ASCE/AWWA Draft American National Standard for Trial Use
Guidelines for the
Physical Security of
Wastewater/Stormwater Utilities
December 2006
Publication of this draft standard for trial use and comment has
been approved by the American Society of Civil Engineers and
the American Water Works Association. Distribution of this draft
standard for comment shall continue for no longer than six
months from the date of publication. It is expected that following
this public comment period, this draft standard, revised as
necessary, will be submitted to the American National Standards
Institute for approval as an American National Standard. A public
review in accordance with established ANSI procedures is
required at the end of the trial use period and before a draft
standard for trial use may be submitted to ANSI for approval as
an American National Standard. This draft standard is not an
American National Standard. Comments should be directed to:
ASCE
1801 Alexander Bell Drive
Reston,VA20191
Attn: Standards Department
AWWA
6666 W. Quincy Avenue
Denver, CO 80235
Attn: Standards Department
American Society of Civil Engineers
t\\
American Water Works
Association
The Authoritative Resource on Safe Water'
Water Environment
Federation8
Preserving & Enhancing
the Global Water Environment
Or email: wise@asce.org Or email: standards@awwa.org
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Contents
Foreword v
Purpose of the Guidelines v
Background of the Development v
Use of this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use vii
Special Issues vii
Disclaimer viii
Acknowledgements ix
1.0 Application of Guidelines 1-1
1.1 Introduction 1-1
1.2 Methodology for Applying These Guidelines 1-6
2.0 Wastewater Treatment Plants 2-1
2.1 Scope 2-1
2.2 Facility Mission 2-1
2.3 Philosophy of Security Approach 2-1
2.4 Special Considerations for Critical Assets 2-2
2.5 Benchmark Security Measures 2-3
3.0 Collection Systems 3-1
3.1 Scope 3-1
3.2 System Mission 3-1
3.3 Philosophy of Security Approach 3-1
3.4 Benchmark Security Measures 3-2
4.0 Pumping Stations 4-1
4.1 Scope 4-1
4.2 Facility Mission 4-1
4.3 Philosophy of Security Approach 4-1
4.4 Benchmark Security Measures 4-2
5.0 Wastewater/Stormwater System Support Facilities 5-1
5.1 Scope 5-1
5.2 Facility Mission 5-1
5.3 Philosophy of Security Approach 5-2
5.4 Benchmark Security Measures 5-2
Appendices
A Physical Security Elements A-l
1.0 Fencing and Perimeter Walls A-l
2.0 Gates A-4
3.0 Site Areas A-6
4.0 Facility Entrances A-7
5.0 Bollards and Other Vehicle Barriers A-8
6.0 Exterior Surfaces A-8
7.0 Outdoor Security Lighting A-9
8.0 Signage A-10
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9.0 Electronic Security Systems A-ll
10.0 Access Control Systems A-15
11.0 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Surveillance A-16
12.0 Security, Controls, and SCADA Wiring A-19
13.0 Building Elements A-19
14.0 Hatches/Vaults and Vents A-21
15.0 Online Water Quality Monitoring A-22
16.0 Operator Devices A-22
17.0 Chemical Fill-Line Locking Devices A-23
18.0 Hydrants A-23
19.0 Manholes A-23
B Glossary and Abbreviations B-l
C References C-l
Figures
1-1 Concept of Delay Calculation 1-2
1-2 Example Decision Tree 1-7
1-3 Typical Cost-to-Risk Reduction Curve 1-9
Tables
1-1 Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix 1-4
2-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater Treatment Plants 2-4
3-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Collection Systems 3-4
4-1 Benchmark Security Measures for Pumping Stations 4-3
5-1 Benchmark Security Measures
for Wastewater/Stormwater System Support Facilities 5-4
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Foreword
This Draft Standard for Trial Use (DSTU) has been developed as a joint effort between the
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and the American Water Works Association
(AWWA) with technical input from the Water Environment Federation (WEE), in
accordance with ASCE Rules for Standards Committees. The consensus process includes
balloting by a balanced standards committee and reviewing during a public comment
period. This DSTU will be reviewed and considered for approval as an American National
Standard upon completion of the six-month public comment and trial use period.
The provisions of these documents have been written in permissive language and, as such,
offer to the user a series of options or instructions but do not prescribe a specific course of
action. Significant judgment is left to the user of these documents.
These guidelines use common U.S. units with the International System of Units (SI) in
parenthesis. This approach is in the best interest of ASCE, AWWA, and WEE at the time of
development of this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use.
Purpose of the Guidelines
This Draft American National Standard for Trial Use (DSTU) applies to physical security for
wastewater collection and treatment systems (also called sanitary sewer collection and
treatment systems) and stormwater systems.
Background of the Development
Highlights related to the creation of all the Water Infrastructure Security Enhancements
(WISE) guidance documents and/or standards in the early years of the twenty-first century
are summarized below:
(1) Under the U.S. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002 (PL 107-188), drinking water utilities serving more than 3,300 customers were
required to conduct vulnerability assessments (VAs) of their water systems. These VAs
often recommended security improvements to reduce the risk of malevolent acts (which
may also reduce the risk associated with natural events). Similar requirements for
wastewater utilities have yet to be promulgated, but the protection of wastewater utility
facilities using similar approaches has been promoted by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (USEPA) and various industry organizations. In addition, ASCE, AWWA, and WEE
agreed to work together to develop materials to assist in the implementation of security
recommendations and the overall improvement of water and wastewater infrastructure
security. The project was funded by USEPA under a cooperative agreement to foster
public/private partnership in water and wastewater security. This project is known as the
USEPA Water Infrastructure Security Enhancements (WISE) Project.
(2) The three organizations each became responsible for a portion of the project: AWWA led
the drinking water supply, treatment, and distribution systems effort; WEE led the
wastewater and stormwater collection, treatment, and disposal systems effort; and ASCE
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led the effort concerning the methodology and characteristics pertinent to design of
contaminant detection and monitoring systems for both water and wastewater systems.
(3) Phase 1 of the USEPA WISE project focused on the creation of Interim Voluntary Security
Guidance documents (ASCE 2004, AWWA 2004, and WEE 2004). The purpose of these
documents was to provide a centralized starting point for utilities as they integrate modern
security practices into the management, operation, construction, or retrofit of their water,
wastewater, and stormwater systems. Training materials were developed in Phase 2 to
disseminate the information contained in the Phase 1 guidance documents.
(4) Under the direction of USEPA, Phase 3 focuses solely on the development of physical
security guidelines for water, wastewater, and stormwater facilities. These voluntary
consensus guidelines are to be published as Draft American National Standards for Trial
Use through ASCE's and AWWA's American National Standards Institute (ANSI)-
accredited standards development process. The primary reviewers were within the ASCE
WISE Standards Committee (SC), Water Supply Subcommittee, Wastewater and Stormwater
Subcommittee, and the USEPA/ASCE/AWWA/WEE WISE Project Phase 3 Team.
(5) The sections compiled in these guidelines are intended to provide direction to
wastewater and stormwater utilities on how to design or retrofit their infrastructure, with
consideration given to their unique circumstances and threats. A discussion of the various
security threats and incidents that have occurred at water and wastewater utilities is
provided in an American Water Works Association Research Foundation (AwwaRF) report
by Welter (2003). This document can provide additional information in the assessment of
security measures for utilities.
(6) The USEPA Water Security Working Group presented its report on Water Sector Security
Findings to the National Drinking Water Advisory Council (NDWAC) on May 18, 2005
(WSWG 2005). Those findings include fourteen features of an "active and effective" security
program. These guidelines address the following NDWAC features, which discuss physical
security:
(a) Establish physical and procedural controls to restrict access to utility
infrastructure to only those conducting authorized, official business and to detect
unauthorized physical intrusions.
(b) Incorporate security considerations into decisions about acquisition, repair, major
maintenance, and replacement of physical infrastructure; this should include
consideration of opportunities to reduce risk through physical hardening and the
adoption of inherently lower risk design and technology options.
(7) These guidelines should be implemented in concert with the other features and
approaches described in the NDWAC Report (WSWG 2005).
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Use of this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use
Major points for the trial use of these draft guidelines imply:
(1) It is the responsibility of the user of an ANSI standard or guideline to determine that the
products and approaches described in the standard or guideline are suitable for use in the
particular application being considered.
(2) To effectively use these draft guidelines, a wastewater or stormwater utility should first
complete a VA of its system. This VA should be completed in accordance with a generally
accepted methodology such as the Risk Assessment Methodology for Water (RAM-W™),
the Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool (VSAT™), or other acceptable method. The resulting
information will guide the utility in defining the capabilities and motives of its design basis
threat (DBT) and in ranking each facility's criticality within the system. The VA will also
help to define the anticipated response time and response capability that, with the
capabilities of the DBT, will characterize the robustness required for an effective security
system.
(3) The selection and recommendation of the physical protection approaches and measures
contained in these guidelines are best engineering practices based on the collective
experience and judgment of the WISE Standards Committee members. The physical security
measures should be combined with management policies, operational procedures, and
network security systems to form a comprehensive security system that provides multiple
layers of protection or "protection in depth" for critical assets.
(4) These guidelines contain information that utilities should consider when applying
specific security technologies and methods to individual facilities or assets. These are
described in Sections 2.0 through 5.0, which, in conjunction with the Foreword,
1.1 Introduction and its subsections, and Appendices in this document, can be used as
standalone documents.
(5) It is important to recognize that a physical protection system should be designed as a
site-specific system integrated into facility operations, response force capabilities, and the
overall utility's security system to ensure that there are no gaps in protection. Furthermore,
simply implementing the recommendations contained herein is no guarantee that an
adversary cannot compromise a specific facility or critical asset.
Special Issues
(1) These guidelines describe physical security approaches to delay or detect malevolent
parties whose actions may otherwise defeat the mission of the utility. Enterprise-wide
security approaches, while extremely important to any balanced security system, are
beyond the scope of these guidelines. These approaches include management policies,
administrative procedures, operational practices, and network security approaches,
including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks. Contaminant
detection and monitoring systems, although briefly referenced in these guidelines, are also
best employed as an integrated, enterprise-wide system. Guidance on enterprise-wide
security approaches is provided in the USEPA WISE Phase 1 Interim Voluntary Security
Guidance documents (ASCE 2004, AWWA 2004, and WEF 2004).
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(2) Added wastewater/stormwater security is beneficial for continuity of business,
protection of water quality, provision of sufficient water quantity, and protection of public
health and safety. Thus, when implementing the security measures provided in this
guidance document, the dual benefits should be taken into account by utility staff and other
stakeholders.
(3) Within the scope of this document, domestic and international terrorists have been
considered a special category of design basis threats. With significantly enhanced tool and
weapon capabilities, terrorists may be politically or ideologically motivated to cause
maximum human casualties, often without regard for the terrorist's personal survival.
Effectively protecting a facility from such a threat requires specialized security knowledge
and equipment, and response forces typically not available to utilities. A utility that
concludes it is facing such a threat should seek guidance from specialized security experts
and/or enhance its emergency response planning and execution to mitigate the
consequences of such a terrorist attack. Strategies to counter such a defined threat may
require higher-level measures than described in these guidelines.
Disclaimer
The information presented in this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use guidance
document is intended to assist wastewater and stormwater utilities as they strive to improve
the safety and security of their facilities, their employees, and the public. While the
strategies and methods described can reduce risk and enhance response and recovery
actions, they cannot guarantee that any possible act of vandalism, violence, or terrorism will
be prevented or stopped. As such, those responsible for the content and publication of this
document can provide no guarantees for the performance of any actions taken in response
to this guidance.
This document has been prepared in accordance with recognized engineering principles and
should not be used without the user's competent knowledge for a given application. The
publication of this DSTU is not intended to warrant that the information contained therein is
suitable for any general or specific use, and those responsible for the content and
publication of this document take no position respecting the validity of patent rights. The
user is advised that the determination of patent rights or risk of infringement is entirely
their own responsibility.
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Acknowledgements
These voluntary guidelines were developed during the USEPA WISE Project, Phase 3 under
the direction of the ASCE WISE Standards Committee. This committee consisted of the
individuals listed below through the end of the Committee balloting process. The members
of the WISE Wastewater/Stormwater Subcommittee, which was the primary review group
before the first WISE SC pilot sections ballot, are also provided below. The CH2M HILL
WISE Project Phase 3 Team members listed below drafted the document and assisted in the
resolution reporting during the balloting process. The USEPA personnel listed with the
Project Team reviewed material during the monthly WISE Project Partners conference calls
of the USEPA WISE Project.
Clifford L. Bowen, PE
William C. Boyle, PhD, PE,
DEE
Erica M. Brown
Jeanette A. Brown, PE, DEE
Jonathan W. Bulkley, PhD,
PE
Ivan Burrowes
James Conboy, PE, DEE
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Esq.
Clyde R. Dugan
John H. Easton, PhD
Findlay G. Edwards, PhD,
PE (Vice Chair)
Wayne Einfeld
Jorge A. Garcia, PhD, PE
Neil S. Grigg, PhD, PE
Yakir J. Hasit, PhD, PE
Todd Humphrey, PE
C. Dale Jacobson, PE, DEE
Jyung Seok Jeong
Conrad G. Keyes Jr. ScD,
PE, PS, D.WRE (Chair)
M. Patricia Lamb, CUSA
Thomas J. Lane, PE
Srinivasa Lingireddy, PhD,
PE
Thomas J. Linville, PE
Daniel L. Lynch, PE, DEE
John W. Me Laughlin, PE
Brian M. Murphy, PE
Irwin M. Pikus, PhD, Esq.
J. Alan Roberson, PE
Kyle E. Schilling, PE, DEE,
D.WRE
Charles R. Stack, MPH
C. Wesley Strickland, Esq.
Lloyd V. Urban, PhD, PE
James Van Norman
Gregory J. Welter, PE, DEE
James F. Wheeler, PE
Harold F. Wiedeman, PE
Robert C. Williams, PE,
DEE
Wastewater/Stormwater
Subcommittee
William C. Boyle, PhD, PE,
DEE (Vice Chair)
Jeanette A. Brown, PE, DEE
(Chair)
Daniel D. Clark
James Conboy, PE, DEE
Findlay G. Edwards, PhD,
PE
Dale D. Gabel, PE
C. Dale Jacobson, PE, DEE
Daniel L. Lynch, PE, DEE
Stacy Passaro, PE, BCEE
(WEF)
Jeffrey W. Talley, PhD
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The USEPA ASCE/AWWA/WEF WISE Project Team that worked with the CH2M HILL
and its subconsultant Richard Brady and Associates, Inc. team members listed below
organized and carried out the Phase 3 plan during June 2005 through the end of 2006. They
included:
L. Christian Hanson, CAE
(ASCE; WISE Project
Manager and Recording
Secretary for WISE SC)
Conrad G. Keyes Jr. ScD,
PE, PS, D.WRE (WISE
Standards Committee
Chair)
Findlay G. Edwards, PhD,
PE (WISE Standards
Committee Vice Chair)
John W. Me Laughlin, PE
(Water Supply
Subcommittee Chair)
M. Patricia Lamb, CUSA
(Water Supply
Subcommittee Vice Chair)
Irwin M. Pikus, PhD, Esq.
(Methodology and
Characteristics
Subcommittee Chair)
Yakir J. Hasit, PhD, PE
(Methodology and
Characteristics
Subcommittee Vice Chair)
Jeanette A. Brown, PE, DEE
(Wastewater/ Stormwater
Subcommittee Chair)
William C. Boyle, PhD, PE,
DEE (Wastewater/
Stormwater Subcommittee
Vice Chair)
Stacy Passaro, PE, BCEE
(WEE; WISE Project
Manager)
James S. Wailes, PE
(AWWA; WISE Project
Manager)
CH2M HILL
Jason M. Assouline
Paul A. Berg, PE
Richard D. Brady, PE, DEE
(Richard Brady and
Associates, Inc.)
Dale D. Gabel, PE
Forrest M. Gist, PE
Kristine K. Hargreaves,
AIA
Yakir J. Hasit, PhD, PE
Sam Irrinki, PE
Alan B. Ispass, PE, DEE
Jacqueline T. Kepke, PE
M. Jane Mailand
Lena Perkins
USEPA
Gregory Spraul
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1.0 Application of Guidelines
1.1 Introduction
These wastewater/stormwater utilities guidelines recommend physical and electronic
security measures for physical protection systems to protect against identified adversaries,
referred to as the design basis threats (DBTs), with specified motivation, tools, equipment,
and weapons. Additional requirements and security equipment may be necessary to defend
against threats with greater capabilities.
1.1.1 Elements of a Physical Protection System
Effective physical and electronic protection systems balance four elements (WEF 2004):
deterrence, detection, delay, and response.
1.1.1.1 Deterrence
Security measures such as lighting, the presence of closed circuit television (CCTV), a clearly
visible facility with no visual obstructions, or people in the area may deter an adversary
from attacking a facility. Deterrence is not generally considered a part of a physical
protection system with a predictable level of effectiveness; however, it can reduce the
occurrence of crime or low-level vandal attacks.
1.1.1.2 Detection
Security measures such as sensors are intended to detect the presence of an intruder. An
effective detection system should include electronic features such as sensors as well as
cameras or visual observation for assessment of alarm validity. Depending on the types of
sensors, a detection system may also include lighting systems, motion detectors, monitoring
cameras, access control equipment, or other devices.
1.1.1.3 Delay
Security features such as physical barriers are designed to delay an adversary until a
response force can interrupt the adversary's actions. Delay features consist primarily of
physical hardening devices often employed in multiple layers to provide protection in
depth. Delay features are only effective when placed within a layer of detection.
1.1.1.4 Response
(1) Response refers to actions taken to interrupt the adversary's task. Utility staff, the
utility's security response force, or law enforcement may carry out the response with the
appropriate responder dependent on the threat and policy of the utility.
(2) The capabilities of the responders to a security event, including number, authority, and
weaponry, should be greater than the capabilities of the perceived threat to the facility. The
appropriate response force should be identified during the facility's vulnerability
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assessment (VA) with notification, communication, and protocol requirements established
in the utility's emergency response plan or similar plan.
(3) Figure 1-1 illustrates the interaction of detection (at the perimeter fence and facility
entrance door), delay (fence, exterior door, interior door), and response time to an
adversary's sequence of actions. This figure was originally developed by Mary Lynn Garcia
of Sandia National Laboratories and uses a thief (that is, a criminal) as the DBT to illustrate
the time required for delay. Utilities should develop their own time sequence as part of their
vulnerability assessment process.
Perimeter
Detection
Total
Task
1 i
-*
Task
2
Task
; 3.
*• *
Task Task
4 , 5
* i
Task8
Task
6
Task
7 „
r\
3 Minutes
Time Estimate
Task
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Task Time
(minutes)
0.1
0.3
0.8
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.9
Cumulative Time
(minutes)
0.4
1.2
1.6
1.8
1.9
2.1
3.0
Adversary
Task Description
Climb over fence
Run 250 feet (76 m)
Force door
Walk 150 feet (46m)
Cut door lock
Walk to asset
Disable asset
Escape
Response
1st Alarm
2nd Alarm
Response Force Arrives
Stop Adversary
Effective
response
time
3.0
Total Time
FIGURE 1-1
Concept of Delay Calculation (adapted from Garcia, 2001)
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1.1.2 Design Basis Threat
DBTs considered in these guidelines address persons who intend to interrupt the
wastewater/stormwater treatment or collection processes, contaminate the wastewater, or
trespass on the wastewater/stormwater utility property in order to commit a malevolent
act. The following subsections summarize the objectives, motives, and fundamental security
approaches for each DBT used in these guidelines. Table 1-1 contains additional information
on the objectives, motives, and capabilities of DBT levels. The table also elaborates on the
differences between base and enhanced DBT levels.
1.1.2.1 Vandal
(1) Vandals are intent on defacing, damaging, or destroying property. They primarily seek
targets of opportunity, using stealth to avoid detection. Adversaries in this group do not
intend to injure or kill people (although such may occur as an accidental result of their
actions), and are assumed to be unarmed.
(2) Security approaches for a base-level vandal threat generally consist of placing physical
barriers between the assets and public areas, and visual detection of intruders by utility staff
or the general public. Use of appropriate perimeter fences and gates, adequate perimeter
and area lighting, and hardened locks often provides sufficient deterrence from all but the
most motivated vandals. Where the damage that could be caused by vandals is of relatively
low cost to repair, utilities should consider whether it is more cost-effective to focus on
consequence mitigation, that is, the repair or replacement of assets, than investing in
expensive security systems and protective measures.
(3) An enhanced threat created by a more intense or invasive vandal (one consisting of a
greater number of individuals that plan the activities or that has access to larger or more
capable tools) requires security approaches that detect and delay the intruder until the
appropriate response force can stop the threat. These measures are generally only
appropriate when the value of the assets is sufficient that consequence mitigation is a more
costly or an unacceptable approach. Liability issues should also be considered.
1.1.2.2 Criminal
(1) The primary motivation for a criminal is the desire to obtain equipment, tools, or
components that have inherent value and can be sold. Criminals typically use stealth to
avoid apprehension, and response times should focus on the time for the adversary to
obtain the asset. Depending on the level of desperation or sophistication, criminals may be
armed and willing to injure or kill to accomplish their objectives.
(2) Protective approaches against the base level of criminal threat with limited hand tools
are focused on deterrence and delay. Visual barriers act as a deterrent to prevent the
detection of assets by an opportunistic criminal. Prevention or delay of the removal of
equipment and other targets can result from physical separation from public areas,
adequate lighting, and physical barriers such as fences, protected heavy-duty locks, high-
quality doors and strikes, cabinets, and similar features. Multiple layers of protection
provide additional delay to the adversary in completing his objective. Replacement or repair
of some equipment in lieu of extensive security systems may be an appropriate and cost-
effective approach.
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TABLE 1-1
Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix
Characteristic
Objective
Motivation
Planning/system
knowledge
Weapons
Tools and
implements of
destruction
Contaminants
Asset damage
Injuries
Fatalities
Vandal
Damage, deface, or destroy targets of
opportunity
Thrill, dare, grudge
Base
Little or none
None
Readily available
hand tools or
equipment
available at the
facility, spray paint
None
Minimal
None
None
Enhanced
Possible
None
Basic hand tools
(e.g., pliers, wire
cutters, hammers,
crowbars),
baseball bats, or
firecrackers.
Possible
Possible
Possible
(unintentional)
Possible
(unintentional)
Criminal
Theft of valuable assets
Financial gain, grudge
Base
Little, opportunistic
Unlikely
Hand tools or
readily available
tools or equipment
at the facility (as
needed)
None
Minimal
Possible
Possible
Enhanced
Definite
Knives, hand
guns, or rifles
Sophisticated
hand and/or
power tools
None
Possible
Possible
Possible
Saboteur
Disruption, destruction, or
contamination; destroy public
confidence in utility/governmental
agency
Political, doctrinal, or religious causes,
grudge
Base
Definite
Knives or hand
guns, toxic
materials
Basic hand tools
(e.g., pliers, wire
cutters,
hammers,
crowbars)
Probable
Possible
Possible
Possible
Enhanced
Definite
Automatic and
semi-automatic
weapons, toxic
materials
Unlimited variety of
hand, power, and
thermal tools
(including tools
such as cutting
torches,
contaminant
agents, lEDs, and
I IDs)
Probable
Significant
Possible
Possible
Insider1
Property damage, theft, disruption,
destruction, or contamination
Revenge, financial gain, political cause,
collusion with outsider
Base
Limited access to
equipment,
facilities, SCADA,
or computer
networks
Unlikely
Tools or
equipment
available at the
facility.
Possible
Significant
Possible
Possible
Enhanced
Extensive access
to equipment,
facilities, SCADA,
networks, and
security systems;
greater system
knowledge
Knives, hand
guns, or rifles,
toxic materials
Tools or
equipment
available at the
facility.
Possible
Significant
Possible
Possible
1The insider may possess similar objectives or motivations to the other DBT categories, but will have access to facilities without causing suspicion. Insiders include: employees, vendor
representatives, delivery persons, consultants, and onsite contractors.
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(3) Equipment with significant monetary or mission-related value that the utility determines
must be protected from an enhanced criminal threat with significant planning or substantial
hand, power, and possibly thermal tools requires a security system that detects the
adversary and physically delays the theft until the appropriate response force arrives.
1.1.2.3 Saboteur
(1) A saboteur is typically motivated by political, doctrinal, or religious causes, although
revenge may also be a motivation. These individuals primarily use stealth to achieve their
objectives, but they can be armed and willing to injure or kill others if threatened. The
saboteur is bent on damage or destruction of the utility's facilities or generating a lack of
public confidence in the utility's ability to protect the public. Effectively defeating a saboteur
may require a response force more robust than that typically needed for the other DBT
categories and may require the capabilities of a trained Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) team.
(2) The difference between a base and enhanced level of threat from a saboteur is defined by
the capabilities and methods. The base saboteur threat often possesses simple tools and
attempts to either contaminate the wastewater system by introducing a toxic compound or
damage the facility components to prevent its operation. The security approach for
defeating this threat is to detect the intruders, quickly assess that the intruders are a threat,
and delay them until a response force interrupts their actions.
(3) Additional physical delay features are required to adequately impede an enhanced
saboteur threat with more sophisticated tools and weapons, which can include explosives,
and the ability to not only contaminate the wastewater but also to destroy critical facilities.
Depending on the capabilities of the saboteurs, security features may be required to resist an
attack from an improvised explosive device (IED) such as a pipe bomb or an improvised
incendiary device (IID).
1.1.2.4 Insider
(1) An insider is a person with knowledge of the utility who has access to the facilities or
portions of the system as part of his or her daily work activities. Insiders may be disgruntled
employees or contractors with employee-level access and may be armed. Insiders may also
include personnel being manipulated by or working in collusion with criminals or
saboteurs. Objectives of insiders may include compromising the effectiveness of the utility
facilities, contaminating the environment, humiliating the utility's management, stealing
records or other information, stealing items of value (for example, tools, money, parts,
computers, or televisions), or injuring other employees.
(2) The approach for preventing insider threats includes effective control of staff access to
critical areas through management policies (for example, a two-person access rule) and
possibly an electronic access control system (for example, individualized card readers) to
document entry. Access to the facility's supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
and other instrumentation and control software and hardware should also be controlled.
Effective access control to prevent insider tampering is typically achieved through tiered
access strategies, such that higher levels of access rights are necessary to access increasingly
more critical physical areas or software systems. This should be combined with background
checks to ensure only trusted individuals have access to critical assets. Consequence
mitigation should also be considered.
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(3) An enhanced insider threat has more in-depth system knowledge and generally has a
higher level of access rights to critical equipment, facilities, SCADA, computer networks,
and security systems. Protection from an enhanced threat requires additional management
policies, increasingly more robust electronic access control, and computerized monitoring
systems where consequence mitigation is unacceptable. Management policies are not
addressed in these physical security guidelines; however, the physical security elements
that complement those policies are presented.
1.2 Methodology for Applying These Guidelines
This section, "Methodology for Applying These Guidelines," applies to all subsequent
sections in this document and contains instructions that describe the basic steps for its use.
This section also contains information that utilities should consider when applying the
overall guidelines to their specific facilities and needs. Sections 2.0 through 5.0 describe
specific security technologies and methods that can be applied to individual facilities or
assets. These sections, in conjunction with the Foreword, 1.1 Introduction and its
subsections, and Appendices in these guidelines, can be used as standalone documents.
1.2.1 Instructions for Applying These Guidelines
The following steps list in order the actions a utility should take as it applies these
guidelines to its facilities. Figure 1-2 presents an example of a decision tree a utility would
use as it follows these steps for a particular asset.
1.2.1.1 Step 1 - Complete Vulnerability Assessment
(1) Complete a wastewater/stormwater system-wide VA and define the following:
(1) Critical assets to be protected
(2) DBT and its capabilities and motives
(3) Response force capabilities and response time
(4) Recommended security approach to reduce risk
(2) Several methodologies have been developed to assist utilities in completing vulnerability
assessments. These include:
(1) Risk Assessment Methodology for Water Utilities (RAM-W™) developed by Sandia
National Laboratories in partnership with the American Water Works Association
Research Foundation (Sandia Corporation 2002)
(2) Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool (VSAT™) developed by the Association of
Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (AMSA, which is now known as the National
Association of Clean Water Agencies ) (NACWA 2005)
(3) "Asset Based Vulnerability Checklist for Wastewater Utilities," produced by AMSA
(NACWA 2002)
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Step 1 -
Complete VA
System VA Defines:
1. Critical asset: Pump at Pump Station XYZ
2. Capabilities and Motive of the DBT:
Local kids intent on vandalism using hand tools
3. Response force: Local police, 15 minute response time
Step 2 -
Characterize DBT
DBT Matches: Base Vandal Threat
Benchmark Security Recommendation:
Basic perimeter fence (chain link)
Step 3 -
Identify Security
Measures
Step 4 -
Consider
Consequence
Mitigation
Consider
Ornamental
Fencing
(alternate
physical security
measure)
No: Local codes
do not allow
fences
No: Neighbors
have aesthetic
concern
Recommended
Measure
Appropriate for
Site-specific
Conditions?
Consider
Enhanced
Lighting and
CCTV
Surveillance
(alternate physical
security measure)
Consider
Use of a Stand by
Portable Pump
(consequence
mitigation)
Recommended
Measure
Cost-effective for the
Risk Reduction
Achieved?
Install
Recommended
Measure
"Note: Risk reduction
incorporates the likelihood
of a successful attack and
the consequence or damage
resulting from an attack
FIGURE 1-2
Example Decision Tree
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(4) "Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide for Small Drinking Water Systems/'
prepared by the Association of State Drinking Water Administrators and National
Rural Water Association (ASDWA 2002)
(5) "Protecting Your Community's Assets: A Guide for Small Wastewater Systems"
published by the National Environmental Training Center for Small Communities
(NETCSC 2002)
The last three documents are suited primarily for small utilities with a limited number of
assets.
1.2.1.2 Step 2 - Characterize Design Basis Threat
(1) Compare the DBT identified in the VA to the DBT levels described in 1.1.2. Select the
appropriate DBT category (more than one may be selected): vandal, criminal, saboteur, or
insider.
(2) Within each of these DBT categories (see Table 1-1), determine whether the base level or
enhanced level of security is appropriate.
1.2.1.3 Step 3 - Identify Security Measures
(1) Using the security measures table contained within the appropriate facility section of
these guidelines, locate the column that applies to the selected DBT category at either the
base level or enhanced level to identify the recommended physical and electronic security
measures. Ensure that the appropriate level of protection is applied consistently to all
elements of the facility to avoid any weak points.
(2) Compare VA-recommended security approaches to the recommendations in the table
and determine whether changes to the recommendations are warranted.
(3) Deviations may be appropriate for a DBT that is defined differently (for example, with
greater capabilities) from those presented in 1.1.2. Based on an analysis of the DBT's
capabilities and the anticipated response time for an adequate response force, a utility may
determine that it is necessary to apply the recommended enhanced level measures plus
additional security measures to provide a greater or more consistent level of security.
(4) Deviations may also be appropriate based on specific site conditions or external
requirements (for example, local ordinances, standards, or codes), the criticality of the asset,
or the response time or capability of the responders. In these cases, the utility should
consider alternate security measures that accomplish similar objectives to the measure
recommended in the table. Where certain measures may be less desirable (such as the
barbed wire in a residential neighborhood), they may be offset by other measures (such as
providing natural surveillance that may deter intruders averse to being caught in the act).
1.2.1.4 Step 4 - Consider Consequence Mitigation
(1) Consider the costs of the recommended security features and determine whether
mitigation of the consequences is more cost-effective than applying the recommended
security measures. A utility may wish to reduce the amount of physical hardening and
electronic security (such as secure fencing, hardened doors and windows, closed-circuit
television cameras) that is applied if it is more feasible, reliable, and cost effective to repair
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or replace a damaged asset. For example, a utility may decide to bypass a pumping station
or use a portable pump located off-site in the event that a permanent pump is damaged
instead of implementing additional security measures.
(2) As illustrated in Figure 1-3, a cost-risk reduction curve can be a useful tool in
determining the point at which the risk reduction associated with implementing additional
security measures is marginal. Management and operational measures to lower
consequences are important elements of a utility or facility security plan (WEF 2004) that are
not addressed in these guidelines.
c
o
TJ
&
to
O
O
. __ Advanced
- C> Perimeter
Develop Emergency f~ Detection
Response Plan / System
Camera
Develop Security
Policies and
Procedures
Door Contact Alarms
Improved Locks and
Door Hardware
Risk Reduction
FIGURE 1-3
Typical Cost-to-Risk Reduction Curve (taken from Exhibit 1-13, WEF 2004)
1.2.2 Additional Information to Assist in Applying These Guidelines
The following sections provide additional information that will be helpful as the subsequent
sections of these guidelines are reviewed and considered for implementation.
1.2.2.1 New and Existing Facilities
(1) These guidelines can be applied to new and existing facilities. For new facilities, the VA
to identify the key assets and appropriate DBT should be conducted during the early design
phases, for example, during conceptual design, and should be consistent with the VA for the
utility's other facilities. In addition to incorporating the appropriate security measures
identified in these guidelines into the design, consideration should be given to using
security-focused design approaches. Examples would include limiting routes of access to
critical assets, selecting building materials that are less prone to vandalism or forced entry,
arranging building orientations to provide visual site control, providing redundant critical
assets, locating redundant critical assets in nonadjacent areas, and replacing large-diameter
pipes with multiple smaller diameter pipes that are too small for an individual to enter and
together can carry the entire design flow.
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(2) Most of the security measures can be applied as retrofits to an existing facility. The
exceptions are those measures that require minimum site dimensions to be effective (for
example, double-layer fencing or set-back distances) or are dependent on other site-specific
conditions (for example, landscaping or site lighting). In applying these guidelines to
existing facilities, a utility should ensure that a consistent protection layer is achieved; for
example, the delay capability of a pry- or break-resistant door added to a facility should
match the resistance provided by the facility's other doors, windows, walls, and roof.
1.2.2.2 Local Codes and Required Aesthetics
The application of these guidelines needs to consider local codes, ordinances, restrictive
covenants, and aesthetic requirements. For example, local codes may limit the extent and
intensity of site lighting. Required aesthetics may limit the height or material type of a fence,
or it may not be appropriate to use a fence with outriggers and barbed wire for a facility that
is located in a park-like or residential neighborhood setting.
1.2.2.3 Assets Not Under Utility Control
These guidelines apply only to assets that are within the control of the utility. For critical
assets that are not owned by the utility, the utility needs to coordinate protection of the
assets with the owning parties.
1.2.2.4 Balance of the System
Where multiple facilities are located in a single complex, consider the security measures
needed for each type of facility and integrate the measures to provide the most effective
approach.
1.2.2.5 Value of the Asset
The relative value of an asset or facility is determined through the VA process and may be
contingent on perceived or actual monetary value, value to the process, value to the
community, or potential consequences if out of service. A higher value asset may warrant
enhanced security measures when compared to a lower value asset.
1.2.2.6 Levels of Security Measures
Each section of this document recommends security measures for base and enhanced levels
in each DBT category that are deemed appropriate to a wide range of facility types. The
choice between applying the base level or enhanced level of security depends upon the DBT,
the criticality of the asset, and the response time and capability of the responders. It may be
appropriate for a utility to apply security features in excess of those identified as enhanced.
It may also be appropriate for a utility to apply alternative solutions to achieve a similar
level of security for all facilities.
1.2.2.7 Response Time and Capabilities
If the anticipated response time is high or if the response capability is low, additional
security measures may be warranted.
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2.0 Wastewater Treatment Plants
2.1 Scope
This section of this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use covers wastewater
treatment plants used within a municipal wastewater system. It establishes benchmark
physical and electronic security features for protecting a wastewater treatment plant
(referred to as the facility in this section) from vandal, criminal, saboteur, and insider
threats. Threats and malevolent acts of concern include damage or destruction of individual
treatment processes or equipment, or introduction of a chemical or biological contaminant
that severely impedes wastewater treatment. A wastewater treatment plant that cannot
provide adequate capacity or performance due to a malevolent activity could discharge an
effluent with significantly impaired quality that may create a public health hazard or cause
environmental damage of the downstream receiving water or receiving environment.
Employee safety and public health concerns can be caused by the intentional release of
hazardous chemicals or toxic gasses, or by damaging ventilation and other life-safety
control features. The potential for malevolent individuals to create intentional fire and
explosive hazards are additional concerns that may require security features.
2.2 Facility Mission
(1) The mission of this facility is to treat the incoming wastewater to an environmentally and
public health-acceptable level before discharging to a receiving body of water or other
system. Wastewater treatment plants typically include below-grade, ground level, and
elevated structures, tankage, and buildings with typical throughput capacities ranging from
a thousand gallons per day (3.8 cubic meters per day) to more than a billion gallons per day
(>3,800,000 cubic meters per day). Large wastewater treatment plants are routinely staffed
on a continuous basis; small facilities are likely to be staffed by operations and maintenance
personnel only periodically to perform maintenance activities, conduct process monitoring,
collect environment samples, or respond to failure alarms. Although often isolated from the
general public, these facilities can be located in residential settings, or in the midst of denser
populated urban areas. Because of safety concerns, the public generally has no direct access.
(2) More detailed information on specific functions and treatment processes is contained in
the Design of Municipal Wastewater Treatment Plants - 4th Edition, WEF Manual of Practice
No. 8, ASCE Manuals and Reports on Engineering Practice No. 76 (WEF 1998, ASCE 1998),
and WEF Manual of Practice 11: Operation of Municipal Wastewater Treatment Plants (WEF
2005).
2.3 Philosophy of Security Approach
(1) An effective security approach for wastewater treatment plants includes equipment or
systems to deter, detect, delay, and respond to a threat prior to an adversary achieving its
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objective, or mitigation of the consequences of a successful attack by the threat. The
equipment and systems for successful detection and delay of a threat should be matched to
the capabilities of the DBT, which are usually established during a facility's VA. In addition,
equipment and systems should be selected bearing in mind that the adversary must be
adequately delayed until the utility's identified response force arrives. For a saboteur DBT,
an enhanced response force with superior numbers and weapons would typically be
required.
(2) DBTs considered in this guideline include vandals, criminals, saboteurs, and insiders.
Characteristics and capabilities of the two levels of DBT threats—base and enhanced—upon
which the benchmark security measures in this guideline are based, are presented in
Table 1-1, Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix. Threats with capabilities less than or
greater than those identified in Table 1-1 require a less or more robust security system as
appropriate. Physical security measures are recommended without regard to cost or other
factors that may preclude their implementation.
(3) Benchmark security measures for deterrence, detection, and delay are provided in this
guideline. Approaches for consequence mitigation are presented in the Interim Voluntary
Security Guidance for Wastewater/Stormwater Utilities (WEF 2004) and are not addressed here.
2.4 Special Considerations for Critical Assets
Special considerations should be provided for security of the extremely critical or hazardous
assets or facilities identified in the VA. These assets may be the target of a DBT that is more
capable than the DBT for the remainder of the wastewater treatment plant, thus the critical
assets may require additional security measures. Security approaches for these assets should
be based on protection-in-depth principles, where multiple layers of security measures are
employed around the critical assets to detect and delay the adversary. Typical critical assets
of wastewater treatment plants that should be considered for more robust or enhanced
security measures include:
• Toxic gas storage facilities such as chlorine, sulfur dioxide, and ozone
• Facilities for storage and use of combustible/flammable materials such as methane,
gasoline, propane, methanol, and oxygen storage facilities and natural gas metering and
connections
• Power equipment and systems such as electrical switchgear, transformers, substations,
generators, and motor control centers
• Major mechanical systems such as influent, effluent, and in-plant pumping stations,
and blowers
• SCAD A, security and communication systems such as network, Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA), and security servers, and radio, microwave, and
telephone communications
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2.5 Benchmark Security Measures
(1) Table 2-1 establishes the benchmark measures for a recommended security system to
deter a threat or detect and delay the threat until the appropriate response force arrives. If
the threat includes more than one DBT, for example an enhanced criminal and a base
insider, the security system should include the recommended security measures for both
threats. Recommended security measures for a specific DBT are indicated with a check mark
(/). A security measure without a check mark for a specific DBT indicates that either the
security measure is not recommended or a more robust security measure is recommended.
The security measures of Table 2-1 have been grouped into the following categories:
• Perimeter
• Site (area between perimeter and facilities)
• Facility Structures
• Water Quality Monitoring
• Closed Circuit Television - Alarm Assessment (fixed cameras)
• Closed Circuit Television - Surveillance (pan-tilt-zoom [PTZ] cameras)
• Power and Wiring Systems
• SCADA - Physical Security
(2) Security decisions are site and utility specific, and the measures identified in the table are
good practice options to be considered, not rules to follow. Additionally, the measures
presented in the table are for typical wastewater treatment plants. Facilities with different
attributes or threats with capabilities in excess of the descriptions in Table 1-1 may require
additional or more robust security measures. Appendix A provides additional details on
security measures (specific sections are referenced in Table 2-1 where applicable).
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GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WASTEWATER/STORMWATER UTILITIES 2-3
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TABLE 2-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater Treatment Plants
Security Measure
System
Objective3
>,
03
-------
TABLE 2-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater Treatment Plants
Security Measure
Gate entrance lighting
Hardened site openings larger than
96 square inches (62,000 square
millimeters) in area (e.g., grates on
culverts)
Provide separate visitor vehicular
sign-in checkpoint
"No Trespassing" signage (every
50 feet [15 meters])
System
Objective3
>,
03
-------
TABLE 2-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater Treatment Plants
Security Measure
Foundation enhancements for
second layer of fencing
Bollards or vehicle barriers around
critical exterior equipment
Bollards or vehicle barriers limiting
vehicle access to area within
second layer of fencing
Electronic access-controlled
entrance gate for second fence
Transformer (outdoor) - locked
protective barrier or cage
Generator (outdoor) - locked
protective barrier or cage
Switchgear/motor control center
(outdoor) - protective cage
Chemical storage and feed
equipment (outdoor) - locked
access
Chemical storage and feed
equipment (outdoor) - locked
access with intrusion detection
Landscaping that does not obscure
building or other assets
System
Objective3
03
-------
TABLE 2-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater Treatment Plants
Security Measure
Manholes - locked with security
fastener
Manholes - intrusion detection on
lock
Minimize exterior signage
indicating the presence or locations
of assets
System
Objective3
03
-------
TABLE 2-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater Treatment Plants
Security Measure
Exterior doors with status switch
contact alarmed to security
Electronic access-controlled
entrance door
Automatic locking critical interior
doors with access control
Double entry system or secured
lobby entry (mantrap)
Visitor waiting area
Blast-resistant exterior doorsb
Bollards or vehicle barriers
protecting vehicle doors
Break-resistant glass
Blast-resistant windows'3
Glass-break detection at windows
Interior motion detection
Grilles or other barriers at skylights
and louvers over 96 sq. in.
(62,000 sq. mm)
System
Objective3
>,
03
-------
TABLE 2-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater Treatment Plants
Security Measure
Grilles or other barriers with
intrusion detection at skylights and
louvers over 96 sq. in.
(62,000 sq. mm)
Locked roof hatches
Locked roof hatches with intrusion
alarm
Roof access ladder with locked
shroud
Roof access ladder with locked
shroud and intrusion alarm
Transformer (indoor) - locked
protective barrier or cage
Generator (indoor) - locked
protective barrier or cage
Switchgear/motor control center
(indoor) - locked protective cage
Chemical fill lines at building
exterior- locked access
Chemical fill lines at building
exterior- locked access with
intrusion detection
System
Objective3
>,
03
-------
TABLE 2-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater Treatment Plants
Security Measure
Chemical storage and feed
equipment (indoor) - locked
access
Chemical storage and feed
equipment (indoor) - locked with
intrusion detection
System
Objective3
>,
03
-------
TABLE 2-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater Treatment Plants
Security Measure
System
Objective3
>,
03
-------
3.0 Collection Systems
3.1 Scope
This section of this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use covers the collection and
conveyance components of wastewater and stormwater systems. This section establishes
benchmark physical and electronic security features for protecting these system from
vandal, criminal, saboteur, and insider threats. Threats and malevolent acts of concern
include damage or destruction of individual facilities or equipment, release of untreated
wastewater into the environment, or use of the collection system as a conduit to reach
buildings or other targets of malevolent action.
3.2 System Mission
(1) The mission of these facilities is to collect and convey wastewater from its origins in the
community to wastewater treatment facilities or to convey stormwater to treatment or to
discharge points. They include pipelines, culverts, conveyance tunnels, manholes, isolation
and control valves, air release valves, combined sewer structures, stormwater inlets, and
catch basins, stormwater outfall structures, stormwater retention/detention basins, and
related items. These facilities are distributed throughout the community that is served by
the utility and rarely have defined individual facility perimeters. Most pipelines and valves
are buried and therefore, out of sight of the public. However, every customer has a direct
connection to the wastewater system through their service line, and manholes that provide
access to the wastewater and stormwater systems are prevalent throughout the community.
(2) More detailed information on specific functions and features of wastewater and
stormwater collection systems is contained in the following documents:
• Gravity Sanitary Sewer Design and Construction, WEF Manual of Practice No. FD-5 and
ASCE Manuals and Reports on Engineering Practice No. 60 (WEF 1982, ASCE 1982)
• Wastewater Collection Systems Management, Manual of Practice No. 7, 5th Edition (WEF
1999)
• Design and Construction of Urban Stormwater Management Systems, WEF Manual of
Practice No. FD-20 and ASCE Manuals and Reports of Engineering Practice No. 77 (WEF
1992, ASCE 1992)
• Standard Guidelines for the Design, Installation, Maintenance and Operation of Urban
Stormwater Systems, ASCE/EWRI45-, 46-, 47-05 (ASCE 2006b)
3.3 Philosophy of Security Approach
(1) An effective security approach for collection systems includes equipment or systems to
deter, detect, delay, and respond to a threat prior to an adversary achieving its objective, or
DECEMBER 2006
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mitigation of the consequences of a successful attack by the threat. The equipment and
systems for successful detection and delay of a threat should be matched to the capabilities
of the DBT, which are usually established during a facility's VA. In addition, equipment and
systems should be selected bearing in mind that the adversary must be adequately delayed
until the utility's identified response force arrives. For a saboteur DBT, an enhanced
response force with superior numbers and weapons would typically be required.
(2) DBTs considered in this guideline include vandals, criminals, saboteurs, and insiders.
Characteristics and capabilities of the two levels of DBT threats—base and enhanced—upon
which the benchmark security measures in this guideline are based, are presented in
Table 1-1, Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix. Threats with capabilities less than or
greater than those identified in Table 1-1 require a less or more robust security system as
appropriate. Physical security measures are recommended without regard to cost or other
factors that may preclude their implementation.
(3) Benchmark security measures for deterrence, detection, and delay are provided in this
guideline. Approaches for consequence mitigation are presented in the Interim Voluntary
Security Guidance for Wastewater/Stormwater Utilities (WEF 2004) and are not addressed here.
3.4 Benchmark Security Measures
(1) Table 3-1 establishes the benchmark measures for a recommended security system to
deter a threat or detect and delay the threat until the appropriate response force arrives. If
the threat includes more than one DBT, for example an enhanced criminal and a base
insider, the security system should include the recommended security measures for both
threats. Recommended security measures for a specific DBT are indicated with a check mark
(^). A security measure without a check mark for a specific DBT indicates that either the
security measure is not recommended or a more robust security measure is recommended.
The security measures of Table 3-1 have been grouped into the following categories:
• System Structures
• Water Quality Monitoring
• Closed Circuit Television - Alarm Assessment (fixed cameras)
• Power and Wiring Systems
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) - Physical Security
(2) Security decisions are site and utility specific, and the measures identified in the table are
good practice options to be considered, not rules to follow. Additionally, the measures
presented in the table are for typical collection systems. Systems with different attributes or
threats with capabilities in excess of the descriptions in Table 1-1 may require additional or
more robust security measures. Appendix A provides additional details on security
measures (specific sections are referenced in Table 3-1 where applicable).
(3) Collection systems present challenges in developing adequate detection and delay
approaches, as many facilities are not constructed with defined perimeters or site areas
where access can be controlled and are frequently open to the public. Section 2.0,
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"Wastewater Treatment Plants/' and Section 4.0, "Pumping Stations/' provide guidelines
for protecting facilities with defined perimeters and site areas. For the elements of the
collection systems without defined perimeters and site areas, a utility may elect to
selectively apply the recommended security measures on a subset of their assets, the most
critical assets, based on the results of their VA or similar risk assessment evaluation.
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TABLE 3-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Collection Systems
Security Measure
System
Objective3
>,
03
-------
TABLE 3-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Collection Systems
Security Measure
Locking covers for control, air
relief, and other valves
Locking covers with intrusion
detection for control, air relief, and
other valves
Pan-type manhole cover locks
Bolt-type manhole cover locks
Tack-weld manhole covers with
motion detection
In existing system, mount bar
screens or horizontal bars on catch
basins, curb inlets, and pipe inlets
and outlets
Mount bolt-type locking devices on
catch basins, curb inlets, and pipe
inlets and outlets
Weld screen and bars on catch
basins, curb inlets, and pipe inlets
and outlets and install motion
detection
Hardened key locked accessways
for deep tunnels
System
Objective3
>,
03
-------
TABLE 3-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Collection Systems
Security Measure
Electronic access-controlled for
deep tunnel accessways
Motion detection or intrusion
alarms for deep tunnel accessways
Thermal imaging devices in access
shafts and tunnels
System
Objective3
03
-------
TABLE 3-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Collection Systems
Security Measure
Redundant critical utility (power)
connections
System
Objective3
>,
03
-------
4.0 Pumping Stations
4.1 Scope
This section of this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use covers pumping stations
used within a wastewater collection system (often called a sanitary sewer or sewerage
system) or within a stormwater system. It establishes benchmark physical and electronic
security features for protecting a pumping station (referred to as the facility in this section)
from vandal, criminal, saboteur, and insider threats. Threats and malevolent acts of concern
include damage or destruction of the pumping station equipment that causes an
uncontrolled release of the wastewater or stormwater creating a public health hazard or
environmental damage. Additional threats include introduction of a chemical or biological
contaminant that severely impedes or damages downstream sewer lines and treatment
processes that may ultimately contaminate the water or environmental system receiving the
treatment plant's discharge.
4.2 Facility Mission
(1) The mission of this facility is to pump raw wastewater or stormwater to a treatment
facility, another pumping station, or to a sewer line at a higher elevation. Pumping stations
typically comprise both below-grade and at-grade facilities with capacities ranging from a
thousand gallons per day (3.8 cubic meters per day) to more than a million gallons per day
(>3,800 cubic meters per day). Although larger pumping stations may be routinely staffed
on a continuous or part-time basis, more frequently operations and maintenance staff only
visit these facilities periodically to perform maintenance activities or to respond to failure
alarms. Although typically isolated from the general public, these facilities can be located in
residential, park-like settings, or in the midst of denser populated urban areas. Due to safety
concerns, the public generally has no direct access.
(2) More detailed information on pumping station functions and features is contained in the
Design of Wastewater and Stormwater Pumping Stations, WEF Manual of Practice No. FD-4
(WEF 1993).
4.3 Philosophy of Security Approach
(1) An effective security approach for pumping stations includes equipment or systems to
deter, detect, delay, and respond to a threat prior to an adversary achieving its objective or
mitigation of the consequences of a successful attack by the threat. The equipment and
systems for successful detection and delay of a threat should be matched to the capabilities
of the DBT, which are usually established during a facility's VA. In addition, equipment and
systems should be selected bearing in mind that the adversary must be adequately delayed
until the utility's identified response force arrives. For a saboteur DBT, an enhanced
response force with superior numbers and weapons would typically be required.
DECEMBER 2006
GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WASTEWATER/STORMWATER UTILITIES 4-1
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(2) DBTs considered in this section include vandals, criminals, saboteurs, and insiders.
Characteristics and capabilities of the two levels of DBT threats—base and enhanced—upon
which the benchmark security measures in this section are based, are presented in Table 1-1,
Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix. Threats with capabilities less than or greater than
those identified in Table 1-1 require a less or more robust security system as appropriate.
Physical security measures are recommended without regard to cost or other factors that
may preclude their implementation.
(3) Benchmark security measures for deterrence, detection, and delay are provided in this
section. Approaches for consequence mitigation are presented in the Interim Voluntary
Security Guidance for Wastewater/Stormwater Utilities (WEF 2004) and are not addressed here.
4.4 Benchmark Security Measures
(1) Table 4-1 establishes the benchmark measures for a recommended security system to
deter a threat or detect and delay the threat until the appropriate response force arrives. If
the threat includes more than one DBT, for example an enhanced criminal and a base
insider, the security system should include the recommended security measures for both
threats. Recommended security measures for a specific DBT are indicated with a check mark
(^). A security measure without a check mark for a specific DBT indicates that either the
security measure is not recommended or a more robust security measure is recommended.
The security measures of Table 4-1 have been grouped into the following categories:
• Perimeter
• Site (area between perimeter and facilities)
• Facility Structures
• Water Quality Monitoring
• Closed Circuit Television - Alarm Assessment (fixed cameras)
• Closed Circuit Television - Surveillance (pan-tilt-zoom [PTZ] cameras)
• Power and Wiring Systems
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) - Physical Security
(2) Security decisions are site and utility specific, and the measures identified in the table are
good practice options to be considered, not rules to follow. Additionally, the measures
presented in the table are for typical pumping stations. Pumping stations with different
attributes or threats with capabilities in excess of the descriptions in Table 1-1 may require
additional or more robust security measures. Appendix A provides additional details on
security measures (specific sections are referenced in Table 4-1 where applicable).
DECEMBER 2006
GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WASTEWATER/STORMWATER UTILITIES 4-2
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TABLE 4-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Pumping Stations
Security Measure
System
Objective3
03
-------
TABLE 4-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Pumping Stations
Security Measure
"No Trespassing" signage (every
50 feet [15 meters])
System
Objective3
5x
03
-------
TABLE 4-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Pumping Stations
Security Measure
Transformer (outdoor) - locked
protective barrier or cage
Generator (outdoor) - locked
protective barrier or cage
Switchgear/motor control center
(outdoor) - locked protective cage
Chemical storage and feed
equipment (outdoor) - locked
access
Chemical storage and feed
equipment (outdoor) - locked
access with intrusion detection
Landscaping that does not obscure
building or other assets
Manholes - locked with security
fastener
Manholes - intrusion detection on
lock
Minimize exterior signage
indicating the presence or locations
of assets
System
Objective3
5x
03
-------
TABLE 4-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Pumping Stations
Security Measure
System
Objective3
03
-------
TABLE 4-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Pumping Stations
Security Measure
Bollards or vehicle barriers
protecting vehicle doors
Break-resistant glass
Blast-resistant windows'3
Glass-break detection at windows
Interior motion detection
Grilles or other barriers at skylights
and louvers over 96 sq. in.
(62,000 sq. mm)
Grilles or other barriers with
intrusion detection at skylights and
louvers over 96 sq. in.
(62,000 sq. mm)
Locked roof hatches
Locked roof hatches with intrusion
alarm
Roof access ladder with locked
shroud
Roof access ladder with locked
shroud and intrusion alarm
System
Objective3
5x
03
-------
TABLE 4-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Pumping Stations
Security Measure
Transformer (indoor) - locked
protective barrier or cage
Generator (indoor) - locked
protective barrier or cage
Switchgear/motor control center
(indoor) - locked protective cage
Chemical fill lines at building
exterior- locked access
Chemical fill lines at building
exterior- locked access with
intrusion detection
Chemical storage and feed
equipment (indoor) - locked
access
Chemical storage and feed
equipment (indoor) - locked with
intrusion detection
System
Objective3
5x
03
-------
TABLE 4-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Pumping Stations
Security Measure
CCTV - Hatches, vaults
System
Objective3
5x
03
-------
TABLE 4-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Pumping Stations
Security Measure
System
Objective3
03
-------
5.0 Wastewater/Stormwater System
Support Facilities
5.1 Scope
This section of this Draft American National Standard for Trial Use presents guidelines for
security for support facilities that are part of wastewater and stormwater systems. It
establishes benchmark physical and electronic security features for protecting support
facilities from vandal, criminal, saboteur, and insider threats. Threats and malevolent acts of
concern include damage or destruction of individual facilities or critical assets within
facilities.
5.2 Facility Mission
Wastewater/stormwater system support facilities include administrative buildings,
maintenance yards, sites for material and vehicle storage, laboratories, and septage disposal
facilities. The common element linking these facilities is that they are not in direct contact
with the wastewater or stormwater. If a facility such as a laboratory or storage yard is
located at the wastewater treatment plant, then the security guideline for wastewater
treatment plants should be referenced. This guideline applies to those facilities that are not
located at a treatment plant, or pumping station, or otherwise in direct contact with the
wastewater or stormwater. Because support facilities are located apart from the water flow,
they have a low risk for being avenues of intentional contamination of the wastewater or
stormwater.
Support facilities may also have the following common factors that are often different from
other system facilities:
• Large number of people entering and leaving the facility, including the public
• High vehicle traffic
• Fuel tanks to supply utility fleet
• In the case of laboratories, may house chemicals or even pathogens that are used in tests
• May be symbolic of the utility's image, such as a headquarters facility
• May provide storage for utility vehicles, which as moving assets, present unique
challenges
• May be combined with other government facilities, such as an administrative facility
within the city hall or a maintenance yard combined with other city maintenance
functions
DECEMBER 2006
GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WASTEWATER/STORMWATER UTILITIES 5-1
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The assets in a support facility may include maps, Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA)/controls/ reports, cash, business systems, heavy and mobile
equipment, and tools.
5.3 Philosophy of Security Approach
(1) An effective security approach for support facilities includes equipment or systems to
deter, detect, delay, and respond to a threat prior to an adversary achieving its objective, or
mitigation of the consequences of a successful attack by the threat. The equipment and
systems for successful detection and delay of a threat should be matched to the capabilities
of the DBT, which are usually established during a facility's VA. In addition, equipment and
systems should be selected bearing in mind that the adversary must be adequately delayed
until the utility's identified response force arrives.
(2) DBTs considered in this guideline include vandals, criminals, saboteurs, and insiders.
Characteristics and capabilities of the two levels of threats— base and enhanced— upon
which the benchmark security measures in this guideline are based, are presented in Table
1-1, Design Basis Threat Capability Matrix. Threats with capabilities less than or greater
than those identified in Table 1-1 require a less or more robust security system as
appropriate. Physical security measures are recommended without regard to cost or other
factors that may preclude their implementation.
(3) Benchmark security measures for deterrence, detection, and delay are provided in this
guideline. Approaches for consequence mitigation are presented in the Interim Voluntary
Security Guidance for Wastewater/Stormwater Utilities (WEF 2004) and are not addressed here.
5.4 Benchmark Security Measures
(1) Table 5-1 establishes the benchmark measures for a recommended security system to
deter a threat or detect and delay the threat until the appropriate response force arrives. If
the threat includes more than one DBT, for example an enhanced criminal and a base
insider, the security system should include the recommended security measures for both
threats. Recommended security measures for a specific DBT are indicated with a check mark
(S). A security measure without a check mark for a specific DBT indicates that either the
security measure is not recommended or a more robust security measure is recommended.
The security measures of Table 5-1 have been grouped into the following categories:
• Perimeter
• Site (area between perimeter and facilities)
• Facility Structures
• Closed-Circuit Television - Alarm Assessment (fixed cameras)
• Closed-Circuit Television - Surveillance (pan-tilt-zoom [PTZ] cameras)
• Power and Wiring Systems
• SCADA - Physical Security
DECEMBER 2006
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(2) Security decisions are site and utility specific, and the measures identified in the table are
good practice options to be considered, not rules to follow. Additionally, the measures
presented in the table are for typical wastewater/stormwater support facilities. Facilities
with different attributes or threats with capabilities in excess of the descriptions in Table 1-1
may require additional or more robust security measures. Appendix A provides additional
details on security measures (specific sections are referenced in Table 5-1 where applicable).
(3) Special considerations should be provided for security of extremely critical assets or
facilities such as SCADA, security equipment, and network computer servers, hubs and
related systems, and dangerous chemicals and pathogens located in analytical laboratories.
DECEMBER 2006
GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WASTEWATER/STORMWATER UTILITIES 5-3
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TABLE 5-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater/Stormwater System Support Facilities
Security Measure
System
Objective3
03
-------
TABLE 5-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater/Stormwater System Support Facilities
Security Measure
Perimeter site lighting
Gate entrance lighting
Hardened site openings larger than
96 square inches (62,000 square
millimeters) in area
Provide separate visitor vehicular
sign-in checkpoint
"No Trespassing" signage (every
50 feet [15 meters])
System
Objective3
><
03
O
Q
•
•
Detection
•
•
•
Vandals
Base
Level
S
S
S
Enhanced
Level
S
-------
TABLE 5-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater/Stormwater System Support Facilities
Security Measure
Enhanced second layer of fencing
that is climb/cut resistant
Intrusion detection at second layer
of fencing
Foundation enhancements for
second layer of fencing
Bollards or vehicle barriers around
critical exterior equipment
Bollards or vehicle barriers limiting
vehicle access to area within
second layer of fencing
Electronic access-controlled
entrance gate for second fence
Transformer (outdoor) - locked
protective barrier or cage
Generator (outdoor) - locked
protective barrier or cage
Switchgear/motor control center
(outdoor) - locked protective cage
Chemical storage and feed
equipment (outdoor) - locked
access
System
Objective3
03
-------
TABLE 5-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater/Stormwater System Support Facilities
Security Measure
Chemical storage and feed
equipment (outdoor) - locked
access with intrusion detection
Fuel storage tanks located at least
100 feet (30 meters) from all
buildings and away from perimeter
fence lines
Landscaping that does not obscure
building or other assets
Minimize exterior signage
indicating the presence or locations
of assets
System
Objective3
><
03
O
Q
*
*
*
Detection
*
•
Vandals
Base
Level
'
'
Enhanced
Level
'
'
Criminals
Base
Level
'
Enhanced
Level
'
'
Saboteurs
Base
Level
^
'
'
Enhanced
Level
'
^
'
'
Insiders
Base
Level
'
Enhanced
Level
'
'
Applicable Sections
in Appendix A,
Physical Security
Elements
13.3, 17.0
1.6, 3.0(3)
Facility Structures
Industrial-type, tamper-resistant
door hinges
Key-locked entrance door
Exterior doors with status switch
contact alarmed to security
Electronic access-controlled
entrance door
Automatic locking critical interior
doors with access control
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
'
'
'
'
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
'
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
^
'
^
^
^
10.1, 10.2,
13.2(6)(c)
9.4, 13.2
9.4, 10.4, 13.2
10.1, 10.3, 10.4,
13.2
DECEMBER 2006
GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WASTEWATER/STORMWATER UTILITIES
5-7
-------
TABLE 5-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater/Stormwater System Support Facilities
Security Measure
Blast-resistant exterior doorsb
Double entry system or secured
lobby entry (mantrap)
Visitor waiting area
Provide dedicated meeting room
located outside secured interior for
meetings with visitors or vendors
Design building circulation to
provide unobstructed views of
people approaching controlled
areas or critical assets
Bollards or vehicle barriers
protecting vehicle and personnel
doors
Break-resistant glass
Blast-resistant windows'3
Interior motion detection
Do not locate windows next to
doors so that intruders could
unlock the doors through them
System
Objective3
><
03
O
Q
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Detection
•
•
•
•
Vandals
Base
Level
-------
TABLE 5-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater/Stormwater System Support Facilities
Security Measure
Grilles or other barriers at skylights
and louvers over 96 sq. in.
(62,000 sq. mm)
Grilles or other barriers with
intrusion detection at skylights and
louvers over 96 sq. in.
(62,000 sq. mm)
Locked roof hatches
Locked roof hatches with intrusion
alarm
Roof access ladder with locked
shroud
Roof access ladder with locked
shroud and intrusion alarm
Transformer (indoor) - locked
protective barrier or cage
Generator (indoor) - locked
protective barrier or cage
Switchgear/motor control center
(indoor) - locked protective cage
Chemical fill lines at building
exterior- locked access
System
Objective3
><
03
O
Q
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Detection
•
•
•
•
Vandals
Base
Level
S
S
Enhanced
Level
S
-------
TABLE 5-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater/Stormwater System Support Facilities
Security Measure
Chemical fill lines at building
exterior- locked access with
intrusion detection
Chemical storage (indoor) - locked
access
Chemical storage (indoor) - locked
with intrusion detection
System
Objective3
03
-------
TABLE 5-1
Benchmark Security Measures for Wastewater/Stormwater System Support Facilities
Security Measure
System
Objective3
03
-------
APPENDIX A
Physical Security Elements
The design of any security measure must always take safety and maintenance
considerations into account.
This guideline applies only to assets that are within the control of the utility. For critical
assets that are not owned by the utility, the utility needs to coordinate protection of the
assets with the owning parties.
1.0 Fencing and Perimeter Walls
(1) The primary goals of fencing and perimeter walls are to establish a legal demarcation by
defining the perimeter boundaries of a facility, to present a barrier that causes an intruder to
make an overt action to penetrate that demonstrates intent, and to create a delay barrier
against unauthorized access.
(2) Secondary goals may include screening the facility against visual observation,
establishing a clear zone enhancing lighting and surveillance, and providing a means to
install intrusion detection sensors.
1.1 Chain-Link Fencing
(1) For terms related to chain-link fencing systems, refer to ASTM F552, "Standard
Terminology Relating to Chain Link Fencing" (ASTM 2005d). For detailed specifications and
design information related to chain-link fencing and posts, refer to Military Handbook MIL-
HDBK-1013/10, "Design Guidelines for Fencing, Gates, Barriers, and Guard Facilities"
(NFESC 1993b) and Federal Specification RR-F-191/2D, "Fencing, Wire and Post, Metal
(Chain-Link Fence Gates) (Detail Specification)" (Naval Construction Battalion Center
1990a). Both documents have been approved for public release and are available online.
Aluminum fabric, poles, or accessories are not recommended for security applications.
(2) Base-level fence guideline is galvanized steel chain-link fence post with a 6-foot
(1.8-meter [m]) or greater fabric height. Enhanced-level fence guideline is galvanized steel
chain-link fence post with an 8-foot (2.4-meter [m]) or greater fabric height.
(3) Fence fabric should be one piece and should be coated with zinc or polyvinyl chloride
(PVC). PVC over zinc-coated steel is recommended in harsh, corrosive environments.
(4) Base-level fabric wire gauge should be a minimum standard wire gauge of No. 9 and
mesh pattern of 2-inch (50-millimeter [mm]) diamond mesh or smaller.
(5) Enhanced-level chain-link fencing should comply with the requirements for the base-
level guideline chain-link fencing, except use No. 6 or No. 8 gauge fencing fabric in place of
No. 9 gauge and select mesh patterns less than 2-inches (50-mm) across.
DECEMBER 2006
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(6) Post strength and stiffness for base-level and enhanced-level chain-link fences should
meet ASTM F1043, "Standard Specification for Strength and Protective Coatings on Steel
Industrial Chain Link Fence Framework/' Group 1A requirements (ASTM 2005c) for heavy
industrial fences. Follow manufacturer's standard with allowance for minimum embedment
below finished grade.
(7) The average dimension between line posts for chain link fences is recommended to be no
more than 10 feet (3 m) when measured center-to-center between posts and parallel to the
fence grade (ASIS 2004, Chapter 3 - Chain Link Fencing). For additional guidance on
installing chain-link fencing, refer to RR-F-191K/GEN, "Fencing, Wire, and Post Metal (and
Gates, Chain-Link Fabric, and Accessories) (General Specification)" (Naval Construction
Battalion Center 1990b); ASTM F567, "Standard Practice for Installation of Chain-Link
Fence" (ASTM 2005e); and Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-1013/10, "Design Guidelines for
Fencing, Gates, Barriers, and Guard Facilities" (NFESC 1993b) for guidelines on connection
of fencing mesh to posts for security applications.
(8) The ASIS "Protection of Assets" manual (ASIS 2004) further identifies that post hole
depth be a minimum of 24 inches (610 mm), plus an additional 3 inches (76 mm) for each
1-foot (0.3-m) increase in fence height over 4 feet (1.2 m), such that an 8-foot (2.4-m) fence
requires 36-inch (910-mm) depth for post holes. The hole should be backfilled with concrete
into the excavation hole (2500 psi [17,000 kilopascals]) and the concrete extended 2 inches
(50 mm) above grade, with a crowned surface to shed water.
(9) Where fences cross a stream, culvert, swale, depression or other openings that fencing
does not enclose, where opening size is 96 square inches (62,000 square mm) or larger, these
openings should be protected by additional grilles, fencing, or other barriers against
penetration. Refer to 13.3 of this Appendix and to Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-1013/10,
"Design Guidelines for Fencing, Gates, Barriers, and Guard Facilities" (NFESC 1993b) for
recommendations and construction of grilles.
1.2 Anti-Climb/Anti-Cut Fencing
(1) If the design basis threat (DBT) warrants, a specialized anti-climb/anti-cut fence such as
wire-panel mesh fencing should be considered.
(2) Wire-panel mesh fabric wire gauge should be a minimum of No. 8 wire gauge.
(3) Wire-panel mesh pattern should be non-climbable, with 0.5-inch by 3-inch (13-mm by
76-mm) mesh pattern, welded at each intersection.
(4) Fabric wire should conform to ASTM A853-04, "Standard Specification for Steel Wire,
Carbon, for General Use," Grade AISI1006 as specified by the American Iron and Steel
Institute (AISI) (ASTM 2005b). After welding, the fabric is hot-dipped and galvanized with a
zinc coating followed by a PVC coating.
1.3 Ornamental Fencing
(1) Site conditions and local codes may dictate the use of aesthetically pleasing fence
materials. In such cases, ornamental fences of steel, aluminum or wrought iron should be
considered.
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(2) As an example of aluminum fencing meeting the requirements, base-level ornamental
fence should be a picket fence, 8-foot (2.4-m) picket height or greater, constructed of HS-35
aluminum alloy. Nominal picket spacing should be 5 inches (130 mm) on center or less.
Pickets may include spiked tops, depending on the DBT.
(3) Suggested minimum sizes for fence pickets are 1-inch (25-mm) square by 0.062-inch
(1.6-mm) thick, while suggested minimum fence rail dimensions are 1.625-inch (41-mm) by
0.070-inch (1.8-mm) thick top walls, and 1.625-inch (41-mm) by 0.100-inch (2.54-mm) thick
side walls.
(4) Line posts for aluminum ornamental fences should be constructed of HS-35 aluminum
alloy, with suggested dimensions of 2.5-inch (64-mm) square by 0.075-inch (1.9-mm) thick.
Follow manufacturer's standard with allowance for minimum embedment below finished
grade.
(5) Gate posts for aluminum ornamental fences should be constructed of HS-35 aluminum
alloy of minimum dimensions 6-inches (150-mm) square by 0.125-inch (3.2-mm) thick.
Follow manufacturer's standard with allowance for minimum embedment below finished
grade.
(6) Fencing should have a powder-coated finish or other appropriate protective finish.
1.4 Perimeter Wall
(1) The need for solid perimeter walls, such as concrete masonry walls, may be dictated by
the DBT, hardening needs, aesthetics, or the desire to fully screen a facility or asset from
outside view. In those instances where hardening and aesthetics are both objectives,
hardened (or crash-resistant) ornamental fencing is available.
(2) Base-level concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall height should be 6-feet (1.8-m) high or
greater. Enhanced-level CMU wall height should be 8-feet (2.4-m) high or greater. Wall
thickness should be 8 inches (200 mm) as a suggested minimum with additional thickness as
required to meet hardening designs.
(3) Immediate wall columns should be spaced per design criteria and site conditions.
(4) Corner columns should be positioned where directional changes in wall alignment occur.
(5) Wall foundation and reinforcement should be provided per local design criteria and
geotechnical conditions.
1.5 Fencing Topping
(1) Fence topping may include barbed-wire topping or concertina barbed-wire tape topping,
or a combination of both.
(2) For base-level barbed-wire topping guideline, attach a three-strand of barbed wire,
conforming to ASTM A176, "Standard Specification for Stainless and Heat-Resisting
Chromium Steel Plate, Sheet, and Strip" (ASTM 2004b) and ASTM A666, "Standard
Specification for Annealed or Cold-Worked Austenitic Stainless Steel Sheet, Strip, Plate, and
Flat Bar" (ASTM 2005a) to a 2-foot (0.6-m) high single outrigger; for enhanced-level climb
resistance, use double Y-style outriggers with 3-strand barbed wire.
DECEMBER 2006
GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WASTEWATER/STORMWATER UTILITIES A-3
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(3) For concertina-wire topping, attach 12-gauge stainless steel wires to 2-foot (0.6 m) high
double Y-style outriggers. Concertina wire should conform to ASTM F1910, "Standard
Specification for Long Barbed Tape Obstacles" (ASTM 2003), and should be 24-inch to
30-inch (610 to 760 mm) diameter double-coil concertina type. Each concertina loop should
consist of 43 +/- 2 clusters of needle-sharp barbs on 4-inch (100-mm) centers, each barb
measuring a minimum of 1.2 inches (30 mm) in length.
(4) Refer to ASTM A121, "Standard Specification For Metallic-Coated Carbon Steel Barbed
Wire" (ASTM 2004a) and Federal Specification RR-F-191/4D, "Fencing, Wire, and Post,
Metal (Chain-Link Fence Accessories)" (Naval Construction Battalion Center 1990c) for
installation guidance.
(5) Ornamental fencing with angled "pikes" can be provided as a fence topping to
discourage or prevent access to a facility by climbing.
1.6 Perimeter Line
(1) Periodic treatment of the perimeter line is recommended to prevent vegetation growth.
(2) Provide a 1-foot (0.3-m) wide vegetation-free zone with fence or wall placed in center of
zone, using 2-inch (50-mm) thick layer of 0.375-inch to 0.75-inch (10-mm to 19-mm)
aggregates, and treat with herbicide.
1.7 Fence Foundation Enhancements
(1) To prevent stretching of the fence fabric to allow an adversary to move under the fence,
it may be appropriate to anchor the bottom fabric of the fence to create similar delay to that
of fencing. For anchorage of fabric, the bottom fence fabric should be secured to a bottom
rail and securely anchored at the midpoint between the fence posts along the fence line. For
the base-level guideline, the bottom rail may be anchored to an eyebolt embedded in a
"deadman" anchor, a concrete cube 3 feet by 3 feet (0.9 m by 0.9 m) as described in Military
Handbook MIL-HDBK-1013/10, "Design Guidelines for Fencing, Gates, Barriers, and Guard
Facilities" (NFESC 1993b); the deadman should be buried in the soil below the fence rail. As
an alternative, 12-inch (300 mm) deep rows of metal bars or pickets may be embedded at
12-inch (300 mm) intervals along the base of the fencing.
(2) For the enhanced-level guideline to prevent tunneling under fences, provide a
continuous concrete curb at base of fence 8-inches (200-mm) wide by 24-inches (610-mm)
deep. The maximum clearance between the bottom rail and the top of the grade strip should
be no more than 2 inches (50 mm) maximum clearance with the bottom rail of fencing
secured to the concrete strip at the mid-point between the posts and at intervals of 10 feet
(3 m) or less.
2.0 Gates
Personnel gates should be of similar construction guidelines as fences, or stronger, while
vehicle gates will need additional strength due to the weight of the gate assembly, and to
prevent vehicle incursion, if dictated by the DBT. Where the DBT justifies additional layered
security, hardened (or crash resistant) gates are available.
DECEMBER 2006
GUIDELINES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WASTEWATER/STORMWATER UTILITIES A-4
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2.1 Chain-Link Gates
(1) For detail specifications on chain-link gates, refer to Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-
1013/1 A, "Design Guidelines for Physical Security of Facilities/' Table 6 - Common Chain
Link Fence Materials (NFESC 19933), and Federal Specification RR-F-191/2D, "Fencing,
Wire and Post, Metal (Chain-Link Fence Gates)" (Naval Construction Battalion Center
1990a).
(2) Entry gates using perimeter fence double swing gates should have maximum 2.5-inch
(64-mm) clearance between bottom rail and finished grade.
(3) Entry gates should have reinforced steel latch with hardened steel padlock protection.
(4) Posts for swing gates with fabric height up to 8 feet (2.4 m) should have nominal
minimum dimensions of 2.875-inches (73-mm) outside diameter (OD) to 8.625-inches
(219-mm) OD, depending upon the gate leaf width.
(5) Posts for swing gates with fabric height of 9 to 10 feet (2.7 to 3 m) should have nominal
minimum dimensions of 3.5-inches (89 mm) OD to 8.625-inches (219 mm) OD, depending
upon the gate leaf width.
2.2 Electronic Gate Opening
(1) Electrical gate operators should be UL-listed, heavy-duty, high-frequency electrical
models designed to open and close sliding or other types of gates as selected for specific
applications. Gates should have maximum 2.5-inch (64 mm) clearance between bottom
tension bar and finished grade.
(2) Electrical motors should be sized appropriately for gate size, duty rating, and frequency
of operation. Provide industrial-quality motor overload protection with manual reset. Gate
operators and other electrical appurtenances should be positioned within the fenced
perimeter to avoid vandalism and tampering.
(3) Recommended gate travel speed is a minimum 1 foot (0.3 m) per second. Speed adjusting
feature that provides range of appropriate speeds for slide gate operation is recommended.
(4) Provide positive limit switches that sense position of gate and provide control to prevent
damage to gate operator.
(5) Provide manual operation feature or disconnect for operation during power failure,
malfunction, or emergency. The manual gate operator should be secured inside a locked
weather resistant cabinet, with an attached key box as required. Gate operators should be
located so they cannot be reached or tampered with from outside the fence. A variety of
types of manual and automatic gate operators, from simple push-button type operators to
complex electronic operating systems as well as associated hardware and safety devices, are
available from gate manufacturers. Gate storage, housing for operators, and site-specific
operating systems, warning devices, or signage should also be considered to ensure safe
operation when authorized.
(6) Component parts of gate operator, including attachments, should be constructed with
materials or plated, coated, or finished as necessary to provide reliable service in an all-
weather environment.
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2.3 Electronic Gate Control System
(1) Pushbutton or card-reading sensor in weatherproof enclosure should be mounted on
steel tube post or concrete bollard anchored to concrete foundation outside gate as required.
(2) Consider providing loop, beam, or other vehicle detectors a minimum of 4 feet (1.2 m)
away from each side of gate for safety.
(3) Communication interface should enable remote monitoring of gate position from central
location, such as central security office.
(4) Suggested operation sequence:
(a) Entry: Gate opens when activated by valid card presented to card-reading sensor.
Gate closes after sensing loop / sensing beam has determined that vehicle has
passed through gate.
(b) Exit: Gate opens when activated by detector loop in pavement or push button
inside gate. Gate closes as for entry.
(5) Other options for automated gate access control systems include radio controlled, remote
operated (from control room or operations centers), guard operated, key switched, and
others. Each type will have specific features to consider with respect to the overall access
control system.
3.0 Site Areas
3.1 Clear Zones
(1) The purpose of a clear zone is such that intrusion detection surveillance and assessment
using visual observation or cameras can be applied and to provide an unobstructed area in
which placed devices can be readily observed/detected. Clear zone regions are typically
established:
(a) On both sides of a perimeter security fence to allow unobstructed surveillance of
the fence area
(b) Between a perimeter fence and structures, buildings, or other critical assets
enclosed within the fence to maintain a clear area for detection of intruders or placed
devices
(c) Around the perimeter of a building to prevent areas of concealment of intruders
or placed devices.
For additional information regarding clear zones, see "Minimum Antiterrorism Standards
for Buildings," Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-01 (DoD 2002).
(2) Effective clear zone distances should be in accordance with the DBT, but a suggested
minimum distance is 20 feet (6 m) or more between the outer perimeter fence and interior
structures per UFC 4-010-01 (DoD 2002).
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(3) Within the clear zone, prune or trim vegetation to a height of 4 inches (100 mm) or less,
and remove large obstacles or rocks that can shield intruders from view. Avoid locating
equipment within clear zones or with spaces below in which devices can be readily
concealed.
3.2 Site Utilities
(1) Wherever possible, incoming site utilities need to be protected from accidental or
deliberate damage that might affect operations. It is recommended that the core site utility
connections entering the site and facility be hardened. Hardening techniques may include
burying, protecting within conduit, security cages or grilles or by adding redundant service
feeds. The following utilities should be examined and protected to the extent possible:
(a) Electrical Power
(b) Natural Gas
(c) Incoming Water
(d) Wastewater
(e) Fire Water Main(s)
(2) Exposed pipelines should be protected, where possible, using fence barriers to limit
access.
(3) Alternatively, exposed pipelines could be run within carrier pipes to enable double-wall
protection.
(4) Redundant utility connection sources should be provided if available. Dual electrical that
feeds off separate circuits or incoming water supply from different source mains should be
utilized where available.
(5) Electrical lines should be placed underground where applicable.
4.0 Facility Entrances
4.1 Sallyport Entrances
(1) A sallyport is a combination of electrically operated gates or portals that are interlocked
to prevent more than one gate from opening at a time. The sallyport provides a means for
secured, controlled entry through the fence perimeter of the facility. Entry processing,
paperwork review, and driver/load identification or verification occur within the sallyport.
Sallyports may also be used to enable searching the interior and undercarriage of vehicles
for explosives.
(2) Typical vehicle sallyport dimensions are in the range of 75-feet (23-m) long by 20-feet (6-
m) wide (and should be sized to accommodate the largest delivery vehicle), enclosed by
fenced sides of height, construction, and configuration consistent with the site perimeter
fencing. Vehicle gates should be consistent with the gate guidelines provided in Section 2.0,
Gates, of this Appendix.
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(3) Sallyport gates should be equipped with an interlocking system to ensure that the inner
and outer gates are not capable of being opened at the same time.
(4) Gate controls should be located in an area so that the person operating the controls
maintains a constant visual observation of the sallyport area. The controls should be
protected and covered so that non-authorized use is eliminated.
(5) A keyed manual override switch should be provided that allows the gates to be opened
simultaneously. However, this override switch must be protected and covered such that the
possibility of accidental operation is eliminated.
4.2 Building Entrances
(1) Building entrances should provide a space for screening visitors. The area should
provide enough space for visitors to wait, queue, and be logged in prior to entering the
interior secure spaces. If frequent visitor entry is anticipated, anti-vandal furniture may be
provided within the visitor waiting area.
(2) Visitor management software can facilitate the log in and registration of incoming
visitors. Some systems permit pre-registration prior to entry and notification upon visitor
arrival.
(3) If the DBT warrants, x-ray screening of incoming personnel and visitors may be
considered. Additionally, explosive screening may be considered for incoming mail and
packages.
5.0 Bollards and Other Vehicle Barriers
(1) Bollards, jersey barriers, decorative planters, or other vehicle barriers, where applied,
should be capable of stopping a 4,000-pound (1,800 kilogram [kg]) vehicle traveling at
30 miles per hour (48 kilometers per hour) within 3 feet (0.9 m) or less.
(2) Refer to Department of Defense Handbook MIL-HDBK-1013/14, "Selection and
Application of Vehicle Barriers," (NFESC 1999) for detailed descriptions, attributes, and
stopping capabilities of several barrier types. This document has been approved for public
release and is available online.
6.0 Exterior Surfaces
(1) At surfaces subject to vandalism, incorporate glazed concrete masonry units, glazed
ceramic tiles, or fiberglass coatings to resist vandalism attempts.
(2) Apply non-stick, non-mark, polyurethane-based paints and coatings for external surfaces
subject to vandalism.
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7.0 Outdoor Security Lighting
(1) Depending on the DBT and local site environment, the amount of recommended
illumination may vary. Consult with local code officials for additional restrictions that may
apply to lighting levels.
(2) In addition to the suggested illumination levels provided below, refer to the Illumination
Engineering Society of North America (IENSA) handbook, "Guideline on Security Lighting
for People, Property, and Public Spaces - G-l-03" (IESNA 2003).
(3) General perimeter roadways and parking areas should be illuminated to 1 to 2 horizontal
foot-candles (11 to 22 lumens/square meter [lux]) on average.
(4) Vehicle gate areas should be illuminated to 3 to 5 foot-candles (32 to 54 luces), average,
measured horizontally. If this area will receive CCTV camera coverage, a recommendation
is that the illumination levels be 5 to 10 foot-candles (54 to 108 luces), measured vertically at
the subject height.
(a) Horizontal illumination measures the lighting at a horizontal surface or plane,
such as the ground surface.
(b) Vertical illumination measures the illumination received on a vertical plane, such
as a person's face or license plate of a vehicle.
(5) If a gatehouse or sallyport entrance is used, an illumination level of 10 to 30 vertical foot-
candles (110 to 320 luces) is the goal.
(6) Building exterior door areas should be illuminated to 3 to 5 horizontal foot-candles (32 to
54 luces), on average, for a radius of 15 feet (4.5 m) beyond the exterior door.
(7) General outdoor areas should be illuminated to 0.5 horizontal foot-candles (5 luces),
average.
(8) Provide a minimum light-to-dark illumination ratio of maximum 6:1, preferably 4:1.
Preferably, a lighting engineering study should be performed using point-by-point lighting
calculations with a point spacing not more than 25 feet (7.6 m) on center.
(9) Where applicable, incorporate motion-activated lighting to provide instant-on lighting
upon motion-alarm activation. Such a system will raise the illumination from 0.5 foot-
candles (5 luces) to 2 to 3 foot-candles (22 to 32 luces). If motion-activated lighting is
included, make sure that lamp re-strike time is quick enough to support instant-on
activation.
(10) When CCTV cameras are used, these additional lighting considerations should be taken
(ASIS 2004, Chapter 19 - Security and Protective Lighting):
(a) Color Rendering Index: Choose an appropriate lamp that has accurate color
reproduction.
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(b) Reflectance of Materials: Consider the material that will be illuminated, and its
ability to reflect and transmit light.
(c) Direction of Reflected Lighting: Identify whether reflected lighting will assist or
interfere with camera operation.
8.0 Signage
8.1 Fence Signage
(1) Post "No Trespassing" signs at 50-foot (15 m) intervals in multiple languages as
consistent with local population. From a general legal standpoint, the fence and signage
establishes a boundary that intruders must cross for violation.
(2) Include appropriate federal, state and local laws prohibiting trespassing. For example,
U.S. Code Title 42, Section 300i-l, titled "Tampering with public water systems," states the
following (42 U.S.C. § 300
a) Tampering - Any person who tampers with a public water system shall be
imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or fined in accordance with title 18 <" Crimes
and Criminal Procedure" >, or both.
b) Attempt or threat - Any person who attempts to tamper, or makes a threat to
tamper, with a public drinking water system be imprisoned for not more than
10 years, or fined in accordance with title 18, or both.
c) Civil penalty - The Administrator may bring a civil action in the appropriate
United States district court (as determined under the provisions of title 28
<" Judiciary and Judicial Procedure" >) against any person who tampers, attempts to
tamper, or makes a threat to tamper with a public water system. The court may
impose on such person a civil penalty of not more than $1,000,000 for such
tampering or not more than $100,000 for such attempt or threat.
d) "Tamper" defined - For purposes of this section, the term "tamper" means:
(1) to introduce a contaminant into a public water system with the intention
of harming persons; or
(2) to otherwise interfere with the operation of a public water system with the
intention of harming persons.
8.2 Primary Site Entrance Signage
At the primary entrance to the site, post the address of the site so that first responder crews
(such as police and fire departments) can confirm the address location.
8.3 Water Line Delineation
At lake or river intakes, provide buoys or float lines with appropriate signage to delineate
no-entry zones.
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9.0 Electronic Security Systems
9.1 Intrusion Detection Sensors - General
(1) The intrusion detection system should be capable of detecting an individual (weighing
75 pounds (34 kg) or more) crossing the detection zone walking, crawling, jumping,
running, or rolling (at speeds between 0.5 and 15 feet (0.2 and 4.6 m) per second), or
climbing the fence, if applicable.
(2) Perimeter intrusion detection should provide average false alarm rates of not more than
one false alarm per week, per sensor, while maintaining proper detection sensitivity.
(3) Interior intrusion detection should provide false alarm rates of not more than one false
alarm every three months, per sensor.
(4) Detection probability should be at a 95 percent confidence level. When calculating
detection probability for multiple sensor systems, detection is assumed if any of the sensors
detect the intrusion.
(5) Intrusion detection systems should cover the entire length of the perimeter of a detection
area.
(6) Intrusion detection sensors should be provided with a redundant power source for a
period of not less than four hours.
(7) Detection sensors should be monitored for alarm and fault conditions by an attendant
security monitoring system (an electronic system that monitors security alarms).
9.2 Exterior Intrusion Detection
(1) Prevalent sensor technologies include active infrared, microwave, dual-technology,
buried-line, fence-mounted sensors, and video motion detection.
(2) Appropriate detection technology should be selected based on factors such as facility
environment, location, climate, and ambient temperature conditions, and on the DBT.
9.2.1 Active Infrared Sensors
(1) Active infrared sensors transmit infrared signals to a receiver. Interruption of the signal
indicates an intruder or object has blocked the path.
(2) Active infrared sensors require line of sight; the signal must be projected over a clear
path where the line of sight remains unblocked.
(3) Transmitters and receivers should be installed where they will not be misaligned due to
earth tremors, objects hitting the unit (such as falling rocks, branches, or falling trees), or
freezing and thawing of the ground.
(4) Active infrared sensors do not work well in areas with heavy snowfall because drifts or
snow mounds cover sensors and block transmission and reception paths. Weather
conditions such as fog, heavy rain, or severe sand or dust will affect the reliable detecting
range.
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(5) Nuisance alarm sources for active infrared sensors include animals and wind-blown
debris. Fencing can minimize animal false alarms. Vegetation can also pose a problem if it is
allowed to grow to a size where its movement will generate an alarm.
9.2.2 Microwave Sensors
(1) Microwave sensors transmit or flood a designated area with an electronic field. A
movement in the area disturbs the field and sets off an alarm.
(2) The detection area should be free of bushes and obstructions. Close proximity to other
high frequency signals can adversely affect the detection reliability of microwave sensors.
Areas that contain strong emitters of electric fields (such as radio transmitters) or magnetic
fields (large electric motors or generators) can affect the ability of the microwave sensors to
function properly and should be avoided.
(3) Grass should be cut to less than 3 inches (76 mm). A gravel surface prepared for water
drainage is better than a grass surface. Avoid dead spots or areas of no detection created by
metal objects such as dumpsters, shipping crates, trashcans, and electrical boxes. These dead
spots create areas for intrusion attempts.
(4) Nuisance alarm sources for microwave sensors include wind creating wave action on
puddles or moving nearby fences or vegetation, or movement adjacent to, but outside, the
protected area (because the signal can easily pass through standard walls, glass, sheet rock,
and wood).
9.2.3 Dual Technology Sensors
(1) Dual-technology sensors use both microwave and passive infrared (PIR) sensor circuitry
within the same housing. PIR sensors pick up heat signatures from intruders by comparing
infrared receptions to typical background infrared levels. Typically, activation differentials
are 3 degrees Fahrenheit (1.7 degrees Celsius).
(2) Dual-technology sensors generate an alarm condition if either the microwave or PIR
sensor detects an intruder.
(3) Dual-technology sensors can be installed along a perimeter line, a fence, or a buffer zone,
or as a defense against intruders approaching a door or wall.
(4) Nuisance alarms for microwave sensors are described in 9.2.2. Nuisance alarms for PIR
sensors include reflected light and radiated heat.
(5) In some dual-technology sensors, alarm settings may be adjusted to require that both the
microwave and the PIR unit detect an intruder before an alarm condition is generated. With
two independent means of detections, false alarms are reduced.
9.2.4 Buried Line Sensors
(1) There are several types of buried line sensors, including fiber optic cable, ported cable,
and ported coax cable.
(2) The two principle advantages of buried cable are that it is covert and it follows the
terrain.
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(3) Buried line systems do not work well with shrubbery or trees that require landscaping
and maintenance.
(4) It is important that the cable be buried to a uniform depth. Changes in soil conductivity
can affect the sensor readings.
(5) Nuisance alarms can be caused by the ground shifting due to standing or puddling
water, or erosion. Tree roots can also be a cause for nuisance alarms when windy conditions
aboveground cause movement in the roots. Large animals passing over the detection zone
can also generate alarms.
9.2.5 Fence-Mounted Sensors
(1) Fence-mounted sensors detect vibrations on fence fabric associated with sawing, cutting,
climbing, or lifting the fence fabric.
(2) Fence-mounted sensors are not reliable in areas where high vibrations are likely to be
encountered, such as in close proximity to roadway activity or construction. Do not use in
areas with high wind or numerous animal interactions with the fence line.
(3) Fence-mounted sensors perform best when mounted directly to the fence fabric. Each
sensor is connected in series along the fence with a common cable to form a single zone of
protection.
(4) Sensor zone lengths have a typical recommended range of 300 feet (90 m), although some
systems permit longer sensing zones.
(5) Install on high-quality fencing. Poor quality fences with loose fabric can create too much
background activity due to flexing, sagging, or swaying.
(6) Nuisance alarms can be generated from shrubbery and tree branches as well as animals
and severe weather that come in contact with the fence, causing it to vibrate.
9.3 Interior Intrusion Detection
(1) Provide appropriate interior intrusion detection according to the DBT and the building
environment.
(2) Applicable technologies include dual-technology (passive infrared and microwave),
linear beam, and glass-break sensors.
(3) Select products that are consistent with the ambient temperature, environment, and
moisture content of the structure to be protected.
9.3.1 Dual Technology Motion Sensors
(1) Dual technology motion sensors use passive infrared and microwave technology to
detect motion. Described in 9.2.3, these sensors are applicable for both interior and exterior
applications.
(2) Do not use dual-technology sensors in areas where the PIR sensor can be exposed to
sudden changes in temperature, such as near an exterior door.
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(3) Nuisance alarms can be generated from heat radiating objects such as heat-system
registers or other warm objects (including things as innocuous as a mop bucket with hot
water in it).
9.3.2 Linear Beam Sensors
(1) Linear beam sensors transmit a beam of infrared light to a remote receiver creating an
"electronic fence." Once the beam is broken, an alarm signal is generated. It has a high
probability of detection and a low false alarm rate.
(2) This type of sensor is often used to cover openings such as doorways or hallways, acting
essentially as a trip wire. The infrared beam is unaffected by changes in thermal radiation,
fluorescent lights, electronic frequency interference (EFI), or radio frequency interference
(RFI).
(3) The transmitter and receiver can be up to 1,000 feet (300 m) apart.
(4) Nuisance alarms can be created by any objects that may break the beam, such as paper
blowing off of a shelf or desk.
9.3.3 Glass-Break Sensors
(1) There are three basic types of glass-break sensors: acoustic sensors (listens for an acoustic
sound wave that matches the frequency of broken glass), shock sensors (feels the shock
wave when glass is broken), and dual-technology sensors (senses acoustic and shock
vibrations).
(2) Using dual-technology sensors significantly reduces false alarms from background noise
such as RFI and frequency noise created by office machines.
(3) Glass-break sensors provide intrusion detection for windows and doors with glass
panes. Mount on the window, window frame, wall, or ceiling. If mounted on the wall or
ceiling (this is the preferred placement), place opposite the window. If mounted on glass,
place in the corner, approximately 2 inches (50 mm) from the edge of the frame.
(4) Use mounting adhesive specified to withstand long exposure to summer heat, winter
cold, or condensation.
(5) Regardless of the type of sensor, coverage typically does not exceed 100 square feet
(9 square meters) of glass surface.
(6) Nuisance alarms can be caused by improper calibration or installation. In addition, RFI,
sharp impact noises, and background noise such as office, industrial, and cleaning
machinery can cause false alarms.
9.4 Door and Hatch Contact Alarm Switches
(1) Door and hatch contact alarm switches should interface to a security monitoring system
in addition to the SCADA system.
(2) Magnetic door contact switches should be installed at all building exterior doors to
monitor for door ajar and door forced-open conditions.
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(3) Exposed exterior locations, such as exterior hatches or vaults, should utilize high-
security balanced magnetic switches.
(4) Industrial doors, gates, and roll-up doors should use high-security rugged-duty, sealed,
wide-gap magnetic switches.
9.5 Pipeline Vibration Detection
(1) Emerging technologies are being developed that provide vibration detection within
pipeline sections. By incorporating this technology, attempts at sabotage such as cutting,
hammering or detonation of the pipeline can be detected and a response can be initiated.
Such detection systems might be considered for critical pipeline sections without
redundancy. The detection systems monitor vibration within the pipeline section. If the
vibration level exceeds a threshold amount, then an alarm may be transmitted back to a
central monitoring station. Such systems are relatively new technology, but are in operation
currently for critical utility (oil, natural gas) pipelines within the United States.
10.0 Access Control Systems
10.1 Access Control Systems - General
A means of providing access control should be incorporated into all security systems.
Access control measures should consist of one or more of the following systems; key locks
and/or padlocks, numeric keypad locks, or card reader systems.
10.2 Locks and Padlocks
(1) Padlocks should be weather-resistant with a hardened-steel shackle.
(2) Padlock pulling resistance should be 4,500 pounds (Ibs.) (20,000 Newtons) at minimum.
(3) Padlock pressure resistance to bolt cutters should be 10,000 Ibs. (44,000 Newtons) at
minimum.
(4) Key locks should use hardened steel inserts protecting the plug face, shell, and sidebar
from drilling attack.
(5) Provide an access guard of channel steel or other material against bolt-cutter or torch
access to padlocks.
(6) Whenever possible, avoid using "daisy chains" of padlocks. Instead, use a
programmable lock that allows for authorized entry by multiple individuals using unique
codes.
10.3 Numeric Keypad Locks
(1) Numeric keypad locks are locking systems that include a programmable keypad in
addition to the door latch or deadbolt and lever handle. A user must enter a code at a
keypad before the door will unlock and allow access. New codes can be added or changed
at the keypad.
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(2) Models are available that require both a credential and a code. This dual method can
provide an additional layer of protection.
(3) Models are available to mount on various door thicknesses and doors with narrow stiles.
10.4 Card Reader Systems
(1) Card reader systems should incorporate:
(a) Alarm Display and Programming: A computer server or workstation that
displays alarm conditions and allows programming of the system.
(b) Badge Creation: A badge station, allowing creation and programming of badges.
(c) Local Control: Local control panels that control the doors, card reader units, and
access cards.
(d) Printer Unit: A printer unit that can print a report for each event and alarm
condition.
(2) Under normal operation, the system should grant access at doors with card readers by
comparing the time and location of any attempted entry with information stored in local (at
the door controller) memory.
(3) Access is granted only when the security card used has a valid entry code at the card
reader for the designated time frame.
(4) The access card should be a standard credit-card-size passive component with an
integral coding technology, such as coding contained within a chip in the card.
(5) Electrical locking means should be electric strike, magnetic lock, or other approved
means. Great care should be taken in designing access control for doors used for egress to
ensure free egress is permitted at all times.
(6) Refer to NFPA 101, Life Safety Code (NFPA 2006), and NFPA 101B, Means for Egress for
Buildings and Structures (NFPA 2002) for code guidance on egress and ingress doors.
11.0 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Surveillance
11.1 General Considerations
(1) CCTV cameras can be analog or IP-network cameras, depending on factors such as the
suitability to the installation, site conditions, and availability of local area networks.
(2) The ASIS publication "Protection of Assets," Chapter 38 - Television in Security (ASIS
2004), identifies the following specification items to consider when specifying CCTV
cameras:
(a) Imager: The size of the image-sensing device within the camera.
(b) Resolution: The measure of detail that the camera can distinguish, usually
measured in horizontal TV lines per inch (25 mm). The larger the number, the
sharper the image and the better the camera.
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(c) Sensitivity: Typically, the minimum lighting illumination level required for full
video. The lower the required illumination level, the more sensitive the camera.
(d) Signal-to-Noise Ratio: The ratio of the peak value of the video signal to the peak
value of the noise or electromagnetic interference, measured in decibels. The greater
the ratio, the sharper and better the picture image.
(e) Automatic Light Compensation: The process whereby the amount of illumination
on the image sensor is automatically adjusted to the scene brightness. A high ratio
indicates that the camera can automatically adjust to wide variations in scene
illumination without noticeable distortion in the transmitted image.
(f) Backlight Compensation: A feature available in many cameras that automatically
reduces contrast and silhouetting between near and far objects.
(g) Video Output: A measurement, stated in Volts peak-to-peak, between the darkest
black to brightest light levels of the signal. Typical values are 1.0 Volts peak to peak.
(h) Synchronization: A means of controlling the imager scanning so that the camera
image will not roll when switched between video monitors. Better cameras allow for
synchronization adjustment to accommodate multi-phase power supplies.
(i) Environment: Upper and lower temperature and humidity limits for the cameras.
It is important to specify a camera that works in the intended environment,
including weather.
(j) Dimensions: The outside measurements of the camera case.
(k) Weight: The weight of the camera within its casing.
(3) Because camera technology is improving so rapidly, detailed performance specifications
are not provided here; it is recommended that utilities consult with a security engineer for
current camera hardware standards and sensitivity ratings.
11.2 Field of View
(1) Provide fixed-position or pan/tilt/zoom cameras depending upon desired field of view
and intended application.
(2) Provide appropriate camera lenses corresponding to camera application and field of
view requirements.
(3) The CCTV surveillance system should be capable of viewing prescribed objects within
the field of view as follows, considering a screen height of 480 pixels to be full-screen
(100 percent = 480 pixels).
(a) For intrusion detection purposes, the object should occupy a minimum of
10 percent of the screen height or be 48-pixels tall.
(b) For recognizing a person's face, the body of the person should be a minimum of
50 percent of the screen height or 240-pixels tall.
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(c) To identify a license plate, the plate height should be a minimum of 5 percent of
the screen height or 24-pixels tall.
(4) In some cases, the field of view of a camera may include public areas or private
residential areas that should not be monitored by video surveillance. In these cases, to
minimize liability issues, a current capability with modern CCTV systems allows masking
of these areas or views so that they cannot be seen by the attendant staff.
11.3 CCTV Housings and Mounts
(1) CCTV housings should be adequate for the intended application and site location.
(2) Incorporate heater/blower units, wipers, or other elements as necessary to accommodate
site environmental conditions.
(3) Incorporate pole-mount, building-mount, or other mounting means so that the camera
obtains a clear field of view of the intended target.
(4) Specify and locate housing and camera mount such that tampering or vandalism of the
camera units is prevented.
11.4 Video Network Servers
(1) The video network server should be high-performance Internet-Protocol (IP) network-
compatible video system.
(2) The network server should be capable of streaming images at a frame rate of 30 frames
per second.
(3) The video communication system should be capable of transmitting live video across
communication networks and enable video cameras to be remotely monitored and
controlled over the network, provided password authentication requirements are met.
(4) The camera view desired should be selectable by designated camera name and IP
address.
11.5 Digital Video Recorders
(1) As a minimum, it is recommended to provide adequate digital recording capacity for all
cameras at 30 days of continuous storage at 5 frames per second.
(2) Provide a means for archiving video to DVD or other long-term storage format.
(3) Specify the physical location of recorder unit based on environmental considerations,
location, network, and bandwidth availability.
(4) Identify appropriate video compression technology to conserve network bandwidth and
storage needs.
11.6 CCTV Computer Application Software
(1) CCTV application software should be full management software to monitor and manage
single or multiple sites.
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(2) Software should allow monitoring and recording of images from multiple simultaneous
cameras at frame rates up to 30 frames per second.
(3) System should enable customized layouts for intuitive and interactive ways of
representing the camera network.
(4) Software should provide flexible live and recording settings per individual camera input.
(5) Software should allow connectivity to other systems, via application programming
interface (API) alarm and pre-alarm recordings, and enable support for external joysticks to
perform pan and tilt operations.
12.0 Security, Controls, and SCADA Wiring
(1) All security, controls, and SCADA wiring should be protected within conduit.
(2) All interconnecting wiring between security components should be monitored for
integrity so that an abnormal condition (wire-to-wire short, wire break, or wire ground-fault
condition) is automatically indicated to the user upon arming the system.
(3) The security wiring configuration at the end device should be a 4-state configuration
using an end-of-line (EOL) resistor network where neither alarm nor normal condition are
0 ohms or open-circuit.
(4) Conceal security conduits, telephone lines, and other critical utility connections from
view and access, or locate them in the interior of buildings.
(5) Provide a backup power source (4 hours minimum) to security components and SCADA
and other crucial control systems.
(6) Backup power sources may include battery units, auxiliary power supplies,
uninterruptible power supplies (UPSs), or generators.
(7) Refer to NFPA 70, National Electrical Code (NFPA 2005), for code guidance on electrical
wiring requirements.
12.1 SCADA and Electrical Control Panel Enclosures
(1) Provide a tamper switch at all security and SCADA control panel enclosures. Upon
enclosure door opening, an alarm condition should be logged by the system.
(2) Though panels should be locked, the electrical disconnect should never be locked.
13.0 Building Elements
13.1 General
(1) When new buildings are being designed, discuss with the building architect and
structural engineers the opportunity to incorporate design elements that prevent
progressive collapse of the facility in the event of explosion within or adjacent to the
building. Progressive collapse is defined by the ASCE and SEI (Structural Engineering
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Institute) in "Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures" (ASCE 2006a) as
"The spread of an initial local failure from element to element eventually resulting in the
collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionate large part of it."
13.2 Doors
(1) Exterior doors should be heavy-duty steel-metal door, ASTM F476 Grade 40 high-
security level door (ASTM 2002), prepped for security door hardware. Doors should comply
with ANSI/NAAMM HMMA 862-03 "Guide Specifications for Commercial Security
Hollow Metal Doors and Frames" (ANSI/NAAMM HMMA 2003).
(2) Doors should have a maximum window opening of 96 square inches (62,000 square mm)
or nominal 4-inch by 16-inch (100-mm by 400-mm) size with a minimum side panel size.
(3) Door frame should be heavy-duty with concrete fill.
(4) Hinge pins should be on the secure side or be non-removable/tamper-resistant to
eliminate door compromise by removing hinge pins.
(5) Consider electronic door status monitoring for door forced and door ajar conditions.
(6) The following door recommendations are provided for example purposes from the U.S.
General Services Administration Publication "Facilities Standards for the Public Buildings
Service/' Section 3.5 - Building Elements (GSA 2005).
(a) Glazed exterior doors and frames should be steel and meet the requirements of
SDI Grade III with a G-90 galvanic zinc coating.
(b) Hinges, hinge pins, and hasps must be secured against unauthorized removal by
using spot welds or peened mounting bolts.
(c) All exterior doors must have automatic closers.
(d) The exterior side of the door should have a lock guard or astragal to prevent
jimmying of the latch hardware.
(e) Doors used for egress only should not have any operable exterior hardware.
13.3 Security Grilles
(1) Base-level security grilles (for windows, louver openings, roof hatches, culverts, etc.)
should be woven #10 wire gauge steel, 1.5-inch (38-mm) diamond mesh, or welded #10 wire
gauge, 2-inch (50-mm) square welded mesh screens.
(2) The grilles should be hot galvanized with a hot-powdered coat finish.
(3) Use tamper-resistant and tamper-proof fasteners for mounting window grilles.
(4) For enhanced-level protection, refer to Military Handbook MIL-HDBK-1013/10, "Design
Guidelines for Fencing, Gates, Barriers, and Guard Facilities" (NFESC 1993b) for security
grilles.
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13.4 Security Cages
(1) Caged partitions (for critical equipment, pumps, motor control centers, and so on)
should be #10 wire gauge steel with 2-inch (50 mm) welded openings in 1.25-inch by
1.25-inch by 0.125-inch (32-mm by 32-mm by 3-mm) angle iron framework.
(2) Ensure the partitions include framework supports, access gates, locks, and other
accessories.
14.0 Hatches/Vaults and Vents
14.1 Hatch, Vault, and Vent Alarms - General
(1) Hatch, vault, and vent alarms should use similar alarm contact hardware such as
magnetic door contact switches, depending on the final hatch/vault design.
(2) Interconnect alarm contacts to a security monitoring system.
(3) Note that curb and sidewalk devices may become a tripping or safety hazard. Consider
the location and application carefully when designing the system.
(4) Provide locking covers for valve operators.
14.2 Roof or Sidewalk Hatches
(1) Provide a lock on a manufacturer's metal door system that is set into concrete curb with
gutter and drain.
(2) Consider an additional protected keyed bar lock across the door that is mounted directly
to the structural curb, especially for large, publicly accessible pumping stations.
(3) Consider an elevated upper structure cover surrounding the sidewalk door, especially
for large, publicly accessible pumping stations. This cover is to prevent drilling through the
doorplate and adding liquids to the contents as well as to delay access to the sidewalk door
hatch. This additional layer delays someone attempting to gain access to water to introduce
a contaminant.
(4) Alarm upper structure using exterior-rated balanced magnetic door contacts.
14.3 Roof Vents
(1) Provide metal roof vents with numerous small openings rather than vents with fewer,
larger openings (96 square inches [62,000 square mm] is considered a person-passable
opening). Contaminants can be introduced through much smaller vents; prevent direct
passage of contaminants through a vent by using traps.
(2) Position or barricade vent openings to prevent spray of a contaminant liquid into vent
opening.
(3) Provide a metal structure cover surrounding the vent to delay access to the vent
structure, with adequate standoff (nominally 8 inches [200 mm] or more) from the vent to
limit drilling attempts into the vent assembly.
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(4) Provide protected dual locks on a metal vent cover system set on a concrete curb.
(5) Alarm protective cover using exterior-rated magnetic door contacts.
14.4 Vault Hatch with Elevated Curb
(1) Provide lock on manufacturer's door system. Alarm the vault hatch using exterior-rated
magnetic door contacts.
(2) Consider an additional protected key bar lock across the door that is mounted directly to
the structural curb.
14.5 Vault Door Hatch Set Flush with Top of Structural Slab
(1) Provide a lock on a manufacturer's door system. Alarm vault hatch using exterior-rated
magnetic door contacts.
(2) Consider an interior keyed bar lock system or secondary horizontal structure
immediately below the vault sidewalk door hatch to block access.
15.0 Online Water Quality Monitoring
(1) A suite of online instruments to monitor some surrogate water quality parameters
should be installed.
(2) Among parameters to monitor in water distribution systems are pH, chlorine residual
(either total or free, depending on the type of residual maintained in the system), specific
conductance, turbidity, and total organic carbon.
(3) Among parameters that could be considered for monitoring in wastewater collection
systems are pH and volatile organic carbon.
(4) Periodic readings from the online instruments should be compared with baseline water
quality values to determine if there is potential contamination.
(5) The placement of the sampling location for the instruments depends on the type of asset.
For example, in water storage tanks, the sampling location should be from the outlet pipe
near the tank, ideally between the tank and the isolation valve. If there is a common inlet/
outlet pipe, then the sampling location should be installed on the common pipe near the
tank, ideally between the tank and the isolation valve.
16.0 Operator Devices
16.1 Man-Down Transmitter
(1) A man-down transmitter is worn by personnel for automatic man-down signaling.
(2) The unit should be portable, lightweight, and supplied with a belt clip or holster for
mounting.
(3) Built-in tilt switches should automatically activate the man-down transmitter when the
user is knocked down.
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(4) A pull cord should activate the alarm or emergency signal when an attempt is made to
remove the unit from a belt.
(5) The transmission mode should integrate both radio frequency (RF) and Infrared (IR)
signaling for redundant communications.
(6) Power should be provided by a long-life lithium battery.
17.0 Chemical Fill-Line Locking Devices
(1) Connections for filling chemical tanks should be locked to restrict access to only
authorized personnel. Chemical fill lines usually are fitted with quick-connect, cam-arm
actuated couplings for ease of use by the chemical vendor. Locking devices for contractor's
temporary connections are recommended.
(2) Lockable dust caps or dust plugs with hardened key locks should be installed on the
individual couplings.
(3) Where multiple fill lines are collocated, a hardened box or port integrated into the
building masonry complete with shrouded and hardened lock can be used in lieu of the
individual coupling locks.
18.0 Hydrants
(1) Provide tamper seals on hydrants. Tamper seals reduce tampering or unauthorized
operation of the hydrant.
(2) Provide locking mechanisms on hydrants. Hydrant locking systems should be designed
so that the hydrants can be operated using a special keyed wrench without the need to
remove the lock.
(a) If locking mechanisms are used on hydrants, it is important that training on
unlocking the mechanisms be provided to all local firefighting personnel and any
other fire departments with which there are mutual aid agreements in place who
would respond in an emergency.
(b) Provide the specialized wrenches in sufficient quantity to the fire department and
other authorized persons so that they can operate the hydrants as needed. These
wrenches are typically only sold to fire authorities and water utilities.
19.0 Manholes
(1) Securing manholes can be accomplished in three ways; tack welding, bolt locks, and pan
locks:
(a) Tack welding provides a fast method of securing manholes. It is economical and
effective for manholes not frequently accessed. The disadvantage is that the
tackweld must be removed or broken before utility staff can access the manhole.
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(b) Bolt locks anchor the manhole to the manhole frame. They have a specialized bolt
head which requires a specialized tool to unbolt or unlock the manhole. To remove
or access the manhole, the bolt locks must be removed. This system of locking
manholes is more flexible than the tack welding method, but more expensive to
install.
(c) Pan locks prevent entry into the manhole, as well as eliminating dumping into
the collection system. The pan unit is installed into the manhole, with the edge of the
pan resting within the manhole opening. The manhole is then locked into place into
the pan unit. This system of locking manholes is more flexible than the tack welding
and bolt locking methods, but more expensive to install.
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APPENDIX B
Glossary and Abbreviations
access control. The physical guidance of vehicles and/or people going to and coming from a
space through judicious placement of entrances, exits, landscaping, lighting, and
controlling devices (such as, guard stations, turnstiles, etc.)
agent. Any physical, chemical, or biological entity that can be harmful to an organism.
AISI. American Iron and Steel Institute.
AMSA. Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (now National Association of Clean
Water Agencies [NACWA]).
ANSI. American National Standards Institute.
API. Application programming interface.
ASCE. American Society of Civil Engineers.
ASDWA. Association of State Drinking Water Administrators.
asset. Anything of value (such as, people, information, hardware, software, facilities,
equipment, reputation, activities, or operations) that may be a target of the design basis
threat adversary. Assets are what an organization needs to get the job done —to carry out
the mission. The more critical the asset is to an organization accomplishing its mission,
the greater the effect of its damage or destruction.
ASTM. American Society for Testing and Materials.
AWWA. American Water Works Association.
AwwaRF. American Water Works Association Research Foundation.
base. Minimum recommended.
biological contaminants. Living organisms or derivatives (for example, viruses, bacteria,
fungi, and mammal and bird antigens) that can cause harmful effects when inhaled,
swallowed, or otherwise taken into the body.
bollard. One of a series of posts preventing vehicles from entering an area.
CCTV. Closed-circuit television.
clear zone. An area surrounding the perimeter of a facility that is free of shrubs and trees,
and features well-maintained landscaping that does not provide hiding places for an
adversary.
CMU. Concrete masonry unit.
contaminant. Any physical, chemical, biological, or radiological substance or matter that
has an adverse effect on air, water, or soil.
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contamination. Introduction of microorganisms, chemicals, toxic substances, wastes, or
wastewater into water, air, and soil in a concentration that makes the medium unfit for
its intended use.
countermeasure. A reaction to or a defense against a hostile action to deal with a
threatening situation.
criminal. The primary motivation for a criminal is the desire to obtain equipment, tools, or
components that have inherent value and can be sold. Criminals typically use stealth to
avoid apprehension, and response times should focus on the time for the adversary to
obtain the asset. See also Table 1-1.
CSC. Codes and Standards Committee.
daisy chain. Groups of padlocks connected and hooked to a common chain in such a way as
to allow access through a key that can unlock any one of the padlocks.
delay features. Security objects such as physical barriers designed to occupy or limit an
adversary until a response force can interrupt accomplishment of the adversary's
objectives. Delay features consist primarily of physical hardening features and are often
employed in multiple layers to provide protection in depth. Delay features are only
effective when placed within a layer of detection.
design basis threat (DBT). The adversary against which a utility must be protected.
Determining the DBT requires consideration of the threat type, tactics, mode of
operations, capabilities, threat level, and likelihood of occurrence.
detection. The point at which a potential attack is discovered, assessed, and determined to
be an attack in progress rather than a false alarm.
detection features. Security items such as sensors that are intended to detect the presence of
an intruder. A complete detection system generally includes electronic features such as
sensors as well as cameras or visual observation for assessment of alarm validity.
Depending on the types of sensors, a detection system may also include lighting systems,
motion detectors, monitoring cameras, access control equipment, or other devices.
deterrence. Security measures such as lighting or the presence of closed circuit television or
people in the area that may discourage an adversary from attacking the facility.
Deterrence is not generally considered a part of a physical protection system with a
predictable level of effectiveness, however, it can reduce the occurrence of crime or low-
level vandal attacks.
DoD. Department of Defense.
DSTU. Draft American National Standard for Trial Use.
DVD. Digital Versatile Disc, Digital Video Disc.
EFI. Electronic frequency interface.
enhanced. Augmented with improved, advanced, or sophisticated features.
EOL. End of line.
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EWRI. Environmental and Water Resources Institute of the ASCE.
foot-candle. A unit of light intensity defined as the amount of light measured on a surface
one foot from a uniform point source of light equal to the light of one candle. A foot-
candle is equal to one lumen per square foot.
GSA. General Services Administration.
harden. To improve the physical strength of a protective measure.
improvised explosive device (IED). An apparatus or contraption placed or fabricated
without detailed manufacturing that incorporates destructive, lethal, noxious,
pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and is designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or
distract through high-speed projectiles and overpressure.
improvised incendiary device (IID). An apparatus or contraption placed or fabricated
without detailed manufacturing that incorporates destructive, lethal, noxious,
pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or
distract by creating intense heat and fire.
insider. An individual who is granted normal access to a facility. This may be an employee,
a contractor, custodial worker, or an authorized visitor. See also Table 1-1.
intrusion. Entrance by force or without permission or authorization, either physically or via
electronic methods.
IP. Internet protocol.
IR. Infrared.
lumen. The SI unit of measuring the power of light being produced by a light source or
received by a surface.
luces. Plural of lux.
lux. The SI unit of light intensity defined as the amount of light equal to one lumen per
square meter.
m. Meter.
mm. Millimeter.
mantrap. Secured entry system that prevents and individual from gaining access to an area
by holding them first in an assessment area.
NACWA. National Association of Clean Water Agencies (formerly Association of
Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies [AMSA]).
NDWAC. National Drinking Water Advisory Council.
NETCSC. National Environmental Training Center for Small Communities.
NFPA. National Fire Protection Association.
NRWA. National Rural Water Association.
OD. Outside diameter.
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PIR. Passive infrared.
PL. Public Law.
psi. Pounds per square inch.
protection in depth. The strategy of providing multiple layers of protective measures,
therefore requiring an adversary to defeat a system, travel to the next protective layer
and defeat that system, and so forth until reaching the target. An example of protection
in depth is the application of layers of protective measures at the site boundary
(perimeter fencing system), at the building envelope (exterior walls, doors, windows,
grilles, and roof system), and at the target enclosure (the room in which the targeted asset
is housed).
PTZ. Pan, tilt, and zoom.
PVC. Polyvinyl chloride.
RAM-W™. Risk Assessment Methodology for Water.
response. Actions taken to interrupt the adversary's task. Utility staff, the utility's security
response force, or law enforcement may carry out response, depending on the threat and
policy of the utility.
RF. Radio frequency.
RFI. Radio frequency interference.
risk. The potential for realization of unwanted, adverse consequences to human life, health,
property, or the environment. The quantitative or qualitative expression of possible loss
that considers both the probability that a hazard will cause harm and the consequences of
that event. Risk is usually expressed as a function of the probability that an adverse effect
will occur and the criticality of the effect on the ability to fulfill a mission or function.
RTU. Remote terminal unit.
saboteur. A saboteur is typically motivated by political, doctrinal, or religious causes,
although revenge may also be a motivation. These individuals primarily use stealth to
achieve their objectives, but they can be armed and willing to injure or kill others if
threatened. The saboteur is bent on damage or destruction of the utility's facilities or
generating a lack of public confidence in the utility's ability to protect the public. See also
Table 1-1.
SCAD A. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.
SI. International System of Units.
significant. Having or likely to have a major effect; important; fairly large in amount or
quantity.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). The system that provides automatic
or semi-automatic sensing of key parameters and control of key elements of the water or
wastewater system. It generally provides for communications, notifications, and alarms,
as well as for manual over-ride of controls.
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surveillance. The placement of physical features, activities, vehicles, and people that
maximize visibility by others during their normal activities. Surveillance may be natural
or electronic, informal (office windows placed to facilitate surveillance of entry roads), or
formal (continuous monitoring). Surveillance provides the link between detection
(sensors activated due to the presence of an intruder) and assessment (confirming that
the detection is valid and not a nuisance alarm).
SWAT. Special Weapons and Tactics.
target. This term is used synonymously with asset throughout this document.
terrorist. A radical who employs terror as a political weapon; with significantly enhanced
tool and weapon capabilities, terrorists may be politically or doctrinally motivated to
cause maximum human casualties, often without regard for the terrorist's personal
survival.
TISP. The Infrastructure Security Partnership.
UL. Underwriters Laboratory.
UPS. Uninterruptible power supply.
USEPA. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
VA. Vulnerability assessment.
vandal. An individual acting alone or in a group, unarmed and using spray paint to deface
property or using hand tools to inflict damage to utility assets. See also Table 1-1.
vehicle sally port. Interlocking gates within a fenced area where incoming drivers pass
through the first gate and stop at the second gate. Once both gates are closed and the
vehicle is captured within the sally port, a security guard may confirm the identity of the
driver and, if necessary, search the vehicle to confirm the contents. Once the vehicle and
driver are approved, the second gate opens and the vehicle may drive onto the facility.
VSAT™. Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool.
vulnerability. A characteristic of a critical infrastructure's design, implementation, or
operation that renders the infrastructure susceptible to destruction or incapacitation by a
threat. Vulnerabilities may consist of flaws in security procedures, software, internal
system controls, or installation of infrastructure that may affect the integrity,
confidentiality, accountability, or availability of data or services. Vulnerabilities also
include flaws that may be deliberately exploited and those that may cause failure due to
inadvertent human actions or natural disasters. Vulnerability may be considered any
weakness that can be exploited by an adversary or, in a non-terrorist threat environment,
make an asset susceptible to hazard damage.
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vulnerability assessment (VA). An assessment of the vulnerabilities of a water or
wastewater system. The six common elements of vulnerability assessments identified by
USEPA are: (1) characterization of the system, including its mission and objectives; (2)
identification and prioritization of adverse consequences to avoid; (3) determination of
critical assets that might be subject to malevolent acts that could result in undesired
consequences; (4) assessment of the likelihood (qualitative probability) of such
malevolent acts from adversaries; (5) evaluation of existing countermeasures; and (6)
analysis of current risk and development of a prioritized plan for risk reduction. Two
example approaches to VAs are the Risk Assessment Methodology for Water Utilities
(RAM-W™) and the Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool (VSAT™).
WEF. Water Environment Federation.
WISE. Water Infrastructure Security Enhancements.
WISE SC. Water Infrastructure Security Enhancements Standards Committee of the EWRI
of ASCE.
WSWG. Water Security Working Group.
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APPENDIX C
References
For a comprehensive list of resources related to water and wastewater security, see the USEPA WISE Phase 1 documents developed
by the American Society of Civil Engineers (2004), the American Water Works Association (20043), and the Water Environment
Foundation (2004).
Reference
Annotation
American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/National Association of
Architectural Metal Manufacturers (NAAMM) Hollow Metal Manufacturers
Association (HMMA). 2003. Guide Specifications for Commercial Security Hollow
Metal Doors and Frames. Chicago, IL. www.naamm.org/hmma/pdfs/HMMA862-
03.pdf
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). 2006a. Minimum Design Loads for
Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE/SEI Standard 7-05. Reston, VA: ASCE.
https://www.asce.org/bookstore/book.cfm?book=5581
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). 2006b. Standard Guidelines for the
Design, Installation, Maintenance and Operation of Urban Stormwater Systems,
ASCE/EWRI Standard 45-, 46-, 47-05. Reston, VA: ASCE.
https://www.asce.org/bookstore/book.cfm?book=5684
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). 2004. Guidelines for Designing an
Online Contaminant Monitoring System. Reston, VA.
www. asce. org/static/1 /wise, cfm
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). 1998. Design of Municipal
Wastewater Treatment Plants (ASCE Manual and Report on Engineering Practice
No. 76), 4th edition. Virginia. www.pubs.asce.org/WWWdisplay.cgi79805170
This document provides specifications for commercial security hollow
metal doors and frames. Its focus is protection from vandalism, forced
entry, theft, and firearms attack.
This update to ASCE/SEI Standard 7-02 and its supplement provides
requirements for general structural design and includes means for
determining dead, live, soil, flood, wind, snow, rain, atmospheric ice,
and earthquake loads, and their combinations that are suitable for
inclusion in building codes and other documents.
This set of guidelines provides for the design of urban stormwater
systems, covering topics such as site analysis, system configuration,
hydrology, hydraulic design, nonstructural considerations, structural
design, and materials (ASCE/EWRI Standard 45-05); guidelines for the
installation of urban stormwater systems and discusses subjects such
as contract documents, preconstruction site inspection, construction,
and inspection (ASCE/EWRI Standard 46-05); and guidelines for the
operation and maintenance of urban stormwater systems, including
operation and maintenance plans, water quality, periodic inspection,
and maintenance (ASCE/EWRI Standard 47-05).
USEPA WISE ASCE/AWWA/WEF Phase 1 Documents
(December 9, 2004) are available at the ASCE, AWWA, WEF, and
USEPA web sites.
The focus of this manual is current practice in the design of municipal
wastewater treatment plants. Its intended audience is design
professionals knowledgeable in the areas related to wastewater
treatment, including plant operations and regulations.
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Reference
Annotation
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). 1992. Design and Construction of
Urban Stormwater Management Systems (ASCE Manual and Report on
Engineering Practice No. 77). Virginia.
http://www.pubs.asce.org/WWWdisplay.cgi798051
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). 1982. Gravity Sanitary Sewer
Design and Construction (ASCE Manual and Report on Engineering Practice No.
60). Virginia. http://www.pubs.asce.org/WWWdisplay.cgi79805170
American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS). 2004. Protection of Assets.
Alexandria, VA.
American Waterworks Association (AWWA). 2004. Interim Voluntary Security
Guidance for Water Utilities. Denver, CO.www.awwa.org/science/wise/
Association of State Drinking Water Administrators (ASDWA) and National Rural
Water Association (NRWA). 2002a. Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide
for Small Drinking Water Systems. May 30.
http://www.asdwa.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pagelD=733
Association of State Drinking Water Administrators (ASDWA) and National Rural
Water Association (NRWA). 2002b. Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide
for Small Drinking Water Systems Serving Populations Between 3,300 and
10,000. November 13.
http://www.asdwa.org/index. cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pagelD=733
ASTM International. 2005a. A666, Standard Specification for Annealed or Cold-
Worked Austenitic Stainless Steel Sheet, Strip, Plate, and Flat Bar.
http://www. astm.org/cg i-
bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/A.htm?L+mystore+qkng6334+1140140874
ASTM International. 2005b. A 853, Standard Specification for Steel Wire, Carbon,
for General Use. http://www.astm.org/cgi-
bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/REDLINE_PAGES/A853.htm?L+mystore+uid
19817
This manual is an update of relevant portions of the ASCE/WPCF
Manual of Practice No. 37, Design and Construction of Sanitary and
Storm Sewers to include the new developments in the field of
stormwater management. The manual describes currently accepted
procedures for financial services, regulations, surveys and
investigations, design concepts and master planning, hydrology and
water quality, storm drainage hydraulics, and computer modeling.
This manual is an update of relevant portions of the ASCE/WPCF
Manual of Practice No. 37, Design and Construction of Sanitary and
Storm Sewers and presents the current practice in the field of sanitary
sewer design and construction. Its intended audience is design
professionals knowledgeable in the areas of gravity sewers.
Although the availability of security literature is growing rapidly, with
general and specialized texts, it has not been possible—until now—for
a business manager or protection professional to find in one place,
current, accurate, and practical treatment of the broad range of
protection subjects, strategies, and solutions.
USEPA WISE ASCE/AWWA/WEF Phase 1 Documents
(December 9, 2004) are available at the ASCE, AWWA, WEF, and
USEPA web sites.
This guide is intended for water utilities that serve a population of less
than 3,300. Its purpose is to help utilities identify critical assets and list
appropriate security measures.
This guide is intended for water utilities that serve a population from
3,300 to 10,000. It was developed to help utilities meet the
requirements of the "Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002."
This specification covers the required annealed and cold-worked
conditions for austenitic stainless steels in a variety of structural,
architectural, pressure vessel, magnetic, cryogenic, and heat-resisting
applications.
This standard specification covers carbon steel wire that intended for
general use that is supplied in coils and is produced hard drawn,
annealed in process, or annealed at finish size.
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Reference
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ASTM International. 2005c. F 1043, Standard Specification for Strength and
Protective Coatings on Steel Industrial Chain Link Fence Framework.
http://www. astm.org/cg i-
bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/F.htm?L+mystore+qkng6334+1140140874
ASTM International. 2005d. F 552, Standard Terminology Relating to Chain Link
Fencing, http://www.astm.org/cgi-
bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/F.htm?L+mystore+qkng6334+1140140874
ASTM International. 2005e. F 567, Standard Practice for Installation of Chain-Link
Fence, http://www.astm.org/cgi-
bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/F.htm?L+mystore+qkng6334+1140140874
ASTM International. 2004a. A 121, Standard Specification For Metallic-Coated
Carbon Steel Barbed Wire, http://www.astm.org/cgi-
bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/A.htm?L+mystore+qkng6334+1140140874
ASTM International. 2004b. A 176, Standard Specification for Stainless and Heat-
Resisting Chromium Steel Plate, Sheet, and Strip, http://www.astm.org/cgi-
bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/A.htm?L+mystore+qkng6334+1140140874
ASTM International. 2003. F 1910, Standard Specification for Long Barbed Tape
Obstacles, http://www.astm.org/cgi-
bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/F.htm?L+mystore+qkng6334+1140140874
ASTM International. 2002. F 476, Standard Test Methods for Security of Swinging
Door Assemblies, http://www.astm.org/cgi-
bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/F.htm?L+mystore+qkng6334+1140140874
Department of Defense (DoD). 2002. Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for
Buildings. Unified Facilities Criteria UFC 4-010-01.
www.tisp.org/files/pdf/dodstandards.pdf
Garcia, Mary Lynn. 2001 The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection
Systems. Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.
This specification covers the strength and protective coating
requirements for industrial steel chain link fence framework. Details
include the maximum allowable heights of framework, post spacing
based the mesh size and gages of the fence fabric, and specified wind
loads. Also include are factors to consider when determining wind load
as well as the cross-sectional shape and approved fabrication methods
for posts and rails.
This specification contains the standard terminology associated with
aspects of chain-link fencing design and construction.
The standard of practice pertaining to the installation procedure for
chain-link fence is described in this document. While this practice
describes performance under varying conditions, weather, intended
use, materials, etc. it does not address all of the safety problems, with
the installation of a chain-link fence.
This specification describes two-strand metallic-coated steel barbed
wire fabricated of aluminum, zinc, and zinc-5 % aluminum-mischmetal
alloy coatings, with a number of coating weights, in a variety of designs.
This specification covers stainless and heat-resisting chromium steel
plate, sheet, and strip. A wide variety of surface finishes may be
available for the steel plate, sheet and strips described in this
specification.
This specification covers barbed tape materials and configurations used
for security barriers. Referenced in this document are the ASTM
specifications A764, F1379, A176, A666, A370, and A240.
The standard test methods covered in this document are designed to
measure the capability of a swinging door assembly to restrain or delay
and to frustrate the commission of "break-in" crimes. Door assemblies
of various materials and types of construction covered by these test
methods also include individual components such as the hinge, lock,
door, jamb/strike, and jamb/wall.
The Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) system is prescribed by MIL-STD
3007 and provides planning, design, construction, sustainment,
restoration, and modernization criteria.
This book provides detailed information on the full process of security
system design and integration, illustrating how the various physical and
electronic elements work together to form a comprehensive system.
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Reference
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Illumination Engineering Society of North America (IESNA). 2003. Guideline for
Security Lighting for People, Property, and Public Spaces (G-1-03). New York,
NY.
National Association of Clean Water Agencies (NACWA). 2005. Vulnerability Self
Assessment Tool™ for Water & Wastewater Utilities (Version 3.2 Update).
February, http://www.nacwa.org/pugs/index.cfm
National Association of Clean Water Agencies (NACWA). 2002. Asset Based
Vulnerability Checklist for Wastewater Utilities©.
http://www.nacwa.org/pugs/index.cfm
National Environmental Training Center for Small Communities (NETCSC). 2002.
Protecting Your Community's Assets: A Guide for Small Wastewater Systems.
November, http://www.nesc.wvu.edu/netcsc/netcsc_tresource.htm#tool
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). 2006. NFPA 101®: Life Safety
Code®. Quincy, MA.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). 2005. National Electrical Code®
(NFPA 70) Handbook. Quincy. MA.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). 2002. NFPA 101B: Code for Means
of Egress for Buildings and Structures. Quincy, MA.
Naval Construction Battalion Center. 1990a. Federal Specification Sheet: Fencing,
Wire and Post, Metal (Chain-Link Fence Gates) (Detail Specification).
http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/FEDMIL/rrf1912d.pdf
Naval Construction Battalion Center. 1990b. Fencing, Wire and Post Metal (and
Gates, Chain-Link Fence Fabric, and Accessories) (General Specification).
http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/FEDMIL/rrf191k.pdf
This guideline covers basic security principles, illuminance
requirements for various types of properties, protocol for evaluating
current lighting levels for different security applications, and security
survey and crime search methodology. This guideline includes exterior
and interior security lighting practices for the reasonable protection of
persons and property.
Three versions of the Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool™ (VSAT™)
software—wastewater, water/wastewater/ and water—can be ordered
from this web site. This tool was originally developed under NACWA's
former name, Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (AMSA).
This document was developed to help wastewater utilities identify and
evaluate the vulnerability of their assets, as well as the threats against
them. This document was originally developed under NACWA's former
name, Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (AMSA).
This guide allows decisionmakers for small wastewater treatment
systems to evaluate the security of their systems and to plan for
emergencies. Tools provided in the guide include an Inventory of
Critical Assets, Threat Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment
Checklist, and Prioritization of Potential Corrective Actions.
This code addresses those egress features necessary to minimize
danger to life from fire and smoke, crowd pressures, and movement of
individuals and groups, and provides minimum criteria for the design of
egress facilities in order to permit prompt escape of occupants from
buildings or, where desirable, into safe areas within buildings.
This code describes the safe installation and use of electrical
equipment by consumers.
This code includes the latest technologies, advances, and safety
strategies in areas such as alarms, egress, emergency lighting, and
special hazard protection. The contents are not meant as a standalone
document, but for inclusion in a building code.
This document provides detailed requirements for chain-link fence gates
and accessories.
This specification covers general requirements for chain-link fencing and
accessories including classification for various parts of fencing, wire and
post metal, fencing fabric, gates, posts, top rails, braces, and
accessories.
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Reference
Annotation
Naval Construction Battalion Center. 1990c. Fencing, Wire and Post, Metal (Chain-
Link Fence Accessories) (Detail Specification).
http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/FEDMIL/rrf1914d.pdf
Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC). 1999. Selection and
Application of Vehicle Barriers (MIL-HDBK-1013/14). Washington Navy Yard, DC.
www.wbdg.org/ccb/NAVFAC/DMMHNAV/1013_14.pdf
Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC). 1993a. Design Guidelines
for Physical Security of Facilities (MIL-HDBK-1013/1A). Washington Navy Yard,
DC. www.wbdg.org/ccb/NAVFAC/DMMHNAV/1013_1a.pdf
Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC). 1993b. Design Guidelines
for Security Fencing, Gates, Barriers, and Guard Facilities (MIL-HDBK-1013/10).
Washington Navy Yard, DC.
www.wbdg.org/ccb/NAVFAC/DMMHNAV/1013_10.pdf
Sandia Corporation. 2002. Risk Assessment Methodology for Water (RAM™).
May.
42 U.S.C. §300(i)(1). http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=browse_usc&docid=Cite:+42USC300i-1
U.S. General Services Administration (GSA). 2005. Facilities Standards for the
Public Buildings Service. Washington, DC.
http://www.gsa. gov/Portal/gsa/ep/channelView.do?pageTypeld=8195&channelPa
ge=%2Fep%2Fchannel%2FgsaOverview.jsp&channelld=-17304
This specification covers general requirements for chain-link fence
accessories including: caps, rail sleeves, brace bands, rail and brace
ends, wire ties and clips, tension wires, tension bars, truss rods, barbed
wire, barbed wire support arms, and other miscellaneous accessories.
This handbook provides guidance to ensure that appropriate design,
operational, environmental, cost, security, and safety considerations
are included in the selection process for vehicle barrier systems. Topics
covered in the handbook include: vehicle barrier requirements, vehicle
barrier installation and design, and descriptions and data on
commercially available vehicle barriers and passive barriers that can be
constructed on site.
This manual provides guidance to ensure that appropriate physical
security considerations are included in the design of general facilities.
Aspects considered in this manual include the pre-design phase, the
assessment of physical security threats, and an overview of the design
phase. Specific technical sections in the manual also describe exterior
site physical security, building physical security, ballistic attack
hardening, standoff weapon hardening, and bomb blast hardening.
This military handbook provides guidance and detailed criteria for the
design, selection, and installation of new security fencing, gates,
barriers, and guard facilities for perimeter boundaries of Navy and
Marine Corps installations or separate activities, and designated
restricted areas.
This document is a two-volume training guide used in a RAM-W™
methodology workshop.
This web site provides the text of U.S. Code Title 42, Section 3001-1,
"Tampering with public water systems."
These design standards and criteria are to be used in the programming,
design, and documentation of GSA buildings.
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Reference
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Water Environment Federation (WEF). 2005. Operation of Municipal Wastewater
Treatment Plants, Manual of Practice No. 11,6* edition (electronic version).
Alexandria, VA. http://www.e-wef.org/timssnet/common/WEF_MOP11.cfm
Water Environment Federation (WEF). 2004. Interim Voluntary Security Guidance
for Wastewater/Stormwater Utilities, Alexandria, VA. www.wef.org/
ConferencesTraining/TrainingProfessionalDevelopment/WaterSecurity/
Water Environment Federation (WEF). 1999. Wastewater Collection Systems
Management, Manual of Practice No. 7, 5th Edition. Alexandria, VA.
Water Environment Federation (WEF). 1998. Design of Municipal Wastewater
Treatment Plants, Manual of Practice No. 8, 4th Edition. Alexandria, VA.
Water Environment Federation (WEF). 1993. Design of Wastewater and
Stormwater Pumping Stations, Manual of Practice No. FD-4. Alexandria, VA.
Water Environment Federation (WEF). 1992. Design and Construction of Urban
Stormwater Management, Manual of Practice No. 77. Alexandria, VA.
Water Environment Federation (WEF). 1982. Gravity Sanitary Sewer Design and
Construction, Manual of Practice No. FD-5. Alexandria, VA.
Water Security Working Group (WSWG). 2005. Recommendations of the National
Drinking Water Advisory Council to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency on
Water Security Practices, Incentives, and Measures, www.epa.gov/safewater/
ndwac/pdfs/wswg/wswg_report_final July2005.pdf
Welter, G.J. 2003. Actual and Threatened Security Events at Water Utilities.
AwwaRF. Denver, CO.
This three-volume Manual of Practice covers the operation of municipal
wastewater treatment plants. Volume I, Management and Support
Systems, covers plant management, support systems, plant operations,
safety and health, and chemical application systems. Volume II, Liquid
Processes, addresses characterization and sampling of municipal
wastewater, select biological processes, and other related topics.
Volume III, Solids Processes, includes sludge thickening, aerobic and
anaerobic digestion, sludge and lime stabilization, disposal of biosolids,
and related topics.
USEPA WISE ASCE/AWWA/WEF Phase 1 Documents
(December 9, 2004) are available at the ASCE, AWWA, WEF, and
USEPA web sites.
Manual of Practice No. 7 is a reference for the operation and
maintenance of a wastewater collection system.
This is the industry standard for wastewater design. This is also ASCE
Manual of Practice No. 76.
This manual focuses on the design of wastewater and Stormwater
pumping stations.
This document provides design and construction best practices for
urban Stormwater management.
This manual is an update of relevant portions of the ASCE/WPCF
Manual of Practice No. 37, Design and Construction of Sanitary and
Storm Sewers and presents the current practice in the field of sanitary
sewer design and construction. Its intended audience is design
professionals knowledgeable in the areas of gravity sewers.
This report presents the consensus reached by WSWG on 18 findings
that: (1) establish the features of active and effective security programs,
(2) identify ways government and others might encourage utilities to
adopt and maintain active and effective programs, and (3) suggest utility-
specific and national measures of water sector security progress.
This report documents the security incidents, threats, and hoaxes that
have occurred involving or of direct relevance to water systems. The
report includes a review of 264 incidents, classifying them by geographic
region, type of attacker, mode of attack, targeted asset, and other
categorization. The report reviews the incidents and discusses specific
types of contaminants and the purported motivation of attackers.
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