jflfcD 5 T/\>
SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
¦I
x
-------
vyEPA
SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
Recent events have created a heightened awareness
of security at the nation's critical infrastructure, includ-
ing its drinking water and wastewater systems. These
systems are potentially vulnerable to different kinds of
natural disasters and terrorist threats. EPA has devel-
oped a series of Security Product Guides to assist treat-
ment plant operators and utility managers in reducing
risks from, and providing protection against, possible
natural disasters and intentional terrorist attacks.
The guides provide information on a variety of prod-
ucts available to enhance physical security (such as
walls, gates, and manhole locks to delay unauthorized
entry into buildings or pipe systems) and electronic or
cyber security (such as computer firewalls and remote
monitoring systems that can report on outlying pro-
cesses). Other guides present information on moni-
toring tools that can be used to identify anomalies in
process streams or finished water that may represent potential threats. Individual
products evaluated in these guides will be applicable to distribution systems,
wastewater collection systems, pumping stations, treatment processes, main plant
and remote sites, personnel entry, chemical delivery and storage, SCADA, and con-
trol systems for water and wastewater treatment systems.
DISCLAIMER
The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental Protection
Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse the vendors and
products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further public awareness
of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of the different types of
security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of vendors is not a com-
plete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
3
-------
CONTENTS
CYBER PROTECTION PRODUCTS
Anti-Virus and Pest Eradication Software 9
Firewalls 11
Network Intrusion Hardware / Software 14
PHYSICAL ASSET MONITORING AND CONTROL PRODUCTS
Backflow Prevention Devices 19
Exterior Intrusion - Burled Sensors 27
Fences 31
Films for Glass Shatter Protection 35
Fire Hydrant Locks 39
Ladder Access Control 42
Locks 47
Manhole Locks 52
Security for Doorways-Side Hinged Doors 57
Valve Lockout Devices 66
Visual Surveillance Monitoring 72
WATER MONITORING PRODUCTS
Biological Sensors for Toxicity 81
Chemical Sensor - Arsenic Measurement System 84
Chemical Sensor - Chlorine Measurement System 89
Chemical Sensor for Toxicity - (Adapted BOD Analyzer) 93
Chemical Sensor - Total Organic Carbon Analyzer 95
Sensors for Monitoring Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Contamination—98
Toxicity Monltorlng/Toxlclty Meters 100
.Radiation Detection Equipment 101
Radiation Detection Equipment for Monitoring Personnel and Packages 105
Radiation Detection Equipment for Monitoring Water Assets 109
-------
Cyber Protection Products
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
Anti-Virus and Pest Eradication
Software
# DITBCT
§ DILAY
9RIBPOND
OBJECTIVE
These systems are designed to detect electronic threats to a computer or other electronic sys-
tem, and to delay these threats from damaging the system. In addition, some anti-virus software
responds to threats by deleting them or otherwise disabling them.
Anti-virus software is installed on an individual computer, computer network, or other electronic
device to detect and delay harmful files from entering the computer system.
LOCATION USED
Computer system. Should be installed on individual computers, especially portable laptops
(protects only computer on which it is installed) and on a computer network (protects potential
threats from entering a computer hard drive from the network).
DESCRIPTION
Anti-virus programs are designed to detect, delay, and respond to programs or pieces of code
that are specifically designed to harm computers. These programs are known as "malware."
Malware can include computer viruses, worms, and Trojan Horse programs (programs that
appear to be benign but which have hidden harmful effects).
Pest eradication tools are designed to detect, delay, and respond to "spyware" (strategies
that websites use to track user behavior, such as by sending "cookies" to the user's com-
puter), and hacker tools that track keystrokes (keystroke loggers) or passwords (password
crackers).
Viruses and pests can enter a computer system through the internet or through infected floppy
discs or CDs. They can also be placed onto a system by insiders. Some of these programs,
such as viruses and worms, can then move within a computer's drives and files, or between
computers if the computers are networked to each other. This malware can deliberately dam-
age files, utilize memory and network capacity, crash application programs, and initiate trans-
missions of sensitive information from a PC. While the specific mechanisms of these programs
differ, they can infect files, programs, individual pieces of computer code, operating systems,
and even the basic operating program of the computer firmware/hardware.
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
The most important features of qn anti-virus program are its abilities to identify potential
malware and to alert a user before infection occurs, as well as its ability to respond to a virus
already resident on a system. Most of these programs provide a log so that the user can see
what viruses have been detected, and where they were detected. After detecting a virus, the
anti-virus software may delete the virus automatically, or it may prompt the user to delete the
virus. Some programs will also fix files or programs damaged by the virus.
APPLICATION
9
-------
Various sources of information are available to inform the general public and computer system
operators about new viruses being detected. Since anti-virus programs use signatures (or
snippets of code or data) to detect the presence of a virus, periodic updates are required to
identify new threats. Many anti-virus software providers offer free upgrades that are able to
detect and respond to the latest viruses.
COST
The cost of anti-virus software packages varies depending on the complexity and level of
protection provided (i.e., some anti-virus software may be able to respond to new viruses be-
cause they respond to certain patterns in the computer code). Shareware (software that can
be downloaded for free from the internet) anti-virus programs can be obtained via the internet
free-of-charge. These free programs provide a basic level of protection. Individual PC anti-virus
programs, which provide additional virus protection, range from $25 to $60. Network versions
for a typical system of 10-25 computers range from $250 to $1000 or more. Installation and
maintenance costs will vary depending on the ease-of-use, setup and configuration. Installa-
tion time ranges from a few hours for an individual PC to 8-40 hours or more of man-hours
for a small to medium size network of workstations. Installation time varies depending on the
level of computer software and hardware skills of the installer. Ongoing maintenance of anti-
virus systems typically requires computer support time of several hours or more per month.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA Is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors Identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
McAfee Corporation/Network Associates
3965 Freedom Circle
Santa Clara, California 95054
(972) 963-8000
www.mcafee.com
Symantec Corporation
20330 Stevens Creek Blvd.
Cupertino, California 95014
(408) 517-8000
www.symantec. com
PestPatrol, Inc.
453 Lincoln Street
Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013
(717) 243-6588
www.safersite. com
Trend Micro, Inc.
10101 N. De Anza Blvd.
Cupertino, California 95014
(800) 228-5651
www.antlvirus.com
10
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
Firewalls
£ DBTBCT
§ DELAY
O RESPOND
OBJECTIVE
Firewalls are used to detect unauthorized connections or access to a computer system or to
specific computer files, and to deny that access. This can delay unauthorized access to the
system.
APPLICATION
These systems are installed on a facility's computer system to detect electronic threats to a
computer or other electronic system, and to delay these threats from damaging the system. In
addition, some anti-virus software responds to threats by deleting them or otherwise disabling
them.
LOCATION USED
Computer system. Can be installed on individual computers (protects only computer on which it
is installed) or on a computer network (protects all computers on network).
DESCRIPTION
A firewall is an electronic barrier designed to Keep computer hackers, intruders, or insiders
from accessing specific data files and information on a utility's computer network or other
electronic/computer systems. Firewalls operate by evaluating and then filtering information
coming through a public network (such as the internet) into the utility's computer or other
electronic system. This evaluation can include identifying the source or destination addresses
and ports, and allowing or denying access based on this identification.
There are two methods used by firewalls to limit access to the utility's computers or other
electronic systems from the public network:
• The firewall may deny all traffic unless it meets certain criteria; or
• The firewall may allow all traffic through unless it meets certain criteria.
A simple example of the first method is to screen requests to ensure that they come from an
acceptable (i.e., previously identified) domain name and Internet Protocol address. Firewalls
may also use more complex rules that analyze the application data to determine if the traffic
should be allowed through. For example, the firewall may require user authentication (i.e., use
of a password) to access the system. How a firewall determines what traffic to let through
depends on which network layer it operates at and how it is configured. Some of the pros and
cons of various methods to control traffic flowing in and out of the network are provided in
Table 1.
11
-------
Table 1: Pros and Cons of Various Firewall Methods for
Controlling Network Access
Method
Description
Pros
Cons
Packet
Filtering
Incoming and outgoing packets
(small chunks of data) are analyzed
against a set of filters. Packets that
make it through the filters are sent to
the requesting system and all others
are discarded. There are two type
of packet filtering: static (the most
common) and dynamic.
Static filtering is
relatively inexpensive,
and relatively little
maintenance is required.
It is well-suited for
closed environments
where access to or from
multiple addresses is
not allowed.
Leaves permanent open
holes in the network-
allows direct connection
to internal hosts by
external sources; offers
no user authentication;
method can be
unmanageable in large
networks
Proxy Service
Information from the internet is
retrieved by the firewall and then sent
to the requesting system and vice
versa. In this way, the firewall can
limit the information made known
to the requesting system, making
vulnerabilities less apparent.
Only allows temporary
open holes in the
network perimeter. Can
be used for all types
of internal protocol
services.
Allows direct
connections to internal
hosts by external
clients; offers no user
authentication
Stateful
Pattern
Recognition
This method examines and compares
the contents of certain key parts of an
information packet against a database
of acceptable information. Information
traveling from inside the firewall to
the outside is monitored for specific
defining characteristics, then incoming
information is compared to these
characteristics. If the comparison
yields a reasonable match, the
information is allowed through. If not,
the information is discarded.
Provides a limited
time window to allow
packets of information
to be sent; does
not allow any direct
connections between
internal and external
hosts; supports user-
level authentication
Slower than packet
filtering; does not
support all types of
connections
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
A variety of different portable and on-line chlorine monitors are commercially available. These
range Firewalls may be a piece of hardware, a software program, or an appliance card that
contains both.
Advanced features that can be incorporated into firewalls allow for the tracking of attempts to
log-on to the local area network system. For example, a report of successful and unsuccess-
ful log-in attempts may be generated for the computer specialist to analyze. For systems with
mobile users, firewalls allow remote access in to the private network by the use of secure log-
on procedures and authentication certificates. Most firewalls have a graphical user interface
for managing the firewall.
In addition, new Ethernet firewall cards that fit In the slot of an individual computer bundle
additional layers of defense (like encryption and permit/deny) for individual computer transmis-
sions to the network interface function. These new cards have only a slightly higher cost than
traditional network interface cards.
12
-------
COST
The cost of firewall systems varies depending on the complexity and level of protection pro-
vided. Basic firewalls begin at around $50 and can be installed on a single machine in a few
hours by a knowledgeable computer user. A typical small network system of hardware and
software designed for a system of 10-50 computers would cost approximately $1,000-$ 1,500
and would require an initial installation and configuration time of between 8-40 man-hours by
an information technology specialist. Larger systems will have additional costs for more soft-
ware license fees, hardware equipment capable of handing more traffic, and increased instal-
lation and testing time for additional workstations.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
. the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
Zone Labs
1060 Howard Street
San Francisco, California 94103
(415) 341-8200
www.zonelabs.com
Symantec Corporation
20330 Stevens Creek Blvd.
Cupertino, California 95014
(408) 517-8000
www.symaniec. com
Sygate Technologies
6595 Dumbarton Circle
Fremont, CA 94555
(510) 742-2600
www.sygate.com
SonlcWALL
1143 Borregas Avenue
Sunnyvale, California 94089
(408) 745-9600
www.sonlcwall.com
Check Point Software Technologies
Three Lagoon Drive, Suite 400
Redwood City, California 94065
(650) 628-2000
www. checkpoint, com
SMC Networks
38 Tesla
Irvine, California 92618
(800) 762-4968
www.smc.com
DASCORE, Inc.
(866) 321-3804
www.dascore.com
CHEMetrics, Inc.
4295 Catlett Rd.,
Calverton, Virginia 20138
(800) 356-3072
www.chemetrics.com
Lucent Technologies
600 Mountain Avenue
Murray Hill, New Jersey 07974
(888) 426-2252
www.lucent.com
Net Screen Corporation
805 11th Ave., Building 3
Sunnyvale, California 94089
(408) 543-2100
www.netscreen.com
Sun Microsystems
4150 Network Circle
Santa Clara, California 95054
(800) 786-0404
www.sun.com
3Com Corporation
5500 Great America Parkway
Santa Clara, California 95052
(800) 638-3266
www.3com.com
13
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
Network Intrusion
Hardware / Software
£ DITICT
# D E LAY
O RESPOND
OBJECTIVE
Designed to detect and delay an unauthorized attack on a computer network system.
APPLICATION
These systems are installed on individual computers, computer networks, or other electronic assets.
LOCATION USED
Computer system. Can be installed on individual computers (protects only computer on which it
is installed) or on a computer network (protects all computers on network).
DESCRIPTION
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems are software- and hardware-based pro-
grams designed to detect unauthorized attacks on a computer network system.
While other applications, such as firewalls and anti-virus software, share similar objectives
with network intrusion systems, network intrusion systems provide a deeper layer of protec-
tion beyond the capabilities of these other systems because they evaluate patterns of com-
puter activity rather than specific files.
It is warth noting that attacks may come from either outside or within the system (i.e., from
an insider), and that network intrusion detection systems may be more applicable for detect-
ing patterns of suspicious activity from inside a facility (i.e., accessing sensitive data, etc.)
than are other information technology solutions.
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
• Network intrusion detection systems employ a variety of mechanisms to evaluate potential
threats. The type of search and detection mechanisms are dependent upon the level of
sophistication of the system. Some of the available detection methods include:
• Protocol analysis - Protocol analysis is the process of capturing, decoding, and interpreting
electronic traffic. The protocol analysis method of network intrusion detection involves the
analysis of data captured during transactions between two or more systems or devices,
and the evaluation of these data to identify unusual activity and potential problems. Once a
problem is isolated and recorded, problems or potential threats can be linked to pieces of
hardware or software. Sophisticated protocol analysis will also provide statistics and trend
information on the captured traffic.
• Traffic anomaly detection -Traffic anomaly detection identifies potential threatening activ-
ity by comparing incoming traffic to "normal" traffic patterns, and identifying deviations. It
does this by comparing user characteristics against thresholds and triggers defined by the
network administrator. This method is designed to detect attacks that span a number of
connections, rather than a single session.
14
-------
• Network honeypot - This method establishes non-existent services in order to identify po-
tential hackers. A network honeypot impersonates services that don't exist by sending fake
information to people scanning the network. It identifies the attacker when they attempt to
connect to the service. There is no reason for legitimate traffic to access these resources
because they don't exist, therefore any attempt to access them constitutes an attack.
Anti-intrusion detection system evasion techniques - These methods are designed to identify
attackers who may be trying to evade intrusion detection system scanning. They include meth-
ods called IP defragmentation, TCP streams reassembly, and deobfuscation.
While these detection systems are automated, they can only indicate patterns of activity, and
a computer administer or other experienced individual must interpret activities to determine
whether or not they are potentially harmful. Monitoring the logs generated by these systems
can be time consuming, and there may be a learning curve to determine a baseline of "nor-
mal" traffic patterns from which to distinguish potential suspicious activity.
COST
The cost of network instruction detection systems varies depending on the level of sophis-
tication of the system and the corresponding protection provided. Basic intrusion detection
systems begin at around $100 and can be installed on a single machine in a few hours by a
person who is knowledgeable in computers. A typical small network system of hardware and
software designed for a system of 10-50 computers would cost approximately $l,000-$5,000
and would require an initial installation time of between 20-60 hours of man-hour time by an
information technology specialist. Larger systems will have additional costs for more software
license fees, hardware equipment capable of handing more traffic, and increased installation
and testing time for additional workstations. Routine maintenance of the software or hardware
system is required to analyze the information collected and update the system with informa-
tion on new threats.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, Its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA Is publishing lists of vendors on this site In an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors Is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
Zone Labs
1060 Howard Street
San Francisco, California 94103
(415) 341-8200
www.zonelabs.com
Symantec Corporation
20330 Stevens Creek Blvd.
Cupertino, California 95014
(408) 517-8000
www.symantec.com
Syygate Technologies
6595 Dumbarton Circle
Fremont, California 94555
(510) 742-2600
www.sygate.com
Check Point Software Technologies
Three Lagoon Drive, Suite 400
Redwood City, California 94065
(650) 628-2000
www.checkpolnt.com
15
-------
Internet Security Systems (ISS)
6303 Barfield Road
Atlanta Georgia 30328
(888) 901-7477
www.iss.net
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, California 95134
(800) 553-6387
www.cisco.com
Lucent Technologies
600 Mountain Avenue
Murray Hill, New Jersey 07974
(888) 426-2252
www.lucent.com
Net Screen Corporation
805 11th Ave., Building 3
Sunnyvale, California 94089
(408) 543-2100
www.netscreen.com
SonicWALL
1143 Borregas Avenue
Sunnyvale, California 94089-1209
(408) 745-9600
www.sonicwall.com
TippingPoint Technologies, Inc.
7501B North Capital of Texas Highway
Austin, Texas 78731
(888) 648-9663
www.tippingpoint.com
-------
wEPA
Physical Asset Monitoring
and Control Products
tPMMli
m w&
IMMMMhrmm
asi
Mi
pp» it»iWWMilW,
R 1
MIX
mac >
^fv
-.4 % f'' v
^SidftoiSBS >
;• .-v.* i-.
M W W IP &
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
o
Backflow Prevention Devices *
O
OBJECTIVE
Visually monitor an asset to detect potential intruders, unauthorized or suspicious materials or
objects, or other threats.
APPLICATION
Used to detect physical threats to an asset (i.e., persons or materials) through surveillance of
asset. Can be used to monitor any water or wastewater assets (perimeter of facility, remote
pumphouses, potential access points to distribution or collection systems, etc.). Primarily used to
monitor exterior areas, but can be used in interior of buildings or facilities.
LOCATION USED
Usually mounted at a strategic location at the asset to be monitored to monitor as large an area
as possible. Can be mounted near doors or windows, on or along fences, or within buildings.
DESCRIPTION
Backflow prevention devices are designed to prevent backflow, which is the reversal of the
normal and intended direction of water flow in a water system. Backflow is a potential prob-
lem in a water system because it can spread contaminated water back through a distribution
system. For example, backflow at uncontrolled cross connections (cross-connections are any
actual or potential connection between the public water supply and a source of contamination
or pollution) can allow pollutants or contaminants to enter the potable water system. More
specifically, backflow from private plumbing systems, industrial areas, hospitals, and other
hazardous contaminant-containing systems, into public water mains and wells poses serious
public health risks and security problems. Cross-contamination from private plumbing systems
can contain biological hazards (such as bacteria or viruses) or toxic substances that can
contaminate and sicken an entire population In the event of backflow. The majority of historical
incidences of backflow have been accidental, but growing concern that contaminants could
be intentionally backfed into a system is prompting increased awareness for private homes,
businesses, industries, and areas most vulnerable to intentional strikes. Therefore, backflow
prevention is a major tool for the protection of water systems.
Backflow may occur under two types of conditions: backpressure, and backsiphonage.
Backpressure
Backpressure is the reverse from normal flow direction within a piping system that is the result
of the downstream pressure being higher than the supply pressure. These reductions in supply
pressure occur whenever the amount of water being used exceeds the amount of water being
supplied, such as during water line flushing, fire fighting, or breaks in water mains.
DETECT
D RLAY
RESPOND
19
-------
Backsiphonage
Backsiphonage is the reverse from normal flow direction within a piping system that is caused
by negative pressure in the supply piping (i.e., the reversal of normal flow in a system caused
by a vacuum or partial vacuum within the water supply piping). Backsiphonage can occur
when there is a high velocity in a pipe line; when there is a line repair or break that is lower
than a service point; or when there is lowered main pressure due to high water withdrawal
rate, such as during fire fighting or water main flushing.
Aging water systems, leaking sewer connections, contaminated groundwater, cross-over con-
nections, and growing numbers of users all contribute to the potential for backflow in a sys-
tem because they can lead to unintended connections between different parts of the system
or leaks that can contribute contaminants to the system. Therefore, backflow preventers are
typically installed at critical points in a distribution system to prevent contamination. Currently,
backflow preventers are mandated in many jurisdictions at the point where the backflow may
occur, such as at a hose bib or at a feed point to a fire sprinkler system. However, security
concerns dictate that wider use of backflow preventers be considered.
It should be noted that water systems are typically designed with numerous interconnec-
tions so that water can routinely flow in either direction in many areas of the water system.
This improves the system hydraulics while minimizing the required sizes of water mains. It is
desirable that each point in the system be fed from at least two points so that a maintenance
problem can be isolated within the smallest possible area. Therefore, the use of backflow pre-
venters within the water service network may have limited applicability. However, they may be
applicable in other places in the network, such as at user connections.
The appropriate type of backflow preventer for any given application will depend on the cate-
gory of hazard which may flow into the potable water supply if backflow occurs. Municipalities
define their own hazard classifications, which usually include two or three general classifica-
tions, depending on the municipality. These categories include:
• Pollutants/non-health hazards - A pollutant/non health hazard is any substance which
would affect the color or odor of the water, but would not pose a health hazard.
• Contaminants/health hazards - A contaminant/health hazard is any substance that causes
illness or death if ingested.
• Lethal hazards - Some communities establish a separate classification for hazards that
are typically lethal. These municipalities define a lethal hazard is any substance that could/
would be lethal to water users. For example, lethal hazards could include high concentra-
tions of sewage, toxic chemicals, and radioactive materials.
As noted above, the appropriate type of backflow preventer for any given application will
depend on the category of hazard which may flow into the potable water supply if backflow
occurs. The primary types of backflow preventers that are appropriate for use at municipalities
and utilities are:
• Air Gap Drains;
• Double Check Valves;
20
-------
• Reduced Pressure Principle Assemblies; and
• Pressure Vacuum Breakers.
Each of these types of backflow preventers is manufactured to achieve certain standards. For example,
the American Water Works Association (AWWA), the American Society of Sanitary Engineers (ASSE),
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), and the International Association of Plumbing
and Mechanical Officials (IAPMO) have standards for the construction materials, design, workmanship,
testing, and delivery of several types of backflow prevention devices. Interested parties can consult
these standards and verify with vendors that their products meet these requirements. Each backflow
preventer type is described in detail below.
AIR GAP DRAIN
An air gap is a non-mechanical backflow prevention method that is
effective against backsiphonage or backpressure conditions. An air
gap system is implemented by physically separating the supply pipe
from the receiving vessel (see accompanying figure). This breaks the
pressure between the inlet and the outlet, and thereby prevents back-
flow. According to standard engineering design practice, the distance
between the supply pipe and the receiving vessel should be at least
twice the diameter of the water supply outlet and never less than
one inch. An air gap is acceptable for use in applications to protect against contaminant or pollutant
hazards. In addition, an air gap may be the best means of protecting against accidental contamination
from lethal hazards.
An air gap system may be constructed using commercially available plumbing components, or it may be
purchased as separate components, which are then integrated into existing plumbing and piping con-
figurations. Because an air gap breaks the pressure between the inlet and the outlet, a booster pump is
usually needed downstream to ensure downstream pressure, unless the flow of the water by gravity is
sufficient for the downstream water use. The air gap drain is a very effective way to prevent accidental
contamination of the water system; however, it is important to note that an air gap is not always practi-
cal and can easily be bypassed. If the distance between the supply pipe and receiving vessel is compro-
mised either purposely or inadvertently to prevent excessive splash, the air gap is defeated. Also, with
an air gap, water is exposed to the surrounding air; therefore, the aspiration effect could potentially drag
down airborne pollutants or contaminants into the receiving vessel.
AMSE standards A112.1.1 and A112.1.2 and IAPMO PS 65 provide standards for air gap drains. Some
of these standards are for specific applications (for instance, IAPMO PS 65 is for water conditioning
equipment).
When it is not possible to design an air gap into a system, designers may opt to install mechanical
backflow prevention devices, which provide physical barriers to backflow. Physical backflow prevention
devices are described on the following pages.
&rp
-------
Double Check Valve
A double check valve is a mechanical device that consists of two single check valves coupled
within one body, and two tightly closing gate valves, one located at each end of the unit. Each
check valve consists of a physical plate connected to the top of the pipe by a hinge. The hinge
is oriented such that flow in the intended flow direction keeps pressure on the plate and keeps
it open, permitting the passage of fluid in the intended flow direction. Thus, under normal
conditions, the check valves remain open. In the absence of water flow, the plate is not being
held open by flow in the correct direction, and the valves close until the normal water flow
resumes. In the event of backflow, the flow is against the direction of the hinge, so the plate
remains closed. A double check valve may be used under continuous pressure. It can be effec-
tive against either backpressure or backsiphonage, and may be used to protect against pollut-
ant hazards. It should be noted that double check valves are susceptible to interference from
materials within the piping system. For example, grit or fibers can catch under the valves,
causing them to remain open and potentially allowing leakage back into the system.
AWWA standard C510-97 and ASSE standard 1015 cover double check valve backflow preven-
tion assemblies.
Normal Flow
Reverse Flow
Spring Loaded Check Valve
Open During Normal Flow
Spring Loaded Check Valve
Closed During Reverse Flow
Reduced Pressure (RP) Principle Assembly
The principle behind a reduced pressure principle backflow prevention device is to reduce a
negative pressure differential between the upstream and downstream ends of a line, thereby
preventing backflow. A reduced pressure principle assembly is a mechanical backflow pre-
venter that is essentially two check valves with an automatically operating pressure relief
valve placed between the two checks. This system is designed such that this "zone" between
the two checks is always kept at a lower pressure than the supply pressure. Under normal
flow conditions, the check valves remain open and the relief valve is closed. In the event of
backsiphonage, the relief valve will open to allow the Induction of air to break the vacuum. In
the event of backpressure, the opened relief valve routes the contaminated water out of the
system (drainage can be provided for such spillage). The reduced pressure principle assembly
also contains two shut-off valves upstream and downstream of the check valves and a series
of test cocks for periodic testing of the valves.
Reverse Flow
jrtng loaded
leek VSalve
Closed During
Reverse Flow
Pressure Relief Valve
Open During Reverse Flow
Normal Fkyw
Loaded
Valve
Open During
Normal Flow
Pressure Relief Valve
Closed During Normal Row
22
-------
A reduced pressure principle assembly is effective against either backpressure or backsiphon-
age, and may be used to protect against pollutant or contaminant hazards. Reduced pressure
principle assemblies may be used under constant pressure, and are commonly installed on
high hazard installations.
AWWA standard C511-97 and ASSE standard 1013 cover reduced pressure principle backflow
prevention assemblies.
Pressure Vacuum Breaker
The principle behind a pressure vacuum breaker (PVB) backflow prevention device is to break
the vacuum created during a backsiphonage event, thereby preventing backflow. A PVB con-
sists of a spring-loaded check valve which closes tightly when the pressure in the assembly
drops or when zero flow occurs, plus an air relief valve (located on the discharge side of the
check valve) that opens to break a siphon when the pressure in the assembly drops. The as-
sembly also includes two shut off valves and two test cocks for periodic testing of the assem-
bly. The air relief valve ensures that no non-potable liquid is siphoned back into the potable
water system.
PVBs prevent the backflow of contaminated water into a potable drinking main line, but they
are not designed for backpressure conditions. PVBs may be used under continuous pressure,
but the air inlet valve may become stuck in the closed position after long periods of continu-
ous pressure. A PVB may only be used against backsiphonage and may be used to protect
against pollutant or contaminant hazards.
ASSE standard 1020 covers PVB backflow prevention assemblies.
A summary of the typical applications for the backflow prevention devices discussed above is
provide in the following table.
Normal Flow
Reverse Flow
Vacuum ^
Breaker-^
Valve
Opens O
To Break
Siphon c
Vacuum
Spring Loaded
Check VWve
Open During
Normal Flow
Spring Loaded
Check Vfetfve
Closed During
Reverse Flow
23
-------
Table 1: Backflow Prevention Devices and Typical Uses
Product
Typical Applications
Air Gap Drain
Faucets and sinks, process waters
Double Check Valve
In-house pumps, elevated tanks, non-toxic boilers
Reduced Pressure Principle Assembly
Industrial plants, hospitals, morgues, chemical plants, irrigation
systems, pumps, elevated tanks, boilers, fire sprinkler systems
Pressure Vacuum Breakers
Industrial plants, cooling towers, laboratories, laundries, swimming
pools, lawn sprinkler systems, fire sprinkler systems
Implementation of Backflow Prevention Devices and Backflow Prevention Programs
The implementation of backflow prevention devices within a water or wastewater system can
be complex. Because backflow and cross connections can occur at so many different places
within a typical system, and because many systems have large numbers of connections, it is
not practical for a municipality to implement backflow preventers completely on their own to
protect their system. Therefore, most municipalities have adopted ordinances requiring end us-
ers to install and maintain appropriate backflow preventers.
Determining where the implementation of backflow prevention devices is appropriate or fea-
sible is an important consideration in any backflow prevention program. For example, as
discussed above, the reversal of the direction of flow is a normal condition within an average
municipal water system. As a result, backflow preventers are not practical for use in many
areas of a water system. However, backflow preventers can be used at a point where water is
fed to individual users to prevent flows back into the water system.
In order to be effective in reducing the potential for tampering, backflow preventers can be
installed within secured locations, such as within locked underground vaults or within secured
rooms within a building. However, the need to secure the backflow prevention devices must
be balanced with the need to access the devices for testing.
As mentioned above, many municipalities, and many end-users, have implemented backflow
prevention programs. These backflow prevention programs typically require periodic testing of
each backflow prevention device (typically on an annual basis) to ensure that it is functioning
properly. These programs typically require that testing be conducted by a trained and certified
technician.
COST
Capital Costs
The primary factor affecting cost of a given type of backflow prevention device is the size of
the pipe for which it is designed. The following will also contribute to the total cost for Install-
ing a backflow preventer: system design (including consultation as to which products are
appropriate); on-site delivery; installation and retrofit; maintenance; and inspection, testing,
and surveying. Costs for individual backflow preventers or backflow preventer systems will
vary depending on the product brand and vendor. However, some general prices are provided
24
-------
below. These prices are capital costs for the backflow preventer and do not include installa-
tion or service costs.
• Costs for double check assemblies range from $100 for a -inch diameter unit to $2,000
for 8-inch diameter units. Larger sizes could be $10,000 or more.
• Costs for reduced pressure principle assemblies range from $180 for a -inch diameter unit
to $3,000 for 8-inch diameter units. Larger sizes can be $12,000 or more.
• Costs for vacuum breakers range from $10 for a hose bib to $400 dollars for a 2-inch pres-
sure vacuum breaker.
• Costs for air gap drains will be site-specific, and will depend on the size of the pipe and the
area in which it is located. If re-pumping is required, the capital and operating costs will
most likely be higher than for all other devices.
Operation and Maintenance Costs
As discussed above, backflow prevention devices must be tested on a periodic basis. Test-
ing must be conducted by a trained and certified technician. Testing time for an individual
backflow prevention device will vary with the size of the device and its accessibility. Typically,
testing time can range from half an hour for a small, easily accessible device to several hours
for larger units located in areas that are not easily accessible. When these requirements are
extrapolated to include testing for each backflow prevention device within a system, costs for
a backflow prevention testing program can be considerable.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The Information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition. EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site, EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
Watts Regulator Company
815 Chestnut Street
North Andover, Massachusetts 01845
(978) 688-1811
www.wattsreg.com
Zurn-Wilklns
1747 Commerce Way
Paso Robies, California 93446
(805) 238-7100
www.zurn.com
Cla-Val
P.O. Box 1325
Newport Beach, California 92659-0325
(800) 942-6326
www.cia-vai.com
Conbraco
PO Box 247
Matthews, North Carolina 28106
(704) 841-6000
www.conbraco.com
Ames Fire and Waterworks
875 National Drive Suite 107
Sacramento, California 95834
(916) 928-0123
www.amesfirewater.com
FEBCO Backflow Prevention
SPX Valves & Controls
PO Box 8070
Fresno, California 93747
(559) 441-5300
www. cmb-ind. com/febco. asp
25
-------
Donfoss Flowmatic Valves Flomatic Corporation
15 Pruyn's Island Drive
Glens Falls, New York 12801
(800) 833-2040
www.flomatic.com
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
Exterior Intrusion - Buried Sensors °
O
OBJECTIVE
Monitor asset perimeters to detect intruders.
APPLICATION
Designed to detect attempted physical access to a water/wastewater asset. Can be connected to
an alarm, lights, or video surveillance cameras to alert facility personnel of attempted access.
LOCATION USED
Buried in ground around perimeter of asset. Monitor water samples to detect chemical, biological, or
radiological parameters that may represent threats to the system.
DESCRIPTION
Buried sensors are electronic devices that are designed to detect potential intruders. The sen-
sors are buried along the perimeters of sensitive assets and are able to detect intruder activity
both above- and below-ground. Some of these systems are composed of individual, stand-
alone sensor units, while other sensors consist of buried cables.
There are four types of buried sensors that rely on different types of triggers. These are: pres-
sure or seismic; magnetic field; ported coaxial cable; and fiber-optic cables. These four sen-
sors are all covert and terrain-following, meaning they are hidden from view and follow the
contour of the terrain. The four types of sensors are described in more detail below.
Pressure/Seismic
Pressure or seismic sensors are passive detectors that respond to a change or a disturbance
in the soil caused by an intruder. Pressure sensors consist of a container filled with liquid,
which is connected to a transducer. A seismic sensor consists of geophones that are made
up of conducting coils. Pressure sensors are more sensitive to lower frequency pressure
waves than are seismic sensors. Pressure or seismic types of sensors would be most useful
for detecting intruders by foot.
Magnetic Field
Magnetic field sensors are also passive detectors that respond
to a change in the local magnetic field. This change may be
caused by the movement of metallic material nearby, such as
movement of an intruder with a metallic weapon. Magnetic field
sensors consist of series of wire loops or coils buried in the
ground. These sensors can be susceptible to false alarms due
to electromagnetic disturbances, such as lightning.
DETECT
DELAY
RESPOND
£
"-1 £3—CT
Burled Sensor Detection Field
27
-------
Ported Coaxial Cables
Ported coaxial cable sensors are active sensors that respond to nearby material with a high
dielectric constant or high conductivity. Two cables-one acting as a transmitter, the other as a
receiver-are run parallel to one another and are spaced approximately two meters apart. The
signal leaking from one to the other creates a field between the two cables, and active dis-
turbance of the field triggers the sensor. Materials that trigger these types of sensors can be
found in people and metal vehicles.
Fiber-Optic Cables
Optical fibers are long, hair-like stands of transparent glass or plastic that use optical tech-
nology to guide light from one end of the fiber to the other. Pressure on the fiber causes a
distortion in the light signal, which is detected and analyzed at the far end of the fiber. These
sensors are typically woven into a mesh grid to ensure complete coverage of an area to be
protected. The fibers require a burial depth of only a few centimeters to be effective. These
sensors are ideal for wet environments since the non-metallic, fiber-optic cable is designed as
a direct burial cable with a 20-year life expectancy.
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
Buried sensors are designed to follow the existing terrain and are feasible options if a site is
hilly. The sensors are buried at a relatively shallow depth (ranging from a few inches to one
foot, depending on the type). These types of sensors are also covert, because they are buried
and potential intruders cannot see them.
These systems may be continuous or discrete. A continuous system consists of a continuous
cable, such as a fiber optic or ported coaxial cable. These types of systems monitor along a
continuos line corresponding to the location of the cable. Discrete sensors consist of individ-
ual sensor units that can be buried in non-linear patterns to increase the area monitored. For
example, Qual-Tron sensors are designed to monitor all activity within a 30-foot radius in any
direction.
A drawback to these type of systems is that they may have different sensitivities when they
are buried below different media. For example, if continuous systems are buried below differ-
ent types of media (such as under a lawn, then under an intersecting concrete driveway, and
then back to lawn again), the sensitivities required for different types of media may be differ-
ent. For example, a good sensitivity adjustment for concrete may be too sensitive for grass.
Therefore, it may be best to individually zone those areas.
Another factor that must be considered when using a buried sensor is underground utilities.
Underground utilities, such as gas, water, and sewer lines, must be located at a sufficient
depth below the detection zone (typically three feet), so as to not cause false and nuisance
alarms. Below-ground electrical wires must also be compensated for; however, the potential
for nuisance alarms caused by underground power lines is not as great as with other types of
utilities.
28
-------
Several other factors must be considered when using a buried sensor. Rodents have been
known to cause maintenance problems by gnawing on the sensor cables; this problem is
limited primarily to the Western states. Installations also should not be in areas where running
water will either wash away the soil that buries the sensor or cause nuisance alarms during a
heavy rain. Table 1 presents the distinctions between the four types of buried sensors.
Table 1: Types of Buried Sensors
Type
Discussion
Pressure or Seismic
Responds to disturbances in the soil. Effective in detecting an intruder walking,
running, jumping, or crawling on the ground.
Magnetic Field
Responds to a change in the local magnetic field caused by the movement of
nearby metallic material. Effective for detecting intruders carrying weapons as
small as a pocketknife.
Ported Coaxial Cables
Responds to motion of a material with a high dielectric constant or high
conductivity near the cables. Effective in detecting materials found in the human
body and metallic vehicles.
Fiber-Optic Cables
Responds to a change in the shape of the fiber that can be sensed using
sophisticated sensors and computer signal processing. Effective in detecting
intruders by foot.
In order to be effective security measures, sensors must be tied into some type of alarm sys-
tem or other system that alerts facility personnel when the sensors have been tripped. Many
sensor systems include these features; in other cases, these features can be added on and
the alert system can be networked to go off when the sensors are tripped.
COST
Stand-alone sensors, such as pressure/seismic and magnetic field sensors, are often sold as
individual components, and the cost will depend on the number of sensors required and the
sophistication of the transmitting, receiving, and recording equipment. For example, a typical
system will require sensor/transmitters and a receiver. In some cases, the system may need a
relay if the transmitter and receiver are located at a sufficient distance from one another.
Qual-Tron Inc. provides two types of pressure/seismic or magnetic sensor systems. The first,
Mini-Intrusion Detection System (MIDS) includes sensors that transmit on a single channel at
a fixed frequency. This system can handle up to 32 sensors. The EMIDS system can transmit
on multiple channels and frequencies, and can handle up to 999 individual sensors. Costs for
these systems are provided in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Example Cost for Individual Sensor-Based Systems
Component
MIDS
EMIDS
Sensor/Transmitter
$850
$1,100
Hand-held Receiver
$720
$1,150
Relay
$1,400
$4,350
29
-------
Both of these systems can be installed and maintained by the customer. Qual-Tron indicates
that training on installation and maintenance can be accomplished in a day or less. Costs for
ported coaxial cable and fiber optic cable systems are provided in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Example Costs for Buried Line Sensors
Type
Cost/Ft
Notes
Ported Coaxial Gable - Stand alone
$24 - $46
Stand alone
Networked
$24 - $34
Cost for hardware only. Typical
installation is 300-500 ft/day.
Fiber-Optic Cables
$10- $15 .
Cost for hardware only. Costs for both
2-core (basic) and 4-core (advanced)
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, Its products or its services, In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
Qual-Tron, Inc.
Senstar-Stellar, Inc.
9409 East 55th Place South
43184 Osgood Road
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74145-8157
Fremont, California 94539
(918) 622-7052
(510) 440 1000
www.qual-tron.com
www.senstarstelior.com
Fiber SenSys, Inc.
Whltaker Security, Inc.
9640 StV Sunshine Court, Suite 400
4501 Lantern Place, Suite 100
Beaverton, Oregon 97005
Alexandria, Virginia 22306
(503) 641-8150
(703) 768-5025
www.fibersensys.com
www.whitakersecurity.com
Auratek Security, Inc.
DAQ Electronics
Richelieu Industrial Park
Piscataway Corporate Center
15 Buteau Street
262B Old New Brunswick Road
Gatineau, Quebec J8Z 1V4
Piscataway, New Jersey 08854-0050
Canada
(888) 778-8440
(732) 981-0050
www.auratek.net
www.daq.net/securlty/sabre_solutions.htmi
Sparton Electronics
Hach Company
Division Headquarters
PO Box 389
Johnson Lake Road
Love/and, Colorado 80539
DeLeon Springs, Florida 32130
800-227-4224
www.hach.com
30
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
Fences
O detect
# DILAY
O RESPOND
OBJECTIVE
Physically deter potential intruders from gaining access to an asset.
APPLICATION
Installed around the perimeter of any water or wastewater asset to deter unauthorized access to
that asset. Fences are often placed around the perimeter or boundary of a facility, or around the
perimeter of a sensitive structure within a facility. Access to the asset is controlled by directing all
traffic through specific access points (e.g., gates or doors).
LOCATION USED
Perimeter of any asset to be protected.
DESCRIPTION
A fence is a physical barrier that can be set up around the perimeter of an asset. Fences often
consist of individual pieces (such as individual pickets in a wooden fence, or individual sec-
tions of a wrought iron fence) that are fastened together. Individual sections of the fence are
fastened together using posts, which are sunk into the ground to provide stability and strength
for the sections of the fence hung between them. Gates are installed between individual sec-
tions of the fence to allow access inside the fenced area.
Many fences are used as decorative architectural features to separate physical spaces from
each other. They may also be used to physically mark the location of a boundary (such as a
fence installed along a property line). However, a fence can also serve as an effective means
for physically delaying intruders from gaining access to a water or wastewater asset. For
example, many utilities install fences around their primary facilities, around remote pump sta-
tions, or around hazardous materials storage areas or sensitive areas within a facility. Ac-
cess to the area can be controlled through security at gates or doors through the fence (for
example, by posting a guard at the gate or by locking it). In order to gain access to the asset,
unauthorized persons would either have to go around or through the fence.
Fences are often compared with walls when determining the appropriate system for perimeter
security. While both fences and walls can provide adequate perimeter security, fences are
often easier and less expensive to install than walls. However, they do not usually provide the
same physical strength that walls do. In addition, many types of fences have gaps between
the individual pieces that make up the fence (I.e., the spaces between chain links in a chain
link fence or the space between pickets In a picket fence). Thus, many types of fences allow
the interior of the fenced area to be seen. This may allow Intruders to gather important infor-
mation about the locations or defenses of vulnerable areas within the facility.
31
-------
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
There are numerous types of materials used to construct fences, including chain link, iron, alu-
minum, wood, or wire. Some types offences, such as split rails or pickets, may not be appro-
priate for security purposes because they are traditionally low fences, and they are not physi-
cally strong. Potential intruders may be able to easily defeat these fences either by jumping or
climbing over them or by breaking through them. For example, the rails in a split rail fence may
be removed, and the pickets in a picket fence may be able to be broken easily.
Important security attributes of a fence include the height to which it can be constructed, the
strength of the material comprising the fence, the method and strength of attaching the indi-
vidual sections of the fence together at the posts, and the fence's ability to restrict the view of
the assets inside the fence. Additional considerations should include the ease of installing the
fence and the ease of removing and reusing sections of the fence. Table 1 provides a compari-
son of the important security and usability features of several different types of fences.
Table 1 Comparison of Different Fence Types
Specifications
Iron
Aluminum
Chain Link
Height Limitations
12"
10"
12"
Strength
High
Medium
Medium
Installation Requirements
High
High
Low
Ability to Remove/Reuse
High
High
Low
Ability to Replace/Repair
High
High
Medium
Some fences can include additional measures to delay, or even detect, potential intruders.
Such measures may include the addition of barbed wire, razor wire, or other deterrents at the
top of the fence. Barbed wire is sometimes employed at the base of fences as well. This can
impede a would-be intruder's progress in even reaching the fence. Fences may also be fitted
with security cameras to provide visual surveillance of the perimeter. Finally, some facilities
have installed motion sensors along their fences to detect movement on the fence. Several
manufacturers have combined these multiple perimeter security features into one product and
offer high security fences that incorporate stronger materials, sensors, alarms, and other se-
curity features. These specialized fences will be covered in other product guides.
COST
Costs for fences will vary depending on the type of material chosen, the height of the fence,
and the length of fence to be installed. Table 2 provides cost information for several different
kinds of fences, including capital costs plus estimates of the number of manhours required to
install the fence.
32
-------
Table 2 Fencing Costs
Fence Type
Material Cost (per linear tt)
Labor Cost (man-
hours/100 linear ft)*
Chain link, 2" mesh, 9 gauge
$3.55
124
6' high
$4.90
28
8' high
$6.20
32
10' high
Aluminum, 6' section
$148
18
6' high
$210
23
8' high
Steel, 6' section
$157
31
6' high
$198
36
8' high
$237
43
10' high
Some security fencing systems include enhanced security features, such as razor wire at the
top of the fence. However, additional security features can be installed along with the fence at
additional cost. Two examples are listed below:
• 18" Razor Wire with a high tensile wire core - $63 for a 50 foot roll, not including installation.
• Vibration/Motion sensors - These units are sold as complete detection systems only. One
unit includes a battery-operated burglar alarm, with a motion detector. With one electrician
installing the system, the cost is $325 per unit.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or Its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further Information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors Is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
AMESCO, Inc., Metalco Products
7800 S. Qulncy Street
Wlllowbrook, Illinois 60527
(800) 708-2526
www.metalco.tv/default.htm
FenceCenter.com
(888) 336-2358
www.fencecenter.com
Alabama Metal Industries Corporation
3245 Fayette Avenue
Birmingham, Alabama 35208
(800) 366-2642
www.amico-securltyproducts.com/fence.htm
Fiber Sensys, Inc.
9640 $W Sunshine Court
Beaverton, Oregon 97005
(503) 641-8150
www.flbersensys.com
Hoover Fence Co.
P.O. Box 563
5531 McCllntocksburg Rd.
Newton Falls, Ohio 44444
(800) 355-2335
www.hooverfence.com
33
-------
Ameristar Fence
PO Box 581000
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74158
(866) 467-2773
www.impassefence.com/
Alamo Fence Company
9618 Honeywell
Houston, Texas 77074
(713) 981-1113
www.alamofence.com/contents.htm
Fence City
619 Bethlehem Pike
P.O. Box 779
Montgomeryville, Pennsylvania 18936
(800) 336-2310
www.fencecity.com
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
o
Films for Glass Shatter Protection •
O
OBJECTIVE
Protect windows, glass doors, and other glass from shattering.
APPLICATION
Can be used on any glass surface to prevent the glass from shattering. Preventing the glass from
shattering may prevent access to a building or a room through the broken glass, and may also help
to reduce injuries to personnel located behind the glass.
LOCATION USED
Windows, glass doors, and any other piece of glass at a water/wastewater utility.
DESCRIPTION
Most water and wastewater utilities have numerous windows on the outside of buildings,
in doors, and in interior offices. In addition, many facilities have glass doors or other glass
structures, such as glass walls or display cases, These glass objects are potentially vulner-
able to shattering when heavy objects are thrown or launched at them, when explosions occur
near them, or when there are high winds (for exterior glass). If the glass is shattered, intrud-
ers may potentially enter an area. In addition, shattered glass projected into a room from an
explosion or from an object being thrown through a door or window can injure and potentially
incapacitate personnel in the room. Materials that prevent glass from shattering can help to
maintain the integrity of the door, window, or other glass object, and can delay an intruder
from gaining access. These materials can also prevent flying glass and thus reduce potential
injuries.
Materials designed to prevent glass from shattering include specialized films and coatings.
These materials can be applied to existing glass objects to improve their strength and their
ability to resist shattering. The films have been tested against many scenarios that could re-
sult in glass breakage, including penetration by blunt objects, bullets, high winds, and simu-
lated explosions. Thus, the films are tested against both simulated weather scenarios (which
could include both the high winds themselves and the force of objects blown into the glass),
as well as more criminal/terrorist scenarios where the glass is hit directly with an object with
the intent of penetrating the glass, or is subject to explosives or bullets. Many vendors provide
information on the results of these types of tests, and thus potential users can compare differ-
ent product lines to determine which products best suit their needs.
This product guide focuses on specialized films that can be applied to glass. Most of these
films are constructed of specialized polyesters to which adherents are added to ensure a
secure bond to the glass surface. The films are available in a number of different thicknesses
depending on the level of protection needed for certain objects. These films are easy to add
existing glass surfaces, making them excellent security features to retrofit at a water or
wastewater utility. The films are also multi-functional, and many product lines absorb UV rays,
shading the interior and reducing energy requirements for heating and cooling.
DETECT
D ILAY
RESPOND
35
-------
Additional product guides that focus on coatings for glass shatter protection and other types
of safety glass are available from EPA.
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
The primary attributes of films for shatter protection are:
• The materials from which the film is made;
• The adhesive that bonds the film to the glass surface; and
• The thickness of the film.
Standard glass safety films are designed from high strength polyester. Polyester provides both
strength and elasticity, which is important in absorbing the impact of an object, spreading the
force of the impact over the entire film, and resisting tearing. The polyester is also designed
to be resistant to scratching, which can result when films are cleaned with abrasives or other
industrial cleaners.
The bonding adhesive is important in ensuring that the film does not tear away from the glass
surface. This can be especially important when the glass is broken, so that the film does not
peal off the glass and allow it to shatter. In addition, films applied to exterior windows can be
subject to high concentrations of UV light, which can break down bonding materials.
Film thickness is measured in gauge or mils. According to test results reported by several
manufacturers, film thickness appears to affect resistance to penetration/tearing, with thicker
films being more resistant to penetration and tearing. However, the application of a thicker
film did not decrease glass fragmentation.
Many manufacturers offer films in different thicknesses. The "standard" film Is usually one 4
mil layer; thicker films are typically composed of several layers of the standard 4 mil sheet.
However, newer technologies have allowed the polyester to be "microlayered" to produce a
stronger film without significantly increasing Its thickness. In this microlayering process, each
laminate film is composed of multiple micro-thin layers of polyester woven together at alternat-
ing angles. This provides increased strength for the film, while maintaining the flexibility and
thin profile of one film layer.
As described above, many vendors test their products in various scenarios that would lead
to glass shattering, including simulated bomb blasts and simulation of the glass being struck
by wind-blown debris. Some manufacturers refer to the Government Services Administration
standard for bomb blasts, which require resistance to tearing for a 4 PSI blast. Other manu-
facturers use other measures and tests for resistance to tearing. Many of these tests are not
"standard," in that no standard testing or reporting methods have been adopted by any of the
accepted standards-setting institutions. However, many of the vendors publish the procedure
and the results of these tests on their websites, and this may allow users to evaluate the
protectiveness of these films. For example, several vendors evaluate the "protectiveness" of
their films and the "hazard" resulting from blasts near windows with and without protective
films. Protectiveness is usually evaluated based on the percentage of glass ejected from the
window, and the height at which that ejected glass travels during the blast (for example, if
the blasted glass tends to project upward Into a room - potentially towards people's faces - it
36
-------
is a higher hazard than if it is blown downward into the room towards people's feet). There
are some standard measures of glass breakage. For example, several vendors indicate that
their products exceed the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards 1' 1
64Z-95 "Standard Test Method for Glazing and Glazing Systems Subject to Air Blast Loadings."
Vendors often compare the results of some sort of penetration or force test, ballistic tests,
or simulated explosions with unprotected glass vs. glass onto which their films have been
applied. Results generally show that applying films to the glass surfaces reduces breakage/
penetration of the glass and can reduce the amount and direction of glass ejected from the
frame. This in turn reduces the hazard from flying glass.
In addition to these types of tests, many vendors cpnduct standard physical tests on their
products, such as tests for tensile strength and peel strength. Tensile strength indicates the
strength per area of material, while the peel strength indicates the force it would take to peel
the product from the glass surface. Several vendors indicate that their products exceed Ameri-
can National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard Z97.1 for tensile strength and adhesion.
Vendors typically have a warranty against peeling or other forms of deterioration of their
products. However, the warranty requires that the films be installed by manufacturer-certified
technicians to ensure that they are applied correctly, and therefore that the warranty is in ef-
fect. Warranties from different manufacturers may vary. Some may cover the cost of replacing
the material only, while others include material plus installation. Because installation costs
are significantly greater than material costs (see discussion below), different warranties may
represent large differences in potential costs.
COST
As discussed above, all of these products must be installed by manufacturer-certified tech-
nicians. For any individual product line, costs are dependent upon the area of glass to be
covered and the configuration of the area. In general, labor costs are higher than material
costs for installation of these films, and the primary factor affecting labor costs is the amount
of cutting and fitting that must be done with the film. The more individual panes or surfaces to
be covered, the higher the cost. For example, a 9' x 9' window composed of a single pane of
glass would be less expensive to treat than would a 9' x 9' window composed of nine 3' x 3'
panes. In addition, costs of the films generally increase as the thickness or gauge of the film
increases. However, costs generally range from $3-$7 per ft2, installed.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, Its products or Its services, In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA Is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security eaulpment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
37
-------
Plastic-View International, Inc.
4585 Runway, Su:-¦"> 6
Simi Valley, California 93063
(805) 520-9390
www.pvifilm.com
FShatterguard.com
(888) 306-7998
www.shatterguard.com
Bekaert Specialty Films, LLC
13770 Automobile Blvd.
Clearwater, Florida 33762
(800) 282-9031
www.bekaertspecialtyfilms.com
HCPFilms, Inc.
Llumar Technical Services
P.O. Box 5068
Martinsville, Virginia 24115
(800) 255-8627
www.llumar.com
A3M
3M Center
St. Paul, Minnesota 55144
(888) 364-3577
www.3m.com
Perma-Gard Window Protection, Inc.
100 South Federal Highway
Pompano Beach, Florida 33062
(888) 946-6300
www.perma-gard.com
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
O DETECT
Fire Hydrant Locks
OBJECTIVE
Hydrant locks can be used to prevent unauthorized physical access to a water asset via a fire hy-
drant.
APPLICATION
Installing hydrant locks on all hydrants in a system may help to prevent introduction of unauthorized
substances into the system.
LOCATION USED
On any fire hydrant valve.
DESCRIPTION
Fire hydrants are installed at strategic locations throughout a community's water distribu-
tion system to supply water for fire fighting. However, because there are many hydrants in a
system and they are often located in residential neighborhoods, industrial districts, and other
areas where they cannot be easily observed and/or guarded, they are potentially vulnerable
to unauthorized access. Many municipalities, states, and EPA Regions have recognized this
potential vulnerability and have instituted programs to lock hydrants. For example, EPA Region
1 has included locking hydrants as number 7 on its "Drinking Water Security and Emergency
Preparedness" Top Ten List for small ground water suppliers.
A "hydrant lock" is a physical security device designed to prevent unauthorized access to the
water supply through a hydrant. They can also ensure water and water pressure availability to
fire fighters and prevent water theft and associated lost water revenue. These locks have been
successfully used in numerous municipalities and in various climates and weather conditions.
Fire hydrant locks are basically steel covers or caps that are locked in place over the operating
nut of a fire hydrant. The lock prevents unauthorized persons from accessing the operating nut
and opening the fire hydrant valve. The lock also makes it more difficult to remove the bolts
from the hydrant and access the system that way. Finally, hydrant
locks shield the valve from being broken off. Should a vandal at-
tempt to breach the hydrant lock by force and succeed in breaking
the hydrant lock, the vandal will only succeed in bending the op-
erating valve. If the hydrant's operating valve is bent, the hydrant
will not be operational, but the water asset remains protected and
inaccessible to vandals. However, the entire hydrant will need to
be replaced.
Hydrant locks are designed so that the hydrants can be operated by special "key wrenches"
without removing the lock. These specialized wrenches are generally distributed to the fire de-
partment, public works department, and other authorized persons so that they can access the
hydrants as needed. An inventory of wrenches and their serial numbers is generally kept by a
% DELAY
O RESPOND
McGard Hydrant Lock and
Wrench
39
-------
municipality so that the location of all wrenches is known. These operating key wrenches may
only be purchased by registered lock owners.
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
The most important features of hydrant locks are their strength and the security of their lock-
ing systems. The locks must be strong so that they cannot be broken off. Hydrant locks are
constructed from stainless or alloyed steel. Stainless steel locks are stronger and are ideal for
all climates; however, they are more expensive than alloy locks. The locking mechanisms for
each fire hydrant locking system ensure that the hydrant can only be operated by authorized
personnel who have the specialized key to work the hydrant.
There are three major vendors for fire hydrant locks: Mueller Company, McGard, and Hydra-
Shield. Specifics of hydrant locking systems are discussed below.
At a minimum, a fire hydrant lock system consists of a steel locking system and a special key
wrench that operates the hydrant without unlocking it. In addition, the McGard locks require a
universal security plug key for installing and removing the hydrant locks.
The principle behind the McGard and Hydra-Shield hydrant locks is the
same. First, a "mating collar" is fitted over the operating nut. The mat-
ing collar surrounds the operating nut, preventing a wrench from grip-
ping the nut and allowing access to the nut only from the top. Next, a
"drive plug" is installed on the top part of the operating nut. The drive
plug secures the hydrant's operating nut and prevents it from being
from turned. Last, an outer collar is installed over the drive plug, effec-
tively "locking" the hydrant by denying access to the operating nut.
McGard Hydrant Lock
The McGard and Hydra-Shield locking mechanisms operate differently. The McGard lock is
mechanical, and is installed and uninstalled using a specialized plug key. The McGard plug
cap is rounded and has no edges to grip; therefore, standard wrenches cannot open it, and
only McGard's specialized operating wrenches can be used to operate the hydrant. The Hydra-
Shield lock is magnetic. The specialized key wrench works by pulling the magnetic drive plug
up and "unlocking" the hydrant. Turning the wrench after "unlocking" the drive plug turns the
hydrant's operating nut to the open position. The combination of the location of the lock within
the outer body and the specialized properties of the magnet ensure that standard magnets
cannot be used to remove the lock. The outer collar also spins freely around the operating nut,
preventing a potential vandal from gripping the operating nut and turning it through the mating
collar. This can add an additional layer of protection for the hydrant.
Mueller's Hydrant Defender™ systems consist of covers that fit over the
operating nut and the hydrant valves, and 14 gauge stainless steel
straps that connect the caps and keep them from being removed. The
straps are locked in place by a uniquely coded mechanical lock. The
manufacturer recommends a specific lock, although users may substi-
tute other types of locks if they wish.
McGard Hydrant Lock
Mueller Hydrant Lock
40
-------
The Mueller and McGard locks are manufactured to fit standard hydrant sizes. Hydra-Shield
customizes its locks for any hydrant.
Mueller Hydrant Lock
Installation of a hydrant lock is straightforward, although the process may differ depending on
the lock vendor. Locks are either installed on the existing hydrant operating nut, or on a new
nut that is supplied with the hydrant lock. In the latter case, the standard hydrant operating is
removed and replaced with a special nut that will operate with the hydrant lock.
COST
Individual components of fire hydrant locks are sold separately. Standard Hydra-Shield locks
sell for between $185 and $240 apiece. Wrenches range from $105-$ 135 each. Heavy duty
locks can be more expensive. McGard locks range from $142.50 per lock for large orders
(typically >1000) to $203 per lock for small orders (<50). As with the locks, the costs for op-
erating wrenches depend on the quantity ordered, but typical costs are $47-$62 per wrench.
Plug keys are approximately $16.50 per key and can be ordered in any amount.
The Mueller Hydrant Defender1" systems are sold through local distributors and sell for approxi-
mately $70-85 apiece. The locks and keys are sold separately. Locks are under $10 apiece,
while the specialized keys will cost approximately $40 apiece.
Fire hydrant locks do not required specialized knowledge to install, and thus they can typically
be installed by the owner's maintenance crews. Installation is quick - a typical lock that does
not require the operating nut to be replaced can be installed in approximately five minutes.
The locks do not typically require maintenance, and thus overall installation and maintenance
costs are low.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services, In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
McGard Special Products Division
3875 California Road
Orchard Park, New York 14127
(716) 662-8980
www.mcgard.com
Mueller Company
500 West Eldorado Street
P.O. Box 671
Decatur, Illinois 62525
(217) 423-4471
www.muellercompany.com
Hydra-Shield Manufacturing, Inc.
3249 Wesf Story Road
Irving, Texas 75038
(800) 676-0911
www.hydra-shield.com
41
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
o
Ladder Access Control *
O
OBJECTIVE
To delay access to assets such as roofs, raised water tanks, pipes, or other assets by con-
trolling access to the ladders leading to the asset.
APPLICATION
Used to protect any indoor or outdoor ladder.
LOCATION USED
On any indoor or outdoor ladder, such as ladders leading to roofs, water tanks, raised
pipes, or other raised assets.
DESCRIPTION
Water and wastewater utilities have a number of assets that are raised above ground level,
including raised water tanks, raised chemical tanks, raised piping systems, and roof access
points into buildings. In addition, communications equipment, antennae, or other electronic
devices may be located on the top of these raised assets. Typically, these assets are reached
by ladders that are permanently anchored to the asset. For example, raised water tanks typi-
cally are accessed by ladders that are bolted to one of the legs of the tank. Controlling access
to these raised assets by controlling access to the ladder can increase security at a water or
wastewater utility.
A typical ladder access control system consists of some type of cover that is locked or
secured over the ladder. The cover can be a casing that surrounds most of the ladder, or a
door or shield that covers only part of the ladder. In either case, several rungs of the ladder
(the number of rungs depends on the size of the cover) are made inaccessible by the cover,
and these rungs can only be accessed by opening or removing the cover. The cover is locked
so that only authorized personnel can open or remove it and use the ladder. Ladder access
controls are usually installed at several feet above ground level, and they usually extend sev-
eral feet up the ladder so that they cannot be circumvented by someone accessing the ladder
above the control system.
Permanent Covers with Locking Doors
Permanent ladder covers usually consist of some type of door that is
bolted over the ladder. The door hides the rungs and prevents them from
being accessed when the door is closed and locked. To access the lad-
der, the door is unlocked and then opened, enabling the ladder behind it
to be used. Several types of permanent covers are discussed below:
RB Industries manufactures the Ladder Gate, which consists of an 8 foot
high by 36 inches wide by 1/8 inch thick aluminum cover that is installed
over a ladder leading to a water tank, a raised pipe, or another raised
DETECT
DELAY
RESPOND
RB Industries. Ladder
Gate
42
-------
asset. The Ladder Gate has a front and two sides. The front of the Ladder Gate fits over the
front of the ladder and covers the rungs, preventing anyone from accessing the ladder from
the front. The two sides extend behind the ladder and back to the base of the structure to
which the ladder is attached. This prevents anyone from reaching around or behind the Ladder
Gate to grasp the ladder. Therefor, although the Ladder Gate does not enclose the entire lad-
der, it does cover the front and both sides of the ladder for an 8 foot length.
The Ladder Gate's height ensures that intruders cannot reach above it to grasp the ladder.
These systems are usually installed above ground level to provide additional height before an
intruder could reach an unprotected part of the ladder. For example, by installing a Ladder
Gate at 10 feet above ground level, an intruder would have to be 18 feet above ground level
(10 feet plus the 8-foot height of the Ladder Gate) to reach the unprotected part of the ladder
above the Ladder Gate.
The Ladder Gate is anchored to the ladder frame using 3 brackets that are bolted using gal-
vanized steel bolts. Because the gate's hinge is at the angle between the side and the front
of the unit, the hinge is not bolted directly to the ladder frame, which makes the system more
secure. Another plate containing an eye bolt is mounted on the other side of the ladder. The
side panel opposite the hinge has a slot through which the eye bolt fits when the Ladder Gate
is closed. A padlock can then be placed on the eye bolt to lock the Ladder Gate. Depending on
how the Ladder Gate is installed, it can be oriented so that it opens to the left or to the right.
The system accommodates ladders up to 20 inches wide.
Two manufacturers (Brock Manufacturing and Carbis, Inc.) have
designed ladder access controls that consist of a door that is
fastened to one side of the ladder frame. When the door is open,
the rungs are accessible, and the ladder can be climbed. When
the door is closed and locked, the ladder rungs are blocked, and
the ladder cannot be climbed. The door is secured by a padlock
that locks the handle on the door to a hasp bolted to the ladder
frame. Only authorized personnel can unlock the padlock, open the
door, and access the part of the ladder behind the door. The Brock
product is a 17 gauge galvanized steel door that is 6 feet high and
weighs 30 lbs. The door is secured to the ladder frame by up-
per and lower hinges fastened with 5/16-inch bolts. The bolts are
located on the inside of the door so they cannot be removed from
the outside. The Carbis doors are also 6 feet high and are available
in several materials, including aluminum and mill, primed, galvanizei
doors weigh from 22 to 56 lbs.
While the Brock and Carbis doors protect access to the front side/outside of the ladder, they
do not protect access from the back side of a free-standing ladder. Therefore, these products
may be most appropriate for a ladder that is bolted to a wall because the wall prevents ac-
cess to the other side of the ladder. However, even in the case of a freestanding ladder, ac-
cess up the back side of the ladder may be blocked from above by the structure to which the
ladder provides access.
Brock Manufacturing. Locking
Door Ladder Cover
I, or stainless steel. Carbis
43
-------
Removable Covers
Serrmi Products, Inc. provides removable protective covers for ladders
that it installs on structures designed for the railroad industry. The
Serrmi ladder protection device is a 6 foot high aluminum sheet which
weighs about 10 lbs and is hung from the upper rung of a ladder. The
bottom of the sheet is locked in place using a bar that is placed be-
hind the ladder and is padlocked to the aluminum cover. This prevents
the cover from being moved vertically, which prevents it from being slid
up and off the top rung from which it is hung. This product is currently
manufactured for standard 16 inch-wide railroad industry ladders.
Serrmi Products. Inc.
Removable Ladder Cover
The ladder covers described above can also be used on ladders with safety cages. However,
they must be installed above or below the safety cages.
Folding Ladders
While the products discussed above are installed on existing ladders,
Carbis, Inc. has designed a folding ladder that may also be appropriate
for purchase and installation for security applications. Although it has
primarily been marketed for other purposes (such as fire escape), the
Carbis Security Access Ladder can easily be applied to provide protected
access to rooftops or other raised assets. The ladder consists of a 12
inch-wide, marine-grade aluminum ladder that is hinged at the rungs so
that it can close in on itself from side to side. One side of the ladder
is bolted to a wall, and the other side of the ladder frame is folded up
against it. To open the ladder, the free (unbolted) side of the ladder is
pulled out and down away from the wall, which extends the rungs and
moves them from a vertical to a horizontal position. To close the ladder,
the free side of the ladder is pushed up and towards the wall, which
folds the rungs up against the wall. The entire unit is only 2 inches wide
when closed. The units can be secured using a normal padlock, which
must be purchased separately. Depending on the ladder's design, the padlock can be installed at
the top or the bottom of the ladder. When the ladder is closed and locked, the entire ladder is hid-
den from view and cannot be accessed. In addition, the closed unit is not easily recognized as a
ladder. The unit is available in heights ranging from 9 to 26 feet. Because this unit must be bolted
to an existing wall, it may be most appropriate to protect access to a building roof rather than an
asset that does not have walls, such as a raised water tank or raised pipes.
Carbis. Inc. Security Access
Ladder
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
The important features of ladder access control are the size and strength of the cover and its
ability to lock or otherwise be secured from unauthorized access.
The covers are constructed from aluminum or some type of steel. This should provide ade-
quate protection from being pierced or cut through. The metals are corrosion resistant so that
they will not corrode or become fragile from extreme weather conditions in outdoor applica-
tions. The bolts used to install each of these systems are galvanized steel. In addition, the
bolts for each cover are installed on the inside of the unit so they cannot be removed from the
outside. A discussion of these attributes is provided in Table 1.
44
-------
Table 1 Ladder Access Control Systems
Manufacturer/ j
Product Description j Discussion
! HRB Industries | Consists of an 8 foot high, i This product is installed over an existing ladder,
i i ^j. : 1/8 inch thick aluminum j and can be installed on both freestanding and
Ladder Gote i , ,
! I cover that covers the front i wall-mounted ladders. It weighs 65 lbs, and the
! i and both sides of the j manufacturer recommends that it be installed at least
| ladder. It does not enclose j 10 feet above ground level
the entire ladder.
i
Brock Manufacturing
'
Ladder Security Door
17 gauge galvanized steel
door bolted to one side of
an access ladder. Door
secured by a padlock.
Protects only one side of the ladder (front side). Back
side of ladder is accessible, but total access may be
blocked by the structure that ladder leads to. May
work best when ladder is against a wall so back side
cannot be accessed.
Carbis, Inc. j Available in aluminum or
Security Cover i several ^es of steeL
y ! Door is bolted to one
side of the ladder and is
secured by a padlock.
Protects only one side of the ladder (front side). Back
side of ladder is accessible, but total access may be
blocked by the structure that ladder leads to. May
work best when ladder is against a wall so back side
cannot be accessed.
ACarbis, Inc.
Security Access
Ladder
Consists of a ladder that
can fold up against a
wall. The ladder is bolted
to a wall and locked. The
ladder must be unlocked
and folded out to be used.
The ladder is closed up against a wall and locked,
potentially providing two levels of security. First, the
ladder is hidden from view and the structure may not
be recognized as a potential access point to the raised
asset that is being protected; and second, the ladder
is locked, preventing access unless it is unlocked.
The unit is very lightweight (between 12 and 26 lbs,
depending on the size).
Serrmi Products, Inc.
Ladder Locking
Product
Aluminum plate is hung
from an upper rung of a
ladder and locked in place
at a lower rung. The ptate
then covers several rungs
of the ladder.
This is a very simple system for providing security to
a ladder. It is removable and portable, which may give
this product some advantages over other protection
devices. Manufacturer supplies products to the railroad
industry, but product could have applications to all
types of ladders.
COST
RB Industries' Ladder Gate is sold by distributors, and costs approximately $750. A padlock
to secure the door must be purchased separately. The Ladder Gate can be installed by the
purchaser in approximately 1-2 hours. The manufacturer indicates that a team of 2 is typically
needed for installation.
Carbis, Inc.'s Security Access Ladder ranges from $340 for the smallest model (shortest lad-
der) to $732 for the largest model. The Security Access Ladder can be installed by one person
in less than an hour. It requires that holes be drilled into the wall on which the ladder will be
installed so that the bolts can be anchored. A padlock to secure the compartment must be
purchased separately.
The Carbis Security Covers range from $90 to $120 depending on the material. Padlocks are
sold separately. The Security Covers can be installed easily by the purchaser.
45
-------
The Brock Manufacturing Ladder Security Door costs $86. A padlock to secure the door must
be purchased separately. Installation of the door is quick (less than one hour), and it can be
installed by the purchaser.
The Serrmi ladder lock is currently not sold as a stand-alone product. However, interested par-
ties should contact the manufacturer to discuss options for obtaining the product. The manu-
facturer indicates that this product is very simple to install and that installation can be done
by a single staff person.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
R B Industries
P.O. Box 4734
Greensboro, North Carolina 27404
(336) 852-6276
www.laddergate.com
Serrmi Products, Inc.
PO Box 43346
5290 Tulane Rd.
Atlanta, Georgia 30336
(404) 691-8033
www.serrmi.com
Brock Manufacturing
611 N. Higbee St.
PO Box 2000
Milford. Indiana 46542
(574) 658-4191
www.ctbinc.com
Carbis, Inc.
1430 West Darlington St.
Florence, South Carolina 29501
(800) 948-7750
www.carbis.net
46
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
O DETECT
Locks §delay
O RESPOND
; OBJECTIVE
! Locks are used to prevent physical access to an asset,
j APPLICATION
Locks are applied on any physical asset to be protected. Most applications require some type of
! strong physical structure to which the lock can be attached so that access to the asset is impeded
or blocked. The use of locks also requires management of authorized access to the lock, which could
include distribution and control of keys to the locks, distribution and control of combinations to the
lock, management of data allowing the lock to be opened, etc.
LOCATION USED
Used on any physical asset that needs to be secured, including doors, windows, vehicles, cabinets,
drawers, equipment, etc.
i
DESCRIPTION
A lock is a type of physical security device that can be used to delay or prevent a door, a win-
dow, a manhole, a filing cabinet drawer, or some other physical feature from being opened,
moved, or operated. Locks typically operate by connecting two pieces together - such as by
connecting a door to a door jamb or a manhole to its casement. Every lock has two modes
- engaged (or "locked"), and disengaged (or "opened"). When a lock is disengaged, the asset
on which the lock is installed can be accessed by anyone; but when the lock is engaged, only
persons that can disengage the lock (through the use of a key, a combination, etc.) can gain
access to the locked asset.
Locks are excellent security features because they have been designed to function in many
ways and to work on many different types of assets. Locks can also provide different levels
of security depending on how they are designed and implemented. The security provided by a
lock is dependent on several factors, including its ability to withstand physical damage (i.e.,
can it be cut off, broken, or otherwise physically disabled) as well as its requirements for
supervision or operation (i.e., combinations may need to be changed frequently so that they
are not compromised and the locks remain secure). While there is no single definition of the
"security" of a lock, locks are often described as minimum, medium, or maximum security.
Minimum security locks are those that can be easily disengaged (or "picked") without the cor-
rect key or code, or those that can be disabled easily (such as small padlocks that can be cut
with bolt cutters). Higher security locks are more complex and thus are more difficult to pick,
or are sturdier and more resistant to physical damage.
Many locks, such as many door locks, only need to be unlocked from one side. For example,
most door locks need a key to be unlocked only from the outside. A person opens such de-
vices, called single-cylinder locks, from the inside by pushing a button or by turning a knob or
handle. Double-cylinder locks require a key to be locked or unlocked from both sides.
47
-------
Parts of a Lock
There are many different types of locks that function in many different ways. However, the
basics of a lock are relatively standard. Every lock must have a fastening mechanism (i.e., a
way to hold together the parts to be "locked"), and a method for engaging and disengaging
the fastening mechanism. The fastening mechanism may be physical (such as a deadbolt lock
that connects a door to a door jamb) or non-physical (for example, a strong magnetic current
in an electromagnetic lock). Similarly, the method for engaging and disengaging the lock can
also be physical (such as inserting a key or dialing a combination on a combination lock),
magnetic (such as a door that is held in place by the force of two magnets), or electric (such
as an electric signal that is generated when the correct keys are pressed on a keypad). Sev-
eral major parts of typical types of fastening mechanisms are defined below. Different meth-
ods for engaging locks are described in more detail in the following sections.
Bolt/Latch and Strike-Type Locks
The bolt or latch is the part of a lock that extends into the strike to physically connect two
objects. Bolts and latches are typically mounted within a door or on a window and are usually
set on a spring so that they can be extended or retracted. When a bolt or latch is engaged,
it slides across the open space between the two parts to be fastened, connecting them. The
strike is the part of the lock into which the bolt or latch fits. For example, the strike could be a
metal plate with a hollowed out area for the bolt inserted within a door frame.
Hasp and Shackle-Type Locks
A hasp is a fastener that consists of at least two parts that fit together or next to each other.
An example is the hasp on a metal locker. This hasp consists of a fixed metal ring on the
locker frame (usually oriented on the perpendicular) and a moveable metal ring mounted on
the door. When the locker door is closed, the ring on the door can be moved over and behind
the ring on the locker frame. A combination lock can then be put on the top ring. This lock
prevents the bottom ring from moving across the top ring, and thus prevents the locker door
from being opened.
A shackle is a physical device by which the parts of a hasp are connected, such as the curved
metal piece in a padlock which fits through the rings of the hasp and then inserts into the
base of the padlock.
Lock Types
There are many ways to name or describe a lock, including names that describe a lock's
mechanical features and names describing the way the lock is used. Locksmiths often refer to
locks based on their installation method. For example, a rim lock is a lock that mounts on the
surface, or rim, of a door or object. A mortise lock is installed in a hollowed out, or mortised,
cavity. In other cases, a generic term can be used to group together different types of locks
that have similar features. For example, a "padlock" is a generic term used to describe remov-
able, portable hasp and shackle type locks that consist of a piece of curved metal, both ends
of which connect to a base. One of these ends is permanently attached to the base, but the
other is attached to the base only when the lock is engaged. When the lock is disengaged,
the piece of curved metal can be looped through a hasp to secure an asset, such as a door
on a locker or a file cabinet drawer.
48
-------
Locks can also be defined or described by their functional, or "locking," mechanism. Different
types of locking mechanisms include keys, combinations, and electronic or magnetic signals.
Keyed locks, which are among the most familiar types of locks, open after a person inserts
and turns the correct key. Other locks, such as combination locks, are opened by pressing
a series of buttons on a keypad or by turning a dial to the correct sequence of numbers or
letters. Some electronic locks are opened by inserting a specially coded "key card." Sophisti-
cated electronic locks open after a computer has identified a feature, such as a fingerprint, of
the person desiring access.
Mechanical Locks
Mechanical locks have moving parts that operate without electric current. There are two types
of mechanical locks: warded and tumbler.
Warded locks operate through the physical insertion of a key into the lock. These locks have
several fixed ridges or obstacles called wards that fit the correct key and block other keys
from operating the lock. When a person inserts the correct key, the key fits past the wards
and moves a spring inside the lock. The bolt (or shackle) slides into a locked or unlocked posi-
tion when the spring moves.
Warded locks are easy to pick with a stiff piece of wire or thin strip of metal. Therefore,
warded locks are usually used in areas that do not require a high level of security.
Tumbler locks are similar to warded locks except that they have movable metal parts called
tumblers that prevent the wrong key from opening the lock. Because tumblers provide more
security than wards, most door locks use some type of tumbler arrangement.
There are three types of tumbler locks. These are outlined in the table below.
Type of Tumbler Lock
Locations Commonly Used
Pin-tumbler locks (most common)
Automobiles
Disk-tumbler locks
Desks and file cabinets
Lever-tumbler locks
Briefcases and lockers
A combination padlock is a special disk-tumbler lock combined with a padlock. A combination
padlock has a movable dial with a series of numbers around it. To open the lock, a person
must turn the dial left and right in the correct sequence of numbers.
Electric Locks
Electric locks require electric current to operate. Many electric locks
include electronic devices with scanners that identify users and
computers that process codes. If the correct code or data is received
by the scanner, computer, or other input device, an electric current
engages or disengages the lock. The specific fastening devices used
in electronic locks may be a bolt or an electromagnetic field. Types of
electric locks include:
Card Access Lock
49
-------
• card access systems
• electronic combination locks
• electromagnetic locks
• biometric entry systems
Card access systems, such as those used in many hotels and office buildings, are the most
common electronic lock systems. A person desiring access needs a card or a special "key" to
engage/disengage the lock. A device reads the code on the card and sends the information to a
computer. If the code matches the one in the computer's memory, the locking mechanism releas-
es and the door opens. Several different card access systems have been developed. One system
uses a paperboard or plastic card, on which the code appears as a series of holes or bumps.
Another system uses cards or keys that have their code on a microchip or a magnetic strip.
Card Access Lock
Electronic Combination Lock. Electronic combination locks are used in
many stores and other businesses. To open a typical electronic com-
bination lock, a combination or sequence of numbers must be entered
on a numbered keypad. Once the combination is entered, the internal
computer compares it with the combination stored in its memory and
the door opens if the codes match. Electronic
Combination Lock
Electromagnetic locks use magnetism rather than bolts to hold a door shut. In these locks,
a strike is mounted on the top of the door. A strong electromagnet (a device that acts as a
magnet when electric current flows through it) is fastened to the door frame in alignment with
the strike. An electric current is put through the system, causing the electromagnet in the door
to be attracted to the strike. To disengage the lock, a key is used to stop the flow of current.
Doors with electromagnetic locks are often used as emergency exits from buildings. In some
electromagnetic systems, the doors automatically unlock when a fire alarm is activated.
Other kinds of electric locks include some types of time locks and delayed-access timers. Time
locks are designed to open only at certain times on certain days. They are commonly used on
vaults or safes, and the release of the lock can be coordinated with shift changes or working
hours. Once the correct combination has been entered, a safe protected by such a timer can
only be opened at a pre-set time.
Biometric entry systems are unique forms of electric locks that identify a person by using a
computer to compare the unique features of a fingerprint, palm, voice, eye, or signature with
the one in its memory. In a fingerprint system, for example, a person who wants to open the
lock places his or her finger on a plate. A scanner analyzes the print. If it matches the infor-
mation in the computer's memory, the lock will disengage. Biometric entry systems are most
often used in high-security areas.
Electric locks may be combined with mechanical locks to provide a higher amount of security
than electric or mechanical locks alone. For example, electric bolt locks are a type of mechani-
cal lock that provides higher security than magnetic locks. They are available in surface mount
Electronic
Combination Lock
50
-------
or concealed mortise mount and are often used for security applications where electromag-
netic locks are not required.
Specifics on different types of locks, including individual information on costs and vendors, are provided in
product guides on specific types of locks.
51
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
O DETECT
Manhole Locks • d,"-av
O RESPOND
OBJECTIVE
Manhole locks can be used to prevent unauthorized physical access to sewer lines, water valves, or
other water or wastewater assets via a manhole.
APPLICATION
Installing manhole locks on all manholes in a system may help to prevent unauthorized personnel
from accessing or entering the system. Locking manholes may also prevent the introduction of haz-
ardous substances into the storm water or wastewater system.
LOCATION USED
On any type of manhole.
DESCRIPTION
Manholes are located at strategic locations throughout most municipal water, wastewater,
and other underground utility systems. Manholes are designed to provide access to the under-
ground utilities, and therefore they are potential entry points to a system. For example, man-
holes in water or wastewater systems may provide access to sewer lines or vaults containing
on/off or pressure-reducing water valves. Because many utilities run underneath other infra-
structure (roads, buildings), manholes also provide potential access points to other critical
infrastructure as well as water and wastewater assets. In addition, because the portion of the
system to which manholes provide entry is primarily located underground, access to a system
through a manhole increases the chance that an intruder will not be seen. Therefore, protect-
ing manholes can be a critical component of guarding an entire community.
A "manhole lock" is a physical security device designed to delay unauthorized access to the
utility through a manhole. Locking a manhole that provides access to a water or wastewater
system can mitigate two distinct types of threats. First, locking a manhole may delay access
of unauthorized personnel to water or wastewater systems or assets through the manhole.
Second, locking manholes may also prevent the introduction of hazardous substances into the
wastewater or storm water system. There are two design types for manhole locks: a bolt-type
manhole lock and a pan-type manhole lock. These two design types are discussed below.
Bolt-Type Manhole Lock
McGard, Inc., has developed a bolt-type manhole lock called the
Intimidator Man-Lock™. This product is a specialized bolt that is
installed at two separate locations in the top of the manhole cover,
anchoring the cover to the frame beneath the cover. The top of the
bolt has a uniquely designed groove that can only be turned with
a matching "key wrench." The bolt therefore serves as a locking
mechanism and helps prevent unauthorized persons from opening
the manhole cover.
—— s2
The Intimidator"
Manhole Lock
-------
Pan-Type Manhole Lock
The pan-type manhole lock design consists of a steel pan that is inserted
within the manhole and locked into place. This design does not lock the man-
hole cover on the manhole, but it physically obstructs the manhole entrance.
The pan is typically 10 to 12 gauge stainless steel and has a flared edge that
rests on the same base or frame ledge as the manhole cover. The body of the
pan is more narrow than the manhole opening and is slightly recessed into
the manhole. The locking mechanism is located in this recessed portion of
the pan.
Two manufacturers currently market pan-type manhole locks. The No Access™ (patent pend-
ing) manhole security device by Henkels & McCoy consist of a pan which has two cutouts in
its sidewalls, opposite from one another. Stainless steel pins are inserted horizontally from
inside the pan through each cutout so that they extend outside the pan and under the man-
hole casement. An eyelet on each pin is matched to an eyelet welded to the interior wall of the
pan next to each cutout. A padlock is then inserted through each eyelet pair to secure the pin
in place. The manhole cover is then replaced over the pan and the manhole.
The LockDown-LockDry™ pan locking system, manufactured by Barton Southern Company, has
been used since 1996. This pan locking system, secures the pan in the manhole with a "bolt
and bar" system. After the manhole cover is removed, the steel "bar" portion of the system is
tilted and lowered into the manhole. A threaded rod with a cable
attached at the top is then screwed into the center of bar, forming
a "t." The pan is then seated on the same ledge where the man-
hole cover normally sits. The pan has a hole through the center,
and the cable attached to the threaded rod is pulled up through the
center of the pan. As the cable is raised, the threaded rod is also
pulled up through the center of the pan. A lock nut on the cable
above the threaded rod is tightened down onto the threaded rod.
The No Access"
Manhole Lock
The LockDown-LockDry"
Manhole Lock
The Lockdown-Lockdry™ Manhole Lock
This pulls the steel bar upward towards the manhole frame,
while compressing the pan down on the frame edge. This forms
a seal between the manhole frame and pan and secures the
pan in place. The threaded rod also has a hole bored through
it. As the locknut is tightened, the threaded rod is pulled further
upward, eventually exposing the hole. Once the hole is raised
Section of the Lockdown-Lockdry
above the locknut, a padlock can be inserted through the hole. Manhole Lock
This prevents the loosening of the locknut and the lowering of
the horizontal bar. The padlock is protected with a standard lock guard to deter unauthorized
personnel from tampering. In addition, the entire lock, lock guard, and lock nut sit in a re-
cessed portion of the pan, which is then concealed underneath a hinged cover plate to protect
it from water and other contaminants. The manhole cover is then replaced over the pan and
the manhole.
As stated above, a standard padlock can be used to secure the locknut and pan locking as-
sembly in place. For added security, more sophisticated locks are available that can sound
53
-------
an alarm or send out an electronic signal if they are disturbed. This can notify the owner of
attempted unauthorized access to the manhole. These types of locks are available separately
and are not part of the standard pan locking system supplied by the vendors.
An important security feature of each of the pan-type manhole locks is their seal against the
manhole casement. A tight seal prevents groundwater inflow into the manhole. In addition, the
seal can also be an effective barrier against the introduction of hazardous substances into the
water or wastewater system. The LockDown-LockDry'" pan style locking system is designed
to form a watertight seal with the manhole frame. The No Access " pan locking system can be
custom manufactured to form a watertight seal with the manhole frame.
Some utilities have constructed makeshift locks that consist of a steel bar bolted over a man-
hole. The bars are secured by padlocks, and the padlocks must be unlocked before the steel
bar can be removed and the manhole can be accessed. These makeshift locks are usually
located in off-street areas so that they do not impede vehicle traffic over the manhole.
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
Bolt-Type Manhole Lock
The Intimidator Man-Lock'" bolt locking system uses a specialized bolt that is installed at two
locations in the top of the manhole cover, anchoring it to the frame beneath the cover. The
product is designed with several security features. First, the top of the bolt has a uniquely
designed, patterned groove that can only be turned with a specially designed matching "key
wrench." These specialized patterns are regionally distributed so that no two like patterns co-
exist in the same geographical region. Each bolt type lock is also fitted with a threaded plastic
cap to prevent debris from obstructing the keyed groove. To provide additional security, the
bolt is either countersunk in the cover or has a special angled head to further protect against
tampering with common gripping devices. Finally, Intimidator Man-Lock™ manhole cover locks
are constructed from alloy or stainless steel, which can deter attacks from common tools and
also withstand various environmental conditions. Custom plating is applied to suit a variety
of different environments and applications. The vendor can be consulted to determine which
grade of steel and plating is appropriate for a particular situation.
As described above, the Intimidator Man-Lock™ manhole cover locks can only be opened with
specialized key wrenches. These specialized wrenches are tightly controlled and available only
to authorized persons registered by the end-user so that they can access the manholes as
needed. An inventory of wrenches and their serial numbers are generally kept by a municipality
so that the location of all wrenches is known. Controlling access using these patented keys
minimizes the potential for unauthorized access to the manholes.
Intimidator Man-Lock™ manhole cover locks do not require specialized knowledge to install,
and they can typically be installed by the owner's maintenance crews with a special heavy
duty electromagnetic drill and carbide-tipped drill bits. Installation instructions are provided
by the vendor. The vendor can also be consulted to determine the appropriate bolt size for a
given application, or to determine where to drill holes in different types of manhole covers.
This type of manhole lock is suitable for retrofitting in place for concrete, steel and cast iron
access covers of any size and shape. In addition, this lock can be retrofitted into manhole
covers that are already fitted with non-locking bolts that secure the cover to the frame. Many
54
-------
of the current installations are in manholes which have been custom-ordered with pre-drilled
holes in the manhole. These locks do not typically require maintenance, except for periodic
greasing, and thus overall installation and maintenance costs are low.
The Intimidator Man-Lock'" can also be used to secure other infrastructure assets. For in-
stance, this product can also be installed on most storm water and sewer grates, which
could delay intruders from entering the storm water system.
Pan-Type Manhole Lock
Pan-type manhole locks are constructed from strong, durable, corrosion-resistant stainless
steel. They require no special tools for installation, and installation requires no modifications
to the manhole cover or frame. A typical installation can be accomplished by one person in a
few minutes. The most important factor in choosing a pan-type manhole lock is choosing the
right size for the manhole; therefore, taking proper measurements of the manhole diameter
prior to ordering the pan-type manhole lock is essential. Vendors can help with any questions
and will generally be willing to send a representative to take the required measurements if nec-
essary. Standard padlocks can generally be used to secure the assembly, although vendors
may recommend a specific type suitable to the owners' unique requirements.
COST
Bolt-Type Manhole Lock
The Intimidator Man-Lock" bolt-type manhole locks range from about $10.00 per lock for
orders over 1000 to around $20.00 per lock for orders less than 50. The manufacturer recom-
mended that each manhole be fitted with two separate manhole locks to ensure security. The
large t-shaped key wrench sells for around $40.00. They also make a smaller key adaptable to
a regular socket wrench that costs about $16.50. Keys are available only to registered users.
Pan-Type Manhole Lock
Prices for the No Access™ manhole locking system by Henkets & McCoy, Inc. range from about
$495 to $600 apiece depending on the manhole size and quantity ordered. Each No Access™
locking system is custom manufactured to the precise manhole dimensions required with each
order.
Pricing for the LockDown-LockDry™ pan locking system from the Barton Southern Company
ranges from about $390 to $525 apiece depending on the manhole size and quantity ordered.
They can be ordered from standard sizes or they can be custom designed for specific needs.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
55
-------
McGard, Inc.
3875 California Road
Orchard Park, New York 14127-4198
(716) 662-8980
www.mcgard.com
Henkels & McCoy, inc.
985 Jolly Road,
Blue Bell, Pennsylvania 19422
(888) 436-5357
www.henkels.com
LockDown-LockDry Division,
Barton Southern Company
2387 Klnmor Industrial Parkway
Conyers, Georgia 30012
(800) 572-3119
www.lockdown-lockdry.com
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
Security for Doorways-
Side Hinged Doors
O detect
9 D E LAY
O RESPOND
I OBJECTIVE
| Protect a door from being forcefully entered. Security of the doorway can be enhanced by modifying
the door, the door frame, the hinges, or the lock. Different doorway security measures may protect
against various potential threats, including breaking, blasting, or fire.
| APPLICATION
| Can be applied to any doorway. An individual application may consist of modifying one or more fea-
| tures of the doorway, depending on the potential threats.
i LOCATION USED
! Used in any doorway that may be a target for intruders.
DESCRIPTION
Doorways are the main access points to a facility or to rooms within a building. They are
used on the exterior or in the interior of buildings to provide privacy and security for the areas
behind them. Different types of doorway security systems may be installed in different door-
ways depending on the needs or requirements of the buildings or rooms. For example, exterior
doorways tend to have heavier doors to withstand the elements and to provide some security
to the entrance of the building. Interior doorways in office areas may have lighter doors that
may be primarily designed to provide privacy rather than security. Therefore, these doors may
be made of glass or lightweight wood. Doorways in industrial areas may have sturdier doors
than do other interior doorways and may be designed to provide protection or security for
areas behind the doorway. For example, fireproof doors may be installed in chemical storage
areas or in other areas where there is a danger of fire.
Because they are the main entries into a facility or a room, doorways are often prime targets
for unauthorized entry into a facility or an asset. Therefore, securing doorways may be a ma-
jor step in providing security at a facility. This Product Guide provides information on several
areas that can help upgrade security for a doorway.
A doorway includes four main components:
• The door, which blocks the entrance. The primary threat to the actual door is breaking
or piercing through the door. Therefore, the primary security features of doors are their
strength and resistance to various physical threats, such as fire or explosions.
• The door frame, which connects the door to the wall. The primary threat to a door frame is
that the door can be pried away from the frame. Therefore, the primary security feature of a
door frame is its resistance to prying.
• The hinges, which connect the door to the door frame. The primary threat to door hinges is
that they can be removed or broken, which will allow intruders to remove the entire door.
57
-------
Therefore, security hinges are designed to be resistant to breaking. They may also be de-
signed to minimize the threat of removal from the door.
• The lock, which connects the door to the door frame. Use of the lock is controlled through
various security features, such as keys, combinations, etc., such that only authorized
personnel can open the lock and go through the door. Locks may also incorporate others
security features, such as software or other systems to track overall use of the door or to
track individuals using the door, etc.
Each of these components is integral in providing security for a doorway, and upgrading the
security of only one of these components while leaving the other components unprotected
may not increase the overall security of the doorway. For example, many facilities upgrade
door locks as a basic step in increasing the security of a facility. However, if the facilities do
not also focus on increasing security for the door hinges or the door frame, the door may
remain vulnerable to being removed from its frame, thereby defeating the increased security of
the door lock.
Security for doors, door frames, and hinges are discussed below. Locks are discussed in the
Locks Product Guide.
Doors
The door provides physical protection for the asset located behind it, and
its main security aspects are its strength and resistance to physical dam-
age from various forces, including physical instruments, fire, or explosion.
"Security doors" is a generic term that usually refers to a door that is rein-
forced in some way to prevent damage to the door. Many security doors
are manufactured from some type of metal (mainly steel) or wood with a
steel frame or core. Security doors may be specialized to withstand fire,
explosions, bullets, other projectiles, fragmentation, etc.
McKinney Two Knuckle
Door Hinge
Doors may also have windows in them to allow people to see to the other
side of the door. These windows are referred to as "glazing." Glazing on security doors may
also have its own security features, such as bullet-, blast-, fire-, or shatter-resistance.
Door Frames
fy 3
I * ~'j
•
r i
pf1 §KP rj
I
1 V
r
1 r
r :"
I r
McKinney Five Knuckle
Door Hinge
The door frame is the structure which integrates all of the other pieces of the
doorway together. The door is hung from the door frame using hinges. The
door frame anchors the doorway to the wall, and also provides a physical
structure for the lock to connect the door to the wall. Door frames are typically
anchored to a wall by screwing them into the wall; by casting them into the
masonry as it is being erected or poured; by building them into stud partitions;
or by welding them to a wall (if the wall is metal or if masonry is end-capped
with steel channels or similar structures). Frames screwed into a wall are
potentially the least secure of these frame types because the screws may be
able to be removed, allowing removal of the frame.
58
-------
Door hinges are used to secure any door to its door frame. A typical
hinge includes two steel plates held together by a hinge pin. One plate
is mounted to the door, and the other is mounted to the door frame.
Steel screws are typically used to mount the plate to the door and the
door frame. In general, the longer the screws, the more difficult it will
be to remove the hinges, and therefore the door will be more secure.
Hinges can be attached using wood screws, although machine screws
are considered more secure.
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
Doors and Frames
As described above, the primary attribute for the security of a door
Is its strength. Many security doors are 14-20 gauge hollow metal doors consisting of steel
plates over a hollow cavity reinforced with steel stiffeners to give the door extra stiffness and
rigidity. This increases resistance to blunt force used to try to penetrate through the door. The
space between the stiffeners may be filled with specialized materials to provide fire-, blast-, or
bullet resistance to the door.
The Windows and Doors Manufacturers Association has developed a series of performance
attributes for doors.
• Structural Resistance;
• Forced Entry Resistance;
• Hinge Style Screw Resistance;
• Split Resistance;
• Hinge Loading;
• Security Rating;
• Fire Resistance;
• Bullet Resistance; and
• Blast Resistance.
The first five bullets provide information on a door's resistance to standard physical breaking
and prying attacks. These tests are used to evaluate the strength of the door and the resis-
tance of the hinges and the frame in a standardized way. For example, the Rack Load Test
simulates a prying attack on a corner of the door. A test panel is restrained at one end, and a
third corner is supported. Loads are applied and measured at the fourth corner. The Door Im-
pact Test simulates a battering attack on a door and frame using impacts of 200 foot pounds
by a steel pendulum. The door must remain fully operable after the test. It should be noted
that door glazing is also rated for resistance to shattering, etc. Manufacturers will be able to
provide security ratings for these features of a door as well.
Maximum Security Products
Corporation Steel Door
59
-------
Door frames are an integral part of doorway security because they anchor the door to the
wall. Door frames are typically constructed from wood or steel, and they are installed such
that they extend for several inches over the doorway that has been cut into the wall. For
added security, frames can be designed to have varying degrees of overlap with, or wrapping
over, the underlying wall. This can make prying the frame from the wall more difficult. A frame
formed from a continuous piece of metal (as opposed to a frame constructed from individual
metal pieces) will prevent prying between pieces of the frame.
Many security doors can be retrofit into existing frames; however, many security door instal-
lations including replacing the door frame as well as the door itself. For example, bullet-resis-
tance per Underwriter's Laboratory (UL) 752 requires resistance of the door and frame assem-
bly, and thus replacing the door only would not meet UL 752 requirements.
Specialty Security Doors
Some doors/door systems are also designed for resistance to other types of physical attacks,
such as fire, explosion, or bullets. Doors designed to resist these types of incidents are discussed
in more detail below.
Fire Resistance
Fire resistant and fire proof doors are specially manufactured to resistant burning and/or to
reduce the temperature increase on the side of the door away from the fire. Resistance to
burning is usually given as the number of minutes that it would take a door to burn under
standard conditions (for example, a 20-minute fire door would take 20 minutes to burn, while
a 90-minute fire door would take 90 minutes to burn). These ratings include evaluation of the
fire resistance of the door, the door frame, and the hardware. Evaluations of temperature in-
creases on the side of the door away from the fire are indicated as "temperature rise" ratings.
The temperature rise rating indicates a maximum temperature rise, above ambient, developed
on the unexposed face of the door at the 30 minute point of a Standara Fire Test. Thus, a door
rated for a 250 degree temperature rise would only allow the temperature to rise 250 degrees
on the other side of the door after 30 minutes, whereas a 450 degree temperature rise door
would allow the temperature to rise 450 degrees.
Ambico Blast Door Cutaway There are a number of different associations and organizations
that provide fire ratings, including the American Society for Test-
ing and Materials (ASTM), the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA), the Underwriters Laboratory (UL), and Intertek Testing Ser-
vices - Warnock Hersey. The current standards for fire rating require
testing under positive pressure; previous fire door ratings may be
quoted under positive and/or negative pressure. Individual tests that
may be performed or cited by manufacturers include ASTM El52
(Methods of Fire Tests of Door Assemblies), ASTM E-2074 (Standard
Methods of Fire Tests of Door Assemblies, Including Positive Pressure
Testing of Side-Hinged and Pivoted Swinging Door Assemblies), NFPA-
80 (Fire Doors and Windows), NFPA 252 (Standard Methods of Fire
Tests of Door Assemblies), and UL 10B (Fire Tests of Door Assem-
blies), Intertek Testing Services - Warnock Hersey (Fire Tests of Door
Assemblies). It should be noted that most of these standards (for
STRUCTURAL
STEEL
TOP CHANNEI
FULLY WELDC
SEAMLESS ED
PRESSURE
RESISTANT
STEEL CORE
VOIDS FILLED
WITH BATT
INSULATION
THROUGHT
PRESSURE
RESISTANT
STEEL
STRUCTURAL
STEEL
BOTTOM
Door Cutaway
60
-------
example, ASTM E-2074) do not provide information regarding the reduction of smoke or toxic
gases provided by these doors. However, other standards (for example, ASTM Test Method
E 84, which examines flame spread and smoke development) may provide information about
these other factors.
Blast Resistance
Blast-resistant doors are typically constructed of two metal plates en-
closing a hollow cavity. The cavity typically contains an interior structure,
such as reinforced steel ribbing or a steel frame. The void space may be
filled with fire-resistant material or insulation to provide fire protection as
well as blast protection. Typically, these doors are installed as an entire
doorway and include a reinforced steel frame, blast resistant hinges, and
blast resistant latching hardware.
In general, the doors are rated depending on the strength of the blast
they are designed to withstand, as expressed in pounds per square inch
(psi) and/or pounds per square foot (psf). As a general rule, the thicker
and heavier the door, the higher the blast rating. However, as described
above for fire-proofing, newer construction materials are reducing
the need to merely make the door thicker to meet the blast-proof-
ing requirements. Standard tests conducted by manufacturers to evaluate blast resistance of
their products include meeting the requirements of Uniform Building Codes (UBCs), Institute
of Building Control Officers (IBCO) standards, and ASTM E330-97el (Standard Test Method
for Structural Performance of Doors by Uniform Static Air Pressure Difference). Testing for the
blast doors also includes ensuring that the frame and the door hardware survive the blast.
Many manufacturers offer blast doors that can be retrofit into existing frames (including exist-
ing wooden frames). However, in many cases, the entire door system (door, frame, and hard-
ware) must be purchased in order for the blast rating and the warranty to be valid.
Bullet Resistance
In contrast to blast proof doors, which are designed to withstand positive pressure over the
entire door and at the hinges, bullet resistant doors are designed to absorb the impact of a
bullet, which directs its impact force over a small area of the door. These doors are similar to
blast-proof doors in that they contain a hollow inner cavity under an outer shell that can be
constructed of heavy duty steel plates, or a solid wooden frame. In many of these doors, the
hollow cavity contains a impact-disseminating material, such as fiberglass, polyurethane fiber,
or mylar, which helps maintain the integrity of the door when it is struck by a bullet. Other
doors have strengthening steel framework similar to the blast resistant doors. Standard tests
conducted by manufacturers to evaluate bullet resistance of their products include meeting
the requirements of UL 752 weapons criteria. UL 752 rates doors according to their ability to
withstand bullets from different weapons - from handguns to rifles and high-powered weap-
ons. Lower ratings offer resistance to lower-powered bullets. Ratings 1 to 3 cover traditional
handguns (for example, a rating of 1 is resistant to a bullet from a .38 caliber handgun while
a rating of 3 offers resistance to a bullet from a .44 Magnum revolver). Ratings of 4 and
above cover high-powered weapons.
61
-------
Ceco Bullet Resistant Door
As with blast-proof doors, many manufacturers offer bullet resistant doors that can be retrofit
into existing frames (including existing wooden frames). However, in many cases, the entire
door system (door, frame, and hardware) must be purchased in order for the bullet rating and
the warranty to be valid.
Door Hinges
Two major features to consider for adequately secured hinges are their size and their con-
struction material. Larger hinges provide more mass that must be bent or removed before
an intruder can force off a hinge. In addition, depending on the construction material, larger
hinges may be stronger than smaller hinges and thus will provide more resistance to tamper-
ing. A hinge s construction material is also important for strength. The three most commonly
used materials for hinges are brass, chrome, and steel. Steel is the strongest of these three
materials, and thus it may be most appropriate for security applications.
Plugs concealing the hinge pin. Adding a plug to the top of the hinge pin can provide added
security for the hinge by preventing the hinge pin from being removed.
There are a number of specialized hinges types and hinge modifications that offer added
security to the hinge, including non-removable pins, safety studs, and fast riveted pins. A
non-removable pin has a "set screw" which is screwed through the hinge pin, preventing the
pin from being pulled up vertically from the hinge. The set screw is accessible and can be
removed when the door is open, but when the door is closed, it is inaccessible. A safety stud
is a projection or stud that is molded onto one face of the hinge. When the door is closed,
the stud fits into a cavity in the other hinge face. The connection of the studs when the door
is closed will hold the door in place even if the hinges are removed. Finally, fast riveted, or
crimped, pins, are made longer than the hinge, and then "spun" at the ends to flatten them
such that they are wider than the pin hole and they cannot be removed unless the pin is cut.
COST
Doors and Frames
The cost of a security door is dependent on a number of factors, including the type of door,
the size of the door, and its design specifications, among other things. This section provides
some general costs for different types of security doors. It should be noted that costs for any
actual application could be substantially different from the general cost information presented
in this document depending on numerous site-specific variables, including the actual vendor
chosen to supply the doors and hardware, local building requirements, the threat scenarios
for which the door is designed, the hardware (hinges and locks) required to meet the design
threat, and any site preparations necessary to install the door system.
Standard "security doors" are designed for strength and resistance vs. structural damage,
such as from battering or prying. For example, Maximum Security Products Corporation's Maxi-
mum Protection Hollow Steel Door (including the frame), which is constructed from 10 gauge
steel face plates with 3/16-inch internal stiffeners and is UL fire-rated, sells for approximately
$1,600. A 14 gauge, 2-inch thick hollow metal door from Warren Doors is priced at approxi-
mately $ 1,400 for the door, but adding the door frame and appropriate hardware brings the
62
-------
cost closer to $2,000. The Ceco Door Products RestrictDor® Security Door, a 14 gauge, 2-
inch thick hollow metal door, is similarly priced at $1,350-$1,500 for the door and frame.
Standard hollow metal doors can be easily designed with fire resistant cores instead of stan-
dard cores, and thus the price of fire-rated hollow metal doors may not be significantly higher
than the cost of non fire-rated hollow metal doors. For example, purchasing a fire-rated hollow
metal door from Warren Doors may only increase the cost by approximately $40 relative to a
non fire-rated door.
In contrast to the relatively minor increase in cost in purchasing a fire-rated hollow metal door,
blast-or bulletproof doors may be significantly more expensive. First, the cores of blast and
bulletproof hollow metal doors are specially designed to withstand these types of stresses.
Second, the door frame, hardware, hinges, and lock must all be rated for withstanding the
stress as well, and upgrading these components will increase costs.
While the specific costs will depend on the specific stresses that the door is designed to
withstand, purchasers can expect to spend between $1,500 and $10,000 per door for bullet
and blast-resistant doors. For example, the Ceco Door Products ArmorShield Level 3 Door and
Frame System (rated for UL 752 Level 3, designed to withstand a bullet from a .44 Magnum
revolver), which is comprised of a 1 -inch thick 16 gauge steel door with a stiffened steel
core and a 14 gauge frame, costs approximately $1,500. This does not include hinges or oth-
er hardware, which will be additional costs (for example, the required hinges will cost approxi-
mately $200). Similar Level 3 rated doors from Ambico Limited and Krieger Products would
cost approximately $1,800. Doors that provide Level 4 resistance and higher (resistance to
rifles and higher-powered weapons) cost significantly more than doors rated at Levels 1 to 3.
A door rated for a small explosion (for example, a force of 100 psf) would be in the $2,000 or
more, while a door rated for a blast of 5 psi would be closer to $4-$5,000. For example, Krieger
Specialty Products, Inc., markets a 1 3/4-inch thick door able to withstand a blast of 100 psf for
approximately $2,000. Specialty Doors, Inc.'s BR-07 door is a 1 3/4-inch hollow metal blast door
designed to withstand a blast pressure of 150 psf. This door costs approximately $5,000. The
BR-20 model, which is 2 3/4 inches thick and is designed to withstand a blast of 6 psi, is ap-
proximately $8,000. A Krieger door designed to withstand a 5 psi blast would be in the $4-$5,000
range. Doors rated for larger blasts would be in the $6,000 or higher range.
The costs for installing security doors can be substantial, particularly for doors where the
entire doorway (frame, door, hinges, and other hardware) must be replaced. However, these
doors can typically be installed by a facility's maintenance crew, if they are familiar with in-
stalling frames and doors.
Door Hinges
Costs for door hinge protection systems can vary greatly depending on the level of complexity.
Hinge costs depend on the type of hinge purchased, the material, and the finish. The major
differential in cost is the style. For instance, hinges with an exposed pin and no extra features
cost approximately $9 to $15. A hinge with a concealed ball bearing will cost from $20 to
$25. A hinge with a concealed ball bearing and concealed hinge pin will cost approximately
$140-$ 150.
63
-------
Security hinges can be installed by any facility maintenance crew. Manufacturer installation is
not necessary.
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
General Security Doors Fire Resistant Doors
Commercial Doors and Accessories Inc. Advance Fiberglass. Inc.
P.O. Box 1503 PO Box 13268
Macon, Georgia 31202 Maumelle, Arkansas 72113
VENDORS
(800) 689-3667
(800) 342-7367
www.fibrdor.com
Maximum Security Products Corporation
3 Schoolhouse Lane
Waterford, New York 12188
(518) 233-1800
www.maximumsecuritycorp.com
Karona Doors. Inc.
4100 Karona Court
Caledonia, Michigan 49316
(800) 829-9233
www.karonadoor.com
Ceco Door Products
9159 Teiecom Drive
Milan, Tennessee 38358
(888) 232-6366
www.cecodoor.com
Blast Doors
Overly Door Company
574 West Otterman Street
Greensburg, Pennsylvania 15601
Warren Door
332 Plant Street - PO Box 70
Niles, Ohio 44446
(800) 255-3667
www. warrendoor. com
Krieger Specialty Products
4880 Gregg Road
Pico Rivera, California 90660
(866) 203-5060
www.kriegersteel.com
(800) 979-7300
www.overiy.com
Norshield Security Products
3224 Mobile Highway
Montgomery Alabama 36108
(800) 633-1968
www.norshieldsecurity.com
Ambico Limited
1120 Cummings Avenue
Ottawa, Ontario K1J 7R8
(613) 746-4663
Amweld Building Products, Inc.
PO Box 267
1500 Amweld Drive
Garrettsville, Ohio 44231
(330) 527-4385
www.amweld.com
Specialty Doors, Inc.
269 West 154th Street
South Holland, Illinois 60473
(708) 339-4331
www.doors-ambico.com
64
-------
Bullet Resistant Doors
Gaffco
6 North Street
Mount Vernon, New York 10550
(914) 663-9266'
www.gaftco.com
Krieger Specialty Products
4880 Gregg Road
Pico Rivera, California 90660
(866) 203-5060
www.kriegersteel.com
Safeguard Security Services, Ltd.
4728 Goldfield, Building 8
San Antonio, Texas 78218
(800) 880-8306
www.armortex.com
Specialty Hinges
Habersham Metal Products Company
264 Stapleton Road
Cornelia, Georgia 30531
www.habershammetal.com
McKinney Products Company
820 Davis Street
Scranton, Pennsylvania 18505
(800) 346-7707
www.mckinneyhinge.com
Daro Industries, Inc.
3905 California Street, NE
Columbia Heights, Minnesota
(877) 865-4154
www.daro-ind.com
Locks4Less
3225 S. 116th Street
Suite 169
Seattle, Washington 98168
(866) 562-7453
www.locks4less.com
-------
WATER AND WASTE W A T£R SECURITY PROD UCT GUIDE
O detect
Valve Lockout Devices ,"1"
O respond
i OBJECTIVE
!
| To prevent or delay unauthorized access to a valve.
i
1 APPLICATION
J
] Used to ensure a valve remains in the desired position and is not tampered with by an unauthorized
! individual. Valve lockout devices are placed on, over, or through valve handles to prevent rotation.
i
I
| LOCATION USED
I On valves located in water or wastewater treatment plants, remote facilities (pumping stations,
| etc.), water distribution systems, backflow prevention devices, and other piping systems.
DESCRIPTION
Valves are utilized as control elements in water and wastewater process piping networks.
They regulate the flow of both liquids and gases by opening, closing, or obstructing a flow
passageway. Valves are typically located where flow control is necessary. They can be locat-
ed in-line or at pipeline and tank entrance and exit points. They can serve multiple purposes in
a process pipe network, including:
• Redirecting and throttling flow;
• Preventing backflow;
• Shutting off flow to a pipeline or tank (for isolation purposes);
• Releasing pressure;
• Draining extraneous liquid from pipelines or tanks;
• Introducing chemicals into the process network; or
• As access points for sampling process water.
Valves are located at critical junctures throughout water and wastewater systems, both on-
site at treatment facilities, and off-site within water distribution and wastewater collection
systems. They may be located either aboveground or below ground. Because many valves are
located within the community, it is critical to provide protection against valve tampering. For
example, tampering with a pressure relief valve could result in a pressure buildup and poten-
tial explosion in the piping network. On a larger scale, addition of a pathogen or chemical to
the water distribution system through an unprotected valve could result in the release of that
contaminant to the general population.
66
-------
Different security products are available to protect aboveground vs. below ground valves. For
example, valve lockout devices can be purchased to protect valves and valve controls located
aboveground. Vaults containing underground valves can be locked to prevent access to these
valves. This Product Guide will focus on security for aboveground valves. A separate Product Guide cov-
ers security for underground valves.
As described above, a lockout device can be used as a security measure to prevent unauthorized ac-
cess to aboveground valves located within water and wastewater systems. Valve lockout devices are
locks that are specially designed to fit over valves and valve handles to control their ability to be turned
or operated. These devices can be used to lock the valve into the desired position. Once the valve is locked,
it cannot be turned unless the locking device is unlocked or removed by an authorized individual.
Various valve lockout options are available for municipal and industrial use, including:
• Cable lockouts;
• Padlocked chains/cables;
• Valve-specific lockouts; and
• Valve box-locks.
Many of these lockout devices are not specifically designed for use in the water/wastewater industry
(i.e., chains, padlocks), and are available from a local hardware store or manufacturer specializing in
safety equipment. Other lockout devices (for example, valve-specific lockouts or valve box-locks) are
more specialized and must be purchased from safety or valve-related equipment vendors.
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
Cable Lockouts
A cable lockout is a section of cable with an attached locking device.
Depending on the valve configuration, the cable lockout is looped around
or through the spokes of the valve handle, then through another part of
the piping system or to an anchoring device in the floor, and finally back
through the attached lock. The cable can be pulled tight so that the ten-
sion on the cable prevents the handle from being turned. For maximum
security protection, cable lockouts can be manufactured from coated,
braided steel, which is highly resistant to cutting.
Padlocked Chains/Cables
Padlocked chain/cable valve lockouts work in very much the same fashion as cable lockouts,
except that they do not have an integrated locking device. Instead, they must be secured
with a separate padlock. The chain/cable is looped around or through the spokes of the valve
handle, and is then secured to another part of the piping system or to an anchoring device in
the floor. The chain/cable can be pulled tight and secured with the padlock so that the ten-
sion on the chain/cable prevents the handle from being turned. Chains and cables are avail-
able in a wide variety of shapes and strengths, and are most easily purchased through a local
Cable Lockout
67
-------
hardware store. Hardened steel cables and chains are manufactured for security applications.
They are designed to be wear and cut resistant and to provide a long service life.
Valve-Specific Lockouts
Valve-specific lockout devices are self-contained lockouts that are typically used to cover
the valve handle to prevent its rotation, which, in turn, prevents the opening or closing
of the valve. They are placed over the valve handle and secured in place with a separate
padlock.
Valve-specific lockout devices are typically similar in design, although they may have minor
variations according to the type of valve being locked. They are typically manufactured from
polypropylene, so they are nonconductive. Other design specifications include corrosion-resis-
tance (to protect them from potential chemical or solvent spills), temperature-resistance (typi-
cally to temperatures of up to 360°F), and weather-resistance.
The three most common types of valves for which lockout devices are available are gate, ball,
and butterfly valves. Each is described in more detail below.
• Gate Valve Lockouts - Gate valve lockouts are designed to fit over the operating hand wheel
of the gate valve to prevent it from being turned. The lockout is secured in place with a
padlock. Two types of gate valve lockouts are available: diameter-specific and adjustable.
Diameter-specific lockouts are available for handles ranging from 1 inch to 13 inches in
diameter. Adjustable gate valve lockouts can be adjusted to fit any handle ranging from 1
inch to 6 inches in diameter.
• Ball Valve Lockouts - There are several different configurations available to lock out ball
valves, all of which are designed to prevent rotation of the valve handle. The three major
configurations available are a wedge shape for 1 inch to 3 inch valves, a lockout that com-
pletely covers 3/8 inch to 8 inch ball valve handles, and a universal lockout that can be
applied to quarter-turn valves of varying sizes and geometric handle dimensions. All three
types of ball valve lockouts can be installed by sliding the lockout device over the ball valve
handle and securing it with a padlock.
Gate Valve Lockout Ball Valve Lockout Butterfly Valve Lockout
• Butterfly Valve Lockouts - The butterfly valve lockout functions in a similar manner to
the ball valve lockout. The polypropylene lockout device is placed over the valve handle
and secured with a padlock. This type of lockout has been commonly used in the bot-
tling industry.
A major difference between valve-specific lockout devices and the padlocked chain or cable
lockouts discussed above is that they do not need to be secured to an anchoring device
in the floor or the piping system. In addition, valve-specific lockouts eliminate potential
68
-------
tripping or access hazards that may be caused by chains or cable lockouts applied to valves
located near walkways or frequently maintained equipment.
Valve-specific lockout devices are available in a variety of colors, which can be useful in dis-
tinguishing different valves. For example, different colored lockouts can be used to distinguish
the type of liquid passing through the valve (i.e. treated, untreated, potable, chemical), or to
identify the party responsible for maintaining the lockout. Implementing a system of different-
colored locks on operating valves can increase system security by reducing the likelihood of
an operator inadvertently opening the wrong valve and causing a problem in the system.
PADLOCKS
As described above, padlocks are required for securing several different types of valve lock-
out devices. Padlocks are available in a variety of sizes and strengths, and with a number of
different locking mechanisms (for example, keyed or numerical combination padlocks). Maxi-
mum-security padlocks are manufactured with a hardened boron alloy shackle and laminated
steel body for strength and cut resistance. More specific information on padlocks is available
from the Locks Product Guide.
Controlling the padlocks and implementing an effective key control process is essential in
ensuring that the system is adequately protected. Key control includes tracking which keys
can open which locks and ensuring that authorized personnel receive the correct keys for the
locks for which they are responsible. There are three general types of keying strategies when
multiple valves are locked in a system. These are:
• Keyed-alike systems;
• Master-keyed systems; or
•Individually-keyed padlocks.
In keyed-alike systems, all the locks can be opened with the same key. In a master-keyed
system, groups of locks can be opened with the same key. For example, locks could be indi-
vidually keyed so that each individual would be responsible for his/her own padlock; groups
of padlocks could be keyed alike so that only employees in a single group (for example,
maintenance personnel) could access a specific group of padlocks; or all of the padlocks in
a facility, whether individually- or group-keyed, could be opened by a single master key. In an
individually-keyed padlock system, there is no master key, and all of the locks must be opened
with their own key.
As with valve-specific lockouts, padlocks are available in different colors. Utilities can use dif-
ferent-colored valve locks to identify specific valves, which can enhance security as described
in the Valve-Specific Lockout discussion above.
Valve Box-Locks
Unlike the other types of lockout devices described above, which are designed to prevent a
valve handle from being turned, valve box-locks are used to fully enclose the valve and prevent
unauthorized access to the valve and its connection points. For example, McGard's Intimidator
Valve Box-Lock'" is designed to enclose both the shutoff valve and the coupling nut, thereby
69
-------
preventing tampering with the shutoff valve. The Box-Lock™ consists
of two 16-gauge steel pieces that are fastened around an existing
straight through- or right angle valve using a specialized locking
screw. The screw can only be removed using a specially coded T-
key, which is provided by the manufacturer. Installing the box is rela-
tively easy and no modifications are required to the existing valve.
COST
Valve lockout devices are generally low cost, and thus locking out
the valves in a system can be a relatively inexpensive means of
protecting water and wastewater process and distribution/collection
marizes costs for several lockout devices.
Table 1: Valve Lockout Costs
Lockout Device
Cost
APadlocks:
$6- $12
Keyed Combination
$20
Cable lockout
$15-$35
Cables and Chains
2 - $20 per foot
Ball valve lockout
$25-$75
Butterfly valve lockout
$85
Gate valve lockout
$30-$100
Valve box-lock
$25-$35
Coded T-key
$12
Cost Information provided by emedco and McGard Inc.
In addition to their low costs, valve lockouts are easy to acquire and implement. Some types
of lockouts, such as chains and padlocks, can be easily purchased at local stores. Other lock-
outs can be obtained through the internet. The lockouts can be installed easily with minimal
labor hours because they do not typically require any modification to the existing valve.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The Information provided In this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
McGard's Intimidator Valve Box-
Lock~
systems. Table 1 sum-
70
-------
McGard, Inc.
3875 California Road
Orchard Park, New York 14127-4198
(716) 662-8980
www.mcgard.com
ANorth Safety Products
2000 Plainfield Pike
Cranston, Rhode Island 02921
(800) 430-4110
www.northsafety.com
Prinzing Enterprises, inc.
30W 196 Calumet Avenue
Warrenville, Illinois 60555
(800) 292-2914
www.prinzing.com
Smith Flow Control (USA)
21 Kenton Lands Road
Erlanger, Kentucky 41018
(859) 578-2395
www.smithflowcontrol.com
Swagelok Company
29500 Solon Road
Solon, Ohio 44139
(440) 248-4600
www.swagelok.com
emedco
P.O. Box 369
Buffalo, New York 14240
(800) 442-3633
www.emedco.com
A BlueBook
PO Box 9004
Gurnee, Illinois 60031-9004
(800) 548-1234
www.usabluebook.com
Sharpe Safety Supply, Inc.
PO Box 3477
Chester, Virginia 23831
(804) 796-4777
www.sharpesafety.com
Regulatory Consultants, Inc. (RCI)
140 IVest 8th Street
Horton, Kansas 66439
(800) 888-9596
www.rci-safety.com
ANI Safety & Supply, Inc.
PO Box 228
Skokie, Illinois 60076-0228
(800) 676-5581
www.anisafety.com
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SEC
PRODUCT GUIDE
Visual Surveillance Monitoring
O DETECT
# DELAY
0 RESPOND
OBJECTIVE
Visually monitor an asset to detect potential intruders, unauthorized or suspicious materials or ob-
jects, or other threats.
APPLICATION
Used to detect physical threats to an asset (i.e., persons or materials) through surveillance of asset.
Can be used to monitor any water or wastewater assets (perimeter of facility, remote pumphouses,
potential access points to distribution or collection systems, etc.). Primarily used to monitor exterior
areas, but can be used in interior of buildings or facilities.
LOCATION USED
Usually mounted at a strategic location at the asset to be monitored to monitor as large an area as
possible. Can be mounted near doors or windows, on or along fences, or within buildings.
DESCRIPTION
Visual surveillance is used to detect threats through continuous
observation of important or vulnerable areas of an asset. The
observations can also be recorded for later review or use (for
example, in court proceedings). Visual surveillance systems can be
used to monitor various parts of collection, distribution, or treat-
ment systems, Including the perimeter of a facility, outlying pump-
ing stations, or entry or access points into specific buildings. These
systems are also useful in recording individuals who enter or leave a
facility, thereby helping to identify unauthorized access. Images can
be transmitted live to a monitoring station, where they can be moni-
tored in real time, or they can be recorded and reviewed later. Many
facilities have found that a combination of electronic surveillance and
security guards provides an effective means of facility security.
Visual surveillance is provided through a closed circuit television (CCTV) system, in which the
capture, transmission, and reception of an image is localized within a closed "circuit." This is
different than other broadcast images, such as over-the-air television, which is broadcast over
the air to any receiver within range.
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
At a minimum, a CCTV system consists of:
• One or more cameras;
• A monitor for viewing the images; and
• A system for transmitting the images from the camera to the monitor.
72
-------
Specific attributes and features of these components are presented in the tables that follow.
Camera Systems
Cameras capture the image for transmission to the monitor. They consist of a lens, which
focuses light into the camera, and a system to convert that captured light into an electronic
signal which can be transmitted to the monitor. The characteristics of the lens and the camera
affect their ability
Table 1: Attributes of Camera Systems
| Attribute
Discussion
| Camera Types
1
j
I
i
i
1
j
I
i
Major factors in choosing the correct camera are the resolution of the image
required and lighting of the area to be viewed (see discussions of these topics
below).
• Solid State (including charge coupled devices, charge priming device, charge
injection device, and metal oxide substrate) - these cameras are becoming pre-
dominant in the marketplace because of their high resolution and their elimina-
tion of problems inherent in tube cameras.
• Thermal - these cameras are designed for night vision. They require no light and
use differences in temperature between objects in the field of view to produce a
video image. Resolution is low compared to other cameras, and the technology
is currently expensive relative to other technologies.
• Tube - these cameras can provide high resolution but the tubes burn out and
must be replaced after 1-2 years. In addition, tube performance can degrade
over time. Finally, tube cameras are prone to burn images on the tube. This
requires tube replacement.
Resolution (the ability
to see fine details)
User must determine the amount of resolution required depending on the level of
detail required for threat determination. A high definition focus with a wide field of
vision will give an optimal viewing area.
Field of vision width
Cameras are designed to cover a defined field of vision, which is usually defined
in degrees. The wider the field of vision, the more area a camera will be able to
monitor.
Type of image
produced (color,
black and white,
thermal)
Color images may allow the identification of distinctive markings, while black
and white images may provide sharper contrast. Thermal imaging allows the
identification of heat sources (such as human beings or other living creatures) from
low light environments; however, thermal images are not effective in identifying
specific individuals (i.e., for subsequent legal processes).
Pan/Tilt/Zoom (PTZ)
Panning (moving the camera in a horizontal plane), tilting (moving the camera in
a vertical plane), and zooming (moving the lens to focus on objects that are at
different distances from the camera) allow the camera to follow a moving object.
Different systems allow these functions to be controlled manually or automatically.
Factors to be considered in PTZ cameras are the degree of coverage for pan and
tilt functions and the power of the zoom lens.
73
-------
Table 2: Attributes of Lenses
Attribute
Discussion
Format
Lens format determines the maximum image size to be transmitted.
Focal Length
This is the distance from the lens to the center of the focus. The greater the focal
length, the higher the magnification, but the narrower the field of vision.
F Number
F number is the ability to gather light. Smaller F numbers may be required for outdoor
applications where light cannot be controlled as easily.
Distance
and width
approximation
The distance and width approximations are used to determine the geometry of the
space that can be monitored at the best resolution.
Table 3: Attributes of Lighting Systems
Attribute
Discussion
Intensity
Light intensity must be great enough for the camera type to produce sharp images.
Light can be generated from natural or artificial sources. Artificial sources can be
controlled to produce the amount and distribution of light required for a given camera
and lens.
Evenness
Light must be distributed evenly over the field of view so that there are no darker
or shadowy areas. If there are lighter vs. darker areas, brighter areas may appear
washed out (i.e., details cannot be distinguished) while no specific objects can be
viewed from darker areas.
Location
Light sources must be located above the camera so that light does not shine directly
into the camera.
to capture sharp images from a specific field of view under variable light conditions. Cam-
eras and lenses can be purchased separately, which allows users to design a system that is
tailored to their needs. Important attributes of camera systems, lenses, and lighting systems
are provided in Tables 1-3 below.
Another important consideration when choosing cameras is whether they will be used indoors
or outdoors. Camera location will determine the types of lighting available, as well as the
types of cameras and lenses that are applicable. Cameras mounted outdoors may require
climate-specific weatherproof housing, heaters for snow/ice blockage or reduction, blow-
ers to reduce fogging, etc. These additional features will add to the cost and flexibility of the
system.
TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS
Systems may be hardwired (physically connected by cables) or wireless. While hardwiring
(such as through coaxial or fiber optic cables) is the traditional method for transmitting video
signals in a CCTV system, new wireless applications, such as microwave links, optical sys-
tems, and radio frequencies, are becoming more prevalent.
Hardwired systems require a direct physical connection between the transmitter and the
receiver. Because the signal is transmitted directly to the receiver and not over the air, hard-
wired systems may be more secure than wireless systems. However, it may be difficult to
hardwire remote locations. Specific factors affecting hardwired cable connections include:
74
-------
• Bandwidth: related to the amount of information that can be transmitted along the system.
Affects resolution of recorded vs. received signal.
• Line loss: some cables may lose some of the signal depending on their design, and there-
fore may require signal conditioning to compensate.
• Signal conditioning: May be required to compensate for distorted signal based on the types
of transmission equipment used.
Wireless transmission systems do not require that the transmitter and the receiver be physi-
cally connected to each other. This may make wireless more attractive for remote locations.
However, wireless systems require a direct line of sight between transmitter and receivers and
may require re-transmitters (also known as repeaters and amplifiers) for remote operations. In
addition, wireless systems may be susceptible to interception or interference.
MONITORS
Monitors are used to view images transmitted by cameras. Factors to be considered when
choosing the appropriate monitor for a specific application include:
• Bandwidth: The monitor's bandwidth should be equivalent to camera/lens bandwidth. This
will allow the best resolution of the image transmitted from the camera to be viewed on fhe
screen.
• Color vs. black and white: The use of a color vs. black and white monitor depends on user's
preference. In some cases, black and white may offer more contrast, but color may offer
easier identification of specific or tell-tale marks (distinctive clothing, hair color, skin color).
• Screen size. A larger screen and color image make live feed identification more accurate to
the employee using the system.
IMAGE STORAGE
In many cases, images generated by camera systems may be stored for later viewing. While
the detection of certain images may require real-time, immediate action (such as when intrud-
ers are detected), the ability to store and view images at a later time may be important for
forensic purposes (i.e., to determine what or how an event occurred at a site) or for legal ac-
tions to be taken at a later date. Options for image storage include:
• Digital video recording (DVR) - stores digital images on a PC or on a network/server sys-
tem;
• Video recording (VCR) - stores images on videocassettes; and
• Solid state recording - stores individual images or frames on a solid state disk.
DVR is rapidly replacing video cassette recording VCR as the medium of choice for recording
and storing images. DVR devices record and store images digitally on a computer hard drive
(i.e., a PC, handheld computer, or dedicated DVR system) vs. devices such as VCRs, which
store images on videotapes using analog technology. Costs for DVR systems have declined in
recent years while technology has improved. Other advantages vs. VCRs include:
75
-------
• Longer recording period
• Clearer images
• Clearer resolution of still ("paused") images
• Search functions enable users to immediately locate images by camera, date, or other
methods
• Image files do not degrade over time
• Requires less storage space than VCR tapes
However, some digital storage systems using PC hard drives require that the entire PC be
dedicated to this system. This may not be practical for some utilities.
One of the important features when setting up a DVR system is determining how many frames
per second (fps) will be recorded. The more fps that are recorded, the clearer the image will
be, and it will be easier to view still pictures from the camera. However, the more fps that are
stored, the more storage space will be required on the hard drive. Many DVRs also have a mo-
tion sensor mode that can be set to trigger an action (such as recording or an alarm) when
the camera detects motion in its field of vision.
Table 4: Enhanced System Features
Feature
Factors to Consider
Benefits to the System
Video
Switcher
Control can be active (controlled by user)
or passive (viewed or recorded area
switches automatically).
Switches cameras being viewed on monitor or
recorded. Can be used to switch monitor or
recorder to image tripping an alarm.
Video
Controller
Interface between the visual surveillance
system and other electronic processes,
such as alarm or alert systems.
Can be used to automatically sound alarms
based on interpreted data.
Table 4 provides a discussion of several optional features which enhance the management of
a CCTV system.
COST
Components for a CCTV/visual surveillance system can be sold separately, or packaged sys-
tems may be purchased. For example, a typical lower-end package consisting of a 4 camera
CCTV system consisting of cameras/lenses, cables, power supplies, and a monitor can cost
as little as $550. This is a capital cost only and does not include maintenance or installation
costs, which are facility dependent.
Costs for individual components depend on their specifications. Several example costs and
factors affecting costs are provided in Table 5 on the next page.
76
-------
Table 5: Costs for Visual Surveillance Components
Component
Cost
Factors Affecting Cost
Cameras
Black and White. $80
Color: $130
PTZ: $350-$3,000
Resolution desired and the amount of
light required for the camera to function
properly
Lenses
Manual iris 8 mm lens (tor steady-light
applications): $50
Auto iris 3.7 mm lenses (for use in
applications where light conditions are
variable): >$200
Zoom lenses are more expensive.
Monitors
Black and white monitor with 1 camera
input: $330
Color monitor with 4 camera inputs: $1,000
The cost of monitors depends on the
resolution, the image (black and white
or color) and the number of inputs (for
example, inputs for one camera vs.
inputs for four cameras).
— Storage Systems —
VCR
VCR unit: <$60
Individual videotapes are several dollars
apiece
Higher end features can increase
resolution of paused images.
DVR
Low end unit: $770.
Higher end units (a 16 camera system
capable of recording at 240 frames per
second, with a 240GB hard drive): >$5,500
DVR costs depend on the number
of camera inputs and the hard drive
storage space.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
Control Electronic Security
8245 NW 36th Street, Suite #6
Miami, Florida 33166
(305) 499-9396
www.controlelectronic.com
Sperry Wesf Inc.
5575 Magnatron Blvd
San Diego, California 92111
(858) 551-2000
www.sperrywest. com
Extreme Surveillance
Fiesta Tech Business Centre
2150 South Country Club Drive, Suite 16
Mesa, Arizona 85210
(800) 788-7101
www.extremesurveillance.com
Axis Communications, Inc.
100 Apollo Drive
Chelmsford, Massachusetts 01824
(800) 244-2947
www.axis.com
77
-------
Industrial Video & Control Co.
300 Pleasant St,
Watertown, Massachusetts 02472
(617) 926-7802
www.ivcco.com
Pelco
3500 Pelco Way
Clovis, California 93612
(800) 289-9100
www.pelco.com
Q-Star Technology
9960 Canoga Avenue. Suite D4
Chatsworth, California 91311
(866) 201-4197
www.qstartech.com
-------
Water Monitoring Products
-------
water and wastewater security product guide
Biological Sensors for Toxicity
Q DETECT
O delay
O RESPOND
OBJECTIVE
Monitor water samples to detect toxicity.
APPLICATION
Current uses are primarily for wastewater discharge permit compliance or monitoring water samples.
Can also monitor for toxicity in other water assets (finished drinking water distribution systems, influ-
ent wastewater, raw water, process streams).
LOCATION USED
Potential for use at critical points in water distribution systems (for example, at potentially vulnerable
points downstream of distribution pump stations) to detect contamination added to water after treat-
ment. Portable sensors can be used to monitor grab samples at critical areas of a system; off-line
systems are used to test samples in the laboratory. It may be difficult to effectively monitor large
systems because of their diffuse nature.
DESCRIPTION
Toxicity tests measure water toxicity by monitoring adverse biological effects on test organ-
isms. Toxicity tests have traditionally been used to monitor wastewater effluent streams for
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System(NPDES) permit compliance or to test water
samples for toxicity. However, this technology can also be used to monitor drinking water
distribution systems or other water/wastewater streams for toxicity. Currently, several types
of bio-sensors and toxicity tests are being adapted for use in the water/wastewater secu-
rity field. The keys to using bio-monitoring or bio-sensors for drinking water or other water/
wastewater asset security are rapid response and the ability to use the monitor at critical lo-
cations in the system, such as in water distribution systems downstream of pump stations, or
prior to the biological process in a wastewater treatment plant. While there are several differ-
ent organisms that can be used to monitor for toxicity (including bacteria, invertebrates, and
fish), bacteria-based bio-sensors are ideal for use as early warning screening tools for drinking
water security because bacteria usually respond to toxics in a matter of minutes. In contrast
to methods using bacteria, toxicity screening methods that use higher-level organisms such as
fish may take several days to produce a measurable result. Bacteria-based bio-sensors have
recently been incorporated into portable instruments, making rapid response and field-test-
ing practical. These portable meters detect decreases in biological activity (e.g. decreases in
bacterial luminescence), which are highly correlated with increased levels of toxicity.
At the present time, few utilities are using biologically-based toxicity monitors to monitor
water/wastewater assets for toxicity, and very few products are now commercially available.
Several new approaches to the rapid monitoring of microorganisms for security purposes (e.g.
microbial source tracking) have been identified. However, most of these methods are still in
the research and development phase.
81
-------
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
In general, the commercial application of biological toxicity monitoring is quite new. Many
biological toxicity monitoring systems have been developed for site-specific applications, and
there is little opportunity to compare commercially available products. Therefore, it is difficult
to directly define sensitivities and detection limits of biological toxicity meters at the current
time. However, sensitivities of some products may be compared relative to each other. For
example, temperature control is important in increasing the accuracy of the toxicity measure-
ment, and systems that have temperature Table controls are considered to be more accurate
in measuring and reproducing results than those without temperature controls.
Biological toxicity monitors provide a kind of relative, nonspecific indication of water qual-
ity rather than precise, reportable measurements of specific parameters. The non-specificity
is partly by design, because some biological toxicity monitors are typically used to provide
a first-order screening test. Broad sensitivity to a wide range of contaminants is considered
strength of a good bio-monitor.
Table 1: Comparison of Biological Toxicity Monitoring Systems
Product Sensitivity j Detection Limit Reliability/ I Response j Ease of Installation/
| i Ruggedness | Time j Use
— Portable System —
DeltaTox Analyzer
(SDI (formerly AZUR))
Accurate (use of a
luminescent bacteria,
Vibrio fischeri)
Medium
15 minutes
Easy to install and
use
— Laboratory-Based System
—
Microtox Toxicity
Highly accurate (use of
Medium
15 minutes
Easy to install and
Model 500 Analyzer
a luminescent bacteria,
use
(SDI)
Vibrio fischeri)
COST
The Microtox toxicity ondlyzer costs approximately $18,000, while the AZUR DeltaTox analyzer
costs approximately $5,900. The difference between these two products is that the portable
DeltaTox analyzer does not have temperature controls.
Capital costs for traditional laboratory-based bio-monitoring systems vary widely because
of the unique setup for each type of system. Most laboratory-based systems include desig-
nated space and equipment (for example, fish tanks or bowls for invertebrate tests) to set up
and run the tests. This space may require specialized features (for example, climate control)
depending on the types of toxicity tests to be run. Periodic costs include the purchase/use of
test organisms for each toxicity test, as well as costs to set up and maintain each test. These
facilities may also require regular inspection and cleaning. Some toxicity tests require expen-
sive laboratory equipment.
82
-------
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors Identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
Strategic Diagnostics Inc. (SDi) / AZUR Environmental
111 Pencader Drive
Newark, Delaware 19702
(800) 544-8881
83
-------
W AT E R AND W A STEWATER SECUR IT Y PRO D U C T GUIDE
Chemical Sensor -
Arsenic Measurement System
0 DETECT
O delay
O RESPOND
! OBJECTIVE
Monitor arsenic in water samples.
APPLICATION
Primarily water distribution systems and finished drinking water.
LOCATION USED
Portable arsenic detection systems are designed to be used in the field, and can be used to quickly
evaluate samples taken at critical areas of system.
Arsenic is an inorganic toxin that occurs naturally in soils. It can enter water supplies from
many sources, including: erosion of natural deposits; runoff from orchards; runoff from glass
and electronics production wastes; or leaching from products treated with arsenic, such as
wood. Synthetic organic arsenic is also used in fertilizer.
Arsenic toxicity is primarily associated with inorganic arsenic. Arsenic ingestion has been
linked to cancerous health effects, including cancer of the bladder, lungs, skin, kidney, nasal
passages, liver, and prostate. Arsenic ingestion has also been linked to noncancerous car-
diovascular, pulmonary, immunological, and neurological, endocrine problems. According to
EPA's Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Arsenic Rule, inorganic arsenic can exert toxic effects
after acute (short-term) or chronic (long-term) exposure. Toxicological data for acute expo-
sure, which is typically given as a LD50 value (the dose that would be lethal to 50 percent of
the test subjects in a given test), suggests that the LD50 of arsenic ranges from 1- 4 mil-
ligrams arsenic per kilogram (mg/kg) of body weight. This dose would correspond to a lethal
dose range of 70 to 280 mg for 50 percent of adults weighing 70 kg. At nonlethal, but high,
acute doses, inorganic arsenic can cause gastroenterological effects, shock, neuritis (contin-
uous pain) and vascular effects in humans. EPA has set a maximum contaminant level goal
of 0 for arsenic in drinking water; the current enforceable maximum contaminant level (MCL)
is 0.050 mg/L. As of January 23, 2006, the enforceable MCL for arsenic will be 0.010 mg/L.
The SDWA requires arsenic monitoring for public water systems. The Arsenic Rule indicates
that surface water systems must collect one sample annually; groundwater systems must
collect one sample in each compliance period (once every three years). Samples are collect-
ed at entry points to the distribution system, and analysis is done in the laboratory using one
of several EPA-approved methods, including Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectroscopy
(ICP-MS, EPA 200.8) and several atomic absorption (AA) methods. However, several differ-
ent technologies, including colorimetric test kits and portable chemical sensors, are currently
available for monitoring inorganic arsenic concentrations in the field. These technologies can
provide a quick estimate of arsenic concentrations in a water sample. Thus, these technolo-
gies may be useful for spot-checking different parts of a drinking water system (for example,
DESCRIPTION
84
-------
reservoirs, isolated areas of distribution systems) to ensure that the water is not contami-
nated with arsenic.
The two primary technologies for evaluating arsenic concentrations in the field are colorimetric
test Kits and portable chemical sensors. These two technologies are described in further detail
below:
Test Kits
The field test kits detected by mixing the water sample with
powdered reagents, which converts the arsenic to arsine gas. A
colorimetric test strip is then immersed in the sample, removed,
and compared to a reference table to determine the arsenic con-
centration in the sample. Several vendors (including Industrial Test
Systems, Inc., and Peters Engineering) also offer a battery-oper-
ated tester, which measures the color change electronically and
displays the results on the unit.
Sensors
There are two portable sensor technologies currently on the markel
International's PDV 6000 and TraceDetect's Nano-Band™ Explorer). These analyze arsenic
using anodic stripping voltammetry (ASV) technology and transmit results to a laptop (not
included with the sensor product) loaded with specialized software to interpret, display, and
store the results. The ASV technology works through a standard oxidation/reduction (redox)
chemical reaction in the test solution. First, a "reducing potential" is applied at the working
electrode. When the "reducing potential" exceeds the "ionization potential" of the arsenic ion
in solution, the arsenic is "reduced" and collected on the electrode. After a pre-specified time,
"oxidizing potential" is applied to the working electrode. This strips off the arsenic and creates
an electric current, which is measured and compared to a reference standard to determine the
sample concentration. The results are then displayed on the laptop.
The Nano-Band'" Explorer uses a unique electrode configura-
tion to increase its response time. Its electrode is composed
of 100 sub-electrodes, and the increase in mass that can be
transported across these multiple electrodes allows mea-
surement of the arsenic concentration in a much shorter
time relative to conventional electrode technologies (usually
within a few seconds).
The Nano-Band~ Explorer
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
The U.S. EPA Environmental Technology Verification (ETV) program has evaluated multiple
products for measuring arsenic in water samples, including seven different test kits and two
portable sensors. For each product, EPA evaluated accuracy, precision, linearity, method
detection limit, matrix interference effects, inter-unit reproducibility, rate of false positives/false
negatives, and other factors. In general, EPA evaluated solutions ranging from 0.001 to 0.1
mg/L arsenic. This translates to 10 percent to 1,000 percent of the new 0.010 mg/L standard
for arsenic in drinking water. A summary of results of these evaluations are presented below.
Arsenic Test Kit from the Hach
Company
(Monitoring Technologies
85
-------
For a full discussion of the tesfs and resulfs, see http://www.epa.gov/etv/verifications/vcen-
terl-21.html.
Accuracy
Accuracy is a measure of how close a measurement is to the true value. The measured dif-
ference between sample reading and the true value is referred to as "bias." Bias is reported
as a percentage of the measure value relative to the true value, and can be positive (sample
reading is above the true value) or negative (sample reading is below the true value). Bias
can vary in magnitude between different analytical techniques or procedures. It should also be
noted that small errors can result in a large bias when the actual concentration in the sample
is low. For example, an error of 1 ppb in measuring concentrations of 10 ppb arsenic vs. 100
ppb arsenic would result in a positive bias of 10 percent for the first measurement, but only 1
percent for the second measurement.
EPA found that many of the arsenic test kits could have a large bias (up to almost 10,000
percent in some cases) in measuring a known arsenic concentration. Most of the biases were
positive (i.e., the results were reported as higher than the actual concentration), although
at least one kit (Industrial Test Systems (ITS) Quick'" Ultra Low II) produced results that had
negative biases.
Results from the portable sensors also showed biases. While the Nano-Band™ Explorer showed
only high bias in the EPA trials, the PDV 6000 showed both positive and negative bias.
Precision
Precision measures the repeatability of a measurement (e.g., the bias in measuring the same
sample a number of times). EPA's ETV program expresses precision as the Relative Standard
Deviation (RSD) of replicate analyses.
Precision for the test kits ranged from 0 to 139 percent of the original measurement.
Precision for the Nano-Band™ Explorer ranged from 3 to 91 percent. Precision for the PDV
6000 ranged from 3 to 16 percent.
Summary
In summary, it can be difficult to generalize or draw conclusions regarding the overall accu-
racy and precision of arsenic test kits or portable sensors because there is a wide variation
between the different products. Therefore, the use of arsenic test kits or sensors must be
tempered with the knowledge of their limitations. While they do provide a quick, inexpensive
method to evaluate general concentrations of arsenic in water, they may not be reliable for
providing a consistent, accurate result. However, since the use of arsenic testing for security
purposes should not require a highly accurate result (i.e., decisions regarding the immediate
safety of water would most likely be based on much higher arsenic concentrations than those
used for regulatory monitoring, and thus more accurate testing may be done to confirm exact
concentrations at a later time), these kits and sensors may be useful for water security ap-
plications.
86
-------
A summary of several available products, ranges, and total test times is provided in below:
Table 1
Arsenic Test Kits and Sensors
i " "
Concentra-
- ~
Total
1 Product Range of
tions Detect-
Test Time
Arsenic
ed (ppb)
Accuracy (ETV Tests)
Precision (ETV Tests)
(Min)
ITS 481300 Quick1"
0.2-30
Color Chart method: Bias
Color Chart method:
12
Ultra Low II
i
1
ranged from -87% to 45%
Quick1" Arsenic Scan
method: Bias ranged from
-95% to 22%
Compu Scan method: Bias
ranged from -92% to 161%
RSD ranged from 0% to
84%
Quick™ Arsenic Scan
method: RSD ranged
from 2% to 78%
Compu Scan method:
RSD ranged from 6% to
139%
S 481297 Quick™
2-80
Color Chart method: Bias
Color Chart method:
12
: Low-Range
ranged from -81 % to 579%
Quick™ Arsenic Scan
method: Bias ranged from
-93% to 99%
RSD ranged from 0% to
23%
Quick™ Arsenic Scan
method: RSD ranged
from 0% to 42%
Peters Engineering
2.5-60 (blue
PeCo test method: Bias
PeCo test method: RSD
No Data
AS75 Arsenic Test
filter holder)
ranged from 1% to 113%
ranged from 0% to 41%
Kit
10-100 (grey
AS 75 Tester method: Bias
AS 75 Tester method:
filter holder)
ranged from 1% to 310%
RSD ranged from 10%
to 89%
As-Top Water Test
10-300
Bias ranged from 2% to
RSD ranged from 0% to
30
kit
>9,900%
111%
Monitoring
5-1000
Bias ranged from -74% to
RSD ranged from 3% to
Instrument
Technologies
31%
16%
calibration:
International PDV
30 min.
6000
Analysis: 5
min.
raceDetect Nano-
1
Bias ranged from 1 % to
Bias ranged from 1% to
< 1 min.
Band™ Explorer
499%
499%
Matrix Interference Effects
Sodium chloride, iron, sulfate, and acidity can potentially interfere with arsenic measurements
in water. However, in general, EPA found that the test kits and portable chemical sensors were
not affected by the presence of sodium chloride, iron, sulfate, or acidity, and that measure-
ments of arsenic were similar in samples that contained these potential interfering chemicals
vs. samples that did not. EPA did find that high iron and/or hydnogen sulfide concentrations
-------
biased arsenic measurements by the PDV 6000 analyzer. Arsenic results in samples with high
concentrations of iron and/or hydrogen sulfide were biased high.
COST
Costs for arsenic detection systems can vary greatly depending on the level of system sophistica-
tion. Costs for test kits depend on the number of tests in the kit, and the range of the test. For
example, Industrial Test System, Inc. kits can range from $16 for a two-test kit to $250 for an ultra
low-range 25-test kit. The Peters Engineering test kit capable of analyzing 100 samples is $220;
refill packs for 100 additional tests can be purchased for $60. The AS 75 tester is $330.
The Nano-Band™ Explorer Portable Water Analyzer costs $8,000. This includes the battery-powered,
rechargeable instrument, software, one Nano-Band™ Explorer electrode, an auxiliary electrode, a
reference electrode, a cleaning and reconditioning kit for the electrode, and a temperature sensor.
The PDV 6000 portable analyzer for the detection of heavy metal ions has a list price of $7,900.
This price includes the analyzer unit, software, batteries, charger, and carrying case. Neither
system includes a laptop computer, which is necessary to run either technology in the field.
Several arsenic test kits and sensors have been evaluated by the EPA Environmental Technol-
ogy Verification program. Information on these technologies can be found at http://www.epa.
gov/etv/verifications/vcenter 1 -21 .html.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services, In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency hds selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
LaMofte
802 Washington Avenue
P.O. Box 329
Chestertown, Maryland 21620
(800) 344-3100
www.lamotte.com
TraceDetect
180 North Canal Street
Seattle, Washington 98103
(206) 523-2009
www. tracedetect. com/index.htm
Monitoring Technologies International, Pty. Ltd.
10 Main Street, Osborne Park
Perth, Western Australia 6017
618-9444-3377
www.monitoring-technologies.com
Envitop, Ltd.
Riihitie 5
FIN-90240
Oulu, Finland
358-8-372 586
www.envitop.com
Industrial Test Systems, Inc.
1875 Langston Street
Rock Hill, South Corolina 29730
(800) 861-9712
www.sensafe.com
Apyron Technologies, Inc.
4030 Pleasantdale Road
Suite F
Atlantd, Georgia 30340
(770) 263-1012
www.apyron.com
Peters Engineering
Sfyregasse 78010 Graz
Austria
43(0)316-840792
Hach Company
PO Box 389
Loveland, Colorado 80539
800-227-4224
www.hach.com
88
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
Chemical Sensor -
Chlorine Measurement System
OBJECTIVE
Monitor water samples to detect chlorine levels, which can serve as indicators of potential threats. i
APPLICATION |
Primarily water distribution systems and finished drinking water. j
| LOCATION USED j
Portable sensors used at critical areas of system; on-line tests/monitoring equipment for continuous j
monitoring. j
DESCRIPTION
Residual chlorine is one of the most sensitive and useful indicator parameters in water dis-
tribution system monitoring. All water distribution systems monitor for residual chlorine con-
centrations as part of their Safe Drinking Water Act(SDWA) requirements, and procedures for
monitoring chlorine concentrations are well established and accurate. Chlorine monitoring as-
sures proper residual at all points in the system, helps pace re-chlorination when needed, and
quickly and reliably signals any unexpected increase in disinfectant demand. Monitoring chlo-
rine levels in the system also can serve as a "surrogate" for detecting potentially threatening
contamination, because many chemical and biological contaminants are known to combine
with chlorine. Therefore, a significant decline or loss of residual chlorine could be an indication
of potential threats to the system.
Several key points regarding residual chlorine monitoring for security purposes are provided
below:
• Chlorine residuals can be measured using continuous on-line monitors at fixed points in the
system, or by taking grab samples at any point in the system and using chlorine test kits
or portable sensors to determine chlorine concentrations.
• Correct placement of residual chlorine monitoring points within a system is crucial to early
detection of potential threats. For example, while dead ends and low-pressure zones are
common trouble spots that can show low residual chlorine concentrations, these zones are
generally not of great concern for water security purposes because system hydraulics will
limit the circulation of any contaminants present in these areas of the system.
• Monitoring points and monitoring procedures for SDWA compliance vs. system security pur-
poses may be different, and utilities must determine the best use of on-line, fixed monitor-
ing systems vs. portable sensors/test kits to balance their SDWA compliance and security
needs.
89
n E T E C T
DELAY
RESPOND
-------
It should be noted that not all potential contaminants react with chlorine. One ot the key areas
of concern with reliance on chlorine residual is microbial adaptation under potable water treat-
ment conditions or within conveyance systems. Microorganisms that develop resistance to po-
table water disinfectants may be much more problematic as emerging waterborne pathogens
than those that are not resistant to chlorine. Several of these organisms are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Contaminants Known to be Resistant to Chlorine Disinfection
i Pollutant or Chemical Agent j Type
1 Anthrax Bacteria
! Bacteria
! Cholera Bacteria
I Bacteria
Plague (Yersinia pestis) Bacteria
Bacteria
Salmonella Bacteria
Bacteria
; T-2 Mycotoxin Biotoxin
j Biotoxin
; Microcystins Biotoxin
Biotoxin
j Ricin Biotoxin
j Biotoxin
Botulinum Toxin Biotoxin
i Biotoxin
! Cryptosporidiosis Protozoan
j Protozoan
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
A variety of different portable and on-line chlorine monitors are commercially available. These
range from sophisticated on-line chlorine monitoring systems to portable electrode sensors to
colorimetric test kits. On-line systems can be equipped with control, signal, and alarm sys-
tems that notify the operator of low chlorine concentrations, and some may be tied into feed-
back loops that automatically adjust chlorine concentrations in the system. In contrast, use of
portable sensors or colorimetric test kits requires technicians to take a sample and read the
results. The technician then initiates required actions based on the results of the test.
Sensitivity and Detection Limit
Because residual chlorine concentrations are surrogates that can indicate potential prob-
lems in a system, gross changes in these concentrations are the best indicators of potential
threats. Therefore, high-sensitivity probes are not required for security purposes. Chlorine con-
centrations ranging from 0.5 to 2.0 mg/L are typically required for drinking water monitoring
applications, and deviations from this range should be sufficient to identify security threats.
Both colorimetric and electrode technologies can detect free or total chlorine to hundredths of
a milligram per liter. Linearity of response in the range of 0.5 percent with repeatability of 0.05
mg/L can be expected.
90
-------
Measurement Method and Maintenance
To operate reliably, the on-line monitoring instruments require regular inspection and frequent
maintenance, fn many cases, consumables such as compressed gases, reagents, solutions,
and calibration standards must be refreshed on a regular basis. Colorimetric monitoring gener-
ally requires periodic replenishment of consumable test strips or reagents. Electrode moni-
tors require maintenance, which may include membrane and electrolyte replacement as the
cell performance degrades. Power requirements typically are line power with signal output as
either milli-volts or milli-amps.
Table 2 provides a list of portable chlorine analyzers. The sensor technology used in these
commercial products is readily available for setting up online chlorine measurement in water
distribution systems.
Table 2: Comparison of Chlorine Measurement Systems
Product
Sensitivity/
Detection Limit
| Response
Reliability/ Ruggedness 1 Time
Ease of
Installation/ Use
On-Line Monitoring Systems —
1
CL17 On-line Chlorine j 0.035 mg/L
Analyzer (HACH)
High -Strong and corrosion-
resistant
_ „
2.5 min/
cycle
Easy
AccuChlor2 Residual i 0.01 mg/L
Chlorine Measurement
System (HACH (formerly 1
GLI))
High - Amperometric
technique, stable and
repeatable measurements
2 min/ cycle
Intermediate
— Portable Monitoring Devices —
Six-CENSE (DASCORE) j 0.01 mg/L
High - Sits on o robust
ceramic chip, designed for
durability
No Data
Easy
B20 Recording Chlorine j 0.01 mg/L
Analyzer (ATI)
High
1 minute
Easy
VR Water Analysis | Better than 1%
System (CHEMetrics)
High
4 seconds
Intermediate
— Field Test Kits —
AquaCheck Test Strips i Low
(HACH)
Low (semi-quantitative)
Very fast
Easy
Color Disc (HACH) 0.01 mg/L
Low
Fast
Easy
91
-------
COST
Costs for chlorine monitoring systems can vary greatly depending on the level of system so-
phistication. On-line chlorine analyzers/sensors typically range from $2,700 to $3,100. Chlo-
rine measurement systems that include automatic controls will be more expensive. Portable
chlorine measurement systems typically cost around $600. However, multiple-parameter
portable chlorine analyzer such as DASCORE's Six-CENSE, which is designed to measure six
different parameters, costs $8,000 to $10,000 per unit. In comparison, disposable test kits
for chlorine analysis costs about $115 for a pack of 250. The color disc for chlorine cost
about $40 for a pack of 50.
Vendors
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
Hach Company / GLI International / Hydrolab
P.O. Box 389
Loveland, Colorado 80539-0389
(800) 227-4224
www.hach.com
Analytical Technology Inc. (ATI)
6 Iron Bridge Drive
Collegeville, Pennsylvania 19426
(800) 959-0299 or (610) 917-0991
www. analyticaltechnoiogy. com
DASCORE, Inc.
(866) 321-3804
www.dascore.com
CHEMetrics, Inc.
4295 Catlett Rd„
Calverton, Virginia 20138
(800) 356-3072
www.chemetrics.com
92
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
Chemical Sensor for Toxicity
(Adapted BOD Analyzer)
0 DETECT
O DELAY
O RESPOND
OBJECTIVE
Monitor water samples to detect toxicity using biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) as a surrogate. j
APPLICATION
Current uses are primarily for wastewater discharge permit compliance or monitoring water samples.
Can also monitor for toxicity in other water assets (finished drinking water distribution systems, influ- j
ent wastewater, raw water, process streams). j
LOCATION USED
Potential for use at critical points in water distribution systems (for example, at potentially vulner-
able points downstream of distribution pump stations) to detect contamination added to water after
treatment. Monitor is on-line, and thus location of monitor must be permanent and secure. This also
makes placement of monitor important to maximize coverage of distribution system.
DESCRIPTION
One manufacturer has adapted a BOD analyzer to measure oxygen consumption as a surro-
gate for general toxicity. The critical element in the analyzer is the bioreactor, which is used to
continuously measure the respiration of the biomass under stable conditions. As the toxicity of
the sample increases, the oxygen consumption in the sample decreases. An alarm can be pro-
grammed to sound if oxygen reaches a minimum concentration (i.e., if the sample is strongly
toxic). The operator must then interpret the results into a measure of toxicity.
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
At the current time, it is difficult to directly define the sensitivity and/or the detection limit of
toxicity measurement devices because limited data is available regarding specific correlations
of decreased oxygen consumption and increased toxicity of the sample.
A summary of several available products, their ranges, and the total test times is provided in
Table 1 below:
Table 1: Attributes and Features of the adapted BOD Analyzer
Product
CSensitlvlty/
Detection Limit
Accuracy
(ETV Tests)
Ease of
Response Time installation/Use
ISCO / Accurate (may need minor
STIPTOX adaptation for general
Adapt W toxicity)
Toximeter
Successfully used in 3-15 mins.
Europe since 1984 . racn
(Quick response
to large number of
toxins)
Easy to install
and use
93
-------
COST
The cost of the toxicity measurement device will be similar to the costs of a real time BOD
analyzer. The ISCO real-time BOD Analyzer generally ranges between $20,000 and $30,000,
depending on the user's specific requirements, as well as on the inclusion of any optional
features.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
ISCO, Inc.
4700 Superior St.
PO Box 82531
Lincoln, Nebraska 68504
(800) 228-4373
www.ISCO.com
94
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
DETECT
Chemical Sensor - OOELAY
Total Organic Carbon Analyzer 0 rESpono
OBJECTIVE
Monitor water samples to detect total organic carbon concentrations.
APPLICATION
Monitor critical areas of a drinking water distribution system or wastewater influent to detect higher-
than-normal total organic carbon concentrations, which can serve as indicators of potential chemical
threats to human health or to wastewater treatment processes.
LOCATION USED
On-line monitoring equipment can be placed at critical areas of a drinking water distribution system
or at a wastewater influent wet well to detect potential chemical threats.
DESCRIPTION
Total Organic Carbon (TOC) analysis is a well-defined and com-
monly used methodology that measures the carbon content of
dissolved and particulate organic matter present in water. Many
water utilities monitor TOC to determine raw water quality or to
evaluate the effectiveness of processes designed to remove or-
ganic carbon. Some wastewater utilities also employ TOC analysis
to monitor the efficiency of the treatment process. In addition to
these uses for TOC monitoring, measuring changes in TOC con-
centrations can be an effective "surrogate" for detecting contami-
nation from organic compounds (e.g. petrochemicals, solvents,
pesticides). Thus, while TOC analysis does not give specific infor-
mation about the nature of the threat, identifying changes in TOC
can be a good indicator of potential threats to a system.
Shimadzu On-Line TOC Analyzer
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
TOC analysis consists of inorganic carbon removal, oxidation of the organic carbon into C02,
and quantification of the C02. The primary differences between different on-line TOC analyzers
are in the methods used for oxidation and C02 quantification.
The oxidation step can be high or low temperature. The determination of the appropriate ana-
lytical method (and thus the appropriate analyzer) is based on the expected characteristics
of the wastewater sample (TOC concentrations and the individual components making up the
TOC fraction). In general, high temperature (combustion) analyzers achieve more complete
oxidation of the carbon fraction than do low temperature (wet chemistry/UV) analyzers. This
can be important both in distinguishing different fractions of the organics in a sample and in
achieving a precise measurement of the organic content of the sample.
95
-------
Three different methods are also available for detection and quantification of carbon dioxide
produced in the oxidation step of a TOC analyzer. These are:
• Nondispersive infrared (NDIR) detector
• Colorimetric methods
• Aqueous conductivity methods
The most common detector that on-line TOC analyzers use for source water and drinking wa-
ter analysis is the nondispersive infrared detector.
While the differences in analytical methods employed by different TOC analyzers may be im-
portant in compliance or process monitoring, high levels of precision and the ability to distin-
guish specific organic fractions from a sample may not be required for detection of a potential
chemical threat. Instead, gross deviations from normal TOC concentrations may be the best
indication of a chemical threat to the system (see below).
Sensitivity and Detection Limit
The detection limit for organic carbon depends on the measurement technique used (high or
low temperature) and the type of the analyzer. Because TOC concentrations are simply sur-
rogates that can indicate potential problems in a system, gross changes in these concentra-
tions are the best indicators of potential threats. Therefore, high-sensitivity probes may not be
required for security purposes. However, the following detection limits can be expected:
• High temperature method (between 680°C and 950°C or higher in a few special cases,
best possible oxidation): = 1 mg/L carbon
• Low temperature method (below 100°C, limited oxidation potential): = 0.2 mg/L carbon
Response Time
The response time of a TOC analyzer may vary depending on the manufacturer's specifica-
tions, but it usually takes from 5 to 15 minutes to get a stable, accurate reading.
Maintenance
On-line TOC analyzers are designed to operate in remote locations without continuous surveil-
lance by an operator. However, to operate reliably, the instruments require regular calibration,
inspection, and maintenance by technically skilled personnel. Previous research recommends
that, at a minimum, a weekly check should be done if the analyzer is in a remote location.
Table 1 provides a list of available TOC analyzers and summarizes their important attributes.
96
-------
Table 1 Comparison of Chlorine Measurement Systems
Product | Sensitivity/ Detection Limit
High
Response
Time
HACH / 1950plus On-Line 1 0.015 mg/L for range of 0-5mg/L
TOC Analyzer
High
8 min
I
ISCO / STIP-toc High- : 2 mg/L
Temperature TOC Analyzer
j.
High
3-15 min
;
CO / EZ TOC Low- i 21.5% for 0-75% full scale; 2.5% for 75-100%
Temperature TOC Analyzer full scale
;
High
8 min
Shimadzu TOCN 4000 | Variable. Settings from 0-5 ppm to 0-1000
1 PPM
j
j
High
4 min
Kmar Dohrmann Phoenix 2 ppb - 1000 PPM
8000 UV-Persulfate TOC
Analyzer
High
No Data
Tekmar Dohrmann Apollo 100 ppb- 25,000 PPM
9000/9000 HS Combustion
TOC Analyzer j
High
1-3 min
97
-------
W ATE R A N 0 WASIEW ATER S € C U R I T Y P R O D U C T G UIDE
Sensors for Monitoring Chemical,
Biological, and Radiological
Contamination
O DETECT
O DELAY
O RESPOND
OBJECTIVE
Monitor water samples to detect chemical, biological, or radiological parameters that may represent
threats to the system.
APPLICATION
Can be used to monitor finished water assets (i.e., water distribution system) to detect potential
threats to downstream users introduced to the system after treatment. Can also be use to monitor
water or wastewater influent to detect potential for upset of treatment processes or for potential
pass-through of harmful contaminants.
LOCATION USED
Downstream of potential access to the water distribution system (i.e., downstream of pumping sta-
tions). Also, raw water assets (reservoirs, etc.), influent wet wells (wastewater treatment plants)
or wastewater treatment plant effluent. Monitoring can be at fixed or random locations depending on |
the perceived threat..
Water quality monitoring sensor equipment may be used to monitor key elements of water
or wastewater treatment processes (such as influent water quality, treatment processes, or
effluent water quality) to identify anomalies that may indicate threats to the system. Some
sensors, such as sensors for biological organisms or radiological contaminants, measure
potential contamination directly, while others, particularly some chemical monitoring systems,
measure "surrogate" parameters that may indicate problems in the system but do not iden-
tify sources of contamination directly. In addition, sensors can provide more accurate control
of critical components in water and wastewater systems and may provide a means of early
warning so that the potential effects of certain types of attacks can be mitigated. One advan-
tage of using chemical and biological sensors to monitor for potential threats to water and
wastewater systems is that many utilities already employ sensors to monitor potable water
(raw or finished) or influent/effluent for Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) or Clean Water Act
(CWA) water quality compliance or process control.
Chemical sensors that can be used to identify potential threats to water and wastewater sys-
tems include inorganic monitors (e.g. chlorine analyzer), organic monitors (e.g. total organic
carbon analyzer) and toxicity meters. Radiological meters can be used to measure concentra-
tions of several different radioactive species. Monitors that use biological species can be used
as sentinels for the presence of contaminants of concern, such as toxics. At the present time,
biological monitors are not in widespread use and very few bio-monitors are used by drinking
water utilities in the U.S.
DESCRIPTION
98
-------
Continuous Online Monitoring vs. Grab Sample Analysis
Monitoring can be conducted using either portable or fixed-location sensors. Fixed-location
sensors are usually used as part of a continuous, on-line monitoring system. Continuous moni-
toring has the advantage of enabling immediate notification when there is an upset. However,
the sampling points are fixed and only certain points in the system can be monitored. In addi-
tion, the number of monitoring locations needed to capture the physical, chemical, and biologi-
cal complexity of a system can be prohibitive. The use of portable sensors can overcome this
problem of monitoring many points in the system. Portable sensors can be used to analyze
grab samples at any point in the system, but have the disadvantage that they provide mea-
surements only at one point in time.
Sensor Technology in Water vs. Wastewater Applications
Because of the direct threats to drinking water systems, the chemical, biological, and ra-
diological sensors described in the subsequent Product Guides have primarily been used for
source water and water distribution applications. However, the same technology can also be
used in wastewater security, primarily for detecting disruptions in the treatment process. This
guide on chemical and biological sensors covers the following individual products:
Chemical Sensor - Arsenic Measurement System
Chemical Sensor - Chlorine Measurement System
Chemical Sensor - Total Organic Carbon Analyzer
Radiation Detection Equipment
Radiation Detection Equipment for Monitoring Personnel and Packages
Radiation Detection Equipment for Monitoring Water Assets
Toxicity Monitoring/Toxicity Meters
Chemical Sensor for Toxicity (Adapted BOD Analyzer)
Biological Sensors for Toxicity
99
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
Toxicity Monitoring/Toxicity Meters
0 DETECT
O DELAY
O RESPOND
| OBJECTIVE
! Monitor water samples to detect toxicity.
j APPLICATION
Designed to detect chemical/biological threats to water assets. Current uses are primarily for
wastewater effluent. Can also monitor for toxicity in other water assets (finished drinking water, influ-
ent wastewater, raw water, process streams).
Portable sensors used at critical areas of system; off-line tests/monitoring conducted in laboratory
Toxicity measurement devices measure general toxicity to biological organisms, and detec-
tion of toxicity in any water/wastewater asset can indicate a potential threat, either to the
treatment process (in the case of influent toxicity), to human health (in the case of finished
drinking water toxicity) or to the environment (in the case of effluent toxicity). Currently, whole
effluent toxicity tests (WET tests), in which effluent samples are tested against test organ-
isms, are required of many National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) discharge
permits. The WET tests are used as a complement to the effluent limits on physical and chemi-
cal parameters to assess the overall effects of the discharge on living organisms or aquatic
biota. Toxicity tests may also be used to monitor wastewater influent streams for potential
hazardous contamination, such as organic heavy metals (arsenic, mercury, lead, chromium
and copper) that might upset the treatment process.
• Meters measuring direct biological activity (e.g. luminescent bacteria) and correlating de-
creases in this direct biological activity with increased toxicity; and
• Meters measuring oxygen consumption and correlating decreases in oxygen consumption
with increased toxicity.
I LOCATION USED
OVERVIEW
100
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
Radiation Detection Equipment
OBJECTIVE
Detect radioactive contamination.
APPLICATION
Some types of radiation monitoring equipment can be used to monitor for radioactive contamination
of water assets (e.g., finished water, etc.). Other types of equipment can be used to monitor person-
nel or packages for radioactive contamination.
LOCATION USED
On-line equipment to monitor water assets would be located at critical points in the system, portable
equipment would be used in specific locations as necessary. Equipment used to monitor personnel
or packages for radioactive contamination would be located at building entrances or screening areas.
DESCRIPTION
Radioactive substances (radionuclides) are known health hazards that emit energetic waves
and/or particles that can cause both carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic health effects. Ra-
dionuclides pose unique threats to source water supplies and water treatment, storage, or
distribution systems because radiation emitted from radionuclides in water systems can affect
individuals through several pathways - by direct contact with, ingestion or inhalation of, or ex-
ternal exposure to, the contaminated water. While radiation can occur naturally in some cases
due to the decay of some minerals, intentional and non-intentional releases of man-made
radionuclides into water systems is also a realistic threat.
Threats to water and wastewater facilities from radioactive contami-
nation could involve two major scenarios. First, the facility or its as-
sets could be contaminated, preventing workers from accessing and
operating the facility/assets. Second, at drinking water facilities, the
water supply could be contaminated, and tainted water could be dis-
tributed to users downstream. These two scenarios require different
threat reduction strategies. The first scenario requires that facilities
monitor for radioactive substances being brought on-site; the second
requires that water assets be monitored for radioactive contamina-
tion. While the effects of radioactive contamination are basically the
same under both threat types, each of these threats requires different
types of radiation monitoring and different types of equipment. This
document provides a general discussion of radiation and radiation
monitoring. Specific information on radiation monitoring equipment designed for these two dif-
ferent threat scenarios is provided in the two documents below:
• Radiation Detection Equipment for Monitoring Personnel and Packages
• Radiation Detection Equipment for Monitoring Water Assets
DETECT
DELAY
RESPOND
Ludlum Measurements, Inc.
Portable Scintillation Portal
101
-------
Radioactivity and Radiation Measurements
The most common types of radiation are alpha, beta and gamma radiation.
Alpha emitters emit heavy, positively-charged alpha particles. Many alpha emitters are natu-
rally occurring, but some are man-made. Examples include plutonium, radon, radium, uranium,
and thorium. Alpha radiation is short range (i.e., it can only travel a few centimeters from the
source through air) and it cannot penetrate human skin. Alpha emitters can be a serious health
hazard if they are ingested, such as if they are consumed from radiation-contaminated water.
Beta emitters emit lightweight, negatively-charged particles (electrons). Beta emitters are
primarily man-made and include strontium-90, carbon-14, tritium (H-3), and sulfur-35. Beta
radiation has a medium range (i.e., it can travel several feet from its source through air) and it
has moderate capabilities to penetrate through objects.
Gamma emitters emit very long range electromagnetic radiation, and can be both man-made
and naturally-occurring. Examples of man-made gamma emitters generated by the nuclear
industry include iodine-131, cesium-137, and cobalt-60. Gamma radiation is highly penetrating,
and it can travel through many types of objects, including human skin and clothing. It is effec-
tively shielded or absorbed by materials such as concrete, steel, or lead.
Radiation Monitoring and Radiation Monitoring Equipment
Different types of radiation monitoring instruments have been designed for different purposes.
In general, this equipment is designed to measure either:
• The total amount of radiation emitted from a source (the "gross" radiation); or
• The specific type and energy level of radiation emitted from a source.
For example, if a utility wished to determine whether there was elevated radiation from some
source, they would most likely use some type of "screening"-type equipment to measure
the gross radiation from the source. If a high level of radiation was detected, the utility may
identify individual species of radionuclides and their energy levels using equipment specifically
designed for this purpose. This would allow the calculation of radiation doses and exposure
levels and an evaluation of the potential health effects of the radiation exposure.
While the goals of the radiation monitoring influence the type of analysis
to be done, other factors also affect the specific type of equipment to be
used to conduct the monitoring. Different types of radiation have unique
properties (i.e., particle vs. wave radiation, ability of different types of
radiation to penetrate different materials, distance that different forms
of radiation travel from their source, interaction of radiation with matter,
and the unique energy signatures of different types of radiation), and
therefore radiation detection instrumentation is somewhat specific to
the radiation to be detected. For example, survey meters such as Gei-
ger-Mueller (GM) counters allow the rapid evaluation of different types of
radiation from solid surfaces. Therefore, these GM meters are appropriate
for evaluation of radioactive spills. However, due to the fact that water is
Ludlum Measurements. Inc.
Geiger Mueller Meter
102
-------
not a smooth surface, and because alpha and beta emissions are relatively short range and
can be attenuated within the water, these types of instruments are not suitable for measuring
alpha or beta radiation in water samples. A more appropriate method for measuring alpha and
beta radiation in water is in a laboratory setting with a liquid scintillation counter. While field
measurements of gamma radiation in water may be easier to accomplish than field measure-
ments of alpha or beta radiation in water, they still may not be highly accurate. For example,
gamma emissions may be attenuated by the sample container and/or the water itself, reduc-
ing the efficiency of the detection device.
With all of these factors affecting the appropriate choice of radiation monitoring equipment,
choosing the appropriate instrument to achieve an individual's monitoring goals can be a daunting
task. Therefore, it may be appropriate to consult an expert in radiation monitoring to ensure that
the goals of any radiation monitoring program are met (i.e., to ensure that the appropriate type of
radiation is measured and that the appropriate type of instrumentation is used).
Radiation Monitoring - Evaluating Overall Radioactivity
As discussed above, different equipment has been developed to evaluate gross radiation vs.
specific radionuclides. For security monitoring purposes, it may be most appropriate to ini-
tially evaluate the overall radiation from a source, whether it be a package coming into the
plant or a water sample from a drinking water reservoir. Should elevated levels of radiation be
detected, additional measurements can be made to identify the specific radionuclides present.
Therefore, this document will focus on detection devices that are used to perform screening-
type measurements for gross levels of radiation.
Radiation Measurements
Radioactivity is expressed in the number of disintegrations per unit time. For example, 1
becquerel (Bq) is 1 disintegration per second, and 1 curie (Ci) is 3.7 x 1010 disintegrations
per second. However, due to various physical and statistical factors related to detection
efficiency, determining the actual number of disintegrations per unit time is almost impos-
sible. For example, measuring the actual radiation from a source would require one hundred
percent efficiency in measuring all alpha, beta, and gamma emissions, which are radiating in
every direction from the source. This would require a detector that would completely surround
the sample and could capture a large range of energies from an unlimited number of sample
shapes and physical properties within a defined distance from the sample. Therefore, radiation
emissions are typically measured as counts per minute (cpm), which takes into account the
detection efficiency of the instrument.
Operational Parameters
As discussed above, the most important factor in purchasing any radiation monitoring equip-
ment is ensuring that the equipment is appropriate for the type of survey being conducted.
There are many different detection methods available for different types of radiation, and thus
individual users must determine the appropriate equipment for their needs. Other factors in
choosing the appropriate equipment are the local conditions at the site (i.e., temperature,
humidity), and the specific properties of the radionuclides at the site.
103
-------
Department of Energy (DOE)/Department of Justice (DOJ) Equipment Program
The U.S. DOE is working with the U.S. DOJ to make older-generation equipment available to
emergency preparedness organizations in major U.S. cities. Types of radiological instrumenta-
tion redeployed through this program include portable instrument probes (e.g., GM counters
and alpha and gamma scintillators) and self-reading pocket dosimeters (dosimeters are used
to track an individual's exposure levels, and they are not discussed in this document). Starting
in April 2003, DOE formally transferred excess radiological detection instrumentation to cities
across the country through the Homeland Defense Equipment Reuse (HDER) Program.
104
-------
WATER AND WASTEWATER SECURITY PRODUCT GUIDE
Radiation Detection Equipment for *
Monitoring Personnel and Packages o respond
| OBJECTIVE
j Monitor facility entrances to detect radioactive substances.
| APPLICATION
j Radiation detection equipment can be implemented at entrances to buildings and facilities to detect
! radioactive substances that are being brought into the facility
I
i LOCATION USED
Equipment to monitor personnel for radioactive substances would be located at entrance points to
the facility, or at entrance points to sensitive locations within the facility.
DESCRIPTION
One of the major potential threats facing water and wastewater facilities is contamination by
radioactive substances. Radioactive substances brought on-site at a facility could be used to
contaminate the facility, thereby preventing workers from safely entering the facility to perform
necessary water treatment tasks. In addition, radioactive substances brought on-site at a
water treatment plant could be discharged into the water source or the distribution system,
contaminating the downstream water supply. Therefore, detection of radioactive substances
being brought on-site can be an important security enhancement.
The basic principles of radiation and radiation detection are described in the Radiation Detec-
tion Equipment Product Guide. As described in that document, different radionuclides have
unique properties, and different equipment is required to detect different types of radiation.
However, as is also discussed in that document, it is impractical and potentially unnecessary
to monitor for specific radionuclides being brought on-site Instead, for security purposes, it
may be more useful to monitor for gross radiation as an indicator of unsafe substances. An
expanded discussion of the pluses and minuses of monitoring for gross radiation vs. specific
radionuclides can be found in the document cited above.
In order to protect against these radioactive materials being brought on-site, a facility may
set up monitoring sites outfitted with radiation detection instrumentation at entrances to the
facility. Depending on the specific types of equipment chosen, this equipment would detect
radiation emitted from people, packages, or other objects being brought through an entrance.
Specific discussions regarding the differences in implementafion/detection and effectiveness
of the different types of monitoring equipment are provided under the Attributes and Features
section below.
ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES
One of the primary differences between the different types of detection equipment is the
means by which the equipment reads the radiation. Radiation may either be detected by direct
measurement or through sampling.
105
-------
Direct radiation measurement involves measuring radiation through an external probe on the
detection instrumentation. Some direct measurement equipment detects radiation emitted
into the air around the monitored object. Because this equipment detects radiation in the air,
it does not require that the monitoring equipment make physical contact with the monitored
object. Direct means for detecting radiation include using a walk-through portal-type monitor
that would detect elevated radiation levels on a person or in a package, or by using a hand-
held detector, which would be moved or swept over individual objects to locate a radioactive
source.
As described above, some types of radiation, such as alpha or low energy beta radiation,
have a short range and are easily shielded by various materials. These types of radiation
cannot be measured through direct measurement. Instead, they must be measured through
sampling. Sampling involves wiping the surface to be tested with a special filter cloth, and
then reading the cloth in a special counter. For example, specialized smear counters measure
alpha and low energy beta radiation.
Examples of both direct measurement and sampling equipment are described in more detail
below.
Portal Monitors
Portal monitors can be used at facility entrances, or at entrances
to locations within facilities that require extra security (for example,
pump houses, etc.). Portal monitors are designed to monitor for
gamma radiation only or for high-energy beta and gamma radiation.
Because of their limited range in air and other materials, low-energy
beta and alpha radiation are typically not detected by these monitors.
Portal monitors may be stationary or portable. Stationary portal moni-
tors (See Figure) are heavy and more expensive than are portable por-
tal monitors, but their increased shielding relative to portable portals
lowers the amount of background radiation detected by the portal,
and therefore increases the instrument's sensitivity. Portable portal
monitors are generally less expensive than the stationary models, which allows for greater
flexibility in their use, but they are less sensitive than stationary models.
Ludlum M-53 Portal Monitor
Hand-Held Instruments
An additional option for scanning personnel or packages enter-
ing a facility is to monitor them using hand-held monitors. For
example, survey instruments such as a Geiger-Mueller (GM) de-
tector (See Figure) can be used to frisk personnel or equipment
. .... , . . . . .. .. .. Ludlum Handheld M-44-9 Pancake
entering a facility for alpha, beta, and/or gamma radiation. GM GM Detector
detectors and meters and similar survey instruments are manu-
factured by several companies, are generally easy to use, and are relativity inexpensive. Using
this type of smaller, hand-held equipment may allow for more flexibility in frisking personnel
coming through an entrance and in pinpointing the location of a radioactive source than does
a portal monitor. However, the smaller probe size of a handheld monitor vs. a portal would
also result in an increased monitoring time.
106
-------
Hand and Shoe Monitors
Specially designed hand and shoe monitors are available to detect alpha, beta, and/or gamma
radiation on a person's hands or feet. To use this equipment, personnel to be scanned are
required to stand on a platform and simultaneously place their hands in another part of the
detector. While this type of detector may give highly accurate readings, it can also be time-
consuming to screen all personnel coming into a facility. The adjacent figure shows a typical
hand/foot monitor.
Smear Counters
As described in the Radiation Detection Equipment Product Guide, alpha and
low energy beta radiation does not travel very far in air, and can be shielded
or blocked by many types of materials. Therefore, equipment that is more
sensitive to alpha and low energy beta radiation, such as a smear coun-
ter (See Figure), may be required to detect these types of radiation. Smear
counters require that a sample (or a "smear") be taken from the object or
person being monitored. The smear sample is
taken by wiping a small cloth filter over a certain
area on a surface. The smear filter is then placed
in a specially designed smear sample counter, and is read over a
specific period of time (typically 1-30 minutes, depending on the
required sensitivity). Alpha/beta smear sample counters are typi-
cally portable, so the analysis does not necessarily need to take
place at the location where the sample was taken
Ludlum M-49-12-1 Hand
and Shoe Monitor
Ludlum M-2929 Alpha/Beta
Scaler
Appropriate devices for detecting various types of radiation is summarized in Table l below.
Table 1: Instruments for Measuring Different Types of Radiation at Facility Entrances
Instrument
Cost
GM Probe and Meter (alpha, beta, and gamma radiation)
$500 - $700
Portal Monitor (beta and gamma radiation)
$9,000 - $25,000
Hand/Shoe Monitor (alpha and beta radiation)
$9,000 - $25,000
Smear Counter (alpha and beta radiation)
$800 - $5,000
Smear Filters (box of 250)
$25-$50
107
-------
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
Technical Associates
7051 Eton Avenue
Conogo Park, California 91303
(818) 883-7043
www.tech-associates.com
LAURUS Systems, Inc
8779 Autumn Hill Drive
Ellicott City, Maryland 21043
(410) 465-5558
www.laurussystems.com
Environmental Restoration Group, Inc.
8809 Washington St. NE - Suite 150
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87113
(505) 298-4224
www.ergotfice.com
Canberra, Inc.
Radiation Monitoring Systems
800 Research Parkway
Meriden, Connecticut 06450
(423) 282-4621
www.canberra.com/homeland.htm
Saint-Gobain Crystals & Detectors
1655 Townhurst Drive
Houston, Texas 77043
(281) 355-1033
www.detectors.saint-gobain.com
Ludlum Measurements, Inc.
P.O. Box 810
501 Oak Street
Sweetwater, Texas 79556
(800) 622-0828
www.ludlums.com
108
-------
Radiation Detection Equipment
for Monitoring Water Assets
O DETECT
O delay
O RESPOND
OBJECTIVE
Monitor water samples to detect radioactive contamination.
APPLICATION
Primarily finished water assets. Can also monitor for contamination of other water assets (influent/
effluent wastewater, raw water, process streams).
LOCATION USED
On-line equipment to monitor water assets would be located at critical points in the system; por-
table equipment would be used in specific locations as necessary.
Most water systems are required to monitor for radioactivity and certain radionuclides, and to
meet Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) for these contaminants, to comply with the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Currently, EPA requires drinking water to meet MCLs for beta/pho-
ton emitters (includes gamma radiation), alpha particles, combined radium 226/228, and
uranium. However, this monitoring is required only at entry points into the system. In addition,
after the initial sampling requirements, only one sample is required every 3 to 9 years, depend-
ing on the contaminant type and the initial concentrations.
While this is adequate to monitor for long-term protection from overall radioactivity and spe-
cific radionuclides in drinking water, it may not be adequate to identify short-term spikes in
radioactivity, such as from spills, accidents, or intentional releases. In addition, compliance
with the SDWA requires analyzing water samples in a laboratory, which results in a delay in re-
ceiving results. In contrast, security monitoring is more effective when results can be obtained
quickly in the field. In addition, monitoring for security purposes does not necessarily require
that the specific radionuclides causing the contamination be identified. Thus, for security
purposes, it may be more appropriate to monitor for non radionuclide-specific radiation using
either portable field meters, which can be used as necessary to evaluate grab samples, or on-
line systems, which can provide continuous monitoring of a system. This document will focus
on field meters and on-line systems that can be used in the field to provide quick, nonspecific
measurements of radiation.
Radiation Detection Equipment
Ideally, measuring radioactivity in water assets in the field would involve minimal sampling and
sample preparation. However, the physical properties of specific types of radiation combined
with the physical properties of water make evaluating radioactivity in water assets in the field
somewhat difficult. For example, alpha particles can only travel short distances and they
cannot penetrate through most physical objects. Therefore, instruments designed to evaluate
alpha emissions must be specially designed to capture emissions at a short distance from the
DESCRIPTION
109
-------
Gamma radiation does not have the same types of physical properties, and thus it can be
measured using different detectors.
Measuring different types of radiation is further complicated by the relationship between the
radiation's intrinsic properties and the medium in which the radiation is being measured. For
example, gas-flow proportional counters are typically used to evaluate gross alpha and beta
radiation from smooth, solid surfaces, but due to the fact that water is not a smooth surface,
and because alpha and beta emissions are relatively short range and can be attenuated with-
in the water, these types of counters are not appropriate for measuring alpha and beta activity
in water. An appropriate method for measuring alpha and beta radiation in water is by using a
liquid scintillation counter. However, this requires mixing an aliquot of water with a liquid scin-
tillation "cocktail." The liquid scintillation counter is a large, sensitive piece of equipment, so
it is not appropriate for field use. Therefore, measurements for alpha and beta radiation from
water assets are not typically made in the field.
Unlike the problems associated with measuring alpha and beta activity in water in the field,
the properties of gamma radiation allow it to be measured relatively well in water samples in
the field. The standard instrumentation used to measure gamma radiation from water samples
in the field is a sodium iodide (Nal) scintillator. This information is summarized in Table 1
below.
Table 1: Instruments for Measuring Different Types of Radiation
in Water Assets in the Field
Radltation Type
Appropriate Field Detection Device
Alpha
N/A (liquid scintillation may be done quickly in the lab)
Beta
N/A (liquid scintillation may be done quickly in the lab)
Gamma
Sodium iodide scintillation survey meter
Although the devices outlined above are the most commonly used for evaluating total alpha,
beta, and gamma radiation, other methods and other devices can be used. In addition, local
conditions (i.e., temperature, humidity) or the properties of the specific radionuclides emit-
ting the radiation may make other types of devices or other methods more optimal to achieve
the goals of the survey than the devices noted above. Therefore, experts or individual vendors
should be consulted to determine the appropriate measurement device for any specific appli-
cation.
Continuous Online Monitoring vs. Grab Sample Analysis
The section above described the different detection methods and
equipment available to monitor radiation. An additional factor to
consider when developing a program to monitor for radioactive
contamination in water assets is whether to take regular grab
samples or sample continuously. For example, portable sensors
can be used to analyze grab samples at any point in the system, Technical Associates medast
110
-------
but have the disadvantage that they provide measurements only at one point in time. On the
other hand, fixed-location sensors are usually used as part of a continuous, on-line monitor-
ing system. These systems continuously monitor a water asset, and could be outfitted with
some type of alarm system that would alert operators if radiation increased above d certain
threshold. However, the sampling points are fixed and only certain points in the system can be
monitored. In addition, the number of monitoring locations needed to capture the physical and
radioactive complexity of a system can be prohibitive.
On-line instruments for monitoring alpha, beta, and gamma radiation in water assets have
been developed, although there are a limited number of these currently available. Technical
Associates offers the SSS-33-5FT, which is a continuous flow-through scintillation detection
system for alpha, beta, and gamma radiation; and the MEDA-5T, which is designed for con-
tinuous gamma radiation monitoring. Both are outfitted with alarms that will be triggered if the
radiation exceeds a certain threshold. Canberra has developed several on-line radiation moni-
toring systems, including the 0LM-100 On-Line Liquid Monitoring System, which is an on-line
monitor attached to a pipe that is designed to continuously measure the quantity of radioac-
tive gamma isotopes in the liquid stream; and the ILM-100, which is a similar system that
is installed within the pipe system. Canberra's 4Pi series offers on-line gamma or beta and
gamma analysis using a specialized 3- or 4-Pi geometry monitor to enhance the effectiveness
of the evaluation, while the LEMS-600 series offers continuous off-line evaluation of beta and
gamma radiation. In addition, the Department of Energy (DOE) has tested a prototype on-line
real-time alpha radiation detection instrument. Development of this technology was moved to
the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 2001. Other applications of small-scale flow-through
scintillation technology are being developed for field measurements of alpha, beta, and gam-
ma radiation. In most cases, utilities interested in on-line monitors for radionuclides/radiooctiv-
ity will need to work with a manufacturer to configure a custom monitor adapted from moni-
tors intended for small-scale applications.
Because of the limited number and high costs of on-line analyzers, they may be of limited use
for most facilities. Therefore, the regular analysis of grab samples for alpha, beta, and gamma
activity may be more appropriate for many facilities.
ATTRIBUTES AND FACILITIES
In addition to choosing the most appropriate type of equipment for the evaluation to be per-
formed, there are other important factors in choosing the specific type of detector. Among
these other important features of individual radiation detectors are their specificity and their
sensitivity. These attributes are discussed in more detail below.
Specificity
Specificity is the ability of an instrument to quantify or evaluate the specific type of radiation or
radionuclide for which it is designed without interference from other radiation or radionuclides.
Such interference could lead to false conclusions about the nature and extent of potential
radioactive contamination.
A general discussion of the sensitivities of the instruments summarized in Table 1 above is
provided in Table 2 below. This information is summarized from the MARSSIM.
Ill
-------
Table 2: Summary of Specificity of Survey Equipment
Scanning Device
Evaluation of Specificity
Liquid scintillation counter (alpha, beta
radiation)
This method is extremely flexible and accurate when used with
proper calibration and compensation for quenching effects
(compensating for the fact that the full energy pulse may not
reach the photo-multiplier detector). Quantitative determination
of complex multi-energy beta spectra is possible because energy
spectra are 10 to TOO times broader than gamma spectra.
Sodium iodide scintillation survey meter
(gamma radiation)
Some meters have the ability to analyze at selected ranges
of gamma energies, which can allow for the preliminary
identification of specific isotopes
Sensitivity
The Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM, EPA 402-R-97-
016, August, 2000), which was developed as a multi-agency document by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the DOE, the Department of Defense, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, defines the detection sensitivity of a given radiation measurement system as the
radiation level or quantity of radioactive material that can be measured or detected with some
estimated level of confidence. MARSSIM continues on to note that an instrument's sensitivity
is a factor of both the instrumentation and the technique or procedure being used to measure
the radiation. As described above, different types of radiation detection devices are designed
for different purposes, and thus their sensitivities and detection limits will be very different and
will reflect the purposes for which they were designed. However, a general discussion of the
sensitivities of the instruments summarized in Table 1 above is provided in Table 3 below. This
information is summarized from MARSSIM.
Table 3: Summary of Sensitivity of Survey Equipment
Scanning Device
Evaluation of Specificity
Liquid scintillation counter (alpha, beta
radiation)
Ideal for moderate to high energy beta emitters, as well as alpha
emitters, because pulse shape discrimination allows different
radiation types to be distinguished easily.
Sodium iodide scintillation survey meter
(gamma radiation)
Minimum sensitivity is 200-1,000 cpm, lower in digital integrate
mode.
On-line Systems
The sensitivity/detection limit of Canberra's OLM-lOO On-line Liq-
uid Monitoring System (which detects gamma radiation) depends
on a preset Lower Limit of Detection (LLD) and normal back-
ground.
Canberra, Inc. OLM-lOO System,
Clamp-On Configuration
112
-------
Installation and Maintenance
While certain radiation detectors are "maintenance free" in design, specialized expertise is
usually needed for installation, setup, and routine calibration of radiation monitoring equip-
ment, whether it is field survey detectors or on-line monitoring equipment.
COST
TMARSSIM also provides rough equipment costs for radiation detection equipment summarized
in Tables 1-3.
Table 4: Summary of Instrumentation Costs
Instrument
Cost
Liquid scintillation counter (alpha, beta radiation)
$20,000-$ 70,000
Sodium iodide scintillation survey meter (gamma radiation)
$2,000
Depending on the size of pipe for a specific application, the price of Canberra's ILM and
OLM-lOO On-line Liquid Monitoring Systems range from $35,000 to $75,000, with the OLM
system in the lower part of the range because it can be clamped onto an existing pipe, and
the ILM system closer to the higher end of the range because it must be fitted into the pipe.
A major factor in determining the cost is the pipe size. The larger the pipe size, the higher the
cost because of the added expense of ensuring that the detector is properly fitted into the
pipe. However, the manufacturer notes that both systems can be fitted into inch to 16 inch
pipes. Canberra's 4Pi series ranges from $60,000-$ 130,000, while the LEMS system is in the
$100,000-$ 150,000 range. Technical Associate's MEDA-5T for continuous gamma radiation
monitoring costs approximately $20,000, while the SSS-33-5FT continuous flow-through scin-
tillation detection system for alpha, beta, and gamma radiation costs approximately $58,000.
VENDORS
Disclaimer: The information provided in this guide does not constitute an endorsement by the Environmental
Protection Agency of any non-Federal entity, its products or its services. In addition, EPA does not endorse
the vendors and products listed on this site. EPA is publishing lists of vendors on this site in an effort to further
public awareness of vendors identified as possible contacts for further information and possible purchase of
the different types of security equipment. The Agency has selected the listed vendors on that basis. The list of
vendors is not a complete list, and EPA does not endorse the products or services of these vendors.
Technical Associates
7051 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, California 91303
(818) 883-7043
www. tech-ass ociates.com
Canberra, Inc.
Radiation Monitoring Systems
800 Research Parkway
Meriden, Connecticut 06450
(423) 282-4621
www.canberra.com/homeland.htm
Mineralab, Inc.
2860 W. Live Oak Drive
Prescott, Arizona 86305
(800) 818-3811
www.geigercounters.com
Ludlum Measurements, Inc.
P.O. Box 810
501 Oak Street
Sweetwater, Texas 79556
(800) 622-0828
www.ludlums.com
113
-------
IN/US Systems, Inc.
5809 North 50th Street
Tampa, Florida 33610
(813) 626-6848
www.inus.com ¦
Saint-Gobain Crystals & Detectors
1655 Townhurst Drive
Houston. Texas 77043
(281) 355-1033
www.detectors.saint-gobain.com
------- |