I
EPA 550/9-74-019A
CIVIL AVIATION STUDIES AND
INTERAGENCY COORDINATING
ORGANIZATIONS
VOLUME!
DECEMBER 1974
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D.C. 20460
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EPA 550/9-74-019A
CIVIL AVIATION STUDIES AND
INTERAGENCY COORDINATING
ORGANIZATIONS
(A Background History, with
Emphasis on Organizations
Dealing with the Aircraft Noise
Issue.)
DECEMBER 1974
Prepared by
Carl Modig
Under Contract 68-01 -2229
for the
Office of Noise Abatement and Control
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
This report has been approved for general availability- The contents of this
report reflect the views of the contractor, who is responsible for the facts
and the accuracy of the data presented herein, and do not necessanly
reflect the official views or policy of EPA This report does not constitute
a standard, specification, or regulation.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This compilation could not have been produced without the help of many
people on the staff of the Office of Noise Abatement and Control, in addition to
the staff of the Informatics Noise Information Program.
ONAC staffers who assisted included John Schettino and Harvey Nozick,
who provided overall guidance; Dorothy Stuart and Eileen Fadely, who made
significant research contributions and also provided much-appreciated typing
support; and Stan Durkee and Cosimo Caccavari, who reviewed the draft.
Other ONAC personnel provided many useful insights into particular organiza-
tions from their direct experience. These included Eugene Wyszpolski, Alan
Merkin, William Sperry, and ONAC consultants Joseph Blatt and Dr. Henning
von Gierke.
From the Informatics, Inc., staff, Jerry Rafats, Librarian for the Noise
Information Program, was indispensable in tracking down hard-to-find docu-
ments; Mrs. She Hie Ballon provided editorial support; and last but far from
least, Frank Wilson contributed a painstaking and highly useful review of the
interim draft.
iii
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Section
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 1-1
Scope and Methodology 1-1
Organization of the Report 1-4
Summary and Conclusions 2-1
Chronological Perspective 2-1
Coordination of Research 2-2
Coordination of Operational Policy 2-3
Coordination of Aircraft Noise Abatement 2-3
General Observations 2-4
Congressional Impetus 2-4
Coordination 2-5
High-Level Support 2-6
Recurring Problems 2-7
Coordinating Organizations 3-1
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)
-1915 to 1958 3-1
Origins and Outline History 3-1
Operation 3-1
Outputs 3-5
Impact 3-6
Monitoring and Updating of Organizational Goals
and Operations 3-6
References 3-6
The Air Coordinating Committee (ACC)—1945-1960 3-9
Origins and Outline History 3-9
Operation 3-11
Outputs 3-18
Impact 3-19
Monitoring and Updating 3-22
References 3-23
National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC)
-1958-1973 3-25
Origins and Outline History 3-25
Operation 3-26
Outputs 3-28
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)
Section Page
Impact 3-29
Monitoring and Updating of Organizational Goals
and Operations 3-30
References 3-30
Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB)
-1960 3-33
Origins and Outline History 3-33
Operation 3-33
Impact 3-35
Monitoring and Updating 3-36
References 3-37
Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA)
—1960-Present 3-39
Origins and Outline History 3-39
Operation 3-39
Outputs 3-41
Impact 3-42
Monitoring Progress toward Objectives 3-42
References 3-42
Federal Aircraft Noise Alleviation Program 3-43
Origins and Outline History 3-43
Operation 3-44
Outputs 3-48
Impact 3-49
Monitoring and Updating 3-52
References 3-53
Interagency Aircraft Noise Abatement Program IANAP
—1968-1973 3-55
Origins and Outline History 3-55
Operation 3-56
Outputs 3-61
Impact 3-61
Monitoring and Updating 3-64
References 3-65
Joint DOT/NASA Office of Noise Abatement (JONA)
—1971-1974 3-69
vi
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Section
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)
Page
Origins and Outline History 3-69
Operation 3-70
Outputs 3-73
Impact 3-74
Monitoring and Updating 3-75
References 3-75
Committee on Hearing, Bioacoustics, and Biomechanics
(CHABA) of the National Academy of Sciences—1952-Present 3-77
Origins and Outline History 3-77
Operation 3-77
Outputs 3-81
Impact 3-82
Monitoring and Updating of Organizational Goals 3-83
References 3-83
Studies 4_1
President's Air Policy Commission (PAPC)—The Finletter
Report, 1947 4-3
Origins and Outline History 4-3
Operation 4-4
Outputs 4-7
Impact 4-8
Monitoring and Updating 4-8
References 4-8
Congressional Aviation Policy Board—Brewster Report, 1948 4-9
Origins and Outline History 4-9
Operation 4-9
Outputs 4-11
Impact 4-13
Monitoring and Updating 4-13
President's Airport Commission—The Doolittle Report, 1952 4-15
Origins and Outline History ' 4-15
Operation 4-15
Outputs 4-17
Impact 4-17
Monitoring and Updating 4-18
References 4-18
vii
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Section
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)
Page
Aviation Facilities Study Group—The Harding Report, 1955 4-19
Origins and Outline History 4-19
Operations 4-20
Outputs 4-21
Impact 4-23
References 4-23
The Curtis Report—1957 4-25
Origins and Outline History 4-25
Operation 4-25
Outputs 4-26
Impact 4-27
References 4-29
Project Horizon—1961 4-31
Origins 4-31
Operation 4-31
Outputs 4-33
Impact 4-35
Monitoring and Updating 4-36
References 4-37
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the
National Academy of Engineering—Civil Aviation Research
and Development Study, 1968 4-39
Origins and Outline History 4-39
Operation 4-40
Outputs 4-41
Impact 4-42
Monitoring and Updating 4-42
References 4-42
The Civil Aviation Research and Development Policy Study
(Card Study), 1971 4-43
Origins and History 4-43
Operations 4-43
Outputs 4-45
Impact 4-46
Monitoring and Updating 4-46
References 4-48
viii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont)
Section
Report: R&D Contributions to Aviation Progress (RADCAP)
-1972 4-49
Origins and History 4-49
Operation 4-49
Outputs 4-50
Impact 4-50
Monitoring and Updating 4-50
References 4-51
Aviation Advisory Commission (AAC)—1973 4-53
Origins and History 4-53
Operation 4-54
Outputs 4-56
Impact 4-56
Monitoring and Updating 4-57
References 4-57
EPA Report to Congress on Aircraft/Airport Noise—1973 4-59
Origins and Outline History 4-59
Operation 4-60
Outputs 4-61
Impact 4-63
Monitoring and Updating 4-63
References 4-63
ix
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VOLUME n
APPENDICES
A. Outline History of Air Coordinating Committee
B. Texts of Executive Orders Establishing and Disestablishing the ACC (E. O.
9781, 10883)
C. Verbatim Text of Finan Report Recommendations Concerning the ACC
D. Restatement of Objectives in Terms of Work Plan by PEDC, July 1967
E. Excerpt from Summary Status Report. Federal Aircraft Noise Abatement
Program
F. Presidential Documents Associated with FANAP
G. 1972 IANAP Membership List
H. Conclusions of the Doolittle Jteport
I. Excerpts from the Harding Report on Government Organization, Inter-
agency Coordination, and the Federal Role in Civil Aviation. Comments
of J. G. Bennett, Jr. and N. E. Halaby
J. Contractor Reports for Curtis Report
K. Recommendations of the Curtis Group Concerning Aircraft Noise
L. Organization of and Persons Cooperating with the Card Study
M. RADCAP Study Organization
N. Members, Staff, Consultants, and Organizations Assisting the Aviation
Advisory Commission
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O. Members and Consultants, Task Group 1, EPA Aircraft/Airport Noise Study
P. Excerpt from Report of Task Group 1, EPA Aircraft/Airport Noise Study
Q. Memorandum on Government Organization for Civil Aviation, by P. W.
Cherington, for the Aviation Advisory Commission
xii
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AAC Aviation Advisory Commission (1973)
ACC Air Coordinating Committee (1945-1960)
AACB Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (1960-present)
AMB Airways Modernization Board (1948-1957)
ANDB Air Navigation Development Board (1948-1957)
ASEB Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board of the National Academy
of Engineering (1967-present)
BOB Bureau of the Budget (now OMB—Off ice of Management and the
Budget)
BBN Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Inc.
CAA Civil Aeronautics Administration (succeeded in 1958 by Federal
Aviation Agency)
CAB Civil Aeronautics Board
CAPB Congressional Aviation Policy Board (1948)
CARD Civil Aviation Research and Development Policy Study (1971)
CMLC Civilian-Military Liaison Committee (1958-1960)
DOC Department of Commerce
DOD Department of Defense
DOS Department of State
DOT Department of Transportation
ABBREVIATIONS 1
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EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FAA Federal Aviation Agency (1958-1968)
Federal Aviation Administration (1968-present)
FANAP Federal Aircraft Noise Alleviation Program (1966-1967) of the
Office of Science and Technology of the Executive Office
FHA Federal Housing Administration
HUD Housing and Urban Development
IANAP Interagency Aircraft Noise Abatement Program (1968-1973)
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IGIA Interagency Group on International Aviation (1960-present)
JONA Joint DOT/NASA Office of Noise Abatement (1971-present)
MANAPS Metropolitan Airport Noise Abatement Policy Studies
NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (1915-1958)
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASC National Aeronautics and Space Council (1958-1973)
OIAA Office of International Aviation Affairs of DOT
OMB Office of Management and Budget
ONA Office of Noise Abatement of DOT
OST Office of Science and Technology (1962-1973) of the Executive
Office
PAPC President's Air Policy Commission (1974)
PEDC Program Evaluation and Development Committee (1966-1967) of
FANAP
RADCAP Research and Development Contributions to Aviation Progress, a
DOD sponsored study (1972)
ABBREVIATIONS 2
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R&D Research and Development
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (1935-present).
ABBREVIATIONS 3
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Section 1
INTRODUCTION
"We ought not to look back unless it is to derive useful
lessons from past errors, and in the purpose of profit-
ing by dear bought experience."
George Washington
This report presents a compilation of facts about organizations and studies
concerned with the coordination of federal activities and policies in the field of
civil aviation. As part of its duties under the Noise Control Act of 1972, the
EPA Office of Noise Abatement and Control is now in the process of considering
what sort of mechanism might best ensure coordination of future federal efforts
to reduce aircraft and airport noise. It was thought that a look at past inter-
agency coordination efforts might prove useful.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
Suggestions from the staff of the Office of Noise Abatement and Control of
EPA provided the initial list of candidate organizations, and others were found
in the course of our research. It quickly became obvious that there were two
types of organizations:
1. Those temporarily engaged in studying some aspect of the problems
of interagency coordination, either directly or as part of a larger study.
2. Those engaged in interagency coordination (two or more agencies or
departments).
For simplicity, we have called the latter coordinating organizations and
the former study groups. We chose a representative sample of coordinating
organizations and study groups that have been active since World War H,
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especially those with noise-related functions. Most of the coordinating
organizations chosen were involved with more than three agencies. Industry-
inspired groups such as SAE and ASTM were excluded, as were groups whose
sole function was coordination of aspects of the federal SST program. While
some chosen organizations coordinated on a broad scale, many concentrated
on coordination of federal research. We then collected as many documents by
or about each organization or study as was possible in the time available. With
the help of this documentation, we were able to develop a uniform set of facts
about each, based on the following outline:
1. Origins and outline history. (How was the organization or study
setup?)
1.1 Specific authorization
1. 2 Preauthorization history
1.3 Outline history
2. Operation. (How did it function?)
2.1 Formulation of objectives
2.2 Membership
2.3 Activities
2.4 Staff
2. 5 Use of contractors
2. 6 Relations with other groups
3. Outputs. {What were its outputs ?)
3.1 Reports
3. 2 Proposed laws and/or regulations
3.3 Public relations and information dissemination
3.4 Proposed coordination of federal agency activities
4. Impact. (How were its outputs used?)
4. 1 Legislation
4. 2 New organizations or major changes in existing organizations
4. 3 Coordination of federal agency activities
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5. Monitoring and updating of organizational goals and updating of
organizational operations. (How were monitoring and follow-up
accomplished ?)
5.1 Monitoring progress toward objectives
5. 2 Updating objectives
5.3 Revision of organizational structure
We tried to follow the outline for each description, but the fine points have
been omitted when they did not fit. Also, in many instances, study organiza-
tions were ad-hoc in nature, and organizations expired at the completion of
the study. In such cases the section on monitoring and updating obviously did
not apply.
One methodological problem arose from the fact that, although each of the
institutions discussed was concerned with coordination, the degree of coordina-
tion, and even the meaning of the word as understood by participating parties,
varied. In some institutions, coordination was understood to be largely the
process of facilitating better communication—putting agency programs on the
table, so to speak. As a result, the degree of change in individual programs
was a voluntary matter, depending on the degree to which individual agency
interests were not threatened and/or in conflict. In other cases, there was an
active effort to persuade autonomous agencies to agree on policies and, equally
important, to implement decisions. Only rarely did coordination include the
right of the coordinating organization to make binding decisions and to obtain
sufficient resources to monitor the progress toward implementation of such
decisions. In this compilation, we have included institutions that exercised
various degrees of coordination.
Another basic problem was the familiar one of trying to decide whether
there was a causative relationship between two events simply because one pre-
ceded the other. We relied on the basic documents to provide this insight
wherever possible.
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While this report may ultimately be used in evaluating the effectiveness
and limitations of the various institutions, a necessary prior task was to
establish the facts. We made the assumption that partial analysis of a complete
set of facts is better than premature study of a partial set of facts. To that
end, we have included basic data such as membership lists, bibliographies,
excerpts from documents, and texts of Executive Orders.
ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
Coordinating Organizations, as a group, are treated first, followed by
Studies. For the convenience of the reader, organizations are included in the
list of abbreviations in the front matter. In addition, the organizations can be
found in Figure 1, which places them in time. Certain entities appearing in
Figure 1 (RTCA, ANDB, AMB, and the Finan Report) are not treated separately
but are discussed in the sections on the Air Coordinating Committee (ACC),
the Harding Report, and the Curtis Report.
So as not to clutter the text, such things as compilations of basic data
and excerpts from documents are provided as appendices.
We have deliberately stopped short of describing what the ideal organiza-
tional structure should be for coordinating federal aircraft noise research or
federal aircraft noise policy, for the ideal form and structure partly depend
on the contemporary environment rather than on the past. However, the reader
should find this material useful in synthesizing his own conceptions of model
coordination systems.
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Figure 1."Selected National Aviation Studies and Coordinating Organizations 1917-1973
(Note. Organizations in parentheses provided administrative support)
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Section 2
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This overview first examines the long-term trends in interagency
coordination and attempts to put past coordinating organizations into better
chronological perspective. The distinction is made between coordination of
research and development and coordination of civil aviation system operations
and policies.
The emphasis then shifts to general observations about common patterns
and problems that seem to have recurred. These observations are necessarily
tentative in nature since the source documentation was more complete for some
profiles than for others and because errors of emphasis or omission may have
entered during the process of reducing the large amount of information that was
collected. In addition, some of the material is open to a variety of interpreta-
tions. It is for these reasons that we have included as much detailed information
as possible—including excerpts from documents—in the text and appendices, and
that we suggest that the reader rely on this information as well as the summary
in forming his own conclusions.
CHRONOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the years immediately following World War II, there were clearly desig-
nated organizations for coordinating civil aviation research and system opera-
tions. However, mechanisms for ensuring coordination between these organiza-
tions were less clearly defined.
The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) had the primary
responsibility for coordinating the research needs of private, commercial, and
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military research, in addition to its function of performing fundamental and
applied research (Finletter Report, 3). *
The Air Coordinating Committee (ACC) had the primary responsibility for
coordinating all Federal aviation activities excluding research and development.
(Finletter Report, 3; Brewster Report, 3). In practice, the ACC also became
involved in research and development activities related to air traffic control
and navigational aid systems, while staying out of the area of aerodynamic
research and development of new aircraft and aircraft engines. This involve-
ment was through the activities of the committees in the ACC Technical Division
(ACC, 2.6).
COORDINATION OF RESEARCH
By 1960, NACA had been abolished and there was no longer a single coordi-
nating mechanism capable of ensuring a national policy for civil aviation research
and development.
The successors to NACA that were created in 1958 were NASA, with an
operational space mission, and the National Aeronautics and Space Council
(NASC), for research policy coordination. NASC, however, emphasized prob-
lems concerned with the space effort and was less active in coordinating aero-
nautical research (NASC, 4, 5).
NASA, DOD, and FAA each had their own policies and programs for re-
search. As a U. S. Senate committee concluded,
Policy is a composite of the separate policies of the various
agencies . . . primarily NASA, DOD, and FAA (now a part of
DOT)
Conclusions of Senate Committee on Aeronautical
Space Sciences, Report No. 957, Jan. 31, 1968,
p. 21.
^Numbers in the references correspond to sections of the topic outline presented
in Section 1 of this report.
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The use of bilateral mechanisms such as the Aeronautical and Astronautics
Coordinating Board (AACB) increased. The problem was mitigated in the area
of bioacoustics-related aircraft noise research by the coordination role played
by CHABA, the Committee on Hearing, Bioacoustics, and Biomechanics of the
National Academy of Sciences. The problem of research coordination was one
of the factors leading to various studies such as the ASEB study (1967-68),
CARD study (1968-71), and the report of the Aviation Advisory Commission
(1970-72).
COORDINATION OF OPERATIONAL POLICY
By the early 1960's, in the area of national aviation system operations, the
ACC had been abolished and a centralization of powers had occurred that made
ACC-style coordination less necessary.
The problem of coordination of operations was mitigated by the centraliza-
tion of many functions in the Airways Modernization Board in 1957, succeeded
by the FAA in 1958. Included in the FAA were most ACC functions, as well as
responsibility for safety. Thus, for the development of air facilities (airports,
the traffic control system, navigational aids) there was less need for coordina-
tion of the type performed by the ACC, the Air Navigation Development Board
(ANDB), and their member departments and agencies (Harding Report, 1. 2;
Curtis Report 3. 2, 3.3).
While most ACC functions went to FAA, coordination of civil international
aviation policy went to the Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA),
created in 1960. The secretariat of this interagency committee was housed in
FAA. Its organizational procedures were similar to those of the ACC.
COORDINATION OF AIRCRAFT NOISE ABATEMENT
In the early 1960's there was no institution actively coordinating federal
aircraft noise abatement activities.
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The aircraft noise problem was developing while centralized coordination
institutions for research and development were declining, as previously out-
lined. FAA responsibility and authority in the operational areas of air traffic
control, safely, facilities development, and air space allocation were evidently
sufficient to enable that agency to act effectively. However, FAA was less active
in the area of noise abatement.
It was in that context that President Johnson directed the Office of Science
and Technology (OST) to initiate what he called an "action program" in 1966
(Ref. FANAP, 1.1; Appendix F). Under this program, the Federal Aircraft
Noise Alleviation Plan, participating federal agencies (FAA, NASA, HUD,
DOC) began to agree upon and implement measures aimed at alleviating the
problems of aircraft noise in the vicinity of airports. (FANAP, 1, 2). The
principal measure was introduction of legislation requiring noise certification
of new aircraft (FANAP 3, 4; Appendix F, No. 3).
The action program started by OST became less active when it was trans-
ferred to DOT in 1967 as the Interagency Aircraft Noise Abatement Program
(IANAP). The primary focus of IANAP shifted away from operational innovations
toward more research, and the type of coordination shifted from new agency
program commitments toward exchange of views and information (IANAP, 2.1,
2, 3, 4).
The lack of clearcut coordination arrangements evident in the 1960's per-
sists today. Congress and the Aviation Advisory Commission both expressed
hope that NASC would evolve into a centralized coordination mechanism for
civil aviation research and development within the Executive Branch (AAC, 3).
However, NASC was abolished by a Presidential reorganization order in 1973.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
CONGRESSIONAL IMPETUS
The existing impetus for better coordination for all federal aviation policy,
including noise abatement, has come chiefly from Congress.
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• Congress inspired the CARD study (1967-71) to try to get NASA, DOT
and FAA within DOT to work more closely together (CARD, 1, 3).
• Congress created the AAC (1970-72) to examine the long-range needs
of civil aviation, including organizational needs (ACC, 1.1, 1.2, 2.1).
• Congress mandated EPA, under Section 4 of the Noise Control Act of
1972, to coordinate federal noise research and control programs,
including those for airport/aircraft noise.
COORDINATION
Coordination efforts that have gone beyond the "exchange of information"
stage have included those of the AACB (1960-present), FANAP (1966-67), IGIA
(1960-present), some elements of IANAP (1967-1973), JONA (1971-1974), and
CHABA (1963-1972). All have done more than facilitate exchange of informa-
tion. AACB claims harmonization of Defense/NASA plans for joint use of
research facilities and for the space shuttle program. IGIA has unified U.S.
positions at ICAO. FANAP activities included paving the way for noise certi-
fication of new aircraft in FAR 36. IANAP panels identified technology gaps.
CHABA helped shape federal research on human response to noise. AACB
has drawn Congressional praise as a model for other coordination efforts.
JONA was established to integrate NASA and DOT (including FAA) plans for
aircraft noise research and development. (Profiles on AACB, IGIA, FANAP,
CHABA, JONA.)
One possible pattern for a coordinating mechanism for aircraft noise
abatement is that used by the Interagency Group on International Aviation
(IGIA). IGIA organization and procedures were modeled on those of the ACC.
Like ACC, it was created by Executive Order. IGIA coordinates federal
agency inputs into recommendations for a unified U. S. position on numerous
civil aviation matters (ACC 2.3; IGIA 2.3). Although, in the ACC/IGIA model,
it only takes one member's dissent to bring ah issue to a higher level for reso-
lution (ACC 4.2, 4. 3), ACC had the defect of sometimes failing to surface
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controversial issues because it was in the member's short-term interest to
keep them hidden.
HIGH-LEVEL SUPPORT
"Successful" coordination efforts have evidently been facilitated by high-
level agency support and participation as well as the existence of an appropriate
coordinating institution. The AACB principals (co-chairmen) are at the Assis-
tant Secretary level; this has also been the level for IGIA principal members.
FANAP was created under White House auspices, thus ensuring high-level
agency interest.
Active interest at the top (Executive Office) is also essential to successful
interagency coordination because the budgetary agency (BOB, now OMB) has
control of the allocation of funds and because of the need for the Executive
Office to take an active role in deciding unresolved disputes.
If agencies are to implement programs agreed upon through interagency
coordination, financial resources must be made available in agency budgets.
This requires not only Congressional appropriations but also OMB coopera-
tion, which in turn is a function of Executive Office interest.
One example is the relative ability demonstrated by the CAA and the
Bureau of Public Roads in obtaining adequate funding in the mid-1950's.
Although both agencies were equally buried within the organizational structure
of the Commerce Department, CAA had funding problems, while the Bureau
of Public Roads had great success in getting funds for the Interstate Highway
Program. "The Bureau was greatly aided in this effort by the fact that it was
able to interest President Eisenhower personally in the program" (Appendix
Q, p. 1-515). BOB (now OMB) has intervened to play a role in civil aviation
coordination through its expertise in the field of government organization
throughout the Finan Report/Harding Report/Curtis Report sequence of events
in the 1950's. It is presently involved in the ongoing improvement of coordina-
tion of federal noise activities.
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Active interest of policy level personnel in federal departments and agencies
is also a prerequisite for successful coordination.
RECURRING PROBLEMS
Whatever the form of an interagency coordinating mechanism, certain
problems tend to recur unless positively dealt with:
• The active participation of non-federal government groups must be
secured, particularly that of industry, while still insulating actual
interagency deliberations from their excessive influence. ACC had
this problem (ACC, 2.6, 5.3; also Appendix C, pp. 42-7). The Pro-
gram Evaluation and Development Committee had this problem
(FANAP, 2.6). IGIA procedures show that it is aware of the problem
(IGIA, 2.6). The problem also existed in IANAP (IANAP, 2. 2, 2.3,
2.6). NASC was encouraged to set up liaison groups (CARD, 3; ACC,
3) in the form of various study groups. Another aspect of this ques-
tion is the narrowing of representation that tends to occur when non-
governmental representatives must provide financial support (such
as travel expenses) while providing technical expertise in the coordi-
nation process (CHABA, 2.2, 2.6).
• Member agencies possessing statutory duties cannot voluntarily
abrogate them. The history of ACC experience with CAB and FCC
provide examples (Appendix C, pp. 11-12). A parallel situation can
be seen in the FAA statutory responsibility for air safety, as it may
be impacted by noise abatement alternatives.
• When the policy review or agency coordinating mechanisms are too
closely tied to one agency, there is a tendency for other agencies not
to participate as actively or effectively. The ACC Secretariat was
located in the Department of Commerce. By the end of its existence
it was widely regarded as being dominated by Commerce (ACC, 2. 6,
4.3). Once a coordination mechanism begins to obtain the reputation
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that it is dominated by one agency, it may begin to lose its effectiveness.
Other agencies may become more reluctant to seriously participate.
The host agency is therefore led to do more of the work. But in doing
more of the work, the host agency heightens the image of domination.
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Section 3
COORDINATING ORGANIZATIONS
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS (NACA)—
1915 to 1958
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
Act of Congress, approved March 3, 1915 (50 U. S. C. 151)
Preauthorization History
The NACA was appointed pursuant to law in 1915. It was modeled after a
similar committee established in Great Britain to investigate the scientific
problems involved in flight and to give advice to the military air services and
other aviation services of the government.
OPERATION
NACA was both a line agency performing research and an advisory com-
mittee serving both the agency and the rest of the government.
Formulation of Objectives
The line duties of the NACA were:
1. To supervise and direct scientific study of the problems of flight with
a view toward their practical solution.
2. To determine the problems that should be attacked experimentally,
and to discuss their solution and its application to practical issues.
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3. To direct and conduct research and experiment in aeronautics at the
Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, the Ames Aeronautical Laboratory,
the Lewis Flight Propulsion Laboratory, and any other laboratories
that might be placed partially or wholly under the direction of the Com-
mittee.
The functions of the NACA were:
1. To equip, maintain, and operate offices, laboratories, and research
stations under its direction.
2. To acquire additional land for, undertake additional construction at,
and purchase and install additional equipment for existing laboratories
and research stations under its direction.
The coordination responsibilities of the Advisory Committee were as
follows:
Under the Policy Statement of March 21, 1946, it is clearly
the duty and the responsibility of the NACA to coordinate
Government aeronautical research with civilian, industrial,
and university programs (Ref. 2, p. 91).
The 17 members of the Advisory Committee were appointed by the Presi-
dent and served without compensation, except for expenses. The law provided
that ten of the members would be representatives of specified government
agencies, and that seven other members would be selected from "persons
acquainted with the needs of aeronautical sciences, either civil or military,
or skilled in aeronautical engineering or its allied sciences" (Ref. 1). Five
major and twenty-two subordinate committees, similarly organized, assisted
the Committee in determining policy and programs—total membership, more
than 400. One of the subcommittees was on aircraft noise (see Figure 2).
Nongovernmental employees were appointed for a term of five years,
with the exception that any member appointed to fill a vacancy that occurred
prior to the expiration of a term would be appointed for the unexpircd portion
of that term.
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Subcommittee on Aircraft Noise
Mr. William Littlewood, Vice President, Equipment Research,
American Airlines, Inc., Chairman
Dr. H. 0. Parrack, Wright Air Development Center.
Dr. H. E. von Gierke, Wright Air Development Center.
Comdr. B K. Weaver, USN. Bureau of Aeronautics, Depart-
ment of the Navy
Mr. Joseph Matulaitis, Office of the Chief of Transportation,
Department of the Army.
Mr. Stephen H. Rolle, Chief, Power Plant Branch. Aircraft
Engineering Division. Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Mr. B. S. Spano. Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Mr. Arthur A Regier, NACA Langley Aeronautical Laboratory.
Mr. Newell D. Sanders, NACA Lewis Flight Propulsion Labora-
tory.
Dr. Leo Beranek, President and Bolt, Beranek & Newman,
Inc
Mr. A. W Cobb, Aerojet-General Corp.
Mr. Allen W. Dallas, Director. Engineering Division. Air
Transport Association of America.
Mr. Harry H. Howell, Transport Division Boeing Airplane
Co.
Mr. E. J. Kirchman. The Martin Co.
Dr. Robert B. Lawhead. Rocketdyne Division, North
American Aviation, Inc.
Prof. R. W. Leonard, University of California
Mr. M. M. Miller, Chief, Acoustics Section, Douglas Air-
craft Co.. Inc.
Dr. Charles T. Molloy, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
Mr. John M. Tyler, Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, United
Aircraft Corp.
Dr. P. J. Westervelt, Assistant Professor, Department of
Physics, Brown University.
Mr. J F. Woodall, Convair, Division of General Dynamics
Corp.
Mr. George P. Bates, Jr., Secretary
From. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Forty
-fourth Annual Report, 1358. Washington: U.S.G.P.O..
1959,p 91.
Figure 2. Membership of NACA Subcommittee on Aircraft Noise in 1958
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On May 21, 1958, current members were:
• Allen V. Astin, Ph. D., Director, National Bureau of Standards
• Preston R. Bassett, D. Sc.
• Detlev W. Bronk, Ph. D., President, Rockefeller Institute for
Medical Research
• Leonard Carmichael, Ph. D., Secretary, Smithsonian Institution
• Frederick C. Crawford, Sc.D., Chairman of the Board, Thompson
Products, Inc.
• William V. Davis, Jr., Vice Admiral, United States Navy
• James H. Doolittle, Sc. D., Vice President, Shell Oil Co.
• Paul D. Foote, Ph. D., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and
Engineering
• Wellington T. Hines, Rear Admiral, United States Navy
• Jerome C. Hunsaker, Sc.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology
• Charles J. McCarthy, S. B., Chairman of the Board, Chance Vought
Aircraft, Inc.
• Donald L. Putt, Lieutenant General, United States Air Force
• James T. Pyle, A. B., Administrator of Civil Aeronautics
• Francis W. Reichelderfer, Sc.D., Chief, United States Weather Bureau
• Edward V. Rickenbacker. Sc.D., Chairman of the Board, Eastern
Airlines, Inc.
• Louis S. Rothschild, Ph. D., Under Secretary of Commerce for
Transportation
• Thomas D. White, General, United States Air Force
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Activities
The Advisory Committee was required to meet twice each year and could
meet more often in special meetings called by the chairman or upon the request
of five members of the Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee actually
met on an average of 10 times a year (Ref. 6, p. 24). The average attendance
at meetings compared creditably with the most strictly run industrial board.
The committee set policy and broadly planned a research outline to be carried
out by scientists, engineers, and other persons on the staff of the agency. It
was given the responsibility for hiring and firing only three people: director,
executive secretary, and associate director.
Coordination was carried on largely through the NACA technical committees
and subcommittees. These groups were made up of representatives of the mili-
tary, civil aeronautical agencies of the Government, the aircraft industry, and
educational and scientific institutions (Ref. 2, p. 91). Membership for a typical
subcommittee is shown in Figure 2.
Technical committee and subcommittee meetings were held two or three
times a year. A NACA career employee served as secretary to each of these
groups to ensure continuity of proceedings. The purpose of these committees
was to exchange information and make recommendations only; they did not
share the decision-making power of the main Advisory Committee (Ref 6,
p. 24).
OUTPUTS
NACA published annual reports ending with its 44th and final Report of
1958 (Ref. 5). These reports described both research activities and coordina-
tion activities.
In addition, coordination work was performed by the committees and sub-
committees; this was largely coordination in the sense of facilitation through
exchange of information.
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IMPACT
As mentioned earlier, NACA was both a line organization conducting
research for other government agencies (like National Bureau of Standards
today) and an advisor to other agencies through its Committee and various
subcommittees. In its advisory role, it was more of a technical than a policy
advisor, and that is why it did not play a direct role with organizations such
as the ACC. Instead, NACA advised ACC members. Nevertheless, its in-
fluence was great, because of the prestige of Advisory Committee members,
their numerous informal channels of communication, and the private and
governmental expertise of the subcommittees.
It was generally recognized that NACA played a key role in aeronautical
research and development as well as serving as a link between government
and industry (Ref. 3, p. 119). Because of this, it was remembered with
nostalgia in the 1960's, when no single authoritative institution of its kind
existed any longer (Ref. 4, p. 16).
MONITORING AND UPDATING OF ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND
OPERATIONS
For NACA, an 8000-man research (agency, this function was performed
by the Advisory Committee described previously. In the case of the Advisory
Committee, the committee performed this function for itself, but did so
effectively: the organization was capable of changing its goals. During the
last decade of its existence the NACA research focus gradually moved away
from aeronautics and toward astronautics.
REFERENCES
1. U.S. Congress, House, Report of the'Select Committee on Astro-
nautics, and Space Exploration. House Report 1758, 85th Cong.,
2nd Sess., May 21, 1958.
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2. Survival in the Air Age. A Report by the President's Air Policy
Commission, Washington, D. C., January 1, 1948.
3. U.S. Congress, House, The National Space Program, Report of the
Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Administration, House
Report 1758, 85th Cong., 2ndSess., 1958.
4. U.S. Congress, Senate, Aeronautical Research and Development
Policy, Senate Report 957, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1968.
5. U. S. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Forty-Fourth
Annual Report, 1958 (Final Report). Washington, B.C., USGPO,
1959.
6. Rosholt, Robert L., An Administrative History of NASA. 1958-1963.
Washington, D.C., NASA, 1966.
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THE Am COORDINATING COMMITTEE (ACC)—1945-1960
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
The ACC was established by interdepartmental memorandum between the
Departments of State, War, Navy, and Commerce. On September 19, 1946,
the ACC was reconstituted by Executive Order 9781, which served from then
on as its basic charter. Later Executive Orders added full voting members
but did not materially change the terms of reference or functions.
Preauthorization History
"The demand for the establishment of an Air Coordinating Committee or
some alternative mechanism for interagency coordination became increasingly
insistent as the number of federal agencies with a substantial interest in
aviation matters grew. However, an immediate factor in the creation of the
Committee was the urgent need for a means of developing and coordinating
the positions of the United States in connection with the Provisional Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO) and after April 1947, the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). For some time after the forma-
tion of the Air Coordinating Committee it met weekly to develop the United
States positions on the numerous annexes under consideration by PIACO and
the succeeding permanent organization" (The Finan Report, p. 2).*
*In 1954 the Chairman of the ACC, Robert Murray, asked BOB to review ACC
organization, functions, and operations. William F. Finan, BOB Assistant
Director for Management and Organization, directed the Study, which was
completed in November 1954. The Finan Report, Survey of the Air Coordinating
Committee, will be referred to as Ref. 1 throughout the rest of this section.
Major excerpts from the Finan Report are to be found in Appendix C.
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Outline History
A detailed but not exhaustive outline history may be found as Appendix A.
In brief:
• ACC established by interdepartmental
memorandum Mar. 27, 1945
• ACC formally established by President
Truman in Exec. Order 9781 Sept. 19, 1946
• ACC published a general national avia-
tion policy statement, prepared for the
President on behalf of the Executive
Branch (Ref. 7) Aug. 1, 1947
• Release of report prepared by ACC for
President: Civil Air Policy (Ref. 4) May 1954
• The Finan Report (Ref. 1) Nov. 1954
• Curtis Report proposed ACC eventually
be dissolved May 1957
• FAA established by Act of Congress August 1958
• FAA made full member and FAA
representative made Chairman of ACC
by Exec. Order 10796 Dec. 24, 1958
• ACC terminated by Exec. Order 108883,
effective Oct. 11, 1960. FAA charged
with winding up ACC affairs and absorbing
most ACC functions and personnel Aug. 11, 1960
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OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
The main objective of the ACC as set out in Executive Order 9781 of 1946
was "to provide for the fullest development and coordination of the aviation
policies and activities of the Federal Agencies."* E.O. 9781 further specified:
• The Committee shall examine aviation problems and develop-
ments affecting more than one participating agency; develop
and recommend integrated policies to be carried out and actions
to be taken by the participating agencies or by any other Govern-
ment agency charged with responsibility in the aviation field;
and, to the extent permitted by law, coordinate the aviation
activities of such agencies except activities relating to the
exercise of quasi-judicial functions.
• The Committee shall consult with federal interagency boards
and committees concerned in any manner with aviation activi-
ties and consult with the representatives of the United States
to the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization or
to the permanent successor thereof and recommend to the
Department of State general policy directives and instructions
for the guidance of the said representatives.
Membership
The organization of the Air Coordinating Committee (Figure 3) may be
viewed as a group of 50 or more interagency committees, many of which
were highly specialized, others of short duration. These committees were
arranged in at least four levels, headed by the "Top ACC,"which were
designed to permit the disposition of aviation matters requiring interagency
coordination at the lowest appropriate level. At the same time, the hierarchy
made it possible to force unresolved matters or questions involving major
policy to successively higher levels until a solution was reached (Ref. 1, p. 5).
*Full text of E.O. 9781 is in Appendix B.
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MEMBER AGENCIES
STATE
DEPARTMENT
TREASURY
DEPARTMENT
POST OFF ICE
DEPARTMENT
COMMERCE
DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT
OF THE
ARMY
NAVY
DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT
OF THE
AIR FORCE
MEMBERS DESIGNATED BY
AGENCIES AND THEIR ALTERNATES
ACC ADVISORY PANEL
AVIATION INDUSTRY
ADVISORY PANEL
U
i—>
DO
SECRETARIAT
AIRCRAFT CLAIMANT
DIVISION
LEGAL DIVISION
L
CIVIL
AERONAUTICS
BOARD
BUREAU OF
THE BUDGET
(NONVOTING)
OFFICE OF
DEFENSE
MOBILIZATION
(NONVOTING)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GENERAL
ICAO MATTERS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE
CHICAGO CONVENTION
ECONOMIC DIVISION
ICAO SECTION
TECHNICAL DIVISION
3 SUBCOMMITTEES
6 STANDING WORKING
GROUPS
AIRPORT USE PANEL
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
AND NAVIGATION PANEL
12 SUBCOMMITTEES
Figure 3. Air Coordinating Committee Organization in 1954.
-------
The original member agencies in the Top ACC were:
• Voting Members: Dept. of State
Dept. of War (later replaced by indivi-
dual Army and Air Force memberships)
Post Office Dept.
Commerce Dept.
Civil Aeronautics Board
• Nonvoting Members: B. O.B.
Office iof Defense Mobilization
Added later were:
• Voting Members; Dept. bf the Air Force (added earlier;
removed; reinstated 1950)
Treasury Dept. (1948)
• Nonvoting Members; Office of Defense Mobilization
Other federal agencies could become voting ad hoc members when the subject
concerned aviation matters of substantial interest to them. They also had
membership on some ACC components. Heads of member agencies appointed
their representatives to ACC. They were usually of subcabinet rank, on the
assistant secretary or deputy under secretary level. The President of the
U. S. chose one of the members to be chairman. The above members consti-
tuted the Top ACC.
Each high-level member also had one or more alternate members who
attended meetings and voted in his absence. The alternates were also formally
responsible for handling most of the decision making on the ICAO portion of
ACC business (Ref. 1, p. 4). All decisions of the top Air Coordinating Com-
mittee were reached by unanimous vote. In the event of a disagreement among
the members of the Committee, the matter could be referred to the President
for a decision. Throughout its history the committee meetings fluctuated in
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frequency from the weekly sessions of 1945 and 1946 to meetings spaced
somewhat less than monthly by the 1950's (Ref. 1, p. 2). Principals of sub-
cabinet rank were frequently absent from Top ACC meetings.
Below the level of the top members and alternates were four divisions
(see Figure 3). In theory, and to a degree in practice, the members of the
divisions were relatively high-level officials better equipped to speak for
their agencies than the members of many of the subcommittees (Ref. 1, p. 4).
Decisions of the lower committees were arrived at also by unanimous
vote. In case of dissent, matters were automatically referred to the next
higher level.
Most of the groundwork in the preparation of ACC papers and in resolving
and clarifying issues took place in the subcommittee, in standing work groups
and ad hoc committees, and in groups established by and under the divisions.
The technical division alone had 12 established subcommittees exclusive of
the Air Traffic Control and Navigation Panel, and many of these had working
groups and ICAO sections. The Aviation Meteorology Subcommittee of the
technical division had, for example, five active working committees dealing
with specialized fields of aviation meteorology.
There was also an Airport Use Panel and an Air Traffic Control and Navi-
gation Panel. The Air Traffic Control and Navigation Panel occupied a position
under the technical division, but its responsibilities for coordinating the devel-
opment of the Common System made it one of the most active of the ACC
components (Ref. 1, p. 4).
Activities
The coordination of international aviation matters continued to be a major
function of the Air Coordinating Committee, with some subcommittees still
spending as much as 90 percent of their effort on ICAO items. However, as
the annexes to the Chicago Convention were developed and approved, and as
the major United States policy positions on international civil aviation matters
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were determined, the relative importance of the work of the Committee in the
international aviation field began to decline.
The coordination of military and civil aviation policies, programs, techni-
cal standards, and procedures assumed a greater importance in the work of
the Air Coordinating Committee not only because of somewhat reduced pressure
from international matters but also because of the expanded use of aircraft and
advances in air navigation systems, instruments, and procedures. With only
one airspace, the military and civil users and regulators found it impossible
to go their separate ways. Therefore, the entire complex of problems in-
volving airspace, a common navigational system, communications, aerodromes,
and related matters had to be subjected to continuous and, in some instances,
meticulous inter agency coordination (Ref. 1, p. 3).
Policy issues in the economic field were also considered. Many commit-
tees handled voluminous casework. In 1959, ACC distributed 231 documents,
690 working papers, and 402 ICAO letters to an average of over 50 recipients
for each. In the same year the Airport Use Panel decided 58 separate airport
or runway location questions (Ref. 5, pp. 56-50).
Staff
The following description is from the Finan Report of 1954:
The Air Coordinating Committee is one of the few interagency
groups in the executive branch served by an independent, full-
time secretariat. The secretariat is charged with performing
a wide range of facilitative functions including recording actions
taken at meetings, arranging for meetings of ACC components,
circulating papers to be considered on an informal action basis
or in actual meetings, assisting in the scheduling of items for
consideration, helping the chairmen of ACC components increase
the effectiveness of their respective units, calling attention to
deadlines on matters pressing for ACC action, and a large
number of related activities. The secretariat also is responsible
for maintaining certain records, such as current airspace maps
utilized throughout the Government. Although there are about
25 employees on the staff of the independent secretariat, this
group provides only a part of the facilitative work done on behalf
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of the Air Coordinating Committee. Most of the subcommittees,
working groups and standing working committees have secre-
taries provided by the agency with the major interest. Some,
like the Aviation Meteorology Subcommittee, have special
secretarial arrangements because of their relationship to other
non-ACC interagency committees. Nevertheless, the major
components, that is, Top ACC, the divisions, the panels and
such vital subcommittees as those on airspace, search and
rescue, facilitation of civil aviation, and international aviation
facilities are served by the independent secretariat (Ref. 1,
p. 5).
The 1955 budget for ACC was $174,000. It was contributed pro rata by
member agencies (Ref 1., p. 19).
Contractors
There was no direct use of contractors.
Relations with Other Groups
The ACC was always regarded as a central forum in which industry could
be heard. As early as 1946 an ACC Industry Advisory Panel had been organized
at the request of industry. At the end of its organizational life, the benefits of
ACC as a forum were still being emphasized by government officials. The
reaction of industry was to press for as much influence as possible in ACC
bodies. Participation was restricted. At times, various elements of indus-
try sought the right to vote. Although the situation varied from committee
to committee, industry nonvoting members appeared to vote in some commit-
tees, while in others their dissent had "the automatic effect of forcing the
matter to a higher echelon—the equivalent of a vote" (Ref. 1, p. 44). The
Finan Report was critical of the lack of uniform enforcement of ground rules
for industry participation (Ref. 1, pp. 43-47).
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At the same time, industry preferred, when possible, to move the forum
to another organization in which it had full voting rights: the Radio Technical
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA). According to the Finan Report of 1954:
The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics was organized
in 1935 through the initiative of the Department of Commerce
and is now a nonprofit cooperative association composed of fed-
eral agencies concerned with aviation communications and indus-
trial organizations with a similar interest. The Executive Com-
mittee consists of representatives of eight federal agencies and
seven industrial organizations. The Assembly has about ninety
private firms and associations and eight federal agencies in its
membership.
The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics has provided
a means of bringing to bear the knowledge and advice of experts
from both industry and the Government on. matters relating to
radio aids to air navigation, communication, and traffic control.
It has conducted a number of studies of the "state of the art" in
its field of interest.
In 1947, the Air Coordinating Committee requested the RTCA
to undertake a study of the airway problems which were handi-
capping the development of postwar civil aviation. RTCA
established Special Committee 31, which, after thorough study,
recommended the establishment of a single all-weather traffic
control system. The report further proposed the creation of
a permanent Air Traffic Control and Steering Committee to
assure continuity in the implementation of the common all-
weather system. The present Air Traffic Control and Naviga-
tion Panel was established to implement the report and was
placed under the Air Coordinating Committee.
The fact that industry has full membership and a vote in RTCA
Inclines some of the non-governmental participants to prefer it
over the Air Traffic Control and Navigation Panel (NAV Panel)".
as a forum in which to take up matters affecting the common
system. On June 8, 1954, with the affirmative vote of the Gov-
ernment members, RTCA established a Steering Committee on
a permanent basis to redefine the requirements of the common
system. This development has brought into the fore the issue
of NAV Panel-RTCA relationships. There is now a risk of
friction between elements of the two groups, and the latent un-
certainty as to the role of each has been accentuated (Ref. 1,
p. 40).
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In relations with Congress, the original ACC view was that the ACC, rather
than BOB, should provide final coordination of the views of the Executive
Branch on draft legislation to be presented to Congress, and "this view had
some support in Congress" (Ref. 1, p. 21). However, when Congressional
efforts began to give the ACC statutory recognition,
The dangers to the Air Coordinating Committee from
becoming an agency in direct communication with Congress
were eventually perceived, and the Committee ceased
attempting to coordinate the reports of member agencies
on pending bills (Ref. 1, pp. 21-22).
For each of its participating agencies, one liaison official of the agency was
designated as the contact point for channeling communications to and from the
ACC and for coordinating those agencies' numerous representatives to various
ACC committees.
OUTPUTS
Reports
Annual reports were submitted to the President by January 31 of each
year. E.O. 9781 also provided for interim or special reports upon request,
such as the Civil Air Policy Report of 1954 (Ref. 4).
Proposed Laws and Regulations
The ACC did not propose laws but did, in fact, propose regulations and
commented on regulations under consideration by member agencies.
Public Relations and Information Dissemination
ACC documents and reports were directed towards the decision makers
in government and industry rather than towards the general public. There was
no public information program as such.
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Coordination of Federal Agency Activities
There were two types of coordination outputs: (1) issues referred to the
President because no agreement could be reached; and (2) "decisions" unani-
mously agreed to, which were to be implemented by the appropriate member
agencies. The areas in which these decisions were most numerous included
ICAO policy questions, airport or runway location issues, and obstruction \
(radio tower) issues.
IMPACT
Legislation, Regulations, Executive Orders
While implementation was up to the President (executive orders) or member
agencies (regulations) there is little doubt that the ACC had a decisive influence
on many small but important rules, orders, and regulations. It is also clear,
however, that it had only an indirect influence on the major legislation of the
1950's, which led to the transfer of functions from existing agencies to the
FAA. That is, the Harding and Curtis groups used the expertise of the ACC
as one input but made their own decisions. Those decisions eventually led to
a drastic curtailment of the coordinating mechanisms, including the ACC
itself.
New Organizations or-Major Changes in Existing Organizations
Because of the collective nature of its decision-making process (including
the unanimity rule), the ACC tended to recommend the expansion of the scope
of existing member agencies rather than the creation of new ones. Most
typically, it was never able to address itself to major jurisdictional questions.
For example, the 1954 Report on Civil Air Policy that the ACC sent to the
President was full of generalities concerning what should be done. However,
because member agencies' could not agree, there were no recommendations on
specific agency tasks and deadlines. (For details, see p. 31 of the Finan
Report in Appendix C.)
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Coordination of Federal Agency Activities
The two types of coordination outputs were: (1) issues raised to the Presi-
dent and (2) unanimous decisions to be implemented by a member agency.
The ACC did not function well as a mechanism for presenting unresolved
interagency disputes for Presidential decision. It was evidently recognized by
each agency that if one member persisted in forcing a Presidential decision in
which it might gain and other agencies lose, other agencies would do the same
in return. It was safer not to rock the boat. Instead there seemed to be two
patterns. Either intractable problems were avoided or else agencies compro-
mised incompatible positions to achieve some sort of "decision." In the latter
case, the decision was not likely to be as well-reasoned as the original posi-
tions, or to really solve the problem.
As to implementation of decisions by members, the ACC had problems
seeing that implementation actually occurred. When agency representatives
were of insufficiently high rank, they were less able to (a) get their agency to
bring problems to the ACC or (b) get their agency to fulfill commitments made
at the ACC (Ref. 8, p. 1-514). The Department of Commerce implemented ACC
decisions better than the military branches because its representative on the
Top ACC was of very high rank in DOC and actively participated in ACC. There
were other factors in the Commerce performance, however, Commerce had a
deep interest in ACC because it ran large parts of the federal aviation program
including CAA and the Weather Bureau; CAA voluntarily did much of the ACC
staff work; and Commerce also provided office space for the ACC Secretariat.
All of these close ties made it more likely that ACC decisions would take
Commerce's interests into account, in turn making Commerce more inclined
to implement ACC decisions. As the Finan Report summed it up:
The Air Coordinating Committee cannot compel member
agencies to implement its decisions. These agencies should,
therefore, arrange individually to assure that implementation
does take place or that the Committee is advised of obstacles
which justify reconsideration of a decision.
:{-20
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One of the criticisms of the Air Coordinating Committee is
that it has, on occasion, failed to implement its decisions.
Such criticism cannot appropriately be leveled against the
Committee for it neither has, nor should have, mandatory
powers over its member agencies. It is nonetheless true
that in the long run the standing and effectiveness of the Air
Coordinating Committee will be strongly influenced by the
seriousness with which participating agencies carry out
their roles in the implementation of the decisions in which
they take part. The most satisfactory approach would thus
seem to be for each agency to establish the internal proce-
dures required to advise appropriate officials of the Air
Coordinating Committee's decisions and to follow up on
actions taken pursuant thereto (Ref. 1, p. 26).
In general, then, the ACC was useful as a mechanism by which
representatives of various Federal agencies meet to debate
and, whenever possible, coordinate action on pressing
current problems (Halaby in the Harding Report, full text at
Appendix I).
As such, it successfully resolved many routine matters. It was also useful
for communicating to the top level of the Executive Branch a picture of policies
that participating federal agencies were prepared to propose and implement.
It was not useful in communicating problem issues to the top level, however.
If the Executive Office had wanted the ACC to perform this function, it should
have taken more positive steps to induce the ACC to surface the "important"
issues. It also should have become more involved in resolving some of these
issues so that the ACC could proceed. The ACC by its nature could not perform
alone other essentials of effective government action such as coordinated bud-
getary planning and a unified approach to Congress for appropriations. Evi-
dently, BOB did not completely fill the gap, either because of lack of interest
or resources or because member agencies did not present their budgets to BOB
in a form that made control possible (e. g., insufficient differentiation of bud-
getary line items, particularly in military budgets).
At any rate, rapid advancements in the number and speed of aircraft in
the postwar years made continuous and rapid improvement of the air facilities
system necessary. The ACC mechanism, with its slow progress of issues
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from lower to higher levels of committees, became less useful as this particular
problem became more acute. The ACC was unsuccessful in reorganizing itself
in ways that were within its power. Besides, it was unable to reorganize in any
way that would interfere with statutory responsibilities conferred by Congress
on individual members like the CAB. Thus the stage was set for the Harding
and Curtis Reports and the reorganization by Congress that followed.
MONITORING AND UPDATING
Monitoring Progress Toward Objectives
The agency liaison officers, together with individual agency representatives
to particular committees, were supposed to monitor progress toward objectives
embodied in ACC decisions. As critic N. E. Halaby pointed out in the Harding
Report, ACC groups often disbanded after writing reports and recommendations,
and did not continue to review progress and keep operational requirements up
to date (Appendix I, p. 32). The annual reports were also mechanisms for
reviewing progress of the ACC bodies and, to a lesser extent, progress of
agencies in implementing ACC decisions.
Updating Objectives
The entire four-level committee structure was the day-to-day mechanism
for revision of specific objectives. Review of policy objectives in their entirety
was largely induced by outside requests for special reports, such as the 1947
(Ref. 7) and 1954 (Ref. 4) presidential requests for statements of overall
national aviation policy.
Revision of Organizational Structure
There were at least two points at which review occurred: in 1954, when
ACC Chairman Murray asked BOB to evaluate the ACC organization (Ref. 1)
and in 1957, when the ACC prepared a Statement of Organization Functions and
Procedures (Ref. 2). The BOB Report of 1954 endorsed the basic goals,
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structure, and usefulness of the ACC but also made many recommendations for
improving it. (A complete set of the recommendations and the rationales for
them is in Appendix C.) There is evidence (Ref. 2) that the ACC attempted to
implement many of the recommendations that were directed toward it, including
the regularization of industry-ACC relations, the addition of a management
committee (which ACC called the Executive Council instead), the addition of the
FCC as a full member, and the strengthening of machinery to encourage individ-
ual agencies to consult the ACC before making irreversible program and hard-
ware commitments (Ref. 2, p. 23). On the other hand, fewer recommendations
directed at the member agencies were adopted. For example, the Post Office
was unwilling to remove itself from full membership, unnecessary memberships
on committees continued, and ACC time was still burdened with bilateral matters
between agencies that could have been settled elsewhere. Also, no Executive
Order revising the charter of the ACC was issued.
REFERENCES
1. U. S. Bureau of the Budget, Survey of the Air Coordinating Committee,
Washington, D.C., Bureau of the Budget, 1954.
2. U. S. Air Coordinating Committee, Statement of Organization Functions
and Procedures, Washington, D.C., Air Coordinating Committee,
October 1957.
3. U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Air Coordinating Committee,
1947, 80th Cong., 2nd. Sess., House Document 524, 1948.
4. U. S. Air Coordinating Committee, Civil Air Policy, Washington, D. C.,
Air Coordinating Committee, May 1954.
5. U. S. Air Coordinating Committee, Annual Report to the President,
1959. Washington, D.C., Air Coordinating Committee, January 31,
1960.
6. U. S. Air Coordinating Committee, Eighth Annual Report to the Presi-
dent of the United States. 1953. Washington, D.C., Air Coordinating
Committee, 1954.
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7. U.S. Air Coordinating Committee, A Statement of Certain Policies of
the Executive Branch of the Government in the General Field of Avia-
tion. Aug. 1, 1947, Washington, D. C., USGPO, 1947.
8. Cherington, Paul W., "Memorandum on Government Organization for
Civil Aviation," in Aviation Advisory Commission staff and consultants,
The Long Range Needs of Aviation, Technical Annex to the Report of
the Aviation Advisory Commission, January 1973, Vol. I, pp. 1-507
to 1-531. (Attached as Appendix Q.)
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE COUNCIL (NASC)—1958-1973
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
Established by the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (July 29,
1958: 72 Stat. 427; 42 U. S. C. 2471)
Preauthorization History
In the context of the space race with the U. S. S.R., a lead agency was
being sought to put the U.S. into space. The agency chosen was an offshoot of
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), which, since 1915,
had conducted research and played an advisory and coordinating role for national
aviation research and development. The old NACA became the new NASA, a
line agency with a mission in space. The NASC, which was created by the
same act that established NASA, was supposed to take over the old NACA advis-
ory role. It was first envisaged that the NASC (in initial legislation termed
a board instead of a council) would be organized along the lines of the NACA
(see section on NACA, Ref. 1). But the NASC that emerged was a cabinet-
level committee chaired by the President (later the Vice President) with a
sweeping mandate to coordinate "aeronautical and space activities by Federal
Agencies" (Ref. 2).
Outline History
• Created 1958
• Amended (Vice President instead of
the President to be Chairman) 1961
• Secretary of Transportation made 1970
a member
• Abolished by Presidential reorganization, 1973
imposed by Congress
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OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
The objectives of the NASC were spelled out in Section 201 of the National
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958:
(d) It shall be the function of the Council to advise the
President with respect to the performance of the duties
prescribed in subsection (e) of this section.
(e) In conformity with the provisions of section 102 of this
Act, it shall be the duty of the President to—
(1) survey all significant aeronautical and space activities,
including policies, plans, programs, and accomplishments
of all agencies of the United States engaged in such
activities;
(2) develop a comprehensive program of aeronautical and
space activities to be conducted by agencies of the United
States;
(3) designate and fix responsibility for the direction of
major aeronautical and space activities;
(4) provide for effective cooperation between the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department
of Defense in all such activities, and specify which of
such activities may be carried on concurrently by both
such agencies notwithstanding the assignment of primary
responsibility therefore to one or the other of such
agencies; and
(5) resolve differences arising among departments and
agencies of the United States with respect to aeronautical
and space activities under this Act, including differences
as to whether a particular project is an aeronautical and
space activity (Ref. 2, p. 3).
Despite this broad mandate, NASC proved more active in space-related ques-
tions than in aeronautical affairs. Between 1968 and 1970, NASC, encouraged by
Congress, reformulated its specific objectives to play a larger role in aeronauti-
cal policy affairs, specifically by identifying research gaps detrimental to aviation
and by playing a coordinating role between the agencies to assist in filling the gaps
(Ref. 5., pp. 29-31).
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Membership
The members of the NASC were to be:
• The President of the United States (after 1961, the Vice President)
• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense
• The Administrator of NASA
• The Chairman of the AEC/Director of National Science Foundation
• One other member from a federal department or agency
• Three individuals from private life, eminent in "engineering, tech-
nology, education, administration or public affairs"
• After 1973, the Secretary of Transportation.
Activities
Annual budgets stabilized at about half a million dollars ($500,000 for FY
'64; $480,000 for FY '73).
The main focus of the NASC was to coordinate the efforts of all federal
agencies with respect to U.S. goals in space and aeronautics. However, meet-
ings proved to be infrequent because membership was made up of such high-
level officials. In 1960 abolishment of NASC was proposed. But it remained,
largely because alternative plans under consideration by Congress were dis-
carded for one reason or another (Ref. 3). In 1961, on the recommendation
of President Kennedy, an Act of Congress made the Vice President chairman
of NASC.
After the creation of the Department of Transportation in 1967, DOT
representatives participated in NASC meetings until DOT was made a full
member in 1970.
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Staff
NASC was housed in the Executive Office. The staff was small relative to
the size of the NASC mandate and had to depend on the support of other agencies
to do its work (Ref. 5, p. 30). The staff was headed by an executive director
(Mr. E. C. Welsh; after 1969, ex-astronaut William Anders). Staff expansion
coincided with advent of the CARD stridy, enabling NASC to establish liason
with the CARD group.
Use of Contractors
The published literature does not indicate use of contractors.
Relations with Other Groups
It was the primary function of NASC to interact with other federal agency
groups. Relations with industry were evidently minimal until the 1969 expansion
of staff. One CARD Study recommendation was the increased use of NASC as
an interface with industry, presumably in the style of the old NACA (Ref. 6,
pp. 6-9).
Relations with Congress included annual testimony at appropriations time
and, from 1968 on, almost continual encouragement from the sympathetic House
Committee on Science and Astronautics to play a larger role in coordinating
aviation research and development (Ref. 5, pp. 24-31).
OUTPUTS
The primary output required of the NASC was furnishing advice to the
President (later, the Vice President) when asked.
Until the mid-1960's other NASC outputs apparently consisted of providing
a forum for exchange of information about space programs, and disseminating
to the public information about them, various Executive reports on space policy
projections were also produced.
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After 1967-68, NASC staff provided some advice on the conduct of the
CARD Study (Civil Aviation Research and Development) initiated in August 1968
by interagency agreement between NASA and DOT. The subject matter of
CARD was precisely the area in which NASC had newly formulated interests
(as previously mentioned under the heading Formulation of Objectives). With
regard to this study, NASC saw its contributions as twofold:
1. To monitor to identify gaps in the subject outline while the study was
going forward;
2. Together with DOT and BOB, to "consider the appropriate level of
federal government involvement in aeronautical R & D" (Ref. 5, pp. 40-41).
IMPACT
As time went on, despite its expanded aeronautical role after 1969, NASC
did not have the reputation of playing an influential role in formulating national
policy, even on space matters. As P. W. Charington, an official of DOT
during the period, put it in 1972:
In point of fact the Space Council, which is chaired by the
Vice President and has a small staff of its own, appears to
have been only moderately active in recent years. It has
become largely an information exchange on the space program
and a public relations vehicle (for space shots and the like),
rather than a focal point for major policy coordination and
decision-making, en route to the President (Ref. 4, p. 1-529).
Although the CARD Study recommended that NASC be strengthened and used
more for coordination in the future, the CARD Study organization roster does
not suggest that NASC staff played an overt role in shaping or influencing the
study itself (Ref. 6, pp. II-3 to 11-11).
NASC was abolished by President Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
1973, effective July 1973. The reason advanced for its abolition was that the
urgent need for NASC to advise the President on space matters no longer
existed.
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The NASC may have served a useful purpose vis-a-vis space problems,
but its mandate in the area of aeronautics was ignored and its potential for
playing a strong coordination role in achieving a unified national aviation policy
was never fulfilled.
MONITORING AND UPDATING OF ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND
OPERATIONS
Monitoring Progress Toward Objectives
Congress provided some monitoring of NASC from time to time (Ref. 3, 5).
Updating Objectives
As mentioned previously, the objectives of NASC were reviewed by Congress
in the 1967-1970 period and NASC set itself the goal of taking a larger role in
coordinating federal aeronautical research and development.
Revision of Organizational Structure
Revision occurred once in 1960, when Congress passed legislation making
the Vice President instead of the President the chairman of NASC.
REFERENCES
1. U. S. Congress, House, The National Space Program Report of
the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration.
House Report 1758, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 21, 1958.
2. U. S. Congress, House, National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.
House Report 2166, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 15, 1958.
3. U. S. Congress, House, National Aeronautics and Space Act Amend-
ment of 1958, House Report 1688, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 19, 1960.
4. Cherington, Paul W., "Memorandum on Government Organization for
Civil Aviation," in Aviation Advisory Commission staff and consultants,
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The Long Range Needs of Aviation. Technical Annex to the Report of
the Aviation Advisory Commission. January 1973, Vol. I, pp. 1-507
to 531.
5. U. S. Congress, House, Issues and Directions for Aeronautical
Research and Development. Report of the Subcommittee on Advanced
Research and Technology of the Committee on Science and Astronautics,
U. S. House of Representatives, House Report 91-932, 91st Cong.,
2ndSess., March 23, 1970.
6. U. S. Department of Transportation and National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, Civil Aviation Research and Development Policy
Study, DOT TST-10-4 and NASA SP-265, Washington, D. C., March 1971.
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AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS COORDINATING BOARD (AACB)-1960
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
Established in 1960 by an administrative agreement between NASA and
DOD in July 1960. This eliminated the need for a section in a House bill
(H.R. 2049) then pending (Ref. 4).
Preauthorization History
The specific institution established in 1958 for coordinating aeronautical
and space research and development activities of NASA and DOD was the
Civilian-Military Liaison Committee (CMLC). Although some effective NASA/
DOD coordination was occurring informally, the CMLC had not worked as an
institution, and the AACB was created in its place. In fact, the AACB institu-
tionalized the informal coordination machinery that had evolved (Ref. 3, p. 171).
OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
The main goal was to ensure that NASA and DOD continued to "advise and
consult and keep each other fully informed with respect to space activities and
related research and development within their respective jurisdictions. "
Specifically, the AACB was responsible for:
• Avoiding undesirable duplication
• Coordinating activities of common interest
• Identifying problems requiring joint solution
• Exchanging information.
Membership
As it was established, the Deputy Administrator of NASA and Director of
Defense Research and Engineering co-chaired the Board.
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Activities
The AACB was a managerial type of joint NASA/DOD coordinating board,
following a formerly successful pattern already practiced by the two agencies.
Because the AACB followed the unsuccessful CMLC, great care was taken in
designing its method of operation. The CMLC had suffered from being a third
party organization with an independent chairman who evidently had no power
base of his own in either organization. Moreover, some branches of the mili-
tary service were unhappy because they were not directly represented and
because the duties of the CMLC were not defined specifically enough.
Before making its decision in regard to the Board, the
Committee considered several alternatives, including the
establishment of a Military Applications Division within
NASA similar to the structure within the Atomic Energy
Commission. There appeared to be sufficient differences,
however, between NASA's operations and those of the AEC
to make such an arrangement impractical. Corollary
thought was given to a statutory requirement that NASA and
the Department of Defense each establish a panel of techni-
cal experts to be permanently assigned to the other agency
and to operate under the general supervision of the Board,
thereby accomplishing some of the desirable effects of the
Military Applications Division-type organizational struct-
ure. This idea was not pressed because both NASA and the
Defense Department felt it would be unwise to establish
such reciprocal panels on a permanent basis, and because
the Committee desired to afford the greatest opportunity to
responsible officials of both agencies to develop satisfac-
tory interrelationships unemcumbered by too much legisla-
tive detail.
Testimony provided the committee indicates that coordina-
tion of the kind contemplated for the Board is now being
undertaken informally, and with general effectiveness, by
the two agencies. Nevertheless, the bill is designed to
insure that the mechanism of coordination and the responsi-
bilities of the Board be formalized. It is intended that
within its proper sphere the Board be a policy and decision-
making body, with working groups operating under its
supervision.
As established by the bill, the Board would operate under
the direction of officers who have managerial functions and
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immediate authority to make decisions and get things done.
Thus, it is expected that the Board, with the assistance of
its working groups, can cut delay, red tape, and duplica-
tion of effort to a minimum. The more specific duties
imposed on the Board, together with the avoidance of the
'third party' status which has plagued the CMLC, should
make the new concept more effective (Ref. 1, p. 6).
The AACB meets regularly—in 1973, for example, it met four times. In
September 1972, the AACB was co-chaired by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.,
Director of Defense Research Engineering, and Dr. George M. Low, Deputy
Administrator of NASA. Besides the Board itself, which is concerned with the
broad spectrum of DOD/NASA interaction, there are two panels that are con-
cerned with aeronautics:
• Aeronautical Vehicle Panel
• Supporting Research and Technology Panel
The AACB is not the only DOD/NASA channel. In addition to it, one option
earlier considered and rejected by Congress—Military Aircraft Programs
Office within NASA—was established to serve as a focal point for NASA programs
directly supporting military efforts. Also, DOD technical advisory councils
use NASA personnel, and vice versa.
Coordination activities of AACB range from joint testing or development
projects to joint planning of new facilities. On joint projects coordinated by
the AACB there is no set pattern of contribution; on some projects NASA pro-
vided hardware and DOD funds, on others the converse was true. No particular
effort is made to keep a detailed set of accounting books for relative contribu-
tions of the two agencies. DOT and FAA observer participants are invited to
AACB whenever interests overlap.
IMPACT
Two results of AACB efforts were cited before a Congressional Committee
in September 1972. First, the Army was using some NASA facilities instead
of building its own. Second, NASA and DOD had agreed on the three new major
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national test facilities to be built for use of DOD, NASA, industry, and others
(Ref. 2).
A further accomplishment of AACB was contributing to decisions on
development roles for the space shuttle (Ref. 5, p. 4-1).
The AACB gives the impression of being an effective coordinating body
(Ref. 6, p. 23). Perhaps coordination is facilitated by the availability of
resources, e.g., NASA has underutilized facilities to lend. Also, the two-
agency coordination is probably less difficult than multiagency coordination
would be.
MONITORING AND UPDATING
Feedback and revision of AACB apparently occurs in two ways.
First, it occurs through testimony before Congress, such as that con-
tained in the September 1972 Congressional review of the CARD Study (Ref. 2).
The approval or disapproval of an influential congressional committee carries
strong weight with agencies in the executive branch. In this instance, the
House Committee on Science and Astronautics approved of the AACB work. In
a previous instance, Congress abolished the AACB predecessor, CMLC.
Second, feedback is provided by advisory bodies of both DOD and NASA in
the areas of science, research, technology, etc.; this makes outside advice
available to the top people. And the institution can be modified by the two
agencies concerned either by asking Congress for legislation or simply by
adding parallel institutions, such as NASA's Military Aircraft Programs Office,
by administrative order.
However, except for the annual appropriations hearing ritual before
Congress, there is no regular institution for providing outside review or self-
review for an organization like the AACB.
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REFERENCES
1. U.S. Congress, House, National Aeronautics and Space Act Amendment
of 1958. House Report 1633, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., May 19, 1960.
2. U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Aeronautics and Space
Technology of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, Civil
Aviation Research and Development; Policies. Programs and
Problems. House Report, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., September 1972.
3. Rosholt, Robert L. , An Administrative History of NASA, 1958-1963.
Washington, B.C., NASA, 1966.
4. Aviation Daily. September 15, 1960, p. 84.
5. U.S. Department of Defense, "Statement by the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical
and Space Sciences, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, " (Statement by Dr.
Malcolm R. Currie).
6. U.S. Congress, House, Issues and Directions for Aeronautical
Research and Development. Report of the Subcommittee on Advanced
Research and Technology of the Committee on Science and Astronautics,
U. S. House of Representatives, House Report 91-932, 91st Cong.,
2nd sess. , March 23, 1970.
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INTERAGENCY GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL AVIATION (IGIA)-1960-Present
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
IGIA was established on December 9, 1960 by a formal interagency agree-
ment between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of State
(DOS), Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Defense (DOD), and
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). It was founded in accordance with a memo-
randum from the President dated August 11, 1960.
Preauthorization History
IGIA was created because of the Department of State's need for coordinated
recommendations from all federal agencies on international aviation matters
of substantial concern to the agencies. These recommendations were used by
the Department of State when formulating instructions for U.S. representatives
to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
Outline History
• Presidential memo August 11, 1960
• Interagency agreement December 9, 1960
• DOT assumes FAA's IGIA duties
per Executive Order 11332 November 1967
• EPA becomes full member 1973
OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
The objective of IGIA is to provide DOS with recommendations on inter-
national aviation matters (mostly ICAO) affecting two or more agencies in
addition to DOS.
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Membership
Permanent members are cabinet-level agencies: DOT (Chairman), DOS,
DOD, DOC, CAB, and EPA. In addition, other agencies may become ad hoc
members with full privileges when matters of substantial concern to them are
considered. All representatives to IGIA must be policy-level officials. Other
agencies who have designated their ad hoc representatives include OMB,
Department of the Treasury, HEW, Agriculture, Post Office, Justice, FCC,
and NASA.
Activities
The budget of IGIA is included in the budget of the Office of International
Aviation Affairs (OIAA) of DOT.
Incoming case material may come from other federal agencies or from
U.S. representatives to ICAO and its regional organizations. The IGIA Secre-
tariat designates the action agency, gives it the case material, and provides
information copies of the material to member agencies. The action agency
consults with all interested agencies as well, as industry and prepares draft
United States Position Papers for the IGIA Secretariat. The Secretariat repro-
duces and distributes the drafts to IGIA member agencies for approval with a
Request for Approval or Comment. Normally, drafts are approved by this
informal action procedure. In cases in which it becomes apparent that there
is a major divergence of opinion, the Secretariat arranges, with the IGIA
Chairman, for a meeting to consider the case further. The Secretary of State
is furnished with the agreed-upon IGIA recommendations, together with any
dissenting views a substantially affected agency may wish to have transmitted.
The many and diverse functional areas of international aviation for which fed-
eral policy is thus coordinated include accident investigation, charts, aircraft
airworthiness, communications, air traffic control, navigation, meterology,
facilities, flight rules, and user charges. The IGIA/ICAO actions most directly
related to noise to date were (1) the adoption by ICAO of a modified form of
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the U. S. FAR 36 regulation for certificating noise emissions of new types of
aircraft (the aircraft airworthiness functional area), and (2) the consideration
of an ICAO proposal that new propeller-driven aircraft be noise-certificated.
Working-level personnel represent their agencies in the various functional areas.
Staff
The secretarial staff includes a committee director as well as a principal
staff officer.
Use of Contractors
Contractors are not used.
Relations with Other Groups
Relations with industry are primarily between the designated action agency
for a particular case and the industries affected. The action agency must
record in its drafts any dissenting views of a substantially affected industry
group. When the action agency authorizes it, the Secretariat will circulate
IGIA documentation directly to industry for its information. Industry may par-
ticipate in IGIA meetings only in exceptional cases, by invitation from the IGIA
Chairman, as an observer without a vote. Relations with state and local
governments, to the extent that they exist, presumably are handled in the same
way as relations with industry.
OUTPUTS
Outputs of IGIA are in the form of recommendations to the Secretary of
State and documentation associated with the preparation of recommendations.
When there is no disagreement, the recommendations are in the form of IGIA
Final Action Papers. When there is disagreement, the Final Action Paper is
issued after the Secretary of State's decision. The IGIA Secretariat also pro-
duces and sends directly to U.S. ICAO representatives communications of a
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factual (not policy) nature. Papers distributed by the Secretariat to its members
for approval or comment are termed IGIA Papers. Materials circulated in
draft form by the action agency prior to presentation to the 1G1A Secretariat
are called Agency Papers.
There is an elaborate number system for IGIA documentation. The basic
document for IGIA organization is IGIA O/1A, "Membership-Organization and
Procedures of the Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA). "
IMPACT
IGIA provides policy guidance to ensure that the United States speaks with
a single voice at international aviation forums.
MONITORING PROGRESS TOWARD OBJECTIVES
IGIA obtains feedback on what happens to its recommendations in the form
of reports of U. S. Delegations to ICAO meetings. These reports are submitted
to the Secretary of State within 30 days after the close of an international
meeting, and also to IGIA, where they are circulated with a covering IGIA paper
for approval or comment.
REFERENCES
1. IGIA Summary Fact Sheet, April 2, 1970.
2. IGIA, "Membership-Organization and Procedures of the
Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA)," IGIA
O/1A Revision No. 4, September 15, 1969.
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FEDERAL AIRCRAFT NOISE ALLEVIATION PROGRAM (OST's Program
Evaluation and Development Committee (PEDC))— 1966-1967
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
Created by OST in cooperation with FAA, NASA, and HUD in response to
a directive in the Presidential transportation message of March 2, 1966. DOC
became involved shortly after.
Preauthorization History
The aircraft noise problem had existed for some time. Several factors
helped make it more visible at this time:
1. Increased acuteness of the problem because of more widespread use
of jets.
2. Persistent pressure from certain members of Congress.
3. Entree to the President through high-level staff members of the Office
of Science and Technology who were sensitive to the problem (Ref. 3).
Outline History
One-day seminar of government and industry October 1965
aviation and noise experts (The Jet Aircraft
Noise Panel)
Presidential transportation message March 2, 1966
OST Report, Alleviation of Jet Aircraft Noise March 17, 1966
Near Airports. (The "Green Book")
Formation of PEDC, Policy Committee, Spring 1966
Management Committee (Federal Aircraft
Noise Alleviation Program)
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Creation of four PEDC subcommittees at sixth April 19, 1967
PEDC meeting
Report of PEDC subcommittees on updating and July 3, 1967
improving Federal Aircraft Noise Abatement
Program
Transfer of direction from OST to newly Fall 1967
created DOT
OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
Conclusions and recommendations of the March 1966 OST report set the
following objectives:
1. The federal aircraft noise alleviation program will provide for:
a. Systematically developing and analyzing alternative
solutions to the aircraft-community noise problem;
b. Establishing a rationale for selecting a "best" solution;
c. Achieving an equitable allocation of costs;
d. Establishing Federal financial assistance programs
where necessary and appropriate; and
e. Establishing a functional organization responsible for
analyzing, selecting, and implementing preferred
solutions in accordance with a time-phased plan
(Ref. 2).
These objectives were to be met in a way consistent with the following
general understanding ot the problem and general form of the solution:
1. The problem is one of conflict between two groups—the
producers of air transportation services and those people
living and working in communities near airports. A con-
flict exists because social and economic costs resulting
from aircraft noise are being imposed upon certain land
users in the vicinity of airports for which no direct benefits
are received.
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2. The most rational approach to resolving the conflict is to
reduce the adverse effect of noise to the lowest practicable
level, and to ensure that incurred costs are allocated in the
most equitable and expeditious way possible, and to reduce
such costs to a minimum.
3. Solutions to the noise problem should be planned and imple-
mented with a minimum of Federal Government control and
a maximum utilization of the resources available to the free
enterprise system (Ref. 2).
Dr. Donald Hornig of OST later reported to the President:
Your Transportation Message of March 2, 1966 directed
me to work with the Administrators of the Federal Aviation
Agency (FAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), and the Secretaries of the Depart-
ment of Commerce (DOC) and of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), to frame an action program
aimed at alleviating the problems of aircraft noise in the
vicinity of our Nation's airports. I am pleased to report
that a comprehensive program was agreed to on April 29,
1966, and that the participating agencies are working
actively to implement its several objectives (Ref. 4,
p. 527).
Activities, Staff Contractors
Three governmental committees were established to provide policy
guidance, industry advise, and means for ensuring interagency cooperation:
1. Policy Committee, composed of heads of participating federal agencies
and departments,
2. Program Evaluation and Development Committee (PEDC), composed
of representatives of Policy Committee members, with industry
experts participating in an advisory capacity,
3. The Management Committee, composed of representatives of participa-
ting federal agencies responsible for day-to-day conduct of the
program.
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The PFDC, under OST, met periodically to review progress, secure
industry advice and cooperation, and recommend actions to the Management
Committee (Figure 4).
Thus, the PEDC was the coordinating body for information and the develop-
ment of recommendations; the Management Committee was the interagency
coordinating body for implementing programs. The PEDC was a government/
industry body. The Management Committee membership was 100 percent
government officials. The Management Committee was chaired by and housed
in the FA A.
Administrative costs and expenses were paid by OST. Staff was provided
by OST as well as by member agencies. Some contract work, paid for by
member agencies (e.g., FAA), was used by the PEDC and the other committees.
Such FAA contractors included Bolt, Beranek and Newman (NEFs for 1965,
1970, and 1974; August 1967) and University of California at Berkeley (Paul
Dygert studies, February 1967). There does not appear to have been any contract
work done directly for the PEDC or the other committees and paid for by OST
funds. Work initiated by NASA included the 2-year Tracer study.
Relations with other Groups
Relations with industry were handled through the PEDC. In fact, industry
advisors participated in PEDC as equals, and a caveat in the basic terms of
reference (No. 3 in general problem statement) stated that solutions should
involve a minimum of government control and a maximum use of the free
enterprise system. The objective, which derived naturally from the original
OST approach, was to bring key government and industry people together in a
completely off-the-record environment in order to arrive at a general approach
acceptable to all parties. The persistence of this tone ensured that later parts
(recommendations) of the PEDC would be pre-coordinated with industry interests
and viewpoints.
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POLICY COMMITTEE
(AGENCY/DEPT HEADS)
OST
FAA. NASA. DOC. HUD
1 1
PROGRAM EVALUATION
& DIRECTION INDUSTRY
OST (CHAIR) PARTICIPANTS
FAA. NASA. DOC.
-------
Relations with Congress, ond state and local governments, if any, were
not reflected in the formal organization.
Relationships with federal agencies were handled simultaneously at different
levels by different committees.
OUTPUTS
The original March 1966 OST Report made 10 recommendations (accord-
ing to Ref. 3):
1. Develop an analysis of noise problems, including formulation of trends
at the local airport level (to assist airport operators and communities
in coping. . .)
2. Develop a partial alleviation program for use at the local airport level.
3. Decide how additional coats are to be allocated among aircraft manu-
facturers, airlines, airport operators, aviation users, etc.
4. Develop better measurement methods (physical, acoustical, psycho-
acoustic, sociological).
5. Reduce engine noise as both a remedial and a prevent at ive measure.
6. Develop quieter landing procedures.
7. Develop quieter take-off procedures.
8. Find a coordinated federal program that would stimulate compatible
land use at the local level.
9. (additional recommendation) Evaluate alleviation through the insulation
of houses.
10. (additional recommendation) Introduce legislation for aircraft noise
certification.
In the year that followed, various member agencies were encouraged to
undertake numerous research, demonstration, and test programs as a response
to the various recommendations.
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A PEDC self-study took place between April and June 1967; the result was
the report (Ref. 2) of July 1967, which suggested "re-emphasizing certain
aspects of the program and re-orienting others." The "work plan" that stemmed
from the report appears as Appendix D. It does not seem to have made any
radical changes in the recommendations; it restates the original recommen-
dations, and may be interpreted as giving priority to three specific programs
(3a. ". . . the earliest practicable date."):
1. Establishment of noise abatement flight procedures at noise-sensitive
airports.
2. Establishment of a retrofit program using immediately available state-
of-the-art technology.
3. Modification of federal aid programs to reward communities developing
effective, compatible land use plans near airports.
IMPACT
While it could be maintained that certain federal actions that occurred later
would have happened anyway, there is little doubt that the flurry of activity
stimulated within the executive branch by the PEDC and the other committees
accelerated these actions. Appendix E contains a summary of part of a status
report (Ref. 2) issued by DOT in April 1968, not long after DOT had taken
direction of the whole effort.
Legislation, Regulations, Executive Orders
Legislation was introduced by the Administration for noise certification of
certain new types of aircraft:
1966: S.359/H.R. 16171 89th Congress/no action
1967: S. 707/H.R. 3400 90th Congress/amended
version became law
3-49
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This legislation became P.L. 90-411 in accordance with FAR Part 36, issued
by FAA, which became effective in December 1969.
New Organizations
FANAP became IANAP within DOT (see page 3-53 of this report).
Coordination of Federal Agency Activities
Studies and projects responsive to the ID recommendations of the OST Re-
port were initiated by various member agencies. The ID recommendations
were:
Work Started/Result
NEF studies at 25 airports.
Pilot projects at JFK, O'Hare, and LAX (Los
Angeles International Airport).
Conclusions of Dygert Study and FAA Report 67/WA-
1650 of 1967: Federal noise abatement grants to
local governments "should be recovered from the
aviation industry—in effect from the air travelers
and shippers. Such a cost solution would not signi-
ficantly retard the growth of civil aviation."
Methodology for certification extensively developed
by NASA and FAA.
Numerous contracts to the industry for research
or noise reduction, including nacelle acoustic
treatment, NASA Quiet Engine, compressor noise
reduction, etc.
Recommendation No.
1
2
3-50
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Recommendation No. Work Started/Result
6 Two-segment approaches tested including FAA-
developed on-board guidance computer for VFR
conditions. NASA continued tests of six-degree
glide slope.
7 FAA developed and tested a noise abatement take-
off profile for four-engine aircraft. "There does
not appear to be any constraint that will prohibit
implementation of this program" (Ref. 3).
8 Survey of federal agencies organized by HUD showed
that over 70 federal programs might be used to
give federal leverage on local land use near airports,
but that total existing leverage would be slight.
9 Start of HUD-FAA coordination at regional level:
Urban Planning Assistance Program and Open-
Space Land Program.
9 Noise insulation of houses study prepared by FHA.
10 Noise certification of new'aircraft types: FAA
government-industry dialogue (the "Blatt letter" of
Sept. 1966), ad hoc working groups worked to re-
fine concept. Sixth and final draft finished in Feb.
1968.
The PEDC succeeded in getting things moving. Together with the Manage-
ment Committee it helped initiate many new research projects. However, except
in the case of the aircraft-type certification for noise (far from the most emphasized
3-51
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of the original objectives), the Management Committee was much less success-
ful in getting its member agencies (e. g., the FAA) to implement abatement
programs such as the three priority programs recommended by PEDC in July
(see Outputs). The addition of a "research" objective in the April 1968 Status
Report is symptomatic of a shift of the program's focus away from programs
and toward research studies during and after its move to DOT. For example,
one PEDC objective—development of a cost allocation rationale—seemed nearly
complete by the end of 1967. But the next logical step—applying it to specific
legislative and regulatory proposals—was never taken.
MONITORING AND UPDATING
As mentioned earlier, a mid-term self-study review of progress made
toward objectives was done by PEDC in July 1967 (Ref. 2). In summary, it
proposed specialized subcommittees for PEDC (see Appendix F) and that "the
present Management Committee be strengthened at the earliest possible time."
The Federal Noise Alleviation Program moved from OST to become a per-
manent program under DOT chairmanship in Fall 1967. Combined with the
Sonci Boom Panel, which was also transferred from OST, the program was
renamed LANAP—Interagency Aircraft Noise Abatement Program.
As mentioned abpve, the Office of Noise Abatement created within DOT to
handle IANAP issued an April 1968 Status Report, which is excerpted as
Appendix E. The report monitors progress toward the original OST objectives
and updates those objectives. Worthy of attention is the addition of an objective
attributed to the March 1966 OST report: coordination of research programs.
3-52
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REFERENCES
1. Stevenson, Gordon M., Jr., The Politics of Airport Noise. Belmont,
Calif., Duxbury Press, 1972.
2. U.S. Congress, Recommendations for Updating and Improving the
Federal Aircraft Noise Alleviation Program (Executive Summary).
Report of the Subcommittees of the Program Evaluation and Develop-
ment Committee, July 3, 1967.
3. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Noise Abatement, Summary
Status Report. Federal Aircraft Noise Abatement Program. April 1,
1968.
4. U.S. President, Memorandum to Heads of Departments and Agencies,
With the Report of the Science Advisor to the President, "Aircraft Noise
and Land Use Near Airports," March 22, 1967.
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INTERAGENCY AIRCRAFT NOISE ABATEMENT PROGRAM
IANAP-1968-1973
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
Established administratively by DOT as successor to the Federal Aircraft
Noise Alleviation Program (FANAP) and the Sonic Boom Panel, both of which
were transferred from OST to DOT in Fall 1967 by mutual agreement (Ref. 17
and 28) Specific authority for IANAP, cited by DOT, was the presidential
directive that founded PANAP (Ref. 33).
Preauthorization History
The Department of Transportation Act of October 15, 1966 (80 Stst. 931;
49 U. S. C. 1651 note) was the broad authority under which DOT organized its
Office of Noise Abatement and took over the coordination of federal activity
in the field of aircraft noise abatement. However, the extent of that authority
was not clear, and it was a matter of "intense controversy" at the outset
(Ref. 27).
Outline History
• DOT established April 1, 1967
• OST's FANAP and Sonic Boom Panel
transferred to DOT (Ref. 33) August 25, 1967
• Combined program reorganized and
renamed IANAP Early 1968
• IANAP "Summary Status Report ..."
issued for former FANAP Activities
and ongoing IANAP activities (Ref. 10) April 1, 1968
.l-fifi
-------
• Joint NASA/DOT Office of Noise Abate-
ment (JONA) formed. Head of JONA
continued as Chairman of IANAP Coordi-
nating Committee August 1971
• IANAP administratively terminated by
DOT. Legislation required the termina-
tion of all committees by the end of 1972,
unless covered by an Executive Order) April 23, 1973
OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
The objectives were the same as for FANAP, with the March 1966 OST
report cited as the source. The only difference was the addition of an explicit
"coordinate research" plank that was implicit in the FANAP (PEDC) statement
of its objectives (Ref. 10, pp. 2-3).
Membership
Membership and organization of IANAP (or at least all but the sonic boom
part) as it was inherited from OST is shown in Figure 4. The early organiza-
tion of IANAP under DOT is shown in Figure 5. As can be seen, the main dif-
ferences were that membership gradually expanded (DOD, CAB, etc., were
brought in) and the four PEDC subcommittees were expanded to eight IANAP
panels. Also, PEDC and the Management Committee were merged into the
IANAP Coordination Committee, and the Policy Committee became the IANAP
Advisory Committee with the same basic function: to resolve, at a higher level,
policy problems beyond the competence of the working level Coordination Com-
mittee members. Like the previous Policy Committee, it was little used.
Total IANAP membership at a typical point in time is shown in Appendix G.
The strong relationship with industry that developed in the PEDC continued
unchanged in the IANAP panels right up to the end of IANAP. The panel meetings
3-5R
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SECRETARY. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
DOT-OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
OST-OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
MAS-NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
MEMBERS DOT. FAA.OST, DOD.DOI.DOC.
HUD. HEW. NAS. AND NASA
CO
CJI
COORDINATION COMMITTEE
MEMBERS DOT CHAIRMAN. FAA. HUD. DOI. NASA. OST
HEW. DOC. DOD. CAB. EACH PANEL CHAIRMAN
AND NON-GOVERNMENT MEMBERS
NOISE RESEARCH PANEL
NASA CHAIRMAN
SONIC BOOM RESEARCH PANEL
NASA CHAIRMAN
LAND USE/AIRPORTS PANEL
HUD CHAIRMAN
OPERATIONS PANEL
FAA CHAIRMAN
HUMAN RESPONSE PANEL
DOD CHAIRMAN
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT PANEL
DOI CHAIRMAN
LEGISLATIVE/LEGAL PANEL
DOT CHAIRMAN
STRUCTURES PANEL
HUD CHAIRMAN
SOURCE US DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
FIRST FEDERAL AIRCRAFT NOISE ABATEMENT PLAN-FY 1969-1970 NOV. 1969
Figure 5. Organization Structure of Interagency Aircraft Noise Abatement Program, 1968
-------
were sessions at which industry reported to a broader government audience
their work conducted under contract or in-house.
Appendix G shows that in early 1972 there were 25 members on the Coordi-
nating Committee, representing 13 different federal departments or agencies.
Participating in the Coordinating Committee meetings were the top people from
the 11 leading aviation industry groups.
Eight panels were set up in 1968. A proposed reorganization between
1972 and 1973 would have eliminated, or combined with another panel, the
activities of the Legislative/Legal Panel, Operations Panel, and Natural En-
vironment Panel.
In 1972 the composition of the panels was as follows:
Panel
Human Response
Land Use/ Airports
Legislative/Legal
Natural Environment
Noise Research
Operations
Sonic Boom
Structures
Members
(Fed. govt.
employees)
9
5
5
9
11
7
9
8
Advisors
(Industry &
other nongovt. )
7
10
3
0
8
8
6
4
Other
(Some fed. employ-
ees, some not)
2
3
It can be seen that nonfederal participation varied from panel to panel.
The degree to which the member vs. advisor distinction was formalized in
documentation also varied. Some individuals participated in more than one
panel.
Some panels met more frequently than others. In fact, it seems clear
that all aspects of the panels, including membership and operations, were
affected to a large degree by inclinations, abilities, and resources of the panel
3-58
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chairmen. However, it was common practice for member agencies, or their
contractors, to present the results and recommendations of specific research
projects, often using audio-visual aids. All participants could get copies of
materials used at the presentations, together with a short summary report of
the actual meeting agenda. The work of compiling, reproducing, and distrib-
uting these handouts was done either by the DOT/ONA staff or by the staff of
the panel chairman's agency. The meeting summaries, which were done by
the panel chairmen, recommended future research and development needed to
fill technology gaps and included a brief overview of member and advisor noise-
related activities.
The Coordinating Committee met to hear summary reports by panel
chairmen concerning the activities of their panels. Once a year the Coordi-
nating Committee issued a report based on the summaries submitted by all
IANAP panels, describing the aircraft noise related programs of various mem-
ber agencies. This report was published as the "National Federal Aircraft
Noise Abatement Program" (Ref 12-15). According to its terms of reference,
the Coordinating Committee was to review recommendations and programs of
the functional panels, endorsing, rejecting, or suggesting modifications in
these recommendations, as well as "developing common policy recommenda-
tions, establishing priorities and schedules leading to total program integra-
tion" (Ref 26, pp. 1-2). Recommendations were to be reached by agreement
of all members whose agencies would be parties to actions taken under the
recommendation, and in cases of lack of agreement, the matter was to be
referred to the Advisory Committee for action (Ref. 26, pp. 3-4). However,
a survey of the meeting minutes shows that while reports were heard and dis-
cussed, the process did not in practice extend to voting on recommendations or
bringing in the Advisory Committee (Ref. 20-25).
The budget of IANAP was that portion of the DOT/ONA budget given for
administrative support of IANAP. The time and expenses of all participants,
members, or advisors were paid for by their parent organizations. The actual
projects and programs discussed at IANAP meetings were those of the member
agencies, and they were completely funded by these agencies.
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Staff
Staff support for the IANAP structure came from DOT/ONA. Staff support
for the panels came from the panel chairman's agency.
Use of Contractors
IANAP, as an organization, used no contractors.
Relations with Other Groups
Relations with various segments of the aviation industry were discussed in
the preceding sections: industry initially participated directly in IANAP at
every level, * which led to the diffusion of results of government-sponsored
research throughout industry.
IANAP itself had little direct .contact with Congress, except insofar as it
was mentioned in DOT/ONA or NASA testimony (e.g., Ref. 7, pp. 209-233:
"Statement of Charles A. Foster, Director, Office of Noise Abatement, Depart-
ment of Transportation").
There was some, but not much, state and local representation in IANAP.
The U. S. Council of Mayors was represented among the advisors to the Coordi-
nating Committee. About six advisors on the Land Use/Airport Panel repre-
sented local jurisdictions. One lawyer on the Legislative/Legal Panel was
from the New York Port Authority.
Any federal agency could send representatives to the Coordinating Committee
or to panels in which It had an interest. The scope of interest of various agencies
can be seen by inspection of Appendix G.
* Except that after two years the nongovernment advisors to the Advisory
Committee were eliminated (Ref. 34).
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OUTPUTS
IANAP outputs were as follows:
• From the panels:
- Meeting summaries and xeroxed materials presented and distributed
to all participants.
- Reports by panel chairmen to Coordinating Committee.
• From the Coordinating Committee—Review of draft of annual report.
"Federal Aircraft Noise Abatement Plan"
• From DOT/ONA:
- Drafting of the annual report, which summarized the research and
other programs done in the aircraft noise subject area by member
agencies, 'as reported by the representatives of those agencies who
participated in IANAP.
- General staff work, including details of a proposed expansion of the
subject scope of IANAP to include nonaircraft noise topics in its
framework (see Outline History and Monitoring and Updating).
IMPACT
The President had desired an "action program" to alleviate jet noise prob-
lems. This program included research to assess the problem and consideration
of various actions the federal government could take immediately to help solve
the problem, as well as the launching of research and development work on the
technology needed to produce longer-term solutions. By the time FANAP
terminated, the options had been developed and new research and development
was being started. The Secretary of Transportation assumed responsibility for
continuing both aspects of the program (Ref. 16, 17, 18).
With regard to the various available options for action, noise certification
was adopted through Congressional action, and IANAP activities continued to
support the detailed implementation of FAR 36 by FAA. But other options under
3-61
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active consideration by FANAP were more controversial, and these became
stalled in IANAP. These options included development of a financial plan for
allocating costs and establishment of noise abatement flight procedures, in-
cluding takeoff and landing (Ref. 18). An FAA advisory circular was prepared
recommending a new standardized climbout procedure, but observance of this
procedure by the airlines was not mandatory (Ref. 19, p. 2). Often the process
of formulating formal IANAP recommendations became stalled at the panel
level, never getting as far as the Coordinating Committee. For example, in
1970, when NASA was pointing out feasible changes in flight operations proce-
dures (Ref. 20, p. 2), the Operations Panel, chaired by an FAA representative,
could not agree on any recommendations to be forwarded to the Coordinating
Committee (Ref. 21, p. 4). In fact, there seemed to be some confusion at that
time about the role of the panels vis a vis the Coordinating Committee. The
minutes of one meeting suggest that programs planned in the panels were to be
presented to the Coordinating Committee for endorsement (Ref. 23, p. 1).
Other minutes suggest that the Coordinating Committee wished the Operations
Panel to report "in a positive fashion that certain operational procedures shall
be implemented" (Ref. 22, p. 3). (FAA, which had chairmanship of the Opera-
tions Panel, also had sole authority to promulgate recommendations in this
subject area.)
Another immediate action option was in the area of federal policy toward
land use near airports. Here, IANAP played a role in the conduct of the DOT/
HUD MANAPS studies of four airports, in accordance with Recommendation 8
of the original 1966 OST report.
The Boston-Logan study, one of the MANAPS series, had as its goal:
From the spectrum of possible land use controls and change,
alternative flight and ground handling procedures, and air-
port modifications, the Boston-Logan study will recommend
the preparation of alternative actions which can be taken to
provide immediate relief from aircraft noise exposure."
(Emphasis added.)
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This study had been completed before June 1969 (Ref. 36, p. 5) but had still
not been published in February 1970 (Ref. 35). More than a year after comple-
tion, and after extensive government review and revision, the IANAP Coordina-
ting Committee had not been able to endorse any study recommendations by
August 1970 (Ref. 23). Ultimately, HUD was to issue a policy guideline (Circu-
lar 1390. 2 on Noise Abatement and Control) in August 1971, which set minimum
noise quality standards to be met as a prerequisite for federal mortgage assis-
tance for residential property, including property near airports.
Thus as time passed, the Federal noise abatement activities with which
IANAP dealt became largely research and development activities.
To assess outputs, it is thus important to understand the type of federal
activities that IANAP dealt with and the IANAP understanding of coordination.
Like FANAP before it, IANAP was originally intended to coordinate a national
noise abatement program (Ref. 10, pp. 2-3), leading to immediate federal
actions. But federal activities were to be undertaken unilaterally by the various
member agencies, and coordination for IANAP did not and could not involve
direct influence over member agency research programs or control of agency
resources (Ref. 27, p. 1).
The highly useful functions IANAP could and did perform were its functions
of identifying technology gaps and of indicating what additional research needed
to be done. Some IANAP panels, such as the Noise Research Panel, were par-
ticularly valuable performing these functions, and NASA initiated programs
responsive to gaps noted by the various panels.
IANAP also functioned as an information clearing house, for government
agencies and industry. This knowledge may have caused certain agencies to
"precoordinate" by avoiding initial research in areas in which other agencies
had a strong on-going program. Alternatively, in cases in which two agencies
had strong but similar projects in progress, knowledge gained through IANAP
may have induced them to enter into sufficient bilateral coordination to ensure
that the projects were not unnecessarily duplicative—a situation looked on with
disfavor by BOB (OMB) or Capitol Hill.
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lANAP's lack of direct power probably facilitated this passive type of
coordination by encouraging more open communication of lANAP-sponsored
meetings.
In its 1972 testimony before Congress, when DOT/ONA presented a dia-
gram showing elements of a true national aircraft noise abatement program,
the progression was from "R&D," to "systems analysis," to "decisions" and
finally, to "implementation" (Ref. 7).
Quite clearly, despite 5 years of effort by IANAP and DOT/ONA, except
for certification of new aircraft types, the federal government had not succeeded
in getting beyond the R&D and system analysis elements to decisions and imple-
mentation. From the outset, IANAP and DOT/ONA were simply not organized
with clear enough authority, at a level high enough, to stimulate further federal
movements (Ref. 27).
MONITORING AND UPDATING
The annual IANAP reports were the closest approximation of monitoring
progress toward the research goals of various participating member agencies.
However, the reports did not constitute a mechanism for monitoring or updating
the goals of IANAP itself. As mentioned already, these reports were essen-
tially summaries of the current and projected research projects of the agencies
(Ref. 12-15).
The monitoring and updating of IANAP objectives that did occur were done
by DOT/ONA. At several points it was proposed that the scope of IANAP be
expanded. In 1969-70 there was discussion of the possibility of IANAP becoming
an "Interagency Committee on Noise Abatement," to work under a cabinet-level
environmental committee (Ref. 2, 5). In 1971, it was proposed to expand IANAP
to include surface transportation noise problems, an "Interagency Transporta-
tion Noise Abatement Program," (Ref. 25, p. 4). DOT/ONA supported both of
these proposals. These proposals would have expanded the scope of IANAP
interest without changing its basic method of operation, its orientation toward
research activities, or its information exchange function (Ref. 20, p. 1).
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These proposals were overtaken by events when the Council of Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ) and the Environment Projection Agency were created
and the cabinet-level committee was dissolved.
REFERENCES
1. "Milestones in Coordination of Federal Aircraft Noise Abatement
Programs," (DOT/ONA informal paper presented to EPA/ONAC
interagency review session), Fall 1973.
2. DOT/ONA, "Interagency Committee on Noise Abatement, " (working
paper outlining proposal structure), March 5, 1970.
3. Foster, Charles R., Chairman, IANAP Coordinating Committee,
"IANAP Organizational Structure," (memo to IANAP Panel Chairmen),
February 24, 1971.
4. Foster, Charles R., Chairman, IANAP Coordinating Committee,
Meeting of IANAP Coordinating Committee, Agenda Item No. 4,
(draft structure of an expanded IANAP), March 9, 1971.
5. Foster, Charles R., Director, DOT/ONA, "Interagency Committee
on Noise Abatement (ICNA)," (memo to the record, plus attachments
dated July 8, 1970), September 4, 1970.
6. Roudebush, W. H., NASA, "Minutes of the Noise Research Panel
Meeting at NASA Headquarters on December 6 and 7, 1972," (memo
from chairmen of panel to meeting participants), January 11, 1973.
7. U. S. House, Subcommittee on Aeronautics and Space Technology of
the Committee on Science and Astronautics, Hearings of January 18,
19, and 29, 1972 on Aeronautical Research and Development.:
8. Summary of Report of the Noise Research Panel, IANAP, March 22,
1968.
9. Summary of Noise Research Panel Meeting, IANAP, February 25,
1971.
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10. DOT/ONA, "Summary Status Report—Federal Aircraft Noise Abate-
ment Program," April 1, 1968.
11. PEDC Subcommittees, "(Executive Summary) Recommendations for
Updating and Improving the Federal Aircraft Noise Alleviation Program,"
July 3, 1967.
12. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, First
Federal Aircraft Noise Abatement Plan—FY 1969-70, November 1969.
13. U. S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, Second
Federal Aircraft Noise Abatement Plan—FY 1970-71, January 1971.
14. U. S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, Third
Federal Aircraft Noise Abatement Plan—FY 1971-72, January 1972.
15. U. S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, Fourth
Federal Aircraft Noise Abatement Plan—FY 1972-73, January 1973.
16. Densmore, James E., Acting Assistant Secretary for Research and
Technology, DOT, "Transfer of Responsibilities for Aviation Noise
and Sonic Boom Activities from the Office of Science and Technology
to the Department of Transportation (memo to the Secretary), August
2, 1967.
17. Hornig, Donald F., Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology, letter to Alan S. Boyd, Secretary of Transportation,
October 2, 1967.
18. Golovin, N. E., "Summary of the Eighth Meeting of the PEDC July 18,
1967 and Agenda for the Ninth Meeting September 1, 1967, " (memo to
Dr. D. F. Hornig), July 31, 1967.
19. Foster, Charles R., Acting Director, DOT/ONA, letter to Mr. Peter
Gutman, Metro Suburban Aircraft Noise Council, April 12, 1969.
20. Foster, C. R., Chairman, IANAP Coordinating Committee, "Minutes
of February 17, 1970 IANAP Coordination Committee Meeting," (memo
to members and advisors), March 31, 1970.
3-66
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21. Foster, C. R., "Minutes of May 26, 1970 IANAP Coordination
Committee Meeting (memo to members and advisors), July 7, 1970.
22. Foster, C. R., "Minutes of October 27, 1970 IANAP Coordination
Committee Meeting," (memo to members and advisors), January 18,
1971.
23. Summary, IANAP Panel Chairmen Meeting, May 18, 1970.
24. Foster, C. R., Minutes of October 28, 1969 IANAP Coordination
Committee Meeting, (memo to members and advisors), December 1,
1969.
25. Foster, C. R., Minutes of IANAP Coordination Committee Meeting,
March 16, 1971 (memo to members and advisors), April 19, 1971.
26. U. S. Department of Transportation, Office of Noise Abatement,
"Terms of Reference of the Interagency Aircraft Noise Abatement
Program," (Attachment 7 of Report by C. R. Foster sent to Congres-
sional Study on Advisory Committees, September 23, 1969). no date.
27. Densmore, James E., Acting Assistant Secretary for Research and
Technology, DOT, "Authority for Noise Abatement Procedures, "
(memo to DOT General Counsel), October 7, 1969.
Various papers presented at first IANAP meeting. October 2. 1968;
28. Boyd, Alan S., Secretary, Dept. of Transportation. "Background
paper."
29. Foster, Charles R., Director, DOT Office of Noise Abatement.
Remarks on organizational structure of IANAP.
30. "Functions and Current Programs of the Legislative/Legal Panel."
31. "Department of Housing and Urban Development Research as Part of
the Interagency Aircraft Noise Abatement Program." (Probably pre-
sented by HUD.)
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32. "Report of Structures Panel," September 26, 1968. (Probably
presented by HUD.)
33. Foster, Charles R., "Annual Report of Agency Advisory Committees.
Report Period: CY 1972," 1973.
34. Volpe, John A., Secretary, Dept. of Transportation. Letter to
Mr. James T. Pyle, Aviation Development Council, Aug. 12, 1969.
35. Land Use/Airports Panel of IANAP. "Status Report." February 17,
1970.
36. Foster, C. R., Minutes of the IANAP Coordination Committee Meeting
of 3 June 1969, (memo to members), July 31, 1969.
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JOINT DOT/NASA OFFICE OF NOISE ABATEMENT (JONA) — 1971 - 1974
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
Founded administratively by DOD and NASA in August 1971; located within
the Office of the Secretary of Transportation.
Preauthorization History
The two major agencies in noise research were DOT (including FAA) and
NASA. To achieve a higher degree of planning and coordination than was
possible through LANAP, and to prevent duplication that might hinder OMB
approval of future projects, JONA was created as a jointly funded DOT/NASA
office. This was done by expanding the already existing Office of Noise Abate-
ment in DOT (DOT/ONA). Mr. Foster, Director of JONA, said at a January
1972 Congressional hearing that the major noise objectives based upon the
CARD Study would be the starting point for JONA and that JONA would provide
overall leadership "in accordance with the recommendations of the CARD
Study" (Ref. 2, p. 211).
Outline History
• JONA created
• First NASA employee joined JONA (Ref 4)
• "National Aircraft Noise Abatement Plan,"
to be completed by July 1, 1972, mentioned
in testimony before Congress
August 1971
October 1971
January 19, 1972
Noise Control Act of 1972 passed; EPA
empowered to coordinate all Federal pro-
grams relating to noise research and control October 1972
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April 3, 1973
March 23, 1973
July-August 1973
August-September, 1973
• Letter from C. R. Foster to NASA, DOT,
FAA, and EPA representatives starting the
Long Range Aircraft Noise Abatement Plan
(LRANAP) development process
• LANAP abolished
• Reports of working groups of Long Range
Aircraft Noise Abatement Plan completed
• Briefing document on LRANAP prepared by
JONA for presentation to top-level DOT and
NASA officials
• Exchange of correspondence between EPA/
ONAC and JONA concerning clarification of
relationships of the JONA plan to EPA's
mandate to coordinate Federal activities
• Presentation of LRANAP by JONA| as part of
DOT/NASA activities and plans, to EPA/ONAC
Federal Activities Report review meeting
• JONA program review meeting, EPA/ONAC
observer present (one of a regular series of
meetings of the "DOT Noise Abatement Com-
mittee" organized by JONA)
• JONA activity terminated upon withdrawal of
last NASA professional
OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
The initial objectives of JONA, as stated by C. R. Foster, Director, JONA,
before House Science and Astronautics Committee, January 19, 1972, were
October 1973
November 1973
December 11, 1973
September 1974
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To provide the overall leadership and to act as a focal point
for a national program to attack the noise problems associated
with the current and planned transportation systems.
JONA provided a definite means of integrating the efforts of
the two government organizations most involved in noise
abatement. However, there are other government organiza-
tions, such as DOD, HUD, HEW and EPA, also involved,
and this joint office will be responsible for integrating noise
abatement programs with other agencies through the already
established and operating interagency aircraft noise abatement
program (IANAP) whose coordination committee I chair
Thus, the original scope of JONA interest included research done in all areas
of transportation—both surface and air. But in terms of actual coordination
and implementation of program plans as part of the annual budgeting process,
its scope was limited to DOT and NASA, and to aircraft noise R & D.
Leaving surface transportation noise activities to the already established
DOT/ONA, JONA started an integrated NASA/DOT planning process in 1972
and 1973 for aircraft noise research and development. The objectives of the
1973 planning process were to develop this research and development plan for
both agencies to cover "the full spectrum of activity from technology to im-
plementation. " The intent was to "develop an initial plan that will provide a
basis for management review and program adjustment. Thus, the final plan
that evolves will provide an approved guide for detailed program within the
line organizations" (Ref. 3).
More specific goals of the plan were stated as follows:
The primary goal of the DOT/NASA Aircraft Noise Program
is to provide the technology for the design and development
of quiet air transportation systems. More specifically, the
goals are:
1. To develop and demonstrate the technology pertinent
to the reduction of noise of current aircraft systems;
2. To develop the technology to be used by industry in
advanced aircraft and engine designs for further
noise reduction;
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3. To provide to DOT/FAA, EPA, industry, and the
public the advanced technology needed in continu-
ing consideration of possible revisions to aircraft
noise control regulations, and the establishment
of uniform aircraft noise standards; and
4. To develop a comprehensive understanding of the
aircraft noise factors that influence individual
and community attitudes towards aircraft opera-
tions, and their influence on future noise standards.
The plan covers the following subject matter which forms the
outline for subsequent discussion:
1. Community Assessment
2. Regulatory Planning and Support
3. Existing CTOL Aircraft
4. Advanced Subsonic CTOL Aircraft
5. Quiet Powered-Lift Aircraft
6. Advanced Supersonic Transport (AST) Aircraft
7. General Aviation
8. Basic Noise Research
9. Aircraft Systems Noise Analysis (Ref. 3)
Membership
JONA was composed of full-time employees of the two agencies (DOT and
NASA) whose noise abatement research efforts were being coordinated. See
"Staff."
Activities
JONA was a two-agency activity, based in the DOT office of Noise Abatement
(DOT/ONA), that performed the following functions:
• Coordinated and monitored all DOT and NASA research projects and
programs concerned with aircraft noise.
• Represented DOT and NASA at meetings of other federal agencies
concerned with aircraft noise, public meetings and conferences, and
before Congress and OMB.
• Under (H) prepared an annual plan for DOT/NASA R & D work in the
field of aircraft noise abatement technology development.
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Staff
By January 1972, the staff of the JONA/ONA complex had grown to 18 persons
(professional and clerical). The director, C. R. Foster, who had headed DOT/ONA
since its inception in 1967, also headed the JONA activity. The new deputy director
of JONA was from NASA. The maximum size of the professional staff was the
original DOT/ONA staff plus two professionals from NASA.
Use of Contractors
Numerous noise research and development contracts were awarded not by
JONA itself but by the various offices within the DOT/FAA/NASA framework
JONA coordinated.
Relations with Other Groups
Relations with other Federal agencies and nongovernment groups were
more the province of IANAP than of JONA.
IANAP and JONA both represented DOT and NASA in testimony before
Congress.
JONA relations with other federal agencies including those with EPA,
were on an informal basis except for attendance and participation at EPA-
organized review and coordinating meetings covering noise-related federal
activities.
OUTPUTS
As mentioned previously, the main functions performed by JONA were
in-house staff functions: coordination of the joint research plans of DOT and
NASA. The outputs were thus largely invisible to the outside world. They
included:
• Management of a joint NASA-DOT (including FAA) committee for
coordination of all retrofit activities
• Review and assessment of FAA regulatory proposals
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o Development of the previously mentioned annual joint agency plan
for aircraft noise abatement R&D
• Review of information releases prepared by FAA, DOT or NASA.
The JONA function with regard to retrofit was to monitor the day-to-day
progress of all retrofit programs, including the FAA "SAM-retrofit" and the
NASA "refan-retrofit" R&D, and to report to and advise top management in
DOT and NASA.
The joint-agency plan development cycle was envisioned to be an annual
process. However, only one development cycle was completed—from April
through fall of 1973, as mentioned in the "outline history" portion of this
section. This plan included goals for the phased reduction of noise from
various types of aircraft.
IMPACT
NASA and DOT policy decisions concerning retrofit were taken at a higher
level than JONA, and necessarily involved wider considerations than technolog-
ical feasibility alone. These decisions were reflected in FAA regulatory
proposals of 1974. The JONA contribution was in the area of technology
assessment.
The result of the 1973 joint agency planning process was a report that was
presented to the three agencies involved. Responsibility for integrating the
recommendations of the plan into agency budgets did not rest with JONA, but,
rather, the report was an input into the budget development processes of the
agencies involved. In light of the original CARD study recommendations, JONA
was partly successful in coordinating NASA/DOT research at the planning
stage, including that of FAA, for it did "develop an initial plan that will
provide a basis for management review and program adjustment" (Ref. 3).
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MONITORING AND UPDATING
The design of the 1973 Long Range Aircraft Noise Abatement Plan provided
for monitoring and updating of joint aircraft noise R&D plans. Progress reviews
were to occur every 6 months and program updates every year, timed to mesh
with the annual budget cycle.
There was no formal mechanism for review of JONA organizational structure.
REFERENCES
1. JONA, "DOT/NASA Long Range Noise Abatement Plan 1973-1982
(Draft)." Package as of November 1973, includes:
(a) Blatt, S. _et al., "Final Report of Advanced CTOL Aircraft Work-
Group, " E. W. Conrad, Chairman, August 16, 1973.
(b) No author, "Aircraft Systems Analysis Program," no date.
(c) Edge, Phillip, et al., Community Acceptance Working Group,
"Community Acceptance of Aircraft Noise," no date.
(d) No author, "Basic Noise Research," no date.
(e) Winflade, R. L. (chmn.) et al., "Final Report—General Aviation
Noise Reduction Technology Program Plan, " August 24, 1973
(f) No author, "Noise Abatement Plan for Powered Lift Aircraft,"
no date.
(g) Groenewey, J., et al., "Preliminary Report, Existing CTOL
Aircraft," no date.
(h) No author, "Planning for Noise Abatement of Powered Life
Aircraft: RTOL-STOL-VTOL-Helicopters," no date.
2. U.S. House, Subcommitte on Aeronautics and Space Technology of the
Committee on Science and Astronautics, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess.,
Hearings of January 18, 19, and 29, 1972 on "Aeronautical Research
and Development."
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3. Foster, Charles R., Director, JONA, "Long Range Aircraft Noise
Abatement Plan (for DOT and NASA)," (memorandum sent to potential
planning team members in NASA, FAA, DOT, EPA), April 3, 1973.
4. Foster, Charles R., "Minutes of October 14, 1971IANAP Coordination
Committee Meeting" (memo to members and advisors), November 18,
1971.
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COMMITTEE ON HEARING. BIOACOUSTICS. AND BIOMECHANICS (CHABA)
OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES—1952-PRESENT
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
CHABA is a private advisory organization with federal representative and
a quasi-official function. The Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force) spon-
sored the establishment of CHABA by the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences in 1952 to provide a group of informed consultants
in the field of hearing and bioacoustics (Ref. 2). Over time, CHABA assumed
similar functions for various civilian agencies, including FAA, DOT, and EPA.
The period of greatest activity in the field of aircraft noise and sonic boom
spanned the period 1963-1971. Originally, there were two separate CHABA
working groups established at the request of NASA and FAA for research advice
on airport noise and sonic boom. Later, these were expanded into one sub-
committee, Subcommittee 5 (Ref. 1). Subcommittee 5 has not been active since
1972.
OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
According to CHABA terms of reference, purpose and areas of activity
are as follows:
CHABA, the Committee on Hearing, Bioacoustics, and Bio-
mechanics (formerly the Committee on Hearing and Bio-
acoustics) is established by the NAS-NRC at the request of
certain agencies of the government (Sponsors).
1. Purposes of the Committee
The Committee provides the following types of advi-
sory assistance to its Sponsors in the areas of hear-
ing, bioacoustics and biomechanics:
a. application of available scientific information in
the solution of current operational problems,
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b. research planning to meet future operational
.problems,
c. acquainting scientific investigators with the
problems of the Sponsors,
d. promoting exchange of research information,
e. encouraging research in areas where there are
deficiences of knowledge.
2. Areas of Committee Activity
The Committee concerns itself with any field of science
or technology that it finds necessary in pursuit of its
objectives. These fields may include pertinent aspects
of biological science, behavioral science, physics,
chemistry, mathematics, engineering and medicine.
Examples of specific areas of interest to the Commit-
tee include:
a. Hearing
(1) Measurement and evaluation of hearing.
(2) Conservation of hearing.
(3) The ear and associated central nervous sys-
tem, its functions and means for protection
against intense sounds.
(4) Communications, particularly speech com-
munication in the presence of noise.
b. Bioacousticu
(1) Non-auditory effects of intense sound fields
. on man and means for protection.
(2) Physiological, psychological and social reac-
tions of man exposed to sound, for example,
noise produced by Jet-planes, rockets, gun-
fire, weapons, and vehicles.
(3) Physical and engineering problems of the
generation, measurement and control of
acoustical energy.
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c. Biomechanics
(L) Specification of the mechanical properties
of the human body or its component parts.
(2) Effects of mechanical force fields (for exam-
ple - vibration) upon human performance,
health, and comfort.
(3) Protection of man from mechanical force fields.
(4) Physical and engineering problems of the gen-
eration, measurement and control of mechanical
force fields.
As a general policy the Committee will undertake work in the
above areas only when the required advisory services are not
provided elsewhere (Ref. 3).
Membership
Members are appointed by the President of the Academy upon recommen-
dation of the CHABA Executive Council. There were over 300 members in
1973. Most are Council-nominated members drawn from the scientific commu-
nity. In addition, other members represent government sponsors and other
government agencies. These members form a resource pool from which
working groups and subcommittees, generally consisting of six to eight mem-
bers, are formed (Ref. 4). Travel expenses of members while they are
participating in CHABA activities are paid either by sponsoring agencies
(for their members) or by the National Academy of Sciences (other members).
Activities
Most CHABA working groups have been concerned with problems not directly
related to environmental aspects of aircraft noise and have performed ad hoc
services over a limited time period, such as the preparation of a single report
to the sponsoring agency. Subcommittee 5, however, was a relatively long-
lived group that evolved from two working groups. It was the function of
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Subcommittee 5 to annually review past federal research activities on human
response to aircraft noise and sonic boom and to make recommendations for
further research, suggesting priorities.
The question of which agencies were to perform various elements of the
recommended program was, strictly speaking, outside the terms of reference
of CHABA and was not formally addressed.
An Executive Council has overall responsibility for all CHABA activities,
including these of the subcommittees and working groups. There is one voting
member from each of the sponsoring agencies and an equal number of voting
members nominated by the Council. In addition, there are several non-
voting, ex-officio members. The Council nominates one of its members to
serve as Chairman for a term of 1 year.
Staff
An Executive Secretary with a small staff supports the Executive Council
and CHABA as a whole. The secretariat resides at the National Academy of
Sciences in Washington, D. C.
Relations with Other Groups
CHABA, as a whole, maintains ties with and gives advice to four international
organizations: NATO, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) (Ref. 4).
Within Subcommittee 5, limited contact with contractors of sponsoring
agencies occurred when those contractors were invited to give short presenta-
tions to the Subcommittee. About one half day of the Subcommittee's 1- to
2-day meeting time might be allotted for contractor presentations each year.
An important informal coordination channel existed between Subcommittee
5 and IANAP. While the CHABA group developed research recommendations,
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agency representatives in IANAP formulated policy recommendations regarding
the distribution of implementation responsibility among federal agencies.
Coordination was assured by overlapping memberships of several key individuals
who served both on the CHABA Subcommittee 5 and on the IANAP Human Response
Panel. Meetings of the CHABA Committee and the IANAP panel were scheduled
for the same week so that members from out of town could attend both with
one visit, which was important because CHABA paid expenses and INANP did not.
OUTPUTS
The chief output of Subcommittees was the list of annual recommendations
to government sponsors. For example, in 1972 the CHABA recommendations
were:
1. Initiate studies concerning chronic behavioral and physio-
logical effects of noise including adaption to long-term noise
exposures (three to four-year funding, if possible).
a. Examine the effect of noise-induced sleep interference
upon performance. Continue primate work where
applicable. Conduct laboratory studies of adaptation
to sleep disturbance over two or three years using
physiological measures of arousal. (Laboratory.)
b. Threshold studies of noise-induced sleep interference
(field study in private homes.)
c. Examine the effect of noise in work areas on perfor-
mance and communication (field studies in areas such
as offices and classrooms.)
d. Examine the effect of noise and sleep disturbance on
special groups such as aged, sick, schools, and infants.
2. Examine long-term health effects of noise and sonic boom
on growing urban areas such as Tulsa and Oklahoma City.
3. Airport-noise community surveys should be supported
with the following emphases:
a. Focus on same group of respondents over longer times
to assess:
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(1) seasonal variations
(2) differences between day and night
(3) evaluation of operational changes, e. g. special
utilization of runways
(4) changes in attitudinal and other psychological
factors over time
(5) addition over time of multiple events
b. Compare hearing levels of airport neighbors with
control group
4. Laboratory study of origins of psychological factors, e. g.
fear, that contribute to annoyance produced by noise.
5. Continuing study of the impact of sonic boom exposure on
residents of the Antelope Valley, California, area.
6. Continue piggyback studies of the impact of noise and sonic
boom on domestic animals and wild life (Ref. 1).
As previously mentioned, these recommendations were not only given directly
to agency sponsors but also were considered collectively by the agencies within
the IANAP framework.
IMPACT
CHABA recommendations were influential in starting several federal
research programs directly connected to the PEDC-FANAP-IANAP series of
efforts from 1966 on. One example was the exhaustive series of surveys on
community response to aircraft noise and sonic boom, done by Tracor, Inc.,
for NASA between 1967 and 1969. Such work was an essential part of the
implementation of Recommendation No. 4 of the 1966 OST report, calling for
developing meaningful yardsticks for measurement of aircraft noise exposure.
Since CHABA Subcommittee 5 meetings included representatives from the
various federal agencies, the meetings also served as a means for informal
interagency coordination in their own right.
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MONITORING AND UPDATING OF ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS
Progress toward objectives set by Subcommittee 5 was monitored by com-
paring previous recommendations with reports to the Subcommittee from agency
sponsors on recent federal research activities. This comparison, plus further
discussion at the Subcommittee annual meeting, formed the basis for further
recommendations. This process was most fruitful from 1963 to 1970. There-
after the input of CHABA to federal research coordination decreased, mainly
because federal agencies were no longer implementing recommended research
at previous levels. Obtaining necessary funding was apparently a major
problem. Thus, the CHABA lists of recommendations began to look similar
from year to year, and CHABA terminated the subcommittee in 1972. During
its period of activity, however, the subcommittee served a highly useful
function in coordination of those aspects of federal noise research activities
with which it was concerned.
REFERENCES
1. CHABA, "Minutes of the Third Meeting of Subcommittee 5 Held at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, July 11-12, 1972."
2. "CHABA," Noise Control, vol. 3 no. 6, November, 1957, pp. 53-54.
3. CHABA, "Purposes and Procedures for the Operation of CHABA,
the NAS-NRC Committee on Hearing, Bioacoustics, and Biomechanics,"
October 8, 1963.
4. CHABA, "Information Concerning the Committee on Vision and the
Committee on Hearing, Bioacoustics, and Biomechanics," July 1, 1973.
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Section 4
STUDIES
There have been numerous studies of national aviation policies, problems,
and goals in the last 25 years, and most of them have touched upon the federal
interagency coordination aspects of the problem. Whether they emerged from
an interagency task group or a commission* most of the studies were set into
motion by a Presidential directive, generally stimulated by Congressional prod-
ding. It is not clear, in some cases, whether the President ever had a personal
interest or was only reacting to a strongly articulated recommendation from
governmental and nongovernmental interests.
It has typically been the fate of studies to be widely disregarded after
their completion. Rarely have the recommendations of studies been trans-
formed into specific legislative proposals, and even more rarely are the pro-
posals acted upon. Such was the case with the Aviation Advisory Commission
recommendations in early 1973. This is nothing new. The authors of Project
Horizon Report (1961) made much the same comment about previous studies:
The task force also had available to it the reports and studies
which have been made since 1948 in the field of aviation. In
many instances, the recommendations contained in these
reports and studies are as fresh and important today as when
they were first written. The unhappy implication of this state-
ment is that far too little attention has been given to important
recommendations of the past. It is freely admitted that cer-
tain of the goals which we suggest herein have been put forward
before. Theyr reiteration here serves to underscore their
urgency, importance, and lack of fulfillment to date (Foreword,
p. xiii, Project Horizon Report).
The influence of studies on subsequent events is sometimes hard to measure
objectively. When a study has been given widespread credit for an effect, this
is mentioned in the summaries that follow. The reports of commissions, task
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groups, and ad hoc committees were undoubtedly read, or at least perused by
both interested congressmen and members of the aviation community, many
of whom had a hand in their creation. Thus, the reports may have had some
indirect influence on the thinking and subsequent actions of a narrower group.
However, the degree to which this influencing of the decision-makers occurs
is even more difficult to measure objectively, and no systematic effort to do so
has been made in this compendium.
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PRESIDENT'S AIR POLICY COMMISSION (PAPQ—The Finletter Report. 1947
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
The PAPC was established and its members were appointed by President
Truman in a letter of July 18, 1947. In the letter, the PAPC was established
as a temporary commission and charged to submit its final recommendations
by January 1, 1948. It was assured of the cooperation of all federal agencies.
Preauthorization History
The PAPC was established in light of the Cold War. Thus, there were twin
issues: national security and the development of civil air transportation. In
his letter, President Truman said that he was creating the PAPC "upon the
recommendation of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Commerce and of
the Air Coordinating Committee" (ACC).
Outline History
• Commissioners sworn in July 29, 1947
• Executive Director appointed July 30, 1947
• Recruitment and organization of working
staff complete Mid-August 1947
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• Outline for report and commission
operating procedures complete End of August
• Formal hearings September 8 to
December 30, 1947
The PAPC submitted its report on December 30, 1947, on schedule.
OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
The PAPC was instructed to make the broadest kind of survey, including
recommendations on revising old policies and the framing of new ones to achieve
an integrated national air policy to (1) ". . . protect the Nation's security to the
greatest extent possible," and (2) ". . . foster its economic and social interests."
The Commission understood this as a mandate to review the following
topics, which were dealt with in its report:
• Significance of air power for national security (including strategy in
the atomic age, reorganization of the armed forces, military need
for air transport, mobilization planning)
• Aircraft manufacturing industry
• Aeronautical R&D
• Civil aviation (including safety, air mail, economic regulation,
international air transport, general aviation)
• Government organization
Membership
The five appointed members of the PAPC were Thomas F. Finletter,
Chairman; George D. Baker, Vice Chairman; Palmer Hoyt; John A. McCone
(replaced Henry Ford); and Arthur D. Whiteside.
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Activities
During its short life, the PAPC was extraordinarily active. It gathered
information primarily through a series of formal hearings and secondarily by
means of field trips to industrial facilities and military installations. The
total of 206 PAPC meetings included 96 public hearings and 65 hearings where
testimony was taken in executive session. All witnesses were requested to
file statements in advance. Full stenographic records were kept of all public
hearings and abstracts were made of all statements and testimony. Witnesses
represented all government agencies involved, including the military establish-
ment, the domestic and foreign airlines, railroads, aircraft manufacturers,
trade and industry associations, and the press. In general, they were either
recognized experts in their field or heads of their institutions.
The President provided his own aircraft for several PAPC field trips.
Staff
There were about 40 technical staff members and about 20 secretarial
staff. In accordance with the Presidential letter of July 18, the Department
of Commerce provided space, administrative support, and much of the staff.
Under the Executive Director (S. Paul Johnson) staff was organized around
staff advisors for each of the five topic areas listed under Formulation
of Objectives (See Figure 6).
Use of Contractors
No contractors were used.
Relations with Other Groups
Industry, state and local governments, and federal agencies were repre-
sented by various witnesses. Congress was kept informed, and used the testi-
mony before the CAPB in the preparation of its parallel report (Brewster
Report, 1948).
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PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
PRESIDENT'S AIR POLICY COMMISSION
THOMAS K FINLETTER-CHAIRMAN
GEORGE P BAKER VICE-CHAIRMAN
- MEMBERS -
JOHN A MC CONE PALMER HOYT A O WHITESIDE
_ EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
S PAUL JOHNSTON
-ADVISORS-
SPECIAL
CONSULTANTS
RESEARCH
ASSISTANTS
GOVERNMENT
LIAISON
JOHN A MC CONE
GROVER LOENING
E S PRENTICE
ASSISTANT
EXEC DIRECTOR
LEGAL
ADVISORS
[EDITORIAL
1 ADVISORS
05
NATIONAL
SECURITY
MATTERS
AIRCRAFT
INDUSTRY
MATTERS
RESEARCH
AND
DEVELOPMENT
CIVIL
AVIATION
GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATION
PROCEDURES
SECRETARIAL STAFF
Figure 6. Organization—President's Air Policy Commission
-------
OUTPUTS
The 166-page PAPC Report, "Survival in the Air Age," was published
January 1, 1948. It represented the unanimous opinion of the Commission.
It contained sweeping, but not surprising, recommendations in all five general
topic areas listed previously. Its main national security conclusion was that
hostile forces could have the atomic bomb in quantity by the end of 1952 and
that the U.S. should, therefore, have an air defense sufficient to repel atomic
attack by that time.
In the area of R&D coordination, it named the recently published Research
and Development Board in the military establishment and the NACA on the civil
aviation side as the principal coordinating bodies, but ascribed a broader role
to NACA in that NACA "coordinates the research needs of private, commercial
and military aviation . . ." (Ref. 1, p. 154). It saw proper coordination more
in terms of better communication than control (p. 92 of report). The report
saw the National Aeronautical Research Policy Statement of March 21, 1946,
as clearly giving NACA the duty of coordinating government aeronautical research
with civilian, industrial, and university programs. Current NACA coordination
was inadequate mainly because of lack of people and money, according to the
report.
The main recommendation in the area of government organization was to
establish a Department of Civil Aviation within Commerce to absorb most of
the functions of the CAA, to keep the CAB semi-autonomous, and establish a
new independent board for air safety. The new Secretary of Civil Aviation was
also to be the chairman of the ACC— an interdepartmental advisory and coordi-
nating group for examining aviation problems affecting more than one agency.
The report recommended that the ACC be lodged within Commerce and that
unresolved disputes should be taken from the ACC by the Secretary of Commerce
for resolution at the Cabinet level.
Partly because of the support of the parallel Congressional Report of the
CAPB (Brewster Report), most of the appropriate recommendations of the
PAPC appeared in bills submitted to Congress.
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The use of public hearings by the PAPC provided plenty of publicity from
the start. The completed report was also well publicized.
IMPACT
Little of the proposed legislation ever became law. According to L. E.
Leverone, President of the National Aeronautical Commission, the main
reason was the inability of various elements of American aviation to unite in
the support of almost any proposal:
Almost two years ago the President's Air Policy Commission
and the Congressional Aviation Policy Board, after long and
complete studies, submitted to the nation strong recommenda-
tions for a comprehensive national policy. The Congressional
board put its proposals into legislative form and submitted
them as bills to Congress. There most of them still are,
peacefully reposing in Committees, where they are likely to
stay unless enough elements in aviation who want them passed
can get together and thus make their voices heard (Ref. 2).
MONITORING AND UPDATING
As with most studies, the study group was dissolved at the completion of
its report.
REFERENCES
1. President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age.
Washington, D. C., USGPO, January 1, 1948.
2. New York Times. December 17, 1949, p. 10.
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CONGRESSIONAL AVIATION POLICY BOARD—BREWSTER REPORT. 1948
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
The CAPB was established in 1947 by an Act of Congress, Public Law 287
(80th Congress), to provide for the establishment of a temporary Congressional
Aviation Policy Board.
Preauthorization History
There was concern in Congress that, only two years after the end of World
War II, national security was threatened (by the Cold War and the existence of
atom bombs) as well as the solvency of the civil .aviation industry. In January,
1947, legislation was introduced in the Senate to establish a National Aviation
Policy Board, presumably to be permanent. After lengthy debate, another bill,
H. R. 3587, establishing the temporary CAPB was passed by both Houses and
signed by the President (July 1947). A factor in the development of the CAPB
was the prior existence of the Presidential Air Policy Commission.
Outline History
The first meeting of the CAPB was held on September 13, 1947, and its
report (the Brewster Report) was published in March, 1948.
OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
The objectives of the CAPB were to develop a national aviation policy that
would maximize the ability of "a great aviation industry" and airport and
navigational flexibilities of "scheduled dependability" to contribute to air power
for the national defense.
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Although CAPB was set up to consider both national security and the health
of civil aviation, it concentrated on national security. Its rationale was that if
military aviation were strengthened the situation of the aircraft industry and
civil aviation would improve in the process.
Membership
Senator Owen Brewster of Maine was chairman, and Congressman Hinshaw
of California was vice chairman of a board consisting of 19 Senators and Con-
gressmen, of whom four were specially selected from the House and four from
the Senate, and the rest appointed ex officio as representatives of the House
Armed Services Committee, House Appropriations Committee, Senate Armed
Services Committee, and Senate Appropriations Committee.
Activities
The CAPB used the exhaustive testimony in public hearings already given
before the Presidential Air Policy Commission to save time. It proceeded in
executive sessions (with an advisor to the board, see below) to develop recom-
mendations in the following areas:
• Combat aviation
• Air transport (including the contribution of general aviation and the
upgrading of an aeronautical educational program in the nation's
schools)
• Aircraft manufacture
• Research
• Government organization
Some additional testimony was heard and additional research was done by
CAPB staff. A 24-man Advisory Council, composed of prominent individuals
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from business, labor, the academic community, and government worked
directly with the board within the framework of four subcommittees:
• Combat aviation
• Transportation
• Manufacturing
• Government organization
Staff
Staff support appears to have been modest. There was one advisor to the
board itself, a former director of the Aircraft Division of the wartime War
Production Board. One or two professionals staffed each of the subcommittees,
in addition to one for the research and development area, and two for the
financial area.
Use of Contractors
There was no contracted research.
Relations with Other Groups
Relations with industry were covered through representatives on the
advisory council, as were relations with Executive Branch agencies, including
the military. In fact, the work of the board has the appearance of a joint
military-Congressional effort. Little or no effort was made to involve state
and local government.
OUTPUTS
Reports
The end product of CAPB work was Report No. 949 of the 80th Congress
("The Brewster Report") which made 92 recommendations in the five areas
mentioned above. This was a consensus report in which individual differences
were not recorded in separate comments.
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In the area of government reorganization, it was recommended that the
then existing Air Coordinating Committee (ACC) be given statutory power "to
coordinate and recommend aviation policies affecting two or more agencies of
the Federal Government" (Rec. No. 77). The strong interpretation of the
meaning of the word "coordination" is illustrated by the following excerpt from
the Brewster Report (p. 47):
A fundamental weakness of civil aviation is lack of adequate
coordination of policy within the executive departments. The
present Air Coordinating Committee, established originally
by interdepartmental memorandum and later by Executive
Order, has encountered insurmountable obstacles in attempt-
ing to persuade autonomous departments to agree upon
policies involving controversial issues and, particularly, in
implementing decisions once reached. This can only be met
by establishing a statutory basis for coordination of aviation
policy, following the pattern employed in the National Defense
Act of 1947 of establishing statutory boards for interdepart-
mental coordination of military research and mobilization
planning. While the Air Coordinating Committee should
primarily deal with general policy, certain limited operat-
ing functions can best be handled by it to bring about proper
balance between military and civil agencies.
The CAPB envisaged that the ACC would be composed of representatives
of all concerned agencies, as determined by the President (Rec. No. 77). Deci-
sions would be reached by majority vote, with dissenting members having the
right of appeal to the President (Rec. No. 78). The ACC would also have
various advisory panels, including liaison with state and municipal governments
(Rec. No. 80). Other recommendations (Nos. 82-89) proposed changes to
clarify the status and the responsibilities of the Civil Aeronautics Board and
the Civil Aeronautics Administration, and to eliminate friction between them.
The CAB was to be strengthened and made more independent of the Department
of Commerce, and the CAA was to be abolished. A new "Office of Civil Avia-
tion" was to be created in the Department of Commerce to handle the residual
of its duties. Other recommendations included setting up a separate office for
investigating civil air accidents.
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Recommendations for the area of research included approval of the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics as the coordinating organization for basic
aeronautical research (with the Research and Development Board of the National
Military Establishment coordinating the application of research results by the
military).
IMPACT
Legislation, Regulations, Executive Orders
Many CAPB organizational recommendations were introduced as proposed
legislation, but none of them received prompt attention from Congress. In par-
ticular, the idea of granting the ACC statutory authority in order to strengthen
its coordination power was never adopted. (See Impact in the preceding discussion
on the PAPC.)
New Organizations or Major Changes in Existing Organizations
In accordance with Recommendation 80, the ACC set up an advisory panel
for liaison with state and municipal governments.
MONITORING AND UPDATING
The Brewster Committee was disbanded after completing its study, but not
without an attempt to constitute itself as a permanent body within the Congres-
sional Committee framework. This attempt failed, however.
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PRESIDENT'S AIRPORT COMMISSION—THE DOOLITTLE REPORT. 1952
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
The temporary President's Airport Commission (The Doolittle Commission)
was authorized by President Truman in his letter of February 20, 1952.
Preauthorization History
The President had been concerned about a series of aircraft accidents that
had taken place in heavily populated areas near airports. This in turn led him
to conclude that the nation's policy on airport location and use should be
restudied.
Outline History
• Presidential directive February 20, 1952
• Report submitted to President May 16, 1952
OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
The Presidential letter set the following objectives:
• To study the problems of airport locations taking into account the
"safety, welfare and peace of mind" (Ref. 1, p. iv) of people living
close to them, as well as the needs of national defense and the air-
craft industry.
• Specifically, to study and make recommendations concerning:
1. The federal, state and local investment in existing civil and
military airports and the factors affecting the utility of air-
ports to adjacent communities
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2. Actions by federal, state, and local authorities to lessen the
hazards surrounding existing civil and military airports
3. Assignment of newly activated military units to existing air-
ports with particular regard for potential hazards to commu-
nities involved
4. Site selection for new civil and military airports and the
factors affecting relocation of existing airports
5. Joint civil and military use of existing or new airports
6. Legislation and appropriations necessary to carry out appro-
priate policy.
Membership
Members were:
James Doolittle, Vice President of Shell Union Oil
C. F. Home, Administrator of Civil Aeronautics
J. C. Hunsaker, Head, Department of Aeronautical Engineering at M. I. T.
Activities
The commission used hearings, questionnaires, and whirlwind field trips
to gather its information within a two-month period. Thirty airports were
personally inspected by the commission or its staff, of which 16 were visited by
the commission in one nine-day trip. Approximately 70 airport cities answered
the questionnaire. Written or oral statements were received from 42 organi-
zations, and 264 individuals were consulted.
Staff
Technical staff was borrowed from the military, CAA, CAB, and NACA.
The Department of Commerce provided office space and administrative services
including editorial and clerical support (eight persons). S. Paul Johnson, who
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had served as Executive Director of the PAPC in 1947, was again Executive
Director. Five technical advisors each covered a particular technical area.
Expenses of the Commission were paid from the President's emergency fund.
Use of Contractors
Four contractors were used:
• Adams, Howard and Greeley
• John C. Cooper
• Cornell Aeronautical Labs
• Pogue and Neal
Relations with Other Groups
The views of industry, state and local governments, federal agencies, and
the public were represented by the testimony of various witnesses in the hearing
process.
OUTPUTS
In its report, the Doolittle Commission foresaw and stated the emergency
airport problem—including the noise problem—accurately, succinctly, and com-
prehensively. In fact, the report includes many aspects of solutions presently
under consideration by EPA. The 20-page "Summary and Recommendations" are
attached because they are of more than usual historical interest (Appendix H).
For example, it was the commission's opinion that the federal government could
and should expand its power to become involved in problems of new residential
development near existing airports and of compensation for land owners in
situations where there was a compensable 'taking' (pp. 72-78 of report). A
major proposal was the certification of airports.
IMPACT
The Doolittle Report did not address itself to the federal organizational
changes that would be required in order to implement its substantive
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recommendations. It was sent by the President to the Air Coordinating Com-
mittee with a request for prompt suggestions for putting the report proposals
into effect (Ref. 2). Thus, the substantive proposals were dealt with by the
hierarchical ACC committee process, whose problems in achieving rapid coordi-
nation are described elsewhere (in a previous section on the ACC and in subse-
quent sections on the Harding and Curtis Reports). As a result, no action was
taken on most of the recommendations, including the recommendation to amend
the Civil Aeronautics Act to permit certification of airports.
MONITORING AND UPDATING
As with all studies, the study group was dissolved once the final report
had been written.
REFERENCES
1. President's Airport Commission, The Airport and its Neighbors,
Washington, D. C., USGPO, May 16, 1952.
2. Aviation Daily. June 6, 1952, p. 211.
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AVIATION FACILITIES STUDY GROUP—THE HARDING REPORT. 1955
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
The Harding Report was commissioned for the President by the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget, Mr. Rowland Hughes, in a letter to study director
William Barclay Harding on May 4, 1955, and similar letters to other Study
Group members.
Preauthorization History
There was widespread consensus that the aviation facilities system—
airports, airways (including air traffic control, navigation, and instrument
landing services), and associated communications—was growing too slowly, in
piecemeal fashion, and becoming increasingly unsafe. Moreover, it was felt
that the federal institutions responsible for solving the problem were proving
themselves unable to do so. The CAA had the responsibility for operating the
airways, the military operated partially within and partially outside the CAA
system, the Air Coordinating Committee had the responsibility for coordinat-
ing broad aviation policies, and the Air Navigation Development Board (ANDB)
was responsible for coordinating Aviation Facilities development policies.
The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, "a government-industry
advisory organization with no continuing government status," was also offi-
cially recognized as playing a role (Ref. 1, p. 30).
The organization most immediately involved was the ANDB, which was
founded in 1948 to keep civil and military agencies coordinated. Specifically,
the ANDB was charged with preparing a single budget for all R&D required for
a common aviation system, and neither civil nor military agencies were to
begin or maintain any R&D without the express authorization of the board.
However, the ANDB, set up by mutual agreement of the Secretaries of
Commerce and Defense, and consisting of one member each from CAA, the
Navy and the Air Force (Ref. 2), was handicapped by a unanimity rule, a
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confused relationship with the ACC, and insufficient cooperation between
technical and operating people (Ref. 3, p. 105; Ref. 4, p. 51).
Outline History
• Established by letter of Director of BOB May 4, 1955
• Report submitted to Director Dec. 31, 1955
OPERATIONS
Formulation of Objectives
The terms of reference given by BOB were to provide, within a period of
several months, recommendations on the following:
1. Should a study of long-range needs (20 years) for aviation facilities
and aids be undertaken?
2. What should be the coverage of such a study, if it were made ? What
specific areas and subjects would seem to require particular
attention ?
3. How could such a study, if made, best be organized and conducted?
Membership
Appointed to the study group were:
• William Barclay Harding, Chairman, New York investment banker
with experience in aviation finance and previous experience in
government.
• George P. Baker, professor of transportation at Harvard Business
School and former member of the CAB.
• Fred Glass, aviation director for the Port of New York Authority.
• N. E. Halaby, lawyer, pilot, and a recent Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Affairs.
• Harold Harris, former president of Northwest Airlines.
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• Jerome Lederer, director of Flight Safety Foundation.
• T. F. Walkowicz, analyst with research experience at Department of
Defense.
• J. Gordon Bennett, CAA official and former aviation advisor to the
Commerce Undersecretary.
Activities
The study group made extensive use of interviews, as discussed below.
Staff
High-level BOB assistance was provided. In addition to clerical and
administrative support, BOB designated as liaison officers Mr. William
Finan, assistant director of the Budget and head of the BOB 1954 study of the
ACC; Arthur Kimball, staff director of the President's Advisory Committee on
Government Organization; and two Presidential staff assistants.
Consultants
No consultants were used other than the study group members themselves,
who were nominally temporary consultants to BOB.
Relations with Other Groups
During its seven-month life the study group consulted with nearly 300 top
officials and their staffs, representing interested agencies, industry groups,
and individual airline and aircraft manufacturers.
OUTPUTS
The single output of the study group was its Report to the Director of the
Budget, Aviation Facilities of Dec. 3, 1955 (Ref. 1). In this report the Study
Group strongly and unanimously recommended that a comprehensive study for a
20-year master plan of aviation facilities be made, and produced projections
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of the likely future demand on such a system. Facilities were defined to
include airports, navigation aids, traffic control devices and communications
equipment. The report also emphasised strongly that the study should be
directed by a highly qualified individual of widest possible experience and
national reputation, backed by the President's authority. It should be set up
at the highest possible level independently of any existing operating depart-
ments and interdepartmental committees "to assure objectivity and freedom
from deep involvement in day-to-day operating problems" (Ref. 1, pp. 4-5).
Individual members of the Study Group undertook to write various detailed
sections of the report. In his section, J. Gordon Bennett wrote:
There are now over 75 committees, subcommittees, and
special working groups addressing themselves to Aviation
Facilities matters. The existence of so many groups is
not, in itself, an evil, but it is increasingly apparent that
the process of coordination is becoming more and more
time consuming, and that preoccupation with current
issues tends to obscure forward vision (Ref. 1, p. 30).
In his section, which used the ACC as his main example, Najeeb Halaby added:
We find that none of the interdepartmental committees
dealing with coordination has any independent executive
authority. Their members serve only on a part-time basis
and the membership changes frequently. While it was orig-
inally intended that, in addition to exercising their coordi-
nating functions, they would be instrumentalities for the
development of forward looking policies, they have, in
practice, become primarily mechanisms where in the re-
presentatives of various Federal agencies meet to debate
and, whenever possible, coordinate action on pressing
current problems. Furthermore, the coordination among
the committees themselves has become a problem, and the
delineation of their respective functions is not always clear.
Certain essential elements of effective government action
seem to be mission—full time direction, full disclosure of
departmental information and plans, closely coordinated
budgetary planning and funding, and a unified approach to
the Congress in matters of appropriations (Ref. 1, p. 31).
(These sections appear verbatim as Appendix I.)
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IMPACT
The Harding Report was adopted immediately in its entirety by President
Eisenhower. In February 1956 he appointed Mr. Edward P. Curtis, Vice
President of Eastman Kodak in Rochester, New York, to be Special Assistant
to the President for Aviation Facilities Planning. The Curtis Report was
issued the following year and became a blueprint for legislation creating the
interim Airways Modernization Board and then the new Federal Aviation
Administration (see next section, The Curtis .Report).
The Harding Report succeeded ont only on its own merits, but also because,
from its inception, it was already part of a larger White House plan to secure
from Congress the legislation necessary for the reorganization of the federal
role in air facilities development and operation. This was noted by Eisenhower
himself in his special message to Congress of June 13, 1958 (Ref. 5, p. 146).
REFERENCES
1. U.S. Aviation Facilities Study Group, W. B. Harding, Chairman,
Aviation Facilities; The Report of the Aviation Facilities Study Group
to the Director. Bureau of the Budget. Washington, Bureau of the
Budget, December 31, 1955.
2. "Air Navigation Development Board to be Organized," Aviation Daily.
May 24, 1948.
3. Sayen, C. N., President, Air Line Pilots Association, Statement in
U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings on S. 3880 before Subcommittee on
Aviation of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th
Cong., 2ndSess., May 22, 23, June 4, 5, 16, 17, 18, 1958,
Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1958.
4. Younger, J. A., Congressman from California, in U.S. Congress,
House, Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce on House Report 12616, June 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, July 1, 2, 8,
and 24, 1958. Washington, D. C., USGPO, 1958.
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5. Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the U.S., Message to Congress
of June 13, 1958, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before Sub-
committee on Aviation of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 22, 23, June 4, 5, 16, 17,
18, 1958. Washington, D. C., USGPO, 1958.
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THE CURTIS REPORT—1957
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
Presidential letter of appointment to Mr. Edward P. Curtis, February
10, 1956.
Preauthorizatlon History
The Curtis study and report developed naturally from the Harding Report
that immediately preceded it. See previous section for details.
Outline History
• Presidential letter of appointment February 1956
• Final report submitted to President May 10, 1957
• Contractor reports completed and
released May-June 1957
OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
The Presidential letter of appointment to Curtis set forth the goals and
terms of reference for the study. The goals were:
• To direct and coordinate a long-range study of the nation's require-
ments for aviation facilities.
• To develop a comprehensive plan for meeting in the most effective
and economical manner the needs disclosed by the study.
• To formulate legislative, organizational, administrative, and budgetary
recommendations to implement the comprehensive plan.
Terms of reference included working closely with and receiving assistance from
the Department of Defense and Commerce. The Harding Report was to be used
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for more detailed guidance. No specific tiihe deadline was set (Ref. 1,
pp. VII-VIII).
Membership, Activities, Staff
Curtis established an Office of Aviation Facilities Planning within the Execu-
tive Office. A great deal of technical work was required for the study the bulk
of which was assigned to contractors. The evaluation of the institutional changes
in government organizations that would be needed was conducted in-house.
Use of Contractors
Contractors were Airborne Instruments Laboratory, Aeronautical Research
Foundation, and Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory.
Relations with Other Groups
The Presidential letter of appointment required and guaranteed cooperation
from all federal agencies, but singled out the Departments of Defense and Com-
merce as potentially having the experience most useful to the Curtis group. It
required those two Departments to appoint top-level liaison officials to facili-
tate their investigations.
OUTPUTS
Reports
Curtis' Aviation Facilities Planning, Final Report, was submitted in May
1957 (Ref. 1) together with supporting contractor documents (listed and des-
cribed in Appendix J). The final report had three sections. Section I outlined
future national requirements in terms of air systems handling capacity; Section
II drew heavily on the contractor reports to propose a basic technical plan;
and Section III outlined the proposed necessary institutional changes.
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Proposed Laws and Regulations
In the area of federal reorganization, the report proposed both interim
legislation and legislation to be enacted within three years.
The interim legislation would create an Airways Modernization Board
(AMB) as an independent agency to develop and consolidate the requirements
for a future Common System for air facilities, and to select and test new com-
ponents of the system. The AMB would be composed of a chairman selected
by the President, a Defense member, and a Commerce member.
The permanent legislation would establish within three years an indepen-
dent Federal Aviation Agency into which would be consolidated "all the essential
management functions necessary to support the common needs of the military
and civil aviation of the United States." This agency would be responsible for
long-range planning, safety regulations, and accident investigations. It would
absorb the interim AMB described above. In addition, the interim plan pro-
posed that the President appoint a Special Assistant for Aviation to implement
the permanent plan.
Proposed Coordination of Federal Agency Activities
As described above, it was proposed to consolidate most functions eventually
in the FAA and many functions in an interim AMB. The CAB would lose its safety
functions but retain its primary function of economic regulation. The ACC
would continue to operate temporarily with the Special Assistant for Aviation as
Chairman, but would ultimately be dissolved, and most of its functions would be
taken over by an advisory council to FAA (Ref. 1, pp. 17-31).
IMPACT
It is remarkable how thoroughly the "blueprint" outlined above was imple-
mented. First, the Administration adopted the whole report as its program
essentially without change (Ref. 2). In fact, the Administration bill proposing
the AMB had been introduced even before the Curtis Report had been officially
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submitted to the President. The President also promptly appointed Elwood
"Pete'1 Quesada to be the Special Assistant for Aviation (Ref. 3).
Second, Congress promptly passed the legislation creating the AMB, as
proposed, despite efforts led by Senator Morony to alter it (Ref. 4; Act of
August 14, 1957, 71 Stat 349, 49 U. S. C. 1211). Congress also accelerated
the creation of the FAA (Federal Aviation Act of August 23, 1958, 72 Stat.
810), partly as a result of several spectacular mid-air collisions that occurred
during the intervening period. AMB was duly dissolved and its functions trans-
ferred to FAA (Executive Order 10786 of November 1, 1958, pursuant to Fed-
eral Aviation Act). ACC was dissolved in 1960 and a new organization, IGIA,
inherited its function of coordinating U. S. international civil aviation policy
matters.
What factors were responsible for the relatively strong impact of the
Harding and Curtis Reports ? One was the continuity provided by a two-term
President who was actively backing a timely reorganization. Another was the
seriousness of the problem.
A reading of the literature shows widespread approval for the general out-
come. Nevertheless, the large impact of the two reports had a negative effect
on the efforts of federal agencies to achieve aircraft noise abatement. This was
because the Curtis Report largely passed over the subject in its definition of
a future system. There was a short discussion* of aircraft noise in one of
the back-up documents (Ref. 4, pp. 61-62) but it did not meet the problem
squarely, and there was no mention of it at all in the final report (Ref. 1,
p. 17). This was unfortunate because, in identifying airport expansion as a
possible future system bottleneck, the Curtis group had an opportunity—which
they missed—to draw the corollary conclusion that noise might become a big
problem. One result of this last opportunity was that the terms of reference
supplied to FAA upon its creation did not specifically include a noise control
mission.
* Included verbatim as Appendix K.
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REFERENCES
1. Curtis, Edward P., Aviation Facilities Planning; Final Report
by the President's Special Assistant, May 1957, Washington, D. C.,
USGPO, 1957.
2. Eisenhower, Dwight, D., President of the U. S., Message to Congress
of July 13, 1958, in U. S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., May 22, 23, June 4, 5, 16, 17,
18, 1958, Washington, D. C., USGPO.
3. "Quesada to Succeed Curtis as White House Aide Next Week,"
Aviation Daily, June 14, 1957.
4. U. S. Executive Office, Office of Aviation Facilities Planning,
Modernizing the National System of Aviation Facilities, Washington,
D. C., USGPO.
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PROJECT HORIZON—1961
ORIGINS
Specific Authorization
"On March 3, 1961, the President directed the development for Presiden-
tial consideration of a statement ... of national aviation goals for the period
between now and 1970. " This message was conveyed in a letter from President
Kennedy to Najeeb E. Halaby, Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency.
Preauthorization History
At the same time the President directed that a companion study (Project
Beacon) be undertaken to specify requirements for the national air traffic con-
trol system. These studies were timed to coincide with the completion of
other transportation studies intended to lead to an "action program. "
OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
In his letter, the President directed:
The definition of our aviation goals is essential if the agencies
of the executive branch are to work effectively together and
with Congress toward common objectives, and if the United
States is to have the safest, most efficient, and economical
national aviation system attainable. These goals must define
the technical, economic, and military objectives of the Fed-
eral Government throughout the broad spectrum of aviation,
and provide sufficient definiteness to facilitate practicable
long-range planning. The goals and programs developed to
attain those, should be based on foreseeable technical and
financial capabilities and be formulated in terms of the appro-
priate role of aviation in the Nation's total transportation
system. While excluding matters of peculiar concern to
combat operating forces, you should take into account those
plans of the executive departments and agencies which have
a significant impact on aircraft or aviation facilities serving
civil and military requirements (Ref. 1, p. iii).
President Kennedy set the date of June 1, 1961 for completion of the task.
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Membership. Budget, Method of Operating. Staff
A Task Force was formed to fulfill the President's directive. Fred M.
Glass (former Harding Committee member and Director of Aviation for Port
of New York Authority) was appointed chairman of the Task Force, which took
on the name "Project Horizon. " Members of the Task Force were chosen
according to their expertise and background in the areas to be covered. Glass
selected specific individuals and assigned work in each particular area. Task
Force membership and specific assignments were as follows:
• Stanley Gewirtz, Vice Chairman (former Western Airlines official)
• Dr. Leslie A. Bryan, Education and General Aviation (Director of
the Institute of Aviation)
• Selig Altschul, Financial (independent aviation consultant)
• Gerald A. Busch, Market Analysis and Forecasts (Director of
Marketing and Planning, Lockheed, Los Angeles, California)
• Paul Reiber, International (former ATA attorney)
• John F. Loosbrock, Editorial (Editor of Air Force Magazine and
Space Digest)
• Francis T. Fox, Air Terminals (General Manager, Los Angeles
Department of Airports)
Financial and administrative support was provided by the Federal Aviation
Agency.
Use of Contractors
The Task Force made use of consultants and contractors, including
Airborne Instruments Laboratory, National Planning Association, and
R. Dixon Speas Associates.
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Relations with Other Groups
An Advisory Board, composed of leaders of the aviation community and
individuals with previous experience in the area of aviation policy, was formed
to provide counsel to the Task Force.
The Task Force requested that the Advisory Board, government agencies,
and representatives of the aviation industry (e.g., trade associations, labor
unions, airline companies, aircraft and equipment manufacturing companies)
air their views as to existing and proposed goals. The Task Force conferred
with these groups often during the course of the study.
A technical Review Committee, comprised of members from airline/
aircraft companies, provided the Task Force with studies that served as a
basis for the conclusions and recommendations made in the final report.
OUTPUTS
The President's directive resulted in the Report of the Task Force on
National Aviation Goals, Project Horizon, Federal Aviation Agency, submitted
to Halaby (Administrator, FAA) on September 1, 1961 (Ref. 1). Halaby sub-
mitted the report to President Kennedy with a letter dated September 5, 1961.
The report contained 24 specific recommendations, covering the problems
of airline financial posture, economic regulation of airlines, government sub-
sidies, safety, research and development, civil-military relations, labor
management relations, and education. Most of these were substantive recom-
mendations — for example:
• CAB approach to regulation requires reorientation.
• Air carriers must pursue new marketing and promotional ideas to
broaden their base of support.
• The 10 percent passenger transportation tax should be repealed.
• The Railway Labor Act should be replaced by an act tailored to
airline needs.
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• U.S. international carriers must receive more government support
or face subsidy.
• A mach 3 transport should be developed as soon as possible.
• Aviation research and development programs in government should
be revamped and stressed (Ref. 4).
There was also a recommendation for new legislation to deal with aircraft
noise:
The head-on conflict between aviation interests and communi-
ties and property owners adjacent to airports is too important
and basic to progress and the Nation's commerce to permit
indifferent treatment of the problem by our Federal authorities.
The need for the air traveler and air shipper to have available
aviation facilities close to his points of origin and destination,
and the right of the property owner to the peaceful use of his
property without unwarranted interference from aircraft noise
and flight, are both in the Nation*s interest. The situation
calls for a massive technical attack by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, the Federal Aviation Agency, and
private industry on the problem of engine noise, with particular
emphasis on turbine powerplants. It is further essential, from
an operating standpoint, that the Federal Aviation Agency
establish and enforce standards of aircraft noise exposure and
noise abatement rules applying to aircraft operations into and
out of airports, and that future aircraft be designed against
standards reflecting maximum limits for noise output, likewise
established by the FAA. This will require legislation.
A corollary consideration, which properly falls to the local
communities, is the accomplishment of zoning changes so as to
reclassify land and critical areas near airports from residen-
tial to industrial or recreational use. The value of good
industrial land adjacent to airports has almost universally
grown at a rapid rate, and the transition should, except per-
haps in rare instances, inflict no economic loss on property
owners. As a corollary, the Federal Government should not
permit a Federal agency to participate in land development
programs which are not compatible with adjacent airport
utilization. It is gratifying to note the enlightened position
in this regard recently taken by the Federal Housing Admini-
stration (Ref. 1, pp. 95-96).
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Few of the recommendations, however, dealt with government organization
or interagency coordination, probably because the emphasis was on outlining
broad goals that the FAA could later use in developing a detailed National
Aviation Plan (Ref. 1, p. xiii). However, in the field of research and develop-
ment, it was pointed out that "aeronautics is running a poor second to space
technology" within NASA (Ref. 1, p. 49) and it was recommended that a group
should be set up to take over the aeronautical portion of NASC's mandate:
Recommendations;
1. A senior technical group should be established within NASA
charged with providing broad leadership, direction, guidance,
and coordination to the entire aviation community in aero-
nautical research and development. This group should have
the advice and counsel of an advisory board composed of
leading aeronautical scientists from outside the Government.
2. The group should be headed by a qualified aeronautical scientist,
rather than an engineer, with the rank of operating director
within the NASA organizational framework.
3. NASA should emphasize its in-house applied research effort,
with the built of essentially development work being carried
out by private industry.
4. The work of the Bureau of Research and Development within
the FAA should be reoriented in accordance with changing
requirements and technology in air traffic control and related
systems.
5. NASA should also continuously monitor the basic research
sponsored by the Department of Defense and other Government
agencies, particularly that being undertaken in support of the
missile, space, and electronic technologies, to assure that
aeronautical technology derives maximum benefit from the
results of such research (Ref. 1, pp. 49-50).
IMPACT
The immediate impact of the report was a general Presidential endorse-
ment, and instructions to FAA Administrator Halaby to take the lead in its
implementation (Ref. 4). However, the report had been delayed because of
"intra-governmental squabbling over its contents" (Ref. 5) and although
-------
Halaby used the President's action directive, he disassociated himself somewhat
from the Task Force's report (Ref. 6). Part of the interagency relations prob-
lem may well have concerned relations with the Department of Commerce,
which had said that Project Horizon was part of a Commerce grand plan for
transportation (Ref. 2), or with CAB, criticized for slowness of regulatory
action in the report.
At any rate, there were few perceptible results based on the recommenda-
tions listed. Noise certification of new aircraft did not come until after
the Office of Science and Technology push of 1966-67 (previously described in
the section on FANAP), and there was a considerable delay before noise-
related standards to be used in the approval or disapproval of all federally
assisted construction projects were promulgated by HUD in 1971 (Ref. 3).
In the field of research and development coordination, Recommendations
1 and 2 were aimed at reconstituting a group similar to the main Advisory
Committee of the NAG A, which had been widely regarded as successful in its
operations. These recommendations were not adopted until 1967, when ASEB
was created; meanwhile, the NASC remained. Recommendation 5 was, how-
ever, implemented when NASA and DOD set up the Aeronautics and Astro-
nautics Coordinating Board.
MONITORING AND UPDATING
The FAA was charged with monitoring progress toward the goals outlined
in Project Horizon.
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REFERENCES
1. U.S. Federal Aviation Agency, Report of the Task Force on National
Aviation Goals—Project Horizon. September 1961.
2. Aviation Daily, June 6, 1961, p. 226.
3. U.S. HUD, Circular 1390.2. July 1971.
4. Aviation Daily. September 11, 1961, p. 45.
5. Aviation Daily. August 21, 1961, p. 301.
6. Aviation Daily. September 18, 1961, p. 89.
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AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ENGINEERING BOARD (ASEB) OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING-CIVIL AVIATION RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT STUDY, 1968
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
The study was selected by ASEB itself and supported by a NASA grant.
Preauthorization History
The National Academy of Engineering (NAE) established the Aeronautics
and Space Engineering Board in May 1967 to advise NASA and other agencies of
the government. NAE was itself established in 1964 to:
• Provide means of assessing changing needs of the nation and the tech-
nical resources that should be applied to those changing needs.
(a) Sponsor programs aimed at meeting these needs.
(b) Encourage engineering research as may be advisable in the
country's interest.
• Explore means for promoting cooperation in engineering in the U. S.
and abroad.
• Advise Congress and the Executive Branch (when called upon by a
department or agency thereof) on matters of national importance in
engineering.
• Cooperate with the National Academy of Science on both science and
engineering related matters.
• Recognize outstanding contributions to the nation by leading engineers.
ASEB consists of a chairman, a vice chairman, and nine members, all
from different areas of the aviation community.
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ASEB acts as an advisor to NASA and other related agencies of the govern-
ment. ASEB's study was preceded by a report prepared by the Library of
Congress for the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences (Ref. 1).
OPERA 11ON
Formulation of Objectives
In consultation with NASA, DOT, FAA, the President's Science Advisor,
certain interested committees of Congress, and the National Aeronautics and
Space Council (NASC), ASEB selected as its first topic of study "An Assess-
ment of Federal Government Involvement in Civil Aviation Research and
Development."
Membership, Activities, Staff, Contractors
In order to study federal government involvement in civil aviation research
and development, six ad hoc committees chaired by ASEB members were directed
to compile reports in pertinent areas:
• Flight Vehicles and Airbreathing Propulsion (Edward Wells, Perry
Pratt, Chairmen)
9 Aircraft Operations (Willis Hawkins, Chairman)
• Air Traffic Control (Drs. Allan Puckett, George Solomon, Bernard
Oliver, Co-Chairmen)
• Airport and Support Facilities (John Kyle, Jr., Chairman)
• Economics of Civil Aviation (Carlos Wood, Chairman)
• Noise (Dr. Leo Bernek)
Each committee consisted of knowledgeable men from various sectors of the
aviation community.
A drafting committee chaired by Dr. Raymond L. Bisplinghoff (an ASEB
member) and composed of the ASEB chairmen was responsible for the final report.
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Relations with Others
Various members of ASEB and the ad hoc committees were from the
industrial community.
OUTPUTS
The study of the federal government's involvement in civil aviation R&D
resulted in six reports prepared by the ad hoc committees listed above.
A final report entitled "Civil Aviation Research and Development: An
Assessment of Federal Government Involvement" summarized the results of
the study. The major conclusions as stated in the introduction to the final report
were:
A. The three most critical factors limiting the growth of ,
civil aviation were (1) airport and support facilities;
(2) noise; and (3) air traffic control, in that order.
B. It was necessary for federal aeronautical research and
development to be much more closely coordinated:
". . .knitting together more tightly the civil aviation
research and development activities of the Department
of Transportation, it smajor operating unit, the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration, and the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration, and especially dividing
their responsibilities according to capability. The DOT
should provide the leadership in conducting systems
studies to identify, analyze, and rank civil aviation goals
as well as the research and development needed to attain
these goals; NASA should be responsible for research
and development in all the areas of importance to civil
aeronautics; the FAA should, in addition to operating the
airways network, be responsible for the systems testing
of the resulting operational concepts and hardware
(Ref. 2, pp. v-vi).
Thus, the ASEB study was the first to highlight the aircraft noise problem.
It also proposed a specific jurisdictional solution that would leave each of the
three agencies with important roles. However, it did not address itself
specifically to the kind of coordination mechanisms that adoption of such a
division of labor implied.
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IMPACT
The major outcome of the ASEB work was not that its recommendations
were immediately adopted, but that its thinking shaped the CARD (Civil Aviation
Research and Development) Study that immediately followed it (Ref. 3, pp. 19-20).
The NAE organized an Advisory Committee to the CARD study staff, which
assisted them from the outset. The degree to which the ASEB work facilitated
the CARD work is open to question, however. The CARD study, which was
initiated in August 1968, soon feel far behind schedule. Later, however, NASA
officials said that the ASEB report "had been used extensively in reshaping their
aeronautical program" (Ref. 3, p. 71).
MONITORING AND UPDATING
While the study group itself disbanded after the report was completed, as
is typically the case, the Advisory Committee mentioned above continued to
monitor developments as the CARD study progressed.
REFERENCES
1. U. S. Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Policy
Planning for Aeronautical Research and Development, Staff Report
prepared for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, U. S. Senate, S. Doc. 90, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
May 19, 1966.
2. National Academy of Engineering, Aeronautics and Space Engineering
Board, Civil Aviation Research and Development—An Assessment
of Federal Government Involvement Summary Report, August 1968.
3. U. S. Congress, House, Issues and Direction for Aeronautical Research
and Development, Report of the Subcommittee on Advanced Research
and Technology of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U. S.
House of Representatives, House Report 91-932, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.
March 23, 1970.
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THE CIVIL AVIATION'RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY STUDY
(CARD STUDY). 1971
ORIGINS AND HISTORY
Specific Authorization
The Civil Aviation Research and Development Policy Study was undertaken
jointly by the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) in accordance with a memorandum signed
August 6, 1968.
Preauthorization History
According to the report (Ref. 1), one of the first stimuli was a recommenda-
tion by Dr. Glen P. Wilson of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences, 90th Congress. Dr. Wilson had made a preliminary study of the
subject in the summer of 1965 (Ref. 1, p. 11-8). Considerable Congressional
pressure led to the CARD Study (Ref. 2, p. 38), and its objectives closely
followed Congressional recommendations (Ref. 2, p. 41). The ASEB study
was an important input of the CARD Study.
OPERATIONS
Formulation of Objectives
The Committee recommended that the study should analyze the benefits to
the nation from aviation resulting from various levels of research and develop-
ment effort.
Membership. Activities. Staff (Details in Appendix L)
Personnel were detailed from the two primary participating agencies
(DOT, NASA) as well as from the Department of Defense and the Civil Aero-
nautics Board. Part-time participation came from the Department of State,
the Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce, the Interstate
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Commerce Commission, the National Aeronautics and Space Council, the
Export-Import Bank, and the National Transportation Safety Board.
A committee (the ASEB Advisory Committee) was organized by the Academy
of Engineering to act as an advisor to the joint study.
The work of the study was accomplished under the general direction of a
management committee consisting of a chairman, vice chairman, and four
other members (two from NASA, one from FAA, and one from DOT).
The joint study staff, under the direction of the management committee,
operated with an executive director (DOT), a deputy director (NASA), and
members from CAB, DOT, and NASA.
In carrying out the study, individual analyses were made, resulting in a
number of supporting papers that were the foundation of the final report.
Use of Contractors
Information provided by contractors included:
• "Institutional Factors in Civil Aviation, " prepared by Arthur D.
Little, Inc., January 1971.
• "A Historical Study of the Benefits Derived from the Application of
Technical Advances to Civil Aviation," Vol. I, Summary Report and
Appendix A, prepared by Booz, Allen Applied Research, Inc.,
February 1971.
o A Historical Study of the Benefits Derived from the Application of
Technical Advances to Civil Aviation, " Vol. II, Appendices B through
I, prepared by Booz, Allen Applied Research, Inc., February 1971.
Relations with Others
Various professional and industrial organizations offered advice. Rela-
tions with Congress have been partially covered in previous paragraphs.
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Essentially, Congressional Committees such as the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics served as sponsors and, when the pace of the study
slowed, as project monitors, accelerating progress by the use of oversight
hearings.
OUTPUTS
The joint DOT/NASA study was published in March 1971. It attempted to
examine thoroughly all the factors affecting the future of civil aviation. Dur-
ing the study, analyses were made of the following:
• Long- and short-haul passenger service
• Air cargo
• General aviation
• Air traffic control
• Airports
• Complementary surface transportation
• Financial considerations
• Institutional and environmental factors
• Foreign competition
• Military Contributions to civil aviation — benefits
• Several key policy issues
Supporting papers on the above topics were published.
As far as interagency coordination was concerned, the report recommended:
• Program offices to be established in DOT and staffed in part from
experts on loan from other agencies, in those cases where responsi-
bilities crossed organizational lines.
• Interchange of technical personnel from DOT, NASA, DOD, and
possibly CAB at middle management levels.
• More active use of the NASC as a "focal point for the evolution of
national policy related to civil aviation," including a permanent
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mechanism for policy review of interagency questions and the e
establishment of some sort of communications channel by which
industry could make its views known (Ref. 1, pp. 6-8 to 6-9).
Another key recommendation was "To take full advantage of the expertise
and other resources in the airline and aerospace industries, joint enterprises
between the Government and industry should be considered for major experi-
mental hardware and demonstration programs" (Ref. 1, pp 2-8).
IMPACT
According to Congressional hearings (Ref. 3) held nearly 18 months after
completion of the CARD Study, progress implementation of study recommenda-
tions was slow. The NASC had not taken the lead in continuing policy analysis
and coordination, and CARD Study priorities had not yet been "formally
acknowledged or agreed to by the Administration" (Hearing Finding 1, Ref. 3,
p. 1). On the other hand, it was acknowledged that "substantial progress has
been made in developing more effective working relationships between NASA,
DOT and FAA" (Hearing Finding 7, Ref. 3, p. 10). One of the areas of
improved coordination, and in fact, the principal example cited at the hearings,
was the establishment of a joint NASA/DOT Office of Noise Abatement.
It was also acknowledged that the problems of setting policy were formid-
able and that the evidence concerning the divergence of military and civil
aeronautical requirements remained inconclusive (Hearing Finding 9, Ref. 3,
p. 11), which led to the launching of still more studies (the AAC Study, and
the RADCAP Study, respectively).
MONITORING AND UPDATING
Since the CARD study group was disbanded and since NASC had failed to
take an active role, the chief mechanism for monitoring progress toward
CARD study goals was the series of Congressional hearings referred to in the
previous sections.
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The goal of the CARD Study was to try to determine what level of research
and development should be maintained in order to achieve desired results.
The study was also to include an analysis of the differences between military
and civil aeronautical requirements, and to outline the diminishing benefits of
military research and development as related to civilian needs.
The specific objectives as formulated in an expanded charter finally
agreed upon in September 1969 were:
Objectives of the Study
Consonant with the recommendations of the Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences in Senate Report 957, the
overall objectives of the study are:
(a) To analyze the relationship between benefits that accrue
to the nation from civil aviation and the level of aeronautical
research and development effort.
(b) To determine or develop criteria for determining the
level of civil aeronautical research and development required
to maintain U. S. leadership in civil aviation in the future.
(c) To identify what portion of civil aviation R. & D. should
be sponsored by the government.
(d) To analyze the divergence and commonality of military
and civil aeronautical requirements and assess the trends
of benefits to civilian needs from military R. & D.
(e) To identify civil aviation R. & D. anticipated to be
undertaken in the private sector (to the end that civil aviation
R. & D. efforts of both public and private sector can be
viewed in an overall national context) (Ref. 2, pp. 41-42).
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REFERENCES
1. U.S. Department of Transportation and National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, Civil Aviation Research and Development
Policy Study, DOT TST-10-4 and NASA SP-265, Washington, D. C.,
March 1971.
2. U.S. Congress, Issues and Directions for Aeronautical Research
and Development, Report of the Subcommittee on Advanced Research
and Technology of the Committee on Science and Astronautics,
U.S. House of Representatives, House Report 91-932, 91st Cong.,
2nd Sess., March 23, 1970.
3. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
Subcommittee on Aeronautics and Space Technology, Civil Aviation
Research and Development: Policies. Programs and Problems.
House Report 92-1423, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., September 1972.
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REPORT; R & D CONTRIBUTIONS TO AVIATION PROGRESS (RADCAP)—1972
ORIGINS AND HISTORY
Specific Authorization, Preauthorization History, Outline History
The RADCAP Study, which followed the CARD Study, concerned itself only
with the relevancy of military aeronautical programs to civil aviation R & D
needs. It was initiated in late 1971 by DOD following a suggestion in a memo
(September 9, 1971) from William McGruder of the White House staff to Deputy
Secretary of Defense, David Packard. The first meeting of the Study Team
occurred on December 13, 1971. The report was issued in August 1972.
The underlying reason for RADCAP was that the original January 1968
Senate Report (of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences) that
led to the CARD Study suggested that a "detailed analysis of the divergence of
military and civilian aeronautical requirements" be made to assess "the dimin-
ishing benefits to civilian needs from military R & D." It was felt that the
CARD Study had covered civilian needs and benefits but had not covered suffi-
cently the question of military contribution and relevancy.
OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
Specific objectives of the study were:
• To identify the major technological advances that have been made in
aviation since 1925—including background, sponsor, user, application,
timing, and trends.
• To show the relevancy of currently planned and funded DOD aeronautical
R & D programs to the R & D needs of civil transport aviation—research
and technology, development, application, and transfer process.
Membership
Overall guidance and direction were provided by a four-man DOT/NASA/DOD
Steering Group. The work was done by a Study Team.
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Activities and Staff
The Study Team consisted of a working group and nine panels (see Appendix
M); the panels made the primary effort in the nine subject areas that led to
the nine appendices of the report, and the working group drew together the Sum-
mary Report. Maximum use was made of existing data, and the CARD Study
was used as the source for civil aviation R & D needs.
The Aeronautical Systems Division and Laboratories of the Air Force Sys-
tems Command supplied clerical and support personnel.
Use of Contractors
There was no use of contractors.
Relations with Other Groups
Relations with industry: The AIAA, McDonnell Douglas, Boeing, Pratt
and Whitney, and G. E. all provided technical assistance, comments, and
advice at the request of the Study Team.
There were apparently few or no contacts with Congress or state and local
governments.
OUTPUTS
The only output was the RADCAP Report (Ref. 1).
IMPACT
The report has had no apparent impact, in the sense of any significant
influence on recentlegislation or regulations.
MONITORING AND UPDATING
By its nature, the group working on RADCAP went out of business with the
publication of the report. There is no standing body to update its findings. Also,
it is worth noting that the focus of RADCAP was on R & D that was accomplished,
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rather than on the institutional framework in which the R & D occurred, was
coordinated, or was transferred to civil aviation.
REFERENCES
1. Joint DOT/NASA/DOT Study, R & D Contributions to Aviation Progress,
August 1972, Volume I, Summary Report, Volume II, Appendices 1
through 9:
TITLE
APPENDIX
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Propulsion and Power
Meteorology
Avionics
Materials
Human Factors/Aviation Medicine
Air Vehicle Technology
Military "R" Relevancy/Civil Aviation R & D
Needs
Military "D" Relevancy/Civil Transport
Aviation
Aeronautical R & D Funding
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AVIATION ADVISORY COMMISSION (AAC) — 1973
ORIGINS AND HISTORY
Specific Authorization
P. L. 91-258 (1970) required by the President and Congress. Both the
President and Congress were concerned that the current aviation transporta-
tion system would not be sufficient to meet the projected demand in future years.
Preauthorization history
In 1969 the Senate Commerce Committee held hearings "to determine the
appropriate course of federal action for the coining years in the field of
airport/airways development (Ref. 4, title page), with three bills under con-
sideration. At the hearings, Alfred E. Driscoll, former governor of New Jersey
and co-chairman of a regional development commission, proposed that a national
commission be appointed to specify a long-term optimal national aviation system.
Such a commission can project the air travel demand for the
1980's and onward and define the overall pattern of facilities,
equipment and services that will best meet this demand —
taking into account the total costs and benefits and the long-
term effects on the general design and environment of the
Nation's emerging superregions.
Once the commission has arrived at a general definition of
the optimum air system, the continuing detailed airport and
airway planning for this system can be carried forward as set
forth in S. 2437 — with compatible vehicle and service develop-
ment by the appropriate industries and Government agencies.
By its composition, the commission cannot only outline the
national air system but can provide for the vital integration
of this system with other forms of transportation (particularly
highspeed ground service) and with effective land-use programs.
In doing so, it can give encouragement to broad regional trans-
portation planning and development as contemplated in S. 2425
which is also under consideration by your committee (Ref. 4,
p. 887).
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Thus, under the Driscoll proposal, the proposed commission would have
a broader mandate than that of DOT to prepare an initial national airport
system plan, which was proposed under a different section of S. 2437, the
Administration bill.
Senator Boggs incorporated Driscoll's ideas in an amendment to S. 2437
to establish the Aviation Advisory Commission, including terms of reference
covering "airport location and size, surround land use, terminal arrange-
ments, ground access, airspace use, air traffic control, airline route struc-
ture and administrative arrangements, aircraft design, environmental effects,
effect on urban areas, and costs of carrying out the plan (Ref. 4, p. 944).
Boggs added an AAC advisory role to the responsibilities of the Secretary
of Transportation, noting that the AAC could solicit ideas from the private
sector in the interest of developing a more comprehensive outlook on the
problems of civil aviation. He wrote that this advisory role was not designed
to "usurp the powers of the Secretary of Transportation," but rather, "in the
opinion of a broad range of people who are deeply concerned and involved in
the industry who support this amendment," to help him (Ref. 4, p. 943).
The amendment envisioned a somewhat larger Commission than the one
that was subsequently established, proposing that the membership include
representatives of interested federal departments and agencies, major industry
associations, and local regional planning entities.
OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
P. L. 91-258-970, page 5, lists the duties of the Commission. From
these requirements, a Commission Goal was established:
To outline to the President and the Congress those long-range
needs of our aerospace transportation system which must be
met, if, as an integral part of the total transportation system
of the world, it is to have sufficient capacity to satisfy the
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reasonable demands of all users, is to be technically,
economically and politically sound, and can at the same
time be operated in harmony with the environment (Ref. 3).
Membership
Nine members appointed by the President (list of members Appendix N).
The members included one person to serve as Chairman, chosen on basis of
education, training or experience, and eight persons specifically qualified to
represent commercial air carriers, general aviation, aircraft manufacturers,
airport sponsors, state aeronautics agencies, -and three major organizations
concerned with conservation or regional planning (Ref. 2).
The AAC was authorized an appropriation not to exceed $2 million to be
drawn from the airport and airways trust fund. The Commission did not
expend all of the authorized funds.
Activities
Two-year study. Major-issue questionnaires were sent out to state,
federal and industrial organizations. Studies were prepared by private
industry and federal, state, and local government agencies. AAC-sponsored
conferences were held, and reports were generated from them.
Staff
Average size at any one time was 14 people (see Appendix N).
Use of Contractors and Consultants
Several contractor organizations and consultants were utilized
(Appendix N).
Relations with Others
Appendix N, which lists 56 organizations that helped in the selection of
major issues and participated in Commission conferences to develop those
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issues. The list includes industry, state and local governments, and federal
agencies. Because the Commission was not part of another government agency,
the study could be conducted with complete objectivity and without fear of
offending a supporting federal agency.
OUTPUTS
The Aviation Advisory Commission designed a course of action for the
period through 1985. The AAC was confident about being able to meet the
system needs during this period. However the Commission was unsure of how
the plan would work beyond 1985, since it would be affected by trends in the
following areas:
• Population
• Land Resources Available
• Energy Resources Available
To make allowances for these trends, the Commission recommended a
periodically updated 10-year National Aviation Plan to be prepared by a newly
established Under Secretary for Civil Aviation. Recommendations were made
covering immediate and future problems of the aviation transportation system
and the implementation of a workable system (Ref. 3).
The AAC made the same recommendation on government organization as
the CARD Study had made before it: accomplish interagency coordination of
civil aviation activities through the NASC (Ref. 3, p. V-85ff). (See also AAC
consultant report in Appendix Q.)
IMPACT
After the report was submitted to the President and Congress, little was
heard of it. According to Crocker Snow, Chairman of the Commission, the
report failed (Ref. 2). Snow believes that a major reason for the failure was
the presence of strong dissent on the Commission. He also believes that the
only recommendations of the Commission that have been heeded so far are
those regarding aircraft noise.
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A major recommendation of the report concerning use of the NASC as a
coordinating body was modified shortly after the report came out. The NASC
was abolished by President Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973,
effective July 1973.
MONITORING AND UPDATING
AAC was established only for the study. It was legally disbanded 60 days
after the final report was completed.
REFERENCES
1. Aviation Daily. February 13, 1974, p. 243.
2. P.L. 91-258 (May 21, 1970).
3. Report of Aviation Advisory Commission. "The Long Range Needs of
Aviation," January 1973.
4. U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce. Subcommittee
on Aviation. Hearings on S. 1637, S. 2437, and S. 2651. Serial No.
91-13. 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969.
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EPA REPORT TO CONGRESS ON Am CRAFT/AIRPORT NOISE—1973
ORIGINS AND OUTLINE HISTORY
Specific Authorization
Section 7(a) oft he Noise Control Act of 1972 (P. L. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234)
(Ref. 2).
Preauthorization History
The legislative history of the Noise Control Act shows a compromise be-
tween those who wanted to give EPA authority to promulgate regulations to
abate aircraft/airport noise and those who felt this responsibility more pro-
perly rested with FAA. The Act required EPA to conduct a study and then to
present proposed regulations to FAA. FAA was required either to promulgate
the regulations under its existing authority or to explain why it would not do so.
The Act also required each federal agency to consult with the Administrator of
EPA in prescribing standards and regulations respecting noise and charged
EPA with the "effective coordination of Federal research and activity in noise
control" (Ref. 2, Section 2(b)).
Outline History
• Initiation of EPA study efforts November 1972
• First meeting of Task Force February 1973
• Final meeting of Task Force June 1973
• Final task group reports July 27, 1973
• EPA Report submitted to Congress July 1973
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OPERATION
Formulation of Objectives
Objectives were spelled out in the Act. To a lesser extent, terms of re-
ference and methods of procedure were also specified:
Sec. 7 (a). The Administrator, after consultation with appro-
priate Federal, state, and local agencies and interested per-
sons, shall conduct a study of the (1) adequacy of Federal
Aviation Administration flight and operational noise controls;
(2) adequacy of noise emission standards on new and existing
aircraft, together with recommendations on the retrofitting
and phaseout of existing aircraft; (3) implications of identi-
fying and achieving levels of cumulative noise exposure
around airports; and (4) additional measures available to
airport operators and local governments to control aircraft
noise. He shall report on such study to the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Committee on Commerce and Public
Works of the Senate within nine months after the date of the
enactment of this act (Ref. 2, Sec. 7 (a)).
To that end a Task Force consisting of six Task Groups was set up by
EPA.
Task Group One, examined the existing legal/institutional structure in-
cluding Federal interagency coordination problems.
Membership
In accordance with the provisions of Section 7 (a), a participatory and con-
sultative process was used to develop the six task group reports. Letters of
invitation to participate were sent to organizations' representing various sec-
tors of interest, including other federal agencies, organizations representing
state and local governments, environmental groups, pilots, airport proprie-
tors, and airlines, as well as persons or organizations expressing an interest
in the study. (Complete list for Task Group 1 is in Appendix 0.) However, the
membership of the group producing the final task group reports consisted en-
tirely of EPA staff and their consultants.
4-60
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Activities
Each of the task groups held four to six working meetings, culminating in a
linal planning session June 21 and 22, 1973. EPA staff used draft recom-
mendations from participants to write recommendations tor each task group.
A consensus existed for each recommendation, even though not all the partici-
pants agreed on each. Therefore, separate individual and organizational
positions were printed in appendices to the task group reports.
Use oi Contractors
Approximately 15 EPA consultants and contractors worked directly with
the task groups.
Relations with Other Groups
As previously mentioned, task groups were themselves interorganizational
groups that included representatives from states and municipalities, federal
agencies, industry, and other interest groups.
OUTPUTS
Reports
The basic output was the July 1973 Report to Congress (Ref. 1) together
with backup documents from each of the six task groups (Ref. 3-8).
Two related reports, required by another section of the Noise Control Act
of 1972, were also prepared by the EPA Office of Noise Abatement and Control.
These documents, the "Criteria Document (Ref. 9) and the "Levels Document"
(Ref. 10), help establish the effects of environmental noise on public health and
welfare that must be known in order to set ultimate goals for the national avia-
tion noise reduction effort.
4-61
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Proposed Laws and Regulations
A major finding in the Report to Congress was that the federal government
should promulgate an airport noise regulation designed to limit cumulative
noise exposure in residential communities. It was concluded in a related back-
up report (Ref. 3) that this could be done by FAA under existing FAA airport
certification processes and that no new legislation was required. Other recom-
mendations included:
• Establishment by states of airport land use commissions.
o A study by Congress and the Executive Branch of financing schemes
(with the particular participation of CAB).
a Acceleration of federal regulation of aircraft noise under existing
FAA authority.
Public Relations and Information Dissemination
The Task Group reports and the Report to Congress were disseminated widely
by EPA and released for sale to the public.
The main report to Congress committed EPA to take active responsibility
for coordinating federal noise control and noise research activities under Sec-
tion 4 of the Noise Control Act (Ref. 2).
Specifically, it was noted that the abolition of previous coordination
mechanisms for aviation research in general (NASC) and noise research in
particular (IANAP) made the coordinating role of the EPA Administrator as
established in the Act more important. Moreover, the report stated that the
interim informal communications existing in 1973 between responsible officials
of DOT, FAA, NASA, and EPA would "be translated into an effective formalized
procedure before the end of FY 1974" (Ref. 1, pp 42-43). One function of such a
procedure would be to establish and monitor progress toward a comprehensive
set of national aviation noise reduction objectives consistent with public health
and welfare (Ref. 1, p. 116).
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[M PACT
Sinco July 1973 the FA A has issued several notices of proposed rulemak-
I
in-; dealing with uircr:iU noise reduction. These actions may be due in part to
the report to Congress and to EPA activity in drafting regulations for presen-
tation to FA A under Section 7(c) of the Noise Control. Act.
In January 1974, EPA set up within the Office of Noise Abatement and
Control an Aviation Noise Control Requirements Study to develop a plan for the
creation of a permanent National Aircraft Noise Abatement Plan, i.e., a com-
prehensive, integrated federal plan for the abatement and control of aircraft
noise (Ref. 11, p. 1). The work of this group is in progress.
MONITORING AND UPDATING
To date, Congressional oversight hearings in December 1973 and in
March, May and July 1974 have been the main forums for review of progress
toward an improved federal coordination mechanism. A further mechanism for
review will be the periodic report on all federal noise activities called for by
Section 4(c)(3) of the Act:
(3) On the basis of regular consultation with appropriate
Federal agencies, the Administrator shall compile and pub-
lish, from time to time, a report on the status and progress
of Federal activities relating to noise research and noise
control. This report shall describe the noise control pro-
grams of each Federal agency and assess the contributions
of those programs to the Federal Government's overall
efforts to control noise (Ref. 2, Section 4(c)(3)).
REFERENCES
1. "Report on aircraft/Airport noise," Report of the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency in Compliance with Public Law 92-
574, Senate Committee on Public Works, Serial No. 93-8, July 1973.
2. Noise Control Act of 1972 (P. L. 92-574, 86 Stnt. 1234), October 27,
1972.
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3. "Legal and Institutional Analysis of Aircraft and Airport Noise and
Apportionment of Authority Between Federal, State, and Local
Governments, " Report of Task Group 1, EPA NTID 73. 2, July 1973.
4. "Operations Analysis Including Monitoring, Enforcement, Safety, and
Cost, " Report of Task Group 2, EPA NTID 73. 3, July 1973.
5. "Impact Characterization of Noise Including Implications of Identifying
and Achieving Levels of Cumulative Noise Exposure," Report to Task
Group 3, EPA NTID 73.4, July 1973.
6. "Noise Source Abatement Technology and Cost Analysis Including Re-
trofitting," Report on Task Group 4, EPA NTID 73.5, July 1973.
7. "Review and Analysis of Present and'Planned FAA Noise Regulatory
Actions and their Consequences Regarding Aircraft and Airport
Operations," Report to Task Group 5, EPA NTID 73.6, July 1973.
8. "Military Aircraft and Airport Noise and Opportunities for Reduction
without Inhibition of Military Missions," Report of Task Group 6, EPA
NTID 73.7, July 1973.
9. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Public Health and Welfare
Criteria for Noise. 550/9-73-002, July 27, 1973.
10. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Information on Levels of En-.
vironmental Noise Requisite to Protection Public Health and Welfare
with an Adequate Margin of Safety. 550/9-74-004, March 1974.
11. Schettino, J. C. and H. J. Nozick, Office of Noise Abatement and
Control, EPS, "Information Brief on National Aircraft Noise Abate-
ment Management Plan Concept," January 25, 1974.
4-64
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA
SHEET
1- Kiport No
EPA 550/9-74-019A
's Acrission No.
4. I ilk ,i'iJ
CIVIL AVIATION STUDIES AND INTERAGENCY COORDINATING ORGANIZATION
A Background History, with Emphasis on Organizations Dealing with the Aircraft Noise
Issue Volume 1, Report
'5- Report D.uc
5 December 1974
6.
7. Aulhnr(s)
Carl Modig
8- Performing Org ini/.mon Kepi
No.
9. Informing Organization Niimr jnj Address
Informatics Inc.
Noise Information Program
6000 Executive Blvd. Rockville. Md 20852
10. Proicct/Task/Work Unn No.
11. Contract/Grant No.
68-01-2229
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address
U S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Noise Abatement and Control
1921 Jefferson Davis Highway
Arlington, Virginia 20460
13. Type of Keport & Period
Covered
Final
14.
15. Supplementary Notes
Volume two contains copies of source documents pertaining to the studied organizations.
16. Abstracts As background information to the federal noise abatement program, past and present federal organizations set
up to coordinate civil aviation policy are described, including those dealing with the aircraft noise problem. Commissions
and agency task groups who studied civil aviation problems are also described. Descriptions include membership, authori-
zation,' outline history, objectives, activities, staff, outputs (reports, proposals, etc.), impact, and mechanisms for modifi-
cations of organizational structure or goals. The evolution of these organizations from after World War II to the present
is traced, both those coordinating research and those coordinating operational policy. Typical problems that have been
encountered by various organizations are discussed. Some conclusions of the study are: (1) in the early 1960's there was
no institution actively coordinating federal aircraft noise abatement activities; (2) much of the impetus for better co-
ordination has come from Congress; (3) successful coordination requires high-level agency and Administration support,
(4) the host agency may have difficulty securing cooperation of other agencies.
17. Kiy Words and Document Analysis.
Civil Aviation*
Noise Pollution*
Aircraft Noise*
Interagency Coordination
Interagency Committee
Presidential Commissions
Congressional Commissions
Policy Coordination
17o. Descriptors
(* = terms verified already used in GRA/GRI)
17b. likmif iers/Op<.n-L nded Terms
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
National Aeronautics and Space Council
Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board
Interagency Noise Abatement Program
CARD Study
Aviation Advisory Commission
Committee on Hearing, Bio-Acoustics and Bio-Mechanics
17c. COSATI Field/Group
EPA Report to Congress on Aircraft/Airport Noise
Office of Science and Technology
Federal Aviation Administration
Environmental Protection Agency
Interagency Group on International Aviation
5/D
18. Availability Statement
Release unlimited
19. Security Class (This
Report)
UNCLASSIFIED
ASSIF1ED
Zlass (Thi
20. Security Class (This
Page
UNCLASSIFIED
21. No. of Pages
22. Price
FORM NTIS-3S (REV
THIS FORM MAY BE REPRODUCED
USCOMM DC 14BS2-P72
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