LOMA PRIETA
RESPONSE:
FIVE YEARS
LATER
A Follow-up Survey to the Summary and Analysis of
Hazardous Materials Response and Recovery Operations
Following the Loma Prieta Earthquake of
October 17,1989
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LOMA PRIETA RESPONSE:
FIVE YEARS LATER
A Follow-up Survey to the Summary and Analysis of
Hazardous Materials Response and Recovery Operations
Following the Loma Prieta Earthquake of
October 17, 1989
Kathleen G. Shimmin, Director
Office of Health and'Emergency Planning
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region IX
Prepared by U.S. EPA Region IX Staff:
Sandra Carroll
Chemical Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
Mike Ardito
Chemical Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
Al Fischer
Region IX Planner/Emergency Support Function #10 staff
and
Gene Bailard
Technical Assistance Team Member
Ecology and Environment, Inc.
Date: June 1994
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Page
SECTION I- INTRODUCTION
LOMA PRffiTA EARTHQUAKE 1
LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL RESPONSE 1
PURPOSE OF THE FOLLOW-UP SURVEY 2
SECTION H- ALAMEDA COUNTY
ALAMEDA COUNTY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 3
BERKELEY FIRE DEPARTMENT 3
FREMONT FIRE DEPARTMENT 4
HA YWARD FIRE DEPARTMENT 5
LAWRENCE BERKELEY LABORATORY 6
NEWARK FIRE DEPARTMENT 6
OAKLAND FIRE DEPARTMENT 7
PLEASANTON FIRE DEPARTMENT 8
UNION CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT 9
SECTION ffl- CONTRA COSTA COUNTY
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY DEPT. OF HEALTH SERVICES 10
SECTION IV- MARIN COUNTY
MARIN COUNTY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 12
SAN RAFAEL FIRE DEPARTMENT 12
SECTION V- MONTEREY COUNTY
MONTEREY COUNTY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 14
MONTEREY FIRE DEPARTMENT 15
SECTION VI- SAN BENITO COUNTY
SAN BENITO COUNTY OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES 17
SECTION VII- SAN FRANCISCO CITY AND COUNTY
SAN FRANCISCO FIRE DEPARTMENT 18
SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 19
SECTION Vffl- SAN MATEO COUNTY
SAN MATEO COUNTY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 20
BRISBANE FIRE DEPARTMENT 21
SECTION DC- SANTA CLARA COUNTY
SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH 22
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SANTA CLARA FIRE DEPARTMENT 23
STANFORD DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY 25
SUNNYVALE DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY 26
SECTION X- SANTA CRUZ COUNTY
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 28
SCOTTS VALLEY FIRE DISTRICT 29
U.C SANTA CRUZ ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY 30
U.C. SANTA CRUZ FIRE DEPT 31
WATSONVILLE FIRE DEPT 33
SECTION XI- SOLANO COUNTY
SOLANO COUNTY DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 35
SECTION XII- SONOMA COUNTY
SANTA ROSA FIRE DEPARTMENT 36
SECTION XID- U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 37
SECTION XIV- SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 39
PROPOSED FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 41
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APPENDIX A- UNIVERSITY LABS/PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS 42
APPENDIX B-OAKLAND-BERKELEY HILLS FIRE 43
APPENDIX C- BIBLIOGRAPHY 46
IV
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SECTION I INTRODUCTION
LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE
On Tuesday, October 17,1989, at 5:04 p.m., Pacific Standard Time, a 25-mile section of the San
Andreas Fault Zone ruptured in the largest earthquake to hit California since the San Francisco
earthquake of 1906.
The 7.1 Richter magnitude earthquake, originating under Mount Loma Prieta 60 miles southeast of
San Francisco in the Santa Cruz Mountains, affected 10 bay area counties and was felt over
400,000 square miles in northern and central California. The main shock lasted 7 to 10 seconds. In
general, damage was caused by severe ground shaking and ground failure, and was greatest to
structures built on or adjacent to unconsolidated soils, artificial fill over unconsolidated soils, bay
or river margins, and coastal dunes. Significant landslides also occurred in the Santa Cruz
Mountains, isolating many small communities.
Less than 24 hours after the earthquake, on October 18, 1989, seven bay area counties were
declared disaster areas by the president of the United States. Three additional counties and two
cities outside the 10 county area were subsequently declared part of the disaster area. Together this
included Alameda, Monterey, San Benito, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Santa Cruz
counties, followed by Contra Costa, Marin, and Solano counties, and the cities of Isleton and
Tracy in Sacramento and San Joaquin counties, respectively.
LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL RESPONSE
Local, state, and federal agencies responded rapidly to the unfolding emergency situation. At the
community level, 911 public dispatchers, fire departments, and law enforcement officials provided
the first line of response. City and county emergency operations centers were activated to provide
direction and control and to initiate response and recovery procedures.
The state Office of Emergency Services (OES) activated the regional emergency operations center
in Pleasant Hill, then transferred regional direction and control to the state operations center in
Sacramento. Following the earthquake, state officials received and processed requests for
resources, coordinated state and local activities, provided damage assessment reports, and released
public information.
Preliminary damage assessment reports indicated that communication systems in the San Francisco
and Monterey/Santa Cruz bay areas were intact, although there was significant scattered damage
compounded by telephone line overloading due to a large increase in incoming and outgoing calls.
It was clear that the entire region was not devastated and, therefore, the decision was made by the
state OES to follow normal emergency operating procedures rather than implement the procedures
in the final draft of the State Response Plan for a Catastrophic Bay Area Earthquake.
Immediately after the presidential declaration was issued, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) implemented a limited activation of the Plan for Federal Response to a
Castastrophic Earthquake to provide California with emergency response assistance. The federal
Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG), representing 25 federal agencies, convened the
evening of the earthquake and had already begun national level coordination. FEMA immediately
began operations by assigning lead federal agencies with specific missions. A temporary disaster
field office was opened at the San Francisco Presidio and later transferred to Mountain View in
Santa Clara County.
The U.S. EPA, Region IX, Office of Health and Emergency Planning, was activated and staffed
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the disaster field office throughout the response phase of Loma Prieta. Both FEMA and state OES
opened a total of 18 disaster application centers, five of which were mobile, to provide initial
service to disaster victims. Telephone 800 numbers were provided to facilitate the application
process for disaster assistance and access to other related emergency information. Within 72 hours
of the earthquake, preliminary damage assessments were completed for the seven counties
originally declared as disaster areas, and by October 26, public assistance operations had begun in
the affected 10 counties.
PURPOSE OF THE FOLLOW-UP SURVEY
This report is intended to report the progress and/or modifications made by the 29 agencies
interviewed for the initial survey more than four years ago.
To understand local response actions and to assist with planning for future major earthquakes, the
Office of Health and Emergency Planning interviewed officials from administering agencies and
other organizations affected by the Loma Prieta earthquake.(Under Chapter 6.95 of the California
Health and Safety Code, certain city and county agencies or departments are designated
"administering agencies" and have been authorized to collect facility business plans and prepare
local area plans. These plans contain basic information on chemical identities and quantities as well
as chemical emergency preparedness and response procedures based on minimum statewide
standards. Most administering agencies are either county health departments or city fire
departments.)
As in the initial survey, a list of questions and a letter of explanation were sent to each of these
agencies and organizations.
A synopsis of information contained in the first survey, for each jurisdiction, is contained in this
report followed by the complete text of responses to the three questions asked in the follow-up
survey. The synopsis and the follow-up text are done in order by county and agencies within the
county.
Questions in the follow-up survey were as follows:
1) Do you believe your present emergency response capability would be able to handle any
hazardous material incident occurring from an earthquake?
If not, would your jurisdiction be able to draw upon mutual aid from a nearby jurisdiction?
2) Has the status level of hazardous material response in your jurisdiction changed since the Loma
Prieta Earthquake 4 years ago?
3) Has your degree of concern increased in your jurisdiction about hazardous materials incident
response since the 1989 earthquake?
Why/why not?
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SECTION H ALAMEDA COUNTY
ALAMEDA COUNTY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
In the fall of 1989 County Environmental Health did not have a dedicated team or unit, but did
have a hazardous materials specialist on 24-hour call who responded with the local fire department.
The hazardous materials specialist was qualified and equipped for level A entry, assessed risks and
identified chemicals, but did not cleanup released materials.
The department responded to a chemical release in an environmental health laboratory at Highland
Hospital and to a school chemical recycling center for reported odors. The county expected many
more problems, and its resources were taxed only minimally.
No mutual aid was requested by Alameda County Environmental Health and none was provided to
other agencies or jurisdictions. If needed, the county would request hazardous materials assistance
from the state OES and funding assistance from both the Department of Health Services and the
Environmental Protection Agency.
Following the earthquake, Alameda County Environmental Health contacted oil companies to
check the condition of underground storage tanks within its jurisdiction.
Status 1994
Alameda County Environmental Health serves as technical support for (hazardous materials) first
responders and has 24-hour on-call staff and an emergency response van to assist the first
responders. They can handle the technical needs of first responders.
The Incident Commander would be responsible for calling mutual aid.
The department has ongoing training with local fire departments in the area of emergency response,
including CAMEO training, drills, Hazardous Materials Management Plan, etc. They serve
approximately 14 first responding agencies in the county.
Still, their degree of concern about hazardous materials incident response has increased —
including their review of Risk Management Prevention Plans. "The consistent concern of both the
public and private citizens and their knowledge of hazardous materials in their (respective) areas
prompts our giving priority to the oversight of hazardous materials in the county," states Ed
Howell, Chief, Hazardous Materials Division.
BERKELEY FIRE DEPARTMENT
In the fall of 1989 the Fire Department had a dedicated hazardous materials unit located within the
department. When the 911 communications system is called, it notifies Berkeley Environmental
Health. The first fire engine to arrive at the incident scene confirms that hazardous materials are
involved and then isolates and evacuates the area, if necessary. A trained hazardous materials
specialist is also sent to an incident along with the Berkeley Fire Department.
Berkeley followed normal alerting and dispatch procedures following Loma Prieta and established
an operations center at the public safety dispatch office in the police department, according to
procedures in its disaster plan. In addition to two fires, two hazardous materials incidents were
reported. One occurred at Veriflow where acid and cyanide were discharged from plating vats.
Three units and an engine company responded, and IT Corp. conducted the cleanup. The other
occurred at PQ Corp. where a storage tank ruptured containing 250,000 gallons of sodium silicate
with a pH of at least 12.5. The U.S. Coast Guard and state Department of Fish and Game
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approved use of the sanitary sewer system to dispose of spilled product. The high pH, however,
killed the bacteria in an East Bay Municipal Utility District sewage treatment plant
Berkeley expected more incidents. The city's hazardous materials resources were severely strained
during the first three hours after the earthquake and then only minimally in the following days.
Berkeley requested assistance from Oakland, Albany, and Emeryville fire departments through the
Alameda County mutual aid system. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Albany, and Alameda Naval
Air Station assisted but on the night of the earthquake, Oakland was unable to provide assistance
because of its own emergency operations at the Cypress Street viaduct.
No hazardous materials mutual aid was provided by Berkeley. Mutual aid would be requested
through the state OES and National Response Center using existing mutual aid procedures. The
city attempted to request support from the Environmental Protection Agency for the Veriflow
release, but telephone calls to the agency went unanswered. Berkeley was able to obtain air
monitoring assistance and cyanide detection meters from IT Corp. because Berkeley was the first
to call. No outside assistance was offered or provided in the absence of a request. If outside
assistance had been offered, it would have been coordinated through the police department
operations center. A hazardous materials unit would be deployed for a non-hazardous materials
incident, as it was during Loma Prieta, and an outside team would be called in to standby.
Following the earthquake, Berkeley Fire Dept. used the Chapter 6.95 inventory lists to make site
visits. Inspection teams were composed of personnel from Berkeley Fire and Berkeley
Environmental Health.
Status 1994
Berkeley Fire DepL does not believe it has the present emergency response capability to handle any
hazardous material incident occurring from an earthquake, according to Capt. Ron Falstad.
Berkeley would be able to draw upon mutual aid from a nearby jurisdiction. Capt. Falstad qualifies
this by adding, "Except in an earthquake. I doubt if near neighbors would be available."
The status level of hazardous materials response has changed in the past four years. Berkeley is
working and crosstraining with Oakland Fire Dept. Hazardous Material and Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory Fire Dept. personnel. "We also have better business plan information," Capt. Falstad
added.
The department's degree of concern about hazardous materials incident response has not increased,
since it has always been concerned about the potential of a disastrous hazardous materials spill.
FREMONT FIRE DEPARTMENT
The Fremont Fire Department, as of October 1989, had 18 firefighters with specialized hazardous
materials training and a constantly staffed hazardous materials response team. The fire department
responds to requests for mutual aid assistance from other agencies through requests received by the
department. Non-emergency hazardous materials incidents are referred to the Fremont
Environmental Protection Division.
During the Loma Prieta response this procedure was used by the fire department which was called
to several incidents. The worst involved a breach in the primary containment system at a plating
facility, resulting in a discharge of a dilute acid solution. The secondary containment system
remained intact preventing a release to the environment. Given the few incidents that did occur, the
city's hazardous materials resources were only moderately utilized, though many more incidents
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were expected
Fremont neither requested mutual aid for hazardous materials nor provided any to other agencies or
jurisdictions. If hazardous materials assistance was needed, it would have been requested from
neighboring cities such as Newark and Union City and from Alameda County, the state OES, or
the U.S. Coast Guard. A hazardous materials team would be called in from outside to standby until
needed or demobilized.
Following the earthquake, the public works department telephoned 75 facilities to determine if they
sustained any damage. Most facilities indicated there was little or no damage.
Public Works in Fremont is responsible for obtaining and maintaining business plans and
emergency response information under Chapter 6.95.
Status 1994
Fremont Fire believes their capability to handle "any" hazardous materials incident could be
achieved by relying upon other agencies for support during major incidents. "Any" encompasses
too many unknowns, commented Capt. Roland Gove.
Whether Fremont could draw upon mutual aid is problematical, reported Gove. "It depends if the
other jurisdiction were affected by the earthquake."
He did not know if the status level of hazardous materials response in Fremont had changed since
the Loma Prieta Earthquake more than 4 years ago.
However, the department's degree of concern about hazardous materials incident response has
increased. "The 1989 earthquake confirms our belief and fears that an earthquake can and will
strike our community. The potential for a haz mat incident is very real."
HAYWARD FIRE DEPARTMENT
The Hay ward Fire Department did not have specialized hazardous materials response capability in
October of 1989. A joint powers agreement under negotiation at that time between Hay ward, San
Leandro, and Union City was to set up a specialized team in 1991. If a hazardous materials team
was needed in 1989, a battalion chief or incident commander had the authority to ask for outside
assistance. Hay ward firefighters were trained at the first responder level (in 1989) and could only
take initial defensive action at a major release.
Hayward Fire Department responded to one incident during Loma Prieta, a spill of 100 gallons of
23 percent hydrochloric acid solution stored in one quart containers at National Sanitary Supply.
No outside assistance was needed for the cleanup. Hayward expected at least five incidents. With
only one response, its resources were taxed very little. No outside mutual aid was needed or
requested, and none was provided to outside agencies. If other resources had been required,
Hayward would have contacted Alameda County, Oakland, San Mateo, San Jose, the state OES,
and the private sector. Hayward has used and would call the U.S. Coast Guard and the
Environmental Protection Agency. Resources would be requested and deployed according to the
California master mutual aid plan. If adequate assistance were not available locally, it would be
requested through the county, the OES, Region II, or the state OES.
After Loma Prieta, trucks, engines, and reserves of the Hayward Fire Department surveyed the city
for facility damage, each fire station having responsibility for facilities within its response zone.
Hayward Fire Department administers the Chapter 6.95 program. Under the program, all
hazardous materials facilities have been required to develop comprehensive plans and place them in
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lock boxes for easy access by response personnel.
The fire department referred to a detailed article which appeared in the San Jose Mercury News
stating that during the preceding six years there had been a rigorous inspection program for
hazardous materials, as well as earthquake bracing of various facilities throughout the south bay.
This program, the article continued, was responsible for preventing more chemical accidents than
would have otherwise occurred.
The Hayward Fire Department stated it would like an expanded approach to hazardous materials
response in which the fire service would provide countywide coordination and direction.
STATUS 1994
The Hayward Fire Department states it would not be able to handle "any" hazardous materials
incident. A Richmond, Ca. General Chemical-type incident is beyond the capabilities of any single
hazardous materials response team, a department spokesman replied.
Hayward is currently attempting to improve and/or develop mutual aid agreements with other
jurisdictions in the region.
In 1989, Hayward Fire Department had first responder operational capability only. Today they
have a hazardous materials technician capability.
The department's degree of concern about hazardous materials incident response is about the same
as it was in 1989, said Steve Faelz, Deputy Fire Chief.
LAWRENCE BERKELEY LABORATORY FIRE DEPT.
The LBL Fire Department was not contacted for the 1989 survey, nor was the U.C. Berkeley
Office of Environmental Health and Emergency Response.
STATUS 1994
A spokesperson for the U.C. Berkeley office said the University can handle minor spills in science
laboratories on campus, but would immediately notify the Berkeley Fire Department and/or the
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Fire Department on hazmat or chemical releases of a larger nature.
The LBL Fire Department presently does not have the emergency response capability to handle any
hazardous material incident occurring from an earthquake. They would be able to draw upon
mutual aid from both the Berkeley and Oakland Fire Dept. hazardous materials unit.
Billy P. White, Fire Chief, said the department is currently moving to the hazardous materials
technician level with a few haz mat specialists. "But we have yet to purchase the necessary vehicle
and equipment to support such a team," he adds.
His degree of concern about hazmat incident response has increased. "It has made us realize we
need to upgrade our level of service."
NEWARK FIRE DEPARTMENT
The department did not have a dedicated hazardous materials team in 1989, but there were 12
firefighters with hazardous materials training assigned to three stations in the city. The department
would respond to calls from 911 in normal emergency circumstances and could be deployed by the
emergency operations center during a catastrophic event. "White channel," the state emergency
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channel, is used to communicate with city and county government during an emergency response.
There were no hazardous materials responses conducted by the Newark Fire Department during
Loma Prieta, and consequently mutual aid was not needed. In addition, no outside assistance was
brought in or offered in the absence of a request. It was expected some releases might occur from
bulk storage facilities or containers. Newark Fire Department would request assistance from
neighboring fire departments in Hayward, Fremont, and Union City, and in some cases the state
OES. Requests would be made by telephone or radio, or by calling 911.
Six to seven businesses were inspected one hour after the earthquake and others were inspected
within the following week. A major concern expressed by Newark is the lack of safeguards and
monitoring for hazardous materials facilities during periods when operations are shut down. It has
been suggested that facility owners or operators conduct their own inspection and report the results
to the fire department
STATUS 1994
Two major variables could be difficult to address — as far as the department's capability to handle
any hazardous materials incident. First, the number of incidents that may occur simultaneously
could cause even simple incidents to become overwhelming. Secondly, incidents involving
transportation, especially rail cars of chemicals, would be overwhelming. Additionally, some
facilities with bulk above-ground containers could create additional problems if several of the
containers had major failure simultaneously Newark has very few hazardous materials mutual aid
agreements in place. "Even without mutual aid agreements, many of the locally-available fire
department haz mat response teams are new, marginally trained and only a few personnel available
any given day," stated Jacqueline Bretschneider, Hazardous Materials Coordinator.
If the earthquake was large enough to cause damage in Newark, the belief is that other east bay
cities might be impacted to a greater extent and not be in a postion to give aid.
The department has better training and better equipment than it did four years ago.
The question of degree of concern over hazmat incident response can be answered both "yes" and
"no." Yes, the city needs more personnel trained and available on any given day. No, because
some facilities in the city have reduced or eliminated their hazardous materials/chemical release risk
factor.
OAKLAND FIRE DEPARTMENT
The department had a dedicated hazardous materials team and a special hazardous materials
response vehicle at the time of the Loma Prieta earthquake. They are available to other fire agencies
through mutual aid. All Oakland firefighters have been trained at the awareness and operations
level, and the hazardous materials team has been trained at the technician or specialist level. There
were no reported major hazardous materials incidents in Oakland during Loma Prieta. The
response vehicle was dispatched to the Cypress Street viaduct (elevated freeway) where it was
used for a command post and communications center. The hazardous materials team remained at
the station as a fire engine company and was not utilized for chemical emergencies or requested for
mutual aid by other localities. No hazardous materials assistance was offered or brought in
unrequested.
Emergency call lists are kept at the 911 communications center, which dispatches the hazardous
materials team, and mutual aid is available to Oakland through the California master mutual aid
plan. In the past Oakland has used the U.S. Coast Guard but is not aware of resources available
through the Environmental Protection Agency or other federal agencies. Oakland would either
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deploy a hazardous materials team for a nonhazardous materials incident or have it stand by
depending on the circumstances. An outside team would also be called in to standby, depending on
the circumstances.
Because Oakland is a port city, large quantities of fuels and other hazardous materials are
transported and stored for short periods of time without their existence or movement being reported
to the fire department
The Oakland Fire Department receives Chapter 6.95 information from Alameda County, although
the department has already identified most facilities with hazardous materials through its prefire
inspection program. Oakland indicated (in 1989) that the number of hazardous materials incidents
is increasing. This is causing an increase in the commitment of resources for standby time, thereby
affecting the availability of units. The department believes an overemphasis on reporting
requirements is partially to blame. The volume of data on fixed facilities overloads information
storage and handling systems and prevents responders from quickly obtaining specialized data on
the chemicals they are likely to find. The lack of reporting on transportation-related materials
continues to be a problem.
STATUS 1994
The Fire Department failed to respond to survey forms mailed and faxed in November 1993 and
January 1994, and to phone calls to the department in December 1993 and January 1994.
PLEASANTON FIRE DEPARTMENT
As of October, 1989, Pleasanton did not have a dedicated hazardous materials team but was in the
process of developing a special services unit with hazardous materials capability. Once the unit is
established it will respond to releases or spills and to incidents involving power and lighting. The
department does have a hazardous materials specialist who reports to the duty battalion chief. The
specialist is dispatched through the 911 communications system, and communicates with Alameda
County by radio based on procedures described in a contingency plan.
Standard notification procedures were used during the Loma Prieta response. Pleasanton Fire
Department responded to a single incident at a Clorox research and development laboratory where
chemical containers, not seismically secured, broke and spilled contents on the ground. Various
mineral acids, surfactants, and organic solvents reacted with water from leaking pipes to form an
unknown gas or vapor. An assessment was conducted by Clorox personnel, and a contractor in
level A protective equipment conducted the cleanup. Three to four incidents were expected because
of the number of bulk storage chemical tanks in the area. With only one hazardous materials
specialist available, Pleasanton's resources were severely taxed.
Pleasanton Fire Department did not request or provide mutual aid, and no agency mutual aid was
brought in or offered unrequested. The city would contact Alameda County Health Department, the
Region IIOES, Department of Fish and Game, and the Environmental Protection Agency using
800 numbers and procedures defined in its area plan. Hazardous materials resources would be
deployed for non-hazardous materials incidents and would be called in from outside agencies to
standby.
Following the earthquake, Pleasanton made 15 site visits and found one potential problem, an
8,000-gallpn truck of sodium hydroxide which appeared to have shifted on its supports. No
follow-up inspection was made. Pleasanton Fire Department stated there is little or no knowledge
by local officials concerning hazardous materials problems. There are four to five facilities in the
city that contain reportable quantities of extremely hazardous materials that could pose a problem.
These include the sewage treatment plant, a blueprinting facility, the city of Pleasanton, and the
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Kaiser Research Center. The Clorox facility business plan, the city said, is out of date and its
procedures are inadequate and confused. Furthermore, the research and development laboratory is
not covered in the plan, response procedures were not followed, and Clorox did not have the
necessary equipment to cleanup a chemical spill or an inventory of chemicals on site.
STATUS 1994
Pleasanton Fire Department is not certain its present emergency response capability could handle all
hazardous material incidents occuring from an earthquake. Chief George Withers says it would
depend on the severity of the earthquake.
Pleasanton would be able to draw upon mutual aid from a nearby jurisdiction.
The status level of hazardous materials response in Pleasanton has changed since Loma Prieta, but
the department spokesman did not elaborate. The degree of concern about hazardous materials
incident response has not increased. The total number of underground storage tanks has decreased
and others have been upgraded, Withers explained.
UNION CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT
As of 1989, the department had six men with 200 hours each of hazardous materials training, but
no specialized hazardous materials response unit. The 911 communications system receives calls
and dispatches the fire department for chemical incidents. There were no reported hazardous
materials releases during Loma Prieta, although the fire department responded to numerous reports
of gas line leaks. As a result, hazardous materials resources were not used at all.
Mutual aid was not a factor for Union City during the earthquake. None was used, requested, or
brought in unrequested. If Union City had been seriously affected, resources would have been
requested from neighboring cities such as Fremont, Alameda County Environmental Health, and
the state OES using procedures described in the area plan. Hazardous materials resources
responding from ouiside the city would be deployed to hazardous materials incidents. In general,
deployment of mutual aid depends on several factors in the type of units responding and type of
incidents underway.
The night of the Loma Prieta earthquake, engine companies inspected all major facilities. As an aid
in planning, Union City uses seismic maps for placement and design of facilities that will contain
hazardous materials. Zoning responsibilities include issuing conditional use permits for some
hazardous materials. Union City indicated that good facility maintenance was responsible for the
low incidence of hazardous materials releases.
Union City Fire Department is an administering agency and responsible for collecting Chapter 6.95
information. Businesses that report under Chapter 6.95 place maps in safe boxes in the front of
each facility for use by responders. The city uses CAMEO software, and the engine companies
attend facility inspections.
STATUS 1994
The Fire Department failed to respond to survey forms mailed in November 1993 and faxed in
January 1994, and to telephone calls in January 1994.
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SECTION ffl CONTRA COSTA COUNTY
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY DEFT. OF HEALTH SERVICES
The department has a hazardous materials team consisting of seven trained personnel with level A
entry capability and an equipped truck. Through procedures contained in the area plan, the
department of health services responds if requested to incidents in 18 fire agency jurisdictions
throughout the county. The 911 communications system notifies the police, sheriff, or highway
patrol when a release is reported. The agency that is notified then calls health services directly or
pages team members. There is also a direct hotline to the department During off hours the sheriff
automatically receives calls from the hotline and contacts the team. Generally two team members
are on call. When activated, one gets the truck and the other reports directly to the scene. The state
OES is always notified.
The Loma Prieta earthquake severely affected telephone service throughout the county.
Communications were sporadic, there were no notifications, and responses were delayed. Some
information was available from the media as well as from police and fire radio channels.
Contra Costa County responded to four incidents involving hazardous materials. At Unocal,
200,000 gallons of unleaded gasoline were released from three ruptured storage tanks and several
thousand gallons of motor oil were released from a fourth tank. Containment was effective, but
patching was difficult because of a shortage of materials. At Unitank, next to Unocal, two tanks
ruptured discharging hot coconut oil to a storm sewer leading into the bay. The oil mass solidified
on the bay water and was cleaned up by IT Corp. At Castro Oil, also next to Unocal, an 83,000-
gallon tank lost 5,000 gallons of motor oil additive which was completely contained. At IT Corp.,
a 20-inch force main pipe carrying sewage ruptured and discharged 20,000 gallons of material into
holding ponds, all of which were contained. Despite the apparent severity of these releases, Contra
Costa County expected many more incidents. Resources, however, were taxed severely because of
failed communications and lack of sufficient plugging and patching materials.
The county health services department did not request mutual aid, but both the U.S. Coast Guard
and Richmond Fire Department were on site at Unocal when the county hazardous materials
specialist arrived. The U.S. Coast Guard provided patching materials and transfer pumps.
The county provided mutual aid to the local fire department in the form of expertise and materials.
Contra Costa County stated it would call the state OES, Dept. Fish and Game, Regional Water
Quality Control Board, the sheriff, CHP, Dept. of Health Services, and the Environmental
Protection Agency for assistance, based on existing contingency plan procedures. The county
hazardous materials team is used only for hazardous materials responses, but specialized teams
would be called in from neighboring counties, industrial organizations, and the EPA to standby.
The county did not conduct follow-up inspections at any of the release sites or other hazardous
materials sites within its jurisdiction. It did expect more power failures. Loss of electricity without
backup power would have caused major problems at refineries and chemical plants for shutdown
and startup operations when uncontrolled temperature and pressure changes would affect container
integrity. The EPA, it was suggested, could stockpile and provide essential materials for use
following a catastrophic event. Hazardous materials supplies are used quickly and are very difficult
to obtain, especially after working hours.
STATUS 1994
The key word here is "any." Assuming an earthquake of the magnitude of Loma Prieta or greater,
the county says it would have a number of difficulties in attempting to apply its response
capabilities to handle "any" hazardous material incidents. If the quake occurs after hours, 20
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percent of the staff would be unable to come to the office due to closed bridges, reported Jim
Gallagher of the county's Health Services Department.
It is doubtful the county would be able to get mutual aid from a nearby government agency.
However, local industry could probably provide assistance, Gallagher remarked.
The status level of hazardous materials response has changed since the Loma Prieta earthquake 4
1/2 years ago. Each year, adds Gallagher, a greater demand has been placed on the county's
emergency response program. "We have improved our air sampling capabilities and Personal
Protective Equipment capabilities."
The county, Gallagher said, has always placed a high priority on incident response. "However,
newly developing community issues such as environmental racism has helped our programs to be
more sensitive to the way we handle and respond to hazardous materials incidents."
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SECTION IV MARIN COUNTY
MARIN COUNTY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
In 1989, neither the Environmental Health nor County Fire Department had a dedicated hazardous
materials team. The county relied, instead, on the resources of the San Rafael Fire Department.
During a catastrophic event, the county health officer, acting on behalf of the administering agency,
would help establish and operate a command post. Normal procedures were not followed during
Loma Prieta because hazardous materials incidents were not immediately reported. The state Office
of Emergency Services notified Marin County that there was a spill of 300 to 400 gallons of diesel
fuel at the Golden Gate Transit Larkspur ferry terminal. Marin County responded by inspecting the
facility to see if its emergency plans were followed, but this was the only action it took. Marin
County's hazardous materials resources were not taxed at all. The county was, however,
concerned about a one-ton chlorine cylinder and a container of sulfur dioxide at a water and storage
treatment plant
Marin County neither requested nor provided outside assistance during the earthquake. Emergency
response personnel contacted the state Department of Fish and Game, Regional Water Quality
Control Board, Office of the State Fire Marshal, and Environmental Protection Agency about the
Golden Gate Transit incident but it did not specifically request assistance. The county indicated it
would hesitate to ask for cleanup assistance from agencies it notified because the requester is
required to pay for cleanup services.
Marin County Environmental Health is an administering agency and collects information under
Chapter 6.95. Fire departments have been given copies of business plans submitted to the health
services department, but the data contained is insufficient to determine potential hazardous
materials problems.
STATUS 1994
As presently constituted, the department's response system would be overloaded if a major
earthquake was to produce multiple hazardous materials incidents.
The department would be able to draw upon mutual aid from nearby jurisdictions, stated Bill
Doyle, Marin County Office of Emergency Services coordinator. "However, in a major quake bay
area wide, we would not expect much, if any, mutual aid from out of county."
The environmental health department's status level of hazardous materials response has not
changed in the 4 1/2 years since the Loma Prieta Earthquake. The department's degree of concern
has increased, though.
"We realize that a major quake will most likely produce multiple hazmat incidents. Marin has only
one hazmat response team," Doyle added.
SAN RAFAEL FIRE DEPARTMENT
The department, at the time of the 1989 earthquake, had a dedicated hazardous materials team
which is available to 13 fire agencies in the county including Marin County Fire Department, under
a joint powers agreement. San Rafael Fire Department has a containment vehicle located at its own
station, as well as a mobile laboratory located at Marin County Fire Department, and 22 trained
hazardous materials personnel. The hazardous materials team responds when notified by San
Rafael Fire Department, but is dispatched by the county emergency operations center on a priority
basis during multiple incidents. When the emergency operations center is activated, the incident
commander requests the team through 911. A hazardous materials management support team is
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also notified by 911, consisting of a representative from Marin County Fire Department, the district
attorney's office, the sheriffs office, the Marin County Office of Emergency Services, and the
county health officer.
San Rafael Fire Department dispatched the hazardous materials team for four reported hazardous
materials incidents during Loma Prieta. At W. Granger, Inc., paint was spilled on the ground and
three employees suffered inhalation and dermal exposure during cleanup. An above ground diesel
tank released part of its contents into a creek located near Woodacre, and waste oil was reportedly
dumped into the storm drain system in downtown San Rafael. Department hazardous materials
resources were not taxed at all. Businesses where spills or releases occurred provided their own
cleanup. The fire department stated that it should have been asked whether or not it was safe to
handle the spilled materials before cleanup operations began.
Mutual aid was neither requested nor provided by the fire department. The fire department has
requested assistance in the past from the Department of Fish and Game, Regional Water Quality
Control Board, Department of Health Services, and the state Office of Emergency Services.
Petaluma, in Sonoma County, would be contacted under certain circumstances. A hazardous
materials team would be called in from outside under certain circumstances, but (as of October,
1989) no mutual aid agreements existed in writing to make a request.
The fire department is an administering agency and has immediate access to chemical inventory
information, based on data obtained from business license applications and the fire inspection
program. After the earthquake, inspections were made at some facilities that handle chlorine gas,
written reports of hazardous materials releases were reviewed, and additional monitoring and
mitigation activities were conducted. In San Rafael, 17 to 18 percent of the businesses on file have
extremely hazardous materials, but lack of resources prevented inspecting all of them.
San Rafael Fire Dept (as of October, 1989) pointed out that formal mutual aid agreements should
be made with neighboring hazardous materials teams and that these teams should share equipment
and standardize their training. Information should also be shared on facilities that could affect a
neighboring jurisdiction. Additionally, responders should become more involved in reviewing
business plans, inspecting for inventory verification, and learning about processes, equipment,
laws, and codes pertaining to chemicals stored in San Rafael.
STATUS 1994
The containment systems and engineering controls installed at San Rafael Fire Department facilities
are in compliance with the RMPP process and uniform building and fire codes, with respect to
storage and handling.
Deputy Fire Marshal Forrest M. Craig believes, with respect to whether present emergency
response capability would be able to handle any hazardous material incident (occurring during an
earthquake), that any would first have to be defined.
The department would be able to draw upon mutual aid from a nearby jurisdiction. Through a
regional hazmat response organization, the City of San Rafael may call any or all of the hazmat
teams within the nine bay area counties.
The department's level of hazardous materials response has changed since the Loma Prieta
Earthquake 4 1/2 years ago, but details were not listed. The department's degree of concern has
increased about hazardous materials incident response since the '89 quake. On the latter, Craig
responded, "For obvious reasons — but most important to be able to triage release conditions in
order to determine which ones need containment/control and which ones are just clean-up sites
after the earthquake.
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SECTION V MONTEREY COUNTY
MONTEREY COUNTY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
As of October 1989, County Environmental Health did not have a dedicated hazardous materials
response unit. They assembled an emergency response team to conduct damage assessment. The
team is comprised of staff trained in environmental health, chemistry, and emergency response
procedures. The health department provides technical assistance to the county, cities within the
county, and other local jurisdictions on request through the 911 communications system.
Environmental Health called 911 just after the earthquake struck to obtain a status report on the
earthquake effects. Telephone and electrical power systems were down, requiring the use of car
radios to contact county communications. The emergency response team was alerted and placed on
standby, and shortly afterwards, the Monterey County emergency operations center was activated
with the health department reporting as one of the principal county operators. County
Environmental Health was notified of eight hazardous materials incidents, two of which required a
response. For the first, the team assisted Monterey Fire Department at the Hyatt House in
Monterey where containers of cleaning chemicals had fallen off shelves, their contents mixing to
form a vapor cloud. And for the second, it responded to the Uni-Kool ice plant and vacuum cooler
in Pajaro for an unspecified anhydrous ammonia release. In addition, county environmental health
investigated a report of spilled fuel at the Pacific Gas and Electric Co., Moss Landing power plant,
although no spilled material was found. Due to the intensity of the earthquake, more hazardous
materials releases had been expected, especially at cold storage facilities where there are significant
amounts of anhydrous ammonia.
Throughout the Loma Prieta response, county hazardous materials resources were used
moderately. The response team, in addition, investigated beach contamination from sewage
releases and conducted sampling.
Monterey County Environmental Health neither requested nor provided mutual aid. Assistance was
not requested by outside jurisdictions, but it was offered to Santa Cruz and San Benito counties.
Both counties declined the offers because they had adequate resources.
As an administering agency, Monterey County Environmental Health receives and maintains
business plans from facilities that handle acutely hazardous materials within its jurisdiction.
Following the earthquake, county environmental health officials conducted a number of facility
surveys, concentrating on Uni-Kool which failed to notify the department of the ammonia release.
Environmental health is particularly concerned about ammonia leaks due to the large quantity of
anhydrous ammonia used in the county. It inspects businesses once a year and stated that its
inspection and enforcement program prevented more serious releases from occurring during the
earthquake.
STATUS 1994
The County Environmental Health Department believes emergency response personnel from the
department would be able to handle many but not all hazardous material incidents from seismic
events.
Mutual aid is currently available from at least three fire agencies which have hazardous materials
response teams. These include teams from the Salinas, Watsonville and Seaside fire departments.
The status level of hazardous materials response has both increased and decreased in the past four
years, according to Walter Wong, director of the Division of Environmental Health. It has
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increased, Wong said, because of an overall increase in awareness and preparation for a seismic
event However, it has decreased due to funding cuts and budgetary problems.
Wong feels that the department's degree of concern has probably lessened since the 1989 quake —
because of the implementation of Risk Management Prevention Programs by many high risk
facilities which handle acutely hazardous materials, and because of an emphasis on seismic safety
and preparation.
MONTEREY FIRE DEPARTMENT
The city of Monterey did not have a dedicated hazardous materials team at the time of Loma Prieta,
but contracted with the city of Salinas to use its team. Salinas had a fully trained hazardous
materials team with level A capability and a fully-equipped hazardous materials response van. The
arrangement was not pan of a mutual aid system or agreement but involved payment to Salinas for
its services. Normally, the 911 communications system received and prioritized calls, then
dispatched Monterey Fire Department for initial assessment. The Salinas hazardous materials team
is also dispatched if needed. In a major emergency, Monterey activates its emergency operations
center and dispatched its personnel independently.
The normal 911 dispatch procedure was not used during Loma Prieta, but rather, the Fire
Department received calls directly, then prioritized and dispatched its personnel independently.
Vehicles were also staged at the main fire station next to the city administrative offices for priority
dispatch. When the city emergency operations center opened, it assumed dispatch duties from the
fire department. The fire department responded to one hazardous materials incident which occurred
at the Hyatt House in Monterey. Cleaning chemicals had vibrated off shelves and fallen on the
floor, some breaking open, mixing, and generating a vapor cloud. Monterey Fire called 911 by
radio and requested the Salinas hazardous materials team. The team responded, made an entry, and
collected broken containers for disposal. Salinas spent two days on site conducting response and
removal operations.
During an emergency, Monterey Fire Dept. would contact the appropriate local, State, and Federal
agencies including the U.S. Coast Guard. It was unaware of the EPA hazardous material response
capability prior to the Loma Prieta earthquake. Known resources would be obtained through
current mutual aid procedures if those of Salinas were exceeded or unavailable. Monterey Fire
would deploy hazardous materials resources for non-hazardous materials incidents and would
deploy an outside team rather than have it stand by.Monterey Fire is an administering agency
which receives and maintains Chapter 6.95 and SARA Title III business plans and other
information. The business plans, which have been submitted by facilities that handle acutely
hazardous materials, are stored in specially made files on board the fire department command
vehicle for immediate access at the site of an incident.
Monterey Fire pointed out that the California Dept. of Forestry staged 50 strike teams at Gilroy
shortly after Loma Prieta struck, each team consisting of five engines with three men and a team
leader. Monterey Fire was not notified about the availability of the strike teams, and to its
knowledge, other local jurisdictions or agencies. Consequently, CDF assets were not utilized.
CDF also maintains a helicopter at King City for reconnaissance and observation which was not
used. In addition, Fort Ord has a civilian fire department and a considerable quantity of equipment
and personnel that could be used for emergency operations such as fire fighting and heavy rescue,
but no formal agreement or procedure was developed to request and deploy those resources.
STATUS 1994
Battalion Chief Mike Ventimiglia says the department's emergency response capability depends on
the type and amount of material involved. "We would still rely on mutual aid for hazardous
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material control and mitigation." The department would rely on mutual aid from the City of Salinas
or Seaside Fire Dept. for identification and minor mitigation.
Status level of hazardous materials response has changed. The department has turned the
administering agency program over to Monterey County. Ventimiglia says the Monterey Fire
Department no longer tracks materials or sites.
Yet, the department's degree of concern about hazardous materials incident response has not
increased. "For the most part hazardous materials concern is too costly," Ventimiglia declared.
"We could not meet State and Federal mandates. These are some of the reasons the program was
abandoned."
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SECTION VI SAN BENTTO COUNTY
COUNTY OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES
The county office did not have a dedicated hazardous materials team at the time of the Loma Prieta
earthquake, but the city of Hollister Fire Department had three trained personnel, and Aromas Fire
Department, in neighboring Monterey County, had two. The Hollister Fire Dept. responds to
hazardous materials emergencies throughout the county. For areas outside its city limits, Hollister
responds only if backup personnel from the county or other local jurisdictions are already on
scene. Hollister's response is initiated by a call to 911 which is relayed to the fire department
The only hazardous materials incidents in the county during Loma Prieta occurred in the city of
Hollister. These incidents included broken bottles of ammonia and peroxide at Beauty Supply
Wholesale House, spilled pickling liquid containing nickel, cadmium, hydrochloric acid, and
sulfuric acid at a plating company, and spilled formaldehyde at Hazel Hawkins Hospital.
San Benito County requested assistance from the Salinas Fire Dept. hazardous materials team,
Gilroy Fire Dept., and Aromas Fire Dept. following Loma Prieta. The Salinas team responded and
assisted with the plating company cleanup. Hollister Fire Dept. could not offer or provide mutual
aid for other cities in the county or other areas outside the county. The state Office of Emergency
Services asked San Benito County to provide assistance at the Cypress Street viaduct in Oakland,
but it could not be provided because the county needed the resources locally. San Benito County
OES and Hollister Fire would ask for additional assistance from the Office of the State Fire
Marshal and Santa Clara County using cellular telephones by calling 800 numbers.
Neither San Benito County or Hollister was aware of EPA resources available on standby.
Hollister Fire has immediate access to business and other response plans for hazardous materials
emergencies. After the earthquake, a representative from the Office of the State Fire Marshal
inspected and assessed damage in the county, and the sheriff inspected hazardous materials
facilities to assess possible damage. San Benito County OES and Hollister Fire indicated that
training with the EPA would facilitate a needed working relationship.
STATUS 1994
County OES stated that its present emergency response capability would not be able to handle all of
the potential hazardous material incidents occurring from an earthquake. But, the city of Hollister
and county would be able to draw upon mutual aid from nearby jurisdictions — and would assist
them if necessary.
The status level and awareness of hazardous materials response has heightened due to the Loma
Prieta earthquake, but the county office did not elaborate.
Margie M. Riopel, OES Coordinator, said the degree of concern in Hollister and San Benito
County has increased since the 1989 earthquake, attributing this to national news and media
emphasis. This has added to greater awareness in both the public and private sectors, she added.
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SECTION VII SAN FRANCISCO CITY AND COUNTY
SAN FRANCISCO FIRE DEPARTMENT
The department had a manned hazardous materials unit and vehicle located at one of its stations
near the geographic center of the city, during the time of the Loma Prieta earthquake. The unit is
not a dedicated unit of the fire department. All firefighters at the station are trained as hazardous
materials technicians and a team is available when an incident occurs. Two rescue squads are also
available and certain members of the squads are hazardous materials qualified. For unidentified
spills, the hazardous materials unit is deployed with a battalion chief and an engine company.
An industrial hygienist from San Francisco County Health Department may respond if warranted.
Standard response procedures were followed for Loma Prieta with a fully staffed hazardous
materials team ready at all times. Three hazardous materials incidents were reported that required a
fire department response. Diesel fuel spilled at San Francisco Gty Hall, formaldehyde spilled in a
laboratory at Balboa High School, and ammonia leaked out of an unspecified unit at a facility on
Boardman Street The department had expected 20 to 50 spills or releases because of the number of
industries, laboratories, universities, and other facilities located in San Francisco that contain
hazardous materials. Response resources during the earthquake were only moderately taxed.
The fire department did not request additional assistance and did not provide mutual aid to other
agencies or jurisdictions. No unrequested assistance was brought in or offered from outside San
Francisco in the absence of a request. If mutual aid is needed, San Francisco Fire would obtain it
from South County Fire Authority, Marin County, or the state Office of Emergency Services.
These resources would be requested and coordinated through the 911 communications system or
the U.S. Coast Guard.
Chapter 6.95 and SARA Title III information is available from San Francisco County Health
Dept., including lists of facilities where hazardous materials are used or stored for facilities that
have submitted reports.
The fire department said that it needs a way to establish contact with the health department and that
it also needs an updated list of hazardous materials sites.
STATUS 1994
The department does not believe its present emergency response capability would be able to handle
any hazardous materials incident "of size," states Frank Ceacos, a battalion chief. They would,
however, be able to draw upon mutual aid from nearby jurisdictions — as noted in the 1989 Loma
Prieta Response Survey. That would include South County Fire Authority, Marin County, and the
state Office of Emergency Services. Resources, as in 1989, would be requested and coordinated
through the 911 communications system or the Coast Guard.
The status level of hazardous materials response has not changed since the Loma Prieta earthquake
4 1/2 years ago, according to Ceacos.
The hazardous materials section has been organized within the department for a number of years
and has worked closely with the Dept. of Public Health for the past three years in preparation, he
reported. Thus, the department's degree of concern over hazmat incident response has not
increased.
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SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT
At the time of Loma Prieta, the department had five hazardous materials specialists who could
respond with the San Francisco Fire Department to chemical release incidents, although they do not
don protective clothing or enter an exclusion zone. The specialists are on a rotating on-call schedule
and are notified and dispatched through the 911 communications system.
The earthquake interrupted telephone service on the first day of the event, preventing health
department personnel from deploying to possible release sites. Beginning with the second day,
telephone service was reestablished and 911 dispatched the health department for four incidents.
These included a formaldehyde spill, chemical spills at John O'Connell and Lowell high schools,
an ammonia leak from the cooling unit of a meat packing plant, and a methyl ethyl ketone peroxide
container explosion at a Caltrans yard. This number was much fewer than expected, and resources
were utilized only moderately.
The Health Department indicated it was not aware of assistance that other agencies could have
provided during the earthquake. It asked for and received spill response funding from the State,
but less money was received than was requested. The role of EPA in a hazardous materials
response was unclear, although the county has worked with Federal on-scene coordinators in the
past.
The department stated that the two biggest problems it encountered following the earthquake were
potential and actual gas leaks and asbestos inspection and removal. Assistance would have been
helpful in the form of cleanup funds, specially trained people and teams, and technical guidance.
STATUS 1994
Richard Lee of the Bureau of Toxics, Health and Safety Services says the fire department's hazmat
team is capable of handling any single hazardous materials incident which may occur in San
Francisco from an earthquake "if the team is able to respond intact with any needed support."
Unfortunately, added Lee, during an earthquake there may be many more incidents which require
the services of Fire Engine 36 and Battalion 2, which comprise the Hazardous Materials Team.
Depending on the number and nature of the hazardous materials incidents and what other
earthquake-related incidents are occurring, the Hazardous Materials Team may or may not be
activated. An incident involving a large gaseous chemical leak spreading into the community would
warrant a higher priority for mitigation by the Hazardous Materials Team.
San Francisco would be able to draw upon mutual aid from nearby jurisdictions if available. The
San Francisco Hazardous Materials Team works closely with South County Hazardous Materials
Team in San Mateo County. San Francisco also may be able to get assistance from Alameda and
Marin counties, Lee commented.
The status level of hazardous materials response has changed somewhat since Loma Prieta. The
S.F. Hazardous Materials Team has acquired a new vehicle to carry more equipment. The vehicle
also has a cellular phone. Members of the team have been upgraded to Hazardous Materials
Specialists. The team is more familiar with utilizing Level A encapsuling suits. The team is still
available 24-hours-a-day.
Has the degree of concern increased? "Yes and no," responded Lee. "The earthquake has made us
aware of the potential damage which can occur during an earthquake. This damage can certainly
initiate hazardous materials incidents." In addition, the Fire Department HazMat Team may have to
respond to non-hazardous materials incidents, thereby limiting hazardous materials response.
Yet, there were relatively minor hazardous materials incidents associated with the Loma Prieta
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earthquake in San Francisco. Lee said this may indicate that hazardous materials may be of less
concern during a major earthquake, in comparison to fires or rescues in San Francisco.
SECTION Vffl SAN MATEO COUNTY
SAN MATEO COUNTY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
County Environmental Health had a specialized hazardous materials unit, a mobile laboratory and
two state-issued response vans at the time of the mobile laboratory, and two state-issued response
vans, at the time of the Loma Prieta earthquake. The county has other trained units and specialists
including a mitigation team, medical support specialists, an industrial hygienist, a chemist, and an
environmental health specialist It provides technical support for spill monitoring and mitigation to
San Mateo Fire Dept. and to South County Fire Authority, a response agency covering Belmont,
San Carlos, and the contiguous harbor area located on the bay. A hazardous materials response is
initiated by calling the 911 communications system. At the scene of a release, the incident
command system is used.
Normal response procedures were employed following Loma Prieta, and when alerted, personnel
reported to their fire departments. The San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services
established a command post staffed by the sheriff, a member of the board of supervisors, and the
health department director. Seven incidents occurred requiring a response, one of which was a
major release. At Kelly-Moore Paint in San Carlos, 1 million gallons of latex paint were released
(10,000 gallons of which entered a storm drain and were discharged to a creek draining into San
Francisco Bay). The remaining material and an additional 4,000-gallon spill of lacquer were
contained on the facility grounds. Throughout the county fewer releases occurred than were
expected, taxing county resources only moderately.
San Mateo County did not request hazardous materials mutual aid, but contacted 20 fire chiefs in
the county and offered assistance, some of which was accepted. The state Department of Health
Services and Department of Food and Agriculture called the county and offered assistance. The
county asked for and received Draeger tubes and other monitoring and sampling equipment. The
county Office of Emergency Services had written mutual aid agreements with all cities in the
county for police, fire, and emergency medical services. Hazardous materials units, when called,
are deployed only for chemical emergencies. Outside teams would be requested to assist the county
in office or administrative assignments, enabling county personnel to operate in the field.
County Environmental Health is an administering agency and maintains and reviews business
plans for hazardous materials facilities. Fire departments in the county have written copies of plans
for businesses within their jurisdictions. Following the earthquake, the health department contacted
city fire departments for damage assessments. The fire departments received damage assessment
reports from major facilities on request. County environmental health inspectors went to various
facilities and made themselves available for post earthquake inspections.
County Environmental Health officials commented that uniform data management of information
collected under SARA Tide III is needed. The EPA can assist the county by facilitating the use of
CAMEO (Computer Aided Management of Emergency Operations) as a data management tool. It
can also offer hazardous materials training and exercises.
STATUS 1994
Dirk Jensen, hazardous materials specialist for San Mateo County Environmental Health, believes
the department would be able to respond to a hazmat incident. "Whether or not we would have
adequate resources to handle a major incident resulting from an earthquake is hard to say," he
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cautions.
County environmental health believes other jurisdictions would probably have their hands full
during an earthquake scenario.Jensen believes the department has improved its ability to work with
local agencies such as fire and police more closely. But, the equipment and resources are
essentially the same as they were in 1989.
The department could not pinpoint if its degree of concern has increased about hazmat incident
response since Loma Prieta almost five years ago. "There is always concern for serious hazmat
emergencies resulting from a catastrophic event such as an earthquake," Jensen responded.
BRISBANE FIRE DEPARTMENT
The department did not have a specialized hazardous materials team in 1989, but relied on the
response team from South County Fire Authority. SCFA would be dispatched to Brisbane through
the 911 communciations system. In the event of a response, 911 would also contact the sheriff,
ambulance, and county environmental health officers.
Following the Loma Prieta earthquake there were two hazardous materials releases handled by
facility owners or operators. South County Fire Authority was not called. Considering that there
are three chemical companies in Brisbane and a 21-million gallon capacity aviation tank farm that
supplies fuel for San Francisco International Airport, the number of incidents was fewer than
expected. Response resources were not used at all.
Mutual aid was not requested by Brisbane nor was it provided, and no mutual aid was brought in
or offered in the absence of a request. Brisbane was aware of resources available from the
Department of Fish and Game and Bay Area Air Quality Management District, but was not aware
of those available from the EPA. Brisbane was not aware of the National Response Center.
Hazardous materials response is perceived as a local concern only, and Brisbane's first call for
assistance would be to South County Fire Authority with which it has a signed mutual aid
agreement.
Brisbane Fire Department, an administering agency, keeps Chapter 6.95 and SARA Title III
facility map books for businesses that report data. After the earthquake, there were no immediate
facility inspections because of constraints imposed by limited resources. A city disaster plan was in
the process of being revised at the time of Loma Prieta and updated with the help of the San Mateo
County Office of Emergency Services. This plan addresses response and recovery issues of
importance in the event of a disaster.
STATUS 1994
Brisbane does not believe it has the capability to handle any hazardous material incident occuring
from an earthquake. Fire Chief Scott Kenley reports that the city has a large tank storage facility
and numerous chemical storage warehouses. If all were to sustain major damage "we would be
unable to adequately manage all incidents effectively."
There are mutual aid plans in place that would allow the ultimate management of hazmat incidents,
Kenley stated. "However, there is a great degree of probability that these resources will be engaged
in their own jurisdiction and unable to respond to mutual aid requests."
The status level of hazardous materials response in Brisbane has changed somewhat in the
intervening years. Brisbane has arranged automatic aid with Daly City, a large neighboring city.
The department's degree of concern about hazardous material incident response has not increased,
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however. "We still expect to be able to access or not access resources from the 'North County1
depending on what incidents occur in these other cities," Chief Kenley states.
"We experienced the earthquake in 1989 and were fortunate not to sustain much damage."
SECTION DC SANTA CLARA COUNTY
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
The department, as of 1989, maintained a hazardous materials program in its toxics control unit,
and provided technical assistance to emergency response personnel in the Santa Clara County
Central Fire District. The system is activated through the 911 communications system. The 911
dispatcher contacts the appropriate emergency response agency, which sends its hazardous
materials personnel to the incident scene. If the agency notified is the Central Fire District, the
public health department may also be called for technical assistance.
The normal 911 activation procedure was followed by city response teams to all the hazardous
materials incidents following the Loma Prieta earthquake. The public health department, however,
was not called for any emergency response actions. The county established an emergency
operations center from which mutual aid and investigative follow-up were coordinated as well as
emergency responses by the city teams. County hazardous materials resources were used heavily,
but primarily for non-response related activities such as post-earthquake inspections.
The only hazardous materials mutual aid the county Department of Public Health requested was
from the state Department of Health Services for an overflight of United Technologies, which the
state provided. Santa Clara County offered mutual aid to Santa Cruz County, though no hazardous
materials mutual aid was requested by or provided to any outside jurisdiction. Santa Clara Public
Health Department indicated it would request assistance from local, state, and federal agencies,
including the Environmental Protection Agency, based on procedures in existing contingency
plans. The county would also make requests directly to agencies or obtain additional resources
through the county emergency services office. Deployment of hazardous materials teams or
resources from outside, either for immediate use or on standby, is handled by the Central Fire
District
The department is an administering agency which receives and maintains Chapter 6.95 business
plans for facilities within unincorporated areas of the county. Fire departments in cities throughout
the county maintain copies of business plans for facilities within their jurisdictions. Follow-up
inspections were made after Loma Prieta of underground storage tanks, hazardous waste
generators, and plating shops, with special attention to United Technologies and Stanford
University. The inspection system worked well, and no major problems were found.
Santa Clara County stated that in a disaster direct lines of communication are needed between
agencies and this might be facilitated by liaison officers stationed in the county emergency
operations center. During the Loma Prieta response, the state Office of Emergency Services was in
contact with the county EOC where the public health director and other county principals were also
stationed. No one, however, was aware of the specific Environmental Protection Agency
hazardous materials response capabilities.
STATUS 1994
In Santa Clara County the local cities and the Central Fire District each have their own response
teams. The Hazardous Materials Compliance Division (HMCD) in the Department of
Environmental Health is not a first response agency to hazardous materials emergencies. HMCD
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does supply technical support (sampling, investigations, etc.) when asked by a local agency.
Responses to survey questions, then, are from HMCD's perspective and do not represent the other
local agencies (fire departments).
HMCD staff are fully trained (to OSHA standards) and can respond if asked by other local
agencies to assist in investigations, sampling and other activities related to releases of hazardous
materials. All HMCD staff meet the state's requirements for being hazardous waste inspectors and
are trained in use and maintenance of equipment. Staff have regular meetings and training for
response to emergencies such as county-wide disasters. The division's capabilities and resources
would be drained quickly and outside assistance needed, said Jim Blarney, supervising hazardous
materials specialist
The county and other local agencies can draw upon mutual aid through various comprehensive
agreements. The specifics of these mutual aid agreements can be found in the County-wide Area
Plan.
Blarney says the Loma Prieta earthquake was a testament to the success of the hazardous materials
program in Santa Clara County. Agencies with first response designation could provide more
specific input Three agencies, the Santa Clara Fire Department, the Department of Public Safety in
Sunnyvale, and the Stanford Dept. of Environmental Health and Safety, are surveyed in the
following pages.
With the myriad of local ordinances and state laws/regulations governing the storage and use of
hazardous materials and toxic gases, the county as a whole survived the earthquake in relatively
good shape, Blarney commented. "There were very few releases outside of containment areas and
few requests for assistance immediately after the earthquake."
Since the division is not a first responder, Blarney could not truly assess whether the county's
degree of concern about hazardous materials incident response had escalated since the 1989
earthquake.
SANTA CLARA FIRE DEPARTMENT
At the time of the Loma Prieta earthquake, the department had three specialists who comprised the
hazardous materials division. The department also had a dedicated hazardous materials van
equipped with level A and level B personal protective equipment, detection and monitoring
instruments, containment and recovery equipment, and several communications systems. All
firefighters in the department (in 1989) were certified at the hazardous materials operations and
technician levels, and hazardous materials specialists had more advanced training. Through the
Santa Clara County Fire Chief Association, the Santa Clara department's hazardous materials team
met monthly together with similar teams from San Jose, Sunnyvale, Mountain View, and Santa
Clara County Central Fire District to conduct preparedness training. Teams from Lockheed, United
Technologies, and IBM also attend. The Santa Clara Fire Department is responsible for
containment and cleanup of hazardous materials while the county handles hazardous waste
problems and conducts inspections. The fire department team is activated through 911 and
responds to confirmed spills with two engines, a battalion chief, a chemist, a rescue vehicle, and
the van.
This procedure was used following Loma Prieta. In all, there were 16 fire department hazardous
materials responses in the first 28 hours after the earthquake. These were mostly minor spills,
reports of odors, other unconfirmed reportings, and one fire in a chemical cleaning room. Other
spills or releases occurred but were contained and cleaned up by responsible parties in conjunction
with Santa Clara regional industrial preparedness teams. Santa Clara Fire Department hazardous
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materials resources were taxed very little during the Loma Prieta response. Secondary containment
and other safeguard systems functioned properly, and facilities handled their own spills based on
fire department guidelines. In addition, there were so many volunteers from throughout the city
that there were more people than needed for all the assignments.
The department did not request nor provide mutual aid during Loma Prieta, even though it offered
aid to the Central Fire District (based in Los Gatos). The fire district, while needing considerable
assistance, had to request and receive it from outside the bay area through the county HOC. The
county is aware that other assistance is available, primarily from the Environmental Protection
Agency and U.S. Coast Guard, with which Santa Clara has signed memorandums of
understanding. Local mutual aid would be requested first through neighboring fire departments,
and then through the fire district. Santa Clara Fire Department would deploy the specialized
hazardous materials team for non-hazardous materials responses but would have its chemists stand
by only for spills or releases. The department indicated that it would not call an outside hazardous
materials team to assist with an operation.
The department is an administering agency and maintains business plans for facilities within its
jurisdiction submitted under Chapter 6.95. Response information, including site maps and
chemical inventories, is available to responders from the department's computer on "complex
cards." This same information is also available to county communications through the 91 IE system
and is provided to the 911 dispatchers when requested.
The Santa Clara Fire Department also indicated that the low incidence of damage to facilities during
the earthquake was the result of city prevention programs. First responders were, in many cases,
facility personnel. Santa Clara, in addition, has good hazardous materials ordinances, and its
model community right-to-know ordinance was used as the basis for laws developed by the State
of California and federal government. A supportive judiciary and district attorneys office,
furthermore, greatly increases the city hazardous materials planning and response capabilities.
STATUS 1994
Following the Loma Prieta earthquake, David R. Parker, hazardous materials administrator, said
the fire department and corporate emergency response teams successfully handled all known
hazardous materials releases in Santa Clara. Mutual aid was not needed. "We are better trained now
than on 10/17/89. However, a larger earthquake could overwhelm any local response capabilities."
Parker says the department would probably not be able to draw upon mutual aid from a nearby
jurisdiction. Santa Clara County probably has one of the highest densities of highly-trained and
equipped hazardous materials responders in the country, he stated. "Yet, if one jurisdiction is
overwhelmed with hazmat responses, all nearby, jurisdictions are also likely to be overwhelmed,
Parker added. Mutual aid will need to come from unaffected areas — in all likelihood outside the
San Francisco Bay Area.
The status level of hazardous materials response has made incremental improvement in Santa
Clara. "Since we continually train, evaluate, and rehearse for hazmat response, we should be
achieving incremental improvement. We believe we had a high level of hazardous materials
emergency response capability prior to 10/17/89."
Santa Clara had a "significant" level of concern about hazardous materials incident response prior
to the earthquake, stated Parker. At the time of the earthquake, local government and industry were
developing strict regulations dealing with the safe storage, use, and handling of toxic gases. These
regulations have subsequently been completed and implemented.
As a result of local hazardous materials storage, use, and handling regulations passed in 1983, we
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continue to see a decrease in the annual number of serious hazardous materials releases in our
jurisdictions, Parker reported. These regulations, which include provisions for earthquake safety,
helped mitigate the effects of the Loma Prieta earthquake, Parker related.
STANFORD UNIVERSITY DEPT. OF HEALTH AND SAFETY
Stanford University employs several hazardous materials specialists with 200 hours of training,
two of whom are on call at all times. University responders are capable of level B entry, but IT
Corp. is contracted to provide level A entry capability. When an emergency occurs, Palo Alto Fire
Department and Santa Clara County Central Fire District respond immediately. The incident
command system is used and a joint response team is formed, with an official from the university
health and safety office as the safety officer. The response system is activated by a call from
campus fire dispatch. The university response team determines whether level A or level B entry is
required, and then it notifies the county office of emergency services or other appropriate agency
depending on the circumstances.
During Loma Prieta the Stanford Police Department established an emergency operations center
composed of an operations team and a policy team with a representative from the environmental
health and safety office. A total of 130 spills, releases, or possible releases were reported,
primarily in university science laboratories, 22 of which Stanford personnel investigated in level B
or less. These spills were classified as chemical hazards, radiation hazards, industrial hygiene
(smells), and biohazards. The university had expected at least several serious hazardous materials
incidents. Its resources were only moderately utilized, however.
Stanford University did not request mutual aid, but it did provide assistance to the Veterans
Administration Medical Center in Palo Alto. Moffett Field Naval Air Station sent an officer by
helicopter to the university with an offer of assistance, but the offer was declined. Other resources
with which the university is familiar would be provided by the state Office of Emergency Services,
the poison control center, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The Palo Alto Police
Department and the Santa Clara County Office of Emergency Services can also assist in
evacuations. In the event of an on-campus emergency, hazardous materials personnel would not be
deployed if the emergency involved a non-hazardous materials incident. Outside teams would be
called in for standby if there was more than one priority incident.
Stanford officials stated that the university has learned to operate independently and not rely on
outside assistance from the county. The university conducts elaborate disaster drills every two
years focusing on worst case scenarios, and it was felt that this helped in preparing for the
response. At the time of Loma Prieta, an earthquake expert was on campus who organized and led
27 teams in a comprehensive inspection of all buildings. Some of the hazardous materials spills
were detected by these teams. To aid emergency workers, a life safety box is located outside each
laboratory that contains hazardous materials. These boxes, of which there are thousands on
campus, contain information on emergency contacts, chemicals present, hazards, and maps. The
boxes are not updated as often as they should be because their importance is not universally
recognized.
The environmental health and safety department indicated that the level of earthquake damage was
directly related to laboratory "housekeeping." Those laboratories utilizing good housekeeping
practices suffered little if any earthquake damage, while those utilizing poor practices suffered
more damage.
STATUS 1994
The Stanford University emergency response coordinator believes the office's present response
capability would not be able to handle any hazardous materials incident.
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The coordinator doubts if Stanford would be able to draw upon mutual aid from a nearby
jurisdiction. "The nearest jurisdiction that I know of would be Santa Clara County Hazmat. Even
under normal conditions it takes at least 30 minutes and sometimes in excess of one hour to
respond. I am not confident that we would get their aid in the event of an earthquake." Gary
Schell, safety engineer, doesn't think the status level of hazardous materials response has changed.
He says the Palo Alto Fire Department has been talking about forming a hazmat team for a few
years now.
Schell says his degree of concern about hazardous materials incident response has remained about
the same since the 1989 earthquake.
Nothing has changed, he concludes, regarding Stanford's ERT or PAFD's
hazmat capabilities since then. Stanford ERT is responsible to address "modest" gains.
SUNNYVALE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Public Safety, in 1989, had 12 men assigned to a special hazardous materials unit and an equipped
response truck. Most of the 12 responders have over 480 hours of training and are capable of level
A entry. The hazardous materials team is available to the county health department and is also part
of a permitting and inspection group. The hazardous materials team, through the department,
works regularly with other city and county agencies and has a mutual aid agreement with the
county. The team is activated by a call from the 911 communications system.
Standard notification procedures were used throughout the Loma Prieta earthquake response. After
the event the hazardous materials team responded to three incidents. The team made a level A entry
to shut off a phosphine leak at Hoechst-Celanese; a level A assessment for spilled chemicals at
Hewlett-Packard; and an investigation of a gasoline leak from underground storage tanks into the
storm drain system at a Chevron service station. Hewlett-Packard contracted with a private
organization for cleanup and Chevron diked and pumped out spilled product at its station.
Sunnyvale expected more incidents and was prepared to respond. Given the number of spills called
in to 911, resources were moderately utilized.
The department did not request nor provide hazardous materials mutual aid. If needed, Sunnyvale
would ask for assistance from the state Office of Emergency Services, Department of Fish and
Game, and other agencies which have been used in the past. Telephone numbers are listed in the
office, carried in the response truck, and periodically checked and updated. The only assistance
Sunnyvale requested was from Chevron, which provided pump trucks to remove product from the
underground storage tanks. No assistance was brought in or offered in the absence of a request.
Because the team is trained for a variety of tasks, it would be deployed for a non-hazardous
materials incident. As a general rule, an outside hazardous materials team, which is made available
through county mutual aid, would not be placed on standby, but would be deployed.
The hazardous materials team maintains business plans for facilities within its jurisdiction and
assists the county health department with permitting and inspections. Following Loma Prieta, the
team listed, prioritized, and conducted over 350 facility inspections beginning with hospitals and
schools. The inspections showed that only minor hazardous materials incidents had occurred and
that most had been handled internally by facility cleanup teams. Follow-up inspections indicated
that further recovery operations were performed by facility owners or operators. The team has also
participated in a city planning study in which seismic maps were used and hazardous materials
problems considered.
The Department of Public Safety noted that the city has a high concentration of facilities that use
hazardous materials. The fire service has been instrumental in providing leadership and guidance in
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the area of hazardous materials use and storage and, as a result, many facilities have organized their
own response teams. These teams were used successfully following Loma Prieta. The Department
of Public Safety also implements state risk management and prevention program guidelines and
strictly enforces other compliance regulations.
STATUS 1994
Gil Candelaria, a captain with the Sunnyvale Dept. of Public Safety, believes the department's
present emergency response capability would be able to handle any hazardous material incident
occuring from an earthquake.
Status level of hazardous materials response in Sunnyvale has not changed since the Loma Prieta
earthquake. Further, Candelaria said the department's degree of concern about hazardous materials
incident response has not increased.
The City of Sunnyvale has had a fully operational hazardous materials response team since 1981,
Candelaria explained. With the changes in technology, Sunnyvale has been experiencing a
significant decline in the number of hazmat calls for service each year. It is expected that this trend
will continue in the future.
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SECTION X SANTA CRUZ COUNTY
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
The department has trained hazardous materials personnel who usually respond with local fire
departments. County communications, 911, contacts both the local fire department and hazardous
materials personnel when a response is necessary. A hazardous materials response team is
available through the Watsonville Fire Department The county emergency operations center, when
activated, initiates a response through 911. This activation procedure was generally used during the
Loma Prieta response for which time notification and coordination were provided by the county
emergency operations center.
Local fire departments responded to fires, gas leaks, and emergency rescues after Loma Prieta.
Fire department and environmental health personnel responded to 15 small hazardous materials
incidents, mostly in the city of Santa Cruz, to provide cleanup or to package spilled chemicals.
Many of these incidents involved broken containers in residences, small pesticide, herbicide, and
household chemical spills at garden supply and hardware stores, and broken containers in the
chemistry and biology laboratories at Cabrillo College. To assist in disposal of the materials county
environmental health established chemical collection and removal areas for household chemicals.
Due to the size of the earthquake, more hazardous materials incidents were expected than occurred.
Hazardous materials resources were moderately utilized.
Because no major incidents took place, environmental health did not request mutual aid through the
emergency operations center. The telephone numbers of all response agencies are available to the
county, and agencies are contacted in a prioritized listing, kept at the county communications
center, depending on the type of incident and environment affected. Procedures to obtain assistance
are contained in the county hazardous materials and multi-disaster response plans. Following Loma
Prieta, the state Office of Emergency Services contacted Santa Cruz County and offered assistance,
promptly delivering personal protective equipment and drums to package hazardous materials.
Timely assistance was also supplied by the state Department of Health Services. Other agencies
provided assistance, some of which arrived too late for use. The county stated it would deploy a
hazardous materials response team for a non-hazardous materials incident and that it would call in
an outside team to standby, depending on the severity of the incident
Santa Cruz County Environmental Health is an administering agency and collects business plans
from all hazardous materials handling facilities. These plans include information about the type and
quantity of materials handled and their storage method and location. After Loma Prieta, the county
ordered that all underground storage tanks be tested and monitored frequently by owners or
operators and ordered the results submitted to the health department. In addition, the county
inspected all "high risk" companies including pesticide applicators, computer chip manufacturers,
and plating facilities. Visual inspections did not indicate evidence of leakage or spillage of
hazardous materials. County health officials attended meetings of the planning department and
offered assistance on hazardous materials facility siting.
Environmental Health expressed confidence that it is prepared for most hazardous materials
incidents by activating its hazardous materials response plan and utilizing material aid agencies.
Multiple incidents, however, are not addressed in the plan (as it was structured in 1989), and the
county may not be prepared for such responses. Local jurisdictions, it should be noted, are
increasing their overall level of preparedness. Federal assistance is considered too slow to respond
during an emergency situation, and therefore would not be requested.
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STATUS 1994
Steven Schneider, Hazardous Materials Program Manager, says county Environmental Health
Services, in concert with other agencies, is far better able to respond to hazardous materials
incidents resulting from an earthquake than five years ago. The county has more staff, with more
experience and better training. More and better equipment is readily available. As a result of the
Hazardous Materials Management Plan and the Hazardous Waste Generator Program inspections,
Environmental Health has a much better knowledge of what types and amounts of chemicals exist
in the county and the potential associated risks posed following a variety of disasters.
The status level of hazardous materials response has changed since 1989, Schneider said. The City
of Scotts Valley Fire Department has added a hazardous materials response van and trained staff.
The county's degree of concern about hazardous materials incident response has not increased, due
to many of the reasons and improvements already noted. This is primarily due, Schneider
explained, to the better understanding of what chemicals are being used and stored in Santa Cruz
County. Also, the business community has been relatively cooperative in improving its handling
of hazardous materials and wastes. "Although we have seen much improvement since 1989, we
recognize further enhancement is possible and will continue to make strides in that direction, said
Schneider.
SCOTTS VALLEY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT
In 1989 Scotts Valley had two hazardous materials specialists located in the public works
department. A number of firefighters in the Scotts Valley Fire District are undergoing hazardous
materials training. After the Loma Prieta earthquake, the city emergency operations center was
activated and the hazardous materials team was dispatched by public works personnel in
accordance with standard operating procedures contained in the city's emergency preparedness
plan.
There were no hazardous materials responses following Loma Prieta. A number of spills occurred,
however, on private property but were cleaned up by the owners or operators. These spills
involved small quantities of solvents, pesticides, and herbicides at hardware and home supply
stores. Following the earthquake, the county offered household waste disposal services to collect
spilled materials and broken containers. Scotts Valley expected more incidents because of the size
of the earthquake. There were no incidents involving a city response, and hazardous materials
resources were not utilized at all.
Scotts Valley did not request, was not asked for, and did not provide mutual aid during the
earthquake recovery period. The city has the names and telephone numbers of all local, state, and
federal response agencies. Had there been a need for outside assistance, the city would have made
a request either from Scotts Valley Fire District or the county emergency operations center.
Additionally, Watsonville Fire Dept. would respond through a mutual aid agreement Scotts Valley
would deploy a hazardous materials team for non-hazardous materials incidents and use an outside
team immediately for an incident if it was necessary.
After the earthquake, major industries were called by the Scotts Valley emergency operations
center, at which time it was learned that owners or operators conducted their own cleanup. Scotts
Valley made no recommendations regarding follow-up investigations. The city indicated it has
good relationships with businesses, and expressed confidence in its cleanup activities. Scotts
Valley further stated that it holds post-incident meetings after emergencies with affected agencies to
upgrade the city emergency preparedness plan. These meetings have facilitated good working
relationships among agencies to increase understanding of planning activities requiring
improvement. Scotts Valley would prefer not to utilize federal assistance unless local resources
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were overwhelmed and such federal assistance became absolutely essential.
STATUS 1994
Mike McMurry, division chief for training, said the district has increased emergency response to
hazardous materials incidents substantially since the Loma Prieta earthquake. "We believe that we
have an excellent response capability, but would not speculate on the unforseen challenges that
may arise from a future event" McMurry said that district personnel are better trained and equipped
today and were able to adequately handle the incidents that occurred in 1989.
Scotts Valley would be able to draw upon mutual aid from a nearby jurisdiction — "provided that
their response is not impaired or committed to their local community," McMurry stipulated.
Status level of hazardous materials response in Scotts Valley has changed since Loma Prieta. The
district now operates a technician level hazardous materials team with a fully equipped unit for
emergency response. The district now serves as the administrating agency for the city.
The district's degree of concern for hazardous materials incident response has not increased since
the 1989 earthquake. "I felt the fire district handled any hazardous material incident adequately,"
McMurry stated. "We have also increased training/expertise and equipment to better meet the
ongoing demand for service in addition to being prepared for a disaster."
U.C. SANTA CRUZ ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
UC Santa Cruz did not have a specialzed hazardous materials response team in 1989. It relied to a
limited extent on the campus fire department which has level B capability, but is not a hazardous
materials first responder. The university, however, does have access to dedicated hazardous
materials teams from University of California campuses at Los Angeles, Davis, Berkeley, Santa
Barbara, Irvine, and San Francisco through an informal mutual aid system. UCLA also has a
helicopter available for hazardous materials response. Responses on campus at the time of Loma
Prieta were initiated through a call to campus 911, not county communications (911). Campus 911
notifies the campus environmental health and safety office and the campus fire department.
Environmental health and safety is not formally involved with city or county planning and has no
written or other procedures to integrate its activities with local jurisdictions.
Following Loma Prieta, the campus environmental health and safety office initially contacted the
campus fire department through the campus 911 operator about possible hazardous materials
incidents. The university vice chancellor called the chancellor of the Los Angeles campus directly
and requested a hazardous materials team. In addition, the environmental health and safety office
called the Santa Cruz County Health Dept. to obtain a situation status report. Although a campus
emergency was not declared, the campus fire chief also activated the emergency operations center
which was staffed by health and safety and other designated response officials. Numerous spills of
chemicals occurred, mostly from containers on shelves in two large science buildings. Both the
health and safety office and the campus fire department made entries and conducted evaluations
with subsequent assistance from the Los Angeles, Davis, and Santa Barbara campus hazardous
materials teams. Some laboratories were vented by the teams, but faculty members generally
cleaned up their own areas. Many more spills were expected because of the large amount of
teaching chemicals present. Santa Cruz campus resources were taxed heavily while the UC
systemwide resources were taxed only slightly. There were no reported unstable conditions or
hazardous materials emergencies.
Mutual aid for the university was requested from the Los Angeles, Santa Barbara and Davis
campuses. At the request of Santa Cruz County, the Santa Cruz campus sent a combined Los
Angeles-Davis team to a middle school in the northern county to investigate reported chemical
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spills. The city of Santa Clara sent a hazardous materials team to the Santa Cruz campus without
having been requested, but returned because it was not needed. The University of California at
Irvine and the Los Alamos National Laboratory offered teams, but were turned down because
sufficient resources were already deployed on campus.
The environmental health and safety office indicated it is somewhat aware of local resources, as
well as those available through the state Office of Emergency Services and National Response
Center. There are, however, no formal procedures to request this assistance, and the campus is not
a signator to the California master mutual aid plan. Teams were called to conduct hazardous
materials operations, rather than standby, but all were from other University of California
campuses.
UC Santa Cruz does not work with the state Office of Emergency Services or participate in SARA
Title III planning, and is not subject to local ordinances except as specifically indicated by state
law. The campus, however, does have business, disaster preparedness, and building specific
response plans with standard emergency planning and response procedures. The business plan,
which contains emergency response procedures, meets the requirements of Chapter 6.95.
Since Loma Prieta, fire marshals and industrial hygienists from all the University of California
campuses have met to discuss the earthquake and recommend formal mutual aid procedures for the
University of California system.
STATUS 1994
Environmental health and safety would be able to handle most incidents even if only to secure the
area and prevent access, according to Use Kolbus, director. "However, it is possible that multiple
significant incidents could overwhelm our capabilities.
"Due to the nature of our facilities, most releases would be finite and not ongoing, therefore, the
need for immediate offensive action in most cases is not critical. It would take us time to ultimately
mitigate and cleanup, but this could happen under non-emergency conditions as part of recovery,"
Kolbus explains.
Kolbus says two mechanisms are now in place to draw upon mutual aid. The UC system has set
up "mutual aid" between and among its campuses. "We could request and receive that assistance
during or following an emergency. Again, there would be a time delay, but as stated previously
most releases would not be of an ongoing nature (e.g., rupture of large storage tank, leak in piping
system). We could also access the county's Regional Hazardous Materials Response teams,
providing they were available and not tied up elsewhere.
The status level of hazardous materials response has changed for the better in the last four-plus
years. "Our position has improved by training of additional persons to assist in response actions
and through the acquisition and maintenance of on site equipment. We have also emphasized
prevention by securing, bracing and containment requirements to prevent spillage," Kolbus
comments.
The environmental health and safety office on the UC Santa Cruz campus believes it is more
aware, with respect to hazardous materials incidents, than in the past. "We also realize that our
preparation and planning needs to be ongoing to be effective," said Kolbus.
U.C. SANTA CRUZ FIRE DEPARTMENT
The UC Santa Cruz Fire Department did not have a dedicated hazardous materials response team at
the time of Loma Prieta. The firefighters, who have level B training and entry capability, are
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primarily first responders for fire or rescue operations, although they can assist in hazardous
materials assessment and cleanup. The campus fire department has established mutual aid
agreements with Watsonville, other Santa Cruz County fire chiefs and districts, and the California
Department of Forestry, which would be invoked during an emergency. The response system is
activated through the campus 911 system, and responses are conducted according to guidelines
contained in the fire department emergency procedures manual.
This system was used following the Loma Prieta earthquake. Both the campus fire department and
environmental health and safety office were initially notified by campus 911, and each worked
cooperatively to locate classrooms and laboratories where hazardous materials were reportedly
spilled and to identify the chemicals involved. The fire department also worked closely with the
other campus hazardous materials teams for inspecting and venting buildings and conducting
cleanup operations.
The campus fire department did not request mutual aid and did not provide any outside assistance.
Through the county emergency operations center, Santa Cruz County asked campus fire for
hazardous materials assistance. The campus, however, was not able to provide this aid. The
campus fire chief must contact local, state, and federal resources, but rely primarily on assistance
from Watsonville Fire Department. Outside resources must be obtained during emergencies
through the operational area fire and rescue coordinator located in the county emergency operations
center. While campus fire is not a signator to the agreement, it must use the coordinator to make
requests for mutual aid assistance based on other formal mutual aid agreements.
Immediately after the earthquake struck, the campus fire chief activated the campus emergency
operations center. The center was staffed by the fire chief, police chief, executive assistant to the
chancellor, staff from the environmental health and safety office, chief doctor from student health
services, and representatives from other campus departments and offices. Some officials with
responsibilities in the center did not report to the center. Once activated, the campus emergency
operations center established communications with the Santa Cruz County emergency operations
center.
STATUS 1994
UC Santa Cruz Fire would not be able to handle any hazardous materials incident occuring from an
earthquake.
It probably would not be able to draw upon mutual aid from a nearby jurisdiction, under
earthquake conditions, since the two local resources, Scotts Valley Fire Protection District and
Watsonville Fire Department, staff their hazmat units with fire personnel who would be
overwhelmed with their own local circumstances.
The status level of hazardous materials response has changed since Loma Prieta. "Our personnel
have received the hazmat first responder operational training," noted Michael Quinton, acting fire
chief, "and they will be receiving a modified 80-hour condensed (without railroad tank car, etc.)
HazMat la, Ib, Ic, and Id course focused on the needs of the University of California at Santa
Cruz. Also, our campus environmental health and safety office has established and trained
emergency response teams in the lab buildings to handle low level incidents."
The degree of concern about hazardous materials incident response has definitely increased,
according to Quinton. "We at UCSC had several lab buildings contaminated with major spillage of
assorted chemicals and one building in particular was not reopened for several days."
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WATSONVILLE FIRE DEPARTMENT
At the time of Loma Prieta the department had a dedicated and trained hazardous materials team
with level A entry capability and a fully equipped hazardous materials response van containing
monitoring, communications, and database access equipment. During major emergencies,
Watsonville establishes and operates a city emergency operations center in which the incident
command system is employed, with the fire department chief acting as operations section chief.
The hazardous materials team is dispatched by a call to the 911 communications system, which
relays the message to the fire department. Once the city emergency operations center is activated, it
coordinates with the county emergency operations center.
During the Loma Prieta response, communications with 911 were disrupted, preventing an initial
hazardous materials dispatch by the county. The fire department immediately established its own
dispatch capability using two communications vehicles in the fire department parking lot, and
prioritized and deployed its hazardous materials team while 911 was down. Two hours after the
earthquake, communications with 911 were reestablished and normal communications procedures
were reinstituted.
Watsonville responded to 39 hazardous materials incidents, as well as numerous reports of natural
gas and ammonia odors and several fires. Immediately following the earthquake the fire department
conducted a visual survey of the city, observing dust clouds and spirals of smoke at various
locations. Life threatening emergencies received first priority. The most significant hazardous
materials incidents were the following: (1) Green Giant, major facility damage with a loss of 5,500
pounds of anhydrous ammonia which was contained on site, neutralized, and ventilated during a
one-week response, (2) Burchell water purification facility, level A response to a leak from a 150-
pound cylinder of compressed, liquefied chlorine gas, (3) Crossiti cannery, anhydrous ammonia
release, (4) Watsonville High School, hazardous materials releases from broken containers of
chemicals used for classroom instruction, (5) Apple Growers, small anhydrous ammonia leak, (6)
Martinelli, illegal hydrocarbon dumping into the storm sewer system, and (7) local pharmacy
chemical spills from broken containers.
The Green Giant release, potentially the most disastrous hazardous materials incident resulting
from the Loma Prieta earthquake, required the continuous effort of command level officials. The
response entailed a controlled release of ammonia vapor to the atmosphere. The airborne release
was sprayed down to the ground using fire hoses and 3,000,000 gallons of water. The grounded
ammonia solution was neutralized by mixing it with carbon dioxide gas taken from two tank
trucks. The neutralized product then was collected for disposal. The hazardous materials response
resources of Watsonville were taxed severely after Loma Prieta. The teams were deployed for
Green Giant, and the engine companies were used for other investigations in the city.
The Santa Cruz County operational area fire coordinator, a position established by the state fire and
rescue mutual aid plan in the event of declared emergencies, ordered seven strike teams for
deployment within the county, each consisting of five engines with accompanying officers and
firemen. Watsonville also ordered a strike team from Aptos. A strike team arrived from Napa,
under the direction of a California Department of Forestry captain, and it remained on site for three
weeks to assist with the Green Giant response. Although the Salinas Fire Department hazardous
materials team was available through the mutual aid system, it was not requested. Watsonville was
not requested and did not provide mutual aid.
Additional resources are available to Watsonville from various local, state and federal sources.
Watsonville was unaware of Environmental Protection Agency capabilities and resources, but
would hesitate to use federal assistance anyway. Such resources are considered too far away, and
facility owners or operators may not want federal personnel on their property who could use the
opportunity to look for facility violations. Access to assistance would be made through procedures
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outlined in the Watsonville hazardous materials area plan, by contacting 911, or through the county
emergency operations center, the latter being the case during the Loma Prieta response. State
mutual aid assistance is normally obtained for Watsonville by Santa Cruz County.
Watsonville Fire Department is an administering agency and collects and maintains business plans
for facilities within the city. All businesses in Watsonville, a total of 149, have submitted plans,
which are received by a dedicated fire department captain under the supervision of the fire marshal.
Appropriate information from the plans has been entered in the city's IBM computer system using
MS DOS and Auto CAD (computer aided drafting). This information is immediately available to
hazardous materials response personnel by cellular telephones, radio, portable facsimile, and
computer link. Following the Loma Prieta earthquake, Watsonville was concerned primarily with
the Green Giant facility, which did not provide the fire department with all necessary follow-up
data. Although Watsonville Fire Department does not actively participate with the Region II Local
Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), it may request information from Green Giant through the
community right-to-know provisions of SARA Title in. Review of business plans, it was stated,
has been the most important preparedness measure for the city in its planning process.
An emergency management problem occurred in Watsonville with regard to the incident command
system and emergency operations center, which affected response and recovery operations
following the earthquake. A policy group was formed comprised of the city manager and various
department heads, which never met together. A separate group was formed comprised of elected
officials including city council members, the mayor, and a member of the county board of
supervisors. The group of elected officials acted independently of the emergency operations center.
This resulted in a lack of coordination on major command and control decisions. It apparently did
not prevent an adequate hazardous materials response but may have had implications for certain
recovery and funding issues, as well as the credibility of the local emergency organization.
STATUS 1994
Fire Chief Gary W. Smith says he will never be completely satisfied with regard to the
department's emergency response capability (for hazardous materials incidents). "I feel our hazmat
response plan is very good — but we can always improve."
Responding to the question of whether the department would be able to draw upon mutual aid,
Chief Smith stated, "We already support a regional (three-county) response effort."
The status level of hazardous materials response in Watsonville has changed in the last five years.
"We have improved pur training," Smith said, "for anhydrous ammonia emergencies and have
added a decontamination trailer to our response effort."
The department's degree of concern over hazardous materials incident response, therefore, has not
increased.
Also, there has not been any growth in the industrial community that uses hazardous materials. "In
fact," Smith added, "there has been a small reduction of hazardous materials and a major increase
in prevention, mitigation and risk assessment."
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SECTION XISOLANO COUNTY
SOLANO COUNTY DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
At the time of Loma Prieta the depanment had a hazardous materials van and four trained personnel
qualified to make level B entries. Within the county, the cities of Vallejo and Benicia have
hazardous materials teams. Vacaville had a lesser hazardous materials capability in 1989. County
personnel provide coordination and technical assistance to cities and rural fire districts when
requested. They are notified of incidents through the 911 communications system, or through the
county emergency operations center if it is activated for a major emergency or catastrophic event
Normal notification procedures were employed for Loma Prieta, but because there were no
hazardous materials releases, there were no response actions by county personnel. Based on
existing capabilities (1989), the county would be overwhelmed with more than two incidents. No
mutual aid was requested by the county from outside and none was provided, although the state
Department of Health Services called to offer assistance. The county would request additional
resources, if needed, from city fire departments, the U.S. Coast Guard, or the U.S. EPA, by
contacting the state Office of Emergency Services.
The county Dept. of Environmental Management is an administering agency and responsible for
maintaining business plans under Chapter 6.95. Local fire departments, in addition, have business
plan information which is made available to responders through 911. The county estimated, in
1989, that 30 to 40 percent of the businesses that must report under Chapter 6.95 had submitted
plans or other information, and there had been good cooperation from Travis Air Force Base and
the Exxon refinery. No information was available from the Mare Island Naval Shipyard.
STATUS 1994
The Solano County DEM does not believe it would be able to handle any hazardous material
incident occurring from an earthquake. Clifford K. Covey, program manager/environmental
health, says the Environmental Health Division for Hazardous Materials Emergency Response was
eliminated in this year's budget. "Our team was primarily limited to field identification of an
unknown material and technical assistance to the incident commander. We never had the capability
to handle any hazardous materials incident occurring from an earthquake. We would rely on
outside resources."
The county would be able to draw upon mutual aid. In 1993 the county was considering a contract
with the California Division of Forestry, Napa, to respond to incidents within Solano County. The
county could also utilize the services of the Sacramento County Fire Department Hazardous
Materials Team during an emergency.
The status level of hazardous materials response in Solano County has changed somewhat. There
have been a number of training exercises which have included hazardous materials.
The degree of concern about hazardous materials incident response has changed since 1989. Loss
of the Environmental Health Division Hazardous Materials Response Unit has made field
identification of unknown materials more difficult, Covey explained. "It has left a void in our
ability to respond quickly to an incident. However, with the use of outside resources, that void
may be filled, albeit on a sporadic basis. The current Office of Emergency Coordinator is
addressing this issue."
The county DEM offices are located at the county seat in Fairfield.
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SECTION Xn SONOMA COUNTY
SANTA ROSA FIRE DEPARTMENT
The department maintains a dedicated hazardous materials response unit which is available by
contract to the county. At the time of Loma Prieta, all firefighters in Santa Rosa had received
training at least to the awareness or operations levels and team members were trained to the
technician level. Normal notification and response procedures were followed during the Loma
Prieta earthquake. The only responses made by the Santa Rosa Fire Department were to three
natural gas leaks in residential buildings. Beyond this, the team and other fire units conducted a
visual inspection of the community to look for problems. The hazardous materials resources of the
fire department, consequently, were taxed very little. No mutual aid was requested from outside,
none was provided, and no aid was brought in or offered unrequested. Deployment of a hazardous
materials team for a non-hazardous materials incident would depend on specific circumstances.
Outside units would be called in and might be placed on standby.
Santa Rosa Fire Department is an administering agency and as such has received Chapter 6.95
information. The department also has a pre-fire inspection program by which specific hazards are
identified. Owners or operators of specific hazards facilities are included in training, planning, and
exercises for earthquakes and other types of emergencies. To facilitate planning, the fire
department uses seismic maps and provides advice on the placement of facilities to the planning
commission and city council. The fire department indicated that a list of state and federal resources
with the names of contact persons and telephone numbers would be useful. In addition, the fire
department pointed out, hazardous materials should be identified that are in transit or short transit
storage.
STATUS 1994
Gordon R. Stedman, a division chief for the department, says no one can answer the question of
being able to handle any hazardous materials incident in the affirmative. If the earthquake is severe
enough, centered in just the right area, and hazardous materials are released in great magnitude,
and the department's capabilities are limited because of decreased staffing and/or damage to hazmat
equipment, "we would just have to do the best job we can," Stedman answered.
"Generally our aggressive fire prevention program, requiring hazmat permits, special inspections,
secondary confinement, proper storage, site plans, and general good housekeeping should limit
our exposure to hazmat releases."
The department maintains a hazardous materials team of 28 firefighters trained to the technician
level. Three more firefighters are in the process of being trained. AU fire suppression personnel are
trained to the hazardous materials operational level. The department has a hazardous materials
response vehicle fully equipped per state standards. Generally, this aggressive fire prevention
program, requiring hazmat permits, special inspections, secondary confinement, proper storage,
site plans and general good housekeeping should limit exposure to hazmat releases.
Stedman said the department is more likely to be the resource called upon by neighbors, in
answering the question about drawing on mutual aid. "In the event of an earthquake, we are not
counting on being helped by nearby jurisdictions as any earthquake of the magnitude alluded to
will cause them to have problems. We should be able to get help from further away within 2-4
hours, and certainly by the next day utilizing resources through OES in Sacramento."
Status level of hazardous materials response has changed in Santa Rosa since Loma Prieta.
Personnel have more experience in responding to hazmat calls, an increased awareness of the
problem, and have benefitted from increased enforcement of hazmat fire prevention protection.
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Stedman, however, cannot say that the department's concern has greatly increased with respect to
hazardous materials incident response. "We are quite conscious of hazardous materials problems
experienced after an earthquake," Stedman said. "We had problems with two local laboratories as a
result of the 1967 earthquake, dealing with spilled chemicals. Since then we have become
increasingly responsible toward requiring proper storage and good house keeping.
SECTION XIII U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
The emergency response section of the Environmental Protection Agency in conjunction with the
technical assistance team constitutes the hazardous materials response capability for the inland area
of Region IX.
An emergency response begins when an official notification is received by the Region IX offices,
and an on-scene coordinator, after making a determination, mobilizes and deploys the team. The
notification is usually initiated by a government agency through the National Response Center in
Washington, D.C. Requests for assistance may also be received directly from jurisdictions or
individuals through the Region IX 24-hour spill phone. Under certain circumstances, notification
may be made through the State Warning Center of the state Office of Emergency Services in
Sacramento.
Activation of the emergency response section and technical assistance team was made by
notification of hazardous materials releases from the National Response Center following the Loma
Prieta earthquake. At the moment of the earthquake (5:04 p.m., Oct. 17, 1989), an on-scene
coordinator and two technical assistance team members were "on call" with two fully-equipped
response vans and additional equipment standing by in the Embarcadero area of downtown San
Francisco. Other on-scene coordinators and technical assistance team members working in the field
were initially out of contact with one another and with headquarters because telephones and cellular
units were overloaded with calls.
Under the direction of an on-scene coordinator, a mobile command post was established and the
team was operational and ready for assignment.
Suspected damage to the team's headquarters office forced the transfer of operations to a command
vehicle until the building could be declared safe by San Francisco Fire Department.
Two hours after the first shock, half the team had checked in and was ready to respond.
Additionally, when telephone communications were reestablished, the technical assistance team
immediately notified technical assistance teams in Seattle and Denver to standby for deployment to
the San Francisco bay area. Four team members from each of the two offices were alerted and
prepared to augment the Region IX team. Additional technical assistance team members from eight
other teams were available if needed.
The day after the earthquake, the duty OSC and technical assistance team established a permanent
command post at the Environmental Protection Agency field warehouse in a southern section of
San Francisco. Equipment stocks were augmented to supply two teams of three people each with
all field instrumentation, protective clothing, self-contained breathing apparatuses, and extra air
tanks for major operational deployments. The team was prepared for three days of operations at the
warehouse and eight emergency responses. After a thorough inspection of its downtown offices
had been completed, the technical assistance team returned, remaining on standby until emergency
conditions were downgraded.
Throughout Loma Prieta, the duty on-scene coordinator and technical assistance team screened and
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prioritized telephone calls received from the State Warning Center and National Response Center.
It was agreed that the hazardous materials incidents reported were not significant enough for a
federal response. Consequently, the duty on-scene coordinator and team remained on alert at the
command post and headquarters building until the response phase of the earthquake was over.
Preliminary arrangements were made while on standby to establish a transfer station where spilled
chemicals could be stored prior to shipment for disposal. A team chemist was made available for
this assignment. At the request of Alameda County, the technical assistance team provided health
officials with air purifying respirators, cartridges, and protective clothing by direct deb'very as well
as direct shipment from MSA, the manufacturer. The duty on-scene coordinator and technical
assistance team expected many more hazardous materials releases than occurred, including several
releases. Beginning on the third day of the earthquake, when the most critical part of the response
phase was over, the technical assistance team demobilized and returned to normal response
operations.
As a result of Loma Prieta, Region IX EPA emergency response section, with its technical
assistance team, is developing its own catastrophic incident response plan. It will include
guidelines or protocols for emergency notification, disaster communications and coordination,
emergency resource acquisition and deployment, alternative transportation modes and routes,
command post relocation, and remote staging. Plans are also being formulated to establish an
emergency operations center for the Office of Health and Emergency Planning for activation during
a major seismic event. This is outlined in the regional supplement to Emergency Support Function
#10 of the Federal Response Plan.
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SECTION XIV SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the Loma Prieta earthquake of October 17, 1989, produced considerable damage
throughout the San Francisco and Monterey bay areas, it was not the catastrophic event anticipated
for the San Andreas fault. Earthquakes of similar magnitude generally produce a period of
maximum ground shaking (peak acceleration) lasting 25 to 30 seconds, almost three times longer
than that of Loma Prieta. If the seismsic characteristics of Loma Prieta had corresponded to a
"normal" 7.1 event, the amount of energy released and the level of destruction would have been
exponentially greater. The fact that the energy level of Loma Prieta was less than normal explains
the limited number of hazardous materials releases.
The lack of significant earthquake damage and hazardous materials releases is also attributable to
the fact that power, communications, and transportation systems were relatively unaffected. This
permitted an immediate and coordinated response by local agencies that otherwise would not have
been the case. Collapse of a section of the San Francisco-Oakland bay bridge and the Cypress
elevated freeway in Oakland, while major occurrences in themselves, did not seriously affect
response and recovery operations. The level of readiness, or preparedness, by local jurisdictions
was generally high. This tended to minimize facility and infrastructure damage and, again, allow
quick response. Effective local planning, prevention, compliance, enforcement, training, and
mutual aid programs (both public and private) helped ensure that hazardous materials releases and
resulting injuries were minimalized. There were no significant exposures and no fatalities.
Cooperation within and between jurisdictions was evident and essential in managing the disaster
situation.
Based on the interviews summarized in this report, both those conducted in 1989 and the "Five
Years Later" survey responses, the Office of Health and Emergency Planning, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Region IX, and the technical assistance team (Ecology and
Environment, Inc.) have developed recommendations that can be implemented locally to increase
the level of preparedness for a major northern California earthquake. Specific types of assistance
are also identified that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency can provide to local jurisdictions
for preparation, response and recovery from a catastrophic event.
RECOMMENDATIONS (Local jurisdictions may wish to use these in checklist format.)
1. Implement resource utilization procedures contained in California Fire Service and Rescue
Emergency Mutual Aid Plan, emphasizing the operational area concept and the role of the
operational area fire and rescue coordinator in evaluating, requesting, and deploying available
resources. Utilize the city-county-region resource chain of command for reporting and requesting
mutual aid or other resources contained in the plan.
2. Enhance existing ability to establish and operate out of emergency operations centers. Utilize the
Incident Command System (ICS) outlined in the California Hazardous Material Incident
Contingency Plan, and where feasible, include, inform, and coordinate with elected officials on
overall policy issues. Develop backup communication systems between emergency operations
centers and field responders and with emergency operations centers at the next highest level of
government.
3. Prepare comprehensive citywide or county wide resource inventories detailing available response
equipment and personnel and including emergency telephone numbers when appropriate. Cross
reference the inventories according to type of resource and agency or private vendor.
4. Develop emergency procedures to prioritize, request, and deploy resources for sustained use.
Develop a disaster resource tracking system indicating resources available, committed, required,
and out-of-service.
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5. Prepare notification lists containing the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all local,
county, regional, state, and federal agencies. The lists should describe available services and
resources, including cleanup funds.
6. Determine type and location of commercial or industrial hazardous materials teams, especially
those with specialized expertise in handling chlorine or pesticides, and oil spill response teams.
Develop procedures for requesting and utilizing these industrial response resources.
7. The possibility for disaster from disrupted science experiments involving hazardous chemicals
or bio-hazards on university and college campuses, particularly the University of California at
Berkeley, should be examined. (Note: It was reported to the Region DC Mainland Regional
Response Team that UC — which rests on the Hayward fault— has over 2,000 laboratories,
including those experimenting with bio-hazards, animals, chemicals and radioactivity.) Procedures
should be followed for inventorying and storing chemicals in school and university chemistry labs.
Earthquake safety practices should be implemented and enforced. In addition, cross-training and
mutual aid for response and cleanup to hazardous materials spills on campuses should be
established for university or college systems and adjacent jurisdictions.
See APPENDIX A for some problems that could be encountered and possible solutions.
8. Develop an integrated local-state-federal plan for transporting hazardous materials resources
under catastrophic conditions when transportation arteries (roads, bridges, ports, airports) are
severely disrupted or damaged.
9. Develop initial damage assessment, situation analysis, and response prioritization procedures for
hazardous materials incidents for implementation in the absence of normal communications
systems including 911 dispatch. Prepare an alternate means of reporting and an alternate means of
communicating between responders in the field.
10. Focus planning, preparedness, and seismic retrofitting activities on facilities and transportation
corridors located on, crossing over, or lying directly adjacent to areas of unconsolidated soils (bay
mud, alluvial soils, artificial fill) where extremely intense shaking and liquefaction would be
expected to occur.
These recommendations are intended primarily to encourage the use of existing procedures in the
California fire and rescue mutual aid plan for requesting and deploying hazardous materials
resources. Ensuring that local jurisdictions have detailed resource inventories and emergency
resource tracking systems in place will facilitate resource inquiries and deployments.
During the initial phases of a catastrophic earthquake, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
can provide valuable resources and technical assistance by working directly with fire and rescue
operational area coordinators in county emergency operations centers. Federal resources can be
made available early in the event. Area coordinators could communicate the status of federal
resources to the region when the state operations center becomes fully functional, and as the
Federal Emergency Management Agency disaster field office becomes activated, resource reporting
and deployment could be coordinated directly with the state. The Environmental Protection
Agency's direct support to the county emergency operations centers would occur only initially until
mutual aid procedures were implemented in the affected areas by the state operations center and
disaster field office.
The final recommendation is that local jurisdictions develop formal standard operating procedures
for responding to hazardous materials incidents caused by earthquakes. Once finished, this plan
could be appended to the local multi-hazard functional plan, thereby completing other required
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planning and preparedness activities.
PROPOSED FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
1. Provide information or guidelines on the (a) role of the Environmental Protection Agency in
hazardous materials incidents, (b) availability of cleanup funds, (c) types and availability of
specially trained hazardous materials teams, (d) methods for obtaining Environmental Protection
Agency assistance during a catastrophic event, (e) availability of other federal resources, (0
earthquake prevention and preparedness activities including seismic retrofittings, and (g)
procedures for conducting post-earthquake chemical safety audits. Distribute this information to
local fire departments, administering agencies, and other appropriate agencies or organizations.
2. Offer direct assistance to local jurisdictions in the disaster area during the response and recovery
periods, including hazardous materials teams, materiel, and earthquake related technical guidance.
Inform local jurisdictions and state agencies about the availability of federal response resources that
are on standby or that can be obtained in a timely manner.
3. \ssist local jurisdictions by providing training or exercising on hazardous materials response.
Provide instruction on the use of CAMEO (Computed Aided Management of Emergency
Operations) as a management tool.
4. Support local jurisdictions in evaluating or inspecting hazardous materials releases if required.
Develop guidelines for post-earthquake inspections and provide other assistance as requested on
earthquake-related issues.
5. Support administering agencies in their efforts to obtain business plans. Encourage military
installations to submit business plans. Determine how business plan information could be made
more useful in responding to hazardous materials releases. Ensure that business plan data is
relevant, applicable, and immediately available to emergency responders on a 24-hour-a-day basis.
6. Advise local jurisdictions on the need for and use of seismic maps in planning and facility siting.
Encourage jurisdictions to share seismic planning information.
After a review of the information available on response actions during Loma Prieta, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency noted that in jurisdictions where there are (1) a supportive
judiciary and district attorney's office, (2) good city prevention programs, and (3) effective
hazardous materials ordinances, the incidence of damage to facilities and the number of releases of
hazardous materials during Loma Prieta was low. Such programs and support have also resulted in
good planning and increased local response capabilities. Cities and counties, accordingly, are
encouraged to review and upgrade their plans and programs, especially with regard to judicial and
legal involvement. In conclusion, the EPA is prepared to assist local jurisdictions with direct
support following a major earthquake, particularly with respect to on-scene coordination and
resource acquisition. The EPA will also provide information, technical assistance, and training, if
requested, as part of local planning and preparedness activities.
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APPENDIX A
UNIVERSITY LABS/PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Some problems that could be encountered (as the result of a major earthquake) and possible
solutions:
1) Cabinets not secured to wall.
ACTION- Secure cabinets using approved earthquake securing systems (straps).
2) Chemicals segregated on shelves could fall onto the floor and become no longer segregated.
ACTION- Install braces or restraints to keep chemicals from sliding off shelves.
3) Gas cylinders may not be properly secured.
ACTION- Use approved methods for securing gas cylinders.
4) Access doors to chem labs may need to be secured, but back-up systems need to be established
in case of electrical or structural problems resulting from an earthquake.
ACTION- Master keys and other emergency or alternative access procedures need to be identified
for authorized individuals.
5) Lab inventory lists kept on computers may be inaccessible with power outages.
ACTION- Lab inventory lists need to be maintained in alternate locations or forms to assure
accessibility in emergency situations.
6) Experiments utilizing animal research may include live animals that need to be cared for
following a disaster.
ACTION- A contingency plan should be established for the care of the animals (providing food,
water, and waste disposal) following a disaster.
7) Most research labs do not have sufficient quantities of most chemicals to trigger the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) reporting requirements to the local fire
department.
ACTION- Federal, state and local laws need to be evaluated for adequacy in
bringing research, teaching and medical labs into the reporting and preparedness system that local
responders depend upon.
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APPENDIX B
OAKLAND-BERKELEY HILLS FIRE
Excerpts from the Hazard Mitigation Report of November 16,1991 follow:
A firestorm, possibly ignited by a controlled burn that got out-of-hand, and hot, east winds,
burned over large portions of wooded hillsides, residential neighborhoods, and grassland hillsides
October 20-29,1991. On October 22, the President declared the county of Alameda to be a major
disaster area as a result of damages from urban-wildland fires (FEMA-919-DR-CA). The
declaration was for Individual Assistance and Public Assistance.
Of the 11,055 people living in the fire area, 25 were killed, 150 injured, and at least 5,000 left
homeless. The average price of the 3,354 single family dwellings destroyed was $360,000 for a
total of $1,207,440,000. Four-hundred and fifty-six apartment units were destroyed. In addition,
two thousand automobiles were immolated.
Over 400,000 pounds of debris was hauled away by Pacific Gas and Electric. Approximately
1,500 utility poles were destroyed along with thirty-five miles of power, telephone, and TV-cable
lines. Damage estimates were in excess of $20,000,000.
East Bay Municipal Utilities District (EBMUD) reported no major problems with the sewer system
or pipeline breaks.
Based on preliminary damage estimates, $54,356,000 was expended on fire suppression and
emergency protective measures and $5,794,000 will be needed to repair and restore publically-
owned facilities.
Fire of this intensity often creates a "hydrophobic" soil condition, a barrier which inhibits or
prevents water from soaking into the soil. Either heavy rains of a short duration (two inches in
three hours) or lighter rains for an extended period of time (six inches over three days) could
saturate the permeable ground, causing soil slippage off steep headland slopes. Uncompacted
colluvial fill along with slope debris will flush out of headwater swales into outlets and stream
channels. This in turn, will reduce the effective carrying capacity of these inlets and streams,
raising the flood elevation and spreading the flows over a greater period.
This may result in overland flooding, with potential damage to streets, utilities, and homes.
Structures that were shown to be outside the special flood hazard areas prior to the fire could
experience flood damage from winter rains.
Immediately after the fire was controlled, City of Oakland soil consultants established priority
erosion control zones in the burn area and implemented an erosion control plan. The first priorities
were to: 1) Protect areas which pose an imminent threat to houses and property that survived the
fire; and 2) Protect areas upslope and adjacent to significant drainage courses, water conveyance
systems, and water courses that drain to Lake Temescal and San Francisco Bay.
A variety of erosion control treatments were used, including the following:
1) Construction of check dams, 2) Clearing of outlets/inlets, 3) Contouring of slopes, 4) Aerial
seeding, 5) Hydroseeding from roadways, 6) Hydraulic seeding, 7) Dust control, 8) Blankets,
nets, roving, mats, 9) Silt fencing.
Oakland's erosion control plan was operational October 30, 1991. Initial erosion and sediment
control cost estimates range up to $5,000,000. Additional costs will be incurred for long term
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monitoring and maintenance.
EPA Region IX comments on Draft Hazard Mitigation Report for the Tunnel Fire
Al Fischer of the Office of Health and Emergency Planning (OHEP) attended Hazard Mitigation
Team meetings conducted by FEMA and California OES on Nov. 5-7 at University Hall/U.C.
Berkeley.
The Team was formed under the authority of Section 409, Public Law 93-288, to make
recommendations in order to reduce future fire damages in Alameda County and the State of
California.
The Team's recommendations were incorporated into a Hazard Mitigation Team Report to the State
Hazard Mitigation Officer. The latter prepares the State Hazard Mitigation Plan and selected local
jurisdictions prepare local annexes to the State Plan.
The Plan includes the following elements:
1) An analysis of the natural hazards in the disaster declared area,
2) An analysis of existing state and local laws, regulations and programs that pertain to hazard
mitigation,
3) Identification of the strengths and weaknesses in existing state and local programs and,
4) Identification of mitigation measures.
Among the issues discussed over the three days were the following: Development types (wildland
interface, intermix versus urban in forest and brush-covered areas); Fire mitigation measures
(vegetation management, appropriate materials and construction methods, measures to assist in
suppression efforts and in warning and evacuation); Seismic issues (Hay ward fault, meeting fire
and seismic standards, secondary effects such as landslide and multiple fires with a major
earthquake).
U.S. EPA made general comments on three of the recommendations filed by the team. "EPA
Region IX would want to be a training resource for local and regional agencies through our water
management, air and toxics and/or hazardous waste management divisions, and our technical
assistance team. Region IX would have to be in the technical/advisory 'loop' on any issues even
marginally related to wildlands, riparian habitats/wetlands, and/or areas having landfills. Region
IX must be in the advisory/developmental study phase of any program involving seismic or other
hazard issues."
EPA's asbestos coordinator (Air and Toxics Division) stated, "The major issue is the coordination
problem between communities and local agencies on air quality and debris removal."
Also commenting was the nonpoint source coordinator/water quality branch of the Water
Management Division. The watershed for the burned over area drains into the San Francisco
Bay/Estuary. All erosion control measures are intended to protect the water quality of the Bay and
its tributaries.
The nonpoint source (NPS) coordinator also recommended that a document titled "Proceedings of
the Symposium on Wildland Fire 2000" (April 27-30, 1987, South Lake Tahoe, CA.) be
considered as work elements to the section on recommendations. The conference covered three
basic aspects of wildland fire management: public needs, resource management, and
education/research.
The NPS coordinator also urged continued coordination with the Region DC Water Management
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Division, and to include the Alameda Resource Conservation District and the San Francisco Bay
Regional Water Qualaity Control Board.
While the Hazard Mitigation Team report made no specific references to the potential for igniting of
large quantities of hazardous materials or the release of toxic chemicals, two of the
recommendations noted the need for federal response. "Develop plans, procedures, and mutual aid
agreements for obtaining and using local, regional, state and federal resources. Develop and
implement the use of Incident Command System Management Teams."
Wildlife and other major incidents require coordination, cooperation, and commitment of all levels
of government. Metropolitan, urban and regional fire-fighting agencies must re-evaluate plans and
procedures to reflect early recognition for obtaining mutual aid assistance, while maintaining
sufficient resources to respond to other incidents within their jurisdiction. Fire weather and fire
behavior elements need to be recognized in development of response levels. To accomplish this
requires the use of the Incident Command System (ICS).
A second recommendation states in part: The California Department of Forestry, State Office of
Emergency Services, and State Fire Marshal should explore and coordinate the development and
use of Geographical Information Systems (CIS) for hazards identification and monitoring of
changing conditions of vulnerability. Information sharing between local, state and federal planning
and emergency management agencies should be emphasized.
Communications:
Allegedly, one of the biggest impediments to combatting the catastrophic fire was an ineffective
communications system. The communications and coordination of activities for the many
responders was difficult because of the intensity and rapid spread of the fire. The communication
system was quickly overwhelmed by the volume of telephone and radio messages generated by the
responding agencies and the public. Unfortunately, the Oakland Dispatch Center had no telephone
lines reserved for outgoing calls. Dispatchers had difficulty making outgoing calls due to the flood
of incoming calls. Radio frequencies (including mutual aid frequencies) were saturated. In
addition, the steep hills of the fire area interfered with the radio transmissions. Reportedly, the
Oakland Fire Department's communications system had only four available radio channels for
deploying fire crews — and 100 people wanted to concurrently use the radio frequencies.
Ironically, Oakland's antiquated communications system was scheduled to be replaced in the
summer of 1992.
Water
Perhaps no water supply system would have been adequate for a wildfire of this magnitude. Nine
of the eleven water pressure zones in the district were affected by the fire. The rapid spread of the
fire caused numerous power failures impacting the pumping stations. As houses incinerated, the
water service lines ruptured and water kept flowing creating quite a drain on the reservoirs of
water. By the end of the first day of the fire, ten key reservoirs were dry.
Also, the National Fire Protection Association reported in a document after the fire that "Oakland's
fire hydrants have one or more standard three-inch thread outlets. Other California cities and towns
have hydrants with two-and-one-half-inch-thread outlets. Except for those departments in cities
immediately adjacent to Oakland, to whom Oakland had previously supplied the appropriate
adapters, responding fire departments could not connect to the hydrants."
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APPENDIX C
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dames & Moore. The October 17.1989. Loma Prieta Earthquake. A Special Report by Dames &
Moore. Los Angeles, 911 Wilshire Blvd., 1989.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. After Action Report 89. An exercise involving a
coordinated federal/state response to a simulated earthquake in Northern California. Region DC,
Presidio of San Francisco, 1990.
Federal Emergency Management Agency and State/Federal Hazard Mitigation Survey Team.
Hazard Mitigation Opportunities. The State/Federal Hazard Mitigation Survey Team Report for the
October 17,1989, Loma Prieta Earthquake, FEMA-845-DR-CA, 1990.
Federal Emergency Management Agency 44 Code of Federal Regulations Part 206. "Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act; Implementation, etc., Final Rules," in 55
Federal Register. January 23, 1990, 2284-2319.
State of California. Hazardous Material Incident Contingency Plan. Sacramento, Office of
Emergency Services, 1991.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 40 Code of Federal Regulations. Part 300. "National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Final Rule," in 55 Federal Register. March
8, 1990, 8666-8865.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Emergency Support Function 10, Hazardous Materials,"
Regional Supplement of Plan for Federal Response to a Catastrophic Earthquake." Region DC, San
Francisco, 1990 (Pending, Final Draft of San Francisco Bay Area Supplement to ESF #10 Annex
of FRP, 1994).
State/Federal Hazard Mitigation Team. State and Federal Hazard Mitigation Survey Team Report
for the Oct. 17,1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake (FEMA-845-DR-CA).
46 GPO 585-674/19111
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