A
"// wisn'/ the money. The i.s.sue wax
how can government get awav with doing
this and not tell anybody about it."
A Citizen of Bellevue Washington
&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
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Produced for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency by
Hall & Associates, Seattle, Washington.
Project Team: S.H. Hall, A. H. Zubko, J. A. Coburn, M. Katayama.
Excerpts from "The Bellevue Experience" may be reproduced
without prior authorization from EPA.
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One citizen going to the City Council with concerns about pollution in
her backyard stream initiated a process which became the hottest controversy
in the history of Bellevue, Washington. City Government is still reverberating
from the power of outraged citizens who feel they haven't been consulted
about decisions that affect them.
Bellevue's experience includes both constructive, long-term public partici-
pation and "dissent-after-decision" involvement. How the conflict was managed
and what the city learned about public participation offers guidance for other
communities faced with solving today's complex problems.
" You can't run a government talking to yourself.
You have to run a government talking to other people."
A Bellevue Citizen
WMTB PUBUC PARTldMTHH?
Many variations are possible from citizens observing, voting, advising,
or drafting legislation. Ideally, public participation is an open, cooperative,
ongoing process in which an agency presents policy and planning issues for
public discussion, and through which it receives community input and feed-
back from diverse groups. Its object is to arrive at technically workable plans
which meet the special needs, concerns and values of a community, and
thereby to have support from a broad spectrum of the public before implemen-
tation.
ALL JMHBMI CITY
Bellevue, with a population of 69,000, is the fourth largest city in the
state of Washington. Its citizens look south toward Mt. Rainier and east to
Seattle across Lake Washington. Rapid growth has accelerated its change
from a classic bedroom suburb into an economically-balanced satellite city
in its own right.
Its Council-Manager government spends more on planning per capita
than any other city in the state. The mayor and City Council members serve
part time.
Besides the Seattle media, Bellevue has two radio stations and a daily
newspaper, the Daily Journal American. (It was a weekly when the controversy
began.)
An award as an "All American City" reinforced what its inhabitants
already knew about life in Bellevue: it is family-oriented with good schools
and services; the economic, educational level is high; and it is picturesque
with streams meandering through its neighborhoods.
Because of Bellevue's quick expansion, it never had time to develop a
traditional storm sewer system with extensive underground pipes for streams.
As a result, most of Bellevue's streams are above ground... a source of civic
pride, and the beginning point in the conflict.
"Nature provides a drainage system. Let's work with nature."
A Bellevue Citizen
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In the late 1960's, homeowners living along Kelsey Creek noticed changes
in their backyard streams—increased runoff after storms, erosion of the banks,
siltation and fewer fish. One resident, Joan Way, wanted to do something to
preserve and protect the stream, so she began a program of self-education
in water resource management. She became convinced that soon Bellevue
would have to face up to problems of storm drainage runoff.
Bellevue's Department of Public Works didn't have a comprehensive
plan for drainage, and problems were handled on a crisis basis. Rainstorms
meant flooding streams fed by water rushing from nonabsorbent surfaces
like concrete. After the storm, the problems of runoff again were invisible.
In the spring of 1970. Mrs. Way attended a City Council session to express
her concern that a proposed development of Kelsey Creek might further
damage the stream. The City Council quickly responded by appointing her
and six others to become a Citizens Advisory Committee on Stream Resources
to develop standards for stream preservation.
Instead of taking six months as planned, the Streams Committee met for
more than three years and became expert in the technical, long-range subject
of watershed management. Working with planners and consultants, they
considered alternative ways of providing storm and surface water drainage.
including the usual one of routing through underground pipes.
They felt that Bellevue with its open streams was in a unique position
to come up with a solution that would preserve natural beauty as well as
provide drainage for most of the city.
Late in 1973. the Streams Committee proposed a comprehensive plan
for stormwater management, including the formation of a utility to oversee
the program and a service charge based on the amount of impervious surface
on each property.
The City Council took the citizen group's advice and began drawing up
an ordinance to create the utility. The Council called for an "all out public
education program aimed at building support for the project'.'
WHY UTILIZE THE OPEN STREAM
SYSTEM?
Bellevue's Open Stream System is more than:
• A scenic and panoramic attraction
• A haven and home for wildlife
• A recreation area for people pleasure
• A buffer zone for residential communities
• A strip (linear) park or an aqua greenbelt
It is nature's way of handling:
• Storm runoff
• Surface water drainage
• Sifting of water pollutants
WHY CAN'T WE USE IT AS IT IS?
We've monkeyed so much with Mother Nature as we built our
homes, driveways, patios, commercial buildings and parking
expanses that we have:
• Destroyed the natural ground cover that intercepted rainfall
and absorbed as much as 95% of it into the earth, creating
ground water that fed plants and streams all year around
• Channeled rushing water so rapidly into waterways that it
erodes stream banks, causing property damage and
building up sediment which destroys fish spawning
grounds, wildlife habitat and natural drainage efficiency
• Created a safety hazard for children attracted by fiercely-
rushing torrents of storm-swollen streams
• Allowed pollutants and trash to reduce natural drainage
capabilities of the open stream system
Reproduced from the League of Women Voters. Lake Washington East
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"How do you put sex appeal in storm drainage?
How do you collar someone and say. "Hey, I want to tell
you about storm drainage—this is really vital to you."
Local Journalist
The public information program was plagued by lack of time, money
and a clear line of responsibility (who should inform the voters: city staff
or volunteer committee?). Since the subject does not translate easily into
something interesting or understandable to an average voter, no matter how
much publicity appeared, few people noticed.
Throughout years of working together, the Streams Committee, City
Council and staff had developed such rapport with each other that the
committee members became almost an extension of staff. They all supported
the plan and were confident that the public would too.
"We were so entranced with looking in the mirror that we
didn 't see the people sneaking up on us.
We were completely unprepared for the avalanche of protest."
Public Information Officer, City of BeUevue
In March 1974. the City Council signed legislation establishing the Utility
and a system for stormwater management. Bellevue became one of the first
cities to address the issue so completely. They were proud of their innovative
solution to a problem as old as cement and blacktopped land.
"We thought it was a very progressive idea, we were proud of it.
it was environmentally sound and saved money. You can't beat that!"
Member of Cilv Council
A TACTICAL ERROR
Target date for the first Utility service charge billing was late June for
the July-August period. The deadline wasn't met because of data processing
problems. Instead, a notice was sent with the regular water bill announcing
a two-month delay in the start-up of the fee and further explaining the Utility
and its responsibilities. The slight response to the notice was, for the most
part, positive.
The first bills were sent in September. To make up for the postponed
billing, the charge was for a four-month period (average of less than S8.00
per household, slightly more for business). Since no explanation accompanied
these bills, people assumed the charge was for one month. And most were
taken by surprise. Unaware of the formation of the Utility and unprepared
for this new "Tax',' they were furious and let the city know it.
"The city has done this to us. You have rammed it down our throats."
A Bellevue Citizen
The City Council was confused. They had responded in good faith to a
citizen group's concerns, presented a model solution to a nagging urban
problem and had carried out a public information campaign. Now. they ended
up with a citizens' revolution.
" The phones started ringing. They were screaming and
they were just irrational. And then the newspapers started
and the letters-to-the-editor started. The charge we
heard most was "How could you do this and not even
have told us about it?" We honestly and truly thought we had"
Member of Citv Council
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The double billing crystallized opponents into a strong force. They had
an issue that directly concerned the public, they had visibility through extensive
media coverage and they had a definite goal —stopping the Utility.
" With all of (hose people as angry as they were,
I was afraid there was going 10 he a vigilante mob..."
Organizer of VOTE
The members of VOTE (Victory Over Tax Excess) held public meetings.
spoke at City Council meetings, drew up a petition and, in six weeks, collected
8,500 signatures (40% of all those voting in the previous general election).
The petition called for the City Council to either rescind the enabling
legislation for the Utility or put the Utility question on the next local ballot
for a vote of the people.
There were as many different reasons—and misconceptions—for opposi-
tion to the Utility as there were signatures on the petition. But most criticism
fell into these categories:
1. People were surprised by the formation of the Utility and thought the City
was "putting one over" on the public.
2. Some suspected duplication of effort with the Department of Public Works
and charged "empire building".'
3. Others thought the importance of the problem was exaggerated, calling
the Utility "a Cadillac response to a Vega Problem'.'
4. The service charge was mistaken for a tax which the public didn't have an
opportunity to vote on and which could be increased without voter approval.
5. Distrust of elected officials (former President Nixon had recently resigned)
and frustration with spiraling inflation combined to make the Utility a lightning
rod for people's generalized complaints about government.
"The issue wasn't the money, it was the way it was handled"
A Bclleviie citizen
City Government's response was low-key. The mayor acknowledged
inadequate public relations in terms of informing the public about the new
Utility and called the double billing a mistake. He asked that a decision on
the fate of the Utility be based on a rational discussion of the issues and not
an "emotional outburst'.' He proposed a reevaluation of the entire problem
by a 13-member Drainage Utility Task Force which would include members
of VOTE as well as supporters. This assured a wide range of input into the
decision-making process^ During this time, the service charge was reduced
to a token amount.
" We stubbed our toe administratively and possibly
legislatively. But we're human beings too."
Cilv Council Member
The controversy cooled to the relief of City Council members, but ahead
were three more rollercoaster years of delays, committees, two ballots,
misinformation and lawsuits.
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In six months of compromise, the Task Force came to the same conclu-
sions as the original Streams Committee. The unanimous report called for
an advisory' ballot to get the public's input on how to finance the Utility.
The more basic question of whether the voters wanted comprehensive
drainage control at all was not an alternative on the ballot. According to
legal advisors, by establishing the Utility, the City had formally acknowledged
government's responsibility to alleviate the problem. Canceling the Utility
would not automatically cancel the responsibility. The City might lose
insurance and be liable for damages from stormwater runoff.
This as-yet-untested legal question haunted the decision-making process
throughout. The reluctance to put a "no action" alternative before the public
had the effect of short-circuiting the public participation process.
"Citv Hall knows the people will never approve of it.
so they're going to figure out a way to do it anyway'.'
VOTE Leader
The two choices presented to the public were whether to finance the
Utility through the general fund (within the existing organizational frame-
work) or the service charge (based on amount of impervious surface on all
property).
Citizen activists organized campaigns for both alternatives. In November
1975, the general fund alternative won by a slim margin. This was interpreted
by some as the public saying "No" to the Utility and "Don't try to put
anything over on us" to the Council.
However, the City Council did not change the Utility's method of funding.
Instead, it appointed a 15-member Storm and Surface Water Management
Advisory Committee. Its charge:
1. To recommend alternative levels of service, service priorities and funding
sources.
2. To review the proposed multi-million dollar capital improvement program
and method of funding.
The mayor promised that if the recommendation required more money
than was available under the general fund, the City would put together a total
package and present it to the voters once again.
The Advisory Committee met for seven months and came to the same
conclusions as the first two—storm drainage control is a significant issue that
merits a separate department and a steady and sure source of funds as much
removed from political considerations and battles over priorities as possible.
The Advisory Committee recommended the Utility and service charge
funding as the best solution for Bellevue's needs. In doing so, it turned its
back on the voice of the majority as expressed in the advisory ballot.
"I've been a victim of the Great American Fraud...
teachings that we have a democracy and you can have citizen
input and then have results on the other end of the tunnel.
As soon as the citizens start competing with what the bureaucrats
want, the desires of the people go out the window'.'
VOTE Leader
The Advisory Committee formulated a ballot to put the question of
funding before the voters again. The alternatives were almost identical to
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the first advisory ballot a year ago. But this one more clearly spelled out the
real costs of storm drainage control.
Some committee members felt that voter awareness and political accept-
ability of their conclusions were two hurdles still to be overcome toward
gaining approval of the Utility concept. But no public education campaign
had been carried on during the committee's deliberations. However, just before
the advisory ballot, publicity increased substantially. This, along with presen-
tations and doorbelling campaigns, brought the issue to the public more clearly
and meaningfully than at any time in the previous seven years. In 1976, the
voters gave a decisive victory to the service charge alternative. A citizen's
commission was appointed to advise on Utility policy and "to provide...
tighter citizen control of all aspects of storm-water management'." This
commission has an ongoing monitoring function.
The story continues today with a small group of the opposition planning
to test the legality of the Utility in court. And when the Utility reinstated its
billing in the summer of 1977. angry citizens called demanding to know "what
this is all about'.' But it's nothing compared to the earlier eruption which
effectively derailed a model plan for years and became the worst crisis of
confidence in Bellevue's historv.
"Ipersonally believe Bel/erne's a success story in thai
thev came against a problem and. while at any one lime
there were people going in different directions.
wondering whv thev were even in this program at all. they
did persevere. Thev didn't back down from what they
set out to do.
And it's a siiccess because it was followed through for
the time it's going to take. So many people expect a piece
of legislation to be up and running in two years and if it s
not. they feel disappointed and the impetus is dropped.
But Beilevite stayed with it. Bellevue went all the way."
208 Program Manager. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle (METROI
BELLEVUE IN RETROSPECT
Public participation's history in this country is as old as the government.
Today, incorporating the citizen voice into the planning process is a tricky
jigsaw puzzle of technical, complex decisions and numerous publics.
Elected officials and planners have the seemingly impossible task of
building a lasting, involved constituency in a fluid, constantly changing
atmosphere in which citizens usually react, rather than anticipate. Planners
and officials must attract people's attention over and over again in order to
ask them what they need and want. And. perhaps most important, while they
have the people's attention, they must say. "We hear you. We recognize the
validity of your concerns. Let's work out a solution together before a decision
is made'.' The result usually is credibility and support for the final plan.
There's no sure formula for success and it costs time, effort,commitment
and money. But, as Bellevue discovered, not seeking public input is a risk.
The Bellevue decision-makers sincerely thought they had done their best
to include and inform the public. Two major factors made it difficult to predict
the intense public reaction:
1. On the national scene. Watergate and inflation contributed to an uproar out
of proportion to the mistake of the double billing; and the Utility became the
focal point for citizens' generalized complaints about government.
2. The potential legal responsibility for stormwater control had the effect
of keeping a "no action" alternative off the ballot, and infuriating the
opponents.
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From a public participation viewpoint, the major deficiency in Bellevue's
experience is that it did not have an ongoing, organized citizen involvement
effort. Instead, it was on a crisis-by-crisis basis with no overall direction or
responsibility for carrying it out. There was no monitoring to insure that public-
support was building, no overall strategy and no attempt to analyze the
effectiveness of the process. Was the public informed? Was the public sup-
portive? Was the public being listened to and responded to? If not. why not?
Despite this, there was a great deal of participation in Bellevue. Citizen
committees spent years studying problems and drafting ordinances and ballots.
Opponents effectively organized and circulated petitions. Voters attended
meetings and hearings, went on educational tours of the streams and made their
views known through two advisory ballots. Media (news articles, letters-to-the-
editor. brochures, slide presentations, radio and TV coverage) aided the com-
munication process between government and people. The entire storm drainage
question was opened to intense public scrutiny, especially after the double
billing. A compromise was hammered out that satisfied both government and
community.
EFFECTIVE PUBUC PARTlCIPftTMfl
Each situation is so different that a blueprint for public participation has
to be devised for each project. But there are basic components of the process
that can be examined in light of Bellevue's experience.
EFFtCTIVt PUBUC PARTIdPATlOH
Awareness—Both the government and the public need to accept the value of
long-range planning for far-sighted solutions. Raising the awareness of people
so they understand the future implications of each problem takes time. In
Bellevue, the committee members were convinced of the need for planning,
but did not convey this to the public in an understandable way.
Government Commitment to the Planning Process—Citizens must feel that
elected officials value their input and take it seriously. They also need feedback
on how their ideas are being used. The City Council did listen to the Streams
Committee's plan and signed it into law. When the public protested, the
Council stopped the Utility's work except on a minimal level. The anti-Utility
sentiment of the first advisory ballot was heard but, seemingly, not heeded.
Belief in a Real Problem—People must believe that a real problem exists that
is personally relevant to them. Most of the public information centered around
the technical aspects of the Utility and the rate structures. An information
campaign emphasizing the significance of the problem to each person, as well
as showing that everyone had a stake in the solution would have paved the
way for factual information later. It's difficult because drainage can be a dull
subject with long-range aspects rather than current critical needs.
Ideal public participation usually follows a pattern of open and accessible
education, alternative selection and action (legislative or otherwise).
Open—Bellevue's deliberations throughout were always accessible to the
public.
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Education—Mutual education occurs as planners and officials learn about
community needs, concerns and values, and citizens become informed about
technical details. In Bellevue, committee members and City Hall educated each
other well. But they did not effectively educate the public at the same time.
Contributing factors were confusion over whose responsibility it was to educate
and public apathy about the subject of stormwater drainage.
Alternative Selection—As many diverse views as possible must be solicited,
considered and refined through a continuous dialogue with both supporters
and skceptics. This avoids future suspicions about whose interests are being
served and produces a satisfactory plan. All options were considered in the
beginning of the Streams Committee work. But the public was not actively
included in the alternative selection process as the Streams Committee elimi-
nated unworkable options. Though the meetings were open and there was
news coverage, some opponents labeled the committee as a special interest
group because many of them live on streams.
Action—To the average Bellevue citizen, it appeared that the action stage
came at the beginning of the process rather than at the end. Their interest was
not stimulated until after the legislation created the Utility. When the Task
Force was formed to restudy the problem, the public felt that it didn't really
go back to the beginning because a "no action" alternative was not allowed
consideration.
Of the many tactics for encouraging public participation, three w:ere
especially important in Bellevue: use of media, timing and constituency
building.
Use of Media—Media coverage is critical in each phase of planning for main-
taining a dialogue between the planners and the public and as a barometer of
public opinion. In Bellevue. television and radio were used very little. During
the controversy, the newspaper covered it extensively and assisted the VOTE
group to coalesce by actually putting them in touch with each other. Before
the second advisory ballot in 1976, the newspaper provided an objective forum
for discussion.
Tuning—Citizen involvement activities should be planned to run concurrently
with the technical side of program development and the two should be well
integrated. Since Bellevue lacked an overall participation plan, it was difficult
to time activities for maximum effectiveness. Timing of publicity was also off.
For example, there was a seven-month lag between public information about
the double billing and the bill in the mailbox. A flyer had been included with
the previous bill, but the double bill arrived with no accompanying explanation.
Constituency Building—Planners must constantly be aware of the necessity
for building a constituency of supporters for the plan as it is being developed.
If the public participation process is well carried out and all viewpoints have
been considered, this constituency confirms the validity of the plan and
smooths the way for implementation. To accomplish this it is important to
identify potential supporters and opponents and involve them at the beginning.
The supporters aid in leading the program and informing the public while the
opponents raise issues that help refine the plan. Community leaders, business
interests, service clubs and all institutionalized segments of the community
should be brought into the process either through direct involvement or
through information campaigns.
In Bellevue. several community leaders were actively involved. They had
such a large task in understanding the technical information that they ended
up working in a vacuum created by time constraints, public ignorance, apathy
and their own assumptions that the base of support was already out there.
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The opponents were not identified and involved in the beginning. In this
case, it may have been impossible to predict who they would be. A natural
opponent, the developers, did not choose to be involved at all. After their
successful petition drive, VOTE members were included on all the committees.
This was instrumental in winning most of them over to the idea that Bellevue's
need for a comprehensive stormwater management system was best served by
a Utility and funded by a service charge on all property.
"/ don't necessarilv like it, but I've been
involved in it and I can live with it."
Committee member
What was the effect of this experience on Bellevue? The city has a model
utility, a unique approach to the problem of storm drainage. The citizens
preserved the streams and gained a closer relationship with City Council and
staff. And city government learned to listen to—and constructively utilize —
the voices of the people.
"An entirely different climate prevails down at City Hall.
They're listening. Sometimes I don't think they like
what they hear, but they 're listening."
Committee Member
For a detailed case study, see "The Bellevue Experience,
a study of social Political and Environmental Action"
by Hall & Corwin Associates for the Municipality of
Metropolitan Seattle. (METRO). November. 1976.
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