RESOURCE DOCUMENT
WORKSHOP ON RISK COMMUNICATION
June 1992
-------
LIST OF CONTENTS
RESOURCE DOCUMENT FOR WORKSHOP
ON RISK COMMUNICATION
INTRODUCTION / WHY BOTHER? PAGE
• The Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication. Vincent T. 1
Covello and Frederick W. Allen. (U.S. EPA 1988).
• Risk Communication Problems and Tasks, adapted from "Risk 7
Communication (A Review of the Literature)", a report prepared
for the Environmental Protection Agency, August 1987, by Vincent
T. Covello, Paul Slovic and Detlof Von WinterfeldL
• Some Do's and Don'ts of Listening, from I Hear You, by 9
Eastwood Atwater, from I Hear You. (Englewood & Clifts, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1981), pp. 110-115.
• Improving Dialogue with Communities: A Short Guide for 13
Government Risk Communication. Caron Chess, Billie Jo Hance,
and Peter Sandman (Trenton, N.J. Division of Science and
Research, N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, 1987).
• Ten Reasons to Release Information Early, from "Improving 47
Dialogue with Communities: A Short Guide for Government Risk
Communication," written by Caron Chess, Billie Jo Hance, and
Peter Sandman (Trenton, N.J., Division of Science and Research,
N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, 1987).
EL OVERVIEW OF RISK COMMUNICATION
• Letter, with attachment from EPA Administrator Lee Thomas to 49
U.S. Representative Henry Waxman. May 29, 1987.
• Differences Between Expert and Public Ratines of Environmental 57
Problems. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pok'cy,
Planning, and Evaluation.
m. MAR.TOL SUPERFUND SITE
• Draft Community Relations Plan, prepared for the Marjol Battery 61
Removal Site in Throop, Pennsylvania. Prepared by U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Region 3.
The Lethal Legacy of Risk. New York Times 75
-------
IV. DEALING WITH THE MEDIA/HANDLING TOUGH QUESTIONS
• Preparing for the Interview, written by Paul Lapsley of the 77
Environmental Protection Agency. A piece written for the Risk
Communication Workshop.
• Excerpts from a Presentation by Tom Vacor on the Role of the 79
Media in Risk Communication. Excerpted from Risk
Communication: Proceedings of the National Conference on Risk
Communication. January 29-31, 1986. Edited by J. Clarence
Davies, Vincent T. Covello, and Frederick W. Allen. (The
Conservation Foundation, 1987).
• Do's and Don'ts for Spokespersons. Reprinted in the Risk 83
Communication Student Manual, edited by Erin Donovan, Vincent
Covello and John Slavick (Chemical Manufacturers Association,
Washington, D.C. 1989).
• EDB: A Case Study in Communicating Risk. An article written by 87
Harold I. Sharlin. Risk Analysis. Vol6, No.l, 1986 pp 61 -68.
V. EXPLAINING TECHNICAL ISSUES
• What Do We Know About Making Risk Comparisons. An article 95
by Emilie Roth, M. Granger Morgan, Baruch Fischoff, Lester
Lave, and Ann Bostrom,. Risk Analysis. Vol 10, No.3, 1990 pp
375 -386.
• What Should We Know About Making Risk Comparisons, an 109
article by Paul Slovic, Nancy Kraus, and Vincent T. Covello. Risk
Analysis. Vol 10, No. 3, 1990 pp 389 - 392..
• Explaining Environmental Risk: Some Notes on Environmental 113
Risk. Peter M. Sandman. TSCA Assistance Office, Office of
Toxics Substance, U.S. EPA, November 1986.
• Risk Communication Training Instrument, developed by Region K 143
- Typical Questions and Responses at a Public Meeting.
-------
VI. TRUST AND CREDIBILITY
Ten Ways to Lose Trust and Credibility, from "Improving 165
Dialogue with Communities: A Short Guide for Government Risk
Communication," written by Caron Chess, Billie Jo Hance, and
Peter Sandman (Trenton, N.J., Division of Science and Research,
N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, 1987).
VIL PLANNING FOR RISK COMMUNICATION
• Focus Group Technique, by Decision Research Corporation. 167
• EPA Title ffl Focus Group Results, adapted from material prepared 169
for the Environmental Protection Agency by Elaine Arkin and
David McCallum
• Focus Groups and Risk Communications: The Science of 177
Listening to Data. An article written by William Desvousges and
Kerry V. Smith. Risk Analysis. Vol. 8, No. 4 1988 pp. 479-484.
• Planning Dialogue With Communities: A Risk Communication 183
Workbook. Caron Chess, Billie Jo Hance, and Peter M. Sandman.
Environmental Communication Research Program, Rutgers
University. 1989
• Evaluating Risk Communication Programs: A Catalogue of Quick 227
and Easy Feedback Programs. Mark Kline, Caron Chess, and Peter
M. Sandman. Environmental Communications Research Program,
Rutgers University. 1989
-------
United States Aonl
Environmental Protection Agencv '988
Washington DC 20460 OPA-87-020
SEPA Seven Cardinal
Rules of Risk
Communication
-------
here are no easy
prescriptions for
successful risk
communication.
However, those who
have studied and
participated in recent
debates about risk
generally agree on
seven cardinal rules. These rules
apply equally well to the public and
private sectors.
Although many of the rules may
seem obvious, they are continually
and consistently violated in practice.
Thus, a useful way to read these
rules is to focus on why they are
frequently not followed.
Accept and involve
the public as a legitimate
partner
A basic tenet of risk communication
in a democracy is that people and
communities have a right to
participate in decisions that affect
their lives, their property, and the
things they value.
Guidelines: Demonstrate your
respect for the public and underscore
the sincerity of your effort by
involving the community early,
before important decisions are made.
Involve all parties that have an
interest or a stake in the issue under
consideration. If you are a
government employee, remember
that you work for the public. If you
do not work for the government, the
public still holds you accountable.
Point to Consider:
• The goal of risk communication in
a democracy should be to produce an
informed public that is involved,
interested, reasonable, thoughtful,
solution-oriented, and collaborative;
it should not be to diffuse public
concerns or replace action.
Plan carefully and
evaluate your efforts
Risk communication will be
successful only if carefully planned.
Guidelines: Begin with clear, explicit
risk communication objectives—such
as providing information to the
public, motivating individuals to r
stimulating response to emergent
or contributing to the resolution o.
conflict. Evaluate the information you
have about the risks and know its
strengths and weaknesses. Classify
and segment the various groups in
your audience. Aim your
communications at specific subgroups
in your audience. Recruit
spokespeople who are good at
presentation and interaction. Train
your staff—including technical
staff—in communication skills;
reward outstanding performance.
Whenever possible, pretest vour
messages. Carefully evaluate your
efforts and learn from your mistakes.
Points to Consider:
• There is no such entity as the
public"; instead, there are many
publics, each with its own interests,
needs, concerns, priorities,
preferences, and organizations.
• Different risk communication
goals, audiences, and media require
different risk communication
strategies.
-------
Listen to the public's
specific concerns
If you do not listen to people, you
cannot expect them to listen to you.
Communication is a two-way activity.
Guidelines: Do not make
assumptions about what people
know, think, or want done about
risks. Take the time to tmd out what
people are thinking: use techniques
such as interviews, focus groups, and
surveys. Let all parties that have an
interest or a stake in the issue be
heard. Identify with your audience
and try to put yourself in their place.
Recognize people's emotions. Let
people know that you understand
what they said, addressing their
concerns as well as yours. Recognize
the "hidden agendas," symbolic
meanings, and broader economic or
political considerations that often
underlie and complicate the task or
risk communication.
Point to Consider:
• People in the community are often
more concerned about such issues as
trust, credibility, competence,
control, voluntanness, fairness,
caring, and compassion than about
mortality statistics and the details of
quantitative risk assessment.
Be honest, frank,
and open
In communicating risk information,
trust and credibility are your most
precious assets.
Guidelines: State your credentials;
but do not ask or expect to be trusted
by the public. If you do not know an
answer or are uncertain, say so. Get
back to people with answers. Admit
mistakes. Disclose risk information as
soon as possible (emphasizing any
reservations about reliability). Do not
minimize or exaggerate the level of
risk. Speculate only with great
caution. If in doubt, lean toward
sharing more information, not
less—or people may think you are
hiding something. Discuss data
uncertainties, strengths and
weaknesses — including the ones
identified by other credible sources.
Identify worst-case estimates as such,
and cite ranges of risk estimates
when appropriate.
Point to Consider:
• Trust and credibility are difficult to
obtain. Once lost they are almost
impossible to regain completely.
Coordinate and
collaborate with other
credible sources
Allies can be effective in helping you
communicate risk information.
Guidelines: Take time to coordinate
all inter-organizational and
intra-organizational communications.
Devote effort and resources to the
slow, hard work of building badges
with other organizations. Use
credible and authoritative
-------
intermediaries. Consult with others
to determine who is best able to
answer questions about risk. Try to
issue communications jointly with
other trustworthy sources (for
example, credible university
scientists, physicians, or trusted local
officials).
Point to Consider:
• Few things make risk
communication more difficult than
conflicts or public disagreements with
other credible sources.
Meet the needs of
the media
The media are a prime transmitter of
information on risks; they play a
critical role in setting agendas and in
determining outcomes.
Guidelines: Be open with and
accessible to reporters. Respect their
deadlines. Provide risk information
tailored to the needs of each type of
media (for example, graphics and
other visual aids for television).
Prepare in advance and provide
background material on complex risk
issues. Do not hesitate to follow up
on stories with praise or criticism, as
warranted. Try to establish long-term
relationships of trust with specific
editors and reporters.
Point to Consider:
• The media are frequently more
interested in politics than in risk;
more interested in simplicity than in
complexity; more interested in
danger than in safety.
Speak clearly and
with compassion
Technical language and jargon are
useful as professional shorthand. But
they are barriers to successful
communication with the public.
Guidelines: Use simple,
non-technical language. Be sensitive
to local norms, such as speech and
dress. Use vivid, concrete images
that communicate on a personal
level. Use examples and anecdotes
that make technical risk data come
alive. Avoid distant, abstract,
unfeeling language about deaths,
injuries, and illnesses. Acknowle
and respond (both in words and
actions) to emotions that people
express—anxiety, tear, anger,
outrage, helplessness. Acknowledge
and respond to the distinctions that
the public views as important in
evaluating risks, e.g., voluntanness,
controllability, tamiiiantv. dread,
origin (natural or man-made),
benefits, fairness, and catastrophic
potential. Use risk comparisons to
help put risks in perspective; but
avoid comparisons that ignore
distinctions that people consider
important. Always try to include a
discussion of actions that are under
way or can be taken. Tell people
what you cannot do. Promise only
what you can do, and be sure to do
what you promise.
Points to Consider:
• Regardless of how well vou
communicate risk information, some
people will not be satisfied.
• Never let your efforts to inform
people about risks prevent you from
acknowledging—and saving—th?
-------
any illness, injury, or death is a
tragedy
o If people are sufficiently motivated.
they are quite capable ot
understanding complex risk
information, even it they may not
agree with you
This pamphlet was diatted bv Vincent T
Covello ami Frederick W Allen, with the
assistance ami review ot numerous
colleagues in and out ot government
Covello is Director ot the Center tor Rt?k
Communication in Columbia University
iind is currently President ot the Society
tor Risk Analusis iSRA) The vieics
expressed here ao not necessarily
represent the I'leics ot Columbia
University or the SRA Allen is Associate
Director ot the Otncc ot Policy Analysis
at the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) The EPA has published this
pamphlet as a non-binding reference
document, recognizing that the manner
in which the guidance sliould be applied
will necessarily ; am from case to case
The authors imnte your comments
-------
-------
Risk Communication Problems and
Problems
Risk communication problems arise from (1) message problems
(e.g., limitations of scientific risk assessments); (2) source
problems (e.g., limitations of risk communicators and risk
experts); (3) channel problems (e.g., limitations in the means or
media by which scientific information about health or
environmental risks is transmitted); and (4) receiver problems
(e.g., characteristics of the intended recipients of the
communication).
Message problems include:
o deficiencies in scientific understanding, data, models,
and methods resulting in large uncertainties in risk
estimates;
o highly technical analyses that are often unintelligible
to lay persons.
o shear amount of complexity of the analysis.
Source problems include:
o lack of trust and credibility;
o disagreements among scientific experts;
o limited authority and resources for addressing risk
problems;
o lack of data addressing the specific fears and concerns
of individuals and communities;
o failure to disclose limitations of risk assessments and
resulting uncertainties;
o limited understanding of the interests, concerns,
fears, values, priorities, and preferences of
individual citizens and public groups;
o use of bureaucratic, legalistic, and technical
language.
Adapted from Risk Communication (A Review of the Literature), a
report prepared for the Environmental Protection Agency, August
1987. Covello, Vincent T., Slovic, Paul and von Winterfeldt,
Detlof.
-------
Channel problems include:
o selective and biased media reporting that emphasizes
drama, wrongdoing, disagreements, and conflict;
o premature disclosure of scientific information;
o over implications, distortions, and inaccuracies in
interpreting technical risk information.
Receiver problems include:
o inaccurate perceptions of levels.of risk;
o lack of interest in risk problems and technical
complexities;
o overconfidence in one's ability to avoid harm;
o strong beliefs and opinions that are resistant to
change;
o exaggerated expectations about the effectiveness of
regulatory actions;
o desire and demands for scientific certainty;
o a reluctance to make trade-offs between risks, costs,
and benefits;
o difficulties in understanding probabilistic information
related to unfamiliar technologies.
-------
Some Dos and Don'ts of Listening
by Eastwood Atwater
In a crisis situation, you will be faced with several different audiences requiring your
attention and ability to really "hear" what they are saying.
Here are some suggestions for improving your listening skills, but be reminded that mastery
of these skills requires repeated practice.
When listening, try to do the following:
1. Become aware of your own listening habits.
What are your strong points? What arc your faults? Do you judge people too quickly?
Do you interrupt too often? A better awareness of your listening habits is the first
stage in changing them.
2. Shorn iespon$ib«!yfojtti0comfmirtcatton.
Remember that it takes two to communicate — one to talk and one to listen — with each
person alternating as the listener. Whenever you are unclear about what a speaker is
saying, it is your responsibility to let the speaker know this, either by asking for
clarification or actively reflecting what you heard and asking to be corrected.
3. Be puydk»ull/ attentive.
Face the speaker. Maintain appropriate eye contact. Make certain your posture and
gestures show you are listening. Sit or stand at a distance which puts you and the
speaker at ease. Remember that the one who is speaking wants an attentive, animated
listener, not a stone wall.
4. Concentrate on what the speaker Is saying.
Be alert for wandering thoughts. Being physically and verbally responsive will
probably help you concentrate on what the speaker is saying.
"Some Dos and Don'u of Listening" from / Hear You. copyright 1986 by Eastwood Atwater. Prentice Hill. Englewood Cliffs SJ l'< v
-------
5. Listen for the total meaning, including feelings as well as information.
Remember that people communicate their attitudes and feelings "coded" in socially
acceptable ways. Listen for the feelings as well as the content.
6. Observe the speaker's non-verbal signals.
Watch the speaker's facial expressions, and how modi he or she gazes and makes eye
contact with you. Listen to the speaker's tone of voice and rate of speech. Does the
speaker's body language reinforce or contradict the spoken words?
7. Adopt an accepting attitude toward the speaker.
An accepting attitude on the listener's part creates a favorable atmosphere for
communication. The more speakers feel accepted, the more they can let down their
guard and express what they really want to say. Any negative attitude OR the listener's
part tends to malt* a speaker feel defensive, insecure,, and more guarded in
communication.
8. Express empathetic understanding.
Use active, reflective listening skills to discover how other people feel, and what they
are really trying to say in terms of their own frame of reference.
9. Listen to yourself.
When you recognize the feelings stimulated in you by another's message, and can
express those feelings, this clears the air and helps you to listen better.
10. *Ck»eh^loop-of IWenir^bytok^
Remember that people often speak with the purpose of getting something tangible
done—to obtain information, to change your opinion, to get you to do something The
acid test of listening is how well you respond to the speaker's message with an
appropriate action. In listening, actions speak louder than words.
•Some Dos and Doo'u of Lirteaing" from / Hear You. copyright 1986 by Eastwood Atwaier, Prentice Hall. Englewood Cbffs SJ I'M
in
-------
While emphasis should be on positive suggestions for improving listening habits, it is helpful
to keep in mind some of the pitfalls of listening.
Consequently, in listening, don't do the following:
1. Don't mistake not talking for listening.
People who remain silent arm'r necessarily listening. They may be preoccupied with
their own thoughts. On the other hand, people can talk a lot and still process
information and listen quite well.
2. Don't fake listening.
Whenever you try to fake listening, your disinterest or boredom inevitably shows up in
your facial expressions or body language. More often than not, fake listening comes
across as an insult to the speaker.
3. Don't interrupt needlessly.
People in positions of power tend to interrupt more often than those not in power
without realizing it. If you must interrupt someone in a serious conversation, tn to
follow with a retrieval—helping the speaker to re-establish the train of thought.
4. Don't pass judgment too quickly.
Judgmental remarks invariably put others on the defensive, serving as barriers tn
effective communication.
5. Don't moke arguing an 'ego-trip.'
Even if you argue only "mentally" with what the speaker is saying, you tend to xt» >p
listening and look forward to your turn to talk. When you begin to argue verbulU >> u
become so preoccupied with justifying your own views that you often fail to hear the
other's viewpoint When you honestly disagree, you need to listen carefully in order t.»
understand what you are disagreeing with. Then state your point of view.
'Some Dos and Doo'ls of Listening" from / Hear You. copyright 1986 by Eastwood Atwater, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs
1L
-------
6. Don't ask too many questions.
Closed questions that require a definite answer should be kept to a minimum. Even
open questions that encourage a speaker to elaborate on a point should be used with
caution. Too many questions have a way of shifting control of the conversation to the
listener, putting the speaker on the defensive.
7. Don't ever toff a speaker 1 know exactly how you feel/
This remark serves more to justify your own efforts than to convince someone you are
really listening. In the first place, it is difficult to know just how another person feels.
Then too, such a generalized remark is likely to distract the speaker from further efforts
at self-expression, as well as cast doubt on your own credibility as a listener. It is
usually more effective to demonstrate you have heard with a reflective, empatheuc
response such as "I sense that you are feeling disappointed," or "I get the impression
you are angry about this."
8. Don't overreact to emotional words.
Be careful not to let yourself get so caught up in the speaker's outburst of feelings that
you miss the content of his or her message. Be alert for loaded words and expressions,
but listen also for the message that comes with them. Your own feelings can block
your understanding of something you may really need to hear.
9. Don't give advice unless it is requested.
Even when someone asks your advice, it is better to use reflective listening skills to
determine what that person wants to know.
10. Don't use listening as a way of hiding yourself.
People may use the appearance of listening as a way of avoiding emotional involvement
and real communication. The "listener" who uses silence as a personal retreat is
inadvertently preventing effective communication, rather than furthering it.
'Some Dos and Don'ti of Listening" from / Hear You. copyright 1986 by Eastwood Aiwaier. Prentice Hall. Englewood Cbffi NJ
12
-------
IMPROVING DIALOGUE WITH COMMUNITIES:
A SHORT GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT RISK COMMUNICATION
Submitted to:
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.
Division of Science and Research
Contract #029444
December 14,1987
(This report accompanies two related volumes: Improving
Dialogue with Communities: A Risk Communication Manual for
Government, and "Encouraging Effective Risk Communication In
Government: Suggestions for Agency Management'*)
Carpn Chess
Associate Director
Billie To Hance
Research Associate
Peter M, Sandman
Director
TNf »;*if uN
-------
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
Til
Hew Communities See Risk
Factors in Community Outrage
Yes. But
n. Earning Trust and Credibility
Yes. But .
Ten Ways to Lose Trust and Credibility
Yes. But
Ten Reasons to Release Information Early
IV. Interacting with the Community
Ladder of Citizen Participation
Yes. But
V. Explaining Risk
Yes. But
VI. Ten Myths of Risk Communication
"Improving Dulogne with Communities." wnnea by Caroo Chew. Bilbe Jo rhnce. »nd Peter Sandman of (he EovironmeDUl CommuiuuiiaD
Rewireh Progrkm a Cook College. Rutgers University, 1987.
14
-------
INTRODUCTION
Agency representatives who deal with environmental health Issues often feel
frustrated with communities that don't seem to listen and many times seem frightened
of the "wrong" risks. In response, agency policy-makers and staff can choose to ignore
communities (and In all likelihood face Increased hostility). Or they can choose to
Interact more effectively with the public. This guide was written for those who under-
stand that they must deal with communities but need some help In doing so.
• understand public perception and more easily anticipate community response to
agency actions:
• Increase the effectiveness of risk management decisions by Involving concerned
publics;
• Improve dialogue and reduce unwarranted tension between communities and
agencies:
• explain risks more effectively; and
• alert communities to risk in constructive ways.
CuiiuiiuiiiuiUng' about eiiviiuiuiieiitdl problems, however, cannot replace effec-
tive risk management. This guide will not provide techniques to make environmental
problems disappear. Although it might seem possible to sell "bad" policy with "good"
communication, we doubt that communities will buy the result.
DEVELOPMENT OF THIS GUIDE
"Improving Dialogue with Communities" was made possible by a contract from
tYuf Division, of 5r^T% anA agency staff throughout. *fr» country. These suggestions
have undergone a review process involving both an advisory committee and those we
interviewed. The authors are grateful to all the people who agreed to be Interviewed:
they are listed In the longer version of this guide, Improving Dialogue with Communities:
A Risk Communication Manual Jar Government.
Although based on extensive Interviewing and a review of the research literature.
'this guide does not purport to be derived from quantitative analysis or entirely free of
bias. We attempted to distill the wisdom, judgments, values, and Intuitions of those
whom we interviewed in ways that would be helpful to practitioners.
USING THIS GUIDE
This guide, which Is an abbreviated version of a longer manual, is useful to
_ those who wish a quick overview of how the public sees risk and how to Improve inter-
•Improving Dialogue with Communities.- written by Caron Chew. Bilbe Jo Huce. and Pewr Sandman of ibe Environmental Commuiuciuon
Research Program ai Cook College. Rutgers University. 1987
15
-------
actions with the public. As such, this guide may help orient new staff or those unfa-
miliar with strategies for dealing with communities. It may also serve as a reference for
more seasoned practitioners.
Because most risk communication Issues are so interrelated, we suggest you
read the entire guide first. Pay particular attention to Chapter I. which lays the ground-
work for much of the guide. When you are dealing with a particular communication
problem, you may wish to consult the longer manual for more in-depth guidance. If the
suggestions, here strike you a*-a bit too "cut and dried.* also ***•*•«•*»••
ns
longer manual for more substantiation. Although the guide you are reading
nearly all the "guidelines" In the longer version and sections entitled "Yes. But...." to
deal with the most likely concerns, we have omitted a variety of features: (a) In-depth
explanations of the rationale for each suggestion; (b) extensive quotations from those we
interviewed concerning the suggestions: and (c) anecdotes and examples that illustrate
the suggestions. (The complete manual is available from NJDEP's Division of Science
and Research. 401 East State Street. CN 409. Trenton. 08625.)
Finally, some of the suggestions may seem difficult to Implement without sup-
port from agency policy-makers. This issue is discussed in a separate report. "Encour-
aging Risk Communication In Government: Suggestions for Agency Management." also
available from the Division of Science and Research.
A FINAL NOTE
Many of the suggestions In this guide may seem common sense. Unfortunately.
these common-sense guidelines are routinely violated in agency practice, leading to the
all-too-common battles between agencies and communities. We hope this guide will
help common sense-become more omnium than the battle*.
•Improving Dialogue with Commooiues.* written by Caron Qttu. Bfllie Jo Hince. ind Peter Sandman of the Environmental Commua.cn,.
Research Program it Cook College. Rutgers University. 1987.
16
-------
Risk Communication Problems and Tasks
Problems
Risk communication problems arise from (1) message problems (e.g.. limitations of scientific
risk assessments); (2) source problems (e.g^ limitations of risk communicators and risk
experts); (3) channel problems (e.g., limitations in the means or media by which scientific
information about health or environmental risks is transmitted); and (4) receiver problems
(e.g., characteristics of the intended recipients of the communication).
Message problems Include:
a deficiencies in scientific understanding, data, models, and methods resulting in large
uncertainties in risk estimates;
o highly technical analyses that are often unintelligible to lay persons;
Q sheer amount of complexity of the analysis.
Source problems include:
Q lack of trust and credibility,
a disagreements among scientific experts;
a limited authority and resources for addressing risk problems;
Q lack of data addressing the specific fears and concerns of individuals and
communities;
Q failure to disclose limitations of risk assessments and resulting uncertainties:
Q limited understanding of the interests, concerns, fears, values, priorities, and
preferences of individual citizens and public groups;
a use of bureaucratic, legalistic, and technical language.
Adtpud from Halt Communication—A Renew of OK iaraturt.'t report prepared for ihe Envffoameoul Proucuon Agency. August
ViDcem T Covello. Paul Slovic. tad Detlof Von Wmtafeldt
17
-------
Channel problems include:
a selective and biased media reporting that emphasizes drama, wrongdoing,
disagreements, and conflict;
Q premature disclosure of scientific information;
a over implications, distortions, and inaccuracies in interpreting technical risk
information.
Receiver problems Include:
Q inaccurate perceptions of levels of risk;
o lack of interest in risk problems and technical complexities;
Q overconfidence in one's ability to avoid harm;
Q strong beliefs and opinions that are resistant to change;
a exaggerated expectations about the effectiveness of regulatory actions;
Q desire and demands for scientific certainty;
a a reluctance to make trade-offs between risks, costs, and benefits;
3 difficulties in understanding probabilistic mfonnatkm related to unfamiliar
technologies.
Adapud from Risk Communication-* Review of At Lueraairt. a repon prepared for the Environmental Protection Agency. Augiui l'»' h>
Vincent T. CoveHo, Paul Slovic, and Dedef Voo Winterfeldt
18
-------
I. HOW COMMUNITIES SEE RISK
Agency scientists and policy-makers are particularly confused and frustrated by
public reactions to environmental risk. Tempers flare at a public meeting concerning a
risk that the agency estimates might cause considerably fewer'than one-ln-a-million
Increased cancer deaths. Yet people will smoke during the break and drive home
without seat belts- risks far greater than those discussed at the public meeting. When
agency scientists point out this apparent contradiction (ignoring the fact that smoking
and driving, without a seat belt are risks that people choose, not an environmental risk
that chooses them), people become even angrier. Conversely, risks that the agency sees
as serious—naturally occurring radon gas In homes, for example—can be met with
relative Indifference by the public.
In order to reduce the level of hostility between agencies and the public, those
who work within agencies need to understand better how communities perceive risk.
Agencies sometimes respond to unexpected community reactions by dismissing them as
irrational and concluding that the public is unable to understand the scientific aspects
of risk. But when agencies make decisions that affect communities without involving
those «*nmmnnm*MB they o*Vn fitftt even angrier responses.
In order to break this cycle, agencies might begin by recognizing that communi-
ties are quite capable of understanding the scientific aspects of risk assessment. "The
public* includes doctors, chemists, and teachers, as well as persons with less scientific
background, who understand many of the technical intricacies of risk. In fact, while
government personnel may change over the course of an environmental problem, rest-
dents of affected communities often remember studies, reports, and agency actions with
an Impressive amount of recall. Too often government assumes that because communi-
ties don't agree with an agency action, t'-.ey don't understand iL
Because outbursts of citizen anger make agencies understandably uncomfort-
able, they also tend to forget that public outrage can be extremely positive. In fact.
most environmental agencies and a significant number of the laws they enforce are the
results of citizen campaigns, fueled by anger over environmental degradation. Funding
for these laws, and consequently for agency staff, also depends in some cases on tough
legislative battles fought by citizens. In addition, most agencies can admit to a number
of environmental problems that wouldn't have been uncovered were it not for commu-
nity action.
On the other hand, agencies particularly resent anger directed at them rather
than at the environmental problem. Unfortunately, agencies tend to act (often unwit-
tingly) in ways that provoke such anger.
FACTORS IN COMMUNITY OUTRAGE
Admittedly, public fears are often not well-correlated with agency assessments
While agencies focus on data gathered from hazard evaluations, monitoring, and risk
assessments, the public takes into account many other factors besides scientific data
Collectively, it is helpful to think of these non-technical factors as the 'outrage* dimen-
sion of risk, as opposed to the "hazard*
als. Because the public pays more attention to outrage than the experts do. public nsk
assessments are likely to be very different from agency risk assessments. Ignoring the
"Improving Dialogue with Communities.' wnnen by.Caron Chess. Bilbe Jo Hince. and Peier Sandman of the Environment Gxnni.- .. r
Research Program at Cook College. Ringers University. 1987
19
-------
variables that influence public perception- or worse, labeling them irrational and then
discounting them- is guaranteed to raise the level of hostility between community
members and agency representatives and will ultimately stand in the way of a success-
ful resolution of the problem.
Merely hammering away at the scientific information will rarely help. Most
agency representatives can recall Instances when explaining the science made little
difference- or made people even angrier. While it may be tempting to conclude from
this thai laypeople cannot understand risk assessment data, research in the field of risk
perception, backed by much anecdotal evidence, strongly suggests that other factors
are at work. Below are some of the key variables that underlie community perception of
risk:1
a. Voluntary rtsks are accepted more readily than those that are imposed. When
people dont have choices, they become angry. Similarly, when communities feel co-
erced into accepting risks, they tend to feel furious about the coercion. As a result, they
focus on government's process and pay far less attention to substantive risk Issues:
ultimately, they come to see the risk as more risky.
b. Rtsks under individual control are accepted more readily than those under govern-
ment control Most people feel safer with risks under their own control. For example.
most of us feel safer driving than riding as a passenger. Our feeling has nothing to do
with the data— our driving recant versus the driving recoid of others. Similarly, people
tend to feel more comfortable with environmental risks they can do something about
themselves, rather than having to rely on government to protect them.
c. Rtsks that seem fair are more acceptable than those that seem unfair. A coerced
risk will always seem unfair. In addition, a community that feels stuck with the risk
and little of the benefit will find the risk unfair- and thus more serious. This factor
explains, in part, why communities that depend on a particular industry for Jobs some-
times see pollution from that Industry as less risky.
d» Risk' tnfut inatton thutwuwfromtrttstwm ttiu wurceftrifiuie
than tnformattonjrom untrustworthy sources. If a mechanic with whom you have quar-
relled in the past suggests he cant find a problem with a car that seems faulty to you.
you will respond quite differently than if a friend delivers the same news. You are more
apt to demand justification, rather than ask neutral questions, of the mechanic. Unfor-
tunately, on-going battles with communities erode trust and make the agency message
far less believable.
While the above factors are those most frequently stumbled over by government
agencies, social scientists have Identified additional variables that are also likely to be
relevant to agencies dealing with the public about environmental health issues:
e. Risks that seem ethically objectionable wOl seem more risky than those that don't.
To many people, pollution is morally wrong. As former EPA Assistant Administrator
Milton Russell put It, speaking to some people about an acceptable level of pollution is
like talking about an acceptable number of child molestera.
1 Baruch Jlachhoff. Paul Slavic, and Sarah Uchtenstetai conducted much of the grouad-breaktng
Dulogue with Cbmnniaibef." wntten by Csron Chen. Bilbe Jo Hiaee. and Peter -<••*•«• of the Environmental Conunuoicjiioo
Research Program at Cook College. Ruigen University. 1987
20
-------
/. Natural risks seem more acceptable than artificial risks. Natural risks provide no
focus for anger a risk caused by God is more acceptable than one caused by people.
For example, consider the difference between the reactions to naturally occurring radon
in homes and the reactions to high radon levels caused by uranium mine tailings or
industrial sources.
g. Exotic risks seem mare risky than familiar risks. A cabinet full of household
cleansers, for example, seems much less risky than a high-tech chemical facility that
makes the cleansers.
ft. Risks that are associated with other, memctrible events are considered more
risky. Risks that bring to mind Bhopal or Love Canal, for example, are more likely to be
feared than those that lack such associations.
The greater the number and seriousness of these factors, the greater the likelihood
of public concern about the risk, regardless of the scientific data. As government agen-
cies have seen many times, the risks that elicit public concern may not be the same
ones that scientists have identified as most dangerous to health. When officials dismiss
the public's concern as misguided, moreover, the result is controversy, anger, distrust.
and still greater concern. None of this is meant to suggest that people disregard scien-
tific information and make decisions- based only on the other variables— the outrage
factors. It does suggest, however, that outrage also matters, and that by ignoring the
outrage factors, agencies skew the balance and cause people to become still more
outraged. This is the logic that leads to the guideline that follows.
Pay as much attention to outrage factors, and to the community's concerns, as to
scientific variables. At the tame time, don't underestimate the public's ability to
understand the science.
Agencies tro often focus on the scientific data and Ignore the outrage factors.
They pay the price for doing so. Insistence on dealing with the "right* risks, the "right"
way. may seem to many outside the agency as arrogant at best. If you fall to attend to
the outrage factors and people's concerns from the outset, you will often be forced to
attend to them later, after you have angered the public—a far more difficult situation.
For example, communities which were not consulted during the decision-making
process more readily fight agency decisions. Similarly, agency representatives have
sometimes been shouted down when trying to present data because communities have
felt their concerns were not acknowledged, much less addressed.
Nonetheless, there are examples of agency successes. The New York Department
of Health asked office workers their concerns and gave them opportunities for input
following a fire that contaminated their office building with dloxln. Trust was built in
the process. NJDEP listened to— and responded to— community concerns in Clinton
where extremely high radon levels were found, leading to a community response to
NJDEP that seemed far more positive than in many other instances. In Virginia, a
developer Involved the community in the risk assessment process, building sufficient
credibility that when the risk assessment showed negligible risks, the results were
believed. In most of these instances of success, communities that were consulted about
their concerns were also helped to understand the science, and their understanding
"Improving Dialogue with Communities.- wntleo by Cargo Chess. Billie Jo Haoce. aad Peier Sandman of the Environmental Conunuucu.
Research Program it Cook College. Ringers University. 1987
21
-------
In short, response to risk is more complex than a linear response to "the facts.*
This does not mean that people dont need to know— or want to know—the facts. It
means rather that agencies need to take into account other factors as well.
YES, BUT-..
• Our Job is to protect public health. That means relying on data, not deal-
ing with outrage/actors.
There are basically three responses to this point:
First, if you merely run with scientific information and ignore the outrage fac-
tors, you will outrage the public. As a result, risks the agency deems minimal will
become battlegrounds. Agencies will have less time for serious risks. In short, one way
or another agencies wffl have to deal with these factors.
Second, in a democracy controversial issues are not merely determined by those
with technical expertise. For example, the experts in the Pentagon have great technical
expertise in weaponry, but few people, regardless of their political beliefs, feel that
American defense policy should be determined solely by the Pentagon.
Third, data are not always complete, and management options are rarely perfect.
The public's raising other concerns can lead to better technical solutions.
• {fit were not for activist groups, there would be no outrage.
As anyone who has tried to organize a community can attest, it is hard to create
outrage when none exists. Advocacy groups can focus or direct the community's anger.
but rarely create it. In fact, most environmental activists count on government to create
the outrage. In many cases where environmental officials blame public-interest groups
for blocking solutions, the blame needs to be shared by the officials themselves, who
amrtttmgty goaded the outrage by neglecting from the outset to listen to community
concerns. Instead of blaming citizens for not understanding risk, in short agencies
might spend more time trying to understand citizen concerns.
•Improving Dialogue with Communiuej." written by C«ron die*. Bilbe Jo Huce. tad Peier Sudrau at the Environment*] Commucuciiion
Research Program it Cook College. Rutgers University. 1987.
22
-------
H. EARNING TRUST AND CREDIBILITY
Agencies achieve trust. In large part, by being consistently competent, caring.
and honest. If you communicate with honesty and fairness, your audience will often
respond in kind. On the other hand, slick packaging with a veneer of honesty is easy to
see through and more likely to undermine trust than to build it. Jim Callaghan. who
spent many years advising industry as senior vice president of the public relations firm
of Hill and Knowlton. puts it this way: The only way to achieve credibility is to 'be
credible.'
Of course, acting trustworthy is no guarantee that people will ultimately trust
you. But if you fail to "be credible,' you will virtually guarantee community opposition,
in the form of both disagreement with the science and resentment of the agency.
Bruce Bentley. citizen participation specialist at the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation, points out that a key to building
trust can be involving people in decision-making. A controversy over what to do
with PCBs In the Hudson River was fueled by the lack of trust resulting from the
agency's failure to ask people about disposal of the PCBs. Bentley says. "We
failed to involve people In determining what the criteria for a site should be and
then went ahead and selected the site.... By that time, people were not willing to
buy into the criteria and certainly, therefore, not willing to. buy into the site.*
Conversely, trust can be built by dealing with the public forthrtghtly.
When a flre contaminated a Blnghamton office building with dloxln. the New York
State Department of Health decided to make all working sessions of the technical
risk assessment committee open to the public and the media. The committee.
which consisted of people from the city, union members, and technical people
unafllllated with the health department struggled with difficult questions openly.
Although the meetings were not public information meetings, there was time
allotted for questions at the end of each session. As Faith Schottenfeld. commu-
nity relations specialist at the department, pointed out. 'It was really helpful for
people to »ee the kind of Interchange that went on betaken time expert* when it
LHIIK to rmkliig difficult decisions.*
The guidelines In this chapter provide a framework for the more specific recom-
mendations in other chapters.
1. Be aware of the factors which Inspire trust. Trust in an agency depends, in
large part, on whether the agency: (a) seems competent; (b) seems caring: (c) encourages
meaningful public involvement: (d) seems honorable and honest; and (e) takes into
account the "outrage factors* which Influence perception of risk. (See Chapter 1.) In
essence. Instead of pushing the public to trust them, agencies should strive toward
acting consistently trustworthy.
2. Pay attention to process. In many cases citizen opposition focuses not only on
agency action (or inaction), but also on the manner in which the agency proceeded
toward that action. Try. whenever possible, to involve affected communities In agency
action.
3. Explain agency procedures. Communities need to understand government's
Internal workings, a"d "gr™**^ ™"*i to show U*^ they ppcrattt in some icigft'^ manner.
Indicate* how public input fits Into the process.
"ImproviDg Dulogue with Communities." written by Caroo Cheii. Bilbe Jo Hiacc. ud Peiet Stndmu at the Environment!) Comnuio,*ji,. n
Research Program ai Cook College. Ringers University. 1987
23
-------
"People nod the agencies and thetr actions more care/uUy than they read the details of
the studies.... That's what we have generalized skill at" Baruch Flschhoff. leading
researcher on risk perception, Carnegie-Mellon University.
4. Be forthcoming with Information and Involve the public from the outset. If
you fall to disclose Information or Involve people early, the public is apt to mistrust the
agency. The agency will then be put on the defensive. (See Chapter III.)
B. Focnt oa building trust as veil as generating good scientific data. As
explained In Chapter I. people's risk judgments are seldom based solely on scientific
information, but rather on a combination of the data, their perception, of the risk due to
other variables, and their feelings about the agency.
6. Follow up. When your promises fall through the cracks, you might not notice.
but those to whom you made the promises usually do. Make every effort to get back to
people and check to see if your promises are becoming reality. In particular, consider
making sure that notes are taken at public meetings regarding commitments. Then
write follow-up memos and take follow-up actions to make the promises happen.
7. Uake only promises you are sure you can keep. It is often tempting to make
unrealistic promises when pressed by the public, or to promise something you genu-
inely expect to deliver, only to find out later you cant. Consider explaining goals and
the process leading to them rather than promising firm dates. Providing regular prog-
ress reports, even when progress is slow, can be very helpful. If you find you cant
follow through on a promise you have made, explain fully as soon as possible rather
than hoping people will forget. They probably wont.
8. ProvtdB iafonDattoB tint BMta pcopIt'fcBMda* *>i*t<**ii%te what people want
to know— and what they win need to know even if they dont ask for it. Take some time
to develop a list of problems, issues, and needs people might have, and prepare re-
sponses that address them. Keep in mind that different organizations and types of
people will have different needs— a pregnant woman may have different concerns than
the Chamber of Commerce. (See Chapter V.)
9i Get the facts straight. Although agency representatives work hard to provide
accurate information, sometimes facts get Jumbled or key information is left out so
people later feel misled. Try to spot areas In advance where confusion might occur and
make an extra effort to be clear. If the effort fails, correct the misimpresslon as quickly
as possible.
10. Try to coordinate with other agencies. When communities get mixed mes-
sages, they are apt to feel confused and distrustful. To the extent possible, coordinate
agency messages. When agencies have honest differences, acknowledge them.
1 1. Blake sure to coordinate within your agency. Lack of coordination within the
agency creates, confusion, and an. impression of agency ineptness. Responses to various
acknowledged and explained.
•laproviag Dialogue with Communiuw." writtea by tira Chen. BOUe Jo Hioee. ud Pete* Sandman of the Eovironma.ul Commuoicauoa
Research Program u Cook College, Rutgen University. 1987.
-------
12. Don't give mixed messages. Risk Issues are sufficiently confusing that any
Inconsistencies— or seeming Inconsistencies- can make matters worse. For example, if
you tell a community that risks are minimal and then take samples wearing protective
gear, to reduce confusion, explain the seeming contradiction before you take the action.
13. Listen to what various groups are telling you. Try to foster mutual respect
and consideration with all stakeholders in an Issue. Avoid offending any group, includ-
ing activists. Agencies tend to overestimate the power of activist groups. These groups
can't create outrage; they can only nurture existing outrage.
14. EnlUtthc help of orfndcfttioin? tint bra credibility with communities.
Groups that have focal credibility (not merely organizations which agencies believe
should have credibility) can be Involved In helping explain risks. However, this ap-
proach can't replace forthrightness or more extensive community Involvement.
15. Avoid "closed" meetings. While casual meetings- the routine turning of gov-
ernment wheels-are rarely suspect, private meetings-those closed to the public- are
more likely to cause distrust. The meetings agencies feel they can't afford for the public
to know about are the very ones the public will probably eventually hear about. You
may avoid many problems by keeping meetings open.
16. If yon are dealing with a tf tnation In which trust IB low, consider taking the
following steps:
a. Review the outrage factors in Chapter I and the guidelines in this chapter.
Consider which ones may have been violated.
b. Acknowledge the lack of trust: "I know you may feel I cant be trusted because
the person who handled this case before me delayed In giving you the informa-
tion...."
c. Indicate what steps you plan to take to prevent the trust-eroding actions from
happening again: "In order to make sure you get information as quickly as
possible. I am going to send you bi-weekly updates about the status of the
situation. These updates will include all new data."
d. Ask those who distrust you what they feel would make them more likely to trust
you. To the extent possible. Implement their suggestions.
e. Respond on a personal level, when appropriate (see Chapter rvj".
f. Try to reduce reasons for distrust by sharing Information and involving the
public In developing solutions (see Chapter IV).
g. Be patient. Dont expect all the people to trust you all the time, even if you feel
you are totally trustworthy.
Because it may take a lot of effort to recoup trust, expect to go out of your way
for people. If you are the person who aroused the distrust, acknowledge your mistakes.
"Because communities don't trust us they forget what ts loglcaL The reason they don't '
tru*u» to tt&uxdOrtttiwoto* them tn the decisions.* Bruce Bentlcy.CtttenParttci- .
patlon Specialist. New York Department of Environmental Conservation.
"Improving Dialogue «iih Communities'.- written by Cafoo Chess. BilUe Jo Hince. and taa Sandman of the Envronmeoul Commueuc-.on
Research Program at Cook College. Ruigeri University. 1987
25
-------
YES, BUT....
• ft seems that no matter what we do, some people will never trust us.
True. However, the fact that you can't earn the trust of aD the people all the
time does not imply that you should forgo the effort. Check to make sure that— despite
a basic commitment to trustworthiness—you have not violated some of the basic prin-
ciples in this guide. The agency may also be confusing trust with agreement; people
can trust each, other's integrity and f**H disagree on fundamental matters.
TEN WAYS TO LOSE TRUST AND CREDIBILITY
Take a good look at most risk communication 1101101' stories" and you'll
probably find a major breakdown In trust between government representatives and
the public they are supposed to serve. The next time someone comes to you with a
sob story about communicating with the public, you might want to hand them this
tongue-in-cheek list. Or better yet. hand it out before the damage is done.
1. Don't Involve peep** tn decisions that directly affect their lives. Then
act defensive when your policies are challenged,
2. Hold onto information until people are screaming for It. While they are
waiting, don't tell them when they will get it. Just say. "These things take
time." or "It's going through quality assurance."
3. Ignore peoples'feelings. Better yet. say they are Irrelevant and irrational.
It helps to add that you can't understand why they are overreacting to such
a small risk.
4. Don't follow up. Place returning phone calls from citizens at the bottom of
your to do" list. Delay sending out the information you promised people at
the public meeting.
5. If you make a mistake, deny ft. Never admit you were wrong.
6. If you don't know the answers, fake it. Never say "I dont know."
T. Dsrft speak plain English. When explaining technical information, use
professional Jargon. Or simplify so completely that you leave out important
. information. Better yet, throw up your hands and say, "You people could
not possibly understand this stuff."
8. Present yourself tike a bureaucrat. Wear a three-piece suit to a town
meeting at the Jocal grange, and sit up on stage with seven of your col-
leagues who art dressed similarly.
9. Delay talking to other agencies Involved- or other people involved within
your agency- so the message the public gets can be as confusing as pos-
sible.
IflU' fern* ofymir trhiif luff has- trouble relating to people hates to do it.
- * and has begged not to, send him or her out anyway. It's good experience.
Dialogue with Commaahies." wnnea by Cvon Chess. Bilbe lo Hiace. ud Peter Sudmu ef the Environmental
Research Program u Cook College. Rittgen University. 1987.
26
-------
HI. DECIDING WHEN TO RELEASE INFORMATION
Perhaps no other aspect of agency communication of environmental risk is so
closely related to the agency's credibility as Its decision about when to share informa-
tion with the public. Agencies fear that releasing Information early may lead to undue
alarm or lead to disclosure of incorrect or misinterpreted data. Agencies also hold onto
information while developing risk management options rather than going to the public
empty-handed.
But what agencies view as responsible caution, communities are apt to see as a
"cover-up" or as bureaucratic intransigence. When health risks are Involved, regardless
of the level of risk, communities find it difficult to accept any Justification for withhold-
ing information. Therefore, community anger over agency process may block possibili-
ties for constructive dialogue over the risk itself. Moreover, waiting to release informa-
tion until the agency has made its management choices reduces the chances for com-
munity participation In the risk management process, and thus lessens the chances of
a solution acceptable to the agency and the community.
Fox ^U^IPP^I Susan ^an^rtft, fonnftrfy mttK ti»» jsti|p^y|i[]pr^ PTQAF&IH in
EPA Region I and currently manager of the Risk Assessment Group at E.C.
Jordan Company, was once in a position where the release of test results was
delayed for three months while the agency analyzed an additional round of
samples. Interpreted the data, and decided whether EPA or state government
should take the lead. By the time the agency let the community know the level of
contaminants in their wells, residents were so upset with the agency that com-
munication was extremely difficult. if not impossible.
On the other hand. Bruce Bentley. citizen participation specialist with
the New-York Department of Environmental Conservation, tefls* of • county
health department going door-to-door sampling wells for TCE and explaining the
potential risk as soon as there was any reason for suspicion of contamination of
private wells. Results of the tests were sent by mall, informing residents of times
for •availability sessions* with state and county representatives to answer ques-
tions. People were alerted to each step of the process before it happened, and as
a result discussion with the community centered on the risk Itself, not on the
way people were treated.
The following suggestions provide guidance about deciding when to communi-
cate and steps to take If you decide to delay release.
1. If people are at risk, do not wait to communicate—and to act on—risk In-
formation. If a hazard Is putting people at immediate risk, the agency should follow its
mandate to protect public health without hesitation.
2. 1C the agency la Investigating a potential risk that people aren't aware of.
tbat affeBcyrafeflnldF aflriootfjF consider rrraklnf fcnowv vttatnTis) tfofatf and why.
When an agency announces findings from an investigation people have not been aware
'Improving Dialogue with Communities," written by Cvoo Chew. Billie Jo Hince. tod Peter Sandman of the Environmental Commurucu^n
Research Program at Cook College. Rutgers University. 1987
27
-------
of, the agency Is forced to defend Its delay tn announcing the investigation, and to
justify the possibility that people were exposed to a risk longer than necessary. The
public, In Its anger over not being told. Is more likely to overestimate the risk and far
less likely to trust any recommendations that the agency makes concerning the risk
Itself.
3. If It seems likely that the media or someone else may release the informa-
tion before yon are ready, release it yourself. When information is leaked, agencies
lose the ability to shape the issues and are Instead engaged in playing "catch up" at the
expense of their ci edibility ondt the accurate portrayal of information.
4. If it is likely that the media will "fill in" with information concerning an
ongoing story while they are waiting for yon to speak, speak first. When you wait
to communicate about an issue that is already news, the press will shape the issue
without you. You may spend more time defending your views or your credibility.
5. If you really don't trust your data, talk to the public about your procedures
but don't release the data. Obviously, hold onto data for which your preliminary
review shows serious quality euntiul ormethodologtcal flaws. However, be op-front and
tell citizens what has happened and when they will be able to get some results,
6. If the preliminary results do show a problem—and yon are fairly confident
of the results—release them and explain the tentativeness of the data. If you are
fairly confident that the data show a problem, then holding onto data for any length of
time for any reason is likely to be considered unconscionable. You will leave the agency
vulnerable to charges of cover-up later on and risk creating a great deal of anger.
7. Before deciding to wait to communicate—especially if the newt is bad-
consider the effect on the credibility of the agency representative dealing with
the public. Because credibility can be a scarce commodity, difficult to replace, you
might make it a major variable In your decision about timing the release of Information.
In particular, take into account the effect of your decision on those staff who are dealing
with the community.
8. Release information while the risk management options are tentative.
rather than waiting to develop solutions. If they are not consulted during the deci-
sion-making process, people are likely to resent decisions that affect their lives. Con-
sider, instead, giving people risk management options, not decisions, when you release
the data. Then work with them to develop risk management decisions. (See Chapter IV.)
9. If yon feel the information will not make sense unless released with other
relevant information—and yon don't have all the information yet—wait to release
'When you're designing an Investigation or a regulatory strategy, the communication
iM Kpg/n_ft|gf r^
Thuuiaa.Burfce. Deputy Conimtsalener; New Jeraey Department of
Health.
-Improving Dialogue with CommuniUei.* wntteo by Caroo diets. Bribe Jo Haoce. and Peter Sandman of the EnvironineDUl Communion...n
Research Program at Cook College. Rutgers University. 1987
28
-------
"We get a. great deal of criticism because people don't know what we're doing.... There's
always going to be delay: there's always going to be problems. But at least we can tell
them what we're doing.' Gary Sondermeyer, Acting Bureau Chief. Bureau of Solid
Waste & Resource Recovery Planning. NJDEP.
it all at once. But explain to the public why you are waiting, and get the Informa-
tion as toon as you can. If piecemeal release of information would seriously disrupt
the agency's program or the public's understanding, then consider delay. But take a
hatrf Inrft at wh^H^r gaplaTWiinrte r^aHy twrf tn n«tt nr 1m farf n*vA tn Tu» hanriUrf
better. If you wait, be sure to be clear about your reasons, and say when the Informa-
tion will be available.
10. If yon wait until the data are quality-assured to release them, use the
time—and the preliminary data—to develop management options and advise the
community on interim actions, if necessary. While the agency may choose not to
release data until it is fully confident, it can still use those preliminary results to guide
discussions about the risk.an^ possible mitigation efforts.
11. If yon are waiting to communicate data or Information for some other
reason, don't say you are waiting for data to undergo quality assurance. Use this
rationale only when It is the real reason. Agencies lose credibility when they tell half-
truths or remain silent and let others fill in the information gaps—often incorrectly If
you need to delay release of Information, you will generally do better by being forthright
and not using quality control as an excuse.
*Z. u yotr uWVoecTQCO; cnrr yw cuz s coBiBBxrcYtvrfgTiT iwvyavotn tne risk,
talk to the public about the process yon are going through to get the information.
etc. Don't merely remain silent. In the absence of information from the agency.
people may fill In the blanks of missing Information themselves, or they may become
more fearful thinking that the truth is too awful to be told.
§§§
YES, BUT....
• Releasing information early, while data are still preliminary and we don't
have a clear game plan, leaves the agency vulnerable to criticism.
This guide is not suggesting releasing information without forethought and
planning. We are suggesting that you consider releasing the data if you trust them, a.-.d
if you have developed some management options or a process leading to development of
options. Although the agency is obviously vulnerable to criticism, you may be more
vulnerable if you hold onto information. You will be taking a gamble with your credibil-
ity.
'Improving Dialogue with Communities." written by Caron Chess. Bilue Jo Hance. and Peter Sandman of (he Environmental Cornier.,
Research Program at Cook College. Ruigen University. 1987
29
-------
• By releasing information early, we may cause undue alarm.
You may cause greater alarm, compounded by resentment and hostility, if you
hold onto Information. When people are not given information, they may think that the
truth is too awful to be told, or they may consider the agency uncaring. Instead, con-
sider releasing information In context and with caveats, if necessary.
• We run the risk of legal liability if we release information early.
The number of cases in which ttabfltty is a primary concern—rather than a
convenient lattoxiale is questionable. Xan we do this?'wiB probably etett a different
response from a lawyer than "We want to do this, so can you help us deal with any legal
concerns?' If. in fact, there might be a liability problem, vulnerability to legal action
should be weighed against the ten reasons given below for considering early release of
information.
TEN REASONS TO RELEASE INFORMATION EARLY
Decisions about when to release information depend, in large part on the
situation. However, agencies should seriously examine the Implications of holding
onto Infonnatian. The next time you contemplate whether to make mfi
public, consider some of the reasons to release information early:
vnociuun
1. People are entitled to information that affects their lives.
2. Early release of information sets the pace for resolution of the problem.
3. If you wait the story may teak anyway. Wheattdoex* van are-opt to lose
trust and, credibfltty,
4. You can better control the accuracy of information if you are the first to
present it.
5. There is more likely to be time for meaningful public involvement in decision-
making if the information is released promptly.
6. Prompt release of information about one situation may pi event similar situ-
ations elsewhere.
7. Less work is required to release information early than to respond to inquir-
ies, attacks, etc. that might result from delayed release.
8. You are more apt to earn public trust if you release information promptly.
9, If you wait, people may feel angry and resentful about not learning of the in-
formation earlier.
10. People are more likely to overestimate the risk if you hold onto information.
•Improving Dialogue with Communities." wimen by Caron Oxen. Bilbe Jo Huce. and Peter Sudmu of the EDvironmenul Cofiununjcai,.
-------
IV. INTERACTING WITH THE COMMUNITY
Agency staff and members of the public are apt to feel equally frustrated by
stormy interactions. Both get weary of arguments that revolve around "who said what
to whom when." rather than issues that contribute substantrveh/ to solving environ-
mental health problems.
In response, some agency representatives feel that the best Interaction with the
public is no Interaction. They fervently hope that risk communication techniques will
make the public go away and leave the agency to make decisions in peace. However.
there is a strong consensus among experienced practitioners that the solution to the
problems described above is more, rather than less interaction.
Two cases illustrate this point and contrast markedly with the battles that
sometimes characterize agency interactions with the public:
In Tacoma. Washington EPA was confronted with a difficult policy
question: How should the agency regulate an arsenic-emitting smelter that
aa* tnr »K» «r.nmiiiiliy> The pTObletR Involved
(as environmental health problems often do) Issues of equity, economics, and
community values In addition to technical concerns. EPA decided to open the
process to the public, enabling the community to grapple with some of the
uncertainties and judgment calls that often face agencies. While making clear
that the final decision rested with the agency, EPA demonstrated by word and by
action genuine Interest In the community's concerns and values. For example.
EPA staff who lived In the area by the smelter critiqued presentations so that the
agency better addressed community needs. To demonstrate EPA's commitment
to soliciting input, informational presentations were followed by questlon-and-
answer sessions in smalt group*, facilitated by people from outside the agency.
Because the smelter clused. a decision was iieiiei1 required: Bur the experiment
in Tacoma is an example of an agency respecting community values and attempt-
ing to involve people outside the agency meaningfully In the decision-making
process.
Lois Glbbs of the Citizen's Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes (and
previously a key citizen leader at Love Canal) relates a story In which a private
developer was confronted with high levels of arsenic In groundwater. In the
Interests of selling homes and avoiding litigation, he provided potential homeown-
ers with funds to hire a technical consultant agreeable to both sides. The
consultant or the community members themselves were Involved in every step of
the risk assessment process. Including developing sampling plans and determin-
ing the assumptions on which the assessment was based. When the risk assess-
ment showed negligible risk, people trusted the results sufficiently to purchase
homes.
When Interacting with the public, consider the following guidelines.
1. Recognize the importance of community input. Citizen Involvement is
important because: (a) People are entitled to make decisions about issues that directly
affect. their lives; (a) Input team, the community can help the* agency make better deci-
sions: (d Involvement in the process leads to greater uiufei standing' of— and more
appropriate reaction to- a particular risk; (d) Those who are affected by a problem bring
"Improving Dialogue with Communiues." wnaeo by Caron Chess. Billie Jo Huce, tod Peter Sandman of (he Environmental Commutu.u. n
Research Program at Cook College. Rutgers University. 1987
31
-------
"The community is the expert about possible routes of exposure and what they are most
concerned about * Raymond Neutra, Chief, Epldemiological Studies and Survefllancc
Section, California Department of Health Services.
different variables to the problem-solving equation; and (e) Cooperation Increases
credibility. . Finally, without community input, battles that erode public confidence and
agency resources are more likely.
2. To the extent possible. Involve the community In the decMon-nuking
pieces*. Agencies typically spend considerable effort developing a risk management
strategy, announce it to the community, and then defend the strategy against the
onslaught of opinion- often a reaction to the agency's failure to Involve those affected.
Instead, particularly with issues which are apt to provoke controversy, consider involv-
ing the public In risk management decisions. Some practitioners and academic experts
also suggest public involvement in the risk assessment process, as Illustrated by the
story at the beginning of this chapter.
As illustrated by the "Citizen Participation Ladder" on the following page, citizen
involvement takes a variety of forms from fairly minimal participation ("Government
Power) to citizens taking the lead ("Citizen Power"). Consider placing agency tnterac-
ttonswtth theccagnuntty at a higher rung on the ladder. Propose a higher level of
Involvement from the outset rather than being pushed by the community to the next
rung. Increasing the level of public participation is particularly important when: (a)
controversy exists: (b) feelings run high; (c) the agency genuinely needs Input: or (d)
citizens request It.
• Involve the community at the earliest stage possible. Meaningful input is
easier before agency staff feel committed to a course of action. Communities are also
• Clarify the public's role from the outset. In other words, clearly define your
position on the Citizen Participation Ladder. For example, dont promise the public
Input and then essentially ask for ratification of agency decisions.
• Acknowledge situations where the agency can give the community only
limited power In the decision-making. Present legal or other constraints (resources.
time, staffing, regulatory limitations, etc.) from the outset, but avoid using them as false
excuses. Consider community suggestions for ways to deal wife these constraints.
• Find out from communities what type of involvement they prefer. Different
communities win want different types of interaction and should be consulted about
these preferences.
3. Identify and respond to the needs of different audiences. Although the term
the public" is used throughout this guide, in fact there are many publics, each affected
differently by an Issue. Depending on the Issue, the agency may need to communicate
with industry representatives, environmental groups, cMc organizations, sporting or
recreational associations, local government agencies, local elected officials, local busi-
ni SMI r jimpi i Ij ..... mil • n iilliati ftr Ttif n Inlr rr ila nhmilrt hr trtrntlflrrt imrt ipnlrrn
with about thetr concents.
"Improving Dialogue with Commuoiiiet.' wnnea by Caroa Oiesi. Bilbe Jo Huce. ud Peter Sudmu of the Eoviromnenul Commumuiioo
Research Program at Cook College. Rutgers University. 1987.
32
-------
THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY
RUTGERS
Environmental Communication Research Program
A program of the Agricultural Experiment Station
Cook College • 122 Ryden Lane • New Brunswick • New Jersey 06903 • 201/932-6795
LADDER of CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
Citizen Power
Power-Sharing
Citizens act without
communicating with
government
• volunteer fire department;
• citizen investigation;
• dtizen development and
implementation of programs
Citizens and government
solve; problems together
Government Power
1 funding of dtizen groups to
hire technical consultants
and/or implement projects;
• citizen oversight and
monitoring;
> meetings called jointly by
government and dtizen groups
Government asks citizens • dtizen advisory committees;
for meaningful input and * infoimal meetings;
_ • most public hearings;
Government asks citizens . mos, requests for responses to
for limited input and formal proposals;
would prefer not to listen • pro-forma meetings and
advisory committees
Government talks;
citizens listen
• some public meetings;
• press releases and other
informational strategies:
newsletters, brochures, etc.
Government acts without .- „ u
. . ... • some investigations;
communicating with . Icga, and enforcement actions
citizens
"Improving Dialogue wiih Communities.' wniteo byCaioo Oieu. Bilbe Jo Haoce. aad Peter Sandman of the Enwoomeoul Coir-nu-iK.ii. «
Research Program at Cook College. Rutgers University. 1987
33
-------
'People have to identify with people as human betngs.... Rapport 1s the key." Vincent
Covello, Director. Risk Assessment Program. National Science Foundation
• Try to Identify the various interests In a situation at the beginning and
meet with them informally. This Involves a networking process: (a) Make a list of the
aspects of the issue and types of organizations that might be interested; (b) Contact
groups with which you are familiar; and (c) Ask those groups, for the names of others.
Then contact the affected groups. Keep working' to* expand the range1 of ctiiisUlueiitles
to ensure that yon hare consulted those affected by the Issue.
• Recognise the strengths and weaknesses of elticen advisory groups. Define
the role of the group from the outset. Such groups work most effectively if they
represent the affected public and Involve people in meaningful ways, rather than dis-
tance the agency from concerned citizens. Before developing a citizen advisory group,
consult the full-length version of this manual (see Introduction).
• Deal with everybody equally and fairly. For example, don't give one group in-
formation that you refuse another. Be especially careful not to favor industry or local
4. When appropriate, develop alternatives to public hearings. In particular.
hold smaller, more informal meetings. Large public meetings often lead to posturing
on both sides rather than problem-solving or meaningful dialogue. Instead of waiting
until a formal meeting Is necessary, consider other options for exchanging information.
such as drop-in hours at the local library for questions, newsletters, telephone hot
lines, information booths, advisory «*M*»»*iH»»3_ ftc. Most <™p«**nn»iy attempt to hold
informal rnfftfr|fl* with *TttOTrtttflrt part*** 81*4 matnfafo, ^/yi^y^ on a> routine ****** The
more controversial the issue, the wiser it is to meet with the affected groups frequently.
separately, and Informally.
• If yon cannot avoid a targe public meeting, the logistics should be devel-
oped so that both the agency and the community are treated fairly. For example.
structure a meeting so that people do not feel upset by having to wait a long time to
speak.
• Consider breckhtg larger groups Into smaller one*. This approach can be
helpful for questlon-and-answer sessions or discussion groups.
• Be clear about the goals for the meeting. If yon cannot adequately fulfill a
citizen request for a meeting, propose alternatives. Prepare so that you can attain
the goals of the meeting and meet citizen concerns. If you do not know or cannot
address those concerns, meet informally to discuss community needs and to develop a
meaningful process to address those needs.
• In certain situations one-to-one communication may be best. When sam-
pling, it Is critical to prepare technicians to respond to people's questions, or provide
them with literature to hand out and a phone numbg for residents, to calL Also, leave
(line after meetings to respond to personal concerns.
"Improving Dialogue with Communities," written by Caroo Chew. Billie Jo Haoce. and Peter Saodmaa of (be Environmental Conur.uoiuiiuo
Research Program at Cook College. Rutgers University. 1987
-------
5. Recognize that people's values and feelings are a legitimate aspect of envi-
ronmental health Issues, and that such concerns may convey valuable Informa-
tion. Feelings are not only an inevitable part of environmental health issues, they often
contain valuable Information about: (a) what is Important to people; (b) technical as-
pects of the problem, such as the frequency and duration of an odor, and (c) creative
approaches to solving the problem.
• Provide a forum for people to air their feelings. People will become more
frustrated when an agency attempts to squelch their saying how they feel. Provide
mechanisms for expression of feeling, such as telephone hotlines, small meetings, and
one-to-one communication.
• Listen to people when they ei.pi ess their rateea said fecHng*. When people
do not feel they are being heard, often they will express their concerns more loudly.
• Acknowledge people's feelings about an Issue. Try restating what people have
said so that they know you have heard them: "I can tell that you are angry about this
proposal because...."
• When people are speaking emotionally, respond to their emotions. Do not
merely follow with data. Do not use scientific data in an attempt to refute feelings or
concerns. Instead, acknowledge the feelings and respond to the concerns in addition to
• Show respect by developing a system to respond promptly to calls from
community residents. Put calls from community residents toward the top of the
priority list and develop mechanisms for your program to handle them efficiently.
• Recognise and be honest about the values Incorporated In agency deci-
sions. Communities sense when there is more going on than science, and the agency
loses credibility unless It acknowledges those Issues.
• Be aware of your own wfoe* and feeling* about air Issue and the effect they
have on you. Agency representatives also become invested In positions or feel strongly
about Issues. Recognize when your own feelings cause you to resist modifications of a
project or to react strongly to a community group.
6. Prepare responses to personal questions about risk. Agencies develop poli-
cies to protect public health generally, but Individuals are usually most Interested in
how a risk or poHcy specifically affects them and their families. Anticipate and prepare
honest responses to such individual-level questions. Including those asking you what
you would do In a similar situation: "Would you drink the water?" Personal responses
are particularly Important when the situation Is not clear-cut and people need some
context for their own decisions.
• When yon speak at a public meeting, tell people who you are. what your
background Is, and why you are there. Give people a sense of why you are qualified
to discuss a topic and what you can and cant do for them.
"You realize that people need a Jorum to get those emotions and questions out and that
If you can do that outside a large meeting which ts Impersonal... It can be much more
eJJecUijf,m Susan &******* Managrr Risk Assessment Group. G^C. Jordan. Company.
fouueily with EPA Region I Superfund program. ^^^^_^^
"Improving Dialogue wiih Communities." written by Caron Chess. Bilbe Jo Haoce. aad Peter Sandman of the Environmental
Research Program at Cook College. Rutgers University. 1987
35
-------
• Let people tee yon are human. People win treat you as a person if you act like
one. If you act like a bureaucrat, you will be treated accordingly.
• When speaking personally, pnt your views Into the context of your own
Talnes. and urge your audience to do the same. If you tell people how you might
handle a situation, put your response into context (such as whether you smoke, exer-
cise. etc.) so they can do the same.
•M^MftAAuBMk Jt^^^^ ^k^^b ^Mfl^^B^ ^^ftA^B «^^^^^^^» ^^KtA^^w A^ ^k^^b - *— • --- »
|WIBII HOT UIMpV UUl •JJIBC WIUE Uf/tlUfj |IU1HJ» QB- Bill BuHCKCk
the community. Instead, try modifying the agency position or having the task reas-
signed. Or find a way of acknowledging the lack of consensus within the agency. Mis-
representing the situation or dodging questions about your position will obviously
reduce your and the agency's credibility.
• If speaking personally makes yon uncomfortable, work on It until It gets
easier. If you Just dont think it's appropriate, dont do it
7. Use community relation* staff to amplify community conceimi wtthbr the
agency. Instead of acting as buffers between the public and agency technical staff.
community relations people should make community concerns heard before the public
feels a need to shout.
8. Choose carefully those who represent the agency and provide appropriate
support. Because agency representatives can give an impression of the entire agency.
they should be carefully chosen and given the time and training to do the job
adequately. People who «*"*™* copt with **""Trm«nfa»att»T» »«QI»« rfmnifj ^Kfr \^f reouired
to do* so.
• Technically qualified people should have a major role In communicating
with the public about risk. Communities usually want to talk to people who are
directly Involved in problem-solving.
• Make sure that representatives are appropriate to the situation. Send
people who have the expertise and authority to respond to people's concerns.
• The agency lepteseutatlfc should be consistent throughout the life of the
project or situation, If possible. Trust takes time to build.
• In some situations a non-agency communicator may be more useful than
someone from Inside the agency. Consider using academic experts, local community
people, and representatives of civic organizations (such as the League of Women Voters)
to present information. This needs to be done with care so that such groups are not
perceived as "agency fronts."
Dialogue with Communities." written by Cvoa Cheu. Billie Jo Haacc. ind Peter Sandman of (he Environment*! Com™ an
Research Program tt Cook College. Rutgers University. 1987
36
-------
YES, BUT....
• As an agency, we are supposed to protect health— not deal with feelings.
As explained In Chapter I. protecting health will be quite difficult if you do not
take Into account community concerns. Ignoring such concerns will not only lead to
stress on the part of the community, but ultimately will also undermine the agency's
ability to implement ztsk niaiiugeuieiit decisions.
• Communities worry about the 'wrong" risks. Involving them In decision-
making will lead to poor policy.
Public response to risk Is not merely a function of the numbers but also involves
other considerations, explained in Chapter I. such as equity. In many cases agency risk
management decisions are also based on values, not merely technical factors. Agencies'
|