WATER POLLUTION CONTROL RESEARCH SERIES !5080 EAG 07/69
REVIEW OF
SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL
OIL POLLUTION INCIDENT
fS. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR • FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
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RESEARCH REPORT
REVIEW OF THE SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL
OIL POLLUTION INCIDENT
to
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ADMINISTRATION
and
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
July 18, 1969
PACIFIC NORTHWEST LABORATORIES
a division of
BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE
3000 Stevens Drive
Richland, Washington 99352
Battelle is not engaged in research for advertising, sales promotion, or publicity,
and this report may not be reproduced in full or in part for such purposes.
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11
FOREWORD
This report summarizes the collection of factual data conducted by
Battelle-Northwest for the Department of Interior, Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration and the Department of Transportation, United
States Coast Guard, under Contract No. 14-12-530 during the period
March 17, 1969, through July 11, 1969.
The research team was comprised as follows:
W. H. Swift Coordinator, Marine Science and
Technology Programs (Project
Manager)
C. J. Touhill Manager, Water and Land Resources
Department
(Water quality aspects, disposal,
and general review)
W. A. Haney Research Coordinator, Water and
Land Resources Department
(Geology, well operations,
surveillance)
R. E. Nakatani Senior Research Associate
Ecosystems Department
(Marine biology and ecology)
P. L. Peterson Technical Leader
Mechanical Engineering Department
(Control, special problems, and
restoration)
D. S. Des Voigne Scientist, Ecosystems Department
(Marine biology)
Acknowledgment must be given to the outstanding cooperation and
assistance provided by the many interested parties and agencies involved.
Special thanks go to the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, the
United States Coast Guard, the Union Oil Company of California, the Weather
Bureau, the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the California Department
of Fish and Game, and the University of California at Santa Barbara.
Many others contributed measurably to the conduct of this review and
their assistance is acknowledged in later pages.
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Ill
It must be recognized that technical evaluation of the Santa Barbara
Channel incident, from cause through to effect, is still under consideration.
Thus this review can only serve to provide a summary "back-drop" in the
hope of capturing some of the tenuous and hence perishable lessons from
the experience.
The main issue at hand is that when the next incident occurs, regardless
of origin, all concerned will be in an improved position to cope with the
situation.
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IV
CONTENTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . .1-1
1.1 Background . . . . . . • .1-1
1.2 Purpose of Study . . . . . . .1-2
1.3 Scope of Review . . . . . • .1-2
2.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ..... 2-1
2.1 Description of the Source ..... 2-1
2.2 Nature of Oil Spread and Surveillance . . . . 2-1
2.3 Control at Source ....... 2-3
2.4 Control of Released Oil at Sea . . . .2-3
2.5 Defensive Measures . . . . . 2-5
2.6 Shoreline Restoration Methods ..... 2-5
2.1 Disposal of Recovered Oil ..... 2-6
2.8 Biology and Ecology . . . . . .2-7
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 3-1
3.1 Geography . . . . • • • .3-1
3.2 Prevailing Meteorological Conditions . . . 3-1
3.3 Oceanographic Conditions . . . . .3-2
4.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE SOURCE . . . . .4-1
4.1 General Geology . . . . . . .4-1
4.2 Well Operations ....... 4-4
4.3 Areal Distribution and Chronology . . . .4-8
5. 0 MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCY
PLANNING 5-1
5. 1 Preplanning Activities . . . . . .5-2
5.2 Initial Actions . ....... 5-3
5.3 Regional Operating Team Activities . . . . 5-4
5.4 On-Scene Actions ....... 5-4
6.0 CONTROL OF RELEASED OIL 6-1
6.1 Control at Source . . . . . . .6-1
6.2 Control at Sea ....... 6-6
6.3 Defense of Harbors . . . . . 6-17
6.4 Defense of Beaches ...... 6-23
Appended Information from Union Oil Company
of California • • • • • • • 6~24
7.0 SURVEILLANCE ....•••• 1~l
7.1 Visual Observation . . . . • .7-1
7.2 Photographic . . • • • • .7-2
7.3 Remote Sensors ....... 7-4
8.0 DISTRIBUTION AND BEHAVIOR OF OIL AT SEA . .8-1
8.1 Spread and Path of Oil Movement - Chronology . . 8-1
8.2 Breakup Behavior of Slick . . • • .8-2
8.3 Changes in Physical and Chemical Properties . . 8-2
8.4 Interaction with Offshore Kelp Beds .... 8-5
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9.0 BEACH AND HARBOR PROBLEMS 9-1
9.1 Winter Storm Effects . . . . . .9-1
9.2 Fire Hazards ....... 9-3
9.3 Special Constraints . . . . . . . 9-4
9.4 Littoral Sand Transport . . . . . . 9-6
10.0 SHORELINE RESTORATION METHODS .... 10-1
10.1 Beaches ........ 10-1
10.2 Cleaning of Harbors ...... 10-7
10.3 Cleaning of Rocks and Jetties .... 10-10
11.0 DISPOSAL OF WASTES AND RECOVERED OIL . . 11-1
11.1 In-Place Burning ...... . 11-1
11.2 Landfill Disposal ....... 11-3
11.3 Disposal of Skimmed Oil ..... 11-6
12.0 BIOLOGICAL AND ECOLOGICAL SURVEYS AND FINDINGS . 12-1
12.1 Sea Birds 12-2
12.2 Intertidal and Nearshore Communities . . .12-8
12.3 Offshore and Benthic Surveys .... 12-14
12.4 Marine Mammals . . . . • .12-17
12.5 Related Studies and Events ..... 12-19
Appended Information from Union Oil Co.
of California ...... • 12-23
13.0 ON- GOING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS . 13-1
14.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I4'1
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VI
LIST OF FIGURES
3.1 Southern California Geography and February Predicted
Ocean Currents 3-7
3. 2 Aerial View Across Santa Barbara Channel to the South--
Anacapa Island in Background, February 14, 1969*1' 3-8
4.1 Santa Barbara Channel Showing Location of Platform A
and Position of Geologic Cross Sections 4-2
4.2 Structural Sections East (A-A1) and West (B-B1) of
Platform A 4-3
4. 3 Oil, Gas and Sediment Boils in Vicinity of Platform A,
January 29, 1969, Shortly Following Blowout'1' 4-7
6.1 Platform A^' 6'3
6 2 Large Steel Cable Reinforced Fabric Boom 6-5
(2)
6.3 Workboat Spreading Straw Inside Kelp Beds 6-8
6.4 Workboat Distributing Chemical Dispersant 6-9
6. 5 Oil Distributed in "Ropes and Windrows" 6-10
6.6 Open Sea Skimmer 6-14
6.7 Inflatable Plastic Boom* 6-16
6. 8 "Sea Sweep" Being Readied for Deployment 6-16
6.9 Straw Being Used Behind Log Boom for Oil Absorption 6-20
6.10 Semiflexible Boom at Shore Line 6-20
6. 11 Air Curtain Barrier in Operation - Santa Barbara Harbor 6-22
6.12 Area of Low Upwelling with Air Curtain Barrier 6-22
7 1 Infrared Ektachrome - Contrast of Oil and Kelp 7-3
(3)
7.2 Aerial Photography Panchromatic Film - K-2 Filter 7-5
7 o Nighttime Image (8-13u) of Platform A and Oil Seepage. Flown
27 March, 1969<4> 7.7
/o)
7.4 Remote Sensing Imagery* Ultraviolet 0.32to0.38tj
Infrared 8.0 to 13.5^1 7-9
/o)
7.5 Remote Sensing Imagery* ' Ultraviolet 0.32to0.38|j
Infrared 0. Stol.Ou 7-10
(3)
7.6 Remote Sensing Imagery-Kelp Beds
Infrared 0. 8 to l.On
Ultraviolet 0.32toO. 38^ 7-11
(1) Credit Santa Barbara News Press
(2) Credit U. S. Coast Guard
(3) Courtesy Infrared and Optics Laboratory, Institute of Science
and Technology, University of Michigan
(4) Courtesy North American Rockwell Corporation
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7.7 Thermal Infrared (8-13n) Image Illustrating the Contrasting
Hot Returns of Surficial Fronding Kelp and the Colder
Streaks of Oil*4' 7-13
8.1 Oil Behavior Near Platform* 8-3
8.2 Oil Behavior Near Platform* 8-3
8.3 Oil Plume Leaving Platform, 26 February, 1969 8-4
8.4 Oil "Windrows and Ropes" Santa Barbara Harbor in Upper
Left, Boat Spreading Straw or Dispersant, 26 February, 1969 8-4
(2)
8. 5 Oil Streamers Emerging from Kelp Bedsv 8-6
(2)
8.6 Oil Streamers Approaching Shoreline Inside Kelp 8-6
(2)
8.7 Example Oil Location Diagram* 8-7
9.1 Storm Debris on Beach Near Santa Barbara 9-2
9.2 Sand Deposits Inside Santa Barbara Harbor Breakwater
Indicating Breakwater Porosity 9-5
9.3 Santa Barbara Harbor Dredge Maintenance 9-7
9.4 Oil Deposits in Santa Barbara Harbor Sandspit Covered
by Littorally Drifted Sand 9-8
9.5 Santa Barbara Harbor Maintenance Dredge Discharge 9-9
10.1 Application and Removal of Straw on Beaches 10-2
10.2 Oiled Straw and Debris*1 * 10-2
10.3 Oiled Straw 10-4
10.4 Oiled Sand on Santa Barbara Harbor Sand Bar 10-4
10.5 Power Mulcher Spreading Straw 10-5
10. 6 Grader Modified with Tines Welded to Blade 10-5
10. 7 Removal of Oil from Santa Barbara Harbor Using Vacuum 10-8
10. 8 Removal of Oil from Santa Barbara Harbor Using Straw 10-8
11.1 Burning Operations on Beach 11-2
11.2 Disposal of Waste by Landfill Burial 11-5
12.1 Location and Direction of Aerial Transects U. S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife 12-3
12.2 Santa Barbara Wildlife Study—Aerial Transects Data
Collection Form 12-4
12.3 Santa Barbara Beach Bird Study 12-6
12.4 Beach Transect Sites for Intertidal Study 12-10
12.5 Area Surveyed for Oil Spill Damage, 5, 11-14, February,
1969, California State Department of Fish and Game 12-13
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V1U
LIST OF TABLES
3. 1 Wind and Sea Conditions Santa Barbara Channel Oil Pollution
Incident 3-3
4.1 Well A-21 Control Chronology 4-5
4.2 Oil Release Observations 4-9
7.1 Organizations Participating in Photographic and Remote
Sensing Surveillance Operations 7-15
12.1 Biological Stations (Beach Transects) Surveyed by University
of California, Santa Barbara Students, February-March, 1969 12-11
12.2 Dissolved Oxygen at Santa Barbara Harbor 12-22
13.1 Ongoing Research and Development Programs, May 1969 13-2
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1-1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
On 28 January, 1969, during operations to shut in well A-21 on the
offshore drilling Platform A about six miles southeast of Santa Barbara and
in 190 feet of water, a leak of mixed crude oil and gas occurred. The well,
the fifth drilled from the platform, was at that time nearing the final stages
of completion. Estimates of the rate of release of oil at any one time vary
by an order of magnitude and are highly qualitative due to the impossibility
of making direct measurement of the flow rate or cumulative volume.
For the first few days the re.eased crude oil largely remained at
sea in the Santa Barbara Channel. However, starting on 4 February,
southeasterly winds began to drive the oil ashore, resulting in contamina-
tion of beaches, harbors and rocky coastline, and initiating perhaps the
largest oil pollution clean-up operation that has occurred in the United
States.
The nature of the Santa Barbara Channel incident is unique in con-
trast to other major oil spillage incidents such as the TORREY CANYON
tanker disaster (March, 1967). The source was characterized as a continu-
ing one rather tnan an essentially instantaneous release. Thus, the threat
to beaches, harbors and ecology continued over an extended period of time
and complicated clean-up operations.
The Santa Barbara Channel incident, particularly the restoration
and biological assessment aspect, was also complicated by the severe rain
storms that occurred both prior to and during the incident.
The intent of this report is to assemble the technical specifics of
the incident with emphasis on the pollution control factors. Discussion of
the initial cause and nature of the release is beyond the scope of this study,
and is only briefly commented on to the extent it had bearing on the pollu-
tion control aspects.
As pointed out in "Oil Pollution - A Report to the President," Feb-
ruary 1968, technology for control of major oil pollution incidents is far
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1-2
from highly developed. Thus reports of field experiences presented tend
to be more qualitative than quantitative. Fortunately, as indicated in the
above report, contingency planning received considerable attention. This
culminated in a "National Multiagency Oil and Hazardous Materials Contin-
gency Plan, " published in September 1968. The latter, and subsequent
local agreements, served as the framework for immediate response at the
onset of the Santa Barbara incident. Thus existing know-how was expedi-
tiously made available. The management considerations in implementation
of the contingency p]an are discussed in Section 5. 0.
1.2 PURPOSE OF STUDY
The purpose of this review is to assemble a synopsis of defensive,
control and clean-up activities in the Santa Barbara Channel in as much
technical detail as possible.
1.3 SCOPE OF REVIEW
The specific areas covered in this report parallel those in a pre-
vious review conducted for the U.S. Coast Guard. The major areas
covered include:
* Environmental conditions.
• Description of the source.
• Management considerations.
• Control of released oil.
• Surveillance experience.
• Behavior of oil at sea.
• Beach and harbor problems.
• Restoration and disposal.
• Biology and ecology.
• Current research and development.
Numerous sources provided the information herein reported either in
writing or in personal verbal communications. Although the review cannot
be regarded as exhaustive in detail, every attempt was made to fully cover
the breadth of the subject. Thus, in several instances the sources ranged
from personnel in administrative and technical positions to those supervis-
ing work crews in the field.
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Principal sources of information:
Federal Agencies
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration
U.S. Coast Guard
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries
Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife
U.S. Geological Survey
Weather Bureau
National Park Service
California State Agencies
Department of Fish and Game
Water Quality Control Board
University of California at Santa Barbara
Commercial
Union Oil Company of California
Western Oil and Gas Association
Restoration and Clean-up Contractors
Other
City of Santa Barbara Administrative Offices
Santa Barbara County Oil Well Inspection Department
Santa Barbara News Press
Various Agency Contractors; Academic Institutions, Museums
Specific and additional sources of information are acknowledged in
Section 14.0. Written and photographic information collected during the
study is available on file at Battelle-Northwest offices in Richland,
Washington.
Extensive use has been made of photographs taken either by the
study team or obtained from the sources listed above. It is hoped that this
device will emphasize the key points that should be noted.
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SECTION 1.0 REFERENCES
"Oil Spillage Study - Literature Search and Critical Evaluation for
Selection of Promising Techniques to Control and Prevent Damage. "
November 20, 1967 Report to U. S. Coast Guard from Battelle-
Northwest.
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2-1
2.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
2.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE SOURCE
The geology of the Santa Barbara Channel is relatively complex, with
some stratigraphic units cut out of the local section sequences due to
depositional interruption or faulting. Producible oil deposits have been
encountered in both shallow and deep formations, and slow but continuous
ocean floor seepage of oils and tars has occurred at several locations
within the 1, 750 square mile area for many years.
Ocean floor seepage associated with the well blowout on Platform A
showed a high degree of variability with respect to location of the seepage
points and magnitude of release with time. Such variability could be due to
either changes in seepage pathways resulting from recharge of shallow
sands and/or fissures, or to in-well and ocean bottom control operations
undertaken from and in the vicinity of Platform A, or to combinations of
these factors. In any event, release of oil occurred generally along a line
extending 800 and 400 feet east and west respectively from Platform A.
2.2 NATURE OF OIL SPREAD AND SURVEILLANCE
Oil spreading, influenced by weather factors, was highly variable
throughout the major period of the incident. Oil slicks moved mostly under
the influence of prevailing wind changes as surface water currents in the
Santa Barbara Channel generally did not exceed 2.5 nautical miles per day.
Under slack or near-slack wind conditions, oil slick plumes generally con-
formed to expected surface current counterclockwise gyres in the Channel.
Bulk, e. g. , "black oil" observed at sea tended to break up with time
into "windrows" (parallel to advancing wave fronts) and irregular "ropes. "
Wind conditions were the predominant factor influencing oil movement and
persist ance.
Observations of the oil slicks were undertaken by visual, photographic
and remote sensing methods with most of the day-to-day mapping of slick
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movement being carried out by visual observation from aircraft. This
mapping, together with surface craft daily observations, provided a basis
for predicting slick arrival times and locations at beaches and harbor
facilities; and for scheduling both ocean surface and beach counter-measure
activities.
Both good and poor results were obtained using airborne photographic
techniques (infrared, color, camouflage and panchromatic films) to detect
primary and secondary slicks. Because of lack of timeliness, the photo-
graphic or remote sensing data collected were not used to any appreciable
degree in planning day-to-day control and clean-up activities; but the infor-
mation gained from these studies indicates that there is considerable poten-
tial for developing such useful applications employing these surveillance
methods.
Good contrast between oil and water was noted in the ultraviolet
(0.32-0. 38u), far infrared (8-14|_t) and microwave (1-3 cm) spectral regions
using remote sensing instrumentation. Although some ground truth correla-
tions were obtained, additional laboratory and field control data are needed
to realize the maximum utility of these 24-hour observation methods.
It must be recognized that the primary motivation for surveillance of
oil slicks under "disaster" conditions is the resultant operational utility,
i. e., use in "near real time" direction of at sea oil recovery operations or
advance warning to shore forces and facilities of an impending threat. In
the former case, surface oil recovery operations must generally be conducted
during daylight hours and visual observations from spotting aircraft are a
reasonable solution. In the latter case, the rate of oil slick movement can
generally be forecasted from meteorological conditions and forces appro-
priately alerted.
Thus the consensus of the contingency team is that the use of surveillance
techniques that provide a timely response is adequate. Those involving
sophisticated methods or requiring expert and time consuming interpretation
have little pollution control utility under "disaster" circumstances.
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2.3 CONTROL AT SOURCE
Control of any pollution problem at the source and before it becomes
diffused continues to be the obvious and seemingly most practical approach.
In the case of the Santa Barbara Channel incident, the source occurred
variably along a line approximately 1, 200 ft in length and under 190 ft of
water. These conditions and exposure to open sea environment resulted in
general failure of attempts to capture the oil before it reached the surface.
Furthermore, the volatile and flammable nature of the oil-gas mixture in the
immediate vicinity of the platform presented an often serious fire hazard.
2.4 CONTROL OF RELEASED OIL AT SEA
Containment of the oil as it emerged directly under the platform on the
surface could have been hazardous because of the gas concentrations and
resultant potential for fire.
Attempts to control the oil on the surface near the platform were largely
unsuccessful, principally due to the lack of satisfactory all weather open sea
booms and effective methods of recovering the oil as it accumulated. In
order to encompass the entire area of surface oil emission, booms several
thousand feet in length would have been required as subsurface currents
carried the oil horizontally from the point of emission.
Boom systems are not presently available with a capability to contain
oil in an all weather open sea environment. Positioning and mooring
present severe problems in deep water and rough seas; it is doubtful that
any present system can function properly in conditions exceeding relatively
calm or when currents exceed three knots.
Open sea containment of surface oil is probably most effectively
accomplished with floating booms. A repositioning capability is desired to
compensated7for periodic changes in the direction of drift as well as a con-
figuration permiting unrestricted access to both sides of the boom and to the
source or other features in the area. The oil must be recovered as it
accumulates with mobile skimmers or suction devices.
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The effectiveness of chemical dispersant is considered questionable for
use on large spills and despite their use at Santa Barbara, oil was deposited
on the shore line. However, all persons contacted generally agreed on the
following:
1. Chemical treatment of large oil spills is extremely costly.
2. The distribution logistics problem is formidable.
3. Natural agitation is not always adequate for full chemical
effectiveness.
4. Effectiveness is greater on thin rather than thick films.
5. Permanence of dispersion under field conditions is doubtful.
6. Information on toxicity to marine organisms is sketchy.
Straw and other commercial sorbents were spread over the oil slick in
the vicinity of the platform and near shore. Straw, because of its ready
availability, low cost, and relative ease of pickup, was the only sorbent
subsequently applied on a large scale. It was found to sorb oil up to four
times its weight. At sea recovery of the oil-straw mixture with
mechanical devices was considered but not employed and manual pickup in
shallow water and after straw washed up on the beach was generally
practiced.
Skimming of oil from the surface at sea was constantly hampered by
environmental factors, principally wind and waves. One mobile skimmer,
an advancing wier or trough, was developed with a capability to traverse
slicks, follow and recover the relatively long "ropes" of oil windrowed by the
currents and wind, and recover oil retained by the kelp beds. The oil and
water were subsequently pumped to decanting and storage tanks aboard
ship. Several operational problems were encountered which should be
overcome by further development and tests.
Ship-mounted suction devices had utility for recovering the oil accumu-
lated behind containment devices. The suction devices employed were not
found effective for the recovery of a thin film of oil and the systems
generally lacked mobility.
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2.5 DEFENSIVE MEASURES
The defense of harbors was mainly concentrated in efforts to boom off
the entrance and thus prevent entry of incoming oil. Secondary booms and
other protective devices within the harbor were generally not employed. If
an adequate supply of commercial booms had been utilized in the Santa
Barbara Harbor, the majority of contamination of boats and harbor facilities
may have been averted. The oil which came over or through the porous
breakwater could not be prevented.
The extremely heavy in-rush of oil at Santa Barbara presented an
unusually severe case. Booming at other harbors was generally successful,
particularly if more than one line of defense was used with removal of oil
as it arrived.
An air curtain barrier later installed at Santa Barbara proved effective
in sheltered waters, allowing ready passage of traffic and capable of being
turned on and off to take advantage of natural tidal flushing.
Due to their extent and exposure, total defense of beaches was not
practical. In some instances artificial berms were created with construc-
tion equipment and high run-up of oil was prevented.
In the majority of cases, mechanical spreading of straw with mulchers
at low tide provided a mat for sorption of some of the oil.
2.6 SHORELINE RESTORATION METHODS
Beach cleanup was generally accomplished by spreading absorbent straw
before and after arrival of the oil, pushing the mixture into piles either by
hand or machines, and loading the accumulation into dump trucks for subse-
quent inland disposal. The requirement for extensive manual labor made
beach cleaning operations extremely slow and costly. Motorized equipment
such as graders, bulldozers, loaders, and straw mulchers were employed
as much as possible when available. However, many areas were
inaccessible to motorized equipment due to lack of access roads or impass-
ability because of heavy seasonal rains.
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Two types of motorized equipment proved effective during beach
cleaning operations: straw mulchers or spreaders normally used to prevent
erosion of highway rights-of-way and graders with tines welded below the
blade for raking. The need for equipment modification or more maneuver-
able and efficient motorized rakes to pile the oily straw mixture is indicated.
Although seeming unsophisticated, the use of straw (not hay) was
highly effective due to its ready availability, low cost, and ease of distri-
bution and subsequent pickup. In geographical areas where straw is not
readily available, similar materials should be sought and tested in advance.
Chemical dispersants were for all practical purposes not employed in
beach restoration as previous experience with chemical treatment of
beaches had been unsatisfactory.
In Santa Barbara Harbor, recovery of the majority of the accumulated
oil was accomplished by vacuum tank trucks foUowed by manual spreading
and pickup of straw.
The only method found effective for removal of oil stains from rocks and
jetties was high pressure water washing followed by sandblasting. Either
wet or dry blasting was employed, depending on wind conditions. This
method is slow and requires extensive manual labor to remove accumulated
debris.
2.7 DISPOSAL OF RECOVERED OIL
The bulk of wastes from clean-up operations consisted of oil-soaked
straw, sand and debris (storm debris washed onto the beaches), and oil-
seawater mixtures recovered by skimming operations. The solid wastes,
over 5, 200 large dumptruck loads, were hauled to three major landfill
sites east and west of Santa Barbara. Special arrangements were made to
dispose of the wastes at these sites with cognizance being given to fire
hazard, odor and water contamination considerations. Several problems in
logistics were associated with organizing and carrying out this large and
somewhat unique operation; and continuous advanced planning, almost on
an hourly basis, was required.
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Sortie solid waste material was piled and burned on the beaches;
however, smoke and odor problems near the populated areas dictated the
abandonment of this disposal method fairly early in the clean-up period.
About 800 barrels of skimmed oil-water mixture were trucked to
onshore processing facilities at Carpenteria and Ellwood. There it was
blended with the crude petroleum feed collected from nearby producing
wells and cleaned to meet pipeline specifications.
2.8 BIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY
The earliest biological effect of the incident showed itself among the
sea birds. On 30 January, two days after the initial release, the first
oil-soaked dead bird was found. Aerial surveys of the affected area were
begun and beach transects were walked daily to find distressed birds. Bird
salvage operations were begun at two sites; the birds were washed with
detergent and held a short period of time. By 26 March, about 10% of the
treated birds survived, closely paralleling bird survival rates of earlier
oil spill disasters.
Total known bird losses through 31 March in the area affected were
determined to be 3600.
Personnel of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (USFWS), the Federal
Water Pollution Control Administration, the U. S. Coast Guard, the
California Department of Fish and Game, and the University of California
at Santa Barbara examined the intertidal and inshore areas. Although these
zones were covered with considerable amounts of crude oil, only minimal
adverse effects were noted.
Several vessels of the involved agencies were employed to survey the
pelagic species. Pelagic fish eggs, larvae, macroplankton and basic
hydrographic data such as nutrients, light transmittance and dissolved
oxygen were examined. Acoustic surveys detected schools of anchovy,
rockfish, squid and jack mackerel.
Bottom characteristics and the condition of the benthic organisms were
assessed by California Department of Fish and Game personnel; no evidence
of oil contamination on the bottom was noted at depths between 6 and
62 fathoms.
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Although the marine mammals in the area became heavily coated with
oil, no adverse effects or mortalities could be detected. The mortalities
which did occur following the leak could not be attributed to the oil.
Scientists involved felt these were simply the "background" or natural
deaths which occur within any normal population.
This report covers those programs which examined the short-term
effects of the incident. Investigations of the latent or long term effects of
the spill are under way. General ecological surveys similar to those
previously conducted will be continued at three, six, and twelve month
intervals following the spill. It will be possible to then compare them with
surveys made prior to and just following the release.
Independent observations made by biologists from other organizations
provide further evidence of the lack of any serious acute kills among inter-
tidal species. As of May 23, 1969, no direct evidence has been firmly
established that any organisms were killed directly by oil, although there is
some evidence of kill by the low salinity resulting from severe storm runoff.
2.0 REFERENCES
1. Oil Spillage Study - Literature Search and Critical Evaluation
for Selection of Promising Techniques to Control and Prevent
Damage, November 20, 1969. Report to U. S. Coast Guard
from Battelle-Northwest.
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3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
3.1 GEOGRAPHY
The Santa Barbara Channel is an oval basin approximately 75 miles in
length and 25 miles in breadth. The long axis of the oval lies essentially
on an east-west line extending from Port Hueneme on the east to Point
Conception on the west. The area of the Channel is approximately
1, 750 square miles.
The Channel is fed by a drainage basin on the north and east, bounded
by the Santa Ynez Mountains. This basin encompasses an area of approx-
imately 2, 000 square miles. As discussed in Section 3.3, this drainage
basin consideration is important due to the severe storm precipitation
conditions that occurred in late January and late February.
3.2 PREVAILING METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
Meteorological conditions that prevailed in the Santa Barbara Channel
area during January and February, 1969, are of interest from the stand-
point of n ovement and breakup of the oil slick, the large quantities of
debris and turbidity carried into the Channel, and the effect on marine
organisms of the reduced salinity in the surface waters and intertidal
zone.
Two major storms occurred during the period of interest. The first,
running from 18 January through 27 January, although occurring prior to
the first release of oil, was responsible for severe floods in the South
Coast Drainage District. These floods resulted in massive deposits of
runoff carried debris along the beaches and coastline and severely hindered
cleanup operations, particularly the disposal of oil soaked material.
On the positive side, this severe storm very likely resulted in a
lower than normal bird population in the area (Section 11.1).
Overall precipitation for January was four to six times normal. The
storn runoff also carried with it large quantities of turbidity and
undoubtedly markedly reduced the salinity of the intertidal and surface
waters in the Santa Barbara Channel. Rainfall for this storm alone
-------
3-2
ranged from 10 to over 20 inches throughout the Channel and the adjacent
drainage area. * The net addition of fresh water to the Channel proper was
probably on the order of 15 to 20 inches. As pointed out in Section 3.3,
the Santa Barbara Channel is not rapidly flushed and hence this water very
likely remained in the Channel through the early days of the incident,
clouding analysis of any biological effects, as discussed in Section 11.1.
The extensive turbidity introduced very likely also hindered surveillance
and identification of the slick spread.
During February, precipitation in the Channel area ranged from two
(2)
to three tin.es normal. A second major storm occurred during the
period 23 February through 1 March, probably contributing 10 to 15 inches
net fresh water to the Channel.
Available wind and sea state information is summarized in Table 3-1
(3)
from data provided by the U. S. Weather Bureau and the Santa Barbara
(4)
Group Office of the U. S. Coast Guard.v '
3.3 OCEANOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS
The current structure in the Santa Barbara Channel is the most impor-
tant single oceanographic aspect pertinent to the incident. Figure 3.1
indicates the general nature of the average surface currents expected
(3)
during February as constructed from data provided in reference 5 and
reference 6. Current strengths are in nautical miles per day.
Predominant features are the counterclockwise gyres (one or rr.ore)
occurring within the Channel itself. Along the northern side of the
Channel, e. g., the mainland, net surface current averages 2 nautical
miles per day. Thus surface material here may require on the order of
one month to move the length of the Channel. In the center of the Channel,
the residence time of a pollutant must be considerable longer. The across-
channel aerial photograph (Figure 3. 2) illustrates the gyre effect. Anacapa
Island appears in the background.
During March, the surface drift off Southern California shifts to set
predominantly southeasterly down coast with typical velocities of 1 to
2 nautical miles/day.
-------
3-3
TABLE 3.1.
Wind and Sea Conditions Santa Barbara Channel
Oil Pollution Incident
Date
Jan. 24
30
31
Feb. 1
Time
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1415
1800
0000
0600
0830
1200
1530
1800
0000
0600
1200
1240
1800
2
3
4
5
0000
0600
1130
1200
1800
0000
0600
0830
1200
1800
0000
0600
1045
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
Wind
Wave and Swell
Velocity
Kts.
6
5
7
8
calm
calm
11
10-15
7
12
6
6
5
0
4
3
calm
(8)
11
15
14
6
6
calm
4
10
8
5
calm
5
0
6
3
calm
calm
8
13
5
5
3
13
12
Direction Height
°True Feet
250
020
160
090
--
--
250
230 (M)
300
000
290
135 1
160
--
330
350
--
(270)
220 1
5
320
090
030 1
--
020
230 1
230-260 1
250
--
010
calm
210
350
--
--
135 1
110
080
050
240
120
130
Direction
°True
—
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
190
--
--
--
--
--
--
270
--
--
220
__
--
230
235
--
--
--
--
--
--
—
—
110
--
--
--
--
—
--
-- Indicates data not reported
(M) Indicates magnetic bearing
-------
3-4
TABLE 3.1 (Contd)
Wind
Wave and Swell
Date
Time
Feb. 6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
0000
0060
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
0700
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
Velocity
Kts.
15
12
12
10
10
5
0
12
calm
5
calm
3
6
7
calm
calm
7
6
calm
calm
12
14
No
No
8
7
7
8
6
6
11
9
12
10
10
4
4
5
5
calm
calm
calm
6
5
calm
6
12
12
Direction
0 True
200
230
290
250
100
030
130
020
315
220
250
150
140
6
260
data
data
320
270
150
080
030
020
120
110
120
090
090
130
320
030
210
160
260
350
260
280
Height Direction
Feet °True
— —
2 225
__
__
2 135
__
1 245
__
__
__
__
calm
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_-
-_
_-
No data
No data
--
~_
__
— —
__
— —
__
__
__
_-
__
__
__
__
-_
__
__
__
__
-_
—
_„
__
__
-------
3-5
TABLE 3. 1 (Contd)
Wind
Wav.e and Swell
Date
Feb. 19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Mar. 1
Time
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
Velocity
Kts.
calm
calm
10
calm
12
4
12
15
7
4
__
9
7
5
5
6
4
7
7
6
7
6
6
9
7
12
8
7
8
15
14
10
Direction
0 True
No data
--
--
220
300
250
250
130
190
120
No data
No data
230
250
050
220
240
070
160
170
060
080
020
260
290
270
320
190
250
320
310
250
290
Height
Feet
Direction
°True
No data
No data
No data
-------
Date
Time
Mar. 4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
1200
1000
1100
1100
1100
1200
1200
1200
1700
1500
1200
1000
1200
3-6
TABLE 3. 1 (Contd)
Wind
Velocity
Kts.
11
10
15
12
7
8
7
16
7
15
12
10
10
30
12
5
10
4
10
8-10
10
15
10
6-10
10
13
8
11
10
Direction
0 True
280
250
210
330
070
150
230
000
300
230
150
310
270
320
300
030
210
250
210
320
270
250
140
230
130
230
120
090
250
Wave and Swell
Height
Feet
Direction
0 True
12
Surface water temperature normally expected in February is
55-56 °F. Tidal range (unadjusted for storm conditions) was 8.4 feet
in February.
-------
FIGURE 3. 1. Southern California Geography and February Predicted Ocean Currents
-------
**
i o
I
FIGURE 3. 2. Aerial View Across Santa Barbara Channel to the South - Anacapa Island
in Background, 14 February, 1969 (courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)
-------
3-9
SECTION 3.0 REFERENCES
Climatological Data; U. S. Department of Commerce, Environmental
Science Services Administration; California, January 1969, Vol. 73,
No. 1.
Climatological Data; U. S. Department of Commerce, Environmental
Science Services Administration; California, February 1969, Vol. 73,
No. 2.
Personnel Communication, Mr. Gordon C. Shields, Marine
Meteorologist; Weather Bureau Forecast Office, Los Angeles,
California.
U. S. Coast Guard Situation Reports, Group Office, Santa Barbara,
29 January 1969 to 9 March 1969.
Robert de Violani, "Climatic Handbook for Point Mugu and
San Nicolas Island," Volume I - Surface Data. Miscellaneous
Report, PMR-MR-67-2, 25 October, 1967.
A. Fleminger and H. T. Klein, Editors, "California Cooperative
Oceanic Fisheries Investigations, " Atlas No. 4, December 1966,
Scripps Institution of Oceanography.
-------
4-1
4.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE SOURCE
4.1 GENERAL GEOLOGY*1*
Santa Barbara Channel, approximately 75 miles long and 25 miles
wide, lies within the geomorphic province of southern California known as
the Transverse Ranges. These ranges, a series of east-west trending
mountains and valleys, lie in a position that is contrary to the northwest-
southeast structural and topographic trend of California. The channel is
both a topographic and structural basin that occupies about 1750 square
miles of ocean, and is located between the coast of Santa Barbara County
and an offshore east-west group of four islands. Depths within the channel
vary considerably and inconsistently with distance from shore. A maximum
water depth of over 2000 feet exists near the center of the submerged basin.
The thickness of individual stratigraphic units varies from place
to place, and in some locations units in the sequence are cut out of the
local section by faulting or depositional interruption. The section as a
whole is made up of a series of interbedded sand and shale bodies with
individual members varying in thickness from a few feet to several hun-
dred feet. Oil and gas normally accumulate in the sand bodies; and when
favorable entrapment conditions exist, the porosity and permeability are
favorable, a reservoir can be produced.
Along the onshore and offshore areas of the south coast practically
all accumulations of oil and gas are complicated to some degree by faulting.
Significant changes in the geologic section may occur over relatively short
distances. As an example, Figure 4.2 shows two nearly parallel (about
10 miles apart), north-south geologic cross sections. These sections, as
shown on Figure 4.1, are about equidistant east and west of Platform A
where the well blowout occurred. Recent exploration in the channel has
indicated that ". . .Contrary to some seismic indications, the geology in the
channel is proving to be just as complex--if not more so--than the crumpled
(2)
and faulted rock layers onshore. "
-------
4- r-
I ^ ~ ~~^i*? •
f3m ...
O OIL PROCtSMNr, FACIlITf
• DR1UINO Pl*TFOim ,
PUBL1C PARK
A PRIVATE PARK
A PftRK ACQUIS1IIOM UXOEII OlSCUSilDK
HA8IN[ TEDKINAL
0 CEASE WITH iJ«l)I»«Ai[» COHPLETIon
HESA EXTENSION
EAST BEACH
SUMMtRLANO OFFSHORE • WEST POOl
IIIHMKI ANIl HEAP, BEACH •
WEST |iII»'.IUN
OOIETA OFFSHORE
CARPENTERIA OfFSHORC EIIENSIOK
[ASTERN ANTICLINE
BUFFER ZONE
ISLA VISTA FAR OFFSHORE
I? Mil! REEF WESTERN DO"!
1? KILE REEF CENTRAL OOHE
I? HUE REEF EASTERN DOME
"
1 SANTA ROSA
''
ii
i
i
FIGURE 4.1. Santa Barbara Channel Showing Location of Platform A and Position of
Geologic Cross Sections^!'
-------
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
OFFSHORE-ONSHORE PETROLEUM JTUOY
SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL
PHASE I
EFFECTS OF FKDERAL. LEASING
Ovl«f Cen'-nvnlOt Shtlt
»,.!!»..,., •.»..!
PLATE F
DIAGRAMMATIC STRUCTURE SECTIONS
ACROSS CHANNEL
NOTE Stciionl qf« tch*malic only end not
ttCTIOfl •-•
Platform
I
i.
i
,
"
FIGURE 4.2. Structural Sections East (A-A1) and West (B-B1) of Platform A
(1)
-------
4-4
4.2 WELL OPERATIONS
The sequence of events related to drilling operations prior to and
following the blowout of well A-21 is presented in considerable detail in
references 3 and 4. Descriptions of well-control operations subsequent to
the issuance of reference 4 (February 9, 1969) were obtained primarily
from discussions with involved parties, daily reports and current journal
articles.
Fixed drilling Platform A is located in the northeast corner of
Tract 402 (Lease OCS-P 0241) about six miles southeast of Santa Barbara
and six miles southwest of Carpenteria, California. Operations on the
lease are conducted by the Union Oil Company (lessees are Union Oil
Company, Texaco Inc. , Gulf Oil Corp. , and Mobil Oil Corp.). Drilling
began on the A-21 well, the fifth well to be drilled from Platform A, on
January 14, 1969. Drilling reached a total depth of 3479 feet on January
28, and 13 3/8-inch conductor casing had been set and cemented to a depth
of 238 feet below the ocean floor (ocean depth is about 190 feet). At mid-
morning on January 28, mud began to flow from the drill pipe as it was
being removed from the hole preparatory to running electric logs and later
setting production casing. Eight stands of drill pipe (720 feet) had been
removed when the "kick" (blowout) occurred.
Table 4. 1 following is a condensation of the sequence of events,
including well-control operations, which took place following the blowout.
All five of the wells on Platform A were planned to be placed on pro-
duction in an effort to relieve the pressure causing seepage from the fissures
and/or shallow sands. Also, several days following the blowout a direction-
ally-drilled relief well was spudded about 1000 feet south of Platform A
(from a floating rig) to intersect the A-21 well near the bottom of the hole.
The intent was to pump mud into the well to seal off the high pressure zone.
The relief well was drilled to a depth of over 1000 feet and then abandoned
after the A-21 well was cement-filled and shallow-zone recharge was noted
from several of the platform wells when they were produced.
-------
4-5
TABLE 4.1. Well A-21 Control Chronology
Approximate
Elapsed Time
0
0-1 minutes
2-3 minutes
4-13 minutes
14-25 minutes
0.5-18.5 hours
1-7 days
Operations and Events
Mud flowed out of drill pipe 90 feet above floor of
platform.
Attempt to screw check valve on top of drill pipe,
mud flow 20 feet out of pipe, floor slippery, mud
flow ceased and heavy gaseous hydrocarbon mist
under pressure issued from pipe, eyes affected,
visibility near zero, floor extremely slippery, instal-
lation of check valve abandoned.
Hooked elevator onto kelly for installation on drill
pipe, plug on standpipe broke off rendering mud con-
trol through kelly ineffective (attempt abandoned);
visibility restricted, communication difficult, decided
to drop drill pipe back into hole and shut blowout pre-
venter to contain pressure.
Blocks lowered to raise drill pipe, slips removed,
hydril blowout preventer actuated to hold pipe column
while disconnecting elevator (ineffective). Pipe
raised about 30 feet, pipe rams on BOP actuated to
hold pipe, elevators disconnected and pipe rams
opened to drop pipe in hold, blind rams closed to seal
well, flow from well ceased.
Bubbles noticed in ocean around platform, large boil
appeared about 800 feet from platform (Figure 4. 3).
Choke and kill operations attempted following well
closure were ineffective and thus abandoned.
Single stands of drill pipe (check valve on leading
stand) were snubbed into the well to reconnect to
dropped pipe and circulate mud to seal off leakage
into shallow zones, time consuming operation. Drill
string was reconnected.
Upon reconnection, bottom of drill pipe was found to
be stuck and plugged, attempted to unscrew pipe below
check valve to pull pipe and rerun without valve
(unsuccessful) so that gun perforator could be lowered
to bottom of drill string to punch holes for mud circu-
lation. Decided to mill out valve interior, milling tool
obtained, valve milled, drill pipe perforated, and sea
-------
4-6
TABLE 4. 1. (contd)
Approximate
Elapsed Time
1-7 days (contd)
8-10 days
11-12 days
15-16 days
Subsequent to
16th day
Operations and Events
water followed by 3000 bbls. of heavy mud circulated.
Definite reduction noted in amount of oil and gas
emerging at ocean surface. Decided to stop pumping
mud until additional mud and pumping capacity were
available. Sea water continued to be pumped while
supplies were amassed.
Worked on assembling supplies needed to mix and
pump 14,000 bbls. of heavy-weighted mud into any
cavities and to build up the mud column in the hole
sufficiently to overcome pressure in the strata from
which gas was flowing. High winds and seas caused
delay.
Mud pumped into well at high injection rate and
pressure. Boils diminished to a few small bubbles,
mud return noted. Later there was no visible evi-
dence of leakage at surface, and it was decided to
cement and abandon the well. Cement injected in
stages and well was filled to ocean bottom. Only a
few small gas bubbles were noted under edge of
platform.
Increased seepage noted, at reduced rate than origi-
nally, extending out to 800 feet from the platform.
Adjacent wells put on production in an attempt to
reduce pressure in upper sand zone.
Several wells on the platform were placed on produc-
tion in an attempt to relieve pressure. Cement was
drilled from the A-21 (blowout) well to a depth of
about 175 feet, casing was perforated, and well was
placed on production to reduce pressure in shallow
zones. Attempts were made to cement fissures on
the ocean floor (divers) through which oil was seeping.
Rough seas and very restricted visibility made this
difficult. Leakage continued at a significantly reduced
rate than originally and was believed to originate in
shallow zones charged through other wells that were
put on production for pressure relief.
-------
4-7
FIGURE 4.3.
Oil, Gas and Sediment Boils in Vicinity of Platform A,
29 January, 1969, Shortly Following Blowout (courtesy of
Santa Barbara News Press)
-------
4-8
4.3 AREAL DISTRIBUTION AND CHRONOLOGY
Information on the ocean floor release of oil and gas resulting from
the well blowout consistently indicates appreciable variability in both the
location of seepage points and magnitude of release with time. Such vari-
ability is not unexpected in consideration that the immediate release source
was believed to be primarily shallow sands and/or fissures recharged by
the deeper producing zones (via well bores and casing annulus) rather than
direct communication between the ocean floor and the deep reservoir. Also,
control or defensive operations carried out in the blowout and other wells on
the platform caused significant alterations in the pattern and rates of
recharge in the shallow sands and fissures. Certainly, the rate of crude oil
release was more difficult to estimate than was the location of seepage areas;
although very restricted ocean floor visibility due to oil, gas, sediment (and
at times storm) turbulence made exact pinpointing of seepage areas difficult.
Estimation of the rate of release and cumulative volume of oil is
extremely difficult due to the impossibility of making direct measurement.
(3 4)
Estimates by the U.S. Geological Survey ' place the initial seepage
rate at about 500 barrels of crude oil per day (maximum of 5000 b/d), and
the later sustained release at up to 50 b/d.
(6)
More recently, Allen provided a "conservative" release rate
estimate of 5000 b/d during the initial eleven days of maximum activity
followed by a near steady release rate of 500 b/d out to 100 days from the
initial release. He further estimates that the cumulative total was 77,000
barrels after 100 days. This is equivalent to approximately 12,000 tons.
For comparison purposes, the TORREY CANYON release has been esti-
(7)
mated at 30, 000 tons. '
Allen's "conservative" release estimates are based upon a 1/1000
inch uniform film thickness over the area observed to be covered. An alter-
native graded estimate of thickness (1-inch thick over 10,000 sq yards,
1/4-inch thick over 640, 000 yards, 1/100 inch over 1 sq mile with 50%
water-in-oil emulsion) during the maximum release rate period, resulted
in an estimated release rate of 16, 000 b/d during the initial period.
-------
4-9
In any event, it must be recognized that the variability of oil
release in terms of volume and location with time presented a unique and
difficult to manage situation. At one period the oil slick covered approxi-
mately 500 square miles.
TABLE 4.2. Oil Release Observations
Approximate
Elapsed Time
0
25 minutes
1 day
2 days
7 days
12 days
16 days
(345)
Observations of Oil Released ' '
Well blowout. Mud followed by heavy, gaseous hydro-
carbon mist issued from drill pipe.
Drilling platform personnel first noticed bubbles in
ocean around platform. A large gas and oil boil
(several hundred feet in diameter) appeared about
800 feet east of platform and smaller boils appeared
in a line intersecting northeast leg of platform.
Large boil east of platform persists, smaller boil
(30 feet diameter) at northeast leg of platform, lesser
bubbling in between and extending in line to 300 feet
west of platform.
Oil and gas bubbles subsided except the single boil at
northeast leg which had increased to 300 feet. This
condition persisted with only minor changes for about
4 days.
Some reduction in the amount of oil and gas flow noted
following addition of mud to A-21 well. During short
time intervals the boil at northeast leg subsided.
Boil at northeast leg continued as the major seep until
mud and cement were placed in well. Following well
abandonment, platform and aerial inspection revealed
only a few small bubbles issuing at the ocean surface
over an area about ten feet in diameter under edge of
platform.
Increased seepage occurred along a line extending to
800 feet east of platform. Believed due to placing
another well on production. Later, primary leakage
was at northeast leg of platform. The slick from this
seepage was from 30-150 feet wide, extending for 1-2
miles.
-------
4-10
TABLE 4.2. (contd)
Approximate
Elapsed Time Observations of Oil Released
26 days Boil at platform leg predominates with lesser bubbling
500 feet east and 300 feet west of platform.
30 days Minor oil and gas bubbling east and west of platform
appearing to stop. Seepage persists at northeast leg.
31 days Boil at northeast leg diminished and seepage along the
east and west lines was renewed.
(5)
Subsequent to Seepage continued at rate up to an estimated 50 b/d.
31 days
SECTION 4.0 REFERENCES
1. D. K. Bickmore, et al. Phase I, Effects of Federal Leasing Outer
Continental Shelf, (Preliminary), Oil Well Inspection Dept., County
of Santa Barbara, California, November 15, 1967.
2. "Verdict Still to Come in the Santa Barbara Channel, " Oil and Gas
Journal, vol. 67, no. 9, March 3, 1969, pp. 76-77.
3 E. W. Standley, et al. "First Field Report on Union Oil Co. Lease
OCS-P 0241, Platform A, WellA-21,"U. S. Geological Survey,
February 4, 1969.
4 E. W. Standley, et al. "Second Field Report on Union Oil Co. Lease
OCS-P 0241, Platform A. Well No. 21, "U. S. Geological Survey,
February 9, 1969.
5. U.S. Coast Guard Situation Reports, Group Office, Santa Barbara,
29 January to 28 February 1969.
6. A. A. Allen. Statement to U. S. Senate Interior Committee, Sub-
committee on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels; May 20, 1969.
7. J. W. Smith. "The TORREY CANYON Disaster, " British Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Science, Leeds, England, September 6,
1967.
-------
5-1
5.0 MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Following the TORREY CANYON incident off Lands End, England,
in March 1967, the President directed the Secretary of the Interior and
Secretary of Transportation to examine how the resources of the nation
could best be mobilized against the pollution of water by spills of oil and
other hazardous substances. This examination resulted in the report
"Oil Pollution - A report to the President, " dated February 1968. This
report pointed out the need for contingency planning as a necessary first
step in combating major water pollution incidents.
The national level effort in contingency planning culminated in
September 1968 issuance of the "National Multiagency Oil and Hazardous
Materials Pollution Contingency Plan. " Agencies signatory to this plan
are the Department of the Interior, the Department of Transportation, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
and the Office of Emergency Planning (currently the Office of Emergency
Preparedness). The national plan further called for the development of
regional contingency plans and for designation of a single on-scene com-
mander (OSC) as the single predesignated executive agent to coordinate and
direct such pollution control activities in each area of the region. Accord-
ing to the plan, "the U.S. Coast Guard is assigned the responsibility to
furnish or provide for on-scene commanders for the coastal and contiguous
zone waters, ports and harbors, Great Lakes and major navigable water-
ways. " The Department of the Interior furnishes or provides on-scene
commanders in other areas.
While the authority to furnish or provide OSC's is thus vested in
these two agencies, it is recognized that where other Federal agencies are
present and have a greater capability, they may be asked to provide the
OSC.
Additionally, where Federally owned or operated vessels or
facilities are involved, in any geographical area, the intent of the Plan is
that the Federal agency most concerned provide the OSC. This means, in
effect, that the Army Corps of Engineers (for dams, locks, etc.), the Navy
(for its ships), the Air Force, and other such agencies may assume the
function of OSC from time to time.
-------
5-2
The national contingency plan also provided for the activation of
regional operating teams (ROT) in the event of a pollution disaster with
representation from the signatory agencies. The ROT as set out in the
National Plan has no command responsibility, operational or not. When the
Coast Guard provides the on-scene commander, the Coast Guard chain of
command is in effect. The ROT advises, except as regards "continuing
water pollution control measures, " where it has a veto.
One of the purposes of the regional contingency plan was to assess
the potential major water pollution threats in the area and to identify
resources subject to damage. The regional contingency plan is also intended
to establish cooperative agreements with state and local authorities so that
in the event of a disaster, defensive resources can be inventoried and made
available with a minimum of lost motion and time. At the time of the Santa
Barbara Channel oil pollution incident, the appropriate regional contingency
plan was in the process of revision and not yet in full effect. However, the
federal-state "Cooperative Agreement for Marine Chemical Spill Disasters
in and about the State of California" had been promulgated and was amplified
by the U. S. Coast Guard llth District "Marine Chemical Spill Disaster
Plan."
This chapter is intended to summarize the management considera-
tions and activities undertaken by the various parties operating under these
contingency plans. As of this writing (October 1969) the National Contingency
Plan is being revised to reflect lessons learned from the Santa Barbara
Channel incident.
5.1 PREPLANNING ACTIVITIES
Although as pointed out above, formal implementation of a Regional
Contingency Plan had not been achieved at the time of the incident, substan-
tive agreement had been reached between the State and Federal agencies
involved and working arrangements were generally available under the
"Cooperative Agreement for Marine Chemical Spill Disasters in and about
the State of California. "
Planning for coping with an oil pollution incident specifically in the
Santa Barbara Channel was initiated in December 1967 under responsibilities
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5-3
outlined in the USCG llth District "Marine Chemical Spill Disaster Plan. "
Meetings were held during 1968 in Santa Barbara and Ventura counties with
Civil Defense, Law Enforcement, Harbor Administration personnel and
various California State agencies. A total of eleven such meetings were
held from December 1967 through December 1968. These meetings,
although not resulting in a formalized plan, did serve the very useful pur-
pose of establishing lines of communication that later proved extremely
useful throughout the incident.
From the industry standpoint, the Western Oil and Gas Association
had prepared a Santa Barbara Channel Water Pollution Control emergency
statement that reportedly proved valuable in the early stages of the incident
in locating equipment and materials.
5.2 INITIAL ACTIONS
Following the initial release from Platform A at about 1100 U 28
January 1969, the Regional Operating Team (ROT) and the Joint Operations
Team in Washington, D.C. , were alerted on 29 January as called for in
the National Multiagency Oil and Hazardous Materials Pollution Contingency
Plan. The ROT met 30 January in San Francisco, California, to declare
an incident and was then fully activated on 4 February to provide further
technical and logistical support to the On-Scene Commander. This initial
meeting was held under the auspices of the 12th Coast Guard District in
San Francisco although the incident occurred within the jurisdiction of the
llth Coast Guard District. This temporary situation was later rectified
with transfer of the ROT activities to Santa Barbara.
The U. S. Coast Guard assumed on-scene command responsibility
(2)
and established headquarters for the ROT in Santa Barbara on 29 January.
At the request of the Union Oil Company, the FWPCA granted permission
for use of chemical dispersants as necessary to protect the lives of the
crew on the platform from fire and explosion and to control and prevent
further pollution.
On 30 January, the FWPCA established a technical staff on scene
in Santa Barbara to Provide coordination and technical counsel to the
On-Scene Commander and to the Union Oil Company on cleanup and
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5-4
confinement procedures and to monitor the pollution and pollution control
U.
(3)
measures. On 31 January, the U. S. Weather Bureau established a mobile
forecasting unit at Santa Barbara.
5.3 REGIONAL OPERATING TEAM ACTIVITIES
The chairman of the ROT arrived on-scene 30 January and was joined
on 31 January by other members or their representatives and the expert
team assembled by the Secretary of the Interior. Agencies on the ROT, as
well as representatives of the State of California, assembled skilled person-
nel both in the engineering and biological sciences field. As the need arose,
contracts were executed especially in the field of ecological damage assess-
ment and to collect perishable information.
5.4 ON-SCENE ACTIONS
At the onset of the incident, Union Oil Company assumed responsi-
bility for organizing and conducting the control and restoration activities.
Federal and state agency partification was directed at providing counsel to
the On-Scene Commander and to the Union Oil Company, and monitoring
pollution effects in accord with agency capabilities. Some State assistance
was also provided for restoration.
Suggestions for control and cleanup were generated by the ROT and
On-Scene Commander. While no approved regional plan had been promul-
gated, recommendations were usually directed to Union Oil Company through
the On-Scene Commander to satisfy the command intent of the plan. Among
(3 4)
the recommendations were: '
1. The need to boom at the source coupled with recovery of oil from
the boomed area by use of barges and vacuum pumps.
2. The use of straw as a sorbent for oil.
3. The use of power mulchers for distribution of the straw sorbent.
4. The need to locate and provide on-land disposal sites for oiled
debris, straw, and sand.
5. The use of vacuum tank trucks for removal of oil from.the Santa
Barbara harbor.
6. That chemical dispersants not be employed on the beaches due to
potential for driving oil deeper into the sand and producing "quicksand"
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5-5
condition. Further stipulations were later placed on the use of
dispersants at sea (Section 6.2).
7. The procedures for water fowl rehabilitation.
Personnel of the U. S. Coast Guard, FWPCA, and Bureau of Sport
Fisheries and Wildlife, and the California Department of Fish and Game
conducted aerial and beach surveys and monitored the extent of the oil
slick on a near-daily basis until March 1, 1969, and thereafter as required
fortheOSC. The FWPCA also conducted water quality, biological, and
ecological surveys, and arranged for experimental use of aerial remote
sensing.
Considerable effort was also devoted to handling and evaluating more
than a thousand unsolicited recommendations from vendors and interested
citizens.
The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers provided assistance in locating
contractors and cleanup equipment. The U. S. Navy provided the services
of a yard oiler and five pontoon sections/ The Office of Emergency Pre-
paredness provided counsel on the applicability and operation of emergency
(3)
legislation and regulations.
5. 0 REFERENCES
1. DeFalco, P., Jr., Statement to Committee on Public Works, U.S.
House of Representatives, February 14, 1969, Santa Barbara.
2. Brown, Lt. G. B. Ill, USCG, Statement to Subcommittee for Air and
Water Pollution, U.S. Senate, 25 February 1969.
3. On-Scene Commander's Report, "The Santa Barbara Channel Oil
Pollution Incident, January 1969. "
4. Biglane, K. E. , Statement to the United States Senate Committee on
Public Works, Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Santa
Barbara, California, February 25, 1969.
5. Gaines, T. H. , Statement to Committee on Public Works, U.S. House
of Representatives, February 18, 1969, Santa Barbara.
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6-1
6.0 CONTROL OF RELEASED OIL
6.1 CONTROL AT SOURCE
6.1.1 Capture Below Sea Level
Several attempts were made to collect the oil mechanically as it
issued from the sea floor. Basically the devices used were hoods or
inverted funnels placed over a point of emission. The natural buoyancy of
the oil caused it to collect at the top of the vessel from whence it could be
pumped to storage vessels on the platform.
On about 16 February, a small steel hood was suspended above a
fissure near the platform by attaching it to one of the platform legs. Oil
was pumped to the platform through a four-inch diameter line at the top;
up to 12 bbl of oil per day were recovered during this operation.
A second hood, subsequently known as the "Barbecue Pit", was rela-
tively large and designed to be lowered to the bottom over a fissure.
The physical configuration permitted emplacement over the conductor
casings of the platform; therefore, it was of a somewhat irregular shape,
resembling a t'hree-sided tank. The approximate dimensions were 40 feet
long, 30 feet wide, and 55 feet high, with a weight of approximately 25 tons.
The size and weight required that a large crane be used for loading and
emplacement. Placement was attempted on 10 March, but the hood was
severely damaged by waves and currents upon lowering, and it was sub-
sequently removed and dismantled for disposal. The device was never
operational.
Structural and particularly emplacement problems associated with
mechanical oil capture devices become apparent when wave-induced surge
forces in an open ocean environment are examined. The water depth at
Platform A is approximately 190 feet, under essentially deep ocean con-
(2)
ditions for the passage of waves with periods up to eight or nine seconds.
o
The relationship between wave length (L) and wave period (T) is L = 5.12T .
Effective water motion for progressive deep ocean waves decreases with
depth below the still water level (SWL) according to the expression
-------
6-2
Ke ^ where K = a constant, y - vertical distance from the SWL (negative
downward), L = wavelength and e = base of Natural logarithm. From this
expression it is evident that water motion decreases to a lesser degree with
depth as the wave length increases for a fixed vertical position.
Emplacement operations were conducted of necessity in the presence of
long period waves or swells of relatively low height. For the case of a
wave period of 12 seconds, the surge at 190 feet below the SWL is 20 percent
of the value at the still water level. Therefore, emplacement operations
must include provisions for considerable water movement and wave forces
even at 190-foot depth in a deep sea environment. These operations can
become particularly difficult (and potentially hazardous) near a rigid
structure such as a platform (Figure 6.1).
Subsurface hooding of emission points was hampered since the emissions
tended to vary in position from day to day, and severe turbidity limited
diving operations. In addition, some of the emission points were as much
as 800 feet horizontally from the platform which caused difficulty in piping
captured oil to the platform.
6.1.2 Physical Confinement on the Sea Surface
Several types of floating booms, including a rigid "corral", were
employed to contain the oil on the surface. Most were deployed in the
immediate vicinity of the platform to prevent spread of the oil until it
could be recovered. Attempts also were made with booms to prevent the
slick from moving toward the beaches. In order to contain the oil as it
emerged at the surface, very long booms (up to 1, 800 feet) were required
since the oil spreads rapidly and surface currents caused the boom to take
on a catenary shape. During the early stages of the blowout containment
booms would have had to encompass areas of thousands of square feet, based
/0\
on the estimates of the boil diameter at the sea surface (up to 300 feet).
Booms and containment devices employed or tested at sea in the vicinity
of the platform to capture or contain the oil slick included:
• Sheets of rubberized asbestos approximately 36 inches high and one
inch thick.
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6-3
• i
urn
*v--
FIGURE 6.1. Platform A (courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)
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6-4
• Log booms.
• An inflatable boom 20 inches in diameter with a 30 inch skirt.
• A smaller commercial plastic boom with skirt.
• Rubberized fabric sheet with battens for stiffening.
• A "corral" formed from sheet metal.
• A lattice of steel cables covered with a quilted fabric material.
The log booms were fabricated from telephone poles 30-50 feet long
with minimum diameters of 12. inches. Steel cables up to one inch in
diameter joined the successive sections and canvas wrapping prevented
leakage between sections. The log booms were assembled in lengths up
to 1, 000 feet or more near shore and towed to the scene. This type of
boom generally proved to be ineffective in rough seas because of the
inability to conform to the sea surface, thus permitting the oil to be
carried over or under. Skirts were not used on the log booms. Several
were destroyed by rough seas. Approximately 5, 000 feet of log boom was
positioned within 1, 000 yards of the north side of the platform on
(4)
5 February.
The commercial booms employed at sea generally range in price from
$8-$15/foot (without mooring systems). The cost of emplacement, posi-
tioning and/or holding is estimated to range between $20 and $50/hr,
depending on the number of ships required. Makeshift booms, such as
those fabricated from telephone poles, are estimated to cost $4-$8/foot.
The steel "corral" was an open cylinder approximately 30-35 feet in
diameter and 10-12 feet high. The sheet metal outer covering was braced
internally with structural members; 55 gallon drums on the inside provided
buoyancy. It was to be towed to the scene and moored on the surface over
the boil with the intent that the accumulated oil would be pumped out as it
collected. However, the "corral" struck a leg of the platform during
placement and was damaged beyond repair before it could be tested.
A large boom (Figure 6.2) was formed from a ten inch square lattice
of 1/2 inch diameter steel cables covered by a heavy quilted fabric which
was claimed to pass water while retaining the oil. The physical dimensions
were 10 feet high by 200 feet long; approximately 3-1/2 feet rode out of the
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6-5
FIGURE 6.2. Large Steel Cable Reinforced Fabric Boom
water. Buoyancy was provided by plastic foam-filled bags on either side.
The 200 foot section was towed to sea for tests in late March and tested
for several days. The short length employed did not permit evaluation of
the effectiveness to contain oil. However, the boom proved strong enough
to survive at least 10 days of relatively calm seas. The cost of this boom
was reportedly $10, 000 for 200 feet.
An inflatable boom was also employed in the vicinity of the platform.
The configuration of this boom made it difficult to tow at moderate speeds
and it failed structurally. A strengthened version was later used across
the mouth of the Santa Barbara harbor but was damaged by a ship. A
third, further in.proved, model used plastic foam instead of air for
flotation and reportedly worked satisfactorily across the mouth of the
Channel Islands Harbor.
Booming was often hampered by heavy seas and a number of severe
operational problems such as structural integrity of the booms, mooring,
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6-6
alignment and holding with ships, launching from shore, inability to
contain the accumulated oil, and dragging of ground tackle. One of the
commercial booms was damaged by a ship's propeller and had to be
returned to shore for repairs. ( The booms were often deployed with one
end attached to a buoy while a ship maintained the other end on station.
The moorings often parted in heavy seas, thus suspending operations.
Positioning posed a problem because lateral forces on the relatively long
booms and excessive towing forces caused mechanical failure. Floating
debris constituted a navigational hazard and its accumulation against booms
also produced severe structural forces. Booms that had a relatively high,
narrow rectangular cross section were subject to tipping and thus loss of
oil retention capability, particularly if mooring lines slackened. Confine-
ment of oil by an encircling boom placed around the platform, even if it had
been possible, might have markedly increased the fire hazard and possibly
closed down attempts being made to shut in the well. Complete encircle-
ment would have also restricted ship traffic to and from the platform.
6.1.3 Chemical Dispersants
Chemical dispersants were injected underwater near the emission
points on the seafloor to reduce the fire hazard of the oil as it emerged on
the water surface. The description of chemical dispersants in this section
is limited to those applied underwater near the source. A further descrip-
tion of the dispersants applied to the oil slick near the platform and in other
areas of the Santa Barbara Channel is included in Section 6. 2. 2.
Polycomplex A-II was applied from the deck of the platform directly
into the boil of oil and gas. Application was made by pumping the disper-
sant through a line extending underwater from the deck of the platform. A
total of 25 barrels was applied in this manner up to the latter part of
February. Application was subsequently discontinued. Typical applica-
tion rates of about one barrel per day were reported.
6.2 CONTROL AT SEA
6.2.1 Sorbents
(7)
Sorbents applied at sea included straw, perlite, a ceramic catalyst
support for sinking oil, (8) foam pads, and micronized talc. Straw was
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6-7
the absorbent judged most successful and was subsequently applied in large
quantities. The absorbents were applied primarily to prevent the oil slick
from spreading.
The micronized talc tested was similar to that used to absorb oil
following the OCEAN EAGLE incident at San Juan, Puerto Rico. Blowers
and fertilizer spreaders were used to spread the talc from work boats.
Following a test, the talc was judged ineffective because it could not be
readily recovered and its use was discontinued. ' The ceramic catalyst
support intended to sink the oil was reportedly applied offshore on one
occasion to try to prevent oil from reaching the beaches.
At least two types of straw were used—Bermuda straw and the more
common straw from wheat stalks. Bermuda straw, closely resembling
hay, is much finer than common straw and, like hay, was found less
effective because of the much smaller volume of oil that could be absorbed.
Straw reportedly repels water and absorbs 4 to 5 times its weight in oil.
Straw was trucked to Santa Barbara from throughout the Southwest. No
information could be found regarding mechanical methods tested at sea to
recover the agglomerated oil-straw mixture from the surface and no device
is known to have been used for the specific purpose of recovering the
agglomerated mixture at sea.
Straw spreading was effectively accomplished by mulchers normally
used to spread straw along highway borders to prevent soil erosion. Up to
45 tons per day were spread near the platform in late February by two
ships. Vessels were also used to spread the straw near shore as shown
in Figure 6.3. Up to 140 tons per day were spread by vessels working
(12)
parallel to the beach a few hundred yards offshore. Individual mulchers
(41)
were capable of broadcasting 8 to 10 tons of straw per hour.
The effectiveness of sorbents such as straw applied at sea near the
platform is doubtful as the straw-oil mixture was not easily recovered at
sea and tended to clog skimmers designed for removing oil. However,
straw does tend to prevent further oil spreading. Application of straw near
shore when the oil was certain to wash ashore did have merit as it facilitated
beach cleanup by minimizing penetration into the beach surface.
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6-8
FIGURE 6. 3. Workboat Spreading Straw Inside Kelp Beds
(courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard)
6.2.2 Chemical Dispersants
Chemical dispersants were applied at sea for two purposes: (1) to pre-
vent the oil slicks from reaching the shore as they approached the beaches,
and (2) to reduce the hazardous concentrations of flammable oil in the
immediate vicinity of the platform. The application of chemical dispersants
was discontinued in all areas other than the immediate vicinity of the plat-
form (within one mile) for safety reasons when the FWPCA advised that the
chemical usage had exceeded the manufacturer's recommended application
ratio based on the Union Oil Company estimate of 2, 500 barrels of oil
released. The use of chemical dispersants within state waters (three
miles offshore) was opposed by the California Department of Fish and Game
because of previously established policy banning the use of any chemical
(14)
deleterious to marine life.
The majority of the dispersant applied to the slicks to prevent the oil
from reaching the beaches was "Correxit 7664" and the application area was
normally in excess of one mile offshore. Three hundred thirty seven (337)
drums of this dispersant were reportedly applied by two fixed wing aircraft
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6-9
and surface vessels between 30 January and 5 February 1969. '' The
337 drums (~~2Q, 000 gallons) applied should have dispersed a minimum of
200, 000 gallons of oil, based on the manufacturer's literature from
/I c\
previous trials. General observations were that the majority of the
oil that was located offshore during this period eventually reached the
beaches.
The application ratio used was based on the manufacturer's recommended
/i 7)
rates and the Union Oil Company estimates of oil released. Tne dis-
persants were applied to the slicks either from surface vessels, referred
to as "Soap Boats" (Figure 6.4) or fixed wing aircraft, normally used for
(1 8)
agricultural crop dusting, flying a few feet above the water surface.
Application rates from surface vessels were typically one barrel per hour
with a spray pattern about 50 feet wide and the ship advancing at speeds up
to three knots. Approximately 40 gallons/acre were applied by the fixed
wing aircraft.
FIGURE 6. 4. Workboat Distributing Chemical Dispersant (Courtesy
of Santa Barbara News Press)
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6-10
FIGURE 6. 5. Oil Distributed in "Ropes and Windrows'
(courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)
(20)
The dispersants applied from surface vessels normally required
auxiliary "mixer" ships to provide sufficient water surface agitation by
their natural screw and hull wake. These auxiliary craft normally
followed directly astern on both sides of the spray vessel. Up to four
spray vessels and twelve "mixer" ships were employed at various times.
The use of chemical dispersants was almost totally discontinued in early
March, but resumed again later in the month.
The policy of the FWPCA concerning the use of chemical dispersants
(21)
in such situations includes the following recommendations:
• Application should be restricted to areas further than 1-1/2 miles
offshore to minimize the toxicity to nearshore marine life.
• The rate of application should be limited so as not to exceed a concen-
tration of 5 ppm mixed in the top three feet of the water column.
• Dispersants should not be employed which contain solvents composed
of aromatic petroleum fractions or chlorinated hydrocarbons.
• Application should be limited primarily to the leading edge of the slick.
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6-11
The chemical dispersants used vary in price from about $2. 50-$5/gallon.
The dispersant sprayed from surface vessels was diluted with seawater
during application to the water surface in ratios up to 80 parts seawater to
(92)
one part dispersant. The manufacturers generally supplied represen-
tatives and, in at least one case, operating personnel to supervise and
conduct spraying operations. Based on manufacturer's literature the
chemicals should be able to disperse between 10 and 50 gallons of oil per
gallons of dispersant. The amount of dispersants applied during the
incident (at least 37, 500 gallons), therefore, should have dispersed at
least 375, 000 gallons of oil. It is impossible to determine if this was
indeed the amount dispersed, but it seems highly doubtful as field con-
ditions rarely approach the ideal.
The rental charge for the surface vessels employed to spray the
dispersant in the open sea is approximately $30-$40/hr and the "mixer"
ships probably rented for $20-$40/hr. The fixed wing aircraft used for
spraying are estimated to have cost between $30-$40/hr. Two of these
aircraft were employed.
When applied properly, the dispersants were effective in removing the
slick from the water surface. Little or no quantitative information is
available pertaining to the long term effectiveness, based on continuous
visual observations of a particular area, of the dispersants used in the
Santa Barbara Channel.
The following chemical dispersants and amounts used were reported by
the Union Oil Company from 26 February to 8 March, 1969.
Amount Reported
Chemical Dispersant (55 Gallon bbls)
Polycomplex A-ll 2271/2
20 (30 January to 5 February)
Ara Chem 140 1/2
Unico 31/2
Crane OD-2 19
Correxit 7664 337 (30 January to 5 February)
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6-12
More than 150 products were reportedly offered to the Union Oil
Company as possible aids in treating the oil; most were not used because
(23)
little or no toxicity data were available.
The question of effectiveness of chemical dispersants was put to many,
if not all of the contacts made in this review. There was no clear-cut con-
census, although the majority felt that while the chemical dispersants
decreased, at least temporarily, the visibility of the oil slick, the net
effectiveness was marginal and the method was costly at best. Most agreed
that mechanical recovery was preferable, if possible on the open sea. Quan-
titative data for comparative dispersant toxicity and effectiveness are almost
wholly nonexistent and should be obtained under practical field conditions.
Subsequent to the initial drafting of this report, additional information
was supplied by the Union Oil Company on tests conducted under their
auspices. A portion of their report is appended starting on page 6-26.
It should be noted that these results apply only to the conditions of the tests
and are not necessarily broadly applicable.
6. 2. 3 Physical Removal
In the first few days following the incident, attempts were made
throughout the United States to locate oil skimmer systems. Those located
were determined to be either incapable of open sea skimming or unable to
be air transported to the scene. As a result, no existing open sea skimmers
were brought to the scene, and efforts were directed toward designing sys-
tems to be adapted for use with available vessels.
Offshore work boats were equipped with suction pumps to remove
the thick oil layers which accumulated on the surface and behind booms.
This equipment was effective when the oil layer was up to several inches
thick The MV PIKE I was reported to have skimmed 250 barrels of an
(24)
oil-water mixture (ratio unspecified) on 3 February. Later in February,
MV WINN was fitted with a Union Oil-designed skimming device consisting
of a square box or chamber approximately seven feet on each side. Buoyancy
was provided by empty 55 gallon drums on the corners. An overflow weir
was mounted in the center of the box from which the oil-water mixture was
pumped through the bottom of the weir to storage tanks on the ship. A
curved boom was used in conjunction with this skimmer to collect the oil.
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6-13
Operational problems were encountered when it was advanced through
the water (too much water recovered), and straw reportedly plugged the
intake. However, the device achieved some success when the oil was
sufficiently concentrated. On 28 February, off-loading of 218 barrels
(25)
gross, including 105 barrels of oil, from the WINN was reported.
In early March, MV WINN was equipped with a side-boom skimmer
designed by Union Oil Company (Figure 6.6). Two self-priming, high
capacity centrifugal pumps were employed to transfer the oil through six-
inch diameter lines from the skimmer to on-board storage tanks. These
pumps were typical of those commonly used for dewatering behind coffer-
dams and are capable of alternately pumping either air or water containing
a considerable amount of solids. Each pump had a capacity of about 700 gpm
and was equipped with a vacuum assist system for self-priming. The oil
recovery apparatus consisted of an adjustable trough mounted transversely
between two steel flotation cylinders in an open "V" configuration. The
cylinders were approximately 26 inches in diameter and 20 feet long. The
opening of the "V" was approximately 20 feet. The trough, ten feet long and
8 inches wide, was in the form of a "j" with the lower lip facing the direc-
tion of advance. The oil-water mixture, after entering the trough over the
leading edge, was pumped from the bottom of the trough through one of two
6-inch lines. It was estimated that this device, as designed, would recover
(9fi)
a 19:1 water to oil mixture. Two 17, 500 gallon ship tanks were
employed; one for holdup and decanting, and the other for storage of the
oil-water emulsion. The mixture was held in the decanting tank approxi-
mately 30 minutes before transfer to the storage tank.
This skimming device proved relatively effective while advancing at
speeds up to five knots. Initial tests recovered 200 barrels of mixture,
(27)
including 72 barrels of oil. It was the only skimmer used that was
capable of traversing slicks and recovering the "ropes" of oil formed by
wind and wave forces and which extended for considerable distances
(Figure 6. 5). It was also successfully employed to skim the oil held up by
kelp beds near shore. Auxiliary vessels were often employed to locate
and windrow the oil ahead of the skimmer. The capacity of the skimmer
-------
Rubber
Fenders
6 in. Hose
SECTION A' - A'
O5
I
> '
.1.
FIGURE 6. 6 Open Sea Skimmer
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6-15
under ideal conditions and working in a relatively thick slick was about
25 barrels per day. As much as 100 barrels of oil were off loaded every
three to four days.
Operational problems and limitations encountered during skimming
were: (I) the piping between the skimming apparatus and pumps con-
tained restrictions subject to clogging when straw or surface debris was
encountered; (2) drag forces caused the skimmer to submerge and thus
become ineffective when the speed of advance exceeded five knots; (3) the
large physical size prohibited lifting the skimmer aboard ship and,
therefore, transport to and from the scene was slow; (4) since a vessel
tends to turn "on its bow", the side mounting presented a maneuverability
problem in following a narrow "rope" of oil; and (5) splashguards were not
included on the outriggers or behind the trough and therefore some of the
oil was swept over the device in rough seas.
Skimming operations were not practical in winds exceeding 15 knots.
Rough seas prevented operation on many occasions. Skimming was limited
to daylight operations; therefore, a considerable amount of time was spent
skimming oil that had escaped during the night. It is likely that the overall
efficiency of this operation could have been improved if the skimming vessel
did not have to spend a significant portion of time hunting for oil "ropes",
i. e. , some improved system of "spotting" would have increased the
effectiveness.
The centrifugal pumps tended to emulsify the oil during each transfer
operation and severe problems often were encountered offloading the oil to
receiving trucks after the oil had been transferred between tanks at sea.
A water-in-oil emulsion was formed with the approximate consistency of
light grease after two transfer operations with centrifugal pumps. Chemical
demulsifiers were occasionally necessary to achieve transfer.
Another skimming device, "Sea Sweep", was constructed for use at
sea (Figure 6. 8). This "Sea Sweep" consisted of two 800 foot sections of
20-inch diameter steel pipe joined at one end in the form of a "V" with an
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6-16
FIGURE 6. 7. Inflatable Plastic Boom (courtesy
of Santa Barbara News Press)
FIGURE 6. 8. "Sea Sweep" Being Readied for Deployment
(courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)
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6-17
opening of between 500-800 feet. Motive power was supplied by tugs. A
recovery boat equipped with six pumping stations was to travel at the
apex of the "V" and transfer oil to storage barges nearby (capacity,
12, 000 barrels). The device encountered severe mechanical problems
almost immediately, and the length of the pipe sections was subsequently
reduced. Because of its inability to cope with rough seas, operations were
(28)
terminated in mid-February after one day of operation.
Other schemes considered, but not attempted, included: (1) a large,
open bottom barge (140, 000 barrel capacity) to be moored over the boil on
the surface and the oil was to be pumped aboard and decanted on the scene,
(2) 5, 000 feet of gill net offered by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries to
(2 9)
drag through the water to collect oil-soaked straw, and (3) commercial
kelp harvesters, also to be used for the recovery of oil-soaked straw.
6.3 DEFENSE OF HARBORS
6.3.1 Physical Barriers
Most of the ports and harbors along the Santa Barbara coast were
protected with booms strung across the entrances. The booms proved
effective in relatively calm seas if the oil was continuously removed as it
accumulated. A commercial inflatable boom (Figure 6.7) with a
relatively deep skirt was used at Channel Islands Harbor and at Santa
Barbara Harbor. Defensive booms prevented oil penetration of the major
harbors on several occasions during the month of February. Santa Barbara
was the only major harbor penetrated by large amounts of oil, although
lesser amounts did enter Ventura Harbor.
Harbors and sloughs protected with floating booms were:
Santa Barbara
a) 2, 000 feet of log boom extending south from end of Steam's Wharf
b) 500 feet of commercial inflatable boom, plus 1800 feet of cork
(31)
boom
c) Commercial boom with small skirt
d) Air curtain barrier.
(30)
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6-18
Ventura Marina
Log boom (3 rows)
Channel Islands
Commercial inflatable boom
Port Hueneme
Two log booms supplemented with straw between
Point Mugu
a) 2, 000 feet of log boom (a second timber boom was subsequently
added)
b) 2, 000 feet of plastic commercial boom
Avalon
2, 000 feet of log boom (not deployed because oil never reached
this harbor)
Sandy land
Unconfined straw boom (placed behind artificial berm)
Devereux Slough, Golita Slough, Mandolay Power Plant
Plastic boom
Many operational problems occurred during placement and use of these
defensive booms. Floating booms or their moorings failed at Santa
Barbara Harbor (inflatable boom), Ventura Harbor (log boom), Point Mugu
(loy boom), and Sandyland (straw boom). The log booms seemed particu-
larly susceptible to structural failure of attachment cables, generally
because of rough seas or heavy storm runoff. Large accumulations of
kelp reportedly exerted great pressure against the inflatable boom across
the entrance to the Santa Barbara Harbor. Four ships were required to
maintain position of a 2, 000 foot log boom extending south from the end of
Steam's Wharf. Rerigging or readjustment was necessary at
Point Mugu and Ventura. On one occasion the boom got out of adjustment
(32)
at Ventura and permitted some oil to enter the harbor. Heavy seas
broke the Ventura Harbor boom on another occasion and again permitted
entry of a small quantity of oil.
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6-19
Constant removal of oil accumulating behind log booms was necessary
to prevent its passage. Generally straw was used to facilitate recovery
of the accumulated oil (Figure 6.9). In areas that employed a multiple
boom system, such as Port Hueneme and Point Mugu, straw was spread
between the strings of logs. Labor forces were on standby to remove oil
accumulation behind the booms if there was any possibility of an oil slick
entering the area. The necessity of maintaining standby personnel
(~ $7/hour per man) greatly increased the cost of defensive booming.
The defense of harbor entrances and features within the harbor can
require different types of booms. No boom or system employed was
completely successful for all of the required protective functions, even in
calm water. The protection of rip-rapped or rocky areas such as within
the Santa Barbara Harbor was best accomplished by either an unskirted
boom or one with a flexible skirt. Rigid skirts extending below the water
would be obstructed by underwater objects or often drift too close to the
rocks, causing tipping on a falling tide.
Another problem existed on sandy beaches. Most booms observed
could not accommodate the effect of tidal flow undercutting the sand at the
point where the boom entered the water, thus creating an opening through
which the oil could pass under the boom (Figure 6.10). Rigid-skirted
booms or those strung tightly could not fill the passage created.
Large quantities of oil entered Santa Barbara Harbor on the night of
4 February. The boom across the entrance originally consisted of a
500-foot section of skirted inflatable boom (Figure 6. 7) and an 1800-foot
section of an unskirted cork boom stretched between the sandspit and the
shore at the foot of Steam's Wharf. Oil passed under the unskirted portion
as it accumulated behind the boom. (33) A mooring line subsequently parted
and the shore end of the boom was repositioned nearer the harbor jetty.
The inflatable boom was punctured during the operations and permitted
oil to come over that portion. The thickness of the accumulated oil
behind the boom was estimated to be up to eight inches.
-------
6-20
FIGURE 6.9. Straw Being Used Behind Log Boom for Oil Absorption
(courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)
FIGURE 6.10. Semiflexible Boom at Shore Line
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6-21
6.3.2 Air Curtain Barrier
An underwater bubble or air curtain barrier was installed between the
jetty and sandspit at the entrance to the Santa Barbara Harbor (Figure 6.11).
The first unit installed was about 500 feet long and was fabricated from one
inch diameter aluminum pipe with perforations in the top. Emplacement
was near the channel bottom. A portable trailer-mounted air compressor
supplied air at nominally 100 psi.
The underwater bubble barrier caused an upwelling flow of water that
resulted in a surface current in both directions away from the point of
emergence on the surface. The net current effectively prevents passage of
oil provided that surface currents are not excessive and that debris does
not accumulate to be forced through by the wind. An advantage of this
boom is that it permits unimpeded ship traffic. It is also relatively immune
to damage by wind and waves.
The air barriers employed were in the development stage at the time of
the incident and, therefore, emergency units were not available. The first
unit, installed in mid-February, encountered many operational problems
including compressor failure, filling of the pipe with sand and water during
shutdown, a change of head due to irregular bottom contour resulting in
insufficient air along portions of the barrier, inadequate upwelling in
shallow water, momentary loss of effectiveness during the passage of
(35)
ships, and passage of accumulated debris through the barrier.
The barrier was normally shut down during ebb tide to permit the out-
flow of oil that had accumulated in the harbor.
A second air curtain proved much more effective, although a supple-
mental floating boom was still required in the shallow water near the sand-
spit where inadequate upwelling occurred (Figure 6.12). The pipe size was
increased to a diameter of two inches and the underwater line was mounted
about 15 feet below the water surface to obtain uniform air distribution.
Two compressors were used: 600 scfm on the jetty side, and 250 scfm
on the sandspit end. Check valves or flaps were reportedly installed over
-------
6-22
.
FIGURE 6.11. Air Curtain Barrier in Operation - Santa
Barbara Harbor
FIGURE 6.12. Area of Low Upwelling with Air Curtain Barrier
-------
6-23
the air distribution orifices to prevent the pipe from filling with water and
sand when the unit was shut down. The original unit was left in place to
/o c)
trap the oil that was carried past the barrier during passage of ships.
The installation cost of air barriers is estimated to be about $4-$5/foot,
exclusive of the compressor, the latter at about $20, 000 for a 600 SCFM
(37)
unit. Typical cost of rental units is about $1.25/SCFM/month. The
estimated cost of operating a unit that is periodically turned on and off
such as was done at Santa Barbara (including maintenance and surveillance)
is $3-$4/SCFM/month.
6.3.3 Other
The chemical dispersant "Polycomplex A-ll" was applied inside the
entrance to Santa Barbara Harbor to reduce fire hazard by dispersing oil.
This particular dispersant was reportedly chosen because it was known to
have a flashpoint in excess of 300 ° F. Application was limited to one or
two days following penetration of oil into the harbor.
6.4 DEFENSE OF BEACHES
6.4.1 Artificial Berms
Artificial berms erected in several locations were constructed of
either beach sand or soil. Areas protected by berms included a residential
(38)
development on the Ventura waterfront, the upper end of the beach
(39)
lagoon adjacent to the bird sanctuary of East Beach, and the upper end of
Mandolay beach. A weir was constructed at Sandyland cove and a dike was
erected along a portion of Edgecliff Lane. The artificial berms were
effective, but some subsequently had to be broken and rebuilt to permit
draining of water accumulated by storm runoff.
Selected waterfront features such as bulkheads at the "Castle" at
Sandyland were protected with plywood and sheets of plastic. Bulkheads
can be protected with plywood and/or plastic for approximately $3-$5/foot in
areas that do not have excessive wave action.
6.4.2 Sorbents
Straw was the principal sorbent material applied on the beaches. It
was applied both from vehicles on the beach and ships operating parallel
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6-24
to the beaches a few hundred yards from shore. Several hundred tons were
applied by these ships in the near-shore waters using mulchers (blowers)
developed for highway applications. Vehicles equipped with similar
mulchers spread the straw in the intertidal zone both before and after
deposition of oil. A considerable amount of straw was also applied by hand.
Limited amounts of "Ekoperl, " a proprietary product, and talc were
tried but their use was discontinued due to cost and the difficulty in subse-
quent pickup. Additional discussions on the use of straw are given in
Section 10. 0.
APPENDED INFORMATION FROM UNION OIL COMPANY
OF CALIFORNIA*41)
Qualitative Evaluation of Corexit 7664 and Polycomplex A-11 Dispersion
of G rude Oil on Sea Water
A qualitative test of Corexit 7664 and Polycomplex A-11 to disperse
crude oil floating on sea water was conducted on February 9, 1969 near
Platform A in the channel at Santa Barbara. The tests were observed by
Dr. P. J. Kinney and Dr. Don Button of the University of Alaska and
Ken Becker of Enjay Chemical Company.
The dispersants were sprayed on a floating crude oil slick with dilution
water from a moving boat. Following were observed:
1. There appears to be no significant difference in the dispersion ability
of Corexit and Polycomplex when Polycomplex is applied to approxi-
mately one-half the dosage rate of Corexit.
2. When either Corexit or Polycomplex was sprayed on a black crude slick
and not mixed by the wake of a moving boat, very little dispersion of the
floating crude occurred at the point of spray entry into the floating crude.
There appeared to be a sharp reduction in surface tension. The floating
crude oil pulled away from the point leaving a brownish wrinkled floating
layer of thicker crude surrounding green water. Microscopic inspection
of the brownish layer revealed water in oil emulsion.
3. When either Corexit or Polycomplex was sprayed on a black crude slick
and mixed by the wake of the boat moving at 10 knots/hour, there
appeared to be good dispersion along the boat's path for a width of 150 ft.
-------
6-25
Green water was evident in the wake with small patches of black crude
spreading out into iridescent and gray films. The boat path remained
open in the slick. After one hour, a bucket sample of sea water from
the opened path contained many 0. 010 inch diameter and smaller
spherical particles of black oil. Some of the larger particles of black
oil floated to the surface in the bucket and broke into an iridescent film.
Many of the smaller particles failed to rise to the surface of the sample
after one hour of settling.
4. When the boat was run through the slick at 10 knots/hour with no appli-
cation of dispersants, the slick was dispersed along the boat's path very
similar to the runs with dispersants. The boat path remained open in
the slick. The bucket sample of sea water from the open path appeared
similar to those obtained in the dispersant runs. There were possibly a
few more larger spheres of oil that settled to the surface and decayed
into an iridescent film.
5. It was concluded that the dispersants tested were not significantly better
than the mechanical mixing energy supplied by a boat's propellers when
attempting to break up an oil slick in open sea.
Discussion
The tests were conducted utilizing the supply ship Pike I which is a flat
bottom vessel of 130 ft length, 30 ft beam and twin screw with 1300 h. p.
All running tests were conducted at 10 knots/hour at an estimated 70% power
setting.
The dispersants were applied by pumping 200 barrels/hour of sea water
through a 1-1/2 in. pipe by 20 ft long nozzle spray boom mounted forward
and two 1-1/2 in. fire nozzles mounted aft. The spray system gave a net
30 ft wide spray application on either side of the vessel. The dispersants
were added into the suction of the sea water pump at the following rates:
Barrels/hour (55 gal/bbl)
Corexit 7664 2-1/2
Polycomplex A-11 1
-------
6-26
A black crude oil slick of approximately 200 feet width and 2 mile plus
length was utilized for the tests. Thickness of the oil in the slick was
estimated to be approximately 1/16 inch thick at the center. The boat cut
across the width of the slick during the test runs. Winds were slight at
less than three knots/hour from 310 degree compass bearing. Ocean swells
were slight (one foot) with no wind ripples.
Polycomplex A-11 Versus Corexit
These tests were conducted in standard glass sampling jugs with screw
metal tops and graduation tapes from top to bottom.
Test I
Water - 7500 cm3
o
Oil - 1800 cm (twenty gravity)
o
Polycomplex A-11 - 125 cm , added to surface of oil. Jug was inverted
with vigorous action six times.
Perfect complexing occurred. Breaking time - 1 hour. The separation
was not complete. The salt water was still heavily clouded and instead of
3 3
the original 1800 cm of oil, we now had a measurement of 2400 cm of
same color density. Test discontinued at one hour.
Note
The manufacturer states that "for complete dispersion you must have at
least 50 times as much water as oil". In this test we had only four times
plus as much water.
Test II
o
Corexit 7664 - 125 cm added in a duplicate situation to Test I. Also,
six vigorous inversions of the jug were made.
Breaking time - 1-1/2 minutes. The separation was complete.
Another 25 cm3 of Corexit 7664 was added, and again six inversions of
the jug. Breaking time - 6 minutes. Break was complete, with a total of
q
200 cm of Corexit 7664 used. Test discontinued.
-------
6-27
Conclusions
Polycomplex A-11 complexed this crude sample completely, and proved
vastly superior to Enjay Corexit 7664.
Dispersant Evaluation
Material: ARA Gold Crew Bilge Cleaner
ARA Chem. Inc.
808 Gable Way, El Cajon, California
Summary
ARA Gold Crew Bilge Cleaner has the ability to disperse the type of oil
being lost at Platform A in concentrations as low as four gallons of chemical
per barrel of oil, provided the oil is relatively nonweathered and the chemi-
cal is applied with a great deal of agitation. Chemical concentrations
approaching seven to ten gallons per barrel of oil added with violent agita-
tion, followed by further agitation such as boat wakes gave rapid visible
results. It is infeasible and economically unsound to attempt to disperse the
oil once it has lost its light fractions through weathering and is approaching
the consistency of a heavy gas oil or light residuum. It is felt that ARA Gold
Crew would work excellent in quite low concentrations on light oil spills or
iridescent slicks within harbor confines. Its toxicity to marine life is
currently being checked by means of bioassays.
Discussion
Sunday, March 2, 1969, I accompanied Mr. W. L. Tinker, representa-
tive of ARA Gold Crew aboard the M. V. "Coast Tide" for an evaluation
of the effectiveness of this chemical to permanently disperse the oil slick
from Platform A. The system employed for applying the dispersant con-
sisted of a sump pump taking sea water suction, and a second pump taking
suction on barrels of the chemical, admixing it with the sea water and dis-
charging the mix through two fire hoses equipped with 90 gpm nozzles at a
pressure of 85 psi. The hoses were affixed on each side of the vessel just
forward of mid-ship. Application was made by directing the nozzles straight
down from the hull then whipping the nozzles, adjusted for a nearly straight
-------
6-28
stream of water, through an arc of 10 to 15 degrees perpendicular to the
side of the hull. This resulted in a violent agitation of the water surface
from a distance of about six to ten feet. The strength of the stream alone
was sufficient to break up the continuity of the oil slick.
Additional agitation of the oil-chemical mix was provided by work boats
plying at fairly high speeds across and through the sudsy wake left by the
chemical. The suds resulting from application of the chemical are in them-
selves of little value. Little, if any, chemical action was noted in the foam
line. For inner harbor work esthetics would be better served if no suds were
produced. ARA Gold Crew in comparison to other dispersants noted, pri-
marily the Grain OD-2, could be rated as a low sudser.
The chemical as it works, first turns the oil to a dark brownish color.
This effect was particularly notable as the work boats plowed through our
wake. The black oil from their bow could be seen turning brown as the
chemical-oil mix became agitated together. It is apparent that dispersion,
regardless of chemical concentration, is slow and inadequate unless proper
agitation is provided. The volume of oil on the surface at the time the test
was made and the combined boat and wave action made it essentially impos-
sible to retrace our path and determine if a clear swath had been established.
Even so, I was convinced the product was doing a good job of dispersing the
oil.
Some rather crude hand tests were made using one quart Mason jars to
further determine the chemical's effectiveness. By sampling the oil and the
chemical mixture being applied, hand mixes were prepared and agitated by
shaking. At concentrations of approximately four gallons of chemical per
barrel of oil, it was noted that shaking did disperse the oil and that no oil
clung to the sides of the jar. Upon standing, the oil re-agglomerated at the
surface, but had lost its stickiness. Slight agitation, similar to wave action,
would again disperse the oil throughout the jar. Results at such low concen-
trations would be slow, but with continued wave action would probably be
effective.
Where lesser amounts of chemical were tried, some dispersion took
place, but the oil came back together on standing and would not again
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6-29
disperse on shaking. My rather rapid conclusion would be that a concen-
tration in the area of ten gallons of chemical per barrel of oil would be the
most economical and yet effective application of the ARA Gold Crew.
Later tests on heavily weathered oil proved completely ineffective.
Chemical was applied essentially full strength with the result that some
iridescent film was released, which could only result in the oil becoming
even more sticky and tarry. It is my opinion that the use of dispersants on
weathered oil is a waste of money.
It would be most interesting to apply ARA Gold Crew to an inner harbor
light slick and note the results. I can visualize for such work application
by a Hudson type sprayer from a skiff, since the degree of agitation could
probably be much less and the production of suds is undesirable.
Bioassays are being run on the material by the Nuss Corporation to
determine its toxicity to marine life.
Chemical Testing
Vessel: M. V. Pike I
Equipment: Side beam sprayers, one out each side. Booms about 15 ft
long with three spray heads on each boom; using vessel's
pumps on sea suction to supply water at about 30-32 Ib pres-
sure. Engineer unable to estimate pumping rate. The chemi-
cal was being added, using a small portable barrel pump.
Chemical was being added at the rate 1 bbl/40 min. Would
estimate this to be a ratio of water to chemical of about
40/1 to 50/1.
This type of spraying provides none of the agitation of the water
surface required to mix the chemical with the oil. Chemical
solution appeared to ride on top of surface. This method
appears to be very unsatisfactory except in possibly very
choppy water or unless a very high concentration of chemical
is used. About 3-4 parts of oil to one-part chemical. No
information was available as to the manufacturer's recommended
concentration or method of application.
Dosage:
Comments:
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6-30
Chemicals Tested
1. Poly com plex A-ll. They were just finishing the last couple of
barrels when I arrived. Took two samples: (1) Sample immediately after
spraying. (2) Sample after second application.
On both of these samples, the oil would break down into small particles
on agitation. However, as soon as agitation was stopped, the oil would
quickly rise to the surface in a thick, sticky film.
2. Crane Industrial Product OD-2 Biodegradable Oil Slick Disperser.
Sample of the sprayed oil differed little from the samples sprayed with the
Polycomplex A-ll. However, when adding the undiluted chemical to a
sample of oil using one part chemical to about 3-4 part oil, the oil immedi-
ately broke down into a very light emulsion. This emulsion was not sticky
and showed no visible change after setting for two days.
On March 5, 1968 received information on manufacturer's recommended
concentration and, application. On light and moderate spills on water, the
manufacturer recommends using one part chemical to 3 parts water sprayed
over the oil slick. Then after about 30 minutes, slick should be agitated to
disperse the oil. On heavy oil slicks, undiluted chemical should be sprayed
directly onto the spill at a ratio of one part chemical to six parts oil. Used
under these conditions, I believe that this material would do a good job of
dispersing an oil slick.
Feasibility Tests on Removing Or Controlling Free Oil from the Surface
of Water by the use of Scott Industrial Foams^
On Saturday, February 22, 1969, a series of tests were conducted by
Mr. Ron St. Pierre, Mr. Skip St. Pierre, and Mr. Pat Zaremba of Wilshire
Foam Products, to determine the feasibility of using Scott Industrial Foam
to remove or control free oil contamination from the surface of the ocean.
The tests were witnessed by Mr. Ross Wright and Mr. Sam Taber and
several other members of the Union Oil Company. The testing was per-
formed from the deck of a boat provided by Union Oil Company about eight
miles offshore of Santa Barbara, California.
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6-31
The first tests were run to determine how much oil would be absorbed
by foam as it floated freely on the surface of the ocean. The foam used for
these tests was 24 x 36 x 4 inch samples of Scott Industrial Foam 10 PPI,
20 PPI, 30 PPI and 60 PPI.
The various foams were put over the side of the boat and directly into
an oil slick. They were allowed to remain in the oil for periods ranging
from 5 to 30 minutes. The foam was then removed from the oil and
examined to check oil absorption and penetration. The penetration was
determined by cutting into the center of the 4 inch slabs of foam and observ-
ing same. Penetration was approximately 1/2 to 3/4 inch in all cases. The
surface absorption was visually examined. After each test, an attempt was
made to squeeze out the oil that had been absorbed by the foam.
Upon our examination of this first test, it was decided that the 20 PPI
foam worked best, however, it did not absorb enough oil to make its use for
large oil spillage applications practical. Both Mr. Wright and Mr. Taber
of Union Oil Company agreed with our conclusion with this phase of the
testing.
The second test was run on a 24 x 36 x 4 inch piece of 10 PPI foam.
Weights were attached along one of the 36 inch dimensions and a buoyant
material was attached along the other 36 inch dimension of the material.
The foam was then suspended over the side of the boat from a long pole and
emersed in the water so that approximately 12 inches protruded above the
water. Lines were attached to the foam so that it could be held in an
upright position while suspended at a right angle to the side of the boat.
The boat then proceeded at a slow speed, (approximately 2 or 3 knots)
through the oil slick. As the foam was moved through the water, it was
observed that the water was passing fraply through the foam while the oil
remained on the upstream surface of the foam. The foam was then removed
and examined. A large quantity of oil was found on the upstream side of
the foam, while no oil was found on the downstream side of the foam. This
test indicated to us that the 10 PPI foam could be efficiently used in the
control, or pick-up of oil from the surface of water.
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6-32
The foam could be used to prevent oil from moving from one place to
another, or to move the oil from one place to another, or to actually pick up
small quantities of oil from the surface of the water. Mr. Ross Wright of
Union Oil observed this portion of the testing and agreed with our conclusions.
However, he stated that Union Oil was interested only in a finished product
that was ready for use. They were not in a position to do research work
with the media only.
In summary, we believe the absorption tests were not, in our opinion,
practical. However, the boom type tests employing the 10 PPI were quite
successful. We believe it is for Wilshire to interest an outside company in
pursuing the above use of the 10 PPI on a commercial basis. There are
several such companies on the West Coast that we will be contacting regard-
ing this matter.
Throughout the entire testing program, we had the complete cooperation
and assistance of the people from Union Oil Company.
United Sierra Talc Test
Tuesday, March 11 0530-1830 5 hours
Left L. B. at 0530 for S. B. to set up Talc test. At 1030 accompanied by
Dan Dunlap on "Winn" proceeded to Platform A. Found some streaks of
fairly heavy new oil. Sprayed United Sierra Talc on these streaks using
regulation foamite generator and ship's salt water fire system. System pres-
sure was 50 psi and we used a 1-1/2 inch orifice nozzle. Talc could be
sprayed in a fairly even spread about 10-12 feet wide. Put out 10 sacks in
approximately 25 min covering an estimated 1/4 mile circle. Then
observed carefully by travelling periphery. Talc definitely does not sink
the oil. It will combine to a small degree forming small curds which still
float. It would take forever to clearup any degree at all of slick using this
material. At 1 p.m. abandoned the test and skimmed until 3:45 p.m. when
rough water caused us to quit. Arrived Stearns wharf at 5:30 p. m.
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6-33
SECTION 6.0 REFERENCES
1. Oil and Gas Journal, March 17, 1969, p. 49.
2. Wiegel, "Oceanographical Engineering, " Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood
Cliffs, N.Y., 1964.
3. Coast Guard On-Scene Commander's Report.
4. Ibid
5. Union Oil Company Daily Report, 3 March, 1969.
6. Union Oil Company Daily Report, 9 March 1969.
7. Santa Barbara News Press, 7 February, 1969.
8. Coast Guard Situation Report No. 4, 30 January, 1969.
9. Union Oil Company Daily Report, 22 February, 1969.
10. Ibid, 11 March, 1969.
11. Union Oil Company Daily Report, 26 February, 1969.
12. Ibid, 12 February, 1969.
13. Coast Guard Situation Report, No. 15, 1 February, 1969.
14. Letter from R. J. Kaneen, California Department of Fish and Game,
to Coast Guard On-Scene-Commander, 15 May, 1969.
15. Personal Communication with Thomas H. Gaines of Union Oil Company.
16. Enjay Magazine, Fall 1968 Issue.
17. Personal Communication with Thomas H. Gaines, Union Oil Company.
18. Coast Guard Situation Report No. 10, 31 January, 1969.
19. Personal Communication with Thomas H. Gaines, Union Oil Company.
20. Ibid
21. A Statement to the United States Senate Committee on Public Works,
by Kenneth E. Biglane of the FWPCA, 25 February, 1969.
22. Letter from W. H. McNeeley of Ara Chem, Inc. to FWPCA,
25 March, 1969.
23. Chemical and Engineering News, 17 March, 1969, p. 40.
24. "Offshore Oil Well Blowout, Union Oil Company Well, " Harbormaster
of Santa Barbara Report, 22 April, 1969.
25. Union Oil Company Daily Report, 1 March, 1969.
26. Personal Communication, Capt. Tatro, MV WINN.
27. Union Oil Company Daily Report, 7 March, 1969.
28. Santa Barbara News Press, 17 February, 1969.
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6-34
29. Summary of Coast Guard Situation Reports, 4 February, 1969.
30. Coast Guard On-Scene - Commander's Report.
31. "Offshore Oil Well Blowout, Union Oil Company Well, " Harbormaster
of Santa Barbara Report, 22 April, 1969.
32. Union Oil Company Daily Report, 12 February, 1969.
33. Personal Communication, Santa Barbara Harbormaster.
34. Ibid
35. Union Oil Company Daily Report, 23 February, 1969.
36. Personal Communication, R. S. Crog, Union Oil Company.
37. Personal Communication, E. K. Thompson, Crosby and Overton.
38. Santa Barbara News Press, 8 February, 1969.
39. Union Oil Company Daily Report, 17 February, 1969.
40. Personal Communication, George P. Metson, General Marine
Transport of Santa Barbara Inc. June 26, 1969.
41. T. H. Gaines. "Notes on Pollution Control Santa Barbara. "
Appendix III, undated.
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7-1
7.0 SURVEILLANCE
7. 1 VISUAL OBSERVATION
Surveillance of the progressive development and movement of the
oil slicks on the ocean was undertaken by both surface and airborne methods.
Surface observation utilized Coast Guard patrol craft and work boats to
report general slick behavior and relative thickness. There was no signi-
ficant amount of mapping carried out from the surface craft, but a consid-
erable effort in mapping the movement; and extent of the oil was made by
both visual and photographic techniques from aircraft.
Frequent flights were made in USCG and USFWS aircraft by contin-
gency team observers who plotted the position of the slicks on blank charts
of the Santa Barbara Channel. Such mapping was semiquantitative in that
distances, slick width and relative thickness were estimated by eye. Also,
the area covered by the many slicks and the large number of "stringers"
emanating from primary and secondary slicks resulted in a very complex
pattern that would be difficult to map in its entirety solely from visual
observation. Attention, therefore, was focused on mapping the primary
oil patches as these were determinable from the continuity of connection
with surface leakage at Platform A and from color contrast, i.e. , the
darkest color was indicative of a relatively thick oil film. The proximity
of oil to beaches and kelp beds also was observed and plotted so that con-
trol or clean-up operations could be scheduled and instigated as appropriate.
Visual and photographic mapping could not be effectively pursued during
hours of darkness, since no significant amount of the slick was discernible
even with moonlight illumination.
In one instance, a USGS mobile radar-tracking station (M-33 unit)
located on a hill overlooking the area used an X-Y plotter to track a low
flying USGS plane as it visually traced along the path of the major slick.
Although the accuracy of the observation was good, the method was fairly
well restricted to determining the boundaries of the major slicks.
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7-2
Oil location diagrams (constructed primarily from visual observa-
tions) were prepared daily by the U.S. Coast Guard showing the chronolo-
gical development and movement of the slicks. An example of such diagrams
is shown in Figure 8.7.
7.2 PHOTOGRAPHIC
Varying results were obtained using aerial photography to detect and
map the oil slicks. Generally, as with most photographic techniques, fac-
tors such as film sensitivity, lighting, altitude and haze were responsible
for the varied results. The later vast area of oil spread made it difficult
to obtain good real-time photographic coverage due to both the long flight
periods involved and to changes in lighting and visibility over the large area
encompassed. Thus, the assemblage and interpretation of photomosaics
would be an arduous task.
The Apollo-9 astronauts, in-flight at the time of the oil spill incident,
were requested to attempt to photograph the area. It is understood that at
least one photograph showing essentially the entire oil slick coverage was
successfully obtained.
7.2.1 Infrared Sensitive Film
Several organizations (U. S. Geological Survey, Air Force) made
infrared photographic flights over the oil slicks. Colored infrared (false
color) film was fairly efficient in detecting the slicks and the oil-water
interface at low (5000-10,000 feet) altitudes. Vegetation (e.g. , kelp) also
showed good contrast, as expected, on infrared color plates. Oblique photo-
graphs were taken on some of the high altitude flights to obtain maximum
reflection from the oil slicks; in some instances this enhanced the contrast
of the oil-covered surface; in other instances sunlight reflected from the
water surface made it difficult to define the oil slicks.
Photographs taken from a plane showed good definition of oil inter-
mingled with kelp (Figure 7.1). Good contrast in this case was obtained
using Infrared Ektachrome Film with either the K-2 (yellow) or 25A (red)
filter.(2)
-------
7-3
FIGURE 7. 1. Infrared Ektachrome - Contrast of Oil and Kelp
-------
7-4
Flights also were made using "Camouflage Detection" film which
gives a black and white image with high sensitivity in the near infrared
region. With some exceptions, the series of sequential photos which made
up the film strips did not reveal the definitive oil-water interface that could
be discerned by other than a highly-competent film interpreter.
7.2.2 Panchromatic and Color Film
Panchromatic (black and white) photographic results, in general,
were much like those obtained using the Camouflage Detection film. That is,
in some cases quite good definition of the oil slicks was evident; however,
usually the results were similar to those in Figure 7.2 in which there is
poor contrast even in the vicinity of the platform.
Conventional color film exposures, obtained by the U.S. Geological
Survey and the Naval Air Station at Point Mugu, generally showed good
contrast when taken at low altitudes. The latter organization reported good
oil-water contrast on the Ektachrome (color) movie film made from a low-
flying helicopter. Still color photos taken from the shoreline showed the oil
slick partially, and improved definition was obtained on near-flat views.
High-altitude color photographs were in most all instances ineffective in
defining the oil slicks due primarily to haze interference.
7.3 REMOTE SENSORS
Several types of passive, remote sensing systems were evaluated to
determine their effectiveness in detecting the oil slicks and in defining both
the chemical and physical characteristics of the slicks. Systems used by
the governmental agencies and private organizations known to have partici-
pated employed infrared, ultraviolet, multiband video and microwave
detectors. All of the instruments were mounted in aircraft with one excep-
tion: a trailer with boom-mounted microwave radiometers (Aerojet General
Corp.) was used along the Rincon Causeway to obtain spectral response data
on nearshore oil slicks and deposits.
-------
I
01
FIGURE 7.2. Aerial Photography Panchromatic Film - K-2 Filter
-------
7-6
The considerable amount of remote sensing studies undertaken was
concurred in by recommendations of the OST Special (Dubridge) Panel,
to-wit, ".. .Advanced techniques such as infrared, which will eventually be
capable of estimating thickness, state of oxidation and physical factors of
(3)
the oil slick should be employed.
7.3.1 Infrared and Ultraviolet Scanning
Airborne infrared scanning and recording equipment was used by the
USGS, University of Michigan and North American Rockwell to determine
response characteristics in the near (0.8-l.Ou) and thermal (8-14|j) infrared
regions. Generally, similar responses and results were noted by these
observers. The infrared (IR) flights were made at fairly low altitudes
(2000- 10, 000 feet) and under varying weather and lighting conditions. Good
contrast between oil slick and water was obtained during clear weather
(night or day) in the thermal (8-14u) region. Very little contrast was noted
in the near IR region. As expected, IR results showed decreasing contrast
(4)
and definition as the weather varied from haze to total overcast. That
thermal IR sensing methods are capable of detecting oil slicks under clear,
nighttime conditions is clearly evident from Figure 7.3.
Thin oil films near the edge of the primary (thick) slick emanating
from the platform area showed the highest oil-water contrast in the thermal
region. In this case the oil slick appeared colder than the adjacent water
surface (cold shows as dark exposure on the scanner film). The relatively
thick oil layer near the platform showed much less contrast in the thermal
region, and its response was about the same or perhaps slightly warmer
than the water surface temperature. Reasons for the different responses
have yet to be resolved; however, several possible causative factors concern:
surface characteristics (roughness) of the oil film, changes in chemical
composition of the oil with aging which might result in spectral character-
istic changes, and heat transfer phenomena associated with film thickness,
evaporation rates and/or composition. Laboratory measurements and
analyses are presently being undertaken to better define the quantitative
information obtainable from remote sensed data collected on the flyovers.
-------
- I
I
- I
FIGURE 7.3. Nighttime Image (8-13U band) of Platform A and Oil Seepage. Flown 27 March.
1969 (Courtesy of North American Rockwell)
-------
7-8
Some ground truth measurements were taken in conjunction with a North
American Rockwell flight on 24 March. A small patch of Platform A
crude oil on the water surface was sequentially scanned and surface obser-
vations were made of slick size, thickness, oil and water temperatures as
the aircraft collected data on the expanding slick. Hopefully, these results
will be quantitatively correlatable with much of the imagery collected over
the channel oil spill.
Information collected by the USGS and with the multi-spectral instru-
mentation of the University of Michigan indicated that the greatest oil-water
contrast was in the thermal infrared and ultraviolet (0.32-0. 38^ regions.
Wavelengths between these regions showed much less differentiation of the
oil and water. Figures 7.4 through 7. 6 show typical responses of the oil,
kelp and water in the various spectral regions (photos courtesy of Infrared
and Optics Laboratory, Institute of Science and Technology, the University
/£j\
of Michigan). Figure 7.2 is a panchromatic photograph, taken in the
early morning, which shows Platform A and a boat spreading chemicals to
disperse the oil. Very little indication of the slick is evident. Figure 7.4
shows the two regions of the spectrum where good contrast exists between
the oil and water. The ultraviolet image shows the entire slick to best advan-
tage, while the thermal infrared image shows selected portions of the slick
(edges?) which are at a lower apparent temperature. Differences in the
width of the imagery are due to the use of part of the scanning angle capa-
city for viewing an IR reference source.
Figures 7.5 and 7.6 show how oil and kelp areas can be differentiated
spectrally. The response for oil shows high reflectance in the ultraviolet
and no reflectance in the near infrared, while kelp shows absorption in the
ic\
ultraviolet region but high reflectance in the near infrared. One would
expect kelp partly contaminated with oil to show a significant reflectance-
absorption contrast in the UV region; unfortunately, ground truth informa-
tion was not available for correlation with data collected on this sensing
flight. As a matter of interest, the apparent "path" of uniform width just
inside and parallel to the seaward edge of the kelp bed in Figure 7. 6 is the
-------
Ultraviolet - .32 to .
-1
i
CD
Infrared - 8.0 to 13.5//
FIGURE 7:4. Remote Sensing Imagery
Ultraviolet 0. 32 to 0. 38
Infrared 8.0 to 13.5
-------
Infrared - 0.8 to l.O/i
- I
—•
o
vB^
Ultraviolet - .32 to .
FIGURE 7.5. Remote Sensing Imagery
Ultraviolet 0.32 to 0.38 u
Infrared 0.8 to 1. 0
-------
Infrared - 0.8 to 1.0/w
Ultraviolet - .32 to .38//
FIGURE 7.6. Remote Sensing Imagery - Kelp Beds
Infrared 0.8 to 1.0 n
Ultraviolet 0.32 to 0.38 ^
-------
7-12
swath removed by a kelp cutter. Also, dark streaks within the slick on the
UV display and light sections in the slick on the thermal IR display may be
indicative, in part, of an oil-dispersant mixture. Additional ground control
data and/or laboratory measurements will be required to determine response
characteristics of such mixtures before quantitative conclusions can be
drawn.
Thermal infrared imagery was successful in discriminating between
oil-coated and clean surficial kelp fronds. Figure 7. 7 shows oil-free kelp
as a light (warm) area; kelp containing oil is darker (cooler) than the sur-
face water. Oil slicks moving from the kelp toward the beach also show
good contrast (Figures 7.3 and 7.7 courtesy of Space Division of North
American Rockwell Corp.).
7.3.2 Other
Microwave radiometer flights were made by North American Rock-
well; the previously mentioned, near-shore microwave measurements were
made by Aerojet General Corporation; and microwave oil characteristic
measurements were conducted in the laboratory by Ryan Aeronautical
Company.
Airborne microwave radiometer (non-imaging) results showed con-
trasts exist between oil and water. The instrument in this case is sensitive
to long wavelength radiation (up to several centimeters), and thus responds
strongly to media characteristics which affect emissivity. The apparemt
temperature of the oil slick, as determined with a 19.35 GHz microwave
(4)
radiometer, was higher than that of the adjacent water surface. Near-
shore (Rincon Causeway) observations showed a similar response from
(7)
microwave radiometers operating at frequencies of 13.4 and 37 GHz.
Additional results from these nearshore studies are still being evaluated as
are those laboratory measurements and correlations on oil thickness, dielec-
tric constants and age characteristics made by the Ryan Aeronautical
^ (8)
Company.
-------
<
-1
i •
•-•
FIGURE 7.7. Thermal Infrared (8-13^ Image Illustrating the Contrasting Hot Returns of
Surficial Fronding Kelp and the Colder Streaks of Oil
-------
7-14
Personnel of the TRW Company, using an airborne spectrometer
(0.4-0.7u range), were able to discern changes in the percentage of light
reflectance and spectral curves as the oil film thinned and thickened.
North American Rockwell Corporation attempted remote detection
of the oil slick using a multiband video system consisting of four Panasonic
TV cameras to provide multiplexed information to a video tape recorder.
One camera was unfiltered; the remaining three were equipped as follows:
o o oo
4000 A ±100 A (violet interference filter), 7000 A ±100 A (near IR interfer-
ence filter), and Wratten 18A filter (UV band pass). The violet and UV
filtered cameras reportedly gave little useful information due to high attenu-
ation in the optics and vidicon in these spectral regions. The unfiltered
camera provided coverage but showed no unique or applicable discriminat-
ing ability. The near IR filtered unit showed surface fronding kelp dis-
tinctly with response contrasts similar to those noted in color IR film
(4)
exposures and 0.8-l.Ou scanning results.
Much potentially beneficial information was collected relative to the
oil slick by using both photographic and remote sensing techniques. Most of
this probably will be soon available in the form of reports and journal arti-
cles. Belatedly, the studies revealed several specific areas whereby the
usefulness of existing and future collected data would be enhanced insofar as
deriving optimum plans for combating an oil spill:
• Additional ground truth information is desirable for correlation with
photographic and remote sensor response. Included in this category
are oil film thickness, temperature and composition as functions of
time (aging) and location. Also, for future applications, the above
information should be determined for various typical crude oil
sources.
• Control data are needed on the spectral response of various oil-
dispersant mixtures as functions of chemicals and concentrations
used.
-------
7--15
TABLE 7.1. Organizations Participating in Photographic and Remote Sens-
ing Surveillance Operations
Organization
U.S. Air Force
U. S. Navy
U. S. Geological
Survey
U. S. Geological
Survey
University of Michigan
North American
Rockwell Corp.
Aerojet General Corp.
Ryan Aeronautical Co.
TRW Co.
Aerial Photography
Technique
Ektachrome IR Aerial Film
Ektachrome Aerial Film
Ektachrome Movie Film
Ektachrome IR Aerial Film
Ektachrome Aerial Film
Panchromatic Film
Remote Sensing
Ultraviolet Scanning
Thermal IR Scanning
Multispectral Scanner
Ultraviolet
Near IR
Thermal IR
Thermal IR Mapper
Microwave Radiometer
Multiband Video
Microwave Radiometers
(trailer and boom mounted)
Microwave Radiometer
(laboratory measurements)
Spectrometer, near IR
Remarks*
variable results
variable results
good contrast
poor contrast
good contrast
(low alt.)
good contrast
(low alt.)
good contrast
(low alt.)
fair contrast
(low alt.)
good contrast
poor contrast
good contrast
good contrast
good response
good contrast
(near IR)
good contrast
results not
known
good response
* Remarks refer to oil-water contrast unless otherwise noted.
-------
7-16
SECTION 7.0 REFERENCES
1. Personal Communication, Mr. H. B. Skibitzke, USGS, March 26,
1969.
2 Personal Communication, Mr. A. Caldwell, FWPCA Santa Barbara
Sub-off ice, May 7, 1969.
3 J C. Calhoun (chmn.), "Immediate Recommendations of the Oil
Spill Panel" (letter) to Dr. L. A. Dubridge, February 21, 1969,
p. 3.
4. Personal Communication, Mr. R. A. Fowler, North American
Rockwell Corp., April 2, 1969.
5 Memorandum of March 25, 1969, from Santa Barbara Sub-off ice
FWPCA (R. G. Wills to V. W. Tenney) "Ground Control for North
American Rockwell Flyover on 24 March, 1969.
6. Personal Communication, Mr. F. C. Polcyn, Infrared and Optics
Lab. , 1ST, the University of Michigan, April 22, 1969.
7. Personal Communication, Mr. D. T. Trexler, Aerojet General
Corporation, April 3, 1969.
8. Personal Communication, Mr. J. M. Kennedy, Ryan Aeronautical
Company, April 2, 1969.
9. Personal Communication, Mr. Peter White, TRW Company,
April 2, 1969.
-------
8-1
8.0 DISTRIBUTION AND BEHAVIOR OF OIL AT SEA
The nature of oil behavior at sea is important in predicting its movement
toward threatening resources, determining its character when it reaches a
beach, and in the design of equipment for its recovery at sea.
8. 1 SPREAD AND PATH OF OIL MOVEMENT - CHRONOLOGY
Chronological information on the gross spread and movement of the oil
slick was obtained largely from visual reconnaissance flights by a number
of observers. These flights were generally made daily (sometimes more
frequently) and were principally directed at obtaining operational information
of use in warning coastal communities of impending threats. As such, the
data tend to be qualitative.
Daily oil location diagrams have been prepared by the U. S. Coast
Guard On-Scene Commander based on the above observations. An
example diagram is shown in Figure 8. 7 near the time of maximum oil
spread.
Except under conditions of low wind velocity, the oil moved largely under
the influence of the prevailing winds. In the Santa Barbara Channel area, the
normally prevailing winds were west to northwest at Point Conception, west
to southwest at mid-Channel and east to northeast at Point Mugu--i. e., no
obvious wind vector during the period ventilated and hence tended to remove
oil from the Channel. Thus the storm commencing on 4 February and con-
tinuing through 7 February with winds shifting from the southeast clockwise
to the west, acted on the inventory of oil slick accumulated since the initial
release on 28 January.
A Weather Bureau meteorologist estimated that downwind oil slick drift
ranged from 1 0 to 20 percent at the surface wind velocity and stated
"... instances of skin layer shear were noted with surface oil moving
rapidly past nearly stationary free floating debris suspended less than half
/n \
an inch below the water surface. "
The above is in contrast with the experience in the TORREY CANYON
incident during which the oil movement rate averaged 3.3 to 3.4 percent of
(3)
the wind velocity.
-------
8-2
Much of the oil contaminated area observed in reconnaissance flights
was noted as "iridescent. " The quantity of oil required to create this
(4)
condition is on the order of 100-200 gallons per square mile. The
observation "black oil" probably represents concentrations greater than
2, 000 gallons per square mile.
Additional discussion on this matter is given in Section 4.3.
8.2 BREAKUP BEHAVIOR OF SLICK
Oil on the surface tended to form streaks often described as "windrows"
or "ropes" with irregular and unpredictable patterns. The formation and
variability of these are shown in Figures 8. 1, 8. 2, 8. 3, and 8. 4. This
pattern of oil behavior increased the difficulty of at-sea skimming or
treating with dispersants or straw.
8.3 CHANGES IN PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES
Oil released to the sea surface undergoes marked changes with time.
These changes include evaporation of the more volatile constituents, dis-
solution of water solubles, oxidation, and emulsification.
The following limited results were obtained on a simple atmospheric
ii (5)
pressure, distillation of a sample of "Platform A" crude :
Boiling Point ° C Volume % Distilled
206 2.5
232 5.0
282 10.0
322 15.0
345 18.0
(6)
Based on the above and work by the British Petroleum Co., Ltd.
it appears that evaporative losses at sea were less than 20 volume percent.
Observers noted the existence of water-in-oil emulsions ranging up to
(7)
50 percent water.
No other information was obtained on changes in physical properties.
-------
8-3
FIGURE 8.1. Oil Behavior Near Platform (courtesy of
Santa Barbara News Press)
FIGURE 8.2. Oil Behavior Near Platform (courtesy
of Santa Barbara News Press)
-------
8-4
FIGURE 8.3. Oil Plume Leaving Platform, 26 February, 1969
FIGURE 8.4.
Oil "Windrows and Ropes" Santa Barbara Harbor in Upper
Left, Boat Spreading Straw or Dispersant, 26 February, 1969.
-------
8-5
8. 4. INTERACTION WITH OFFSHORE KELP BEDS
The kelp beds offshore in the Santa Barbara Channel, with their tendency
to hold up debris, formed a natural barrier partially protecting the coast
line. The diurnal land-sea breeze gradually would bring the oil ashore but
the kelp undoubtedly had the beneficial effect of affording additional time for
oil weathering and evaporation of non-volatile fractions. Much of the
iridescence repeatedly seen in reconnaissance flights near the coast line
undoubtedly resulted from the gradual bleeding of thin films from the oil
retained in these beds.
Figures 8. 5 and 8. 6 illustrate the oil streamers being driven out of the
kelp by an onshore breeze.
SECTION 8.0 REFERENCES
1. On Scene-Commander's Report: Santa Barbara Oil Pollution Incident,
January 1969, Lt. George H. Brown III.
2. Memorandum Gordon C. Shields, Marine Meteorologist to Director,
Western Region Salt Lake City, Utah, February 25, 1969.
3. Smith, J. E., Ed., "Torrey Canyon Pollution and Marine Life, "
Cambridge at the University Press, 1968, pp. 150-162.
4. "Oil Spillage Study - Literature Search and Critical Evaluation for ^
Selection of Promising Techniques to Control and Prevent Damage,
Battelle-Northwest, November 20, 1967.
5. Personal Communication, E. C. Martin, Battelle-Northwest,
May 19, 1969.
6 Brunnock J. V., D. F. Duckworth, and G. G. Stephens, Analysis
of Beach Pollutants, J. Inst. of Petroleum 54, 310-325, November 1968.
7 Alan, A. A., Statement Presented to U. S. Senate Interior Committee,
Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels. May 20, 1969.
-------
8-6
FIGURE 8. 5. Oil Streamers Emerging from Kelp Beds (courtesy of U, S.
Coast Guard)
.
FIGURE 8. 6. Oil Streamers Approaching Shoreline Inside Kelp
(courtesy of U. S. Coast Guard)
-------
12CP20'
12CPOO'
11SP401
119°20*
11^00'
35'
34°
15'
33°
55'
PRELIMINARY OIL LOCATION DIAGRAM
1625-1725 - 2/4/69
2/4/69
SPEED;
DIRECTION:
TIME
WIND
WIND
Black Oil Total Coverage
Predominantly Black Oil with Some
Iridescence
Predominantly Iridescence with Some
Black Oil
Iridescence
Oil Streaks
mMm^-'^
Santa Cruz
Island
jgjgljAnacapa Island
San Miguel
Island
Santa Rosa
Island
120°20'
12CPOO' 11
-------
9-1
9.0 BEACH AND HARBOR PROBLEMS
9.1 WINTER STORM EFFECTS
The winter storm and unusually high tides, which occurred before
and during the incident, imposed a significantly larger burden on beach
clean-up operations (cf Section 3.0). The unseasonably large quantity of
debris washed into the Channel during the heavy storm period prior to the
incident was subsequently deposited on the beaches. The accumulation was
several feet thick at and above the high tide line in the Santa Barbara area
(Figure 9.1). Later storms and strong onshore winds deposited more drift-
wood and kelp. Debris on the water surface impeded skimming operations
and increased the pressure against containment booms when it accumulated
behind them. Large quantities of oil-contaminated kelp and debris were
deposited on the beaches during storms several days after the blowout.
This debris can serve as a sorptive agent if pushed into the surf prior to
the arrival of oil.
The driftwood on the beaches often had to be cut up before it could
be removed and all driftwood and other debris were necessarily removed
whether it was oil contaminated or not. The debris deposited by the
storms on rocky areas or riprap had to be removed by hand before the oil
(14)
could be cleaned from the rocks. Union Oil Company estimated that
over 30, 000 tons of storm debris was disposed of.
On one occasion in mid-February, 20 to 30 knot winds from the
southeast blew oily caps of breakers and kelp over the Santa Barbara
Harbor breakwater. Storm runoff in the Ventura River caused overflow-
ing into the harbor and deposition of large amounts of floating debris; this
(2)
same runoff reportedly broke the boom across the entrance of the harbor.
Several artificial berms had to be broken to release storm runoff. These
were subsequently repaired.
A typical sand beach is composed of a terrace, or berm, of sand
above the water surface and bars in the surf zone parallel to the beach.
The berm is approximately flat and constantly changes size and shape,
depending upon wave action. A continuous seasonal interchange of sand
occurs between the berm and sub-surf bars. Winter storm waves tend to
-------
I
FIGURE 9. 1. Storm Debris on Beach Near Santa Barbara
-------
9-3
transfer sand from the berm (in some cases total sand removal) to the bars.
Subsequent calmer conditions will reestablish the beach and berm. Severe
storms which had immediately preceded the initial oil release removed large
quantities of sand from the berm to the bars; therefore, the oil coming
ashore on some of the more remote beaches may have been covered with
fresh clean sand brought in during calmer weather before commencement of
cleaning operations. These oil-contaminated layers of sand will likely
remain in place until future storms again remove the layer of sand which
covered them.
9.2 FIRE HAZARDS
The most significant fire hazard existed in the vicinity of Platform A
where concentrations of fresh oil and gas occurred. The weathered oil
reaching the beaches posed no real fire hazard and was, in fact, difficult to
ignite. The wind generally kept the gas from accumulating to a hazardous
level around the platform, although evacuation was necessary on 30 January
because of hazardous gas concentrations accumulating in slack wind condi-
tions. During the 26 February storm, lightning struck the gas vent stack
of a nearby platform, starting a fire which caused no damage.
When the oil initially entered Santa Barbara Harbor on 4 February,
several precautionary measures were taken to reduce the potential fire
hazard, including disconnecting electrical leads to boats in the harbor and
(4)
spraying chemical dispersant on the oil. Later, the use of solvents,
gasoline and detergents for cleaning boats was prohibited in the harbor
because of potential fire hazard. The Santa Barbara Fire Department
checked the harbor atmosphere with a commercial explosimeter; no explo-
sive mixture was indicated. Similar tests two weeks later on incoming
oily kelp also indicated no combustible vapors. The Fire Department also
performed crude bench tests to*determine the temperature at which combus-
tion of the surface oil could be sustained. A small can was filled with oil
and a thermometer immersed near the surface. A torch was then applied;
combustion was not sustained until the temperature exceeded 190 °F.
-------
9-4
The chemical dispersant (Polycomplex A-ll) was spread on the
entering oil slick near the harbor entrance to disperse the oil and thus
reduce the fire hazard/6* The use of dispersants within one mile of Plat-
(7)
form A was subsequently permitted to reduce fire hazard.
9.3 SPECIAL CONSTRAINTS
The relatively fresh crude oil which came ashore in the vicinity of
Pitas Point on 31 January was observed to sink immediately into the sand
without leaving a residue. Similar behavior has been observed during
past crude oil spills in the Long Beach area when the unweathered crude oil
came directly ashore. ' The depth of penetration of the relatively fresh
crude into the beach on this particular occasion is not known.
The oil-soaked straw recovered from beaches often had to be mixed
with additional straw and sand before dumping inland. Thus, an extra handl-
ing operation was required. Some loads of oil-soaked beach debris that
were trucked inland for dumping were rejected at the dump site and had to
be returned for supplementation with dry straw and sand.
Porosity of the breakwater forming the outside of the Santa Barbara
Harbor undoubtedly permitted some passage of oil into the harbor. The
breakwater is constructed of large boulders with no filler material between.
The porosity was evidenced by sand deposits fanning out from openings
between the rocks in the inner harbor (Figure 9.2).
Inconvenience and hazards to navigation occurred in several locations
during protective and recovery operations. Notices to Mariners were issued
on several of these occasions concerning the presence of unlighted booms in
certain areas, mainly around the entrance to ports and harbors. Mariners
were advised to stay outside a five mile radius of Platform A. Booms
across the entrance to harbors were closed when the arrival of oil was immi-
nent, thus preventing passage of vessels. A request to open the booms to
permit entry of a ship into the Santa Barbara Harbor was denied on at least
one occasion because of the danger of the accumulated oil entering the
harbor.
-------
\ I
to
I
F1UUKE 9.2. Sand Deposits Inside Santa Barbara Harbor Breakwater Indicating Breakwater
Porosity
-------
9-6
9.4 LITTORAL SAND TRANSPORT
Littoral sand transport is the net along-shore movement of beach
material under the influence of wave-induced currents. The along-shore
currents are created when incoming waves strike the shoreline at an angle;
therefore, the drift generally depends upon the direction of the prevailing
waves. The coastline of California between Point Conception and the Los
Angeles area has an approximate east-west orientation. The prevailing
waves in this region are westerly and therefore the net transport of sand is
eastward along the coast. The net drift along the Santa Barbara coast is
(12)
approximately 300,000 cubic yards per year.
The breakwater which forms the Santa Barbara Harbor is the first
major obstruction, south of Point Conception, to this flow of sand along the
coast. Correspondingly, a large sandspit results inside the outer end of
/ -1 O\
the breakwater. Past observations have established the average rate of
sand deposition on this sandspit to be 400 to 900 cubic yards per day. During
storm conditions, the rate of growth has exceeded 2500 cubic yards per day
as a consequence of depletion of beach material from the west.
Year-round maintenance dredging operations are required to prevent
harbor mouth obstruction by bypassing sand past the harbor. A dredge
(Figure 9.3) transfers the sand by pipe line to a point eastward down coast
where it is again picked up by the prevailing littoral drift.
Oil that came ashore on the sandspit at the Santa Barbara entrance
was subsequently covered with fresh uncontaminated sand. Inspection of a
vertical cross-section of this sandspit (Figure 9.4) revealed layers of oil-
soaked sand up to several feet below the surface.
The dredge discharge (Figure 9.5) contained an undeterminable
amount of oil, even if it was removing accumulated sand from an area
where the beach surface appeared clean. Thus, the presence of the buried
oil will be witnessed for some time into the future as the dredge redeposits
it further down the coast. This source of further oil pollution on previously
cleaned beaches did not appear severe during observations in late March.
-------
i
- I
FIGURE 9.3 . Santa Barbara Harbor Dredge Maintenance
-------
CO
00
,
FIGURE 9.4. Oil Deposits in Santa Barbara Harbor Sandspit Covered by Littorally Drifted
Sand
-------
I
CD
FIGURE 9.5 . Santa Barbara Harbor Maintenance Dredge Discharge
-------
9-10
Other beach areas where the deposited oil was similarly covered by sand
due to littoral transport will also undoubtedly yield some amount of further
contamination in the future, especially during winter storms that erode the
beaches. This contamination will probably not represent a serious problem
or require clean-up operations as the oil is associated with sand grains and
will generally sink below the surf zone.
SECTION 9.0 REFERENCES
1. Offshore Oil Well Blowout Union Oil Company Well. A report of the
Harbormaster of Santa Barbara. April 22, 1969.
2. Union Oil Company Daily Report of 2/24/69.
3. Willard Bascom. "Waves and Beaches, " Doubleday and Company,
Garden City, New York, 1964. p. 188.
4. Offshore Oil Well Blowout Union Oil Company Well. A report of the
Harbormaster of Santa Barbara. April 22, 1969.
5. Chemical and Engineering News, March 17, 1969. p. 42.
6. Personal communication: Fire Marshal, Santa Barbara Fire
Department.
7. U. S. Coast Guard Situation Report No. 73, 26 February, 1969.
8. U. S. Coast Guard Situation Report No. 10, 31 January, 1969.
9. Personal communication: Captain W. H. Putman, State of Cali-
fornia Department of Fish and Game.
10. Union Oil Company Daily Report of 2/14/69.
11. Offshore Oil Well Blowout Union Oil Company Well. A report of the
Harbormaster of Santa Barbara. April 22, 1969.
12. Willard Bascom. "Waves and Beaches, " Doubleday and Company,
Garden City, New York, 1964. p. 228.
13. Ibid, p. 222.
14. Gains, T. H. "Notes on Pollution Control Santa Barbara, " Union
Oil Company of California, undated.
-------
10-1
10.0 SHORELINE RESTORATION METHODS
10. 1 BEACHES
The priority established for the cleanup of the coastline was as
follows: (1) marinas, (2) public beaches, (3) less accessible public
beaches, (4) private beaches, and (5) rock riprap. The oil was most
heavily deposited on approximately 30 miles of the coastline between
(2)
Point Conception and Point Dume. The oil reaching the shore was
generally weathered sufficiently to prevent significant penetration of the
beach surface which greatly facilitated clean up operations. Most observers
felt that the depth of penetration was less than 1/2 inch. An exception was
noted near Pitas Point on 31 January when fresh crude oil came ashore and
reportedly immediately sank below the surface (Section 9.0).
Cleaning and restoration of beaches were generally accomplished by
spreading straw on the deposited oil, collecting the oily mixture, and sub-
sequently hauling it to an inland dump for disposal. Straw reportedly
absorbs four to five times its weight in oil under optimum conditions.
Collection of the oily straw and other debris on the beaches was accom-
plished principally by mechanized devices such as bulldozers, graders and
loaders, although a significant amount was removed by manual labor (Fig-
ure 10.1). During one period of beach restoration, 550 personnel, 54 water-
craft, 29 pieces of heavy equipment, 96 trucks and 7000 tons of straw and
hay were employed for cleanup of the beaches and harbors. The total
amount of straw employed was alternatively estimated as 3000 tons by
(4)
another source.
Later estimates indicate that the clean-up effort peaked at
almost 1, 000 men and 125 pie es of mechanical equipment. Up to June 1,
1969, 9, 826 truck loads of oil-soaked straw and debris had been disposed of.
The rental rate for heavy equipment similar to that employed for
beach cleaning operations normally ranges from $20-$30/hour. Lighter
equipment such as smaller trucks and portable cranes rent for -approxi-
mately $8-$20/hour. The straw used was obtained through brokers and cost
approximately $24/ton initially; the price reportedly rose to approximately
$35/ton when the immediate supply became exhausted. 5 Wages paid to
laborers for beach cleanup were $3.97/hour and the billing charge was
-------
10-2
FIGURE 10.1. Application and Removal of Straw on Beaches (courtesy of
Santa Barbara News Press)
FIGURE 10.2.
Oiled Straw and Debris (courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)
Press)
-------
10-3
(6)
approximately $7. 00/hour. In addition, an unknown amount of overtime
wages was paid at a correspondingly higher rate. The rental rate for
watercraft is approximately $20/hour for vessels 50 feet long and approxi-
/ n\
mately $40/hour for vessels 120 feet long.v
(21)
Union Oil Company estimated that 400 man hours of labor sup-
plemented with four skip loaders, two bulldozers and ten trucks were
required to clean one mile of beach, under typical conditions encountered.
Based on these values, we estimate the cost of beach cleanup in the neigh-
borhood of $5, 000 per mile (about $1 per linial foot) including transportation
and possible added costs of land fill disposal sites. Costs for cleaning rip-
rap and rocky coast line undoubtedly run higher.
Straw was the primary absorbent material used for beach cleanup
(o\
although limited amounts of "Ekoperl" and talc were tried. Chemical
detergents were not employed for beach cleaning operations as it was felt
that dispersed oil might sink in and lubricate the sand, causing excessive
erosion or limiting the use of wheeled vehicles on the beaches. The latter
situation was encountered on English beaches following the TORREY CANYON
stranding. In the Santa Barbara incident, access to some beaches was
restricted when heavy seasonal rains made the access roads impassable.
Straw was spread on the beaches between high and low tides, both
before and after the oil reached shore. The oily mixture was worked into
piles either manually or by machines and subsequently loaded for transport
to inland dumps. The mixtures often contained excessive oil and further
operations were required to mix dry straw and sand with the oily
contaminant.
Debris deposited in and around rocky areas, such as rip-rap, was
removed by hand before cleaning the oil from the rocks. Considerable
manual effort was also required on beach areas, such as the Harbor sandbar,
inaccessible to motorized equipment. Following removal of the majority of
the oil and debris, the sandy beaches were worked with commercial motor-
ized sand sifters normally employed to recover litter on the beaches.
The general procedure that evolved during operations was to permit
the oil to come ashore and be deposited at the high tide line, spread straw
-------
10-4
on the oil, and push it into piles (Figures 10. 2, 10. 3, and 10. 4). Recovery
operations were concentrated at the high tide line rather than the intertidal
zone.
Two types of large motorized equipment which proved especially
effective for spreading and recovery of straw were mulchers or straw -
spreaders (Figure 10. 5) normally used for spreading straw on highway
right-of-ways to prevent soil erosion, and graders with tines below the
blade for raking (Figure 10. 6). Two types of motorized hay rakes were
(10)
tested but found ineffective for recovery of oil-soaked straw.
The only type of straw effective for absorbing the oil on beaches was
that derived from wheat stalks. "Bermuda straw, " which is much finer and
more closely resembles hay, would not absorb the oil well.
Burning of the oil-soaked straw on the beaches generally was ineffec-
tive and the burning operations often had to be suspended because of
(12)
smoke. Driftwood and other debris which had been deposited on the
beaches (Figure 11.1) was often successfully burned, including that con-
taminated with oil. Burning operations were conducted on several beaches.
(13)
At one time 24 fires were counted at Carpenteria Beach State Park.
These operations were subsequently suspended due to smoke complaints.
(14)
Diesel fuel was successfully employed to start fires. A diesel oil
fueled, blower type burner was tried with good results and employed in sub-
sequent burning operations. Heavy rains tended to hamper burning.
A tabulation of some of the more significant equipment and mate-
rials used for beach restoration (excerpted from Union Oil Company reports)
is given below: Chemicals Employed for Secondary
Materials Cleanup of Equipment etc.
Straw DDX-11 Solvents
Ekoperl Uniflame Diesel Fuel
Talc T-5-X
Motorized Equipment Hand Equipment
Bulldozers Pitch Forks
Skiploaders (D-4,D-6,D-8) Steel Brooms
Backhoes Square Point Shovels
Tractors Rakes
Cranes Axes
Hayblowers Hand Saws
Dump Trucks Rope
-------
10-5
J
'&>•
FIGURE 10. 3. Oiled Straw
FIGURE 10.4. Oiled Sand on Santa Barbara Harbor Sand Bar
-------
10-6
FIGURE 10.5. Power Mulcher Spreading Straw
FIGURE 10.6. Grader Modified with Tines Welded to Blade
-------
10-7
Motorized Equipment (contd) Hand Equipment (contd)
Motorized Rakes Pick Axe
Graders Flood Lamps
Sand-sifting Machine Hudson Sprayers
Fork Lifts Rotary Barrel Pumps
Brush Burner
Sandblasters
Chain Saws
Fertilizer Spreaders
High Pressure Water Cleaning Units
Numerous Utility Vehicles and Trucks
10.2 CLEANING OF HARBORS
Harbor oil contamination was most severe at Santa Barbara, although
some oil did penetrate into the Ventura Harbor. The majority of the oil came
through the Santa Barbara Harbor entrance when defensive measures failed;
however, a smaller amount came over and through the porous breakwater
(Section 9.0). Most of the oil was recovered by drag booms which concen-
trated in the vicinity of the small boat launching ramp, whence it was trans-
ferred to tank trucks equipped with suction pumps (Figure 10.7). Propeller
wash from taut-moored vessels in the harbor was effective for moving the
(15)
oil into the center of the channel. Skirted booms proved effective for
dragging operations to contain oil-soaked straw and kelp. Subsequent cleanup
of residual oil and floating debris such as kelp was accomplished principally
by application of straw, followed by manual labor pickup. A limited amount
of "Ekoperl" was also applied in the harbor. Portable water pumps were
employed to wash the oil off the decks of ships and from around otherwise
inaccessible places such as ships' berths. Light equipment such as these
pumps are estimated to cost approximately $10/hour with operator.
Debris, kelp, and oil-soaked straw were recovered from the water
surface by men working from punts (Figure 10.8), designed for oil spill
cleanup in the Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor area. These were about ten
feet long by four feet beam, with a freeboard of about 18 inches. The
recovered material was generally placed in 55-gallon open drums to facili-
tate subsequent handling. The debris was recovered with either pitchforks
or hand rakes.
-------
10-8
FIGURE 10.7. Removal of Oil from Santa Barbara Harbor Using Vacuum
Trucks
FIGURE 10.8. Removal of Oil from Santa Barbara Harbor Using Straw
-------
10-9
The suction pump trucks employed to pump the concentrated oil
accumulation from the water surface were similar to those used to empty
septic tanks. The capacity was typically 4200 gallons and several were used
at the Harbor each day. Twelve hundred barrels of oil were reportedly
/ -I f-\
recovered by these trucks on 6 February,
A commercial skimmer, tested in Santa Barbara Harbor, employed
a rotating cylinder covered with oil absorbent plastic foam. Debris picked
up by the foam, i.e. , straw and driftwood damaged the foam, and, hence,
the device was not used.
Several techniques were employed to clean various harbor facilities,
depending on the nature and accessibility. The launching ramp area, dredge,
and protecting plastic panel shield around the "Undersea Gardens, " a marine
(17)
aquarium, were steam cleaned. The sea-wall was also steam cleaned
with steam and 120 °F water which necessitated covering nearby boats with
plastic sheeting. 8* Riprap and the walkway along the breakwater were
washed with pressurized water streams and steam cleaned. The riprap
inside the Santa Barbara Harbor was subsequently sandblasted to improve
its appearance. Floats in the harbor were hand scrubbed with commercial
"waterless" hand cleaning compound and wiped off.
Of the approximately 750 boats which were berthed in the harbor, it
(19)
was estimated that over 700 were stained by oil.v Cleaning the hulls with
chemical solvents was prohibited by the Santa Barbara Fire Department due
to fire hazard and waste pollution considerations. Therefore, the cleaning
of hulls that could not be removed from the water was limited to waterless
hand cleaner which could be wiped off following application. Very few boat
hulls had been successfully cleaned as of late March, in part due to residual
oil being released to the harbor waters from the shoreline. Boat baths and
small booms commonly placed around and under small craft in harbors
afforded protection to a few boats.
-------
10-10
10.3 CLEANING OF ROCKS AND JETTIES
Several methods were used to remove deposited oil from rocks and
riprapped areas. The riprapped areas presented a severe problem because
of the numerous inaccessible cracks and crevices into which the oil had
penetrated. Methods tested included washing with cold and hot (120 °F)
pressurized water streams, steam cleaning, application of chemical deter-
gents (on a limited basis), and sandblasting. Of these methods, only sand-
blasting was found to satisfactorily remove stains despite the slowness of
the process. The air was supplied to the nozzles by standard compressors
(100 psig). Up to four spray nozzles could be operated from a single 1200
scfm compressor. Application was either wet or dry, depending on the
prevailing wind direction, with the dry blasting being slightly more effective.
Effective cleaning of riprap such as that on the jetty of Santa Barbara
Harbor entailed three separate operations: (1) hand removal of debris,
(2) washing down with a stream of pressurized cold water, and (3) sandblast-
ing. Typical rates for wet sandblasting were 60 to 80 feet per day per spray
nozzle, working on a six to eight foot wide strip of nominally two foot dia-
meter boulders. Protective booms were placed while sandblasting the
inside of the harbor jetty to prevent further contamination of the harbor
waters.
SECTION 10.0 REFERENCES
1. "Offshore Oil Well Blowout, Union Oil Company Well, " Santa
Barbara Harbormaster Report, 22 April, 1969.
2. Map Supplement from Coast Guard On-Scene Commander's Report.
3. Summary of Union Oil Company Cleanup Activities (based on pro-
gress reports furnished to the On-Scene Commander).
4. Thomas H. Gaines, Union Oil Co. Statement 18 February, 1969.
5. "The Santa Barbara Channel Oil Pollution Incident January 1969 -
On-Scene - Commander's Report.
6. Personal Communication, E. K. Thompson, Crosby and Overton Inc.
-------
10-11
7. Quotation from General Marine Transport Inc. Santa Barbara,
California.
8. Union Oil Company Daily Report, 11 February, 1969.
9. Ibid. , 14 February, 1969.
10. Ibid., 17 February, 1969.
11. Personal Communication with D. D. Shaw of Crosby and Overton Inc.
12. Union Oil Company Daily Report, 16 February, 1969.
13. Santa Barbara News Press, 14, February, 1969.
14. Union Oil Company Daily Report, 26 February, 1969.
15. "Offshore Oil Well Blowout, Union Oil Company Well, " Santa
Barbara Harbormaster Report, 22 April, 1969.
16. Santa Barbara News Press, 6 February, 1969.
17. Union Oil Company Daily Report, 17 February, 1969.
18. Ibid.. 18 February, 1969.
19. Santa Barbara News Press, 16 February, 1969.
20. Personal Communication with D. D. Shaw of Crosby and Overton Inc.
21. Gains, T. H. "Notes on Pollution Con+rol Santa Barbara.. " Union
Oil Company of California, undated.
-------
11-1
11.0 DISPOSAL OF WASTES AND RECOVERED OIL
Wastes from clean-up operations consisted primarily of oil-soaked
straw (with admixed sand in most cases) from beach, harbor and sea
cleaning; a considerable amount of oil-soaked debris (tree limbs, etc.),
due to high water in coastal streams, that was washed to sea and later
deposited on beaches concurrent with oil deposition; small amounts of
other absorbents (e. g., perlite) used on beach and harbor cleanup; and
oil-water mixtures removed from the water surface by skimming opera-
tions.
11.1 IN-PLACE BURNING
Most of the straw and debris was trucked to landfill areas; however, in
some instances these combustibles were piled and incinerated on the
beaches (Figure 11.1). For the most part, burning was abandoned as a
disposal method in later phases (16 February, Ref. 1) of the cleanup due
to voiced objections to the smoke and odor. In all cases where wastes
were burned in-place, it was necessary to obtain burning permits from
appropriate city or county authorities. Originally, some difficulties were
encountered in kindling the waste material; later a blower-type, diesel-
fed burner was found to give good ignition.(1) In general, however, and
with the exception of storm debris burning, combustion of oil recovered on
the beaches (largely mixed with straw) was impaired by the fire retardant
properties of included wet sand. In addition, due to the sulfur content
(1. 2 to 1. 5 percent in fresh oil as released) burning possibly would have
caused an air pollution problem.
On-site burning, though objectionable from several viewpoints, had a
number of advantages. Some of these are apparent in the following dis-
cussion wherein problems- attendant to hauling and landfill operations are
pointed out.
It is evident that in-place burning attempts in the event of future inci-
dents must consider the unexpected complexities introduced by nature
(such as storm debris) and the possible need for mobile high temperature
-------
i -
FIGURE 11.1. Burning Operations on Beach (courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)
-------
11-3
(artificially fueled) incineration equipment which substantially reduces the
potential air pollution problem. Such considerations must be integrated
with beach cleaning methods which will undoubtedly involve sorbents such
as straw.
11.2 LANDFILL DISPOSAL
The disposal of solid waste by landfill (shallow burial) was considered
as the simplest of disposal methods; however, there were a number of
problems which had to be surmounted in this particular case due to the
scale of the operation, the time element, and the somewhat unique charac-
teristics of the disposed material. Some of the items requiring considera-
tion were:
• The disposal site(s) should be situated so that burial would not consti-
tute either a short term (e.g., fire, odor) or long term (groundwater
contamination) problem.
• It was desirable that the disposal site be close to the clean-up areas to
minimize hauling distance, traffic problems, etc.
• There was need to arrange for beach access (sometimes through
private property) for heavy collection, loading and hauling equipment.
In practice, this required considerable advanced planning.
• The relative remoteness of the major disposal sites selected made some
road improvement work necessary to accommodate the dump trucks.
Also, the extremely heavy rains resulted in the sites being inaccessible
for several days during which waste material was stockpiled on the
beaches.
• Legal responsibilities with regard to long-term liabilities had to be
resolved between the property owner(s) and the clean-up contractor.
A number of dumpsites were used for solid waste disposal. Early in
the beach clean-up operation, relatively minor amounts of wastes were
trucked to established Santa Barbara, Ventura and Oxnard disposal
grounds. However, the bulk of the wastes was hauled to two sites where
specific arrangements had been made for landfill burial and to a third site
where the oil-sand mixture was used for road building. In some instances
-------
11-4
the oil content of the waste was high enough to allow free drainage. In
these cases, the waste was returned to the beach area for introduction of
additional straw and sand.
3
Over 2, 200 large dumptruck loads of wastes (estimated 30, 000 yd )
were trucked to the head of a small side canyon near the crest of the
watershed in Toro Canyon (Figure 11.2). An estimated 3-4 acres (hori-
zontal surface) of fill were placed in the canyon. One criterion for
selecting this site, about 10 miles east of Santa Barbara, was the recog-
nition that it would not be subjected to significant leaching by regional
groundwaters. In late March, after the site had been abandoned insofar
as waste oil residue dumping was concerned, the site had been completely
backfilled and there was no visible evidence of the waste nor significant
petroleum odor Periodic checking of the small stream in this canyon has
(2)
failed to reveal the presence of any oily effluent.
Later in the clean-up operation, arrangements were made to dispose
of solid wastes in an area about 25 miles west of Santa Barbara
(Abercrombie Ranch). Here, about 1. 000 loads of waste material
(estimated 10, 000 yd3) were dumped down a hillside. There was some
concern over this site with respect to material being washed by heavy
rains into an ephermeral streambed at the base of the hill, and disposal
was relocated to more level ground (Hollister Ranch) a short distance
away. About 6 acres of ground were filled at these adjacent sites. Infor-
mation on the stream indicated that there had been flow during the past
(2)
winter for the first time in 8 years. Although no surface or groundwater
contamination problems are anticipated at either of these two disposal
sites, periodic confirmatory observations are planned by the California
State Water Quality Control Board.
3
About 2, 000 loads (estimated 20, 000 yd ) of beach clean-up wastes
were hauled to a river bottom fill area on the south bank of the Santa
Clara River near Oxnard. The material was used as road foundation on
(3)
this reclaimed river bottom land.
-------
11-5
FIGURE 11.2. Disposal of Waste by Landfill Burial
-------
11-6
Waste disposal was a major and relatively expensive operation that
required and received considerable planning and cooperation. Over 30
large trucks were in continuous waste-hauling operation at one period of
the undertaking. The total cost of landfill disposal (including hauling,
dump fees, road improvement, etc.) is estimated at about $200, 000 or
$4/yd3 by the authors. Gaines, estimated that over 30, 000 tons of
storm debris alone was disposed of. Gaines further states that, "up to
June 1. 1969, 9, 826 truck loads of oil-soaked straw and debris had been
disposed of. "
The lesson to be learned here is that, in the event of another major
oil spillage incident, the problem of disposal of waste oil and associated
material can be a significant problem. This can be of even increased con-
cern in areas where water supplies are dependent upon groundwater sources.
The major problem of locating acceptable waste disposal sites that
arose in this particular incident dictates the advisability of incorporating
a survey of potential disposal areas as part of the contingency plan.
11. 3 DISPOSAL OF SKIMMED OIL
Oil from harbor and sea-skimming operations constituted a poten-
tial, though negligible, recoverable product rather than a waste. Generally,
the skimmed material contained from 30-50 percent petroleum
(emulsified with sea water). Vacuum trucks equipped with suction hoses
were used to remove oil from the harbor at the shoreline (Figure 10. 7),
and oil-water mixtures collected by sea skimmers were transferred to
tank trailers at Stearns Wharf. These mixtures were trucked to either
local processing or disposal facilities depending upon the quality of the
recovered material. About 400 barrels of the mixture were trucked to the
(4)
Standard Oil Company processing facility at Carpenteria, California,
and an equal amount was sent to the Richfield processing facility at
Ellwood, California. These facilities receive crude oil from wells in
the area, separate water, free gas and extraneous material from the crude
(physical separation) to meet pipeline specifications, and ship the
clean product to refineries. The skimmed mixture was blended into the
normal plant feed stream for processing. Some problems in equipment
fouling were presented by the heavy, thick crude. Also, straw
-------
11-7
tended to clog pumps and valves to such an extent that only an estimated
25 barrels of oil were recovered at the Richfield facility.
It was reported that skimmed oil was disposed to an approved
liquid waste disposal site at Fillmore, California; however, attempts to
confirm this were not successful.
SECTION 11.0 REFERENCES
1. Anonymous Union Oil Company Daily Reports on Clean-Up Operations,
February 10 - March 21, 1969.
2. Personal Communication, Mr. Kenneth Jones, California State Water
Quality Control Board, San Luis Obispo, California, April 21,
1969.
3. Personal Communication, Mr. Frank Robinson, Ventura Coastal
Refuse Disposal Company, June 19, 1969.
4. Personal Communication, Mr. John Herring, Producing Department,
Standard Oil Company, Carpenteria, California, April 7, 1969.
5. Personal Communication, Mr. Elmer Robertson, Richfield Production
Division, Ventura, California, June 18, 1969.
6. Gaines, T. H. "Notes on Pollution Control, Santa Barbara", undated.
-------
12-1
12.0 BIOLOGICAL AND ECOLOGICAL SURVEYS AND FINDINGS
To determine the biological impact of the Santa Barbara pollution
incident and its impact on the plant and animal communities, a base line of
previous studies on the macroflora, fauna and plankton of the area is
essential. It is fortunate that extensive studies of marine flora and fauna
have been made in the area from the depths of the Channel up through the
intertidal zone. The University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB) and
Santa Barbara City College (SBCC) use the intertidal zone as an outdoor
laboratory. Similarly, the University of California-Scripps Institution of
Oceanography and the Allan Hancock Foundation of the University of
Southern California have made extensive studies of the offshore waters of
the Channel.
The USFWS, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and Bureau of Sport
Fisheries and Wildlife have studied commercial fisheries, marine mammals
and waterfowl in the area. The California Department of Fish and Game has
made studies of the intertidal zone of the mainland and Channel Island's fish
and wildlife resources. (1 * The Water Quality Control Board investigated the
/2)
oceanographic regime of the area.v With these data from the various insti-
tutions, a baseline understanding of organisms in the area is available.
An estimation of the biological cost of the oil release was of primary con-
cern to the agencies involved. Studies were initiated as soon as personnel
became available; some, of necessity, are on-going. Background information
regarding general biological and ecological effects were well documented.
There were four basic areas of investigation throughout the period following
the oil release. These were:
• Sea birds
• Intertidal and nearshore communities
« Offshore and benthic communities
• Marine mammals.
In addition, some comments are presented on related projects, such as
bioassays and hydrographic measurements, and natural phenomena which
occurred during the period (e.g., the heavy precipitation and flooding).
-------
12-2
This portion of the report attempts to document the surveys conducted
during and after the incident. Relevant laboratory studies are also reported.
It is not our purpose, however, to go beyond the scope of general documenta-
tion. Conclusions and evaluations are not included as these must necessarily
derive from studies currently in progress,
12.1 SEA BIRDS
Crude oil presents special problems in pollution control. Since it is
relatively insoluble in water, it tends to spread on the surface in films of
variable thickness. The effect on the biological communities involved is
most notable when the oil comes ashore--the most likely contact point for
water birds. On 30 January, 1969, the first dead bird was found. The
following day personnel from the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife,
USFWS, arrived and began aerial surveillance of the Channel and shore bird
populations to establish the number and species of affected waterfowl.
Approximately 50 miles of coastal transects and 80 miles of Channel tran-
sects were flown daily from 4 February through 8 February, and on alternate
days 9 February through 14 February (Figure 12.1). Subsequently, weekly
flights were made. Two California State Department of Fish and Game
vessels were also on the lookout for distressed birds and mammals following
the transects shown on Figure 12.1.
Early estimates indicated a population of about 12, 000 birds in the
Santa Barbara Channel area. Average counts ran about 3, 490 on the tran-
(25)
sects during the eighteen days of flights. No significant change from
day to day was observed. However, there appeared to be a definite movement
away from the area. The kinds of birds counted, in their order of
frequency were gulls (three species); grebes (95% Western); cormorants;
scoters; shore birds; loons; and a very small percentage of pelagic species.
The Western grebes and cormorants were most affected by the oil; sea gulls
were the least affected.
In addition, four beach transects were walked to observe shore birds.
Initially, one control and three contaminated transects were established;
however, the control transect also became oil soaked. The Santa Barbara
-------
! 3
I
FIGURE 12. 1. Location and Direction of Aerial Transects, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife
-------
12-4
FIGURE 12.2
Transect:
Observer (rj7
Weather:
SANTA BARBARA WILDLIFE STUDY - AERIAL TRANSECTS
DATA COLLECTION FORM Date:
Time: Start:
_
Total Time!
Low Tide Time:
Species
Loon (sp.)
Grebe (sp.)
Shearwater
Brown pelican
Cormorant (sp.)
Black brant
C. goldeneye
Bufflehead
Scoter ISP.)
Red-br. merganser
Unknown waterfowl
Great blue heron
A. egret
Black oystercatcher
Black-bellied plover
Whimbrel or M. godwit
Willet
Turnstone (sp.)
Sanderlinq
Sandpiper (sp..
Phalarope (sp.,
Gull (sp.)
Tern (sp.)
C. murre
Pigeon quillemot
Murrelet (sp.)
Others
Unidentified
Total Birds
Sea lion
Harbor seal
Porpoise
Whale
Others
Total Mammals
Dead
Bird Observations
Affected Normal
by Oil
Mammal Observations
Total
|
Notes:
-------
12-5
Chapter of the Audubon Society also assisted with the transects and made
weekly counts in the Carpinteria and Goleta Marshes. The counts can be
compared with several made during 1966.
One of the first reactions to the oil spill was the establishment of bird
salvage operations for oiled birds. Personnel of the Childs' Estate (a
municipal zoo), local and humane society officials, California State Depart-
ment of Fish and Game, and the Union Oil Company established two centers,
and provided Polycomplex A-11 to wash the birds. Treatment generally con-
sisted of chemical washing followed by placing the birds in a warm recovery
room.
Approximately 900 birds were treated at the Carpinteria State Beach and
/o)
670 at the Childs1 Estate. Although early estimates (13 February) of
survival ranged as high as 50%, this decreased to 27. 5% by 19 February and
to a low of 10% by 1 April; *lj this closely parallels the results of the TORREY
CANYON and OCEAN EAGLE incidents. Total known bird losses through
31 March in the area affected by the oil spill were determined to be
(25)
3, 600. Survivors of the treatment were distributed to three locations.
Some were released; others were sent to the San Diego Zoo; and some were
(3)
banded and released in the vicinity of Vandenberg Air Force Base.
The University of California at Santa Barbara (Dr. Barbara Drinkwater)
statistically examined the methods which were most successful with each
species. Her reasons for such an approach were threefold. First, there
was (and still is) an almost complete lack of published material regarding
bird salvage. Second, the bird cleaning group did not include a pathologist
with the resultant lack of immediate feedback to pinpoint the cause of death.
Finally, physiological data were lacking.
At the time of this writing, Dr. Drinkwater and her group are compiling
a computer program. When their results are available, they will have
compiled the mean survival rate for each species for each type of treatment,
as well as the interaction of the two factors. Statistical variables will be
available relating survival to:
1. Species
2. Amount of oil
-------
12-6
FIGURE 12.3
SANTA BARBARA BEACH BIRD STUDY
Transect:
Observer(sTT
Weather: "
Date:
Time: Start:"
Stop-/
Total Time:
Bird Observations
Species
Red- throated loon
Common loon
Western Grebe
Double crested
cormorant
Surf scoter
Kill deer
Black-bellied
plover
Snowy plover
Whimbrel
Marbled godwit
Millet
Sanderling
Knot
Western sandpiper
Least sandpiper
Gulls (all
species)
Royal tern
Others :
Unidentified
Total
Dead
Oil
Stained*
Soaked*
Clean*
Total
KemarKS
(Feeding, Flying or Resting)
* Oil stained - those birds with body feathers with oil but not ragged in appearance.
Oil soaked - those birds with body feathers heavy with oil and ragged in appearance.
Clean - those birds with little or no oil on theirplumage.
Additional Notes
BEACH CONDITION (Oil contamination, clean-up activity, number of people, etc.)
ANIMALS OBSERVED OFFSHORE (Bird and mammals seen, flight pattern and activity)
UNUSUAL ANIMAL BEHAVIOR
(Use other side as needed)
-------
12-7
3. Species and amount of oil
4. Treatment
5. Treatment and species
6. Condition prior to treatment
Dr. Drinkwater to date has compiled and coded data as follows:
1. SPECIES - 26 species treated, each species assigned number.
2. NUMBER - UCSB identification number.
3. CLEANING - type of cleaning compound used.
4. AMOUNT OF OIL - whether light, medium or heavy oil covering.
5. CONDITION BEFORE CLEANING - quiet or active.
6. CONDITION AFTER CLEANING - quiet or active.
7. SIDE EFFECTS - such as convulsions, respiratory trouble.
8. TREATMENT - 15 treatments tried, some in combination, such as
butter, vitamins, fish.
9. SURVIVAL PERIOD - number of days lived after cleaning.
(4)
10. FATE - whether dead, alive, released.
Mr. Jack Hemphill (USFWS-BSF&W) during the United States Senate
hearings in Santa Barbara (24-25 February) stated: "The current practice
of cleaning birds with a detergent removes the protective oils as well as
the petroleum. As a result, a prolonged rehabilitation period, extending
through a complete moult, is currently advocated to prevent death by exposure.
An efficient method of oil removal in combination with the application of a
substitute oil or wax which would provide immediate protection from the
elements may prove a logical solution. "
Mr. Hemphill continued, "Bird losses, to this point, have been relatively
moderate. That bird losses have been low is purely fortuitous; the ingredients
for a major avian disaster were present. Various factors appear to have
mitigated bird losses. It was the consensus that bird populations in the area
were generally low, due in part to the storm immediately preceding the
spill. Many birds were driven out of danger, including an estimated 25, 000
pintails reported in the area prior to the storm. Flooded inland areas may
have provided a haven for some of the shore birds in search of food.
Seasonal migrations of various species such as the brant and sooty shearwater
-------
12-8
had not begun, thus reducing the total number of birds in the area and
potential exposure to contamination. It is frightening to think what might
have happened had the usual flight of brant landed here during the critical
period. Almost the entire population of this specie could have been exposed
to extermination.
"... Over 5, 800 birds were treated following the TORREY CANYON
spill; it is conceivable that facilities for treating up to 100, 000 birds might
be required should an oil spill occur in certain critical areas; for example,
Cook Inlet, Alaska, during the months of May and September. The manpower
and facilities for such an operation would be staggering. On the other hand,
the annihilation of one or more species of waterfowl could be the
alternative. "
Despite the very considerable effort and expense devoted to bird cleaning
and care, the results appear to be no better than in the case of the TORREY
CANYON incident. Undoubtedly the effort put forth in Santa Barbara
saved many birds and it was apparent that many birds died as much due to
the stresses of captivity and handling as to oil contamination per se.
The facilities and procedures set up by Union Oil Company were in the
nature of an assembly line. This undoubtedly reduced mortality resulting
from unnecessary handling.
12.2 INTERTIDAL AND NEARSHQRE COMMUNITJES
The most practical and useful method for assessing oil damage to marine
macrofauna and flora in the intertidal zones is to compare periodic observa-
tions, i.e., beach surveys, made before and after oil deposition. This
method obviously requires base-line information or background data
collected before the incident. In most oil pollution incidents, such background
data have been lacking. Fortunately, in terms of assessment of damage in
the Santa Barbara Channel, the late E. Yale Dawson established and surveyed
intertidal pollution monitoring stations along the sourthern California coast
(fi)
in 1957. Dawson's stations were again surveyed by marine biologists
from UCSB in 1967. During this intervening ten year period, little change
had occurred in the marine fauna and flora. These data collected by Dawson
-------
12-9
and UCSB marine biologists provide a valuable base line for assessment of
damage to the intertidal organisms as a result of the oil release and
shoreline deposition.
Under the direction of Professor Michael Neushul, of UCSB, student
biologists assisted the FWPCA in making transects and samplings of the
(7)
beaches to estimate the amount of oil on the stations. Details of the
procedures are not presented here, but, in brief, two students assigned to
a station recorded a number of items observed along a transect line running
from Dawson's benchmark to a stake at the water's edge at low tide. Some
of the items observed and recorded for each station were:
1. Beginning of high tide mark and oil mark on the beach.
2. Kinds and number of organisms alive or dead touching the transect
line.
3. Surface samples of beach sand to estimate oil on the station.
4. Sand core samples for estimation of amount of oil penetrating beach.
5. Photographs of each line transect.
6. Photographs of oil-covered live, moribund, or dead organisms.
The survey included ten of Dawson's stations (Figure 12.4) on 8 and
9, February, 1969, about ten days after the initial oil release. Some stations
were resurveyed in March. Observations for each beach transect are
detailed in reports prepared by students and submitted to Professor Neushul.
Studies were conducted at El Capitan Beach, Coal Oil Point, Goleta Point,
Santa Barbara Point, Eucalyptus Lane, Loon Point, Carpentaria Reef,
Rincon Beach, Palm Street Beach, Arroyo Sequit (Table 12. 1), and in two
locations in Santa Barbara Harbor. Surveys were comprised of observations
of the various zones (intertidal, midwater, open water) as well as the
benthos.
In summary, UCSB beach transect studies showed that no significant
acute oil kills of intertidal organisms were observed at any of the ten stations
surveyed.
Independent observations made by biologists from other organizations
provide further evidence of the lack of any serious acute kills among inter-
tidal species. Mr. C. M. Seeley, aquatic biologist. Federal Water
-------
/ I
POINT IM Ml
I 5
I
FIGURE 12.4. Beach Transect Sites for Intertidal Study
-------
12-11
TABLE 12. 1. Biological Stations (Beach Transects) Surveyed by Univer-
sity of California, Santa Barbara Students, February-
March, 1969
(West to East)
_ Station No. Name
40 El Capitan Beach
1 Coal Oil Point
28 Goleta Point
27 Santa Barbara Point
39 Eucalyptus Lane, Mo'ntecito
38 Loon Point, Summerland
15 Carpenteria Reef
35 Rincon Beach
12 Palm Street Beach, near Ventura River
4 Arroya Sequit, Los Angeles County
Pollution Control Administration, observed no obvious oil-killed organisms
with the exception of at least several hundred dead wavy-top snails or wavy
top turbans (Astrea undosa) found dead or dying on oil covered beaches at
(8)
Carpinteria on 9 February. At present no direct evidence has been firmly
established that these wavy-top snails were killed directly by oil; rather, it
appears that the kill most likely resulted from sudden exposure to fresh
water runoff resulting from rain storms. W. C. Johnson, FWPCA, reported
that about a week before the incident the Santa Barbara coast was subjected
to heavy rains and flooding; therefore, damage to the biota in some areas on
the coast could be the results of fresh water rather than oil.
The FWPCA examined the biological damage created in the Santa Barbara
Harbor. In addition, they compiled data accumulated by Santa Barbara City
College. Inspections of the intertidal zone revealed very little initial adverse
effect obviously due to oil. Some mortalities were observed, however, this
(1)
may have been due to the hot water used to clean the jetty. Near the end
of March, however, some possible effects may have begun to manifest
themselves. R. H. Clawson (FWPCA) noticed an apparent degradation of
-------
12-12
fauna while the flora increased in abundance. This was interpreted as
(26)
a possible long-term manifestation of the oil's toxicity.
The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries provided an experienced observer,
John B. Glude, Deputy Regional Director, Pacific Northwest Region, who
observed the effects of crude oil spills in England and France following the
TORREY CANYON incident and in Puerto Rico following the wreck of the
tanker OCEAN EAGLE. Glude observed the intertidal zone at Channel
Islands Harbor, Ventura, El Capitan Beach, Goleta "County Beach, and
Santa Barbara beaches during the period 13-15 February, 1969. He reported
in summary that the only mortality observed among intertidal species was
of mussels (Mytilus californianus) ranging from an estimate of about one
percent on the rocky beach area southeast of Santa Barbara to about 10 to
(9)
20 percent at the entrance to Channel Islands Harbor. He also believed
that the lack of damage presently observed among intertidal organisms is
largely because only limited amounts of dispersant chemicals were used in
Santa Barbara and further because crude oil by itself is not highly toxie to
the macrofauna and flora which he observed.
The California State Department of Fish and Game and the U. S. Park
Service coordinated their efforts in surveying the shore and nearshore
marine communities around Anacapa Island (a national refuge) on 5 ana
14 February and Santa Cruz Island on 11-14 February, 1969. *
Figure 12. 5 illustrates the area studied for oil damage. Marine biologists
of the California Department of Fish and Game led by C. H. Turner worked
the area from the vessel COUGAR (U. S. Park Service) and ALASKA
(Department of Fish and Game) and smaller skiffs. Four transects
extending from above high tide line into depths not exceeding 50 feet were
established and studied at Anacapa Island, and at eleven locations at
Santa Cruz Island.
Turner reported: "in general, the various animal and plant assemblages
observed appeared normal and healthy, although some of those in the inter-
tidal (splash zone to just below low tide) were coated with varying amounts
of oil. Oil was observed on the surface canopy of many of the kelp
-------
West Point
Area Surveyed for Oil Spill Damage
February 5, 11-14, 1969
Sandstone
"'
Point
Scorpion
Anchorage
SANTA CRUZ ISLAND
San Pedro
Point
JlAnacaoa Island
to
FIGIJRE_1_2._5. Area Surveyed for Oil Spill Damage, 5, 11-14, February, 1969, California
State Department of Fish and Game
-------
12-14
(Macrocystis) beds, but most of this oil was easily shaken off the stipes,
indicating that self cleaning would follow storms and heavy seas. Surf
grass (Phyllospadix) at Anacapa Island, which was heavily coated with oil
on February 5, was appreciably cleaner on February 14. Subtidal plants
and animals appeared untouched by the oil.
"Black abalones (Haliotis cracherodii) and numerous other intertidal
animals, algae (Hysperophychus and Pelvetia) and surf grass (Phyllospadix)
were heavily coated with oil at Punta Arena. None appeared in distress,
however, and we presume most will survive. Losses to this island's inter-
tidal life should not exceed 5 to 10 percent (subjective estimate) and the
subtidal life should be unharmed. "
Dr. W. J. North, California Institute of Technology conducted a one-
week study to determine possible oil damage to marine life three weeks
after the initial oil release. This study, sponsored by the Western Oil
and Gas Association, included surveys of about 10 miles of beach exposed to
oil deposition. No evidence of damage to marine life was found near shore
with the possible exception of one dead Pismo Clam .
Concern was expressed about the important kelp-bed resources being
contaminated with oil, but North, who has made major contributions on the
biology of the giant kelp (Macrocystis) and the utilization of kelp-bed
(12)
resources, reported kelp beds were unharmed. He explained that kelp
secretes a mucus substance (polysaccharide) which prevents oil from
adhering to the living tissue of the plant.
Possible latent effects were examined by D. Straughan of the University
of Southern California, Allen Hancock Foundation. Samples of 5 intertidal
species were examined to determine if the surviving animals were
reproducing and if repopulation was occurring in devastated areas. She
concluded that, except in areas still badly polluted, the examined species
^ • ,1 <27)
are reproducing normally.
12.3 OFFSHORE AND BENTHIC SURVEYS
The USFWS Bureau of Commercial Fisheries conducted offshore surveys
aimed at determining the oil's effect on pelagic fish eggs and larvae,
-------
12-15
phytoplankton and zooplankton and spawning as well as related hydrographic
conditions such as nutrient concentrations, dissolved oxygen, and light
transmittance. The eggs, larvae, and zooplankton were taken in 0.5 meter
nets with 1/3 mm mesh. Oblique tows were made through the water column;
in addition, samples were taken at 1 and 5 meters in horizontal tows. Near
surface phytoplankton and microzooplankton were sampled through 0. 04 mm
mesh sieves. All specimens were examined immediately on retrieval and
(13)
preserved later for more detailed analysis.
The cruise of the R/V DAVID STARR JORDAN was designed to study the
area of the spillage and determine the effects on pelagic eggs and larvae.
The presence and absence of larvae and eggs on anchovy was no different
than long-term average variations. In addition to anchovy larvae, the
samples included larvae of hake, rockfish (Sebastodes spp.), sciaenids
(Cynoscion spp. ), sand dab (Citharichthys spp.), English sole (Parophrys
spp.), deep sea smelt (Leuroglossus spp.) and flounder (Pleuronichthys spp.)
in approximate amounts expected for the areas sampled. Some specimens
were taken from beneath oil slicks; no dead eggs or larvae were found.
Phytoplankton and zooplankton from near-surface samples appeared normal
(14)
and were not adversely affected.
The hydrographic studies indicated varying light transmittance according
to the thickness of the oil layer. There was complete light transmission in
areas of thin slicks decreasing to nearly zero light transmission under
thicker layers.
UCSB biologists Drs. Alfred Ebling and Adrian Wenner, aboard the
FWPCA chartered SWAN, continued a study begun long before the spill.
Dr. Wenner examined plankton samples for larval stages of the sand crab,
Emerita, and found them to be present in abundance. Dr. Ebling was
examining the kelp fish population in order to compare post-spill data with
data he had collected in the four previous years. As yet, no statement can
be made on the actual effect of the oil deposition. In every case the data
were not completely analyzed or were simply incomplete.
The State of California Department of Fish and Game aboard the
-------
12-16
ALASKA surveyed the Santa Barbara Channel to determine the effects of
oil pollution on the pelagic fishes of the area. Acoustic surveys, similar
to those routinely conducted since 1965, were made along 96 miles of
acoustic transects. The echo sounder detected schools of anchovy, rockfish,
squid, and, perhaps, jack mackerel.
Since 1965, this area had been surveyed 12 times in a similar manner.
Compared with previous surveys, those following the oil release ranked
second in number of anchovy schools. There was apparently an unusual
seasonal abundance since anchovies are generally scarce during this time
period.
In addition, three transects were established from 10 meter depth to
50 fathoms. A drag net (otter trawl) with 1-1/2 inch stretch mesh was used
on the transects to capture fish. All fish captured were weighed and measured
to establish baselines for future investigation. The dominant fish caught were
sea perch, followed by flat fish (Pleuronectidae), sharks, and angel sharks.
Midwater trawls, limited to two due to inclement weather, also indicated
better than average catches of jack mackerel and bonito, two species last
taken in 1963.(16)
California State Department of Fish and Game personnel also assessed
bottom characteristics and the condition of benthic organisms along three
transects ranging in depths from 2 to 62 fathoms. Samples were taken with
a Ponar 0.1 meter square dredge and a 41-foot headrope gulf shrimp trawl.
Twenty-six dredge samples were taken in depths between 2 and 50 fathoms.
Seventeen 10-minute bottom trawls were completed between 16 and 62 fathoms.
No evidence of oil contamination on the bottom was noted at depths between
6 and 62 fathoms. Oil or oil emulsion occurred in the dredge sample taken
(17)
inside Santa Barbara Harbor.
None of the reporting groups defined any significant detrimental effects
upon the fauna. The R/V DAVID STARR JORDAN studies indicated
"minimal adverse effects: on the plankton in the area. California Fish and
Game Cruise Reports also indicate the damage was minimal or nonexistent
among benthic organisms and pelagic fishes.
-------
12-17
12.4 MARINE MAMMALS
In the early stages of the Santa Barbara Channel oil pollution investiga-
tions, concern was expressed for the marine mammal populations in the
area. California Fish and Game personnel examined Santa Cruz and Anacapa
Island on 5 February and 11-14 February, 1969, to assess the effects of the
oil spill on the marine communities. Approximately 35 California Sea Lions
(Zalophus californianus) were observed coated with oil but in no apparent
distress. Another group of about 300 were observed in the area with no
signs of oil coating.
On 10 February, field personnel reported the oil slick had not extended
westward as far as Santa Rosa and San Miguel Islands, and the small colony
of fur seals (Callorhinus ursinus) on San Miguel had not been affected.
Press reports stated ". . . nine dead (Elephant Seals) and 35 so heavily coated
with oil that none were likely to survive. " However, upon personal contact
with California Fish and Game personnel at Terminal Island, California,
it was disclosed that all but one of the nine "dead" elephant seals
(Mirounga angustirostris) on San Miguel Island had left the island as had
the remaining 35 "doomed" seals, apparently under their own power since
they were above the high water line.
Other seals and sea lions observed in the vicinity of Anacapa and Santa
Cruz islands did not appear to be affected although they had been observed
swimming in areas where oil was present. When the Department skiff
approached, the already oil-covered seals were aroused, dove into the
water and received an additional coat of oil. As the skiff departed, the seals
crawled back onto the rocks and fell asleep, apparently unaffected by the
., (18)
oil.
Marine mammals reported during this period (28 January to 31 March)
to have washed ashore dead in the study period numbered three sea lions and
four porpoises. Autopsies performed on two porpoises failed to incriminate
oil contamination as the cause of death.
The California Grey Whales (Eschrichtius gibbosus) received a great
degree of notoriety. They were in the peak of their northern migration period
during the period of major oil release. By 10 February, only five grey whales
-------
12-18
had been observed in the area since the initiation of oil release. All of
these appeared to be in good condition. Observers reported the whales
appeared to be just "passing through. "
Six whales (five California Grey Whales and one Pilot whale) were
stranded along beaches north of the Santa Barbara area. This is about
(19)
normal according to the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries personnel;
and not unusually high according to Mr. R. L. Brownell, Jr. of the
Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History. Brownell, in reviewing
records from between 1960 and 1968, noted that 15 to 20 California Grey
Whales were stranded along the California coast. "Of these, five were
found between mid January and mid May 1961, and three between
February 25 and March 15, 1964. "(20)
Examination on 14 March by FWPCA personnel at the site of a stranding
produced the following information: "The dead whale, a male California
Grey Whale, was located on the beach near the foot of a 75 foot bluff. . . .
It was washed ashore on 12 March. The body and head show considerable
evidence of bites, presumably from sharks of good size. No oil was seen
on the body surface, but had any been originally present it would probably
have been lost when the body was covered and uncovered with sand. "
The whale was transferred to the Pt. Molate Whaling Station for further
examination. The whale was in an advanced state of decomposition; the
viscera were severely autolysed. Visual inspection of the baleen, mouth
and blow-hole showed no traces of oil. Tissue samples were taken by BCF
(n-l \
personnel for analysis.v ' The FWPCA analysed these tissues on 17 March,
1969. They were unable to detect the presence of oil in the tissues
provided.
Transects have since been flown by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries
from Santa Barbara north to Coos Bay, Oregon and from Coos Bay to Cape
Flattery, Washington. Five to six hundred whales were seen in each transect;
no additional mortalities or strandings were observed.
Thus, in general, although most mammal species in the area received
some oil coating, minimal effects can be attributed to the oil. The seals
and sea lions which became covered appeared normal. The whales
-------
12-19
migrating through the channel either were able to avoid the oil or
were unaffected when in contact with it.
12.5 RELATED STUDIES AND EVENTS
12.5.1 Bioassays
When the leak occurred, only very limited background material was
available concerning the toxicity of various chemicals used in spill
treatment. However, from previous experience (e. g., TORREY CANYON),
it was known that at least certain dispersants were considerably more toxic
than the oil itself. Thus, the FWPCA, with limited facilities at the site,
set up small bioassays to evaluate both the immediate effects of crude oil
and oil-with-dispersant mixtures used at Santa Barbara.
A preliminary test used the salt water minnow, Fundulus parvipinnis,
to test "Corexit 7664, " "Corexit"-Oil mixtures and oil alone. Limited
investigations, using goldfish, were made on the relative toxicities of
"UNICO"; "E-147"; "Besline"-Oil Mixture; "Polycomplex A-ll", with and
(22)
without oil; and the household detergent "Joy. "
"Corexit 7664" was also tested at the BCF Fishery-Oceanography
Center at La Jolla, California. This bioassay employed the eggs and early
larvae of the northern anchovy, Engraulus mordax. Two experimental
containers of sea water each containing 25 eggs were used for concentrations
(14)
of "Corexit" ranging from 2-100 ppm.
The California Department of Fish and Game has established criteria
for assessing the suitability of oil spill treatment chemicals. Their primary
goal is the protection of fish and wildlife, but aesthetic and recreational use
is also considered. Any application of a potential contaminant must be
evaluated with respect to the area or volume it will occupy as a function of
time; once this has been determined, it must be decided what changes the
dispersant may bring about in the physical, chemical and biological
characteristics of the environment.
A summary of their criteria of toxicity is as follows:
1. No toxicity to selected plants and animals at 100 times the concentration
-------
12-20
of the treatment chemical expected at the edge of the zone of appli-
cation as calculated from static bioassay TL values.
2. Selected plants and animals should not be adversely affected at concen-
trations occurring in the zone of dilution as determined by long-term
flowing water bioassay of emulsions, nor should the detergents or their
metabolites accumulate in the food chain.
3. Establish time-to-death versus concentration relationship of the treat-
ment chemical and emulsion.
4. No toxicity or fouling of birds or mammals.
5. Toxicity tests must be performed on the detergent, solvent, and
stabilizer portions of the treatment chemical in addition to emulsions
resulting from oil treatment.
6. Toxicity tests must be performed according to standard methods on
susceptible and sensitive species from lists supplied by the Department.
With regard to biodegradability, the factors are as follows:
1. The treatment chemical or emulsions should show no toxicity to the
appropriate decomposer bacteria.
2. An analytical measure should be made of the rate of decay of the treat-
ment chemical and resulting emulsions in a simulated marine
environment.
3. The effect of essential nutrients on the rate of decay of the surfactant-
oil complex needs to be determined.
4. The biochemical oxygen demand with rate-factor of the treatment
chemical and resulting emulsions.
Following the initial drafting of this report, information was pro-
(29)
vided by the Union Oil Company on bioassay studies of several pro-
prietary chemical treating agents. This information is appended (page
12-23) without comment. Suffice it to say, conclusions drawn from bio-
assay evaluation must recognize the specific conditions under which these
tests were conducted. Further investigations are necessary before any
responsible conclusions regarding relative toxicities can be made.
12. 5. 2 Flood Damage
Almost concurrently with the oil spill, one of the heaviest rainfalls
in the past 100 years occurred throughout Southern California. The
-------
12-21
flooding which occurred in conjunction with the rainfall carried large
quantities of debris, earth and silt into the Channel. Much of the debris
was washed onto the beaches and was covered with oil. The silt remained
in suspension for several days and, in some cases, could be seen clearly
from the air for several weeks. In addition, just prior to the rains,
agricultural areas of Santa Barbara, Ventura and neighboring counties had
been heavily treated with pesticides. During the floods a large portion of
these chemicals was undoubtedly washed to sea.
On 9 February, Mr. Charles Seeley of the FWPCA reported at
Carpenteria State Beach that he "walked up the beach for about 150 yards and
found numerous wavy-top snails (Astrea undosa) dead or dying on the sand
and in, or covered by, the heavy oil and debris deposits. A conservative
estimate of numbers would be several hundred dead. " On February 13, 1969,
he reported "It was of interest to note that the storm debris which inundates the
beach northwest of Carpenteria Creek is relatively scarce below the creek.
Also, no specimens of Astrea were observed in this section. "
Thus it would appear that the marked salinity decrease and, perhaps,
the introduction of abnormal quantities of silt, debris, and pesticides con-
tributed to the overall mortality in the area. The mortalities caused by the
flood effects may indeed be masked by the presence of oil on specimens,
perhaps already dead or dying, which were washed up onto the beaches.
12. 5. 3 Dissolved Oxygen Studies
The dissolved oxygen (DO) regime in Santa Barbara Harbor was
monitored from 7 to 11 February, 1969. Samples were collected by FWPCA
field personnel at various tides to assess the exchange of harbor water. In
addition, the water within the "Undersea Gardens, " an aquarium in the
harbor, was monitored from 6 to 11 February, 1969. These data are given
in Table 12. 2.
The DO determinations were made with an azide modification of the
Winkler method. Surface samples were taken one foot below the surface and
bottom samples one foot above the bottom. Table 12. 2 indicates slightly
lower values than those reported in earlier work in 1959. These latter
studies found the amount of dissolved oxygen in all areas of Southern
California to a depth of 200 feet was usually between 5 and 10 ppm.
-------
12-22
TABLE 12.2. Dissolved Oxygen at Santa Barbara Harbor
Date Station Time Depth Temp. DO mg/1
2,7/69
2/8/69
2/9/69
2/9/69
2/10/69
2
1
1
1
1
3
4
5
1445
1330
1900
0940
1650
0950
1000
1030
Surf.
Surf.
1.5m
3.0m
Surf.
1.7m
3.4 m
Surf.
1.5 m
3.0 m
Surf.
1.7m
3.0m
Surf.
2.0 m
Surf.
2.5m
5.0 m
Surf.
3.0m
6.0m
14.0 °C
15.5 °C
14.0 °C
14.0 °C
14.0 °C
13.5 °C
13.5 °C
13.5 °C
13.5 °C
13.5 °C
14.5 °C
14.0 °C
14.0 °C
14.5 °C
14.3 °C
14.3 °C
14.3 °C
14.3 °C
14.3 °C
14.0 °C
14.0 °C
4.95
4.95
5.0
5.40
5.25
5.60
5.50
4.85
4.82
4.70
4.80
4.75
4.65
4.80
4.50
5.10
5.00
4.84
5.30
5.20
5.20
2/11/69
1020
Surf.
14.5 °C
5. 04
Only five samples (of 450) had concentrations below 5. 5 ppm. Unfortunately,
they present no data w ithin the Santa Barbara Harbor, thus making direct
comparisons impossible.
The FWPCA also determined respiration rates within the "Undersea
Garden. " These were determined by the incubation of light and dark bottles
in situ. These data, however, are incomplete.
-------
12-23
(29)
APPENDED INFORMATION FROM UNION OIL CO. OF CALIFORNIA
Results of a Bioassay for Union Oil Company
The results of our investigation of the fish tolerance of several
surfactants of different manufacture are presented in this report.
On March 13, 1969, seven samples of surfactants of different manu-
facture were received from Mr. Harry M. Brandt of the Technical Service
Division of Union Oil Company. We have performed 96-hour TLm or
Median Tolerance Limit assays on all seven samples.
The seven samples are the following:
1. AHA Gold Crew Bilge Cleaner; Ara Chem. Inc.
A somewhat viscous, clear, liquid miscible with water.
2. Corexit 7664; Enjay Chem. Co.
A somewhat viscous, clear liquid miscible with water.
3. Grain OD-2; Grain Ind. Prod. Co.
Resembles green soap. Miscible with water.
4. H 4000; Verne Hollander
Clear, kerosene odor, forms white emulsion with water.
5. Polycomplex A-11; Guardian Chem. Corp.
A somewhat viscous, clear, liquid miscible with water.
6. Surfemul #5; 3C Chemical Corp.
A milky-white aqueous dispersion.
7. Unico; Universal Supply Co.
Resembles green soap. Miscible with water.
The bioassay conducted for the Union Oil Company was a static
type carried out according to the procedures of the Standard Methods for the
Examination of Water and Wastewater, Twelfth Edition. (1965)
Two containers of five fish each in six liters of artificial sea water
were used for each dilution level of each sample. At least four dilution
levels were used for each surfactant sample. At least ten control fish were
similarly treated for each sample series. Each container was aerated
slowly with filtered air throughout each test. This was necessary to main-
tain the dissolved oxygen level above 4 mg/L.
-------
12-24
The dissolved oxygen (DO) was measured using a Precision Scientific
Co. galvanic cell oxygen analyzer. The analyzer was calibrated in air
saturated artificial seawater. The known value of 7. 3 mg oxygen per liter
of seawater at 21 °C was used. Tables supplied by Precision Scientific Co.
were used to convert meter readings to mg/L.
The pH value of each test container was recorded using a Coleman
pH meter.
The water temperature throughout the test remained at 21-22 °C.
The fish used (Fundulus parvipinnis) in the Union Oil Company
bioassay were obtained from the brackish water areas just to the south of
Seal Beach. The fish were collected at high tide at different intervals using
a small seine. The fish were acclimatized for at least 14 days to laboratory
conditions before use. They were fed frozen brine shrimp once a day except
for two days preceeding a test.
Artificial seawater mixed 2:1 with ocean water was used to
acclimatize the fish. Artificial seawater alone was used as dilution water
for the surfactants in each test to avoid other contaminants. This was
permissible since no exact source was specified and the concentrations of
salts were within the accepted range.
The weight of all fish in each test container averaged 2 to 2-1/2 g/£.
Preliminary exploratory tests had to be conducted for each sample
because at the time of the test little information had been found in the
literature and no other indication of the tolerance of fish to the material
was known. In some cases a second preliminary test was necessary as
the concentrations in the first test were in steps of one-hundred.
Results
Surfactant 24 hr TL in ppm 96 hr TL in ppm
————^————-^—-———— 111 m
ARA Bilge Cleaner 128 128
Corexit 7664 15, 900 (?) 7, 200
Grain OD-2 125 (?) 118
H-4000 118 81
Polycomplex A-11 225 134
Surfemul #5 350 350
Unico 220 220
All 70 control fish survived the test.
-------
12-25
Discussion
A reduction in toxicity of the surfactants was apparent in the static
tests. In four of the samples the 24 hr TL and the 96 hr TL were the
mm
same. A semi-dynamics test in which the liquids test is periodically
renewed in order to nullify the loss from volatilization of the test materials
would enable more precise measurement of tolerance.
The pH appeared virtually independent of the material tested and the
tolerance of the fish to the material. The dilution water used for the
May 6th tests was somewhat lower in pH than that run previously. A check
shows no effect of this decrease on the significance of the test.
The 24 hr TL of Corexit 7664 was determined by drawing a line
from the single point of 70% survival parallel to the line for the 96 hr TLm.
This is because no point higher in concentration than 10, 000 ppm was
established.
Generally when two test concentrations one above and one below
the TL have proved unquestionably lethal to some (about 20% or more) but
not to all of the test animals, the determination of survival percentages at
intermediate concentrations is not essential. This was only achieved in
two of the samples tested here. However, as stated in Standard Methods,
testing of more concentrations may not be justifiable when the increase
reliability of the estimate thus achieved has no immediate practical
import. Lacking any knowledge to the contrary, the intervals used in this
test are presumed satisfactory.
Reference:
Standard Methods for the Examination of Water
and Wastewater, 12th ed. , 1966.
American Public Health Association, Inc. ,
1790 Broadway, New York, New York 10019
May 12, 1969
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12-26
SECTION 12.0 REFERENCES
1. Johnson, W. C. Biological Input of Oil Spill from Offshore Oil Well
Break. Memo to R. C. Bain, Chief, Operations Section, California-
Nevada Basins, FWPCA, February 19, 1969, 4 pp.
2. State of California Water Pollution Control Board. Oceanographic
Survey of the Continental Shelf Area of Southern California. Water
Pollution Control Board, Sacramento, California, Publication No. 20,
560pp. 1959.
3. Shanks, Warren, Biologist, Bureau of Sport Fisheries & Wildlife,
Portland, Oregon. Personal Interview, April 3, 1969.
4. Drinkwater, Dr. Barbara, University of California at Santa Barbara,
Personal Communication, April 7, 1969.
5. Hemphill, Jack E. Report - Santa Barbara Channel Oil Spill.
Manuscript for presentation to the Hearings of the U. S. Senate,
Santa Barbara, California, February 24-25, 1969, Bureau of Sport
Fisheries and Wildlife, 5 pp.
6. Dawson E. Yale. (Allan Hancock Found. - Oceanographic Survey)
Section IV. A primary report on the benthic marine flora of
Southern California. In Oceanographic Survey of the Continental Shelf
of Southern California, pp. 169-264, State Water Pollution Control
Board, Sacramento, California Publication No. 20, 1959.
7. Neushul, Michael. Personal Interview, March 20, 1969, UCSB.
8. Seeley, Charles. Trip Report: Santa Barbara Oil Spill, February 5-14,
1969. Memo to Chief, Operations Branch, Calif. Nevada Basins,
FWPCA, February 25, 1969, 4 pp.
9. Glude, John B. Observations on the Effects of the Santa Barbara Oil
Spill on Intertidal Species. Draft of John B. Glude, Deputy Regional
Director, Pacific Northwest Region, BCF, Seattle, Wash., April 10,
1969, 9 pp.
10. Turner, Charles H. Inshore Survey of Santa Barbara Oil Spill.
California State Department of Fish and Game, Cruise Report 69A2,
Feb. 5-6; Feb. 11-14; 1969, 3 pp.
11. Anonymous. Oil-spill damage to marine life scant. The Oil and Gas
Journal, March 17, 1969, pp. 65-68.
12. North, Wheeler J. and Carl L. Hubbs. (ed) 1968. Utilization of Kelp -
Bed Resources in Southern California. California State Department of
Fish and Game, Fish Bulletin 139, 264 pp.
13. Smith, Paul. Cruise Report - R/V David Starr Jordan, Cruise 33.
USFWS, BCF, 5 pp. 1969.
14. Smith, Paul and Reuben Lasker. Appendum to Cruise Report #33, Crude
Oil Reconnaissance. U. S. Government Memorandum 3201. 6,
February 18, 1969, 2 pp. Also Commercial Fisheries Review, Vol. 31,
No. 3, March 1969, pp. 6, 7.
-------
12-27
15. Hof, Charles. "What Role Have the Biologists at UCSB Played in M
Solving the Problems Demonstrated by the Blowout on Platform A?
Typewritten Report for Political Science 166 (UCSB), 11 pp. 1969.
16. Mais, K. F. Pelagic Fish Survey of Santa Barbara Oil Spill.
California State Department of Fish and Game, Cruise Report 69A4,
February 18, 1969, 4pp.
17. Jow, Tom. Preliminary Cruise Report. California State Department
of Fish and Game, February 3-7, 11, 1969, 3pp.
18. Turner, Charles H. and Jack Prescott, California State Department of
Fish and Game, Personal Interview, April 10, 1969.
19: Roppel, Al. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (USFWS). Personal
Interview, April 4, 1969.
20. Brownell, R. J., Jr. Letter to Sen. Alan Cranston, March 24, 1969.
21. Seeley, Charles M. Trip Report to Pt. Molate Whaling Station and
Autopsy of the Pacifica California Grey Whale Specimen. U. S.
Government Memo, March 17, 1969, 2pp.
22. Merrill, John. FWPCA, Personal Interview, March 20-21, 1969.
23 Zobell, C. E. The Occurrence, Effects and Fate of Oil Polluting the
Sea. Proc. Int. Conf. Wat. Poll. Res., Pergamon Press,
pp. 85-118. 1964.
24. Battelle Memorial Institute. Oil Spillage Study Literature Search and
Critical Evaluation for Selection of Promising Techniques to Control
and Prevent Damage. BMI-AD-666-289, Ch. 6. 1967.
25. State of California Department of Fish and Game. Progress Report
on Wildlife Affected by the Santa Barbara Channel Oil Spill.
January 28-March 31, 1969. 8 pp.
26. Clawson, R. H. U. S. Government Memo Re: Biota on Pilings
Supporting Steam's Wharf. Mimeo. 1 p. 1969.
27. Straughan, D. Breeding Activity of Intertidal Species. USC, Allen
Hancock Foundation, Mimeo, 2 pp. 1969.
28. Federal Water Pollution Control Administration. Report on Whale
Tissue. 17 March 1969. Mimeo, 2pp.
29. Gaines, T. H. "Notes on Pollution Control, Santa Barbara", undated,
Appendix III.
-------
13-1
13.0 ON-GOING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Numerous research and development programs in the overall field
of oil pollution have been proposed, are currently underway, or are anti-
cipated in the future. Since it is important that workers in the field know of,
and are in contact with, complementary efforts, Table 13. 1 is attached
summarizing twenty-three publicly sponsored research programs underway
as of mid-May, 1969. This table does not include the various Federal and
State agency in-house efforts or individual petroleum company activities.
Nevertheless, it is hoped that the summation will be of assistance in coordin-
ating various efforts and in avoiding unnecessary duplication.
-------
PROJECT TITLE/DESCRIPTION
13. 1 Prevention of Oil Release
1. In-Tank Gellation to Reduce
Oil Loss from Tankers
2. Development of Equipment for Control
of Oil Spillage and Systems for Aerial
Delivery
13.2 Control and_R«»toratk>n
1. Oil-Water Separation System
for Treatment of Oil Wastes
2. Prevention and Elimination of Oil
Pollution in the Buffalo River
TABLE 13.1. ONGOING RESEARCH In DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
MAY. 1969
ESTIMATED
PROJECT COST
SPONSOR
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
U. S. Coast Guard
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
CONTRACTOR/GRANTEE
Western Company $ 42, 290
2201 Waterview Pkwy. (1st Phase)
Richardson, Texas
Ocean Science and Engineering 290,710
Garrett Corporation Airesearch 78. 178
Manufacturing Company
City of Buffalo 737, 194
85 N. Vagora Street
Buffalo, N. Y. 14202
REMARKS
Onboard and portable facilities.
Air transportable tanker emergency
unloading equipment.
High Capacity (500 gpm) centrifuge.
Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory sub-
contractor. Evaluation of oil control
methods, particularly the air curtain
barrier.
oo
i
N)
Investigation of Recovery of Large
Marine Oil Spills by Use of a Vortex
Assisted Air Lift System
Test and Evaluate Mechanical and Pneu-
matic Barriers to Contain Spilled Oil
and Means for Removing the Contained
Oil in Harbors and Adjacent Waters
Analysis of Methods for Removal
of Oil from Harbor Waters
6. Evaluate Stresses on High Seas Oil Booms
7. Evaluate Use of Sand for Sinking
of Oil Slicks
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
U. S. Naval Civil Engineering
Laboratory, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command
U. S. Coast Guard
U. S. Coast Guard
Battelle-Northwest 29.880
Richland, Washington 99352 (1st Phase)
Maine Port Authority 100, 850
Portland, Maine 04111
Battelle-Northwest 16,750
Richland, Washington 99352
Hydronautics Inc., Laurel, Md. 62,790
U. S. Army Corps of Engineers 10, 000
Eighteen months' study.
Development of boom design criteria.
valuation of treated sand using
ooper dredges.
-------
TABLE 13.1 (CONTD) . ONGOING RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
MAY, 1969
PROJECT TITLK/DESCRIPTION
13. 3 Biological h Ecological Effects
1. Pathological Effects of Oil on Birds
Caught in the Santa Barbara Oil Slick
2. Ecological Effect of the Santa Barbara
Channel Oil Pollution Incident
3. Hesurvey of Santa Barbara Inter -
tidal Zone Transects
4. Fishes of the Santa Barbara Kelp Forest
5. Population Dynamics of Inter-tidal
Organisms
6. Effects of oil on plankton
13.4 Other
1. The Spreading of Oil Films
2. Oil Tagging Systems Study
3. Review of the Santa Barbara Channel
Oil Pollution Incident
4. Investigation of Microwave
Measurements of Oil Slicks
5. Investigation of Ultraviolet and Infrared
Spectra of Oil Slicks
6. Identification of R & D Requirements
7. Microwave Radiometric Measurement
of Oil and Sea Temperature
8. Chemical Determination
of Source Pollutant Tars
9. The Effects and Implications of Petroleum
Pollutants on Resources of the
Santa Barbara Channel
10. Evaluation of Remote Sensing
Data
SPONSOR
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
Western Oil & Gas Assoc.
Los Angeles, California
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
National Science Foundation
Office of Sea Grant Programs
National Science Foundation
Office of Sea Grant Programs
National Science Foundation
Office of Sea Grant Programs
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
CONTRACTOR/GRANTEE
University of California
at San Diego
University of Southern Calif.
Allen Hancock Foundation,
Los Angeles, California
University of California
at Santa Barbara
University of California
at Santa Barbara
University of California
at Santa Barbara
University of California
at Santa Barbara
New York University School of
Engineering & Sciences. Univ.
Heights. Bronx, N.Y. 10453
Melpar Inc. , 7700 Arlington Blvd.
Falls Church, Va. 22046
Federal Water Pollution Control Battelle-Northwest
Administration, U. S. Coast Guard Richland, Washington 99352
U. S. Coast Guard
U. S. Coast Guard
U. S. Coast Guard
National Science Foundation
Office of Sea Grant Programs
National Science Foundation
Office of Sea Grant Programs
National Science Foundation
Office of Sea Grant Programs
Aerojet General Corp.
University of Michigan
A. D. Little, Cambridge, Mass.
University of California
at Santa Barbara
University of California
at Santa Barbara
University of California
at Santa Barbara
Federal Water Pollution Control University of Michigan
Administration
ESTIMATED
PROJECT COST
31,000
150, 000
7,000
IB, 000
29, 000
17,293
27, 000
50, 000
22, 900
48,285
52,644
47,235
38, 000
16, 500
.0,000
16,600
REMARKS
Ecological Study. Principal Investi-
gator: Dr. A. Ebling.
00
I
Determine operational systems for tag-
ging, petroleum & petroleum products
with chemicals fc other identifying tags.
Principal Investigator:
Dr. N. K. Saunders.
Heavy metal concentrations in natural seeps
and production crude oil. Principal
Investigator: Dr. P. G. Mikolaj.
Principal Investigator: Dr. P. G. Mikolaj.
-------
14-1
14.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The following organizations and people provided information for this
review and their assistance is gratefully acknowledged.
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration
Mr. Paul De Falco
Director, Pacific Southwest Region
Mr. JohnC. Merrell, Jr.
Director, Technical Evaluation Office
Pacific Southwest Region
Mr. Kenneth E. Biglane
Director, Division of Technical Support
Office of Operations
Mr. Vern W. Tenney
Director, Enforcement
Pacific Southwest Region
Mr. Arthur Caldwell
Pacific Southwest Region
Mr. R. C. Bain
Pacific Southwest Region
United States Coast Guard
Lt. George H. Brown III
On-Scene Commander
Group Office, Santa Barbara
Lt. E. L. Seeman
llth District
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries
Mr. JohnB. Glude
Deputy Regional Director
Pacific Northwest Region
Mr. Alton Roppel
-------
14-2
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife
Mr. Warren Shanks
Mr. Alan Weinrick
U. S. Geological Survey
Mr. Harry Cypher
Branch of Oil and Gas Operations
Dr. Parke D. Snavely, Jr.
Chief, Office of Marine Geology & Hydrology
Mr. Herbert Skibitzke
Weather Bureau - Environmental Sciences Services Administration
Mr. Gordon C. Shields
Marine Meteorologist
California Department of Fish and Game
Mr. Howard R. Leach
Game Management Supervisor
Mr. Charles H. Turner
Mr. Robert Mallette
Mr. John H. Prescott
Captain W. H. Put man
Mr. Robert G. Kaneen
California Water Quality Control Board
Mr. Kenneth Jones
University of California at Santa Barbara
Dr. Robert W. Holmes
Dr. Michael Neushul
Dr. Barbara Drinkwater
Union Oil Company of California
Dr. R. C. Grog
Union Research Center
Mr. Al Percy
Union Research Center
-------
14-3
Union Oil Company of California (contd)
Mr. D. E. Craggs
District Operations Manager
Mr. K. J. Stracke
District Production Superintendent
Mr. T. H. Gaines
Western Oil and Gas Association
Mr. Henry Wright
Crosby and Overton, Inc.
Mr. E. K. Thompson
Mr. D. D. Shaw
General Marine Transport of Santa Barbara, Inc.
Captain Leon J. Tatro
Standard Oil Company of California
Mr. John Herring
Producing Department, Carpinteria
City of Santa Barbara
Mr. Donald R. Sathre
Harbormaster
Mr. Dale E. Bennett
Fire Marshall
Santa Barbara County
Mr. David K. Bickmore
County Petroleum Engineer
Aerojet General Corporation
Mr. T. D. Trexler
North American Rockwell
Mr. Robert Fowler
-------
14-4
Ryan Aeronautical
Mr. J. M. Kennedy
TRW Inc.
Mr. Peter White
University of Michigan
Institute of Science and Technology
Mr. F. C. Polcyn
Infrared and Optics Laboratory
-------
DISTRIBUTION
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration
U. S. Department of the Interior
760 Market Street
San Francisco, California 94102
Attention: Mr. JohnC. Merrell, Jr.
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration
U. S. Department of the Interior
Washington, D. C. 20242
Attention: Mr. H. Bernard 3 copies
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration
U. S. Department of the Interior
Washington, D. C. 20242
Attention: Mr. P. A. Martin 1 copy
Lt. G. H. Brown, III, USCG
Commander Group, Santa Barbara
U. S. Coast Guard, P. O. Box 218
Santa Barbara, California 93102 1 copy
Cdr. William E. Lehr & LCdr. Chas. W. Koburger
U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters
1300 E Street N. W
Washington, D. C. 20004
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration
U. S. Department of the Interior
Washington, D. C. 20242
Attention: Patent Advisor
Reproducible master
plus 222 copies
1 copy each
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Battelle-Northwest:
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W. H. Swift
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