&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Office o( Solid W««te
end Emergency Response
April1992
Report of the EPA
Hazardous Substances
Task Force
:%?: Printed on Recycled Paper
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REPORT OF THE EPA
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
TASK FORCE
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, DC 20460
April 30,1992
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES TASK FORCE MEMBERS vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY be
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Background 1
1.2 Hazardous Substances Under CERCLA 1
1.3 EPA and NRT Task Forces 2
1.4 Non-Task Force Activities 4
1.5 Organization of the Report 5
CHAPTER 2: REPORT FROM WORKING GROUP ONE:
BACKGROUND AND RELEASE TRENDS 7
2.1 Introduction 7
2.2 Case Study of the Cantara Loop Train Derailment 7
2.3 Notification Requirements 9
2.4 Analysis of Historical Releases 10
CHAPTER 3: REPORT FROM WORKING GROUP TWO:
SHORT-TERM INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS 19
3.1 Introduction 19
3.2 Criteria for Regulating Potentially Dangerous Substances in Transportation .... 20
3.3 Innovative Non-Regulatory Solutions 21
3.4 Outreach 23
CHAPTER 4: REPORT FROM WORKING GROUP THREE:
LONGER TERM REGULATORY SOLUTIONS 27
4.1 Introduction 27
4.2 Clarification of Reporting Requirements 28
4.3 Additional Reporting 29
4.4 Designation of Hazardous Substances 32
ACRONYM LIST 39
APPENDICES
A. CASE STUDY OF THE JULY 14,1991 CANTARA LOOP
TRAIN DERAILMENT
B. SUMMARY OF OPEN FORUM PRESENTATIONS
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report could not have been possible without the great time and effort put forth by all members of
the Hazardous Substances Task Force. Timothy Fields, Jr. provided able leadership in his capacity as Task
Force Chair. Special appreciation is extended to the chairpersons of each Working Group: David
Ouderkirk of the Response Operations Branch, chair of the Background and Release Trends Working
Group; Jim Jones of the Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances, chair of the Short-Tenn
Innovative Solutions Working Group; Barbara Hostage of the Response Standards and Criteria Branch,
chair of the Longer-Term Regulatory Solutions Working Group; and John Riley, Chief of the Response
Standards and Criteria Branch, chair of the Coordination and Communications Working Group.
Additionally, the contributions of Dorothy Canter, Science Adviser to the Assistant Administrator for
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, the many other EPA employees, and the representatives of the
Federal agencies participating with EPA in this effort are greatly appreciated.
The efforts of the Task Force are rewarded by the impact its work and recommendations reflected in
this report will have on the protection of human health and the environment in the future.
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HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES TASK FORCE MEMBERS
Timothy Fields, Jr., Chair EPA, Office of Emergency and Remedial Response (OERR)
Background and Release Trends Working Group
David Ouderkirk, Chair EPA, OERR
Jack Arthur National Library of Medicine (NLM)
Terry Brubaker EPA, Region 9
David Donaldson Department of Transportation (DOT), Office of Hazardous Materials
Safety (OHMS)
Lt J.G. Mike Ernesto U.S. Coast Guard
John Ferris EPA, Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO)
Kevin Garrahan EPA, Office of Research and Development (ORD)
Tom Gomez Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)
Henry Hudson EPA, Region 4
Bob Walter DOT, Transportation Systems Center
Tom Yatabe EPA, Region 4
Laurie Kermish EPA, Region 9
Short-Term Innovative Solutions Working Group
Jim Jones, Chair EPA, Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances (OPPTS)
Tom Beisswenger EPA, Office of General Counsel (OGC)
Kathleen Bishop EPA, CEPPO
Dorothy Canter EPA, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER)
Richard Carnevale Department of Agriculture (USDA), Food Safety and Inspection Service
Denny Dobbin National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS)
Jim Falk USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS)
Jill Gallagher EPA, Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP)
John Gustafcon EPA, CEPPO
Theresa Gwynn DOT, OHMS
Barbara Hostage EPA, OERR
Kevin McShane EPA, OERR
Craig Reed USDA, AMS
Jim Roelofe EPA, OPP
Ralph Ross USDA, Animal, Plant, and Health Inspection Service
Steve Specht Department of the Interior (DOI), Office of Environmental Affairs
(OEA)
Longer Term Regulator; Solutions Working Group
Barbara Hostage, Chair EPA, OERR
John Austin EPA, Office of Solid Waste (OSW)
Tom Beisswenger EPA, OGC
Dorothy Canter EPA, OSWER
Jim Cogliano EPA, ORD
John Dement NIEHS
John Ferris EPA, CEPPO
John Gale DOT, OHMS
Jill Gallagher EPA, OPP
Gene Gilbert USDA, Soil Conservation Service
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HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES TASK FORCE MEMBERS (Continued)
Ricardo Gomez
Frank Gostomski
Hollis Hall
Henry Hudson
Vera Hudson
Jim Jones
Larry Longanecker
Bill Opfer
Gerain Perry
Christopher Prins
Craig Reed
Jim Roelofs
Steve Specht
Sandra S. Susten
Dave Topping
Hubert Waiters
Dave Williams
USDA, Extension Service (ES)
EPA, Office of Water (OW)
USDA.ES
EPA, Region 4
NLM
EPA.OPPTS
EPA, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics (OPPT)
USDA, Forest Service (FS)
EPA, OERR
EPA, OSWER
USDA, AMS
EPA, OPP
DOI, OEA
ATSDR
EPA, OSW
EPA, OERR
EPA, OPPT
Coordination and Communication Working Group
John Riley, Chair
John Gustafson
Kevin McShane
Douglas Parker
Members -at-Large
Gerald Clifford
Sandra Connors
Becky Daiss
William Farland
Bill Hanson
Kathy Kaufman
Joseph Lafornara
James O'Steen
Jim Parochetti
Richard Parry
Cynthia Puskar
Nancy Ragsdale
Vanessa Rodriguez
Joe Schive
Cecilia Smith
Pat Spirer
David Tordoff
Wendy Wagner
EPA, OERR
EPA, CEPPO
EPA, OERR
USDA.FS
EPA, OERR
EPA, Office of Enforcement
EPA,ORD
EPA.ORD
EPA, OSWER
EPA, Office of Air and Radiation
EPA, OERR
DOT, OHMS
USDA, Cooperative State Research Service
USDA, Agricultural Research Service
EPA,OW
USDA, Office of Science and Education
EPA, CEPPO
EPA, Office of Waste Programs Enforcement (OWPE)
EPA, OWPE
DOT, OHMS
EPA, Region 1
USDA, OGC
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
BACKGROUND
On July 14, 1991, several Southern Pacific
railway cars derailed on the Caniara Loop near
Dunsmuir, California! One of these railway cars
ruptured and released approximately 19,500 gallons
of the herbicide metam sodium into the
Sacramento River. As a result of the spill, the
surrounding environment along a 45-mile stretch
of the river and portions of Lake Shasta were
significantly affected, more than 200,000 fish were
killed, and several hundred people were treated for
eye, skin, and respiratory irritation.
Metam sodium is not a listed hazardous
substance under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), aor was the metam sodium shipment
regulated by the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) as a hazardous material
pursuant to the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act (HMTA). However, its release
was subject to CERCLA notification and liability
provisions because the metam sodium rapidly
hydrolyzed and decomposed into at least three
specifically listed CERCLA hazardous substances,
and because the released substance became a
hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA).
Early assessments of the situation failed to
indicate that a release of metam sodium had
occurred. Once the release was discovered,
however, an incident command system was
established, under the direction of the California
Department of Fish and Game, to coordinate the
response efforts of more than 60 different Federal
and State agencies and hundreds of response
personnel. In addition to participating at the
scene, EPA issued an enforcement order to
Southern Pacific, requiring that the railroad
undertake response actions. EPA also accessed the
CERCLA Trust Fund to implement a plume
interdiction operation at Lake Shasta.
THE HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES TASK
FORCE
Although this spill of metam sodium did
trigger the notification, response, and liability
provisions of CERCLA, it points to the fact that
many chemicals that are potentially hazardous to
human health and the environment are not
specifically listed under CERCLA and do not meet
DOT'S criteria as hazardous materials, even though
such chemicals may pose a significant hazard upon
release. As such, the spill raised public concerns
that the regulatory framework of the Federal
government often overlooks many chemicals that
are, or potentially could be, hazardous to human
health and the environment It called into
question the ability of the Federal government to
prevent and respond to future releases similar to
the Cantara Loop release.
To respond to these concerns, EPA Assistant
Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency
Response (OSWER), Don Clay, in consultation
with the EPA Assistant Administrator for
Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances, Linda
Fisher, established the Hazardous Substances Task
Force. The task force was charged with examining
the issues associated with the expansion of the
CERCLA hazardous substance list, as well as
identifying public health and environmental
hazards for purposes of further regulating
environmentally hazardous material in
transportation. The task force also was instructed
to look beyond the Agency's traditional regulatory
framework to identify innovative approaches that
would enhance protection of human health and the
environment.
Although the focus of the task force was on
EPA responsibilities and additional activities that
could be taken by the Agency, the problems that
arose were not solely within EPA's authority and
expertise. Thus the task force was a coordinated
Federal effort, involving representatives from
several Headquarters offices and Regions within
EPA and a variety of other Federal entities: the
Departments of Transportation, Agriculture, and
Interior, the U.S. Coast Guard; the National
Institute for Environmental Health Sciences; the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry,
and the National Library of Medicine.
The task force established four working
groups. Briefly, the working groups and their key
responsibilities were as follows:
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The Background and Release Trends Working
Group, established to provide the technical
data and analyses necessary to identify and
characterize past releases.
The Short-Term Innovative Solutions Working
Group, which focused on (1) identification of
ecological and human health criteria that DOT
may consider for use in identifying substances
to be regulated as hazardous materials in
transportation, and (2) short-term public
information, training, and information
exchange opportunities.
The Long-Term Regulatory Solutions Working
Group, whose objective was to analyze existing
statutory and regulatory authorities and
identify and develop regulatory options for
addressing releases of potentially dangerous
substances, including those not currently
regulated as CERCLA hazardous substances
or DOT hazardous materials.
The Coordination and Communications
Working Group, established to ensure the
sharing of information among the working
groups and to develop a communications
strategy for the task force's findings. This
working group also served as the point of
coordination and contact with related activities
being undertaken by the National Response
Team (see below).
In addition to the EPA Task Force, Assistant
Administrator Don Clay requested that the
National Response Team (NRT) form an
interagency task force to evaluate the Federal role
in regulating substances that pose human health
and environmental threats and can result in
significant natural resource damages, and to
recommend actions for improving interagency
coordination on these issues. The work of the
NRT Task Force, which was chaired by DOT, was
coordinated through the EPA Task Force. The
NRT Task Force Report will be issued separately,
after it has been reviewed by the 15 Federal
agencies comprising the NRT.
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS
In this report, the task force makes a number
of recommendations. The key recommendations
fall into three broad areas and are summarized in
Exhibit ES-1.
TASK FORCE ACHIEVEMENTS
In the process of carrying out its work and
developing recommendations, the Hazardous
Substances Task Force completed a number of
activities. These accomplishments consist of both
short-term, stand-alone achievements and
achievements that lay the ground work for action
on the various task force recommendations.
Short-Term Achievements
The short-term, completed achievements of the
task force include:
7 Designation of a workgroup to develop
ecological and human health criteria for
consideration by DOT in identifying
potentially dangerous substances for regulation
as hazardous materials because they may pose
a significant environmental or human health
hazard if released during transportation
accidents.
J Convening of an Open Forum for
representatives of interested government
agencies, industry, labor, and environmental
groups, and the general public to exchange
information about initiatives and other
activities that could be taken to enhance the
prevention and control of releases of
potentially dangerous substances.
7 Development of a draft Federal Register
notice that clarifies and reiterates the
requirement under CERCLA to immediately
report releases of substances that form
ignitable, corrosive, reactive, or toxic wastes
(i.e., RCRA characteristic wastes) when
released into the environment Metam sodium
is an example of such a substance.
J Development, publication, and distribution of
a technical bulletin providing information on
metam sodium, its uses, its environmental and
human health effects, and ways in which it is
regulated.
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EXHIBIT ES-1
KEY TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS
Development of criteria to identify potentially dangerous substances.
Finalize development of the ecological and human health criteria for transportation incidents, and provide
support to DOT in toe development of appropriate hazardous materials transportation regulations.
Resolve issues related to designation of Extremely Hazardous Substances as CERCLA hazardous substances
prior to proceeding with the further development of designation criteria under CERCLA
Thoroughly review the approach utilized by the task force in developing screening criteria for hazardous
substances designation, and consider, as necessary and appropriate, the convening of an interagency workgroup
to develop additional criteria or take other actions to refine or expand upon that work.
Expanded availability of Information about potentially dangerous substances.
Work with groups representing chemical manufacturers, NIOSH, and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) in the Department of Labor to ensure that Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs)
include any information that may be pertinent to: (1) possible breakdown products that may form and (2) any
hazardous characteristics (e.g., ignitability, reactivity, or corrosivity) that may be displayed when substances are
released into the environment.
Develop additional advisories on potentially dangerous substances for distribution to State emergency response
commissions (SERCs), local emergency planning committees (LEPCs), local governments, unions, the general
public, and public and private responders and response organizations. Topics could include information on
substances that are most toxic, released most frequently, or in the greatest quantity, or those that are responsible
for the most injuries, death, or property and environmental damage.
Enhanced notification and response procedures and capabilities.
Expand centralized reporting to the National Response Center (rather than separate reports to a variety of
governmental agencies), and develop a mechanism for updating and correcting initial reports of information on
releases of potentially dangerous substances.
Work with industry trade associations to promote voluntary reporting to the National Response Center of any
release that results in "significant harm," including all releases that cause death, injury, environmental damage,
or exceed some specified quantity (e.g., 10,000 pounds).
Develop and make widely available regional, State, and local contingency plans that clearly and simply delineate
the roles and responsibilities of agencies, departments, and other organizations that may be involved in an
emergency response.
Widely disseminate comprehensive information on available training opportunities for emergency responders, and
promote greater coordination among training providers to make the most of existing training resources. Provide,
as necessary, more and better training to workers on the use of contingency plans during an emergency release.
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y Development of an advisory to alert
transporters and first responders of the
hazards and reporting requirements that may
arise when there is a release of substances that
rapidly form or become CERCLA hazardous
substances when they are released into the
environment
Long-Term Achievements
In addition to these specific and significant
accomplishments, a number of additional
achievements will lay the ground work for future
actions taken as a result of task force
recommendations. Specifically, the task force
completed the following additional activities:
y A case study of the Cantara Loop incident,
which reviews the response effort at the
Federal, State, and local levels, and illustrates
that there is a need for contingency plans
throughout the country that are clearer and
more direct in assigning responsibilities, as
well as increased training of workers who may
have to respond to releases of potentially
dangerous substances.
y A review of State and Federal requirements to
report releases of potentially danger
substances that shows some inconsistencies in
different reporting requirements and the
potential for confusion and duplication.
y An analysis of historical releases of potentially
dangerous substances that have caused death,
injury, or serious environmental damage.
y Identification of several regulatory and
guidance options that would enhance the
likelihood that the National Response Center
would be notified of any release that directly
causes significant adverse effects to human
health or the environment.
y Evaluation of different approaches for
designating additional chemicals as hazardous
substances under CERCLA, including (1)
immediately designating a chemical that has
caused significant damage as a result of a
release, and (2) designating the MARPOL
Annex III pollutants (which include metam
sodium).
y Development and evaluation of an overall
strategy for identifying chemicals that should
be considered for designation as hazardous
substances under CERCLA, including an
analysis of the RTECS, AQUIRE, and
MERCK databases to identify substances that
pose acute, chronic, and carcinogenic human
health hazards or aquatic toricity hazards, or
that exhibit characteristics of ignitability or
reactivity. Preliminary analyses indicate that
between 1,500 and 2,000 substances have been
identified as potentially dangerous, warranting
further evaluation.
IMPLEMENTATION OF TASK FORCE
RECOMMENDATIONS
EPA is moving forward expeditiously to
implement the task force recommendations. The
EPA Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics
(OPPT) will continue to take lead responsibility
for developing ecological and non-acute human
health criteria for identifying potentially dangerous
substances in transportation so that DOT may
consider incorporating the criteria into its
hazardous materials regulations. OPPT also will
take lead responsibility for coordinating EPA
support to the DOT rulemaking effort.
The EPA Office of Emergency and Remedial
Response (OERR) will continue to develop
criteria for designating additional chemicals as
hazardous substances under CERCLA. The
criteria may be used to identify high priority
substances for EPA advisories, as well as possible
designation under CERCLA.
OPPT will work with OERR to revise the
draft policy statement interpreting section 8(e) of
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to
enhance the likelihood that the National Response
Center will receive reports of releases of
potentially dangerous substances. OPPT also will
take the lead in requiring manufacturers to
communicate to potential users that their product
poses an environmental hazard; this
communication may be accomplished through
product labels or information on MSDSs.
OERR will take the lead in developing
additional advisories and guidance documents to
assist facilities in complying with existing CERCLA
notification requirements. The clarification notice
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also will be published in the Federal Register.
clarifying CERCLA notification and liability
provisions that apply to substances that become
RCRA characteristic wastes when released into the
environment. The notice also may address the
CERCLA notification requirements that pertain to
potentially dangerous substances that rapidly form
CERCLA hazardous substances when released,
OERR will convene a workgroup to identify
options for improving the quality of EPA data on
release incidents, effects, and response, including
expanding ERNS to include information
confirming data supplied during the initial release
reports to the National Response Center.
The EPA Chemical Emergency Preparedness
and Prevention Office (CEPPO) will work with the
Regional Title III Coordinators to ensure that
local emergency exercises test both the procedural
and technical features of the LEPC plans, and will
work to ensure a more active role for Regional
Response Teams in reviewing LEPC plans as well
as area plans under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
Finally, OSWER will ensure that hazardous
materials training curricula include procedures for
notification as well as information on technical
issues facing transporters in the event of a
hazardous materials release, and will work through
the NRT Training Committee to ensure that
Federal training courses cover both procedural and
technical issues.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
On July 14, 1991, a diesel locomotive and six
Southern Pacific railway cars derailed on the
Cantara Loop near Dunsmuir, California, falling
25 feet down a rocky embankment into the
Sacramento River. Although Southern Pacific first
reported the incident as a minor train derailment
to the National Response Center, it was learned
several hours later that one of the railway cars
carrying the herbicide metam sodium had ruptured.
Approximately 19,500 gallons of metam sodium
spilled into the river through several holes in the
wall of the tank car. As an immediate precaution,
the Sheriffs Department issued an advisory to the
citizens of Dunsmuir to stay away from the river
and to close their windows. Following the metam
sodium spill, an incident command system was
established that, under the direction of the
California Department of Fish and Game,
successfully coordinated the response efforts of
more than 60 different Federal and State agencies
and hundreds of response personnel.
The tank car carrying metam sodium was not
marked for special handling, but was labeled "weed
kl" for weed killer, and the bill of lading showed
that the car carried metam sodium. As a
herbicide, metam sodium is a soil disinfectant that
is used to treat soil fungi, nematodes, and soil
insects. Its spill had a devastating effect on the
surrounding environment, heavily damaging a 45-
mile stretch of the Sacramento River and portions
of Lake Shasta, into which the river flows. In
addition, more than 200,000 fish were killed and
several hundred people were treated for eye, skin,
and respiratory irritation. Because harmful
reproductive effects (i.e., neural tube defects) may
be attributed to exposure to metam sodium,
pregnant women in the area in their first trimester
of pregnancy were advised to consult with their
doctors.
Although metam .sodium is not specifically
designated as a hazardous substance under
CERCLA, when released into the water it rapidly
hydrolyzed and decomposed into several different
CERCLA hazardous substances, including
hydrogen sulfide, monomethylamine, and carbon
disulfide. In addition, when released, the metam
sodium became a hazardous waste because it
exhibited the RCRA characteristic of reactivity,
and thus became a CERCLA hazardous substance
as well. Because, when released, metam sodium
rapidly formed a CERCLA hazardous substance
and became a RCRA hazardous waste, EPA issued
an enforcement order to Southern Pacific under
section 106 of CERCLA requiring that the
company undertake appropriate response actions.
In addition, EPA used the CERCLA Trust Fund
to implement a plume interdiction operation at
Lake Shasta.
Implications of the Cantara Loop Incident
The circumstances of the Cantara Loop
incident did trigger the notification, response, and
liability provisions under CERCLA; however, the
incident points out that the regulatory framework
of the Federal government may overlook certain
substances that, when released, are, or potentially
could be, hazardous to human health and the
environment At a minimum, there are many
potentially dangerous substances that are not
CERCLA hazardous substances, and have never
been considered for listing under CERCLA. In
addition, the DOT regulations governing hazardous
materials in transportation have not covered many
substances that pose primarily environmental
hazards. In its implementation of HMTA, DOT
has focused on acute human health effects
(principally human lethality).
As the metam sodium spill clearly illustrates,
certain substances may, when released, rapidly
degrade or hydrolyze into substances that are
hazardous to human health and the environment.
Thus, the metam sodium spill raised the question
of why potentially dangerous substances, such as
metam sodium, are neither listed as hazardous
substances under CERCLA nor regulated in
transportation as hazardous materials under
HMTA.
1.2 HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES UNDER
CERCLA
As used in this report, the terms potentially
dangerous substances, hazardous materials, and
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hazardous substances refer to distinct sets of
chemical substances:
The term potentially dangerous substances is
the generic term used in this report to refer
broadly to all chemical substances that have the
potential to cause harm to human health, welfare,
or the environment.
The term hazardous materials refers to those
chemicals or categories of chemicals, such as
explosives, that are regulated in transportation by
the DOT under HMTA
The term hazardous substances refers only to
the subset of hazardous materials that are listed by
EPA under CERCLA Ail CERCLA hazardous
substances are also automatically listed and
regulated by DOT as hazardous materials.
Designation Under CERCIA
CERCLA is the primary Federal statute by
which Federal government officials are notified of
the release of a hazardous substance, allowing
them to evaluate and carry out response actions.
Under CERCLA section 104, EPA has the
authority to respond to a release or a threatened
release of a hazardous substance, or a pollutant or
contaminant that may present an imminent and
substantial danger to the public health or welfare.
Although EPA has the authority to respond to all
such releases, only releases of CERCLA hazardous
substances trigger CERCLA's notification and
liability requirements under CERCLA sections 103
and 107, respectively.
A substance can become a "hazardous
substance" under CERCLA through one of three
mechanisms. First, section 101(14) of CERCLA
defines as hazardous substances those substances
that are specifically listed or designated under
section 307 or 311 of the Clean Water Act (CWA),
section 112 of the Clean Air Act (CAA), or
section 3001 of RCRA, and those for which action
has been taken under section 7 of the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA). When a
substance is added by regulation or law to any of
these lists, it automatically becomes a CERCLA
hazardous substance.
Second, a substance may become a CERCLA
hazardous substance if it is a waste that exhibits
any of the RCRA characteristics of ignitability,
corrosivity, reactivity, or toricity.
Finally, CERCLA section 102 authorizes EPA
to designate as a hazardous substance any
additional chemical element, compound, mixture,
solution, or substance that, when released, may
present a substantial danger to public health or
welfare or the environment.
IMPLICATIONS OF DESIGNATION
OF A CHEMICAL AS A CERCIA
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE
Persons in charge of a facility or vessel
must immediately notify the National
Response Center of the release of any
CERCLA hazardous substance that
equals or exceeds the reportable
quantity.
Releases of hazardous substances must
be reported to State emergency
response commissions and local
emergency planning committees.
Responsible parties are liable for the
costs of cleanup and any injury to or
loss of natural resources that result
from a CERCLA hazardous substance
release or potential release.
CERCLA hazardous substances also
are automatically listed and regulated
as hazardous materials by DOT.
13 EPA AND NRT TASK FORCES
Following the Cantara Loop incident,
Representative Barbara Boxer, Chair of the House
Subcommittee on Government Activities and
Transportation, held two hearings to investigate
what steps could be taken at the Federal level to
increase the likelihood that incidents similar to
Cantara Loop would not happen in the future.
At the first of these hearings held on July 31,
1991, Don Clay, EPA Assistant Administrator for
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, expressed
concern that there are many potentially dangerous
substances in commerce that could pose a threat to
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human health and the environment and that
currently are not CERCLA hazardous substances.
At a second hearing held on October 3,1991,
Linda Fisher, EPA Assistant Administrator for
Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances,
testified about the pesticide programs' information
on the adverse effects of metam sodium. In
addition, Alan Roberts, Associate Administrator
for Hazardous Materials Safety in the Research
and Special Programs Administration at DOT
testified that his agency relies on EPA to identify
the environmental and chronic human health
hazards posed by various chemicals.
More broadly, the implications of the Cantara
Loop release indicated that Federal regulatory
agencies, in general, need to explore other
approaches beyond the traditional regulatory
framework for acting to prevent releases of
substances known to be dangerous to human
health or the environment, and to improve
responses to releases of such substances. The
testimony provided at these hearings supplied the
impetus for the formation of both EPA's
Hazardous Substances Task Force and the NRTs
Hazardous Materials Task Force.
The EPA Hazardous Substances Task Force
In responding to the concerns raised by the
Cantara Loop spill, the EPA Hazardous
Substances Task Force was created to explore the
short-term and long-term steps EPA could take to
prevent or mitigate the likelihood that releases like
the metam sodium spill will occur in the future,
and to better respond to them if they do occur.
The EPA Task Force was composed of
representatives from several offices and Regions
within EPA and a variety of other Federal entities,
including:
Department of Transportation
Department of Agriculture
Department of the Interior
The U.S. Coast Guard
The National Institute for Environmental
Health Sciences
The Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry
The National Library of Medicine.
To carry out its mission, the task force
examined the issues associated with both using the
traditional regulatory approach of expanding the
CERCLA hazardous substance list, as well as
looking at approaches for providing controls that
are beyond the Agency's traditional regulatory
framework. Within the task force, four working
groups were established, each with its own defined
set of activities and responsibilities. In practice,
however, many of these activities were inter-
dependent.
The Roles of the Four Working Groups
To identify and define the broad scope of the
problem of chemical releases, the Background and
Release Trends Working Group was asked to
provide technical data and analyses that would
characterize historical releases of potentially
dangerous substances. Because the metam sodium
spill involved a transportation accident and
because DOT relies on EPA to identify potentially
dangerous substances that pose deleterious chronic
human health or environmental hazards, the Short-
Term Innovative Solutions Working Group was
asked to focus on identifying ecological and human
health criteria that DOT may consider
incorporating into regulations under HMTA. In
addition, the working group was charged with
identifying short-term innovative and non-
regulatory approaches for controlling the release of
potentially dangerous substances, such as providing
public information, enhanced and more frequent
training, and information exchange opportunities.
The Hazardous Substances Task Force also
was committed to examining regulatory options for
addressing releases of potentially dangerous
substances that are currently not covered by the
existing Federal regulatory framework, as well as
those that are so regulated; therefore, the Long-
Term Regulatory Solutions Working Group was
asked to analyze existing statutory and regulatory
authorities to assess how this could best be
accomplished. The Coordination and
Communications Working Group was given
responsibility for ensuring that information was
shared among the various working groups and for
providing a liaison between EPA's Hazardous
Substances Task Force and the NRTs Hazardous
Materials Task Force to coordinate the efforts and
activities of the two groups.
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KEY DATES
July 14.1991: The Canta*., Loop spill occurs
when a Southern Pacific railway tank car derails,
releasing 19,500 gallons of metam sodium into
toe Sacramento River.
July 31.1991; Fust hearing held by the
Subcommittee on Government Activities and
Transportation to investigate ways of addressing
concerns raised by Cantara Loop release.
Testimony is provided by Don Clay, EPA
Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and
Emergency Response and Alan Roberts, DOT
Associate Administrator for Hazardous
Materials Safety in the Research and Special
Programs Administration.
September 4.1991; The EPA Hazardous
Substances Task Force convenes for its first
organizational and planning meeting. The EPA
task force subsequently met four additional
times over the next four months.
September 5.1991; The NRT Hazardous
Materials Task Force convenes for its first
organizational and planning meeting. The NRT
task force subsequently met eight additional
times over the next five months.
October 3.1991; Second hearing held by the
Subcommittee on Government Activities and
Transportation. Testimony is provided by Alan
Roberts of DOT and Linda Fisher, EPA
Assistant Administrator for Prevention,
Pesticides, and Toxic Substances.
October 29.1991; The Open Forum is held to
explore innovative, non-regulatory solutions for
preventing or mitigating releases of potentially
dangerous substances into the environment.
January 31.1992; The Interim Task Force
Report on the findings and recommendations of
the EPA Hazardous Substances Task Force is
completed and presented to Don Clay and
Linda Fisher.
February 3.1992; The Draft Task Force
Report on the findings and recommendations of
the NRT Hazardous Materials Task Force is
completed and presented to the NRT Task
Force members.
April 1992; The Final EPA and NRT Task
Force Reports on toe findings and
recommendations of the EPA and NRT Task
Forces are completed.
The NRT Hazardous Materials Task Force
While EPA's Hazardous Substances Task
Force focused on EPA's role in addressing releases
of potentially dangerous substances, at the request
of Eton Clay, a parallel effort was carried out by
the NRTs Hazardous Materials Task Force. The
objective of the NRT Task Force was to evaluate
the broader arena of the Federal role in regulating
potentially dangerous substances that, if released,
pose a threat to human health and the
environment and can result in significant natural
resource damages. Chaired by DOT, the NRT
Task Force is developing a compendium of Federal
regulatory programs that are implemented under
the auspices of various Federal agencies.
The compendium will describe which Federal
agencies control or regulate potentially dangerous
substances and what substances are regulated; the
purpose of each regulatory agency's control; what
criteria are used by various agencies to recognize,
classify, and control potentially dangerous
substances; what regulatory and functional
relationships exist among Federal regulatory
agencies with respect to these activities; and what
gaps and overlap among agencies exist in
recognizing, classifying, and controlling potentially
dangerous substances.
Finally, based on its findings, the NRT Task
Force will submit a report assessing these
regulatory deficiencies and recommending
approaches for improving interagency coordination
and control among Federal agencies.
1.4 NON-TASK FORCE ACTIVITIES
In addition to the efforts and activities of the
EPA and NRT Task Forces, other activities and
initiatives have been carried out at the Federal and
Regional level, as well as by the State of California
in response to the Cantara Loop spill.
Federal-level Activities: EPA and DOT
At the Federal level, both EPA and DOT have
implemented initiatives outside of the respective
activities of the two task forces to address the
metam sodium spill. EPA's Office of Prevention,
Pesticides, and Toxic Substances (OPPTS) has
implemented new restrictions on the use of metam
sodium as a pesticide, including eliminating its
registration for use by homeowners. In addition,
OPPTS has worked to establish an agreement for
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additional requirements for protective clothing for
people involved in commercial applications of
metam sodium and is continuing to evaluate the
status of metam sodium under the Federal
Insecticide. Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA). Separately, DOT has published a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking for regulating under
HMTA the MARPOL Annex III list of marine
pollutants, on which metam sodium is listed (57
FR 3853, January 31, 1992).
State of California Activities
In addition to immediately responding to the
Cantara Loop spill, the State of California took
the lead in implementing response actions, cleanup
of the spill, and monitoring the impact of the spill.
The California Regional Water Quality Control
Board is monitoring water quality in the area; the
California Department of Health Services is
conducting a health effects survey and establishing
a database with the help of ATSDR; the California
Department of Fish and Game has issued a draft
Damage Assessment Plan; and the California
Public Utilities Commission is formally
investigating the circumstances surrounding the
derailment.
L5 ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
This report is organized along the lines of the
working groups that made up the task force.
Following this introductory chapter, there are
chapters for each of Working Groups 1, 2, and 3.
Working Group 4, as pan of its coordination and
communication functions, has been responsible for
the production of the report itself. Each of the
next three chapters presents a complete discussion
of the working group, its objectives, and its specific
activities. Accomplishments of each working group
are described in detail. Each issue area
investigated is described and findings and
recommendations are presented. Following the
main body of this report is a list of acronyms. This
report also includes two appendices, representing
discrete significant work products developed by
individual working groups in the course of their
activities that may be of particular interest to
readers of this report. Other discrete work
products of the task force, such as the preliminary
analysis of CERCLA designation criteria, will be
utilized by EPA to assist in the implementation of
task force recommendations.
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CHAPTER 2
REPORT FROM WORKING GROUP ONE:
BACKGROUND AND RELEASE TRENDS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of Working Group 1 was
to gather data on past releases of potentially
dangerous substances, and to analyze the data to
identify trends and characteristics common to those
releases that resulted in damage to human health,
welfare, or the environment This analysis
provides a context in which the metam sodium
spill and other releases of potentially dangerous
substances may be viewed. The working group's
data collection effort involved preparation of a
case study of the July 14,1991, Cantara Loop train
derailment near Dunsmuir, California; a review of
Federal and State notification requirements; and
retrieval of reports of chemical releases from
various databases. As a result of this effort, the
working group provided:
A determination of whether there are
adequate notification requirements to ensure
appropriate responses to releases of potentially
dangerous substances;
An analysis of past releases of potentially
dangerous substances that may have caused
substantial damage to human health or the
environment; and
A list of substances that pose a potential
threat to human health or the environment
and may be candidates for designation as
hazardous substances under CERCLA, or the
subject of advisories about potentially
dangerous substances.
Working Group 1 accessed and analyzed data
and information from multiple sources, which
required close cooperation among representatives
from many different Federal and State agencies
and departments. The working group was chaired
by David Ouderkirk of the Emergency Response
Division in EPA's Office of Emergency and
Remedial Response. The achievements of the
working group are summarized in the
accompanying box.
ACHIEVEMENTS
The review and analysis of the Cantara Loop
train derailment and historical release data
provided valuable lessons in emergency response,
and information on the quantity and frequency of
releases of potentially dangerous substances.
A Case Stud? of the July 14. 1991,
Cantara Loop Train Derailment - This
review of the response effort at the Federal,
State, and local levels provided insights into
how emergency responses can be improved
in the future.
A Review of Notification Requirements
- This review of Federal and State
requirements for reporting releases " of
potentially dangerous substances shows some
inconsistencies and the potential for
confusion and duplication.
An Analysis of Historical Releases and
a Short List of Potentially Dangerous
Substances - The analysis resulted in a list
of potentially dangerous substances that,
when released, may have caused death or
injury in the past.
22 CASE STUDY OF THE CANTARA LOOP
TRAIN DERAILMENT
To provide a context in which to understand
and evaluate the task force's findings and
recommendations, and to determine whether there
were any direct lessons to be learned from the
incident, Working Group 1 conducted a case study
of the July 14, 1991, Cantara Loop train
derailment near Dunsmuir, California, in which
approximately 19,500 gallons of metam sodium
spilled into the Sacramento River. The case study,
which is provided in Appendix A, summarizes the
uses for and regulation of metam sodium; describes
the emergency and long-term response activities
associated with the spill; and provides available
information on the health and environmental
effects of the Cantara Loop release.
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The working group prepared the case study by
reviewing and comparing numerous reports and
incident summaries issued by various Federal,
State, and local agencies and departments, and
private industry; Congressional testimonies; news
releases; and newspaper articles.
Two key issues made consolidation of the
information into an unambiguous and complete
chronology of events challenging. The first is that
the several and varied sources of information often
contained contradictory and/or dissimilar
information, and several aspects of the release are
subject to interpretation. In particular,
contradictions were found most frequently among
accounts of when the spill was discovered and
when notification of the spill was provided to the
appropriate response agencies.
A second issue that influences any findings is
that conclusive data on the environmental and
human health effects of the metam sodium spill
are still being collected and analyzed. For
example, the effect of exposure to the vapors of
metam sodium and its breakdown products on
pregnancy outcomes among Dunsmuir women
cannot be known until all of the women give birth.
Thereafter, an analysis of the incidence of birth
defects after the spill will be required to compare
post-spill incidence to the normal incidence. In
addition, several years will be required before
other potential adverse health effects (e.g., learning
disabilities) may be assessed with respect to the
Cantara Loop spill. Similarly, a natural resources
damage assessment being conducted by the
California Department of Fish and Game will not
be completed for at least a year.
Findings
The working group devoted substantial effort
to reviewing selected State and local emergency
response contingency plans, as well as the specific
plan and response effort surrounding the metam
sodium spill near Dunsmuir, California. Although
Federal, State, and local agencies made important
contributions to response efforts, the Cantara
Loop release raises questions about the ability of
responsible agencies to effectively deal with certain
emergencies involving potentially dangerous
substances, particularly in remote areas. Review of
the sequence of events immediately following the
release indicates that there was some uncertainty
about appropriate response activities, and also
suggests the need for manufacturers and/or
transporters of potentially dangerous substances to
provide personnel with more training about
chemical properties and safety.
The working group found that clearer, less
complicated contingency plans could alleviate some
of the uncertainties associated with response
activities. A review of selected contingency plans
throughout the country revealed that persons
charged with responding to and mitigating
chemical release emergencies might easily become
overwhelmed by information presented in the
plans. Some of the plans, for example, are
voluminous collections of emergency response
instructions designed more appropriately for pre-
emergency education. The plans do not always
present a clear and direct explanation of the
appropriate sequence of actions to be taken in the
event of a release of a potentially dangerous
substance. The National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP),
promulgated under the authority of CERCLAand
the Clean Water Act, seeks to do just this by
providing a relatively concise overview of how site
assessment and emergency response activities will
be carried out in Federal-lead situations.
The working group also concluded that
development of a clear explanation of the
delineation of the roles and responsibilities of
various responding agencies and organizations
could be useful in ensuring a unified and
comprehensive response to a release. The
response to the Cantara Loop incident involved
coordinating the activities of more than 60 public
and private agencies. In the hours immediately
following the derailment, there was some
indication of confusion as to who was in charge.
Confusion can delay the overall response process.
Local response authorities, particularly in remote
or sparsely populated areas, bear much of the
responsibility as first responders. As regional,
State, or Federal involvement increases, however,
primary response authority must be effectively
transferred based on predetermined roles and
responsibilities.
The lines of authority for responses to releases
of CERCLA hazardous substances may serve as a
useful model for response networks involved in
responding to releases of other potentially
dangerous substances. The NCP outlines an
organizational structure for the Federal response
system composed of several different entities with
clearly defined authorities and responsibilities.
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National policy making, preparedness planning,
and coordination are the responsibility of the
multi-agency National Response Team (NRT).
Regional Response Teams are designed to serve in
much the same way as the NRT, except on a
regional level. Various special teams, such as the
National Strike Force Coordination Center, have
been created to provide specialized response
support in a variety of areas, such as identifying
and mobilizing public and private response
resources. National response action is coordinated
by a predesignated On-Scene Coordinator (OSC),
who serves as the lead Federal official at the scene
of a release, and is responsible for taking whatever
actions are necessary, consistent with Federal law,
to remove the threat posed by the release. All
other entities in the national response system
support the OSC in their areas of expertise during
a response action.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Develop and Make Available
Contingency Plans that are Clearer and
Mo re DI r e c t I n Assign! o g
Responsibilities! States, regions, and
localities should develop in a coordinated
fashion and make available contingency plans
that clearly delineate the roles and
responsibilities of agencies, departments, and
other organizations that may be involved in
an emergency response. These plans should
include specific actions to be taken when
releases of potentially dangerous substances
occur near population centers or
environmentally sensitive areas.
Provide Adequate Training that
Emphasizes the Need to Report
Releases of Potentially Dangerous
Substances: The transportation industry
should provide more extensive training and
simulation experience to their workers on the
use of contingency plans during an
emergency release. Workers should be
encouraged to make the toll-free telephone
call to the National Response Center if there
is any potential for release of a large volume
of any contained material, or if any actual
release of a potentially dangerous substance
occurs.
23 NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
Notification is the first step in ensuring a
timely and effective response to a release of a
potentially dangerous substance, although
notification does not, in and of itself, ensure a
proper and effective response to such a release.
Notification requirements vary among States, and
between State and Federal authorities. State and
Federal requirements for notifying authorities in
the event of a release or potential release of a
potentially dangerous substance are, at times,
inconsistent or unclear. Confusing and duplicative
notification requirements can reduce the likelihood
that response officials receive timely notifications
which, in turn, can compromise the effectiveness of
a response.
Working Group 1 analyzed eight Federal and
115 State and territorial land, air, and water
regulations that require notification of releases or
potential releases of potentially dangerous
substances to different environmental media, and
contacted several State agencies by telephone to
verify data. This analysis reveals the complexity of
the notification requirements and provides a
mechanism for identifying where regulations may
be inadequate to ensure prompt and appropriate
notification of, and response to, releases of
potentially dangerous substances.
Findings
It is important to note that many State and
Federal notification requirements have been
imposed to satisfy different needs; some
regulations pertain to permit excursions and
violations, others to emergency notification about
unanticipated and uncontrolled releases of
potentially dangerous substances. Differences in
regulations do not necessarily need to be
eliminated; however, confusing and duplicative
requirements for reporting to many different
government agencies may reduce the likelihood
that the appropriate agencies are notified about
the release in a timely manner.
In addition, to evaluate the need for a
response by Federal authorities, it is extremely
important that as much complete and accurate
information as possible on the release be obtained
from the caller. This information should include
information, whenever possible, on the specific
name and/or Chemical Abstracts Service Registry
Number (CASRN) of the released substance;
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volume released; cause of the release; location of
the release; environmental medium affected; and a
characterization of the immediate environment
(e.g., industrial, residential, natural). Although
this information may not be known with certainty,
a mechanism for linkage among responding
agencies and for updating and correcting initially
reported information (e.g.f through the use of
written follow-up reports) would enhance the
Federal government's understanding of the types of
releases that occur and the hazards they pose.
Finally, the responsibility for notification is on
the shipper and carrier (during transportation),
and on the producers and users of potentially
dangerous substances if released at other times.
These parties must be made aware of the potential
for damage posed by their cargo or products, and
must be prepared to act immediately should any
potentially dangerous substances be accidentally
released into the environment.
2.4 ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL RELEASES
Many substances that are not currently subject
to regulations under CERCLA or HMTA can
nonetheless, if released into the environment,
cause significant damage to human health and the
environment. Working Group 1 reviewed
historical data on releases of potentially dangerous
substances to identify a discrete list of substances
that are released frequently, in large quantity, or
that have been shown to cause significant damage
to human health or the environment These
chemicals may be prime candidates for additional
regulation by EPA or some other Federal agency.
The working group considered five databases
in depth that contain historical information on
releases of potentially dangerous substances, and
selected two databases for extensive analysis
because they contain the most comprehensive
number of release reports. These two databases are
(1) The Emergency Response Notification System
(ERNS); and (2) The Hazardous Materials
Information System (HMIS), a DOT database that
contains reports of releases of hazardous materials
during transportation.
The ERNS database is the repository of all
initial telephone reports to the National Response
Center, EPA Regions, or U.S. Coast Guard Marine
Safety Offices, for releases of oil and other
petroleum products (reported pursuant to section
311 of the Clean Water Act) and CERCLA
RECOMMENDATIONS
Expand Centralized Reporting to the
Federal Government; EPA should
analyze the legal and administrative feasibility
of requiring all emergency release reports to
be directed to the National Response Center.
The Center would then immediately notify
the appropriate EPA Region, SERC, and
LEPC. Information received from the one
telephone call could satisfy all reporting
requirements (thereby reducing the burden
on industry), and could trigger the response
network through notification to all
appropriate Federal, State, regional, and local
authorities and responders.
Reouire Follow-up Information About
Releases; EPA should consider establishing
a mechanism for updating and verifying
information on releases reported to the
National Response Center, including data on
the release effects and the resources required
to respond to the release.
Increase Worker Knowledge of
Potential Hazards; Because of the
potential risks associated with handling
potentially dangerous substances, greater
emphasis should be placed on making
workers more aware of the dangers of a
release and the appropriate response
procedures.
hazardous substances (reported pursuant to
CERCLA section 103). The database, however,
also contains reports of other potentially
dangerous substances that are not specifically listed
under CERCLA. These release reports of other
potentially dangerous substances, which represent
about 12 percent of the non-petroleum release
reports in ERNS, may have been reported to the
National Response Center for a variety of reasons,
including the possibility that the release posed a
sufficient enough hazard that the person in charge
decided that a report to the National Response
Center or EPA Region was warranted, or because
the release occurred during transportation and
resulted in a fatality, property damage greater than
$50,000, or was otherwise required to be reported
under HMTA.1
The HMIS database is the repository for all
information on releases of hazardous materials
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reported pursuant to the requirements of DOTs
hazardous materials regulations. HMIS, therefore,
includes release reports related solely to
unintentional releases Curing transportation,
including loading and unloading but excluding
releases that involve carriers engaged only in
intrastate highway transportation.
Nonetheless, the HMIS database has some very
valuable attributes. For example, the data are
based on written reports submitted by the carrier
involved in the release, who is given 30 days to
collect information on the circumstances, causes,
and effects of the release. Thus, the HMIS data
are generally more complete and accurate than
data from ERNS, which reflect unverified
information submitted in the initial telephone
reports of the release.
Another important difference between the
ERNS data and the HMIS data is the relationship
between the release data and the effects data in
each database. The ERNS data do not
differentiate between the effects of the released
substances and the effects of the incident itself.
For example, if a transportation accident resulted
in a release of a potentially dangerous substance
and vehicular injury to the driver of the vehicle,
the ERNS data would indicate that the release
caused an injury but would not specify whether the
injury was caused by exposure to the released
substance or to the collision. In contrast, HMIS
data reflect injuries, deaths, and property damage
attributable to exposure to the hazardous material.
Although ERNS and HMIS contain the most
comprehensive and reliable national data for
purposes of the analyses planned by Working
Group 1, they contain only federally reported
release information. However, releases of many
potentially dangerous substances (especially those
that are currently unregulated) are not required to
be reported to the National Response Center or to
DOT or EPA. Thus, historical information on
significant releases of some potentially dangerous
substances may be missing from these data sources.
The working group believes, however, that most
significant releases of potentially dangerous
substances do get reported and incorporated into
one or both of these databases because many
persons report releases regardless of their legal
requirements to do so, and because most
significant releases of potentially dangerous
substances are newsworthy events. Thus, although
certain data elements, such as quantity released,
may not be completely reliable, a significant
release event generally will be represented in at
least one of the databases.
The working group also analyzed, to a lesser
extent, three other databases: (1) the Acute
Hazardous Events (AHE) database, an EPA
database that contains information from other
sources (such as newspapers) about potentially
dangerous substance releases and explosions; (2)
the Accidental Release Information Program
(ARIP), an EPA database that contains extensive
information from facilities about the causes and
consequences of accidental releases and on release
prevention procedures and equipment; and (3) the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry's (ATSDR) Hazardous Substance
Emergency Event Surveillance (HSEES) System,
which describes the release or threatened release
of specific hazardous substances and the resulting
public health consequences (e.g., deaths, injuries,
evacuations). The AHE and ARIP databases use
ERNS to varying degrees as a basic screen to
identify releases. Thus, Working Group 1 used
these more focused databases to verify the trends
and indications revealed through the analysis of
ERNS and HMIS.
Findings
One of the primary objectives of Working
Group 1 was to identify non-petroleum substances
that are not currently listed as CERCLA
hazardous substances, but whose release may have
caused significant adverse effects on human health
(i.e., death or injury) or the environment. Exhibit
2-1 presents a list of such substances. The exhibit
shows 106 substances (including one chemical-use
categorypesticides) that have been reported in
ERNS or the HMIS database and whose release
may have caused a death or injury. (The ERNS
data represent reported releases between January
1987 and July 1991; HMIS data span the period
between January 1982 and July 1991.) Fourteen of
these substances are extremely hazardous
substances (EHSs) already proposed for
designation as CERCLA hazardous substances, and
18 are pesticide active ingredients. Sixteen percent
of the listed chemicals were reported to be
associated with a release that caused deaths. The
chemical category, pesticides, represents reported
releases where the caller did not identify the
specific pesticide.
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Several of the substances listed in Exhibit 2-1
are not highly toxic or dangerous, but have been
released frequently in very large quantities,
resulting in deaths or injuries. For example, some
of the substances released in large quantities
include sulfur (104 releases/13 million pounds),
chlorine dioxide (17 releases/1.3 million pounds),
propylene (32 releases/1.2 million pounds), soda
ash (8 releases/1 million pounds), and ethanol (143
releases/1 million pounds). These five substances
were reported in release incidents that caused
three deaths and SO injuries, as reported in ERNS.
Four gases, nitrogen, oxygen, carbon dioxide,
and hydrogen, were reported in release incidents
that caused deaths or injuries; these gases are not
included in Exhibit 2-1 because they are ubiquitous
and non-toxic under normal conditions and
generally would not be considered potentially
dangerous substances. Nitrogen and carbon
dioxide are inert and are generally used as cryogens
to provide inert atmospheres or for other
industrial purposes. Hydrogen and oxygen can
form explosive atmospheres. Although they are
not considered potential environmental toxicants,
they nonetheless have histories of frequent releases
and can pose a health hazard through
overpressure, asphyxiation, or burns. For example,
128 releases of nitrogen (a total of 6 million
pounds) were reported in ERNS for the period
1987 through July 1991. All four of these gases
have been involved in release incidents that caused
three deaths and IS injuries, as reported in ERNS.
There are also other substances not included
in Exhibit 2-1 that are not toxic under normal
circumstances but nonetheless have been
responsible for significant environmental damage
when released into sensitive areas in significant
amounts. Examples of such substances include
molasses (in Boston), butter (in Delaware), and
liquid manure.
In identifying potentially dangerous substances,
Working Group 1 attempted to focus on releases
that have been shown to cause significant adverse
effects on human health or the environment, and
have some probability of causing similar damage in
the future. None of the databases examined,
however, have ecological effects data related to
chemical release reports. The HMIS database,
however, does contain property damage
information. To some extent, property damage
may be used as a proxy for environmental damage.
Many of the substances listed in Exhibit 2-1 caused
significant property damage in addition to deaths
or injury. Seven other substances not listed in
Exhibit 2-1 caused more than $50,000 worth of
property damage, but did not cause death or
injury: ammonium phosphate, chloroprene, di-
isobutylene, dicyclopentadiene, dimethylcarbinol,
isobutyl acetate, and helium.
In general, many of the substances listed in
Exhibit 2-1 are produced in large volumes and are
used as feedstocks or intermediates in a variety of
industrial processes. For example, ammonium
nitrate, whose primary use is as a fertilizer, is an
important component of certain industrial
explosives and has been implicated in some serious
accidents. Sulfur and sulfur trioxide are precursors
of sulfuric acid (a large volume CERCLA
hazardous substance). Several other substances,
including butadiene, isopropyl acetate, propylene,
and the alcohols are flammable. Propylene and
butadiene can also polymerize, resulting in heat
generation and overpressure of containers.
Hydrogen peroxide and chlorine dioxide are strong
oxidizers.
An analysis also was performed to identify the
10 most frequently reported releases of potentially
dangerous substances and the 10 substances
reported released hi the greatest quantities,
excluding release reports of listed CERCLA
hazardous substances. The results are shown in
Exhibits 2-2 and 2-3, respectively, and are based on
data contained in ERNS for the period 1987
through 1991. These exhibits contain 16
potentially dangerous substances that are either
among the top 10 substances reported in terms of
frequency of reports or quantity released, or both
(ammonium nitrate, nitrogen, sulfur, and sulfur
dioxide). Half of the substances listed in Exhibits
2-2 and 2-3 are also listed in Exhibit 2-1 because
they also have been involved in incidents with
deaths or injury (ammonium nitrate, chlorine
dioxide, ethanol, nitrogen, propyl alcohol,
propylene, sulfur, and sulfur trioxide). The
substance most frequently reported released in
ERNS (and currently not listed as a CERCLA
hazardous substance) is sulfur dioxide, which is
used extensively as a preservative, disinfectant, and
bleaching agent; the substance released in the
greatest quantity, as reported in ERNS, is
ammonium nitrate.
Exhibits 2-4 and 2-5 further demonstrate the
relationship between quantity released and the
likelihood of death or injury based on data
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contained in ERNS and HMIS, respectively. These
data were derived from release reports of both
CERCLA hazardous substances and other
potentially dangerous substances. As illustrated in
Exhibit 2-4, only one to two percent of releases
between 1 and 10,000 pounds are associated with
incidents involving deaths or injury. Releases in
excess of 10,000 pounds are between two times and
four times more likely to result in a death or
injury, but represent only about four percent of all
releases in this size range. This same trend is
observed in the HMIS data.2
RECOMMENDATIONS
Consider Further Regulation and
Control of Potentially Dangerous
Substances That Have Historically
Caused Serious Damage; Potentially
dangerous substances whose release has
caused death, injury, or significant
environmental damage should be further
evaluated and additional control measures
considered.
-13-
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EXHIBIT 2-1
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES RELEASED IN
INCIDENTS INVOLVING DEATH OR INJURY
Acetylene1-2
Ally! Bromide"
AUyl Chlorofonnate2
Aluminum Chloride1-2
Aminoethylethanolamine1
Aminoetbylpiperazine"
Ammonium Lauryl Ether
Sulfate1 (P)
Ammonium Nitrate1-2
Ammonium Sulfate
Nitrate1
Ammonium Thiosulfate1-2
(P)
Amylene1-2
Benzaldehydeu
Benzene Phosphorous
Dichloride1
Boron Trifluorideu (E)
Bromine1-2 (E)
Bromine Trifluoride1
Butadiene*1-2
Butyl Acrylate"
Butyl Isocyanate2
Butyl Mercaptan1-2
Butyl Methacrylate1
Butyl Trichlorosilaneu
Butyraldehyde"
Carbon Monoxide1-2
Chlorine Dioxide1 (P)
Chlorine Trifluoride1
Chloroacetophenoae*"
Chloroacetyl Chloride1-2
Cbloropicrinu (P)
Cyclohexylamineu (E)
Decyl Alcohol1 (P)
Diboraneu (E)
Diethylene Glycol1
Diisobutyl Ketoneu
Dimethyl Aniline2
Dimethyl Disulfide1
Dimethyl Sulfide1-2
Dimethyl Terephthalate1
Dioctyl Adipate1
Dioxolane2
Dipbenylmetnane1
Ethanol1-2 (P)
Ethyl Butyrate1-2
Ethyl Mercaptan"
Ethyl Silicate"
Ethylene2
Ethylene Glycol
Monoethyl Acetate2
Ethylene Glycol
Monomethyl Ether"
Fluoroboric Arid2
Fluorosulfonic Acid"
Hexaldehyde2
Hexamethylenediamine"
Hydrated Lime1
Hydrofluorosilicic Acid1
Hydrogen Peroxide1-2 (P,E)
Hydroxyacetic Acid1 (P)
Hydroxyethylacrylate1
Isophorone Diisocyanate1
(E)
Isopropanol" (P)
bopropyl Acetate"
Isopropylamine"
Lime1
Lithium"
Lithium Hydride1 (E)
Magnesium Chloride1 (P)
Mercaptoethanol1
Methamidophos1 (P,E)
Methyl Acrylate"
Methyl Amyl Ketone"
Methyl Butyrate2
Methyl Ethyl Pyridine"
Methyltrichlorosilane"
(E)
Morpholine"
Mustard Gas1 (E)
Nitrocellulose2
Nitrochlorobenzene, o-1
Nitromethane"
Oxalic Acid1 (P)
Pestickles"
(Use Category)
Phosphorus Tribromide2
Potassium Sulfide2
Propylene"
Propylene Glycol1 (P)
Silicon Chloride"
Silicon Tetrafiuoride2
Soda Ash1 (P)
Sodium Aluminate"
Sodium Chlorate" (P)
Sodium Chlorite2
Sodium Dichloro-s-
Triazinetrione1 (P)
Sodium Hydrosulfite1
Sodium Nitrate1-2 (P)
Sodium Pentachloro-
phenate" (E)
Sodium Sulfide1-2
Stearic Acid1
Sulfur" (P)
Sulfur Dioxide" (E)
Sulfur Trioride" (E)
Sulfuryl Chloride1-2
Thioglycolic Acid2
Thionyl Chloride2
Titanium Tetrachloride"
(E)
Toluenesulfonic Acid1
Trichloroisocyanuric
Acid"
Trichloromethyl-Sulfone1
Trichlorosilane"
* Certain isomers are CERCLA hazardous substances.
(P) - pesticide; (E) = EHS.
SOURCE: (1) ERNS data, 1/87 - 7/91; (2) HMIS data, 1/82 - 7/91.
-------
MX III It IT 2-2
MOST KRKQUKN'I LY RKI'ORTKI) POTI'.NHAU.Y DANGKROUS SUHSTANCKS (KKNS DATA)
90CK
800-
A. sulfur dioxide
B. pesticide
C. ethanol
D. ammonium nitrate
E. nitrogen
F. sulfur triox'de
G. dimethyl suffide
H. titanium tetradiloride
. isopropanol
J. sulfur
K. cartxsn monoxide
Lpropytene
M. cartwn black
N. chlorine dioxide
O.pentane
P. sodium sulfkJe
D
EFGHIJKL
Potentially Dangerous Substance
M N O P
15.
-------
EXHIBIT 2-3
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES REPORTED
RELEASED IN THE CREATKST QUANTIT1KS
25-fT
20-
15-'
10-'
5-'
A. ammonium nitrate
B. sulfur
C. cartx>n monoxide
D. carbon black
E. nitrogen
F. sodium sutfide
G. sulfur dioxide
H. chlorine dioxide
I. propylene
J. pentane
K. ethanol
Lisopropanol
M. pesticide
N. sulfur trioxide
O. titanium tetrachloride
P. dimethyl sulfide
1/91 - 7/91
1989
1988
BCD
E F G H I J K L
Potentially Dangerous Substance
M N O P
-------
EXHIBIT 2-4
1-10
»10-100 >100-1K »1K-1QK
Pound* Spllfed
>10K
Relationship Between Spill Size and Death or Injury (ERNS data),
EXHIBIT 2-5
1-10
3.10-100 ' >100-1K >1K-10K
Pound* Splll*d
>10K
Relationship Between Spill Size and Death or Injury (HMIS data).
- 17 -
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-18-
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CHAPTERS
REPORT FROM WORKING GROUP TWO:
SHORT-TERM INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The broad goal of the task force focuses on
the issue of identifying potentially dangerous
substances that are not adequately regulated and
thus pose a significant risk to human health and
the environment when released. Working Group
2 was given the general mission of identifying and
implementing short-term solutions to the problems
resulting from releases of inadequately regulated
potentially dangerous substances, including
developing possible non-regulatory, innovative
approaches. To achieve this goal, Working Group
2 conducted activities under two general tracks:
Implementation of short-term, regulatory
solutions -- focusing on a sub-set of the larger
regulatory problem by analyzing the feasibility
of establishing ecological and human health
criteria that can be used to identify additional
substances that should be handled as
hazardous materials in transportation; and
Identification of innovative, non-regulatory
solutions -- tapping into the expertise of the
various task force members, as well as industry
and other members of the public, to identify
innovative solutions, including outreach
materials and industry/government initiatives.
Working Group 2 was chaired by Jim Jones,
Special Assistant to the Assistant Administrator
for Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances
(OPPTS), and' included representatives from
OPPTS, the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response (OSWER) and the Office of General
Counsel within EPA, and representatives from
other Federal government agencies, including the
Departments of Agriculture and Transportation
and the National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences (NIEHS). Dorothy Canter,
Science Advisor to the Assistant Administrator for
OSWER, played a critical role in several
innovative, non-regulatory initiatives.
ACHIEVEMENTS
The specific accomplishments of the working
group both in the near term and as part of
continuing activities include:
Implementation of short-term.
regulatory solutions - Creation of
workgroup to identify potential ecological and
human health criteria for consideration by
DOT in identifying additional substances that
should be regulated as hazardous materials in
transportation.
Identification of Short-Term. Innovative
Solutions - Identification of innovative
approaches to reducing the risk from releases
of potentially dangerous substances through:
(1) an Open Forum for representatives of
interested government agencies, industry,
labor, and environmental groups, and the
general public to exchange information about
initiatives and other activities that could be
taken to enhance the prevention and control
of releases of potentially dangerous
substances; and (2) an information-exchange
exercise with task force members to identify
other innovative solutions.
Outreach - To enhance compliance and
control in the short term, development of.
(1) an advisory to alert transporters and first
responders of the hazards and the reporting
requirements that may arise when there is a
release of a substance that rapidly forms a
CERCLA hazardous substance when released
into the environment; and (2) a technical
bulletin on metam sodium, its uses, its
environmental and human health effects, and
ways in which it is regulated.
The achievements of the working group are
summarized on this page. Further explanation of
the activities and findings under each of these
areas is described in more detail in the sections
that follow.
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3.2 CRITERIA FOR REGULATING
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS
SUBSTANCES IN TRANSPORTATION
One of the primary issues raised by the July
1991 release of metam sodium was the tact that
the metam sodium in concentrations of less than
35 percent was not classified as a hazardous
material by DOT and, thus, was not subject to
DOTs hazardous materials regulations (HMR).
Historically, DOTs primary emphasis has been to
regulate the transportation of materials that pose
medium and high acute hazards to human health.
The HMR both lists specific materials as
hazardous and provides criteria for classifying
hazards; pursuant to CERCLA section 306, any
CERCLA hazardous substance is also listed and
regulated as a hazardous material under HMTA.
The recent revisions to the HMR set forth in
Docket HM-181 (published December 21, 1990)
provide additional, expanded criteria for classifying
materials as poisonous, including numerical cutoff
values for acute toxicity.3 However, the HMR
does not specify set criteria based on ecological
and non-acute human health hazards.
In hearings before Congresswoman Barbara
Boxer's Subcommittee on Government Activities
and Transportation, DOT testified that it looks to
EPA to take the lead in identifying substances that
pose environmental hazards. In subsequent
meetings between EPA and DOT, it was agreed
that EPA would investigate the possibility of
developing criteria for identifying substances that
pose an environmental hazard, as well as
substances that pose a human health hazard other
than the acute hazards already addressed by DOT
in the HMR. EPA would then provide these
criteria to DOT for possible incorporation in the
HMR.
To initiate the process of providing DOT with
criteria, Working Group 2 recommended that EPA
establish the Interagency Criteria Development
Group to develop options for ecological and
human health criteria. The Criteria Development
Group established by EPA included representatives
from the following EPA offices: Prevention,
Pesticides, and Toxic Substances; Solid Waste and
Emergency Response; Research and Development;
Water; Air and Radiation; and Policy, Planning,
and Evaluation; as well as representatives from the
Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and
Transportation; and the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry. The Group
further subdivided into subgroups: one to develop
ecological effects criteria and the other to develop
human health effects criteria. The analysis
undertaken and the options developed by each
subgroup are described below.
Findings
Ecological Effects Subgroup. Given that
DOTs HMR currently does not include ecological
criteria, the group first identified types of effects
(i.e., endpoints) that would address ecological
threats posed by substances released in a one-time
spill event Endpoints considered included aquatic
acute toxicity, terrestrial avian acute toxicity, and
terrestrial mammalian acute toxicity. For each of
these endpoints, the group then determined that it
was possible to identify different numerical cutoff
values to correspond to DOTs Packaging Groups
I, II, and III (i.e., those substances posing relatively
high, medium, and low hazards, respectively). In
establishing the cutoff values, the group considered
the potential magnitude of transportation releases
and the relative frequency of different sizes of
streams and rivers.
Human Health Effects Subgroup. The human
health effects subgroup initially determined that it
would focus on criteria for human health effects
other than acute lethality, which is already
addressed by DOTs HMR. It also decided that
the criteria should be based on toxicity associated
with acute exposure rather than chronic exposure,
because acute exposure is generally the primary
concern for transportation-related releases. Thus,
the criteria focus on subletha! human health effects
of acute exposure.
The group determined, however, that data -
especially numerical toxicity values - for such
effects are limited for many substances, and that
there are few, if any, existing criteria based on sudh
effects that could be used as precedent. Thus, the
group focused the criteria development effort on a
small number of sublethal human health endpoints
associated with acute exposure: neurotoxicity,
developmental toxicity, and reproductive toxicity.
Although numerous other endpoints potentially
could be of concern, these three were selected
because of their severity, their clear and direct
association with acute exposures, the (relatively)
high likelihood that at least some relevant test data
would be available for many substances, and the
availability of consensus EPA risk assessment
-20-
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guidelines for them. The group also determined
that, due largely to limitations in data availability,
it is not possible at this time to develop
scientifically defensible numerical cutoff values for
these three endpoints. As a result, the group is
considering the development of qualitative criteria
that would define each of the three endpoints, so
that substances could be classified as either "known
to cause" or "not known to cause" the relevant
toxic effect(s).
RECOMMENDATIONS
Complete Analysis of Ecological and
Non-Acute Human Health Criteria;
EPA should continue to analyze issues
surrounding the development of ecological
and non-acute human health criteria and
provide the criteria to DOT for
incorporation, if appropriate, in its hazardous
materials regulations. EPA also should
provide technical support to DOT in its
regulation development effort.
3.3 INNOVATIVE, NON-REGULATORY
SOLUTIONS
In setting the agenda for Working Group 2,
EPA recognized that traditional, long-term
regulatory approaches may not represent the only
way to address the risks posed by releases of
unregulated, potentially dangerous substances. In
other environmental areas, EPA has developed
voluntary programs to achieve tangible
environmental benefits through non-traditional,
non-regulatory approaches.
To identify a broad range of possible non-
traditional approaches, the working group wanted
to draw upon the experience and expertise of task
force members as well as industry and other
members of the general public. Two efforts were
undertaken: an internal T>rainstorming" effort and
an Open Forum with external groups.
As a first step in identifying non-traditional
options, the working group sought ideas from the
members of the Hazardous Substances Task Force.
At the second meeting of the task force, the
members were asked to present ideas for both
short-term and long-term innovative solutions to
the problem of better controlling potentially
dangerous substances. This effort resulted in a list
of 35 ideas, which the working group then
prioritized and categorized by subject area,
including more expansive outreach efforts to
improve information about the presence of and
methods for responding to releases of potentially
dangerous substances; unproved training for
transporters and emergency responders; and
improved accessibility and generation of data on
chemical toxicity and hazards.
The working group also sponsored an Open
Forum on October 29,1991, for representatives of
interested government agencies, industry, labor,
and environmental groups, and the general public.
The Open Forum provided an opportunity for
these interested parties to exchange information
about planned and ongoing initiatives to enhance
the prevention and control of releases of
potentially dangerous substances, and to provide
suggestions for non-traditional actions that the
Federal government or private parties could take
to address such releases.
The Forum was announced in a Federal
Register notice on October 11, 1991 (56 FR
51626). EPA directly contacted potential speakers
from organizations representing industry, labor,
and environmental4 concerns, as well as State and
local government organizations and academic
institutions involved in release prevention and
safety. EPA also sent out a mailing to a number
of groups that have an interest in release planning
and prevention, and in Federal regulatory
activities. In addition to EPA and DOT officials,
the speakers at the forum included representatives
from the following organizations: the Chemical
Manufacturers' Association (CMA); the American
Association of Railroads; the National Agricultural
Chemicals Association; the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters; the AFL-CIO
Transportation Trades Department; the University
of Maryland's Center for Hazard Communication;
the Workplace Health Fund and its Center for
Emergency Response Planning; and the
International City/County Management
Association. Also in attendance were
representatives from industry, labor, Federal
government, and the press.
The Forum began with an overview by EPA
and DOT officials on the circumstances and
implications of the July 1991 metam sodium spill,
and on current DOT and task force efforts to
address the problem. The overview presentations
also addressed EPA and DOT regulations
-21 -
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governing the designation, control, cleanup, and
transportation of potentially dangerous substances.
The remainder of the morning session consisted of
presentations about planned and ongoing industry,
labor, educational, and local government initiatives
to prevent and control releases of potentially
dangerous substances in transportation and at fixed
facilities. The afternoon session focused on
information gathering and fact finding from these
groups concerning innovative, non-traditional
activities that could be undertaken by the Federal
government and private parties to prevent and
control releases of potentially dangerous
substances.
Findings
The innovative ideas generated at both the
task force session and the Open Forum indicated
a need to focus on improvements in training,
communication, and coordination. Participants at
the Open Forum identified a lack of information
and coordination among regulatory agencies,
industry, and the general public as a fundamental
problem in preventing and controlling releases of
potentially dangerous substances. Many of the
initiatives suggested at the meetings were intended
to prevent and mitigate releases by providing
information and training to workers and emergency
response personnel. Specifically, some of the "high
priority" suggestions were:
Outreach -- developing various communication
tools for informing industry and the public
about the need for notification to the National
Response Center following a release of a
potentially dangerous substance. Specifically,
developing television spots to publicize the
role of the National Response Center and its
phone number; and developing "environmental
alert advisories" to discuss voluntary actions
that can be taken in response to a release.
Training - ensuring that the various parties
responsible for responding to releases of
potentially dangerous substances are provided
with adequate training, either by increasing
awareness about existing training programs or
increasing funds available for training through
grants and scholarships.
Data - identifying and filling gaps in data on
potentially dangerous substances to ensure
more effective emergency responses, including
data on environmental and health effects, and
ways in which releases can be handled.
The specific initiatives already being undertaken in
the chemical and transportation industries, labor
groups, and academic institutions are presented in
the summary of the Open Forum, which is
provided as Appendix B to this report
The speakers at the Open Forum also
identified near-term options that could be
undertaken by government agencies to prevent and
mitigate releases of potentially dangerous
substances. In general, these options stressed the
need for improved communication and
coordination among agencies, adequate training at
all levels, and more stringent regulation of
chemical production, transportation, and disposal.
Some of the specific suggestions made were:
Improve coordination and communication
among those Federal agencies (i.e., DOT,
EPA, and OSHA) that each have authority
over certain aspects of chemical transportation
and use.
Increase enforcement of worker safety and
transportation regulations.
Provide local governments with greater
authority to require release prevention
initiatives.
Emphasize the importance of training and
encourage communities to commit resources
to training emergency responders.
Provide training programs to help prepare
local officials for emergency response efforts.
Encourage companies and trade associations
to share training initiatives and improve
communication among themselves.
Encourage local emergency planning
committees (LEPCs) to use available training
programs to ensure consistent, high-quality
emergency response training.
Encourage insurance companies to offer lower
premiums to companies that take appropriate
release prevention measures.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Enhance the Availability of Information
on Potentially Dangerous Substances;
EPA and trade associations (such as CMA)
should work with chemical manufacturers to
ensure that material safety data sheets
(MSDSs) and other emergency response
information include all available information
that may be pertinent when responding to
releases of potentially dangerous substances.
This would include any possible breakdown
products that may form or any hazardous
characteristics (e.g., toxicity, ignitability,
reactivity, or corrosrvity) that substances may
display when they are released in the
environment.
3.4 OUTREACH
In both the task force session and the Open
Forum, the need for communication with industry
and between agencies was identified as a key issue
in preventing and controlling releases of
potentially dangerous substances. Although
development and enforcement of regulations will
address the problem in the long term, voluntary
compliance can be achieved in the short term by
informing industry about the problem at hand.
Working Group 2 has identified several initiatives
that can be undertaken by both government
agencies and industry to improve communication
and outreach.
Advisories
One high-priority innovative solution identified
during the task force session was to issue
"environmental alert advisories* to discuss
voluntary actions that can be taken in response to
a release. As a first step, the working group
suggested that the Emergency Response Division
of EPA's Office of Emergency and Remedial
Response develop an advisory focusing on metam
sodium. The advisory was intended to increase
transporters' and first responders' awareness of the
hazards and reporting requirements associated with
a situation that they may race, namely, accidents
involving chemicals that become CERCLA
hazardous substances when they are released into
the environment. The advisory discusses
characteristics of such chemicals; offers guidelines
for transporters and emergency responders for
incident response, transportation safety, and
reporting requirements for releases of unknown or
hazardous substances; stresses the importance of
notifying the National Response Center, and
provides contact names and addresses for obtaining
further information on emergency response and
transportation outreach and training programs.
It is hoped that this advisory will result in
increased communication among the parties
involved in or responding to these releases. If
transporters and first responders are aware of their
responsibilities and know what to do when a
release occurs, releases of the size and destructive
potential of the recent metam sodium spill will be
less devastating and more quickly mitigated.
In October 1991, Working Group 2 also issued
a technical bulletin containing information about
metam sodium, its regulation, and its health and
environmental effects. The bulletin discusses the
uses of metam sodium, and describes the
circumstances under which the July 1991 spill
occurred. The bulletin also explains why
the particular release of metam sodium was subject
to CERCLA provisions, while the chemical itself
is not listed as a CERCLA hazardous substance.
Finally, the bulletin provides addresses and phone
numbers for obtaining further information on
CERCLA and designated CERCLA hazardous
substances.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Develop Additional Advisories to
Enhance Communication: One or more
advisories should be developed to address
potentially dangerous substance releases,
focusing on substances that are highly toxic,
released most frequently or in the greatest
quantity, or have been responsible for the
most injuries, damage, or deaths when
released
Training
Another particularly important issue in
improving efforts to prevent and control releases
of potentially dangerous substances is the need for
adequate training. The need for effective training
was repeatedly identified as a high-priority
consideration in both the Open Forum and the
task force session.
-23-
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Both the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorizalion Act of 1986 (SARA) and the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA)
establish basic authorities, requirements, and
programs for training workers in the handling and
transportation of potentially dangerous substances,
respectively. Some of the more pertinent
components include:
Training Standards - As required by SARA
section 126, OSHA and EPA each issued
regulations that establish minimum training
standards for employees engaged in responses
to releases of potentially dangerous substances.
These regulations cover workers at certain
facilities who must respond to on-site releases,
as well as first responders and HAZMAT
teams that respond for the community. The
OSHA regulations are codified at 29 CFR
1910.120 and the EPA regulations, which
incorporate the OSHA regulations by
reference, are codified at 40 CFR 311. DOT
also has the responsibility for developing and
periodically updating a curriculum which
consists of a list of courses and other resources
necessary to train public sector emergency
response and preparedness teams.
Worker Training Grants Programs SARA
section 126(g) assists qualifying non-profit
programs in training workers engaged in
hazardous waste removal and containment,
hazardous material handling, transportation,
and emergency response. NIEHS is
responsible for this program that now supports
more than 60 institutions. Over 200,000
workers nationwide have been trained in the
first four years of the program. Section 118 of
HMTA, as amended, establishes a similar
assistance program specifically for training
workers engaged in hazardous materials
transportation, which is also administered by
NIEHS.
State/Local Training Grants - HMTA also
provides training funds to States and local
governments for use in emergency response
training. These DOT funds will be made
available beginning in FY93. In addition,
LEPCs and their equivalents also may receive
grants for planning for transportation
emergencies; such grants will help make
existing training programs more accessible to
State and local planners and responders.
Findings
The need for effective training has already
been demonstrated. One particularly successful
example identified by Working Group 2 is the
Railway Workers Hazardous Materials Project of
the George Meany Center for Labor Studies, which
is an NIEHS grantee. Following the metam
sodium spill, the Project developed training
courses to ensure the protection of workers from
harmful exposure to metam sodium. In November
1991, the Project conducted training, in both
English and Spanish, for 456 California railworkers
in Los Angeles, San Bernadino, Oakland, and
Sacramento.
The Railway Workers Hazardous Materials
Project provides evidence that there are many
opportunities for training currently available in
both the private and public sector. In particular,
many public training programs that address
hazardous materials issues are offered at the
Federal and State level. Additionally, public and
private academic institutions (e.g., universities and
community colleges), as well as private
organizations and institutes, offer opportunities for
additional training in planning and response to
releases of potentially dangerous substances. An
abbreviated list of sources of information on
training opportunities or additional materials and
resources identified by the working group are
presented in Exhibit 3-1.
Although there are numerous training
opportunities and resources currently available, the
working group recognizes that knowledge and use
of these training opportunities may be insufficient.
Some reasons identified by the working group
include:
Availability of resources - Even when training
information is available, the lack of financial
resources or the time to undertake training is
often an impediment These resource and
time constraints are particularly true for
volunteer fire fighters, who make up the
majority of first responders. This problem
may be compounded when training efforts are
not coordinated and the resulting duplications
waste scarce resources.
Quality of training materials ~ High-quality
training materials and programs are essential
to protecting workers and the community.
However, in some cases, although there may
-24-
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EXHIBIT 3-1
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON TRAINING RESOURCES AND OPPORTUNITIES
The following is an abbreviated list of some training resources and opportunities identified by the
Working Group:
Minimum Criteria for Worker Health and Safety Training for Hazardous Waste Operations and
Emergency Response - This peer-reviewed NIEHS document establishes the minimum criteria
for training programs to effectively address the OSHA requirements in 29 CFR 1910.120, and
describes minimum generic training curriculum guidelines. This document resulted from an
NEHS-sponsored technical workshop of experts from academia, management, labor, and
government, and has had wide technical review in both private and public sectors, including the
NRT Training Committee. This document is available from the National Clearinghouse on
Occupational and Environmental Health (see below).
Hazardous Materials Incident Response Training (HMIRT> Program - The HMERT program,
available from EPA's Environmental Response Team (ERT), is designed for emergency
responders and personnel who investigate and clean up uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. The
HMERT program has a curriculum of 12 courses that provide technical and professional
training in worker health and safety and in various operations that must be performed by site
personnel engaged in hazardous materials response activities. (Note: because these courses are
highly technical, they may not be appropriate for all levels of workers.) The course schedule is
available from EPA/ERT, 26 West Martin Luther King Drive, Cincinnati, OH 45268, (513) 569-
7537.
Standard Operating Safety Guides (SOSG) and the 'Four-Agency' Document - EPA/ERTs
SOSG and the Occupational Safety and Health Guidance Manual for Hazardous Waste Site
Activities (Four-Agency document), written jointly by OSHA, EPA, NIOSH, and the U.S. Coast
Guard, both provide guidance on fulfilling OSHA requirements for training workers engaged in
hazardous waste operations and emergency response. SOSG is available through the National
Technical Information Service (NTIS) at 703-487-4650. The Four-Agency document is available
from NIOSH, Publications C-13,4676 Columbia Parkway, Cincinnati, OH 45226-1998,
(513) 533-8287.
National Clearinghouse on Occupational and Environmental Health - This clearinghouse,
administered by the Workplace Health Fund, disseminates a wide variety of training materials.
The clearinghouse is located at 815 16th Street, NW, Suite 301, Washington, DC 20006,
(202) 842-7833.
National Fire Academy and Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA') - The
National Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute of FEMA provide training
materials for use by State and local emergency responders. They provide "train-the-trainer"
courses at the Emmitsburg, Maryland, facility and disseminate materials to States for use in
their own training programs. Contact FEMA, National Emergency Training Center,
Emmitsburg, MD 21727-8995.
Hazardous Materials Information Exchange (HMDO - HMTX is an electronic bulletin board
sponsored by DOT and FEMA, with support from EPA, providing information about training
opportunities and facilitating an exchange of information, (708) 972-3275 or FTS 772-3275; for
technical assistance: (800) 752-6367.
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be funding for training, the materials available
may not be of sufficient quality. In particular,
training materials may not adequately address
the OSHA regulations for hazardous waste
operations and emergency response.
Training appropriateness - Training material
for emergency response may not always be
presented in a form appropriate for all
audiences; materials may be too technical or
provided at a reading level that is
inappropriate for certain audiences, or may be
in the wrong language. For example, trainers
working with the emergency response
personnel handling the metam sodium spill
reported a need to translate English training
material into Spanish. In other cases, the
trainers themselves may not be adequately
trained to effectively disseminate such training.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Ensure that Interested Parties are
Informed About Currently Available
Training Materials and Ways tn Which
These Curricula or Materials Can Be
Effectively Disseminated; Government
agencies involved in the preparation and
dissemination of training materials should
coordinate their activities to avoid overlaps
and confusion and make the most of existing
training resources. One focal point for
Federal coordination is the NRT Training
Committee, which comprises representatives
from all key agencies that have training
responsibilities. The committee should be
fully supported and its efforts expanded to
reduce duplication and to ensure adequate
dissemination and sharing of training course
information.
Increase Support for Appropriate and
Proven Training and Education
Programs; Programs such as those
supported by EPA, DOT, OSHA, FEMA,
and NTEHS should be expanded to continue
to provide models for and to stimulate high
quality training at the local level.
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CHAPTER 4
REPORT FROM WORKING GROUP THREE:
LONGER-TERM REGULATORY SOLUTIONS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Working Group 3 of the Hazardous
Substances Task Force was charged with
identifying and, to the extent possible, developing
longer-term, more traditional approaches to
preventing and addressing releases of potentially
dangerous substances. The approaches pursued by
Working Group 3 include the development of a
Federal Register Notice that clarifies existing
notification requirements under CERCLA;
identification of regulatory or guidance options
that could be used to require or solicit additional
notification to the National Response Center for
releases of potentially dangerous substances that
cause substantial harm to human health or the
environment; and consideration of several different
approaches that would add chemicals to the list of
hazardous substances under CERCLA, including a
methodology to identify criteria that may be used
to screen chemical databases to identify potentially
dangerous substances that currently are not listed
as hazardous substances under CERCLA.
CERCLA defines hazardous substances in
section 101(14) by reference to environmental
statutes implemented by EPA. In particular,
hazardous substances include any substance listed
pursuant to sections 307 and 311 of the Clean
Water Act (CWA), section 112 of the Clean Air
Act (CAA), or section 3001 of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), those for
which action has been taken under section 7 of the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), or any
substance specifically designated as hazardous
under CERCLA section 102. Persons in charge of
facilities or vessels must immediately report
releases of CERCLA hazardous substances to the
National Response Center, if the release is into
the environment in quantities that equal or exceed
a reportable quantity (RQ). In addition, persons
responsible for a release or potential release of a
hazardous substance may be held liable for any
response costs and natural resource damage
resulting from the release.
An underlying purpose of the Working
Group's activities was to explore whether the
ACHIEVEMENTS
The working group produced three major
documents that together achieved its mandate:
Clarification of Reporting
Requirements - a Notice that will be
published in the Federal Register that
clarifies and reiterates the CERCLA
notification requirements.
Additional Reporting - an issues/options
paper analyzing several regulatory and
guidance options that could result in
increased notifications to the National
Response Center of any chemical release
that directly causes significant adverse effects
to human health or the environment.
Hazardous Substance Designation - an
evaluation of three different approaches for
designating additional chemicals as hazardous
substances under CERCLA:
(1) an analysis of current Agency authority to
immediately designate a chemical that has
caused significant damage as a result of a
release;
(2) an analysis of the advantages and
disadvantages of designating potentially
dangerous substances on pre-established lists
as hazardous substances under CERCLA;
and
(3) a report on a Strategy for developing
criteria to identify potentially dangerous
substances that should be considered for
designation as hazardous substances under
CERCLA, and implementation of that
strategy to identify a preliminary list of
potentially dangerous substances.
CERCLA hazardous substances list includes, to the
extent practicable, all potentially dangerous
substances that, when released, pose a serious
threat to human health and the environment.
Further, the working group examined whether
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there is a need for prompt notification to the
National Response Center for releases of other
potentially dangerous substances that might require
a Federal response.
The Working Group's achievements are
summarized in the box on the previous page.
Working Group 3 was chaired by Barbara
Hostage of the Emergency Response Division in
the Office of Emergency and Remedial Response,
and included representatives from the EPA Offices
of Research and Development; Prevention,
Pesticides, and Toxic Substances; Solid Waste;
Solid Waste and Emergency Response; General
Counsel; and Chemical Emergency Preparedness
and Prevention. In addition, representatives from
the following Federal agencies provided significant
contributions to the working group's efforts:
Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and
Transportation; National Library of Medicine;
National Institute of Environmental Health
Sciences; and the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry.
4.2 CLARIFICATION OF REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
The recent metam sodium spill drew attention
to the potential for delays in notification to the
National Response Center about releases of
substances that are not specifically listed CERCLA
hazardous substances, but that nonetheless rapidly
form hazardous substances when released into the
environment. That spill revealed that persons in
charge of facilities or vessels may not be fully
aware of the CERCLA section 103 notification
requirement to immediately report to the National
Response Center the release of a substance that
rapidly forms an RQ or more of a RCRA
hazardous waste. Because metam sodium, while
not specifically designated as a CERCLA
hazardous substance, rapidly hydrolyzed and
decomposed into at least three specifically listed
CERCLA hazardous substances, including
hydrogen sulfide, monomethylamine, and carbon
disulfide, and exhibited the reactivity characteristic
of a RCRA hazardous waste, it became a
CERCLA hazardous substance pursuant to
CERCLA section 101(14)(C) when released. The
metam sodium spill thus should have been
reported immediately to the National Response
Center.
To improve the likelihood that future releases
of substances similar to metam sodium will be
immediately reported to the National Response
Center, Working Group 3 prepared a draft Federal
Register Notice that addresses this issue.
The Notice reiterates the criteria used to
define a RCRA characteristic waste and explains
that a generally good source of information about
a chemical's hazardous characteristics and its
potential breakdown products is the material safety
data sheet (MSDS). OSHA requires
manufacturers to develop MSDSs and to make the
MSDS available to downstream processors and
users of the chemical pursuant to the requirements
of the Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR
1910.1200). Although information on the MSDS
is not always complete and readily comprehensible,
the MSDS is at times the primary source of
information on a chemical's potential hazards. An
MSDS often contains .information on the
fiammability and reactivity of the chemical, based
on ratings established by the National Fire
Protection Association; these ratings are based on
criteria similar to those that define a RCRA
characteristic waste. In addition, OSHA published
RECOMMENDATIONS
Publish the Clarification Notice; EPA
should publish the clarification Notice to
enhance the likelihood that potentially
dangerous substances that are not specifically
listed as hazardous substances under
CERCLA would be reported immediately to
the National Response Center when they are
released at potentially hazardous levels.
Encourage Chemical Manufacturers to
Include Information in MSDSs about
Potential Breakdown Products of
Chemicals; Because transporters,
processors, and users of chemicals often
must rely on MSDSs as their sole source of
information about the potential hazards of
chemicals, EPA should work closely with
OSHA and with chemical manufacturers to
ensure that accurate and complete
information about potential hazards,
including those associated with breakdown
products, of chemicals is included in the
MSDSs.
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an Advisory in Appendix C to 29 CFR 1910.1200,
which lists available sources of information about
the hazards of chemicals. The clarification notice
references both the Advisory and the Hazard
Communication Standard, and reiterates that if a
reasonable person should have known that a
substance when released would become a RCRA
characteristic waste, failure of the person in charge
of the vessel or facility to comply with the
notification provisions in CERCLA can result in
serious penalties. The Notice emphasizes that it is
advisable, and parties are encouraged, to report all
significant releases of potentially dangerous
substances. The message in the Notice is: When
in doubt, report.
4.3 ADDITIONAL REPORTING
Although the clarification notice described
above will enhance the likelihood that the National
Response Center will receive an increased number
of reports of releases of potentially dangerous
substances, the working group concluded that there
was still a large universe of substances at fixed
facilities and in transportation that, if released into
the environment, would currently not be reported
to the Federal government because current
regulations do not affect these substances.
The working group believes that Federal
notification could be enhanced further by
developing a regulation that would establish
specific reporting triggers that are tied to the
potential adverse effects of the release rather than
to a specific list of substances. Statutory
justification for such regulatory action could be
found in CERCLA section 115, which authorizes
EPA to promulgate any regulations necessary to
implement CERCLA, and 104(e), which authorizes
EPA to collect information about releases of
potentially dangerous substances so that EPA may
carry out its responsibility to respond to releases of
pollutants and contaminants under CERCLA
section 104(a), and to designate additional
substances as hazardous substances under
CERCLA section 102.
EPA implements two other statutes that also
may provide authorization for a regulation that
requires releases of potentially dangerous
substances to be reported to the National
Response Center: The Clean Air Act (CAA) and
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).
Section 112(r)(7) of the CAA provides EPA with
general authority to establish regulations requiring
reports of releases of certain substances into the
air. This authority, however, would enable EPA
only to require reports to the National Response
Center of releases to air, CERCLA provides EPA
with authority to address releases to all
environmental media.
Section 8(e) of TSCA already requires
manufacturers, processors, and distributors of
chemicals to notify EPA when a release of a
chemical causes significant damage to human
health or the environment TSCA, however, does
not cover pesticides and certain other categories of
substances (e.g., Pharmaceuticals). An EPA policy
statement issued on March 16, 1978 (43 FR
11110), and currently undergoing revision,
nonetheless does require notification to the
National Response Center when there is a release
of a potentially dangerous substance that causes
serious barm to human health or the environment
The TSCA section 8(e) reporting triggers could be
clarified to ensure that releases of potentially
dangerous substances are reported to the National
Response Center in a timely manner. Exhibit 4-1
summarizes some of the issues considered by the
working group in considering the various statutory
authorities.
The working group also believes that
notification to the National Response Center could
be enhanced if EPA were to develop a regulation
or guidance that identifies which chemicals would
be likely to exhibit a characteristic of a RCRA
hazardous waste when the chemical is released into
the environment. If a chemical, when released,
becomes a hazardous waste, it also automatically
becomes a CERCLA hazardous substance and
persons responsible for the release of such a waste
would be subject to CERCLA notification and
liability provisions.
Reporting Triggers
Working Group 3 identified several possible
reporting triggers that could be used to require
immediate notification to the National Response
Center of releases of potentially dangerous
substances. For example, death or serious injury
where medical attention is needed could be used to
ensure that the Federal government is notified
about releases of potentially dangerous substances
that cause serious acute human health effects.
Establishing appropriate reporting triggers,
however, that reflect the likelihood that serious
environmental or chronic human health effects
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EXHIBIT 4-1
SUMMARY OF REGULATORY OPTIONS
OPTION
ADVANTAGES
DISADVANTAGES
1. Promulgate a regulation under CERCLA
sections 104 and 115 that requires notification
to the National Response Center when an
accidental release of a potentially dangerous
substance into the environment causes certain
human health and environmental effects or
exceeds a specified quantity
Not restricted by substance or media
Requirement could be justified not only on
need for designation, but also for response
obligation
Could be controversial because requiring
notification of a release of a potentially
dangerous substance could lead to eventual
designation of that substance as a hazardous
substance under CERCLA, with its attached
liability
Promulgate a regulation under CERCLA
sections 104 and 115 that requires immediate
notification to the National Response Center of
a release of 100 pounds or more of specifically
listed chemicals that are likely to exhibit a
RCRA characteristic when released
Alternatively, provide list of substances in
guidance rather than in CFR table
TSCA and FTFRA labeling requirements could
be used to support its implementation
Would promote compliance with existing
obligation to immediately report releases of
substances that, when released, become RCRA
hazardous wastes
Assists EPA in fulfilling its obligation to
respond to releases of hazardous wastes
List of chemicals and criteria may be extremely
controversial and difficult to generate
Producers of chemicals will not want their
products labeled as hazardous
May overwhelm the National Response Center
and Federal response system
3. Promulgate a regulation under CAA section
112(r)(7) that requires notification to the
National Response Center when a release of a
potentially dangerous substance into air causes
certain specified human health and
environmental effects or exceeds a specified
quantity
Less direct link to eventual designation of a
chemical as a hazardous substance under
CERCLA and to CERCLA liability if section
112(r) authority is used
Statutory listing criteria under section 112(r)
are analogous to proposed reporting triggers
CAA section 112(rX7) only addresses releases
of specific substances to the ambient air
CAA section 112 addresses only releases from
fixed facilities
Unking the notification regulation to the
designation of substances under section
112(b)(2) is closely aligned with CERCLA
designation and liability
4. Revise the Policy Statement under TSCA
section 8(e) to clarify the requirement to notify
the National Response Center when a release
of a chemical causes certain specified human
health and environmental effects or exceeds a
specified quantity
Implements existing statutory interpretation;
could be fairly noncontroversial
TSCA section 8(e) does not apply to releases
that are otherwise required to be reported to
EPA
TSCA excludes coverage of chemicals used
solely as pesticides
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may occur as a result of an accidental chemical
release is more problematic. Possible approaches
may include establishing a reporting trigger of "any
fish or other wildlife kill directly related to the
presence of a released chemical" and/or
establishing a specified released quantity as a
reporting trigger. The specified quantity could be
based on historical release quantities that have
been responsible for the majority of serious
chemical releases (e.g., 10,000 pounds based on
data from ERNS), the highest RQ level of 5,000
pounds, or some other basis.
The success of this regulatory approach is
directly related to whether reasonable reporting
triggers can be established that are clear and
recognizable but not overly inclusive. It is
extremely important that a balance be struck
between the need to ensure that the National
Response Center is notified in a timely manner
about any serious release of a potentially
dangerous substance and the need to ensure that
the Federal response system, as well as that of
industry, is not overwhelmed with reports about
releases to which the Federal government would
never, or rarely, respond, and which are currently
being adequately addressed at the local level.
An alternative to this regulatory option would
be to adopt the selected reporting triggers as
guidance, and to publicize those triggers through
such things as advisories to industry trade
associations, and to encourage responsible parties
to notify the National Response Center on a
voluntary baste if a release exceeds one of the
designated triggers. This voluntary approach to
notification may accomplish the same goals as a
notification regulation, but would be less
controversial.
Products That Exhibit RCRA Characteristics
The Working Group considered development
of a second regulation under CERCLA sections
104(e) and 115, or guidance materials, that would
enhance the likelihood that releases of chemicals
that become RCRA characteristic wastes upon
release into the environment are immediately
reported to the National Response Center. The
regulation or guidance would identify a list of
chemicals that, based on their chemical properties,
are likely to exhibit RCRA characteristics when
released into the environment and become a waste.
RCRA characteristic wastes are CERCLA
hazardous substances and have an assigned RQ of
100 pounds. Thus, this option would adopt the
100 pound reporting trigger for a specified list of
chemicals that exhibit the characteristics of toricity,
ignitability, corrosivity, and reactivity as defined
under section 3001 of RCRA.
Promulgation of such a regulation, or adoption
of such guidance materials, would not alter existing
CERCLA liability or notice requirements;
responsible parties may only be held liable for
releases or threatened releases of CERCLA
hazardous substances. The guidance would only
state that such substances have a likelihood of
becoming RCRA characteristic wastes upon
release. The listed chemicals would not be
designated as hazardous substances, and thus
would not automatically be subject to CERCLA
liability, the status of the released substance under
RCRA and CERCLA would depend on whether
after a release occurs, the waste indeed meets the
definition of a hazardous waste under section 3001
of RCRA This suggested regulation or guidance
would only address notification to the National
Response Center, ensuring that the Federal
government has the opportunity to evaluate the
RECOMMENDATIONS
Consider Clarifying Reporting Triggers
Linked to the Effects of a Release; EPA
should review the reporting triggers under
TSCA section 8(e) to determine whether they
are adequate to ensure timely notification of
releases of potentially dangerous substances
that may warrant a Federal response. If
necessary, revise the TSCA section 8{e)
reporting triggers to provide increased clarity.
Develop a List of Chemicals Likely to
Become RCRA Characteristic Wastes
When Released into the Environment:
To enhance notification to toe National
Response Center, EPA should provide more
information about chemicals that are likely to
exhibit the RCRA hazardous waste
characteristics if they are released into the
environment and not cleaned up. Guidance
should be adopted that lists those chemicals
that, when released, have a high probability of
satisfying the criteria of toricity, ignitability,
corrosivity, and reactivity specified in RCRA
regulations defining characteristic wastes (40
CFR part 261.21-.24).
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release in a timely manner and, if necessary, to
respond to the release. Because publication of a
regulation or guidance would rely on a specific list
of chemicals (and not jo»i specified characteristics),
the requirement to report releases of these wastes
would be clearer and thus more likely to occur.
The feasibility of this approach depends upon
how straightforward it would be to develop a list of
chemicals that exhibit the RCRA hazardous waste
characteristics when released into the environment
Manufacturers of identified chemicals may
vigorously resist any characterization of their
chemicals as "hazardous" without specific
designation under CERCLA or a showing that the
chemical, when released, will become a RCRA
hazardous waste.
4.4 DESIGNATION OF HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCES
Several different approaches for expanding the
list of hazardous substances designated under
CERCLA were explored by Working Group 3,
including: (1) automatically designating any
chemical that, upon release to the environment,
has been shown to cause significant damage to
human health or the environment (e.g., metam
sodium); (2) initiating a rulemaking to designate
under CERCLA the marine pollutants in
MARPOL Annex III (which include metam
sodium); and (3) developing criteria for identifying
potentially dangerous substances that should be
designated as hazardous substances under
CERCLA
Immediate Designation
In response to a request from Congresswoman
Boxer, the working group evaluated invoking the
'good cause" exception contained in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to
immediately designate metam sodium as a
hazardous substance under CERCLA. Section 553
of the APA requires that administrative rules and
regulations be promulgated pursuant to "notice
and comment." Subsection (b)(3)(B) provides an
exception to the notice and comment requirement
"when the agency for good cause finds ... that
notice and public procedure thereon are
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest." Pursuant to that exception, EPA
may promulgate an interim final rule that would
take effect immediately upon promulgation when
the Agency can show "good cause" for not
following normal notice and comment procedures.
After considerable scrutiny of this provision, it
was determined that it would be inappropriate to
list metam sodium as a hazardous substance
without notice and comment.
In a letter to Congresswoman Boxer on
October 29, 1991, Don Clay, the Assistant
Administrator for OSWER explained the Agency's
position. He stated that although it was of
foremost importance to EPA that the metam
sodium spill had caused significant environmental
abuse to a 45-mile stretch of the Sacramento
River, including abundant fish and animals killed,
restrictions on recreation, and potential human
health consequences, the Agency believed it was
inappropriate to pursue an immediate hazardous
substance designation by invoking the "good cause"
exception to the APA That decision in no way
should suggest, however, that EPA did not
consider this an issue of serious importance. As a
result of the release, EPA has initiated a broad
review of the regulatory framework through which
the Agency responds to releases of substances like
metam sodium.
The APA requires that regulations be
promulgated pursuant to notice and comment
unless the Agency for "good cause" finds that such
procedures are impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest. Because metam
sodium, when released, rapidly formed CERCLA
hazardous substances when it came in contact with
water, and became a hazardous waste under
RCRA, the CERCLA reporting and response
authorities were triggered at the time the release
occurred or shortly thereafter. Thus, the
immediate listing of metam sodium as a CERCLA
hazardous substances would not accord the Agency
significant additional reporting or response
authority.
Further, EPA believes that the underpinnings
of notice and comment rulemaking should not be
disregarded lightly. In fact, the importance of
notice and comment is underscored by EPA's
recent efforts to promulgate a rule to designate
226 extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) as
CERCLA hazardous substances. Among these 226
EHSs are 29 pesticides, many of which are more
acutely toxic to humans than metam sodium.
Nonetheless, EPA is following notice and comment
rulemaking procedures in seeking to list these
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extremely toxic chemicals. The Agency believes it
would be inappropriate to invoke the "good cause"
exception to the APA for metam sodium when that
exception was not evoked for the 226 EHSs.
In sum, EPA has determined that invocation
of the "good cause" exception would not be
appropriate for metam sodium. In the future,
however, the Agency is not precluded from
invoking that exception to designate other
substances in appropriate circumstances.
Designation of MARPOL Annex HI Marine
Pollutants
The MARPOL Annex III list of pollutants,
which includes metam sodium, is made up of
marine pollutants and severe marine pollutants
that are regulated while in maritime transit under
an international treaty known as the 1978 Protocol
to the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, or the MARPOL
Protocol. Annex III "responds to concerns about
the possible adverse environmental impact of
packaged harmful substances entering the marine
environment due to ship collisions, grounding, and
other accidental and operational causes." On June
10, 1991, the President signed Annex HI of the
MARPOL Convention with no resolutions or
reservations; MARPOL Annex III becomes
effective on July 1, 1992.
Annex III of MARPOL is titled "Regulations
for the Prevention of Pollution by Harmful
Substances Carried by Sea in Packaged Form" and
applies to all ships. Annex Ill's major provisions
include: (1) a requirement that packaging of
harmful substances be adequate to minimize the
hazard to the marine environment posed by the
package's specific contents; (2) a requirement that
packages be marked with a durable and distinctive
label which identifies the contents and that the
contents are potentially harmful; (3) a requirement
that packages be stowed onboard ship in a way
that minimizes the risk to the marine environment;
(4) a requirement that the vessels cany a special
list or manifest setting forth the harmful
substances on board, and where they are stowed;
and (5) permission for parties to prohibit or
impose quantity limitations on the carriage of
certain substances.
Annex III regulates over 400 harmful
substances. Many of these pollutants have an
extremely high potential to cause significant
adverse human health and environmental effects
upon release into the environment. One hundred
and fifty-three (153) of the MARPOL Annex DI
pollutants are already on the list of CERCLA
hazardous substances. Twenty-nine (29) of the
MARPOL Annex III pollutants are EHSs already
proposed to be designated as CERCLA hazardous
substances (54 FR 3388, January 23,1989). There
are 241 MARPOL Annex III pollutants, however,
that are not currently CERCLA hazardous
substances and have not yet been proposed for
designation as CERCLA hazardous substances.
For the purposes of Annex III, substances
identified by any one of the following criteria are
marine pollutants: (1) substances that
bioaccumulate to a significant extent and are
known to produce a hazard to aquatic life or to
human health; (2) substances that bioaccumulate
with attendant risk to aquatic organisms or to
human health with a short retention of the order
of one week or less; (3) substances that are highly
toxic to aquatic life; or (4) substances that are
liable to produce tainting of seafood.
The working group considered whether all
Annex HI marine pollutants should be designated
as hazardous substances under CERCLA because
the MARPOL pollutants could be released into
navigable waters of the United States and could
cause severe damage; except for those pollutants
already designated as CERCLA hazardous
substances, parties responsible for such releases
would generally not be subject to CERCLA
notification requirements.
The working group was concerned, however,
that not all marine pollutants on the MARPOL
Annex III list are considered to be toxic. For
example, nine of the pollutants are on the list
because they can taint seafood (i.e., affect the smell
or taste, not the safety). Such a characteristic may
not be sufficient to warrant designating the
pollutant as a hazardous substance under
CERCLA.
Further, because DOT has proposed to
regulate the MARPOL Annex III pollutants as
hazardous materials, the benefits from EPA
regulatory action under CERCLA would be less
significant
The working group believed that a better
alternative to designating all MARPOL Annex III
marine pollutants as hazardous substances under
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CERCLA would be to develop criteria that could
be used to screen databases and lists of chemicals
for the most potentially dangerous substances that
are currently not on the CERCLA list of
hazardous substances. Any pollutants on the
MARPOL Annex III list that met those criteria
would be considered for designation, along with
other potentially dangerous substances. The
criteria could be used to identify and designate the
subset of MARPOL Annex III pollutants that most
warrant listing.
Designation Criteria
Specific designation of potentially dangerous
substances as hazardous substances under
CERCLA would subject them to regulatory control
and should minimize the occurrence of accidental
releases and the consequent damage. Currently,
there are 783 designated CERCLA hazardous
substances derived from the lists under the CWA,
CAA, and RCRA, including 51 hazardous air
pollutants (46 individual substances and 5
categories) added by Congress under the CAA
Amendments of 1990.5 In addition, EPA has
proposed to designate 226 EHSs listed pursuant to
section 302 of Title HI of SARA
To designate a substance as hazardous under
CERCLA section 102(a), EPA must be able to
show that the substance, "when released in the
environment may present substantial danger to the
public health or welfare or the environment." To
date, EPA has not developed quantitative criteria
to serve as a designation standard under CERCLA
The working group, therefore, devoted
considerable energies to reviewing criteria and
evaluating the implications of selecting those
criteria for the universe of potentially dangerous
substances that would be considered for
designation under CERCLA
The working group used screening criteria that
included measures of the following types of effects,
reflecting CERCLA's mandate to protect human
health, welfare, and the environment: acute,
chronic, and potential carcinogenic effects to
human health; physical effects such as ignitability
and reactivity, and ecological effects. The
screening criteria enabled the working group to
search large databases electronically, which was the
most feasible way initially to examine large
numbers of substances. It was anticipated that this
would be a process that would undergo a series of
refinements and the substances identified would be
further evaluated.
To measure the potential adverse effects on
human health, substances that exhibit acute
mammalian toxicity (as measured by an LD50 or
LC50 below specified levels) were screened
considering oral, dermal, and inhalation routes of
exposure. The screening levels selected for each
exposure route are shown in Exhibit 4-2 and are
based on the methodology used to adjust RQs
under CERCLA section 102.
Reproductive effects were the primary non-
carcinogenic chronic effect considered by the
working group, although other criteria were
considered indirectly by augmenting the candidate
chemical list with the nine additional substances
not currently on the CERCLA list of hazardous
substances that were identified as chronic toxicants
by OSHA and the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health (N1OSH).6
Substances also were included as candidates
for designation if they are considered to be
potential human carcinogens based on analyses
performed by the International Agency for
Research on Cancer (IARC) or by the National
Toxicology Program (NTP). Potential human
carcinogens were identified by these organizations
through the review of bioassay data that indicated
potential human carcinogenicity based on human
or animal evidence studies, while noting varying
degrees of certainty associated with the research.
IARC potential human carcinogens were included
if IARC assigned the substance to Groups 1,2A or
2B; NTP potential human carcinogens were
included if they were contained in the Fifth
Annual NTP Report on Carcinogens.
For ecological considerations, aquatic toxicity
criteria were selected as a preliminary screening
criterion. Physical criteria (i.e., ignitability/
flammability and reactivity) also were considered,
although at this time the screening criteria
included primarily non-quantitative key word
searches (e.g., an electronic search for
"flammable").
The working group used five screening levels
for acute and chronic mammalian toxicity, aquatic
toxicity, and ignitability, the five levels are
equivalent to the thresholds used to adjust final
RQs under CERCLA The RQ levels were used
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EXHIBIT 4-2
SCREENING CRITERIA BY LEVEL
Criteria
Level 1
Level 2
LevelS
Level 4
LevelS
Acute Mammalian Toxicity
Oral LD50
(mg/kg)
0 to < 0.1
Oto < 1
0 to < 10
0 to < 100
0 to < 500
Dermal LD50
(mg/kg)
0 to < 0.04
0 to < 0.4
Oto < 4
Oto < 40
Oto < 200
Inhalation LCSO
0 to < 0.4 ppm
0 to < 4 ppm
0 to < 40 ppm
0 to < 400 ppm
0 to < 2000 ppm
Aquatic
LC50 (mg/1)
0 to < 0.1
0 to < 1
0 to < 10
0 to < 100
0 to < 500
Ignitability
Not used
Pyropboric or self ignitable
FP < 100°F
BP < 100°F
FP< 100°F
BP£100°F
FP< 140°F
1 Searches were also conducted for data expressed in mg/m3.
ADDITIONAL SCREENING CRITERIA
Additional screening criteria were applied to databases.
Carcinogenicity
1. Listed in 1ARC 1A, 2A, 2B
or
2. Listed in the Fifth Annual
NTP Report on Carcinogens
Reactivity
Textual search for keywords
such as detonation,
polymerize, and stabilizer.
Chronic Toxicity
Search on RTECS for
reproductive effects, plus
additional NIOSH chronic
toxicants.
* The TSCA and FIFRA inventories were screened to eliminate chemicals that are not currently in
production.
EXHIBIT 4-3
NUMBER OF POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES MEETING EACH CRITERIA LEVEL1
Level 1
Level 2
Levels
Level 4
LevelS
Standard Species
147
250
594
1,057
1,506
Unspecified Species
268
466
923
1,540
2,131
1 The fathead minnow and the bluegill are standard species for aquatic toxicity, and the
rat is the standard species for acute mammalian toxicity and chronic toxicity.
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as preliminary screening criteria because they are
quantitative and allow for fairly straightforward
electronic screening of large databases. Chemical
databases were screened at each of the five levels
for toxicity data based on studies using standard
and unspecified" species.
A final screening criterion was used to
preserve on the candidate list only those
substances that are not currently in commercial
production. Presence on either the list of pesticide
active ingredients pursuant to FIFRA or on the
publicly available portion of the TSCA Inventory
served to efficiently identify substances that are
more likely to pose a threat to human health,
welfare, and the environment. The working group
assumed that substances not produced or used in
commerce are less likely to be released into the
environment and exposure to such chemicals would
likely be minimal.
The working group developed and analyzed the
effects of these human health and environmental
screening criteria assuming that there would be
ample opportunity later to carefully augment and
modify the criteria. For example, members of the
working group raised particular concerns about the
criteria used to identify potential chronic toxicants
and other toxicants that induce chronic effects
following acute exposure, as well as ecological
toxicants. The lack of precise quantitative criteria
for the former and reliance solely on aquatic
toxicity for the latter caused some concern for
working group members. Before any rulemaking
proceeds, therefore, the working group strongly
recommends that the screening criteria be carefully
reviewed and revised as necessary; none of the
criteria should be considered final.
Databases
Three primary databases were considered for
the first tier screening: the Registry of Toxic
Effects of Chemical Substances (RTECS), Aquatic
Information and Retrieval (AQUIRE), and the
MERCK database. RTECS was selected as a
starting point because it contains toxicity data on
approximately 110,000 chemicals. A chemical is
listed in RTECS if there is at least one
documented positive study indicating that it is
toxic. IARC data were accessed through data
fields in RTECS. Similarly, there are fields in
RTECS that identify those chemicals on the
publicly available TSCA Inventory and/or on the
FIFRA list of pesticide active ingredients.
As the primary source of aquatic toxicity data,
the AQUIRE database was consulted. AQUIRE
has information on approximately 4,000 chemicals.
The information on ignitability and reactivity was
obtained from the MERCK database, an index
developed by the MERCK Company that includes
information on ignitability, reactivity, and
corrosivity for approximately 10,000 chemicals.
Two chemical lists were consulted subsequently
to the screening analysis to begin to test the
comprehensiveness of the screening criteria: the
MARPOL Annex III list of marine pollutants that
contains 270 substances not currently listed as
CERCLA hazardous substances (all but nine
marine pollutants were identified based on the
screening criteria; metam sodium was identified as
Level 2), and the list of 226 EHSs not on the
CERCLA hazardous substances list
Exhibit 4-2 presents the five screening levels
and their associated criteria used to identify
potentially dangerous substances that are currently
not designated as hazardous substances under
CERCLA. Exhibit 4-3 shows the number of
substances that would be affected if EPA selected
each screening level.
Additional Screening Criteria
Besides considering modified screening criteria
to identify chronic and ecological toxicants, the
working group believes it is appropriate to
consider additional criteria to further narrow and
fine-tune the candidate list. One possible criterion
could be a minimum production level for candidate
chemicals because chemicals produced in small
quantities are less likely to be transported and
used at different facilities and thus may pose a
lower hazard. A production level threshold of
10,000 pounds could be considered, based on the
fact that such a threshold was used to develop the
list of regulated substances under CAA section
112(r) and to require reporting of toxic chemicals
under SARA Title III section 313. Alternatively,
a threshold could be established by analyzing
production levels for chemicals that have caused
serious adverse effects in the past
The working group acknowledges that there is
a potential problem in using production levels as
a screening criterion for designating substances as
hazardous substances under CERCLA; namely,
production can change relatively quickly and,
indeed, has been known to change in response to
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regulatory actions. Nonetheless, the working group
believes that such a criterion should be given
serious consideration by future workgroups
finalizing designation screening criteria.
A second screening criterion that should be
considered would be release history. Consideration
should be given to those substances that have been
released in the past and have caused significant
damage to human health or the environment. For
example, Working Group 1 identified a list of
potentially dangerous substances that caused death,
injury, or environmental/property damage when
released in the past These substances should be
considered carefully for designation as hazardous
substances under CERCLA.
Finally, because the RQ adjustment criteria
are not risk based, it may be appropriate to
analyze the potential risks attributable to releases
of the candidate chemicals. This final risk analysis
could be used to further identify the substances of
greatest concern. It would be important, however,
that the risk models rely on the equations and
default values contained in the Risk Assessment
Guidance for Superfund and that they consider both
episodic acute exposures and continuous chronic
exposures caused by releases of these potentially
dangerous substances. The risk analysis also could
be used to quantify the benefits associated with
designating these chemicals as hazardous
substances under CERCLA
RECOMMENDATIONS
Resolve Issues Related to Designation
of EHSs Prior to Developing Criteria:
Several issues surrounding the Agency's
efforts to designate EHSs as CERCLA
hazardous substances could significantly
affect any designation criteria. These issues
should be resolved, therefore, prior to
moving forward with criteria development
under CERCLA.
Consider Refining Screening Criteria.
Validating Data, and Establishing
Priorities for Designating Chemicals As
Hazardous Substances under CERCLA;
The results of toe analysis, although
preliminary, indicate that there are potentially
dangerous substances in commerce such as
metam sodium that should be considered for
designation under CERCLA. No definitive
candidate chemical list can be generated based
on this preliminary analysis, however, until
there is opportunity for a comprehensive
review of the studies and data supporting the
toxicity findings. Serious consideration should
be given to convening an interagency
workgroup to develop additional criteria or
take other actions to refine or expand upon
the approach and analysis conducted by the
working group thus far.
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ENDNOTES FOR DOCUMENT
1. Reports of releases of potentially dangerous substances may be made to the National Response Center
for a variety of reasons. Many Federal statutes and regulations direct release reports to the National
Response Center, including the Toxic Substances Control Act, HMTA, CERCLA, CWA, and others.
2. Copies of the ERNS data analyses are available from EPA through the ERNS Program Manager,
(202) 260-2342.
3. These criteria will be phased-in over the next three years, but voluntary compliance is encouraged until
the regulations are in effect It should be noted that the new criteria would have covered the
transport of metam sodium if the concentration of the mixture being transported was at least 35
percent metam sodium; however, in the July 1991 incident, the mixture was only 32 percent.
4. Although a number of environmental organizations were contacted and invited to speak at the Open
Forum, all of the groups declined because of prior obligations.
5. CERCLA section 101(14) defines hazardous substance to include (A) any substance designated
pursuant to section 311 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), (B) any element, compound, mixture,
solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 102 of CERCLA, (C) any hazardous waste
having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of RCRA, (D) any toxic
pollutant listed under section 307 of the CWA, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section
112 of the Clean Air Act, and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with
respect to which EPA has taken action pursuant to section 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act.
6. The nine additional chronic toxicants were identified hi the NIOSH Recommendations for
Occupational Safety and Health Standards (1988). The nine toxicants are: carbon black, carbon
monoxide, carbon dioxide, cobalt, furfural alcohol, isopropyl alcohol, 2-nitronaphthalene, phenol-beta-
naphthylamine, and zinc oxide.
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LIST OK ACRONYMS
AHE - Acme Hazardous Events
APA - 'Administrative Procedure Aci
AQUIRE - Aquatic Information and Retrieval
ARIP - Accidental Release Information Program
ATSDR - Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
CAA - Clean Air Act
CASRN - Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number
CERCLA - Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation, and Liability Act
CWA - Clean Water Act
DOT - Department of Transportation
EHS - Extremely Hazardous Substance
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
ERNS - Emergency Response Notification System
FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIFRA - Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
HM1S - Hazardous Materials Information System
HMR - Hazardous Materials Regulations
HMTA - Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
HSEES - Hazardous Substance Emergency Event. Surveillance
IARC - International Agency for Research on Cancer
LEPC - Local Emergency Planning Committee
NIEHS - National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
NIOSH - National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
NRC - National Response Center
NRT - National Response Team
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NTP
OSC
OSHA
RCRA
RSPA
RTECS
SARA
SERC
TSCA
LIST OF ACRONYMS
(continued)
National Toxicology Program
On-Scene Coordinator
Occupationsal Safety and Health Administration
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Research and Special Programs Administration
Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
State Emergency Response Commission
Toxic Substances Control Act
-40-
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REPORT OF THE
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES TASK FORCE
APPENDIX A
Case Study of the
July 14, 1991
Cantara Loop Train Derailment
-------
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Page
Introduction A-l
Uses and Regulation of Metam Sodium A-l
Accident Summary A-l
Notification and Response Actions A-l
Health Effects A-3
Environmental Effects A-3
Post Accident Activities A-4
Addendum: Chronology of Spill Response Activities A-5
-------
INTRODUCTION
This case study is an overview of the events
that occurred during and after the derailment of a
Southern Pacific train car containing the pesticide
metam sodium on July 14, 1991, near Dunsmuir,
California. The train car was carrying
approximately 19,500 gallons of metam sodium
which spilled into the Sacramento River, resulting
in extensive environmental damage, adverse health
effects that ranged from minor irritations to
nausea, and reduced tourism in a town known for
its location on and near world class fishing
streams. The spill has called into question the
adequacy of existing methods for transporting
hazardous materials and other potentially
dangerous substances, and controlling them when
released, and has prompted policymakers to
examine the process of reporting and responding
to environmental disasters.
This case study summarizes information
gathered from a number of different Federal and
State regulatory authorities, as well as from
Southern Pacific Transportation Company (the
owner of the train from which the release
occurred), to provide a context in which to
understand and apply the task force's findings and
recommendations. The case study is organized
into sections on the uses and regulation of metam
sodium, a summary of the accident, notification
and response activities, information on health and
environmental effects, and a description of post-
release activities.
USES AND REGULATION OF METAM SODIUM
Metam sodium is a soil-applied pesticide for
soil fungi, weed seeds, nematodes, and soil insects,
and is used in the United States primarily on
potato crops. As shipped on July 14,1991, metam
sodium was not regulated as a hazardous material
by the DOT under HMTA.
Under CERCLA, as amended, a potentially
dangerous substance is a hazardous substance if it
is listed or designated pursuant to the authority of
specific environmental statutes listed in CERCLA
section 101(14), including the Clean Water Act,
Clean Air Act, RCRA, and CERCLA section 102,
or if action has been taken with respect thereto
under section 7 of TSCA. Metam sodium is not a
specifically listed CERCLA hazardous substance.
The release of metam sodium on July 14, 1991,
however, was subject to the reporting and liability
provisions of CERCLA because, when released,
the metam sodium rapidly hydroryzed and
decomposed to form several different specifically
listed hazardous substances, and because metam
sodium became a hazardous waste as defined under
section 3001 of RCRA.
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, metam sodium is regulated as an
active ingredient in registered pesticide products.
It also is a marine pollutant under MARPOL
Annex II and III1; and is a hazardous and
dangerous material under U.S. Coast Guard
regulations governing shipment of materials by
vessels.
ACCIDENT SUMMARY
On Sunday, July 14,1991, a Southern Pacific
train derailed just north of Dunsmuir, California,
on a section of track known as the Cantara Loop.
Several cars fell down a 25-foot rocky embankment
into the Sacramento River. The tank car
positioned five cars behind the locomotive was
thrust into an inverted position and sustained
punctures above and below the waterline. This
tank car contained approximately 19,500 gallons of
metam sodium, and within a very short time,
virtually all of the pesticide was released into the
Sacramento River.
The exact cause of the Dunsmuir spill is still
under investigation, but Southern Pacific has
suggested several factors as possible contributors to
the incident: the positioning of the tank car close
to the head of the train immediately behind a long
empty flat car, extreme draw-bar forces; a sharp
throttle increase; the step grade that includes
several sharp curves; and the positioning of cars
loaded with scrap metal at the rear of the train,
which consisted predominantly of empty cars.
NOTIFICATION AND RESPONSE ACTIONS
The derailment occurred at approximately 9:40
p.m. and was first reported by Southern Pacific to
the California Office of Emergency Services (OES)
just before 11:00 p.m. Southern Pacific did not
report at that time that the tank car containing the
metam sodium had ruptured or that there was a
release of pesticide into the Sacramento River. At
A-l
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11:40, California Department of Fish and Game
(DFG) officials arrived at the scene. Southern
Pacific notified the National Response Center
about the derailment at 1:2G a.m. on July 15,1991,
more than three hours after the incident At 3:30
a.m., the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) from
USEPA Region 9 contacted the California DFG to
offer assistance, but was told at that time that no
assistance was needed because no release had
occurred. At 5:45 a.m. on July 15, California DFG
officials notified USEPA Region 9 that a three-
inch hole in the tank car had been located and
metam sodium was indeed being released from the
car into the Sacramento River. The USEPA
Region 9 OSC again offered to assist the State in
the response; however, State officials again
declined the offer, believing at the time that the
situation was under control. The addendum to this
case study presents a chronology that summarizes
the notification and response activities that
occurred during the first three days of the spill.
Later on the morning of July 15, 1991, the
California OES and California DFG notified
USEPA Region 9 that the spill was more serious
than originally reported and that the Sacramento
River appeared to be seriously affected. In
response to this report, but still without request by
the State of California, two USEPA OSCs began
the 5-hour drive from San Francisco to Dunsmuir
and arrived at the spill scene at approximately 5:00
p.m., July 15, 1991. Simultaneously, USEPA
requested that the U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Strike
Team (PST) also respond to the release. The
State of California formally requested Federal
USEPA assistance at approximately 1:00 p.m.,
when it was confirmed that virtually all of the
contents of the tank car had spilled into the
Sacramento River.
The response was organized under the
structure of the Incident Command System2 with
the California DFG and California Division of
Forestry and Fire Protection sharing the command.
More than 60 Federal, State, local, and private
agencies and organizations participated in the
response. The USEPA, in conjunction with several
California State agencies, ensured that appropriate
response actions were (and continue to be) taken.
For example, upon arrival, the USEPA OSCs
established an exclusion and contaminant reduction
zone, and met with the California Department of
Occupational Safety and Health to discuss safety
planning. The OSCs oversaw the removal of
residual metam sodium from the tank car, and
removal of the tank car from the river. The
USEPA issued an enforcement order under section
106 of CERCLA to ensure that Southern Pacific
undertook appropriate response activities. The
CERCLA trust fund, Superfund, was accessed to
finance an emergency response for a plume
interdiction operation at Lake Shasta.
Once the severity of the spill was fully realized,
the two counties bordering the spill area declared
local emergencies and activated their emergency
response systems. A Shasta County emergency
response center was opened in Redding, and a
Siskiyou County center was established in the city
of Mt. Shasta. The California DFG acted as the
State Agency Coordinator at the Incident
Command Center, and was responsible for
assigning key staff to both of the county centers.
Officials at these centers focused on evaluating the
spill impact on the environment and public health.
On July 15,1991, a planning meeting was held
to organize local agencies and coordinate response
activities. Representatives from the USEPA and
the Coast Guard PST met with representatives of
Southern Pacific on July 16,1991, to discuss details
of the response action. On July 16, the residual
material remaining in the tank car was removed
and the tank car itself was removed from the river.
Analysis of air and water samples showed levels
above the human health warning limits of
methylisothiocyanate, a harmful breakdown
product of metam sodium.
Southern Pacific hired a clean-up contractor to
contain the spill. Various proposals for
containment or cleanup were discussed among
Southern Pacific and the governmental agencies.
The proposals included reducing the river flow in
affected areas to facilitate use of activated carbon
treatment; pumping contaminated water from
pooled areas into rail cars and/or trucks; and
dissipating the plume by aerating and agitating the
water. On July 19, the Incident Commander
approved initiation of plume aeration in Lake
Shasta. These aeration activities commenced on
July 20.
In addition to providing on-site technical
assistance, the USEPA set up an "air curtain"
downstream from the Southern Pacific operations
A-2
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as a plume interdiction measure. The air curtain
was designed to remove residual substances that
escaped the aeration system. The USEPA also
assessed treatment methods for substances entering
Lake Shasta; made available EPA's remote
submarine to conduct subsurface monitoring and
sampling; and provided assistance to California
DFG with the Department's natural resource
damage assessment plan. In addition, the USEPA
participated in a public meeting to discuss the spill
and response, status of the river restoration,
enforcement, and economic and financial
reimbursements.
HEALTH EFFECTS
Exposure to metam sodium has the potential
for causing adverse health effects from both acute
and chronic exposures.3 In addition, existing
medical conditions may be exacerbated upon
exposure to metam sodium. Examples of acute
health effects include excessive salivation, sweating,
fatigue, weakness, nausea, headache, dizziness, and
eye and respiratory tract irritation. Chronic
conditions can include conjunctivitis, photophobia,
and blurred vision. Studies also have suggested
that the chemical may exhibit reproductive toxicity.
Medical conditions that are prone to further
aggravation upon exposure to metam sodium
include impaired pulmonary functions and pre-
existing eye problems.
A California Department of Health Services
physician, Dr. Lynn Goldman, testified that
exposure to metam sodium particularly affected
citizens with pre-existing conditions, many of
whom had lower immunity at the time of the spill,
putting them at greater risk for exposure-related
ailments. Emergency room records at the local
hospital indicate increased activity levels in the
aftermath of the spill. Between July 15 and July
31, for example, there were 252 visits to the
emergency room, compared with eight visits for the
first three weeks in August4 The most common
symptoms were nausea (reported in 51% of
patients), headaches (44%), eye irritation (40%),
throat irritation (26%), dizziness (23%), and
shortness of breath (21%).
Pregnant women are of special concern to
health officials and continue to be monitored as a
group because they have an elevated risk for
chemical exposure-related medical problems5.
The fetuses of pregnant women exposed during the
first few weeks of pregnancy may be at increased
risk for neural tube defects. The California
Department of Health Services advised pregnant
women to undergo a test to screen for this type of
birth defect if they were in the first trimester of
pregnancy.
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
The California DFG has primary responsibility
for assessing the total resource damage attributable
to the metam sodium spill According to early
accounts, all aquatic life and substantial amounts
of vegetation along a 45-mile stretch of river
leading to Lake Shasta was destroyed. Several
sources place the number of fish killed at more
than 200,000. The area affected by the spill
supports more than 240 species of wildlife,
including 75 mammalian species; 17 reptile species;
14 amphibian species; and 140 bird species.
Among the mammals are the black bear, black-
tailed deer, mountain lion, coyote, raccoon, river
otter, and mink. The birds include several species
of songbirds, hawks, and owls, as well as the
flycatcher, bald eagle, and osprey. The amphibians
include several species of salamanders and frogs;
reptiles include the western pond turtle, three
lizard species, and 12 snake species. In addition, a
large number of insect species are found in this
habitat Several of the species potentially affected
by the spill are considered endangered or
threatened, including the bald eagle, Swainson's
hawk, peregrine falcon, and wolverine.
It is clear from early assessments that the spill
dramatically altered the ecological system. In their
recently published draft Natural Resource Damage
Assessment Plan, the California DFG outlines
plans for assessing longer term damage to species
known to be injured, and those suspected to be
injured, by the spill.
Assessments indicate that the spill has not
affected the drinking water supply to the residents
of Dunsmuir, and California DFG biologists have
noted that insects, algae, and small trout are
returning to the river faster than originally
anticipated. Naturalists fear, however, that large
trees lining the banks may die within a few years,
and would not be fully replaced for up to 50 years.
A-3
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POST ACCIDENT ACTIVITIES
Due to the severity of the spill, several
Federal, State, and local agencies are conducting
investigations in an attempt to determine the long-
term effects of the spill and to assess how similar
releases might be prevented in the future. In
addition, support services are being offered by
Southern Pacific, that will provide the town of
Dunsmuir needed health and financial resources.
Southern Pacific Support Services
Southern Pacific has taken several measures to
reduce the burden placed on the citizens of
Dunsmuir as a result of the spill. Southern Pacific
reports that the company has spent approximately
S3 million for spill-related clean-up, medical check-
ups, economic recovery, and for other purposes.
Southern Pacific also established a community
relations office in Dunsmuir to encourage dialogue
between top Southern Pacific officials and the
citizens of the region and opened a claims office to
reimburse certain expenses incurred as a result of
the spill. As of October, 1991, Southern Pacific
reports it had received over 1,400 claims and made
payment on 500 of these claims.
California DFG Resource Damage Assessment
Immediately following the spill, the California
DFG announced plans to conduct a comprehensive
natural resource damage assessment. This damage
assessment will determine the amount of damage
to the ecosystem and will estimate the costs of
restoration. A draft assessment plan was released
in mid-October. The damage assessment will
include a description of the contamination and
pathways of exposure, a .determination of the
quantity of injury, a resource recoverability
analysis, and a restoration and compensation
determination plan.
Legislative Initiatives
Congresswoman Boxer has introduced three
bills as a result of the metam sodium spill. H.R
3423 and H.R. 3424 would amend HMTA. H.R.
3423 would require DOT to list as hazardous
materials any material designated by the U.S.
Coast Guard as a hazardous material when shipped
by water. H.R. 3424 proposes to change the focus
of HMTA by amending the definition of
"hazardous material" in section 102(4) of HMTA
to include substances that pose an unreasonable
risk to the environment when transported in
commerce, including risks posed by accidental
discharges to water, air, or soil. In addition,
Congresswoman Boxer introduced a bill, H.R.
3758, to add metam sodium to the DOT hazardous
materials list and the CERCLA hazardous
substances list.
Joint Government Enforcement
Immediately following thespill, representatives
from Federal, State, and local governments met to
develop a cooperative approach to enforcement
actions arising out of this incident EPA Region
9 is participating in this enforcement effort, along
with the U.S. Departments of Justice and Interior,
the U.S. Forest Service, California Attorneys
General's Office (on behalf of various State
agencies), and the District Attorneys from Siskiyou
and Shasta Counties.
A-4
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Addendum:
Chronology of Cantata Loop Release: July 14 - August 6, 1991
JULY 14,1991
9:40 pm A Southern Pacific (SP) Transportation Company locomotive and six freight cars derail at the
Cantara Loop, between the towns of ML Shasta and Dunsmuir, Siskiyou County, California. The
cars fall directly into or adjacent to the Sacramento River. One tank car containing
approximately 19,500 gallons of the pesticide metam sodium begins discharging into the river,
apparently unknown to the railroad personnel.
11:00 pm SP reports rail accident to the California Office of Emergency Services (OES); initial reports
indicate a minor train derailment involving a tank car of weed killer. As a precaution, the
Sheriffs Department issued an advisory for the general population to stay away from the river and
to keep all windows closed.
JULY 15, 1991
1:18 am SP reports the train derailment to the National Response Center, indicating that diesel oil spilled
onto the banks of the Sacramento River and that one tank car, carrying a weed killer, rested in
the river but was not leaking.
1:30 am OES reports the SP train derailment to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region
9. An EPA On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) receives the initial report of a train derailment from
the National Response Center. This report does not specify that the river is being affected and
does not request EPA assistance.
3:30 am The OSC contacts the California Department of Fish and Game (DFG) and offers EPA
assistance, which is declined. The metam sodium leak from the tank car has not yet been
reported.
5:00 am Estimated time that the pesticide reaches the town of Dunsmuir. Estimates indicate that metam
sodium will flow through 45 miles of river to the Sacramento Ann of Lake Shasta over the course
of the next three days.
5:45 am California DFG Incident Commander (1C) contacts the EPA OSC to report a 3" hole in the tank
car that has leaked approximately 1000 gallons of weed killer: 200 gallons into the river and 800
gallons onto the river bank. EPA's offer to assist is again declined.
5:50 am Fisherman and SP personnel observe massive fish kill underway.
7:00 am EPA OSC reports the incident to the EPA Region 9 Emergency Response Section chief.
10:00 am Two OSCs dispatched to the scene, although EPA assistance still has not been requested and
confirmed reports of the metam sodium spill have not been received.
11:00 am SP's hazardous materials team, wearing protective clothing, determines additional damage exists
to tank car below the water line.
11:30 am EPA OSC requests that the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Pacific Strike Team (PST) respond to the
incident.
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12:00 pm The California Highway Patrol closes nearby interstate highway.
1:00 pm State of California EPA formally requests Federal EPA assistance and confirms the report that
most of the 19,500 gallon tank car load has spilled into the river.
5:00 pm EPA and PST arrive at the site and find inadequate safety practices in effect. EPA assumes
temporary command at the scene. SP is ordered to provide security in order that unauthorized
persons do not enter the site.
6:00 pm The interstate highway is reopened.
6:15 pm EPA is informed by SP personnel that the track, after extensive hours of repair, is open and clear;
trains will be coming through on schedule. A Sisktyou County Health Administrator arrives and
expresses concerns about the lack of air monitoring. Seventy residents have been treated for
complaints ranging from minor skin irritations to nausea.
7:30 pm Site operations suspended due to darkness. EPA's offer to assist in directing the recovery and
removal efforts at the spill scene are accepted, provided EPA activities are within the scope of
the Incident Command System (ICS). California DFG assumes the lead in monitoring the river
cleanup and impact of the spill.
9:25 pm EPA issues a verbal Notice of Federal Interest to SP, under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, considering the company a potentially responsible
party for the cleanup of the spill.
9:30 pm A meeting is held at the Command Post (CP) to inform responding agencies of the status of
activities surrounding the incident and identify tasks to be performed. It is discovered that
voluntary evacuation of the Dunsmuir townspeople has begun. Information regarding metam
sodium and its properties is available for planning response activities.
11:00 pm EPA meets with California Department of Occupational Safety and Health to discuss safety
planning for removal operations scheduled to begin on July 16,1991.
JULY 16, 1991
12:00 am Responding agencies meet at the CP to discuss operations and safety plans for pumping and
removal of the tank car, as approved by the 1C
7:00 am EPA and PST meet with SP to discuss details of the removal A site safety meeting is held to
review the details of the operation.
11:15 am EPA allows SP to operate trains during tank car removal. Several trains coming through cause
delays in response operations.
12:15 pm Pumping equipment is ready for operation. A test train operated by Southern Pacific with the
Federal Railroad Administration personnel on board to observe is included in the rail traffic line-
up.
3:15 pm The 2,800 gallon capacity vacuum truck is positioned near the river and approximate 2,100 gallons
of the tank car contents are removed. The railcar is dragged across river onto the bank, releasing
liquid through previously unseen punctures in the tank car.
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4:40 pm Worker and equipment decontamination commence. Operations at the spill site begin partial
demobilization.
5:00 pm EPA takes aerial photos of the spill site, Sacramento River, and Lake Shasta for visual assessment
of the damage. The river appears cloudy with a pale green color in the area of Dunsmuir and
many dead fish are seen. Several members of the media are seen wading through the river in
areas not authorized for public access.
PM A meeting is held to inform responding agencies of decision to establish a separate CP in
Redding. EPA asks 1C to concentrate on the remediation of the spill downstream of the train
wreck.
JULY 17,1991
AM EPA continues to emphasize immediacy in beginning operations on spill cleanup. Several
methods are discussed as options. PST views the river and reports conditions similar to those
reported by EPA Responding agencies learn that incorrect medical treatment information has
been released to area physicians.
12:00 pm Physicians from CAL EPA arrive. They begin to implement proper treatment practices and
consult with SP to improve air sampling.
2:00 pm EPA is informed that DFG 1C, in agreement with Shasta County 1C, is not requiring SP to begin
remedial actions in the river. Because the pesticide had already reached Shasta Lake, it was
considered inconsequential to concentrate on the river. EPA and Siskiyou County officials believe
differently and request 1C to reconsider.
6:20 pm SP is issued a verbal order by DFG 1C to begin removal of contaminants from eddies and deep
pools.
JULY 18,1991
10:00 am PST personnel are released from the scene.
4:00 pm SP reports delay in the river pumping due to technical difficulties within the contaminated water
storage system and problems with Department of Transportation driver time.
6:00 pm A meeting is held at the Redding CP, where most of the decision makers are located. Shasta
County Health official recommends reopening campgrounds. Pumps arrive at the Cantara Loop;
samples are collected to determine contaminant concentration. SP reports negative air
monitoring results and commits to restocking the river.
8:00 pm A Redding meeting informs responding agencies of the 40 medical cases reported in Dunsmuir,
fifty percent of the previous day's cases. It is estimated that the plume may reach the dam in 30
to 40 days.
JULY 19,1991
7:00 am Responding agencies meet and focus response objectives on health-related issues. EPA's request
to direct attention to environmental concerns is acknowledged. Reports indicate the plume in
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Lake Shasta is sinking while contaminant concentrations in affected areas are decreasing. Lake
and river sampling continue, but sediment sampling is deferred until a later date.
10:15 am SP's plan to aerate and agitate the main body of the plume is approved by responding agencies
but California DFG recommends a secondary barrier in the case that SP's plan is not effective.
Fish cages would be lowered into pools to search for hotspots.
6:00 pm Meeting allows responding officials to express concerns and frustrations with response activities.
Suggestions include construction of a safety zone, however, this will require closing the major
highway. Discussions focus on concern for the public and the anxiety being exhibited by displaced
residents.
Other reports indicate wildlife casualties. Vegetation has been agitated, and strong odors are
prevalent in the region of the spill site. California DFG requests EPA take the lead in constructing
and monitoring the second air barrier below the SP operation.
JULY 20, 1991
4:45 pm SP begins pumping operations. The secondary air barrier is prepared for operation. Air
monitoring in and around SP aeration operation resulted in non-detectable levels of targeted
contaminants. The plume, according to SP, is not expected to reach the air barrier for 2 to 3 days
because it is moving at about 3/4 miles per day in the Sacramento River arm of Lake Shasta. No
mandatory evacuation is implemented.
JULY 21,1991
Diving and Environmental Response Team efforts are delayed. Air monitoring continues to result
in negative detection of contaminant levels around SP operations.
7:30 pm A meeting informs responding agencies of the river access restrictions that are being lifted. SP
commits to the provision of site security.
11:30 pm Secondary air barrier is operational, but not yet ready for continuous operations.
JULY 22, 1991
12:30 am Air barrier construction crew stops for the night.
7:00 am EPA is informed that plume has reached or surpassed the location of the air barrier. This is two
days earlier than SP's estimates.
8:30 am Continuous operations of the air barrier commence. TAT air monitoring is transferred from SP
operation to the air barrier; results continue to be below the detection limit.
6:30 pm Meeting provides SP with written notification designating EPA officials for response activities.
The 1CS is dismantled. SP agrees to provide site security and communications. SP requests that
the aeration/agitation operation be shut down but their request is denied.
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JULY 23,1991
12:00 pm Second segment of air barrier is operational. A distinct chemical odor is detected in the area of
the air barric., while air monitoring results continue to register below levels of detection.
6:00 pm Responding agencies review the contaminant hotspots present in the river. SP recommends shut
down of aeration operations, as worker safety is being compromised. This is denied. It is agreed
that SP operations may break down on the condition that immediate construction of their
proposed second air barrier commences.
10:30 pm EPA observes that SP equipment is shut down but no construction activities are occurring. EPA
issues SP a verbal notification of noncompliance.
JULY 24, 1991
12:00 am SP equipment is operational. SP agrees to maintain the aeration operation until the second air
barrier has been constructed.
6:40 am 1C upholds the actions of EPA in serving SP verbal notification of noncompliance.
8:00 am EPA retracts notice of noncompliance as SP immediately reacted to the notification by starting
operations and reporting that the air barrier would be running within the day. The second air
barrier is constructed upgradient from the air barrier constructed by EPA/USCG.
6:00 pm A meeting report is held to confirm that a well-defined layer in the lake had no dissolved oxygen
and elevated levels of MITC are found in sediments along the river. Test sample taken
downstream from the air barrier showed dramatically reduced MITC readings.
6:30 pm EPA provides SP with written notification of responsibility to oversee operation and monitoring
of the EPA/USCG air barrier within 24 hours. 1C orders SP to begin construction of second air
barrier. SP is requested to pump the area of the river emitting strong chemical odors.
JULY 25, 1991
5:10 am The first SP air barrier begins operations. EPA/USCG air barrier experiences difficulties that
result in temporary shutdown. Air monitoring continues below detection. EPA inspection of the
air barriers results in the SP admission that they did not plan to construct a second air barrier.
11:00 am EPA informs California DFG of SP's intent of operating two air barriers: the first SP air barrier
and the EPA/USCG air barrier.
6:00 pm California DFG agrees to discontinue air monitoring on the recommendation of EPA and SP.
EPA and USCG/PST report that they will be demobilizing the following day.
JULY 26,1991
7:00 am EPA disagrees with the requirement that SP build a third air barrier. EPA provides written
notice that if the judgment for a third air barrier is not lifted, SP does not have to repair the
EPA/USCG air barrier.
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10:30 am The first EPA OSC is demobilized.
PM SP is informed of the decision to maintain operations of the first air barrier and repair the
EPA/USCG air barrier.
AUGUST 6,1991
Shasta County health officials notify the California DHS of an outbreak of dermatitis among Shasta
County jail inmates and crew leaders who had assisted in removing dead fish from the river.
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ENDNOTES FOR APPENDIX A
1. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modiCvJ by the
Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78), is an international treaty designed to "prevent the pollution of the
marine environment by the discharge of harmful substances or effluent containing such substances* from
ships. Annex III "responds to concerns about the possible adverse environmental impact of packaged
harmful substances entering the marine environment due to ship collisions, grounding, and other
accidental and operational causes." On June 10,1991, the President signed Annex III of the MARPOL
Convention; MARPOL Annex III enters into force for all parties on July 1, 1992.
2. The Incident Command System is a management tool for achieving coordinated decision making and
concerted action during responses to large scale emergencies, when more than one organization is involved
in the response.
3. ATSDR has provided initial financial assistance to the California Department of Health Services to begin
conducting long-term health effects studies. Potential areas of analysis may include chronic respiratory
disease, reproductive hazards, immune system function, and laboratory tests of liver and other metabolic
functioning. Further funding will be necessary to cany out these studies.
4. State of California Department of Health Services and California Environmental Protection Agency, Office
of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, "A Draft Medical Surveillance for Metam Sodium Spill-
Related Illnesses," October 7,1991.
5. EPA's Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances (OPPTS) is currently reviewing data on the
reproductive effects of exposure to metam sodium. According to OPPTS, however, the available
developmental lexicological studies are problematic because they do not indicate a level at which an effect
is observed. Also, the available animal studies showing birth defects used daily oral exposure over most
of the gestation period, which is different from the more acute exposure experienced by the people near
the Dunsmuir spill. Assessing the risks to residents of the area is also difficult because of uncertainty
about extrapolating results of animal studies to humans.
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REPORT OF THE
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES TASK FORCE
APPENDIX B
Summary of Open Form Presentations
October 29, 1991 -- 8:30 a.m. to 3:15 p.m.
Sheraton Premier Hotel at
Tysons Corner, Virginia
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Page
Welcoming Remarks B-l
Overview of Federal Activities B-2
Questions to EPA and DOT B-4
Presentations by Interested Organizations on Ongoing Initiatives B-5
Presentations by Interested Organizations on Options B-ll
Audience Comments B-12
Questions from the Audience B-13
Closing Remarks and Next Steps B-14
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WELCOMING REMARKS
Dorothy A. Canter, Science Advisor, Office of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER),
functioned as Chair of the Open Forum and
provided an introduction to the day's
presentations.
Bowdoin Train, Deputy Assistant
Administrator of OSWER, began with a brief
background of the July 1991 train derailment that
caused the release of almost 20,000 gallons of the
pesticide metam sodium into the Sacramento River
in California.
The River and Lake Shasta suffered massive
fish kills and other environmental damage;
hundreds of people sought medical assistance;
and pregnant women were given health
advisories.
Following the spill, concerns were raised about
whether metam sodium, and other potentially
dangerous substances, are adequately regulated
to prevent and control releases of these
substances.
Mr. Train then commented on the implications
of the release, i.e., that Federal regulatory agencies
need to examine the issue of accidental releases of
potentially dangerous substances, identify
substances that fall through regulatory gaps, and
explore approaches to minimize releases and
improve response to releases.
One outcome of the spill was the formation of
the EPA Hazardous Substances Task Force.
Its goals are to examine the process by which
potentially dangerous substances are listed as
hazardous substances under CERCLA, and to
identify approaches for controlling releases of
potentially dangerous substances.
DOT, through the NRT, formed a parallel task
force to evaluate the Federal role in
controlling the transport of potentially
dangerous substances.
Mr. Train indicated that the EPA Hazardous
Substances Task Force is charged with the
responsibility of going beyond the traditional
regulatory framework in controlling releases.
It is important for EPA to explore non-
traditional approaches to augment traditional
regulatory approaches.
EPA has already developed two voluntary
programs to achieve tangible environmental
benefits through such non-command, non-
control approaches:
~ The "33/50" program, a voluntary program
in which corporations develop plans to
reduce emissions of chemicals on the
Toxics Release Inventory initially by 33
percent and ultimately by 50 percent; and
- The "green lights" program, a program
encouraging the use of more efficient and
modern lighting in the business
community.
The non-traditional approaches presented at
the Open Forum will assist the task force in
developing additional strategies to control
releases of potentially dangerous subsfances.
Mr. Train concluded with the announcement
that the EPA Hazardous Substances Task Force is
on a fast track: an interim report by the Task
Force is scheduled to be completed by January
1992, and a final report, including
recommendations, by April 1992. The Open
Forum, which is one of the efforts of the task
force, will have the following goals:
To provide information on activities being
undertaken by the Federal government to
prevent and control releases of potentially
dangerous substances.
To provide interested parties the opportunity
to describe their organization's activities and
initiatives that address releases of potentially
dangerous substances.
To provide interested parties the opportunity
to present additional approaches for
preventing and controlling releases of
potentially dangerous substances.
Alan I. Roberts, Associate Administrator for
Hazardous Materials Safety in the Research and
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Special Programs Administration (RSPA) of DOT,
described RSPA's role in DOT and explained
DOTs activities following the metam sodium spill.
RSPA is a very small pan of DOT, but has a
wide range of responsibilities and
achievements with respect to the transport of
hazardous materials, including an excellent
safety record. Some current activities of DOT
with respect to hazardous materials transport
include:
- The 1990 Hazardous Materials
Transportation Uniform Safety Act
(HMTUSA), which amends the 1974
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
(HMTA), will require a large number of
rulemakings and studies.
- DOT has been given new responsibility for
sanitary food transportation issues under
the 1990 Sanitary Food Transportation
Act.
-- DOT will be taking a major role in
implementing section 4 of the Oil
Pollution Act, including participating in
the prevention of spills.
In addition, RSPA is responsible for ongoing
maintenance of its basic program. The
regulation Docket HM-181, which was issued
on December 21,1990, is an entire revamp of
the regulations for transportation of hazardous
materials. International compatibility is
emphasized, which will also serve to enhance
the U.S. chemical trade surplus.
Mr. Roberts then referred to the October 29,
1991, Washington Post article which indicated that
the Sacramento River was recovering quickly
despite dire forecasts after the spill of metam
sodium. He expressed the opinion that many
substances could cause aquatic fatalities if released
in large quantities, but the persistence of
substances needs to be recognized. Mr. Roberts
then summarized some agency and industry
responses to the events of spill:
The event prompted acknowledgement of
issues concerning non-regulated substances.
For example, the Chemical Manufacturers
Association (CMA) issued a press release
supporting examination of products not
currently regulated under CERCLA or
HMTA. Some of this is addressed by HM-181,
which expanded the toxicity definition by a
factor of ten for full regulation under HMTA,
In addition, other substances are being
researched to determine their potential to
cause serious environmental harm.
DOT is also committed to adopting the
requirements of Annex III of the MARPOL
Convention on marine pollutants. After July
1,1992, Annex III will become mandatory for
the international transport of marine
pollutants by vessel DOT is currently drafting
a proposed rulemaking for applying the Annex
III requirements to all modes of
transportation. (Since the Open Forum, the
DOT proposed rule has been published in the
Federal Register (57 FR 3854, January 31,
1992).)
Mr. Roberts concluded with the observation
that any regulation must take into account its
degree of complexity, level of understanding,
applicability, and comprehensibility. DOT,
through the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance
Program, must work in cooperation with 16,000
State enforcement personnel to oversee an even
larger regulated community.
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES
Timothy Fields, Jr., Deputy Director of EPA's
Office of Emergency and Remedial Response
(OERR), provided an overview of EPA's authority
to respond to releases of hazardous substances and
explained how the metam sodium spill relates to
the issue of controlling substances that are
potentially hazardous upon release.
Mr. Fields described the Superfund program
and the regulations under CERCLA and Title III
of SARA.
Response under CERCLA has two general
components: (1) response authority, and (2)
notification and liability provisions.
- Under CERCLA section 104, EPA has the
authority to respond to a release, or a
threatened release, of a hazardous
substance, or a pollutant or contaminant
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that may present an imminent and
substantial danger to the public health or
welfare.
- Only those substances that are specifically
identified as CERCLA hazardous
substances trigger the additional
notification and liability requirements
under CERCLA sections 103 and 107,
respectively.
The mechanisms for defining a CERCLA
hazardous substance include: (1) under
CERCLA section 101(14), specific listing or
designation under four other Federal
environmental statutes; (2) exhibition of a
RCRA hazardous waste characteristic; and (3)
under CERCLA section 102, designation
through rulemaking (used to develop the draft
final rule which designates the 226 extremely
hazardous substances defined in SARA Title
III).
Mr. Fields then discussed the ramifications of
designating potentially dangerous substances as
CERCLA hazardous substances to achieve
CERCLA's goal of protecting human health and
the environment:
Notification to the National Response Center
(NRC) for any release of a hazardous
substance in amounts greater than its
reportable quantity (RQ);
Notification to State emergency response
commissions (SERCs) and local emergency
planning committees (LEPCs), to ensure
adequate State and local response capabilities
in the event of a release;
Responsible party liability for cleanup costs
and damages for injury to or loss of natural
resources; and
Automatic listing and regulation of hazardous
substances under DOPs HMTA.
Mr. Fields then explained that if the
government is properly informed of hazardous
substance releases, it can coordinate and monitor
the response activities of the appropriate agencies
to ensure that everything possible is done to
protect public health and welfare and the
environment. The metam sodium spill was a prime
example of how important this notification is.
Metam sodium is not specifically designated as
a CERCLA hazardous substance nor is it
listed as a hazardous material under DOTs
regulations. However, when released, it
rapidly hydrolyzed to form several different
CERCLA hazardous substances, including
hydrogen sulfide, monomethylamine, and
carbon disulfide. The spilled metam sodium
also exhibited RCRA characteristics, making it
a RCRA hazardous waste, and thus, a
CERCLA hazardous substance as well.
Although the circumstances of this particular
spill did trigger the response and liability
provisions under CERCLA, the incident points
out that the regulatory framework of the
Federal government may overlook certain
substances that are, or potentially could be,
hazardous to human health and the
environment when released.
* Therefore, EPA needs to reexamine its
approach for designating substances as
hazardous substances under CERCLA to
ensure that all potentially dangerous
substances are identified and addressed.
Mi. Fields then stated that the purpose of the
Hazardous Substances Task Force is to examine
the issues associated with expanding the CERCLA
hazardous substance list, including identifying
approaches for providing controls beyond EPA's
traditional regulatory framework. He concluded
that information collected during the Open Forum
may assist the task force in understanding the
nature and scope of the problem and in identifying
potentially innovative, non-regulatory approaches
for controlling releases of currently unregulated,
dangerous substances.
James O'Steen, Director of the Office of
Hazardous Materials Safety of DOT, discussed the
current and future hazardous materials
transportation regulation.
DOT regulations have been established for
approximately 80 years, but, more recently, the
regulations have increasingly addressed
B-3
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environmentally hazardous materials. DOTs
primary emphasis has been in regulating
materials that pose medium and high acute
hazards to the public and environment and
that may be released during transportation.
The hazardous materials regulations (HMR)
are established under the authority of HMTA
(1974) as amended by HMTUSA (1990).
Fewer than 3,000 hazardous materials are
specifically listed under DOTs hazardous
materials regulations; the rest are regulated
under generic descriptions in 20+ hazard
classes, each of which has specific defining
criteria. The regulatory system is based on
classifications according to the criteria and a
hierarchy between these criteria.
Under CERCLA section 306(a), CERCLA
hazardous 'substances* are required to be
listed and regulated by DOT as hazardous
"materials;" hazardous substances are listed in
a separate appendix in the HMR. Shippers
are responsible for classifying a material as
hazardous in accordance with the defining
criteria of the HMR and for determining
whether a material is listed as a CERCLA
hazardous substance in the appendix.
Major changes to the HMR were
accomplished by the publication of Docket
HM-181 on December 31, 1990 (effective for
voluntary compliance on January 1, 1991).
HM-181 amended the HMR to improve safety,
put HMR in harmony with international
regulations, and support American
competitiveness in the international market.
HM-181 provides the following safety
provisions: improved packaging for bulk/non-
bulk hazardous materials; improved hazard
classification, communication, storage
requirements; expanded the scope of criteria
for the classification of poisons; and enhanced
packaging regulations for less acutely
hazardous chemicals, including hazardous
substances and wastes.
Mr. O'Steen then described DOT'S efforts in
response to the metam sodium spill.
On June 10,1991, the US ratified MARPOL
Annex III, which will be mandatory for
international transport of marine pollutants
after July 1,1992. Up to 500 chemicals have
been identified by Annex III as marine
pollutants; the majority of these are already
defined as hazardous materials, but under
Annex III, they would also bear additional
marine pollutant markings. Under Annex III,
there are two risk categories of pollutants:
marine pollutants and severe marine
pollutants. Metam sodium is categorized as a
marine pollutant
A DOT priority is to apply the MARPOL
Annex III requirements to all modes of
domestic transportation. DOT plans to
publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) for regulating these materials under
the HMR. In the meantime, US shippers may
use the provisions of Annex III on an optional
basis.
Mr. O'Steen also briefly described the goals of
the NRT Task Force, which are to:
Develop a compendium that catalogs which
agencies control what hazards and how;
Identify existing gaps and overlaps in the
system of regulations and controls (guidance,
information, etc.);
Develop recommendations for improvement in
regulation and interagency coordination.
Mr. O'Steen concluded with the note that
DOT looks to EPA to take the lead in evaluating
chronic health and environmental hazards of
materials. DOT believes that it is important to
work with EPA and other Federal agencies, the
general public, and the regulated community in
taking expedient actions to improve transport of
materials that present an environmental hazard.
QUESTIONS TO EPA AND DOT
Vemon McDougall, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, requested a progress report on
the hazardous materials worker training
regulations required under HMTUSA Alan
Roberts responded that the final rule package
is entering the clearance process.
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Mike Rush, Association of American
Railroads, asked if DOT, in promulgating the
rule to implement the treaty requiring DOT to
regulate the MARPOL substances, had given
thought to incorporating environmental
criteria into the HMR so that the regulations
would address not only listed substances, but
also substances that pose environmental
hazards which have not been specifically
identified by United Nations groups. Alan
Roberts responded that consideration has been
given to this issue but commented that the
DOT rulemaking incorporating the MARPOL
list into the HMR will not address this issue in
order to expedite the process. Mr. Roberts
pointed out, however, that 90 percent of those
pollutants on the MARPOL list (at 100
percent concentration) are already subject to
the HMR. Dorothy Canter also added that
the EPA Hazardous Substances Task Force is
looking into developing such environmental
criteria.
Tim Fields provided some additional
comments on the Hazardous Substances Task
Force's activities. More than 20 chemical lists
are being reviewed to identify additional
substances to be considered for designation as
hazardous substances under CERCLA By the
end of January 1992, the task force hopes to
determine what actions (e.g., regulatory or
non-regulatory) should be taken for substances
not currently on the CERCLA hazardous
substance list The final task force report will
be distributed to interested parties.
PRESENTATIONS BY INTERESTED
ORGANIZATIONS ON ONGOING
INITIATIVES
Ron Weber, Chairman of Distribution
Committee at the Chemical Manufacturers
Association (CMA), discussed initiatives being
undertaken by both CMA and by Air Products and
Chemicals, Incorporated, in preventing and
controlling transportation-related spills.
CMA is the focal point for the chemical
industry's advocacy on legislative, regulatory,
and legal matters at the international, Federal,
State, and local levels, and maintains voluntary
programs and services to address public
concerns. The purpose of the distribution
committee is to oversee CMA programs to
ensure safe and efficient distribution of
chemicals and to promote effective emergency
response.
Some chemical industry initiatives,
implemented through CMA programs, include:
- CMA adopted Responsible Care* from
the Canadian chemical industry and
implements the following performance
objectives: community awareness and
emergency response; pollution prevention;
process safety, employee health and safety,
distribution; and product stewardship.
The chemical industry's collective
emergency response programs are
activated through the National Chemical
Response and Information Center, and
include the Chemical Transportation
Emergency Center (CHEMTREC), the
Chemical Mutual Aid Network
(CHEMNET), the Chemical Referral
Center, and emergency response training
programs.
-- In September 1985, CMA established a
Lending Library of audiovisual training
programs that provide guidance for
personnel responding to hazardous
materials emergencies. Library services
are available at no cost to anyone in the
US.
- Two new CMA initiatives to be
operational in the near future are the
Medical Treatment Emergency
Communications (MEDTREC) initiative
and the Epidemiology Resource and
Information Center (ERIC).
CMA has also been involved in several
interindustry initiatives that involve chemical
manufacturers and chemical carriers working
together:
- The Interindustry Rail Safety Task Force
was re-established in 1989 to improve
railroad and chemical company operating
practices, risk assessment, risk
management, emergency response, and
product identification.
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- The interindustry Transportation
Community Awareness and Emergency
Response (TRANSCAER) initiative was
established to increase the public's
awareness and understanding of the
transportation of hazardous materials and
to improve the readiness of communities
to respond to transportation incidents. (A
TRANSCAER video was shown following
the Open Forum.)
i
The company Air Products and Chemicals,
Inc., an international supplier of industrial
gases and related equipment, chemical
products, and environmental and energy
systems, has also undertaken its own initiatives
to improve distribution safety:
- The company has several programs
designed to reduce product releases,
including bulk truck, railroad tank car,
and drum shipment leak prevention
measures.
~ The company offers returnable or
disposable intermediate bulk containers
(IBCs) which have exhibited significant
advantages over drum shipment.
Mr. Weber stressed the importance of
transportation safety and the chemical
industry's awareness of the potential risks to
public safety, health, and the environment
posed by the release of hazardous materials.
Vernon McDougall, Acting Director, Safety
and Health Department, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, discussed labor
initiatives in spill prevention and mitigation.
Because there is a direct link between the way
a vehicle is operated and the likelihood of a
spill, prevention practices essential for the
trucking industry include means of ensuring
alert, qualified, and skilled drivers and safe
vehicle operating condition.
The modal administrations of DOT that
regulate carriers play a large role in preventing
spills. The Teamsters are working with DOT
and others to improve worker safety through
initiatives such as the commercial drivers
license program, and implementation of the
Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program.
Other initiatives include collective bargaining
with unionized companies to obtain improved
safety performance as a means of preventing
spills. For example:
- Contracts have been negotiated to require
double-trailer trucks to be configured with
better handling capabilities.
- Contracts have been negotiated to include
initiatives for reducing driver fatigue, by
including air-ride seats, air conditioning,
and requirements for cab dimensions
(ergonomics). Heated rear-view mirrors
are another example of negotiated safety
measures that go beyond government
regulations.
-- Contracts have also been negotiated for
hazardous materials training, and for
provision of respirators and protective
clothing.
- One final, but very important contract
provision, is the driver's right to refuse to
drive an unsafe truck or to drive under
unsafe conditions.
In an effort to mitigate spills, the Teamsters
are also developing training programs:
-- Currently, they have a grant from the
National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences to train hazardous
materials transportation workers.
- More focused programs will also be
developed that will incorporate HMTUSA
requirements, when these are issued.
Mr. McDougall concluded with the
observation that the HMTUSA requirements
will help integrate hazardous materials
transportation training requirements into the
workplace.
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Dr. Barbara Sattler, National Center for
Hazard Communication, University of Maryland,
discussed the role of the university in
environmental work fcrje training and education.
The University of Maryland's National Center
for Hazard Communication, like programs at
other universities, provides education and
training through non-credit programs. For
example, employees are taken from the field
and given updated information based on
regulations, guidance documents, and expertise
from within the universities.
The focus of aU training and education should
be on prevention. Prevention can be
separated into three categories: primary (how
to avoid future accidents); secondary (how to
immediately contain damage and avoid
expansion of contaminants); and tertiary (how
to control long-term damage, such as long-
term health effects, and avoid further damage).
The university's role in primary prevention is
accomplished by providing basic scientific
information on hazardous materials. The
Center also conducts basic research used in
developing material safety data sheets
(MSDSs). This scientific information is
eventually communicated to all of those
handling hazardous materials.
A recent national study of 2,000 facilities
indicated massive non-compliance with the
hazard communications standards, which
require that workers be given information on
hazardous chemicals. Survey results indicated
that although 80 percent of workers had
managed hazardous substances, many did not
know proper handling practices, had not had
training, or had never heard of the hazard
communications standards. Thus, small and
middle-sized companies, in particular, need to
be taught how to comply with regulations.
Scientific education can be provided to the
public through university programs,, in both
credit and non-credit formats.
A study of worker knowledge of MSDSs
showed that 40 percent of the MSDSs tested
were incomprehensible to workers because of
the reading level at which the MSDSs were
written, and also because of poor formatting
and difficult vocabulary, an even larger
percentage of MSDSs are inaccurate to varying
degrees. To correct this problem, universities
have developed hazard communications
courses to teach workers how to properly label
chemicals (to ensure compliance and
comprebensibility). The University of
Maryland is holding a course on how to
develop MSDSs.
Other primary prevention initiatives include:
- Under a grant, in part from EPA, the
University of Maryland worked with towns
and townships to develop a guide on how
to respond to emergencies involving
hazardous substances. The Center also
works with unions and trade associations
to develop educational materials.
- Universities are also conducting basic
research on ways to prevent pollution
through source reduction and how to
conduct on-site reclamation, thus
decreasing the hazardous chemicals being
transported.
- The University of Maryland Technical
Extension Service uses university
knowledge to assist small and medium-
sized businesses with technical problems
and environmental audits.
- Training is available through the National
Continuing Education Association and a
consortium of universities.
Secondary prevention initiatives include non-
credit programs to train the emergency
response community to understand the
problem and correct it
Tertiary prevention initiatives include
providing policy staff and decision-makers with
information, and working to make
environmental health part of medical training.
Michael J. Rush, General Counsel,
Association of American Railroads (AAR),
discussed railroad industry initiatives.
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The Interindustry Rail Safety Task Force
(including the AAR, CMA, and Railroad
Progress Institute) has four working groups.
One of these is examining railroad operating
practices.
As pan of the task force, AAR conducted a
data analysis of chemicals transported by rail
and identified IS chemicals that represent
substantial environmental risk. Most of these
are responsible for a small percentage of
hazardous materials traffic, but a large
percentage of cleanup costs.
Two sets of restrictions were implemented for
trains transporting these chemicals and PIH
chemicals, flammable gases, and Class A
explosives.
-- Key trams (5 or more cars of these
hazardous materials) are restricted to a
maximum speed of 50 mph and, when
passing other trains, are given the main
track. Key trains must also be inspected
following any emergency braking. Speed
and inspection requirements apply upon
warning from wayside detectors for
overheated bearings.
-- Key routes are tracks with annual traffic
of 10,000 car loads of hazardous materials,
or 4,000 car loads of the hazardous
chemicals subject to the key train
restrictions. On these routes, wayside
detectors must be placed no greater than
40 miles apart. Requirements governing
track inspections and the class of track
used for passing trains apply. Annual
hazardous materials training for
employees, including emergency response
plans, also is required.
The three other work groups of the task force
focus on: (1) chemical company operating
practices (e.g., hazardous materials storage and
loading); (2) chemical risk assessments, which
may help in designing railroad operating
practices, tank car design, and track
conditions; and (3) emergency response
information (e.g., standard format for shipping
papers).
The railroad industry provides information to
its employees through a hazardous material
data base. Emergency response instructions
are automatically printed on shipping papers
for train transport
Other railroad industry programs include
emergency response training for fire fighters,
other public officials, and industry employees;
publications containing emergency response
'information on virtually all hazardous
materials transported by rail; emergency action
guides with detailed methods of response to
releases; and initiatives and programs to
prevent releases (including upgrades in track
and equipment, requirements for car testing,
and the installation of wayside detectors).
Rick Homer from the Workplace Health Fund
provided an update on the activities of the Center
for Emergency Response Planning (CERP).
The Workplace Health Fund is an institution
for the promotion of research and education
on industrial disease, and serves as a technical
resource in making accessible (primarily to the
AFL-CIO and other labor groups) information
that has already been or is being developed.
CERP serves as a clearinghouse for
information (e.g., on regulations, data bases,
and training courses); holds training sessions
concerning ways to prevent chemical incidents;
and produces books and other publications
providing information about incident
prevention issues in industry.
CERP stresses that there are only "incidents,"
not accidents, because incidents can be
prevented, while the word "accidents" means
they cannot
In an effort to prevent such chemical
"incidents," CERP emphasizes the importance
of its programs for training labor and
management together.
CERP also produces publications that focus
on incident prevention such as films and
training modules. In addition, CERP issues
Hazard Alerts when specific problems are
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identified in the industry that kill people (e.g.,
venting of hazardous materials from tanks).
It's "cheap* insurance to look at hazards before
incidents occur.
Other initiatives include research by the
Workplace Health Fund on ergonomic issues
that affect facilities where hazardous waste is
produced, tested, or stored, such as how the
design of facility control rooms can affect how
easy it is to see and understand warning
systems.
Tom Gilding, Director of Environmental
Affairs at the National Agricultural Chemicals
Association (NACA), provided examples of
company initiatives to better prevent and/or
respond to spills at stationary facilities storing
agricultural chemicals.
NACA has developed programs promoting fire
and spill prevention and emergency
preparedness to warehouse operations through
awareness and self-evaluation.
Prevention initiatives must take into account
the locations, storage facilities, and handling
practices for the chemicals involved.
Regulatory and educational initiatives coupled
with voluntary actions need to be properly
balanced to achieve effective spill prevention
and mitigation efforts.
One area of focus has resulted from the
concern about fires at warehouse facilities,
because such fires often have damaging
environmental consequences.
- To address this concern, NACA, in
cooperation with the public warehousing
industry, has developed survey documents
that identify proper chemical storage and
handling procedures. These documents
also specify appropriate pre-emergency
planning measures that should be taken.
-- These survey documents have been
modified to also apply to smaller retail
outlet warehouse operations.
Another NACA initiative addresses bulk
storage and handling of agricultural chemicals.
- Although the majority vof agricultural
chemical containers currently being used
are non-reSllable, there is a significant
trend within the industry towards using
refillable containers. The main reason for
this trend is to minimize wastes by
reducing the number of containers
needing disposal
~ NACA is also looking for ways to
standardize refillable containers to further
increase safety during handling operations,
and to add "user-friendly" features that
encourage greater use of these containers.
- The Midwest Agricultural Chemicals
Association (MACA) has also been active
and has developed industry performance
standards for refillable containers.
.. Spill mitigation depends on containment
and pre-emergency planning. Pre-
emergency planning is critical in that it
stresses coordination and communication
programs for emergency responders prior
to incidents.
Mr. Gilding concluded with the observation
that the actions that industry trade
associations can take in developing
recommendations or industry standards for
spill prevention and control is seriously limited
because of anti-trust liabilities.
Edward WjtUnd, Executive Director of the
Transportation Trades Department (TTD) of the
AFL-CIO, provided the labor perspective on the
transportation of hazardous materials and its
initiatives to prevent incidents and provide
response.
TTD was organized to represent workers in all
modes of transportation, including fire
fighters.
Despite any good intentions by the industry,
the marketplace will not take care of itself nor
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will it protect working people; thus, TTD feels
that increased Federal enforcement is
necessary because in the current regulatory
environment, this is not being carried out.
For example, after the metam sodium spill,
government inspections were cancelled.
To address this concern, TTD sees the need
for more regulations to improve worker safety,
such as higher penalties imposed for safety
infractions, including penalties for first-time
infractions.
In addition, the basic elements of response in
the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration's (OSHA) Hazardous Waste
Operations and Emergency Response
(HAZWOPER) regulations (29 CFR Part
1910.120) should be incorporated into
hazardous materials training for railroad
workers.
- For example, a survey of railroad workers
showed that railroad training programs did
not address the minimum items required
by HAZWOPER. Even at Dunsmuir,
railroad workers responding to the
emergency were not wearing the personal
protective equipment now required for
farm workers and others using metam
sodium.
- Currently, the unions provide the only
source for emergency response training for
railroad workers who deal with hazardous
wastes, despite the requirement by OSHA
that employers provide this training.
Another area of concern is inadequate
emergency response plans.
- Emergency response plans are not
required for hazardous material transport,
and there is little coordination, therefore,
between rail and truck carriers and
LEPCs.
- The National Transportation Safety Board
recommended in 1985 that railroads
develop and implement emergency
response procedures for their railyards; as
of 1991, only 6 of the 54 with railyards
had developed such plans.
Development and implementation of a data
base for emergency response planning has
been proposed in legislation referred to as the
Fire Fighters' Bill; this legislation is likely to
be considered during the 103rd Congress. The
data base would track and monitor daily
shipments of hazardous materials and provide
information on content, appropriate response
procedures, and personal protective
equipment.
Cindy Kelly, Director of Environmental
Programs for the International City/County
Management Association (ICMA), described the
problems facing local governments and made
recommendations for initiatives that could address
these problems.
ICMA is an association of professional
managers serving cities, counties, regional
councils, townships, and other forms of local
government.
-- ICMA publishes a series of books for use
by local government, the most recent of
which addresses emergency management.
-- ICMA also gives seminars and works with
LEPCs to help them develop emergency
planning programs, and assists local
governments in taking steps toward
preventing pollution.
Recommendations for government initiatives
include giving local government more
authority to require spill prevention initiatives,
and encouraging insurance companies to offer
lower premiums to companies that take
precautionary or preventative steps.
In addition, any potentially hazardous
substance and possible by-products of listed
chemicals, such as metam sodium, should be
put in CHEMTREC so that information is
available when needed for a response effort;
environmental effects data should also be
incorporated.
Better preparation for responding to incidents
is needed especially in rural areas, including
better response coordination. One way to
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improve response coordination in the event of
an emergency is to respond according to the
Incident Command System, which is adopted
by fire departments nationwide.
Training programs should be developed to
prepare local government officials for response
efforts in emergency situations.
PRESENTATIONS BY INTERESTED
ORGANIZATIONS ON OPTIONS
Vernon McDougall, Acting Director of the
Safety and Health Department for the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, suggested
several near-term options for spill prevention and
mitigation.
More government agencies, especially OSHA,
should become involved in the dialogue over
spill prevention and mitigation.
DOT needs to improve its enforcement of
regulations controlling the transportation of
hazardous materials; in the past, DOPs
Federal Highway Administration has been
more education-oriented and less involved in
enforcement activities.
OSHA and the Federal Highway
Administration, the Federal Railroad
Administration, and other modal
administrations at DOT should work together
to better exchange information and to improve
regulatory enforcement in the field.
Non-regulatory approaches for spill mitigation
and prevention should include efforts to
encourage companies and associations in the
industry to better share training initiatives and
improve communication among themselves.
Through the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance
Program, DOT should begin to consistently
collect data on the conditions under which
hazardous materials are transported by truck,
such as the condition of equipment used and
the qualifications of drivers.
- In particular, DOT should use OSHA as
a resource in addressing worker safety
issues and ensuring that drivers and other
workers dealing with hazardous materials
are working under satisfactory conditions;
OSHA should be delegated more
jurisdiction from DOT to resolve
problems in this area.
HMTUSA grant dollars earmarked for
hazardous materials transportation worker
training programs in fiscal year 1992 should be
allocated by the National Institute of
Environmental Health Sciences in time to
plan, prepare for, and implement the new
training programs mandated by forthcoming
regulations under HMTUSA.
Dr. Barbara Settler from the Center for
Hazard Communication at the University of
Maryland discussed the role of universities in
preparing the environmental work force to help
prevent incidents from happening and to
appropriately address the incidents that do occur.
In the past, the curricula used to train the
environmental work force have emphasized
reacting effectively to incidents, rather than
focusing on preventing them from occurring;
now the entire educational process has to be
re-examined at all levels to facilitate a shift in
focus from response to prevention.
Universities can encourage and educate the
environmental work force to focus more on
prevention by incorporating a greater diversity
of courses into the environmental health
curricula, and by encouraging students to look
more broadly at the environmental safety
issues they will be facing.
- Management classes should be
incorporated into technical curricula for
environmental professionals, and technical
information and courses should be offered
to professional managers so that both
have the knowledge and training needed
to work effectively in an environmental
health capacity.
- In addition, public health concepts,
economics, risk communication training,
training courses to teach environmental
health scientists how to provide training
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programs, and global-level issues in
environmental health science should be
incorporated by universities into their
curricula and offered as non-credit courses
or in training seminars.
EPA should adopt or encourage LEPCs to use
orientation programs to ensure more
consistent and high-quality local emergency
response planning. Currently, there is no
training required by LEPC members, nor any
orientation.
EPA should also assist universities in finding
ways to finance the high cost of offering a
quality education to environmental health
science students.
Innovative approaches EPA should consider
for enhancing spill prevention and mitigation
include: (1) finding more effective ways to
transmit the relevant information to the
regulated community when new regulations are
promulgated; (2) and becoming more self-
aware of what functions EPA's various
programs carry out and what resources they
offer and have access to.
Finally, EPA could hold a national conference
of environmental practitioners, representatives
from the regulatory community, and members
of the academic community to develop a plan
for ensuring that the environmental health
work force is well-qualified to do its job.
Sheldon Samuels from the Workplace Health
Fund spoke about risk reduction through proper
plant siting and function and offered additional
suggestions for environmental planning to reduce
the risk of chemical spills.
Realizing that the chemical industry, due to its
competitive environment, cannot regulate
itself, the government must accept the
responsibility for regulating the industry.
Because too much time is required to regulate
chemicals individually, a risk reduction and
spill prevention plan should be developed in
which the entire chemical industry would be
re-designed so that all levels of production
would be integrated at the same site. This
would minimize the amount of handling of
hazardous materials and, thus, reduce the risk
of incidents occurring. EPA needs to begin
prevention activities that are more than just
lip service.
One major barrier to the government's efforts
to create a plan for regulating the industry is
the lack of available information and data.
There is also a lack of coordination evident
among the various Federal agencies that
should be working together on environmental
health and safety issues.
The Federal government should also
encourage improvements in: (1) the design of
trucks and facility control rooms; (2) the
incorporation of ergonomics into training
programs; (3) and the establishment of adult
education programs for scientific literacy so
that the workforce has the ability to respond
effectively to incidents that occur.
In addition, the Federal government should
encourage management and labor to work
together to reduce the risk of spills during
transportation and at facilities.
In conclusion, EPA ought to conduct
environmental planning; it has the capacity but
has not taken the initiative to promote
effective planning measures. Furthermore,
industry, various organizations and response
groups, and government agencies need to work
together in carrying out environmental
planning initiatives.
AUDIENCE COMMENTS
Andrea Corbett of the International
Association of Fire Fighters suggested that the
Hazardous Substances Task Force should broaden
its scope.
The task force should consider the issue of
making more information available to
emergency responders before and during an
incident
EPA should emphasize the importance of
training and encourage communities and fire
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departments to commit resources to training
all emergency responders to handle chemical
incidents.
In the long-term, EPA should have some
enforcement authority for ensuring compliance
with 49 CFR Part 311 (emergency responder
training, medical surveillance, etc.) for
personnel not covered by relevant OSHA
regulations.
QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE
The following questions were taken from the
audience, and answers were provided by the
appropriate speakers.
Question (for Barbara Settler): Will the Technical
Extension Service work with farmers and if not,
what is the best way to reach the agricultural
community?
Answer: Although the Technical Extension Service
works in Maryland only, there are chapters of the
Agricultural Extension Service in every state which
are available to work with the agricultural
community. The Cooperative Extension Service at
the University of Maryland provides certification
training for farm workers involved in the
application of pesticides as required by the EPA.
To get to the broader question of how to reach the
agricultural community, this may be (and is) done
through the Cooperative Extension Service and/or
the state Department of Agriculture. Each state
has a Cooperative Extension Service, located in a
university setting that is funded by a "Land Grant*
The Cooperative Extension Service in Maryland
employs an agent to serve each of the counties in
Maryland. This system is (reportedly) the same in
every state, and provides a major information
network to the agricultural community. The state
Departments of Agriculture also serve as
communication networks, but act more strongh/ in
a regulatory, rather than training, capacity.
Question (for Sheldon Samuels, Vernon
McDongall, and Michael Rush): Are there
common initiatives that labor and management can
work to accomplish together?
Answer (Sheldon Samuels): Yes, however, it is
usually the case that management refuses to
participate in workshops and other activities held
to promote such initiatives. In general,
cooperation from management is lacking.
Answer (Vernon McDoogail): A key opportunity
for cooperating is to improve safety initiatives is
through worker training programs.
Answer (Michael Rash): Labor and management
can work together on communicating emergency
response information to public officials. Train
crews are the first to be affected by an incident and
should therefore be trained to communicate
pertinent information to public officials effectively.
Question (for VenaoaMcDoagall): What programs
exist to address worker/operator responsibility for
safety, particularly for controlling problems of
substance abuse and overall worker physical and
mental health quality?
Answer: Drivers of heavy trucks, and those
carrying hazardous materials requiring placards, are
subject to DOT-mandated drug testing. Truck
drivers are also subject to a DOT-mandated
medical examination every 2 years. However,
caution should be given against the tendency to
place too much of the blame for hazardous
materials incidents only on the drivers.
Question (for Michael Rush): What kind of
information is available in the Standard
Information Commodity Code (STCC) data base?
Answer STCC assigns identification numbers to
commodities. The railroads retrieve chemical
information from their data bases by STCC
numbers. For example, railroads place emergency
response information on shipping papers by
retrieving information on the STCC numbers
assigned to the commodities. The information is
then placed on the shipping papers.
Question (for Michael Rush): What information is
available in CHEMTREC about metam sodium
spill and how was the railroad involved?
Answer: CHEMTREC had an MSDS on metam
sodium. The railroad involved notified
CHEMTREC following the accident
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OPEN FORUM - CLOSING REMARKS
Timothy Fields, Jr., Deputy Director of
OERR, provided the closing remarks.
In reference to the absence of environmental
groups at the open forum, more than five
environmental groups were invited to
participate, but declined Written comments
from those groups will be welcomed and
considered by EPA in the activities of the
Hazardous Substances Task Force.
Since the inception of the task force, EPA has
taken several steps to address task force
concerns, including:
- Developing a Federal Register notice
clarifying the notification and liability
requirements under CERCLA for releases
of potentially dangerous substances that
may rapidly hydroryze or form CERCLA
hazardous substances or that become
RCRA characteristic wastes when released
into the environment
Publishing an environmental alert
requiring immediate notification to the
NRC of releases of metam sodium and
other potentially dangerous substances.
EPA is considering publishing an Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM) regarding the possible
designation of metam sodium as a
CERCLA hazardous substances.
A draft interim report will be completed
early in 1992 summarizing the Hazardous
Substances Task Force's findings and
recommendations for regulatory,
enforcement, voluntary, and educational
actions that should be taken.
EPA's Hazardous Substances Task Force
will work closely with the NRT Task
Force in this effort
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