UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION I
J.F. KENNEDY FEDERAL BUILDING, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02203-2211
TECHNICAL SAFETY SEMINAR
THE PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY
POLYETHYLENE PLANT EXPLOSION.
PASADENA, TEXAS
OCTOBER, 23, 1989.
One of the largest U.S.A. chemical plant explosions
23 people died. 130 others seriously injured.
$750 million loss of property.
The presentation will be based primarily on (a) the 1990 Presidential Report.
issued by The U.S. Department of Labor; (b) the 1990 formal Recommendations
of the U.S. Enviromental Protection Agency; and (c) the (300 pages of) text of
the citations of allegations issued by CSHA -Region VI.
SPEAKER:
Norman A. Beddows CSP. CEH
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 1.
August 7, 1990
The J.F. Kennedy Fed. Bldg.
Floor 22 - Room 2208
10:30 - 12:00
A seminar to promote safety in the chemical
industries and be useful to industry, government
and local officials and the public.
OPEN TO INDUSTRY AND THE PUBLIC
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CHEMICAL SAFETY AUDIT
PHILLIPS 66 CORPORATION
HOUSTON CHEMICAL COMPLEX
PASADENA, TEXAS
NOVEMBER 6-7,1989
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PREPARED BY:
US. EhMRONMENTAL PROTECTtON AGENCY - REGION 6
DRAFT REPORT: 12fl8/89
REVISED ON: 01/1CV90
RNALCOPY:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND 1
FOREWORD 6
REPORT ORGANIZATION 6
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 GENERAL FACILITY AND AUDIT INFORMATION 7
1.2 PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE AUDIT 7
2.0 FACILITY INFORMATION
2.1 SITE DESCRIPTION
2.1.1 Facility Profile 8
2.1.2 Site Topography and Meteorological
Conditions 9
2.1.3 Site Access 10
2.1.4 Special/Sensitive Populations 10
2.1.5 Regional Demographics 10
2.1.6 Identification of Vulnerability
Zones 11
2.2 FACILITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
PLANNING ACTIVITIES
2.2.1 Facility Emergency Response Plans .... 11
2.2.2 Emergency Response Exercises and
Simulations 11
2.2.3 Fire, Evacuation, and Rescue
Corridors 12
2.2.4 Emergency Equipment Provisions 12
2.2.5 Emergency Response Chain of
Authority 13
2.2.6 Emergency Response Management
Procedures 13
2.2.7 Emergency Communication Network
Within the Facility 13
2.2.8 Emergency Response Personnel
Training Requirements 14
2.2.9 Monitoring Stations for Chemical
Releases 14
2.2.10 Follow-Up Release Procedures/
Investigations 15
2.3 COMMUNITY AND FACILITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE
PLANNING ACTIVITIES
2.3.1 Facility Planning and Outreach
Activities with Community 15
2.3.2 Local/Community Emergency Response
Plan 16
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2.3.3 Community Response Structure and
Procedures
2.4 PUBLIC ALERT AND NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES
2.4.1 Procedures for Public Notification
of Releases
2.5 SAFETY AND LOSS PREVENTION ACTIVITIES
2.5.1 Corporate Support to Facility
Safety .................. 18
2.5.2 Facility Safety/Loss Prevention
Organization ............... 19
2.5.3 Training Program in Plant and
Process Safety .............. 19
2.5.4 Facility Management Activities ...... 21
2.5.5 Audit Procedures ............. 21
2.6 ACCIDENTAL RELEASE INVESTIGATION
2.6.1 History of Accidental Releases ...... 22
2.6.1.1 Past Releases Above Reportable
Quantities (RQ) ......... 22
2.6.1.2 Summary of Air Incident
Notifications .......... 23
2.6.1.3 Spill Reports Summary ...... 23
2.6.1.4 Wastewater Violations Summary . . 24
2.6.2 Summary of Release on 10/23/89 ...... 24
2.6.3 Facility Procedures ........... 28
3.0 HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS ON-SITE
3.1 List of On-Site Hazardous Chemicals ....... 28
3 . 2 Properties of Hazardous Chemicals
Covered by Audit ................ 29
3.2.1 1,3-Butadiene .............. 29
3.2.2 Activated Catalyst ............ 30
3.2.3 Polyolefin Catalyst ........... 31
3.2.4 Chlorine ................. 32
3.2.5 Cyclohexane ............... 33
3.2.6 Diethylzinc ............... 34
3.2.7 Ethylene ................. 35
3.2.8 Hexene-1 ................. 35
3.2.9 Hydrogen ................. 36
3.2.10 Nitrogen ................. 37
3.2.11 Isobutane ................ 37
3.2.12 Polyethylenes/Polypropylenes ....... 38
3.2.13 Stadis 450 ................ 39
3.2.14 Styrene ................. 40
3.2.15 Sodium Dichromate ............ 41
4.0 PROCESS INFORMATION FOR HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
4.1 Storage and Handling
4.1.1 Storage Systems ............. 42
4.1.2 Shipping/Receiving ........... 43
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4.1.3 Material Transfer 43
4.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION
4.2.1 Overview of Processing Steps and
Operating Procedures 44
4.2.2 General Description of Process
Equipment 45
4.2.3 Standard Operating Procedures 46
4.2.4 Equipment Maintenance Procedures .... 46
4.2.5 Instrument Maintenance 47
4.2.6 Training Practices 47
5.0 HAZARD EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY
5.1 HAZARD EVALUATION 48
5.2 MODELING 48
6.0 RELEASE RELATED TECHNIQUES
6.1 HAZARDOUS FACILITY PROCESSES WITH SIGNIFICANT
ACCIDENT POTENTIAL 50
6.2 RELEASE PREVENTION SYSTEMS 52
6.3 MITIGATION SYSTEMS 53
6.4 BACK-UPS AND REDUNDANCY 54
6.5 MONITORING SYSTEMS
6.5.1 Process Parameter Monitoring 54
6.5.2 Environmental Monitoring 54
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 55
PHILLIPS' 66 COMPANY RESPONSE AND COMMENTS 59
APPENDICES
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LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix A ..
Appendix B ..
Appendix C ..
Appendix D . .
Appendix E . .
Appendix F . .
Appendix G ..
Appendix H . .
Appendix I . .
Appendix J . .
Appendix K . ,
Appendix L .
Appendix M .
Appendix N .
Appendix O .
Appendix P .
Appendix Q .
List of Audit Team Members
City of Pasadena Vulnerability and Risk Analysis
(VRA)
Phillips 66 Houston Chemical Complex (HCC)
Emergency Procedures Manual
Phillips 66 HCC Emergency Response Team Manual
Phillips 66 HCC Tier II Forms and Chemical Lists
for SARA Title III Reporting
City of Pasadena Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plan (Table of Contents only)
Phillips 66 Corporate Safety Review Manual
Phillips 66 Corporate Environmental Review
Manual
Phillips 66 Corporate Philosophy-Safety & Loss
Prevention
Summary of Air Incident Notifications
Wastewater Violations Summary
Phillips 66 HCC Training Program-Course List
Polyethylene Plant Chemical Inventory
Environmental Protections Agency Region 6
Pollution Reports
Phillips 66 Corporate Press Releases
Phillips 66 HCC Contractor Agreement
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations Used in This
Chemical Safety Audit Report
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure la United States Geological Survey (USGS)
Topographical Map of Phillips 66 HCC Area
Figure Ib List of Land Owners Around Phillips 66 HCC
Property
Figure 2 .... Site Map of Phillips 66 HCC
Figure 3 Initial Notification to National Response Center
(NRC)
Figure 4 Phillips 66 HCC Notification to NRC
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PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND
The Chemical Accident Prevention (CAP) program within the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) emerged from
concerns raised by the release of methyl isocyanate at Bhopal,
India, and of aldicarb oxime at Institute, West Virginia.
Awareness of the critical threat to public safety posed by
similar incidents led to an emphasis on preparedness and planning
for response to chemical accidents. Simultaneous with the
development of preparedness activities by EPA was the passage of
the passage and implementation of the Emergency Planning and
Right-to-Know Act, Title III of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), 1986. Because prevention is the most
effective form of preparedness, the CAP program promotes an
effort to enhance prevention activities. The primary intentions
of the CAP program is to identify the causes of accidental
releases of hazardous substances and the means to prevent them
from occurring, to promote industry initiatives in these
areas, and to share activities with the community.
Many of the key concerns of the CAP program arise from the 305(b)
study, Review of Emergency Systems discussed below. EPA is
working closely with other Federal agencies, States, industry,
professional organizations such as American Institute of Chemical
Engineers (AIChE), trade associations such as the Chemical
Manufacturers Association (CMA), as well as environmental groups
and academia in implementing this program. Such joint efforts
will serve to determine and implement a mechanism for sharing^
information on prevention technology and practices, and creating
approaches for enhancing the state of practice in the chemical
process safety arena. In addition, EPA has created a broad-based
Prevention Work Group to deal with issues such as accident
databases, audits, and research, and to lay the groundwork for
further study.
The Chemical Safety Audit (CSA) program is part of this
initiative and has been designed to accomplish the following
chemical accident prevention goals:
- Investigate the causes of accidental releases and review the
equipment, procedures, training programs, and management
techniques used in selected facilities;
- Heighten awareness of the need for chemical safety among
chemical producers, distributors, and users, as well as in
communities where chemicals are located;
- Establish a national database for the assembly and
distribution of chemical safety information obtained from
facility investigations and from other sources;
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Build cooperation among authorized parties by coordinating
joint accidental release investigations where appropriate.
It should be noted that the CSA program is not a compliance tool
or enforcement inspection program. However, if serious problems
are discovered during the audit, EPA has a variety of legal
authorities to use in response to them.
Section 305(b) Report to Congress
EPA's June 1988 report, Review of Emergency Systems. to Congress
under SARA Title III Section 305 (b) made a number of
recommendations on the future course of prevention activities by
EPA, and identified several aspects of current practices that
will require careful consideration in an overall prevention
strategy. First, while it is evident that risk awareness among
the larger chemical producers is high, many large distributors
and users of hazardous chemicals, as well as many smaller
operations, have not yet attained a comparable level of accident
consciousness. Second, the study also indicated the need for new
technologies in certain key areas: process area monitoring
devices, back-up detectors, mitigation devices, and practices to
adequately identify disabled equipment of these types. Third,
the report suggested that a great deal of caution must be
exercised in analyses using real time dispersion models. The
report also indicated that employee familiarity with methods of
hazard evaluation was limited, which in turn suggests that
ineffective or improper techniques may be in practice. Finally,
the examination of management practices revealed a failure to
place sufficient emphasis on safety-related issues such as
standard operating procedures, employee training, preventative
maintenance, and post accident investigation, as well as a
general lack of commitment to safety.
This audit report prepared under the CSA program is intended to
contribute to the continuation of the study of emergency systems
begun in the Section 305(b) report, and in turn, to produce
improvements in the ability of the audited facility, and industry
in general, to prevent or mitigate releases of hazardous
substances. The report itself will outline the observations of
the site visit team and the information provided by the facility.
With this information, the team will draw conclusions, and
make recommendations on facility safety practices, where they are
warranted. In this fashion, the CSA program will be a vital
component of EPA's Chemical Accident Prevention program.
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PROGRAM AUTHORITY
The Comprehensive, Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) was enacted December 11,
1980, and amended by SARA on October 17, 1986. CERCLA authorizes
the federal government to respond where there is a release or a
substantial threat of a release into the environment of any
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant that may present
danger to the public health or welfare or to the environment.
Section 104(a) of CERCLA provides the federal government with the
authority to respond to releases or threatened releases of
hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants in certain
situations. This section authorizes the EPA Administrator "to
act, consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP), to
remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial
action relating to such hazardous substances, pollutants, or
contaminants at any time, or take any other response measure
consistent with the NCP which the Administrator deems necessary
to protect public health or welfare or the environment, where:
- Any hazardous substance is released:
- There is a substantial threat that a hazardous substance will
be released into the environment;
- Any pollutant or contaminant is released into the environment
"which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the
public health or welfare;" or
- There is a substantial threat that a pollutant or contaminant
may be released into the environment "which may present an
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or
welfare."
Under Section 104(b), the Administrator is authorized to
"undertake such investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and
other information gathering" that may be needed "to identify the
existence and extent of the release or threat thereof, the source
and nature of the hazardous substances, pollutants, or
contaminants involved, and the extent of danger to the public
health or welfare or the environment." This investigatory
response can be initiated whenever the Administrator can act
under Section 104(e) when he has "reason to believe" that:
- A release has occurred;
- A release is about to occur; or
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- "Illness, disease, or complaints thereof may be attributed
to exposure to a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant and that a release may have occurred or be
occurring.
Under Section 104(e), a designated representative of the
President, or a State or political subdivision under a contract
or cooperative agreement, is authorized to obtain information and
gain access to sites and adjacent property "for the purposes of
determining the need for response, or choosing or taking" a
response, or to enforce any provision of CERCLA. The authority
to enter a site and to inspect and take samples from a site may
only be exercised where "there is a reasonable basis to believe
there may be a release or threat of release of a hazardous
substance or pollutant or contaminant."
Section 104(e) authorizes any designated official, upon
reasonable notice, to require persons to provide relevant
information or documents concerning:
- "Identification, nature, and quantity of materials which have
been or are generated, treated, stored, or disposed of" at
the facility;
"The nature or extent of a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant at" the
facility; and
"Information relating to the ability of a person to pay or
perform a cleanup."
In addition, upon reasonable notice, Section 104(e) requires
persons to grant access to a facility to inspect and copy all
documents or records, or at their option to provide copies.
Designated representatives are authorized to enter at reasonable
times, any vessel, facility, establishment, or other place or
property:
- "Where any hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant may
be or has been generated, stored, treated, disposed of, or
transported from;"
- "From which or to which a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant has been or may have been released;" and
- "Where entry is needed to determine the need for response or
the appropriate response or to effectuate a response action."
If consent is not granted for access to information, entry onto
the facility, and inspection or sampling, Section 104(e)(5)
authorizes EPA to:
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"Issue an order directing compliance with the request," after
such notice and opportunity for consultation;
- Ask the Attorney General to commence a civil action to compel
compliance with a request or or order; and
- Civil penalties up to $25fOOO/day for failure to comply with
the order.
Section 104(e) also provides for the right to obtain access or
information in any other lawful manner, which includes warrants.
Section 104(e)(7) provides that no person required to provide
information under CERCLA may claim that such information is
entitled to protection unless such person shows each of the
following:
- The "person has not described the information to any other
person, other than a member of a Local Emergency Planning
Committee (LEPC) under Title III of SARA", an officer or
employee of the U.S. or a State or local government, an
employee of such person, or a person who is bound by a
confidentiality agreement, and such person has taken
reasonable measures to protect the confidentiality of such
information and intends to continue to take such measures;"
"The information is not required to be disclosed, or otherwise
made available, to the public under any other Federal or State
law;"
"Disclosure of the information is likely to cause substantial
harm to the competitive position of such person;" and
- "The specific chemical identity, if sought to be protected, is
not readily discoverable through reverse engineering."
The following information on hazardous substances is not entitled
to protection:
- Trade name, common name, or generic class or category;
- Physical properties;
- Hazards to health and the environment, including physical;
hazards (i.e., explosion) and potential acute and chronic
health hazards;
- Potential routes of human exposure;
- Disposal location of any waste stream;
- Monitoring data or analysis on disposal activities;
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- Hydrogeologic or geologic data; and
- Groundwater monitoring data.
Section 106(a) of CERCLA provides the federal government with the
authority to pursue administrative and judicial action to require
responsible parties to respond to actual or threatened releases
of hazardous substances. If the Administrator "determines that
there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
public health or welfare or the environment," he has two options
under 106(a):
- Require the Attorney General to seek the necessary relief in
the Federal district court where the threat occurs. The
district court is given jurisdiction to grant relief as the
public interest and the equities of the case may require; or
- Act on his own, after providing notice to the affected State,
to take other action, including the issuance of orders that
may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the
environment.
FOREWORD
The recommendations made in this report reflect information
concerning the Phillips 66 HCC facility obtained during a U.S.
EPA Chemical Safety Audit and from records provided by the
Phillips 66 HCC facility. The recommendations contained in this
report are not mandatory and EPA makes no assurances that if
implemented, the recommended actions contained in this report
will prevent further chemical accidents, equipment failures, or
unsafe management practices, and/or provide protection from a
future enforcement action under any applicable law or regulation
administered by any Federal, State, or local regulatory agency.
REPORT ORGANIZATION
This report for the CSA conducted at the Phillips 66 HCC will be
divided into seven major sections. These sections include:
Introduction, Facility Information, Hazardous Chemicals On-Site,
Process Information, Hazard Evaluation and Methodology, Release
Related Techniques, and Recommendations.
It should be noted throughout this report that Marlex and K-Resin
are registered trademarks.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 GENERAL FACILITY AND AUDIT INFORMATION
This CSA was conducted at the Phillips 66 Petroleum Company
Houston Chemical Complex (HCC). The primary operation at the
facility is the manufacture of polyethylene, polypropylene, and
K-Resin.
The audit was conducted on November 6-7, 1989, by a team led by
EPA Region 6. This team included members from the U.S.
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) headquarters
and Region 6, Ecology and Environment Inc. (EPA Region 6
Contractor), the Texas Department of Health (TDK), the Texas Air
Control Board (TACB), and the LEPC.
A complete listing of the participants in the audit is included
in Appendix A.
1.2 PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE AUDIT
The purpose of the CSA at the Phillips 66 HCC was primarily to
assess the facility's chemical emergency preparedness and
prevention procedures, while determining the potential for, and
consequences of releases that impact off-site. The audit
was prompted by the explosion, fire, and release that occurred at
the plant on October 23, 1989.
Although the facility has many production plants for various
products, the audit team's area of emphasis was on the
polyethylene production plant. This prioritization was based on
the significance of the explosion and release as well as the
hazardous properties associated with the chemicals stored or
produced in that area.
The audit was conducted only three weeks after the explosion
which occurred in the polyethylene plant on October 23, 1989.
Most of the employees of the polyethylene plant had not returned
to work at the time of the audit and many of the facility's
records were destroyed. The Phillips 66 HCC was in a state of
high abnormality and the primary efforts were being devoted to a
safe search and recovery of the missing people and the
identification and removal of any potential environmental
problems. Phillips 66 consented to the audit even though
operations were not back to normal and the notice of the audit
was very short.
This CSA was coordinated with the numerous State and Federal
agencies having jurisdiction over this facility.
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2.0 FACILITY INFORMATION
2.1 SITE DESCRIPTION
2.1.1 Facility Profile
The Phillips 66 HCC is located in the City of Pasadena, Harris
County, Texas. The facility is situated on approximately 800
acres of land on the south bank of the Buffalo Bayou, Houston
Snip Channel, at the intersection of State Highway 225 and
Jefferson Road (see Figure la and Ib).
Phillips Chemical Company purchased the land from the Houston
Ship Building Corporation in 1948. The first operation at the
facility was the manufacture of ammonium sulfate fertilizer. In
1952, the construction of an ammonia plant was completed and the
plant was put into operation.
The Phillips 66 HCC complex has changed operations from the
manufacture of fertilizers to the manufacture of plastics. The
primary operations at the facility at the present time are the
manufacture of polyethylene, polypropylene, and K-Resin. The
facility produces approximately 2 billion pounds of total
plastics annually, of which polyethylene capacity was
approximately 1.5 billion pounds.
The Phillips 66 HCC employs approximately 850 personnel,
including 560 in the manufacturing division, and an additional
290 in marketing, administration, and management staffs. There
are several construction projects currently in progress by
outside contracting firms. As a result, daily total population
at the Phillips 66 HCC numbers approximately 1,200 Phillips and
contractor personnel.
As stated, the primary product at the Phillips 66 HCC is
polyethylene. Polyethylene manufacturing began in 1956/57 with
the construction of the Solution Plant.
The process currently in use is the particle form process. In
this process, ethylene reacts in the presence of a catalyst in
loop reactors to form polyethylene. Isobutane serves as a
diluent. The first of these loop reactors was constructed in
1961 and were capable of producing approximately 2,500 pounds per
hour of polyethylene. The first two loop reactors were
collectively known as Plant III. Plant III was shut down in
1983.
Plant IV was constructed in 1968 and consists of two loop
reactors. These reactors were substantially larger than the
Plant III reactors and were capable of producing approximately
9,000 to 10,000 pounds per hour of polyethylene. In 1978, the
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reactors were modified to increase their manufacturing capacity.
The modification consisted of increasing the height of the loops.
In 1974, a new series of loop reactors were constructed. The new
reactors were collectively known as Plant V. Reactors 1 and 2
were completed in 1974 and each reactor was capable of producing
17,000 to 19,000 pounds per hour. In 1978, reactors 3 and 4 were
constructed. These reactors are sister units to reactors 1 and
2. In 1981, reactors 5 and 6 were completed. These are the
largest reactors to date, with each reactor capable of producing
up to 40,000 pounds of polyethylene per hour.
Figure 2 shows the Phillips 66 HCC facility. Plants IV and V,
and the Plant V Finishing Building were the structures most
severely impacted by the explosion and resultant fire. The
explosion destroyed the power distribution station at the south
end of Plant V. The cooling tower and warehouse immediately west
of Plant V were also completely destroyed. Several of the
product storage tanks to the west of the Plant V Finishing
Building were completely destroyed and many more were severely
damaged. There was heavy damage to the plant shop and to the
Marlex distribution building. Less severe damage was suffered by
other portions of the facility with most of the damage being
limited to blown-out windows and roofing materials being torn
off.
2.1.2 Site Topography and Meteorological
Conditions
The general topography of the area is very flat with little
natural physical relief. Several large gypsum piles exist on
adjacent property to the west and northwest. Figure 1 is a
portion of the USGS topographical map for Pasadena, Texas, which
shows the flat relief features.
The facility is located in the Texas Gulf coastal plain, which
causes it to be susceptible to hurricanes and associated
flooding. The region has been struck by three hurricanes in the
last two years, although none have substantially impacted the
facility's operating units. The subsurface geology of the site
is primarily coastal sand and limestone. As such, the site is
susceptible to minor subsidence due to the extraction of
underlying water and/or oil. The existence of the sand/limestone
bedrock does not lend the site to significant tectonic activity.
The climate of the site is subtropical. The summers are warm
(temperatures average above 90 degrees) and humid. Winters are
mild (temperatures average above 55 degrees) and also humid.
Annual rainfall averages over 35 inches per year. Winds are
generally southeasterly at 10 to 15 m.p.h.
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2.1.3 Site Access
Transportation routes to the site include rail and waterways.
The primary land route to the site is via Jefferson Road off
State Highway 225, as shown in Figure 1. This highway intersects
Interstate 45 (approximately 5 miles west of the site) and
Interstate 10 (approximately 3 miles north of the site) via Loop
610 (approximately 3 miles west). Every access gate has either
automatic or manual security checks and controls. A visitor to
the facility is required to report to the administration
building located at the northwest corner of the plant, the
construction guard gate, the north guard gate or main guard gate
prior to entering the plant.
Rail lines cut across the center section of the site (Southern
Pacific Railroad) and there are several spur lines and a siding
yard on the eastern side of the Phillips area. This siding yard
is used for the storage of railcars used in the transport of raw
materials to the K-Resin plant and the transport of finished
products from the facility.
Phillips also has dockage facilities along the northern boundary
of the facility. The dockage facilities along the Houston Ship
Channel are primarily for barge unloading operations. There is a
slip dockage along the eastern boundary of the facility where
cargo and tanker ships may turn.
2.1.4 Special/Sensitive Populations
As can be seen from Figure 1, the Phillips 66 property is
surrounded by vacant land, industrial facilities, and petroleum
product terminals. There are three schools located approximately
two miles south of the facility. These schools are the Deepwater
Elementary School, the Deepwater Junior High School, and the Red
Bluff Elementary School. Pasadena General Hospital is located
approximately 2 miles southwest of the facility. There is a
senior citizen center on East Thomas Road. The schools,
hospital, and senior citizen center are not located in the
prevailing downwind direction.
2.1.5 Regional Demographics
Pasadena has a population of approximately 120,000. Pasadena is
almost completely bordered by other cities. The general economy
of the area is based on the petrochemical industry. The area
immediately surrounding the facility is heavily industrialized.
Most of the residential growth is to the south and east away from
the industrial complexes. There are some industrial facilities
in the south east corner of Pasadena in the bay area. The
residents living across State Highway 225 are primarily workers
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at the petrochemical plants that line the Houston Ship Channel.
The land surrounding the plant is already substantially developed
and future growth would be primarily limited to plant expansion
and replacement/modification of existing facilities/operations.
2.1.6 Identification of Vulnerability Zones
The City of Pasadena performed a Vulnerability and Risk Analysis
(VRA) in 1989, in cooperation with industry which identified 15
chemicals of major concern that are manufactured or stored in the
city (see Appendix B). The Phillips 66 HCC had the following
chemicals listed in the VRA: cyclohexane, 1,3-butadiene,
chlorine, and styrene. In addition, the Phillips 66 HCC had
performed worst-case scenarios on 9 chemicals. Section 5.2
(Modeling) goes further into this study. The City of Pasadena
report indicates that chlorine was the chemical of greatest
concern based on its toxicity and the relatively large quantities
used in both large and small facilities in Pasadena. Other
rationale may be reviewed in Section V (Priority Ranking) of the
VRA (see Appendix B).
2.2 FACILITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND PLANNING
ACTIVITIES
2.2.1 Facility Emergency Response Plans
At the Phillips 66 HCC, the Emergency Procedures Manual (EPM)
provides employees guidelines for dealing with internal and
external emergency situations (see Appendix C). The EPM is
maintained and updated by the Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee
at the Phillips 66 HCC with the latest revision dated March 28,
1989.
In addition, an Emergency Response Team Manual (ERTM) (see
Appendix D) is maintained by the Emergency Response Subcommittee
with the latest revision dated May 4, 1987. This plan is used by
the Phillips 66 HCC Fire Brigade and Rescue and First Aid Teams
to provide guidance for the teams in maintaining high performance
standards and compliance with government regulations while
responding to plant emergencies.
2.2.2 Emergency Response Exercise and Simulations
The last full-scale exercise involving CAER, LEPC, and CIMA was
conducted in September, 1988. This was a coordinated effort of
emergency response groups which would respond in a large scale
emergency. An exercise was scheduled involving the same level of
response for November, 1989, but was canceled after the October
23rd explosion.
•
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 11 ***
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There is an annual training schedule prepared by the Fire Chief
and Safety Officer which details specific training, preplanning
and associated activities for the HCC Emergency Response Team
("ERT") . This training schedule is strictly for the use of the
HCC-ERT; any other activities such as the annual community-type
response and drill are planned separately by individuals
representing industry and the community.
2.2.3 Fire, Evacuation, and Rescue Corridors
Evacuation procedures are described in detail in Part C, Section
XIII (Plant Preparedness) in the EPM. There are instructions for
total Phillips 66 HCC plant evacuation and individual evacuation
of specific plants inside the Phillips 66 HCC.
The signal for total evacuation of the plant is one continuous
blast on the steam whistle which can be activated by a call
through the emergency radio system. Back up is on the telephone
system. Phillips employees are to go to the field north of the
main gate unless told otherwise. Contractors and other non-plant
personnel are to go through the gate they came through so a
security guard can get an accurate head count. Supervisors of
each area in the plant are responsible for notifying contractors
and visitors to evacuate.
Maps indicating evacuation routes are in the EPM but no
indications are given if symbols or other markings for evacuation
routes are inside the Phillips 66 HCC. Evacuation plans are to
be updated annually for each plant or more often as needed.
2.2.4 Emergency Equipment Provisions
The EPM lists out under Section XIII (Plant Preparedness) the
organization of equipment and transportation for emergency
situations except for fire brigade equipment. The manual calls
for the Service Chief to be responsible for equipment such as
cranes, bulldozers, and transportation for injured as well as
transportation needs such as motor fuel. The manual reports
under Section XIV (External Emergencies) what firefighting
equipment and manpower will be released by Channel Industries
Mutual Aid (CIMA) under agreement during an external incident not
affecting the Phillips 66 HCC.
The ERTM mentions emergency equipment in 4 areas. Section VI
(Protective Equipment and Clothing) states that each emergency
team member will be supplied equipment and each member will be
responsible for maintaining their own equipment. According to
the Phillips manual, all protective equipment purchased is in
accordance with 29 CFR 1910.156 (Fire Brigades).
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 12 ***
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Section XII (Fire Equipment Maintenance) indicates who is
responsible for inspecting fire trucks, fire extinguishers, fire
hoses, self contained breathing apparatus, fire hydrants, and
sprinkler systems. The Fire Chief or his designee is basically
in charge of all the inspections and the safety department is
responsible for repairs or recharging. Section XIII (Training
Courses) and Section XII (Fire Brigade) list training courses
available in-house.
Section XIV lists equipment which may be released in an external
emergency situation such as a CIMA response.
The EPM also lists equipment available in the Phillips 66 HCC for
emergency response. Section XV, Part C (Emergency Equipment)
lists fire trucks, fire extinguishers, fire pumps, sprinkler
systems, and other equipment. The maintenance for the equipment
is described in the manual in Section XIII, Part B (Fire
Equipment Maintenance).
2.2.5 Emergency Response Chain of Authority
The EPM describes the chain of authority in Section III
(Emergency Organization). The Phillips 66 HCC Manager is the
Emergency Manager for the entire Phillips 66 HCC.
The ERTM Section II (Organizational Chart) shows the Fire Chief
in charge of the actual incident scene, while the organizational
chart in the EPM is for the entire complex.
2.2.6 Emergency Response Management Procedures
The Phillips 66 HCC does have procedures for management of
emergency response defined in the EPM Section III (Emergency
Organization). The statements in the organization section of the
manual describe the scope of the plan, the structure of the
organization, and the overall general policies to be followed in
emergency situations.
2.2.7 Emergency Communication Network Within the
Facility
The EPM lists out two communication networks. The plant alarm
procedure is discussed in this report in Section 2.4 (Public
Alert and Notification Procedures). The Phillips 66 HCC
emergency procedures for communication are in Section VI
(Communications) of the EPM. The Phillips 66 HCC is set up to
use a radio system in an emergency situation and may also use the
in-plant telephones. The plan describes how to use the radio and
what information to have if a caller is making notification of an
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 13 ***
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emergency. In addition, the plan mandates that the main gate
security guard perform weekly integrity checks on the radio
network. Quarterly checks are made on the designated command
post base station, and the communications committee checks the
entire Phillips 66 HCC emergency radio network quarterly.
The main gate security guard plays an important role in the
network because he takes the emergency calls, locks in various
notification systems and informs the plant of the particular
emergency. The main gate security checks the CIMA radio daily.
A service contract is in place, and radio repairs are done as
needed.
The ERTM lists communication in Section X (Communications). The
Emergency Response Team communicates internally by portable and
mobile radios. Radio checks are made each Monday morning after
the emergency alarm test.
2.2.8 Emergency Response Personnel Training
Requirements
The ERTM lists the training requirements in Section V (Training)
and the in-house Fire Brigade Training resources in Section XIII
(Training Courses) (see Appendix 4).
In Section V, the following training requirements were mentioned:
fire brigade training, team leader training, first aid training,
hazardous material training, Incident Command System, total
emergency management, and Phillips 66 HCC Emergency Procedures.
Additionally, the manual states that "all plant personnel are
trained in the use of first aid fire fighting (extinguishers)."
2.2.9 Monitoring Stations for Chemical Releases
Specific monitoring for hydrocarbons is conducted in the
polyethylene plant area by plant personnel using an MSA Minigard
II Combustible Gas and Oxygen Indicator instrument as well as
industrial hygiene monitoring on a periodic basis.
Automatic hydrocarbon detectors are located at the six-inch lines
from the polymerization reactor to the fluff storage silos, and
at the line from the fluff storage silos to the finished feed
tank. There are no other systematic programs or air monitoring
instruments permanently installed at the facility to monitor
fugitive or accidental releases of chemicals from the plant
operations. There are no fence line monitors except at the San
Jacinto water treater which has two monitors for chlorine.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 14 ***
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2.2.10 Follow-Up Release Procedures/Investigations
Section XIII (Plant Procedures) of the EPM lists Environmental
Procedures for the Phillips 66 HCC. The section includes a
summary of environmental notifications made pursuant to CERCLA
(Superfund), SARA, and the Clean Water Act (CWA). The
information contains outside telephone numbers to call if
releases occur and forms with information that may be asked of
the caller. General procedures are defined for notifications
during office hours and off-hours. Specific instructions and
example forms are in the EPM for (1) Excessive Smoke Emissions or
Major Upsets, (2) 10-Day Notification of Potential Air Emissions,
(3) CERCLA (Superfund) Release Reporting, (4) SARA Release
Reporting, and (5) SPCC (Oil Spill) Reporting. Copies of the
completed forms to report these incidents are to be sent to the
environmental office. The general instructions cover all spills
or releases whether reportable or not and indicate that the
environmental office should be notified; and that for incidents
occurring during off hours, the Area Superintendent should send a
detailed report to the environmental office within two working
days after the release. Other than the information required on
the reporting forms mentioned above, there are no instructions on
the information required on the detailed report nor is there a
written follow-up investigation procedure.
2.3 COMMUNITY AND FACILITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE
PLANNING ACTIVITIES
2.3.1 Facility Planning and Outreach Activities
With Community
In reviewing the SARA Title III data the audit team reviewed the
following sections of the law:
Section 302 - The Phillips 66 HCC does have extremely hazardous
substances (EHSs) above the TPQ at its plant and has notified the
Pasadena LEPC and Texas State Emergency Response Commission
(SERC) that they were subject to the planning provisions.
Chlorine was the most evident EHS at the Phillips 66 HCC.
Section 303 - The company has designated a facility coordinator,
Mr. Bill Stoltz, Environmental Director, to work with the LEPC and
has designated Mr. Rick Wiederstein, Safety Director, as an
alternate. It was reported in an interview with the LEPC
Chairperson, Ms. Elizabeth Gonzalez, that Phillips had been very
active with the LEPC and had served on several subcommittees.
303 notification was also given to the SERC.
Section 304 - The Phillips 66 HCC made calls to the LEPC, State
Agencies, and NRC on the 23rd and 24th of October, 1989 (see
Section 2.6.2).
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 15 ***
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Section 311-312 - The Phillips 66 HCC has filled out a Section
311 Chemical List and also complied with the 1988 Texas
Workplace Chemical List. The 312 submissions were made on
February 2, 1989, for OSHA Hazardous Chemicals of more than
10,000 pounds at the site and on May 1, 1989, for OSHA Hazardous
Chemicals of over 500 pounds. The latter was to comply with the
Texas Hazards Communication Act. Information was submitted to
the LEPC, Local Fire Department, and the SERC (see Appendix E) .
Section 313 - The Phillips 66 HCC has submitted Form R's for 1987
and 1988.
It appeared that the company had been very active with the
Pasadena LEPC. The Phillips 66 HCC has held on open house for
the Pasadena City Council and an employee open house in the Fall,
1988. Additionally, the Phillips 66 Company is a member of the
CMA and the Phillips 66 HCC has participated in the Chemical
Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) program. The Phillips 66
HCC is heavily involved with the CIMA, which is a conglomerate of
over 100 chemical companies and government agencies around the
Houston Ship Channel. CIMA responds with personnel and equipment
when needed through pre-planned mutual aid agreements.
2.3.2 Local/Community Emergency Response Plan
The Texas Division of Emergency Management (DEM) governs local
emergency response plans under the Texas Disaster Act of 1975.
Each political subdivision in the State is required to have a
comprehensive emergency management plan that addresses all
hazards. The emergency response plan that is required by SARA
Title III has been incorporated into the all hazards planning
concept as Annex Q (Hazardous Materials) of the All Hazards Plan.
The City of Pasadena has a Comprehensive Emergency Management
Plan with an original date of October 30, 1984, with the latest
re-certification occurring on January 25, 1988 (see Appendix F
for Plan Table of Contents). Annex Q (Hazardous Materials
Response) was updated on August 25, 1988. The City participates
on the LEPC, the CAER group, and the CIMA.
The City has an excellent working relationship with the
industries in their community as is evidenced by the information
in the City of Pasadena VRA. The LEPC Chairperson, Ms. Elizabeth
Gonzalez, Deputy Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, reported
that the Phillips 66 HCC has been very active with the LEPC,
CAER, and CIMA, and has participated in various exercises
sponsored by the City.
It is important to note the City of Pasadena is responsible for
incorporating input from other entities, such as industry, into
the Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 16 ***
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2.3.3 Community Response Structure and Procedures
There are two response structures with the City of Pasadena. One
is the City of Pasadena Municipal response per its Comprehensive
Emergency Management Plan, in which the procedures are detailed
in various annexes for its departments to follow. The other is
through the CIMA group, which facilitates response through
various pre-planned mutual aid agreements. It is important to
note that the LEPC is not a response agency, and SARA Title III
does not establish such response groups. The CAER group has a
24-hour notification telephone number, but the primary response
structures are the City's and CIMA's.
2.4 PUBLIC ALERT AND NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES
2.4.1 Procedures for Public Notification of
Releases
In the City of Pasadena's Comprehensive Emergency Management
Plan, Annex A, methods for notifying the general public are
outlined. The primary methods are through the Emergency Broadcast
System (BBS) and the Public Information Emergency Services (PIES)
System. Through the EBS, the Emergency Preparedness Office will
contact the media to have the emergency broadcast put out over
radio and television transmissions. PIES is a radio unit that
allows the Emergency Preparedness Operations Center to cut into
the radio and television to give an emergency broadcast. At the
time of this audit, the City of Pasadena does not have a primary
warning siren system in stationary locations. As stated in the
plan, the city will use police and fire mobile sirens, door-to-
door, and radio and television alerts.
The Mayor of Pasadena, as Director of Emergency Preparedness, has
overall responsibility for warning. The Chief of Police is
responsible for coordinating warning operations with the
Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, law enforcement, fire
services, media broadcast and print, and other special locations,
such as schools, nursing homes, hospitals, and industries. The
warning system is tested on a regular basis.
The Phillips 66 HCC can notify locations outside their complex by
radio and telephone. Notification can be made to the public
through the City of Pasadena Office of Emergency Preparedness, or
by making an announcement over the EBS. The Phillips 66 HCC may
also notify the CAER Hotline, which is available to the public.
Radio notification to CIMA can initiate assistance from industry
and government. The Phillips 66 HCC may also use the news media
and explain the situation.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 17 ***
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Based on CSA interviews and the EPM, the public notification will
be made through the City of Pasadena, while industry notification
will be through CAER and CIMA.
While this section details Public Notification, the audit team
believed that a review of the warning system at the Phillips 66
HCC was warranted also. The plant alarm procedure is described
in the EPM under Section IV (Plan Activation). Audio alarm
systems at the plant consist of a siren system, steam whistle,
emergency radio and pager system. In addition each operating
unit has a manual system (air horn for Plants IV and V) and some
areas contain loud speaker systems.
To activate the siren, the notifier must use the Phillips 66 HCC
telephone and dial 5000. The call will be received by the
security center at the main gate, who will receive, record, and
rebroadcast the information over other notification systems. If
a power failure occurs, the call will be routed to security, who
will then contact the boiler house to sound the steam whistle.
If both these systems are unable to function, then an emergency
radio network is used.
The warning system is tested each week and up-to-date contacts
are kept in the EPM.
2.5 SAFETY AND LOSS PREVENTION ACTIVITIES
2.5.1 Corporate Support to Facility Safety
Corporate Safety and Environmental Reviews are administered by
the parent company of Phillips 66 Company, Phillips Petroleum
Company. Phillips' Quality, Environment and Safety Group
administers about 35 corporate safety and environmental reviews
on its facilities worldwide each year, according to Mr. Bill
Tuckett, Manager of Reviews and Assessment. There is a Corporate
Safety Review Manual (see Appendix H) and a Corporate
Environmental Review Manual (see Appendix I) . According to the
safety manual, "The primary objective of the Corporate Safety
Audit is to provide management with a valid assessment of the
safety conditions within a facility at the time it is audited."
The manual outlines 29 different areas or systems that will be
checked. A safety or environmental professional normally arrives
from Bartlesville, Oklahoma, to lead the audit team of three to
five people. The team talks to supervisors and Phillips
employees. The audit usually takes one week and a draft report
is left with the Phillips 66 HCC manager, to which he must
respond. Additionally, Phillips has issued a Corporate
Philosophy Safety &. Loss Prevention Statement (see Appendix J).
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 18 ***
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2.5.2 Facility Safety/Loss Prevention
Organization
The Environmental Director, Mr. Bill Stoltz, sends a monthly
environmental compliance report to corporate headquarters. For
notices of violation, he sends immediate notification. There is
no internal safety or environmental audit manual for Phillips 66
HCC. Mr. Chuck Dingman is the industrial hygienist at Phillips 66
HCC. One certified industrial hygienist, Mr. Bob Veit,
periodically visits from the Phillips Petroleum Company office in
Bartlesville, Oklahoma, to advise and consult on personnel
monitoring. Recently, before the explosion, they conducted
asbestos personal air sampling because of an ongoing asbestos
removal project in the plant. This has continued during search
and cleanup operations because of the possibility of asbestos in
the Plant IV area. The environmental and safety people usually
have weekly walk-through inspections. The company trains its own
employees in general safety and has a written hazard
communication program, in accordance with OSHA rules.
Contractors are required to train their own employees.
2.5.3 Training Program in Plant and Process Safety
The following information was obtained from Rick Wiederstein,
Safety Director, and Sally Brewer, Training Coordinator:
The safety training program requirements are established by the
Central Safety Committee which consists of the Plant Manager,
Safety Director, Operating Plant Managers, Engineering Manager,
Environmental Director, Technical Director, Quality Assurance
Manager, Purchasing and Warehouse Superintendent, Administrative
Manager, and distribution Manager. Each employee receives
initial safety orientation training, and attends refresher
courses and monthly safety meetings throughout his career. The
effectiveness of the safety training is determined by test
drills, which are critiqued by supervisory personnel. The
"DuPont Process Hazards Review" and the "Hazards Analysis Risk
Assessment (KARA)" are used in the training of management^
representatives in hazard evaluation and accident prevention.
Operator training is the responsibility of the area in which an
employee is assigned. Area superintendents coordinate and log
the employee's training.
Maintenance training is coordinated with the training group and
area representatives. Both classroom and on-the-^ob training is
given to each maintenance employee depending on their craft
responsibilities.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 19 ***
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The majority of the training is conducted by experienced, skilled
Phillips 66 HCC employees, with the remainder being conducted by
outside contractors. Outside vendors and contractors, as well as
experienced company employees, are used to conduct training
classes for maintenance employees and the Emergency Response
Team.
None of the trainers are certified by any educational
institution as trainers.
For the maintenance workers, the four-year period of training
which leads to becoming a "First Class Qualified" worker involves
approximately 80 to 84 actual hours of training. The millwrights
(pump and turbine workers) are given 64 additional hours of
training in addition to many hours of on-the-job training. The
maintenance workers have refresher training as needed for new or
changed conditions. The operators have a total of 74 to 100
hours of initial training and 20 hours of refresher training
after three years.
A log is kept on the computer of all employees formal training by
type and date. The log is about three-fourth of an inch thick on
printout paper. Because of the size and complexity of the
operations at the Phillips 66 HCC, there have been problems in
keeping the log current. Therefore, the centralized computer
records do not always reflect the current total training status
of each employee.
In order to determine if the training given to employees is
effective, it is necessary to interview a large percentage of the
employees. Due to the audit team's time restrictions, it was not
possible to interview a sufficient number of employees of either
Phillips 66 or the contractor, Fish Engineering, for the purpose
of evaluating the effectiveness of training. Access to
polyethylene plant personnel was limited because many employees
had not returned to work since the explosion, fire, and release
that occurred at the plant on October 23, 1989.
At the time of the audit, OSHA was conducting an in-depth
investigation which was to include a review of the adequacy of
training programs.
After the audit team had left the Phillips 66 HCC facility, a
conference call was held to interview one of the supervisors for
Fish Construction, a private contractor for the Phillips 66 HCC.
The supervisor indicated that Fish conducts training orientation
in safety by in-house personnel. The trainers for this
orientation have no specific safety background. The supervisor
also reported that there was no specific process equipment safety
training for contractors, although the foreman indicated he
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 20 ***
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possessed eight years of experience on Phillips 66 HCC's
equipment. It was also reported that the Phillips 66 HCC
conducted no oversight of Fish employee training on safety or
process equipment, nor did the Phillips 66 HCC review Fish
employee training records. Fish employees were required to sign
the standardized Phillips 66 HCC's safety booklet (see Appendix
2.5.4 Facility Management Activities
Line management is responsible for safety and environmental
performance. Facility managers are responsible for making action
plans based on corporate audit conclusions and recommendations.
Facility managers must make quarterly reports until any problems
found in the audit are solved. A corporate audit at Phillips 66
HCC is scheduled every four years, unless it received an
excellent rating, then the interval may be five years. If there
is a major release, the interval is shortened.
2.5.5 Audit Procedures
The review/audit procedures covered in this section and Section
5.1-Hazard Evaluation interrelate. Corporate Safety and
Environmental Reviews are administered by the parent company of
Phillips 66 Company, Phillips Petroleum Company. Safety and
environmental reviews are conducted at Phillips 66 facilities.
The corporate environmental reviews focus on compliance with
Phillips 66's environmental policy and practices, National
environmental laws and regulations, city and state laws, and the
environmental policy and practices of Phillips Petroleum Company,
and its subsidiaries. The Environmental Conservation Committee,
under the direction of the Corporate Safety and Environmental
Control Committee, has the responsibility for managing the
environmental review program.
The primary objective of the corporate safety review is to
provide the facility management with a current assessment of the
safety conditions within the facility (see Appendix G).
Information covered under the Safety review include: training,
emergency response program, fire protection and prevention, and
equipment safety programs. The Corporate Safety and
Environmental Control Committee has oversight responsibility for
the Safety Review.
The Phillips 66 HCC received a corporate environmental review in
1986 with one scheduled for 1989. A corporate safety review was
conducted in 1986 with one scheduled for 1990.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 21 ***
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The review teams are comprised of employees of Phillips Petroleum
Company and its subsidiaries. No personnel are permitted to
review the facilities at which they work. The review teams have
found that management from top to bottom supports the reviews,
with quarterly progress reports being sent to line management and
a copy to the Manager of Reviews and Assessments.
The Phillips 66 HCC itself has no formal internal environmental
review, such as the corporate review. HCC environmental,
operation, and maintenance personnel conduct on-going oversight
of operations to ensure regulatory compliance. The Phillips 66
HCC does have a safety review which is done weekly at each
individual plant within the complex. Also, monthly safety
meetings are held at which employees are updated on safety
procedures. A team comprised of shift supervisor, chief of
operations, area engineer, and the Plant Superintendent walk
through their own plant in the complex and note areas needing
stronger safety practices. Safety problems that need work orders
are turned in and corrected by the maintenance group. Personnel
who are repeated safety violators are disciplined. Also
employees, can turn in unsafe procedures, acts, or processes to
a shift supervisor, and if it is mechanical, a work order will be
submitted to maintenance for correction. After injuries and near
misses, a "safety alert" is provided plant-wide by the Central
Safety Group.
A Central Safety Committee, chaired by Mr. Bill Price, Plant
Manager, meets monthly to discuss safety policy and revise
procedures as required.
2.6 ACCIDENTAL RELEASE INVESTIGATION
2.6.1 History of Accidental Releases
2.6.1.1 Past Releases Above Reportable
Quantity (RQ)
The following list summarizes releases by the Phillips 66 HCC
that the facility reported to the NRC as being over the RQ under
CERCLA or SARA.
Substance Quantity Date Time
Cyclohexane/n-hexane Over RQ, exact 9/29/81 1000-1200
quantity unknown
Cyclohexane 5,288 Ibs 7/10/82 1045
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 22 ***
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(continued)
Substance
Cyclohexane
Elemental Mercury
Cyclohexane
Cyclohexane
Quantity
1,299 Ibs
1 Ib
19,742 Ibs
6,500 Ibs
Date
7/19/82
4/19/84
1/17/86
Time
1100
0845
1115
11/19/87 0200-0500
2.6.1.2 Summary of Air Incident Notifications
See Appendix J.
2.6.1.3 Spill Reports Summary
The following list summarizes spills reported to the Texas Water
Commission (TWC) or the NRC. These spills are then reported to
EPA Region 6, Water Enforcement Branch, under the Discharge
Monitoring Reports (DMRs).
Year Date Substance
1989 None
1988 11/04 Aluminum Sulfate solution at water treater
1987 11/19 Cyclohexane and water at MDV
07/22 Diesel fuel at slip
07/14 Diesel fuel at slip
1986 09/12 Bunker fuel at slip
05/01 Styrene at K-Resin plant
04/21 Toluene at K-Resin plant
01/17 Cyclohexane at Plant II (Solution Plant)
1985 08/19 Hexane from railroad car
04/12 Styrene at K-Resin plant
1984 11/15 Chlorine at Plant V cooling tower
04/19 Mercury at water treater
1983 08/12 Hexene at Plant V
07/25 Sodium Hydrosulfide at MVP
04/15 Isoparaffin at Plant V
02/05 Gasoline at fuel pumps
1982 07/19 Cyclohexane at K-Resin plant
07/10 Cyclohexane at K-Resin plant
02/08 Hexene at Plant IV
01/22 Hexene at Plant IV
01/12 Cyclohexane at Plant II
1981 11/01 Cyclohexane at Plant II
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 23 ***
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2.6.1.4 Wastewater Violations Summary
See Appendix L.
2.6.2 Release of October 23, 1989
Appendix N contains the Pollution Reports (POLREPS) issued by the
EPA Region 6 On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) who responded to the
explosion and release. Appendix O contains Press Releases issued
by Phillips 66 from October 23, 1989, to November 03, 1989.
Due to the significance and extent of damage, both physical and
personal, caused by the explosion and fire on October 23, 1989,
this section is included in the report to serve as a summary of
the events that occurred.
At 1305 hours on Monday, October 23, 1989, a massive explosion
occurred at the Phillips 66 Company Houston Chemical Complex
(HCC) located in Pasadena, Texas. The facility produces
polyethylene, polypropylene, and butadiene-styrene polymers. The
explosion occurred in the polyethylene manufacturing portion of
the facility (PE Plant).
According to several eyewitnesses, there was a leak of isobutane
from reactor #6 in PE Plant V. The isobutane leak created a
hydrocarbon cloud which drifted towards the northwest with the
prevailing winds. The cloud was ignited from an unknown source
in the vicinity of the catalyst activation unit. The hydrocarbon
cloud backflashed to the source. The initial explosion was
followed by at least one fireball. The resulting plume rose
several hundred feet into the air and drifted in a northwesterly
direction across the Houston Ship Channel (Buffalo Bayou). The
plume was visible from the western boundaries of the City of
Houston approximately 25 miles away. The explosion was heard at
least five miles away and the force of the explosion was measured
at 3.8 on the Richter scale by the seismograph at Rice
University.
As of December 15, the explosion had resulted in the confirmed
deaths of 23 persons with three still unaccounted for. Out of
the 23 deaths, 19 bodies had been identified. 19 of the deaths
were Phillips 66 HCC employees, and 4 of the dead were contractor
employees. A total of 124 persons, including 5 residents on the
north side of the ship channel, were treated at area hospitals
for injuries sustained in conjunction with the accident.
The force of the explosion destroyed a power distribution station
which supplied power to the electric driven fire water pumps and
severely damaged above ground water supply lines. This severely
hampered the initial response to control the fires. Water lines
were run from one neighboring plant's pond, the Phillips 66 HCC
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 24 ***
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storm water holding pond and HCC's water treater to supply
sufficient water to fight the fire.
The Phillips 66 HCC notified the Channel Industries Mutual Aid
(CIMA) for a Zone 2 response. More than 200 emergency personnel
immediately responded to the explosion. In addition, two "Life
Flight" helicopters from Houston area hospitals and one from
Beaumont responded to transport injured personnel. Fire
Departments from Houston, Deer Park, Pasadena and La Porte also
responded to the incident. At one point during the response
there were approximately 3,400 responders and over 200 pieces of
emergency equipment.
During interviews conducted at General American Tank Storage
(GATX), employees indicated that access to the facility was
excellent. However, exit from the area was restricted for non-
injured personnel because exit roads were blocked by response
vehicles.
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) halted all traffic on the
Houston Ship Channel within a three mile area of the explosion.
Harris County authorities also closed State Highway 225 on the
south side of Phillips' property and all southbound traffic on
the Beltway 8 Toll Bridge east of the site and the Washburn
Tunnel west of the site.
Immediately after the incident, Mr. Bill Stoltz, Director of
Environmental Control, called the Local Emergency Planning
Committee (LEPC), the Regional office of the Texas Air Control
Board (TACB), Harris County Pollution Control Department, and
placed a recorded message on the CAER hotline.
The U.S. EPA Region 6 office in Dallas was notified of the
explosion by a report from the NRC. The call to NRC was placed
by a concerned citizen living -near the Phillips plant at 1514
hours CDT and relayed to Region 6 EPA at 1527 hours CDT (see
Figure 3). EPA immediately dispatched Technical Assistance Team
(TAT) personnel to respond and provide technical assistance to
Phillips personnel. An EPA On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) arrived at
Phillips at 1930. After being informed by the OSC of their legal
requirement to call, Phillips called the NRC at 0007 hours CDT
which was relayed to Region 6 EPA at 0014 hours CDT (see Figure
4). The TAT team performed air monitoring downwind of the
facility at several locations between 1500 and 1945. No
concentrations of hydrocarbons above background were detected
with an Organic Vapor Analyzer (OVA).
By approximately 1500 hours emergency response personnel were
able to apply cooling water to two isobutane tanks which were
located to the northeast of Plant IV, in the vicinity of the
developmental reactor. There was a strong concern that the fire
would cause a rupture of the isobutane tanks. Monitor nozzles,
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 25 ***
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capable of supplying more -than 1,000 gallons per minute, were
placed to keep a steady stream of water on the tanks. With the
water supply to the isobutane tanks established, Phillips 66 HCC
and CIMA emergency response personnel began to gain control of
the fires.
Fire water run-off flowed to the stormwater retention pond on the
north side of the site. As the use of fire water increased, a
small amount of the run-off overflowed the pond. As a
precautionary measure, Phillips 66 HCC personnel placed booms
across the drainage outfall to the Houston Ship Channel. The
booms were placed to control the spread of foam from the fire
water run-off and minimal discharge to the Houston Ship Channel
was expected.
At approximately 2100 hours Phillips 66 HCC contracted the
Houston Regional Monitoring (HRM) Corporation to conduct air
monitoring downwind of the facility. One set of samples for
organic vapors in air was collected over a three hour period
(2105 hours, October 23, to 0005 hours, October 24) at HRM
monitoring station number 3, located north of the Phillips'
facility. Continuous 24 hour samples were collected at both
monitoring site 3 and monitoring site 1 (located west of the
Phillips' facility) over the period 10/25 through 10/28. These
filters were analyzed for asbestos fibers, total chromium, and
radioactivity. Measured concentrations of chromium were very
low: 0.0005 to 0.005 micrograms Cr/m3 of air. No asbestos
fibers were detected. No radioactive Cesium 137 was detected and
the level of Radium 226 was not above background level for either
monitoring site.
At approximately 2330 hours on October 23, representatives of the
TACB Air Toxics response Team arrived on-site to perform air
monitoring. The TACB personnel collected three samples downwind
and one background sample. The air samples were collected on
charcoal tubes and analyzed on a gas chromatograph-ion trap mass
spectrometer (GC-ITMS). No concentrations of contaminants above
background were detected. Due to concerns about possible
asbestos contamination/release from Plant IV, the filters were
analyzed using polarized light microscopy (PLM) for friable
asbestos. No asbestos was detected.
According to CIMA representatives, the fires were brought under
control at approximately 0100 hours on October 24. It was
decided to let the fires continue to burn under controlled
conditions due to the presence of hydrocarbons still in the
facility. Polyethylene pellets continued to smolder for the next
two days.
At approximately 1000 hours on October 24, Phillips 66 HCC
Emergency Response personnel made the initial entry into the area
to begin search and recovery operations. During these initial
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 26 ***
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operations, five deaths were confirmed and 19 individuals
remained unaccounted for.
The explosion and fire completely destroyed the cooling tower to
the immediate east of Plant V. With the destruction of the
cooling tower and the storage tank, several hundred gallons of
water containing sodium dichromate were released. The sodium
dichromate solution flowed to the south pond and then through a
pond outfall to the wastewater holding ponds. Water samples
taken by Phillips from the effluent discharge stations indicated
a discharge of chromium above the permit limitations of 0.5 parts
per million. Concentrations of chromium in the on-site storage
ponds ranged from 1 to 22 ppm. The outfall from the south pond
to the drainage system was plugged with concrete to prevent
further contamination of the wastewater ponds. The contaminated
water was pumped into fractionation tanks for storage prior to
disposal by deep well injection at the DSI facility.
A strong concern during the initial phases of the incident was
possible asbestos contamination of the surrounding area by
asbestos-containing insulation. Phillips 66 Company had
completed an asbestos audit of the facility within the past six
months. Results of the asbestos audit indicated that Plant V,
where the initial explosion occurred, was asbestos free and that
Plant IV had small quantities of asbestos insulation (less than
22% of samples had asbestos). Phillips contracted with Hall-
Kimbrell Co., Inc. to conduct an asbestos survey of the affected
area. Service Abatement Co., Inc. was contracted to collect any
scrap material which may have contained asbestos.
Another concern was the effects of the explosion on several
monitoring instruments which contained radioactive materials.
Phillips contracted with Texas Nuclear to perform a search for
the instruments and determine if any radioactive materials may
have been released. Results of the survey indicated that all
radioactive sources survived the explosion intact and that there
was no release of radioactive materials.
There were two 1-ton Chlorine cylinders involved in the explosion
and fire. The contents were released at some point during the
fire. An estimated 2,300 pounds of Chlorine was released during
the fire, but this release had no observed impact. The two
cylinders were recovered and stored at a specific location
(Warehouse D) prior to disposal.
Many of the reactor vessels still had liquids in them after the
fires had been extinguished. The hydrocarbons were transferred
to trucks and removed off-site to other Phillips facilities. A
total of 88,000 gallons of isobutane and 30,000 gallons of hexene
were transferred to the Phillips Sweeney Refinery. Once the
tanks were emptied of liquids, the remaining vapors were purged
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 27 ***
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with nitrogen. The purged gasses were sent to a portable flare
for incineration.
At the time of this report, cleanup operations were continuing.
A substantial portion of the Plant IV finishing building had been
demolished and removed from the site. Plans were underway for
the demolition of the reactor structures in both Plant IV and V;
however, there was a temporary restraining order preventing the
action by the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union (OCAWU).
Phillips reported the following estimate of material lost from
the polyethylene plant in the incident:
Ethylene - 80,000 pounds
Isobutane - 550,000 pounds
Hexene - 4,500 pounds
Propane - 15,000 pounds
Chlorine - 2,300 pounds
Asbestos - Unknown
Chromium 60 pounds
2.6.3 Facility Procedures
Facility procedures for investigating accidental releases were
covered under Section 2.2.10-Follow-up Release Procedures/
Investigation.
3.0 HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS ON-SITE
3.1 LIST OF ON-SITE HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
Phillips listed approximately 300 hazardous chemicals under the
OSHA Hazard Communication Standard that were located in the
Polyethylene Plant. Anti-oxidants and catalysts contained on the
list are considered Confidential-Trade Secret by Phillips (see
Appendix M). However, 14 of these chemicals were included in
this audit, because of their physical and chemical properties.
Additionally, 1,3 Butadiene and Styrene, which are located
elsewhere in the complex, were included because of their specific
physical and chemical properties.
**•* FINAL REPORT - PAGE 28 ***
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3.2 PROPERTIES OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS COVERED BY AUDIT
3.2.1 1,3-Butadiene
INGREDIENTS: 1,3-Butadiene (99+), Related Compounds (0.8),
Butadiene Dimer (0.2)
CAS #: 1,3-Butadiene: 106-99-0
Related Compounds:
Butadiene Dimer: 68606-37-1
NOAA ID: 4891 IMIS ID: 0410 DOT ID: 1010
HAZARD CLASS: Flammable Gas
NFPA CODES: 2-4-2 USCG ID: BDI
RTECS ID: EI9275000
CHEMICAL FAMILY: Olefin
APPEARANCE: Liquefied colorless gas
ODOR: Mild gasoline-like odor
VAPOR PRESSURE: 3309 mm Hg at 100F
BOILING POINT: 24F (-4C) VAPOR DENSITY: 1.9
SOLUBILITY IN WATER: Negligible
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: 0.627 at 60/60F
PERCENT VOLATILE BY VOLUME: 100
FLASH POINT: -105F (Estimated)
FLAMMABLE LIMITS: LEL - 2 UEL - 12
AUTO IGNITION TEMP.: 788F MELTING POINT: -164F
IDLH: Not applicable, potential human carcinogen.
TLV TWA: 10 ppm OSHA PEL: 1000 ppm
MOLECULAR WEIGHT: 54.09 MOLECULAR FORMULA: C4Hg
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Butadiene is a colorless gas with an
aromatic odor. It is used to make synthetic rubber and plastics,
and to make other chemicals. It is shipped as a liquefied gas
under its vapor pressure. Contact with the liquid can cause
frostbite. It must be shipped inhibited as it is liable to
polymerization. If polymerization were to take place in a
cylinder or tank car, the cylinder or tank car can violently
rupture. It is easily ignited. Its vapor is heavier than air
and a flame can flash back to the source of leak very easily. It
can asphyxiate by the displacement of air. Under fire
conditions, the cylinders or tank cars may violently rupture and
rocket.
FIRE HAZARDS: Extremely flammable. May be ignited by heat,
sparks, or flames. Vapors may travel to a source of ignition and
flash back. Container may explode violently in heat of fire.
Vapor explosion hazard indoors, outdoors, or in sewers.
Explosion hazard is high if material is heated under pressure, in
air, or mixed with phenol, Chlorine dioxide, or crotonaldehyde.
It may form explosive peroxides upon exposure to air.
Formaldehyde and acrolein are produced when material is exposed
to photooxidation with ozone and nitrogen dioxide, as in smog
formation. It emits acrid fumes when heated. At elevated
temperatures, polymerization may take place and containers may
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 29 ***
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rupture. In butadiene, vapors are uninhibited and may form
polymers in vents or flame arresters of storage tanks, resulting
in stoppage of vents.
HEALTH HAZARDS: Death can result 23 minutes after inhaling air
containing 25% butadiene. It is a central nervous system
depressant in high concentrations. It may be irritating to skin
and mucous membranes. Contact with the liquid may cause
frostbite. It can asphyxiate by the displacement of air. If
inhaled, may be harmful; contact may cause burns to skin and
eyes. Vapors may cause dizziness or suffocation. Fire may
produce irritating or poisonous gases. 1,3-butadiene has
suspected carcinogenic potential for humans. Signs and symptoms
of exposure: Initial signs and symptoms include blurred vision,
nausea, prickling and dryness of mouth, throat, and nose,
followed by fatigue, headache, vertigo, decreased blood pressure
and pulse rate, unconsciousness, and respiratory paralysis.
3.2.2 Activated Catalyst at Phillips 66 HCC
INGREDIENTS: Silicon Dioxide (94-99), Titanium Trioxide (0-2.7),
Chromium Dioxide (0.5-3.0), Aluminum Oxide (0-0.1),
Fluoride (0-2.0)
CAS #: Titanium Dioxide: 13463-67-7
Silicon Dioxide: 7631-86-9
Chromium Trioxide: 1333-82-0
Aluminum Oxide: 1344-28-1
Fluoride: 16984-48-8
CHEMICAL FAMILY: Mixture
APPEARANCE: Green, Yellow, or Sandtone Powder
ODOR: Virtually Odorless
VAPOR PRESSURE: n/a BOILING POINT: n/a
VAPOR DENSITY: > 1 SOLUBILITY IN WATER: Approx. 40 mg/1
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: Approx. 2.0
PERCENT VOLATILE BY VOLUME: 0
FLASH POINT: n/a FLAMMABLE LIMITS: LEL - n/e UEL - n/e
TLV TWA: Titanium Dioxide: *+ 10 mg/nr
Silicon Dioxide: + 10 mg/nr
Chromium Trioxide: 0.05 mg/m3
Aluminum Oxide: *+ 10 mg/nr
Fluoride: 2.5 mg/iir
OSHA PEL: Titanium Dioxide: *+ 15 mg/m;:
Silicon Dioxide: 80 mg/nr
Chromium Trioxide: 0.5 mg/m;:
Aluminum Oxide: *+ 15 mg/nr
Fluoride: 2.5 mg/m3
MOLECULAR FORMULA: Mixture
* - Nuisance particulate
+ - Total dust
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 30 ***
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GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Activated catalyst is a powder either
colored yellow, green or sandtone. It is virtually odorless. It
may be slightly to moderately irritating to the eyes and skin.
Dust may be irritating to mucous membranes in the nose and upper
respiratory tract. Nose bleeds and lung inflammation may occur
with exposure to dust. Amorphous silica dioxide has been
reported to cause mild lung changes while fibrosis is associated
with crystalline silica dioxide contamination. Hexavalent
chromium may cause kidney damage with repeated exposure. It has
also been associated with causing irritation, allergic contact
dermatitis, skin ulcers, nasal irritation and perforation, and an
increased incidence of lung cancers in humans. Hexavalent
chromium has been designated a carcinogen by NTP and IARC. High
concentrations of dust may cause explosive conditions.
3.2.3 Polyolefin Catalyst
INGREDIENTS: Silicon Dioxide (80-99), Chromium Acetate (1-3.0),
(in some grades: Alumina (0-15), Ammonium Fluosili-
cate (0-2.1), and Ammonium Fluoborate (0-1.5))
CAS #: Silicon Dioxide: 63231-67-4
Chromium Acetate: 1066-30-4
Alumina: 1344-28-1
Ammonium Fluosilicate: 1309-32-6
Ammonium Fluoborate: 13826-83-0
RTECS ID: Silicon Dioxide: W7322000
Chromium Acetate: AB2975000
Alumina: BD1200000
Ammonium Fluosilicate: GQ9450000
Ammonium Fluoborate: GQ9450000
CHEMICAL FAMILY: Promoted Silica Gel Catalyst
APPEARANCE: Light green powder ODOR: None
SOLUBILITY IN WATER: Silica gel base insoluble in water.
Chromium acetate component soluble in
water.
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: Approx. 2.1 pH: Approx. 6-8
TLV TWA: Silicon Dioxide: 10 mg/m^
Chromium Acetate: 0.5 mg/m;*
Alumina: 10 rag/mi*
OSHA PEL: Silicon Dioxide: 80 mg/nc
Chromium Acetate: 0.5 mg/mj
MOLECULAR FORMULA: SiO2.H2O + Cr(C2H3O2)3.H,O
(Al^O-j, (NH4)2SiF6, and NH4BF4 added
to some grades)
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Polyolefin catalyst is a light green powder
that is considered basically inert. It is not classified as an
oxidizer. It is not reactive with water or chemical fire
extinguishers. It will not explode, and is non-flammable.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 31 ***
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HEALTH HAZARDS: The drying action of this material may cause
irritation of the mucous membranes of the nose and throat and
irritation of the skin. The IARC lists chromium acetate as
having indefinite test results as an animal carcinogen.
Trivalent chromium compounds have been reported to cause
dermatitis. Prolonged contact with silicon dioxide can cause
drying irritation of the skin. Polyolefin Catalyst is not known
to cause any abnormal aggravation of existing medical conditions.
The primary route of entry is inhalation.
3.2.4 Chlorine
INGREDIENTS: Chlorine (100)
CAS #: 7782-50-5 NOAA ID: 2862 IMIS ID: 0640
DOT ID: 1017 HAZARD CLASS: Poison
NFPA CODES: 3-0-0 Oxidizer USCG ID: CLX
RTECS ID: F02100000
CHEMICAL FAMILY: Halogen
APPEARANCE: Greenish, yellow gas
ODOR: Pungent, suffocating odor
VAPOR PRESSURE: 7600 mm Hg 6 86F BOILING POINT: -29.3F
VAPOR DENSITY: Approx. 2.5
SOLUBILITY IN WATER: 0.729g/100g 6 68F
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: 1.42 @ 60.IF, 85.6 psia
PERCENT VOLATILE BY VOLUME: 100 pH: 5.5
FLASH POINT: n/a FLAMMABLE LIMITS: LEL - n/a UEL - n/a
AUTO IGNITION TEMP.: n/a MELTING POINT: -150F
IDLH: 30 ppm TLV TWA: 1 ppm TLV STEL: 3 ppm
MOLECULAR WEIGHT: 70.91 MOLECULAR FORMULA: C12
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Chlorine is a greenish, yellow gas with a
pungent suffocating odor. It is used to purify water, bleach
woodpulp, and to make other chemicals. It is toxic by
inhalation. It is slight soluble in water. It reacts
explosively or forms explosive compounds, with many common
chemicals. It is normally shipped as a liquid in cylinders or
tank cars. Contact with liquid should be avoided as it can cause
frostbite. The liquid readily vaporizes to a gas. Chlorine does
not burn but will support combustion. The vapors are much
heavier than air and tend to settle in low areas.
FIRE HAZARDS: Will not burn, but most combustible materials will
burn in Chlorine as they do in oxygen; flammable gases will form
explosive mixtures with Chlorine. May ignite other combustible
materials. Mixture with fuels may cause explosion. Container
may explode in heat or fire. Vapor explosion and poison hazard
indoors, outdoors, or in sewers. Hydrogen and Chlorine mixtures
(5-95%) are exploded by almost any form of energy. May combine
with water or steam to produce toxic and corrosive fumes of
hydrochloric acid. Emits highly toxic fumes when heated. May
degrade plastics and rubber.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 32 ***
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HEALTH HAZARDS: Poisonous; may be fatal if inhaled. Contact nay
cause burns to skin and eyes. Signs and symptoms of exposure:
immediate, severe irritation of the nose, throat, and eyes.
Severe coughing; anxiety is usually present. Difficulty in
breathing, rales, cyanosis, and vomiting may be present.
Bronchitis or chronic lung conditions may be aggravated by
exposure.
3.2.5 Cyclohexane
INGREDIENTS: Cyclohexane (85), 2,4-Dimethylpentane (6.3), 2,2-
Dimethylpentane (2.1), 2-Methylhexane (1.2),
2,2,3-Trimethylpentane (0.8), 2,3-Dimethylpentane
(0.6), 3,3-Dimethylpentane (0.5), 1,1-Diroethyl-
cyclopentane (0.4), 3-Methylhexane (0.4), trans-
1,2-Dimethylcyclopentane (0.2), cis-l,3-Dimethyl-
cyclopentane (0.1), trans-l,2-Dimethylcyclopen-
tane (0.1)
CAS #: 110-82-7 NOAA ID: 3043 IMIS ID: 0810
DOT ID: 1145 HAZARD CLASS: Flammable Liquid
NFPA CODES: 1-3-0 USCG ID: CHX RTECS ID: GU6300000
CHEMICAL FAMILY: Cycloparaffinic Hydrocarbon
APPEARANCE: Clear, colorless liquid
ODOR: Pungent, petroleum-like odor
VAPOR PRESSURE: 165 mm Hg @ 100F
BOILING POINT: 177.3F @ 760 mm Hg VAPOR DENSITY: 2.8
SOLUBILITY IN WATER: Negligible
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: 0.77 at 60/60F
PERCENT VOLATILE BY VOLUME: 100 FLASH POINT: -4F
FLAMMABLE LIMITS: LEL - 1.3 UEL - 8.0
AUTO IGNITION TEMP.: 518F MELTING POINT: 43.8F
IDLH: 10,000 ppm TLV TWA: 300 ppm TLV STEL: 375 ppm
OSHA PEL: 300 ppm
MOLECULAR WEIGHT: 84.16 MOLECULAR FORMULA: C6H12
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Cyclohexane is a clear, colorless liquid
with a petroleum-like odor. It is used to make nylon, as a
solvent, paint remover, and to make other chemicals. It is
lighter than water and insoluble in water. Its vapors are
heavier than air.
FIRE HAZARDS: Flammable. Flashback along vapor trail may occur.
Vapor may explode if ignited in an enclosed area. Carbon oxides
and various hydrocarbons formed when burned. Vapors which are
heavier than air may accumulate in low areas and/or spread along
ground away from handling area.
HEALTH HAZARDS: As a vapor, irritating to eyes, nose, and
throat. If inhaled, will cause dizziness, nausea, and vomiting,
or loss of consciousness. As a liquid, irritating to skin and
eyes. Harmful if swallowed. Overexposure by ingestion may cause
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 33 ***
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increased respiration rate, fatigue, diarrhea, nausea, and
central nervous system depression. Extreme exposure may cause
circulatory collapse and death. May be aspirated into lungs if
swallowed, resulting in pulmonary edema and chemical pneumonitis.
3.2.6 Diethylzinc
INGREDIENTS: Diethylzinc (100)
CAS #: 557-20-0 DOT ID: 1366
NFPA CODES: 0-3-3 No water RTECS ID: ZH2070000
APPEARANCE: Clear, colorless liquid ODOR: Garlic-like odor
VAPOR PRESSURE: 15 mm Hg @ 68F
BOILING POINT: 253F @ 760 mm Hg
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: 1.205 @ 68F
FLASH POINT: Ignites spontaneously in air
FLAMMABLE LIMITS: LEL - n/a UEL - n/a
AUTO IGNITION TEMP.: Pyrophoric at ambient conditions
MELTING POINT: -22F MOLECULAR WEIGHT: 123.5
MOLECULAR FORMULA: (C2H5)2Zn
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Diethylzinc is a pyrophoric liquid with a
garlic-like odor. It is stable when it is shipped in sealed tubes
with carbon dioxide. It may decompose violently in water and
ignite spontaneously with air. It is toxic by ingestion. It is
used as a catalyst. If exposed to heat or flame, containers of
this material may explode.
FIRE HAZARDS: Ignites when exposed to air. Yields zinc oxide
fumes when burning; can cause "metal fume fever". Reacts
spontaneously with air or oxygen, and violently with water,
evolving flammable ethane gas. Contact with water applied to
adjacent fires will intensify the fire.
HEALTH HAZARDS: Inhalation of mist or vapor causes immediate
irritation of nose and throat; excessive or prolonged inhalation
of fumes from ignition or decomposition may cause "metal fume
fever" (sore throat, headache, fever, chills, nausea, vomiting,
muscular aches, perspiration, constricting sensation in lungs,
weakness, sometimes prostration); symptoms usually last 12-24
hours, with complete recovery in 24-48 hours. Eyes are
immediately and severely irritated on contact with liquid, vapor,
or dilute solution; without thorough irrigation, cornea may be
permanently damaged. Moisture in skin combines with chemical to
cause thermal and acid burns; tissue may be scarred without
prompt treatment. Ingestion would cause immediate burns at site
of contact; pain, nausea, vomiting, cramps, and diarrhea may
follow; if untreated, tissue may become ulcerated.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 34 ***
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3.2.7 Ethylene
INGREDIENTS: Ethylene (99.95), Ethane (0.03), Methane (0.02)
CAS #: 74-85-1 NOAA ID: 3404 IMIS ID: 1115
DOT ID: 1962 HAZARD CLASS: Flammable Gas
NFPA CODES: 1-4-2 USCG ID: ETL RTECS ID: KU5340000
CHEMICAL FAMILY: Olefinic Hydrocarbon
APPEARANCE: Colorless gas ODOR: Mild, sweet odor
VAPOR PRESSURE: 69,796 mm Hg at 100F
BOILING POINT: -154F (-103C) VAPOR DENSITY: 0.97
SOLUBILITY IN WATER: Negligible SPECIFIC GRAVITY: 0.61
PERCENT VOLATILE BY VOLUME: n/a
FLASH POINT: -213F (-136C) (Estimated)
FLAMMABLE LIMITS: LEL - 2.7 UEL - 28.6
AUTO IGNITION TEMP.: 842F MELTING POINT: -272.4F
TLV TWA: Simple Asphyxiant
MOLECULAR WEIGHT: 28.05 MOLECULAR FORMULA: C2H4
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Watery liquid; colorless; mild pleasant
odor. Floats on water. Flammable, irritating vapor is produced.
FIRE HAZARDS: Flammable. Flashback along vapor trail may occur.
Vapor may explode if ignited in an enclosed area. Carbon oxides
formed when burned.
HEALTH HAZARDS: If vapor inhaled, will cause dizziness,
difficult breathing, or loss of consciousness. Liquid is
irritating to skin and eyes. Harmful if swallowed. Liquefied
gas can cause freeze burns upon direct contact to eyes and skin
resulting in tissue necrosis. Overexposure through inhalation
may produce narcosis, anesthesia, unconsciousness, and death.
If ingested, liquefied gas may cause freeze burns to the mucous
membranes and possible central nervous system depression.
3.2.8 Hexene-1
INGREDIENTS: Hexene-1 (96.8), trams-Hexene-2 (<0.1), cis-Hexene-
2 (<0.1), Hexenes-3 (0.3), n-Hexane (1.2), Related
Isoolefins (1.6)
CAS #: 592-41-6 DOT ID: 1268 RTECS ID: MP6600100
HAZARD CLASS: Flammable Liquid USCG ID: HXE
CHEMICAL FAMILY: Olefinic Hydrocarbon
APPEARANCE: Colorless Liquid ODOR: Mild
VAPOR PRESSURE: 155 mm Hg at 7OF BOILING POINT: 146F (63C)
VAPOR DENSITY: 3.0 SOLUBILITY IN WATER: Negligible
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: 0.678 at 60/60F
PERCENT VOLATILE BY VOLUME: 100
FLASH POINT: -15F (-26C) (TCC, ASTM D56)
FLAMMABLE LIMITS: LEL - 1.2 (Estimated) UEL -
AUTO IGNITION TEMP.: 521F MELTING POINT: -219.6F
MOLECULAR WEIGHT: 84.16 MOLECULAR FORMULA: CgH12
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 35 ***
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GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Watery liquid; colorless; mild pleasant
odor. Floats on water. Flammable, irritating vapor is produced.
FIRE HAZARDS: Flammable. Flashback along vapor trail may occur.
Vapors may~explode if ignited in an enclosed area. Carbon oxides
and various hydrocarbons formed when burned. Product will float
on water and can be re-ignited. Highly flammable vapors which
are heavier than air may accumulate in low areas and/or spread
along ground away from handling area.
HEALTH HAZARDS: If vapors inhaled, will cause dizziness,
difficult breathing, or loss of consciousness. May also cause
headache, narcosis, vomiting, vertigo, central nervous system
depression. Liquid is irritating to eyes and skin. Can be
absorbed through skin in harmful amounts. If ingested, may cause
irritation to intestines. May be aspirated into lungs if
swallowed resulting in pulmonary edema and chemical pneumonitis.
n-Hexane has caused nerve damage producing a lack of feeling in
extremities and more severe nerve damage.
3.2.9 Hydrogen
INGREDIENTS: Hydrogen (99.9)
CAS #: 1333-74-0 DOT ID: 1049 HAZARD CLASS: Flammable Gas
NFPA CODES: 0-4-1 RTECS ID: MW9650000
CHEMICAL FAMILY: Inorganic Flammable Gas
APPEARANCE: Colorless gas ODOR: Odorless
VAPOR PRESSURE: 760 mm Hg 6 -423F BOILING POINT: -423F
VAPOR DENSITY: 0.070 SOLUBILITY IN WATER: 1.82% @ 68F
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: -0.0710 6 -423F
PERCENT VOLATILE BY VOLUME: n/a FLASH POINT: -259C
FLAMMABLE LIMITS: LEL - 4 UEL - 74.2
AUTO IGNITION TEMP.: 1975F MELTING POINT: -259.2C
TLV TWA: Simple Asphyxiant
MOLECULAR FORMULA: H2
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Hydrogen is a colorless, odorless gas. It
is easily ignited. Once ignited, it burns with a pale blue,
almost invisible flame. It is lighter than air. A flame can
flash back to the source of a leak very easily. It is flammable
over a wide range of vapor/air concentrations. It may be shipped
in cylinders and special tank cars. Under fire conditions, the
cylinders may violently rupture and rocket. Hydrogen is not
toxic but is a simple asphyxiant by the displacement of oxygen in
the air. Hydrogen is used to make other chemicals and in
oxyhydrogen welding and cutting.
FIRE HAZARDS: Extremely flammable; may be ignited by heat,
sparks, or flames. Vapors may travel to a source of ignition and
flash back. Container may explode in heat of fire. Vapor
explosion_hazard indoors, outdoors, or in sewers.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 36 ***
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HEALTH HAZARDS: Vapors may cause dizziness or suffocation.
Contact will cause severe frostbite. Fire may produce irritating
or poisonous gases. Overexposure may cause dizziness,
unconsciousness, or death.
3.2.10 Nitrogen
INGREDIENTS: Nitrogen (>99)
CAS #: 7727-37-9 DOT ID: 1066
HAZARD CLASS: Nonflammable Gas NFPA CODES: 3-0-0
RTECS ID: QW9700000
CHEMICAL FAMILY: Inert Gas
APPEARANCE: Colorless gas ODOR: Odorless
BOILING POINT: -320.4F (-195.8C) VAPOR DENSITY: 1.2
SOLUBILITY IN WATER: .02 @ 68F
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: 0.97 at 70F FLASH POINT: n/a
FLAMMABLE LIMITS: LEL - n/a UEL - n/a
AUTO IGNITION TEMP.: n/a MELTING POINT: 210.01C
TLV TWA: Simple Asphyxiant
MOLECULAR WEIGHT: 28.01 MOLECULAR FORMULA: N2
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Nitrogen is a colorless, odorless gas. It
is non-combustible. Nitrogen is non-toxic and makes up the ma^or
portion of air, but will not support life by itself. It is
slightly soluble in water. Nitrogen is used in food processing,
in purging air conditioning and refrigeration systems, and in
pressurizing aircraft tires. It can cause asphyxiation by
displacement of air. It can be shipped in cylinders, cargo
tanks, or tank cars.
FIRE HAZARDS: May burn but will not ignite readily. Container
may explode in heat or fire.
HEALTH HAZARDS: Vapors may cause dizziness or suffocation.
Contact with liquid may cause frostbite. Fire may produce
irritating or poisonous gases. Effects of exposure to high
concentrations may include: loss of balance or dizziness;
tightness in the frontal area of the forehead; tingling of the
tongue, fingertips, or toes; weakened speech leading to the
inability to utter sounds; rapid reduction in the ability to
perform movements; reduced consciousness of the surroundings;
loss of tactile sensations; and heightened mental activity. It
is possible that none of the above symptoms may in occur in
nitrogen asphyxia so that there are no definite warning symptoms.
Nitrogen can cause suffocations without warning.
3.2.11 Isobutane
INGREDIENTS: Isobutane (99.6), n-Butane (0.2), Propane (0.2)
CAS #: 75-28-5 DOT ID: 1075 HAZARD CLASS: Flammable Gas
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RTECS ID: TZ4300000
CHEMICAL FAMILY: Parrafinic Hydrocarbon
APPEARANCE: Colorless liquefied petroleum gas ODOR: None
VAPOR PRESSURE: 2327.68 mm Hg @ 70F
BOILING POINT: 11F (-12C) VAPOR DENSITY: 2.16 60F
SOLUBILITY IN WATER: Negligible
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: 0.563 at 60/60F
PERCENT VOLATILE BY VOLUME: 100
FLASH POINT: -117F (-83C) (Estimated)
FLAMMABLE LIMITS: LEL - 1.8 UEL - 8.4
AUTO IGNITION TEMP.: 890F MELTING POINT: -427.5F
MOLECULAR WEIGHT: 58.12 MOLECULAR FORMULA: C4H1Q
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Isobutane is a colorless gas with a faint
petroleum like odor. It is shipped as a liquefied gas under its
vapor pressure. Contact with the liquid can cause frostbite. It
is easily ignited. Its vapor is heavier than air and a flame can
flash back to the source of leak very easily. The leak can
either be a liquid or vapor leak. It can asphyxiate by the
displacement of air. Under fire conditions, the cylinders or
tank car may violently rupture and rocket.
FIRE HAZARDS: Flashback along vapor trail may occur. Vapor may
explode if ignited in an enclosed area. Carbon oxides formed
when burned. Highly flammable vapors which are heavier than air
may accumulate in low areas and/or spread along ground away from
handling site.
HEALTH HAZARDS: Vapor can be irritating to eyes. Liquefied gas
may cause freeze burns upon direct contact with eyes. Gas is not
considered irritating to skin; however, extreme overexposure to
high gas concentrations may cause mild irritation to mucous
membranes. Liquefied gas may cause freeze burns upon direct
contact with skin. Overexposure by inhalation may cause
dizziness, disorientation, headache, excitation, rapid
respiration, and central nervous system depression. Extreme
overexposures may cause anesthesia, unconsciousness, and
respiratory arrest. Ingestion is not a likely exposure route,
but can cause freeze burns to mucous membranes and possible
central nervous system depression.
3.2.12 Polyethylene/Polypropylene
INGREDIENTS: Polyethylene (100) or Polypropylene (100)
CAS #: Polyethylene: 9002-88-4
Polypropylene: 9003-07-0
CHEMICAL FAMILY: Olefin Polymers and Copolymers
APPEARANCE: Opaque, translucent, amber or black waxy pellets or
fluff ODOR: None
VAPOR PRESSURE: n/a BOILING POINT: n/a VAPOR DENSITY: n/a
SOLUBILITY IN WATER: Negligible
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SPECIFIC GRAVITY: 0.94-0.96 g/cm3
PERCENT VOLATILE BY VOLUME: 0.01
FLASH POINT: 430F (221C) (COC, ASTM D92)
FLAMMABLE LIMITS: LEL - n/a UEL - n/a
IDLH: n/e TLV TWA: n/e TLV STEL: n/e
OSHA PEL: n/e
MOLECULAR FORMULA: Various
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Polyethylene or Polypropylene can be found
either as dust or waxy pellets, either colored opaque,
translucent, amber or black. It has no odor. It is slightly
lighter than water.
FIRE HAZARDS: Smoke and noxious gases (carbon oxides and
hydrocarbons) released when burned. If heated, Polyethylene or
Polypropylene may off-gas one or more of the following chemicals:
Acetaldehyde, Acetic Acid, Acetone, Acrolein, Butane, Carbon
Dioxide, Carbon Monoxide, Dimethylbenzene, Ethanol, Ethylene,
Formaldehyde, Formic Acid, Methane, Methanol, Methyl Ethyl
Ketone, Pentane, 2-Pentanone, Propane, Propionic Acid, or Propyl
Alcohol.
HEALTH HAZARDS: Dust may cause mechanical irritation to eyes.
Dust is essentially non-irritating to the skin. Dust may produce
mechanical irritation to the mucous membranes of the nose,
throat, and upper respiratory tract. If ingested, dust is
essentially inert and non-toxic. Long term exposure to high dust
concentrations may cause non-debilitating lung changes. At
extrusion temperatures, Polyethylene or Polypropylene can release
vapors and gases which are irritating to the mucous membranes of
the eyes, mouth, throat, and lungs. Generally these irritant
effects are all transitory. However, prolonged exposure to
irritating off-gases can lead to pulmonary edema. Exposure to
the burning material can result in carboxyhemoglobinemia. Molten
polymer may cause severe thermal burns. The interior of molten
masses may remain hot for some time because of low thermal
conductivity of the polymer.
3.2.13 Stadis 450
INGREDIENTS: Toluene (60), Isopropyl Alcohol (3), Mixed Aromatic
Solvents (8), Three Trade Secret Components
CAS #: Toluene: 108-88-3 Isopropyl Alcohol: 67-63-0
DOT ID: 1993 HAZARD CLASS: Flammable Liquid
CHEMICAL FAMILY: Polymeric Nitrogen & Sulfur Compounds
APPEARANCE: Amber Liquid ODOR: Toluene-like
BOILING POINT: 90C @ 760 mm Hg SOLUBILITY IN WATER: Slight
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: 0.90 at 16C FLASH POINT: 4C (TCC)
TLV TWA: Toluene: 100 ppm Isopropyl Alcohol: 400 ppm
TLV STEL: Toluene: 150 ppm Isopropyl Alcohol: 500 ppm
OSHA PEL: Toluene: n/e Isopropyl Alcohol: 400 ppm
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GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Stadis 450 is an amber-colored liquid with
a Toluene-like odor. It is lighter than water. It is a stable
compound and polymerization will not occur.
FIRE HAZARDS: It is flammable.
HEALTH HAZARDS: The product contains skin and eye irritants.
Toxic effects expected from exposure by inhalation, ingestion, or
contact, largely attributable to Toluene, include: reversible
abnormal liver function as detected by lab tests; temporary
nervous system depression with anesthetic effects such as
dizziness, headache, and confusion; irritation of the upper
respiratory passages; and eye irritation with discomfort,
tearing, or blurring of vision. Higher exposures may lead to
these effects: nonspecific discomfort, such as nausea, headache,
or weakness; nervous system depression with anesthetic effects
such as in-coordination, and loss of consciousness; and death
from gross overexposure. Significant skin permeation after
contact appears unlikely. Individuals with pre-existing diseases
of the central nervous system, cardiovascular system, liver,
kidneys, and bone marrow may have increased susceptibility to the
toxicity of excessive exposures.
3.2.14 Styrene
INGREDIENTS: Styrene (100)
CAS #: 100-42-5 NOAA ID: 4553 IMIS ID: 2280
DOT ID:^ 2055 HAZARD CLASS: Flammable Liquid
NFPA CODES: 2-3-2 USCG ID: STY RTECS ID: WL3675000
CHEMICAL FAMILY: Aromatic Hydrocarbon
APPEARANCE: Colorless, oily liquid
ODOR: Penetrating, aromatic odor
VAPOR PRESSURE: 4.3 mm Hg at 15C BOILING POINT: 293.4C
VAPOR DENSITY: .90 @ 25C ' SOLUBILITY IN WATER: Insoluble
SPECIFIC GRAVITY: .91 § 68F
PERCENT VOLATILE BY VOLUME: 100
FLASH POINT: 88F (31C) (TCC)
FLAMMABLE LIMITS: LEL - 1.1 UEL - 6.1
AUTO IGNITION TEMP.: 914F MELTING POINT: -23.IF
IDLH: 5000 ppm TLV TWA: 50 ppm TLV STEL: 100 ppm
MOLECULAR WEIGHT: 104.15 MOLECULAR FORMULA: CgHg
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Styrene is a clear, colorless liquid with a
penetrating, aromatic odor. It is used to make plastics, paints,
and synthetic rubber, and to make other chemicals. If it becomes
contaminated or is subjected to heat, it may polymerize. If the
polymerization takes place inside a container, the container is
subject to violent rupture. It is lighter and insoluble in
water. Its vapors are heavier than air.
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FIRE HAZARDS: Flammable. Containers may explode in fare.
Flashback along vapor trail may occur. Vapor may explode if
ignited in an enclosed area. Vapor is heavier than air and may
travel considerable distance to a source of ignition and flash
back. At elevated temperatures, such as in fire conditions,
polymerization may take place which may lead to container
explosion. Emits acrid fumes when burned.
HEALTH HAZARDS: Vapor is irritating to eyes, nose, and throat.
If inhaled, will cause dizziness or loss of consciousness.
Liquid will burn skin and eyes. Will cause defatting of skin.
It is toxic by ingestion or inhalation.
3.2.15 Sodium Dichromate
INGREDIENTS: Sodium Dichromate (100)
CAS #: 10588-01-9 NOAA ID: 4482 DOT ID: 1479
NFPA CODES: 1-0-1 Oxidizer USCG ID: SDL
RTECS ID: HX7700000
APPEARANCE: Red-Orange crystalline solid
VAPOR PRESSURE: n/a BOILING POINT: Decomposes
VAPOR DENSITY: n/a FLASH POINT: n/a
MELTING POINT: 675F TLV TWA: 0.5 mg/m
MOLECULAR WEIGHT: 262.01 MOLECULAR FORMULA: Cr2O?.2Na
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Sodium Dichromate is red orange crystalline
solid. It is used in the manufacture of other chemicals, as a
corrosive inhibitor, and for many other uses. It is non-
combustible. It is soluble in water.
FIRE HAZARDS: Not flammable. May cause fire on contact with
combustibles. Decomposes to produce oxygen when heated. May
ignite other combustibles upon contact.
HEALTH HAZARDS: Dust is irritating to eyes, nose, and throat.
If inhaled, will cause difficult breathing. As a solid, it will
burn skin and eyes. If swallowed, will cause nausea and
vomiting.
REFERENCES
1. Phillips Petroleum Material Safety Data Sheets
2. 1987 Emergency Response Guidebook. U.S. Department of
Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration,
Office of Hazardous Materials Transportation, Washington D.C.
3. Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards. National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Centers for Disease Control, Cincinnati, Ohio,
1985.
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4. Threshold Limit Values and Biological Exposure Indices for
1988-1989. American Conference of Governmental Industrial
Hygienists, Cincinnati, Ohio.
5. Consolidated List of Chemicals for CERCLA. SARA, and RCRA.
U.S. EPA Region 6, Contingency Planning Section (6E-EP), Dallas,
Texas, September, 1989.
4.0 PROCESS INFORMATION FOR HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS
4.1 STORAGE AND HANDLING
4.1.1 Storage Systems
For the PE plant, the facility stores and handles a wide number
of chemicals. However, a summary of the procedure to store only
the major chemicals used in Plants IV and V is provided here.
Physical and chemical properties of these chemicals have been
presented in Section 3.2 (Properties of Hazardous Chemicals).
Ethylene: Ethylene is transported to the plant through a pipeline
from a Phillips 66 refinery in Sweeney, Texas, which is
approximately 50 miles southwest from the Houston plant. Once
received at the plant, ethylene is distributed to the reactors in
PE Plants IV and V via smaller pipelines. The amount of ethylene
used by the plant is measured at the facility on a regular basis.
Isobutane: Isobutane is received by tank cars at the east-central
location (see Figure 2) . From there, it is pumped to the
following areas:
Plant Reactor Tank Capacity (gallons)
IV 1-2 10,000
V 1-4 45,000
V 5-6 2 X 90,000
The isobutane is then passed through a degassing column and a
dryer for purification and drying before being fed into the
reactors under pressure through steel pipes.
Hexene: Hexene is transported to the facility in tank cars at PE
Plant IV. It is then transferred directly to three tanks located
in Plant IV. One tank has a 9,000 gallon capacity, whereas the
other two have capacities of 8,000 gallons each. After degassing
and drying hexene received from the three tanks, it is fed
directly to PE Plants IV and V.
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Hydrogen: Hydrogen is received directly through a pipeline from
the nearby Linde/Air Products plant. It is dried, filtered, and
then piped to Plant V. Hydrogen is not stored on site.
Nitrogen: Like hydrogen, nitrogen is also received by a pipeline
directly from the Linde/Air Products plant.
Catalyst and co-catalyst: The catalyst/co-catalyst used for the
polymerization reaction in the PE plant are received either in
drums or tanks, and are stored in the plant area.
Scavenger: The scavenger used in the PE process reactors is
received in 5-lb metal containers specifically designed for the
pyrophoric materials.
Chlorine: Chlorine is used in cooling water towers and two one-
ton cylinders were stored in PE Plant V.
Fluff Polyethylene: The polymerized powder product (fluff) from
the reactors is stored in 400,000 Ib storage silos located on the
west side of the PE plant. Plants IV and V contain six and
twenty-one such silos, respectively.
Pelletized Polyethylene: The finished pelletized polyethylene is
also stored in silos located just north of the fluff polyethylene
silos.
4.1.2 Shipping/Receiving
Phillips has access to transportation routes at the Phillips 66
HCC that include water, rail, and highway. Process chemicals are-
received in the plant via rail. These chemicals are then
transferred into holding tanks that are linked to the appropriate
reactors. Exception to this receiving system are nitrogen,
hydrogen, and ethylene, which is brought in via pipeline.
Finished polyethylene, which is stored in large holding tanks, is
shipped via rail cars and hopper trucks.
4.1.3 Material Transfer
Raw materials are transferred within the plant by piping systems
which are detailed by the plant though process diagrams.
Unpelleted polyethylene is sometimes held in storage tanks and
then transferred to extruder feed tanks.
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4.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION
For this section, Phillips 66 HCC has claimed all the information
to be.highly confidential. Because of this claim, a very general
description of the processes involved has been provided here.
4.2.1 Overview of Processing Steps and Operating
Procedures
Polyethylene is manufactured in PE Plants IV and V. Plant IV has
two reactors and Plant V has six reactors to polymerize ethylene.
The reactors were brought into operation as follows:
Plant Reactor Year
IV 1 1966
2 12/68
V 1 and 2 11/74
3 and 4 5/78
5 and 6 3/82
Major steps involved in the polyethylene manufacturing process
include process start-up, feed purification and drying,
polymerization, product drying, product transfer and extrusion.
Some of the major steps involved in these operations are
summarized below.
Polymerization Reaction, Product Transfer and Extrusion:
Polyethylene is produced by the addition reaction of ethylene
monomer or co-monomers in the presence of a catalyst within a
diluent-polymer slurry in a loop reactor. The material is
circulated in the reactor at a very high flowrate using a pump.
Feedstocks are continuously added while reaction products are
continuously withdrawn to a low pressure flash chamber. The
flashed gases are recovered, purified and returned to the
reactor. Polyethylene powder is pneumatically conveyed to storage
tanks having an inert purge. From these tanks, the polyethylene
powder is pneumatically conveyed, and loaded either into rail
cars, hopper trucks or to extruder feed tanks. After adding
appropriate additives, the mixture is fed to an extruder via a
mixer. The polyethylene is pelletized and sized in the extruder.
Pellets are then pneumatically conveyed to storage blending or
loading tanks.
Feed Purification and Drying: Prior to feeding any material into
a reactor, it is purified and dried. This is essential because
any presence of water or oxygen in the feed severely affects the
catalyst, and hence, the polymerization reaction. The feed
streams consist of ethylene, hydrogen, isobutane and hexene. The
purification and drying involve degassing and/or passing the feed
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through dryers. The catalyst is received at Plant V in
pressurized sealed tote bins, which is transferred to the
catalyst system using dry nitrogen.
Reactor Start-up and Pressure Testing: Prior to start-up, a
reactor is pressure tested to ensure that there is no leak in the
reactor system. Various steps in pressure testing involve:
filling the reactor with nitrogen; if no oxygen is detected in
the reactor, then proceed with pressure testing with nitrogen at
a specified pressure; if no leak is detected using a commercial
soap solution and pressure gauges, then proceed to pressure
testing at the reactor's operating pressure with ethylene. Once
two consecutive ethylene pressure tests show no leaks, the
reactor is filled with isobutane, leading to normal reactor
operations.
4.2.2 General Description of Process Equipment
A variety of processing equipment is involved in the polyethylene
manufacturing process in Plants IV and V. Because of the
confidentiality claim by Phillips 66 HCC, only a very general
description of some of the major equipment has been provided
here.
As mentioned in the previous section, all eight reactors in the
Plants IV and V are called loop reactors, and they constitute the
heart of the PE plant. They are 18-24 inches in diameter, 500-800
ft. long, and have a capacity ranging from 7,500 to 18,000
gallons. The reactors contain several vertical legs and a number
of 90-degree radius ells. The vertical legs are jacketed for
circulation of water coolant. The reactors are designed and
constructed such that there are minimum joints along the reactor-
length. All flange joints have commonly used asbestos or metallic
gaskets. The reactors are operated at a certain optimum pressure
and temperature for the polymerization reaction. The material in
the reactor is circulated at a specific velocity using a very
high flowrate pump.
Most of the operating controls in the PE plant are monitored from
the control rooms. The purpose of computer control is to maintain
a lined out operation of the reactors, increase production rates
and reduce the operator's supervisory time on the reactors. The
computer looks at a new set of data every six seconds and makes
automatic adjustments based upon these inputs and calculations it
makes. The computer prints the information every hour. The
control room for Plant IV is located in Plant III just west of
reactor 2. The control room for the Plant V was located in Plant
V between reactors 3 and 4, and the finishing area. Various
operating parameters which are being monitored, controlled and/or
recorded by the computer control system include: flow rates of
chemicals fed to the reactors, physical and chemical properties
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 45 ***
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of materials at various stages in the reactor and at the product
take-off end, concentrations of various chemicals during the
reaction phase, heat and mass transfer data, and temperature and
pressure throughout the reactor system. A comprehensive list of
the computer controlled parameters has been provided in Phillips
66 HCC's Plant V PF Reactor Unit Training Program, Course # OPF-
41 on Computer Control.
Other equipment items involved in the PE Manufacturing process
are as follows:
- Ethylene preheaters, oil separator and dryers.
- Isobutane degassing column and dryers.
- Flash tank, purification and drying equipment for
recycled chemicals.
Catalyst activator, and charging/feeding tanks and
equipment.
- Reactor "Kill System" equipment including an alcohol
feed tank.
Reactor sealant system equipment including sealant pot.
Product take-off and control equipment.
Reactor emergency dump tank.
- Equipment for product purification and drying.
Equipment for product finishing, extrusion and
palletizing.
- Product storage silos and bagging equipment
Because of the confidentiality claim by Phillips 66 HCC, no
further process information has been provided in this report.
4.2.3 Standard Operating Procedures
Phillips 66 HCC has an established program of training the
personnel for the polyethylene plant. The training program
outline and the eighteen courses offered are provided in Appendix
L. The training courses are generally designed to educate the
trainees on the standard operating procedures for the plant
operations.
4.2.4 Equipment Maintenance Procedures
Table 4 provides a list of Phillips 66 HCC employees working in
the PE plant. There are two Maintenance Superintendents assigned
to the PE plant: one for the reactor operations, and the other
for the finishing operations. Each superintendent has several
Maintenance Supervisors under him, responsible for maintenance
work on any equipment or instrument in the PE plant. There are
numerous contractor personnel who also perform fabrication and/or
maintenance work in the plant. Phillips 66 HCC has both
preventive and predictive maintenance procedures established.
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However, no information was provided by Phillips 66 HCC on the
predictive maintenance at the time of writing this report. For
preventive maintenance, Phillips 66 HCC has established a work
order system. All work order records are maintained in computer
files which contain information on work order number, job title,
type and frequency, the date of issuance and the date of last
completion of the work. Phillips 66 HCC has provided a list of
such work orders, but it has been claimed confidential.
Phillips 66 HCC has also provided information on their Plant V
training courses. It indicates that Phillips 66 HCC has an
established training program for its personnel. Further
information on training material and levels of training has been
provided in Section 4.2.6 (Training Practices) of this report.
4.2.5 Instrument Maintenance
No information was available on the instrument maintenance,
calibration and repairs. During the audit, Phillips 66 HCC had
stated that the records were maintained in the plant; however,
they were destroyed due to the explosion.
4.2.6 Training Practices
The following information is based on examination of manuals and
logs, and information obtained from the Safety Director and other
Phillips 66 HCC management representatives:
Extensive training is available for employees in hazard
communication, standard operating procedures, maintenance, and
emergency response. All training is carried out by in-house
experienced personnel. It was noted that employee turnover is
very low.
In hazard communication training, a training officer gives each
new employee a "generic" training course in hazard communication,
and then the unit supervisor gives more detailed and specific
hazard communication training related to the operations of the
unit and related hazardous materials.
The training given to operators for the operation of a processing
unit appears to be comprehensive and specific (see Appendix L) .
The training for operators in Plant V consists of 18 courses on
various aspects of the safe operation of this unit.
All maintenance workers are put through a 48-month period of
training courses (plus related on-the-job training that consists
of a wide variety of courses). They are tested via a written
test and on-the-job test to determine if they qualify for being
able to work independently as a maintenance worker. They are not
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called "Master Qualified" but are given an equivalent rating
("First Class Qualified").
The Emergency Response Team is given training in all aspects of
emergency response. Phillips 66 HCC maintains a log of emergency
response training given to the Emergency Response Team.
Phillips 66 HCC designates a prime contact to act as liaison
between Phillips 66 HCC and each contractor. The contact will
not necessarily be the same for each contractor. The contact
with Fish Engineering states that the contractor shall be
responsible for training its own employees in safety and health
aspects of their job assignments (see Appendix P) (Phillips 66
HCC Contractor Safety Manual).
There was no evidence that Phillips 66 HCC conducted oversight of
the contractor's training programs to ensure effectiveness of
their programs and equivalency with that of Phillips 66 HCC for
its own employees.
5.0 HAZARD EVALUATION AND MODELING
5.1 HAZARD EVALUATION
For general information on Phillips 66 HCC Facility and Corporate
environmental and safety reviews, see Section 2.5.5 (Audit
Procedures), in this report.
The Phillips 66 HCC performs a Hazard Assessment and Risk
Analysis (KARA) on each process plant in the complex before it is
started up. The KARA includes process hazard review, design and
hazards review, and pre-start up safety audit. A team comprised
of a process engineer, design coordinator (person in charge of
overall design), operating personnel, and a safety representative
from the Phillips 66 HCC perform the KARA. The KARA is only
performed during the pre-start up. After the plant is in
operation, HARAs are performed only when modifications are made.
Because the Phillips 66 HCC is comprised of several plants with
different process and design features, each plant must take into
consideration the other plant's concerns. Worst-case events,
such as catastrophic failure of vessels are considered in design
of the plants. Each plant in the Phillips 66 HCC is assigned an
engineering staff. Phillips 66 HCC also has a central
engineering group that oversees complex-wide projects.
5. 2 MODELING
Phillips 66 HCC did some air release modeling during the summer
of 1989. The modeling was done using the Radian Corporation's
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CHARM software. The purpose of the modeling was to aid in
determination of appropriate off-site emergency response
procedures to a vapor cloud release. Nine chemical compounds
were used in worst-case release scenarios to provide information
for the development of emergency actions and to identify
pertinent health and safety concerns. In addition, the model
showed qualitative descriptions of cloud changes with conditions
of temperature, relative humidity, and pressure. The company has
done no surface or ground water modeling.
The CHARM program input included what was considered to be worst-
case scenarios for nine compounds. The worst-case scenarios were
obtained from two sources. First, process engineers who would be
aware of possible accidents were asked to provide their
assessment of worst-case situations. Second, mechanical flow
sheets with information regarding a compound's storage pressure
and temperature, etc., were consulted. From the combined
information, one worst-case was selected for each compound. The
compounds used and the worst-case scenario for each compound are
listed in Table 1. The variations of weather conditions are
listed in Table 2.
Worst-case releases were assumed so cloud width, downwind
distance and concentration would be overestimated. Other
assumptions were that puff clouds were assumed to be circular,
with the diameter given by the maximum width of the cloud. These
clouds were assumed to move with the wind. They were to be
denoted in the tabulation of the resulting data by a value listed
under maximum concentrations. Fixed clouds were assumed not to
move along with the wind and to span the whole area from the
release site to the downwind distance indicated. For these
clouds, no value would be listed under maximum concentrations in
the tabulation of results.
The results of this modeling were used in the vulnerability and
risk assessment evaluation for the City of Pasadena. The input
parameters and results are contained in the Vulnerability and
Risk Assessment document.
TABLE 1
WORST CASE SCENARIOS
BY CHEMICAL
Hexane: Storage Tank Rupture
Hexene: Storage Tank Rupture
Butadiene: Sphere Piping Rupture
Cyclohexane: Wet Cyclohexane Storage Tank Pipe Leak
Styrene: Storage Tank Leak
Propylene: Storage Bullet Drainage
Chlorine: Cylinder Valve Breakage
Ethylene: Feed Pipe Rupture
Isobutane: Recycle Isobutane Storage Tank Pipe Rupture
•
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TABLE 2
ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS
USED IN MODELS
WIND SPEED
TEMP. 1234
Clear Day, 65% humidity: 50 F 5 mph 10 mph 15 mph 20 mph
90 F 5 mph 10 mph 15 mph 20 mph
Clear Night, 65% humidity: 40 F 5 mph 10 mph 15 mph 20 mph
85 F 5 mph 10 mph 15 mph 20 mph
6.0 RELEASE RELATED TECHNIQUES
6.1 HAZARDOUS FACILITY PROCESSES WITH SIGNIFICANT ACCIDENT
POTENTIAL
The entire Phillips 66 HCC complex has a high accident potential
due to the inherent dangers in the petrochemical processing
industry.
At the Phillips 66 HCC, large quantities of hydrocarbons are used
to produce plastics and plastic related resins. Most of these
hydrocarbons are very flammable and due to the number of ignition
sources, present a significant accident potential. The emphasis
on this section will focus on the Polyethylene Plant but the
accident potential described applies to the entire Phillips 66
HCC complex.
The Polyethylene plant has significant accident potential due to
the processing of ethylene and isobutane into polyethylene. These
two chemicals enter the reactors and the ethylene is reacted
under controlled temperature and pressure to form the intermediate
polyethylene "fluff". The fluff is then sent to the polyethylene
finishing building where it is re-melted and combined with other
olefinic chemicals to produce a finished polyethylene plastic to
customers' specifications.
The chemicals involved are not "stored" in the classical sense.
The ethylene is brought into the plant in a pipeline from the
Phillips 66 Refinery in Sweeney, Texas. Isobutane is transported
to HCC in railcars and is transferred to two special
holding/storage silos on the northeast side of the PE Plant.
From these silos, the isobutane is piped to the particular
reactors where it will be used. After exiting the reactor, the
isobutane is sent to a cleaning facility where it is "cleaned"
and then sent back to the silo prior to being reloaded into a
reactor. The isobutane system is a closed loop with additional
isobutane added to the system as required due to operating
losses.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 50 ***
-------
The most hazardous property of the chemicals at the Phillips 66
HCC is flammability. Flash points of some the chemicals are as
low as -213F (-136C). These hydrocarbons are also under pressure
in the reactors and/or storage vessels. If there is a rupture,
either of the vessel itself or in the supporting piping system,
the hydrocarbons are released under pressure. The release will
cause a vapor cloud to form and drift with the prevailing winds.
There are potential ignition sources within the chemical complex.
These potential ignition sources range from process sources like
heaters, flares, and catalyst activators, to nonprocess sources
like cutting or welding torches, light switches, and vehicle
ignition systems. If the cloud drifts to one of these sources
and is within the flammable limits, an explosion and fire may
occur.
Process parameters which may lead to accidental releases include
temperature rises above the set parameters for process operation.
Since the gasses in the reactors obey the gas laws, temperature
raises may lead to overpressurization of the vessel or reactor
which could then lead to a mechanical failure of a valve or
flange. The same holds true for the initial pressurization and
filling of the reactors. The reactors are designed to operate at
a range of pressures and overpressurization could lead to a
release through the relief systems which is described in Section
6.2. In the unlikely event that the relief systems were to fail,
there could be a catastrophic release.
The chemical storage areas associated with the K-Resin plant also
present a significant potential for an accident. The chemical of
primary concern is the 1,3-Butadiene stored in four 50,000-gallon
spherical pressure tanks. As stated in Section 3.0, 1,3-
Butadiene is extremely flammable. The chemical is stored under
pressure in a liquid state and if involved in a fire or ruptured,
the storage tanks may explode violently.
The explosion and fire which occurred on October 23, 1989, could
be easily described as a "Worst-Case" scenario for a catastrophic
release. The incident released an estimated 80,000 Ibs of
ethylene, 555,000 Ibs of isobutane, 4,500 Ibs of hexene, and
15,000 Ibs of propane. These chemicals were in use either in the
reactor structure or in the finishing building. Additionally,
approximately 2,300 Ibs of chlorine (gaseous), 60 Ibs of chromium
(in the catalyst as Cr), and an unknown quantity of asbestos were
lost. These last substances were not directly involved in the
explosion, but were in the plant structure (asbestos and
chlorine) or were reactant products (catalyst).
Phillips has a set of procedures which are to be followed by the
system operators during the filling, startup, shutdown, and
emptying of the reactor vessels. These procedures have been
described in Section 4.2 and will not be reviewed again here.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 51 ***
-------
6.2 RELEASE PREVENTION SYSTEMS
Phillips has a flare system to prevent or manage releases. There
are three flares located on-site in the Polyethylene plant. Two
of the flares are elevated flare towers, and the third is a
ground flare located in a flare pit. The two elevated flares are
typical natural gas-fired flares using steam injection for smoke
control. The flare towers are 100 and 130 feet tall. Plant V has
a single flare to control process upsets or releases. Plant IV
has a single flare which is shared with Plant II, the Solution
Plant. The Solution Plant, in addition to the elevated flare
shared with Plant IV, has a ground flare.
All three flares have a water knockout leg to prevent liquids
from entering the elevated flares. This is particularly true of
the Solution Plant flare which has the greatest potential for
liquids to enter the flare system. The knockout legs also
prevent any fine solids from entering flares.
The flare system has a history of good performance at the
Phillips facility. The system has performed according to design,
and except for smoking, without problems. The incidences of the
flares smoking were caused by process upsets causing larger than
the design amount of gasses to pass through the flare and
overcome the flares' ability to burn in a smokeless manner.
Process water passes through a series of four treatment ponds
prior to discharge. Storm water passes through a stormwater
retention pond.
There are two possible ways a leak in a reactor can be
identified. During a visual routine inspection of the reactor, if
an operator finds a leak, it is reported, and a corrective action
is required to be taken. The other fail-safe procedure involves
observing the level of sealant in the "Sealant Pot". A
significant drop in the sealant level observed periodically by
the reactor operator will indicate an "internal" or an "external"
leak in the reactor system. An "internal" leak implies that the
sealant is leaking into the reactor through the seal in the pump.
An "external" leak indicates that the sealant is leaked out of
the pump, and can be visually observed at the pump. The Sealant
Pot level gauge glass is required to be checked twice during a
shift. Typically, there should be no drop in the sealant level.
However, if the sealant level drops three or more inches during
any eight hour period, the reactor is required to be shutdown
immediately.
The reactor operations also include a "Kill System" and an
"Emergency Dump Procedure". The Kill System is activated
automatically with loss of circulation pump or coolant pump and
can also be activated manually. When activated, certain valves
open and close and an alcohol is pressured into the reactor with
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 52 ***
-------
ethylene. In case of an emergency, a reactor can be emptied into
the Dump Tank. The recoverable chemicals are then recovered from
this tank. As an added protection, the tank is equipped with
relief valves and pressure indicator controller to control tank
pressure and relieve to flare or vent.
The PE manufacturing process involves various streams going to
the flare which include: feedstock purification off-gas,
feedstock dehydrator regeneration gas, isobutane recovery unit
heavies, pressure relief from flash chamber, dump tank, guard
filters, and catalyst system.
6.3 MITIGATION SYSTEMS
Once a process upset occurs, there are a number of systems in-
place to mitigate the release. As described above, the flare
system is in place to mitigate a process upset which may be
routed through the flare. This is part of a closed system which
diverts process off-gasses through the flare system for
incineration. This system has worked well in mitigating upsets
for which it was designed.
In the event of a large scale release similar to the incident of
October 23, 1989, there are two systems available to assist in
mitigating the release. The first system is the fixed firewater
monitor nozzle system. In this system, there are a series of
firewater monitor nozzles fixed to the standpipes which carry
fire fighting water from the plant fire mains. These nozzles are
preset and aimed to provide cooling water and firewater to
specific structures and areas. This system is dependent on large
electric and diesel driven pumps to provide water pressure to the
nozzles. The October 23 explosion destroyed the electric power
distribution building and knocked the power station off-line,
which effectively knocked out both electric firewater pumps.
With the loss of of electrical power to these pumps and damage to
the water supply headers, part of this system was rendered
useless and alternate pumps were used to provide firewater.
After the alternate pump hookup was made, the fixed monitor
nozzle system was very effectively used to supply cooling water
to the isobutane storage silos.
In addition to the firewater monitors, there are a series of
fixed and portable AFFF (Aqueous Film Forming Foam) foam nozzles.
The AFFF nozzles supply a mixture of foam and water to a fire
area to suppress the fire and remove the oxygen support. As with
the fixed monitor system, this system was rendered partially
inoperable in the explosion. Additionally, the magnitude of the
explosion was such that the portable system was overwhelmed.
With specific reference to the October 23 explosion, the
firewater run-off was diverted to the stormwater retention pond
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 53 ***
-------
where it was recycled for reuse in fighting the fire. The
stormwater retention pond has an underflow weir to prevent
floating solids from bypassing the pond. This system worked very
well. Following the incident, the stormwater pond was returned
to its normal levels through manual discharge and pumping.
6.4 BACK-UPS AND REDUNDANCY
Some of the back-up systems have been described earlier in
Sections 4.2.1, 6.1 and 6.2. Additional information on automatic
shutdown has been provided in the Training Material for Plant V
which has been claimed confidential by Phillips.
6.5 MONITORING SYSTEMS
6.5.1 Process Parameter Monitoring
Section 4.2.2-General Description of Process Equipment has
provided summary information on various operating parameters
which are being monitored, controlled and recorded on a regular
frequency.
The existing PE Plants IV and V did not have any continuous
permanently installed organics detection systems. The new design
of the plant installed at the Phillips facility in Singapore in
1984, as well as the one under construction (Plant VI) at the HCC
facility, include hydrocarbon detection instruments in the plant
area.
6.5.2 Environmental Monitoring
As mentioned in Section 2.2.9-Monitoring Stations for Chemical
Release, the plant has no systematic program to monitor release
of hazardous chemicals into the atmosphere.
The Phillips 66 HCC has no automatic system within the main
plant to monitor pollutant levels or to trigger alarm systems
during a release. There is a Chlorine detector and alarm
at the water treatment plant. There is no general company
policy on "fenceline monitors", which are left to the
plant manager's discretion. Plant personnel utilize an
organic vapor analyzer (OVA) to check for fugitive emissions
on a regular basis. Explosimeters are also available. There
are about 30,000 possible emission sources (valve, pump, seals,
etc.) according to Mr. Stoltz. They hope to computerize the
OVA data collected to date and use it to track certain
equipment problems. The plant subscribes to an air monitoring
service, the Houston Regional Monitoring (HRM) network,
which is run by Radian Corporation for 50 to 80
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 54 ***
-------
companies in the vicinity. During the accident and fire, one HRM
sampling station was triggered to sample for hydrocarbons.
According to an unofficial verbal report to Mr. Stoltz, there
were no elevated levels of benzene or pentane detected during the
fire by the HRM station.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are the conclusions and recommendations of the
Chemical Safety Audit team. As stated in the foreword,
compliance with the recommendations is not mandatory. The order
of appearance does not reflect any deliberate prioritization.
1) Inspection of the area reveals a shortage of exit roads
outside the facility boundary for evacuation of non-injured
personnel. In the initial hours that followed the explosion,
evacuations were hampered by traffic problems created by incoming
response personnel and equipment. The facility should work with
the City of Pasadena to develop and construct additional access
roads.
2) Traffic control on the area perimeter was less than
effective. There needs to be better control to minimize danger
to onlookers if the release plume shifted. Law enforcement
agencies should review their interactive procedures within their
own contingency plans to ensure better coordination with other
agencies having traffic control responsibilities.
3) The facility evacuation plans were inappropriate for the
event that occurred on October 23, 1989. The plan appeared
to be based on underlying assumptions that the event causing the
evacuation would have already occurred, be in the process of
occurring, or would be controllable enough to allow for orderly
evacuation. The plan contained a requirement that "non-plant"
personnel exit the facility through the same security gate they
had entered. This benefits personnel accountability but could
increase the time required to exit the facility.
Additional evacuation plans should be made for "imminent danger"
situations, such as the one that existed in the few minutes prior
to the initial explosion that occurred on October 23, 1989. The
primary consideration in such a plan would be immediate
evacuation of all personnel, to a minimum safe distance, by the
most expedient means possible. The alarm system for this
emergency evacuation procedure should: a) contain the minimum
practical number of communication nodes necessary for activation;
b) be readily activated by all personnel; c) utilize an alarm
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 55 ***
-------
that is distinguishable from all other audible signals; and d) be
exercised routinely to ensure personnel familiarity.
4) The EPM prescribes evacuation routes for various categories
of personnel. However, wind direction could cause those routes
to be blocked by chemical plumes. Phillips 66 HOC should
consider training employees in flexible evacuation procedures and
routes based on various factors, such as wind direction.
Additional wind socks should be installed around the complex to
indicate wind direction, so that a sock will be visible from any
location within the Phillips 66 HCC.
5) Evidence suggests that past releases of CERCLA hazardous
substances may have occurred above the Reportable Quantity (RQ)
but not been reported in a timely manner to the NRC. In 1987,
the Phillips 66 HCC reported under SARA Title III, Section 313,
an estimated 4,700 pounds of chlorine were released as fugitive
emissions. Since the RQ for chlorine is 10 pounds, it is likely
that this RQ was exceeded within some 24 hour period.
Additionally, Phillips reported spills to the TWC (Section
2.6.1.3 of this report), which included CERCIA hazardous
substances, but were not reported to the NRC.
6) In the EPM, Section XIII (Plant Preparedness), Part E
(Environmental Procedures) , the list of CERCIA substances with
reportable quantities (RQ) was illegible. A legible copy of the
current list of CERCLA hazardous substances (August 14, 1989)
should be included. Under the CERCLA release reporting
requirements, the responsible party for a release is to notify
the NRC as soon as they have knowledge that the substance
released exceeded the RQ. Delaying the notification could result
in a violation of federal law if the release does exceed the RQ.
The EPM should be revised to better reflect this reporting
requirement.
7) The Phillips 66 HCC made the release notification to the City
of Pasadena/LEPC after the October 23, 1989, in a timely manner.
However, notification to the NRC occurred 11 hours after the
initial explosion. Notwithstanding the severity of the explosion
and the resultant confusion, Phillips 66 HCC should have notified
the NRC in a more timely manner.
8) The notification procedures for reporting chemical releases
appear to be covered by the emergency procedures manual, with the
exception of methods for estimating the quantity of releases.
The manual states that releases "should" be followed up by a
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 56 ***
-------
report to the environmental division. The Phillips 66 HCC should
make it a mandatory policy for each release to be investigated
internally and a thorough report on the nature and reason for the
release documented.
9) Review of the Phillips ERTM and the Phillips EPM revealed
that there is an inconsistency in the emergency phone number to
call to announce an emergency. The ERTM states that personnel
should dial 716 to activate the alarm system, while the.EPM
specifies 5000 as the number to dial. Assignment of one number
for all emergencies should be considered.
10) The Phillips 66 HCC alarm procedure is described in the EPM.
However, based on interviews during and after the Chemical Safety
Audit, the warning system in the plants IV and V were not
operating properly at the time of the incident on October 23,
1989.
Specifically it was pointed out that one of the manual alarm
systems in Plant IV that was to be used to signal an emergency
had not been operating for some time. Additionally, a phone in
the electric shop adjacent to Plant V that could have been used
for activating the alarm had been disconnected because of
employee abuse. Therefore, initial warnings to some of the
employees were solely vocal.
It appears that the weekly safety checks as prescribed in the
EPM by the Phillips 66 HCC should have detected the missing or
inoperative equipment, including the safety alarms. Phillips 66
HCC management should ensure detailed and accurate testing of all
alarm systems and strict compliance with the safety procedures as
stated in the EPM.
11) Procedures for notifying neighboring non-CIMA facilities
should be put into the EPM. The industry that surrounds the
Phillips 66 HCC is at greater risk from a chemical release than
the general public of Pasadena because of their proximity to the
Phillips 66 HCC.
12) The CIMA proved to be a valuable resource that provided
assistance to the Phillips 66 HCC during the October incident.
During the Chemical Safety Audit, all comments made by the
Phillips 66 HCC and local government concerning CIMA were
positive. Interviews with employees of neighboring facilities
indicate that the entities within the CIMA network interacted
very well. Communication and response activities were very
effective.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 57 ***
-------
13) The participation by the Phillips 66 HCC with the local
government and the LEPC in emergency planning and preparedness is
excellent. The Phillips 66 HCC had personnel serve on various
subcommittees of the LEPC and had worked very closely with the
City of Pasadena. One example is the valuable information the
Phillips 66 HCC submitted to the City for inclusion in the VRA.
14) Phillips 66 Company performed worst-case air release
modeling during the summer of 1989. Nine chemical compounds
were used in the release scenarios to aid in determination of
appropriate off-site emergency response procedures for a vapor
cloud release. Four of these chemicals were used in the City of
Pasadena's VRA. The City's report identified chlorine as the
chemical of most concern for airborne releases because of its
human toxicity and abundant supply throughout industry in the
city. The report does indicate chemicals that are explosive, but
noted that most damage caused by an explosion would be to the
plant itself. Based on the explosive potential of the butadiene
and other chemicals that were not involved in the incident on
October 23, 1989, it is reasonable to assume that the potential
impact to the surrounding facilities and community could have
been greater. Therefore, the dangers posed by explosive
chemicals should be re-evaluated by both the City and the
Phillips 66 HCC.
15) The Phillips 66 HCC does not have stationary monitoring
equipment capable of detecting hazardous substances releases in
the different plants. It is recognized that chlorine is
monitored at the water treatment plant; but, the audit team is
concerned that CERCLA hazardous substances, such as chlorine, are
not continuously monitored within the plant areas. Hydrocarbon
monitors, such as those planned for Plant VI, should be installed
in existing plants. The Phillips 66 HCC should also have
fenceline monitoring to detect releases migrating off-site. The
monitoring systems should be interfaced with the alarm system to
provide warning of releases.
16) The Phillips 66 Company has stated it has a commitment to
safety (Appendix I) and environmental areas within its
facilities. The Phillips 66 HCC is a very large facility with 3
individual plants within the complex. The staff of 3 for the
Environmental Department at the Phillips 66 HCC should be
enlarged to help meet the needs of a large growing complex.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 58 ***
-------
PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY RESPONSE AND COMMENTS
After the preparation of the draft report by the audit team,
Phillips 66 HCC was allowed the opportunity to review and address
comments. Phillips provided clarification and corrections on
specific issues. Where EPA concurred with Phillips' comments,
these were included in the text of the report. Where EPA did not
concur with Phillips' response or wished to include Phillips'
clarification or expansion, these were included below.
Section 2.2.9, Page 14, Paragraph 2 -
Phillips clarified and expanded this paragraph.
Phillips' comment: Hydrocarbon monitors were planned for new
polyethylene plant VI from its early planning stages at least one
year ago. They will be installed for all future polyethylene
plants. In early 1989, money was placed in the budget for 1990
to install hydrocarbon monitors in the K-Resin plant at the
hydrocarbon unloading and at the butadiene storage spheres. The
facility is working with Webb Murray & Associates on
installation, which should be complete by the 3rd quarter 1990.
There are currently carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon monitors
located in the neohexene plant.
Section 2.5.3 Page 21, Last Paragraph, last two sentences -
Phillips' comment: Hazard communications for Fish employees is
accomplished by Fish personnel prior to each job. Spot checks
are conducted by the Phillips 66 HCC Chief Construction Engineer,
Mr. Bill Wegmann, to ensure that Fish is advising its employees
on Hazard Communications issues. Fish conducts group safety
meetings every Tuesday morning and these are attended by Mr.
Wegmann. Fish also conducts weekly craft safety meetings. A
schedule of the craft safety meetings is furnished to Mr. Wegmann
prior to the meetings being conducted. Fish employees were
required to review and sign the standard Phillips 66 HCC's safety
booklet (See Appendix P).
Section 4.2.6 Page 48, Paragraph 3 -
Phillips cannot concur with the conclusion reached by the EPA in
this paragraph.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 59 ***
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Section 6.1 Page 50, Paragraph 1 -
Phillips comment: The entire Phillips 66 HCC complex has the
risks normally associated with the petrochemical processing
industry.
Section 6.1 Page 50, Paragraph 2, 2nd sentence -
Phillips' comment: All of these hydrocarbons are flammable and
there are potential ignition sources present at the plant.
Section 6.1 Page 51, Paragraph 3, 3rd sentence -
Phillips' comment: 1,3 Butadiene is extremely flammable. It is
suggested that 1,3 Butadiene not be listed in Section 3.0 because
it is not present in the polyethylene plant.
Section 6.5.2 Page 55, Paragraph 1, last sentence -
Phillips' comment: The hydrocarbon concentrations determined
from these charcoal tube samples are (reported as ppb by volume
in air):
Chemical Train 1 Train 2
C4 Aliphatic hydrocarbons 18 18
C5 Aliphatic hydrocarbons 14 13
C6 Aliphatic hydrocarbons 13 13
Benzene 5 4
Toluene 5 5
Xylenes 2 1
other hydrocarbons 4 4
Results of analysis of samples was received.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - COMMENTS
Recommendation #2: Phillips does not necessarily concur with the
conclusion reached by the EPA in Item 2.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 60 ***
-------
Recommendation #3: Phillips does not concur with the EPA's
conclusion that the facility evacuation plans were inappropriate
for the event that occurred on October 23, 1989. Employees
recognize that in the case of a catastrophic event, the
evacuation plan must be modified to take into account such
factors as wind direction and inaccessibility of planned
evacuation routes. The primary purpose of the plan is to
relocate all non-injured personnel to a safe location.
Furthermore, there is need to maintain accountability and to have
an organized rescue plan. In addition, for those units not
affected by the release or incident, personnel must be maintained
in the units to properly shut them down prior to evacuating the
facility. To do otherwise could create unsafe conditions in
operating units.
Recommendation #4: Phillips cannot concur with the conclusions
reached in Item 4. There were four wind socks installed at
Phillips 66 HCC. These were located in the Polypropylene plant,
the polyethylene distribution area, the K-Resin area, and at
Plant V, Reactor 5. Three of these wind socks are still in
place. Further, the Phillips employees recognize that common
sense must be utilized in following the evacuation plans to take
into account such factors as wind direction and inaccessibility
of ordinary evacuation routes.
Recommendation #5: Phillips cannot concur with the conclusion
that the reportable quantity for chlorine had previously been
exceeded and not reported. The 4,700 pound total of fugitive
emissions of chlorine reported in the 1987 SARA Title III report
was purely an estimate. This total was reached by using standard
emission rates for various valves and fittings from EPA accepted
tables for VOC fugitive emissions for SOCMI. As these are
calculated estimates and do not reflect any actual measurements
of loss of chemical, Phillips cannot concur that the reportable
quantity for chlorine was exceeded, as suggested by the EPA.
Recommendation #7: Under the circumstances, Phillips did make
notification to the appropriate agencies in a timely manner.
Immediately after the explosion, Mr. Bill Stoltz, Director of
Environmental Control, called the LEPC, the regional office of
the TACB, the Harris County Pollution Control Department, and
left a recorded message on the CAER hotline.
Recommendation #8: While the notification procedures specified
in the emergency procedures manual use the word "should" in
assigning responsibility for making agency notifications and
completion and submittal of internal written reports detailing
any release, plant personnel are aware that this is not optional.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 61 ***
-------
The Environmental Section is notified of any upset condition and
any additional information required to make proper notification
is requested on an as-needed basis. The system has proven
adequate in obtaining needed data. Formalization of a follow-up
investigation procedure is underway.
Recommendation #9: There is only one number to report all
emergencies at the Phillips 66 HCC; this number is 5000. The
number is correctly listed in the EPM, which is the official
manual distributed throughout the plant. The ERTM is utilized
solely by the emergency response team, all of whom are clearly
familiar with the correct number. Thus, while the ERTM needs to
be updated, the inconsistency did not cause confusion to plant
employees.
Recommendation #10: Phillips cannot concur with the conclusions
reached by the EPA in Item 10. The test of the plant warning
system conducted Monday, October 23, 1989, at 0800 indicates that
the alarm was heard in both PE plant IV and V. This is confirmed
in the report completed by the Fire Chief every Monday morning.
The report for October 23 indicates both plants called in. This
is the alarm system that was sounded just prior to the explosion.
The primary safety alarm appears to have been activated from the
Plant V control room after the release, but prior to the
explosion. Although several persons who were working in Plant IV
and V tragically lost their lives, dozens more safely evacuated
the area upon the sounding of the general alarm. Many of those
who safely evacuated were working in the immediate area of Plant
IV and V at the time of the explosion. Therefore, Phillips
believes that the alarm system functioned satisfactorily,
particularly when it is noted that the explosion occurred so
shortly after the initial release.
Recommendation #14: The Audit Report indicates a concern for
dangers of the surrounding community based upon the explosion
potential of the materials involved in the plant processes.
However, Phillips cannot concur with this conclusion. The
Phillips' plant is surrounded on three sides by vacant land. The
fourth side is bounded by another petrochemical facility. Thus,
the danger to the general community was minimal. In addition,
the resulting damage caused by the October explosion supports the
VRA report's conclusion that the greatest potential danger
associated with these explosive materials was to the plant
itself. The primary damage was to the polyethylene plants IV and
V. Adjacent support units and the remainder of the complex
received comparatively minimal damage. Consequently, Phillips
must disagree with the conclusion that there was a significant
risk to the surrounding community.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 62 ***
-------
Recommendation #15: Phillips does not concur with the conclusions
reached in Item 15. With respect to the chlorine monitors, there
are two chlorine monitors located at the San Jacinto Water
Treater, the greatest potential source of release. These
chlorine monitors are close to the property line.
With regard to the suggested hydrocarbon monitoring at the fence
line, Phillips does not concur that such monitoring is necessary.
The fence line monitoring for non-acutely toxic hydrocarbon is
not appropriate where evaluations have shown that combustible
mixtures will not occur. Hydrocarbon monitors have been planned
for new polyethylene Plant VI since the early design stages in
1988. In addition, there are presently hydrocarbon and carbon
monoxide detectors in the neohexene plant. In early 1989, money
was placed in the budget for the installation of hydrocarbon
monitors in other units, including the K-Resin Plant, at the
hydrocarbon unloading areas, and the butadiene storage spheres.
Installation of these monitors is scheduled to be completed in
the third quarter of 1990. These monitors will allow detection
of hydrocarbon leaks close to the source, thus negating the need
for fence line monitoring.
Recommendation #16: Phillips does not concur with the conclusion
reached in Item 16, Phillips 66 has in its employ 13 safety
personnel, three environmental personnel, and one industrial
hygienist. In addition, the environmental department can call
upon the corporate environmental group for assistance, as
necessary.
*** FINAL REPORT - PAGE 63 ***
-------
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FIGURE 1A
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7) USA
^ HOUSTON,TEXAS
T) OLIN CORP.
I2O LONG RIDGE ROAD
STAMFORD. CONN. O69O4
T) LONE STAR IND.
-^ 935 TEXAS BK S TR TWR.
HOUSTON.TX. 77036
4) HOUSTON LIGHTING AND
^ POWER CO. 280200
HOUSTON, TX
•5) SHELL PIPE LINE CORP
^ PO BOX 2099
HOUSTON, TX. 77OOI
"?) HARRIS COUNTY HOUSTON
^ NAVIGATION DIST.
HOUSTON, TX.
7) AIR PRODUCTS E
"^ CHEMICALS INC.
ATTN. TAX DEPT.
PO BOX 53B
ALLENTOWN. PA. I8IO5
ETHYL -OR P.
ATTN BR BLAIR
P O BOX 47 2
PASADENA, TX. 77SOI
GEORGIA PACIFIC CORR
C50 GELHORN
HOUSTON, TX. 77029
CHAMPLIN PET.
PO BOX 592
ENID, OK.
CO.
GENERAL AMERICAN
TRANSP CORR
% KIRKWOOD 8 DARBY
1511 CNB BLDG.
FORT WORTH. TX. 76IO2
SUN PIPE LINE
SERVICES CO.
P O BOX 2039
TULSA, OK. 74IO2
SHAPIRO JULIAN L ET AL
62O SOUTHWEST TOWER
HOUSTON, TX. 77002
FRUCHT SIG
4927 YARWELL DR.
HOUSTON, TX. 77O96
COLONIAL PIPE LINE CO.
% KIRKWOOD a DARBY
CONT'L NAT'L BK BLDG.
FT WORTH, TX. 76IO2
EXPLORER PIPE LINE CO.
% KIRKWOOD A DARBY
1511 CNB BLDG.
FORT WORTH, TX. 76IO2
SHELL OIL CO.
TAX DEPT.
P O BOX 2O99
HOUSTON, TX. 77001
EXXON PIPE LINE CO.
PO BOX 222O
HOUSTON, TX. 77001
MARATHON OIL CO.
% JJ DELAGARZA
PO BOX 3128
HOUSTON, TX. 77OOI
FIGURE IB
Sheet 2 Of 2
-------
HOUSTON
CHEMICfiL
PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY
COMPLEX
0 K-Resin/Neohexene Plant
Laboratory
, Central Services
cv
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DC
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Polypropylene Plant 0 Developmental Plant
5) Polyethylene - Plant 2 0 Polyethylene - PF Plants
0 D aution 0 All areas
-------
['.... o Ftfj-or-Leds 10/23.3' TUT.J: :S2V Rc-CL-z.^-J By : K'i
F-eport&'J By : GOERIG, GEORGE
Druauization: PRIVATE CITIZEN Calling **: DISCHARGER
Address : 7135 WOODBPIDGE DR
HOUSTON , TX 77067-
Ti?lephone : 713-644-1745
Discharger- : PHILLIPS
A-f-filiation: PRIVATE
AdrJrt»ss :
PASADENA , TX
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-------
INCITE",'! NOTIFICATION RETORT P&.HC.- 1
i^F C C =• £ «• (i : 15"'^ 4 region Ca = e fc: r9'I—013S
Lt-te Pepor ted: lO.Z^/3? Tiin=?: 14 Received fcy : COOPER
Reported By : SFOLT2. BILL
Organization: PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. Calling as: L'lbLHARbtR
Address : BOX 792
PASADENA . TX 77501-
Telephone : 713-473-9244
Discharger : PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO.
A-f -f i 1 ist 101 is •" l- . VA7C.
Address, : BC-A 792
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TelephtHifc. : 7l3-473-°J44
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-------
INCIDENT NOTIFICATION REPORT >» Pays
—Rasp one! ing Aqenc ios-~
Primary Ayency ." EPA EPA
Cither Ayency :
—L, a mm en ts—
—Region Spec i-Fie Information —
Routed to:
Routed to No One?
-------
APPENDIX A
LIST OF AUDIT TEAM MEMBERS
*** DRAFT - DO NOT CITE - NOT SUBJECT TO FOIA ***
-------
APPENDIX A
PARTICIPANTS OF CHEMICAL SAFETY AUDIT
Jim Staves, Team Leader
George Allman
Dusty Pruitt
Steve Mason
Mike Ryan, P.E., OSC
Del Krehbiel
Mary Ann Garrahan
William Elliott, PhD
Winona Henry, P.E.
Elizabeth Gonzalez
U.S. EPA Region 6
Contingency Planning Section (6E-EP)
1445 Ross Avenue
Dallas, TX 75202
(214) 655-2277
U.S. EPA Region 6
Emergency Response/Site
Investigations (6E-EI)
1445 Ross Avenue
Dallas, TX 75202
(214) 655-2270
U.S. OSHA Region 6
Federal Building #602
525 Griffin Street
Dallas, TX 75202
(214) 767-4761
U.S. OSHA HQS-USDL
Room N3469
U.S. Labor Department Bldg.
200 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20210
(202) 523-8036
Texas Department of Health
Hazard Communication Branch
1100 West 49th Street
Austin, TX 78756
(512) 458-7410
Texas Air Control Board, Region 7
5555 West Loop South, Suite 300
Bellaire, TX 77401-2192
(713) 666-4964
Pasadena LEPC
Emergency Preparedness Office
City of Pasadena
1211 South Morae
Pasadena, TX 77501
(713) 475-5588
*** DRAFT - DO NOT CITE - NOT SUBJECT TO FOIA ***
-------
PHILLIPS REPRESENTATIVES DURING
CHEMICAL SAFETY AUDIT
Robert McElvain
Frank Newman
Don Kuper
Steve Cooper
Eva Fronun
Bill Price
Bill Tuckett
Paul Wollett
Rick Wiederstein
Bill Stoltz
Barbara Price-
Thurman
Cynthia Williams
Mike
Phillips 66 HCC
Phillips 66 HCC
Phillips 66 HCC
Phillips 66 Corporate
Fulbright & Jaworski
Phillips 66 HCC
QES
QES
Phillips 66 HCC
Phillips 66 HCC
QES
Phillips 66 HCC
Phillips 66 HCC
Process Engineer
Env. Engineer
PE Plant Manager
Legal
Legal
Complex Manager
Manager Reviews &
Assessment
Reviews &
Assessment
Safety & Security
Director
Environmental
Director
Manager, Environ-
mental Services
Envi ronmental
Engineer
Director,
Production servics
*** DRAFT - DO NOT CITE - NOT SUBJECT TO FOIA ***
-------
APPENDIX B
CITY OF PASADENA VULNERABILITY AND RISK ANALYSIS
*** DRAFT - DO NOT CITE - NOT SUBJECT TO FOIA ***
-------
CITY OF PASADENA
VULNERABILITY AND RISK ANALYSIS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section I
Section II
Section III
Section IV
Section V
Chemicals Identification
Planning Release Quantities
Vulnerability Analysis
Risk Analysis
Priority Ranking
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CITY OF PASADENA
VULNERABILITY AND RISK ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The criteria used for performing this Vulnerability and
Risk Analysis is the "Technical Guidance for Hazards
Analysis" document, developed by the EPA, FEMA, and DOT,
dated December, 1987. The Hazards Analysis is defined
as a three step process: Hazards Identification, Vul-
nerability Analysis, and Risk Analysis.
A Hazards Analysis is a necessary step in comprehensive
emergency planning for a community. Comprehensive plan-
ning depends upon a clear understanding of what hazards
exist and what risks they pose for various members of
the community. This document follows the definition of
"Hazards Analysis" used in NRT-1 and focuses principally
on hazards analysis for airborne releases of extremely
hazardous substances. The air release model used for
dispersion analysis is the Radian Corporation "CHARM"
model.
-------
CITY OF PASADENA
VULNERABILITY AND RISK ANALYSIS
SECTION I
CHEMICALS IDENTIFICATION
This section . identifies the 15 chemicals of major con-
cerns that are-manufactured or stored in Pasadena.
These selected chemicals were identified by the regulated
facilities as the ones they felt might impact the general
public if accidentally released.
This list does not represent all of the chemicals reported
by regulated facilities, but only those juJ^cd by each
facility to be of major concern if a release occurred.
The information sources are the regulated facilities,
EHCMA CHEM Manual, and U.S. DOT Emergency Response
Guidebook (1984). The information from the facilities
was acquired using a questionnaire.
The information is organised in alphabetical order and
lists the chemical name, the locations^where they are
present, the approximate total quantities on hand, and
the properties of the chemical.
Transportation of chemicals was found to be^very com-
plex due to the number of regulated facilities in the
Ship Channel area, the many kinds of chemicals trans-
ported through Pasadena and the various modes (i.e.,
highway, rail, water, pipeline). Transportation vul-
nerability and risk analysis is done using assumptions
based on general knowledge of hazardous material trans-
portation as furnished by industrial representatives, and
the Office of Emergency Preparedness. A traffic survey
conducted by the Deer Park LEPC at the intersection of
Highway 225 and Center Street was used in the following
analysis.
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CHEMICALS ANALYSIS MATRIX FOR
CITY OF PASADENA
CHEMICALS IDENTIFICATION
(MAJOR CONCERNS)
(Quantity is for largest single container or source)
II A**
CHEMICAL "A
A. Chemical
B. Location(s)
C. Quantity(s)
D. Transportation
Mode
E. Properties
Toluene
Air Products
1,140,000 Ibs.
Pipeline, water
Flammable liquid. Clear and colorless
with characteristic aromatic ("sweet")
odor. Will form explosive mixtures in
fire situations. Fire may produce toxic
gases. May cause dizziness or suffo-
cation if inhaled. May irritate or
burn skin and eyes.
CHEMICAL "B"
A. Chemical
Location(s)
Quantity(s)
B.
C.
D.
Transportation
Mode
E. Properties
Cyclohexane
Phillips 66
680,000 Ibs.
No information
Flammable liquid. Clear and colorless
with hydrocarbon odor. Will form ex-
plosive mixtures in fire situation.
Fire may produce toxic gases. May
cause dizziness or suffocation if in-
haled. May irritate or burn skin and
eyes.
-------
CHEMICAL ANALYSIS MATRIX FOR
CITY OF PASADENA
CHEMICAL IDENTIFICATION
(MAJOR CONCERNS)
Page 2
CHEMICAL "C1
A.
B.
Chemical
Location(s)
Quantity(s)
D.
Transportation
Modes
E. Properties
Ammonia
1) Air Products
2) ICI Americas
3) Crown
4) Kerley
5) Mobil
6) Cain
7) Occidental-Ammonia Terminal
1) 330,000 Ibs.
2) 60,500 Ibs.
3) 125 Ibs.
4) 324,000 Ibs.
5) 13,364,000 Ibs.
6) 300,000 Ibs.
7) 25,000,000 Ibs.
Truck, Rail, Water, Pipeline
Liquefied, compressed, colorless gas,
floats and boils on water. Visible
vapor cloud is produced. Pungent odor.
Vapor poisonous if inhaled. Irritating
to eyes, nose, and throat. Liquid will
burn skin and eyes. Liquid will cause
frostbite. Harmful to aquatic life in
very low concentrations. Flammable gas
under certain conditions. Oil or other
combustibles will increase fire hazard.
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CHEMICAL ANALYSIS MATRIX FOR
CITY OF PASADENA
CHEMICAL IDENTIFICATION
(MAJOR CONCERNS)
Page 3
CHEMICAL "D"
A. Chemical
B. Location(s)
C. Quantity(s)
D. Transportation
Mode
E. Properties
ii tr"
CHEMICAL "E
A. Chemical
B. Location(s)
C. Quantity(s)
D. Transportation
Mode
E. Properties
Silicone Tetrafluoride
Ethyl
22,000 Ibs.
Truck
Liquefied, compressed, colorless gas
with pungent odor. Liquid boils upon
release. Forms hydrofluoric acid upon
contact with water. Irritating to eyes,
skin and respiratory system. Highly
toxic.
Methanol
Coastal Chemical
83,500 Ibs.
Truck
Flammable, colorless liquid with mild
alcohol odor. Vapors cause eye irri-
tation. High vapor concentrations can
produce loss of consciousness and
dizziness.
-------
CHEMICAL ANALYSIS MATRIX FOR
CITY OF PASADENA
CHEMICAL IDENTIFICATION
(MAJOR CONCERNS)
Page 4
CHEMICAL "F"
A. Chemical • Butadiene
B. Location(s) Phillips 66
C. Quantity(s) 2,190,000 Ibs.
D. Transportation
Mode Rail, truck
E. Properties Colorless, mildly aromatic gas.
Flammable, forms explosive mix-
tures with air. Heavier than air
and may travel a considerable dis-
tance to a source of ignition and
flash back. At elevated temper-
atures, polymerization may take
place. If the polymerization takes
place in a container, there is "a
possibility of violent rupture.
Slightly toxic, but may cause asphyxi-
iation by excursion of oxygen. Slight
respiratory irritant. Direct expansion
on skin may cause freeze burns.
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CHEMICAL ANALYSIS MATRIX FOR
CITY OF PASADENA
CHEMICAL IDENTIFICATION
(MAJOR CONCERNS)
Page 5
it/i li
CHEMICAL "G
A. Chemical
B. Location(s)
C. Quantity(s)
D. Transportation
Mode
E. Properties
Chlorine
1) Phillips 66
2) Crown
3) ICI Americas
4) Simpson Paper
5) Occidental-PVC Resins
6) Exxon-Clear Lake
7) Tenn-USS
8) Numerous other public and private
facilities such as water works,
sewage treatment, swimming pools
1) 2,000 Ibs.
2) 2,000 Ibs.
3) 2,000 Ibs.
4) 180,000 Ibs.
5) 2,000 Ibs.
6) 2,000 Ibs.
7) 2,000 Ibs.
8) usually 150 to 2,000 Ibs.
Truck, Rail
Pungent, irritating greenish, yellow
gas. May be fatal if inhaled. Liquid
will cause serious skin burns to skin
and eyes. Corrosive. Non-combustible
in air, but most combustible materials
will burn in chlorine as they do in
oxygen. Reacts explosively or forms
explosive mixtures with many common
chemicals.
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CHEMICAL ANALYSIS MATRIX FOR
CITY OF PASADENA
CHEMICAL IDENTIFICATION
(MAJOR CONCERNS)
Page 6
CHEMICAL "H"
A. Chemical
B. Location(s)
C. Quantity(s)
D. Transportation
Mode
E. Properties
HT"
CHEMICAL "I
A. Chemical
B. Location(s)
C. Quantity(s)
D. Properties
Ethylene Oxide
Cain Chemical
400,000 Ibs.
Rail
Liquefied gas, colorless, sweet
odor; floats and mixes with water;
flammable irritating vapor is pro-
duced. Irritating to eyes, nose,
and throat. If inhaled, will cause
nausea, vomiting, and difficult
breathing. Liquid will burn skin
and eyes.
Hydrochloric Acid (35%)
Kaneka
158,000 Ibs.
Liquid; colorless to slightly yellow.
Irritating odor. Sinks and mixes
with water. Poisonous visible vapor
cloud is produced, yapor poisonous
if inhaled. Irritating to eyes, nose,
and throat. Liquid poisonous if
swallowed. Will burn skin and eyes.
Not flammable, but flammable gas may
be produced on contact with metals.
Dangerous to aquatic life in high
concentrations.
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CHEMICAL ANALYSIS MATRIX FOR
CITY OF PASADENA
CHEMICAL IDENTIFICATION
(MAJOR CONCERNS)
Page 7
CHEMICAL "J"
A. Chemical
B. Location(s)
C. Quantity(s)
D. Transportation
Mode ' ,
E. Properties
lln-M
CHEMICAL "K
A. Chemical
B. Location(s)
C. Quantity(s)
D. Transportation
Mode
E. Properties
Hydrogen Fluoride
Crown
150,000 Ibs.
Truck
Fuming liquid, colorless to green,
irritating odor, sinks and mixes
with water. Harmful vapor produced.
Non-combustible, but difficult to
contain as it corrodes most substances
except lead, wax, polyethylene, and
platinum. May generate hydrogen in
contact with some metals. Highly
toxic and irritating to eyes, skin and
respiratory tract in both liquid and
vapor states. Vapor will burn eyes,
nose, and throat. Liquid will burn
skin and eyes and can cause immediate.
blindness.
Methyl Chloride
1C1 Americas
60,500 Ibs.
Assume Rail
Colorless gas with faintly sweet ethe-
real odor. Flammable gas. Inhalation
of high concentrations causes serious
central nervous system damage, lingerii
illness and sometimes death. Because
Methyl Chloride has so little odor and
only a mild narcotic action, persons may
be exposed to considerable concentrations
without being aware of the danger.
Symptoms of poisoning may be delayed for
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CHEMICAL ANALYSIS MATRIX FOR
CITY OF PASADENA
CHEMICAL IDENTIFICATION
(MAJOR CONCERNS)
Page 8
CHEMICAL "L"
A. Chemical
B. Location(s)
C. Quantity(s)
D. Transportation
Mode
*
E. Properties
CHEMICAL "M"
A. Chemical
B. Location(s)
C. Quantity(s)
D. Transportation
Mode
E. Properties
Sulfuric Acid
Exxon-Clear Lake
45,600 Ibs.
Truck, Rail, Pipeline, Water
Colorless to dark brown in color;
oily, dense liquid. Sinks and
mixes violently with water. Irri-
tating mist is produced. Reacts
violently with evolution of heat.
Extremely hazardous in contact with
many materials, particularly metals
and combustibles. Causes severe,
deep burns to tissue, very corrosive.
Mist irritating to eyes, nose, and
throat. If inhaled, will cause
coughing, difficult breathing, or
loss of consciousness. Harmful to
aquatic life in very low concentrations
Styrene
Phillips 66
7,590,000 Ibs.
Assume Rail
Colorless liquid with aromatic odor.
Not soluble in water. Flammable
liquid. Vapor heavier than air, and
may travel considerable distance to
source of ignition and flash back.
Eye and respiratory irritant. High
concentrations produce anesthetic
effect.
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CHEMICAL ANALYSIS MATRIX FOR
CITY OF PASADENA
CHEMICAL IDENTIFICATION
(MAJOR CONCERNS)
Page 9
tlntl
CHEMICAL "N
A. Chemical
B. Location(s)
C. Quantity(s)
D. Transportation
Mode
E. Properties
CHEMICAL "0"
A. Chemical
Location(s)
Quantity(s)
B.
C.
D.
Transportation
Mode
E. Properties
Vinyl Chloride
Occidental- PVC Resins
6,000,000 Ibs.
Assume Rail
Colorless; sweet smelling gas at ordinary
temperatures; liquid below 7°F. Liquid
floats and boils on water. Flammable, irri-
tating visible vapor cloud is produced. Acts
as a general anesthetic and may be fatal in
high concentrations. Flammable poisonous
gas is produced in fire. Vapor is irritating
to eyes, nose, and throat. If inhaled wil1
cause dizziness or difficult breathing.
Liquid will cause frost bite.
Flammables
All Facilities
Varies
Truck, Rail, Water, Pipeline
Flammable materials; particularly those that
will ignite a relatively low temperature,
clearly may be a hazard to the community.
There are several major types of fires that
may be associated with hazardous materials
discharges, with the type of fire being a
function not only of the characteristics
and properties of the spilled substance,but
the circumstances surrounding the accident.
The types are flame jets, BLEVE's, vapor
or dust cloud fires and explosions, liqu'
pool fires, and flammable solid fires. A,
though all of these situations present dirr
rent problems, their area of impact for the
most part will be much less than the vul-
nerable zones identified for toxic releases.
-------
GLOSSARY
LEPC
LOG
IDLH
TLV
STEL
Local Emergency Planning Committee
Levels of Concern (A Planning Number)
Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
(Concentration a healthy person can be exposed
to for up to 30 minutes with no permanent
damage)
Threshold Limit Value
Short Term Exposure Limit
(Typically 15 minutes)
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CITY OF PASADENA
VULNERABILITY AND RISK ANALYSIS
SECTION II
PLANNING RELEASE QUANTITIES
This section provides the initial screening estimates
for defining the vulnerable zones. A vulnerable zone
is an estimated geographical area that may be subject
to concentrations of an airborne release at levels
that could cause irreversible, acute health effects
or death to human populations within the area following
an accidental release.
The assumptions made in defining the vulnerable zone
are as follows:
(1) The largest quantity in a single or interconnected
vessel(s) is released immediately.
(2) The meteorological conditions are stated in the
attached analysis. Two cases are used - a very
conservative case of stability class F and wind
speed of 1.5 m/s ( 3.5 mph ) and a less conservative
case of stability class D and wind speed of 3.5'm/s
( 8 mph).
(3) The Level of Concern (LOG) used in determining the
maximum allowable concentrations that people could
be exposed to without harmful effect is one-tenth
of the IDLH value. The TLV and 1DLH values are
also modeled with their respective vulnerable
zones shown.
(4) The dispersion models used are from the CHARM
system developed by RADIAN CORP. and the dis-
persion tables in the technical guidance docui
d by RADIAN CORP. and the dis-
in the technical guidance document.
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY: Air Products Manufacturing Corp.
ADDRESS: 1423 Highway 225, Pasadena. Texas 77501 (P.O.Box 3326)
PHONE NUMBER: 477-6841 CONTACT: Bob Martien
CHEMICAL: Ammonia
Ave. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 1.350,000
» __» O^ftrtrtO
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 330,000
Tvn« BforAcrB; Horizontal Tank
Type storage: Horizontal ian*.
Storage phase: LIQ Storage t-amp^Ambient Storage pressure: 220 PS1G
Height of tank ab
Type containment:
Height of tank above .ground (+/-): + 4 ft
TV«. containment: Spill Pool CConcrete)Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL: Toluene
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 1,140,000
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 1.140,000
Tvn« BtaraeB! Vertical Tank
Type storage: Vertical Tank j_ ____
Storage phase: LIQ storage temp.: Ambient Storage pressure: Ambient
Height of tank above ground (+/-): + (On grade) .
Type containment: Earth Dike Surface Area (ft"): J^OJID
CHEMICAL: .
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
• 7 *• v W»"»»»^"« ^
Storage phase: Storage temp.: Storage pressure:
Height of tank above ground (+/->: —rr
Type containment: — Surface Area (ft ):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: ____ • —
Storage phase: Storage temp.: Storage pressure:
Height of tank above ground (+/-): —7-
Type containment: Surface Area (ft4):
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY A
SSESSMENT
FACILITY:
Air Products
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS:
CHEMICAL :
Ammonia
Amount release (Ibs): 330.000
Release type: Continuous liquid soill w/nogl contained
Pool Diameter (ft.) 25
Atmosphere Temp.: "T0°
Analysis Report:
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
1DLH
Concentration
Levels
(ppinl
25
50
500
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
than 10
preater than 10
than 10
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 H/S _
t-pr than 10
than 10
Amount release (Ibs): 1 . l&Q.QQQ
A t-mnanhara Tamo.: 7B°
w/oool contained
Analysis Report:
Concentration
Levels
TLV
LOC
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLK
100
200
2000
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
1.7
1.7
970 ft
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability .
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
4100 ft
2600 ft
800 ft
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY:
ADDRESS:
Tai'n
S7S7
PHONE NUMBER: &76-51S1
CONTACT: K T.
CHEMICAL:
Oxide
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: Horizontal Tank
Storage phase; LIO Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-):
Type containment: No Info
SO" F Storage pressure: 2S PS 1C
1QAOOO
CHEMICAL:
Ammonia
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: Horizontal Tank
Storage phase: LIQ Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/•): —1
Type containment: No Info
1 SO 000
nno
Storage pressure:
g.irfarc Area
1&7QQQ
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: .
Storage phase:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment:
Storage temp.:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft^):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: .
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-):
Type containment: . .
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
Cain Chemical
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS:
Ethylene Oxide
Amount release (Ibs): 400.000
CHEMICAL :
Release type: Continuous linuid soill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.) 500
Atmosphere Temp.: 78°
Analysis Report:
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
(DP ml
80
800
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Vind Speed of
_ 1.5 M/S _
prpatpr than 10
than 10
grpatpr than 10
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
tor- than 1Q
Q 7
2.7
CHEMICAL
Ammonia
300.000
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous^ liquid spill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
432
78'
Concentration
Levels
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
25
50
500
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
greater than 10
greater than 10
greater than 10
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Do.wnwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
greater than 10
greater than 10
5.8
-------
PASADENA LEPC
ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY- Coastal Chemical Company
ADDRESS: 3205 Pasadena Road. Pasadena. Texas 77503
FHONE NUMBER: 477-1561 CONTACT: w. B. Smith
CHEMICAL: Methanol
Avg. amount maintained on-slte (LBS): 39,700
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 83.538
Type storage: Vertical Tank
Tvoe storage: »>.». w «.»,««•. *«-•••-
Storage phase: L1Q • storage temp.: Ambient Storage pressure
Height of tank above ground (+/•): 1 j
Type containment: Concrete sump Surface Area (ft ):
4000
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-slte (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: .
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment:
CHEMICAL: .
Avg. amount maintained on-slte (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type, storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment: ________
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (Ct ):
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/•)'•
Type containment: .
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
Coastal Chemical Comoanv
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS:
CHEMICAL : Methanol ________________________
Ajnount release (Ibs): 83f538 (about: 40,000 Ibs in a tank
Release type: Continuous liauid soill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.) 71
Atmosphere Temp.: 78°
Analysis Report: (model 83,000 Ibs. from facility)
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
(ppm)
200
2SQQ
2500
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
\ .0
2600 ft
"US ft
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(0 Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
2SOO ft.
1200 ft.
3SO ft
CHEMICAL :
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.: 78°
Analysis Report:
suill W/DOO! contained
Concentration
Levels
(ppm)
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Vind Speed of
1.5 M/S
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Do.wnwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability '
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
TLV
LOC
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY: Crown Central Petroleum
ADDRESS: P.O. Box 1759. Houston. Texas 77001 fill Red Bluff PacaH«»na T
PHONE NUMBER: 92Q-3927 CONTACT: W. L. Warnemenf
CHEMICAL: Hydrogen Fluoride
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 285.000
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 150.000
Type storage: Vertical Tank
St-nrAcrn nhase: LIQ Storaee temo.: .
Storage phase: Lig storage temp.: Storage pressure:
Height of tank above ground (+/-): 1.
Type containment: None Surface Area (ft^): 735QQ
yv : (.49x150,000 Ib)
CHEMICAL: Chlorine
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 8000
Max. single largest .amount (LBS): 2000
Type storage: Cyj-j-nder
Storage phase: LIQ Storage temp.: Ambient Storage pressure:
Height of tank above ground (+/'): 1-
Type containment: None Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL: Ammonia
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 1500
Max. single largesp amount (LBS): 125
Type storage: Cylinder
—
Storage phase: LI^ Storage tamp.; Ambient Storage pressure:
Height of tank above ground (+/-): i 2
Type containment: None Surface Area (ft ): _£J—
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.: Storage pressure:
Height of tank above ground (+/•):
Type containment: Surface Area (ft ):
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
Crown Central Petroleum
CHARM BET-EASE PARAMETERS:
Hydrogen Fluoride
CHEMICAL
Ajnount release (lbs)V 150.000
Release type: Continuous liquid spill w/pool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.) 306
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
(ppm)
30
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
(3 Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
greater than 10
greater than 10
3.9
(Reevaluatlon Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
4.2
4.2
2.1
CHEMICAL
Chlorine
TOW
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid spill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
78'
Concentration
Levels
f ppnO
TLV
LOC
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
30
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
greater than 10
greater than 10
(Reevaluatlon Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability .
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
V4
1.4
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
Crown Central Petroleum
CHARM PET.EASE PARAMETERS:
CHEMICAL : Ammonia
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type:
Pool
T7T
Atmosphere Teinp.:
Analysis Report:
__ .
Continuous liquid soill w/pool
Vft.l ¥ - _
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDL1I)
1DLH
Concentration
Levels
(poih)
25
50
500
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
2.0
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
Not reevaluated
1.7
63 ft
(small quantity)
CHEMICAL
Amount release (Ibs): .
Release type: Continuous liquid spill w/ppol contained
Pcol Diameter (ft.) . _
Atmosphere Temp.: 78°
Analysis Report:
Concentration
Levels
(com)
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
(Reevaluation Screen!
llaximum Do.wnwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5_M/S
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY: Ethvl Corporation
ADDRESS: 1000 North South gfr«»0ftP O Rnx LT)
PHONE NUMBER: Q20-570Q
Texas 775Q1
CONTACT: Warren Gafford
Paula McLemore
CHEMICAL:
Silicon Tetra Fluoride
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 46.000
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 22.000
Type storage: TnhP Trailer
Storage phase: LIQ • Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/O: —
Type containment: None
Storage pressure:
Surface Area fftM; 10.780
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: _
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/•):
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft/):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LUS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/•):
Type containment: ________________
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: _
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/•):
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
Ethvl Corooration
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS:
CHEMICAL : Silicon Tftra FlimriHa fmnHplpH as hyrfrnf 1 iinr i r arid)
A>mount release (Ibs): 9?nnn
Release type: Continuous liquid spill w/uool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.) 117
Atmosphere Temp.: 78°
Analysis Report: *used HF because no NIOSH Data and not in CHARM data
base
TLV
LOG
(1/10 ID Lit)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
fDPHl)
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
3.4
3.4
30
1.1
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
(3 Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
4200 Et
4200 ft
2500 ft
CHEMICAL : .
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid spill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
Concentration
Levels
(ppm)
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Do.wnwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability '
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY: F.vvrm-Cloar T.akp Kas Planf
ADDRESS: P.O. Box 4358 Houston. Tpxas 7721Q-4.158
PHONE NUMBER: 775-6057
CONTACT: E. E. Lesikar
(or H. H. Trussell)
CHEMICAL: Sulfuric Acid
Avg. amount maintained on-slte (LBS): 15.200
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 45.600
Type storage: Tank
Storage phase: LIQ Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-): —i
Type containment: None
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft'): 22344
CHEMICAL:
Chlorine
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
4000
Cvclinder
2000
Storage phase: LIQ Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-)•
Type containment: None
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
980
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: __ .
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: .
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
Exxon - Clear Lake Gas Plant
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS:
CHEMICAL
Sulfuric Acid
45600
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous llauid soil! w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
168 '
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
(pom1)
0.25
2.5
25
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5. M/S
4.2
450 ft
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
nnn ft
576 ft
CHEMICAL
Chlorine
TUUTT
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid spill W/DOO! contained
Fool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
78'
Concentration
Levels
TLV
LOC
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
30
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
greater than 10
9.2
2.6
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability -
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
3.6
3.4
1.4
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY: Georgia Gulf Corp.
ADDRESS: 3503 Pasadena Freeway (Hwy 225), Pasadena. Texas 77503
PHONE NUMBER: 473~4453
None reported
CONTACT: Gene Hamilton
Russell Robinson
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-):
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type "tore^c:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/•):
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment: ^_________
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-):
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
6/88
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY:
ADDRESS:
ICI Americas. Inc
5757 Underwood
Pasadpna Toxas 77507
PHONE NUMBER: 474-5151
CHEMICAL: Ammonia
CONTACT: Larry Laoole
Bruce Scamoffa
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 190.000
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 60.500
Type storage: Tank
Storage phase: T.TQ Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-): —±
Type containment: No InFo
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Chlorine
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 2000
Type storage: Cylinder
9nnn
Storage phase: LIQ Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-):
Type containment: None
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (£t*): QRfi
CHEMICAL: Methyl Chloride
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 287.000
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: .Tank Car
Storage phase:
193.600
LIQ
Storage temp.: .
Height of tank above ground (+/•): 1.
Type containment: None
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft'):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: .
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-):
Type containment:
^___ Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
ICI Americas. Inc
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS:
CHEMICAL : Ammonia
60500
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liauid soill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.: ,
Analysis Report:
lliQUi
277
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
fppm)
25
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
greater than 10
50 greater than 10
500
5.9
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
CHEMICAL
Chlorine
2000
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid spill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.) 35 __
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
Concentration
Levels
(nnm)
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
greater thani_l_0_
9.2
30
2.6
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Do.wnwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability '
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
3.6
3.4
1.4
-------
CHARM RE PORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESU 11EMT
FACILITY:
ICi Americas, Inc.
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS:
CHEMICAL : Methyl Chloride
Amount relate fibal! 193.600
Release type: Continuous liquid so ill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter fft.V 347
Atmosphere Temp.: 78°
Analysis Report:
(Initial Screening) (Reevaluatlon Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
(jj Extremely Stable
Concentration Conditions (F Class)
Levels and Wind Speed of
fpoint 1.5 M/S
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
Q Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed oT
3.5 M/S
TLV
LOC
(1/10 IDLH)
1DLH
(use 300 ppm
as LOC)
300(5 min/3HR
peak)
No 1DLI1
5.5
2.7
CHEMICAL :
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid spill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
(Initial Screening) (Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind Maximum D-o.wnwind
Distance/Miles Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable @ Neutral Stability
Concentration Conditions (F Class)
Levels and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
(D Class)
and Wind Speed oC
3.5 M/S
TLV
LOC
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY: Kaneka Texas Corp.
ADDRESS: 6161 Underwood. Pasadena. Texas 77507
PHONE NUMBER: 47A~7084
CONTACT: Mark Reynolds
CHEMICAL: Hydrochloric Acid (35%)
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 25.025
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 158.257
Type storage: Tank
Storage phase: LIQ Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-):
Type containment: Dike
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*): 118R
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/'):
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: .—
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-)'•
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VIM N F. R A R T LTTY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
Kaneka Texas Corp.
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS:
Hydrochloric Acid (35%)
CHEMICAL
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid soill w/oool contained
Pool ni*m«fe«r (ft.) I* _
Atmosphere Temp.: 78° .
Analysis Report: (modeled as hydrogen chloride)
(Initial Screening) (Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Concentration Conditions (F Class)
Levels
(pom)
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
1DLH
10
100
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
greater than 10
greater than 10
2.9
Maximum Downwind
Dis ta nee/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
greater than 10
5.2
1.3
CHEMICAL : _
Amount release (Ibs): __________——————^~-
Release type: Continuous liquid snill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
Concentration
Levels
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Do.wnvind
Distance/Mile s
@ Neutral Stability •
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY: Kerley AG Products Inc.
ADDRESS: 1050 Jefferson Road, Pasadena, Texas 77501
PHONE NUMBER: 477-4400
CONTACT: Ron Sanders
CHEHICAL:
Ammonia
Avg. amount maintained on-slte (LB 5^120^000
Max. single largest amount (LBS): _
Type storage: Horizontal Tank
324.000
Storage phase: LIQ Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/•)'• *
Type containment: None
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*): 158760
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained oil-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-):
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: .
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/*):
Type containment: __________^___^___
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: .
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
Kerley AG Products
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS:
Ammonia
CHEMICAL :
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid sniil w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.) *»50 .—_ .
Atmosphere Temp.: 78°
Analysis Report:
----- - ' (Reevaluation Screening)
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDL1I)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
25
50
500
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
greater than 10
greater than 10
greater than 10
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
than 10
than 10
5.9
CHEMICAL : .
Amount release (Ibs): —
Release type: Continuous liquid spill w/oool contained
Pocl Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
Concentration
Levels
(norni
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Do.wnvind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability .
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY: Mobil Mining and Minerals
ADDRESS: P.O. Box 3447 Pasadena. Texas 77501
PHONE NUMBER: 472-3641
CONTACT: Richard LeClair
CHEMICAL:
Ammonia
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 8.022.400
Max. single largest amount (LBS): I3j364.000
Type storage:D?uble Walled Vertical Tank
Storage phase:
Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/'):
Type containment: None
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*): 6548360
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS): _____
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/*):
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/•):
Type containment: _____________________
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY: Mobil Mining and Minerals
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERSL
CHEMICAL
Ammonia
Ajnount release (Ibs): 11 r 364. OOP
Release type: Continuous liquid spill w/pool
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDL11)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
(ppm)
25
50
SQO
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
_ 1.5 M/S _
grea »•«»*• t-han 10
grea r«»r than 10
than 10
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
<§ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
fhan 10
rhan 10
t-e»r 1 Han 10
CHEMICAL
Amount release (Ibs): __
Release type: Continuous Itnutd snill W/PQOl contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
Concentration
Levels
(nnm)
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Do.wnwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability '
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5_M/S
TLV
LOC
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY: Occidental Chemical Corp. - Houston Ammonia Terminal
ADDRESS: 4403 LaPorte Road, Pasadena, Texas 77501, P.O.Box 849
PHONE NUMBER: 479-6008 CONTACT: Earl Walling
CHEMICAL: Ammonia
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 50,000,000
Max. single largest amount (LBS):. 25,000^000
Type storage: Double wall vertical tank
Storage pha«e;~T.IQ ' Storage temp.r28_L
Height of tank above ground (+/•): "*"
Type containment: Pike
Storage praasura:Ambient
Surface Area (ft^): 6633Q
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: —
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft'):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-slte (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: _
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment: .
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft/):
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY: Occidental ChpmiraT C.nri
uinal
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS:
CHEMICAL :
Amount release (Ibs): 7 3 nnn nnn
Release type: Continuous liquid spill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.) 290
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
(Initial Screening) (Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
fltii»r frhan 10
than 10
t-han 10
CHEMICAL ;
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid spill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
Concentration
Levels
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability •
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY: Occidental Chemical Corp. - PVC Resins
ADDRESS: 4403 LaPorte Road Pasadena. Texas 77501
PHONE NUMBER: 884-4000
CHEMICAL: Vinyl Chloride
CONTACT: J. L. Oliver
Avg. amount: maintained on-site (LBS): 5,000,000
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 6000OUU
Type storage:
iype BUUJ. <*&<>. - — -•
Storage phase:Jb±iL__ Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/•): _i-
Type containment: No Info
Storage pressure:
: 2.940.000
CHEMICAL: Chlorine
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 6 , OOP
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 2 i000
>e storage: Cylinder
Type storage
Storage phase:
Storage temp.:
Storage pressure:
Height of tank above ground (+/-):
Type containment: _N° -- _
Surface Area (ft*): 980
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment: _____^__
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: .
Storage phase:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment: _____^___
Storage temp.:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
Occidental - PVC Resins
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS:
CHEMICAL
Vinyl
Chloride
6.000.000
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid snill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.) 1935
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
78'
TLV
LOC
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
5 (STEP
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
greater than 10
greater than 10
500 (Not IDLH^greater than 10
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
<§ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
greater than 10
greater than 10
greater than 10
CHEMICAL : Chlorine .
Amount release (Ibs): 2.000 .
Release type: Continuous liquid spill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
_78'
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
foptn)
1
30
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
'Distance/Miles
{§ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Vlnd Speed of
1.5 M/S
fereater than 10
9.2
2.6
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Do.wnwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability •
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
3.6
3.4
1.4
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY: Phillips 66 Company
ADDRESS: P. 0. Box 792, Pasadena, Texas 77501
PHONE NUMBER: 475~3666 CONTACT: Bill Stoltz
CHEMICAL: Chlorine
Avg. amount maintained on-slte fLBSl: 34.,000
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 27OOO
Type storage: Cylinder
•/r- -»»» —e>»« . _ _r
Storage phaae: LIQ Storage temp.: Storage pressure
Height of tank above ground (+/-): _1
Type containment: NO Info Surface Area (Ct*):
CHEMICAL: Butadiene
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): j »P°°'°°^
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 2.19U.UUU
Type storage:
_ _
Storage phase: LIQ Storage temp.: _ Storage pressure:
Height of tank above ground (+/-): ""
- ,
Type containment: No Info _ _ Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL: Styrene __
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): ^ 'P. PP. 'P.P.0.
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 7.390.0UU
Type storage:
4JI/B OWW^»6w. _ _
Storage phase: LIQ Storage temp.: Storage pressure:
Height of tank above ground (+/-): 1 7 ,,.olfw>
Type containment: No Info Surface Area (ft^); 3719100
CHEMICAL: Cvclohexani
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 1,500,000
6 580,000
Max. single largest amount (LBS): £i
Tvn« atnraee: Tank
Type storage:
Storage phase: LIQ Storage temp.: Storage pressure: —
Height of tank above ground (+/-): , >KV.rtA
Type containment: No Info . Surface Area (ft^): 333200
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
Phillips 66 Company
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS:
CHEMICAL
Chlorine
2 .000
Ajnount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid soill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
f pom)
1
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
t-han If) '
9.2
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
3.6
30
2.6
3.4
1.4
CHEMICAL
Butadiene
2.190.000
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid soill w/oool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.) 1170
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
f ppml
1000
2000
20000
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
(3 Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
3.4
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability •
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
2.1
1.7
1.2
2000 ft
2000 ft
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
Philli ns 66 Comoanv
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS:
CHEMICAL :
R fvrpnp
7.590.000
' Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous Itauid soill v/pool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
2171
TLV
LOG
(1/10 1DL1I)
1DLH
Concentration
Levels
(ppm)
100
500
5QQO
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
1.7
1.5
800 ft
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
<§ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
4000 ft
2200 ft
520 ft
CHEMICAL : Cvclohexane
Amount release (Ibs): 680,000
Pr.nl Diameter (ft.) 651
Atmosphere Temp.: . 79°
Analysis Report:
W/DOO! contained
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
(ppm)
300
1000
10000
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
1.5
4700 ft
590 ft
Maximum Do.vnwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability -
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/5
3100 ft
1200 ft
-------
PASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY: Simpson Pasadena Paper Company
ADDRESS: P. 0. Box 872, Pasadena. Texas 77501
PHONE NUMBER: 675-6200
CONTACT: Sudhir Desai
CHEMICAL: Chlorine
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS): 1.400.000
Max. single largest amount (LBS): 180.000—
Type storage: Railcar
Storage phase: LIQ Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment: None
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*): RK
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: ,
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-):
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft'):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/-):
Type containment: __^_____^___—
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: .
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
Simpson Pasadena Papgr Company
CHARM RELF.ASF. PARAMETERS;
CHEMICAL :
Chlorine
nnn
Amount release (Ibs): ^
Release type: Continuous liouid solll w/nool
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
Concentration
Levels
(ppnO
1
30
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
\.5 M/S
greater than 10
preater than 10
greater than 10
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
_ 3.5 M/S __
pr than 10
than 10
CHEMICAL :
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid soill w/nool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.:
Analysis Report:
Concentration
Levels
(pom)
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability .
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
TLV
LOC
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
-------
fASADENA LEPC
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Facility Data Sheet
FACILITY: TENN-USS Chemical Company
ADDRESS: 4403 LaPorte Road. Pasadena, Texas 77501
PHONE NUMBER: 884-A300 CONTACT: H. R. Robinson
CHEMICAL:
Chlorine
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS): —2000
Type storage: Cylinder
3000
Storage phase: LIQ Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/•):
Type containment: None
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft ):
980
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: -
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/'):
Type containment:
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ft*):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage: .
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground
Type containment: __________
Storage pressure:
Surface Area (ftz):
CHEMICAL:
Avg. amount maintained on-site (LBS):
Max. single largest amount (LBS):
Type storage:
Storage phase: Storage temp.:
Height of tank above ground (+/•>:
Type containment: ,
Storage pressure:
8/88
-------
CHARM REPORT FOR VUT.NERA BILITY ASSESSMENT
FACILITY:
TENN-USS Chemical Company
CHARM RELEASE PARAMETERS;
Chlorine
2000
CHEMICAL :
Amount release (Ibs):
Release type: Continuous liquid spill w/pool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.) 35
Atmosphere Temp.: 78°
Analysis Report:
Concentration
Levels
( ppm)
TLV
LOG
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
30
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
<§ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
greater than 10
9.2
2.6
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
CHEMICAL :
Amount release (Ibs): .
Release type: Continuous liquid soill w/pool contained
Pool Diameter (ft.)
Atmosphere Temp.
Analysis Report:
Concentration
Levels
(ppmi
(Initial Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Extremely Stable
Conditions (F Class)
and Wind Speed of
1.5 M/S
(Reevaluation Screening)
Maximum Downwind
Distance/Miles
@ Neutral Stability '
(D Class)
and Wind Speed of
3.5 M/S
TLV
LOC
(1/10 IDLH)
IDLH
-------
CITY OF PASADENA
VULNERABILITY AND RISK ANALYSIS
SECTION III
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
This is an estimate of worst case scenarios based
on fixed facility release. Transportation scenarios
are projected for the ma.ior rail and highway routes.
Vulnerable zone projection is based on the reevalu-
ation screening meteorological conditions and a level
of concern (LOG) of 1/10 the IDLH (as listed by NIOSH)
Population counts and essential services are estimated
within the vulnerable zones based on information pro-
vided by Houston Key Maps.
-------
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
CHEMICAL "A
• I A I*
A.
B.
C.
D.
Chemical
Vulnerable Zone
Population
Within Vul-
nerable Zone
Essential
Services
Within Zone
Toluene
A worst case scenario releasing
1,140,000 Ibs of toluene from
Air Products could result in an
area of radius 0.5 miles where
the level of concern (LOG) is ex-
ceeded. Flammable material that
will likely reach a source of
ignition at or near the point of
release.
Less than 300 residents and Highway
225 is within the vulnerable zone.
Closures of Highway 225, Davison
Road, and PTRA railroad.
II nil
CHEMICAL "B
A. Chemical
B. Vulnerable Zone
Population
Within Vul-
nerable Zone
Essential
Services
Within Zone
Cyclohexane
A worst case scenario releasing
680,000 Ibs of cyclohexane from
the Phillips site could result in
an area of radius 1200 ft. where
the LOG is exceeded. Flammable
material will likely reach a source
of ignition at or near the point
of release.
Total population within the vulner-
able zone is all industrial facilities
Possible closure of Highway 225 and
probable closure of Jefferson.
-------
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 2)
M/ill
CHEMICAL "C
A. Chemical
B. Vulnerable Zone
C. Population
Within Vul-
nerable Zone
D. Essential
Services
Within Zone
Ammonia
A worst case scenario releasing over
300,000 Ibs. of ammonia from a facility,
or a barge on the Ship Channel could re-
sult in an area of radius greater than 10
miles where the LOC is exceeded. A re-
lease of over 35,000 Ibs. from a tank
truck could result in a vulnerable zone
of over 5 miles.
Total population within the vulnerable
zone is over 100,000 which includes
schools, universities, industrial plants,
state and local government complexes,
airport and numerous commercial establish-
ments .
Fire Stations; EMS Stations; Hospitals;
Police Stations; Nursing Homes; major
Highways, Railroads, Ship Channel.
CHEMICAL "D"
A. Chemic?!
B. Vulnerable Zone
Population
Within Vul-
nerable Zone
Essential
Services
Within Zone
Silicone Tetrafluoride
A worst case scenario releasing 22,000 Ibs.
from a tube trailer could result in an area
of radius 0.8 miles where the LOC is exceeded.
Total population within the vulnerable zone
is variable but could be up to 1000, made up
of motorists, and nearby commercial and re-
sidential populations.
Highway 225, Beltway 8, Red Bluff, South and
East of Fairmont, Fairmont, other possible
streets. Other services vary, but could
include schools and public buildings.
-------
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 3)
CHEMICAL "E"
A. Chemical
B. Vulnerable Zone
C. Population
Within Vul-
nerable Zone
D. Essential
Services
Within Zone
Methanol
A worst case scenario releasing 83,000 Ibs.
of methanol from a facility or 40,000 Ibs.
from a fank truck could result in an area
of radius 1200 ft. where the LOG is exceeded,
Total population within the vulnerable zone
is variable but could include up to 200,
which could include schools and numerous
commercial establishments.
Schools, Beltway 8, Highway 225, Fairmont,
Red Bluff, and other possible streets.
CHEMICAL "F"
A. Chemical
B. Vulnerable Zone
C. Population
Within Vul-
nerable Zone
D. Essential
Services
Within Zone
Butadiene
A worst case scenario releasing 2,190,000
Ibs. from a facility could result in an area
of radius 1.2 miles where the LOG is exceeded
Flammable material will likely reach a sourco
of if*nilion nl or nonr Iho point of rolonno.
A lank U'uek or ruilcar release could cause
a smaller vulnerable zone but with a higher'
impact.
Population within the vulnerable zone is
industrial or motorists.
Railroads, Jefferson,
Ship Channel.
N. South, Highway 225
-------
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 4)
CHEMICAL "G"
A. Chemical
B. Vulnerable Zone
Population
Within Vul-
nerable Zone
Services
Within Zone
Chlorine
A worst case scenario releasing 180,000
Ibs. from a facility, or tank car on the
railroad could result in an area of radius
greater than 10 miles where the LOC is
exceeded. As little as 2000 Ibs. result
in an area of radius 5.1 miles.
Total population within the vulnerable
zone is over 100,000, which includes
schools, universities, industrial plants,
local and state government complexes,
metro airport, numerous commercial estab-
lishments .
Fi.e Station; EMS Stations: Hospitals;
Police Stations; Nursing Homes; major
Highways, Railroads, and Ship Channel.
CHEMICAL "H"
A. Chemical
B. Vulnerable Zone
Population
Within Vul-
nerable Zone
Essential
Services
Within Zone
Ethylene Oxide
•
A worst case scenario releasing 400,000
Ibs.' from a facility could result in an
area of radius 9.7 miles where the LOC
is exceeded. Flammable material will
likely reach a source of ignition at
or near the point of release. A railcar
release of over 100,000 Ibs. could cause
a vulnerable zone of over 2 miles.
Total population within the vulnerable
zone is over 100,000, which includes
schools, universities, industrial plants,
local and state government complexes,
and numerous commercial establishments.
Fire Stations; EMS Stations; Hospitals;
Police Stations; Hospitals, Nursing
Homes; major Highways and Railroads.
-------
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 5)
CHEMICAL "I"
A. Chemical
B. Vulnerable Zone
B. Population
Within Vul-
nerable Zone
Essential
Services
Within Zone
Hydrochloric Acid
A worst case scenario releasing 158,000 Ibs.
from a facility could result in an area of
radius 5.2 miles where the LOG is exceeded.
A truck or railcar release could cause a
vulnerable zone of over 1 mile.
Total population within the vulnerable zone
is over 50,000 but varies on release source
including schools, industrial plants, uni-
versity, commercial establishments and local
and state government complexes.
Hospitals; Nursing Homes; Fire Stations;
EMS Stations, Police Stations; major Roads,
Railroad and Ship Channel.
CHEMICAL "J"
A. Chemical
B. Vulnerable Zone
Population
Within Vul-
nerable Zone
Essential
Services
Within Zone
Hydrogen Floride
A worst case scenario releasing 150,000 Ibs.
from a facility could result in an area of
radius of 4.2 miles where the LOG is exceed-
ed. A truck release of over 20,000 Ibs.
could result in a vulnerable zone of over
1 mile.
Total population within the vulnerable zone-
is over 100,000, including schools, indus-
trail plants, and local and state government
complexes, and numerous commercial estab-
lishments .
Fire Stations; EMS Stations; Hospitals;
Police Stations; Nursing Homes; Highway
225, Red Bluff, other Streets, Railroads,
Ship Channel.
-------
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 6)
CHEMICAL "K"
A. Chemical
B. Vulnerable Zone
Population
Within Vul-
nerable Zone
Essential
Services
Within Zone
Methyl Chloride
A worst case scenario releasing over
100,000 Ibs. from a railcar could
result in an area of radius of over
1 mile where the LOC is exceeded.
Flammable material will likely reach
a source of ignition at or near the
point of release.
Total population within the vulnerable
zone could be over 5000, but varies
including schools and commercial
establishments.
Varies but could include
public facilities, major
railroads.
numerous
roads, and
CHEMICAL "L"
A. Chemical
B. Vulnerable Zone
Population
Within Vul-
nerable Zone
Essential
Services
Within Zone
Sulfuric Acid
A worst case scenario releasing over
40,000 Ibs. by tank truck or tank car
could result in an area of radius of
1000 ft. where the LOC is exceeded.
Total population within the vulnerable
zone varies, but could include over 100.
Any public facilities within 1000 ft. of
major highways or railroads could be in-
cluded.
Varies. Includes major highway and
railroads.
-------
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 7)
Hull
CHEMICAL "M
A. Chemical
B. Vulnerable Zone
Population
Within Vul-
nerable Zone
Essential
Services
Within Zone
Styrene
A worst case scenario releasing over
100,000 Ibs. from a railcar could re-
sult in a vulnerable zone of several
hundred feet. Flammable material will
likely reach a source of ignition at
or near the point of release.
Varies depending upon location of
release.
Varies but could include Railroads,
major Highways, any public facilities
within several hundred feet of a
railroad.
CHEMICAL "N"
A. Chemical
B. Vulnerable Zone
Population
Within Vul-
nerable zone
Vinyl Chloride
A worst case scenario releasing 180,000
Ibs. from a tank car could result in an
area of radius over 1 mile where the LOG
is exceeded. Flammable material will like-
ly reach a source of ignition at or near
the release point.
Total population within the vulnerable
zone varies, including schools, univer-
sities, industrial plants, and state
and local government complexes.
Essential
Services
Within Zone
Varies but could include Fire Stations;
EMS Stations; Hospitals; Police Stations;
Nursing Homes; major Highways, Railroads,
and Ship Channel.
-------
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 8)
CHEMICAL "0"
A. Chemical Flammable
B. Vulnerable Zone Varies but could be over several
hundred feet in radius.
C. Population . Varies depending on material and
Within Vul- source.
nerable Zone
D. Essential Varies depending on material
Services -and source.
Within Zone
-------
EXAMPLE DEFINITIONS OF
SEVERITY OF CONSEQUENCES TO PEOPLE
Lou CHEMICAL zs EXPECTED TO MOVE INTO THE
SURROUNDING ENVIRONMENT IN NEGLIGIBLE
CONCENTRATIONS. INJURIES EXPECTED
ONLY FOR EXPOSURE OVER EXTENDED
PERIODS OR WHEN INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL
HEALTH CONDITIONS CREATE COMPLICA-
TIONS.
MEDIUM CHEMICAL is EXPECTED TO MOVE INTO THE
SURROUNDING ENVIRONMENT IN CONCENTRA-
TIONS SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE SERIOUS
INJURIES AND/OR DEATHS UNLESS PROMPT
AND EFFECTIVE CORRECTIVE ACTION IS
TAKEN. DEATH AND/OR INJURIES EXPECTED
ONLY FOR EXPOSURE OVER EXTENDED
PERIODS OR WHEN INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL
HEALTH CONDITIONS CREATE COMPLICA-
TIONS.
HIGH CHEMICAL is EXPECTED TO MOVE INTO THE
SURROUNDING ENVIRONMENT IN CONCENTRA-
TIONS SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE SERIOUS
INJURIES AND/OR DEATHS UPON EXPOSURE.
LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE EXPECTED TO BE
AFFECTED.
-------
VULNERABILITY AND RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
SECTION IV
RISK ANALYSIS
Risk Analysis is the third part of the Hazards Analysis.
Risk Analysis provides a relative measure of likelihood
and severity of various possible hazardous events and
enables the emergency plan to focus on the greatest
potential risk.
The Risk Analysis utilizes certain information collected
during the first two steps of the Hazards Analysis
(Hazards Identification and Vulnerability Analysis), as
well as other information specific to a facility acquired
through discussions with facility coordinators and visits
to some sites.
This Risk Analysis includes an estimate of the probability
or likelihood that an event will occur. The risks are
characterized in qualitative terms as low, medium or-high,
per the definitions on the following pages.
For practical purposes, this Risk Analysis is based on a
subjective, common sense evaluation.
-------
RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
CHEMICAL "A" -
TOLUENE
A.
Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
B.
C.
D.
E.
Consequences if
People are Ex-
posed
Consequences for
Proper ty
Consequences of
Environ.Exposures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Low. Present at only one fixed location.
Tanks where material is stored is an in-
ternal floating roof tank. Tank is diked
to contain spilled material. Material
does not readily vaporize at atmospheric
conditions, so potential for a large
vapor cloud is remote. A spill would be
contained on site. The material is
transported by barge and pipeline and a
transportation incident has more potential
to impact the public, however, a spill
would be localized and not over a broad
area like more volatile compounds such as
chlorine or ammonia.
IDLH is 2000 ppm for toluene. Vapors caij
irritate eyes and skin and cause dizzi-
ness in high concentrates.
Minimal
Minimal
Low/Low,
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RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 2)
CHEMICAL "B" - CYCLOI1EXANE
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
Consequences if
People are Ex-
posed
Consequences for
Property
Consequences of
Environ. Ex-
posures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Cyclohexane is stored/used at
?ne facility. This material hi
Low.
only one facility. This material has
a low vapor pressure, and does not
readily vaporize at atmospheric con-
ditions. The likelihood of this
material having any impact on the
public outside of the site is very low
IDLH is 10000 ppm. Vapors can irri-
tate eyes and skin and cause dizziness
in high concentrations.
Minimal
Minimal
Low/Low.
-------
RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 3)
CHEMICAL "C" - AMMONIA
A. Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
Medium. The likelihood of an accident at
a given site is low. However, the material
is utilized and stored in many locations.
It is also transported by rail, truck, water
and pipeline. These factors increase the
chances of an incident involving ammonia.
A transportation incident is more likely
than an incident at a fixed site.
B. Consequences if
People are Ex-
posed
Consequences for
Property
Consequences of
Environ. Ex-
posures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Ammonia vapors are toxic (IDLH 500 ppm, LOC=
STEL 50 ppm). Vapors are irritating to eyes
and respiratory tract, an:* *re deadly at
high concentrations. Vapors are lighter tbl
air and will rise after the initial release.
Ammonia is also somewhat flammable and pre-
sents a fire hazard. Due to its high vol-
atility (readily vaporizes), the vulnerability
zone Is large. For some of the fixed sites,
the vulnerability zone is greater than 10
miles. This is also true for a transporta-
tion incident involving a tank car.-
Minor if only subjected to vapors. Greatest
potential for property damage is by fire,
if vapors contact a source of ignition.
Potential for damage is primarily by fire.
Trees, vegetation, and foliage could be
damaged by fire. Partial recovery with
time.
Medium/Low.
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RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page A)
CHEMICAL "D" - SILICONS TETRAFLUORIDE
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
Consequences if
People are Ex- •
posed
Consequences for
Property
Consequences
Environ. Ex-
posure
of
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Low. Present at only one fixed facility
but transported through via truck and
tube trailer.
Silicone tetrafluoride is a highly toxic
substance. Hydrofluoric Acid is formed
upon contact with water. It is very
irritating
system.
to eyes, skin and respiratory
May become extremely corrosive as hydro-
fluoric Acid is formed.
May be dangerous if it enters water in-
takes and is toxic to aquatic life. HF
can severely damage trees, but generally
will recover after time.
Low/Medium.
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RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 5)
CHEMICAL "E
"IT" —
METUANOL
A.
Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
B.
C.
D.
E.
Consequences if
People are Ex-
posed
Consequences for
Property
Consequences of
Environ. Ex-
posures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Low. Methanol is present at only one location
It is transported by truck. Methanol is
flammable but its vapor pressure is low so
it does not readily form a vapor cloud. Con-
centrations above TLV would be restricted
to a small area.
Methanol vapors are irritating to skin and
eyes. It can cause dizziness. The IDLH
is 25,000 ppm.
Minimal, other than fire hazard.
Minimal.
Low/Low.
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RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 6)
CHEMICAL "F" - BUTADIENE
A.
Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
B.
Consequences if
People are Ex-
posed
C.
D.
E.
Consequences for
Property
Consequences of
Environ. Ex-
posures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Low. Probability of a major release
due to failure of a large storage
vessel are very small. Minor leaks
from pump seals, leaking valve packing,
etc. occasionally occur, but such in-
cidents have not had off site impact.
Large storage vessels are built to
code, and are routinely audited and in-
spected. Rail and truck releases are
more likely than facility releases.
Butadiene is only moderately toxic (IDLH-
20,000.) Its biggest hazard or threat is
its flammability. It is stored under
pressure and upon release it readily
vaporizes at atmospheric conditions.
Its vapors are heavier than air (similar
to chlorine) and will stay close to the
ground and travel long distances. Since
it is very flammable, a large release
has the potential for ignition and the
results would be a large fire. A storage
vessel or a tank car/tank truck that is
subiected to fire has the potential to
B*LEVE.
Very low if subjected only to vapors in
low concentrations. Consequence could
be severe if subjected to a large release
that is ignited. Damage would result
from fire.
Not harmful to aquatic life. Trees and
foliage would be damaged if vapors are
ignited.
Low/Low.
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RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 7)
CHEMICAL "G
iir.ii _
CHLORINE
A. Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
B.
Consequences if
People are Ex-
posed
C.
D.
E.
Consequences for
Property
Consequences of
Environ. Ex-
posures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Medium. Likelihood of an incident at
any single site is low. This material
has been produced, stored, and used
in the area for many years with only
minor incidents. However, due to the
large number of locations where this
material is used/stored, the chances
of an incident involving chlorine is
considered to be medium. Chlorine is
the chemical of greatest concern.
Chlorine is transported in cylinders
(150 Ib and 2000 Ibs.), tank cars,
and barges.
Chlorine is very toxic (IDLH-30 ppm,
LOG 3 ppm). Exposure to high concen-
trations will cause respiratory distress
and death. One of the fixed sites store
large volumes, and has a vulnerability
zone of over 10 miles. Tank cars also
have a vulnerability zone of over 10
miles. A major release from a tank
car or large storage facilities at these
sites would have severe consequence.
Only superficial damage likely to equip-
ment and structures due to the corrosive
nature of fumes, particularly upon con-
tact with moisture.
High-concentrations of chlorine gas will
badly damage and possibly destroy trees,
vegetation and foliage.
(1) Fixed location
with large volumes
(2) Fixed location
with cylinders only
(3) Transportation
incidents
Total Assessment
Low/High
Low/Medium
Low/High
Medium/High
-------
RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 8)
CHEMICAL "II
"u11 -
ETHYLENE OXIDE
B
Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
Consequences if
People are Ex- '
posed
C.
D.
E.
Consequences for
Property
Consequences of
Environ. Ex-
posures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Low. Present at one fixed facility
in the area, but transported through
via tank car.
This product maybe easily ignited
under all ambient temperature con-
ditions. The liquid will rapidly
evaporate when spilled, thus evol-
ving large amounts of vapor. These
vapors are irritating to the eyes,
skin and respiratory system. Vapors
are heavier than air and may travel
considerable distance to a source
of ignition and flash back. The
IDLH is 800 ppm. Can cause irri-
tation, nausea and breathing diffi-
culties.
Mostly fire potential if area in-
volved in a vapor cloud ignition.
May be dangerous if it enters water
intake.
Low/Medium.
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RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 9)
CHEMICAL "I" - HYDROCHLORIC ACID
Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
B. Consequences if
People are Ex-
posed
Consequences for
Property
Consequences of
Environ. Ex-
posures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Low. HC1 is found at only one location
It is a liquid. It is assumed to be
shipped by rail and truck.
HC1 is very toxic (IDLH-100 ppm). In-
halation of high concentration will
result in death. Exposures to low
concentrations will irritate eyes/
nose/throat. Contact with liquid
will cause frostbite, and will burn
the skin. Material is not flammable.
HC1 is very corrosive, so exposure
of metal structures/machinery will
result in rusting/corrosion, parti-
cularly in the present of moisture.
Dangerous to aquatic life at high
concentrations. Could be dangerous
if entered into water wa>s.
Low/Low.
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RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 10)
CHEMICAL "J" - HYDROGEN FLUORIDE
B,
C.
D.
E.
Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
Consequences if
People are Ex-
posed
Consequences
Property
for
Consequences of
Environ. Ex-
posures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Low. HF is stored and used at only one
fixed facility. Prevention systems are
in place. The material is transported
by truck on Highway 225.
Experience has shown that the chemical
does not follow normal vaporization
tables. It atomizes and may travel
much longer distances, than previously
thought, as a rolling vapor cloud. Hy-
drogen fluoride is extremely dangerous
by all possible routes of exposure.
Toxic concentrations may exists over
considerable down wind distances. IOLH
is 30 ppm.
HF is corrosive and will attack natural
rubber, leather; many organic materials,
glass, concrete and certain metals,
especially those like cast iron.
Toxic to aquatic
concentrations.
Low/High.
life in very low
-------
RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 11)
CHEMICAL
- METHYL CHLORIDE
B
Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
Consequences if
People are Ex-
posed
C.
Consequences
Property
for
D.
E.
Consequences of
Environ. Ex-
posures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Low. Present at only one fixed facility
and is transported by tank car. Tank
car release is more likely than from
facility.
Vapors are relatively toxic. Contact
with liquid or cold gas may result in
frostbite. All spills on land or water
will involve relatively large amounts
of flammable gases or vapors that are
heavier than air. Products of com-
bustion may include phosgene, hydrogen
chloride and other toxic and irritative
gases. No IDLH was found. 300 ppm
(5 min. peak in 3 hour period was used
as LOC.)
Reacts with aluminum. May take on
reactivity of hydrochloric acid when wet.
Will attack some forms of plastics &
rubbers.
Minimal.
Low/Medium.
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RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 12)
CHEMICAL "L" - SULFURIC ACID
A.
Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
B.
C.
D.
E.
Consequences if
People are Ex-
posed
Consequences for
Property
Consequences of
Environ. Ex-
posures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Low. Sulfuric Acid is known to be
present at several fixed facilities
and is transported by tank truck,
tank car, pipeline and barge. Pipe-
line leaks have occurred. Tank truck
spills have occurred.
Immediate spill area may be impacted
due to fumes. Highly corrosive to
body tissues if contacted.
Highly corrosive acid, may generate
hydrogen gas in contact with metals.
Harmful to aquatic life in very low
concentrations.
Low/Low.
-------
RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 13)
CHEMICAL "M" -STYRENE
A. Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
B. Consequences if
People are Ex-
posed
C. Consequences for
Property
Consequences of
Environ. Ex-
posures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Low. Styrene has a low vapor pressure,
and does not form a vapor cloud at
atmospheric condition. Areas where
it is stored likely to contain liquid.
Any spill would be contained on site.
Its biggest hazard is its flammability.
The liquid will burn the skin on con-
tact. The vapors are irritating and
only moderately toxic (IDLH 5,000 ppm).
Property would be damaged if there is
a fire, as Styrene is highly flammable.
Since it does not readily form a vapor-
cloud, this would require a liquid spill
on the premise.
Harmful to aquatic life in low concen-
trations .
Low/Low.
-------
RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 14)
CHEMICAL "N" - VINYL CHLORIDE
A.
Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
B.
Consequences if
People are Ex-
posed
C.
D.
E.
Consequences for
Property
Consequences of
Environ. Ex-
posures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
Low. Vinyl Chloride is a highly regu-
lated compound, so plants producing/
handling, vinyl chloride are required
to comply with rigid standards. One
facility has vinyl on site. Facilities
are audited frequently for fugitive
emissions. An incident that would
impact the public is more likely from
a tank car (transportation incident)
than from the fixed facility.
Vinyl Chloride is very volatile and
readily vaporizes when released to the
atmosphere. Vinyl chloride is a known
carcinogen from long term exposure to
low concentrations. Its acute toxicity
is only moderate (STEL=500 ppm for 5
min). Vinyl chloride is very flammable,
and represents a significant fire hazard,
also gases produced when burned are poison-
ous (HC1). Contact with liquids will cause
frostbite and irritation of the skin.
In case of a major leak, the potential
for property damage is high, due to its
volatility and flammability.
Minimal.
Low/High.
-------
RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
(Page 15)
CHEMICAL "0" - FLAMMADLES
A.
Likelihood of
Hazard Occurrence
B.
C.
D.
E.
Consequences if
People are Ex-
posed
Consequences for
Property
Consequences of
Environ. Ex-
posures
Summary: Likeli-
hood and Severity
of Consequences
High. Flammables are present at most
fixed facilities, and transported
by tank truck, tank cars, barges and
pipelines. Potential for catastrophic
incidents, i.e.. BLEVE's are judged
to be higher for transportation re-
lated incidents.
People in close proximily to incidents
may receive burns. Worst case scenari-
os indicate a relatively small vulner-
able zone. Explosions, although felt
long distances, have relatively minor
consequences.offsite.
Serious property damage limited typi-
cally to the site in most cases.
Essentially none for most flammable
incidents. A few can emit toxic
gases as a product of combustion.
High/Low.
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VULNERABILITY AND RISK ANALYSIS
CITY OF PASADENA
SECTION V
PRIORITY RANKING
This section ranks the chemicals in priority order
for emergency planning purposes and includes a de-
tailed rationale to support the relative ranking.
Under the rationale, a further ranking of worst
case accident scenarios, by location based on re-
leased quantities and potential consequences, is
provided.
-------
PRIORITY RANKING FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING
PRIORITY RATIONALE
1. Chlorine - Chlorine is the chemical of greatest concern fur
the following reasons:
Chlorine vapors are extremely toxic (1DLH-30
PPM, STEL-3PPM).
Chlorine has a high vapor pressure and readily
vaporizes at atmospheric conditions if released.
Chlorine vapors are heavier than air and will
hug the ground and carry long distances.
Chlorine is stored/utilized at many of the
large fixed sites.
It is also utilized at a very large number of
smaller unmanned sites (water treatment plan Is
and sewer treatment plants) in one ton cyclinders
and 150 # cylinders.
It is transported in large volumes by rail car,
" Lank truck, and cylinders (on trucks).
Due to all the reasons listed above, the conse-
quences of a major release could be very severe.
The vulnerability zone is large for all C.TSCVS
involving large vessels (lank truck or larger).
- Although the likelihood of a major release -iL
any given location is low, the likelihood of
a serious release is increased due to the
large number of locations where chlorine is
used/stored plus the fact that it is trans-
ported by rail and truck. The ability to
predict where such a release is most likely to
occur is highly improbable. However, Lhe sever-
ity of consequences for major releases are
prioritized below based on the quantity stored/
transported in a single vessel. The. ability to
cope with and/or mitigate the impact 'of a major
incident are much better at large fixed .facili-
ties due to the timely response of Emergency
Response Resources (trained personnel plus
facilities).
1. Failure of a tank car ~ 110,000 to 180,000 lb.
2. Failure of tank truck — 40,000 lb.
Interstate & Highway System
3. Cylinder Failure — 2,000 lb.
4. Small Cylinder Failure- 130 lb
-------
2. Ammonia - Ammonia vapors are toxic (1DLH-500 PPM STEL-
35PPM)
- Ammonia has a high vapor pressure and readily
vaporizes at atmospheric conditions
- Vapors are heavier than air initially upon
release and will travel before becoming bouyant
- Ammonia is also flammable and represents a fire
hazard. If a source of ignition is contacted,
property damage at/around the release site is
increased, but the potential for personnel in-
juries from toxic vapors are reduced.
Several of the fixed sites have vulnerability
zones greater than 10 miles due to volume
stored/handled in a single vessel.
- Ammonia is transported by rail, truck, pipeline
and barge. A tank car or tank truck failure
has a vulnerability zone of greater than 5
miles.
- Ammonia is also used/stored at a number of
. commercial facilities as a refrigerant.
- Although the likelihood of a major release
• at any given site is low, the likelihood of a
major release is increased due to the large
number of sites that uses/stores ammonia. Since
the material is transported by rail, truck,
pipeline, and barge, this also increases the
likelihood of a major incident. The ability to
predict- the most likely site for a major re-
lease is highly improbable, however, the severity
of consequences based on quantity stores/trans-
ported in a single vessel are prioritized
below.
The ability to cope with and/or partially miti-
gate the impact of an incident are much better
at large fixed facilities due to the timely
response of Emergency Response Resources (trained
personnel plus equipment).
1. Failure of storage vessel 300,000" Ibs to
25 million.lbs,
2. Rail car incident 110,000 Ibs.
3. Failure of a tank truck 30,000 Ibs.
4. Failure of small container 1,000 to 3,000
Ibs. (estimated)
-------
3. Hydrogen Fluoride
Silicon Tetra-
fluoride
Vinyl Chloride
Hydrogen Fluoride is extremely toxic
(1DLH-30PPM). It is extremely dangerous
by all possible routes of entry into
the body.
Experience has shown that this chemical
does not follow normal vaporization
tables. It atomizes, and may travel
longer distances than predicted by con-
ventional vapor dispersion models.
11F is used and stored at only one site.
Likelihood of an incident that would im-
pact outside the site is judged to be
low. A tank truck incident is more likely
Similar to HF in potential hazard.
Stored at only one site. Risk is low.
- Transported by truck. Risk is increased.
- Vinyl chloride is a known carcinogen
from long term exposure, even at low
concentrations.
Vinyl chloride is very volatile and
readily vaporizes at atmospheric con-
ditions .
Its vapors are heavier than air and will
travel long distances.
Its acute toxicity is only moderate (STEL=
500 PPM).
- It is highly flammable and will most often
ignite rather than travel long distances.
It is a highly regulated compound, so
facilities producing/handling vinyl chlo-
ride already have to comply with rigid
standards.
It is handled at only one facility.
Likelihood of a facility incident involv-
ing the public is low. A tank car inci-
dent is more likely. From an emergency
response standpoint, it must be treated
as a flammable, but special concerns
must be paid to its carcinogencity.
-------
6. Flammables
(Including
Butadiene,
Ethylene Oxide,
Methyl Chloride
Flammables are present at most fixed facilities.
They are also transported by tank cars, tank
trucks, pipelines, and barges. Due to the
the presence of flammables at so many locations,
the likelihood of fires is judged to be high,
so flammables clearly represents a potential*
hazard to the community. There are several
types of fires that can result from the re-
lease/spill of flammable materials, the type
being dependent not only on the characteristics
of the flammable material, but also on the
circumstances surrounding the incident. The
types of fires include : Flame iets liquid
pool fires, flammable solid fires", vapor or
dust cloud fires and/or explosion, and BLEVE's.
Most fires have a very limited vulnerability
zone compared to toxic releases and only the
people involved in the accident and those in
Lhe very near proximity are likely to receive
burns. At large fixed facilities, the impact
of such incidents are almost always limited
to the site. Vapor cloud explosions and
BLEVE's represent special cases that have a
somewhat greater vulnerability zone, and
greater impact, although still considerably
less than toxic gas releases.
BLEVE is a result of the failure of pressur-
ized storage vessels during a fire. Since
Butadiene, Ethylene Oxide, and Methyl-Chlo-
ride are flammable hydrocarbons, stored under
pressure, they were included in this category.
However, where dealing with a situation that
involves these materials, special attention
must be paid to potential carcinogenicity as
well as other unique hazards. The availability
and timely response of fire control resources
on large fixed sites greatly reduces the po-
tential for BLEVE's. The time delay in reporting
and responding to transportation incidents in-
volving pressure vessels carrying flammables
make BLEVE's a more likely possibility in
transportation related incidents than in fixed
facilities.
-------
7. Other Chemicals present
in Significant Quantities -
0 Hydrochloric Acid
0 Cyclohexane
0 Sulfuric Acid
0 Styrene
0 Toluene
All of these chemicals have relatively
low pressures, and do not readily form
vapor clouds when released. At fixed
facilities they would tend to remain
on site if a spill occurred. In a
transportation incident, the zone of
vulnerability would be limited (signi-
ficantly smaller than other chemicals
higher on the priority list). The
likelihood of an incident that would
impact the public is judged^to be low,
and the consequences of an incident
would also be considerably less.
-------
APPENDIX C
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES MANUAL
*** DRAFT - DO NOT CITE - NOT SUBJECT TO FOIA ***
-------
PHILLIPS
Hiiiliiililll
EPR 00261
-------
"HCC EMERGENCY PROCEDURE MANUAL DESIGNATION SHEET
MANUAL NUMBER 57
ASSIGNED TO: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
Individual responsible for maintaining this manual* BILL STOLTE
*Should this responsibility change, complete a revised Designation Sheet
and return it as specified below.
I certify receipt of the referenced Manual and/or Revision
dated
Signature ^. 2i/
Date
Return to: Chairman, Emergency Preparedness Sub Committee
Central Safety Committee
HCC
MANUPDATEtbs
EPR 00262
-------
HCC EMERGENCY PROCEDURE MANUAL DESIGNATION SHEET
MANUAL NUMBER
T>
* CCTPUVT) TO* ^ •*"* ^' ^* — - -^ - -* C^L^AM^ v^i .^x^^^i ^s^* I
Individual responsible for maintaining this manual*
*Should this responsibility change, complete a revised Designation Sheet
and return it as specified below.
I certify receipt of the referenced Manual and/or Revision
dated .
Signature
Date
Return to: Chairman, Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee
Central Safety Committee
HCC
EKERPRO:bs
£PR 00263
-------
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES MANUAL
FOR
HOUSTON CHEMICAL COMPLEX
EPfl 0026H
-------
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. DISTRIBUTION
III. EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION
A. SCOPE
B. STRUCTURE
C. GENERAL POLICIES
IV. PLAN ACTIVATION
A. EMERGENCY REPORTING
B. BOMB THREATS
C. PLANT EVACUATION
D. AREA EVACUATION
E. HURRICANES
F. EMERGENCY CALL-OUT
V. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS
VI. COMMUNICATIONS
VII. EMPLOYEE WELFARE
VIII. EQUIPMENT & TRANSPORTATION •
IX. TRAFFIC CONTROL & SECURITY
X. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
XI. ENGINEERING
XII. PUBLIC RELATIONS
XIII. PLANT PREPAREDNESS
A. PLANT PROCEDURES
B. FIRE EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE
C. EVACUATION PROCEDURES
D. HURRICANE PROCEDURES
E. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES
F. POWER FAILURE PROCEDURES
XIV. EXTERNAL EMERGENCIES
A. CIMA
B. RELEASE OF FIRE EQUIPMENT
C. PEP
D. CAER
XV APPENDIX
A LISTING OF REFERENCE TELEPHONE NUMBERS
B' AUTHORIZED TO DIAL EMERGENCY CONFERENCE LINE
C. EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT
D. SPCC PLAN
00265
-------
I. INTRODUCTION
A. This Emergency Action Plan is specifically designed for the
Houston Chemical Complex of PhjJIips 66 Company at Pasadena
Texas. The plan is structured to provide useful informat.on and
systematic guidelines for dealing with internal and external
emergency situations.
B. The purpose of the plan is to minimize the adverse impact of
emergency situations on:
1. Safety of employees and visitors.
2. Safety of surrounding areas.
3. Property damage and loss.
A. Public relations and company image.
C. To achieve this purpose the plan provides:
1. A system of "readiness".
2. Procedures for orderly transition from normal to emergency
operations.
3. A design for delegation of emergency authority and
responsibility.
4. Methods for interfacing with other emergency
organizations.
5. Means of preventing an emergency situation from becoming
a disaster or "perceived" disaster.
D. The Emergency Action Plan is administered by the HCC
Emergency Preparedness Committee. Comments and/or questions
should be directed to the Committee Chairman.
EPR 00266
-------
DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Complex Manager
2. Quality Assurance Manager
3A. Quality Assurance Shift Supervisor
3B. Quality Assurance Shift Supervisor
4. Central Safety Office
5. Polyethylene Manufacturing Manager
6. Polyethylene Plant V Operations Superintendent
7. Polyethylene Plant II Purification Control Room
8. Polyethylene Plant II Reactor Control Room
9. Polyethylene MDV Control Room
10. Polyethylene Maintenance Supt. (Finishing)
11. Polyethylene Plants II & IV Operations Superintendent
12. Polyethylene Plants III & IV Reactor Control Room
13. Polyethylene PF Catalyst Activator Control Room
14. Polyethylene Maintenance Superintendent (Reactor)
15. Polyethylene Plant V (Finishing) Shift Supv.
16. Polyethylene Plant V (Reactor) Shift Supv.
17. Polyethylene Safety/Training Representatives
18. Developmental Reactor Control Room
19. Developmental Operations & Maintenance Supv.
20. Polypropylene Manufacturing Manager
21. Polypropylene Operations Superintendent
22. Polypropylene Plant Control Room
23. Polypropylene Maintenance Supv.
24. Polypropylene Safety/Training Representative
25. K-Resin Manufacturing Manager
26. K-Resin Operations Superintendent
EPR 0026?
-------
DISTRIBUTION
(Continued)
27. K-Resin Maintenance Supv.
28. K-Resin Reactor Control Room
29. K-Resin Finishing Control Room
30. Distribution Manager
31. Distribution Maintenance Supv.
32. Distribution P.P. Control Room
33. Distribution Safety/Training Representative
34. Distribution Superintendent
35. Central Services Superintendent
36. Warehouse/Purchasing Superintendent
37A. Central Shops Supervisor
37B. Central Shop Supervisor
37C. Central Shop Supervisor
38. Warehouse Supervisor
39. Utilities Shift Supervisors
40. Central Services Safety/Training Representative
41. Chief Instrument Engineer
42. Boiler House
43. Environmental Staff Office
44. Pasadena Garage Supervisor
45. Union Committee Chairman
46. Electrical Chairman
47. Clerical Chairman
48. Main Guard Gate
49. Administration Manager
EPR 0026B
-------
DISTRIBUTION
(Continued)
50. Marketing & Manufacturing Services Manager
51. Resin Marketing Manager
52. Office Services Supervisor
53. Financial Services Manager
54. Data Processing Manager
55. Planning & Accounting Manager
56. Railcar Shop
57. Emergency Preparedness Committee Chairman - RC
58. Central Services and Engineering Manager
59. Technical Manager
DISTRIBUTION:bs Revised 3/27/89
EPR 00269
-------
DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Complex Manager
2. Quality Assurance Manager
3A. Quality Assurance Shift Supervisor
3B. Quality Assurance Shift Supervisor
4. Central Safety Office
5. Polyethylene Manufacturing Manager
6. Polyethylene Plant V Operations Superintendent
7. Polyethylene Plant II Purification Control Room
8. Polyethylene Plant II Reactor Control Room
9. Polyethylene MDV Control Rooa
10. Polyethylene Maintenance Supt. (Finishing)
11. Polyethylene Plants II & IV Operations Superintendent
12. Polyethylene Plants III & IV Reactor Control Room
13. Polyethylene PF Catalyst Activator Control Room
14. Polyethylene Maintenance Superintendent (Reactor)
15. Polyethylene Plant V (Finishing) Shift Supv.
16. Polyethylene Plant V (Reactor) Shift Supv.
17. Polyethylene Safety/Training Representatives
18. Developmental Reactor Control Room
19. Developmental Operations & Maintenance Supv.
20. Polypropylene Manufacturing Manager
21. Polypropylene Operations Superintendent
22. Polypropylene Plant Control Room
23. Polypropylene Maintenance Supv.
24. Polypropylene Safety/Training Representative
25. K-Resin Manufacturing Manager
26. K-Resin Operations Superintendent
EPfl 00270
-------
DISTRIBUTION
(Continued)
27. K-Resin Maintenance Supv.
28. K-Resin Reactor Control Room
29. K-Resin Finishing Control Room
30. Distribution Manager
31. Distribution Maintenance Supv.
32. Distribution P.P. Control Room
33. Distribution Safety/Training Representative
34. Distribution Superintendent
35. Central Services Superintendent
36. Warehouse/Purchasing Superintendent
37A. Central Shops Supervisor
37B. Central Shop Supervisor
37C. Central Shop Supervisor
38. Warehouse Supervisor
39. Utilities Shift Supervisors
40. Central Services Safety/Training Representative
41. Chief Instrument Engineer
42. Boiler House
43. Environmental Staff Office
44. Pasadena Garage Supervisor
45. Union Committee Chairman
46. Electrical Chairman
47. Clerical Chairman
48. Main Guard Gate
49. Administration Manager
EPR 00271
-------
DISTRIBUTION
(Continued)
50. Marketing & Manufacturing Services Manager
51. Resin Marketing Manager
52. Office Services Supervisor
53. Financial Services Manager
54. Data Processing Manager
55. Planning & Accounting Manager
56. Railcar Shop
57. Emergency Preparedness Committee Chairman - RC
58. Central Services and Engineering Manager
59. Technical Manager
DISTRIBUTION:bs Revised 3/27/89
EPR 00272
-------
t *
DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Complex Manager
2. Quality Assurance Manager
3./T. A & B Quality Assurance Shift Supervisors (2)
%&•
4 Central Safety Office
5. Polyethylene Manufacturing Manager
6. Polyethylene Plant V Operations Superintendent
7. polyethylene Plant II Purification Control Room
8. Polyethylene Plant II Reactor Control Room
9. Polyethylene MDV Control Room
10. Polyethylene Maintenance Supt. (Finishing)
11. Polyethylene Plants II & IV Operations Superintendent
12. Polyethylene Plants III & IV Reactor Control Room
13. Polyethylene PF Catalyst Activator Control Room
14. Polyethylene Maintenance Superintendent (Reactor)
15. Polyethylene Plant V (Finishing) Shift Supv.
16. Polyethylene Plant V (Reactor) Shift Supv.
17. Polyethylene Safety/Training Representatives
18. Developmental Reactor Control Room
19. Developmental Operations & Maintenance Supv.
20. Polypropylene Manufacturing Manager
21. Polypropylene Operations Superintendent
22. Polypropylene Plant Control Room
23. Polypropylene Maintenance Supv.
24. Polypropylene Safety /Training Representative
25. K-Resin Manufacturing Manager
26. K-Resin Operations Superintendent
EPB 00273
-------
DISTRIBUTION
( Continued )
27. K-Resin Maintenance Supv.
28. K-Resin Reactor Control Room
29. K-Resin Finishing Control Room
30. Distribution Manager
31. Distribution Maintenance Supv.
32. Distribution P.P. Control Room
33. Distribution Safety /Training Representative
34. Distribution Superintendent
35. Central Services Superintendent
36. Warehouse/Purchasing Superintendent
37. A, B & C Central Shops Supervisor
37.
Warehouse Supervisor
39. Utilities Shift Supervisors
40. Central Services Safety/Training Representative
41. Chief Instrument Engineer
42. Boiler House
43. Environmental Staff Office
44. Pasadena Garage Supervisor
45. Union Committee Chairman
46. Electrical Chairman
47. Clerical Chairman
48. Main Guard Gate
49. Administration Manager
EPfl 00274
-------
DISTRIBUTION
(Continued)
50. Marketing & Manufacturing Services Manager
51. Resin Marketing Manager
52. riactioc Forinc Minag-gr Oft^U Sendee.*
53. Financial Services Manager
54. Data Processing Manager
55. Planning & Accounting Manager
56. Railcar Shop
57. Emergency Preparedness Committee Chairman - RC
58. Central Services and Engineering Manager
59. Technical Manager
DISTRIBUTION:bs
EPR 00275
-------
III. EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION
A. SCOPE
The basic concept of the Emergency Action Plan is to provide
one organization to deal with all emergencies, as opposed to
separate groups, committees, etc. for specific s.tuat.ons The
organization is structured to: u«i°ni. i he
1. Address all aspects of internal and external emergency
situations from preparedness through public relations.
2. Respond in a systematic manner to the degree that is
necessary and consistent with the type and severity of the
situation.
B. STRUCTURE
The organization consists of an Emergency Manager with service
groups for spec.f.c functions. The service groups are headed
by Service Chiefs who report to the Emergency Manager (Refer
to the organizat.on chart on page 111-3.) Duties of the
Emergency Manager include:
1. Overall responsibility for protection of personnel, site
facilities, and surrounding communities.
2. Determines the required degree of Emergency Act.cn Plan
activation.
3. Directs all emergency control activities prior to, durinc
and after a situation with disaster potential.
Detailed descriptions of service group functions are presented in
later sections. A listing of current incumbents, alternates, and
telephone numbers is shown on pages 111-4 and 5.
:. GENERAL POLICIES
1. Access into the plant during emergency situations will be
restricted to only personnel with an emergency pass * All
other personnel must be cleared through the Central
command Post.
2. The plant alarm system will activate only the Emergency ,/• ,.-
Response Teams All other service groups are activated by J« * ~* '* -
of the Emergency Manager. — ,XJ.* - •—" ' '
3" U??K ?n'V °"e 'nr*ice 9rOUp ls re<*ulr«d. the Service Chief
of that group will function as the Emergency Manager.
* Issued by Security. Unit Manager approval required.
MF04MC:A:10:87
REVISED: 05/26/87
EPfl 00276
-------
GENERAL POLICIES - (continued)
.J
A. When more than one service group is involved, the P .
-Emergency Manager will immediately take charge at the / , *°
Central Command Post located at the Recreation Hall.'" "
(Alternate location is the Administration Building.) All
emergency actions and decisions will be coordinated
through the Central Command Post.
5. During off-hours the Utilities Shift Supervisor will have
authority for emergency action until the Emergency
Manager arrives.
6. The Service Chiefs have a key responsibility in keeping
the Central Command Post informed of the situation status.
7. All areas will develop and maintain procedures for an
orderly transition from normal to emergency conditions.
Evacuation plans and hurricane procedures will be reviewed
and revised annually or more often as required.
E. Plant Traffic
a. All plant traffic must stop when the sirens sounds,
even during tests all vehicles and mobile equipment
must (1) pu!l off the road as far as possible, (2)
have ignition switch turned off , (3) have keys left
in vehicle and (4) occupants get out of vehicle.
This clears the road for emergency vehicles and makes
company vehicles available for emergency use.
b. Welding machines, lawn mowers, forklifts, tractors,
etc., must be shut down. Rail car movement by the
switch engine and trackmobile must stop and all roads
be cleared.
c. Do not go to the scene of the emergency unless you
have specified duties. Remain in your assigned
control room, shop, etc., until instructed otherwise,
or the all clear signal is given.
d. Plant vehicular traffic may resume only after being
notified by Security, emergency personnel or the all
clear signal.
MF04MC:A:10:87
REVISED: 05/26/87
EPfl 0027?
-------
EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION CHART
EMERGENCY MANAGER
HCC MANAGER
•Utilities Shift Supvr.
COMMUNICATIONS -
Chief Inst. Engineer
•Computer Tech.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
TEAMS
Fire Chief
*Asst. Fire Chief
EMPLOYEE WELFARE
•^A* .o - C.».JL,\- •
Personnel Supv/
•Scheduler
TRANSPORTATION &
EQUIPMENT
*r.*
"Craft Supv.
TRAFFIC CONTROL -
AND SECURITY
Distribution Mgr.^
•Guard Lieutenant
•Equipment Inspector
/ ,
'
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS '
Quality Assurance Supt
•Environmental Engineer
•Radiation Officer
ENGINEERING '
Central & Engr. Svcs. Dir,
*Sr. Project Engr.
Sr. Elec. Engr.
PUBLIC RELATIONS •
Environmental Director
•Safety Director
'Alternate
REVISED 04/29/88
MF04MC:B:11:87
EOC:bs
EPR 0027B
-------
CONTACT NUMBERS
EMERGENCY MANAGER
D. W. PRICE
•Utilities Shift Supvr.
3610
3612
60-270
60-103
485-7799
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS
J.Berotte 3695
'Assistant
Chief (Day Shift) (L. w. Smith) 3910
60-154
60-248
328-4092
488-0206
COMMUNICATIONS
J. M. Walls
*Ricci Wright
EMPLOYEE WELFARE
L. A. Jeide
'Scheduler
TRANSPORTATION & EQUIPMENT
F. B. Easby-Smith
*N. J. Breton
TRAFFIC CONTROL & SECURITY
B. E. Ward
*Guard Lieutenant (G. Kisla)
*L. F. Hess
ENGINEERING
J. E. Knott
*M. O. Hogan
*S. Hietpas
3788
3897
3652
3670
3826
3785
3850
3815
3653
3804
3803
3710
60-116
60-201
60-284
60-128
60-113
60-275
60-274
60-150
60-169
60-261
60-181
946-0105
470-1424
476-4886
473-5752
447-1831
482-4858
441-1028
476-0354
476-1743
480-7360
•Alternate
REVISED: 4/29/88
MF04MC:B:11:87:CONNUM:bs
EPR 00279
- 4 -
-------
CONTACT NUMBERS - (continued)
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
*F. R. Newman
*A. p. Johnson
PUBLIC RELATIONS
W. C. Stoltz
*R. A. Wiederstein
CENTRAL COMMAND POST
Phone 1 - 475-0391 or 0485
Phone 2 - 475-0391 or 0485
3630
3607
3748
60-206
60-152
60-105
666-3267
479-4225
431-1988
3606
3696
60-170
60-185
- L, <* ^ *
280-9420
MEDIA ROOM
Phone y - 475-3618
Phone/2 - 475-3619
I ? 7S-J
•Alternate
REVISED 4/29/88
MF04MC:B:ll:87:CONNUM:bs
- 5 -
EPR 00280
-------
IV. PL*N ACTIVATION
A. EMERGENCY REPORTING
1. The plant alarm procedure. Page IV-3, is to be used for
situations that require immediate action and/or plant-wide
alert. This type of emergency includes:
a. Fires and/or medical aid
b. Explosions
c. Hydrocarbon release
d. Hazardous material release
e. Tornadoes
2. For other emergency situations do not sound the alarm but
notify the Emergency Manager immediately. Other
emergencies include:
a. Bomb threats
b. Riots and civil disorder
c. Adjacent industrial emergencies
d. Transportation incidents near plant
e. Floods
f. Hurricanes
g. Acts of war
h. CIMA/CAER alerts
i. PEP alerts
3. All emergency reporting should be as accurate and specific as
possible. Give the nature and exact location of the
emergency. If you receive notification of the emergency by
phone, take the time to gain as much information from the
caller as possible.
4. Under no circumstances are there to be discussions of the
emergency with the news media. Refer all inquiries to
Security for direction to the proper spokesman.
B. BOMB THREATS
1. If the threat is received by phone, get as much information
as possible and fill out the Bomb Threat Information Sheets at
the end of this section.
2. Notify the Emergency Manager and Security immediately. The
Emergency Manager will activate the Traffic Control and
Security groups and alert the Emergency Response Team to
stand by.
MF04MC:C:11:87
REVISED: 05/21/87
EPfl 0028!
-------
B. BOMB THREATS - Continued
3. All personnel should remain 300 feet from the threatened
4. Rad.os and sirens should not be used within 150 feet of the
3r£c .
C. TOTAL PLANT EVACUATION
1. The authority to order total plant evacuation rests with the
Emergency Manager.
2. The signal for total plant evacuation is a continuous blast on
the steam whistle. Notification will also be made through the
emergency radio system.
3. Evacuation and head-count procedures are presented in
Section XIII.
D. AREA EVACUATION
1. The authority to order evacuation of an individual ares rests
with the supervision of that area.
2. Methods of notification are included in the area evacuation
procedures presented in Section XIII.
E. HURRICANES
1. The Emergency Manager will alert the Service Chiefs when a
Hurricane Watch is issued that indicates a threat to Houston
Chemical Complex.
2. Specific functions and duties for hurricane preparation are
presented in the following sections for each service group.
3. Hurricane procedures for each area are presented in Section
^\ III.
F. EMERGENCY CALL-OUT
When deemed necessary, the Emergency Manager will instruct
Security to activate the Emergency Call-Out Procedure. The
procedure and call-out list are shown in Section IX
MF04MC.-C: 11:87
REVIS1D: 0^/21/87
EPR 00282
-------
PLANT ALARM PROCEDURE
1. The sirens are sounded by dialing 5000 on the telephone. Do not hang
up. Stay on the phone until instructed to hang up. Give the exact
location, nature, and degree of the emergency. Personnel ai the main
gate will record the information, instruct the caller to hang up and then
re-dial into the alarm. u-«>/
/ ^
2. Sounding the alarm opens the emergency conference lines. Authorized
personnel can enter this conference. Personnel dialing/into th-
conference should listen only. Do not complicate communications by
talking. A list of personnel authorized to dial into the conference is
shown in the Appendix.
3. In the event of an emergency during a power failure dial Security,
extension 3662 or 3663. Give the exact location, nature, and degree of
the emergency. Security will dial the Boiler House, extension 3831, and
instruct the-operator to sound three short and distinct blasts on the
steam whistle. Security will also notify by the emergency radio
network. These actions will alert the plant that an emergency exists.
Security will access the telephone and give details on the conference.
4. If the phone system, sirens, and/or steam whistle are unusable,
notification will be made with the emergency radio network. Radio
Security and the message will be relayed.
5. The security guard will also transmit the emergency message through
the plant pager system. The message will be repeated three times and
is received by fifteen alert monitors in the Administrate Building.
Everyone carrying a plant pager can also receive these messages by
holding down the receive button after hearing the alarm.
6. When the emergency situation has ended, an all-clear signal will be
sounded. This signal is two long blasts on the steam whistle.
Alternate notification is by the emergency radio system.
FPfl 00283
MF04MC:C:11:87 tr
REVISED: 05/21/87
3
-------
BOMB THREAT • INFORMATION SHEET
TIV.E CALL RECEIVED
TIN'E CALLER HUNG UP
EXACT WORDS OF PERSON PLACING CALL:
QUESTIONS YOU SHOULD ASK CALLER:
1. WHEN IS BOMB SET TO EXPLODE' _
2. WHERE IS THE BOMB LOCATED?
(Exact Location)
3.
4.
5.
WHAT TYPE OF BOMB IS IT?
WHAT DOES IT LOOK LIKE?
DO YOU REPRESENT AMY ORGANIZATION? Yes
5a. (If Yes, Request Name of Organization)
WHY DID YOU PLACE THE BOMB?
No
6.
IF THE CALLER WILL NOT ANSWER THE ABOVE QUESTIONS, INFORM HIM
THAT PEOPLE ARE PRESENTLY IN THAT AREA AND THAT THEY COULD
BE INJURED OR KILLED.
(Caller informed? Yes No )
PERSON (receiving) (monitoring) CALL
GROUP
PHONE NUMBER
HOME ADDRESS
HOME PHONE NO.
DATE
If more space is needed, use back of this sheet.
MF04MC:C: 11:87
REVISED: 05/21/87
EPR 00281
-------
DESCRIPTION OF CALLER'S VOICE
1. Male or female Young, middle age, old
2 Tone of voice (Pitch - high, low or normal) (Accent: foreign, local)
(Quality -• rasping, thin, nasal, speech defect, or lisp, disguised.
muffled)
WRITE DESCRIPTION OF VOICE FROM THE ABOVE SUGGESTIONS:
3. IS VOICE FAMILIAR? IF SO, WHO DID IT SOUND LIKE?
Yes: _ No: _
(SOUNDED LIKE: _ .
4 Background noise (Such as machines running. re=ord P"8*?/' ™d'°
people talking, vehicle traffic, etc.) DESCRIBE BACKGROUND NOISE:
5. WHO WAS THE FIRST PERSON YOU NOTIFIED:
6. DID YOU NOTIFY PLANT SECURITY: Yes No If so, exact
time
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES ARE THE PRESS. RADIO. TELEVISION OR
OTHER NEWS MEDIA TO BE NOTIFIED OR VISITED WITH ON THIS
SUBJECT.
Remarks:
Date: • (Signed)
MF04MC:C: 11:87
REVISED: 05/21/87
EPfl 00285
-------
. • V. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (ERT)
(Fire Brigade and First Aid)
A. ERT ORGANIZATION
Fire Chief: Jesse Berotte Ext 3695
ff icer : ant * «* Supvr . )
Alternate: EMT on Shift or FA Captain on Day.
Emergency Teas Organization
^^^^
o
ccurring .£t.r nor«l working nour.
B. FUNCTIONS ADD ttSMHSUILXTIIS OF CRT
rg.n T
prot.c«on of HI. Sd pro£"4. " "* •'ut«'—": «<»«rd. th.
2. Utlll^tlon of Mnpov.r ln dlr.ctlng flr.
Olr.ct r..cu. .„,, flr.t
4. Request assistance from CIMA.
5. Contact hospital, or ambulance, if chelr service, are required.
6. Activation of Emergency plan..
7. Follow up on status of injured at hospital..
C. PREPAREDNESS
' "
-------
S. There are numerous emergency organizations which may need to be
contacted in an emergency. They can all be contacted by dialing
911.
6. Hospitals (call if needed for injuries):
Humana Southnore 477-0411
Bayshore 944-6666
Pasadena General 473-1771
D. INFORMATION
Organizational Structure.
(For detailed information refer to the Emergency Response Team
manual.)
C:S:10:89 2
•
EPR 00287
-------
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TRAIN CREW »*.nnmi\ FISH 4^.4.23 IM TECH SHOP BOILER HOUSE EN<
13/pS:aa"- •"• !iJ5J&S& sWfflSfBBf1 ,|£™E«#c?N*(*™miwM) as:
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p^"1 j , EE — ' —
-------
VI. COMMUNICATIONS
HCC EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
IN CASE OF EMERGENCY:
A. Turn portable radio to channel 1, use flexar base in control
room; or use a telephone.
B. Call main guard gate (for telephone Ext. 3624).
C. Once in contact, state:
1. Type of emergency
2. Location of emergency
3. Your name
D. Once call is complete, stand by and monitor radio.
NOTE: DO NOT USE RADIOS AGAIN UNLESS CALLED UPON BY
EMERGENCY PERSONNEL.
TO MONITOR AN EMERGENCY:
*A. Turn portable radios to channel 1; or,
B. Depress monitor button pagers; or,
*C. Listen to an flexar base located in all control rooms.
*NOTE; FOR MONITORING PURPOSES ONLY. DO NOT TRANSMIT OVER RADIOS.
COMM-EP:bs
Pfl 002B9
-------
VI. COMMUNICATIONS
ORGANIZATION:
D.
Co™t
Committee:
Hartle
Joe Cochran
Ed Gates
Ken Baldwin
Ext. 3897
Ext. 3776
Ext. 3725
Ext. 3794
H°me Phones 946-0105
Home Phone: 747-6078
Home Phone: 476-5621
Home Phone: 477-2244
Home Phone: 360-6395
B. FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY:
"lth
3. Trains plant personnel on operation of radio systems.
*' Si^S'S ,the P;acement of Qualified personnel to the Central Command
Post to help with emergency communication and technical problems.
5. Has total responsibility for all the emergency communication
equipment in the Central Command Post. communication
C. PREPAREDNESS:
1. Weekly integrity check is made of the emergency radio communicatio,
network. Channel 1. by the main gate security guard. Results are
reported to communications committee. guara. results are
2. Quarterly inspections and integrity check is made of the P. E. P
emergency radio network by the communications committee.
3'
check of Conanand Post and Media Room
4. Daily frequency check of the CIMA (CHANNEL INDUSTRY MUTUAL AID) radio
is performed by* the main gate security.
INFORMATION:
1. P.E.P. and Emergency Radio Network
2. Radio Operating Instructions
COMM-EP:bs
- 1 -
EPR 00290
-------
MOBILE, PORTABLE AND BASE STATION RADIO
A. BASE STATIONS
1. Emergency Repeater. Channel 1
Call Sign KA 55070, Frequency TX 463.6625 MHZ
RX 468.6625 MHZ
Location: Main Shop
2. K-Resin Repeater, Channel 2
Call Sign KA 55070, Frequency TX 463.7125 MHZ
RX 468.7125 MHZ
Location: Reactor Control Room
3. F.F. Plant IV Repeater, Channel 3
Call Sign KA 55070, Frequency TX 463.6125 MHZ
RX 468.6125 MHZ
Location: Reactor Control Room
4. Marlex Solution Form Repeater, Channel 4
Call Sign KA 55070, Frequency TX 463.5125 MHZ
RX 468.5125 MHZ
Location: MDV Control Room
5. P.F. Plant V Repeater, Channel 5
Call Sign KA 55070, Frequency TX 463.3626 MHZ
RX 468.3625 MHZ
Location: Reactor Control Room
6. Polypropylene Plant Repeater, Channel 6
Call Sign KA 55070, Frequency TX 463.5625 MHZ
RX 468.5625 MHZ
Location: Reactor Control Room
7. Developmental Plant Repeater, Channel 7
Call Sign KA 55070, Frequency TX 463.8625 MHZ
RX 468.8625 MHZ
Location: Reactor Control Room
8. Distribution Area Repeater, Channel 8
Call Sign KA 55070, Frequency TX 463.9125 MHZ
RX 468.9125 MHZ
Location: Main Shop
9. Plant 5 Finishing Repeater, Channel 9
Call Sign KA 55070, Frequency TX 463.9875 MHZ
RX 468.9875 MHZ
Location: Plant 5 Black Spec Room
10. Main Shop Repeater, Channel 12
Call Sign KA 55070, Frequency TX 464.0625 MHZ
RX 469.0625 MHZ
Location: Main Shop
- 2 -
EPR 00291
COMM-EPtbs
-------
11. Security System Repeater
Call Sign KA 55070, Frequency TX 463.2125 MHZ
RX 468.2125 MHZ
Location: Main Shop
12 ' ?hJ? c?*nnviJSJUStrial Mutual Aid- (* Channel Scan)
Call Sign KKP982. Frequency 491.8875 MHZ
Location: Main Gate
13. Personnel Paging
Call Sign KFX 636, Frequency 151.835 MHZ
Location: Main Gate
14. Dispatcher Trucking Dept.
Call Sign KKL 321, Frequency 153.320 MHZ
Location: Main Gate
15. Boiler House
Call Sign WZA 672. Frequency 153.125 MHZ
Location: Water Treater Boiler House
16. Dispatcher's Backup to Base Station
Call Sign KKL 321, Frequency 153.320 MHZ
Location: Dispatchers Office
17. Twelve Flexar Radios Located in Processing Units
Radios to be used as emergency radio system backup.
Call Sign KA 55070, Frequency TX 463.6625 MHZ
RX 468.6625 MHZ
Location: K-Resin Reactor Control Room,
Laboratory Supervisor's Office,
Boiler Control Room,
Polypropylene Control Room,
Plant V Control Room,
Plant IV Control Room,
Developmental Control Room,
MDV Control Room.
Safety Office
Transportation,
Pipeline
Main Gate.
18. Centracoa - Central Communications Control Center Remote
Locations Main Gate
Centracom has access to the following radio systems:
A. Plant Emergency System Channel 1, KA 55070
B. K-Resin System Channel 2, KA 55070
C. Plant IV System Channel 3, KA 55070
D. M.D.V. System Channel 4, KA 55070
E. Plant V System Channel 5, KA 55070
F. Polypropylene System Channel 6, KA 55070
G. Developmental System Channel 7, KA 55070
H. Distribution System Channel 8, KA 55070
- 3 -
COMM-EP:bs
EPR 00292
-------
NOTE: All radio systems may be "patched" to each other for communication
between radios responding to different frequencies and between any
telephone in the plant.
Phone Extension to Centracom - 3624
B. Mobile Two Way Radios
1. Two Locomotives
Call Sign KA 21269, Frequency 464.2375
2. Two Fire trucks
Call Sign KG 3460. S-9 Ladder Truck, Frequency 153.320 MHZ, F2
(CDfA). Frequency 154.280 MHZ, Fl
S-10 Old Truck, Frequency 153.320 MHZ, F2
(4 CHANNEL SCAN) KKP 982 S-9 Ladder Truck, Frequency 491.8875 MHZ
3. Emergency Vehicle, 4 Channel Syntor
Call Sign KE 7857. Frequency Fl 154.280 MHZ State CIMA
KKL 321, Frequency F2 153.320 MHZ Dispatcher
KXY 245. Frequency F3 151.625 PEP & Construction
MITREK KKP 982, Frequency 491.8875 MHZ Ship Channel Mutual Aid
4. Trucks and Forklifts, Seventeen Mexar and Five Maxtrax Radios
Call Sign KC 3640, Frequency 153.320 KHZ
C. Portable Two Way Radios
1. Processing Units - Operator and Maintenance Crews
Twelve MX300 Eight Channels, Twenty-Three MX300 Twelve Channels
Thirty-Five Saber.
Call Sign 55070
Location: A) K-Resin Plant - Twelve Radios
B) P.F. Plant IV - Eight Radios
C) P.F. Plant V - Twenty Radios
D) S.F. Plant MDV - Seven Radios
E) P.P. Plant - Eight Radios
F) Developmental - Three Radios
G) Distribution - Twelve Radios
2. Boiler House, Six HT220
Call Sign KS 5447, Frequency 153.125 KHZ
3. Train Crew, Three MX300 Radios, Seven Expos, Ten Sabers
Call Sign 21269, Frequency 464.2375 MHZ
COMM-EP:bs
- 4 -
EPR 00293
-------
4. Engineering Dept. Loop Checkout Crew, Six MX300 Radios (Four
Channel Radios)
Call Sign KA 27519, Frequency 462.200 MHZ
5. Plant Security Guard Crew. Two MX300 Radios (Four Channels).
Three HT-90 Radios (Two Channels)
Call Sign 55070, Frequency TX 463.5125 MHZ
RX 468.5125 MHZ
6. Fire Fighting Crew, Two MX300, Five MX350, Four MX300S,
Three Saber Radios
Call Sign KC 3640 (Plant Frequencies Fl through F12)
D. AVAILABLE OUTSIDE COMMUNICATIONS
1. PEP (PHILLIPS EMERGENCY PROCEDURE) - 151.625 MHZ
Contacts: Sweeny
Transportation
Pipeline
2. Mutual Aid - 154.280 MHZ
Contacts: Hospitals
Fire Dept.
Police Dept.
3. CIMA (CHANNEL INDUSTRIAL MUTUAL AID)
City Wide emergency use.
4. Dedicated telephone lines for power failure
Locat ions: Administration
Scheduler
Utility shift supervisor
Guard gate
Purchasing
Polypropylene
K-Resin
Plant 5
Plant 4
Distribution
E. FREQUENCIES AND ASSIGNMENTS (SEE FOLLOWING PAGE)
COMM-EPibs
- 5 -
EPR 00294
-------
COMM-EP:BS
EPR 00295
CH.
- 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
FREQUENCY
468. 6625-463. 6625
468. 7125-463. 7125
468. 6125-463. 6125
468.5125-463.5125
668.3625-463.3625
468.5625-463-5625
468.8625-463.8625
468.9125-463.9125
468.9875-463.9875
464.0125-464-0125
464.0375-464.0375
469.0625-464.0375
ASSIGNMENTS
EMERGENCY
K-RESIN
PLANT 4
MDV
PLANT 5
POLYPROPYLENE
DEVELOPMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION
PLANT 5 FINISHING
TALK AROUND
TALK AROUND
MAIN SHOPS
FIRE CHIEF SABER RADIOS
CH.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
FREQUENCY
468.6625-463.6625
468.7125-463.7125
468.6125-463.6125
468.5125-463.5125
468.3625-463.3625
468.5625-463.5625
468.2125-463.2125
464.2375-464-2375
468.9125-463.9125
464.2625-464.2625
468.8625-463.8625
469.0625-464.0625
ASSIGNMENTS
EMERGENCY
K-RESIN
PLANT 4
MDV
PLANT 5
POLYPROPYLENE
SECURITY
TRAIN CREW
DISTRIBUTION
TRACK MOBILE
DEVELOPMENTAL
MAIN SHOP
- 6 -
-------
OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS
I. PORTABLE TWO-WAY RADIOS
A. To Make Adjustments and Answer a Call
1. Set frequency switch to desired channel (1 through 12).
2. Hold squelch switch in open private line position as marked by (0).
3" is'Seard*** *quelch contro1 counter clockwise until background noise
4 s^uelSi V°lume contro1 for d«»ired listening level while holding
5. Rotate squelch control clockwise until background noise stops. Do
not adjust any more. Excessive squelch reduces sensitivity and may
prevent reception. * y
*' fervour radio"? ^^ s«u«lch »*itch to receive only calls coded
B. To Make A Call
1. Set frequency switch to desired channel (1 through 12).
2. Hold speaker microphone three inches from mouth.
3. Press push-to-talk switch on side of radio or on the extern..
speaker microphone. «".«ra—
ft. Speak into grill area. When message is completed, release
push-to-talk switch so that other messages may be received.
II. EMERGENCY RADIOS - FLEXAR DESK TOP
*USED ONLY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES.
*
A. To Answer A Call
1. Lift handset off cradle. The message is heard in handset earpiece
and the speaker is off in the radio until the handset is replaced
on cradle.
2. Press transmit switch on handset to answer call.
3. Release transmit switch to listen.
ft. Hang up handset when call is completed.
COMM-EP:bs
fPfl 00296
-------
B. To Make An Emergency Call
1. Lift handset off cradle.
2. Press transmit switch on handset to talk.
3. Ask for Main Gate Security. Once security answers, state
location and brief description of.the emergency.
4. Hang up handset when call is completed.
5. Do not use radios again unless called upon.
C. To Make Adjustments
1. The "Squelch" (receiver sensitivity) can be adjusted by
depressing the "Monitor" button. This takes receiver off
private line operation.
2. Turn "Squelch" control fully counterclockwise.
3. Adjust "Off-Volume" control for desired listening level.
4. Turn "Squelch" control clockwise until noise is eliminated.
5. Momentarily press the transmit button on the handset to switch
radio from monitor mode back to private line operation.
*NOTES:
1. Security will notify appropriate personnel of emergency.
2. During power failure, limit use of radios. Battery back-up will last
approximately 5 hours.
3. In the event that the telephone system is down due to a power
failure, there are nine (9) dedicated phone lines that will be
activated. Contact Main Gate Security via radio for information.
COMM-EP:bs
EPfl 00297
-------
VII. EMPLOYEE WELFARE
A. ORGANIZATION
AttVrnftf^'1 k\A* ^idC . Ext" 3652 Home Phone: 476-4866
Alternate: Scheduler on duty Ext. 3670
B. FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Coordinates the "head count" procedure.
2. Make*_ar/angement$ to notify^employees1 families
3. Provides necessary food, clothing, and shelter. ~
C. PREPAREDNESS -. .- —
1. List of materials for Warehouse to buy or have on hand for any
emergency, which includes hurricane preparations.
2. Maintains accurate records of the names and addresses of
employees.
D. INFORMATION
1. Head Count Procedure
2. Evacuation Checklist
3. Employee Welfare Requirements for a Hurricane
4. Material Requirements for Hurricane Preparation
MF04MC: 0:10:87
REVISED: 05/26/87
EPR 00298
-------
HEAD COUNT PROCEDURE " - /•-"'
• ,-, •'.•-•• ' '
1. SuDcrvisc-s e-e responsible for reporting an accurate head count of
ali personnel to the Scheduler.
2. Contract Supervisors are responsible for reporting their head count
to the Security Guard at the gate through which they entered. The
Security Guard will in turn notify the Scheduler of the status of
contract personnel.
3. The Scheduler will use the Evacuation Checklist on the following
page to record the evacuation procedure. The Scheduler will then
report the status of the head count to the Emergency Manager.
MF04MC:G:10:87
REVISED: 05/26/87
EPfl 00299
-------
EVACUATION CHECKLIST
AREA
K-RESIN
EVACUATION COMPLETE MISSING EMPLOYEES
K-RESIN
DISTRIBUTION
POLYPROPYLENE
POLYPROPYLENE
DISTRIBUTION
MARLEX I t II
MARLEX III & IV
MF04MC:G:10:87
REVISED: 05/26/87
EPR 00300
-------
EVACUATION CHECKLIST
AREA
INCOMPLETE LIST
EVACUATION1 COMPLETE MISSING EMPLOYEES
MARLEX V
POLYETHYLENE
DISTRIBUTIO\
LABORATORY
SHOPS
SHIFT MAINTENANCE
ADMINISTRATION
BUILDING
CONTRACTORS t, VISITORS:
MAIN GATE
NORTH GATE
CONTRACTOR GATE
MF04MC:G:10:87
REVISED: 05/26/87
EPR 00301
-------
EMPLOYEE WELFARE REQUIREMENTS FOR A HURRICANE
J£i! mat%'al and equipment should be secured starting 5 hours prior to
Phase I and ready for delivery at start o* Phase 3.
Utilities Group (Main Shop)
I. Provide meal rations for 10 men for 36 hour period
2. Provide foul weather gear for 10 men
3. Provide flashhghts for 10 men. along with extra batteries.
H^« *r~ * 9,8p°nS °f dr,inkjn9 *ater a** Paper cups at the Boiler
House Control Room, and Loadmg t Storage Control Room.
5. Provide 10 chin straps for safety hats.
Marlex Solution Plant
I. Provide meal rations for 8 men for 36 hour period
2. Provide foul weather gear for 8 men.
3. Provide flashlights for 8 men, along with extra batteries
4. Prov.de 30 gallons of drinking water and paper cups at each of the
following location!: Purification Control Room, Reactor Control Room
em ' M°V C°ntr°' R°°m' and
Shlf<
5. Provide 8 chin straps for safety hats.
Marlex PF Plants III fr IV
I. Provide meal rations for 6 men for 36 hour period
2. Provide foul weather gear for 6 men.
3. Provide flashlights for 6 men, along with extra batteries
Roomde 2° 9a"°nS °f drinki"9 water and paper cups in the Control
5. Provide 6 chin straps for safety hats.
Marlex PF Plant V
I. Provide meal rations for 6 men for 36 hour period
2. Provide foul weather gear for 6 men.
3. Provide flashlights for 6 men, along with extra batteries
de 2° 9a"°nS °f drinkinS water and paper cups 'in the Control
5. Provide 6 chin straps for safety hats.
Personnal Protection and Walfara
The following items must' be provided for HCC personnel during hurricane
weather and will be located at the Main Guard Gate. curing nurncane
1. Water - 40 gallons in portable tank and paper cups
2. Food - 18 meal rations. '
.
3. Foul weather gear (for 12 men).
4. Portable stove - 2.
MF04MC:G:10:87
REVISED: 05/26/87
00302
-------
EMPLOYEE WELFARE REQUIREMENTS FOR A HURRICXvNE
Continued
Personnel Protection and Welfare - Continued
5. Chin straps for safety helmets.
6. Flashlights (for 12 men).
7. One truck with radio.
8. Two shovels.
Polypropylene Plant
I. Provide meal rations for 4 men for 36 hours period.
2. Provide foul weather gear for 4 men. r««tr«i
3. Provide 20 gallons of drinking water and paper cups in the Control
Room.
4. Provide flashlights for 6 men, along with extra batteries.
5. Provide 4 chin straps for safety hats.
K-Resin Plant
I. Provide meal rations for 4 men for 36 hour period.
2. Provide foul weather gear for 4 men. . *w. r««*r«i
3. Provide 20 gallons of drinking water and paper cups in the Control
Room.
4. Provide flashlights for 6 men, along with extra batteries.
5! Provide 4 chin straps for safety hats.
Distribution
1. Provide meal rations for 7 people for 36 hour period.
2 Provide foul weather gear for 7 people.
3. Provide flashlights for 7 people, along with extra batteries.
4. Provide 10 gals of drinking water and paper cups.
5. Provide 7 chin straps for safety hats.
MF04MC:G: 10:87
REVISED: 05/26/87
6 EPfl 00303
-------
MATERIAL FOR WAREHOUSE TO BUY OR HAVE ON HAND FOR
HURRICANE PREPARATIONS
1. Flash lights - 2 ce!! and hand lanterns (46 light)
2. Batteries for flash lights and lanterns (960 batteries)
3. Rain Suits for 30 people
4. 10 Pairs Boots
5. Masking tape 3/4" (240 rolls)
6. Sash cord, 1/4 I 3/8 (5,000 feet)
7. Poly-Rope, 1/4 & 3/8, 600 feet each (5,000 feet)
8. Plastic sheeting - 4 mil, 20 rolls
9. 20' x 20' canvas tarps (10)
10. Wood, chocks for drums and outside material storage (150)
11. Coleman stoves W/oven (2)
12. Fuel for Coleman stoves (2 gallons)
13. Paper plates, cups, plastic knives, forks, spoons (250 each)
14. Bottled water • 30 1/gal. size
15. Two 96 quart size Igloo Ice Chest
16. Six 3 gal. Igloo Water Coolers
17. Dry ice for food (150 pounds)
18. Portable pump for receiving pump (6 pumps)
19. Fuel for portable pump (15 gallons)
20. Chin straps for hard hats (50)
21. Food per HCC attached requisition
MF04MC:G:10:87 EPR 0 0 3 0
REVISED: 05/26/87
-------
MATERIAL TOR WARFMOUl D OR HAVE ON HAND
fOR HIIRRICANF PREPARATIONS
O
tn
TORN MR- IE
DATE
MATIRIAL RFOUISIIION
PHILLIPS fifi COMPANY
A SUBSIDI ARY_OF_ »I LI. I PS_PF 1ROI FHM CO.
VlNnOR^IIXAS MAR INL JkJNi)._SUPPLY_VI NDOR
Aiminss-r.o. i»ox 3? in ADIIRISS
" nous f ONillx 7 iv?.?
N0.._
P. O. NO.
PAP.
f.'.T
"" v I
INVOU.I
SALESMAN
PHONF
IISFD I OR -_
(JIY.
OHOIRlO
D/.
cAsrs
CASI S
CASI S
CASF
LOAVf S
CAM S
CASIS
CASI
CASI
CAsr
CASIS
CAsr s
? CASIS
1r> CAR IONS
3 CASIS
2 CASIS
6 CASIS
?
?
1
70
7.
16
1
I
t
?
CAsr
CASI
CASI
CASIS
CASIS
SALESMAN. _.
DA 11 10 ACC.I.
PHONE ___ .
PREPARATION
~" "VI NDOR
Rl C' 0. NO
.cos,.c,NMR-Anoor,o wo f. ..... ---
"T»l SCR I PI I ON" of MA I f RI Al
lll|If
TV DINNIRS
MlXI D JIIICF
SPAM
VIINNA SAUSAGES
CRACKFRS
RRI Al)
MlXII) COOKirS
COID OR INKS
ORANGI S
APPl I S
1OMAIOFS
PFACIII S
I RIM I COCKTAIL
PORK fr m ANS
MIX(D CIC.AHI IUS
coirir
prANin nufHR
SOUP (? CASI S
vr err ARIL * mrr.
? CASES mil, ?
CASIS CMICKFN)
HFAVV KNIVIS - PIASIIC
IIIAVY FORKS - PI AMU;
IIIAVY SPOONS - PIASIIC
IIIAVY PAPIR PI AIIS
IIIAVY SMAII MOWIS
NONI
(, CASI S ON HAND NOW
NONI
NllNI
NONI
NONI
NONI
NUN I.
NONF
NONF
NUN I
I CASr ON HAND NOW
1 CASI ON HANI) NOW
Nom
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RrqOIRIO_OAT.r_.
API-IIOVM) MY:
ORlr.lNAIOIC
DM IVIR 10:
HI vi si i):
-------
VIM. EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORTATION
A. ORGANIZATION
£' ?' £asbVSmith Ext. 3826 Home Phone
N. J. Breton Ext. 3785 Home Phone 473-5752
B. FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
t^D^Vt^ln^I t*C Emer9encV ^nager, assembles .11 available
transportation at a strategic point outside the danger zone.
Coordinate and controls all transportation requirements except
those vehicles designated « fire brigade equipment.
'«ekmob,l-. •*• « -quired
2.
4. Provide transportation for movement of injured
•:— .__, otner required equipment.
5. Provide fuel to the emergency area as needed.
6' Ir7 d?seru7tSed!n9erS '" *** *"*"* ^^ method$ of communication
?' endid1."816 C'eanUP W0rk after the emergency conditions have
C. PREPAREDNESS
1. Coordinates cleanup work prior to a hurricane.
2. Maintains adequate fuel level in all fuel tanks.
avai"bility of "
D. INFORMATION
1. Location of mobile equipment during a hurricane.
2. Location of portable air compressors requiring diesel fuel.
3. Location of fire pumps requiring gasoline.
4. Location of portable power plants.
MF04MC:N:10:88
REVISED: 03/31/88
EPR 00306
-------
LOCATION OF MOBILE EQUIPMENT DURING HURRICANE
1. Bulldozer - North Zone Guard Gate
2. Mobile Cranes - Trucking Quarters
3. Forklifts • Trucking Quarters
4. Tractors - Trucking Quarters
5. Welding Machines • Main Shop Bid.
6. Locomotives - Moved to High Ground (South)
Radio Trucks
7. S-13 • Mam Shops Bldg.
8. S-3 - West Door Boiler House
9. S-14 - Carpenter Shop Pick-up Mam Gate
10. S-16 - Boiler House (Tail lift)
11. Conventainer-Dumpster, - Carpenter Shop
Other Trucks
12. Both Winch Trucks t Fuel Truck - Mam Whse.
13. P & T, G.M., Inst., Elect., - Parked in Shops Main Shops Bldg
14. Maintenance - Supt. Pick-up
15. Carpenter - Shop Pick-up
16. Painter - Shop Pick-up
MF04MC:N:10:87
REVISED: 05/26/87
EPfl 00307
-------
LOCATION OF PORTABLE AIR COMPRESSORS
THAT REQUIRES DIESEL FUEL
1. Two (2) air compressors at south end. Road 3 at Plant V
2. Two (2) air compressors on Road 5 Marlex
3. One (1) air compressor at Polypropylene Plant south of two large
propylene feed tank.
A. One (1) air compressor east side of *1 Boiler at Main Boiler House.
5. One (1) or possible two (2) air compressors at Paint Shop.
6. One (1) or possible two (2) air compressors on Road 3 Marlex by the
Joy compressor.
LOCATION OF FIRE PUMPS & PORTABLE
POWER UNITS THAT REQUIRE GASOLINE
1. One (1) fire pump at Polypropylene Plant Cooling Tower (increase to
two diesel pumps after September 1987).
2. One (1) fire pump west of Plant 3, Between Road 1 and Jefferson street
fence.
3. Two (2) fire pumps at Safety office with one (1) gas tank (decrease to
one diesel after September 1987).
POWER PLANTS
1. One (1) Power Plant at Main Guard Gate, gasoline tank on south-east
side.
2. One (1) Power Plant will be located at Boiler House.
MF04MC:N: 10:87
REVISED: 05/26/87
EPR 00308
-------
IX. TRAFFIC CONTROL AND SECURITY
A. ORGANIZATION
Service Chief: B. E. Ward Ext. 3850 Home Phone: 447-1831
Alternate: Guard Lt. (Kisla) Ext. 3815 Home Phone: 482-4858
Alternate: L. F. Hess Ext. 3653 Home Phone: 441-1028
B. FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Secures gates and limits entry to authorized persons having
emergency passes. Managers, Superintendents, Service Chiefs,
Alternates, and all Emergency Team Members shall be issued
emergency passes. Any personnel having to enter without an
emergency pass must be cleared through the Central Command
Post.
2. Contacts local police and notifies Central Command Post so that
road blocks and traffic control measures can be taken to maintain
access to plant entrances.
3. Receives visitors, particularly representatives of news media,
and has them escorted to the proper location (Upstairs at
Recreation Center, or -alternate location: Administration
Building).
4. Takes all incoming calls from media and directs them to the
company spokesman. If spokesman is not available at that time,
asks them to call back at a later time. (NOTE: This pertains
only to calls from the media dealing with the emergency at hand.)
The switchboard operation will follow this same procedure.
5. By direction of Emergency Manager, initiates call out list by
most feasible method at the time of emergency. Reports back to
Emergency Manager, all personnel who could not be contacted.
6. Responsible for notifying the Safety Department and Control Rooms
about emergency in the event of alarm failure. Use radio system
or phone.
7. Responsible for procedure on emergency messages utilizing plant
pagers.
8. Responsible for emergency evacuation of Administration Building,
utilizing Alert Monitors.
9. Responsible for control of staging area during a total plant
evacuation.
I
REVISED: 10/23/87
MF04MC:H: 10:87
1
EPR 00309
-------
C. PREPAREDNESS
1. Weekly Security will conduct a radio check of all emergency
radios.
2. Weekly check o? Administration Alert Monitors.
D. INFORMATION
1. Procedure for Fire Control Messages utilizing plant pagers and
emergency evacuation of Administration Building, utilizing Alert
Monitors.
2. Call out list.
3. Emergency radio weekly check procedure.
REVISED: 05/26/87
MF04MC:H: 10:87
EPR 00310
-------
PROCEDURE FOR FIRE CONTROL MESSAGES UTILIZING PLANT
PAGERS AND EMERGENCY EVACUATION OF ADMINISTRATION
-BUILDING UTILIZING ALERT MONITORS
A. EQUIPMENT
1. Fifteen alert monitors located at key areas in Administration
building. Each monitor is a radio receiver with identical pag-
ing codes (221) and assigned to operate on emergency radio
frequency, channel 1, 463.6625 MHZ.
2. A Modem paging encoder located in the Centracom at mam gate.
B. EMERGENCY PROCEDURE
1. Fire alarm sounds.
2. Security guard at main gate receives emergency message by dialing
proper number on plant phone.
3 Guard selects emergency radio channel 1, 463.6625 MHZ, and the
paging base, 151.835 MHZ, by holding down the "Green" button on
MCM and selecting both base stations.
4. The alert monitor paging code "21" is dialed on the paging
encoder in the Centracom panel and the button "P" is depressed.
5. Red light turns on in the paging encoder. Red light means paging
tones are being transmitted through the emergency radio base
station to the alert monitors. The alert monitors are turned ON
by the paging tones.
6 While the red light is on in the paging encoder, the microphone
is muted (out of service). Do not transmit messages until the
red light is out.
7 After the red light turns off, depress the transmit button on the
Centracom. Transmit the emergency message three times with a
five second delay between each message. Keep the transmit button
depressed from start of first message to end of third message.
Alert monitors have auto reset and will turn off five to seven
seconds after the transmit button is released.
8 Everyone carrying a plant pager will receive emergency messages
from the security guard by holding the pagers push-to-talk button
down after hearing the fire alarm.
9 Immediately after the message has been given, the red "Take-
Over" button is locked in for the plant pager system. This
prevents anyone from using the system other than Security.
REVISED: 05/26/87
MF04MC:H:16:87
3 EPfl 0031 I
-------
CALL-OUT LIST
*
*
*
*
*
*
Berotte. J.
Bridgeford, R. E.
Digman, D. P.
Dominiak, J. J.
Parrel, Warren
Gates, O. E.
Henson, L. W.
Hess, L. F.
Hickman, C. R.
Jeide, L. A.
Knott, J. E.
Kuper, D. G
Lewis, R. C.
Merchlinsky, E. A
Moore, K. N.
Mosley, A. J.
Newman, F. R.
O'Connor, M. K.
Price, D. W.
Rich, T. J.
Ryel, J. L.
Shurtz, G. L.
Schmitz, S.
Sperry, D. L.
Stewart, J. D.
Vaden, J. H.
Walls, J. M.
Ward, B. E.
Wiederstein, R. A.
Williams, A. M.
Zellers, D. A.
328-8440
474-4529
333-1680
360-5771
331-3415
Pager:
549-0016
477-2244
476-5247
441-1028
472-8647
476-4886
476-0354
480-2371
280-8240
864-4533
326-4073
280-8044
479-4225
666-3267
485-7799
480-8758
326-1428
334-1425
532-1663
486-7220
996-7770
480-6667
496-0105
447-1831
280-9420
930-9370
280-8495
Car Radio
Sta. 113
LT. G. J. KISLA-ISSC SECURITY 482-4858
* Service Chiefs
REVISED: 03/31/88
MF04MC:H:10:88
EPfl 00312
-------
EMERGENCY RADIO WEEKLY CHECK PROCEDURE • KA 55070
A. Every Monday morning, the integrity of the plant-wide emergency
radio system will be checked from the Centracom radio base at the
Main Gate and Phillips Emergency Control Center (PEP) in
Recreation Building.
B. All ten field units will report in to the emergency base station.
C. A weekly radio log will be maintained at Main Gate in order to
detect possible radio malfunctions in the field. Failure of
field units to report in to the main base will be logged.
D. All radio units are powered by 110 volt A.C. with battery backup.
Communications can be maintained between emergency radios for an
eight hour period during a plant-wide power failure.
E. Power to all emergency radios will be left in the on position at
all times.
F. Operating instructions for the radios are posted at each site
location.
G. The emergency radio will be used only for emergency situations
such as loss of plant telephone system, plant power failures and
plant disasters.
H. All portable radios can communicate with the emergency radio
system in the channel one (1) position.
I. When the Modat alarms and displays a distress signal code.
Security will immediately call the control area from which the
distress signal originated as evidenced by the digital code
number and informs the personnel in the area that someone is
injured or disabled. The distress signal code will continue to
be transmitted at a fixed interval after being keyed until the
circuit is reset. This is done by momentarily turning off the
portable radio concerned.
REVISED: 05/26/87
MF04MC:H:10:87
EPfl 00313
-------
X. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SERVICE GROUP
A. ORGANIZATION
Service Chief: M. K. O'Connor Ext. 3630 Home Phone: 666-3267
Alternates: F. R. Newman Ext. 3607 Home Phone: 479-4225
O. E. Gates Ext. 3725 Home Phone: 477-2244
Group Activated at the request of Emergency Manager or his delegate.
B. FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITY
1. Initiates steps to detect- and assess special chemical, radio-
logical and biological hazards, including, necessary measures to
decontaminate personnel and equipment and the environment.
Upon notification that an emergency exists, the Service Chief or
alternate will report to the Emergency Manager at the Central
Command Post. After determining if hazardous materials are
involved, e plan to minimize losses will be worked out.
Necessary testing will be done to define the hazard potentially
and to assist efforts to restore safe conditions.
2. Reports all findings and recommendations to the Central Command
Post.
C, PREPAREDNESS
1. A reference book of hazardous materials used at Houston Chemical
Complex will be kept by each member of the Hazardous Materials
Group. The reference book will include location of radioactive
chemical devices by type and plant area, along with potentially
hazardous materials which may originate from emergencies at
neighboring plants as well as our own facilities.
2. Members of the Service Group will maintain information on nuclear
radiation fall out and procedures for decontamination of person-
nel and equipment. The Radiation Control officer should be
consulted to ensure all necessary procedures and reports are
accomplished.
3. For potential environmental contamination the Environmental
Engineer should be consulted to ensure all necessary procedures
end reports are accomplished. (See XIII E.)
MF04MC:I:11:88
REVISED: 03/31/88
EPfl 00311
-------
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS (Continued)
D. SUMMARY OF SPILL PROCEDURES
1. Unit operations personnel will attempt to minimize the spill by
shutting off the source, transferring material, etc.
2. Where possible, the spill wilt be contained in a small area
through the use of dikes, berms, sorbent material, etc. Be aware
of the potential for fires or explosions!
3. Spills which cannot be adequately contained should be preferably
directed to the concrete drainage ditches leading to the
skimmers. If this is not possible, spills should be directed to
the waste water ponds.
4. If contract services are required to clean up a spill, the
purchaser (on-call) should be contacted to get the necessary
equipment to the plant. The area supervisor or Hazardous
Materials Service Chief (for a major emergency) should inform the
purchaser of *hat is needed and a Requisition number.
5. The environmental engineer should be consulted to ensure that all
necessary procedures and reports have been accomplished.
MF04MC:I:11:87
REVISED: 05/22/£7
EPfl 00315
-------
XI. ENGINEERING
A. ORGANIZATION
Service Chief: J. E. Knott Ext. 3804 Home Phone 476-0354
Alternate: M. O. Hog an Ext. 3803 Home Phone 476-1743
S. J. Hietpas Ext. 3710 Home Phone 480-7360
B. FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Responsible for maintaining and restoring buildings, equipment,
power and utilities if damaged or disrupted.
2. Provide on-the-$cene emergency lighting.
3. Responsible for isolating damaged sections of pipelines, electrical
lines, and other utilities or service to restore operations.
Coordinate these actions with operating supervision of plant
involved.
C. PREPAREDNESS
1. Make sure emergency lighting equipment is on hand or is readily
available.
2. Maintain established lines of communication with H.L.tP., Phillips
Pipeline, etc.
MF04MC:Q:10:87
REVISED: 05/26/87
EPR 00316
-------
XII. PUBLIC RELATIONS
A. ORGANIZATION
Service Chief. C. T. Levctt Ext. 3506 Home Phone 325-1125
Alternate: R. A. Wiederstein Ext. 3596 Home Phone 280-9420
During times of an emergency, all public relations will be handled by
the Service Chief or his alternate.
B. FUNCTION AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The Public Relations Service Group will be activated only by the
Emergency Manager or his selected alternate.
2. Serve as spokesman during the emergency and coordinate activities
with the Emergency Manager and Corporate Public Relations in
Bartlesville.*
3. Set up a news media room upstairs in the Recreation Building or in
the Administration Building (Conference Room A-4), if the
Recreation Building is damaged or destroyed. All media should be
directed to the location where telephones will be made available. A
log of all media entering the news room should be maintained.
4. Select technical advisors, as needed, to provide technical
information during interviews.
5. As soon as possible issue a statement about the incident. The
statement should be coordinated with the Emergency Manager and,
if possible, Corporate Public Relations.
6. At the earliest opportunity determine when and where camer?s will
be allowed in the area.
7. As follow-up, the spokesman must recontact all media who express-
ed interest in the incident.
C. PREPAREDNESS
1. The Public Relations Service Chief will have responsibility for
familiarizing himself with the Emergency Procedures Manual and
particularly his role as spokesman.
2. The Emergency Manager will have the responsibility for any special
training necessary to handle the news media.
D. INFORMATION
1. Statements to the media should deal only with:
a. What happened (fire, explosion, bomb threat, etc.).
b. When it happened (time, date, etc.).
c. Where it happened (location in the facility).
MF04MC:J: 11:87
REVISED: 05/22/87
1
EPR 00317
-------
D. INFORMATION - Continued
d. The presence or absence of any continuing threat to life or
property in the surrounding area.
e. Brief, non-technical explanation about the function of the
damaged area.
f. Injured or dead, if any. (NOTE: Proper notification of next
of kin must be made before giving such information-
coordination with local police and fire officials and public
relations in Bartlesville is crucial.)
2. Photographs, TV, Film
The Public Relations spokesman with assistance from security
personnel and the Plant Manager, will determine when and where
cameras will be allowed in the damaged area. A predetermined
route will be selected and security personnel will guide photo-
graphers and cameramen. It will be necessary for the official
spokesman to accompany them. The following criteria should be
used in allowing filming at the accident site:
a. If it is completely safe to permit them to go near the accident;
b. Proper safety procedures and protective equipment are used
(i.e., helmets);
c. All cameramen are escorted by authorized personnel to and
from the accident site;
d. No classified or proprietary equipment are photographed; and
e. It does not violate any company policy.
* Corporate Public Realations Contacts
(Area Code 918) Home Office
Bill Adams 333-9657 661-5224
Dan Harrison 745-6638 661-5204
Steve Milburn 333-9559 661-4987
Jere Smith 333-3870 661-4982
MF04MC:J: 11:87
REVISED: 05/22/87
2
EPfl OQ31B
-------
XIII. PLANT PREPAREDNESS
A. PLANT PROCEDURES
Each area is responsible for developing and maintaining procedures for
an orderly transition from normal to emergency conditions. These
procedures should include shut-down sequences, methods for isolation
of equipment, critical valves, breakers, etc. The procedures are to be
directed toward the "immediate action" to be taken by employees in the
affected area. The action of these people in the first few minutes of an
emergency is often the difference in an "incident" and a "disaster".
B. FIRE EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE
1. Fire Alarm - Safety Department shall test alarm system on Monday
at 0800 hours during normal work days.
2. Fire Trucks - Quarterly maintenance checks and service are the
responsibility of the Safety Department.
3. Fire Pumps - Fire pumps will be started and checked weekly by
the Operating Group in the area where they are located. An
annual performance test will be conducted by Safety.
4. Fire Hydrants and Monitors - The fire hydrants and monitors shall
receive an annual maintenance check by the assigned plant or
area, a record maintained thereof and copies routed to the Safety
Department.
No one is allowed to use a hydrant for any reason other than an
emergency situation without approval by the Safety Department or
permission of the Manager of the area or his designate.
5. Fire Extinguisher - Shall be inspected monthly by area supervisors
or their designees. An annual maintenance check shall be done by
an outside firm under direction of the Safety Department. For
repairs or recharge notify the Safety Department.
6. Sprinkler System - It will be the responsibility of the individual
plants to keep the sprinkler systems in satisfactory condition.
The sprinkler system will be checked annually by an outside firm
and a record maintained. The sprinklers will be used only in the
event of emergency. If any of the sprinkler systems are tripped
or shut off for any reason, the superintendent of plant involved
must be notified immediately so that the system can be reset.
Service: Grinned Fire Protection
8600 Howard Drive
Houston, Texas 77071
713/644-8872
Rt, 1SED: 06/08/87
EPH 00319
-------
B. FIRE EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE - Continued
7. Fire Hose and Hose Carts - Shall be tested annually by Safety and
marked with the date of test.
8. Self Contained Breathing Apparatus - W.ll be inspected monthly by
area supervision or their designee. An annual maintenance check
will be made by the Safety Department and records kept at the
Safety Office.
9. Fire Extinguisher Recharge Service - Call Safety Department for
service. Typical suppliers are:
Groda Fire & Safety
1013 San Jacmto
P. O. Box 866 - 713-470-8348
LaPorte, Texas 77571
Computer Room Halon System (Recharge/Inspection)
Texas Fire Technology
5721 Heffernan
Houston, Texas 770E7
713-6-53-2075
C. EVACUATION PROCEDURES
1. Total Plant Evacuation
a. The signal for total plant evacuation will be one continuous
blast on the steam whistle followed by a call through the
emergency radio system. (Back up will be through the
telephone system.)
(1) The staging area for Phillips' employees will be the field
north of the main gate unless notified otherwise.
(2) The staging area for contractors and other non-plant
personnel will be the security gate through which they
entered. Contract supervisors are responsible for
reporting their head count to the security guard. In
turn the security guard will notify the scheduler of any
contractors not reporting to the gate. Supervision in
each area of the plant has the responsibility of notifying
contractors and visitors to evacuate.
/
b. Supervisors are responsible for reporting an accurate head
count of all personnel to the Scheduler (3670, 3671).
c. The Scheduler will use the evacuation checklist and report
evacuation proceedings to the Emergency Manager.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
EPR 00320
-------
D. HURRICANE PROCEDURES
General Information - A hurricane is defined as a severe circular
movement of wind which reaches a velocity of 75 mph for a period
of five minutes "or more", usually accompanied by heavy rains and
lightning. Hurricane season on the Gulf of Mexico starts June 1
and continues until November 1. Weather services furnish
information on hurricanes from the time a storm spawns until
dissipation.
Hurricane Advisory • These advisories give eye of storm location,
size of storm, wind velocity, and direction of movement. The
frequency of advisories depends on severity and landfall
probability.
Hurricane Watch - Issued when the storm movement indicates
landfall in a given area but still well offshore.
Hurricane Warning - Issued when the storm is approaching land
and considered a definite threat to a specific area.
2. Hurricane Preparedness • Plant Inspections
All facilities at Houston Chemical Complex will be insoected in the
first week of each month during hurricane season. The inspection
will be conducted jointly by the following personnel:
(1) Area Safety/Training Representative
(2) Operating Superintendent
(3) Maintenance Superintendent
The inspection procedure will be repeated immediately upon
notification of a Hurricane Watch that includes Houston Chemical
Complex.
3. Hurricane Plan Activation
Houston Chemical Complex uses the "Time Phase" system for
activating hurricane action plans. The Time Phases are as follows:
Phase 1 Wind velocity 12 to 18 MPH - 8 to 10 hours from plant.
Phase 2 Wind velocity 19 to 24 MPH - 6 to 8 hours from plant.
Phase 3 Wind velocity 25 to 31 MPH - A to 6 hours from plant.
Phase 4 Wind velocity 32 to 38 MPH - 2 to 4 hours from plant.
Phase 5 Wind velocity 39 to 46 MPH - 0 to 3 hours from plant.
Upon notification of a "Hurricane Watch", the Emergency Manager
will alert the Service Chiefs and the operating areas. The storm
path and approach will be monitored and the operating areas
informed as to which time phase is in effect. Authority to
shutdown and secure the plant rests with the Emergency Manager.
Factors such as size, speed, direction of approach, wind velocity,
probability of high tides, and flooding will be considered in making
this decision.
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
EPH 0032Y
-------
D. HURRICANE PROCEDURES - Continued
4. Hurricane Procedures
Each aree vuJJ maintain written procedures for an orderly
transition to emergency conditions during a hurricane. These
procedures vull be updated annuaUy in April, and *iH include
preparation, securing, and shutdown of the plant, if necessary.
Certain premises and procedures apply to all areas as follows.
a. It will be assumed that during a hurricane, electrical power
will not be available. Natural gas, steam, nitrogen, inert
gas, fire and sanitary water, ethylene, and propylene will be
available in limited quantities.
b. All loose material such as ladders, lumber, drums, etc.
should be tied down with a 3/8" or larger sash cord. Empty
drums and excess material should be placed by roads to be
hauled off. (Contact Equipment and Transportation Service
Chief). Must be completed prior to Phase 1.
c. All windovss and doors should be closed and secured. All
glass sections, if not of the reinforced type, should be cross
taped with 2" masking tape. The tape is to be applied to the
inside of the glass on two-foot centers running at an angle.
The emergency organization also has specific duties for
hurricane preparation. These functions are included in the
appropriate service group section of the manual.
MF04MC:K: 10.87
REVISED: 06/08/87
EPR 00322
-------
MARLEX PLANT II AREA EVACUATION
(IB SHOP ALSO)
PURPOSE:
To c'jt:.-ie spec-'.c procedures for the safe and orderly evacuation of Plant II
in ar. eT.erce~icy .
1. The authority to order an evacuation of Plant II rests vMth the Shift
Supervisor Responsibilities may be delegated.
2. Notify the Safety Office on day shift and the Main Guard Gate on off
shifts. Include details of emergency. Inform all levels of Polyethylene
Management.
3. The order to evacuate Plant II \sill be communicated by plant. Three
short blasts on the emergency sir horn and ''or by radio and 'or
telephone.
4. AM personnel in the area shall proceed north to a safe location along
Avenue "D* near hopper car vsash.
5. An accurate head count of all personnel shall be taken by the Shift
Supervisor
6. If plant evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of the Main
Guard Gate or as instructed by supervisor.
7. No one shall return to Plant II or the IB Shop, unless instructed b\
their supervisor.
..
It
Btr *
MFWMCrK: 11:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
i !
\
o
N
n
H
It
V,
EPH 00323
-------
PERSONNEL COUNT FOR EVACUATION OF PLANT II
POSITION-
MANAGER
SECRETARY
OPERATIONS SUPERINTENDENT
OPERATIONS SUPERVISORS
TRAINING SUPERVISOR
OPERATORS (32)
SR. PROCESS ENGINEER
PROCESS ENGINEER
MAINTENANCE SUPERINTENDENT
MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORS
INSTRUMENT t ELEC. SUPERVISORS
PLANNERS
CRAFTSMEN-
MECHANICAL ENGINEER
ELECTRICAL ENGINEER
INSTRUMENT ENGINEER
*NOTE: MAINTENANCE t OPERATION SUPERVISORS ARE RESPONSIBLE
FOR REPORTING THEIR HEAD COUNT TO THE OPERATIONS
SHIFT SUPERVISOR, SUPERINTENDENT, OR MANAGER
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
EPR 00324
-------
PLANT II HURRICANE PROCEDURES
CONTROL CENTER
SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S OFFICE
Shutdown of the Marlex Plant II will be determined by the Emergency Manager.
The following sequence will be used to effect an orderly shutdown of the plant
and place in standby condition:
1. Follow the general procedures for securing doors, taping of windows, and
removal or tie-down of loose material.
2. Emergency Manager will notify Sweeny of time we will start down. Notify
Shift Dispatcher if ethylene is shutdown. AC-491-2206 or 2236.
3. Either hold "off-going" Shift Supervisor or call out "on-coming" Shift
Supervisor, whichever is most expedient.
4. Flush hydrocarbon and process sewers with water and check to see that
they are flowing properly.
5. Check out all emergency lighting.
Reactor Area
Cut catalyst feed out of reactors and proceed with normal reactor shutdown.
Make sure all spargers in reactors are thoroughly flushed during shutdown so
plant can be started back up after hurricane with minimum difficulties. When
solids in secondaries have dropped below 0.5°0, shut out solvent feed to
reactor. Leave reactor full of solvent with a normal operating level in
primary and secondary flash tanks.
Purification Area
1. As ethylene and solvent flows through plant, decrease feed and proceed
with normal shutdown of both areas.
2. Check to be sure sweet gas pressure maintenance is available.
3. Fuel Atlas Copco I Check Battery
Centrifuge Area
Continue to operate as long as feed is received. However, leave about 3 ft.
of liquid in stripper feed tank. When feed stops, proceed with normal
shutdown of solvent removal area and place in standby condition.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
tPfl 00325
-------
PLANTS II HURRICANE PROCEDURES - Continued
MDV
Continue to operate as long as feed is received. Then start dilutmc
concentrators down. a
Manpower Requirements
One Shift Supervisor
Necessary Operating Crew
As equipment is shutdown and made secure. Shift Supervisor will release
operators that are not needed.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
8
EPR 00326
-------
MARLEX PLANT IV AREA AND GENERAL EVACUATION
PURPOSE.: Tc o_ti'ne specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacua-
tion cf Plant IV personnel in an emergency.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of Plants IV rests with the Manager,
Superintendent, or Shift Supervisor. Responsibilities may be delegated.
2. Notify the Safety Office on day shifts and the Main Guard Gate on off
shifts. Include details of emergency. Inform all levels of Polyethylene
Management.
3. The order to evacuate will be communicated with three (3) long blasts on
the plant air horn. "
4. As instructed by the supervisor, activate the necessary process kill
systems and shut doxs n and secure all systems.
5. Operating o Maintenance personnel shall assemble at the west end of the
PolyethyTene Office area (between tanks 318 and 320).
6. If total ple~t -evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of the
Mam Guard Gate, or as instructed by supervisor.
7. An accurate head count of all personnel shall be taken by the
Superintendent or Shift Supervisor.
8. No one shall return to Plant IV unless instructed by their supervisor.
v:-
^
p.t.
PL--4-
T~r
CAT.
-i^cg
MF04MC:K: 11:87
REVISED: 06/08/S'
EPR 0032?
-------
MARLEX PLANT CATALYST ACTIVATOR AND ENGR.
TRAILER AREA AND GENERAL EVACUATION
PURPOSE: To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacua-
tion to Marlex Catalyst Activator personnel in an emergency.
1 . The authority to order an evacuation of Catalyst Activator rests with the
Manager, Superintendent, or Shift Supervisor. Responsibilities may be
delegated.
2. Notify the Safety Office on day shifts and the Main Guard Gate on off
shifts. Include details of emergency. Inform all levels of Polyethylene
Management.
2. The order to evacuate x\ill be communicated with three (3) long blasts on
the plant air horn.
4. As instructed by the supervisor, shut dov.n and secure area.
5. Operating £• Maintenance personnel shall assemble at the west end of the
Polyethylene Office area (between tanks 320 and 31c).
6. If total plant evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of the
Main Guard Gate, or as instructed by supervisor.
7. An accurate head count of all personnel shall be taken of all personnel
by the Superintendent or Shift Supervisor.
8. No one shall return to Catalyst Activator or PE Trailer unless instructed
by their supervisor.
322
OOP O O
1C" >''- ~—*- 4
-• ' "JLt.K^.-Z-
*_r-haAr-Zj ^
J-" trtfr-
p.p.
MF04MC:K: 11:87
REVISED: 05/08/87
EPfl 00328
PL"-4-
TC f, M I,
c- •••-=•
10
-------
MARLEX POLYETHYLENE OFFICE EVACUATION!
PURPOSE: To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacua-
tion of FE Office personnel in an emergency.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of PE Office rests with the Manager,
Superintendent, or Shift Supervisor. Responsibilities may be delegated.
2. Notify the Safety Office on day shifts and the Main Guard Gate on off
shifts. Include details of emergency. Inform ail levels of Polyethylene
Management .
3. The order to evacuate will be communicated with three (3) long blasts on
the plant air horn .
Secure as instructed by the supervisor.
PE Office personnel shall assemble at the west end of the Polyethylene
Office area (between tanks 318 and 320).
If total plant evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of trie
N'.ain Guard Gste. or as instructed by supervisor.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
An accurate heed count of all personnel is to be made by the N'enecer,
Superintendent or Shift Supervisor.
No one. shall return to the PE Office area unless instructed by the -
supervisor.
o o o o o ^.,,^_
R
1 I
T~- - I y " T«s f> ( 1 I I
z:.-^^r.^^cyi Y
MF04.MC:K: 11:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
11
EPfl 00329
-------
MARLEX PLANT DEVELOPMENTAL REACTOR,
ERU t IRU AREA AND GENERAL EVACUATION
PURPOSE: To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacua-
tion of Plant Developmental Reactor personnel in an emergency.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of Plant Developmental Reactor rests
with the Manager, Superintendent, or Shift Supervisor. Responsibilities
may be delegated.
2. Notify the Safety Office on day shifts and the Main Guard Gate on off
shifts. Include details of emergency. Inform all levels of Polyethylene
Management.
The order to evacuate will be communicated with three (3) long blasts on
the plant air horn.
4. As instructed by the supervisor, activate process kill systems and shut
down and secure area.
5. Operating personnel shall assemble at the west end of the Polyethylene
Office area (between tanks 318 and 320).
6. If total plant evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of the
Main Guard Gate, or as instructed by supervisor.
7. An accurate head count of all personnel is to be made by the Manager,
Superintendent or Shift Supervisor.
8. No one shall return to the Developmental Reactor area unless instructed
by their supervisor.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
12
EPR 00330
-------
MARLEX PLANT V FINISHING
AREA, 1A SHOP AND GENERAL EVACUATION
PURPOSE: To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacua-
tion of Plant V personnel in an emergency.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of Plant V Finishing and 1A Shop
rests with the Manager, Superintendent, or Shift Supervisor.
Responsibilities may be delegated.
2. Notify the Safety Office on day shifts and the Main Guard Gate on off
shifts. Include details of emergency. Inform all levels of Polyethylene
Management.
3. The order to evacuate will be communicated with three (3) long blasts on
tne plant air horn.
4. As instructed by the supervisor, shut down all extruders, FCM and secure
area.
5. Operating personnel shall assemble at the west end of the Polyethylene
Office area (between tanks 320 and 322).
6.
7.
8.
9.
Maintenance personnel shall assemble at the south end of fluff storage
tanks.
If total plant evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of the
Main Guard Gate, or as instructed by supervisor.
An accurate head count of all personnel is to be made by the Manager,
Superintendent or Shift Supervisor.
No one shall return to the Plant V Finishing area or 1A Shop unless
instructed by their supervisor.
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tfrCMMC:K: 11:87
Kil VISED: 06/08/87
13
IPB
-------
MARLEX PLANT V REACTOR AREA
AND GENERAL EVACUATION
PURPOSE: To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacua-
tion of Plant V personnel in an emergency.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of Plant V reactors rests with the
Manager, Superintendent, or Shift Supervisor. Responsibilities may be
delegated.
2. Notify the Safety Office on day shifts and the Main Guard Gate on off
shifts. Include details of emergency. Inform all levels of Polyethylene
Management.
3. The order to evacuate will be communicated with three (3) long blasts on
the plant air horn.
4. As instructed by the supervisor, activate process kill systems and shut
down and secure area.
5. Operating personnel shall assemble at the west end of the Polyethylene
Office area (between tanks 320 and 322).
6. If total plant evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of the
Main Guard Gate, or as instructed by supervisor.
7. An accurate head count of all personnel is to -be made by the Manager,
Superintendent or Shift Supervisor.
8. No one shall return to the Plant V reactor area unless instructed by
their supervisor.
MF04MC:K:11:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
EPB 00332
14
-------
POLYETHYLENE PLANTS III, V IV DEV.
REACTOR HURRICANE PROCEDURES
CONTROL CENTER
SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S OFFICE
The following sequence will be used for an orderly shutdown, if determined
necessary by the Emergency Manager, and to place equipment in standby con-
dition. .
1. Follow the general procedures for securing doors, taping of windows, and
removal or tie-down of loose material.
2. Stop catalyst addition and kill reactors and dilute as soon as possible.
3. FCM extruder will be shut down and placed in standby condition.
4. Check gasoline tank on fire pump. Have filled if needed. Must be
completed prior to Phase I.
5. All catalyst tote bins are to be tied together (3 or 4) and tied to a
pipe support or store compounding building. XPF drums also to be
secured.
6. All fluff storage tanks should be checked and hatches or covers made-
secure, prior to Phase 3.
7. Notify Shift Dispatcher if ethylene is shut down' - AC409-491-2206 or 2236
(Home Phone).
Manpower Requirements
One Shift Supervisor
Necessary Operating Crew
As equipment is shut down and made secure, Shift Supervisor will release
operators that are not needed.
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
1 d
EPR 0033?
-------
POLYETHYLENE PLANT V HURRICANE PROCEDURE
CONTROL CENTER
SHIFT SUPERVISOR OFFICE
The following sequence will be used for an orderly shutdown, if determined
necessary by the Emergency Manager, and to place equipment in standby con-
dition.
1. Follow the general procedures for securing doors, taping of windows, and
removal or tie-down of loose material.
2. Stop catalyst addition and kill reactors and dilute as soon as possible.
3. FCM extruders will be shut down and placed in standby condition.
4. Shift Supervisor will request that feedstock storage tanks are filled to
adequate levels. Must be completed prior to Phase 1. Leave room to dump
reactors in the recycle isobutane tanks if necessary.
5. All fluff storage tanks should be checked and hatches or covers made
secure prior to Phase 3.
6. Check out and fuel up portable air compressor.
7. Notify Shift Dispatcher if ethylene is shut down - AC409-491-2206 or 2236
(Home Phone)
Manpower Requirements
Two Shift Supervisors
Necessary Operating Crew
As equipment is shut down and made secure, Shift Supervisor will release
operators that are not needed.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
16 EPB 0033M
-------
PERSONNEL COUNT FOR EVACUATION OF PLANTS III & IV
ERU, IRU & DEVELOPMENTAL REACTOR
POSITION
MANAGER
SECRETARY
OPERATIONS SUPERINTENDENT
TRAINING SUPERVISOR
OPERATIONS SUPERVISORS
REACTOR OPERATORS (32)
FINISHING OPERATORS
SR. PROCESS ENGINEER
PROCESS ENGINEER
MAINTENANCE SUPERINTENDENT
MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORS
INSTRUMENT & ELEC. SUPERVISORS
PLANNERS
MECHANICAL ENGINEER
ELECTRICAL ENGINEER
INSTRUMENT ENGINEER
SAFETY & TRAINING REPRESENTATIVE
SAFETY & TRAINING REPRESENTATIVE
NOTE: SUPERINTENDENT AND OR SUPERVISORS ARE RESPONSIBLE
FOR REPORTING THEIR HEAD COUNT TO THE OPERATIONS SHIFT
SUPERVISOR, SUPERINTENDENT, OR MANAGER.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
17 EPB 00335
-------
PERSONNEL COUNT FOR EVACUATION OF PLANT V
POSITION
MANAGER
SECRETARY
OPERATIONS SUPERINTENDENT
TRAINING SUPERVISOR
OPERATIONS SUPERVISORS
REACTOR OPERATORS (76)
FINISHING OPERATORS
SR. PROCESS ENGINEER
PROCESS ENGINEERS
GENERAL MAINT. t PLANNING SUPT.
MAINTENANCE SUPERINTENDENT
MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORS
INSTRUMENT t ELEC. SUPERVISORS
PLANNERS
MECHANICAL ENGINEER
ELECTRICAL ENGINEER
INSTRUMENT ENGINEER
LAB TESTER (1)
SAFETY & TRAINING REPRESENTATIVE
NOTE: SUPERINTENDENT AND OR SUPERVISORS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR
REPORTING THEIR HEAD COUNT TO THE OPERATIONS SHIFT SUPERVISOR,
SUPERINTENDENT, OR MANAGER.
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
18
EPR 00336
-------
POLYPROPYLENE EVACUATION
PURPOSE:To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacuation
of the Polypropylene Plant in an emergency.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of the Polypropylene Plant rests
with the Shift Supervisor. Responsibilities may be delegated.
2. Notify the Safety Office on day shift and Main Guard Gate on off shifts.
Include details of emergency. Inform all levels of Polypropylene
Management.
3. The order to evacuate shall be communicated via the plant Terryphone
System and/or in person.
4. If instructed by the supervisor, activate process kill systems.
5. All personnel shall leave the area through the nearest safe exit.
Proceed to the parking/storage lot south of Fish office building (1).
6. An accurate head count shall be taken of all personnel by the Shift
Supervisor.
7. If plant evacuation is necessary, exit using the Construction Guard Gate
or as instructed by Supervisor (2).
8. No one shall return to the Polypropylene Plant unless instructed by their
Supervisor.
\
N
MF04MC:K: 11:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
EPR 0033?
19
-------
PERSONNEL COUNT
POSITION
MANAGER
SECRETARY
OPERATIONS SUPERINTENDENT
TRAINING SUPERVISOR
REACTOR OPERATORS
FINISHING OPERATORS
SR. PRODUCTION ENGINEER
PRODUCTION ENGINEER
PRODUCTION ENGINEER
MAINTENANCE SUPERINTENDENT
MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR
INSTRUMENT t ELEC. SUPERVISOR
PLANNER
CRAFTSMEN
MECHANICAL ENGINEER
ELECTRICAL ENGINEER
INSTRUMENT ENGINEER
*NOTE: SUPERVISORS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR REPORTING THEIR
HEAD COUNT TO THE OPERATIONS SHIFT SUPERVISOR.
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
20
EPR 0033B
-------
POLYPROPYLENE PLANT HURRICANE PROCEDURE
CONTROL CENTER
SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S OFFICE
The following sequence will be used for an orderly shutdown, of the Plant as
determined necessary by the Emergency Manager, and to place in standby
condition.
1. Follow the general procedures for securing doors, taping of windows, and
removal or tie-down of loose material.
2 Stop catalyst addition to loop reactors, dilute as rapidly as possible.
In the event of electrical power failure, automatic kill system will be
activated.
3 Continue to extrude feed as long as it is available. Follow normal
shutdown procedure and place all equipment in standby condition.
A. Shift Supervisor will request that both propylene storage tanks are
filled. To be completed prior to Phase I.
5. Check level in fuel tank for fire pumps, have filled if necessary. To be
completed prior to Phase I.
6 Check level in portable air compressor diesel fuel tank, have filled if
necessary. Start compressor and run for duration of storm or hurricane
watch.
7. Block off two H.P.N2 bottles from process for reserve.
Manpower Requirements
One Shift Supervisor
Two Chief Operators
Two No. 1 Operators
As equipment is shut down and made secure, Shift Supervisor will release
operators that are not needed.
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
21 EPfl 00339
-------
K-RESIN PLANT EVACUATION
PURPOSE: To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacua-
tion of the K-Resin Plant in an emergency.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of the K-Resin Plant rests
with the Shift Supervisor. Responsibilities may be delegated.
2. On day shift, notify the Safety office (3696) and Security (3662) and on
off shifts notify Security only.
3. The order to evacuate the K-Resin Plant will be communicated by sounding
a continuous blast on the emergency air horn.
4. If instructed by the supervisor, stop making batches and shut down
extruders.
5. All personnel in the area shall assemble at the K-Resin Office Building.
6. If plant evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of the Main
Guard Gate or as instructed by supervisor.
7. An accurate head count of all personnel shall be taken by the Shift
Supervisor.
8. No one shall return to the K-Resin Plant unless instructed by their
supervisor.
9. Inform all levels of K-Resin Management.
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MF04MC:K: 11:87
REVISED. 06/08/87
22
EPfl 00310
-------
PERSONNEL COUNT FOR EVACUATION OF K-RESIN
POSITION
MANAGER
SECRETARY
OPERATIONS/MAINT. SUPERINTENDENT
SAFETY TRAINING REPRESENTATIVE
OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR 1
OPERATORS 7
ENGINEER SPECIALIST
PRODUCTION ENGINEER
PRODUCTION ENGINEER
PRODUCTION ENGINEER
MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR-
INSTRUMENT t ELECT. SUPERVISOR
PLANNER
CRAFTSMEN 11 Normally on
days only
MECHANICAL ENGINEER
MECHANICAL ENGINEER
INSTRUMENT t ELECT. ENGINEER
*NOTE: MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR REPORTING
THEIR HEAD COUNT TO THE OPERATIONS SHIFT SUPERVISOR.
£i ISED: 06/08/87
23
-------
K-RESIN HURRICANE PROCEDURE
CONTROL CENTER
SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S OFFICE
The following sequence will be used for an orderly shutdown, and to place
equipment in standby condition, if determined necessary by the Hurricane
Control Committee.
1. Follow the general procedures for securing doors, taping of windows, and
removal or tie-down of loose material.
2. If possible, fill feedstock storage tanks to adequate level. Check
storage tank hatches or covers, secure those necessary.
3. After word of shutdown do not begin processing any new batches in
reactors. Shut down Neohexene in an orderly fashion.
4. After last batch has been dumped, proceed with normal shutdown of
purification area. This includes the butadiene column, the solvent
column, the styrene drying beds and the reject stripper. All these
items must be placed in standby condition.
5. Pull down levels in both feed tanks, if possible, and proceed with normal
shutdown of Finishing.
6. Have all K-Resin Distribution tanks as full of pellets as possible.
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
One Shift Supervisor
Two Chief Operators
Normal Operating Crew
As equipment is shut down and made secure, Shift Supervisor will release
operators that are not needed.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: OB/08/87
24
EPfl 00342
-------
MARLEX POLYETHYLENE DISTRIBUTION EVACUATION .
PURPOSE: To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacua-
tion of Marlex Distribution in an emergency.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of Marlex Distribution rests with
the Shift Supervisor. Responsibilities may be delegated.
2. The Shift Supervisor notifies the Safety Office on day shift and the Main
Guard Gate on off shifts. Include details of emergency. Inform all
levels of Distribution Management.
3. The order to evacuate will be communicated via the Terryphone system/
plant telephones and/or in person.
4. The Supervisor shall advise the operating groups of all Polyethylene
Plants about the evacuation, so any changes can be made in their
processes.
5. If instructed by the supervisor, shut down all equipment.
6. All personnel in Marlex Distribution shall leave by the nearest safe exit
and proceed immediately to the front of the Distribution Office along
Jefferson Street or as directed by supervision depending on wind
direction.
7. If plant evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of the Main
Guard Gate area or as instructed by the supervisor (depending on wind
direction).
8. An accurate head count of all personnel shall be taken by the Shift
Supervisor or supervisor in charge. All personnel should stay together
until a head count has been obtained.
9. No one shall return to Marlex Distribution or leave the premises unless
instructed by their supervisor.
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
25
EPR 00343
-------
r-ULYHKUHYLENE DISTRIBUTION EVACUATION
PURPOSE: To outline specific procedures for-the safe and orderly evacua-
tion of Polypropylene Distribution in an emergency.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of Polypropylene Distribution rests
with the Shift Supervisor. Responsibilities may be delegated.
2. The Shift Supervisor notifies the Safety Office on day shift and the Main
Guard Gate on off shifts. Include details of emergency. Inform all
levels of Distribution and Polypropylene Management.
3. The order to evacuate Polypropylene Distribution will be communicated
person to person.
4. If instructed by the supervisor, shut down all equipment.
5. All personnel in Polypropylene Distribution will leave via the nearest
safe exit and proceed immediately to the Carpenter's Shop or the North
East Construction Gate (due to wind direction) as directed by
supervision.
6. If total plant evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of the
Main Guard Gate or as instructed by the supervisor (depending on wind
direction).
7. An accurate head count of all personnel shall be taken by the Shift
Supervisor or supervisor in charge. All personnel should stay together
until a head count has been obtained.
8. No one shall return to Polypropylene Distribution or leave the premises
unless instructed by their supervisor.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
26
EPR 00344
-------
K-RESIN DISTRIBUTION EVACUATION
PURPOSE: To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacua-
tion of K-Resin Distribution in an emergency.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of K-Resin Distribution rests with
the Shift Supervisor. Responsibilities may be delegated.
2. The shift supervisor notifies the Safety Office on day shift and the Main
Guard Gate on off shifts. Include details of the emergency. Inform all
levels of Distribution and K-Resin Management.
3. The order to evacuate K-Resin Distribution will be communicated from
person to person.
4. If instructed by supervisor, shut down all equipment.
5. All personnel in K-Resin Distribution will leave by way of the nearest
safe exit and proceed immediately to the front of the K-Resin office
building.
6. If total plant evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of the
Main Guard Gate or as instructed by the supervisor (depending on wind
direction).
7. An accurate head count of all personnel shall be taken by the Shift
Supervisor or supervisor in charge. All personnel should stay together
until a head count has been obtained.
8. No one shall return to K-Resin Distribution or leave the premises unless
instructed by their supervisor.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
27
EPR 00345
-------
PERSONNEL HEAD COUNT FOR DISTRIBUTION
POSITION
MANAGER
SUPERINTENDENT - ENGINEER
SAFETY/TRAINING REP.
OPERATIONS SHIFT SUPV. 1 of 4
MECHANICAL ENGINEER
MAINTENANCE SUPVS.
PLANNER
SHIPPING CLERKS
OPERATORS SHIFT (INCLUDES PP, KR) 21-22
MAINTENANCE DAYS 9
OPERATOR DAYS 5
HYDROCARBON UNLOADER DAYS 1
YARDMASTER
LOCOMOTIVE CREW DAYS/EVENINGS 3 each Shift
LOCOMOTIVE CREW THURSDAYS 6 on Days
NOTE: SUPERINTENDENT AND OR SUPERVISORS ARE RESPONSIBLE
FOR REPORTING THEIR HEAD COUNT TO THE OPERATIONS SHIFT
SUPERVISOR, SUPERINTENDENT, OR MANAGER.
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
28
EPfl 003H6
-------
DISTRIBUTION HURRICANE PROCEDURE
POLYETHYLENE, POLYPROPYLENE fc K-RESIN PACKAGING
PLANTS, CAR PREPARATION CENTER
CONTROL CENTER - POLYETHYLENE SHIFT SUPT. OFFICE
Shutdown of packaging and loading will be initiated as determined necessary by
Emergency Manager, sometime during Phase 3. Also material movement and
security will be started.
The following sequence will be started after receiving directions from the
Emergency Manager:
1. Follow the general procedures for securing doors, taping of windows, and
removal or tie-down of loose material.
2. Move empty pallets inside warehouse and stack against doors.
3. Secure all tank filters with several wing nuts.
A. Oil drums and LPG bottles should be tied down or moved inside. Tie down
loading hoses and flexible hoses, or move inside.
5. Loose boards and material, secure or move inside.
6. Be sure each piece of mobile machinery and trucks have full fuel tanks
and ready to run.
7. Obtain portable air compressor from the transportation garage. Check
fuel.
8. Close and secure all doors to warehouse and buildings .
9. Close all hatches and move all Hopper Cars from low storage tracks in B&D
area up to high trackage on hill. Pump air on all cars then set hand
brake on top car.
10. Fill Hopper Car Tanks
Fill Bagging Tanks
Cover the Sackmatic's in all Areas
11. Tie down all pallets stored outside. Check all areas.
12. Shift Supervisor will release employees not required as soon as foregoing
are completed. Standby crew during hurricane shall be as follows:
PE B/S PP B/S K-RESIN B/S
1 Shift Supervisor 1 Chief Operator 1 Chief Operator
1 Chief Operator 1 No. 1 Operator 1 No. 2 Operator
1 No. 1 Operator
F=\ -ED: 06/08/87
29
EPR 00317
-------
LABORATORY EVACUATION
PURPOSE: To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacua-
tion of the laboratory in an emergency.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of the Laboratory rests with the
Q. A. Superintendent, Safety and Training Representative, and Quality
Control Supervisor. Responsibility may be delegated.
2. Notify the Safety Office on day shift and Main Guard Gate on off shifts.
Include details of the emergency. Inform Laboratory Management.
3. Individuals shall leave by the nearest safe exit and assemble at the east
side of the Administration Building. Remain there for further
instructions.
A. If total plant evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of the
Main Guard Gate or as instructed by supervisor.
5. The Shift Supervisor shall inspect the Laboratory for personnel. An
accurate head count shall be taken by the Shift Supervisor.
6. No one shall return to the Laboratory unless instructed by their
supervisor.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
30
EPfl 00318
-------
PERSONNEL COUNT FOR EVACUATION OF LABORATORY
POSITION
MANAGER
QUALITY ASSURANCE SUPERIN-
TENDENT
CLERK
A SHIFT SUPERVISORS 1 Per Shift
28 SHIFT TESTERS 7 Per Shift
QUALITY ASSURANCE ENGINEER
CHEMISTS
TECHNICIANS
DAY TESTERS
Rheologist
Technical Service Chemist
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
31
EPB 00349
-------
LABORATORY HURRICANE PROCEDURE
The participation of the laboratory personnel in a hurricane alert shall be
directed by the Emergency Manager or a person designated by him to assume
those particular duties in case of a hurricane. If the hurricane is not
severe enough to warrant shutting down the plants, reasonable precautions will
be taken to prevent storm damage. If it is severe enough to warrant shutting
down the plants, the complete plan described below should be followed.
The following list of items covers most of the necessary precautions that need
to be taken for the entire Central Laboratory:
1. Follow the general procedures for securing doors, taping of windows, and
removal or tie-down of loose material. Sand bag front doors.
2. Bottom file cabinet drawers in all offices should be emptied and contents
stacked on desk tops.
3. Remove all analytical balances into Room 107 or stockroom. Turn off
power to all analytical equipment.
4. Cover all instruments x-ray spectrometer, and calculators with P. E. film
or other water-proof cover.
5. Move all trash cans and any other small outside items into Lab or outside
storage house.
6. Shortly before leaving the Main Lab, the air conditioning units are to be
turned off. This can be done by Lab personnel, using switch panels on
west side of compressors.
7. Be sure the floor drains in the West Test Room and in the south air
conditioner room are securely plugged.
8. Tie down "drummed" chemicals.
9. Turn off the main water and gas valves into the Lab.
10. Before leaving the Lab, all electrical switches should be turned off at
the panel in the south utility room and in the stockroom.
11. The person in charge will notify the Emergency Manager and report work
completed and request further instructions. At this time the Lab
personnel will eitheir be assigned to another area or leave the plant.
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
32
EPfl 00350
-------
LABORATORY HURRICANE PROCEDURE - Continued
12. After the storm has passed, as many Lab personnel as considered
necessary wilf be called back to the Lab for clean-up work and getting
the vital equipment ready to go.
13. Before any clean-up work is done, a careful survey of the Lab damage
must be made for insurance purposes. It is likely that this cannot be
done entirely by Lab personnel. However, they will be called upon to
assist.
14. As soon as possible, turn the 2 pick-up trucks over to Central Services
and Engineering Department for hurricane protection work.
MF:-4MC:K:10:87
RE 5ED: 06/08/87
33
EPR 00351
-------
EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN
CENTRAL SHOPS BUILDING, WAREHOUSE & OFFICE
PURPOSE:To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacuation
of the shops building, warehouse and office.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of the buildings rests with the
Central Services Supt. during normal work hours, and with the Utilities
Shift Supervisor at all other times. Responsibilities may be delegated.
2. Activate the HCC fire alarm by dialing 701 on the nearest plant phone.
Repeat as much detail of the emergency as can safely be done before
hanging up the phone.
The order to evacuate the building will be communicated by intermittent
long blasts on the compressed gas horns and over the warehouse intercom
system.
4. If instructed by the supervisor, all shop equipment will be shut down.
5. All personnel in the building will leave via the nearest safe exit and
will proceed immediately to the supervisors parking lot, north across the
road from the Central Shops building.
6. If total plant evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of the
main guard gate or as instructed by the supervisor.
7. An accurate head count of all personnel shall be taken by the supervisor
of each area.
8. No one shall return to the building unless instructed by their
supervisor.
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
34
EPfl 00352
-------
PERSONNEL COUNT FOR EVACUATION OF SHOPS BUILDING
MAINTENANCE IMPROVEMENT ENGINEER (1)
CHIEF ELECTRICAL ENGINEER (1)
SENIOR MAINT SYSTEMS ENGINEER (1)
WAREHOUSE PURCHASING SUPT. (1)
SUPERVISORS (2)
BUYERS (3)
SENIOR INVENTORY
CONTROL ANALYST (1)
CLERKS (4)
STOREKEEPERS (11)
CENTRAL SERVICE/UTILITIES SUPT. (1)
SUPERVISORS (5)
CRAFTSMEN - (30)
CLERKS (2)
PLANNERS (2)
SAFETY TRAINING REP. (D
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
35
EPfl 00253
-------
EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN
TRUCKING, TECHNICIAN BUILDING
CARPENTER & PAINT SHOPS
PURPOSE: To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacuation
of the technician and shops area in an emergency.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of the area rests with the Central
Services Superintendent during normal working hours, and with the
Utilities Shift Supervisor at all other times. Responsibilities may be
delegated.
2. Activate the Houston Chemical Complex fire alarm by dialing 701 on the
nearest plant phone. Repeat as much detail of the emergency as can
safely be done before hanging up phone.
3. The order to evacuate the area will be communicated by radio, telephone,
and/or in person.
4. All personnel in the area shall proceed northwest to the supervisor's
parking lot north of the Main Shop Building.
5. If total plant evacuation becomes necessary, proceed to the field north
of the Main Guard Gate, or as instructed by supervisor.
6. An accurate head count of all personnel shall be taken by the supervisor
of each area.
7. No one shall return to the area unless instructed by their supervisor.
MF04MC:K: 10:87
RFVISED: 06/08/87
36
0035M
-------
PERSONNEL COUNT FOR EVACUATION OF TRUCKING
TECHNICIAN BUILDING CARP. &> PAINT SHOP
POSITION
CHIEF INSTRUMENT ENGINEER (1)
CHIEF INSTRUMENT TECHNOLOGIST (2)
CONTROL SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS (10)
SUPERVISOR (1)
CRAFTSMEN (6)
CRANE OPERATORS H.E.O.'s & L.E.O.'s (8)
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/57
37 EPH 00355
-------
BOILER HOUSE AREA EVACUATION
PURPOSE: To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly evacua-
tion of Boiler House Area personnel in an emergency.
1. The authority to order an evacuation of the Boiler House rests with the
Manager, Superintendent, or Shift Supervisor. Responsibilities may be
delegated.
2. Activate the HCC fire alarm by dialing 701 on the nearest plant phone,
repeat as much detail of the emergency as can safely be done before
hanging up the phone.
3. The order to evacuate the Boiler House will be communicated by radio,
telephone, and/or in person.
4. As instructed by the supervisor, activate Boiler House shutdown systems.
5. All personnel in the area shall proceed west to a safe location along
plant personnel parking lot and toward Main Guard Gate.
6. If total plant evacuation is necessary, proceed to the field north of the
Main Guard Gate, or as instructed by supervisor.
7. An accurate head count of all personnel shall be taken by the
Superintendent or Shift Supervisor.
8. No one shall return to the Boiler House unless instructed by their
supervisor.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
38
EPfl 00356
-------
MAINTENANCE HURRICANE PROCEDURE
CONTROL CENTER - MAIN SHOPS BUILDING
Hurricane Coordination
The following personnel will coordinate the overall effort of Maintenance
in providing manpower, materials and equipment as needed for an orderly
clean-up, shut down and securing of Houston Chemical Complex for a
hurricane. All hurricane activities by the Maintenance Division will be
directed through the group listed below and coordinated through the
Utilities Shift Supervisor.
Emergency Supervisor.
Area Hurricane Coordinator.
Utilities Shift Supervisors
Office, Main Shops Building
Area Planning &
Scheduling Supervisors
Headquarters - Main
Shops Building after
securing their areas.
This group, with the guidance of the Emergency Manager, provide detail
SMP's for each zone so that all phases of hurricane preparation can be
carried out in an orderly manner. They will, as far as possible, have the
necessary tools, hose heaters, etc., to wash up, dry out, and place
equipment back in service following the hurricane.
MAINTENANCE HURRICANE PROCEDURE
The Maintenance Groups will furnish the manpower and equipment necessary to
secure the plants and yard area at Houston Chemical Complex. In addition
to securing the plants prior to a hurricane, the Maintenance Groups will
maintain a standby crew of all crafts necessary to make emergency repairs
during the storm. After receiving notification that the hurricane will
strike, all area manpower, after completion of area assignments, will
report to Central Shops for assignments.
Maintenance Responsibility During the Hurricane Season
1. Give priority and attention to keeping portable pumps in good running
condition. Suction hoses and strainers should be kept in good shape.
Pumps should be secured from Automotive Maintenance Center (475-0326
or 475-2775) prior to Phase I.
2. Check windshield wipers and headlights on all vehicles, especially on
all trucks. This will lighten load on Auto Mechanics when hurricane
alert is given.
3. See that large doors on buildings can be closed and secured without
too much trouble.
4. Make arrangements to have "first" call to rent portable generators and
portable water pumps (all gasoline engine driven) as set forth in this
manual. Automotive Maintenance Center 475-0326 or 475-2775. See list
for pumps and generators.
M-04MC:K:10:87
Rl.'ISED: 06/08/87
39
EPfl 00357
-------
5. Pay particular attention to policing the general yard area, removing and
storing loose material. Tie down any materials that might blow or roll
if impossible .to. move.
6. In general, it will be the Maintenance Department's responsibility to
keep work that would have to be done at the last minute at an absolute
minimum.
7. See that all mobile trailers are securely anchored.
8. Warehouse to have "foul" weather gear setup.
Maintenance Responsibilities When Hurricane Alert is Received
Call out crews necessary to place plants in standby condition. Call out
will be necessary only if alert is given on a night shift or a weekend.
Utilities Shift Supervisor's office will be used to assemble crews.-
Set up an Emergency Operation Center in Maintenance Scheduler's Office to
direct maintenance activities. All trucks will be dispatched from
Truck Supervisor's office and extra maintenance men will wait in Main
Shops Building for direction.
3. Orders from Terminal and Operations groups will be received at Emergency
Operation Center, and the necessary crafts will be dispatched.
4. Remove all loose material in and around the substations. To be completed
prior to Phase 1.
5. Upon instructions from the Hurricane Control Committee, all electrical
power will be cut off from the North Zone and South Zone. See list for
electrical power to disconnect and equipment to remove.
6. After power has been cut off, tag all breakers.
7. Check and test emergency generators. This includes the portable
generators secured from Automotive Maintenance Center.
8. Locate all portable pumps, test run them and make necessary repairs.
Locate all suction and discharge hoses.
9. The Tool Room should check rain coats, boots and rain suits.
10. Check bucket trucks for operation condition and locate all skip buckets.
11. Painters should see that their air compressors are fueled, pulled into
Paint Shop, check rjn and notify the garage of any repairs needed.
12. Painters should unload their skip buckets to make them available for
general use.
13. The garage will immediately give high priority to checking bulldozers and
payloaders.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
40
| 0035B
-------
14. An adequate supply of gasoline and diesel fuel should be put in portable
tanks, cans, or drums so the generators and pumps can be serviced.
Keep in mind, that the electricity may be off. Prior to flooding, plug
vents in gasoline tanks at garage.
15. All trucks and vehicles should be filled completely full of fuel just
prior to the time the high winds hit.
16. Install stakes on Jefferson Street where high water crosses road.
17. After the plants are in safe standby condition, or 2 hours before the
ttorm strikes (whichever is first), the maintenance crews will be
dismissed. The standby crew will remain in the Shops Building and the
Services Superintendent will report to the Control Center at the Main
Guard Gate.
: 10:87
87
41
-------
UTILITIES HURRICANE PROCEDURE
CONTROL CENTER
SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S OFFICE
BOILER HOUSE
It will take about 12 hours to shut the plant down to a standby condition in
an orderly manner.
General
1. Follow the general procedures for securing doors, taping of windows, and
removal or tie-down of loose material.
2. Emergency Manager will notify Phillips Gas Dept. dispatcher of time we
will start down and how much gas we will need during shutdown.
Boiler House
1. The 55,000 barrel water storage tank should be completely filled.
2. Operator will start Continental and Chrysler fire pumps (changed to
diesel after September 1987) and check them out. See that plenty of fuel
is on hand. Should fuel be needed during storm notify the Emergency
Manager phone 3662, 3663, 3865. Must be completed prior to Phase 1.
3. Set a portable air compressor at Boiler House and have it filled and
hooked up.
4. The windows of Boiler House are to be protected with masking tape.
5. Cover electric motor on deaerator feed pump - Boiler House.
6. Boilers will be operated as per instructions from Hurricane Control
Committee.
7. Check to see that motor valve on fire and sanitary water to bearing water
tank is working and is holding level.
8. Operate Water Treater in normal manner.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
42 EPR00360
-------
UTILITIES HURRICANE PROCEDURE - Continued
10. Provide portable.water pump for wind tunnels at boilers.
Manpower Requirements
.Two No. 1 Operators
Boiler House
T.nn.n.l.i.J.W.T One Chief Op.r..or
Propane Refrigeration and Storage
The following measures should be completed prior to Phase 1.
1. Tie down all loose material and oil drums.
•C:K:10:87
•D: 06/08/87
00361
-------
HYDROCARBON LOADING AND UNLOADING FACILITIES
TERMINAL OPERATIONS
CONTROL CENTER
General
1. Follow the general procedures for securing doors, taping of windows, and
removal or tie-down of loose material.
2. Move railroad cars to high ground rail spurs.
Dock Area
The following measures should be completed prior to Phase 1.
1. Remove or tie down all loose material from Berth 9 to Berth 4 including
Ethyl Oil unloading, Styrene unloading.
2. Tie-down loading arms at Berth 7. Tie to bollards and to top of bumper
rails.
3. Recommend to Leasors they should secure loose material and prepare for
hurricane.
ELECTRICAL NORTH ZONE HURRICANE PROCEDURE
Phase 1 of hurricane watch disconnect power from the following area:
1. Tag and remove to storage the fire pumps motors in dock area.
2. Sub 2 and 3. Disconnect at HV Sub 2A by propane storage.
In the event of unusual high tides before Phase 1, the above procedures would
be initiated immediately.
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
44
EPR 00362
-------
SAN JACINTO WATER TREATER HURRICANE PROCEDURE
CONTROL CENTER • BOILER HOUSE SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S OFFICE
The Water Treater will be run until the Emergency Manager gives notice that
the plant will be shut down.
The following steps should be taken in the sequence outlined below in shutting
the plant down, if advised to do so.
1. Follow the general procedures for securing doors, taping of windows, and
removal or tie-down of loose material.
2. The Emergency Manager will call Shell operator on direct line telephone
and advise that the Water Treater is being shut down.
3. The Emergency Manager will call the City of Houston Water Plant, Phone
424-1822, 424-1821 or 424-2312 and advise that the plant is being shut
down.
4. Shut down all pumps and block in. Close all motor valves, holding all
filters and clear well at standby levels so that they will be ready to
put back on stream at a moment's notice.
5. Close off valves on all chlorine and shut down chlorinators.
6. Throw all breakers to pump motors, fans, agitators, etc., to the "OFF"
position.
Emergency generator should be ordered and in place for Phase 1. Diesel
fuel preferred - 300 KW, Phase 3, 440 V, rated at 452 amps.
MFC-'MC:K:10:87
RE'- ~ED: 06/08/87
45
E P R 00363
-------
ADMINISTRATION BUILDING EVACUATION
EMPLOYEES WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THE PROPER ACTION TO BE TAKEN
THROUGH THE EMERGENCY SPEAKER SYSTEM AND BY PHONE. STAY IN
THE BUILDING AWAY FROM WINDOWS AND DOORS UNTIL NOTIFIED OTHER-
WISE.
*NOTE: THIS REFERS TO PLANT EMERGENCIES ONLY.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
46
EPR 00364
-------
ADMINISTRATION BUILDING EVACUATION
PURPOSE: To outline specific procedures for the safe and orderly
evacuation of the Administration Building.
1. The authority to order an evacuation rests with the Administration
Coordinator.
2. Notify the Safety Office and the Main Guard Gate. Include details of the
emergency.
3. The order to evacuate the building for plant emergencies will be
communicated by the emergency alert monitors and person-to-person.
4. Special consideration may be given to Marketing, Marketing and
Manufacturing and Computing, if conditions permit.
5. In the event the fire alarm system is activated either automatically or
by hand then all personnel shall evacuate by the predetermined exits and
move to assembly areas.
6. An accurate head count of all personnel shall be taken by the area floor
leaders.
7. The assembly area coordinator will accumulate data on personnel count and
report to the Administration Coordinator or Emergency Response Team.
8. No one shall return to the Administration Building until instructed by
the Administration Coordinator.
Terminology such as; Administration Coordinator, area floor leaders, and
assembly area coordinator, make reference to the supplemental Emergency
Plan for the Administration Building. The supplemental plan covers the
specific responsibilities and procedures for evacuation.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
47
00365
-------
OFFICE BUILDING, COMPUTER FACILITIES, STORAGE VAULT, SAFETY
BUILDING, GUARD GATES, RECREATION BUILDING
HURRICANE PROCEDURE
Main Office Building
The windows should be taped with 2" wide masking tape or plastic tape on 2 ft.
squares. All outside doors should be taped with 4" or 6" wide tape (either
masking tape or plastic tape). One door should be left till last so that the
outside work can proceed while the inside preparations are being made. If
enough time is available, the jalousie windows should be taped to prevent
blowing rain from coming in. Hooks or some type of fasteners should be
installed on the window sills to secure the lower part of all Venetian blinds.
All Venetian blinds should be lowered completely, secured and the blinds
turned so that the inside edge is up. This will help prevent glass from
scattering badly if a window is broken. All drapes should be closed. Board
up windows, on the east wall of the computer room. Do not tape windows
covered with reflective film as tape will destroy the film. The film itself
is good protection.
All important files on the first floor in the first two bottom drawers of file
cabinets should be moved to the second floor. Also, all office machines such
as typewriters, adding machines, calculators, etc., on the first floor should
be moved into these same rooms. After this is done the doors should be taped
as an added precaution, especially on the first floor. The electricity will'
be cut off as soon as the inside preparations have been completed.
Office personnel will assist with all preparations as much as possible. When
everything has been secured, the Division Managers will check to see that it
is complete, then check with the Utilities Shift Supervisor to see if their
help is needed elsewhere. If not, they should be released to go to their
homes as early as possible.
When it is determined what the phone number will be for the office Marketing
and Manufacturing Services for the duration of the hurricane, the Office
Service's Supervisor will forward the customer WATS lines as follows:
Automatic Forward Call With Diverters
1. Release diverter key (in up position).
2. Depress "M" key (lock in down position).
3. On dial, depress number you want calls forwarded to.
EXAMPLE: 1-214-620-2666.
4. Release "M" key (in up position).
5. Diverter will automatically go through programmed sequence.
6. Depress diverter key (lock in down position).
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
EPfl 00366
-------
HOUSTON CHEMICAL COMPLEX
GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTING DISASTER
FUNCTIONING 05/31/85
ADVANCE PREPARATION
A. Back-up Facility
1. Location • Bartlesville
2. Contacts - Gary Rebels
3. Description -
B. Back-up Site Configuration
1. Hardware - DOS/VSE Computer (4341 Range), 3340 t 3375 Disk
Dr.ves (10), One Tape Drive, One Printer
?£??'? " D0^VSE' Reach/EpAT, Johnson Time Acctg., CICS
ICCF, Syncsort (we will take our current software)
3. Communication Facilities (Voice & Data)
4. Computing Personnel (Minimum of six (6) people)
A. Coordinator • DP Supervisor
B. Systems Person -
C. A Programmer for each System (BDS & Cost) -
D. Two (2) Operators (one per shift)
Manager)*-"* Repre"ntative (to be name°* *>y MtM Services
6. Accounting Representative (depends on time of month - to be
named by Accounting Supervisor) -
C. Record Requirements
Scratc^Ta'pe"!01" SOUr" Pr°9rams' Load Modules (Core) and
'" C°ntain ^^^ SVStCm dat8 " deSCH
Location: Phillips Employee Credit Unit
2102 East Pasadena Freeway
Tape Name
a. SYSBAKUP
b. USRBAKUP
c. ICCFBACK
d. RCHBAKUP
e. EPAT
f. HSTEVT
g. CASOLI
h. NON-EPAT SCRATCH (10 TAPES)
i. EPAT SCRATCH (30 TAPES)
j. HST002
k. BDSOL2
I. PDSPAK
m. SYSOL1
n. CICSDB
R. SED: 06/08/87
49
EPR 00367
-------
3. Form and Printed Information
a. - Data Entry Forms for BDS, Voucher and Cost (Coov ©
Credit Union) Hy
b. RPG and Cobol Coding Forms
c. Input from last processing
d. Run Book and Operator's Guide (in ICCF) (Copy @ Credit
Union)
e. Special Forms needed for printer:
1. Purchase Order Acknowledge #10133
2. Invoices #10413/A022
3. Dun Letters #9874-N
4. Trial Balances #8060-N
f. Error Recovery Procedures
4. Normal Backups on a two (2) tape rotation
D. Responsibility Assignments
1. Back-up site initialization and processing - HOC DP Operations
Supervisor
2. Security, Personnel safety and well-being - HCC DP Operations
Supervisor
3. User Coordination and Communication - HCC DP Operations
Supervisor
4. Transportation
a. Personnel Accommodations • HCC DP Operations Supervisor
b. Data/Programs from off-site storage - HCC DP Operation
Supervisor
c. Supplies - HCC DP Operations Supervisor
d. Equipment - HCC DP Operations Supervisor
E. Transportation
1. Method - To be determined by HCC DP Manager, according to
type of emergency
2. Timely Expense Advance Arrangements - HCC DP Manager will
handle
3. Pre-arranged Meeting Locations - HCC DP Supervisor will handle
F. Training of Personnel
1. Training plans for all assign responsibilities
a. Personnel will be trained for operation of critical HCC
Systems
b. Training will be verified during annual disaster recovery
test
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
50
EPR 00368
-------
G. Notification procedures, including work and home phone numbers
1. Management and Key Personnel - HCC DP Manager, DP
Operations Supervisor, Lead Operator, Systems Person,
Programmer and Operators
2. Users - MtM Services, Cost Accounting, Manufacturing,
Bridgestone, Marketing, Financial Services, Planning and
Budgeting
3. Back-up Site Personnel - Personnel selected to travel to
back -up site.
4. Off-Site Storage Personnel - Credit Union
Address and Home Phone of Contact to Credit Union:
Glenna LeBlanc Doris Gross
601 Misty Lane 3219 Thorn wood
Friendswood, TX 77546 Pasadena, TX 77503
(713) 482-0126 (713) 920-1333
5. Vendors - IBM, Bell Telephone Company, Moore Business Forms
II. Activate Back-up Site
A. Implement the notification procedures established in the advance
preparation under Section I.
B. Prepare Back-up Site
1. Establish work area
2. Ensure telephone facilities available
3. Prepare to execute necessary operating system change
4. Invoke communication change
5. Arrange for supplies
C. Transport to Back-up Site
1. Implement the transportation plans as defined in advance
preparation
2. Consider that the plans were to cover worst case and may have
to be tailored to fit the specific conditions
D. Initialization of Back-up Site
1. Install operating system on predetermined system as described
in advance preparation
a. Test system components
b. Certify system readiness
c. Return back-up data to storage
2. Perform application installation and test criticals for
readiness/of processing
3. Establish security and controls at back-up site
a. Keep Command Center advised of progress
4. Establish work area for members of back-up operation
a. Desks
b. Telephones
5. Ensure that sufficient supplies are on hand to handle
environmental changes
tf~ 'MC:K:10:87
RL, :-ED: 06/08/87
51
EPR 00369
-------
III. Processing at Back-up Site
A. Scheduling
1. If you are in a shared environment, scheduling must be worked
out with host of back-up site.
B. Special Consideration
1. Contact of special services such as bursting & microfiche, if
needed
2. Distribution of output will not be typical: thus, arrangements
need to be made during this time
C. Continue standard back-up procedures
1. System
2. Data back-up
IV. On-Site Protection
A. The following steps will be implemented before evacuation (only for
hurricane)
1. Shut down power and CICS/ICCF
2. Shut down disk drives
3. Power off machine
4. Make sure safe and vault are closed
5. All windows in the area will be taped
6. Windows along the outer wall of Computer Room will be boarded
up from the outside
7. Sand bag doors leading to the outside of the building
V. Recovery at On-Site Installation
A. Coordinator selected to be computing representative during
evacuation (HCC DP Manager)
1. Telephone numbers for coordinator to call during evacuation
(plant and off-site installation)
2. On-site person will work with HCC's Safety Department in
determining when it is safe to return to on-site to check for
damage.
3. On-site person is responsible for initiating with vendor and
HCC's Safety personnel, the power up of equipment and having
a safety inspection.
4. On-site person is responsible for calling off-site installation
and infor;:iing personnel when they can return to on-site
location.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
52
00370
-------
OFFICE BUILDING, COMPUTER FACILITIES, STORAGE VAULT, SAFETY
BUILDING, GUARD GATES, RECREATION BUILDING HURRICANE PROCEDURE
(Continued)
6. Depress diverter key (lock in down position).
7. To restore to original station number use the above step on change number
in Step 6.
Dtverters are located in telephone equipment room, second floor Administration
Building. The diverters are located on the left as you enter the room, in a
cabinet with screen wire doors. The key is located on top of the cabinet.
Safety Office and Fire Station
Filing cabinets (5) and desks in Safety Office will be turned with fronts
facing the inner walls. All files in the lower drawers of file cabinets
should be removed and stacked on desk tops. Everything in Fire Station that
might be damaged by water will be raised off floor.
The above shall be the responsibility of the Safety Supervisor.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
53
EPB 00371
-------
LOCATION OF MOBILE EQUIPMENT DURING HURRICANE
1. Bulldozer - North Zone Guard Gate
2. Mobile Cranes - Trucking Quarters
3. Forklifts - Trucking Quarters
4. Tractors - Trucking Quarters
5. Welding Machines - Main Shop Bldg.
6. Locomotives - Moved to High Ground (South)
Radio Trucks
7. S-13 - Main Shops Bldg.
8. S-3 - West Door Boiler House
9. S-14 Carpenter Shop Pick-Up Main Gate
10. S-16 - Boiler House (Tail lift)
11. Conventamer - Dumpster, - Carpenter Shop
Other Trucks
12. Both Winch Trucks & Fuel Truck - Main Whse.
13. P & T, G.M., Inst., Elect., - Parked in Shops Main Shops Bldg.
14. Maintenance - Supt. Pick-up
15. Carpenter - Shop Pick-up
16. Painter - Shop Pick-up
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
54
EPR 00372
-------
LOCATION OF PORTABLE AIR COMPRESSORS
THAT REQUIRES DIESEL FUEL
1. Two (2) air compressors at south end, Road 3 at Plant V
2. Two (2) air compressors on Road 5 Marlex
3. One (1) air compressor at Polypropylene Plant south of two large
propylene feed tank.
4. One (1) air compressor east side of *1 Boiler at Main Boiler House.
5. One (1) or possible two (2) air compressors at Paint Shop.
6. One (1) or possible two (2) air compressors on Road 3 Marlex by the
Joy compressor.
LOCATION OF FIRE PUMPS fc PORTABLE
POWER UNITS THAT REQUIRE GASOLINE
1. One (1) fire pump at Polypropylene Plant Cooling Tower (increase to (2)
two diesel pumps after September 1987).
2. One (1) fire pump west of Plant 3, between Road 1 and Jefferson Street
fence.
3. Two (2) fire pumps at Safety office with one (1) gas tank (decrease to
(1) one diesel pump after September 1987).
POWER PLANTS
1. One (1) Power Plant at Main Guard Gate, gasoline tank on south-east side.
2. One (1) Power Plant will be located at Boiler House.
f-
P- ~ED: 06/08/87
55
EPR G-373
-------
PORTABLE H20 PUMPS NEEDED IN CASE OF HURRICANE
No.
of Pumps
1
1
1
1
Size
3"
3"
3"
3"
Deliver To
Boiler House
North Guard Gate
Purification C. R.
1-B Shop
Utilities
Terminal
Plants I.e. II
Plants III l IV None Needed
Plant V None Needed
Polypropylene None Needed
K-Resin None Needed
Phillips Automotive Center (ON 225) will furnish portable pumps; 475-0326 t
475-0327. They have 8-10-4" pumps, 2-3" pumps and 6-2" pumps, one 2" pump
at Boiler House.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
56
EPfl 00374
-------
E. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES
SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL NOTIFICATIONS
General Procedure'.
1. Office Hours
a. Telephone or page Cynthia Williams (3738 or 3711-269), Bill Stoltz
(3606 or 3711-170), Utilities Supervisor (3612 or 3711-103). or Rick
Wiederstein (3696 or 3711-185) as soon as possible.
b. Give as much information as is known - time or release, quantity
released, from what piece of equipment, substance(s) released, why
released, where it is going, etc. (see report forms).
c. Preferably Frank Newman or Cynthia Williams should make necessary
calls to agencies; otherwise. Utilities Supervisor should make the
call(s).
d. Area Superintendent should send detailed report to Bill Stoltz within
two working days.
Off-Hours
a. Telephone or page Utilities Supervisor (3612 or 3711-103) as soon as
possible.
b. Give information as in l.b. (above).
c. If there are questions about reporting. Utilities Supervisor can call
Cynthia Williams, Frank Newman or Bill Stoltz at home.
d. Utilities Supervisor should call appropriate agencies.
e. The Utilities Supervisor should send a copy of any notification forms
which were filled out for telephone reports to Bill Stoltz.
f. Area Superintendent should send a detailed report to Bill Stoltz
within two working days.
g. For a major incident, Bill Stoltz should immediately be notified.
The emergency call out procedure should be initiated, if warranted.
Applicable to;
1. Smoking flares, boiler or fires
2. Gaseous hydrocarbon, chlorine releases, etc.
3. Liquid hydrocarbon, oil chromate, or hazardous material spills.
4. Shutdowns and startups.
Phone Numbers;
Frank Newman - 3607 or 152; 479-4225
Cynthia Williams - 3738 or 3711-269; Call guard gate at 3662 for home phone no.
Bill Stoltz - 3606 or 170; 486-6620
Utilities Supervisor - 3612 or 103
Rick Wiederstein - 3696 or 185
Harris County Pollution Control - 920-2831
Texas Air Control Board • 666-4964
Texas Water Commission - (512) - 463-7727 and 479-5891 (office hours)
Coast Guard - 672-6639
Pasadena Emergency Coordinator - 473-2273 or 911
National Response Center - (800) 424-8802 or (202) 426-2675
Main Gate/Security - 3662/3, 3624
FWNOTtbs 10:87
I -ised 2/23/89
~57~ EPfl 00375
-------
E. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES
EXCESSIVE SMOKE EMISSIONS
OR
MAJOR UPSETS
Reporting is required for any visible smoke emissions lasting five minutes or
longer in any two hour period. Five minutes of smoke can be either continuous
or a five minute accumulation of short, itermittent periods.
Reporting is also required when an upset condition, maintenance work or
equipment failure releases substances(s) to the air which exceeds emissions
under normal operating (permitted) conditions.
Follow reporting procedures in Summary of Notifications.
If at all possible, a notification should be made within 15 minutes of the
start of the incident to:
1. Harris County Pollution Control - 920-2831
2. Texas Air Control Board - 666-4964
3. If necessary, other agencies (see CERCLA, SARA, SPCC)
The following information should be supplied to the agencies:
1. Your name
2. Calling from - Phillips 66 Company, Houston Chemical Complex in
Pasadena.
3. Account Number HG0566H (Texas Air Control Board only).
4. Unit involved. (Example: Polyethylene Plant 5)
5. Start time of emissions.
6. Stop time (or estimated stop time) of emissions.
7. Cause of emissions.
8. Substance(s) released or major components of material being flared.
9. Quantity released (usually unknown).
10. What was done to minimize the release (like max. steam to flare).
11. Note the time you make the call.
12. Note the name of the person you talk to, if not an answering machine.
Use the Major Upset Report Form (See Supplement) as a guide.
ENVNOT: bs 10:87
Revised 2/23/89
•
-58-
EPfl 00376
-------
E. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURE
The Utilities Supervisor should send a copy of the completed report form to
Bill Stoltz which summarizes the information conveyed to the agencies.
If a representative from an agency should call or visit the plant, refer them
to Bill Stoltz, Frank Newman, Cynthia Williams, Rick Wiederstein, or the
Utilities Supervisor. Details of the contact must me made on the Agency Visit
Record (see Supplement) and sent to Bill Stoltz.
NOTE: Do not make a telephone report to the agencies until a smoke or
release violation has occurred. A potential for a violation is
covered in the next section.
ENVNOT:bs 10:87
Revised 2/23/89
-59-
EPR 00377
-------
E. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES
10-DAY NOTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL AIR EMISSIONS
Reporting is required at least 10 days in advance of any potential increase in
air emissions, which would include:
1. Planned maintenance - like repair of steam line to a flare.
2. Unit shutdown.
3. Unit start-up.
4. Non-routine fire brigade practice.
5. Other circumstances.
Give information to Frank Newman so written report can be received by Texas
Air Control Board and Harris County Pollution Control at least 10 days before
work begins.
If sufficient notice cannot be given, let Frank Newman know as soon as
possible.
If a variable start or stop date is given in the notice, let Frank Newman know
when the actual date is set, so a telephone update can be made to the
agencies.
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
60
CPR 00370
-------
E. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES
CERCLA (SUFER7UND) RELEASE REPORTING
For the substances listed on the CERCLA Reportable Quantities list (immediately
following this procedure), if the quantity released to the environment (which
does not include substances contained by concrete lined ditches and skimmers)
exceeds the quantity listed for that substance, a report needs to be made to:
1. The National Response Center - (800) 424-8802
or (202) 426-2675
2. Texas Water Commission - (512) 463-7727
or 479-5981 (office hours)
3. Pasadena Emergency Coordinator 473-2273 or 911
4. Coast Guard (if a potential for
release to the Ship Channel) 672-6639
5. If necessary, other agencies (see Smoke, SARA, SPCC).
Follow the reporting procedures in Summary of Notifications.
The report should be made "immediately11. Agency representatives have stated
that "immediately" is dependent upon the seriousness of the incident. "Within
seconds" would be appropriate for a very large, toxic release (like chlorine),
whereby the nearby community would be evacuated. (In such a case, the Pasadena
Emergency Coordinator would be the first to be called since they would initiate
the evacuation). The "next day" would be appropriate for a minor incident with
minimal in-plant response required during the middle of the night.
Agencies might prefer a detailed report to a breathless "We've got a big spill
and it just caught fire."
The National Rsponse Center and Coast Guard will request information listed on
the National Response Center Reporting Format (see Supplement).
The Texas Water Commission will want information from the Texas Water
Commission Notification form (see Supplement).
The Pasadena Emergency Coordinator will be looking for information contained on
the SARA Notification from (see Supplement).
A copy of any notification form(s) filled out for telephone reports should be
sent to Bill Stoltz.
Any agency representative calling or visiting HCC should be referred to Bill
Stoltz, Frank Newman, Cynthia Williams, Rick Wiederstein or the Utilities
Supervisor. Details of the contact must be made on the Agency Visit Record
(see Supplement) and sent to Bill Stoltz.
ENVNOT:bs 10:87
Revised 2/23/89
•
-61-
EPR 00379
-------
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66 EPR003B4 M-:«->-57
-------
E. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES
SARA RELEASE REPORTING
The following list of designated "extremely hazardous chemicals" (below) are
'required to be reported to.
1. Pasadena Emergency Coordinator - 473-2273;
2. Other agencies as appropriate - at a minimum: Texas Water
Commission or Texas Air Control Board. (See Smoke. CERCLA.
SPCC) if the quantity released exceeds the quantity listed next
to that substance.
Follow reporting procedures in Summary of Notifications.
"Immediate" notification is necessary. In this case, "immediate" would mean
within minutes of the release of discovery of release.
The SARA Notification form (see Supplement) should be used as a guideline for
information which will be requested. Send a copy of the completed report
form to Tom Levett.
Any agency representative calling or visiting HCC should be referred to
Tom Levett, Frank Newman, Rick Wiederstein or the Utilities Supervisor.
Details of the contact must be made on the Agency Visit Record (see
Supplement) and sent to Tom Levett.
Extremely Hazardous Chemicals at HCC
Name Reportable Quantity (Ibs.)
Butadiene 1
Chlorine 10
Hydrazine 1
Hydrogen Chloride (gas) 1
Propylene Oxide 100 (14 gal.)
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 05/18/88
67
-------
E. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES
SPCC (OIL SPILL) REPORTING
Reporting
Reporting is required if "oil" is released and reaches the Ship Channel
(including the slip) or may potentially reach the Ship Channel. The quantity
which triggers reporting is:
1. Creates a sheen on the water surface.
2. Creates an emulsion or sludge (which may be subsurface).
"Oils may be: Diesel, Kerosene, Gasoline, Lubricants, etc., which are
basically crude oil products (not chemically synthesized).
Report is to be made to:
I. The National Response Center - (600) 424-8802
or (202) 426-2675
2. Coast Guard 672-6639
3. Texas Water Commission - (512) 463-7727
4. TWC District Office (office hours only)- 479-5981
Follow the reporting procedures in Summary of Notifications.
A sizeable discharge should be reported within minutes to the Coast Guard so
they can immediately take necessary action on the Ship Channel. Less
significant spills are to be reported "immediately".
Use the National Response Center Reporting Format for *1 & 2 (above), and the
Texas Water Commission Notification for #'s 3 t 4 (above). (See Supplement
for forms.) Copies of these completed report forms should be sent to
Tom Levett.
Any agency representative calling or visiting HCC should be referred to Tom
Levett, Frank Newman, Rick Wiederstein or the Utilities Supervisor. Details
of the contact must be made on the Agency Visit Record (see Supplement) and
sent to Tom Levett.
**lf outside help is needed for cleanup: Contact the Purchaser on-callr give
them a requisition number, and the type of equipment or service needed.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
68
Pfl 00386
-------
May 5, 1989
INTER-OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE/ SUBJECT:
TO: Utility Shift Supervisors
Operations Superintendents
In reviewing HCC's spill contingency plan, the currently listed outside
contacts for response to a hazardous material or oil spill into the
channel or our slip are inadequate. I an thinking primarily of a
incident resulting from styrene unloading but the need for such
assistance could be applicable to other situations also.
The following information will be incorporated into HCC's Spill
Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plan (SPCC) and Emergency
Procedure Manual, but so that adequate response is available during this
revision process, effective immediately, the following outside firms are
to be contacted (in order of preference listed), if assistance is needed
for emergency clean-up of spilled material.
Contact in the following order of preference:
24 Hour
Company Emergency
Name _ Number _ Comments
EmTech 1-800-336-0909 Located at 312 S. Richey,
Environmental Pasadena. Local office
Services number - 477-3107
Peterson- 1-800-334-0004 Located at 1110 Howard
Riedel Drive, Deer Park. Local
Services office number - 479-5295
Chemical 475-1077 Located at 407 Eagle St.,
Plant Pasadena.
Services
If there are any questions, please give me a call at extension 3606.
cc: Jesse Berotte
F. Easby-Smith
F. R. Newman
D. W. Price
J. L. Ryel
R. A. wiederstein
C. M. Williams
WCS-5-5B: jsh
EPfl 00397
-------
E. ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEDURES
SUPPLEMENT
(REPORT FORMS)
MF04MC:K: 10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
69
R 00388
-------
REPORT FORM FOR NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
FOR MAJOR UPSET. PLANNED MAINTENANCE, START-UP OR SHUTDOWN
31 1AC 101.6 AND 101.7
TO: EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR - TACB (AUSTIN)
ACCOUNT NUMBER: HG-0566-H REGION: 7
COMPANY NAME: PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY-
PLANT LOCATION: HOUSTON CHEMICAL COMPLEX (HCC)
MAILING ADDRESS: P. 0. BOX 792 CITY: PASADENA STATE: TX ZIP: 77501
OWNER. OPERATOR OR RESPONSIBLE MANAGEMENT: D. W. PRICE TEL: (713) 475-3666
NATURE OF UNIT OR PROCESS AFFECTED (AND OTHER PROCESSES AFFECTED. IF ANY'):
DATE OR EXPECTED DATE(S) OF EXCESSIVE EMISSIONS:
TIME AND EXPECTED DURATION OF EXCESSIVE EMISSIONS:
REASON OR CAUSE: MAINTENANCE > ' MAJOR UPSET
EXPLANATION:
LEVEL OF EMISSIONS (GIVE BASIS FOR ESTIMATE): PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL
COMPOSITION. RATE, CONCENTRATION AND DURATION:
MEASURES (TO BE) TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE (IF NOT DETERMINED YET. GIVE
DATE WHEN MEASURES WILL BE SUBMITTED):
CC: NOTE DATE, TIME AND MEANS OF NOTIFICATION (LETTER. TELEPHONE. ETC.):
REGIONAL OFFICE:
LOCAL PROGRAM:
DATE: SIGNED
C. T. LEVETT
ENVIRONMENTAL STAFF DIRECTOR
CTL:FRN:22A
EPfi 00389
-------
(800) 424-8802
or (202) 'i2G-2C75
NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER REPORTING FORMAT
Date and Time of Call:
Name of Person Accepting Report:
Person Making Report -
Name:
Company: Phillips 66 Company - Houston Chemical Complex
Address: 1400 Jefferson Street, Pasadena, Texas 77506
County: Harris
Telephone: (713) 475-3666
Location of Release -
Address: 1400 Jefferson Street, Pasadena, Texas 77506
County: Harris
State: Texas
Time Incident Occurred/Discovered:
Substance Released:
Quantity Released:
Source of Release:
Made and Duration of Release:
Weather: Speed:
Wind Direction: Sea Height:
Wind Velocity:
Remedial Actions:
Agencies Notified -
State:
Federal:
Other:
Other Notes:
EPfl 00390
-------
(512) 463-7727
and 479-5981
TEXAS WATER COMMISSION NOTIFICATION
Person Making Report -
Name:
Company: Phillips 66 Co. - Houston Chemical Complex
Address: 1400 Jefferson Street, Pasadena, TX 77506
DiiLc of Notification:
Time of Notification - Austin:
- Deer Park:
Person Accepting Report - Austin:
Deer Park:
Date and Time of Release:
Type (Name) of Substance Released:
Quantity Released:
Exact Location of Release:
(Incl. name of waters involved or threatened)
Source of Release:
Person responsible for the source (cause) of the release -
Name:
Address: 1400 Jefferson Street, Pasadena
Telephone: (713) 475-3666
Extent of Actual or Potential Water Pollution:
Person in charge of release cleanup -
Name:
Telephone: (713) 475-3
Steps taken or proposed to contain/cleanup release:
Extent of injuries:
Possible hazards to human health or the environment:
EPR 00391
-------
SAKA NUI Jl JCATJUlJ
|'a«nilpiifi LI-ICI nr"c>' kcsi'ou^p Cot>i cl inn'ui - 473-2273
lexas Uater Coiiimission Uf waler or soil) - (51J) 463-7727
479-5981 (office hoursi
Texas Air Control Board (if air) - 666-4964
Harris County Pollution Control (if air) - 920-2831
Person Making Report -
Name:
Cotnpanv; Phillips 66 Company - Houston Chemical Complex
Address: 1400 Jefferson Street, Pasadena, TX 77506 (Harris County)
Date of Notification:
Time of Notification:
State:
Local:
Person Accepting Hoport •
State:
Local:
Name of Subslance(s):
Is substance(s) a SARA extremely hazardous chemical?
Yes CD LZ3Ko
Quantity Released:
Time and Duration of Release:
Released to: dUxr dJWater CjSoil
* Acute (immediately) health effects:
* Chronic (long term) health effects:
• Recommended medical procedure(s) for exposed people:
* Proper precautions to take:
For further information contact -
Name:
Name:
Name:
Actions taken to respond to/contain release:
* Refer to the Chemical Hazards Emergency Management Manual for
this information. £pfl
REV IS-Jut 05/18/88
-------
SAKA NurjriCAllON
Pasadena Emergency Response Coordinator - 911
Texas V.ater Connission (if water or soil) - (512) 463-7727
479-5981 (office hours)
Texas Air Control Board (if air) - 666-4964
Harris County Pollution Control (if air) - 920-2831
Person Making Report -
Name:
Company: Phillips 66 Company - Houston Chemical Complex
Address: 1400 Jefferson Street. Pasadena, TX 77506 (Harris County)
Date of Notification:
Time of Notification:
State:
Local:
Person Accepting Report -
State:
Local:
Nane of Substance(s):
Is substance(s) a SARA extremely hazardous chemical?
YesLZ] DNO
Quantity Released:
Time and Duration of Release:
Released to: C^Air CZJwater I I Soil
Acute (immediately) health effects:
Chronic (long term) health effects:
Recommended medical procedure(s) for exposed people:
Proper precautions to take:
For further information contact -
Name: Phone:
Name: Phone:
Name: Phone:
Actions taken to respond to/contain release:
EPR 00393
-------
FORM AID: 1.87
REVISED: 8/li/66
HOUSTON CHEMICAL COMPLEX WASTE DISPOSAL REQUEST
Date of this Request: Date for Disposal of Waste:
Material to be Discarded (Describe as fully as possible):
Quantity:
Person Requesting Disposal Perrrit
HOUSTON CHEMICAL COMPLEX WASTE DISPOSAL PERMIT
Conditions for Disposal of Waste:
Permit Approved By:
Date:
AD18C:E:11:66
EPR 00394
-------
AGENCY:
DATE:
NAME(S):
PHILLIPS PERSONNEL:
REASON FOR VISIT:
June
AGENCY VISIT RECORD
COMMENTS:
(Signature)
(dace)
00395
-------
F. POWER FAILURE PROCEDURES
Purpose:
. in th. „.„,
Types of outages:
This procedure is to be in effect during outages of the following nature:
1. Complete power outages unless isolated to HLtP's system
2. Partial outages of the 138 KV or 6S KV system
?Uw\a/9fS *nvo'vin9 a HV substation mam 5 KV breaker. Th.s excludes
5 KV feeder breakers to individual MCC's.
Personnel:
Contacts:
Mam: G. Ouinn Anton 3777 60-130 479-0718
Alternate: Scott J. Hietpas 371060-181 480-7360
Tom H. Huston 3817 60-161 480-8817
_Be. ' ' ' — > EMERGENCY
MANAGtRS MANAGER
V .
PLANT ELECTRICIAN . CENTRAL SHOP
ciiprev/icoD •—* v^tr\ i KAL SHOP
SUPERVISOR ELECTRICIAN SUPERVISOR
CENTRAL SERVICES < , ELECTRICIANS
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERS KICIANS
MF04MC:K:10-87
REVISED: 06/08/87
76 E PR 00396
-------
F. POWER FAILURE PROCEDURES
Personnel cont'd):
Emergency Manager
Responsible for central coordination and communications.
Plant Electrician Supervisors
Responsible for reporting major outages as outlined above to the
Centra! Shop Electrician Supervisor.
Central Shop Electrician Supervisor
Responsible for coordination of all electrical activities to
re-establish power. Responsible for coordination of electrician
activities. Will request additional electricians as needed and make
electrician work assignments. Responsible for central
communications and directions to electrical personnel during
electrical power outages. Will contact HLtP, emergency electrical
team members and Emergency Manager as required.
Central Services Electrical Engineers
Will provide field assistance as required including problem
assessment, emergency switching instructions and field guidance for
electricians.
No other plant personnel should be in the electrical substations during
the time of a power failure. Any questions or comments should be
directed to the Emergency Manager who will be kept up to date on the
situation at all times. This includes managers, superintendents, plant
electricians and all other non-requested plant personnel.
General Procedures:
This power failure response team will have the following
responsibilities:
1. Gather initially at the Substation Alarm Central Control Station in
the Shops Bldg.
2. Determine the extent of the outage including which breakers have
tripped and what relay flags are showing.
3. Determine the cause of the outage by visual examination, megger
testing, interviews and whatever other methods are required.
4. Determine the proper method for restoring power to the system
through the use of alternate feeders, equipment replacement or
repair, or whatever other methods may be required.
5. Restore power quickly and safely.
6. Maintain communications with HL&P as required by their Operating
Agreement.
7. Upon restoration of power, file a report to the concerned parties
discussing the nature of the outage, causes for the outage, any
equipment failures and proposals for preventing a recurrence, as
appropriate.
MF04MC:K:10:87
REVISED: 06/08/87
77 EPR 00397
-------
XIV.EXTERNAL EMERGENCIES
A. CIMA ASSISTANCE
1. INTRODUCTION
Channel Industries Mutual Aid (CIMA) is an organization of
over 68 member companies and agencies which are prepared to
handle their own normal emergencies, but are also prepared
to lend emergency assistance to other members to help with
emergencies beyond their own capabilities.
Assistance to any stricken plant or agency will be available
and rendered only if a call or request is made via telephone
or emergency radio by a responsible official of a member
plant or agency.
2. CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES
Fire and emergencies of different degrees of magnitude are
roughly classified below under the call designation which
will be used on the CIMA emergency radio. It is vitally
important that each member of CIMA understands the
classifications of emergencies and the operation of the Zone
system, and has planned for emergencies so as to make the
proper calls in each instance.
Note: Proper procedures for placing these calls are
listed under "CIMA Radio Procedures" (See pages 2
and 3).
Not to be Reported on Emergency Radio
Fires and emergencies which are reasonably expected to be
controlled by in-plant forces with in-plant materials and
equipment.
To be Reported on Emergency Radio
a. Zone Standby Alert
A fire or emergency which might be controlled with
in-plant manpower and materials, but which has the
potential of developing so that outside assistance is
required. This call activates the CIMA Specialist
Group.
b. Zone Assistance Call
A fire or emergency which is beyond the control of in-plant
manpower and materials to the extent that specific
assistance is required from members in the form of
materials, equipment and/or manpower.
MF04MC:S:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
1
EPfl 00398
-------
CIMA RADI JCEDURES
ALL-OUT ZONE ALERT
1. PERSON OPERATING RADIO WILL ANNOUNCE:
THIS IS /70NF
NAME OP MEMBER
ISSUING A ZONE CALL
X
2. REPEAT THE ABOVE ONCE
3. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OP EMERGENCY:
WE HAVP A ANf
TYPE EMERGENCY
ZONE CAI L
4. REPLY CHECK: PROM MEMBER OP SAI
ninvrai
MEMBER MEOUESIINQ REPLY FROM
5. SIGN OFF BY ANNOUNCING:
) THIS IS AN ALL-OUT
ME ZONE
RECEIVE THIS CALL?
ffONE
NAME OF MEMBER
THIS IS AN ALL-OUT ZONE CALL
ALL STATIONS STAND-BY EXCEPT THOSE COMPANIES
RESPONDING
ALL CLEAR
1. PERSON OPERATING RADIO WILL ANNOUNCE:
I70NF
NAME OF MEMBER
OUR EMERGENCY SITUATION NO LONGER EXISTS WE
ARE ISSUING AN ALL CLEAR
REPEAT THE ABOVE ONCE
3. REPLY CHECK: FROM MEMBER OP SAME ZONE
nm YOU RECEIVE THIS CALL*
MEMBER RECEIVING REPLY FROM
4. SIGN OPF BY ANNOUNCING:
ffONF
NAME OF MEMBER
THIS IS AN ALL CLEAR
NO OTHER RESPONSE IS NECESSARY
CALL SIQN
**************************************
-------
CIMA RADIO* oihOUHffS
STAND-BY ALERT
1. PERSON OPERATING RADIO WILL ANNOUNCE:
•
THIS IS CONE
NAMEOPMEMWER
ISSUING A ZONE STAND-BY ALERT
i REPEAT THE ABOVE ONCE
3. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EMERGENCY:
WE HAVE A.
.AND NO OUTSIDE
TYPE EMEROENCY
ASSISTANCE IS NEEDED AT THIS TIME.
4. REPLY CHECK: FROM MEMBER OF SAME ZONE
DID YOU RECEIVE THIS CALL?
WEMKN REOUESTINQ REPLY PROM
3. SIGN OFF BY ANNOUNCING:
MAMC OF MEMBER
ISSUING A ZONE STAND-BY ALERT
NO OTHER RESPONSE IS NECESSARY
/ZONE
ASSISTANCE CALL
1. PERSON OPERATING RADIO WILL ANNOUNCE:
/ZONE
NAME OF MEMRER
ISSUING A ZONE ASSISTANCE CALL
REPEAT THE ABOVE ONCE
3. WE HAVE A
.AND ARE REQUESTING
TYPE EMCRQENCV
ASSISTANCE FROM THE FOLLOWING COMPANIES:
(1).
<2L
CT-
W.
(5)
-W.
NOTE: RADIO OPERATOR SHOULD REQUEST ONLY THE AMOUNT OP
COMPANIES AUTHORIZED TO REQUEST.
4. SIGN OFF BY ANNOUNCING:
/ZONE
NAME Of WFMKR
THIS IS A ZONE ASSISTANCE CALL
ALL STATIONS STAND-BY EXCEPT THOSE COMPANIES
RESPONDING
•i
4
1 .
-------
This call is issued in the form of a request for
definite amounts of a specif.c type of equipment
materials and/or manpower. This call shouM b'
Th?. "lin"? the;earest «o«rc« « listed in the manual
This call also activates the CIMA Specialist Group.
Equipment and/or manpower may be requested from
zones at the member's discretions.
c. Zone All-out Call
A major disaster where all assistance is required from
CIMA Particuar "ne- Thi* "II also activates thT
CIMA Specialist Group.
d. All-Out Call
A major disaster where all resources of the entir*
organization will be required. This type of caH
Sh°"ld be very rare because of the excellent
availability of resources within each zone. This call
w.ll activate the CIMA Specialist Group.
• • Civil Defense Alert
(Given only by the Civil Defense Corps.)
Indicates that an enemy attack is imminent or that a
mimhiV. mpY 7JLV1™ v«lunt«rV assistance from CIMA
SfTrt TK3"1 C'n'1 56fCnSe Plan$ snould be P«t into
Specialist cSi'up. "* 'CtiVate the C'MA
f. All Clear
To be given by the member who issued one of the above
"„*' ^hf" the .pafticu,lar emergency condition which
promoted the original call no longer exists.
3. Response to CIMA Alerts
Chlnn^t a!ftPt*^11 ,b» receivcd via the CIMA radio,
Channel 1 located at the Main Gate. The receipt of
specific assistance will be acknowledged by Security
..?*"' ~" -••— »rf« *" *»IITI/-» alert, personnel at the
Mam Gate shall notify the following:
•Fire Chief
-Utility Shift Supervisor
MF04MC:S: 10:87
REVISED: 05/17/87
EPR OOH01
-------
c. Security will contact four of the CIMA response fire
crew members (day fire crew) and log the names of the
personnel dispatched.
d. The location requesting assistance will be notified of
dispatched equipment and personnel and the estimated
time of arrival (ETA).
e. Apparatus leaving their facility enroute to a stricken
location will indicate "Responding" on Channel 1. They
should then switch their radio to the channel being
used for incident command and monitor while enroute.
If a Staging Area has been established, apparatus
should communicate their arrival to the Staging Officer
face to face. If a Staging Area has not been
established, they should communicate their arrival to
Command on the Incident Command Channel. To
minimize confusion, apparatus identifiers should
consist of the member name followed by number, if
desired (e.g., Celanese Ladder 1).
If only one incident is working, Command may use the
other Tactical Channel as needed. Usually this will be
a Support Channel. Functions not directly related to
incident command, such as Staging, Rehabilitation,
etc., can be moved to the Support Channel and reduce
congestion and confusion on the Incident Command
Channel.
If a second CIMA response occurs while another is in
progress, the Incident Command Channel for the second
incident will be the unused Tactical Channel regardless
of the location in relation to Center Street/Sheldon
Road.
Channels 4 and 5 will be used at Command's discretion.
f. Standby day fire crew personnel may be released to
relieve the crew first dispatched to the CIMA Alert by
the Fire Chief (or senior Phillips fire official) at
the stricken location.
4. Additional CIMA Assistance
a. Special response to request for equipment and personnel
not committed to CIMA, but available, are to be
approved by one of the following in order:
-HCC Manager
-Safety/Security/Environmental Director
-Safety Supervisor
-Fire Chief
MF04MC:S: 10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
EPR OOH02
-------
b. Should the CIMA emergency be prolonged, the personnel
at the scene may need to be relieved by a replacement
crew. The Fire Chief or Senior Phillips official at
the stricken plant is responsible to request this
replacement.
REQUEST FOR CIMA ASSISTANCE
Emergencies that "sized-up" or judged to likely exceed
in-house capabilities certainly justifies a CIMA Standby
Alert. Should the emergency fulfill that judgment, then a
delay period of the assistance to assemble has been
eliminated and the CIMA officers and specialists will be on
the scene.
a. Initiating the Request
Emergencies that are "sized-up" or judged to exceed
in-house capabilities should activate a CIMA assistance
call immediately. The Utility Shift Supervisor
(Assistant Fire Chief) or the Fire Chief will activate
a Zone 2 stand-by alert by notifying Security.
Security will obtain authorization from one of the
following in order and then notify the others listed
below of the action taken.
HCC Manager
Safety/Security/Environmental Director
Safety Supervisor
Fire Chief
b. Issuing the Request
Upon receipt of a call from any of the above, Security
at Main Gate, who is responsible for operation of the
CIMA radio, shall activate the appropriate CIMA alert,
via the CIMA radio net. (Reference item B & E this
section).
c. Responding CIMA Equipment
1. /Apparatus leaving their facility will indicate
"Responding (plant, name, equip, name).
They should then switch their radio to the
channel being used for incident command and
monitor while enroute.
MF04MC:S:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
EPR 00403
-------
2. Upon entrance. Security will fill out the CIMA
Response log with company name, type of
equipment, and individual name of personnel.
(The CIMA Response log is completed when
responding units depart the plant, reference the
attached form).
Security will relay this information to the Fire
Chief via the Main Guard Gate and direct the fire
units accordingly.
3. The Staging area for CIMA equipment and
personnel
will be the concrete slab west of the propane
storage area. Security or a Phillips Rep. will
be stationed at the Staging Area and will escort
the fire units to the fire scene if needed.
4. The HCC Emergency Response Team will switch
from
the trucking frequency to CIMA Channel 2 radios
after CIMA equipment and personnel have entered
the plant or after CIMA officials have set up at
the Command Post.
d. CIMA Control Center
The CIMA Control Center will be the Main Guard Gate.
THEY WILL MONITOR CIMA Channels for directions and
relay the pertinent information via CIMA Channel 1 or
through other respective plant communication systems.
(Reference the Phillips Emergency Plan).
e. CIMA Command Post
The CIMA Command Post will be the command post on the
scene. This will be the HCC communication vehicle or
the CIMA communication vehicle. The CIMA Specialists
will provide assistance to the Fire Chief directly or
through his designee(s).
MF04MC: 5:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
EPR 00404
-------
6. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
a. GENERAL
The CIMA radio system consists of three UHF repeaters
located at separate sites. Each repeater consists of a
UHF transmitter with receiver voting capabilities and
satellite receivers located at each of the other
repeater sites. All necessary site interconnections
are made by microwave. Twenty-four hour battery
backup for both repeater and microwave is provided at
each site. The system is provided with both
private-line and automatic numeric identification
(AMI). Each transmitter transmits a unique
identification number which is logged by a printer
each time the unit transmits.
A total of five channels (three repeaters, two
talkaround) are available for use. The radio channels
will be used as follows:
Channel 1 - Main Dispatch (Repeater)
•Issue Standbys
•Request Assistance
-Issue All Clears
-Apparatus will indicate "Responding"
when leaving their facility enroute
to the stricken facility.
Channel 2 - Tactical (Repeater) -
Primary Incident Command Channel for
incidents that occur west of Center Street in
Deer Park and Sheldon Road in Channelview.
Channel 3 - Tactical (Repeater) -
Primary Incident Command Channel for
incidents that occur east of Center
Street/Sheldon Road.
Channel 4 - Talkaround for Channel 2 • Use as needed.
Channel 5 • Talkaround for Channel 3 - Use as needed.
Shot/Id a member attempt to issue a call on Channel 1
and the Channel 1 repeater is inoperable, the call
should be issued on Channel 2 and an announcement
made that Channel 1 is out of service.
MF04MC: 5:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
8
EPfl 00405
-------
b. PROCEDURES
1. Apparatus leaving their facility en route to a
stricken location will indicate "Responding" on
Channel 1. They should then switch their radio to
the channel being used for incident command and
monitor while enroute. If a Staging Area has been
established, apparatus should communicate their
arrival to the Staging Officer face to face. If a
Staging Area has not been established, they should
communicate their arrival to Command on the
Incident Command Channel. To minimize confusion,
apparatus identifiers should consist of the member
name followed by number, if desired (e.g. Celanese
Ladder 1).
2. If only one incident is working, Command may use
the other Tactical Channel as needed. Usually
this will be as a Support Channel. Functions not
directly related to incident command such as
staging, rehabilitation, etc. can be moved to the
Support Channel and reduce congestion and
confusion on the Incident Command Channel.
3. If a second CIMA response occurs while another is
in progress, the Incident Command Channel for the
second incident will be the unused Tactical
Channel regardless of the location in relation to
Center Street/Sheldon Road.
4. Channels 4 and 5 will be used at Command's
discretion. Potential uses include:
-Simplex operation if repeater goes down
-Communications needs where high power/wide area
broadcast of repeater is not wanted.
MF04MC: 5:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
9
EPR 00406
-------
CIMA RESPONSE LOG
DATE:
TIME ARRIVAL:
TIME DEPARTURE:
II.
III.
RESPONDING COMPANY: m
TYPE OF EQUIPMENT:
MATERIAL CARRIED:
A. FOAM
QUALITY:
TYPE:
GALLONS
B. DRY POWDER
QUALITY:
LBS.
TYPE:
IV. MATERIAL USED:
A. FOAM:
B. DRY POWDER:
GALLONS
LBS.
EQUIPMENT LEFT BEHIND
NOZZLES.^ SIZE:
HOSE -
NO.
SIZE:
NO:
SIZE:
FT.
SIZE:
FT:
MISC. EQT-
V.
FIRE FIGHTERS ON UNIT (NAMES):
RESPOND ING-TO-SCENE DEPARTING-FROM-SCENENOTES*
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
SIGNED
*Those remaining indicate field location,
MF04MC:S: 10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
10
EPR OOH07
-------
B. RELEASING FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT
1. Should HCC receive a request to release fire fighting
equipment and personnel to one of the CIMA members or to
other Phillips installations, approval must be given by one
of the following and all notified:
HCC Manager
Safety/Security/Environmental Director
Safety Supervisor
2. The unit will be manned by members of the day fire crew
whether notification is given during daytime or nightime
hours.
3. Security will call out four of the eight day Fire Brigade
members to respond to the CIMA alert.
The remaining four will be used as standbys.
4. The Main Guard Gate keeps a log of when, where, etc., HCC
responds to a call-out. A log book is also kept in the:
a. Emergency Response Vehicle
b. Rescue/Communication Vehicle
c. Snorkel/Pumper Fire Trucks
5. Fire Equipment Committed
1- Snorkel truck '85
1500 gpm pumper w/6" suction
4 1/2" adapter, 2 1/2" discharge
1000' of 2 1/2" hose w/NST threads
330 gallon AFFF-ATC foam
3- 30 minute Scott Air Paks
1- Rescue/Communication Vehicle
1 - portable light generator, 1500 kw
12-30 minute Scott Air Pak cylinders
1 - Plant radio system, mobile unit
1 - CIMA radio system, mobile unit
Rescue equipment
1- Ford Pick-up Response Vehicle
110 gallons AFFF-ATC foam
2 - Scott Air Paks
600' of 2 1/2" hose w/NST threads
Rescue/Fire equipment
2- Portable radio's 154.280 freq.
3- CIMA portable radio's (new system)
MF04MC: 5:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
11
EPfl OOHOB
-------
C. PHILLIPS EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN
FIRE CONTROL
Plan of Action
Pasadena Area
HCC
-Plant Emergency Team on 1st response
-Mobile command post established at fire scene
-Primary control at MAIN Gate/PEP Office
-Auxiliary team called in on 2nd alarm
-Oncoming shift crew on 2nd alarm
-Channel Industries Mutual Aid
-CIMA System activated on Major fires
-Pipeline foam unit requested 33.38 MHZ (KK6957)
-Phillips Gulf Coast facilities notified if additional
manpower and equipment needed under PEP Plan
-Staging areas will be established with a radio controlman
Pipeline
-Pipeline fire crew 1st response in plant
-HCC Fire Crew will respond with necessary fire unit
-CIMA NET activated on major fire
-Phillips Gulf Coast facilities notified if additional
equipment on manpower needed under PEP Plan
Pasadena Transportation Division
-HCC fire crew on 1st alarm
-City of Pasadena 2nd response
Phillips Building - Bellaire
-City of Bellaire Fire Department
-Other facility request subject to City Fire Department
American Thermoplastics
-Additional aid must be by City of Houston on CIMA NET
Outside District Response Under PEP Plan
-Contact Main Gate at HCC 475-3624 or Phillips Radio Net
-One fire unit with a 3 to 5 man crew will respond from
district
-Additional man power will be supplied by Exploration and
-Production department
CAER
•Public Notice given by Safety Environmental and Security
Director
Catalyst Resources, Inc.
-CRI fore crew 1st response
-CIMA net activated on major fires
MF04MC:S:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
12
EPR 00409
-------
D. Community Awareness Emergency Response (CAER) Aterts
Most members of CIMA are actively involved in the CAER activities
in their respective zones. A key part of the CAER program is
quick notification of surrounding communities/facilities
concerning incidents occurring inside a plant. Information is
provided concerning both incidents that are visible and/or
audible but pose no hazard, and those that could or do create a
hazard external to the plant. The CAER program has adopted the
following level system to clearly indicate the level of hazard
present in any incident. These levels are provided for
information purposes and should not be confused with CIMA
Alerts.
Level 1 Informational purposes only. An industrial incident is
in progress at that facility with no effect on areas
outside the facility.
Level 2 Standby alert. An industrial incident is in progress
at that facility which appears that it can be handled
within the boundaries of the facility. However,
outside areas could be affected.
Level 3 Full emergency condition. An industrial incident is in
progress which will affect outside areas.
All Clear The industrial incident previously reported has
terminated and everything is back to normal.
Many CIMA members, for expediency in making CAER notifications
to neighboring CIMA facilities, may choose to use the CIMA radio
system. This is acceptable use of the system. However, it must
be noted that the Issuance of a CAER Alert, regardless of the
level, is for awareness only. CIMA member facilities must be
aware that if they need assistance, either CIMA Specialist
and/or equipment or other CIMA resources, they must issue the
appropriate CIMA Alert (Standby or Assistance Call).
Several CIMA members have made arrangements with adjacent
facilities that upon notification, roads can be quickly blocked
by personnel from those facilities until law enforcement can
respond. This request can also be made on the CIMA radio system
and likewise, does not, in and of itself, constitute a CIMA Alert
of any type.
MF04MC:S:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
13
EPR QOH 1 0
-------
XV. APPENDIX
A. LISTING OF REFERENCE NUMBERS
Houston
U. S. Coast Guard Air and Service Rescue
Houston Fire Department
Harris County Sheriff's Department
Southeast Texas Poison Center
Texas Department of Public Safety
Civil Defense
Red Cross
Medical Examiner (Coroner)
Life Flight
Pasadena
Police
Fire
Civil Defense
Office of Emergency Preparedness
National Guard
CIMA - Radio Contact
Southmore Hospital
Pasadena Bayshore Hospital
Pasadena General Hospitaf
Dr. A. E. Mircea
Dr. J. A. Nart
CHEMTREC
Numbers
672-6639
(227-2323)
(221-6000)
654-1701
(681-1761)
222-3901
526-8300
Pasadena 477-1221
221-5250
797-HELP
(477-1221)
(477-1122)
477-1511
475-5588
481-1400
Radio
Contact
477-0411
944-6666
473-1771
944-6600
946-8408
800-424-9300
911
911
911
911
911
MF04MC:M:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
EPfl OQH1t
-------
Emergency Medical Transportation Numbers
Medic I Ambulance Service 477-4123
Emergency Medical Transportation
Port of Houston Authority 672-8221
Colonial Funeral Home 472-4337
Earthman Funeral Home 472-5521
Forest Park Funeral Home 928-5141
Pasadena Funeral Home 473-6206
Weather Information
Forecast & Local Weather 228-8703 or
529-4444
Travelers and Recreation Weather 228-4427
Administration Weather Bureau 228-4427 or
331-3752
MF04MC:M:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
EPR 00412
-------
B. AUTHORIZED TO DIAL IN ON EMERGENCY CONFERENCE LINE
The emergency conference line can be reached by dialing the correct
number on the telephone system. There are 21 lines open for
conference calls, once you have received the message please hang Uo
so that others needing to use the conference line may do so.
Those authorized to use the conference line are as follows:
1. Managers
2. Emergency Response Team Members
MF04MC:M: 10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
3
EPR 00413
-------
C. EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT
- GENERAL: Fire Trucks With Hose
One CMC truck, a combination high pressure and volume, 750 gpm 4-1/2"
suction NST 2-1/2" discharge, with 1000' hose, 2-1/2" NST, and 400' hose,
NST. One - 20 Ib. CO2 unit, two - 150 bl. BC dry chemical.
One American LaFrance 85' Snorkel, 1500 gpm, 6" suction with 4-1/2"
adapter, 2-1/2 discharge, NST 1000' 2-1/2" hose, NST treads.
One Chlorine Institute Emergency Kit "B" for chlorine ton containers. This
kit is designed for use with the standard DOT 106A500X chlorine ton
container in chlorine service only. The Chlorine Institute Emergency Kit "B"
contains devices to stop leaks at valves and fusible plugs, and in sidewalls of
ton containers. Respiratory equipment is not included in the kit, but must
always be worn when investigating and correcting chlorine leaks. The kit,
packed in a steel box measuring 10" x 10" x 27", weighs approximately 110
Ibs.
FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
POLYPROPYLENE PLANT:
NUMBER TYPE SIZE
3 Halon 5 Ibs.
3 Halon 9 Ibs.
10 C02 15 Ibs.
10 C02 20 Ibs.
1 C02 50 Ibs.
45 Dry Chemical 30 Ibs.
3 Dry Chemical 150 Ibs.
1 Dry Chemical 350 Ibs.
10 Dry Chemical 20 Ibs.
POLYPROPYLENE DISTRIBUTION:
NUMBER TYPE SIZE
1 Dry Chemical 6 Ibs.
2 Dry Chemical 30 Ibs
2 -C02 20 Ibs.
K-RESIN PLANT
NUMBER TYPE SIZE
8 Dry Chemical 20 Ibs.
57 Dry Chemical 30 Ibs
7 Dry Chemical 150 Ibs.
3 Halon 7 |D$.
J C02 20 Ibs.
2 C02 50 Ibs.
6 C02 15 ib$.
MF04MC:M: 10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
EPfl 00414
-------
K-RESIN DISTRIBUTION
NUMBER
5
1
TYPE
Dry Chemical
Dry Chemical
SIZE
30 Ibs
20 Ibs
»6 WAREHOUSE (K-RESIN)
NUMBER
4
TYPE
Dry Chemical
SIZE
30 Ibs
SOLUTION PLANT I & II - REACTOR I
NUMBER
12
1
TYPE
Dry Chemical
Dry Chemical
SIZE
30 Ibs
150 Ibs
SOLUTION PLANT I & II - REACTOR II
NUMBER
1
22
3
1
2
TYPE
Dry Chemical
Dry Chemical
Dry Chemical
C02
C02
SIZE
350 Ibs.
30 Ibs.
150 Ibs.
20 Ibs.
15 Ibs.
MARLEX SOLUTION MDV
NUMBER
6
45
7
2
6
TYPE
Dry Chemical
Dry Chemical
Dry Chemical
C02
CO2
SIZE
150 Ibs.
30 Ibs.
20 Ibs.
20 Ibs.
15 Ibs.
MF04MC:M: 10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
EPR 00415
-------
MARLEX PLANTS Ml £. IV
NUMBER.
83
2
1
15
1
TYPE
Halon
co2
co2
Dry Chemical
Dry Chemical
Dry Chemical
co2
CO.
SIZE
9 Ibs.
20 Ibs.
50 Ibs.
30 Ibs.
150 Ibs.
20 Ibs.
15 Ibs.
10 Ibs.
MARLEX PLANT V
NUMBER
TYPE
138
13
A
27
9
5
1
LABORATORY
NUMBER
1
4
1
3
2
5
5
CARPENTER AND
NUMBER
4
1
Dry Chemical
Dry Chemical
Halon
CO,
co2
co2
Dry Chemical
TYPE
Dry Chemical
Dry Chemical
Dry Chemical
Halon
co2
co2
co2
PAINT SHOPS
TYPE
Dry Chemical
CO.
SIZE
30 Ibs
150 Ibs,
9 Ibs.
15 Ibs.
20 Ibs.
50 Ibs.
350 Ibs.
SIZE
150 Ibs,
20 Ibs.
30 Ibs.
9 Ibs.
5 Ibs.
15 Ibs.
10 Ibs.
SIZE
30 Ibs.
20 Ibs.
MF04MC:M:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
EPR 00416
-------
BOILER AREA
NUMBER- TYPE SIZE
12 Dry Chemical 30 Ibs,
5 Dry Chemical 20 Ibs
1 C02 20 Ibs.
2 CO2 15 Ibs.
S.J.W.T
NUMBER TYPE SIZE
5 Dry Chemical 30 Ibs.
2 C02 15 Ibs.
ETHYLENE UNLOADING I DOCK AREA
NUMBER TYPE SIZE
8
2
2
1
Dry Chemical
Dry Chemical
Dry Chemical
co2
30 Ibs.
20 Ibs.
150 Ibs.
20 Ibs.
INSTRUMENT t ELECTRIC SHOP
NUMBER
4
3
2
MAIN SHOP: WELDING, PUMP
NUMBER
10
TYPE
Dry Chemical
co2
co2
& TURBINE, MECH.
TYPE
Dry Chemical
SIZE
30 Ibs.
15 Ibs.
20 Ibs.
SIZE
30 Ibs.
ADMINISTRATION BUILDING
NUMBER ' TYPE SIZE
10 Dry Chemical 6 Ibs,
3 Dry Chemical 10 Ibs
3 CO2 15 Ibs.
5 Halon 7 Ibs.
1 Halon 9 Ibs.
MF04MC:M: 10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
EPR 00117
-------
SAFETY PERT. AND SECURITV
NUMBER.. TYP£ S|ZE
24 r\
« Dry Chemical 20 Ibs
3 SrV J:temical 30 Ibs
5 Dry Chemical 6 Ibs
f Dry Chemical g IK.
1 C02 15 ibs
MF04MC:M: 10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
8
EPR 004 IB
-------
PLANT FIRE PUMPS
SAFETY OFFICE
Chrysler Engine Drive (East Pump), 1000 gpm @ 100 psi. Replaced
by one diesel after September 1987.
Chrysler Engine Drive (West Pump), 1000 gpm @ 100 psi. Replaced
by one diesel after September 1987.
Electric Drive unit, 1000 gpm @ 100 psi.
MARLEX PLANT
1. Chrysler Engine Drive, 1000 gpm @ 100 psi.
2. Electric Drive unit (old), 1000 gpm @ 125 psi.
3. South Electric Drive unit, 1500 gpm @ 125 psi.
4. North Electric Drive unit, 1500 gpm @ 125 psi.
DOCK AREA
1. Electric Wharf Pump, (West), 1500 gpm @ 100 psi
2. Electric Wharf Pump, (East), 1500 gpm @ 100 psi
POLYPROPYLENE PLANT
1. Engine Drive unit, 1500 gpm @ 125 psi.
(Two diesel pumps after September 1987.)
SPRINKLER SYSTEMS
K-RESIN PLANT
1. Six Viking 6" Deluge valve, Model D-5 1977 (H.A.D.) with air
pressure between 25 and 27 psi, also water pressure between 85
and 100 psi.
2. Two CSC 6" Dry-Pipe valve, Model D 1977 with air pressure of 40
psi and water pressure between 85 and 95 psi.
POLYPROPYLENE PLANT
1. Four Grinnetl 6" Multiroll Deluge Rate-of-Rise System, Model C
(Pilot Line) with air pressure of 8 oz. and water pressure of 85
psi.
2. One CSC 6" Dry-Pipe valve, Model D 1978 with air pressure of 35
psi and water pressure of 85 psi.
MF04MC:M:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
9
CPfl 00419
-------
SPRINKLER SYSTEMS
MDV AREA
1. Two Viking 4" Deluge valve. Model D-5 1980 (H.A.D.) with air
pressure between 35 and 37 psi, water pressure of 90 psi.
MARLEX I t II AREA
1. Seven, Viking 6" Control valve. Model D 1956 Manual System with
water pressure at 85 psi.
PLANT IN
1. One, Automatic 6" Suprotex Deluge System, Model C, 1967 with air
pressure of 20 02. and water pressure of 95 psi.
2. Four, Grinnell 6" Multiroll Deluge System, Model C 1960 (HAD)
with air pressure between 16-30 02. and water pressure of 85 psi!
PLANT IV
1- ?£?' Automatic 6" Deluge Suprotex Deluge System 1967, Model C
(Pilot Lines) with air pressure of 26 02. and water pressure of 95
psi.
PLANT V
1. Ten, Grinnell 4" Multimatic valves, Model A-14, 1974 (Pilot Lines)
with air pressure of 30-35 psi, water pressure of 85 psi.
PAINT BOOTH SYSTEM
One 2" Gate valve and flow switch.
PLANT III. IV. £. V ETHYLENE RECOVERY UNIT
6" Delu9e valve' Model D'5 !977 (H.A.D.) with water pressure of
100 PSI.
MF04MC:M:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
10
-------
SPRINKLER SYSTEMS
NORTH WAREHOUSE
Two Grinnell F-300 Dry-pipe valve, 1978 with air pressure between 45-
62 psi, water pressure between 88-90 psi.
SOUTH BAGGING AND BLENDING BLDG.
One Viking 6" Dry-pipe valve, Model C, 1956 with air pressure of 32
psi, water pressure of TOO psi.
MONITOR NOZZLES
MARLEX 1 & 2:
10 Adjustable Fog Nozzles
2 Straight Bore Nozzles
MARLEX 3 £ 4:
8 Adjustable Fog Nozzles
1 Straight Bore Nozzle
MARLEX 5:
18 Adjustable Fog Nozzles
POLYPROPYLENE:
9 Adjustable Fog Nozzles
1 Straight Bore Nozzle
K-RESIN:
13 Adjustable Fog Nozzles
1 Straight Bore Nozzle
HYDROCARBON UNLOADING AREA:
4 Adjustable Fog Nozzles
MF04MC:M:10:87
REVISED: 06/-17/87
11
EPR 0042 I
-------
FIRE HOSE STORED IN AREA
K-RESIN:
2 - 200' hose cart of 1-1/2" hose
POLYPROPYLENE:
1 - 200' hose cart of 1-1/2" hose
1 - 200' hose cart of 2-1/2" hose
MARLEX 3 L 4:
1 - 200' hose cart of 2-1/2" hose
MARLEX 5:
2 - 200' hose cart of 2-1/2" hose
MARLEX 1 E. 2:
None
MF04MC:M:10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
12
EPH 00422
-------
VEHICLES
. SNORKLE - AMERICAN LAFRANCE
4 ea. Scott Air Pak II w/cylinder
3 Fire Axe
3 ea. Foam Enductor 2 1/2' x 1 1/2" 1%-6%
2 ea. "Wye" 21/2x1 1/2" Elkhart
2 ea. Nozzle 1 1/2" 125 gpm
3 ea. Nozzle 2 1/2" 500 gpm
3 ea. Double Female Adaptors
3 ea. Double Male Adaptors
300 gal Ansulite Foam 3%
2 section Hard Suction Hose 10* ea.
1 ea. Hose Clamp 2 1/2"
1 ea. Tool Box Complete
800' Hose 6" S??? Suction
3 ea. Wat - wall 2 1/2"
4 ea. 1 1/2"
700- Hose 1 1/2"
800' Hose 2 1/2"
1 ea. Hose clamp
2 ea. Flash Light
1 ea. Ladder - Roof Type Alum.
1 ea. Ladder, Extensions Alum.
2 ea. Portable Lights 120 volt
1 ea. Genator - Kohler Electric Plant
S/N 259812 Model # 1.5 MM 25
1 ea. CO, Fire Extinguisher 20*
MF04MC:M: 10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
13
EPR 00423
-------
VEHICLES
.- COMMUNICATION/RESCUE VEHICLE
1 ea. P.P. Rescue Kit
1 «a- Type B Chlorine Emergency kit
1 ea. Jobst - Jet Air Splints Set of 6
1 ea. Burn Dressing Kit *122
2 ea. Acid Suits (MSA)
6 ea. Gibbs Free running cam *l-1/2' rope
8 ea. Double Fully 3"
6 ea. Single Fully 1"
2 ea. Electric Wire Reel
1 ••• Hazardous Material Response kit Series "A"
1 ea. Opening Tool
1 ea. Generator Hale/Pump Model 3500 GE
Serial * 12325 E 8 hp 3.5 kw, 120/240 volts
3600 rpm, M260, Phase 1 P.P. 1, 29.2/14.6 amps
2 ea. Fire Intree Suits
12 ea. Scott Air Pak II cylinder 30 min.
6 «a- Rescue Bags w/rack, Hotness and webbing
2 ea. Rope 150' per/section
2 ea. Rope 300' per/section
1 ea. Radio w/154.280 Mutual Aid
153.320 Plane Dispatch
151.625 P.E.P
153.125 Boiler house
1 ea. Radio New CIMA System
1 ea. Bag/mask Resuscitator
1 ea. Dixie Jump Kit Complete
MF04MC:M: 10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
14
EPR 00424
-------
VEHICLES
CMC PUMPER EQUIPMENT
2 ea. "Wye" 21/2x1 1/2" Elkhart
1 ea. Wye 4 1/2" x 2 1/2" Elkhart
3 ea. Double Female
3 ea. Double Male
2 ea. Storz coupling 4 1/2" VST x 4 1/2" lock
4 ea. . 1 1/2", 125 gpm nozzle Elkhart
4 ea. 2 1/2", 500 gpm nozzle Elkhart
2 ea. Dry Chemical Extinguisher Ansul S150
1200' Red Chief 2 1/2" Hose
1100' Red Chief 1 1/2" Hose
2 ea. Wye 2 1/2" x 2 1/2" Elkhart
1 ea. Ladder Roof type wood
1 ea. Ladder extension wood
1 ea. Hose jacket
1 ea. Bolt cutter
4 ea. Wat-R-Wall 2 1/2"
1 ea. Dry Chemical Extinguisher 30*
1 ea. Foam Eductor 3%-6% Elkhart 2 1/2"
1 ea. Hose clamp
2 ea. Fire Axe
MF04MC:M: 10:87
REVISED: 06/17/87
15
EPfl 00425
------- |