AN ON-SCENE REPORT
THE SINKING OF THE TANKER "ARROW"

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AN ON-SCENE REPORT
THE SINKING OF THE TANKER "ARROW
Chedabucto Bay, Nova Scotia
February 1970
by
Thomas A. Murphy
Edison Water Quality Laboratory
Edison, New Jersey
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

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INTRODUCTION
On Wednesday, February 4, 1970, the Greek tanker, Arrow, of Liberian
registry, went aground on Cerberus Rock in Chedabucto Bay, Nova
Scotia. She was bound Cor the docks of Canadian Pulp, Ltd., near
Port liawksbury, with a cargo of 16,000 tons of Bunker C Oil.
The subsequent events are still unclear in detail, but the major hap-
penings are fairly apparent. As representative of the FWPOA on scene
from February 10 through 13, I recorded the following impressions.
The scene was one of great tension and confusion, with information
coming from diverse sources of varying reliability. Thus, some of the
following may not be accurate, but should be useful until official in-
vestigations and reports bring forth the exact events.
Although not of the magnitude of the Torrey Canyon, this incident
involved severe pollution and is similar to what might be expected off
the coast of Maine. A number of unfavorable circumstances combined to
form an exceptionally difficult incident:
1.	l'he vessel went aground in a bay almost completely surrounded by
land, so the chances for dispersion of oil at sea by natural
forces was very slight.
2.	Air and water temperatures were near freezing.
3.	The oil, at this temperature, was aLmost solid, could not be pumped,
and tended not to disperse easily.
k. The area was remote, lacking readily available resources such as
vacuum trucks.
5. The shores were generally inaccessible; bea
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CONCLUSIONS
1« Contingency planning is essential. The Canadians entered this
incident without a contingency plan. Most of the people involved
had little or no previous experience with oil pollution. As a
result much time was lost organizing and considering various
options which should have been thought out to some extent before-
hand .
2.	Timely and concerted action is vital. This requires action and
decisions at two levels: polit ical and operat ional. Fortuitous
conditions often will not occur. The Canadian team was hampered
by retention of such decisions as the disposition of the stern
section, if freed, at the political level. The timing and magni-
tude of events coupled with the vagaries of weather require
concerted action of a military nature. These events occur without
notice and require immediate marshalling and coordination of people
and material. Yet such a military-type operation is only as good
as the objectives given it — the political decisions. Timely
advice on options must be funnelled to the political decision-
makers and the necessity of timely decisions emphasized.
3.	The state-of-the-art of oil pollution control is such that any
action involves considerable risk. Yet these risks must be assumed
to prevent a serious and continuing pollution problem such as
resulted with the Arrow. The Canadians preferred to keep their
options open and await fortuitous combination of circumstances.
These never arrived and the vessel was lost. This attitude pene-
trated the operational level with some loss of a sense of urgency.
Things seemed to get underway about 10:00 am daily and, although
several hundred government people were available, only a score or
so were fully utilized.
4.	Reliable salvage advice is essential. Effective salvage can
remove the pollution problem and should receive highest priority.
Salvage people must be informed of the pollution problems and
vice-versa. Timely and effective salvage could have solved the
Arrow problem. But decisions must be quick and action concerted.
A major problem is the need for competent advice on salvage. This
seems to be an arcane art, entrusted to the select few. But, as
with war, salvage is too important to be left to the salvors.
Guidelines and agreements must pre-exist for timely, concerted
act ion.
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5.	The decision to do nothing, however rational, is difficult. In-
action is politically distasteful and people tend towards the
visible. This appeared to have been the case partially with the
attempt to burn oil along the shore. Although published informa-
tion indicates that Bunker C has relatively mild effects on the
intertidal life, the urge to do something was powerful.
6.	Shore contamination was heavy, but damage was difficult to assess.
Possibly 2,000 sea birds perished. A large number of recently
dead sea urchins were observed, but this may not have been caused
by oil. Plankton tows showed no damage. The shores were remark-
ably beautiful but not intensively used for recreation.
7.	Operationally available control methods were inadequate.
a.	Diapersants were not favorably considered. Corexit 8666
apparently was the only chemical on hand, with a stockpile of
several hundred barrels. It was ruled out because of toxicity,
although it appears to be relatively non-toxic. Although it
seems to be markedly more effective than Corexit 7664 on heavy
oils, field trials gave unclear results.
b.	Burning of floating oil shows promise. Pittsburg-Corning
"Sea Beads" showed an ability to burn Bunker C oil in cold
weather, with 15 knot winds. Combustion was not complete, but
reignition was possible. There seemed tci be relatively little
danger of an uncontrolled conflagration, since burning was
limited to the area of application of "Sea Beads". Yet use
was limited to small slicks and fuLl-soale trials are needed.
The one full-scale trial was prevented by the rapid spread of
oil to a thin slick. Effective burning may require some sort
of containment.
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Feb.
9, m/0
- Monday
Arrived at Hal if ax/Dartmouth Airport about 9:30 pm. With no success
in reaching Mr. Weston of the Department of Transport, my assigned
contact, by phone I rented a i:ar and began the drive to Port Hawks-
bury. Becoming weary I stopped at 11:30 pm at Antigonish. Half of
the motel was occupied by CBC crews covering the incident.
Feb. 10, 1970 - Tuesday
Arose early and drove to the operation headquarters at the Port llawks-
bury Motel. I immediately ran into Farrel Boyce of the Canadian
Inland Waters Research Laboratory, Department of Minerals, Mines, and
Natural Resources at Burlington, Ontario, who had attended one of our
courses at Edison. Through him I met the apparent operations team:
James Hornsby, DOT on-scene commander, Captain Marsham, DOT accident
investigator and Hornsby's assistant for this incident, and Dr. A. G.
Le Feuvre, Boyce's boss. These gentlemen were cooperating with Mr.
Berrister and others from Imperial Oil.
A number of other unidentified people were milling around in a scene
of general confusion. Formal assignments obviously had not been made
and the "chiefs" were occupied with such tasks as answering the tele-
phone. The status of the vessel was unclear, except that she still
was aground. Similarly, not much seemed to be known of the extent of
pollution.
The motel, and the town, was full of representatives of the press and
some manufacturers, notably Pittsburg-Corn ing, who had apparently been
invited by the Canadian government, and tisso Ri-.search and Engineering.
(Imperial is a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey.) However,
there was a mere trickle of"whiffle-dust" vendors compared to the
deluge of other recent incidents. The remoteness and relatively non-
sensational publicity seemed to have contributed to their absence.
The events to date appeared to be as Eolluws:
Feb. 4, 197 0 - Wednesday
The vessel want aground at about 13 knots speed on Cerberus Rock, a
well-marked rock alongside a chamsl five miles wide. No reason was
given for the grounding and no distress call was sent, merely a wire
to the pilot that the vessel would be "a little late arriving".
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Feb. 4-7, 1970 - Wednesday-Saturday
Salvage efforts were reportedly being directed by TOVALOP, but on
the weekend after the Arrow broke up, the Canadian government appar-
ent Ly declared Imperial Oil responsible.
Feb. 9, 1970 - Monday
Sometime about this date the Esso people sprayed Corexit 8666 onto
the slick from aircraft with unclear results. Also, the Pittsburg-
Coriiing "Sea Beads" had been used, under Le Feuvre's supervision on
small slicks £n and just off shore near Arichat, with reported
success. Reports of oiled beaches included several miles either side
of Arichat and about eight miles along the south shore of Chedabucto
Bay.
At the motel I also ran into Captain Alexander and Cmdr. McLean of the
First Naval District, Boston.
The plans for the day were somewhat informal. I joined Le Feuvre who
was shepherding another trial run with the Pittsburg-Corning "Sea
Beads". This manufacturer had been selected, apparently as the result
of demonstrations held at Edison during September 1969, as part of the
training course on Oil and Hazardous Materials. Le Feuvre was inter-
ested in the possible use of burning agents on spills in the Arctic as
well as on this incident.
After extensive delays we sailed from Arichat on the Shediac Bay, a
long-liner converted for use as a patrol boat for the Department of
Fisheries. We reached the Arrow at about 2:30 pm. She was broken in
two with the two sections at right angles to each other, the bow just
awash and the stern sticking up at an angle with rudder exposed. Two
tugs had lines to the rear of the stern section and were maintaining
tension.
Spreading southward from the Arrow were moderate slicks consisting
mostly of an iridescent, film, but with globs up to fifteen feet in
diameter of viscous Bunker C. These globs held together in the calm
seas and "buckled" with the waves. They appeared to be no more than
3/8 inch thick. Ninety-nine percent of the slick area was iridescent
form.
One glob was selected and coated with "Sea Beads". This was followed
by some Varsol and a marking flare (supplied by Canadian Navy personnel
attached to operation: Cmdr. Hoult and Chief Petty Officer Eisler).
The slick burst into flame and burned for about 90 seconds.
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The second trial on another glob was more impressive. The patch of
oiL, 15 feet in diameter, burned vigorously for almost 5 minutes,
belching great clouds of black smoke. Obviously, the Bunker C was
burning. The flame slowly spread across the patch of oil, the
flames being bent almost horizontally by the 15 knot wind. Gradu-
ally, a cooling front appeared to form on the windward edge of the
patch which appeared to drive the flame slowly across the patch until
it extinguished on the lee edge. The glob was readily reignited with
Varsol and a flare and after three burnings, a patch of about 10 feet
by 5 feet, containing somewhat less than half of the original oil
remained. Although the oil was far from being consumed, the ability
of "Sea Beads" to sustain combustion was very impressive.
Returning to Port Hawksbury that night I ran into Cmdr. Curry of the
U. S. Coast Guard, Boston, and a team of U. S. Army flame thrower ex-
perts from Fort Devens, Mass., apparently requested by Capt. Alexander.
Today appeared to have been organization day for the Canadians who
entered this incident without a contingency plan. A spokesman for
environmental concerns had arrived. He was Mr. Leaziel of the Depart-
ment of Fisheries. Several DOT and fisheries vessels were on scene
and an oceanographic research vessel from the Bedford Institute was
en route.
The plan, at this point, appeared to be to sit tight through tomorrow's
predicted gales and on Thursday with winds to the west, which would
blow the oil to sea, to attempt to free the stern. Apparently, some
tanks in the forward part of the stern section were full of water and
could be "blown" with relatively little additional pollution. A com-
pressor had been helilifted today to the deck of the stern sect ion 1.or
this purpose. The stern apparently was fairly intact, but fears were,
that she would "go vertical" if pulled off without the additional
buoyancy forward.
Also, today, the Esso people had gone out alone and tried Co rex it 806(1
on some small slicks, by applying with back pumps,agitating with prop
wash. Results were unclear because of "operational problems".
I talked for awhile with Dr. Richard Warner of the Univ. of Newfound-
land who had been hired as a biological consultant by Imperial Oil.
He seemed concerned about effects of the. oil on the intertidal zone,
and favored the use of "Sea Beads" to burn oil in the tidal pools
along the south shore of Chedabucto Bay. 1 tried to point out that
this would likely cause intertidal losses, whereas the Bunker C was
known to be fairly innocuous, and that the amounts of oil destroyed
would not significantly reduce the problem.
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While along the south shore this afternoon on the Shediac Bay, we
observed an extremely thin slink extending about 1 1/2 miles offshore
and along shore as far as one could see. As the boat cut through the
slick the oil parted, leaving a c Lear path the distance of visibility -
about one mile.
Feb. 11, 1970 - Wednesday
As predicted, the winds and storm arrived. I had planned to observe
field trials of Corexit 8666, but these were abandoned. Leaziel had
expressed interest in data on this chemical so I called Dr. Tarzwell
and Edison for mummichog bioassays and SET tests. I relayed the3e
results through Boyce and Le Feuvre along with information from Edison
on the absorptive properties of straw and tree bark. (A few truck
loads of straw were arriving in town, apparently as a stockpile for
possible use.)
1 talked with Lezie.l, the environmental spokesman. He, too, was new
to the problem of oil pollution and was taking a moderate course of
no drastic action. He appeared to oppose the use of chemicals, but
favored the burning of tidal pools. I pointed out that most data in-
dicated that Bunker C had relatively mild biological effects, except
for the birds.
This was a day of waiting and catching up on sleep. Rather than waste
it, I surveyed the shore from Arichat to ttirache Point. The pollution
was remarkably severe. This was a barren area, relatively inaccessible
with jagged rocks interspersed with shingle or boulder beaches. It L3
a striking and beautiful landscape, similar to the coast of Maine.
Notes are as follows:
Feb. 11, 1970 - 1130 hrs., off lighthouse, Marache Point
Asphalt-like oil covers rocks and pebble beaches at high tide line,
coverage from light (10% area) to heavy (50% area).
Some iridescence in sheltered areas, negligible percent of oil in this
form, asphalt-like coat remains on rocks, does not float to surface -
no repollut ion.
On one shingle beach 50 ft. long ro 2U moribund appearing sea urrhins,
1.5" diameter, oil on mouth.
Shore face between Marache Point and Forest Cove coverage rJ 20%, no
oil on water; many sea urchin carcasses, of varying time after death;
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one dead bird, completely oil covered, form like a teal; one heavily
oiled diving bird {pointed bill, short, sharp wings) flapped off
rocks into surf, disappeared 30 seconds later; pebble and boulder
beaches, when steep, appear to clean themselves.
Oil globs on snow or ice caused melting, impressions several inches
deep.
Just south of Cape Auget, heavy oil coverage on rocks and pebbles
( ^ 75% area), iridescent to blotched slick in fingers rj 100 yards
offshore.
Slight promitory, 1/8 mi. in Cape Auget, 80% oil cover, in some tide
pools oil rs 1/8" thick, local resident says he counted about 12 ducks
oiled yesterday along about 300 yds. beach, also saw 6 oiled ducks in
woods, 1/4 mi. from shore.
One gull, healthy-looking (immature black-backed) had 1/3 underparts
stained with oil.
Little Barachois - one dead oiled flat-bill duck just to south, cove
itself is clean.
Conservative estimate - dead and dying birds during last 48 hrs. from
Marache Point—# Arichat: 100-200.
Talking with several local residents I heard many complaints, primarily
from soiling of clothes of children, and rugs and furniture by children
and dogs. One man reportedly shot two dogs he couldn't get clean.
Significant observations:
1.	A significant, but not disastrous bird kill.
2.	Hundreds of dead sea urchins - normal for this time of year?
3.	The oil stuck to the rocks as it hit, with little apparent tendency
to refloat and repollute.
4.	Oil in small amounts caused marked melting of ice and snow.
I ate dinner with the U. S. contingent and Capt. Marsham, DOT, deputy
on-scene-commander. According to Marsham the attempt to dislodge the
stern was awaiting a fortuitous combination of circumstances. No
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decision had yet been made of what to do with the stern when freed.
Apparently this, with other matters, was being retained as a polit-
ical decision. The bow section was receiving secondary (i. e.
negligible) consideration. Some thought had been given to gelling
its contents with Esso's gelling agent. However, this had been
used only in thousand gallon tanks and the cost of $250,000 was
considered too expensive.
Feb. 12, 1970 - Thursday
Having grown tired of the slow pace, I decided to return home. I
packed my bags and dropped by the Port Hawksbury Motel to make my
farewells. Cmdr. McLean and the U. S. Army flame thrower team were
heading off for Arichat to carry out some burning trials, independent
of Le Peuvre.
At the motel the atmosphere was one of tense anticipation. Rumors,
whispers, urgent gatherings, and secrecy. The Pittsburg-Corning
people were on immediate standby. Apparently, the plan was, as soon
as the wind subsided and shifted to the west, to blow several tanks
in the stern, believed to be full of oil and water, pull the stern
free and tow to sea to be sunk. The oil from the purged tanks was to
be burned with "sea beads". I decided to stay and made for the
C.C.G.S. Skua. Here, I found Le Feuvre and the Pittsburg-Corning sys-
tem to be readied. An Erosion Control, Inc. muleher/blower had been
fastened to the port bow and 120 bags (4 cu. ft. ea.) of "sea beads"
were on board. Three hundred more bags were en route by chartered jet
and the Kansas City plant was producing 2b hours per day.
The Skua was the sole radio link for headquarters — 4 miles from the
motel (II) and had to await replacement by the Dawson before making
way. In the midst of this activity, at 10:35 am a laconic radio
message crackled in from the Fountain Valley (apparently one of the
tugs maintaining tension on the stern section): the stern section had
sunk. This message was relayed to the motel from a phone booth on
shore, creating a minor panic. Apparently, oil had been released, so
after some confusion, the Skua set sail to burn the slick.
We steamed out into the heavy seas, with eight foot swells and kO knot
winds. Along the way were occasional "leathery" patches of tarry oil,
from 6" to 3' in diameter.
At the scene of the wreck were no vessels — all had left. Only the
foremast was visible and occasionally in the wave troughs the top of
the smoke stack on the stern would appear.
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Some oil was being discharged, but spreading rapidly. The slick
widened quickly to about 400 yds. at most and had disappeared with-
in a mile downwind. It consisted mostly of an iridescent sheen
with occasional (every 100' or so) leathery blobs about 6' in diam-
eter. These blobs were covered by a layer of water about 1/4" thick.
Confronted with this scene we turned and sailed back. Great confus-
ion existed throughout this operation as to where the oil was and
what exactly was a slick by visual sighting. Attempts to provide
helicopter coverage failed since the Skua could communicate directly
with neither the headquarters or the helicopters.
About 8 miles from the wreck to the west we passed through a slick
consisting of iridescent sheen interspersed by small (1-2") globs of
black oil in a peppery pattern, 3-4" apart. Large groups of these
peppery arrangements swept past. Occasionally, we'd see a leathery glob
3" in diameter.
When we reached Port Hawksbury I departed for home, leaving a somewhat
disheartened group of Canadians.
CONCUSIONS FROM DISCUSSION WITH LCDR. JAMES J. COLEMAN, USN, AT IANTIC
FLEET SALVAGE OFFICER
The Arrow was generally intact for two days after grounding. The prin-
ciple question at this time was whether or not she was impaled on
Cerberus Rock. If she were, no amount of tugging would remove her.
If she merely rested on the rock, she probably could have been pulled
off. Thus, initial action should have been to bring in powerful tugs
and these sot budging her, "blow" several tanks to lighten her. This,
of course, would have released some oil.
During this time the salvors boarded the Arrow and got up steam, but
the Greek crewmen followed them around shutting everything down 11
If the vessel were impaled, getting her off would be a major, time-
consuming task. The first action would have been to secure the vessel
with "beach gear" — essentially lines and anchors to fix her in a
four point mooring. This would have stabilized her and reduced the
probability of later loss. "Beach gear" could likely be fixed in 24
hours with favorable weather. However, "beach gear" is not available
in Canada, or with the salvor from Halifax involved in this incident.
Such "beach gear" is available from the U. S. Navy and large private
salvors such as ttirphy-Pacific. The U. S. Navy offered such materials
for use on the Arrow, through the Royal Canadian Navy, but the Canadian
Navy was reluctant to get involved.
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The vessel L: racked on Saturday arid broke in two on Sunday. Had it
been lightened with some loss of oil, it may have been freed (at
least the stern section) with the removal of the major portion of
oil. llad it been fixed with "beach gear" the chances of losing the
stern, as occurred on Thursday, would have been substantially
reduced. Several calm days were available early in the second week
for transfer of materials from the deck of smaller vessels to the
Arrow.
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Fig. 1. The "Arrow" aground on	Fig- 2. An oiled duck - nearly
Cerberus Rock, and broken in two.	unrecognizable as such.
It

Fig. 3. Typical landscape of Chedabucto Fig. k. Apply "Sea Beads" burning
Bay.	agent.
Fig. 5. "Sea Beads" burning a small oil
patch. Combustion was incomplete, but
continued for about 3 minutes.
Fig. 6. Dead sea urchins, hound in
abundance in polluted area. Cause of
death unknown.
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