H^I^IHHMfc
The Water Security Research
and Technical Support
Action Plan V
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"We 're... taking significant steps to strengthen our homeland protections —
securing cockpits, tightening our borders, stockpiling vaccines, increasing security
at water treatment and nuclear power plants. "
President George W. Bush
June 6, 2002
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EPA/600/R-04/063
March 2004
WATER SECURITY RESEARCH AND
TECHNICAL SUPPORT ACTION PLAN
Office of Research and Development
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Cincinnati, OH 45268
and
Office of Water
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, DC 20460
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This document has been reviewed in accordance with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency policy and
approved for publication. Mention of trade names or commercial products does not constitute endorsement or
recommendation for use.
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan March 2004
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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20460
Foreword
We are pleased to share with you the Water Security Research and Technical Support Action
Plan (Action Plan). The Action Plan presents the results of a collaborative effort between the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), federal partners, the water industry, public health
organizations, and the emergency response community to identify the most pressing needs related
to drinking water and wastewater security. A draft of the Action Plan was peer-reviewed by the
National Research Council's Panel on Water System Security Research, which was organized in
response to a request by EPA. We thank the panel for their fast-track provision of valuable
comments and recommendations.
The Action Plan identifies critical research and technical support projects in the areas of physical
and cyber infrastructure protection; contaminant identification; monitoring and analysis;
treatment, decontamination, and disposal; contingency planning; infrastructure mterdependencics;
and risk assessment and communication. The projects described in the Action Plan are intended
to improve our understanding of the public health and environmental impacts of different kinds of
attacks on water infrastructure. This knowledge, when applied and integrated into practices of the
water security sector, will lead to improved awareness, preparedness, prevention, response, and
recovery from intentional acts against water systems.
The very nature of protecting the nation's water infrastructure is a dynamic and evolving process
that requires flexibility. The Action Plan will, therefore, be periodically updated to reflect new or
additional information on possible threats to water infrastructure and executive or legislative
mandates and directives on homeland security.
The water sector will benefit from the new knowledge, methodologies, tools and other products
generated as we implement this Action Plan.
E. Timothy Oppelt. Director Cynthia C. Dougherty, Director
National Homeland Security Research Center Office of Ground Water and Drinkin
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan March 2004
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Peer review is an important component of the Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan. The
peer review history for this document is as follows:
Partners Meeting November 20-21, 2002
Initial Internal Agency Review: January 18-21, 2003
Stakeholders Meeting: February 5-7, 2003
Second Internal Agency Review: April 1-4, 2003
National Academies External Peer Review: May 8-9, 2003 and July 17-18, 2003
Reviewers:
Garret P. Westerhoff, Chair, Malcolm Pirnie, Inc., White Plains, NY
Gregory B. Baecher, University of Maryland, College Park
Joseph A. Cotruvo, Joseph Cotruvo and Associates, Washington, DC
Gunther F. Craun, Gunther F. Craun and Associates, Staunton, VA
Charles N. Haas, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA
James B. McDaniel, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Los Angeles, CA
Charles R O'Melia, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD
David M. Ozonoff, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston, MA
Kerry Kirk Pflugh, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Trenton, NJ
David A. Reckhow, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA
David P. Spath, California Department of Health Services, Sacramento, CA
Marylynn V. Yates, University of California, Riverside, CA
Consultant to the Panel:
David R. Siburg, Kitsap Public Utility District, Poulsbo, WA
National Research Council Staff:
Stephanie E. Johnson, Study Director
Laura J. Ehlers, Senior Staff Officer
Dorothy K. Weir, Project Assistant
Coordinated by: Stephanie Johnson
Water Technology Science Board
National Research Council
500 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20001
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan March 2004
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Section Page
Notice ii
Foreword iii
Peer Review iv
Acknowledgments vii
Acronyms and Abbreviations viii
Executive Summary ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Purpose of the Action Plan 2
1.2 Laws and Documents Driving the Action Plan 3
1.3 Process for Development of the Action Plan 3
1.4 Information Users and Communication 4
2 Action Plan Background 5
2.1 EPA's Pre-September 11th National Security Role 6
2.2 EPA's Evaluation of Past and Present Contamination Threat Information 6
2.3 Public Heath Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 7
2.4 The National Strategy for Homeland Security 8
2.5 EPA's Strategic Plan for Homeland Security 8
2.6 National Research Council Report 9
3 Drinking Water System Protection and Security 11
3.1 Protecting Drinking Water Systems from Physical and Cyber Threats 12
Key Research or Technical Support Questions 12
3.1.1 Needs and Associated Projects 12
3.2 Identifying Drinking Water Threats, Contaminants, and Threat Scenarios 14
Key Research or Technical Support Questions 14
3.2.1 Needs and Associated Projects 14
3.3 Improving Analytical Methodologies and Monitoring Systems for Drinking Water 16
Key Research or Technical Support Questions 16
3.3.1 Needs and Associated Projects 17
3.4 Containing, Treating, Decontaminating, and Disposing of Contaminated
Water and Materials 21
Key Research or Technical Support Questions 21
3.4.1 Needs and Associated Projects 21
3.5 Planning for Contingencies and Addressing Infrastructure Interdependencies 26
Key Research or Technical Support Questions 26
3.5.1 Needs and Associated Projects 26
3.6 Targeting Impacts on Human Health and Informing the Public about Risks 27
Key Research or Technical Support Questions 28
3.6.1 Needs and Associated Projects 28
4 Wastewater Treatment and Collection System Protection 31
Key Research or Technical Support Questions 31
4.1 Needs and Associated Projects 32
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan March 2004
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Section Page
5 Implementing the Action Plan 36
5.1 Collaborative Research and Technical Support 36
5.1.1 Distribution System Research Consortium 36
5.2 Technology Advancement through Testing, Evaluation, and Verification 37
5.3 Information Sharing 37
5.3.1 Information Users 38
5.3.2 Information Products 38
5.3.3 Information Dissemination Methods 39
6 References 40
Figure Page
1.1 The Context of Research and Technical Support Relative to the EPA's Water
Security Program 1
1.2 Flow Chart for Navigating the Water Security Research and Technical Support
Action Plan 2
2.1 EPA Is the Designated Lead Federal Agency for Protecting the Water Sector, From
Source Water Through Use, Treatment, and Discharge 5
Table Page
2.1 Federal Government Organization to Protect Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets 6
5.1 Potential Users of Research and Technical Support Information Developed
Under This Action Plan 38
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan March 2004
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-,-. -•:;-
The Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan was prepared by Office of Water (OW) and
Office of Research and Development (ORD) scientists and engineers. Co-leaders were Jonathan Herrmann of
ORD and Hiba Shukairy of OW (September 2002 through May 2003). Grace Robiou led the OW contributions
beginning in June 2003.
Major contributors included: Steve Allgeier (OW), Curt Baranowski (OW), Eletha Brady-Roberts (ORD), Kim
Fox (ORD), Alan Hais (ORD), Jonathan Herrmann (ORD), Richard Hertzberg (ORD), Eric Koglin (ORD), Alan
Lindquist (ORD), Matthew Magnuson (ORD), Scott Minamyer (ORD), Dan Murray (ORD), Regan Murray
(ORD), Grace Robiou (OW), Hiba Shukairy (OW), and Kenneth Stone (ORD).
Numerous helpful comments were provided during several reviews by Janet Pawlukiewicz (OW), Tim Oppelt
(ORD), and Cayce Parrish (formerly OW, now EPA's Office of Homeland Security). Virginia Hodge (SAIC)
was most supportive in preparing the peer review draft and draft final versions of the Water Security Research
and Technical Support Action Plan.
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan March 2004
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CDC
DHS
DoD
DOE
DSRC
EPA
ETV
EWS
FDA
GIS
HSPD
IAG
ISAC
LD50
MOU
NBC
NEMI
NHSRC
NOAEL
NRC
FDD
PL
POU/POE
QSAR
SCADA
TSWG
WERF
WPTF
WSD
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Distribution System Research Consortium
Environmental Protection Agency
Environmental Technology Verification
early warning system
Food and Drug Administration
geographic information system
Homeland Security Presidential Directive
Interagency Agreement
Information Sharing and Analysis Center
lethal dose 50 (dose causing death in 50% of the exposed animals)
Memorandum of Understanding
nuclear, biological, or chemical
National Environmental Methods Index
National Homeland Security Research Center
no-observed-adverse-effect-level
National Research Council
Presidential Decision Directive
Public Law
point-of-use/point-of-entry
Quantitative Structure Activity Relationship
supervisory control and data acquisition
Technology Support Working Group
Water Environment Research Foundation
Water Protection Task Force
Water Security Division
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan
March 2004
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r 5.
V „,
Water — every drop of it — is a precious natural
resource that Americans once enjoyed with little
thought to potential tampering by terrorists or
others. Today, however, U. S. citizens are
increasingly aware of threats of harm to our
homeland. The terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, and the delivery of anthrax-contaminated
letters later that year have taught all of us to
anticipate that threats to water are possible.
Terrorist threats are targeted not just at individuals,
but also at the country's vital institutions and
infrastructure, including the nation's drinking water
and wastewater systems. Government, water
utilities, state and local water agencies, public
health organizations, emergency and follow-up
responders, and academia, as well as the private
sector from across the country must be ready to
protect water infrastructure. These organizations
are working together to reduce vulnerabilities to
terrorism, prevent and prepare for terrorist attacks,
minimize public health impacts and infrastructure
damage, and enhance recovery from any attacks
that may occur.
r \ -
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act (Bioterrorism Act)
of 2002 is the legislative mandate for the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) work in
water security. This law, coupled with executive
directives and the Agency's own strategic plan for
homeland security, guide the Agency's research and
technical support activities to protect the water
infrastructure. The Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD) 7, Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,
reinforces EPA's role as the sector-specific lead for
water infrastructure. It also assigns the
responsibility of coordinating the overall national
effort to protect critical infrastructure and key
resources of the United States to the Department of
Homeland Security.
As the sector-specific federal lead for protecting the
nation's drinking water and wastewater
infrastructures, EPA plays a critical role in the
homeland security arena. To meet these
responsibilities, the Agency's Office of Water
established the Water Protection Task Force. The
Task Force was formally organized as the Water
Security Division (WSD) in August 2003.
Additionally, the Agency's Office of Research and
Development (ORD) officially established the
National Homeland Security Research Center
(NHSRC) in February 2003. These organizations
work together in providing research and technical
support to the drinking water and wastewater
sectors.
NHSRC's Water Security Team contributes by
conducting applied research and then reporting on
ways to better secure the nation's water systems
from threats and attacks. The Team is producing
analytical tools and procedures, technology
evaluations, models and methodologies,
decontamination techniques, technical resource
guides and protocols, and risk assessment methods.
All of these products are for use by EPA's key
water infrastructure customers — water utility
operators, public health officials, and emergency
and follow-up responders. Other research programs
in NHSRC deal with the protection of buildings and
rapid risk assessment.
WSD provides support to drinking water and
wastewater systems by preparing vulnerability
assessment and emergency response systems and
tools, providing technical and financial assistance,
and developing information exchange mechanisms.
WSD is also charged with supporting best security
practices, providing security enhancement
guidance, and incorporating security into the day-
to-day operations of the drinking water and
wastewater industries. In addition, WSD works
closely with NHSRC in delivering research results
in a timely and appropriate fashion.
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March 2004
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Along with providing research and technical
support, both NHSRC and WSD encourage
information sharing and risk communication
strategies among key water infrastructure
customers. This includes making use of the Water
Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(WaterlSAC).
To better understand the security problems of the
water industry in the United States, EPA has
engaged with numerous water experts and
stakeholders from government, industry, and
academia. Other key participants are
representatives from public health organizations,
emergency responders and follow-up responders,
law enforcement officials, environmental groups,
and related professional associations.
As a result of these meetings, EPA has gained
valuable insights on the vulnerabilities and
technical challenges facing the water industry for
which research and technical support are crucial.
With assistance from other federal agencies and
contractors, both WSD and NHSRC are addressing
these challenges. Issues, needs, and projects are
summarized in this comprehensive Water Security
Research and Technical Support Action Plan,
hereafter referred to as the Action Plan.
Much of the work described in the Action Plan has
begun, and what is not underway will start over the
next few months. The Action Plan must be
recognized as a snapshot in time. As new
information is developed on threats, contaminants,
and threat situations, adjustments will most
certainly be necessary. Revisions to the Action
Plan will be made periodically based on input from
others dealing with drinking water and wastewater
security. The Action Plan will also evolve based on
the changing needs in the homeland security arena.
The Action Plan addresses drinking water supply,
water treatment, finished water storage, and
drinking water distribution system infrastructure. It
also addresses wastewater treatment and collection
infrastructure, which includes sanitary and storm
sewers or combined sanitary-storm sewer systems,
wastewater treatment, and treated wastewater
discharges.
In various meetings with EPA, federal partners and
water stakeholders discussed issues, needs, and
projects to secure water infrastructure and safeguard
water quality. The Action Plan developed as a
result of these meetings describes research and
technical support that addresses many questions
focused on protecting water infrastructure. Some of
the questions are as follows:
Drinking Water Questions
• What are the most plausible threats,
contaminants, and threat scenarios facing the
drinking water industry? How does this
information compare with intelligence
information on possible threats?
• What types of biological and chemical
contaminants could be introduced into water
systems and what are their physical, chemical,
and biological properties? What are the
potential health impacts of these contaminants?
• What are the most effective means to detect
contaminants in water? How can this
information be combined with reporting,
analysis, and decision making to arrive at a
reliable and cost-effective early warning
system?
• Can effective methods be developed to ensure
that a sufficient number of qualified
laboratories exist to perform rapid analysis of
water contaminants in the event of an attack?
• If contaminants were introduced into a water
system, where will they travel? How quickly
will they travel? What will be their
concentration at various points along their path?
Can human exposures and the health impacts of
these contaminants be effectively minimized?
• How can water that has been contaminated be
effectively treated so that it can be released to
wastewater systems or otherwise disposed of?
• Are alternative water supplies available in the
event of an attack? How would water utilities
or governments most effectively supply clean
water to affected communities and businesses
in both the short and long term?
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan
March 2004
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What are the routes of human exposure to
contaminants if a water system were attacked?
What are the acute and chronic impacts from
these exposures and can they be adequately
represented based on existing risk information?
Can a health surveillance network be
established to rapidly identify disease outbreaks
associated with contaminated water? Are there
other means of providing early warnings or
alerts from water contamination using surrogate
health data?
What are the risks of hazardous substances that
may be introduced into wastewater treatment
systems?
Can intrusion and surveillance monitoring
technologies be improved to rapidly detect
water contamination and alert authorities should
a wastewater facility be compromised?
Are alternative wastewater treatments and
discharge locations available in the event of an
attack?
What are the most plausible threats,
contaminants, and threat scenarios facing the
wastewater industry? How does this
information compare with intelligence
information on possible threats?
i "•r-l-niation
How best can emergency responders, public
health officials, health care providers, and the
public be effectively and efficiently informed in
the event of an attack?
What are some risk communication principles
that drinking water and wastewater systems
could employ to belter respond to crisis
situations?
ai, "•'' r.'L-
Results from federal partner and water stakeholder
meetings are organized in the Action Plan under the
seven issues listed below. Each issue describes
significant research needs and lists specific projects
for each need. Although the Action Plan focuses
primarily on biological, chemical, and radiological
contaminants in drinking water systems, it also
addresses physical and cyber threats, contingency
planning, risk assessment, risk communication, and
infrastructure interdependencies:
Protecting drinking water systems from
physical and cyber threats
Identifying drinking water threats,
contaminants, and threat scenarios
Improving analytical methodologies and
monitoring systems for drinking water
Containing, treating, decontaminating, and
disposing of contaminated water and materials
Planning for contingencies and addressing
infrastructure interdependencies
Targeting impacts on human health and
informing the public about risks
Protecting wastewater treatment and collection
systems.
How these issues are being addressed and the
resulting products delivered are described in the
Chapter 5 of the Action Plan. The following
approach is being used:
Enhancing collaborative research and technical
support
Providing for technology advancement through
testing, evaluation, and verification
Sharing information in both secure and open
fashions.
Some of the research and technical support needs
are identified below:
Ensure the protection of existing water
infrastructure
Enhance cyber security and other external
means of disrupting water systems
Identify and characterize threats that could be
used to disrupt water systems
Develop methods for detecting and monitoring
contaminants in water
Create rapid screening technologies for the
identification of unknown contaminants
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March 2004
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Test and evaluate the performance of sensors
and biomonitors
Improve detectors and early warning systems
for water distribution and collection systems
Enhance models for contaminant transport in
pipes and distribution systems
Refine fate and transport information for
contaminants in water
Develop treatment or inactivation techniques
for water contaminants
Evaluate and improve decontamination and
disposal techniques for contaminated materials
and equipment
Establish contingency planning and
infrastructure backup procedures
Improve methods for assessing risks to the
public from water contamination
Enhance risk communication and information
sharing among individuals and organizations
dealing with a threat or attack
Provide training and exercises that enhance
preparedness, response, and mitigation to water
system threats or attacks.
The challenges facing EPA in securing water
infrastructure are interdependent and complex. The
goal of the Action Plan is to provide useful and
timely products to key water infrastructure
customers that help protect drinking water and
wastewater systems.
EPA's research and technical support activities will
result in various types of products, tools, and
technologies. There are a variety of groups that will
use the information developed under the Action
Plan:
Water industry representatives
State, regional, and local response organizations
Public health officials and organizations
Federal agencies and departments
Laboratories with water sample testing
capabilities
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan
Academia and consulting firms
Elected officials and the public.
Because of the diverse nature of the above
information users, the products must be tailored to a
variety of audiences. Publicly available interim
research products will be placed on NHSRC's Web
site at: http://www.epa.gov/ordnhsrc. An Internet-
based catalog with publicly available products from
both WSD and NHSRC will be located on the WSD
Web site at: http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security.
Some examples of products include, but are not
limited to:
Computerized data compendiums
Response guides and protocols
Technical resource documents, case studies,
and model procedures
Laboratory methods and protocols
Communication tools and frameworks
Technology screening, evaluation, and
verification
Workshops and training
Computerized tools and software systems
Risk assessment methods and procedures
Journal articles, fact sheets, and technical
bulletins.
Work in progress will be shared in open forums
such as journals, Web sites, and meetings. If the
information is sensitive, it will be provided using
more limited venues such as the WaterlSAC. EPA
information clearinghouses, booths at conferences
and workshops, and announcements and press
releases will be used to deliver Action Plan results
as well.
With a long history in environmental protection,
and assessing and managing risks, EPA is well-
positioned to develop the tools and technologies
that address threats to and attacks on drinking water
and wastewater systems. As the lead for the
research under this Action Plan, NHSRC is
providing information that can be quickly used by
those with a stake in securing the water system
March 2004
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infrastructure. As the lead for technical support to WSD will continue to foster this kind of an
key customers in the water arena, WSD is charged approach by routinely engaging individuals and
with a much broader responsibility that is informed organizations with a vital interest in water security.
by NHSRC's research. This allows for quick adaptation of the Action Plan
to meet the most pressing needs in protecting water
The Action Plan is a collaborative undertaking that infrastructure from terrorist threats and attacks.
involves EPA and many others. Both NHSRC and
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan March 2004
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Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan
March 2004
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The citizens of the United States face increased
threats of harm since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and the delivery of anthrax-
contaminated letters later that year. These threats
relate not just to individuals, but also to the
country's vital institutions, systems, and
infrastructure. The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) provided its detailed response to
water-related threats in the Strategic Plan for
Homeland Security (hereafter called the EPA
Strategic Plan) [Ref 1]. The EPA Strategic Plan
defines the Agency's responsibility to protect the
nation's water and wastewater systems, and is
described in greater detail in Chapter 2 of this
document.
As the lead federal agency protecting water systems
from terrorist attacks, EPA efforts focus on physical
security, cyber security, and the risk associated with
delivery of chemical, biological, and radiological
contaminants into water systems. This approach
fits well within the Agency's mission of protecting
public health and safeguarding the natural
environment upon which life depends.
As illustrated in Figure 1.1, EPA is working to
improve the security of drinking water and
wastewater systems by focusing on financial
assistance, the development of tools and training,
emergency response, incorporation of security into
the water business, information sharing, and
Water Security
Figure 1.1. The Context of Research and Technical Support Relative to the EPA's Water Security Program
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan March 2004
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research and technical support. The Water Security
Division (WSD) has developed numerous projects
to satisfy the needs of the water industry in these
areas. Research and technical support is only one
component of the EPA's water security program.
The National Homeland Security Research Center
(NHSRC) is collaborating with the WSD to identify
and address research and technical support needs.
The WSD and NHSRC have worked with federal
partners and stakeholders to develop and implement
this comprehensive Water Security Research and
Technical Support Action Plan (hereafter referred to
as the Action Plan), which will undergo periodic
updating as issues evolve and additional needs are
recognized.
The products that result from this Action Plan will
be contained in a comprehensive and integrated
catalogue. Types of products may include Web
sites, response guides, reports, compendiums,
handbooks, technical resources, workshops,
seminars, training, exercises, information systems,
newsletters, model protocols, journal articles, and
risk communication strategies. This continually
updated catalogue of available products, as well as
many of the products themselves, will be available
through EPA Web sites. EPA also envisions that
hard copies of the catalogue and products will be
available through EPA information clearinghouses.
The actual structure of the catalogue is still
undergoing development and will evolve as
products are produced and venues for sharing
information become more refined.
1,1 of the
The purpose of the Action Plan is to: (1) identify
important water security issues for drinking water
and wastewater, (2) describe research and technical
support needs that address these issues, and (3)
present a list of projects that are responsive to the
identified needs. To accurately represent the needs
of the water sector, representatives of the water
industry and other stakeholders, in collaboration
with EPA and its federal partners, proposed and
refined the issues and needs presented in the Action
Plan throughout 2003.
Figure 1.2 aids the reader in navigating the chapters
of the Action Plan. Each section of Chapters 3 and
4 begins with the key research and technical support
questions to be addressed. From these questions,
needs were developed and projects defined to meet
those needs.
the
Chapter 1.0
Introduction
Chapter 2.0
Background
Chapter 3,0
Drinking Water Issues
- Key Questions
-Needs
Projects
I
Collaborative Research
and Technical Support
Chapter 5,0
Implementation
Technology
Advancement
Chapter 4.0
Wastewater Issues
Key Questions
Needs
Projects
Information
Sharing
Figure 1.2. Flow Chart for Navigating the Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan
March 2004
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The Action Plan focuses on both drinking water
(Chapter 3) and wastewater (Chapter 4), and
addresses needs and projects in the following areas:
Physical protection of the water infrastructure,
including cyber security
Identification and characterization of
contaminants
Monitoring and detection of contaminants
Containment, treatment, decontamination, and
disposal of contaminated materials
Contingency planning and infrastructure
interdependencies
Risk assessment and risk communication.
Chapter 5 describes Action Plan implementation,
and includes discussions on research collaboration,
technology advancement, and information sharing
activities.
Research and technical support for water security
must be responsive to and, more importantly,
forward thinking in ensuring that water supplies and
systems remain safe and secure. Three principal
drivers led to the development of this Action Plan,
and were critical in framing the research and
technical support needs in Chapters 3 and 4. These
drivers were:
The EPA Strategic Plan for Homeland Security
(September 2002) [Ref.l]
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act (June 2002)
[Ref 2]
A set of research and technical support needs
prepared by the EPA's Water Protection Task
Force (WPTF), now WSD (February 2002).
These are described in more detail in Chapter 2, and
will enable EPA to measure its progress as this
Action Plan is implemented in the coming years.
EPA will continue to identify and respond quickly
to additional water security needs throughout the
implementation of this Action Plan. The threats to
water infrastructure are dynamic and change based
on information gathered by the intelligence
community and from other sources.
1,3 for
Using the drivers presented above and the
additional guiding documents discussed in Chapter
2, EPA convened a meeting of federal partners
(Water Security Research Partners Meeting,
Cincinnati, Ohio) in November 2002, to discuss and
refine water security issues and needs. The
Cincinnati meeting also included a number of water
utility representatives. Based on the invaluable
input from meeting participants, the Action Plan
was prepared and presented at a meeting of
stakeholders (Water Security Research Stakeholders
Meeting, Washington, DC) in February 2003. The
Action Plan was well received by the stakeholders,
and additional needs and projects were proposed
that were included in a Peer Review Draft of the
Action Plan. In developing and implementing this
Action Plan, EPA has made it a point to engage:
Drinking water and wastewater utilities, water
organizations, and other water stakeholders
Public health officials and organizations
Emergency and remedial response
organizations.
The next step in developing this Action Plan was to
obtain peer review from a representative group of
water experts. The purpose of the May 2003 and
July 2003 meetings with the National Research
Council (NRC) of the National Academies was for
EPA to consult with an independent peer review
panel and obtain their assessment of this Action
Plan. Comments were received from the peer
review panel on July 28, 2003 and October 15,
2003. EPA reviewed these comments, and
incorporated most of them into this Action Plan.
EPA also worked with the Water Environment
Research Foundation (WERF) to more fully
develop needs and projects related to improving
wastewater security. EPA and WERF collaborated
to conduct a stakeholder wastewater security
symposium in Washington, DC in August 2003.
The needs and projects for wastewater security
identified at the WERF symposium are also
reflected in this Action Plan.
Some projects described in this Action Plan are
essential to EPA's homeland security efforts and
have already started (in 2002 and 2003), while
others are being initiated in fiscal year 2004. Some
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan
March 2004
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of the critical needs already being addressed relate
to threat assessment; contaminant identification and
methods development; technology testing,
evaluation, and verification; and distribution system
modeling.
The needs and associated projects identified in this
Action Plan are another step in the direction of
enhancing national water security. The Action Plan
is designed to describe the universe of water
security needs as best understood at the present
time.
The projects presented in this Action Plan do not
reflect resources or who will be addressing them;
such decisions will be made as budgets are
allocated. This likely will mean that important
needs and projects will have to be addressed by
others with a vested interest in protecting the
nation's water systems. Such organizations include
other federal agencies, the water industry and its
research organizations, and to some degree the
private sector.
' .
Information from Action Plan activities must be
conveyed and communicated in a timely and useful
fashion. This approach is confirmed by statements
in the National Strategy for Homeland Security [Ref
3], which describes a national vision of information
sharing - a "system of systems" that "provides the
right information to the right people at all times."
According to this vision, "... information will be
shared 'horizontally' across each level of
government and 'vertically' among federal, state,
and local governments, private industry, and citizens
... [so that] ... homeland security officials ... can
have complete and common awareness of threats
and vulnerabilities as well as knowledge of the
personnel and resources available to help address
those threats."
A variety of organizations and individuals will be
involved along the continuum of preparing for,
preventing, and responding to a threat to or attack on
a water system. Examples include:
Water industry representatives
State, regional, and local response organizations
Public health officials and organizations
Federal agencies and departments
111 Laboratories with water sample testing
capabilities
111 Academia and consulting firms
111 Elected officials and the public.
As either NHSRC or the WSD produces new
information under this Action Plan, all of the above
users will be considered.
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Chapter 2
Action Plan Background
In the President's National Strategy for Homeland
Security [Ref. 3] published by the Office for
Homeland Security in July 2002, EPA is designated
as the lead federal agency for protecting the water
sector, from source water through use, treatment,
and discharge (see Figure 2.1). This designation is
consistent with Presidential Decision Directive
(PDD) 63 (see Table 2.1) [Ref. 4].
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act [Ref. 2] signed by
President Bush in June 2002 specifies several
activities EPA must take to help community water
systems improve security. Most recently,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)
7, Critical Infrastructure Identification,
Prioritization, and Protection [Ref. 5], directs the
EPA to identify threats and take the lead role in
protecting drinking water and wastewater treatment
systems. These and other documents describe
EPA's expanded role in countering terrorism,
thereby ensuring that the nation's water systems are
safe and secure.
The rest of this Chapter summarizes the key
documents that support EPA's role in water security
research and technical support. It provides the
rationale and background information that was used
to develop this Action Plan. These documents
include Executive Orders, PDDs, internal EPA
evaluations, the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
(Public Law [PL] 107-188 [hereafter referred to as
the Bioterrorism Act]), the National Strategy for
Homeland Security (hereafter referred to as the
National Strategy), the EPA Strategic Plan for
Homeland Security (hereafter referred to as the
EPA Strategic Plan), and a report by the NRC
entitled Making Our Nation Safer: The Role of
Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism.
Source ^Treatment^Distribution ^Sewer/Treatment ^Discharge
Ground Water
Wells
Post Treatment
Storage
Booster
Pumps
River
Modified from a graphic provided by Sandra National Laboratories
Figure 2.1. EPA Is the Designated Lead Federal Agency for Protecting the Water Sector, From Source
Water Through Use, Treatment, and Discharge
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2.1 11th
EPA has long held responsibilities related to national
security. Executive Order 12656, Assignment of
Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, directs
the Agency to take on two responsibilities: (1)
develop guidance on acceptable emergency levels of
nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) materials,
and (2) develop plans to ensure the availability of
potable water after a national security incident [Ref.
6, Part 16]. Several legislative acts also shape EPA's
role in responding to national security emergencies,
including the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act [Ref. 7],
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act [Ref. 8], the Clean Water Act [Ref. 9], the
Oil Pollution Act [Ref. 10], and the Clean Air Act
[Ref. 11], among others.
PDD 39, United States Policy on Counterterrorism,
signed by President Clinton in June 1995, requires
all federal agencies to plan and prepare for terrorist
attacks. In particular, PDD 39 requires EPA to
provide environmental response support to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in the case of an
NBC or any weapon of mass destruction event [Ref.
12]. Also, PDD 63, Critical Infrastructure
Protection, signed in May 1998, introduces a
public/private partnership to protect the nation's
critical infrastructure and ensure the orderly
functioning of the economy and critical services.
The partnership is responsible for assessing the
vulnerabilities of the water sector to cyber or physical
attacks, recommending a plan to eliminate significant
vulnerabilities, proposing a system for identifying and
preventing major attacks, and developing a plan for
reconstituting essential capabilities after an attack.
PDD 63 lists water systems as part of the nation's
critical infrastructure and designates EPA as the lead
agency for protecting water systems from intentional
attacks [Ref. 4]. PDD 63 also "...strongly
encourages the creation of a private sector
information sharing and analysis center [ISAC] for
critical infrastructures" The Association of
Metropolitan Water Agencies is the lead for the
WaterlSAC, which was launched in December 2002
[Ref. 13].
2.2 EPA's of Past
In response to the events of September 11, 2001,
EPA created the WPTF in the Agency's Office of
Ground Water and Drinking Water. The WPTF,
later formalized as the WSD, works with drinking
water and wastewater systems personnel to enhance
their security. One of the first efforts of the WSD
was to evaluate past and present research related to
the contamination of drinking water. EPA
convened an interagency meeting to gather the
latest information regarding contamination threats
to water systems. This information generated a list
of research needs, which is the baseline for this
Action Plan.
Table 2.1. Federal Government Organization to Protect Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets
Agriculture
Food
Water
Public Health
Emergency Services
Government
Defense
Information and Telecommunications
Energy
Transportation
Banking and Finance
Chemical Industry
Postal and Shipping
National Monuments and Icons
Department of Agriculture
Meat and Poultry - Department of Agriculture
Other Products - Department of Health and Human Services
Environmental Protection Agency
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security and all other agencies
Department of Defense
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Energy
Department of Homeland Security
Department of the Treasury
Degartment of Homeland Security*
Department of Homeland Security
Department of the Interior
Changed from the Environmental Protection Agency to the Department of Homeland Security by HSPD 7 [Ref. 5].
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EPA developed guidance on threats facing water
systems and made it available to community
drinking water systems that serve populations
greater than 3,300. Community drinking water
systems of that size or larger are required by the
Bioterrorism Act to complete vulnerability
assessments. This guidance presents an overview of
threats, methodologies, strategies, and responses for
water utilities to consider when conducting these
assessments. It describes which kinds of terrorist
attacks or other intentional acts are likely to: (a)
substantially disrupt the ability of a system to
provide a safe and reliable supply of drinking water,
or (b) otherwise present significant public health
concerns.
2.3
Act of
President Bush signed PL 107-188, commonly
referred to as the Bioterrorism Act, on June 12,
2002. This law authorizes funds for national, state,
and local efforts to address bioterrorism and other
public health emergencies; establishes controls for
dangerous biological contaminants and toxins;
authorizes funding for food and drug safety; and
mandates protections for the drinking water
industry, requiring that: (1) water systems serving
more than 3,300 persons perform vulnerability
assessments, and (2) EPA review methods to
protect water systems.
Title IV of the Bioterrorism Act amends the Safe
Drinking Water Act [Ref 14] by adding the
following sections:
I Section 1433 - Terrorist and Other Intentional
Acts - requires community water systems to
perform and submit to EPA vulnerability
assessments and a certificate that they have
completed the assessment. Also, these systems
must develop or revise emergency response
plans and submit a certification. It also requires
the EPA to provide these systems with baseline
threat information.
I Section 1434 - Contaminant Prevention,
Detection, and Response - directs EPA to
review methods to prevent, detect, and respond
to the intentional contamination of water
systems, including a review of equipment, early
warning notification systems, awareness
programs, distribution systems, treatment
technologies, and biomedical research.
Specifically, the Bioterrorism Act directs EPA
to review each of the following:
(1) Methods, means and equipment, including real
time monitoring systems, designed to monitor and
detect various levels of chemical, biological, and
radiological contaminants or indicators of
contaminants and reduce the likelihood that such
contaminants can be successfully introduced into
public water systems and source water intended to
be used for drinking water.
(2) Methods and means to provide sufficient notice
to operators of public water systems, and individuals
served by such systems, of the introduction of
chemical, biological or radiological contaminants
and the possible effect of such introduction on public
health and the safety and supply of drinking water.
(3) Methods and means for developing educational
and awareness programs for community water
systems.
(4) Procedures and equipment necessary to prevent
the flow of contaminated drinking water to
individuals served by public water systems.
(5) Methods, means, and equipment which could
negate or mitigate deleterious effects on public
health and the safety and supply caused by the
introduction of contaminants into water intended to
be used for drinking water, including an
examination of the effectiveness of various drinking
water technologies in removing, inactivating, or
neutralizing biological, chemical, and radiological
contaminants.
(6) Biomedical research into the short-term and
long-term impacts on public health of various
chemical, biological, and radiological contaminants
that may be introduced into water systems through
terrorist or other intentional acts.
Section 1435 - Supply Disruption Prevention,
Detection, and Response - requires the review
of methods by which the water system and all
its parts could be intentionally disrupted or
rendered ineffective or unsafe, including
methods to interrupt the physical infrastructure,
the computer infrastructure, and the treatment
process. Specifically, the Bioterrorism Act
directs EPA to review each of the following:
(a)(l) Methods and means by which pipes and other
constructed conveyances utilized in public water
systems could be destroyed or otherwise prevented
from providing adequate supplies of drinking water
meeting applicable public health standards.
(a) (2) Methods and means by which collection,
pretreatment, treatment, storage and distribution
facilities utilized or used in connection with public
water systems and collection and pretreatment
storage facilities used in connection with public
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water systems could be destroyed or otherwise
prevented from providing adequate supplies of
drinking water meeting applicable public health
standards.
(a) (3) Methods and means by which pipes,
constructed conveyances, collection, pretreatment,
treatment, storage and distribution systems that are
utilized in connection with public water systems
could be altered or affected so as to be subject to
cross-contamination of drinking water supplies.
(a) (4) Methods and means by which pipes,
constructed conveyances, collection, pretreatment,
treatment, storage and distribution systems that are
utilized in connection with public water systems
could be reasonably protected from terrorist attacks
or other acts intended to disrupt the supply or affect
the safety of drinking water.
(a) (5) Methods and means by which information
systems, including process controls and supervisory
control and data acquisition and cyber systems at
community water systems could be disrupted by
terrorists or other groups.
(b) Methods and means by which alternative
supplies of drinking water could be provided in the
event of the destruction, impairment or
contamination of public water systems.
The Bioterrorism Act also directs the EPA
Administrator to:
(c)(l) Ensure that reviews carried out under this
section reflect the needs of community water systems
of various sizes and various geographic areas of the
United States.
(c)(2) Consider the vulnerability of, or potential for
forced interruption of service for, a region or
service area, including community water systems
that provide service to the National Capital area.
(d) Disseminate, as appropriate as determined by
the Administrator, to community water systems
information on the results of the project through the
Information Sharing and Analysis Center, or other
appropriate means.
2,4 The for
Published by the Office of Homeland Security in
July 2002, the National Strategy seeks to "mobilize
and organize the Nation to secure the U.S.
homeland from terrorist attacks." In a speech on
July 16, 2002, the President said, "This
comprehensive plan lays out clear lines of authority
and clear responsibilities..." for federal, state, and
local employees; community and business leaders;
and the American public. The National Strategy
identifies six critical mission areas for homeland
security:
•I Intelligence and warning
It Border and transportation security
11 Domestic counterterrorism
ill Protecting critical infrastructure and key assets
It Defending against catastrophic terrorism
§1 Emergency preparedness.
In addition, the National Strategy emphasizes using
unique American strengths: law, science and
technology, information sharing and systems, and
international cooperation.
The National Strategy sets forth several roles for
EPA. First, under the category of Critical
Infrastructure, EPA is the lead agency for
protecting water systems [Ref 3, page 32]. Second,
under Defending Against Catastrophic Threats,
EPA is involved in detection of chemical and
biological materials [Ref. 3, page 38], and
improving chemical sensors and decontamination
techniques [Ref. 3, page 39]. Finally, under
Emergency Response and Preparedness, EPA is a
participant in the National Incident Management
System developed by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), and must prepare for chemical and
biological decontamination [Ref. 3, page 44].
2,5 EPA's for
Security
EPA's Strategic Plan describes the Agency's
expanded role in responding to and preparing for
national emergencies, including securing the
nation's water systems, promoting security of the
chemical and hazardous materials sector, and
recovering from chemical, biological, radiological,
or other terrorist attacks. Announced by EPA
Administrator Whitman on October 2, 2002, the
Agency's senior leadership prepared the EPA
Strategic Plan with input from other federal
agencies and organizations.
The EPA Strategic Plan outlines goals, tactics, and
activity lists in four "mission critical areas:"
§1 Critical Infrastructure Protection - assessing
and reducing vulnerabilities and strengthening
detection and response capabilities for the water
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and wastewater industries as well as food,
transportation, and energy.
ill Preparedness, Response, and Recovery -
strengthening and broadening EPA's
emergency response capabilities, clarifying
EPA's role in federal response, and developing
and disseminating tools for first responders.
ill Communication and Information - improving
management and sharing of environmental
information during and after chemical,
biological, or radiological incidents.
ill Protection of EPA Personnel and Infrastructure
- ensuring the safety of EPA's personnel and
vital infrastructure.
EPA's Strategic Plan outlines initial water security
research and technical support efforts. Goal 1
under Mission Goal I (Critical Infrastructure
Protection) states that "EPA will work with the
states, tribes, drinking water and wastewater
utilities (water utilities), and other partners to
enhance the security of water and wastewater
utilities" Goal 1 also tasks EPA to review
monitoring and decontamination methods for
chemical, biological, and radiological contaminants
in water, wastewater, and distribution systems.
This includes the development of a water utility
security research plan and the initiation of priority
research projects [Ref. 1, pages 3-4].
Goal 4 under Mission Goal II (Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery) states that "EPA will
advance the state of the knowledge in areas
relevant to homeland security to provide responders
and decision makers with tools and the scientific
and technical understanding they need to manage
existing or potential threats to homeland security"
This includes the review, development, and testing
of enhanced methods for detection, treatment, and
containment of chemical, biological, radiological,
and industrial chemicals intentionally introduced
into water systems. Also, EPA will provide
scientific and technical support to other agencies
and partners [Ref. 1, pages 28-31].
2,6
The NRC report, Making the Nation Safer: the Role
of Science and Technology in Countering
Terrorism, identifies and prioritizes threats and
vulnerabilities posed by terrorism, and opportunities
for science and technology to play a role in
counterterrorism [Ref. 15]. The report recommends
research goals for nine key areas: nuclear and
radiological threats, human and agricultural health
systems, toxic chemicals and explosive materials,
information technology, energy systems,
transportation systems, cities and fixed
infrastructure, the response of people to terrorism,
and integrated systems analysis and engineering.
The NRC report regards water supply and
wastewater systems, along with electrical supply,
stadiums and other buildings, and underground
facilities, as critical components of "cities and fixed
infrastructure." The report discusses the key
vulnerabilities of water systems, the barriers to
effective mitigation of these threats, and research
and development needs. Among the key
vulnerabilities are the antiquated infrastructure, the
ease of public access to reservoirs and distribution
systems, the ease of introducing contaminants to
wellheads and distribution systems, the potential for
intentionally contaminated backflow, the
interconnectedness of water systems (aqueducts,
sewer, and wastewater lines), and the dependence
on electrical and computer networks.
The NRC report makes specific recommendations
related to water systems:
II Identify and implement revisions to applicable
laws or statutes, thereby removing the
constraints to testing public water supplies for
dangerous contaminants that might be
employed by terrorists.
II Take other necessary steps to assure that
adequate laboratory testing capability and
capacity are available to water utilities.
Ill Research and development to create sensors
and supporting systems for monitoring the
safety of drinking water. These sensor systems
would continuously test the water supply for
contaminants in sufficient concentrations to
pose serious threats; they would signal a
response site or automatically close valves.
11 Research on water sampling schemes to
determine what types and population of data
points are required for a spatial-temporal
network and on intelligent design processing to
be able to reliably recognize the pattern of
attack indicators versus natural hazards. Such
research would require that priority attention be
given to the development of simulation models
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that would both analyze and simulate events
and serve to train operators in systematic
recovery, emergency response, and evacuation.
The NRC report identifies four high priority areas
for water security research: (1) physical security of
water systems, (2) monitoring and identification of
chemical and biological contaminants, (3) decision
models and sampling (what, when, and how to
sample), and (4) interactions across infrastructures
(e.g., electricity, high-pressure hydrant system).
The NRC report also notes the need for creating a
research center to perform risk assessment and to
communicate with first responders and industry, a
need partially fulfilled by EPA's NHSRC [Ref. 15,
pages 245-252].
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There are many pressing drinking water protection
and security issues. As depicted in Figure 3.1 and
consistent with the National Research Council
recommendations, projects have been developed
specific to physical and cyber security,
identification of water contaminants, analytical
protocols, containment of contamination events,
evaluation of treatment practices, decontamination
and disposal of contaminated water and materials,
and contingency planning. This Chapter also
addresses risk assessment and risk communication,
which play critical roles in supporting the risk
management process prior to, during, and following
a threat to, or attack on, drinking water systems.
Research and technical support needs are discussed
in detail in the following sections of this Chapter.
The research and technical support needs are
presented in a logical sequence, rather than priority
order, since all were identified as high priority in
the stakeholders meeting held in February 2003.
Many of these needs are being addressed
simultaneously and, in some cases, projects are
already underway. For each need, a list of projects
to address the need is suggested.
In addressing drinking water security issues, there
are overarching needs that apply to, and/or affect,
all the contributing factors discussed in the sections
below. Some overarching needs also cross over
into wastewater protection (e.g., prioritization of
contaminants, communication). Other needs are
based on the impact that one system may have on
the other (e.g., decontamination waste from
cleaning up a drinking water contamination event
will impact receiving waters, thereby necessitating
a dialogue between representatives of the drinking
water and wastewater systems).
The following list presents the overarching needs
identified by federal partners who met with the EPA
in November 2002 and stakeholders who met with
EPA in February 2003 to review this Action Plan.
At that time, specific projects were suggested to
address the needs presented in this Chapter:
Develop, test, and validate a protocol for the
analysis of "unknowns" that is specific to
drinking water supplies and systems
Prioritize and list the most likely contaminants
that could be used as threats to, or in attacks on,
drinking water supplies and systems
Develop a database that includes contaminant
properties, treatability, and other data to support
risk assessment
Develop analytical methods (to address water
and wastewater sampling and matrix needs) that
are a prerequisite to filling gaps in the database
Identify the most likely or "most credible"
threats, including "clustered threats" (e.g.,
physical and contaminant-related)
Advance on-line detectors and sensor
technologies, and test those devices in realistic
settings and situations
Develop laboratory capability and capacity,
especially for addressing environmental
samples
Perform table top exercises and run simulations
of threats, onsets of incidents, and ultimately
returning the decontaminated system to service
Improve information sharing and
communication between all involved and/or
affected parties during a threat or an attack
Provide training and education across the many
stakeholders dealing with threats to or actual
incidents involving drinking water supplies and
systems
Gather information and best practices from the
experiences of other countries and the military
in protecting their water supplies and water
systems.
Where the above needs are not identified
specifically in this Chapter, they will be developed
as part of an overall Water Security Research
Implementation Program under Chapter 5.
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3.1
Protecting the physical and cyber infrastructure
(treatment and distribution systems, source water,
conveyance systems, and other remote locations) of
a drinking water system requires a comprehensive
approach: identifying potential threats, assessing
vulnerabilities to these threats, and improving
security procedures and technology to deter attacks
or mitigate their impacts. As authorized under the
Bioterrorism Act, EPA supports the vulnerability
assessment process by providing funding and
baseline threat information to community drinking
water systems. Additionally, the Bioterrorism Act
directs research toward addressing: (1) the physical
and cyber threats most likely to be used against
drinking water supplies and systems, (2) the
consequences of these threats if they are actually
used in an attack, and (3) the countermeasures that
could be employed to prevent or respond to such
attacks. Results will be used primarily by drinking
water utilities, federal and state officials, and
possibly emergency responders in addressing both
physical and cyber threats to drinking water
systems.
3.1.1
a. An updated identification andprioritization of
physical threats to, and vulnerabilities of,
drinking water infrastructure taking into
account information gained from vulnerability
assessments and from other assessments of
water systems and their cyber infrastructure.
b. A thorough understanding and documentation
of the consequences of physical or cyber
attacks on the drinking water supply sources
and infrastructure, including the evaluation
and testing of computational models and
decision science.
c. A suite of countermeasures to prevent or
mitigate the effects of physical and cyber
attacks on water infrastructure, including
improved design of supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCAT)A) and-water systems
to reduce vulnerabilities.
a. An updated identification and prioritization of
physical threats to, and vulnerabilities of, drinking
water infrastructure taking into account
information gained from vulnerability assessments
and from other assessments of water systems and
their cyber infrastructure. In response to the
requirements of the Bioterrorism Act, EPA
developed baseline threat information to support
drinking water systems as they assessed their
vulnerabilities. This baseline information outlines
the major threats faced by water utilities as
contemplated in early 2002. As community water
systems complete individual vulnerability
assessments and as law enforcement and
intelligence agencies learn more about the
capabilities of terrorists, the most likely threats
compiled by the EPA should be reviewed and
refined to reflect this additional crucial information.
Learning from the experiences gained by community water systems in assessing their vulnerabilities and building on
EPA's assessment of baseline threat information under the requirements of the Bioterrorism Act, what are the key
physical and cyber threats to drinking water infrastructure?
What can be done to minimize the physical and cyber threats to drinking water systems, including the storage of
hazardous materials used as part of treatment plant operations?
How can computer-based computational models and decision science help to improve decision making and assist water
utility operators in understanding threats and managing consequences from attacks?
As resources are limited for many water systems, especially small systems, what countermeasures will most effectively
improve the physical and cyber security of drinking water supplies and systems?
What are the best ways to protect supervisory control and data acquisition and other computer systems used by drinking
water utilities?
How can security measures be incorporated into the design of the next generation of drinking water systems or
retrofitted to existing systems?
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Special emphasis also should be given to
identifying sources of information on the types of
threats faced by the smallest water systems (serving
less than 3,300 persons), since these facilities are
not required to conduct vulnerability assessments.
Physical and cyber threat scenarios and
vulnerability assessments can be enhanced by using
vulnerability information to answer questions such
as: Which vulnerabilities are most apparent?
Which are catastrophic? Which can be easily
mitigated by cost-effective strategies and which
require longer term solutions? What are the most
likely categories or groupings of physical and cyber
vulnerabilities? The following projects will address
this need:
1. Identification of physical and cyber threat
scenarios facing the drinking water sector,
including a comparison of their impacts.
2. Examination and evaluation of lessons learned
by drinking water utilities in assessing their
vulnerabilities and in implementing
countermeasures.
3. Refinement of the methodology for community
water system vulnerability assessments,
including evaluation of distribution systems.
b. A thorough understanding and documentation
of the consequences of physical or cyber attacks
on the drinking water supply sources and
infrastructure, including the evaluation and
testing of computational models and decision
science. While the physical and cyber threats to
drinking water systems are to some degree
understood, the consequences of such attacks are
challenging and difficult to envision. Water system
components are extensively interconnected, so
destruction of one component may cause a
cascading effect [Ref. 15]. These consequences
need to be more thoroughly understood in order for
the most effective countermeasures to be employed.
In addition, disruption of water service may impact
other critical community sectors, such as medical
services, fire fighting capabilities, and the local
economy. Computational models and decision
science tools provide one method to explore
possible consequences from attacks that cannot be
simulated accurately in an experiment or in real life.
The following project will address this need:
1. Assessment of the consequences of physical
and cyber attacks with an emphasis on the
cascading consequences of such attacks on
overall water system integrity, and compilation
of technical information and tools for enhanced
consequence analysis of physical and cyber
threats to drinking water systems.
c. A suite of countermeasures to prevent or
mitigate the effects of physical and cyber attacks
on water infrastructure, including improved
design ofSCADA and water systems to reduce
vulnerabilities. An updated understanding of
countermeasures to physical and cyber threats
associated with the water infrastructure is needed.
In the short term, this will help the water industry
prevent or mitigate the effects of such attacks.
Information is needed by small water systems that
may not have the resources to employ extensive
countermeasures. Over the longer term,
information is needed on countermeasures that have
multiple benefits (e.g., enhance security and, at the
same time, improve water quality or other aspects
of water system operations). Such standards would
take into account the "multiple benefits" aspects of
revised design features since many security
enhancements may not be cost-effective otherwise.
Similarly, to improve security, water systems need
to adopt security practices and integrate them with
operational strategies as part of their routine. The
following projects will address this need:
1. Working with standards-setting organizations,
preparation of voluntary design standards and
recommendations for new construction,
reconstruction, and retrofitting with a focus on
security in combination with operations.
2. Establishment of standards for minimum
security protection of SCADA and other
computer systems used in drinking water
systems.
3. Identification of physical countermeasures that
could be used by a drinking water utility to
minimize threats or mitigate the consequences
of terrorist attacks, including disaster response
and recovery plans (e.g., shut down methods,
reconstruction).
4. Assessment of existing security measures for
the storage and transport of hazardous materials
at water utilities and ways to improve security.
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3.2
Knowing the contaminants that are the most likely
threats to drinking water supplies or systems is
critical to the Agency's efforts on research and
technical support related to detection, monitoring,
containment, treatment, decontamination, and
disposal. EPA has undertaken an extensive effort to
identify the most likely contaminants and the
situations in which those contaminants could be
used. This is an evolving effort that will be updated
and improved as information on human health and
other factors that affect a contaminant's priority are
developed or discovered. Information on
contaminants and contaminant surrogates/simulants
will be maintained in a limited access compendium.
This information will support drinking water
utilities, public health officials, and responder
organizations faced with threats to or attacks on
drinking water supplies and systems.
3.2.1
a. A manageable, prioritized list of threats,
contaminants, and threat scenarios that might
be used to destroy, disrupt, or disable drinking
water supplies and systems.
b. A contaminant identification tool for
consultation by approved individuals and
organizations that describes critically
important information on contaminants with
the potential to harm drinking water supplies
and systems.
c. A set of carefully selected surrogates or
simulants for use in testing and evaluating
fate and transport characteristics and
treatment techn ologies for priority
contaminants.
d. Methods and means to securely maintain and,
when appropriate, transmit information on
threats, contaminants, and threat scenarios
applicable to drinking water supplies and
systems.
a. A manageable, prioritized list of threats,
contaminants, and threat scenarios that might be
used to destroy, disrupt, or disable drinking water
supplies and systems. A frequently reviewed and
updated list of likely drinking water contaminants
and associated threat scenarios is needed. As a
class of contaminants, biochemicals must be belter
understood. Another important consideration is the
potential for exposure to such contaminants through
several routes, since drinking water is used for a
variety of purposes in addition to consumption.
Most threat assessments consider ingestion as the
primary exposure route for contaminants in
drinking water. This may represent only a portion
of the threat spectrum as inhalation, dermal, and
ocular contact should be considered as well.
Understanding exposures through such secondary
routes will lead to a more robust and accurate
prioritization of both contaminants and threats.
This is further addressed in Section 3.6. The
following projects will address this need:
What contaminants - biological, chemical, or radiological - are threats to community drinking water systems and what
is their priority in terms of health risks to drinking water consumers?
How do different contaminant-oriented threat scenarios for drinking water systems influence the health risks of these
contaminants?
In addition to health risks, what are the other characteristics of biological, chemical, or radiological contaminants that
may make them threats to drinking water systems?
For ensuring a safe water supply, how can water contaminants be evaluated with regard to both health (e.g., acute
toxicity, lethality, long-term health impacts) and other characteristics (e.g., availability, psychological terror) to present
a comprehensive picture of prioritized threats?
Once information about the most likely contaminants has been developed, how can organizations needing the
information gain appropriate access to it?
What are the surrogates and simulants that best represent the prioritized contaminants for use in testing, evaluation, and
verification of technologies to protect drinking water supplies and systems?
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1. Preparation of a prioritized list of contaminants
(and/or contaminant classes), which includes a
ranking approach that allows for dynamic
changes to various parameters in order to
routinely generate robust prioritization of
contaminants based on emerging data or
concerns.
2. Identification and prioritization of contaminant
threat scenarios facing the drinking water sector
considering the various sizes, types, and
geographic locations of utilities.
3. Development of an improved understanding of
the role of biologically-produced toxins as a
drinking water contaminant.
b. A contaminant identification tool for
consultation by approved individuals and
organizations that describes critically important
information on contaminants with the potential to
harm drinking water supplies and systems. After
the preliminary list of contaminants is prepared and
prioritized, a database of these contaminants will be
developed and continually updated as new
information becomes available. Databases of the
effects and properties of many microbiological
species and chemicals are common in the open
literature. However, a database of all priority
chemical, biological, biochemical, and radiological
contaminants specific to water is very important,
but not currently available. This database will
include information on the basic properties of
priority contaminants, mixtures and formulations,
co-contaminants and byproducts, toxicity and health
effects, and sampling and analysis methodologies.
For the database to be useful in the event of a
response to an emergency, users must be
systematically trained to find the necessary
information and to query the database. Users also
should be encouraged to practice database usage by
the inclusion of database searching as part of
emergency response training exercises. Another
important role of the database is to help the user
decide if the presence of a contaminant at their
location should cause a response action to be taken.
In some cases, the contaminant may already be
present in the background at detectable
concentrations. Therefore, it is important for the
database to include information on the natural
background concentrations of priority contaminants
for various locations. The following projects will
address this need:
1. Development of a water contaminant
information tool for use by individuals or
organizations responding to a water
contamination event.
2. Development of guidance on training approved
individuals and organizations in effective use of
the water contaminant information tool.
3. Development of an improved understanding of
the biological, physio-chemical, and/or
toxicological properties of contaminants, based
on gaps in the water contaminant information
tool developed under Project 1.
4. Survey of information about background levels
of priority contaminants known or suspected to
occur in source or treated drinking waters.
c. A set of carefully selected surrogates or
simulants for use in testing and evaluating fate
and transport characteristics and treatment
technologies for priority contaminants. This
surrogate or simulant information resource is
closely coupled to information in the water
contaminant information system described above.
While using an actual contaminant in conducting
research is preferable, this is not always possible for
some potential water contaminants. In such cases, a
surrogate or simulant may be used if it has
properties similar to the actual contaminant relative
to the specific application (e.g., type of detector or
treatment train). Information on surrogates and
simulants that share some characteristics with
priority contaminants, but are less hazardous to
work with than the actual contaminants, are of
particular interest. In order for the information
gathered on the surrogate or simulant to be
considered applicable to the actual contaminant, the
relationship between the surrogate or simulant and
the contaminant being tested must be understood
with respect to the particular parameters being
modeled. An extremely important aspect is to
determine the conditions under which a particular
surrogate or simulant is not appropriate for use.
This information resource is intended to provide
known data and information on these relationships
as well as information on the appropriateness of
specific surrogates or simulants for a particular
research application. Similar to the water
contaminant information system, training on the use
of the surrogate or simulant information resource is
necessary. The following project will address this
need:
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1. Development of an information resource
(possibly as a component of the water
contaminant information tool) on surrogates or
simulants for water contaminants, including
relationships between the surrogate or simulant
and the contaminant of interest with respect to a
variety of biological, physio-chemical, and
toxicological properties with guidance and
training materials for approved individuals and
organizations.
d. Methods and means to securely maintain and,
when appropriate, transmit information on
threats, contaminants, and threat scenarios
applicable to drinking water supplies and systems.
Lists of contaminants, potential surrogates,
prioritizations, and characteristics may contain
several types of sensitive or secure information.
Some of this information may be publicly available,
while other information may be secured with
limited or restricted access. Such information
might even be classified. There are cases where a
collection of information may be classified, even if
each individual piece of information in the
collection is unclassified. This occurs because of
the potential for the pooling of information to pose
a threat even if the individual pieces do not.
Specific decisions about the distribution of
information will be made using classification
procedures established by the EPA or through
agreements with the information sources.
Procedures will need to be established to ensure that
access controls are appropriately maintained and
that appropriate channels for dissemination of such
information are in place. The following projects
will address this need:
1. Development and implementation of a
framework for evaluating the sensitivity of
information and for keeping that information
appropriately categorized as classified, for
official use only, or available for public release.
2. Preparation of methods and means of
information sharing on contaminants to ensure
appropriate access by individuals and
organizations based on their need for this
information.
3.3
for
Water
Unlike a physical attack, the intentional
introduction of a biological, chemical, or
radiological contaminant into a drinking water
system is not always evident. Correctly identifying
contaminants after they have entered a drinking
water system is extremely important, particularly
when they are not apparent through general
observation or conventional testing. Building a
capacity and capability to respond to threats or an
actual contamination event, and for restoration of
systems after an event, also is essential. Accurate
contaminant identification using a combination of
detection technologies and analytical methods is
implicit in meeting the requirements of the
Bioterrorism Act; Sections 1434 and 1435 of the
Bioterrorism Act [Ref 2] both require analytical
methodologies and detection techniques that can
quickly and accurately provide information on
contaminants.
What approaches, methods, and technologies can be used, in an emergency response mode, to confirm or rule out the
biological, chemical, or radiological contamination of drinking water supplies or treated water?
What approaches, methods, and technologies can be used in an "early warning" mode to detect biological, chemical,
or radiological contaminants in water supplies and treated water?
What are the most effective analytical tools, methods, and laboratory procedures to use in the event of biological,
chemical, and radiological contamination of a water supply or water system?
What methods, techniques, and approaches are available to measure the efficacy of treatment, disinfection, and
remediation approaches for biological, chemical, or radiological contamination in drinking water supplies or systems
and in treated water?
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a. A "play book" (or module) for sampling and
analytical response to contaminant threats and
attacks on water supplies and systems,
including protocols for identifying "unknown"
contaminants that will serve as a vital
component of an integrated response plan.
b. New analytical hardware and associated field
and laboratory analysis methodologies for
biological contaminants in water, including
requirements for appropriate quality
assurance/quality control and sampling
approaches.
c. Improved analytical hardware and associated
field and laboratory analysis methodologies
for chemical contaminants in water, including
requirements for appropriate quality
assurance/quality control and sampling
approaches.
d. Monitoring technologies, including standard
operating procedures, for biological, chemical,
and radiological contaminants and threats.
e. Drinking water "early warning systems" and
early warning systems from other sectors
amenable to application in the water
environment.
f. An improved and expanded, tiered laboratory
capacity and capability in order to be fully
prepared in responding to threats or attacks on
water.
g. Training exercises, drills, and simulation
modules for analytical methodologies and
monitoring systems.
a. A "play book" (or module) for sampling and
analytical response to contaminant threats and
attacks on water supplies and systems, including
protocols for identifying "unknown"
contaminants that will serve as a vital component
of an integrated response plan. As with any new
analysis paradigm (e.g., compliance monitoring,
forensic analysis, new disease outbreak
investigation), the capabilities of existing
methodologies to detect contamination events needs
to be defined and improved. This is particularly
important because the efficacy of many of the
prevention, preparedness, and response
technologies being developed must be tested and
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan
evaluated using reliable, standard analytical
methodologies and standard operating procedures.
As part of method development, the effects of
sample collection, transport, worker safety, and
handling on the analytical result must be
considered. In addition, communication must be
maintained at all stages of the response. A "play
book" provides information on both the analytical
methodology and detection technology that can be
used in the event of a water contamination threat or
actual attack.
Identification of field and laboratory capabilities
and capacity for sampling and analyzing
"unknowns" is a first step in providing standardized
screening protocols for biological, chemical, and
radiological contaminants in a drinking water
system. In addition, there are general protocols
developed by other federal entities to address
attacks through various media (e.g., air, water,
food). This effort may benefit from adapting these
generalized protocols to the specific needs and
requirements of drinking water systems. Such
protocols must consider the capabilities of the
laboratory response network that would perform an
analysis of the "unknowns," and should include the
need for communication between the sampler and
analyst. To be most effective, once the protocols
are developed and tested, they should undergo trial
application by drinking water utilities and others
involved in response actions. The following
projects will address this need:
1. Preparation of a draft analytical response
module, including decision trees, fully tested
protocols, and methodical approaches, for use
in addressing drinking water contamination
threats and attacks.
2. Development of a protocol for the analysis of
"unknowns" that is specific to drinking water
supplies and systems.
3. Laboratory testing and validation of the
analytical response protocol using a round-
robin approach with a variety of laboratories
that would be expected to provide support in a
threat or attack situation.
4. End-user testing and validation of the analytical
response protocol and identification of ways
that it could be improved.
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5. Development of an improved protocol for the
analysis of "unknowns" taking into account
lessons learned from Projects 3 and 4, and real-
world experiences in responding to "unknowns"
in drinking water.
6. Systematic updating of the analytical response
module based on results from the above
projects and the projects in Needs "b" and "c,"
below.
b. New analytical hardware and associated field
and laboratory analysis methodologies for
biological contaminants in water, including
requirements for appropriate quality
assurance/quality control and sampling
approaches. Gaps are present in both analytical
hardware and analysis methodologies for biological
contaminants. Sampling and analysis must be
standardized and validated within a given set of
parameters. A survey and summary of all available
sampling, concentration, and analysis techniques
(both presumptive and confirmatory) will help meet
this need. An inventory of environmental
monitoring methods for contaminants is currently
being developed by EPA and is being extended to
encompass methods applicable to specific water
threats. This inventory will: (1) identify
information gaps and help to focus the development
of reliable methods and hardware, particularly for
biological contaminants, (2) support the
identification of needs for improved chemical
methods, and (3) draw on the National
Environmental Methods Index (NEMI)
(http://www.nemi.gov). Inventory development
involves collaborative funding by EPA and the U.S.
Geological Survey. The following projects will
address this need:
1. Development of concentration techniques and
technologies for biological contaminants in
water.
2. Adaptation of the NEMI to include water
contaminant analytical hardware and analysis
methodologies for biological contaminants.
3. Identification of water utility and response
organization preferences or standards in
technology design and operation for biological
contaminants.
4. Development of a comprehensive
understanding and definition of analysis goals,
such as data quality objectives, for biological
contamination events.
5. Development of standardized and validated
methods for detection and identification of
biological contaminants in water that might
result from a contamination event.
6. Incorporation of analytical hardware and
analysis methodologies from the above projects
into the NEMI and the analytical response "play
book" under Need "a," above.
c. Improved analytical hardware and associated
field and laboratory analysis methodologies for
chemical contaminants in water, including
requirements for appropriate quality
assurance/quality control and sampling
approaches. Currently available monitoring
technologies do not address all chemical (i.e.,
chemical, biochemical, radiological) contaminants
or contaminant categories that are water threats.
Monitoring system characteristics, operational
parameters, and quality assurance/quality control
requirements must be identified for detection
technologies used to respond to drinking water
contamination events. Examples of characteristics
and parameters include:
•;- • Presumptive versus confirmatory testing
;x; Minimum detection limits
::: Recovery and variability parameters
K Sampling, sample processing, sample transport,
and analytical considerations
• • Utility for forensic analysis
:;:;: Safety and security
;:;:; Integration with operations
•• Commercialization.
This information can be used by technology users
and developers to assess technology availability and
potential applications. These requirements will
help guide the analysis of potential monitoring and
detection technologies. The effort will address
specific principles and set achievable numeric
goals. The following projects will address this
need:
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1. Survey, analysis, and compilation of existing
analytical hardware and analysis methodologies
for their applicability to water security
analytical needs for chemical contaminants.
2. Development of a comprehensive
understanding and definition of analysis goals,
such as data quality objectives, for chemical
contamination events.
3. Development and application of new analytical
hardware and analysis methodologies for
chemical contaminants, including radionuclides
and biochemicals, based on gaps revealed
through Projects 1 and 2, above.
4. Incorporation of analytical hardware and
analysis methodologies from the above projects
into the NEMI methods database and the
analytical response "playbook" under Need "a,"
above.
d. Monitoring technologies, including standard
operating procedures, for biological, chemical,
and radiological contaminants and threats. Water
system operators, scientists, engineers, and others
are identifying monitoring technology needs for
water contaminant threats. Technologies currently
used to monitor water quality (e.g., total dissolved
solids, pH, turbidity) may be adapted or "tuned" to
detect contaminants. Technologies used in different
applications (e.g., power industry, food industry)
may have a role as well. Finally, new technologies
such as the next generation of monitors may be
sufficiently developed to undergo testing and
evaluation. Closely associated with monitoring
technology advancement, is detector performance
and reliability. Any such technologies, especially
ones not already in common use in the water
industry, must include standard operating
procedures that address:
Specific contaminants or classes of
contaminants
Response procedures for "knowns" and
"unknowns"
Critical operational and performance features to
detect contaminants before a public health
exposure or effect occurs
Specific activities and monitoring technologies
to be employed in a "credible threat" event
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan
Monitoring procedures in response,
disinfection, decontamination, and remediation
phases
Implementation of, and support for, monitoring
operations
Guidance for appropriate interpretation of
results.
These standard operating procedures, along with
improved monitoring technologies, analytical
hardware, and analysis methodologies, will result in
increased confidence in water quality. The
following projects will address this need:
1. Testing and evaluation of currently used water
monitoring technologies for their ability to
respond meaningfully to changes in drinking
water quality.
2. Preparation of a set of preliminary standard
operating procedures for evaluating monitoring
technologies, including the adequacy, accuracy,
and usability of the set of preliminary standard
operating procedures in a variety of response
situations.
3. Testing and evaluation of detectors used in
other sectors and in various applications for
their utility to drinking water monitoring and
detection.
4. Testing and evaluation of bio-sensors and
biological monitors in responding to changes in
drinking water quality.
5. Preparation of a set of revised standard
operating procedures for use by utility
operators, emergency and remedial responders,
public health officials, and laboratory personnel
to evaluate monitoring technologies.
6. Preparation of a handbook on currently
available and emerging water security
monitoring technologies that is updated
periodically.
e. Drinking water "early warning systems" and
early warning systems from other sectors
amenable to application in the water environment.
Early warning systems (EWSs) are a special subset
of monitoring systems that have attracted much
attention in water security. EWSs may help in
responding quickly to water contaminant threats or
March 2004
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actual attacks. A survey is needed of EWSs and
their component technologies and systems for use
in protecting water supplies and systems. This
survey would include EWSs used in other sectors
and settings that may have applicability to water.
Information is needed on how specific contaminants
affect the water quality parameters measured by
some EWSs, particularly with regard to which EWS
may best detect a contaminant. From the survey,
some of the most promising EWSs would be tested
at both pilot and field scale. The following projects
will address this need:
1. A survey and improved understanding of EWSs
that could be employed in protecting water
supplies and systems.
2. Pilot-scale testing and evaluation of EWSs that
could be used by water utilities to give an early
warning of a contaminant threat or
contamination event.
3. Field-scale testing and evaluation of EWSs that
could be used by water utilities to give an early
warning of a contaminant threat or
contamination event.
4. Preparation of a handbook on the application of
EWSs for drinking water supply and system
protection.
/ An improved and expanded, tiered laboratory
capacity and capability in order to be fully
prepared in responding to threats or attacks on
water. Based on the need to identify and network
current analytical laboratories and to train
laboratory personnel to assure preparedness as
described above, an assessment of national
laboratory capability and capacity is needed. This
may involve expanding the existing federal
infrastructure to provide surge capacity during an
actual contamination event and its aftermath. The
following projects will address this need:
1. Assessment and characterization of existing
laboratory capacity and capability for drinking
water sample analysis in emergency situations,
and development of a laboratory compendium.
2. Determination of which laboratories are
currently able, or potentially able, to run the
analytical protocol developed for Section 3.3,
Need "a," along with the most effective way to
structure a laboratory network to assist drinking
water utilities in an emergency.
3. Preparation of a gap analysis of resources (e.g.,
personnel, equipment), training, and methods,
along with short-, medium-, and long-term
recommendations to address these gaps.
4. In concert with other parts of the EPA and other
federal organizations, integration of laboratories
able to support emergency water analyses into
an existing national network or establishment of
another appropriate mechanism to meet
emergency water analysis needs.
5. Development of an outreach and
communication plan to facilitate inter-
laboratory coordination and information
exchange for water security.
6. Preparation of performance criteria for methods
and infrastructure that assure adequate training
of field and laboratory personnel.
g. Training exercises, drills, and simulation
modules for analytical methodologies and
monitoring systems. Products resulting from Needs
"a" through "f" must be transferred to individuals
and organizations (e.g., water utilities, response
organizations) through training programs. Also,
EPA and other federal organizations are developing
scenarios to prepare for future threats or actual
attacks. These types of exercises could easily be
extended to include modules on analytical
methodologies and monitoring systems by actively
engaging water utilities and emergency response
organizations to train personnel (or trainers).
Although still in the preliminary stages, such
engagements are intended to be a regular and
routine part of advancing water security
methodologies and technologies as they become
available and ready for use. The following projects
will address this need:
1. Compilation and development of training
exercises and simulation modules designed to
ensure the preparedness of analytical
laboratories to respond to drinking water
contamination events.
2. Development of training exercises and
simulation modules for water utility personnel,
emergency response personnel, and public
health officials on the use of monitoring and
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March 2004
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detection technologies for timely response to
potential threats or actual contamination events.
3. Development of training exercises and
simulation modules for water utility personnel,
emergency response personnel, and public
health officials on the use of monitoring
systems for mitigation of potential threats or
actual contamination events.
3.4
of
Drinking water quality in the United States is
controlled by federal regulations and guidance.
These requirements are in place to assure the public
that their drinking water is safe to consume. The
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have raised
concerns that drinking water safety could be
compromised by deliberate contamination of water
sources and systems. The Bioterrorism Act [Ref 2]
calls for actions to prevent drinking water systems
and supplies from contamination events and for
ways to respond to those events should they occur.
Such contamination events could result from
intentional introduction of biological, chemical, or
radiological contaminants into water. The concern
exists that introduction of a contaminant could
result in widespread dissemination of that
contaminant and subsequent public exposures. If a
contamination event occurs, there will need to be
information and technologies available to address
containing and treating the water, decontaminating
both water and equipment, and disposing of
residuals from any response activities.
3.4.1 Projects
a. Improved distribution system models that can
be used to more effectively protect drinking
water in the event of deliberate contamination.
b. An improved understanding and
documentation of the environmental fate of
contaminants in source waters, drinking water
treatment plants, and the distribution system.
c. New and more effective treatment and
decontamination technologies and processes
for water that has been contaminated.
d. An improved understanding and
documentation of decontamination and
disposal of pipes, equipment, and other
materials, and when a decontaminated system
can be returned to safe use.
a. Improved distribution system models that can
be used to more effectively protect drinking water
in the event of deliberate contamination.
Distribution system hydraulic models need to be
better understood and improved for use in
preventing, containing, and mitigating
contamination of drinking water systems. This
includes an analysis of how the models can help
when contaminants are injected into a water system.
Commercially available and non-proprietary
hydraulic models can be used to evaluate water
movement in distribution systems. These models
can also be used to model how non-hazardous tracer
chemicals move through distribution systems.
There are several large water utilities that are
currently using hydraulic models for a basic
understanding of their distribution system, but there
is a need to determine how best to implement and
use these models in medium and small water
utilities.
The ability to contain a contaminant in a water
distribution system will depend on: (1) how
quickly the event is detected, (2) how fast the
contaminant is dispersed in a distribution system,
(3) how far the contaminant spreads, (4) how
reactive the chemical contaminant is with residual
disinfection materials, and (5) how effective
residual disinfection materials are for inactivating
biological contaminants. Current water distribution
system models may help to answer some of these
What techniques and procedures should water utility, regulatory authorities, public health officials, and first responder
organizations use to contain and mitigate the deliberate contamination of a drinking water system?
What is the role that computer modeling can play in understanding and tracking contaminant flow in drinking water
systems?
How can contamination of water by biological, chemical, or radiological attacks be effectively mitigated and systems
quickly returned to use?
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questions. Additional effort is needed to determine
how models can be used to establish optimum
locations for in-line monitoring devices or sampling
points for grab samples. By using hydraulic
models, areas of high use, high flow, rapid
dispersion, or other points of interest can be
predicted. These points might include locations to
strategically place valves or backflow prevention
devices. Key distribution system endpoints also
need to be evaluated, particularly to develop a
better understanding of pumping devices, storage
facilities, and various connections.
The capabilities of hydraulic models to effectively
respond to a contamination event need to be better
understood. If in-line monitoring or detection can
be networked with distribution system operations,
containment or direction of a contaminant within a
system may be possible. Hydraulic models would
show where to shut down a system, isolate the
contamination to prevent it from spreading, or
direct the contaminated water to an off-line storage
system. Such containment would minimize
exposure and facilitate cleanup. During an event
where sections of a water distribution system are
shut down, the hydraulic models could be used to
determine how to get clean drinking water to the
open sections of the distribution system. That same
information would be useful in determining where
in the distribution system alternative water supplies
may be needed during an emergency.
During a contamination event, exposure to
contaminants will depend on their concentration
and the length of exposure. Determining both the
concentration and time of exposure may be difficult
if it is too late to sample properly. Hydraulic
models can help to determine the duration of the
exposure. These models may also be used to
determine contaminant concentrations by running
dispersion modules and reactive versus
conservative reaction modules within the models.
Thus, models can help to determine the need for
additional cleanup, potential sites for sample
collection, and the need for medical followup.
Potential sites for sample collection may include
low flow locations within a distribution system and
models may indicate where those sites are.
Ultimately, there is a need for both field and pilot
test calibration methods for hydraulic models and to
determine proper or standardized calibration
procedures.
Water Security Research and Technical Support Action Plan
Another potential sampling site following a
contamination event may involve point-of-
use/point-of-entry (POU/POE) devices in
residential or commercial buildings. Hydraulic
models may show the areas where contaminant
concentration and duration was sufficiently high
that POU/POE devices could be assumed to have
trapped some of the contaminants. Such locations
can then be evaluated to determine if the POU/POE
devices can provide information about the
contamination event.
Hydraulic models could also be interfaced with
real-time consumer complaints to indicate areas of
concern. Consumer complaints are often used by
water utilities to identify where problems exist. If
these complaints are part of distribution system
models (i.e., call location identified by geographic
information system [GIS]), the data could be used
to indicate geographic areas of concern. In
addition, existing models can be overlain with GIS
and public health data. The most effective way for
these models to be used in all sizes of distribution
systems also needs to be addressed.
Advancement of Water Quality Models and Their
Application. The following projects will address
this need:
1. Development of a water quality module
extension (using EPANET as the research and
development platform) that takes into account
contaminant flow in distribution systems.
2. Identification and development of improved
methods for hydraulic model calibration and
data collection using non-hazardous tracers.
3. Development of a post-service-connection
model or module to assist building owners and
operators in tracking water and contaminant
flow.
Development of Water Security Modeling Tools
and Approaches. The following projects will
address this need:
4. Development of modeling tools to harden and
evaluate the vulnerability of distribution
systems to intentional contamination threats
through simulated threat scenarios.
5. Development of a tool to assist in confirmatory
water quality sampling during emergency
response to a contamination event.
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6. Development of models and/or tools to evaluate
decontamination strategies for water
distribution systems, ranging from flushing to
more innovative decontamination approaches.
7. Preparation of guides or handbooks for medium
and small water systems on use of hydraulic
models for distribution systems.
Development of Data Analysis Tools for EWSs.
The following projects will address this need:
8. Development of data analysis tools to process
on-line sensor data and consumer complaint
data to determine when a contamination event
has occurred.
9. Preparation of a technical resource document
for using hydraulic models in locating EWS
sensors.
b. An improved understanding and
documentation of the environmental fate of
contaminants in source waters, drinking water
treatment plants, and the distribution system. The
environmental fate of various chemical, biological,
and radiological contaminants needs to be better
understood. Of particular interest is what happens
to contaminants when dispersed in source waters
(e.g., rivers, lakes, ground water), water treatment
plants, or distribution systems (e.g., pipelines,
storage tanks). Dilution of chemical, biological, or
radiological contaminants in source waters will, in
many cases, reduce the concentration to below
levels of concern based on dilution and treatment
plant removal. This may or may not be true in the
distribution system. In cases where very low levels
of contaminants are toxic or aesthetically
unpleasant, dilution may not provide adequate
safety assurances. Also, various contaminants may
attach themselves to pipe walls in a water
distribution system. This could result from direct
attachment to the pipe wall material, to the biofilm
layer, or to the corrosion-inhibiting layers
intentionally deposited on the pipe walls. A better
understanding is needed regarding which
contaminants may attach to the interior of the water
distribution system and how they can best be
removed. The following projects will address this
need:
1. An assessment of the environmental fate of
biological, chemical, and radiological
contaminants in source waters, drinking water
treatment plants, and the distribution system.
2. An investigation to determine what
contaminants may attach themselves to pipe
walls or to biofilms, and how best to minimize
attachments on those surfaces.
3. Preparation of a technical resource document
on the fate of biological, chemical, and
radiological contaminants in source waters,
drinking water treatment plants, and the
distribution system.
c. New and more effective treatment and
decontamination technologies and processes for
water that has been contaminated. The ability to
treat contaminants in a water system needs to be
better understood. This understanding will assist in
development of preventive measures, treatment of
water if it is contaminated, and post-treatment
disposition of contaminated water. There are some
treatability data in the literature that can be used,
and sparse data already exist for some biological,
chemical, and radiological contaminants. Research
investigating the removal of various organic and
inorganic compounds from drinking water using
typical drinking water treatment techniques has
been extensive over the years and can be used to
develop a treatability matrix for contaminants.
Such a removal and inactivation treatability matrix
would benefit water utilities, first responders, state
and federal agencies, and the public during an
event.
Different treatment scenarios for microbiological
contaminants may be necessary depending on the
location of contaminant introduction (e.g., into
source water, into a water treatment plant, in the
distribution system, or from cross-contamination).
Information is needed to evaluate various
disinfectants to kill or inactivate biological
contaminants and the time required for inactivation
in order to effectively treat contaminated water.
Efforts will focus on the use of chlorine,
chloramines, chlorine dioxide, and ozone, which are
the disinfectants typically used by water utilities.
Information will also be developed on
concentration-time performance for inactivation.
The disinfection data initially will be developed
from bench-top studies. EPA, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have some
disinfection data, but information on many of the
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biological contaminants is still required.
Information is also needed on germination
techniques for contaminants that are spores; if such
contaminants can be forced from the spore stage,
disinfection or inactivation will be easier.
Information is also needed to evaluate the impact of
treatment on some chemical contaminants.
Typical water treatment practices (e.g.,
conventional coagulation-filtration systems, direct
filtration systems, slow sand filtration systems,
membrane systems, cartridge and bag filtration
systems, etc.) will need to be evaluated for removal
of specific microbial contaminants. Evaluation of
the effectiveness of advanced treatment techniques,
such as ultraviolet light and membranes, that can
also provide multiple benefits is needed. Boiling
tables need to be developed for biological
contaminants, since time and temperature data also
will be beneficial to assist the public in complying
with "boil water" orders. Inactivation through
exposure to elevated temperature (below boiling)
for extended periods of time should be evaluated;
an example is whether a home water heater holds
the water for a sufficient period of time at the
elevated temperature to inactivate the organisms.
Such removal and inactivation data for microbial
contaminants will help to put treatment techniques
in place to remove contaminants from the source
water, provide information to first responders, plan
for cleaning up a contaminated system, and provide
guidance for the ultimate disposal of contaminated
water and associated wastes.
Different treatment scenarios may be necessary for
chemical contaminants introduced into source
water, a water treatment plant, or the distribution
system. Information is needed to evaluate various
water treatment techniques for their ability to
remove chemical contaminants, including
coagulation, lime softening, membrane, carbon, and
ion exchange processes. These are typical water
treatment practices that would be used at a water
treatment plant to remove chemical contamination
from source waters, by first responders to cleanup a
contaminated system, or for disposal of
contaminated water. EPA, Department of Energy
(DOE) laboratories, and Department of Defense
(DoD) have done work related to some of the
contaminants, but data for others may be limited.
Oxidation could be used to destroy some chemical
contaminants, but this may also create byproducts
that are harmful. Information is needed for some of
the chemical contaminants to determine the effect
of oxidation (disinfection) on those contaminants
and what byproducts are formed.
In cases where biological, chemical, or radiological
contamination occurs in a distribution system,
POU/POE devices may provide the first line of
defense for individuals, and these devices need to
be evaluated to determine how well they remove
specific contaminants. Procedures for cleaning the
distribution system need to be developed. This
includes understanding the best way to remove the
contaminants from the interior surfaces of the
various components in a water distribution system.
For example, high levels of disinfectant (or
alternatives to disinfectant) could be used to remove
biofilm that entrapped biological contaminants, or
physical scouring or surfactants may be necessary
to remove attached chemical and radiological
contaminants. Ultimate disposal of POU/POE
devices also will need to be evaluated, and special
handling and disposal needs determined, if such
devices become contaminated with chemicals or
radiological material.
The following projects will address this need:
1. Review of the literature for treatability
information on contaminants most likely to be
used to contaminate drinking water supplies
and systems, including military documentation
that may not be available in the open literature.
2. Preparation of a systematic method for
evaluating existing and innovative treatment
technology efficacy for contaminants most
likely to be used in water supplies or systems.
3. Execution of bench-scale studies to determine
inactivation and removal capabilities of typical
water treatment and disinfection technologies
for biological contaminants, taking into account
various water quality parameters (e.g., pH,
turbidity, temperature).
4. Execution of bench-scale studies to determine
destruction and removal capabilities for typical
water treatment technologies for chemical
(including radiological) contaminants taking
into account various water quality parameters
(e.g., pH, turbidity, temperature).
5. Development of treatability documentation and
a computer-driven tool for manipulating
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information on the treatment of contaminants in
drinking water.
6. Identification of POU/POE capabilities for
treating or capturing the most likely
contaminants and disposal procedures for such
devices should they become contaminated.
7. Assessment of technologies for pretreating
contaminated water generated from
decontamination activities.
8. Identification and documentation of chemical
contaminants that may create hazardous
byproducts when exposed to drinking water
disinfectants.
9. Preparation of a technical resource document or
guide (in collaboration with wastewater
expertise) for the treatment, disposal, and
discharge of contaminated water or water used
for cleaning contaminated pipes and equipment.
d. An improved understanding and
documentation of decontamination and disposal of
pipes, equipment, and other materials, and when a
decontaminated system can be returned to safe
use. Combining the knowledge gained from the
research projects on fate and transport of
contaminants (Need "b," above) and treatment
processes (Need "c," above), and the projects listed
below on decontamination of pipes, a recovery
protocol will document effective methods for
treating water, decontaminating pipes, and returning
a water system to safe use. An initial version of this
protocol will be developed early, with continual
updates as the knowledge gaps are filled by the
planned research projects.
For many contaminants, flushing the pipes or
treatment of the water by chlorination or other
methods may be sufficient to clean the water and
the pipes. These methods will be tested,
documented, and included in the protocol.
However, for other chemicals (e.g., insoluble
substances or those that tend to partition and attach
to biofilms or adhere to pipe walls and tubercles),
decontamination techniques may be necessary. The
projects listed below will investigate and document
effective methods for decontaminating drinking
water systems through bench, pilot, and analytical
studies. The data resulting from these research
projects will inform water utility managers, state
and federal agencies, emergency responders, and
decision makers about the efficacy of
decontamination methods. Research results will
improve the nation's ability to respond and recover
from terrorist attacks on drinking water systems, as
well as accidental contamination through leaching,
permeation, or backflow incidents.
The following projects will address this need:
1. Preparation of a preliminary set of standard
operating procedures for decontaminating
drinking water infrastructure that has been
contaminated by a variety of biological,
chemical, and radiological contaminants.
2. Determination of the relevant physio-chemical
properties of contaminants that pose the
greatest decontamination challenge for pipes
and equipment.
3. Testing and evaluation of bench- and pilot-scale
techniques for decontaminating distribution
systems and equipment, including removal of
contaminant residues from pipes.
4. Development of detailed micro-scale models of
flow through pipes to evaluate fate and
transport of contaminants in pipes, as well as
macro-scale models to evaluate
decontamination and recovery methods.
5. Demonstration of the utility of EPANET and
other water quality models to plan and track a
decontamination procedure for a distribution
system.
6. Execution of larger or field-scale pipeline
decontamination studies to determine the
effectiveness of water system decontamination
in a close to real-world setting.
7. Development of decontamination efficacy
information and procedures for post-service
connections, including small pipes and water-
consuming appliances that have been
contaminated.
8. Preparation of a technical resource document or
guide (in collaboration with public health and
remedial response expertise) for
decontaminating pipes and equipment,
including criteria to determine when a system is
safe to use.
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9.
Preparation of a technical resource document or
guide (in collaboration with hazardous and
solid waste disposal expertise) for disposal of
treatment residuals and contaminated pipes and
equipment.
for
lencies
3.5
Alternative supplies of water must be provided
when drinking water systems are taken offline as
the result of a physical attack or contamination
event. When water delivery is disrupted, plans
must be in place to provide clean and safe drinking
water to customers. Traditional contingency
planning approaches for providing drinking water
need to be investigated, along with innovative
approaches such as transportable or modular
technologies that can treat water at different
locations. The Bioterrorism Act [Ref 2] calls for a
review of the methods and means of providing
alternative sources of drinking water. An
assessment of water supply and delivery
alternatives will be undertaken for various-sized
systems and geographical areas, and will consider
types of water sources, adjacent systems and
interconnections, system redundancies, pressure
source (e.g., gravity systems, pumped systems, a
combination), and portable capabilities. A case
study of the National Capital Area [Ref. 2] will be a
key part of this review. Work is also needed to
assess water infrastructure interdependencies with
other critical national infrastructure, as
recommended by the NRC [Ref. 16] and as
described in the National Strategy [Ref. 3].
3.5.1 Projects
a. An assessment and case studies of water
supply alternatives for drinking water systems
disrupted by contamination events.
b. Tests and evaluations of improved
technologies and approaches for providing
supplies of water in the event of both long-
term and short-term disruptions to drinking
water systems.
c. An improved understanding of water system
interdependencies and the relationships of
such interdependencies with other
infrastructure sectors critical to national
security.
a. An assessment and case studies of water supply
alternatives for drinking water systems disrupted
by contamination events. An assessment is needed
of water supply alternatives for various system sizes
in different geographic locations considering
various water sources, distribution system designs,
and types of pressurized delivery. The nation's
drinking water utilities, particularly large utilities,
often have contingency plans for alternative water
supplies should portions of their systems become
inoperable. Small- and medium-size systems need
to be prepared for such situations as well. Such an
assessment will help various-sized drinking water
utilities enhance their contingency plans or develop
plans if they are needed. Other benefits could also
arise from planning for contingencies resulting from
terrorist actions or threats. These include improved
preparedness for natural hazards (e.g., earthquakes,
floods, tornadoes) or accidents (e.g., line breaks,
chemical tank failures). Traditional and innovative
contingency planning approaches and water supply
alternatives will be addressed as part of this
assessment. The following projects will address
this need:
1. Development of an assessment and case studies
under varying situations (e.g., community water
system size, geographic location) that provide a
spectrum of contingency planning situations and
responses (e.g., water sharing), including one
specifically focused on the National Capital Area.
What are the methods and means by which alternative supplies of drinking water can be provided to utilities and
consumers in the event of the destruction, impairment, or contamination of drinking water systems?
What are the most effective ways to secure the water sector infrastructure as it interrelates with and supports other
critical infrastructure sectors in the nation?
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2. Assessment of truck-mounted and otherwise
portable treatment facilities that are designed
for use during a crisis for areas where drinking
water quality is not dependable.
3. Assessment of redundancy approaches that can
be used by small, medium, and large systems to
assure continuity in water supplies.
4. Systematic analysis of the use and utility of GIS
in protecting water infrastructure.
5. Development of a compendium of options for
providing alternative supplies of drinking water
in various situations (e.g., system size and
location, extent of need).
b. Tests and evaluations of improved technologies
and approaches for providing supplies of water in
the event of both long-term and short-term
disruptions to drinking water systems. A
systematic analysis and, as appropriate, further
investigation is needed for new or alternative
treatment techniques that use advanced technology,
which might be mobile or modular. The
investigation would focus on alternatives that would
represent a significant advance in providing safe
and clean drinking water should a water supply or
system be compromised, rather than traditional
contingency planning approaches. These various
technological alternatives, if successful, could be
added to the potential options that drinking water
utilities would be able to draw upon should such be
needed. The following projects will address this
need:
1. Assessment of innovative technologies that
specifically enable or enhance the short-term
delivery of drinking water to impacted
customers, as well as those that enable long-
term delivery in the event of a systemic
collapse of water supplies or systems.
2. Testing and evaluation of the most promising
innovative technologies with an analysis of the
positive features and those areas needing
improvement prior to full-scale deployment in
the field.
c. An improved understanding of water system
interdependencies and the relationships of such
interdependencies with other infrastructure
sectors that are critical to national security. The
interdependencies between water infrastructure and
the remainder of the nation's critical infrastructure
systems need to be better understood. In addition, a
better understanding is needed of the reliability of
systems upon which continued functioning of the
water system depends (e.g., electric power, road
transportation, telecommunications), including an
assessment of the weakest links among the systems
that are required for continued functioning. This is
true for general utility-based infrastructures (e.g.,
electricity) that affect water infrastructure and vice-
versa. Once better understood, actions can be taken
to minimize the influence of these
interdependencies. The DHS is responsible for
protecting the nation's critical infrastructure as set
forth in the National Strategy [Ref 3], and an
evaluation of how water systems affect, and are
affected by, other infrastructures will have to be
coordinated with DHS. Preliminary contacts have
been made with DHS on a number of possible
interactions, including this one. The following
projects will address this need:
1. Identification and analysis of interdependencies
among the nation's critical infrastructures that
affect water supplies and systems in order to
identify mitigation strategies and maintain
water utility operations.
2. Development of guidance or a technical
resource document to assist water utilities in
ensuring the continued delivery of safe and
clean water taking into account potential
disruptions caused by other malfunctioning
critical infrastructure.
3.6 1 i on
the
The appropriate response to water security concerns
and health risks to the public is to develop tools to
assess risks rapidly and reduce the uncertainties
associated with rapid assessment of these risks.
Section 1434 of the Bioterrorism Act [Ref. 2] calls
for a review of biomedical research into short-term
and long-term impacts on public health of chemical,
biological, and radiological contaminants
introduced into drinking water systems. By
assessing human health risks from acute (i.e., 1
hour to less than 1 day) as well as short-term (i.e., 1
day to 30 day) exposures, these risk assessment
tools will contribute to improved decisions on
emergency response and remedial action,
respectively. These tools also will help to facilitate
risk communication with drinking water utility
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personnel, responders, and public health officials,
as well as with the general public. Coupled with
this rapid risk assessment approach is the need to
communicate risks and associated health
information between organizations and individuals
who can perform the following: (1) recognize
diseases or illnesses that may be related to water
exposures, (2) communicate with utility
personnel/managers and share information that can
help in determining the extent of any risk, and (3)
report the information to all affected parties so that
messages on risk are clear, consistent, and accurate.
3.6.1
a. An improved understanding of multiple routes
of exposure from contaminants in drinking
water supplies and systems, which should
focus on generic models for different large
classes of contaminants, and an improved
understanding of acute and short-term
exposures and chronic public health effects
from contaminants in drinking water supplies
and systems, which should focus on generic
models for different large classes of
contaminants.
b. An improved communication in health
surveillance to help public health officials and
water utility operators rapidly identify and
control a disease outbreak or other public
health emergency associated with
contaminated drinking water.
c. An evaluation of the usefulness and validity of
non-traditional data sources (e.g., lethal dose
5tfh percentile [LD50], Quantitative Structure
Activity Relationship [QSAR]) for the
derivation of acute and chronic toxicity values
applied to water.
d. A risk assessment/risk management
framework for identifying the impact of
containment, decontamination, treatment, and
disposal options and the subsequent response.
e. Methods and means to communicate risks to
local communities and to respond to
customers in case of an attack on drinking
water systems.
a. An improved understanding of multiple routes
of exposure from contaminants in drinking water
supplies and systems, which should focus on
generic models for different large classes of
contaminants, and an improved understanding of
acute and short-term exposures and chronic
public health effects from contaminants in
drinking water supplies and systems, which should
focus on generic models for different large classes
of contaminants. A drinking water system can be
contaminated with a single contaminant or a
complex mixture of contaminants. The
contaminant(s) can be introduced into a water
supply system at various locations and through a
series of events and mechanisms. The possible
widespread distribution of a contaminant can result
in the exposure of a relatively large population and
may result in an adverse health effect, which
depends on either the minimum infective dose or
the potential dose of the biological or chemical
contaminant, respectively. The severity of the
effect(s) depends on who is exposed, exposure
duration and media concentration, and this could
result in sickness and in some cases death.
Consumers are not the only group of individuals
What are the risk-related questions that need to be addressed following a threat or actual attack on a drinking water
system?
What are the components of a rapid risk assessment protocol for drinking water that has been contaminated with
biological, chemical, or radiological contaminants?
What are the most likely pathways of exposure for individuals who come in contact with contaminated water supplies
or treated water?
What are the acute, short-term, and (when appropriate) chronic longer-term effects from exposure to contaminants in
water supplies or treated water?
What are the desired decontamination levels that would minimize health risks to responders and drinking water
customers?
What types of information should be communicated for water threats and attacks and how can this information best be
conveyed to targeted organizations, individuals, and the general public?
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that could be exposed to the contaminants.
Individuals working for a water utility or
emergency responders also may be exposed and,
therefore, are at some risk of an adverse effect.
The traditional exposure route for contaminated
drinking water is ingestion. This is not the only
route, as some contaminants may result in
exposures via inhalation, dermal, and ocular routes.
The following projects will address this need:
1. A compilation of a comprehensive, readily-
modified database on the acute, short-term,
and chronic non-cancer health effects
associated with the priority contaminants.
2. Evaluation of all possible routes by which
people might be exposed to contaminated
water and an analysis as to the likelihood or
viability of these routes for exposure.
3. Development of an easily updated and secure
information portal on exposure routes and
public health effects associated with various
threat scenarios to water supplies and treated
water.
4. Critical review and assessment of various
methods or models (e.g., QSARs), as well as
other available information and scientific
judgments regarding the toxicity or infectivity
of the priority contaminants to estimate
reference and infective doses.
b. An improved communication in health
surveillance to help public health officials and
water utility operators rapidly identify and control
a disease outbreak or other public health
emergency associated with contaminated drinking
water. Early detection of water-borne
contamination, whether accidental or intentionally
introduced, is the primary goal of a health
surveillance system. CDC has the capability to
develop a health surveillance monitoring network.
A network of this type, coupled with information
from drinking water utilities, will provide both the
capability and capacity for real-time surveillance of
water quality. Since tracking morbidity is a late
indicator of risk, some earlier indicators are
desirable. Syndromic surveillance is one example
that may be useful to indicate increased illness,
disease, or death related to waterborne
contaminants. For example, supermarkets and
druggists track sales of over-the-counter
antidiarrheal medications as an early indicator of
Cryptosporidium outbreaks. Another potential
avenue for early warning of illness or disease is an
enhanced role for poison control centers.
If a water contaminant causes a "notifiable disease,"
health surveillance systems may detect this.
Through EPA collaboration with agencies such as
CDC, FDA, and state/local health departments,
input to surveillance systems may be improved, and
a linkage may be developed between existing health
surveillance systems with water utility data. This
would help to determine whether a disease or illness
outbreak is caused by a water contamination event
within a system or utility.
Another area where risk assessment tools and the
appropriate risk communication approach can be
helpful is in the surveillance and warning of
increased disease and illness reported by physicians
and hospitals. The following projects will address
this need:
1. Collaboration with CDC, FDA, and state/local
health departments to evaluate existing health
surveillance networks to rapidly detect and
control a disease outbreak by more effectively
linking public health and water system
information and data.
2. Development of a technical resource document
or guide to assist water utilities, public health
officials, and other organizations in instituting a
program for tracking disease outbreaks
associated with water contamination events.
c. An evaluation of the usefulness and validity of
non-traditional data sources (e.g., LD50, QSAR)
for the derivation of acute and chronic toxicity
values applied to water. The evaluation of a
contaminant involves the identification of its
hazards through the collection and generation of
relevant toxicity data. These data can be used to:
(1) identify the most sensitive indicator of toxicity,
(2) provide information on the dose-response
relationship, and (3) estimate the no-observed-
adverse-effect-level (NO AEL) [Ref 17]. Many of
the contaminants of interest do not have a complete
toxicity data set. Therefore, LD50 data must be used
instead of NOAELs to estimate acute toxicity
values for particular contaminants. Use of single
point toxicity estimates such as LD50 values and
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structure-activity relationships to project acute
toxicity values for human populations is a difficult
concept and one that will require significant
validation. Some models do exist (e.g., MCASE,
TOPCAT, DEREK3, PALLAS). The DoD's Armed
Forces Medical Intelligence Center recently
concluded that QSARs are less well developed for
acute toxicity than for chronic toxicity. QSAR
methodologies have been developed for many
longer-term toxicology endpoints, such as cancer,
reproduction, and neurotoxicity. The following
projects will address this need:
1. Preparation of a methodology for extrapolating
LD50 data to derive toxicity values for
biological, chemical, and radiological
contaminants that are threats to drinking water
supplies and systems.
2. Preparation of a methodology for using QSARs
to estimate toxicity values for priority chemical
contaminants that are threats to drinking water
supplies and systems.
d. A risk assessment/risk management framework
for identifying the impact of containment,
decontamination, treatment, and disposal options
and the subsequent response. The proactive
integration of risk management and risk assessment
will pose many challenges in responding to terrorist
threats or attacks. Any attempt to address risk must
consider both assessment and management in order
to be most useful to a number of stakeholders. In
particular, when responding to a contamination
event, the responders or remedial managers must
know the risk management options for minimizing
exposures to the public. In an emergency situation,
the risk management option(s) might determine:
(1) the protocols used to evaluate the chemical,
biological, and radiological contaminants, (2) the
approach used in conducting the risk assessment,
and (3) the method and means of communication
that will be used to convey the risks to various
groups. The following projects will address this
need:
1. An analysis of current approaches to and
procedures for integrating risk assessment and
risk management decision making in order to
quickly respond to threats and attacks with
information for on-scene decision makers from
threat notification through threat response.
2. Testing and refinement of approaches and
procedures through the application of
simulations, table top exercises, and
information applications that involve risk
assessment and risk management integration.
3. Development of a test protocol for use by risk
assessors and risk managers in addressing
threats and attacks on drinking water supplies
and systems as part of improved consequence
management.
e. Methods and means to communicate risks to
local communities and to respond to customers in
case of an attack on drinking water systems.
When a threat or attack occurs, fast and effective
communication on risks is essential. No one
method or means will be appropriate for all places
or times. Knowing what tool to use, when, and how
can only be determined through communication
planning and research. Information developed in
advance can be distributed to the appropriate people
as needed. Releasing appropriate information in a
timely fashion can build trust and may moderate the
public response in the event of an actual attack or a
hoax. Efforts to educate the general public in
understanding and preparing for potential threats is
critical to effectively prevent and/or respond to an
event incident. Mechanisms to achieve such needs
have to be developed based on open communication
between all affected parties. The following projects
will address this need:
1. Adaptation of a preliminary risk
communication framework that can be used to
respond to threats or attacks on drinking water
systems.
2. Preparation of information, materials, and
model protocols prior to an actual threat or
event that can facilitate early response to
customers facing concerns about their drinking
water.
3. Development and stocking of a repository
where prepared information and materials can
be maintained and retrieved for use, when and
if the need arises, in response to a threat or
attack on drinking water supplies and systems.
4. Development of a refined risk communication
framework that ensures access to appropriate
individuals and organizations so they are well
prepared to respond to threats or attacks on
drinking water systems.
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4
and
Wastewater systems, like drinking water systems,
have been identified as a part of the nation's critical
infrastructure. The wastewater treatment and
collection infrastructure requires additional
measures for security and protection from a variety
of high potential threats and attacks. This Chapter
on protecting wastewater systems parallels Chapter
3 on drinking water by describing needs in a
number of key areas. While there are many
similarities and interdependencies between drinking
water and wastewater security issues that will
benefit from a sharing of information and tools,
there also are some significant differences as
described below.
A clearer understanding of the threats faced by
wastewater systems is needed, including a thorough
assessment of the health and safety risks that could
result from the misuse or intentional introduction of
hazardous substances at wastewater facilities.
Needs for improving system design are described in
this Chapter, as is the use of intrusion protection
technologies for wastewater treatment systems.
Finally, this Chapter identifies security-related
needs for prevention, response, and
communications at wastewater facilities. For each
need, a list of projects is presented to address the
need, and the projects are presented in order of
priority. The research and technical support needs
are presented in a logical sequence, rather than
priority order, since all were identified as high
priority in the stakeholders meeting held in
February 2003. Many of these needs will be
addressed simultaneously and, in some cases,
projects are already underway for many of the
needs.
This list of overarching needs and projects was
essentially confirmed and further developed by
wastewater stakeholders who participated in the
WERF wastewater security symposium in August
2003. The projects identified in Section 4.1
incorporate the combined input from all of these
meetings. In addressing wastewater protection,
there are overarching needs that apply to both
drinking water and wastewater security and
protection. Examples include, but are not limited
to, physical and cyber security and contaminant
identification. Other needs underscore the
interdependency between drinking water and
wastewater systems based on the impact that one
system may have on the other (e.g., intentional
contamination and subsequent decontamination of
drinking water systems can significantly impact the
operation of downstream wastewater facilities).
Building on experience already gained by wastewater utilities, what are the high priority threats to the nation's
wastewater infrastructure and the potential consequences of those threats?
What countermeasures can be undertaken to best prevent, contain, or mitigate attacks on the wastewater infrastructure?
What enhancements can be made to monitoring and surveillance systems, technologies, and security measures to protect
the wastewater infrastructure?
How can security measures be incorporated into the design of the next generation of wastewater systems, or retrofitted to
existing systems?
What is the critical information that wastewater utilities need in order to most effectively prepare for and respond to
potential threats or actual attacks?
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4.1
a. A thorough understanding and documentation
of the possible threats to the nation's
wastewater treatment and collection system
infrastructure, including the
interdependencies with drinking water systems
and other critical infrastructure.
b. An updated assessment of the possible health,
safety, and environmental risks related to
potentially hazardous substances used by
wastewater utilities or produced during
response to security threats (e.g.,
decontamination materials and their
byproducts) or intentionally introduced into
wastewater collection and treatment systems or
stormwater conveyance and treatment systems,
including any impact on residuals
management operations (e.g., sewage sludge).
c. Improved intrusion monitoring and
surveillance technologies to quickly notify
wastewater utilities when these facilities or
technologies are compromised by physical or
cyber threats or chemical, biological, and
radiological contaminants.
d. Improved designs for wastewater systems to
reduce vulnerability to physical threats and as
a way to prevent or mitigate the effects of
attacks on wastewater infrastructure.
e. Enhanced prevention and response planning
methods, including emergency response (e.g.,
relocation of discharge or alternative
treatment), contingency planning, and risk
communication protocols and guidance for
wastewater systems of varying types (size,
geographic location, design).
f. Methods and means to securely maintain and,
when appropriate, transmit information on
contaminants and threat scenarios applicable
to wastewater systems.
a. A thorough understanding and documentation
of the possible threats to the nation's wastewater
treatment and collection system infrastructure,
including the interdependencies with drinking
water systems and other critical infrastructure. To
more fully prepare for threats or attacks on the
nation's wastewater collection and treatment
systems, additional work is needed to more
thoroughly identify and prioritize possible threats
and threat scenarios. For example, treatment
chemicals that are potentially hazardous to human
health and the environment, if workers or the
surrounding community are exposed to them, are an
area of particular interest. Attention needs to be
given to "unattended operations" (e.g., pumping
stations, small treatment plants with limited staff)
and the possible risk to the health and welfare of the
general public. The following projects will address
this need:
1. Identification and prioritization of potential
physical, cyber, and contaminant (e.g.,
biological, chemical, radiological) threats and
threat scenarios for the nation's wastewater
treatment and collection infrastructure,
including consequence analysis of adverse
events.
2. Assessment of countermeasures or system
redundancies that could be employed for the
most likely threats and threat scenarios.
3. Evaluation of "unattended operations" and how
they can best be protected from physical, cyber,
and contaminant threats and attacks.
4. Improved understanding and assessment of the
critical linkages and interdependencies between
drinking water and wastewater systems, and
how these linkages directly impact human
health and safety as well as the operation and
performance of the wastewater system.
5. Identification and analysis of interdependencies
between critical infrastructure that affect, or are
affected by, impacted wastewater systems to
maintain operations and to promote the
development of prevention, mitigation, and
response technologies.
b. An updated assessment of the possible health,
safety, and environmental risks related to
potentially hazardous substances used by
wastewater utilities or produced during response
to security threats (e.g., decontamination materials
and their byproducts) or intentionally introduced
into wastewater collection and treatment systems
or stormwater conveyance and treatment systems,
including any impact on residuals management
operations (e.g., sewage sludge). Depending on the
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specific setting, the intentional contamination of
wastewater could result in harmful exposures to
chemical, biological, or radiological hazards.
Chemical, biological, or radiological contaminants
that pass in and through wastewater treatment
plants can subsequently have deleterious effects on
downstream waters, operations, and related
infrastructures. On-site use of hazardous chemicals
for disinfection and other purposes is common at
wastewater utilities, and presents a unique hazard to
both human health and system operations. The
following projects will address this need:
1. Preparation of a "Baseline Threat Document"
for wastewater systems that is analogous to the
drinking water baseline threat document.
2. Screening level risk assessments of biological,
chemical, and radiological contaminants that
could be used as contaminant threats in
wastewater treatment plants and collection
systems using currently available risk
assessment tools.
3. Comparative assessment (including associated
risks) of alternatives to conventional
disinfection that use chlorine, including the
byproducts that may result from such
alternatives.
4. Evaluation of wastewater treatment
technologies that either currently or through
enhancement can more effectively remove
contaminants introduced into or received by
wastewater collection systems, including
consideration of safe handling of contaminated
wastewater.
5. Evaluation of intentionally introduced
biological, chemical, or radiological
contaminants on sewage sludge and other
residuals associated with wastewater treatment.
c. Improved intrusion monitoring and
surveillance technologies to quickly notify
wastewater utilities when these facilities or
technologies are compromised by physical or cyber
threats or chemical, biological, and radiological
contaminants. The challenge of maintaining
wastewater system integrity must be combined with
a vigilant program of monitoring and surveillance.
Protecting wastewater systems and discouraging
intrusion using physical protection technologies
will achieve a high degree of threat reduction.
Using various real-time monitoring and intrusion
detection devices that can immediately recognize
the introduction of harmful chemical, biological, or
radiological contaminants can provide timely alerts
and trigger critical response actions. Additional
surveillance devices could be identified and adapted
or developed to complement those already available
for wastewater system applications. Similar to the
needs identified for drinking water systems, sensor
technologies for wastewater systems also are
needed to monitor water quality for chemical and
biological contaminants that have been identified as
threats to wastewater systems, or would
compromise the protection to human health and the
environment provided by these systems. The
following projects will address this need:
1. Development and assessment of information on
current practices and methods to control
intrusion of wastewater collection systems and
other components of the wastewater
infrastructure (including combined systems and
storm water systems), which could be used to
gain access to critical community targets.
2. Assessment of existing and new technologies
and systems (i.e., commercially available) for
use in sensing physical threats to and
contaminant introduction into wastewater
collection and treatment systems, including
toxins that could disrupt wastewater treatment
processes.
3. Testing, evaluation, and verification of
intrusion monitoring and surveillance
technologies and systems, as well as their
ability to provide timely notification of physical
attacks or contamination events on the
wastewater collection and treatment systems.
These efforts would include current bioassay
methods for detection and identification of
contaminants, and use of intelligent monitoring
and control networks.
4. Assessment of currently applied
wastewater/storm water/combined sewer
outflow models for simulating the movement of
dangerous/hazardous materials in wastewater
collection systems.
5. Assessment and dissemination of information
on technologies and methods for developing
continuous monitoring and control systems for
wastewater/storm water collection systems for
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dangerous levels of volatile, explosive, and
toxic gases.
6. A thorough identification and analysis of
potential threats to computerized and automated
controls and other SCADA systems associated
with wastewater collection and treatment
systems, and the means to protect them from
cyber attacks.
d. Improved designs for wastewater systems to
reduce vulnerability to physical threats and as a
way to prevent or mitigate the effects of attacks on
wastewater infrastructure. An updated
understanding of threats to wastewater
infrastructure and the consequences of attacks will
facilitate the development of guidance for the
wastewater industry on methods to prevent or
mitigate their effects. The following activities will
aid in prevention and mitigation: (1) developing
prevention or mitigation countermeasures based on
specific threat scenarios, and (2) working with
standards-setting organizations to develop design
standards and recommendations for new
construction, re-construction, and retrofitting with a
focus on security (e.g., optimal levels of
redundancy to main continuity of critical
operations). An important consideration in
developing revised design standards for wastewater
systems is to recommend measures that have
multiple benefits (e.g., enhance security and, at the
same time, improve wastewater system operations).
Without consideration of "dual-use" aspects of
revised design features, many security
enhancements may be relatively expensive, which
could limit their adoption by wastewater utilities
and the design community. The following project
will address this need:
1. Working with standards-setting organizations,
preparation of voluntary design standards and
recommendations for new construction,
reconstruction, and retrofitting with a focus on
security in combination with improved
operations.
e. Enhanced prevention and response planning
methods, including emergency response (e.g.,
relocation of discharge or alternative treatment),
contingency planning, and risk communication
protocols and guidance for wastewater systems of
varying types (size, geographic location, design).
Vigilant surveillance and reliable protection
technologies greatly increase the security of
wastewater collection and treatment systems.
However, the health and safety of the general public
also relies on carefully developed emergency
response and contingency plans. For example,
when monitoring and surveillance systems alert
wastewater utilities of a possible breach of security,
immediate response actions must be triggered.
Carefully developed risk communication messages
provide the necessary information to the media and
the general public to make informed decisions
while minimizing panic or concern. In addition,
educational materials developed to help the general
public understand and prepare for potential threats
are key elements of effective prevention and
response plans. Additional work can be undertaken
in these areas to enhance measures already in place.
The following projects will address this need:
1. Development of response protocol "play books"
for use by all key participants to create their
own "game plans" in responding to wastewater
collection and treatment system threats or
attacks.
2. Preparation of a wastewater system table top
exercise to guide, and an accompanying case
studies resource document to encourage,
interaction among wastewater system
organizations and to provide them with insight
and experience in role-playing threat scenario
3. Improvement of risk communication tools (with
the public, individuals, and organizations) for
those personnel and organizations responsible
for protecting wastewater collection and
treatment systems and/or responding to threats
or attacks.
/ Methods and means to securely maintain and,
when appropriate, transmit information on
contaminants and threat scenarios applicable to
wastewater systems. Lists of contaminants,
potential surrogates, prioritizations, and
characteristics may contain several types of
sensitive or secure information. Some of this
information may be made available to the public,
while other information may have to be secured
with limited or restricted access. The need for
limited or restricted access may result from the
source of the information, the nature of the
information, or the potential for harm from
widespread release. Specific decisions about the
distribution of information will be made using
classification procedures established by EPA or
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through agreements with the information sources.
Procedures will need to be established to ensure that
access controls are appropriately maintained, and
appropriate channels for dissemination of such
information will need to be created and utilized.
The following projects will address this need:
1. Evaluation of existing methods and means of
information sharing on wastewater threats and
contaminants, including the feasibility of a
dynamically updated database, to ensure
appropriate access to individuals and
organizations based on their need for this
information.
Based on consideration of critical knowledge
management issues, development of a
framework for evaluating the sensitivity of
information related to wastewater systems, and
addressing needs identified in Project 1, above.
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.6nn:".n
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EPA will implement this Action Plan with the help
of a number of organizations in order to get the
most accurate information quickly and efficiently to
those who need it. To this end, the Water Security
Team at the NHSRC is working closely with the
WSD in the Office of Water to advance research
collaborations, provide technical support, improve
technology readiness, and disseminate timely and
targeted information on water security. Chapters 3
and 4 of this Action Plan describe what needs to be
done for drinking water and wastewater,
respectively. This Chapter describes how it will be
done.
5.1 aruf 7 fs
The WSD and NHSRC are working together
closely to address water security needs through this
Action Plan. This is a collaboration involving
numerous partners and stakeholders. Both the
Office of Water and ORD have conducted
discussions with many organizations who are
critical in the execution of this Action Plan. Close
collaborations are underway with the American
Water Works Association Research Foundation and
WERF on research and technical support projects
related to drinking water and wastewater,
respectively. Work is underway with the American
Society of Civil Engineers on designing physical
security into future water and wastewater
infrastructure projects.
Relationships have been developed between EPA
and other organizations with expertise in many of
the project areas. Such relationships (e.g.,
Memorandum of Agreement [MOA], Memorandum
of Understanding [MOU]) allow for formal working
relationships across federal organizations, including
the means to transfer funds through Interagency
Agreements (lAGs). Examples include partnerships
with the Department of the Army's Edgewood
Chemical Biological Center in Edgewood,
Maryland; the Department of the Air Force's Air
Force Research Laboratory in Dayton, Ohio; the
FDA Forensic Chemistry Center in Cincinnati,
Ohio; the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers' Civil
Engineering Research Laboratory in Champaign,
Illinois; DOE's Argonne National Laboratory in
Chicago, Illinois; and DOE's Sandia National
Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Discussions are underway with the CDC in Atlanta,
Georgia, and the National Institute of Science and
Technology in Washington, DC. In addition, EPA
is working with two directorates in DHS (the
Science and Technology Directorate, and the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate) to address water issues, needs, and
projects.
Various EPA Offices and Regions are also
collaborating in the water security arena. The EPA
Regions are involved in implementing this Action
Plan through the WSD. Other EPA Offices
engaged in addressing homeland security that
directly or indirectly relate to water security are the
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response;
the Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic
Substances; the Office of Air and Radiation; and the
Administrator's Office of Homeland Security. In
addition, collaboration with the water sector in
implementing some of the needs and projects
presented in this Action Plan will continue.
5.1,1
Consortium
EPA has formed the Distribution System Research
Consortium (DSRC), comprised of 14 partnering
organizations. The DSRC is an EPA-led national
umbrella organization made up of member federal
agencies and water organizations dedicated to the
advancement of science, technology, and research
to protect drinking water distribution systems from
terrorist attacks. The DSRC accomplishes this
mission by:
* Collaborating to advance science, technology,
and research in the following areas:
* Monitoring and Detection
* Early Alert and Warning Systems
* Models and Modeling of Systems
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* Treatment of Waters in Systems
* Decontamination of Equipment and
Materials.
&, Identifying challenges and prioritizing the
development of short- and long-term solutions
to expedite the implementation of useful and
feasible distribution system technologies.
li Transferring information (through EPA
communication mechanisms and via other
routes such as the WaterlSAC) and assisting
drinking water utilities, states, researchers,
policy makers, risk assessors, public health
community members, and others needing
research results or guidance on the security of
distribution systems.
5.2
An integral part of the Agency's water security
program involves advancing water security
technologies and determining their readiness for
implementation. It is important for water system
utility operators and the public to know whether
these technologies, which are at various stages of
development, are reliable and ready for use.
Chapters 3 and 4 of this Action Plan describe many
drinking water and wastewater needs and projects,
some of which involve detection, monitoring,
containment, treatment, decontamination, and
disposal technologies. Many technologies are being
offered to water system operators, and many more
technologies are being advanced that technology
developers or vendors hope will be commercial
successes.
The WSD provided funding to expand the EPA
Environmental Technology Verification (ETV)
Program to validate sensors and biomonitoring
technologies, POU/POE devices, and
decontamination water treatment technologies in
August 2002. The NHSRC has continued to
support these efforts with funding in 2003.
Advancing water security technologies will occur in
a number of ways:
:& Convening vendors and users in forums (e.g.,
homeland security technologies development
forum) where technology vendors address user
needs in an open, fact-based interchange on
needs and capabilities.
It Offering vendors (that have demonstrated
proof-of-concept up through a first- or second-
generation prototype) an opportunity to advance
their technology through an accelerated and
competitive Small Business Innovation
Research Program.
§1 Engaging with the Office of Water and the DoD
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) to
advance technologies through TSWG's broad
agency announcements for technology
advancement.
ill Offering vendors a site, or sites, where they can
bring their fully-prototyped technologies for
controlled or more real-world testing assisted
by EPA (e.g., EPA Water Awareness
Technology Evaluations Research and Security
Center, National Environmental Technology
Test Sites) using Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements.
ill Offering vendors (that have commercially ready
technologies) an opportunity to undergo
verification through the EPA's ETV Program.
II Establishing a national clearinghouse for
technology users to access information on water
security technologies and to facilitate more
informed decisions when selecting technologies
for use [Ref 18].
The above options are being employed to address
technology advancement as part of this Action Plan.
They are proven approaches from the standpoint of
being accepted ways of doing business to advance
environmental protection technologies in other EPA
programs, and they can all be used to meet the
urgent needs of technology advancement for water
security.
5.3
One of the overarching issues of homeland security
communication is the proper dissemination of
information. The Bioterrorism Act [Ref. 2] stresses
information sharing as follows:
Section 1435(d) - Information Sharing: ...the
Administrator shall disseminate, as appropriate
as determined by the Administrator, to
community water systems information on the
results of the project through the Water
Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(Water ISAC) or other appropriate means.
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A variety of organizations and individuals may be
involved along the continuum of prevention,
preparedness, and response to a threat to or an
attack on a water system. They also are potential
users of the water security research and technical
support products that are developed under this
Action Plan. As either the NHSRC or the WSD
produce new information under this Action Plan, all
of the potential users must be considered and
information provided appropriately.
5.3.1
A variety of organizations and individuals will need
information that is developed under this Action Plan
to make more informed decisions on prevention,
preparedness, and recovery in the case of a threat to
or actual attack on a water system. Table 5.1
presents some examples of information users, but
there are other potential users that may not yet be
identified. As with several aspects of this Action
Plan, the information users listed in Table 5.1 and
how they are targeted to receive information will
evolve over time. The method of information
dissemination will be determined, in part, based on
the level of sensitivity of the information presented,
and distribution will follow processes established by
EPA.
5.3.2 Information Products
The types of information sharing products provided
will depend on the research or technical support
subject matter, the end user of the information, and
how quickly it is needed. Types of products may
include response guides, technical notes,
contaminant-specific advisories, technology
bulletins, technical reports, workshop presentations,
seminars, training sessions, newsletters,
mathematical models, response protocols,
procedures, peer-reviewed journal articles, risk
communication products, web broadcasts, and secure
or open-source databases.
5.3.3
A listing of all available research products, as well
as many of the products themselves, will be placed
on NHSRC's Web site at
http://www.epa.gov/ordnhsrc. An internet-based
catalog with publicly available products from both
WSD and NHSRC will be located on the WSD
Web site at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security.
Table 5.1. Potential Users of Research and Technical Support Information
Developed Under This Action Plan
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Drinking water and wastewater facility owners and
operators
National/state level drinking water and wastewater
associations
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
Public health agencies
Public health professionals
Medical practitioners and medical support personnel
National/state public health associations
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Federal laboratories (including EPA)
State public health and environmental laboratories
Municipal laboratories
Commercial laboratories
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Media
Elected officials
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State water administrators and authorities
State and local law enforcement
Fire departments
National Guard
Emergency planning officials and committees
State/municipal elected and appointed officials
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EPA Regional and Headquarters Offices
Department of Homeland Security
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
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Academic researchers
Consultants
Engineering, scientific, and public health
associations
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General public
International organizations and entities
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Dissemination mechanisms for sharing information
developed under this Action Plan may include a
variety of traditional media and venues, such as
industry conferences and poster sessions, peer-
reviewed journals, and workshop presentations.
When information is sensitive, dissemination
mechanisms may include secure or limited-access
information exchanges (e.g., WaterlSAC [Ref 13]).
How EPA will handle sensitive information that is
developed under this Action Plan will evolve. The
Administrator has classification authority, and
levels of delegation below the Administrator are
still being considered. In preparing and distributing
information from this Action Plan, the EPA
NHSRC and security policies that guide disclosure
of sensitive data will be followed. A variety of
media and venues may be used to ensure that the
most relevant information is made available to
stakeholders in a timely fashion. Whereas
traditional publishing and e-publishing are suitable
media for distribution of general information on
most technologies, it may be necessary to use more
secure means of communication, with classified
networks being the most secure, to disseminate
highly sensitive information.
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1. Strategic Plan for Homeland Security. U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, September
2002.
http://www.epa.gov/epahome/downloads/
epa_homeland_security_strategic_plan.pdf
2. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act (Bioterrorism
Act), PL 107-188, United States Congress, June
2002. http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/publaw/
107publ.html
3. The National Strategy for Homeland Security,
Office of Homeland Security, July 2002.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/
index.html
4. PDD63. Critical Infrastructure Protection.
May 1998.
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm
5. HSPD 7. Critical Infrastructure Identification,
Prioritization, and Protection. December
2003. http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-7.html
6. Executive Order 12656. Assignment of
Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities.
Federal Register, Vol. 53. No. 228, Wednesday,
November 23, 1988.
7. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act: 42 U.S.C. s/s
9601, 1980, as amended.
8. Emergency Planning and Right-to-Know Act:
42 U.S.C. s/s 11001, 1986, as amended.
9. Clean Water Act: 33 U.S.C Chapter 26, s/s
1251, 1977, as amended.
10. Oil Pollution Act: 33 U.S.C. 2702 to 2761,
1990.
11. Clean Air Act: 42 U.S.C. s/s 7401, 1970, as
amended.
12. PDD39. United States Policy on
Counter terrorism. June 1995.
Unclassified version:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm
Updated interpretation:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39_frp.htm
13. Water Information Sharing and Analysis
Center, Association of Metropolitan Water
Agencies, http://www.waterisac.org
14. Safe Drinking Water Act: 42 U.S.C. s/s 300f,
1974, as amended.
15. Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science
and Technology in Countering Terrorism. The
National Research Council of the National
Academies. The National Academies Press,
Washington, DC. 2002.
http://www.nap.edu/html/stct/index.html
16. A Review of the EPA Water Security Research
and Technical Support Action Plan, National
Research Council, National Academies Press,
Washington, DC, 2003.
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309089824/html/
index.html
17. Lu, FC. Basic Toxicology: Fundamentals,
Target Organs, and Risk Assessment. Eds: A.
N. Bartlett and E. Dugger. New York:
Hemisphere. 1991.
18. Security Product Guide, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 2003.
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/guide/
index.html
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