi-
sion, staggering walk, numbness or tingling
in hands and/or feet.
INHALATION
• Oxygen if needed.
6. DANGER—FIRE: 4
Conditions under which material might ig-
nite:
Exhibit E-ll. RSMA Safety Data Sheet on Vinyl Chloride
E-52
-------
• At normal temperatures and pressures will
rapidly vaporize and burn easily.
• Extreme danger, since both a highly flam-
mable gas and heavier than air.
7. CONTROL—FIRE: E
The amount, rate and method of using the
Fire Extinguishing Agent in relation to the
size and type of fire must be carefully con-
sidered.
• Stop flow of gas.
• Use carbon dioxide, dry chemical type or
water (pray to put out fire only if leak can
then be stopped.
• If leak cannot be stopped, let fire burn out,
cooling container with water to prevent fur-
ther failure.
8. STABILITY—AREA: 1
Reaction of material alone or with water.
Does not include reaction with other ma-
terials:
• Normally stable, except at elevated temper-
atures and pressures.
• Rating baud on polymerixlng In air, oxy-
gen, sunlight or heat, with evolution of
heat; but usually inhibited to prevent this.
Not reactive with water.
9. CLEAN-UP—AREA: —
Toxicity of material to be considered for
clean-up and disposal.
Index: Amount to produce death when swal-
lowed by an average (150-lb.) man:
• Information not available.
• Gas; oral toxicity not apply.
0. GENERAL PROPERTIES
AS SHIPPED—Liquified gas under pressure.
COLOR—Colorless or water white.
FLAMMABILITY—High, limits 4-22% by
volume in air.
AUTOIGNITION—882CF.
CORROSIVITY—Not at normal tempera-
tures when dry.
ODOR—Sweet smelling gas.
VAPOR DENSITY—2.15 X heavier than
air.
FORMULA—CH2CHC1.
USE—Widely used in plastics industry—
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) is an example.
Also as a refrigerant and in organic syn-
theses.
Exhibit E-ll (continued)
E-53
-------
APPENDIX F
OTHER USEFUL DOCUMENTS
(See Also: Appendix C)
1. Simons, J. H., (Ed.) Fluorine Chemistry, Volume 1. Academic Press,
New York, 1950.
2. Schmidt, H. W., Fluorine and Fluorine-Oxygen Mistures in Rocket
Systems. National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration No. SP-3037, U. S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D. C. 1967.
3. Stokinger, H. E., (Ed.) Beryllium: Its Industrial Hygiene Aspects.
Academic Press, New York, 1966.
1 4. Bidstrup, P. L., Toxicity of Mercury and Its Compounds. American
Elsevier Publishing Company, New York, 1964.
5. Community Air Quality Guide Series. American Industrial Hygiene
Association, 25711 Southfield Road, Southfield,
Michigan, 48075.
6. Hygienic Guide Series. American Industrial Hygiene Association,
25711 Southfield Road, Southfield, Michigan, 48075.
7. Henderson, Y. and Haggard, H. W., Noxious Gases and the Principles
of Respiration Influencing their Action. ACS
Monograph Series No. 35, Reinhold Publishing Corp.,
New York, N.Y., Second Edition, 1943.
8. Dawson, G. W., Shuckrow, A. J. and Swift, W. H., Control of
Spillage of Hazardous Polluting Substances. Battelle
Memorial Institute Pacific Northwest Laboratories
report for the Federal Water Quality Administration,
Department of the Interior; Program No. 1509, Contract
No. 14-12-866, November 1, 1970. U. S. Government
Printing Office.
9. Case Histories of Accidents in the Chemical Industry. Manufacturing
Chemists' Association, Inc., Washington, D. C. 20009.
Volume One, 1962, Case Nos. 001-596
Volume Two, 1966, Case Nos. 597-1097
Volume Three, 1970, Case Nos. 1098-1623
10. Abstract of Proceedings, Hazardous Polluting Substances Symposium,
14-16 September, 1970, Jung Hotel, New Orleans, La.;
Department of Transportation, U. S. Coast Guard.
National Technical Information Service, Springfield,
Va. 22151.
(Include Annexes)
11. Katz, D. L. (Chairman), A Study of Transportation of Hazardous
Materials. Report to the Office of Hazardous
F-l
-------
Materials of the U. S. Department of Transportation,
Contract No. DOT-OS-A9-106 with Group of Ninety Persons
Assembled at Airlie House, Warrenton, Va., May 7-9,
1969. National Academy of Science-National Research
Council, Washington, D. C.
12. Goodier, J. L., Stevens, J. I., Margolin, S. V., Keary, W. V.,
and McMahan, J. R., Spill Prevention Techniques for
Hazardous Polluting Substances. Report by Arthur D.
Little, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., to Environmental
Protection Agency, Water Quality Office, Under Contract
14-12-927, February 1971.
13. McCloud, W. H. (Chairman), Los Angeles County and Cities Disaster
Relief Manual. Disaster and Civil Defense Commission
August 1, 1969.
14. Hazardous Material Transportation Regulations at the Port of New
York Authority Tunnel and Bridge Facilities, effective
May 15, 1969.
15. Safety in Air and Ammonia Plants. Vols. 2 {August 1960), 3 (June
1961), 6 (September 1964), 7 (August 1965), 8 (September
1966), 9 (November 1967), 10 (March 1968) available.
American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, N. Y.
10017.
16. Loss Prevention. Volume 1, February 1967; Volume 2, February
1968; American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York,
N. Y. 10017.
17. Smith, T. C., (Chairman), CIMA Manual. Channel Industries Mutual
Aid, Houston-Harris County, Texas, September 1961 (Reprint
April 1969).
18. Mutual Aid Program, Kanawha Valley Industrial Emergency Planning
Council; Organization and Responsibilities, December 1,
1967.
19. Mutual Aid Program, Kanawha Valley Industrial Emergency Planning
Council; Material Assistance Manual, November 1, 1959.
20. Emergency Procedures,'Pesticide Spills and Fires. California
Department of Agriculture, Sacramento, California 95814.
21. Standard Operating Procedures, Major Oil or Chemical Spill, State
of California Disaster Office, SOP-8, revised November
1969.
22. National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council.
Evaluation of the Hazard of Bulk Water Transportation of
Industrial Chemicals - A Tentative Guide. NAS-NRC Publi-
cation No. 1465, Revised, 1970.
F-2
-------
23. California Oil Spill Disaster Contingency Plan. State of California
Office of Emergency Services, Sacramento, California, June
17, 1969.
24. National Oil and Hazardous Materials Pollution Contingency Plan.
Council on Environmental Quality, June 1970.
25. Accidents of Large Motor Carriers of Property. U. S. Department
of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety: 1967
Data published December 1968, 1968 published December 1969,
1969 Data published December 1970.
26. Engineering and Safety Reports, issued annually by National Tank
Truck Carriers, Inc., Washington, D. C. 20036. Currently
available: E & S Bulletin Nos. 61-A (November 1963), 68
(October 1965), 70 (December 1966), 72 (March 1968), 74
(November 1968), 77 (October 1969), and 80 (December 1970).
27. Railroad Accident Report, Crete, Neb., February 18, 1969. National
Transportation Safety Board, U. S. Department of Trans-
portation, Washington, D. C. 20591; Report No. NTSB-RAR-
71-2, February 24, 1971.
28. Railroad Accident Report, Dunreith, Ind., January 1, 1968. National
Transportation Safety Board, U. S. Department of Trans-
portation, Washington, D. C. 20591. Report No. SS-R-2,
December 18, 196a.
29. Railroad Accident Report, Laurel, M1ss., January 25, 1969.
National Transportation Safety Board, U. S. Department of
Transportation, Washington, D. C. 20591; Report unnumbered,
October 6, 1969.
30. Railroad Accident Report, Glendora, M1ss., September 11, 1969.
National Transportation Safety Board, U. S. Department of
Transportation, Washington, D. C. 20591. Report No. NTSB-
RAR-70-2, August 19, 1970.
31. 92nd Congress, 1st Session. Control of Hazardous Polluting Sub-
stances. Message from the President of the United States
transmitting a Report on Control of Hazardous Polluting
Substances pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, as amended. (Via U. S. Coast Guard
Department of Transportation). House Document No. 92-70.
U. S. Government Printing Office.
32. See also Bibliography in above reference, on pages 11-67 through
11-73.
33. Elkins, H. B. The Chemistry of Industrial Toxicology. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., New York, N. Y. 10016, 1.959; 2nd ed., 452 pp.
F-3
-------
34. Smyth, H. F., Jr. Military and Space Short-Term Inhalation
Standards. Archives of Environmental Health, Volume 12,
488-490, April 1966.
F-4
-------
APPENDIX G
PARTICIPATING AGENCIES AND EQUIPMENT
G.I PARTICIPATING AGENCIES OF A LOCAL CONTINGENCY PLAN
Section G.I, which begins on the next page, consists entirely of
Table G-l, which is a list of typical participating agencies of a local
Contingency Plan Organization. The reference text is Section 6.3. Members
are*marked by (M), Associates by (A).
Section G.2 consists entirely of a cross-indexed list of equipment
and services available through the sources in Table G-l.
G-l
-------
ro
Agency
Police Departments (M)
(Specify by name)
Sheriff's Offices (M)
(Specify by name)
Highway Patrol (M)
Fire Department (M)
(Specify by name)
Disaster and Civil
Defense Office (M)
Public Health Officer
(M)
Department of Public
Health (M) or (A)
U. S. Public Health
Service (A)
Type
City
County
State
City
Federal -
local and
regional
offices
City
County
State
Federal -
local or
regional
offices
Address
(local , if available)
Telephone
Number
Contact
Equipment and Services
Available
Air compressors, canvas, ambu-
lances, communications equipment.
earth moving equipment, first
aid, floodlights, hardware, emer-
gency hospital, medical aid,
paper supplies, stretchers, tents
tow trucks, traffic control,
wreckers, protective clothing,
evacuation routes, mobile radios.
Ambulances, decontamination
equipment, disaster assistance,
toxic materials, flrefightlng
equipment, oxygen, protective '.
equipment, pumping units, rescue
trucks, medical aid, rope and
twine, hand tools, stretchers,
tarpaulins.
Blankets, buses, canvas, cots,
communications equipment, public
announcements, drugs and medicine
first aid, hand tools, National
Guard assistance, Federal assis-
tance, rescue trucks, tarpaulins.
tents.
Air pollution information, drugs
and medicine, food poisoning
treatment, immunization and gen-
eral public health services,
chemical analysis, water purifi-
cation units.
Packaged Disaster Hospitals,
emergency medical supplies,
blankets, cots, first aid
stations, immunization, chemical
analysis, public sanitation,
Mobile Disaster Medical Teams.
Table 6-1. Typical Participating Agencies
of a Local Contingency Plan
Organization
-------
Agency
Department of Hospitals
(A) or (M)
Medical Examiner -
Coroner (M)
Poison Control Center
(Food and Drug Adm.)
(A)
Air Pollution Control
Agency (M)
National Oceanographic
and Atmospheric Adm.
National Weather Service
(A)
Department of Highways
and Traffic (M)
Department of Public
Works (M)
Type
City
County
State
City
County
Federal -
local
office
City
County
State
Federal -
local
^^ •
office
City
State
City
State
Address
(local , if available)
Telephone
Number
Contact
Equipment and Services
Available
Emergency hospital space and
services.
Identification, care, examination
and removal of dead bodies.
Information and advice on ingested
poisons.
Chemical hazard detection, mobile
laboratory, chemical analysis,
prediction of hazard area, mete-
orological data, air contamina- •<•
tlon reports.
Weather reports and forecasts,
meteorological information for
hazard area prediction.
Information:
Highway hazards, traffic control,
evacuation routes, road condi-
tions.
Air compressors, cement, chemical
toilets, dynamos and generators,
earth moving equipment, hand
tools, floodlights, hardware,
emergency housing, mobile kitch-
ens, plumbing supplies, rock,
sand and gravel , heavy power
equipment, tractors, dump trucks,
welding equipment, wreckers.
Table G-l. (continued)
-------
Agency
Type
Address
(local, if available)
Telephone
Number
Contact^
Equipment and Services
Available
en
i
U. S. Coast Guard
(M) or (A)
U. S. Army Corps of
Engineers (A) or (M)
National Guard
(M) or (A)
Office of Emergency
Preparedness (A)
Department of Human
Resources (or equiv-
alent} (A^
Environmental Protection
Agency
Emergency Operations
Control Center (A)
American National Red
Cross
Federal -
local or
regional
offices
Federal -
local or
regional
office
State
Federal -
regional
offices
State
Federal-
(regional
offices)
Quasi-
public
local
chapters
Washington, D.C.
Research Triangle
Park, N. C.
(202)
254-3111
(919) 549-
8411
Ext. 2251
24 hrs/
day
D. Tyler
C. Whit-
more
or
Duty
Officer
On-Scene Commander for marine
chemical spills, boats and barges
emergency power equipment, first
aid, pumping units, rope and
twine, winch equipment, tarpau-
lins.
Air compressors, dynamos and
generators, floodlights, hard-
ware, power hoists, pumping
units, rope and twine, hand
tools, tow trucks, trenchers,
tractors, water purification
units, winches, wreckers.
Buses, first aid, rescue trucks,
law enforcement assistance.
Advisory and coordinating ser-
vices on major disasters.
Emergency manpower, rehabilita-
tion.
Limited advisory only.
Capability to offer wider
variety of services is being
developed.
I Disaster relief: emergency hos-
'pitals, cots, blankets, clothing,
'canteen service, housing, kitch-
en units, rehabilitation.
Table G-l. (continued)
-------
CD
cn
Agency
Salvation Army (A)
Industrial Mutual
Aid Associations
(M)
Manufacturing Chemists
Association
, Chemical Transportation
Emergency Center
(CHEMTREC) (A)
National Agricultural
Chemicals Association
/ A \
(A)
The Chlorine Institute,
Inc. (A)
Type
Quasi-
public
local
chapters
Private,
with or
without
govern-
ment
members.
Trade
Assoc.
Trade
Assoc. ,
regional
offices
Trade
Assoc. ,
regional
offices
Address
(local , if available)
1875 Connecticut Ave.
Washington, O.C.
20009
Cincinnati, Ohio
(headquarters)
342 Madison Ave.
New York, N.Y.
10017
Telephone
Number
(800)
424-9300*
M83-7616
in Wash. ,
D.C. area
24 hrs/
day
(513)
961-4300
(head-
quarters)
24 hrs/
day
(212)
MU2-4324
Contact"
Duty
Officer
Pesti-
cide
Safety
Team
Mr.
Mitchell
Mr
ii i .
Ldubu^rh
Equipment and Services
Available
Emergency clothing, canteen
service, kitchen units, housing,
rehabilitation
Air compressors, cement, chemi-
cal toilets, decontamination
apparatus, disaster assistance
on hazardous materials, fire-
fighting equipment, power hoists,
hydraulic jacks, stand-by power
plants, aluminum pipe, plumbing
supplies, pumping units, protec-
tive equipment, mobile radios,
resuscitators, rock, sand and
gravel, welding equipment.
Also, emergency field crews.
Information on chemical hazard,
identification, shipper, manu-
facturer, carrier, shipper hand-
ling, neutralization, disposal,
cleanup. Referral to emergency
field crew associations.
Safety teams to neutralize and
remove spills of pesticides and
other chemicals; also informa-
tion on manufacture, character-
istics, neutralization, and
disposal of wide variety of
chemicals.
Emergency response teams
specializing in releases of
chlorine gas and compounds;
containment, neutralization,
disposal, cleanup.
Table G-l. (continued)
-------
en
i
Agency
National Defense Trans-
portation Association
(A) or (M)
Railway Systems and
Management Assoc. (A)
American Trucking
Associations (A)
(National Tank Truck
Carriers, Inc)
Association of American
Railroad, Bureau of
Explosives (A)
Association General
! Contractors of America
"Plan Bulldozer" (A) or
-------
cr>
Agency
Local news media:
Newspapers
Radio stations
Television stations (M]
Type
Public
informa-
tion
Address
(local , if available)
Telephone
Number
Contact
Equipment and Services
Available
Dissemination of news, reports,
and instructions. Communica-
tions assistance, equipment.
Table G-l. (continued)
-------
G.2 SOURCES FOR EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES (See Directory for Addresses)
(Generally acquired through Disaster Services Coordinator)
Item
Acetylene Torches
Air Compressors
Air Pollution Information
Aluminum Pipe
Ambulances
(also see Rescue Trucks)
Blankets
Boats and Barges
Bodies, Dead
Bulldozers
Buses
Canteen Service, Mobile
Canvas
Cement
Chemical Toilets, Portable
Order of
Contact
Agency
See Welding Equipment
1 City Police Department
2. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
3. Industry Mutual Aid Association
4. Department of Public Works
1. Air Pollution Control Agency
2. County Public Health Officers
1. City Fire Department (Rescue Squad)
2. Disaster and Civil Defense Commission
3. City Police Department
1. Disaster and Civil Defense Commission
2. American National Red Cross
3. U. S. Public Health Service
1. U. S. Coast Guard
2. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
1. Chief Medical Examiner-Coroner
See Earth Moving Equipment
1. Disaster and Civil Defense Commission
2. State National Guard
3. Natl. Defense Transportation Assn.
1. American Natl. Red Cross
2. Salvation Army
1. Disaster and Civil Defense Commission
2. City Police Department
3. State National Guard
1. Department of Public Works
2. Industry Mutual Aid Association
3. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
1. Industry Mutual Aid Association
2. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
3. Department of Public Works
G-8
-------
Clothing Donations, Emergency 1.
2.
Communications Equipment
Compressors
Coroner
Cots
Cranes
Crowbars
Declaration of State of
Disaster (State or Federal)
Decontamination Apparatus
Detection, Chemical Hazard
Disaster Assistance,
Toxic Materials
Drugs and Medicine
Dynamos and Generators
Earth Moving Equipment
Employment Assistance
Evacuation Routes
1.
2.
3.
1.
1.
2.
1.
2.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
1.
1.
2.
American National Red Cross
Salvation Army
Disaster and Civil Defense Commission
City Police Department
News Media
See Air Compressors
County Chief Medical Examiner-Coroner
U. S. Public Health Service
American National Red Cross
See Earth Moving Equipment
See Hardware
Governor
Chairman, Disaster and Civil Defense
Commission
City Fire Department
Industry Mutual Aid Association
Chlorine Institute, Pesticide Safety
Team, etc. (based on chemical released)
See Hazard, Chemical Identification
City Fire Department
Industry Mutual Aid Association
Chlorine Institute, Pesticide Safety
Team, etc. (based on chemical released)
U. S. Public Health Service
State Department of Health
County Medical Association
County Public Health Officers
U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
U. S. Coast Guard
Department of Public Works
Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
City Police Department
Department of Public Works
State Department of Human Resources
Department of Highways and Traffic
State Highway Patrol
G-9
-------
Feeding during Disasters
(Victims and Workers)
F1re Equipment
(See Footnote 1)
First Aid
First Aid Stations
Floodlights
Food Poisoning Treatment
Generators
Gas Masks
Gloves
Graders
Gravel
Hammers
Hardware
Health, Public
Highway Hazards
Hoes, Hand
1. American National Red Cross
2. Salvation Army
1. City Fire Department
2. Industry Mutual Aid Association
1. County Sheriff's Office
2. City Police Department
3. State National Guard
4. U. S. Coast Guard
1. U. S. Public Health Service
2. State Department of Health
1. County Sheriff's Office
2. City Police Department
3. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
4. Department of Public Works
1. County Public Health Officer
2. Poison Control Center
3. U. S. Public Health Service
See Dynamos
See Protective Equipment
See Protective Equipment
1. City Police Department
2. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
3. Department of Public Works
See Rock
See Hardware
1. Department of Public Works
2. City Police Department
3. Industry Mutual Aid Association
4. U. S. Corps of Engineers
1. U. S. Public Health Service
2. State Department of Health
3. County Public Health Officer
1. State Highway Patrol
2. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
3. Department of Highways and Traffic
1. City Police Department
2. Department of Public Works
G-10
-------
Hoists, Power
Hose
Hazard, Chemical:
Information and Advice
Hospitals, Emergency
(also see First Aid)
Hospitals, 200 Bed Units
Housing, Emergency
Immunizations, Medical
Jacks, Hydraulic
Kitchen Units, Mobile
Lights, Portable
Loaders, Front End
Manpower, Emergency
Marine Chemical Spill
Medical Aid, Emergency
1. Department of Public Works
2. Industry Mutual Aid Association
3. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
4. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
1. City Fire Department
2. Industry Mutual Aid Association
1. Manufacturing Chemists Association
2. A1r Pollution Control Agency
3. Industry Mutual Aid Association
1. U. S. Public Health Service
2. American National Red Cross
3. City Police Department
4. State Department of Health
1. U. S. Public Health Service
2. State Department of Health
1. Department of Public Works
2. American National Red Cross
3. Salvation Army
1. U. S. Public Health Service
2. County Public Health Officer
1. Department of Public Works
2. Industry Mutual Aid Association
3. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
1. Department of Public Works
2. American National Red Cross
3. Salvation Army
1. County Sheriff's Office
2. City Police Department
3. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
4. Department of Public Works
1. Department of Public Works
2. Industry Mutual Aid Association
3. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
1. State Department of Human Resources
1. U. S. Coast Guard
1. County Sheriff's Office
2. City Police Department
3. State Disaster and Civil Defense
Commission
4. U. S. Public Health Service
G-ll
-------
Medicine
Mobile Kitchen Units
Meteorological Information
(Weather Prediction)
Mobile Stand-by Power Plants
Mortician Supplies
Mobile Laboratory, Chemical
Analysis
Nails
National Guard Assistance
(Law Enforcement, etc.)
Nozzles
Office of Emergency Pre-
paredness, Federal Assistance
Oxygen, Medical
Paper Supplies
Personnel, Emergency
Pipe, Aluminum (6")
(Fire Fighting)
Plumbing Supplies
Poisons, Information and
Advice
Pollution, Air Information
See Drugs and Medicine
See Kitchen Units
1. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, National
Weather Service
2. City Air Pollution Control Agency
3. News Media
1. Department of Public Works
2. Industry Mutual Aid Association
3. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
1. County Chief Medical Examiner-Coroner
1. City Air Pollution Control Agency
2. U. S. Public Health Service
3. State Department of Health
See Hardware
1. County Sheriff's Office
2. State Disaster and Civil Defense
Commission
3. State National Guard
See Fire Equipment
1. State Disaster and Civil Defense
Commission
1. Fire Department Rescue Squad
2. Disaster and Civil Defense Commission
3. State Highway Patrol
1. County Sheriff's Office
2. City Police Department
1. State Department of Human Resources
1. City F1re Department
2. Industry Mutual Aid Association
1. Department of Public Works
2. Industry Mutual Aid Association
3. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
See Hazards, Chemical
1. Air Pollution Control Agency
G-12
-------
Prediction, Weather
Prediction, Hazard Area
Protective Equipment
(Clothing, Gloves, Gas
Masks)
Pumping Units
Radios, Mobile
Rescue Trucks
Resuscltators, Portable
(also see First Aid)
Road Conditions
Rock, Sand and Gravel
Rope and Twine
Sanitation, Public
Scrapers, Earth
Shovels, Power
1. U. S. Department of Commerce,
National Weather Service
2. City A1r Pollution Control Agency
3. News Media
1. City Air Pollution Control Agency
1. County Sheriff's Office
2. City Fire Department
3. Industry Mutual Aid Association
1. City F1re Department
2. Industry Mutual Aid Association
3. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
4. U. S. Coast Guard
1. State Highway Patrol
2. Industry Mutual Aid Association
3. City Police Department
1. Disaster and C1v1l Defense Commission
2. State National Guard
3. Natl. Defense Transportation Assn.
4. City Fire Department
1. City Fire Department
2. City Police Department
3. Industry Mutual Aid Association
4. U. S. Public Health Service
1. State Highway Patrol
2. News Media
3. Department of Highways and Traffic
1. Department of Public Works
2. Industry Mutual Aid Association
3. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
1. : City Fire Department
2. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
3. U. S. Coast Guard
•1. U. S. Public Health Service
2. State Department of Health
3. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
1. Department of Public Works
2. Industry Mutual Aid Association
3. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
1. Department of Public Works
2. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
3. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
G-13
-------
Shovels, Hand Tools, etc.
State of Disaster Declaration
(State or Federal)
Stretchers
Surgical Supplies
(also see Drugs and First Aid)
Tarpaulins
Tents
Tools, Hand
(also see Hardware, Plumbing,
etc.)
Torches, Acetylene
Tow Trucks
(also see Trucks and Wreckers)
1. Disaster and Civil Defense Commission
2. U. S. Army Corps of Engineer
3. City Fire Department
4. Department of Public Works
1. Governor, of State
2. Chairman, State Disaster and Civil
Defense Commission
1. City Fire Department
2. City Police Department
3. Disaster and Civil Defense Commission
1. U. S. Public Health Service
2. State Department of Health
3. County Medical Association
1. Disaster and Civil Defense Commission
2. U. S. Coast Guard
3. City Fire Department
4. State National Guard
1. Disaster and Civil Defense Commission
2. State National Guard
3. City Police Department
See Shovels, Hand Tools, etc.
Tractors
Transportation, common and
proprietary carriers
Traffic Control
Trenchers
See Welding Equipment
1. County Sheriff's Office
2. City Police Department
3. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
4. Natl. Defense Transportation Assn.
1. Department of Public Works
2. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
3. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
1. National Defense Transportation Assn.
1. State Highway Patrol
2. City Police Department
3. County Sheriff's Office
4. Department of Highways and Traffic
1. Department of Public Works
2. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
3. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
G-14
-------
Trucks, Dump and General
Hauling (also see Tow Trucks
and Wreckers)
Undertaking Supplies
Walkie Talkies
Water Purification Units
Weather Reports
Welding Equipment
1. Department of Public Works
2. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
3. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
See Mortician Supplies
See Radios
1. U. S. Public Health Service
2. County Public Health Officers
3. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
1. U. S. Department of Commerce,
National Weather Service
2. News Media
3. State Highway Patrol
4. Air Pollution Control Agency
1. Department of Public Works
2. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
3. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America
4. Industry Mutual Aid Association
Winch Equipment
(also see Hoists and Wreckers)
Workers, Emergency
Wreckers, Automotive
(also see Hoists, Tow Trucks,
and Winch Equipment)
1. Department of Public Works
2. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
3. U. S. Coast Guard
4. Assoc. Gen Contractors of America
1. State Department of Human Resources
1. Department of Public Works
2. County Sheriff's Office
3. City Police Department
4. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
G-15
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