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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Washington, D. C. 20460
oOo
PUBLIC HEARING
on
CALIFORNIA WAIVER REQUEST
VOLUME II
Pages 210 - 420
August 4, 1977
Conference Rooms A-B-C
US Environmental Protection Agency, Region II
100 California Street
San Francisco, California
9:00 a.m.
Reported by:
JERRY R. SMYTHE
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2
HEARING PANEL
19290
BENJAMIN R. JACKSON, Presiding Officer
Director, Mobile Source Enforcement Division
CHARLES GRAY
Chief, Standards Development and Support Branch
KARL HELLMAN
Chief, Technology and Evaluation Staff
RON E. KRUSE
Project Manager, Light Duty Vehicle Regulations
EPA STAFF
DANIEL M. STEINWAY
Attorney-Advisor
JAMES McNAB, III
Attorney-Advisor
JOAN F. URBINE
Secretary
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3
INDEX
WITNESS PAGE
CHRYSLER CORPORATION 213 & 33 7
MICHAEL W. GRICE, Staff Attorney
ROBERT M. WAGNER, Staff Engineer, Emission
Planning
AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION 232 & 396
WILLIAM C. JONES, Manager, Emissions and
Energy Standards
AUTOMOBILE IMPORTERS OF AMERICA 247 & 257
DONALD M. SCHWENTKER, Staff Attorney
SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC. 251 & 406
WALTER D. BIGGERS, General Manager
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD 261
THOMAS AUSTIN, Deputy Executive Officer,
Technical
KINGSLEY MACOMBER, Chief Counsel
GARY RUBENSTEIN, Manager, Special Projects
Section
MOTOR AND EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION 2 78
MARK R. JOELSON, Attorney with Arent, Fox,
Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn of Washington, D.C.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 2 98
DONALD A. JENSEN, Director, Automotive
Emissions and Fuel Economy Office
EUGENE E. WEAVER, Emissions Planning
Associate
JOHN EPPEL, Attorney
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION 3 65
EDWIN E. NELSON, Assistant Director of
Automotive Emission Control
HAROLD W. SCHWOCHERT, Staff Engineer
RICHARD I. PETERSEN, Attorney
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3A
INDEX (Cont'd)
ATTACHMENTS
Attachment A of AMC's Presentation
Attachment I of Ford Motor Company's Presentation
Attachment II of Ford Motor Company's Presentation
Attachment III of Ford Motor Company's Presentation
Attachment IV of Ford Motor Company's Presentation
Attachment V of Ford Motor Company's Presentation
Smog Chamber Simulation of Los Angeles Pollutant
Transport by William A. Glasson, Environmental
Science Department, General Motors Research
Laboratories
GM Statement on ARB Proposal for 1982 Automotive
NO Exhaust Standards
x
Meeting of State of California Air Resources Board,
(Excerpt), Wednesday, June 22, 1977, submitted by GM
GMR Smog Chamber Simulation of Los Angeles Pollutant
Transport Graph, submitted by GM
Statement by American Motors Corporation on the
California Air Resources Board Proposal for 1982
and Later Passenger Car, Light-Duty Truck and Medium-
Duty Vehicle NO Exhaust Emission Standards (June 22,
1977) x
oOo
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213
MR. GRICE: Good morning. I am Michael Grice, an
attorney with Chrysler Corporation. We welcome this oppor-
tunity to present our views on California's request that the
preemption provisions of Section 209(a), the Clean Air Act, be
waived to permit California to enforce its vehicle maintenance
regulations beginning with 1980 model passenger cars and 1981
model light- and medium-duty trucks.
These regulations have two basic provisions. First,
they would significantly limit the maintenance permitted during
certification testing. This requirement is, in our judgment,
well within the authority of both the ARB and EPA once tech-
nological feasibility is established.
Second, they would prohibit a manufacturer from
recommending additional maintenance to its customers except
under very limited and exceptional circumstances.
I will address my comments to this second portion of
California's regulation, the prohibition of additional main-
tenance recommendations to consumers. As I will explain, this
portion of the regulation is not authorized by either
California or federal law and is specifically preempted by
provisions of the federal law which cannot be waived pursuant
to Section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act.
Equally important, we do not believe that this
regulation is technologically feasible within the meaning of
the requirements of Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act.
Accordingly, we submit that California's request for waiver
of its regulation prohibiting additional maintenance recom-
mendations must be denied.
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I will not discuss the question of California's
authority today. That subject has been discussed at length in
the MVMA memorandum which has been submitted to the record
here.
Turning to the federal law, Section 207(c)(3) of the
Federal Clean Air Act requires that the manufacturer furnish
"such written instructions for the maintenance and use of the
vehicle or engine by the ultimate purchaser as may be reason-
able and necessary to assure the proper functioning of
emission control devices and systems" This provision applies
equally to vehicles sold in California and in the other 49
states.
The determination of what maintenance is reasonable
and necessary is primarily left to the discretion of the
vehicle manufacturer. That discretion is controlling unless
EPA establishes that the particular recommendation is
unreasonable and unnecessary.
Thus, the existing law permits, indeed requires, a
manufacturer to specify additional maintenance to its customers
if that maintenance is reasonably and necessarily required to
assure proper operation of components affecting vehicle
emissions during real world operation of the vehicle.
As a practical matter, this requirement covers
directly or indirectly virtually all engine and power train
maintenance. Significant civil penalties can be imposed for
failing to provide such maintenance instructions. We submit
that under the "Supremacy Clause" of the United States
Constitution the obligations and requirements of Section
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207(c)(3) are the supreme law of the land and supersede and
prohibit any state action such as contemplated by this pro-
posal .
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Mr. Grice, may I interrupt you?
MR. GRICE: Certainly.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I perceive your argument is much
the same as that offered by Ford and General Motors on this.
Is that fair? Is there anything in here that I am going to
be surprised with?
MR. GRICE: Let me think about that question for a
minute, Ben.
My immediate reaction is no.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Then let me ask you the question:
If pursuant to this review that the EPA does, which you
acknowledge as having the greater force of the law with regard
to cars certified for California under the maintenance require-
ments specified in the regulations that they have adopted, we
make the determination that anything above and beyond what was
done in connection with certification in their programs is
unreasonable and unnecessary, would that satisfy your concerns
about what goes in the maintenance instruction to the ultimate
consumer?
MR. GRICE: No, it wouldn't, because I don't think
that you can make that finding.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Well, now, wait a minute. You
said very clearly on the bottom of Page 2 and top of Page 3,
"This discretion is controlling unless EPA establishes that
the particular recommendation is unreasonable and unnecessary."
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And the basic thrust of it would be that once above
and beyond what is established by California rules is
unreasonable and unnecessary, and I am saying: If that were
the determination of the EPA, wouldn't that solve your con-
cerns?
MR. GRICE: No, it wouldn't.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You wouldn't have a conflict of
law, because the issue of your liability would be arguably
dealt with when EPA made that determination. At least that's
the way the court looks at it, I presume.
MR. GRICE: Let's put it this way, Ben: I don't
think that you can establish present maintenance recommenda-
tions of manufacturers are unreasonable and unnecessary.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: In other words, it really doesn't
have any meaning for EPA to make any kind of determination with
regard to maintenance instructions offered by Chrysler or
anybody else because there is no way you can prove its
unreasonable and unnecessary if the manufacturer recommends
it.
MR. GRICE: I think under certain limited circum-
stances it might very well be possible to establish that a
recommendation is unreasonable and unnecessary.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What one do you know of that's
been made by Chrysler that would be such a recommendation?
MR. GRICE: I think I object to that question. I am
not speaking of any recommendation that is made by Chrysler.
Hypothetically, I suppose someone using existing
technology and recommending that the spark plugs be changed
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every thousand miles, I really don't think EPA would have too
much difficulty arguing that that was unreasonable and
unnecessary.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: But if you made that in a good
faith attempt to prescribe maintenance instructions for in-use
vehicles, arguably you make the point that it's the discretion
of the manufacturer to in good faith prescribe what he thinks
is reasonable and necessary.
MR. GRICE: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I can't imagine that somebody
would do that just to be doing that. Certainly, it would be
in good faith; wouldn't it? Certainly, Chrysler wouldn't be
doing it?
MR. GRICE: No, we certainly wouldn't.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: See, there's my problem. I don't
think what you are telling me means anything in terms of any
kind of substantive review on the part of EPA, and I don't see
how that can get you in trouble with regards to the conflict
of the two requirements. Because I always come back to where
I'm trying to find out what it is that caused us to say you
didn't provide reasonable and necessary instructions, and
that's some sort of judgment about whether you were in good
faith; and if you recommended it, surely you are not going to
say, "I recommended it in bad faith." It's a very tight
circle.
MR. GRICE: I am not sure I agree with you there.
I think EPA has a certain review power and a certain review
authority over maintenance recommendations.
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay. Let me ask you this: If
you in good faith made a recommendation, all your engineers
believed it was necessary and reasonable for the proper func-
tioning of the emission control of a particular car and EPA
determined that it was unreasonable or unnecessary and you
went ahead and put it in your instructions, what would that
mean?
MR. GRICE: I guess that might very well lead to a
confrontation.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Would it trigger the prohibition
of failure to provide a maintenance instruction?
MR. GRICE: I think conceivably it could.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: In other words, you would concede,
if you did that
MR. GRICE: Conceivably, you could challenge what-
ever manufacturer was doing that that they had not issued
reasonable and necessary or issued unreasonable and
unnecessary maintenance instructions.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What would EPA have to prove;
that you were in bad faith?
MR. GRICE: I am not certain that you would have to
establish bad faith. You would have to establish that it
was unreasonable and unnecessary.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: So the burden
MR. GRICE: And that would be a very difficult
showing.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Right. Exactly. The burden is
on EPA.
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MR. GRICE: That's right.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: So really what you are saying is
whatever you say should go.
MR. GRICE: I'm saying that's what the Clean Air
Act provides, and I'm also saying that that is preempted
that preempts California's authority in this area.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I hear you saying that. Now,
back to the point.
If EPA goes ahead and says it's unreasonable and
unnecessary if you go beyond the maintenance instructions
associated with the regulations that we have before us here,
how does that be in conflict? Are you saying we have to show
it? Wouldn't we say that the showing has been made because in
certification you didn't have to do it because it wasn't per-
mitted?
MR. GRICE: I think the argument has been made and
Let me ask you a question, then. You
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You are supposed to answer them.
MR. GRICE: Well, I am going to ask you a question
first.
You asked me whether the arguments that I made here
primarily followed the arguments that were made yesterday by
General Motors and Ford. They do.
Are you making a request that I shortcut my state-
ment, because I get into that point at some detail later.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I'm just trying to find out
exactly how this would work, this business that you have set
up before us here.
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You say unless EPA establishes a particular recom-
mendation is unreasonable and unnecessary. And I say if our
basis for doing that was the demonstration that was done in
certification pursuant to California's regulations, why
wouldn't that be necessary and why wouldn't that absolve this
problem with the law that you seem to keep raising?
MR. GRICE: Well, you raised the question
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You seem to concede EPA's judgment
on the one hand. On the other hand, you say it's whether we
decide that it's unreasonable and unnecessary or it's reason-
able and necessary, and that would trigger the prohibition.
On the one hand, you trigger the prohibition. On the other
hand, we trigger the prohibition.
And I'm trying to figure out which one you are
really worried about.
MR. GRICE: I don't think you I don't think you
quite perceive the point.
Basically, the manufacturer has the discretion to
recommend those maintenance services. I am willing to concede
that EPA has a limited power to challenge the reasonableness
and the necessariness of those maintenance instructions, but
EPA has the burden of establishing that they are unreasonable
and unnecessary.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay. Now let's follow this
through.
The conflict in the law that you seem to keep
raising as your problem, is it self-actuating? EPA would
have to establish the prohibition, would have to come in and
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find that Chrysler had, on the one hand, not provided a main-
tenance instruction or, in your interpretation, not provided
one that's reasonable and necessary; is that right?
MR. GRICE: That's right.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: So it's up to EPA to make the
conflict in the law. I mean it doesn't exist just because of
your judgment. It exists because EPA is in opposition to your
judgment about what's reasonable and what's necessary.
MR. GRICE: No, I think we have on the one hand,
we have a good faith obligation to provide what we consider is
reasonable and necessary. And I think our failure to exercise
that judgment and recommend what we consider reasonable and
necessary for the purposes of emission control, for the
purposes of fuel economy, for the purposes of keeping that
vehicle in proper, safe functioning condition throughout its
life all goes into these reasonable and necessary maintenance
instructions. And I think if we fail to make a recommendation
we could very easily if we fail to exercise that good-faith
obligation, we very easily could be in violation of the law.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You are saying the manufacturer
triggers the prohibition by virtue of his good faith, and I
just don't know how that ever happens.
MR. GRICE: Well, I think the point is this, Ben:
On the one hand, we have a flat obligation under federal law
to issue those maintenance instructions that we consider
reasonable and necessary. On the other hand, we have a flat
prohibition in the California regulation that thou shalt not
recommend maintenance instructions.
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: One more question, and we will
leave it.
You say EPA has the discretion to make a judgment
about whether it's reasonable and necessary, but you made a
good-faith
MR. GRICE: EPA has the discretion to challenge.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay. We challenge, and we
determine that it's unnecessary. But you, nevertheless, made
a good-faith judgment that you should have had that particular
maintenance. Now what's going to happen? Are you not going
to put it in the maintenance instructions? Now it's in
opposition to your good faith, which is the thing that triggers
the prohibition, that EPA has come in and said, "We think it's
unreasonable." You say, "No, it's reasonable because we put
that in there in good faith in the beginning."
Is prohibition triggered if you don't put it in
there?
MR. GRICE: That would be a situation which I think
a manufacturer's reaction in all likelihood would be to
examine the particular recommendation and assess the relative
strengths and weaknesses of EPA's position and its own posi-
tion and make a judgment as to whether that was an issue which
needed contesting. And I think in all likelihood if EPA said,
"We don't think that's reasonable, and we don't think that's
necessary," I suspect in a good many cases the manufacturer
would follow that.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That's the situation, the hypo-
thetical that I set up before. We look at a car that's
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certified under the California procedures and we judge that
it's not reasonable or necessary. You in good faith think it
is reasonable and necessary. But we made that judgment, so
you don't put it in the maintenance instructions. No pro-
hibition, even though it was in contradiction to your good-
faith intentions. That's just what you walked me through.
MR. GRICE: I think your hypothetical oversimplifies
the matter to a great extent.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I think it focuses it.
MR. GRICE: No, I don't, because you are saying:
Well, obviously, those instructions are reasonable and
necessary because they have been performed on the certifica-
tion vehicles on the durability fleet, and I think that's
correct. Those are reasonable and necessary.
However, that second step, that step from those
are resaonable to those are the only recommendations that are
reasonable and necessary, just doesn't follow because the
durability test by itself is not an indication of the type of
maintenance that's going to be needed in the real world. I
mean you have a test which runs
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: We are talking about the conflict
of the law. That's your big hang-up here, is the fact you are
going to get dinged $10,000 per car for every one of these
maintenance instructions you put out for which in your judgment
you needed to put in a maintenance instruction which we agreed
with California you didn't need. That's your big problem
here.
I understand that there may be a situation where you
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think you ought to cover yourself with regard to a particular
maintenance item, and it may be good judgment to do it. But
what I am talking about is this conflict with the law and how
this law operates that gets you into this problem that you
keep raising to us as being the reason why California should
not be granted a waiver for these regulations.
MR. GRICE: Well, I think there is a very clear
conflict, Ben. I think there is a very clear conflict between
the two requirements. I think there is also a very serious
question as to whether or not this provision is subject to a
waiver. It is our position that it is not.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay. That's another issue.
I am sorry to have interrupted you. I would suggest
you go on and pick up the portion of your statement that jumps
over this issue and goes on.
MR. GRICE: Well, we are at that point.
Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act specifically
preempts state action to control the emissions from new motor
vehicles. That provision states:
"No state or any political subdivision thereof shall
adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the
control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines subject to this part. No state shall
require certification, inspection, or any other approval
relating to the control of emissions from any new motor
vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as a condition prece-
dent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or
registration of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine,
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or equipment."
Clearly, a prohibition against recommended main-
tenance such as proposed by ARB is condition precedent to sale
relating to the control of emissions covered by Section 209(a).
Under limited circumstances, EPA may waive applica-
tion of Section 209(a) to California standards "for the control
of emissions from new motor vehicles." In our judgment, this
provision permits California to seek a waiver for more stringen
emissions standards than those promulgated under Section 202(a)
and for more stringent test procedures than those promulgated
under Section 206. It does not empower EPA to waive Section
209(a) as to the other requirements of the Clean Air Act, such
as the requirements of Section 207(c)(3), which althouqh
related to motor vehicle emissions, do not constitute standards
within the meaninq of Section 209(b).
I must therefore conclude that, subject to a finding
of technological feasibility, changes to the certification test
procedure are the proper subject for a waiver but the prohi-
bition of recommended maintenance is not. As a result, waiver
must be denied as to the prohibitions on recommended main-
tenance.
At the same time, we question whether a finding of
technological feasibility as required by Section 209(b) is
possible. This ARB regulation oversimplifies the problems and
purposes of maintenance recommendations. It also misconstrues
the results of a 50,000 mile durability test by equating what
is necessary during the test with what maintenance will be
required during five years or 50,000 miles of real world
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operation.
The certification test procedure is designed to
provide a basis for estimating the performance of a vehicle
over 50,00 0 miles of simulated average urban operation. As
such, it does not provide a basis for predicting the per-
formance of the vehicle when subjected to many normal but
more severe driving conditions regularly encountered during
real world operation.
For example, the test is conducted over a peroid of
about 12-15 weeks during which the vehicle is subjected to
about 14 cold starts and few, if any, significant climatic
changes. In real life, a vehicle will be subjected to
thousands of cold starts, radical climatic changes and many
other operating conditions not encountered in a durability
test of a few weeks. Under these circumstances, a manu-
facturer's ability to pass the test and certify does not
establish or accurately predict what will be required to
properly maintain the vehicle over its life.
Proper emission control is only one of the factors
involved in establishing vehicle maintenance requirements.
Equally important are the needs of vehicle safety, proper
vehicle operation, fuel economy and maintenance of vehicle
life. Each factor is taken into consideration in establishing
vehicle maintenance.
As a practical matter, the manufacturer must
recommend that maintenance which provides the required safety,
performance, emission control and fuel economy, and at the
same time, protects the performance of the vehicle over the
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life expected by the customer. Anything which would provide
less would be nothing short of irresponsible, would violate
the provisions of Section 207 (c) (3) of the Clean Air Act, be
contrary to the needs of motor vehicle safety and result in
an unnecessary and unavoidable increase in product liability
exposure.
In typical customer usage, the time interval is as
critical, if not more critical, than the mileage interval.
It is simply unrealistic to equate an ability to perform
adequately during a short lived durability test with the
ability to perform over five years of reasonably anticipated
use of an automobile.
Some of the real world conditions severely taxing
maintenance requirements include: the extended operation of a
vehicle at low speeds for extended hours; driving in dusty
areas; trailer towing; commercial usage such as in taxicabs
or police service; long periods of idling; and numerous cold
starts. Each of these situations and many other types of
driving conditions too numerous to mention will realistically
require routine maintenance service not required during certi-
fication. To ignore these conditions and to base required
maintenance on what is required for certification could result
in a number of unsafe, poorly performing, high emitting
vehicles.
A few examples of the types of problems which can be
encountered and the problems which can be anticipated would be
helpful. They include:
1. Choke linkage. Emission durability cars are run
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under cover for 50,000 miles with only perhaps 14 cold starts
in a period of 9 0 days. These vehicles probably could get by
without solvent. However, to eliminate this inexpensive
recommendation in typical field service will probably lead to
numerous tune-ups to resolve inevitable choke sticking com-
plaints. It would be improper to prohibit this normal type of
maintenance which is required today and will be required in the
future.
2. Drive belts are responsible for maintaining and
operating many key components of a vehicle. Their proper
operations is vital to the vehicle owner or operator not only
in terms of emission control/but in terms of vehicle safety
and performance as well. Indeed, in emission control their
performance while significant is relatively minor when compared
with providing the necessary safety, comfort and the perform-
ance of the vehicle. Even more important, these belts are
subject to weathering and deterioration due to aging which is
substantially caused and affected by climatic conditions, as
well as modes of use.
3. Air filters. Air filter performance would
depend heavily upon the type of operation the vehicle is
placed in. For example, the use of a truck in a dry, dusty
desert may result in serious problems if the filter is not
maintained frequently.
Equally distressing is the possibility suggested at
the ARB hearings on this proposal that the vehicle manu-
facturer should be responsible for in-use service problems
caused by a vehicle owner's failure to maintain a vehicle.
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Chrysler submits that such a result would be highly improper.
In our judgment, a service failure caused by normal in-use
operation which could have been prevented by proper main-
tenance is not a defect and cannot be the manufacturer's
responsibility under the applicable emission warranty.
Pushed to its extreme, the ARB proposal might have
the long-term effect of making the vehicle manufacturer
responsible for five years of maintenance. It is not unreason-
able to assume that problems caused by failure to apply solvent
to a choke linkage will result in many engine tune-ups and
other service at a manufacturer's expense under the expanded
warranty suggested during the ARB hearings on this matter.
The disruptive impact of such a result on the vehicle manu-
facturer, the vehicle dealer, and the service industry is
readily apparent. It could result in substantial price
increases to cover this type of service.
Under the circumstances just discussed, we submit
that no finding of technological feasibility is possible.
And I think I would like to make a distinction. I
am not certain, after having sat through yesterday's hearing,
that it is entirely appropriate to zero in on the question of
technological feasibility. That is an appropriate inquiry in
a situation where EPA is considering a waiver request on a
standard. Obviously, if through the promulgation of more
severe certification requirements, for example, ARB was
attempting to force the development of more durable technology,
more maintenance-free technology, the question of technological
feasibility would be appropriate. I really think that if we
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talk of technological feasibility in this type of a situation
we must address the question of whether CARB has established
that all other maintenance services are unreasonable and
unnecessary. And I suggest this they have not done.
Finally, I think it appropriate to note, as was
discussed at some length yesterday by Ford, that the restric-
tion on the maintenance recommendations that the ARB is pro-
posing is highly questionable under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
Bob Wagner and I will be happy to answer any ques-
tions you may have.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I have a question from the CARB.
Don't California regulations allow more frequent
air-filter and drive-belt maintenance to be recommended to
owners to account for the extreme driving conditions and
safety issues you raise?
MR. GRICE: They certainly do. However, I don't
think that the provisions that they have incorporated into
their regulations adequately cover the needs of vehicle main-
tenance.
You may have a very, very simple maintenance service
which costs nothing or next to nothing, an inspection of a
particular component, an inspection of a hose or putting
solvent on a choke linkage. In the process of developing your
maintenance recommendations, a manufacturer is going to have
to balance the ease and the cost of that particular service
against the possibilities and the dangers that arise out of
not performing the service. If, for example, it's a very
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simple service but by having a particular component checked
every 5,000 or 10,000 miles you are going to avoid the
possibility of someone's engine failing, you are probably
going to recommend it simply because it's very, very good
preventive maintenance. If he is developing a problem, he
is going to find out about it. And he is going to find out
about it when he has to spend a few cents on a minor component
instead of having an engine failure.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let me ask you
MR. GRICE: This is not covered by the ARB regula-
tions .
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: With regard to what seems to be
your problem here in terms of talking about technological
feasibility, if we could for a moment assume that the only
requirement is the restriction on the amount of maintenance
done in certification and there's no requirement other than
the EPA review with regard to unreasonableness, necessity of
the instructions that you give the consumer, can we talk about
the technological feasibility of meeting the requirements
that they have placed on maintenance and certification?
MR. GRICE: I think
MR. WAGNER: Can we talk about that?
MR. GRICE: you are talking about the I think
we made the distinction very early in the statement that this
is a very, very proper subject for a waiver hearing. And I
guess the question of technological feasibility of those as
certification requirements I'm going to have to turn to Bob.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Fine. Are they technologically
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feasible?
MR. WAGNER: I don't think we've ever taken any
issue on that basis of certification. Why, we feel that
the moves that have been made are moves that the industry
would probably have made all by themselves. And, of course, we
have made the point on more than one occasion.
We don't really think that this is an area that
requires regulation. We feel that the manufacturers them-
selves have the same basic objective that you fellows have,
and that is to eventually eliminate maintenance.
In the meantime, why, we feel we are in a better
position to exercise reasonable judgment than anyone else.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: So really it's not an issue of
technological feasibility once we get away from the idea of
what you tell the consumer?
MR. GRICE: That's right.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you very much, gentlemen.
MR. JONES: Good morning. My name is William Jones,
Manager of Energy and Emissions Standards for American Motors.
American Motors appreciates the opportunity to
comment on California's request for a waiver to impose
restrictions on the allowable maintenance applicable to 1980
and later cars and 1981 and later model-year light-duty
trucks and medium-duty vehicles.
Although we have a standing commitment to extending
the maintenance intervals for our vehicles, we submit that
the Environmental Protection Agency must deny the California
Air Resources Board waiver request for the following reasons:
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1. The Clean Air Act does not permit California to
implement the proposed regulation and does not allow EPA to
grant a waiver as requested.
2. The need to effectuate the regulation has not
been demonstrated.
3. There is insufficient lead time for our com-
pliance .
On the issue of legal authority, we believe that
the ARB lacks the legal authority to impose regulations that
prohibit a manufacturer from providing reasonable and necessary
maintenance instructions to their customers. By reference,
American Motors endorses the legal memorandum submitted to the
ARB by the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, dated
January 31, 1977, which we understand has been made part of the
record.
On the issue of need, we do not possess evidence, nor
has the ARB shown sufficient evidence in their Staff Report
No. 77-9-2 dated April 28, 1977, to provide a basis for con-
cluding that maintenance limitations will result in an improve-
ment in California's air quality.
In fact, we have some very hard conceptual problems
relating something For instance, like the power-steering
pump belt, lack of being able to check the tension on that in
less than 30,000 miles to California's air quality problems.
The ARB estimates for 199 0 South Coast Air Basin
total motor vehicle emissions reductions of 1.5 percent for
HC; 2.5 percent for CO and 0.5 percent for NO really argue
A
against pursuing this regulatory action. The estimated
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emissions reductions involve uncertainty and demonstrate very
marginal percentage gains which cannot be justified when the
costs and risks to other vehicle performance factors are con-
sidered.
Competitive industry pressures combined with tech-
nological improvements have dictated that extension of main-
tenance intervals for all of our vehicles was good and neces-
sary business. Since this trend exists, we suggest that this
proposed regulatory action is not needed to achieve the goal of
encouraging limited maintenance of emission-related compon-
ents. We are convinced of the value of this goal, and we
offer the AMC Buyer Protection Plan and the AMC Service
Protection Plan as proof of our dedication to this end.
Maintenance is scheduled to accommodate many
interrelated objectives. Vehicle safety, driveability, dura-
bility, reliability, fuel economy and customer satisfaction,
as well as emission performance, must be factored into the
maintenance equation to derive a reasonable and necessary main-
tenance schedule. Narrow and rigid regulations such as the
ARB as proposed run contrary to our efforts to optimize all
of the necessary maintenance considerations.
There are practical limitations to the ARB's desire
to have the certification test procedure accurately reflect
the real world of in-use vehicles. In the case of rubber-
based belts and hoses, we find the certification schedule does
not reflect the time-age relationship of in-use vehicles.
The 50,000 mile span equates to more than four years of
operation for about half of all car owners. Efforts by ARB
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to equate the four- to five-month certification schedule to
the real world are simply not practical. As a responsible
manufacturer, we are compelled to specify periodic inspection
of these parts. We judge this particular recommendation to be
compatible with as well as complementary to current ARB and
EPA plans for the implementation of a mandatory vehicle
inspection program.
Included as Attachment A is a graph which shows the
results of a test of belt tension conducted on 20 new vehicles.
The belt tension was first measured on the assembled engines
before they were installed into the vehicle. A second reading
was taken after the roll test on the final assembly lines. The
vehicles were then driven for 20 miles. The belt tensions were
again checked and recorded. The range of drop-off was from, a
minimum of 40 pounds to a maximum of 85 pounds from the initial
tension. This is quite a significant difference and shows the
need for belt tension check and adjustment of in-use vehicles
more frequently than every 30,000 miles.
Vehicle maintenance must consider a variety of in-use
driving conditions. As a manufacturer of four-wheel-drive
vehicles, we are aware of differences that exist between
passenger car in-use driving conditions and those encountered
by our Jeep vehicle owners. Prior to this proposed California
regulation, adequate regulatory flexibility permitted cars
and trucks to comply with the same general maintenance cri-
teria. The proposed regulation erroneously assumes that
cars and all light-duty trucks and medium-duty vehicles can
continue to comply with the same maintenance criteria. It
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should be fully obvious that vehicles designed and used for
off-highway operation such as our Jeep vehicles cannot meet the
proposed reduced maintenance intervals even if by some magic
cars could.
On the issue of lead time, at the May 18, 1977,
waiver hearing on the 1980 California car emission standards,
we stated that due to our lack of experience and availability
of three-way catalyst emission control systems the progress of
our development programs as well as our durability and relia-
bility programs would not permit reasonable certification
success for the 1980 model year. With this critical situation
in front of us, we are forced to conclude that the extended
maintenance regulation places an additional time contraint on
our emerging development programs which will further delay the
date that we can successfully implement the required system
technology.
The possible impact of this regulation on our future
emission control programs cannot be adequately assessed until
we have gained production experience with the actual systems
we are planning to introduce for the 1980 model year.
In conclusion, we suggest that the one best course
of action would be to allow the industry to continue to imple-
ment its own schedule for reduced maintenance. Due to the
uncertainties of all new 1980 and later emission control system
and possible changes in fuel additives, the proposed regulatory
action at this time is premature and far too rigid to be
effective. We believe the practice of reasonable recommended
maintenance supports the objective of clean air.
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Thank you. That concludes my statement.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Mr. Jones, is it AMC's position
that requirements aside from the notification of the owner are
technically infeasible to do on certification?
MR. JONES: We don't have the wherewithal at this
point based on the 1980 systems which we are just beginning to
develop. The maintenance requirements on those are classified
as undefined at this point.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: So you can't say it is or it is
not?
MR. JONES: No, we can't say it is, and we can't say
it isn't.
MR. KRUSE: We have a question on your chart.
MR. JONES: Certainly. Sorry for the reproduction on
the axis there; although, the numbers are labeled.
MR. KRUSE: I believe what you are telling is that
you assembled this engine, set the drive belt tension assembly,
installed the engine in the car, ran it on a chassis dynamometer
for transmission checks or whatever, and then you went out and
did 20 miles
MR. JONES: That's correct.
MR. KRUSE: with only one adjustment when the
engine was assembled; is that right?
MR. JONES: That's correct.
MR. KRUSE: What kind of relationship would you
expect to see if you had adjusted the belt tension after the
dynanometer run out?
MR. JONES: Would have been less of a drop-off. How
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much, I am not sure.
MR. KRUSE: Is it your experience that this thing
continues to decay with time, or is there a plateau after
original break-in.
MR. JONES: There is a big knee in the curve in its
early life of the engine in the vehicle, so there would be a
plateau in time. And it would be a relatively short time.
Our point here, of course, is that this is not recog-
nized by the current regulation. If we don't catch it before
it goes out our door, we don't get another crack at it until
30,000 miles. It's kind of inconceivable, really, from a
practical engineering standpoint to say that we can't go and
check the belt tension on our alternators, our power steering
pump belts, our air-conditioning compressor belts. I don't
get the relationship to clean air and to the objectives that
are evident here.
MR. KRUSE: From a technical point of view, it might
be possible for you to check that just before it goes out the
door and have it be satisfactory for some long period of time?
MR. JONES: It would be a small step in the right
direction, not totally compensating for, say, the first 5,000
miles of operation.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you very much.
We have a question from Helen Petrauskas of Ford
Motor Company for CARB asking for a clarification of an issue
that was raised yesterday.
Her question is: How does CARB intend to implement
and interpret Subparagraph (a) 6.078-25a(5) (iii) incorporated by
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reference in Subsection 3(f) of the California Exhaust
Emission standards and test procedures as amended June 22,
1977?
MR. AUSTIN: Mr. Jackson, since I am intimately
familiar with that paragraph and carry it with me in my wallet
at all times, I'll try to give you a brief response now and
then will provide something in greater detail for the record.
This is the paragraph that gives us the authority to
allow certain additional maintenance items. Should we
Let's go over the specific language.
"Request for authorization of scheduled maintenance
of emission control related components not specifically
authorized be maintained by these regulations must be made
prior to the beginning of durability testing. The
Administrator" in this case it would mean the
Executive Officer "will approve the performance of such
maintenance if the manufacturer makes a satisfactory showing
that the maintenance will be performed on vehicles in use."
We let that in in order to give us some flexibility
should there be new devices or components which come into use
which the manufacturer can show require maintenance prior to
the completion of 50,000 miles and, additionally, the manu-
facturer can show that we can be assured that that maintenance
will be performed in actual customer use by virtue of the
effect of not performing the maintenance, by virtue of what
will happen if the maintenance is not performed.
If, for example, there is component on a car, a
widget or whatever, and failure to maintain this component will
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cause the vehicle to fail to start and the only way the
vehicle can be made to start reliably again is to have the
component replaced rather than having a wire pulled off or
some simple means of bypassing it accomplished, that's the
kind of case that a manufacturer could make that we'd be very
likely to go ahead and authorize additional maintenance for.
There would have to be some showing that failure to perform
the maintenance would cause some condition to exist which
clearly would be intolerable to the owner; and not only that,
the way to correct the condition would be to have proper main-
tenance performed on the vehicle and there wouldn't be some
more expeditious means of accomplishing the owner's desire to
have the vehicle returned to proper operating condition.
We'll supply you something in writing that may
give some additional examples and elaborate on our thoughts
on this provision in greater detail.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Fine.
Before you leave, yesterday General Motors requested
that we include in the record of this proceeding the entire
record associated with the maintenance limitation rulemaking
from the CARB.
Do you have that record?
MR. AUSTIN: No. We discussed this briefly with
General Motors yesterday. It will take us a significant amount
of time to put together what we consider to be a complete
record. If we receive that request formally, we will consider
it and we will make a more detailed estimate of how long it
will take. But it's not going to be something we can do
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quickly, because of the fact that there are no written
transcripts yet available of all the ARB meetings at which the
regulations were considered.
We will have to have someone sit down and go through
all the tapes of those meetings. We have done that before
for previous regulations, and we have discovered that it's a
rather time-consuming process and it will take us quite a
while.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Mr. Austin, I'm not going to ask
that you include that for this record.
However, to the extent that General Motors feels
that there was something included in that record which would
be of benefit to their argument in connection with the matter
under consideration here, they can feel free to submit that
and it will be incorporated into the record.
MR. PETERSEN: Mr. Jackson, could we ask that the
record for the hearing be held open for the specific purpose
of incorporating and including into the record the information
which the Air Resources Board may have to gather together
for this purpose?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I have already said, Mr. Petersen,
that as far as I am concerned I don't need that material. If
there is something of particular interest to General Motors
that they want to include in the record, they can do so.
Are you talking about the transcripts?
MR. PETERSEN: Yes, I am. I am talking specifically
of the record of the rulemaking process which it may take the
Air Resources Board more than three weeks to accumulate that
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information, and we would like to ask that the waiver hearing
record be held open long enough to accommodate the inclusion
of that information just for that sole purpose.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Why is it relevant?
MR. PETERSEN: Well, we believe that it's relevant
for several issues: technological feasibility, cost, justifi-
cation, need
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Above and beyond that argument
which you provided to us on behalf of General Motors yesterday?
MR. PETERSEN: I believe so.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is it somebody else's argument?
MR. PETERSEN: It is General Motors' arguments made
before the Air Resources Board and the other manufacturers'
arguments before the Air Resources Board. And I have a letter
from Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association which we would
like to give to Mr. Austin this morning asking that the record
in the rulemaking proceeding be accumulated in time to submit
to the EPA on behalf of the MVMA.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Only to the extent that you can
show how it's relevant to General Motors and how it's relevant
to this proceeding. I presume any such information like that
would be in your possession, and you are welcome to include
that in the record of this proceeding to the extent it's a
furtherance of your argument.
But I am reluctant to just go out and get the entire
record of the rulemaking and burden this record with it,
because I haven't seen a demonstration of the reason why I
should. You had an opportunity to make your case here
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MR. PETERSEN: Mr. Jackson
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: to present whatever documents
you may think are pertinent to your case.
MR. PETERSEN: You've got the discretion to not
consider any information which is submitted for the record of
this waiver hearing which you deem to be irrelevant. I can't
make that determination before the fact, nor can you.
Mr. Austin has stated that it may take a great deal
of time to pull this record together. We are, on behalf of
the MVMA, prepared to make someone available in Sacramento to
help accumulate this record and pull the record together.
That was part of the discussion yesterday afternoon with
Messrs. Macomber, Rubenstein, and Austin.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I'm certainly
MR. PETERSEN: So it may not be necessary to hold
the record open beyond the August 26th date. We certainly
hope it wouldn't be necessary.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Are you suggesting that you have
made arguments relative to the case that General Motors
champions that were made in front of CARB that were not made
in this forum?
MR. PETERSEN: There was a lot of discussion in the
rulemaking process which certainly the EPA has not been
exposed to relating to the maintenance issue.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: There is an awful lot of dis-
cussion I have not been exposed to, I am sure. The question
is, one, do I want to
MR. PETERSEN: We believe
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: and, too, is it relevant?
MR. PETERSEN: We believe that discussion is rele-
vant, Mr. Jackson, or we wouldn't be making the request.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is it material presented by
General Motors?
MR. PETERSEN: It's material that was presented by
General Motors and other vehicle manufacturers and after-
market parts manufacturers regarding the regulation, yes.
MR. AUSTIN: Mr. Jackson, if I may.
It sounds to me like all this material is material
that was available to General Motors and, in fact, the Air
Resources Board is being asked to help make General Motors1
case, something they were capable of doing on their own.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That's kind of the way I am
coming down.
MR. PETERSEN: It's not only material that was sub-
mitted by the manufacturers. It's the material that is in
the Air Resources Board's possession justifying or establishing
the need for this regulation
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Are you
MR. PETERSEN: showing that the regulation is
technologically feasible, showing that the regulation is
necessary in order to meet compelling and extraordinary con-
ditions in the State of California?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Are you suggesting there is
information in the possession of the CARB relating to this
rulemaking that General Motors is not aware of that would be
relevant to the decision that's before the EPA?
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MR. PETERSEN: I think that's possible, certainly.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I'm not going to direct that the
CARB provide that record for this record. To the extent that
you have additional information that is not available to us
that you are aware of, you are welcome to submit it.
As far as directing the accumulation of that record
for inclusion into this record with the potential of extending
the comment period, I'm reluctant to do that.
MR. AUSTIN: Mr. Jackson, if it would help General
Motors out, we would be happy to provide General Motors copies
of tapes from which they could make their own transcripts of
the hearings, or perhaps since I believe all of these
hearings were taken down by a court reporter, they could
procure the transcripts for themselves and submit them.
MR. PETERSEN: That's fine. That's all we are
asking.
Like I said, through MVMA, someone will be made
available in Sacramento to help accumulate the record on this
rulemaking proceeding.
MR. AUSTIN: That's not what I understand they are
asking for. They are not asking just for a transcript of the
hearings, they are asking for ARB to itemize everything on
which their decision was based, which is something that goes
far beyond the transcript of the hearing process.
MR. PETERSEN: That is exactly right. That is what
we are asking for and we are going to make somebody available
to help in that process and hopefully that information can be
accumulated before the record for this hearing closes and the
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relevant information can be submitted to EPA for purposes of
the waiver hearing. That's all we are asking.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Fine. That's between you and
CARB. If you get it in in time, that's fine.
Mr. Eppel?
MR. EPPEL: Mr. Jackson, I just have two comments.
One, it's kind of incredible to me that you would
suggest that the regulated party has the burden of scouring
through untranscribed transcripts. It seems to me that the
agency has the obligation to submit the record on which they
rely so that you can make the determinations that you are
required to make under the statutes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That's exactly what we are having
this hearing for. If there is something you have failed to
say on your behalf that you want to say in furtherance of your
case, you should have said it yesterday. If you want addi-
tional time, we'll let you do it.
MR. EPPEL: All I am observing is it's very difficult
to specify items from untranscribed transcripts. How are we
supposed to do that?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I presume if you said it you
can say it again.
MR. EPPEL: We are supposed to keep verbatim notes
during those procedures?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I don't know what you are supposed
to do. I'm just saying the forum is here. The forum for
decision-making is here.
MR. EPPEL: Well, okay. Be that as it may
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I am giving you the opportunity to
bring your case up here and make your arguments.
MR. AUSTIN: As we see it, fortunately EPA and
Ford are not constrained to have a decision on this issue made
on the basis of the hearing record that was established by
ARB. This is a new proceeding, and they are free to introduce
any evidence that they introduced in our hearing procedures or
any additional information.
MR. EPPEL: That's true if it's material in our
possession, but it's material in ARB's possession, such as
studies and raw data. We don't have that.
My second point is, just very briefly for the record,
we'd like to join General Motors in the same request that they
made. Thank you.
MR. SCHWENTKER: My name is Don Schwentker, counsel
for the Automobile Importers of America.
It might be appropriate that I mention now while we
are discussing it that I had planned to ask that on behalf of
the Automobile Importers of America the responses that were
made by the manufacturers to the ARB in response to the ARB
questionnaire on maintenance intervals be made a part of the
record. We were not asking that the entire ARB record be
included in the record of this hearing, but specifically the
responses of the manufacturers to the ARB questionnaire.
I think that's entirely appropriate, in that ARB
in its own statement relies on these responses and submits
only a table as a matter of fact, I don't think a table
has been provided yet. But we have had experiences in the
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past where the ARB has summarized the responses of manu-
facturers, and we don't believe in every case that these
summaries have been entirely accurate.
We think it's very important that the responses to
this questionnaire be included as part of this record. Each
of these companies has not had the opportunity, it's not
practical for each of them to come here and testify on this
subject, but they would like their responses to be
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Are you asking permission to
include in this record the responses of your clients to
questions asked by the CARB in connection with this rule-
making?
MR. SCHWENTKER: It was a questionnaire that was
sent out by ARB last Fall, and we are asking that the responses
to this questionnaire be included, because what has been
included by ARB
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You may include them.
MR. SCHWENTKER: Pardon?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You may include them.
MR. SCHWENTKER: We may include them?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That's correct.
MR. SCHWENTKER: What we are asking is that the
ARB submit them, because presumably they have them in a nice,
neat stack. They have already included results in tabular
form on which they are apparently relying, and what we are
asking is that the complete responses
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Are they in your possession?
MR. SCHWENTKER: Pardon?
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Are they in your possesion?
MR. SCHWENTKER: Presumably the responses included
a copy of the responses in the possession of each of the
individual companies that responded.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Each of those that are concerned
about the outcome of this rulemaking has got an opportunity
to present its argument however it may want to, not limited
with what they presented to the CARB in any way. Nothing
precludes them from presenting in this forum what they pre-
sented to the CARB.
MR. SCHWENTKER: As a practical matter, each of these
companies cannot come here and make that presentation.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: As a practical matter, I am
reluctant to go back and direct CARB in furtherance of their
case to provide an entire record of their rulemaking.
MR. SCHWENTKER: Don't misunderstand me, Ben. AIA
is not asking that the entire record of the rulemaking be
included. What we are asking specifically is that the
responses to the questionnaire be included, and that's not
asking something that requires 30 days of work on anyone's
part. The responses to this questionnaire, I would be willing
to bet, are in one manila folder and a copy could be made
very readily.
The concern we have is that there are in many cases
in response to the questionnaire various caveats and qualifi-
cations that were included in the responses that don't appear
in the tabular material. The tabular material just says
a, b, c, d, e. But it doesn't have the asterisks and the
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footnotes and the warnings.
We would like you to have a look at that without
each of us having to go back and submit it. We think that
it's not a burden to ask ARB to provide this. We think it's
something that's readily available.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do you want to provide that? Is
it not a burden?
MR. AUSTIN: We will be happy to provide the written
responses to the questionnaire that we sent out last year.
That won't always include all of the responses we got, since
the manufacturers did not fully answer were not fully
responsive to the questionnaire and we had to draw out some
additional information through personal contacts. But what
was submitted in writing by the manufacturers can be pulled
together by us and submitted for the record. We'll volun-
tarily do that.
MR. SCHWENTKER: That's what we are asking. I
don't think we are asking for something that's unreasonable.
MR. RUBENSTEIN: One more thing, Don. Some' of your
member companies requested that portions, and in some cases
major portions, of these responses be treated confidential.
Unless we get express permission from them to release those
documents, we will not be submitting them for the record.
MR. SCHWENTKER: All right.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Mr. Grice?
MR. GRICE: Just for the record, Ben, I'd like to
join in the request of GM and Ford that the record be
included that you hold the record open for inclusion of the
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CARB record in this matter. I think it's very important for
EPA in connection with these hearings to thoroughly assess the
ARB's basis for their action, and I think that is almost an
impossibility without that record being in the material you
are considering in these proceedings.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Mr. Grice, as I said before, I
am not going to direct that entire record be made a part of
this record. To the extent that Chrysler feels that there is
information that's available to them that hasn't been made
available to this forum, I request you to evaluate your needs
and submit whatever you think is pertinent.
MR. GRICE: It is, of course, rather difficult to
assess a record as a whole which has never been accumulated.
We are aware or have a reasonable basis of drawing together
the material that we have submitted. We do not have such a
basis for the entire record of what has been a rather lengthy
rulemaking proceeding before the ARB.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: All we want is Chrysler's
position.
MR. BIGGERS: Good morning. My name is Walt Biggers,
and I am General Manager of Subaru Technical Center, and I am
here representing Subaru of America, Inc. We would like to
make several comments regarding the State of California's
request for a waiver to enforce special requirements pertain-
ing to the maintenance performed on durability and in-use
vehicles beginning with the 198 0 model year.
First of all, we believe that CARB's apparent
assumption that tampering is directly related to the vehicle
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exposure to the service industry we believe that assumption
is unfounded. It is our judgment that tampering, at least in
California, is almost never voluntarily performed by service
mechanics.
Generally, it is an issue brought by strong
pressure from the vehicle owner who perceives some defect in
vehicle performance, driveability, fuel economy and so forth.
The penalties for such action are well known by the industry
in California.
If our view is correct, then the proposed reduction
in required maintenance will have no influence at all in
reducing tampering, and because the greater complexity of
the systems required to meet the more stringent durability
requirements and the more marginal performance of some of
these systems at extended service intervals in fact emissions
performance will decrease and the whole approach will be
basically counterproductive.
We question whether these requirements constitute
any additional stringency. While vehicles certified under
conditions postulated by CARB may be more durable, they would
not be any different in nominal emissions values.
Can a requirement for a more durable car be viewed as
a more stringent emission standard? If so, does this create
an inconsistency with Section 202(a) by altering the concept
of "useful life"? If the change in allowable maintenance
does not constitute a more stringent standard or if it is more
stringent because it alters the concept of "useful life," then
we think the waiver should be denied.
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Next, we must say that our supplier, Fuji Heavy
Industries of Japan, has indicated that they have severe
reservations about the technological feasibility of meeting
California's maintenance requirements by model-year 198 0. It
must be remembered that a durability development program by
its very nature is a time-consuming program. The State of
California is effectively asking auto makers to produce a
car that can run without maintenance for a period of time longer
than the time remaining to develop such a system. It has
been impossible to address the issues of costs since we have
no firm idea of the magnitude of the changes that would be
involved.
Other items that we think create problems include
the following:
1. CARB limits drive-belt maintenance but, depending
upon the particular emission control system, such maintenance
is not necessarily emission related.
2. Spark plug change intervals of 30,0 00 miles are
not presently technologically feasible with leaded fuels and
maybe not with fuels which contain MMT either. The technical
feasibility of a 30,000-mile interval for spark plug changes
on small, highly loaded engines, even with unleaded fuels,
is very uncertain. Furthermore, we do not consider the use
of unleaded fuel solely to extend spark life as an economically
justifiable solution. In view of American refinery capa-
bilities, it may not even be feasible.
3. The current CARB list of allowable maintenance
is apparently predicated on gasoline engines with three-way
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catalyst systems. The Subaru system basically, and there are
other systems, does not depend upon catalysts. In some ways,
their characteristics are entirely different.
What about advanced engines, sterling engines,
turbines, or other engines not now envisioned? Are these
engines to be ruled out by regulations which do not anticipate
the use of such engines?
The great disparity between the requirements for
gasoline and for diesel engine maintenance raises basic
questions of equity and weather a compelling need really
truly exists. Gasoline engines are permitted service at
30,000-mile intervals with the exception of valve lash at
15,000 miles while diesel vehicles can be serviced at
12,500-mile intervals. Further, the service allowed for
gasoline vehicles is severely limited while the diesel service
is virtually unrestricted. If a compelling need does exist,
then it seems that both diesel and gasoline engine vehicles
should be similarly constrained.
Finally, the CARB has issued regulations covering
the maintenance instructions that the manufacturer may issue.
This appears to be directly preempted by Section 207(c)(3) for
which there are no waiver provisions.
In conclusion, we at Subaru of America feel that
the maintenance related changes made by the State of California
are undefined in terms of effects on stringency, doubtful for
compelling need, unreasonable technically, and preempted in
some areas. We therefore ask that California's request for
waiver on maintenance-related items be denied.
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That's all I have to say. If you have any questions,
I'll try to answer them.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is it your contention that aside
from all the other concerns it's technologically infeasible to
comport with the limitations on maintenance that are contained
in the regulations before us?
MR. BIGGERS: We think so, at least for the 1980
model year, for us.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: How about '81?
MR. BIGGERS: Well, it's a hard question to answer.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Can't say it is; can't say it
isn't?
MR. BIGGERS: That's right.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Can you be specific And I
think you touched on it in your statement as to what you
think is technologically infeasible to accomplish?
MR. BIGGERS: Well, I think for us, since we have
depended on leaded fuels, that the spark plug service interval
of 30,000 miles, we feel, is not possible with leaded fuels.
Of course, we can use unleaded fuels and penalize
our owners by two to three cents a gallon, but we don't have
enough experience, really, with the performance of our engines,
which are substantially more heavily loaded than maybe the
larger American engines are. We don't have enough
experience at this time to judge whether it's possible or not.
I think other items I think the drive belts and
things like that our emission system doesn't directly
depend on drive belts or any emission system proper, but we
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certainly feel we need to adjust drive belt tensions more
often than 30,000 miles. We just doubt that it's possible to
not do it more often.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You don't know that it's
technologically infeasible?
MR. BIGGERS: No. I think, as an engineer, we know
that drive belts are a pretty highly developed item. I don't
see any reason to believe that there are compounds available
and material available that would really make that a feasible
thing to do.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: It may cost more?
MR. BIGGERS: Even at higher cost. So many things
happen to drive belts that are well, again, I guess I have
to say I don't know.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You have raised the concern that
was raised by Ford earlier, and that's the new technology
which may have different intervals that do not comport with
the California prescribed maintenance intervals, and you
suggest that that could be a problem. It could preclude
is that what you are saying new technology?
MR. BIGGERS: Yes. I heard Mr. Austin's response
this morning to that, but by essentially constraining certain
things like spark plug changes I can envision an advanced
engine utilizing spark plugs that might be a very good candi-
date as an alternate engine. But maybe the spark plugs may
have to be changed every 10,000 miles. It seems unreasonable
to rule those out on the face of it just setting arbitrary
restrictions which really seem to be directed at one specific
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engine technology.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That's not a very good example;
is it? Spark plug replacement at 10,000 miles, it's not very
innovative technology?
MR. BIGGERS: Well, maybe it could be. Suppose it's
a sterling engine or something like that, and maybe because of
the combustion chamber requirements they really do have to
be a spark plug change is not a thing which is subject to
tampering. It's a cost thing. It's hard to see how that has
any effect on the argument that the ARB makes for the need
for these regulations.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you, sir.
We will take a short break.
(Short recess.)
MR. SCHWENTKER: My name is Don Schwentker, counsel
for the Automobile Importers of America, and half of what I
had planned to say I have already said. So I will be even
faster, because I, too, want to get back to Washington.
In the past
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You and what two? What two are
you talking about?
MR. SCHWENTKER: I assume that you guys, being
hardworking government employees, are anxious to get back to
Washington and get back to work
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: So much for your assumptions.
MR. SCHWENTKER: and cut out this vacation.
Industry has in the past been accused at one time or
another in responses to various rulemaking proposals of taking
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a least-common-denominator approach. If I understand the
so-called least-common-denominator approach, what it means is
that the industry gauges its ability to comply on the ability
of the weakest of its members.
If that's the appropriate comment, least-common-
denominator approach to rulemaking, it would seem that ARB
in this case, and EPA I guess if they accept the ARB premise,
would be taking a most-common-denominator approach, if there
is such a thing. I don't know what the opposite of least
common denominator is, but let's assume for the moment it's
called most common denominator. It would appear that that's
the approach that ARB is taking. They are saying if these
guys over here can do it, then all of these other guys can
obviously do it.
And it's being done on a piecemeal basis. It's
being done on the ability of one guy to do something with
respect to an ignition system and someone else being able to
do something in an induction system and so on down the line
and then we arrive at a composite which is the best that every-
one can do in combination.
I think that that is not exactly appropriate, and
that's one of the reasons we wanted the responses to the
questionnaire made part of this record, so that you would have
the opinions and abilities of the so-called least-common-
denominator people at your disposal.
The most-common-denominator approach ignores the
maintenance requirements, we believe, of small cars with small
engines that don't necessarily require unleaded fuel. And
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Walt Biggers of Subaru explained that a little bit more fully,
and I don't need to go into that. It's especially true with
spark plug replacement.
The ARB relied, we think rather heavily, on manu-
facturers' past practices, which are not necessarily their
current practices. The case of the Chrysler 5,000-mile
spark plug we heard about over and over during the ARB rule-
making. The Chrysler 50,000-mile spark plug is no more. We
also heard yesterday about the Brand C's lack of a transmission
drain plug in 1961 or 1962, and if that's so, and I have no
reason to believe that it's not so, someone relying on that
experience might logically conclude that everyone should
eliminate transmission drain plugs. And apparently Brand C
determined that that was not the best idea. So I just want
to caution against buying that sort of approach.
And, lastly, I think it's easily distinguishable, the
difference between EPA approval of reasonable and necessary
maintenance and the California requirements. The California
requirements would disapprove in advance the manufacturers'
determination as to what maintenance is reasonable and neces-
sary. We are talking about making a determination in 1977
that would be applicable in 1980 and God knows how far beyond
1980.
That's it.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is it your position that the
manufacturer has an obligation to foresee what he thinks is
pertinent to the maintenance of his vehicle?
MR. SCHWENTKER: Of his vehicle under the
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circumstances, yes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: And prescribe that maintenance?
MR. SCHWENTKER: That's right.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: And that's a flexibility he
should continue to have and indeed should live up to?
MR. SCHWENTKER: That's right. Absolutely. I
don't think we can say right now what the situation is going
to be in 1980 or 1981 or beyond. I think these determinations
as to what's reasonable and necessary have to be made in the
light of the technology that's in use at that time. By making
determinations in advance, we tend to polarize.
Many, many years ago the FAA made a decision that
small airplanes weighed 12,500 pounds or less and large air-
planes weighed more than 12,500 pounds, and they set forth
different regulations applicable to these two different types
of aircraft. That was easy at the time the determination was
made because little airplanes weighed a lot less than 12,500
and big ones weighed a lot more. But as the years wore on
small airplanes got bigger and some big airplanes got smaller,
and finally we had airplanes that were weighing 12,500 pounds.
Along came a guy named Bill Lear who wanted to certify a jet
under the small airplane regulations because his jet weighed
12,500 pounds, and it was something that was considered in
1938 when that 12,500-pound limit was set.
So you can't always foresee what's going to happen
in the future, and I don't think that this thing should be
polarized by being set now. What is reasonable and necessary
in 1981, we may not know until 1980 or 1981.
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Schwentker.
The next item on the agenda was high altitude test
requirements for 1980 and subsequent model-year passenger
cars, light-duty trucks and medium-duty vehicles. And I
understand that the concerns that Ford Motor Company and
General Motors and AMC has have been resolved on the record.
However, their statements will be included in the record, and
whatever response is necessary on the part of the CARB will be
included in the record, too.
Mr. Grice has asked to make a statement on behalf of
Chrysler on this subject.
MR. GRICE: I'm not sure, Ben, I would dignify with
a statement.
I just wanted to make the comment that our basic
concern, and I suspect the concern of our competition, was
the lack of definition in the high altitude regulation. I
think that lack of definition has been largely cured by the
representations and interpretations of that regulation which
are set forth in the ARB statement.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Fine.
(California Exhaust Emission Standards and Test
Procedures for 1982 and Subsequent Model-Year Passenger Cars,
Light-Duty Trucks and Medium-Duty Vehicles).
MR. AUSTIN: Mr. Jackson, before I get into the
next portion of our statement for this waiver hearing
involving the lower NO emission standards to be established
A
for passenger cars, light-duty and medium-duty trucks, I'd
like to briefly summarize the comments we made yesterday
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regarding the issue of need for more stringent standards and
the stringency issue itself.
The NO emissions which we are attempting to further
X
control through the regulations which have recently been
adopted by the Board relate to several different air quality
problems in California. They relate to violations of the
state and federal standard for nitrogen dioxide. They relate
to violations of the state and federal standard for photo-
chemical oxidant. But they also relate to violations of
the state standard for visibility and the state and federal
standards for total suspended particulate matter. We are
additionally concerned over NO emissions because of their
potentially carcinogenic effect on man.
It's for all these reasons that the Board has taken
action to further control NO . We would encourage the
Environmental Protection Agency to not allow the manufacturers
to attempt to mislead you in this situation by focusing
exclusively on the effect that nitrogen dioxide nitrogen
oxide emissions have on oxidants in upwind areas.
We've had extensive seminars on this issue. We
understand that reductions in NOx emissions, leaving all other
emissions alone, will tend to increase oxidant emissions in
the vicinity of the emission sources? or for most areas in
California that would be the upwind areas of the particular
basin or region that we are talking about. There's plenty
of smog chamber data which shows that effect.
Our principal concern, however, is quite often with
the downwind areas, when there has been significant amount of
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time elapse between the actual emission of the precursor
compound and the formation of the high levels of photochemical
oxidant that the populations in the downwind areas of a number
of our basins are exposed to. We believe that there are some
fundamental problems with the smog chamber data on which the
industry has based some of their conclusions, and we believe
that a study of the ambient air quality data in California over
the last decade shows fairly conclusively that further reduc-
tions in NO emissions will reduce the peak oxidant levels
that the populations in the downwind end of the Los Angeles
the greater Metropolitan-Los Angeles area are exposed to and
will probably also reduce oxidant air quality problems in
some of the other California Basins, such as the Central
Valley Area where we believe we have a significant amount of
our oxidant problem caused by transport from metropolitan
areas such as the Bay Area.
That all relates to the oxidant situation. In
addition to that, we are regulating NO emissions further to
X
reduce the exposure of the public to nitrogen dioxide. We
are still exceeding the federal standards in. the Los Angeles
Area. We expect to continue to exceed the federal standards,
and more importantly as far as we are concernedexceed the
state hourly standard for a number of years unless we get
substantially more NO control.
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We believe that it was reasonable for us to consider
our state standards, and indeed the National Academy of
Sciences and other recognized organizations have encouraged
the Environmental Protection Agency to adopt an hourly standard
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for NO2 which is similar to California's state standard or, in
fact, more stringent.
We also think that our analysis of how nitrogen
oxide emissions affect visibility and total suspended par-
ticulate in the South Coast Air Basin is a valid one and that
we should not ignore and you should not ignore the signifi-
cance of NC>x emissions as it relates to violations of the
state and federal standards for total suspended particulate
matter.
We prepared a table on the first page of our handout
for today which summarizes the lower NO^ standards and modi-
fied procedures for which the ARB is requesting a waiver of
federal preemption. The HC and CO standards were the subject
of previous waiver hearings, and are shown for information
only.
Basically, the new NOx standards require the 90 per-
cent reduction in emissions originally mandated by the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970 for the 1976 model-year vehicles.
Some relaxation of the standards required for passenger cars
has been provided for the heavier truck categories to account
for the greater weight which those vehicles need to meet
important customer needs.
On the issue of stringency, whether or not the
standards listed in the preceding table will be more stringent
than federal standards depends on action yet to be taken
by Congress and the President. ARB's waiver requests are
therefore conditional in the sense that the waivers are
requested only for those standards which turn out to be more
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stringent than federal standards yet to be established.
A related issue is whether California standards will
apply in lieu of federal standards in cases where the
California standard for a particular pollutant is less
stringent. We understand that a provision of the conference
bill may allow, on a model basis, some relaxation of the
federal CO standard should the NO standards required by
California adversely affect the cost or fuel economy associ-
ated with meeting a federal CO standard of 3.4 grams per mile.
Should this provision be signed into law, ARB
requests that EPA consider relaxation of any federal CO
standard lower than the CO standard requested by California
for those California models using systems which the manu-
facturer demonstrates experience a significant cost or fuel
economy penalty when designed to meet the federal CO standard
in lieu of the California CO standard.
We believe federal CO standards lower than those
which California believes are adquate to achieve and maintain
the National Ambient Air Quality Standard for CO should not be
required for California models unless EPA determines that cost
and fuel economy penalties will not be associated with the
enforcement of such standards.
On the issue of technological feasibility, we see
the question of technological feasibility, as it relates to
the lower NO standards for which we are requesting a waiver,
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as being in large part mooted by the successful certification
of two different 1977 model vehicles by two different manu-
facturers. The California regulations do not require
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compliance until five years after demonstration of the capa-
bilities of three-v/ay catalyst systems.
The basic similarity between the models which have
already met standards as low as those ARB has proposed for
1982 and beyond and, indeed, the statements of automobile
manufacturers who participated in ARB workshops and meetings
clearly indicate that this same basic emission control tech-
nology can be effectively applied to most other models.
In testimony presented at workshops and public hear-
ings, and in reports submitted to ARB, manufacturers such as
General Motors, Ford, Nissan, Honda, Volvo and Saab have indi-
cated that the 0.4 grams per mile NO standard has been con-
sistently achieved at low mileage. When we contrast this
state of technology development, five years prior to its
required use, with the state of hydrocarbon/carbon monoxide
catalyst technology in 1970, five years prior to its intro-
duction, it is apparent that the manufacturers are in an
excellent position to comply with the 1982 California standards
Many manufacturers of diesel vehicles have argued
that the technology does not exist that will allow diesels to
achieve 0.4 grams per mile NO , and will not be available by
1982. Testimony received by ARB in this area was often incon-
sistent and contradictory; however, the ARB addressed the manu-
facturers' concerns by providing alternative NO standards in
A
1980 and later model years. Manufacturers will be permitted
to certify vehicles to higher NO standards, as shown above,
provided these vehicles satisfy specific maintenance and
durability requirements for 100,000 miles.
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Our conclusions regarding the ability of diesels to
meet the 198 0 and later model-year NO standards are detailed
and supported in our November 23, 1976 and June 22, 1977
staff reports on this matter.
Based on testimony received during the last year,
the ARB concluded that the 50,000-mile standards could be
achieved by most diesels in 1980 and later model years. The
100,000-mile option and related standards were adopted in an
attempt to alleviate the potential lead time and feasibility
problems expressed by some manufacturers.
In summary, we believe that compelling and
extraordinary conditions now exist and will continue to exist
in California, requiring more stringent NOx emission standards,
that the California standards under consideration today are
more stringent than the likely federal emission standards, and
that California's standards are technologically feasible
within the lead time remaining. Consequently, we believe
that the Administrator cannot deny California's request for
a waiver to implement these standards.
We would be happy to answer any questions you may
have for us.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: On Page 2, you stated that if
a certain provision of the Conference-passed Clean Air
Amendments is enacted into law you request the EPA to consider
relaxation of the CO standard for California automobiles.
How does that relate to your waiver request?
MR. AUSTIN: We've requested a waiver for a set of
standards for HC, CO, and NO . The CO standard may turn out
x
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to be a less stringent standard than the CO standard that will
apply under federal law.
We have evaluated the need for CO control in
California and determined that there are some benefits to
requiring a standard lower than nine grams per mile as soon
as possible but that will probably meet the Ambient Air
Quality standard by staying with the nine gram standard as soon
as we have a significant turnover of the vehicle fleet.
This being the case, there's certainly no long-
range benefit there is potentially no long-range benefit
for California in having our vehicles meet a CO standard more
stringent than the nine gram standard which we have adopted.
However, as was brought out during the hearing process and
the workshops which ARB conducted, there may be some disbenefit
associated with enforcement of a federal CO standard that's
somewhat lower than the nine gram standard which has been
adopted by the Board. The penalties could range from cost
penalties to fuel economy and driveability penalties.
It appears to us that lower standards all the way
down to the 3.4 level are technologically feasible, and I
think the workshop and the hearing process and staff reports
that the ARB put together would tend to support that determi-
nation. However, the disbenefits may be significant.
And that being the case, we'd prefer to see our
set of standards used as a package and not to see a federal
CO standard significantly more stringent than the nine gram
standard superimposed on top of the requirements the manu-
facturers have to meet for California.
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Of course, it's speculation at
this time because I don't think any of us has seen what came
out of the Conference. But as I understand it, the CO
standard for which a waiver may be granted to is seven grams,
which is lower than nine.
MR. AUSTIN: Based on what we heard yesterday from
Mr. Eppel from Ford, it may be that there are going to be
two provisions under which a CO standard could be relaxed from
the basic standard that will be part of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977. There may be a provision for the federal
government to, on their own, provide some relaxation up to a
level of seven grams per mile for either California models or
federal models on a specific model basis, and there may be
another provision which would allow EPA to relax the CO
standard to the level requested by California should the
determination be made that the set of standards adopted by
California in total are more stringent than the set of
standards which would apply federally.
This could provide some flexibility to set some
CO standard, perhaps as high as nine grams. .
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Just for a point of clarification,
Mr. Hellman has noted that on your table you show for the
198 0-1981 passenger cars a standard of 1.5 gram per mile of
NOx with an option of 100,000-mile certification.
MR. RUBETNSTEIN: No. Those standards apply to the
100,000-mile certification option. We are requesting at
this hearing only a waiver for that option. The one gram
NO standard, which is the original standard for 1980 passenger
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cars, was the subject of the May waiver hearing.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I see.
In other words, it would be at one gram, 50,000-mile
certification
MR. RUBENSTEIN: And one and a half gram for
100,000 miles.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: 100,000 miles?
MR. RUBENSTEIN: That's correct.
MR. MACOMBER: This table only reflects the most
recent changes made by the Board.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay.
MR. HELLMAN: Mr. Austin, you indicated that in your
opinion the standards for which you are requesting a waiver
for 198 2 and later passenger cars are feasible based on,
among other things, a demonstration of emissions to those
levels by two foreign manufacturers.
Can you tell us if in the ARB's judgment there is
anything different between those vehicles and domestic
vehicles, any technological reasons why that technology could
or could not be applied to vehicles manufactured in the
United States?
MR. AUSTIN: We don't believe there are any
significant differences. The issue of differences between
those vehicles and domestic vehicles was the subject of a lot
of the discussion that took place during the ARB hearings
and workshops on this issue.
One of the considerations was the weight of these
vehicles. We are talking basically about the 3500-pound
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inertia weight class as discussed in the staff reports which
are a part of this hearing record. While that inertia weight
class and lighter classes do not now make up the bulk of the
market, by the 1982 model year we'll see a much greater
fraction of total production, U.S. production, being in the
3500-pound weight class and. lighter.
We also looked at the cushion that was available for
those vehicles which certified 3500-pound weiqht class. We
saw that those vehicles did not incorporate all of the NO
control technology that is now available; the Volvo vehicle,
for example, certifying at half the standard and not using
exhaust gas recirculation. That was another consideration
that led us to believe that the standards were feasible, not
only for domestic vehicles in the 3 500-pound weight class and
lighter but indeed for vehicles of significantly higher weight
than 3500 pounds.
There was a lot of discussion regarding the fact
these vehicles used four-cylinder engines. However, we
examined the data available on prototype vehicles from other
manufacturers which indicated no significant difference in the
efficiency of three-way catalyst control systems when they are
applied to V-type engines of six or eight cylinders.
If those two factors are indeed not going to cause a
significant problem in transferring that technology over to
different vehicles, then we don't see any reason why the same
kind of performance that was demonstrated by Volvo and Saab
cannot be demonstrated by the domestic manufacturers and other
foreign manufacturers by the 1982 model year.
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In our hearing process and in the staff reports,
we discuss the engine-out emission levels of vehicles that
had been equipped with three-way catalysts, and we could see
that the engine-out emission levels of vehicles which were
below the statutory standards or below the California proposed
standards for 1982 were in line with the engine-out emission
levels that are achievable on many different types of vehicles
with different types of engines.
We looked at the issue of fuel injected engines
compared to carbureted engines. We could see there were no
fundamental reasons why carburetors could not be made to work
with three-way catalyst systems, and indeed there was proto-
type data available to us which showed that, in fact,
carbureted vehicles do perform well when equipped with three-
way catalyst systems.
MR. HELLMAN: Supposing that new carburetion or
new fuel metering would be needed in order to meet the
standards, how long do you think it would take a manufacturer
to build a whole new facility from the ground up to manu-
facture the new fuel metering system?
MR. AUSTIN: If you were starting from the ground up
with an entirely new fuel metering system First of all, I
wouldn't necessarily want to conclude that you'd have to get
into new bricks and mortar. It may very well be possible
to build a fuel metering system in an existing facility.
Were that the case, then you would be talking about
lead times from design finalization, which any manufacturer
would be very close to now since these systems are very similar
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from manufacturer to manufacturer and only relatively minor
changes are required to incorporate a box-type fuel injection
system, for example, onto an engine which has not yet used
the system. We would be talking about lead times that would be
in the range of two and a half to three years to start getting
production hardware out the door and ready for installation on
engines which had never used fuel injection before.
This would be a sufficient amount of lead time to
order and install entirely new tooling. The tooling would not
have to be designed from the ground up, since similar tooling
has been designed and is used by the manufacturers of fuel
injection equipment now. The industry would know basically
what was required. It would be talking about the lead time
necessary to modify those designs slightly to get the tools
built and installed and to start with the production process,
and that's a lead time that normally runs two and a half to
three years, depending on how much salvaging you can do of
the basic bricks and mortar that will house the manufacturing
facility in the first place.
MR. HELLMAN: Do you consider this two-and-a-half-
year time period to be a worse case In other words, that it
could be speeded up and this is the upper bound of lead
time for a whole new fuel metering system?
MR. AUSTIN: It could be speeded up for many manu-
facturers by relying on vendors rather than starting their
own manufacturing facility. To some extent, vendors could
increase their production and may be able to more efficiently
provide the additional numbers of components that a manufacturei
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may need or may want in order to comply with the standards that
we are talking about.
MR. HELLMAN: So that even at the worst case the
lead time exists in the ARB's opinion to comply fully with
these standards?
MR. AUSTIN: That's right. The lead time still
exists. The manufacturers are now at the point where they've
got to be deciding whether they are going to continue with
attempts to meet these standards using feedback control
carburetion systems or whether they are going to go to fuel
injection systems which potentially provide greater control
over air-fuel ratio and potentially provide somewhat higher
efficiency than may be achievable with carburetion systems.
That's a decision for the manufacturers to make.
They have two ways of going. There's still lead time for them
to go either route for 198 2.
MR. HELLMAN: Do you think that the cost in fuel
economy, the implications of meeting this standard in 1982,
should be deemed by EPA to be excessive?
MR. AUSTIN: I think that EPA is only on firm
ground in making determinations that the costs of the
California standards will be excessive when that cost is at
such a level that you can expect to see a problem with meeting
basic market demand, a problem with continued turnover of
the fleet, cost that's so excessive that it's likely to cause
an adverse air quality impact.
I think based on our past experience with what
happens to car sales as a function of their cost that the costs
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that we are talking about for compliance with these standards
is nowhere close to a cost that would cause that kind of
disruption, that kind of inability to meet basic market demand
in California.
MR. HELLMAN: Is a federal standard of 0.41 hydro-
carbons, 3.4 CO, and 1.0 NO more or less stringent than a
X
California requirement for 0.41 hydrocarbons, nine CO, and
0.4 NOx?
MR. AUSTIN: I think for most manufacturers for
most models of cars the California requirement that includes
the .4 gram per mile NO standard will turn out to be more
stringent.
The difference in what a manufacturer would have to
do to meet the 3.4 CO standard in combination with a one gram
NO standard may very likely involve differences in the use of
x
air pumps and oxidation catalysts. It could turn out that
there's more sophisticated NO control techniques required on
the .4 gram per mile NO cars, possibly more sophisticated
EGR systems, to make a car meet both sets of standards. To
comply with the 3.4 while it's complying with the .4 NO ,
we'd probably be talking about the addition of a second
catalyst and an air pump for further oxidation after we go
through the three-way catalyst bed. There it's going to be
more a cost penalty associated with meeting both standards than
a strict technological feasibility problem.
MR. HELLMAN: Based on what you feel the performance
of the systems that will be used to meet your proposed
standards of 1.41 hydrocarbons, nine CO, and 0.4 NO , do you
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believe that those vehicles would also comply with a CO
standard of seven grams per mile on a federal basis?
MR. AUSTIN: I think that's pretty clear that they
would. This was something that we discussed with the manu-
facturers to some extent.
It appeared to us. that was only when you started
getting close to the 3.4 CO level that you started running
into some of these problems with three-way catalyst systems,
problems in complying with the CO standard.
The CO that's going to go into the catalyst bed is
pretty much a function of the air-fuel ratio which you are
operating the engine. In a three-way catalyst system, you
are constrained to operate the engine over a fairly narrow
band of air-fuel ratios, and you pretty much have to live with
the CO that the engine is going to generate at that air-fuel
ratio, and there's not much you can do to reduce it prior to
the exhaust gases crossing over the three-way catalyst bed.
Given the efficiency of current three-way catalyst
systems on CO, it is difficult for middle size and large
vehicles to achieve tailpipe levels significantly below
3.4. It is possible to get down to 3.4 by adding a second
catalyst and adding an air pump to the engine and going back
to an air oxidation catalyst bed after the gases have passed
through the three-way catalyst bed. But that's going to add
some cost to the system. It may increase the NOx emissions to
some extent, requiring a little bit more exhaust gas recircula-
tion or a little bit more spark retard on the basic engine.
I think it was fairly clear, though, from the
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prototype data that we reviewed when going through our hearing
process and from discussions with the manufacturers that the
nine gram CO was going to pretty much come for three, can come
automatically when you set the system up to meet the .41
hydrocarbon or the .4 NO or the .41 hydrocarbon in combination
with the 1 NO for 19 80 and '81.
X
If you look at the prototype data, it appears that
those vehicles will be coming in somewhere in the ratio of
three to five grams carbon monoxide, well under the nine-gram
standard, and would have no problem in complying with the
standard in the seven-gram-per-mile range without any changes
to the basic system that the manufacturers would choose to
use to comply with our standard that includes the nine-gram
CO limitation,.
MR. HELLMAN: So that's your judgment, then, that
imposition of a federal standard of seven grams per mile CO
would not be very much of a burden or require system changes
to vehicles that are meeting your requirements; but, however,
a federal imposition of a standard of 3.4 CO would require
major changes?
MR. AUSTIN: Yes. I'd agree with that. That's
essentially correct.
There is essentially no burden, in my opinion,
associated with the seven-gram standard. It's for all
practical purposes just as easy to meet .41 hydrocarbon,
seven CO, and .4 NOx as it is to meet .41 hydrocarbon, nine
CO, and .4 NO .
And in discussions we had with some of the conferees,
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members of the committees that were working on the Clean Air
Act Amendments for 1977, our position was that a standard of
six grams per mile CO was essentially the equivalent required
the equivalent technology as our nine gram CO standard when
in combination with the .4 hydrocarbon and the .4 NO or the
.4 hydrocarbon and the 1 NOx. And we would have been com-
fortable with any standard between six grams and nine grams.
Comfortable in that we would not have expected that standard
to in any way affect the cost or lead time associated with
complying with our California standards.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I like the six all along. I
don't know why they didn't go with it.
Thank you very much.
MR. AUSTIN: Thank you.
MR. JOELSON: Good morning. This all looks
familiar. And given the familiarity of the issue we are con-
sidering today to the proposal we took up yesterday, my state-
ment may have a somewhat familiar ring.
My name is Mark R. Joelson, and I am a member of the
Washington, D.C. law firm of Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin &
Kahn. I am appearing today on behalf of the Motor and Equip-
ment Manufacturers Association, a national trade association
representing approximately 75 0 manufacturers of automotive
parts. The MEMA member manufacturers produce vehicle equipment
both for use as original equipment by the automobile manu-
facturers, and for sale to vehicle owners through the auto-
motive aftermarket.
MEMA opposes granting California a waiver to
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implement amendments to the California exhaust emission
standards pertaining to the 198 2 and subsequent model-year
standards and test procedures, adopted on June 22, 1977. MEMA
opposes the grant of this waiver because it fails to meet the
prerequisites for a waiver under Section 209(b) of the Clean
Air Act, and it would be severely anticompetitive in its effect.
More particularly, we are concerned about and oppose a waiver
for the optional 100,000 mile certification procedure.
MEMA does not have specific expertise with respect
to the technological feasibility of vehicle manufacturers
meeting either a 1.0 or a .4 gram per mile standard for oxides
of nitrogen. Therefore, while there appears to be substantial
question whether the requisite technological feasibility has
been shown, our statement is not directed to that issue.
MEMA believes, however, that the proposed California
regulations fail to meet the requirement in Section 209 (b) of
the Clean Air Act that "the state standards and accompanying
enforcement procedures" must be consistent with Section 202(a)
of the Clean Air Act on the ground that there is substantial
evidence that the amendment is not technically feasible in
terms of its application throughout a vehicle's warranteed
life, particularly during the stipulated optional 100,000-
mile certification period.
The optional 100,000-mile certification procedure
appears to have been developed by the California Air Resources
Board staff in recognition of the inability of diesel-powered
passenger cars to meet a 1.0 gram per mile standard for oxides
of nitrogen. Yet despite this limited reason for developing
the option, the Air Resources Board Amendment would apply to
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all light- and medium-duty vehicles, whether gasoline or
diesel powered.
Surprisingly, the California Air Resources Board
failed to make a critical finding, a finding which would be
necessary to demonstrate the validity of the 100,000-mile
certification option. Specifically, the Board made no finding
that a 100,000-mile certification and warranty period with
attendant restrictions on maintenance is technologically
feasible for both gasoline and diesel powered vehicles.
In point of fact, no consideration at all was given
to the question of whether gasoline-powered vehicles could
meet the longer certification period with the maintenance
restrictions which the Board admits are "similar to those
now recommended for diesels." Nevertheless, California
adopted the optional standard for all vehicles.
There is no question in our judgment that the
100,000-mile certification option was adopted arbitrarily and
with no consideration given to its technological feasibility.
The option, as a result, clearly fails to meet the requirements
for a waiver under Section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act.
In addition to the 100,000-mile option itself, the
restrictions on maintenance built into that option also serve
to disqualify it for a waiver from federal preemption. As
was discussed yesterday with respect to California's proposals
to restrict allowable maintenance, vehicle maintenance practice
are dealt with in Section 207 of the Clean Air Act and do not
come within the scope of the California exemption from the
requirements of Section 202 of the Clean Air Act. Section
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207(c) of the Act governs the maintenance of emission control
devices, and it would be inconsistent with the regulatory
scheme established in the Clean Air Act of California to
assert jurisdiction in this area.
In enacting the Clean Air Act, Congress made it
clear that the law was not designed to require the vehicle
manufacturer to undertake to perform vehicle maintenance which
had been traditionally the responsibility of the car owner.
This view was recently acknowledged by the EPA in the preamble
to its advance notice of proposed rulemaking with respect to
Section 207(a) of the Clean Air Act, in which it noted that
"Congress did not intend to alter substantially the traditional
burden of the purchaser to take care of his vehicle periodically
at his expense." Since the 100,000-mile certification option
would alter this traditional burden (particularly in the case
of gasoline-fueled vehicles since the maintenance specified is
based on diesel maintenance), by requiring the vehicle manu-
facturer to assume responsibility for virtually all emission-
related maintenance for 100,000 miles, it is inconsistent with
the federal Clean Air Act, and a waiver would be inappropriate.
I'd like at this point to revise the statement that
you all have before you to deal with a point that came up
yesterday. That is that the point was made yesterday, I think
in colloquy between the panel and ARB, that the current
proposal does not have the prepaid maintenance feature which
was contained in an earlier proposal and that this anti-
competitive feature therefore has been eliminated.
But we submit that the impact of the present proposal
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will, as a practical matter, be the same. If a car is not,
in fact, a maintenance-free car and this is a conclusion
that seems imminently reasonable to us, that the car will not
go on for 100,000 miles with the very, very limited maintenance
proposed here and under the proposal the vehicle manu-
facturer has not given the motorist instructions for main-
tenance that does prove to be reasonable and necessary in
other words, the maintenance instructions were too limited
then the motorist will look to the vehicle manufacturer to
remedy the problem.
That's the necessary import of this proposal. The
independent parts and service industry will have been shut out
of the process, although maintenance will, in fact, have been
necessary.
Once again, I want to stress that I am not advocating
unneeded maintenance. I am suggesting that under these pro-
posals as the car necessarily operates, particularly over
a 100,000-mile life, there will be maintenance then, in fact,
proves to be necessary and it will not be contained in the
maintenance instructions. The motorist will certainly turn to
the vehicle manufacturer on the basis that he was entitled to
maintenance instructions, and they will turn to the vehicle
manufacturer to remedy the problem.
That's a problem for them, but it's also a problem
for us in the sense that there will have been maintenance
necessary. But our people, the independent industry, will not
have had access to making those repairs.
Now resuming the statement on Page 4.
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Like the general restrictions on allowable main-
tenance, it is not sufficient for California to contend that
this regulation only affects certification testing, since
California officials state that maintenance prescribed by the
manufacturer to the vehicle owner must comport with that
performed during certification testing unless a specific
waiver is granted.
However, a vehicle manufacturer could not have
maintenance instructions for California vehicles which differ
from those approved by the federal government without risking
a violation of federal law.
As was discussed yesterday, Section 207(c)(3) is
quite clear that it's an obligation of the vehicle manufacturer
to give instructions which are, as a practical matter and
subject to the review of the agency, reasonable and necessary.
In this situation in which the scheme of the federal act is
clear, traditional concepts of federal preemption dictate that
the state regulation cannot be implemented.
Furthermore, MEMA believes that the EPA has an
affirmative obligation to consider the competitive impact of
this proposal prior to granting the waiver requested by the
State of California. Not only is the nature of the competitive
impact a "cost of compliance" that must be considered by the
EPA in determining whether the proposal is technically
feasible and justifies a waiver under Section 209(b), but the
EPA should always consider the competitive impacts of its
activities, and a failure of the EPA in this case to consider
that impact would be an abrogation of its responsibilities.
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And there are cases cited which should go into the record,
but I won't burden you with them orally now.
[See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. F.P.C., 399 F.2d 953
(D.C. Cir. 1973); McLean Trucking Co. v. United
States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944).]
The competitive impact of the 100,000-mile certifi-
cation option would be devastating, in that it would result in
a substantial loss of business for automotive parts manu-
facturers, independent garages and other repair outlets.
As we mentioned yesterday, these repair facilities employ more
than 60,000 people in California, many of whom would lose their
jobs if repairs were not permitted at their current places of
employment. The competitive implications of the 100,000
certification option are therefore an important and additional
reason for denying the option.
In sum, MEMA opposes the grant of a waiver to the
State of California to implement amendments to the California
exhaust emission standards and test procedures for 1982 and
subsequent model year passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and
medium-duty vehicles, pertaining to 1982 and subsequent model-
year standards and test procedures. The California regulation
does not meet the requirements for a waiver contained in
Section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act.
On behalf of MEMA, I want to express my appreciation
for the opportunity to appear here today. I will be pleased
to answer any questions.
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Mr. Joelson, you have concluded,
again, that any kind of approval of this waiver would be
devastating, but I don't see where you have made the case
anywhere that it would be devastating in the terms of any kind
of quantification at all.
MR. JOELSON: Well, as we discussed yesterday, it's
not possible to quantify something that has not occurred yet.
The best we can do is to look at the proposal, to determine
what the impact of the proposal is likely going to be, and
to reach a conclusion.
As I indicated yesterday, I'll see what we can do
better to quantify it, but I remain doubtful that it can be
quantified at this point.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: It's just very difficult to
believe that you can come out and conclude it's going to be
devastating, but yet you have no basis whatsoever for showing
how you get there, other than just your judgment.
MR. JOELSON: Well, this is a judgment-type hearing.
It has to be because we are looking far into the future. We
are talking about an industry that survives on maintenance
basically. That's what the independent service industry is
all about, and we are talking about a California proposal to
drastically reduce the maintenance on cars for 100,000 miles.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That's another term of lack of
quantification, "drastic."
MR. JOELSON: Well, I think you can look at their
proposal and see that they contemplate very little maintenance.
That's the purpose of it.
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: The industry has already said if
you just let us alone we are going to drastically reduce the
amount of maintenance necessary.
MR. JOELSON: They have said two things, yes.
They've said that the competitive pressures will be
such that there will be a trend to limit and reduce main-
tenance. We understand that. As I mentioned yesterday, to the
extent that a maintenance-free car, in fact, becomes the case,
I think our people will have to take their economic lumps.
But what the vehicle manufacturers have also said is
that some maintenance will be required. There will be a number
of inspect, replace-if-necessary-type operations, that they
do not believe that the California proposal is proper in that
it would limit maintenance too much, that additional main-
tenance is indeed necessary and will continue to be necessary
in the foreseeable future.
Therefore, I am saying, as I did yesterday, let us
not, by legislative fiat, in effect eliminate maintenance when
that maintenance cannot yet be eliminated. Let it happen as
a factual matter. If that, indeed, happens as a factual
matter, as I say, our people have no complaint.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What I would like to see is: one,
some sort of analysis that really puts this thing into focus.
You pointed out the 100,000-mile certification thing is an
option. I'm not sure I would see why anybody would choose
that as an option. You apparently speculate that somebody
would try to do that with the gasoline engine, but that's one
contingency right there. Your speculation is based on
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somebody in the gasoline industry certifying to 100,000 miles,
because if you are talking about diesels you really don't have
that as a big part of your market either.
MR. JOELSON: No, I'm not talking about diesel. But
before you turn to the second premise, let's talk about that
one.
I think California is holding out this option as an
attractive option. I think they intend it to be an attractive
option, which is why they are holding it out. So I am not
inclined to down play it, and I don't see why we should.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do you have any evidence to indi-
cate that manufacturers would prefer to go to 100,000-mile
certification versus meeting a lower standard at 50,000 miles?
MR. JOELSON: Well, I think you have the manu-
facturers here. You can ask them. I think that would be
better evidence than my speculation.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: We can take your statement.
MR. JOELSON: I don't want to testify for them,
Mr. Jackson. On the other hand, this is obviously set forth
by California as an attractive option.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You are making a point that's
based on some sort of judgment about what will happen, and
to get us to believe that we'd like to see the basis upon
which you make these judgments. And you've asked us to
consider your statement, which is speculative at best, it's
got a lot of words that are not quantified in any way at all,
and it's just very hard to deal with that.
I am not suggesting that you don't have anything to
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tell us, except to tell you you are not telling us. It makes
it very difficult for us to deal with these kinds of generali-
zations .
MR. JOELSON: They are difficult to deal with, but
may I respectfully submit that that's the nature of this
entire process. You are talking about 1982 vehicles. I think
the vehicle manufacturers have indicated there is a serious
question as to what the maintenance parameters for 1980 cars
will be. So, necessarily, there would be even more speculation
as to what the parameters for 1982 cars would be.
Nonetheless, everybody is trying to see into the
future, trying to determine what the impact of all this will
be without being able to quantify. If I am deficient in not
being able to quantify, I am not the only one.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I know you haven't been a party
to these proceedings in the past to a great extent, but there
is a certain burden on the part of those who oppose the regula-
tions to demonstrate why they should not be put into effect and
to consider the kinds of claims that you make here and to look
for things that would permit us to make some.reasonable judg-
ment about the likelihood of the outcome you predict.
What I would like to see is some kind of analysis
that shows which manufacturers and how many would elect to go
to 100,000-mile certification and how that differential impact
on maintenance in the aftermarket would be quantified, taking
into consideration that they have said they are going to reduce
maintenance in the future anyhow.
So, really, we are only talking about the
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differential in the amount of maintenance that would be
associated with, one, their election to go to 100,000-mile
certification on gasoline engines; and, two, that the
differential and maintenance that would be associated with
the implementation of the California regs and that which the
manufacturers would do on their own, and it's only that part
that we are talking about that would be the influence of these
regulations that would make any difference.
MR. JOELSON: Mr. Jackson, but your fingers, let the
record show, indicate a very small space there, and I think our
people would be inclined to feel that it's a much larger space
there.
As I said, if we can supply anything further to
quantify, we will.
I think in some respects, for example, the attractive-
ness of the option to the vehicle manufacturers, what they are
likely to do, I'm not sure that is our burden. And I think to
the extent that we can get elucidation on that point you are
in as good if not better a position to inquire into that, and
I think it is a part of your responsibility to determine how
serious this option is. Obviously, as I said, I don't think
California would have set it forth unless it were attractive,
were at least a feasible option, and it's certainly an
appropriate part of this hearing today to inquire into that.
We are willing to carry our burden, but I think our
burden may not be quite as large as you suggest.
MR. GRAY: One question in clarification.
Is it fair to say that you are not contending that
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you have evidence that the .4 gram per mile NC>x standard for
1982 is technically infeasible for the 50,000-mile certifica-
tion process?
MR. JOELSON: No. As I indicated in our statement,
we are not offering any views with respect to the feasibility
of that.
MR. GRAY: You seem to make your point about the
you said there is no question that the 100,000-mile certifica-
tion option was adopted with no consideration given to its
technological feasibility. With the narrow constraints of
technological feasibility, wouldn't you agree that since it is
an option that the regulation as a whole would be no more
stringent than the most stringent of two approaches?
MR. JOELSON: I am not sure I understand your
question. I'll try to answer it, although I am not sure I
understand it.
I think that in terms of whether you approve this
waiver request or not, I think that you are obliged, really,
to look at both options one option, the NO standard;
and the other option, the 100,000-mile procedure and
determine that both of them are substantiated, are justified.
As I said, we take no position, are not qualified to take a
position on the NO standard. But we can see that there has
been no finding, based on a reasonable record, as to the
feasibility of this 100,000-mile maintenance-free car.
MR. GRAY: Perhaps if I put it another way. If it
can be demonstrated that it is reasonable to expect that the
technology can be developed and applied by 1982 to achieve a
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.4 gram per mile NOx standard with a 50,000-mile certification
period, isn't it a bit academic as to whether or not in the
extreme the 100,000-mile certification is more or less diffi-
cult if it is feasible to achieve the 50,000-mile standard?
MR. JOELSON: It's not academic at all as long as
the manufacturer has an option. As I understand the option
and if I am wrong perhaps the Resources Board will explain it
to me. As I understand it, they can choose. Even if they are
able to meet the other standard, they can still choose.
Therefore, if they can choose the second option, then I think
that you should look at that option and determine the validity
of it in terms of clean air as well as the legality of it,
the propriety of it.
MR. GRAY: You are not challenging the technological
feasibility of the 100,000-mile program?
MR. JOELSON: The 100,000-mile aspect, yes. I say
there is a serious question which I think has been developed
in the record on the 50,000-mile issue, and there has been no
record on the 100,000-mile issue.
I am not challenging with respect to the other part
of the option, the N0x standard, because we are not technically
qualified to make a statement on that.
But your basic question, is the second option
academic, I have to say very specifically no, it's not academic
as long as they can choose it.
MR. GRAY: If it is technically feasible to achieve
the base standard and in a manufacturer's opinion not
technologically feasible to achieve a 100,000-mile standard
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since it's an option, how can it be considered as a basis for
denying the waiver? I mean if no manufacturer can elect
that option, it wouldn't impact on the technological feasi-
bility determination; would it?
MR. JOELSON: The trouble with this whole problem is
that you have something that may be technologically infeasible
as a practical matter, but nonetheless by law that limited
maintenance or no maintenance car will be decreed. As I
said in the revision to my statement, once that is decreed,
the consumer is going to come back to the vehicle manufacturer
and say, "I didn't get reasonable and necessary maintenance
instructions," and insist that he remedy it. And the inde-
pendent industry, you know, will be shut out of it.
MR. GRAY: Is it fair to say, then, that your basic
concern is more along the lines of the 100,000-mile limited
maintenance provision of that option as opposed to the issue
of technological feasibility?
MR. JOELSON: My concern is with the second half of
the option, yes. But as I've said, as long as the manufacture::
can choose one of the two, the second one does not become
academic and it must be reviewed on its own merits in review
of the waiver.
I don't think you can say the first part of the
option is dandy, it's technically substantiated, it's attain-
able, we grant the waiver without also looking at the other
half of the option and saying that also is substantiated as
long as somebody can choose the second option.
MR. GRAY: I agree, certainly, that as long as the
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option is there it needs to be evaluated.
But in particular, if manufacturers can comply with
the standards by electing the option and not, of course,
certifying with the base standard, then it's a very important
aspect of the consideration. But if they can achieve the
standard without having to look at the option,then whether
or not the option is more difficult or less difficult does not
become important in that context if they can achieve it without
even considering the option.
MR. JOELSON: I think we are still not communicating
on this point.
As I understand, they are entitled to look at the
option.
MR. GRAY: Only if it's less stringent and more
achievable. That's the reason the option is there. If it is
less difficult, then it would be loqical that a manufacturer
would elect the option. And certainly in review of the testi-
mony it would be important to find out if it is technically
more feasible for a manufacturer for certain instances or for
all vehicles to achieve the standard with this option. Then
it becomes an important part of the technological feasibility
issue in that context.
But more from a limiting standpoint, is it less
stringent than the 50,000-mile requirement? If that's the
case, then the required waiver could be granted on the basis
that the option allows it to be implemented because it's
economically feasible.
MR. JOELSON: But the manufacturer may have other
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factors that go into his determining which of the two options
he is going to follow. He may have economic considerations,
considerations of a
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: We can let them make those
decisions; right?
MR. JOELSON: Pardon?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: We can let them make those
decisions.
MR. JOELSON: I think you can let them make those
decisions if both of these options are valid. What I am saying
is look at both of these options and make sure they are valid
and not simply one on the theory that they are going to follow
that one if it's available.
MR. GRAY: Definitely. The issue is: Can the
regulation be met using either of the options?
MR. JOELSON: And are both of the options valid
from the viewpoint of technical feasibility, the impact on
clean air and the other standards that go into your rulemaking.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That's your restatement of it,
but that1s not what we are required to do.
Just for the purpose of clarifying the record and
making sure you don't leave here with a misimpression, if one
of those options is technologically feasible, that's our
burden if there is one.
MR. JOELSON: lam sorry. Are you saying that as
long as one of the options is feasible you can approve the
entire package, even if
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: As long as it's an option.
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MR. JOELSON: Well, I ~
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That means it's technologically
feasible to comply with the requirements of the regulation.
Whether or not that suits your needs is a different issue as
it relates to what might happen in the aftermarket. Tech-
nologically feasible to meet one of those options. That reg
has met the test of techonological feasibility as long as the
other one is just he's got the option to do that. He can
comply with the requirements of the regulations.
MR. JOELSON: Let me I hate to take up the time.
Let me posit this slightly differently.
Without regard to the .specific options, what if we
have one option that's perfectly adequate and perfectly
approvable and then one option that's an absolute horror and
clearly will impair clean air and do everything else. I trust
you are not saying that as long as one of the two options is
approvable and proper that this is sufficient for the waiver,
that you need not consider whether the second option indeed
will be chosen or indeed may impair clean air?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I direct you to.go back and look
at the test that we have to apply to a waiver. Technological
feasibility and lead time cost. If one of those options is
technologically feasible to be done in the time available,
that meets the test for waiver. If they've got something
else in there that doesn't make sense, is a horror, that's
their public judgment about what they want. We are not going
to make a judgment on that.
MR. JOELSON: Even if
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: As long as there is a path to
comply with the requirements of the law and it's more stringent
than federal standards, then that meets the test for waiver.
MR. JOELSON: I thought that it was a key part of
your review that they do take a path that meets the waiver
requirements and that's beneficial to clean air. It seems to
me that if you permit them to take an option which is not
beneficial to clean air and not technically feasible that you
have missed the point in the review process.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: California makes a judgment that
that is what they want to do. It's a public judgment. It may
not make sense. It may be more costly than something else
as far as they are concerned, but that's their judgment.
MR. JOELSON: What if it's not beneficial to clean
air?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Are you making that contention,
that it's not beneficial to clean air?
MR. JOELSON: No. I am trying well, yes, I am
as to the 100,000-mile option, yes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You can show that is?
MR. JOELSON: I can show that it is on the basis of
the testimony that some maintenance in addition to that
prescribed by California will still be needed in order to make
it a properly functioning car.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Then you have to show it won't
be done.
MR. JOELSON: That what wonlt be done?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That the maintenance needed won't
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be done. Not that it's needed, but that it won't be done. If
you can make that argument, we will hear it.
MR. JOELSON: That's California's theory, that
maintenance is not being done now.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Right.
MR. JOELSON: Which is why they want to eliminate
maintenance.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: But you are going to show us that
it won't be done.
MR. JOELSON: The prescribed maintenance won't be
done?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Right.
MR. JOELSON: I am not arguing about the prescribed
maintenance. What I am saying is that with a 100,000-mile
basically largely maintenance-free car there will nonetheless
still be a lot of maintenance which really should have been
done.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Yes, but you are qoinq to show us
that it won't be done. Is that your point?
MR. JOELSON: I am saying that it probably will not
be done, and since the consumer has not been given those
instructions, he is going to turn to the vehicle manufacturer
and say, "You didn't properly instruct me as to how to maintain
my car."
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I guess you have to show us how
that is a differential in terms of clean air versus the other
approach.
MR. JOELSON: Well, I can argue. Once again, I
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can't quantify.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Anybody can argue.
MR. JOELSON: Well, that's why I'm here. I don't
think anybody can quantify it. I think that's all any of us
is doing is really arguing, trying to reason forward.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Sometimes it helps in the evalua-
tion of these arguments to have some data, some information,
some quantification with whatever qualifications for lack of
position as may be appropriate, but just on the basis of
speculation and argument and wolf which we have heard a
lot of from the aftermarket parts and service industry
it's very difficult to make any kind of judgment.
MR. JOELSON: All right. I think the aftermarket
has had some substantial problems created by the sort of
limbo position it's been in under the Clean Air Act. Some of
these problems are being remedied by the amendments that took
place the other night. If they've cried wolf, it's because
of fear of actions that have not yet taken place and have not
yet been triggered and to some extent it sounds like wolf
because it's hard to quantify.
In terms of trying to quantify it better, I will go
back and see what we can do.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I would certainly appreciate
that.
MR. JOELSON: All right. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you, sir.
MR. JENSEN: I am D. A. Jensen, Director of
Automotive Emissions and Fuel Economy Office, Ford Motor
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Company.
On June 22, 1977, CARB adopted a NO standard of
X
0.4 grams per mile, first applicable to 1982 model passenger
cars and 1983 model light-duty trucks and certain medium-duty
vehicles. Before CARB may enforce these regulations, EPA
must find that they satisfy the criteria set forth in Section
209 of the Clean Air Act, the most relevant of which in this
case are need and feasibility.
A finding of feasibility at this time must rest
upon specific facts and the absence of any persuasive analyses
to the contrary. As noted in a recent EPA decision, no
finding of feasiblity can be made where:
"Plausible reasons for. . . estimates (of insuf-
ficient lead time) were given by the various manu-
facturers, and no concrete reasons for not accepting
them were advanced by the CARB or any other witness."
Our purpose in appearing today is to provide and
review all facts and analyses available to Ford which relate
to the feasibility of and the need for meeting these
California standards.
Prior to adoption of these emission standards, CARB
held a series of workshop and public hearings. Ford's
testimony at these meetings has been consistent and can be
summarized as follows:
First, a vehicle NO standard in the 1.0 gram per
mile range should be sufficient to permit compliance with
California's N02 air quality standard.
Second, evaluation of data already generated by the
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Los Angeles Reactive Pollutant Program (LARPP) and other
sources should be undertaken to assess whether or not a
significant improvement in air quality will result from a 0.4
gram per mile NO standard over that achieved by a 1.0 gram
A
per mile NO standard. An analysis of this type is underway
at Environmental Research and Technology, Inc., and their
findings will be reported in a public seminar early in 1978.
Third, Ford does not yet possess the technology
necessary to meet the 0.4 gram per mile NO standard, and, in
view of the limited lead time remaining, there is a significant
question as to whether it can be developed for 1982.
Finally, assuming there is capability to achieve
the 0.4 gram per mile NO level, we are concerned that it may
X
result in significant compromises in model availability, fuel
economy, and costs that are not commensurate with the potential
effects on air quality.
Based on these concerns, Ford has continued to
recommend to CARB that the final decision be deferred at least
one year so that as many of these issues as possible can be
supported with data rather than to make the decision on regula-
tory judgment.
We believe that EPA's decision on this waiver
request should similarly be deferred until the data needed to
determine whether the compelling and extraordinary conditions
in California will be improved by this action and whether the
technological feasibility and lead time requirements are
satisfied can be obtained. EPA does not have, and CARB cannot
present, the facts required by EPA to fully consider, much less
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make the determinations, required to grant a waiver of
preemption under Section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act.
The basis for our position on this matter is as
follows:
First, compelling and extraordinary conditions:
As we understand it, CARB promulgated its 198 2
and beyond low NOx standard on the basis of its belief that
NC>2 air quality standards are being exceeded and that the
maximum control of NO emissions from mobile sources is
required to rectify this situation, because it is not possible
to obtain sufficient NO reductions from other sources to
x
meet the desired levels. This conclusion was based on a
simple, basin-wide tonnage analysis and did not take into
account the effects of the spacial distribution of NO sources
X
or possible adverse effects on local oxidant levels that may
be associated with increases in the HC/NOx emissions ratio.
Ford has presented two studies of the relationship
between vehicle NO emissions and air quality for considera-
tion by CARB. These studies are attached as Attachments I and
II and support our conclusions that:
A 1.0 gram per mile NO standard will permit attain-
ment of the NO2 air quality standard in downtown Los Angeles,
the most critical N02 problem area. Such a standard should go
a long way toward solving, if not resolving, the N02 problem
in other areas in the South Coast Air Basin. Of course,
further study and work is needed to understand better the
effects of vehicle NO in the "downwind areas." CARB has
presented no evidence however that a .4 NOx standard is an
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answer to any remaining "downwind area" problem.
For these N02 episode days when a 1.0 gram per mile
NO standard would not permit attainment, it appears that
A
even a 0.4 NO standard would have little effect, because on
A
those unusual days, stationary sources appear to dominate.
CARB has presented no evidence to the contrary.
Feasibility and Lead Time:
Ford has shared its technological developments with
CARB and, for that matter, EPA. Ford has testified before
CARB, and the fact is at this time, Ford does not possess the
technology to assure attainment of the proposed NOx standards
for 198 2 and beyond with acceptable durability. This should
not be interpreted as an indication that we believe the
standard is not attainable.
Subsequent to a March 9, 1977, hearing of a House
Subcommittee on Health and Environment, where CARB members
also testified, we submitted to the subcommittee a list of
prototype vehicles which met the 0.41 HC/3.4 CO/0.4 NO
standards at low mileages.
Attachment III lists these vehicles and provides
the reasons why the systems shown are not considered tech-
nologically feasible for production at this time.
Let me intersperse here just a second. What we did
in that attachment was list every research vehicle we have
ever had that met the standards, then we classified them with
different kinds of control systems like PROCO, three-way
catalysts, dual catalysts, Questor systems, and so forth
and analyzed why each one of those control systems had not
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established feasibility as far as production is concerned. We
can discuss that later if you wish.
Back to the statement now, Mr. Chairman.
During that public hearing this refers, now, back
to the hearing in Washington, D.C. on March 9th we testified
that, if our production and field experience are successful
with three-way catalyst systems, we believe we can achieve
standards of 0.41 HC/3.4 CO/l.O NO in the early 1980's with
our total product line. We believe the technology utilized to
meet those standards may have an ultimate capability of meeting
a 0.4 NO standard.
However, we cannot, today, say with any confidence
when such levels will be possible. There are a whole series
of unknowns that make a firm judgment extremely difficult,
For example, MMT will affect our capability to
control hydrocarbons, which in turn has an effect on NO
levels we can achieve, because of control technology trade-
offs between the two constituents. We have a similar problem
in respect to a trade-off of CO. If California's nine grams
per mile CO standard prevails, we have an opportunity to
eliminate use of an oxidation catalyst in conjunction with the
three-way catalyst and to pick up some additional potential
for reducing NO emissions. The "clean-up" oxidation catalyst
is part of the NOx problem, because it converts some ammonia
from the three-way catalyst back to oxides of nitrogen.
If a 0.4 gram per mile NO standard is required for
1982 in California, we will try to offer for sale our vehicles
which have the greatest potential of meeting the 0.4 NO
2^
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304
standard with the added use of new hardware, such as three-
way catalysts, feedback carburetors, electronic engine
controls and electronic fuel metering, if development progress
continues at the present rate.
With current technology, our confidence of meeting
a 0.4 NOx standard with larger vehicles is extremely low, and
we expect that smaller vehicles/engines would have the best
potential for certification in 1982. Further, we would
expect that the complexity and nature of these control systems
would pose unique and difficult problems with respect to
meeting assembly line test and other unique requirements.
Beyond the general problem of 0.4 gram per mile
NO feasibility, we would like to draw EPA's attention to a
special problem which results from the application of the
0.4 NOx standard to light-duty trucks.
Since a pickup in the below 3999 pound inertia
weight class would be tested at a PAU horsepower setting
approximately 70 percent higher than that used for a comparable
inertia weight class passenger car, increased NO emission
X
rates with increased PAU settings (about 2.2 percent for each
10 percent increase in PAU) would result.
Therefore, a 3500 pound inertia weight light truck
would be required to meet approximately a 15 percent more
stringent emission standard than a passenger car of a com-
parable weight. If 0.4 NO technology becomes available for
passenger cars, it will not necessarily support a light
truck standard more stringent than 0.5.
Ford, therefore, believes that, at the very least,
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305
any waiver must be conditioned on an upward adjustment of the
NO standard to 0.5 gram per mile.
A
In addition, the substantial differences in fuel
economy expected between trucks designed to meet 0.4 NO
(under 3500 pound inertia weight) and those designed to meet
1.0 NOx (4000 and over inertia weight) destroys any incentive
even to attempt to implement weight reduction programs for
trucks over 3500 pounds inertia weight in order to improve
fuel economy. In other words, you try to keep the trucks
a little heavier so you have more liberal NO standards.
A
In our June 22, 1977, testimony, we detailed our
conventional engine 0.4 gram per mile NO development plans
for the 1977 calendar year. A status report on this program
is provided as Attachment IV. We redid this as of July 29th
and brought it up to date where we stand at Ford in this
regard.
As you will note from this summary, we are concentrat-
ing on the refinement and selection of the most promising
three-way catalyst system components. Following selection of
the candidate systems, advanced vehicle build programs will be
initiated to determine feasibility and permit the start of the
1982 production program in early 1979, and we have a timing
schedule which is part of that Attachment IV. From this
timing chart, it can be seen that the final decision regarding
1982 emissions hardware needed to meet the 0.4 NO level
should be made in late 1978 or early 1979.
This advanced development program is coordinated
with our planned production prove out program. For example,
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we are planning to introduce the three-way catalyst system
on 1978 2.3 litre engines in California; we are also planning
a separate 1978 pilot program for electronic engine controls.
These systems will be merged and volume expanded beginning
in 1979.
If the 1978-1979 programs are successful, we would
expect to have fully integrated electronic engine controls
and three-way catalyst systems essentially across the board
in the early 1980's. These production "tests" of the basic
three-way catalyst/electronic control concepts will provide
much of the data and experience needed to make a knowledge-
able decision regarding the 1982 0.4 gram per mile NC>x
feasibility in late 1978, as required.
Beyond the development of three-way catalyst
applications for conventional engines, Ford is also working
on selected alternate engine programs, such as PROCO, which
have good potential at 1.0 gram per mile NOx and may have a
potential at..41 gram hydrocarbon and 0.4 gram per mile N0X
levels.
The PROCO engine is not a possible solution for
1982, however, because manufacturing and development lead time
requirements preclude availability in volume that year.
Total expenditures for development of low NO
systems capable of meeting a 0.4 gram per mile NOx level
have expanded substantially in recent years and will
accelerate in the future in response to the continued
California and federal concern regarding the need for NOx
control. Expenditures for 1975-1976-1977 are shown on
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Attachment V and reflect the major acceleration in this effort,
as outlined above.
That attachment was submitted to EPA in April at
their request, and the details in both financial and personnel
dedicated to the program are indicated.
Model Availability:
Another key element of the 0.4 gram per mile NOx
issue is the degree to which such a standard will force manu-
facturers to reduce model offerings further. While significant,
the restricted model problem has been minimized to date in
California, because most manufacturers have been able to use
some aspects of 49-state technology in California, and, more
importantly, because there were no national fuel economy
standards.
These conditions will probably not be present in
the early 1980's. Ford will be pressed up to, if not beyond,
the limits of technology, manpower capability, and financial
resources to meet, simultaneously, fuel economy and federal
emission control requirements. This will, in turn, limit
the resources available for satisfying a unique California
market.
Reduced model availability due to pressure limita-
tions may be further aggravated by the difficulty of fuel
efficient diesel, PROCO, CVCC, or other forms of "lean
combustion" engines to meet the 0.4 gram per mile NO level.
This could lead to further potential compromise in the
automobiles available in California versus those available in
the 49-states.
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As manufacturers move toward a mandated 1985 fuel
economy standard of 27.5 miles per gallon, Ford believes that
the use of the various 'lean combustion" engine concepts
will be increased in the 4 9 states. Thus, it is not out of
the question to project that establishment of a 0.4 gram
per mile NOx standard in California could lead to a future
California fuel economy gap even greater than the current two
to three miles per gallon, or 12 percent.
Moreover, it is also possible that the combination
of technology and fuel economy restraints will result in
decreased availability of six-passenger vehicles versus 4 9-
state Ford programs. Clearly, the interests of the people of
California and, for that matter, all of the people in this
country, would not be served if these penalties were to be
exacted without major gains in California's air quality.
In conclusion, Ford believes that there are serious
questions as to the need, feasibility, and lead time associated
with California's proposed 1982 and beyond NO standards. The
lack of data on these issues will preclude EPA from making
supportable findings on these key waiver criteria; however,
studies now in progress will provide substantially more data
on these issues by late 1978, when final 1982 decisions need
to be made.
On this basis, Ford does not believe that a waiver
decision should be made at this time; instead, EPA should hold
further hearings in late 1978 and make its 1982 waiver
decision in early 1979.
At this time, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask
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Mr. Eppel from our Office of General Counsel to supplement
what I have just read with some comments with respect to the
Conference Bill before Congress.
MR. EPPEL: I really would just like to add two
points, and I would note, of course, for the record that the
conference report has not been adopted by either House. But
assuming that it is and assuming that it is done shortly,
certain of the provisions of that report, it strikes me, will
be relevant to this decision. It's true they may not control
the hearing procedures today, but they do lay out, it seems
to me, certain new factors that EPA is going to have to
consider.
The first provision I have reference to is taken
from the House Bill that's known popularly as the Eckhardt
Amendment, which provides, and I'll read it, "Notwithstanding
Section 209 (a), any state which has planned provisions
approved under this section" and these are transportation
control plans "may adopt and enforce for any model year
standards relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines and take such
other actions as are referred to in Section 209(a) respecting
such vehicles if (1) such standards are identical to the
California standards for which a waiver has been granted for
such model year; and (2) California and such state adopt such
standards at least two years before commencement of such
model year (as determined by regulation of the Administrator)."
So I suggest to the hearing panel that your
decision may involve considerably more vehicles than simply
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those to be sold in the State of California in the model-year
1982.
Now if you ask me how do we know which states will
do this, I guess I can't answer that. But it seems to me you
are going to have to take a look at all of th6 states that are
at least authorized to take such action and make your determi-
nations with respect to the fleet for all those states.
Now the second provision is one that Mr. Austin
alluded to earlier. This is also from the House Bill. It
amends Section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act. I think it's
directly relelvant to the 9.0 gram CO issue. It seems to me,
anyway, under this provision there is no question that if EPA
finds that .41, 9, and .4 is more stringent in the aggregate
than .41, 3.4, and 1.0 you may properly grant a waiver for
the nine gram CO standard as applied to California cars with
the benefits that Mr. Austin noted earlier.
In any event, Section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act,
as amended, will read as follows:
"The Administrator shall, after notice and oppor-
tunity for public hearing, waive application of this
section to any state which has adopted a standard
(other than crankcase emission standards) for the control
of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines prior to March 30, 1966 if the state determines"
And I guess I might interject this is the hew part
"that the standard will be in the aggregate at least as
protective of public health and welfare as the applicable
federal standards. No such waiver will be granted if the
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Administrator finds that (a) the determination of the
state is arbitrary and Capricious, (b) such state does not
need such state standards to meet compelling and
extraordinary conditions, or (c) such state standards and
accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent
with Section 202 of this part."
There's more, but that's the relevant portion of the
conference report adopted provision from the House Bill. So
that it is likely in my judgment that both of those provisions
will probably, if the report is adopted, control your decision
in this matter, because I doubt seriously you are going to get
the decision out prior to the time those two provisions become
law if they do become law.
And those are my remarks.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That's: pretty interesting. With
regard to approved transportation control plans, is that as
of some date?
MR. EPPEL: I'm not familiar enough with the rest
of that provision to answer that question, Mr. Jackson.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I think we called for revisions
for most of them. So, it's probably fair to say there's not
very many approved plans out there.
MR. EPPEL: I suspect that's the case, but I think
the possibility still remains that all the states that fall
within those criteria can at least consider the adoption of
the California standards.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: The provision with regard to the
aggregate notion, does that mean to you that we can grant a
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waiver for a CO standard that was less stringent than the
federal standard?
MR. EPPEL: I think that's exactly what it means to
me.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Then do your comments with regard
to feasibility also pertain to such levels as seven for CO
or nine for CO?
MR. EPPEL: Well, I think the technical people can
answer that. But I think Mr. Jensen's statement noted that
a nine gram CO standard for California is at this point,
anyway, at the time standard was written, somewhat of an
uncertainty. And it does bear on our ability, I believe,
Don?
MR. JENSEN: Yes. I think it would be up to
somebody else to determine in the aggregate whether it was
more or less stringent.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That's not my question.
MR. JENSEN: But I personally would like to see it
determined that way, if that's the answer to your question,
because the nine gram CO helps us to meet a lower NO standard.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That was my question.
MR. JENSEN: Yes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Your technological feasibility
argument is modified, I assume, at different levels of CO
standards?
MR. JENSEN: Yes, sir, because of the follow-on
oxidation catalyst.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let's work on that a little bit.
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What is your technological feasibility of achieving
.41, 9, and .4?
MR. JENSEN: We haven't got the We haven't demon-
strated feasibility to meet that standard at the moment.
That's what the data shows, particularly
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What's your judgment about it?
MR. JENSEN: As we said in the statement, we are
not saying it cannot be attained, but we have no data now
that would say we could meet it for 1982.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What's your judgment?
MR. JENSEN: And my judgment is that we cannot meet
it in 1982.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: It really doesn't help in terms
of your technological feasibility argument?
MR. JENSEN: As I have indicated in the full state-
ment, if it is feasible, it would be for the smaller engines.
There may be a possibility there. And on those smaller
engines, if you had a nine gram CO, it would help you meet
the .4 gram NO .
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: In your judgment, knowing what
you do now, if the standard for CO were nine, which option
would you select in 1982 for California certification?
MR. JENSEN: I'm sorry, I don't understand the
question, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: With regard to your gasoline
engines and
MR. JENSEN: Oh, the 50 and 100,000?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Correct.
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MR. JENSEN: Oh, the 50,000 mile because of catalyst
durability and the durability of other components.
MR. GRAY: You included as Attachment III a list of
vehicles that had achieved a .41 HC, 3.4 CO, and .4 NO
standards of low mileage.
Do you have additional vehicles that have attained
those standards except 3.4 CO being replaced by nine grams CO
that could be added to that list?
MR. JENSEN: Let me ask Dr. Weaver.
Do you know of any vehicles that have met .41 and
.4 NO with a higher CO level that is not on this list?
X
MR. WEAVER: There I'd have to go through my list
here specifically, but we do have a fleet of three-way catalyst
vehicles which you are aware of, and I'd have to look at them
individually to see whether they could be added. But most
of them, as I recall, do not meet, because we have had
trouble with hydrocarbon control with this fleet.
MR. JENSEN: We will check the record, though, and
file for the record any additional cars that would meet .41,
9, and .4 and add to this list.
MR. GRAY: Since this fleet appears to have been
designed to try to achieve those levels, have you conducted
any programs that provide the flexibility that a nine gram CO
standard would provide to see what feasibility exists there,
or are you really projecting from your experience at the
3.4 gram CO level.
MR. JENSEN: Gene, you could answer that, I guess.
MR. WEAVER: In the three-way catalyst fleet, there
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are one or two vehicles which do not have cleanup oxidation
catalysts on them. And the performance, again, has not been
very satisfactory. These are durability vehicles.
MR. GRAY: Do you think it's a very straightforward,
simple distinction between, then, the nine and the 3.4, or
the seven and the 3.4, being the cleanup catalyst, the oxida-
tion catalyst, versus just the three-way catalyst?
MR. WEAVER: What is the question?
MR. GRAY: Is the only difference in your opinion
between achieving 3.4 as opposed to seven or nine grams CO
the cleanup oxidation catalyst? Can it be made that simple?
MR. WEAVER: No, I don't think so. It depends on
the inertia weight and the engine.
MR. JENSEN: For clarification, we mention in our
statement about ammonia being in the follow-on catalyst
being converted back into NO .
You may want to discuss that briefly, because I
think it bears on Mr. Gray's question.
DR. WEAVER: I think to this I look at an EPA
report where they measured ammonia on a Volvo vehicle under
normal operating conditions and malfunction conditions, and
in this report there was a range and this was various
test cycles, including the crowded freeway drivinq, the
schedule of low CVS, and hiqhway fuel economy cycle. There
was a ranqe in a normal operatinq vehicle, now, there was a
ranqe of ammonia emitted by this vehicle durinq these test
cycles of 15 to 4 0 milliqrams per mile. The maximum ammonia
emitted in normal operatinq conditions was 126 milliqrams oer
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mile.
Now if you convert that to the amount of NC>2 emitted,
if all of that ammonia was oxidized by the catalyst, under the
maximum emissions it would be .34 grams per mile N02 emitted
by that vehicle, which under the conditions of the test would
be emitted by ammonia.
So that gives you some feeling for the magnitude of
our problem.
MR. HELLMAN: Do you have any data or results that
you can share with us on tests run on Ford vehicles to measure
the ammonia produced and subsequently reoxidized?
MR. WEAVER: We have measured ammonia produced under
the maximum conditions but not under normal conditions at
this point. We are currently making such measurements, in the
process of making such measurements.
MR. HELLMAN: So you can't say whether or not your
systems that you are planning to introduce
MR. WEAVER: That's right.
MR. HELLMAN: will have the same problem that you
conjectured might happen if you put an oxidation catalyst and
an air pump on the Volvo vehicle that was tested by EPA?
MR. WEAVERi That's right.
MR. HELLMAN: I'd like to ask a question that deals
with a statement you made on Page 2 of your statement. It
deals with the lead time.
Under the paragraph called "Third," Ford indicated
that the lead time remaining was limited. However, later in
your statement you recommend that EPA defer a decision on this
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until late 1978 or early 1979 because that's when final
1982 decisions need to be made.
MR. JENSEN: If you look at the attachment behind
Attachment IV, the last page of Attachment IV, you can see that
there is a timing chart the very last page of Attachment IV -
which indicates that you select the system you go with among
various possibilities, "Order hardware/build vehicles" and
so forth, towards the latter part of 1978. And even then you
would have a slippage of five months, but presumably you might
be able to make that up.
But, nevertheless, there is time for a decision
between now and '78, and yet there would be this slippage even
when you made that time. So there is a shortage of lead time
under this hypothesis if you look at the timing chart.
MR. HELLMAN: Yes. But statements in the end of
your prepared statement and on Page 2 seem to me to be a little
bit inconsistent.
Would it be fair for us to conclude that with respect
to the lead time issue there is lead time available now and
there will even be lead time should EPA decide to defer the
decision until late 1978?
MR. JENSEN: Well, the difficulty here is it gets
to another point that was in the statement in respect to
production testing. As we indicated, we are now in '78
models putting in three-way catalyst systems in production for
the first time in one group and electronic controls on another
group of cars in large numbers. We will combine them in '79.
We will be able, in the early Eighties, to go across the board.
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It's unknown technology, and it's hard for us to predict
with certainty what's going to happen in those production
tests. We wouldn't be doing them if we knew in advance.
So the answer to the lead time question is: There
wouldn't be a lead time problem if everything works out
beautifully, but we don't think that's going to happen. It
never has, and we think that's why we are doing the production
tests, to try to get the bugs out of this so we have an orderly
introduction to this new technology.
MR. HELLMAN: So would it be fair for me to
characterize your approach here is to tell EPA to wait a year
or so to make the decision and then by that time the lead time
will all be used up and the issue removed?
MR. JENSEN: That isn't our intent at all. A year
from now we will know a lot more about our production
experience with three-way catalysts, electronic controls,
and we'd also have a better feel because of the LARPP data
being analyzed and reported on in 1978 with respect to the
need. So there would be a much better opportunity to indicate
the trade-offs between feasibility and need as far as air
quality in California.
But we would not from that timing chart, we
would not throw up the statement that because of this year's
delay that we ran out of lead time. We still perceive
MR. HELLMAN: If there still would be lead time
one year from now, then that means there is lead time now.
MR. JENSEN: Again, I guess the definition of what
works and what doesn't work as we go into production
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experience with the systems.
You may want to speak to this, Gene.
MR. WEAVER: I don't think I can add anything more
to that.
MR. JENSEN: Okay.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON:. Oh Page 5, you said, "Further,
we would expect that the complexity and nature of these con-
trol systems would pose unique and difficult problems with
respect to meeting assembly line test and other unique require-
ments. "
What are you talking about there?
MR. JENSEN: More and more, there has been a tendency,
both in California and at EPA and now we are speaking about
California to pay a lot more attention to production-line
tests and a lot more attention to in-use tests of cars.
California now is checking cars in use to see what happened
to them, where the levels are.
On end-of-line tests, there is year by year more
and more tightened requirements with respect to levels that
end-of-line test must pass. Sample testing in California
under Title 13 of their Administrative Code have had increasing
requirements applied. And those are unknown as far as we are
concerned with respect to something like a .4 NO standard.
At the present time, even with a 1.5 gram NO
standard I don't know whether the car passed that's being
tested today on Title 13, but we had difficulty meeting that
on one engine family.
So as these things get tighter year by year, both in
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Washington and in California, we just have no real feel for
what .4 NO levels would do in those kind of tests.
X
Go ahead, Gene.
MR. WEAVER: I'd like to add to that by pointing out
more specifically what the components are. We will be using
electronic controls, carburetors. We will be including
electronic controls as spark timing and EGR. And these are
new devices which we don't know how they are going to perform
on end-of-line testing, for example.
The electronic or any tests in the field, it would
make more sense at this point, I guess. The electronic
devices, as you all know from your experience with hand calcu-
lators or whatever, there's often early problems with
electronics. Until we have enough production experience here so
that we know what to. look for to determine that we have proper
quality control, we can expect some problems on end-of-line
test and in the field.
This is a risk we have to assume as we introduce new
technology. We are willing to assume this, but we don't know
at this point what kind of problems will be there, particularly
related to electronic components.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: So it's not that you know of
problems that you are going to have
MR. WEAVER: That's right.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: but you are showing some sort
of concern for the unknown?
MR. WEAVER: That's right.
MR. HELLMAN: You indicated that in order to meet
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these California 1982 standards you might need added use of new
hardware such as three-way catalysts, feedback carburetors,
electronic engine controls, and electronic fuel metering.
You also indicated in your statement that if you
were successful you would achieve .41 hydrocarbons and 3.4
CO and 1.0 NOx in the early Eighties with your total product
line. The system that's planned for use on your total product
line to meet those standards I refer to is very much the same
as the new technology that you refer to to meet the 0.4 NO
x
standard. So, that, new is relative.
Will the technology that you are using in '82
already have a history of two or three years of use and be
well implemented at that time?
MR. JENSEN: Well, the reason Let me talk to
components specifically; and, Gene, you pitch in when I get
through.
From my experience at least Gene is much more
expert in the technical aspects Let me talk first about the
electronic controls.
By the time we put electronic controls in mass
production on a car, the electronic experts that see that on a
car think we are back in the dark ages. It moves that fast,
the technology moves that fast. So we already have plans
in-house for electronic controls one phase, second phase, and
third phase down the line. So maybe .4 is going to be the
fourth phase. But there's tremendous improvement going to
come along year after year after year in electronic controls,
I think much more, just from what my observation as more or
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less a layman looking over the shoulders of what the engineers
and electronic experts are doing at Ford. It will be even more
dramatic, I think, than the advances we have seen in catalyst
technology.
You will recall in the suspension hearings before we
had catalysts in cars we were talking about levels of
efficiency of what we anticipated which are much higher now.
All I am saying in all this discussion is that we
just don't know today where we'll be in respect to .4 in '82.
We think we will know a lot more a year from now because of
this fast developing technology.
Gene, do you want to add to this?
MR. WEAVER: I think what you pointed out is right.
The system will be essentially the same, the same idea. The
Ford system, the three-way system, is a three-way catalyst,
plus air introduced, followed up by a cleanup oxidation
catalyst.
The electronic components include the electronic
control of the carburetor and a spark timing and EGR. And
there are sensors involved here, which is something I didn't
mention in connection with Ben's question about components
which might fail. There's going to be sensors for the oxygen
and the exhaust sensors of engine RPM, manifold vacuum, and
this type of thing.
All of these things, as Don has indicated, we expect
that we will develop in a normal way and move so that we can
introduce cars which will control a .41, 3.4, and 1.0 in the
early Eighties.
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If things move well, we have a certain amount of
confidence we can do that. Beyond that, we are just unsure,
and it takes time to get that confidence.
MR. HELLMAN: Mr. Jensen mentioned that the
electronic controls are moving quite quickly in their state of
the art. They generally tend to improve; is that correct?
MR. WEAVER: Sure.
MR. HELLMAN: And performance gets better, smaller,
possibly cheaper. But the performance, and we are specifically
talking about emission performance here, is expected to be
better because that's why you are developing them; isn't that
correct?
MR. JENSEN: Are you going to answer, Gene, or do
you want me to?
MR. WEAVER: Go ahead. I'll let you speculate.
MR. JENSEN: Okay.
It does get better, and we anticipate it getting
better. It will get smaller. It will get cheaper.
In addition to those items you mentioned, Mr.
Hellman, it will also cover more aspects of engine operation.
For example, like I think, Gene, we are talking about trying
to get something that would detect engine knock, to make
adjustments, that kind of thing which are not built into these
initial systems. So there will be more aspects covered of
engine operation.
MR. HELLMAN: You are trying to certify vehicles
right now for 1978 in California?
MR. WEAVER: That's right.
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MR. HELLMAN: This has the first generation version
of what you call the Ford system?
MR. WEAVER: Yes.
MR. HELLMAN: What would the emissions be of those
vehicles if you took the oxidation catalyst off?
MR. WEAVER: I don't know the answer to that.
MR. HELLMAN: You haven't made any efficiency tests
on prototypes to see what the efficiency is of the oxidation
catalyst?
MR. WEAVER: The vehicles have just finished the
15,000-mile durability, and to my knowledge we have not been
allowed yet to do the post-certification evaluation of those
catalysts. But we will do this.
MR. JENSEN: Do you think we will be able to have
that information before the hearing record closes?
MR. WEAVER: I doubt it.
MR. JENSEN: We will take a check, and if we do have
it we will get the information to you.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Would you let us know, if you
can't get it in by the time the hearing record is closed, when
you can have it in?
MR. JENSEN: Okay. Fine.
Gene, would you follow up on that?
MR. HELLMAN: If the oxidation catalyst were taken
off, you would expect that the hydrocarbon and CO levels
would rise and the NO level would fall?
MR. WEAVER: That's right.
MR. HELLMAN: And except for hydrocarbons,
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directionally that would be in the way that you would want to
go to approach the California requirements which are higher
CO and lower NO ?
A
MR. WEAVER: That's right.
MR. HELLMAN: Would you try this approach for meeting
these stnadards, or would you stick with the oxidation
catalyst?
MR. WEAVER: I think with the smaller engines it
probably is a viable approach. I'm not sure about the larger
vehicles and the larger engines. Because of the larger mass
flow of exhaust through the larger engines, you are going to
end up with more, larger, higher level of CO than you can
easily convert over a three-way catalyst by itself.
MR. JENSEN: Incidently, the reason we are not saying
"yes" or "no" for some of these answers is there's internal
debates at Ford on this subject. Some of our engineers have
said we have just got to continue to have the oxidation
catalyst.
As you know, there's a group like that, Gene, that
exists at the company. And other people argue with them and
say, "We don't need the follow-on catalyst."
So we really don't have enough data to make a firm
decision in-house. We are talking from the state of the art
at the moment. The engineers at Ford now that work with
Dr. Weaver generally believe we are going to have to have the
oxidation catalyst.
MR. HELLMAN: But you wouldn't dispute my contention,
if I make it, that Ford by 1982 could probably duplicate the
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performance that Volvo has demonstrated in 1977 with their
system?
MR. WEAVER: We have obviously looked at the Volvo
system, and we have a feel for the differences between the
Volvo system and our own system.
And I might point out, initially, that when we got
these two vehicles they didn't work very well. The catalysts
did not operate properly, and they did not meet the standards
as they were first tested. After replacing the catalyst, we
got some quite different results.
Now the differences in the system between the Volvo
system and our own system is partially in the fuel-injection
system. We use a feedback carburetor, and it is not capable
at this stage of development of having as close an air-fuel
ratio control. As far as a range and an average reading as
the fuel-injection system, it doesn't respond as quickly to
changes measured by the oxidation sensor.
Also in the area of fuel economy, we think that our
system probably did a better job of getting fuel economy than
the Volvo, which may merely reflect their more conservative
approach on their first try. I am sure that they can improve
that fuel economy.
But on emissions, when it was operating properly, it
did a very excellent job. I think we must agree with that.
MR. HELLMAN: So there is no reason that Ford
couldn't do as well on similar size vehicles with that same
system?
MR. WEAVER: If we had fuel injection, which doesn't
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seem to be I can't I do not believe we could say that we
could put fuel injection on all of our cars by 1982.
MR. HELLMAN: Would you agree with the characteriza-
tion made by the Air Resources Board with respect to cost and
fuel economy determinations that EPA has to make that they
should be wholly made in a negative sense if market demand is
not met?
MR. JENSEN: Mr. Eppel?
MR. EPPEL: I guess I don't understand the question,
Dr. Hellman. Do you want to try again?
MR. HELLMAN: I asked how far into the question,
which I can paraphrase thusly
MR. EPPEL: Let me see if I can paraphrase what your
question is and we'll see if I can do it that way, because
hopefully I'll understand what I am saying.
MR. HELLMAN: Okay.
MR. EPPEL: I gather it's the assertion of
California that the cost penalties have to be so great as to
cause an inability of the otherwise marketplace to sustain
those costs and to create a, if you will, diminution of demand
less than would otherwise be there if the prices would have
been in a more normal range. Is that a fair statement of
their contention?
MR. HELLMAN: I believe so, yes.
MR. EPPEL: Well
MR. JENSEN: I think Mr. Austin said it a lot better
than you did, John.
MR. EPPEL: Well, it was his argument; not mine.
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I guess the answer to that is I don't think that's
consistent with the intent of International Harvester, and I
guess we are working under 202(a) and that's where the terms
"basic demand" comes from. I don't think that the costs have
to be so prohibitive as to run the vehicles out of the range
of the average consumer.
I think you also have to look at it as a difficult
judgment, but is a 9,000,000 car year Let's take the 49
states and look at it nationwide under 202.
Is a 9,000,000 car year a basic demand and it
otherwise would have been a 10,000,000 car year not basic
demand?
I think the court in International Harvester when
they were talking about basic demand weren't simply talking
about the benefits of consumers, but rather the place of the
auto industry in the public interest. And a 9,000,000 car
year versus a 10,000,000 car year, while there may not be
anyone out there who is directly deprived of an automobile
right now because they carry over the use of their old ones,
the employment impacts and the impacts on the economy are
substantial. So to that extent, I guess I don't believe that
it has to be so substantial.
Now on the other hand, I can't give you a figure
I don't think Mr. Austin can either even under his definition
as to when a cost on its face without any data and I might
add with very little testimony on this point in the record
before you as to when it becomes so costly as to frustrate
the satisfaction of basic demand.
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MR. HELLMAN: So I am concluding that you do not
agree with the ARB position.
MR. EPPEL: I think that's a fair statement.
MR. HELLMAN: Do you believe that the costs
MR. JENSEN: Let me say one other thing.
In our statementwe didn't raise We talked about
model availability, fuel economy, and other items. We didn't
raise the cost issue.
MR. HELLMAN: Do you believe that the model Let
me take fuel economy.
Do you believe that the fuel economy impact of these
1982 California standards should be judged excessive by EPA?
MR. JENSEN: Well, this gets back to this new
technology. We've testified in Washington this gets back to
the same kind of technology we said would be across the product
line in the early Eighties.
We've testified in Washington when we have the
maximum combination of electronic controls, three-way catalyst
systems, and so forth that we can, in effect, negate any fuel
economy loss. We still think, as we stated in the statement,
that there would be a fuel economy loss if you went to .4
grams of NO .
We put out regular charts that we've filed, inci-
dentally with the Department of Transportation, and under
.4 grams of NO we haven't even got an item listed on the
charts as we speculate to future standards. We don't know what
the fuel economy would be. So this is strictly a judgmental
item rather than a data based fact. It's the only anticipated
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number, and we have about 20 numbers on these charts where we
estimate emission levels, you know, that have all been con-
sidered in Congress and California. When you get to the
California numbers with .4 NO , our chart just says, "No data
X
available."
We speculate that as you go from one gram of NO to
.4 gram of NOx you will lose fuel economy. But it's pure
speculation. I don't think we've got any data at all.
Have we, Gene?
MR. WEAVER: No, except from engine mapping results,
which are not vehicle results.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do you speculate that that will
cause you not to be able to meet the fuel economy standards
applicable to the 1982 model year?
MR. JENSEN: I go back again to Washington testimony
of about two weeks ago. We will met the fuel economy
standards that are in the energy act.
MR. HELLMAN: Your statement on Page 8 indicated
that Ford is projecting 49-state usage of various, quote,
lean combustion, unquote, technologies.
Am I right in assuming that you feel these lean
combustion technologies will enable you to meet federal
standards of .41, 3.4, and 1 but would not be applicable to
meet the California requirements that are before us here
today for 1982?
MR. JENSEN: At Ford, we are speaking primarily of
PROCO in this lean combustion technology, and in Attachment III
we do indicate under PROCO it's Page 17 in Attachment III
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what the problems have been in respect to our PROCO development
in trying to get down to .4 grams of NOx. We have only been
able to do it on low mileage vehicles. The hydrocarbon
emissions go up, and then we have to balance off the technology.
So we think, at least what we have seen so far in
PROCO, that we can meet the .41, 3.4, and 1 in the early
Eighties. We haven't seen it where it's capable, and we
explain this in detail, of meeting a .4 gram of N0x. But we
are still working on it. It's one of the targets of the
development engineers working on PROCO.
MR. HELLMAN: When you calibrate the engine to meet
0.4 NO , which it can meet, the hydrocarbons cause you a very
serious problem with that engine; isn't that correct?
MR. JENSEN: Yes.
MR. HELLMAN: So am I wrong in saying that the
difficulty with that engine with respect to the California
1982 standards is primarily a hydrocarbon and not one of NOx?
MR. JENSEN: Gene?
MR. WEAVER: The hydrocarbon problem is the major
problem, and because of that we have to use great volumes of
catalysts, and twice or three times as much as we have on our
current California cars.
I might refer draw your attention to Attachment
IV. There is two short paragraphs on the PROCO engine
program there which is a research program, and it merely
states that there is a study in Ford research to determine
the capability of PROCO to meet .4, 3.4, and .4 emission
standards. And the statement is made that "Preliminary
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projections from dynamometer data indicate that it may be
possible to meet these standards in PROCO vehicles up to a
4,000-pound inertia weight with a conventional catalyst
utilizing a lean calibration. Estimates of the average fuel
economy losses range from approximately five to ten percent
for a lean calibration .4 NO PROCO when compared to a one-
X
gram-per-mile NO lean calibration PROCO vehicle."
So there will be a fuel economy loss, but apparently
we are optimistic we will be able to do it on the lighter
vehicles.
MR. HELLMAN: But with the fuel
MR. JENSEN: Just so there is no conflict, we are
talking here, as he just read, about engine mapping, engine
dynamometer data. No vehicle data.
MR. HELLMAN: I understand that.
MR. JENSEN: Okay.
MR. HELLMAN: Based on your projections of fuel
economy, would the PROCO engine with the five to ten percent
fuel economy penalty be better or worse in fuel economy than
a conventional engine would be comparable to it?
MR. JENSEN: We have indicated that PROCO would get -
what? 20 percent better fuel economy than a conventional
engine. So you are still better off with this loss.
MR. HELLMAN: Thank you.
MR. EPPEL: Can I ask a quick question, Mr. Jackson?
Dr. Hellman, I have one concern. Your comments
about the PROCO1s difficulty being a hydrocarbon one rather
than N0X problem, I hope you are not suggesting that the
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hydrocarbon difficulties of that engine are irrelevant for
the purposes of considering the .4 NO waiver on the grounds
that we've already had a .41 hydrocarbon waiver. Because if
you are, I don't think that would be an accurate assessment
of the situation.
If the engine is disqualified from .4 NOx for some
other reason, it's still disqualified from .4 NO .
X
MR. HELLMAN: From the three standards
MR. EPPEL: Correct.
MR. HELLMAN: which we are considering?
MR. EPPEL: Correct.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Mr. Jensen, would you agree that
there are compelling and extraordinary conditions of air
pollution in California?
MR. JENSEN: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: With regard to oxidant and N02?
MR. JENSEN: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You make a statement on Page 2
that we should wait on additional studies to determine to
assess whether or not a significant improvement in air quality
will result from .4.
Can I infer from that that you think some improvement
will result?
MR. JENSEN: We really don't know until we get the
LARPP data analyzed because of this spacial thing. I am way
over my head on this, but I've sat and listened to our atmos-
pheric chemists talk about ground level emissions from motor
vehicles versus stack emissions in the air with respect to
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oxides of nitrogen, and when you get all through I've asked
the same question of the scientists that you just asked, will
there be some improvement. The answer it takes them about
a half hour to answer, and when they end up I still don't
know what they said. When they get right down to it, they
say, "Let's analyze the LARPP data and see if there will be
some improvement." At least that's the way I gather what they
are saying.
Gene, have you got a different interpretation? You
understand them better than I do, I guess.
MR. WEAVER: I think it depends a lot on the
situation you are talking about. If you will read our
Attachments I and II, we try to explain it in some detail.
Maybe I can merely summarize it.
Our analysis of the data says that under most of the
stagnant conditions which lead to the atmospheric smog in
Los Angeles in downtown Los Angeles, most of the NO
when there is a low ceiling, most of the NO comes from the
automobile and not from stationary sources. And if we take
the available data about the atmospheric conditions under
these worst conditions and if we use a rollback calculation
similar to what EPA uses for modeling CO and relating CO
ambient conditions to vehicle emission standards, if we do
that, we conclude that a one gram NO standard is sufficient
so that Los Angeles will meet the N02 atmospheric standard.
Now that's one special situation.
Now if we look at other data downtown and we are
fairly certain that most of that NO comes from the automobile
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because of the ratio between NO^ and CO in the atmosphere at
this point. Now under some other conditions where there is
apparently ventilation of the pollutants from the stacks and
stationary sources, and we can verify this by seeing the
difference now in the ratio between NO and CO in the atmos-
phere, there we don't know how to make the calculation. So,
we can't do it.
What happens downwind is another situation.
For these two situations, we think the LARPP data
when the complete analysis of that data is made hopefully
we will be able to understand those situations much better.
The only situation we think we understand is the first one I
described.
I should say one other thing. Under the conditions
where the stationary sources ventilate into the lower atmos-
phere, on those episodes, even if the automobile contributed
nothing to that episode, the ambient air quality standard for
NO2 would still be exceeded.
So the second point to remember is that on the
few cases where the stationary sources contribute, if you had
zero emissions from the car, you still wouldn't correct the
problem.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Okay.
DR. WEAVER: So our position is that until we get
all the information we ought not to make a final decision
regarding .4 versus 1.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I understand how you feel now,
Mr. Jensen.
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MR. WEAVER: I thought I did a pretty good job.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I don't even think I mentioned
1.
My question is: Why do you use the words
"significant improvement" as opposed to "any improvement"?
The inference that I choose to draw from that is there will be
some improvement, but whether it's a whole lot or not may be
difficult to judge.
MR. JENSEN: Yes. We met one time with Mr. Austin in
his office, and Mr. Austin asked Dr. Gratch, "Will there be
some improvement?" You recall, Mr. Austin, he said, "Yes,
there will be some"?
MR. AUSTIN: Yes.
MR. JENSEN: So, you've got the right inference.
Mr. Austin dragged it out of him. I couldn't get it out of
him.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you very much, gentlemen.
MR. JENSEN: Do you have anything to say, John?
MR. EPPEL: Yes, I had just a couple things I
wanted to add to clarify the record.
First of all, with respect to the conference
committee provisions we didn't write our statement in antici-
pation of those. We might have some things to add for the
record with respect to the impact of both of those provisions.
We may or may not on that.
Secondly, on the question of whether or not we've
got some inconsistency with respect to our recommendations
about lead time and waiting, I don't really think there is
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an inconsistency. I think what we are trying to say is what-
ever lead-time problems we've got are not going to be made any
worse by deferring the decision and having a little bit better
scientific and technical basis for making the decision.
And as to the electronics, whether or not they
improve that's a matter of speculation. And I don't think the
record has anything on it that would allow that speculation.
They may or may not improve. If you want to take judicial
notice of the fact that the hand calculator has improved,
well be my guest. But how that relates to some of the devices
in the automobile, I don't know.
That's all I got to say.
MR. JENSEN: That wasn't bad.
Thank you, Ben.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I'd like to reconvene at
1:30.
(Luncheon recess.)
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: We are ready, Mr. Wagner.
MR. WAGNER: Chrysler Corporation welcomes the
opportunity to speak again on the important subject of vehicle
emission standards for California. We would like to emphasize,
as we have at previous Air Resources Board meetings and EPA
hearings, that Chrysler and the State of California have the
same basic objective, which is to attain clean air goals as
rapidly as possible by eliminating automotive emissions, but
hopefully not the automobile, as a contributing source.
Since the early 1950's, Chrysler has served in many
capacities to help relieve the air pollution problems in
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California. We believe our contributions have been sub-
stantial, and we retain a strong interest in this continuous
and sometimes frustrating struggle. We fell, therefore,
an obligation to once again summarize our conclusions regard-
ing more stringent emission standards for California.
Chrysler agrees that Southern California in par-
ticular continues to have an extraordinary air pollution
problem despite the billions of dollars and manhours expended
during the last two decades. This fact alone should make
one wonder if it is wise to continue to do more of the same
thing.
The same thought must have occurred to the ARB when
they scheduled the air quality workshop in January of this
year. The most prominent air quality experts were gathered
together to pool their knowledge and hopefully establish
direction for future improvements. We believe the workshop
was worthwhile and more frequent meetings of a similar nature
should be held.
However, it was very apparent that the reports
presented were not conclusive and no positive direction could
be established except to observe that additional study was
required. In fact, there was substantial disagreement and it
is not at all clear, for instance, what the effect of a NO
<2C
change would be downstream of the emission source. Certainly
some of the experts, but not all, felt that the overall
effect depended on the amount of hydrocarbons in the air,
and that it was more important to control hydrocarbons than
N0X.
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The consensus seemed to be that good progress has
been made. Dr. Pitts believes the eye irritation and odor
problems have been essentially resolved and we must now work
on the visibility problem. However, the way is not clear.
The experts agreed there is a need for a compre-
hensive coordinated program to better define ambient air con-
ditions and the changes that occur. They also recognized a
need for better control and coordination of the data gathering
activity.
Chrysler can only conclude after hearing the recom-
mendations of the experts that it would certainly be prema-
ture at best to insist that lowerina the NO standard would
result in anv measurable improvement in California air aualitv.
We have stronalv recommended to the Air Resources Board that
no additional chancres be made in the recmlated standards until
additional technical information is provided which clearlv
indicates the direction to move, otherwise we think some verv
costlv mistakes mav be made. Chrysler believes the waiver
should be denied on this basis alone.
In addition, there are unresolved technological
problems, that Chrysler has revealed to the Air Resources
Board on numerous occasions, obviously with little apparent
effect.
As we have previously testified, technology will
probably exist to achieve 1.0 gram per mile N0X by the 1980
model year, but the techniques required will be new. Chrysler
recently decided to attempt to certify for 1979 California
production a three-way catalyst with feedback carburetor
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emission control system on our 225 six-cylinder engine.
Hopefully some production experience at the 1.5 NO level can
be used to help resolve the problems associated with getting
to the 1.0 and .4 NO levels. However, there will still be
the inevitable higher costs for this new technology which can
only be paid by the consumer.
To date, we have had limited success applying three-
way catalysts and associated components to four-and six-
cylinder engines; our V-8 program has just started. Whatever
success we have had so far has been achieved with catalyst
volumes approximately 70 percent of engine displacement,
roughly a two-fold increase in catalyst size over those oxi-
dation systems currently in use. We are deeply concerned
about our ability to accommodate this catalyst volume in all
our vehicles and also about the implications to worldwide
availability to the catalyst ingredients.
As regards the feedback systems which are most likely
to be required with three-way systems, we have been working
with two suppliers of fuel injection systems and both of our
major carburetor suppliers. While we are confident that such
systems can and will be developed, we are disappointed to
observe that announcements of success and availability are
frequently overly optimistic and premature. The result is
that we are unable to fully identify the implications of such
new systems in terms of cost, emissions, driveability and
fuel economy at this time.
The foregoing comments are equally applicable to
the proposed .4 N0X standard for 1982 model passenger cars as
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they are for the 1.0 NO standard for 1980 models.
In addition we would make the following comments.
First, to our knowledge, no one has demonstrated the ability to
certify and manufacture its product line in compliance with a
.4 gram per mile NO standard.
Second, we are convinced that the federally mandated
fuel economy requirements and the California assembly line
audit test requirements would render compliance with such a
standard virtually impossible.
Third, any NO standard below the 1.0 or 1.5 gpm
range would preclude consideration of offering the diesel
engine in California. Predictions by our diesel consultant
indicate possible capability to achieve 1.0 gram per mile level
for four-cylinder engines but no capability below that. As
you know, the diesel represents a potentially significant
fuel economy improvement.
In summary, we conclude that our ability to comply
with a 1.0 gram per mile NOx standard is still uncertain, and
our ability to comply with a .4 gram per mile NOx standard is
still nonexistent. Therefore, we cannot precisely quantify
the costs of such standards to the California public. We can
predict, however, as we have in the past, that these standards
will penalize fuel economy, further limit product avail-
ability, and increase vehicle cost.
Chrysler's position on fuel economy has been con-
sistent and clear. Our engineers are convinced that a more
stringent NOx standard means poorer fuel economy. While we
are constantly striving to find emission systems which provide
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better economy while meeting the standards, the fact remains
that for any particular emission system, fuel economy can be
improved if the standards are eased. Conversely, fuel
economy is penalized when the standards are tightened.
In the future, as we are faced with tighter federal
fuel economy standards and presumably tighter California
emission standards, the lower fuel economy of whatever system
is required to satisfy California will force compensating
improvements in federal vehicle fuel economy. Just what these
improvements will be and what they will cost in purchase
price, driveability and product offering remains to be seen,
but suffice to say that, by definition, a tighter California
NO standard will perpetuate and increase the gap in fuel
economy and cost between comparable 49 state and California
vehicles.
This is not to say that the State of California
should not tighten its emission standards simply because
fuel economy will suffer; rather, we wish to emphasize that
any claims that this can be achieved without economy loss are
not consistent with the facts.
Costs for undeveloped or unperfected hardware
cannot be reliably predicted. However, we believe these
standards will materially increase the price differential
between California and 49 state vehicles, which presently
stands at approximately $75 per vehicle and which is only part
of the total cost. The balance is spread over the other 49
states.
In summary, Chrysler recommends that the ARB waiver
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request be denied so that the 1980 emission standards would
be retained for both passenger cars and trucks. Progress
toward cleaner air would continue as older, higher emitting
vehicles are retired without imposing additional cost and
fuel penalties on the California consumer.
Mike Grice from our legal staff has a short statement
to make in conjunction with mine.
MR. GRICE: I would like to address one additional
aspect of the issues presented here.
As you know, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration recently promulgated fleet average fuel
economy standards for the 1981 through *84 model years.
In its notice, NHTSA indicated that these standards
seriously press the limits of technological feasibility for
these years and could result in the imposition of penalties
for some manufacturers.
As Bob indicated, we anticipate that a .4 gram per
mile NO standard will have a significant adverse effect on
A
the fuel economy of California cars. In our judgment, this
would have one of two possible results.
First, it could increase the likelihood or amounts
of a civil penalty imposed under the Energy Act. Chrysler
submits that a standard which could result in the imposition
of civil penalties for a violation of the Energy Act is not
technologically feasible within the requirements of the waiver
provision.
Second, it is also possible that a manufacturer will
be forced to seriously restrict the size and engines of
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vehicles offered in California as a means of reducing or
eliminating such civil penalties.
We submit this could result in the inability of the
automobile industry to meet basic market demand as defined and
discussed in the International Harvester decision. Under
these circumstances, we believe that no finding of tech-
nological feasibility is possible.
There are a couple of other recent developments,
potential developments, which I think also should be con-
sidered and certainly could have an aggravating effect on
the points that I have just raised.
The Metzenbaum Amendment would prohibit the sale of
vehicles under a certain mile-per-gallon level. This
obviously would have the tendency to aggravate this situation.
The second is the provisions of the Conference Bill, which in
all honesty I haven't had an opportunity to review very
closely, which would permit other states to obtain or enforce
standards at the California levels.
Obviously, these are factors which I think will have
to be taken into consideration in your technological feasi-
bility assessment of California's waiver request.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON; Have you concluded that there
are compelling and extraordinary conditions of air pollution
in California?
MR. WAGNER: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: With regard to oxidant and NO2?
MR. WAGNER: Yes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: However, you quantify the effect
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of a lower NO standard for automobiles somewhat differently
than did Ford, in that you suggest it's premature that there
will be any measurable improvement in California air quality.
You make that statement with regard to both oxidant and N02?
MR. WAGNER: I make that statement primarily
associated with oxidants.
I'm trying to recall what some of the testimony of
the experts was, and as I remember it it's reasonable to
assume that if you lower NO from automobiles there should be
some lowering of N02 in the atmosphere. Whether you can
measure it or not, I really don't know.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is it Chrysler's position that
there would be some reduction in NOj with lower tailpipe
N0X standards?
MR. WAGNER: I believe so.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You raised, again, the point that
Ford raised with regard to assembly line audit test require-
ments, and on Page 4 you suggest that these requirements would
render compliance with the .4 gram per mile NO standard
X
virtually impossible.
Would you explain that a little bit?
MR. WAGNER: Yes, I said that. And right now we
don't know how to meet .4, the fuel economy requirements, and
the quality audit requirements on a production basis. That's
not to say that we don't have some test results that meet the
proposed or the standards that the waiver is requested for.
The problem as we see it for 1982 is to meet the
fuel economy requirements at the same time that you are trying
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to meet the .4 and still get the average below the standard.
And we just don't know how to do that yet, and whether we will
have that knowledge by the time we have to go into production
for 1982, I think, is anybody's guess at this moment.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: With regard to your concerns about
ability to meet a .4 gram per mile NO standard, has your
conclusion changed any as you look at different CO standards
associated with that standard?
MR. WAGNER: If we go all the way down to 3.4, it
definitely makes the job more difficult. We don't see a
difference between seven and nine bothering anybody.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do you conclude that it's tech-
nologically feasible to meet .41, 9, and .4?
MR. WAGNER: No. That's what I just said. We don't
see how we can do that.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: In other words, it doesn't make
any difference to you?
MR. WAGNER: What?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: In terms of your technological
conclusion?
MR. WAGNER: What doesn't make any difference?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: The higher CO number.
MR. WAGNER: Higher than seven?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Right. Nine.
MR. WAGNER: The seven or nine doesn't make any
difference in our conclusions.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I see. I presumed your conclusion
was based on 3.4.
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MR. WAGNER: No. The conclusion is based on the
proposed California standard the standards that California
has adopted and for which they are requesting a waiver, which
is .41, 9, and .4.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I see. You are going to ignore
the federal standards?
MR. WAGNER: Didn't know they were there when I
wrote this up. Oh, you mean the 3.4 federal one?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Yes, sir.
MR. WAGNER: Sorry about that. No, we didn't ignore
it. We just recognized it would make life more difficult.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do you agree with Ford that there
is a break point in the technology somewhere between seven
and five on CO?
MR. WAGNER: I .think they said six and nine. As I
remember, Ford said No, we have no basis for disputing
what Ford said.
At the same time, I don't believe our testing has
been that extensive to be able to make that statement.
MR. HELLMAN: Chrysler's statement on Page 3 indi-
cates the technology will probably exist to achieve 1.0 grams
per mile NO by the 1980 model year but the techniques required
will be new.
MR. WAGNER: We are talking about three-way catalyst
techniques and the electronics associated with feedback
carburetors.
MR. HELLMAN: Is this 1.0 NO in conjunction with
WW
a certain hydrocarbon and CO level?
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MR. WAGNER: Yes, .41 hydrocarbons and 9.0 CO.
MR. HELLMAN: This feedback fuel metering and
three-way catalyst technology that will exist to achieve this
level, how does that differ from the technology that you would
attempt to use to try to meet the proposed or the adopted in
California 1982 standard?
MR. WAGNER: Well, when you say "technology," I kind
of wish you would talk about an emission control system. How
would the emission control system differ between a one gram
NO and a .4 gram NO , because the basic technology that we
are talking about is a three-way catalyst system with a feed-
back carburetor. That's the basic technology that we are
talking about.
Your question is: Why if you can meet 1, can't you
meet .4? The answer is
MR. HELLMAN: No.
MR. WAGNER: No?
MR. HELLMAN: My question was: What will the emis-
sion control system be like comparing the 1 standard to the
.4 standard?
MR. WAGNER: I'd like to be able to tell you that,
but we don't know how to get to .4 yet, so I don't know what
that technology really will be.
MR. HELLMAN: You indicated you had some results
that were possibly of low mileage, below the standard.
MR. WAGNER: We have some research numbers that are
below the standard.
MR. HELLMAN: What kind of system was used on those
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cars?
MR. WAGNER: Three-way catalyst with feedback
carburetor.
MR. HELLMAN: So the generic system is the same?
MR. WAGNER: Say again?
MR. HELLMAN: The generic system, the technologies
you referred to, is the same? It's a three-way catalyst with
feedback carburetion?
MR. WAGNER: The emission control system of
components, ye s.
MR. HELLMAN: Do you know what's different about
those research cars? Did they have a bigger catalyst, more
highly loaded?
MR. WAGNER: Both. We have done both. We have
been experimenting with different size catalysts and different
loadings in the catalysts, and with various combinations, why,
we are trying to get numbers that are, first of all, below
1.0 and, secondly, below .4. We are having extreme difficulty
in trying to get numbers on the order of 1.0 grams per mile.
If we get an N0x number below .4, it's usually in conjunction
with some other number which is exceeding our objective. We
really have developed very little confidence that we are going
to be able to satisfy all of the requirements even by 1980.
MR. HELLMAN: If as you indicate in your statement
the technology will be available for meeting 1.0 N0x in 1980,
is it fair to conclude that the time that's available for you
to at least produce systems of the type that could be used
to meet 0.4 NOx?
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MR. WAGNER: I think the answer to that is fairly
obvious. As long as we are assuming that the systems are
going to be, for all intents and purposes, very much the same
between 1980 and 1982, the capability of producing such
systems should exist. Whether or not we will be able to meet
a .4 in conjunction with all the other requirements is pretty
unlikely at this point.
MR. HELLMAN: That's based on your extreme diffi-
culty in meeting 1?
MR. WAGNER: That's based upon our extreme difficulty
in not only meeting 1, but getting good, consistent results
with what we have so far and in recognition that the fuel
economy requirements are going to be pressing us to the wall
all the way.
MR. HELLMAN: The results that you have had so far
is your statement Do I interpret your statement correctly
that you have no three-way catalyst results on V-8 engines?
MR. WAGNER: No. I said our V-8 engine program has
just started. We have generated some results. I don't have
any direct knowledge of what those results are, as I said.
MR. HELLMAN: The 70 percent of engine displacement
for the volume of the catalyst, was that used on V-8's or
on all the engines?
MR. WAGNER: That's been used on the 4 and 6's. I
don't know what the ratio is with the V-8's.
MR. HELLMAN: What's the problem with the ability to
accommodate this catalyst? Is it a space problem?
MR. WAGNER: Space problem, yes.
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MR. HELLMAN: The bodies that are going to be used
in 198 2, are they already frozen in terms of being set up for
production?
MR. WAGNER: No.
MR. HELLMAN: So there is time yet to increase the
room there
MR. WAGNER: Yes.
MR. HELLMAN: to make room for a larger catalyst
should you need it?
MR. WAGNER: There is time to juggle things around,
yes.
MR. HELLMAN: Would you consider a California
standard of .41 hydrocarbons, 9 CO, and 0.4 NO more stringent
or less stringent than a federal standard of .41 hydrocarbons,
3.4 CO, and 1.0 NO?
MR. WAGNER: I believe that the California require-
ment is more stringent than the federal requirement that you
mention.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Mr. Wagner, have you developed any
data on systems targeted to 1 or .4 NOx that's not available
to EPA?
MR. WAGNER: Would you ask that again?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Have you developed emission data
on systems that are targeted to 1 NO or .4 NO that is not
X X
available to EPA that has not been made available?
MR. WAGNER: No, sir. Whatever information we have
is available to EPA or ARB.
I have recently given ARB some of the latest
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information that we have, test data.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You are continuing to --
MR. WAGNER: If we haven't already forwarded a copy
of that to EPA, we certainly will.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Are you continuing to develop
these systems and test them?
MR. WAGNER: Oh, yes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I would ask that you submit to
the record of this proceeding any data which becomes available
before the record closes.
MR. WAGNER: Certainly will.
MR. HELLMAN: Mr. Grice, in your statement you talked
about the impact of the proposed standards on the availability
of cars. How should I characterize that? Is it one that
you think is serious enough that would meet or fail to meet
an International Harvester test of basic market demand? . I am
not accepting or rejecting that as it applies under this
hearing.
MR. GRICE: I think at this point in time the
ability of a manufacturer, the ability of Chrysler to be
specific, to meet .4 is totally speculative. The impact of
that, the impact of whatever system was developed, if any,
to meet that standard on fuel economy is uncertain at least in
terms of the extent of the impact.
At this point in time, the answer to your question
is uncertain. It is a distinct possibility, even a probability,
I think my purpose in raising the issue was not that
we can at this point in time demonstrate that this is going to
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occur. However, I think it is a factor which you in your
deliberations on the waiver request have to consider, and it
is a possibility which does exist.
MR. HELLMAN: Because there is uncertainty on this
issue, would you agree that the uncertainty lies in both
directions?
MR. GRICE: It is possible that it lies in both
directions. On the basis, I think, of the information avail-
able today, it's likely to have some significant impact on
vehicle availability. Whether that impairs the industry's
ability to meet basic market demand or not is uncertain. It
is, however, a very distinct possibility.
MR. HELLMAN: You indicated that if the cars manu-
factured for sale in California had poor fuel economy this
would tend to directionally require the cars sold in the other
4 9 states to have better fuel economy for you to meet a
NHTSA requirement; is that correct?
MR. GRICE: I think both Bob and I indicated that,
yes.
MR. HELLMAN: Would you maintain based on that
statement that that is something that has to be considered by
EPA in granting a waiver, whether or not Chrysler meets or
does not meet the requirements of NHTSA?
MR. GRICE: I think EPA has to consider two things.
I think they have to consider and I am not certain that
it is restricted narrowly to Chrysler, but this obviously is
a factor.
I think they have to consider the ability of the
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industry to meet basic demand,and I think they have to consider
the in terms of technological feasibility whether or not
that will have an additional impact in terms of civil penal-
ties on manufacturers.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That being the cost of compliance?
MR. GRICE: I donft totally follow your remark, Ben.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Well, the idea being we have to
judge consistency with 202, which says lead time taking into
consideration the cost of compliance.
MR. GRICE: No. No, I'm not saying that at all.
I am raising the question of whether a standard which
will or will likely result in the imposition of civil penalties
on a manufacturer for inability to meet another federal
standard is technologically feasible. I think it goes
beyond the question of cost of compliance.
MR. HELLMAN: Just what is it that makes you so
negative about your ability to meet these standards? We have
heard some testimony by the Air Resources Board that indi-
cated that two manufacturers in 1977 almost a year ago now
as the model year runs already would have complied with
those standards in 1977 had they been applicable.
MR. WAGNER: Would they have complied with the fuel
economy and quality audit requirements at the same time for
1982? The answer to that question is no. Their fuel
economy today would not meet the 1982 fuel economy require-
ments. In order for them to meet the 1982 fuel economy
requirements, they are going to have to do something to that
engine, which with our present knowledge would indicate they
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would not be able to meet .4 NO requirements. They may have
X
some knowledge that we don't have, but they've got a long way
to go before they can say that they"are going to meet all of the:
requirements in 1982.
MR. HELLMAN: All right. Thank you for your
dissertation on why it's going to be difficult for two foreign
manufacturers to meet the fuel economy standards in 1982.
What I'd like to get from you is some idea of your
feeling on why it is that the emission performance required by
the California standards for N02 is going to be so difficult
for you to meet since other manufacturers have already met
it?
MR. WAGNER: I think I have already answered that
question.
MR. HELLMAN: Is it a problem of catalyst
deficiency? Is it a problem of emissions out of the engine?
What is it for you?
MR. WAGNER: It's a problem of getting fuel economy,
meeting the emission standards on a consistent enough basis
to meet quality audit requirements, and with our present
state of knowledge of three-way catalyst and feedback
carburetor systems. So far we do not see any way of meeting
all three of those things. If you want to have just the
.4 NO requirement and do away with the other two, why,
certainly we would be a lot more optimistic about meeting
.4. If you want to do away with meeting .4, we would be
a lot more optimistic about meeting fuel requirements.
All I am saying is when you put all of those things
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together, we don't see how we are going to do it as of right
now. Hopefully before the time comes when it is too late we
will have more knowledge than we have today that will make us
more optimistic.
But I cannot tell you that we are optimistic today
when we are not.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You said consistently meet the
quality audit requirements. What are you talking about there?
MR. WAGNER: There are two options in the quality
audit requirements.
One is that on your quality audit sample, you shall
meet the standards with at least the undeteriorated
standards with at least 90 percent of your vehicle; or,
Option 2, with the deteriorated standards you should pass on
average. That's what I mean by consistently meeting the
requirements. Right now we don't see any way of doing that.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What leads you to believe that
you can't do it?
MR. WAGNER: Because in order to consistently meet
a .4 NO our engineering test goal must be on the order of
.2 NO . We aren't seeing numbers anywhere near that yet.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I see. Are you suggesting, then,
that you can possibly certify at a .4, or that there is a
situation where you can certify at .4 but you couldn't meet
the assembly line test requirements at .4?
MR. WAGNER: It would be more likely to be able to
certify at .4 than to be able to meet the quality audit
requirements, too, yes.
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That meaning that assembly line
test requirement added some measure of stringency beyond that
which
MR. WAGNER: Yes, it does.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: ~ for certification?
MR. WAGNER: Yes, it does.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Mr. Austin, do you have any
quality audit data on the Volvo system?
MR. AUSTIN: Yes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Would you make that available to
us?
MR. AUSTIN: Yes. We will submit it. Would you
like a brief summary of what it looks like?
MR. HELLMAN: If you would, please.
MR. RUBENSTEIN: The quality audit data for the, I
guess, first three quarters, or how many have been completed,
for both Volvo and Saab have indicated that both three-way
catalyst engine families fully comply with the force quality
audit requirements with a comfortable safety margin.
MR. AUSTIN: What about NOx emissions?
MR. RUBENSTEIN: The NO emissions for those cars,
I believe they are using the averaging approach, somewhere
between .1 and .2 grams per mile, including deterioration
factors.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Have you got variability data?
Do you know what the standard deviation is? I mean, are you
seeing a great deal of variation, or is it fairly consistent?
MR. AUSTIN: The data I've looked at shows quite a
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lot of variation, but that's often due to the fact that one
vehicle will be Q,5 grams per mile NOx and the next would be
.2. You know, half the standard to a tenth of the standard or
something in that neighborhood. There is variation, but
usually the large variation is only when the levels are well
under the .4 level.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Mr. Wagner, have you seen that
data?
MR. WAGNER: No, I haven't.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What's the added cost of a system
that would be targeted to the .4 standard?
MR. WAGNER: Over what? Over the 1.0 standard or
the present standard?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What standards are now required
for I think it1s 1.5.
MR. WAGNER: Now, yes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Excuse me.
MR. WAGNER: The cost of putting a three-way catalyst
system in is about $300 to $350.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Over
MR. WAGNER: Over the present system.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Over the 2
MR. WAGNER: Over the present mini catalyst, oxida-
tion catalyst system.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That's system design for two gram
per mile NO ?
MR. WAGNER: Or one and a half, yes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: One and a half?
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MR. WAGNER: Right.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: So it would be $300?
MR. WAGNER: $300 to $350 for a 1 or .4 NOx-
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I guess I would like to have some
sort of elucidation, if you could, on your position with
regard to the impact of fuel economy in California assembly
line audit test requirements rendering compliance with the
standard virtually impossible. I don't think I quite under-
stand. What I would suggest is you submit something into the
record and detail more precisely just exactly what your
concerns are there.
We've had information from the CARB that suggests
that these targets are achievable, at least with Volvo, and
the variability is not that great. So that tends to direct
itself at that particular concern.
As far as fuel economy is concerned, I guess we
want to understand just exactly what you mean, whether you are
saying because you sell ten percent of your cars in
California it would not be able to get as low a fuel economy
as you like that would cause you to fail to meet the aggregate
fuel economy goals that are established under Fuel Economy Act.
MR. WAGNER: I'm not sure what I can give you to
satisfy you in that respect, Ben, because the basis for coming
to the conclusions that we have are the numbers, which I have
indicated I will forward to you, which say that we are trying
to right now trying to get to a one-gram NO level. That's
our immediate objective for 1980. We are experiencing very
limited success in being able to do that.
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In conjunction with those tests, we will run fuel
economy with them. And the fuel economy numbers that we are
getting would lead us to believe that even if we achieve the
1.0 standard by 1980 meeting fuel economy requirements will be
extremely difficult.
When we are talking about going to .4, there are
only very limited available techniques to you to improve fuel
economy at the same that you are lowering NO requirements.
And so far we don't have a system that will do both of those
things is what I am saying. All I can give you to support that
statement are the test results that we have been able to
achieve so far.
X don't think that Volvo for 1977 tried to achieve
the 1982 fuel economy numbers. I sura pretty sure they didn't.
And I think that when they do come up with a system to meet
the 1982 fuel economy requirements, it's going to be somewhat
different from what it is today.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I have a question from CARB.
Isn't it true that the fuel economy of the three-way
Volvo and Saab vehicles are significantly better than the
fuel economy of 1977 model domestic vehicles of similar weight
and power-to-weight ratios?
MR. WAGNER: Which vehicles?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: The '77 model domestic vehicles
of similar weights and power-to-weight ratios.
MR. WAGNER: The information that I have seen would
indicate that their fuel economy is poorer than other compar-
able sized vehicles.
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What is comparable?
MR. WAGNER: What is comparable? Same inertia
weight category, same engine displacement. That type of
comparability.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Chrysler vehicles?
MR. WAGNER: No, not Chrysler vehicles. Other
vehicles.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is that there are no comparable
Chrysler vehicles?
MR. WAGNER: That's right.
MR. AUSTIN: Mr. Jackson, could I ask a point of
clarification?
The question dealt with power-to-weight ratios, the
horsepower of the engine that moves the vehicle, not the
size of the engine.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Does that point of clarification
make any difference, sir?
MR. WAGNER: I don't I don't think I can I
don't have knowledge offhand associated with power-to-weight,
so I can't answer the question on that basis.
MR. HELLMAN: Just to expand on the question that
the Air Resources Board asked.
Of the 40 or so vehicles that were in the detailed
listing of the '77 data that was in the Fuel Economy Buyers
Guide, the 40 vehicles that were reasonably comparable to the
Volvos in terms of inertia weight, horsepower, axle ratio,
N/V and other parameters that influence fuel economy when
adjustments are made to put the vehicles on a common basis.
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Of the 40 vehicles, the Volvos were better in fuel
economy than all but three vehicles, and those three vehicles
were not domestic vehicles.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I have a follow-on question for
CARB that arose, I presume, with a question that I asked them.
You don't have to. answer this one (meaning Mr.
Wagner).
MR. WAGNER: Can I if I want to?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Has CARB any test results on any
three-way catalyst equipped Volvo or Saab vehicle or vehicles
in excess of .41 HC, 9 CO, and .4 NO ?
MR. AUSTIN: We have run some tests of the ten
Volvos that the state owns where individual tests were in
excess of one or more of the standards on occasion.
In cases where there were levels above the .41,'.
3.4, and .4 levels, there was an attempt to determine the
cause, and on, I think, a couple of cars we found defective
components which when replaced cause the emission levels to
go below those levels again.
There have been numerous tests run. Not all of the
tests have been under the standards. When we have had any
significant deviation from the standards, we have been able to
identify the problem. In all cases, we have found it to have
been a problem that was not related to the basic capability of
a three-way catalyst system to reduce emissions, but some
quality problem with one or more of the components on the
vehicle.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Did you prepare a report with
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regard to those tests?
MR. AUSTIN: I don't believe we have put together
any report yet on the testing. The testing is still in
progress.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Would you supply the test results
to the record of this hearing?
MR. AUSTIN: We can give you a summary of basically
what's been done to date.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: How about the individual test
results?
MR. AUSTIN: The individual test results include a
number of tests where we have altered the vehicles and,
therefore, I'd be reluctant to supply data on vehicles which
we wouldn't feel to be representative of what's coming off the
line. I think that you'd be on much or anyone would be on
much firmer ground assessing the capabilities of the system
by reviewing the quality audit data which we have already
agreed to supply.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I don't quarrel with the evalua-
tion of the quality audit data, but it seems to me if we are
going to set this system out as one that's demonstrating the
technological feasibility of meeting the standards, we ought
to have all the relative data. You can qualify the various
tests any way you want to according to the facts, but I think
that information should be provided,
MR. AUSTIN: I'd like to give you the data, then,
from the vehicles which are in the condition as they left the
factory or else if there was a defect found after the defect
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was corrected, but not give you the data that involves
vehicles that have been altered by ARB for our own in-house
purposes. I don't see how that bears on the issue here.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That would be fine.
MR. GRICE: I would suggest, Mr. Jackson, that in
one respect I think it would be very relevant for the record
in this hearing if all of that data were included in the
record, particularly the data from the vehicles which Mr.
Austin stated had developed a defect. I think the existence
of those defects, I think the number of those defects to some
degree has a great deal of relevance to the capability of the
particular system. I think that it is very, very inadequate
to submit only the data reflecting vehicles tested after the
defects have been corrected.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I think he said he would supply
the test data with regard to the defective vehicles.
Is that correct?
MR. AUSTIN: That's correct.
MR. WAGNER: Would you give us the test information --
or I guess I shouldn't put it that way.
I guess the test information before and after
correction might be significant.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: He said he would supply that,
Mr. Wagner.
MR. WAGNER: Okay.
I know our engineers would be interested in data
that would indicate what kind of deterioration factors we are
talking about.
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MR. HELLMAN: On the Volvo?
MR. WAGNER: Yes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I would imagine the certifica-
tion
MR. HELLMAN: It was published in "the Federal
Register on Wednesday, June.8th, 1977.
MR. WAGNER: You are probably right.
MR. SCHWENTKER: Have you got a copy we can read?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Mr. Wagner, that's all we have.
Thank you very much.
MR. WAGNER: All right.
MR. NELSON: Good afternoon, Mr. Jackson, members of
the EPA Hearing Panel, and ladies and gentlemen.
My name is Edwin E. Nelson, Assistant Director of
Automotive Emission Control, General Motors Environmental
Activities Staff.
With me today is Harold VI. Schwochert, Staff
Engineer in charge of California emission regulations;
Richard I. Petersen, an attorney with GM legal staff; and
Or. Klimisch, head of Environmental Science Department,
General Motors Research Laboratories.
General Motors submits the following comments con-
cerning California's waiver request for 1982 model-year
passenger car NO exhaust standards of 0.4 grams per mile.
We believe that the two most important considera-
tions which are pertinent to this hearing are, one, the need
for the standards to meet air quality and health requirements
and, two, the technological feasibility of meeting the
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proposed standards.
Historically, General Motors has supported the need
for more stringent automotive emission standards in California
because of the special air pollution problem.s. The need for
more hydrocarbon control has never been seriously questioned
or challenged because scientists generally agree that hydro-
carbon reduction is a straightforward and effective means of
reducing ozone everywhere in the state.
The effect of more stringent NO automotive emission
standards is not as clear. It is generally agreed by the
scientific community that NO reduction increases ozone in the
vicinity of the emission source which is also the most highly
populated area. Experimental data also suggest that N0x
reduction may decrease ozone in regions that are downwind
from the primary emission source.
In an area such as the Los Angeles Basin, which is
complex from both a geographical and meteorological standpoint,
it is not clear what, if any, reduced ozone benefits in down-
wind areas will be realized by reductions in NO. However, it
is clear that reductions in N0X will have an adverse effect
on ozone in downtown Los-Angeles.; Since most health experts
agree that ozone health effects are more severe than N02
health effects, EPA must be convinced that NO reduction will
not cause a net adverse health effect.
GM briefly described this oxidant/N02 trade-off
issue at the May, 1977, EPA waiver hearing where California's
1.0 gram per miles N0x standard for 1980 was considered.
The issue becomes more significant, however, as the NO
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standard is set at lower numerical values such as the 0.5
grams per mile proposal being considered today. At the May
waiver hearing, the EPA panel appeared to dismiss this issue by
inferring that compelling and extraordinary conditions
presently exist in California, and will continue to exist
whether or not California implements the proposed NOx standard.
It is GM's opinion that Congress intended that EPA
give more than casual treatment to this air quality and health
effects issue. This health effects subject is much more
important than other potential penalties associated with more
stringent automotive emission standards. Although GM has
disagreed with EPA's position, EPA has given deference to
California in deciding if the fuel economy, vehicle drive-
ability, model availability, cost and other penalties
associated with a given set of requirements are offset by
the reduction in automotive emissions. EPA clearly cannot
defer to California when the trade-offs are quality and
health related. EPA must be convinced that these standards
will result in net health effect benefits prior to granting
the requested waiver. Any action short of this would be
evading the supervisory responsibility imposed upon the
agency by Congress.
The proposed 1982 and subsequent model-year exhaust
emission standards apply to both gasoline and diesel-powered
vehicles. Since the apparent technological feasibility of
meeting 0.4 gram per mile NO for these two power plants
differs substantially, feasibility for the two engines will be
discussed separately.
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Both the EPA and ARB are aware of GM's plans to
introduce Phase II catalyst systems on gasoline powered
vehicles in California in 1978. Expanded application of
three-way catalysts and closed loop fuel metering is planned
for 1979, with full scale usage scheduled for 1980 California
production. This new hardware provides for additional control
of NO and will allow standards more stringent than the present
1.5 gram per mile NOx standard to be met.
Numerous reports to both agencies over the past
several years have shown experimental test results at or
below the proposed NO standard of 0.4 gram per mile on low
mileage vehicles. Although we have been encouraged by our
advanced experimental work, the present state of development
has not demonstrated the ability to achieve 0.4 gram per mile
NO under the 50,000-mile certification requirements. This
includes the proposed maintenance restrictions that were
considered both yesterday and today. This includes not being
done under those conditions. The technology available to
GM today is not sufficient to meet the 0.4 gram per mile NO
standard. However, we are dedicated to continue development
work with this goal in mind.
With respect to the diesel engine, the primary
reason for GM's interest in this power plant is its superior
energy efficiency. However, experimental data available to
General Motors has not indicated that diesel vehicles have the
potential to be certified at 0.4 NO . Based on what is known
today, we cannot project the potential of this power plant to
meet the 0.4 grams per mile NO standard. Therefore, we must
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conclude that GM passenger car and light truck diesels will
be excluded from the California market by this proposed NOx
standard.
In summary, the implementation of the 0.4 gram per
mile N0X standard could result in net adverse health effects
because of the air chemistry oxidant/N02 trade-offs that occur.
It is our opinion that EPA should be sure that the proposed
standards are the correct emission control strategy for the
Los Angeles Basin air quality before they grant California a
waiver.
Experimental data which are below the proposed
standards have been obtained from low mileage gasoline
powered vehicles. Although vehicles have not demonstrated
the required durability for 50,000 miles, we are continuing
our development of advanced emission control systems toward
the 0.4 grams per mile NO goal. Until we have achieved
acceptable durability, we cannot project when such a standard
is feasible.
Our judgment is that the application of energy
efficient diesel engines -in light duty vehicles will be
eliminated by the 0.4 NO standard. We are not aware of any
information which can be used to project potential of the
diesel engine to meet the proposed standards.
Therefore, based on air quality and health effects
considerations, General Motors recommends that EPA not grant
this requested waiver.
Mr. Jackson, I would like to submit three addi-
tional reports to be included in the record of this hearing.
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The first report is entitled "Smog Chamber
Simulation of Los Angeles Pollutant Transport" by Dr. William
A. Glasson, submitted to the ARB seminar on June (sic) 6th,
1977.
The second statement was submitted to ARB on the
1982 NO standard by Dr. Fred Bowditch at the ARB hearing on
January 25, 1977.
The third report is a transcript of the General
Motors testimony at the June 22nd, 1977, ARB meeting.
I'd like to make a correction. On the first report,
it should be January 6th, 1977. I apparently said "June,"
and that was January.
Also, Dr. Klimisch, head of the Environmental Science
Department of General Motors Research, will now make some
additional comments on the air quality and health effect
considerations.
Dr. Klimisch?
DR. KLIMISCH: It's a monumental understatement to
say that the formation of smog and photochemical processes are
complex, and the arguments about the effects of nitrogen
oxides have been going on for a long time.
I want to assure you that our purpose isn't to
mislead. We are very much concerned that the strategy that's
used is the right one. We are using smog chamber data, but
the regulations are basically set on the basis of smog
chamber data. We realize some of the imperfections in smog
chamber data, and that still looks like the best model of the
atmosphere we have.
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Furthermore, nothing has happened to clear up this
issue or resolve it, particularly nothing at the conference
on the ARB. As a matter of fact, I think the general consensus
was that NO control is even more questionable, but that's
certainly only opinion.
Furthermore, as Mr. Austin said this morning, that
I believe he said that historical trends show that NOx
decreases oxidants. As far as I know, that's completely
wrong. The historical trends, particularly in California,
have shown hydrocarbon going down and ozone going down. At
the same time, NO has either stayed the same or gone up
slightly. Those were analyses by EPA contractors.
The major agreement is that hvdrocarbons reduce
ozone everywhere, both upwind and downwind, and all that
historical data, I think, confirms that.
I also want to point out that all those other things
that are currently unregulated, such as pam peroxyacil -
nitrates, nitrous acid, nitric acid, visibility, even NOj
itself to some extent are also improved by hydrocarbon control.
And that's why we haven't argued about the need for hydro-
carbon control, particularly in the Los Angeles Basin.
The effect of the NO problem has been called a
dilemma since the beginning, and I passed a chart out which
showed a smog chamber run that we did last year. And it
shows I think everyone agreed that the initial effect of
NOx is an increase in ozone near the source, and I think this
is the first time it was confirmed, the NO effect downwind.
X
That is, increasing NO may, in fact, increase ozone downwind.
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We have tried to put locations on this for the Los Angeles
Basin by looking and corresponding the time the light
intensity and the time of an air mass moving out. We think
the crossover point from the plus to minus effect in ozone
may occur in the San Bernardino/Riverside area. That can
move up or down, depending upon what factors one considers.
The problem is you can't consider just that downwind
effect and not consider the upwind effect. You can also
argue about which is bigger. However, since the population
density is higher upwind, it would seem clear, coupled with
the fact ozone health effects are much more severe, the net
effect is going to be adverse for NOx reduction.
Furthermore, this same effect is going to occur
everywhere else in California, and all the other cities will
primarily experience the first part of that.
And, so, our conclusions are on the back, and we
end up with our estimate that this reduction is going to cause
a net adverse health effect.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: If I understand you correctly, you
say you are still working diligently towards a .4 tailpipe
MR. NELSON: That is correct.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Why?
MR. NELSON: Well, because there is a possibility
that it will become a standard, and that possibility was
even greater until Congress acted apparently or is appearing
to act.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is that based on the
MR. NELSON: It's based on the probability of a
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standard being required at that level, and we are developing
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: In the federal law?
MR. NELSON: Well, in any law, in any regulation,
whether it be federal or California.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Why would you continue to work on
it in California if you are convinced it's a net detriment
to health?
MR. NELSON: California regulation requires it if
the waiver is granted by California. So, we are attempting to
meet future possible requirements.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do you think we can rightly grant
a waiver if your conclusions are correct?
MR. NELSON: I believe that we have valid concerns
for every conclusion we have stated, and it would appear that
it would be improper for EPA to ignore some of the considera-
tions we have pointed out.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do yoij think your conclusions
are sufficient to suggest that you wouldn't be willing to
accept a grant of waiver?
MR. NELSON: I can't answer that question.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You mean there is some doubt?
It's not all black and white?
DR. KLIMISCH: No, of course not:. You said the
California Air Resources Board came to a different conclusion
than we've come to, and I said this was controversial. And
it's been controversial for some time, and the issue is not
resolved yet.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do you see a forum for resolution?
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DR. KLIMISCH: Well, I think the best bet at the
moment is perhaps the analysis of the LARPP data. I don't
think that's going to be the final answer either. I don't
think the EPA scientists have been able to make up their
minds on this issue either, if I interpret their statements
correctly, nor has the National Academy of Science or National
Research Council or anybody else that's looked at this problem.
You have two effects. You have a law that says you
have to meet nitrogen oxide standards, but you know that's
going to have an adverse effect on ozone. But the law doesn't
take that into account. The law doesn't take those inter-
actions into account. Neither do the health effect estimates
that the EPA did on the 300 or the Interagency Task Force
don't take those kinds of interactions into account. It's
been thefe, and it still is there.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You don't see an answer coming
in the near future?
DR. KLIMISCH: I don't see an answer that everybody
is going to accept. It's going to be difficult to resolve
that question. Certainly it's not black and white.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Would you say it's fair to say,
then, that there is room to believe that reducing tailpipe
NO emissions may have beneficial effect in terms of
DR. KLIMISCH: A net beneficial effect?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Yes.
DR. KLIMISCH: There is room to believe that,
certainly. A lot of people believe that.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: So that's why you are keeping on
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working with it in regard to targeted .4?
MR. NELSON: We don't believe that argument, as you
just'heard from Dr. Klimisch, but we do believe in meeting
any requirement that is placed on us to meet. And we've got
a federal law and a proposal in California to meet .4. So, I
think it behooves us as a prudent business practice to
attempt to meet that requirement.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is that a contemporary statement
in liqht of the action by the Conference in the Clean Air
Bill?
MR. NELSON: I don't understand what you mean by
"A contemporary statement."
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That is, does it take into con-
sideration the fact that .4 is not going to show up as a
federal standard?
MR. NELSON: I don't know that yet. Can you assure
me that?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: My question was: Does it take
that into account? Your statement is with regard to the
assumption that .4 will stay in the federal law; is that
correct?
MR. PETERSEN: I think the statement was based on
the fact that until yesterday or the day before, whenever the
Conference Committee adjourned, that .4 was the law. We
haven't had a chance to analyze the Conference Bill.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I understand. But I'm asking
you: In the eventuality that the .4 does not stay in the
federal law, will you continue your efforts?
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MR. NELSON: I'm not prepared to say we would make
any change in our policy. So far, we have been working to be
able to comply with that requirement if it goes into effect.
We have serious concerns that we have expressed that it's
not the direction, but that's somebody else's decision to make.
MR. HELLMAN: Dr. Klimisch, you indicated that there
was substantial controversy about the methods by which you
control air pollutants, especially the effect of producing
tailpipe NO , and you made some conclusions here on the back of
the figure that you handed us.
Do you think there's the same degree of controversy
on all of these issues: No. 1, "Hydrocarbon reduction
decreases ozone everywhere"?
DR. KLIMISCH: No, I don't think there is a contro-
versy about that.
MR. HELLMAN: Mr. Austin, could you comment on this
conclusion?
MR. AUSTIN: That hydrocarbon reduction decreases
ozone everywhere?
MR. HELLMAN: That's correct.
MR. AUSTIN: I think that's essentially correct.
There may be some rural areas where hydrocarbons are much less
significant and NO is the principal source of the oxidant,
but for all practical purposes I think that's essentially
correct. And there is fairly universal agreement on that.
MR. HELLMAN: The second point you made, Dr.
Klimisch, was: re<^ucti°n increases ozone in the most
populated areas and may decrease ozone in downwind regions."
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Is there a lot of controversy on that as far as
you know?
DR. KLIMISCH: Yes. Well, the controversy is about
the second part. That really is the more difficult to demon-
strate. It ends up to be a complicated process. As an air
mass moves away from a city, it gets diluted, it gets other
things added to it. That's been more difficult to pin down.
The first effect, the initial increase, is not as
controversial. Although, you know, there's degrees of contro-
versy, and there's a lot of people that
MR. HELLMAN: But you would say that the second part
of the statement, No. 2, ". . . may decrease ozone in downwind
regions," is a source of greater controversy than for the
first part?
What I am trying to do here, for the record, is try
to focus the areas that you indicated were controversial so
the record will be clear about which areas are and which are
not.
DR. KLIMISCH: The whole effect of NO is quite
controversial. The whole issue.
MR. HELLMAN: Do you have a few short words you can
say on that second conclusion, Mr. Austin?
MR. AUSTIN: I'd say it's becoming much less
controversial, and it's becoming clear that in many areas,
particularly the Eastern seaboard, NO is definitely contribut-
X
ing to the oxidant problem because there is long-range trans-
port involved and the people who are exposed to pollutants are
living great distances from the original source of the
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pollutants. And any time you have that situation, NO becomes
a very significant factor.
DR. KLIMISCH: Well, that's an opinion. There are
many people who say that that's largely stratospheric. There
are many opinions on what that East Coast ozone comes from.
Again, you get into degrees of controversy. There
is no doubt that that's controversial, too.
MR. HELLMAN: What about the "ozone health effects
are more severe than NC^ effects"? Do you think that is
controversial?
DR. KLIMISCH: No, I don't think that is contro-
versial.
MR. HELLMAN: What about it, Mr. Austin, is there
controversy on this point?
MR. AUSTIN: There's less controversy. The basic
difference of opinion that we have here with GM, though, is
that the peak ozone levels are the problem. It's as the
ozone goes up, the effect does not go up in a linear manner.
You have greater and greater health effects as ozone goes up
incrementally, and we believe that our studies have shown
that the worst ozone levels will be reduced if we control NOx
further in the Basin. The worst ozone levels being those
that occur somewhat downwind of downtown Los Angeles.
DR. KLIMISCH: No one knows whether these things are
linear. That's tremendously controversial. There isn't any
data that can prove that point. That's a controversial issue,
except where you measure the two effects, the two pollutants,
you find ten to 50 times greater biological responses to ozone
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than NO2.
MR. HELLMAN: Then I guess it may be redundant, but
your fourth conclusion is that the NO reduction and I am
assuming that this means the NOx reduction from the tailpipes
as proposed by California will cause a net adverse health
effect.
I guess I'd just like to ask Mr. Austin if you
agree with that.
MS. AUSTIN: I think the answer is obvious. If
we believed that/ we never would have taken the action.
I think the EPA should also be cognizant of the
fact that the Air Resources Board doesn't have a vested
interest in controlling air pollution in California one way
or the other.
MR. HELLMAN; So this is the crux of the difference
in opinion, whether or not it's a net adverse health effect?
DR. KLIMISCH: I resent that if that's an implica-
tion that we intend to harm the health of the people of
California. I said our objective is to make sure the right
thing is done and to make sure that this is considered.
Again, I'd ask you about the EPA opinion. They have
been studying this thing for a long time, and maybe they
should be the arbiter of this. They are quite aware of this
controversy.
MR. HELLMAN: Mr. Nelson, on Page 4 of your state-
ment you make a reference to a 50,000-mile requirement. I
think it's in the first paragraph.
On Page 5, in the second paragraph, you also make
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mention to a required durability of 50,000 miles.
Can you explain a little bit more about what you
mean by that in relation to meeting the California standards?
MR. NELSON: The basic standard requires 50,000
miles of durability before you can be certified. So I am
saying we have not been able to run a vehicle for 50,000 miles
under the certification requirements as we know them or under
the restricted maintenance requirements that were considered
yesterday and this morning at this hearing.
MR. HELLMAN: Considering just the emission require-
ments for the time being, is it your understanding that in
order to qualify to be in compliance with the California
regulations the vehicle has to be operated on durability for
50,000 miles remaining below those standards?
MR. NELSON: That isn't my understanding of the
requirement, but I don't understand the question.
Certainly if you take the requirement into considera-
tion, the least square lines to the data points, the require-
ment clearly states that you have to be below the standard
with that line that's calculated from your data points.
MR. HELLMAN: For the California standards?
MR. NELSON: Yes.
MR. HELLMAN: Is that correct, Mr. Austin?
MR. AUSTIN: Restate it, Karl.
MR. HELLMAN: Do the California regulations require »
these are the 1982 regulations we are talking about for .4 NO .
Do they require that a vehicle must demonstrate compliance
with the durability car for the entire 50,000 miles?
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MR. AUSTIN: No.
MR. HELLMAN: No they do not?
MR. AUSTIN: The durability car does not have to
be below the standards for 50,000 miles.
MR. HELLMAN: So what is this 50,000-mile require-
ment you are talking about,. Mr. Nelson?
MR. NELSON: Well, I am sorry I indicated it did.
Mr. Austin is correct, of course, because there is carryover
as long as it stays under the federal requirement for 50,000
miles. But one of our criteria is to meet the present federal
requirement that does have a 50,000-4nile durability being
under the standard for 50,000 miles.
MR. HELLMAN: But the federal standard is not 0.4
N°x.
MR. NELSON: It is as far as the federal law today
is concerned.
MR. HELLMAN: And that's what you are trying to meet;
is that right?
MR. NELSON: That was the objective of trying to
run durability tests for 50,000 miles and meet the criteria,
yes.
MR. PETERSEN: I might also add that we are
responsible for in-use compliance, and I don't think that our
in-use compliance is -judqed by the federal standards in
California.
Is it, Mr. Austin?
MR. AUSTIN: Under California law, you are
responsible for meetino that standard»se for 5q#000 miles.
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The question related to the durability vehicle itself, a
specific test vehicle. It's true that that vehicle does not
have to meet the standard of 50,000 miles.
MR. HELLMAN: I'd like to proceed on this line of
questioning.
Assuming that the federal standard of 0.4 NOx will
not be enforced in 1982 if it is, then the question is moot.
Given that consideration, what is the problem with
the 50,000-mile durability? Is it that the vehicles that you
are running with the systems that you plan to introduce
fall apart before 50,000 miles?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: The point we are trying to make is
that without regard for what the certification requirements
are, certainly as a responsible manufacturer, one must be
assured of your emission control system having the capability
of meeting the requirements that the standards that you
are trying to meet. And the point we are trying to make is
that in our development work we have not run vehicles for
50,000 miles below the proposed California standards.
MR. HELLMAN: All right. But let's leave the
record with the clear understanding that that does not prohibit
you from satisfying those certification requirements in
California.
MR. SCHWOCHERT: It would not prohibit us from
meeting one of the requirements that exist in the State of
California.
MR. HELLMAN: Right. The certification require-
ments.
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MR. SCHWOCHERT: The certification requirements.
MR. HELLMAN: Correct.
Is there any reason that would lead you to believe,
especially considering the successful introduction of three-way
catalysts by other manufacturers, that General Motors would be
unable to run a vehicle for 50,000 miles to satisfy the
California requirements in 1982?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: Are we just talking about the
certification requirements now?
MR. HELLMAN: Yes. Again, just certification.
MR. SCHWOCHERT: I guess based on what we know
today, that we have been able to build low mileage vehicles
at or below the .4 gram per mile standard. So based on what
we know today, I guess the answer would be there's probably
a pretty good possibility that we could build a vehicle to
meet the certification requirements if that's the only concern
we had.
MR. HELLMAN: I want to make sure that up until now
we have primarily been talking about gasoline vehicles,
because you did divide-your testimony into two different parts
for gasoline and dieselj is that correct?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: That's right.
MR. PETERSEN: But I'd like to clarify that we
would not offer that vehicle for sale unless we were assured
that it would also comply with the California assembly line
test requirements and our in-use emissions performance
responsibilities.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What you are saying is there is
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an added degree of stringency associated with those latter two
programs?
MR. PETERSEN: Well, certainly there is. We
cannot Mr. Austin just stated that in-use compliance is
determined by the California standard, not the federal
standard, for NOx.
MR. HELLMAN: Yes. However, do you mean to say that
General Motors wouldn't introduce a vehicle for sale in
California unless it did pass the federal requirements
pass the California requirements and also not exceed the
standards for 50,000 miles during certification? Is that your
position?
MR. PETERSEN: No, we are not saying that at all.
MR. HELLMAN: Okay.
MR. PETERSEN: I think the record will be clear on
what we said.
MR. HELLMAN: On Page 5, you discuss the diesel
engine, and you indicate that the energy efficient diesel
engine will be eliminated by the 0.4 gram per mile NO standard,
Earlier today we had testimony from the California
Air Resources Board that indicated that there was an optional
procedure which is part of the package for which they are
requesting a waiver. Your statement applies to a 0.4 gram per
mile N0X standard.
Does the existence of this waiver alter the con-
clusion that you have drawn?
MR. NELSON: Existence of what waiver?
MR«. HELLMAN * X mean the option, X am sorry.
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MR. NELSON: I guess we could look at that option
as no option at all, because it's twice as long, 50,000 miles
to 100,000 miles. It would take twice as long. It would be
more complicated to run a vehicle that way, and if it's
equivalent we don't have a whole lot of data on a 100,000
mile type of operation.
But if that's equivalent on air quality, as ARB
implied in their report when they considered the issue, then
if you can't meet one I don't know how you can meet the other
one. Most of our judgment is based on the old rule of 50,000
miles.
MR. HELLMAN: I didn't quite understand your answer.
Let me see if I can paraphrase it and see if I got it right.
Most of the work that you have done to date has been
to try to determine compliance with the 50,000-mile require-
ment?
MR. NELSON: That's correct.
MR. HELLMAN: There isn't a whole lot of data
available to you to be able to judge your ability to meet
the optional procedure. And, therefore, is it too premature
to make a conclusion, or what?
MR. NELSON: I think it's premature without data to
make a determination, but the basic premise in my comment
was: If it's equivalent and we can't do it under the 50K,
why would you spend more money and double your cost of opera-
tion and the complexity of operation and try to do it at
100,000 miles?
MR. HELLMAN: So is it your position that it's
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disequivalent in terms of
MR. NELSON: No, sir, I didn't say that. I don't
have the data to know whether it is or is not.
It was apparently judged by ARB staff to be
equivalent.
MR. HELLMAN: What's General Motors' position on
the lead time available to meet these standards?
MR. NELSON: The absence of a lead time argument in
the statement would imply that is not a major problem we can
foresee at this time.
MR. SCHWOCHERT: I'd like to add that we have
indicated right today we don't have the technology in hand to
meet the standard, and one can really not project when the
technology is going to be available. So you can't really
discuss the issue of lead time in a very positive and specific
sense, since you are confronted with getting the technology,
obtaining the technology before you can really make a lead-
time determination.
MR. HELLMAN: Is the California standard of 0.41
hydrocarbons, 9 CO, and 0.4 NO in your judgment more or less
stringent than the federal requirement for .41 hydrocarbons,
3.4 CO, and 1.0 NO ?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: Well, it's certainly The
California standard is less stringent for CO and more stringent
for NO .
MR. HELLMAN: That appears to be correct.
Can you give me your
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You are losing a little of the
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edge here.
MR. HELLMAN: Right.
your opinion of the stringency of the standards
taken as a package that you have to design and build systems
to meet?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: I guess I really don't understand
\
the relevancy of that question, since really the 3.4 gram per
mile standard is not a subject of this waiver hearing today.
That it is not a proposed California standard, so I guess I
don't really understand the question.
MR. HELLMAN: What happens if it's a federal
standard at the same year that the California waiver is
applied for?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: I guess
MR. HELLMAN: Doesn't that make it relevant to this
hearing?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: It seems like then your agency is
forced into a determination of the stringency of the standard.
MR. HELLMAN: And so that you would just rather not
answer the question; is that right? I've asked several other
people to try to get them to give EPA some guidance or
opinions on this issue, which we always request and are glad
to get.
MR. SCHWOCHERT: I don't think there is an answer
that's really straightforward. I think in general the more
stringent N0X standard the .4 grams per mile NOx is a very
difficult standard, and it probably in itself is a more
stringent standard. I think that I'd have to make that
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general concession, that it is a very stringent standard.
So that would seem to suggest that the combination
that includes the .4 grams per mile NOx standard is probably
more stringent.
MR. HELLMAN: Thank you.
One last question. The statement that you gave to
us doesn't include a discussion of the cost and/or fuel
economy impact as being a reason why the waiver should be
denied. Since it's not there, am I correct in inferring that
General Motors' position is that the cost, including the fuel
economy impacts of that standard, is not one which should
cause EPA to deny the waiver application?
MR. SCHWOCHERTs We felt in the past that this is
one of the considerations that should impact EPA's decision.
Generally speaking, as we indicated in our statement, EPA has
deferred this issue to California. We did not include this
specific cost and fuel economy estimates because we don't know
what hardware would be required to meet the standard today.
If the three-way catalyst system is able to meet the
standard itself without additional hardware, then the costs
obviously would be essentially the same as the costs will be
in 198 0 as we have announced our plans to go across the board
with three-way systems in California.
We do expect that if this same system is used
that is, three-way catalyst systems there will be a fuel
economy penalty. To achieve lower NO , one would have to
assuming the catalyst hasn^t changed appreciably, we have
about the same catalyst activity, one would have to increase
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the amount of exhaust gas recirculation which increases
hydrocarbons. And to lower hydrocarbons again to the original
value again is going to probably result in a fuel economy
penalty.
So, probably, if the same system is used, there will
be a fuel economy penalty but we can't quantify it at this
time.
MR. HELLMAN: Cannot be quantified at this time; is
that right?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: That's right.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Are you familiar with the LARPP
study? 1 think you mentioned that you were.
DR. KLIMISCH: Yes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: And I think you also said some-
thing about whether it has any hope of shedding any light on
the issue of the benefits of a lower NO tailpipe standard.
DR. KLIMISCH: Yes. It's the best data that's
available. It's the most detailed collection of atmospheric
data that's just become available.
The problem is it's so detailed that no one's had
a chance to analyze it.
Through the APRAC organization, we've contracted
with Environmental Research and Technology to analyze that
data. And they are doing that now and expect to have some
information on how that fits the mathematical models by the
first of the year.
At that point, then, it's a matter of scientific
judgment in terms of how much faith one is going to put in the
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extrapolations. But certainly that's better than anything we
have today.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Would you comment on whether or
not there would be sufficient lead time to design your best
system for production in 1982 if your decision was made some-
time near the first of the year?
MR. NELSON: Mr. Jackson, as we pointed out in our
statement, we don't know how to meet the requirement. So
until we learn how to meet that requirement, we don't know what
type lead-time problem there could be because we don't know whal:
technology we would have to use to meet the requirement.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: How about your best system right
now, first choice system?
MR. NELSON: There wouldn't be any problem. If we
were going to build that, it would be like releasing the
three-way system in California. We are doing that next year
and the following year, and then across the board in 1980 is
our present plan.
And, so, we don't have a lead-time argument with
this system, but if we have to develop additional capability,
we can't prognosticate what lead time would be with that new
system.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do you think there is any possi-
bility that the analysis of the Clean Air Bill that's been
passed by the Conference and hopefully will be passed by the
Congress Friday and signed by the President over the weekend
will give you any reason to reevaluate your position with
regard to the California NOx standard?
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MR. SCHWOCHERT: Although there's probably some
small possibility that it might affect our position, I think
basically it would not because our basic position is one of
we are questioning moving ahead in this regard from it being
a direct control strategy because of the oxidant/NOj trade-off
situation.
So, basically, that's our basis for requesting that
EPA deny the waiver. It's not going to affect that aspect of
our position.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Wait a minute. You just jumped
stories on me. A while ago you said your basic goal was to go
ahead and target from .41 because that was in the law. Now
you have said it won't make any difference.
MR. PETERSEN: Can you repeat the question, Mr.
Jackson, because I'm not sure we understood it.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I am questioning whether or not
an analysis of the hoped-to*-be amended Clean Air Act would
make any difference in your position with regard to the .4
NO standard. Do you think there is a possibility?
X
MR. PETERSEN: What part of our position?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON! I'm not sure.
MR. SCHWOCHERT: I tried to answer
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Obviously, one part would be your
determination to continue development work towards .4 because
it's in the federal law. Obviously, that would change.
MR. PETERSEN: I think it would be inappropriate for
us to speculate on that part of our position now. There are
other parts of our position. Mr. Schwochert responded to one,
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and that wasn't the part that you were interested in, the air
quality aspect.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I think the air quality aspect
thing of it is connected as I understand it from your
scientists, would be evaluated based on looking at the results
of the LARPP as opposed to amendments to the Clean Air Act.
MR. PETERSEN: I think that's what Mr. Schwochert
said.
MR. SCHWOCHERT: I don't think that I'm not aware
of anything that would change our basic position relative to
the bill that left the Conference Committee as we understood
it.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: In other words, a higher CO number
wouldn't change your position?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: I am sorry, Mr. Jackson, I don't
understand what you mean by "a higher CO number."
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Well, you have said before that
you realize that the statutory requirements are the ones that
apply to you. That is, the 3.4 CO number. I am just suggest-
ing you look at a 9 in combination with a .41. Does that
change your position with regard to technological feasibility
of meeting .4?
And I asked it that way because I didn't want to get
the answer that well, the federal law requires this. I'm
trying to put you behind the amendments to the federal law.
MR. SCHWOCHERT: With respect to the feasibility of
meeting .4 grams per mile NO. whether the standard is 9 or
3.4, right now we do not have the technology to meet either
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standard.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Would you change any of your
development work?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: I think in general the answer
probably would be no, that we would proceed to work on systems
that we think have the capability of meeting .4 grams per mile
N°x.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: If you weren't concerned so much
about the level of CO, certainly you wouldn't be concerned
about 3.4.
MR. SCHWOCHERT: That does impose upon us another
concern, because we do feel that we are I guess a first-
line system, if you will, that we would prefer to consider
having potential to meet .4 would be just a plain three-way
catalyst system. But 3.4 grams per mile CO, based on what
we know today, we would have to add an oxidizing converter
behind the three-way catalyst, we think, to achieve that CO
control. That presents some additional NO control problems
that we don't completely understand.
We do also see an increase in NO across the
oxidizing converter. We don't completely understand that. I
don't know if it's the inability to measure ammonia correctly
or not, but it appears that the increase is greater than one
would anticipate based on present ammonia measurements that
one can make.
So, the system would be different, perhaps, if we
had 3.4 versus 9. But it still wouldn't change our basic
development program. We would still continue along the same
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basic lines, I think.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: A question with regard to your
position on diesel technology.
You said the option with reqard to 100,000-mile
durability wasn't really an option, and the lower standard was
technologically infeasible. I think, Mr. Nelson, you said
that the reason that it wasn't an option was because it took
so much longer; is that correct?
MR. NELSON: The reason it isn't an attractive
option is because it's double as expensive as the present pro-
cedure, takes twice as long, it would be much more time-
consuming and complex to go through a certification process
in that manner. We can just double everything. So, it
doesn't appear attractive.
The main basis for not being very excited about the
optional 100,000 mile requirement relates to the fact that
ARB apparently felt that it was equivalent or at least it
was equivalent to the atmosphere and, therefore, it would be
an option. If it's equivalent, I don't see any point in
trying to develop that requirement. We don't have experience
I did point that out, too that would help guide us. It's
a guessing game on that requirement until we have more time to
look at it.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: But you are not making a judgment
that it's technologically infeasible to run 100,000 miles?
MR. NELSON: I didn't make that determination, no.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: What you are saying is there are
a lot of practical reasons why you don't want to run 100,000
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miles as an option, but you are not saying it's technologically
infeasible?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: It's not technologically infeasible
to run 100,000 miles, but if it's equivalent from the atmos-
phere standpoint we think it, too, is technologically infeasi-
ble to meet that requirement since we think it's technologically
infeasible to meet .4. So from that standpoint we think it's
technologically infeasible.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let's assume you don't worry
about whether it's equivalent or not. Let California worry
about that.
MR. SCHWOCHERT: Well, then, we can't make that
determination. We don't have enough information to make that
determination.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Just the simple question of
being prepared to be able to run and certify at 100,000 miles,
a diesel. You make the statement that you just wouldn't offer
diesels in California at the 100,000 mile requirement for
certification.
Are you saying you wouldn't do it because it's
technologically infeasible, or you just don't want to go
through the cost of running a 100,000-mile certification?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: We don't know if it's technologically
infeasible because we don't have the information that one needs
to make that determination. We have questions about the
ability of diesels to even meet one gram per mile for 50,000
miles, as a matter of fact, right now. Right now we feel
that we cannot meet one gram per mile for 50,000 miles.
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CHAIRMAN JACKSON: How about 1.5 for 100,000?
MR. PETERSEN: How about two for 50?
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I'm talking about the 1.5.
MR. HELLMAN: So, then, it's your position that it's
not technologically feasible to meet 1.0 grams per mile NO for
50,000 miles with a diesel engine?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: Right today we don't know how to
do that. With our present experience, we don't know how to do
that.
MR. HELLMAN: Present experience and present hard-
ware?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: That's right. In order to achieve
that level of NO control, we believe that.we need to use
exhaust gas recirculation. And there are some unknowns
associated with the use of exhaust gas recirculation on diesel
engines in our mind right at this time.
MR. HELLMAN: That doesn't rule it out from being
a possibility? It's just that you have not done the developmen
work that would allow you to draw that conclusion? it's an
unknown?
MR. SCHWOCHERT: That's right. We haven't resolved
all of the problems that we have uncovered at this time.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Gentlemen, thank you very much.
Take about a five-minute break.
(Short recess.)
MR. JONES: Good afternoon. My name is William
Jones, Manager of Energy and Emissions Standards for American
Motors.
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397
American Motors appreciates this opportunity to
present our brief testimony pertaining to California's
request for a waiver of preemption to permit California to
enforce its 1980 and later oxides of nitrogen standards and
test procedures. These standards and test procedures apply
to passenger cars, light-duty trucks and medium-duty vehicles.
Based on our previous waiver hearing statements
concerning our experience and lead-time requirements for the
1.0 gram per mile NO level, we believe the Environmental
Protection Agency is cognizant of the facts as they would
pertain to the 0.4 gram per mile NO level proposed for the
1982 model year.
In brief, American Motors as a low-volume vendor-
dependent producer needs approximately two extra years of
development and prove-out time when the NOx standard drops to
a level that forces use of new total-system technology. We
must acquire the new basic total-system technology externally
as a total system, and this is why we would need a special
delay of about two sears. Further discussion on our part
would not provide any new input to this hearing.
For the record, I have attached to this statement
our November 23, 1976, January 25, 1977 and June 22, 1977,
statements before the ARB.
One other comment that we have, just to maintain
consistency, we also raise the problem that Ford mentioned
this morning and we have been consistent in mentioning it
is the way that light-duty trucks are being given actually a
more stringent standard than passenger cars and particularly
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light-duty trucks of the 3500-pound inertia weight and below.
That concludes my statement.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is it fair to conclude from what
you said that if the industry in general can meet the standard
that American Motors can likely meet that standard within two
years?
MR. JONES: That gives us a fighting chance/ yes.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do you know whether the Conference
Bill provides a delay for American Motors in connection with
standards in California?
MR. JONES: Just secondhand. I haven't anything
firm from American Motors on this position. I'm just aware of
the two-year NO waiver for companies like American Motors.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Do you know of any?
MR. JONES: I certainly do.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: But you don't know whether it
would apply to the standards of California or not?
MR. JONES: I think it would be premature for me to
comment on that.
MR. HELLMAN: Mr. Jones, could you describe for us
what a vendor-dependent company is?
MR. JONES: American Motors.
We are talking in the context of emission control
systems, and that's the context in which I use "vendor-
dependent." And I assume that's the context of which your
question raises.
MR. HELLMAN: Yes, and with respect to emission
control.
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399
That means you have to buy fuel-metering systems
and catalysts?
MR. JONES: That means we virtually make nothing.
We certainly produce nothing that can be considered an
emission control device.
MR. HELLMAN: You. buy almost all of it from other
people?
MR. JONES: Except one small component that I am
aware of at this time.
MR. HELLMAN: So you do buy your fuel metering
from other people, you buy your ignition systems from other
people, and you buy your catalysts from other people?
MR. JONES: And our air pumps and EGR belts, correct.
MR. HELLMAN: You maintain that this puts you in a
very difficult position with respect to meeting the standards
proposed by California?
MR. JONES: It hasn't up to now, but with the advent
of total-system technology where you can no longer go out and
buy part add-on like a catalytic converter was not really a
total system. It was a component. An air pump was a component.
These were like building blocks of a system, but
they weren't required uniquely as an optimized package in a
given model year. And this is specifically what I am
referring to right now.
MR. HELLMAN: Currently you buy components from
other people and optimize them for your specific vehicle
engine combinations?
MR. JONES: Correct.
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MR. HELLMAN: And you will continue to do that?
MR. JONES: Correct.
MR. HELLMAN: Volvo buys their catalysts from
Englehart and buy their fuel-injection systems from Bosch. I
believe they also buy their distributors from Bosch, too. Yet
in 1977 they were able to meet these standards that are pro-
posed for 1982 for California.
Is there something different there between that
company which buys components and assembles them and cali-
brates them and certifies them?
MR. JONES: Other than the whole basic vehicle
philosophy that Volvo has. They are a more expensive vehicle.
They have fuel injection. It's been a part of their vehicle
for years. The basic unit price of their vehicle is about
double ours. I think you tend to maybe enjoy some luxuries
that we don't enjoy when you look at how we are going to
approach a control problem.
MR. HELLMAN: And the reason for the difference is
that their components that they buy are more expensive; is
that right?
MR. JONES: Certainly the fuel injection is.
MR. HELLMAN: But you wouldn't say the distributor
or the catalyst are more expensive?
MR. JONES: No, I don't think I would make that
statement. I don't know for sure, but I don't think.
MR. HELLMAN: Do you know how much the fuel-
injection system costs compared to carburetors?
MR. JONES: We have looked at it almost on a yearly
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401
basis religiously at American Motors and have always been of
the opinion that it was not a cost-effective device for our
product. This doesn't mean that next year we haven't the
right to change that opinion, but that has been our past
opinion and it is our current today's opinion.
MR. HELLMAN: And how much is this extra cost that
makes it not cost effective?
MR. JONES: I don't have the exact cost data, but
the last recollection I had it was in the $150 to $200 cost
penalty range.
MR. HELLMAN: Over and above carburetion?
MR. JONES: Over and above carburetion. And there
were no You know, you just don't look at it on a cost basis.
We tested it. So, therefore, we said, "Okay. Cost is a
factor, but let's see if we can justify the cost with the
merits of the system." We did not see driveability improve-
ments . We did not see fuel economy improvements. We did not
see emission improvements. All we saw was a cost when we
were done evaluating it. Therefore, we are left with a cost
that we could not absorb because of the potential that it may
have in system optimization.
MR. HELLMAN: If there is no emission benefit over
a carburetor and the catalyst costs about the same, then you
could do what Volvo did with the carburetor?
MR. JONES: You are jumping gears on me. You just
jumped from a current technology to a three-way catalyst
system. You are not talking apples and apples anymore. You
are talking about a system that happens to like the control,
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the preciseness, that a fuel-injection system would have.
Up until now we have been able to capably adapt
the carburetor to the current needs. I'm not saying that a
.4 NO or a lower level NO can be addressed with a carburetor
X X
anymore. I'm conceding that.
MR. HELLMAN: And.it's the time that it takes you to
optimize these systems that puts you a year or more, as your
statement says
MR. JONES: No. No. If you read the attachments,
and you probably haven't been able to, but we have to enter
into a contractual agreement. We have to find a source that
has the capability of supplying us with not just a piece that
we are going to plug into our system. We now have to go out
and look for a total system. These total systems, as the
larger manufacturers today have indicated, are in a very
crude state in technology. Especially the electronic tech-
nology is changing rapidly.
Can you imagine what it's like to try to get in and
negotiate a contract with everything changing all over the
place? You know, it's a difficult situation. That's a big
aspect of it. It's not the total aspect of it, but it's a
very large aspect of it.
And then to get the hardware that's of a system-type,
to bring it back, and to adapt it to our engine is the other
significant part of it. This is what takes what we consider
a minimum of a year, probably two years.
MR. HELLMAN: Both the procurement and the optimiza-
tion?
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MR. JONES: Yes. It's a major undertaking.
MR. HELLMAN: And that takes Is it a year to
year, or can you
MR. JONESt We haven't done it yet, so ask me about
1980 and I'll have a better answer. Today I just can't give
you an estimate there.
MR. HELLMAN: You don't have anything to add over
your other statements about the cost or the fuel economy
impacts of these proposed regulations? As far as you are
concerned, they are the same as -they were in May when you were
discussing the 1.0 NO standard.
MR. JONES: No, we have nothing. We would have
worse than poor speculation at this point. I don't think that
would be worth bringing up from our point of view.
MR. HELLMAN: In your opinion, which standard is
more stringent, the California standard of .41 hydrocarbons,
9 CO, and .4 NOx or a federal standard of .41 hydrocarbons,
3.4 CO, and 1.0 NO ?
A
MR. JONES: I'm flattered that you would ask me that
question. I know you've asked it of all the other manu-
facturers. And in beinq flattered with you askinq me the
question, I'il try to be as direct as I can; althouqh, again,
it's very, very poor speculation on my part.
I would concede that .4 NOx is a more stringent
requirement on system development than the CO standard
differential. But this is speculation. This is something we
will not have data on for some time to come.
MR. HELLMAN: In the past, you have bought components
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from other people and introduced them on your vehicles pretty
much at the same time that they did. For example, the
catalytic converter that you procured from a supplier.
This new total system that you are talking about,
which I assume to be integrated with electronic control of
several engine parameters, that's what's going to make it
different; is that right?
MR. JONES: That's correct.
MR. HELLMAN: You would probably purchase something
that had application other than to your product; is that
correct? For example, now you buy carburetors and the
carburetor has uses other than for just the AMC product on
which it goes?
MR. JONES: That's correct.
MR. HELLMAN: So the sensors that you would procure,
the actuators that you would procure, would also have applica-
tion other than AMC vehicles to avail yourself of the
economies of scale?
MR. JONES: Most likely.
MR. HELLMAN: So if they are going to be used on
other people's products in a given year, then they will be
available to you in that year also?
I'm not saying that you know what to do with them
yet. We will get to that. But I am saying if the XYZ
company gears up to produce 5,500,000 electronic controlled
EGR valves for use in model year '81 or something like that,
then you would be able to buy those in *81?
MR. JONES: Yes.
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MR. HELLMAN: So in terms of your lead time being
significantly different than others, it's the fact that the
XYZ company was able to do the optimization and calibration
work on their vehicles while they were getting ready to produce
the part and you haven't been able to do that; is that correct?
MR. JONES: To a great degree, yes.
MR. HELLMAN: You don't make any agreements with
your suppliers, potential suppliers, to get prototype hardware
for you ±o evaluate?
MR. JONES: No. We get prototype. That's why I
said to a great degree. Not totally.
MR. HELLMAN: And you have prototype hardware of
some of the components you are going to need for the early
'80 California standards?
MR. JONES: Yes.
MR. HELLMAN: And you are working on it right now?
MR. JONES: Yes.
MR. HELLMAN: Then as far as you know, from what
you have heard other people talking about today, they are
working on it right now too; isn't that right?
MR. JONES: Yes, with a qualification. What they
are working on right now isn't necessarily what they are
willing to share with us right now.
MR. HELLMAN: So if, as Mr. Jensen said, they have
generation one and generation two and generation three of
some electronic gadget that you might be working with
generation one and they might be working with some more
advanced generation?
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MR. JONES: That's quite possible.
MR. HELLMAN: But when they go into production,
they won't produce generation one for you, will they? You
will get what they produce?
MR. JONES: It all depends on how the contract is
worded. A contract can be pretty binding on both parties, and
a contract has to be established very early in the game before
any exchanges of even prototype hardware. It's a difficult
MR. HELLMAN: A contract has to be established with
the exchange of prototype hardware?
MR. JONES: Yes.
MR. HELLMAN: But a production commitment does not
have to be made before you get a piece of prototype product?
MR. JONES: Right.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you very much, sir.
MR. BIGGERS: Gentlemen, my name is Walt Biggers,
and I represent Subaru of America, Inc. We would like to
comment on the State of California's request for a waiver to
enforce more stringent standards for oxides of nitrogen.
The Subaru system now used in California and the
balance of the United States utilizes a lean combustion
approach which does not require a catalytic converter to meet
relatively low emission standards. Further, in contrast to
other lean combustion systems, Subaru vehicles do not employ
complicated engine configurations or complex carburetion and
ignition systems.
As a result of this, the Subaru engine is one of
the simplest sold in California. Procedures and techniques
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required for service are familiar to today's mechanics.
Because of this, the car can be maintained about as easily and
inexpensively as a car without emission controls over most of
the useful life of the car, far beyond the statutory 50,000
miles.
One problem which, appears to be inherent in our
system is that as emission levels drop lower and lower, both
fuel economy and performance begin to suffer. At some point,
the system becomes noncompetitive in the marketplace because
of these advantages.
My best personal estimate of this point for the
Subaru system is that at any level significantly below 0.41
HC, 9 gram CO and 1.0 gram NO , we will be forced to adopt
catalyst technology.
Why do we wish to avoid using catalyst? First of
all, for purely selfish commercial reasons, because it will
increase the cost of our car the initial cost and main-
tenance costs and thereby weaken our competitive position.
However, there are additional considerations which are more
in the public interest and which we hope you will consider.
Without catalyst, Subaru and other lean burn cars
can utilize leaded fuels. This results in a 3 percent to
4 percent saving to the owner and means that lower grade
petroleum stocks can be upgraded to usable motor fuels.
Without catalyst, systems are not nearly so sus-
ceptible to permanent damage due to fuel contamination or
poisoning, accidental or otherwise.
Subaru systems do not exhibit any significant
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deterioration in emissions performance in the 50,000-mile
EPA durability test. Our experience with cars in actual
service demonstrates that with normal routine service, such
as oil chanqes, spark pluq replacement, and carburetor
adjustments, Subaru systems will maintain effective emission
control well beyond the statutory 50,000 miles.
This is important to air quality because 50,000
miles is only about half the service life of a car. Most
cars still need emission control for another 50,000 miles, and
this is when they are in the hands of second and third owners
who are less able or likely to spend money for major service.
We are confident that Subaru can continue to give good
emission control in the second half of its life without placing
an undue burden on its owner.
V7e don't think that this will be true with a
catalyst technique.
Finally, the basic Subaru approach is a frugal one
in terms of resource utilization. It requires less material,
energy, and manpower to build and maintain. We believe that
in the future, society's personal transportation needs will
be best met by even smaller, simpler, and more efficient
vehicles. If a costly, complex, and bulky system is required
to meet emission standards, this line of evolution" will be
thwarted.
The standards that the CARB proposes are actually a
two-tiered system. A low value for NO with a conventional
50,000-mile certification and a higher value for NO if a
X
100,000-mile certification procedure is employed. Faced with
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this apparent anomaly, the first question which is raised is
whether a compelling need for a stringent NO standard really
exists.
It's my understanding, which may be incorrect, that
this is really a NO /hydrocarbon trade-off because no system
that I am aware of, except the three-way catalyst systems,
really demonstrates much NO deterioration.
Nonetheless, 50,000-mile stndards are much lower than
100,000-mile standards. If there is a compelling need for a
low NOx standard, then why is the 100,000-mile standard so
disparate from the 50,000-mile standard?
Secondly, it would appear that the 100,000-mile
durability procedure is clearly in conflict with Section
202(a) and Section 202(d) by using concepts beyond "useful
life" for setting standards.
Finally, we see absolutely no feasibility in achiev-
ing 100,000-mile durability, or even 50,000 miles, within the
constraints of the allowed maintenance. As now stated, with
no spark plug changes permitted, 100,000-mile durability seems
impossible for gasoline engine. We would imagine that it is
extremely difficult for diesel engines as well.
In our opinion, neither Congress nor the various
regulatory agencies have adequately considered or faced up to
really what may happen during the second half of a vehicle's
normal service life. In our view, the California regulations
force the use of three-way catalyst for most manufacturers.
We have seen some problems already in maintaining emissions
performance in actual field use. And here I'm not referring
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to a three-way catalyst. I'm talking about conventional
catalyst systems. Systems being proposed to meet 0.4 gram
N0X are far more complex and costly from a service viewpoint
than existing systems. Does it seem reasonable that field
experience with these new systems will be even as good as it
is with conventional catalyst systems?
A substantial commitment to three-way catalyst
technology has already been made by GM and others. Surely it
would be wiser to wait until the performance of these systems
can be judged before adopting regulations which force
industry-wide commitment to an as yet unproven technology.
Now we've heard some discussion today about two
manufacturers who produce three-way catalyst cars, and I think
we all commend their industry and their success in this. But
I don't know their actual sales figures in California# but I
would guess that they must be under 10,000 vehicles. And
that's a very small percentage of the total cars and really
seems to me some question as to whether that's an adequate
sample. And they have not been in service very long.
Anyway, because of these reasons, we urge denial of
this waiver.
Any questions, I'll be happy to try to answer them.
MR. HELLMAN: Mr. Biggers, is it fair to
characterize your testimony as that you are not taking a strong
position against the feasibility or the lead time or the cost
or the stringency determinations that EPA has to make, is that
Subaru of America would just rather not meet these standards?
MR. BIGGERS: No, I don't mean that at all. Subaru
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in Japan is We don't have anything like the publicity that
Honda does or the other people, but in Japan Subaru
characteristically is the first company to meet Japanese
standards. Generally speaking, we meet them for six months
to a year ahead of our major competition. We were the first
Japanese company to complete certification to the latest
Japanese standards with our full product line.
And I think our engineering people are very'
aggressive. We have three-way catalyst systems under
development, and we can adopt three-way catalyst technology
as easily as any other Japanese company. And I think we all
have somewhat of a disadvantage because electronic technology
and some of the really in terms of hardware technology,
I think Japan is maybe a year to two years behind the rest of
the world, at least behind the United States.
But we are confident that we can meet the standards,
at least as far as one gram, if anyone else can. And that's
not really the issue.
The issue is we think we have a system which is
representative of few other systems that are similar that
really is a maybe much better answer to what we need in
society, especially if you consider the long-term durability
aspects than catalyst systems.
If you want to be a little paranoid, you can look at
what might happen in the case of a major fuel shortage in
this country. Suppose we don't have enough refinery capacity
a couple years down the road to make all the unleaded gasoline
we need. Suppose there is another major outbreak in the
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Par East or Middle East, and suppose that there's a shortage
for whatever reason of unleaded gasoline. Do you really think
if there's leaded gasoline available people with catalyst
cars are going to walk to work or not go to work? I think
they are going to get a funnel and put leaded fuel in the car.
The other question arises as to what happens 60, 70,
80,000 miles down the road. Those cars are still in use. We'd
like to believe that they still have adequate emission control
systems.
We know our kind of system. We are not the only
people who make systems that are like this. We think our
kind of system basically doesn't have the disadvantage of
having very expensive components that may have to be replaced
in order to make it meet its to furnish good emissions
over almost the total life of the car.
I'm really very seriously afraid when we talk about
systems that have costs of $350 to $500 or $600 what's going
to happen at 60,000 miles or 70,000 miles if it's determined
that there really is a problem for whatever reason with these
cars., Do you think that it's going to be politically possible
for the State of California to make people change $100 or
$200 systems? That's really what our interest is.
MR. HELLMAN: So that you are in favor of systems
that last a long time?
MR. BIGGERS: Yes, and systems that are simple.
In my job as Manager of Subaru Technical Center,
we are very directly involved in the service aspect. We have
a durability fleet of privately owned vehicles in California
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which numbers about 200 vehicles. In the durability fleet,
we also have a few competitive makes, and so we are verv much
aware of the problems of servicinq vehicles.
You've got to remember that when you get 50,000,000
or so catalyst cars on the road or three-way catalyst cars on
the road, it takes a lot of mechanics to service those, and
all of them have to know how and have to be trained and have
to have the proper equipment and have to be able to do it if
it's going to be effective at prices people can afford to pay.
We think our kind of system has some inherent
advantages in this area that are not shared by the more
expensive, more complex systems.
MR. HELLMAN: As far as you know, what needs to be
serviced on a catalyst system that's not serviced on your
system?
MR. BIGGERS: Well, I'm not familiar with all the
systems. I am more familiar, I quess, with some of the
Japanese systems.
I'd say that if you open the hood of a Subaru or
a Honda or a Mitsubishi product in California and look at the
systems I think, first of all, you'll see a lot more parts,
generally speaking, on the catalyst systems, more hoses, more
controls. The systems, I think, are more complex.
I think that part of the problem right now the
State of California alludes to tampering and maladjustment as
being a major problem of system degradation in the field. I
think there is some tampering; although, to be honest with
you, we didn't see very much of it. It's really quite small,
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at least on our product and the vehicles that we service.
As I told you earlier, I don't think tampering is
ever done spontaneously. I think it's done in a direct
response to an express need by the consumer.
The maladjustment, to a certain extent, is a direct
we can all do a better job of training our service people. And
Subaru, of all the companies, we are one of the newest people
to sell vehicles in this country. We have further to go than
a lot of other people. We've still got a long ways to go.
We've done a qood job of traininq our people, but we are
nowheres near our service needs at this point are nowhere
near what they ought to be.
Part of the problem is that even our system is
difficult with the people we get for service, it's diffi-
cult to train them to do it properly. With the more complex
systems, I think it would be far more difficult to service and
to train people to service properly.
MR. HELLMAN: You mentioned Honda and Mitsubishi.
Am I to infer from that that they are two other manufacturers
that have a technology which is the type of technology you
apparently prefer?
MR. BIGGERS: Well, I don't want to exclude other
people. I think diesel technology is comparable, and that
there may be there are more expensive components to some
extent in terms of fuel-injection pumps. But, generally
speaking, they are relatively long-lived, and I think only a
small part of them really need service or replacement at
100,000 miles.
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MR. HELLMAN: Considering the Honda approach for
just a minute here, I think the California Air Resources
Board in their statement and submittals to the record has
indicated that Honda may very well have a good chance of
meeting this standard that they propose for 1982.
If vou don't like being forced into using a more
complicated catalyst technology, to use your words, why
couldn't you use their technology?
MR. BIGGERS: Well, we could use our own technology.
We think we can meet the standards with our technology. I
don't think it would be commercially viable.
I think that with our lean system at something like
current federal standards we are maybe 15 to 20 percent better
than a system that's basically stoichiometric. We lose almost
all of that in order to get to one gram NO . So we lose 15
to 20 percent from two grams to one gram and with nine grams
CO.
We can probably go with 0.4 N0X with our system, but
we think the fuel economy penalty would be on the order of
another 20 percent. And we don't think that that faced
with three-way catalyst systems that are probably not much
worse at four-tenths of a: gram thaft they, are at, one. gram,
we don't think we can stay in business with that kind of fuel
economy.
MR. HELLMAN: So what's forcing you into a technology
that you would rather not go to is fuel economy rather than
emissions?
MR. BIGGERS: Yes, but it's all part of the same
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package.
I'd also like to address the comments that ARB made
and sort of alluded to Honda.
I frankly have never heard Honda make a commitment
that they could meet four-tenths of a gram NOx with competitive
fuel economy. I heard Mr. Austin make a reference to that
effect, but I've never seen a statement to that effect. I
think it's kind of noteworthy that Honda has been conspicuous
by their absence at any of these hearings in the past year or
two.
I don't know what their position is. I don't see
any fundamental reason why they can go much lower than we
can or why their system is really inherently much different
than ours in terms of this capability at those low emission
levels.
MR. HEELMAN: According to your estimate of relative
stringency to the standards, would you care to offer a comment
on whether vou thought the California standards of .41
hydrocarbons, 9 CO, and 0.4 NO were more or less stringent
than the federal standards of .41 hydrocarbons, 3.4 CO, and
1.0 NO ?
MR. BIGGERS: I think clearly the California
standard is much more stringent for us. I think even than
catalyst vehicles. The carbon monoxide, CO level, is by far
the biggest factor.
The latest estimate I've seen is that and this is
based on actual performance for '76 and '77- California model
cars is that to go from 1.5 gram N0x at 9 grams CO is only
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a three to five percent fuel economy penalty. But to go
simultaneously to a 3.4 gram CO adds another 15 percent
well, another 12 to 15 percent.
MR. HELLMAN: And why is that?
MR. BIGGERS: Primarily because our system is a
lean system. One of the things we run into, if we lean the
mixture too much, it's a combination of driveability, lean
surge problem, and hydrocarbon misfire.
Now we can handle the hydrocarbon by converting it
essentially in our exhaust system. But it gets converted
not all the way, it gets converted to CO. So, we end up with
something that starts out as hydrocarbon at the exhaust valve
and ends up as CO at the tailpipe. The only way we can
oxidize it is to put in more heat at the exhaust valve, which
means retardinq the timing.
So the net effect is that our system is maybe some-
what more penalized by goinq to lower CO standards than the
other systems, although I think all the catalyst systems have
a similar problem.
MR. HELLMAN: If the partial oxidation of hydro-
carbons to CO you indicated was dependent on the temperature,
oxygen level in the exhaust also has something to do with it;
doesn't it?
MR. BIGGERS: That's right, but you can't have
MR. HELLMAN: The air pump on your double wall
insulated reactor and exhaust system, would that heat up some
of the hydrocarbon?
MR. BIGGERS: No, it wouldn't. The problem is
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because our system depends on a very careful balance of just
enough oxygen. If you add air to an air pump, you also cool
the system and the heat turns out the heat to us is more
important than the extra oxygen as long as we have enough
oxygen. And one of the reasons why our system works as well
as it does is because the air suction valve which we use
happens to give us almost exactly the right air flow with load
and speed that we need to do an optimum job over the whole
range. If we added more air, we'd drop the reaction tempera-
ture so low that there probably would be no net gain.
MR. HELLMAN: If you have enoucth air for an optimum
job. then what you are saying is the optimum for your system
is 9 CO; is that right? "Optimum" is a relative word; it's
a value judgment.
MR. BIGGERS: It depends on the hydrocarbons and
NOx both.
MR. HELLMAN: All right. I have a question for
you from the Air Resources Board.
Has Subaru compared the cost and complexity of the
Volvo three-way catalyst system with the cost and complexity
of the conventional oxidation catalyst system used by Volvo to
meet much less stringent 1976 California standards?
MR. BIGGERS: I haven't. And if the factory has, I
don't know about it.
I think we have done some rough analysis of comparing
our system with existing technology to what we think a three-
way catalyst system would cost. We think our existing system
is a little hard to determine what part of the total cost of
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the vehicle is really represented by the emission control
system. But my best estimate is that our existing system
is about $150 the cost of it is about $150 incrementally
over what our, essentially, uncontrolled vehicles would be.
We think that to add three-way catalyst, we are
talking about an additional $300 to $500. That's a pretty
wide band, but that's about as close as we can estimate it.
MR. HELLMAN: Would this cause your cars to be
noncompetitive? In your statement, you indicated on Page 2
that will increase the cost of the car in terms of initial
cost and weaken your competitive position. However, if, as
you indicated, other manufacturers are going to more expensive
technology, wouldn't this just more or less keep you in the
same relative position?
MR. BIGGERS: Yes, I suppose in a way to some
extent.
One problem we have, we are a small manufacturer and
our friends at General Motors are very strong and any com-
petitive situation which requires a high degree of technology,
whether it's emissions or air bags or whatever, I think that
General Motors the more complicated the system is, the
better their competitive position because of their strength in
these areas.
In contrast, the poorer our position is and the
poorer the other manufacturer's position is.
CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you very much, sir.
Anybody else have anything to say?
This hearing is adjourned.
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
o ss.
City and County of San Francisco )
I, RICHARD S. ADAMS, a Notary Public in and for the
County of Marin, and I, JERRY R. SMYTHE, a Notary Public in and
for the County of Contra Costa, do hereby certify:
That we are disinterested persons herein; that the
foregoing United States Environmental Protection Agency public
hearing on the California Waiver Request was reported in short-
hand by us, Shorthand Reporters of the State of California, and
thereafter transcribed into typewriting.
We further certify that we are not of counsel or
attorney for amy of the parties to said hearing, nor in any
way interested in the outcome of said hearing.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands
this 8th day of August, 1977.
i I C- "uS. ¦* . ' ' ./ "V y'j - -
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the
County of Marin,
State of California
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the
County of Contra Costa,
State of California
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