NUREG-1634
EPA903-K-98-002
1997 Lost Source Exercise
An Exercise of Radiological Response Through
Cooperation and Coordination of Local, State
and Federal Agency Resources Under the
National Contingency Plan
Prepared by
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
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NUREG-1634
EPA903-K-98-002
1997 Lost Source Exercise
An Exercise of Radiological Response Through
Cooperation and Coordination of Local, State
and Federal Agency Resources Under the
National Contingency Plan
Manuscript Completed: June 1998
Date Published: August 1998
Prepared by
B. Belanger, B. Steuteville, EPA
D. Chawaga, E. Weinstein, NRC
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region in
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Philadelphia, PA 19103-2029
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ABSTRACT
This report describes an exercise conducted
by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) Region HI and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region I
with the assistance of the Department of
Energy (DOE), the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and Chester County, PA. The
exercise took place on September 30, 1997
and October 22, 1997. It demonstrated an
emergency response and source recovery
operation involving the private sector,
county government and state government,
utilizing federal assistance from multiple
federal agencies. The federal assistance
was provided under the National
contingency Plan (NCP) using the
notification and communications procedures
as described in the Federal Radiological
Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). The
FRERP identifies the EPA as the Lead
Federal Agency (LFA) under certain
circumstances. These circumstances include
events where radioactive materials licensed
by the NRC are involved but the identity of
the licensee is unknown. This designation
from the FRERP was used as a model in this
simulated NCP response. This report shows
how such a response would be conducted,
and may be useful for training in emergency
response and as a blueprint for future
exercises of similar nature.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract iii
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction 1
Participating Organizations 2
Purpose of the Report 3
Organization of the Report .. 4
Overview of the Public Domain Response 4
Exercise Objectives 5
Summary of the Tabletop Exercise and Lessons Learned 6
Summary of the Field Exercise and Lessons Learned 8
Exercise Accomplishments 10
Discussion and Recommendations 11
APPENDICES
A Exercise Scenario 12
Part 1 - Tabletop Exercise (September 30, 1997) 13
Background Conditions 13
Initiating Event 14
Timeline 14
Part 2- Field Exercise (October 22, 1977) 18
Initial Conditions 18
Health Physics 18
Source Recovery 19
B Controller Messages - Day One 21
C Exercise Guidelines and Ground Rules used for this Exercise 24
D Exercise Critique 28
Individual Statements on Lessons Learned 28
Tabletop Exercise Participant Comments 30
Field Exercise Participant Comments 31
v
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
Page
E Exercise Planning Committee Members 33
F Participants in the 1997 Lost Source Exercise 34
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Lost Source Exercise was conceived
and organized by Bill Belanger of the U. S.
Environmental protection Agency (EPA),
Region m and David Chawaga of the U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
Region I. Special thanks go to Eric
Weinstein of NRC's Office for Analysis and
Evaluation Operational Data (AEOD), who
facilitated the exercise and who contributed
the basic organization of the tabletop
exercise. Special thanks also go to Bill
Steuteville of EPA Region HI, who also
facilitated the exercise and contributed the
basic understanding of the authorities and
procedures for the National Contingency
Plan as it applies to radioactive materials. In
addition, the authors would like to thank
PECO Energy Company for generously
providing the facilities where the exercise
was held, as well as the U. S. Department of
Energy (DOE) Brookhaven National
Laboratory Radiation Assistance Program
(RAP) Team for their technical assistance.
Finally the authors would like to thank
Browning Ferris Industries, Inc. (BFI) for
adding to the realism of the source recovery.
Other members of the Exercise Planning
Committee included Doug Broaddus, US
NRC Office of Nuclear Materials Safety
Safeguards; Steve Centore, DOE
Brookhaven Laboratory; Frank Costello,
NRC Region I; Randy Easton, PA DEP;
Tom Hugh es, PEMA; John McGrath, NRC
Region I; Michael Shuler, PECO Nuclear,
and James Yusko, PA Department of
Environmental Protection Southwest
Region. The exercise would not have been
possible without their participation.
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INTRODUCTION
During the mid to late 1990s, radiation
detection systems have been installed in
increasing numbers at waste disposal and
processing facilities, as well as scrap metal
facilities. During this time the States, the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
the U.S. Environmental protection Agency
have noticed a significant increase in the
number radiation alarms reported by these
facilities. This increase most likely reflects
an increase in the number of radiation
detectors present at waste disposal and scrap
metal facilities rather than an increase in the
amount of uncontrolled radioactive material.
Nonetheless, there is a significant potential
for radioactive sources to find their way into
commerce, which NRC is working to
reduce. Examples of these "lost sources"
include the following.
In August of 1996, workers removed a
radioactive gauge containing americium-241
from an industrial process in Racine,
Wisconsin. The Radiation Safety Officer
did not discover the unauthorized removal of
the gauge until November of that year. The
source was never recovered, and the licensee
believes it was sent to a landfill.
In September, 1997 a radiography camera
was reported missing. The camera was
located in a pickup truck and the truck was
stolen. The incident happened near Tulsa,
Oklahoma. The camera was subsequently
recovered and was intact, but there had been
the potential for it to enter the waste stream
or the scrap metal market. Loss of a source
of this type is the basis for the data used in
the Lost Source Exercise.
In September of 1997, an americium-241
gauge was removed from an assembly line in
Allentown, Pennsylvania. In this incident,
the gauge found its way to an automotive
scrap metal facility. Unlike the 1996
incident, the gauge went through the metal
shredder and the container was breached.
This resulted in approximately 40 cubic
yards of contaminated waste, as well as'the
ruptured source, which the Department of
Energy removed for disposal. This incident
was noteworthy because, in responding to
the State request for assistance, Federal
Agencies followed the procedures described
in this exercise.
In all, during 1996 (the latest year available
at the time of this writing), NRC's Office for
Analysis of Operational Data reported 88
incidents where there was a loss of control
of NRC licensed material, and 76 similar
incidents of agreement-state licensed
material. In the April 1995 and March 1998
issues of Health Physics, Lubenau and
Yusko describe the occurrence of
radioactive materials in recycled metals.
While the regulatory agencies may be able to
reduce the number of incidents where there
is a loss of control over radioactive
materials, there will always be a potential for
radioactive materials to enter the waste and
scrap metal operations. It is not practical to
reduce human error to zero and there are
also foreign sources where United States
regulatory agencies have no authority.
Certain radioactive substances can also enter
the public domain legally, as when a radio-
pharmaceutical leaves the hospital in the
body of a patient. This presents a wide
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spectrum of potential alarm situations, all of
which must be addressed in some way.
Radiation alarms at waste facilities often are
attributable to contamination from short-
lived medical isotopes or involve small
quantities of radioactive material lost,
stolen, or otherwise released by the private
sector. Similarly, alarms received from
scrap metal facilities may result from
inadvertent disposal of radioactive source
materials along with scrap metal. The
appropriate response to such incidents often
involves isolating the material and holding it
for a few days, weeks, or months until the
material adequately decays. Other
circumstances require provisions for long-
term cleanup, storage, and/or disposal of
radiological material. In either case, the
facility may return the material to its owner
(or last known point of origin) as long as the
shipment conforms to Department of
Transportation regulations. The facility may
also ship the material to a radioactive waste
disposal facility. Since these and other
incidences involving radioactive materials
may pose a threat to health and safety,
government agencies, (including DOE, EPA,
NRC and the States) must be prepared to
quickly and appropriately respond through
predictable and consistent means.
Responding to these alarms imposes a
significant burden on State resources, and
can, in turn, impose a burden on Federal
Agencies responding to State requests for
assistance. The States are requesting EPA
and NRC and DOE assistance in these
response activities, and so the Federal
agencies are also being affected by the
increased burden.
EPA and NRG and DOE share responsibility
for radiological incidents in the private
sector and public domain and are natural
partners in radiological response. The
Federal Radiological Emergency Response
Plan (FRERP), dated May 8, 1996,
designates a Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for
all types of radiological responses to
emergencies. For example, the EPA is the
designated LFA for responses to emergencies
in which sources are of unknown,
unlicenced, or foreign origin. By contrast,
the NRC is the designated LFA for
responding to incidents involving materials
licensed by the NRC or an Agreement State.
The DOE maintains an independent
Radiological Assistance Program which may
respond to State requests for assistance
independently or as part of the FRERP.
The EPA also has the ability to respond
pursuant to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, of 1980 (CERCLA), as
amended, and the National Contingency
Plan (NCP) adopted under CERCLA
authority. CERCLA and the NCP give EPA
broad funding and response authority to
protect the health and welfare of the public
and the environment.
The Lost Source Exercise, conducted in
Coatesville, PA in September and October
of 1997, was an opportunity for the EPA and
the NRC to coordinate their response efforts
with those of DOE and state and local
officials to address a public domain incident
using FRERP and NCP authorities. This
exercise examined the ways that Federal
assistance can be provided to state and local
officials by the EPA, NRC, DOE pursuant to
the FRERP and NCP during a public
domain, private sector incident.
Participating Organizations (in
alphabetical order)
1. Browning Ferris Industries, Inc. (BFI)
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2. Chester County Emergency Management
Agency
3. Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA)
4. PECO Energy Corporation (formerly
Philadelphia Electric Company)
5. Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection (PA DEP)
6. Pennsylvania Emergency Management
Agency (PEMA)
7. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense
Nuclear Weapons School
8. U.S. Department of Energy, Brookhaven
Radiological Assistance Program (BNL
RAP)
9. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)
10. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC)
Purpose of the Report
This report documents The Lost Source
Exercise conducted by EPA Region EI and
NRC Region I on September 30 and
October 22, 1997. This exercise
demonstrated an emergency response and
source recovery operation conducted by state
and county government, as well as the
private sector, utilizing assistance from a
variety of Federal agencies. The Federal
assistance was provided under the NCP,
using the FRERP notification and
communications procedures and LFA
designation as a model. This report shows
how such a response would be conducted,
and may be useful for training related to
emergency response.
Most participants also urged that similar
exercises be conducted on a regular basis in
other locations throughout the country. This
report provides the information needed to
facilitate such exercises, including details
concerning the exercise scenario, guidelines
and ground rules (provided in the
appendices to this report.)
This exercise provided also demonstrated
the EPA Radiological Emergency Response
Plan (RERP) for Region IE as well as the
necessary interfaces with the other Federal
agencies. This demonstration includes the
use of the NCP On-Scene Coordinator
(OSC), a Superfund employee, in the role of
the On-Scene Commander as defined in the
FRERP. Until this exercise, these roles were
not thought to be the same. When EPA is the
LFA, the FRERP On-Scene Commander
was envisioned as coming from the EPA
Radiation Program, not the Superfund
Program. EPA Region HI now uses the NCP
in addressing radiation incidents. Other EPA
Regions may wish to consider this approach
on the basis of the exercise results
documented in this report.
The exercise also demonstrated what the
NRC should expect from the EPA as the
other EPA Regions adopt an approach
similar to the Region HI RERP. It also gave
the NRC an opportunity to observe the
Unified Command approach employed by
the EPA's OSC, and it demonstrated what
the NRC is expected to contribute to provide
an appropriate level of support to the EPA
and ultimately the State and local
organizations in a response where EPA is
the LFA.
Other participants, including the State
Radiation and Emergency Management
Officials in attendance and several Federal
agencies, were unfamiliar with the role the
NCP and the NCP OSC could play in
responding to a radiological incident. Tliis
exercise provided an opportunity for the
participants to understand the new
capabilities that are available by utilizing the
NCP as a radiological incident response
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mechanism. It also demonstrated the
Federal resources that are available for use
in responding to a materials incident, and
allowed the participants to see a simulated
source recovery operation.
Organization of the Report
This report comprises seven main sections,
including the Introduction, Overview of the
Public Domain Response, Exercise
Objectives, Summary of the Tabletop
Exercise and Lessons Learned, Summary of
the Field Exercise and Lessons Learned,
Exercise Accomplishments, and Discussion
and Recommendations. Appendices provide
the detailed scenario and agenda used for the
exercise, controller messages, guidelines and
ground rules, a summary of the exercise
critique by participants, lists of exercise
planning committee members and
participants, and a list of abbreviations used
in this report. The appendices give
sufficient information to repeat the exercise
in other locations. Some information
contained in the tabletop and Held exercise
summaries is repeated in the appendices for
the convenience of the reader.
Overview of the Public Domain Response
The EPA and the NRC conceived and
conducted the Lost Source exercise to
demonstrate the capability to mount a
regional multi-agency response to a
radioactive material release in the public
domain, since such releases in the public
domain pose a different set of problems than
those involving a fixed nuclear facility. In
the public domain, there is no advance
knowledge of where a release might occur,
and the identity of the licensee or
responsible party might not be known or the
licensee might not have the ability to
maintain financial responsibility. By
contrast, releases at a fixed facility usually
originate from a point somewhere within the
facility, and the fixed facility has a known
licensee or responsible party who can be
held responsible for cleanup activities.
Consequently, for releases in the public
domain where the identity of the licensee is
unknown or where the material is of foreign
origin, the FRERP designates the EPA as the
lead Federal agency.
The purpose of this exercise, the multi-
agency response to an incident in the public
domain involved EPA Region HI, NRC
Region I, the DOE Brookhaven RAP team,
Pennsylvania DEP and PEMA (the
cognizant State agencies in this case) local
officials and commercial industry
representatives. Representatives from
FEMA and the DOD Defense Nuclear
Weapons School observed the exercise and
discussed the capabilities which could be
provided by their agencies. The response
was conducted at the regional level for two
reasons. First, the EPA Region HI RERP
was unique when the exercise was
conducted, because it included radiological
incident response under the NCP. The nine
other EPA regional offices had not yet
incorporated similar provisions. Second, the
size and nature of the release were chosen to
require only a response on the regional level,
a situation which is typical of most releases
in the public domain. The regional response
reflected the provisions of the FRERP,
while also examining resources available
through the NCP that may be appropriate
with the EPA as the designated LFA. Also,
the reader should note that, in playing the
cognizant state government, Pennsylvania
represented the necessary interface between
the Federal government and any State
involved in a given incident.
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In addition to demonstrating multi-agency
response capability, the Lost Source
Exercise yielded a number of ancillary
benefits. For example, this exercise gave
participants the opportunity to review
current incident response plans, which are
geared to the FRERP, and to determine how
those plans may need to be better integrated
with the NCP. In particular, this exercise
examined the process for determining LFA
responsibilities and other agency support
activities. This is important, since the recent
revisions to the FRERP have not otherwise
been exercised under conditions involving a
spill of radiological material of unknown
ownership licensed under the Atomic
Energy Act (AEA), with the EPA designated
as LFA. In that capacity, the EPA's primary
intent is to coordinate Federal response and
assistance activities from the scene.
The Lost Source exercise also provided an
opportunity for the staff of EPA Region HI,
NRC Region I, DOE Brookhaven, and
various state agencies (PEMA, DEP, etc.) to
work together side by side. It involved the
EPA Superfund personnel as well as the
EPA Radiation personnel who will work
with the NRC and PA State Radiation and
Emergency Response staffs. This allowed
participants to develop a personal
knowledge of their staff counterparts in
other agencies. The attendees from FEMA,
DOD and the states of NJ, DE and MD,
while primarily in an observer role, also
received the benefit of this knowledge.
Industry representatives also received a
similar benefit. This knowledge should
greatly facilitate the multi-agency response
to any real incident in the future.
Exercise Objectives
In conceiving and conducting the Lost
Source Exercise, the EPA and NRC sought
to achieve the following objectives:
1. The affected commercial facility should
notify the appropriate State and local
officials consistent with local emergency
response plans and in a timely manner.
2. Local officials should notify the State
consistent with local emergency
response plans and in a timely manner.
3. The State should notify appropriate
Federal agencies consistent with State
emergency response plans and in a
timely manner.
4. Demonstrate interagency communication
and coordination protocols for radio-
active material response under the NCP.
5. The affected facility should evaluate and
respond to an incident appropriately and
in accordance with its own procedures.
This requires an initial assessment of the
severity of the incident and appropriate
actions based on that assessment.
6. The local officials should evaluate and
respond to an incident appropriately and
in accordance with local emergency
response procedures. This requires a
further assessment of the severity of the
incident and appropriate actions based
on that assessment.
7. The State officials should evaluate and
respond to an incident appropriately and
in accordance with State emergency
response procedures. This requires a
further assessment of the severity of the
incident and appropriate actions based
on that assessment.
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8. Demonstrate technical assessment
capabilities of the local, State and
Federal agencies.
9. Demonstrate effective assessment of the
danger to public health and implemen-
tation of actions to protect the public by
the local, State and Federal agencies.
10. Demonstrate unified command
procedures and the ability of these
procedures to facilitate safe and effective
recovery practices by response
personnel. Response personnel from
multiple State and Federal agencies
should perform as a unified team.
11. Evaluate availability and adequacy of
support equipment (instruments, tools,
etc.)
12. Exercise the EPA Region EH
Radiological Response Plan.
13. Evaluate consistency of NCP response
with protocols established in the FRERP
14. Provide training to participants. In
particular, the exercise should
familiarize the participants with the NCP
and response procedures under the NCP.
Participants should also become
personally acquainted with each other.
15. Produce training materials and a training
video for possible national distribution,
in conjunction with the Council of
Radiation Control Program Directors
(CRCPD).
16. Exercise Manual Chapter 1301.
Summary of the Tabletop Exercise and
Lessons Learned
The tabletop portion of the Lost Source
Exercise was conducted on September 30,
1997, as a scripted exercise facilitated by
Eric Weinstein of the NRC's Office for
Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
(AEOD) and Bill Steuteville of EPA Region
QI's Superfund Program. According to the
script, this scenario presented the
participants with a situation that unfolded as
the exercise continued. The exercise began
when the local emergency response "911"
line received a call from a hypothetical
landfill. The initial responders from the
local Emergency Management Agency
found gamma radiation levels well above
background at a distance of several blocks
from the facility. Local officials then
notified the cognizant State Emergency
Response and Radiation personnel, who
were presented then with additional data.
This data consisted of two detailed maps of
gamma radiation levels, one on a ten by ten-
foot grid extending several hundred feet
from the source and the other on a fifty by
fifty-foot grid covering several thousand
feet. The maps presented a number of
technical problems, as well as administrative
issues to be resolved by the participants.
Among the technical issues, participants
faced the problems associated with a truck
containing an exposed iridium source, with
postulated gamma radiation levels high
enough to pose an imminent threat to the
public. As a result, participants could not
simply move the truck off the site. They
also faced the potential for driver exposure
(both past and future) and were compelled to
determine what to do with the truck in the
short term. The charge given to participants
was simply to stabilize the situation and get
the truck to a safe location where it would
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not pose an immediate danger to the public.
On a map of the site provided to the
participants, an unused area of the landfill
was indicated. This area was away from
public access and provided the potential
location to move the truck without the need
to travel the highways.
Despite the complexity of the technical
problems, the administrative issues were the
main focus of the tabletop exercise. The
Exercise included a number of participating
organizations, including the landfill
operators, local and county response
officials, State emergency management
officials, State radiation officials and the
various Federal agencies. Each of these
participants had their own capabilities and
responsibilities, as well as their own way of
doing things. Consequently, a primary
objective of the tabletop exercise was to
combine these capabilities into a unified
response. To achieve that objective, each of
these participants gave a short presentation
concerning their perception of their own
organization's role and how they expected to
interface with the others. As these
presentations continued, the participants
began to explore their interfaces with the
others. Eventually the participants achieved
a unified response to the incident by forming
a Unified Incident Command (UIC),
through which the participants jointly
decided on the appropriate solution. In
addition, the participants learned the
following lessons by conducting the tabletop
portion of the Lost Source Exercise:
The EPA Superfund Program
encompasses substantial capabilities and
authorities, which can be mobilized in
the event of a radiation emergency
(whether or not the material is licensed
under the AEA.)
Each responding entity has its own goals
and priorities during a response. These
goals and priorities are dynamic and may
evolve as the situation develops. For
example, in this exercise, private
industry wanted to minimize the impact
on business operations, solid waste
agencies wanted to ensure that the
continuing stream of municipal waste
had a place to go, county officials
handled the immediate threat, State
officials had the ultimate responsibility
to protect public health from the ,
radiation threat, and Federal officials
provided technical support and had the
capability to mobilize significant
resources. While it was not apparent in
this exercise, these dynamic priorities
might be expected to conflict at times
throughout a response.
Federal notification procedures are well
defined within each federal agency, but
an individual agency's internal
procedures are not well known among
the other agencies. Consequendy, the
federal community needs to develop a
standardized notification scheme that
applies to the Federal response as a
whole. While the FRERP provides a
standardized notification scheme among
the agencies, internal procedures are not
consistent from agency to agency. This
can result in confusion as the federal
team is formed.
The UIC concept was not familiar to all
of the participants. This concept needs to
be better explained in future exercises
and training opportunities.
Management personnel within the
various Federal agencies need to
recognize and utilize the benefits of the
LFA concept and interagency
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coordination under the FRERP and the
NCP, and the agencies must then act
within the defined protocols.
Notification thresholds need to be better
defined for each agency and office. The
NCP specifies required notification of
the National Response Center of releases
of all chemicals (including radioactive
materials) exceeding certain reportable
quantities (RQs) specified in the NCP.
The agencies responding to radiation
incidents are generally unfamiliar with
this legal requirement. A courtesy
notification at lower levels should also
be considered.
Federal officials need to recognize that
the States differ greatly in their
capabilities and their needs. This
includes responsibilities associated with
Agreement State status, different
responding organizations within each
State, and the roles of local government
in emergency response.
The tabletop radioactive materials
exercise provided a unique opportunity
for incident responders from all levels of
government to meet, get acquainted, and
clarify the respective roles in emergency
response. Similar exercises should be
conducted in other parts of the country.
Early notification of the appropriate
DOE RAP team should be routine. The
RAP team needs to know of a
developing situation, rather than simply
being called in after the fact.
Private sector capabilities and constraints
are highly variable and will need to be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
Industry groups should be consulted
when government emergency response
plans and procedures are formulated.
Local government may play a significant
role in emergency response and must not
be overlooked in either the planning or
the actual response activities.
Agency acronyms and jargon should be
carefully avoided when multiple
agencies are acting in concert. There are
many conflicting acronyms between
agencies. For example, "NRC" may
stand for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission or the EPA's National
Response Center. Such conflicts and
unfamiliar jargon restrict effective
communication.
A status board is needed for future
exercises, and should be used in a real
event.
Summary of the Field Exercise and
Lessons Learned
The field portion of the Lost Source Exercise
was conducted on October 22,1997, as a
logical continuation of the tabletop exercise.
The initial condition in this scenario was
that the truck had been moved to a safe
location within the hypothetical landfill,
where it had been isolated from the public
and posed no immediate threat. The goal
presented to the participants for the field
exercise was to recover the source.
After an initial briefing on the situation, a
UIC team was broken out to a separate
room. Specifically, that team included
representatives of all involved parties (the
landfill operator, the local and county
officials, the State emergency management
and radiation officials, and the Federal
officials.) With the EPA as the Designated
LFA, the Superfund representative (whose
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job title is also OSC) acted as the OSC.
EPA, NRC, DOE, and State radiation
officials acted as the scientific support team.
Working together, the team elected to
recover the source using DOE procedures
and equipment. The technical approach was
for the team to enter from behind a dumpster
filled with dirt to provide shielding. This
approach accomplished the recovery with a
dose of about 100 mrem to the most exposed
member of the recovery team.
For the recovery simulation, the exercise
coordinators constructed a realistic physical
simulation of the situation. PECO Energy
provided the facility where the exercise was
conducted, and this simulation was
constructed in the parking lot of that facility.
BFI provided a large packer truck to add
realism to the simulation. To simulate a load
of municipal trash from the packer truck, the
coordinators placed a large number of plastic
trash bags, inflated with air, on a 30-foot
tarp. Other simulated trash from the PECO
Energy was placed with the trash bags. A
dumpster was moved into position beside
the simulated trash to provide simulated
shielding. Finally, a dummy radiographic
camera and source were placed in the trash
pile. Radio-controlled survey meters added
to the realism of the simulation. This
physical simulation allowed the exercise to
include a highly realistic simulation of the
recovery of a source. The multi-agency entry
team gained valuable experience working
together and many of the other exercise
participants had an opportunity to see how a
real source would have been recovered.
The recovery was accomplished by an entry
team consisting of DOE, NRC and EPA.
State and local officials and industry
representatives were included in the UIC to
decide on the recovery strategy, but the entry
team consisted of the experienced Federal
field personnel. Recovery of the source was
accomplished using the procedures agreed
upon by the UIC in the morning session. To
further add to the realism of the field
exercise, the exercise organizers held two
mock press conferences, one before the
recovery to discuss actions in preparation,
and one after the recovery focusing on what
the team had done to eliminate the threat to
the public. These provided a realistic
challenge to the command team and also
allowed an explanation of the recovery to be
presented to the entire group.
As a result of the field portion of the lost
Source Exercise, the participants learned the
following lessons:
The DOE and DOD possess a large body
of expertise and resources, and the
FRERP and NCP provide a means to
access those resources. In addition,
individual cooperative agreements
between the various agencies can be
used in addressing incidents. The
Unified Incident Command gives a
useful mechanism to employ these
cooperative agreements.
By providing a practical scenario to
apply the the UIC concept, this exercise
gave participants a valuable learning
experience. Many participants suggested
in their comments that this experience
should be shared with others.
Many participants also commented that
the opportunity to witness recovery of a
highly radioactive source very valuable,
and that the experience should be
provided to others.
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Exercise Accomplishments
1. The affected commercial facility notified
the appropriate State and local officials
consistent with local emergency
response plans. The exercise revealed
some lack of clarity in the notification
procedures used by the facility, and the
plans will be clarified.
2. Local officials notified the State
consistent with local emergency
response plans. As result of the exercise,
the State participants identified
additional State radiological capabilities
that were already in place but had not
been fully integrated into a unified
whole.
3. The State notified the appropriate
Federal agencies consistent with State
emergency response plans. The Federal
agencies found that there is a need to
unify the Federal notification under a
single contact point rather than ask the
State to notify several Federal agencies.
4. The Federal agencies demonstrated
interagency communication and
coordination protocols for radioactive
material response under the NCP.
Response under the NCP was new to
many participants, and the exercise was
a valuable learning experience. Subse-
quent to the exercise, the NCP OSC has
been the Federal lead official at several
actual responses with good results.
5. The affected facility evaluated and
responded to the incident in accordance
with its own procedures. The commer-
cial facility operators realized, as a result
of the exercise, that additional facility
response capability was needed. A
radiological consultant was subsequently
retained by the facility. Since the facility
represents one of the largest waste
disposal firms in the United States, this
accomplishment is likely to be far-
reaching.
6. The local officials responded to incident
in accordance with local emergency
response procedures.
7. The State officials evaluated and
responded to the incident appropriately
and in accordance with State emergency
response procedures. The State
demonstrated a correct assessment of the
severity of the incident, and took the
appropriate actions based on that
assessment.
8. The local, State and Federal agencies
demonstrated a wide array of technical
assessment capabilities. These
capabilities were adequate to deal with
the problem.
9. The participants demonstrated effective
assessment of the danger to public health
and implementation of actions to protect
the public by the local. State and Federal
agencies.
10. The participants demonstrated UIC and
the ability of these procedures to
facilitate safe and effective recovery
practices by response personnel. The
UIC concept was new to a significant
number of participants, so the exercise
facilitators provided a short course on
the subject. After the training, response
personnel from multiple State and
Federal agencies performed successfully
as a unified team.
11. Support equipment (instruments, tools,
etc.) which were available through the
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State and the Federal agencies, were
found to be adequate.
12. The exercise demonstrated that the EPA
Region HI Radiological Response Plan
was a workable framework within which
radiological emergencies can be
addressed.
13. The exercise demonstrated the
consistency of NCP response procedures
with protocols established in the FRERP
14. The exercise provided training to the
participants. In particular, the exercise
familiarized the participants with the
NCP and response procedures under the
NCP. Participants also became
personally acquainted with each other.
15. During the exercise, contract support
personnel operated video cameras.
These have been supplied to the Council
of Radiation Control Program Directors
(CRCPD) for use in training materials
and a training video for possible national
distribution.
Discussion and Recommendations
The Lost Source Exercise represented an
initial effort to demonstrate the cooperation
of Federal, State, and local agencies in
response to a radiological incident. This
response was carried out under the NCP
with the EPA as the designated LFA.
Overall, the exercise demonstrated the
viability of the NCP in dealing with
radiological emergencies.
EPA Region m is adopting a Radiological
Emergency Response Plan which reflects
this response mechanism. In addition, NRC
Region I and the DOE RAP team at
Brookhaven National Lab are now familiar
with this response mechanism. Moreover, a
response was successfully conducted using
this model in an actual incident in Temple,
PA in September, 1997. Consequently, in
the event that a real radiological emergency
were to occur in the Mid-Atlantic States, one
can reasonably expect that this response
mechanism would be used.
The authors therefore recommend that
similar exercises be conducted in other areas
of the country. In addition, in view of the
success of the response under the NCP, this
response mechanism should be examined for
potential application in other locations.
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APPENDIX A
Exercise Scenario
The intent of the Lost Source Exercise was
to involve the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Department of Energy (DOE) as partners to
assist the state in the response to a release of
radioactive material. In this exercise,
Pennsylvania played the role of the
cognizant State. NRC participated in
support of the EPA's response under the
FRERP. EPA draws its authority from the
National Contingency Plan (NCP), which
authorizes EPA respond to radioactive
material spills under certain conditions. EPA
has authority so long as the licensee does not
fall under the financial assurance provisions
of the Price-Anderson Act or other Federal
funding mandate (that is, the licensee is not
a commercial nuclear power plant or DOE
facility). Nonetheless, the EPA would not
normally initiate a removal action using
CERCLA (Superfund) funds unless other
options to address the situation had been
exhausted, or another Federal agency
requested the assistance. The reader should
note that the EPA response for the Lost
Source Exercise was not conducted under
the FRERP. However, the FRERP
designates EPA as the Lead Federal Agency
(LFA) in the event that radiological
materials are involved and the identity of the
licensee is unknown. Moreover, the
regulatory structure provided in the NCP is
not incompatible with the guidance in the
FRERP; thus a response conducted under
the NCP would also generally conform to
the FRERP.
Under the NCP, DOE resources can be used
for cleanup and disposal of released
material, and the exercise committee
anticipated that the EPA and NRC
participants would realize this fact during
the exercise. Thus, in order to accomplish
the exercise objective coordination between
EPA and NRC, the exercise also included
DOE participation.
Incident response capabilities vary widely
from State to State, with some having the
resources for a significant cleanup endeavor,
while others do not possess this level of
resources. For the purposes of this exercise,
the State was assumed not to have the
necessary cleanup and disposal capability,
which may or may not be the case for
Pennsylvania. The intent was to simulate
the capabilities of a typical State.
In order to satisfy the need for a regional
response beyond typical State capabilities,
the exercise committee felt that an incident
would need to involve high radiation levels
with a release (or a threat of release) of
radioactive material to the environment. In
the case of this exercise, high radiation
levels were used as the factor that caused the
State to request Federal assistance. It was
also desirable that gamma radiation levels be
significant enough to require the
establishment of a "radiation area," thereby
necessitating the use of Health Physics
controls over the personnel who entered the
area. This required cooperation between the
EPA, NRC, and DOE, as well as State
Health Physics personnel, thereby further
exploring the interface between the Federal
agencies and the State. (Current EPA
Superfund guidance directs the
establishment of a radiation area when
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gamma levels exceed 5 mR per hour. In
such a case, the radiation area perimeter is to
be established at a location where the
gamma levels are less than 2 mR per hour.
The scenario was designed to create such
radiation levels.)
This exercise took place in two parts. The
first part involved a "tabletop" exercise
oriented toward the initial communications,
negotiations, and decision-making that
would take place in activating the State and
Federal agencies, as well as the planning that
would need to take place before the
radioactive material could be dealt with.
The second part involved a "field" exercise
oriented toward the actual handling of the
contaminated material and the health physics
and radiation protection considerations
associated with this activity, including a
simulated manipulation of the unshielded
source. As such, the field exercise
represented a continuation of the scenario
begun during the tabletop exercise.
Both portions of the Lost Source Exercise
were conducted at the PECO Energy
Emergency Operations Facility in
Coatesville, PA. This facility allowed
simulated manipulation of radioactive
material in a controlled outdoor environment
with little risk of undue public alarm from
the nature of the activities. A "dummy"
source was used to make the simulation
realistic. PECO also agreed to allow the use
of their radio-controlled survey meters to
allow a realistic simulation of radiation
levels near the source. Again, this made the
simulation realistic, and facilitated the health
physics aspects of the exercise. The DOE
participated with a mobile command center
from the Brookhaven National Laboratory
(BNL) and a Helicopter from Andrews Air
Force Base in Maryland.
Part 1 - Tabletop Exercise (September 30,
1997)
The organization and conduct of the
Tabletop exercise follows. This section of
the report is the agenda and schedule of
events which were used for the first day's
play. The exercise play followed the agenda
very closely.
The exercise facilitators used the following
information during the tabletop exercise.
This information was reserved for facilitator
use only, and is provided here to give tHe
reader an understanding of the exercise
planning process. The facilitators also
supplied maps of gamma radiation levels to
the participants on large (36 X 36-inch)
sheets. These sheets are not included in this
report because of their size. The data that
was on the sheets is summarized in Table 2.
The writers of this report modified this text
slightly from the original handout to remove
reference specific to this exercise so that
others may use it more easily in future
exercises. The actual material provided to
the participants is in Appendix B.
Background Conditions
The exercise is predicated on the presence of
radioactive material not under the control of
an NRC licensee. The identity of the
licensee is unknown because the radioactive
source is concealed within a trash truck
The location of the trash truck route will be
provided by the "truck driver" and during
the debriefing of the truck driver. This will
lead to the likelihood of Atomic Energy Act
material with no known licensee, and will
trigger the EPA involvement. This
background is needed to allow EPA
involvement early in the exercise before any
specific label or identification markings are
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available from the source, which will be
buried deep in the truck.
Initiating Event
The initiating event is the triggering of a
radiation alarm at a generic municipal waste
landfill (WASTEHOME INC). The Actual
name of the landfill will remain unidentified
during and after the exercise to avoid the
potential for public concern over routine
landfill operations. The meter reading is off
scale reading high. The landfill operator
stops the truck and prevents it from entering
the landfill. The truck is backed to the side
of the scale station, but the alarm meter
continues to be off scale. This prevents
other trucks from entering the landfill
because the operator is unable to clear the
alarm condition. The Chester County 911
Center (the designated LEPC notification
point) is contacted by the landfill operator.
Facilitator Note: Have WASTEHOME
relay the contents of the caU to the players.
This is the call that begins the exercise.
Time Line
9:00 -10:00 Early Assessment by the
Landfill Operator and Local Officials
(About 8 min per question)
Facilitator Note: Relay Initial scenario
information and then ask the following
questions of the participants:
What information is important for the
first responders to get in order to respond
adequately?
What information would be provided to
the first responders?
Who are they?
What would the landfill officials be
doing while waiting for the response?
What type of detection equipment would
one expect to be available at a landfill?
What would constitute an early Hazar/i
assessment?
What are the legal requirements on the
part of the landfill to report the event?
10:00 -10:45 Notifications (About 10
minutes per question)
Who would the landfill owners first
notify of the event?
When would the State/ locals/ Federal
organizations be notified?
Who in those organizations would be
notified and for what purpose?
What organizations would those first
notified organizations then notify?
What is the purpose of early notification?
Response? Resources? Assistance?
Support?
How and when is the media notified?
10:45- 11:00 Break
11:00 * 12:00 Initial Response Actions
(About 8 min per question)
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Woodlands
30ป ป
Qrass A/eฎ
Him tMinu
Qrats Arts
Woodtand*
State survey personnel discover that the
source is not in the truck that was originally
thought to be the problem. It is a truck that
is third in line, about 100 feet away from the
scales. Gamma levels at this distance are 11
mR/hr. This is why the alarm failed to clear
when the first truck was diverted. Gamma
survey results will be provided to the State
personnel as follows.
What would the first response actions be
of the;
Local Officials - Fire/Police/ Emergency
Services?
State Officials?
Landfill owners?
How would these initial response actions
be coordinated?
When is a JIC set up and whose
responsibility is it?
What are the truck drivers supposed to
do while waiting for response actions?
Facilitator Note: Facilitator provides
radiation data
(A large gamma map handed out at this time
is not included in this report. Data are
summarized in Appendix B.)
These values were obtained using the
Microshieid4.21 computer program. An
"equivalent source" was used to account
separately for the buildup factors from the
shielding of the truck contents and the truck
15
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body. The source was placed 4 feet from the
side of the truck, in the approximate center
of the load. Density of the trash in the truck
was 600 pounds per cubic yard at 20 percent
moisture content. The truck side is one-
eighth inch steel. Source strength is 100
curies. Data will be presented in the form of
a site map rather than a table. The site map
will be drawn as concentric circles around
the original suspect truck, but the data will
make it apparent that the source is at another
location. Additional data for intermediate
distances are available on a spreadsheet.
Gamma spec results will be an Ir-192
spectrum as processed through the same
make and model instrument that the State
would use. An actual or simulated printout
from the instrument will be provided. From
this data, the State should identify that Ir-
192 is involved and that there is an
unshielded source within the truck. The
material is located in a truck about 100 feet
from the scales. The radiation drops to 2
mR/hr at about 230 feet.
Facilitator Note: The State should contact
EPA at this time.
12:00- 1:00 Lunch
1:00 - 2:00 State and Federal Decision
Making (About 8 min. Per)
What information would be necessary
for the State to request Federal
Assistance?
What type of assistance would be
requested?
What decisions would be made within
the Federal government to provide that
assistance?
What authorities exist that allow the
provision of assistance?
What time would be required to plan for
assistance to be delivered?
Who would be in charge of the Federal
response?
What is the NCP and its relationship to
the FRERP?
What assistance would be provided
under each plan and through what
mechanism?
The truck driver is interviewed to
determine the area where his pick-ups
were made and to assess his radiation
dose. He is also asked about the loaders
who picked the trash up from the curb.
The two loaders are contacted at home
and shown pictures of the gamma
camera. One remembers picking it up (it
was heavy) somewhat before the middle
of the run, which lasted about 5 hours.
This interview places the source toward
the center of the truck. This will place it
about 7 feet from the driver and the
loaders.
Facilitator Note: Health physics
calculation should be done for driver and
loader exposures.
It is assumed there would be 5 feet of
trash and one quarter inch of steel
between the source and the driver with a
two-foot air gap. Driver exposure will be
about 900 mR/hr for more than 2 hours,
resulting in an exposure with little
likelihood of acute symptoms. The
loader remembers lifting the device by
the shield and noticing "something
hanging out" which he did not touch.
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Loader exposure should be similar to
driver exposure.
Facilitator Note: Nevertheless, driver and
loaders should be referred for medical
evaluation.
2:15-3:15 Monitoring Plan and Data
Analysis (15 min per)
What plans are in plans to coordinate
assessment activities with the State and
local responders?
What data is required for protective
action assessment?
What data is required to declare the
emergency over?
What assistance is provided by the
Federal agencies following the
emergency phase?
How is the press kept informed and by
whom?
3:15-3:30 Break
3:30 - 4:30 Recovery
There are two residences within a mile
of the current location of the truck, one
at about 3000 feet and the other at 5000
feet. (A map will be provided to the
participants.) These homes will be
located far enough away from the source
that evacuation may not be warranted but
might be considered, radiation levels
will be at background, but close enough
to the event that a the question might
come up.
Facilitator Note: Any monitoring of these
homes should be planned during the
exercise.
What actions are required by the State,
locals and landfill operator to enter
"recovery" mode?
What constitutes a recovery plan and
who is responsible for developing it?
What role does the Federal government
have in recovery operations?
What provision exists for assisting the
State in cost recovery for clean up *
activities?
What responsibilities are assigned to
whom for recovery operations?
What are the provisions to keep the
public informed of recovery operations?
4:30 - 5:00 Exercise Summary
Facilitator Note: The general procedure
for Part 2 should be defined. This should
include the designation of a scientific
support coordinator and appropriate
support team to plan the details of
unloading the truck and recovering the
source. This committee will identify any
resources needed for the unloading, but
will not do the detailed health physics
calculations or develop specific minimum-
dose procedures at this point. This will
take place in Part 2.
Exercise coordinators provide an
introduction to the 10/22 Field Exercise
5:00 Adjourn
This will end the tabletop with the situation
temporarily stabilized until the truck can be
emptied. If any of the above actions are not
17
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accomplished, they will be initiated by the
controllers because they are essential to Part
2 of the exercise.
Part 2 Field Exercise (October 22,1977)
Initial Conditions
The initial condition for the field exercise
(Part 2 of the Lost Source Exercise) is the
same as the conclusion of the tabletop
exercise (Part 1 of the Lost Source
Exercise). Specifically, the truck containing
the unshielded source is parked in an unused
area within the landfill fence line, and a
radiation area has been established. In Part
1, the participants identified the desirability
of parking the truck in a low spot so the
surrounding earth would provide shielding.
There is considerable press and public
interest in this situation. The neighbors are
in an uproar and are demanding immediate
removal of the radioactive material. People
living several miles away have threatened
legal action, and local politicians are
demanding immediate action with
suggestions ranging from driving the truck
elsewhere to evacuating the area. Resources
identified as needed in Part 1 are assumed to
be available, and a disposal facility has been
identified.
Health Physics
The initial activity for Part 2 was a planning
session for emptying the truck and
recovering the source. This included
calculations of radiation exposure related to
dumping the load and searching for the
source, and development of minimum dose
procedures and an outline for any training
that may be needed for the people who will
physically recover the source. The
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participants independently established goals
of the planning session, which included all
goals necessary to complete the objectives of
the exercise. The participants also formed an
entry team and a Unified Incident Command
(UIC) and conducted a source recovery
planning session in a breakout room.
The planning session was scheduled for
most of the morning and ended about a half
hour before lunch. Simultaneous with the
planning session, the participants not in the
entry team or the UIC were given
presentations on the capabilities of the
participating agencies. At the end of the
planning session, a mock press conference
was held. This served two purposes, by
allowing the planning team to present their
strategy to the participants who were not in
the breakout room, and presenting a realistic
challenge to the planning team by the
"press" and the "neighbors."
The (UIC) accomplished the following
tasks:
Establish the functions of the various
agencies represented in the recovery
effort. The UIC assigned the EPA
Superfund team the task of concentrating
on the physical and logistical aspects of
source recovery. The EPA and NRC
Health Physicists would then establish a
health physics team, with the NRC
heavily involved because of their
experience with high gamma levels and
radiography cameras. Press and political
communications were also addressed,
using the FRERP as a model.
Identify the team who would recover the
source. This team consisted of DOE and
NRC personnel.
Develop source recovery procedures.
Establish radiation monitoring plans to
assess the exposure of source recovery
personnel.
Decide on the appropriate protective
clothing and personal protective
equipment for recovery personnel.
Establish "hot line" procedures for
monitoring and decontamination.
Perform dose calculations for source
recovery personnel including the driver
who unloads the truck and the
technicians who handle the source.
Identify the physical resources needed
for source recovery. An example might
be a lead shielded container, remote
manipulators, etc.
Identify a way to localize the source
within the truck to narrow the search
after the truck's load is spread on a tarp.
Brief public affairs specialists on the
procedures to be used, risks to the
public, etc.
Source Recovery
This part of the exercise began after the
lunch break. The physical recovery proce-
dures depended on the procedure developed
in the breakout session. However, for the
purposes of this scenario, the committee was
able to assume with reasonable confidence
that the UIC would develop plans to dump
the truck onto a tarp. This allowed the
exercise committee to prepare the recoveiy
area during the morning while the UIC was
meeting to decide what to do. Experts on the
team also suggested that in a real incident of
this type, a dumpster would be filled with
19
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dirt and used as a shield. After lunch, the
recovery team was presented with a tarp
covered with simulated trash. The "trash"
consisted of green household waste bags
inflated with air and weighted down with
water balloons. A dumpster was placed next
to the simulated trash, but the dirt fill was
simulated for logistical reasons. A hot line
defined with banner-guard and a step-off
pad, were in place.
There was one exception from good field
practice. The dumpster was placed to the
side of the "trash pile" rather than in a line
from the hot line to the trash. This was done
to allow the participants to see the recovery
of the source. In practice, the dumpster
would be placed to shield the entry path of
the recovery personnel. Team members wore
appropriate protective clothing as decided in
the morning session. "Level d" protection
was selected on the basis of the assumption
that the source was not powdered and so
would not be airborne. (Ir-192 sources are in
the form of small discs, not powder.)
The survey meters were manipulated to
produce approximately square-law response
during the recovery effort (the radiation
intensity drops as the square of the distance.)
The facilitator varied the gamma levels on
the radio-controlled meter according to the
following table:
Table 1
50 ft
200 mR/hr
30 ft
560 mR/hr
20 ft
1.3 R/hr
15 ft
2.2 R/hr
10 ft
5 R/hr
5 ft
20 R/hr
2ft
125 R/hr
1 ft
500 R/hr
These radiation exposure values are
predicated on a 100 Curie Ir-192 source with
only air between the source and the survey
meter. (This is because the truck has been
dumped on a tarp.) Gamma levels are
approximately 4 times their value when the
truck and its contents provided shielding.
The Microshield 4.21 program was used for
these calculations.
The "trash" included a dummy radiography
source and camera buried close to its center.
PECO-supplied radio-controlled meters
guided the recovery team to the source. The
team then transferred the source to a
shielded container and removed it from the
trash. This transfer involved the use of a
remote survey meter (Teletector) to locate
the source, remote manipulators to move the
trash and the source, and a small television
camera to view the "hot" area from above to
pinpoint the source location and see its
condition. This equipment was provided by
the DOE.
The dummy source was successfully
transferred into a lead container. This ended
the exercise. Calculated radiation exposures
for the recovery team were approximately
100 mrem to each team member.
Distance (feet)
Gamma level
500 ft
1.6 mR/hr
250 ft
7.9 mR/hr
150 ft
23 mR/hr
100 ft
51 mR/hr
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APPENDIX B
Controller Messages - Day One
The following messages were distributed
individually to the participants during the
tabletop exercise. Each numbered message
was provided to the participants on a
separate sheet of paper so they could not
anticipate the coming events. The facilitators
provided this information in accord with the
schedule given in the exercise scenario in
the main body of this report. Abbreviations
were used only where they would be
meaningful to the participants. There were
no detailed controller messages for Day two.
Initial conditions were specified and the
exercise was played free-form with the
participants choosing their own strategy.
1. The initiating event is the triggering of a
radiation alarm at a fictitious municipal
waste landfill, WASTEHOME INC.
While a fictitious landfill is used for
exercise purposes, a commercial landfill
operator (BFI) has agreed to play the part
of the landfill owner. While it is not
possible to offer assurance to the public
that the events described in this scenario
cannot happen, it is the intent of the
exercise planners to demonstrate
responsible actions on the part of the
landfill operators to minimize risk to the
public.
The landfill is located in a remote wooded
area. There are two residences within one
mile, one about 2000 feet from the scale
and the other at about 3000 feet. The entry
drive to the landfill is 300 feet long and
terminates in a public road. The landfill
itself is fenced for its entire perimeter and
surrounded by woods on all sides outside
the fence.
The meter reading on the alarm is off
scale reading high. The landfill operator
stops the truck and prevents it from
entering the landfill. The truck which
was on the scale at the time of the alarm
is backed to the side of the entry drive
away from the radiation sensor, but the
alarm meter continues to be off scale.
This prevents other trucks from entering
the landfill because the operator is
unable to clear the alarm condition. The
landfill operator has a low range G-M
type survey meter, and it is found to
operate erratically when turned on in the
vicinity of the scale.
2. County HAZMAT team arrives at the
scene. Gamma radiation levels are
found to be 17 uR/hr above background
several blocks from the driveway.
(About 1200 feet) As the driveway is
approached, gamma readings increase
above 2 mR/hr and then drop to about I
mR/hr at the entrance. Gamma levels
increase to 6 mR/hr as the line of waiting
trucks is approached along the driveway.
3. State survey personnel discover that the
source is not in the truck that was
originally thought to be the problem. It is
a truck that is third in line, about 100
feet away from the scales. Gamma
levels at the scales are 12 mR/hr. This is
why the alarm failed to clear when the
first truck was diverted. Gamma survey
results will be provided to the State
personnel on gridded survey maps. The
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State gamma spectrometer indicates that
the radionuclide is Iridium 192. Table 2
is included in this report in lieu of the
maps provided to the participants. Data
were presented in the form of a site map
rather than a table. The map was 36 by
36 inches in size and included gamma
measurements on a 10- by 10-foot grid
out to 300 feet. Realistic "shadows"
caused by the shielding by uncontami-
nated trucks were included on the maps.
A second set of maps of similar size
contained data out to 1200 feet on a 50-
by 50-foot grid. Additional data for
intermediate distances was available on a
spreadsheet. An Ir-192 spectrum was
provided to the participants. From this
data, the State identified that Ir-192 was
involved and that there is an unshielded
source within the truck.
4. Source strength is calculated to be about
100 curies, assuming an unshielded point
source in the center of the truck.
Approximately equal gamma levels on
both sides of the truck suggest a location
near the center. Density of the trash in
the truck is 600 pounds per cubic yard at
20 percent moisture content, based on
information on "typical" municipal
waste obtained from the solid waste
officials. The truck side is one-eighth
inch steel. Gamma readings surrounding
the truck are provided on a grid map.
5. The truck driver and loaders are
interviewed to determine the route where
pick-ups were made and to assess their
radiation dose. The two loaders are
shown pictures of the gamma camera.
One remembers picking it up. It was
heavy and had the remnants of a
yellowish label, but most of the label
was gone. The device was picked up
somewhat before the middle of the run,
which lasted about 5 hours. This inter-
view places the source toward the center
of the truck. This will place it about 7
feet from the driver and the loaders.
6. It is assumed there would be 5 feet of
trash and one quarter inch of steel
between the source and the driver with a
two-foot air gap. Measured exposure in
the driver's seat and at the loader stations
is about 900 mrem per hr. This exposure
is estimated to have lasted less than 3
hours, resulting in an exposure with little
likelihood of acute symptoms. The
Table 2
Distance from
truck in feet
(approximate)
Gamma survey
meter reading
1200 ft
17 uR/hr
1000 ft
39 uR/hr
900 ft
58 uR/hr
800 ft
88 uR/hr
700 ft
140 uR/hr
600 ft
220 uR/hr
500 ft
350 uR/hr
400 ft
610 uR/hr
300 ft
1.2 mR/hr
250 ft
1.7 mR/hr
200 ft
2.8 mR/hr
150 ft
5.0 mR/hr
100 ft
11 mR/hr
50 ft
44 mR/hr
30 ft
91 mR/hr
20 ft
190 mR/hr
10 ft
560 mR/hr
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loader remembers lifting the device by
the shield and noticing "something
hanging out" which he did not touch.
Loader exposure should be similar to
driver exposure. There may be additional
exposure accrued based on the location
and stay time at that location (if any)
before the area is cleared of personnel.
This depends on the exercise play by the
participants.
7. There are two residences within a mile
of the current location of the truck, one
at about 2000 feet and the other at 3000
feet. (A map will be provided to the
participants.) Radiation levels at these
locations will be at background. These
homes will be located far enough away
from the source that evacuation may not
be warranted but might be requested by
the residents. Radiation levels will be at
background, but the homes are close
enough to the event that the question
might come up.
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APPENDIX C
Exercise Guidelines and Ground Rules used for this Exercise
This appendix presents the guidance and
ground rules for conducting the 1997 Lost
Source Exercise. As such it provides the
framework for conducting (or replicating)
the exercise, demonstrating emergency
response capabilities, and evaluating
response activities. The appendix includes a
discussion of the overall exercise conduct
including exercise controller and facilitator
responsibilities and functions, avoiding
violations of laws, avoiding personnel and
property endangerment, actions to minimize
public inconvenience, exercise simulation
guidelines, participant guidelines and
gamesmanship, and conditions for exercise
termination.
Exercise Controller and Facilitator
Responsibilities and Functions
NRC Region I and EPA Region HI have
appointed exercise coordinators to oversee
all exercise activities. These exercise
coordinators are responsible for approving
the objectives and developing the scenario
time sequence. The exercise coordinators are
also responsible for the selecting and
training the personnel required to conduct
and evaluate the exercise. The Defense
Nuclear Agency has agreed to supply
exercise evaluators. EPA Region fll and
NRC Headquarters will provide exercise
facilitators.
The participating agencies will supply
controllers for major functions where an
emergency response action will be
demonstrated. Before the exercise, the
exercise coordinators will provide the
controllers with the appropriate materials
necessary for their assigned function. The
materials will include any maps and
messages to be used, as well as forms for
documenting and evaluating observed
activities. The main job of the controllers is
to document the actions of their agency (for
inclusion in the final report) and to ensure
that the participant's actions reflect the
policies and procedures of their respective
agencies.
In each facility where an activity takes place,
the designated facilitators will make
judgments to keep the action going in
accordance with the scenario time line. The
exercise coordinators will provide advice to
the controllers assigned to their facility to
resolve minor exercise control issues or
concerns that may occur. If a major exercise
control problem arises, the controller should
contact the exercise coordinator for guidance
or resolution of the problem. Any requests
for scenario modifications or holding
periods must be cleared through one of the
exercise coordinators. Controllers also have
the authority to resolve scenario-related
problems which may occur during the
exercise.
Controllers will observe the participants as
they perform their assigned emergency
response functions. Controllers are
responsible for being knowledgeable in the
area of their assigned function and possible
activities which may be observed. In the
event of corrective or repair activities, the
controller shall be cognizant of procedures
associated with the action. If an activity is
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to be simulated (as identified within the
specific mini-scenarios or exercise ground
rules), the controller shall request the
participants to describe the actions that
would be initiated to effect the desired
outcome of the assigned task within the
scenario time sequence of events and
constraints allowed. The controllers will
provide a verbal critique the effectiveness of
the emergency response actions taken, and
will also provide a written evaluation of
their observations.
As information is provided to the partici-
pants, they should determine the nature of
the emergency and implement appropriate
procedures including emergency plan
implementing procedures and emergency
operating procedures. The hypothesized
emergency will continue to develop on the
basis of information provided to the
participants. Wherever possible, operators
should complete actions as if they were
actually responding to real events.
Inconsistencies in the scenario may be
intentional and may be intentionally placed
there to test the capabilities of the
emergency response facilities to the
maximum extent possible in a limited period
of time.
Avoiding Violations of Laws
Violation of laws is not justifiable during the
exercise. To implement this guideline the
following actions must be taken:
(I) Participants must be specifically
informed of the need to avoid violating
any federal, state and local laws,
regulations, ordinances, statutes and
other legal restrictions. The orders of all
police, sheriffs or other authorities shall
be followed as appropriate.
(2) Participants will not direct illegal actions
to be taken by other participants or
members of the general public.
(3) Participants will not intentionally take
illegal actions when responding to
scenario events. Specifically, local traffic
laws (i.e., speed limits) will be observed.
Avoiding Personnel and Property
Endangerment
All participants will be instructed to avoid
endangering property (public or private),
other personnel responding to the events,
members of the general public, animals, and
the environment. All EPA personnel
involved in the exercise will be field
qualified and shall have completed the
EPA's basic field safety course. NRC and
State personnel will conform to their own
field safety requirements. There will be no
exposure to radioactive or chemical hazards
during this exercise. No radioactive material
above natural background will be used in
this exercise. There will be no confined
space entries. There will be no physical
hazards except those associated with the
wearing of protective clothing and with the
weather. Loan of radio-controlled survey
meters has been arranged from PECO
Energy. These meters will provide realistic
radiation readings to the response personnel
without the need for exposure to radiation.
"Dummy" sources will be used to represent
the radioactive source to be simulated. These
dummy sources will be provided by the
NRC.
Actions to Minimize Public Inconvenience
It is not the intent, nor is it desirable, to
effectively train or test the response of the
public during the conduct of the exercise.
Public inconvenience is to be avoided. The
25
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simulated event, release of a significant
quantity of radioactive material, could cause
great public concern and would be quickly
distributed by the news media. For this
reason, all communications associated with
this exercise shall be prefaced and followed
by the words, "This is a drill" or "This is an
exercise." This especially applies to radio or
cellular phone traffic, which may be
intercepted by outsiders. It also applies to
telephone logs and written correspondence
which may find its way into the trash stream.
Local officials shall be notified of the nature
of the exercise and invited to participate. It
is important that conversations that can be
monitored by the public (radio, loud-
speakers, etc.) be prefaced and concluded
with the words, "THIS IS A DRILL; THIS
IS A DRILL."
Exercise Simulation Guidelines
Since the exercise is intended to demonstrate
actual capabilities as realistically as possible,
participants will be instructed to act as they
would in an actual emergency. Wherever
possible, emergency response actions will be
carried out. Some of the exercise objectives
will be demonstrated by simulating the
associated emergency response actions.
When an emergency response is to be
simulated, the Controller will provide verbal
or written directions on actions that are to be
simulated. Ail decontamination actions
associated with the scenario events may be
simulated after discussion and approval by
the Exercise Controllers. The use of
respiratory protection and other personal
protective equipment may be simulated by
exercise participants after discussion and
approval by the Exercise Controller. All
radiation measurements will be made using
PECO-supplied radio-controlled survey
meters. No actual radioactive materials will
be used during the exercise.
Guidelines and Gamesmanship for
Participants
Exercise controllers will provide participants
with command and message cards to initiate
emergency response actions and evaluate
participant actions. There are no formal
evaluators assigned to the exercise. All
participants and controllers are asked to
function as exercise evaluators, noting
things which went well and things which
might be done better. Everyone will be
asked to provide a personal critique at thฃ
end of the exercise.
Participants should play out all actions, as
much as possible, in accordance with their
agency's plans and procedures as if it were
an actual emergency. If an action or data is
to be simulated, an exercise controller will
provide appropriate direction.
Day 1 play will be in a round table format so
that each participant will be able to hear and
see all the decisions and actions of all
participants. Each action will be explained
by the participant to the entire group using a
microphone. This will assure that everyone
can hear, and will allow the proceedings to
be video-taped with good sound
reproduction.
Exercise controllers have the authority to
redirect play as necessary. If an Exercise
Controller intervenes in a response action
and recommends redirection or
reconsideration of play actions, it is for a
good reason. The exercise controller's
direction may be essential to ensure
demonstration of objectives for all
participating groups.
Participants should use status boards and log
books as much as possible to document and
record their actions, and keep a list of items
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they believe will improve their agency's
plans and procedures. A participant
debriefing will follow the exercise. Players
should provide any comments or observa-
tions to a spokesperson for their group after
the exercise. Areas for improvement or
weaknesses when corrected will improve the
overall emergency response capability.
Exercise Termination
The exercise will be terminated by the
Exercise Coordinator when all emergency
response actions have been completed in
accordance with the exercise scenario time
sequence and exercise objectives.
In the event that an actual plant
emergency condition should occur, the
exercise will be terminated to allow
emergency responders to assume their
normal duties. If the emergency affects
only a small number of people within the
exercise, the exercise coordinators may
elect to continue the exercise with
modifications to account for the missing
personnel. In no case will the exercise be
allowed to interfere with real emergency
response duties of the participants.
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APPENDIX D
Exercise Critique
At the end of each exercise day, exercise
coordinators conducted critique sessions to
summarize the major findings identified
during the exercise. Each organization was
asked to appoint a representative to provide
the perspective of that organization. Written
critique forms were also distributed to each
participant.
Individual Statements on Lessons
Learned (by those who elected to write
extended comments):
Charlie Kleeman, EPA:
By far, the most significant lesson learned
was that there are many individuals, private
entities, and governing organizations that
must be involved in an incident of the type
that was exercised; and many of these are
very unfamiliar with each other and each
other's roles and responsibilities. Of
particular note, I observed the following
areas of concern:
Initial Local Notification - Wastehome, Inc.
did not appear to fully understand the
differences between "the LEPC" and the
Chester County Emergency Management
Agency (EMA). While in some communi-
ties, the EMA might well be directly
identified as the LEPC, in this case I do not
believe they are so identified. This therefore
raises some concern over the initial
notification. Early initial notification to the
correct agency is essential to a good
response, and so it is important for us to
highlight to the response community that
any confusion over whom to notify must be
overcome.
Federal Notification - In the exercise, the
PA DEP Bureau of Radiation Protection
(BRP) made the notification to the National
Response Center. Three points deserve
mention here. (1) It was good that Federal
notification was made by the BRP, and it
would be good to highlight the importance
of making early Federal notification
whenever it is suspected that an incident is
more than just a "nuisance" incident. This
notification could have been made by the
County EMA earlier, however it is
understood that judgement calls must be
made at every stage of an incident, and their
decision not to make Federal notification at
that time is not criticized. (2) There was a
sentiment expressed and implied by State
and local stakeholders, of some fear of
opening the Federal floodgates, and thereby
losing control of the incident to the EPA.
These stakeholders should be assured that
EPA is not bent on "federalizing" local or
State responses, and only wishes to provide
assistance or authority as needed by the
incident commander. (3) The exercise
highlighted a potential problem concerning
expectations once Federal notification was
made. When Federal notification is made by
a State or local government, it is imperative
that it be communicated to the duty officer
whether the notification is just notification
or whether and what type of assistance is
being requested.
Who's In Charge? - A little surprisingly,
most participants said that the Fire Chief
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was in charge. However, once the State,
NRC, and EPA were on-scene , it was not as
clear to all participants that the Fire Chief
was still the incident commander. Dis-
cussion about this subject and about Unified
Command in particular demonstrated
significant weakness in the understanding
and support by all participants in the Unified
Command model. However, it is noteworthy
that some participants did understand and
support it.
The Response - It seemed to this observer
that there was a bit too much discussion
about who was in charge, about who could
bring what expertise, about fears of Federal
intervention, about uncertainty about what to
do, and about what the source was or where
it came from while there was not enough
immediate attention given to move and
shield the truck as a means of controlling
and stabilizing the threat to human health.
This is where the Federal EPA could
probably have had a more prominent role if
a clear request for help had been given at the
earliest point.
John Feeney, NJ DEP:
At the end of the exercise, during the
discussion period, I brought up the situation
of the less significant or "nuisance"
incidents, where the radioactive material is
not a direct immediate health threat, but
needs to be removed and disposed of
properly.
The enclosed short report "Radiation
Incidents Involving Contaminated Waste"
(not included with participant packages)
summarizes the incidents we've had to deal
with over the past 3 years in New Jersey.
Our fiscal year (FY) runs from July 31 to
June 30 (e.g., FY96 runs from 7/95 to 6/96).
The report shows 3 categories that have had
substantial impact on our Section (i.e.,
contaminated waste/trash, contaminated
metal and lost, stolen or abandoned devices).
The report demonstrates that almost all of
the contaminated waste/trash involve shorter
lived radionuclides used in nuclear medicine
procedures. The State of New Jersey's
problem is that the Solid Waste Regulations
do not allow radioactive waste that is
regulated by the Atomic Energy Act to be
disposed of at Solid Waste Disposal
Facilities. Other states, I believe also have
this problem. The problem may be resolved
if we could receive a statement from NRC
that waste generated by patients after they
had been released under 10 CFR 3 5.75 is
not only considered as not licensed, but
also not regulated by the Atomic Energy
Act. This might then allow the waste to be
disposed of at landfills rather than have to be
disposed of as radioactive waste.
The second point I would like to clear up is
that it appeared that EPA is considering
establishing a policy or criteria for
determining when a radiation incident could
qualify for some assistance. If we could be
informed of EPA's policy or criteria for
assistance, it would be most helpful. We're
not looking to have EPA run out or pay to
have someone run out and evaluate every
radiation incident that takes place in our
state. We will always respond to the
incidents in our state. What we are looking
for is a possible mechanism for covering the
cost of disposal of the materials. Any
guidance or assistance on this point would
be appreciated. By the way, we have the
CRCPD report on radioactive materials and
devices sought for recycling, but so far none
of the recovered sources qualified for
recycling.
The third and final point I'd like to make is
that perhaps NRC and EPA could jointly
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EPA903-K-98-002
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generate a Recommended Guide for Waste
and Recycling Facilities to follow when
their radiation monitors are triggered.
The guide could include some of the items
discussed during the exercise (e.g., isolate
the vehicle, mark off the aiea where
exposures of > 2.0 mR/hr, contact
appropriate officials, etc). This could
supplement NRC's "Hazardous Scrap
Metal" Poster with a few basic protective
measures the facilities could do to minimize
unnecessary exposure.
Tom Hughes, PEMA:
Because of the exercise, DEP ERT & BRP
and PEMA were able to talk more on this
type of response activity and this has already
started a dialog. I was invited to the DEP
Emergency Response Team Coordinators
meeting in Williamspoit PA next Wednesday
to talk about PEMA's rad program and how
we can work better with DEPs responders.
Tabletop Exercise Participant Comments
Excellent exercise.
Learned states in our region are very
capable.
Need more on decisions - less on
organization.
Need status boards.
Too much jargon and acronyms - need to
clarify.
Learned lots.
Would like to see this in all EPA /' NRC
Regions.
Need more attention to public radiation
exposure by participants.
Need unified command discussion.
Surfaced many issues my state needs to
address.
NRC / EPA / DOE joint participation
made the exercise very valuable.
Other state's experiences very valuable.
Need to establish joint information
center early on.
Unified command discussion needed.
Important to surface issues as well as
solve them.
Need more health physics considerations
in exercise play.
Need more attention to public health
issues.
Good discussion of federal resources
available.
Private industry groups need training on
notification procedures.
Early federal notification is important
when it's suspected this is more then a
nuisance event.
There is fear on the part of the states that
federal agencies might take over the
incident, causing the state to lose
control. This fear must be addressed.
When states notify federal agencies, they
need to clearly communicate what type
of assistance and how much is requested.
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Participant Ratings - Day One
Was the format effective?
100% YES
Level of audience
participation?
95% JUST
RIGHT
Would you recommend
participation to others?
100% YES
Did you leam anything useful?
100% YES
Average Participant Ratings of Phases of the
Tabletop Exercise (l=Best, 5=Worst)
Early Assessment
1.5
Notification
1.7
Initial Response
1.6
State and Federal Cooperation
1.9
Monitoring & Data Analysis
2.0
Breakout Session
2.0
Wrap up
1.9
Overall
1.6
Field Exercise Participant Comments
Already starting new dialog within the
state.
Need more like it.
Valuable insight gained.
Never saw a recovery before - good
experience.
Overall a good learning experience.
Very useful exercise - do more in other
parts of the country.
Want to keep involved in future
exercises.
Liked press briefings - develop follow up
exercises.
Tremendous learning experience - well
planned - excellent facilitators.
Include contractor role in the future.
Federal agencies working together is
long overdue.
Very valuable exercise - already acting
on ramifications.
One of the most informative safety
meetings
Field demo resource intensive but worth
it.
Include citizens in command team.
Far superior to part 1.
Please do more non power-plant
exercises.
Would like a closer look at the field
activity - perhaps TV monitor.
Future exercises needed involving other
states.
Need to take to other EPA and NRC
regions.
Some observers would like to have seen
the recovery team deliberations.
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Participant Ratings:
Was the field exercise a
valuable experience?
100% YES
Level of audience
participation?
90% JUST
RIGHT
Would you recommend
participation to others?
100% YES
What was most valuable?
Morning activities
27%
Press briefings
27%
Field activity
46%
What was least valuable?
Morning activities
35%
Press briefings
45%
Field activity
20%
Average Ratings of Phases of the Field
Exercise (l=3est, 5=Worst)
Opening / Overview
2.1
Unified Command discussion
2.1
Landfill / local government
2.1
State / NRC / EPA presentations
2.0
DOD & DOE presentations
1.9
Press conferences
1.9
Field simulation
1.8
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APPENDIX E
Exercise Planning Committee Members
William Belanger, EPA RIH
(215)814-2082
David Chawaga, NRC, RI
(610) 337-5246
William Steuteville, EPA RIII
(215)814-3264
Eric Weinstein, NRC, AEOD
(301)-415-7559
JohnMcGrath, NRC, RI
(610) 337-5069
Frank Costello, NRC, RI
(610) 337-5275
James Yusko, PA DEP, SW Region
(412) 442-4000
Steve Centore, DOE, BNL
(516) 344-7309
Doug Broaddus, NRC, NMSS
(301)415-5847
Michael Shuler, PECO Nuclear
(610) 640-6989
Tom Hughes, PEMA
(717) 651-2231
Randy Easton, PA DEP
(717) 783-6003
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APPENDIX F
Participants in the 1997 Lost Source Exercise
Gary Alderman
A1 Brown
Chester County Department of
U.S. EPA Region m (3NW33)
Emergency Services
1650 Arch Street
601 Westtown Road, Suite 12
Philadelphia, PA 19103
West Chester, PA 19380
Carl Brown
Bernard Au
Browning Ferris Industries
PA DEP
P.O. Box 128
555 North Lane, Suite 6010
Morgantown, PA 19543
Conshohocken, PA 19428
George P. Brozowski
James Barn hart
US EPA Region VI
PABRP
Dallas, TX 75202
P.O. Box 8469
Harrisburg, PA 17105
Deborah Carlson
US EPA, Region HI, Removal Branch
Diane Bearde
1650 Arch Street
US NRC, Region I
Philadelphia, PA 19103
475 Allendale Road
King Of Prussia, PA 19406
Dennis Carney
Chief, Removal Branch
Bill Belanger
US EPA, Region HI
U.S. EPA, Region ID
1650 Arch Street
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Philadelphia PA 19103
Sarah Casper
Steven Boykevich
US EPA, Region m, Removal Branch
NJ DEP
1650 Arch Street
PO Box 415
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Trenton, N J 08625-0415
Steve Centore
Doug Broaddus
US DOE, Brookhaven National Lab.
US NRC
53 Bell Avenue
Office of Nuclear Materials Safety
Upton, NY 11973
and Safeguards
Washington, DC 20555
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Larry Chang
PA DEP
555 North Lane, Suite 6010
Lee Park
Conshohocken, PA 19428
David Chawaga
US NRC, Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406
Michael Cosgrove
PA DEP
555 North Lane
Suite 6010 Lee Park
Conshohocken, PA 19428
Frank Costello
US NRC, Region I
475 Allendale Road
King Of Prussia, PA 19406
Steven R. Courtemanche
US NRC, Region I
475 Allendale Road
King Of Prussia, PA 19406
Bill Csaszar
NJ DEP
P.O. Box 415
Trenton, NJ 08625
Tony Derstine
PA DEP
Lee Park
555 North Lane, Suite 6010
Conshohocken, PA 19428
JeffDodd
US EPA, Region HI
401 Methodist Building
Wheeling, WV 26003
Jack Downie
US EPA, Region m
401 Methodist Building
Wheeling, WV 26003
Ronald A. Drake
PA DEP
Lee Park, Suite 6010
555 North Lane
Conshohocken, PA 19428
Michelle Dyarman
PA DEP
Lee Park,Suite 6010
555 North Lane.
Conshohocken, PA 19428
Maijorie Easton
US EPA, Region III
401 Methodist Building
Wheeling, WV 26003
Randy Easton
PA BRP
PO Box 8469
Harrisburg, PA 17105
Emily P. Falone
DEMA
12 Penn's Way, Corporate Commons
Newcastle, Delaware 19720
JohnFeeney
NJ DEP
P.O. Box 415
Trenton, NJ 08625-0415
Rich Fetzer
U.S. EPA Region ffl (3NW33)
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia PA 19103
35
. NUREG-1634
EPA903-K-98^002
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Rick Flack
Roy F. Weston SATA
5 Underwood Court
Delran NJ 08075
Roland Fletcher
Director Radiological Health Program
Maryland Department of the Environment
2500 Broening Highway
Baltimore, MD 21224
Robert D. France
PA DEP, SERO, WMP
Suite 6010 Lee Park
55 North Lane
Conshohocken, PA 19428
Tom Glass
Chester County Department of
Emergency Services
601 Westtown Road, Suite 12
West Chester, PA 19380
Craig Gordon
US NRC, Region I
475 Allendale Road
King Of Prussia PA 19406
Larry Grisham CWO-3, USMC
Defense Nuclear Weapons School
1900 Wyoming Blvd. SE
Kirtland AFB, NM 87117
Bob Guami
U.S. EPA, Region in
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia PA 19103
David S. Hake
DEMA
PO Box 527
Delaware City, DE 19706
Felicia M Hinson
US NRC, Region 1
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406
Kevin G. Hughes, Tech Sgt, USAF
Defense Nuclear Weapons School
1900 Wyoming Blvd. SE
Kirtland AFB, NM, 87117
Tom Hughes, CEM
Radiological Officer
PEMA
PO Box 3321
Harrisburg, PA 17105
Becky Hunter
PA DEP
555 North Lane
Lee Park, Suite 6010
Conshohocken, PA 19428
Alan Jacobson
Radiological Health Program
Maryland Department of the Environment
2500 Broening Highway
Baltimore, MD 21224
Rich Janati
PA BRP
P.O. Box 8468
Harrisburg, PA 17105-8469
Donna Janda
Roy F. Weston SATA
5 Underwood Court
Delran, NJ 08075
Wanda Johnson
U.S. EPA Region III
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
NUREG-I634
EPA903-K-98-002
36
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Paul Kauffman
Joel Lubenau
US NRC Region I
US NRC
475 Allendale Road
11555 Rockville Pike
King Of Prussia, PA 19406
Rockville, MD 20852-2738
Kevin Kilje
Raymond Manley
DEMA
Radiological Health Program
114 Center Court
Maryland Department of the Environment
Wilmington, DE 19810
2500 Broening Highway
Baltimore, MD 21224
William Kirk
PA BRP
Dennis Matlock
P.O. Box 8469
US EPA, Region HI
Harrisburg, PA 17105
401 Methodist Building
Wheeling, NW 26003
Charles L. Kleeman
US EPA Region III
Josie Matsinger
1650 Arch Street
U.S. EPA, Region m
Philadelphia, PA 19103
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia PA 19103
Kevin Koob
FEMA Region IE
Louis C. Matz
105 S Seventh Street
Roy F. Weston SATA
Philadelphia, PA 19106
31 -B Sunflower Road
Maple Shade, NJ 08052
Janies Kopenhaver
PA DEP
Doug McAbee
I Ararat Blvd.
Radiological Health Program
Harrisburg, PA 17110
Maryland Department of the Environment
2500 BroemAjg Highway
Joe Koshy
Baltimore, MD-21224
PA DEP
15 Driftwood Drive
Robert McGlade
Audubon, PA
Roy F. Weston Inc. SATA
5 Underwood Court
Robert Kramer
Delran NJ 08075
U.S. EPA Region III (3AP23)
1650 Arch Street
Dan McGoldrick
Philadelphia PA 19103
EPA, OERR
401 M Street SW (5204-G)
Glen Lapsley
Washington, DC 20460
U.S. EPA Region ffl
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia PA 19103
37
NUREG-1634
EPA903- K-98-002
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John McGrath
US NRC, Region I
475 Allendale Road
King Of Prussia, PA 19406
John McNamara
Chester County Department of Emergency
Services
601 Westtown Road, Suite 12
West Chester, PA 19382-4558
Roxana Mero
EPA,OERR
401 M Street SW
Washington, DC 20460
Rich Messimer
US EPA Region IE
40 r Methodist Building
Wheeling, WV 26003
Rex A. Miller
PADEP
Lee Park, Suite 6010
555 North Lane
Conshohocken, PA 19428
Michael Modes
US NRC, Region I
475 Allendale Road
King-Of Prussia, PA 19406
Rosalind Moore
US EPA, Region IQ
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia PA 19103
John F. Nau Jr.
PEMA
Hamburg Center
Hamburg, PA 19526
Madeline Nawar
EPA, ORIA
401 M Street SW
Washington, DC 20460
Bob Nelson
Radiological Health Program
Maryland Department of the Environment
2500 Broening Highway
Baltimore, MD 21224
Thomas Newmeyer
PA DEP
Lee Park, Suite 6010
555 North Lane
Conshohocken, PA 19428
Lyn O'Harc
Manager, Environmental, Safety, Health
Browning Ferris Industries
P.O. Box 128
Morgantown, PA 19543
Nat Owrutsky
Radiological Health Program
Maryland Department of the Environment
2500 Broening Highway
Baltimore, MD 21224
Alex Page
PA DEP
Lee Park, Suite 6010
555 North Lane
Conshohocken, PA 19428
George Pangborn
US NRC Region 1
475 Allendale Road
King Of Prussia, PA 19406
Marty Powell
US EPA Region HI
401 Methodist Building
Wheeling, NW 26003
NUREG-1634
EPA903-K-98-002
38
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Joseph Pryber
PA DEP
Lee Park, Suite 6010
555 North Lane
Conshohocken, PA 19428
Leon Rachuba
Radipjogical Health Program
Maryland Department of the Environment
2500 Broening Highway
Baltimore, MD 21224
Larry Richardson
U.S. EPA Region ffl (3NW33)
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia PA 19103
Christopher L. Rittiger
PA DEP., BRP
500 Water Front Drive
Pittsburgh PA 15222
Mark Roberts
US NRC, Region 1
475 Allendale Road
King Of Prussia, PA 19406
Kurt Rutzmoser
PA DEP
Lee Park, Suite 6010
555 North Lane
Conshohocken, PA 1942$
Diane Screnci
US NRC, Region I
475 Allendale Road
King Of Prussia, PA 19403
Mikal Shabazz
U.S. EPA Region m (3NW33)
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia PA 19103
Ivna Shanbacky
PA DEP
Lee Park, Suite 6010
555 North Lane
Conshohocken, PA 19^28 '
Michael J. Sharon
Maryland Department of the Environment
2500 Broening Highway
Baltimore, MD 21224
Neil A. Sheehan
US NRC, Region I
475 Allendale Road
King Of Prussia, PA 19406
Michael Shuler, Physicist
PECO Nuclear
965 Chesterbrook Blvd. 6103
Wayne PA 19087
Henry Skoczalek
FEMA Region ID
105 S. Seventh Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Andrew Simpson
PEMA
P.O. Box 3321
Harrisburg, PA 17105-3321
Eric Simpson
US EPA, Region II
290 Broadway, 28th Floor
New York, NY. 10007-1866
William Steuteville
US EPA, Region III
1650 Arch Building
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Lisa Strissel
Roy F. Weston SATA
5 Underwood Court
Delran NJ 08075
39
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Donna Thim
MDE
2500 Broening Highway
Baltimore, MD 21224
Carl Trump
Radiological Health Program
Maryland Department of the Environment
2500 Broening Highway
Baltimore, NM. 21224
Alan Van Kuehner
DOE
Brookhaven Nation Laboratory; Bldg. 129
Upton, NY. 11973
Jim Waddington
PECO Energy
2301 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Chris Wagner
U.S. EPA, Region m (3NW33)
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia PA 19103
Bucky Walters
US EPA, Region Rffl (ATSDR)
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia PA 19103
Erie weinsteifi
US NRC, AEOD
Washington, DC 20555
Michael Welsh
US EPA, Region III 3HW33
1650 Arch Building
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Duncan White
US NRC, Region I
475 Allendaie Road
King Of Prussia, PA 19406
Mark Winslow
US EPA, Region II
290 Broadway
New York, NY. 10002
Vince Zenone
U.S. EPA, Region HI
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia PA 19103
Linda Ziegler
U.S. EPA Region IH
1650 Arch Street
Philadelphia PA 19103
NUREG-1634
EPA'903-K-983>0I
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~c porm 33M UA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
P-W) <(V_
BIBUOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET
(S matucborm on thm rwrtn*)
1. REPORT NUMBER
(Anlgnad by NRC, AM Vol., Supp., fttv
ปnd Addendum Numbare, w any.)
NUREQ-1634
EPA9O3iK-98*0O2
"^Ttitle and subtitle
1997 Lost Source Exercise
An Exercise of Radiological Response Through
Cooperation and Coordination of Local, State and Federal
Resources Under the National Contingency Plan
3- PATE EXPORT PUPMGHED
MONTTH * | ~ 'year
Auausf ' ^998
4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER
5. AUTHOR(S)
B. Belanger, B. Steuteville, EPA
0. Chawaga, E. Weinstein, NRC
Retype otf. iMte3RTti
T* ecTinical
7. PERllOO COVERED (Inckaiy* Qtl&t)
S PERFORMNG ORGANIZATION ฆ NAME ANO AbORESS (fNPC, pnxriiMOhntien, OMemarRtion U.S. NuctrRtguMay Commotion mtiahj VcdMabtee
pmidt nana and mttUng tddnu)
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data U. S. Environmental Protection Agency,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III
Washington, DC 20555-0001 Philadelphia, PA 19103-2029
9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION -NAME ANO ADORESS (VMRC iypป "Sama u ซ6ow* teontmAr, pnxidm MRC Dhwon, OHIemerRagtBn, U. 5> rvueir'najuwmy Commum,
and maOinfddmt*.)
Same as 8. above.
10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
11. ABSTRACT (300 wcrOt or tms)
This was the first major exercise of Its type with the Environmental Protection Agency as the lead Fede/tU Ag0nCy
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f Printed *
on recycled
paper
Federal Recycling Program
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