Analyzing Nonpoint Source
Water Pollution Problems:
Nutrient Control Policies in the
Chesapeake Bay States
Philip Favero. Ph.D
Institute for Governmental Service
University of Maryland at College Park
October 1997
Printed on recycled paper by the U.S. £nvirnnment»l Protection Agency
for the Chesapeake Bay Program
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The views, recommendations, and opinions
expressed in this report are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the
views, recommendations, or opinions of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
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Foreword
. B"We nay love a place, but still be dangerous to
it." Wallace Stegner wrote these words about his
beloved American West, but they apply equally
well to the Chesapeake Bay. Among many reasons.
we love the bay as a source of food, for its recrea-
tional opportunities, and for its ability to absorb
waste. Ironically, it is our very love for the bay
and, therefore, pur propensity to live near it, that
threatens its existence.
Tins paper is intended for people who make pub-
lic decisions about the bay arid about other environ-
mental resources—both interested citizens and
public officials. It provides a nonmathematical, in-
stitutional model for investigating nonpoint source
water pollution issues—beginning with a set of
ideas for how to analyze the issue—to judgements
about the value of policies and programs designed
to solve the problem. The model is applied to non-
pomt source nutrient water pollution in the
Chesapeake Bay, an issue that is of emerging con-
cern and undoubted importance. After an explana-
tion of nonpoint source issues, a definition of the
model, and an examination of research methods
all contained in Chapter l-4he model is used in
chapters 2 through 4 to guide analyses of nonpoint
source pohcies m Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
Maryland. These chapters include case studies of
innovative efforts in the three states. The discus-
sion, in Chapter 5, offers suggestions for re- '
searchers and public policy makers about how to
analyze nonpotnt source water pollution issues,
Many people in the Chesapeake Region contrib-
uted to.this study. At the risk of forgetting some-
one, and with this usual vaveat that the author
alone is responsible for errors, a list of contributors
is provided in Appendix A, People listed in Appen-
dix A provided information during personal inter-
views or fitmishcd written comments and
materials. This paper is dedicated to the contribu-
tors; my family; colleagues at the University of
Maryland at College Park and at the Maryland De-
partment of Natural Resources; and the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, which provided
financial support during my sabbatical leave from
the university. Without the help of all these* con-
ducting the study would not have been possible.
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Contents
1. An Introduction to Bay Noripoint Source Policy Issues and to Methods for Studying Them 1
2. Virginia's Initiatives, Including the Bay Preservation Act 7
3. Pennsylvania's Programs and the Nutrient Management Act ,....,,.,, 1?
4. Maryland's Bay Initiatives, Including Tributaiy Teams . 29
5. How To Analyze Nonpoint Source Water Pollution 43
Appendix A; Contributors 54
Appendix B: Interview Instrument .. 55
IV
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1. An Introduction to Bay Nonpoint
Source Policy Issues and to Methods
for Studying Them
Bay Policy Actors and Rolos
William Shakespeare never saw the Chesapeake
Bay. Nevertheless, his metaphor of the world as "a
stage and all the men and women merely players"
is a useful way to begin thinking about the forma-
tion of public policies for the bay. Shakespeare's
analogy of life and theater orients our inquiry into
bay policy development beginning with actors and
their roles.
Residents' Roles: A People's Bay
Over the last several decades, most residents of
the bay basin have played supporting roles; they
have taken actions out of the limelight Neverthe-
less, our combined actions have had large impacts
on the bay. Our story is one of "good news-bad
news." The good news is that we enjoy being near
the Chesapeake Bay and, in ever increasing num-
bers, we've decides! to live around it. The bad news
is that we enjoy being near the Chesapeake Bay
and. in ever increasing numbers, we've decided to
live around it. We may love a place, but still be
dangerous to it.
Living near the Chesapeake Bay is a tradition.
Surely, from the first time indigenous people
Scouted it, America's largest estuary has sustained
and delighted us. The bay has yielded countless
oysters, soft and hard crabs, and other culinary de-
lights; exploration experiences on beach and boat;
open vistas to wooded coves and distant shores;
and the means to leave routine life on land for
water recreation.
European explorers, in awe of the bay's abun-
dance, described what they saw. Captain John
Smith, in the early 1600s, wrote of seeing enough
striped bass to fill a 100-ton ship and "more stur-
geon than could he drowned by dog or men." An-
other explorer noted wild celery so thick that it
impeded attempts to row a boat. And another de-
scribed oyster shells piled high enough to form haz-
ards to navigation.
By the mid-twentieth century we were, how-
ever, "loving the bay to death." As former Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator
William Ruckelshaus noted, "...our Chesapeake is
a 'peoples bay' and therein lies its infinite charm
and the i*eds of its destruction " By mid-century
we had built homes, factories, and businesses to be
near the bay's treasures, removed trees, paved
land, and discarded our wastes into the bay and its
tributary streams and rivers. As a result, the hay's
living resources declined precipitously.
But as residents became aware of the decline of
bay resources, many became dissatisfied. Some
communicated their concerns for the bay to politi-
cians; some joined interest groups to "save the
bay." People's dissatisfaction with the bay's de-
cline' scl the stage for collective actions to restore it
Major Roles Leading to Bay Agreements
Environmental groups—pa/ticularly the Alli-
ance for the Chesapeake Bay and the Chesapeake
Bay Foundation—gathered people's dissatisfaction
to form demands for action. The groups expressed
the demands to public decision makers in local,
state, and national governments. Working with
leaders of the states in the bay basin and with fed-
eral officials, environmentalists supported agree-
ments for multi-government action.
Since 1983, the governors of Maryland, Pennsyl-
vania, and Virginia, the Administrator of EPA, the
mayor of the District of Columbia, and the chair of
the Chesapeake Bay Commission (representing the
legislatures of the three states), have acted in con-
cert as the Chesapeake Executive Council. Politi-
cians have responded to demands for saving the
bay. They've also molded public opinion in sup-
port of programs to improve the bay (Favero, Pitt
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Analyzing Nortpsint Source Water Pollution Problems:
& Tuthill 1988). And they've used the work of sci-
entists and government agency staff to form poli-
cies. Annually, the principals of the Executive
Council take center stageite announce agreements
about new policy initiatives. Several of the agree-
ments mark the evolution of bay policies.
On D»e«inW 9, 1983, Executive Cuunitil mem-
bers signed a commitment to restore the bay's
water quality and living resources and established
the Chesapeake Bay Program. The 1983 Agree-
ment provided not only a promise of initial public
funding for the bay; it also created a network of in-
dividuals and groups with a common interest in
continuing public efforts to improve the bay. The
network includes elected politicians responsive to
public demands for bay improvements; managers
of private firms who seek contracts for projects
such as stormwater systems and wastewater treat-
ment plant upgrades; state and fedora! officials
who manage bay improvement programs; and
higher education faculty who research and extend
educational services about the bay. The 1983
Agreement was a threshold event made alt the
more impressive by the fcets that Western Marylan-
ders, while Jiving in the bay basin, are distant from
the estuary's amenities; Virginians from the west-
ern portion of that state are likewise distant from
the bay and are not in the basin; similarly, only part
of Pennsylvania lies in the basin; and all of the citi-
zens of Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia
live "upstream" from the bay's shores.
Five years after the initial agreement, with
mounting scientific evidence that nutrients "are a
key Cause of the bay's decline, th* principals
signed an agreement by which they pledged to re-
duce nitrogen and phosphorus loadings into the bay
basin. The 1987 Agreement made the Chesapeake
lay Program unique among intergovernmental
compacts to improve the environment. In it the
principals pledged that signatory jurisdictions will
reduce, by 40 percent in the year 2000, the 1985
^controllable" nitrogen and phosphorus bads.
"Controllable" is defined as the difference between
the 1985 base load and the estimated loads from a
totally forested (undisturbed) watershed. In 1992,
the Executive Council agreed also that onca the 40
percent reduction is attained, reduced level of nutri-
ent loadings will become a limit or "cap" in perpe-
tuity. r ^
By agreeing to the reduction and cap, the Execu-
tive Council concentrated public resources on ef-
forts to reduce nullification. They began to
"compete" with other signatory jurisdictions to re-
duce nutrient loadings, and they pledged to imple-
ment nutrient reduction methods that are
sustainable into perpetuity.
In 1992, the Executive Council reaffirmed the
overall 40 percent reduction goal and pledied ftjr-
oierihai jurisdictions would develop individual
"tributary strategies" to reduce nutrient loadings
for major rivers flowing to the bay. Each tributary
strategy, the principals agreed, should reflect spe-
cific management plans tailored to anticipate popu-
lation growth and economic growth between 1985
and 2000. At a subsequent meeting, the Executive
Council also agreed to expect the development of
final strategies by 1997; meanwhile, all tributaries
would continue under the interim 40 percent reduc-
tion goal. In targeting population growth and eco-
nomic growth as major causes for environmental
degmdatiun of the bay, the principals called for
more active involvement in the bay cleanup effort
by local governments—jurisdictions that have sig-
nifieant land use authority in the Chesapeake re-
gion. The emphasis on land use reflects increasing
knowledge that nutrient pollution is often diffused
or "nonpoint."
Emergence of the Nonpoint Source
Pollution Issue
The 1972 Federal Clean Water Act defined
"point source* water pollution as the discharge of
effluent that can be traced to a single place, be it a
factory, wastewater treatment plant, or other
source; but it did not define nonpoint source water
pollution. Since 1972. bm especially since the mid-
1980s, the significance of nonpoinl source pollu-
tion—that is, diffused pollution created through
surface water runoff and through percolation into
groufldwater—has become better understood. Sci-
entific models estimate that nonpoint source pollu-
tion contributes the major portions of phosphorus
and nitrogen loadings to the Chesapeake Bay
(Shuyler 1W3). The models estimate that for the
base year of 198S, the nonpoint source portion of
the total 27.2 million pounds of phosphorous
loaded into the Bay. was 18.6 million pounds—68
percent of the total bad. Of the 376.3 million
pounds of nitrogen estimated to have been loaded
to the Bay in 1985,291.6 million pounds—77 per-
cent—were from nonpoint sources.
In keeping with their pledge to reduce nutrient
loadings, and in light of new scientific evidence
about pollution sources, the signatory states to the
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Nutrient Control Policies in the Chesapeake Bay Slates
Bay Agreement—Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia—are developing policies and programs to
control nonpoint source pollution. To analyze
those actions requires providing answers to several
questions:
1. Who and in what ways are people in the bay
Iwsin iuvulvciJ in creating nonpolm source
water pollution?
2. What actions have the states taken to control
nonpoint source pollution, and what may be
said about the impacts of Ihe actions?
3. How has action been taken; that is, why have
the states developed some policies and pro*
grams, but not others?
Answers to these questions will provide lessons,
out of the Bay Program experience, about the na-
ture of nonpoint source water pollution and govern-
ment actions to control it But first we need an
analytic framework to form the questions and re-
search methods to know how to ask them,
An Analytic Framework
The issue of nonpoint source nutrient water pol-
lution is not unlike other public issues. Some peo-
ple are behaving in ways that are harmful to others.
When one group of people harms others, a public
issue arises (Dewey 1927). Government, of neces-
sity, becomes involved in public issues by making
choices—cither to effect change or to preserve the
status quo.
Situation
For every public conflict there is a "situation,"
that is, a set of physical and social characteristics
by which people have become interdependent
Some characteristics of a situation must be taken as
givens. For example, considerations about how to
solve nonpoint source nutrient water pollution
must take into account the fact that animals pro-
duce nutrients as a by-product of life.
A. Allan Schmid (1978) noted the importance of
situational analysis for the study of public policy
making. George Johnston (1988) and Paul
Thompson (1994) applied situational analysis to en-
vironmental policy making. To analyze the situ-
ation of nonpoint source policies for the bay
requires a basic understanding of the physical sci-
ence of nutrient pollution. (See Alliance for the
Chesapeake Bay 1993). It also requires obtaining
social knowledge about who the polluters are and
what motivates them to act as they do.
Drawing on Schmid again, Johnston and
Thompson identified three additional concepts that
are building blocks for a framework to analyze en-
vironmental policy making. They are institutions,
behavior, and performance.
Institutions
Douglass North (1990) defined institutions as
"... the rules of the game in society or, more for-
mally, ... the humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction." Institutions may be for-,
mal or informal (Wandschneider 1986). They in-
clude laws, administrative codes, customs,
organizations, and traditions (Busc & Bromley
1975).
When people attempt to solve a public issue, ei-
isting institutions guide the behavior of individuals
and groups involved in the policy-nuking process
As a result of that process, governments often cre-
ate new institutions in an attempt to affect people's
behavior. Both kinds of institutions—those that
shape policy making and those that are the result of
policy making—are evident in nonpoint source
policies being developed in the bay region.
Recently, for example. Pennsylvania, Virginia,
and Maryland created rules for cost-sharing agree-
ments with farmers. The agreements encourage
farmers to install agricultural structures that are de-
signed to reduce nutrient runoff. AH three states de-
veloped cost-share agreements through processes
that reflect their own unique rules of the game for
policy development That is, state-by-state, there
were unique institutions that guided the processes
of legislating, implementing, funding, and adminis-
tering cost-share agreements. Not surprisingly, be-
cause institutions differ among the three states, so
too do the cost-share agreements. To fully analyze
cost share and other institutions for reducing non-
point source pollution, a researcher must investi-
gate both pel icy-shaping institutions arid the
institutions that result from policy making.
Behavior
Institutions provide incentives—rewards and
punishments—that influence human behavior. For
example, because commercial farmers are moti-
vated by profits, and because agricultural cost-shar-
ing arrangements provide farmers with additional
profit-making opportunities, such institutions are
likely to encourage fanners to undertake additional
nutrient management efforts. To be successful,
new institutions must be designed with due consid-
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Analyzing Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Problems:
eration for the incentives they create, so as to an-
ticipate the human conduct they will encourage
and to avoid unintended, nndesired behavior that
often occurs with public policies (Tenner 1996).
An investigatoralso needs a concept to think about
how to evaluate institutions and behavior created
by public policies. "Performance" is that concept.
Performance
Performance refers to the consequences of pub-
lic policies. Performance is gauged typically
against some policy goal(s) such as that of a 40 per-
cent reduction in nitrogen and phosphorus load-
ings. Measures of policy consequences may be
intermediate or ultimate. Fur example, counting the
number of additional participants in a cost-share
program would be an intermediate gauge of the per*
formance of the institution. The ultimate measure
would be additional pounds of nitrogen and phus-
phorous removed from the bay because of the pro-
gram. The research question for measuring either
intermediate or ultimate performance is what indi-
cates the consequences of this institution?
With a framework for analysis—situation, insti-
tutions, behavior, and performance—now defined,
the kinds of questions to ask about nonpoint source
pollution policies in the signatory states may be
posed. The overall question is: "Given the increas-
ing knowledge that Chesapeake Bay water quality
is being degraded by nonpoint source nutrient load-
ings, how are governments in the three sipatory
states responding?" The sub-questions, are;
t, What is the situation, i.e., what MC the charac-
teristics of nonpoint source nutrient pollution?
2. What institutions are shaping the states* re*
sponses?
3. What institutions are the stated creating?
4. What incentives to behavior do the institutions
create?
5. How are the institutions performing?
A Practical Guide for Asking Questions
Ingram (1984) provides a practical guide for in-
stitutional analyses of natural resources issues such
as nonpoint source water pollution. That guide
takes into consideration all three concepts defined
to this point: situation, institution, and behavior.
She suggests asking the following questions:
1. What is the problem and its limits?
2, Who are the actors, and what stake do they
have in the problem?
3. What resources do the stakeholders have to ad-
vance their interests? Resources include
- legal rules and arrangements
« economic power
• prevailing values and public opinion
• technical expertise and control of informa-
tion
- control of organizational and administrative
mechanisms
- political resources
4. What are the biases of alternative decision-
making arenas?
- How do they affect processes of bargain-
ing, negotiation, and compromise?
- How do they affect access?
- How do decision-making arenas—Con-
gress, state legislatures, courts, administra-
tive agencies, local governments, popular
processes, other institutions—interrelate
over time?
5. What options do actors have to respond to
solve impediments and problems? Options
may include
- -market mechanisms
- -changes in legal definitions, rights, and re-
lations
- -changes in government management prac-
tices
The practical guide by Ingram (1984) suggests
additional, more detailed questions to ask. Next re-
search methods are needed to know how to ask
questions,
Resear&h Methods
Given the questions to be answered in this in-
quiry about nonpoint policy making, the appropri-
ate method is qualitative research. Qualitative
methods involve examining whole programs and
case experiences; assuming change is constant and
ongoing; and seeking detailed, "thick," in-depth
data and information (Pattern 1990). Case studies
are particularly appropriate for the inquiry because
they reveal systems relationships in a dynamic set-
ting (Yin 1994). In this instance, the investigation
concerns relations among institutions, behavior,
and performance; the dynamic setting is that of pol-
icy creation,
Units of Analysis
Graham Allison (1971) suggests a method for
choosing units of analyses in case studies of public
policy making that fits this inquiry well. Allison de-
fines three units: total jurisHir.tiftm; Argani-ysf inm
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within jurisdictions; and individual actors. He dem-
onstrates that, for a case study of policy making,
analyzing each of the three units separately pro-
vides unique insights; and analyzing them jointly
yields complementary insights. For this inquiry
into nonpoint source policies, all three types of
units were used. They were the three state jurisdic-
tions as whole entities; legislatures, agencies,
boards, interest groups and otner orgw.M-t.ona th*t
operated within the states; and individual actors
such as governors and key legislators who influ-
enced the policy process,
Data and Information Collection Methods
The investigation began with a literature review,
proceeded to the development of a Questionnaire
and a first round of personal interviews, turned to
the selection of three case studies, then advanced to
a second round of interviews. During both sets of
interviews, documents were collected and later re-
viewed. The study continued with the composition
of draft documents that were submitted to people
who had been interviewed; their reviews were then
used to write the final draft.
In conducting the preliminary literature review
a Chesapeake Bay Program overview of nonpoint
programs in the signatory jurisdictions provided
the starting base for the inquiry (Implementatron
Committee 1988). State program descriptions in
that publication suggested ideas for a draft inter-
view instrument that was designed to gather over-
view information in a first round of interviews.
During the Spring of 1996,12 people from acade-
mia, government agencies, and the private sector—
all l»«*d 5n Appendix A—feviewed the instrument
and provided comments for revisions. A copy ot
the instrument in its final form and the list ot
names of reviewers are included in this report as
Appendix B.
Eighteen people from Pennsylvania, Maryland,
and Virginia participated in the first round of per-
sonal interviews by responding to questions con-
tained in the instrument. Interviews took fronvone
to three hours and were conducted during the Sum-
mer and Fall of 1996. Three advisors Cec.ly Ma-
le™*—University of Maryland at College Park,
William Matuszeski-EPA Chesapeake Bay Pro-
gram, and Thomas Simpson-MarylandDepart-
ment of Agriculture and University of Maryland at
College Park, suggested a preliminary list ot peo-
ple to interview in the first round. Additional
names were added by a "snowball method
whereby those interviewed from the preliminary
list w*i« asked to suggest others. Most of those in-
terviewed were public officials to the three signa-
tory states. To reduce any concerns about speaking
frankly, those interviewed were assured that their
nnswtw would not be attributed to them, unless the
statements were public knowledge or permission
was received.
TIM** interviewed in the first round provided
general overview information about their state s
philosophy, policies, and programs to solve non-
point source water pollution problems in their re-
spective bay areas. First-round respondents, the
three advisors, and others knowledgeable about
state programs also provided information about
which programs states were most proud of mnd
which programs people were curious to leant more
about. Eventually, three cases, one for each state,
were selected for in-depth study. The cases-*!! ot
which demonstrate significant departures from ttm-
-lVirmia'sChesapeake
Bay Preservation Act; (2) Pennsylvania's Nuirient
Management Act; and (3) Maryland's Tributary
Strategies and Teams.
Once the cases were selected, first-round inter-
viewees who were particularly knowledgeable
about them were contacted again, either personally
or by telephone; they provided supplementary m-
formation-both verbal and wntten-about die
cases An additional literature review about the
three cases was also conducted. For this second
round of interviews, seven more people were vis-
ited in Pennsylvania and two more in Virginia.
Two others provided reactions to draft papers, ine
executive director of the Chesapeake Bay Comm.s-
Son was also interviewed. Charles Abdalla, from
the Pennsylvania State University, so.up «J
jointly conducted all the second-round interviews
done in Pennsylvania.
For Maryland, all the tribuwy urn ch^f«"
1996 were interviewed. They provided information
about the workings of their teams. Names of all
those who contributed information in the first and
second rounds, other interviews, «d .rewtion. to
draft papers are contained in Appendix A.
The approach to studying tributary J«*i£s
and teams in Maryland was augmented by a com-
nlementary research method. The principle investi-
gator became a participant observer of the state s
SihWt—by^-toJ^^r^
group that assists the development of theteams, m
tending one or more meetings of five ot me «m
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Reports on findings-state
Each «port uses a staadart
a penpcctiw on the state's
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2. Virginia's Initiatives, Including the
Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act
About one-thud of the bay basin is in Virginia—
a larger area than in any other jurisdiction; thus en
vironmentalfolicies in the state have a major
impact on bay water quality. Two-thirds of Vir-
ginia's land area—including the roost populous
portion of the sate—4s in the basin; thus most, but
not all of the state's citizens directly affect the bay
by how they use their land.
In keeping with die Executive Council Ap»^
mart of 1992, Virginia is developing customized
tributary strategies for nutrient reduction, begin-
ning with a strategy for the Potomac River Basin.
in 1996, the Virginia General Assembly required
the state's Secretary of Natural Resources to coor-
dinate the development of tributary plans and to re-
port annually on progress to develop those P»»s
(Article 2, Chapter 5.1, Title 2.1 of the Cod* of Vir-
ginia). In its 1997 session, the General Assembly
affirmed detailed requirements for reports on tribu-
tary plans and amended the timeline for develop-
mem of plans (2.1-51.12:2 of the Cod. ofViiginw)
State Government Philosophy: Values
and Policy Design Questions
The secretary's first annual report (Virginia Sec-
retary of Natural Resources 1996) says much about
the philosophy of bay policy making among cur-
rent leaders of Virginia's executive branch. Values
in the report are revealed by preferences for the fol-
lowing;
• Extensive and intensive collaborative policy
development with stakeholders, interest
groups, and local citizens
* Voluntary as opposed to regulatory actions,
based on the assumption that "sources of nutri-
ents are willing to be part of the solution
. Government financial support for nutrient re-
duction as a "major element in the funding pat-
tern
Consider the three preferences, one by one.
Collaboration
Collaboration with stakeholders, interest groups,
and citizens is beneficial in that it provides opportu-
nities to gather information, gamer support, and
build partnerships. But in the short run, collabora-
tion has an opportunity cost; the time needed to
reach many groups and communicate intensively
with them delays action. In the long ran, building
partnerships may be necessary for sustained efforts
in nutrient reduction.
The short-run issue thus is one of balance: how
much time is needed to collaborate effectively with-
out delaying action too long? A related question ir
how concerned should Virginia and the other signa-
tory jurisdictions be about delaying the 40 percent
nutrient reduction beyond the year 2000? The sec-
retary's report states that Virginia is more con-
cerned about achieving the goal "in a timely, ^
practical, cost-effective and equitable manner"
man about achieving a 40 percent reduction by
2000.
Voluntary Action
A preference for voluntary over regulatory ac-
tion is desirable in that it corresponds wliliOie «••••-
mon and cherished American value of minimal
government. But sole reliance on volunteers may
not suffice to solve the problem of nutrient water
pollution in the bay basin; if that happens, who
would government** choice—the choice to avoid
regulation—serve?
The purest form of reliance on volunteers—gov-
ernment action only for education and moral sua-
sion—is based on the assumption that people who
are sources of nutrients will change their behavior
out of increased knowledge of the damage they ao,
strengthened belief in stewardship, a heightened
sense of community with people whom they hurt,
concern about the possibility of government coer-
cion, or a realization thai they're better off doing it
Education and moral suasion may, without otner
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[Notpoint Source Water Pollution Problems:
government interventions, solve the problem; but promote nutrient trading. Virginia conducts a cost
economic forces sometimes work against that share program for nonpdnt sf uTe^fution, aT
r« »• ^ „ . lowslepl suits against polluters, and is takimr the
eomSf nUTr*ff tfW0n 1S Ofte" Bfll Ie2>d fa ** I** b«fa to Bering JS52?
oons«fered a cost of production or of consumption; ing. Each option has consequences some more or*
tims when nument pollution happens, the eco- dictable fe others. ThelsL a?d cSengeT
normc motivations of business profit and consumer policy makers thus is: Based on iJSeSeS
utility can be difficult to overcome. It may be too En. rfi™, h*avior^£S3jtS^T
T^^^1*"*™**™**** w*™™™*™*™^y°^h™mwh
bedbhng plants because consumers prefer "lush- government regulation is needed to solvVthTmrtri
ness" or homeowners who overfertlize their lawns ent pollution problem?
because they prefer the greenest grass in the neigh-
borhood will make very large changes in their be- Government Finance
haviors when they learn about the consequences of
too much nitrogen. In the absence of hard-to- Finally, government financial support for nutri-
achieve changes in people's taste—toward a bit cnt "^i60011 is acknowledged as a necessary cost
less green--the largest modifications to behavior for P™^5-But *« issues, like devils, lurk in the
will occur if and when researchers determine and deteuk- How much money is needed? How much
those who fertilize learn ways to achieve the same snouW federal, state, and local governments con-
amount of green with fewer nutrients. tribute? And how much of the cost burden should
be imposed on polluters and how much on benefici-
Other economic disincentives to voluntary ac- wes of nutrient reductions?
tion for nutrient reduction in the bay watershed ex-
ist as well. The first is the so-called "free rider The fi*« tributary strategy for Virginia, de-
problem." This refers to the difficulty, if not the im- scribed in Skemmdoah and Potomac River Basins
possibility, of excluding people who do not contrib- 5S*[*y ffutrie»l Deduction Strategy: Final Draft
trie resources to reducing nutrients from enjoying (October 1996), examines these issues. The report
the benefits of cleaner water. With normal human ProvMes a range of cost estimates to achieve the
behavior, free riders balk at paying for what they fil" 40 J*"*"* reduction goal for the Shenandoah
can enjoy at someone else's expense. mA Potomac Basins. To install recommended con-
trols beyond current/planned programs would cost
A related problem is the "upstream/downstream 8 tota> of $157 m'llion to $ 193 million, mostly for
problem," which refers to the fact that one of the upg*»des of wastewater treatment plants. Revenue
primary benefits of nutrient removal—reduced al- s0"***51» meet these costs include dedicated fees
gae growth—are downstream in the bay, rather and chai«es, voluntary contributions, and infergov-
than upstream where cleanup efforts are made. A crnntental transfers. The report also suggests crite-
disim.cutivc Is created, again, tor people to invest "* f?r1*l)00s!n8 "»«w»s the sources: cost of
in water improvements that will be enjoyed by non- ^Wstratori; revenue-generating potential; reli-
investors. Virginia, like the other signatory states, ab*%; incentive effects; level of administration;
is accounting for the upstream/downstream prob- «»d equity.
lem by "selling" the idea to upstream citizens that
benefits accrue locally as a consequence of bay im- In a ^"^ of Publ'c meert"SS to examine the
proyement efforts. The success of targeting pro- **vw»« sources and criteria for choice, Virginia of-
grams for small watersheds across the bay basin flc¥s foun<1 P^'eipants preferred voluntary and
will depend, in large part, un the ability of the dedicated twenties over general revenue sources,
states to convince upstream citizens that local bene- • er finc!inSs were C') *« was no consensus
fits are worth the local colts, aoout equity—some people favored having benefi-
ciaries pay, while others wanted dischargers to
Othwr than education and moral suasion, govern- pay; ^)some stakeholders expressed uncertainty
men t has several other options to promote volun- ***?? *** *)enefits of nutrient removal and favored
tary actions that reduce nutrient pollution. These *«*"»§ to discuss costs until after examining the
include cost-share programs to encourage invest- value of beneflts; m& (3) «« "overriding concern"
ments in BMPs and wastewater treatment plants, was for Uflderstandiiig how foods could be spent
judicial remedies whereby aggrieved parties take and who would decide now to sP*nA them before
polluters to court; and quasi-market institutions to selectil>g a funding source. At the beginning of
1997, executive branch officials, members of the
-------
Nutrient Cowtrof Policies in the Chesapeake Bay States
General Assembly, and others were meeting to
make funding decisions. During its 1997 *»SK»,
the Virginia General Assembly appropriated $15
million fur water quality cost share in focal year
1998_$I2.5 million of which will go the Com-
monwealth's Chesapeake Bay watershed (Daven-
port 1997).
The policy design questions surrounding values
in the secretary's report illustrate the challenges
Virginia, in the last year of Governor George Al-
len's administration, feces in its nutrient reduction
efforts. But truly, they are questions feeing all the
signatory jurisdictions as well.
Nonpoint Source Programs
Virginia's Department of Conservation and Rec-
reation (OCR) is the lead agency for developing
and implementing nonpoint source programs in the
state. A muMagency Nonpoint Source Advisory
Committee, chaired by DCR, coordinates the
state's nonpoint source efforts. The state s pro-
grams are designed to tddress significant sources
of nonpoint source pollution. Among the efforts,
several stand out as prime examples.
Nutrient Management
Virginia's Nutrient Management Program is de-
signed to help farmers and other laitd managers ap-
ply and store fertilizers in ways mat prevent
nutrients from reaching surface or gnwndwater.
Nutrient management regulatory requirements are
currently included in Virginia Pollution Abatement
permits and biosolids application permits. Since its
beginning in 1959, roe progran li»» bio*}**** *»
include nutrients other than nitrogen; plant nurser-
ies as m target industry; and urban landowners. Nev-
ertheless, agriculture remains the primary sector of
concern. Since 19S9, approximately 450,000 acres
and 1,150 farms have obtained nutrient manage-
ment plans through this program; of those, about
70 percent of the acres and farms are in the bay wa-
tershed portion of the state. Twelve technicians
work in the program to provide farmers with plan-
ning advice.
Since 1990 the state has offered a tax incentive
to encourage more farmers to participate in mrtn-
ent management. State tax credits are available to
farmers who have nutrient management plans to
purchase qualifying nutrient application equip-
rnent-^redit for 25 percent of the purchase pnce
or $3,750, whichever is less, Virginia intends to ex-
pand this program in 1998 by offering tax credits
for installed BMPs of up to 570,000 (Common-
wealth of Virginia 1996).
In addition, the Virginia General Assembly
authorized, in 1994, training and certification regu-
lations to establish a voluntary program for persons
preparing nutrient management plans. DCR, which
administers the program, had trained and certified
85 people by the end ot 19%. Stxry percent of
those were from the private sector, the majority of
whom represented fertilizer and sewage sludge dis-
posal firms. DCR expects newly certified planners
to increase the number of farms and acres under nu-
trient management plans. For example, in the Poto-
mac basin, the state expects shortly to triple,
annually, new acreage covered by nutrient plans
{Virginia's Potomac Basin Tributary Nutrient Re-
duction Strategy 1996).
Virginia is also committed to providing staff re-
sources required for nutrient management planning
for poultry producers. This commitment follows an
trniouncement in 1995 by the Virginia Poultry Fed-
eration that all four of the major poultry integrators
in the state—Purdue Farms, Roeco, Tyson Foods
and WLR Foods—will require their poultry grow-
ers to have nutrient management plans before be-
ginning operation. Furthermore, the federation
announced the goal of having nutrient n>nnag«n«rt
plans for all eilsting growers as soon as state-certi-
fied planitm are available to assist (Virginia Poul-
try Federation 1995).
Developed Und
Effective erosion and sediment control laws re-
due* iiitrient runoff and sediment iransport created
by construction disturbances. Virginia's.Erosion
and Sediment Control Law and Regulation estab-
lishes standards for local government programs.
Bur in 1993. a study revealed that only 23 percent
of the Commonwealth's 171 local E & S control
programs were in compliance with state standards
(Cox 1993). Shortly thereafter the Virginia General
Assembly passed legislation that provided local
governments with more enforcement and flnanaai
capacity. The legislation also requires technically
correct and officially approved plans. It provides
authority for frequent site inspections by the swe
and for enforcement actions when necessary. As •*
result of that legislation, Virginia has a goal for the
vear 2000 that every local government will have an
E & S program that meets minimum state stand-
arts (Virginia's Potomac Basin Nutncnt Rcduct,or,
1996).
-------
Agricultural BMPS and Stewardship
Although Virginia appropriates slightly over $1
million annually in cost-share funds for agricul-
tural BMPs in the Chesapeake Bay drainage area—
funds provided by EPA under the Chesapeake Bay
Program—the state emphasizes voluntary plan-
ning and installation of such practices, with a mini-
mum ufswe cost snare, state programs encourage
voluntary actions by providing information on the
agronomic effectiveness and financial advantages
of BMPs to farmers. Cost share is considered pri-
marily "dciiiwBstnKton," rather than "itnplemenla-
tion. As one state official put it, the cost-share
program is "designed more to sell conservation
than it is to buy it" Virginia runs a 75:25 eost-
share program witli a payment cap for each BMP,
While eligible BMPs receive an average 50:50 cost
share, less expensive BMPs receive a relatively
large state share, and more expensive BMPs re-
ceive a smaller share.
The state targets the program by "hydrologie
units"—land areas that average about 50,000 acres.
Priority is given to those units having the highest
pollution potential. Statewide, about 500 hydro-
logic units are digitized for computer analyses;
these are programmed to inventory data on land
u«, apimai densities, soil erosion rates, and other
factors (Virginia Department of Conservation and
Recreation 1996), In the most recent year for
which data are available, about 900 cost shire
agreements were funded by the state; over 400 eli-
gible projects were not funded because of budget
constraints and their location in lesser priority hv-
drofogic units.
The Commonwealth's Agricultural Stewardship
Act of 1996, scheduled to take effect April 1,1997,
requires farmers whose operations cause or will
cause water pollution to develop plans for install-
ing "stewardship measures," Le., BMPs (Virginia
Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Serv-
ices 1996). This so-called "Bad Actor Law" applies
to agricultural activities not already officially per-
mitted. It does not apply to forestry activities nor to
odor concerns. The law is "complaint-driven,"
meaning it requires an investigative response to a
complaint about a water pollution incident or prac-
tice Local Soil and Water Conservation Districts
or the Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer
Services must respond to each complaint. Agricul-
tural commodity groups supported the passage of
this act because, it seems, they wanted agriculture
to be known as conservation-minded and because
they wished to avoid heavier state or local govern-
ment regulations.
Other Program Examples
Virginia also includes in its nonpoint source pro-
grams: (1) requirements for managing wastes of
animal operations havine rt» equivalent of 300 ani-
mal units in confinement, liquid poultry wastes,
and poultry litter, (2) voluntary silviculture BMPs-
and (3) on-site shoreline inspections and technical
analyses, available to landowners on request.
These additional programs are important, but when
Virginia State officials and out-of-state observers
speak about.fundamental changes in Virginia's
nonpoint source policies, they most often refer to
the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act
The Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act
In 1986 Virginia Governor Gerald Baliles pro-
vided strong leadership for government action on
environmental problems. At that time, two of Vir-
ginia's representatives to the Chesapeake Bay
Commission—Delegate W. Tayloe Murphy Jr
and Senator Joseph Gartten, Jr.—urged their col-
leagues in the General Assembly to provide funds
for a group to study land use issues and the hay
The legislature responded by providing $20,000 to
the commission for "an evaluation of local land-
use policies" in Tidewater Virginia—roughly that
portion of Virginia east of Interstate 95—a region
that contains 29 counties, 17 independent cities,
and 38 towns, located in nine planning districts.'
With a budget available, the commission turned to
the Institute for Environmental Negotiations at the
University of Virginia to staff the evaluation.
The Chesapeake Bay Land Use Roundtable
The institute began by identifying groups and in-
dividuals interested in Virginia's land use issues
and about people active in those groups. The insti-
tute then invited 17 people to form a policy discus-
sion group—the Chesapeake Bay Land Use
Roundtable. Roundtable members included citizen
activists, developers, environmentalists, farmers,
industrialists, local government officials, and two
State legislators—Delegate Murphy and Senator
Gartlan. The institute also recruited five public and
private experts to provide consultation services to
roundtable participants (Chesapeake Bay Land Use
Roundtable 1987).
Although participants to the rqundtable mirrored
and balanced groups interested in land use and the
10
-------
Nutrient Control Policies m the Chesapeake Bay States
bay, they did not formally represent specific or-
ganizations. Rather, the institute chose participants
by their reputed abilities to articulate interests, to
respect others,, and to engage in constructive dia-
logue. Many of those invited to join the roundtable
had been vocal adversaries in meetings about land
use issues (McCubbin 1989). Once the roundtable
formed (In June 1986) and fui llic next 18 months,
members engaged in 14 meetings. Participants
were aware that their work would likely contribute
to legislative consideration of Virginia's land use
policies (McCubbin 1989). In the meetings, round-
table members did not achieve total agreement, but
they did reach a group consensus. All roundtable
members supported, in the published conclusions
to their work, a set of desired outcomes and & pro
posed framework for further state action
(Chesapeake Bay Land Use Roundtable 1987).
The roundtabic's conclusions provide insights
about the nature of nonpoint source pollution and
about rules for solving water pollution problems in
Virginia. The findings are clear, succinct, broad,
and though published in 1987, indicative of many
land use issues that persist in Virginia to the pre-
sent day. The roundtable concluded the following:
t, Land use—or abuse—causes nonpoint water
• pollution; to this fact, all interest groups agree.
Controversies exist, however, about who
should control the use of land. Conflicts arise:
(a) between private landowners and those with
public responsibilities; (b) among public agen-
cies with land use responsibilities; (c) and be-
tween state and-bcal governments.
2. The Commonwealth of Virginia, by th»
authority of its constitution, is ultimately re-
sponsible for the quality of natural resources
in the state, even though the state has histori-
cally delegated land use control authority tn lo-
cal governments.
3. The population of Tidewater Virginia is ex-
pected to grow rapidly in the coming decades.
Population growth will create changes in land
use that, if not managed, will significantly in-
crease nonpoint source water pollution in the
region. But local governments of the Tidewa-
ter, many of which have nn one responsible
for land use planning and management, are un-
prepared to manage population growth. Thus
state leadership is needed to forge new poii- '
eies, institutions, and state-local relationships.
After offering their findings about nonpoint
source problems, roundtable members provided
five statements about how conflicts over land use
control should be resolved (Roundtable, pp. 7-8).
The statements, called "Agreements in Principle,"
suggested a guide for policy making in land use.
They are:
I. Virginia's response to issues related to land
use and the Bay should flow from an analysis
and understanding of Virginia's laws, institu-
tions, historical context, and natural setting.
2. Local governments should retain primary re-
sponsibility for local land use decision when-
ever possible and should be granted the
powers necessary to execute that responsibil-
ity at the local level.
3. The state should play a strong leadership mle
in the protection of public lands, critical re-
sources, and environmental quality. The state
would have to work closely with local govern-
ments to assure that state policies and goals
are met
4. Tensions between public responsibilities to
protect natural resources and the environment
and private interests in property are inevitable:
they must be dealt with as fairly and equitably
as possible.
S. Healthy state and local economies and a
healthy Chesapeake Bay are integrally related;
economic development and resource protec-
tion are not and cannot afford to be seen as
mutually exclusive.
Virginia operates under the Dillon Rule; locali-
ties may exercise only those powers granted to
them explicitly by the General Assembly (Benson
* norland 1989). The state had previously directed
local governments to adopt comprehensive plans
by July 1,1980 (Sec 1-446.1 of the Code of Vir-
ginia), But the General Assembly had not recog-
nized water quality as a legitimate concern. The
roundtable proposed a set of new land use initia-
tives and efforts to strengthen programs for water
quality and natural resource protection. The initia-
tives included the following:
* A statute clarifying the state's interests in pro-
tecting the bay and granting local governments
planning and zoning authority to protect water
quality and other resources
• Minimum standards for land use planning and
requirements for zoning ordinances by local
governments in the Tidewater Region to gov-
ern areas of particular concern—wetlands,
coastal sand dunes, barrier islands, and shore-
lands along tributaries and the bay
ll
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Analyzing Nonpoitu Source Water Pollution Problems:
• State review of plans and ordinances for consis-
tency with common standards, and state finan-
cial and technical assistance to local authorities
to meet those standards
» A citizen board to develop planning standards,
provide financial and technical assistance, and
approve plans and ordinances
The roundtable published its conclusions in De-
cember of 1987 and sent a copy to each member of
the General Assembly. Meanwhile, Delegate Mur-
phy and Senator Gartlan convened a group of legal
experts to transform the roundtabfe's recommenda-
tions into a legislative proposal for the 1988 ses-
sion of the Virginia General Assembly (Murphy
and McKcnncy, 1990).
Legislative Debate and Action
In an extraordinary show of support during his
State of the Commonwealth speech before the Gen-
eral Assembly on January 13,1988, Governor
Baliles adopted the roundtable proposals as the cor-
nerstone of his environmental policy for the year
(Baliles 1988). Shortly thereafter, on January 26,
Delegate Murphy and Senator Gartlan introduced a
legislative bill in the General Assembly, based on
the roundtable report (McCubbin 1989). The bill
called for the establishment of a cooperative state-
local program designed to incorporate general
water quality protection measures into the compre-
hensive plans, zoning ordinances, and subdivision
ordinances of local governments in Tidewater Vir-
ginia; and the definition and protection of environ-
mentally sensitive lands, To implement the
program, the bill called for a nine-member citizen
board, called the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance
Board (Board), to promulgate regulations that es-
tablish program criteria, provide technical and fi-
nancial assistance to Tidewater local governments,
provide technical assistance and advise to regional
and state agencies, and ensure that local govern-
ment plans and ordinances are in compliance with
State regulations. The bill also proposed the crea-
tion of the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance De-
partment (GBLAB) to provide staff support to the
Board.
Murphy and Gartlan's legislation drew signifi-
cant opposition from three groups that had been
represented, unofficially, on the roundtable: land
developers, farmers, and local government offi-
cials. Developers and farmers expressed concerns
that the proposed legislation would overly restrict
their activities and lead to lower property values.
Locai public officials, through their representative
organizations—the Virginia Municipal League and
the Virginia Association of Counties—opposed the
legislation because they feared it would interfere
with zoning and planning preroptives traditionally
exercised at the local government level. The Mu-
nicipal League supported the aim of the bill—to
protect the bay—but opposed the requirement that
local governments comply with state guidelines for
planning and zoning (McCubbin 1989).
The General Assembly rejected two proposed
amendments to the bill. The first would have made
state guidelines for local governments voluntary
instead of mandatory; the second would have re-
quired prior approval by the General Assembly for
program criteria promulgated by the Board
(McCubbin 1989).
/
Legislators in the Virginia House of Delegates
did add several amendments to the legislation;
1. In response to local government concerns, leg-
islators removed the Board's authority to ap-
prove all local government comprehensive
plans and ordinances prior to implementation.
But they let stand the Board's authority to "en-
sure that local government comprehensive
plans, zoning ordinances and subdivision ordi-
nances are in accordance with the provisions
of (the Act)* (Virginia Code Section 10,1-
2103).
2. They deleted language directing the Board to
consider "all adverse effects" of land use to
water quality and substituted "significant deg-
radation" to water quality caused by land use.
3. Tne delegates restricted application of the act
to protection of water quality rather than to all
natural resources.
4. They added language requiring the Board to
consider "flic economic and social costs and
benefits" of any criteria it proposed.
5. And they added a provision protecting vested
rights of land owners in local land-use deci-
sions (McCubbin 1989),
Likewise, Members of the Virginia State Seriate
adopted several amendments to the legislation:
1. The Senate required that the Board be com-
posed of at least one person from each of nine
affected Tidewater Planning Districts.
2. Senators rewrote the vested rights provision of
the bil! to indicate the legislation would not
"affect vested rights of any landowner under
existing law."
12
-------
Nutrient Coniroi Policies in the Chesapeake Bay States
3, And they invested the Board with exclusive
authority to institute legal actions to ensure lo-
calities would comply with the legislation. In
effect, this last amendment prevented environ-
mentalists from challenging the legality of spe-
cific development projects allowed by local
governments in compliance with state guide*
lints, but it also prevented developers from su-
ing local government for their actions in order
to delay implementation of the Act (McCub-
bin 1989),
Sixty percent of ail members of the General As-
sembly signed onto the proposal when it was intro-
duced. On March 3,1988, less than two months
after they received the bill, members of the Gen-
eral Assembly passed it, as amended, with a large
majority. Governor Baliles then signed the legisla-
tion and on July 1,1988 a new cooperative state-lo-
cal institution—the Chesapeake Bay Preservation
Act (Code of Virginia, Chapter 21 Sec 10.1-2100
et seq.}—took effect
In reflecting on passage of the act, Delegate
Murphy emphasizes the role played by Governor
Baliles. In Murphy's opinion, the roundtable pro-
vided a consensus statement, but support for the
consensus eroded as details were written into, legis-
lation and debated in the General Assembly. When
consensus erodes, Murphy believes, progress de-
pends on politicians who are willing to take risks
and exercise leadership. In Murphy's opinirm, Gov-
ernor Baliles provided the leadership needed to
win quick passage of the act in the face of strong
opposition.
Post-Passage Disagreements
During the first year after the act became tew, le-
gal and policy authors disagreed about its meaning.
In the view of McCubbin (1989), the General As-
sembly had passed legislation that did not alter, in
any significant way, conclusions reached by the
roundtable. Amendments to the original bill,
McCubbin wrote, should be viewed as insignifi-
cant As evidence she offers the fact that, even af-
ter amendments were accepted by the General
Assembly, roundtable members continued to sup-
port the legislation as an accurate expression of
their consensus.
W. Todd Benson, at the time an assistant county
attorney in Henrico County, and Philip O. Garland
disagreed (1989). Among several questions they
raised, one seems central: did the authority con-
veyed to the Board by the act include the power to
"promulgate regulations binding on localities?"
They cite instances from the early 1980s in which
the Virginia executive and legislative brandies con-
firmed the state's tradition of local government
land-use authority. The roundtable consensus, Ben-
son and Garland wrote, was rooted in that tradition.
Moreover, the authors interpreted amendments to
the original bill as significant indications of intent
by the General Assembly to preserve local land*
use authority. The authors pointed, in particular, to
the amendment removing the Board's authority to
review local comprehensive plans and land use or-
dinances prior to adoption. In their view, the role -
created for the Board by the act was to "assist," not
to "dictate."
Delegate Murphy responded quickly to Benson
and Garland's argument (Murphy & McKenney
1990). Murphy wrote from personal experiences in
the roundtable and the General Assembly. His posi-
tion was that the General Assembly intentionally
legislated a cooperative state-local program in
which the state, through the Board, nay exercise
direct regulatory authority over local government
land-use planning, zoning, and subdivision rule
making. In Murphy and McKenny's opinion, the
General Assembly had given each local govern-
ment in the Tidewater Area an "opportunity, albeit
by mandate, to cooperate in the protection of the
state's, and therefore at least partially the local gov-
ernment! s, natural resources" (Murphy & McKen-
ney 1990). White the authors debated over what
the act meant, interest groups struggled over regula-
tions to implement it
Regulatory Development
Fanners, builders, loggers, private landowners,
and other groups had differing views on what the
regulations should be. So did local governments
and state and federal agencies with natural re-
source responsibilities. The press made differences
among the groups well known. Despite the differ-
ences, however, the act provided the Board with
only one year—until July 1, 1989—to write a set
of regulations for local government implementa-
tion.
The Board immediately began to develop crite-
ria for local governments so as to determine land
areas of concern and to grant, deny, or modify re-
quests to rezone, subdivide, or develop land in
those areas. Staff involved interest groups and indi-
vidual citizens in the process of writing regula-
tions. The staff organized a public information
meeting and a meeting for local government and
13
-------
Analyzing fforyeiitt Source Water Pollution Problems:
planning district officials in each of the nine plan*
ning districts in the Tidewater region. Additional
meetings were held for interest groups, technical
committees, and an advisory committee to the
Board. The intent was to infonn people about the
act, to identify issues, and to reflect those issues
back to the Board.
In the Spring of 1989, the Board published a set
of draft regulations for public comment. After pub-
lication of the draft, during a 60-day period pro-
vided for public comment, the Board held nine
public hearings—one in each of the planning dis-
tricts. In total, more than 2,000 people attended the
public information meetings and hearings, more
than 300 spoke before the Board, and more than
1600 submitted written comments (CBLAD 199$).
From oral andvmtten comments, the staff recom-
mended a set of final regulations to the Board.
These the Board adopted in June 1989 and sent to
Governor Baiiles; the Board's work had been com-
pleted within the twelve month window provided
by the act
Governor Baliles ejrtended the period of com-
ment for 30 days, however, when agricultural and
environmental groups objected to the regulations
becauj* of criteria for septic systems and for sTOrffl-
water- management and buffer areas for agriculture.
Agriculture groups were unhappy because of
equivalency in the criteria, between agriculture and
uAan lands, regarding stormwater management
• and buffer areas. Environmentalists were dissatis-
fied because criteria for septic systems would have
been left to the discretion of local government
health departments, whereby the cnviiuiuiicniallsts
believed, they would be too weak. During the 30-
day period the Board revised the regulations, re-
solving the equivalency issue and inserting state
rules for most septic systems within locally desig-
nated Chesapeake Bay Preservation areas. The
Board then readopted the regulations, and they
were certified on September 20,1989.
Immediately thereafter, plaintiffs challenged the
legality of the regulations in court. After a year of
litigation, the court decided the case and issued an
opinion notable for two of its conclusions: (1) the
court upheld the legality of the regulations on sub-
stantive grounds, stating that the requirements for
public involvement and for adequate technical
bases for the regulations had been met; and (2) the
court held that state law had been violated because
the regulations had been certified too quickly—on
the last day of the mandatory comment period—
rather than after the period had ended. The Board
was forced, thereby, to readopt the regulations. But
die practical result of the litigation was only the
year of delay it caused. In 1991, the Board made
minor modifications to the management regula-
tions, resulting in the rules currently in force.
Implementation
To understand the status of existing land use
planning capabilities in Tidewater localities after
the act became operative, CBLAD—tne administra-
tive unit created to implement the act—analyzed lo-
cal planning methods, plans, and policies—
particularly those related to water quality (CBLAD
1996), Th« department's conclusions were thai lo-
cal governments:
• often lacked information on environmental re-
sources
* reviewed wafer quality protection inadequately
or not all
« had incomplete or no information on develop-
ment trends
* had information in inconsistent formats
» had not, in general, adequately assessed avail-
able environmental data
CBLAD found, in short, that "there was a sig-
nificant need for better information at the local
level," particularly for environmental resource pro-
tection (CBLAD 1996). Moreover, CBLAD found
that many Tidewater jurisdictions had not done
timely updates of their comprehensive plans, nor
were they using innovative planning techniques.
Based on its r«*areh findings, CBLAD initiated as-
sistance to local governments to help them pro-
gress through the three phases of compliance
required by the regulations. The Board, through
CBLAD, provides financial and technical assis-
tance for completing the phases. Through a com-
petitive grants program, the Board also relieves the
burden of implementation by offering funding to lo-
cal governments—a dollar-fhr-dollar match with
local cash or in-kind services.
Phase I objectives are to determine the extent of
environmentally sensitive lands, to map those
lands, and to implement performance criteria. In
this phase, local governments designate Resource
Protection Areas (RPAs), which are sensitive lands
at or near the shoreline and a minimum 100-foot
buffer landward, and Resource Management Areas
(RMAs), which are lands contiguous to the inland
boundary of the Resource Protection Areas that, if
improperly used or developed, have a potential to
14
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Niurienl Control Policies in the Chesapeake Bay States
degrade water quality. Development within RPAs
is restricted to water-dependent uses. Within
RMAs, development must be accomplished using
established performance standards. Eleven perform
ance standards apply, among them: minimization
of impervious cover and land disturbance; septic
tank pump-out every five years; and agricultural
land conservation plane. Areas of concentrated de-
velopment, already existing, may be designated in
portions of either RPAs or RMAs.
Phase II requires local governments to adopt
comprehensive plans or plan amendments to incor-
porate water quality protection measures consistent
with the act. Comprehensive plans must address
physical constraints to development, water supply,
waterfront access, and redevelopment The intent is
that comprehensive plans integrate water quality
considerations with local policies for economic de-
velnpment, historic presentation, a
Phase III requires local governments to adopt or
revise zoning ordinances, subdivision ordinances,
and other development standards to protect water
quality. Local governments must examine their lo-
cal development standards for consistency with the
Bay Act and Regulations, They must ensure that
their development standards reflect the act by mak-
ing provisions for the protection of water quality,
by referencing performance criteria in the regula-
tions, and, in general, by resolving any inconsisten-
cies to the act and its regulations within a locality's
land-use management program.
In sum, the Board has used a resource-based ap-
proach to implement the act taking into considera-
tion unique resource characteristics and treating
differently various land forms. The Board requires
local governments to regulate land use where nec-
essary and to the degree appropriate. This approach
allows local governments the flexibility to develop
programs based on community characteristics and ,
goals. The Board has encouraged innovative and
creative approaches to achieve program objectives.
The result is a heterogenous set of local Bay Act
programs.
Over the tifespan of the act, the Commonwealth
of Virginia has provided about $8 million in imple-
mentation grants to local governments (Bay Act
Status Report 1996). Mapping projects, computer
systems, revisions of plans and ordinances, and
salaries for planners, engineers, and enforcers re-
ceived most of the grant monies. The state also pro-
vides, through eighteen staff members in CBLAD,
technical assistance and advice to local govern*
ments. With state grants and technical assistance,
and with their own internal resources, the counties,
ehits, and towns of Tidewater Virginia are pro-
gressing toward implementation (CBLAD 1996).
As of early 1997,83 of the 84 jurisdictions had
adopted Ph«t* I programE—designation of Pr»s*r
vation Areas and adoption of ordinances to imple-
ment performance criteria. Twenty of the 84 had
completed Phase H—integration of water quality
improvement measures into local comprehensive
plans—and had their plans reviewed by the Board.
Another 13 revised plans awaited Board review;
the remaining half were revising their comprehen-
sive plans. Several local governments had begun
Phase III—the development of ordinance amend-
ments.
Experiences by local jurisdictions serve to illus-
trate how funds and technical assistance provided
by the Bay Preservation Act have worked in indi-
vidual-communities and regions. The following
three experiences were all described in Chesapeake
Bay Communities: Making the Connection (1996):
Using a grant of $30,000 awarded by CBLAD
in 1995. the Rappahannock Area Development
Commission developed a program to notify
septic owners of the need to comply with regu-
lations requiring pumpouts every five years.
Local governments in a 1,300-square mile re-
gion that includes portions of the Rappahan-
nock, Potomac, and York Rivers will assume
responsibility for the project after its develop-
ment by the Commission.
Prince William County, with funds provided by
CBLAD, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
created a storm water management program that
protects stream habitat, improves drainage and
water quality, and controls erosion and pollu-
tion. To sustain the effort, the county initiated
a fee for property owners based on the amount
of impervious land they own.
Hampton Roads Planning District Commis-
sion, with over 3,000 square miles, 1.5 million
* people, and fifteen cities and counties, prepared
a guide for nontraditional homeowner BMPs.
Funded by CBLAD, in part, the guide provides
information about how landscaping, nutrient
and pest management, use of native plants, and
IS
-------
Analysing Nmpoira Source Water Pollution Problems:
water conservation can be used to increase
water quality.
Performance
The Board was conducting a review of its regula-
tions in early 1997. The process uses an advisory
group that includes 11 members who represent
stakeholders in land-use planning and controlfor
the Tidewater Region. Board members will over-
see the redrafting of regulations. While the review
is incomplete, three conclusions about progress
thus far seem likely to drive the review process.
The Commonwealth Government of Virginia,
by authority of the Chesapeake Ray Preservation
Act and Regulations, established unprecedented
control over local government actions to plan and
control land use in the Tidewater Region, Imple-
mentation of the act has been steady, if not rapid
Nearly all local jurisdictions have completed Phase
I, and significant numbers of localities are imple-
menting Phases II and III. Local governments have
accepted the act, and the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia will maintain its authority. Any changes in
regulations for local government will likely be lim-
ited to providing more local freedom to adapt state
rules to local conditions and streamlining criteria
to improve their effectiveness.
In implementing the act, local authorities have
made least progress in the development of agricul-
tural conservation plans; such plans are required
for farms in preservation areas. The slow pace re-
sults from an unexpectedly large number of farm
acres in the preservation regions. Absentee land-
owners, of which there are many in the Tidewater
Region, also impede progress; they are relatively
inaccessible and uninterested in assisting the proc-
ess. Estimates are that at the beginning of 1997,
only 10 to 15 percent of the required acreage was
under conservation plans. The Board is likely to re-
write regulations for agricultural land, either by
strengthening the ability of local officials to write
conservation plans or by using alternative means to
promote conservation practices.
. Finally, the model developed for implementing
the act and its regulations—a cooperative arrange-
ment of state, regional, and local authorities—has
worked well and is unlikely to change in any funda-
mental way. The following are elements of that
model;
1. CBLAD, a state agency with technical capac-
ity and grant-making ability, assists local gov-
ernments, many of which are too small and
too financially pressed to hire adequate staff
or to fund needed projects;
2. The regional planning counci Is, as repre-
sentatives of local governments in parts of the
Tidewater, are able to develop programs that
meet the aggregate needs of their members by
using CBLAD grants. Examples arc the septic
pumpoat notification and tracking project and
the homeowners* guide to nontraditional
BMPs.
3. Local governments, while required to plan and
legislate for water quality protection, have the
freedom to adjust their efforts to local situ-
ations and resource conditions that they are
best able to understand and articulate.
This model may also serve other states inter-
ested in creating institutions that balance statewide
, l«id use cuiitiub against lotal freedom of adjust-
ment and that provide state and regional govern-
ment economies of scale to assist environmental
programs in small units of local government.
-------
3. Pennsylvania's Programs and the
Nutrient Management Act
Pennsylvania's involvement in the Chesapeake
Bay Program is both important and puzzling. Be*
cause nearly one third of the 67,000- square-mile
Chesapeake Bay Basin lies in the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania—primarily in the Susquehanna
River drainage area—the Keystone Stale is an im-
portant member of the program. As it flows south
from Pennsylvania into Maryland, the Susque-
hanna contributes one-half of the ftesh water and
nutrients entering the bay.
Pennsylvania has, however, no bay shore. It is
the "upstream state" of the bay agreements. Never-
theless, during the administrations of several gover-
nors—both Democrat and Republican—it has
made major and continuous efforts to improve the
bay. Why does Pennsylvania make such efforts?
Pennsylvanians answer with several explana-
tions; the Commonwealth's citizens benefit by
their access to bay recreation and seafood harvests;
they take pride in their contribution to improving
the natural environment; they enjoy upstream bene-
fits of cleaner streamwaters like improved habitat
for living resources; and they can reduce costs to
{aimer5 by eliminating excess fertilizer opplw*-
tions.
State Government Philosophy
Pennsylvania's bay cleanup philosophy demon-
strates "neighborliness" and sets a standard for in-
terstate relations. As one official noted, "Almost all
states arc upstream and downstream from someone
else." Pennsylvania has chosen to be a good up-
stream neighbor, thereby creating expectations for
like behavior across the mid-Atlantic region.
The bay cleanup effort crystallized Pennsylva-
nia's nonpoint source programs; in the words of
one official, "The Bay effort put our nonpoint
source programs on the map." But state officials
are forthright in saying also that they do not expect
Pennsylvania will reach the 40 percent goal by the
year 2000 (Funk 1996). The Commonwealth pre-
dicts that 91 percent of the nitrogen reduction goal
and 94 percent of the phosphorus reduction goal .
will be met by 2000 (PDEP 1996),
Funding levels constrain greater achievements.
The state's tributary strategy notes that "...the pro-
gress of Pennsylvania's nutrient reduction program
is dependent upon...financial resources available to
implement the program" (PDEP 1996). Pennsylva-
nia stole government has a policy not to establish
any unfunded mandates or initiatives to reach bay
cleanup goals (PDEP 1996). Since taking office in
1994, the administration of the state's current gov-
ernor, Tom Ridge, has increased funding for water
quality improvements by obtaining $500,000—an
increase of about 20 percent—for technical and ad-
ministrative staff in County Conservation Districts.
The Ridg* administration also has supported level
funding for other programs designed to support bay
cleanup efforts.
Advocates of nonpoint source cleanup efforts in
Pennsylvania are working to maintain the visibility
and priority status of those programs within the
state's budget process. Some of the programs re-
quint additional funds to become effective; the
'prime example is a need for more resources for
stormwatcr management. Likewise, supporters of
the agricultural cost-share program are hopeful, but
uncertain, that sufficient funds will he allocated for
implementing the agricultural BMPs needed to
reach the 40 percent goal.
Core Nonpoint Source Programs
To meet its goal, Pennsylvania must reduce ni-
trogen loads by 19.8 million pounds and phospho-
rus hy 2.5 million pounds from the 1985 base year.
To maintain the 60 percent cap beyond the year
2000, the state must control nitrogen toads at a
maximum level of 29.7 million pounds and phos-
phonis at a maximum level of 3.7 million pounds
(PDEP 1996). The commonwealth is conducting
point and nonpoint programs to achieve nutrient re-
ductions; the latter programs include five initia-
17
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Analyzing Nonpoimt Source Water Pollution Problems:
tives that are focused primarily on agriculture.
Four of the five are described in this report as "core
programs;" the fifth, the Nutrient Management
Law, is the subject of a ease study.
Conservation Practice Program for the
Bay Watershed
Pennsylvania's Conservation Practice Program,
fay which the state shares, with farmers, the costs
of installing agricultural BMPs in the bay water-
shed, is expected to reduce nitrogen loadings by
about 7.8 million pounds and phosphorus loadings
by about 0,78 million pounds, per annum, by the
year 2000 (PDEP 1996). The program is voluntary
and responds to fanner requests for technical and
financial assistance. While, at one time, the pro-
gram was restricted to certain targeted counties, eq-
uity concerns led the state to expand the program
to th* whole watershed; now, local conservation
districts prioritize requests by their potential for nu-
trient reductions,
Pennsylvania's effort complements federally
funded BMP implementation and technical assis-
tance programs. To receive public funds, farmers
agree to address all critical nutrient pollution prob-
lems on their land, us identified by the conserva-
tion districts, and to implement approved nutrient
management plans. The maximum government
cost share, per BMP, is 80 percent; the total public
dollar share per farmer may not exceed $30,000.
From January 1985 to December 1999, Pennsyl-
vania officials project they will have assisted about
1 ,SOn farmers to add conservation practices on
about 36,000 acres; developed nutrient plans for
131,000 acres; and installed more than 1,200 ani-
mal waste storage facilities. Federal programs will
likely have added another IJ million acres of land
with conservation practices, 340,000 acres of nutri-
ent management plans developed, and more than
1,300 animal waste storage facilities.
Estimated budget outlays for the state's cost-
share implementation are $2.5 million for 1993 and
a target of $3,0 million, per year, from 1994
through 1999. Total COSTS to the state and federal
governments for installation of conservation prac- '
tices, from 1995 through 1999, will be about $80
million, assuming continued funding from both lev-
els of government (PDEP 1996)
New Agricultural Nonpoint Source
Initiatives
Pennsylvania recently initialed two new agricul-
tural programs for reducing nutrient loadings—one
to reduce barnyard runoff and the second to protect
stream corridors. Barnyard runoff is a significant
contributor to nonpoint source pollution in the
state. To combat this problem, the commonwealth
has established a BMP that is directed to farms
with barns, feediots, and other livestock concentra-
tion areas. Major components of runoff control will
be roofing, concrete paving, ptters, and other
means to divert, filter, collect, or treat water. Total
program costs for this BMP for the period 1996
through 1999 will be about $1.8 miHion. The pro-
gram is expected to reduce nitrogen loadings by
300,000 pounds and phosphorus loadings by
37,000 pounds over that same period of time.
Stream corridor protection involves several ac-
tions. Two separate but complementary programs
for streambank fencing are administered by the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protec-
tion (PDEP) and the Pennsylvania Game Commis-
sion. Between 1985 and 1995, these programs
assisted in fencing 138 miles of streams across the
state's Chesapeake Bay watershed, The programs
provide materials, installation, and technical assis-
tance in exchange for landowner agreements to
maintain fencing systems for 10 years. Objectives
are to improve water quality and habitat for wild-
life. The PDEP fencing program will be expanded
significantly to add more miles of stream. In combi-
nation, between 1995 and 2000, the efforts are ex-
pected to add another 215 miles of f*nc*. At a cost
of $2 million from 1985 through 1999, the pro-
grams should provide fencing for 350 miles of
streams and reduce nitrogen loadings by 37,000
pounds and phosphorus loading-; by 460 pounds.
Two other new initiatives in stream corridor pro-
tection are also being made in Pennsylvania. They
are (1) expanded efforts to include stream protec-
tion systems in farm nutrient management and
BMP cost-share programs; and (2) partnerships
with private companies, nonprofit organizations,
and state and federal agencies to promote vegeta-
tive buffers to protect the quality of water in Penn-
sylvania's streams.
Other Public and Voluntary Agricultural
Programs and Efforts
Pennsylvania has begun documenting reductions
in nutrient loadings attributable to the USDA Con-
-------
Nutrient Control Policies in the Chesapeake Bay Slates
servation Reserve Program. This program re-
moves, from agricultural production for a period of
ten years, highly credible land and land that con-
tributes to a serious water quality problem. Federal
annual rental payments compensate farmers for
lost production. Nutrient redactions result from
vegetative cover over idle land. The Conservation
Rcacnrc Program ia expected to include 44,315
acres in 1999 and to result in nitrogen reductions of
948,000 pounds and phosphorus reductions of
20,000 pounds in that same year.
Urban initiatives
Pennsylvania's Erosion and Sediment Pollution
Control Program, administered by PDEP and the
slate's conservation districts, prevents or reduces
soil erosion during construction, agricultural plow-
ing and tilling, or other land-disturbing activities.
Historically, implementation of the program has
been uneven across counties, particularly in re*
gards agricultural land disturbances (Select Com-
mittee 1990). But a survey conducted in 1993 did
reveal unproved program compliance in 87 percent
of the counties in the state's bay watershed area
(PDEP 1996),
The state's Stomtwater Permitting Program re-
quires controls on runoff from construction sites.
Pennsylvania requires counties to develop storrawa-
ter management plans, after which local govern-
ments within counties must adopt ordinances to
correspond with the county plans. But state assis-
tance to implement county stormwater planning
has been minimal (Select Committee 1990). As a
result, many counties—-particularly rural ones—
have not developed plans; and therefore, their local
governments have not adopted ordinances.
Construction projects, to which the Stormwater
Permitting Program applies, are typically of short
duration-*—usually less than one year. Estimated nu-
trient savings thus are not continual. Nevertheless,
recent federal law requires stormwater permitting
for many more construction activities. Statewide,
the increase is likely to be from 100 projects requir-
ing permits in 1992 to about 4,500 projects requir-
ing permits in 2000. As a result of this program,
projected savings of nutrient loadings in 1999 arc
144,000 pounds of nitrogen and 7,000 pounds of
phosphorus (PDEP 1996),
Pennsylvania also counts, as initiatives among
its core programs, two new efforts—Riparian'Buff-
er Workshops for Local Governments and Citi-
zens, and Keystone '93 Programs (PDEP 1996).
The workshops, to be conducted at four sites by the
Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay in cooperation
with the Pennsylvania State Government, will en-
courage the creation of vegetated riparian buffers
through planning, zoning, land acquisition, and
other means. Keystone '93 Programs—the Rivers
Conservation Program, Keystone Land Trust Grant
Program, and Keystone Community Grant Pro-
gram—are a cluster of programs designed to fund
open space conservation.
Nutrient Management Law: A Case
Study
Like Virginia's Bay Restoration Act, Pennsylva-
nia's Nutrient Management Law illustrates a ease
in which multi-interest collaboration made a sig-
nificant contribution to policy development Dur-
ing the late 1980s and early 1990s, support swelled
in Pennsylvania for. stronger state regulations to re-
duce nutrient runoff from animal waste; opposition
also arose. In 1990, when then-Governor Robert
Casey appointed the "Select Committee on Non-
point Source Nutrient Management," repre-
sentatives of farm organizations, environmental
groups, local governments, and business interests
collaborated to develop a state policy for managing
farm nutrients through state regulation- The col-
laborative effort was imperfectly designed and has
not eliminated conflict over the idea of regulation,
nor dissatisfaction with state legislation or rules of
implementation Collaboration has not substituted.
moreover, for the use of political power. But col-
laboration did make a contribution to a major taw,
one that some state officials expect will signifi*
cantly mtiiee nitrogen and phosphorus loadings to
Pennsylvania's Bay Tributaries and other waters
(PDEP 1996), and one that other states will want to
examine.
Background
After the Chesapeake Bay Executive Council
signed the 19S? Agreement establishing the 40 per-
cent reduction goal, many Pcnnsylvanions became
increasingly concerned about nonpoint source pol-
lution and contributions of the state's agricultural
industry to nutrient loadings. The Executive Coun-
cil's nutrient reduction strategy, published in 1988,
noted that agricultural runoff contributes "82 per-
cent of the total controllable nitrogen load and 65
percent of the controllable phosphorus bad...flow-
ing from Pennsylvania each year" (Chesapeake Ex-
ecutive Council 1988). Moreover, the strategy
noted that animal waste contributes the single larg-
est portion of both the nitrogen and phosphorus
19
-------
Analyzing Mo
[Source Water Pollution Problem:
loads. In 1988, control of 85 percent of Pennsylva-
nia's animal waste would have accomplished the
40 percent nutrient reduction goal for the state (Ex-
ecutive Council 1988),
Pennsylvania bad regulations to reduce animal
waste pollution. Promulgated under the Clean
streams Law, the replations required livestock
farmers who spread or stored manure to adopt nu-
trient management BMPs. Guidelines for animal
waste management were contained in the publica-
tion Manure Managementfor Environmental Pro-
tection, commonly known as the "Manure
Management Manual11 (PDEP 1986). Critics
claimed, however, that while the manual estab-
lished adequate standards, provided the Common-
wealth with appropriate authority, and offered a
useful education tool, state agencies had not devel-
oped a clear and decisive strategy to implement its
regulations. Enforcement was "permit by rule,"
meaning that as long as a farm was in compliance
with the manual, it didn't need a permit. Problems
went unnoticed because enforcement relied only on
neighbor complaints. Confusion existed, the critics
wrote, "over the nature of the regulations and the
manner of their enforcement" (Garber & Gardner
1989). Popular dissatisfaction with animal waste
management encouraged legislative proposals in
1989.'
Governor Casey's Select Committee
In 1989 the Pennsylvania General Assembly de-
bated how to clarify animal waste replations and
establish a strategy and program for enforcement.
But, although the General Assembly h«-iH hearings
about legislative proposals, no law was passed.
State officials in DER were aware of flaws in
the commonwealth's manure management policies,
but believed the legislative proposals in the 1989
session were less than ideal because they contained
loopholes; thus they were interested in a collabora-
tive study process leading to improved legislation.
Likewise, Governor Casey believed animal waste
issues were becoming too partisan and needed to
be examined by a group of scientists and stakehold-
ers. So, in March of 1990, the governor appointed
the Select Committee on Nonpoint Source Nutrient
Management He charged the committee to "inves-
tigate the problem of nonpoint source nutrient pol-
lution throughout Pennsylvania, evaluate current
control practices and programs, and make recom-
mendations to reduce the contribution of nutrients
to surface and ground waters of the Common-
wealth "(Select Committee 1990).
State Representative Jeffrey W. Coy chaired the
committee, which included nine members chosen
to represent varied interests surrounding animal
waste management—a farmer, an ex-farmer who
administered a USDA agency, an official from the
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, a leader of a major
Pennsylvania farm organisation, two technical «*-
perts from The Pennsylvania State University, two
state legislators, and a Chesapeake Bay Commis-
sion member for Pennsylvania, A former staff
member to the committee, on later reflection, be
lieved the committee should have represented a
broader range of stakeholders and that their ab-
sence reduced the policy ideas, political influence,
and support needed for policy development and re
sources needed for implementation.
In response to the governor's charge, the com-
mittee held three public hearings to gather testi-
mony about the impacts of excess nutrients in
Pennsylvania's rivers, streams, lakes, and drinking
water; agricultural and other sources of nutrients;
and governmental efforts to control nonpoint
source nutrient pollution. The committee also con-
ducted a fact-finding tour of several central Penn-
sylvania farms to observe, in the field, nutrient
management practices and problems. Little infor-
mation on nutrient management initiatives in other
states was integrated into committee deliberations
because, it was believed, Pennsylvania was a pio-
neering state and was developing unprecedented
policy.
During the FaH of 1990, subjects of agreement
emerged out of committee deliberations and staff.
committee interactions. By October, for example,
the Select Committee had agreed that new nutrient
management legislation should be enacted for agri-
cultural specifically and other nonpoint sources
generally; all agricultural operations should be re-
quired to have nutrient management plans, but
phased implementation should be done by target-
ing—beginning with new agricultural operations
and those undertaking significant expansion; and
the state Conservation Commission, as repre-
sentative of a broad range of interest groups,
should be the lead agency. In December 1990, the
committee Issued a report (Select Committee 1990).
The committee found that excess nutrients in the
state's waters were creating significant and increas-
ing problems—polluted wells, eutrophication of
lakes and reservoirs, and nutrient enrichment of the
Chesapeake Bay. In addition, the committee found
that agriculture, primarily because of livestock ma-
20
-------
Nutrient Control Policies in the Chesapeake Bey Stales
nure and chemical fertilizers, was the single largest
contributor to nonpoint source nutrient water pollu-
lion, although atmospheric deposition, en-lot sew-
age disposal, and urban stormwater runoff also
made significant contributions. In examining gov-
ernmental programs, the committee concluded that
there was not a sufficiently clear mandate to deal
with the problems, and that "Expanded voluntary,
educational programs will be important and helpful
but not sufficient to achieve the reductions of non-
point sources in Pennsylvania necessary to allevi-
ate nutrient pollution. Additional regulatory
programs," the committee advised, "are needed"
(Select Committee 1990). The committee sug-
gested placing more attention on reducing nutrients
from agricultural operations and noted that "Many
fanners can realize economic benefits from im-
proved nutrient management, through reduced fer-.
iilizcr use and more judicious application of
manure and other nutrients" (Select Committee
1990).
The committee presented eleven recommenda-
tions to Governor Casey (Select Committee 1990),
The recommendations document areas of consen-
sus achieved by the committee and help explain the
motivations of interests represented,
h AH agricultural operations in Pennsylvania
should eventually be required to prepare and
implement nutrient management plans.
2. Nutrient management plans should be based
on meeting surface and groundwater quality
objectives as well as agronomic needs,
3. Certain specific categories of agricultural op-
ciatiuus siiuukl be targeted fur preparation and
implementation of nutrient management plans
on a priority basis.
4. The Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture
.(PDA) should develop and implement • pro-
gram for state certification of nutrient manage-
ment specialists, both commercial and
individual. It should be a requirement that all
nutrient management plans be prepared by an
individual certified by the state program.
S, The county Conservation Districts should pro-
vide some degree of oversight of nutrient man-
agement plans. Government agency review
and approval of nutrient management plans
should not be required for most agricultural
operations, if the plans have been prepared by
a certified nutrient management specialist.
However, the highest priority targeted opera-
tions should be required to submit their plans
to the county Conservation Districts for re-
view and approval. All nutrient management
plans should be on file with the county Conser-
vation Districts.
6. The Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Resources (PDER) should be required
to report to the General Assembly what addi-
tional regulatory, statutory, and budgetary ac-
tions are needed to control nonagricuitural
sources of nutrients, including atmospheric
deposition, on-lot sewage disposal, and urban
stormwater.
7. The lead agency for the nutrient management
program should be the State Conservation
Commission (SCC or Commission), in con-
sultation with PDA and PDER. Lead agency
responsibilities should include:
- Development of criteria and regulations
- Education
- Technical assistance
. ( - Program oversight and coordination
- Certain aspects Of the program should be
specifically assigned to other agencies, as
follows;
- Development and administration of a nutri-
ent management specialist certification pro-
gram - PDA
- Nutrient management plan oversight - ,
county Conservation Districts
- Enforcement - PDER (Bureau of Water
Quality Management)
8. Local ordinances that regulate nutrients
should be required to be consistent with the
statewide program
9. If an agricultural operation is fully and prop-
erly implementing a certified nutrient manage-
ment plan, it sliuukl be uuiraklcrcti ait
affirmative defense in any enforcement action
taken for violation of the nutrient management
legislation.
. 10. funding for the nutrient management program
should be adequate for the administration of
its various components by the designated agen-
cies, including the development of nutrient
planning criteria and other activities of the
SCC, development and administration of the
nutrient management specialist certification
program by PDA, plan review and approval
by th* county Conservation Districts, and in-
spection and enforcement by PDER.
] 1. The General Assembly should give serious
consideration to the creation of a statewide fi-
nancial assistance program to farmers for nu-
trient management
The committee agreed with criticisms of Ma-
nura Management Manual *mfir»rr«*mpnt'irt
21
-------
Analyzing Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Problems;
ing that, "Although the Select Committee believes
that there may be general authority to create & nutri-
ent management program, the best way to imple-
ment the Select Committee recommendations is
through enactment of new legislation which clearly
defines the requirements and responsibilities for a
statewide nutrient management program" (Select
Committee 1990).
Thus the Select Committee, with its diverse
membership, achieved a notable consensus. It iden-
tified agriculture as the main, although not the sole,
source of problems caused by nonpoint source nu-
trient loadings to Pennsylvania's waters. It recom-
mended clear, consistent, and enforceable
regulations requiring nutrient management for all
the state's farms. And it requested adequate fund-
ing to develop and enforce a regulatory effort By
its recommendations, the committee report served
the interests of both environmental and agricultural
advocates.
For their part, environmentalists achieved a con-
sensus statement to pin the support of Governor
Casey and to counter the arguments of anyone op-
posed to state actions to reduce nutrient loadings.
The committee agreed that the Manure Manage-
ment Manual was inadequate for reducing animal
wasteirunoffand advocated a phased approach for
applying nutrient management requirements, begin-
ning with new and expanding farms; operations
with identified water-quality problems; and farms
producing more livestock manure than can be "ap-
plied in an agronomieally and environmentally
sound manner to the cropland which is fanned as a
pan of the operation, or over which the agricultural
operation has direct control" (Select Committee
1990). Moreover, the committee stated its ultimate
goal as nutrient management on dl farms in the
communwealth. Finally, the committee supported
strengthening state programs in air quality, on-lot
sewage disposal, and stormwater management.
Agricultural interests could also count several
achievements among the committee's recommenda-
tions. The committee advocated a requirement that
all local government ordinances that regulate nutri-
ents be consistent with state law, and suggested
that consideration be given to removing the ability
of local governments to implement nutrient man-
agement ordinances without a state delegation of
authority. The requirement for local government re-
strictions was included, according to the report, to
protect farmers against inconsistent standards and
requirements and double jeopardy—by state and lo-
cal prosecution—for alleged violations.
Agricultural interests could be pleased also be-
cause the committee recommended that PDA
should implement the program for state certifica-
tion of nutrient management specialists Mid should
consult with the state Conservation Commission—
the proposed lead agency for the program. PDA
like departments of agriculture in other states, is
thought to have an organizational culture thai is
sympathetic to farmers' values, thus placing it in a
position to influence policy decisions, even when it
is not the lead agency, reducing farmers' anxieties.
The committee also recommended that "If an ag-
ricultural operation is fully and properly Imple-
menting a certified nutrient management pian, it
should be considered an affirmativs defense in any
enforcement action taken for violation of the nutri-
ent management legislation" (Select Committee
1990). The committee pointed to atmospheric depo-
sition, on-lot sewage disposal, and urban stormwa-
ter runoff as sources of nutrient pollution from
nonagriculrural sources. Finally, the committee rec-
ognized that nutrient management regulations for
farmers would impose additional costs on Pennsyl-
vania's agricultural sector, a sector that, if it is to
survive, must be cost-competitive with agriculture
elsewhere. Therefore, the committee urged the
.General Assembly to create a financial assistance
program for Pennsylvania farmers for nutrient man-
agement,
Legislation
During the 1991-1992 session of the Pennsylva-
nia General Assembly, Representative Coy pro-
posed legislation that incorporated
recommendations from the Committee Report
(House Bill No. 496; 1991), Governor Casey and
environmental groups endorsed the bill. Likewise,
the Chesapeake Bay Commission viewed the pro-
posed legislation as a potential model for Virginia
and Maryland (CBC 1991).
But reactions among farmers were mixed. Lead-
ers of the Pennsylvania Fanners Association (nuw
the Pennsylvania Farm Bureau) supported Repre-
sentative Coy's proposal by arguing that fanners
should be active in shaping the best law possible;
m a close vote, the leaders obtained tke endorse-
ment of the association's members. Two other ma-
jor farm organizations—the Pennsylvania Farmers'
Union and Grange—also supported the bill
1001) Rut wocal opposition arose
22
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Nutrient Control Policies in the Chesapeake Bey States
among some farm operators, local farm organiza-
tions, and agribusinesses. An organization called
the Family Farm Movement formed in opposition
to House Bill 496 (Intelligencer Journal 3/31/92).
In May of 1992, the Movement claimed the mem-
bership of 3,800 fanners and 100 organizations and
businesses—although others disputed that claim—
and endorsed several changes to the proposed legis-
lation, most notably making nutrient management
voluntary rather than mandatory, transferring en-
forcement of the act from PDER to PDA, and bas-
ing compliance inspections on a random lottery
(Intelligencer Journal 5/7/92),
The Republican Caucus of the Pennsylvania
House of Representatives also raised concerns
about Coy's bill, particularly about regulating only
agriculture and about budget implications
(Dumeyer 1991). Republican Representative John
Barley had, in the same session, introduced a rival
bill—HB No.448—that would have placed admin-
istrative responsibility for nutrient management in
PDA and required soil tests for landowners using
chemical lawn care services. During the session,
Barley's proposal was referred to the House Agri-
culture and Rural Affairs Committee, but no action
resulted. The House of Representatives approved
Coy's legislation and sent It 10 the stale Senate. But
opposition arose in the Senate, where some legisla-
tors with agricultural constituencies spoke Against
the bill; Coy's bill died in there at the end of the
session, in November 1992,
Representative Barley holds the view that, in
their efforts to protect the environment, Democrats
arc sometimes too prone IO use regulation, ratJtci
than education and incentives. Thus he was critical
of many of Democratic Governor Casey's environ-
mental initiatives and pleased that Coy's bill,
which he regarded am too regulatory, had not be-
come law.
But Barley was unpleasantly surprised when, in
November of 1992, the Democrats became the ma-
jority party of the Pennsylvania Senate, thereby
giving their party control of both houses of the
General Assembly, At that time. Barley decided
that he would work with Representative Coy to de-
velop compromise legislation.
During the 1993-1994 legislative session Repre-
sentative Coy introduced House Bill 100—an exact
replica of House Bill 496 from the previous ses-
sion. Barley worked with Coy to shape a compro-
mise bill. The results of their collaboration—an
amended version of House Bill 100—-strengthened
the administrative role of PDA and applied the leg-
islation only to concentrated animal operations; but
essential elements of Casey's committee propos-
als—regulations designed to clarify and strengthen
the management of agricultural animal waste—re-
mained in the bill (Dumeyer 1993). In May of
1993 the Uenerai Assembly passed the compro-
mise proposal, known as the Nutrient Management
Act (Act 1993-6X and in July of that year Gover-
nor Casey signed it In detail, the act:
1. Charged the state Conservation Commission
to develop regulations that establish minimum
criteria for nutrient management plans incor-
porating best management practices, provide
financial assistance to the extent that funds are
available, and enforce the act, except that en-
forcement may by delegated to local conserva-
tion districts.
2. Established a Nutrient Management Advisory
Board, appointed by the commission, to re-
view and comment on regulations developed
by the commission. BOOT! members include;
- farmers (5), representing the livestock,
swine, meat poultry, egg poultry, and dairy
industries
- animal nutrition specialist
- feed industry representative
- fertilizer industry representative
- commercial agriculture lenders repre-
, sentativc
- local government representative
- university agronomist
- hydrologtst
- c!t I ten representative! (2) who arc not form
ere
- environmental representative
3. Directed the PDA, in consultation with the
commission, to develop a nutrient manage-
ment certification program for people who de-
velop nutrient management plans.
4. Required farms with two or more animal
equivalent units (AEUs), per acre, on an an-
nuaiized basis, to submit a nutrient manage-
ment plan within one year after the effective
date of regulations and to implement a plan
within three years after it is approved.
(An AEU is 1,000 pounds of live weight of
' livestock or poultry animals. An AEU per acre
is an animal equivalent unit per acre of crop
land or acre of land suitable for application of
animal manure.)
(The three year implementation deadline is
extended two additional years if improvement
23
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Analysing N&npoint Source Water Pollution Problems:
costs cannot be financed through available
funding mechanisms and state financial assis-
tance of S2 million has not been appropriated
by the state legislature within one year of the
effective date of the regulations.)
5. Provided financial assistance for implementa-
tion of nutrient management plam, to Hi* mc-
tent funds are available, in the form of loans,
loan guarantees, and grants.
6. Preempted local units of government from en-
acting any ordinance inconsistent with or
more stringent than the requirements of the act
or its regulations.
7. Required the PDER to assess, for the General
Assembly, the impacts of other nonpoint
sources of nutrient pollution, including;
- malfunctioning on-lot sewage systems
- improper water well construction
* nonagricuftural use of nutrients
- stormwater runoff
- atmospheric deposition
A brief and useful summary of the act is found
in Beegle, Lanyoit, and Lingenfelter (1996),
i
Regulatory Negotiations
If the Select Committee created a blueprint for
reaching nutrient reductions and the General As-
sembly constructed the Nutrient Management Act
to drive toward reductions, the Nutrient Manage-
ment Advisory Board (Board) authored the rales of
the road. Actions by the Select Committee, the
General Assembly, and the Board are mileposts in
the process of developing nutrient management pol-
icy for Pennsylvania,
In writing the rales to implement the Nutrient
Management Act, the Board operated in an un-
precedented manner and in a time of shifting ad-
ministrative structure. When the Board first began
meeting in mid-1993, it followed, by its relation-
ship with state agency staff, standard operating pro-
cedure—a staff-Board partnership. The staff,
drawn from PDER where the state Conservation
Commission was located, organized public hear-
ings and initiated a rule-drafting process; the Board
participated in hearings, reacted to draft papers, ad-
vised on technical and political issues, and recom-
mended changes to draft papers.
The effort to develop implementation regula-
tions was, of necessity, a detailed process. Accord-
ing to the act, the commission had two
years—until July 1995—working with the Board,
to promulgate regulations that established mini.
mum criteria for nutrient management plans. The
regulations were to include identification of nutri-
ents to be managed; establishment of proper appli-
cation rates of nutrients to land of various soil
types and agricultural uses; verification of accept.
able best management practices and specifications
for th*ir development; installation of record-keep-
ing requirements; and establishment of conditions
under which amendments to plans may be made,
criteria for manure handling in emergency situ-
ations, and conditions when changes are necessary
due to unforeseen circumstances.
The standard process of writing regulations for
the Nutrient Management Act continued for one
year and into a second. In November of 1994, Re-
publican candidate Tom Ridge won election to be-
come Governor of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and the Republican. Party took major
ity control of the commonwealth's General Assem-
bly back again from the Democrats. When he
assumed office, Governor Ridge appointed new
cabinet secretaries, including new leaders for the
Departments of Agriculture and Environmental Re-
sources. With the changes in executive and legisla-
tive leadership came an alteration in philosophy
about government regulations and, eventually, a
new administrative structure for the state Conserva-
tion Commission.
The new philosophy about regulation correlated
with a change in the writing process to implement
the Nutrient Management Act. The views of partici-
pants to (he process differ about what concerns
Governor Ridge's appointees had were "pnliHca!"
and what concerns were "substantive;" but, in any
case, when the new appointees arrived, they de-
cided the standard procedure—state government
staff initiating drafts and the Board reacting to
them—was improper because it placed the staff,
which they suspected of being too prone to regu-
late, in too powerful a position. Therefore, in early
1995, they revised the process to make the Board
responsible for drafting regulations and placed the
staff in the role of assisting the Board in its writing
process. The Board, after some initial uncertainty
and dissention about how to proceed, organized it-
self into three drafting committees, one each for
manure management, stormwater and setback is-
sues, and financial issues. Thus began 20 months
of regulatory negotiations, within the drafting com-
mittees and the lull Board,'and the incorporation of
extensive public comments, to produce rules for
consideration by the commission.
24
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Ntarienl Control Policies in the Chesapeake Bay States
Concurrent with the change in procedure, the
Ridge administration and the General Assembly
created, front parts of PDER and elsewhere, a new
state land management agency called the Depart-
ment of Conservation and Natural Resources, and
renamed what remained of PDER the "Department
of Environmental Protection" (PDEP) (Act 1995-
18), Shortly thereafter, slate legislative leaders in
the new Republican majority—including Repre-
sentative Barley as Majority Whip in the House of
Representatives—insisted, over the objections of
environmentalists and administrators in PDEP, that
state agencies administering the Nutrient Manage-
ment Act be restructured. In the reorganization that
resulted, PDA gained the budget for the executive
secretary of the commission (Memorandum of Un-
derstanding Between PDEP and SCC1996; Memo-
randum of Understanding Between PDA and SCC
1996). PDA also pined authority to co-chair the
commission, on alternate yean, with PDEP, Sev-
eral staff members with responsibilities for assist-
ing the development of the Nutrient Management
Act were shifted from PDEP to PDA, as PDA took
on work with the Board to draft regulations and rec-
ommend methods for financial assistance and edu-
cation (Addendum "A" Memorandum of
Understanding Between PDA and SCC 1996).
The Board finished its task of writing draft regu-
lations in April of 1995, shortly after which, in
June, the commission gave its approval to the draft.
Proposed rules were published in December of the
same year (Pennsylvania Bulletin, December 30,
1995). The public provided written reactions by
mail and oral comments during four hearings and
seven information meetings held in th* first quarter
of 1996. Sixty two individuals and organizations
provided written comments—three legislators, two
state agencies, 16 conservation districts, 13 agricul-
ture and conservation organizations, six county
Farm Bureau and Grange organizations, three uni-
versitie.s and school districts, and 19 individuals,
primarily farmers. The comments were technical
and specific; they contained suggestions for
changes to clarify language, eliminate duplication,
and make the rules either more or less stringent (At-
tachment 3, 1996). Public comments provided in-
formation to fuel the last several months of
regulatory negotiations by the Board, after which it
proposed a final set of regulations for commission
consideration, in March 1997—20 months after the
date specified in the act. After their approval by the
commission, the rules wili be subject to a series of
normal reviews and would likely take effect in Fall
1997.
Participants to the regulatory negotiation proc-
ess and to the administrative restructuring among
the commission, PDEP, and PDA make two consis-
tent observations about their results; the process
added months to the time required for drafting
regulations; but regulatory negotiations and admin-
istrative changes built trust between Pennsylvania
state government and the state's farm community.
The end product, to date, is a set of proposed regu-
lations that seem generally acceptable to farmers.
But, although the Chesapeake Bay Foundation
(CBF) representative on the Board voted to pass
the draft regulations on to the commission for ac-
tion, the CBF's executive director for Pennsylva-
nia, Jolene E. Chinchilti, expressed concerns about
the draft regulations. In a letter to Pennsylvania's
Secretary of Agriculture, Chinchilli wrote that,
"...while we supported the decision to pass the regu-
lations on to the Commission, CBF does not sup-
port this draft of the regulations," Chjnchilli stated
further that the Foundation's position is that "...key
provisions of the regulation have been weakened."
The change of greatest concern to CBF is. the elimi-
nation of a requirement to have an erosion and sedi-
mentation control plan as part of a nutrient
management plan. In the view of the foundation,
that change will seriously weaken the regulations
"because soil conservation is critical to sound nutri-
ent management" and the commission should re-
store the requirement (Chinchilli 1997),
Major Provisions of the Final Proposed
Regulation*
As required by the Nutrient Management Act,
regulations apply only to concentrated animal op-
erations (CAOs) where animal density exceeds two
AEUs per acre on an annualized basis. Voluntary
nutrient management planning is encouraged for
nonregulaicd operations. Estimates of the portion
of farms to which the CAO regulations apply
range, roughly, from 5 to 10 percent. But no one is
certain as to the exact number of applicable farms
because (1) rented land may be counted as an inte-
gral part of a farm operation; (2) only those lands
(owned or rented) under the management control
of an operator—and on which manure generated in
an operation is to be applied—may be counted as
part of an animal operation; and (3) agriculture cen-
sus data at the individual farm level is confidential.
One guess is that 50 percent or more of the CAOs
will be farms often acres or less.
Difficulties in knowing to whom regulations ap-
ply make it uncertain that all CAOs will comply by
25
-------
iHt Source Water Pollution Problems:
mentation of an officially approved plan "shall be
of «BU atton'f , ' ,' fifiers
T? , 1™° US P* acre *" not re'
singly,°r in multicoun* *te- ^ *£SL»
may chose ****«« ^ levcls of responsibility:
fanners and
(Pennsylvanw Bulletin, September 28, 1996). Certi-
^
. approval of implementation delays, and ap-
Nutrient Management Specialist for approval, and
certain records must be kept. In addition to farm
identification, a plan summary, and an implementa-
tion schedule, each plan must include the follow-
»ng:
• Information on nutrient allocation and use, in-
ceding:
- nutrients available
- crop ^ production nutrient needs
• nutrient application rates and prbcedilres
- excess manure utilization plans
• Plans for BMPs needed to prelect ground and
surface water in animal conceotmtiun areas
Existing CAOs will have one year from the time
regulations are adopted to submit their plans for ap-
proval. New operations with more man two AEU*
per acre must submit a plan within three months of
the adoption of the regulations, or prior to com-
mencing manure operations, whichever is later.
CAOs are required to implement their plans within
three years of plan approval. Implementation re-
quirements are extended by two years for substan-
tial capital improvements if the cost of the
improvements cannot he financed through avail-
able funding mechanisms, or if $2 million or more
has not been appropriated for grants and loans by
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania within one
Assuming regulations to implement the Nutrient
Management Act take effect in Cfcluber 1 997, by
October 1998 existing CAOs must submit plans for
f Pproval. Then by October 200 1 , or October 2003
if state ftmds for implementation are not provided,
plans must be implemented. Numbers of plans de-
vel°Ped and numbers of acres covered will provide
the first indications of how the Nutrient Manage-
meni Act is working.
Officially, the commonwealth expects that the
act wil1 Provirfe significant reductions in nutrient
Io8d«igs '« *e bay watershed because it both man-
dares nutrient management and promotes voluntary
management and because the Susquenanna River
Basm is exPected to contain large proportions of
*e state's CAOs- Pennsylvania's Chesapeake Bay
Nutrient Keductioa Strategy ( 1 006) projects as rc-
sults °f fte **• for the P*;"0*1 ' 99S through 1 999, a
'8 m^os\ P0""** reduction in nitrogen loadings
and a -7 million pound reduction in phosphorus.
. ' science assumptions for these pro-
J«tioiw— •ores in agriculture, animal units per
acre> nu*"ent load available for treatment, and load
reduction efficiencies — seem accurate. Two addi-
tionai ^"mptions are also reasonable, although
less certain: eflual numbers of farms will imple-
r?ent nut"ent management plans because of regula-
tion and because of voluntaiy effhtte; and
26
-------
Nutrient Control Policies in the Chesapeake Bay Slates
regulated farms will have higher animal densities
than voluntary farms. One other factor works in fa-
vor of reduced nutrient loadings to the bay: die lo-
cation of most of Pennsylvania's CAOs is expected
to be in the Susquehann* Tributary to the bay.'
But two other assumptions in the projections
seem overly optimistic. One Is that 10 percent of
the 21,500 farms in the bay basin will submit man-
datory nutrient management plans. The true per-
centage is uncertain, but 10 percent is believed by
some state officials to be at the high end of the
range of estimates. Predictions about the number of
farms subject to regulation are necessarily uncer-
tain because of census data confidentiality and be-
cause of the unknown consequences of the formula
that will be used to determine AEUs per acre. A
second assumption that is too optimistic is the time
line. Because of the lengthy process used to negoti-
ate regulations, implementation of plans wit) likely
begin no sooner than i 8 months after the date an-
ticipated by the act Moreover, residual nutrients in
the soils of CAOs create an unknown lag time be-
tween increased manure management and im-
proved water quality. White load reductions will
occur, they may well be lower and later than those
projected in the Pennsylvania Strategy.
The strategy also provides estimates of Nutrient
Management Act program costs (PDEP 1996). Ma-
jor categories of costs, all dependent on approval
by the Gencnt Assembly, will be funds for plan-
ning assistance, CAO financial assistance, aid to lo-
cal conservation districts for delegated functions,
demonstration and alternative uses of manure, and
education. CAO financial assistance, the largest
category of exists, may primarily be in the form of
loans over a ten-year period. Loans would rise rap-
idly during the implementation stage—around the
turn of the century—then become more than bal-
anced by loan receipts in the early 2000s. The strat-
egy estimates program costs for the bay drainage
area of Pennsylvania at approximately $ 15.8 mil-
lion over the period 1995 through 1999, based on
1995 dollars (PDEP 1996), As with all of Pennsyl-
vania's bay efforts, landing for the Nutrient Man-
agement Act is dependent on priorities and efforts
by Governor Ridge, the Commonwealth's General
Assembly, and interest groups and citizens who in-
fluence the governor and the state legislature. The
need for budget support to implement the act will
be critical, especially, for areas of Pennsylvania
outside of the bay drainage where state and federal
dollars are more difficult to obtain.
27
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28
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4. Maryland's Bay Initiatives, Including
Tributary Teams
Maryland's geography and history, and much of
the state's commerce and culture, are bound to the
Chesapeake Bay. Ninety five percent of the state
drains over 17,000 miles of tributary streams and
rivers into the bty. European exploration of the Up-
per Chesapeake and its environs, beginning in the
early seventeenth century, ted to the settlement,
colonization, and statehood of Maryland. The cur-
rent economic value of the bay to Maryland, as esti-
mated by a state agency, is $678 billion (Economic
Viewpoint, 1996). Included in that figure are val-
ues for many activities dependent on water quality.
including: fishing; boating; swimming; beach use;
and waterfront and water-view living. In today's
Maryland, much of the popular culture is
Chesapeake-oriented; bookstores abound with bay-
based photography and literature; gift shops offer
Chesapeake wares ranging from the sublime to the
ridiculous, from exquisite waterfowl carvings to
crab hats.
State Government Philosophy and
Accomplishments
With so much of Maryland bay-oriented, no one
would argue with John Griffin, Secretary of Mary-
Iand*s Department of Natural Resources (MDNR),
who said: The Chesapeake Bay is Maryland's
most treasured natural resource.!' Indeed, perceived
threats to the bay as an ecosystem, a treasure chest
of natural resources, and a cherished way of life,
have provided powerful political symbols to galva-
nize collective actions for its protection (Favero,
Pitt & Tuthill 1988),
Expenditures
The State of Maryland spends many dollars for
Chesapeake Bay protection, although the trend has
been for declining expenditures during the 1990s
(MDNR 1995). From fiscal years (FY) 1990
through 1996. the state spent $189.5 million in gen-
eral operating funds for bay protection. Annual op-
erating budgets for the bay declined, however,
from $34,6 million in FY 1990 to $24 million in
1996. In contrast, the state's capital budget for the
bay rose, over the same seven-year period, from
$3.8 million in FY1990 to $5.9 million in 1996.
State of Maryland bay-related capital budgets to-
taled $373 million over the seven-year period.
Maryland's bay effort is muitiagency. Tradition-.
ally, the governor's office coordinates across agen-
cies, although that function is reduced in the
Glendening administration. The Departments of
Natural Resources, Agriculture (MDA), the Envi-
ronment (MDE), and Transportation (MOOT), and
the University of Maryland System all spend sig-
nificant amounts of resources (MDNR 1995),
Counting expenditures from FY 1990 to 1995 and
appropriations for FY 1996, Maryland's bay-re-
lated operating and capital budgets by. agency,
from Maryland sources only, in millions of dollars,
totaled more than $200 million—as shown in Ta*
bid.
When all sources of funds—federal included—
for bay-related capital and operating spending by
Maryland State Agencies are considered, the total
appropriations for FY 1996 are $229.4 million. For
all seven years combined, Uic lutal is $1.1 billion
(MDNR 1995).
Agency Functions
Although the names of bay-related agencies in
Maryland have remained the same since 1987, re-
Tablt 1: State of Maryland Spending for the
Chesapeake Bay: 1990-1 995
{$ millions)
Agency Operating Capital
Agriculture 31.9
Environment 82.1
Natural Resources 48.4
Transportation 0.7
University of MD System
TOTAL 189.5
31.7
3,8
2.0
0.0
26,4
37.3
29
-------
Analyzing fftmpoint Source Water Pollution Problems:
sponsibilities among agencies have shifted. In his
most significant reorganization for natural resource
management, Governor Parris Glendening contin-
ued a shift begun by previous governors when he
moved regulatory functions into a single agency—
MDE—and water quality monitoring functions
into another agency—MDNIt Governor Glenden-
ing also jcauued the role of the governor's office in
coordinating bay efforts and pve that task to
MDNIt To provide cross-agency administrative
leadership, Maryland has a "Bay Cabinet" that is
chaired by the Secretary of MDNR, meets
monthly, and includes representatives of the state
agencies that have bay programs, the university,
and the governor's office.
Agriculture's Position
When questioned about what they find most dis-
tinctive about Maryland's philosophy to improve
the bay, many observers first point to leadership by
the state's Department of Agriculture. During the
past decade, research scientists have found, with in-
creasing certainty and accuracy, that agricultural
practices contribute significantly to nutrient pollu-
tion of bay waters. But because it conflicts with
their sense of themselves as land stewards, the in-
itial response by some members of the agriculture
community in Maryland was to deny the research
findings.
MDA has taken the lead, however, in shaping
agriculture's collective reaction to scientific find-
ings, That position is one of (1) acceptance of re^
sponsibility for nutrient pollution, as that
responsibility is determined by science; (2) burden-
snaring wttii others in bay cleanup efforts; but (3)
resistance to government regulation of agricultural
operations. By their resistance, MDA and agricul-
tural interest groups in Maryland have successfully
avoided attempts in the state's General Assembly
to impose nutrient management replations.
Instead, MDA has led the argument for volun-
tary efforts by farmers to share, with the public,
costs required to reduce nutrient loadings caused
by agriculture. MDA's case for voluateerism and
cost-sharing rests on the following five assertions:
I. Insufficient public and private resources are
available for making nutrient reduction pro-
grams mandatory across all of Maryland's ag-
ricultural sector.
2. Voluntary efforts by fanners who choose toln-
vest in BMPs imply they will be more likely
to maintain those practices over time titan they
would if investments were mandated.
3. Each farm is unique and requires a customized
system of nutrient management that is more
likely to be achieved by a voluntary program
than by a mandated program.
4. Education, technical assistance, and hurfen-
shanng—rather than official rules—will pro-
mote farmer acceptance and will enhance the
value of landowner stewardship.
5. Voluntary programs are more likely than man-
dated ones to encourage fanners to exceed
what^ alternatively, would be a "ceiling for ac-
tion," as set by government regulation (Brodie
and Powell 1995; Simpson 1997).
In Maryland the philosophy of burden-sharing—
farmers with city dwellers, nonpoint sources with
point sources, rural with urban people—permeates
efforts to improvethe bay. Efforts to create tribu-
tary nutrient reduction strategies illustrate an appli-
cation of this philosophy.
Tributary strategies Philosophy
Following the Executive Council Agreement of
1992 to create tributary strategies, the State of
Maryland identified 10 discrete geographic areas in
the state's bay watershed and determined the nutri-
ent loadings in each. (See Figure A.) The ten areas
include two single river watersheds—the Choptank
and the Patuxent; one dual river watershed the
Patapsco-Back; three portions of a single river—
the Upper, Middle, and Lower Potomac; and four
multiple river/creek areas—the Upper and Lower
Eastern Shore, smA the Upper and Lower Weslsm
Shore tributary regions.
In 1993, leaders of stale agencies and gover-
nor's aides established a requirement, as th« means
to reach the stale's 40 percent reduction goal, that
every tributary area would have the same 40 per-
cent goal. As a more cost-effeciive means to reach
Maryland's goal, the state could have targeted
some watersheds for more than a 40 percent reduc-
tion and some for less. But instead, the state de-
cided (1) an equal reduction goal provides a
common and apparently fair method to share the
burdens of reducing nutrient loadinp; and (2) an
equal goal spreads the benefits of any habitat im-
provements that will result from nutrient reduc-
tions.
Progress to Date
In May of 1996 Maryland officials presented a
30
-------
Figure A
Maryland's Tributary Strategy Basins
Tributary
r>«ii»ur RnundarV
in Boundary
-------
Qint Source Water Pollution Prv&tems;
; cover crops;
improved
'
utjJl«»sitofBMPs.Univeniity of Maryland Co-
state and locil leaders jointly de-
signed a set of program strategies-both point and
nonpoint .uuree-ro achlCve the state's 40 percent
reduction goal. Table 2 contains a sumnuuy Ite of
ttie 34 core strategies, in four categories (Adapted
rrom State of Maryland 1 995).
4 ne stole designed the strategies through a proc-
ess ot collaborative policy making called Tribu-
tary Strategies Development" and created a new
institution to perpetuate the process— the "Mary.
land Tributary Teams." Tributary Strategies Devel-
opment and Teams are the subjects of a case study
in this report. First, however, core nonpoint source
programs for agricultural land, developed land and
resource protection and watershed planning are ex-
P'amed-
Agricultural Land
.
who provide certified planning advice Data
*11 im «"««* plans had been provided for
'000 acrcs' ato« « Percent of the goal for the
year 200° (Steinhilber 1996), A survey of 135 ant-
mil P™***" who had received nutrient manaEe-
mem plans from MCES between 1 990 and 1 993
«v«.ted43 percent of the respondents said they
Md )mP'cmented the plans on their entire farm An-
other.71 P«rcent s«W they had implemented plans
on at least 50 P«reent of their farm (Steinhilber
1996>-
. To promote improved management prac-
Uces on ag"culroral land, the Maryland Depart-
ment of Agriculture administers the Maryland
Ai"cuto™l Cost-Share (MACS) Program BeEun
inW83 and funded by the state-with support
from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)-MACS provides financial assistance of
32
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Nutrient Control Policies in the Chesapeake Bay States
Table 2
Maryland's 40 Percent Nutrient Reduction Strategies
Programs Unit Coverage Load Reductions
N (Ibs/yr) P (Ibs/yr)
Wastewater Treatmnt Plants fof
Biological & Chemical Removal plants
Developed Land
Emsion & Sed. Control acres
Enhan. Stormwatef Mgmt acres
Stormwater Retrofits acres
Stormwater Conversion acres
Septic Pumping systems
Septic Denrtrif. systems
Septic Connections systems
Urban Nutrient MgmL acres
Cluster New Devel acres
SUBTOTAL
Ag Land
SC/WQ Plan Imptem. acres
Cooserv. Tillage acres
Treat H. Erod Land acres
Retire H. Erod Land acres
Anim. Waste Mgmt-Lvstk. systems
Artim, Waste Mgmt-Pexilt systems
Runoff Control .acres
Stream Protec. Fencing acres
Stream Protection acres
Nutrient Mgmt Frttzr. , acres
Nutrient Mgmt Organic acres
Cover Crops w/ N. Mgmt acres
Cover Crops w/o N. Mgmt acres
Hanse Pasture Mgmt. annas
Presideress Test acres
SUBTOTAL
Resource Protect & Watershed Planning
Suffers
Forested acres
Grassed acres
Str. Shore Erosion Ctr. linear ft.
Nonstr S, E.Control linear ft.
Forest Conserv. acres
Tree Planting acres
Forest Hrvstg. Pr. acres
Marine Pumpouts " mannas
Pumpout Education boaters •
SUBTOTAL
TOTAL REDUCTIONS (millions Ibs/yr)
* Loading reduction mt*> h«vc not be*n quantified.
47
19.272
134,901
7,554
3,426
3,269
101
5,946
49,818
1.920
468,377
339.805
186,511
5,941
637
392
566
2,668
6,656
766.849
100,052
150,698
16,500
23
1,679
3,204
4,173
37,782
76.810
18,333
10,290
19,530
164
30,535
11,409,300
37.041
333,226
18.614
8,403
3.962
1,215
75,357
34,973
5.760
511.551
659.556
1,385.902
333,875
58.587
338,550
82.352
38,025
7,847
8,780
1,987,773
535,782
1,218,976
196,350
*
*
6.852,355
61.910
73.745
38,312
59.327
196.002
21,154
54,587
99.490
*
604,527
19
252,700
21,909
35,284
2,028
935
0
0
0
0
768
60,156
86,620
133,881
85,158
7,895
66,537
16.434
7.770
335
605
106.450
34,602
32,611
3,300
*
*
582,198
8.492
9,866
25,186
39.240
23,175
3,91 i
35,859
22.072
*>
167.809
39 1-06
33
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Amlyiing NonpoiM Source Water Pollution Problems;
amounted to $5.4 million, an increase of'$12 mil-
lion from FY 1995. The MDA operating budget for
MACS in FY 1996 was $383,000 (Lawrence 1997).
According to administrative regulations, MACS
offers financial assistance to a maximum of
$10,000 per practice and $35,000 per farm. An ex-
ception is made tor farms receiving assistance for
animal waste storage; they may receive up to
$50,000 for this practice and up to $65,000 for the
farm (Supervisors* Handbook 1995; Simpson
1997). Twenty-seven practices qualify as eligible
for MACS funds, including various structures and,
agronomic practices. Funding depends on two crite-
ria; first, and most important, that the existing con-
dition critically affects water pollution; and
second, that the farm is located in a priority water-
shed. Some funds are available for farms not lo-
cated in priority areas.
The most recent figures published by MDA
(1996) show that from laty 1,1983, to June 30,
1995, $29.9 million in MACS funds had been paid
. to the state's fanners. These funds supported the
completion of 5,788 projects.
The environmental and economic consequences
of agricultural conservation cost-share programs
like MACS are not fully understood. For example,
Abdalla (1996) summarized evidence found in re-
search literature on agricultural cost-sharing and
found it incomplete. Abdalla suggested additional
research be conducted to answer these questions;
1. What incentives exist to motivate farmers, par-
ticularly operators of uualtci fojms, lg utilize .
knowledge and adopt technologies for protect-
ing soil and water quality?
2. Given varying local social and economic situ-
ations, what mix of policies and programs—
cost-sharing programs included—will
maximize pollution reduction in various situ-
ations?
3. Assuming that a BMP's profitability, not its
reduction in environmental degradation, is the
most important factor affecting its rate of
adoption by farmers, to what extent are pollu-
tion reductions that result from cost-share pro-
grams offset by production expansions
resulting from increased profitability?
4, Assuming, as preliminary evidence indicates,
that larger farms are more likely to adopt
BMPs via cost-sharing than smaller farms,.
and if communities value the preservation of
small scale farms, what mix of cost-share and
other programs will best accomplish the dual
objectives of preserving small farms while re-
ducing the pollution they cause?
Developed Land
The State of Maryland uses nine strategies, as
shown in Table 2, to reduce nonpoint source nutri-
ent loadings from developed land (State of Mary-
land 1995). Within the state's 40 percent strategy
those nine are expected to reduce nitrogen loadings
by .52 million pounds—2.7 percent of the total,
and phosphorus loadings by .06 million pounds—
5.7 percent of the total. As the state's population
grows, developed land options will take on greater
significance. But the underlying problem is one of
land use.
In early 1997, Governor Glendening introduced
a set of legislative proposals into the 1997 session
of the Maryland General Assembly to manage the
state's urban growth-—particularly the location of
residential and business development The propos-
als contained implications, among others, for envi-
ronmental quality. Land-use control policy debates
in Maryland, as was the case when the Bay Preser-
vation Act was debated"in Virginia, raise issues of
balance between public vs. private rights and state
vs. local government authority. Conflicts also
emerged about the governor's proposal between de-
veloped jurisdictions—cities and urbanized coun-
ties, which were favored for state infrastructure
spending in the proposal—and rural and urbanizing
counties, which were not In the closing hours of
the 1997 session, the General Assembly enacted an
amended version of the governor's proposal that
weakened some provisions, but preserved the core
principle of directing growth by means of targeting
state spending for physical infrastructure.
Undoubtedly, however, the growth issue will
emerge again and become increasingly important
in Maryland and the other Chesapeake Bay states.
This prediction is possible because of dynamic in
tcrrclationships among bay improvements, popula-
tion, and land use.
To consider these relationships, first assume bay
cleanup efforts in the basin do succeed in improv-
ing water quality. Such improvements would make
theVegton a more attractive place to work and live,
other thinp being equal. But the cost of maintain-
ing nutrient loadings at the 60 percent cap, under
conditions of increasing populations and current
land use practices, would, eeteris paribus, grow
over time. In the absence of new, more efficient
34
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Nutrient Control Policies in the Chesapeake Bay Slates
technologies to reduce nutrient loadings, the more the riparian forest buffer policy at their 1996 meet-
the cleanup succeeds, the more costly it would be- ing, but farmers' dissatisfaction over Maryland's
Pftm* buffer strategy persists into 1997.
Tributary Strategies and Teams
Following the 1992 agreement by the Executive
Council to create tributary strategies, Maryland
state agencies formed a "Bay Work Group" to cre-
ate watershed-based plans (Wenzel, Banting & Lu-
cid 1996). Staff from the governor's office, the
Departments of Agriculture, Environment, and
Natural Resources, the Office of State Planning,
and the University of Maryland formed the group
and led the effort
Strategies and Options
The work group first divided Maryland's bay
watershed into the ten tributary basins shown on
Map A and applied the 40 percent, reduction goal to
all ten tributaries. Then they described existing pol-
lution loads, sources of pollutants, land uses, and
fish and wildlife populations in the ten areas.
In 1993 and 1994 the group conducted technical
analyses and public meetings with private stake-
holder organizations and local public officials.
These activities provided the means to identify and
analyze likely consequences of options for nutrient
reduction. The analyses and meetings yielded infor-
mation on monetary costs, nutrient reduction bene-
fits, and technical and political feasibility. From
that knowledge base, the group drafted an overall
strategy, chose the strategies shown in Table 2, and
developed sub-urategy options for each of the ten
tributary areas.
Tributary Teams
As part of the process for developing strategies.
MDA and university staff invited farmers, local
government representatives, representatives of
farm organizations and agribusiness firms, environ-
mentalists, conservation district staff, and agricul-
tural extension educators to form "agricultural
tributary teams." The teams were provided informa-
tion on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of reduc-
ing nutrient loadings from agriculture lands. Then
they identified which actions they believed farmers
would willingly take to help meet the 40 percent
goal. Team meetings also educated people about
the contributions of fanning to nutrient loadings
and built political support among farmers for par-
ticipation in nutrient reduction efforts.
Environmental staff from the governor's office
In this scenario, basin residents would be caught
in & social trap—paying increasing amounts of re-
sources just to remain at the same level of water
qualiry. other than through the use of new tech-
nologies, Ac only possible exit from the trap is to
change where and how people live—their use of
land. Examinations of how to get out of the trap
will thus become more frequent and important, if
no less controversial. Citizens and public officials
in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia will be
challenged to find new land use and economic
growth policies thai are effective, acceptable, eco-
nomical, and equitable.
Resource Protection and Watershed
Planning
The third leg of Maryland's nonpoint source
strategy is a set of 11 programs in forest, wetlands,
and other resource protection and watershed plan-
ning options. As shown in Table 2, the load reduc-
tions from this set of programs are projected at .60
million pounds of nitrogen—3.1 percent of the to-
tal and ,17 million pounds of phosphorus—15.8
percent of the total.
Among the resource protection options, the
Slate of Maryland has made a priority of planting
slreamside forested buffers and protecting existing
buffers on agricultural and developed lands. At the
Fall 1996 meeting of the Executive Council, the
principals signed a document pledging themselves
to add 2,010 additional miles of riparian forest buff-
ers by the year 2010. Governor Glendening, speak-
ing for the State of Maryland, pledged to exceed
his state's portion of the total riparian miles by add-
ing 600 mites of forest buffers by 2010.
For many months prior to the meeting,
Chesapeake Bay Program scientists, farmers, devel-
opers, and representatives of local governments
and the forest industry struggled to write a muni-
ally acceptable riparian buffer policy. Uncertainty
about what policy the principals would endorse per-
sisted until the final hours before the meeting. A
major issue leading up to the meeting was whether
the policy should be to cnaic forested buffers, as it
eventually did, or vegetative buffers. Landowners,
particularly farmers, argue that although trees
make good buffers, so do grasses and other vegeta-
tion; trees remove more land from agricultural uses
than do vegetative buffers. The principals signed
35
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Analyzing NonpoMSource Water Pollution Problem:
were hoping, at the time, that the process of creat-
ing tributary strategies could result in greater in-
volvement and an increased "sense of ownership"
of bay cleanup policy and programs among citi-
zens, local governments, and grassroots organiza-
tions and interest groups. Thus the governor's
aides supported *h* creation of agricultural tribu-
tary teams and decided to create ten similar, but
broader-based, permanent "Maryland Tributary
Teams"—one for each of the tributary areas. To im-
plement their decision they first requested the assis-
tance of state agencies and the state's 23 county
governments. But initial efforts to establish the
teams met with resistance.
Some state government officials were reluctant
to accept local governments as equal partners in
the initiative because they believed local officials
lacked commitment to the state's pledge to reduce
nutrients. On the other side of the issue, some local
government officials were suspicious mat state gov-
ernment agencies would use tributary teams as
"Trojan Horses" to deceive them into accepting un-
funded mandates or state regulations. It took sev-
eral months for the governor's aides to convince
both sides that the initiative was conceived in good
faith as a true partnership.
Obtaining the involvement of environmental and
business groups also proved more of a challenge
than expected. Environmentalists were accustomed
to working at the state government level and were
reluctant to divide their attention and resources
among multiple, regional teams. Business groups
were likewise reluctant to becoming involved *«
team members, apparently because they sensed no
immediate threats to nor advantages for their'firms.
In spite of apathy and resistance, the governor's
aides and other state and local officials in me work
group continued to s*ek private sector involvement
on the teams.
In 1994 the work group issued a statewide call
for volunteers to serve as team members. After-
wards, they gathered the names of self-nominees
into ten lists—corresponding to the tributary areas;
recruited additional people to provide balance
among interests and occupations; sent the lists to
county elected officials for review, comment, and
approval; and, finally, submitted the revised lists to
the governor for his review. Governor Glendening
and elected county government officials appointed
the Maryland Tributary Teams in mid-1995, and
the teams have been meeting since September of
that year.
Each of the ten teams includes 25 to 35 people,
the majority of whom were self-nomtnated.The "
teams include concerned citizens; people with agri-
cultural, business, and environmental interests;
staff from local and state governments; and staff"
from federal facilities contained in their water-
sheds. Typically, aUnii five HI ten additional non-
member volunteers attend meetings on a regular
basis. The teams' general charge, as presented in
members • appointment papers, is to;
» ensure that implementation of the state's pro-
grams to reach the 40 percent goal "proceeds
on schedule in a fair and equitable manner"
« coordinate "participation among citizens, gov-
ernment agencies, and other interested parties"
» promote "an understanding of Tributary Strat-
egy goals and the actions needed to achieve
them through public education" (Wenzel,
Banting & Lucid 1996).
The Bay Work Group had decided also that
Tributary Teams would have the uptiun of rework-
ing sub-strategy options to meet the 40 percent
goal—if their reworking of strategies maintained
the total nutrient reduction within the 40 percent
target
To coordinate efforts between the Maryland
state government and the teams, four state agencies
and the University of Maryland each provide em-
ployees, on a part-time basis, called Lead State
Agency Contacts, to meet with and assist teams.
The state also provides two full-time people, called
T«am Coordinator*:, to staff day-to-day operations
of the teams. A Tributary Teams Interagency
Group, made up of the all state government staff
who assist the teams, gathers monthly to coordi-
nate efforts.
During their first year of existence, tributary
teams pursued a somewhat common agenda. Team
members accepted official appointment by the gov-
ernor; discussed their mission; conducted team-
building exercises; received presentations by
experts on the state's bay strategy and options; se-
lected chairpersons from among their members; di-
vided into workgroups to develop plans for
education, agriculture, point source pollution, and
urban nonpoint source pollution; developed an an-
nual report; and developed grant proposals |n re-
sponse to the state's offer of financial support for
their activities.
Team chairpersons met twice during IQQfi tn
36
-------
Ntttri&a Corarol Policies in the Chesapeake Sty States
compare notes on their activities and intentions. Af-
terwards they reported on their discussions to the
governor's Bay Cabinet Local government repre-
sentatives on the teams also met twice with state
staff to compare notes and to discuss teams' pro-
gress.
Survey. In a mail survey sponsored by the Inter-
agency Group in mid-1996, tributary team mem-
bers indicated how their teams were doing (Favero
1997). Sixty percent of members responded to the
survey, with answers to questions about qualify of
relationships among members of their teams,
among teams, and between their teams and the
broader community. Large majorities of respon-
dents agreed the teams had formed well, developed
high levels of mutual trust, had open relationships,
and held effective meetings. Another strong major-
ity expressed an interest in meeting people from
other teams to share information about how to be
effective.
One answer, however, surprised and concerned
people in the Bay Work Group and Interagency
Group. Forty-four percent of respondents ex-
pressed their disbelief that the teams would have
significant impacts on water quality in their tribu-
tary areas. Such skepticism, while disturbing,
should be placed in context When the survey was
administered, after ten months of meetings, the
teams were only beginning to develop action agen-
das. At that time, team members would likely have
been less certain about how to take action, relative
to later, once their actions agendas were set An-
other survey would be needed to measure and com-
pare how skeptical team members now are.
First Annual Reports, When their first year
ended in September 1996, tributary teams began
preparing annual reports. They were asked to re-
port on their activities and accomplishments, on
what they had learned, and on what their priorities
are for 1991. By the end of 1996 three teams—the
Choptank River, Upper Eastern Shore, and Upper
Western Shore Teams—had put their annual re-
ports in final form for publication by the state
(Tributaiy Team Annual Reports 1996). "He three
reports indicate that while teams continue to have
much in common, diversity has begun to emerge:
i. All three teams said they had spent consider-
able time learning about nutrient loading prob-
lems and they viewed teaching others about
those problems as part of their missions. One
team—Upper Eastern Shore—has begun
"community outreach briefings" to educate
public officials and civic groups.
2. The three teams had divided into smaller
workgroups. The Choptank River Team had
created three workgroups, focused on "exist-
ing agricultural practices, innovative agricul-
tural practices, and developed lands." The
Choptank Team generated a conservative and
focused agenda, consisting primarily of inten-
tions to examine issues, In contrast, the Upper
Eastern Shore Team created 16 workgroups
and generated more than 50 detailed recom-
mendations for actions by the state govern-
ment, local governments, and private groups.
3. The three Eastern Shore Teams—Choptank
River, Lower Eastern Shore, and Upper East-
ern Shore—united to discuss a state govern-
ment proposal to eliminate cover crops from
the MACS program because of funding con-
straints. The three consulted technical experts
on, the issue and formed a Cover Crops Task
Force to investigate the need for state cost
share for such crops.
By evidence of its report, the Upper Eastern
Shore Team has been very active. But the cover let-
ter to that team's report, written by Chairman Ray-
mond Forney, reveals uncertainties about his
team's role in relation to the state strategy for im-
proving water quality in the region. In the tetter,
Forney asks, are we "...to take the strategy, as writ-
ten by [the state government], as gospel and try to
make it happen? Or should we be reviewing and re-
writing the strategy based on our own perspec-
tives? How are we supposed to get anything done -
will we have a budget or any spending authority, or
any influence over policy or legislation or regula-
tion? Is this public/private partnership just a prel-
ude to regulation (Forney 1996)?"
The questions Forney poses are fundamental.
Moreover, conversations with other team leaders
and members reveal that similar uncertainties are
held by others. In early 1997, some team leaders
and members seem unclear about the mission of
the teams.
Proposals fur 319 Grants. Forney's question
about resources was partially answered by the
Maryland state government when, in mid-1996, it
issued a request for proposals from the Maryland
Tributary Teams; by this means the state offered to
allocate Section 319 Clean Water Act funds to the
teams. Projects will be funded for one year, one
time only, and each team is restricted to a maxi-
37
-------
Analyzing Nonpoim Source Water Pollution Problems:
mum of three proposals. The state created two
grant categories, the first for funds up to $4,000.
This category allows all ten teams, assuming they
develop reasonable proposals, to receive a small
grant. The second, and Implicitly more competitive
category, is for proposals of more than $4,000. The
timeline fair awarding grants b*gon with a. state
government review of proposals in January 1997,
in EPA review in February, an award in March,
and funds available in April 1997.
A draft summary of project awards, dated
March 28,1997, reveals an allocation of $3 77,587
for 29 projects—an average of about $13,000 per
grant. Grants went to a variety of education pro-
jects—such as programs for horse owners, home-
owner associations, and students—and projects
with a technical focus—such as an assessment of
Stream restoration alternatives, and an analysis of
stormwater infiltration facilities.
First Annual Meeting. Using ideas provided by
tributary team members,, state staff, and the mail
survey, Interagency Workgroup members designed
a first annual meeting of Maryland's Tributary
Teams for January 11,1997, The agenda included
the following:
• eight workshops taught by technical experts on
issues such as riparian forest buffers, stormwa-
ter utilities, and urban nutrient management
• eight workshops designed to build skills for
. team activities like working with the media,
building community involvement, and writing
successful grant proposals
* nine information exchange sessions for team
members to share ideas about point source
water pollution, animal waste management,
stream protection, and other topics of common
interest
Governor Glendening was the keynote speaker
for the annual meeting. He talked about new initia-
tives for growth management and the importance
of Maryland's Tributary Teams for the state's Bay
Program, In addition to his public comments, the
governor held a private meeting with team chairs
wherein he discussed their needs and offered his
support,
Strengths and Weaknesses. By late 1996 ob-
servers of the Maryland Tributary Teams—Inter-
agency Group Members and others who work with
the teams—noted the teams were operating with
several strengths. First, because the teams repre-
sent many stakeholder groups—organized and un-
organized, public and private, state and local, and
multiple county—ihey bring fresh, varied, and par-
ticular information into the bay cleanup effort. The
diversity of members also suggests that teams have
the capacity to provide a neutral setting for multi-
jurtadictional dissuasions, problem identification,
and consensus building across groups.
As to weaknesses, observers first noted what
Chairman Forney's letter plainly expresses: team
members are not completely clear about what the
teams* roles and mission are. Some team members
believe they should only provide advice on the nu-
trient reduction strategies, -while uthcrs want to in-
itiate local actions to reduce nutrient pollution. To
some observers this lack of clarity about role and
mission is problematic. Others, however, believe
that roles and missions will evolve in due time as
teams go about their business and that the end re-
sult will be more clarity, and probably more diver-
sity. Some observers, but not all, add that teams are
weakened by their lock of authority and suggest the
state should grant official powers to teams.
Another concern about weakness, common to
many observers, is that teams lack resources—par-
ticularly funds and time—relative to the tasks they
want to pursue. Al the annual conference Governor
Glendening responded to this concern by pledging
more staff help from the state by the appointment
of a third Team Coordinator, Finally, some ob-
servers note that membership balance has shifted.
They believe there are now too many government
employees and too few private sector people serv-
ing on tributary teams.
Opportunities and Threats. People's perceptions
of opportunities and threats for tributary teams are
based on their sense of probabilities—that the
teams may succeed in doing A or B, and that teams
may be vulnerable to C or D. In the opinion of
those who work with the tributary teams, many op-
portunities exist. The teams are thought to have the
potential for:
* building local support to reduce nutrients
* reflecting local tastes, preferences, and issues
in the bay policy development process
* helping coordinate government actions across
jurisdictional boundaries
• providing neutral locations for policy develop-
ment
« attracting additional funding for bay cleanup ef-
forts
38
-------
Nutrient Control Policies in the Chesapeake Bay States
But observers also perceive threats to the teams.
There are risks, they note, that team members
could lose interest because of frustration and dis-
couragement with the slow pace of accomplish-
ments, that teams could become unable to
accomplish their tasks because of internal divisive-
ness or a lack of political skills, and that teams
vuuIU luse external resources or have Insufficient
external support to accomplish their goals. Ob-
servers also suggest that local governments or state
agencies might ignore, block, or misuse the teams
if they become too independent or two critical of of-
ficial policies.
Issues, Alternatives, and Consequences. Mary*
land state and county governments have, by their
appointment and support of the tributary teams, cre-
ated a unique institution for improving water qual-
ity. Counties have assigned members to the teams;
the state government has made a large allocation of
resources for staff support, has strongly encour-
aged the teams through the words of the governor
and the Bay Cabinet, and has allocated $200,000 in
grant monies for the teams. In the future, people re-
sponsible for the teams will make choices about
three fundamental issues:
1. Should the state government take the initiative
to clarify teams'role and mission?
2, What should be done about the changing mix
of participants?
3. Should teams be public policy advocates?
Should the State Clarify Teams' Sale and Mis-
sion? Some interagcncy group members and others
believe teams ore weakened by the absence wf dcoi
roles and mission. Chairman Forney's letter to the
governor asking basic questions about his team's
role reinforces this view. But not all state employ-
ees who assist tributary teams agree that the state
should initiate such an effort, Some are reluctant to
impose roles on the teams now, since teams have
formed and functioned for more than a year; some
also believe a formal examination of roles and mis-
sion at this time may signal indecision about state
government intentions for teams. Those who advo-
cate a hands-off approach expect teams to create
clearer, albeit varied, understandings over time
about their roles and mission; and some see a risk
that any state government initiative will truncate
that evolution. Those who resist writing team roles
and mission prefer to continue the existing
course—supporting teams and encouraging them
to team by doing.
The alternative is to initiate a process to clarify
team roles, probably by writing a "charter" docu-
ment to state the institutional form of tributary
teams. A charter need not be imposed on teams. It
could be coauthored by a group of team members,
with staff support from local and state government
representatives. But that approach involves, for
sate officials, taking a nsk on what the team mem-
bers would write.
Writing a viable charter would not be an easy
task. It would need to strike an acceptable and ef-
fective balance between tributary team inde-
pendence and state and local government
. expectations. For example, it would need to answer
questions such as the following;
1. What is the length of term for existing mem-
bers?
2. Who can remove members and for what rea-
sons?
3. What process will be used to replace members
who retire or who are removed from die
teams?
4. What may the teams change with respect to
* state strategies for water quality improve-
ments in their tributaries?
5. May teams take official positions that conflict
with the policies of state agencies or local
units of government?
6, Should teams hive any official authority-?
What are the likely consequences of these two
alternatives? It seems improbable that after more
than a year's experience teams will evolve quickly,
in lire next yew ui iwu, tu trcaic clear missions and
roles. Without a charter document, more likely the
teams will spend more time deciding what they
should do, trying some things that work and others
that don't, losing members who take with them
their institutional memories, taking in new mem-
bers .who must relearn their roles by trial and error,
observing other teams, sharing information about
roles, and slowly becoming more effective. Ques-
tions and conflicts about roles that would need to
be answered in a charter document would emerge
from time-to-time. The bottom-line question to this
approach seems to be. Will those who are" investing
significant resources to support the teams be will-
ing to accept progress at that pace and level?
If a writing group could achieve an acceptable
and effective balance between team freedom and
state and local government expectations, it seems
unlikely that team members would view this effort
-------
Analyzing Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Problem:
as a signal of state indecision. Rather, it seems
more likely that they would welcome the opportu-
nity, at this time, to clarify what teams can and
should do. But again, writing an acceptable and ef-
fective charter would be a challenge.
What roles might a charter define- ft* tributary
teams? In the Fall of 1996, the Interagency Group
began a discussion, as yet uncompleted, to examine
possible roles for teams. Lauren Wenzel, Inter-
agency Group Chair, prepared a list of possible
roles suggested by vinous people (Wenzel 1996b).
The list includes the following options and exam-
ples:
1. Act« a network for a broad set of constituen-
cies. For example, represent the agricultural
community in reviewing a draft of Maryland's
Riparian Buffer Policy.
2. Use team diversity as a strength. For example,
come to a consensus on an issue, then use the
teams" diversity as a base for building politi-
cal and community support
3. Educate local communities about nutrient
problems and solutions. For example, hold a
workshop on BayScaping, or talk to a Rotary
Club about what individuals can do to prevent
nutrient pollution.
4. Implement specific nutrient reduction pro-
jects. For example, arrange for aerial seeding
of cover crops or local b«e planting projects.
5. Make recommendations to (lobby) all levels
of government to support nutrient reduction ef-
forts. For example, write a letter to EPA to
urge a workable solution to the Blue Plains
wastewater treatment plant permit
6. Undertake necessary followup actions to en-
sure that recommendations are implemented,
For example, tfter recommending nutrient re-
duction measures on federal military bases,
meet with decision makers to identify ways to
assist their efforts.
7. Influence state and local government budget
priorities. For example, write letters to deci-
sion makers in support of additional agricul-
tural technical assistance staff.
8. Identify alternative funding sources, such as
private grants or innovattvt approaches. For
example, write a grant to a private foundation
to support a horse pasture management pro-
gram.
One could add to this list the role of rewriting
strategies for tributaries, within the 40 percent goal.
What Should Be Done About the Mix of Team
Members? Unfortunately, incentives for individu-
als to devote time to any of these team roles are not
strong. Government employee members of teams
may view their appointment as part of their jobs,
but attending monthly evening meetings, plus pro-
viding additional •{forts for team activities, are
likely to take from members' personal time. Non-
government individuals have higher opportunity
costs; when engaging in team business, they must
give up other uses of their time. For some nongov-
ernment members, like retirees, the costs for giving
time to teams may be relatively low; but for others,
like people with business responsibilities, time
away from their own work would have a relatively
high cost.
What advantages do members obtain for their
participation? The benefits of nutrient reduction for
team members are lessened by the facts that they
are difficult to obtain, mostly in the future, and lo-
cated primarily downstream in the bay, rather than
upstream in the tributaries. Also, those benefits
will be available to all who access and use the prod-
ucts of a cleaner bay whether or not they contrib-
uted resources to tributary teams or to other
cleanup efforts. Some financial advantages to team
membership may be possible to two private
groups—farmers and private developers—both of
whom want to protect their incomes from nutrient
reduction policies that would impose regulatory
costs. But for developers, none of the strategies be-
ing pursued creates a threat to their business. Farm-
ers do have an interest in shaping cost-share
opportunities for the installation nf RMPs But for
most people, there are few tangible personal advan-
tages to team membership.
The incentive problem probably explains the ob-
servation that the balance between private and pub-
lic sector team members is shifting toward too
many government, too few private sector people. It
also lends credence to observers' concerns that the
teams are at risk of losing members and energy
over time. How might these concerns be answered
and the incentive problem solved?
One option, already being employed by the state
government, is to encourage a sense of community
among team members about protecting the bay,
Through certificates of gubernatorial appointment,
meetings with Bay Cabinet members, publication
of team reports, assistance by state employees, and
an annual meeting addressed by the governor, the
state government is sending a message that work
40
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Nutrient Control /Wfcfer in the Chesapeake Bay Sit
on tributary teams is important for the bay and
much appreciated by Maryland's citizens. But,
while necessary, this strategy may be insufficient
to keep team members engaged and active.
Another option for increasing incentives for
team participation and effort is to encourage teams
to shift a portion of their attcutiun tuwanls local,
upstream environmental issues such as drinking
water quality, wildlife habitat, and perhaps, urban
sprawl. This shift of attention would increase incen-
tives for members to participate in team activities
because it would make the potential benefits of
team efforts more obvious and more localized for
the enjoyment of team members and their families,
friends, and neighbors.
Should Teams Become Policy Advocates? The
state government could also hope to promote in-
creased activity and energy tn teams by encourag-
ing teams to advocate public policy positions.
Advocacy is attractive too, because it holds out the
potential for promoting government policies and
programs that assist the bay. But, unless advocacy
is based on a strong consensus within teams, there
are risks associated with this option. The teams
were designed to span diverse groups interested in
water quality issues, and they include government
representatives whose employers may be the object
of advocacy. Thus encouraging teams to take advo-
cacy positions, without emphasizing the need for
team consensus as its basis, risks internal dissen
tion and the alienation of team members.
Public policy advocacy is explicit or implied in
several of the eight roles for teams listed abov«.
For example, the first role, representing an Interest
group position in a policy consideration, risks alien-
ating team members who hold different positions.
Likewise, the third mle—educating communities,
the fourth—implementing projects, and the
eighth—obtaining grants, will avoid alienating
some team members oniy if there is a consensus on
a team that what they seek tn teach, implement, or
tad is right. The fifth and seventh roles, lobbying
governments and influencing budget priorities, also
imply a need for consensus; without such agree-
ments, those roles may put team members who are
representatives of governments that are being lob-
bied and influenced in untenable positions. Al-
though the transaction costs associated with
reaching consensus positions about controversial
water-quality issues-costs of time and energy.
spent in discussion, deliberation, and debate—are
undoubtedly high, such agreements would under-
gird team actions to educate, undertake projects,
seek grants, lobby governments, and influence
budget priorities.
An alternative to advocacy is to emphasize the
second role on the list—using team diversity as a
strength. By taking this role, teams could create
"neutral spaces" for themselves and for community
members to examine water-quality issues; explore
policy alternatives and their likely consequences;
inform decision makers; and perhaps, reach consen-
sus positions within teams and, if possible, among
citizens in their tributaries about what should be
done. In undertaking this role, team members need
not all agree on how to solve a public issues; ail
that is required is an agreement within teams that
policy decisions should be well informed and that
teams can assist information exchanges. Through
this option of using team diversity as a strength—a
vision of tributary teams as neutral ground for ex-
amining water quality issues—teams could associ-
ate with local stream and river associations, open
space advocates, and with organizations like
county Farm Bureaus, realtor associations, and
other interest group without advocating for any
particular group nor risking the alienation of some
team members. Teams have begun initiating work-
shops on controversial public issues related to nutri-
ent reductions. In the Spring of 1997, two teams *'
sponsored a meeting, attended by several dozen
farmers and environmentalists,about riparian for*
est buffers. Two other teams sponsored a meeting
on financing stormwater systems. And another
team is planning a workshop—for developers and
public officials—on erosion and sediment control
policies.
At this time in our nation's history individuals
and groups art cynical about political dialogue and
quick to take strident, advene positions on commu-
nity issues. Maryland's Tributary Teams offer an
institutional alternative to cynicism and adversity.
By providing a neutral setting for dialogues about
water quality issues, they may be able to assist
more reasoned and informed public policy deci-
sions.
Conclusions. Several lessons emerge from Mary-
land's effort to create watershed-based, muftistake-
holder teams. First, this is a difficult job. Given
Maryland's experience other states can expect
same resistance by state and local officials and by
interest groups; apathy among those interest groups
that do not feel threatened; ambivalence about the
mission of the teams; and some incentive problems
41
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Analyzing Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Problems:
in keeping members involved and active over the government—building grassroots organizations
long run. But given emerging public issues—non- seems increasingly valuable.
point source, land use, and public cynicism about
42
-------
5. How to Analyze Nonpoint Source
Water Pollution
The framework "situation-institutions-behavior-
performahce1' guided the collection of data about
nonpoint source policies in the signatory states.
That same framework provides an analytic lens
that, when used to view the descriptions of state
programs and the three case studies, suggests mean-
ings, implications, and criteria for judging the
value of such policies.
Situation
The signatory states are developing water qual-
ity policies in reaction to a common public issue—
nonpoint source nutrient pollution. Examination of
the states' activities provided many details about
the issue. The concept situation helps sort and
give meaning to these details.
For every public issue, there is a situation—a set
of characteristics that explains people's interde-
pendence, Nonpoint source nutrient pollution is no
different. Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia
are working on an issue with both physical and so-
cial characteristics.
Physical Characteristics
Nonpoint source nutrient water pollution, shares
some physical characteristics with other nonpoint
source environmental issues (Braden & Scgcrson
1993; Shortle and Abler ND), but also involves
unique characteristics of nutrient water pollution.
In general, the three states are forced to accept the
physical characteristics as unalterable givens and
must tailor their policy efforts to those givens. The
first one is site variability,
Site Variahility. Nutrient pollution processes
will vary across the basin because of site-by-site
differences in topography, soil qualities, surface
and groundwater flows, flooding potential, and cli-
mate. Related to site variability is am upstream-
downstream difference; upstream waters, because
they are more turbulent, are less susceptible to nu-
trient-related damage than at* downstream, more
stationary waters.
Costfy or Infeasible Monitoring of Pollution
Sources. To observe nonpoint source nutrient emis-
sions at their_ sources is costly because the sources
are, by definition, diffuse. Moreover, attempting to
trace the specific origin of nutrients, by sampling
water downstream, is technically infeasible be-
cause, nutrients from multiple sources mix and in-
teract A third option for monitoring
sources—assuming causation between fertilizer
purchases by individual homeowners and fanners
and nutrient emissions—is not valid; emissions of
nutrients are not necessarily correlated with fertil-
izer purchases because the timing and techniques
of fertilizer use—the when and where of nutrient
applications—critically affect levels of emissions.
Time Considerations. Permanent improvements
to water quality in the bay, through reduced nutri-
ent loadings, require continuous rather than one-
time-only changes in human behavior and
techniques. Moreover, water quality improvements
are likely to lag. for long perMvk nf time, behav-
ioral and technical changes. Lag effects occur be-
cause (1) most nitrogen flowing to the bay moves
down through the ground and then slowly, as meas-
ured by years or decades, through aquifers until it
reaches surface waters; and (2) phosphorus tends
to bind with soil and generally becomes part of
streambed sediments until it is scoured away by
random storm events.
Social Characteristics
As with the physical side of the situation, sev-
eral social characteristics attend nonpoint source
nutrient pollution in the Chesapeake Bay Basin.
Tlie following social factors help explain people's
intcrdependencies:
Incompatible Uses. Nutrient loadings to water in
the bay basin are one use of the bay—for waste dis-
posal. But if nutrient loadings to the bay and its
43
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Analyzing Nonpoint Source Water Pollution Problems:
tributary waters rise above a threshold level, they
will have adverse impacts on «~.tsiative uses of
those waters. In effect, nutrient loadings above the
threshold level make some other uses of die bay
water-^uses dependent on heallhy living re-
sources—incompatible. In 1987 the Chesapeake
Bay Program adopted an official threshold level
for nutrient loadings—60 percent of the 1985 con-
trollable baseline loadings for nitrogen and phos-
phorus. The goa!—to reduce nutrient loadings
below the threshold by the year 2000—would
make nutrient waste disposal and other uses of the
bay compatible again. But because the goal would
extend the 60 percent level as a cap in peipetuity,
nutrient loading will continue as a public issue;
those people who would use water to remove nutri-
ent wastes and those people who value other uses
of bay basin waters will remain interdependent
Resvurce Users In Unique Circumstances.
About fifteen million people live in the
Chesapeake Bay Basin. Signs over bathroom sinks
saying "The Bay Starts Here" remind us that each
individual among the millions affects the bay,
every day. But because the number of residents is
very large, it is difficult for a single individual to
realize that a change in her behavior will improve
the bay.
Adding to the complexity of the situation, indi-
viduals and organizations within the basin operate
in very different circumstances. For example, pri-
vate businesses can be expected to. use and dispose
of nutrients for different reasons than will house-
holds or governments. Among individuals, circum-
stances differ in ways that aic likely Ui afTcti the
use and disposal of nutrients—people's wealth and
income, amount of property owned, number of
automobiles driven, and so forth.
Moreover, the owner of each parcel of land in
the basin manages his property with a unique set of
knowledge, values, and goals. Landowners have
differing concerns about water quality issues, vari-
ous understandings of the relationship of their prop-
erties' physical characteristics to nutrient loadings,
and all manner of plans for the use of their land.
Thus site variability u social as well aa physical.
Uninformed Resource Users, Knowledge, or
more correctly the lack thereof, further complicates
the issue. Because the effects of nutrients on water
quality in the bay were recently discovered, are
complex, and are counterintuitive—"Aren't nutri-
ents good?—basin residents are likely to be not
well informed about the consequences of their nu-
trient-related behaviors on water quality.
High Exclusion Costs. It would be infeasible to
exclude people from enjoying the benefits of nutri-
ent reductions to the bay. Sport fishermen, boaters,
waterside property owners, watermen, seafood con-
sumers, and all others with an interest in improved
water quality will readily share the benefits; it
would be impossible to prevent that.
But beneficiaries will enjoy the improvements
whether of not we have contributed to paying for
them. High exclusion costs to the benefits of a
cleaner bay create a free-rider condition—whereby
beneficiaries will have a tendency to hope and ex-
pect that others will pay for the improvements that
ail can enjoy. The high exclusion costs/free rider
characteristic implies that private actions to correct
the nutrient pollution problem are unlikely to sat-
isfy people's preference for a cleaner bay. Private
individuals and organizations are unlikely to invest
sufficient funds to satisfy the demand for a cleaner
bay because they cannot sell the products their in-
vestments would create. Collective action is neces-
sary to make thoSfe investments.
Nonetheless, government programs to reduce nu-
trient loadinp will not be equally appreciated by
everyone; some people are likely not to value, com-
mensurate with tile cost of taxes they will pay to
produce, the benefits of cleaner water in the bay ba-
sin. They would prefer not to pay taxes (they are
unwilling riders) for nutrient reductions. To date,
public support for nutrient reductions in the signa-
tory jurisdictions raffle Bay Agreements seems
strong. But as the public costs of additional reduc-
tions of nutrient loadings increase, the states will
anticipate the prospect of increasing numbers of un-
willing riders and will consider means 10 make the
benefits of nutrient reductions better known and
more generally shared.
t/pstream-Downstream Access Differences. Al-
though exclusion costs to the benefits of a cleaner
bay are high across the basin, there are also geo-
graphic differences. Access to the living resources
enhanced by nutrient reductions will be mure
costly for upstream residents living near turbulent
water than it will be for downstream residents liv-
ing nearer to or on the bay. This access cost differ-
ence introduces tension into the question of who
will participate in the cleanup and who wil! pay for
bay improvements.
44
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Nvrient Control Policies in the CAeigpeafe Bav State*
Joint fmpaet. Assume that nutrient loadings to
the bay and its tributaries have been reduced to be-
low the threshold level. And assume, likewise, thai
other uses of the bay waters «J* somehow con-
strained so that depletion of living resources is not
occurring. At that time, uses of the bay's re-
sources—for nutrient disposal, fishing, and otter
means «f stynynumt—b*com* entirely compatible,
albeit at a maintenance cost to preserve water qual-
ity. At the point of full resource compatibility, an
additional person could begin using the bay with-
out adding any cost to the resource.
But at the point of full compatibility, a source of
conflict among users of the bay resources may be
expected nevertheless. That source—called the
joint-impact characteristic—will exist because at
lull compatibility, every user will have an incen-
tive to argue that he is the one adding no cost
(Johnston 1988) Who then will pay for maintain
ing the resource? The joint impact characteristic of
a clean bay—the marginal cost of an additional
user being zero—complicates the issue because it
implies potential conflict over who should pay for
maintaining the quality of the bay.
Policy Implications
Physical and social characteristics of nonpoint
source nutrient pollution imply significant chal-
lenges for public policy makers who are intent on
improving water quality in the bay basin. Lessons
from Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia imply
that if public jurisdictions are to mount successful
efforts to reduce nonpoint nutrient pollution, they
must overcome several barriers:
Site Variability: Tailoring and Targeting. Physi-
cal site variability implies that nonpoint source nu-
trient pollution will vary over space and time, thus
decision makers arc challenged 10 tailor and target
policies that induce site- and time-specific re-
sponses (Braden & Segerson 1993), The challenge
is heightened by the fact that site variability is so-
cial as welt as physical, the single most important
factor in determining the implementation of a pol-
icy on a specific site will likely be the preference
of the landowner.
A lesson from the bay states is that well-inten-
tioned, cost minimizing, onc-size-fits-all ap-
proaches to nonpoint nutrient water pollution are
inappropriate. To be effective, policy makers roust
be knowledgeable about the ways by which sites
differ-both socially and physically—and must de-
sign policies that are flexible enough to adjust to
site differences.
Cost of Enforcement: Incentives to Volunteers.
Because monitoring nonpoint source pollution-re-
lated behavior is costly, policy makers are chal-
lenged to design new mechanisms that can detect
«jid aoiKiiun noncompllance (Braden & Segerson
1993). But more practically, high costs for enforce-
ment imply the value of policies that create incen-
tives for private individuals to voluntarily
comply, thereby reducing the burden of monitoring.
Education. Common ignorance about nutrient
water pollution implies the value of education as a
policy method-most likely in combination with
other means to change behavior.
Time Considerations: Water Quality Benefits;
Co-benefits; (utd Multiple Bern/lit. Long lag-times
for nutrient pollution and the need for permanent—
rather than one-time-only—changes in nutrient-re*
loted behavior imply the importance of designing
policies that are continuous and sustainable—so as
to affect nutrient loads over a long span of time.
Moreover, lag times between changes in nutrient
loading and improved water quality suggest identi-
fying co-benefit! of nutrient i eduction and inform-
ing polluters of them and undertaking actions that
create multiple benefits. For example, a co-benefit
of nutrient management will almost invariably be
reduced fertilizer costs to fanners and lawn and
garden owners. Also an action such as riparian
vegetative buffer planting can create aesthetic,
wildlife habitat, property value, and increased in-
eom« benefits particularly fees fm hunting tmU
fishing rights—that complement a buffer's value ,
for nutrient reduction.
Barriers to Collective Actions. Having many re-
Source users raises the transactions costs needed to
work out solutions to nonpoint source nutrient pol-
lution of the bay. Likewise, the presence of a free
rider/unwilling rider condition, upstrcam-down-
stream access differences, and the joint-impact
characteristic imply interpersonal conflicts among
basin residents. In short, these characteristics are
all harnere to collective actions needed to reduce ,
nonpoint source nutrient loadings and keep them
below the threshold level. The 1983 Chesapeake
Bay Agreement and the Bay Program it created
overcame the initial barrier to collective action for
bay improvements. But as our understanding of the
consequences of nutrient pollution grows and as
new nonpoint source nutrient reduction policies get
45
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Analyzing Nonpotnt Source Water Pollution Problems:
considered, these characteristics will continue to
raise obstacles to additional collective efforts.
Policy makers thus will be challenged to en-
hance the sense of community, good neighborli-
ness, and conservation ethic across the basin. Also,
by identifying and increasing upstream benefits, co-
benefits of nutrient reduction, and personal bene-
fits to landowners and others in the basin, policy
makers would increase the likelihood that basin
residents will accept the additional costs, over
time, of reducing nutrient pollution.
Institutions
Recall that institutions are the format and infor-
mal "rules of the game," the "humanly devised con-
straints that shape human interaction" (North
1990). Institutions include laws, administrative
codes, customs, organizations, and traditions (Buse
& Bromley 1975). Institutions have shaped, and
are shaping the actions of the signatory states, as
they design and implement policies to reduce non-
point nutrient loadings. Moreover, the resultant
policies themselves are institutions—new sets of
rules intended to shape human behavior and
thereby improve water quality in the basin.
institutions That Shape State Actions
Among the rules of the game that are shaping
State actions to reduce nonpoint nutrient pollution,
three kinds of institutions are salient: private prop-
erty rights, multiple political jurisdictions, and
state government authorities.
Private Properly Rights. The fact that individual
landowners hold private property rights puts mean-
ing into the human side of site variability. Not only
do landowners have various preferences for their
land, they also have a very large, although not an
unlimited, influence in how their property is used,
American property rights law involves a balance
of private and public interests (Wunderlich 1995).
In recent years, the environmental movement has
raised the consciousness of citizens about their in-
terests in natural resource conservation, while the
private property rights movement has raised peo-
ple's consciousness to individual rights under the
law. Each movement has resorted to the courts to
protect its core values (Delaney 1996).
A principal cause of property rights advocatesls
an appeal to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion and the right it provides for landowners to be
compensated when a regulatory action results in a
taking of their property. Traditionally, public regu-
lation is hot considered a taking if a regulation sub-
stantially advances a legitimate state interest and
the owner is left with an economically viable use
of the property (McCubbm 1989). Until recently, a
property owner's remedy to a regulation that de-
nies the landowner economically viable use of his
or her land, or fails to substantially advance a legiti-
mate state interest, was invalidation. But court
cases have now well established that for an invalid
regulation, the landowner is compensable (Delaney
1996).
The courts have ruled that the cost of regula-
tions that are designed to benefit the community as
a whole should not be borne disproportionately by
a small segment of the community. Those ruling
are affecting efforts by Maryland, Pennsylvania,
and Virginia to balance the equities of common in-
terests in nonpoint source nutrient reductions and
private property rights. In their attempts to balance
equities, the three states are:
Using Collaborative Policy Development. Vir-
ginia's Chesapeake Bay Land Use Roundtable,
Pennsylvania's Casey Select Committee, and Mary-
land's Tributary Teams incorporate collaboration—
that is, bringing interest group representatives
together to negotiate bargains, mediate differences,
and achieve compromises—to identify interests
and balance equity. Collaboration is intended to
avoid problems commonly observed in interest
group politics—delay, self-serving attitudes, com-
petition without regard to the "broad spectrum of
interests," aosence of opportunity for deliberation,
and unbalanced, and as a result, Unstable policies
(McCubbm 1989).
In her study of Virginia's Roundtable, McCub-
bm offers the following recommendations for suc-
cessful collaborative methods (1989):
1. Include all affected interests,
2. Invite individuals as such, rather than as offi-
cial representatives of interest groups.
3. Use a mediator to define issues, clarify dis-
agreements, discover agreements, and explore
alternatives.
4, Strive for consensus.
Some observers argue that collaboration is the
best way to develop and implement land use/envi-
ronmental policies because it has the potential of
reducing transactions costs to achieve and imple-
46
-------
'States
ilty of involving
basis. Some inter-
Multiple
The
aa. -
lllt
COBflict; i
common versus private i
tad I use do not offer multitwdi win-
fS f ' O***** ^
fort to pass the commonwiaW.
Ac observed that after the
S- !LSlatOIS "d *e 8°cn»
ftsh-oned power politics" before
s-
*6 d!fflculties
eams suggest that
tton and substmtial support.
pol«cy arena by agricultural BMP cost-s
be,ng used by all three state,
a
S,5f "T18"*1 \Depaftnienf of ricul-
. The rationale are that there are in
for mandating behavior amo
of-
- j- - —.— w w W|B %Mt.V»*li?U
-- - -.m.™y; and site variahility
•«, K^- *. » f°f Wl"m8 P«Mp«fan by farm-
ersj»rocl.e & Powell 1995; Simpson!997) But
Abdalla notes (1996), because agricultural cost
^ JherebyDfcdJLi M
""
. But the effects of tod
boundaries;
^C actions *•
they create political
h Maryland's
rn o» t ln smil1
U) opportunities forcrtoens to "vote with
* ^ locating in jurisdictions where
ment best reflects their mfam; and
ern-
it the sma.
vesting authority in larger, more heteroge-
f,
fer to solve proWeras cxtend
jumdictional boundaries of small units.
-
later, centralized approach. In part th
•*"* 'rCi°f gOVC"»ncnt sh«^ have
S ISi°nC °f WhoSC Prefc«"«S should count.
t,ona| anrnngemente roay ta dtvi$ed how.
ever for authority sharing and for coordination to
acheve some advantages of both small and large
an
,
attempt to promote coordination without creating
47
-------
new authority. In contrast, Virginia's Bay Preserva-
tion Act represents a shift in legal authority from
local to state government Nevertheless, Virginia
state officials have created new institutions for co-
ordination and authority sharing by the ways they
have implemented the act Hie state government
provides technical assistance ro.small luwd units,
grants for regional actions by local governments,
and authority to local governments to adjust their
land use controls to local situations and conditions.
State Authorities. In essence, the case studies of
Virginia's Bay Preservation Act, Pennsylvania s
Nutrient Management Act, and Maryland's Tribu-
tary Teams are analyses of how individuals and or-
ganizations operated within complex sets of rules.
The studies provide, in certain instances, insights
about personal actions—Governor Baliles fight for
the Bay Preservation Aci, Representative Bartey «
shift in position after the 1992 election, and the
struggles of Governor Schaefer's sterffto create the
tributary teams in the face of resistance from all
sides. But out of all the detail of the case studies,
three general lessons about state institutions should
be apparent.
Sntify the Tvtal Policy Development Process—
Including Implementation. Public policy ta re-
sponse to an issue typically involves not only the
creation of legislation, but also the development of
rules for implementation. Both the Virginia and
Pennsylvania case studies illustrate the signifi-
cance of the implementation phase—how nales that
define or extend legislatures' words can shift
auihutily and can, thereby, pleas* or oflfend interest
groups.
Realize thai Institutions may be in Conflict. The
institutional context within which state potties are
developed is a complex mix of rules—some of
which may well be in conflict. Thus, for example,
once the Virginia General Assembly passed the
Bay Preservation Act, the commonwealth had to
overcome a eourt challenge based tin the opposing
legal tradition—that local governments had prt-
mary land-use control authority. Likewise, opposi-
tion to Pennsylvania's Nutrient Management
legislation primarily was offered by some agricul-
tural groups concerned about landowners* property
rights. And some public officials in both state and
local government resisted the formation of Mary-
land's Tributary Teams because the concept
seemed to threaten well-established relationships
and standard operating procedures.
Understand Agency Biases, State agencies func-
tion, in part, to represent certain interests within
government. The most obvious examples of this
ftom the state studies are the roles played by De-
partments of Agriculture in Pennsylvania and
Maryland. In Pennsylvania, agricultural interests
s«ece*d«l bririi in including the commonwealth's
Department of Agriculture in implementing the Nu-
trient Management Act; and, once the act was
passed, shifting some implementation authority to
Agriculture from the Department of Environmental
Protection. In Maryland, the Department.of Agri-
culture has been quite successful in making the
case for voluntary nonpoint source programs.
Behavior
Behavior may be thought of as people's re-
sponse to those incentives created by a situation
and by the institutions related to it {Johnston el al.
1988). Thus the concept is useful in understanding
responses to characteristics of the nonpoint nutrient
situation-such as incompatible uses, free riders
and unwilling riders, upstream-downstream differ-
ences, and joint impact; and related institutions-
such as private property rights, political
boundaries, and agency biases. Thinking about be-
havior also helps a person understand the signifi-
cance of policy designs created to avoid
unintended consequences—designs such as incen-
tives to promote voluntary behavior, co-benefits
and multiple benefits to gain people's acceptance,
collaborative policy development to balance equi-
ties, and authority sharing to achieve the benefits
of both centralized and devolved government.
Lastly the idea of behavior provides tne oasis tor
suggesting that Chesapeake Bay cleanup efforts are
creating a large social trap by cleaning water in the
bay basin, making the area more attractive as a
place to live and thereby increasing the costs of
maintaining clean water. In the absence of new,
highly efficient technologies for environmental pro-
tection, the trap implies, over time, either mounting
environmental expenses or environmental degrada-
tion-sinless fundamental changes in human behav-
ior, particularly the use of land, are made.
Performance
Performance refers to the outcomes of public
policies—the "who gets what" consequences. The
ultimate judgement of the performance of nonpoint
source nutrient reduction policies will be their abil-
ity to reduce nutrient loading. But monitoring the
nonpoint sources of nutrients is very costly or in-
-------
fftttrienl Control Polio*, /„ thf CfmSQ
'.Bay States
nutrient Ioadin« N^ts «f fc*-
*
n o «
may only be estimated at this
™« ""»
cess nutrient
tone. MMy
•« shown in Table 2.
Nevertheless, it is possible also to create some
Pr™™"" « fota ft,r nonpoint source nutrient
r^uction policies, based on characteristics of the
nonpomt source situation and on relevant mstitu-
tons. These criteria provide rationale for making a
«££*, ^Sements about how well « policy corre-
sponds to current knowledge about ihYnatare of
nenpomj t source nutrient water pollution (cf.
Rua*Il & Shogren 1993). BefoUowingare six
ZZZSZ Crite? -for nonpotet sourcc notrient
water pollution policies:
Ability to Tailor and Tar§et
^r*' £* physiai1 ind
** ls
ttl^£Z+*sp»>
'"
preferred to one that ignores varability and in
S ^ ^ ^^"^ Be<*use *V hive reh.
ttvely ow tawsactions costs between citizens and
officials and are likely, therefore, to be relatively
m drtails •-
ions, local political orgtnizations-^on-
on dMnctt, municipalities, and counties-
ve ^cular valu in tailoring a«ri targeting
AWJity to Effect and inforci
The cost or nonfeasiWlity of monitoring sources
v*'w °f ' '
• w! ° ' ^ ^ «• •n
sired behavior and enforce compliance. Effecting
desired behavior implies structuring appropriate in-
11* '
des
SUCCCS$ nonpoint source
Enforcing compliance rebukes m overseeing
body that ,s able to detect and sanction noncompli-
ance. Because water flows across jurisdktional
dSS?^*Sb*catee centralized Political juris-
oieuons—in this case, the stale and federal govern-
ments--^ monitor political externalities of
nonenforcement by local jurisdictions, centralized
junsdjctions have particular value in creating uni-
form enforcement.
Ability to Sustain
Because the benefits of nonpoint source nutrient
••"•"Sss^ssxsffi1
Ability to Create Co-Benefits
The Benefits of nutrient reductions i
unevenly—primarily because of the i
downstream factor. Moreover,
not value the water quality improvement induce,
by nutnem reductions (unwilling riders). Land-
owners, again, are in a position to make their pref-
erences count. Therefore, a policy that bundles
water quality improvements with other benefits
«* *s improved wildlife habitat, enhanced aes-
thetics, or increased property values, is preferred
«jr a poky with the single water quality beSt
Ability to Educate
s nutrient pollution is. ,wii
1 by landowners and is, in a wna^'couiih.
-.-._.,.,„ a policy that incorporates education of
nonpoint source polluters is preferred to one that
QQCS not.
Correlation with Water Quality
Because the ultimate goal of nonpoint source nu-
trient reduction policies is to improve water qual-
ity, that policy that has a direct and certain effect
on nutrient loadings would be valued over one that
has an uncertain effect, ceteris pan bus
Application of the Criteria to Case Study
Subjects
Although the subjects of the three case studies
are dissimilar—two are legislative acts, and one js
t new kind of watershed organization—the six per-
formance cntena, nevertheless, may be applied to
make some judgments about their value.
Virginia's Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act
Tins act, as implemented, involves an unusual com-
bination of state and local government authority in
1 idewater Virginia. The commonwealth assumed
pwer to effect and enforce water quality standards
m land-use plans and controls; but the power is ex-
ercised through local government actions and in
ways that provide opportunities for the local juris-
dictions to tailor and target their plans and ordi-
nances. Implementation of the act, while imperfect,
has spanned governors of two parties, and indica-
tions are the program is sustainable and improv-
49
-------
Analyzing Noryoint Source Water Pollution Problems:
able, over time. Improvements to local land use
planning aM control that result from state require-
ments and technical assistance are likely to have
multiple benefits—to landscape, wildlife habitat,
and both point and nonpoint improvements in
water quality. Administration of the act has in-
volved direct education ttbuul nonpoint source is
sues for local public officials and indirect
education, some through state grants, to local citi-
zens. The benefits of efforts to change land use, so
as to improve water quality, are mostly indirect—
and, as such, not as highly correlated, in the short
run, as other efforts like upgrades to waste water
treatment plans. But, in the long run, changes in
land use seem essential to avoid the emerging so-
cial trap of population growth/escalating environ-
mental protection costs in the Chesapeake Region.
Pennsylvania's Nutrient Management Act. Al-
though implementation rules weakened sedimenta-
tion provisions valued by environmentalists, this „
act places the commonwealth in a much stronger
position to effect and enforce controls over agricul-
tural animal waste than was the case with the Ma-
nure Management Manual. By focusing on
concentrated animal operations, working through
local conservation districts, and requiring individ-
ual farm management plans, the act and its imple-
mentation regulation provides for tailoring and
targeting of effort. Preemption of local government
regulation, while necessary perhaps for pining the
acceptance of farm groups, does reduce the influ-
ence of some local environmental groups. Broad
political acceptance of the act and its regulations,
albeit with som* reservations hy ffnvirrmmcntalists.
suggests the law is sustainable, even in a climate of
fiscal scarcity. Undoubtedly, assuming state Cost-
share funding, improvements to farm infrastructure
will create a co-benefit of increa.'sed property val-
ues, thus making the act more acceptable to farm
property owners. The individual planning process,
too, will educate farmers about best management
techniques of nonpoint source nutrients. Although
uncertainty «xists about the number of farms and
total acreage covered by the act, and although im-
provements to water quality will be delayed be-
yond initial expectations, by targeting concentrated
animal operations, most of which are in th*
Chesapeake Bay Basin, the act is highly correlated
with water quality improvements to the bay.
Maryland's Tributary Ttatns. The Tributary
Teams involve an innovative design co-created by
the state and multiple local governments and meant
to coordinate nutrient reduction efforts among
those jurisdictions in ten watershed-areas. The
teams' ability to tailor and target the state's water-
shed strategies has not been emphasized and, to
date, not exercised- The teams lack the authority to
effect and enforce changes in citizen behavior, but
they do have the ability to educate and exercise
moral suasion. Their educational ability and natu-
ral advantage extends too, to their potential role, al-
ready being initiated, in providing "neutral ground"
for conversations about controversial public issues
related to nutrient pollution. Their scope of interest
provides them opportunities to focus on efforts that
will be highly correlated with water quality and to
encourage upstream co-benefits of nutrient manage-
ment that will encourage participation by Mary-
land's citizens and political support for the state's
sizeable bay cleanup effort. The biggest questions
about the teams are whether they can avoid an ero-
sion of energy and declining private sector partici-
pation caused by an uncertain mission, the free
rider problem, and opportunity costs for private
members. If so, they could become a model for
other states. But "creating a grassroots movement
from the top-down" has proven to be a difficult
task, even though the State of Maryland has in-
vested much time, energy, and resources into that
effort.
50
-------
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53
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Appendix A
Contributors
Charles Abdaila
Suzanne Aucella
Roger Banting
John Barley
Russ Baxter
Bill Bostian
Charles Brosius
Karl Brown
Bill Browning
MarkBundy
Tom Burke
Mauro Chiavenni
Jim Cox
Scott Crafton
Malanie Davenport
Frank Dawson
Richard Douglas
Rich Eskin
Glenn Eugster
Gary Felton
Fran Flanigan
Ray Fomey
Rupert Friday
Jack Frye
Vic Funk
Lamonte Garber
Keith Gentzler
Caren Gbtfelty
Doug Goodlander
Ted Haas
Rich Hall
Jim Hannawald
Vema Harrison
Jerry Hollowell
Beth Horsey
Jay Howes
Richard Hutch inson
Bill Jenkins
Wayne Jenkins
Q Johnson
Cy Jones
Greg Kappler
Mike Krempasky
Scott Kudlas
LynnLanger
Kathleen Lawrence
Louise Lawence
Mtrya Levelev
Danielle Lucid
Joe Macknis
RussMadcr
Rob Magnien
Cecily Majerus
Paul Massicot
Bill Matuszeski
Ray Morgan
Tayloe Murphy
Dave Ncmazie
Sara Nunuez
Kenn Pattison
Theresa Piemo
Marge Podlick
Royden Powell
John Rhoderick
Wayne Rhodes
LoriRoeser
Len Shabman
Lynn Shuyler
Tom Simpson
Bill Stack
Bob Summers
Ann Pesiri Swanson
Paul Swartz
Joe Tassonc
Bob Tjaden
Lauren Wenzel
George Wolff
54
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PART II: More Questions About Bay Programs and Agriculture
Q IB What is being done by your state and local governments to
' preserve private land in the ' Bay . watershed in
agriculture?
Land truat.0
State or local land use controls
Q 2B What is being done in your state to improve the marketing
of animal wastes,' sludge, and other organic wastes?
Q 3B What are the current ' status - and trends in the ways
Chesapeake Bay ag NFS. programs works in your state, as
regards;
a. private involvement in 'planning the control and
management of nutrients; and in the finance,
design, construction, operation, and maintenance of
BMP structures?
b. regulation vs. voluntary participation in programs?
Q 4B What incentives are there for farm land owners in your
state to:
a. choose the least costly and most efficient
practices for controlling nutrients?
b. operate BMPs after they are installed?
c. maintain Bni4 structures after they are installed?
Q 5B What evidence is there about the level of operation and
maintenance of ag BMPs in your state?
Q 6B What evidence is ' there about the effects of Chesapeake
Bay ag NFS programs on:
a. fertilizer use in your state?
b. surface and ground water quality in your state?
-------
Part III
A Final Question for All States
Q 1C May I obtain copies of any reports you have submitted
since 1988 to your .legislature branch, executive branch,
about Chesapeake Bay program organiimtion, efforts {e.g.»
funding and resources), and piregjr*»» (e.g., acres
covered, BMP types and numbers, cost sharing
participants, or impacts on water quality)?
-------
Part I
Maryland Chesapeake Bay programs
Q 1MD How have Maryland's philosophy and goals for Chesapeake
Bay HI'S management changed in recent years?
Other changes '
Q 2MD How has the state's administrative structure, i.e.,
agencies responsible for Chesapeake Bay programs (p. 53),
evolved in recent years?
Q 3MD How, in recent years, has the Chesapeake Bay »g NFS
control program in Maryland evolved in its;
a. goals (p. 55}--
to. targeting approaches (p. 55) —
non participant land owners?
types of fans operations?
certain locations?
certain pollutants?
y-
c. cost share priorities (p. 56}--
d. technical assistance (p. 5?) —
e. research ana demonstration (p. 57} —
f. education {p. 59) —
g. enforcement (pp. 59-60)™
Q 4MD How, in recent years, has the Bay related urban NPS
control program evolved in its;
a. program approach (p.60)~
new eaphases on stoonwater management, runoff,
septic tanks?
b. targeting approaches (p. 60} —
c. implementation
-------
1 d.-research and developnent (pp.61-62)— •
e. education and training—
f. enforcement—'
Q 5MD How, in recent years, have these other Bay related NPS
programs evolved:
a. critical areas (pp.62-64)—
to. forestry (p.64)—
c. shoreline protection (p.64)--
d.-shoreline erosion control (p.64)—
e. surface sine reclamation (p.65)—
f. marine pumpout (p.65)—
g. innovative techniques for reducing nutrients (p.6§)—
h. Act 319 prograns—
i. other programs created in recent years—
-------
Part I
Pennsylvania Chesapeake Bay Programs
Q 1PA How have Pennsylvania's philosophy and goals Cor
Chesapeake Bay NFS management (p.39) changed during
Governor Ridge's Administration?
Tributary strategies
Other changes
Q 2PA How has the state's Chesapeake Bay NPS administrative
structure, i.e., agencies responsible for programs,
{p.40) evolved in the Ridge Administration?
Q 3PA How, in the Ridge Administration, has the Chesapeake Bay
mg UPS control program in Pennsylvania evolved in its:
a. goals (p.41)—
b. targeting approaches (p.42)--
non participant land owners?
types -of farn operations?
certain locations?
certain pollutants?
c. BMP financing (p.46)--
d. technical assistance (p.46)—
e. research and demonstration (p.46)—
f. education (p.48)—
g. enforcement (p,49)—
h. other ag-related projects (p.49)—
Q 4PA How, in the Ridge Administration, has the Chesapeake Bay
urban NPS control program evolved in its:
a. program approach (p.50)—
new emphases on stormwater management, runoff,
septic tanks?
b. targeting approaches—
-------
c. technical assistance in plan development (p.SO)—
d. research and development— . ",,
e. education and training (p.51)— *
/
f. enforcement (p.51)—
Q SPA How, in the Ridge Administration, have other Bay related
KPS control programs evolved:
,a. Act 319 in the Chesapeake watershed (p.51)—
to. soil erosion and sedimentation (p.si)—
c. earthmoving in forestry operations (p.51)—
d. acid mine drainage (pp.51-52)—
e. solid waste management (p.S2)--*
f. Dam Safety and Encroachments Act (p.52)—
g. homeowner education (p.52)—
h. other programs created by the Ridge Administration—
-------
Part I
Virginia Chesapeake Bay Programs
Virginia^ philosophy and goals for Chesapeake
(P"22) chan^« toi«g Governor Allen's
e.g. Tributary strategies
Other changes
s™c| Ch€:saPea*c »*y NFS administrative
structure, i.e., agencies responsible for programs
changed during the Allen Administration? Programs,
"iD?1 tht A1,len M»ln«tration, has the Chesapeake Bay
NFS control program in Virginia evolved in ita;
a. history and approach (pp. 24-25)--
b. targeting (pp. 25-27) —
non participant land owners?
types of farm operations?
certain locations?
certain pollutants?
c. implementation and cost share priorities (pp. 28-30) —
d. research and demonstration (pp.30-32)--
e. education and technical assistance (pp. 32-33) —
f. enforcement (p. 32) —
Q 4VA How, in the Allen Administration, has the Chesapeake Bay
urban NFS control program evolved in its:
a. program goals and approach (pp. 33-34) —
new enphases on stormwater management, runoff,
septic tanks?
b. targeting (p.34) —
c. technical assistance (p. 35) —
d, research and demonstration (pp. 35-3 6) —
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e. education (pp.36-37)
f. enforcement (p.37)
ft sv* HOW, !„ the Allen Administration, have other Chesapeake
Bay NFS programs evolved:
a. highway construction (p.37) —
b, mining (p. 3?) —
c. forestry (p.37) —
d, shoreline erosion (p.37)— *
e. drainfields and other waste disposal systems (p.37)-
£. conservation easeaneitts (p.38)
g. river basin committee (p.38> —
h. youtn conservation (p.38)
i. other programs created by the Allen Administration-
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Appendix B
interview Instrument: Nonpolnt Source
Control Programs in Md., Perm., and Va.
^firai?h HaS ^f P"* ™ first ^ contains ^es«°«s that refer to a
55
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