United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
2007 Workshop on
Decontamination, Cleanup,
and Associated Issues for
Sites Contaminated with Chemical,
Biological, or Radiological Materials
REPORT
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J
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EPA/600/R-08/059 | May 2008 www.epa.gov/ord
Report on the 2007 Workshop on
Decontamination, Cleanup, and
Associated Issues for Sites
Contaminated with Chemical,
Biological, or Radiological Materials
Prepared by
Sarah Dun
Eastern Research Group, Inc.
Lexington, MA 02421
For
Joseph Wood
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security and Research Center
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
Research Triangle Park, NC
Contract No. EP-C-07-015
Office of Research and Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center, Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
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Note
This report was prepared by Eastern Research Group, Inc.
(ERG), a contractor for the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), as a general record of discussions from
the "2007 Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and
Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical,
Biological, or Radiological Materials." The report captures
the main points of scheduled presentations and summarizes
discussions among the workshop panelists but does not
contain a verbatim transcript of all issues discussed. EPA
will use the information presented during the workshop to
address decontamination and cleanup challenges faced at
sites contaminated with chemical, biological, or radiological
materials.
The gathering of information in this document has been
funded wholly by EPA under Contract No. EP-C-07-015.
This document does not represent the official views of the
EPA and, as such, no product or technology endorsement
should be inferred.
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Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations viii
Executive Summary x
I. Introduction 1
II. Presentations and Associated Question and Answer Periods 3
Opening Remarks 3
Session 1: Some U.S. Perspectives 3
Overview of Select U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and
Technology Programs 3
Evidence Awareness for Remediation Personnel at Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Crime Scenes 4
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Decontamination Research & Development Activities 5
Regulating Bio-Decontamination Chemicals 6
Environmental Sampling for Biothreat Agents: Current Research and Validation Efforts 7
Session!: International Perspectives 8
G8 Bio-Terrorism Experts Group (BTEX) 8
Biological Decontamination with Peracetic Acid and Hydrogen Peroxide 9
Field Demonstration of Advanced Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)
Decontamination Technologies 9
Japanese Research Project for Development of On-site Detection of Chemical
and Biological Warfare Agents 10
A Fatal Case of "Natural" Inhalational Anthrax in Scotland-Decontamination Issues 11
Case Study of Fatality Due to Anthrax Infection in the United Kingdom (UK) 12
Session 3: Biological Threat Agent Decontamination Research and Development 13
National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) Systematic
Decontamination Studies 13
Improvement and Validation of Lab-Scale Test Methods for Sporicidal
Decontamination Agents 14
Full-scale Experience in Decontaminations Using Chlorine Dioxide Gas 15
Systematic Decontamination-Challenges and Successes 16
New York City Anthrax Response 17
Update on EPA Decontamination Technologies Research Laboratory (DTRL) Activities 18
Localizing and Controlling Biothreat Agent (BTA) Transport with Polymer Sprays 19
Can We Expedite Decontamination? 20
Session 4: Chemical Threat Agent Decontamination Research and Development 21
Airport Restoration Following a Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA) Attack 21
Quantitative Structure Toxicity Relationships (QSTR) to Support Estimation of
Cleanup Goals 22
Determining Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA) Environmental Fate to Optimize Remediation
for Indoor Facilities 23
Chemical & Biological Defense Program Physical Science & Technology Program
Overview-Hazard Mitigation 24
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Table of Contents
Session 5: Biological and Foreign Animal Disease Agent Decontamination 25
(1) Results from the Evaluation of Spray-Applied Sporicidal Decontamination Technologies
(2) Test Plans and Preliminary Results for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Persistence
and Decontamination Tests 25
Inactivation of Avian Influenza Virus Using Common Soaps/Detergents, Chemicals, and Disinfectants 25
Inactivationof Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus on Various Contact Surfaces 26
Session 6: Radiological Agent Decontamination 27
Decontamination of Polonium in the United Kingdom (UK) 27
Decontamination of Terrorist-Dispersed Radionuclides from Surfaces in Urban Environments 28
An Empirical Assessment of Post-Incident Radiological Decontamination Techniques 29
Cesium Chloride Particle Characteristics from Radiological Dispersal Device (ROD)
Outdoor Test 30
Radiological Dispersal Device (ROD) Rapid Decontamination 31
Session 7: Research and Development for Decontamination-Related and Support Activities 31
Water Infrastructure Protection Division (WIPD) Decontamination Research Overview 31
Incineration of Materials Contaminated with Bio-Warfare Agents 32
Detection to Support Decontamination 33
EPA Responder Decontamination Needs 34
III. Agenda 37
IV. List of Participants 43
V. Presentation Slides 51
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List of Abbreviations
ANSTO Australian Nuclear Science & Technology Organisation
AOAC Association of Analytical Chemists
ATP adenosine triphosphate
BI biological indicator
BROOM Building Restoration Operations Optimization Model
BTEX Bio-Terrorism Experts Group
°C degrees Celsius
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNC Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CPU colony forming units
C1O2 chlorine dioxide
ClorDiSys ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc.
CT concentration x time
CWA chemical warfare agent
DCMD Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
DDMP dimethyl methylphosphonate
DEFRA UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DEM diethyl malonate
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DNA deoxyribonucleic acid
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
DoS U.S. Department of State
DTRL Decontamination Technologies Research Laboratory
ECBC Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
EDS electrostatic decontamination system
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
°F degrees Fahrenheit
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIFRA Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
ft3 cubic feet
GAO Government Accounting Office
GDS UK Government Decontamination Service
H5N1 strain highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 strain (A/Vietnam/1203/4)
H7N2 strain low pathogenic avian influenza H7N2 strain (A/H7N2/chick/MinhMah/04)
HEPA high-efficiency paniculate air
HPS Health Protection Scotland
HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
ICT Incident Control Team
INL Idaho National Laboratory
L liter
LAX Los Angeles International Airport
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List of Abbreviations (continued)
LIBS laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LOAEL lowest observed adverse effect level
m3 cubic meter
mg/kg/d milligrams of agent per kilogram body weight per day
ml milliliters
MS mass spectrometer
NDT National Decontamination Team
NHSRC National Homeland Security Research Center
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NIST National Institute of Standards & Technology
NRMRL National Risk Management Research Laboratory
NYC DHMH New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
NYES New York Environmental Services
NYPD New York Police Department
OPP Office of Pesticide Programs
OSC on-scene coordinator
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OTD Operational Technology Demonstration
PCR polymerase chain reaction
ppb parts per billion
ppbv parts per billion by volume
PPE personal protective equipment
ppm parts per million
ppmv parts per million by volume
pptv parts per trillion by volume
QAPP Quality Assurance Project Plan
QSTR quantitative structure toxicity relationship
ROD radiological dispersal device
RNA ribonucleic acid
RT-PCR reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction
Sabre Sabre Technical Services
SFO San Francisco International Airport
SNL Sandia National Laboratory
SOP standard operating procedure
SPI single-photon ionization/time-of-night mass spectrometry
STERIS STERIS Corporation
STM Single-Tube Method
TAGA trace air gas analysis
TIC toxic industrial chemical
TSM Three-Step Method
TSWG Technical Support Working Group
TTEP Technology Testing and Verification Program
UK United Kingdom
|jul microliters
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List of Abbreviations (continued)
(jum microns
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
UV ultra violet
VHP vaporized hydrogen peroxide
VOC volatile organic compound
WIPD Water Infrastructure Protection Division
WMD weapon of mass destruction
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Executive Summary
Opening Remarks
Opening and introductory remarks were provided by leaders
within EPA's Office of Research and Development, and
in particular, the National Homeland Security Research
Center (NHSRC). These speakers discussed EPA efforts to
collaborate with its international partners in decontamination
research, provided some background on NHSRC and its
research programs, and highlighted the advancement in
decontamination technology since the 2001 anthrax attacks.
U.S. Perspectives
Brooks (DHS) provided an overview of his division's efforts
to address large-scale biological and chemical agent response
and recovery, such as the restoration of an airport following a
chemical or biological attack and the restoration of an urban
environment following an anthrax release.
McKinney (TSWG) provided an overview of the Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures
(CBRNC) subgroup and highlighted some of the
subgroup's research and development activities. These
projects included detection technologies for both threat
agents and decontamination chemicals, decontamination
chemical application systems, and disposal of contaminated
agricultural materials.
Kempter (EPA) discussed a potentially new pesticide
product category—sporicidal decontaminant—that would
apply to products intended to inactivate B. anthracis. This
new category would streamline the process of getting
products registered for B. anthracis inactivation since
currently none exist. Kempter also described some of
the fumigant test requirements under consideration for
registration under this category.
Wagner (FBI) discussed forensic sampling issues, while
Martinez discussed various projects the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) is involved with related to
biological agent sampling. Many of the CDC projects have
bio-aerosol implications. One lab study seeks to compare
the efficiency of swab, wipe, and vacuum techniques for
the sampling of bacterial spores, while in another study,
investigators compare various air sampling filters.
International Perspectives
Hillesheim (DoS) provided an overview of the G8 Bio-
Terrorism Experts Group (BTEX). The formation of the
G8 BTEX group was initiated in 2004. G8 BTEX members
have held workshops on forensic epidemiology, protecting
food supplies, and decontamination. Hillesheim provided
additional examples of bilateral collaborative efforts between
the U.S. and other nations, including initiatives with Russia,
India, and Australia.
Niederwohrmeier discussed Wofasteril, a decontamination
technology being developed by German researchers.
Wofasteril is formulated with peracetic acid, hydrogen
peroxide, acetic acid, and other proprietary ingredients. It can
be employed as a thermal fog or liquid for direct application
to surfaces. Niederwohrmeier presented results of efficacy
tests deactivating various spore species using formaldehyde;
a peracetic acid-based product; and Wofasteril SC250 with
alcapur, a foaming agent that raises the pH.
Volcheck, of Environment Canada, discussed the results
for a series of field demonstrations of decontamination
technologies for biological, chemical, and radiological
threat agents. The objectives were to demonstrate building
decontamination technologies; analyze agent concentrations
before, during, and after decontamination; evaluate
technology performance with various materials; calculate
associated cost, material, and labor requirements; and
develop manuals and guidelines based on findings.
Seto (Japan) presented the results of previous testing and
evaluation for over a dozen detection devices currently
available for chemical and biological agents. For each device,
he presented agent detection capabilities, whether false
positives or negatives occurred, response times, and detection
limits. Seto also discussed ongoing research in Japan to
improve and develop identification and detection capabilities.
This research seeks to combine existing technologies such as
the monitoring tape method, biosensors, chemical sensors,
and counter-flow technologies.
Ramsey (UK) discussed a fatal case of inhalation anthrax
that occurred in Scotland in 2006. His presentation provided
a general overview of the entire event, including the lengthy
legal, clinical, and environmental investigations that were
involved. In the following presentation, Lloyd and Spencer
(UK) provided more details on the response, focusing
more on the sampling and decontamination processes.
Investigations confirmed that the deceased participated in
a drumming group and made his own drums using animal
skins. In the drum storage area of a Belford home that was
contaminated with B. anthracis, HEPA vacuuming served
as the decontamination method. B. anthracis was also
found in the village hall, where drumming-related activities
occurred, and was decontaminated with chlorine dioxide gas.
The drums themselves were decontaminated with a surface
application of a formaldehyde solution with a contact time
of 12 hours.
Biological Agent Decontamination
Ryan (EPA) presented and discussed the results from the
extensive biological and chemical agent decontamination
projects that he oversees. He presented results from tests
to assess the impact of different building materials and
operating conditions (temperature, relative humidity) on
the log reduction of B. anthracis and surrogate spores
decontaminated with various technologies. Ryan presented
some results for the toxic industrial chemical (TIC) and
chemical agent persistence and decontamination tests he has
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conducted. He noted that preliminary findings indicate that
chlorine dioxide may be effective for VX but not for sarin or
soman. Ryan also briefly presented preliminary results from
the persistence and decontamination tests with ricin toxin and
vaccinia virus (a smallpox virus surrogate).
Tomasino (EPA) presented the results of test efforts
conducted by the Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP)
to determine appropriate modifications to the AOAC
Method 966.04 Sporicidal Activity of Disinfectants Test, a
qualitative procedure to determine a product's effectiveness
in inactivating bacterial spores. Tomasino also discussed his
research to evaluate quantitative test methods for determining
decontamination efficacy. OPP focused the evaluation on
two well-developed methods to generate a quantitative
assessment of efficacy—ASTM E2111-05 and the three-step
method (TSM).
John Mason (Sabre Technical Services) provided an
overview of his company's chlorine dioxide decontamination
technology and experience since the anthrax attacks
in 2001. Along with other projects, Mason's company
decontaminated the Brentwood US Postal Service building,
has done extensive mold remediation work in New Orleans
following Hurricane Katrina, and participated in the Scotland
B. anthracis decontamination. Mason then discussed an
upcoming project to decontaminate a 12 million cubic feet
medical facility suspected of mold contamination.
Rastogi (ECBC) discussed the collaborative efforts with
NHSRC to conduct systematic studies of the performance
of three fumigant technologies for the decontamination of
building materials contaminated with B. anthracis. The study
objectives were to evaluate the kill kinetics and D-values
(time required for a 1-log reduction) for chlorine dioxide
against B. anthracis, assess the effect of bioburden on the
recovery of spores and its effect on the efficacy of VHP and
chlorine dioxide, and identify an appropriate surrogate for
B. anthracis. For the surrogate work, the results indicate
that the NNR1A1 strain may be an appropriate avirulent
surrogate. ECBC also evaluated/?, subtilis and Geobacillus
stearothermophilus as potential surrogates.
Norrell (EPA) described the response events following
an inhalation anthrax case occurring in New York City in
February 2006. A drum maker and performer (who used
animal hides from Africa) was confirmed with inhalation
anthrax. Sampling confirmed the presence of B. anthracis
in his home, workshop, and van. For the decontamination
of his home and workshop, a combination of pH-amended
bleach and HEPA vacuuming was used—depending on
the type of material. The van and some materials from the
home and workshop were fumigated with chlorine dioxide.
Perimeter monitoring ensured no release of chlorine dioxide
from the treatment enclosure. Arranging for disposal of
materials was the most difficult component of the response.
Materials were eventually autoclaved, but following this,
no landfills would accept the treated waste. After additional
coordination, a facility in Ohio accepted the decontaminated
waste for incineration.
In a second presentation, Ryan discussed research being
performed in NHSRC's Decontamination Technologies
Research Laboratory (DTRL), which is used to
investigate some of the engineering aspects of promising
decontamination methods. Ryan discussed some of the
current projects, such as C1O2 measurement technology
evaluation and adsorption of C1O2 on activated carbon.
Another focus of the DTRL research involves fumigation—
material interactions, such as material demand of the
fumigant, by-products, and materials compatibility. Ryan
outlined upcoming tests (in collaboration with DHS) to
determine the impacts of C1O2 on computers and monitors.
Krauter (LLNL) discussed her research to investigate
technologies designed to minimize spore (e.g., B. anthracis)
reaerosolization. Several published reports discuss
reaerosolization as a possible source of anthrax cross-
contamination at the Brentwood postal facility. Krauter tested
various polymer formulations in small and large chambers.
The research confirmed that certain polymer sprays inhibit
spore resuspension by adhering particles to a surface.
Martin (EPA) discussed advances in technologies and
decontamination process streamlining to expedite the
overall decontamination timeline and reduce cost. He gave
examples of advances in C1O2 fumigation technology, such
as the use of tents (for containment of the gas during
a building fumigation) and the size reduction in
chlorine dioxide generation equipment. To expedite the
decontamination process, pre-planning is essential; however,
only a limited number of critical facilities (e.g., airports)
may have the resources to prepare a comprehensive
plan. Efforts to improve biological indicators (Bis), have
more products obtain FIFRA registration, and optimize
characterization and clearance sampling may further
reduce the time and cost associated with restoring a facility
contaminated with B. anthracis.
Chemical Agent Decontamination
Knowlton (SNL) discussed the Facility Restoration
Operational Technology Demonstration (OTD) project,
which addresses restoration of an airport following a
chemical agent release. This project focuses on facility
interior remediation, and the resulting restoration plan for
Los Angeles International Airport will serve as a template
for other airports. The project also includes an experimental
phase to address data gaps identified when developing
the LAX restoration plan. Knowlton listed four current
research projects: investigation of surface sample
collection efficiency; material and agent interactions;
gas/vapor decontamination; and statistical sampling
algorithm validation.
Moudgal (EPA) discussed quantitative structure toxicity
relationships (QSTRs), which are mathematical equations
that determine the correlations between a chemical's
molecular structure and observed biological activity. QSTR is
most useful in providing toxicity estimates when no agent-
specific experimental toxicity data are available. The QSTR
methodology initially involves gathering data on a toxicity
endpoint and the mode of action of an agent, if available,
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which then can be used to develop specific de novo QSTR
models. Once validated, the model can be used to predict
toxicity in other agents with similar structures. Moudgal
provided an example using the QSTR methodology to
estimate a reference dose for 1,4-thioxane (a TIC).
Love (LLNL) discussed his current research, which is being
conducted as part of the Facility Restoration Operational
Technology Demonstration (OTD) project, to address data
gaps in CWA persistence and interactions on various surfaces.
Love's study will use three CWAs and eight different
materials found at airports. At high concentrations, the bulk
properties of the agent dominate fate and transport (e.g.,
volatilization, dissolution, infiltration). As the concentration
decreases, molecular properties dominate (e.g., hydrolysis,
oxidation, others). Love presented concentration data on VX
and its degradation products as a function of time.
Mueller (DTRA) began by stating that the civilian definition
of decontamination does not exactly coincide with that of the
military, i.e., the military does not necessarily require 100%
decontamination for reuse. Historically, the military sought
a decontamination solution that would apply to all agents in
all circumstances. Currently, the military is rethinking this
approach. Disposal may be the best option in a domestic
event where equipment replacement is readily available,
but decontamination might be required in a front-line
situation with limited resources. Mueller provided examples
of research completed in 2007, such as the development
of a decontamination wipe and a new chlorine dioxide
formulation with a broader capacity for decontaminating
G-agents. Some ongoing projects include an aerosolized
activated hydrogen peroxide technology for decontamination
of aircraft interiors and an electrochemically generated
decontamination solution.
Biological and Foreign Animal Disease Agent
Decontamination
Wood (EPA) described two decontamination projects,
the first of which is completed. With the first one, he
provided the results for eleven spray-applied sporicidal
decontamination technologies that were evaluated for their
ability to decontaminate glass inoculated with B. anthracis
Ames spores. Wood also provided results comparing the
efficacy of pH-amended bleach, CASCAD SDF, Hi-Clean
605, KlearWater, and Peridox on three different test material
coupons and three different bacterial spore strains. The
results indicate that even the best liquid sporicides could not
completely inactivate spores on porous materials. The second
project is currently underway and is designed to assess the
persistence of the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1
virus under various environmental conditions and materials.
The project's second purpose is to investigate the efficacy of
various generic chemicals to inactivate the virus.
Alphin (University of Delaware) is currently leading a
project to assess avian influenza virus inactivation using
various common chemicals. The ideal decontaminant would
be effective against the virus on a variety of surfaces and
would be widely available, biodegradable, and inexpensive.
The test agent is a low pathogenic isolate of the avian
influenza virus, H7N2. To assess viral inactivation, fluid
from the decontaminated test coupons was injected into
eggs, and then after a 5-day exposure period, fluid from each
egg was examined for hemagglutination activity. Alphin
provided detailed test results. The testing so far has identified
several common chemicals that may be suitable for avian
influenza virus inactivation. Further testing with additional
disinfectants is underway.
Einfeld (SNL) began by noting that although guidelines
exist, there are currently no U.S. standard methods to
evaluate virucide efficacy against various organisms, which
are needed for product registration. Researchers at Plum
Island Animal Research Center are currently conducting
studies with the foot-and-mouth disease virus, which infects
cloven-hoofed animals and is highly infectious. The study
objectives are to optimize coupon carrier inoculation and
recovery for common agricultural materials and evaluate
various virucide efficacies for the foot-and-mouth disease
virus. Einfeld presented the results for the eight virucides
tested, indicating that each virucide, except ethanol,
performed well. In general, the porous material carriers
negatively impacted virucide efficacy. Overall, carrier tests
showed worse, but adequate, virucide efficacy compared to
previous suspension tests.
Radiological Agent Decontamination
Bettley-Smith (UK CDS) described the 2006 polonium
incident in the UK. On November 24, 2006, CDS was
informed that a substance, confirmed as polonium-210, had
been associated with the death of an individual. Polonium
is an alpha emitter, a type of radiation easily contained
by bagging. Detecting the short-lived alpha particles to
identify the contaminated materials, however, is difficult.
Alpha particles tend to adhere to materials, and detection
is accomplished with instrumentation. Characterization
surveys using a variety of sampling and analytical techniques
occurred at each location prior to decontamination to
determine the extent of contamination. Over time, a total of
ten locations were identified for decontamination. Currently,
decontamination is complete at nine of these ten locations.
The materials that could not be remediated were packaged
and transported to an appropriate disposal facility. Waste
management was time consuming and complex.
Decontamination of common urban area materials
contaminated with radiological agents can be influenced by
grime layers and many other material and environmental
factors. The further the agent migrates into a surface, such as
concrete, the harder decontamination becomes. Fischer and
Viani (LLNL) described several studies undertaken to further
the understanding of factors that affect urban environmental
contamination and restoration following detonation of
a "dirty bomb." Their studies have focused on concrete
surfaces and cesium contamination.
Parkinson (ANSTO) described a project to assess the
effectiveness of commercially available, low-impact
radiological decontamination technologies for a variety of
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common building materials. Results from this project will
assist organizations preparing response guidelines. Coupons
of five common building materials were contaminated
with cesium-137, americium-241, and strontium-90.
Ten decontamination products were tested, including six
strippable coatings and four wet chemical products (e.g.,
surfactants and/or chelating agents). Parkinson presented
the results and noted that the liquid chemical technology
approach provided better decontamination than the
strippable coatings.
Lee (EPA) presented his research, in which the specific
objectives were to characterize the physicochemical
properties of cesium chloride particles generated during
an outdoor detonation and to estimate the cesium chloride
deposition and penetration on limestone. In conjunction with
LLNL, two outdoor detonations were conducted. Particle
concentrations were measured on limestone coupons and
via air sampling and monitoring. Lee presented some of the
aerosol data and electron microscope photographs of particles
captured from one monitor. Analysis of the limestone
coupons is ongoing. Laser-ablation inductively coupled
plasma/mass spectrometry and other techniques will be
used to determine the extent of cesium penetration into the
limestone. Overall, experimental results indicate that most
cesium particles were below 10 jjum.
Drake (EPA) discussed a project to evaluate rapid
decontamination technologies after a radiological dispersal
device (RDD) event. The goal is to evaluate the performance
of commercially available products that are quickly
deployable and fast acting for building and outdoor area
decontamination. The test approach consists of depositing
cesium chloride on 2-foot by 5-foot concrete coupons,
measuring contaminant levels, conducting decontamination,
and measuring residual contamination. Sets of contaminated
coupons will be held in controlled humidity and temperature
conditions for both 14 and 28 days, and then tests will begin
to evaluate both chemical and mechanical decontamination
technologies. A short list of proposed decontamination
technologies has been generated, of which two will be
initially selected for testing and evaluation.
Research and Development for Decontamination-
Related and Support Activities
Fox (EPA) oversees NHSRC's Water Infrastructure
Protection Division (WIPD). This group's primary research
focus is on detection and decontamination methods to be
used following a threat agent attack on drinking water
sources and systems. To a lesser degree, this group also
researches technical issues related to wastewater collection,
treatment, and disposal procedures. Fox noted that water
supply system decontamination includes water treatment as
well as decontamination of the system infrastructure.
In some cases, pipe abandonment in place may be the best
response to a contaminated distribution system situation.
Ongoing and future research, however, strives for removal
of the contaminant. Within water systems, contaminants
may be dissolved or suspended in the water or adhere to
the pipe walls. Decontamination is also affected by agent
attachment to biofilms, reaction with pipe walls or corrosion
products, and permeation through pipe walls. Fox briefly
described several decontamination research projects
currently underway.
NHSRC's research and development program for disposal
of potentially threat agent-contaminated materials focuses
mostly on the effectiveness and environmental impacts
of landfill options and thermal destruction technologies.
Lemieux's presentation focused primarily on thermal
destruction research efforts and noted that incinerator
operators have many concerns about accepting threat agent-
contaminated waste. Lemiuex (EPA) described experiments
using a pilot-scale rotary kiln incinerator in which building
material bundles embedded with Bis are fed into the kiln.
Lemieux provided example test results from trials with carpet
and ceiling tile bundles. He also discussed a model developed
to predict whether an incinerator will completely destroy the
threat agent of interest.
Snyder (EPA) provided an update on several detection-
related research projects. The focus of his presentation was
on detection technologies applied to support decontamination
research. Research with Laser Induced Breakdown
Spectroscopy (LIBS) includes determining detection limits
for pure samples of B. atrophaeus (a surrogate for B.
anthracis). Single-Photon lonization/Time-of-Flight Mass
Spectrometry (SPI) and Dual-Source Triple-Quadrupole Mass
Spectrometry have been used by Snyder to detect fumigants
and fumigant by-products. Snyder provided schematics of
each device's principle of operation and presented data. He
also briefly presented data from ongoing efforts to determine
cesium penetration into building materials using LIBS and
efforts to develop a rapid detection method for F. tularensis
and Y. pestis (viable and nonviable) on building materials.
Throughout the workshop, speakers discussed numerous
detection, containment, decontamination, and disposal
issues. Much research has occurred, is ongoing, or is
planned. All this information feeds into the actions and
decisions of OSCs and other responders. Mickelsen (EPA)
emphasized that responders are the ultimate end-users of the
decontamination information being developed and that they
need it in user-friendly formats. Few manuals or hands-on
materials exist. Mickelsen outlined specific areas of interest
and data needs, such as the need for faster and cheaper
detection and decontamination methods, and guidance related
to PPE selection, clearance, and disposal. In conclusion,
Mickelsen noted that through coordination, cooperation, and
communication, decontamination stakeholders are capable
of producing products, based on the completed research, that
impact decontamination, reduce restoration costs, and create
effective responses.
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I.
Introduction
This report summarizes presentations and discussions from
the "2007 Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and
Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical,
Biological, or Radiological Materials," which was held June
20-22, 2007, in Research Triangle Park, NC. The technical
content of the report is based entirely on information and
discussions from the workshop.
The workshop allowed participants from federal agencies
and laboratories, international organizations, academia, and
decontamination technology companies to share information
and discuss issues associated with the decontamination of
chemical, biological, and radiological threat agents.
During the workshop, speakers gave presentations on specific
topics. Following each presentation, speakers held a brief
question and answer period. The presentations and panel
discussion covered a number of topics and were organized
into seven sessions:
• Some U.S. perspectives. Representatives from the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Technical
Support Working Group (TSWG), U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) Office of Pesticide Programs
(OPP), and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) provided an overview of domestic
decontamination research projects. Brooks (DHS)
summarized DHS projects and programs addressing
decontamination issues. Wagner (FBI) outlined the
FBI's role as an enforcement authority during a threat
event and discussed evidentiary concerns during
decontamination. McKinney described research
underway through multi-agency TSWG programs.
Kempter provided an overview of OPP's process for
permitting the use of decontamination agents. Martinez
highlighted CDC decontamination concerns and current
research projects.
• International perspectives. Hillesheim (U.S.
Department of State) introduced the U.S. approach to
combating bioterrorism and emphasized international
collaboration goals. Representatives from Germany,
Canada, and Japan each provided information about
ongoing research in their respective nations. Topics
included assessment of fumigation technologies,
a field demonstration of building decontamination
technologies, and development of on-site
decontamination technologies. Representatives
from the United Kingdom (UK) described a case study
of a single, natural anthrax case and the resulting
response actions.
• Biological threat agent decontamination research and
development. Researchers and industry representatives
gave eight presentations that provided information
about decontamination technologies that are currently
available or under development and are specific to
biological threat agents. In addition to describing
decontamination technologies, speakers discussed
decontamination efficacy testing and validation. Norrell
described a case of naturally occurring anthrax and
the subsequent response actions. Martin reviewed the
components of a decontamination and restoration event
and highlighted research needs to reduce the time and
cost of this process.
Chemical threat agent decontamination research
and development. The four presentations in this
session described projects addressing chemical agent
decontamination. Knowlton described a project to
assess and preplan for a chemical warfare agent (CWA)
release at an airport. Moudgal discussed a methodology
for assessing risks associated with chemical agents
and developing agent-specific screening levels for
restoration. Love provided an overview of research
to understand the fate of CWAs in the environment.
Mueller highlighted chemical agent decontamination
research related to military applications.
Biological and foreign animal disease agent
decontamination. Three speakers provided information
about ongoing research to address foreign animal
diseases. Wood summarized two projects underway at
EPA's National Homeland Security Research Center
(NHSRC). One evaluates sporicidal decontamination
technologies; the other evaluates virus persistence and
decontamination under varying conditions. Alphin
described research assessing the disinfectant properties
of several common cleaning products. Einfeld discussed
ongoing research regarding inactivation of the foot-and-
mouth disease virus.
Radiological agent decontamination. Five presentations
addressed concerns related to radiological agents.
Bettley-Smith described a case of polonium
contamination in multiple public facilities in London.
He provided information about response actions and
lessons learned during this event. Other speakers
described ongoing research to understand surface
interactions with radiological agents, to test the efficacy
of various decontamination technologies, to evaluate
agent dispersal during detonation, and to assess rapid
decontamination technologies.
Research and development for decontamination-
related and support activities. The final four
presentations highlighted additional areas of
decontamination research. Fox discussed projects
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to assess decontamination of drinking water supply
and wastewater systems. Lemieux described NHSRC
research to evaluate incinerators as a disposal option.
Snyder highlighted several recently developed detection
devices undergoing testing at NHSRC. Mickelsen
closed by discussing how on-scene coordinators
(OSCs) use research results and products during
response actions.
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Presentations and Associated Question
and Answer Periods
Opening Remarks
Lek Kadeli, Deputy Assistant Administrator, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research
and Development
Nancy Adams, Director of the Decontamination and
Consequence Management Division, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, National Homeland Security
Research Center
Blair Martin, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Risk Management Research Laboratory
Kadeli welcomed participants and provided an overview of
the workshop schedule. During the course of the workshop,
attendees would hear presentations regarding U.S. and
international decontamination perspectives and research. EPA
currently has working relationships with the UK and Canada,
and hopes to foster partnerships with the other G8 countries
and additional nations such as Australia and Singapore.
Kadeli mentioned a meeting the day before with EPA, the
US Department of State, and G8 country representatives to
discuss potential decontamination research collaborations.
EPA became involved in researching homeland security
issues after the 2001 anthrax attacks and subsequent
decontamination efforts. At that time, EPA served as the
lead federal agency in decontaminating and restoring
facilities contaminated with anthrax. To foster and facilitate
improved decontamination approaches in potential future
events, Congress provided funding, and Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 10 named EPA as the lead agency,
for addressing biological threat agent decontamination.
In response to the Congressional directives, EPA's Office
of Research and Development created NHSRC, bringing
together scientists and engineers from many disciplines.
The goal of NHSRC's research and development is to
provide a scientifically sound basis for effective remediation
of contamination of indoor and outdoor facilities and
environments contaminated with a range of potential
biological, chemical, and radiological agents. This research
and development is intended to assist in effective remediation
of these agents with the minimum time and cost.
NHSRC maintains its own research program, as well as
collaborates with a number of other federal agencies and
departments, academia, and industry. Kadeli emphasized
that success has come from collaborations and working
relationships developed across governmental departments
and with other nations. He provided several examples of
collaborative research projects, including the work with
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) to study
decontamination methods.
Adams continued with a brief overview of the four
areas of research completed and underway in NHSRC's
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
(DCMD): detection, containment, decontamination,
and disposal. Much of DCMD's early research focused
on decontamination and building protection related to
anthrax events. DCMD's research has now expanded to
consider chemical and radiological events as well. Adams's
presentation in Appendix D provides more information about
some of these projects.
Martin concluded by emphasizing that decontamination
research continues to develop improved technologies. As
research provides additional data, responders will be able
to better apply these technologies during responses. Martin
stressed the benefits of collaborating across disciplines and
nations, such that groups can leverage each other's efforts
and maximize resources. Each nation and organization is
interested in restoring facilities and infrastructure to safe use
as quickly as possible after an event. The current time and
cost to restore a facility should an event occur will be greatly
reduced compared to the 2001 anthrax attacks in the U.S., but
technology improvements and early preparedness can further
reduce time and cost needs.
Session 1: Some U.S. Perspectives
Overview of Select U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Science and Technology Programs
Lance Brooks, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
During the "2006 Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup,
and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical,
Biological, or Radiological Materials," Brooks provided an
overview of DHS research projects. Since the last meeting,
DHS has undergone reorganization. Three directors—
research, innovation, and transition—now head the Science
and Technology Directorate and oversee six divisions.
The directors are integrated across the divisions and align
research within the divisions to meet DHS needs and
minimize duplicate efforts. The research lead and transition
lead in each division support and report to the directors. With
this reorganization, the focus will shift from applied to more
basic research.
DHS research seeks to develop technology and science
solutions to assist others in addressing homeland
security events. Agencies such as the Federal Emergency
Management Association (FEMA), US Coast Guard, and
Transportation Security Administration are a few of the
primary recipients of DHS research. The Capstone Integrated
Product Team, which includes members of various DHS
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offices and operational groups, identifies research gaps
and needs through Presidential Directives, Congressional
guidance, national planning, risk studies, and private, local,
and state stakeholder input. In the Chemical/Biological
division, research falls under three thrust areas—biological
(which includes the Biowatch program), agricultural (which
includes the Plum Island Laboratory), and chemical—and
focuses on developing new technologies or advancing
existing systems.
Brooks discussed the systems approaches for addressing
biological and chemical response and recovery efforts. He
then briefly described a few of his division's programs:
• Airport restoration guidance. DHS, in conjunction
with the San Francisco International Airport (SFO),
developed a restoration guidance document and
checklist to assist airports in responding to a bioattack.
The report is due to be published soon. This guidance
includes prereviewed protocols and plans to assist in
preplanning efforts and speed restoration. DHS, in
partnership with EPA and CDC, has held workshops
to familiarize airports with this restoration plan and to
assess possible response actions. DHS is developing
additional guidance documents, which build from the
airport restoration document, for transit systems.
• Integrated biological restoration demonstration.
Under a collaborative effort with U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD), DHS aims to provide a coordinated,
systems approach to restoring wide urban areas after
an anthrax release. This effort will evaluate social,
economic, and operational interdependencies; establish
a working relationship between DoD and DHS;
identify restoration plans and technologies; and include
restoration activity and technology solution exercises.
Currently, the project focuses on the response and
recovery to an outdoor, urban dispersal of anthrax.
The first task, which is currently in process, involves
conducting an analysis of existing capabilities and
data gaps. Results from this analysis will feed into a
second task to develop and enhance existing decision
frameworks. The resulting frameworks will support the
third task to identify and develop methods, procedures,
and technologies to enhance restoration. As a final task,
DHS and DoD will conduct a series of exercises and
workshops to demonstrate the applicability of the plans
and technologies. Brooks noted that planning efforts
drive technology research efforts.
• Biological sampling. DHS is working with a number
of federal partners to validate sampling plans, which
discuss sampling strategy and sample collection,
transportation, extraction, and analysis. The initial focus
is anthrax, but research will extend to other agents in
the future. DHS is also conducting demonstrations to
verify sampling methods.
For chemical response and recovery, DHS aims to
demonstrate a systems approach to critical facility restoration
and to develop prototype fixed and mobile laboratories to
support chemical restorations.
• Mobile laboratory capability. DHS is working to
develop a mobile laboratory that is rapidly deployable
and provides high-throughput analysis of environmental
samples. DHS considers high-throughput as the analysis
of at least 100 samples in a 24-hour period. The
laboratory must also identify toxic industrial chemicals
(TICs) and CWAs at or below their permissible
exposure levels. Capabilities include identification
of samples for reanalysis, automated sample
tracking, sample processing, waste analysis, and data
management. DHS is in the last stages of developing
this mobile laboratory and aims to transfer ownership of
the laboratory to EPA.
• Facilities restoration demonstration. DHS, along with
interagency partners and committees, is conducting
a project to promote rapid recovery and minimize
the economic impact of a chemical release at an
airport. The project also seeks to enhance public
health decisions regarding the restoration of these
facilities. Tasks under this project include preplanning
restoration at a representative facility, developing
planning tools, identifying and evaluating sampling
and decontamination methods, and developing analysis
tools. DHS plans a final demonstration and transfer of
the systems approach to additional facilities in fiscal
year 2009.
Question and Answer Period
Workshop participants posed no questions.
Evidence Awareness for Remediation Personnel at
Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Crime Scenes
Jarrod Wagner, Federal Bureau of Investigation
The FBI presented at the "2006 Workshop on
Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for Sites
Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological
Materials" to communicate with OSCs and other remediation
personnel. Communication and cooperation between law
enforcement and remediation workers is critical to ensuring
proper evidence collection. Wagner sought to continue these
communication efforts.
The World Trade Center attack illustrates the complexity of
a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) crime scene. In that
situation, the FBI is unlikely to identify all relevant evidence
before restoration begins. During the response to the anthrax
release at Capitol Hill, the FBI was sorting through mail
evidence as EPA was beginning remediation. These cases
illustrate the need for remediation workers to be able to
identify possibly relevant evidence and report that evidence
to law enforcement.
In the U.S., a WMD crime scene includes any location
where WMD have been prepared, used, or discovered.
WMD include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and explosive materials. Wagner noted that some nations
use a military response when faced with WMD crime scenes.
Civilian federal and local agencies respond to these events
in the U.S.
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A WMD incident response involves four phases: tactical
phase, operational phase, crime scene phase, and remediation
phase. These phases do not necessarily occur chronologically
but can overlap. The tactical phase involves removing the
hostile threat. For example, firefighters responding to calls
during Los Angeles riots had to avoid gunfire. The operation
phase includes the first responders who are working to
protect public health. The FBI is typically not involved
in this phase. The crime scene phase consists of evidence
collection and packaging. In this phase, the FBI goes to
the scene, collects evidence, and sends the evidence to
laboratories for analysis. Contaminated materials do not get
processed through the FBI laboratories but are sent to partner
laboratories at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL) and ECBC in the case of chemical evidence.
Biological and radiological materials are sent to partner labs
in these program areas. Evidence collection may also be used
to characterize the extent of contamination and to inform the
remediation process.
Processing a WMD scene requires extensive time and effort.
The FBI supports 27 teams consisting of over 300 people for
these efforts. In addition, other personnel, such as local law
enforcement with hazardous materials training, may become
involved in evidence collection. Wagner outlined the FBI's
12-step approach to processing a WMD crime scene. More
information about crime scene processing can be found
in the FBI Handbook of Forensic Services posted on the
Department of Justice Web site. Remediation begins after
the FBI releases a scene. At release, the FBI will meet with
EPA, or the local or state entity responsible for remediation,
to provide information about the agents found, the location
of these agents, possible protective equipment needed for site
entry, and materials remaining at the scene.
During evidence collection, the FBI is concerned with
personal and public safety, evidence integrity, evidence
preservation, and accurate documentation of the evidence
chain-of-custody. Forensic evidence includes anything that
indicates a crime was committed, anything taken from the
scene or left at the scene by suspects, and anything taken
from the scene or left at the scene by victims. WMD evidence
specifically includes any chemical, biological, or radiological
materials or any items contaminated with these materials.
Wagner noted that the FBI has a team specially trained to
respond to biological, chemical, or radiological events.
Ideally, the FBI has collected all critical evidence prior to
releasing the WMD scene for remediation. However, the FBI
counts on remediation workers to be able to identify critical
evidence and to contact the FBI or other law enforcement
agencies when they encounter such evidence. Critical
evidence may include device components, concentrated
WMD materials, attack plans, or identification documents.
If remediation workers discover these items, they should
contact the OSC, who in turn notifies the FBI case agent
or WMD coordinator. The FBI case agent or WMD
coordinator then communicates with FBI headquarters to
determine next steps in addressing the additional evidence.
Wagner recommended that OSCs identify and meet WMD
coordinators before an event occurs to build a working
relationship.
To ensure that evidence can support litigation, trained
personnel should properly document the chain of custody
for the evidence/samples. At least one or two law
enforcement agents must witness evidence collection
and ensure proper chain-of-custody and transport to an
appropriate laboratory for analysis. During the period when
additional evidence is identified, remediation efforts cease.
Remediation resumes once the evidence has been collected
and removed from the site.
In summary, Wagner emphasized that remediation workers
play a critical role in recovering from a WMD event. These
workers, however, should be aware that critical evidence
may still be present following release of the crime scene.
Communication and coordination with the FBI and local
law enforcement is necessary to ensure the safe collection
of this evidence.
Question and Answer Period
• When the FBI handles a scene contaminated with
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN)
materials, what agency is responsible for the proper
disposal of wastes? The FBI is responsible for properly
disposing wastes and contaminated materials. The
FBI will coordinate disposal with EPA or local fire
departments with hazardous materials units.
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)
Decontamination Research & Development Activities
John McKinney, Technical Support Working Group
TSWG is a multi-agency group that coordinates and
researches counterterrorism technologies. McKinney
provided an overview of the Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures (CBRNC)
subgroup and highlighted the subgroup's research and
development activities.
The CBRNC subgroup's mission is to identify interagency
user requirements related to terrorist-employed CBRN
materials. The group provides rapid research, development,
and prototyping of technologies. Projects typically require 24
months from conception to completion. The group objectives
include providing an interagency forum to coordinate
research, sponsoring research not addressed by individual
agencies, promoting information sharing, and influencing
basic and applied research. Research falls under four main
areas: protection, detection, information resources, and
decontamination. McKinney noted that his presentation
covered decontamination research only. Some of the projects
he discussed are highlighted below.
• Personnel decontamination simulation kits. These kits
assist in first responder training exercises. The kits
contain safe (as defined by the International Dictionary
of Cosmetics and Fragrances) surrogates for threat
agents. These surrogates mimic the physical properties
of CWAs and radiologicals such that first responders
can assess how these agents will act during a release.
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Building disinfection by-products database. This
planning tool estimates fumigant consumption and
chemical by-products that occur during building
decontamination. The fumigants include ozone, chlorine
dioxide, vaporized hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and
methyl bromide. The tool is currently available to any
government agency.
Wireless multisensor environmental monitors. These
monitors provided real-time detection of agents,
primarily TICs and CWAs, to verify decontamination
efforts. The unit is battery operated, lightweight,
portable, and inexpensive. At any one time, the unit
can monitor up to six different parameters through
interchangeable sensors. The wireless units form their
own network and transmit data through wireless or
Internet/Ethernet communications.
Sensor web for fumigation applications. The sensor
web is a network of wireless sensors that provide
real-time monitoring of various building fumigation
parameters (e.g., temperature, humidity, fumigant
concentration) in a building or location. For example,
during fumigations conducted in New Orleans in 2006,
this system replaced sampling tubes and ensured that
environmental conditions remained favorable and
fumigants were properly dispersed within a building to
achieve decontamination.
Electrostatic decontamination system (EDS). An
EDS provides a means for applying liquids, which
are activated with the use of ultraviolet light, to
decontaminate biological and chemical agents. The
systems require no scrubbing and, therefore, generate
minimal waste or run-off. Clean Earth Technologies has
demonstrated an EDS that is compact and easy to use
by a single operator. One EDS used one sixth as much
decontamination solution as foam but still achieved
greater than a 6 log reduction of Bacillus anthracis
and high chemical agent decontamination efficacy.
Testing at ECBC found the solution comparable to
bleach and DF-200 for decontamination efficacy.
The decontamination solution itself has also shown
high material compatibility. EDSs are currently
undergoing EPA regulatory review but are available for
procurement.
Expedient mitigation of a radiological release.
IsoFix and HeloTRON are two currently available
formulations that minimize the spread and impact of
radiological releases by fixing radioactive materials in
place with a strippable coating.
Radiological decontamination technologies. Argonne
National Laboratory is developing a gel that uses
chemical processes to remove cesium-137 from porous
building materials. The gel draws the cesium-137
from the building material, sequesters the cesium-137
molecules, and then hardens into a material that can be
vacuumed for removal.
• Guidelines for disposal of contaminated plant and
animal waste. TSWG, in collaboration with the Texas
Agricultural Experiment Station, is developing a clear,
concise, and easy-to-use handbook for first responders
disposing of contaminated plant and animal materials.
This guidance will enable responders to quickly identify
disposal methods that meet their specific needs. In
conjunction with this guidance, TSWG has designed
a portable gasifier that is capable of large-scale,
environmentally safe, animal carcass removal. TSWG
is working with EPA to conduct an emissions test of
the gasifier.
McKinney briefly discussed decontamination projects
planned for fiscal year 2008. One project seeks to develop
personal protective equipment (PPE) decontamination
procedures, such as decontamination of face masks without
disposal or destruction of the masks.
Question and Answer Period
• Has testing of the strippable coatings for radiological
agents examined possible scatter or aerosolization
of the radiological agent during application of the
coating? Efforts have examined, and have not found,
scatter during application on a porous surface.
Regulating Bio-Decontamination Chemicals
Jeff Kempter, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Office of Pesticide Programs
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA), EPA regulates any substance or device
applied to or used on inanimate surfaces for the purpose
of inactivating a pest, including microorganisms. Before
a manufacturer can sell or distribute a pesticide for use
in the U.S., the manufacturer must undergo the FIFRA
registration or exemption process. To obtain registration,
the manufacturer submits an application, including data and
product labeling, to EPA. To obtain an exemption, a state or
federal agency must submit a request, along with pertinent
information, to EPA. Both registration and exemption require
EPA to conclude that no adverse effects to humans or the
environment will result from product use.
When applying for a FIFRA section 18 exemption, a state
or federal agency may request a specific, public health,
quarantine, or crisis exemption. During the anthrax attacks
in 2001, no product had been approved specifically for use
against B. anthracis. As such, EPA needed to issue crisis
exemptions for each sporicide and each decontamination
event. EPA received 63 requests, of which only 28 were
approved. For fumigants, the application needed to include a
remediation action plan, a sampling and analysis plan, and an
ambient air monitoring plan.
To ensure that a product meets use claims, EPA requires
efficacy testing. Testing requirements depend on its use as
either a sanitizer, disinfectant, virucide, or sterilant/sporicide.
Sterilants and sporicides must pass the AOAC Sporicidal
Activity of Disinfectants Test (AOAC Official Method
966.04). For EPA acceptance, both porous and nonporous
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carriers with B. subtilis and Clostridium sporogenes
must show no growth on 720 treated carriers. For claims
specifically related to the inactivation of B. anthracis spores,
manufacturers must also conduct this test using B. anthracis
and again report no growth on all 720 carriers.
In July 2007, however, EPA will propose a new product
category at the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel. This
category—sporicidal decontaminant—will apply to products
intended to inactive B. anthracis, as supported by data from
a well-developed, quantitative sporicidal test. The product
would be tested on B. anthracis or a surrogate on porous
and nonporous materials and report a 6 log reduction, based
on recoverable spores. The purpose of having this new
category is to facilitate or streamline the process of getting
products registered for B. anthracis, since currently none
exist. After receiving input from the panel, EPA intends to
issue a Pesticide Assessment Guideline for anthrax-related
products. Overall, EPA seeks to help biological agent incident
responses by having anthrax-related products already
registered.
Typically gas and vapor product registration has been limited
to use in small indoor spaces, such as glove boxes used in
hospitals. To apply to larger spaces, such as a hotel room,
office, or building, the gaseous product must undergo the
simulated use test. The purpose of this test is to ensure that
key parameters for gas use can be met in all areas of the
space and to establish product parameters for effective use.
Prior to conducting a simulated use test, the manufacturer
should submit the test protocol to EPA to ensure that the
test is appropriate and represents real-world situations. Test
rooms should be a similar size and contain relevant materials
(e.g., beds in hotel rooms, desks and chairs in offices) to
real-world conditions. During the test, the manufacturer must
document the test conditions (e.g., gas/vapor concentration,
temperature, humidity) and the number and location of
monitoring devices. The manufacturer must also specify
the maximum volume that can be treated and the minimum
concentration and contact time required. Overall, the test
must be conducted under Good Laboratory Practices per 40
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 160, or in a federal
laboratory with an appropriate Quality Assurance Project
Plan (QAPP). A successful simulated use test shows that the
parameters necessary to achieve decontamination (i.e., no
growth on all carriers) can be achieved and maintained for
the required contact time.
Product registration includes specified terms and conditions
for approved use. For anthrax-related products, EPA
intends to limit sale and distribution to OSCs, authorized
government workers, and properly trained and certified
users, such that public access is restricted. EPA will also
require manufacturers to train and register approved users
and keep records of purchasers. These processes will by-
pass certifications required in each of the 50 states. Kempter
indicated that EPA wants to track the use of these products
but does not want to prevent their use by the people who
need them.
Kempter concluded with a review of EPA goals to improve,
harmonize, and validate sporicidal efficacy tests, such as the
current validation of the Three-Step Method (TSM).
Question and Answer Period
• If the liability associated with product use falls on
registrants, how do registrants make sure that OSC and
remediation personnel training meets the registrants'
requirements? An OSC plays an advisory role and
brings information to on-site remediation personnel.
The OSC likely will not actively apply the product;
the on-site remediation workers will use the product.
Regardless, the OSCs and registrants must work
together to ensure proper training.
• Does EPA have a means to register antimicrobial
coatings? EPA has registered very few products with
a residual self-sanitation claim. Kempter suggested
that manufacturers speak directly with EPA to identify
product-specific efficacy testing.
Environmental Sampling for Biothreat Agents: Current
Research and Validation Efforts
Kenneth Martinez, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
Martinez began his talk with a discussion of CDC's renewed
interest in environmental microbiology as a priority research
area. The topic of environmental microbiology was touched
on at the meeting with G8 representatives the day before. In
2004, CDC convened an expert workgroup to analyze CDC's
environmental microbiology research portfolio. Martinez
presented CDC's framework for environmental microbiology
research. This framework consists of three components:
detection and investigation, control and containment, and
recovery and remediation. Martinez then provided an
overview of some CDC research projects related to biological
agent sampling.
• Bioaerosol sampler. This device collects a sample in a
tube and allows for direct analysis without extraction
or preparation. The device has been used to sample and
analyze molds and flu mists.
• Letter reaerosolization study. In collaboration with
TSWG and Canadian partners, CDC conducted studies
to address concerns about existing guidelines for
handling suspicious letters and packages to minimize
transmission of potential biological agents. Initial
results identified problems with existing guidelines.
• Resuspension o/B. anthracisyro/w contaminated mail.
During investigations of anthrax cases, CDC never
identified a source for two cases—a nurse in New
York City and an elderly Connecticut woman. Cross-
contamination of their mail has been suspected. To
standardize procedures for assessing exposure from
cross-contaminated mail, CDC, in conjunction with
ECBC, constructed a chamber to identify factors that
affect B. anthracis resuspension.
• Sampling strategy toolkit. The Government Accounting
Office (GAO) report on anthrax recommended further
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development of probabilistic sampling methods. In
response to this, the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) is developing a toolkit
approach that combines targeted and probabilistic
sampling strategies to define contamination boundaries.
This approach would maximize resources and minimize
the recovery timeline.
• Sampling validation studies. Martinez highlighted field
and laboratory sampling validation studies. One lab
study seeks to compare efficiency of swab, wipe, and
vacuum surface sampling techniques. Another compares
various air sampling methods, including various
filters. CDC is working toward validating the various
sampling protocols. Part of the project has included the
development of an aerosol system for creating uniform
samples of deposited bacteria.
• Validated sampling plan. A GAO review identified
the need to validate sampling methodologies used by
various government agencies. As such, a number of
federal agencies, including CDC, came together to
create a strategic plan for validating environmental
sampling and analysis methodologies used during
biological contamination. The group identified five
process steps to a sampling strategy: sampling plan
development, sample collection, sample integrity,
sample extraction, and sample analysis. Initially,
the group considered developing a generic sampling
plan to disseminate to first responders. Sampling
plans, however, must consider unique situations
and conditions. CDC, in collaboration with other
participants, is assessing various aspects of the five
process steps, including collection methods for air;
porous and nonporous surface sampling, sample
integrity during transportation and storage, exercises for
sampling and analysis plans, and external peer review.
Question and Answer Period
• What is the time frame for the generation of plans and
results for validated sampling plans? CDC is targeting
completion of a sampling plan by the end of 2007 and
completion of the project by the end of 2008.
• If a scenario occurs in which three major airports suffer
anthrax attacks, and other airports fear attack, are
existing sampling collection and analysis capabilities
sufficient? Collection efficiencies are about 50%,
which is sufficient to understanding the risk to the
public. From a decontamination perspective, collection
efficiencies may impact the understanding of whether
agents remain after remediation. Currently, the largest
information gaps include understanding the exposure
risk, infectious disease resuspension, and application of
environmental sampling results to public health.
• How do response plans address different types of air-
handling systems, such as those found in airports (e.g.,
terminals versus aircrafts)? Some research has been
conducted to understand different air flows in terminals
versus aircrafts versus jetways. Buses are more
complicated. The type of air-handling system, such as a
shared system, impacts whether people are at risk from
cross-contamination versus resuspension.
• Is there any research to validate methods during natural
disease outbreaks? Martinez was unaware of validation
research conducted during natural disease outbreaks.
Session 2: International Perspectives
G8 Bio-Terrorism Experts Group (BTEX)
Lindsey Hillesheim, U.S. Department of State
Hillesheim spoke about the U.S. approach to combating
bioterrorism and the need for intersectoral and international
collaboration in preparing for and responding to bioterrorism.
The G8 Bio-Terrorism Experts Group (BTEX) is an example
of such intersectoral and international collaboration.
Bioterrorism is different from other forms of terrorism for a
number of reasons, including:
• It may occur silently. Officials may not recognize that
an attack has occurred until symptoms become apparent
several days or more after a release. At that point, the
agent may have had widespread transmission.
• Bioterrorism attacks also lack geographical boundaries,
with possible global movement as victims unwittingly
spread the disease.
• Distinguishing between bioterrorism events and natural
epidemics can be difficult.
• In bioterrorist events, health care workers (e.g.,
nurses, doctors, emergency room workers) are the first
responders. Therefore, response agencies must engage
with health care workers to identify events as quickly as
possible.
• Biological agents, Hillesheim noted, could be the most
cost-effective weapons for a terrorist. The cost for a
single death has been estimated as $1,000,000 for a
nuclear weapon, $1,000 for a chemical weapon, and $1
for a biological agent.
The U.S. strategy for handling bioterrorism events consists
of four components. The first component is threat awareness,
which includes threat assessment activities. Prevention
and critical infrastructure protection comprise the second
component. The third component—surveillance and
detection—includes early identification of unusual disease
patterns, epidemiological investigations, laboratory release
confirmations, and information dissemination. Response
and recovery, the fourth component, includes response
planning, mass causality care, risk communication, medical
countermeasure development, decontamination, and recovery.
The formation of the G8 BTEX group was initiated in
2004. G8 BTEX members have held workshops on forensic
epidemiology, protecting food supplies, and decontamination.
In addition to BTEX, the U.S. currently works through a
number of international partnerships, forums, and vehicles
to foster intersectoral cooperation and collaboration. These
include the Global Health Security Action Group and the
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Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. Hillesheim provided
additional examples of bilateral collaborative efforts between
the U.S. and other nations, including initiatives with Russia,
India, and Australia.
In conclusion, identifying areas of intersecting interests,
collaborating on concrete responses, and building
relationships before an event are vital to addressing
bioterrorism.
Question and Answer Period
• A participant noted that the U.S. has shown leadership
on bioterrorism issues and stated that each nation gains
from collaborative efforts. This participant thought that
all could benefit from additional collaboration.
Biological Decontamination with Peracetic Acid and
Hydrogen Peroxide
Barbel Niederwohrmeier, Armed Forces Scientific
Institute for Protection Technologies, Germany
Ideal decontamination technologies are effective, rapid,
and noncorrosive. They also must not inconvenience the
public. Niederwohrmeier listed six common decontamination
agents but focused her presentation on technologies using
formaldehyde, hydrogen peroxide, and/or peracetic acid
formulations.
For interior space decontamination, Germany has most
commonly used formaldehyde. Formaldehyde, however,
has a number of disadvantages, such as its toxicity and
resulting strong liquid precipitation. The high toxicity has
led to numerous regulations overseeing formaldehyde use.
Formaldehyde decontamination is also a wet process, which
is often incompatible with sensitive equipment.
Sublimating paraformaldehyde to a gas is easy and treatment
requires less contact time than liquid formaldehyde for
effective decontamination. Niederwohrmeier presented
several parameters, such as contact time and temperature,
for interior space fumigation with formaldehyde vapor.
Maintaining the proper relative humidity and temperature is
very important for proper decontamination. Niederwohrmeier
presented test results from fumigating two different sized
chambers containing B. cereus and/or B. atrophaeus.
VHP is an alternative to formaldehyde decontamination. It
is compatible with most materials; however, some material
compatibility issues exist (e.g., copper), and some materials
absorb VHP (e.g., textiles), so surfaces should be clean and
dry. The mobile VHP unit used treats a maximum of 124
cubic meters (m3). In Germany, laboratory testing of VHP
efficacy has been conducted with B. cereus and B. subtilis
on stainless steel carriers to meet European requirements.
These spores were more resistant to hydrogen peroxide than
B. stearothermophilus, which has been used elsewhere for
validation. Additional testing using B. anthracis is planned.
Niederwohrmeier described the decontamination of two
army tanks contaminated with mold. VHP decontamination
was recommended because of the low toxicity—personnel
would spend many hours in the tanks after fumigation—
and the compatibility with sensitive equipment. STERIS
Corporation (STERIS) completed the decontamination and
monitored bioindicators; German researchers conducted
biological sampling. Niederwohrmeier provided details
regarding the decontamination parameters. Immediately after
decontamination, yeast, but no fungus, was found during
sampling. All five sampling points were negative for fungus
contamination four weeks after decontamination.
German researchers have also developed a decontaminant
called Wofasteril, which is formulated with peracetic acid,
hydrogen peroxide, acetic acid, and other proprietary
ingredients. It can be employed as a thermal fog (Wofasteril
fog 300; to aerosolize the liquid) or liquid for direct
application to surfaces (Wofasteril SC250). Niederwohrmeier
presented results of efficacy tests deactivating various spore
species using formaldehyde, Peraclean (a peracetic acid-
based product), and Wofasteril SC250 with alcapur, which is
a foaming agent that raises the pH.
Question and Answer Period
• Would you recommend any of the interior space
decontaminants for complex spaces (e.g., airplanes)?
One reason to select VHP over other decontaminants
is its apparent compatibility with sensitive materials.
Sensitive equipment in the two tanks treated with VHP
appears unaffected.
• What was the VHP concentration in the tanks one hour
after aeration? Continuous monitoring data recorded
VHP concentrations. Personnel entering the tanks to
remove the bioindicators wore personal protective
equipment (PPE). Additional aeration beyond one hour
was required to reach acceptable concentrations for
reentry without PPE.
• Was a visible structural change in the fungus in the
tanks observed after treatment? All the fungus samples
were inactive after treatment and four weeks later.
Niederwohrmeier did not visually inspect the fungus
under a microscope after treatment.
Field Demonstration of Advanced Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Decontamination
Technologies
Konstantin Volchek, Environment Canada
Environment Canada, in collaboration with other Canadian
federal and industrial partners and with participation from
EPA, is conducting a series of field demonstrations of
decontamination technologies for biological, chemical, and
radiological threat agents. The objectives are to demonstrate
building decontamination technologies; analyze agent
concentrations before, during, and after decontamination;
evaluate technology performance with various materials;
calculate associated cost, material, and labor requirements;
and develop manuals and guidelines based on findings.
For the chemical and the biological demonstrations,
Environment Canada built custom structures that consisted
of three open rooms, each constructed of different building
materials. Room A contained brick walls and ceramic floor
tiles. Room B contained drywall and linoleum flooring.
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Room C contained wood pine panel walls and carpet flooring.
Volchek provided a diagram and photograph of the structure.
For the chemical agent demonstration, Environment Canada
conducted laboratory trials to identify appropriate surrogates.
Diethyl malonate (DEM) served as a surrogate for the "G"
series nerve agents. Malathion also served as a surrogate
because it is a persistent agent with established sampling
and analysis protocols. Both DEM and malathion also react
with the decontaminants used to destroy CWAs. These
agents were disseminated in the test rooms with hand-held
sprayers. After agent dissemination and monitoring, Surface
Decontamination Foam, a commercial product developed by
Defense Research and Development Canada, and provided
by Allen-Vanguard Corp., was applied for decontamination.
After a 30-minute contact time, the decontamination team
used a vacuum system to remove the foam. Volchek provided
photographs of the agent application, foam decontamination,
and foam removal.
During the demonstration, Environment Canada collected
hundreds of surface, air, and water samples, and Volchek
presented some detailed sampling results. Overall, the
decontamination yielded satisfactory results. Higher
concentrations of DEM and malathion remained in Room
C because overspray during the initial application resulted
in higher than expected concentrations in that room. Also
detected was Malaoxon, which is toxic and results from
incomplete degradation of malathion. Researchers concluded
that two to three applications of the foam were needed for
a more complete decontamination, especially when higher
initial concentrations were present. Environment Canada was
able to estimate a cost for chemical decontamination. The
costs, as presented by Volchek, included labor, materials, and
electricity but not waste disposal or site security costs.
For the biological demonstration, Environment Canada dry
dispersed B. atrophaeus, a surrogate for B. anthracis, in
a similar three-room structure. Dry dispersal consisted of
puffing air into a test tube containing the spore powder. A
total of 1 gram (1/3 gram per room) was released. After spore
dispersal, decontamination was conducted using the STERIS
VHP system. Researchers collected air and surface sampling
predispersal, post-dispersal, and post-decontamination.
Stainless steel biological indicators (Bis) were also placed
in the facility. Volchek provided detailed sampling results,
noting that the log reduction was in most cases between
3 and 5. Some post-decontamination samples, however,
had spore levels up to 105. These higher levels following
decontamination might be due to VHP concentrations not
reaching the required level in some areas of the test structure.
Another reason for this was likely cross-contamination with
B. atrophaeus, which was present from previous testing on
the same site.
For their radiological decontamination demonstration,
Environment Canada has scheduled testing on the exterior
of a test structure for fall of 2007. The demonstration will
employ several decontamination techniques.
Reports summarizing the findings of the chemical and
biological demonstrations should be available through
Environment Canada in the fall of 2007.
Question and Answer Period
• For radiological decontamination, how will run-off be
contained and how much of an issue is run-off during
building decontamination? The volume of liquid waste
is estimated at 300 gallons. The runoff will be collected
in trenches and pumped to storage containers. It will
remain there for about three weeks until the radiation is
reduced to safe levels.
• For the chemical trials, what solvent was used to spray
the chemical agents? DEM was used in a pure form,
and malathion was mixed with an organic solvent.
• What stoichiometric rates of decontamination reagents
to surrogate agent were used in the chemical trial?
The stoichiometric excess rate ranged from 2 to 5. The
rooms with an excess of 5 achieved more meaningful
decontamination.
Japanese Research Project for Development of On-site
Detection of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents
Yasuo Seto, National Research Institute of Police
Science, Japan
Rapid and sensitive on-site detection of chemical and
biological agents leads to proper treatment and reduced
casualties during an event. Seto listed a number of chemical
and biological agents' lethal doses or concentrations and
the associated levels of detection that must be achieved. He
also provided examples of countermeasures used in the field
during two events that occurred in Japan.
Seto presented the results of previous testing and evaluation
for over a dozen detection devices currently available for
chemical and biological agents. For each device, he presented
agent detection capabilities, whether false positives or
negatives occurred, response time, and detection limit. Seto's
presentation in Appendix D provides details.
Seto also discussed ongoing research in Japan to improve
and develop identification and detection capabilities. This
research seeks to combine existing technologies such as the
monitoring tape method, biosensors, chemical sensors, and
counter-flow technologies.
Some of the technologies that were evaluated or are currently
undergoing development for CWA or TICs detection include
colorimetric gas detection tubes, ion mobility spectrometry,
surface acoustic wave detection, photoionization (ultraviolet)
detection, Fouier-transform infrared spectrometry,
spectrophotometric tape method, and atmospheric pressure
chemical ionization mass spectrometry. For biological agent
detection, technologies Seto discussed included those based
on bioluminescence (which measures adenosine triphosphate
[ATP]), lateral flow immunoassay, and surface plasmon
resonance. Results from these tests have been published or
are in press.
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Question and Answer Period
• Were the data regarding various detector performances
based on new research or a literature review? The
validation data represent information generated by
Japanese research.
A Fatal Case of "Natural" Inhalational Anthrax in
Scotland-Decontamination Issues
Colin Ramsay, Health Protection Scotland
Ramsey discussed a fatal case of inhalation anthrax that
occurred in Scotland in 2006. This presentation provided a
general overview of the entire event, whereas the following
presentation by Lloyd and Spencer provided more details
on the response.
In August 2006, Health Protection Scotland (HPS) learned of
a confirmed case of anthrax infection based on blood taken
from a patient who had died on July 8, 2006. The deceased
was a 50-year old male who lived in rural Scotland. He
reported three days of flu-like symptoms prior to death. A
number of issues were immediately raised, including the
time gap between death and confirmation of B. anthracis,
uncertainties about continuing public risk, the lack of
precedents and experience with these incidences in the UK,
the potential for a deliberate release, and the need for a legal
investigation. As an immediate response, an Incident Control
Team (ICT) and Environmental Investigation Team were
formed. These teams comprised numerous agencies and
working groups.
Understanding the deceased's history, activities, and risk
factors prior to the illness were the first steps in addressing
the incident.
The deceased's home was sealed as a preventative measure,
so investigators relied on friends and family for information
about the home and the deceased's activities. Investigators
were unable to determine whether the deceased had traveled
abroad prior to reporting symptoms. Friends and family
also provided conflicting information about a sore on the
deceased's finger, which could have been an indication of
cutaneous anthrax. Investigations confirmed that the deceased
was a woodworker, participated in a drumming group, and
made his own drums using unknown animal skins. He had
recently fixed a drum-head with a new goat skin and had
attended drumming events days before reporting symptoms.
The deceased also had a previous history with leukemia,
which was in remission, and had seen a clinician prior to his
death. At that time, all blood work results were normal.
Based on information about the deceased and a case of
anthrax in a drummer in New York City, HPS hypothesized
that the anthrax exposure occurred during the remaking of
a drumhead. Other hypotheses considered that the deceased
may have contracted anthrax through exposure to some
environmental source near the home or through contact
with anthrax spores from other drums. Legal, clinical, and
environmental investigations focused on these hypotheses.
Ramsey detailed the environmental investigations and
sampling and resulting decontamination efforts. Two teams
conducted exhaustive sampling at the deceased's home in
Scotland (Black Lodge). Additional investigations occurred
at other drumming-related locations, such as a village
hall in Scotland (Smailholm), and two homes in England
(Belford and Cumbria). Samples collected at Block Lodge
and Cumbria were negative. Samples from Smailholm and
Belford identified B. anthracis from cultures and polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) analyses.
ICT created a clearance committee and also convened an
expert advisory group, which included representatives
from EPA and CDC, to assist in addressing sampling and
decontamination issues. In establishing decontamination
parameters, ICT not only needed a defensible rationale
for decisions, but also needed to balance the political
considerations of England versus Scotland and the possibility
of setting a precedent in clearance requirements.
ICT selected a precautionary approach to decontamination.
The Smailholm and Belford properties were deemed
contaminated, and no detectable viable spores was selected
as the clearance level. Based on literature reviews and
consultation with experts, chlorine dioxide gas was selected
for decontamination of the Smailholm village hall and
garage. The decontamination was completed in March 2007.
All Bis and verification sampling results were negative; a
concentration x time (CT) dose of 9000 parts per million
(ppm)-hours chlorine dioxide was achieved. Ramsey did not
discuss the Belford decontamination effort.
This event raised many issues. The case investigation
itself, as well as the number of agencies involved, added
complexity to the situation. In addition, no benchmarks or
guidelines existed for addressing natural anthrax cases in the
UK, in terms of sampling, risk management, and other areas.
The public response to the incident was generally calm,
perhaps due to the area's agricultural background and history
of anthrax in agriculture.
Ramsey recommended several actions to improve future
responses. These included improving the published database
regarding natural anthrax and responses; enhancing
environmental investigation and decontamination capabilities
in the UK; investigating and quantifying risks associated with
goat hides and drums; and agreeing to a risk communication
message for natural anthrax incidents.
Question and Answer Period
• Has blood testing of other people also exposed to B.
anthracis identified antibodies? The two people who
operated the drumming school were offered blood
testing, which they both refused.
• Was the strain found previously undetected? The
strain identified by the Porton Down laboratory was
previously unidentified. A sample was sent to CDC for
further identification.
• What was the cost of decontamination? As an
order of magnitude estimate, the cost was in excess
of $500,000 (US).
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• Did the victim's status as immuno-compromised due to
leukemia treatment impact the case? A clinician had
reviewed the victim's blood work before his death. At
the time all values were normal.
• What methods were used for environmental sampling?
A variety of standard methods were used.
• Bettley-Smith from the Government Decontamination
Service (GDS) in the UK acknowledged the rapid
response and assistance provided by EPA in addressing
this incident.
Case Study of Fatality Due to Anthrax Infection in the
United Kingdom (UK)
Graham Lloyd, Health Protection Agency, United
Kingdom
Robert Spencer, Health Protection Agency, United
Kingdom
Lloyd and Spencer presented additional information
regarding the fatal case of anthrax in Scotland in summer
2006, with a focus on the sampling and decontamination
aspects.
In August 2006, a blood culture from a person who died in
July 2006 was identified as containing B. anthracis. The
case highlights a number of public health dilemmas that
arise when an unexpected case occurs, such as clinical
diagnostic concerns, laboratory diagnostic concerns, potential
public health risks, and forensic needs. Lloyd noted that
the clinical diagnosis was not anthrax and the laboratory
finally reporting the case found B. anthracis in only one
of four blood cultures. During the time between death and
identification of anthrax, the drumming group associated
with the deceased continued to visit schools and public areas,
which posed a public health concern. The drums repaired by
the deceased and used by the drumming group were the focus
of investigations.
The Health Protection Agency maintains a laboratory in
Porton Down. This laboratory plays an advisory and support
role during incident response. In this incident, investigations
expanded from the deceased and his home in Scotland
(Black Lodge) to a village hall in Smailholm, Scotland, and
residences in Belford and Cumbria in England. The multisite
and multinational scope of the incident added many layers
of complexity to the investigations. For example, simply
coordinating the logistics of multiple responding agencies
(e.g., ambulance services, fire services, law enforcement,
press, public health agencies) was difficult.
Lloyd presented a summary of investigations undertaken at
locations in Scotland and England. Before environmental and
remediation sampling could began, investigators needed to
consider and reach consensus regarding sampling methods,
sample locations and numbers, and validation methodologies.
They also needed to consider sampling location accessibility.
Overall, sampling results needed to meet the requirements
of multiple agencies with multiple end points (e.g., forensics
versus public health). In addition to sampling the locations
in Scotland and England, the drums themselves needed to be
sampled to ensure safe use.
Lloyd described sampling at Black Lodge and presented a
site map and photographs from the sampling event. Both
targeted and probabilistic sampling strategies were employed.
A grid system was used to document each sample location.
Lloyd provided photographs to illustrate the complexity
of sampling a residence. The bedroom also functioned
as a workshop; collecting all materials for sampling was
impossible. Lloyd noted that the personnel on-site wore
high levels of PPE to ensure their protection in an unknown
situation. After review of available sampling methods, high-
efficiency paniculate air (HEPA) vacuum sampling was
chosen, as it allowed large surface area sample collection.
None of the methods, however, completely remove spores
from surfaces. Lloyd also briefly described sampling
conducted at the Belford residence.
Results from Black Lodge indicated no environmental
evidence of B. anthracis. A residence in England also
contained no evidence of B. anthracis. As such, no
decontamination was deemed necessary at these locations. At
a residence in Belford, molecular and biological evidence of
B. anthracis was found in drum storage areas of the home. A
village hall and drum storage area in Smailholm, Scotland,
also contained evidence of B. anthracis contamination.
Decontamination was recommended in these locations.
For the buildings requiring decontamination, responding
agencies grappled with questions about selecting appropriate
decontamination methods, delineating the extent of
decontamination, and determining acceptable clearance
parameters. At the Belford home, vacuuming contaminated
areas served as the decontamination method. At Smailholm,
complete building fumigation with chlorine dioxide
served as the decontamination method. After conducting
laboratory studies with VHP and various concentrations of
formaldehyde, the drums were decontaminated with a surface
application of a formaldehyde solution for 12 hours.
This case illustrates how a response effort can expand beyond
the original event and highlights questions and issues that can
arise when an event occurs. Numerous questions regarding
sampling remain, such as method validation, method peer
review, error rates, and general method acceptance by the
scientific community. In this event, responding agencies
sought consensus but were unable to reach consensus
regarding response protocols, strategies, standards, and
spore detection methods. Key considerations in an effective
response include understanding the chain of infection,
infectious capabilities, and impact of conventional cleaning
methods on transmission. Responding agencies must also
consider environmental microbiology in the context of
laboratory results. An agent found in a laboratory sample
does not necessarily translate to public risk. Lloyd stressed
that interagency coordination, cooperation, and consensus
regarding sampling method selection and validation is
paramount to future responses.
Question and Answer Period
• Were samples collected after decontamination and
what were the molecular results? Post-decontamination
sampling found no molecular positive results.
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• When was CDS formed? The Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)
established CDS in October 2005. CDS supports all
territories in the UK and abroad.
• Does the UK have a unified command system similar
to the U.S. incident command system? The UK does
have a similar system, which was not activated in
this incident.
• International standards exist for many agents. Because
an incident such as this can quickly cross international
borders, is an international response standard needed?
Each incident serves as another learning experience.
Each incident is also unique, so responses must be
flexible.
• Who is responsible for site clearance? In Scotland, a
clearance committee reviewed the post-decontamination
evidence and presented this evidence to the local health
department, which then declared that no viable spores
remained. No single individual decided whether the site
could be cleared.
Session 3: Biological Threat Agent
Decontamination Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC)
Systematic Decontamination Studies
Shawn Ryan, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
Ryan started his presentation with some background
information about NHSRC and its decontamination research
program. He then presented results from assessing the
impact of different building materials on the log reduction
of B. anthracis and surrogate spores decontaminated with
various technologies. Based on tests with VHP, pH-amended
bleach, and chlorine dioxide gas, the results highlight the
importance of material effects on the log reduction. As an
example, Ryan presented a spectrum of building materials in
order of difficulty to decontaminate, based on the systematic
decontaminations studies with chlorine dioxide gas. Carpet
and painted concrete required the lowest CT, while ceiling
tile and wood required the largest.
Ryan next discussed the use of Bis, noting how much easier
they were to inactivate compared to the same population of
spores on building materials. During decontamination studies
of various building materials, Bis consistently resulted in no
growth well before (i.e., a much lower CT) a 6 log reduction
occurred on the building material coupons. Bis typically
showed no growth at chlorine dioxide CT levels of 3,000
to 4,000 ppm-hours, whereas ceiling tile coupons required
chlorine dioxide CTs as high as 15,000 ppm-hours for a 6 log
reduction. With VHP testing, Bis were similarly inactivated
at lower CTs compared to building materials.
NHSRC has also evaluated the impact of varying operating
conditions on decontamination efficacy. Typically, chlorine
dioxide fumigation requires a relative humidity of greater
than 75% at 75 degrees Fahrenheit (°F). Decontamination
testing of B. anthracis at varying relative humidities—
ranging from 40% to 85%—suggested that the reduction
in spore viability is a strong function of relative humidity.
Ryan presented detailed results from chlorine dioxide
decontamination of various building material coupons
inoculated with B. anthracis Ames. At a relative humidity
of greater than 90%, all materials reported decontamination
after a 20-minute contact time. These results emphasize
the need to document laboratory test conditions in order to
properly translate results to field applications.
Quality assurance monitoring of decontamination conditions
is essential to achieving successful decontamination.
Measuring high concentrations of the reactive gases used
in decontamination, however, is not trivial. No standard
monitoring methods exist, and the gases themselves may
interfere with monitoring other parameters (e.g., relative
humidity). Ryan reported results from two different monitors
measuring relative humidity. The sensor that had previously
been exposed to chlorine dioxide reported a significant
difference in relative humidity at the target range.
In addition to evaluating biological decontamination, NHSRC
has begun evaluating the decontamination of five building
material surfaces contaminated with TICs and CWAs. Ryan
is investigating the use of chlorine dioxide (Sabre Technical
Services [Sabre] system) for TIC decontamination and
gaseous chlorine dioxide, aqueous chlorine dioxide, and
diluted bleach for CWA decontamination. He followed
a two-phase approach with initial studies assessing
agent persistence and subsequent studies investigating
decontamination technologies. Ryan presented some results
for malathion persistence and decontamination tests. He
also noted that analysis of data from CWA decontamination
studies is ongoing; preliminary findings indicate that chlorine
dioxide may be effective for VX but not for sarin or soman.
Ryan also briefly presented preliminary results from
persistence and decontamination tests with ricin toxin and
vaccinia virus (smallpox virus surrogate), and noted that a
final report should be available later in 2007.
Ongoing research efforts include the systematic evaluation
of methyl bromide and the STERIS VHP system to
decontaminate various building materials contaminated with
B. anthracis Ames. NHSRC is also working to develop Bis
that better correlate to real-world building decontamination.
Further studies will also evaluate various liquid
decontaminants and kill kinetics data for decontamination
of biological agents, as well as determine persistence and
decontamination kinetics using fumigants against biological
agents on porous and nonporous materials. In a joint effort
with OPP, NHSRC is also conducting ongoing systematic
decontamination studies to assess efficacy as determined by
three different methods. This effort seeks to assess how the
different methods vary in efficacy findings.
Question and Answer Period
• What was the relative humidity during CWA
decontamination experiments? The relative humidity
was 75-80% and no liquid water was observed.
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• Bis with liquid inoculation do not represent real-
world scenarios compared to aerosol exposures. Bis
have been successfully used during sterilization of
both porous and nonporous medical devices. These
industries likely have cumulative data regarding
the role of relative humidity, temperature, and other
parameters. Efforts are underway to consider the
differences between liquid and aerosol inoculation of
Bis. Researchers acknowledge that the liquid-inoculated
Bis provide conservative results when compared to
aerosol deposition.
• What were the sampling efficiencies of carpet versus
pine? Studies considered the varying positive control
recovery efficiencies of different materials to determine
the log reduction. Wood has one of the lowest positive
recovery values, approximately 50-80%.
• Hospital situations may provide useful information.
Hospitals conduct sensitive equipment sterilization, and
researchers have looked to that industry for information.
Their research focus has been on materials impacts
versus sampling efficiencies. Adams (NHSRC) noted
that evaluations and existing data gap prioritization
drive research at NHSRC. Areas considered the highest
priority have been the focus of initial research.
• Is NHSRC considering low concentration and long
exposure durations versus high concentration and short
exposure durations for decontamination technologies?
NHSRC is considering changing decontamination
agent concentrations and exposure times, especially for
non-spore forming threat agents. Evaluations of lower
relative humidities and materials compatibility will also
be pursued.
Improvement and Validation of Lab-Scale Test Methods
for Sporicidal Decontamination Agents
Steve Tomasino, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP)
Researchers must acknowledge the applicability of a test
method before using the method. The OPP Microbiology
Laboratory has historically performed post-registration
efficacy testing of antimicrobial pesticides and emphasizes
the need for developing methods that are easy to understand
and reproduce. These methods are not only useful for
regulatory purposes but also can be useful tools for research
and development. To that end, OPP's research has looked
at improving and modifying existing methods, as well as
developing new quantitative methods to supplement or
replace existing methods. Tomasino discussed several of
these efforts.
AOAC Method 966.04 (Sporicidal Activity of Disinfectants
Test) is a qualitative procedure for determining product
efficacy against spore-forming bacteria. This method is more
relevant to clinical settings than to building decontamination.
For a complete test, method 966.04 requires inoculation and
subsequent decontamination of 720 porcelain carriers and
suture loops. For designation as a sterilant, product testing
must result in no growth on all 720 carriers. Tomasino
provided a schematic of the method process, which requires
21 days for completion.
Tomasino presented the results of OPP's efforts to determine
appropriate modifications to AOAC Method 966.04. OPP
recommended several modifications to the method: replacing
the soil extract nutrient broth with a defined nutrient agar,
adding a spore enumeration procedure (carrier counts),
establishing a minimum and maximum spore titer per carrier,
and adding a neutralization confirmation procedure. Four
laboratories undertook a collaborative study to compare
the current and modified methods to determine whether the
methods were statistically equivalent; Tomasino presented
the results of that work.
OPP has also conducted research to evaluate quantitative
test methods for determining product decontamination
efficacy. OPP focused the evaluation on two well-developed
methods to generate a quantitative assessment of efficacy—
ASTM E2111-05 and TSM. Three laboratories conducted
three replicates of each method side-by-side using three
commercially available liquid decontamination chemicals.
OPP's primary goal was to examine method performance
within and across laboratories. Tomasino presented detailed
results, which indicated that both methods performed
comparably within and across laboratories. No significant
differences in control carrier counts occurred, no significant
differences in the log reduction of spores arose, and the
standard deviations stayed within acceptable limits.
The project comparing ASTM E2111-05 with TSM also
assessed test method attributes, such as protocol clarity,
test preparation, and results recording and interpretation to
identify one method for further validation studies. Three
laboratories identified TSM as the easier method to perform.
As such, OPP advanced the TSM to validation testing
with AOAC INTERNATIONAL, the standard-setting
organization, to further determine method performance
across many laboratories. The validation study was launched
in fall 2006 and involved ten laboratories conducting three
replications for three decontamination products treating glass
carriers with B. subtilis spores. AOAC method 966.04 served
as the reference method.
Tomasino provided detailed results for the TSM validation
testing. No obvious data outliers or unexpected patterns
occurred. The log reduction varied most for the tests
that achieved intermediate log reductions. For each
decontaminant, efficacy-response curves were repeatable.
Overall, the data strongly support validation.
As a next step in the TSM validation process, OPP will
submit the TSM validation report to AOAC for review.
Additional OPP activities related to test method development
include completing modifications to AOAC method 966.04
for application to suture loops and gaseous chemicals,
evaluating other carrier materials, exploring efficacy
testing for non-spore forming threat agents, and developing
interactive methods.
Question and Answer Period
Workshop participants posed no questions.
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Full-scale Experience in Decontaminations Using
Chlorine Dioxide Gas
John Mason, Sabre Technical Services
The Sabre chloride dioxide system has evolved since its first
use following the 2001 anthrax incidents. In 2001, Sabre
built its chlorine dioxide generation system at the Brentwood
US Postal Service site over the course of six months. During
responses (mold remediation) in New Orleans after Hurricane
Katrina, Sabre used generators loaded on truck trailers.
These required 30 minutes for set up. Their technology
advances have resulted from collaborations and ongoing field
applications (e.g., mold and mildew decontamination, B.
cmthracis decontamination in Scotland).
Sabre is currently examining the effectiveness of low
chlorine dioxide concentrations coupled with longer contact
times. At concentration-times of less than 500 ppm-hours,
with a 10-hour contact time, good spore inactivation has been
achieved. As a caveat, Mason noted that field spore loading
is very low compared to laboratory testing. Sabre has also
found that B. atrophaeus is consistently harder to inactivate
than other spores.
During decontamination efforts in New Orleans, Sabre
qualitatively examined chlorine dioxide compatibility
with many of the materials encountered. About 20% of the
materials experienced a color reduction or bleaching effect
from treatment. Sabre has been unable to identify in advance
what materials will experience this effect. No short-term
effects to sensitive electronics have been reported. For some
of the New Orleans facilities that they have decontaminated,
Sabre has over two years of post-decontamination
information related to materials impacts.
In August 2007, Sabre will be decontaminating a
medical facility suspected of mold contamination. The
decontamination will occur at an operating hospital facility
in southern California. The facility is 12 million cubic feet
(ft3) and contains two patient wings, a critical care facility,
emergency room, and administrative offices. The schedule
calls for evacuation, decontamination, and reoccupancy
within six days. Sabre will pre-stage the tenting materials and
immediately begin installing sampling lines and dosimeters
at the start of the demonstration. Decontamination will occur
using 100 ppm of chlorine dioxide with a 12-hour exposure.
A hydrogen peroxide system will be used to scrub the
building after decontamination. The schedule is aggressive,
however, resuming operations as quickly as possible is
critical. Throughout the decontamination process, Sabre will
collect hundreds of data points that track chlorine dioxide
concentrations, relative humidity, and temperature. Bis will
also be placed throughout the facility. Mason demonstrated
Sabre's sample tracking software, which has been updated
to be more user friendly. The program allows users to
create sampling plans and indicate sampling locations while
walking through a facility. The program tracks samples and
results, and can be used for various building parameters (e.g.,
chlorine dioxide gas concentrations in various locations).
Mason anticipated that Sabre would face similar challenges
to those experienced before: interagency communication,
scheduling, and materials compatibility—the facility contains
over 2,800 materials, including sensitive equipment.
Question and Answer Period
• Has Sabre examined the long-term impacts to sensitive
electronics following decontamination with high
concentrations of chlorine dioxide? Sabre has not
conducted any validated and controlled laboratory
studies of sensitive electronic impacts. Sabre, however,
has tracked facilities undergoing chlorine dioxide
decontamination in New Orleans. These facilities
included restaurants with computers, electronic
telephone systems, and high-quality stereo systems. The
early decontaminations occurred at high concentrations
(e.g., CT values of 20,000 ppm-hours to 30,000 ppm-
hours). Sabre has heard of only a single failure of an
inexpensive scanner.
• What is the mechanism of interaction for chlorine
dioxide oxidation on a surface? The oxidation
mechanism needs to be verified through research.
Chlorine dioxide is a true gas and will react with almost
any material. On metals, this reaction likely creates a
film that protects the material from further oxidation.
Copper and aluminum, specifically, seem to create
protective barriers. Regardless, decontamination should
occur at the highest relative humidity possible and with
the purest form of chlorine dioxide possible.
• What PPE is required during decontamination ?
The PPE level depends on a person's location and
tasks. Typically operators and laboratory staff wear
standard coverall and gloves. Chlorine dioxide is easy
to smell, with most people detecting its presence at a
concentration of 40 parts per billion (ppb), which is
below harmful levels. Sabre does not conduct entries
during fumigation, but full protective gear would be
required if entries were needed.
• Has a cost-benefit analysis been conducted to assess
hard-wiring critical infrastructure for fumigation,
similar to existing sprinklers for fire protection? Sabre's
ultimate goal would be hard-wiring critical facilities,
but current technology advancements focus on reducing
the response time. Commercial facilities must consider
costs. For a hospital, the cost of decontamination is
minimal versus the cost of lost income due to closure.
• Can you compare fully loaded cost estimates per ft3
to decontaminate the Brentwood facility versus the
hospital scenario presented? Much of the estimate
depends on sampling and analysis activities, such
as characterization sampling, post-decontamination
sampling, Bis, and clearance needs. Assuming only
post-decontamination environmental sampling and
a reasonable number of Bis, decontamination of the
Brentwood facility may require an estimated three
weeks and $15 million. For the hospital scenario,
an estimated total cost, including moving patients
and ensuring site security, would be approximately
$30 million. The cost of the chlorine dioxide itself is
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insignificant compared to the lost revenue
during closure.
• Past fumigations with tenting have resulted in
accidental mortality due to premature reoccupancy
or unintendedfumigant migration. How does Sabre
prevent these accidents? Sabre has been fortunate to
avoid fatal accidents. Chlorine dioxide is strongly
irritating to people before fatal concentrations are
reached. So premature reoccupancy is unlikely. During
fumigation, Sabre maintains negative pressure within
tents, which has vastly reduced external leaks, and
continuously monitors for leaks. Before reoccupancy,
Sabre also conducts clearance sampling and involves a
technical working group to review analytical clearance
methods and health and safety measures. Sabre would
like to use the trace air gas analysis (TAGA) van for
ambient air monitoring to take advantage of the low
detection limits that the TAGA instruments can achieve.
• How well does chlorine dioxide penetrate through
paper? Under normal conditions, chlorine dioxide can
penetrate through 15 sheets of paper.
Systematic Decontamination-Challenges and Successes
Vipin Rastogi, Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
Rastogi provided results from ongoing collaborative efforts
withNHSRC to conduct systematic studies of fumigant
performance for decontamination of building materials
contaminated with B. anthracis. The specific study objectives
were to evaluate the kill kinetics and D-values for chlorine
dioxide against B. anthracis, assess the effect of bioburden
on recovery and efficacy of VHP and chlorine dioxide, and
identify an appropriate surrogate for the virulent Ames strain.
The experimental design consisted of testing six building
materials with three fumigant technologies—chlorine dioxide
by Sabre and ClorDiSys Solutions, Inc. (ClorDiSys) and
VHP by STERIS—at various time points and fumigant
concentrations. The overall experimental program resulted
in a large number of samples to be analyzed each day. No
methods, however, existed that could handle this sample
load. As such, ECBC developed the Single-Tube Method
(STM), which has been optimized and expanded to include
surface sampling analysis. With various improvements made
to previous techniques, such as the use of pour plating, STM
was able to achieve low viable spore detection limits (1-5
spores), even with pulverized materials such as ceiling tile
and wallboard.
Real-time and titration methods were used to monitor the
chlorine dioxide concentrations during decontamination.
Maintaining a constant relative humidity throughout the
test improved the decontamination cycle. Rastogi provided
photographs of the test equipment and materials.
Before beginning tests, ECBC considered the effect of
coupon liter on decontamination efficacy. Using chlorine
dioxide and a 6-log liter, nearly complete inaclivalion of
spores on all building material coupons was achieved. Wilh
an 8-log liter, inaclivalion was much reduced. Al Ihis higher
spore concenlralion and density, a higher chlorine dioxide
concentration and/or conlacl time is required for complete
inaclivation. Based on Ihese resulls, ECBC selected a
7-log inoculation.
Raslogi also investigated whelher bioburden in Ihe spore
prep impacls spore recovery or decontamination efficacy.
He presented resulls from decontamination of coupons wilh
spore preparations containing various concenlralions of a
serum protein. Resulls indicated lhal a 5% serum protein
conlenl reduced spore recovery. The serum protein, however,
did nol affecl decontamination efficacy for chlorine dioxide.
Based on Ihese findings, sludies included 0.5% serum protein
conlenl in Ihe spore preparations.
To optimize spore recovery, Ihe spore preparations included
0.01% of Tween 80, which is a surfactant Inoculations were
also conducted as seven mini-droplels versus a single, larger
drop. Raslogi presented resulls illuslrating Ihe differenl
percenl recoveries between spore preparation formulations.
A number of differenl terms are used in discussing
decontamination. The D-value is defined as Ihe lime required
for a decimal (1-log) reduction in Ihe number of viable
spores for a given sel of conditions. The Dl-value is Ihe lime
required lo achieve an initial 1-log reduction, and Ihe D6-
value is Ihe lime required lo achieve 6-log reduction. Raslogi
presented his analysis in which Dl-values were used lo
exlrapolale lo a D6-value. The extrapolated D6-value lends lo
underestimate Ihe measured D6-value. These resulls indicate
lhal kill kinetics are nonlinear. Resulls also indicate lhal D-
values vary across differenl building materials.
ECBC also investigated Ihe suitability of using various
species as surrogates for Ihe virulenl B. anthracis Ames
slrain. Raslogi presented resulls from chlorine dioxide
decontamination of cinder block and sleel coupons inoculated
wilh Ihe Ames slrain and Ihe NNR1 Al slrain. These resulls
indicate lhal Ihe NNR1A1 slrain may be an appropriate
avirulenl surrogate. ECBC also evaluated B. subtilis and
Geobacillus stearothermophilus spores as surrogates for B.
anthracis Ames. This evaluation consisted of inoculating
wood coupons and conducting decontamination using
chlorine dioxide for Iwo differenl conlacl times. Resulls
for each spore were comparable, and Ihus each may be an
appropriate surrogate for B. anthracis.
Question and Answer Period
• Do the data suggest that low concentration and
long contact times achieve better inactivation?
Decontamination lesls in December 2006 and January
2007 examined Ihe efficacy using a concenlration of
500 ppm chlorine dioxide wilh a 36-hour conlacl time.
Follow-up lesls consisted of higher concenlralions wilh
shorter conlacl limes. ECBC would like lo conducl
further sludies of lower concenlrations coupled wilh
longer conlacl lime. Ryan (NHSRC) staled lhal
investigations indicate lhal Ihe total CT is Ihe mosl
importanl factor in successful decontamination.
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New York City Anthrax Response
Neil Norrell, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Region 2
Norrell works as an OSC for EPA Region 2. He described the
response events following a single inhalation anthrax case
occurring in New York City in February 2006.
On February 16, 2006, an African drum maker and performer
collapsed during a performance in Pennsylvania. The
Pennsylvania Department of Health confirmed infection with
inhalation anthrax on February 21, 2006. CDC confirmed
the diagnosis the next day. The New York City Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene (NYC DHMH), the New
York Police Department (NYPD), FBI, and NIOSH began
investigating the case for public health and possible criminal
implications. Investigations focused on three locations: 31
Downing Street in New York City (the victim's home), 2
Prince Street in Brooklyn (the victim's workshop), and the
victim's van. Sampling confirmed anthrax in each location.
To make the drums, the victim imported hides from overseas
and used only hand tools (e.g., knives, razors, scrapers) to
work the hides following traditional methods.
Coordination was a substantial consideration in conducting
this response. Numerous agencies and organizations, as well
as representatives of the victim's family, were involved. NYC
DHMH served as the lead agency in addressing human health
issues, determining sampling methods and analysis, locating
samples, and clearing the affected locations for reoccupancy.
OSCs provided support to NYC DHMH.
Overall, Norrell listed a number of issues considered when
selecting decontamination technologies for each location.
NYC DHMH considered sampling procedures, identified
materials for decontamination versus disposal, arranged the
logistics for decontamination (e.g., street closures, public
meetings), and coordinated with family representatives
to identify items of sentimental value. EPA, including
the National Decontamination Team (NOT), supported
NYC DHMH in decision making regarding materials to
decontaminate versus those to be disposed of. Protecting
public health and preventing reinfection of the victim were
primary concerns. NYC DHMH selected a combination of
pH-amended sodium hypochlorite (bleach) solution, HEPA
vacuuming, and chlorine dioxide gas—depending on the
type of material. All food, bedding, textiles, and other porous
materials were disposed of.
From the victim's home, a total of 16 cubic yards of waste
materials designated for disposal were bagged and rinsed
with the amended bleach several times before removal from
the apartment. Remediation workers used a modified sodium
hypochlorite solution and HEPA vacuums to decontaminate
remaining items and surfaces. After initial decontamination,
clearance sampling reported several positive samples from
the apartment floor (made of wood). The flooring material
was more porous than initially anticipated. Complete
decontamination of the floor occurred after reapplication
and agitation of the decontamination solution (amended
bleach). Several sensitive or sentimental porous materials
(e.g., traditional costumes), however, were preserved and
decontaminated with chlorine dioxide gas.
Arranging disposal was the most difficult component of the
response. Facilities refused to accept anthrax-contaminated
wastes, primarily because of the public perception of harm
from anthrax, even naturally occurring anthrax. In addition,
transport of the waste (considered a medical waste) across
states would require a special permit for each state traversed.
Several agencies collaborated to identify an acceptable
disposal solution. New York Environmental Services
(NYES), a medical waste autoclaving facility in New York,
agreed to accept materials from the victim's apartment
with some conditions. NYES personnel would not handle
the waste, autoclaving would occur during off-hours, and
sampling would ensure effectiveness. Autoclaving was
completed in March 2006, and no growth was reported on
Bis used to assess spore inactivation. Regardless, no landfills
would accept the treated waste. After additional coordination,
a facility in Ohio accepted the decontaminated waste for
incineration.
The Prince Street warehouse, where the victim maintained
a workshop, was a much larger facility with a much greater
volume of material for disposal. The building owner hired
its own contractor to conduct the decontamination, with
oversight by NYC DHMH. The same decontamination
methods used at the victim's home on Downing Street—
modified sodium hypochlorite solution and HEPA vacuums
for surfaces and chlorine dioxide gas for porous materials
not disposed of—were applied here. Limited information
regarding this decontamination is available because a private
contractor conducted the work.
The victim's van and some materials from the victim's
apartment and workshop were stored at an NYPD impound
yard. NYC DHMH negotiated with NYPD to allow
decontamination of the van and materials at the yard by
fumigation with chlorine dioxide. Perimeter monitoring
ensured no release of chlorine dioxide from the treatment
enclosure. Norrell provide photographs and a schematic
drawing of the decontamination. The van and materials have
been released to the victim.
Question and Answer Period
• What was the cost of the response to this event?
The response at Downing Street and the work
at the impound yard (the van and other material
decontamination) cost an estimated $750,000 (US).
• Was the source of the animal skins investigated?
Information about the source of the skins is based
on hearsay. Reportedly the victim would return home
to Africa to obtain the skins. Customs officials provided
no clear information regarding the legality of the
skin import.
• In conducting clearance sampling of the victim 's
apartment, only targeted areas were sampled. A
targeted approach does not provide great confidence
in the decontamination efficacy. A more comprehensive
clearance sampling plan should be required. Norrell
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agreed that clearance was based on a target sampling
approach and that this approach may not provide great
confidence in decontamination efficacy. NYC DHMD,
however, was responsible for declaring clearance
and was comfortable in doing so with the available
clearance sampling results. Norrell noted that clearance
sampling included samples collected in the victim's
apartment, as well as air monitoring results from
adjacent apartments.
• What type of incinerator was used for disposal of the
autoclaved materials? The Ohio facility is a medical
waste incinerator.
• During arrangements for disposal, where was the
waste stored? The waste was held at a transport
yard in Albany, New York. Regulators approved
holding time waivers to allow for the unplanned,
extended storage time. The difficulties with disposal
illustrate the importance of the disposal phase. Norrell
thought that difficulties stemmed from perceptions
regarding anthrax.
• To what extent did the family accept fumigated
materials? The family reclaimed the heirlooms,
costumes, and similar items. Mason (Sabre) indicated
that approximately 20% of the items experienced
bleaching or color change. The family also reclaimed
the van.
• When decontamination consistency was being
considered, what criteria were used to decide which
items were treated by gas versus liquid application?
At the time, NYC DHMH was unclear about chlorine
dioxide gas fumigation and public pressure required
a rapid response at the Downing Street location.
Norrell thought that if a future event occurred,
NYC DHMH would likely explore chlorine dioxide
fumigation in homes.
Update on EPA Decontamination Technologies Research
Laboratory (DTRL) Activities
Shawn Ryan, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
Ryan's previous presentation focused on decontamination
technology efficacy evaluations. This presentation discussed
research being performed in NHSRC's Decontamination
Technologies Research Laboratory (DTRL), which
investigates some of the engineering aspects of promising
decontamination methods. Current studies have primarily
focused on chlorine dioxide gas applications because
chlorine dioxide has been shown to be a highly effective
decontaminant. However, research with other fumigant
technologies will be conducted in DTRL as well.
DRTL is located in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina,
and consists of complementary research facilities. Fumigation
research and analytical support are the current research
focuses. Studies address application issues to consider when
selecting a fumigant and to improve technologies for better
efficacy and reduced costs. Ryan discussed six research
projects currently underway at DTRL.
Fumigant process parameter measurements.
No standard method exists for measuring high
concentrations (i.e., >10 ppm) of chlorine dioxide in
air. DTRL has extensively evaluated two methods—a
modification to the AWWA SM-4500 (E) method and
an instrumental technique using the ClorDiSys EMS—
capable of measuring high concentrations. AWWA
SM-4500 (E) is designed to analyze chlorine dioxide in
water. The method has been modified to extend to gas
sampling, however, the modifications eliminated the
method's ability to speciate between chlorine gas and
chlorine dioxide. The modified method has a detection
limit of approximately 25 parts per million by volume
(ppmv). The ClorDiSys EMS photometric method
provides real-time measurement and has a detection
limit of approximately 36 ppmv. As illustrated by the
results presented, a good correlation exists between the
measurements reported by both methods.
For low concentration measurements, DTRL has
evaluated the Drager Polytron 7000 instrument
method and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) Inorganic Method ID-202.
The Drager electrochemical method provides real-time
measurements of chlorine dioxide with a detection limit
of 50 parts per billion by volume (ppbv). The OSHA
method is based on analysis of impinger liquid using an
ion chromatograph and achieves a detection limit of 60
ppbv. A good correlation, as illustrated in a graph of the
results, exists between the two measurement methods.
DTRL is constructing a dual-source, triple-quadrupole
mass spectrometer (MS) bench-top system (the
same instrument used in the TAGA van) and also
uses a single-photon ionization/time-of-flight mass
spectrometer (SPI) for some of its studies. The triple-
quadrupole MS provides real-time measurements
for both chlorine dioxide and chlorine gas with a
quantitation limit as low as 2.3 ppbv. SPI also provides
real-time measurement for chlorine dioxide with a
detection limit of 0.3 ppm but cannot measure
chlorine gas.
Ryan noted that technology efficacy may vary
greatly depending on process parameters (e.g.,
relative humidity, temperature) and decontaminant
concentrations. As such, accurate measurement and
control of the temperature and relative humidity is
critical to successful decontamination, especially
when conducting research to examine impacts of
these parameters. Ryan presented an example of
divergent relative humidity readings from two separate
monitoring devices. One of the devices had previously
been exposed to chlorine dioxide.
Fumigant permeability. Effective decontamination
requires fumigant containment in a defined volume
for a specified concentration and time. Leakages from
this defined volume increase the fumigant generation
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requirements and may present worker and public
health concerns. DTRL devised a system to assess
permeability of materials that may be used for fumigant
containment. Ryan presented results of chlorine dioxide
permeability testing of various potential tenting/
containment materials.
Fumigant adsorption. Solid sorbents (e.g., carbon beds)
or catalysts are used to capture the chlorine dioxide gas
during or after a fumigation event. The air is withdrawn
to keep the structure under negative pressure and routed
to a capture device. At some point, these materials reach
the adsorption capacity and breakthrough occurs. DTRL
is conducting studies to determine the chlorine dioxide
adsorption capacity of different sorbent materials at
various parametric conditions.
Material demand. Materials undergoing fumigation can
substantially affect the fumigant concentration within
a defined volume, either through chemical reaction
or adsorption onto the material. When determining
how much fumigant will be required, decontamination
planners must account for homogeneous decomposition
and material interactions. Research conducted by
ECBC concluded that some materials have a significant
fumigant demand. For VHP, the inflow concentration
had to be double the target concentration within a
chamber containing various building materials (e.g.,
concrete, ceiling tile, wood). DTRL is expanding
this area of research to develop a calculator tool
that will determine how much fumigant is needed
to decontaminate a building as a function of the
decontamination conditions and building materials.
This tool will assist in determining whether a fumigant
generator has enough capacity to meet the required CT.
DTRL's initial focus is chlorine dioxide because of its
high efficacy in decontaminating porous and nonporous
test materials.
Material and fumigant by-products. Researchers are
beginning to assess and monitor building material-
fumigant by-products. During the aeration phase of
material demand and compatibility studies, DTRL
analyzed gaseous by-products from off-gassing and
residuals from coupons.
Material and equipment compatibility. DTRL, in
collaboration with ECBC, recently began evaluating
fumigant impacts to materials and equipment.
Preliminary results for chlorine dioxide and VHP
identified no aesthetic or structural strength impacts.
Published results should be released soon. DTRL plans
to continue examining fumigant impacts on material
and equipment aesthetics and functionality, testing
first with chorine dioxide and then expanding to VHP.
Ryan requested that workshop participants provide
input regarding materials to evaluate and outlined
upcoming tests (in collaboration with DHS) with
computers and monitors.
Question and Answer Period
Workshop participants posed no questions.
Localizing and Controlling Biothreat Agent (BTA)
Transport with Polymer Sprays
Paula Krauter, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Krauter discussed her research investigating technologies
designed to minimize spore (e.g., B. anthracis)
reaerosolization. Several published reports discuss
reaerosolization as a possible source of anthrax cross-
contamination at the Brentwood postal facility. Inhibition of
anthrax resuspension may have provided decision makers
with more time to evaluate decontamination options while
limiting further contamination.
Krauter's research aimed to investigate ways to limit spore
transport by increasing adhesion and inhibiting resuspension.
Following this concept, Krauter sought to identify a polymer
aerosol droplet (~50 microns [urn]) with a slight negative
charge. (The polymer[s] tested had negatively charged
functional groups.) Weapons-grade B. anthracis spores have
a slight positive charge and would be attracted to such a
polymer. (Although Krauter did not test B. anthracis for its
charge, she assumed that a similar spore preparation will
have an electrostatic charge close to B. atrophaeus, which
she did measure.) As the polymer settled on a surface, it
would agglomerate as the solvent evaporated and would
adhere the spores to the surface. Krauter listed key polymer
spray selection criteria (e.g., high adhesion strength,
negative charge, low viscosity and surface tension, moderate
evaporation rate, and low corrosivity and toxicity) and
characteristics of a number of polymer formulations.
After identifying several promising polymers, Krauter
conducted screening tests in a small chamber. Powdered
spores were dispersed, the polymer solution was sprayed
and allowed to dry, and resuspension was measured using
an aerosol particle sizer and microbial plate counts. The
process of spraying the polymer itself or a decontaminant
liquid can resuspend the spores. As such, Krauter also used
small-chamber tests to optimize polymer formulations
and low-pressure spray applications. The terpolymer of
butylaminoethyl methacrylate, octylacrylate, and acrylic acid
(NS-2) performed the best in the small-chamber studies.
As the next step, Krauter conducted validation studies in
a larger test chamber in September 2006. The larger test
chamber was designed as an antistatic aerosol chamber to
represent a worst-case release environment. Krauter provided
a photograph and schematic diagram of this chamber and its
components. The validation tests consisted of disseminating
spores, allowing overnight settling, purging unsettled spores,
resuspending and resettling spores, spraying the test or
control solution, permitting solution drying, and applying a
high-velocity mechanical airflow. An ethanol-water solution
served as the control. (Spores resuspended overnight due to
the temperature gradients caused by turning off the heat at
night. This observation is unassociated with the application
of the water control but shows how easily these spores were
reaerosolized.) In applying the polymer, a thin or partial
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coating was sought to allow for some measurement of
resuspension after application.
Results from validation tests showed a 0.41% to 0.7%
reaerosolization efficiency before the NS-2 application.
After application, reaerosolization was 0.3% for the control
solution and 0.03% and 0.0002% for the NS-2 applications.
The difference in reaerosolization efficiency for the two
NS-2 tests was due to the polymer spray application rate.
Three tests were conducted. Test 1 was a process control that
applied the water-ethanol spray at a rate of 0.12 liter (L)/m3
to inhibit spore resuspension. Test 2 used the copolymer
solution, NS-2, at a rate of 0.1 L/m3. Test 3 applied NS-2 at
a rate of 0.12 L/m3. Using data generated from validation
tests, Krauter calculated the resuspension factor, which
is the ratio of the number of spores in the air versus the
number of spores on the surface. According to comparisons
of resuspension factors calculated during testing, the control
solution inhibited resuspension by 0.5 orders of magnitude.
NS-2 inhibited resuspension by 2 orders of magnitude.
These results indicate that a very small amount of the
polymer spray—only 300 milliliters (ml) of polymer were
applied in a 3.5 m3 antistatic chamber—could significantly
reduce reaerosolization. Based on this success, LLNL is
exploring polymer sprays that will contain and minimize
contact with other hazardous materials, such as beryllium
and uranium particles.
The research confirmed that certain polymer sprays will
inhibit spore resuspension by adhering particles to a surface.
As a secondary goal, Krauter sought and successfully
identified a noncorrosive polymer. Additional testing
indicates that this and other polymers can be formulated
to target specific particles. Overall, use of a polymer spray
can limit agent migration and provide a margin of safety for
personnel during decontamination and recovery.
Question and Answer Period
• What were the spore loadings on the surfaces tested?
The B. atrophaeus used in this study was a dry powder
with a liter of 1.77 to 2.33 X 1011 spores/gram. The
surface concentration during the deposition phase
was about 5 X 109 spores/square meter. Initial spore
release resulted in about 2.5 X 107 ± 6.4 X 106 colony
forming units (CFU)/L air in the aerosol chamber.
• In considering next-generation polymer sprays, can the
polymer formulations be altered to bind and inactivate
agents? Studies have focused on simply binding the
agents as the first phase of a two-phase decontamination
process. Binding and resuspension inhibition provides
decision makers with more time to research and select
the most appropriate decontamination technology for
the situation.
• Is the polymer coating strippable? In these tests, the
polymer coating is too thin to strip, but it can be washed
away. Applying another strippable coating on top of the
polymer, however, may be possible. Research would be
needed to assess this approach.
Can We Expedite Decontamination?
Blair Martin, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Air
Pollution Prevention and Control Division
Decontamination efforts have a reputation for being
time consuming and costly. The response to the anthrax
contamination at Capitol Hill, however, spanned only two
months. When considering critical infrastructure, the cost of
decontamination is minimal compared to other costs, such as
the economic impact of closing a large airport.
Martin reviewed several decontamination events to
illustrate the range of situations encountered, the variety
of decontamination technologies used, and the evolution
and improvement of these technologies over time. He
presented specific details regarding the Brentwood facility
and the SA-32 Building decontamination events. The events
highlight differences in site-specific conditions and the use
of different fumigant technologies: chlorine dioxide and
VHP. Since 2001, chlorine dioxide has also been used to treat
B. anthracis at the American Media International Building,
mold at a department store, and mold at numerous facilities
in New Orleans. Advances in this technology include the
use of tents and the size reduction in chlorine dioxide
generation equipment.
At NHSRC, the systematic evaluation of fumigant efficacy
and decontamination technologies has focused on chlorine
dioxide, although studies have also considered VHP and
methyl bromide. These evaluations consider impacts of
fumigation parameters (e.g., concentration, time, relative
humidity, temperature) and materials on efficacy. Martin
presented data from several studies to illustrate material
impact on decontamination efficacy. In tests with Bis, after
treatment at 6,000 ppm-hours with chlorine dioxide, no
growth occurred on any tested Bis; however decontamination
of B. anthracis on wood or cinderblock required higher
treatment levels to achieve complete decontamination.
NHSRC is also interested in streamlining the
decontamination process. When a release occurs at
critical infrastructure, decision makers must conduct
decontamination with an approach that minimizes the
impact to the general population, the area economy, and
the restoration cost. Preplanning is essential; however, only
a limited number of critical facilities (e.g., airports, urban
transportation facilities) may have the resources to prepare
a comprehensive plan. Preplanning can range from simply
keeping current facility drawings to precontracting with
decontamination vendors and arranging restoration insurance.
As a first step in selecting suitable decontamination
technologies, decision makers must assess the contamination
extent based on information from witnesses to the release,
forensic and characterization sampling, threat agent
properties, and indications of threat agent migration.
This information feeds decisions regarding PPE level
and additional sampling needs. Martin suggested that
characterization sampling include heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning (HVAC) system samples. If the threat agent is
in the HVAC system, it has likely been dispersed throughout
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the facility. Decision makers could proceed immediately
to fumigation without further surface characterization
sampling. Much debate exists regarding the best type of
characterization sampling (e.g., biased versus random) and
best decontamination technology. Each situation must be
evaluated individually.
History has proven that existing technologies have the
capacity to fumigate an entire building. Any fumigant,
however, must comply with FIFRA requirements, either
through registration or exemption. Martin outlined the
steps of a decontamination process. These steps do not
necessarily occur linearly; some activities can occur
simultaneously. Critical components of the process
include containing the threat agent to minimize migration
and impact, preparing decontamination documentation,
implementing the physical decontamination process, and
confirming successful decontamination. The decontamination
process involves sealing the facility to prevent fumigant
leaks, installing equipment and monitoring devices,
conducting the fumigation, and collecting Bis. Martin
recommended minimizing BI use because it is costly and
does not necessarily confirm successful achievement of
decontamination process conditions.
The Brentwood decontamination spanned 18 months. With
the state of the art now, Martin thought decontamination
would currently require only 4 months for a Brentwood-like
decontamination. Pre-planning and preparation are critical
to reducing the timeline; the fumigation itself requires only
a single day. Compared to ancillary requirements (e.g.,
sampling), the fumigant cost and single-day application is
minimal. Martin suggested focusing efforts and resources on
facility clearance to ensure safe reoccupancy.
Future efforts to improve Bis, obtain FIFRA registration, and
optimize characterization and clearance sampling may further
reduce the time and cost associated with restoring a facility
contaminated with B. anthracis. Research and development
in a number of other areas will also provide additional
guidance and support future decontamination events. Martin
listed a number of these research areas. NHSRC continues
to interact with the user community to target key data gaps
and dispense research findings. Overall, decontamination
technologies are much improved; however, additional process
improvements are still needed.
Question and Answer Period
The question and answer period was waived due to time
constraints.
Session 4: Chemical Threat Agent
Decontamination Research and Development
Airport Restoration Following a Chemical Warfare Agent
(CWA) Attack
Bob Knowlton, Sandia National Laboratory
Knowlton discussed the Facility Restoration Operational
Technology Demonstration (OTD) project, which addresses
restoration of an airport following a chemical agent release.
This project focuses on facility interior remediation, and
the resulting restoration plan for Los Angeles International
Airport (LAX) will serve as a template for other airports.
This is a DHS-sponsored project being conducted by the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories, with
representatives from EPA, DoD, and other agencies acting
as advisors.
As an example of possible economic consequences,
Knowlton stated that closing an airport such as San
Francisco International Airport (SFO) would have an
estimated $80 million per day impact on the regional
economy. Unfortunately, transportation centers are highly
vulnerable to chemical terrorism. They also contain a number
of unique areas and materials that pose a wide range of
decontamination and remediation challenges.
This project seeks to develop a systems approach to facility
remediation that will decrease the time required for recovery
following a CWA attack. Tasks focus on preplanning,
recommending decontamination technologies, and filling
technology data gaps through an experimental program.
Knowlton noted that preplanning is critical and may consist
of maintaining current building plans, understanding
HVAC systems, and establishing remediation contracts
before an event. The project builds upon the knowledge
learned in conducting the Biological Restoration Domestic
Demonstration and Application Program. Many of the
fundamental concepts, technical developments, and key
relationships developed for the biological response apply to
a chemical response, with some exceptions, as explained in
detail by Knowlton.
The primary project goal is to develop a remediation plan
for LAX and a template remediation plan for use by other
airports. Much of the historic delay in restoration was
linked to the development and approval of remediation
plans. Preparing this plan in advance will allow officials to
address key issues, such as determining sampling zones and
deciding what materials to decontaminate versus dispose of
(e.g., carpets). Officials should also identify stakeholders
and their needs in restoring a facility. Knowlton noted that
a remediation plan must address multiple contamination
scenarios.
The Facility Restoration OTD team consists of a number
of working groups that address different aspects of the
restoration process.
• Partnerships. This group conducts outreach to
stakeholders and manages and facilitates relationships
between stakeholders. Stakeholders include airport
owners and operators, and federal, state, and local
agencies.
• Threat scenarios. With input from DHS and other
federal agencies, this working group has developed
realistic threat scenarios for transportation facilities.
The scenarios consider likely agents (e.g., CWAs,
TICs), release types, release locations, and agent
amounts. These scenarios will be considered when
conducting a tabletop exercise to demonstrate
preplanning capabilities and tools.
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• Cleanup guidelines. Cleanup guidelines exist for air
concentrations of some CWAs, but no standards exist
for surfaces. This group is gathering data to develop a
set of recommended cleanup standards specifically for
airport workers and transit passengers. Knowlton noted
that EPA is working on a similar task and is involved in
reviewing guidance developed by this working group.
• Sampling. This group is developing recommendations
for sampling and analysis during the characterization,
remediation verification, clearance, and monitoring
phases of restoration.
• Decontamination. Many potential decontamination
technologies are available, but their effectiveness
varies depending on the agent and other factors such
as the surface material. This group, with support
from decontamination experts, seeks to identify and
recommend technologies to address specific agents
listed in the LAX remediation plan.
The Building Restoration Operations Optimization Model
(BROOM) is a decision support tool being adapted for use
in CWA attack planning and post-event operations. BROOM
is a system to collect, manage, visualize, and analyze large
amounts of data. The sample management component relies
on hand-held systems, barcodes, and wireless technology
to track sample locations and results. The data analysis
component maps contamination areas, highlights areas of
contamination uncertainty, and identifies optimized sampling
to reduce uncertainties.
The Facility Restoration OTD project also includes an
experimental phase to address data gaps identified when
developing the LAX restoration plan. Knowlton listed
four current research projects: investigation of surface
sample collection efficiency; material and agent interactions;
gas/vapor decontamination; and statistical sampling
algorithm validation. Knowlton provided details about two
of these projects:
• Surface sample collection efficiency. No validated
standard methods exist for surface sampling and
analysis of trace CWAs. A need exists to demonstrate
CWA detection at concentrations below guidelines (e.g.,
300 nanograms per square centimeter). Studies will
examine sampling efficiencies of three CWAs on airport
material types. Knowlton presented preliminary results
from initial tests. Extraction efficiencies are relatively
high for nonreactive surfaces.
• Gas/vapor decontamination method scale-up
evaluation. This task involves the evaluation of hot air
and existing fire sprinklers for decontamination. For
more volatile agents, natural attenuation and ventilation
may be a viable decontamination technology.
Researchers are evaluating heat to desorb agents
from surfaces. This research seeks to understand the
temperatures needed to desorb agents and identify
technologies that can achieve these temperatures.
Researchers are also evaluating whether existing fire
sprinkler systems can be used to scrub a chemical
agent "cloud." Knowlton presented information from
an initial trial using a fire sprinkler to scrub a G-agent
simultant (dimethyl methylphosphonate [DDMP]).
Question and Answer Period
• In developing response plans, how do you communicate
with stakeholders? The Facility Restoration OTD team
has worked extensively to identify and bring together
stakeholders from multiple groups and agencies.
Workshops are one way to bring stakeholders together.
• What was the 10% bleach solution recommended as a
decontamination technology? The 10% bleach is simply
household bleach with a 10-minute contact time.
Quantitative Structure Toxicity Relationships (QSTR) to
Support Estimation of Cleanup Goals
Chandrika Moudgal, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, National Homeland Security Research Center
The risk assessment paradigm developed by the National
Academy of Science in 1983 serves as the foundation for
EPA risk assessments. The four components are hazard
identification, dose-response assessment, exposure
assessment, and risk characterization. Hazard characterization
involves determining whether an agent causes an adverse
effect. Dose-response assessment quantitatively characterizes
the relationship between dose and effect. Exposure
assessment considers the magnitude, frequency, duration,
and routes of exposure. Risk characterization estimates the
likelihood of adverse health effects in an exposed population.
Moudgal presented a figure that highlights the relationship of
risk assessment, risk management, and research. Research,
such as animal toxicity studies, epidemiological studies, and
computational methods, feed into hazard characterizations
and dose-response assessments, which in turn feed risk
characterization and risk management decisions.
Risk-based cleanup goals are agent concentrations in
environmental media that serve as screening estimates to
determine remediation needs and to support risk management
decisions. These values are health-based and are derived
using estimates of toxicity, exposure, and target (acceptable)
risk or hazard levels. When appropriate, such as when
evaluating possible decontamination alternatives, these
values can serve as initial cleanup goals. Risk-based cleanup
goals are not de facto cleanup standards. Cleanup standards
for a site should also consider agent detection limits,
economics, and technological feasibility of decontamination
alternatives.
Risk-based cleanup goals can be calculated based on
exposure over a lifetime. Typically, EPA selects a hazard
index of 1 for noncarcinogens and a risk of 1 in 1,000,000 to
1 in 10,000 for carcinogens. Moudgal provided equations for
calculating cleanup goals and provided Web links for more
information. A number of EPA regional offices (Regions 3, 6,
and 9) have generated cleanup goals for common pollutants
using default assumptions. Risk-based cleanup goals may be
applied to children, adults, or the overall population. Most
values consider chronic exposures.
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Quantitative structure toxicity relationships (QSTRs) are
mathematical equations that determine the correlations
between various features of a chemical's molecular structure
and observed biological activity. For example, if a particular
chemical structure or agent is associated with liver toxicity,
another structurally similar chemical or agent could be
correlated to liver toxicity using mathematical models.
A number of currently available software programs can
generate thousands of descriptors. Statistical packages, such
SAS, can be used to determine the correlations between
computer-generated descriptors and a biological end-point.
QSTR is most useful in providing toxicity estimates when
no agent-specific experimental toxicity data are available.
This method provides rapid and reliable results and can
permit quick screening and ranking of a number of untested
chemical agents.
The QSTR methodology initially involves gathering data on
a toxicity endpoint (e.g., lowest observed adverse effect level
[LOAEL], lethal dose for 50% of a population [LD50]), and
the mechanism or mode of action of an agent, if available.
This information can then be used to develop specific de
novo QSTR models. Traditionally, commercially available
software or other resources are used to obtain chemical
structure descriptors based on QSTR. From these data,
statistical analysis and experimental validation are conducted
to determine the model's applicability and performance. Once
validated, the model can be used to predict toxicity in other
agents with similar structures.
Existing or custom QSTR models can be applied to develop
cleanup goals for agents. Moudgal provided an example
using the QSTR methodology to estimate a reference dose
for 1,4-thioxane (a TIC). Using a commercially available
software package called TOPKAT®, Moudgal computed
a LOAEL of 219.3 milligrams of agent per kilogram
body weight per day (mg/kg/d). Assuming certain risk
and exposure assessment factors, a cleanup goal of 4,000
milligrams of agent per kilogram of soil was determined.
Alternatively, the QSTR software can be used to find the
most appropriate chemical analogs (surrogates) for which
cleanup goals have already been established. This second
approach is fast, inexpensive, and reliable when a validated
model is used.
Moudgal ended her presentation with a summary of the
advantages and disadvantages of using QSTR models and
how they could be applied to decontamination.
Question and Answer Period
• For chemical threat agents, are dose-response data
already available? To date, a number of CWAs have
been studied extensively and substantial experimental
and epidemiological health effects data exist. For TICs,
available data are more scattered. QSTR could play a
role in better understanding the toxicity of these agents,
specifically acute versus chronic toxicity and qualitative
versus quantitative toxicity.
• One participant commented that QSTR use should
expand into routine use, perhaps in combination with
uncertainty factors. This participant suggested that
Moudgal communicate with EPA regulators and NIOSH
researchers. Moudgal noted that QSTR has been used
more extensively in the premanufacturing process
to model possible exposures and support process
decisions. QSTR uses a weight-of-evidence approach
more than an uncertainty factor approach when deriving
values. The European Union is more accepting of
QSTR and has established guidelines and criteria for its
use in regulatory decision making.
Determining Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA)
Environmental Fate to Optimize Remediation for Indoor
Facilities
Adam Love, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Love discussed his current research, which is being
conducted as part of the Facility Restoration OTD project,
to address data gaps in CWA persistence and interactions on
various surfaces. Most research to date has focused on vapor
hazards to address DoD concerns; very little information is
available on the behavior of CWAs on surfaces.
To address this data gap, Love's study will use three CWAs
and eight different materials found at airports. At high
concentrations, the bulk properties of the agent dominate fate
and transport (e.g., volatilization, dissolution, infiltration). As
the concentration decreases, molecular properties dominate
(e.g., hydrolysis, oxidation, biodegradation, catalysis,
sorption, complextion). Most restoration projects will likely
have many surfaces with low levels of contamination.
Love indicated that data from studies of agent persistence
and surface interactions could enable better decision making
during the restoration process. First responders will be able
to target areas with known affinities for an agent and mitigate
cross-contamination. During the characterization phase,
the sampling plan can focus on surfaces with the highest
probability of retaining an agent. Agent fate data will also
inform decisions about remediation approaches.
Agent fate and transport greatly depend on whether the
agent is released in liquid, vapor, or gas form. A vapor or
gas release will result in a greater spatial spread, but lower
agent concentration. In addition, vapors may be adsorbed
on materials, then volatilized off the material. In a liquid
release, the agent does not disperse as much but will be
higher in concentration.
From their experimental work, Love's research team seeks
to gain a mechanistic understanding of persistence based on
physical and chemical characteristics. With this knowledge,
the persistence for thousands of agent and material
combinations can be assessed without actually testing each
combination individually.
Love's research seeks to understand a material's affinity
for, and rate of accumulation of, CWA vapor. The loss
(attenuation due to airflow) of CWA from different materials,
as a function of either vapor or liquid deposition, will
also be investigated. Detailed surface examination will
also be included as part of the data-gathering activities.
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Love presented affinity and accumulation data for HD on
various surfaces. A mass balance approach is used to more
completely understand the fate of the CWAs, in particular the
potential chemical reaction products between the agents and
materials. As an example, Love presented concentration data
on VX and its degradation products as a function of time.
Love discussed the issue of using surrogates, noting that
although a limited number of materials can be tested using
actual CWAs, surrogates often poorly simulate chemical
interactions. Nonetheless, surrogates can be used to
categorize surfaces with similar physical accumulation and
persistence dynamics. This process may enable limited CWA
data to be extended to additional untested materials with
similar characteristics.
Ultimately, research regarding agent persistence and surface
interactions seeks to reduce the time and effort required for
restoration. Surfaces that do not accumulate CWAs may
not need to be decontaminated or sampled. Surfaces that
accumulate CWAs, but have a short persistence time, may be
used for characterization sampling. Surfaces that accumulate
CWAs and have a long persistence time should be the
primary focus of sampling and decontamination efforts.
Question and Answer Period
Workshop participants posed no questions.
Chemical & Biological Defense Program Physical
Science & Technology Program Overview-Hazard
Mitigation
Mark T, Mueller, U, S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Mueller began by stating that the civilian definition of
decontamination does not accurately reflect military missions,
capabilities, and objectives; military decontamination does
not necessarily require 100% decontamination for reuse.
Historically, the military sought a decontamination solution
that would apply to all agents in all circumstances. Currently,
the military is rethinking this approach. The military must
consider variations in personnel deployed in a domestic
terror event versus a front-line warfare situation. Disposal
may be the best option in a domestic event where equipment
replacement is readily available, but decontamination might
be required in a front-line situation with limited resources.
Mueller compared decontamination approaches to
automobile detailing. No single product is available to fully
detail all components of an automobile. Specialized products
and process are required. Agent decontamination requires the
same specialized products and processes to be effective.
Military decontamination also faces a number of scientific
challenges. Additional research is needed to build a basic
understanding of agent reactions, as well as reaction kinetics
for the agents, material surfaces, and field grime on material
surfaces. For sensitive equipment, materials compatibility
and impacts to equipment service life are large concerns. A
better understanding of the correlation between simulants
and agents is needed, and application and dispersion of the
decontamination liquid is critical.
Mueller listed several research highlights from 2007; some
examples follow. Development of a decontamination wipe
(comprised of activated carbon cloth) containing a freon
substitute (hydroflouroether) to restore sensitive surfaces
was completed. Contaminated human remains from front-
line efforts or a mass casualty event present a unique
decontamination problem. Research identified candidate
technologies for addressing human remains and their
transport. A new chlorine dioxide formulation (containing
bromine) with a broader capacity for decontaminating G-
agents was developed.
A number of additional research efforts are ongoing. Some
highlights are as follows:
• Effect of droplet size on efficacy of aerosolized peroxy
decontamination. This effort evaluates the impact of
different droplet sizes on decontamination efficacy
of DF-200. In 2008, testing will expand to additional
agents and include the design and demonstration of an
aerosol generation system.
• Aerosolized activated hydrogen peroxide technology for
decontamination of aircraft interiors. In conjunction
with Sandia National Laboratory, this research seeks
to develop a technology based on Sandia DF-200 to
decontaminate aircraft interiors and other hard-to-reach
places. Live agent testing and field testing are scheduled
for 2007.
• Electrochemically generated decontamination solution.
Aqueous chlorine dioxide is generated electrically and
tests will be conducted to optimize the application of
the decontamination solution to surfaces.
• Portable decontamination for vehicle interiors
and cargo. Solvent wipes provide a portable,
lightweight system for decontaminating vehicle
interiors and sensitive equipment. Goals for 2007
included demonstrating this technology in a realistic
environment, evaluating packaging, and developing
reactive wipes. This technology is currently ready
for application.
• Sprayable powders for surface decontamination of
CWAs. This effort seeks to develop a system to spray
nontoxic reactive nanoparticles onto surfaces to achieve
decontamination. The nanoparticles would penetrate
further into a surface than a foam spray and provide
improved decontamination. In 2007, efforts focused on
developing a deployment system. In 2008, efforts will
focus on improving this system for testing in relevant
environments in 2009.
Question and Answer Period
• Most military decontamination research has focused on
warfare situations. How has the focus changed when
considering civilian events and open-air or wide-area
decontamination? Assessing these variations is one
objective of a rock drill exercise. Emphasis is on a
theater of operations perspective. How that perspective
will feed specific decontamination scenarios is not well
delineated at this time.
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Session 5: Biological and Foreign Animal Disease
Agent Decontamination
(1) Results from the Evaluation of Spray-Applied
Sporicidal Decontamination Technologies (2) Test Plans
and Preliminary Results for Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza Virus Persistence and Decontamination Tests
Joseph Wood, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
Wood described two decontamination projects. The
first project is completed and was conducted under the
Technology Testing and Evaluation Program (TTEP). Eleven
spray-applied sporicidal decontamination technologies
were evaluated. Wood presented a table summarizing the
technologies and the contact time used for testing.
Wood provided the quantitative efficacy results for all of the
technologies; all of the technologies were evaluated for their
ability to decontaminate glass inoculated with B. anthracis
Ames spores. pH-amended bleach was prepared by mixing
off-the-shelf bleach with water and 5% acetic acid. The
amended bleach is less corrosive and is a more effective
sporicide, due to the hypochlorous acid that is formed at
the lower pH. Detailed results from testing the pH-amended
bleach against B. anthracis Ames spores and three other
spore-forming bacteria (B. subtilis, B. anthracis Sterne,
and G. stearothermophilus) on various coupon materials
indicate that porous surfaces are harder to decontaminate
than nonporous surfaces (e.g., carpet versus glass). G.
stearothermophilus also appears to be the most resistant to
inactivation.
Wood provided a chart to compare the efficacy results
for pH-amended bleach, CASCAD SDF, Hi-Clean 605,
KlearWater, and Peridox on three different test material
coupons and three different spore strains. Again, results
indicate that porous materials are harder to decontaminate
than nonporous materials, and efficacy is highly dependent
on the test coupon material and the spore species.
The quality assurance test plan and the final report for the
spray-applied sporicide tests are available on the NHSRC
Web site.
The second project Wood discussed is currently underway.
The primary purpose of this project is to assess the
persistence of the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1
virus (strain A/Vietnam/1203/4) and the low pathogenic avian
influenza H7N2 virus (strain A/H7N2/chick/MinhMah/04)
under various environmental conditions. The project's second
purpose is to investigate the efficacy of various generic
decontamination liquids.
Persistence testing of the H5N1 virus will be conducted
with four materials at four nonzero time points. The tests
will be conducted at two different temperatures—with
and without exposure to simulated sunlight. Based on test
conditions producing the greatest persistence for the H5N1
virus, persistence tests for the H7N2 virus will include two
materials, two nonzero contact times, and two environmental
conditions. Decontamination studies will then follow the
persistence studies.
Cytotoxicity tests will be conducted to ensure that the
cells used to assay virus inactivation remain viable when
exposed to the coupon material extracts and the neutralized
decontamination liquid. For the quantification assay, results
will be expressed as the tissue culture infectious dose of
50% (TCID50), based on cytopathic effects on cells using
the Spearman Karber method. The assay for the H5N1 virus
will use canine kidney cells, and the assay for H7N2 will use
chicken embryo cells.
Preliminary results were presented for some of the
cytotoxicity and virus recovery tests.
Question and Answer Period
Workshop participants posed no questions.
Inactivation of Avian Influenza Virus Using Common
Soaps/Detergents, Chemicals, and Disinfectants
Robert Alphin, University of Delaware
Alphin is currently leading a project to assess avian influenza
virus inactivation using various common chemicals. The
project, which is funded by U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA), will provide information to support efforts to
restore poultry facilities after an avian influenza outbreak.
Alphin noted at the beginning of his presentation that foam
has been proven as an effective means to depopulate poultry
populations infected with the virus. Adding decontamination
agents to this foam may partially disinfect the facility at the
same time.
The highly pathogenic avian influenza virus significantly
threatens domestic and international poultry production.
Humans who become infected have a high fatality rate (186
fatalities out of 307 cases.)
In case of another major avian influenza outbreak, or even
worse a pandemic, USDA wanted to explore alternatives
to the current EPA-approved disinfection agents because of
their limited availability, expense, corrosive properties, and
environmental impacts. The ideal product would be effective
against the avian influenza virus on a variety of surfaces,
widely available, biodegradable, inexpensive,
and antimicrobial.
USDA and EPA selected several off-the-shelf chemicals
for testing, including acetic acid, citric acid, sodium
hypochlorite, and others. Alphin and his group developed
a method to test foams, thermal fogs, and liquids that met
EPA standards for temporary approval of disinfectants for
hard, nonporous surfaces. Galvanized steel, plastic, and
wood coupons were tested in the presence of hard water with
5% serum to account for organic matter. The test agent is a
low pathogenic isolate of the avian influenza virus (H7N2)
recovered from a 2004 outbreak of avian influenza virus on
the Delmarva Peninsula.
To assess viral inactivation, fluid from the decontaminated
test coupons was injected into eggs, and then after a 5-day
exposure period, fluid from each egg was examined for
hemagglutination activity. Positive and cytotoxic controls
were also used. In addition to testing the egg fluid for
hemagglutination activity, embryos were examined for
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stunting and other lesions. To quantify results, Alphin
compared the virus titer of the positive controls to the
virus titer of the treated groups. Inactivation was deemed
successful when the titer of the positive control was greater
than 4 log and no recoverable virus was found on the test
coupons (detection limit of < 1.2 log).
Alphin provided detailed test results. The neutralization
indices for the nonporous coupons (i.e., metal, plastic) were
higher than the indices for the porous coupons (i.e., wood).
All six disinfectants were effective for hard, nonporous
surfaces; only two were effective for porous surfaces.
Virus recovery from the wood coupons—both the positive
controls and test coupons—proved to be difficult and affected
conclusions regarding effectiveness on porous surfaces. The
testing did identify several common chemicals that may be
suitable for avian influenza virus inactivation. Further testing
with additional disinfectants, including calcium hydroxide,
calcium oxide, sodium carbonate, and sodium hydroxide, is
underway. Preliminary results for calcium oxide indicate that
this disinfectant is effective for nonporous materials.
Question and Answer Period
•At the beginning of the presentation, the possibility of
adding disinfectant chemicals to depopulation foams
was mentioned. Examining the results, however, the
disinfectants provide incomplete decontamination.
How would these results impact use of these materials
as foam additives? Simply approving foams as an
acceptable depopulation technique has required over
a year of discussions with various stakeholders. Foam
has been conditionally approved for avian influenza and
other situations calling for rapid, humane depopulation.
After depopulation, however, a large biomass can
remain (e.g., a broiler house may hold up to 50,000
birds each weighing 5-6 pounds). The foam and any
additive should not impede composting of this biomass
or cause any animal welfare concerns. Many issues
must be considered. As an additive, the disinfectant
would serve as only a first step in the restoration
process. Complete decontamination is not anticipated.
• What were the contact times? Coupons with the applied
disinfectant were agitated for 10 minutes.
• For the wood coupons, if the virus is not detected on
the positive controls, how was efficacy measured?
Alphin agreed that a nondetect for a positive control
would render the data inconclusive. The neutralization
index needed to be greater than 2.8 (with a positive
control of at least 4.0 and no detectable virus on any
test coupons) to conclude that the disinfectant was
effective. A neutralization index below 2.8 was
considered inconclusive.
Inactivation of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus on Various
Contact Surfaces
Wayne Einfeld, Sandia National Laboratory
Virucides are important in disrupting disease transmission
cycles, which can be incredibly costly. The 2001 UK foot-
and-mouth disease outbreak had an estimated economic
impact of $13 billion (US). A single virucide, however, will
not adequately treat all viruses; differences in virus resistance
exist. In addition, environmental factors, such as presence of
organic matter, temperature, humidity, and ultraviolet light,
influence virucide efficacy.
Einfeld presented a table illustrating various virus types
and their level of resistance to inactivation. Among all
microorganisms, the nonenveloped viruses (e.g., foot-and-
mouth disease virus) are relatively easy to treat, whereas
bacterial spore formers (e.g., anthrax) are the most difficult
to inactivate.
Currently no U.S. standard methods exist to evaluate virucide
efficacy against various organisms. Standardized testing
methods are needed for product registration and comparison.
Einfeld listed several domestic and international agencies
(e.g., EPA, American Society for Testing and Materials,
Association Francaise de Normalisation, DEFRA) that have
produced testing guidelines. In addition, many researchers
conduct tests with surrogate viruses because testing highly
pathogenic viruses is limited to specific laboratories. For
example, the foot-and-mouth disease virus can be handled
only at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.
Einfeld reviewed the EPA guideline for virucide testing.
This guideline outlines disinfectant application parameters,
virus recovery requirements, and test protocol components.
To be deemed effective, disinfectants must achieve
inactivation of the target virus at all dilutions or show at
least a 3-log reduction below the cytotoxic level. Einfeld
listed a number of test parameter variables to consider
when designing a virucide test. In addition to assessing
efficacy, virucide tests may also evaluate the mechanism
of inactivation. Different disinfectants may target the lipid
envelope, capsid protein, structural protein, or nucleic acid.
Einfeld listed various disinfectants and their target virus
component. A flow chart provided by Einfeld illustrated the
experimental approach to virucide efficacy and mechanism
of inactivation testing. Past testing typically used viruses
in suspension; current test approaches use a carrier
configuration and nucleic acid evaluations, which help assess
a disinfectant's target virus component.
Researchers at Plum Island Animal Research Center are
currently conducting studies with the foot-and-mouth
disease virus, which is a nonenveloped, single-stranded
ribonucleic acid (RNA) virus. This virus infects only cloven-
hoofed animals (e.g., bovine, porcine, ovine), but is highly
infectious. No surrogates are currently available, so research
is restricted to the Plum Island facility. The study objectives
are two-fold: optimize coupon carrier inoculation and
recovery for common agricultural materials and evaluate
various virucide efficacies for the foot-and-mouth disease
virus. Researchers selected eight virucides for testing.
Einfeld detailed the experimental method developed and
used for efficacy testing. Concrete, rubber, and stainless steel
coupons were inoculated with foot-and-mouth disease virus
propagated at the Plum Island Animal Research Center. After
inoculation with 100 microliters (|jil) of virus, the carriers
were dried in a biosafety hood for 30 minutes. Coupons were
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then treated with 500 ul of the test virucides. After 5, 10, or
20 minutes, researchers added 5 ml of DMEM containing
4% fetal calf serum to the carriers and vortexed the samples
vigorously. Dilutions of this solution were then used to
inoculate baby hamster kidney cells (BHK-21). The Reed-
Muench method and reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain
reaction (RT-PCR) were used to quantify results.
Einfeld presented results for the 5-, 10-, and 20-minute
exposures for each virucide, as quantified by both methods.
Each virucide, except ethanol, performed well. Inactivation
increased with increasing contact times; at 20 minutes,
nearly complete inactivation was achieved. RT-PCR results
provided no clear correlation between inactivation and RNA
destruction. Further evaluation is needed to better understand
the mechanism of inactivation.
In summary, the porous material carriers (i.e., concrete,
rubber) negatively impacted virucide efficacy. Ethanol,
which has a neutral pH, was consistently the least effective
treatment. Results were affected by difficulties in virus
recovery. Overall, carrier tests showed worse, but adequate,
virucide efficacy compared to previous suspension tests.
Carrier tests, as opposed to suspension tests, better mimic
real-world conditions. Ongoing studies are needed to
further evaluate efficacies; refine test methodologies; field
validate inactivation, if feasible; further assess mechanism
of action; and develop rapid on-site confirmation tests for
decontamination effectiveness.
Question and Answer Period
Workshop participants posed no questions.
Session 6: Radiological Agent Decontamination
Decontamination of Polonium in the United Kingdom
(UK)
Robert Bettley-Smith, Government Decontamination
Service, United Kingdom
GDS, which began operations in October 2005, addresses
decontamination issues associated with contaminated land,
buildings, open spaces, infrastructure, and transport aspects.
Human decontamination issues are excluded. GDS primarily
provides advice and guidance to responsible authorities,
maintains and builds a framework of specialized suppliers,
and advises the central government regarding national
response capabilities.
GDS has responded to a variety of contamination events,
such as the 2006 anthrax event in England and Scotland,
motorway accidents, and a 2006 polonium incident in
London. Bettley-Smith described the 2006 polonium incident
to illustrate a GDS response and highlight lessons learned
from this incident.
On November 24, 2006, GDS was informed that a substance,
confirmed as polonium-210, had been associated with the
death of an individual on the previous day. GDS rapidly
deployed a case officer, alerted GDS suppliers, and began
meeting with involved parties to assess the situation. Bettley-
Smith noted that polonium is an alpha emitter. As such, the
radioactive materials are easily contained by bagging and
removal from an affected location. Detecting the short-
lived alpha particles to identify the contaminated materials,
however, is difficult. Alpha particles tend to adhere to
materials and detection is accomplished with instrumentation
and not wipe sampling.
The Westminster City Council agreed to act as the lead
agency overseeing the decontamination process. By the
end of the day on November 24, 2006, responders had
identified five contaminated locations. Over time, a total of
ten locations were identified for decontamination. Currently,
decontamination is complete at nine of these ten locations.
Decontamination at the last venue will commence when
funding issues are resolved. These venues comprise a
mixture of facilities: restaurants, hotels, and historic sites.
Characterization surveys using a variety of sampling and
analytical techniques occurred at each location prior to
decontamination to determine the extent of contamination.
Not all contaminated items could be remediated. These
materials were packaged and transported to an appropriate
disposal facility. Examples of items removed from a hotel
room include upholstered furniture, large desks, and high-
activity wastes. Decontamination activities at this hotel
encompassed a bar area, a men's rest room, and guest rooms.
Activities spanned 19 days and involved a supervisor,
three health physicist monitors, and two decommissioning
operatives. Bettley-Smith noted that doubling the number
of decommissioning operatives would not necessarily
halve the time required to conduct decontamination. More
operatives would require more decontamination personnel
and movement coordination within small spaces.
Bettley-Smith provided a photograph of a bathroom in a
guest room as an example of conditions before and after
decontamination. No matter the technology tried, the
decontamination crews could not remove the polonium
from the bathtub itself. The entire bathtub was extremely
bulky and difficult to remove. As such the decontamination
team simply removed the bathtub's enamel coating with a
hammer and disposed of the enamel. This situation illustrates
the complexity of decontamination events and the need for
creative thinking during a response.
Several lessons can be learned from this response.
Communication is critical to success. The event was
classified as a hazardous material situation, not a CBRN
incident. As such, insurance and payment responsibility
became an issue. Bettley-Smith provided some order of
magnitude cost estimates that ranged up to £130,000 for
remediation. Sampling and monitoring of alpha particles,
especially on soft surfaces such as upholstered furniture,
presented challenges. Waste management was also time
consuming and complex.
GDS also became involved in the post mortem. No facilities
existed that could contain the alpha particles during a post
mortem. Therefore, GDS proposed retrofitting an existing
biological facility. GDS located a teaching hospital with
a facility enclosed by air curtains designed to contain
biologicals. In addition to sealing the facility and covering
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the equipment with plastic, the air curtains drew the alpha
particles into the HVAC system, which was retrofitted to
capture these particles. Monitoring was conducted before,
during, and after the post mortem. After the post mortem, the
plastic, HVAC filters, and other materials were collected and
disposed of. This waste, which contained both clinical and
radiological wastes, presented unique disposal challenges.
Question and Answer Period
• How was the body disposed of? Burying the body in a
sealed coffin was sufficient to prevent further release.
Appropriate measures were taken to prevent ongoing
alpha particle releases during transport from the hospital
to the burial location.
• Can you provide an order of magnitude estimate of
the amount of polonium released? Polonium is a very
mobile material; only a small amount was released.
• What was the physical form of the polonium released?
Polonium is also a weak gamma emitter. Did sampling
seek gamma particles? Were swipe samples collected?
Bettley-Smith was unable to disclose the polonium
form. Once the material was identified as polonium,
detection methods focused on alpha particles; gamma
particles were not detectable. No swipe samples were
collected. Contaminated surfaces, however, were
rubbed to determine whether the polonium was fixed or
mobile. In most cases, the polonium was fixed.
• Some reports indicate that airports were involved
in this incident. How was decontamination handled
in airports? Bettley-Smith could only confirm that
seat material from an aircraft was involved. This
material was removed and disposed of. The aircraft
fell beyond the Westminster City Council jurisdiction.
Decontamination was addressed by agencies within the
aircraft jurisdiction.
• What was the cleanup standard? The cleanup standard
was based on public health concerns. Bettley-Smith
could not release the specific value. Some of the
affected facility owners decontaminated to levels
below this standard. Materials hosting mobile
forms of polonium were removed completely to
prevent contaminant migration. Bettley-Smith noted
that determining a safe cleanup standard involves
consideration of many issues.
Decontamination of Terrorist-Dispersed Radionuclides
from Surfaces in Urban Environments
Robert Fischer, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Brian Viani, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Decontamination of common urban area materials
contaminated with radiological agents can be influenced
by grime layers, agent migration into pores and fissures,
local pH effects, competing materials, surface carbonation,
humidity, surface interactions, and surface weathering
effects. For radiological agents, the further the agent migrates
into a surface, such as concrete, the harder decontamination
becomes. Fischer and Viani described several studies
undertaken to further the understanding of factors that affect
urban environmental contamination and restoration following
detonation of a "dirty bomb." Their studies have focused on
concrete surfaces and cesium contamination, which represent
a worst-case decontamination scenario because these
materials are the most difficult to address during restoration.
To characterize surfaces in mass transportation system
facilities, various concrete samples were collected from
mass transit systems such as the Bay Area Rapid Transit
system. Core samples from two locations illustrate the
differences in the grime layer and surface conditions. LLNL
studies have shown that the grime layer did not affect the
chemical behavior of cesium (i.e., the grime did not adsorb
the cesium). Other radiological agents also had minimal
interaction with this grime. The grime itself contains
significant amounts of metals that could affect the efficacy of
chelator technologies. Chelator technologies offer advantages
over other decontamination technologies for radiological
agents. Chelators can be applied to a variety of surfaces, offer
minimal wastes, are rapidly deployed, and minimally impact
the environment. Chelator technology tests, therefore, focus
on identifying agent-specific materials that minimally interact
with grime layers.
Fischer and Viani conducted a series of detonation
experiments to simulate a realistic urban contamination
situation. In one test, Fischer and Viani constructed and
detonated a radiological dispersal device (ROD) indoors.
Multiple concrete samples (e.g., wet, dry, clean, grime-
covered) were placed within the detonation range to assess
contamination levels. These coupons will be used later in
decontamination studies. Fischer provided detailed study
methodology and results. The results provided information
about particle size morphology, particle density distribution,
and particle penetration depth.
An outdoor detonation study followed the indoor test.
This study sought to characterize near (<15 meter) and far
(150-250 meter) field contamination after detonation. Again,
Fischer and Viani constructed and detonated an ROD. The
first detonation was suspended above ground; the second was
entrained in soil. Fischer presented details and photographs
illustrating the study methodology. The methodology and
parameters used for the outdoor detonation built upon
information gained from the indoor test. Study data regarding
penetration are still undergoing analysis. Initial results,
however, are similar to results from the indoor study. The
depth of particle penetration appears to be a function of
time and environmental conditions. The outdoor testing
results will help researchers develop bench-scale methods to
simulate cesium deposition.
Viani discussed some results related to particle penetration.
Many surfaces in a transportation system are composed of
porous materials, and penetration into these materials is a
critical concern. Viani provided a schematic to illustrate
the various factors that affect penetration (e.g., porosity,
saturation, diffusion). Understanding the differences in
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penetration for pristine coupons versus coupons produced
from real-world cores may allow for penetration prediction,
based on laboratory data, during an event.
Analysis of concrete coupons contaminated during the
indoor detonation tests found cesium penetration varying
from 0.5 to 2.5 centimeters after 28 days. These coupons
were nominally dry; no data for saturated coupons are
available. A literature search identified a study resulting in
a similar level of penetration for saturated Portland cement.
Viani presented the approach for additional laboratory testing
of cesium penetration. These tests will consider the impact
of water on penetration.
Viani also presented cesium deposition results from the
outdoor detonation tests. All outdoor sample coupons were
placed horizontally to measure deposition on horizontal
surfaces. Samples collected after the second shot (soil
detonation) contained higher off-plume background cesium
concentrations but lower peak cesium concentrations than the
air detonation. Viani speculated that the higher background
concentrations resulted from resuspension of materials
released during the first detonation test. Scanning electron
microscopic analysis of the morphology and composition of
the deposited materials showed that most were not cesium.
Viani presented a series of photographs and graphs related to
the cesium concentration of deposited materials. Preliminary
data indicate a strong decrease in concentration with distance.
In summary, penetration of cesium in real-world materials
significantly differs from standard laboratory coupons.
Cesium penetration on dry materials can be significant
and depends on contact time (e.g., days for millimeter
penetrations, weeks for centimeter penetrations).
Applicability of results is limited by the use of a stable
cesium (Cs-133) in these studies. Fischer and Viani hope to
employ cesium-137 in future testing. Additional testing will
include continued analysis of the outdoor detonation results,
laboratory bench-scale deposition and penetration studies,
and chelator evaluations.
Question and Answer Period
The question and answer period was waived due to time
constraints.
An Empirical Assessment of Post-Incident Radiological
Decontamination Techniques
Andrew Parkinson, Australian Nuclear Science &
Technology Organization
The Australian Nuclear Science & Technology Organisation
(ANSTO) is Australia's national nuclear research and
development organization and the nation's nuclear expertise
center. ANSTO scientists collaborate with the forensic and
counter-terrorism community to conduct strategic research on
radiological and nuclear forensics and nuclear security issues.
In addition to conducting research, ANSTO also provides
advice, training, and operations support for all aspects related
to radiological agent release events.
Parkinson's research efforts at ANSTO focus on two main
project areas: effects of radiation exposure on critical
forensic evidence and assessments of post-incident
radiological decontamination techniques.
Decontamination and restoration strategies must remove
radioactive contamination or reduce exposures to
acceptable levels. Strategies can include denying access to
a contaminated area, demolition and rebuilding of affected
areas, or removal of the radiological agent. Low-impact and
nondestructive decontamination methodologies are favored
to minimize the social and economic impact of an event.
Method efficacy, however, must be established.
Parkinson described a project to assess the effectiveness
of commercially available, low-impact decontamination
technologies for a variety of common building materials.
Results from this project will assist organizations preparing
response guidelines and enhance Australia's counter-
terrorism capabilities. Currently accepted decontamination
methods (e.g., natural decay, demolition) are not suitable
in the event of a large area or urban event. This project
seeks to fill the technology gap for addressing widespread
urban releases.
Parkinson presented the study methodology. Coupons of
five common building materials—concrete, sandstone
paving, painted steel, mild steel, and road base asphalt—
were contaminated with three radioisotopes. These
isotopes—cesium-137, americium-241, and strontium-90—
represent the range of commercially available isotopes that
pose the greatest security risk. Contamination readings were
collected after isotope application and after decontaminant
agent application.
Ten decontamination products were tested, including
six strippable coatings and four wet chemical products
(e.g., surfactants and/or chelating agents). The strippable
coatings consist of polymeric materials that capture the
radiological agent and are then peeled from the surface
after curing. For this test, researchers applied the strippable
coating, allowed curing for 24 hours, and then removed
the coating. The chemical-based products were applied to
a contaminated surface, scrubbed, and removed with a wet
vacuum or high-pressure cleaner. Parkinson listed the specific
decontamination agents tested. Water served as a control for
the liquid chemical decontamination technologies.
Parkinson provided detailed results for each of the test
materials and decontamination products. Overall, the
liquid chemical technology approach provided better
decontamination than the strippable coatings and water alone.
One of the chemicals, however, left a dark pink residue that
would be unacceptable during an actual decontamination
and restoration event. Wet vacuuming is recommended for
removing liquids from hard, porous surfaces (e.g., paving,
asphalt) and high-pressure washing is recommended for
soft, porous materials (e.g., concrete). The liquid chemical
decontamination technologies, however, generate a large
volume of wastewater that could spread contamination.
The porous materials were harder to decontaminate than
the nonporous materials. The strippable coatings were
particularly ineffective on the porous materials. Strippable
coatings would best be used to decontaminate small areas
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that are highly contaminated, where wastewater from the
liquid chemical technologies would potentially spread the
contamination. Application of the coatings would also fix
the contamination in place while decision makers evaluated
additional decontamination options.
Future research will expand efficacy testing to additional
decontamination products and technologies, including
dry ice blasting, high-pressure steam, gels and foams,
and other novel technologies. ANSTO will also examine
decontamination effects on forensic trace evidence, such
as fibers, hairs, glass, fingerprints, and deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA). This future work will investigate whether
decontamination methods are successful at removing
radiological contamination without affecting the quality
of the evidence and the forensic interpretation. Currently,
Australia does not have a laboratory dedicated to radiological
forensics.
Question and Answer Period
• Many researchers are discussing chelation as a
decontamination option. In the U.S., no means of
disposing of the mixed waste exists. How does
Australia handle mixed wastes? Parkinson was unaware
of regulatory limitations to disposing of mixed wastes
in Australia. The waste management group at ANSTO
handles these concerns.
• How easy were the different isotopes to remove?
Yellowcake was the easiest to decontaminate, followed
by cesium and strontium. Yellowcake was applied as
a solid suspension and was very easy to remove once
it had dried, whereas the cesium and strontium were
applied as solutions, which enabled them to penetrate
deeper into the surface.
• Why was strontium the most difficult to remove? The
reason that strontium was the most difficult to remove
is unclear and under investigation. Strontium may react
with the material surface or penetrate deeper than the
other radioisotopes.
Cesium Chloride Particle Characteristics from
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Outdoor Test
Sang Don Lee, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
Lee presented data from his research with cesium chloride,
the most common radioactive material used in medical
facilities. Cesium chloride is a salt that transfers to an
aqueous state above a relative humidity of 68%. In the
aqueous phase, cesium chloride particles will easily migrate
through channels in porous urban materials. The transition
to the aqueous phase occurs in microseconds when relative
humidity changes. Lee provided photographs of cesium
chloride particles in different states at different relative
humidities.
The specific objectives of the research that Lee discussed
were to characterize the physicochemical properties of
cesium chloride particles generated during an outdoor
detonation and to estimate the cesium chloride deposition and
penetration on limestone. In conjunction with LLNL, two
outdoor detonations were conducted. Particle concentrations
were measured on limestone coupons placed in the near
field and via three polycarbonate air filter samplers and
Sidepaks™ (real-time particle monitors that provide readings
for PM2.5, PM10, and unfiltered particles) located far field—
approximately 150 meters from the detonation site. Lee also
evaluated the particle composition and size. For the first test,
the RDD detonation occurred one meter above the ground
surface. For the second test, the RDD was entrained in soil.
Lee presented particle concentration and size distribution
data, and electron microscope photographs of particles
captured from one far-field monitor. Lee noted that the black
dots on the photographs are the 0.4-jjum pores in the filter
paper. Based on photographic analysis, most particles were
less than 10 jjum.
Lee presented particle size data for the second test as well.
Although the far-field monitors captured very few cesium
chloride particles, these results do not necessarily indicate
a lack of a plume. They may be due to the monitors being
positioned incorrectly to capture the plume. For the particles
that were captured during the second test, they were
generally larger (7-6 um) than the particles formed from the
first detonation. Particles also agglomerated with multiple
components (e.g., carbon, silica).
Analysis of the limestone coupons placed in the near field is
ongoing. Lee presented details regarding this component of
the research. Both weathered and nonweathered limestone
coupons were used. The coupons received post-conditioning
at two different relative humidities before analysis. Laser
ablation inductively coupled plasma/mass spectrometry and
laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) will be used to
determine the extent of cesium penetration into the limestone.
Overall, experimental results indicate that most cesium
particles were below 10 jjum. When detonated above ground,
the cesium chloride particles were transported in a combined
form with carbonaceous materials, whereas detonation in
soil resulted in agglomeration with soil particles as well as
carbonaceous materials. Materials surrounding the RDD
at the time of detonation may affect particle characteristics
and plume behavior. Ongoing research includes further
analysis of the limestone coupons, and additional laboratory
parametric investigations of cesium penetration into other
building materials, as a function of environmental conditions.
Question and Answer Period
• Have results been compared to RDD dispersion
models? Results have not been compared to existing
dispersion models. Soil entrainment creates larger
particles and more rapid fallout, which leads to a
smaller impact area.
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Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Rapid
Decontamination
John Drake, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
Drake discussed a project to evaluate rapid decontamination
technologies after an RDD event. The goal is to evaluate the
performance of currently available commercial products that
could be used rapidly (quickly deployable and fast acting)
for building and outdoor area decontamination. Based on the
evaluation results, a technology selection guidance document
for planners and operations personnel will be developed.
The project also seeks to identify promising technologies for
future development. A full-scale demonstration of effective
technologies is planned within three to five years.
An RDD event is the deliberate dispersal of radiological
material to cause harm. The current thinking is that the
most likely RDD would consist of a conventional explosive
containing radiological material; however, releases from crop
sprayers or tanker trucks are also possible.
An RDD can be considered a weapon of mass disruption.
Economic disruption is the dominant RDD event outcome.
Acute health effects would be minimal; possible chronic
health effects are the primary health concern. Rapid
decontamination technology deployment is essential to
address public concerns and pressures for restoration after an
event. Drake noted that much could be learned from the UK
experience with polonium contamination in multiple urban
locations.
EPA would be the lead agency for restoration in the event
of a nuclear or radiological incident. NHSRC provides
scientific expertise and technical support to clean up
operations, performed under the direction of OSCs and the
NDT. NHSRC also provides expertise and guidance to other
domestic and international agencies.
The RDD rapid decontamination project focuses on
contaminated buildings, outdoor areas, and equipment. A
number of challenges influence responses to RDD events,
such as the pressure for re-occupancy, economic and political
concerns, waste disposition, and available workforce.
Drake listed the criteria used to prioritize decontamination
technology selection for evaluation. The highest priority is
placed on technologies that preserve building exteriors, treat
large areas, and minimize cost. Prioritization also considers
the volume of wastewater generated, effluent capture
requirements, supporting infrastructure needs, and future
land use. In general, the technology should minimize surface
damage, cost, secondary waste, recontamination, personnel
training, and deployment time. The technology should
maximize speed, decontamination efficacy, availability,
and applicability to the contaminant, affected substrate, and
weather conditions.
The test approach consists of depositing cesium chloride on
2-foot by 5-foot concrete coupons, measuring contaminant
levels, conducting decontamination, and measuring
residual contamination. Cesium chloride and concrete were
selected for testing because these materials are prevalent
in urban environments and are among the most difficult to
decontaminate. Sets of contaminated coupons will be held
in controlled humidity and temperature conditions for both
14 and 28 days, and then tests will begin to evaluate both
chemical and mechanical decontamination technologies.
Contaminant measurements will be used to calculate a
decontamination factor. Decontamination speed will also
be measured. The project will use large coupons to mimic
real-world situations as closely as possible. Using large
coupons will enable evaluation of operational parameters
(e.g., infrastructure needs, personnel training) and
other factors (e.g., deployed costs, availability). Legacy
decommissioning projects, which typically consisted of
building demolition, provide most of the current knowledge
regarding large-scale decontamination.
This project, which began six months ago, is being conducted
under TTEP The QAPP is complete and Idaho National
Laboratory (INL) has been identified as the test facility. Tests
at INL facilities will allow use of actual radioactive materials,
instead of nonradioactive surrogates. A short list of proposed
decontamination technologies has also been generated, from
which two will be selected for testing and evaluation. Drake
encouraged workshop participants to contact him with ideas
for decontamination technologies to test, test parameters, or
other information that would further support this project. He
hopes to obtain initial results by December 2007.
Question and Answer Period
• How will you deposit the cesium chloride on the
coupons? A deposition methodology has not been
selected. The selected methodology must be easily
verifiable and repeatable. Both dry and wet methods
have been discussed. Wet deposition is repeatable, but
will affect strippable coating efficacy.
Session 7: Research and Development for
Decontamination-Related and Support Activities
Water Infrastructure Protection Division (WIPD)
Decontamination Research Overview
Kim Fox, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
Fox oversees NHSRC's Water Infrastructure Protection
Division (WIPD). This group's primary research focus is on
detection and decontamination methods to be used following
a threat agent attack on drinking water sources and systems.
To a lesser degree, this group also researches technical issues
related to wastewater collection, treatment, and disposal
procedures.
Several EPA offices collaborated to publish the Water
Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan.
This document outlines research needs and projects
regarding water safety and security. Both drinking water
and wastewater infrastructure concerns are included. The
document serves as an action plan or guide to direct research
regarding incident response, system decontamination,
and water supply restoration. Fox noted that water supply
system decontamination includes water treatment as
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well as decontamination of the system infrastructure.
Decontamination efforts must also consider public perception
and political pressures surrounding drinking water safety. Fox
listed some of the key collaborators involved in developing
the action plan.
In some cases, pipe abandonment in place may be the best
response to a contaminated distribution system situation.
Ongoing and future research, however, strives for removal
of the contaminant. Fox listed several water system
research projects.
Within water systems, contaminants may be dissolved or
suspended in the water, or adhere to the pipe walls. Health
and economic impacts can vary widely depending on the
release location, and those impacts may occur miles from
the release location. Models are available to assess agent
fate and transport.
Fox described the intentional release of chlordane into
a water supply system to illustrate a response effort.
Decontamination consisted of flushing the system and
using surfactants to remove the chlordane. In some areas,
affected pipes in the distribution system and in homes had
to be replaced. The restoration process lasted more than
nine months. As another example, in response to a mercury
release, another water supplier quickly decided to remove
and replace the impacted pipes.
Decontamination is affected by agent adherence to pipe
walls, attachment to biofilms, reaction with pipe walls or
corrosion products, and permeation through pipe walls.
Different agents, such as petroleum products, CWAs, and
pesticides, each react uniquely to affect decontamination
techniques. Interactions between an agent and the pipe
wall may prolong a release event. Surface roughness and
corrosion may slow transport of the contaminating agent
and diminish decontamination effectiveness. Biofilms
may attract biological agents and result in continued agent
releases. Additional information is needed to fully understand
these interactions.
Fox listed several available decontamination methods.
Typically, the first step in decontamination involves scouring
the system with a high volume of water. Responders may
then add detergents, which must also be removed from the
system before service restoration. Fox briefly described
several decontamination research projects currently
underway.
• Pipe loop studies. EPA designed and built a pilot-scale
water distribution system using clear pipes to allow
evaluation of deposition and collection. The system
includes ports to allow insertion of pipe coupons
generated from actual water distribution system pipes.
To date, WIPD has evaluated decontamination methods
forB. subtilis, arsenic, and mercury. Historically,
biological decontamination consisted of flushing
followed by shock chlorination. Oxidation and scouring
with bubbles from ozone are future decontamination
research areas.
• ECBC enzyme project. WIPD is working with ECBC on
bench- and pilot-scale research to investigate a catalytic
enzyme-based product for treating water and water
systems contaminated with nerve agents or pesticides.
Fox provided photographs of the system and some
initial bench-scale tests.
• National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST)
project. WIPD is partnering with NIST to conducts
experiments to study the accumulation of agents
and decontamination of building plumbing systems
and appliances.
• Radiological issues. RDD events involving
radionuclides such as cesium or strontium can have a
huge impact on water supplies if the release is followed
by rain or if restoration generates contaminated
wastewater. Both rain water and wastewater will enter
the wastewater system and impact this system even
if the release did not directly target the wastewater
system.
Question and Answer Period
• The challenges faced by water suppliers are daunting.
Has EPA conducted exercises or communicated with
other agencies and groups focused on biological
or radiological release events? EPA has conducted
exercises and communicated with other researchers to
discuss how various release and restoration scenarios
would impact water supplies.
• After the 2001 anthrax incidents, did EPA consider
the effects to the water supply from the event itself or
from disposal of wastewater from the restoration? EPA
has considered the impacts of introducing anthrax to
the wastewater system as a result of decontamination
efforts. For naturally occurring anthrax, water suppliers
can treat the spores as a biological contaminant and
disinfect the system accordingly.
• Is EPA concerned about the disposal of flushed water?
EPA is concerned about treatment of wastewater
generated when flushing a system. In some instances,
flushing dilutes the contaminant below health-based
standards. Dilution, however, is not a universal solution.
Consequence management is a substantial consideration
for decontamination.
Incineration of Materials Contaminated with Bio-Warfare
Agents
Paul Lemieux, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
NHSRC's research and development program for disposal
of potentially threat agent-contaminated materials focuses
mostly on the effectiveness and environmental impacts
of landfill options and thermal destruction technologies.
Lemieux's presentation focused on thermal destruction
research efforts.
Incinerator operators, who are often in the private-sector,
have many concerns when accepting threat agent-
-------
contaminated waste at their facilities. They must prevent
contaminant migration, comply with existing permits, and
manage residues. Operators are resistant to risk harming
normal operations by accepting waste from a high-impact,
infrequent event, even in the case of national security. If
accepting a waste, operators have size constraints on the
materials they process, which impacts potential size reduction
efforts needed at the contaminated site.
Several types of incinerators exist, but not all may be
applicable for every agent or have been used for destruction
of a particular type of threat agent in the past. Therefore,
thermal treatment may be technically feasible, but untested,
for some types of incinerators and agents. Similarly, no
guarantee exists that any given incinerator will achieve
successful destruction of the agent. Operational variables can
dramatically impact a given facility's ability to effectively
destroy residual agents in the waste feed. Lemieux described
an EPA study conducted in the early 1990s to assess the
effectiveness of medical waste incinerators in destroying
G. stearothermophilus spores (surrogate for pathogenic
bacteria) doped on the waste. A few of the tested incinerators
contained viable spores in the remaining ash and in the stack
emissions.
NHSRC's approach to evaluating incineration as a disposal
option includes conducting bench- and pilot-scale studies,
as well as modeling efforts. Bench-scale studies employ
small building material coupons containing B. subtilis and
G. stearothermophilus to develop thermal destruction
kinetic data.
For pilot-scale testing, NHSRC uses its rotary kiln incinerator
located in Research Triangle Park, NC. This incinerator has
a primary and a secondary combustion chamber. Building
material bundles embedded with Bis enclosed in small
pipes are fed into the kiln. After exposure to various times
and incinerator temperatures, the Bis are then cultured to
assess spore viability. Lemieux provided results from trials
with carpet and ceiling tile bundles. In one test with wet
ceiling tile, spores remained viable after 35 minutes in the
incinerator. In general, complete spore inactivation occurs if
the internal bundle temperature reaches approximately 400
degrees Celsius (°C).
Lemieux input data generated from the pilot-scale testing
into a computational fluid dynamics model, which also
uses chemical reaction kinetics, and mass and heat transfer
calculations, to compare predicted versus measured results.
For EPA's pilot-scale incinerator, the model under-predicted
the drying time needed for the wet ceiling tile bundle, but
overall, model predictions of bacterial spore inactivation
agreed with measured results within an acceptable range.
Once calibration of the model of the pilot-scale kiln is
performed, the model can be run to predict behavior of
similar materials in three types of full-scale commercial
incinerators. Improvements to the model are being made.
Lemieux also briefly discussed the EPA disposal decision
support tool, which is a Web-based tool designed to assist
decision makers, planners, and responders. The tool includes
a series of input threat scenarios and estimates potential
waste volumes. The tool also lists contact and facility
information for disposal facilities, including landfills,
incinerators, wastewater treatment plants, and other facilities.
Information regarding worker safety, waste packaging
and storage, and waste transportation is also included.
Modules exist for agricultural biomass disposal, water
systems materials, and natural disaster debris. EPA is also
developing a radiological debris module. Users must request
access to the tool; Lemieux provided the information
necessary to do so.
To conclude, Lemieux discussed a number of nontechnical
issues and proposed solutions surrounding disposal of wastes
from restoration efforts following a threat agent attack. One
example is the reluctance of facilities to accept such waste
due to the stigma associated with the threat agents. Lemieux
recommended ongoing communication with facilities and
communities to address their concerns about worker safety,
business liabilities, and health concerns. Lemieux also
discussed data and technology gaps, such as methods needed
to confirm incinerator performance (i.e., agent destruction
efficacy); methods to measure spores in stack gases and ash;
guidance to best package materials at a site for optimized
incinerator performance; information identifying the most
appropriate facility for different waste materials; and disposal
options for RDD waste.
Question and Answer Period
• Is EPA considering plasma technologies for carcass
decontamination? EPA has explored plasma
technologies. DOE and DoD have used plasma
destruction on a small scale. Large-scale testing and
application has not been conducted and is a possible
area for future research.
Detection to Support Decontamination
Emily Snyder, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Homeland Security Research Center
Snyder provided an update on several detection-related
research projects. The detection technologies she discussed
are primarily being used in support of decontamination
research conducted by DCMD and elsewhere.
• Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS). The
LIBS device uses a pulsed laser that passes through
a lens to form a plasma on a sample surface. As the
plasma forms and degrades, it emits a unique light
spectra with characteristics specific to the sample
material. LIBS may be used in the laboratory, and
a backpack configuration of LIBS has also been
developed for field use.
Current research and development with LIBS focuses
on determining detection limits with pure samples of B.
atrophaeus (a surrogate for B. anthracis) and samples
mixed with interference materials (i.e., mysterious
white powders). Similar tests have also been done with
ovalbumin, a surrogate material for ricin. Using LIBS,
Snyder tested each sample to obtain its spectra, which
can then be analyzed using either multiple least square
-------
regression or neural network methodologies to predict
sample concentrations. Both methods could be used to
construct concentration plots (noted as log of CPU for
B. atrophaeus spores). Snyder discussed more details
about using the neural network software to construct
sample identity classifications. The method uses a series
of nonlinear equations to predict output variables from
input variables. To train the model, information for half
of the known spectra was included in the classification
model, which used numerical designations for various
contaminants. After training the model, Snyder tested
it to quantify the rate at which false negatives and false
positive readings occur. The rate of false negatives
dropped as the agent concentration increased. False
positives varied based on the interfering materials (e.g.,
humic acid, house dust) and the spectrum identification
range. In testing mixtures, the number of false positives
also increased with decreasing agent concentrations
and increasing interference concentrations. Humic acid
mixtures caused the highest false positive rate when
mixed with B. atrophaeus.
Snyder also used soft independent modeling of class
analogies to interpret LIBS results and identify sample
components. More false negatives and false positives were
reported using this model versus the neural network model.
Ongoing research with LIBS includes working to mitigate
the interfering effects of the surface material (e.g., laminate,
cement) on which the white power is found, increasing
the available spectral library of potentially confounding
materials, and developing a femtosecond LIBS system.
In 2008, NHSRC hopes to establish an agreement with a
commercial facility to develop a portable LIBS system for
first responders.
• Single-Photon lonization/Time-of-Flight Mass
Spectrometry (SPI). This technology works by using
a laser to ionize matter and time-of-flight mass
spectrometry to analyze the ions. This method has
been used by Snyder to detect fumigants and fumigant
by-products. Snyder provided an example mass
spectrum from a chlorine dioxide test and presented
data comparing results with another chlorine dioxide
measurement technique. Based on the data gathered,
SPI reached a detection limit of 0.3 ppm for chlorine
dioxide. Snyder thought that through future research a
lower detection limit could be achieved.
• Dual-Source Triple-Quadrupole Mass Spectrometry.
Snyder provided a schematic of this device's principle
of operation and presented data for chlorine and
chlorine dioxide. This method detects other fumigants
and fumigant by-products, and future research may
expand its application to TICs. Testing identified
detection limits of 14.5 parts per trillion by volume
(pptv) and 11.7 pptv for chlorine gas and chlorine
dioxide, respectively. Using this instrument to analyze
the purity of the chlorine dioxide gas produced from the
ClorDiSys generator, it was determined that less than
0.017% of the chlorine dioxide was chlorine gas, which
equals approximately 9 pptv or less (i.e., nondetect
levels). No other chlorine compounds were detected in
the generator gas.
Snyder also briefly presented data from ongoing efforts to
determine cesium penetration into building materials using
LIBS and efforts to develop a rapid viability PCR detection
method for the detection of F. tularensis and Y. pestis (viable
and nonviable) on building materials.
Question and Answer Period
• For chlorine dioxide and chlorine gas generation,
did the tests consider both Sabre and ClorDiSys
generation technologies? Tests were specific to the
ClorDiSys system.
• Is there information about vegetative cell survival
on building materials? Research regarding survival
is ongoing.
EPA Responder Decontamination Needs
Leroy Mickelsen, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Decontamination Team
Throughout the workshop, speakers discussed numerous
detection, containment, decontamination, and disposal issues.
Much research has occurred, is ongoing, or is planned. All
this information feeds into the actions and decisions of OSCs
and other responders. Mickelsen emphasized that responders
are the ultimate end-users of the decontamination information
being developed, and they need this information presented
in user-friendly and up-to-date formats. Few manuals or
hands-on materials exist. Mickelsen outlined specific areas of
interest and data needs.
• Personal protective equipment (PPE). Responders
need specific guidance regarding the types of PPE
effective for specific threat agents and decontaminants.
Guides also need to recommend which decontaminants
should be used for different types of PPE. Guidance
on whether responders can safely reuse some PPE is
needed. When conducting decontamination, guidance is
needed to reduce the spread of both the threat agent and
the decontaminant.
• Sampling and characterization. Faster, cheaper, and
better detectors and methods are needed. Responders
need to understand how to sample in complex
environments and how to validate their sampling
programs. Research should develop methods to reduce
the sample numbers required for characterization,
validation, and clearance. Regulators should develop
standard operating procedures (SOPs) for sample
packaging and shipping to ensure sample integrity.
• Decontamination methods. Similar to sampling, faster,
cheaper, and better decontamination methods are
needed. Responders need information about technology
efficacy for various matrices and agents. Research
should evaluate in-place decontamination methods that
would minimize waste disposal needs. SOPs are needed
to outline parameters for specific decontamination
-------
technologies to ensure efficacy and to handle high-value
item decontamination.
• Clearance guidelines. Responders need guidelines that
address cleanup needs and standards for specific agents,
locations, and reuse activities. SOPs should outline
clearances processes and documentation requirements.
• Disposal guidelines. Responders also need
information about disposal options, including
incineration, for specific threat agents, matrices, and
decontamination wastes. SOPs should address waste
transportation needs.
Responders may not have the products and guidelines
necessary to inform decision making for several reasons.
Responders may be unaware of available materials. Research
may be complete, but the findings or resulting products
are not available. Research may be ongoing or planned.
Researchers may also be unaware of a responder need.
Mickelsen noted that this workshop provides an excellent
opportunity for information sharing between researchers and
responders.
Regardless of research status, a need for guidance based on
the best available data still exists. This guidance should be
simple and direct and include the most current information
possible, as well as outline data gaps. Collaboration and
coordination between researchers, responders, and other
stakeholders in decontamination efforts are required to
produce such a guidance document. A guidance document
would ensure that responders have the best and most current
information available and that researchers have tangible
evidence of the impact of their efforts. By identifying
data gaps, the guidance document can direct, and possibly
prioritize, data needs. Responders may identify incomplete
information that is still sufficient to support decisions,
allowing researchers to focus on addressing new data gaps
rather than continuing to refine existing data.
In conclusion, Mickelsen noted that substantial research data
are available for responders; however, these data need to be
translated to field use. Through coordination, cooperation,
and communication, decontamination stakeholders are
capable of producing products, based on this vast research,
that impact decontamination, reduce restoration costs, and
create effective responses.
Question and Answer Period
• Involving OSCs in research proposals will help ground
projects. Mickelsen agreed that communicating
directly with OSCs will help researchers identify
response needs. OSCs, however, should also contact
researchers to provide feedback from actual responses.
Communication must flow in both directions.
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Agenda
United States
Environmental Protection Agency
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
2007 Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated
Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or
Radiological Materials
Sheraton Imperial Hotel
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina
June 20-22, 2007
Agenda
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 2007
8:00 am Registration/Check-in
8:30 am Welcome - Opening Remarks
Lek Kadeli (Deputy AA, Office of Research and Development, US EPA)
Nancy Adams (Director, US EPA/NHSRC/DCMD)
Blair Martin (Deputy Director, APPCD)
SESSION 1: SOME U.S. PERSPECTIVES
SESSION CHAIR: BLAIR MARTIN, USEPA
9:00 am Overview of Select U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Programs
Lance Brooks (DHS)
9:30 am Evidence Awareness for Remediation Personnel at Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Crime Scenes
Jarrod Wagner (FBI)
10:15 am Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Decontamination Research & Development Activities
John McKinney (TSWG)
10:45 am Regulating Bio-Decontamination Chemicals Jeff Kempter (US EPA/OPP)
11:15 am Environmental Sampling for Biothreat Agents: Current Research and Validation Efforts
Kenneth Martinez (CDC/NIOSH)
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SESSION 2: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
SESSION CHAIR: LlNDSEY HlLLESHEIM, US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1:00 pm G8 Bio-Terrorism Experts Group (BTEX) Lindsey Hillesheim (US Department of State)
1:30 pm Biological Decontamination with Peracetic Acid and Hydrogen Peroxide
Barbel Niederwohrmeier
(Armed Forces Scientific Institute for Protection Technologies, Germany)
2:00 pm Field Demonstration of Advanced Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)
Decontamination Technologies
Konstantin Volchek (Environment Canada)
2:30 pm Japanese Research Project for Development of On-site Detection of Chemical and Biological Warfare
Agents Yasuo Seto (National Research Institute of Police Science, Japan)
3:15 pm A Fatal Case of "Natural" Inhalational Anthrax in Scotland-Decontamination Issues
Colin Ramsay (Health Protection Scotland)
3:45 pm Case Study of Fatality Due to Anthrax Infection in the United Kingdom (UK)
Graham Lloyd/Robert Spencer (Health Protection Agency, UK)
THURSDAY, JUNE 21,2007
SESSION 3: BIOLOGICAL THREAT AGENT DECONTAMINATION
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SESSION CHAIR: NANCY ADAMS, US EPA
8:00 am National Homeland Security Research Center's (NHSRC) Systematic Decontamination Studies
Shawn Ryan (US EPA/NHSRC/DCMD)
8:30 am Improvement and Validation of Lab-Scale Test Methods for Sporicidal Decontamination Agents
Steve Tomasino (US EPA/OPP)
9:00 am Full-scale Experience in Decontaminations Using Chlorine Dioxide Gas
John Mason (Sabre Technical Services)
9:30 am Systematic Decontamination-Challenges and Successes Vipin Rastogi (ECBC)
10:15 am New York City Anthrax Response Neil Norrell (US EPA/R.2)
10:45 am Update on EPA Decontamination Technologies Research Laboratory (DTRL) Activities
Shawn Ryan (US EPA/NHSRC/DCMD)
11:15 am Localizing and Controlling Biothreat Agent (BTA) Transport with Polymer Sprays Paula Krauter (LLNL)
11:45 am Can We Expedite Decontamination? Blair Martin (US EPA/APPCD)
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SESSION 4: CHEMICAL THREAT AGENT DECONTAMINATION R&D
SESSION CHAIR: SHAWN RYAN, US EPA
1:15 pm Airport Restoration Following a Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA) Attack Bob Knowlton (SNL)
1:45 pm Quantitative Structure Toxicity Relationships (QSTR) to Support Estimation of Cleanup Goals
Chandrika Moudgal (US EPA/NHSRC)
2:15 pm Determining Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA) Environmental Fate to Optimize Remediation for Indoor
Facilities Adam Love (LLNL)
2:45 pm Chemical & Biological Defense Program Physical Science & Technology Program Overview-Hazard
Mitigation Mark T. Mueller (US Defense Threat Reduction Agency)
SESSION 5: BIOLOGICAL AND FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE AGENT DECONTAMINAITON
SESSION CHAIR: SHAWN RYAN, US EPA
3:30 pm (1) Results from the Evaluation of Spray-Applied Sporicidal Decontamination Technologies
(2) Test Plans and Preliminary Results for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Persistence and
Decontamination Tests Joseph Wood (US EPA/NHSRC/DCMD)
4:00 pm Inactivation of Avian Influenza Virus Using Common Soaps/Detergents, Chemicals, and Disinfectants
Robert Alphin (University of Delaware)
4:30 pm Inactivation of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus on Various Contact Surfaces Wayne Einfeld (SNL)
FRIDAY, JUNE 22, 2007
SESSION 6: RADIOLOGICAL AGENT DECONTAMINATION
SESSION CHAIR: JOHN MACKINNEY, US EPA
8:00 am Decontamination of Polonium in the United Kingdom (UK) Robert Bettley-Smith (UK GDS)
8:30 am Decontamination of Terrorist-Dispersed Radionuclides from Surfaces in Urban Environments
Robert Fischer/Brian Viani (LLNL)
9:00 am An Empirical Assessment of Post-Incident Radiological Decontamination Techniques
Andrew Parkinson
(Australian Nuclear Science & Technology Organization)
9:30 am Cesium Chloride Particle Characteristics from Radiological Dispersal Device (ROD) Outdoor Test
Sang Don Lee (US EPA/NHSRC/DCMD)
10:00 am Radiological Dispersal Device (ROD) Rapid Decontamination John Drake (US EPA/NHSRC/DCMD)
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SESSION 7: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR DECONTAMINATION - RELATED AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES
SESSION CHAIR: JOSEPH WOOD, US EPA
10:45 am Water Infrastructure Protection Division (WIPD) Decontamination Research Overview
Kim Fox (US EPA/NHSRC/WIPD)
11:15 am Incineration of Materials Contaminated with Bio-Warfare Agents Paul Lemieux (US EPA/NHSRC/DCMD)
1:00 pm Detection to Support Decontamination Emily Snyder (US EPA/NHSRC)
1:30 pm US EPA Responder Decontamination Needs Leroy Mickelsen (US EPA/NDT)
2:00 pm Closing Comments Blair Martin (USEPA, APPCDVNancy Adams (US EPA/NHSRC/DCMD)
Notes:
All speakers given 25 minutes for talk, plus 5 minutes for questions, unless noted.
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Acronyms:
APPCD Air Pollution Prevention and Control Division
BTA Biothreat agent
BTEX Bioterrorism Experts Group
CBRN Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CWA Chemical warfare agent
DCMD Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DTRL Decontamination Technologies Research Laboratory
ECBC Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GDS Government Decontamination Service
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
NOT National Decontamination Team
NHSRC National Homeland Security Research Center
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
OPP Office of Pesticide Programs
QSTR Quantitative structure toxicity relationship
R.2 US EPA Region 2
ROD Radiological dispersal device
SNL Sandia National Laboratory
TSWG Technical Support Working Group
US EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
UK United Kingdom
WIPD Water Infrastructure Protection Division
WMD Weapon of mass destruction
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IV.
List of Participants
The following pages list workshop participants. This list does not include those who were invited to
participate but could not attend the workshop. Asterisks denote presenters.
* Nancy Adams
Decontamination and
Consequence Management Division
NHSRC U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-5510
Fax:919-541-0496
Melissa Adkins
ORISE Postdoctoral Fellow
National Homeland Security
Research Center
ORISE- U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E305-03)
Durham, NC 27711
919-541-1140
Fax: 9195412157
Robert Alphin
Poultry Research Coordinator
Allen Laboratory
Department of Animal and Food Sciences
University of Delaware
107 Allen Lab - 601 Sincock Lane
Newark, DE 19716
302-831-0825
Fax: 302-831-8177
Ron Atlas
Dean
Graduate School
University of Louisville
105 Houchins Building
Louisville, KY 40292
502-852-3957
Fax: 502-852-2365
Donald Bansleben
Program Manager
Science & Technology
CBR&D
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528
202-254-6146
Fax: 202-254-6166
James Barnes
Certified Health Physicist
Santa Susana Field Laboratory
Environment, Health and Safety
The Boeing Company
5800 Woolsey Canyon Road
(055-T487)
Canoga Park, CA 91304-1148
323-466-8766
Fax: 323-466-8746
Charles Bass
Capability Area Program Officer
Chemical and Biological Directorate
Physical Science and Technology
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
8725 John J Kingman Road (6201)
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060
703-767-3371
Fax: 703-767-1892
Doris Betancourt
Microbiologist
IEMB
Air Pollution Prevention & Control Division,
NRMRL
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E 305-03)
Durham, NC 27711
919-541-9446
Fax: 919-541-2157
'Robert Bettley-Smith
Headquarters
Government Decontamination
Service
MoD Stafford
Beaconside
Stafford, Staffs ST180AQ
England
01785 216331
Fax: 01785216363
Terry Brennan
Camroden Associates
7240 East Carter Road
Westmoreland, NY 13490
315-336-7955
Fax: 315-336-6180
Mark Brickhouse
Chemical Sciences Senior Team Leader
Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center
E3400 Ricketts Point Road
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010
410-436-8951
Fax: 410-436-7203
* Lance Brooks
Program Manager
Chemical/Biological Research &
Development Section
Departyment of Homeland Security S&T
S&T/8-015
Washington, DC 20528
202-254-5768
Fax: 202-254-6167
Carl Brown
Acting Chief of the Emergencies
Science & Technology Division
Environment Canada
335 River Road
Ottawa, Ontario K1AOH3
Canada
613-991-1118
Jay Burcik
Chemist
TSD
U.S. Secret Service
950 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20223
202-395-9210
Fax: 202-395-9323
Joan Bursey
National Homeland Security
Research Center
Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-2253
Fax: 919-541-0496
Anne Bushier
Manager of Emergency Preparedness
Dynamac Corporation
3912 Idlewild Drive
Rocky River, OH 44116
440-578-0787
Fax: 440-333-4901
Philip Campagna
Chemist
Environmental Response Team
U.S. Environmetal Protection Agency
2890 Woodbridge Avenue (101)
Edison, NJ 08527
732-321-6689
Fax: 732-321-6724
Dorothy Canter
Senior Professional Biophysicist
National Security Technology Department
Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory
11, 100 Johns Hopkins Road (17-N664)
Laurel, MD 20723
240-228-2816
Fax: 240-228-1868
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John Cardarelli II
Health Physicist
OSWER
National Decontamination Team
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King (271)
Cincinnati, OH 45248
513 675-4745
Fax: 513 487-2537
Sandip Chattopadhyay
Senior Chemical Engineer
Energy-Transportation-Environment
Environmental Restoration
Battelle Memorial Institute
505 King Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201
614-424-3661
Fax: 614-424-3667
Adrian Clark
Dstl Porton
Detection
Defence Science &
Technology Lab
Building 06
Porton Down
Salisbury, Wiltshire SP4 OJQ
United Kingdom
+44(0)1980613203
Fax: +44 (0)1980 629806
Matt Clayton
Engineer
Arcadis
4915 Prospectus Drive - Suite F
Durham, NC 27713
919-541-5548
Fax: 919-541-5181
Gordon Cleveland
USDA Radiological POC
Veterinary Services
Animal Health Emergency Management
U.S. Department of Agriculture - APHIS
4700 River Road - Unit 41
Riverdale, MD 20737
301-734-8091
Fax: 301-734-7817
Carmen Costable
Applications Development Specialist
Genencor International
1700 Lexington Avenue
Rochester, NY 14606
585-277-4449
Fax: 585-277-4300
Katie Crockett
Senior analyst
The Tauri Group
675 North Washington Street - Suite 202
Alexandria, VA 22314
703-647-8078
Fax: 703-683-2866
Mohn Drake
National Homeland
Security Research Center
Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division, NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513-235-4273
Fax: 513-487-2555
*Wayne Einfeld
Project Manager
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800 - Mail Stop 0734
Albuquerque, NM 87185
505-845-8314
Fax: 505-844-7786
Victor Engleman
President
EAI
3129 Carnegie Place
San Diego, CA 92122
858-452-0835
Fax: 858-452-0835
'Robert Fischer
Environmental Scientist
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
P.O. Box 808 (L-546)
7000 East Ave
Livermore, CA 94531
925-422-3004
Fax: 925-422-3879
*Kim Fox
Director, Water Infrastructure Protection
Division, NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513-569-7820
Fax: 513-487-2555
Dianne Gates-Anderson
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
7000 East Avenue (L-786)
Livermore, CA 94550
925-423-0447
Fax: 925-422-3469
Jeffrey George
Captain
Canadian Forces Nuclear Biological Chemical
Defence School
Canadian Department of
National Defence
P.O. Box 1000 - Station Main
Canadian Forces Base Borden
Borden, Ontario LOM 1C2
Canada
705-424-1200 ex. 2571
Fax: 705-423-2344
Robert Goodfellow
IBRD SETA
Booze Allen Hamilton
8283 Greensboro Drive
McLean, VA 22102
607-341-2095
Diane Gordon
Research Assistant
National Microbiology Laboratories
Safety and Envrionmental Services
Public Health Agency of Canada
1015 Arlington Street
Winnipeg, MB R3E 3R2
Canada
204-784-7529
Fax: 204-789-5038
Nancy Hammond
Chief, Environmenal & Explosive Safety
Hazardous, Toxic, &
Radioactive Waste Branch
Engineering Division
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
P.O. Box 1715
Baltimore, MD 21203
410-962-2714
Fax: 410-962-4266
Harold Heaton
Principal Staff Physicist
Special Applications
National Security Technology
Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory
11, 100 Johns Hopkins Road (17-N672)
Laurel, MD 20723-6099
240-228-5025
Fax: 240-228-1868
Marianne Heisz
Acting Director
Office of Lab Security
Public Health Agency of Canada
100 Colonnade Road
Ottawa, Ontario K180K9
Canada
613-957-1779
Jonathan Herrmann
Director
National Homeland
Security Research Center
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Room 163
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513-569-7839
Fax: 513-487-2555
Dudley Hewlett
Headquarters
Government Decontamination Service
MoD Stafford
Beaconside
Stafford, Staffs ST18 OAQ
England
01785 216331
Fax: 01785 216363
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*Lindsey Hillesheim
Policy Advisor
Office of International
Health & Biodefense
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, DC 20520
202-647-6922
Fax: 202-736-7336
Nobutaka Hirooka
Major
OTSG
Japan Ground Self-Defense Force
5109 Leesburg Pike - Skyline 6
Room 693
Falls Church, VA 22041
703-681-0108
Fax: 703-681-3429
Pauline Ho
PMTS
Chemical and Biological Systems
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800 (MS 0734)
Albuquerque, NM 87185-0734
505-844-3759
Fax: 505-844-7786
Mario lerardi
Homeland Security Team Leader
Hazardous Waste
Generator and Characterization
Hazardous Waste Identification
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (5304P)
Washington, DC 20460
703-308-8894
Fax: 703-308-1561
Robert Jacobs
School of Public Health and
Information Sciences
Environmental and Occupational Sciences
University of Louisville
555 South Floyd Street - Suite 4026
Louisville, KY 40292
502-852-0196
Fax: 502-852-3304
Peter Jutro
Deputy Director
National Homeland
Security Research Center
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (8801R)
Washington, DC 20460
202-564-3331
Fax: 202 564-1614
*Lek Kadeli
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Office of Research and Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (8101R)
Washington, DC
202-564-6620
Tetsuro Kagao
Major, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force
Bureau of Defense
Defense Policy Division
Ministry of Defense, Japan
5-1 Ichigayahonmuracho
Shinjyuku, Tokyo 162-8802
Japan
+81-3-5269-3245
Fax:+81-3-5229-2135
Melissa Kaps
Program Analyst
Generator and Characterization Branch
Hazardous Waste Identification Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (5304P)
Washington, DC 20460
703-308-6787
Fax: 703-308-0514
*Carlton (Jeff) Kempter
Senior Advisor
Antimicrobials Division, OPP
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20460
703-305-5448
Fax: 703-308-6467
Aaron Kirtley
U.S. Department of State
OBO/PE/DE/MEB
Washington, DC 20520
703-875-7002
Fax: 703-516-1627
* Robert Knowlton
Principal Member of the Technical Staff
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800 (MS 0734)
Albuquerque, NM 87185-0734
505-844-0080
Fax: 505-844-7786
*Paula Krauter
Environmental Microbiologist
Chemical/Biological Division
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
7000 East Avenue (L-528)
Livermore, CA 94550
925-422-0429
Fax: 925-422-2095
David Langfitt
Mechanical Engineer
Mechanical Engineering Branch
U.S. Department of State
125 Henrico Road
Front Royal, VA 22630
703-875-4790
Fax: 703-875-1627
George Lawson
CBRN Integrator
Joint Requirements Office
for CBRN Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
Pentagon
Washington, DC 20318-8000
703-602-9032
*Sang Don Lee
Physical Scientist
DCMD, NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919 541 4531
Fax: 919 5410496
*Paul Lemieux
Disposal Area Lead
Decontamination and
Consequence Management Division
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-0962
Fax: 919-541-0496
Alan Lindquist
Microbiologist
Water Infrastructure Protection Division,
NHSRC
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513-569-7192
Fax: 513-487-2555
*Graham Lloyd
Centre for Emergency
Preparedness and Response
Health Protection Agency
Porton Down
Salisbury, Wiltshire SP4 8BQ
United Kingdom
44 1980 612224
Fax: 44 1980610848
*Adam Love
Scientist
Forensic Science Center
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
P.O. Box808(L-091)
Livermore, CA 94550
925-422-4999
Fax: 925-423-9014
John MacKinney
Environmental Scientist
DCMD, National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (8801R)
Ariel Rios Building
Washington, DC 20460
202-564-9522
Fax: 202-564-1614
*Blair Martin
Associate Director, Air Pollution Prevention
and Control Division
NRMRL
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(E343-04)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-7504
Fax: 919-541-5227
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*Kenneth Martinez
Acting Associate Director
Emergency Preparedness and
Response Office
Centers for Disease Control/NIOSH
4676 Columbia Parkway (Rll)
Cincinnati, OH 45226
513-841-4224
Fax: 513-458-7147
Mohn Mason
Chief Executive Officer
Sabre
406 9th street
Watervliet, NY 12189
202-256-3449
Fax: 518-810-0126
Dino Mattorano
Industrial Hygienist
NOT, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513-487-2424
Fax: 513-487-2102
*John McKinney
Program Analyst
Battelle Memorial Institute
Technical Support Working Group
201 12th Street
Arlington, VA 22202
703-602-6230
Fax: 703-604-1729
Michael Metz
Manager, Environmental
Monitoring and Emergency Response
Office of System Safety
MTA/New York City Transit
2 Broadway
New York, NY 10004
646-252-5766
Fax: 646-252-5960
James Michael
Senior RCRA Advisor
Generator and Characterization
Office of Solid Waste
Hazardous Waste Identification
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (5304P)
Washington, DC 20460
703-308-8610
Fax: 703-308-0514
*Leroy Mickelsen
Engineer
National Decontamination Team
OSWER/OEM
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E-343-06)
Durham, NC 27711
919-541-1356
Fax: 919-541-4537
David Mickunas
Environmental Response Team
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-04)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27516
919-541-4191
Fax: 919-541-0359
Ong Ming Kwei
Senior Executive
Pollution Control Department
National Environment Agency
40 Scotts Road
#12-00 Environment Building
Singapore, Singapore 228231
Singapore
+6567319701
Fax: +6568362294
Richard Morel
Lieutnant-Colonel
Defense
French Permanent Joint Headquarter
14 Rue Saint Dominique
Armees, 00456
France
+0033-176648706
Fax: +0033-176648713
Phil Morey
Director of Microbiology
Building Technology
Boelter Associates
2235 Baltimore Pike
Gettysburg, PA 17325-7015
717-337-2324
Fax: 717-337-0691
Hirohisa Mori
Principal Deputy Director
Bureau of Personnel and Education
Health and Medical Division
Ministry of Defense, Japan
5-1 Ichigayahonmuracho
Shinjyuku, Tokyo 162-8802
Japan
+81-3-5229-2131
Fax: +81-3-5229-2137
Deborah Motz
Logistics/Life Cycle Manager
JPM-Decontamination
Joint Program Executive Office
Chemical Biological Defense
50 Tech Parkway - Suite 301
Stafford, VA 22556
703-617-2466
Fax: 703-617-2452
*Chandrika Moudgal
Toxicologist
National Homeland Security
Research Center, Office of Research and
Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
901 North 5th Street (ENSV/IO)
Kansas City, KS 66101
913-551-7393
Fax: 913-551-8752
*Mark Mueller
Decontamination Thrust Area Manager
Chemical and Biological
Technologies Directorate
Physical Sciences Division
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
8725 John J Kingman Road (6201)
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6201
703-767-2359
Fax: 703-767-1893
*Barbel Niederwohrmeier
NBC - Protection
Head of Central Biological Laboratory
Armed Forces Scientific Institute for
Protection Technologies - NBC-Protection
P.O. Box 1142
Munster, 29623
Germany
0049-5192-136-375
Fax: 0049-5192-136-355
Sean Nolan
DTRA
9006 Stratford Lane
Alexandria, VA 22308
703-283-8493
Fax: 703-767-1892
Canice Nolan
First Counselor, Head of Section
European Commission Delegation
2300 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037
202-862-9533
Fax: 202-429-1766
*Neil Norrell
On-Scene Coordinator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
2890 Wood bridge Avenue
Edison, NJ 08837
732-321-4357
Fax: 732-321-4425
James Oesterreich
Equipment Modernization Analyst
Headquarters Air Force Civil
Engineer Support Agency
Emergency Management
U.S. Air Force
139 Barnes Drive
Tyndall AFB, FL 32403
850 283-6021
Fax: 850 283-6868
Richard Orlusky
Environmental Specialist
U.S. Postal Service
21 Kilmer Road
Edison, NJ 08899
732-689-5674
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Michael Ottlinger
Office of Emergency Management
National Decontamination Team
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Room 271
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513 487 2429
Fax: 513-487-2537
'Andrew Parkinson
Institute of Materials and
Engineering Science
Forensic and Nuclear Security Group
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology
Organisation
PMB 1
Menai, NSW 2234
Australia
+612-9717-9237
Fax: +612-9543-7179
Cayce Parrish
Senior Advisor
Office of Homeland Security
Office of the Administrator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW (1109A)
Washington, DC 20460
202-564-4648
Fax: 202-501-0026
Brooke Pearson
Threat Technologies Division
Cuibic Applications Inc.
5695 King Centre Drive - Suite 300
Alexandria, VA 22315
703-924-3050x5156
Fax: 703-924-3070
Brian Platz
Lead Industrial Hygienist
Domestic Environmental and
Safety Division
U.S. State Department
2201 C Street, NW - Room B2A61
Washington, DC 20520
202-647-4845
Fax: 202-647-1873
Brandalyn Price
Biologist
U.S. Department of Agriculture - APHIS
1800 Dayton Avenue
Ames, IA 50010
515-663-7013
Fax: 515-663-7527
Vladimir Nikolayevich Prokhorov
Department of New
Challenges and Threats
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Russia
*Colin Ramsay
Health Protection Scotland
Clifton House
Clifton Place
Glasgow, Lanarkshire G3 7LN
United Kingdom
+44(0)141 300 1127
Fax: +44(0)141 300 1100
*Vipin Rastogi
Research Biologist
Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center
R&T Directorate
U.S. Army
E-3150 Kinkscreek Street, N
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010
410-436-4856
Fax: 410-436-2081
Katie Reid
CBRN Analyst
J-8
Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Pentagon
Washington, DC 20318-8000
703-602-9040
Fax: 703-602-0941
Brian Reinhardt
Homeland Defense Applied Technologies
Chemical/Biological Applied Technology
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
8725 John J Kingman Road
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6210
703-767-3350
Fax: 703-767-1893
Jacky Rosati
Environmental Scientist
Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive
Research Triangle Park, NC 27278
919-541-9429
Fax: 919-541-0496
Richard Rupert
On-Scene Coordinator
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region 3
701 Mapes Road
Ft. Meade, MD 20755-5350
410-305-2611
Fax: 410-305-3093
*Shawn Ryan
Chemical Engineer
DCMD, National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E-343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27712
919-541-0699
Fax: 919-541-0496
James Salkeld
Head of Operations
BIOQUELL, Inc.
101 Witmer Road - Suite 400
Horsham, PA 19044
215-682-0225
Fax: 215-682-0395
Gregory Sayles
Associate Director
National Homeland
Security Research Center
Office of Research and Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Room 163
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513-569-7607
Fax: 513-487-2555
Jim Seidel
Science Advisor
Homeland Security Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Building 25 - P.O. Box 26227
Denver Federal Center
Denver, CO 80225
303-462-9376
Fax: 303-462-9028
Yasuo Seto
Vice Director of Third
Department of Forensic Science
Third Department of Forensic Science
National Research Institute of Police Science
6-3-1
Kashiwanoha
Kashiwa, Chiba 277-0882
Japan
+81-4-7135-8001
Fax: +81-4-7133-9173
Bradly Setser
Senior Scientist
Cubic Applications Inc.
5695 King Centre Drive - Suite 300
Alexandria, VA 22315
703-924-3050x5145
Fax: 703-924-3070
Gerry Shero
Scientist
Joint Program Executive Office Chemical
Biological Defense/Camber
5203 Leesburg Pike
Skyline 2 - Suite 800
Falls Church, VA 22041
703-931-9180x230
Fax: 703-931-5153
Lisa Smith
Research Biologist
Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center
E-3150 Kingscreek Street, N
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010
410-436-3846
Fax: 410-436-2081
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Kelly Smith
Senior Project Manager
Dynamac Corporation
2306 Riverfront Parkway
Cuyahoga Falls, OH 44221
330-388-3532
Fax: 330-926-0959
Curtis Snook
Medical Officer
OSWER
OEM/NOT
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 West Martin Luther King Drive
Room 271
Cincinnati, OH 45268
513-498-2434
Fax: 513-487-2537
*Emily Snyder
Research Chemist
National Homeland
Security Research Center
Decontamination and Consequence
Management Division
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (E343-06)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-1006
Fax: 919-541-0496
*Robert Spencer
Regional Microbiology Network
Health Protection Agency
Level 8 Queens Building
Bristol Royal Infirmary
Marlborough Street
Bristol, BS2 8HW
United Kingdom
01179283242
Fax: 0117 9299162
Harry Stone
Battelle
10300 Alliance Road - Suite 155
Cincinnati, OH 45242
513-362-2600
Fax: 513-362-2610
Quee Hong Tan
Chief Engineer
Pollution Control Department
National Environment Agency
40 Scotts Road #12-00 Environment Building
Singapore, Singapore 228231
Singapore
65-67319667
Fax:65-67319651
Michael Taylor
Program Manager
Environmental Exposure and Assessment
Energy, Transportation and Environment
Battelle
10300 Alliance Road - Suite 155
Cincinnati, OH 45242
513-362-2600
Fax: 513-362-2610
David Tollerud
MD, MPH
School of Public Health and
Information Sciences
Environmental and Occupational
Health Sciences
University of Louisville
555 South Floyd Street - Suite 4026
Louisville, KY 40292
502-852-3290
Fax: 502-852-3304
'Stephen Tomasino
Senior Scientist
Microbiology Laboratory Branch
Office of Pesticide Programs
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Environmental Science Center
701 Mapes Road
Ft. Meade, MD 20755-5350
410-305-2976
Fax: 410-305-3094
Ken Toomey
Captain
Support Training Group Headquarters
Canadian Forces
P.O. Box 1000 - Station Main
Canadian Forces Base Borden
Borden, Ontario L4N6N3
Canada
705-424-1200 Ext 2820
Fax: 705-432-2344
Dahman Touati
ARCADIS-US
4915 Prospectus Drive - Suite F
Durham, NC 27713
919-541-3662
Fax: 919-541-9717
Stephen Treado
Project Leader
NIST
226, B114
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
301-975-6444
Fax:301-975-5433
*Konstantin Volchek
Restoration Chemist
Environment Canada
335 River Road
Ottawa, Ontario K1AOH3
Canada
613-990-4073
*Jarrad Wagner
Chemist
Laboratory
FBI
2501 Investigation Parkway
(HMRU RM 3130)
Quantico, VA 22135
703-632-7925
Fax: 703-632-7898
Lanie Wallace
Research Biologist
BioDefense Team
Edgewood Biological and Chemical Center
E-3150 Kingscreek Street, N
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010
410-436-2725
Fax: 410-436-2081
Barb Walton
Assistant Laboratory Director
of Emerging Programs
Office of Research and Development
National Health and Environmental Effects
Research Laboratory
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
109 TW Alexander Drive (B305-02)
Research Triangle Park, NC 27711
919-541-7776
Fax: 919-541-1440
Lucienne Wasserman
Assistant Technical Director
JPM-Decon/S&T
JRAD
50 Tech Parkway - Suite 209
Stafford, VA 22556
540-288-3132x213
Fax: 540-288-3391
*Joseph Wood
Engineer
Decontamination and Consequence
Management Divison
National Homeland Security
Research Center
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Research Triangle Park, NC 27713
919-541-5029
Fax:919-541-0496
Lee San Tay
Pollution Control Department
National Environment Agency
40 Scotts Road #12-00
Environment Building
228231 Singapore
(65)67319103
Fax: (65) 62353379
'Brian Viani
Energy and Environment Directorate
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
P.O. Box 505 (L221)
Livermore, CA 94550
925-423 -2001
Fax: 925-423-2001
Yasuo Yanagida
Deputy Director
Bureau of Personnel and Education
Health and Medical Division
Ministry of Defense, Japan
5-1 Ichigayahonmuracho
Shinjyuku, Tokyo 162-8802
Japan
+81-3-5229-2131
Fax: +81-3-5229-2137
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Norman Yanofsky
CRTI Portfolio Manager Chemistry
Defence R&D Canada
Centre for Security Science (5-35)
344 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario K1AOK2,
Canada
613-944-8161
Fax: 613-995-0002
Donn Zuroski
On-Scene Coordinator
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region 9
75 Hawthorne Street (SFD9-2)
San Francisco, CA 94105
415-972-3035
Fax:415-947-8111
* Speaker
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V.
Presentation Slides
-------
Decontamination Research
at the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
Nancy Adams, PhD, Director
Decontamination and Consequence Management Division
National Homeland Security Research Center
Current Programs
Detection
• Containment
• Decontamination
Disposal
Detection
Completed Products
Enhanced OP-FTIR sensitivity
OP-FTIR guide for building owners
• Expanded TAGA capabilities for monitoring
chemical agents
• Guide of surface sampling methods for
persistent chemical hazards
Current Research
Portable systems for real-time detection
• Rapid spore assays
• Sampling strategies
• Improved surface sampling
• Improved biological indicators
Containment
Completed Products
Evaluation of residential safe havens
Guidance for sheltering in large buildings
Evaluation of filters, air cleaners, and HVAC-UVsys
Retrofit/HVAC guide for facility owners
Training program on safe buildings
Current Research
i Deposition on outdoor surfaces
i Urban dispersion
i Infiltration studies
i Particle resuspension
J Inhalation/dose models
-------
Decontamination
Completed Products
Lessons learned from anthrax decontaminations and
fumigant field studies
i Report on available biologial decon methods
Technology evaluations
- H202 x
- CIO2
- HCHO
- Methyl bromide
- Liquids and foams
• Field evaluation of portable CIO2 system
Decontamination
Current Research
Persistence studies (indoor/outdoor)
Standard efficacy test methods
• Lab evaluations (T, t, RH, surface types)
- Biological agents
- Chemical agents
- Toxic industrial chemicals
Fumigant containment
Evaluations of sources and sinks
Dirty bomb surface decontamination
• Materials effects
- Structural
- Sensitive electronics
Disposal
Completed Products
Web-based disposal decision support tool
a Guidance for autoclaving spore-containing wastes
• Guidance on fate/transport/survivability of biological
and chemical agents in landfills
Current Research
• Expansion of disposal decision support tool
• Agricultural waste disposal guide
1 Prototype mobile gasifier
• Guidance for incineration of biological hazards
1 Expanded guidance for land filling
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Program Contacts
• Detection - Emily Snyder 919-541-1006
Containment-Jacky Rosati 919-541-9429
Decontamination - Shawn Ryan 919-541-0
Disposal - Paul Lemieux 919-541-0962
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Overview of select DHS Science and Technology
Programs
2007 Workshop on Decontamination.
Cleanup, and Associated Issues for
Sites Contaminated with Chemical.
Biological, or Radiological Materials
June 20, 2007
Lance Brooks
Program Manager
Chem-Bio Research & Development Section
Chemical and Biological Division
Science and Technology Directorate
Homeland
Security
S&T Organization
DHS U/S S&T
Starnes Walker
Deputy
Dave Masters
Roger McGinnis (Acting)
Deputy
Rolf Dietrich
Explosives C
Jim Tuttle Jo
inVitko Dave^yd'
Innovation
Director of Transition
Bob Hooks
Deputy
Rich Kikla
Borders/ h
Maritime
Merv Leavitt Sha
uman | Infrastructure/
actors Geophysical
aRausch || Chris Doyle
Security
Major Customers
U.S. Customs and Border Protectior
Storing Anwici'tBtrJen CBP,«m
Seven operational components receiving over 85% of DHS FY07 appropriated Junds
.
? Security
DHS Chem/Bio Requirements
Directly from a Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT)
• Co-chaired by DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA) and
DHS Infrastructure Protection (IP)
• Membership from other DHS operational arms
• Identified 50+ Capability Gaps
Chem/Bio Defer
Security
And they in-turn, base their requirements on
Homeland Security Presidential Directives - 10, 7, 9,
Congressional legislation & guidance
National planning & implementation guidance - NIPP.
NRP, NIMS, and the National Planning Scenarios
Risk, vulnerability and mitigation studies
Private, local, state inputs
18
Chem/Bio Division Three Thrust Areas
Overall structure reflects HSPD-9, 10, and 18 responsibilities
Thrust Area
Bio
Ag
Chem
Program
Systems Studies
Threat Awareness
Surveillance and
Detection Operations
Surveillance and
Detection R&D
Forensic s
Response and Recovery
Foreign Animal Diseases
Analysis
Detection
Response and Recovery
Major Products
System tradeoffs e.g. Gen 3 BioWatch; policy net assessments
Risk assessments; lab studies to close key gaps
Pilot, deploy and operate BioWatch, deployable systems
Detection systems for air, food; supporting assays
Enhance and operate the National Bioforensics Analysis Center
(NBFAC)
System approaches for recovering from a biological attack
Modeling, vaccines & diagnostics for FAD; JADO
Chemical threat characterization and risk assessment; Develop
and validate forensic analysis tools to enable attribution
Chemical detection systems for facility monitoring and first
responders
Decontamination tools and systems approaches for recovering
from a chemical attack
-Sfe- Homrltiiiil
W^ Security
Systems Approaches/Tools for Biological
Response & Recovery
Goals
• Demonstrate systems approached to large
scale urban decontamination & recovery
• Develop improved operational tools to
support response & recovery
Road map
FY07: share results of Airport Restoration
Demo thru workshops
FY07: initiate wide area restoration demo
(joint effort with DTRA & Seattle)
FY08: guidelines & protocols for bio-agent
sampling
FY09: 'demonstrate' wide area restoration
FY10: j/a//datedinteragency sampling plan
for anthrax
-------
Restoration Guidance
-Restoration Guidance & Checklist for Major
Airports after a Bioterrorist Attack
• MAS Study: Reopening Public Facilities after a
Biological Attack: A Decision Making Framework
• "Pre-reviewed" Protocols & Plans
-Airport Preparedness Workshop
• Co-sponsored with EPA/CDC
• Eastern Airports (Port Authority of NY & NJ,
Washington Metropolitan Authority, & Chicago
Dept. of Aviation)
-Restoration Guidance for Transit Systems
• Partners (WMATA, MTA)
• Builds off of Restoration Guidance for Airports
Security
DOD (DTRA) S DHS (SST)
co-sponsored program
Integrated Biological Restoration Demo (I-BRD)
(Wide Area Restoration)
Goal/Obiectives
• Goal: This program is focused on providing a
coordinated, systems approach to the recovery and
restoration of wide urban areas, to include DOD
infrastructures and high traffic areas following the
aerosol release of a biological agent.
• Objectives:
- Study the social, econ, & ops interdependences
- Establish formal coordination between DOD & DHS
- Develop strategic restoration plans for DOD & DHS
- Id & demo technologies that support restoration
- Exercise restoration activities & technology solutions
Security
Coordination S partnership with
Interagency (EPA/CDC/etc), urban
area, and other identified partners
IBRD Structure & Deliverables
Task 1: Conduct systems/front-end analysis
- Systems engineering approach (materiel & non-materiel focus)
- Determine capabilities, gaps, & associated choke-points
- Outputs feed into Tasks 2 & 3
Task 2: Establish & enhance existing frameworks
- Establish plans where needed; decision frameworks: refine existing policies,
procedures, & operational approaches
- Outputs evaluated in Final exercise planned for FY11
Task 3: Identify and develop methods, procedures and technologies to
enhance recovery and restoration processes
- Id & demo applied technology solutions; enable recovery and restoration efforts
- Outputs evaluated in Final exercise planned for FY11
Task 4: Conduct series of exercises & workshops to coordinate
Civilian/Military interoperability, practical application of technology, and
refined plans
- Stage and conduct series of exercises and workshops in Seattle Urban area to
assess outputs from Tasks 2 & 3
- Outcomes inform/recommend materiel & non-materiel solutions to program sponsors
Homeland
Security
Biological Sampling
Strategy
-Interagency Validated Sampling Plan
• MOU amongst DHS, EPA, HHS, FBI, NIST & DoD
• Strategic plan including milestones, responsibilities, resources
• Addresses sampling strategy, collection, transportation, extraction and
analysis
• Addresses anthrax first and then will extent to other agents
-Strategy Verification Demonstration
• Chamber tests at JHU/APL for sampling methods,
• Facility tests at INEEL for facility sampling strategies
Systems Approaches/Tools for Chemical
Response & Recovery
Goals
Field Trial of Prototype Mobile Labs
• Demonstrated systems approaches to
restoration of critical facilities
• Prototype fixed and mobile laboratory capability
to support the recovery
Roadmap
FY07: demo mobile lab capability; prototype 3
fixed laboratories in high threat regions
FY08: prototype and transition mobile lab to the
EPA; prototype 2 additional fixed labs
FY08: airport restoration table top exercise and
restoration plan
FY09: airport restoration demo
Mobile Laboratory Capability
Goal: Develop and demonstrate a
rapidly deployable capability for high-
throughput analysis of environmental
samples to assess contaminated area
and facilitate restoration.
Objective:
-Ability to process, analyze and report on at least 100
samples/24 hr operation
- Ability to id contaminants (TICs & CWAs) to
Permissible Exposure Levels (PEL)
-Automated sample tracking, processing, waste
analyses, and data management/output
- Identification of samples requiring re-analysis
-------
Facilities Restoration Demonstration
Goal: Promote rapid recovery from
release of a chemical agent in a major
transportation facility. Minimize the
economic impact and facility closure.
Enhance capability to make defensible
public health decisions concerning the re-
opening of major transportation facilities.
Objective:
-Pre-plan the restoration process at a
representative critical transportation facility
-develop efficient planning tools
-identify sampling methods
-identify decontamination methods
-develop analysis tools
. Hcvnehnd
FY09: Conduct Final Demo;
Transfer/conduct systems
approach at other critical facilitie
Homeland
Security
-------
TSWG Organization
i /A
CBRNC Subgroup Mission U
Identify interagency user requirements related to
terrorist-employed chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials
Rapid research, development, and prototyping
Objectives:
• Provide interagency forum to coordinate R&D
requirements for combating terrorism.
• Sponsor R&D not addressed by individual
agencies.
• Promote information transfer.
• Influence basic and applied research
Subgroup Membership
DOS: DS, OBO, S/CT
DHS: FEMA, ICE (FPS), S&T (HSARPA
DHHS: CDC, FDA, NIOSH
DOJ: FBI, NIJ, USMS
USDA: APHIS, ARS, FSIS
OGA: EPA, GSA, IAB, FDNY, NYPD, Seattle FD, Federal Reserve
Board, Intelligence Community, NRC, U.S. Capitol Police, USPIS,
U.S. Senate (SAA)
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Personnel Decontamination
Agent Simulant Kit
Safe simulants (per International
Dictionary of Cosmetics and
Fragrances) imitating viscosity and
solubility for CWAs (VXand HD),
and radiological particulates marked
with fluorescent dye to accurately
reflect effectiveness of personnel
decon actions in exercises.
UNCLASSIFIED
Building Disinfection
By-Products Database
Planning tool to assist consequence
managers in estimating chemical by-
products that occur when
decontaminating buildings.
- Measure decomposition products from
common office furnishings exposed to
ozone, chlorine dioxide, vaporized
hydrogen peroxide, & methyl bromide
- Incorporate results into a planning
database
• EPA and TSWG funding
1 Database delivered and available
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Wireless Multisensor
Environmental Monitors
Real-time sensor systems that
monitor chemical warfare agents
and toxic industrial chemicals.
- Battery-operated or AC with 6
interchangeable, plug-and-play
sensors
- Lightweight, portable, and
inexpensive
- Wireless and Internet/Ethernet
communication
• Esensors, Inc. is delivering
Environmental Monitoring Unit
(EMU) prototypes to end users for
deployment
List of Gas Sensors
HVAC/Environmental
• Carbon dioxide
• Humidity/Temperature
• Smoke
Decontamination/Industrial
gases
• VOC/Methyl bromide
• Combustible gases
• Carbon monoxide
• Oxygen
• Ozone
• NOx (Nitric oxide,
Nitrogen dioxide)
Toxic gas sensors
' Hydrogen sulfide
• Sulfur dioxide
• Chlorine (chlorine
dioxide)
• Hydrogen peroxide
• Hydrogen cyanide
• Hydrogen chloride
• Arsine
• Phosphine
• Phosgene
Gas Sensor Test Chamber
UNCLASSIFIED
Redesign for End user
Each sensor undergoes validation
Known volumes of gas or solvent are injected into chamber
in small increments
Fan vaporizes and distributes
Data (analog or digital) collected and plotted.
Recent redesign to meet end-user needs
- Improved scan time (decrease cycle time) to less than 12 seconds.
iasily removable batteries for when battery use is not expected.
- Beta software to allow monitoring of several I
locations
UNCLASSIFIED
-------
Sensor Web Combating
Terrorism Applications
Develop a networked wireless sensor
system to monitor temperature,
humidity, and chlorine dioxide
concentration or CO, H2S, O2 or LEL
in real time.
Deployed to New Orleans Jan. 2006 field
tested during building mold remediation
treatments
USAR training/exercises at NASA Ames
April 2006 and May 2007.
Available from SensorWare Systems
DHS Decon Test Bed support 2007
. , .,, ... .] .,;
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Electrostatic Decontamination
Effective, safe, and logistically
efficient decontamination system to
facilitate restoration of operations
following contamination by chemical
and/or biological weapons.
• Clean Earth Technologies demonstrated
that EDS decontaminated "live" CB
agents without damaging target surfaces
i
• Undergoing U.S. EPA regulatory
processes
• Currently available for procurement
-
^ Electrostatic Decontamination ;
System (EDS)
TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW:
• Compact, modular design, one operator, simple to use
• Unique biological decontamination performance
• >6 logs B. anthracis spore kill in seconds
• High chemical agent decontamination efficacy without
brushing, scrubbing, mopping, or scraping
• Requires 6-fold less solution for decontamination than
foam
• Rugged
• Field-tested
• High material compatibility
UNCLASSIFIED *
-------
Expedient Mitigation of a
Radiological Release
Minimize the impact of a
radiological release by fixing
radioactive particulates in place
with a strippable polymer coating.
- Applied after rescue operations are
completed while long term decon plar
is being developed.
IsoFIXand HeloTRON formulations available.
Successful field tests by Army CoE;
MARCORSYSCOM
Demonstrated at JPEO Decontamination
Conference
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Isotron Follow-on Efforts
Development of the IsoTrailer, a
mobile response unit for lock-
down
1 Follow-on work funded by DTRA
through TSWG is currently
ongoing to develop coating
resistance to CB agents
- UV stability studies
- Third-party testing will be
conducted byAFRL
GHOST TOWN BUSTERS
iml i iuiju-k. s|>v];il fumiulaiions
, , ..ill- i,'!iv... ..... .nurrr. ii-iii
Radiological Decontamination
Technologies
Develop chemical processes to
remove Cs-137from porous building
materials after an ROD event.
• Developer-Argonne National
Laboratory
• Available for license
GHOST TOWN BUSTERS
AlVr M flirty-ln.Hiil.1 mtJK'k. s,p«.-cfcil lUnmiLitnH
i'niild counter padiuaetiw funt;iminiition
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
ANL Approach
UNCLASSIFIED
ANL Status
3-Part Decontamination Process
- Ionic wash solution
• In situ release of chemically
bound radionuclides
- Superabsorbent polymer gel
• Extraction on radionuclide into
super-absorbing polymer gel
• Sequestration of radionuclide in
the gel layer
- Vacuum removal and consolidate
gel waste
Focusing on cesium and concrete
- Solubilized cesium salt, little loose
contamination
Concrete chemistry
- Radionuclides partition to components of
concrete differently
Wash solution development
- Identified several ionic solution formulations
suitable for exterior applications
- Removal from cement material >97% in three
applications
- Removal from concrete >70% in single
- Identified coherent, robust, sprayable gel (20-
40 g H2O/g capacity)
Scale-up
- Several companies involved in application
UNCLASSIFIEl
-------
-±- Guidelines for Disposal of
Contaminated Plant and
Animal Waste
Develop a clear, concise, and
easy-to-use handbook on best
practices and guidelines for the
disposal of contaminated plant
material and animal carcasses.
- Based on engineering, economic,
& regulatory analysis of options
- Enables leaders to identify
disposal methods that meet their
needs
• Texas Agricultural Experiment
Station
• Jointly funded and reviewed by
EPA, USDA, and TSWG
Rapid Contaminated Carcass
and Plant Disposal
Destroy in an environmentally safe
manner at least 100,000 pounds per
day of contaminated animal and plant
material from a biological or chemical
terrorist attack on agriculture. System
must be transportable on road and by
air and operational within 24 hours
after arrival on site .
• Mechanically reduce the contaminated
material
' Incinerate using an oil-fired rotary kiln
• Treat exhaust gases in afterburner.
Current Decontamination
Related Requirements
Presented in the FY08 BAA
PPE Decon (Biodecon)
Procedure and Biological
Aerosol Test Method
(BATM) Development
UNCLASSIFIED
-------
UNCLASSIFIED
Contact Information
cbrncsubgroup@tswg.gov
mckinneyj@tswg.gov
http://www.tswg.gov
FY08 TSWG BAA released in Ma
2007
UNCLASSIFIED
-------
EPA Approvals Under FIFRA
FIFRA Registration
EPA approval for a pesticide product under FIFRA
... . ,. ,f , .
emption (i.e., emergency approval).
) obtain a registration, a registrant must sul
i application to EPA along with required da
id product labeling.
To obtain an exemption, a state or federal agency
must submit a request to EPA along with pertinent
information.
Manufacturer must submit an application to EPA
along with product labeling and the following data:
New Active Ingredient product:
• acute/chronic toxicity data
Old Active Ingredient product:
-------
FIFRA Exemption
Crisis Exemptions
Section 18 exemotions: A state or
federal agency may request to EPA to
issue an exemption (four types):
I Specific exemption
Public health exemption
Quarantine exemption
Crisis exemption
When "anthrax attacks'
occurred in October, 2001,
no products were approved
specifically for use against
Bacillus anthracis spores
Accordingly, crisis
exemptions had to be
issued for each sporicidal
chemical at each
contaminated site
EFFICACY DATA
REQUIREMENTS
methods include:
* Sterilants/sporicides
Efficacy data are required to
be submitted to support any
public health related claim
n;
Adding Claims for Specific
Microorganisms
To claim inactivation of
specific microorganisms
(non-snore forming), a
disinfectant must be
successfully tested against
those microorganisms
using one of the above
For example, to add
influenza A virus, need an
AOAC disinfectant test
with that virus.
-------
B. anthracis Inactivation Claims
for Sterilants/Sporicides
To claim inactivation of B.
anthracis spores, a
sterilant/sporicide should t
tested:
On porous or nonporous
surfaces, or both
Using AOAC 966.04, Method
II, as a confirmatory test (i.e.,
120 carriers per surface)
With NO GROWTH on any
New Product Category—
Sporicidal Decontaminant—
for inactivating B. anthracis spore
At a FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel meeting
July, EPA will propose a new product cate
Sporicidal Decontaminant
• This product is intended to inactivate B. anthracit
spores, but would be supported by data from a we
Simulated Use Test for
Gases/Vapors for Large Spaces
Gases
use in large enclosed
spaces must also pass a
Simulated Use Test
Purpose of the test is to:
• Assure that key paramete
for efficacy are met
Establish product
generation rate (Ibs/hr) ai
rate/volume (lbs/hr/ft3)
Simulated Use Test for
Gases/Vapors
Test Procedure
Protocols for the simulated-use test should be submitted
The testing should be conducted under conditions that
labeling, and in a setting that is representative of t
label use site(s). For example, a product intendet
use in a room or a large warehouse should be testt
an empty room or large chamber.
Simulated Use Test
Should be set up in a sealed enclosure at least thi
sixe of a tvnical office and contain items that mi^ht
normally be treated (e.g., dressers, upholstered
furniture, carpet, etc,).
Should specify the dimensions of the enclosure,
and the number and location of monitoring
devices for measuring gas or vapor concentration,
total mass of gas or vapor injected, temperature,
relative humidity, contact time, etc.
-------
Simulated Use Test
All recorded test results pertaining to the test
conditions/parameters should be submitted
The maximum volume ofsoace that can be treated
and the minimum total mass of gas or vapor
required to maintain the required concentration
and contact time per cubic foot of space shoul * '
r Practices (GLP) per 40 CFR
Part 160 or in a federal laboratory with an
appropriate Quality Assurance Project P
(QAPP)
Measure of Success for
Simulated Use Tei
Evaluation of sporicidal success
Measurements should show that the same concentration,
required contact time that were necessary to achieve NO
GROWTH on any carrier in the AOAC 966.04, or a 6 log reduction
in a well-developed quantitative test.
Measurements of the fumigant mass injection/generation rate (e.g.,
pounds/hour), divided by the volume of the simulated use test bed,
that was used to calculate the required generation rate/volume
(e.g., pounds per hour/cubic foot), should be included listed on the
•oduct label.
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
OF REGISTRATION
Who may purchase and use
products with B, anthmcis
What should the terms and
On June 6, 2007, EPA issued a
draft Pesticide Registration
(PR) Notice, "Guidance foi
Antimicrobial Pesticide
rith Anthrax- Relati
u.^....^ , ..hich addresses tht.^
questions (see Federal Registe
Vol. 72, No. 108, pp. 31325-6,
June 6, 2007).
Draft PR Notice for
Anthrax-Related Products
EPA intenua uj mini atuc tmu uiauiuuuuii »Ji unj-
decontamination products for B. a,nthra,cis and
other spore-formers to:
Federal On-Scene Coordinators
Other federal, state, tribal and local government workei
authorized to perform bio-decontamination
Persons trained and certified competent by registrants
The terms and conditions of registration will
include registrant training and testing of
applicators, and registrant record keeping as to
who takes the training and who buys the product.
EPA will review the training materials.
EPA's Goals, Plans and Progress
Improve, validate and harmonize cun
sporicidal efficacy test methods throu^
interagency collaborative research
• AOAC International (AOACI) has published tl
AOAC 966.04. Method TT. AOACT is current!"
validating the Three Step Method (TSM, a
quantitative sporicidal test).
• EPA will continue to collaborate on spor
research with other agencies through the Interagency
Expert Panel on Efficacy Test Methods and
Surrogates for B. anthracis Spores.
EPA's Goals, Plans and Progress
Develop and issue Pesticide Assessment
Guidelines on efficacy test methods that may be
used to support the "B. a,nthra,cis claim"
• On July 17-19, 2007 EPA will present draft guidance on
efficacy tests involving B. anthracis spores to the FIFRA
Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP).
• After receiving the SAP's opinion, EPA intends to issue
Pesticide Assessment Guidelines (810.2100) for --1-
related products in 2007.
-------
EPA's Goals, Plans and Progress
Help the U.S. respond to biological incidents by inak
available registered anthrax-related products that are
effective and cause no unreasonable adverse effects.
Protect public health from the risks of B. anthracis sp
by limiting the purchase of anthrax-related products 1
those who are properly trained in their use.
-------
Environmental Sampling for
Biothreat Agents: Curren.
Research and Validation Efforts
CAPT Kenneth F. Martinez, MSEE, CD
Clinical/
Epidemiology Environmental
Environmental Microbiology at CDC
Background
Identifying Threat Agents
Bioaerosol Sampler
(B. T. Chen, G. Feather, J. Kes
Sampler: cyclone-based micro-centrifuge tube (Du
mm), personal/are a, 4-L/mm, D50 ~ 1.5 mm
Analysis: PCR, immunoassay, or others
Advantages: samples directly collected in the tube
edia used by ci
ase of PCR anab
Detection limit:
Determining Risk of Infection
Transmissibility
Letter Re-aerosolization Study
(S. Shadomy, R. McCleery, K. Martinez)
• Puroose: To address concerns
regarding existing guidelines
for handling suspicious letters
or packages.
and test a revised model for
assessing risk of exposure to
anthrax simulant (BG spores)
under an open office concept.
Collaborators: Defense
Research and Development
Canada (Suffield) and
Technical Science Working
Group
-------
Technical Approach
Slit to Agar aerosol samplers
High Resolution (4)
Standard (10)
Grimm Aerosol spectrometers (3)
Video cameras (3)
Fluorescent Aerodynamic Particle sizers (2)
SKC filter samplers (12)
Swab samples (3 locations)
-------
NIOSH developing Toolkit approach in
response
Rapid and responsive
when reliable details;
Does not quantify confidence
Provides Quantifiable confidence;
Requires more time and samples;
approach
for greater
efficiency
and
confidence
Develop as suite of tools to assist investigator in the field
Overview of approach
Assess Incident details
Develop Judgmental sampling plan
Perform sampling
If results negative — have probabilistic option
Inputs include |udgmental results, other inputs
Generate probabilistic sample plan options
J-
Proceed with probabilistic sampling
-------
Development of an Aerosol System for Creating
Uniform Samples of Deposited Bacteria
e objectives of the study was to determine the efficiency of
sampling methods for B. anthradx.
Compare three surface sampling; methods: swabs, wipes, and
etection for the thi
Settling Chamber
Fan Se"ling
\ Chamber
\ \
HEPA .—
Filter ]_
Settling /
Surface
n
1 1
O O
1=±
7TT
Door p^"" APS
Mixing Mixing
Chamber Element
\ \ Air Cannon
A
I 1
O O
^
|W~ Impactor
1 Venturi
|4t-. -^"Nozzle
fT "J^v Generation
^=l~n Chamber
Vacuum
-------
Validated Sampling Plan
ie working group is comprised of technical exp
from CDC, EPA, DoD, FBI, NIST, and DHS
ic plan tor valid;
Major Categories of Activity
Collection Methods for Air Sampling, Porous,
and Non-Porous Surfaces
Sample Integrity during Transportation/Storage
Sample Processing and Analysis
Sampling Strategy
Sampling and Analysis Plan Exercise
External Peer Review
-------
Biological Decontamination with
Peracetic Acid and Hydrogen Peroxide
Chlorine dioxide
Formaldehyde
Hydrogen peroxide
Peracetic acid
Methylbromide
Ethyleneoxide
Disinfection of Interior spaces
with formaldehyde
Disinfection of Interior spaces
with formaldehyde
Disinfection of interior spaces using fumigation
with formaldehyde-vapour
5 g FA / m3
rLf s> 70 %
reaction time 6 h
Effective range AB
16h/C
TRGS 522 ,,Raumdesinfektion mit Formalde
strong liquid precipitation
long reaction time incl. time up to the
safe entry of this are-
Sublimating of Paraformaldehyde
JS>* Disinfection of Interior spaces
Sublimating of Paraformaldehyde
2 m3-chamber 4 g ParaFA / m3 volume
rLf > 70%
temperature > 23 °C
reaction time 3 h (without time for fumi-
gation) for the inactivation of spores of
Bacillus cereus and atrophaeus
120 m3-chamber 4 g ParaFA/m3 volume
rLf > 70%
temperature > 23 °C
reaction time 2. 7.5 h for the inactivation
of spores of Bacillus atrophaeus
-------
Disinfection of Interior spaces
Hydrogen peroxide - vapour
no visible and toxic residues
H2O2 is not stable, short removing time
short D-values
dry process
good material compatibility
process runs at room-temperature
automatic process
low operating costs
USA-FDA licence
Disinfection of Interior spaces
Hydrogen peroxide - vapour
mobile system up to max. 124 m3 volume
H2O2 adsorbing materials e.g. textiles
H2O2 split up materials e.g. copper
surfaces have to be clean and dry
validation of the disinfection-cycles
Disinfection of Interior spaces
Hydrogen peroxide
urrent results of tests in a high leve
Laminar flow cabinet
Bacillus stearothermophilus
Bacillus cereus, Bacillus subtilis
-------
actual examples for this procedure
Disinfection of different tanks
disinfection procedure done
by a company
biological part done by WIS
Disinfection of Interior spaces
Hydrogen peroxide - vapour
Disinfection Procedure
dehumidification:
humidity:
temperature:
using H2O2:
exposition:
air-volume of about 120 m3
90 - 95 %
18-24°C
totally 2278 g 35%ige solution
0.8- 1.0 mg/ Liter
330 min
Wofasteril fog 300
Wofasteril SC 250
(peracetic acid, hydrogen peroxide, acetic acid, de-sensitizin
and stabilizing substance, special nebula materials
Thermal fog generator
swingfog SN 50
Thermal fog generator - Swingfog SN 50
• Wofasteril fog 300
• Wofasteril SC 250
Exposure-time of Wofasteril SC 250 8 h
23m3-Raum - 2 x 90 sec spraying
23-28°C-90-97% rLf
-------
Anthrax-spores
tests in the context of the TEP -
with repetition of spraying after 1 h
800 -1300 ml 10% FA/ nf
Ca. 1000 ml 1 %PES/m=
using 10° / carrier reduction of
using 10° / carrier reduction of
Anthrax-spores
Tests with Wofasteril SC 250 + alcapur - foam
HDS 698 C ECO
+ Inno Foam Set
test-organism: Bacillus subtilis-Spores
10 6/ carrier
carrier: PUR-painted sheet metals
10 cm x 10 cm
inclination 110°
temperature: 17 - 22°C
Wofasteril SC 250 + alcapur
2,3 % + 3,2 %
Exposition time was decreased
Problems with the inno foam set
Wofasteril SC 250 + alcapur
carriers: painted sheet metal, without organic load, RT
8.8 % V
p
6% V\
PH
4% W
P
2.2 % V
PH
Exposure time was decreased up to
15 and 30 min
with reduction of 5-6 log-steps
Test organisms: Bacillus subtilis, Bacillus
cereus
and Bacillus thuringiensis
PS
reus)
(Be)
S (Bt)
(Be)
(Bs)
Disinfection of interior space
Hydrogen peroxide vapour
Thermoaerolisation with Wofasteril
Disinfection of surfaces
Wofasteril with alcapur
Wofasteril SC 250 + alcapur - foam
-------
-------
Field Demonstration of Advanced
CBRN Decontamination Technologies
Presented by Konstantin Volchek
Environment Canada
2007 Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for Sites
Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina
June 20-22, 2007
Participants
Project lead: Environment
Canada
Federal Partners: DRDC Ottawa,
Counter-Terrorism Technology
Centre, DRDC Suffield, Public
Health Agency of Canada
Industry Partners: Allen-
Vanguard Corporation, SAIC
Canada
Other Participants: US
Environmental Protection Agency
Objectives
Demonstrate building decontamination technologies for
CBRN counter-terrorism
Analyze concentrations of agent simulants or radioactivity
levels on surfaces and in the air before, during, and after
decontamination
Evaluate technology performance on different surface
materials
Calculate associated costs and material and labor
requirements
Use trial results to develop manuals and guidelines for
decontamination teams
Preparation: aerial view of trial site
Preparation: test structures for C and B trials
Preparation: complete setup
-------
Interior surface materials
Chemical trial: agents and simulants
agents and the Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) reacts
nd identifies it as a nerve agent.
Mixture of diethyl malonate (DEM) and malathion to be
sprayed using a commercial air sprayer
DEM was selected since it is a simulant for the "G" series
nerve ag
to it and identifies it as a nerve agent.
Malathion was selected since it is very persistent, techniques
for sampling and analysis are well known and pervious
laboratory studies were carried out (CRTI-02-0067RD).
DEM and malathion react with decontaminants used to
destroy chemical warfare agents. They are "reactive
simulants" for CW agents.
Chemical trial: agent dissemination
Chemical trial: sampling and analyses
• Several Hundred Surface and Air Samples (Solvent
Extraction with GC-MS)
Chemical Indicating Test Strips and Witness Cards
Trace Agent Gas Analyzer (TAGA) (USEPA)
Chemical Agent Monitor Stations (DRDC Suffield)
Handheld CAMs (DRDC Suffield)
Air Sampling Tubes
VOC Meters
Chemical trial: decontamination
Chemical trial: surface coupon results
s
• Remaining DEM o
- Room A: 1% Cc
- Room 8: 1%
- Room C: 58%
- Room B: 7%
- Room C: 77%
• Malaoxon generated
- Room A: 3%
- Room B: 9%
- Room C: 8%
urface decontamination
DEM in room B
] 0-001
001-005
0 05 - 0 1
01-05
" 05-1
" 5-10 Pre-decon
Post-decon
\
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-------
Chemical trial: air monitoring results
Decontamination started _^
Door closed
Door opened \
Door closed \ \
P
2nd disseminations 1 ,/*'"
Nk * J"
/^
1st dissemination /
\ /
. . V
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Ct*B«
01,8-, (*)
se started
Defoaming
^W^^v- ;
Door opened
"K_ ....-.*
Chemical trial: problem areas
• The concentration of simulants in Room C was higher than
that in Rooms A and B due to overspray. This resulted in
lesser decontamination in Room C
• Inside CAMs were saturated with simulants and could not
provide experimental data
• Decontamination was less effective on porous surfaces, due
to hindered interactions between simulants and decon agents
• Formation of malaoxon, a toxic by-product, was observed as
a result of incomplete oxidation
Cosf Scenarios: chemical decon
Floor Area (m2)
Wall Area (m2)
Number of Responders
Duration (days)
Total Cost ($)
Cost per Wall Area ($/m2)
Cost per Floor Area (S/m )
Scenario 1
10
60
8
5
70,220
1,170
7,022
Scenario 2
100
600
10
5
87,445
146
874
Scenario 3
1,000
6,000
20
5
1 89,945
32
190
Biological trial: simulant agent
• Bacillus atrophaeus, a surrogate for Bacillus anthracis
- Rationale: spores are hardest form to inactivate
- Source: DRDC Suffield, formerly Bacillus globigii or 'BG'.
-Concentration: ~1 x 1011 cfu/g
B. atrophaeus spore powder
B. atrophaeus colonies on filter
Biological trial: agent dissemination
Puff of air (2.8 bar) in a test tube of
spore powder (45 cm above floor) in
each "room" simultaneously
Total = one gram (1/3 g per room)
Biological trial:
decontamination with VHP
STERIS Corp. VHP 1000-ARD-
decontamination system using vaporous
hydrogen peroxide (VHP)
Continuous flow at three points in the
structure, approx. 75 cm above floor,
opposing each room
Pedestal fan in corridor opposite each room
Decontamination less than anticipated due to
equipment malfunction (2.3 kg H202 instead
of planned 3.0 kg)
-------
Biological trial: sampling
* Air Samples
- H202 Sensors for VHP profile (one per room)
- Two Anderson-style MAS-100 Eco air samplers
- New Brunswick STA-204 slit-style air sampler
' Surface Samples (rayon-tipped swabs, pre-
moistened sponge wipes, & HEPA vacuum socks)
* Biological Indicators
- Surface samples spiked in-house with
Geobacillus stearothermophilus
- Steel disks with G. stearothermophilus
(commercially available)
Biological trial: air results
' ISA plates at 35°C
- Pre-dispersal: 2-24 colonies per 200-500
Lair sampled
- Post-dispersal: too numerous to count -
no data
- Post-decontamination:
• MAS-100: both generated > 102 CPU in 200
Lair
• STA-100: one colony on one plate, two on
the other.
MAS-100 pre-dispersal
Biological trial: surface results
Pre-dispersal:
- Confounded by background flora
(masking/inhibition)
- Colonies on at least 7 01
with up to 330 CFU
Post-dispersal:
- Swab: 189E+06 CFU
- Sponge: 194E+07 C/
- Sock: 3.99E+09 CFU
Post-decontamination:
Biological trial: problem areas
• Target agent present in site background
- Surface sampling counts likely underestimated (masking etc.)
- Background flora, including B. atrophaeus, reintroduced when
doors opened post-decontamination, may falsely assume they are
resistant to VHP
• Re-dispersion due to doors & personnel/equipment moving
• Failure of VHP generator to inject third bottle of H202
• No H202 neutralizer was used
• In-house biological indicators made from liquid suspension
- may adhere more readily to surfaces (harder to inactivate?)
Radiological decontamination trial
Late September - early October 2007
Exterior surfaces of a two-storey
building
Na-24 as Na2C03 and Tc-99
Multi-stage decontamination to be
used
Conclusions
Commercial technologies chosen were effective in
decontaminating affected buildings
Surface material and agent to decontaminant ratios
were major factors of
One application of decon is not sufficient, especially
for porous surfaces and higher agent concentrations
Enough field data to assess decontamination costs
Material collected for users' guides and manuals
-------
Recommendations
Build a more appropriate test structure
- better means of monitoring air circulation & filtration
Check background flora before selecting a site
Use an H202 neutralizer
- prove that kill is caused by VHP in the specified time
Analyze run-off water quickly
Use repeated applications of decon
Acknowledgements
Funding for this project was provided by the
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
Explosive Research and Technology Initiative
(CRTI), project CRTI-04-0019TD
-------
Japanese Research Project for Development of
On-site Detection of Chemical and Biological
Warfare Agents
EPA 2007 Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated
Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or
Radiological Materials
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, June 20-22, 2007
Yasuo Seto, Ph.D.
National Research Institute of Police Science, Japan
On-site Countermeasure by First Responders against Chemical,
Biological Terrorism and White Powder Disturbance (Japan,
2002-)
• Personal Protection ~ ^
- Level A, C (Chemical) ^ \"*™!
- HEPA filter (Biological) |JF'*-f*'
• Preliminary Detection
Real time PCR (Anthrax, Brucella, Plai
Foul smell disturb
HD detected at Sa
White powder disturbs
i, SEE, BTX, Riclll)
R&D of On-site Detection Method for Chemical Warfare
-------
-------
Mustard gas 4,00
gas 4,000 nig/iir* ^
cuon of^o, co, Low sensitivity \
™y \ s™i
I'V., A
ssibly improved sensitivity: 10 -100 foil
-------
PSP kit Result
Measurement of band intensity by TLC Sc;
LOD:20ng/ml
Interference
White flour (10
1.0MHC1: false positive
1.0 M NaOH: false negative
0.5% NaCIO, 1.2 M HCHO: Impossible
3.5% H,O,, 0.1 M NaNO,: no effec'
Simultaneous, Rapid, Accurate, Sensitive and Automated Detection Systei
-------
Detection of volatile CWA (Monitoring Tape Methods)
ClCH=CHAs(OH)2 + 2 HC1
:action with pH indicat
•[•HO;
Conversion rate of LI to HC1 = 98 %
(Comparing to HC1 standard gas)
I Apparatus : FP-260AGZ
I (silica-coated alumina catalyst)
Tape : FV-017
Time : 30 sec
-------
Detection Strategy by Combining Different Kinds of Equipment
for Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents
1. On-site detection (portable)
^f
Lateral Flow ImmunoAssay
Labeled antibody
Anti-Ricin goat polj cloiial
•I
Sandwich recognition
I
Capture antibody
Anti-ricin monoclonal
Sample nitrocellulose
introduction
Detection zone
-------
-------
..;:;.. Health
••.•'•• Protection
'•'.'• Scotland
National
Services
Scotland
A Fatal Case of
"Natural" Inhalational Anthrax
in Scotland -
Decontamination Issues
US EPA Decontamination Workshop
2007
Dr Colin N. Ramsay
Consultant Epidemiologist
Health Protection Scotland
Describe
-the investigation
and incident
management
Describe
- decontamination
decision processes
and rationale
Describe
- problems and
lessons identified
August 2006 - INCIDENT INITIATION
8 August 2006
HPA-NDPL advise NHS Borders/HPS
- confirmed culture of Bacillus
athracisirom blood culture taken
from "PN"
Case History
• 50 yr old male, living in rural
Scottish Borders
• 3 day history of flu-like symptoms,
developed septicaemia and
collapsed, comatose
• died 8 July 2006
• (Fiscal) Post Mortem confirmed
septicaemia, aetiology unknown,
little else of note
Immediate issues:
• time gap from death to confirmation
• potentially inhalational, therefore
airborne anthrax - when/where/how
• uncertainties -continuing risks to public
• lack of precedents and local/UK
experience
• background of US deliberate release
cases
• "legal" investigation (Procurator Fiscal)
Immediate response:
• Incident Control Team (ICT) convened
NHS Borders/HPS/HPA/GDS etc.
• Environmental Investigation Team (BIT)
- subgroup to investigate possible
sources of anthrax
BORDERS ANTHRAX INCIDENT
Organisation Frameworks
NHS Borders (Chair)
Health Protection Scotland (HPS)
Borders Procurator Fiscal (PF)
Health Protection Agency
(HPA/CEPR/ NDPL)
NHS Lothian (Royal Infirmary)
Scottish Borders Council (SBC)
Health & Safety Executive (HSE)
Scottish Environment Protection
Agency (SEPA)
Lothian & Borders Police (LBP)
State Veterinary Service (SVS)
Government Decontamination
Service (CDS)
Scottish Environment & Rural
Affairs Dept (SEERAD)
SEHD
INCIDENT RESPONSE
Framework & Priorities
Incident Management
Process
Investigatic
- history prio
n of Case
rto illness
activities
Generate
exposure hypotheses
Identify
potential contamination
sources for investigation
Risk Analysis Process
Risk Assessment
- identification of those "exposed"
- ongoing risks to"community"
from airborne contamination?
Risk Management
- agree criteria and measures
- isolation of suspect site
- prophylaxis of "at risk" contacts
Risk Communication
- family/friends/contacts
- neighbours
- local rural community
- wider Borders/Scotland/UK
- politicians
- press/media
CASE INVESTIGATION
PH-AML in remission
5 July - fever, cough
6 July - slight improvement
7 July - breathless, headache
product.
collapse,
8 July - death
PM haemorrhagic
mediastinal he
- Bacillus species -
ough, rash,
septicaemia
septicaemia,
emorrhage
local labs.
suspect skin contaminant
- review by HPA NDPL confirms
B.anthracis - unknown strain
11
m .m
Uncertainties
- 1 month gap
- unable to access PN
personal effects diary/
- 2nd hand informatio
and "evidence"
Route of
infection
unclear
Inhalational
Anthrax
Risk Factc
- Rural woo
Lodge - w
- woodwork
- recently ta
- made his c
badger/de
- recently "r
- 2Julyatte
drumming
- 4Julyatte
local drum
Cutaneous
Anthrax
;ical instruments
MI Djembe drum
)wn animal skin -
r?
tin hide?
ded a local
-------
INVESTIGATION HYPOTHESES
Primary Hypothesis
Exposure to B. anthracis spores at
Black Lodge, during remaking of
Djembe drumhead - shaving animal
hide
• Feb 2006-New York drummer case
- exposure associated with shaving a
goat-skin for a new drumhead
• History of PN making a Djembe drum
with (possibly) a goat-skin
shaving a goat-skin hide
• Family suggested PN worked on hide in
bedroom at Black Lodge
INVESTIGATION HYPOTHESES
| Secondary Hypotheses
Exposure via environmental
contamination
- gardening/composting
- animal contact/rescues
- contaminated private water supply at
Black Lodge - PN recently dug new
drinking-water well
Exposure via contact with other
drums/hides used for drums
- contact with other drums at local
drumming classes
- drums and spare goat hides brought
to UK from Guinea, West Africa by
drumming school owners
INVESTIGATION STRATEGY
Procurator
Fiscal/Police
Investigation
Clinical
Investigation
Review of case history
(CDC/Emory State Uni)
- Atypical inhalation "anthrax
haemorrhag c pneumonia"
Review of histopathology
CDC -Jan 2007
- imunohistochemistry finds
bronchiolar macrophages
supports inhaled exposure
Black Lodge
Environmental sampling
Drumming Activities
Sampling of:
• drums
• hides
• properties (S/E)
• vehicles
ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS
Black Lodge
HPA - NDPL
- Forensic sampling
Sabre -VLA
- Characterisation
• Surfaces/dust/air
• House
• Wood workshop
• Garage/metal shop
• Garden
• Vehicles
• Bat corpse
• Water supply
ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS
Drumming Activities
Stage 1 - HPA
• Smailhotm - garage/drums
• Be/ford house (England),
drums removed to Porton
• Cumbria (England) - goat
hide and drum
Stage2-Sabre/HPA
• Smailhotm
- house/garage
- Village Hall
• Be/fort
- house/vehicle/more drums
- neighbouring houses (door
mats)
ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING RESULTS
Cumbria (England)
• Drum + goat skin
All negative
Belford (England)
• B. atthracis cultured from
from drums, one (goat)hide,
bedroom floor/rug - PN
strain (plus others)
• PCR +ve evidence wide-
spread in house and vehicle
Black Lodge (Scotland)
• HPA -51 samples
• Sabre-113 samples
All negative (including the bat)
Smailholm (Scotland)
• Village Hall - cultures +ve from
soft chairs, floor/brooms and
more PCR +ve surfaces
• Garage floor- culture positive
and PCR +ve surfaces
• Farmhouse - PCR +ve surfaces
• cultures indistinguishable from
PN strain
-------
RISK MANAGEMENT OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES
- THE PLAN
Decontamination Decision
Processes (Scotland)
Issues to resolve
• interpretation of culture and PCR
results
• designation of "contaminated"
and "un contaminated" properties
• agree decontamination and final
clearance criteria
• appraisal of decontamination
methods
• obtain expert advice from range
of sources
• select final decontamination
process
• select contractor
—
"Clearance" Committee created to
advise ICT
-"Lay" chair- Procurator Fiscal
Joint (S/E) "Expert Advisory Group"
Created
Provided with findings and advice requested
on decontamination options
- US EPA/CDC
- HPA-NDPL
- Deutsch Bundeswehr
- GDS
RISK MANAGEMENT OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES
- THE REALITY
Problems
• Need for a defensible rationale and
proportionate decision on decon.
• Lack
and
of definitive published ev
guidance for managemen
dence
of
domestic "natural" anthrax
conic
• Range of opinions from "Expert
AoV
• Pol it
sory Panel"
erns over setting "prece
cal dimension to
decontamination decisions
Solutions
Properties
• Smailholm Hall and garage, Belford
house all designated as "contaminated"
stan da
spores
• "Preca
decont
d - "no detectable viable
' (by characterisation sarr
tionary approach" to
mination method based
pling)
n
"expert group"advice
• Review
- MAS
Diox
• Consul
(via GC
Drums
• Contan
HPA-N
ed "published" recomme
report, 2005 cited "Chlor
de" as "the standard"
ed decontamination oper
S) on practical options
inated drums decontamir
DPL using formaldehyde
dations
ie
ators
ated by
DECONTAMINATION SOLUTION
Smailholm Hall and Garage
but potential site of fatal inhalation exposure by PN.
Options considered
• porous surfaces - remove for disposal/external decon.
• non- porous - liquid decontamination +1- HEPA vacuuming
• or gas/vapour fumigation to coverall surfaces plus airspaces
Final Decision
Precautionary approach in view of history, Hall being a public building and
complications of disposal of furnishings (concern re: hall tapestry).
• Gas/vapour fumigation as method of choice chlorine dioxide as agent of
choice - characteristics, penetration of porous surfaces, track record and
MAS (2005) recommendation for public facility decontamination
• Contract awarded to Sabre Technologies.
March 2007
Decontamination of Smailholm Village Hall and Garage
Sabre Deployment in UK
• local logistics, practicalities
• community liaison
• media, politicians
March 2007
Decontamination of Smailholm Village Hall and Garage
Summary
July 2006
50 year old man, living in rural Scottish Borders, died of septicaemia,
aetiology unknown
August 2006
Bacillus atthracis of previously unknown type isolated by HPA-NDPL
from a blood culture taken pre-mortem, p re-antibiotic therapy
August - January 2007
contaminated drums and 3 contaminated properties identified
investigation concluded that the case was inhalational anthrax and that
the most probable route of exposure was inhalation of anthrax spores
associated with playing or contact with contaminated West African
Djembe drums imported from Guinea, at Smailholm, Scottish Borders.
March 2007
2 properties in Scotland, contaminated with B. anthracis spores,
successfully decontaminated using gaseous chlorine dioxide, courtesy of
Sabre (US) (and GDS)
drums decontaminated with formaldehyde by HPA.
-------
Issues Raised and Lessons Learned
New experience for many involved
- level of uncertainties made decisions problematic and
encouraged a generally "precautionary approach"
Complex investigation of a deceased case - uncertain/inaccurate
history-unclear role of police
No UK benchmarks for investigation and management of a
"natural" human inhalational anthrax incident
Lack of published evidence base for environmental investigation
of domestic property
Debate over sampling strategy - forensic vs characterisation
Lack of published decontamination criteria for decision making
Issues Raised and Lessons Learned
Variations in US/UK microbiological protocols and PCR test
result interpretation created complications
Complex multi-agency incident management organisation -
committee approach vs "executive role" (Incident Commander)
Complex and challenging task to co-ordinate disparate agencies
but in general worked well
Investigation and management strategy was not seriously
contested
Public (and political) reaction was generally calm and
proportionate
Reflections
Did we investigate far enough or too far?
- where else had the contaminated drums been?
- how far should we have looked for spores?
Was the risk management strategy proportionate and reasonable?
- anthrax is "everywhere" naturally - isn't it?
Was it all cost effective?
- were the financial (tangible) costs reasonable
- were the intangible costs justified - collateral damage to
individuals livelihoods, communities, relationships and
professional reputations
Recommendations
Improve published evidence base for environmental investigation of
"natural" anthrax
Improve published evidence base and guidelines for incident
management and decontamination
Enhance environmental investigation and decontamination capacity
in UK
Improve understanding of background anthrax contamination and
background exposure (sero-prevalence data) in UK
Investigate and quantify risk associated with West African goat
hides and drums
Agree risk communication messages for "natural" (non-deliberate)
release inhalational anthrax risk
Acknowledgements
US EPA
US CDC /Emory University School of Medicine
HPA-NDPL(UK]
GDS (UK]
Sabre Technologies
HSE (UK]
SVSand VLA(UK]
All other members of the Expert Advisory Group
Members of the ICT, EIT, Clearance Committee and Logistics Groups
The family of PN and community of Smailholm, Scottish Borders
-------
NHSRC's
Systematic Decontamination Studies
Shawn P. Ryan. Joe Wood, G. Blair Martin,
Vipin K. Rastogi (ECBC), Harry Stone (Battelle)
Motivation
• EPA's National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) was
formed after the events of 9/11 and the anthrax letter incidents in the fall
of 2001 to:
- provide responsive expertise and products based on scientific
research and evaluations of technology that can be used to prepare
for, and recover from, public health and environmental emergencies.
• NHSRC's Decontamination Research Area mission is to provide expertise
and guidance on the selection and implementation of effective
decontamination technologies for indoor and outdoor CBRN event
scenarios and to provide the scientific basis for a significant reduction in
the time and cost of decontamination events.
Decon Program Area Overview
• Research Process:
-Decontamination demonstrations (e.g., chamber and field studies)
-Decontamination technology application studies
(e.g., generation rates, material/equipment compatibility, containment)
-Technology evaluations (e.g., TTEP, systematic decontamination studies)
-Agent Fate (e.g., persistence, penetration)
- Efficacy test methods
-Decontamination method development !«*«*»o™™™™ i
• Office of Research and Development
*
S.EPA
Presentation Overview
• Matrix effects on the inactivation of B. anthrac/s Ames, avirulent 6.
anthrads NNR1A1, B. subtilis, and Geobadllus stearothermophilus
• The lack of a correlation of biological indicators (Bis) results and
inactivation of spores on building materials in fumigation studies
• Importance of controlling process parameters in efficacy studies
-Effect of RH on fumigation results with chlorine dioxide
• Preliminary results for decon of chemical warfare agents and TICs with
chlorine dioxide gas
• Ongoing efforts
^g Office of Research and Development
SEPA
Systematic Decontamination Studies
• Promising technologies are investigated to determine efficacy and
decontamination kinetics as a function of:
- Technology operating conditions (concentration, time, temperature, RH)
- Materials (actual building materials)
- Agents
• Spore-formers (B. anthrads and surrogates)
• Vegetative bacteria (y. pestis, F. tuiarensis)
• Viruses (smallpox, avian influenza)
• BiotOXins (ricin, botullinum)
• Chemical agents and TICs
• Two-phased approach:
1. Environmental persistence (for non-spores)
2. Decontamination Kinetics
i HI
-
&EPA
Systematic Decontamination Studies:
General Approach (Spores)
-------
AEPA
Impact of Material Type on Log Reduction:
Bioquell Hydrogen Peroxide Vapor (HPV)
>1000 ppmv, 20 min, 40-91 % RH, 22-38 °C
Li
DL GM WP
• Office of Research and Development
1C = Industrial Carpet
BW = Bare Wood
GL = Glass
DL = Decorative Laminate
GM = Galvanized Metal Ductwork
WP = Latex-painted Wallboard Paper
PC = Painted Concrete
-SEPA
Impact of Material Type on Kill Kinetics (Liquids)
pH-Amended (pH = 6.8) Bleach _
of Research and Development
s=/EPA
Impact of Material Type on Kill Kinetics (Gas)
EPA/ECBC Studies: Decontamination of B. anthracis NNR1A1 spores
with Chlorine Dioxide Gas (3000 ppmv, 75°F, 75% RH)
Industrial Carpet
Unpainted Pine Wood
0 3000 6000
CT (concentration x time) in
• Office of Research al
9000
6000 9000 '
SEPA
Systematic Decon: Kill Kinetics (Gases/Vapors)
EPA/ECBC Studies: Decontamination of B. anthracis NNR1A1 spores
with Chlorine Dioxide Gas (3000 ppmv, 75°F, 75% RH)
Time required for a six-log reduction (6-LR) in viable spores observed to be a
strong function of material type
- Observed times ranged from 40 - 250 min @ 3000 ppmv CIO2 (75°F, 75%RH)
Order of increasing CT required to achieve a 6-LR observed to be
independent of concentration:
LowCT
. High CT
carpet « painted concrete < painted I-beam steel « painted wallboard < ceiling tile < wood
• Office of Research and Development
SEPA
Building Material Decon and the Use of Bis
• Biological indicators (Bis) or spore strips:
-A specific titer of a non-virulent bac/7/t/s-species spore type
inoculated/dried onto standardized material (e.g., paper or stainless steel)
and packaged in sterile envelopes (e.g., Tyvek8 or glassine)
• Bis: ~106 spores of B. atrophaeus or Geobacillus stearothermophilus
on stainless steel disks in Tyvek8 pouches
• Spore strips: ~106 spores of 6. atrophaeus on filters paper in glassine
-Used extensively in past decontamination events to potentially provide an
indication of efficacy of building decon post fumigation (prior to clearance
sampling)
-Designed to provide qualitative results within 7 days (growth/no growth)
-SEPA
Building Material Decon and the Use of Bis
• Bis consistently resulted in "no growth" well before a 6-LR or no growth
was achieved on building materials
-fumigation with chlorine dioxide (e.g., ceiling tile shown below) from
EPA/ECBC systematic decontamination studies
Acoustic Ceiling Tile
7.
106 B. atrophaeus spores
on stainless steel disk (APEX)
laterial coupons
-------
£EFR
Building Material Decon and the Use of Bis
BIOQUELL HPV
>1000 ppmv, 20 min, 40-91 % RH, 22-38 °C
Indicator (organism)
« B.subtilis
£ G. steanDthermophilus
^ 6. atrophaeus
c B.subtilis
75%RHat75°F
(noted by black stars on
the graph)
• Current results suggest
the reduction in viable spores
is a strong function of RH
(even above 75%)
Fumigation Time (hr)
&EPA
Importance of Controlling Operating Conditions
• Effectiveness of chlorine dioxide for the inactivation of B. anthracis Ames on
all matrices studied is very highly dependent on RH
• Important to have tight control of process parameters in efficacy
studies to ensure that studies are valid for actual technology
application
Irdunnal cap*
to«,»L,mln,.
• Office of Research
20mm(»tC%m~750F)
627E+07 (59) | OOOE+CQ
763E+07 (292) j 0 OOE+CQ
arttraics Ame;
CT = 90(
4 31E 07 19 6)
„„,„.„„_,
wth Sabre CIQ, (3000 pprrv)
RH ~75 °F) 4 hr(>SO%WH, -75 °F)
OOOE+00
9..9.9.E^.9.9 ™ : 2
14
SEPA
Environmental Conditions Measurement QA
• Quality assurance (QA) of process monitoring is essential
• Concentration measurement of many reactive gases is not trivial
- H2O2jv) undergoes rapid homogeneous and surface decomposition
- No standard method for measuring (sampling) CIO2 concentration in air
at high ppmv concentrations exist
• Difficult to speciate between CIO2 and other relevant chlorine species
• Reactive gases may interfere with the monitoring of other process
parameters (e.g., RH)
Environmental Conditions Measurement QA
Comparison of Process monitors for RH
Viasala RH
probe previously
exposed to CIO2
AEPA
Decontamination of Materials for CWAs and TICs
• Investigation of persistence of toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and
chemical warfare agents (CWAs) on building material surfaces
-TICs: malathion, dimethyl methylphosphonate (DMMP), TNT
-CWAs: sarin (GB), thickened soman (TGD), VX
-Materials: concrete, galvanized metal, decorative laminate, carpet,
ceiling tile
• Decontamination of materials contaminated
with TICs (malathion and DMMP) using
Sabre CIO2
• Decontamination of materials contaminated
with CWAs using Sabre CIO2, liquid CIO2,
or bleach
-------
Persistence on Materials: TICs
•
• Office of Research and Da,™,
Decontamination of Materials: TICs
Sabre CIO2 (-3000 ppmv, 75°F, 79% RH)
Malathion on Industrial Carpet
Note: Observed conversion to malaoxon
_ Office of Research and Development
«*EF
! ..
i
i
_ Offic
A
Decontamination of Materials: TICs
Sabre CIO2 (-3000 ppmv, 75°C, 81% RH)
DMMP on Industrial Carpet
i
$ ?
¥
„,„««„-„-,,„,„,
DDEcm
20
Decontamination of Materials: CWAs
• Decontamination studies with Sabre chlorine dioxide (3000 ppmv)
-VX on galvanized steel, decorative laminate, industrial carpet
-TGD on galvanized steel, decorative laminate, industrial carpet
-GB on industrial carpet
• Data analyses are on-going
-Preliminary results suggest:
• VX decomposition complete within 1 hr; residual VX below DL on all surfaces
-Similar results for malathion; perhaps higher decomposition of VX
-EA-2192 not analyzed
• TGD and GB results do not preliminarily appear too different from controls
-ForGB, similar results as those observed for DMMP
^_ Office of Research and Development
S.EPA
Other Recent (Preliminary)
Research Results
• Ricin toxin and vaccinia virus (smallpox vaccine strain) can be highly
persistent on painted concrete and galvanized metal ductwork; extent of
study was 14 days
-Matrix effect observed
- Effect of RH
• Complete inactivation of ricin toxin and vaccinia virus (smallpox vaccine
strain) using CIO2 gas on all materials (porous and non porous) investigated
was observed at -150 ppmv-hr (200-300 ppmv for 30 minutes at 75°F, 75%
RH); lowest CT studied
• Chlorine dioxide liquid (Exterm-6, 1000 ppm) and pH-amended bleach
inactivated vaccinia virus on all materials (porous and non porous) studied
within a 10-minute contact time
Summary
• The overall efficacy and CT required for the inactivation of spores is highly
dependent upon material type for all technologies investigated
-Chlorine dioxide gas and liquid
-pH-amended bleach
- Formaldehyde vapor
-Hydrogen peroxide vapor
• Biological indicators do not correlate with building material decontamination
or required minimum CT for past building chlorine dioxide fumigations for
B. anthracis spores
• Decontamination efficacy can be a very strong function of environmental
conditions (e.g., effect of RH on decontamination using CIO2)
- Proper QA of operational parameter measurements is essential
-------
SB*
Summary
• Chlorine dioxide will react with malathion (observed conversion to
malaoxon); no observed reaction with DMMP on surfaces studied
• Analyses of chemical agent results are ongoing
- Preliminary results suggest complete reaction with VX (1hr @ -3000 ppmv)
• Office of Research and Development
Additional Ongoing Systematic
Decontamination Efforts
• Investigation of liquids for the decontamination of B. anthracis, ricin toxin,
and vaccinia virus on materials
-Generation of kill kinetics data
• Determination of persistence (ambient bldg.) and decontamination kinetics
-Agents: B. anthracis, Y. pestis, F. tularensis, Botullinum toxin
-Porous and non-porous materials
-Fumigants: Chlorine dioxide and hydrogen peroxide
• Office of Research and Development
Additional Ongoing Systematic
Decontamination Efforts
• Systematic decontamination studies of methyl bromide (MeBr) fumigation
for the inactivation of 6. anthracis Ames on building materials
- Effect of RH, concentration, contact time, material, spore type
• Systematic decontamination studies of Steris VHP® fumigation for the
inactivation of B. anthracis Ames on building materials
-Effect of concentration, contact time, material, and spore type
• Development of Bis that are better correlated to building material fumigation
with chlorine dioxide (and other gases/vapors?)
-Spore type, titer, and "standard" material
SEPA
Additional Ongoing Systematic
Decontamination Efforts
• Comparative efficacy study for B. anthracis Ames (NHSRC and OPP)
-Joint effort between NHSRC and OPP
-Efficacy of technologies determined by three methods:
• AOAC sporicidal activity of disinfectants test (AOAC 966.04)
• Three-step method, as modified by EPA/OPP
• TTEP SOPs (Battelle) for the quantitative determination of efficacy on
building materials
-Technologies:
• Fumigants: Sabre CIO2, HP Technology, MeBr
• Liquids: pH-amended bleach (std.), Exterm-6 CIO2, 2 TBD
- Parameters:
•CT
• Spore types and carriers
^g Office of Research and Development
-------
Improvement and Validation of Lab-
Scale Test Methods for Sporicidal
Decontamination Agents
Presented To:
2007 Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup,
and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated
with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological
Materials
Stephen F. Tomasino, Ph.D., Senior Scientist
U.S. EPA, Office of Pesticide Programs
Biological and Economic Analysis Division
Microbiology Laboratory Branch
Fort Meade, Maryland
EPA Regulatory Method Activities
• Test Method Research
- Modifications to AOAC
Method 966.04
(Sporicidal Efficacy)
- Quantitative method
evaluation and
development
- Surrogate studies
- TSM validation
- Related initiatives
involving bio-threat
agents
DMA Chapter 6: Editorial
- Use-Dilution Methods
- Tuberculocidal Activity
- Germicidal Spray Products
Chapter 6: Procedural
- Use-dilution carrier count
procedure
- New recovery medium for
Mycobacterium
EPA/AOAC Contract Tasks
Biofilm methods
Regulatory Standard for a Sporicidal Claim
AOAC Method 966.04
Qualitative assessment
More relevant to clinical
Technique sensitive
Test challenge = Bacillus
subtilis and Clostridium
sporogenes
Hard surface (Porcelain
carriers and suture loops) -
60 carriers each
Full study = 720 carriers
Passing result = zero carriers
positive
Conservative method
Basic Schematic for Method 966.04
Inoculated carriers
5 carriers added to 10 mL disinfectant
Exposure to product per the contact time
Neutralizer and subculture media
Incubate at 37°C for 21 Days
(+) or (-)
IB t i in:i mu i
Modifying Method 966.04
Priorities and Process
Priorities
- Bacillus
- Liquids
- Porcelain
- Clostridium
- Liquids
- Porcelain
- Suture loops
- Gases
Official AOAC Method
Modification Process
- Pre-collaborative studies
- AOAC Committee M
- AOAC General Referee
- Collaborative study
- Collaborative study
manuscript
- First Action method
AOAC Method 966.04
Recommended Modifications
Replace soil extract nutrient broth with a
chemically defined medium (amended
nutrient agar)
Addition of a carrier count procedure for
enumeration of spore inoculum
Establishment of a minimum and maximum
spore titer per carrier: 105 to approx. 106
spores/carrier
Addition of a neutralization confirmation
procedure
Numerous editorial changes
-------
Collaborative Study
Modifications to Method 966.04
A collaborative study (4 labs) was undertaken to
compare the current and modified methods and
determine if the methods are statistically equivalent.
Three medium/carrier combinations were compared:
1) soil extract nutrient broth/porcelain carrier
(current method)
2) nutrient agar amended with 5 ug/mL manganese
sulfate/porcelain carrier
3) nutrient agar amended with 5 ug/mL manganese
sulfate/stainless steel carrier
Carrier counts, HCl resistance, efficacy, quantitative
efficacy, and spore wash-off were the test variables.
Collaborative Study
Conclusions
The data strongly indicate that the modified methods, when used
in place of the current method, provide a similar outcome for
effective and less effective formulations.
The amended NA procedure, the spore enumeration procedure, the
target carrier count, and the neutralization confirmation
procedure were adopted as official first action procedure
modifications to method 966.04.
Although the data support the use of stainless steel for 6. subtilis,
due to the current use of porcelain carriers for testing Clostridium
sporogenes, the use of porcelain carriers was retained until
stainless steel can be evaluated as a replacement carrier material
for Clostridium.
Collaborative study and new method have been published:
Tomasino, 5.F. and Hamilton, M.A. (2006) J.AOAC Int. 89, 1373-
1397 „
m ia i i mil mi ifc i i in i i i
Outcome: The Published AOAC Methods
AOAC Method I
- Original method
- Available in 18th ed of
AOACI DMA
- Available on-line
- Unedited
- Contains the Bacillus
and Clostridium
components
- Contains the porcelain
and suture loop
components
AOAC Method II
- Revised method
- Available in 18th ed of
AOACI DMA
- Available on-line
- Edited and modified
- Bacillus and porcelain
components only
- Useful for other spore
formers, suture loops
and testing gases
Research on Quantitative Test Methods
Carrier type and volume of sporicide tested for AOAC Method 966.04
(see A), ASTM E 2111 -00 (see B), and TSM (see C). Circle in C indicates
Quantitative Protocols for Sporicides
Selection of Methods
1. ASTM E 2111 -05 (QCT-1): Standard Quantitative
Carrier Test Method
2. ASTM E 2197-02 (QCT-2): Standard Quantitative
Disk Carrier Test Method
3. Sagripanti, J. L, and Bonifacino, A. 1996.
Comparative Sporicidal Effect of Liquid
Chemical Germicides on Three Medical Devices
Contaminated with Spores of Bacillus subtilis.
Am. J. Infect. Control 24:364-371.
Method Comparison Study
Test Design and Data Analysis
Each lab (3) conducted each test procedure
(3) on each chemical (3) three times.
Log reduction of surviving spores following
treatment was the primary response to be
analyzed.
Statistical analysis determined means and
variances; ANOVA was conducted to estimate
method reproducibility (within and between
laboratory variation).
-------
Log Reduction Values for
ASTM E 21 1 1 -05 and Three Step Method
Test Chemical
Sodium hypochlorite (3000
ppm with adjusted pH)
Sodium hypochlorite (3000
ppm with unadjusted pH)
Hydrogen peroxide &
peracetic acid
ASTM E 21 11-00
LR SD,
7.1 0.36
3.6 0.66
6.7 0.45
SDR
0.39
1.12
0.52
Three Step Method
LR
7.5
1.2
7.3
in , ! ' i :
SD,
0.27
0.26
0.25
SDR
0.48
0.26
0.75
P-
0.28
0.053
0.25
13
.
Method Comparison Study
Conclusions
Both quantitative methods performed in a similar
fashion.
No significant differences between control carrier
counts for the quantitative methods.
No significant differences between LR for strong or
weak sporicides for the quantitative methods.
Compared to the SD associated with other antimicrobial
test methods, the ASTM and the TSM exhibited small
and acceptable repeatability SD and reproducibility SD.
Additional test method attributes were assessed.
Additional Attributes
Questionnaire Submitted to Analysts
- The Protocols - use and clarity
- Test Set-up - preparing for the test
- Testing - performing the method, resources
- Results - recording, compiling, and interpretation
TSM selected for surrogate studies and validation
testing
For results of collaborative study see: Tomasino,
S.F. and Hamilton, M.A. (2007) J.AOAC Int. vol. 90:
456-464
Method Validation Defined
"Validation of a microbiological method is the process
by which it is experimentally established that the
performance characteristics of the method meet the
requirements for the intended application, in
comparison to the traditional method." (USP-NF,
Validation of Alternative Microbiological methods,
3807-3810)
"Methpd validation is the process of proving that an
analytical method is acceptable for its intended
purpose." (Green, M.J., 1996. A Practical Guide to
Analytical Method Validation. Analytical Chemistry,
68: 305-309)
Conventional approach to method validation is
desirable but not necessary. Official modifications to
existing methods are also acceptable.
Three Step Method Components
Three fractions - A, B and C
- Fraction A (loosely releases spores by washing)
- Fraction B (sonication to dislodge spores)
- Fraction C (agitation/germination of spores)
The log reduction (LR) is the mean of control carrier Iog10 densities
minus the mean of disinfected carrier Iog10 densities
TSM Validation Study
AOAC INTERNATIONAL-facilitated process
OPP Microbiology Lab is the lead lab
Collaborative Study Protocol
10 lab validation study (8 reported), mainly volunteers
One microbe - Bacillus subtilis
Three liquid chemicals
Carrier type is glass
Three replications per laboratory; nine total test days
AOAC Method 966.04 (Method II) used as the reference
method
Launched in Fall 2006 - data analysis has been completed
Potential outcome - a validated quantitative method for
liquids on a hard surface!
-------
ill in I 1 I II li I. ll i.
TSM Validation - Laboratory Participation
U.S. EPA
OPP Microbiology Laboratory - lead lab
U.S. FDA
Denver District Laboratory
U.S. FDA
Winchester Engineering and Analytical Center (WEAC)
U.S. FDA
Office of Science and Engineering Laboratory (OSEL) - White Oak
Advanced Sterilization Microbiology Laboratory
STERIS Corporation
MicroBioTest
ATS Labs
Bioscience Labs
Ohio Department of Agriculture
19
I i i . i i
Test Chemicals and Conditions
Test Chemical
Sodium hypochlorite
0.08% peracetic acid and
1.0% hydrogen peroxide
2.6% glutar aldehyde
Treatment Level and Test Parameters
High (LR>6)
-6000 ppm
-adjusted pH (7)
-30 min
•30 min
-180 min
Medium (LR 2-6) Low (LR 0-2)
•6000 ppm -3000 ppm
•unadjusted pH -unadjusted pH
•10 min -10 min
•10 min •! min
•60 min -10 min
20
ill I ill I I ill I I I
TSM Validation Test Design
Replication
Rep 1 (Day 1 )
Rep 1 (Day 2)
Rep 1 (Day 3)
Treatment and Levels
1. Sodium Hypochlorite
1. High
2. Medium
3. Low
2. Peracetic acid
and hydrogen peroxide
1. High
2. Medium
3. Low
4. Water Control
3. Glutaraldehyde
1. High
2. Medium
3. Low
4. Water Control
Test Method Performed
TSM
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
TSM
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
TSM
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
AOAC 966.04
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
AOAC 966.04
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
AOAC 966.04
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
i i • j
21
I t • I
TSM Validation Test Design
Randomization and Replication
Rep'
Rep 1
Rep 2
Rep 3
Random Order of Test Chemicals**
Labi
2,3,1
1,3,2
2,3,1
Lab 2
1,3,2
3,1,2
2,3,1
Lab 3
2,3,1
2,3,1
3,2,1
Lab 4
1,2,3
3,2,1
2,3,1
LabS
2,3,1
1,2,3
1,3,2
Lab 6
2,1,3
1,3,2
3,2,1
Lab?
1,2,3
3,2,1
1,2,3
LabS
2,3,1
1,2,3
3,2,1
Lab 9
1,2,3
1,3,2
3,2,1
Lab 10
3,2,1
1,2,3
2,3,1
Three total tests days per replication; one chemical class tested per day
**1 = sodium hypochlorite, 2 = hydrogen peroxide/peracetic acid, and
3 = glutaraldehyde; order within a test day will be High, Medium, Low,
and Water Control.
Measuring Method Performance
Is TSM a responsive, repeatable method?
Method response - "efficacy-response" curves
It is desirable for the repeatability (Sr) and
reproducibility (SR) standard deviations to be small.
For disinfectant tests, the AOAC has issued no
standards for how small is acceptably small.
Some guidance is provided by a recent literature review
showing that, for established suspension and dried
surface disinfectant tests, Sr ranged from 0.2 to 1.2
with a median of 0.4 and Sn ranged from 0.3 to 1.5 with
a median of 0.8 (Tilt and Hamilton 1999).
- Tilt, N. and Hamilton, M.A. (1999) Repeatability a
reproducibility of germicide tests: a literature review. JAOAC
Int., 82, 384-389.
It would be reasonable to claim that the Sr and SRare
acceptably small if they fall within these ranges.
The TSM test achieved these criteria. ,,
AOAC Method 966.04 - reference method
No. Positive Carriers
HOGOOGOD OO O
0
o
9
0
0
ODGGDOOD VODGODD OODOO
O
o 0 c
^ cP ^
of0 co° occcro-D ° o
The horizontal line is the mean number of positive carriers for each treatment.
-------
Statistical Summary
LR values for the AOAC 966.04 tests
Disinfectant
Sodium Hypochlorite
Sodium Hypochlorite
Sodium Hypochlorite
PA/ HP
PA/ HP
PA/ HP
Glutaraldehyde
Glutaraldehyde
Glutaraldehyde
For the AOAC966.04 test, the LR values w
1
Level
Low
Medium
High
Low
Medium
High
Low
Medium
High
ere calculated using the P/N form
Mean
4.90
5.31
7.18
4.90
6.69
7.11
4.92
5.38
6.27
SEM
0.13
0.17
0.14
0.13
0.25
0.17
0.14
0.28
0.26
and Hamilton, 2006 JAOAC).
25
1 1
TSM Validation
TSM Control Carriers
The overall mean (± SEM) was 6.86 (± 0.08). The total variance of the control carrier
log density was 57% attributable to the variance among laboratories. For the mean of
3 control carriers per test, the repeatability standard deviation was 0.15 and the
reproducibility standard deviation was 0.27.
26
TSM
Efficacy
Response
Curves
Hb°l.l """CI LibOl.ZPAIHP Lab 01 , 3 Gi.tj.n.ldEhydE
b Q6.3Gi,ti.nlldEl.vdE
1)1 I I !l
TSMV
6-
5"
S 4-
i 3-
1-
o-
L&d
Dferf octant
alidation LR
i
5
Low Madun Hgh
SUM
Data - Summary of Results
i
I
Lew A/Bdun
PA,H>
5
I
X
Hgh low Madun Hgh
GUaraUsryde
Mean LR, with ± SEM error bars, for the 9 treatments, based on 24 TSM tests (3 tests in
each of 8 laboratories). The SEM takes account of both inter-laboratory and intra-
laboratory variation. 28
ii ii i . i ii
TSM Validation - Statistical Analysis
Standard
Deviation
Disinfectant
Sodium Hypochlorite
Sodium Hypochlorite
Sodium Hypochlorite
PA/HP
PA/HP
PA/HP
Glutaraldehyde
Glutaraldehyde
Glutaraldehyde
Efficacy
Level
Low
Medium
High
Low
Medium
High
Low
Medium
High
Mean
LR
0.56
3.92
5.71
1.41
5.85
5.85
0.07
3.81
5.47
SEM
0.13
0.31
0.18
0.46
0.16
0.13
0.11
0.38
0.22
Sr
0.41
0.45
0.51
0.70
0.58
0.64
0.17
0.72
0.48
SR
0.50
0.95
0.66
1.43
0.65
0.64
0.34
1.23
0.75
29
TSM Validation Study
Observations and Conclusions
For AOAC control carriers, the overall mean (± SEM) was 5.52 (±
0.13).
There were no obvious outliers or unexpected patterns.
The greatest variability of LR values occurred for combinations of
disinfectant x efficacy levels that had Intermediate LR values.
Analysis of the mean log density for 3 TSM control carriers per test
showed that the overall mean (± SEM) was 6.86 (± 0.08) and the
reproducibility SD was 0.27.
For each test of each disinfectant, the LR was plotted against
efficacy level. The resulting "efficacy-response" curves were
repeatable and had the correct shape, indicating that the TSM is a
responsive method.
Other than the two PA/HP treatments, every TSM experiment
produced LR values that properly ordered the efficacy levels. Not
only did the LR consistently increase as the efficacy increased but
the amount of increase was repeatable.
-------
TSM Validation Study
Observations and Conclusions
Across the 9 treatments, the TSM LR means ranged
from 0.1 to 5.8. The repeatability SD ranged from 0.17
to 0.72 and the reproducibility SD ranged from 0.34 to
1.43.
For the TSM LR, the repeatability SD values were 0.31
for treatments of low efficacy (overall LR = 0.3), 0.63
for treatments of partial efficacy (overall LR = 3.0),
and 0.57 for treatments of higher efficacy (overall LR =
5.7). The reproducibility SD values were 0.43, 1.22,
and 0.67 for the low, medium, and high efficacy
treatments, respectively.
Overall, the method performance data strongly
support validation.
Acknowledgements
NHSRC - Funding for Tiers 1, 2 and 3 (Sterilant
Registration Protocol Development)
Dr. Martin Hamilton - statistical support
Rebecca Pines - Co-Study Director for TSM
All collaborators including FDA and ECBC
Interagency Expert Panel on Anthrax
AOAC International
Next Steps
Submit the TSM validation report (JAOAC
manuscript) to AOAC - conclusions will support
validation of the method (i.e., for liquids on a
hard non porous surface)
Complete modifications to AOAC method 966.04
(applicable suture loops and gaseous chemicals)
Evaluate other carrier materials for
quantitative efficacy tests
Explore quantitative efficacy tests for non
spore-forming threat agents
Development of interactive methods
Questions/Comments?
-------
Systematic Decon
Challenges and Succes'
Vipin K. Rastoqi1. Lanie Wallace1, Lisa Smith1 and
Shawn Ryan2
1. BioDefense Team, R&T Directorate, US Army- ECBC
2. EPA, ORD, NHSRC
vipin.rastogi@us.army.mil; 410-436-4856
, HID
Presented at the EPA Decon Workshop on June 21, 2007
Outline and Scope
Overall Goal
Experimental Matrix
• Variables and Test Method for Efficacy of Fumigants
Challenges
• Sample Number and Complex Porous Building Materials
• Quantitative test method?
Key Strategies
• Novel Sampling Port for Time-course Studies
• High-throughput Processing and Semi-automation
Fundamental Issues, Challenge Levels, Bioburden, Spore Recovery
Kill Kinetics, D-values, Estimated D6 and Observed D6 and Material Effect
Comparative Kill Efficacy of Virulent / Avirulent and Related Simulants
Goal - Conduct a Systematic Study on the Performance of
Three Commercial Fumigant Technologies for their
Efficacy in Decontamination of Building Interior
Surfaces Contaminated with BW Agent or Selected
Surrogates
Specific Objectives:
- Kill kinetics and D values for CD gas in its sporicidal action against
Bacillus anthracis spores
- Effect of bioburden on recovery and kill efficacy of VHP and CD gas
- Appropriate surrogate for virulent Ames strain
Variables
Six building surfaces - carpet, painted
wallboard, ceiling tile, painted I-beam, unpainted
pine wood, and unpainted cinder block
Five replicates/material (TEST) and Five positive
controls and Five negative controls
Five time points
Two CD gas technologies, Sabre and ClorDiSys
and One VHP, Steris
Four CD concentrations, 500,1000,1500, and
3000 ppmv
Three plates/dilution (spread-plating) and 1/3rJ
sample volume pour-plated
Per Time Point
6 Types of Test Coupons
+ 6 +ve + 6 -ve Coupons
50-mL Tubes (10-mL extractant) 42
Sonicated 10-min +
Vortexed 2-min
EzD
Per 5 Time Points
210 Coupons
50-mL tubes (2.1 L extractant)
Dilutions/test sample & 60 300 Dilutions tubes/test san
J. Dilution each from controls 12 f Dilution tubes/controls
iple60
it 1 90° PLATES/Test samples +
;;- Plates/dilution 180+12 192 |B PLATES/control samples
• Processing 210 coupons/experiment
• Spore enumeration in 'dirty' samples of ceiling tile and wallboard
^3J.xfJ ,., ,„•.- rfttulu.
iH
Which Method was Available for Processing 210 Coupons?
• None! Most methods at the time processed 12-24 samples using liquid
disinfectants!
• 'Single Tube Method' (STM) conceived to meet the challenge (has been optimized
and extended to include surface sampling with a DTRA funded program)
• Spore extraction achieved in 10 rnL BPW(0.5%) in a 50 mL sterile tube with 10 min
sonication and 2 min vortexing
• Percent recoveries improved with the inclusion of 0.01% Tween 80 and inoculation
of 7-logs spores in a 50 jiL volume as 7 mini droplets
• Key attributes include spore enumeration even in the presence of pulverized
material debris released from the ceiling tile and wallboard
• Very low limit of detection of viable spores (1-5) because 1/3rd of the sample volume
analyzed using pour plating
• The CD gas concentration monitored by two independent methods, real-time (CDS,
Inc.) and titration method (Thanks to Mr. John Mason)
• The cycle improved by maintaining a constant RH throughout the run
-------
Key Strategies
Fundamental Issues - Titer Level & Efficacv
Novel sampling port
GMP quality chamber
High capacity vortexer
Multiple sonicators
Automated plate pourer
Plate counters
Highly competent team of
analysts
Careful planning and many
long shifts
8.4 mg/L (3000 pprr
'tn
'
r 1
-
II
—
_L
1
I
OS
DC
DW
DW
teel
nderBloc
eiling Tile
allboard
-*-
S log 7 log S og
Log Titer
1
_L
• Efficacy is a function of spore oading as a single spot!
• CD gas efficacy significantly reduced when 8 log spore teste
'
T
d
•,tf. jt 'ff^fttj
Reduced spore recovery when 5% serum included!
0.5% serum was included in all later studies
Fundamental Issues - Bioburden & Effica
9000 ppmv.hr CD gas (ClorDiSys) with 75°/,
No significant impact on efficacy by increasing bioburden!
0.5% serum included in all further studies
Fundamental Issues
• Wher
• Two
andi
120
100
| 6.
8 40
20
spore inoculated as one spot,
changes significantly improved
nclusion of tween 80 (0.01%)
f
i a
I r
T
,_ •
-V -i
- Spore Recovery f5
recoveries variable and gene
spore recovery, inoculation f.
^ecBPW
f T
I
^£
^^^^~
rally low
s seven mini-drops
Carpet Ceiling Tile Cinder Block Steel Wallboard
Coupon Material
=i
Wood
-
%
Microbial Kill
Few Definitions
Sterilization is removal or destruction of all viable organisms
Disinfection is killing, removal or inhibition of pathogenic organisms
Sanitization is reduction of microbial population to levels deemed safe, based on
public health standards
Microorganisms are not killed instantly
D-value is defined as time it takes for a decimal reduction in the number of viable
spores, i.e. if you have 10-million (7-logs) at time zero, Exposure Time required to
reduce the number of viable spores to 1-million (6-logs) or 90% reduction
CT, i.e. (concentration x time) required for achieving a 6-log-kill or ZERO positives of
the post-decon sampling is another criteria for ascertaining effectiveness
D1 value is the time it takes for the first log reduction - one measure of efficacy of a
sporicidal agent. Can this D1 be used to extrapolate a D6 or time required for a 6-log
reduction?
For clearance, the ONLY accepted standard is "no growth" of environmental samples!
-------
Spore Kill Kinetics - An Example fflh
7 5-,
0-
5-
0-
5-
LL 5-
O o-
0-
0-
•-^
m =-1 575-^0 -I ":
!- = 6 8875 ±0 I570':
R'= 091287
D-value = -1/m =0.
Unpainted Pine W
' Sabre 500 ppm Test 1 75-
Sabre 500 ppm Test 2 7Q.
-^f l:
| Z) 50-
"r 45-
U 40-
o 35-
35hrs =38.1 min -"30-
20.
1 5-
1 0-
05-
ood
Sabru 500 ppm I u;:i ;
f
00 02 04 06 08 10 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Time [hours] Time [hours]
• Kill kinetics is non-linear and is strongly impacted by the material type
• D-values are computed from the initial linear part of the kill curve »^"^5k
. -3-sl
Perspective on D values Qpi
W
*-* 1
required for a
6xD1 = Time
extrapo ated f
for a 6-LR
D-values and Time Required for a 6-LR
d time
6-LR
om D1
Carpet
Ceiling Tile
Wallboard
I-beam Steel
Concrete
Wood
D1
5.3
11.7
11.6
9.4
5.7
20.7
6xD1
32.1
69.9
69.6
56.5
35.8
124.4
D6
40
240
230
130
120
250
D1 (in minutes) for
Sabre CIO2 at
3000 ppmv
• Material type impacts the time required for initial 90% kill
• Because of the non-linearity of the kill curve, the observed time for
a 6-log kill are significantly higher and is a function of material type -'•'-"•^ I
fwU
\
Estimated vs. Observed
ClorDiSys CD gas at 500 ppmv with 75% RH
Since the kill curve is non-linear, observed CT required for 6 log kill is significantly high
The required CTfora six log kill is a strong function of the test material type
3000 ppmv ClorDiSys CD gas for 30 and 120 min
A virulent NNR1A1 strain may be an appropriate surrogate of virulent Ames strain
Comparative Log Reduction of Virulent and Avirulent Spores by
Avirulent Anthrax vs. Simulant Spores
1500 ppmv ClorDiSys CD gas for 4 and 6 hour exposure with 75% RH
Bacillus subtilis or Geobacillus stearothermophilus spores could serve as appropriate
surrogates for B. anthracis
\ m Wood 4-Hr D Wood 6-Hr |
B subtilis
r/op h'iu3
Spore Type
r *
With careful planning, semi-automation, high-throughput sample processing, and
ingenuity in designing the sample port, an efficacy study of an unprecedented level was
completed
A quantitative test method for fumigant efficacy was conceived for processing over 200
coupons (this method has since been optimized with DTRA - DoD funding)
Spore recoveries ranged between 30 and 100% (based on several hundred data points)
High number of replicates and triplicate plates/dilution permitted statistical analyses
and variability assessment
Analysis of a large sample fraction (1/3rd) by pour-plating was a key to a very low
detection limit (1-5)
Spore kill kinetics is non-linear and is a function of material, concentration, and RH
D values are just one measure of efficacy and can not be extrapolated to estimate the CT
required for a six log kill
Plasmid-free NNR1A1 spores may be an appropriate surrogate for virulent Ames Spores
Bacillus subtilis and Geobacillus stearothermophilus spores may be appropriate BSL-1
surrogates for anthrax spores
-------
ACKNOWLEDGE!
• Collaborative Partner and Funding
EPA- NHSRC, Office of Research and Development
Blair Martin - Critical Guidance throughout the Program
Mark Brickhouse - Support as the original PM on this program
1 The Ace Team
Lanie Wallace
Saumil Shah
Jonathan Sabol
-------
Contamination Confirmed
Sampling performed by NIOSH Sampling Team
Analysis by PCR and culture
Positive results at all locations:
S 31 Downey Street
^ 2 Prince Street
The Exposure
e African drums using traditional methods
Imported natural hides from overseas
/ hand tools to wo
Vorking the Hides
> Hides soaked in water to soften
; smoothed by hand
n would be covered with hair and piece
Inhalation of spores during this procedure caused the infection
-------
Decontamination
> Sodium Hypochlorite solution (with Acetic Acid Buffer)
> Vaporized Hydrogen Peroxide (Considered)
> Chlorine Dioxide (Van, Saved Apartment Center
Street items)
> Non-porous surfaces (counters, tables, kitchen utensils,
pans)
What to dispose of
-------
The Response
.unidinination of apartment 15 (approximately 500 sq ft) and
nmon spaces of the building
• Used modified Sodium Hypochlorite Solution and HEPA vacuums
• Materials for disposal were bagged, rinsed, bagged, rinsed and bagged
before removal from the apartment
lals to be decontaminated were
/ HEPA vacuum and bagged
/ Soaked in modified Sodium Hypochlorite
/ Boxed for additional treatment
Total of 16 cubic yards of material were removed from the
apartment for disposal.
Disposal
> Perception = The"
d not want to deal with the possible fallout of their
agencies or the public finding out they were accepting
-------
Autoclaving - NYES
rday, March 18, 2006
=d for 3 hours at 295 degrees Fahrenhe
Zero growth of surrogate
No acceptance at landfills anyway
-------
Summary - Downing Street
ber of agencies involved
Sometimes its not "the more the merrier1'
All in all they worked well together
31 Downey Street was someone's home
The materials inside were all personal
•/ Some had extreme sentimental value
S Some were very private items
Summary - Downing Street
-------
NYPDGOWANUS IMPOUND
Gowanus Impound Issues
Specialized equipment
NYCDHMH lead, EPA contractors performed work (Sabre Technologies}
Fumigation of van plus materials from Downing Street and Prince
ter monitoring to verify no escape of Chlorine Dioxide from
treatment enclosure
-------
gallon at NYPD Auto Impound
Process Equipment Layout
Van & Contents Fumigation
'•
IM
-..„:,
MMGtN
oo
*KM>
legend
01 -Decon 1
02-CWCOT2
H-Hun*»tV
•
-------
SEPA
Update on U.S. EPA
Decontamination Technologies
Research Laboratory (DTRL)
Activities
Shawn P. Ryan, Joe Wood,
Emily Snyder and G. Blair Martin
National Homeland Security Research Center
Dahman Touati, Matt Clayton and Stella Payne
ARCADIS
SERA
Decon Program Research Area Overview
Mission: To provide expertise and guidance on the selection and implementation of
effective decontamination technologies for indoor and outdoor CBRN event
scenarios and to provide the scientific basis for a significant reduction in the time
and cost of decontamination events
Research Process:
- Decontamination demonstrations
(e.g., chamber and field studies)
- Decpntamination technology
application studies (e.g., generatipn
rates, material/equipment compatibility,
containment)
- Technology evaluations (e.g., TTEP,
systematic decontamination studies)
-Agent Fate
(e.g., persistence, penetration)
- Efficacy test methods
- Decontamination method development
i
T«ctino4ogir AfHHuUon »
—"-
DTRL Overview
Decontamination Engineering
- R&D on application related issues for efficacious technologies
• What application issues must be considered in selection and
implementation of a technology?
- e.g., material demand and material/equipment compatibility, fumigant
penetration
• What are the best ways to improve effectiveness and decrease cost of
application?
- e.g., fumigant containment
I L:
- DTRL is comprised of complementary
research labs
• Located in RTP; focus on fumigation
research and analytical support
&EPA
Research Overview
> Process parameter measurements (e.g., gas/vapor concentration, RH)
• Permeability of fumigants through materials and containments
- Which materials are best to contain fumigants?
- How well do fumigants penetrate building materials?
> Fumigant adsorption capacity or reaction rate on sorbents/catalysts
-Which materials are best to scrub gases/vapors from fumigation emissions?
• Material demand
-What is the impact of materials on fumigants (what generation capacity is required
to achieve target gas concentrations and concentration x time (CT) values)?
• Fumigant/material by-products
> Material/equipment compatibility
^_ Office of Research and Development
SERA
Process Parameter Measurement
No standard method for measuring (sampling/analyzing) CIO2 gas
concentration in the high (e.g., >10 ppm) concentration range
-AWWASM-4500(E)
• Designed for analyzing CIO2 in water samples
• Extended to gas sampling by impinging into phosphate
buffered Kl-solution
• pH-based titrations with sodium thiosulphate
- Lose ability to speciate between CI2 and CIO2 due
to sampling method
-Other impinging methods need verification
• DL = 25 ppmv at 2 L gas sampled
-ClorDiSysEMS™
• Real-time measurement of CIO2 via measurement
of UV/VIS adsorption at 319 nm (DL = 36 ppmv)
• Precautionary measures needed for high RH
and pressure fluctuations (flow effects)
Process Parameter Measurement
CIO2 Gas Concentration Measurements: EMS™ vs. SM-4500 (E)
?3000
&
1 25°°
1
5 ]nnn
g
5
v = 1.0646X- 22.12
R2 = 0.9884 *>^***
^/* *
~^7_
S-/
S
^\*
^
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 40
CI02 concentration SM 4500-E (ppmv)
00
5
-------
Process Parameter Measurement
-Drager Polvtron 7000
• Real-time gas measurement of CIO2 via
electrochemical sensor (DL = 50 ppbv)
• Combined response to CI2 and CIO2
• Observed hysteresis during continuous monitoring
-OSHA Inorganic Method ID-202
• Sampling into carbonate buffered Kl-solution
• DL = 60 ppbv (7.5 L gas sampled)
• Analysis via Ion Chromatograph (1C)
• High CIO2 peak interferes with quantification of CI2
SEPA
Process Parameter Measurement
CIO2 Gas Concentration Measurements: Drager vs. ID-202
• Office of Research andDeu
y = 1.4663x- O.OS
R2 = 0.9791
CI02 concentration OSHA ID 202 (ppmv)
SEFA
Process Parameter Measurement
Other in-house capabilities:
-Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA)
• Real-time gas measurement of CIO2 and CI2
via dual source triple quadrupole mass
spectrometer (Quantitation Limit = 2.3 pptv)
• Linear dynamic range: 1 pptv-100 ppbv; may
be detuned to increase
• Bench top system currently being constructed
-Single-Photon lonization/Time-of-Flight MS fSPI)
• Real-time gas measurement of CIO2 via
laser ionization coupled with time-of-flight
mass spectrometer(LOD = 0.3 ppm)
• Large linear range
(ionization mechanism does not limit range)
• Unable to measure chlorine gas
&EPA
Process Parameter Measurement
• Efficacy of technologies may be very dependent on process parameters
(e.g., environmental conditions) in combination with the concentration of the
decontaminant
-e.g., the effectiveness of CIO2 gas to inactivate spores is a very strong
function of RH
• Measurement and control of process parameters is not trivial and requires
stringent QA for laboratory studies
• Office of Research andDeu
Fumigant Permeability
• Containment of a fumigant within a defined volume
- Out-leakage increases generation capacity requirements to achieve target
concentrations
- Leakage may present a worker or public health risk
• Penetration of fumigants through porous materials
- Correlation to efficacy?
Fumigant Permeability
Permeability through candidate tenting material
0.02 - ... ,
Time (minutes after challenge exposure)
-------
SEPA
i££r""ta'
Fumigant Containment: Adsorption
• Use of solid sorbents or catalysts to remove fumigants from process gas
• Initial testing to determine adsorption capacity of different sorbents for CIO2
- Use of ASTM D5160-95 for "Gas-Phase Adsorption Testing
of Activated Carbon"
- Development of adsorption isotherms for sorbents
Critical Bed Depth = y-intercept
Sorbent Capacity =
1/slope x concentration x flow rate
SB*
Fumigant Containment: Adsorption
Outlet Concentration of CIO2 from the Packed Carbon Column
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500
Time (minutes)
* Outlet Concentration Feed Concentration I
• Office of Research andDeu
Material Demand
• Materials can substantially impact the ability to achieve the target
fumigant concentration within a defined volume
-What generation rate is required to achieve target fumigant
concentrations within a volume based on homogeneous decomposition
and material interactions?
•WMK
concrete
blocks
Inlet Concentration
Demand due to
decomposition
Chamber Concentration
S.EPA
Wmd = adsorption + surface reaction
Outlet (Chamber) Concentration
Wn
&EPA
Material Demand
• Prior work with Edgewood Chemical and
Biological Center (ECBC) on CIO2 and VHP®
concluded significant demand for some
materials:
-CIO2: ceiling tile > wallboard
-VHP®: concrete > ceiling tile, wallboard, wood
- EPA/ECBC work done at limited conditions to determine potential importance of
material demand forfumigant/material combinations
• Expanding on work in-house (DTRL) to support and develop a tool (material
demand calculator) to determine material demand as a function of
fumigation conditions and construction materials
- Technology selection and implementation:
• Does the generation system have enough capacity to overcome demand?
• Decon/Disposal paradigm
Material Demand
• Initial focus on CIO2 due to high efficacy
observed on all non porous and porous
materials investigated
• Investigation of material demand as a
function of material, inlet CIO2 concentration,
and operating conditions (T, RH)
- Homogeneous decomposition (light, heat)
- Material Demand
• Ceiling tile
• Galvanized metal ductwork
• Wallboard
• Data used for modeling to develop a
"simple" material demand calculator tool
-------
SERA
Fumigation By-products
• Screening for residual by-products from fumigation
-Performed during the aeration phases of the
material demand and compatibility studies
• Gaseous residual by-products (off-gasing)
• Residuals on materials
• Extraction of coupons for residuals
• Thermal desorption studies
• Analysis of chamber gas during/after aeration
-DNPH tubes (EPA Method TO-11)
• Full-scan aldehyde analysis
-Varian 1200 MSMS (LPCI, APCI)
oEPA
KKSS...
Fumigation By-products
Chamber Air Concentrations
(after 12 hour aeration)
In Exposed
JEL
r n
Ceiling Tite
Material/Equipment Compatibility
• Impact of fumigation on materials and equipment investigated as a function
of fumigation conditions
• Initial work done as part of work with ECBC on CIO2 and VHP* material
demand
-No aesthetic impacts on materials tested
- No significant impacts determined during ASTM physical strength tests
• Published report to be released soon
• Office of Research andDev
Material/Equipment Compatibility
Extension of material/equipment compatibility continuing in DTRL
Initial work on CIO2; plans to extend material demand and
material/equipment compatibility studies to an HP technology in FY 08
Includes aesthetic and functionality testing over time
-Material/equipment down-select:
• Aluminum, copper, and carbon steel coupons
• Stranded wires, house wiring insulation, switches
• Sealants (e.g., silicon), gaskets
• Laser and ink-jet printed paper
• Photographs and media (e.g., CD's, DVD's)
• Small electronics
(e.g., PDA, cell phone, fax machine, and telephone
Material/Equipment Compatibility
• In-depth sensitive electronic compatibility study (EPA/DHS)
-Treatment in the NHSRC fumigation lab to study the impact of the
CIO2 fumigation process on computers and LCD monitors:
• Standard fumigation conditions for B.anthracis
- 9000 ppmhv-hr(3000 ppmvforS hrs), 75°F, 75% RH
• Impact of high and low RH fumigation
- 9000 ppmv-hr (SOOOppmv for 3 hrs), 75°F, low RH (40%) or high RH (90%)
• LowC! fumigation
- 900 ppmv-hr (75 ppmv for 12 hrs), 75°F, 75% RH
• Control (ambient! and RH; ambient! and high RH)
-Detailed analysis, including effect over time,
through the Chemical, Biological, Radiological
Technology Alliance (CBRTA) Independent
Assessment and Evaluation
(LGS Innovations - Bell Labs)
• Aesthetic and functionality evaluation (PC Doctor)
• Visual inspection and more advanced diagnostics
• Module-by-module investigation
• Cross-section and failure mode analysis
SERA
Questions?
-------
Localizing & Controlling BTA Transport
with Polymer Sprays
June 21, 2007
EPA Decontamination Workshop
Paula Krauter
Chemical & Biological Nonproliferation Program
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
krauter2@llnl.gov
I!1
Problem Statement
Biothreat agent (BTA) reaerosolization can spread the contaminate plume
6. anthracis cross-
contamination occurred in the
Brentwood mailroom
facility(10/01)
Inhibition of BTA transport could provide decision-makers time to
consider decontamination options while limiting further contamination
An Outdoor Release of Surrogate Spores
Exhibited Resuspension
2006/2007 LANL & LLNL Gypsy Moth project
Bacillus thuringiensis subsp. kurstaki (Btk) is
used to control Gypsy Moth populations and is a
A goal of this study was to designed and
validated DNA signatures for Btk and screen
aerosol and environmental samples
•More collectors had viable Btk spores 2 days
after release, than during or 1 day after the releasi
ollected up to 14 days post
Lessons learned: persistence and
re-suspension of spore-forming organisms
-„„...
Multiple Influences Effect BTA Deposition
Environmental
Conditions
Influences from particle size to weather can alter particle drift and migration
and extend the initial boundaries of contamination
Logic Behind Project Supported by the Physics
of Adhesion and Reaerosolization l^L
Attraction to surface
(attractive forces)
Adhesion Forces
Reaerosolization
(forces resisting)
I
Settling particle
Bound particle
Reaerosolization
Goal of project was to consider a different response to a BTA
incident by increasing adhesion force and inhibiting BTA
resuspension
Original Concept: Polymer(s) Interact with the
Coulombic Forces on the Particles
Aerosol droplet (-50 jjm) containing
negatively charged polymers (40 nm)
attach to particles on surfaces and in
the boundary layer
For example, an aerosol droplet
containing polymer may attract
positively charged spores (1-3 urn)
Non-charged ends of the polymer
flocculate to form multi-spore
aggregates
Polymer coagulate as solvent
evaporates adhering particles to the
surface
-------
Polymer Spray Criteria
Formulas evaluated based on criteria:
1) High adhesion strength
2) Negative electrostatic charge
3) Low viscosity and low surface tension (wetability)
4) Moderate evaporation rate
5) Lowcorresitivity
6) Lowtoxicity
iC
Polymer Formulation Characterization
Formula
Identification
NS-1, sthane
NS-3, vinyl acetate
NS-2,acrylate
A-6, acrylamide.acid
A- 4, diallyldimethylammonium
chloride
A-5, vinylpyrrolidone
quaternized
A-8, vinyl pyrrolidone
A-9, vinyl pyrrolidone
A-10, styrenesulfonate
A-7, ethylenimine
Surface Electrostatic
pH Density Viscosity tension charge
unit a/mL CD mN/cm nC/a
9.07 0.957 20 31.49 0.60
9.53 0.948 10 33.63 -1.8
7.07 0.953 8 32.18 -0.7
7.96 0.997 N/A 71.81 -0.4
7.84 1.014 171 69.70 1.77
6.91 1.009 74 68.21 1.81
6.72 1.010 90 67.98 1.17
Solubility problems
6.56 1.017 25 58.51 -0.5
Too viscous, high molecular weight
Cp- centipoise @ SOrpm, 23C
Resuspension Ratios for Top Performing
Polymer Solutions and Control
IV
I .
i
Resuspension ratios for polymei
:ontrol solution application
Screening tests in small chamber
1. Powdered spores disbursed with compressed air onto
deactivated glass surface (very few spores settled)
2. Polymer solution sprayed (<10 psi) onto spore covered
surface
3. Resuspension measured by APS with airflow ~1 m/min
Application of Liquid Decon Agents can Displace "^L
or Resuspend Spores •- -
Optimized polymer formula(s)
for low pressure sprayer
device
Evaluated the wetting agent,
solvent blend, viscosity,
elasticity, evaporation rate
the potential to shear, lift
Determination of appropriate
sprayer pressure
Top polymer was the terpolymer of butylaminoethyl
methacrylate, octylacrylamide and acrylic acid
NS-2 is an amphoteric film-forming
polymer solution
We selected polymers
known to adhere to
keratin since keratin-like
proteins are found in
spore's outer coat
Validation Test at U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground
A validation test was
conducted in April &
September 2006 in
collaboration with biothreat
experts
• Success was measured by lower
spore counts after the application
of the copolymer formula in
turbulent airflow
• Data provided the basis for
calculation of deposition velocity,
transport efficiency and
reaerosolization rate with and
without the application of the
polymer solution
Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT
-------
Tested in a 'Worst Case' Environment- an Antistatic
Aerosol Chamber with High Reentrainment Forces
Key issues in designing the chamber included isokenetic probes, antistatic
materials, grounding, homogeneous concentration of enhanced spores, a large air
volume, and multiple measurement systems.
Chamber constructed with poured Lexan sheets, antistatic EO™ coating and
aluminum framing attached to BioDuct apparatus.
Anti-static Aerosol Test Chamber
•Air
ented 3.5 m
•r was drawn through an instrume
disseminated into turbulent airflow
t 0.5, 0.75 and 1 A m from the floor, 1 in effluent
•Four imping
duct
jer probes located at 0.!
•Three aerosol particle sizer probes, 2 in the chamber and 1 on the effluent duct
spores, settle over
night
•Purge unsettled
spores
•Copolymer
solution application
& allow to dry
•Repeat test with
solvent only
NS-2 Application
Spray set
to 10-15
psi so as
not perturb
spores
•Goal was to
apply a light
mist of the
solution that
provided a thin
or partial
coating (-20-22
nm) so as to not
agglomerate all
the spores
•Part of the
selection
criteria was low
surface tension,
low viscosity
with strong
adhesion
Results
i Disperse
Q
Total Transport Efficiency ("JQ
[Total transport efficiency%= 100 x fTa+Ts)/Te]
•We anticipated a total dissemination efficiency of about 10-15%. Aerosol
chamber results were 11-27% (aqua)
•The reaerosolization efficiency without application was 0.7%, 0.41% and
0.45% (orange)
The reaerosolization efficiency with application was 0.3% with water/EtOH and
•The reaerosolization efficiency with application
0.03% and 0.0002% with NS-2 application (yell
Resuspension Factor
Resuspension factor is the ratio of the air concentration of spores
to the surface deposition concentration of spore contamination
(spores serving as the source for the resuspension process)
The resuspension factor, Rf, is expressed as
R,= [Spores in air]/[Surface deposition of spores]
Air concentration was measured by AGI samples, (CFU/cm3)
Surface deposition of spores was measured by
wet swab samples, (CFU/cm2)
Results
Resuspension factors for spores in these chamber tests without any
inhibitor application ranged from 3.4 x 10* to 4.8 x 10* /cm, or 26% of the
spores
Resuspension factors show that NS-2 application ( 50 mL on 2.3 m2)
inhibited spore resuspension by 2-orders of magnitude
- Rf, 3.4 x 10'7 to 5.5 x 10"3 /cm, respectively, or 0.7% and 0.4%
Application of the water-ethanol control inhibited resuspension by a half-
order of magnitude
These results from a mechanical-type resuspension mechanism and are
considerably greater, 1.5 to 2 orders of magnitude, than those reported for
resuspension caused from natural, wind driven processes
Reaerosolization
Factors, Rf
Reaerosolization
application
AGI- After
Test 1 Control
Water-ethanol
34 10 "
87 10 '
Test 2
NS-2 spray
48 10 '
34 10 '
NS-2 spray
1 2 10 '
55 10 8
-------
Polymer formulations were designed specifically
for other hazardous materials L—
Be & U particles generated in a Contained Firing Facility experiment
were successfully encapsulated using P1:P5 spray
•MVIetal participate were in the inhalable size range of 1 - 100 |jm
<-DOE wet-swipe collection method & modified NIOSH 7300 method used for metals analysis
*P1:P5 treated samples were significantly different (P<0.0001) from the control samples
•I-Error bars are the standard deviations, 7 samples/treatment
Team & Publications
Art Biermann-Aerosol Physicist, LLNL
Mark Hoffman- Polymer Chemist, LLNL
Lloyd Larsen- Microbiologist, U.S. Army, DPG
Alex Vu- Biochemist, LLNL
Dave Zalk-Industrial Hygienist, LLNL
Todd Weisgraber- Fluid Dynamics, LLNL
tauter PW, AH Biermann, DM Hoffman, LD Larsen Inhibiting the Reaerosolization of Enhanced Spores
;rauter PW, DM Hoffman, AK VU, GA Keating, DM Zalk Inhibiting the transport of hazardous bio-particulates
using polymer-based solutions J Occupational and Environmental Hygiene In publication, 11/07
tauter Paula, Arthur Biermann April 2007 Reaerosolization of fluidized spores in HVAC systems
J Applied snd Environmental Microbiology, V7 2165-2172
;rauter PW, AH Biermann, LD Larsen Transport Efficiency and Deposition Velocity of Fluidized
Spores in Ventilation Ducts 2005 Aerobiologia 21 155-172
tauter PW, LD Larsen and AH Biermann, Novel Approach Towards Elimination of Inhalation Hazards
Associated with Reaerosolization of Biothreat Particles Presented to the American Society for Microbiology
Biodefense and Emerging Diseases Research Meeting, February 27- March 2, 2007 Washington, D C
Summary
The goal of this project was to adhere airborne particulate biothreat
agents in an air-volume by attracting and attaching biothreat particles
to a surface thus containing the BTA.
A secondary goal was to provide a material that does not degrade
surfaces with corrosive materials.
We evaluated an amphoteric acrylic copolymer solution (NS-2) in a
worst-case environment; an antistatic chamber (3.5 m3) and in high
re-entrainment forces.
Potentially, the negatively charged groups of NS-2 bind a positively
charged spore more efficiently. This material performed better than a
solvent control in inhibiting spore resuspension.
Polymer solutions can be designed to adhere to specific particulate
types.
An environment in which the spores are attached to a surface will allow
those involved in the cleanup effort a margin of safety in which to
decide how to best decon various materials and equipment.
Contact information:
Paula Krauter
krauter2@llnl.gov
(925) 422-0429
7000 East Ave. L-528
Livermore, CA 94551
-------
We Expedite Decon?
By: G. Blair Martin, Shawn Ryan,
Emily Snyder, Joe Wood and Nancy
Adams
U.S. EPA, Office of Research and
Development
National Homeland Security Research
Center
Presented at: Decon Workshop
Research Triangle Park, NC
June 20-22, 2007
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE: Provide insight on past practice and
ongoing R&D on decontamination of CB agents
GOAL: Minimize Time and Cost of Effective
Decontamination
• Background
• Field Experience
• Research and Development
• Decontamination Process Improvements
• Summary
BACKGROUND
In the fall of 2001 a number of buildings were contaminated with
B.anthracis from letters mailed through the U.S. Postal Service
All of the these buildings have been decontaminated using a
variety of methods
/ Removal and disposal of contaminated materials
/ Surface cleaning with bleach, liquid chlorine dioxide or various
hydrogen peroxide products
/ Fumigation with chlorine dioxide, hydrogen peroxide, or
paraform aldehyde
/ The volumes fumigated at one time ranged from about 8,000 to over
14,000,000 cubic feet
/ FIFRA exemptions required as no products registered for 6.a.
/ None registered now
BACKGROUND: Field Experience
PAST FUMIGATIONS FOR 5. anthmcis:
COMPARISON OF TWO FACILITIES
• Location
' Surroundings
> Size
- Volume
- Area
- Zone Size
• Approach
- Area
- Fumigant
- Concentration
- Mixing
- Containment
- Waste
BRENTWOOD
Washington, DC
Heavily Urban
14,000,000 ft3
700,000 ft2
Whole Building
Whole Building
C1O2
750 ppm@ 12 hours
Air Handlers & Fans
NAU/Scrubber
Liquids
- Fumigation Duration One Day
SA-32
Sterling, VA
Rural: Industrial Park, Subdivision
Multiple Zones
Vaporized Hydrogen Peroxide
216 ppm @ 4 hours
Inlet Flow & Fans
NAM/Catalyst
None
Approximately 2 months
BACKGROUND: Field Experience
STORAGE TANKS & C1O2 GENERATION EQUIPMENT
BACKGROUND: Field Experience
Key technology evolution of CIO2 fumigation
American Media International (AMI) Building - B.a.
contaminated
• 700,000 cubic feet
• Carbon cells in place of wet scrubbers
Hudson Falls, NY Department Store - mold
contaminated
• 1,000,000 cubic feet
• Single tarp
• Small carbon cells
Numerous mold contaminated buildings in Louisiana
and Texas
• 1500 to over 50,000 square feet
• Termite tenting
• Target 3000 ppm for 3 hours
• Truck mounted generator and emitter
• Small negative air unit and carbon cells
-------
BACKGROUND: Decontamination R&D
The National Homeland Security Research Center program
• Systematic evaluation of fumigant efficacy
• Fumigants
• Chlorine dioxide
• Hydrogen peroxide
• Methyl bromide
• Parameters
• Concentration
• Time
• Temperature
• Relative humidity
• Materials
• Porous
• Non porous
• Biological indicators
BACKGROUND: Decontamination R&D
Systematic evaluation of fumigant efficacy
• A few reminders - using logs can be deceptive
• 5log= 100,000 spores
• 6 log = 1,000,000 spores
• 7 log = 10,000,000 spores
• Therefore the number of spores in "a log reduction" is
dependent on the staring contamination level
• We need a denominator - most reports are "per sample"
• Decon efficacy is dependent on spore loading
• 106 (6 log) spores on 1 inch square sample equal:
- 1.44 X 10s (8+ log) on a square foot
- 1.296 X 10s (9+ log) on a square yard)
• Most environmental samples are at least a square foot
• Results show <2 to >6 log per sample
• Guidance for fumigation conditions to type/extent of agent?
Systematic Decon Experimental Procedure
Determination of the log reduction in viable avirulent Bacillus anthracis
(B.a.) spores as a function of chlorine dioxide (C1O2) concentration and
fumigation time (CT value) on different indoor buildina materials
Comparison of the CT to achieve "no growth" on biological indicator
-
13 mmx 13 mm coupons (5 replicates per dish)
• raw wood, unpainted cinder block, carpet,
painted I-beam steel, ceiling tile, wallboard
Inoculated with ~107 spores of avirulent
Bacillus anthracis (NNR1A1) in 7 x 7.1 u.l_ drops
<109 per square foot
Inclusion of 0.5 % BSA as bioburden
Biological Indicator spores strips (Bis)
• Bacillus atrophaeus (~1x106) on stainless
steel backing in Tyvek pouches (APEX)
Decontamination of B. anthmcis on Carpet
1"
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1
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Carpet - CIO2
CD05000501
CD05001001
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2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 6000 13000 10000
CT (ppm-hr)
• Large variability in
data at low CT
• Decay curve and
variability not a function
of CIO2 generation method
• Optimal CT not affected
by 2-fold increase in CIO2
concentration
•No growth on any coupon
after treatment at
CT > 6000 ppm-hr for all
three concentrations tested
-------
Effect of Material Type on Decontamination
Unpainted Cinder Block - Sabre CIO2 Unpainted Pine Wood - Sabre CIO2
"No growth" criterion not achieved up to 8000 ppm-hr of treatment on
unpainted cinder block or Unpainted (structural) pine wood
Log reduction is dependent on CT, no distinct difference in reduction due to
fumigation at different CIO2 concentrations (500, 1000, and 1500 ppm)
Liquid inoculation of coupons may be a factor
Some Definitions & D-Value Concept
1 Microorganisms are not killed instantly and microbial
population death usually occurs exponentially
D-value is defined as the time it takes for a decimal reduction
in the number of viable spores
• For example, starting with 10-million (7-logs) spores at time zero, the
D-value is the exposure time required for a disinfectant to reduce the
number of viable spores to 1-million (6-logs)
1 Another measure of efficacy is the CT (concentration x time)
required to achieve a 6-log-kill reduction or "no growth" on
culturing
For building cleanup, the ONLY acceptable standard has been
no growth of pathogenic spores from environmental samples!
1 How does the D-value relate to the clean-up standard?
Non-linear D-Values
D-value from initial log reduction
(1st 3 data points; up to 1 hour)
D-value from initial log
reduction compared to
all data (up to 10 hours)
D-value = -1/m =0.635 hrs =38.1
Time [hours]
Time [hours]
• Kill curves are non-linear; linear D-value severely underestimate the time
required for 6-log reduction and no growth
Effect of CIO, CT on Bis
Bis - ChlorDiSys CIO2
Bis - Sabre CIO,
500 ppm mis
1000 ppm tuns
1500 ppm tuns
1000 ppm i
1500 ppm i
I 1— 6000 ppm-hr
No growth on any of the Bis after 6000 ppm-hr of treatment
- not consistent with results of 6. anthracis (NNR1A1)on cinder block or wood
May limit value of Bis as a fumigation indicator
Alternative Bis may be required
STREAMLINED APPROACH
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CONTAMINATED
• Approach to minimize impact
• Population
• Economy-time
• Cost of restoration
• Prior planning essential
• Maintain current building CAD drawings
• Generic response plans
• Coordination with local authorities
• Expedited decision making
• Rapid contracting for services
• Insurance instead of indemnification
STREAMLINED APPROACH
Decision process: Assess the extent of
contamination
• Evaluation of information from others
• Time between release and discovery
- Movements of occupants
• Results of confirmatory/forensic sampling
• Nature of agent
- Hazard category
- Persistence
- Amount
• Indication of spread of contamination
- Extended occupancy
- Aerosolizable
- Concentrated and/or contained
• Decision to proceed to characterization sampling
• Decision of PPE for characterization sampling
-------
STREAMLINED APPROACH
CHARACTERIZATION SAMPLING
• Assess aerosol dispersion by sampling HVAC returns
• Confirmed = consider proceeding to fumigation
• Negative = proceed to characterization surface sampling
• Approach to characterization sampling (approach in development)
• Biased/focused
• Random stratified
• Full probabilistic or hybrid
• Software for selecting/locating/documenting sampling locations
• Assess surface samples and choose decon approach
• Limited hard surfaces only = consider liquid/foam
• Aerosolized spores and HVAC contaminated^ proceed to fumigation
• Widespread on porous and/or nonporous surfaces = proceed to
fumigation
Any decontamination method chosen will require FIFRA compliance
• Registration
• Exemption
STREAMLINED APPROACH
DECON STRATEGY: FUMIGATION
Demonstrated capacity to fumigate entire building
• Widespread contamination of porous and/or nonporous surfaces
• Aerosolized spores/persistent agent and HVAC contaminated
• Decontamination process steps
• Containment of agent
• Sealing and HEPA/negative air machine
• Tenting and small HEPA/negative air system
• Source reduction for general contamination = HEPA vacuum
• Minimize materials removal
• Paper goods
• Any other contents that might have been moved
• Building materials left in place
• Decontamination documentation = RAP, SAP, AAMP
STREAMLINED APPROACH
DECON STRATEGY: FUMIGATION
• Decontamination process steps (continued)
• Decontamination process implementation
• Tenting building if not done for containment
• Installation of equipment
• Installation of monitoring equipment (concentration, T, RH)
• Installation of Bis-minimize
• Decontamination
• Harvest of Bis
• Decontamination confirmation
• Process parameters are met (CT, T, RH)
• Clearance sampling
• Surface
• Air and aggressive air sampling
• Success = No Growth on all clearance samples
Condensed Conceptual Timeline
Streamlined Approach
fl
SUMMARY
DECON - YOU WANT IT WHEN?
• Sufficient basis is available for decontamination of B.a. in structures
• Chlorine dioxide fumigation
• Demonstrated efficacy
• Experience provides basis for FIFRA exemption
• Evolution of technology
• Availability of decontamination infrastructure
• Potential to improve response time
• Minimize use of Bis
• Improved sampling strategy
• Use forensics to simplify characterization sampling
• Clearance by Hybrid probabilistic method
• Potential for further improvement
• FIFRA registration
• Accept compliance with label for clerance
SUMMARY
DECON -YOU WANT IT WHEN?
• R&D is providing additional guidance
• Better information on liquids
• Additional fumigants, e.g. hydrogen peroxide, methyl bromide
• Additional biological agents, e.g. viruses, vegetative bacteria
• Biological toxins, e.g. ricin
• Chemical agents and Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs)
• Effects of/on materials
• Building construction and contents
• Outdoor materials
• Sensitive equipment
• Improved methods of containment/scrubbing
• Sampling and analysis methods/strategies
• Controlled large scale indoor/outdoor decontamination (planned)
• Continuing interaction with the user community
-------
SUMMARY
DECON - YOU WANT IT WHEN?
BOTTOM LINE: TECHNICALLY WE ARE MUCH BETTER OFF THAN
WE WERE AND WE ARE GETTING BETTER PREPARED ALL THE
TIME!
HOWEVER: CERTAIN PARTS OF THE OVERALL PROCESS STILL
NEED TO BE IMPROVED
• Streamlining decision process
• Access to demonstrated decon technology - critical systems
• Link to forensic sampling
• Characterization strategy
• Application of Bis
• Clearance procedures
-------
Airport Restoration Following a
Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA)
Attack "
Robert G. Knowlton, Ph.D., P.E.
Sandia National Laboratories
Presentation Outline
Background and Project Overview
Project Activities
- Remediation Plan Development
• Partnerships
• Threat Scenarios
• Clean-up Guidelines
• Sampling Methodologies
• Decontamination Technologies
- Decision Support Tool Development
- Experimental Studies to Fill Technology,
Data, and Capability Gaps
Summary
A chemical agent release in a facility may result in.
High Casualties
- Office Buildings
- Indoor Stadiums
- Transportation Hubs
Loss of National Prestige
- National Monuments
- Government Buildings
Large Economic Impact
- Transportation Hubs
A chemical agent release in key
transportation facilities could be devastating
Severe economic impact if closed for even
short periods
Highly vulnerable to chemical terrorism
Wide range of decon and remediation
challenges
The primary focus of the Facility
Restoration OTD is on major airports
- Project will focus on interior remediation
only
- Project will serve as a 'template' for other
airports to follow
We are working in close collaboration with a partner airport (LAX)
and regulatory agencies
Previous recovery activities were very lengthy
The time of the overall recovery operation is governed by
the length of the combined activities
Implementing a systems approach will decrease
the time required for recovery
Objectives:
• Advance the state-of-the-art in facility recovery through the development and
demonstration of efficient planning, decontamination, sampling and analysis tools
• Enhance rapid recovery from chemical attacks
• Minimize economic impact from chemical attack
- Provide the capability to make defensible public health decisions
To achieve these objectives, we are focusing on
• Pre-planning the recovery process
> Selecting the "best-available" methods and technologies for each activity
• Filling data and technology gaps critical to the recovery process
-------
^3
The systems approach is following the structure
developed by an interagency panel of experts
Response and Recovery Activities
Crisis Management
Notification
"™rto
First
Response
emergency
investigation
sampling
•a agent r/pe,
andvianility
Consequence Management
Rem e di ati on/CI e an up
Characterization
Biological agent
affected site
Decontamination
safety
parameters
Clearance
Restoration
(Recovery)
2E,
The Facility Restoration OTD builds off of the recently
completed Biological Restoration DDAP
Many of the concepts will be similar to the
Biological Restoration DDAP, except..
-Agent decay may occur
-Surface interactions with chemical agents must
be considered
- More rapid sampling and analysis techniques are
available
- Decontamination approach may vary depending
on the agent
- Clean-up standards better defined
-Long term air monitoring may be required
ring the Biological Restoration DDAP
The Facility Restoration OTD utilizes experts from the
National Laboratories and other federal agencies
Collaborators
Sandia National Laboratories- PI
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory - PI
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
DHS Project Manager
Don Bansleben
External Advisory Panel
Nancy Adams, US EPA
Veronique Hauschild, US EPA
Dennis Reutter, US DHS
Joe Wood, US EPA
Partner Airport
Los Angeles International (LAX)
Presentation Outline
Background and Project Overview
Project Activities
- Remediation Plan Development
• Partnerships
• Threat Scenarios
• Clean-up Guidelines
• Sampling Methodologies
• Decontamination Technologies
- Decision Support Tool Development
- Experimental Studies to Fill Technology,
Data, and Capability Gaps
Summary
One of the major delays in remediation projects has been the
development/approval of remediation action plans
1 The OTD is 'pre-planning' the recovery
process by developing a
comprehensive remediation plan
- All phases of the operation are
examined
- Reduce the time before remediation
can begin
1 Key issues can be addressed before
an incident occurs
1 Planning templates can speed the
process and help all stakeholders
better understand the issues
- Identify necessary resources
(personnel, equipment, and
consumables)
- Make key decisions (e.g., decon
versus replacement)
- Determine sampling protocols and
methods
- Get "buy-in" from stakeholders
The Facility Restoration OTD team has been divided
into a series of Working Groups
-------
Recovery operations will involve a wide range of stakeholders
Stakeholders include...
Facility owners/operators
Federal, state and local health
agencies
- NIOSH
- US EPA
— Department of Homeland
Security (including ISA)
- State EPA
— Law enforcement (federal and
local)
— Department of Transportation
— Local public health agencies
MOD Signed
- LAX, DHS, SNL, LLNL
Meetings with Partner Airport
- Briefings for LAX Management - Deputy
Executive Director, Airport Law Enforceme
and Protection Services supports project
- Remediation Plan Team tour of LAX facility
Response and Remediation Coordination
Plan Development (Con Ops)
Airport Remediation Plan (RP) Workshop
- Objective: Familiarize Stakeholders with
Remediation Plan Template
- September 2007
Tabletop Exercise
- Objective: To demonstrate pre-planning
capabilities and other tools
- Spring 2008
Final Demonstration
- FY09
The Threat Scenarios Working Group has established a
realistic threat space for the project
Objective: To develop realistic threat space
for critical transportation facilities
- Agents and types of release to be
addressed in the Remediation Plan
- To support the Tabletop Exercise
CW Agent List Defined
- CW Agents
- Toxic Industrial Chemicals
Release Scenario Defined for Tabletop
Exercise
- Location - International Terminal at LAX
- CONTAM modeling exercise in progress to
support tabletop exercise
Threat scenarios developed with input from other DHS projects and
other federal agencies
The Clean-up Guidelines Working Group is using historic data to
develop a set of recommended clean-up standards
Table 2-3. Recommended civiliar
CWAs.
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The Sampling Working Group is developing
recommendations for sample collection and analysis
The Sampling Working Group is focusing on four sampling phases:
- Characterization
- Remediation Verification
- Clearance Sampling
- Monitoring
In addition, the sampling Working Group is also focusing on:
- Statistical sampling methods to reduce number of required samples and to
increase confidence in negative results
- Utilization of the LRN and DHS mobile labs for analysis of chemical samples
The Decontamination Working Group is identifying and
recommending methods to decontaminate agents on the threat list
Four types of technologies needed
- Surface and 'hot spot' decon
• Liquids, foams, gels
- Large volumes (enclosed and semi-enclosed)
• Gases, vapors, and aerosols
- Sensitive equipment
• Gases, vapors, aerosols, and solvent-based
approaches
- Waste
• Liquids, foams, gels
Decon technology may vary depending on
agent released
Have prepared a survey of existing and
emerging decon technologies
Engaging experts from outside of DHS
- DOD, EPA
)ntamination technology recommendations are being
developed for inclusion into Remediation Plan
Decontamination technology surveys were conducted for the
Remediation Plan
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Recommendations for specific decontamination
technologies are included in the Remediation Plan
1 Surface and Hot Spot Decontamination
- DF-200 (for surfaces where corrosion is an issue)
- 10% Bleach (for surfaces where corrosion is not an issue)
1 Volumetric Decontamination
- mVHP (for persistent agents)
- Ventilation and Enhanced Attenuation (for non-persistent agents)
1 Sensitive Equipment Decontamination
- mVHP (for large non-moveable items)
- Solvent Bath (for small moveable items)
1 Decontamination of Waste
-10% Bleach
The Decision Support Tool Working Group is adapting
the BROOM Decision Support Tool for chemical use
Building Restoration Operations Optimization Model (BROOM)
BROOM can collect, manage, visualize, and analyze the large
amounts of data associated with a chemical agent release
Data Collection, Management, and
Visualization
- Sample locations
- Sample results
Data Analysis
- Map Contamination
- Map Uncertainty
- Optimize subsequent sampling to reduce
uncertainty in magnitude and extent
Data Analysis
:
TTie OTD is also integrating BROOM with PNNL's Visual Sampling Plan (VSP)
The Project is also addressing critical data and
technology gaps
Surface Sample Collection Efficiency and Detection Limits for CW Agents
(Koester, LLNL and Hankins, SNL)
- Objective: To determine the collection efficiency and detection limits of the surface sampling
methods on porous and non-porous surfaces that would be typically found in the interior of a
transportation facility. Experimental work will be conducted using relatively low concentrations
relevant to civilian terrorist release scenarios.
Interaction of Chemical Agents on Interior Surfaces and Natural
Attenuation/Decay Rates (Love, LLNL and Ho, SNL)
- Objective: To determine adsorption/desorption and decay rates for chemical agents on interior
surfaces. Experimental work will be conducted using low concentrations relevant to civilian
terrorist release scenarios since there is data available for very high concentrations.
Gas/Vapor Decontamination Method Scale-up Evaluation (Tucker, SNL and
Smith, LLNL)
- Objective: To evaluate potential gas/vapor technologies at a larger scale by conducting a series
of simulant, live agent and TIC tests. We will also assess barrier materials that could be used to
seal facilities prior to a gasA/apor decontamination process.
Statistical Sampling Algorithm Validation (Knowlton, SNL and MacQueen,
LLNL)
- Objective: To validate potential statistical sampling algorithms against data from actual release
sites. In addition, we will integrate the validated methods into BROOM.
Task 1 - Surface Sample Collection Efficiency and
Detection Limits for CW Agents
No validated standard analytical methods available for trace
level CWA sampling and analysis
- Methods, such as those of EPA SW846, promulgated for
regulated toxic industrial chemicals (TICs)
- Proposed methods for other TICs & CWAs currently
undergoing validation & other studies in progress (e.g. A
Literature Review of Wipe Sampling Methods for Chemical
Warfare Agents and Toxic Industrial Chemicals, US EPA,
January 2007)
Need to demonstrate detection of CWAs on relevant substrates
at levels lower than guideline levels (-300 ng/cm2)
Task 1 - Continued
Initial substrates selected are porous and non-porous materials
typically found in building interiors
- 304 stainless steel (3 cm x 3cm)
- Vinyl tile (Armstrong commercial flooring, Standard Excelon vinyl
composition tiles, Pattern 51858, Imperial Texture, sandrift white,
1/8 inch thick)
- Concrete (made in-house for uniform coupon & aggregate sizes)
- Painted, standard drywall (painted with 1 coat Glidden
commercial latex primer and 1 coat) interior eggshell paint, 1/4 inch
thick
CWAs selected for testing
- GB (Sarin)
- HD (Mustard)
- VX
-------
Task 1 - Continued
Sigm a cote®-treated glass
Swipe extract!ons of HDfrom substrates
(10 ug/cm2) with different liquids
Conditions
glass, di
glass, svi
glass, su
ecte
ipee
ipee
traction, 50150 CH2C\-J acetone
traction, 50150 CH2CI2facetone
traction, ethyl acetate
Recovery (%)
82 ±10
29 ±13
31 ±17
The Project is also addressing critical data and
technology gaps
Surface Sample Collection Efficiency
(Koester, LLNL and Hankins, SNL)
- Objective: To determine the collection effici
Task 2 regarding agent fate
activities will be discussed
in a subsequent talk in this
session
jents
centrations
Interaction of Chemical Agents on Interior Surfaces and Natural
Attenuation/Decay Rates (Love, LLNL and Ho, SNL)
- Objective: To determine adsorption/desorption and decay rates for chemical agents on interior J
surfaces. Experimental work will be conducted using low concentrations relevant to civilian
terrorist release scenarios since there is data available for very high concentrations.
Vapor Decontamination Method Scale-up Evaluation (Tucker^SMlTand
SmithT
- Objective: To evaluate potential gas/vapor technologies at a larger scale by conducting a series
of simulant, live agent and TIC tests. We will also assess barrier materials that could be used to
seal facilities prior to a gas/vapor decontamination process.
Statistical Sampling Algorithm Validation (Knowlton, SNL and MacQueen,
LLNL)
- Objective: To validate potential statistical sampling algorithms against data from actual release
sites. In addition, we will integrate the validated methods into BROOM.
Task 3 - Gas/Vapor Decontamination Method
Scale-up Evaluation
Decontamination Experimental Task
- Hot Air Decon Evaluation
- Fire Sprinkler Evaluation
,'
Task 3 - Gas/Vapor Decontamination Method
Scale-up Evaluation
Volumetric decontamination technologies may vary depending
on the persistency of the agent
Ventilation
Natural Attenuation
Enhanced Ventilation
Agent Persistency (Less Volatile)
Objective: Reduce the time for decontamination and eliminate the
need to use more time-consuming processes (i.e., mVHP)
We are evaluating enhanced ventilation (heat assisted) as a rapid
method to remediate facilities contaminated with non-persistent agents
Can a fire sprinkler system (or a specialized spray system) be used
to knockdown a chemical agent cloud in a facility?
-------
Experiments were conducted to determine if fire sprinkler systems
and other spray systems can knockdown a chemical agent cloud
a
Fraction DMMP Remaining in Chamber
1
1
1
n
- ' -
•
',",—"""
n
I
1
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- 1 log knockdown within 5 min
- 3 log knockdown within 30 min
• ESS Nozzles- Dl Water (0.2 gpm)
- 2 log knockdown within 5 min
- 3 log knockdown within 60 min
• ESS Nozzles - Soapy Dl Water (0.2
gpm)
- 3 log knockdown within 5 min
- 4 log knockdown within 10 min
• ESS Nozzles - DF-200 (0.05 gpm)
- Almost 2 log knockdown in 5 min
- 2 log knockdown within 60 min
Preliminary Knockdown Test Conclusions
1 Fire sprinkler system may aid in mitigation of chemical attack for agents that
are soluble in water
- Reduce casualties
1 Under the test conditions with DMMP, the ESS nozzles did not perform as well
as the fire sprinkler system. However, this may be attributed to the smaller
volume of liquid that was released through these nozzles.
1 IPA results (not shown) and other tests indicate that with a longer run time for
the ESS nozzles, they work as well as the fire sprinkler system with smaller
volumes of water.
1 More tests should be performed.
- Repeatability
- Investigate chemical simulants that are not soluble in water
o DMMP - 300% soluble in water and it's vapor pressure is lowered by the
presence of water, which may give a higher success than may actually occur
o Tests with ethyl mustard (HD simulant) showed almost no impact from turning
the sprinklers on with water (ethyl mustard is not soluble in water)
1 Need to identify in what cases this mitigation strategy should be taken - it may
not be advisable in all cases.
1 At the present time, fire sprinklers systems cannot be turned on manually
- they are activated by the presence of heat.
Presentation Outline
Background and Project Overview
Project Activities
- Remediation Plan Development
• Partnerships
• Threat Scenarios
• Clean-up Guidelines
• Sampling Methodologies
• Decontamination Technologies
- Decision Support Tool Development
- Experimental Studies to Fill Technology,
Data, and Capability Gaps
Summary
\
We are developing a systems approach for chemical
remediation and recovery
Response and Recovery Activities
Crisis Management
Notification
:E:
-™Er
First
Response
"™™°
"""'
Consequence Management
Remediation/Cleanup
Characterization
~X
r:;Zar!
Decontamination
safety
strategy
Site preparation
Clearance
and analysis
Restoration
(Recovery)
Reoccupatmn
and puOlic
monitoring
-------
OS 0.
ma.
i j. iviouaga
US EPA, ORD, NHSRC
Decontamination Worksf
RTP, June 20-22, 2007
Outline
• Risk assessment paradigm
• Cleanup goals-an overview
• What is Quantitative Structure Toxicity Relationship
(QSTR)?
• Applying QSTRs to determine screening level, risk-based
clean-up goals
• Conclusions and recommendations for decontamination
Risk Assessment Paradigm-NAS
• Hazard Identification1- process to determine whether
exposure to an agent causes an adverse effect
• Dose Response Assessment- process to quantitatively
characterize the relationship between a dose and the
effect seen at that dose
• Exposure Assessment- process to determine the
magnitude, frequency, duration, and route of
exposures experienced or anticipated
• Risk Characterization- estimate the likelihood of
adverse health effects in the exposed population
1 Also referred to as Hazard Assessment-see EPA 2005
cancer guidelines _
Linking Risk Assessment to Risk
Management
Source: Courtesy, Dr. Hugh McKinnon, U.S. EPA, National Risk Management Research Laboratory
SEPA
What are Risk-Based Cleanup goals?
• Concentrations of chemicals in a variety of
environmental media based on estimates of toxicity,
exposure and a target risk or hazard
• Used for site "screening" and as initial cleanup goals
when applicable
• Can serve as target to use during the analysis of
different remedial/decontamination alternatives
• Solely health-based
• They are NOT de facto cleanup standards
Risk Based Environmental
Concentration
Risk = f (Exposure and Toxicity)
Lifetime incremental
risks
Exposure factors and Chemical specific effects
chemical concentration
-------
Cleanup Goals as Risk Based
Concentration
Risk = Media Cone. X Exposure X Toxicity
Target Risk
i
Exposure X Toxicity
Media Cone.
Target risk for carcinogens is 1 E-6 to 1E-4
Target hazard index (HI) for non-carcinogens is 1
More information available at http://www.epa.gov/oswer/riskassessment
Risk Based Cleanup Goals
• Possible to generate media-specific screening values
based on exposure factors, and toxicity value for
chemical and a risk level
• Exposure assumptions may be default (i.e. Agency
defaults) or site-specific
• Toxicity values may be carcinogenic or non-
carcinogenic
• Most numbers are for chronic exposures
• Numbers can be for adults and/or children, population,
etc.
Commonly Available Cleanup Goals1
• US EPA Region 3 Risk-based Concentrations (RBCs)
• US EPA Region 6 Media-Specific Screening Levels
(MSSLs)
• US EPA Region 9 Preliminary Remediation Goals
(PRGs)
• Soil Screening levels (SSLs)
• Various state numbers
1 Note: These are used for screening purposes only
Moving Onward to QSTR and it's
application
SEPA
What are QSTRs?
QSTRs are mathematical equations or models that
describe the correlations between various features of a
chemical's molecular structure and its observed
biological activities.
T= s(d) + c
T= Toxicological endpoint
s= Statistical coefficient-generally linear
d= descriptor computed from the chemical
structure-physical or chemical properties
c=constant
Why QSTR?
• QSTR can provide toxicity estimates to risk
assessors and toxicologists for use in the risk
estimation process when toxicity data are
unavailable
• QSTR will provide rapid and reliable results
• QSTR will permit rapid screening and ranking
of a number of chemical agents
-------
QSTR Methodology
• Study phenomena/activity; e.g. lowest observed
adverse effect level (LOAEL), carcinogenicity, etc.
• Get descriptors from chemical structure; several
commercial descriptor generator pkgs available
• Perform statistical analyses
• Validate the QSTR model
• Predict activity for new set of compounds
Applying QSTRs to Cleanup Goals
• Utilize commercial or customized QSTR models to
estimate toxicity of one or group of chemicals
• Use quantitative estimate (such as a LOAEL) to
estimate a cleanup goal
• Could utilize the estimate directly using uncertainties
(not recommended!) or utilize the QSTR estimate to
determine an appropriate surrogate with an existing
cleanup goal
SERA
Applying QSTRs to Cleanup Goals
• Let's go through an example
• Using TOPKAT8, a commercial QSTR model
• Two scenarios:
- Utilize the estimate directly to determine a cleanup goal--::
recommended!
-Utilize the estimate to determine an appropriate analog; analog
can be determined using TOPKAT8's unique "similarity
search"1 feature
1 Moudgal et al., Environ Sci. Technol., 2003
QSTR Analysis of 1,4-Thioxane-TIC
• Using TOPKATe's chronic rat oral LOAEL model to
obtain a useful quantitative estimate
s Computed LOAEL Estimate
Submodel Utilized: Chronic LOAEL (Alicyclic) Model
Computed Chronic LOAEL = 219.3 mg/kg
95% Confidence Limits: 67.4 mg/kg and 713.0 mg/kg
Computed Chronic LOAEL, Log (1/Moles) = 2.677
1,4-Thioxane
SEPA
DON'T TRY THIS AT HOME!
Hypothetical Cleanup Goal Using QSTR
LOAEL Estimate
• Computed chronic LOAEL is 219.9 mg/kg-day
• Assuming usage of default uncertainty factors
commonly used in the derivation of an RfD, we can
estimate the computed RfD using the maximum
allowed combined uncertainty factor of 3000 to be:
Computed RfD =
= 0.07 mg/kg-day
SERA
Hypothetical Cleanup Goal Using QSTR
LOAEL Estimate
Calculation for non-carcinogenic effects in adults in residential soil1
C (mg/kg) =
THQ x BVV, x ATn
EFr x EDr x [1/RfD0 x IRSa/106 kg/mg]
Definitions
Default Value
C chemical cone, in soil
THQ target hazard quotient (unitless) 1
BW3 Body Weight-adult (kg) 70 kg
RfD0 oral chronic reference dose (mg/kg-day) chemical specific
ATn averaging time-n on carcinogens (yr) 30 yr x 365 days/yr
EFr exp. Frequency (days/yr) 350days/yr
EDr exp. Duration 30 yrs
IRS3 Soil Ingestion-adult (mg/kg) 100
i™ 1 See http://www.epa.gov/reqion09/waste/sfund/prq/files/04userquide.pdf
-------
&ERA
Hypothetical Cleanup Goal Using QSTR
LOAEL Estimate
• Applying default factors to equation in slide 19 and the
chemical specific computed RfD of 0.07mg/kg-day for
1,4-thioxane we arrive at:
Ci,4-,hioxane = ~4000mg/kg or 4.0E+03
Appropriate Analog Using TOPKAT®
• Using TOPKAT ®'s "similarity search" feature, the following
analogs are recommended for 1,4-thioxane:
Suggested Analogs and Some Suggested Cleanup Goals
Name
1,4-Dioxane
3-Sulfolene
Cyclohexylamine
Dimethoxane
Gamma-butyrolactone
Pivalolactone
PRO
A
NA
A
NA
NA
NA
SSL
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
MSL
A
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
RBC
A
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
A-Available
NA-Not Available
SERA
Advantages of QSTR
• Cheap and reliable
• Extremely fast
• Provides an understanding of the effect of structure on
activity (mechanisms of reaction)
• Predictions may lead to the synthesis of novel
chemicals
SEPA
Disadvantages of QSTR
• False correlations
• Needs well qualified & quantified experimental values
• Co-correlation between descriptors
• Lack of acceptance
SEPA
Advantages for Decon Methods
• Cleanup goals and QSTR methods could drive decon
technology decisions
• QSTR methods may be used to assess the potential
toxicity of chemicals that lack toxicity data
• QSTR methods may be used to assess the toxicity of
the decon agent, if necessary
• QSTR methods may be used to assess the potential
toxicity of decon by-products
SERA
Acknowledgements
Deborah McKean for providing assistance on
cleanup goals
-------
Determining CWA Environmental Fate
to Optimize Remediation for Indoor Facilities
Adam H. Love*. Carolyn J. Koester*, Armando Alcaraz*,
M. Leslie Hanna*, Pauline Ho+, John G. Reynolds*, Ellen Raber*
"Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
+Sandia National Laboratory
Nonpraliferation, Homeland
and Interrutlonal Security
This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by the University of California
Lawfence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract No. W-7405-Eng-4B.
CWA Persistence on Indoor Surfaces
Dynamics, affinity, and reactivity control CWA
persistence
- Current knowledge primarily on vapor hazards
- Limited information about surface
contamination
3 Agents: HD, GB, VX
1. Glass
2. Stainless Steel
3. Vinyl Floor Tile
4. Latex Painted Wallboard
5. Concrete
6. Escalator Handrail
7. Polyester Flexible HVAC Duct
8. Galvanized Steel HVAC Duct
Concentration Matters
for Persistence and Fate
Bulk Properties
Dominate
High Level
Agent Interfaces
Dominate
^ Low Level
Restoration will likely have many surfaces
with low levels of contamination
Surface Properties Matter
for Persistence and Fate
Molecular interaction with
surfaces important
Bulk Properties Time Molecular Properties
Volatilization Hydrolysis Catalysis
Dissolution Oxidation Sorption
Infiltration Biodegradation Complexation
Enabling Better Decisions
First responders phase:
- mitigate any subsequent spread of contamination
Characterization phase:
- more quickly determine the extent of
contamination
Decontamination phase:
- identifying materials that have no affinity for CWA
or rapidly react with CWA to self-decontaminate
- determine if natural attenuation is adequate for
decontamination
- identifying surfaces that require active
decontamination or removal
L3
Understanding Contamination Extent
2 Modes of Exposure:
Vapor Exposure
- Greater spatial spread
- Lower magnitude of
contamination
Liquid Exposure
- Lower spatial spread
- Greater magnitude of
contamination
-*
Understanding contamination distribution and
magnitude focuses remediation efforts
-------
CWA Fate Data
We would like to evaluate and use, where appropriate, Department of
Defense and Environmental Protection Agency information
In addition, important new information is being generated through CWA
persistence experiments to fill in missing technical information
• Affinity
Accumulation rate
Ultimate goal is a mechanistic
understanding of persistence
Physical characteristics
Chemical characteristics
Understand of CWA fate must be improved
to address civilian exposure considerations
Realistic CWA Exposures
Experiments of CWA Fate must represent
realistic contamination
• Vapor Deposition
- Initial exposure to saturated CWA vapor to determine
affinity
- Rate of CWA accumulation from vapors determined
- Rate of CWA attenuation from vapor contamination
determined
• Neat Liquid Deposition
- Rate of CWA attenuation determined
• Detailed Surface Examination
- Understand deterministic properties
Avoiding solvent-diluted CWA
since solvent can alter material interactions
Developing Analytical Methods for Mass Balance
Mechanistic understand of CW fate require Mass Balance approach
- Usually different than analytical methods for characterization efforts
- Strive for 100% accountability
Volatile and non-volatile
chemical analysis
• Multiple techniques
• Individual extraction
efficiencies
Labor intensive,
but necessary
1.4E-04 -
_ 1.2E-04 -
5
^ 1.0E-04
| 8.0E-05 -
§ 6.0E-05 -
O 4.0E-05 -
2.0E-05 -
O.OE-t-00 1
10mMNH4OH ' — p,P,p»
-r • — EA2192
~[T j T Total OP
I Ts
it'-I 1
)w^_
D 10 20 30 40
Days
Evaluating CWA Affinity
1 Wee
Satur
Rapid
Vapor ft
1000 -1
i
1 100
If '°
8^ 1
» 01
° 00,
fS
t Exposure
ated Vapor
Screen for
ccum ulation
rn
Health Effects Threshold
QL
Glass Silamzed Vinyl tile
glass
• Achieves saturated vapor is < 8 hours
• Highly reproducible testing
environment
• Multiple coupons per jar
•Multiple jars
• Worst -case vapor exposure
El
S amless Electroplated Sandblasted Polyester
See SS SS Duct
CWA Surface Accumulation
Dynam ics of CWA accum ulation
has implications for
restoration efforts
• Surfaces that act as collectors for ^M
characterization
• Impacts of delayed remediation
on magnitude of contamination
1
So 100 -
ra A
1 50 -
Polyester Duct
0 §
0.3 (ig/cm2/hr m ^
0 50 100 150 2C
Exposure Time @ 22C (hours)
Subsequent experiments
will determine dynamics
^^> of persistence
• Natural attenuation
• Self-decontamination
• Persistent
Vinyl Tile
0.9 jLg/cnWhr ^^-""!
100 - ^^""^
5iU^_
0 50 100 150 200
Unique Approach to Surrogate Work
Limited number of materials can be tested using real CWA
Most CWA surrogates are poor at simulating chemical interactions
Instead, used to categorize
surfaces that have similar
physical accumulation and
persistence dynamics
• Permits a larger number of
materials to be evaluated
• Creates categories of materials
with similar dynamics
May enable limited CWA
results to be extended to
materials not specifically
tested
-------
Enacting Better Decisions
Understanding CWA fate improves the efficiency of the
time and effort spent on remediation
1. Surfaces that do not accumulate CWA
- Cannot be used for characterizing contamination extent
- Nothing to decontaminate
2. Surfaces that do accumulate CWA but have short persistence
- May be used for characterization
- Self-decontamination requires little effort
3. Surfaces that do accumulate CWA and have long persistence
- Ideal surface for characterizing contamination extent
- Decontamination requires active efforts
Resulting in more rapid and less expensive facility restoration
-------
S.EPA
1. Results from the Evaluation of Spray-Applied
Sporicidal Decontamination Technologies
2. Test Plans and Preliminary Results for Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus Persistence
and Decontamination Tests
Presented at USEPA Decontan
Research Triangle Park, NC
nation Workshop
Results from the Evaluation of
Spray-Applied Sporicidal
Decontamination Technologies
Joseph Wood, Shawn P. Ryan, et al, USEPA
Mike Taylor, James Roger, et al., Battelle
Memorial Institute
Acknowledgements
• Battelle
• TTEP Stakeholders
• Peer reviewers
• Collaborators
• Office of Research and Development
General Overview of Method
vvEPA
Quantitative Determination of Effectiveness
General Test Method
• Extraction
• Coupons placed in 50 ml vials with 10 ml PBS + Triton X-100
• Orbital shaker 15 minutes, 200 RPM
• Analysis
• Dilution plating of extract
-» Quantitative determination of recoverable CPUs
• Coupons placed in Tryptic Soy Broth (TSB)
-» Qualitative assessment of non-extracted viable spores
• Office of Research and Development
-------
AEPA
Liquid Sporicidal Technologies Evaluated
Product
Bleach
CASCAD
SDF
DeconGreen
Dioxi Guard
Vendor
Clorox®
Allen-Vanguard
Edgewood
Chemical &
Biological
Center
S±.»M
General
Formula Type
Sodium
Hypochlorite
Hydrogen
peroxide
Chlorine
dioxide
Components
Sodium hypochlorite 5-6% (pH-amended by
Battelle by adding acetic acid 5% and
water")
(C14-16) olefin sulphonate 10-30%; ethanol
denatured 3-9%; alcohols (C10-16) 5-10%,
sodium sulfate 3-7%; sodium xylene
sodium and ammonia salt along with co-
solvent >9%; dichloroisocyanuric acid,
sodium salt 48-85%; sodium tetraborate 3-
7%; sodium carbonate 10-15%.
propylene carbonate 25%; H2O2 35%, Triton
X-100; polyethylene glycol 4-(tert-
octyl)phenyl 25%
Inerts
EPA
Registration*
5813-1
None
None
None
£S>
10
30
30
10
^H National Homeland Security Research Center, Ueoontammatmn and Consequence Management U,v,s,on
£[=PA Liquid Sporicidal Technologies Evaluated
„.,„,
EasyDecon
200
Exterm-6
ffl-Clean
605
HM-4100
KlearWater
Peridox
Selectrocide
,„,,
Envirofoam
Technologies
ClorDiSys
Solutions
Susies
Biosafe
Technology
Clean Earth
Technologies
BioProcess
Associates
,sS.
Hydrogen
Chlorine
Hjpochloro
2ST
Chlorine
dioxide
Hydrogen
Chlorine
dioxide
—
Hydrogen Peroxide <8%; quaternary
alkyl di-methyl chlorides 5.5-6.5%;
diacetin 30-60%
Inorganic acid25-35%; sodium chlorite
15-30%; inorganic salt35-45%; activator
5-10%
Sodium dichlorisocyanurate 11%;
Octadecyl amino dimethyl trimethoxy silylpr
opyl ammonium chloride 84%;
chloropropyltrimethoxysilane 15%;
dimethyl octadecylamine 1%
<0.30% C1O2 suspended in de-ionized
water
H2O2 23-25%; peroxyacetic acid 1-1.4%;
acetic acid 1-1.4%; inert ingredients 1-2%
Sodium chlorite 15-40%; activator 55-
85%; inert ingredients <2%
EPA RegBtratim-
74436-1 and
70060-19
None
None
None
81073-1
74986-4
&zr
60
60
90
30
30
10
10
eTc"center Decontamination and Conse uence Mana ement Division 7
pH-Amended Bleach
• Using procedure recommended by stakeholders, water and 5% acetic
acid was added to the household bleach to obtain a pH-amended bleach
solution. The solution was prepared using 9.4 parts water, 1 part bleach,
and 1 part 5% glacial acetic acid to yield a solution having a mean pH of
6.81 ± 0.15 and a mean total chlorine content of 6,215 ± 212 ppm. This
"pH-amended bleach" was evaluated for sporicidal activity.
• Sporicidal activity enhanced at lower pH - due to shift in equilibrium from
hypochlorite to hypochlorous acid (a more effective sporicide)
-Dychdala, G.R. Chlorine and Chlorine Compounds, Chapter 7 of
Disinfection, Sterilization, and Preservation, Fifth Edition. Seymour
Block, editor.
• Office of Research and Development
SERft
«4W"'J~"
Evaluation Re
o nH *
•2 e-
« 4
B32
1 -
suits: Efficac
Amended Bleach
IT
i
TTTlfr
-
•
I
y of pH-Amended Bleach
I
mffi
y s *S///
.7.8
0.37 ± 0.22
>7.8
>7.8
2. 3 ±0.08
^H Office of Research and Development
SEPA
Log reduction as function of material, spore species, and tech.
9 -,
§ 6-
3 5 -
TJ
o
° 3
1 -
D pH-amended bleach
• CASCAD SDF
n Hi-Clean 605
D KlearWater
•
fcjfi
1
MMM
IT
•
nr
•
X-axis legend
123456789
test
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
material
Carpet
Carpet
Carpet
Wood
Wood
Wood
Gal metal
Gal metal
spore
Ba
Bs
G s
Ba
Bs
G s
Bs
Gs
• Office of Research and Development
-------
Available reports
EvjkjJmg liqutd jnd Fojm SpofkidJ
Spr^yD*********
Technology Evaluation R*pon
See http://www.epa.gov/nhsrc/news/news072406.html
Test Plans and Preliminary
Results for Highly Pathogenic
Avian Influenza Virus Persistence
and Decontamination Tests
Joseph Wood. Jonathan Kaye, Shawn Ryan
US EPA
James Rogers, Mike Taylor, Young Choi et al.
Battelle
Outline
• Acknowledgement
• Purpose
• Test matrix
• Experimental Methods
-Agents
-Cytotoxicity test
-Assay
• Preliminary Results
• Office of Research and Development
Acknowledgements
• Battelle
• TTEP Stakeholders
• Peer reviewers
• Collaborators
- USDA/APHIS and University of Delaware
- Interagency workgroup - led by Jeff Kempter
• Office of Research and Development
Purpose of Testing
• Assess persistence of highly pathogenic H5N1 virus and low
path H7N2 virus under various environmental conditions and
on various surfaces
• Assess efficacy of generic chemicals to inactivate both
viruses
• Compare results of H5N1 and H7N2 to determine if H7N2 is
suitable surrogate
• Office of Research and Development
Test Matrix Overview
Persistence Tests-H5N1
- 2 ambient temperatures (4 and 26 degrees C) at 1 RH (~ 40%)
- With and without simulated sunlight
• Target average UV-B level is ~ 70 microwatts/cm2
• UV-A levels ~ 100 microwatts/cm2
• UV-C level = zero
- 4 materials
- 4 non-zero contact times
Persistence tests-H7N2
- 2 materials, 2 non-zero contact times, 2 environmental conditions
• Selected based on highest persistence of H5N1
Decontamination tests
- Matrix similar to above, except testing chemical inactivation in lieu of UV, Temperature,
and time
-------
Avian Influenza Test Agents
• H5N1 - A/Vietnam/1203/04
• H7N2 - A/H7N2/chick/MinhMah/04
Preliminary results
• Chamber set up, environmental conditions characterized
• Cytotoxicity (MDCK cells) of material extracts test results
- The required dilutions for material extracts have been determined so that cell viability for
these extracts is above 90%.
• Propagation of virus
-H5N1 inoculum prepared ~ 107TCID50/ml
- H7N2 - ~104 TCID50/ml - based on MDCK assay
• May need to use CEF assay for low path virus
• Recovery of H5N1 off of materials (after 1 hour of drying)
- Recovery off of concrete and pine is zero, after trying different extraction methods
• Will not be able to use these materials
- Mean recovery from glass ~ 9%
- Mean recovery from soil ~ 55%
• Office of Research and Development
S.EFA
Cytotoxicity tests and Al quantitation assay
methods
• Cytotox test
-Purpose is to ensure that cells used to assay Al virus
remain viable when exposed to coupon material extracts,
neutralized decontamination liquids
-MTT assay (3-(4,5-dimethylthiazol-2-yl)-2, 5,-diphenyltetrazolium bromide)
• Al quantitation
—Expressed as TCID50 (tissue culture infectious dose of 50%), based on
cytopathic effects on cells, using Spearman Karber method
-Use M DCK (Madin-Darby Canine Kidney) cells for H5N1
-Will use chicken embryo fibroblasts (CEF) assay for H7N2
-------
1-
Inactivation of Avian Influenza
Virus Using Common Soaps/
Detergents, Chemicals, and
Disinfectants
R.L. Alphin, E.R. Benson, M.E. Lombardi, KJ. Johnson
and B.S. Ladman
JTYoF
EIAWARE
Introduction
Avian influenza virus (AIV) is an
ongoing global threat
HPAIV significant threat to US and
international poultry production
186 human fatalities (307 cases; 5-07)
140+ million poultry
Asian cost: $10 billion
Delmarva Broiler Industry
Annual Broiler Production 2006 - 568 Million
1 Total Pounds Of Chicken ~3.38 Billion
1 Wholesale Value of Broilers~$1.62 Billion
' 13,900 Employed (1,956 Growers)
1 Each Job In The Poultry Industry Creates
7.2 Jobs Elsewhere
Introduction
Current approved disinfecting agents in
the United States have many limitations
• Limited availability
Expensive
• Corrosive
• Harmful to the environment
Introduction
Approval is needed for more economical
and environmentally friendly
disinfecting agents against AIV
• Criteria for the ideal agent
. Effective inactivation of AIV
. Widely available
. Biodegradable
. Inexpensive
. Antimicrobial
Introduction
• Agents selected by the USDA and EPA
• Acetic Acid
• Citric Acid
• Sodium Hypochlorite
• Calcium Hypochlorite
• Powered Laundry Detergent with Bleach
• Iodine/acid commercial disinfectant
• Additional agents to be selected
-------
Objective
Evaluate widely available
soaps/detergents, chemicals, and
disinfectants (agents) for their efficacy
in inactivating avian influenza virus.
Develop test methods to meet the
requirements for Section 18 EPA
temporary approval for hard, non-
porous surfaces.
Experimental Method
• 6-well plate test
» Coupons (2.2 x 2.2 cm)
. Galvanized steel
• Plastic
. Wood
t Hard water (400 ppm CaC03)
• Viral agent:
. A/H7N2/Chick/Minh Ma/04 LPAIV
Experimental Method
Application of agents
* Coupons with dried virus were placed into 6-well
plates
• 2 plates for each material (12 wells)
• 1 plate for positive controls
• 2 wells for each material
• 1 plate for cytotoxic control (6 wells)
• 2.0 mL of prepared disinfecting agent applied to
each well
Plates agitated for 10 minutes
* Fluid from each plate collected and pooled
Application of test solution to virus film on coupons in 6-well plate
Collection of test solution post exposure to virus film on coupon
-------
Collected test solution to be diluted, post treatment of virus film on coupon
Inoculation of diluted test solution into embryonated eggs
Experimental Method
Embryo Inoculation
• Fluid from plates diluted using three 10-fold serial
dilutions
• Positive control materials diluted with six 10-fold serial
dilutions
• First dilution made with D/E Neutralizing Broth
• Each dilution inoculated into five, 9-11 day old
specific pathogen free (SPF) embryonated chicken
eggs
• Eggs candled daily for five days
Experimental Method
Viral inactivation
Fluid collected from each egg
• Examined for hemmaglutination activity (HA) to
determine viral activity
Cytotoxic control
• 0.1 ml of PBS w/serum placed on plastic coupon
• 2.0 ml disinfecting agent applied to plastic coupons
• Fluid collected, diluted (1:10) & inoculated into eggs
• Embryos examined for stunting and other lesions
Egg fluids tested for HA activity
Hemmaglutination Positive • Hemmaglutination Negative
Experimental Method
Quantification of Results
• Compared virus titer of positive control to
virus titer of treated groups:
• Agent successfully inactivated virus when the
titer of the positive control group is >4 log, and
there is no recoverable virus from any test
coupon
• Neutralizing Index > 2.8
• Titer of positive control virus recovered > 4.0
• Titer of virus recovery from tested coupon <1.2
-------
Results
Effective on hard, non-porous surfaces
. Acetic Acid (5%)
Citric Acid (1 and 3%)
• Sodium Hypochlorite (750 ppm)
• Calcium Hypochlorite (750 ppm)
• Powdered Laundry Detergent with Peroxygen
(6 g/L)
• Iodine/acid (300:1) commercial disinfectant
Results
Effective on porous surface (basswood)
. Citric Acid 1%
• Iodine/acid (300:1) commercial disinfectant
Metal A
Metal B
Plastic A
Plastic B
Wood A
WoodB
Acetic Acid 5%
AIV
Positive Control
Titer
4.0
4.0
4.5
4.5
3.5
3.5
Cytotoxic Control
% Survival
100.00%
Lesions
None
Test Titer
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
HA +
0
Neutralization
Index
>2.8
>2.8
>3.3
>3.3
>2.3
>2.3
HA-
4
Note: Exponential values of titers are calculated per 1.0 ml
Citric Acid 1%
Metal A
Metal B
Plastic A
Plastic B
Wood A
Wood B
AIV
Positive
Control Titer
6.9
6.9
5.9
5.9
4.1
4.1
Cytotoxic Control
% Survival
75.00%
Lesions
1
Test Titer
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
HA +
0
Neutralization
Index
>5.7
>5.7
>4.7
>4.7
>2.9
>2.9
HA-
4
Note: Exponential values of titers are calculated per 1.0 ml
Citric Acid 3%
Metal A
Metal B
Plastic A
Plastic B
Wood A
WoodB
AIV
Positive Control
Titer
4.9
4.9
4.2
4.2
<1.2
<1.2
Cytotoxic Control
% Survival
100.00%
Lesions
None
Test Titer
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
HA +
0
Neutralization
Index
>3.7
>3.7
>3.0
>3.0
0
0
HA-
5
Note: Exponential values of titers are calculated per 1.0 ml
Sodium Hypochlorite 750 ppm
Metal A
Metal B
Plastic A
Plastic B
Wood A
WoodB
AIV
Positive Control
Titer
4.3
4.3
5.5
5.5
<1.2
<1.2
Cytotoxic Control
% Survival
100.00%
Lesions
None
Test Titer
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
HA +
0
Neutralization
Index
>3.1
>3.1
>4.3
>4.3
0.0
0.0
HA-
4
Note: Exponential values of titers are calculated per 1.0 ml
-------
Calcium Hypochlorite 750 ppm
Metal A
Metal B
Plastic A
Plastic B
Wood A
Wood B
AIV
Positive Control
Titer
4.9
4.9
5.1
5.1
3.1
3.1
Cytotoxic Control
% Survival
100.00%
Lesions
None
Test Titer
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
HA +
0
Neutralization
Index
>3.7
>3.7
>3.9
>3.9
>1.9
>1.9
HA-
4
Note: Exponential values of titers are calculated per 1.0 ml
Detergent with Peroxygen 6g/l
Metal A
Metal B
Plastic A
Plastic B
Wood A
Wood B
AIV
Positive Control
Titer
4.1
4.1
6.2
6.2
2.2
2.2
Cytotoxic Control
% Survival
80.0%
Lesions
1
Test Titer
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
HA +
0
Neutralization
Index
>2.9
>2.9
>5.0
>5.0
>1.0
>1.0
HA-
5
Note: Exponential values of titers are calculated per 1.0 ml
Iodine/ Acid (300:1)
Metal A
Metal B
Plastic A
Plastic B
Wood A
WoodB
AIV
Positive Control
Titer
4.0
4.0
4.3
4.3
4.2
4.2
Cytotoxic Control
% Survival
100.00%
Lesions
None
Test Titer
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
<1.2
HA +
0
Neutralization
Index
>2.8
>2.8
>3.1
>3.1
>3.0
>3.0
HA-
5
Note: Exponential values of titers are calculated per 1.0 ml
Disinfecting Agent
(2 g/L) (4 g/L) (6g/L)
Laundry Detergent with Peroxygen
Disinfecting Agents
-------
Conclusions
Several common chemicals may be
suitable for post AIV outbreak
cleanup.
Lower NIs were recorded on
porous surfaces than on hard, non-
porous surfaces
Future testing
Calcium hydroxide
Calcium oxide
Sodium carbonate
Sodium hydroxide
Conclusions
Acetic acid, citric acid, sodium
hypochlorite, calcium hypochlorite, and
the powdered laundry detergent with
peroxygen were shown to be virucidal
against LPAIV on non-porous surfaces.
In addition, citric acid was shown to be
virucidal against LPAIV on a porous
surface (basswood).
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the USDA
APHIS Veterinary Services
USDA
-------
USDA
Inactivation of Foot-and-Mouth
Disease Virus on Various
Contact Surfaces
Wayne Einfeld1
Jill Bieker2
Brandalyn Price3
Tammy Beckham2
'Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM
2USDA APHIS, Plum Island Animal Disease Center, Greenport, NY
3USDA APHIS, Ames, IA
Sandia
National
Laboratories
Outline
Virucide testing and validation
Experimental methods
Results
Summary and conclusions
Next Steps
Virucide Use and Validation
Virus inactivation important to aid in disease
containment
- Disrupt transmission cycle
- Dependent on mechanism of inactivation
Preventive measure to help control reservoirs or
vehicles involved in disease transmission
Proper validation is necessary for efficacy claims
- Differences in resistance exist among viruses
Environmental factors influence efficacy
- Organic matter, temperature, humidity, UV
Estimated economic impact of 2001 UK FMD outbreak: $13 Billion
Virus Types and Resistance
Virus Type
Enveloped
Large non-
enveloped
Small non-
enveloped
Resistance
Low
Medium
High
Features
Lipid envelope, protein capsid, nucleic
acid
Protein capsid, nucleic acid
Protein capsid, nucleic acid
Examples
Influenza, HIV,
SARS
Adenovirus,
Rotavirus
FNIDV, Polio,
Rhinovirus
Overall Organism Susceptibility
Most Resistant
Least Resistant
Bacterial spore formers
Protozoa (cysts/oocysts)
Mycobacterium & Non-
enveloped viruses
Fungi
Vegetative bacteria
Enveloped viruses
Non-Enveloped viruses
(FMDV)
Virucide Test Methods
No US standard methods currently exist
for evaluating disinfectants against viruses
-EPA guidelines, ASTM
- International Standards: AFNOR, DEFRA
Standardized tests are important for
product registry and comparison
Initial work often conducted using
surrogate viruses
- Member of same virus family but less
pathogenic
-------
EPA Guidelines for Virucide Testing
• Must follow use-directions (surface, liquid, or spray
disinfection) at a specified exposure length
• Untreated control should recover a minimum of 104
infectious viral titer
• Protocol must include:
- 4 replicates for virus recovery (endpoint)
- Cytoxicity controls
- Any special methods to increase virus recovery or reduce
cytotoxicity
- Activity of germicide for each test dilution
- ID-50 values (tissue culture, embryonated egg, animal infection)
- Data must show complete inactivation of virus at all dilutions, or
at least 3-log reduction in titer beyond cytotoxic level
Key Parameters in Virucide
Testing Methods
Parameter
Test Configuration
Test Virus
Cytotoxicity
Organic Challenge
Exposure Interval
Host Cell System
Viral Enumeration
Alternative Diagnostics
Description
Suspension vs. Carrier
Enveloped, Non-enveloped, Surrogate
Washing, purification step
Addition of feces, serum, etc...
Contact time with virucide
Virus specific, titer differences
Endpoint dilution vs. plaque assay
Nucleic acid, viral proteins, etc...
Evaluating Mechanism of Action
•
Virus target
Lipid Envelope / N
Capsid Protein ^-~
Structural Proteins ^-*
O
Nucleic Acid *
^
Effective
compounds
QACs, Alcohols, Phenols,
Chlorhexidine,
Glutaraldehyde
Chlorine, Oxidizers,
Peracetic acid, Alcohols,
Glutaraldehyde
Chlorine, Oxidizers,
Peracetic acid, Alcohols,
Glutaraldehyde
Oxidizers, Chlorine,
Peracetic Acid
v?t5>r
"C^Jr
*^_L-^*
o
Experimental Approach
Efficacy
Evaluate viral
proteins
Jwestern blot,
ELISA)
Target Virus: FMDV
Non-enveloped, single-stranded
RNA virus belonging to the family,
Picornaviridae, genus Aphthovirus
Only infects cloven-hoofed
animals (bovine, porcine, ovine)
Highly infectious and non-endemic
in US
Work with FMDV limited to Plum
Island Animal Disease Center
No surrogate virus presently
available
Study Objectives
Inoculate and optimize virus
recovery from surfaces
common in ag industry
- Determine length of drying
step
- Determine optimum method for
recovery
Evaluate efficacy of
disinfectant agents against
FMDV
- Systematic exposure and post-
treatment enumeration with
controls
-------
Disinfectant Test Panel
5% acetic acid (pH 2.3)
10% bleach (pH 11.54)
70% ethanol (pH 6.68)
4% sodium carbonate (pH 11.71)
2% sodium hydroxide (pH 12.02)
DF-200 (pH 9.95)
- Surfactant, peracid, hydrogen peroxide
0.4% Oxy-Sept 333 (pH 2.44)
- Peroxyacetic acid, hydrogen peroxide
1%VirkonS(pH2.45)
- Potassium peroxymonosulfate
Experimental Method
Virus
- FMDV O1 Brugge was propagated in Baby
Hamster Kidney (BHK-21) cells and titer was
expressed as TCID50/ml
Carrier Test Surfaces
- Concrete, rubber, and stainless steel
• Concrete was prepared in the base of a 50 ml tube
• Rubber and stainless steel were cut into round
4.15 cm2 pieces (about the size of a quarter)
• Surfaces sterilized by autoclaving and/or UV
exposure
Experimental Method
Sterile test surfaces inoculated with 100 ul
FMDV; dry for 30 min in a biosafety hood
Samples treated with 500 ul disinfectant
(DMEM for positive control) to cover
exposed area
Following 5, 10, or 20 min, 5 ml DMEM
containing 4% fetal calf serum added and
samples vortexed rigorously
Experimental Method
Serial ten-fold dilutions inoculated onto
BHK-21 cells
Endpoint titration calculated using Reed-
Muench; infectivity expressed as
TCID50/ml
Quantitative RT-PCR was performed on
each undiluted sample using standard
method (Callahan et al. 2002 JAVMA vol.
202)
Efficacy Results - 5 min
Infectious virus recovered and
quantified as TCIDgo/ml
Efficacy Results -10 min
Infectious virus recovered and
quantified as
-------
Efficacy Results - 20 min
Infectious virus recovered and
quantified as TCID50/ml
Concrete
Rubber
D Stainless
Fgj
Quantitative RNA - 5 min
Quantitative RNA, reported as Log10 RNA units/ml
*Bold number indicates inhibition of PCR assay
BLCH
ETOH
Stainless steel
Quantitative RNA - 10 min
Treatment
| POS
AA
BLCH
ETOH
NA2C03
NAOH
DF-200
OXYSEPT
VIRKON
Quantitative RNA, reported as
Log10 RNA units/ml
'Bold number indicates inhibition of assay
Concrete Rubber Stainless steel
413 645 651 |
290 570 560
0.00 2 84 1 09
462 619 608
0.00 4 73 4 27
166 111 2 24
0.00 2 64 1 65
384 343 229
277 271 232
Quantitative RNA - 20 min
Quantitative RNA, reported as Log10 RNA units/ml
*Bold number indicates inhibition of assay
BLCH
ETOH
Summary
Porous surfaces (concrete & rubber) negatively impacted
virucide efficacy
- Concrete showed the greatest effect
Ethanol was consistently the least effective treatment
(neutral pH)
Results were affected by difficulty in recovering virus
- Vortexing was used to recover virus
- Concrete samples contained particulate debris which resulted in
cell cytotoxicity at lowest dilution
No clear correlation between virucide efficacy and RNA
degradation
Carrier tests show worse (but generally adequate)
virucide efficacy compared to earlier suspension tests
Next Steps
Continued evaluation for other viruses
- H5N1, pox viruses, etc
Refine test methodology for other viruses
- Inoculum level, drying time, recovery process
Field validation of inactivation
- Dependent on virus (e.g. FMDV only at PIADC)
Further study of virucide mechanism
Development of rapid onsite post-decon tests for
measurement of decon effectiveness
-------
Acknowledgments
DHS funding as part of the Agriculture
Domestic Demonstration and Application
Program (Ag DDAP)
USDA/APHIS for in-kind assistance at
Plum Island Animal Research Center
Questions?
Jill Bieker
USDA/APHIS
Plum Island Animal Disease Center
Jill.m.bieker@aphis.usda.org
631-323-3100
-------
The
Government Decontamination Service
(GDS)
Robert Bettley-Smith FRICS
Chief Executive
G
Government Decontamination Service
• Operating since October 2005.
• Executive Agency of Defra.
• Remit for contaminated land, buildings, open
environment, infrastructure and transport
assets (CBRN and HazMat).
• Provides assistance to Responsible
Authorities, and access to Specialist Supplier
Framework
GDS Primary Functions
1. To provide advice, guidance and assistance on decontamination
related issues to responsible authorities in their contingency
planning for, and response to, CBRN (and HazMat) incidents;
2. To maintain and build on the GDS Framework of specialist suppliers
and ensure that responsible authorities have access to their services
if the need arises;
3. To advise central Government on the national capability for the
decontamination of buildings, infrastructure, transport and open
environment, be a source of expertise in the event of a CBRN
incident or major release of HazMat materials.
G
...but does it work?
Polonium 210 (November, 2006)
24 November 2006 - Day one for the GDS.
• 06.15hrs - Defra contacts GDS Duty Liaison Officer.
• 08.38hrs - Substance confirmed as Polonium 210.
• 10.20hrs - GDS Case Officer deployed to London.
• 10.40hrs- GDS suppliers alerted.
• 1 S.OOhrs - 1 S.OOhrs - various meetings
• 23.15hrs- update on next round of meetings!
-------
Polonium 210 (London, 2006): Timeline.
23.11.06
24.11.06-
24.11.06
24.11.06-
24.11.06-
25.11.06-
26.11.06-
27.11.06-
10.06.07-
Death of Alexander Litvinenko
Confirmation that Polonium 210 was present
GDS contacted @ 06.15 by Defraand agreed to deploy
GDS Emergency Operations Centre opened, Director of
Operations and Case Officer deploy to London
First five contaminated venues identified.
Responsible Authority identified as Westminster City Council
who agreed to act by agreement as Agents for all venues
GDS Contractor commenced monitoring at the restaurant
GDS facilitated Post Mortem decontamination arrangements
9 venues (out of 10) have been monitored, decontaminated by
GDS and returned to public use. Prohibition order served on 1
publ
venue, awaiting decision over funding
G
Venues:
GDS Suppliers decontaminated nine venues in
London.
Venues included:
• restaurants,
• Hotels, and
• buildings with historic features.
Interior of buildings (doors and communal
areas) needed characterisation surveys.
Some Of The Equipment Used To Survey And Remediate
Some contaminated items could not be
remediated...these were packaged ready for
transportation
Polonium 210 (London, 2006): Decontaminating a hotel
When
- 6 to 24 March 2007 (19 day duration)
Where
- Bar area
- Men's ground floor toilets
- Guest rooms
Site Resource
-1 Supervisor, 3 HP Monitors & 2 Decommissioning operatives
G
Polonium 210 (London, 2006): Decontaminating a hotel
Before
After
L "^
\j\
-------
Issues One: Polonium 210 (London, 2006): Some of the
key lessons
• Communication
• Payment/insurance - non CBRN incidents
• Sampling and monitoring
• Waste management
• Site logistics
• GDS resources
G
Government Decontamination Service
MOD Stafford
Beaconside
Stafford
Staffordshire
ST18 OAQ
England
For Information
08458501323
www.gds.gov.uk
G
Issues Two: Alpha Post Mortem?
• Problems of finding a venue
• Making (a purpose built biological facility) venue fit for
purpose
• Arrangements:
• Pre post mortem monitoring (arrival of teams at 07:00)
• Monitoring during post mortem
• Assessment after post mortem
• Decontamination of facility
• Clearance (facility handed back 21:00 same day)
• Waste Issues (clinical and radiological)
• Lessons identified
-------
Decontamination of Terrorist-Dispersed
Radionuclides from Surfaces in Urban
Environments
Presented to:
EPA Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues
for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological
Materials
June 22, 2007
Robert Fischer and Brian Viani
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Understanding the science of urban surface
decontamination
Surface Characterization
Depth of Penetration Concrete Pore/Fiss>
Experimental Substrates
Urban surface decontamination can be influenced by several parameters
including the presence of grime layers, migration into pores and fissures, local
pH effects, competing metals, carbonation of surfaces, humidity, chemical
interaction with the substrate and weathering effects.
Page 2
Urban surface characterization
Caldecott Tunnel
BART
WMATA
Grime layer morphology differed substantially in
the different systems being studied
Urban surface characterization
Phenolphthalein treated x-section of
n BART tunnel wall
plus portlandite
and/or CSH (pH >9.2
Surface carbonated zone:
minus portlandite
and CSH (pH <9.2)
Our studies have shown that the presence of grime only
affects the chemical behavior of americium (europium)
at high pH
Analysis of grime
layer indicates
significant metal
concentration
Studying the chemistry of surfaces and grime
to design more efficient chelators
Of the many types of decontamination methods available, chelation offers
advantages in regard to versatility on surfaces, waste minimization, rapid
application and minimal environmental impact.
Additionally, chelation allows modification for selective binding of the
radionuclide of interest.
We have investigated the chemical
nature and surface interactions of
cement and urban grime to identify
potential interferences during
chelation of radionuclides.
Candidate chelators are then chosen
based on (I) affinity for target
radionuclide and (ii) lack of
interferences.
-------
Indoor Explosive Deposition Experiment
- Purpose was to realistically contaminate urban surfaces.
- A simulated Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) was constructed
(1.5 kg C-4,1 kg stable CsCI. 137Cs RDD = 56,663 Ci).
- Multiple forms of concrete placed into
holders (wet, dry, grime covered, aged).
- Samples were analyzed to determine Cs
fate under differing surface conditions.
- Contaminated samples will be used to
test decontamination agents.
Page 7
Indoor Explosive Deposition Experiment
6m 9m
Prepared samples
UAH I samples
* Horizontal samples
Indoor experimental details
30ft from blast center
Specimen holders-
Experimental Results
Particle Morphology
30 ft (Floor)
Depth of Penetration
Tl
5ft-;,
Outdoor Explosive Deposition Experiments |
- Purpose was to realistically contaminate urban surfaces in both
near( <15m) and far field (150m -250m) collection areas.
- A simulated Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) was constructed
(2.0 kg C-4, 2 kg stable CsCI. 137Cs RDD = 113,326 Ci).
- Experiment designed to build on
lessons learned from indoor experiment
- Better controls on post shot storage and
handling of samples.
- Techniques developed to freeze
penetration at three specific time intervals
(1, 7 and 28 days post shot)
- Multiple conditioning regimes used to
study effects of wetting and drying on
diffusion
Page 11
Shot #1 above ground Shot #2 in ground
Outdoor Explosive Deposition Experiments
Near Field Arrays
-------
Outdoor Experimental Details
Cs Fallout
concentration
Cs penetration
depth
Cs penetration
as a function
of time
Cs penetration
under varying
conditioning
regimes
Bench Scale Testing
Aerosolized 100 mg using 5
psi pressure burst
Burst confined in bell jar
- Jar supported on glass
slides to provide air entry
Bench Scale Testing
Aerosolized 100mg using 5
psi pressure burst
Burst confined in bell jar
- Jar supported on glass
slides to provide air entry
Physical and chemical processes control post-event-^,
radionuclide penetration into porous surfaces
Post-deposition diffusion-driven penetration of soluble
species into concrete
Laboratory prepared concrete
t=28 d, unsaturated, ambient RH
Depth below surface,
Portland cement
t=28 d, fully water saturated
Atkinson and Nickerson (1987) fi
Waste Manag. 81:100
Post-deposition diffusion-driven penetration of soluble
species into concrete
Laboratory prepared concrete
t=28 d, unsaturated, ambient RH
Depth below surface,
1-D Diffusion of Retarded Species Through
Unsaturated Concrete
(t= 28 d, Kj = 1mL/g, vol sat= 0.5)
porosity =0.06 U
-H l-HlfHH-IH-l I-H
TI mirrirrim m
JJ lilliilLLILLI 111
-H I-HH4IH-IH-I I-H
n inimmm m
porosity =0.22
-H l-HlfUH-H-H I-H
TJ miTTirrim m
JJ lilliilLLILLI 111
-H I-HH4IH-IH-I I-H
n inimmm m
-------
Approach
Characterization/Dreoaration Deposition
• Microscopy
- Optical, scanning precondition samples @
electron M% & 33o/o RH
• Porous medium properties h^- ^4
laboratory cements . j
\ T
\storesamples
@83% &33%KH
Page 19
m
Measurements
Deposition quantified using
double stick tape collectors
• SEM analysis of particles
captured on SEM stubs with
double stick carbon tape
• Prescribed equilibration
times of 1 , 7 & 28 days
• Penetration stopped by
freezing (-80 °C) followed by
freeze drying
• Penetration followed using
laser ablation mass
spectrometry (LA-MS)
- Surface profiling
- Transverse profiling
• Internal
Outdoor test results:
Cs Deposition on far-field collectors
.100m Il50m ' 250n
Shot 2 (soil shot)
Outdoor test results:
Cs Deposition on far-field collectors 9
12E-01
1 ODE-02
IGs deposit
| fa fa
Shot
Shot 1 (ai
Blank
*• - \
1 x s \
# ,200m llSOm l 250m 1 /
1 ^
' / 1 prevailing winds
36^ / /
r shot)
\
4 7
r
i
\
H'
Sample Ident
31 34
2.5 E -02
c
•2 1.5E-02
\
5.0 E -03
Shot 2 ( soil shot)
I
^Shol22oS
Shot 2 250
_~__
Sample Ident
r»~
Most particles were not CsCI
Shot 1 (air shot); 50 ft
SEM images of carbon tape collector at 50 feet
Shot 1 (air shot)
(0.07 (ig Cs/cm2; -50 particles/cm2)
SEM images of carbon tape collector at 50 feet
Shot 1 (air shot)
(0.07 fig Cs/cm2; -50 particles/cm2)
-------
Outdoor test results:
Surface concentrations (LA-MS) on near -field substrates
Page 25
s
|, 1E*m
i3 1E+02
hM1--»C— r"onc,e
B^ ^iiss:
transect across surface, cm
Shot 2 (soil shot); 1 day; Lab concr
t 1E-KB
Q 1E*02
*-*-*-•-*» -TOir-
^>AoVn~2o^
: itil:1!:" B^"
°,ansec,ac,osssurface,cm3
1 iE.ce
Sh
5lE*3
|1M?
ShotMafshot^yTconcrete
...*...V.*".A.P*...«...A..2(Ml
" * » A *
transect across surface, cm
«li"'h«"L™**™,.i..
-- M--4--' L
* »....i....
,,,,,,c,«,.,,,,L,cm
Future work
Continued analysis of outdoor shot samples
Laboratory bench scale deposition and penetration
studies
Comparison studies using 137CS
Testing sequestering capabilities of 4 chelates for Cs and
Eu in the presence of various substrates
Summary
In-service materials (weathered and/or grime covered) differ significantly
from standard test specimens, which may impact decontamination
efficiency
- Chelate efficiency in the presence of high concentrations of metals
- Impact of pH differences on radionuclide solubility
Three explosive deposition tests were conducted (indoor and outdoor)
Penetration of dry deposited Cs into nominally dry porous media can be
significant on time scales of days to weeks (mm to cm)
Using 133Cs and laser ablation mass spectrometry to measure
penetration requires much higher Cs loadings than would be expected
in a 'real' RDD because of relatively high 133Cs backgrounds in the
materials we studied
Acknowledgements
LLNLTeam
* Mark Sutton - Co-Pi, complexing agent development
* Max Hu - Laser ablation
* Jeremy Gray - SEM/EDS, ellipsometry
* Walt McNab - Geochemical modeling
* Dianne Gates-Anderson - Decontamination/waste treatment
* Defense and Nuclear Technologies Directorate - For the use of explosive
testing facilities
Collaborators
* Bay Area Rapid Transit District
* California Department of Transportation
* Sandia National Laboratory - Fred Harper
* Environmental Protection Agency - NHSRC (John Mackinney, John Drake,
Sang Don Lee, Emily Snyder)
-------
An Empirical Assessment of
Post-Incident Radiological
Decontamination Techniques
Andrew Parkinson, Tegan Evans,
David Hill, Michael Colella
Australian Nuclear Science & Technology Organisation
Counter-Terrorism Research Project
About ANSTC
Qnsto
ANSTO is located 40km south
of the Sydney CBD.
Australia's national nuclear
research and development
organisation and the centre of
Australian nuclear expertise.
Strong collaboration with the
forensic and counter-terrorism
community on strategic
research in radiological and
nuclear forensics, and nuclear
security research initiatives.
Counter - Terrorism Initiatives
Qnsto
ANSTO provides scientific and technical advice to competently deal with
all aspects of emergency management involving radioactive materials.
1 scientific content to
threat assessments
' on-going tactical
forensics & CT
research
' first responder and
specialist train ing
' scientific advice &
support
• consultancy
' operations support
The Forensic and Nuclear Security group are involved in strategic
research in the area of nuclear and radiological forensics and nuclear
security initiatives.
• The effects of radiation exposure on critical
trace evidence
• An empirical assessment of post-incident
radiological decontamination techniques
Backgrourx
*_ Qnsto
• Radiological materials are used extensively throughout
industry, medicine and research.
• Illicit trafficking of radioactive materials occurs worldwide
• between 1993 and 20061
•1080 incidents
• A Radiological Dispersion Device (ROD) consists of
radiological material coupled with a dispersion mechanism.
• The publics fear of radioactive exposure has the potential to
cause negative psychological and economic consequences.
• The efficiency of the post incident clean up may be the best
measure to counter a radiological terrorist incident.
Background
Qnsto
Post-incident recovery (cleanup) strategies are designed to reduce
radioactive contamination or exposure in the environment to acceptable
levels. i
These strategies can include:
• Area denial
• Demolition and rebuilding
• Decontamination products and technologies
• High impact (concrete shaving)
• Low impact (chemical solutions)
To minimise the social and economic disruption
low impact/ non destructive decontamination
techniques are favourable. But, are they
effective?
-------
Qnsto
This study aims to assess the effectiveness of commercially available low
impact and innovative decontamination techniques on a variety of common
surfaces found in a suburban/city setting.
The outcomes will:
• Assist organisations (HAZMAT, EPA, etc.) to prepare
appropriate guidelines to react to such a radiological
incident, and to minimize harmful social and economic
consequences.
• Enhance Australia's counter-terrorism capabilities by
being able to quickly and safely decontaminate wide
spread urban environments.
Qnsto
Five different surface types were chosen to represent the most
common range of outdoor surfaces in an Australian city
environment.
Surface type
Concrete
Sandstone paving
Color-bond™ Steel
Mild Steel
Uses
Paving, monuments
Roofing, guttering, buildings
Buildings, structures, bridges
Roads, pavement
Sampi. description
(MPa25)
High pedestrian -traffic grade
pavers
Zn/AI coated stainless steel
(Colorbond™)
Mild steel, grade 350, surface
oxidation
Asphalt bitum en AC-10 (Australian
Standard)
*L Qnsto
Three radioactive isotopes were chosen to represent the range of
commercially available isotopes that pose the greatest security risk.
!Radioisotope of concern
esium-137
mericium-241
trontium-90
Surrogate used in
experimentation
Cesium -137
Uranium-238 (Yellowcake)
Strontium -85
Surrogate's properties
•Half life= 30.1 yrs;
• Radiation Type = y, p radiation;
• Form = CsN03 in 500mL water
•Activity~250 cps/mL
• Half life= 4468 million yrs;
• Radiation Type = y, o radiation;
• Form = 0,03 in 500m L water
•Activity-220 cps/mL
• Half life= 64.8 days;
• Radiation Type = p radiation;
•Form = SrN03in500mLwater
•Activity- 180 cps/mL
• 1 ml of contaminant dispersed into a pre defined area (160x80mm).
• Contamination reading taken with a mixed alpha beta probe
*L Qnsto
A total of ten decontamination products (6 strippable polymeric
coatings and 4 wet detergent based products) were evaluated in this
study.
Strip coat decontamination products Decontaminating agents
that form a polymeric coating that can be stripped off the surface
once cured. This effectively peels off the contamination from the
surface that has attached to the product.
Chemical decontamination products Decontaminating products
that are applied to the surface and scrubbed with water. These
products react with the contamination which is removed with a wet
vacuum cleaner or with high pressure water.
Qnsto
Strip Coat TLC: water based, polymer matrix
USA
VA: ethanol based, strippable polymeric
coating
VL: water based, strippable polymeric
coating
Geopolymer composite: modified partially
crystalline alumino-silicate polymer
ANSTO, Australia
Latex: natural polymer
Australia
NuCap: silicone based geopolymei
USA
Dez 1: complexing agent consisting of a mixture
of surface-active and chelating agents
Dez 4: oxidising agent consisting of a mixture of
surface-active and chelating agents
Decon 90: anionic and non-anionic surface
active agents concentrate
England
agents coi
Belgium
-------
R
r~i~,.
hemical products
Qnsto
Decontamination solution scrubbed and then removed with wet vacuum
or high pressure cleaner
*L Qnsto
Colorbond™ samples ~*~ «nsio
Mild Steel samples
*_ Qnsto
-------
Clnsto
• Chemical Decontamination techniques are more successful when
compared to the strip coat methods.
• The use of a chemical decontamination agents is more effective
than using water on it's own.
• Wet vacuum recommended for hard
porous surfaces (paving, asphalt).
High pressure water cleaning
recommended for soft porous
surfaces (concrete).
• Wet decontamination methods
could spread the contamination
during a post blast clean up.
Ctnsto
• Strip coat methods have the advantage of not spreading the
contamination, however would have limited use on a large scale
operation due to their tedious preparation, application and removal
procedures.
• Ease of decontamination
Yellowcake>Cesium>Strontium
• Chemical decontamination products and techniques can be used
effectively to reduce the amount of contamination in public areas.
• However, effective decontamination of a public environment is
dependant on a number of factors (surface and contamination type) and
will require the use of a range of techniques/products.
Future wor
*_, Clnsto
• Expansion of decontamination products and technologies
• dry ice blasting, high pressure steam, gels and foams, other
novel products and techniques.
• Decontamination of forensic trace evidence:
• Fibres, hairs, glass, documents, fingerprints,
DMA, paint chips.
• Is it possible?
• Does the decontamination procedure effect
the quality of the evidence and the forensic
interpretation?
• Is the decontamination procedure more
beneficial (cost, time, & effort) than using
dedicated "hot" instruments?
*_ Qnsto
Australian Government
Depiirtment of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
This work is supported by the Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet
National Security Science & Technology Unit, under Contract NSST 06-032.
Andrew Parkinson
Forensic Chemist
Forensic & Nuclear Security Research
Australian Nuclear Science & Technology Organisation
PMB1,Menai, NSW, 2234
T: +612 9717 9237
F: +612 9543 7179
E: andrew.parkit
www.ansto.qov.au
-------
SERft
CsCI Particle Characteristics from
Radiological Dispersal Device Outdoor
Test
SEFtt
Acknowledgement
Collaboration with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Robert Fischer
Brian Viani
- Dianne Gates-Anderson
MaxHu
Mark Sutton
851 Crew
Radiological Dispersal Device (ROD)
What is an ROD?
Explosive type - also called a 'dirty bomb'
- combination of a conventional explosive device with radioactive
materials
radioactive materials can be obtained from industrial, commercial,
medical and research applications.
What is the impact of an ROD?
casualties, disruption of the economy, and the potential desertion of
the contaminated area
- highly populated urban areas are the primary target
CsCI as ROD material
• Hygroscopicity-Deliquescence
CsCI is a salt like NaCI.
At relative humidity of 68%, CsCI
particles become aqueous.
Aqueous form of CsCI can be
transported through water channels on
porous urban surfaces.
20 RH%
Research Questions
-What are the characteristics of CsCI particles?
Particle size distribution
Particle composition
How do urban surfaces become contaminated as a result of ROD
exposure?
Cs penetration through the surface
Factors that control Cs penetration
Cs bonding to the surfaces
Study Objectives
To characterize the physicochemical properties of CsCI particles from
outdoor explosion tests
To estimate the CsCI particle deposition and its subsequent penetration
into limestone at various relative humidity conditions.
-------
3EPA
Description of Outdoor Test Shot I
Test I: ROD was set 1 m high
from the ground.
ROD: CsCI (2 kg), C4(~2kg)
D(
Near Field: Limestone coupons A
Far Field: Polycarbonate
Filters and Sidepaks
Weather Condition
WS (m/s) 7
WD 347
Temp(°C) 17
RH (%) 42
RDD deposition
FMter samp|ers
SEPA
Summary of Test Shot 1
• Sidepak data from Test 1 clearly show plume movement at location g1 and
92.
SEM analysis also shows significant amount of CsCI particles on filters at
91.
Loc£
9
9
9
.=
CsCI particle
tion concentration
(*cm2)
1 22107
2 6703
3 0
^Mp,i*!><
Other particle
concentration
(#/cm2)
2612
5776
440
„
VyEPA Results of Real Time Particle Monitors (Sidepak) from
:..
~8 "
CD
1
tf)
"3 ""
^-
..
g
1
-j
gs
"==™~--—
\
'.
.
i
,„.
I
&
\
.
—
„,
^
,
I
st Shot I
HI-S:!.
I
-I
&.l
:
:::l
svEPA
CsCI Particles Agglomerated with Carbonaceous Material
Backscattered
Emission Mode
vvEPA
SEM Pictures of Large CsCI Particles
SE Mode BE Mode SE Mode
-------
SERft
Particle Size Distribution from Test Shot I
"otal number of particles
analyzed: 6901
Particle mean diameter:
1.62 jj.m
Mass mean diameter:
I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I 10"
I I I I I IT I
I I I I M\ I I
' ' ' Xii|i.
4 • /iTTTT1
i £**"
¥ '
/ ' \ ii
/iii
i i i
A i i
/ 1\ i i
/ \ V i
' 1 IT.
I I I I
I I I I
I I I I
I I I I
I I I I
I I I I
I I I I
^*W.
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4-Cu'™ h
I |
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S f D t
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U444-
SEFtt
Description of Outdoor Test II
Test II: ROD was positioned in
ROD: CsCI (2 kg), C4 (~2 kg) X
Detonation Site
Far Field: Polycarbonate
Filters and Sidepaks
• ROD deposition
150m
Filter samplers
£p
^H on
iummary of Test Shot II
Sidepak data from Test II does not show any plume movement.
SEM analysis shows significantly low number of CsCI particles on filters.
Location
gi
g2
gs
^==^,D,
CsCI particle
concentration
(#/cm2)
0
0
84
„„—.„,„, C._,,,,,,,™.D,
Other particle
concentration
(#/cm2)
2155
1839
12608
,„
SEM Pictures of CsCI Particles
Most of CsCI contained particles are agglomerated with multiple
components (cartonaceous, Si, Al, Ti, and Ca)
SEM Pictures of CsCI Particles
Particle Size Distribution from Test Shot II
"otal number of particles
analyzed: 68
Particle mean diameter:
1.71 JJTI
Mass mean diameter:
5.29 JJTI
I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I/
I I I I I I l/f
I III ttvfl
I I I fxl I IX
i i y i TWf
i ^-®-if v
^ '
/i i i i i i
/ i i i 1 1 1
i i i 1 1 1
A i i 1 1 1
/ 1 \ i i 1 1 1
t__ \ \ \ \ \ \
i "~*~f- ••
-*
i i i 1 1 1 1
i i i 1 1 1 1
t- Particle Size Dist
)- Cumulative Size Dist.
i i i 1 1 1 1 r
i i i 1 1 1 1
i i i 1 1 1 1
i i i 1 1 1 1
-------
SERft
CsC\ Particle Deposition on Limestone Coupons
-1x1x1 in. limestone coupons near
field (20 and 50 ft from ground zero).
Weathered vs. non-weathered
limestone surfaces.
Horizontal vs. vertical
Pre-conditioning at two relative
humidities (30 and 80 RH%) before
deposition.
Post-conditioning at two different RH
(30 and 80 RH%) before analysis.
Laser-ablation ICP/MS and Laser
Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy will
be used to probe Cs penetration into
limestone.
Limestone coupon analysis for Cs subsurface penetration from the test
shot I
-Weathered surface vs. relatively clean surface
Effects of relative humidity
Laboratory studies to investigate Cs penetration in limestone varying the
following parameters
CsCI initial loading including various particle size
Exposed duration
-Rain
Various substrates such as concrete, brick, granite, asphalt
SEFtt
Summary of Results
Most of Cs particles are smaller than 10 ^m.
From test shot I, CsCI particles are transported in pure form and also
agglomeration with carbonaceous material (possibly C4 residue).
Test shot II results show that CsCI particles are agglomerated with other
minerals such as Si, Al, Ti, Ca (possibly from soil) as well as
carbonaceous material.
ROD surrounding materials affect particle characteristics and plume
behavior (transportation and thermodynamic property).
-------
SERft
RDD Rapid Decontamination
SEFtt
RDD Rapid Decontamination
RDD - Radiological Dispersal Device
Rapid - Deploys quickly, cleans fast,
available now
Decon - Removes contamination
without damaging substrate
Project Goals
Evaluate performance of commercially available cleanup
technologies applicable to buildings and outdoor areas
contaminated by an RDD
• Provide technology selection guidance for planners and
operations personnel
• Identify promising cleanup technologies for future development
Demonstrate a suite of effective technologies in a full-scale
environment (future)
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
RDD: "Deliberate dispersal of radiological
material to cause harm"
Typically made up of conventional
explosive wrapped with dispensable
radiological material
May be non-explosive (e.g. crop sprayer,
tanker truck)
Rad material from commercial source or
waste
DHS planning scenario is 3000 Ib truck
bomb with CsCI (2300 Ci) from stolen
commercial seed irradiators
Effects of an RDD
Weapon of Mass Disruption
Economic and terror weapon
Economic effects
- Denial of use of affected
urban area
- Cost to restore
Future use issues (residual
levels, perceptions)
Terror effects
Fear of anything nuclear or
radioactive
Acute health effects minimal
Chronic health effects are the
concern
EPA is "Lead Agency" for clean-up*
On Scene Coordinators (OSC) and
National Decon Team (NDT)
Contamination control
Clean-Up
Certify for reoccupancy
-NHSRC provides science expertise
and technical support to OSC/NDT
for decontamination
-Others: Fed, state, local, foreign
National Response Plan (NRP), Nuclear/Radiological Annex
-------
svEFA
ROD Rapid Decon Project
Focus is on
- Buildings
- Outdoor areas
Contaminated equipment
Challenges
- Intense pressure to reoccupy
- Restoration vs. demolition
- Driven by economics and politics
- Emergency response climate
- Private ownership and public
access
Radionuclides postulated
Waste disposition unknown
Skilled and unskilled workforce
SEFtt
Priorities in selecting decon technologies to evaluate
Preserve building exteriors (non-destructive)
Large areas so speed & cost/ft2 are crucial
Water-intensive processes exacerbate contaminant migration into
building materials (e.g. concrete)
- Effluent capture required to reduce spread of contamination (including
water/wastewater utilities)
Minimize the supporting infrastructure which must be brought in
Future land/building use will drive decon strategy
Considerations for selecting decon technologies
Minimize
Surface damage (texture, color)
Cost
Secondary waste
Recontamination
Operator skill requirement
Time to deploy
Maximize
Speed
Decon factor
Availability
Applicability
Contaminant
Substrate
Weather conditions
Approach
Deposit contaminant on "large" coupons
Measure contamination levels before application of decontamination
technology
Apply decon technology is a realistic manner (e.g. using the same
application techniques as would be used in the field)
Measure the residual contamination levels
Determine
Decon Factor (DF)
Speed (ft2/hr)
Operational parameters (difficulty, infrastructure, skill level, etc)
-Other (deployed cost, availability, shelf life, etc)
Performance Test Design Decisions
Radioactive CsCI chosen as initial contaminant
Concrete chosen as initial building material
Large" coupons to allow testing full scale decon equipment (2x5 ft array)
Controlled humidity, temperature to reduce variables
Two exposure scenarios: 14 days and 28 days
Two decon technologies: (1) chemical method, (1) mechanical method
Execution
• Utilize existing EPA Technology Test and Evaluation Program (TTEP)
Task Order #1127 SOW to Battelle
Develop test methodology
Develop test plan
Prepare facilities
- Recommend list of proposed technologies for selection by EPA
EPA selects two technologies for FY07
Technology testing performed at radiological facility (INL)
Evaluate results and document
-------
Current Status
SOW completed, TTEP Technical and Cost Proposals accepted
Task Order awarded
Draft Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPP) completed
Test facilities identified (INL)
"Short List" of proposed decon technologies completed
Please contact me if you
have additional questions...
know of projects, programs, products or
technologies which could help meet these needs.
email: Drake.John@epa.gov
hone: 513/235-4273
-------
•SERA
Water Infrastructure Protection Division
WIPD
Decontamination Research Overview
NHSRC Primary Areas of Focus
• Water Infrastructure Protection is charged with conducting
research to detect and respond to terrorist attacks on the
nation's drinking water sources and distribution systems and
the wastewater collection, treatment, and disposal
procedures
• Decontamination and Consequence Management focuses on
decontamination of buildings and outdoor environments, as well
as the safe disposal of contaminated materials
- Threat and Consequence Assessment investigates human
exposure to chemical, biological, and radiological contaminants to
define dangerous levels of these contaminants and establish
protective cleanup goals
Impact of an intentional or un-
intentional attack on a water system
Every system is
different.
How would a chem-
bio contaminant
propagate?
' What happens if a
key system component
is disabled?
Where would an
attack have the
greatest impact?
Homeland Security Presidential Directives
• HSPD-7 Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization and Protection:
designates EPA as the sector-specific lead
agency for critical water infrastructure
safety and security
• HSPD-9 Defense of US Agriculture and
Food: directs EPA to develop a full-
coordinated surveillance and monitoring
program to provide early detection. Also
requires EPA to develop nationwide lab
network to support the routine monitoring
and response requirements
• HSPD-10 Biodefense in the 21st Century
(classified): reaffirms EPA's role adding a
clear directive for Agency's lead in decon
efforts
> Jointly developed by EPA's
OWandORD
> Based around issues, needs,
and projects
> Addresses both drinking
water and wastewater
infrastructure
> Stresses physical, cyber, and
contamination threats
> Extensive input from and
review by stakeholders
> Reviewed by the National
Academy of Science
-------
Key Collaborators
EPA's Office of Water
EPA's Regional Offices, OPPTS, ORIA, OSWER
U. S. Army's Edgewood Chemical Biological
Center
FDA's Forensic Chemistry Center
U. S. Air Force's Air Force Research Laboratory
Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California
DOI's U. S. Geological Survey
DHHS's Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
U. S. Army Corps of Engineers
DOE's National Laboratories
National Science Foundation
Selected Disposal Projects
Decision Support Tool for Disposal of
Contaminated Building and Water System Materials
NHSRC is developing a Web-based tool that will
assist in this decision making.
A vital part of the contaminated site
restoration process includes decisions
related to:
• Treatment or disposal options
• Selection of the appropriate disposal
facility
• Packaging and storing residues
• Transporting materials to the disposal
site
• Compliance with relevant permits
• Worker safety
• Protection of human health and the
environment
Distribution Systems Research
*.
Field Studies,
Modeling and
Management
Water Quality and
Management of
Water Distribution Distribution Systems.
System Analysis A Utility Operator's
Symposium Guide & Pocket
August 27-30, 2006 Guides for Water
Utility Managers
SB*
What we know about threats to
drinking water distribution systems
-We don't know where
contaminant releases will occur
- Health and economic impacts
can vary widely depending on
the release location
-Significant impacts can occur
miles from the release location
Need for Decon
Adherence to pipe walls
Attachment to biofilms
Reaction with pipe walls or corrosion products
Permeation through pipe walls
Petroleum products, chemical warfare agents,
pesticides, etc
Some Knowledge Gaps
Any interaction between the contaminant and the pipe
wall will prolong the the CB attack
Surface roughness from scale or corrosion slows
transport and inhibits decontamination.
Biofilm - Biological contaminants may settle in the
biofilm and continue to release contaminants
-------
•SERA
Potential Drinking Water Decontamination Methods
• Surfactants (detergents)
• Co-solvents (alcohols)
• Organic acids or chelating solutions
• Solutions designed to decontaminate CBW
on surfaces
• Enzymes
• Other?
SEFfc
Decontamination Projects
• Standard Ops
- NIST IAG
• ECBC enzyme
* T&E pipe loop studies
• ECBC pipe loops
• Dahlgren IAG
EPA T&E Pipe Loops
• Clear pipe loop for evaluating areas
of deposition and collection
• Use chemical simulants and
biological surrogates
• Evaluate flushing and some chemical
treatment
-?/EPA
Experiments Conducted to Date:
Decontamination Study
-General Decontamination Study
• Simple flushing for arsenic, mercury, and Bacillus
Subtilis
• Low pH flushing for arsenic and mercury
-Contaminant: Arsenic (sodium arsenite)
• Phosphate buffer flushing
• Acidified potassium permanganate flushing
-Contaminant: Mercury (mercuric chloride)
• Acidified potassium permanganate flushing
-Contaminant: Bacillus Subtilis
• Shock chlorination
-------
SEFA
ECBC Enzyme Project
• Evaluation and development of catalytic enzyme-
based methods for treating contaminated water
and/or decontaminating water distribution system
equipment
• Enzymes with catalytic activity against most
nerve agents and many related OP pesticides
• Development of an appropriate delivery method:
liquid, filter, gel, foam, pipe lining
• Bench and field scale feasibility tests
sx— Containment Facility Test Loop
• Only research facility in the U. S. that
allows experiments with live CB agents
in an instrumented and computer-
controlled environment
• Allows agent fate and transport behavior
to be studied and modeled
• Allows validation of emerging sensors
and countermeasure technologies
• Designed by ERDC and constructed at
ECBC in FY03
Tap water Paraoxon hydrolysis by OPAA-Agarose (left) and OPH-
Agarose (Right) catalytic filter loops after 5 days. The 2 liter
reservoirs in the foreground are for the Enzyme-agarose loops.
NIST Project Goals
• Conduct experiments to study
accumulation and decontamination of
plumbing systems
-Chemical contaminants
-Biological contaminants
• Develop a predictive computer model to
guide decontamination efforts
-------
•SERA
Appliance Studies
• Hot water heaters
• Water softeners
• Water filters
• Ice makers/cold water dispensers
SEFfc
5th story
1st Story
NIST Plumbing Tower
NIST Plumbing Tower
Radiological Issues Follow
an Event's Footprint
.vEPA
cs~"
EPA's challenges in water security research
• Diversity and number of water and wastewater
systems
• Rapid evolution of scientific information relevant to
water security
• Interdisciplinary and Interagency coordination
• Stable leadership
• Pressure for rapid results versus long-term strategies
• Information sharing in the context of national security
• Multiple constituencies
-?/EPA
Recommendations for future research directions
• Address data gaps in the following areas:
-Decontamination
-Surrogate identification
-Contingencies for water emergencies
-Distribution system models (field and laboratory
testing for contaminant transport
-Treatment of contaminants in water and wastewater
-------
Incineration of Materials
Contaminated with Bio-warfare
Agents
P. Lemieux, J. Wood
US EPA National Homeland Security Research Center
Presentation for Decontamination Workshop
June 20-22, RTP, NC
Outline of Presentation
Thermal
destruction
experimental and
modeling work
Online disposal
decision support
tool
Incineration data
gaps
It's called fire... It recycles wood.
Disposal R&D Program
Guidance document development
Thermal destruction of agents bound on matrices
- Bench-scale
- Pilot-scale
- Modeling
- Sampling/analytical methods for stacks and residues
Permanency of landfilling
- Survivability in leachate
- Transport to landfill gas
Destruction of Spores in Autoclaves
Agricultural Residue Disposal (with USDA)
Issues for Incinerators
Prevention of further contamination
Compliance with permits
Operational issues
Sizing of material prior to shipment to disposal facility
Residue management
Selection of appropriate facilities
Minimization of failure modes
Considerations of Thermal Treatment
Technology Options
-------
Approach
Reduction of Bacillus Subtilis
Spiked on Ceiling Tile after
Heating
Heating Time (minutes)
Rapid reduction when heated at temperatures > 200 °C
Reduction rate decreases with reducing heating temperature
"Kinetic Fit" of Spore
Destruction Data
\\tmr i Luf ndwlm tnvi trot hi B wiNiln up *.
Experimental Apparatus
Secondary Combustion Chamber
Spore Feed System
Heatup/Quench of Carpet
E
&
50
Kiln T = 850 °C J
4 min = spores remaining 1
5 min = no spores remaining /
/
,,,,,1^-nf^*-^
Run 1 (2 min)
^M Run 2 (3mm)H
X£ \
^fxpidsf *^'*toW^^
Time (min)
-------
c
1
„ ,000
telling Tile: Time vs Spore
Count
IS. —4^
"\ \
«:±
.1.
Ce
iling Tile: Spore Count vs
MaxT
1
a
3^
fcf\
\s
m
:™,B;±
V.
Reacting CFD Model
Simulation of EPA RKIS
Secondary Combustion Chamber Afterburner
L
\Continuou
Emission:
Monitors
Mo
E
1
del vs. Experiment: Bundle
Temperature
i
1 /
1 / ~EE
/ /
/ /
/ /
'^
",im,m,,20
™',"-p;~,
Mod
=
i
1
I
el vs. Experiment: Spores
on Ceiling Tile
\
N
V
\ Wet Ceiling Tile- Measured
""'""""""
-"-'
-------
Model Input Conditions
tiling Tile
Free Basis
b=4^ —
"—'"•"«
HeatCapacit^jJ/ka^L
-Tffi
20E«
1340
WEF.
3und[e
B3E
3undle
1
Vied i urn
Dry
3undle
B3E
Miasr
3undle
— Hr*
3undle
83 E
.argeWei
3und[e
— in
Simulation of Med-Path
Incinerator
Model Predictions: Med-Path Incinerator
(Comparison of Bundle Position in Bed)
1 ™
*-
of
" a
-------
Model Predictions: WTE Stoker
(Comparison of Bundle Position in Bed)
1:
X
x
x X
/
f /
s
^^s
. 1. 1< 30 K » X «
i1
i
« IE-02
a l&°4
! ,B«
1 l&06
"^.
^\
A
\
\
\
• • " " i,,:; " " •
»*
•:
,„
^^^
jS ' =
~S_
s /
, „ „ „ „ ,, „ . ,
?
L.
$ IE-0
&
l.BO
l|&o
V^^^ v^^
^^~^^v ^""-^
\ T=p
\ L_«y
\
\
Conclusions: EPA RKIS
Simulations
Model reasonably predicts behavior of
ceiling tile bundles in lab-scale rotary
kiln
- Somewhat underpredicts drying rates for
wet ceiling tile
- Spore kill times very well predicted for dry
ceiling tile, slightly underpredicted for wet
ceiling tile
Conclusions: Full-Scale
Simulations
Complete spore destruction is predicted for all 3
incinerator designs for small dry bundles
It is suggested that for larger bundles, particularly if
wet, incomplete spore destruction will occur prior to
ash discharge
If insufficient bed mixing occurs, incomplete spore
destruction could result in all 3 incinerator designs,
particularly for wet material
EPA Disposal Decision
Support Tool
Current Features
Web-based tool with restricted access
Series of inputs defining scenario
Estimates of residue mass & volume
Database of disposal facilities (location, capacity, technical
information, permits)
Access to contaminant and decontaminant information
Worker safety guidance
Packaging and storage guidance
Transportation guidance (links to DOE GIS tool)
Agricultural Biomass Disposal Module
- Includes "Lessons Learned" database on carcass disposal
- Links to APHIS emergency response information
Water Systems Material Disposal Module
Natural Disaster Debris Disposal Module
DST Disposal Facilities
Landfills
• MSW
• Construction & Demolition Debris
• Hazardous Waste
Combustion Facilities
• Municipal Waste Combustors (Waste-to-Energy)
• Hazardous Waste
• Medical/biohazardous Waste
• Industrial combustion facilities (e.g., boilers, smelters, etc)
Decontamination Wastewater Disposal Facilities
• Publicly-Owned Treatment Works (POTWs)
• Federally-Owned Treatment Works (FOTWs)
• Liquid Hazardous Waste Combustion Facilities
Other Disposal Facilities
• Centralized Waste Treatment (CWT) Facilities
• Commercial medical waste autoclaves
-------
Access to the Tool
http://www2.ergweb.com/bdrtool/login.asp
For first-time users will need to request a user
ID and password - the link above has
directions for making the on-line request.
Your request will be approved and your login
ID and initial password will be emailed to you.
Data Gaps and Other Issues
Disposal Non-Technical
Issues
Infrequent but potentially high-impact events
- Not practical to stockpile large quantities of
materiel resources that won't be used very often
(i.e., Maytag repairman)
Potential solutions
- Need to utilize same infrastructure that is used for
routine disposal, but must have surge capacity
- Need to find "multiple-use" technologies that can
supply ongoing needs (e.g., fumigation technology
for mold remediation)
Disposal Non-Technical
Issues (cont)
Stigma associated with the waste
- Disposal facilities have worked long and hard to develop
good rapport with communities -these materials can cause
PR problems
- Some facilities (e.g., POTW, MWC) sell sludge, ash, or
byproducts for reapplication (e.g., land application,
construction)
Potential Solutions
- Include potential disposal facilities in planning activities for
responses at major targets
- Develop risk communications information in conjunction with
facilities prior to event
- Blanket purchase arrangements prior to an event
- May potentially require "overkill" disposal activities (e.g.,
incineration of aqueous wastes)
Disposal Non-Technical
Issues(cont)
Industry concerns
- Worker health and safety
• Need to develop 'comfort level' at dealing with these materials
• Union concerns
- Protection of business assets
• Long term impact of processing these wastes
• Contamination of facilities
- Indemnification
• Disposal technologies not covered in Safety Act
Potential Solutions
- Bring facility in as stakeholder early in the planning process
- Develop training for disposal workers
- Perform research to understand relevant long-term effects
- Discussions with DHS about indemnification
Incineration Data Gaps
Need for "indicator" to assure effective
performance
Sampling methods for spores in stacks and
combustor ash
How best to package materials at the site to
maximize effective combustion and contain
agent
Which types of facilities are most appropriate
for which types of waste materials
What to do with ROD debris (MAJOR DATA
GAP)
-------
Detection to Support
Decontamination
3rd Annual Decontamination Workshop
SEFft
Outline of Presentation and Collaborators (Co-Pis]
• Man-Portable LIBS for characterization of biological agent contamination
- Chase Munson, Andrzej Miziolek ARL
• Single Photon Time of Flight Mass Spectrometry and Dual Source!riple
Quadrupole Mass Spectrometry for detection of TICs, fumigants, and
fumigant-TIC byproducts Dave Mickunas US EPA ERT
• Bench-top LIBS for characterization of cesium penetration into outdoor
building materials (limestone) Sang Don Lee
• Rapid viability PCR for quantitation of viable F. tularensis and Y. pestis
on decontaminated building material coupons. Stad Kane LLNL
AEPA
Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) - Principle of
Operation
SEFft
Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) - Principle of
Operation
Pulsed
Nd:YAG "
1064 nm
A+
A>A'-
Generation of Pure Samples and Mixtures
• Pure B. atrophaeus (or ovalbumin) and
interferent mixed
• Solutions were mixed to achieve
desired binary mixtures of 6.
atrophaeus (or ovalbuminjand
interferent (i.e. Pure, 71% w/w B.
atrophaeus, 50%, 25%, 20%, 10%, and
5%)
• 10-15 uL of solution added to 1/8"
screw sized region in Al dish
• Samples were allowed to dry overnight
• Only 1 LIBS spectra could be
measured from each sample
Area of sample
region =
0.079 cm2
Data Preprocessing
13,604 Intensity Channels/MP-LIBS spectrum
15 elemental and molecular normalized peak areas from 6. atrophaeus and ovalbumin
Summed peak areas for 9
elements
(Na, K, Mg, Mn, Si, C, P, Ca, Fe]
Place into data analysis models
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Construction of Quantitative Models
• Multiple Least Square Regression Analysis: the strength and
direction of a relationship between several independent variables
(in this case summed normalized peak areas) and a continuous
dependent variable (in the case concentration) is described.
P = regression coefficients, X = peak areas
• Neural network is a series of non-linear equations used to predict
output variables from input variables. This particular neural
network model is based upon a single layer feed forward network
Construction of Neural Network Quantitative Models
Nodes
Multiple Least Squares Regression Model - B. atrophaeus
Actual Concentration B.
SEFft
Neural Network Model - B. atrophaeus
y = 0.9308x +0.0545
R2 = O.I
Actual Concentration B. atrophaeus - Log cfu
SEm
EF-"-- •
Construction of Neutral Netwo
Identity of Sample
b.a. - B. atrophaeus
ovalbumin
skim milk
mold
soot
Arizona dust
house dust
humic acid
blank aluminum
k Model for Classification
Assigned Number
for Neural
Network
10
7
5
6
1
5
5
6
0
AEPA
Construction of Neural Network Classification Model
• Neural network is a series of non-linear equations used to predict output
variables from input variables. This particular neural network model is based
upon a single layer feed forward network. Half of known spectra were
excluded to train the neural network.
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False Negative Rate as a Function of Pure B. atrophaeus
Concentration- Neural Network Model
Concentration of B. atrophaeus spores - Log cfu
SERft
False Positives - Neural Network Classification Model
- 6 5 to 7 5
itoio Identification
Range
Sample Type
Mixtures of B. atrophaeus
I3"
• 30-
IVf xture Sample
-SEFft
Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves - B. atrophaeus
Mixtures
Probability of Misdassification
00 02 04 06 08 10
09-
1 07-
0 06-
| 05.
(j
B
J? 03-
1 °2'
^01-
f • 50 % B atrophaeus
Exponential Growth
•// Fit of 50% mixture
-
„ / A 10% B atrophaeus
in anzona road dust •
• Exponential Growth
Fit of 10% mixture
•
-
*
0 9 TJ
07^
OB ~
05 1
§
03 |
0 2 S
0 1
00 02 04 06 08 10
Probability of Misdassification
H Office of Research and Development 15
Soft Independent Modeling of Class Analogies - Training Set
(identity known)
Not Classified Correctly in Model
Class 1 - not B. atrophaeus
Class 2-6. atrophaeus
AEPA
Soft Independent Modeling of Class Analogies - Test Set
(identity unknown)
Tamplcr/Trnrcr Plot of Tent —^^^
False Positives
False Negatives
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SEPA
ssr™
MP-LIBS Conclusions and Future Work
• Determined realistic limits of detection using classification model
• Evaluated two classification models and determined powders that
may yield false positives
• Currently working to mitigate effects seen from analyzing powders
on surfaces such as laminate and cement
• Currently increasing spectral library - looking for potential false
positives
• Currently investigating femtosecond LIBS for increased spectra
classification potential
• We would like to establish an agreement with a commercial entity
to develop a Man-Portable System for the First Responder (FY08)
SEPA
•
Single Photon Time of Flight Mass Spectrometry - Principle of
Operation
~20mJ
355nm VUV/SPI
Cell
Time of Flight
Mass Spectrometer
lonization chamber
pSapillary inlet / Effusive source
SEPA
Mass Spectr
2.0-
1.8-
1.6-
1.4-
? 1.2-
W
§ °-8;
0.6-
0.4-
0.2-
0.0-
um of Chlorine Dioxide
Exp conditions:
Sampling from box with
3000ppmCIO2 ;RH:68%
CIO fragment
Ji
5CIO2
37CIO2
(mass cal. off at lowm/Z
(no mass gate in place)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 9
m/Z
0
SEPA
Chlorine Dioxide Calibration Curves
!icio,
!7CIO.
f\ rv
j
easured byGMP
I , I*
Dual Source Triple Quadrupole Mass Spectrometry-
Principles of Operation
http://www.chm.bris.ac.uk/ms/theory/quad-massspec.html
Calibration Curves for Chlorine and Chlorine Dioxide
-------
Limits of Detection for Chlorine and Chlorine Dioxide
Compound
Limit of Detection
Chlorine
14.5 pptv*
Chlorine Dioxide
11.7 pptv*
*lon pairs for chlorine and chlorine dioxide were equally optimized
Determined <0.017% (of CIO2 concentration) of CI2 broke
through during the generation of CIO2 (corresponded to
9 pptv CI2) - we were not able to definitively see any
other products from the generation.
AEPA
Determination of the Penetration of Cesium into Building
Materials (limestone) via LIBS
Limestone coupon
20 ft from explosive
Conclusions and Future Work
• Our facility has instruments that are able to measure chlorine
dioxide, and chlorine in addition to other fumigants, TICs, and
decontamination by-products
• In the future we will determine by-products from building materials
and fumigants (chlorine dioxide and other fumigants)
• By-products of TICs and decontaminants will also be determined.
Further experiments will be done in parallel with in-house TIC
systematic decontamination experiments.
AEPA
Rapid Viability PCRfor Quantitation of Viable F. Tularensis
and Y. pestis
-------
EPA Responder
Decontamination Needs
Leroy Mickelsen
EPA National Decontamination Team
June 20-22, 2007 Decon Workshop
Overview of Responder Needs
User-Friendly and Updated.... Products
• Personal Protection and Containment
• Sampling and Characterization
• Decontamination Methods
• Clearance
Personal Protection and
Containment
Guides for PPE
- Effectiveness for threat agents
- Effectiveness for decontamination agents
- How to decontaminate
- Effectiveness of decontamination
- Reuse guide
i Guide for containing and reducing the
spread of both agents and decontaminates
Sampling and Characterization
i Faster, cheaper, better and easy to use
detectors and sampling methods
- How to sample in complex environments
Validated sampling methods (easy to use)
i Guide to reduce amount of sampling
SOP for packing and shipping samples
Decontamination Method
Faster, cheaper, better and easy to us
decontamination methods
Decontaminanteffectiveness/agent/matrix
SOPs for decontamination (t, C, T, R.h
In-place decon to reduce disposal
SOPs for handling high-value items
learance Guidelines
How clean do we need to go?
- By agent
- By location/use of area
SOP for clearance process and
documentation for clearance
-------
Most Research is In Progress,
Tncomplete, or Imperfect
jwever, there is still need for guidai
based on the best available data.
a Guidance should be as simple and dir
as possible and include current research
status (what data are lacking).
a Who will undertake the task to develop
guidance based on best available data?
Including constant updating?
a Collaboration! & Coordination!
Result of Guidance Development
a Responder will have best current guidance
a Research will have tangible impact
a Guidance documents will I.D. gaps for
future research
a Guidance based on incomplete data may
actually be good enough in some areas
allowing research to be focused elsewhere
a Guidance documents may be useful in if^
setting impact-based research priorities. 1=1™
Conclusions
a Much data are available for guidance development.
a If properly coordinated we can connect-the-dots
from research to field use, produce products that
impact decontamination, reduce restoration cost and
effectively recover from terrorism.
a We need to use the current data, though nc
complete, to develop user-friendly products.
a We need to collaborate, coordinate and
produce up-to-date useful decontamination
guidance.
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©EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Office of Research and Development
National Homeland Security Research Center
Cincinnati, OH 45268
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use
$300
Recycled/Recyclable
Printed with vegetable-based ink or
paper that contains a minimum of
50% post-consumer fiber content
processed chlorine free
PRESORTED STANDARD
POSTAGES FEES PAID
EPA
PERMIT NO. G-35
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