oEPA
Vol. 3
\*\ ~ff> January/February
No. 1
AUDIOVISUAL TRAINING
John Staley
SDC Integrated Services, Inc., on behalf
of the Management Information and Data
Systems Division (MIDSD) of EPA, has con-
tracted for audiovisual training with
Edutronics/McGraw-Hill and DELTAK, Inc.
These contracts supply the user com-
munities of both the NCC and WCC with
audiovisual training at no tuition. Both
contracts will exist throughout FY1980.
Edutronics courses are divided into
modules, individual units of training.
Each module is composed of an audiovisual
presentation supplemented by written
materials. A module can be presented as
a single unit or as part of the series to
which it belongs. In addition, modules
can be viewed by an individual or by a
group, with or without a proctor.
DELTAK training centers on the written
text, with video segments and additional
textual materials used to reinforce,
illustrate, and review the materials.
Like Edutronics courses, individual
training units can be presented sepa-
rately or as part of a series. Although
the lessons are designed to be viewed by
as few as one student at a time, group
sessions led by someone knowledgeable
in the course content are strongly
recommended.
Both curriculums encompass data pro-
cessing, management, and communications
skills and can be used for training all
levels of management and technical
personnel.
Training materials are available from
both suppliers, and course rentals are
based on the use of one module per
calendar month. Requested modules must
be ordered the first of the month pre-
ceding the month the module is required.
Requested modules are rented from the
appropriate multimedia supplier and are
sent to the requester.
ADP coordinators at each EPA location are
the focal points for requesting audio-
visual courses. Persons interested in
this training should contact their local
ADP coordinators.
COMPUTERIZED LEARNING
Chock Galle
The NCC has supported the Sperry Univac
Author System for Education and Training
(ASET) since June 1978, when the first
locally developed course went on-line.
This course, Filemanager, has been com-
pleted by over 150 students whose com-
puter experience before the course ranged
from graduate degrees in computer science
to no experience at all.
ASET has advantages for both the student
and management:
1. Because it is inexpensive to run, it
appeals to cost-conscious managers.
2. Because it is available to the
student at any time the computer is
up, it allows irregular scheduling.
3. Because it presents self-paced, pro-
grammed lessons (that is, certain
material must be mastered before
more difficult material is encoun-
tered) , the student can progress at
a rate consistent with personal
capabilities.
ASET is also valuable to training and
educational personnel. Educators partic-
ularly interested in one-to-one relation-
(Continued on Page 3)
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NCC HIGHLIGHTS
Tom Rogers
V
Air conditioning problems in the
computer room have contributed heavily to
both degraded stability and total system
downtime. Although several steps have
been taken to solve these problems, the
only sure answer is to relocate equipment
into the new computer space as soon as it
is available.
f A preliminary planning meeting was
held with- Toxic's personnel to prepare
for delivery of the DEC System 2020 in
early January.
A concentrated effort has been made
toward converting to S PERRY UNI VAC Series
1100 Executive Level 36. A major part of
this effort is the commitment to 8-bit
tape labeling scheduled to begin
December 10, 1979.
In response to a request from the
Office of Management and Budget, an
analysis is being made of all direct
costs for operating the NCC data center.
This investigation will identify and
quantify all direct monetary costs,
including those previously omitted, such
as Government personnel costs and certain
facility costs.
V
After visiting potential backup
sites, a task force has developed a
Program Evaluation and Review Technique
(PERT) chart and impact analysis for
implementing the final phases of the
Disaster Recovery Plan. In addition to
security, operations, aid communications
personnel, the final team will include
systems analysts (who will create an
operating system compatible with NCC
users and with the alternate site's
hardware configuration) and user support
personnel (who will meet with potential
users and develop necessary processors)*
WCC HIGHLIGHTS
Maureen Johnson
Job Stream Manager for MVS. The WCC
is making the Job Stream Manager (JSM) at
the COMNET facilities simpler, more
reliable, and easier to use. To achieve
this purpose, Job scheduling will be
virtually the same at WCC as at NCC.
Three priorities will handle day-to-day
processing, and a special priority will
handle jobs which need special consider-
ation. This special priority will
require the permission of the user's
ADP Coordinator before the job is sub-
mitted and will allow any job to be run
immediately during the day for a charge
of six times the normal rate. The
implementation date for the new JSM will
be announced by User Memo when the
schedule is established. Making the JSM
simpler will ease the task of taming the
MVS System and, in turn, will ensure
better performance.
Network Problem Solved. An inten-
sive effort from COMNET and COMTEN per-
sonnel has resolved a major network prob-
lem which caused excessive line drops
during September and October and which
was originally thought to be caused by
trunk circuit errors. Erroneously
detecting circuit problems, the COMTEN
processors initiated a trunk flush opera-
tion which terminated all active users.
The result appeared to be line drops to
the affected users. Trunk circuit
stability has increased dramatically
since the problem was resolved in
October.
Data Backup. Technical direction
has been given COMNET to establish a
secure offsite storage vault for sensi-
tive WCC user and system data. Users
will continue to be encouraged to protect
their data through its use.
The deadline for
March/April issue
February 29, 1980.
contributions to the
of EPA Data Talk is
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(Cont. from Page 1)
ships find that ASET accommodates their
most imaginative efforts. Also, in-
structors with no previous computer
programming experience can easily code
ASET lessons. Instructors, however,
should have some understanding of pro-
grammed Instruction techniques (for
example, those of Jerome Lysaught,
B. F. Skinner, or other educational
technologists).
Following are some examples of ASET
training programs developed by the User
Training ASET staff. The first two are
accessible without an ASET student
registration. The remaining courses
require individual ASET registration by
the student.
<§HELP*ECL. On-line, ECL command
assistance can be obtained by
entering this command.
@INTRODUCT10N*NCC. Entering this
command gives the student a
30-minute history and description of
the NCC system: configuration,
component descriptions, management
organization, usage figures, and
other general-interest information.
This presentation is ideal for man-
agers who have visitors interested
in what the NCC is and in what it
does.
Computer Basics. This introduction
to data processing describes basic
components, registers, symbolic
access to mass storage, operation
systems, Hollerith code, and a brief
history of the industry. It is
aimed at data entry level for new
employees and cross-discipline
trainees.
Filemanager. This course introduces
concepts of the SPERRY. UNIVAC 1100
Mass Storage System and discusses
data files, program files, F-cycles,
element cycles, read and write keys,
symbiont files, and use of the
Sperry Univac Text Editor.
• ECL Introduction. The next step up
from Filemanager, this modular
course treats the most useful ECL
commands. This course and File-
manager should prepare the student
to use the NCC system in all
respects except that of higher-level
programming languages such as
FORTRAN, COBOL, PL/1, etc.
The latter three courses were developed
at NCC and are being used now at over 40
other major Sperry Unlvac sites under
distribution agreements with the USE
Subcommittee on Computer Assisted
Instruction.
Also available are courses developed by
Sperry Unlvac in the programming language
BASIC, the SPERRY UNIVAC CTS Processor,
and the programming language COBOL.
For information regarding ASET, call
User Training at (919) 541-3648
(FTS 629-3648).
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ADP
LAWS AVAILABLE
FROM OMB
The Office of Management and Budget has
compiled an annotated bibliography of ADP
laws, policies, and regulations. Most of
the material referenced in the biblio-
graphy is in MIDSD's Information Manage-
ment Controls Branch files. The Office
can also provide information on where to
locate copies of the laws, Executive
orders, OMB circulars, GAO reports, and
FIPS standards.
The bibliography has been distributed to
the Regional ADP Branch Chiefs, but more
copies are available. If you need a copy
or if you need assistance locating a
document or reference, call Peg Hall at
(202) 755-0800.
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ADP SECURITY
Marguerite I. Hall, Computer Specialist
This Is the second in a series of four articles on ADP Security. The first article
reviewed the peculiarities of ADP that make it Inherently insecure. This article looks at
goals, the scope of ADP security, and its key concepts and terminology. Because of its
length only the first half appears in this issue of EPA Data Talk. The second half dis-
cusses protection of our ADP resources, control, and risk management. The third article
traces the development of awareness of ADP security in the Federal sector. The fourth
article covers EPA's recently developed Agencywide security program and our plans for a
staged Implementation.
Core Concepts: Part I
It's probably true of all new disciplines. They emerge with fuzzy concepts, amorphic
scopes, and tortured terminology. ADP security is certainly no exception. Goals are
confused with policy, policy with standards, standards with guidelines, guidelines with
procedures, and procedures with goals. Antonyms are transformed into synonyms. Synonyms
diverge never again to meet.
ADP security just isn't all that complicated. Most of the principles are things
2-year-olds know intuitively: fire burns, objects fall, locks go with keys, accidents
happen, there are good people, there are bad people, and sometimes people hit back.
With a little thought, scope can be delineated, goals set, and concepts communicated.
That's the intent of this article. While the scope, goal, and concepts were worked out
with EPA in mind, they probably are fully compatible with other organizations and missions.
Whether an agency's products are clean air and clear water (like EPA's), or military
weapons, or global secrets, or welfare checks, concerns are about the same—that is, doing
something about ADP's inherent insecurities.
The scope of ADP security needs to be defined first. Scope concerns boundaries: what's
out and what's in. What's not ADP is out. What's ADP is in. Data processing facilities
are in. Computer hardware and peripherals are in. Telecommunications networks are in.
Sensitive application systems are in. Application systems critical to EPA's mission or
operation are in. Documentation is in. Personnel operating and maintaining sensitive or
critical application systems are in.
On a different level, scope covers those areas of ADP which are subject to problems because
of ADP's complexity, its concentrated and intangible assets, and its accessibility. In
other words, those areas where you're likely to find the nondata "D's" of ADP: disruption,
destruction, diversion, and disclosure.
There's also a third dimension to scope. Many security programs are structured to Include
data center reliability and accuracy. EPA's program doesn't include them since this
dimension has already been addressed, and seems to fit better, in our various computer
performance management and reliability programs.
Once scope has been carved out, goals can be defined. Goals are ideas at the head of
hierarchies or at the top of tree structures. Good goals last a system's life. Goals
should be coded in 25 words or less. EPA's ADP security goal meets all the above criteria.
It Is to:
TAKE ALL REASONABLE MEASURES TO PROTECT OUR ADP RESOURCES
Now I realise that you need to understand what's meant by "take" and "all reasonable" and
"measures" and "protect" and "our ADP resources" to have the goal be anything other than a
jumble of Jargon. That's the intent of the remainder of this article: to explore the
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underlying Ideas that give the goal meaning; to make it glitter, if you will.
stand, you'll need to become familiar with eight concepts:
To under-
1. ADP Resource
2. Threat
3. Vulnerability
4. Adverse Event
5.
6.
Likelihood
Risk
7. Control
8. Risk Management
ADP RESOURCE comes first since it's the
most basic. I like to think of this con-
cept in terms of the structure pictured
in Figure 1.
At the base you see "facilities," "hard-
ware," "software," "data," "supplies,"
"documentation," "people," and "pro-
cedures." The interaction of these
elements, one hopes, results in the
middle layer, "service." "Service" is
computer time, telecommunications, data
storage, user support, and application
system development and operation.
"Service" to be "service" needs to be
available to those authorized to receive
it when they request it. "Information"
is at the top of the triangle. It's the
ultimate ADP resource. It's what every-
thing else is on the floor to support.
Figure 1. ADP Resource
An important thing to remember about ADP resources is that they have value which usually
can be expressed in dollar terms. It costs money to reprogram and redocument. Unauthor-
ized access costs money. Service delay costs money. An information ABEND costs money too.
The next concept is THREAT. Threats are the things that go bump in the night. Threats are
out to get your ADP resources. They attack your facilities, your hardware and software,
your data, supplies, documentation, people, and the procedures people follow.
In graphic form, threats look like
Figure 2.
Fortunately, threats are easy to
recognize. They come in just two basic
forms: (1) people, and (2) change in the
environment.
ADP resources have problems with people.
That's because people do dumb things, un-
expected things, and bad things. They
steal, they subvert, they sabotage, they
smuggle, they sicken, they smoke and
spill Coke in computer rooms. They have
maimed memory, clogged channels, torn
tapes, and damaged disks. They have put
bullets through the hearts of innocent
CPU's. Figure 2. Threats
ADP resources are also threatened by uncontrolled change—change caused by fire, flood,
heat or humidity, wind or weather, shakeup or shakedown, explosion or implosion, dust or
dirt, power peak or power failure. All in all, ADP resources much prefer being kept in
clean, well—lighted places.
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Threats have another attribute too. They occur in finite time. "Never" is never a threat.
The term used most often is "probability of occurrence." Probabilities of threats are
measured in hard clock times, such as once a picosecond, once a memory cycle, once a fiscal
year, or once a century. There are lots of statistics readily available on the probability
of threats. NBS has maps showing the frequency of earthquakes, hurricanes, thunderstorms,
and brownouts. There are publications that predict fires and floods. You can look up your
chances of civil disturbances, sun spots, and accidents on Interstate 270. If you need
drug addiction data, fraud facts, and sabotage statistics, they're available too.
The third concept is VULNERABILITY.
Vulnerabilities look like Figure 3.
Threats can't reach an ADF resource with-
out the assistance of a vulnerability.
Vulnerabilities are holes threats sneak
through or the weaknesses they exploit.
Vulnerabilities, unlike threats, come in
many shapes and sizes. The most common
form of vulnerability is poor management.
It's followed closely by disorganization
and disorder. Vulnerabilities can also
be recognized through open-door and open-
data policies, poor training, and poor
morale. Inadequate or Improper pro-
cedures are way up there too. If you've
seen undocumented software, you've seen a
vulnerability. Likewise, if you've seen
unaware or unconcerned users. Figure 3. Vulnerabilities
ADVERSE EVENTS are the next concept. They result from the combination of threats, vulner-
abilities, and ADP resources. You can't have one without the others. When a threat takes
advantage of a vulnerability and does in your resource, you too can experience the thrill
of an adverse event. Adverse events are roughly categorized into losses and abuses.
Losers first. You can lose facilities, you can lose hardware. You can lose software and
data. You can lose supplies and documentation. You can lose key staff. The grand total
is often denial of service and, ultimately, of access to the information you need when you
need it.
Abuse equates to the unauthorized and unwanted. It comes in the form of unauthorized
access to services, of unwanted destruction or alteration of data and software. It's
diverted paychecks, tax returns, and phony invoices. There's also unauthorized disclosure
or diversion of confidential Information.
Figure 4 Is an adverse event. You have
an adverse event when rioters take over
your data center. It happened recently
in San Francisco. You have an adverse
event with every Playgirl/Playboy calen-
dar that rolls off your line printer.
You have an adverse event with every fire
that burns, flood that soaks, current
that surges, earthquake that shakes, and
storm that interrupts. You have an
adverse event with every bowling score,
recipe, or doctoral thesis stored
on-line. You have an adverse event when
the computer science students
scramble for final grades, play Figure 4. Adverse Event
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crash-the-computer, or develop realtime, interactive, conversational, user-oriented ver-
sions of "Star Trek."
Both the next two concepts, LIKELIHOOD and RISK, relate to adverse events. Likelihood
addresses chance, and risk addresses money. Like threats; adverse events also have prob-
abilities. They're called likelihoods. If there is a probability of a threat occurring, a
suitable vulnerability, and an ADP resource to be had, you have a likelihood. Where
there's a river or rain or pipe or sewer or water cooler or fire department, there's the
probability of an occurrence of a threat (water). For the likelihood of an adverse event
(flooded equipment and supplies), you also need a vulnerability. In this case the vulner-
ability coulvl be no drain or no sump pump or no rolls of plastic sheeting mounted in the
computer room. The plastic, however, doesn't do much good if there are no scissors handy
for cutting. One installation drowned discovering that vulnerability.
Figure 5 pictures the difference between
threat probabilities and likelihood.
Likelihoods, like threats, occur in real
time. The calculation of likelihood is a
bit trickier than coming up with the
probability of a threat, though. That's
because assessing vulnerability is often
pure judgment call. You can dial your
local precinct and get crime statistics,
but what's the likelihood of the intruder
arriving at your facilities just when
your guard is asleep at the closed cir-
cuit screen?
Figure 5. Difference Between Threat
Probabilities and Likelihood
Risk tells you about the cost of loss or abuse from an adverse event over time. The first
question is: What's the value of the ADP resource that will be abused or that you'll lose
if a given adverse event occurs? The second question involves likelihood: How often can
you expect that particular adverse event to occur? Remember, the adverse event results
from a particular threat exploiting a particular vulnerability. It's very specific
reasoning. Obviously, the greater the value of the ADP resource and the more likely the
adverse event, the greater the risk.
If you're the IRS, you worry a whole lot about the integrity of your systems programmers.
If you operate a data center in Washington, D.C., you don't lose a lot of sleep over
earthquakes.
In Figure 6 I've taken a few liberties
with the classic Illustration of likeli-
hood and worry.
Risks are usually expressed in terms of
dollars per year. After all, that's how
we budget. Your risk might be $1,000,000
per year from a major fire to your data
center or $5,000 a year from the theft of
computer time. There are various short
cuts and formulas available to compute
risk. NBS has put out FIPS PUB 31 that
points the way. It's all very workable
--that Is, once you've come to terms with
"likelihood."
High
L
I
K
E
L
I
H
0
0
0
Low
WORRY
DON'T
WORRY
$/ADVERSE EVENT
High
Figure 6. Likelihood and Worry
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CONFERENCE
Southern Pines, NC
February 11-15,1980
UMITIO STATES
•NVnOMMINTAL MOTICTION ACCNCY
National Computer Center
Research Triangle Park
North Carolina 27711
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE S3OO
AN EQUAL OPPCMIfUNfTT EMPLOYE*
POSTAGE AMD PEC* PAID
U S ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
EPA-M9
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