&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
WORKSHOP ON
National Water Security Risk
Communication Symposium
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security
Research Center
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SUMMARY REPORT
National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium
San Francisco, CA
May 20-21, 2004
United States Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Cincinnati, OH
Office of Water
Water Security Division
Washington, DC
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium May 20-21, 2004
Table of Contents
Section Page
Executive Summary iii
Introduction and Statement of Goals 1
Session 1: Risk Communication During and Following A Crisis 2
Opening Presentations 2
Keynote Presentation 3
Stakeholder Panel on Risk Communication During a Crisis 3
Risk Communication During the 2003 Southern California Fires 3
The Psychology of Risk Perception 5
Communicating During A Crisis: Creating a Framework in the State of Washington 6
Case Study of Communication During a Drinking Water System Contamination
Event 7
Lessons Learned from the New York City Experience 7
Facilitated Panelist Question and Answer Session 8
Case Study- 1993 Cryptosporidium Outbreak in Milwaukee, Wisconsin 9
Facilitated Audience Discussion 12
Risk Communication Tools Demonstration Session 13
Session 2: Risk Communication in Preparation for a Potential Crisis Event 14
Opening Presentations 14
Keynote Presentation 15
Case Study: Synopsis of Risk Communication Issues from Multiple Crisis Tabletop
Exercises 15
Panel on Water Security Communication Initiatives 17
Communication for Emerging Contaminants and Water-Related Health Risk 17
Emergency Communication with Local Governments and Communities 18
Response Protocol Toolbox: Public Health Response Guide 19
Stakeholder Panel on Best Practices for Planning 19
Risk Communication in Washington Township, New Jersey 19
Risk Communication at the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 20
Communication Initiatives at the Connecticut Department of Public Health 22
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication at the Cincinnati Fire Department, Ohio 23
Communication and Response Planning at the Newport News Waterworks, Virginia 24
Facilitated Panelist Question and Answer Session 25
Case Study: Massive Power Grid Outage in 2003 in Cleveland, Ohio 25
Facilitated Audience Discussion 28
Symposium Close-Out 29
Appendix A 30
Appendix B 33
Appendix C 49
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium May 20-21, 2004
Executive Summary
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) hosted a 2-day Symposium about communicating risks
to drinking and waste water systems on May 20-21, 2004, in San Francisco, California. The Symposium
provided an opportunity to inform key water security stakeholder groups about the state-of-the-art in
crisis risk communication; a forum to share effective risk communication strategies, best practices, tools,
and existing projects; and an opportunity to gather information and advice to support activities in
developing and implementing successful risk communication strategies, tools, and plans. More than 100
participants attended the Symposium, from drinking water and wastewater utilities, public health
agencies, state and local drinking water and wastewater agencies, local emergency response
organizations, elected officials, and the media.
The Symposium began with opening remarks by Scott Minamyer, Symposium Chair, EPA Office of
Research and Development (ORD); Wayne Nastri, Administrator for EPA Region 9; Jonathan Herrmann,
National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC); Steve Dennis, Alameda County Water District,
California; and Susan Dolgin-Ruggles, EPA Office of Water, Water Security Division.
Session 1 on May 20, "Risk Communication During and Following A Crisis," began with an
informative keynote presentation by Peter Sandman of key elements in crisis and risk communication, 25
fundamental steps in message planning and delivery, how the construction and delivery of a message
influences public reaction, and strategies for effective communication and media interaction that build
public reassurance, confidence, cooperation, and trust. (Refer to web site at www.psandman.com/).
A stakeholder panel on risk communication during a crisis, moderated by Ms. Kerry Kirk Pflugh,
Manager, Office of Outreach and Education, Division of Watershed Management, New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection, focused on the lessons learned by various organizations upon
implementing their risk communication plans. Terri Stratton, Risk Communication Co-Lead, California
Department of Health Services (DHS), discussed risk communication planning actions taken by the State
of California and lessons learned during the fires that occurred in Southern California during October-
November 2003. David Ropiek, with the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, discussed the psychology of
risk perception and provided examples from his long previous experience as a journalist. Denise Clifford,
with the Washington State Department of Health, Office of Drinking Water, discussed the use of risk
communication to support efforts to assure safe and reliable drinking water. Steve Frew, Manager of
Security and Emergency Preparedness, East Bay Municipal Utility District in California, discussed the
communications and interactions that occurred with the media and public throughout a significant water
supply contamination incident. Ed Welch, Chief, New York City Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) Environmental Police, provided insights on communication as experienced in the
largest rescue operation in New York City history on September 11, 2001. An audience question and
answer period followed the panelist presentations and addressed a variety of lessons learned from these
experiences, clarification of experiences during the risk communication process, risk communication
planning, and effective methods for interaction.
Paul Biedrzycki, Manager, Disease Control and Prevention for the City of Milwaukee, provided an in-
depth case study discussion of the 1993 cryptosporidium outbreak, including a chronology of events, risk
communication methods, lessons learned, corrective actions taken for the water system and risk
communication, planned activities, and a question and answer session. An important issue still being
addressed is the loss of public confidence in the safety of drinking water that meets regulatory standards.
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Following this case study, Ms. Pflugh facilitated an audience discussion on Session 1 topics, other crisis
and post-crisis event issues, needs, and emerging tools. Day 1 of the Symposium ended with a
demonstration of a variety of risk communication tools and websites.
Session 2, on May 21, "Risk Communication in Preparation for a Potential Crisis Event," began
with opening remarks from Scott Minamyer, EPA ORD, and a presentation by Marsha Vanderford,
Acting Director, Office of Communication, at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), on
her experiences with and lessons learned from CDC risk communication activities during the anthrax
contamination events in October 2001.
Vincent Covello, Director, Center for Risk Communication, New York City, provided an informative
keynote presentation of key risk communication and message techniques and skills to consider using
during a potential crisis and how the message impacts human behavior. (Refer to
www. centerforriskcommunication. org).
Stanley States, Water Quality Manager with the Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority, discussed a
variety of incident response training sessions conducted nationwide and the risk communication lessons
learned from the tabletop and live exercises included in this training. Dr. States also provided two case
studies (pre- and post-9/11) of risk communication and response for water supply contamination threats.
A question and answer session addressed the role of the spokesperson, dealing with multiple points of
view by responders, and the importance of a unified command system focused on consensus.
A panel on water security communication initiatives, lead by Linda Reekie, American Water Works
Association Research Foundation (AwwaRF), presented several research projects underway in the areas
of risk communication and planning. Dr. Rebecca Parkin, with George Washington University, discussed
the development of a systematic, science-based approach to anticipate and communicate about emerging
contaminants and their risks. Dr. Parkin also discussed a second research project focused on three-way
collaborations and the development of a framework for action to help build such collaborations. Dr.
Thomas Rockaway, with the University of Louisville, discussed efforts underway to build a large
database of utility knowledge on responses to certain types of events that can support risk communication
and response planning. Susan Dolgin-Ruggles, with the EPA Office of Water, Water Security Division,
discussed the newly released module of the EPA Response Protocol Toolbox - Public Health Response
Module 5, which addresses the steps involved in the public health response to a contamination threat or
incident (http://www.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/pubs/guide_response_module5.pdf).
A stakeholder panel on best practices for planning, moderated by Kerry Kirk Pflugh with the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection, focused on the experiences of various organizations in risk
communication planning, processes, and tools. Mayor John Horensky, Washington Township, New
Jersey, discussed the challenges of risk communication planning in a small municipality and his
experiences as an employee of the health department. James McDaniel, Deputy Assistant Manager, Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power, presented the risk communication challenges faced by a large
water utility serving a diverse population and the risk communication planning and tools that have
resulted from these experiences. Scott Szalkiewicz, with the Connecticut Department of Public Health,
discussed current efforts to implement emergency response planning and risk communication throughout
the State of Connecticut. Edward Dadosky, District Chief with the Cincinnati, Ohio, Fire Department,
discussed a number of examples of incidents requiring crisis and/or emergency risk communication and
the lessons learned from these experiences. Tom Kahler, with the Newport News Waterworks, addressed
post-9/11 communications planning; the importance of identifying, developing, and maintaining
relationships with potential responders; and experiences in recovering from the damage caused by
Hurricane Isabel in 2003. An audience question and answer period followed the panelist presentations and
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium May 20-21, 2004
addressed the incident command system, notification systems, and the role of law enforcement during
incident response.
Robin Halperin, Risk Manager with the Division of Water in Cleveland, Ohio, provided a case study of
the experience of this water utility during the massive power grid outage in 2003. Topics included a
chronology of the power outage, water utility responses, and water supply changes to customers; risk
communication activities throughout the event; challenges faced in both returning the water system to
service, effectively communicating with the public, and the role of elected officials; and lessons learned
that are being translated into preparedness planning for future events. A question and answer session
examined responses to a post-event customer survey, reactions of hospitals to loss of water supply, and
future plans for use of water buffaloes (portable drinking water storage tanks) as a temporary water
supply for the public.
Following this case study, Ms. Pflugh facilitated an audience discussion on Session 2 topics. The
Symposium ended with a request for post-meeting feedback on risk communication needs that EPA
should be addressing.
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium May 20-21, 2004
Introduction and Statement of Goals
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) hosted a 2-day Symposium about communicating risks
to drinking and waste water systems on May 20-21, 2004, in San Francisco, California. Risk
communication is a process to develop two-way communication between various parties that meets the
needs and addresses the concerns of all potentially affected parties. It is an important component of the
risk management scheme and should be factored into every step of the risk management process.
The Symposium objectives were to:
Inform participants of the state-of-the-art in risk communication
Provide a forum to share effective risk communication strategies, best practices, tools, and existing
projects
Gather information and advice that would inform the subsequent development of a framework or
similar product by EPA that local stakeholders can use to develop and implement successful risk
communication strategies and tools.
Attending the Symposium were more than 100 participants, primarily from the following key water
security stakeholder groups: drinking water and wastewater utilities, public health agencies, state and
local drinking water and wastewater agencies, local emergency response organizations, elected officials,
and the media.
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium May 20-21, 2004
Session 1: Risk Communication During and Following a Crisis
Opening Presentations
Scott Minamyer, Symposium Chair, with EPA Office of Research and Development (ORD), opened the
Symposium, thanked the audience for attending, the speakers for their participation, and the organizing
committee.
Wayne Nastri, Administrator for EPA Region 9, thanked everyone for the opportunity to host this
Symposium and noted that EPA takes the role of protecting drinking water very seriously and this
Symposium is one of the many first steps to prepare for a host of potential events that hopefully will
never happen. Communication during such events is critical and information must be presented in as
timely and accurate manner as possible. He noted that many in attendance may be called upon to provide
information to those who are scared, concerned, or panicked. How these events transpire and how the
different agencies communicate during such times is critical to the outcome. The program for this
Symposium brings together premier players in risk communication, and emphasizes that effective risk
communication is absolutely critical and requires training and rehearsal. Mr. Nastri also noted how much
has been accomplished and so quickly since the events of September 11, 2001; such as completion of
many water vulnerability assessments.
Jonathan Herrmann, National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC), also thanked everyone
involved in putting together this Symposium and recognized the contributions of the Office of Water,
which has responsibility for implementing many of the activities identified by NHSRC and ORD. Mr.
Herrmann noted that many things changed after September 11th and one of those was the need to be
prepared, not only from the perspective of physical protection, but also being able to respond to the
public's concerns about the water they use every day. Over the next couple of days, participants would be
learning from the experiences of others and from case studies. Mr. Herrmann requested feedback from
participants on what EPA activities are working best and what products for risk/crisis communication will
be most helpful for EPA to develop.
Steve Dennis with the Alameda County Water District, CA, offered a local perspective on risk
communication and welcomed all the participants on behalf of all of the water districts in the San
Francisco area. He emphasized that the importance of understanding, preparing for, and practicing for
crisis communication cannot be overstated. Emergency response plans have recently been updated to
address potential acts of terrorism and other intentional acts to contaminate U.S. water systems. Such
plans traditionally addressed fire, power outages, and other California-specific issues. Communication is
very critical in this new area of response planning and when transitioning from day-to-day water
management into crisis management, it is imperative to understand the "who, what, when, where, and
how" of crisis communications, because effective emergency response requires effective crisis
communication.
Mr. Dennis also described how, following September 11th, the large San Francisco Bay area water utilities
began to address these challenges by forming a collaborative organization, the Bay Area Security
Information Collaborative (BASIC), in recognition of the need to exchange information, understand the
stakeholders, and unify responses to threats. The original group has grown from six to eight members
that service a total of 6 million customers; EPA, California Department of Health Services (DHS), and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have also been included. Communication occurs throughout the
response to a threat and there may be no other element of an emergency response more important than
how to communicate with the public in a crisis.
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium May 20-21, 2004
Susan Dolgin-Ruggles with the EPA Office of Water, Water Security Division, discussed the role of good
communication in emergency planning; with the goal being to protect public health and safety in the
event of a crisis, whether an unforeseen natural disaster or a terrorist attack. Ms. Dolgin-Ruggles
suggested the participants consider the five P's when planning for emergencies:
Partner - with emergency responders, law enforcement officials, health practitioners/officials, other
utilities, local government, and the community
Plan - conduct emergency response planning and learn from existing guidance; work together
cooperatively; hold exercises/drills to ensure preparedness; reach out to new, nontraditional partners
such as law enforcement; and call on neighborhood watch to assist in detection
Procure - information such as guidance available from EPA (e.g., for small/medium water supply
systems, a response protocol tool box, and other readily available information), tools developed by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and through participation in conferences such
as this one
Practice - hold drills to test strategy and communication (include media and concerned citizens); take
advantage of lessons learned, such as those presented in this forum; be an advocate for
communication; build networks; and help EPA to identify gaps (what is needed and how to fill them).
Promote
Keynote Presentation
Dr. Peter Sandman provided an informative discussion of key considerations in crisis communication.
Because the material presented by Dr. Sandman is copyrighted, we cannot directly include it in the
Proceedings. Details of his presentation are, however, provided in a video summary by Dr. Sandman
under "Keynote Speakers" on the Proceedings Main Menu. Materials covered are also available free of
charge from Dr. Sandman's web site at www.psandman.com.
Stakeholder Panel on Risk Communication during a Crisis
Kerry Kirk Pflugh, Manager, Office of Outreach and Education, Division of Watershed Management,
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, served as moderator for a panel session focused on
the experience of various organizations when their risk communication plan was implemented either in a
real or practice scenario - how communication was accomplished, what was learned, what worked, what
did not work, and what might be done different for the next time. The session consisted of five
presentations followed by a question and answer period.
Risk Communication during the 2003 Southern California Fires
Terri Stratton, Risk Communication Co-Lead, California Department of Health Services (DHS),
Emergency Preparedness Office, noted the importance of knowing your community before a crisis occurs
and how this may be done as an assessment in the very beginning of the planning process. She used
California as example, noting that communication goals are to: be prepared in advance of an event, instill
public confidence in the ability to respond, practice response to emergencies in order to build skills and
the ability to utilize knowledge/training in an emergency situation, and work in collaboration or in
partnerships with local, state, and federal agencies.
The preparation strategy in California involved:
Transparency of the planning process and in all press releases and public information materials
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium May 20-21, 2004
Use of an echo strategy to ensure consistency in the message to the public (e.g., state echoes CDC,
local health department echoes state agency, etc.)
Multi-language focus to be able to communicate with the public in a way that they will understand
and in a way that will ensure that they receive the message
Use of partnerships and collaboration, which are very important during a crisis but must be built in
advance of a crisis
Tools and training with examples provided of the CDC website and the state website
(www.dhs.ca.gov)
Coordination of all efforts by a team, which in this case involved a Public Information Officer (PIO),
Department of Mental Health, emergency services, multicultural health, and others that can help
guide the development of messages and plans
Recommendations for emergency preparedness and response planning activities include:
Develop a public relations/media plan in advance to keep actions during an emergency focused;
California requires all local health departments to have a risk communication plan
Educate using more than the press, such as websites and hotlines
Train a spokesperson so they are prepared to be in front of a camera in a crisis
Conduct outreach to local health departments since all emergencies happen at the local level (e.g.,
water district, county, etc.)
Develop a message and have a series of pre-messages in advance of an actual emergency as this helps
to maintain credibility with the public and helps the public prepare; focus on how to prepare, what to
do to protect, and what public can do in the emergency
Conduct risk communication training
Develop partner and stakeholder relations as well as conduct state agency outreach
An example of the application of crisis and risk communication actions is the response to the fires in
October-November 2003, the largest in California history. Planning efforts at the time focused on
bioterrorism and other emergencies rather than fire with loss of property and resources. Some
observations resulting from this experience include:
Involve risk communicators early in the response (from the beginning)
Issue public health messages that give the public clear guidance on what to do (e.g., how to boil water
effectively); the public did not want to hear a series of options on how to boil water
Use press releases to get out information on early actions taken, indicate if conditions are uncertain
and what might happen, and target messages to specific audiences (such as toward parents regarding
concerns about children)
Address the issues that are in the mind of the public, such as notifications that emergency operations
center is being opened, to establish involvement and credibility
Provide consistency in the message by sending press releases to partners at same time as they are sent
to the press
Build the partnerships now for those resources that may be needed in an emergency, such as
assistance from Department of Education or Mental Health for assistance in crafting messages to
address stress or other public concerns.
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium May 20-21, 2004
Overall lessons learned from this experience include:
Involve risk communication early in the process
Pre-establish a quick approval mechanism for press releases, materials, and documents in an
emergency so information is timely
Involve partners from the beginning of the planning process
Hold to core strategies in the emergency and provide as much information as possible
Collaborate with others involved in the response
The Psychology of Risk Perception
David Ropiek, a former journalist with the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, discussed his interest in the
psychology of risk perception with examples drawn from real world experience. He noted that there is an
emotional component to events and that component may be even more important than the risk of the
situation itself. Risk communication is all about that emotional component - the outrage not the hazard,
how we react to the event, and what fuels "high" or "low" outrage during a crisis.
The first and most important factor is trust. The more people can trust, the less afraid they are, and vice
versa. This is real and should not be dismissed as irrational. Therefore, risk communication can be more
about what is done rather than what is said. An example of this was a series of press releases about
government response to an incident of mad cow disease that began with statements that this was an
isolated incident, then saying that the affected cow was not processed into food for other cattle, and then
finding out that was also incorrect.
Trust comes from honesty and this means many things - constant communication, openness, availability.
An important aspect is to avoid over-reassuring; acknowledging and respecting public fear is also
important. Despite the richness of psychology and other studies of fear and risk, there persists a common
assumption in the scientific community that if the public is given the scientific information, they will
think the way the scientists do. Personal risk decision making is not always a rational process.
Trust can come from competence if it can be seen from a person's past that they are able to handle a
situation. Trust also comes from shared control and stakeholder input enabling everyone to feel involved
and a part of what is being done and said. Therefore, how much a person is trusted in a crisis depends on
what they do day-to-day. This type of trust is hard to build and easy to destroy.
Other relevant risk perception factors include:
Personal risk, which differs from person to person, and whether you are the one who is asked to drink
the bottle of contaminated water - the only acceptable personal risk is zero
How awareness increases concern and vice versa, which enables a person to focus on something that
might otherwise be ignored
Lack of control causes certain responses (such as building bomb shelters) to assert some control,
which is often viewed as irrational but is in reality a very personal response
Uncertainty, which can be scary, particularly with a new technology, disease, or catastrophe
Affective underpinnings, such as risk to children being perceived as worse than the same risk to
adults
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium May 20-21, 2004
The concluding thought is to make the messages and actions more trustworthy and the public will be
more receptive to the messages and move in the desired direction. Using top-down monologues to tell
people what to think will not work.
Communicating During a Crisis: Creating a Framework in the State of Washington
Denise Clifford, Office of Drinking Water, Washington State Department of Health, discussed the use of
risk communication to support efforts to assure safe and reliable drinking water. Communication is
critical when an emergency is underway, regardless of the type of emergency or whether the situation
represents an acute health risk. The concepts are the same and the key is to practice in advance. We often
find that communication has not occurred or we only begin to think about risk communication during the
event where such skills are needed. Therefore, it is useful to put the strategies and communication ideas
in place before an event occurs so everyone will be ready.
Ms. Clifford discussed the differences between risk and crisis communication. Crisis communication
occurs during an emergency, such as when a pipeline exploded in the City of Bellingham. Risk
communication includes non-emergency situations and is used for both risk and crisis situations, such as
explaining about lead in drinking water.
Ms. Clifford offered a case study involving the City of Seattle where vandalism occurred in a downtown
reservoir. The first responders arrived in HazMat suits, which implied to residents that the water might
not be safe. Also, many agencies were involved, including the City of Seattle, the Washington
Department of Health, and public health agencies for Seattle-King County. Each organization had
different ideas on how to approach the situation as well as different messages they desired to deliver to
the public - some wanted to be open with the public and others wanted to say nothing. Key questions to
consider in such circumstances are: What are the facts? What are the messages? What will the
perception be? Who makes decisions? Of particular importance is being clear on what the risks are to
health.
The various agencies met after the incident to establish a frameworkPublic Health Emergency
Response Relationshipsthat outlined objectives, roles/responsibilities, coordinated roles/responsibilities
(outside of collective relationships), emergency response and who to notify, communications strategies,
and agreements. This laid out objectives for assuring timely response, making timely health decisions,
and specifying roles/responsibilities (e.g., epidemiologists, water utility, those overseeing response).
Another step being taken is to link important players together such as the State Department of Health,
local health department and health officers, and the water utility. Supporting this will be workshops
conducted across the State of Washington to explore cross-jurisdictional coordination and communication
issues, among other goals. In addition, three table top exercises are being conducted across the State of
Washington to practice coordination between agencies, identify gaps in emergency response plans, and
better understand the roles/responsibilities of each responder. Anticipated benefits are improved
emergency response, partnerships, and an overall strategy for better communication.
Ms. Clifford stressed the need to be diligent about risk communication and integrating it into every aspect
of work and planning for a variety of issues - proactive management of the political environment, water
resource management (a big issue in the State of Washington), customer concerns regarding their water,
and establishing budgets and priorities of government organizations. This requires preparation to address
and lower the outrage levels of the public and others. Ms. Clifford ended the session noting that risk
communication is a constant learning experience.
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium May 20-21, 2004
Case Study of Communication during a Drinking Water System Contamination Event
Steve Frew, Manager of Security and Emergency Preparedness with East Bay Municipal Utility District
(MUD), has responsibilities for keeping the emergency response process flowing and keeping all
responding parties informed during an emergency; communicating with the public is the responsibility of
the public relations personnel. Mr. Frew discussed a significant water supply contamination incident and
the communications that occurred throughout with the media and public.
The event began on the afternoon of Friday, December 22, just before the Christmas holidays, and
employees had been allowed to leave early. The roof on the Piedmont reservoir collapsed and 200,000
gallons of contaminated water were introduced into the water supply. The initial information came from
a resident near the reservoir who witnessed the event. Initially, East Bay MUD did not know if
contaminated water was in fact being supplied to Oakland consumers. Initial responses were to summon
the emergency team and send workers to isolate the water supply, take samples that were rushed to
laboratories for analysis, examine maps to determine where water from the reservoir might have gone and
how to address it, and contact the California DHS for guidance.
Upon determining that it was necessary to issue "Boil Water" orders to 15,000 people, two radio stations
were notified and agreed to provide the announcement live. A version was also drafted for the media to
distribute with the challenge to make the distribution as wide as possible yet without causing undue
alarm. By 5 pm that day, the utility was being contacted by the television stations who wanted to help get
the word out and did so in a clear, serious, and calm manner using veteran reporters who did not overplay
or underplay the situation, did not create panic, and followed the East Bay MUD lead on tone - all of
which was a tremendous help. At the same time, the call center began receiving many telephone calls,
which required a quick briefing of call center staff on a standard script to use and what could or could not
be said. All this occurred in parallel with trying to develop a sound sampling and analysis strategy for the
reservoir.
By evening, the source had been isolated and fire hydrants had been flushed. While it was believed that
contaminants had not reached customers, more testing was conducted to verify. All testing was
completed within 36 hours and by Sunday, December 24, the test results and follow-up results indicated
no contamination, so a media release was prepared rescinding the "Boil Water" order and reporters issued
it promptly.
This case study is a classic example of how an emergency team worked together with the trust of the
public, who did not panic.
Lessons Learned from the New York City Experience
Ed Welch, Chief, New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) Environmental Police,
provided insights on communication as experienced in the largest rescue operation in New York City
history on September 11, 2001. Key aspects in effective response are planning, procedures,
communication, and information.
In an emergency, someone must assume command and make decisions as they see fit. This can only be
done through practice. Information must be communicated in both directions, and the process must
provide for factual decision. Lessons can be learned either by making our own mistakes or learning from
the mistakes of others. As an example, Mr. Welch discussed the many errors that occurred in responding
to the Chernobyl incident - by workers, managers, the government, and the responders.
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium May 20-21, 2004
Proper training and education of the public is essential to smooth evacuation and response. On
September 11, 2001, people in the twin towers were initially told not to leave. In another incident
involving a chlorine spill drill, participants were directed to assemble in an area that was downwind of the
incident.
Since September 11th, there has been no higher priority than water supply security and New York
developed a three-tiered strategic framework designed to secure, protect, and defend the water supply.
His organization has both a Detective Bureau and Intelligence Division that are involved in all long-term
investigations relating to pollution, crime, and terrorism, and also assist in the vital role of prevention
through the gathering of intelligence and information sharing. A part of these efforts involves hardening
physical boundaries (protection) and implementing an identification program to badge visitors,
employees, and contractors. Other actions include protection of infrastructure through canine units
(looking for bombs), patrols by boat and bicycle, and, soon, a trained scuba team.
Other recommendations include:
Subscribe to WaterlSAC, an excellent resource
Draw on anglers, hunters, and others who use the water supply to call in their observations as they are
a useful source of detailed information
Provide security training drawing on police academies with a note that many are not focused on water
security and the environment, which can be addressed through supplemental training
Provide security training agency-wide and tailored to each level to have everyone understand the
importance of security
Practice speaking on the radio or other emergency communications equipment in advance to be able
to communicate clearly
In an emergency, prepare in advance what to say and deliver the message in a calm manner
Develop a culture of cooperation within the organization and build trust with the local community
Prepare the public for emergencies such as developing a citizen's guide for emergency preparedness
Anticipate system failures (such as lack of telephones or radios) in emergency planning so there are
redundant communications and people available to deliver messages if needed
Communication is the most important dynamic of any organization. The New York DEP regularly holds
large- and small-scale drills, and communication is often a primary problem. Communication is essential
to timely, accurate information flow not only to keep an emergency response functional, but also to
relieve stress and panic. An important aspect is to be able to communicate with specialized teams -
scientists, health/medical professionals - in a common language.
Facilitated Panelist Question and Answer Session
Kerry Kirk Pflugh, with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, facilitated the question
and answer session following the panelists' presentations. Topics addressed include:
How the incident at the Atlanta Olympics was well-handled from an emergency response perspective
in that the response was quick and allayed fear, but perhaps not so well-handled from an investigation
perspective
The need to work with law enforcement during an incident to understand what kind of evidence may
be needed
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium May 20-21, 2004
How to identify the transition from crisis to risk communication, which is an incremental process that
begins with the release of initial facts (and how to release them), moves to releasing new information
as it becomes available, and is identifiable by the transition from the initial chaos into a mode of
operational recovery/back to business
The importance of anticipating questions about an incident prior to the actual crisis, use of focus
groups to determine what they might ask, and working with communications personnel to develop
strategies to release information
The need to train the call center staff on how to effectively communicate with the public during a
crisis
Alternate approaches (such as use of mini-test kits) in the first response to incidents in residential
areas other than full HazMat personal protective equipment (PPE), which may elevate concerns
unnecessarily
The importance of media preparation beyond just the messagefor example, where to park their
equipment, strategies for each type of media interaction (e.g., print, local television, national
television), the usefulness of involving the local media in conducting this planning, and the need to
tailor the message for each media type
How to handle effectively the initial contact by the media if the message is not yet available, such as
telling them the message is in preparation, asking for their deadline time, telling them you will get
back with them, and preparing an initial message (in conjunction with your media person) that
includes several facts
Factors that are different for a bioterrorism event than natural disasters, such as a higher level of
public outrage, greater fear of a human-made risk, and greater fear of a risk that is imposed by others
Differences today in response to the City of Seattle's potential reservoir contamination event include
a different response communication that would be prepared by the State Health Department,
communication to the public that vandalism is now taken very seriously with serious consequences,
and preparedness in how to respond to the media and talk to the community
How to handle questions from the public for which the communicator is not prepared or does not
have the information, such as honestly stating what is and is not known; relating concern and
identifying what is being done to find our more information; speaking in a reassuring manner; and
interacting respectfully
Use of the topic of bioterrorism to obtain media interest in reporting on efforts to prepare for such
incidents, what is or is not known, efforts to harden the infrastructure, and other pre-event actions to
help build public confidence
Case Study - 1993 Cryptosporidium Outbreak in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Paul Biedrzycki, Manager of Disease Control and Prevention for the City of Milwaukee, discussed the
largest documented waterborne disease outbreak in the United States. A key message is to connect with
local agencies because many of the health departments have developed protocols for communication and
have received significant amounts of funding post-9/11 for these types of actions.
Contaminants in the water supply were initially suspected because of the magnitude of the outbreak
(indicating massive exposure), symptoms were consistent with ingestion, there were recent and persistent
water quality complaints (to the water authority but not to the health department) in the two weeks before
the outbreak, and no other plausible theory. Almost two weeks passed after the initial outbreak before the
problem was determined. This time period needs to be shortened to reduce morbidity and mortality from
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the event. There were many impacts, including hospitalization, more than 100 deaths, lost time from work
and school, as well as settlements for various lawsuits filed in the aftermath.
Of particular note was that the water in the area most heavily impacted by the outbreak was in total
compliance with all requirements; although some changes in water had been noted (e.g., turbidity).
Corrective actions taken after the event to prevent its recurrence include the addition of treatment with
ozone, coagulation, then enhanced filtration, and extending the affected intake to avoid possible
watershed effects.
The news media was the biggest risk communication method at the time even for the health department
and water utility personnel. Yet, this is a classic story of breakdown or absence of communications
between the water utility and public health organizations (i.e., the water utility assumed this was the flu, a
respiratory disease), between public health and health care providers (first report came from a doctor
seeing multiple cryptosporidium cases), and between government and consumers (ignoring two weeks of
complaints about the water). In 1993, they did not have an emergency communications plan, a PIO, pre-
identified audiences, pre-established channels of communication, clear and authoritative message content,
or identified community resources. At the time, they lacked a relationship between the Milwaukee Water
Works (MWW) and the Milwaukee Health Department, had no response protocols, were not tracking
over-the-counter (OTC) sales of anti-diarrheal and other medications, and lacked efficient data
collection/reporting. Response efforts were also affected by professional arrogance and cultural gaps
(e.g., distrust, lack of respect for other disciplines, trying to appear expert in another discipline), over-
reliance or focus on regulatory compliance, and insensitivity to customers. As a result of these findings,
current practices now include the issuance of Consumer Confidence Reports, sending special advisories to
targeted audiences, developing press releases, development and implementation of training modules, and
investigation/application of community-wide surveillance networks and other methods to support trend
analysis, centralized disease reporting, and emergency notifications.
By working with health agencies or emergency department, it is possible to leverage existing notification
systems and tools such as blast FAX in addition to website, hotline, and media releases of information.
Other tools include SURVNET (to support trend analysis of disease in large areas that are inclusive of the
water system), EMSystem to help post health advisories (have used it for SARS), and CDC-funded
Health Alert Network for the states. Public notification considerations include the importance of
identifying target audiences, incorporating multi-cultural considerations (e.g., one message may not work
for all populations), using multimedia approaches, and being clear and authoritative.
An interdepartmental work group at the operational level was key to bringing together issues, building
consensus, and focusing on the same mission. The work group includes Milwaukee Water Works
(operations, engineering), public health (laboratory, environmental, epidemiological), Department of
Public Works (storm/sewer infrastructure), Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, Milwaukee
Metropolitan Sewer District, and policymakers (e.g., Mayor, others). When convened, the work group
reviews data, develops consensus on response, conducts public notification, initiates interventions, and
performs after-action review. This work group has convened for ozone outages, SDWA Tier 3 violation,
intake rupture, and a potential finding of cryptosporidium.
Lessons learned from this contamination event include:
Build and foster relationships between water utilities and public health agencies in advance, including
professional respect
Routinely share data and expertise
Develop a broad, diverse public notification strategy using tiered approaches so no one is left out
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Pre-identify community resources and partners to help craft the message
Establish a PIO, joint information center, and a plan centered on a single point of contact and one
voice during communication
Engage the media early, often, and at your schedule not theirs
Be up front and forthright in what is or is not known
Have emergency notification and response protocols in place
Use multiple, perhaps redundant, methods of communicating to the public
Cross-train and prepare through exercises
Be prepared for the unexpected
New actions being taken include:
Combining syndromic and environmental surveillance data to compare water quality information
against diarrheal data reported during the same time period
Joint training and exercises enabling response members to work together
Jointly redefining risk by comparing watershed and beach data with wastewater treatment plant
effluent data on specific cryptosporidium species since they do not all have the same impact on
humans
Future considerations in the planning effort include: interfacing the SCADA (supervisory control and
data acquisition) system with public health in real-time, assessing new disinfection technologies as well
as the risk/benefit of their by-products, and developing new partnerships to include law enforcement such
as the FBI and the new discipline of forensic epidemiology as a joint investigative technique.
A question and answer session followed the presentation to clarify the outbreak, the response, and lessons
learned. Topics addressed included:
Calls to the MWW from the public during the first two weeks that primarily focused on the color,
odor, and taste of the water with some reporting that the water was making them sick
Conduct of syndromic surveillance using multi-faceted biological surveillance (e.g., ambulances,
poison control, health care hotline, OTC sales) that are put together so results of all sources can be
viewed at once, with a key difficulty being to establish a threshold for the community
Difficulties in overcoming consumer confidence and continued allegations that the water is not of
high enough quality despite data that indicate the water is of high quality, and the need to engage
other partners to assist in overcoming this hurdle
Whether bottled or filtered water is better than drinking tap water and that there are no current state
regulations for certifying bottled or filtered water as there are for tap water
Measurement of individual filter turbidities (in raw water and post-filter water), which was done as a
once per shift grab sample with effluent turbidity measuring higher than that of raw water
Genotyping of crytosporidium by strain or source (e.g., wild animal, domestic animal, human) as part
of a CDC study of water and wastewater streams to determine which are important as a human
pathogen
Loss of public confidence in compliance because of this outbreak demonstrated that regulatory
compliance is not always sufficient to protect the public all of the time
Use of the public health organization to serve as the primary spokesperson and to interface with the
media, which enabled the water utility to focus on their activities
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Potential for use of SURVNET (a Milwaukee tool) and EMSystem (commercially-available) for
bioterrorism, water security, and other possible alert needs
Interest in strategies to standardize tools and communication methodologies to help communities be
more proactive with reference to the three-prong CDC approachstrategic positioning of supplies,
monitoring, and syndromic surveillance
Reductions in combined sewer outflow (CSO) incidents (from 40 to 2) along with declines in the
slaughterhouses and related industries that reduce possible recurrence, while influences continue from
suburban and agricultural runoff upstream that are outside the Milwaukee agencies' areas of
responsibility
Facilitated Audience Discussion
Kerry Kirk Pflugh, with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, facilitated an audience
discussion of other crisis and post-crisis event issues not covered in Session 1, needs, and emerging tools.
Key topics included:
Use of Maximum Contaminant Level Goals (MCLGs) that may be more stringent than Maximum
Contaminant Levels (MCLs) and whether educating the public on the difference would achieve
greater public acceptance of existing water treatment, which MWW noted was unlikely to occur
How to help the public understand acceptable risk (and that zero risk does not exist), including the
timing of such educational efforts, which is not productive to do following an event that is
endangering the water consumer
How to obtain and/or set up a program for training on risk communication, including upcoming
American Water Works Association (AWWA) workshops on crisis communication; training offered
by the State of Washington and EPA; resources available through CDC, including a website with
names of certified trainers and a CD-ROM with tools (CDCynergy); California DHS tool kit currently
in development; templates, guidance, and workshops provided by EPA; and contacting public health
departments whose programs are expanding through bioterrorism funding
The use of preplanning to understand potential audiences, to identify their issues/concerns, and to
otherwise anticipate their questions
The value of identifying ethnic backgrounds and language skills, how they obtain their information,
who they trust, what their priorities are, and their prior experience with agencies potentially involved
in a crisis, so as to design effective communication strategies and avoid repeating past mistakes
Addressing bold water filtration claims of technology providers by: (1) involving the health
department and/or State Attorney General rather than the water utility responding itself, (2) never
claiming that drinking water is safe as that implies zero risk, and (3) possibly developing a message
involving a sequence of true statements about the water or the state/status of water treatment
The need to balance full disclosure and honesty in risk communication with the need to safeguard
information, noting the public's distrust through past experience of the validity of such claims made
by the government and a more preferable path of telling the public what it wants to know and
omitting what the terrorists may want to know, which are usually sufficiently different
The need to consider risk communication training, which can be expensive, as a cost of doing
business, to build those costs into budgets, to consider bringing in an expert to conduct training rather
than sending personnel to training, and to form partnerships, joint initiatives, or other co-sponsorship
of training or drill activities to help reduce costs
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The importance of understanding both the delivery and receipt of information in order to be an
effective communicator, noting that no matter how well orchestrated the plan, there is no guarantee
that the same message will be equally perceived by everyone
The desire to have a manual that covers, in a simple, understandable way, all of the risks (perhaps in
checklist form) and what can be done to prevent or respond, noting that one process cannot address
every situation and good planning requires going into the community and understanding them, their
frame of reference, their economic background, and other factors
The majority of the value of a communications plan comes from the planning process rather than the
plan itself, and the learning and connections that are made when going through the planning process
are important to long-term successthere are many nuances that cannot be anticipated by simply
following a canned formula
Risk Communication Tools Demonstration Evening Session
A variety of website demonstrations, CD-ROMs, handouts, and posters were made available to
Symposium participants, including:
Physician preparedness for acts of water terrorism and the clinician role in community readiness and
risk communication; demonstrating the Physician On-Line Reference Guide (see
www.WaterHealthConnection.org)
EPA National Homeland Security Research Center (see www.epa.gov/nhsrc)
Risk communication with Dr. Peter Sandman (see www.psandman.com)
CDC toolkit on CD-ROM CDCynergy, Your Guide to Effective Emergency Risk Communication
Planning (see www.cdc.gov/communication/cdcynergy.htm)
EPA Water Security Division (see www.epa.gov/watersecurity)
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Session 2: Risk Communication in Preparation for a
Potential Crisis Event
Opening Presentations
Scott Minamyer, Symposium Chair, opened the second day of the Symposium by thanking the audience
for attending and the Association of State Drinking Water Agencies for their support to this symposium.
Marsha Vanderford, Acting Director, Office of Communication, at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), discussed the CDC experience with water security and general principles of
communication that are often overlooked in haste; such as the content element and relational element of a
message. An illustrative example involved the anthrax events in Washington, DC, in October 2001.
Early on, CDC had been criticized for acting too slowly and appearing to contradict itself. When postal
workers started becoming ill, an emergency communication was developed in the late evening for
immediate release. The internal review/approval process prior to release focused on whether the message
was factually correct and clearly understandable. Overlooked was the fact that this was the first time
doxycycline was to be recommended rather than Cipro (which had been specified to U.S. Senators as the
preferred medication). CDC had just determined that doxycycline is a good alternative to Cipro since it is
just as effective, has fewer side effects, and is more available and less expensive. The next morning, CDC
received many angry telephone calls and emails and the postal workers understandably felt
disenfranchised. CDC had, in its haste, not taken into account what the postal workers had already heard
(i.e., that Cipro was the preferred medication). The emergency message focused on content and ignored
the relational aspects - respect, caring, and the implied relationship/power between the message sender
and receiver. This is relayed in tone, use of personal pronouns, and taking into account the cares/concerns
of the audience to be reached.
Trust is a big part of any message and this was known as far back as Aristotle. People consider the
following to assess whether someone is a reliable source: Do you care about my concerns? Are you
honest? Do you know what you are talking about? Do you have the power and authority to do what you
say you will do? If any parts of this are missing, it will be difficult for the communicator to be believed.
Furthermore, trust is built on long-term relationships, like an investment bank to draw on in an
emergency. This relies on understanding what the audience already knows, what misconceptions they
might have that need to be addressed, and what their concerns might be. This is difficult to do during a
crisis; therefore, it is important to develop such materials with an audience ahead of time. For water
security, this means considering what are the likely water security scenarios, the likely agents to be added,
etc., and generally thinking ahead to what people would want to know in those circumstances.
CDC has gone through this process involving 55 focus groups for different hazards - biotoxins,
radioactive, and others. Initially, participants' first concerns were the location and safety of their families,
followed by wanting to know about the agent, where it is, whether they can be exposed, what it will do,
and what can the individual do if infected/exposed. This feedback formed the basis of a series of First
Line Fact Sheets, some of which are posted on the CDC website or are available should an event occur.
While it is not possible to anticipate everything needed, preparing for some of this in advance will help
CDC focus on the event itself and the unanticipated rather than conducting communication research at the
same time.
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Keynote Presentation
Vincent Covello provided an informative overview of key risk communication issues to consider in
preparing for a potential crisis. Because the material presented by Dr. Covello is copyrighted, we cannot
directly include it in the Proceedings. Details of his presentation are, however, provided in a video
summary by Dr. Covello under "Keynote Speakers" on the Proceedings Main Menu; along with a related
presentation and article on Message Mapping authored by Dr. Covello, which he provided as handout
materials at the Symposium.
Case Study: Synopsis of Risk Communication Issues from Multiple Crisis
Tabletop Exercises
Stanley States, Water Quality Manager with the Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority, discussed lessons
learned from a variety of training courses that include tabletop exercises conducted throughout the United
States in the last P/2 years. The scope of the various exercises varies, but typically involves classroom
training, group discussion, tabletop exercises (participants play various roles then discuss responses,
interpretations, etc.), full staff exercises (individuals from specific organizations fulfill their roles as they
would in a real situation), and a full-scale exercise. Almost all of the training course scenarios involve the
use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (biological or chemical) or the intentional introduction of a
contaminant into drinking water that results in injuries and fatalities. The goal in each case is to obtain
hands-on training utilizing recently published response guidance such as the EPA Response Protocol
Toolbox and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) for incident command and emergency
operations. All of the training includes a public information aspect, regardless of scope and with/without
a professional Public Information Officer (PIO).
Lessons learned from these exercises include the following:
All participants appreciate the importance of effective crisis communications and recognize how
critical this is to effective response
Participants readily understand the need for a common message and a single spokesperson, and
realize the confusion that can result from contradictory messages from different agencies
Participants understand the necessity for being honest and forthright with the media and the public as
well as the consequences of not being honest
Many participants view the relationship with the media as adversarial, which can interfere with
effective communication to the public
Some participants may be overly reluctant to share information with the public, particularly the water
industry which tends to be conservative and focused on delivering safe water
Participants have difficulty in sharing information with the public that has the shock value of
terrorism and WMD agents
Various agencies have difficulty determining "who is in charge" during various phases of the incident
and therefore who is responsible for delivering the message to the public
Difficulties in maintaining a balance between the risk of overreacting to a false alarm and the risk of
under reacting to a real situation, particularly when there is a very short time period for issuing public
notifications and health alerts
Two real past events were also offered as learning experiences. The first occurred in December 1980 in
an area outside of Pittsburgh where a water utility strike was underway. Someone injected chlordane (a
pesticide) through an air vent into the municipal water supply system, and starting that evening, people
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began claiming that the water smelled like gasoline (which is common since chlordane is often carried in
a kerosene container). Most people did not drink the water because of the smell, but some got sick, and
the utility had to replace hundreds of hot water tanks and portions of the distribution system that could not
be flushed adequately. The incident was reported, people were advised of what happened and what to do,
and the public did not perceive the incident as dire.
A second incident occurred two days into the Iraqi war and the threat level had been raised to orange
(indicating high risk of attack). A call came in that a yellow substance had been placed into an open
reservoir. While responders were on the way to the reservoir, efforts were initiated to isolate the reservoir
and the health department was asked to meet the utility personnel at the reservoir. Upon arrival of the
responders at the reservoir 10 minutes after the call, they discovered that members of the media were
already present. The incident appeared to involve a heavy deposition of pollen. A real challenge from a
public information perspective was to hold private conversations among the various responders (utility,
public health, emergency medicine, police, fire) to discuss the possible problem and solution with the
media present. In this case, media personnel were respectful and stayed away from the discussions; but it
was all in view of the cameras. Samples were collected in plain clothes, and an emergency analysis was
done that substantiated that the substance was pollen. All communications involved a single voice and
when laboratory results were available an hour later, the results were immediately released. The situation
was covered well by the media.
A question and answer session followed the case study presentation. Topics addressed included:
When encountering difficulty in balancing the "reaction" to an incident during training, participants
tend a bit toward over-reaction, but under-reaction happens as well
The choice between under-reacting (and people getting sick) and over-reacting (and people becoming
concerned) is difficult, particularly because there is a limited amount of time for decision-making
The need to involve more risk communicators (e.g., Public Information Officers) in these training
exercises, which is a challenge in that many utilities, particularly small utilities, do not have them and
many that are invited do not attend
The importance of tabletop drills to practice the command center operation and to stay focused on
who the appropriate speaker should be, noting that elected officials often want to take control of the
situation and use their PIOs for public communication
Uncertainties of whether a single spokesperson is possible or desirable as there may be value in
showing the public that there are diverse agency opinions and there is perhaps a need to warn the
public that they will hear different opinionsAn alternate viewpoint was that the goal of incident
command is to integrate these various opinions and develop a consensus
Use of a sole spokesperson that presents what the stakeholders have agreed upon and who also hands
off specific questions to other stakeholders (such as technical experts) for the answer
The need for the decision makers and elected officials to participate in the tabletop exercises
Clarification of the concept of single voice rather than single spokesperson and the confusion that the
public can have when different persons provide different opinions at the same time
The difficulty of handling differing opinions and whether to fake a consensus to have one message or
go with honesty and have several messages, and the experience in training that participants prefer not
to be dishonest and strive toward consensus for the public good
Unified incident command as a successful method for working out disagreements behind the scenes
and agreeing on a unified message given the importance of credibility and avoiding confusion of the
public early in the crisis, which may lose their support and make managing the crisis difficult
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The need to recognize limitations in spokesperson representation, such as inappropriateness of the
health department speaking for the Department of Defense
How communication is a large part of the effort in an actual incident and that the public cannot be left
for a long period of time with nothing being said
Panel on Water Security Communication Initiatives
Linda Reekie, American Water Works Association Research Foundation (AwwaRF), Panel Chair,
provided a brief overview of AwwaRF and introduced the panelists. AwwaRF is a member-sponsored
organization whose mission is to make drinking water safer and more affordable. The organization
conducts research on improving, protecting, and treating drinking water to improve quality, as well as
water security and improved communications. This panel provided an overview of research underway in
communications and drinking water, and consisted of three presentations.
Communication for Emerging Contaminants and Water-Related Health Risk
Dr. Rebecca Parkin, with George Washington University, discussed several research projects currently
underway with AwwaRF. The first involves the development of a systematic, science-based approach to
anticipate and communicate emerging contaminants and their risks. The research activities included a
literature review, case studies, application of mental models (neural networks) and a classification model,
and development of a strategic decision making aid.
Key findings from this emerging contaminants research project include:
Risk communication is a different type of communication and is an integral part of risk management
Strategies must be based on scientifically-derived information rather than guesses, and must be
specific to a particular area
Plant managers are viewed as being responsible for providing information and they need clear,
visible, open support by their senior management as well as the training and support to interact with
the community and understand what the community is able to understand
Communication activities must fit with the community's interests and preferences, which requires
interaction to develop this understanding as well as establishment of a visible, positive presence
before a crisis occurs
Risk communication is a part of every step of the risk management process
The literature review showed that risk perceptions are affected by gender, ethnicity, education,
socioeconomic status, geographic location, and sensory perception. Those who will be most worried
about water problems include women, minorities, lower educational levels, and those who are poor or live
in stressed urban neighborhoods, and these groups require different outreach and communication efforts.
Also, in more heterogeneous communities, the media is more likely to frame issues as problems without
solutions and this requires more complex, creative communication methods.
Recommendations for the corporate level of water utilities as an outcome of the research include:
Base strategies on facts not guesses
Plant managers are responsible and need support
Be visibly present in the community
Proactively initiate dialogues
Build professional capacity
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A second study is an effort to advance three-way collaborations for addressing water-related risk and
communication. A primary output is a framework for action to help develop collaborations. Only two-
way collaborations were noted in the literature, even though three-way collaborations are also known to
exist. Surveys were conducted of 98 water utilities, 150 public health agencies, and numerous clinicians
across the United States. Most of the utilities had worked with a local or state health agency, and many
health agencies had worked with clinicians on water security. The findings overall were that (1) each
entity has many other parties to consider and they have incomplete knowledge about each otherperhaps
only assumptions, and (2) utilities and clinicians have much more contact with health agencies than each
other.
This project has just begun. Key points and lessons learned to date include:
The various parties have limited knowledge of what risk communication is or how to use it
strategically
Scientific knowledge is available but under-utilized
Experience with collaboration is limited
Knowing community concerns builds trust
Preparing for strategic risk communication is important
Emergency Communication with Local Governments and Communities
Thomas Rockaway, with the University of Louisville, discussed a research project jointly sponsored by
EPA, WERF, and AwwaRF on emergency response planning. Dr. Rockaway noted that having one set
plan usable by all organizations is not feasible as each plan must be adapted to the local community and
much is learned in the planning process.
A lesson learned is that a utility is most likely to be prepared for more common or anticipated events.
Examples included annual spring flooding in Louisville and annual fire threat each summer in Southern
California. The area of difficulty for utilities is dealing with unexpected events such as wildfires
experienced three years ago in Eastern Kentucky where it would have been useful to tap into the Southern
California experience to help with planning and response.
The goal of this research project is to build a large database of utility knowledge on large and small
events. Some utilities are very good at being prepared for certain types of events. However, when
Louisville handled notification of a water main break by hanging a notice on the doorknobs of homes,
they found that many did not get the message; but they did when a sign was placed in their yard. Another
finding was that it was important to state information that seemed obvious, such as "even if you have
water at your tap, this [boil water order] applies to you." The goal of this database is to help distribute
these experiences.
Other products anticipated from this research effort include the development of an emergency
communication management system, a template to assist utilities in the decision making process, and a
template for an action plan for emergency communications. Research activities will include reviewing
communication plans of a small sample of utility companies, determining a set of probable crisis events
and creating scenarios, and determining the effectiveness of warning and emergency messages to local
government and the public. The focus of these efforts is on communications and ways to assist, but not
perform, response planning.
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Response Protocol Toolbox: Public Health Response Guide
Susan Dolgin-Ruggles, with the EPA Office of Water, Water Security Division, discussed the newest
module to be released for the EPA Response Protocol Toolbox - Public Health Response Module 5
(www.epa.gov/safewater/watersecurity/pubs/guide_response_module5.pdf). Ms. Dolgin-Ruggles
presented the process that the toolbox sets forth and noted that this particular module is used when a
threat is considered credible and public health response actions should be underway.
The main components of Module 5 are consequence analysis, containment options, public notification,
and alternate water supply. The process is not linear and there are times when consequences are such that
it is necessary to move right to the public notification step. There is a decision tree for public notification
and the issuance of specific actions (e.g., boil water advisory). The Module emphasizes the need for
collaboration.
Public health consequences to be considered include contaminant properties (health effects,
toxic/infectious dose, routes of exposure, fate/transport) and spread of contaminant through the water
system (manual estimation methods and models). Public notification guidance includes content, format
(short, simple, all languages common in the area), and delivery vehicles. In addition, short-term alternate
water supply considerations include water for consumption and sanitation (bottled, emergency supply
stored by consumers, bulk water hauled in) and water for fire fighting.
Overall, the Module discusses the public health response to a contamination threat or incident, and helps
the user to think through the actions necessary to protect public health in a progressive manner. The
overall toolbox has been released in draft final form and can be found at www.epa.gov/safewater/security.
EPA is working on an electronic format to enable the user to quickly get to the information needed since
parts of the module are quite long. There are also plans to develop a simplified document, develop and
conduct training, and develop support tools.
Stakeholder Panel on Best Practices for Planning
Kerry Kirk Pflugh, with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, served as moderator for
a panel session focused on the experience of various organizations in risk management planning,
processes, and tools. She noted that there is a tendency to ask for a specific tool, a quick fix, and whether
there is an existing plan or exercise that will provide the answer for risk communication; noting that many
view risk communication planning as something added at the end. Quite the opposite, risk communication
planning is part of the entire effort and must address constituent groups throughout the community, earn
trust and credibility, and be able to explain risk. There are many models and tools and in her experience,
she has found most useful the 7-step process that begins with issue identification and goal setting, and
continues through developing messages and methods to evaluating outcome. To be successful, a risk
communication plan must be in place in advance of an incident with all involved parties knowing in
advance what is expected and what their roles are. This approach yields a more positive risk
communication outcome. The panel consisted of five presentations followed by a question and answer
period.
Risk Communication in Washington Township, New Jersey
Mayor John Horensky, Washington Township, NJ, discussed the challenges of risk communication
planning in a small municipality with five part-time elected officials, four full-time personnel, and 25
municipal employees. Washington Township is incorporated, consists of 14.5 square miles, and is a split
suburban (large lot) and rural area. The water source is primarily groundwater so there are no reservoirs
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or open water supply issues. For emergency and bioterrorism planning, there is little threat except to
wellheads. The distribution system is privately owned.
Mayor Horensky also holds a full time job with the health department and, unlike many elected officials,
deals with risk communication on a daily basis, including message mapping. He noted that without this
experience and training, there would be very little risk communication occurring at the municipal level
and that it is important to rely on the utilities and have the risk communicators work with them when
there is a water problem. Incident command training is not required for local government, although
Mayor Horensky has had such training as a result of his job. He has begun developing relationships with
adjacent mayors to address such issues.
In his area, there is a strong belief that the water supply must be protected because of increased demand
for a limited water supply (groundwater) as a result of growth in the Township. As mayor, his goals for
the Township are to provide accurate information and reduce the risk of panic. Objectives in such
circumstances are to identify credible information sources, provide timely updates, convey concern (built
up through a lot of government interaction with citizens of the Township), and establish trust and
confidence that their best interests are at heart and the information/services required can be provided.
In building relationships, there is a need to identify partners and advocates, the stakeholders (e.g.,
residents and businesses), adversaries (those who wish to derail the risk management program by trying to
make it work for them the way they want), and the apathetic people, which is largely the general public
until an event occurs. Once an event occurs, the apathetic population may move to denial and refuse to
understand that there is a major risk to address, so it is important to communicate with them in advance.
In Washington Township, the water company goes into the schools, secures grants for schools, and is
viewed as a credible resource that will assist in a crisis.
Examples of where risk communication has been used effectively in his area include:
Recent droughts where information was distributed to the local community about water conservation
measures
Pollution episodes that caused discharges to recreational swimming and fishing sites
Siltation from construction activities that polluted waterways
Elevated levels of naturally-occurring radium and mercury in water
How to protect wellheads in their area as part of enhanced security
A key component of successful risk communication is developing partnerships. This provides a
mechanism for sharing accurate information, understanding who knows what, and who to go to for what
type of information. This in turn helps to establish credibility; without credibility, the public will not
believe the message.
Risk Communication at the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
James McDaniel, Deputy Assistant Manager, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP),
presented risk communication from a big city perspective. LADWP is California's largest retail water
supplier, serving 3.8 million people over 465 square miles of service area.
LADWP has recent experience with risk communication through a number of incidents: high chlorine in
the system due to misfeed from a chlorine injector (issued "Do Not Use" alert), Northridge earthquake
(issued "Boil Water" advisory), incidents of noncompliance (sent required health notices that raised
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questions requiring explanation), and post-9/11 issues and precautions. In addition, when taking steps for
their system in response to the cryptosporidium outbreak in Milwaukee, LADWP found a large
potentially impacted population involving immuno-compromised individuals (e.g., having AIDS or
undergoing chemotherapy) that required communication with care givers rather than the affected
individual.
From this response experience, LADWP has evolved a series of response steps that include a risk
communication component:
What happened - where, when, who is affected, why
Utility response - assessment, actions to take, expected outcome, and outreach to pre-identified
community partners, including feedback at early stages of expected outcomes
Advice for consumers - notice of risk, options to manage risk, mechanisms for feedback or customer
access, periodic/scheduled updates via the media, and return to service notice
Wrap-up - evaluations for internal improvement and external messages
Some lessons learned include the need to begin planning for lifting a "Boil Water" advisory upon
issuance, giving the public a context for risk management options (e.g., this is like we did for the
earthquake last year), and working with the media on their news cycle schedules. Another challenge was
that people other than the PIO often want to deliver the messages to the public and LADWP has had good
experience in having the various PIOs discuss this together and strategize on how to get the message out
to the public.
Tools used to assist in communicating the risk message have included:
Signage and road barriers to cover a large affected area
Stand-by and contracted language translators to cover 16 languages, minimum, in the service area
Mapping tools for hard copy and electronic delivery, including pre-planning to identify pressure
zones and identifying geographic boundaries to use in notifications and return to service messages
Standard templates for "Boil Water," "Do Not Use," and "Return to Service"
Also important is the identification of special subpopulations that either need special information or
require special methods to get the information to them. Therefore, it is necessary to understand how these
special subpopulations get their information and who they trust. One approach is to build on networks
such as caregivers for the immune-compromised, schools, hospitals, senior centers, restaurants, large
commercial water users, and those who distribute low flow toilets in the community. Other avenues for
accessing consumers include putting information in the annual report and current actions to create 120
neighborhood councils who can be notified by email.
Partnerships are not easy to maintain, but they are worth the investment of time to do so and to keep up
with changes over time. Partnerships for the water community include regulators (EPA, state/local health
departments), WaterlSAC (for fact sheets on contaminants that are specific to the water industry), rapid
response providers (neighboring utilities and wholesalers), local law enforcement, first responders
(county sheriff, county health, State OES, State Department of Justice), and referral services with other
utilities to share information on laboratories and mutual aid.
Credibility of the message is critical. Water utilities must resist the pressure to appear to be medical
professionals and should enlist the health department to address such issues. Water utilities must also
resist the pressure by elected officials to be over-reassuring in messages to the public. A more productive
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strategy is to select the right spokesperson from the most credible institution, avoid discussion of
comparative risks, and be timely, accurate, and useful in all communications.
Communication Initiatives at the Connecticut Department of Public Health
Scott Szalkiewicz, with the Connecticut Department of Public Health, discussed current efforts to
implement emergency response planning and risk communication throughout the State of Connecticut,
which has over 3,000 regulated public water systems, of which 618 are community water systems. After
the events of September 11, 2001, there has been a dramatic change in the number and types of
organizations with which the Department of Health must interact.
The incident command system (ICS) is recognized as the foundation for an effective all-risk emergency
planning and response capability, with a modular organization and consensus orientation in which all
opinions will be heard. Three key steps in building this capability are to communicate (achieve real-time,
two-way communication), coordinate, and cooperate. Connecticut has held four regional workshops for
first responders and public drinking water system personnel, formed a Security Advisory Committee (to
develop lines of communication), and formed an Emergency Response Group (to build skills). Cross-
training is becoming very important to eliminate pre-conceptions and lack of understanding, such as law
enforcement personnel thinking fire hydrants are controls or utility personnel understanding that a break-
in must be handled as a crime scene. In addition, Connecticut has targeted all community water systems
for vulnerability assessments and has not limited the effort to those meeting the EPA minimum criterion.
In conducting these activities, a number of issues have arisen that must be addressed:
Lack of continuity for all who need to receive security and other training
Importance of having law enforcement attend training/workshops, which has been difficult
Lack of electronic communications access by all entities
Apathy from burnout
Numerous conflicting activities
Independent ("cowboy") behavior, most commonly by law enforcement and water utilities
A key lesson learned is that there is no substitute for professional accountability in providing good, safe
drinking water that has the trust of the consumer, particularly if the health department is brought into the
water utility message. Another critical piece is to coordinate with law enforcement and water suppliers.
To date, over 600 have attended four regional drinking water security workshops, including elected
officials, emergency coordinators, law enforcement, and others. The focus of the workshops was on a
small pocket guide being given to operators with telephone numbers and other information. This was a
Washington State product that Connecticut refocused to meet its needs.
Other preparation activities underway include:
Tying all systems (Wide Area Notification System, broadcast FAX, telephones, etc.) into a broad
structure to help spread emergency messages with a focus on calling 911
Eliminating mass mailings and placing all information on the Health Department website
Making organizational changes
Mr. Szalkiewicz concluded by noting that the keys to success are professionalism, responsibility, and
accountability.
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Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication at the Cincinnati, Ohio Fire Department
Edward Dadosky, District Chief, with the Cincinnati, OH, Fire Department, presented a number of
examples of incidents requiring crisis and/or emergency risk communication and the lessons learned from
these experiences. In his area, there is involvement in both response and response planning not only by
the City of Cincinnati and Hamilton County, but other parts of Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana as well.
Hazard sources in the area come from fixed facilities (80 percent) and transportation (rail, highway,
barge, and pipeline).
Some of the communication lessons learned from incidents and drills in the area include:
Effective communication is two-way between local and federal entities and each has responsibility to
communicate with each other whether addressing a rumor or a true emergency
The importance of obtaining facts about a situation before proceeding into crisis management mode,
such as a report by a local company of an inventory shortage of a chemical that could contaminate the
water supply that turned out to be an inventory error rather than theft
Use of effective, rather than disruptive, communication strategies with the public as demonstrated by
a 3 am notification for an oleum spill using the air raid siren only to wake up nearby residents and
then tell them to shelter in place
The need to work with the media in advance to address potential communication needs and strategies
Use of the health department in the lead communication role in a water contamination event because
the head of the water utility may not be credible to the public
Communication failures can severely limit the response
Notification techniques currently in use include:
Outdoor warning sirens, with usage to be modified as described in the example above
Emergency alert system, which recently had difficulties in properly delivering a message to the
television system
Telephone trees, blast FAXes, and blast emails
NOAA weather radio, which can be used for non-weather-related emergencies
Disaster Radio Network to notify hospitals of the types/number of casualties to expect
Learning continues from drills and exercises, which has resulted in reorganization of equipment (e.g.,
what is being bought), changes in how people are processed (e.g., not separating parent and child
regardless of gender difference), and the need to upgrade speakers in SCBA. In another drill, they learned
that people responded better to direction than general statements such as "fire" or "don't panic." Using
state-of-the-art sound systems and messages that follow the 27/9/3 rule enabled better control of the
crowd as well as credibility with the crowd.
Plans for future incidents include drawing on the system of community councils, cities, and townships in
the area as focal points for communications and providing central locations for the communicators,
media, and the public to assemble and share information. A Terrorism Early Warning Group is in
development that will include all emergency responders and establish one point-of-contact in each
discipline (e.g., police) that will keep all counterparts in that discipline apprised of the situation and
actions. Also in development is an encrypted communication device (e.g., text messaging, secure
messaging) for use by all emergency responders.
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Communication and Response Planning at the Newport News Waterworks, Virginia
Tom Kahler, Operations Support Manager, with the Newport News Waterworks, discussed post-9/11
communications planning and the importance of developing and maintaining relationships with potential
responders and those who may be affected by the loss of the water supply. The Newport News
Waterworks is in a unique position of being located in the middle of the largest military-industrial
complex in the world, including weapons, military installations, and nuclear-powered vessels as well as
being only three hours from another potential major target, Washington, DC.
Key questions raised during the events of 9/11 included: From whom will we get our help? As Security
Manager for the utility, who do I need to talk to? He identified the initial emergency responders (fire
department, law enforcement, emergency management services), and began meeting with the various
organizations to develop both communications and assistance should an event occur. Recommendations
from this process and experience include:
Meet and brief law enforcement in all service jurisdictions, including the military
Help the SWAT and bomb squads get to know your plants, how to get through them, how to
communicate with the plants and law enforcement within the plant, which may include provision of
maps, briefing patrol commanders/officers on how to get around within the plants, etc.
Provide tours, information on who to contact within the utility, GIS maps, and the dispatch number in
case they find something you need to know about (e.g., pipe bomb near a dam)
Educate them on the consequences that could exist for the public and vital services should the water
supply be disrupted, as law enforcement needs to know this to be able to help the water utility in an
emergency
Develop relationships, brief uniformed personnel, and provide HazMat and security information and
maps
All of these activities are a matter of education and it is important to regularly visit/brief these
organizations to let them know of concerns found through vulnerability assessments, what actions are to
be taken in an emergency, etc. His experience demonstrated that none of the law enforcement personnel
had any knowledge of water system vulnerabilities or that the water system is one of the eight critical
infrastructures (identified in the Bioterrorism Act). Conducting this education and building these
relationships is critical because the water utility must rely on law enforcement assistance in an
emergency. Recommended pre-event actions for a water utility include:
Discuss risks and consequences with municipal government(s) as well as areas of mutual assistance
Review Memoranda of Understanding with signatory organizations and address with them the unique
problems that may be encountered for response and recovery
Conduct tabletops and other live exercises
Interface with first responders and incident commanders regularly since personnel may change over
time
Convey to the public and to large utility users (in his case, two military and one brewery) what to
expect in an attack
Another important element is communicating with interdependent utilities and vendors to understand
service restoration priorities (for example, whether electrical power is restored to hospitals first and water
utilities second); to get to know key players for water utility recovery such as electrical, gas,
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telecommunications, and other critical suppliers; and to develop the relationships and interface regularly.
In a crisis, having all the players know each other personally helps the response process.
A critical but often overlooked area is access and debris removal. Access to plants and other facilities is
essential for recovery. If debris cannot be removed, it may not be possible to get personnel to vital
facilities. Therefore, pre-planning for access is important, including pre-arrangement of support services
(whether it is by contractor or from the local public works department), and inclusion of all these services
in tabletop exercises.
A final point was to plan for having no functional communication systems and to develop alternatives in
advance for communication needs. Loss of electrical power can mean no landline telephones, no radios,
and no cell phones. After Hurricane Isabel, Newport News Waterworks went without all of these
communications systems for 7 days. Some organizations have generators, and Newport News
Waterworks was able to get messages to the local paper that had a generator and was able to go to print
and circulate information to the public.
Facilitated Panelist Question and Answer Session
Kerry Kirk Pflugh, with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, facilitated an audience
question and answer session on the panelist presentations. Key discussion topics included:
Elaboration on Incident Command Structure (ICS) training, which is provided by FEMA, instituted
through the New Jersey State Police, and passed down to the local level through local emergency
management offices. This ICS training is a multi-tiered program that takes the user through the
various stages of incident command.
Several panelists discussed automated telephone notification systems. The Los Angeles Department
of Water and Power (LADWP) is also looking into such a system, recognizing that there are concerns
about the ability to keep the information current, the desire to use their own database of customer
accounts/contacts, and plans to test out concepts through the Request for Proposal (RFP) process.
Methods to draw local elected officials into the risk communication process, such as inclusion of the
Mayor of Los Angeles in an annual workshop with LADWP.
Concerns over the role of law enforcement in incident response and how the incident command
system is an interdisciplinary process that does not allow for control by one entity such as law
enforcement. Difficulties have been encountered in the interactions between water utilities and law
enforcement where law enforcement initially directed the utility to take certain actions that were not
feasible (e.g., translation of potential contamination of one open aqueduct into a response to shut off
the entire water supply for 9 million people). This further emphasized the need to develop
interdisciplinary understanding in advance of actual events.
Case Study: Massive Power Grid Outage in 2003 in Cleveland, Ohio
Robin Halperin, Risk Manager, Risk Management Group, Division of Water, Cleveland, OH, discussed
the experience of the water utility during a massive power grid outage, focusing on the risk
communication aspect. The Division of Water services 72 surrounding suburbs through four service
areas and nine pressure districts over 600 square miles. Of particular note is the reliance of this system on
pumps because source water is Lake Erie, which is at a lower elevation than the water collection and
treatment system.
The power outage occurred late afternoon when water supplies were at their lowest. All four water
treatment plants were reported out, which is very unusual for a system of this size and diversity. Within
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one hour, the public was requested to begin conserving water. Not many in the public had made the
connection that if there is no power, eventually there is no water. At the same time, some customers
began losing water. By 10 pm, the question became whether to continue distributing water or conserve it
in case the outage would last several more days. Overnight, more customers lost their water supply, the
Division of Water lost the ability to make more water, and "Boil Water" advisories had to be issued.
Power restoration to one water treatment plant at 4 am the next day began the road to recovery, with
setbacks encountered when the water system was caught in rolling blackouts. Water system impacts
included extensive depressurization and dewatering, lots of air in the pipelines, water quality concerns,
and loss of water supply to hospitals, the fire department, and other critical customers.
The major difficulty in planning, implementing, and managing a response to this situation was the lack of
information on when the power would return, where Division of Water was on the priority list, and what
to restart first once power was available. Other difficulties encountered included:
Lack of response to telephone calls for information by the power company
Absence of the County Health Department during the response despite previous understanding that
they would take over water distribution
Limited ability to find suppliers of potable water and obtain their support
Balancing the need to stop distribution and conserve water in strategic locations for later distribution
if the power was out for several days (which would make system restart easier) with the need to
continue the fire water supply
How to restart the depressurized water system
How to keep pumps from tripping when the system is dry
Whether to pump water before treating
Uncertainties as to when power would return to each part of the system, which directly affected
restart efforts
Customers losing water after system restart because the water storage in their part of the system had
run dry
Lack of system maps that had to be remedied during the crisis
Communication difficulties where cell phones and pagers did not work
Broadcast information that provided limited utility or could not reach its intended audience (such as
"Boil Water" advisories to individuals without power for their television/radios)
Whether to flush the system until clean water or any water is obtained
Whether to issue "Boil Water" advisories to just the customers in potentially affected areas or to all
water customers
Lessons learned in the risk communication area included:
Bringing in all internal players to discuss the risks, how these risks affect the system and its
customers, and to agree on the message to the public, was extremely important
Managing interpretation of the message by external participants, particularly elected officials, can be
difficult and can result in misinformation (e.g., changing the standard templates for "Boil Water"
advisories from a 3-4 minute boil time to a 45 minute time when issued to media)
Accepting the presence of the media and developing an appropriate frequency for press conferences
or press releases as it is possible to have too many press interactions without new information
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Having elected officials defer specific questions to key personnel present such as was done by Mayor
Giuliani of New York City, but recognizing that this is not always possible
Having an up-to-date and accurate point of contact list for local government, responders, and major
customers is important
Developing a concise and clear message to keep the public informed, while recognizing that the
media may still interpret or change it
Providing a 24-hour call center so that the public can talk to a live person while balancing the
potential for misinformation through use of multiple call-in lines
Determining appropriate locations to stage water buffaloes (portable drinking water tanks)
A customer survey one month after the incident involved over 150 persons in each of the nine water
districts and addressed their experiences with the power outage, water outage, and "Boil Water" advisory
as well as whether they would support an increase in their water bill to pay for backup generators.
Findings include:
Elderly customers were least likely to have heard about the "Boil Water" advisory
Television was the primary source of information
Less than 50 percent of those who knew of the water advisory followed the instructions (women and
younger respondents were most likely to have done so)
Confusion over who had to comply with the "Boil Water" advisory, which implied the message was
not as clear as the Division of Water had thought
Confusion about the length of the "Boil Water" advisory
Little use of the water buffaloes despite fairly widespread knowledge that they were available
The next steps for the Division of Water in response to this experience include:
Improving the standard public relations language, scenarios, and communication plans
Coordinating more with the Mayor's press office
Developing more templates and scripts
Re-evaluating who should be presenting the message, for example, a doctor
Evaluating the use of a reverse-911 system to overcome communications issues
Developing a plan for water distribution in a crisis
Coordinating with county officials (health department, emergency management)
Maintaining up-to-date point-of-contact lists
Developing better ways to educate the public on what these water notifications mean in an emergency
so that a "do not use" order is not taken as lightly as the "boil water" advisory was
Obtaining backup power for the water system
A question and answer session followed the presentation to clarify the response, survey results, and
lessons learned. Topics addressed included:
Finding significant customer willingness to pay additional fees for acquisition of a backup power
supply
How Y2K planning did not help to address the challenges encountered in the power outage, such as
Y2K budgetary decisions to not buy backup power generators (as power providers assured that would
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not be a problem) and the technical inability of companies that distribute electricity to take on the role
of power generation
When concerns began to recede (about 4-6 hours after the initial outage) upon recognition that this
was not a terrorist event
Diverse reactions of hospitals to loss of the water supply or "Boil Water" advisory and the absence of
hospital plans/preparedness for such contingencies
The preference to use water buffaloes for longer-term (more than 30 hour) emergencies given the
difficulties encountered in their use - instance of arrival full of sanitization solution rather than
empty, required maneuvering space for delivery truck despite small size of an individual buffalo,
refilling in place with potable water, and lack of authority to force potable water delivery by private
companies
Facilitated Audience Discussion
Kerry Kirk Pflugh, with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, facilitated an audience
discussion of other issues not covered in Session 2, as well as any other needs. Key topics included:
Public concerns in Cleveland over dirty water upon system restart were more significant than their
understanding of why they needed to boil their water
Increased apathy and denial in New England that water security is an issue, which is making it more
difficult to properly maintain the equipment and the procedures developed to address such issues
The need for water utilities to understand the importance of transparency, candor, and not being over-
reassuring in their crisis communications, which is unfamiliar to many, and how to bring out more
interest in the importance of these skills
Using a more personal approach to go beyond the Cleveland customer survey in order to understand
from the general public why the communications during the event did not work as intended and to do
this before developing the next round of educational materials
Obtaining customer feedback 3, 6, or even 12 months after an incident as a better source of
information to help build a communications plan and budgets for communication
Seeking out local organizations who may be able or interested in helping to acquire the "why"
information from the Cleveland experience or who may provide the funding for the Division of Water
to do so
Conserving water helped in some areas of the Cleveland power outage, yet the majority of water
supply loss was the result of system design and the point of water usage for the day at which the
power outage occurred, which could not be offset by conservation
Incorporating into crisis communication planning the concept that this is counter-intuitive and the
importance of involving someone trained in crisis communication not only in the response but also in
the post-crisis review and evaluation to help in learning from the experience
Increasing chlorination for a few days after restoration of the Cleveland water supply turned out to be
inadequate additional protection because the chlorine demand of the system was underestimated as a
result of the extensive depressurization; this led to the need to increase chlorination and for longer
periods of time while not violating regulatory limits
The need to train speakers, particularly executives, and the near-term availability of an executive
communication module developed by CDC that will be suitable for insertion into various programs
that executives may attend
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Symposium Close-Out
Jonathan Herrmann, with the NHSRC, thanked everyone for attending and participating. He noted that
the Symposium involved much successful information exchange and interaction. He offered to all
participants a homework assignment to be received shortly after the Symposium - to identify and
communicate to EPA three take-home messages from this Symposium and the three most challenging
issues that EPA should be addressing. (Send any input to minamyer.scott@epa.gov).
Susan Dolgin-Ruggles, with the EPA Office of Water, Water Security Division, also thanked everyone
for their attention and participation, expressed her interest in participants providing the feedback
requested by Mr. Herrmann, and offered the opportunity for interested Symposium participants to form a
working group to address the suggestions received.
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Appendix A Agenda
National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium, San Francisco, CA
Thursday, May 20, 2004
Session 1: Risk Communication During and Following a Crisis
8:00-8:05 Opening and Introductions by Symposium Chair, Scott Minamyer, USEPA Office of
Research and Development
8:05-8:15 Welcome, Wayne Nastri, USEPA Regional Administrator for Region 9
8:15 - 8:20 USEPA Office of Research and Development, Jonathan Herrmann, National
Homeland Security Research Center
8:20 - 8:30 Local Risk Communication Perspective, Steve Dennis, Alameda County Water
District, CA
8:30 - 8:45 USEPA Office of Water, Susan Dolgin-Ruggles, Water Security Division
Keynote Presentation
8:45 - 10:00 Overview of key issues in crisis communication, Peter Sandman, Internationally
recognized risk communication expert and consultant (Refer to www.psandman.com)
10:00-10:20 Break
10:20 - 11:20 Peter Sandman overviewContinued
11:20 - 11:45 Facilitated Q&A for Peter Sandman
11:45 - 1:00 Lunch (on your own)
Stakeholder Panel on Risk Communication during a Crisis
1:00 - 1:15 Facilitator Opening and Introductions, Kerry Kirk Pflugh, New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection
1:15-1:30 Terri Stratton, California Department of Health Services
1:30 - 1:45 DavidRopeik, Harvard Center for Risk Analysis
1:45 - 2:00 Denise Clifford, Washington State Department of Health
2:00 - 2:15 Steve Frew, East Bay Municipal Utility District
2:15-2:30 Ed Welch, New York City DEP Environmental Police
2:30-3:00 Facilitated Q&A for Panelists
3:00-3:30 Break
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3:30-4:15 Case Study: 1993 Cryptosporidium Outbreak in Milwaukee, WI, Paul Biedrzycki,
Disease Control & Prevention, City of Milwaukee Health Department (30-minute
talk and 15-minute facilitated Q&A)
4:15-5:00 Facilitated Open Discussion with Audience (What are other crisis/post crisis event
issues not covered today, what is needed, what are emerging tools?), Kerry Kirk
Pflugh
Risk Communication Tools Demonstration Session (5:00 - 7:00 PM)
Stations set up for Tools Information Sharing, Demonstrations, and Discussions
Friday, May 21, 2004
Session 2: Risk Communication in Preparation for a Potential Crisis Event
8:00-8:05 Opening and Introductions, Scott Minamyer
8:05-8:15 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Marsha Vanderford
Keynote Presentation
8:15-9:15 Overview of Key Risk Communication Issues in Preparation for a Potential Crisis,
Vincent Covello, Director, Center for Risk Communication, New York City, NY
(Refer to www.centerforriskcommunication.org)
9:15 - 9:45 Facilitated Q&A for Vincent Covello
9:45-10:15 Break
10:15-11:00 Case Study: Synopsis of Risk Communication Issues from Multiple Crisis Tabletop
Exercises, Stanley States, Water Quality Manager, Pittsburgh Water and Sewer
Authority (30-minute talk and 15-minute facilitated Q&A)
11:00 - 11:45 Panel on Water Security Communication Initiatives
Susan Dolgin-Ruggles, USEPA Office of Water, Water Security Division
Linda Reekie, American Water Works Association Research Foundation
Rebecca Parkin, George Washington University
11:45 - 1:00 Lunch (on your own)
Stakeholder Panel on Best Practices for Planning
1:00 - 1:15 Facilitator Opening and Introductions, Kerry Kirk Pflugh
1:15-1:30 Mayor John Horensky, Washington Township, NJ
1:30 - 1:45 James McDaniel, LA Dept of Water
1:45 - 2:00 Scott Szalkiewicz, Connecticut Department of Public Health
2:00-2:15 Edward Dadosky, Cincinnati Fire Department
2:15-2:30 Tom Kahler, Newport News Waterworks
2:30-3:00 Facilitated Q&A for Panelists
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3:00-3:30 Break
3:30 - 4:15 Case Study: Massive Power Grid Outage in 2003, Robin Halperin, Division of Water,
Cleveland, Ohio (30-minute talk and 15-minute facilitated Q&A)
4:15-5:00 Facilitated Open Discussion with Audience (What are other issues not covered today,
what is needed?), Kerry Kirk Pflugh
5:00-5:10 Close Symposium, Scott Minamyer
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May 20-21, 2004
Appendix B List of Participants
Mr. Brad Addison
Program Manager
GA DNR EPD, Drinking Water
Compliance Program
2 MLK Jr. Dr., S.E., Suite 1362 East Tower
Atlanta, GA 30334-9000
Phone: 404-651-5155
E-mail: brad_addison@dnr.state.ga.us
Mr. Bob Alvey
Public Information Officer
Arkansas Department of Health,
External Communications Team
4815 West Markham, Slot 22
Little Rock, AR 72205-3966
Phone: 501-661-2743
E-mail: ralvey@healthyarkansas.com
Mr. Trevor Anderson
Senior Emergency Services Coordinator
Governor's Office of Emergency Services
3650 Schriever Ave.
Mather, CA 95655
Phone: 916-845-8788
E-mail: trevor.anderson@oes.ca.gov
Mr. Sumedh Bahl
Superintendent
City of Ann Arbor Water Treatment Plant
919 Sunset Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48103
Phone: 734-994-2805
E-mail: sbahl@ci.ann-arbor.mi.us
Mr. Roger S. Bailey, P.E.
Utilities Director
CityofGlendale
6210 W. Myrtle Ave., Suite 112
Glendale, AZ 85301
Phone: 623-930-2701
E-mail: rbailey@glendaleaz.com
Dr. Kalyanpur Baliga
Senior Sanitary Engineer
Drinking Water Program
2151 Berkeley Way, #458
Berkeley, CA 94704
Phone: 510-540-2153
E-mail: kbaliga@dhs.ca.gov
Commissioner Thomas Belfiore
Commissioner-Sheriff
Westchester County
Department of Public Safety
1 Saw Mill River Parkway
Hawthorne, NY 10532
Phone: 914-864-7710
E-mail: tebl@westchestergov.com
Mr. Delbert Bell
Environmental Health Division Manager
Klamath County Department of Public Health
403 Pine Street
Klamath Falls, OR 97601
Phone:541-883-1122
E-mail: dbell@co.klamath.or.us
Dr. Lisa D. Benton
Public Health Medical Officer
CA Department of Health Services, Division of
Environmental & Occupational Disease Control
1515 Clay Street, Suite 1700
Oakland, CA 94612
Phone: 510-622-4453
E-mail: lbenton@dhs.ca.gov
Mr. Paul A. Biedrzycki
Manager, Disease Control and Prevention
City of Milwaukee Health Department
841 N. Broadway, 3rd Floor
Milwaukee, WI 53202
Phone: 414-286-5787
E-mail: PBIEDR@milwaukee.gov
33
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium
May 20-21, 2004
Mr. Frank Blanco
Asst. Water Supt.
City of Phoenix
6202 N. 24th Street
Phoenix, AZ 85016
Phone: 602-262-6081
E-mail: frank.blanco@phoenix.gov
Ms. Laura Blaske
Communication Systems Manager
Washington State Department of Health
P.O. Box 47980
Olympia, WA 98504-7890
Phone: 360-236-4070
E-mail: laura.blaske@doh.wa.gov
Mr. James Bourne
Chancellor, Drinking Water Academy
USEPA/OW/OGWDW
1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20560
Phone: 202-564-4905
E-mail: bourne.james@epa.gov
Mr. Clifford L. Bowen
Senior Homeland Security Engineer
California Department of Health Services,
Drinking Water Field Operations Branch
2151 Berkeley Way
Berkeley, CA 94704
Phone: 510-540-2173
E-mail: cbowenl@dhs.ca.gov
Ms. Eletha Brady-Roberts
Environmental Scientist
USEPA/ORD/NHSRC
26 W. Martin Luther King Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Phone: 513-569-7662
E-mail: roberts.eletha@epa.gov
Kristi Branch
Sr. Program Manager
Battelle
1100 Dexter Ave. N, Suite 400
Seattle, WA 98109
Phone: 206-528-3336
E-mail: branch@battelle.org
Mrs. Sandy Briggs
Information Specialist
Dept. of Public Health
321 - East 12th Street
Des Moines, IA 50319-0075
Phone: 515-242-6023
E-mail: sbriggs@idph.state.ia.us
Ms. Kate Brophy
Water Quality Project Manager
California Water Service Company
2632 W 237th Street
Torrance, CA 90505
Phone:310-257-1486
E-mail: kbrophy@calwater.com
Captain Alvin Chun
Senior Environmental Health Policy Advisor
USEPA Region 9
75 Hawthorne Street, AIR-6
San Francisco, CA 94105
Phone: 415-947-4190
E-mail: chun.alvin@epa.gov
Ms. Denise Addotta Clifford
Director
Dept. of Health, Office of Drinking Water
7171 Cleanwater Lane
P.O. Box 47822
Olympia, WA 98504-7822
Phone:360-236-3110
E-mail: denise.clifford@doh.wa.gov
Dr. Vincent Covello
Center for Risk Communication
545 Eighth Avenue, Suite 401
New York, NY 10018
Phone: 646-654-1679
E-mail:
vcovello@centerforriskcommunication.org
Mr. Edward J. Dadosky
District Fire Chief
Cincinnati Fire Department
430 Central Avenue
Cincinnati, OH 45202
Phone: 513-357-7521
E-mail: edward.dadosky@cincinnati-oh.gov
34
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium
May 20-21, 2004
Ms. Nicole Damin
Hazardous Materials Specialist
Stanislaus County - Department of
Environmental Resources
3800 Cornucopia Way, Suite C
Modesto, CA 95358
Phone: 209-525-6725
E-mail: ndamin@envres.org
Mr. Scott Damon
Health Education & Communication Specialist
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) Air Pollution and Respiratory Health
Branch
MS El7, 1600 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30333
Phone:404-498-1825
E-mail: scd3@cdc.gov
Ms. Shannon Dean
Director of Corporate Communications
California Water Service Company
2632 W. 237th St.
Torrance, CA 90505
Phone:310-257-1435
E-mail: sdean@calwater.com
Mr. Arnold Den
Sr. Science Advisor
USEPA Region 9
75 Hawthorne Street
San Francisco, CA 94526
Phone: 415-947-4191
E-mail: den.arnold@epa.gov
Mr. Steve Dennis
Emergency Services Supervisor /
Security Manager
Alameda County Water District
43885 South Grimmer Boulevard
Fremont, CA 94538
Phone: 510-668-6530
E-mail: steve.dennis@acwd.com
Ms. Susan Dolgin-Ruggles
USEPA/Water Security Division
1200 Pennsylvania Ave, NW (4601M)
Washington, DC 20460
Phone: 202-564-9895
E-mail: dolgin.susan@epa.gov
Mr. Paul Ekstrom
V.P., Customer Service
California Water Service Company
1720 N. First Street
San Jose, CA 95112
Phone: 408-367-8348
E-mail: pekstrom@calwater.com
Mr. Jim Fay
General Manager
Champlain Water District
403 Queen City Park Road
South Burlington, VT 05403
Phone: 802-864-7454
E-mail: jimf@cwd-h2o.org
Mr. Richard Fontana, Jr.
Homeland Security Coordinator
City of West Haven, CT
281 Connecticut Ave.
West Haven, CT 06516
Phone: 203-996-3233
E-mail: richardfontana@sbcglobal.net
Mrs. Cindy A. Forbes
Southern California Branch Chief
California Drinking Water Program
1040E. Herndon, Suite 205
Fresno, CA 93720
Phone:559-447-3130
E-mail: cforbes@dhs.ca.gov
Mr. Steven G. Frew
Manager of Security and Emergency
Preparedness
East Bay Municipal Utility District
275 11th Street, P.O. Box 24055
Oakland, CA 94607-4240
Phone: 510-287-0881
E-mail: sfrew@ebmud.com
Ms. Diana Barth Gaines, P.E.
Emergency & Safety Program Manager
Zone 7 Water Agency
5997 Parkside Drive
Pleasanton, CA 94588
Phone: 925-447-6703 x225
E-mail: dgaines@zone7water.com
35
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium
May 20-21, 2004
Mr. David Gilmartin
Emergency Operations Planner
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority
2 Griffin Way
Chelsea, MA 02150
Phone: 617-305-5917
E-mail: david.gilmartin@mwra.state.ma.us
Mr. Darren Greenwood
Water Resources Manager
City of Livermore
101 W. Jack London Blvd.
Livermore, CA 94551
Phone: 925-960-8120
E-mail: dggreenwood@ci.livermore.ca.us
Mr. Richard Haberman
Supervising Sanitary Engnieer
California Dept. of Health Services
1040 East Herndon
Fresno, CA 93720
Phone:559-447-3131
E-mail: rhaberma@dhs.ca.gov
Mr. Ed Hallock
Program Administrator
Division of Public Health
Blue Hen Corp. Center, #203 655 Bay Road
Dover, DE 19901
Phone: 302-739-5410
E-mail: edward.hallock@state.de.us
Mrs. Robin Halperin
Risk Manager
Cleveland Division of Water
1201 Lakeside Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44114
Phone: 216-664-2444 x5634
E-mail: rhalperin@clevelandwater.com
Mr. Jonathan (Jon) Herrmann
Water Security Team Leader
USEPA/ORD/NHSRC
26 W. Martin Luther King Dr.
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Phone: 513-569-7839
E-mail: herrmann.jonathan@epa.gov
Ms. Virginia Hodge
Assistant Vice President
SAIC
11251 Roger Bacon Drive, M/S R-4-3
Reston,VA20190
Phone:703-318-4621
E-mail: hodgev@saic.com
Mr. John A. Horensky
Mayor
Washington Township
350 Route 57 West
Washington, NJ 07882
Phone:908-231-7177
E-mail: horensky@co.somerset.nj.us
Mr. Jack Jacobs
Principal Consultant
EMA Inc.
3478 Buskirk Ave., Suite 1003
Pleasant Hill, CA 94523
Phone: 925-746-4230
E-mail: jjacobs@ema-inc.com
Mr. Matt Jaqua
Env. Health Supervisor
Yamhill County HandH Serv-Public Health
412 N. Ford St.
McMinnville, OR 97128
Phone: 503-434-7423
E-mail: jaquam@co.yamhill.or.us
Mr. Robert Johannessen
DHH Communications Director
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals
1201 Capitol Access Road
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
Phone: 225-342-6039
E-mail: rjohanne@dhh.la.gov
Mr. John Johnson
Security Technician
Santa Clara Valley Water District -
Office of Security
5750 Almaden Expressway
San Jose, CA 95118
Phone: 408-265-2600
E-mail: jjohnson@valleywater.org
36
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium
May 20-21, 2004
Mr. Thomas G. Kahler
Operations Support Manager
Newport News Waterworks (Virginia)
425 Industrial Park Drive
Newport News, VA 23608
Phone: 757-234-4832
E-mail: tkahler@nngov.com
Miss Nikki Kampen
Water Security Specialist
Department of Natural Resources
101 South Webster St. DG/2
Madison, WI 53702
Phone: 608-266-5240
E-mail: nikki.kampen@dnr.state.wi.us
Ms. Kerry Kirk Pflugh
Manager
Office of Outreach and Education, Division of
Watershed Management, NJDEP
401 East State Street, P.O. Box 418
Trenton, NJ 08625
Phone: 609-633-7242
E-mail: kerry.pflugh@dep.state.nj.us
Mr. Bryan Kunic
California Water Service Company
1712 North First St.
San Jose, CA 95112
Phone:408-367-8312
E-mail: bkunic@calwater.com
Ms. Ava Langston-Kenney
Regulatory Compliance Officer
City of Stockton, Municipal Utilities Dept.
2500 Navy Drive
Stockton, CA 95206
Phone: 209-937-8758
E-mail: Ava.Kenney@ci.stockton.ca.us
Kathryn Lawrence
Chief, Emergency Prevention and Preparedness
USEPA
75 Hawthorne St.
San Francisco, CA 94105
Phone: 415-972-3039
E-mail: lawrence.kathryn@epa.gov
Mr. Alex Leong
Risk Manager
Board of Water Supply,
City and County of Honolulu
630 South Beretania St.
Honolulu, HI 96843
Phone: 808-748-5191
E-mail: aleong@hbws.org
Ms. Carrie Lewis
Superintendent
Milwaukee Water Works
841 N. Broadway, Room 409
Milwaukee, WI 53202
Phone: 414-286-2801
E-mail: clewis@mpw.net
Ms. Helen Ling
Water Resources Regulatory
Compliance Officer
City of Livermore
101 W.Jack London Blvd.
Livermore, CA 94551-7632
Phone: 925-960-8168
E-mail: hfling@ci.livermore.ca.us
Mr. Thomas J. Linville
Assistant General Manager
Contra Costa Water District
1331 Concord Avenue
Concord, CA 94520
Phone: 925-688-8026
E-mail: tlinville@ccwater.com
Mr. Carl Lischeske
Chief, Northern California Section
California Dept. of Health Services,
Drinking Water Field Operations
1616 Capitol Avenue, MS 7404
Sacramento, CA 95899-7413
Phone: 916-449-5596
E-mail: clisches@dhs.ca.gov
Mrs. Andrea Littlefield
Information Specialist
Texas Department of Health
1100 W. 49th Street
Austin, TX 78756
Phone: 512-488-7111 x2916
E-mail: andrea.littlefield@tdh.state.tx.us
37
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium
May 20-21, 2004
Ms. Pam Lowe
Associate Civil Engineer
City of Milpitas
455 E. Calaveras Blvd.
Milpitas, CA 95035
Phone: 408-586-3304
E-mail: plowe@ci.milpitas.ca.gov
Mr. Gary R. Lynch
Vice President - Water Quality
Park Water Company
9750 Washburn Rd., P.O. Box 7002
Downey, CA 90241
Phone: 562-923-0711x201
E-mail: gary@parkwater.com
Ms. Amy MacKenzie
Water Security Specialist
Montana Department of Environmental Quality
Lee Metcalf Building, 1520 East Sixth Avenue
Helena, MT 59620
Phone: 406-444-5360
E-mail: amackenzie@state.mt.us
Dr. Bruce A. Macler
National Microbial Risk Assessment Expert
USEPA Region 9
75 Hawthorne St., WTR-6
San Francisco, CA 94105
Phone: 415-972-3569
E-mail: macler.bruce@epa.gov
Mr. Dennis Mahr
Communications/Legislative Director
Coachella Valley Water District
85-995 Avenue 52, P.O. Box 1058
Coachella, CA 92236
Phone: 760-398-2651
E-mail: dmahr@cvwd.org
Mr. Chet Malewski
Safety and Emergency Response Coordinator
Trudkee Meadows Water Authority
1155 Corporate Blvd., P.O. Box 30013
Reno, NV 89520
Phone: 775-834-8036
E-mail: cmalewski@tmwa.net
Ms. Alina Martin
Environmental Specialist
SAIC
11251 Roger Bacon Drive
Reston,VA20190
Phone:703-318-4678
E-mail: martinali@saic.com
Ms. Deirdre Mason
Project Coordinator
Association of State Drinking Water
Administrators
1025 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 903
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: 202-293-4643
E-mail: dmason@asdwa.org
Ms. Maureen R. McClelland
Sr. Public Health Advisor
USEPA Region 1
One Congress Street
Boston, MA 02114-2023
Phone:617-918-1517
E-mail: mcclelland.maureen@epa.gov
Mr. John McCready
Computer Specialist
USEPA/ORD/NRMRL/TTSD/TIB
26 W Martin Luther King Dr.
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Phone: 513-569-7804
E-mail: mccready.john@epa.gov
Mr. James B. McDaniel
Deputy Assistant General Manager -
Water System
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
111 North Hope Street, Room 1455
Los Angeles, CA 90051
Phone: 213-367-1050
E-mail: james.mcdaniel@ladwp.com
Mr. Ian Michaels
Press Secretary
New York City Department of Environmental
Protection
59-17 Junction Blvd.
Flushing, NY 11368
Phone:718-595-6600
E-mail: imichaels@dep.nyc.gov
38
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium
May 20-21, 2004
Ms. Marie Milkovich
Risk Communication Coordinator
Michigan Department of Community Health,
Office of Public Health Preparedness
3423 M.L. King Dr. Blvd.
Lansing, MI 48909
Phone: 517-335-9723
E-mail: milkovichm@michigan.gov
Ms. Johanna Miller
On-Scene Coordinator
USEPA Region 8, Office of Preparedness
Assessment and Emergency Response
999 18th Street, Suite 300, Mail Code EPR-ER
Denver, CO 80202
Phone:303-312-6804
E-mail: miller.johanna@epa.gov
Mr. Scott Minamyer
Environmental Scientist
USEPA/ORD
26 W. Martin Luther King Dr., Mail Stop G-75
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Phone: 513-569-7175
E-mail: minamyer.scott@epa.gov
Mr. Kevin Morley
Regulatory Analyst
American Water Works Association
1401 New York Ave., NW, Suite 640
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: 202-628-8303
E-mail: kmorley@awwa.org
Ms. Katie Mullaly
Public Information Officer
Summit County Health Department
6505 N. Landmark Drive
Park City, UT 84098
Phone: 435-615-3951
E-mail: kmullaly@utah.gov
Mr. Wayne Nastri
Regional Administrator
USEPA Region 9
75 Hawthorne St.
San Francisco, CA 94105
Phone: 415-947-8702
E-mail: nastri.wayne@epa.gov
Ms. Jean M. Nicolai
Operations and Compliance Chief
Vermont Water Supply Division
Waterbury, VT 05671-0403
Phone: 802-241-3405
E-mail: jean.nicolai@anr.state.vt.us
Ms. Janice Okubo
Public Information Officer
Hawaii State Department of Health
1250 Punchbowl Street, Room 326
Honolulu, HI 96813
Phone: 808-586-4442
E-mail: jsokubo@health.state.hi.us
Mr. David Paris
Water Supply Administrator
Manchester Water Works
1581 Cake Shore Rd.
Manchester, NH 03109
Phone: 603-624-6482 x201
E-mail: dbparis@comcast.net
Dr. Rebecca Parkin
Associate Dean for Research
& Public Health Practice
The George Washington University
2100 M Street, NW, Suite 203
Washington, DC 20052
Phone: 202-994-5482
E-mail: eohrtp@gwumc.edu
Ms. Connie S. Patterson
Communications Director
Missouri Department of Natural Resources
205 Jefferson St., P.O. Box 176
Jefferson City, MO 65102
Phone: 573-751-1010
E-mail: connie.patterson@dnr.mo.gov
Mr. Steve Pellei
Technical Services Administrator
Virginia Department of Health,
Office of Drinking Water
109 Governor St., Room 629
Richmond, VA 23219
Phone: 804-864-7489
E-mail: steve.pellei@vdh.virginia.gov
39
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium
May 20-21, 2004
Dr. Dan Petersen
Biological Scientist
USEPA/ORD/NRMRL
26 W. Martin Luther King Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Phone:513-569-7831
E-mail: petersen.dan@epa.gov
Mr. Marshall L. Racine, Jr.
Superintendent, Water Production &
Distribution
Corona Department of Water and Power
730 Corporation Yard Way
Corona, CA 92880-2051
Phone: 909-736-2479
E-mail: marshall.racine@discovercorona.com
Ms. Christine Reckelhoff
ASPH/EPA Fellow
USEPA/ORD/NRMRL
26 W. Martin Luther King Dr.
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Phone: 513-569-7655
E-mail: reckelhoff.chrissy@epa.gov
Linda Reekie
Project Manager
AWWARF
6666 W. Quincy Avenue
Denver, CO 80235
Phone: 303-734-3423
E-mail: lreekie@awwarf.org
Dr. Thomas D. Rockaway, P.E.
Infrastructure Research
University of Louisville
W. S. Speed Hall
Louisville, KY 40292
Phone: 502-852-3272
E-mail: rockaway@louisville.edu
Mr. John Rodgers
Emergency Planning Coordinator
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission
1155 Market Street, 4th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94103
Phone: 415-554-2458
E-mail: jrodgers@sfwater.org
Mr. David Ropeik
Director of Risk Communication
Harvard Center for Risk Analysis,
Harvard School of Public Health
718 Huntington Avenue
Boston, MA 02115-5924
Phone:617-432-6011
E-mail: dropeik@hsph.harvard.edu
SMSgt Kelly Ruff
Sr. Operations NCO
52nd WMD Civil Support Team
8202 S. Access Road
Columbus, OH 43217
Phone: 614-419-8898
E-mail: kelly.ruff@oh.ngb.army.mil
Dr. Peter M. Sandman
59 Ridgeview Rd.
Princeton, NJ 08540-7601
Phone: 609-683-4073
E-mail: peter@psandman.com
Mrs. Charlotte Smith
President
Charlotte Smith & Associates, Inc.
PO Box 629
Orinda, CA 94563
Phone:925-377-1891
E-mail: smith.csa@earthlink.net
Mr. Richard Staley
Emergency Planning Coordinator
Santa Clara Valley Water District -
Office of Emergency Services
5750 Almaden Expressway
San Jose, CA 95118
Phone: 408-265-2600
E-mail: rstaley@valleywater.org
Dr. Stanley States
Water Quality Manager
Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority
900 Freeport Road
Pittsburgh, PA 15238-3132
Phone: 412-782-7553
E-mail: sstates@pgh20.com
40
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium
May 20-21, 2004
Mr. Jeffrey Stone, P.E.
Engineer Supervisor
Arkansas Department of Health,
Division of Engineering
4815 West Markham Street (MS37)
Little Rock, AR 72205-3867
Phone: 501-661-2623
E-mail: jstone@healthyarkansas.com
Ms. Terri Lee Stratton
Risk Communication Co-Lead
Emergency Preparedness
CA Department of Health Services -
Office of Emergency Preparedness
1500 Capitol Ave., MS 7002
Sacramento, CA 95670
Phone: 916-650-6457
E-mail: tstratto@dhs.ca.gov
Mr. Jeffrey Stuck
Safe Drinking Water Program, Manager
AZ Department of Environmental Quality
1110 West Washington Street, 5415B-2
Phoenix, AZ 85007
Phone: 602-771-4617
E-mail: stuck.jeff@ev.state.az.us
Mr. Richard Sykes
Manager of Water System Department
East Bay Municipal Utility District
375 llth Street
Oakland, CA 94607
Phone: 510-287-1629
E-mail: rsykes@ebmud.com
Mr. Scott L. Szalkiewicz
Health Program Supervisor
State of Connecticut Department of Public
Health (Drinking Water Division)
410 Capital Avenue, MS#51 WAT
Hartford, CT 06134-3408
Phone: 860-509-7333
E-mail: scott.szalkiewicz@po.state.ct.us
Mr. Mike Uhrhammer
Communications Manager
Padre Dam Municipal Water District
10887 Woodside Avenue
Santee, CA 92072
Phone: 619-258-4613
E-mail: muhrhammer@padre.org
Dr. Marsha L. Vanderford
Acting Associate Director for Communication
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
1600 Clifton Road, NE, Mail Stop D-25
Atlanta, GA 30333
Phone: 404-639-7290
E-mail: mev7@cdc.gov
Chief Ed Vasques
Asst. Chief (Special Operations)
Sacramento Fire Dept.
3230 J St.
Sacramento, CA 95816
Phone: 916-264-7522
E-mail: evasques@sfd.cityofsacramento.org
Ms. Melissa C. Walker
Public Information Officer
Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals/Office of Public Health
6867 Bluebonnet Blvd.
Baton Rouge, LA 70810
Phone: 225-763-3558
E-mail: mwalker2@dhh.la.gov
Dr. Jeannette V. Weber
Water Quality/Laboratory Manager
California Water Service Company
1720 North First Street
San Jose, CA 95112
Phone:408-367-8319
E-mail: jweber@calwater.com
Mr. Lee Weislogel
Special Projects Coordinator
Tualatin Valley Water District
P.O. Box 745
Beaverton, OR 97075
Phone: 503-848-3064
E-mail: lee@tvwd.org
Mr. Edward J. Welch
Chief of Police
New York City Department of Environmental
Protection
465 Columbus Avenue
Valhalla, NY 10595
Phone: 914-742-2048
E-mail: ewelch@dep.nyc.gov
41
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National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium
May 20-21, 2004
Mr. John Whitler
Environmental Protection Specialist
USEPA/OW/OGWDW/WSD/TAPPB
1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, (4601M)
Washington, DC 20460
Phone: 202-564-1929
E-mail: whitler.john@epa.gov
Ms. J. Lindsey Wolf
Program Manager - Public Affairs
City of San Jose Environmental Services
Department
777 No. First St., Suite 300
San Jose, CA 95112
Phone: 408-277-5597
E-mail: lindsey.wolf@sanjoseca.gov
Mr. Kelvin Yamada
Staff Environmental Scientist
California Department of Health Services
1616 Capitol Avenue, Suite 174
Sacramento, CA 95814
Phone: 916-552-9999
E-mail: kyamada@dhs.ca.gov
Dr. Marylynn Yates
Professor
University of California
4108HinderakerHall
Riverside, CA 92521
Phone: 909-787-2358
E-mail: marylynn.yates@ucr.edu
Mr. Doug Yoder
Asst. Director, Miami-Dade Environmental
Resources Mgmt. Dept.
PTI Sustainability Task Force
33 SW 2nd Ave.
Miami, FL 33146
Phone: 305-372-6766
E-mail: yoderd@miamidade.gov
Mr. Marvin Young
State Program Officer
USEPA Region 9, Drinking Water Office
75 Hawthorne Street, Mail Stop: WTR-6
San Francisco, CA 94105
Phone: 415-972-3561
E-mail: young.marvin@epa.gov
42
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Messages
ufTice MeaiQ
Content Element
» Explicit information
Relational Element
»Implications about
respect & caring
»Implied statements
about power
Watzlawick, Beavin, &
Jackson 1967
SAFER-HEALTHIER- PEOPLE"
Credibility:
Can I trust you?
Do you care and my concerns?
Are you honest?
Do you know what you are talking
about?
Do you have the power and authority
and do what you say you will do?
Aristotle
Max Weber
SAFER -HEALTHIER-PEOPLE
Audience Analysis
What competing beliefs do audiences hold?
» What misconceptions need to be addressed?
What are they most concerned about?
» Addressing their concerns before expecting them
to attend to other messages.
SAFER-HEALTHIER-PEOPLE
CDC1
-------
/.rr.",!. Lessons Learned
from Anthrax
Increase time available for developing incident-specific
ition by
, ,^-event development, audience testing, and clearing
public information
Non-incident specific information on bio, radiation, chemical
threats and shell documents
To decrease perception of contradictions
invironmental scanning: address changes/differences
What new information have we discovered?
» Anticipate changes to come
Acknowledge current uncertainties
Present guidelines and conclusions as "interim" or
"contingent"
EALTHIER
Information Needs:
Across all Agents
What is the agent?
Where is the agent found?
How could I have been exposed?
What are the health effects?
How can I protect myself and those I care about
from exposure/infection?
What should I do if I think I've been
exposed/infected?
Where can I get more information?
First Line Fact Sheets
Chemicals: Abrin/Ricin, Lewisite, Sulfur Mustard,
Sarin, Cyanide, Paraquat, Phosgene, Sodium
Azide, Soman, Tabun
Radiation
Biotoxins: Ricin, Cholera, Ecoli, Typhoid Fever,
Tularemia
SAFER-HEALTHIER- PEOPLE""
12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 ' 5 6 7 ' 8 ' 9' 10 11
Hon. 17 May 2004
I SdiclBdDai
CDC1
-------
linpfovJntj CDininunJ'Jzitions -ffoin
Ths JVJJJw2iLJl«3 VViiisr VVorfe fjyJVVVV)
business enterprise
The utility is operated 24 hours
a day, 365 days a year
In 2002, the utility pumped and
distributed 45 billion gallons of
water to 833,000 people in 15
communities
Average 126M gal/day (2003)
2000 miles of distribution line
"oximately 350 employees
ir purification, distribution,
"'ing, customer service,
:eter installation
Microbe
... Microbe
hiking DOdunOCS, mgy well '-"p?
i~-s*"t5 and cafes htt again "
.|»ll]j*4T I"LT1 m*_.
put t IK- kettles on
Raging virus
hits hard at
area schools
ill .il ,
Some will be told
^".irT"!!1!",. ^ to '3O'' c'*y water
Those with low resistance at risk
Crypto illness count raised to 403,000
sx&iS IspfeS
^Zre/az.'S^Sr .&._,i *_-- »uja&_. . -^-"^^~"~
-------
j si vsirjE^y us cor]
"Jrypiozp ofJdJuin
4-7 microns in size
Not sensitive to chlorin
Removed from water primarily by coagulation and filtration
Also can be impacted by ozone, UV, microfiltration
Can be removed in 1 micron absolute filtration units,
1 minute.
"Jrypiosp orJcJJosJs
ngestion of as few as 30 oocysts (DuPont, et
al,1995), usually C. parvum
Little information regarding infectivity in
immunocompromised
Diarrheal illness with 1-12 day incubation
Illness can last 30 days (usually 2 wks)
~--*-rred immunity unknown
Magnitude of outbreak (massive exposure)
Symptoms consistent with ingestion
Recent and persistent water quality complaints
(odor, color and taste)
Absence of any other immediate and plausible
-------
Meteorologic conditions
(rain, snow melt)
Lake turnover and turbidity
(seasonal)
Water intake location
(depth and position)
p'occulant Efficacy
lidentified f~-'
Howard Avenue plant recorded high turbidities
before and during outbreak, but all regulations m
No mechanical breakdown of flocculators or filters
No other obvious treatment plant failure
All existing MWW protocols followed
ypj:o5{jorjdjLJjjj cli
44,000 doctor visits,
4,400 hospitalized,
more than 100 deaths,
725,000 lost work or school days,
$96 million in lost wages and medical expenses
> 4,000 people filed notices of injury
-1,400 filed claims seeking damages of $25
million
Consolidation into class-action lawsuit (about 540
total)
City settled for $100,000
ral Chemical Corp., settled for $1.5 mill'
oases - $13,500 after attorneys' f«
-------
Howard Avenue intake extended to avoid
possible effects of watershed
Ozone and enhanced filtration installed
Routine watershed environmental monitor
for pathogens began
Water/Health Technical Subcommittee
Disease Si
sntal monitoring
Between the water utility and public health
(where's the flu?)
Between public health and healthcare
providers (the "astute clinician")
Between government and consumers
omplaint log "insensitivity")
emergency communications |^,
die information officer or POC
Pre-identified audiences
Pre-established channels of communication
Clear and authoritative message content
entified c
ledia strategy
Lack of relationship between MWW and MHD
Lack of any response "protocols"
Lack of efficient data collection and reporting
Professional arrogance and cultural gaps
Over reliance/focus on regulatory compliance
Desensitr~t;-" * -*
-------
P u/jJj c JXJ o cj/j ca cj OTJ 0 OTJ 3J d era cj OTJ 3
-------
jrkgroup at operational
evel
Joint Data Sharing &
Review
Emergency Notification &
Response Protocols
'eview of alterations to
aatment plant Practices
rofessional and
ommunity Presentations
Joint Emergency
Preparation & Planning
MWW (operations and engineering)
Public Health (lab, env. and epi)
DPW (storm and sewer infrastructure)
WDNR (regulatory)
MMSD (wastewater treatment)
Policymakers (Mayor and CC)
rarrjapiim/jamiU rruiozt
rch 2y, 2004 rJovyy/d Phmi
Ozone outages
Crypto that wasn't Cr/pfo (PCR tests
negative, contracted Lab did original
Crypto testprobably algae)
Cold Water Ozone Press Release
Immunocompromised Brochure)
SDWA Violation (Tier 3), turbidit
-------
s'/y {Jiiriijijjjjs: Jj/J5irjijg
'incj syndrornic sind sii/i
rLJiurB 0<
Vulnerability Assessment and
Water Security
SCADA system interface with PH
New Disinfection Technologies (UV
microfilitration)
Disinfection By-Products (risk/benefit
analysis) ^^^^m
New partnerships (EM, FBI, HazMa
DHS)
-------
uistriDimon system
Disinfectant resistant organisms
Emergency Response planning,
protocols and training
Hazardous Materials handling and storage
Cyber assaults
Deteriorating infrastructur
a Inter-Utility Cooperation
Acl
-------
I
Communicating During A Crisis:
Creating a Framework in Washington
Denise Addotta Clifford
Office of Drinking Water
PUBLtC HEAITHI
I numim VUUIMTOK I
Health
Communication is Critical
"The biggest problem with
communication is the illusion that
it's been accomplished"
- George Bernard Shaw
-------
Risk vs. Crisis Communication
4 Crisis communication occurs during
an emergency
Risk communication includes non-
emergencies
Used for both risk and crisis situations
Drinking Water Examples
Water Quality Concerns
Health Advisories
Drought/ Floods
Emergencies
Case in Point: City of Seattle
* Cross Jurisdictional Issues:
City of Seattle
WA Dept of Health
Public Health Seattle - King Co.
What are the facts?
What are the messages?
What will the perception be?
Who is on first?
Who makes decisions?
Establishing a Framework
Public Health Emergency Response
Relationship
Objectives
Roles and Responsibilities
Coordinated Roles and Responsibilities
Emergency Response: Notification
Communications
Taking it on the Road
* Link Important Players Together
Department Of Health
Local Health - HEALTH OFFICERS
Water Utility
Conduct Workshops Around the State
Explore cross-jurisdictional, coordination, and
communication issues
Training on Risk Communications
Develop a template for a framework that will
work for them
-------
I
Office of Drinking Wat
Emergency Response Tabletops
Three exercises around the state:
Coordination between agencies
Identify the gaps in emergency response plans
Better understand the roles / responsibilities of
each responder
Benefits
Growth
Partnerships
Better overall communications
Constituent Relations:
Risk Communication Everyday
Proactive Issues Management
Response to Political Environment
Fluoride - Supreme Court Ruling
Water Resource Management
4 Customer Concerns
Aesthetic vs. Public Health Problems
4 Budget and Priorities of Government
-------
tisk Communication:
f f / f / S
Core Slides
Vincent T. Covello, Ph.D.
Director, Center for Risk Communication/
Consortium for Risk and Crisis Communication
29 Washington Square West, Suite 2A
New York, New York 10011
Tel.: 646-654-1679; Fax.: 212-749-3590
email: vincentcovello@ix.netcom.com
web site: www.centerf ' '
lence-based Approach for
Communicating Effectively in:
High-Concern
High Stress
Emotionally Charged, or
Controversial Situation""
:isk Communication:
Kev Messaaes
. , .
sk communication is a science
.__.sed discipline
High stress, high concern situations
change the rules of communication
' ThaSujyit;
is aniicipa
practice
commi
success
pryparaiioi
:isk Communication Science
8000 Articles in Peer Reviewed
Scientific Journals
2000 Books
Reviews of the Literature by Major
Scientific Organizations (e.g., US
National Academy of Sciences; Royal
Society of Great B~:"-:-*
since 9/11 were not just clinical,
epidemiological, technical, issues.
The major challenges were
communication. In fact, as we move
into the 21st century, communication
may well become the central science
of public health practice." (December,
2001) Edward Baker, MD, MPH,
Assistant Surgeon General
=i i iia <« r iMT
Communication CDCvnen
A Guide to Emeraencv Risk
tion Plannin
-------
aae Develoment
95% R
"95% of all questions and
concerns that will be raised by
any stakeholder in any
controversy can be predicted in
advance."
Implicatio
itifying Stakeholders and
Jheir Specific Concerns
Historical Record (e.g., meeting
documents; media reports; logs)
-Specific
-Related
-General
Subject-matter experts
Role Plavine
-------
7/9/3 Tern Dlate
7 words
9 seconds
3 messages
lates
L-4 (clear messages)
2) 27/9/3 (concise messages)
3) Message Maps
Key Message/Fact
3;
I conquered
-------
Overarching Message Map (O Map)
Addresses:
What should people know about "x"
'Vhat you want them to know about
/ "x" regardless of questions asked
-What you would put in your opening
statement about "x"
Be sure it gets delivered
-"Bridge" to it if necessary: e.g., "I
want to remind you again..."
Serves as a "A port in a storm"
ssage Mr
Core, Kev
Messages)
Informational Maps
Challenging Question Maps
Information Forum
Risk Communication Templates
/J~*^LjT f / J'
L-4 (clear messages)
) 27/9/3 (concise messages)
3) Message Maps
Risk Communication Template
GL-4 (clear messages,
"/.
2) 27/9/3 (concise messages)
3) Message Maps
4) IDK
-------
I.D.K. (I Don't Know) Template:
I.D.K. (I Don't Know) Template
Short Form
Don't Know/Can't
ri
Give the Reason Why You Don't
Know or Can't Answer*
Indicate Follow Up
adline
/ /
.cknowledge/Repeat the Question
Say You Don't Know/Can't
Answer/Wish You Could Answe
Give the Reason(s) Why You Don't
Know or Can't Answer*
Indicate Follow Up with Deadline
Bridge to What You Can Say
'.K. (I Don't Know) Template:
, ou are not prepared to answer
You are not the expert
lot the responsible party
t have information or data
(e.g., it is being i
You are limited in what can say (e.g.
(nuiioniiJ security; Jiiicjuiion; privacy)
Messenae
'eople judge the messenger before
he message
/
'eople judge the messenger primarily
in terms of trust
Information about trust comes from
non-verbal communication, verbal
communicatii
Imolicatioi
-------
L-4 (clear messages,
2) 27/9/3 (concise messages)
3) Message Maps
4) IDK
lates
L-4 (clear messages)
2) 27/9/3 (concise messages)
3) Message Maps
4) IDK
) CCO
isk Cornmunication-
L~~~T ft s // _
Non-Verbal Communicatio
Eyes
-- Eye contact
Hands
-- Visible; waist level; small
-- Slight lean forward; relaxed;
6
-------
vidge to known facts,
processes procedures or
actions - "Here's what I can
guarantee (assure;
promise...)"
Guarantee Template
"What I can [guarantee; assure;
tell; promise] you is..."
isk Communication:
/ /^~~r -T
Kev Messaaes
Risk communication is a science
based discipline
High stress, high concern situations
change the rules of communication
o commi
m. and
-------
Homeland Security Fire Response Planning
2
3 - NORTHEAST
4 - NE CENTRAL
5-WEST CENTRAL
6- SOUTHWEST
7-SOUHEAST(1)
(2)
Crisis and Emergency Risk
Communication impacts
5 organizational concerns:
1. Execute response and recovery
efforts
2. Decrease illness, injury, and deaths
3. Avoid misallocation of limited
resources
4. Reduce rumors surrounding
recovery
5. Avoid wasting resources
' Sources of Hazards/Toxics
Fixed Facilities 80%
Transportation 20%
- Rail
- Highway
- Barge
- Pipeline
-------
Hazardous Materials
Emergencies
Accidental or intentional
spills, releases, or
discharges into the
environment
Some are large and result
in harm to people and
property
Air dispersion modeling
programs
- Protective Action Decision
Evacuation
SIP
CINCINNATI
The public can be notified in the
following ways:
- NOAA weather radios
- Outdoor warning sirens
- TV/radio via Emergency Alert System
- Door-to-door notification
- ARTIMIS message boards
- Email and fax system
Phone trees
- Public address system from vehicles
NOAA Weather Radios
All Hamilton County schools, licensed
day care centers and senior centers
have NOAA weather radios
Many citizens have weather radios
(but not 100% coverage) -_^_
Disaster Network
The Hamilton County Disaster Radio
Network cpnsists of a series of radios
with a dedicated frequency issued to
Greater Cincinnati area hospitals. The
system is designed to facilitate the
distribution and flow of patients of
multi-casualty incidents to area
hospitals by providing a means of
communication among emergency
responders and receiving facilities.
Once activated, the "Net" links on-
scene command personnel with area
hospitals.
It alerts area hospitals that a mass
casualty incident has occurred,
provides hospital patient capability
information to scene personnel, and
provides incoming patient information
to receiving facilities.
DISASTER NET WAS NEEDED
Who Concert - 1979
Beverly Hills - 1977
Air Canada - 1983
-------
TERRORISM INCIDENTS
What Do People Feel Inside
When
a Disaster Looms or
Occurs?
Psychological barriers:
1. Denial
2. Fear, anxiety, confusion,
dread
3. Hopelessness or
helplessness
4. Seldom panic
TERRORISM INCIDENTS
ON SCENE
COMMUNICATIONS
2002 Paul Brown
Stadium Exercise
-Victims confused and
disoriented
2003 SORTA Exercise
-Sound system added to
evolution
-SCBA and APR 'speaker'
upgrade
5 communication steps that
boost operational success
1. Execute a solid communication plan
2. Be the first source for information
3. Express empathy early
4. Show competence and expertise
5. Remain honest and open
red.', ,YI
IM
Paul Brown Stadium
PBS Tornado Warning
TORNADO WARNING
The National Weather Service has issued a
TORNADO WARNING for the Cincinnati area.
Conditions may exist that include lightening, heavy
rain, and hail and a tornado. In an orderly manner,
please take shelter immediately in the concourse
area, restrooms and/or parking garage seeking the
lowest level available. Stay away from all areas
having windows. If necessary, public address
announcements will be made with further
instructions.
Great American Ball Park
SEVERE THUNDERSTORM WARNING
The National Weather Service has issued a Severe
Thunderstorm Warning for the Cincinnati area until.
Conditions may exist that include lightning, heavy rain,
and hail and/or high wind.
In an orderly manner, please take shelter immediately in
the concourse area, restrooms and/or parking garage.
Stay away from all areas having windows.
If necessary, public address announcements will be
made with further instructions.
-------
Communication failures that
operational success
-Mixed messages from multiple experts
-Information released late
-Paternalistic attitudes
-Not countering rumors and myths in real-time
-Public power struggles and confusion
COMMUNITY COUNCIL
NOTIFIER
(52) Cincinnati Community Councils
Hamilton County has (49) cities/townships
Pre Incident
Incident concurrent
Post Incident
- Local incident*
- Terrorism threat level increase
- Incident in another part of United States
- World incident
Community Relations
-Community acceptance through community
involvement
-Resource multiplier for volunteer "door to door"
communication
-Involving stakeholders is a way to advance trust
through transparency
-Our communities, our social capital, are a critical
element of a nation's security
City of Cincinnati
Terrorism Early Warning Group
Mobile Data Computer Project
- City/County Fire
- City/County Health
- City/County Police
- Other City/County Departments
- 33 Hospitals in Tri State Region
- 8 Communications Centers
-------
Response Protocol Toolbox:
Public Health Response
Module 5
Susan Dolgin
USEPA, Water Security Division
Risk Communication Symposium
Acknowledgements
Steve Allgeier, project lead
SAIC staff
Technical reviewers:
- Drinking water utilities and organizations
-State drinking water programs
-US EPA: OGWDW, NHSRC, OSWER
- Centers for Disease Control & Prevention
San Francisco, CA
Module 5 Overview
Consequence analysis
Containment options
Public notification
Short-term alternate water supply
mplement Operational
Response Actions
Public Health Consequences
Contaminant properties:
-Acute and chronic health effects
-Toxic or infectious dose
-Routes of exposure
- Fate and transport in treated water
Spread of contaminant through system:
-Manual estimation methods
- Distribution system models
-------
Public Notification Guidance
Content:
- Specific instructions to consumers
-Explanation of situation
-What is being done to address it
Format:
-Short and simple
- In all languages commonly used in area
-Delivery vehicles
- Broadcast media
istribution through community centers
Short-Term Alternate Water Supply
Water for consumption and sanitation:
- Bottled water
- Emergency water stored by consumers
- Bulk water hauled to distribution center
Water for firefighting:
- Pumper trucks filled from neighboring
supply
- Untreated water
- Contaminated water if no other
lediately available alternative
Summary
Public health response to a
contamination threat or incident:
-Actions to protect public health in response
to a credible threat or confirmed incident
- Containment may be effective, alone or in
combination with other actions
- Public notification may be necessary to
prevent exposure
- Consider public health response actions in
a progressive manr--
RPTB - Next Steps
Integrate all Modules into an e-RPTB
Develop a "simplified" RPTB
Develop and conduct training
Develop tools to support the RPTB
Availability of RPTB
-------
(kc eCcvcCand Division of Water's
Experience
Robin Halperin
Risk Manager
Cleveland Division of Water
'D System Overview
The Blackout - Sequence of
Events @ CWD
Water System Impacts
Lessons learned
Risk Communication Issues
Questions?
I THE PLAIN IMiALKK -.-
BLACKOUT
Mil lull-- stniKKk' without |«HM1
«*
.1 - >
ICof* Systu* @ *:W PM. t/tt/09
-------
VMm tyefo* @ IO.-W PJH. I/W03
VMM System @ 10:00 tun. IftffOt
-------
-------
Internally
Needed to fully evaluate
impacts of Blackout on our
system
Needed to agree on risks and
message to customers
Externally
Effectively communicate risk to
outside agencies
Limit "interpretation" of
message
Media/Public
Needed to conduct Press
Conferences & issue Press
Releases
Media & PhMic Relations
-yor's Office
eveland Public Power
lyahoga Coui
hio EPA
Suburban Governments
Police & Fire Departments
Mayors & Managers
Up-to-date & Accurate list?
Water Buffaloes
Critical Customers
'Overall - CWD maintained good
communications, except for with County
riority - keep the public
iformed in order to protect
public health
Primary Communication Route =
Media
Provide a clear & concise message
Regular Briefings with Media
Press Office "interpretation"
Media "interpretation" or
"editorializing"
Established Call Center
Real Person to talk to for answers
Trained personnel?
nserve Water
i Misreported only 2 hours
water left
oil Water Advisor;
How to communicate wit
many customers without,_
Is anyone getting the message?
Accuracy?
Boil water to wash dishes and
brush teeth?
Boil for 45 minutes?
Water Buffaloes
-------
Survey Resets
Conducted in November 2003
1200 Telephone Interviews
Covered Entire Service Area
Topics Covered:
Electric Power Outage Experience
Satisfaction with CWD
Water Outage Experience
Boil Advisory
Water Buffaloes
Support for Backup Power System
rf Boil Advisory
stomers 65 and older were least likely to have
jard about the boil advisory (87.4%)
TV/news main source of info (83.2%)
<50% reported having to boil their water
Females were more likely than males to say they
had boiled water, as were younger respondents
Confusion regarding who had to boil their water
41.6% - only to customers who lost water service
completely
32.1.% - all customers
Length of Boil Advisory varied from one day to
longer than 2 days.
Customer Survey
Next Steps
.gg^,. omers
(53,2%) heard abo.
water buffaloes
Caucasian customers were
significantly more aware of
water buffaloes than African
American customers
Only 2.2% actually used
them
TV/news was most popular
news source (87.7%)
Improvimg Standard PR Language &
Communication Plans
Templetes & Scripts
Consider all layers
Who is sending the message?
Call Center (Joint? Script? Expertise?)
Considering a Reverse 911 system
Develop (Real) Plan for Water Distribution
Coordinate with County Officials
Health Department
Emergency Management
Maintain up-to-date list of Suburban Police
&Fire
t Public Education?
And, 48 MW Backup Power
-------
W
ter Security Risk
imunication Symposium
San Francisco, CA
May 21, 2004
Types of v\
W-ishirinrr
aier systems in
n Township
well water
y sources
John Horensky, Mayor
Washington Township
Warren County, NJ
and community
ns of water
onsumption continues to
...-U-B-il
Water resources are being depleted
Water is safe to drink
Water resources need to be protected
Risk CommunicBi
Bine Objectiv
ion Goals
Provide Accurate Information and
Reduce Risk of Panic
jeciives:
-Identify Credible Information
Sources
-Provide Timely Updates
-Convey Concern
-Establish Trust and Confidence
Building
J VVhc
iships
no are your stakeholders?
Who are your adversaries?
Who are your apathetic people?
Wrier) to J
Communication^
Charges to recreational swimming/
fishing sites
Waterways polluted by construction
activities
Elevated levels of natural substances in
water
Security issues
Water usage by other entities
-------
-------
USEPA Water Security Risk
Communication Symposium
San Francisco, CA
May 20-21,2004
Tom Kahler, Operations Support Mgr
Newport News Waterworks
Newport News, Virginia
Planning Communications
Prior to an Event
Meet with Law Enforcement
* Meet and brief Law Enforcement in all
service jurisdictions, regional JTTF, WMD
Coordinator, Military
* Do SWAT, Bomb Squads know your plants
* Provide tours, who to contact in utility
* What consequences could exist for Public,
Vital Services
* Develop relationship; brief uniformed patrol
Supervisorsprovide HazMat maps
Local jurisdictions
» The Utility and Municinal Governments
should discuss risks and consequences prior
to event
* Review MOU's and unique problems for
response and recovery
* Conduct Tabletops, exercises; interface with
First Responders, Incident Commanders
* Convey to the public and large users what
to expect in the event of attack
Communicate with
Interdependent Utilities, Vendors
* Interdependent Utilities - rjlans an<
priorities to support response & recovery of
vital services; Hospitals, Water, Fire, Roads
Know key players personally: Electric,
Gas, Telecommunications, and Critical
Vendors
* Again, develop relationships, interface!
* In a crisis, knowing the person on the phone
is a big advantage
Access/Debris Removal Support
* Access to plantsfacilities is essential
* Debris Removal snnnort will be vital in
recovery to plants and other facilities
* Getting personnel to assigned locations for
recovery is imperative
* Have a listing of pre-arranged support
Include in Tabletops, Exercises
-------
Plan for no Communications.
Loss of Power Means:
* No landline phones (digital, analog maybe)
* No radios
* No cell phones
* Develop Alternatives!
interest.
Thomas G. Kahler
Operations Support Manager
Newport News Waterworks, Virginia
tkahler(S)nneov.com 757-234-4832
-------
Los Angeles Water and Power
Risk Communication
Jim McDaniel
Deputy Assistant General Manager
L.A. Water System
4 LADWP's Water System:
7,100 miles of pipeline
106 reservoirs and tanks
338 mile aqueduct system
MWD's Colorado River
Aqueduct and State Water
Project
Local groundwater, primarily
in the San Fernando Valley
L. A. Water System
California's Largest Retail
Water Supplier
$400+ million annually
Serving 3.8 million
465 sq mile service area
Open aqueducts
Main Treatment Facility
By-Passing Distribution Reservoirs
Hollywood Reservoir
Stone Canyon Reservoir
-------
Covering other Reservoirs
Elysian Reservoir
Sitvertake Reservoir
Experiences
High chlorine - Do not use
- business district, restaurants Hollywood
Cryptosporidium - Check with Care Giver
- immune compromised
Northridge Earthquake - Boil Water
- Geographical sub area of city
SWTR Agreement - Mandatory Health Notice
- More disinfectant but safe
Post 9/11 preparations
Communications Structure
Communications Structure
What happened
- Where
-When
- Who is affected
-Why
Utility Response
- Assessment
- Actions being taken
- Expected outcome
Advise for Consumers
- Notice of risk and managing risk
- Feedback/ customer access for concerns
- Periodic/ scheduled updates via Media
- Return to service notice
Wrap-up
- Evaluations - internal
- Opportunities for improvements - internal
- Message on event - external
* Staffing
- Communication manager and staff as partofWEC
- 24/7 Field communication, door hangers, signage
- Stand-by / contracted Language translators
* Tools
- Mapping tools for hard copy and electronic delivery
- Standard templates...
"Boil Water", "Do Not Use", "Return to Service"
Multiple Language
Best Practices
Customer considerations
Care givers for Immune-compromised
Kidney Dialysis, Fish Owners
Schools
Hospitals
Senior Centers
Restaurants
Large Commercial Water Users
-------
Best Practices
Venues for access to consumers
- Electronic, voice and fax ability
-TV, RADIO, WEB-SITES
- Updated partnerships contacts
Media contacts
- Special sub-population contacts
Neighborhood watch groups, councils
- Special phone call service for high volume Dial-out
Best Practices
Partnerships (Other)
- Local Law Enforcement,
- First Responders
- County Sheriff
- County Health, public health monitoring
- State OES
- State Dept. of Justice, criminal investigations
Tools and Resources
Partnerships ( Water Community )
- Regulatory - EPA, State Health
- Referral Services - State Labs, Mutual Aid
- ISAC... fact sheets on contaminants
- RAPID RESPONSE., neighboring utilities and
wholesaler
Parting Words
Credibility of message
- Select right spokesperson from most credible institution
- "Timely"
- "Accurate"
- "Useful"
- Past performance will influence
-------
Strategic Health Risk
Communication by Water
Utilities
Rebecca Parkin, PhD, MPH
The George Washington University
Washington, DC
EPA Water Security Meeting
Overview
Two AwwaRF projects
- 2776: Identifying and Communicating about
Emerging Contaminants
-2851: Advancing Water-Related Health Risk
Communication
Highlights
Key Points
2776: Emerging Contaminants
Goal = Develop systematic, science-based
methods for anticipating and communicating
about emerging contaminant risks
Project partners
Des Moines Water Works
Princeton University
- Decision Partners, LLC.
Primary output = decision-making tools
2776: Methods
Literature reviews
Risk communication
Psychology
Case studies
Chemical industry
Electric power
- Military health
Mental models
- DMWW experts
- DMWW customers
- Website analysis
Classification model
Based on scientific
results
- Used DMWW data
- Predictive of
"emerging" issues
Strategic decision aid
- Based on literature,
cases, models
Assess probability of
risk communication
2776: Case Study Lessons
Risk communication is not the same as
communication; it's integral to risk management
Strategies must be based on scientifically derived
information
Plant managers are responsible for local programs,
but they need clear senior management support
Activities must fit communities' interests and
preferences
A visible, positive presence must be in place
before a crisis occurs
Risk
Management
Paradigm
Adapted from CSA (1997)
Decision Step
Next Step or Take
Action 6
-------
2776: Literature Results
Risk perceptions are
affected by:
Gender
Ethnicity
Education
- Socioeconomic status
- Geographic location
- Sensory perception
More heterogeneous
communities
- Are more likely to have
news coverage that
frames issues as
problems without
solutions
- Require more complex,
creative communication
methods to increase
impacts
2776: Mental Models
Method Key Findings
Develop the expert model * Expert model expanded Team's views
- DMWW Steering Team
One session, one follow up
call
Conduct mental models
interviews
On the phone
- In person for website
analysis
of the i
Customers largely favorable about
DMWW
BUT "emerging" and "emergency"
get confused
In crisis, customers want a trusted,
local source of information
They want to know what they can do,
what utility will do
Trust of utility affected (+/-) by
website experience
2776: Strategic Risk Communication
Decision aids developed
- Media data retrieval and
archive system
Classification model
- Diagnostic tool
Major findings
- Limited media content
analysis is valuable
"Frequency" and
"population" predicted
DMWW's communication
decisions
Factors that increase the
probability of "emerging"
communications relate to
- Contaminant
Concerns
Population
- Society
- Utility
How these affect decisions
may vary among utilities
2776: Major Recommendations
Drinking water industry
State risk communication duties
publicly in values and professional
code of conduct
Success and credibility require
vision - beyond tactics - to create
and implement strategies
Study understanding of "emerging"
Validate our classification model in
other areas
Test our diagnostic tool in other
service areas
Corporate level
Base strategies on facts, not
guesses
Plant managers are
responsible, need support
Be visibly present in
communities
Proactively initiate dialogues
Begin building professional
risk communication capacity
now
2851: Three-way Collaborations
Goal = Advance
collaborations for
addressing water-related
risk communication
Project partners
Five water utilities
- Natl. Asso. of County City
Health Officials (NACCHO)
Asso. of Occupational and
Environmental Clinics
(AOEC)
Three sets of
collaborators
- Water utilities (U)
- Health agencies
(H)
- Clinicians (C)
Primary output =
Framework for
Action
2851: Methods
Data collection
Data analysis
Framework for Action
(Data application)
Literature review
Utility survey
Health agency survey
Clinician interviews
In progress
Pending
-------
2851: Literature Review
Three-way (U-H-C)
not documented
Two-way interactions
reported generally
Themes
Relevance
Longevity
- Trust
- Need
Various communication
tools found
- CCRs
Fact sheets
Media reports, releases
- Formal agreements
No peer-reviewed
evaluations of most
(except CCRs)
2851: Utility Survey
98 utilities
- All regions of the USA
- 92% = public
53% = over 20 employees
Respondents
Most = GMs, managers
- 87% = male
- 51 % over 20 years in the
business
65% lived in service area
Population served
- 31% under 10,000
- 33% over 100,000
Health agencies in
service area
- 15% = over 10
agencies
2% didn't know
2851: Health Agency Survey
160 agencies
- All regions of the USA
67% = county agencies
- 53% = over 20 employees
67% = environmental health
unit handles water issues
Respondents
- 74% = male
45% = directors of 2+ units
48% = over 20 yrs work
- 72% lived in service area
Population served
- 5% up to 10,000
- 44% over 100,000
84% = more than one
utility in their area
- 3 7% over 10 utilities
4% didn't know
2851: Clinician Interviews
Practices
- All areas of the US A
43 % practices with
over 5 clinicians
30 participants
- 87% = MDs
- 63% = male
- 43% had 20+ yrs work
- 93% live in service
area
Population served
- 7% up to 100,000
- 60% over 500,000
67% = more than 1
utility
- 17% over 10 utilities
- 23% =didn't know
Utilities and Health Agencies
Nearly 90% U had worked
with local or state Health
agencies
78% with specific person
(most often, the director)
Half had formal
agreements
Want more collaboration
and more frequent
communication
63% H had worked with
a Utility
- 28% with specific person
(most often manager)
Half had formal
agreements
Want more
collaboration and more
frequent communication
Utilities and Clinicians
About 33% U had
worked with C
Nearly 67% U had C
in emergency plans
- 17% worked with C
- 83 % rely on H to be
link with C
90% had no
experience working
withU
- 60% had received CCR
100% willing to
collaborate with U
53% said 4+ per year
-------
Health Agencies and Clinicians
54% H had worked with C
- Most with MDs
Others = nurses, dieticians,
^e;::^m^ ;knin;i!-> tic
58% worked with C on
emergency response plans
62% worked with C on
water security
Most had worked with H
agencies
About 33% once/year
17% monthly
33% had worked on
emergency response plans
100% willing to work with
H agencies
- 23% had been contacted by
H
Three-way Collaborations
Reported by 28% of the health agencies
16% worked on susceptible subpopulations
Children, pregnant women
- Elderly
- Immune compromised
Chronic gastrointestinal disease patients
- Cancer patients
- HIV/AIDS patients
Range of chemical and microbial topics addressed
2851: Themes
Each entity has multiple entities in the other two
sectors to consider - where to start?
There is incomplete knowledge about each other
Utilities and clinicians have much more contact
with health agencies than with each other
- Contacts focus on the top official
Relationships are usually reported as positive
Few three-way contacts have been documented
Sectors communicate about the same issues, but to
different extents
2851: Workshop
March 2004
Representatives from
- Five water utilities
Public health agencies
Medical facilities
- Academic institutions
Elected officials
Presentations
Breakout sessions
Utilities, health agencies, and
clinicians
Have limited knowledge of each
other, others' roles and routines
- Have multiple entities to work
with
Clinicians prefer contact by
clinicians or scientists
Health agencies best serve as
the clinician-utility link
Few organizations have formal
plans or means to communicate
with each other
2851: Next Steps
Finalize the workshop results
Draft Framework for Action
Table top exercises
Finalize the Framework
Disseminate the results
Key Points
Status quo:
Limited knowledge of what risk communication is or how
to use it strategically
Scientific knowledge available is under-utilized
Experience with collaborations is limited
Lessons learned:
Knowing, acknowledging and responding to concerns
builds trust and visible, positive presence
Preparation for strategic risk communication is crucial; it
requires senior management support, time and partnerships
Simple tools are developing to aid decision processes
Risk communication is integral to risk management
-------
Acknowledgment
The George Washington University gratefully
acknowledges that the Awwa Research
Foundation is the joint owner of the technical
information upon which this presentation is based.
The George Washington University thanks the
foundation for its financial, technical, and
administrative assistance in funding and managing
the project through which this information was
discovered.
LJ Oil
-------
Emergency Communications with your
Local Government and Community, 03cts5s
Funded by the Water Environment Research Foundation (WERF) through
USEPA Homeland Security-Wastewater Security Agreement #83075101-0
and as a cooperative project with the American Water Works Association
Research Foundation (AwwaRF)
Principal Investigating Team
University of Louisville Research Foundation
Thomas D. Rockaway Ph.D., P.E., Center for Infrastructure Research
David M. Simpson, Ph.D., AICP, Center for Hazards Research and
Policy Development
Presentation to the
National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium
San Francisco, CA
May 20-21, 2004
Emergency Communications,
Project Objectives
1 . Determine optimal processes and systems for situational analysis,
message creation, and information dissemination.
2. Evaluate the effectiveness of emergency communication messages,
using established literature and a combination of survey and structured
content analysis process methodologies for determining situational
appropriate messages. Additionally, emergency messages will be
evaluated for their efficacy and impact using representative head-of-
household focus group methodology.
3. Create an emergency communication management system which
includes: 1) a decision-tree template to assist utilities in the decision
making process; and 2) a message storage and retrieval system, which
would assist in the selection and implementation of a range of appropriate
emergency messages
4. Create a template for an action plan that will increase public awareness
of risks and the emergency communication process in the community.
Emergency Communications,
Work Tasks
1. Review communications plans of a small sample of utility
companies
2. Determine set of probable crisis events and create scenarios
3. Determine effectiveness of warning and emergency
messages to local government and the public.
4. Review of existing systems and content analysis of cross
section of sample messages in use
5. Create test messages for the scenarios
6. Test the messages using intense focus groups
7. Develop web enabled system for simplified distribution
j
Emergency
Communications,
Work Flow
Emergency
Communications,
Database
Management
Center for Hazards
Metropolitan Sewer
Metro Louisville
Emergency
Bioterrorism
mications. Project Investigating Tea
rarispcrtfiti
-J'"VERi: ;-
-------
Emergency Communications,
Refining the Research Approach
> Project focus is Communications, not an Emergency
Response Plan. However, results should add value to ERPs.
> Determine an appropriate set of scenarios (i.e., flooding to
bio-terrorism)
Is the determining factor the "agent" or "speed of onset"?
How many to do?
> How do you create a guidebook generic enough to help most
communities, but not so generic that it is meaningless?
> What are the most effective strategies for testing messages?
focus groups? tabletop exercises? full drill? other?
Emergency Communications
Project Acknowledgements
WERF Project Subcommittee
Frank Blaha, American Water Works Association Research Foundation
Bob Adamski, Gannett Fleming Engineers and Architects
Susan Dolgin, U.S. EPA
Stephen Frank, APR, Denver MetroWastewater Reclamation District
Paula Kehoe, San Francisco Public Utilities Commission
Linda MacPherson, CH2M Hill
Erica Michaels Brown, Assn of Metropolitan Water Agencies
This work was funded by the Water Environment Research Foundation (WERF)
through USEPA Homeland Security-Wastewater Security Agreement #83075101-0
and as a cooperative project with the American Water Works Association Research
Foundation (AwwaRF)
We welcome your comments and appreciate your interest! For additional information:
Bonnie Bailey, WERF Project Manager, bbaileviaiwerf.org. 703-684-2470x7540
Tom Rockav.'aj'. C<;iii:ef frr Infrastructure Research. Uriiv. of Louisville,
502-852-3272, rockaway@louisville.edu
Emergency Communications,
Your Assistance Welcomed
> Examples of good communications plans/systems that
audience members are familiar with
> Examples of warning messages that audience members
think are particularly effective
> Examples of communities that have been through an
event and revised their message system or approach
-------
AFETY
Greater Risk
AFETY
Greater Risk
SAFETY
Greater Risk
IT COMES M0RE FROM
WHAT YJDU DO THAI
FROM *₯HAT Yj
POLICY, NOT PRESj
" 'reater Risk
OPENNESS. CONSTANT
COMMUNICATION.
> DONjf OVER
> ACK^OWLEDG
PUBLIC
AFETY
Greater Risk
YOU DO AND SAY.
AFETY
Greater Risk
evabt Risk Perception
-------
AFETY
Greater Risk
rs
sonal Risk
Awarenes
AFETY
Greater Risk
levant Risk Perception
irs
rsonal Risk
'Lack of C
^Involuntary
AFETY
Greater Risk
evahl Risk Perception
AFETY
levant Risk Perception
)rs
S-sonal Risk
_JL
^Lack of Control
^^ Greater Risk
-X
-------
SYNOPSIS OF RISK
COMMUNICATION ISSUES
FROM MULTIPLE CRISIS
TABLE TOP EXERCISES
Stanley States
Water Quality Manager
Pittsburgh Water and
Sewer Authority
Executive
Operator/Distribution/Collection Personnel
Small Utilities
150 classes presented nationwide
!1/2 hr. table top exercise
WA 2-Day Course
First Response Strategies and Protocol for
Water Utilities and Public Health Staff'
Denver CO, Atlanta GA
hr. table top exercise
, Security Committee
msburgh, Philadelphia, Harrisburg,
i hr. table top exercise
EPA Region III Security Workshop
Baltimore, MD
3 hr. table top exercise
Table Top Workshop/Exercise
ecurity Related Emergency Response for Water
Utilities'
2 cities nationwide
^ day training/1 day table top exercise
of Pittsburgh/Pittsburgh Pirates Full Scale Exercise
August 2004
Non water scenario
5,000-10,000 participants
1-day exercise
-------
r/prr
iJ -^-J 1 -,
raining utilizing recently
,ned response guidance
PA - 'Response Protocol Toolbox'
lational Incident Management System
(NIMS)
Incident Command System
Emergency Operations Centers
information A
d - regardless of scope of exercise
or without professional PIO's)
risis Communications training provided prior to
References -
Literature
Discussion with PIOs
Films
iservations D-
Jcipants appreciate importance of effective
communications in these scenarios.
ility personnel regulators
2cted officials health officials
emergency responders
Positive
Observations
fcont)
icipants understand necessity for
g honest/forthright with media an
2. Participants understand need for common
"pssanp anrl sinnlp snnkpsnprmn fnr nuhlir infn
consequences of not being honest
vations of Concern Duri
'iew relationship with m
adversarial.
ay interfere with ability to deliver effective
risis communications
Some players may be overly reluctant to share
info with public
Disseminating drinking water health info is
mandated by "Public Notification Rule".
Observ
tions of Concern
CconL
ants feel pressure in having to share ii
h public having the shock value of terrorisn
J WMD agents - without causing
inecessary alarm.
4. Various agencies have difficulty determining
'who is in charge' during various phases of
incident and therefore who is ultimately
responsible for 'message' delivered to public.
(Suggests need for more ICS training)
-------
s of Concern fcont.
ng the uncertain Threat Evaluation' phase
n incident - players feel challenge in
aintaining a balance between -
Risk of overreacting to a false alarm
Risk of underreactina to real incident
e of security emergencies - Crisis
ations in this situation may be even
icult than for accidents and natural
'terrorism' aspect of emergency
shock value of WMD agents
e.g. Anthrax
Ricin
Conclusi
Table t
Crisis C
exercises can be very helpful for
jmmunications training
.., Communications training and exercise
exposure is also useful for personnel other
than PIOs
-------
RISK COMMUNICATIONS
California Demographics
.ornia's Risk Communication Efforts
ing the 2003 Southern California Fires
Terri Lee Stratton, MPH
Emergency Preparedness Office
California Department of
Health Services (CDHS)
One-seventh of country's population
7th largest world economy
Multi-national/multi-ethnic
Long coast line and borders Mexico
Los Angeles 2nd most populated U.S. city
with many dense urban areas
At risk from terrorism and natural disasters
-fires, earthquakes, floods
California's Goal
Communication Goals:
» Be prepared for a potential outbreak of
bioterrorism or other disaster in California.
still public confidence in our ability to
>pond to emergency situations.
trough skill building, learn how to utilize
iur knowledge and training in emergency
^tuations.
» California and CDC and other partners working
together in collaboration with local agencies
(LHDs)
California's Preparation Strategy
Transparency
Echo strategy (CDC) - Consistency in Message
Multi-language focus
Partnerships and collaboration
Tools and training
Coordinated by CDHS Risk Communication
Emergency Preparedness and
Response
Develop public relations/media plan to prepare
and respond
Public preparedness education - web, hotline
Spokesperson trainings
Media relations
LHD outreach activities
Message development
Risk Communication trainings
Partner and stakeholder relations
State agency outreach
Application of Crisis and Emergency
Risk Communication Actions in
Response to Southern CA Fires
Early Involvement in Process - Proactive
jagement
Early issuance of Public Health Messages:
Boil Water Orders / Respiratory Safety
Importance of consistency of message
-------
NUMBER: 03-84
FOR RELEASE: IMMEDIATE
nttti- //V'.'V'.iw dhs ca.aov
DATE: October 26, 2003
CONTACT: Ken August
or Lea Brooks
(916)440-7660
STATE HEALTH DIRECTOR WARNS OF
SMOKE FROM SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRES
--ill! -.n-.i.. 'I-,:-!.' n li-i,FM :! F H , advi^ircf tudciy
Srnokv cc.ndrtiom can tr hOWwdo i~ rr.i vnun.1 rhiTjrrn, l-,r ,-U-Jerly. in-Jividi!-,l - with -,.-;art condition;
r-f-.-.iii-.-- ,-,r tl,.-- uiv .-it.--.int..' .-.I iiiP ,-,-,!- iihrri =, n,-,nt.=. srlvf =..=-. i i==i.-)^nt r. rn^si (he tire; to t
Individuals with .rj^hma, bron:l".rti;, c-mpn1, cc-m.n ar.rt other lunq or hc.rjn niicc.nc-:-: ;ho»jld moke- sure that they
are on medication and fi.ave al It-ail a ti-.-c-.JHy =UPJJ[V ui i han.J. Individuals with asthma should consult their
physicianabci.it .-jr! .-j-inrr,.-, m-,n.-,,3,-17,,-nt r,l.-,n -jr.rl stich to rl rJiJinr. unusuollv smoky ,-,-,n,-lrti,-,n- Li=ten lor radio
i ecu crulstlng inilead of dr.riv/iriy =rnof,v air Iroin ijuldijuri Cunt,act your doctor if YOU have symptoms such as
chest pain, chest lightnp =-,.=-., =-,|-,i:n-|ne-= - OT l-,rf=*th, ,:.r -rvri * TRligi.p Thi= i=. important Tor nrit nnly people with
Early Response
First Press Release sent out prior to EOC
~-i;vation
Established involvement and credibility
Interface with partners
Consistency in Message
Confirm that advice/guidance to public is
consistent.
Share information with other responders
and partners
Provide follow up guidance to public to
facilitate recovery and credibility in
response efforts
NUMBER: 03-88
FOR RELEASE: IMMEDIATE
httD://www.dhs.ca.aov
DATE: Oct.31,2003
CONTACT: Ken August
or Lea Brooks
(916)440-7660
STATE HEALTH DIRECTOR OFFERS ADVICE TO PARENTS ABOUT
CHILDREN'S HEALTH AND EMOTIONAL REACTIONS TO WILDFIRES
SACRAMENTO - ^!.:,:P He.^h hi POT T'lara M Bnnt.s, V H , D' P H, today advised Scn.rthPn L.3: rnm -i ;:aipr]s
to keep a watchful eve over their children;, reaction;' to the wilnitiie\ She al:u advi:ed jjarente to monftor
childish'; ui.rtdcui antivrty and take precaution: to Irt ;h? pinoi.nt ot a:n and p.ir:n: jlatp du:: ti r;r I, i?d intoir.-'
home
::'3|6~'. :"oi.ild re I'lprrMPi that this can be an alarming time for children," Bonta said. "The images of the
'/','ildtirei on television can be very frightening for children who often notice the tension and anxiety in adutts
s-' ound them P.si ents should be av/ai e ot the ph'-sicis; and enotional i e :pon :es ot theii chili:;i en to these
horrif
Lessons Learned
Place Emphasis on education/awareness as
priority - early involvement in process
Quick Approvals in place for
Materials/Documents
Involve Partners from Beginning
Hold to core strategies and provide as much
I information as possible
Collaborate with Others involved in Response
-------
Communication Issues for Public
Health: Respiratory, Water Safety, Ash -
tossessions, missing family members/pets,
;uation, needs of special populations
children/elderly/disabled/non-English
peakers)
-------
Who's Who In Public
Drinking Water?
Federal EPA
CT Department of Public Health
CT Department of Environmental Protection
CT Department of Public Utility Control
Drinking Water Systems Owners/Operators
The Three 's
ommunicate
* New Communications Initiatives
oordinate
* Security Advisory Committee
* DWD Emergency Response Group
ooperate
* EPA Funded Regional Workshops
"Public Drinking Water Security Operations, Emergency
Response and Communications"
Four Regional Workshops for First Responders and Public
Drinking Water System Personnel
Networking (Developing Lines of Communication/Partnerships)
* CT's Division of Homeland Security (Structure and Mission)
* The DPH Incident Command System
* Cross Training ("Law Enforcement/Water 101")
DPH Communication Systems (Wide Area Notification System
(WANS), Health Alert Network (HAN))
* Vulnerability Assessment and Emergency Response Plan
Preparation (Review of Emergency Response Handbook)
Drinking Water Division1
-------
Issues
4 Bumps in the Road
* Lack of Continuity
* Logistics
* Electronic Communications
* Apathy (Burnout)
* Numerous Conflicting Activities
* "Cowboys" "
THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR
PROFESSIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY IN
"PROVIDING GOOD SAFE
DRINKING WATER THAT HAS
THE TRUST OF THE
CONSUMER"
Drinking Water Dh
Over 600 professionals participated in the
four regional drinking water security workshops that were
recently conducted throughout Connecticut, where they used
the handbook, along with the DWD's Emergency Response
Planning Guide for Public Drinking Water Systems.
The goal of the workshops was to increase participants'
awareness of security, communications, and response
issues and initiate and promote networking among the
water utilities, law enforcement, the local health department,
and emergency management personnel.
Coordination of Enforcement and Water Supply Security
Activities is critical for the "New Business of Water".
Health Alert Network (HAN)
Overall Goal
4 To securely facilitate communication of
critical health, epidemiological and
bioterrorism related information on a
24/7 basis to local health departments,
health organizations and other partners.
-------
Reporting a Public Drinking Water
Security Breach.
* NOTE: All and Any Emergencies involving: security
violations, threats, suspicious circumstances or
unusual activity relative to drinking water supplies
and/or infrastructure, are to be reported immediately
to law enforcement (911 or direct) and the
Connecticut Department of Public Health.
Remember!
to the Department of Public Health,
Drinking Water Division
-------
National Water Security Risk Communication Symposium
San Francisco, California
May 20, 2004
Since September 11, 2001
there has been no higher priority at
The New York City
Department of Environmental Protection
than water supply security.
Our efforts to date have resulted in a broader and clearer
strategy focusing on prevention, protection
and consequence management
This three tiered strategic framework has
resulted in a systematic and comprehensive
water supply protection plan.
The Police Division includes three major sub-divisions.
Each plays a critical role providing the foundation
designed to preserve, protect and defend
the water supply and environment.
PREVENTION
Detective Bureau and Intelligence Division
Responsible for all long term investigations
relating to pollution, crime and terrorism.
Detectives also fulfill the vital role of prevention
through the gathering of intelligence and information sharing
-------
PROTECTION
Environmental Enforcement Division
Performs environmental and
infrastructure protective
functions.
Monitors and
provides access control and
intrusion detection.
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
Special Operations Division
Emergency Services Unit
Canine Unit
Aviation Unit
Strategic Patrol Unit
COMMUNICATING THE RISK
through aggressive training opportunities
Environmental Police Academy
Recruit Training School
(1000 hour/6 month)
NYS Mandated Police Training
Environmental Enforcement Training
Environmental & Infrastructure Protection
In Service Training
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Counter Terrorism Training
Domestic Preparedness
Ground Water Investigations
Fire Arms Re-Qualifications Course
Bomb Recognition Courses
Security Awareness Training
Agency-wide
Outside Agency Training
Contractors and Consultants
Communication is the most important dynamic of any organization.
Because of the important nature and sensitivity of the information
we convey within our organizations,
to communities and media outlets
communication can become the primary problem.
Emergency planning, practical exercises and
building trust within the communities
we serve are everyday activities.
During a disaster, communication is essential
to the timely and accurate flow of information
as well as the coordination of relief efforts.
Not only to keep emergency response systems functional
but also to relieve stress and reduce panic.
Lines of communication need to be in place so that
emergency responders: can talk to one another,
communicate with specialized teams
and coordinate supply lines.
Police, fire and emergency medical technicians need to communicate,
as quickly as possible, accurate information
to scientists, engineers, health and medical professionals
as well as to administrative and support personnel.
These disaster relief professionals must
establish effective relationships
so that they speak a common language,
provide appropriate information and access resources, information
and data bases not commonly queried on a daily basis.
-------
PLANNING: Anticipate system failures
Redundant communications include:
High and low band radios
Analog and digital telephones
Priority access to wireless networks
Intra-net and inter-net access
Multiple cellular telephone technologies
Broad paging capabilities
Electronic mail and broadcast facsimile machines
Loudspeakers, bullhorns and runners
Scene of Incident
Incident Command
Decontamination area
Relief Area Medical Triage
Inner perimeter
Staging Areas
Outer perimeter
Emergency Operations Center
Command Center
Designated press area
Community Centers
Develop a culture of cooperation
Use existing resources
Disorganization can easily lead to disaster
Communication and planning are the keys to success
Plan for emergencies-twice
Think out of the box, expect the unexpected
Anticipate things will go wrong and
Practice, practice practice
Pre record all public and internal messages possible
Communicating the risk
to communities
nftmmuai^t^mm^1+^^*
Preparing the public for emergencies
"A citizens guide for emergency preparedness''
Emergency Contact Telephone Numbers
Police
Fire
Counter terrorism information sources
HOME
prepare a supply kit
include water, food, firstaid, clothes, bedding,
flashlights, batteries, radios, kitchen and sanitary supplies.
Plan where to meet family members,
prepare for self reliant survival for four days
include one gallon of water per person
-------
WORK
Prepare a list of emergency contact telephone numbers
for family, friends and neighbors
include building security and police non emergency
telephone numbers.
Create a phone chain to check on the safety of co-workers.
Update these lists every month
SCHOOL
Know your school districts emergency action plans.
Consider ways to contact your children in the event of an emergency.
Include cell phones, neighbors, friends and teachers.
Communicate and work together.
While driving
Have a plan and be prepared.
Know your options
Observe-React-Adapt
Investigate and try alternate routes to and from work and school.
Explore the areas you drive most frequently.
Keep a blanket or extra coat in the car,
a first aid kit, water, flashlight and map.
During the Disaster
Stay calm
Operationalize plans
Stick to the Script
And
Stay calm
Because
You have prepared for this.
Media briefings should be scheduled at regular intervals
Prepare your message
Know what you want the public to hear
and have three different ways to say it.
Anticipate three questions you do not want to answer
Know how you will respond to those questions
Know that you do not have to answer them
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&ERA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Office Business
Penalty for Private Use
$300
EPA 600/C-05/006
November 2005
www.epa.gov/nhsrc
PRESORTED STANDARD
POSTAGE & FEES PAID
EPA
PERMIT No. G-35
Recycled/Recyclable
Printed with vegetable-based ink on
paper that contains a minimum of
50% post-consumer fiber content
processed chlorine free
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