WATER POLLUTION CONTROL RESEARCH SERIES  !5080 EAG 07/69
                REVIEW OF
       SANTA BARBARA  CHANNEL
        OIL  POLLUTION INCIDENT
fS. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR • FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION

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              RESEARCH REPORT
 REVIEW OF THE SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL
            OIL POLLUTION INCIDENT
                           to
           DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
    FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
                  ADMINISTRATION

                          and
      DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
          UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
                WASHINGTON,  D.  C.
                     July 18,  1969
         PACIFIC NORTHWEST LABORATORIES
                       a division of
           BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE
                     3000 Stevens Drive
                 Richland, Washington 99352



Battelle is not engaged in research for advertising, sales promotion, or publicity,
  and this report may not be reproduced in full or in part for such purposes.

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                                   11
                              FOREWORD
    This report summarizes the collection of factual data conducted by
Battelle-Northwest for the Department of Interior,  Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration and the Department of Transportation, United
States Coast Guard, under Contract No.  14-12-530 during the period
March 17,  1969,  through July 11,  1969.
    The research team was comprised as follows:
    W. H.  Swift                    Coordinator, Marine Science and
                                   Technology Programs  (Project
                                   Manager)
    C. J.  Touhill                   Manager, Water and Land Resources
                                   Department
                                   (Water quality aspects, disposal,
                                   and general review)
    W. A.  Haney                   Research Coordinator, Water and
                                   Land Resources Department
                                   (Geology, well operations,
                                   surveillance)
    R. E.  Nakatani                Senior Research Associate
                                   Ecosystems Department
                                   (Marine biology and ecology)
    P. L.  Peterson                Technical Leader
                                   Mechanical Engineering Department
                                   (Control, special problems, and
                                   restoration)
    D. S.  Des Voigne              Scientist,  Ecosystems Department
                                   (Marine biology)
    Acknowledgment must be given to the outstanding cooperation and
 assistance provided by the many interested parties and agencies involved.
 Special thanks go to the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, the
 United States Coast Guard, the Union Oil Company of California,  the Weather
 Bureau, the U. S. Fish and  Wildlife Service, the California Department
 of Fish and Game, and the University of California at Santa Barbara.
    Many others contributed measurably to the conduct of this review and
 their assistance is acknowledged  in later pages.

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                                  Ill
   It must be recognized that technical evaluation of the Santa Barbara
Channel incident, from cause through to effect, is still under consideration.
Thus this review can only serve to provide a summary  "back-drop" in the
hope of capturing some of the tenuous and hence perishable lessons from
the experience.
   The main issue at hand is that when the next incident occurs, regardless
of origin, all concerned will be in an improved position to cope with the
situation.

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                                  IV
                             CONTENTS
1.0   INTRODUCTION    .     .      .     .      .     .     .     .1-1
      1.1  Background    .     .      .     .      .     .     •     .1-1
      1.2  Purpose of Study    .      .     .      .     .     .     .1-2
      1.3  Scope of Review    .      .     .      .     .     •     .1-2
2.0   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS     .....    2-1
      2.1  Description of the Source       .....    2-1
      2.2  Nature of Oil Spread and Surveillance .     .     .     .    2-1
      2.3  Control at Source   .......    2-3
      2.4  Control of Released Oil at Sea  .      .          .     .2-3
      2.5  Defensive Measures       .     .      .          .     .    2-5
      2.6  Shoreline Restoration Methods  .....    2-5
      2.1  Disposal of Recovered Oil      .....    2-6
      2.8  Biology and Ecology       .     .      .     .     .     .2-7

3.0   ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS	3-1
      3.1  Geography    .     .      .     .      •     •     •     .3-1
      3.2  Prevailing Meteorological Conditions      .     .     .    3-1
      3.3  Oceanographic Conditions      .      .     .     .     .3-2
4.0   DESCRIPTION OF THE SOURCE    .      .     .     .     .4-1
      4.1  General Geology    .      .     .      .     .     .     .4-1
      4.2  Well Operations    .......    4-4
      4.3  Areal Distribution and Chronology    .     .      .     .4-8
5. 0   MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCY
      PLANNING	5-1
      5. 1  Preplanning Activities    .     .      .     .      .     .5-2
      5.2  Initial Actions .     .......    5-3
      5.3  Regional Operating Team  Activities   .     .      .     .    5-4
      5.4  On-Scene Actions   .......    5-4
6.0   CONTROL OF RELEASED OIL	6-1
      6.1  Control at Source   .      .     .      .     .      .     .6-1
      6.2  Control at Sea     .......    6-6
      6.3  Defense of Harbors       .     .      .     .      .         6-17
      6.4  Defense of Beaches       ......    6-23
      Appended Information from  Union Oil Company
      of California       •     •      •     •      •          •     •    6~24
7.0   SURVEILLANCE   ....••••    1~l
      7.1  Visual Observation       .     .      .     .     •     .7-1
      7.2  Photographic       .      .     •      •     •      •     .7-2
      7.3  Remote Sensors    .......    7-4
8.0   DISTRIBUTION AND BEHAVIOR OF OIL AT SEA      .     .8-1
      8.1  Spread and Path of Oil Movement  - Chronology    .     .    8-1
      8.2  Breakup Behavior of Slick     .      .     •      •     .8-2
      8.3  Changes in Physical and Chemical Properties    .     .    8-2
      8.4  Interaction with Offshore Kelp Beds   ....    8-5

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9.0  BEACH AND HARBOR PROBLEMS	9-1
     9.1  Winter Storm Effects     .     .     .     .     .     .9-1
     9.2  Fire Hazards       .......    9-3
     9.3  Special Constraints       .  .   .     .     .     .     .    9-4
     9.4  Littoral Sand Transport  .     .     .     .     .     .    9-6
10.0 SHORELINE RESTORATION METHODS    ....   10-1
     10.1  Beaches     ........   10-1
     10.2  Cleaning of Harbors     ......   10-7
     10.3  Cleaning of Rocks and Jetties        ....   10-10
11.0 DISPOSAL OF WASTES AND RECOVERED OIL       .     .   11-1
     11.1  In-Place Burning   ......     .   11-1
     11.2  Landfill Disposal   .......   11-3
     11.3  Disposal of Skimmed Oil      .....   11-6
12.0 BIOLOGICAL AND ECOLOGICAL SURVEYS AND FINDINGS .   12-1
     12.1  Sea Birds	12-2
     12.2 Intertidal and Nearshore Communities     .     .     .12-8
     12.3 Offshore and Benthic Surveys        ....   12-14
     12.4 Marine Mammals       .     .     .     .     •     .12-17
     12.5 Related Studies and Events    .....   12-19
     Appended Information from Union Oil Co.
     of California      ......      •        12-23

13.0 ON- GOING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS  .   13-1

14.0  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	I4'1

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                                  VI
                          LIST OF FIGURES


3.1   Southern California Geography and February Predicted
      Ocean Currents                                               3-7

3. 2   Aerial View Across Santa Barbara Channel to the South--
      Anacapa Island in Background, February 14, 1969*1'            3-8

4.1   Santa Barbara Channel Showing Location of Platform A
      and Position of Geologic Cross Sections                        4-2

4.2   Structural Sections East (A-A1) and West (B-B1) of
      Platform A                                                   4-3

4. 3   Oil, Gas and Sediment Boils in Vicinity of Platform A,
      January 29, 1969,  Shortly Following Blowout'1'                 4-7

6.1   Platform A^'                                                 6'3
6 2   Large Steel Cable Reinforced Fabric Boom                     6-5
                                              (2)
6.3   Workboat Spreading Straw Inside Kelp Beds                     6-8

6.4   Workboat Distributing Chemical Dispersant                     6-9

6. 5   Oil Distributed in "Ropes and Windrows"                       6-10

6.6   Open Sea Skimmer                                            6-14

6.7   Inflatable Plastic Boom*                                       6-16

6. 8   "Sea Sweep" Being Readied for Deployment                     6-16
6.9   Straw Being Used Behind Log Boom for Oil Absorption          6-20

6.10 Semiflexible Boom at Shore Line                               6-20

6. 11 Air Curtain Barrier in Operation - Santa Barbara Harbor       6-22

6.12 Area of Low Upwelling with Air Curtain Barrier                6-22

7 1   Infrared Ektachrome - Contrast of Oil and Kelp                 7-3
                                                       (3)
7.2   Aerial Photography Panchromatic Film -  K-2 Filter            7-5
7 o   Nighttime Image (8-13u) of Platform A and Oil Seepage.  Flown
      27 March,  1969<4>                                            7.7
                             /o)
7.4   Remote Sensing  Imagery*    Ultraviolet  0.32to0.38tj
                                 Infrared     8.0 to 13.5^1           7-9
                             /o)
7.5   Remote Sensing  Imagery*  '  Ultraviolet  0.32to0.38|j
                                 Infrared     0. Stol.Ou            7-10
                                       (3)
7.6   Remote Sensing  Imagery-Kelp Beds
                                 Infrared     0. 8 to l.On
                                 Ultraviolet  0.32toO. 38^          7-11
(1) Credit Santa Barbara News Press
(2) Credit U. S. Coast Guard
(3) Courtesy Infrared and Optics Laboratory, Institute of Science
    and Technology,  University of Michigan
(4) Courtesy North American Rockwell Corporation

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                                    Vll

  7.7  Thermal Infrared (8-13n) Image Illustrating the Contrasting
      Hot Returns of Surficial Fronding Kelp and the Colder
      Streaks of Oil*4'                                               7-13
  8.1   Oil Behavior Near Platform*                                  8-3
  8.2   Oil Behavior Near Platform*                                  8-3
  8.3   Oil Plume Leaving Platform, 26 February,  1969                8-4
  8.4   Oil "Windrows and Ropes" Santa Barbara Harbor in Upper
       Left,  Boat Spreading Straw or Dispersant, 26 February, 1969    8-4
                                             (2)
  8. 5   Oil Streamers Emerging from Kelp Bedsv                       8-6
                                                    (2)
  8.6   Oil Streamers Approaching Shoreline Inside Kelp                8-6
                                    (2)
  8.7   Example Oil Location Diagram*                                8-7
  9.1   Storm Debris  on Beach Near Santa Barbara                     9-2
  9.2   Sand Deposits Inside Santa Barbara Harbor Breakwater
       Indicating Breakwater Porosity                                9-5
  9.3   Santa Barbara Harbor Dredge Maintenance                      9-7
  9.4   Oil Deposits in Santa Barbara Harbor Sandspit Covered
       by Littorally Drifted Sand                                     9-8
  9.5   Santa Barbara Harbor Maintenance Dredge Discharge            9-9
 10.1   Application and Removal of Straw on Beaches                  10-2
 10.2   Oiled Straw and Debris*1 *                                    10-2
 10.3   Oiled Straw                                                 10-4
 10.4   Oiled Sand on  Santa Barbara Harbor Sand Bar                  10-4
 10.5   Power Mulcher Spreading Straw                              10-5
 10. 6   Grader Modified with Tines Welded to Blade                   10-5
 10. 7   Removal of Oil from Santa Barbara Harbor Using Vacuum      10-8
 10. 8   Removal of Oil from Santa Barbara Harbor Using Straw         10-8
 11.1   Burning Operations on Beach                                 11-2
 11.2   Disposal of Waste by Landfill Burial                          11-5
 12.1   Location and Direction of Aerial Transects U. S. Fish and
       Wildlife Service, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife        12-3
 12.2   Santa  Barbara Wildlife Study—Aerial Transects Data
       Collection Form                                             12-4
12.3   Santa Barbara Beach Bird Study                              12-6
12.4   Beach Transect Sites for Intertidal Study                      12-10
12.5   Area Surveyed for Oil Spill Damage, 5,  11-14,  February,
       1969,  California State Department  of Fish and Game           12-13

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                                    V1U
                             LIST OF TABLES

 3. 1  Wind and Sea Conditions Santa Barbara Channel Oil Pollution
      Incident                                                      3-3
 4.1  Well A-21 Control Chronology                                 4-5
 4.2  Oil Release Observations                                      4-9
 7.1  Organizations Participating in Photographic and Remote
      Sensing Surveillance Operations                                7-15
12.1  Biological Stations (Beach Transects) Surveyed by University
      of California, Santa Barbara Students,  February-March,  1969  12-11
12.2  Dissolved Oxygen at Santa Barbara Harbor                     12-22
13.1  Ongoing Research and Development Programs, May 1969        13-2

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                                  1-1

                          1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1  BACKGROUND
       On 28 January,  1969,  during operations to shut in well A-21 on the
offshore drilling Platform A about six miles southeast of Santa Barbara  and
in 190 feet of water, a leak of mixed crude oil and gas occurred.  The well,
the fifth drilled from the platform, was at that time nearing the final stages
of completion.   Estimates of the rate of release of oil at any one time vary
by an order of  magnitude and are highly qualitative due to the impossibility
of making direct measurement of the flow rate or cumulative volume.
        For the first few days the re.eased crude oil largely remained at
sea in the Santa Barbara Channel. However, starting on 4 February,
southeasterly winds began to drive the oil ashore, resulting in  contamina-
tion of beaches, harbors and rocky coastline,  and initiating perhaps the
largest oil pollution clean-up operation that has  occurred in the United
States.
        The nature of the Santa Barbara Channel incident is unique  in con-
trast to other major oil spillage incidents such as the TORREY CANYON
tanker disaster (March, 1967).  The source was characterized as a continu-
ing one rather  tnan an essentially instantaneous release.  Thus, the threat
to beaches, harbors and ecology continued over an extended period of time
and complicated clean-up  operations.
        The Santa  Barbara Channel incident, particularly the restoration
and biological assessment aspect, was also complicated by the severe rain
storms that occurred both prior to and during the incident.
        The intent of this report  is to assemble the technical specifics of
the incident with emphasis on the pollution control factors. Discussion  of
the initial cause and nature of the release is beyond the scope of this study,
and is only briefly commented on to the extent it had bearing on the pollu-
tion control aspects.
        As pointed out in "Oil Pollution - A Report to the President,"  Feb-
ruary 1968, technology for control of major oil  pollution incidents  is far

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                                  1-2

from highly developed.  Thus reports of field experiences presented tend
to be more qualitative than quantitative.  Fortunately, as indicated in the
above report, contingency planning received considerable attention.  This
culminated in a "National Multiagency Oil and Hazardous Materials Contin-
gency Plan, "  published in September 1968.  The latter,  and subsequent
local agreements,  served as the framework for immediate  response  at the
onset of the Santa Barbara incident.  Thus existing know-how was expedi-
tiously made  available.  The management considerations in implementation
of the contingency p]an are discussed in Section 5. 0.
1.2  PURPOSE  OF STUDY
        The purpose of this review is to assemble a synopsis of defensive,
control and clean-up activities in the Santa  Barbara Channel in as much
technical detail as possible.
 1.3  SCOPE OF REVIEW
        The specific areas covered in this report parallel those in a pre-
vious review  conducted for the U.S. Coast Guard.    The  major areas
covered include:
    *   Environmental conditions.
    •   Description of the source.
    •   Management considerations.
    •   Control of released oil.
    •   Surveillance experience.
    •   Behavior of oil at sea.
    •   Beach and harbor problems.
    •  Restoration and disposal.
    •   Biology  and ecology.
   •  Current research and development.
       Numerous sources provided the information herein  reported  either in
writing or in personal verbal communications.  Although the review  cannot
be regarded as exhaustive in detail, every attempt was  made to fully cover
the breadth of the subject.  Thus, in  several instances the  sources ranged
from personnel  in administrative and technical positions to those supervis-
ing work crews  in the field.

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                                 1-3

      Principal sources of information:
      Federal Agencies
              Federal Water Pollution Control Administration
              U.S. Coast Guard
              Bureau of Commercial Fisheries
              Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife
              U.S. Geological Survey
              Weather Bureau
              National Park Service
       California State Agencies
              Department of Fish and Game
              Water Quality Control  Board
              University of California at Santa Barbara
       Commercial
              Union Oil Company of  California
              Western Oil and Gas Association
              Restoration and Clean-up Contractors
       Other
              City of Santa Barbara  Administrative Offices
              Santa Barbara  County  Oil Well Inspection Department
              Santa Barbara  News Press
              Various Agency Contractors; Academic Institutions,  Museums
       Specific and additional sources of information are acknowledged in
Section 14.0.  Written and photographic information collected during the
study is available on file at Battelle-Northwest offices in Richland,
Washington.
       Extensive use has been made  of photographs taken either by the
study team or obtained from the sources listed above.  It is hoped that this
device will emphasize the key points  that should be noted.

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                              1-4


                  SECTION 1.0  REFERENCES

"Oil Spillage Study - Literature Search and Critical Evaluation for
Selection of Promising Techniques to Control and Prevent Damage. "
November 20, 1967 Report to U. S. Coast Guard from Battelle-
Northwest.

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                               2-1

                 2.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
2.1  DESCRIPTION OF THE SOURCE
    The geology of the Santa Barbara Channel is relatively complex,  with
some stratigraphic units cut out of the local section sequences due to
depositional interruption or faulting.  Producible oil deposits have been
encountered in both shallow and deep formations,  and slow but continuous
ocean floor seepage of oils  and tars has occurred at several locations
within the 1, 750 square mile area for many years.
    Ocean floor seepage associated with the well blowout on Platform A
showed a high degree of variability with respect to location of the seepage
points and magnitude of release with time.   Such variability could be due to
either changes in seepage pathways resulting from recharge of shallow
sands and/or fissures, or to in-well and ocean bottom control operations
undertaken from and in the vicinity of Platform A, or to combinations  of
these factors.   In any event, release of oil occurred generally along a line
extending 800 and 400 feet east and west respectively from Platform A.
2.2 NATURE OF OIL SPREAD AND SURVEILLANCE
    Oil spreading,  influenced by weather factors, was highly variable
throughout the major period of the incident.  Oil slicks moved mostly  under
the influence of prevailing wind changes as surface water currents in the
Santa Barbara Channel generally  did not exceed 2.5 nautical miles per day.
Under slack or near-slack wind conditions, oil slick plumes generally con-
formed to expected surface current counterclockwise gyres in the Channel.
    Bulk, e. g. ,  "black oil" observed at sea tended to break up with  time
into "windrows" (parallel to advancing wave fronts) and irregular "ropes. "
Wind conditions were the predominant factor influencing oil movement and
persist ance.
    Observations of the oil slicks were  undertaken by visual, photographic
and remote sensing methods with most  of the day-to-day mapping of slick

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                                 2-2

 movement being carried out by visual observation from aircraft.  This
 mapping, together with surface craft daily observations,  provided a basis
 for predicting slick arrival times and locations at beaches and harbor
 facilities; and for scheduling both ocean surface and beach counter-measure
 activities.
    Both good and poor results were obtained using airborne photographic
 techniques (infrared,  color,  camouflage and panchromatic films)  to detect
 primary and secondary slicks.  Because of lack of timeliness, the photo-
 graphic or remote sensing data collected were not used to any appreciable
 degree in planning day-to-day control and clean-up activities; but the infor-
 mation gained from these studies indicates  that there is considerable poten-
 tial for developing such useful applications  employing these surveillance
 methods.
    Good contrast between oil and water was noted in the ultraviolet
 (0.32-0. 38u), far infrared (8-14|_t) and microwave (1-3  cm) spectral regions
 using remote sensing instrumentation.   Although some  ground truth correla-
 tions were obtained, additional laboratory and field control data are needed
 to realize the maximum utility of these 24-hour observation methods.
    It must be recognized that the primary motivation for surveillance of
 oil slicks under "disaster" conditions is the resultant operational utility,
 i. e.,  use in "near real time" direction of at sea oil recovery operations or
 advance warning to shore forces  and facilities of an impending threat.  In
 the former case, surface oil recovery operations must generally  be conducted
 during daylight hours and visual observations from spotting aircraft are a
 reasonable solution.  In the latter case, the rate of oil slick movement can
 generally be forecasted from meteorological conditions and forces appro-
 priately alerted.
    Thus the consensus of the contingency team is that the use of surveillance
techniques that provide a timely response is adequate.  Those involving
sophisticated methods or requiring expert and time consuming interpretation
have little pollution control utility under "disaster" circumstances.

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                                 2-3
2.3  CONTROL AT SOURCE
    Control of any pollution problem at the source and before it becomes
diffused continues to be the obvious and seemingly most practical approach.
In the case of the Santa Barbara Channel  incident, the source occurred
variably along a line approximately 1, 200 ft in length and under 190 ft of
water.  These conditions and exposure to open sea environment resulted in
general failure of attempts to capture the oil before it reached the surface.
Furthermore, the volatile and flammable nature  of the oil-gas mixture in the
immediate vicinity of the platform presented an often serious  fire hazard.
2.4 CONTROL OF RELEASED OIL AT SEA
    Containment of the oil as it emerged  directly  under the platform on the
surface could have been hazardous because of the gas concentrations and
resultant potential for fire.
    Attempts to control the oil on the  surface near the platform were largely
unsuccessful, principally due to the lack of satisfactory  all weather open sea
booms and effective methods of recovering the  oil as it accumulated.  In
order to encompass the entire area of surface oil emission, booms several
thousand feet in length would have been required  as subsurface currents
carried the oil horizontally from the point  of emission.
    Boom  systems are not presently available with a capability to contain
oil in an all  weather open sea environment. Positioning and mooring
present severe problems  in deep water and rough seas;  it is doubtful that
any present  system can function properly in conditions exceeding relatively
calm or when currents  exceed three knots.
    Open sea containment of surface oil is  probably most effectively
accomplished with floating booms.  A repositioning capability is desired to
compensated7for periodic changes in the  direction of drift as well as a con-
figuration permiting unrestricted access to both  sides of the boom and to the
source or other features in the area.   The oil must be recovered as it
accumulates with mobile skimmers or suction  devices.

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                                 2-4

    The effectiveness of chemical dispersant is considered questionable for
use on large spills and despite their use at Santa Barbara, oil was deposited
on the shore line.  However,  all persons contacted generally agreed on the
following:
    1. Chemical treatment of large oil spills is extremely costly.
    2. The distribution logistics problem is formidable.
    3. Natural agitation is not always adequate for full chemical
       effectiveness.
    4. Effectiveness is greater  on  thin rather than thick films.
    5. Permanence  of dispersion under field conditions is doubtful.
    6. Information on toxicity to marine organisms is sketchy.
    Straw and other commercial sorbents were spread over the oil slick in
the vicinity of the platform and near shore.   Straw, because of its ready
availability, low cost,  and relative ease of pickup,  was the only sorbent
subsequently applied on a large  scale.  It was found to sorb oil up to four
times its weight.   At sea  recovery of the oil-straw mixture with
mechanical devices was considered but not  employed and manual pickup in
shallow water and after straw washed up on the beach was generally
practiced.
    Skimming of oil from the surface at sea was constantly hampered by
environmental factors,  principally  wind and waves. One mobile skimmer,
an advancing wier or trough, was developed with a capability to traverse
slicks, follow and recover the relatively long "ropes" of oil windrowed by the
currents and wind, and recover oil retained by the kelp beds. The oil  and
water were subsequently pumped to decanting and storage tanks aboard
ship.  Several operational problems were encountered which should be
overcome by further development and tests.
    Ship-mounted  suction devices had utility for recovering the oil accumu-
lated behind  containment devices.   The suction devices employed were not
found effective for the recovery  of a thin film of oil and the systems
generally lacked mobility.

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                                 2-5
2.5  DEFENSIVE MEASURES
   The defense of harbors was mainly concentrated in efforts to boom off
the entrance and thus prevent entry of incoming oil.  Secondary booms and
other protective devices within the harbor were generally not employed.  If
an adequate supply of commercial booms had been utilized in the Santa
Barbara Harbor, the majority of contamination of boats and harbor facilities
may have been averted.  The oil which came over or through the porous
breakwater could not be prevented.
   The extremely heavy in-rush of oil at Santa Barbara presented an
unusually severe case.  Booming at other harbors was generally successful,
particularly if more than one line of defense was  used with removal of oil
as it arrived.
    An air curtain barrier later installed at Santa Barbara proved effective
in sheltered waters, allowing ready passage of traffic and capable of being
turned on and off to take advantage of natural tidal flushing.
    Due to their extent and exposure,  total defense of beaches was not
practical.  In some instances artificial  berms were created with construc-
tion equipment and high run-up of oil was prevented.
    In the majority of cases,  mechanical spreading of straw with mulchers
at low tide  provided a mat for sorption of some of the oil.
2.6   SHORELINE RESTORATION METHODS
    Beach cleanup was generally accomplished by spreading absorbent straw
before and  after arrival of the oil, pushing the mixture into piles either by
hand or machines, and loading the accumulation into dump trucks for subse-
quent inland disposal.  The requirement for extensive manual labor made
beach cleaning operations extremely slow and costly.  Motorized equipment
such as graders,  bulldozers, loaders, and straw mulchers were employed
as much as possible when available.  However,  many areas were
inaccessible to motorized equipment due to lack of access  roads or impass-
ability because of heavy seasonal rains.

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                                 2-6

   Two types of motorized equipment proved effective during beach
cleaning operations: straw mulchers or spreaders normally used to prevent
erosion of highway rights-of-way and graders with tines welded below the
blade for raking.  The need for equipment modification or more maneuver-
able and efficient motorized rakes to pile the oily straw  mixture is indicated.
    Although seeming unsophisticated, the use of straw (not hay) was
highly effective due to its ready availability, low cost, and ease of distri-
bution and subsequent pickup.  In  geographical areas where straw is not
readily available,  similar materials should be sought and tested in advance.
    Chemical dispersants were for all practical purposes not  employed in
beach restoration as previous experience with chemical treatment of
beaches had been unsatisfactory.
    In Santa Barbara Harbor, recovery of the majority of the  accumulated
oil was accomplished by vacuum tank trucks foUowed by manual spreading
and pickup of straw.
    The  only method found effective for removal of oil stains from rocks and
jetties was high pressure water washing followed by  sandblasting.   Either
wet or dry blasting was employed, depending on wind conditions. This
method is slow and requires extensive manual labor to remove accumulated
debris.
2.7  DISPOSAL OF RECOVERED OIL
    The bulk of wastes from clean-up  operations consisted of oil-soaked
straw, sand and debris (storm debris washed onto the beaches), and oil-
seawater mixtures recovered by skimming operations.  The solid wastes,
over 5, 200 large dumptruck loads,  were hauled to three major landfill
sites east and west of Santa Barbara.   Special arrangements  were made to
dispose of the wastes at these sites with cognizance being given to fire
hazard,  odor and water contamination considerations.   Several problems in
logistics were associated with organizing and carrying out this large  and
somewhat unique operation; and continuous advanced planning, almost on
an hourly basis, was required.

-------
                                 2-7
    Sortie solid waste material was piled and burned on the beaches;
however,  smoke and odor problems near the populated areas dictated the
abandonment of this disposal method fairly early in the clean-up period.
    About 800 barrels of skimmed oil-water mixture were trucked to
onshore processing facilities  at Carpenteria and Ellwood. There it was
blended with the crude petroleum feed collected from nearby producing
wells and cleaned to meet pipeline  specifications.
2.8  BIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY
    The earliest biological effect of the incident showed itself among the
sea birds.  On 30 January,  two days after the initial release, the first
oil-soaked dead bird was found.  Aerial surveys of the affected area were
begun and beach transects were walked daily to find distressed birds.  Bird
salvage operations were begun at two sites; the birds were washed with
detergent and held  a short period of time. By 26 March, about 10% of the
treated birds survived, closely paralleling bird survival rates of earlier
oil spill disasters.
    Total known bird losses through 31 March in the  area affected were
determined to be 3600.
    Personnel of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (USFWS),  the Federal
Water Pollution Control Administration,  the U. S.  Coast Guard, the
California Department of Fish and Game,  and the University of California
at Santa Barbara examined the intertidal and inshore areas.   Although these
zones were covered with considerable amounts of crude oil,  only minimal
adverse effects were noted.
    Several vessels of the involved agencies were employed to survey the
pelagic species.  Pelagic fish eggs, larvae,  macroplankton and basic
hydrographic data such as nutrients, light transmittance  and dissolved
oxygen were examined.  Acoustic  surveys detected schools of anchovy,
rockfish,  squid and jack mackerel.
    Bottom characteristics and the condition of the benthic organisms were
assessed by California Department of Fish and Game personnel; no evidence
of oil contamination on the bottom was noted at depths between 6 and
62 fathoms.

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                                 2-8
    Although the marine mammals in the area became heavily coated with
oil, no adverse effects or mortalities could be detected.  The mortalities
which did occur following the leak could not be attributed to the oil.
Scientists involved felt these were simply the "background" or natural
deaths which occur within any normal population.
    This report covers those programs which examined the short-term
effects of the incident. Investigations of the latent or long term effects of
the spill are under way.  General ecological surveys similar to those
previously conducted will be continued at three,  six, and twelve month
intervals following the spill.  It will be possible to then compare them with
surveys made prior to and just following the release.
    Independent observations made by biologists from other organizations
provide further evidence of the lack of any serious acute kills among inter-
tidal species.  As of May 23, 1969,  no direct evidence has been firmly
established that any organisms were killed directly by oil,  although there is
some evidence of kill by the low  salinity resulting from severe storm runoff.

                         2.0  REFERENCES
1.   Oil Spillage Study - Literature Search and Critical Evaluation
     for Selection of Promising Techniques to Control and Prevent
     Damage, November 20,  1969.  Report to U. S. Coast Guard
     from Battelle-Northwest.

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                                 3-1

                 3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
3.1  GEOGRAPHY
    The Santa Barbara Channel is an oval basin approximately 75 miles in
length and 25 miles in breadth.  The long axis of the oval lies essentially
on an east-west line extending from Port Hueneme on the east to Point
Conception on the west.  The area of the Channel is approximately
1, 750 square miles.
    The Channel is fed by a drainage basin on the north and east, bounded
by the Santa Ynez Mountains.  This basin encompasses an area of approx-
imately 2, 000 square miles.  As discussed in Section 3.3,  this drainage
basin consideration  is important due to the severe storm precipitation
conditions that occurred in late January and late February.
3.2  PREVAILING METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
    Meteorological conditions that prevailed in the Santa Barbara Channel
area during January and February,  1969, are of interest from the stand-
point of n ovement and breakup of the oil slick, the large quantities of
debris and turbidity carried into the Channel,  and the effect on marine
organisms of the reduced salinity in the surface waters and intertidal
zone.
    Two major storms occurred during the period of interest.  The first,
running from 18 January through 27 January,  although occurring prior to
the first release of oil, was responsible for severe floods  in the South
Coast Drainage District.  These floods resulted in massive deposits  of
runoff carried debris along the beaches and coastline and severely hindered
cleanup operations,  particularly the disposal of oil soaked material.
    On the positive side, this severe storm very likely resulted in a
lower than normal bird population in the area (Section 11.1).
    Overall precipitation for January was four to six times normal.   The
storn  runoff also carried with it large quantities of turbidity and
undoubtedly markedly reduced the salinity of the intertidal and surface
waters in the Santa  Barbara  Channel.  Rainfall for this storm alone

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                                  3-2
ranged from 10 to over 20 inches throughout the Channel and the adjacent
drainage area. *   The net addition of fresh water to the Channel proper was
probably on the order of 15 to 20 inches.  As pointed out in Section 3.3,
the Santa Barbara Channel is not rapidly flushed and hence this water very
likely remained in the Channel through the early days of the incident,
clouding analysis of any biological effects, as discussed in Section 11.1.
The extensive turbidity introduced very likely also hindered surveillance
and identification of the  slick spread.
    During February, precipitation in the  Channel area ranged from two
                      (2)
to three tin.es normal.    A second  major storm occurred during the
period 23  February through 1 March, probably  contributing 10 to 15 inches
net fresh water to the Channel.
    Available wind and sea state information is  summarized in Table  3-1
                                               (3)
 from data provided by the U. S.  Weather Bureau   and the Santa Barbara
                                      (4)
 Group Office of the U. S. Coast  Guard.v '
 3.3 OCEANOGRAPHIC  CONDITIONS
    The current structure in the Santa Barbara Channel is the most impor-
 tant single oceanographic aspect pertinent to the incident.  Figure 3.1
 indicates the general nature of the average surface currents expected
                               (3)
 during February as constructed   from data provided in  reference 5 and
 reference 6.  Current strengths are in nautical miles per day.
    Predominant features are the counterclockwise gyres (one or rr.ore)
 occurring within the Channel itself.  Along the northern side of the
 Channel, e. g., the mainland,  net surface current averages 2 nautical
 miles  per day.  Thus surface material here may require on the order of
 one month to move the length of the Channel.  In the  center of the Channel,
 the residence time of a pollutant must be considerable longer.  The across-
 channel aerial photograph (Figure 3. 2) illustrates the gyre effect.   Anacapa
 Island  appears in the background.
    During March, the surface drift off Southern California shifts to set
predominantly southeasterly down coast with typical  velocities of 1  to
 2 nautical miles/day.

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                                 3-3
     TABLE 3.1.
      Wind and Sea Conditions Santa Barbara Channel
      Oil Pollution Incident
  Date
Jan.  24
     30
     31
Feb. 1
Time
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1415
1800
0000
0600
0830
1200
1530
1800
0000
0600

1200
1240
1800
2




3




4




5



0000
0600
1130
1200
1800
0000
0600
0830
1200
1800
0000
0600
1045
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
                                Wind
                                         Wave and Swell
Velocity
Kts.
6
5
7
8
calm
calm
11
10-15
7
12
6
6
5
0
4
3
calm
(8)
11
15
14
6
6
calm
4
10
8
5
calm
5
0
6
3
calm
calm
8
13
5
5
3
13
12
Direction Height
°True Feet
250
020
160
090
--
--
250
230 (M)
300
000
290
135 1
160
--
330
350
--
(270)
220 1
5
320
090
030 1
--
020
230 1
230-260 1
250
--
010
calm
210
350
--
--
135 1
110
080
050
240
120
130
Direction
°True
—
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
190
--
--
--
--
--
--
270

--
--
220
__
--
230
235
--
--
--
--
--
--
—
—
110
--
--
--
--
—
--
 --  Indicates data not reported
 (M) Indicates magnetic bearing

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                              3-4
                     TABLE 3.1  (Contd)
                             Wind
                                         Wave and Swell
Date
Time
Feb. 6



7



8




9



10



11
12
13



14



15



16



17



18



0000
0060
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
0700
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800


0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
Velocity
Kts.
15
12
12
10
10
5
0
12
calm
5
calm
3
6
7
calm
calm
7
6
calm
calm
12
14
No
No
8
7
7
8
6
6
11
9
12
10
10
4
4
5
5
calm
calm
calm
6
5
calm
6
12
12
Direction
0 True
200
230
290
250
100
030

130

020

315
220
250


150
140


6
260
data
data
320
270
150
080
030
020
120
110
120
090
090
130
320
030
210



160
260

350
260
280
Height Direction
Feet °True
— —
2 225
__
__
2 135
__
1 245
__
__
__
__
calm
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_-
-_
_-
No data
No data
--
~_
__
— —
__
— —
__
__
__
_-
__
__
__
__
-_
__
__
__
__
-_
—
_„
__
__

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                                3-5

                          TABLE 3. 1 (Contd)
                               Wind
                                       Wav.e and Swell
 Date
Feb. 19
     20
     21
     22
     23
     24
     25
     26
     27
     28
 Mar.  1
Time

0000
0600
1200
1800

0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
Velocity
Kts.

calm
calm
10
calm
12
4
12
15
7
4

__
9
7
5
5
6
4
7
7
6
7
6
6
9
7
12
8
7
8
15
14
10
Direction
0 True
No data
--
--
220

300
250
250
130
190
120
No data
No data
230
250
050
220
240
070
160
170
060
080
020
260
290
270
320
190
250
320
310
250
290
Height
 Feet
Direction
 °True
      No data
                                           No data
                                           No data

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 Date
Time
Mar. 4



5



6



7




8



9



10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
0000
0600
1200
1800
1200
1000
1100
1100
1100
1200
1200
1200
1700
1500
1200
1000
1200
                                3-6

                          TABLE 3. 1 (Contd)

                               Wind
Velocity
Kts.
11
10
15
12
7
8
7
16
7
15
12
10
10
30
12
5
10
4
10
8-10
10
15
10
6-10
10
13
8
11
10
Direction
0 True
280
250
210
330
070
150
230
000
300
230
150
310
270
320
300
030
210
250
210
320
270
250
140
230
130
230
120
090
250
   Wave and Swell
Height
 Feet
Direction
  0 True
                                                     12
    Surface water temperature normally expected in February is

55-56 °F.    Tidal range (unadjusted for storm conditions) was 8.4 feet

in February.

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FIGURE 3. 1. Southern California Geography and February Predicted Ocean Currents

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                                              **

                                                                                             i o
                                                                                              I


FIGURE 3. 2.  Aerial View Across Santa Barbara Channel to the South - Anacapa Island
              in Background, 14 February, 1969 (courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)

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                              3-9


                 SECTION 3.0 REFERENCES


Climatological Data; U. S. Department of Commerce, Environmental
Science Services Administration; California,  January 1969,  Vol.  73,
No. 1.
Climatological Data; U. S. Department of Commerce, Environmental
Science Services Administration; California,  February 1969, Vol. 73,
No. 2.
Personnel Communication,  Mr. Gordon C.  Shields, Marine
Meteorologist; Weather Bureau Forecast Office, Los  Angeles,
California.
U. S. Coast Guard Situation Reports,  Group Office, Santa Barbara,
29 January 1969 to 9 March 1969.
Robert de Violani,  "Climatic Handbook for  Point Mugu and
San Nicolas Island," Volume I - Surface Data.  Miscellaneous
Report, PMR-MR-67-2, 25 October,  1967.
A. Fleminger and H. T. Klein, Editors, "California  Cooperative
Oceanic Fisheries Investigations, " Atlas No. 4, December  1966,
Scripps Institution of Oceanography.

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                                 4-1

                   4.0  DESCRIPTION OF THE SOURCE
4.1  GENERAL GEOLOGY*1*
       Santa Barbara Channel, approximately 75 miles long and 25 miles
wide, lies within the geomorphic province of southern California known as
the Transverse Ranges.  These ranges, a series of east-west trending
mountains and valleys,  lie in a position that is contrary to the northwest-
southeast structural and topographic trend of California. The channel is
both a topographic and structural basin that occupies about  1750 square
miles of ocean,  and is located between the coast of Santa Barbara County
and an offshore east-west group  of four islands. Depths within the channel
vary considerably and inconsistently with distance from shore. A  maximum
water depth of over 2000 feet exists near the center of the submerged basin.
       The thickness of individual stratigraphic units varies from place
to place, and in some locations units in the sequence are cut out of the
local section by faulting or depositional interruption.  The section as a
whole is made up of a series of interbedded sand and shale  bodies with
individual members varying in thickness  from a few feet to several hun-
dred feet.  Oil and gas normally accumulate in the sand bodies; and when
favorable entrapment conditions  exist, the porosity and permeability are
favorable,  a reservoir can be produced.
       Along the onshore and offshore areas of the  south coast practically
all accumulations of oil  and gas are complicated to  some degree by faulting.
Significant changes in the geologic section may occur over relatively short
distances.   As an example, Figure 4.2 shows two nearly parallel (about
10 miles apart), north-south geologic cross sections.  These  sections, as
shown on Figure 4.1, are  about equidistant east and west of Platform A
where the well blowout occurred. Recent exploration in the channel has
indicated that ". . .Contrary to some seismic indications, the geology in the
channel is proving to be just as complex--if not more so--than the crumpled
                                 (2)
and  faulted rock layers onshore. "

-------
                                                               4-       r-
                                                               I   ^ ~ ~~^i*?	•
                                                                   f3m                  ...
O OIL PROCtSMNr, FACIlITf
• DR1UINO Pl*TFOim       ,
  PUBL1C PARK
A PRIVATE PARK
A PftRK ACQUIS1IIOM UXOEII OlSCUSilDK
  HA8IN[ TEDKINAL
0 CEASE WITH iJ«l)I»«Ai[» COHPLETIon
  HESA EXTENSION
  EAST BEACH
  SUMMtRLANO OFFSHORE •  WEST POOl
  IIIHMKI ANIl HEAP, BEACH  •
  WEST |iII»'.IUN
  OOIETA OFFSHORE
  CARPENTERIA OfFSHORC EIIENSIOK
  [ASTERN ANTICLINE
  BUFFER ZONE
  ISLA VISTA FAR OFFSHORE
  I? Mil! REEF WESTERN DO"!
  1? KILE REEF CENTRAL OOHE
  I? HUE REEF EASTERN DOME
                                                             "
                                                              1   SANTA ROSA
                                                        ''

ii
 i
i
    FIGURE  4.1.   Santa  Barbara Channel  Showing Location of Platform  A  and  Position  of
                         Geologic Cross  Sections^!'

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SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
OFFSHORE-ONSHORE PETROLEUM JTUOY




    SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL
          PHASE I


 EFFECTS OF FKDERAL. LEASING

      Ovl«f Cen'-nvnlOt Shtlt


        »,.!!»..,., •.»..!



          PLATE  F
 DIAGRAMMATIC STRUCTURE SECTIONS

       ACROSS CHANNEL

 NOTE  Stciionl qf« tch*malic only end not
ttCTIOfl •-•
                     Platform


                           I

 i.
 i
,

                                              "
      FIGURE 4.2.   Structural Sections East  (A-A1) and West (B-B1) of Platform A
                                                                                                      (1)

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                                  4-4
4.2  WELL OPERATIONS
       The sequence of events related to drilling operations prior to and
following the blowout of well A-21 is presented in considerable detail in
references 3 and 4.  Descriptions of well-control operations subsequent to
the issuance  of reference 4 (February 9, 1969) were obtained primarily
from discussions with involved parties,  daily reports  and current journal
articles.
       Fixed drilling Platform A is located in the northeast corner of
Tract 402 (Lease OCS-P 0241) about six miles southeast of Santa Barbara
and six miles southwest of Carpenteria, California.  Operations on the
lease are  conducted by the Union Oil Company (lessees are Union Oil
Company, Texaco Inc. , Gulf Oil Corp. , and Mobil Oil Corp.).  Drilling
began on the A-21 well, the fifth well to be drilled  from Platform A, on
January 14,  1969.  Drilling reached a total depth of 3479 feet on January
28, and 13 3/8-inch conductor casing had been set  and cemented to  a depth
of 238  feet below the ocean floor (ocean  depth is  about 190 feet).  At mid-
morning on January 28, mud began to  flow from  the drill pipe as it  was
being removed from the hole preparatory to  running electric logs and later
setting production casing. Eight stands of drill pipe (720 feet) had been
removed when the "kick"  (blowout) occurred.
       Table 4. 1 following is a condensation of the sequence of events,
including well-control operations, which took place following the blowout.
       All five of the wells on Platform A were planned to be placed on pro-
duction in an effort to relieve the pressure causing seepage from the fissures
and/or shallow sands.  Also,  several  days following the blowout a direction-
ally-drilled relief well was spudded about 1000 feet south of Platform A
(from a floating rig) to intersect the A-21 well near the bottom  of the hole.
The intent was to pump mud into the well to seal off the high pressure zone.
The relief well was drilled to a depth of over 1000 feet and then abandoned
after the A-21 well was cement-filled  and shallow-zone recharge was noted
from several of the platform wells when they were produced.

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                                  4-5
                   TABLE 4.1.  Well A-21 Control Chronology
Approximate
Elapsed Time

      0
0-1 minutes
 2-3 minutes
 4-13 minutes
 14-25 minutes
 0.5-18.5 hours
 1-7 days
             Operations and Events

Mud flowed out of drill pipe 90 feet above floor of
platform.

Attempt to screw check valve on top of drill pipe,
mud flow 20 feet out of pipe, floor slippery, mud
flow ceased and heavy gaseous hydrocarbon mist
under pressure issued from pipe, eyes affected,
visibility near  zero, floor extremely slippery, instal-
lation of check valve abandoned.

Hooked elevator onto kelly for installation on drill
pipe, plug on standpipe broke off rendering mud con-
trol through kelly ineffective (attempt abandoned);
visibility restricted,  communication difficult, decided
to drop drill pipe back into hole  and shut blowout pre-
venter to contain pressure.

Blocks lowered to raise drill pipe,  slips removed,
hydril blowout preventer actuated to hold pipe column
while disconnecting elevator (ineffective).  Pipe
raised about 30 feet, pipe rams  on BOP actuated to
hold pipe,  elevators disconnected and pipe rams
opened to drop pipe in hold, blind rams closed to seal
well, flow from well ceased.

Bubbles noticed in ocean around platform, large boil
appeared about 800 feet from platform (Figure 4. 3).
Choke and kill operations attempted following well
closure were ineffective and thus abandoned.

Single stands of drill  pipe (check valve on  leading
stand) were snubbed  into the well to reconnect to
dropped pipe and circulate mud  to seal off leakage
into shallow zones, time consuming operation.  Drill
string was reconnected.

Upon reconnection, bottom of drill pipe was found to
be stuck and plugged, attempted to unscrew pipe below
check valve to pull pipe and rerun without  valve
(unsuccessful) so that gun perforator could be lowered
to bottom  of drill string to punch holes for mud circu-
lation.  Decided to mill out valve interior, milling tool
obtained,  valve milled, drill pipe perforated, and sea

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                                  4-6
                           TABLE 4. 1.  (contd)
Approximate
Elapsed Time

1-7 days (contd)
8-10 days
11-12 days
15-16 days
Subsequent to
16th day
                   Operations and Events

water followed by 3000 bbls. of heavy mud circulated.
Definite reduction noted in amount of oil and gas
emerging at ocean surface.  Decided to stop pumping
mud until additional mud and pumping capacity were
available.  Sea water continued to be pumped while
supplies were amassed.

Worked on assembling supplies needed to mix and
pump 14,000 bbls. of heavy-weighted mud into any
cavities and to build up the mud column in the hole
sufficiently to overcome pressure in the strata from
which gas was flowing. High winds and seas  caused
delay.

Mud pumped  into well at high injection rate and
pressure.  Boils diminished to a few small bubbles,
mud return noted.  Later there was no visible evi-
dence of leakage at surface,  and it was decided to
cement and abandon the well. Cement injected in
stages and well was filled to ocean bottom. Only a
few small gas bubbles were noted under edge of
platform.

Increased seepage noted, at reduced rate than origi-
nally,  extending out to 800 feet from the platform.
Adjacent wells put on production in an attempt to
reduce pressure in upper sand zone.
Several wells on the platform were placed on produc-
tion in an attempt to relieve pressure.  Cement was
drilled from the A-21 (blowout) well to a depth of
about 175 feet, casing was perforated,  and well was
placed on production to reduce pressure in shallow
zones.  Attempts were  made to cement fissures  on
the ocean floor (divers) through which oil was seeping.
Rough seas and  very restricted visibility made this
difficult.  Leakage continued at a significantly reduced
rate than originally and was believed to originate in
shallow zones charged through other wells that were
put on production for pressure relief.

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                                4-7
FIGURE 4.3.
Oil, Gas and Sediment Boils in Vicinity of Platform A,
29 January,  1969, Shortly Following Blowout (courtesy of
Santa  Barbara News Press)

-------
                                  4-8

4.3  AREAL DISTRIBUTION AND CHRONOLOGY
       Information on the ocean floor release of oil and gas resulting from
the well blowout consistently indicates appreciable variability in both the
location of seepage points and magnitude of release with time.  Such vari-
ability is not unexpected in consideration that the immediate release source
was believed to be primarily shallow sands and/or fissures recharged by
the deeper producing zones (via well bores and casing annulus) rather than
direct communication between the ocean floor and the deep reservoir. Also,
control or defensive operations carried out in the blowout and other wells on
the platform caused significant alterations in the pattern  and  rates of
recharge in the shallow sands and fissures.  Certainly, the rate of crude oil
release was more difficult to estimate than was the location of seepage areas;
although very restricted ocean floor visibility due to oil,  gas, sediment (and
at times storm) turbulence made exact pinpointing of seepage areas difficult.
       Estimation of the rate of release and cumulative volume of oil is
extremely difficult due to the impossibility of making direct measurement.
                                       (3  4)
Estimates by the U.S.  Geological Survey   '   place the initial seepage
rate at about 500 barrels of crude oil per day (maximum of 5000 b/d), and
the later sustained release at up to 50 b/d.
                           (6)
       More recently, Allen   provided a "conservative" release rate
estimate of 5000 b/d during the initial eleven days of maximum activity
followed by a near steady release rate of 500 b/d out to 100 days from the
initial release.  He  further estimates that the cumulative total was 77,000
barrels after  100 days.  This is equivalent to approximately 12,000 tons.
For comparison purposes, the TORREY CANYON release has been esti-
                     (7)
mated at 30, 000 tons.  '
       Allen's "conservative" release estimates are based upon a 1/1000
inch uniform film thickness over the area  observed to be covered. An alter-
native graded estimate of thickness (1-inch thick over 10,000 sq yards,
1/4-inch thick over 640, 000 yards,  1/100 inch over 1 sq mile with 50%
water-in-oil emulsion) during the maximum release rate period,  resulted
in an estimated release rate of  16, 000 b/d during the initial period.

-------
                                  4-9
       In any event, it must be recognized that the variability of oil

release in terms of volume and location with time presented a unique and
difficult to manage situation.  At one period the oil slick covered approxi-

mately 500 square miles.
                    TABLE 4.2.  Oil Release Observations
Approximate
Elapsed Time

       0
25 minutes
1 day
2 days
 7 days
 12 days
 16 days
                                     (345)
         Observations of Oil Released  '  '

Well blowout. Mud followed by heavy,  gaseous hydro-
carbon mist issued from drill pipe.

Drilling platform personnel first noticed bubbles in
ocean around platform. A large  gas and oil boil
(several hundred feet in diameter)  appeared about
800 feet east of platform and smaller boils appeared
in a line intersecting northeast leg of platform.

Large boil east of platform persists, smaller boil
(30 feet diameter) at northeast leg  of platform, lesser
bubbling in between and extending in line to 300 feet
west of platform.

Oil and gas bubbles subsided except the single boil at
northeast leg which had increased to 300 feet.   This
condition persisted with only minor changes for about
4 days.

Some reduction in the amount of  oil and gas flow noted
following addition of mud to A-21 well.  During short
time intervals the boil at northeast leg subsided.

Boil at northeast leg continued as the major seep until
mud and cement were placed in well.  Following well
abandonment, platform and aerial  inspection revealed
only a few small bubbles  issuing at the ocean surface
over an area about ten feet in diameter under edge of
platform.

Increased seepage occurred along  a line extending to
800 feet east of platform. Believed due to placing
another well on production.  Later, primary leakage
was at northeast leg of platform.  The slick from this
seepage was from 30-150 feet wide, extending  for 1-2
miles.

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                                 4-10


                           TABLE 4.2.  (contd)
Approximate
Elapsed Time                  Observations of Oil Released

26 days            Boil at platform leg predominates with lesser bubbling
                   500 feet east and 300 feet west of platform.

30 days            Minor oil and gas bubbling east and west of platform
                   appearing to stop.  Seepage persists at northeast leg.

31 days            Boil at northeast leg diminished and seepage along the
                   east and west lines was renewed.
                                                                     (5)
Subsequent to      Seepage continued at rate up to an estimated 50 b/d.
31 days

                      SECTION 4.0  REFERENCES

1.     D. K. Bickmore, et al.  Phase I, Effects of Federal  Leasing Outer
       Continental Shelf,  (Preliminary), Oil Well Inspection Dept., County
       of Santa Barbara,  California,  November 15, 1967.

2.     "Verdict Still to Come in the Santa Barbara Channel, " Oil and Gas
       Journal, vol.  67,  no. 9, March 3, 1969,  pp. 76-77.


3     E. W. Standley, et al.  "First Field Report on Union Oil Co. Lease
       OCS-P 0241,  Platform A, WellA-21,"U. S. Geological Survey,
       February 4, 1969.

4     E. W. Standley, et al.  "Second Field Report on Union Oil Co.  Lease
       OCS-P 0241,  Platform A.  Well No. 21, "U. S. Geological Survey,
       February 9, 1969.

5.     U.S. Coast Guard Situation Reports, Group Office, Santa Barbara,
       29 January to 28 February 1969.

6.     A. A. Allen.  Statement to U. S. Senate Interior Committee, Sub-
       committee  on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels; May 20,  1969.

7.     J. W. Smith.   "The TORREY CANYON Disaster, " British Associa-
       tion for the Advancement of Science,  Leeds, England, September 6,
        1967.

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                                  5-1

5.0  MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING
       Following the TORREY CANYON incident off Lands End, England,
in March 1967, the President directed the Secretary of the Interior and
Secretary of Transportation to examine how the resources of the nation
could best be mobilized against the pollution of water by spills of oil and
other hazardous substances.  This examination resulted in the report
"Oil Pollution - A report to the President, " dated February 1968.   This
report pointed out the need for contingency planning as a necessary first
step in combating major water pollution incidents.
       The national level effort in contingency planning culminated in
September 1968 issuance of the "National Multiagency Oil and Hazardous
Materials Pollution Contingency Plan. "  Agencies signatory to this plan
are the Department of the Interior, the Department of Transportation, the
Department of Defense,  the Department of Health,  Education and Welfare,
and the Office of Emergency Planning (currently the Office of Emergency
Preparedness).   The national plan further called for the development of
regional contingency plans  and for designation of a single on-scene com-
mander (OSC) as the single predesignated executive agent to coordinate and
direct such pollution control activities in each area of the region.  Accord-
ing to the plan,  "the U.S.  Coast Guard is  assigned the responsibility to
furnish or provide for on-scene commanders for the coastal and contiguous
zone waters, ports and harbors, Great Lakes and major navigable water-
ways. " The Department of the Interior furnishes or provides on-scene
commanders in other areas.
       While the authority to furnish or provide OSC's is thus vested in
these two agencies, it is recognized that where other Federal agencies are
present and have a greater capability, they may be asked to provide the
OSC.
        Additionally, where Federally owned or operated vessels or
facilities are involved, in any geographical area, the intent of the Plan is
that the Federal agency most concerned provide the OSC.  This means,  in
effect,  that the  Army Corps of Engineers (for dams,  locks,  etc.), the Navy
(for its ships),  the Air Force,  and other such agencies may assume the
function of OSC from  time  to time.

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                                  5-2

       The national contingency plan also provided for the activation of
regional operating teams (ROT) in the event of a pollution disaster with
representation from the signatory agencies.  The ROT as set out in  the
National Plan has no command responsibility, operational or not.  When the
Coast Guard provides the on-scene commander, the Coast Guard chain of
command is in effect.   The ROT advises,  except as regards "continuing
water pollution control measures, " where it has a veto.
       One  of the purposes of the regional contingency plan was to assess
the potential major water pollution threats in the area and to identify
resources subject to damage.  The regional contingency plan is also intended
to establish cooperative agreements with state and local authorities  so that
in the event of a disaster,  defensive resources can be inventoried and made
available with a minimum of lost motion and time.  At the time of the Santa
Barbara Channel oil pollution incident,  the appropriate regional contingency
plan was in the process of revision and not yet in full effect.  However, the
federal-state "Cooperative Agreement for Marine Chemical Spill Disasters
in and about the State  of California" had been promulgated and was amplified
by the U. S.  Coast Guard llth District "Marine Chemical Spill Disaster
Plan."
        This chapter is intended to summarize the management considera-
tions and activities undertaken by the various parties operating under these
contingency plans.  As of this writing (October 1969) the National Contingency
 Plan is being revised to reflect lessons learned from the Santa Barbara
Channel incident.
 5.1 PREPLANNING ACTIVITIES
         Although as pointed out above, formal implementation  of a Regional
 Contingency Plan had  not been achieved at the time of the incident,  substan-
 tive agreement had been reached between the State and Federal agencies
 involved and working arrangements were generally available under the
 "Cooperative Agreement for Marine  Chemical Spill Disasters in and  about
 the State of California. "
         Planning for coping with an oil pollution incident specifically in the
 Santa Barbara Channel was initiated in December 1967 under  responsibilities

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                                  5-3

outlined in the USCG llth District "Marine Chemical Spill Disaster Plan. "
Meetings were held during 1968 in Santa Barbara and Ventura counties with
Civil Defense, Law Enforcement, Harbor Administration personnel and
various California State agencies.  A total of eleven such meetings were
held from December 1967 through December 1968.   These meetings,
although not resulting in a formalized plan,  did serve the very useful pur-
pose of establishing lines of communication that later proved extremely
useful throughout  the incident.
        From  the industry standpoint, the Western Oil and Gas Association
had prepared  a Santa Barbara Channel Water Pollution Control emergency
statement that reportedly proved valuable in the early stages of the incident
in locating equipment and materials.
5.2  INITIAL  ACTIONS
       Following the initial release from Platform A at about 1100 U 28
January  1969,  the Regional Operating Team (ROT) and the Joint Operations
Team in Washington, D.C. , were alerted on 29 January as called for in
the National Multiagency Oil and Hazardous Materials Pollution Contingency
Plan.     The ROT met 30 January in San Francisco, California, to declare
an incident and was then  fully activated on 4 February to provide further
technical and  logistical support to the On-Scene Commander.  This initial
meeting  was held under the auspices of the 12th Coast Guard District in
San Francisco although the incident occurred within the jurisdiction of the
llth Coast Guard District.  This  temporary situation was later  rectified
with transfer  of the ROT  activities to Santa Barbara.
       The U. S. Coast Guard assumed on-scene command responsibility
                                                                        (2)
and established headquarters for  the ROT in Santa Barbara on 29 January.
At the request of the Union Oil Company,  the FWPCA granted permission
for use of chemical dispersants as necessary to protect the lives of the
crew on  the platform from fire and explosion and to control and prevent
further pollution.
       On 30  January,  the  FWPCA established a technical staff on scene
in Santa  Barbara to Provide coordination and technical counsel to the
On-Scene Commander and to the Union Oil Company on cleanup  and

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                                  5-4
confinement procedures and to monitor the pollution and pollution control
                                 U.
                                 (3)
measures.    On 31 January, the U. S. Weather Bureau established a mobile
forecasting unit at Santa Barbara.
5.3  REGIONAL OPERATING TEAM ACTIVITIES
       The chairman of the ROT arrived on-scene 30 January and was joined
on 31 January by other members or their representatives and the expert
team assembled by the Secretary of the Interior.  Agencies on the ROT,  as
well as representatives of the State of California, assembled skilled person-
nel both in the engineering and biological sciences field.   As  the need arose,
contracts were executed especially in the field of ecological damage assess-
ment and  to collect perishable information.
5.4  ON-SCENE ACTIONS
       At the onset of the incident,  Union Oil Company assumed responsi-
bility for  organizing and conducting the control and restoration activities.
Federal and state agency partification was directed at providing counsel to
the On-Scene  Commander and to the Union Oil Company,  and monitoring
pollution  effects in accord with agency capabilities.   Some State assistance
was also  provided for  restoration.
       Suggestions for control and cleanup were generated by the ROT and
On-Scene Commander.  While no approved regional plan had  been promul-
gated, recommendations were usually directed to Union Oil Company through
the On-Scene  Commander to satisfy the command intent of the plan.  Among
                          (3 4)
the recommendations were:  '
    1.  The need to boom at the source coupled with recovery of oil from
       the boomed area by use of barges and vacuum pumps.
    2.  The use of straw as a sorbent for oil.
    3.  The use of power mulchers for distribution of the straw sorbent.
    4.  The need to locate and provide on-land disposal sites  for oiled
       debris, straw,  and sand.
    5.  The use of vacuum tank trucks for removal of oil from.the Santa
       Barbara harbor.
    6.  That chemical  dispersants not be  employed on the beaches due to
       potential for driving oil deeper into the sand and producing "quicksand"

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                                  5-5

       condition.  Further stipulations were later placed on the use of
       dispersants at sea (Section 6.2).
    7.  The procedures for water  fowl rehabilitation.
       Personnel of the U. S. Coast Guard, FWPCA,  and Bureau of Sport
Fisheries and Wildlife,  and the California Department of Fish and Game
conducted aerial and  beach surveys  and monitored the extent of the oil
slick on a near-daily basis until March 1, 1969, and thereafter as required
fortheOSC.   The FWPCA also conducted water quality, biological, and
ecological surveys,  and arranged for experimental use of aerial remote
sensing.
       Considerable  effort was also devoted to handling and evaluating more
than a thousand unsolicited recommendations from vendors and interested
citizens.
       The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers provided assistance in locating
contractors and cleanup equipment.   The U. S. Navy provided the services
of a yard oiler and five pontoon sections/ The Office of Emergency Pre-
paredness  provided counsel  on the applicability and operation of emergency
                          (3)
legislation and regulations.
                          5. 0 REFERENCES
1.   DeFalco, P., Jr.,  Statement to Committee on Public Works, U.S.
     House of Representatives, February  14,  1969, Santa Barbara.
2.   Brown,  Lt.  G. B.  Ill, USCG, Statement to Subcommittee for Air and
     Water Pollution, U.S. Senate,  25 February 1969.
3.   On-Scene Commander's Report, "The Santa Barbara Channel Oil
     Pollution Incident,  January 1969. "
4.   Biglane, K. E. , Statement to the United States Senate Committee on
     Public Works, Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Santa
     Barbara, California, February 25, 1969.
5.   Gaines,  T. H. ,  Statement to Committee on Public Works, U.S.  House
     of Representatives, February 18,  1969,  Santa Barbara.

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                                  6-1
                  6.0  CONTROL OF RELEASED OIL
6.1  CONTROL AT SOURCE
    6.1.1  Capture Below Sea Level
    Several attempts were made to  collect the oil mechanically as it
issued from the sea floor.  Basically the devices used were hoods or
inverted funnels placed over a point of emission.  The natural buoyancy of
the oil caused it to collect at the top of the vessel from whence it could be
pumped to storage vessels on the platform.
    On about 16 February, a small  steel hood was suspended above a
fissure near the platform by attaching it to one of the platform legs.  Oil
was pumped to the platform through a four-inch diameter line at the top;
up to  12 bbl of oil per day were  recovered during this operation.
    A second hood, subsequently known as the "Barbecue Pit", was rela-
tively large and designed to be lowered to the bottom over a fissure.
The physical configuration permitted emplacement over the conductor
casings of the platform;  therefore,  it was of a somewhat irregular shape,
resembling a t'hree-sided tank.  The approximate dimensions were 40 feet
long,  30 feet wide, and 55 feet high, with a weight of approximately 25 tons.
The size and weight required that a large crane be used for loading and
emplacement.  Placement was attempted on 10 March,  but the hood was
severely damaged by waves and currents upon lowering, and it was sub-
sequently removed and  dismantled for disposal.   The device was never
operational.
    Structural and particularly emplacement problems associated with
mechanical oil capture devices become apparent when  wave-induced surge
forces in  an open ocean environment are examined.  The water depth at
Platform  A is approximately 190 feet,  under essentially deep ocean  con-
                                                                     (2)
ditions for the passage of waves with periods up to eight or nine seconds.
                                                                      o
The relationship between wave length (L) and wave period (T) is L = 5.12T  .
Effective  water motion for progressive deep ocean waves decreases with
depth below the still water level (SWL) according to the expression

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                                   6-2

 Ke ^    where K = a constant, y - vertical distance from the SWL (negative
 downward), L = wavelength  and e = base of Natural logarithm.  From this
 expression it is evident that water motion decreases to a lesser degree with
 depth as the wave length increases for a fixed vertical position.
    Emplacement operations were conducted of necessity in the presence of
 long period waves or swells of relatively low height. For the case of a
 wave period of 12 seconds, the surge at  190 feet below the SWL is 20 percent
 of the value at the still water level.  Therefore, emplacement operations
 must include provisions for considerable water movement and wave forces
 even at 190-foot  depth in a deep sea  environment.  These operations can
 become particularly difficult  (and potentially hazardous) near a rigid
 structure such as a platform  (Figure 6.1).
    Subsurface hooding of  emission points was hampered since  the emissions
 tended to vary in position  from day to day, and severe turbidity limited
 diving operations.   In addition, some of the emission points were as much
 as 800 feet horizontally from the platform which caused difficulty in piping
 captured oil to the platform.
    6.1.2  Physical Confinement on the Sea Surface
    Several types of floating booms,  including a rigid "corral",  were
 employed to contain the oil on the surface.  Most were deployed in the
 immediate vicinity of the platform to prevent spread of the oil until it
 could be recovered.  Attempts also were made with booms to prevent the
 slick from moving toward  the beaches.  In order to contain the oil as it
 emerged at the surface, very long booms (up to 1, 800 feet) were required
 since the oil spreads rapidly and surface currents caused the boom to take
on a catenary shape.  During  the early stages of the  blowout containment
booms would have had to encompass  areas of thousands  of square feet,  based
                                                                     /0\
on the estimates  of the boil diameter at the sea surface  (up to 300 feet).
    Booms and containment devices employed or tested at sea in the vicinity
of the platform to capture  or contain the oil slick included:
  •  Sheets of rubberized asbestos approximately 36 inches high and one
    inch thick.

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                            6-3



                      •    i
                          urn
                            *v--




FIGURE 6.1. Platform A (courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)

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                                  6-4
  • Log booms.
  • An inflatable boom 20 inches in diameter with a 30 inch skirt.
  • A smaller commercial plastic boom with skirt.
  • Rubberized fabric sheet with battens for stiffening.
  • A "corral" formed from sheet metal.
  • A lattice of steel cables covered with a quilted fabric material.
    The log booms were fabricated from telephone poles 30-50 feet long
with minimum diameters  of 12. inches.  Steel cables up to one inch in
diameter joined the successive sections and canvas wrapping prevented
leakage between sections. The log booms were assembled in lengths up
to 1, 000 feet or more near shore and towed to the scene.  This type of
boom generally proved to be ineffective in rough seas because of the
inability to conform to the sea surface, thus permitting the oil to  be
carried over or under. Skirts  were not used on the log booms.  Several
were destroyed by rough seas.  Approximately 5, 000 feet of log boom was
positioned within 1, 000 yards of the north side of the platform on
            (4)
5 February.
    The commercial booms employed at sea generally range in price from
$8-$15/foot (without mooring systems).  The cost of emplacement, posi-
tioning and/or holding is estimated to range between $20 and $50/hr,
depending on the number of ships required.  Makeshift booms,  such as
those fabricated from telephone poles,  are estimated to cost $4-$8/foot.
    The steel "corral" was an open cylinder approximately 30-35 feet in
diameter and  10-12 feet high.   The sheet  metal outer covering was braced
internally with structural members; 55 gallon drums on the inside provided
buoyancy.  It was to be towed to the scene and moored on the surface over
the boil with the intent that the  accumulated oil would be pumped out as it
collected.  However, the "corral" struck a leg of the platform during
placement and was  damaged beyond repair before it could be tested.
    A large boom (Figure 6.2) was formed from a ten inch square lattice
of 1/2 inch diameter steel cables covered by a heavy quilted fabric which
was claimed to pass water while retaining the oil.  The physical dimensions
were 10 feet high by 200 feet long; approximately 3-1/2 feet rode  out of the

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                                  6-5
        FIGURE 6.2.  Large Steel Cable Reinforced Fabric Boom

water.  Buoyancy was provided by plastic foam-filled bags on either side.
The 200 foot section was towed to sea for tests in late March and tested
for several days.  The short length  employed did not permit evaluation of
the effectiveness to contain oil.  However,  the boom proved strong enough
to survive at least 10 days of relatively calm seas.  The cost of this boom
was reportedly $10, 000 for 200 feet.
    An inflatable boom was also employed in the vicinity of the platform.
The configuration of this boom made it difficult to tow at moderate speeds
and it failed structurally.  A strengthened version was later used  across
the mouth of the Santa Barbara harbor but was  damaged by a ship.  A
third, further in.proved, model used plastic foam instead of air for
flotation and reportedly worked satisfactorily across the mouth of the
Channel Islands Harbor.
    Booming was often hampered by heavy seas and a number of severe
operational problems  such as structural integrity of the booms, mooring,

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                                  6-6

alignment and holding with ships,  launching from shore,  inability to
contain the accumulated oil,  and dragging of ground tackle.  One of the
commercial booms was damaged by a ship's propeller and had to be
returned to shore for repairs. (   The booms were often deployed with one
end attached to a buoy while  a ship maintained the other end on station.
The moorings often parted in heavy seas, thus suspending operations.
Positioning posed  a problem because lateral forces on the relatively long
booms and excessive towing  forces caused mechanical failure.  Floating
debris constituted a navigational hazard and its accumulation against  booms
also produced severe structural forces.  Booms that had a relatively high,
narrow rectangular cross section were subject to tipping and thus loss of
oil retention capability,  particularly if mooring lines  slackened.  Confine-
ment  of oil by an encircling boom placed around the platform, even if it had
been possible,  might have markedly increased the fire hazard and possibly
closed down attempts being made  to shut in the well.  Complete encircle-
ment  would have also restricted ship traffic to and from the platform.
    6.1.3  Chemical Dispersants
    Chemical dispersants were injected underwater near the emission
points on the seafloor to  reduce the fire hazard of the oil as it emerged on
the water surface.  The description of chemical dispersants in this section
is limited to those applied underwater near the source.   A further descrip-
tion of the dispersants applied to  the oil slick near the platform and in other
areas of the Santa Barbara Channel is included in Section 6. 2. 2.
    Polycomplex A-II was applied from the deck of the platform directly
into the boil of oil and gas.  Application was  made by pumping the disper-
sant through a line extending underwater from the deck  of the platform.  A
total of 25 barrels was applied in this manner up to the  latter part of
February.    Application was subsequently discontinued.  Typical applica-
tion rates of about one barrel per day were reported.
6.2  CONTROL AT SEA
    6.2.1  Sorbents
                                                  (7)
    Sorbents applied at sea included straw, perlite,    a ceramic catalyst
 support for sinking oil, (8) foam pads,    and micronized talc.  Straw was

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                                  6-7
the absorbent judged most successful and was subsequently applied in large
quantities.  The absorbents were applied primarily to prevent the oil slick
from spreading.
    The micronized talc tested was similar to that used to absorb oil
following the OCEAN EAGLE incident at San Juan, Puerto Rico.  Blowers
and fertilizer spreaders were used to spread the talc from work boats.
Following a test, the talc was judged ineffective because it could not be
readily recovered and its use was discontinued.   '     The ceramic catalyst
support intended to sink the oil was reportedly applied offshore on one
occasion to try to prevent oil from reaching the beaches.
    At least two types of straw were used—Bermuda straw and the more
common straw from wheat stalks.  Bermuda straw,  closely resembling
hay, is much finer than common straw  and, like hay, was found less
effective because of the much smaller volume of oil that could be absorbed.
Straw reportedly repels water and absorbs 4 to 5 times its weight in oil.
Straw was trucked to Santa Barbara from throughout the Southwest. No
information could be found regarding mechanical methods tested at sea to
recover the agglomerated oil-straw mixture from the surface and no device
is known to have been used for the specific purpose  of recovering the
agglomerated mixture at sea.
    Straw spreading was effectively accomplished by mulchers normally
used to spread straw along highway borders to prevent soil erosion.  Up  to
45 tons per day were spread near the platform in late February by two
ships.      Vessels were also used to  spread the straw near shore as  shown
in Figure 6.3.  Up to 140  tons per day  were spread  by vessels working
                                                 (12)
parallel to the beach a few hundred yards offshore.     Individual mulchers
                                                         (41)
were capable of broadcasting 8 to 10 tons of straw per hour.
    The effectiveness of sorbents such  as straw applied at sea near the
platform is doubtful as the straw-oil mixture was not easily recovered at
sea and tended to clog skimmers designed for removing oil. However,
straw does tend to prevent further oil  spreading.  Application of straw near
shore when the oil was certain to wash ashore did have merit as it facilitated
beach cleanup by minimizing penetration into the beach surface.

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                                 6-8
       FIGURE 6. 3.  Workboat Spreading Straw Inside Kelp Beds
                     (courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard)

    6.2.2 Chemical Dispersants
    Chemical dispersants were applied at sea for two purposes:  (1) to pre-
vent the oil slicks from reaching the shore as they approached the beaches,
and (2) to reduce the hazardous concentrations of flammable oil in the
immediate vicinity of the platform.  The application of chemical dispersants
was discontinued in all areas other than the immediate vicinity of the plat-
form (within one mile) for safety reasons when the FWPCA advised that the
chemical usage had exceeded the manufacturer's recommended application
ratio based on  the Union Oil Company  estimate of 2, 500  barrels of oil
released.      The use of chemical dispersants within state waters (three
miles offshore) was opposed by the California Department of Fish and Game
because of previously established policy banning the use of any chemical
                         (14)
deleterious to marine life.
    The majority of the dispersant applied to the slicks to prevent the oil
from reaching  the beaches was "Correxit 7664" and the application area was
normally in excess of one mile offshore.  Three hundred thirty seven (337)
drums of this dispersant were reportedly applied by two fixed  wing aircraft

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                                  6-9

and surface vessels between 30 January and 5 February 1969. ''    The
337 drums (~~2Q, 000 gallons) applied should have dispersed a minimum of
200, 000 gallons of oil,  based on the manufacturer's literature from
               /I c\
previous trials.     General observations were that the majority of the
oil that was located offshore during this period eventually reached the
beaches.
    The application ratio used was based on the manufacturer's recommended
                                                         /i 7)
rates and the Union Oil Company estimates of oil released.      Tne dis-
persants were applied to the slicks either from surface vessels, referred
to as  "Soap Boats"  (Figure 6.4) or fixed wing aircraft, normally used for
                                                                 (1 8)
agricultural crop dusting,  flying a few feet  above the water surface.
Application rates from surface vessels were typically one barrel per hour
with a spray pattern about 50 feet wide and  the ship advancing at speeds up
to three knots. Approximately 40 gallons/acre were applied by the fixed
wing aircraft.
   FIGURE 6. 4.  Workboat Distributing Chemical Dispersant (Courtesy
                 of Santa Barbara News Press)

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                           6-10
FIGURE 6. 5.  Oil Distributed in "Ropes and Windrows'
              (courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)
                                                                (20)
    The dispersants applied from surface vessels normally required
auxiliary "mixer" ships to provide sufficient water surface agitation by
their natural screw and hull wake.  These auxiliary craft normally
followed directly astern on both sides of the spray vessel.  Up to four
spray vessels and twelve  "mixer" ships were employed at various times.
The use of chemical dispersants was almost totally discontinued in early
March,  but resumed again later in the month.
    The policy of the FWPCA concerning the use of chemical dispersants
                 (21)
in such  situations    includes the following recommendations:
  • Application should be  restricted to areas further than 1-1/2 miles
    offshore to minimize the toxicity to nearshore marine life.
  • The rate of application should be limited so as not to exceed a concen-
    tration of 5 ppm mixed in the top three  feet of the water column.
  • Dispersants should not be employed which  contain solvents composed
    of aromatic petroleum fractions or chlorinated hydrocarbons.
  • Application should be  limited primarily to  the leading edge of the slick.

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                                  6-11

    The chemical dispersants used vary in price from about $2. 50-$5/gallon.
The dispersant sprayed from surface vessels was diluted with seawater
during application to the water surface in ratios up to 80 parts seawater to
                   (92)
one part dispersant.      The manufacturers generally supplied represen-
tatives and, in at least one case, operating personnel to supervise and
conduct spraying operations.  Based on manufacturer's literature the
chemicals should be able to disperse between 10 and 50 gallons of oil per
gallons of dispersant.  The amount of dispersants applied during the
incident (at least 37, 500 gallons), therefore,  should have dispersed at
least  375, 000 gallons of oil.  It is impossible to determine if this was
indeed the amount dispersed, but it seems highly doubtful as field con-
ditions  rarely approach the ideal.
    The rental charge  for the surface vessels employed to spray the
dispersant in the open sea is approximately $30-$40/hr and the "mixer"
ships probably rented  for $20-$40/hr.   The fixed wing aircraft used  for
spraying are estimated to have cost between $30-$40/hr.  Two of these
aircraft were employed.
    When applied properly,  the dispersants were effective in  removing the
slick from the water surface. Little or no quantitative information is
available pertaining to the long term effectiveness,  based on  continuous
visual observations of a particular area, of the dispersants used in the
Santa Barbara Channel.
    The following chemical dispersants and amounts used were reported by
the Union Oil Company from  26 February to 8 March,  1969.
                                          Amount Reported
        Chemical Dispersant	(55 Gallon bbls)	
          Polycomplex A-ll        2271/2
                                    20     (30 January to 5 February)
          Ara Chem                140 1/2
          Unico                       31/2
          Crane OD-2               19
          Correxit 7664            337      (30 January to  5 February)

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                                  6-12

       More than 150 products were reportedly offered to the Union Oil
Company as possible aids in treating the oil; most were not used because
                                       (23)
little or  no toxicity data were available.
       The question of effectiveness of chemical  dispersants was put to many,
if not all of the contacts made in this review.  There was no clear-cut con-
census,  although the majority felt that while the chemical dispersants
decreased, at least temporarily, the visibility of the oil slick, the net
effectiveness was marginal and the method was costly at best.  Most agreed
that mechanical recovery was preferable, if possible on the open sea.  Quan-
titative data for comparative dispersant toxicity and effectiveness are almost
wholly nonexistent and should be obtained under practical field conditions.
       Subsequent to the initial drafting of this report, additional information
was supplied by the Union Oil Company on tests conducted under their
auspices.      A portion of their report is appended starting on page 6-26.
It should be noted that these results apply only to the conditions  of the  tests
and are  not necessarily broadly applicable.
       6. 2. 3 Physical Removal
       In the first few days following the  incident,  attempts were made
throughout the United States to locate oil skimmer  systems.  Those located
were determined to be either incapable of open sea skimming or unable to
be  air transported to the scene.  As a result, no existing open sea skimmers
were brought to the scene, and efforts were directed toward designing  sys-
tems to  be adapted for use with available vessels.
       Offshore work boats were equipped with suction pumps to remove
the thick oil layers which accumulated on the surface and behind booms.
This equipment was effective when the oil layer was up to several inches
thick  The MV PIKE I was reported to have skimmed 250 barrels of an
                                                   (24)
oil-water mixture (ratio unspecified) on 3 February.     Later  in February,
MV WINN was fitted with a Union Oil-designed skimming device consisting
of  a square box or chamber approximately seven feet on each side. Buoyancy
was provided by empty 55 gallon drums on the corners.   An overflow weir
was mounted in the center of the box from which the oil-water mixture was
pumped  through the bottom of the weir to storage tanks on the ship.  A
curved boom was used in conjunction with this skimmer to collect the oil.

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                                 6-13
Operational problems were encountered when it was advanced through
the water (too much water recovered),  and straw reportedly plugged the
intake.  However, the device achieved some success when the oil was
sufficiently concentrated.  On 28 February,  off-loading of 218 barrels
                                                               (25)
gross, including 105 barrels of oil,  from the WINN was reported.

     In early March, MV WINN was  equipped with a side-boom skimmer
 designed by Union Oil Company (Figure 6.6).  Two self-priming,  high
 capacity centrifugal pumps were employed to transfer the oil through six-
 inch diameter lines from the skimmer to on-board storage tanks.  These
 pumps were typical of those commonly used for dewatering behind coffer-
 dams and are capable of alternately pumping either air or water containing
 a considerable amount of solids. Each pump had  a capacity of about 700 gpm
 and was equipped with a vacuum assist system for self-priming.  The oil
 recovery apparatus consisted of an adjustable trough mounted  transversely
 between two steel flotation cylinders in an open "V"  configuration.  The
 cylinders were approximately 26 inches in diameter and 20 feet long.  The
 opening of the "V"  was  approximately 20 feet.   The trough,  ten feet long and
 8 inches wide,  was in the form  of a "j" with the lower lip facing the direc-
 tion of advance.  The oil-water mixture,  after entering the trough over  the
 leading edge,  was pumped from the bottom of the  trough through one of two
 6-inch lines.  It was estimated that this device, as designed, would recover
                            (9fi)
 a 19:1 water to oil  mixture.     Two  17, 500 gallon  ship tanks were
 employed; one for holdup and decanting,  and the other for storage of the
 oil-water emulsion.  The mixture was held in the decanting tank approxi-
 mately 30 minutes  before transfer  to the storage  tank.
     This skimming device proved relatively effective while advancing at
 speeds up to five knots.  Initial tests recovered 200 barrels of mixture,
                            (27)
 including 72 barrels of oil.     It was the only skimmer used that was
 capable of traversing slicks and recovering the "ropes" of oil formed by
 wind and wave forces and which extended for considerable distances
 (Figure 6. 5). It was also successfully employed  to  skim the oil held up by
 kelp beds near shore.   Auxiliary vessels were often employed to locate
 and windrow the oil ahead of the skimmer.  The  capacity of the skimmer

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Rubber
Fenders
                                                                                            6 in. Hose
                                                                               SECTION A' - A'
                                                                                                              O5
                                                                                                               I
                                                                                                              > '
                                                                                                              .1.
                                             FIGURE 6. 6   Open Sea Skimmer

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                                  6-15

under ideal conditions and working in a relatively thick slick was about
25 barrels per day.  As much as 100 barrels of oil were off loaded every
three to four days.
    Operational problems and limitations encountered during skimming
were:  (I) the piping between the skimming apparatus and pumps con-
tained restrictions subject to clogging when straw or  surface debris was
encountered; (2) drag forces caused the skimmer to submerge and thus
become ineffective when the speed of advance exceeded five knots; (3) the
large physical size prohibited lifting the skimmer aboard ship and,
therefore,  transport to and from the scene was slow; (4) since a vessel
tends to turn "on its bow", the side mounting presented a maneuverability
problem in following a narrow "rope" of oil; and (5) splashguards were not
included on the outriggers or behind the trough and therefore some  of the
oil was swept over the device in rough seas.
    Skimming operations were not practical in winds exceeding 15 knots.
Rough seas prevented operation on many occasions.   Skimming was limited
to daylight operations; therefore, a considerable amount of time was  spent
skimming oil that had escaped during the night.  It is likely that the overall
efficiency of this operation could have been improved if the skimming vessel
did not have to spend a significant portion of time hunting for oil "ropes",
i. e. ,  some improved system of "spotting" would have increased the
effectiveness.
    The centrifugal pumps tended to emulsify the oil during each transfer
operation and severe problems often were encountered offloading the oil to
 receiving trucks  after the oil had been transferred between tanks at sea.
 A water-in-oil emulsion was formed with the approximate  consistency of
 light grease after two transfer operations with centrifugal  pumps.  Chemical
 demulsifiers were occasionally necessary to achieve transfer.
     Another skimming device,  "Sea Sweep", was constructed for use at
 sea (Figure 6. 8). This "Sea Sweep" consisted of two 800 foot sections of
 20-inch diameter steel pipe joined at one end  in the form of a "V" with an

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                          6-16
    FIGURE 6. 7.  Inflatable Plastic Boom (courtesy
                 of Santa Barbara News Press)
FIGURE 6. 8.  "Sea Sweep" Being Readied for Deployment
              (courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)

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                                  6-17

opening of between 500-800 feet.  Motive power was supplied by tugs.  A
recovery boat equipped with six pumping stations was to travel at the
apex of the "V" and transfer oil to storage barges nearby (capacity,
12, 000 barrels).   The device encountered severe mechanical problems
almost immediately,  and the length of the pipe sections was subsequently
reduced.  Because of its inability to cope with rough seas,  operations were
                                                     (28)
terminated in mid-February after one day of operation.
    Other schemes considered, but not attempted,  included: (1)  a large,
open bottom barge (140, 000 barrel capacity) to be moored over the boil on
the surface and the oil was to be  pumped aboard and decanted on the  scene,
(2) 5, 000  feet of gill net offered by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries to
                                                 (2 9)
drag through the water to collect oil-soaked straw,     and (3) commercial
kelp harvesters,  also to be used for the recovery of oil-soaked straw.
6.3  DEFENSE OF HARBORS
    6.3.1  Physical Barriers
    Most  of the ports and harbors along the Santa Barbara  coast  were
protected with booms strung across the entrances.  The booms proved
effective  in relatively calm seas if the oil was continuously removed as it
accumulated.  A commercial inflatable boom (Figure 6.7)  with a
relatively deep skirt was used at Channel Islands Harbor and at  Santa
Barbara Harbor.  Defensive booms prevented oil penetration of  the  major
harbors on several occasions during the month of February. Santa  Barbara
was the only major harbor penetrated by large amounts of oil, although
lesser amounts did enter Ventura Harbor.
    Harbors and sloughs protected with floating booms were:
    Santa Barbara
    a) 2, 000 feet of log boom extending south from end of Steam's Wharf
    b) 500 feet of commercial inflatable boom,  plus 1800 feet of cork
            (31)
       boom
    c) Commercial boom with small skirt
    d) Air curtain barrier.
                                                                      (30)

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                                 6-18
    Ventura Marina
      Log boom (3 rows)
    Channel Islands
      Commercial inflatable boom
    Port Hueneme
      Two log booms supplemented with straw between
    Point Mugu
    a) 2, 000 feet of log boom (a second timber boom was subsequently
      added)
    b) 2, 000 feet of plastic commercial boom
    Avalon
      2, 000 feet of log boom (not deployed because oil never reached
      this harbor)
    Sandy land
      Unconfined straw boom (placed behind artificial berm)
    Devereux Slough, Golita Slough,  Mandolay Power Plant
      Plastic boom
    Many operational problems occurred during placement and use of these
defensive booms.  Floating booms or their moorings failed at Santa
Barbara Harbor (inflatable boom), Ventura Harbor (log boom),  Point Mugu
(loy boom),  and Sandyland (straw boom).  The log booms seemed particu-
larly susceptible to structural failure of attachment cables, generally
because of rough seas or heavy storm runoff.  Large accumulations of
kelp reportedly exerted great pressure against the inflatable boom across
the entrance to the Santa Barbara Harbor. Four ships were required to
maintain position of  a 2, 000 foot log boom extending south from the end of
Steam's Wharf.     Rerigging or readjustment was necessary at
Point  Mugu and Ventura.  On one occasion the boom got out of adjustment
                                                    (32)
at Ventura  and permitted some oil to enter the harbor.     Heavy seas
broke the Ventura Harbor boom on another occasion and again permitted
entry of a small quantity of oil.

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                                 6-19

    Constant removal of oil accumulating behind log booms was necessary
to prevent its passage.  Generally straw was used to facilitate recovery
of the accumulated oil (Figure 6.9).  In  areas that employed a multiple
boom system,  such as Port Hueneme and Point Mugu,  straw was spread
between the strings of logs.   Labor  forces were on standby to remove oil
accumulation behind the booms if there was  any possibility of an oil slick
entering the area.  The necessity of maintaining standby personnel
(~ $7/hour per man) greatly increased the cost  of defensive booming.
    The defense of harbor entrances and features within the harbor can
require different types of booms. No boom  or  system employed was
completely successful for all of  the required protective functions, even in
calm water.  The protection  of rip-rapped or rocky areas such as within
the Santa Barbara Harbor was best  accomplished by either an unskirted
boom or one with a flexible skirt.  Rigid skirts extending below the water
would be obstructed by underwater  objects or often drift too close to  the
rocks,  causing tipping on a falling tide.
    Another problem existed on  sandy beaches.  Most  booms observed
could not accommodate the effect of tidal flow undercutting the sand at the
point where the boom entered the water, thus creating an opening through
which the oil could pass under the boom (Figure 6.10).  Rigid-skirted
booms or those strung tightly could not fill  the passage created.
     Large quantities of oil entered  Santa Barbara Harbor on the night of
 4 February.  The boom across  the entrance originally consisted of a
 500-foot section of skirted inflatable boom  (Figure 6.  7) and an 1800-foot
 section of an unskirted cork boom  stretched between the sandspit and the
 shore  at the foot of Steam's Wharf. Oil passed under the unskirted  portion
 as it accumulated behind the boom. (33) A mooring line subsequently parted
 and the shore end of the boom was  repositioned nearer the harbor jetty.
 The inflatable boom was punctured during the  operations and permitted
 oil to come over that portion.   The thickness of the accumulated oil
 behind the boom was estimated  to be up to  eight inches.

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                                6-20
FIGURE 6.9.  Straw Being Used Behind Log Boom for Oil Absorption
              (courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)
             FIGURE 6.10. Semiflexible Boom at Shore Line

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                                  6-21
    6.3.2 Air Curtain Barrier
    An underwater bubble or air curtain barrier was installed between the
jetty and sandspit at the entrance to the Santa Barbara Harbor (Figure 6.11).
The first unit installed was about 500 feet long and was fabricated from  one
inch diameter aluminum pipe with perforations  in the top.  Emplacement
was near the channel bottom. A portable trailer-mounted air compressor
supplied air at nominally 100 psi.
    The underwater bubble barrier caused an upwelling flow of water that
resulted in a surface current in both directions away from the point of
emergence on the surface.  The net current effectively prevents passage of
oil  provided that surface currents are not excessive and that debris does
not accumulate to be forced through by the wind.  An advantage of this
boom is that it permits unimpeded ship traffic.  It is also relatively immune
to damage by wind and waves.
    The air barriers employed were in the development stage at the time of
the incident and, therefore, emergency units were not available. The first
unit,  installed in mid-February, encountered many operational problems
including compressor failure,  filling of the pipe with sand and water during
shutdown, a change of head due to  irregular bottom contour resulting in
insufficient air along portions of the barrier, inadequate upwelling in
shallow water,  momentary loss of effectiveness during the passage of
                                                            (35)
ships, and passage of accumulated debris through the barrier.
    The  barrier was normally shut down during ebb tide to permit the out-
flow of oil that had accumulated in the harbor.
    A second air curtain proved much more effective, although a supple-
mental floating boom was still required in the shallow water near the sand-
spit where inadequate upwelling occurred (Figure 6.12).  The pipe size was
increased to a diameter of two inches and the underwater line was mounted
about 15 feet below the water surface to obtain uniform air distribution.
Two compressors were used:  600 scfm on the jetty side, and 250 scfm
on  the sandspit end.   Check valves or flaps were reportedly installed over

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                           6-22

                                                .
 FIGURE 6.11.  Air Curtain Barrier in Operation - Santa
                Barbara Harbor
FIGURE 6.12.  Area of Low Upwelling with Air Curtain Barrier

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                                  6-23

the air distribution orifices to prevent the pipe from filling with water and
sand when the unit was shut down.  The original unit was left in place to
                                                                   /o c)
trap the oil that was carried past the barrier during passage of ships.
    The installation cost of air barriers is estimated to be about $4-$5/foot,
exclusive of the compressor, the latter at about $20, 000 for a 600 SCFM
                                                             (37)
unit.  Typical cost of rental  units is about $1.25/SCFM/month.      The
estimated cost of operating a unit that is periodically turned on and off
such as was done at Santa Barbara (including maintenance and surveillance)
is $3-$4/SCFM/month.
    6.3.3 Other
    The chemical dispersant "Polycomplex A-ll" was applied inside the
entrance to Santa Barbara Harbor to reduce fire hazard by dispersing oil.
This particular dispersant was reportedly chosen because it was known to
have a flashpoint in excess of 300 ° F.  Application was limited to  one or
two days following penetration of oil into the harbor.
6.4  DEFENSE OF BEACHES
    6.4.1 Artificial Berms
    Artificial berms erected in several locations were constructed of
either beach sand or soil.  Areas protected  by berms included a residential
                                      (38)
development on the Ventura  waterfront,     the upper end of the beach
                                                   (39)
lagoon adjacent to the bird sanctuary of East Beach,     and the upper end of
Mandolay beach.  A weir was constructed at Sandyland cove and a dike was
erected along a portion of Edgecliff Lane.  The artificial berms were
effective, but some subsequently had to be broken and rebuilt to permit
draining of water accumulated by storm runoff.
    Selected waterfront features such as bulkheads at the "Castle" at
Sandyland were protected with plywood and sheets of plastic.  Bulkheads
can be protected with plywood and/or plastic for approximately $3-$5/foot in
areas that do not have excessive wave  action.
    6.4.2 Sorbents
    Straw was the principal sorbent material applied on the beaches.  It
was applied both from vehicles on the beach and ships operating parallel

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                                 6-24
to the beaches a few hundred yards from shore.  Several hundred tons were
applied by these ships in the near-shore waters using mulchers (blowers)
developed for highway applications.  Vehicles equipped with similar
mulchers spread the straw in the intertidal zone both before and after
deposition of oil.  A considerable amount of straw was  also applied by hand.
    Limited amounts of "Ekoperl, " a proprietary product,  and talc were
tried but their use was discontinued due to cost and the difficulty in subse-
quent pickup.  Additional discussions on the use of straw are given in
Section 10. 0.
       APPENDED INFORMATION FROM UNION OIL  COMPANY
                        OF CALIFORNIA*41)
Qualitative Evaluation of Corexit 7664 and Polycomplex A-11 Dispersion
of G rude Oil on Sea Water
    A qualitative test of Corexit 7664 and Polycomplex A-11 to disperse
crude oil floating on sea water was conducted on February 9,  1969 near
Platform A in the channel at Santa Barbara.  The tests were observed by
Dr.  P.  J. Kinney and Dr. Don Button of the University of Alaska and
Ken Becker of Enjay Chemical Company.
    The dispersants were sprayed on a floating crude oil slick with dilution
water from  a moving boat.  Following were observed:
1.  There appears to be no significant difference in the dispersion ability
    of Corexit and Polycomplex when Polycomplex is applied to approxi-
    mately one-half the dosage rate of Corexit.
2.  When either Corexit or Polycomplex was sprayed on a black crude slick
    and not mixed by the wake of a moving boat, very little dispersion of the
    floating crude occurred at the point of spray entry into the floating crude.
    There appeared to be a sharp reduction in surface tension.  The floating
    crude oil pulled away from the point leaving a brownish wrinkled floating
    layer of thicker crude surrounding green water.  Microscopic inspection
    of the brownish layer revealed water in oil emulsion.
3.  When either Corexit or Polycomplex was sprayed on a black crude slick
    and mixed by the wake of the boat moving at 10 knots/hour, there
    appeared to be  good dispersion along the boat's path for a width of 150 ft.

-------
                                  6-25
    Green water was evident in the wake with small patches of black crude
    spreading out into iridescent and gray films.  The boat path remained
    open in the slick.  After one  hour,  a bucket sample  of sea water from
    the opened path contained many 0. 010  inch diameter and smaller
    spherical particles of black oil.  Some of the larger particles of black
    oil floated to the surface in the bucket and broke into an iridescent film.
    Many of the  smaller particles failed to rise to the surface of the sample
    after one hour of settling.
4.  When the boat was run through the  slick at 10 knots/hour with no appli-
    cation of dispersants,  the slick was dispersed along the boat's path very
    similar to the runs with dispersants.   The boat path remained open in
    the slick. The bucket sample of sea water from the open path appeared
    similar to those obtained in the dispersant runs.  There were possibly a
    few more larger spheres of oil that settled to the surface and decayed
    into an iridescent film.
5.  It was concluded that the dispersants tested were not significantly better
    than the mechanical mixing energy supplied by a boat's propellers when
    attempting to break up an oil slick  in open sea.
    Discussion
    The tests were conducted utilizing  the supply ship Pike I which is a flat
bottom vessel of 130 ft length, 30 ft beam and twin  screw with  1300 h. p.
All running tests were  conducted at 10 knots/hour at an estimated 70% power
setting.
    The dispersants were applied by pumping 200 barrels/hour of sea water
through a 1-1/2 in.  pipe by 20 ft long nozzle spray  boom mounted forward
and two 1-1/2 in. fire nozzles mounted aft. The spray system gave a net
30 ft wide spray application on either side of the vessel.  The dispersants
were  added into the suction of the sea water pump at the following rates:
                                    Barrels/hour (55  gal/bbl)
             Corexit 7664                     2-1/2
             Polycomplex A-11                1

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                                 6-26

    A black crude oil slick of approximately 200 feet width and 2 mile plus
length was utilized for the tests.  Thickness of the oil in the slick was
estimated to be approximately 1/16 inch thick at the center. The boat cut
across the width of the slick during the test runs.   Winds were slight at
less than three knots/hour from 310 degree compass bearing.  Ocean swells
were slight (one foot) with no wind ripples.
Polycomplex A-11 Versus Corexit
    These tests were conducted in standard glass sampling jugs with screw
metal tops and graduation tapes from top to bottom.
    Test I
    Water - 7500 cm3
                 o
    Oil - 1800 cm   (twenty gravity)
                              o
    Polycomplex A-11  -  125 cm ,  added to surface of oil.   Jug was inverted
with vigorous action six  times.
    Perfect complexing occurred.  Breaking time - 1 hour.  The separation
was not complete.  The salt water was still heavily clouded and instead of
                    3                                             3
the original 1800 cm  of oil, we now had a measurement of 2400 cm  of
same color density. Test discontinued at one hour.
    Note
    The manufacturer states that "for  complete dispersion you must have at
least 50 times as much water as oil".   In this test we had only four times
plus as much water.
    Test II
                         o
    Corexit 7664 - 125 cm  added in a duplicate situation to Test I.   Also,
six vigorous inversions of the jug were made.
    Breaking time - 1-1/2 minutes.  The separation was complete.
    Another 25 cm3 of Corexit 7664 was added,  and again six inversions of
the jug.  Breaking time - 6 minutes.  Break was complete, with a total of
       q
200 cm  of Corexit 7664 used.  Test discontinued.

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                                 6-27

   Conclusions
   Polycomplex A-11 complexed this crude sample completely, and proved
vastly superior to Enjay Corexit 7664.
Dispersant Evaluation
Material: ARA Gold Crew Bilge Cleaner
          ARA Chem.  Inc.
          808  Gable Way, El Cajon, California
   Summary
   ARA Gold Crew Bilge Cleaner has the ability to disperse the type of oil
being lost at Platform A in concentrations as low as four gallons of chemical
per barrel of oil,  provided the oil is relatively nonweathered and the chemi-
cal is applied with a great deal of agitation.  Chemical concentrations
approaching seven to ten gallons per barrel of oil added with violent agita-
tion,  followed by further agitation such as boat wakes gave rapid visible
results. It is infeasible and economically unsound to attempt to disperse the
oil once it has  lost its light fractions  through weathering and is approaching
the consistency of a heavy gas oil or light residuum.  It is felt that ARA Gold
Crew would work  excellent in quite  low concentrations on light oil spills or
iridescent slicks within harbor confines.  Its toxicity to marine life is
currently being checked by means of bioassays.
   Discussion
   Sunday,  March 2,  1969, I accompanied Mr.  W. L. Tinker, representa-
tive of ARA Gold Crew  aboard the  M. V.  "Coast Tide" for an evaluation
of the effectiveness of this  chemical to permanently disperse the oil slick
from  Platform A.  The system employed for applying the dispersant con-
sisted of a sump pump taking sea water suction, and a second pump taking
suction on barrels of the chemical,  admixing it with the sea water and dis-
charging the mix through two fire hoses equipped with 90  gpm nozzles at  a
pressure of 85 psi. The hoses were affixed on each side  of the vessel just
forward of mid-ship.  Application was made by directing  the nozzles straight
down from the  hull then whipping the nozzles, adjusted for a nearly straight

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                                 6-28

stream of water, through an arc of 10 to 15 degrees perpendicular to the
side of the hull.  This resulted in a violent agitation of the water surface
from a distance of about six to ten feet.   The strength of the stream alone
was sufficient to break up the continuity of the oil slick.
    Additional agitation of the oil-chemical mix was provided by work boats
plying  at fairly high speeds across and through the sudsy wake left by the
chemical.  The suds resulting from  application of the chemical are in them-
selves of little value.  Little, if any, chemical action was noted in the foam
line.  For  inner harbor work esthetics would be better served if no suds were
produced.  ARA Gold Crew in comparison to other dispersants noted, pri-
marily the Grain OD-2,  could be rated as a low sudser.
    The chemical as it works, first turns the oil to a dark brownish color.
This effect was particularly notable as the work boats plowed through our
wake.  The black oil from their bow could be seen turning brown as the
chemical-oil mix became agitated together.   It is apparent that  dispersion,
regardless of chemical concentration, is slow and inadequate unless proper
agitation is provided.  The volume of oil on the surface at the time the test
was made  and the combined boat and wave action made it essentially impos-
sible to retrace our path and  determine  if a clear swath had been established.
Even so, I was  convinced the product was doing a good job of dispersing the
oil.
    Some rather crude hand tests were made using one quart Mason jars to
further determine the chemical's effectiveness. By sampling the oil and the
chemical mixture being  applied, hand mixes were prepared and agitated by
shaking.  At concentrations of approximately four gallons of chemical per
barrel of oil,  it was noted that shaking did disperse the oil and that no oil
clung to the sides of the jar.  Upon standing, the oil re-agglomerated at the
surface, but had lost its stickiness.  Slight agitation,  similar to wave action,
would  again disperse the oil throughout the jar.  Results at such low concen-
trations would be slow,  but with continued wave action would probably be
effective.
    Where lesser amounts of chemical were tried, some dispersion took
place,  but the oil came back  together on standing and would not again

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                                  6-29
disperse on shaking.  My rather rapid conclusion would be that a concen-
tration in the area of ten gallons of chemical per barrel of oil would be the
most economical and yet effective application of the ARA Gold Crew.
    Later tests on heavily weathered oil proved completely ineffective.
Chemical was applied essentially full strength with the  result that some
iridescent film was  released, which  could only result in the oil becoming
even more sticky and  tarry.  It is my opinion that the use of dispersants on
weathered oil is  a waste of money.
    It would be most interesting to apply ARA Gold Crew to an inner harbor
light slick and note  the results.  I can visualize for such work application
by a Hudson type sprayer from a skiff,  since the degree of agitation could
probably be much less and  the production of  suds is undesirable.
    Bioassays are being run on the material by the Nuss Corporation to
determine its toxicity to marine life.
    Chemical Testing
Vessel:      M.  V. Pike I
Equipment:  Side beam sprayers, one out each side.  Booms about 15 ft
             long with three spray heads on  each boom; using vessel's
             pumps on  sea suction to supply water at about 30-32 Ib pres-
             sure.  Engineer unable to estimate pumping rate. The chemi-
             cal was  being added, using a small portable barrel pump.
             Chemical was being  added at the rate 1 bbl/40 min.  Would
             estimate this to be a ratio of water to chemical  of about
             40/1 to 50/1.
             This type  of spraying provides  none  of the agitation of the water
             surface  required to mix the chemical with the oil.  Chemical
             solution appeared to ride on top of surface.  This method
             appears to be very unsatisfactory except in possibly very
             choppy water or unless a very high concentration of chemical
             is used.  About 3-4 parts of oil to one-part chemical.  No
             information was  available as to the manufacturer's recommended
             concentration or method of application.
Dosage:
Comments:

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                                 6-30

    Chemicals Tested
    1.  Poly com plex A-ll.  They were just finishing the last couple of
barrels when I arrived.  Took two samples: (1) Sample immediately after
spraying.  (2) Sample after second application.
    On both of these samples, the oil would break down into small particles
on agitation.   However,  as soon as agitation was stopped, the oil would
quickly rise to the surface in a thick,  sticky film.
    2.  Crane Industrial Product OD-2 Biodegradable Oil Slick Disperser.
Sample of the sprayed oil differed little  from the samples sprayed with the
Polycomplex A-ll.  However, when adding the undiluted chemical to a
sample of oil using one part chemical to about 3-4 part oil,  the oil immedi-
ately broke down into a very light emulsion.  This emulsion was  not sticky
and showed no visible change after setting for two days.
    On March 5,  1968 received information on manufacturer's recommended
concentration and, application.  On light and moderate spills on water,  the
manufacturer recommends using one  part chemical to 3 parts water sprayed
over the oil slick.  Then after about 30  minutes, slick should be  agitated to
disperse the oil.  On heavy oil slicks, undiluted chemical should be sprayed
directly onto the spill at a ratio of one part chemical to six parts oil.  Used
under these conditions,  I believe that this material would do a good job of
dispersing an oil slick.
Feasibility Tests on Removing Or Controlling Free Oil from the  Surface
of Water by the use of Scott Industrial Foams^
    On Saturday, February 22,  1969,  a  series of tests were conducted by
Mr. Ron St.  Pierre, Mr.  Skip  St.  Pierre, and Mr.  Pat Zaremba of Wilshire
Foam  Products,  to determine the feasibility of using Scott Industrial Foam
to remove or control free oil contamination from the surface of the ocean.
The tests were witnessed by Mr. Ross Wright and Mr. Sam Taber and
several other members of the Union Oil Company.  The testing was per-
formed from the deck of a boat provided by Union Oil Company about eight
miles  offshore of Santa Barbara, California.

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                                 6-31
    The first tests were run to determine how much oil would be absorbed
by foam as it floated freely on the surface of the ocean.  The foam used for
these tests was 24 x 36 x 4 inch samples  of Scott Industrial Foam 10 PPI,
20 PPI, 30 PPI and 60 PPI.
    The various foams were put over the  side of the boat and directly into
an oil slick.  They were allowed to remain in the oil for periods ranging
from  5 to 30 minutes.   The foam was then removed  from the oil and
examined to check oil absorption and penetration. The penetration was
determined by  cutting into the center of the 4 inch slabs of foam and observ-
ing same.  Penetration was approximately 1/2 to 3/4 inch  in all cases.  The
surface absorption was visually examined.  After each test,  an attempt was
made to squeeze  out the oil that had been absorbed by the foam.
    Upon our examination of this first test, it was decided  that the 20 PPI
foam worked best, however, it did not absorb enough oil to make  its use for
large oil spillage applications practical.  Both Mr.  Wright and  Mr. Taber
of Union Oil Company agreed with our conclusion with this phase of the
testing.
    The second test was run on a 24 x 36  x 4 inch piece of  10 PPI  foam.
Weights were attached along one of the 36 inch dimensions and a buoyant
material was attached along the other 36  inch dimension of the material.
The foam was then suspended over the side of the boat from  a long pole and
emersed in the water so that approximately 12 inches protruded above  the
water.  Lines were attached to the foam so that it could be held in an
upright position while suspended at a right angle to the side of the boat.
    The boat then proceeded at a slow speed, (approximately 2 or 3 knots)
through the oil slick.  As the  foam was moved through the  water,  it was
observed  that the water was passing fraply through the foam while the oil
remained on the upstream surface of the  foam.  The foam  was then removed
and examined.  A large quantity of oil was found on  the upstream  side of
the foam, while no oil was found on the downstream side of the  foam.  This
test indicated to us that the 10 PPI foam could be efficiently used  in the
control,  or pick-up of oil from the surface of water.

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                                 6-32

    The foam could be used to prevent oil from moving from one place to
another, or to move the oil from one place to another, or to actually pick up
small quantities of oil from the surface of the water.  Mr. Ross Wright of
Union Oil observed this portion of the testing and agreed with our conclusions.
However, he stated that Union Oil was interested only in a finished product
that was ready for use.  They were not in a position to do research work
with the media only.
    In summary, we believe the absorption tests were not, in our opinion,
practical.  However, the boom type tests employing the  10 PPI were quite
successful.  We believe it is for Wilshire to interest an outside company in
pursuing the above use of the 10 PPI on a commercial basis.  There are
several such companies on the West Coast that we will be contacting regard-
ing this matter.
    Throughout the entire testing program,  we had the complete cooperation
and assistance of the people from Union Oil Company.
United  Sierra Talc Test
Tuesday, March 11            0530-1830                        5 hours
Left L. B.  at 0530 for S.  B. to set up Talc test.  At 1030 accompanied by
Dan Dunlap on "Winn" proceeded to Platform A.  Found some streaks of
fairly heavy new oil.  Sprayed United Sierra Talc on these streaks using
regulation foamite generator and ship's salt water fire system.  System pres-
sure was 50 psi and we used a 1-1/2 inch orifice nozzle. Talc could be
sprayed in a fairly even spread about 10-12 feet wide.  Put out 10 sacks in
approximately 25 min covering an estimated 1/4 mile circle. Then
observed carefully by travelling periphery.  Talc definitely does not sink
the oil.   It will combine to a small degree forming small curds which still
float.  It would take forever to clearup any degree at all of slick using this
material.  At 1 p.m. abandoned the test and skimmed until 3:45 p.m. when
rough water caused us to quit.  Arrived Stearns wharf at 5:30 p. m.

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                                 6-33
                      SECTION 6.0 REFERENCES

 1.   Oil and Gas Journal, March 17,  1969, p. 49.
 2.   Wiegel, "Oceanographical Engineering, " Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood
     Cliffs, N.Y.,  1964.
 3.   Coast Guard On-Scene Commander's Report.
 4.   Ibid
 5.   Union Oil Company  Daily Report, 3 March, 1969.
 6.   Union Oil Company  Daily Report, 9 March 1969.
 7.   Santa Barbara News Press,  7 February,  1969.
 8.   Coast Guard Situation Report No. 4, 30 January,  1969.
 9.   Union Oil Company  Daily Report, 22 February,  1969.
10.   Ibid,  11 March,  1969.
11.   Union Oil Company  Daily Report, 26 February,  1969.
12.   Ibid, 12 February, 1969.
13.   Coast Guard Situation Report, No. 15, 1  February,  1969.
14.   Letter from R. J. Kaneen, California Department of Fish and Game,
     to Coast  Guard On-Scene-Commander, 15 May,  1969.
15.   Personal Communication with Thomas H. Gaines of Union Oil Company.
16.   Enjay Magazine,  Fall 1968 Issue.
17.   Personal Communication with Thomas H. Gaines, Union Oil Company.
18.   Coast Guard Situation Report No. 10, 31  January, 1969.
19.   Personal Communication with Thomas H. Gaines, Union Oil Company.
20.   Ibid
21.   A Statement to the United States Senate Committee on Public Works,
     by Kenneth E. Biglane of the FWPCA, 25 February, 1969.
22.   Letter from W.  H.  McNeeley of Ara Chem,  Inc. to FWPCA,
     25 March, 1969.
23.   Chemical and Engineering News, 17 March, 1969, p. 40.
24.   "Offshore Oil Well  Blowout,  Union Oil Company Well, " Harbormaster
     of Santa  Barbara Report,  22 April, 1969.
25.   Union Oil Company Daily Report,  1 March,  1969.
26.   Personal Communication, Capt. Tatro,  MV WINN.
27.   Union Oil Company Daily Report,  7 March,  1969.
28.   Santa Barbara News Press, 17 February, 1969.

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                                 6-34
29.   Summary of Coast Guard Situation Reports, 4 February, 1969.
30.   Coast Guard On-Scene - Commander's Report.
31.   "Offshore Oil Well Blowout,  Union Oil Company Well, " Harbormaster
      of Santa Barbara Report, 22 April, 1969.
32.   Union Oil Company Daily Report,  12 February,  1969.
33.   Personal Communication,  Santa Barbara Harbormaster.
34.   Ibid
35.   Union Oil Company Daily Report,  23 February,  1969.
36.   Personal Communication,  R. S. Crog, Union Oil Company.
37.   Personal Communication,  E. K. Thompson,  Crosby and Overton.
38.   Santa Barbara News Press,  8 February, 1969.
39.   Union Oil Company Daily Report, 17 February,  1969.
40.   Personal Communication,  George  P.  Metson, General Marine
      Transport of Santa Barbara Inc.  June 26,  1969.
41.   T.  H. Gaines.  "Notes on Pollution Control Santa Barbara. "
      Appendix III,  undated.

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                                  7-1

                           7.0 SURVEILLANCE
7. 1  VISUAL OBSERVATION
       Surveillance of the progressive development and movement of the
oil slicks on the ocean was undertaken by both surface and airborne methods.
Surface observation utilized Coast Guard patrol craft and  work boats to
report general slick behavior and relative thickness.  There was no signi-
ficant amount of mapping carried out from the surface craft, but a consid-
erable effort in mapping the movement; and extent of the oil was made by
both visual and photographic techniques from aircraft.
       Frequent flights were  made in USCG and USFWS aircraft by contin-
gency team observers who plotted the position of the slicks on blank charts
of the Santa Barbara Channel. Such mapping was semiquantitative in that
distances, slick width and relative thickness were estimated by eye.  Also,
the area covered by the many slicks and the large number of "stringers"
emanating from primary and  secondary slicks resulted in a very complex
pattern that would be difficult to map in its entirety solely from visual
observation.  Attention, therefore, was focused on mapping the primary
oil patches as these were determinable from the continuity of connection
with surface leakage at Platform A and from color contrast, i.e. , the
darkest color was indicative of a relatively thick oil film.  The proximity
of oil to beaches and kelp beds also was observed and plotted so that con-
trol or clean-up operations could be  scheduled and instigated as appropriate.
Visual and photographic mapping could not be effectively pursued during
hours of darkness, since no significant amount of the slick was discernible
even with moonlight illumination.
        In one instance, a USGS mobile radar-tracking station (M-33 unit)
located on a hill overlooking the area used an X-Y plotter to track a low
flying USGS plane as it visually traced along the path of the major slick.
Although the accuracy of the observation was good, the method  was fairly
well restricted to determining the boundaries of the major slicks.

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                                   7-2
        Oil location diagrams (constructed primarily from visual observa-
 tions) were prepared daily by the U.S. Coast Guard showing the chronolo-
 gical development and movement of the slicks.  An example of such diagrams
 is shown in Figure 8.7.
 7.2  PHOTOGRAPHIC
        Varying results were obtained using aerial photography to detect and
 map the oil slicks.  Generally, as with most  photographic techniques,  fac-
 tors such as  film sensitivity, lighting, altitude  and haze were responsible
 for the varied results. The later vast area of oil spread made it difficult
 to obtain good real-time photographic coverage due to both the long flight
 periods involved and to changes in lighting and visibility over the large area
 encompassed.  Thus, the assemblage and interpretation of photomosaics
 would be an arduous  task.
        The Apollo-9 astronauts, in-flight at the time of the oil spill incident,
 were requested to attempt to photograph the area.  It is understood that at
 least one  photograph showing essentially the entire oil slick coverage was
 successfully obtained.
 7.2.1  Infrared Sensitive Film
        Several organizations (U. S. Geological Survey, Air Force) made
 infrared photographic flights over the oil slicks.  Colored infrared (false
 color) film was fairly efficient in detecting the slicks and the oil-water
 interface at low (5000-10,000 feet) altitudes.  Vegetation (e.g. ,  kelp) also
 showed good contrast, as expected, on infrared color plates.  Oblique  photo-
 graphs were taken on some of the  high altitude flights to obtain maximum
 reflection  from the oil slicks; in some instances this enhanced the  contrast
 of the oil-covered surface; in other instances sunlight reflected from the
 water surface made it difficult  to define the oil  slicks.
       Photographs taken from a plane showed  good definition of oil inter-
 mingled with kelp (Figure 7.1). Good contrast in this case was obtained
 using Infrared Ektachrome Film with either the K-2 (yellow) or 25A (red)
filter.(2)

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                            7-3
FIGURE 7. 1.  Infrared Ektachrome - Contrast of Oil and Kelp

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                                  7-4

       Flights also were made using "Camouflage Detection" film which
gives a black and white image with high sensitivity in the near infrared
region.  With some exceptions, the series of sequential photos which made
up the film strips did not reveal the definitive oil-water interface that could
be discerned by other than a highly-competent film interpreter.
7.2.2 Panchromatic and Color Film
       Panchromatic (black and white) photographic  results,  in general,
were much like those obtained using the Camouflage Detection film.  That is,
in some  cases quite good definition of the oil slicks was evident; however,
usually the results were similar to those in Figure 7.2 in which there is
poor contrast even in the vicinity of the platform.
       Conventional color film exposures, obtained by the U.S. Geological
Survey and the Naval Air Station at Point Mugu, generally showed  good
contrast when taken at  low altitudes.  The latter organization reported good
oil-water contrast on the Ektachrome (color) movie film made from a low-
flying helicopter.  Still color photos taken from the shoreline showed the oil
slick partially, and improved definition was  obtained on near-flat views.
High-altitude color photographs were  in most all instances ineffective in
defining the oil slicks due primarily to haze  interference.
7.3  REMOTE SENSORS
       Several types of passive, remote  sensing systems were evaluated to
determine their effectiveness in detecting the oil slicks and in defining both
the chemical and physical characteristics of the slicks.  Systems used by
the governmental agencies and private organizations known to have partici-
pated employed infrared, ultraviolet,  multiband video and microwave
detectors. All of the instruments  were mounted in aircraft with one excep-
tion:  a trailer with boom-mounted microwave radiometers (Aerojet General
Corp.) was used along  the Rincon Causeway to obtain spectral response data
on nearshore  oil slicks and deposits.

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                                                                               I
                                                                              01
FIGURE 7.2.  Aerial Photography Panchromatic Film - K-2 Filter

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                                  7-6

       The considerable amount of remote sensing studies undertaken was
concurred in by recommendations of the OST Special (Dubridge) Panel,
to-wit, ".. .Advanced techniques such as infrared, which will eventually be
capable of estimating thickness, state of oxidation and physical factors of
                                   (3)
the oil slick should be employed.
7.3.1 Infrared and Ultraviolet Scanning
       Airborne infrared scanning and recording equipment was used by the
USGS, University of  Michigan and North American Rockwell to determine
response characteristics in the near (0.8-l.Ou) and thermal (8-14|j) infrared
regions.  Generally, similar responses and results were noted by these
observers. The infrared (IR) flights were made at fairly low altitudes
(2000- 10, 000 feet) and under varying weather and lighting conditions.  Good
contrast between oil  slick and water was obtained during clear weather
(night or day) in the thermal (8-14u) region. Very little contrast  was noted
in the near IR region.  As expected, IR results showed decreasing contrast
                                                             (4)
and definition as the  weather varied from haze to total overcast.    That
thermal IR sensing methods are capable of detecting oil slicks under clear,
nighttime conditions  is clearly evident from Figure 7.3.
       Thin oil films near the edge of the primary (thick) slick emanating
from the  platform area showed the highest oil-water contrast in the thermal
region.  In this case the oil slick appeared colder than the adjacent water
surface (cold  shows as dark exposure on the scanner film). The  relatively
thick oil layer near the platform showed much less contrast in the thermal
region, and its response was about the same or perhaps slightly warmer
than the water surface temperature. Reasons for the different responses
have yet to be resolved; however, several possible causative  factors concern:
surface characteristics (roughness) of the oil film,  changes in chemical
composition of the oil with aging which might result in spectral character-
istic changes,  and heat transfer phenomena associated with film thickness,
evaporation rates and/or composition.  Laboratory measurements and
analyses are presently being undertaken to better define the quantitative
information obtainable from remote sensed data collected on the flyovers.

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                                                                                                 - I
                                                                                                 I
                                                                                                 - I
FIGURE 7.3.  Nighttime Image (8-13U band) of Platform A and Oil Seepage.  Flown 27 March.

              1969 (Courtesy of North American Rockwell)

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                                   7-8

 Some ground truth measurements were taken in conjunction with a North
 American Rockwell flight on 24 March.    A small patch of Platform A
 crude oil on the water surface was  sequentially scanned and surface obser-
 vations were made of slick size,  thickness,  oil and water temperatures as
 the aircraft collected data on the expanding slick.  Hopefully, these results
 will be quantitatively correlatable with much of the imagery collected over
 the channel oil spill.
        Information collected by the USGS and with the multi-spectral instru-
 mentation of the University of Michigan indicated that the greatest oil-water
 contrast was in the thermal infrared and ultraviolet (0.32-0. 38^ regions.
 Wavelengths between these regions showed much less differentiation of the
 oil and water.  Figures 7.4 through 7. 6 show typical responses of the oil,
 kelp  and water in the various spectral regions (photos courtesy of Infrared
 and Optics Laboratory, Institute  of Science and Technology, the University
              /£j\
 of Michigan).     Figure 7.2 is a panchromatic photograph, taken in the
 early morning, which shows Platform A and a boat spreading chemicals to
 disperse the oil.  Very little indication of the slick is evident.  Figure 7.4
 shows the two regions of the spectrum where good contrast exists between
 the oil and water. The ultraviolet image shows the entire slick to best advan-
 tage,  while the thermal infrared  image shows selected portions of the slick
 (edges?)  which are at a lower apparent temperature.  Differences in the
 width of the imagery are due to the use of part of the  scanning angle capa-
 city for viewing an IR reference source.
        Figures 7.5 and 7.6 show how oil and kelp areas can be differentiated
 spectrally.  The response for oil shows high reflectance in the ultraviolet
 and no reflectance in  the near infrared, while kelp shows absorption in the
                                                         ic\
 ultraviolet  region but high reflectance in the near infrared.    One would
 expect kelp partly contaminated with oil to show a significant  reflectance-
absorption contrast in the UV region;  unfortunately, ground truth informa-
tion was not available for  correlation with data collected on this sensing
flight. As a matter of interest, the apparent "path" of uniform width  just
inside and parallel to  the seaward edge of the kelp bed in Figure 7. 6 is the

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Ultraviolet - .32 to  .
-1
i
CD
 Infrared - 8.0 to 13.5//
 FIGURE 7:4.  Remote Sensing Imagery

              Ultraviolet   0. 32 to 0. 38

              Infrared     8.0 to 13.5

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 Infrared -  0.8  to l.O/i
                                                        - I

                                                        —•
                                                        o

                                    vB^
Ultraviolet - .32 to  .
 FIGURE 7.5. Remote Sensing Imagery
            Ultraviolet   0.32 to 0.38 u
            Infrared     0.8 to 1. 0

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       Infrared -  0.8 to  1.0/w
     Ultraviolet - .32 to .38//

FIGURE 7.6. Remote Sensing  Imagery - Kelp Beds
           Infrared       0.8 to 1.0 n
           Ultraviolet     0.32 to 0.38 ^

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                                  7-12
 swath removed by a kelp cutter. Also, dark streaks within the slick on the
 UV display and light sections in the slick on the thermal IR display may be
 indicative, in part, of an oil-dispersant mixture. Additional ground control
 data and/or laboratory measurements will be required to determine response
 characteristics of such mixtures before quantitative conclusions can be
 drawn.
        Thermal infrared imagery was successful in discriminating between
 oil-coated and clean surficial kelp fronds.  Figure 7. 7 shows oil-free kelp
 as a light (warm) area; kelp containing oil is darker (cooler) than the sur-
 face water.  Oil slicks moving from the kelp toward the beach also show
 good contrast (Figures 7.3 and  7.7  courtesy of Space Division of North
 American Rockwell Corp.).
 7.3.2  Other
        Microwave radiometer flights were made by North American Rock-
 well; the previously mentioned, near-shore microwave measurements were
 made by Aerojet General Corporation; and microwave oil characteristic
 measurements were conducted in the laboratory by Ryan Aeronautical
 Company.
        Airborne microwave radiometer (non-imaging) results showed con-
 trasts exist between oil and water.  The instrument in this case is sensitive
 to long wavelength radiation (up to several centimeters), and thus responds
 strongly to media characteristics which affect emissivity. The apparemt
 temperature of the oil slick, as determined with  a 19.35 GHz microwave
                                                            (4)
 radiometer, was higher than that of the adjacent  water surface.    Near-
 shore (Rincon Causeway) observations showed a similar response from
                                                                  (7)
 microwave radiometers operating at frequencies of 13.4 and 37 GHz.
Additional results from these nearshore studies are still being evaluated as
are those laboratory measurements and correlations on oil thickness, dielec-
tric constants and age characteristics made  by the Ryan Aeronautical
^         (8)
Company.

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                                                                                    <
                                                                                                  -1
                                                                                                  i •
                                                                                                   •-•
FIGURE  7.7.  Thermal Infrared (8-13^ Image Illustrating the Contrasting Hot Returns of

              Surficial Fronding Kelp and the Colder Streaks of Oil

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                                  7-14
       Personnel of the TRW Company, using an airborne spectrometer
(0.4-0.7u range), were able to discern changes in the percentage of light
reflectance and spectral curves as the oil film thinned and thickened.
       North American Rockwell Corporation attempted remote detection
of the oil slick using a multiband video system consisting  of four Panasonic
TV cameras to provide multiplexed information to a video tape recorder.
One camera was  unfiltered; the remaining three were equipped as follows:
     o      o                                 oo
4000 A ±100 A  (violet interference filter), 7000 A ±100 A (near IR interfer-
ence filter), and  Wratten 18A filter (UV band pass).  The  violet and UV
filtered cameras reportedly gave little useful information due to high attenu-
ation in the optics and vidicon in these spectral regions.   The unfiltered
camera provided coverage but showed no unique or applicable discriminat-
ing ability. The near IR filtered unit showed surface fronding kelp dis-
tinctly with response contrasts  similar to those noted in color IR film
                                        (4)
exposures and 0.8-l.Ou scanning results.
       Much potentially beneficial information was collected relative to the
oil slick by using both photographic and remote sensing techniques. Most of
this probably will be soon available in the form of reports and journal arti-
cles.   Belatedly, the studies revealed several specific areas whereby the
usefulness of existing and future collected data would be enhanced insofar as
deriving optimum plans for combating an oil spill:
    •   Additional ground truth information is desirable for correlation with
       photographic and remote sensor response. Included in this category
       are oil  film thickness, temperature and composition as functions of
       time (aging) and location.  Also, for future applications, the above
       information should be determined for various typical crude  oil
       sources.
   •   Control data  are needed on the spectral response of various oil-
       dispersant mixtures as functions of chemicals and concentrations
       used.

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                                 7--15
TABLE 7.1.  Organizations Participating in Photographic and Remote Sens-
             ing Surveillance Operations
    Organization
U.S. Air Force


U. S. Navy
U. S. Geological
Survey
U. S. Geological
Survey
University of Michigan
North American
Rockwell Corp.
Aerojet General Corp.


Ryan Aeronautical Co.
 TRW Co.
   Aerial Photography

	Technique	

Ektachrome IR Aerial Film
Ektachrome Aerial Film

Ektachrome Movie  Film

Ektachrome IR Aerial Film
Ektachrome Aerial Film

Panchromatic Film


	Remote Sensing	

Ultraviolet Scanning

Thermal IR Scanning

Multispectral Scanner
        Ultraviolet
        Near IR
        Thermal IR

Thermal IR Mapper
Microwave Radiometer
Multiband Video

Microwave Radiometers
(trailer and boom mounted)

Microwave Radiometer
(laboratory measurements)

Spectrometer, near IR
   Remarks*

variable results
variable results

good contrast
poor contrast
good contrast
  (low alt.)
good contrast
  (low alt.)
good contrast
  (low alt.)
fair contrast
  (low alt.)

good contrast
poor contrast
good contrast
good contrast
good response
good contrast
  (near IR)
good contrast


results not
known
good response
 * Remarks refer to oil-water contrast unless otherwise noted.

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                                7-16


                     SECTION 7.0 REFERENCES

1.      Personal Communication,  Mr. H. B. Skibitzke, USGS, March 26,
       1969.

2      Personal Communication,  Mr. A. Caldwell, FWPCA Santa Barbara
       Sub-off ice, May 7, 1969.
3      J  C.  Calhoun (chmn.),  "Immediate Recommendations of the Oil
       Spill Panel" (letter) to Dr. L. A. Dubridge, February 21,  1969,
       p.  3.
4.      Personal Communication, Mr. R. A. Fowler, North American
       Rockwell Corp., April 2,  1969.

5      Memorandum of March 25, 1969, from Santa Barbara Sub-off ice
       FWPCA (R. G. Wills to V. W. Tenney) "Ground Control for North
       American Rockwell Flyover on 24 March, 1969.

6.     Personal Communication, Mr. F. C. Polcyn, Infrared and Optics
       Lab. , 1ST, the University of Michigan, April 22,  1969.

7.     Personal Communication, Mr. D. T. Trexler, Aerojet General
       Corporation, April 3,  1969.

8.     Personal Communication, Mr. J. M. Kennedy, Ryan Aeronautical
       Company, April 2,  1969.

9.     Personal Communication, Mr. Peter White,  TRW Company,
       April 2, 1969.

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                                   8-1

            8.0 DISTRIBUTION AND BEHAVIOR OF OIL AT SEA

    The nature of oil behavior at sea is important in predicting its movement
toward threatening resources,  determining its character when it reaches a
beach, and in the design of equipment for its recovery at sea.
8. 1  SPREAD AND PATH OF OIL MOVEMENT - CHRONOLOGY
    Chronological information on the gross spread and movement of the oil
slick was obtained largely from visual reconnaissance flights by a number
of observers.  These flights were generally made daily  (sometimes more
frequently) and were principally directed at obtaining operational information
of use in warning coastal communities of impending threats.  As  such, the
data tend to be qualitative.
    Daily oil location diagrams have been prepared by the U.  S.  Coast
Guard On-Scene Commander based  on the above observations.    An
example diagram  is shown in Figure 8. 7 near the time of maximum oil
spread.
    Except under conditions  of low wind velocity,  the oil moved largely under
the influence of the prevailing winds. In the Santa Barbara Channel area, the
normally prevailing winds were west to northwest at Point Conception, west
to southwest at mid-Channel and east to northeast at Point Mugu--i. e., no
obvious wind vector during the period ventilated and hence tended to remove
oil from the Channel.   Thus the storm commencing on 4 February and con-
tinuing through 7 February with winds shifting from the southeast clockwise
to the west,  acted on the inventory  of oil slick accumulated since the initial
release on 28 January.
    A Weather Bureau meteorologist estimated that downwind oil slick drift
ranged from 1 0 to 20 percent at the surface wind velocity and stated
"... instances of skin layer shear  were noted with surface oil moving
rapidly past nearly stationary free  floating debris suspended less than half
                                 /n \
an inch below the water surface. "
    The above is in contrast with the experience in the TORREY CANYON
incident during which the oil movement rate averaged 3.3 to  3.4  percent of
                  (3)
the wind velocity.

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                                   8-2

    Much of the oil contaminated area observed in reconnaissance flights
was noted as "iridescent. "  The quantity of oil required to create this
                                                          (4)
condition is on the order of 100-200 gallons per square mile.     The
observation "black oil" probably represents concentrations greater than
2, 000 gallons per square mile.
      Additional discussion on this matter is given in Section 4.3.
8.2  BREAKUP BEHAVIOR OF SLICK
     Oil on the surface tended to form streaks often described  as "windrows"
or "ropes" with irregular and unpredictable patterns.   The formation and
variability of these are shown in Figures 8. 1,  8. 2,  8. 3, and 8. 4.  This
pattern of oil behavior increased the difficulty of at-sea skimming or
treating with dispersants or straw.
8.3 CHANGES IN PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES
    Oil released  to the sea  surface undergoes marked changes  with time.
These changes include evaporation of the more volatile constituents, dis-
solution of water solubles,  oxidation,  and emulsification.
    The following limited results were obtained on a simple atmospheric
                                               ii      (5)
pressure,  distillation of a sample of "Platform A" crude   :

                 Boiling Point  ° C       Volume % Distilled
                       206                     2.5
                       232                     5.0
                       282                    10.0
                       322                    15.0
                       345                    18.0

                                                                  (6)
    Based on the  above and work by the British Petroleum Co.,  Ltd.
it appears that evaporative losses at sea were less than 20 volume percent.
    Observers noted the existence of water-in-oil emulsions ranging up to
                 (7)
50 percent water.
    No other information was obtained on changes in physical properties.

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                           8-3
FIGURE 8.1.  Oil Behavior Near Platform (courtesy of
              Santa Barbara News Press)
FIGURE 8.2. Oil Behavior Near Platform (courtesy
             of Santa Barbara News Press)

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                                8-4
       FIGURE 8.3.  Oil Plume Leaving Platform, 26 February,  1969
FIGURE 8.4.
Oil "Windrows and Ropes" Santa Barbara Harbor in Upper
Left,  Boat Spreading Straw or Dispersant, 26 February, 1969.

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                                   8-5

8. 4.  INTERACTION WITH OFFSHORE KELP BEDS
    The kelp beds offshore in the Santa Barbara Channel, with their tendency
to  hold up debris, formed a natural barrier partially protecting the coast
line.  The  diurnal land-sea breeze gradually would bring the oil ashore but
the kelp undoubtedly had the beneficial effect of affording additional time for
oil weathering and evaporation of non-volatile fractions.  Much of the
iridescence repeatedly seen in reconnaissance flights near the coast line
undoubtedly resulted from the gradual bleeding of thin films from the oil
retained in these beds.
    Figures 8. 5 and 8. 6 illustrate the oil streamers being driven out of the
kelp by an onshore breeze.

                        SECTION 8.0  REFERENCES
 1.   On Scene-Commander's Report:  Santa Barbara Oil Pollution Incident,
     January 1969, Lt. George H.  Brown III.
 2.   Memorandum Gordon C. Shields, Marine Meteorologist to Director,
     Western Region Salt Lake  City,  Utah,  February 25, 1969.
 3.   Smith, J.  E., Ed.,  "Torrey Canyon Pollution and Marine Life, "
     Cambridge at the University Press, 1968, pp. 150-162.
 4.   "Oil Spillage Study - Literature Search and Critical Evaluation for ^
     Selection of Promising Techniques to Control and Prevent Damage,
     Battelle-Northwest, November 20, 1967.
 5.   Personal Communication,  E. C. Martin, Battelle-Northwest,
     May 19, 1969.
 6   Brunnock  J. V., D. F. Duckworth,  and G. G. Stephens, Analysis
     of Beach Pollutants, J. Inst.  of Petroleum 54, 310-325,  November 1968.
 7   Alan, A. A., Statement Presented to U. S.  Senate Interior Committee,
     Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials,  and Fuels.  May  20,  1969.

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                                  8-6
FIGURE 8. 5. Oil Streamers Emerging from Kelp Beds (courtesy of U, S.
             Coast Guard)
     .
  FIGURE 8. 6.  Oil Streamers Approaching Shoreline Inside Kelp
                (courtesy of U. S.  Coast Guard)

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          12CP20'
                12CPOO'
                                                11SP401
119°20*
11^00'
35'
34°
15'
33°
55'
                                                                    PRELIMINARY OIL LOCATION DIAGRAM

                                                                         1625-1725 - 2/4/69
 2/4/69
SPEED;
DIRECTION:
    TIME
    WIND
    WIND
                 Black Oil Total Coverage
                 Predominantly Black Oil with Some
                 Iridescence
Predominantly Iridescence with Some
Black Oil
                 Iridescence

                 Oil Streaks
                                                                       mMm^-'^
                                              Santa Cruz
                                               Island
                                                       jgjgljAnacapa Island
San Miguel
  Island
       Santa Rosa
         Island
          120°20'
                 12CPOO'                 11
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                                  9-1

                    9.0 BEACH AND HARBOR PROBLEMS
9.1 WINTER STORM EFFECTS
       The winter storm and unusually high tides, which occurred before
and during the incident, imposed a  significantly larger burden on beach
clean-up operations (cf Section 3.0).  The unseasonably large quantity of
debris washed into the Channel during the heavy storm period prior to the
incident was subsequently deposited on the beaches.  The accumulation was
several feet thick at and above the high tide line in the Santa Barbara area
(Figure 9.1).  Later storms and strong onshore winds deposited more drift-
wood and kelp.  Debris on the water surface impeded skimming operations
and increased the pressure  against containment booms when it accumulated
behind them.  Large quantities of oil-contaminated kelp and debris were
deposited on the beaches during storms several days after the blowout.
This debris can serve as a  sorptive agent if pushed into the surf prior to
the arrival of oil.
       The driftwood on the beaches often had to be  cut up before it  could
be removed and all driftwood  and other debris were  necessarily removed
whether it was oil contaminated or not.  The debris  deposited by the
storms on rocky areas or riprap had to be removed  by hand before the oil
                                                            (14)
could be cleaned from the rocks.  Union Oil Company estimated     that
over 30, 000 tons of storm debris was disposed of.

       On one occasion in mid-February,  20  to 30 knot winds from the
southeast blew oily caps of  breakers and kelp over the Santa Barbara
Harbor breakwater.    Storm runoff in the Ventura  River caused overflow-
ing into the harbor and deposition of large amounts of floating debris;  this
                                                                      (2)
same runoff reportedly broke the boom across the entrance of the harbor.
Several artificial berms had to be broken to release storm runoff.  These
were  subsequently repaired.
       A  typical sand beach is composed of a terrace, or berm, of sand
above the water surface and bars in the surf zone parallel to the beach.
The berm is approximately flat and constantly changes size and shape,
depending upon wave  action.  A continuous seasonal interchange of sand
occurs between the berm and  sub-surf bars.  Winter storm waves tend to

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                                                                          I
FIGURE 9. 1.  Storm Debris on Beach Near Santa Barbara

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                                  9-3

transfer sand from the berm (in some cases total sand removal) to the bars.
Subsequent calmer conditions will reestablish the beach and berm.  Severe
storms which had immediately preceded the initial oil release removed large
quantities of sand from the berm to the bars; therefore, the oil coming
ashore on some of the more remote beaches may have been covered with
fresh clean sand brought in during calmer weather before commencement of
cleaning operations.  These oil-contaminated layers of sand will likely
remain in place until future storms again remove the layer of sand  which
covered them.
9.2  FIRE  HAZARDS
       The most significant fire hazard existed in the vicinity of Platform A
where concentrations of fresh oil and gas occurred.  The weathered oil
reaching the beaches posed no real fire hazard and was,  in fact, difficult to
ignite.  The wind generally kept the gas from accumulating to a hazardous
level around the platform, although evacuation was necessary on 30 January
because of hazardous  gas concentrations accumulating in slack wind condi-
tions. During the 26 February storm, lightning struck the gas vent stack
of a nearby platform,  starting a fire which caused no damage.
       When the oil initially entered Santa  Barbara Harbor  on 4 February,
several precautionary measures were taken to reduce the potential fire
hazard, including disconnecting electrical leads to boats in  the harbor and
                                       (4)
spraying chemical dispersant on the  oil.     Later, the use  of solvents,
gasoline and detergents for cleaning boats was prohibited in the harbor
because of potential fire hazard.  The Santa Barbara Fire Department
checked the  harbor atmosphere with a commercial explosimeter; no explo-
sive mixture was indicated.     Similar tests two weeks later on incoming
oily kelp also indicated no combustible vapors.  The Fire Department also
performed crude bench tests to*determine the temperature at which combus-
tion of the surface oil could be sustained.  A small can was filled with oil
and a thermometer immersed near the surface.   A torch was then applied;
combustion was not sustained until the temperature exceeded 190 °F.

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                                 9-4

       The chemical dispersant (Polycomplex A-ll) was spread on the
entering oil slick near the harbor entrance to disperse the oil and thus
reduce the fire hazard/6*  The use of dispersants within one mile of Plat-
                                                       (7)
form A was subsequently permitted to reduce fire hazard.
9.3  SPECIAL CONSTRAINTS
       The relatively fresh crude oil which came ashore in the vicinity of
Pitas Point on 31 January was observed to sink immediately into the sand
without leaving a residue.    Similar behavior has been observed during
past crude oil spills in the Long Beach area when the unweathered crude  oil
came directly ashore.  '  The depth of penetration of the relatively fresh
crude into the beach on this particular occasion is not known.
       The oil-soaked straw recovered from beaches often had to be mixed
with additional straw and sand before dumping inland.  Thus, an extra handl-
ing operation was required.  Some loads of oil-soaked beach debris that
were trucked inland for dumping were  rejected at the dump site and had to
be returned for supplementation with dry straw and sand.
       Porosity of the breakwater forming the outside of the Santa Barbara
Harbor undoubtedly permitted some passage  of oil into the harbor.  The
breakwater is constructed of large boulders with no filler material between.
The porosity was evidenced by sand deposits fanning out from openings
between the rocks in the inner harbor (Figure 9.2).
       Inconvenience and hazards to navigation occurred in several locations
during protective and recovery operations. Notices to Mariners were issued
on several of these occasions concerning the presence of unlighted booms in
certain areas,  mainly around the entrance to ports and harbors.  Mariners
were advised to stay outside a five  mile radius of Platform A.  Booms
across the entrance to harbors were closed when the arrival of oil was immi-
nent, thus preventing passage of vessels.  A request to open the booms to
permit entry of a ship into the Santa Barbara Harbor was denied on at least
one occasion because of the danger of the accumulated oil entering the
harbor.

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       \    I
                                                                                              to
                                                                                               I
F1UUKE 9.2.  Sand Deposits Inside Santa Barbara Harbor Breakwater Indicating Breakwater

              Porosity

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                                  9-6

9.4  LITTORAL SAND TRANSPORT
       Littoral sand transport is the net along-shore movement of beach
material under the influence of wave-induced currents. The along-shore
currents are created when incoming waves strike the shoreline at an angle;
therefore,  the drift generally depends  upon the direction of the prevailing
waves.  The coastline of California between Point Conception and the Los
Angeles area has an approximate east-west orientation.  The prevailing
waves in this region are westerly and therefore the net transport of sand is
eastward along the coast.  The net drift along the Santa Barbara coast is
                                           (12)
approximately 300,000 cubic yards per year.
       The breakwater which forms the Santa Barbara Harbor is the first
major obstruction, south of Point Conception, to this flow of sand along the
coast.  Correspondingly, a large sandspit results inside the outer end of
                                  / -1 O\
the breakwater.  Past observations    have established the average rate of
sand deposition on this sandspit to  be 400 to 900 cubic yards per day.  During
storm conditions, the rate of growth has exceeded 2500 cubic yards per day
as a consequence of depletion of beach material from the west.
       Year-round maintenance dredging operations are required to prevent
harbor mouth obstruction by bypassing sand past the harbor.  A dredge
(Figure 9.3) transfers the sand by pipe line to a point eastward down coast
where it is again picked up by the prevailing littoral drift.
       Oil that came ashore on  the sandspit at the Santa Barbara entrance
was  subsequently covered with fresh uncontaminated sand.  Inspection of a
vertical cross-section of this sandspit (Figure 9.4) revealed layers  of oil-
soaked sand up to several feet below the surface.
       The dredge discharge (Figure 9.5) contained an undeterminable
amount of oil, even if it was removing accumulated sand from an area
where the beach surface appeared clean.   Thus,  the presence of the buried
oil will be witnessed for some time into the future  as the dredge redeposits
it further down the coast.  This source of further oil pollution on previously
cleaned beaches did not appear severe during observations  in late March.

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                                                                           i
                                                                          - I
FIGURE 9.3 .  Santa Barbara Harbor Dredge Maintenance

-------
                                                                                               CO
                                                                                               00

                                                                                    ,
FIGURE  9.4.  Oil Deposits in Santa Barbara Harbor Sandspit Covered by Littorally Drifted
              Sand

-------

                                                                               I
                                                                              CD
FIGURE 9.5 .  Santa Barbara Harbor Maintenance Dredge Discharge

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                                 9-10
 Other beach areas where the deposited oil was similarly covered by sand
 due to littoral transport will also undoubtedly yield some amount of further
 contamination in the future, especially during winter storms that erode the
 beaches.  This contamination will probably not represent a serious problem
 or require clean-up operations as the oil is associated with sand grains and
 will generally sink below the surf zone.


                       SECTION 9.0 REFERENCES
 1.      Offshore Oil Well Blowout Union Oil Company Well.  A report of the
        Harbormaster of Santa Barbara.  April 22,  1969.

 2.      Union Oil Company Daily Report of 2/24/69.

 3.      Willard Bascom.  "Waves and Beaches, " Doubleday and Company,
        Garden City, New York,  1964. p.  188.

 4.      Offshore Oil Well Blowout Union Oil Company Well.  A report of the
        Harbormaster of Santa Barbara.  April 22,  1969.

 5.      Chemical and Engineering News, March 17, 1969. p. 42.

 6.      Personal communication: Fire Marshal, Santa Barbara Fire
        Department.

 7.      U.  S. Coast Guard Situation Report No. 73, 26  February, 1969.

 8.      U.  S. Coast Guard Situation Report No. 10, 31  January,  1969.

 9.      Personal communication: Captain W. H. Putman, State of Cali-
        fornia Department of Fish and Game.

 10.    Union Oil Company Daily Report of 2/14/69.

 11.    Offshore Oil Well Blowout Union Oil Company Well.  A report of the
       Harbormaster of Santa Barbara.  April 22,  1969.

12.     Willard Bascom.  "Waves and Beaches, " Doubleday and Company,
       Garden City, New York,  1964.  p. 228.

13.     Ibid,  p. 222.

14.     Gains,  T.  H.  "Notes on Pollution Control  Santa Barbara, " Union

       Oil Company of California, undated.

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                                 10-1

                10.0  SHORELINE RESTORATION METHODS
10. 1  BEACHES
       The priority established for the cleanup of the coastline was as
follows:    (1) marinas, (2) public beaches, (3) less accessible public
beaches, (4)  private beaches, and (5) rock riprap.  The oil was most
heavily deposited on approximately 30 miles of the coastline between
                                 (2)
Point Conception and Point Dume.    The oil reaching the shore was
generally weathered sufficiently to prevent significant penetration of the
beach surface which greatly facilitated clean up operations.  Most observers
felt that the depth of penetration was less than 1/2 inch.  An exception was
noted near Pitas Point on  31 January when fresh crude oil came ashore and
reportedly immediately sank below the surface (Section 9.0).
       Cleaning and restoration of beaches were generally accomplished by
spreading straw on the deposited oil, collecting the oily mixture, and sub-
sequently hauling  it to an inland dump for disposal.   Straw reportedly
absorbs four to five times its weight in oil under optimum conditions.
Collection of the oily  straw and other debris on the beaches was accom-
plished principally by mechanized devices such as bulldozers,  graders and
loaders, although a significant  amount was removed by manual labor  (Fig-
ure  10.1).  During one period of beach restoration,  550 personnel, 54 water-
craft, 29 pieces of heavy  equipment, 96 trucks and 7000 tons of straw and
hay  were employed for cleanup of the beaches and harbors.     The total
amount of straw employed was  alternatively estimated as 3000 tons by
                (4)
another source.
        Later estimates    indicate that the clean-up effort peaked at
almost 1, 000 men and 125 pie es of mechanical equipment.  Up to June 1,
 1969, 9, 826 truck loads of oil-soaked straw and debris had been disposed of.
        The  rental rate for heavy equipment similar to that employed for
 beach cleaning operations normally ranges from $20-$30/hour.  Lighter
 equipment such as smaller trucks and portable cranes rent for -approxi-
 mately $8-$20/hour. The straw used was obtained  through brokers and cost
 approximately $24/ton initially; the price reportedly rose to approximately
 $35/ton when the immediate  supply became exhausted. 5   Wages paid to
 laborers for beach cleanup were $3.97/hour and the billing charge was

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                                 10-2
 FIGURE 10.1. Application and Removal of Straw on Beaches (courtesy of
               Santa Barbara News Press)
FIGURE 10.2.
Oiled Straw and Debris (courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)
Press)

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                                  10-3

                          (6)
approximately $7. 00/hour.    In addition,  an unknown amount of overtime
wages was paid  at a correspondingly higher rate.  The rental rate for
watercraft is  approximately $20/hour for vessels 50 feet long and approxi-
                                         / n\
mately $40/hour for vessels 120 feet long.v
                                   (21)
       Union  Oil Company estimated    that 400 man hours of labor sup-
plemented with four skip loaders, two bulldozers and ten trucks were
required to clean one mile of beach, under typical conditions encountered.
Based on these values, we estimate the cost of beach cleanup in the neigh-
borhood of $5, 000 per mile (about $1 per linial foot) including transportation
and possible added costs of land fill disposal sites.  Costs for cleaning rip-
rap and rocky coast line undoubtedly run higher.
       Straw  was the  primary absorbent material used for beach cleanup
                                                         (o\
although limited amounts of "Ekoperl" and talc were tried.    Chemical
detergents were not employed for beach cleaning operations as it was felt
that dispersed oil might sink in and lubricate the sand,  causing excessive
erosion or limiting the use of wheeled vehicles on the beaches.  The latter
situation was  encountered on English beaches following the TORREY CANYON
stranding.  In the Santa Barbara  incident,  access to some beaches was
restricted when heavy seasonal rains made the access roads impassable.
       Straw  was spread on the beaches between high and low tides, both
before and after the oil  reached shore. The oily mixture was worked into
piles either manually or by machines and subsequently loaded for transport
to inland  dumps.  The mixtures often contained excessive oil and further
operations were required  to mix  dry straw and sand with the oily
contaminant.
       Debris deposited in and around rocky areas, such as rip-rap, was
removed by hand before cleaning the oil from the rocks.  Considerable
manual effort was also required on beach areas,  such as the Harbor sandbar,
inaccessible  to motorized equipment.  Following removal of the majority of
the oil and debris, the sandy beaches were worked with commercial motor-
ized  sand sifters normally employed to recover litter  on the beaches.
       The general procedure that evolved during operations was to permit
the oil to come ashore and be deposited at the high tide line, spread straw

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                                   10-4

on the oil,  and push it into piles (Figures  10. 2, 10. 3, and 10. 4).  Recovery
operations were concentrated at the high tide line rather than the intertidal
zone.
       Two types of large motorized equipment which proved especially
effective for spreading and recovery of straw were mulchers or straw -
spreaders  (Figure 10. 5) normally used for spreading straw on highway
right-of-ways to prevent soil erosion,  and graders with tines below the
blade for raking (Figure 10. 6).  Two types of motorized hay rakes were
                                                          (10)
tested but  found ineffective for recovery of oil-soaked straw.
       The only type of straw effective for absorbing the oil on beaches was
that derived from wheat stalks.  "Bermuda straw, " which is much finer and
more closely  resembles hay, would  not absorb the oil well.
       Burning of the oil-soaked straw on the beaches generally was ineffec-
tive and the burning operations often had to be suspended because of
       (12)
smoke.     Driftwood and other debris which had been deposited on the
beaches  (Figure 11.1) was often successfully burned, including that con-
taminated  with oil.  Burning operations were conducted on several beaches.
                                                                (13)
At one time 24 fires were counted at Carpenteria Beach State Park.
These operations were subsequently suspended due to smoke complaints.
                                                  (14)
Diesel fuel was  successfully employed to  start  fires.     A diesel oil
fueled, blower type burner was tried with good results and employed in sub-
sequent burning operations.  Heavy rains  tended to hamper burning.
       A tabulation of some of the more significant equipment and mate-
rials used  for beach restoration (excerpted from Union  Oil Company reports)
is given below:                          Chemicals Employed for Secondary
Materials                               	Cleanup  of Equipment etc.	
Straw                                      DDX-11          Solvents
Ekoperl                                    Uniflame         Diesel Fuel
Talc                                       T-5-X
Motorized  Equipment                    Hand Equipment
Bulldozers                             Pitch Forks
Skiploaders (D-4,D-6,D-8)              Steel Brooms
Backhoes                               Square  Point Shovels
Tractors                                Rakes
Cranes                                 Axes
Hayblowers                             Hand  Saws
Dump Trucks                            Rope

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                         10-5
J
'&>•
                 FIGURE  10. 3.  Oiled Straw
   FIGURE 10.4. Oiled Sand on Santa Barbara Harbor Sand Bar

-------
                      10-6

      FIGURE 10.5.  Power Mulcher Spreading Straw
FIGURE  10.6.  Grader Modified with Tines Welded to Blade

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                                 10-7

Motorized Equipment (contd)             Hand Equipment (contd)
Motorized Rakes                        Pick Axe
Graders                                Flood Lamps
Sand-sifting Machine                    Hudson Sprayers
Fork Lifts                              Rotary Barrel Pumps
Brush Burner
Sandblasters
Chain Saws
Fertilizer Spreaders
High Pressure Water Cleaning Units
Numerous Utility Vehicles and Trucks

10.2 CLEANING OF HARBORS
       Harbor oil contamination was most severe at Santa Barbara,  although
some oil did penetrate into the Ventura Harbor.  The majority of the oil came
through the Santa Barbara Harbor entrance when defensive measures failed;
however,  a  smaller amount came over and through the porous breakwater
(Section 9.0).  Most of the oil was recovered by drag booms which concen-
trated in the vicinity of the small boat launching ramp, whence it was trans-
ferred to tank trucks equipped with  suction pumps (Figure 10.7).  Propeller
wash from taut-moored vessels in the harbor was effective for moving the
                                (15)
oil into the center of the channel.     Skirted booms proved effective for
dragging operations to contain oil-soaked straw and kelp.  Subsequent cleanup
of residual oil and floating debris such as kelp was accomplished principally
by application of straw, followed by manual labor pickup.  A limited amount
of "Ekoperl" was also applied in the harbor.  Portable water pumps  were
employed to wash the oil off the decks of ships and from around otherwise
inaccessible places such as ships' berths.  Light equipment  such as  these
pumps are estimated to cost approximately $10/hour with operator.
       Debris,  kelp, and oil-soaked straw were recovered from the water
surface by men working from punts  (Figure 10.8),  designed  for oil spill
cleanup in the Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor area.  These were about ten
feet  long by four feet beam, with a freeboard of about 18 inches. The
recovered material was generally placed in 55-gallon open drums to facili-
tate  subsequent handling.   The debris was recovered with either pitchforks
or hand rakes.

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                                10-8
 FIGURE 10.7.  Removal of Oil from Santa Barbara Harbor Using Vacuum
               Trucks
FIGURE 10.8.  Removal of Oil from Santa Barbara Harbor Using Straw

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                                 10-9

       The suction pump trucks employed to pump the concentrated oil
accumulation from the water surface were similar to those used to empty
septic tanks.  The capacity was typically 4200 gallons and several were used
at the Harbor each day.  Twelve hundred barrels of oil were reportedly
                                        / -I f-\
recovered by these trucks on  6 February,
       A commercial skimmer, tested in Santa Barbara Harbor, employed
a rotating cylinder covered with oil absorbent plastic foam.  Debris picked
up by the foam,  i.e. , straw and driftwood damaged  the foam, and, hence,
the device was not used.
       Several techniques were employed to clean various harbor facilities,
depending on the nature and accessibility. The launching ramp area,  dredge,
and protecting plastic panel shield around the "Undersea Gardens, " a marine
                               (17)
aquarium,  were steam cleaned.      The sea-wall was also steam cleaned
with steam and 120 °F water which necessitated covering nearby boats with
plastic sheeting.  8* Riprap and the walkway along the breakwater were
washed with pressurized water streams and steam cleaned.  The riprap
inside the Santa Barbara Harbor was subsequently sandblasted to improve
its  appearance.  Floats  in the harbor were hand scrubbed with commercial
"waterless" hand cleaning compound and wiped  off.
       Of the approximately 750 boats which were berthed in the harbor, it
                                              (19)
was estimated that over 700 were stained by oil.v    Cleaning the  hulls with
chemical solvents was prohibited by the Santa Barbara Fire  Department due
to fire hazard and waste pollution considerations.  Therefore, the  cleaning
of hulls that  could not be removed from the water was limited to waterless
hand cleaner  which could be wiped off following application.  Very few boat
hulls had been successfully cleaned as of late March, in part due to residual
oil being released to the harbor waters from the shoreline.  Boat baths and
small booms  commonly  placed around and under small craft in harbors
afforded protection to a  few boats.

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                                 10-10
 10.3 CLEANING OF ROCKS AND JETTIES
       Several methods were used to remove deposited oil from rocks and
 riprapped areas.  The riprapped areas presented a severe problem because
 of the numerous inaccessible cracks and crevices into which the oil had
 penetrated.  Methods tested included washing with cold and hot (120 °F)
 pressurized water streams, steam cleaning, application of chemical deter-
 gents (on a limited basis), and sandblasting.  Of these methods, only sand-
 blasting was found to satisfactorily remove stains despite the slowness of
 the process.  The air was supplied to the nozzles by standard compressors
 (100 psig).  Up to four spray nozzles could be operated from a single 1200
 scfm compressor.      Application was either wet or dry, depending on the
 prevailing wind direction, with the dry blasting being slightly more effective.
        Effective cleaning of riprap such as that on the jetty of Santa Barbara
 Harbor entailed three separate operations:  (1) hand removal of debris,
 (2) washing down with a stream of pressurized cold water, and (3) sandblast-
 ing.  Typical rates for wet sandblasting were 60 to 80 feet per day per spray
 nozzle,  working on a six  to eight foot wide strip of nominally two foot dia-
 meter boulders. Protective booms were placed while sandblasting the
 inside of the harbor jetty to prevent further contamination of the harbor
 waters.
                      SECTION  10.0  REFERENCES
 1.      "Offshore Oil Well Blowout,  Union Oil Company Well, " Santa
       Barbara Harbormaster Report, 22 April,  1969.
 2.     Map Supplement from Coast Guard On-Scene Commander's Report.
 3.     Summary of Union Oil Company Cleanup Activities (based on pro-
       gress reports furnished to the On-Scene Commander).
4.     Thomas H. Gaines,  Union Oil Co.  Statement 18 February,  1969.
5.     "The Santa Barbara Channel Oil Pollution Incident January 1969 -
       On-Scene - Commander's Report.
6.     Personal Communication, E. K. Thompson, Crosby  and Overton Inc.

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                                10-11
7.      Quotation from General Marine Transport Inc.  Santa Barbara,
       California.

8.      Union Oil Company Daily Report, 11 February, 1969.

9.      Ibid. , 14 February, 1969.

10.    Ibid., 17 February, 1969.

11.    Personal Communication with D. D. Shaw of Crosby and Overton Inc.

12.    Union Oil Company Daily Report, 16 February, 1969.

13.    Santa Barbara News Press, 14, February,  1969.

14.    Union Oil Company Daily Report, 26 February, 1969.

15.    "Offshore Oil Well Blowout, Union Oil Company Well, " Santa
       Barbara Harbormaster Report, 22 April, 1969.

16.    Santa Barbara News Press, 6 February, 1969.

17.    Union Oil Company Daily Report, 17 February, 1969.

18.    Ibid.. 18 February,  1969.

19.    Santa Barbara News Press, 16 February, 1969.

20.    Personal Communication with D. D. Shaw of Crosby and Overton Inc.

21.    Gains, T.  H.  "Notes on Pollution Con+rol Santa Barbara.. " Union

       Oil Company of California, undated.

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                                  11-1

           11.0  DISPOSAL OF WASTES AND RECOVERED OIL

    Wastes from clean-up operations consisted primarily of oil-soaked
straw (with admixed sand in most cases) from beach,  harbor and sea
cleaning; a considerable amount of oil-soaked debris (tree limbs, etc.),
due to high water in coastal streams,  that was washed to sea and later
deposited on beaches concurrent with oil deposition; small amounts of
other absorbents (e. g.,  perlite) used on beach and harbor cleanup;  and
oil-water mixtures removed from the water surface by skimming opera-
tions.
11.1  IN-PLACE BURNING
    Most of the straw and debris was trucked to landfill areas; however, in
some instances these combustibles were piled and incinerated on the
beaches (Figure 11.1).  For the most part, burning was abandoned as a
disposal method in later phases (16 February, Ref. 1) of the cleanup due
to voiced objections to the smoke and odor.  In all cases where wastes
were burned in-place, it was necessary to obtain burning permits from
appropriate  city or county authorities.   Originally, some difficulties were
 encountered in kindling the waste material; later a blower-type,  diesel-
fed burner was found to give good ignition.(1)  In general, however, and
with the exception of storm debris burning,  combustion of oil recovered on
the beaches (largely mixed with straw) was impaired by the fire  retardant
 properties of included wet sand.  In addition, due to the sulfur content
 (1. 2 to 1. 5 percent in fresh oil as released) burning possibly would have
 caused an air pollution problem.
    On-site  burning,  though objectionable from several viewpoints, had a
 number of advantages.   Some of these are apparent in the following dis-
 cussion wherein problems- attendant to hauling and landfill operations are
 pointed out.
     It is evident that in-place burning attempts in the event of future inci-
 dents must  consider the unexpected complexities introduced by nature
 (such as storm debris) and the possible need for mobile high temperature

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                                                                                        i -



FIGURE 11.1.  Burning Operations on Beach (courtesy of Santa Barbara News Press)

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                                  11-3

(artificially fueled) incineration equipment which substantially reduces the
potential air pollution problem.  Such considerations must be integrated
with beach cleaning methods which will undoubtedly involve sorbents such
as straw.
11.2  LANDFILL DISPOSAL
    The disposal of solid waste by landfill (shallow burial) was  considered
as the simplest of  disposal methods; however, there were a number of
problems which had to be surmounted in this particular case due to the
scale of the operation,  the time element, and the somewhat unique charac-
teristics of the disposed material.  Some of the items requiring considera-
tion were:
  • The disposal site(s) should be situated so that burial would not consti-
    tute either a short term (e.g., fire,  odor) or long term (groundwater
    contamination) problem.
  • It was desirable that the disposal site be close to the clean-up areas to
    minimize hauling distance, traffic problems, etc.
  • There was need to arrange for beach access (sometimes through
    private property) for heavy collection, loading and hauling equipment.
    In practice,  this required considerable advanced planning.
  • The relative remoteness of the major disposal sites selected made some
    road improvement work necessary to accommodate the dump trucks.
    Also,  the extremely heavy rains resulted in the sites being inaccessible
    for several days during which waste material was stockpiled on the
    beaches.
  •  Legal responsibilities with regard to long-term liabilities  had to be
     resolved between the property owner(s) and the clean-up contractor.
     A number of dumpsites were used for solid waste disposal.  Early in
 the beach clean-up operation, relatively minor amounts of wastes were
 trucked to established Santa Barbara, Ventura  and Oxnard disposal
 grounds.  However,  the bulk of the wastes was hauled to two sites where
 specific arrangements had been made for landfill burial and to a third site
 where the oil-sand mixture was used for road building.   In some instances

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                                  11-4

the oil content of the waste was high enough to allow free drainage.  In
these cases, the waste was returned to the beach area for introduction of
additional straw and sand.
                                                                  3
    Over 2, 200 large dumptruck loads of wastes (estimated 30, 000 yd )
were trucked to the head of a small side canyon near the crest of the
watershed in Toro  Canyon (Figure 11.2).  An estimated 3-4 acres (hori-
zontal surface) of fill were placed in the canyon.  One criterion for
selecting this site,  about 10 miles east of  Santa Barbara,  was the recog-
nition that it would not be subjected to significant leaching by regional
groundwaters.   In late March, after the site had been abandoned insofar
as waste oil residue  dumping was concerned, the site had been completely
backfilled and there was no visible evidence of the waste nor significant
petroleum odor  Periodic  checking of the small stream in this canyon has
                                               (2)
failed to reveal the presence of any oily effluent.
     Later in the clean-up operation, arrangements were made to dispose
of solid wastes in an area about 25 miles west of Santa Barbara
(Abercrombie  Ranch).  Here, about 1. 000 loads of waste material
(estimated  10, 000  yd3) were dumped down a hillside.  There was some
concern over this site with respect to material being washed by heavy
rains into an ephermeral streambed at the base of the hill,  and disposal
was relocated to more level ground (Hollister Ranch) a short distance
away.  About 6 acres of ground were filled at these adjacent sites.  Infor-
mation on the stream indicated that there  had been flow during the past
                                   (2)
winter for the  first time in 8 years.    Although no surface or groundwater
contamination problems are anticipated at either of these two disposal
sites, periodic confirmatory observations are planned by the California
State Water Quality Control Board.
                                          3
    About 2, 000 loads (estimated 20, 000 yd ) of beach clean-up wastes
were hauled to a river bottom fill area on the south bank of the Santa
Clara River near Oxnard.  The material was used as road foundation  on
                                 (3)
this reclaimed river bottom land.

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                     11-5
FIGURE 11.2.   Disposal  of Waste by Landfill Burial

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                                  11-6

       Waste disposal was a major and relatively expensive operation that
required and received considerable planning and cooperation.  Over 30
large trucks were in continuous waste-hauling operation at one period of
the undertaking.  The total cost of landfill disposal (including hauling,
dump fees,  road improvement,  etc.) is estimated at about $200, 000 or
$4/yd3 by the authors.   Gaines,    estimated that over 30, 000 tons of
storm debris alone was disposed of. Gaines further states that,  "up to
June 1. 1969, 9, 826 truck loads of oil-soaked  straw  and debris had been
disposed of. "
       The lesson to be learned here is that,  in the event of another major
oil spillage incident, the problem of disposal  of waste oil  and associated
material can be a significant problem.   This can be of even increased con-
cern in areas where water supplies are dependent upon groundwater sources.
       The major problem of locating acceptable  waste disposal  sites that
arose in this particular incident dictates the advisability of incorporating
a  survey of potential disposal areas as part of the contingency plan.
11. 3 DISPOSAL OF SKIMMED OIL
       Oil from harbor and sea-skimming operations constituted a poten-
tial, though negligible,  recoverable product rather than a waste.  Generally,
the skimmed material contained from 30-50 percent petroleum
(emulsified with sea water). Vacuum trucks equipped with suction hoses
were used to remove oil from the harbor at the shoreline  (Figure 10. 7),
and oil-water mixtures collected by sea skimmers were transferred to
tank trailers at Stearns Wharf.  These mixtures were  trucked to either
local processing or disposal facilities depending upon the quality of the
recovered  material.  About 400 barrels of the mixture were trucked to the
                                                                   (4)
Standard Oil Company processing facility at Carpenteria,  California,
and an equal amount was sent to the Richfield processing  facility at
Ellwood, California.     These facilities receive  crude oil from wells in
the area,  separate water, free gas  and  extraneous material from the crude
(physical separation) to meet pipeline  specifications, and ship the
clean product to refineries.  The  skimmed mixture was blended  into the
normal plant feed stream for processing.  Some problems in equipment
fouling were presented  by the heavy, thick crude.   Also, straw

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                                  11-7
tended to clog pumps and valves to such an extent that only an estimated
25 barrels of oil were recovered at the Richfield facility.

    It was reported   that skimmed oil was disposed to an approved
liquid waste disposal site at Fillmore, California; however,  attempts to
confirm this were not successful.
                   SECTION 11.0  REFERENCES
1.   Anonymous  Union Oil Company Daily Reports on Clean-Up Operations,
     February 10 - March 21,  1969.

2.   Personal Communication,  Mr. Kenneth Jones, California State Water
     Quality Control Board,  San Luis Obispo,  California, April 21,
     1969.

3.   Personal Communication,  Mr. Frank Robinson,  Ventura Coastal
     Refuse Disposal Company, June 19, 1969.

4.   Personal Communication,  Mr. John Herring, Producing Department,
     Standard Oil Company,  Carpenteria,  California, April 7,  1969.

5.   Personal Communication,  Mr. Elmer Robertson, Richfield Production
     Division, Ventura,  California, June 18, 1969.

6.   Gaines,  T. H.  "Notes  on  Pollution Control,  Santa Barbara", undated.

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                                    12-1

     12.0  BIOLOGICAL AND ECOLOGICAL SURVEYS AND FINDINGS

    To determine the biological impact of the Santa Barbara pollution
incident and its impact on the plant and animal communities, a base line of
previous studies on the macroflora,  fauna and plankton of the area is
essential.  It is fortunate that extensive studies  of marine flora and fauna
have been made in the area from the depths of the Channel up through the
intertidal zone.  The University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB) and
Santa Barbara City College (SBCC) use the intertidal zone as an outdoor
laboratory.  Similarly,  the University of California-Scripps Institution of
Oceanography  and the Allan Hancock Foundation of the University of
Southern California have made extensive studies of the offshore waters of
the Channel.
    The USFWS, Bureau of Commercial  Fisheries and Bureau of Sport
Fisheries and  Wildlife have studied commercial fisheries, marine mammals
and waterfowl  in the area.  The California Department of Fish and Game has
made studies of the intertidal zone of the mainland and Channel Island's fish
and wildlife resources. (1 * The Water Quality Control Board investigated the
                                  /2)
oceanographic regime of the area.v    With these data from the various  insti-
tutions,  a baseline understanding  of organisms  in the area is available.
    An estimation of the biological cost of the oil release was of primary con-
cern to the agencies involved.  Studies were initiated as soon as personnel
became available; some, of necessity, are on-going.  Background information
regarding general biological and ecological effects were well documented.
There were four  basic areas of investigation throughout the period following
the oil release.  These were:
  • Sea birds
  • Intertidal  and nearshore communities
  « Offshore and  benthic communities
  • Marine mammals.
    In addition, some comments are presented  on related projects, such as
 bioassays and hydrographic measurements,  and natural phenomena which
 occurred during the period (e.g., the heavy precipitation and flooding).

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                                  12-2

    This portion of the report attempts to document the surveys conducted
during and after the incident.  Relevant laboratory studies are also reported.
It is not our purpose, however,  to go beyond the scope of general documenta-
tion.  Conclusions and evaluations are not included as these must necessarily
derive from studies currently in progress,
12.1  SEA BIRDS
    Crude oil presents special problems in pollution control.  Since it is
relatively insoluble in water,  it tends to spread on the surface in films of
variable thickness.  The effect on the biological communities involved is
most notable when the oil comes ashore--the most likely contact point for
water birds.  On 30 January,  1969, the first dead bird was found.  The
following day personnel  from the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife,
USFWS, arrived and began aerial surveillance of the Channel and shore bird
populations to establish  the number and species of affected waterfowl.
Approximately 50 miles of coastal transects and 80 miles of Channel tran-
sects were flown daily from 4 February through 8 February,  and on alternate
days  9 February through 14 February (Figure 12.1).  Subsequently, weekly
flights were made.    Two California State Department of Fish and Game
vessels  were also on the lookout for distressed birds and mammals following
the transects shown on Figure 12.1.
    Early estimates indicated a  population of about 12, 000 birds in the
Santa Barbara Channel area.  Average counts ran about 3, 490 on the tran-
                                       (25)
sects during the eighteen days of flights.      No significant  change from
day to day was observed.  However,  there appeared to be a definite movement
away from the area.     The kinds of birds counted, in their order of
frequency were gulls (three species); grebes (95% Western); cormorants;
scoters; shore birds; loons; and a very small percentage of pelagic species.
The Western grebes and cormorants were most affected by the oil; sea gulls
were  the least affected.
   In addition, four beach transects were walked to observe shore birds.
Initially,  one control and three contaminated transects were established;
however, the control transect also became oil soaked.  The Santa  Barbara

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                                                                                              ! 3

                                                                                               I
FIGURE 12. 1.  Location and Direction of Aerial Transects, U.S.  Fish and Wildlife
               Service,  Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife

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                                       12-4


                                   FIGURE 12.2
Transect:
Observer (rj7
Weather:
               SANTA BARBARA WILDLIFE STUDY - AERIAL TRANSECTS
                            DATA COLLECTION FORM           Date:
                                                  Time:   Start:
            _
   Total Time!
Low Tide Time:

Species
Loon (sp.)
Grebe (sp.)
Shearwater
Brown pelican
Cormorant (sp.)
Black brant
C. goldeneye
Bufflehead
Scoter ISP.)
Red-br. merganser
Unknown waterfowl
Great blue heron
A. egret
Black oystercatcher
Black-bellied plover
Whimbrel or M. godwit
Willet
Turnstone (sp.)
Sanderlinq
Sandpiper (sp..
Phalarope (sp.,
Gull (sp.)
Tern (sp.)
C. murre
Pigeon quillemot
Murrelet (sp.)
Others



Unidentified
Total Birds

Sea lion
Harbor seal
Porpoise
Whale
Others
Total Mammals

Dead







































Bird Observations
Affected Normal
by Oil
































Mammal Observations







Total































|







Notes:

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                                    12-5

Chapter of the Audubon Society also assisted with the transects and made
weekly counts in the Carpinteria and Goleta Marshes.  The counts can be
compared with several made during 1966.
    One of the first reactions to the oil spill was the establishment of bird
salvage operations for oiled birds.  Personnel of the Childs' Estate (a
municipal zoo),  local  and humane society officials, California State Depart-
ment of Fish and Game, and the Union Oil Company established two centers,
and provided Polycomplex A-11 to wash the birds.  Treatment  generally con-
sisted of chemical washing followed by placing the birds in a warm recovery
room.
    Approximately 900 birds were treated at the Carpinteria State Beach and
                         /o)
670 at the Childs1 Estate.     Although early estimates (13 February) of
survival ranged as high as  50%, this decreased to 27. 5% by 19  February and
to a low of 10% by 1 April; *lj this closely parallels the results  of the TORREY
CANYON and OCEAN  EAGLE  incidents.  Total known bird losses through
31 March in the area  affected  by the oil spill were determined to be
       (25)
3, 600.      Survivors of the treatment were distributed to three locations.
Some were released;  others were sent to the San Diego Zoo; and  some were
                                                                (3)
banded and released in the  vicinity of Vandenberg Air Force Base.
    The University of  California at Santa Barbara (Dr. Barbara Drinkwater)
statistically examined the methods which were most successful with each
species.     Her reasons for such an approach were threefold.  First, there
was (and still is) an almost complete lack of published material regarding
bird salvage.  Second, the  bird cleaning group did not include a pathologist
with the resultant lack of immediate feedback to pinpoint the cause of death.
Finally,  physiological data were lacking.
    At the time of this writing, Dr. Drinkwater and her group are compiling
a computer program.   When their results are available, they will have
compiled the mean survival rate for each species for each type of treatment,
as well as the interaction of the two factors.  Statistical variables will be
available relating survival to:
    1.  Species
    2.  Amount of oil

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                                       12-6

                                   FIGURE  12.3


                       SANTA BARBARA BEACH BIRD  STUDY
Transect:
Observer(sTT
Weather:	"
        Date:
Time:   Start:"
        Stop-/
  Total Time:
Bird Observations
Species
Red- throated loon
Common loon
Western Grebe
Double crested
cormorant
Surf scoter
Kill deer
Black-bellied
plover
Snowy plover
Whimbrel
Marbled godwit
Millet
Sanderling
Knot
Western sandpiper
Least sandpiper
Gulls (all
species)
Royal tern
Others :




Unidentified
Total
Dead
























Oil
Stained*
























Soaked*
























Clean*
























Total
























KemarKS
(Feeding, Flying or Resting)
























* Oil stained - those birds with body  feathers with oil but not ragged in appearance.
  Oil soaked - those birds with body feathers heavy with oil and ragged in appearance.
  Clean - those birds with little or no oil on theirplumage.

                               Additional  Notes

BEACH CONDITION (Oil contamination, clean-up activity, number of people, etc.)



ANIMALS OBSERVED OFFSHORE (Bird and mammals seen, flight pattern and activity)

UNUSUAL ANIMAL BEHAVIOR
                           (Use other side  as  needed)

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                                   12-7

   3.  Species and amount of oil
   4.  Treatment
   5.  Treatment and species
   6.  Condition prior to treatment
Dr. Drinkwater to date has compiled and coded data as follows:
   1.  SPECIES - 26 species treated,  each species assigned number.
   2.  NUMBER - UCSB identification number.
   3.  CLEANING - type of cleaning compound used.
   4.  AMOUNT OF OIL - whether light,  medium or heavy oil covering.
   5.  CONDITION BEFORE CLEANING - quiet or active.
   6.  CONDITION AFTER CLEANING -  quiet or active.
   7.  SIDE EFFECTS - such as convulsions, respiratory trouble.
   8.  TREATMENT - 15 treatments tried,  some in combination, such as
       butter, vitamins, fish.
   9.  SURVIVAL PERIOD - number of days lived after cleaning.
                                              (4)
   10.  FATE - whether dead, alive, released.
   Mr.  Jack Hemphill (USFWS-BSF&W) during the United States Senate
hearings in Santa Barbara  (24-25 February)  stated:  "The current practice
of cleaning birds with a detergent removes the protective oils as well as
the petroleum.  As a result, a prolonged  rehabilitation period,  extending
through  a complete moult,  is currently advocated to prevent death by exposure.
An efficient method of  oil removal in combination with the application of a
substitute  oil or wax which would provide immediate protection from the
elements may prove a  logical solution. "
    Mr.  Hemphill continued, "Bird losses,  to this point,  have been  relatively
moderate.  That bird losses have been low is purely fortuitous; the ingredients
for a major avian disaster were present.   Various factors appear to have
mitigated bird losses.   It was the consensus that bird populations in the area
were generally low,  due in part to the storm immediately preceding the
spill.  Many birds were driven out  of danger, including an estimated 25, 000
pintails  reported in the area prior to the  storm.   Flooded inland areas may
have provided a haven for  some of the shore birds in search of food.
Seasonal migrations  of various species such as the brant and sooty  shearwater

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                                    12-8

had not begun, thus reducing the total number of birds in the area and
potential exposure to contamination.  It is frightening to think what might
have happened had the usual flight of brant landed here during the critical
period.  Almost the entire population of this specie could  have been exposed
to extermination.
     "... Over 5, 800 birds  were treated following the TORREY CANYON
spill; it  is conceivable that  facilities for treating up to 100, 000 birds might
be required should an oil spill occur in certain critical areas; for example,
Cook Inlet,  Alaska, during  the months of May and September.  The manpower
and  facilities for such an operation would be staggering.  On the other hand,
the annihilation of one or more species of waterfowl could be the
alternative. "
     Despite the very considerable effort and expense devoted to bird cleaning
and care, the results appear to be no better than in the case of the TORREY
CANYON incident.     Undoubtedly the effort put forth in Santa Barbara
saved many birds and it was apparent that many birds died as much due to
the  stresses of captivity and handling as to oil contamination per se.
    The  facilities  and procedures set up by Union Oil  Company were in the
nature of an assembly line.  This undoubtedly reduced mortality resulting
from unnecessary handling.
12.2 INTERTIDAL AND NEARSHQRE COMMUNITJES
    The  most practical and useful method for assessing oil damage to marine
macrofauna and flora in the intertidal zones is to compare periodic observa-
tions,  i.e., beach surveys, made before and after oil deposition.  This
method obviously requires  base-line information or background data
collected before the incident.  In most oil pollution incidents, such background
data have been lacking.  Fortunately, in terms of assessment of damage in
the Santa Barbara Channel, the late  E. Yale Dawson established and surveyed
intertidal pollution monitoring stations along the sourthern California coast
        (fi)
in 1957.     Dawson's stations were again surveyed by marine biologists
from UCSB in 1967.  During this intervening ten year period, little change
had occurred in the marine fauna and flora.  These data collected by Dawson

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                                   12-9

and UCSB marine biologists provide a valuable base line for assessment of
damage to the intertidal organisms as a result of the oil release and
shoreline deposition.
    Under the direction of Professor Michael Neushul,  of UCSB, student
biologists assisted the FWPCA in making transects and samplings of the
                                                   (7)
beaches to estimate the amount of oil on the stations.     Details of the
procedures are not presented here,  but, in brief, two students assigned to
a station recorded a number of items observed along a transect line running
from Dawson's benchmark to a stake at the water's edge at low tide.  Some
of the items observed and recorded for each station were:
    1. Beginning of high tide mark and oil mark on the beach.
    2. Kinds  and number of organisms alive or dead touching the transect
       line.
    3. Surface samples of beach  sand to estimate oil on the station.
    4. Sand core samples for estimation of amount of oil penetrating beach.
    5. Photographs of each line transect.
    6. Photographs of oil-covered live, moribund, or  dead organisms.
    The survey included ten of Dawson's stations (Figure 12.4) on 8 and
9, February,  1969,  about ten days after the initial oil release.  Some stations
were resurveyed in March.  Observations for each beach transect are
detailed in reports prepared by students and submitted to Professor Neushul.
Studies were conducted at El Capitan Beach,  Coal Oil Point,  Goleta Point,
Santa Barbara Point, Eucalyptus  Lane, Loon Point, Carpentaria Reef,
Rincon Beach, Palm Street Beach,  Arroyo Sequit (Table 12. 1), and in two
locations in Santa Barbara Harbor.  Surveys were comprised of observations
of the various zones  (intertidal,  midwater, open water) as  well as the
benthos.
    In summary, UCSB beach transect studies showed that  no significant
acute oil kills of intertidal organisms were observed at any of the ten stations
surveyed.
    Independent observations made by biologists from other organizations
provide further evidence of the lack of any serious acute kills among inter-
tidal species.  Mr.  C.  M.  Seeley, aquatic biologist. Federal Water

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/   I

                                               POINT IM Ml


                                                                                     I 5
                                                                                     I
        FIGURE 12.4.   Beach Transect Sites for Intertidal Study

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                                   12-11

  TABLE 12. 1.  Biological Stations (Beach Transects) Surveyed by Univer-
                sity of California,  Santa Barbara Students,  February-
                March, 1969

        (West to East)
        _ Station No.                          Name
             40             El Capitan Beach
              1             Coal Oil Point
             28             Goleta Point
             27             Santa Barbara Point
             39             Eucalyptus Lane,  Mo'ntecito
             38             Loon Point, Summerland
             15             Carpenteria Reef
             35             Rincon Beach
             12             Palm Street Beach,  near Ventura River
              4             Arroya Sequit, Los  Angeles County

Pollution Control Administration, observed no  obvious oil-killed organisms
with the exception of at least several hundred dead wavy-top snails or wavy
top turbans (Astrea undosa) found dead or dying on oil covered beaches at
                           (8)
Carpinteria on 9 February.    At present no direct evidence has been firmly
established that these  wavy-top snails were killed directly by  oil; rather,  it
appears that the kill most likely resulted from  sudden exposure to fresh
water runoff resulting from rain storms.  W. C.  Johnson,  FWPCA,  reported
that about a week before the incident the Santa Barbara coast was subjected
to heavy rains and flooding; therefore,  damage to the biota in  some areas on
the coast could be the  results of fresh water rather than oil.
    The FWPCA examined the biological damage created in the Santa Barbara
Harbor. In addition, they compiled data accumulated by Santa Barbara City
College.  Inspections of the intertidal zone revealed very little initial adverse
effect obviously due to oil.  Some mortalities were observed,  however,  this
                                                        (1)
may have been due to the hot water  used to clean  the jetty.     Near the end
of March,  however, some possible  effects  may have begun to  manifest
themselves.  R. H. Clawson (FWPCA) noticed  an apparent degradation of

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                                   12-12
fauna while the flora increased in abundance.  This was interpreted as
                                                    (26)
a possible long-term manifestation of the oil's toxicity.
    The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries provided an experienced observer,
John B. Glude, Deputy Regional Director, Pacific Northwest Region, who
observed the effects of crude oil spills  in England and France following the
TORREY CANYON incident and in Puerto Rico following the wreck of the
tanker  OCEAN EAGLE. Glude observed the intertidal zone at Channel
Islands Harbor, Ventura,  El Capitan Beach, Goleta "County Beach,  and
Santa Barbara beaches during the period 13-15 February,  1969.  He reported
in summary that the only mortality observed among intertidal species was
of mussels (Mytilus californianus) ranging from an estimate of about one
percent on the rocky beach area southeast of Santa Barbara to about 10 to
                                                   (9)
20 percent at the entrance to Channel Islands Harbor.     He also believed
that the lack of damage presently observed among intertidal organisms is
largely because only limited amounts of dispersant chemicals were used in
Santa Barbara and further because crude oil by itself is not highly toxie to
the macrofauna and flora which he observed.
    The California State Department  of Fish and Game and the U.  S. Park
Service coordinated their  efforts in surveying the shore and nearshore
marine communities around Anacapa Island (a national refuge) on 5 ana
14 February and Santa Cruz Island on 11-14 February, 1969. *
Figure  12. 5 illustrates the area studied for oil damage.   Marine biologists
of the California Department of Fish and Game led by C.  H. Turner worked
the area from the vessel COUGAR (U.  S. Park Service) and ALASKA
(Department of Fish and Game) and smaller skiffs.  Four transects
extending from above high tide line into depths not exceeding 50 feet were
established and studied at  Anacapa Island,  and at eleven locations at
Santa Cruz Island.
   Turner reported:  "in general, the various animal and plant assemblages
observed appeared normal and healthy,  although some of those in the inter-
tidal (splash zone to just below low tide) were coated with varying amounts
of oil.   Oil was observed on  the surface canopy of many of the kelp

-------
West Point
                               Area Surveyed for Oil Spill Damage

                                    February 5,  11-14, 1969
                                                                       Sandstone
                                                                        "'
                                                                        Point
                                                              Scorpion
                                                              Anchorage
              SANTA CRUZ ISLAND
San Pedro
 Point
                                                                                        JlAnacaoa Island
                                                                                                         to
            FIGIJRE_1_2._5. Area Surveyed for Oil Spill Damage, 5, 11-14, February, 1969, California
                          State Department of Fish and Game

-------
                                    12-14
 (Macrocystis) beds, but most of this oil was easily shaken off the stipes,
 indicating that self cleaning would follow storms and heavy seas.  Surf
 grass (Phyllospadix) at Anacapa Island,  which was heavily coated with oil
 on February 5, was appreciably cleaner on February 14.  Subtidal plants
 and animals appeared untouched by the oil.
    "Black abalones (Haliotis cracherodii) and numerous other intertidal
 animals,  algae (Hysperophychus and Pelvetia) and surf grass (Phyllospadix)
 were heavily coated with oil at Punta Arena.  None appeared in distress,
 however, and we presume most will survive.  Losses to this  island's inter-
 tidal  life should not exceed 5 to 10 percent (subjective estimate) and the
 subtidal life should be unharmed. "
    Dr. W. J. North, California Institute of Technology conducted a one-
 week study to determine possible oil damage to marine life three weeks
 after the initial oil release.      This study, sponsored by the Western Oil
 and Gas Association,  included surveys of about 10 miles of beach exposed to
 oil deposition.  No evidence of damage to marine life was found near shore
 with the possible exception of one dead Pismo  Clam .
    Concern was expressed about the important kelp-bed resources being
 contaminated with oil,  but North,  who has made major contributions on the
 biology of the giant kelp (Macrocystis) and the utilization of kelp-bed
           (12)
 resources,     reported kelp beds were unharmed.   He explained that kelp
 secretes  a mucus substance (polysaccharide) which prevents oil from
 adhering to the living tissue of the plant.
   Possible latent effects were examined by D.  Straughan of the University
of Southern California, Allen Hancock Foundation.  Samples of 5 intertidal
species were examined to determine if the surviving animals were
reproducing and if repopulation was occurring in devastated areas.  She
concluded that, except in areas still badly polluted,  the examined species
          ^   •         ,1  <27)
are reproducing normally.
12.3  OFFSHORE AND BENTHIC SURVEYS
   The USFWS Bureau of Commercial Fisheries conducted offshore surveys
aimed at determining the oil's effect on pelagic fish  eggs and larvae,

-------
                                   12-15

phytoplankton and zooplankton and spawning as well as related hydrographic
conditions such as nutrient concentrations,  dissolved oxygen, and light
transmittance.  The eggs, larvae,  and zooplankton were taken in 0.5 meter
nets with 1/3 mm mesh.  Oblique tows were made through the water column;
in addition,  samples were taken at 1 and 5 meters in horizontal tows.  Near
surface phytoplankton and microzooplankton were sampled through 0. 04 mm
mesh sieves.   All specimens were examined immediately on retrieval and
                                          (13)
preserved later for more detailed analysis.
    The cruise of the R/V DAVID STARR JORDAN was designed to study the
area of the spillage and determine  the effects on pelagic eggs and larvae.
The presence and absence of larvae and eggs on anchovy was no different
than long-term average variations. In addition to anchovy larvae,  the
samples included larvae of hake, rockfish (Sebastodes  spp.), sciaenids
(Cynoscion spp. ), sand dab (Citharichthys spp.),  English sole (Parophrys
spp.), deep  sea smelt (Leuroglossus spp.) and flounder (Pleuronichthys spp.)
in approximate amounts expected for the areas sampled.  Some specimens
were taken from beneath oil slicks; no dead eggs or larvae were found.
Phytoplankton  and zooplankton from near-surface samples appeared normal
                                (14)
and were not adversely affected.
    The hydrographic studies indicated varying light transmittance according
to the thickness of the oil layer. There was complete light transmission in
areas of thin slicks decreasing to nearly zero light transmission under
thicker layers.
     UCSB biologists Drs. Alfred Ebling and Adrian Wenner,  aboard the
FWPCA chartered SWAN, continued a study begun long before the  spill.
Dr. Wenner examined plankton samples for larval stages of the sand crab,
Emerita, and found them to  be present in abundance.   Dr.  Ebling was
examining the kelp fish population  in order to compare post-spill data with
data he had collected in the four previous years.   As yet,  no statement can
be made on the actual effect of the oil deposition.  In every case the data
were not completely analyzed  or were simply incomplete.
    The State of  California Department of Fish and Game aboard the

-------
                                  12-16

ALASKA surveyed the Santa Barbara  Channel to determine the effects of
oil pollution on the pelagic fishes of the area.  Acoustic surveys, similar
to those routinely conducted since 1965,  were made along 96 miles of
acoustic transects.  The echo sounder detected schools of anchovy, rockfish,
squid, and, perhaps, jack mackerel.
    Since 1965, this  area had been surveyed 12 times in a similar manner.
Compared with previous surveys,  those following the oil release ranked
second in number of anchovy schools. There was apparently an unusual
seasonal abundance since anchovies are generally scarce during this  time
period.
    In addition, three transects were  established from 10 meter depth to
50 fathoms.  A drag net (otter  trawl)  with 1-1/2 inch  stretch mesh was  used
on the transects to capture fish.  All  fish captured were weighed and  measured
to establish baselines for future investigation.  The dominant fish caught were
sea perch, followed by flat fish (Pleuronectidae), sharks, and angel sharks.
Midwater trawls, limited to two due to inclement weather,  also indicated
better than average catches of  jack mackerel and bonito, two species last
taken in 1963.(16)
    California State Department of Fish and Game personnel also assessed
bottom characteristics and the  condition of benthic organisms along three
transects ranging in depths from 2 to  62 fathoms.  Samples were taken with
a Ponar 0.1 meter square dredge and a 41-foot headrope gulf shrimp trawl.
Twenty-six dredge samples were taken in depths between 2  and 50 fathoms.
Seventeen 10-minute bottom trawls were completed between 16 and 62 fathoms.
    No evidence of oil  contamination on the bottom was noted at depths between
6 and 62 fathoms. Oil or oil emulsion occurred in the dredge sample taken
                            (17)
inside Santa Barbara Harbor.
   None of the reporting groups defined  any  significant detrimental effects
upon the fauna.  The R/V DAVID STARR JORDAN studies indicated
"minimal adverse effects:  on the plankton in the area.  California Fish and
Game Cruise Reports  also indicate the damage was minimal or nonexistent
among benthic organisms and pelagic  fishes.

-------
                                   12-17

12.4  MARINE MAMMALS
    In the early stages of the Santa Barbara Channel oil pollution investiga-
tions, concern was expressed for the marine mammal populations in the
area.  California Fish and Game personnel examined Santa Cruz and Anacapa
Island on 5 February and 11-14 February, 1969, to assess the effects  of the
oil spill  on the marine communities.  Approximately 35 California Sea Lions
(Zalophus californianus) were observed coated with oil but in no apparent
distress. Another group of about 300 were observed in the area with no
signs of  oil coating.
    On 10 February,  field personnel reported the oil slick had not extended
westward as far as Santa Rosa and San Miguel Islands, and the small colony
of fur seals (Callorhinus ursinus) on San Miguel had not been affected.
Press reports stated ". . .  nine dead (Elephant Seals) and 35 so heavily coated
with oil  that none  were likely to survive. "  However,  upon personal contact
with California Fish  and Game personnel at Terminal Island, California,
it was disclosed that all but one of the nine "dead" elephant seals
(Mirounga angustirostris)  on San Miguel Island had left the island as had
the remaining 35  "doomed" seals, apparently under their own power since
they were above the high water line.
    Other seals and sea lions observed in the vicinity of Anacapa and Santa
Cruz islands  did not appear to be affected although they had been observed
swimming in areas where oil was present.  When the Department skiff
approached, the already oil-covered seals were aroused, dove into the
water and received an additional  coat of oil.  As the skiff departed, the seals
crawled back onto the rocks and fell asleep, apparently unaffected by the
  ., (18)
oil.
    Marine mammals reported during this period (28 January to 31 March)
to have  washed ashore dead in the study period numbered three sea lions  and
four porpoises.   Autopsies performed on two porpoises failed to incriminate
 oil contamination as the cause of death.
    The California Grey Whales (Eschrichtius gibbosus) received a great
 degree  of notoriety. They were  in the peak of their northern migration period
 during the period of major oil release.  By 10 February, only five grey whales

-------
                                   12-18

had been observed in the area since the initiation of oil release.  All of
these appeared to be in good condition.  Observers reported the whales
appeared to be just "passing through. "
     Six whales (five California Grey Whales and one Pilot whale) were
stranded along beaches north of the Santa Barbara area.  This is about
                                                                 (19)
normal according to the Bureau of  Commercial Fisheries personnel;
and not unusually high according to Mr. R.  L. Brownell, Jr. of the
Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History.  Brownell, in reviewing
records from between 1960 and 1968, noted that 15 to 20 California Grey
Whales were stranded along the California coast.  "Of these, five were
found between mid January and mid May 1961, and three between
February 25 and March 15, 1964. "(20)
    Examination on 14 March by FWPCA personnel at the site of a stranding
produced the following information: "The dead whale, a male California
Grey Whale, was located on the beach near the foot of a 75 foot bluff. . . .
It was washed ashore on 12 March.  The body and head show considerable
evidence of bites, presumably from sharks of good size.  No oil was seen
on the body surface,  but had any been originally present it would probably
have been lost when the body was covered and uncovered with sand. "
    The whale was transferred to the Pt.  Molate Whaling Station for further
examination.  The whale was in an advanced state of decomposition; the
viscera were severely autolysed.   Visual inspection of the baleen, mouth
and blow-hole showed no traces of  oil.  Tissue samples were taken by BCF
                       (n-l \
personnel for analysis.v   '  The FWPCA analysed these tissues on 17 March,
1969.  They were unable to detect the presence of oil in the tissues
provided.
   Transects have since  been flown by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries
from Santa Barbara north to Coos Bay, Oregon and from Coos Bay to  Cape
Flattery, Washington.  Five to six hundred whales were seen in each transect;
no additional mortalities or strandings were observed.
   Thus,  in general, although most mammal species in the area  received
some oil coating, minimal effects can be attributed to the oil.   The seals
and sea lions which became covered appeared normal.  The whales

-------
                                   12-19
migrating through the channel either were able to avoid the oil or
were unaffected when in contact with it.
12.5  RELATED STUDIES AND EVENTS
    12.5.1 Bioassays
    When the leak occurred, only very limited background material was
available concerning the toxicity of various chemicals used in spill
treatment.  However, from previous experience (e. g.,  TORREY CANYON),
it was known that at least certain dispersants were considerably more toxic
than the  oil itself.  Thus, the FWPCA, with limited facilities at the site,
set up small bioassays to evaluate both the immediate effects of crude oil
and oil-with-dispersant mixtures used at Santa Barbara.
    A preliminary test used the salt water minnow, Fundulus parvipinnis,
to test "Corexit 7664, " "Corexit"-Oil mixtures and oil alone.    Limited
investigations, using goldfish, were made on the relative toxicities of
"UNICO"; "E-147"; "Besline"-Oil Mixture; "Polycomplex A-ll", with and
                                             (22)
without oil; and the household detergent "Joy. "
    "Corexit  7664" was also tested at the BCF Fishery-Oceanography
Center at La Jolla, California.  This bioassay employed the eggs and early
larvae of the northern anchovy,  Engraulus mordax.  Two experimental
containers of sea water each  containing 25 eggs were used for concentrations
                                     (14)
of "Corexit" ranging from 2-100 ppm.
    The California Department of Fish and Game has established criteria
for assessing the suitability of oil spill treatment chemicals.  Their primary
goal is the protection of fish  and wildlife,  but aesthetic and recreational use
is also considered.  Any application of a potential contaminant must be
evaluated with respect to the  area or volume it will occupy as a function of
time; once this has been determined,  it must be decided what changes the
dispersant may bring about in the physical,  chemical and biological
characteristics of the environment.
    A summary of their criteria of toxicity is as follows:
1.  No toxicity to selected plants and animals at 100 times the concentration

-------
                                   12-20

     of the treatment chemical expected at the edge of the zone of appli-
     cation as calculated from static bioassay TL   values.
 2.  Selected plants and animals should not be adversely affected at concen-
     trations occurring in the zone of dilution as determined by long-term
     flowing water bioassay of emulsions, nor should the detergents or  their
     metabolites accumulate in the food chain.
 3.  Establish time-to-death versus concentration  relationship of the treat-
     ment chemical and emulsion.
 4.  No toxicity or fouling of birds or mammals.
 5.  Toxicity tests must be performed on  the  detergent,  solvent,  and
     stabilizer portions of the treatment chemical in addition to emulsions
     resulting from oil treatment.
 6.  Toxicity tests must be performed according to standard methods on
     susceptible and sensitive species from lists supplied by the Department.
     With regard to biodegradability,  the  factors are as follows:
 1.  The treatment chemical or emulsions should show no toxicity to the
     appropriate decomposer bacteria.
 2.  An  analytical measure should  be made of the rate of decay of the treat-
     ment chemical and resulting emulsions in a simulated marine
     environment.
 3.   The effect of essential nutrients on the  rate of decay of the surfactant-
    oil complex needs to be determined.
 4.  The  biochemical oxygen demand with  rate-factor of the treatment
    chemical and resulting emulsions.
        Following the initial drafting of this report, information was pro-
                              (29)
 vided by the Union Oil Company     on bioassay studies of several pro-
 prietary chemical treating agents.  This  information is appended (page
 12-23) without comment.   Suffice  it to say, conclusions drawn from bio-
assay evaluation must recognize the specific conditions under which these
tests were conducted.  Further investigations are necessary before any
responsible conclusions regarding relative toxicities can be made.
       12. 5. 2  Flood Damage
       Almost concurrently with the oil spill, one of the heaviest rainfalls
in the past 100 years occurred throughout Southern California.  The

-------
                                 12-21

flooding which occurred in conjunction with the rainfall carried large
quantities of debris, earth and silt into the Channel.   Much of the debris
was washed onto the beaches and was covered with oil.  The silt remained
in suspension for several days and, in some cases, could be seen clearly
from the air for several weeks.  In addition,  just prior to the rains,
agricultural areas of Santa Barbara, Ventura and neighboring counties had
been heavily treated with pesticides.  During the floods a large portion of
these chemicals was undoubtedly washed to sea.
       On 9 February, Mr. Charles Seeley of the FWPCA reported at
Carpenteria State Beach that he "walked up the beach for about 150 yards and
found numerous wavy-top snails (Astrea undosa) dead or dying on the sand
and in,  or covered by, the  heavy oil and debris deposits.  A conservative
estimate of numbers would be several hundred dead. " On February 13,  1969,
he reported "It  was of interest to note that the storm debris which inundates the
beach northwest of Carpenteria Creek is relatively scarce below the creek.
Also, no  specimens of Astrea were observed in this section. "
        Thus it  would  appear that the marked salinity decrease and, perhaps,
the introduction of abnormal quantities of silt, debris,  and pesticides  con-
tributed to the overall mortality in the area.   The mortalities caused by the
flood effects may indeed be masked by the presence of oil on  specimens,
perhaps already dead or dying, which were washed up onto the beaches.
        12. 5. 3  Dissolved Oxygen Studies
        The dissolved oxygen (DO) regime in Santa Barbara Harbor was
monitored from 7 to 11 February, 1969.  Samples were collected by FWPCA
field personnel at various tides to assess the exchange of harbor water. In
addition,  the water within the "Undersea Gardens, " an aquarium in the
harbor, was monitored from 6 to  11 February, 1969. These data  are given
 in Table  12. 2.
        The DO determinations were made with an azide modification of the
Winkler method.  Surface  samples were taken one foot below the surface and
 bottom samples one foot above the bottom.  Table 12. 2 indicates slightly
 lower values than those reported in earlier work in 1959.     These latter
 studies found the amount of dissolved oxygen in all areas of Southern
 California to a depth  of 200 feet was usually between 5  and 10 ppm.

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                                   12-22
          TABLE 12.2.  Dissolved Oxygen at Santa Barbara Harbor
        Date     Station   Time    Depth     Temp.      DO mg/1
2,7/69
2/8/69

2/9/69
2/9/69
2/10/69


2
1
1
1
1
3
4
5
1445
1330
1900
0940
1650
0950
1000
1030
Surf.
Surf.
1.5m
3.0m
Surf.
1.7m
3.4 m
Surf.
1.5 m
3.0 m
Surf.
1.7m
3.0m
Surf.
2.0 m
Surf.
2.5m
5.0 m
Surf.
3.0m
6.0m
14.0 °C
15.5 °C
14.0 °C
14.0 °C
14.0 °C
13.5 °C
13.5 °C
13.5 °C
13.5 °C
13.5 °C
14.5 °C
14.0 °C
14.0 °C
14.5 °C
14.3 °C
14.3 °C
14.3 °C
14.3 °C
14.3 °C
14.0 °C
14.0 °C
4.95
4.95
5.0
5.40
5.25
5.60
5.50
4.85
4.82
4.70
4.80
4.75
4.65
4.80
4.50
5.10
5.00
4.84
5.30
5.20
5.20
       2/11/69
1020
Surf.
14.5 °C
5. 04
Only five samples (of 450) had concentrations below 5. 5 ppm.  Unfortunately,
they present no data w ithin the Santa Barbara Harbor, thus making direct
comparisons impossible.
    The FWPCA also determined respiration rates within the "Undersea
Garden. "  These were  determined by the incubation of light and dark bottles
in situ.  These data, however,  are incomplete.

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                                 12-23
                                                                  (29)
APPENDED INFORMATION FROM UNION OIL CO. OF CALIFORNIA
Results of a Bioassay for Union Oil Company
       The results of our investigation of the fish tolerance of several
surfactants of different manufacture are presented in this report.
       On March 13, 1969,  seven samples of  surfactants of different manu-
facture were received from Mr. Harry M.  Brandt of the Technical Service
Division of Union Oil Company.  We have performed  96-hour TLm or
Median Tolerance Limit assays on all seven samples.
       The seven samples  are the following:
   1.   AHA Gold Crew Bilge Cleaner; Ara Chem. Inc.
       A somewhat viscous, clear, liquid miscible with water.
   2.   Corexit 7664; Enjay Chem.  Co.
       A somewhat viscous, clear  liquid miscible with water.
   3.   Grain OD-2; Grain  Ind. Prod. Co.
       Resembles green soap.  Miscible with water.
   4.    H 4000; Verne Hollander
        Clear, kerosene  odor, forms white  emulsion with water.
   5.    Polycomplex A-11; Guardian Chem. Corp.
        A somewhat viscous, clear, liquid miscible with water.
   6.    Surfemul #5; 3C Chemical Corp.
        A milky-white aqueous dispersion.
   7.    Unico; Universal Supply Co.
        Resembles green soap.  Miscible with water.
        The bioassay conducted for the  Union Oil Company was  a  static
 type carried out according to the procedures of the Standard  Methods for the
 Examination of Water and  Wastewater, Twelfth Edition.  (1965)
        Two containers of  five fish each in  six liters of artificial  sea water
 were used for each dilution level of each sample.  At least four dilution
 levels were used for each surfactant sample.  At least ten control fish were
 similarly treated for each sample  series.  Each container was aerated
 slowly with filtered air throughout each test.  This was necessary to main-
 tain the dissolved oxygen  level above 4 mg/L.

-------
                                 12-24

        The dissolved oxygen (DO) was measured using a Precision Scientific
 Co. galvanic cell oxygen analyzer.  The analyzer was calibrated in air
 saturated artificial seawater.  The known value of 7. 3 mg oxygen per liter
 of seawater at 21 °C was used.  Tables supplied by Precision Scientific Co.
 were used to convert meter readings to mg/L.
        The pH value of each test container was recorded using a Coleman
 pH meter.
        The water temperature throughout the test remained at  21-22 °C.
        The fish used (Fundulus parvipinnis)  in the Union Oil Company
 bioassay were obtained from the brackish water areas just to the south  of
 Seal Beach.  The fish were collected at high tide at different intervals using
 a small seine.  The fish were acclimatized for at least 14 days to laboratory
 conditions before use.  They were fed frozen brine shrimp once a day except
 for two days preceeding a test.
        Artificial seawater mixed 2:1 with ocean water was used to
 acclimatize the fish. Artificial seawater alone was used as dilution water
 for the surfactants in each test to avoid other contaminants.  This was
 permissible since no exact source was specified and the concentrations of
 salts were within the accepted range.
        The weight of all fish in each test  container averaged 2 to 2-1/2  g/£.
        Preliminary exploratory tests had to be conducted for each sample
 because at the time of the test little information had been found in  the
 literature and no other indication of the tolerance of fish to the  material
 was known. In some cases a second preliminary test was necessary as
 the concentrations in the first test were in steps of one-hundred.
        Results
    Surfactant             24 hr TL   in ppm           96 hr TL  in ppm
————^————-^—-————               111                          m
ARA Bilge Cleaner                 128                        128
Corexit 7664                    15, 900 (?)                  7, 200
Grain OD-2                        125 (?)                    118
H-4000                            118                          81
Polycomplex A-11                  225                        134
Surfemul #5                        350                        350
Unico                             220                        220
All 70 control fish survived the test.

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                                 12-25

       Discussion
       A reduction in toxicity of the surfactants was apparent in the static
tests.  In four of the samples the 24 hr TL   and the 96 hr TL   were the
                                         mm
same.  A semi-dynamics test in which the liquids  test is periodically
renewed in order to nullify the loss from volatilization of the test materials
would enable more precise measurement of tolerance.
       The pH appeared virtually independent of the material tested and the
tolerance of the fish to the  material.  The dilution water used for the
May 6th tests was somewhat lower in pH than that run previously.  A check
shows no effect of this decrease on the significance of the test.
       The 24 hr TL   of Corexit 7664 was  determined by drawing a line
from the single point of 70% survival parallel to the line for the 96 hr TLm.
This is because no point higher in concentration than 10, 000 ppm was
established.
       Generally when two test concentrations one above and one below
the TL   have proved unquestionably lethal to some (about 20% or more) but
not to all of the test animals, the determination of survival percentages at
intermediate concentrations is not essential.  This was only achieved in
two of the samples tested here.  However, as stated in Standard Methods,
testing of more concentrations may not be justifiable when the  increase
reliability of the estimate thus achieved has no immediate practical
import.  Lacking any knowledge to the contrary, the intervals  used in this
test are presumed satisfactory.
       Reference:
                  Standard Methods for the Examination of Water
                  and Wastewater, 12th ed. ,  1966.

                  American Public Health Association,  Inc. ,
                  1790  Broadway, New York,  New York 10019
May 12,  1969

-------
                                    12-26


                        SECTION 12.0 REFERENCES


  1.   Johnson,  W. C.  Biological Input of Oil Spill from Offshore Oil Well
      Break. Memo to R. C.  Bain, Chief,  Operations Section,  California-
      Nevada Basins, FWPCA, February 19, 1969, 4 pp.
  2.   State of California Water Pollution Control Board. Oceanographic
      Survey of the Continental Shelf Area of Southern California.  Water
      Pollution  Control Board,  Sacramento, California, Publication No. 20,
      560pp.  1959.
  3.   Shanks, Warren, Biologist, Bureau of Sport Fisheries & Wildlife,
      Portland, Oregon.  Personal Interview,  April 3,  1969.
  4.   Drinkwater,  Dr. Barbara, University of California at Santa Barbara,
      Personal  Communication,  April 7,  1969.
  5.   Hemphill,  Jack E.  Report - Santa Barbara Channel Oil Spill.
      Manuscript for presentation to the Hearings of the U.  S.  Senate,
      Santa Barbara,  California, February 24-25, 1969, Bureau of Sport
      Fisheries and Wildlife, 5 pp.
  6.   Dawson E. Yale.  (Allan Hancock Found.  - Oceanographic Survey)
      Section IV.   A  primary report on  the benthic marine flora of
      Southern California.  In Oceanographic Survey of the Continental Shelf
      of Southern California,  pp. 169-264,  State Water Pollution Control
      Board, Sacramento, California Publication No.  20,  1959.
  7.   Neushul,  Michael.  Personal Interview,  March 20, 1969,  UCSB.

  8.   Seeley, Charles. Trip Report: Santa Barbara Oil Spill, February 5-14,
      1969.  Memo to Chief, Operations Branch, Calif.  Nevada Basins,
      FWPCA,  February 25,  1969,  4 pp.
  9.   Glude, John  B.  Observations on the  Effects of  the Santa Barbara Oil
      Spill on Intertidal Species.  Draft of John B. Glude, Deputy Regional
      Director, Pacific Northwest Region,  BCF, Seattle,  Wash.,  April 10,
      1969,  9 pp.
10.   Turner,  Charles H. Inshore Survey of Santa Barbara Oil Spill.
      California State Department of Fish and Game,  Cruise Report 69A2,
      Feb. 5-6; Feb.  11-14; 1969,  3 pp.
11.   Anonymous.  Oil-spill damage to marine life scant.  The Oil and Gas
      Journal, March 17, 1969,  pp. 65-68.
12.   North, Wheeler J. and Carl L. Hubbs.  (ed) 1968. Utilization  of Kelp -
      Bed Resources in Southern California.  California State Department of
      Fish and Game, Fish Bulletin 139, 264 pp.
13.   Smith, Paul.  Cruise Report - R/V David Starr Jordan,  Cruise 33.
      USFWS, BCF,  5 pp.  1969.
14.   Smith, Paul  and Reuben Lasker.  Appendum to  Cruise Report #33,  Crude
      Oil Reconnaissance.  U. S. Government Memorandum 3201. 6,
      February 18, 1969, 2 pp.  Also Commercial Fisheries Review, Vol. 31,
      No.  3, March 1969, pp. 6, 7.

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                                  12-27


15.  Hof, Charles.  "What Role Have the Biologists at UCSB Played in  M
     Solving the Problems Demonstrated by the Blowout on Platform A?
     Typewritten Report for Political Science 166 (UCSB), 11 pp.  1969.
16.  Mais,  K. F.  Pelagic Fish Survey of Santa Barbara Oil Spill.
     California State Department of Fish and Game, Cruise Report 69A4,
     February 18,  1969,  4pp.
17.  Jow,  Tom.  Preliminary Cruise Report.  California State Department
     of Fish and Game,  February 3-7,  11, 1969,  3pp.
18.  Turner,  Charles H. and Jack Prescott, California State Department of
     Fish and Game, Personal Interview,  April 10, 1969.
19:  Roppel,  Al.  Bureau of Commercial  Fisheries (USFWS).  Personal
     Interview, April 4,  1969.
20.  Brownell,  R. J., Jr. Letter to Sen.  Alan Cranston, March 24, 1969.
21.  Seeley,  Charles M.  Trip Report to Pt. Molate Whaling Station and
     Autopsy of the Pacifica California Grey Whale Specimen. U.  S.
     Government Memo, March 17,  1969,  2pp.
22.  Merrill, John.  FWPCA, Personal Interview,  March 20-21, 1969.
23   Zobell,  C.  E.  The Occurrence, Effects and Fate of Oil Polluting the
     Sea.   Proc.  Int. Conf.  Wat. Poll.  Res.,  Pergamon Press,
     pp. 85-118.   1964.
24.  Battelle Memorial Institute.  Oil Spillage Study Literature  Search and
     Critical Evaluation for Selection of Promising Techniques to Control
     and Prevent Damage.  BMI-AD-666-289, Ch.  6.  1967.
25.  State of California Department  of Fish and Game.  Progress Report
     on Wildlife Affected by the  Santa Barbara Channel Oil Spill.
     January 28-March 31,  1969.  8 pp.
26.  Clawson, R.  H.  U. S. Government Memo Re: Biota on Pilings
      Supporting Steam's Wharf.  Mimeo.  1 p.  1969.

27.   Straughan,  D.  Breeding Activity of  Intertidal Species.  USC, Allen
     Hancock Foundation, Mimeo, 2 pp.  1969.

28.   Federal Water Pollution Control Administration.   Report on Whale
      Tissue.  17 March 1969.  Mimeo, 2pp.

 29.   Gaines, T.  H.  "Notes on Pollution  Control, Santa Barbara", undated,
      Appendix III.

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                                  13-1

      13.0  ON-GOING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
       Numerous research and development programs in the overall field
of oil pollution have been proposed, are currently underway, or are anti-
cipated in the future.  Since it is important that workers in the field know of,
and are in contact with,  complementary efforts, Table 13. 1 is attached
summarizing twenty-three  publicly sponsored research programs underway
as of mid-May, 1969. This table does not include the various Federal and
State agency in-house efforts or individual petroleum company activities.
Nevertheless,  it is hoped that the summation will be of assistance in coordin-
ating various efforts and in avoiding unnecessary duplication.

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	PROJECT TITLE/DESCRIPTION

13. 1  Prevention of Oil Release

      1.  In-Tank Gellation to Reduce
         Oil Loss from Tankers
      2.  Development of Equipment for Control
         of Oil Spillage and Systems for Aerial
         Delivery

13.2  Control and_R«»toratk>n

      1.  Oil-Water Separation System
         for Treatment of Oil Wastes

      2.  Prevention and Elimination of Oil
         Pollution in the Buffalo River
                                                     TABLE   13.1.   ONGOING RESEARCH  In  DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

                                                                                       MAY.   1969

                                                                                                                     ESTIMATED
                                                                                                                     PROJECT COST
                                                          SPONSOR
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
                                                  U. S. Coast Guard
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration

Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
                                   CONTRACTOR/GRANTEE
Western Company                $  42, 290
2201 Waterview Pkwy.            (1st Phase)
Richardson, Texas

Ocean Science and Engineering     290,710
Garrett Corporation Airesearch      78. 178
Manufacturing Company

City of Buffalo                     737, 194
85 N. Vagora Street
Buffalo,  N. Y.   14202
                                                                                                   REMARKS
Onboard and portable facilities.
                                                                                     Air transportable tanker emergency
                                                                                     unloading equipment.
High Capacity (500 gpm) centrifuge.
Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory sub-
contractor.  Evaluation of oil control
methods, particularly the air curtain
barrier.
oo
 i
N)
         Investigation of Recovery of Large
         Marine Oil Spills by Use of a Vortex
         Assisted Air Lift System

         Test and Evaluate Mechanical and Pneu-
         matic Barriers to Contain Spilled Oil
         and Means for Removing the Contained
         Oil in Harbors and Adjacent Waters

         Analysis of Methods for Removal
         of Oil from Harbor Waters
      6.  Evaluate Stresses on High Seas Oil Booms

      7.  Evaluate Use of Sand for Sinking
         of Oil Slicks
Federal Water  Pollution
Control Administration
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
U. S. Naval Civil Engineering
Laboratory,  Naval Facilities
Engineering Command

U. S. Coast Guard

U. S. Coast Guard
Battelle-Northwest                  29.880
Richland, Washington  99352      (1st Phase)
Maine Port Authority               100, 850
Portland, Maine  04111
Battelle-Northwest                  16,750
Richland, Washington  99352
Hydronautics Inc.,  Laurel,  Md.      62,790

U. S.  Army Corps of Engineers       10, 000
Eighteen months' study.
Development of boom design criteria.

  valuation of treated sand using
 ooper dredges.

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                                         TABLE  13.1  (CONTD) .    ONGOING  RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT  PROGRAMS

                                                                                         MAY,   1969
	PROJECT TITLK/DESCRIPTION	

13. 3  Biological h Ecological Effects

      1.  Pathological Effects of Oil on Birds
         Caught in the Santa Barbara Oil Slick

      2.  Ecological Effect of the Santa Barbara
         Channel Oil Pollution Incident
      3.  Hesurvey of Santa Barbara Inter -
         tidal Zone Transects

      4.  Fishes of the Santa Barbara Kelp Forest
      5.  Population Dynamics of Inter-tidal
          Organisms

      6.  Effects of oil on plankton
 13.4  Other

      1.  The Spreading of Oil Films



      2.  Oil Tagging Systems Study
      3.  Review of the Santa Barbara Channel
          Oil Pollution Incident

      4.  Investigation of Microwave
          Measurements of Oil Slicks

      5.  Investigation of Ultraviolet and Infrared
          Spectra of Oil Slicks

      6.  Identification of R & D Requirements

      7.  Microwave Radiometric Measurement
          of Oil and Sea Temperature

      8.  Chemical Determination
          of Source Pollutant Tars
      9.  The Effects and Implications of Petroleum
          Pollutants on Resources of the
          Santa Barbara Channel

      10.  Evaluation of Remote Sensing
          Data
        SPONSOR
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration

Western Oil & Gas Assoc.
Los Angeles,  California
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration

National Science Foundation
Office of Sea Grant Programs

National Science Foundation
Office of Sea Grant Programs

National Science Foundation
Office of Sea Grant Programs
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration
                                   CONTRACTOR/GRANTEE
University of California
at San Diego

University of Southern Calif.
Allen Hancock Foundation,
Los Angeles, California

University of California
at Santa Barbara

University of California
at Santa Barbara

University of California
at Santa Barbara
University of California
at Santa Barbara
New York University School of
Engineering & Sciences.  Univ.
Heights.  Bronx, N.Y.   10453

Melpar Inc. ,   7700 Arlington Blvd.
Falls Church, Va.  22046
Federal Water Pollution Control    Battelle-Northwest
Administration, U. S. Coast Guard  Richland,  Washington  99352
U. S. Coast Guard
U. S. Coast Guard
U. S. Coast Guard

National Science Foundation
Office  of Sea Grant Programs

National Science Foundation
Office  of Sea Grant Programs
National Science Foundation
Office of Sea Grant Programs
Aerojet General Corp.
University of Michigan
A. D. Little, Cambridge, Mass.

University of California
at Santa Barbara

University of California
at Santa Barbara
University of California
at Santa Barbara
Federal Water Pollution Control   University of Michigan
Administration
                                                                     ESTIMATED
                                                                    PROJECT COST
 31,000


150, 000



  7,000


 IB, 000


 29, 000



 17,293




 27, 000



 50, 000



 22, 900


 48,285


 52,644


 47,235

 38, 000


 16, 500



 .0,000



 16,600
                                                                    REMARKS
Ecological Study.  Principal Investi-
gator: Dr.  A.  Ebling.
                                                                                                                             00
                                                                                                                              I
Determine operational systems for tag-
ging,  petroleum & petroleum products
with chemicals fc other identifying tags.
Principal Investigator:
Dr. N. K.  Saunders.

Heavy metal concentrations in natural seeps
and production crude oil.  Principal
Investigator:  Dr.   P. G.  Mikolaj.

Principal Investigator: Dr. P.  G. Mikolaj.

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                                 14-1


                       14.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

       The following organizations and people provided information for this

review and their assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

       Federal Water  Pollution Control Administration

              Mr.  Paul De Falco
              Director, Pacific Southwest Region

              Mr.  JohnC. Merrell, Jr.
              Director, Technical Evaluation Office
              Pacific  Southwest Region

              Mr.  Kenneth E. Biglane
              Director, Division of Technical Support
              Office of Operations

              Mr.  Vern W. Tenney
              Director, Enforcement
              Pacific Southwest Region

              Mr.  Arthur Caldwell
              Pacific Southwest Region

              Mr. R. C.  Bain
              Pacific Southwest Region

       United States Coast Guard

              Lt.  George H. Brown III
              On-Scene Commander
              Group Office,  Santa Barbara

              Lt.  E.  L. Seeman
               llth District

        Bureau of Commercial Fisheries

              Mr. JohnB. Glude
              Deputy Regional Director
              Pacific Northwest  Region

              Mr. Alton Roppel

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                          14-2
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife

       Mr.  Warren Shanks
       Mr.  Alan Weinrick

U. S. Geological Survey

       Mr.  Harry Cypher
       Branch of Oil and Gas Operations

       Dr.  Parke  D.  Snavely, Jr.
       Chief, Office of Marine Geology & Hydrology

       Mr.  Herbert Skibitzke

Weather Bureau -  Environmental Sciences Services Administration

       Mr.  Gordon C. Shields
       Marine Meteorologist

California Department of Fish and Game

       Mr.  Howard R. Leach
       Game Management Supervisor

       Mr.  Charles H. Turner
       Mr.  Robert Mallette
       Mr.  John H. Prescott
       Captain  W. H. Put man
       Mr.  Robert G.  Kaneen

California Water Quality Control Board

       Mr.  Kenneth Jones

University of California at Santa Barbara

       Dr.  Robert W.  Holmes
       Dr.  Michael Neushul
       Dr.  Barbara Drinkwater

Union Oil Company of California

       Dr.  R. C.  Grog
       Union Research Center

       Mr.  Al Percy
       Union Research Center

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                          14-3


Union Oil Company of California (contd)

       Mr. D. E. Craggs
       District Operations Manager

       Mr. K. J. Stracke
       District Production Superintendent

       Mr. T. H. Gaines

Western Oil and Gas Association

       Mr. Henry Wright

Crosby and Overton, Inc.

       Mr. E. K. Thompson
       Mr. D. D. Shaw

General Marine Transport of Santa Barbara, Inc.

       Captain Leon J. Tatro

Standard Oil Company  of California

       Mr. John  Herring
       Producing Department,  Carpinteria

City of Santa Barbara

       Mr. Donald R.  Sathre
       Harbormaster

       Mr. Dale  E. Bennett
       Fire Marshall

Santa Barbara County

       Mr. David K. Bickmore
       County Petroleum Engineer

Aerojet General Corporation

       Mr. T. D. Trexler

North American Rockwell

       Mr. Robert Fowler

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                           14-4


Ryan Aeronautical

       Mr. J.  M. Kennedy

TRW Inc.

       Mr. Peter White

University of Michigan

       Institute of Science and Technology
       Mr.  F.  C. Polcyn
       Infrared and Optics Laboratory

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Washington, D. C.   20242
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