vvEPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Seattle-King County, Washington
Community Case Study Report
Security and Preparedness
A Collaborative Approach to Water
Sector Resiliency
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Office of Water (4608T)
EPA No. 817-R-08-011
October 2008
www.epa.gov/safewater
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Prepared under
Work Assignment No. 2-08
Active and Effective Security Program Support
EPA Contract No. EP-C-05-045
Technical, Analytical, and Regulatory Mission Support for the Water
Security Division
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
DISCLAIMER
The information presented in the Seattle-King County, Washington Community Case Study provides an
example of how one area of the country was successful at implementing practices that support
preparedness and resiliency, with the expressed intent of using the effort to support water sector
protective practices nationally. This document is not intended to serve as guidance. The mention of trade
names or commercial products does not constitute endorsement or recommendation for use.
Questions concerning this document or its application should be addressed to:
Laura Flynn
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water
Water Security Division
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Mail Code: 4608T
Washington, DC 20460
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Seattle-King County, Washington Community Case
Study Project Team wish to thank the following individuals and organizations for their participation in support of
the project:
Case Study Guidance Team
Allen Alston,
King County Wastewater Treatment Division
Mike Boykin,
U.S. EPA Region 10
Ben Budka,
King County Wastewater Treatment Division
Shad Burcham,
King County Office of Emergency Management
Scott Decker,
Washington State Department of Health
Robin Friedman,
Seattle Public Utilities
Brandon Hardenbrook,
Pacific Northwest Economic Region
Jim Henriksen,
Seattle-King County Department of Public Health
Randy Holmes,
City of Bellevue Utilities
Mike Jackman,
City of Bellevue Utilities
Mitzi Johanknecht,
King County Sheriffs Office
Fred Savaglio,
Virginia Mason Medical Center
Hal Schlomann,
Washington Association of Sewer and Water
Districts
Ron Speer,
Soos Creek Water and Sewer District
Ted Stencilin,
King County Sheriffs Office
Gene Taylor,
U.S. EPA Region 10
Area Workshop Participants
Cedar River Water and Sewer District
Cingular Wireless
Coal Creek Utility District
Highline Water District
King County Water District #111
Lakehaven Utility District
Northwest Warning, Alert, and Response Network
(NW-WARN)
Puget Sound Energy
Qwest
Ronald Sewer District
City of Seattle
Seattle City Light
Seattle Fire Department
Southwest Suburban Sewer District
U.S. Department of Transportation
Washington State Association of Counties and
Cities
Washington Military Department, Emergency
Management Division
Washington State Department of Transportation
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A mission within the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Office of Water is to provide national
leadership in developing and promoting protective programs that enhance the water sector's ability to prevent,
detect, respond to, and recover from all-hazards events that may cause harm to consumers and/or utility
infrastructure. The term "water sector" is used to describe both drinking water and wastewater utilities. The
information contained in this report is a reminder that a protective program is not simply guards and gates, but also
an attitude and culture of security and preparedness that is created and maintained throughout the utility.
EPA embarked on the Seattle-King County, Washington Community Case Study (Case Study) project as a strategy
to increase awareness about the benefits of implementing an active and effective protective program. EPA turned to
the Seattle-King County area because of their history of security and preparedness activity in the water sector. As an
example for other communities across the country, the Case Study demonstrates how one area of the country is
successful at implementing practices that support preparedness and resiliency.
Drinking water and wastewater utilities across the country are important to EPA's efforts for building relationships
at the state and local levels. As such, the broad audience for this Case Study includes water sector utilities of all
sizes, elected officials, local and state emergency management agencies, and leaders of critical infrastructure
organizations across all sectors. The report should empower other communities and water sector utilities by
demonstrating how implementing select practices supports creating an active and effective protective program.
The primary goal of the Case Study was to identify and document select examples of protective practices being
implemented within the Seattle-King County area that validate the key features of an active and effective protective
program developed by the National Drinking Water Advisory Council's (NDWAC or Council) peer-led working
group; the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) Metrics Workgroup for Water would
subsequently revise these key features. The features were developed as elements that, when applied individually or
together, would help improve the water sector's ability to protect its systems, respond effectively to all types of
emergencies, and safeguard public health and safety.
The Case Study report outlines the process EPA used to coordinate stakeholder participation, collect information,
and select practices that would provide the water sector with detailed examples across a broad spectrum of
possibilities. The practices center on activities that support all phases of security and preparedness. The purpose of
this Case Study was to identify and describe security and preparedness practices water sector utilities are
implementing in the Seattle-King County area, and provide a case study methodology that is easily replicated and
can serve as a model for other communities and water sector utilities across the country.
A project team comprising key staff from EPA Office of Water, Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC),
CH2M HILL, and Ross & Associates, formed a guidance team from 16 agencies, comprising 11 utilities and 5 state
and local agencies to advise them on the effort and to provide feedback on the practices. In addition, a workshop
was held with representatives from participating utilities and agencies, to discuss specific security and preparedness
needs and practices. (Refer to the Acknowledgements for a list of guidance team members and workshop
participants.)
The project team selected 23 practices from the many activities taking place in the Seattle-King County area to
highlight the features of an active and effective protective program. To do this, the project team held a workshop
with participants that included a cross-section of staff from water sector utilities, private sector, other infrastructures
such as energy, and other response agencies such as law enforcement, fire, and emergency management. The result
was a robust display of activities in the Seattle-King County area from which to match the features to demonstrate
that all sizes of utilities could implement protective practices.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
Case Study Findings:
The following recommendations should be considered to ensure the water sector is successful in implementing
active and effective protective programs:
Partnership is Essential: Enhancing water sector security and preparedness requires collaborative partnerships with
other interdependent sectors.
Think Long Term: Create a protective mindset and commit to a long-term strategy of continual security and
preparedness improvements.
Secure Leadership Support: Engage municipal and county elected officials and encourage regional emergency
operations staff to reach out to other interdependent sectors.
Think Broadly: Collaborate with other utilities, other sectors, state primacy agencies, public health community, and
law enforcement and other first responders to collect and share essential information.
EPA's support of this Case Study is to raise awareness and encourage adoption of effective practices that individual
communities and utilities may determine appropriate. EPA's involvement with documenting practices is not a
promulgation of guidance or requirements.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DISCLAIMER i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS v
LIST OF ACRONYMS vii
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Background 1
1.2 Case Study Goals and Objectives 2
1.3 Audience and Content 2
SECTION 2: SELECTING SEATTLE-KING COUNTY FOR THE CASE STUDY 3
2.1 Why Seattle-King County? 3
2.2 Current Collaboration in Seattle-King County 3
SECTION 3: CASE STUDY APPROACH 4
3.1 Case Study Guidance Team 4
3.2 Area Workshop 4
3.3 Sample Practice Selection and Information Gathering 5
3.4 Case Study Results Review 5
SECTION 4: RESULTS 6
4.1 Benefits of Implementing Practices to Utilities 6
4.2 Benefits to Case Study Participants 7
4.3 Challenges in Developing a Security and Preparedness Culture 7
4.4 Key Findings 7
SECTION 5: PRACTICES 9
1: Interdependencies Forum to Build Regional Preparedness 12
2: Utilities Helping Utilities through Mutual Aid and Assistance Agreements 14
3: Regional Contamination Response Network 16
4: Conducting Disaster Exercises for Regional Preparedness 18
5: Educating Public Officials 21
6: Water Sector Collaboration with Law Enforcement to Enhance Local Emergency Response 23
7: Drinking Water and Wastewater Agency Collaboration with Other Sectors in Regional Emergency
Planning 25
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
8: Supplying Emergency Water via Temporary Piping 26
9: Enhancing Law Enforcement Response with Video Assessment 28
10: On-site Sodium Hypochlorite Generation for Wastewater Disinfection 30
11: Securing Utility Information 32
12: Enhanced Security of the Distribution System through Bulk Water Metering Stations 34
13: EPA Assistance for Water Contamination Incidents 36
14: Emergency Preparedness Survey of Critical Customers 38
15: Funding Security Enhancements 40
16: Using a Clear Message for Risk Communications 42
17: Security and Emergency Response Metrics 44
18: Radiological Contamination Event Procedure for a Combined Sewer System 46
19: Utility Response to Changing Threat Levels 48
20: Procedure for Contractor and Vendor Access 50
21: Updating a Vulnerability Assessment 52
22: Creating and Maintaining a Security Culture 54
23: Training on Security and Emergency Response 56
SECTION 6: EXAMPLE OF SECURITY AT A SMALL UTILITY 58
APPENDIX A: CASE STUDY GUIDANCE TEAM MEMBERS 60
APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL PRACTICES 61
APPENDIX C: KEY FEATURES OF AN ACTIVE AND EFFECTIVE PROTECTIVE PROGRAM 65
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
AWWA - American Water Works Association
CID - Criminal Investigation Division
CIPAC - Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council
CIPP - Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan
CSC - Computer Sciences Corporation
DEP - Department of Environmental Protection
DEQ - Department of Environmental Quality
DHS - U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DOE - U.S. Department of Energy
EMS - Emergency Medical Services
EOC - Emergency Operations Center
EPA - U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ERP - Emergency Response Plan
FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
GETS - Government Emergency Telephone Service
HAZMAT - Hazardous Materials
HSIN - Homeland Security Information Network
HSPD - Homeland Security Presidential Directive
1C - Incident Commander
ICS - Incident Command System
IT - Information Technology
MOU - Memorandum of Understanding
NDWAC - National Drinking Water Advisory Council
NIMS - National Incident Management System
NIPP - National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NW-WARN - Northwest Warning, Alert, and Response Network
OEM - Office of Emergency Management
PIO - Public Information Officer
PNWER - Pacific Northwest Economic Region
POTW - Publicly Owned Treatment Works
RAM-D - Risk Assessment Methodology for Dams
RAM-W - Risk Assessment Methodology for Water
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RCAP - Rural Community Assistance Partnership
RPTB - Response Protocol Toolbox
SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SSP - Sector-Specific Plan
TEWG - Terrorism Early Warning Groups
TSP - Telecommunication Service Priority
UASI - Urban Area Security Initiative
VA - Vulnerability Assessment
VSAT - Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool
WaterlSAC - Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center
WEF - Water Environment Federation
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPS - Wireless Priority Service
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The Seattle-King County, Washington Community Case Study (Case Study) was initiated to increase awareness of
the benefits of implementing an active and effective protective program. Seattle-King County was invited to
participate because of the area's reputation in providing active leadership in water sector security and preparedness
efforts. The Case Study is a model for other communities across the country. It demonstrates how one area was
successful at implementing practices that support preparedness and resiliency. The intent of using this effort is to
support drinking water and wastewater (water sector) protective practices nationally.
Following the events of September 11,2001, Congress passed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act), requiring drinking water utilities across the nation to
conduct vulnerability assessments of their systems and to update or create emergency response plans. EPA was
tasked with overseeing security and preparedness efforts in the water sector pursuant to Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), "Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection." Under this
directive, EPA has the authority to improve security and preparedness that protects critical infrastructure and key
resources within the water sector. Although wastewater utilities were not required to conduct a vulnerability
assessment under the Bioterrorism Act, EPA included both drinking water and wastewater utilities in their efforts to
promote security and preparedness activities.
In addition, the President issued HSPD-8, "National Preparedness." The purpose of HSPD-8 is to "establish
policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness
goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local
governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local entities."
Moreover, EPA has additional responsibilities under HSPD-5, "Management of Domestic Incidents," HSPD-9,
"Defense of United States Agriculture and Food," and HSPD-10, "Biodefense forthe 21st Century."
HSPD-8 ushered in a new way of thinking about the role of utility staff in an emergency. Utility personnel are now
considered first responders under HSPD-8, and this changes their interactions with traditional first responders such
as police and fire agencies. Recent natural disasters and terrorist incidents underscore the critical nature of
protecting water sector infrastructure and the need for coordinated response efforts.
In the fall of 2003, the National Drinking Water Advisory Council (NDWAC or Council) convened a peer-led
working group within the water sector to consider and make recommendations on water protection issues. The
work group included stakeholders from many disciplines and used a consensus-based collaborative problem-solving
approach to develop its findings. The group presented its findings to the NDWAC, which unanimously adopted the
findings as Council recommendations1.
The NDWAC identified key features of active and effective protective programs that are important to increasing
security and preparedness, and are relevant across the broad range of utility circumstances and operating conditions.
While identifying common features of active and effective protective programs, the NDWAC emphasized that "one
size does not fit all" and that there will be variability in protective approaches and tactics among utilities, based on
utility-specific circumstances and conditions. The key features are based on an integrated approach that incorporates
a combination of public involvement and awareness, partnerships, and physical, chemical, operational, and design
controls to increase overall program performance. In addition, they address utility security and preparedness in four
functional categories: organizational, operational, infrastructure, and collaborative.
The NDWAC Report is available at http://www.epa.aov/safewater/ndwac/pdfs/wswa/wswa report final iulv2005.pdf.
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As part of the charge provided to the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) Metrics
Workgroup for Water, the NDWAC's key features were revised for alignment with the Water Sector-Specific Plan
for Critical Infrastructure Protection (Water SSP). The key features will align closely with the SSP goals and
objectives, making them consistent with the document that acts as the baseline or standard for all-hazards, risk
management efforts.
1.2 Case Study Goals and Objectives
Water sector security and preparedness are the foundation for mitigating consequences to people and property.
Implementing key features of an active and effective protective program, should better position water sector utilities
to protect their facilities and the people they serve. Highlighting the features demonstrates the importance of
collaboration and relationship building at the local and state level. The "one size does not fit all" approach towards
protecting the water sector is evidence of the flexibility the practices provide all water sector utilities.
The following goals and objectives guided the work of the project team and provided the guidance team with a
framework for supporting the Case Study effort.
Goals:
Document and demonstrate how water sector utility practices that implement one or more of the key features of
an active and effective protective program can achieve benefits, protection, and better resiliency.
Develop a case study methodology that is easily replicated and can serve as a model for other communities and
water sector utilities across the country.
Objectives:
Collaboration: Improve understanding among participants of the relationship between implementing key features of
an active and effective protective program and how other agencies in the community are linked through these
practices.
Multiple Benefits: Document how implementing key features of an active and effective protective program provides
benefits to the utility and the community.
Barriers and Mitigation: Identify barriers to implementing protective programs and document how barriers were
mitigated.
Performance Measures: Identify and document success measures from implementing practices.
Next Steps for Seattle-King County: Present the Case Study findings to elected officials to raise awareness of the
importance of making policy decisions that encourage and enable implementing active and effective protective
programs in the water sector.
Next Steps for the Nation: Promote the Case Study model in other areas of the country to raise awareness about
successful practices in Seattle-King County, explore existing practices being implemented in those areas, and
encourage water sector utilities in those areas to implement key features of an active and effective protective
program.
1.3 Audience and Content
The audience for this Case Study is broad and includes water sector utilities of all sizes, elected officials, local and
state emergency management agencies, and leaders of critical infrastructure organizations across all sectors. The
report provides a valuable message to the entire spectrum of stakeholders about the importance and feasibility of
implementing security and preparedness practices that make our water sector infrastructure and communities safe
and resilient. In addition, these practices may assist the water sector in building upon or modifying programs
already in place.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
SECTION 2: SELECTING SEATTLE-KING COUNTY
FOR THE CASE STUDY
2.1 Why Seattle-King County?
Officials in Seattle-King County have a track record of developing protective features, practices, staffing networks,
and relationships between multiple agencies. In addition, proactive planning by officials has resulted in successes in
securing grants, and industry-wide recognition of the region's status as a leader in addressing water sector security
and preparedness. This responsibility to preparedness has prospered in Seattle-King County, even as disaster
planning has lost momentum in other regions of the United States.
Another key to inviting Seattle-King County to participate in the Case Study is the high level of support shown by
local elected officials, including the Mayor of Seattle, Greg Nickels. Mayor Nickels challenged the city and region
to be among the best in the nation in addressing water sector security and preparedness.
The region also has been able to tap into a network of resources across the state, and even in other states, by working
with organizations such as the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER). PNWER is a public/private
partnership promoting sustainable economic development and environmental stewardship in five U.S. states, two
Canadian provinces, and one Canadian territory. For example, Seattle-King County was involved in the Blue
Cascades preparedness exercise series organized by PNWER and supported by the U.S.'s Federal Emergency
Management Agency, among others.
2.2 Current Collaboration in Seattle-King County
The Regional Disaster Plan in Seattle-King County promotes community involvement and collaboration and
incident managers can escalate an emergency to the County level, as needed. This process has fostered mutual aid
planning within the County and altered the culture of agencies by promoting cross-disciplinary teamwork.
Teamwork also helps to integrate critical infrastructures, such as drinking water and wastewater utilities, into the
bigger picture of regional disaster planning.
In support of HSPD-8, the Seattle-King County water sector has taken steps to build relationships with fire, police,
and public health agencies. Several utility representatives joined regional security and preparedness committees
and, with the HSPD-8 designation, the water sector became eligible for federal Urban Area Security Initiative
(UASI) funds to support ongoing security and preparedness programs. Tabletop exercises and monthly regional
committee meetings also foster important relationships between the water sector and other agencies, many of whom
received UASI funding.
In addition, Seattle-King County agencies have agreed on the need for more security and preparedness training and
drills to identify gaps and establish effective communications and relationships among agencies. By standardizing
data flows and communication methods, utilities and collaborative partners hope to better communicate with each
other during emergency events, and also hope to share response capabilities that each can supply during an
emergency.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
SECTION 3: CASE STUDY APPROACH
EPA established a project team that included staff from the Office of Water, contractor CSC, and subcontractors
CH2M HILL and Ross & Associates. The project team was responsible for Case Study design, identifying the Case
Study area, facilitating workshops and meetings, and documenting the Case Study findings and practice
descriptions.
3.1 Case Study Guidance Team
A Case Study guidance team, recruited from 16 organizations, comprising 11 utilities and 5 state and local agencies
to advise on the effort and to provide feedback on the practices, was chartered to assist the project team in
identifying tangible benefits to the water sector and local community (see Appendix A for a list of guidance team
members). Guidance team members shared roles and responsibilities, and had equal standing to participate and
provide guidance to the project team. The guidance team promoted active participation in the Case Study, identified
mutual benefits to the community, and provided the project team with strategic direction and feedback throughout
the Case Study project. This assistance was essential to the success in identifying and validating the practices used
in the community, adding credibility to the project findings.
3.2 Area Workshop
A key element of the Case Study was conducting a workshop to explore and expand on previously gathered
information about practices being implemented in the Seattle-King County area. The Area Workshop brought
together stakeholders from abroad spectrum of disciplines and members of the guidance team (see
Acknowledgments for participant list). The workshop's objectives were to:
Explore collaborative practices and interdependences among the water sector and other sectors in effectively
preventing, detecting, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from an all-hazard event.
Discuss a list of Seattle-King County practices captured earlier in the study and explore how agencies were
using them.
Provide an opportunity for participants to learn more about how to help each other in security and preparedness.
The workshop built upon a list of practices and interdependences in the region already identified through
discussions with water sector utilities and focused on the collaborative practices employed in the region. Workshop
participants reviewed the practices and identified interdependences, barriers, incentives, and multiple benefits.
Attendees participated in five collaborative practice workgroups in the morning and five collaborative agency
workgroups in the afternoon. Morning workgroup participants discussed detailed information on specific
collaborative practices; afternoon workgroup participants discussed inter-agency needs and connections or linkages.
Workshop session leaders also invited attendees to participate in a discussion to generate recommendations for
future case study workshops.
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3.3 Sample Practice Selection and Information Gathering
Following the Area Workshop, the guidance team reviewed key findings from the workshop, determined which
practice discussions should occur, and provided feedback on the format and content of a sample practice description.
The guidance team used the following criteria to select practices:
S Active S Effective
S Sustainable S Current
S Exemplary S Performance tested
S Information available S Relevant to the features
Not all practices met every criterion listed above, but 23 practices with the most information were developed into
detailed practice descriptions. The practice descriptions are included in Section 5 as examples for stakeholders to
use in developing their own customized approaches to security and preparedness. Workshop participants mentioned
many additional practices, but specific details were not available within the time frame of the Case Study. These
practices were still found to be relevant and worth exploring further in future case studies and are captured as a list of
additional practices in Appendix B. In all, the project team conducted in-depth discussions with 16 participating
water sector utilities during the summer of 2006, which resulted in the 23 practice descriptions highlighted in this
report.
3.4 Case Study Results Review
The guidance team met to review the draft Case Study report, evaluate the effectiveness of the Case Study, discuss
plans for presenting results to local public officials, and suggest next steps for the Seattle-King County area. The
guidance team also provided recommendations to EPA on a plan to disseminate the Case Study results and conduct
future case study projects in other locations around the country.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
SECTION 4: RESULTS
The Case Study is the first comprehensive effort to document the practices water sector utilities are implementing to
improve the security and preparedness of their systems and protect the people and community they serve. The Case
Study produced results that were both anticipated and surprising, and begins to answer questions other utilities have
about the types of practices that are being implemented to make water sector facilities more secure and protect the
public. The Case Study team anticipated answering utility questions about protective practices. What surprised the
project team is the number of elected officials and leaders from other sectors and business that are interested in the
practices because of the interdependent relationship between other sector facilities, such as hospitals and food
production, which rely on a secure and resilient water sector.
Although the 23 documented sample practices are from a single region, the lessons learned can be adapted to other
communities across the country to increase local and regional awareness, and give utilities examples of practices
currently being used by their peers. The Case Study provides a methodology that can be replicated in other parts of
the country and a framework for documenting additional practices by other utilities that supports expanding active
and effective protective programs.
4.1 Benefits of Implementing Practices to Utilities
Utilities that implement practices built around an active and effective protective program are able to achieve benefits
that result in reduced risk to their system and the communities they serve. For example, enhanced protection of bulk
water metering stations at one utility led to increased protection of the distribution system and substantial cuts in
operating costs that, by themselves, were enough to justify the practice (refer to Practice Description #12). This
particular practice also improved the monitoring of bulk water usage, which resulted in a significant drop in water
quality complaints caused by hydrant abuse that affected water quality. More reliable systems, cost savings from
mitigating effects of an event, and increased customer confidence and satisfaction are just a few of the potential
benefits.
Utilities that implement protective practices and make their customers aware of their efforts typically increase
customer satisfaction. This satisfaction comes from the awareness of the important role that protective practices
play in keeping facilities secure, and more often the satisfaction comes from a feeling that the utility is committed to
keeping its customers safe.
For drinking water utilities, a survey of critical customers such as those on dialysis machines can improve the
utilities' ability to respond to special needs customers in the event of an emergency while also educating customers
on the need to assess personal vulnerabilities and prepare accordingly. The more community awareness there is
about potential risks, the greater the opportunity for utilities to work in partnership with local officials and the
community at large to encourage and improve practices that support a safe and reliable water sector.
Many practices illustrate the benefits of collaboration between agencies. For example, water sector collaboration
with law enforcement and public safety agencies enhances local emergency response and improves the effectiveness
of regional disaster preparedness exercises (referto Practice Description #6). These collaborative practices can also
create a sense of ownership and responsibility between agencies and lead to faster response times, foster trust among
local emergency responders, and create a more efficient working environment during an emergency. Active
participation by the water sector in collaborative practices enables traditional first responders to recognize water
utilities as an essential team member in emergency preparedness planning and a partner in first response, as defined
inHSPD-8.
Another benefit of promoting active and effective protective programs is that employees well-trained in disaster
response are able to analyze their systems and recognize opportunities to improve operations on a daily basis (refer
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
to Practice Description #23). Preparedness training for employees also benefits the broader community because the
better people understand their role in an emergency; the better able they are to handle the response. Additionally,
worker safety often improves when utilities update their policies to conform to new security and preparedness
practices.
4.2 Benefits to Case Study Participants
In addition to benefiting from the information contained in the practice descriptions, utilities and agencies who
actively participated in the Case Study also benefited from the personal interactions during Case Study meetings and
the area workshop. The interactive format of the meetings and workshop encouraged participants to work
collaboratively in groups to complete meeting objectives and fostered further collaboration after the Case Study.
Additional benefits to Case Study participants include:
Greater awareness of resources available for planning and for assistance
New found understanding of practices used by other agencies to improve response coordination during
emergencies
Increased understanding and familiarity of practices and terminology between agencies and staff
Cross-sector cohesiveness, networking, and collaborative practices generated by gathering a diverse group of
participants from the water sector, fire, police, telecommunications, power, and other agencies
Potential to collaborate
Exposure of participants to existing resources or services, such as the Wireless Priority Service (WPS),
Government Emergency Telephone Service (GETS), and Telecommunication Service Priority (TSP), that allow
a utility's calls to receive top priority when telephone networks are stressed during an emergency or disaster
4.3 Challenges in Developing a Security and Preparedness Culture
The Case Study revealed a persistent theme about the water sector's view of its role in an emergency and the views
outside agencies have of the water sector's role in an emergency. The water sector and other sections within public
works traditionally are considered a low priority for security and preparedness funding by the traditional first
responder groups that receive federal money, which further limits the opportunity to focus on security planning and
preparedness. In addition, within the sector, opportunities to plan and prepare for a future crisis are often deferred to
meet the demands of daily operations.
Many utilities acknowledged that preparedness practices are expensive to implement and/or maintain, and that
training can be costly and time-consuming. Overall within the region's water sector, there has been a general lack of
support for security and preparedness initiatives and this lack of resources remains a significant barrier. Despite
these difficulties, the water sector in the Seattle-King County area was able to implement the 23 described active and
effective protective practices, and receive funding assistance by coordinating with traditional first responders.
4.4 Key Findings
The Case Study findings listed below are fundamental to ensure the success of local communities and the water
sector in implementing security and preparedness programs.
Partnership is Essential: Enhancing water sector security and preparedness requires
partnerships with other interdependent sectors.
Seattle-King County's experiences and practices point clearly to the need for water sector utilities to build
partnerships with community emergency management, public health, hospitals, law enforcement, transportation,
telecommunications, and other agencies/sectors to ensure a comprehensive approach to security and preparedness.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
A first step in building these partnerships is to generate understanding about the critical aspects of drinking water
and wastewater provision within a community, and the first responder role that water sector utility staff will play
during an emergency.
Think Long Term: Developing an active and effective protective program is a long-term
processiterative and at times frustrating.
Water sector utilities and their community partners should feel comfortable adopting practices incrementally and
anticipate the need to adapt practices as experience reveals opportunities for continual improvement. Communities
should also promote a more collaborative emergency management culture so that sectors now operating in isolated
"stovepipes" can work to break down barriers, improve communication, and readily share expertise and resources.
A critical lesson learned in the Seattle-King County area was the need for a fundamental shift in thinking about
culture and long-term commitment. Implementing practices that support an active and effective protective program
is part of a long-term strategy for continual improvement.
Secure Support from Leadership: Initiating and sustaining an active and effective protective
program requires strong support from elected officials and emergency operations
leaders.
Seattle-King County partners identified two factors critical to the region's success: (1) strong support from
municipal and county elected officials; and (2) efforts by regional emergency operations staff to reach out to other
interdependent sectors. These factors point to the importance for leaders in government, utilities, and emergency
management to set the tone for implementing active and effective protective programs, and to work collaboratively
on continuous improvement.
Think Broadly: Pursuing a collaborative and community-oriented active and effective
protective program produces multiple benefits.
Collaboration leads to faster response times and a more effective and efficient working environment during an
emergency. Other practices produce direct and operational cost savings, improved protection, and decreased
operating costs. In addition, improved protective practices boost customer satisfaction and customer awareness of
security and preparedness.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
SECTION 5: PRACTICES
Strong security and preparedness is not an end state, but a process. For Seattle-King County agencies, as for any
utility or community, improvements are gradual and continuous. By building from earthquake and storm events,
local agencies like the King County Office of Emergency Management were able to reach out to each other and
galvanize collaboration among utilities and other agencies within the region. The water sector in any community
can benefit from the efforts in Seattle-King County by reviewing their region's practices and enacting/enhancing
their own program to reduce risk with an all-hazards approach to preparedness.
There are hundreds of highly effective practices in use today by the water sector and other sector infrastructures.
Many are in collaboration with community partners, while others are implemented solely by a utility. This Case
Study report is considered a beginning; by describing 23 of them, EPA hopes to capture and share many more
practices identified in future efforts across the country.
This EPA report, and others that may follow, represent the consensus judgment of EPA, water sector, and public
sector organizations that have participated in a community case study project. This and succeeding reports and
practice descriptions are neither official EPA guidance nor requirements.
Sample Practices
For the purposes of the Case Study, a practice is defined as an action area that includes specific tools, behaviors,
activities, systems, policies, and/or procedures that promote a protective posture and enhances the process for
planning, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from all-hazards events.
The project team identified practices under one or more of the key features of an active and effective protective
program (Appendix C) recommended by the NDWAC. At least one practice was identified as meeting each of the
key features.
Practices were evaluated to determine if they fell into one or more of the following categories:
Organizational practices relate to the agency's overall structure and administration.
Operational practices relate to activities, often daily routines, required to meet the agency's mission.
Infrastructure practices relate to the physical system.
Collaborative practices involve interaction with one or more outside agencies.
Although many practices identified during the Case Study straddled categories, the project team selected one
category for each practice to streamline organization of the report. For example, enhancing law enforcement
response with video assessment involves the "infrastructure" activity of installing a video surveillance system, but is
also "collaborative" due to the coordination with a law enforcement agency. For the purposes of this report, the
sample practice was categorized as "infrastructure" because the video assessment was the primary focus of the
practice (see Table 5-1). The amount of information provided is related to the amount of information made
available to the project team. All summaries provide the reader with enough information to understand the
meaning, context, and applicability to the reader's organization.
Table 5-1 lists the 23 practices from Seattle-King County described in the report and identifies which of the key
features (Appendix C) corresponds to each. In several examples, the practice includes more than one feature
category for that practice. The complete practice descriptions (approximately two pages each) are included
immediately following Table 5-1. The practice descriptions are a sampling and do not represent the full range of
water sector security and preparedness practices taking place in Seattle-King County.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
TABLE 5-1: Twenty-three Practices from Seattle-King County
ID
Number Sample Practice
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Corresponding Feature and
Number (see Appendix C)
1 Interdependencies forum to build regional
preparedness
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
ID
Number
Sample Practice
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
1: I nterdependencies
Forum to Build Regional
Preparedness
Corresponding Feature Description:
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Tested and
Updated; and Partnerships
Category Type:
Collaborative; Operational
General Description: Officials in King County,
Washington, hosted their first Interdependences
Forum (Forum) in November 2005. King County is
the most populous county in the state and is
designated as Washington State Homeland Security
Region 6, one of nine Homeland Security Regions in
the state. The one-day Forum brought together
representatives from the 17 federally recognized
critical infrastructures and was driven by
requirements contained in the Washington State
Homeland Security Region 6 Critical Infrastructure
Protection Plan (CIPP), a decision-making tool for
prioritizing infrastructures and allocating funding
resources.
The Forum helps infrastructure representatives to:
Connect with other owners and operators in their
sector to share best practices and identify the
most critical assets within their sector.
Provide information on initiatives and tools that
may assist with assessing vulnerabilities.
Understand their dependencies related to other
infrastructure sectors.
Connect with other sectors to identify and protect
the cross-sector assets that are considered most
vital to the health and safety of the communities,
the economy, and the environment.
Resources Required: The Forum hosts were able
to keep the costs manageable by using existing
County personnel to organize, conduct, and report on
the Forum activities. Additional funding to support
the Forum was secured through U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) grants and from the
private sector. Members of the Forum planning team
invested approximately 4-8 hours per month in
meetings and document preparation. A consultant
initially assisted with facilitation of the Forum;
however, future plans call for members of the
region's Critical Infrastructure Protection Workgroup
to assist with planning and facilitating future forums.
Roles and Responsibilities: The Critical
Infrastructure Protection Workgroup comprises
representatives from the following six sectors
considered most critical to maintain in an emergency
and tasked with planning the annual forum:
1. Energy
2. Water
3. Information Technology (IT)
4. Telecommunication
5. Transportation
6. Healthcare Systems
The workgroup's mission is to "determine regional
critical infrastructure, establish priorities, evaluate
requests, and provide appropriate resources to protect
critical infrastructure in King County from terrorist
attacks and all-hazard emergency events."
Workgroup members attend monthly meetings,
review plans, represent their sectors in identification
of interdependences, and recommend priorities for
funding to support preparedness efforts in organizing
the Forum.
The King County Office of Emergency Management
(OEM) provided a staff person to lead the workgroup
and organize the workgroup's efforts. The OEM
representative also coordinated with a larger regional
interdependences group and the Pacific Northwest
Economic Region (PNWER), a bi-national, public-
private partnership representing three Canadian
provinces and five U.S. states.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
Collaboration with Other Partners: In addition to
coordinating with regional members from the priority
sectors, many forum participants also participate in
multi-state/bi-national table-top exercises on critical
infrastructure protection. The Blue Cascades series
of exercises are in support of PNWER's initiative
called the Partnership for Regional Infrastructure
Security, whose purpose is to develop a regional
preparedness plan for dealing with large-scale
emergencies in the region.
Barriers: Forum participants face a number of
barriers for achieving their present and future goals
including:
Critical infrastructure sector representatives may
not understand the value of the Forum to their
agencies and not allocate the time to attend.
Critical infrastructures can have different
geographic boundaries, which increases the
difficulty of infrastructure protection planning.
Funding from DHS is limited, and new sources
of funding will likely be needed in order to
sustain efforts.
Lessons Learned: Forum participants learned
valuable lessons that will help improve future efforts
and serve as a model for others that want to replicate
the practice, including:
Developing relationships between
interdependent sectors is critical to cooperating
on joint activities.
"Champions" need to be identified in each sector
and play a leadership role.
Interoperable communications mechanisms are
essential to share threat and response/recovery
information.
Command and control issues dealing with cross-
border threats and hazards need to be addressed.
The principles and concepts of the National
Incident Management System (NEVIS) and the
Incident Command Structure (ICS) need to be
used.
Understanding regional and cross-border
interdependencies is important.
Success Measures: The Forum was considered a
success based on the following outcomes:
The Forum had a high participation rate;
representatives from all 17 federally recognized
critical infrastructures attended.
The Forum satisfied a key requirement in the
Region 6 CIPP.
The action items identified in the Forum have
been developed into a regional action plan,
which will be reviewed and updated at the next
Interdependencies Forum.
Benefits and Incentives: The networking
opportunity afforded at the Forum provided
participants with potential continued benefits,
including:
Having a voice in an organization that can
represent them regionally and nationally
Collaborating and participating in emergency
training exercises
Developing mutual aid agreements with
interdependent or similar infrastructures
Creating a more clear and current understanding
of regional preparedness, and how it affects their
organization
Creating access to Homeland Security grant
funding by participating in a regional emergency
planning group
Developing key relationships with infrastructure
representatives, which may help to increase
routine cooperation and communications
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
2: Utilities Helping
Utilities through Mutual
Aid and Assistance
Agreements
Corresponding Feature Description:
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Tested and
Updated; and Partnerships
Category Type:
Collaborative; Operational
General Description: The primary objective of a
mutual aid and assistance agreement is to facilitate
rapid, short-term deployment of emergency support
to restore critical operations at an affected utility or
group of utilities in an efficient and effective manner.
Mutual aid and assistance agreements accomplish
this by providing the framework through which
private and public utilities share resources with one
another, without the need for a declared state of
emergency. They also include provisions to address
issues such as liability, workers' compensation, and
reimbursement.
While mutual aid has been practiced by fire and law
enforcement officials for hundreds of years, it is
relatively new to other emergency responders, such
as those responsible for securing water and
wastewater critical infrastructure. Thanks to the
efforts of existing Water and Wastewater Agency
Response Networks (WARN) and strong support
from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and water sector partners such as the
American Water Works Association (AWWA),
mutual aid and assistance agreements are now being
developed between utilities across the country.
A model mutual aid and assistance agreement and
guidelines for developing a WARN, both outlined in
the May 2006 "Utilities Helping Utilities" white
paper authored by AWWA, can be found at
www.NationalWARN.org.
Resources Required: The resources associated
with developing and maintaining a mutual aid and
assistance network are minimal. In-kind services are
typically used to draft an agreement and generate
interest amongst other utilities. Once an agreement is
finalized, utilities must determine the best way to
facilitate activation of the agreement during a
disaster. Some utilities invest in dynamic Web sites
with sophisticated resource matching databases while
others opt for an on-the-fly message board where
human intervention is required to match resources
with needs. Specifically, the resources required to
develop and maintain a mutual aid and assistance
agreement include:
In-kind contribution of time from members
Legal fees, or in-kind legal support, associated
with drafting and finalizing an agreement
Marketing the agreement through participation in
conferences and workshops
Development and maintenance costs associated
with a Web site (if applicable)
Meeting space to hold regular meetings between
members
Roles and Responsibilities: Specific roles and
responsibilities are typically defined within the
mutual aid and assistance agreement, and can vary
from one agreement to the next. Initially, a
Leadership Team is tasked with identifying the
utilities, associations, and agencies that should play a
major role in the implementation of the mutual aid
and assistance agreement. They facilitate meetings to
promote interest in the agreement, and eventually
recommend representatives for a Steering
Committee. The Steering Committee is responsible
for identifying a Chair or Leader, determining
membership criteria, and outlining the governing
principles of the agreement. The Chair is responsible
for ensuring an agreement is then drafted, based on
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
input from the group. The agreement then defines
the roles and responsibilities of requesting and
assisting member utilities in response to a disaster, as
well as how other members help facilitate that
process.
Collaboration with Other Partners:
Collaboration is vital to maintaining strong mutual
aid and assistance networks. On February 15,2006,
eight major water sector associations, representing
water and wastewater utilities and regulatory
agencies, signed a joint policy statement promoting
the development of mutual aid and assistance
networks as a necessary step to securing our nation's
water and wastewater critical infrastructure. A strong
partnership between these associations and utilities
provides the framework for a better prepared and
more resilient water sector.
Coordination with the state and local emergency
management agencies is also essential.
Barriers: Mutual aid and assistance agreements
provide many benefits to participating utilities.
However, potential barriers exist and may include:
Integrating intrastate WARN response with state
emergency management agencies requires
ongoing collaboration and education to avoid
apparent duplication with statewide mutual aid
agreements for public assets.
Interstate WARN agreements are challenged by
differences in state laws.
Currently, the ability for private sector resources
to deploy under the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC) is limited.
Lessons Learned: Evaluating response to past
events is the best way to prepare for the future.
Events such as 9/11 and more recently, Hurricane
Katrina, have identified a need for mutual aid and
assistance agreements because:
Utilities require specialized resources to sustain
operations.
Emergency response activities and other critical
infrastructure rely on water supplies.
Utilities must provide their own support until
state and federal resources are available.
Large events impact regional areas, making
response from nearby utilities impractical.
Disasters impact utility employees and their
families, creating a greater need for relief from
outside sources.
Agreements must be established prior to an event
for federal reimbursement considerations.
Success Measures: One of the best ways to
measure the effectiveness of an agreement is to
evaluate how effectively, efficiently, and
appropriately requests for assistance are met. This
evaluation can take place in the form of an after-
action report, summarizing both the strengths and
weaknesses of response actions. The report should
examine at least:
How well requests were met and what
percentage of those requests were addressed in a
timely manner
Monetary and indirect value added due to
decreased service downtime (i.e., cost-avoidance
for businesses and restoration of hope within the
community)
Ability of critical customers such as fire and
health responders to continue their operations
Benefits and Incentives: Numerous benefits exist
for mutual aid and assistance agreement members
including:
Expedited access to specialized resources
Improved planning and coordination
Consistency in response with National Incident
Management System (NIMS) guidelines
Voluntary and cost-free participation
Articles addressing response issues such as
member indemnification, workers'
compensation, and reimbursement
Ability to activate prior to an emergency
declaration
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
3: Regional
Contamination Response
Network
Corresponding Feature Description:
Contamination Detection; and Partnerships
Category Type:
Collaborative; Operational
General Description: Through a grant from the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a
utility in the region wanted to take the lead and
develop a regional response network for responding
to potential drinking water contamination events.
The utility hired a consultant to identify and survey
potential partners for collecting data, including
information on agency decision-making authorities,
and sampling and communications capabilities.
Twenty-eight participants from a network of 16
agencies attended a workshop that used a drinking
water contamination event to determine the region's
response capabilities. During the workshop,
participants drafted a statement of organizing
principles, identified existing response groups,
guidance documents, and systems with which the
network should align. Participants developed a
listing of single points of contact, agreed to
implement a 24-hour phone number to activate their
agency during an emergency, and developed action
items for the network and region. A decision-making
and communications flow exercise enabled
participants to compare information about their
agency's communications needs during a water
contamination emergency, and resulted in the
OCTOBER 2008
creation of a draft communications model for use
during an emergency.
Following the workshop, participants formed a
steering committee to further promote the network.
Thirty agencies in the region participate in the
response network.
Resources Required: Approximately $100,000
was spent to develop the materials, collect research
information, plan and facilitate the workshop, and
write up the results.
Roles and Responsibilities: Each agency
representative participated in pre- and post-workshop
meetings, and coordinated with their respective
coworkers to identify issues of concern and raise
them during the workshop. Additionally,
representatives had decision-making authority so that
critical decisions could be made at the workshop.
Collaboration with Other Partners:
Collaboration between local agencies included
utilities, police, fire, public health, hospitals, and
emergency management.
Barriers: Barriers included:
The existence of other local response networks
dilutes the purpose of a network specific to water
contamination
Lack of funding and commitment to lead the
network inhibit development and growth
Lessons Learned: An important lesson learned
was that creating a contamination response network
was critical for providing local response capability to
a contamination event. EPA provides similar
emergency capabilities in the Seattle-King County
area that enhances a local contamination network's
ability to respond (see Practice Description #13).
Success Measures: In the absence of an actual
contamination event, the success of a response
network can be measured by looking at specific
instances of increased cooperation between network
members. This can be evidenced by:
Instituting or increasing the number of joint
contamination exercises between member
agencies
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
Updating response plans, contact lists, and
communication procedures based on joint
exercises
Establishing mutual aid agreements between
utility network members
Adding new members to the network
Benefits and Incentives: Responding to an actual
or suspected contamination event requires
collaboration between the utility, the local health
department, law enforcement, and emergency
management. Each has a distinct responsibility to
protect the health and safety of the public. Having a
contamination response network provides a vehicle
for engaging these partners as a group, which can
lead to the pooling of resources and reduce costs.
Additionally, federal security grants are increasingly
being awarded with preferences towards regional and
multi-agency approaches towards preparedness.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
4: Conducting Disaster
Exercises for Regional
Preparedness
Corresponding Feature Description:
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Tested and
Updated; and Partnerships
Category Type:
Collaborative; Operational
General Description: To enhance preparedness,
participants in this activity conducted three regional
disaster preparedness drills, known as the Blue
Cascades Series, which focused on public and private
critical infrastructure interdependencies. The U.S.
Department of Homeland Security has identified
critical infrastructure exercises in the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) as the model
for addressing critical infrastructure security issues on
a regional level.
The number of attendees at each of the three Blue
Cascade exercises ranged between 100 and 200
representatives from regional public and private
sector organizations. Participants included public and
private infrastructure sector stakeholders from the
United States and Canada, and federal, provincial,
state, and local agencies. The activity also included
exercise planning, as well as a workshop to follow up
on the findings and recommendations of the after-
action report.
Developing an exercise has been summarized into
the following seven steps:
Step 1. Create a regional cooperative initiative and
partnership comprising key stakeholders, including
the leadership of senior local, state, and private sector
leaders.
In this case, the core group of 30 to 45 organizations
became the steering committee of the partnership and
represents: major utilities; key local, state, regional,
and federal government organizations; businesses;
nonprofits; and community institutions such as
hospitals and academics. Additionally, associations
that represent broad organizational memberships
were invited.
Step 2. Develop and conduct an interactive,
educational workshop(s) to provide necessary
information to key stakeholders on regional
infrastructure interdependencies, disaster
preparedness, and security challenges.
A primary goal of the workshop(s) was to develop an
understanding of regional interdependencies and
establish a framework for trust and collaboration to
advance regional preparedness and response.
Step 3. Develop and conduct a regional
infrastructure interdependencies exercise based on
scenarios designed by members of the core
stakeholder group, and other interested organizations,
which reflect their interests and concerns regarding a
major disaster.
The objectives of the exercise are not to test plans or
procedures, but are designed to:
Provide participants with an awareness of
baseline regional interdependencies and
associated physical and cyber vulnerabilities.
Identify preparedness gaps.
Develop action items and next steps to solve
issues exposed by the exercises.
Step 4. Produce a report based on the lessons learned
from the exercise with findings and
recommendations that have been coordinated and
validated by the key stakeholders.
Step 5. Develop and conduct an Action Planning
Workshop with the exercise participants. This
workshop should focus on implementing the
recommended activities from the exercise reports and
identify specific projects to these ends.
Step 6. In coordination with key stakeholders,
prioritize the projects identified in Step 5 into an
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
Action Plan. The Action Plan activities should be
incorporated into regional and organizational
preparedness strategies, plans, and funding requests.
Step 7. Within the region, create working groups
with lead government agencies and private sector
organizations that will undertake development of a
cross-sector approach to implementing the short-,
medium-, and longer-term activities identified in the
Action Plan.
Resources Required: The total cost of planning
and conducting the seminar, exercise and action
planning workshop was $238,000; this amount does
not include the volunteer efforts by the design team
or participants.
Roles and Responsibilities: The key roles and
responsibilities for this practice are as follows:
The regional organization leading the preparation
of the exercises should obtain funding, identify
the scope of the exercise, and identify a scenario
design team. It should then periodically meet
with the design team to review and refine the
scenario.
In parallel with overseeing the scenario design
work, the organization should arrange all
planning workshop and exercise logistics,
including notifying and scheduling participants,
securing the facilities to be used in the exercise,
and developing materials for the exercise.
After the exercise, the regional organization
collects all exercise feedback and materials and
prepares an after-action report with
recommendations. This report is then reviewed
in a full-day meeting with the design team, the
evaluation team, and in some cases the
participants, to comment on the report and to
prioritize the actions. The report is then finalized
and a meeting is conducted to refine the resulting
action plan.
The design team is responsible for designing the
scenario within the scope dictated by the regional
organization, participating in apre-exercise
walk-through, and helping with the review of
materials for the after-action reports.
The evaluation team also participates in the pre-
exercise walk-through; documents the successes,
failures, and lessons learned from the exercise;
presents their findings; and participates in
drafting the after-action report.
Collaboration with Other Partners: This entire
practice is a collaborative process between sectors
and public and private agencies. The focus is to
identify interdependences and further regional
preparedness through collaboration. Additional
collaboration can occur among regional organizations
by sharing information on planning and
implementing exercises as well as the after-action
reports and other outcomes of the exercises.
Barriers: The most significant barrier is balancing
the need for comprehensive representation among
participants with the inherent difficulties that emerge
from trying to coordinate too large a group. This
group has varied backgrounds, knowledge,
experience, constraints, and capabilities that should
be considered in the exercise design and conduct, as
well as follow-up planning to prepare the region, but
it is feared that the group cannot sustain many more
members.
Lessons Learned: The overall practice includes a
process for identifying and applying lessons learned
to constantly adapt and improve the practice.
Lessons learned specific to this case include the
following:
The core partnership is located in the Puget
Sound region; however, several smaller
metropolitan partnerships exist in Anchorage,
Alaska; Vancouver, British Columbia;
Edmonton/Calgary, Alberta; and Portland,
Oregon. Engaging potential participants through
smaller regional groups may allow the
organizing agency to recruit a greater diversity of
participants without significantly increasing
effort.
The participants tend to be more from the core
location of the organization than from outlying
geographical areas.
The growth has occurred organically, based on
word of mouth. Thus, providing successful
exercises and good follow-up planning attracts
new participants from the region and across
sectors.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
Success Measures: For regional organizations
seeking to undertake a similar activity, the success of
the exercises themselves will be determined based on
the specific objectives of the exercise and the after-
action report and evaluation. For evaluating the
success of the process, the organizers can look at
several factors, including:
Evaluation forms filled out by participants
Projected costs vs. actual costs, and the success
in securing supplementary funding, like
homeland security grants
Deadlines met for meetings and developing
materials
Repeat and expanding participation (although, as
mentioned, the size of the group should remain
manageable)
Benefits and Incentives: This activity presents
many benefits and incentives to participating
agencies, including:
Participants in the practice build relationships
that can improve cooperation and response to
many other types of events.
Interdependencies and gaps in a response are
identified before an incident occurs, allowing
participating agencies to develop plans and
activities to deal with these.
Documentation of preparedness needs such as
these can then support applications for homeland
security grants.
In addition to homeland security grants,
participating agencies can pool resources and
funding, lowering the overall cost to individual
agencies.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
5: Educating Public
Officials
Corresponding Feature Description:
Promote Communication; and Establish Partnerships
Category Type:
Collaborative
General Description: This utility established, and
is maintaining, an ongoing relationship with local
public officials to educate them on the importance of
a safe and reliable water supply. The utility held one-
on-one meetings with top public officials and water
utility leaders to communicate the preparedness
issues faced by the utility and how they impacted the
community. Prior to the meetings, utility staff held
discussions among themselves to decide the most
critical information to provide the public officials,
and provided this information to the public officials'
staffers in pre-meeting briefings. Discussion topics
included utility security program features, funding
issues, outcomes from emergency response exercises,
and interactions with other city departments.
This strategy allowed the utility to effectively
communicate the true value of a safe water supply to
the community, and enabled public officials to better
understand that the water utility is a key component
of the municipal infrastructure for promoting public
safety and health.
These discussions have been extended to an annual
basis and now include the entire group of elected
public officials at the city and county level.
Resources Required: The most significant
investments involved activities related to the
meetings utility staff attended. The main cost
included staff time to develop briefing and
presentation content, present that content to the public
officials, and conduct follow-up activities as a result
of the meetings. There were also additional minor
expenditures for producing briefing materials.
Roles and Responsibilities: Utility managers and
supervisors from the major departments (such as
customer service, operations, treatment, and
distribution) needed to determine their respective
issues, concerns, resources, and funding requirements
for preparing and responding to a water emergency.
The utility security lead acted as the utility's
representative to the public officials by presenting the
utility department's information and facilitating the
subsequent discussion. The utility security lead
required the support of a public official's liaison to
provide preliminary review of utility proposals and
activities; and to coordinate with the public officials
on the utility program and agenda items. The public
officials liaison also needed to convey to the utility
security lead the interests and needs of the public
officials and their constituents to better prepare the
utility security lead for the meetings and discussions.
Collaboration with Other Partners: Key partners
included law enforcement, fire, and information
technology (IT) department officials. These partners
often share budgets and should coordinate with each
other regularly. A water emergency would directly
affect a fire departments' ability to provide adequate
fire protection. Law enforcement may serve many
roles, including site security and crowd control, or
assist with door-to-door notification of water-use
restrictions in the event of a water emergency. The
IT department may need to be accessed to coordinate
communication between these partners and the
utility. Obtaining their support for utility security
proposals and requests serves to bolster the utility's
case to the public officials.
Barriers: The primary barriers encountered during
this activity included gaining access to public
officials and conveying that utility concerns are, in
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
fact, public safety concerns and should be of concern
to public officials. In addition:
Elected officials have a limited amount of time to
allocate to the many, often competing, interests
and constituents they serve. Utility proposals
should be clear and supportable without
overloading the officials with unnecessary
information.
Many public officials have not viewed water
utility security as a vital community security
concern. Changing this mindset will take time
and a regular flow of information to the officials.
Just as utility representatives should present their
concerns in the best interest of the public and the
public officials, they should also consider the
impacts of their proposal from the perspective of
the public officials.
Lessons Leamed: Among the lessons learned
during this activity, a common theme involved
cultivating professional relationships between agency
representatives. In addition:
The credibility of the top utility officials among
public officials and other first responder officials
is invaluable in winning support for adequate
budgets for security and preparedness.
The role of elected officials as policy advocates
for utility security and emergency management
activities is critical to winning requested funding.
An open and stable relationship between the
utility and its elected officials, and first responder
partner agencies, is essential to a successful
utility preparedness program.
Success Measures: The most evident success
measure was increased and/or continued funding of
the security and emergency management activities.
This reflects recognition by public officials of the
challenges faced by a utility in maintaining an active
and effective protective program, as well as the
success of utility representatives in presenting their
concerns as overall community concerns.
Benefits and Incentives: Maintaining regular
meetings and communications with public officials
can result in ongoing funding of the utility's security
and preparedness efforts. Additionally, in an
emergency, public officials will serve as
OCTOBER 2008
representatives both to, and of, the public.
Cultivating a strong relationship with them will help
maintain public confidence in the utility during times
of crisis.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
6: Water Sector
Collaboration with Law
Enforcement to Enhance
Local Emergency
Response
Corresponding Feature Description:
Promote Communication; and Establish Partnerships
Category Type:
Collaborative
General Description: This utility developed a
working relationship with law enforcement to
enhance their emergency response capabilities. The
utility and law enforcement agencies employed a
number of methods to open communication channels
and improve cooperation, summarized below:
The utility and area law enforcement instituted
regular monthly meetings to improve inter-
agency familiarity and communication.
Daily electronic incident reports were sent to
utility, law enforcement, and crime analysis staff
to increase awareness of potential threats and
vulnerabilities.
The utility became involved in the regional
intelligence fusion center, allowing it to both
contribute and receive threat information.
The utility and law enforcement collaborated to
create a utility-specific video for law
enforcement personnel to familiarize them with
water security issues.
The utility included law enforcement personnel
in reviewing and improving utility incident
response procedures and facility security
measures.
The utility and law enforcement agencies
involved agree that the improved
communication and cooperation realized through
these actions has increased the security and
safety of the community.
Resources Required: The main resource
associated with this activity was man-hours to
perform the listed activities. These costs for staff
time varied depending on the number of meetings the
utility attended and the number of representatives
they sent. The costs for staff attendance came out of
the utility's operations budget. Additionally, the
utility had to procure software and training for staff
on the electronic incident reporting tool. Law
enforcement agencies incurred similar labor costs to
attend monthly meetings, contribute to the
development of the utility video for law enforcement,
and review utility security procedures and measures.
Roles and Responsibilities: The utility's Director
of Security and Emergency Management and other
utility security specialists met regularly with local law
enforcement agency representatives to discuss and
maintain their partnership, to review patterns and
trends in crime, and to develop plans to coordinate
overall response. Additionally, utility security and
watershed protection staff met regularly with the law
enforcement officers assigned to their respective
areas to discuss site-specific issues and response
coordination.
OCTOBER 2008
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
Collaboration with Other Partners: The utility
collaborated with their local law enforcement
partners at many levels, from highly placed officials
to patrol personnel. Additionally, their participation
in the regional fusion center allowed them to engage
emergency response and law enforcement partners
beyond the utility's geographical coverage area and
at the state and federal level.
Barriers: Barriers encountered while building this
practice include:
Changes in staff, which can set back
communications while new relationships are
built
Additional burdens on staff time, which limited
their ability to promptly and carefully review the
large amounts of intelligence and incident data
that were received
Lessons Learned: This practice revealed lessons
learned that ranged from selecting appropriate
technologies to better methods of fostering inter-
agency relationships. Specifically:
A stronger relationship with law enforcement
can be developed if both entities focus on
common interests, like physical security and
intelligence sharing.
The utility should be able to employ a number of
different communication technologies. Text
pagers and telephones may be best for relaying
immediate security threat information, while
emails may be the best vehicle for providing
periodic reports. These should not replace face-
to-face meetings and presentations, which
reinforce existing relationships.
A main focus of inter-agency contacts should be
to develop teamwork and trust between agencies
in order to foster a positive working relationship
overtime.
Employing professionally trained patrol staff
with law enforcement experience at the utility
improves communication between agencies.
Success Measures: The success of this practice
can be measured by monitoring regular contacts
between the utility and law enforcement.
Specifically, evaluating the quality and consistency
of:
Regular monthly meetings between utility and
law enforcement managers and supervisors
Daily transmission of incident reports and
summaries
Regular security reviews and patrols in
conjunction with law enforcement personnel
Benefits and Incentives: Partnering with law
enforcement can help the utility win federal grants
through the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI).
UASI is the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security's grant program, passed through to states to
administer at the local level. UASI sets a strategic
direction for the enhancement of regional response
capability and capacity. UASI's mission is to reduce
area vulnerability and prevent terrorism and/or
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents by
strengthening the cycle of response, and ensuring that
potential targets are identified, assessed, and
protected.
The UASI funding board also includes law
enforcement representatives. Developing strong
relationships with local law enforcement agencies
can improve the utility's chance of securing UASI
funding as those agencies can act as advocates for the
utility.
OCTOBER 2008
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
7: Drinking Water and
Wastewater Agency
Collaboration with Other
Sectors in Regional
Emergency Planning
Corresponding Feature Description:
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Tested and
Updated; and Partnerships
Category Type:
Collaborative; Operational
General Description: Water sector agencies in the
area recognized the need to be involved with regional
security committees in order to have a voice in grant
allocation and regional planning decisions. Several
utility directors from across the county divided their
efforts, so each of the regional homeland security
committees would have a drinking water or
wastewater utility representative.
Water sector representatives attended regional
meetings, promoted and received first responder
recognition, and became accepted members of the
regional emergency management groups.
Representatives were able to participate in
developing regional plans, including implementing
requirements under the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security's Strategic Plan.
Resources Required: The resources for this
activity include time and expenses for drinking water
and wastewater utility representatives to travel and
attend their respective regional security committee
meetings and perform associated duties. Meetings
are typically held annually.
Roles and Responsibilities: It is the responsibility
of each drinking water and wastewater utility
representative to attend regional security committee
meetings (or send an informed designee), to present
the water sector's concerns and issues, and to report
back to other drinking water/wastewater security
committee representatives on any regional
developments and opportunities reported in
committee meetings.
Collaboration with Other Partners: This practice
allows for regional collaboration of drinking water
and wastewater utilities with fire and police
departments, port authorities, local government, and
citizen groups.
Barriers: No significant barriers were encountered
during this activity.
Lessons Learned: Balancing the additional
responsibilities of being a regional security
committee representative with normal duties can
prove challenging, as can securing funding for travel
to the various meetings.
Success Measures: Increasing drinking
water/wastewater sector representation on regional
security committees, which includes:
Increasing attendance at regional security
committee meetings
Increasing representation of water sector in
regional trainings and exercises
Increasing representation of water sector in more
localized response committees and
organizations, for example local fire and police
chief associations
Benefits and Incentives: In addition to giving
utilities a voice in the security arena, utilities have
been awarded grants that typically are provided to
traditional first responders such as police and fire.
OCTOBER 2008
25
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8: Supplying Emergency
Water via Tern porary
Piping
SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
is around $150 per foot, including associated fittings.
Additional resources include annual exercises for
field staff to maintain familiarity in the deployment of
the temporary water mains and pipes, and inspection
time to ensure the lines and related supplies are well-
maintained and free of contamination.
Roles and Responsibilities: The utility staff is
trained by the supplier for effective use of the flexible
transmission and distribution lines. Utility staff is
responsible for installation, maintenance,
disinfection, sampling, and testing of the piping and
fittings according to approved procedures.
Collaboration with Other Partners: The military
and other utilities with experience using flexible
transmission and distribution lines provided
information on lessons learned and installation
techniques for the pipes and fittings. Additionally,
the utility incorporated the temporary transmission
and distribution lines into their mutual aid agreements
with other utilities, making them available in times of
need.
Barriers: The primary barrier encountered for
implementing this activity was overcoming staff
concerns that the temporary transmission and
distribution lines might compromise disinfection and
water quality. The utility previously employed rigid,
less versatile piping to supply emergency water,
which did not pose the same concerns.
Lessons Learned: Multiple lessons learned from
implementation and consultation included:
Positioning storage locations for the lines is
important for ready deployment. Key
considerations include storing equipment in
multiple areas and focusing on sections of the
water system that are only served by a single
water main.
Proper maintenance, storage, cleaning, and
disinfection are critical to effective deployment
as a temporary potable water system.
Staff gains training and experience by
implementing procedures and using the
equipment during routine outages due to
maintenance, water main breaks, or construction
activity.
Assessing the correct sizes and amount of
temporary lines needed is critical, and should be
26
Corresponding Feature Description:
Design and Construction
Category Type:
Infrastructure
General Description: This utility's vulnerability
assessment indicated that seismic activity or a
malevolent act could result in significant
consequences to critical customersareas served by
a sole water main or service areas isolated by bodies
of water. The utility evaluated multiple scenarios and
the impacts of a serious water service interruption
following an emergency event or equipment
malfunction, and identified those situations with the
highest probability and consequence.
As a result of the evaluation, this utility purchased
flexible temporary transmission and distribution
lines, along with multiple associated fittings to
mitigate the risk of a service interruption. Lines in
several diameters (up to 12 inches) are stored on reels
and staged in three locations where they can be
rapidly deployed. The water pipes are flexible plastic
and can be installed on the ground or under water to
provide temporary water service.
Resources Required: The cost for 12-inch
diameter flexible transmission and distribution lines
OCTOBER 2008
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
based on the utility size, geography, and single
points of failure.
Success Measures: Success measures for this
activity include staff accepting use of the temporary
lines as standard operating procedure, regular use
during routine operations, and successful deployment
of the lines during training and actual events.
Benefits and Incentives: Implementing this
practice provides multiple benefits for the utility and
the community it serves, including:
The temporary lines can be used for both
emergencies and routine operations.
The lines are sufficient for providing water for
fire suppression, if necessary.
The equipment can be made available as a
regional resource to other water utilities.
Customer confidence and satisfaction is
increased by enhancing the utility's ability to
provide safe water to its customers during
emergency events, routine system failures, and
service interruptions due to construction
activities.
OCTOBER 2008 27
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
9: Enhancing Law
Enforcement Response
with Video Assessment
Corresponding Feature Description:
Physical and Procedural Controls on Facility Access;
and Establish Local Partnerships
Category Type:
Infrastructure; Collaborative
General Description: This utility's vulnerability
assessment identified priority facilities and critical
assets vital to fulfilling the utility's mission. They
determined the loss of one or more of these critical
assets were of high consequence. The utility installed
a video assessment system to increase its ability to
assess alarm events that occur at, or near, critical
assets. This equipment uses a Digital Video
Recording (DVR) system, along with a
communications system to transmit the video to a
central location for viewing and assessment.
An actual security event occurred during the trial
period, where the utility discovered evidence of a
break-in and called local law enforcement. Law
enforcement viewed the related video footage, and
the individual was
apprehended.
After the incident,
the utility and law
enforcement
determined that
security could be
further enhanced
by the installation
of alarms at locations where security cameras were
OCTOBER 2008
installed. The utility then installed detection and
alarm monitoring equipment. The system now alerts
utility staff of the immediate need to assess video
surveillance images and to contact law enforcement
for an investigation, instead of waiting until an
intrusion is detected during routine patrols.
Resources Required: Resources required forthis
practice are divided into three components:
Purchase and installation of cameras and DVR
equipment
Building a wireless communications system to
transfer images
Installing facility alarms
Roles and Responsibilities: Roles and
responsibilities include:
Utility control center staff receives alarms,
monitors the video assessment equipment,
assesses unusual activity, contacts law
enforcement, and prepares incident reports.
Utility maintenance staff inspects and maintains
equipment and the communications systems to
assure reliable operation of the alarm and video
system.
Law enforcement officers assess field conditions
at the site and take appropriate action to prevent
and/or mitigate consequences, including
interactions, as necessary.
Utility management develops protocols for
utility staff assessment and response, provides
training, and provides supervision at critical
events.
Collaboration with Other Partners:
Collaboration occurs between utility staff and law
enforcement to maintain common understanding of
the threats as well as the communication techniques
employed during an event.
Barriers: The barriers encountered were technical,
which affect the operations of the equipment. For
example, difficulty with using and adjusting the
monitoring equipment resulted in poor video images
due to improper camera focus, panning range, and
changes in light and weather conditions. The quality
of the images directly affected the assessment of
those images, which impacted the utility's ability to
gauge the particular threat.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
Lessons Leamed: The lessons learned involved
both technological issues related to the new
equipment implementation and inter-agency
relationships to ensure an efficient response.
Specifically:
Utilities need to include the use of video cameras
in daily operations to keep employees trained
and comfortable with the technology. This will
also alert staff early to problems with the
equipment from malfunctions and improper
adjustments that impact the quality of the images
recorded.
Detection is an important feature of the video
assessment system to indicate an immediate
need to monitor the event. Installing facility
alarm systems in conjunction with video
assessment systems greatly enhances facility
security.
Creating relationships with local law
enforcement before an incident is essential for
coordinating response procedures. It is also
important for law enforcement to know the
reliability of information the utility is providing
(a facility alarm with video of an intruder is more
significant that just a facility alarm).
Success Measures: The equipment has already
proven successful at identifying an intruder. In
addition, the equipment has the potential to decrease
the number of false alarms in cases where an
employee accidentally trips the alarm and fails to
report it.
Benefits and Incentives: This practice increases
the utility's ability to protect its customers' drinking
water supply and provide faster assessment and
response to possible intrusion and malevolent acts.
The enhanced relationship with law enforcement also
helped to improve security and response to other
facilities without equipment upgrades. This practice
is an integral part of the utility's comprehensive all-
hazards preparedness program.
OCTOBER 2008
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
10: On-site Sodium
Hypochlorite Generation
for Wastewater
Disinfection
Corresponding Feature Description:
Incorporate Security Considerations into Design and
Construction
Category Type:
Infrastructure
General Description: Many utilities use chlorine
for drinking water and wastewater treatment. The
practice of using chlorine has included both gaseous
and liquid forms based on factors of convenience,
reliability, and safety. As concerns increased about
risks associated with malevolent acts after
September 11,2001, utilities began finding new ways
to reduce this risk. Concerns for personal and
environmental safety resulted in adoption of risk
management practices that caused many utilities to
switch from using gaseous chlorine to liquid chlorine
and other alternatives. Please note: EPA does not
have an official position on chlorine use; the practice
described here is utility specific.
This practice was implemented at a small utility with
less than 30 employees. The utility determined that
using liquid sodium hypochlorite for one of its
routine applications in wastewater treatment had been
a preferred practice prior to September 11,2001. The
utility chose the process of on-site generation of
sodium hypochlorite over deliveries of liquid
chlorine. This process converts ordinary salt to a
usable chlorine product via an electrolytic process.
The utility continued to use gaseous chlorine for the
remainder of its treatment processes, but changed this
practice when the risk management processes
required conducting emergency drills in the
neighborhoods where the chlorine gas was used.
This new requirement meant creating an ongoing
program to prepare the local residences in the event
of a release of chlorine gas. The utility chose the
conversion process based on a cost-benefit analysis
that considered security and public health concerns.
The new practice at this utility is to use on-site
chlorine generation for all wastewater treatment
practices.
Resources Required: The cost of this practice is
approximately $6,000 every 2 to 3 years for
maintaining the on-site equipment. Additional
resources are needed to pay for power, labor, and salt
costs related to producing sodium hypochlorite. The
utility offset some of these costs by eliminating the
expense and risk of transporting and storing one-ton
gaseous chlorine cylinders. Instead, the utility stores
a small amount of liquid sodium hypochlorite at a
concentration that is at, or below, the concentration of
household bleach.
Roles and Responsibilities: There are no distinct
roles and responsibilities for implementing this
practice outside of the normal utility processes for
operational safety.
Collaboration with Other Partners: This practice
does not involve collaboration with other partners.
Barriers: There are potential financial barriers to this
practice. Individual utilities will need to weigh the
expense of implementing an on-site sodium
hypochlorite generation system with their current
system. This analysis should include other
considerations such as reduced security requirements
from removing the likelihood of being a target.
Lessons Learned: The primary lesson learned was
improved safety for utility staff and the community.
Success Measures: The main measure of success
for this practice is that the utility found the practice
sustainable for partial conversion to on-site
generation before the heightened security concerns
sparked by September 11,2001, and found the
changing security environment post-September 11,
OCTOBER 2008
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
2001, justified conversion to complete on-site
generation.
Benefits and Incentives: The primary benefit of
this practice is reduced risk to the community due to
an accidental or purposeful release of gaseous
chlorine.
OCTOBER 2008 31
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
11: Securing Utility
I nformation
Corresponding Feature Description:
Security Sensitive Information Access Control
Category Type:
Infrastructure
General Description: This utility developed a set
of practices for identifying security sensitive
information, determining the value of the information
(based on the consequences from improper use,
disclosure or loss), and developed practices and
procedures to mitigate those risks, as follows:
Inventorying and controlling information to
which employees need access (e.g., maps and
records) by instituting employee access
classifications, identifying procedures and
facilities to protect restricted records, and
assigning access based upon need and
classification.
Using of a security consultant to assist the utility
in controlling access to critical data in electronic
format.
Restricting consultant/contractor access to data
and preventing removal of data from a utility
site.
Changing the traditional process of security
consultant selection within the utility to reduce
distribution of sensitive information. This
included choosing a security consultant based on
qualifications rather than bid.
Securing critical data from the public record by
removing it from Web sites, and other public
documents and records. Information provided to
other government agencies may be subject to the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and state or
local government requirements. However,
FOIA, and many state and local ordinances,
contain exemptions for sensitive and security
related data.
Re-keying critical facilities on a scheduled basis
to make sure access is restricted to authorized
personnel. Assignment of keys to employees is
done based on need. All assigned keys are
tracked.
Securing vouchers and pay requests from
contracts for physical security enhancements.
When payment vouchers are routed through a
primary government agency, purchase
information becomes part of the public record,
resulting in publicly accessible information about
security enhancements. This knowledge can
increase the risk of individuals or groups
learning the nature, design, capabilities, and
limitations of the utility security system. By
allowing one category of vouchers to remain
accessible only to the auditor, sensitive
information regarding the nature of a utility's
security system is protected. This approach to
designating one type of voucher or pay request
can be justified based on being diligent when
protecting the safety and security of the utility,
the utility's employees, and the public.
Resources Required: The resources needed to
protect and secure information vary widely
depending on how much of the work is done
internally and how much is contracted out to
consultants. Accurate accounting for this practice
was unavailable.
Roles and Responsibilities: The utility
designated an internal information security team,
comprising members of all of the major departments.
The team was responsible for identifying sensitive
information and handling procedures, which include
storage, handling when not in storage, and other
considerations. Individual team members were
responsible for identifying security sensitive
information within their respective departments and
OCTOBER 2008
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
for assessing the level of security needed for each
piece of information. In addition, utility and local
government councils were consulted to determine the
legal issues associated with protecting information.
Collaboration with Other Partners: This utility
conducted their information security program
internally, with the assistance of an outside security
consultant. Utilities engaging in a similar practice
may consider consulting other drinking water and
wastewater utilities (and other utilities in general,
such as electric or gas utilities), and local agencies to
determine how they protect their information.
Barriers: This utility did not face any significant
barriers. However, some utilities may face barriers
getting their employees to take a new, security
minded attitude towards protecting information.
Lessons Learned: Implementing a program to
assess and protect sensitive information reduced the
risk of malevolent acts. Additionally, it helped to
educate staff about the types of information they
handle on a daily basis and the importance of
safeguarding that information.
Success Measures: One measure of success is
that the utility can demonstrate they have fully
catalogued, and appropriately protected, sensitive
security information. In addition, periodic audits of
the program determine if employees have embraced
it and ultimately determine the program's success.
Benefits and Incentives: Instituting an effective
information security program has many benefits.
Protecting sensitive information related to physical
security measures improves the effectiveness of those
measures by making them harder to identify and
defeat. Measures for securing electronic information
include general improvements to the utility's
information technology (IT) systems, which provide
additional benefits in preventing electronic attacks on
the utility (for instance, more secure firewalls for
preventing access to sensitive data also helps prevent
hacking of command and control systems). By
identifying and eliminating information the utility
does not truly need (or by implementing stronger
security measures for protecting it), the utility
increases customer confidence and decreases its legal
liability in the event the data is stolen.
OCTOBER 2008 33
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12: Enhanced Security of
the Distribution System
through Bulk Water
Metering Stations
SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
Roles and Responsibilities: The system requires
minimal stafftraining and only routine equipment
maintenance and billing administration. The utility
provides orientation sessions to bulk water
purchasers on the use of the metering stations.
Citizens within the district take an active role in the
program by reporting unauthorized vehicles and
persons accessing the metering stations, which helps
prevent theft and possible contamination.
Collaboration with Other Partners:
Implementation and design of the system involved
collaboration with bulk water purchasers, fire
department, law enforcement, and water utility
customers. The utility shared its design with a
neighboring water utility, and both utilities installed
the water metering stations concurrently.
Barriers: There was initial resistance from some of
the bulk water purchasers who objected to the cost
incurred for them to provide licensed vehicles and
drivers to travel to the metering stations. This was
resolved through a series of meetings with the utility
manager who explained the importance of the
stations to the security of the distribution system, and
further explained that the utility incurred costs as
well.
Lessons Learned: Some lessons learned during
this activity include:
A utility should site metering stations where
access is visible to, and does not negatively
impact, the existing community. This will
increase the effectiveness of citizens as station
monitors.
A utility should also site the metering stations
where access is easy, and make metering system
instructions as clear and simple as possible. This
will help decrease resistance from bulk
purchasers.
Success Measures: This activity was highly
successful for the utility in cost savings and
community support. Some notable successes
include:
The utility estimated that prior to the water
metering stations, only one in ten water loads
was reported. Revenue from the accurate
accounting of the metering stations paid for the
Corresponding Feature Description:
Intrusion Detection and Access Control; and
Resiliency in Design and Construction
Category Type:
Infrastructure
General Description: To reduce the risk of
contamination from backflow or siphoning into the
water distribution system, this utility installed water
metering stations for its bulk water purchasers, such
as builders and landscapers. All commercial bulk
water purchasers should use the stations and are
prohibited from using fire hydrants for bulk water
filling. Additionally, the utility began a rewards
program for citizens who report unauthorized use of
fire hydrants. The use of the metering stations allows
the utility to better track the number of gallons used.
It also simplifies the monitoring of hydrants because
unofficial vehicles should never use them.
Resources Required: For this utility, a metering
station cost approximately $25,000 to install,
including appropriate backflow protection devices.
Costs may vary depending on local conditions. No
significant maintenance costs were incurred during
the first 2 years of use. This utility also partnered
with a neighboring utility, which decreased costs on
design and construction.
OCTOBER 2008
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
metering stations in 17 months and has provided
a more accurate accounting of system efficiency
and water loss figures.
Customer complaints of low pressure and cloudy
water have decreased now that hydrants are not
used for bulk water filling.
Benefits and Incentives: This practice helps
mitigate the risk of distribution system contamination
identified in the vulnerability assessment. Although
the implementation of the system was driven by a
desire to decrease water contamination vulnerability,
implementing water metering stations has provided
other benefits, including:
Backflow protection.
Increased revenue through more accurate
metering.
Decreased maintenance costs from hydrant
abuse and damage to water mains caused by
sudden surges (water hammers) within the
distribution system.
Decreased customer water quality complaints.
Increased security awareness and personal
responsibility of citizens to care for their water
system.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
13: EPA Assistance for
Water Contam ination
Incidents
Corresponding Feature Descriptions:
Contamination Detection; and Partnerships
Category Type:
Operational; Collaborative
General Description: EPA's Region 10
Emergency Response Unit (Response Team) has
developed a water sampling and analysis practice,
and uses On-Scene Coordinators to support the water
sector in responding to emergency contamination
incidents. The practice was developed after several
contamination events overwhelmed the local utilities'
response capabilities. EPA Region 10, which serves
several Northwest states, including Seattle-King
County, recognized the need for their role in this area
and established this practice.
The Response Team members, including On-Scene
Coordinators, were trained to assist water systems
with emergency preparedness, response, and
recovery. The Response Team developed specific
procedures for water related incidents including
utilizing the practices contained in EPA's Response
Protocol Toolbox (RPTB).
The Response Team's capabilities include:
Readiness to respond 24 hours-a-day to a
contamination incident
Response with technical resources required to
address immediate dangers to the public and
environment
Community relations skills that can be called
upon to assist with informing the public about a
contamination event, response activities, and the
contaminant involved
The four main practice areas where the Response
Team provides emergency assistance are:
1. Collecting multiple samples from different
sampling points.
2. Rapid analytical field testing, including
deploying a portable gas chromatograph and
mass spectrophotometer (GCMS).
3. Coordinating analytical data, including access to
the EPA National Homeland Security Research
Center and certified commercial environmental
labs. In addition, the Response Team
coordinates directly with state labs, other federal
agencies such as the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of
Defense (DoD), depending on the complexity of
the situation.
4. Data management of samples, methods, and
field and lab results.
Members of the Response Team undergo more than
one month of training and education annually,
including:
Hazardous Worker Training
Advanced Emergency Response
Incident Command System (ICS)
Specialized training for sampling and analysis
equipment and instrumentation
Additional information on the Response Team is
available at http://www.rrtlOnwac.com/.
Resources Required: There is no monetary cost to
the utility to access the Response Team. The
Response Team staff and equipment are maintained
by the federal budget to support this practice.
Roles and Responsibilities: On-Scene
Coordinators lead the field sampling and response
effort, and work as part of a Unified Command at an
incident. EPA staff and their contractors are trained
to respond as field support, part of the initial
sampling team, and part of the analysis team.
Administrative staff is provided by EPA to maintain
accurate information on resources, contractors, and
laboratories. The utility contributes to the response by
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
providing staff who can supply utility-specific input
and advice to EPA and contractor staff.
Collaboration with Other Partners: This EPA
practice supports public and private water sector
agencies that request assistance from EPA. To
support this effort, the Response Team uses the
resources of other government and private agencies
to provide a rapid and comprehensive response. The
response capabilities include a variety of public and
private labs, along with federal equipment and
resources.
Barriers: To avoid encountering barriers during a
response, the following recommendations are for all
utilities and drinking water and wastewater agencies
and organizations:
Be familiar with the Response Team and its
capabilities, as described above.
Utilities should be able to activate their own
resources and personnel on short notice to
provide support for an incident.
Understand that the Response Team's first
priority is to protect human health and assist in
stabilization of an incident.
Lessons Learned: EPA realized many lessons
learned, including:
Outreach to local utilities through in-person
networking has been a key to the ongoing
success of the program.
Utilities need to know how to make a request for
technical assistance if resources are needed.
The Response Team's first concern is public
health and the environment.
Capabilities: The EPA Region 10 Emergency
Response Unit has been successful in enhancing the
resources and expertise that can quickly be brought to
bear on a contamination incident. Some of these
capabilities include:
Providing on-scene support in a water sector
contamination incident
Ability to provide and utilize rapid response field
testing kits for water contaminants
Ability to provide and utilize water
contamination incident sampling kits
Successful implementation of emergency
response drills and exercises with water utilities
Benefits and Incentives: The EPA Response
Team provides a number of benefits when activated
to respond to an incident, including the following:
Resources for federal support to a contamination
response can be activated without a disaster
declaration.
Utilities gain access to experienced support staff
that is well-trained in water sector emergency
response and ICS.
Response Team can be a part of the Unified
Command or work under the operations section
of the ICS.
Response Team's access to specialized
equipment and analytical resources provides
rapid and efficient results for samples taken for
testing.
Utilities that access the Response Team are accessing
not only technical assistance, but also resources and
coordination on preparedness, planning, response,
and recovery activities. The Response Team will
assist in incidents involving hazardous substances,
biological agents, pollutants and contaminants, oil,
and weapons of mass destruction in malevolent,
natural, or accidental disasters or other incidents of
national significance.
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1 4: Emergency
Preparedness Survey of
Critical Customers
Corresponding Feature Description:
Partnerships
Category Type:
Operational; Collaborative
General Description: This utility developed a
survey to collect information on critical customers'
water needs in order to help prepare for an
emergency that could result in a temporary or
extended loss of service. Critical customers can
include hospitals and other medical facilities, elderly
populations, or other entities where water is a critical
component to their operations, such as power
generation and other industrial uses. Critical
customers have special needs from water utilities,
especially during emergencies. Periodically
identifying and cataloguing the special needs for each
critical customer provides for an understanding
between the utility and the customer of what to
expect if an emergency strikes.
The utility's annual survey is typically a two-page
instrument with questions related to customer storage
capacity, connectivity to the water system, and
identification of the customer's disaster plan.
Customers respond with information on specific
procedures for water needs (including backup water
supply), an assessment of the customer's level of
independence (the length of time the customer can be
self-sustaining), and emergency 24/7 contact
information. These data are then provided to field
crews responsible for routine and emergency shutoffs
and outages, as well as emergency management staff
responsible for event planning and response.
Resources Required: The level of effort for
developing the survey, administering it, and
cataloguing responses represent a small increase in
the annual operations budget. Implementing the
system, developing surveys, and maintaining the data
required staff time; however, actual hours were not
tracked.
Roles and Responsibilities: The utility Customer
Service Key Account Representative (or equivalent)
has responsibility to collect and maintain the data.
The utility Field Operations and Control Center staffs
maintain and review the data so they remain prepared
for a loss of water in the portions of the system
serving these customers. The lead for field response
is the Water Quality Inspector, who assumes the role
of Incident Commander and makes decisions on
shutdowns, communications with critical customers,
and providing temporary water. The utility should
maintain access to each critical customer's data and
conduct regular, preferably joint training on action
plans to maintain water service or provide adequate
water in the case of a loss of service.
Collaboration with Other Partners: Developing
and maintaining critical customer data requires
collaboration with local hospital associations, dialysis
centers, nursing home associations, critical industries,
and other service providers. Working with these
groups enables improved communications and
identification of additional critical customers, as well
as identification of potential areas for improvement
between the utility and customers.
Barriers: Many of the barriers encountered relate to
securing participation from critical customers, and
include:
Difficulty obtaining responses from all or a high
percentage of customers. Critical customers'
staffs may already be stretched thin answering
other surveys. It is important to impress upon
them the importance of the information to the
utility and how it impacts their operations.
Challenges finding correct customer contacts
within the surveyed entity (e.g., building
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
engineer) who has the needed information and/or
authority to provide it.
Hesitancy on the part of customers and utilities
to make changes that incur costs if the survey
indicates inadequate measures in place to deal
with a loss of service to the customer.
Difficulty maintaining a regular schedule for
updating the information. This is extremely
important because outdated information can
mask the severity of a situation and worsen an
emergency.
Lessons Leamed: Lessons learned during this
activity revealed gaps in the customers' ability to
continue operating during a loss of service from the
utility. Some of the lessons learned include:
Critical customers need to ensure they have
reliable backup supplies of water. Many
customers mistakenly believed they did have
supplies, but found through this effort they did
not.
Utilities need to conduct surveys and work
directly with critical customers to clarify specific
customer vulnerabilities that would otherwise
not be known until an emergency happens.
Once a vulnerability or inadequacy is identified,
it is important to follow up with a contingency
plan between the utility and the customer to
address concerns.
Data and procedures related to water security
apply to a multitude of events linking critical
customers with the utility, including routine
utility operation and maintenance.
After-action reports created following
contamination events show that critical
customers who cooperate with their utilities on
their specific needs prior to an event are better
prepared for a loss of service.
Success Measures: Success measures for
building a comprehensive critical customer database
include:
Creating up-to-date information on critical
customers, including having surveys available
for collecting information
Increasing the number of customer or sector-
specific contingency plans and agreements (e.g.,
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with hospitals and medical facilities, fire
departments, manufacturing facilities)
Benefits and Incentives: Creating data on critical
customers helps the utility meet their mission to
provide safe and reliable water to their customers.
The impact of a loss of service to a critical customer
is likely to have greater consequences, and generate
greater public attention, than a similar loss to the
regular customer base. Avoiding a loss of services
can help improve and maintain public confidence.
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Enhancements
SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
Resources Required: In this case, total cost of the
equipment installed was approximately $383,000.
Consultant services for developing the cost estimate
were $2,000. Approximately $75,000 covered
outside labor costs for installing the equipment, and
approximately $50,000 paid for additional equipment
to complete installation.
The amount of time internal staff spent on preparing
the grant was significant, but not closely tracked. A
large part of this cost went to paying overtime to
meet deadlines. These costs can be reduced through
pre-planning, particularly if the utility has a dedicated
grant-writer.
Roles and Responsibilities: The utility staff
performed most of the work required within the
framework of the assistance agreement. This
included managing the contractors performing the
upgrades, or performing the upgrades themselves.
The utility used a consultant to perform a detailed
costs analysis for DHS.
Collaboration with Other Partners: This activity
did not involve collaboration with other partners
beyond DHS. However, applying for grants in
collaboration with, or with the support of, other local
agencies (e.g., law enforcement and health) or
utilities can help increase the chances of receiving a
grant.
Barriers: The barriers encountered relate to
difficulties negotiating the process of applying for the
grant, and included:
The committee in charge of funds had no formal
system for allocating the money.
Some utility staff changed during the grant
process and new staff had to be brought up to
speed on the security enhancement program and
grant application process, slowing the process.
Changes to the application required additional
reviews by county, state, and sometimes federal
government personnel.
Each step of the grant process required written
approval of the state committee.
Communications between the county and state
were cumbersome.
Lessons Learned: The upgrades implemented for
this activity were identified as necessary in the
Corresponding Features Description:
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Tested and
Updated; Security Resources and Implementation
Priorities; and Intrusion Detection and Access
Control
Category Type:
Operational
General Description: The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) makes grants available
that are administered through state committees for
security enhancements. In this case, the utility
applied for funding for security upgrades via the
county emergency planning committee. The utility
procured the equipment upgrades up front and then
applied for reimbursement. The upgrades included:
Vault alarms installed around the wellheads
A metering station for bulk water sales
Chlorine residual and pH sensors to provide
baseline contaminant protection
All requests for funding should contain detailed cost
information. For example, a utility applying for
fencing should include the type offence and cost per
foot of installed fence. However, the application for
DHS funding does not need to be elaborate; this
successful application was three pages long.
If a utility applies for grant funds prior to
implementing the upgrades, the grant allows for a 10
percent cost variance from the estimate on the
application. Any expenditure beyond that requires
pre-approval.
The utility started the application process in
September 2003 and received the grant
approximately 18 months later.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
utility's vulnerability assessment (VA). Relating
funding requests to a VA, or similar risk assessment,
demonstrates an ongoing commitment by the utility
to improve the safety and security of its system, and
lends additional legitimacy to funding requests.
Success Measures: The new equipment and
upgrades helped address gaps identified in the VA,
allowing the utility to move on to other areas of
concern. The utility's success with obtaining grant
funds has encouraged them to consider applying for
additional grant funds to implement more security-
related improvements.
Benefits and Incentives:
The wellhead protection upgrades and metering
station for bulk water sales has lessened the risk that
contaminants can be introduced to the system by
limiting unauthorized access. As noted in Practice
Description #12, metering stations also help the
utility more accurately monitor bulk water sales,
increasing revenue.
The positive experience this utility had with obtaining
grant funding has encouraged staff to complete a
more comprehensive assessment of the water system
beyond the VA, and look to grants for funding the
assessment and any needed improvements.
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16: Using a Clear
Message for Risk
Com m u n ications
Corresponding Feature Description:
Communications
Category Type:
Operational; Collaborative
General Description: To prepare for critical
communications with the public during an
emergency incident, this utility developed pre-
scripted communications materials, or "message
maps" to deliver key messages to the public about
specific emergency scenarios. Message mapping is a
science-based communications methodology that
enables people who are required to communicate
with the public to quickly and concisely deliver the
most important information about an emergency.
Scientific studies regarding the way in which people
absorb information during high-stress situations have
been reviewed extensively. Guidelines have been
developed for the most effective means for delivering
critical information to the public in such a way as to
increase their retention of important information and
to ease public fears and stress. Guidelines include
recommended length of messages and the order in
which information is provided.
Message mapping provides Public Information
Officers (PIOs) and other public officials with key
messages, graphics, maps, background information, a
guidelines manual, and sample press releases (the
message mapping "kit") that can be quickly modified
to the specifics of the event. Message mapping has
been successfully employed during major crises such
as the September 11,2001 attacks, the London
underground bombings, and the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) scare, as well as
during many less publicized events. In this utility,
message maps were developed for four emergency
scenarios: the bypass of radiological contaminated
wastewater from a combined sewer system;
radiological contamination of a wastewater treatment
plant; toxic and flammable material in a combined
sewer; and chlorine gas release from a treatment
plant.
Resources Required: The time it takes to develop
message maps is dependent on the number of
scenarios to be mapped and the number of people
needing to be involved. In this case, an external
consultant was employed to facilitate message
mapping sessions and develop the initial message
maps. Additionally, message maps should be
reviewed and updated periodically and new staff
should be familiarized not just with the maps, but
with the concepts behind them.
Roles and Responsibilities: The utility PIO
should understand the contents of the message
mapping kit and coordinate with utility staff and
other PIOs to update and maintain the kits. Utility
staff is responsible for providing specific data on an
emergency event to the PIO. Types of data may
include the nature of the incident, extent of the
affected area, anticipated length of any service
disruptions, water use and health advisories, etc.
Collaboration with Other Partners: The message
mapping kit was created in collaboration with
personnel from the City of Seattle, U.S. Coast Guard,
EPA Region 10, Washington State Department of
Health, King County Public Health, King County
Department of Natural Resources and Parks, and
King County Office of Emergency Management. A
key to the success of this practice is including all
PIOs that would have involvement in the regional
Joint Information Center. Another effective method
is the practice of performing joint public briefings,
with PIOs from different agencies addressing
questions in their respective agencies' area of
expertise. For instance, law enforcement PIOs may
address questions regarding criminal aspects of an
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
event, while the utility PIO and health department
PIO address questions regarding the safety of the
water.
Barriers: The concepts and techniques of using
message maps were new to the participants
developing the manual, which created some
resistance to the process. Additionally, maintaining
the kits is time consuming and can be neglected.
Lessons Learned: Message mapping helps PIOs
prepare for the expected and unexpected for
communicating with the public. Following an
emergency event, providing background information
to PIOs can be time consuming and disruptive to the
Incident Commander. Establishing a procedure
before an event occurs that guides how and when a
PIO should obtain information to plug into the
message maps speeds and improves communications
and reduces disruption. It is important that the PIOs
of all responding agencies cooperate on developing
the maps and related procedures prior to an event so
the Incident Commander and his/her staff do not
have to provide duplicate information to different
PIOs.
Success Measures: Success is measured by the
presence of having readily available messages
and reducing public stress and anxiety.
Evidence of success includes:
Having readily available message maps that
address a wide variety of crisis emergencies, as
well as routine events that represent the input of
multiple responding agencies
Increasing PIO usage of message maps in
emergency training exercises, and the resultant
after-action reports that allow emergency
planners to gauge the effectiveness of the
practice at the particular utility and locality
Benefits and Incentives: This specific activity
was initially developed for a radiological event, but
participants learned that message maps are easily
expanded to other types of events, including chemical
releases. Additionally, a well developed message
mapping kit should ease transition for new PIOs by
organizing key utility messages (such as their mission
statement) and presentation materials in advance, and
familiarizing the PIO staff with the utility structure,
assets, and systems.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
1 7: Security and
Emergency Response
Metrics
Corresponding Feature Description:
Utility-Specific Measures
Category Type:
Operational
General Description: The term "security metrics"
is the application of quantifiable or statistical analysis
to measure security functions and workload. If
implemented effectively, it allows the agency to track
staff level of effort, costs, and productivity. This
practice is an ongoing activity to identify and revise
metrics and communicate appropriate levels of detail,
frequency, and format of the data with the intent of
measuring processes, program activity, and
achievements.
A key objective for this practice is to identify those
metrics by which real change can be measured.
Metrics and data sources used in this practice include:
The number of assets patrolled and events
detected or reported (e.g., graffiti, break-ins,
vandalism or unlocked doors, alarms)
Type of background check for each category of
critical personnel, different employees (vendors,
contractors, etc.), and the percentage of those
personnel who have received checks
Employee training (skills assessment/inventory
and completion of scheduled trainings)
Time of response to incidents and resolution of
events
Incident reporting tools (incident report forms,
after-action reports, closure reports, executive
reports, and daily operational reports)
Costs of security program (investments,
resources, time spent)
Resources Required: After an initial investment
of staff time to identify relevant metrics and reporting
format, an estimated 15 percent of security staff time
is spent annually on reporting and analyzing the data.
Roles and Responsibilities: The Director of
Security and Emergency Management was the lead
for identifying and reporting on metrics. However,
staff from many different utility departments
participated in collecting and submitting the data, and
preparing reports.
Collaboration with Other Partners: Law
enforcement, other utilities, and other agencies (i.e.,
state drinking water primacy agency, EPA, state and
local emergency management agencies, etc.) may
provide useful advice in identifying metrics.
Additionally, the utility may share specific incident or
observation data with these partners to ensure the
practice's currency and relevance.
Barriers: Potential barriers that were identified
during this practice were:
Dedicating and maintaining sufficient staff time
for identifying the metrics and subsequently
implementing the data collection and analysis.
Identifying a high-level utility staff person to
oversee the process and push for necessary
changes identified by the practice.
Additionally, this activity involved mainly risk-based
measures that do not necessarily fit the traditional
cost/benefit analysis process, and therefore may be
difficult to communicate to decision makers.
Lessons Learned: The lessons learned that were
identified relate to developing and implementing the
activity, including:
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To ensure data is properly collected,
management should ensure staff understands the
reason for collecting the data.
The utility should periodically review the metrics
and the data associated with them. Over time,
the utility will likely eliminate or alter existing
metrics and develop new metrics as users
become more familiar with the program data and
quality improves.
Measures can be borrowed from other sectors;
however, terminology may not necessarily
translate from one sector to another (particularly
from private to public). One reference used by
this utility was Security Metrics Management by
Gerald L. Kovacich.
Planning for collection of data requires
sophistication and multiple systems to report out
the data with an understanding of the form and
frequency needs of each person (e.g., pagers,
displays on computers for various key staff,
automated paper reports). Users may not know
what they want to see and will need education
and experience to refine information.
Metrics and measurable data can be used to build
a business case for increasing and providing
ongoing support of utility security programs.
Success Measures: Some of the success
measures that can be used to gauge the effectiveness
of this activity include:
Data analysis outputs (like reports) are used in
supporting the case for improving and
maintaining the security program; their use was
determined to be a factor in winning support.
Expanding the group of data users can support
increased procurement of important equipment
(for instance, data used by the department in
charge of distribution may procure more secure
or tamperproof hydrants). The data may also be
used by entities outside the utility such as public
funding agencies to support security
enhancements.
Benefits and Incentives: The output of this
activity is a method for evaluating the effectiveness
and efficiency of a utility's security program in
different ways. This information can be used to
improve specific protocols and procedures to
improve security practices, to better allocate
resources to where they are needed most, and to
demonstrate and justify a utility's security needs to
decision makers.
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18: Radiological
Contamination Event
Procedure for
a Com bined Sewer
System
Corresponding Feature Description:
Security Resources and Implementation Priorities;
and Partnerships
Category Type:
Operational
General Description: This practice is based on a
risk assessment of the effects of a "dirty bomb"
explosion in an urban area serviced by a combined
sewer system. The risk assessment was the first of its
kind to address the dangers to wastewater workers,
treatment plant and conveyance system, biological
treatment processes, and the solid waste stream (e.g.,
biosolids, grit, screenings).
The tools and processes used in this practice
included:
Detection and Notification: There were no detection
instruments deployed in the system itself.
Emergency responders in the area notified
emergency officials, who in turn notified the
wastewater utility.
Determining Extent of Contamination: To
determine the presence and extent of contamination
in the conveyance and treatment system, sampling
points were identified upstream of the plant
(including lift stations), in the influent barscreen
room, at grit collection points, and at biosolids
collection and transport points. Personnel used
electronic personnel dosimeters, portable survey
dosimeters, and other field laboratory
instrumentation.
A Radiological Emergency Response Plan: The
plan included procedures for protecting the workers
and the plant itself in the event of radiological
material entering the waste stream. The plan also
included a decision process flow diagram (also
known as a decision tree) presenting the decision
points and subsequent actions to take.
An Emergency Communications Guidance
Manual: The manual included pre-scripted
messages, also known as message maps, aimed at
targeted audiences. The messages assisted the utility
in answering common questions concerning the
actions of the utility. This manual also included
guidance on communication channels (for instance,
using radio, television, print, and online resources),
sample statements, and graphics to support the
messaging.
Cleanup, Decontamination and Contaminated
Waste Disposal Considerations: It is acknowledged
that an event of this type will likely tax local, state,
and federal response experts and resources, so a
private consultant well-versed in radiological
contamination and terrorism has been contracted to
assist the utility in post-"dirty bomb" operations.
Training: Training is under development. The
training will consider when and how to use the
guidance as well as message mapping skills.
Resources Required: This activity required
conducting a risk assessment and procurement of
detection equipment. Additionally, training on
detection equipment and response procedures should
be conducted. This utility obtained a Homeland
Security grant to help fund this activity. In this case
the risk assessment was designed and performed in
such a way that its findings could be used by other
wastewater utilities with similar combined systems to
conduct a risk assessment if the parties agree to
sharing the information and safeguarding the
contents.
Roles and Responsibilities: The overall lead fora
radiological event is the municipal Emergency
Operations Center (EOC). At the treatment plant,
emergency actions were directed by the on-duty
Operations Supervisor, who acted as the plant
Incident Commander (1C).
Staff was trained on sampling protocols and detection
equipment calibration and maintenance for use
immediately following an event; response protocols
for the protection of workers, the public, and
infrastructure; and cleanup and decontamination
procedures.
Collaboration with Other Partners: The utility
collaborated with response agencies at the local, state,
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
and federal level as part of this activity, and
established notification protocols with local and
regional emergency response agencies based on
which agency first discovers the contamination.
Barriers: Preparing for an event of this magnitude
and impact can present many barriers; however,
barriers can be greatly reduced through early and
active cooperation between response partners. Some
barriers include:
Inconsistent and improvised public
communication protocols have the potential for
causing mass panic.
Response personnel may be concerned for their
personal safety while responding. Worker
protection guidelines should be developed,
communicated, and training conducted with
personnel beforehand.
State and federal regulatory considerations
regarding the collection, transport, and disposal
of radiological contaminated waste may
complicate efforts to restore normal utility
service.
Lessons Leamed: Lessons learned from the
assessment include:
The radiological risk assessment revealed that
the plant and its workers are at risk.
The plant would immediately go from a
permitted Publicly Owned Treatment Works
(POTWs) under traditional regulations, to a low-
level radiological facility, drastically changing
requirements.
The 140-170 tons of biosolids produced atthe
plant every day would go from being marketable
fertilizer to low-level radiological waste.
In trying to address the consequences, the utility and
its partners also determined the following:
Worker protection standards at the state and
federal level would have to be changed to allow
for the continued operation of the plant.
The wastewater utility would largely be on its
own during the first days of a radiological event.
The utility and its partners identified the types of
radiological monitoring equipment necessary to
protect the workers and determine that the
equipment should be stockpiled before an event
to increase utility readiness and decrease
response times.
Success Measures: Success measures for this
activity come from after-action reports following
exercises and trainings. Additionally, the creation of
the emergency response plan, the message maps and
risk communication guidance, and regulation-
compliant cleanup and disposal plans will be
indicative of success.
Benefits and Incentives: This activity provides
many benefits to the utility. For example:
Risk assessments conducted as a precursor to
this activity may reveal other, more probable,
sources of potential radiological contamination
than a dirty bomb scenario.
The concepts and principles for developing
message maps to a radiological event can be
applied to developing message maps for other
scenarios.
The partners the utility engages for this practice
will likely be partners for other types of
responses; therefore this activity will set the stage
for future cooperation on other, more probable
scenarios.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
1 9: Utility Response to
Changing Threat Levels
Corresponding Feature Description:
Threat-level Based Protocols
Category Type:
Operational
General Description: Utilities cannot operate
efficiently in a constant state of high level alert;
therefore, this utility developed a dynamic system of
changing operational conditions, or alert levels, to
correspond to the current level of threat to the utility.
Threat levels can change due to national alerts, local
events, or intelligence provided through a variety of
resources. The practice that the utility developed
uses a communication network with the water sector,
and other agencies in the region, to share ongoing
threat intelligence. This sharing of intelligence
allows for quick adaptation to changes in threat levels
by increasing surveillance at critical assets.
This practice mandates that management monitor the
threat level at the national, state, and local level to
determine the appropriate alert level for the utility
and decide whether an elevation or relaxation is
necessary. Daily threat level monitoring and a
credible communications network with local
emergency managers, police, and federal agencies,
helps assure that this information sharing process is
timely and seamless.
At times of elevated alert, operations staff increase
site visits to critical facilities, and conduct more
intensive inspections at each facility. On-call
employees are also required to expand their weekend
surveillance of utility facilities in response to
increased alert levels.
Resources Required: This practice requires an
initial investment of staff time, mainly at the
managerial level, to establish the communications
network with regional partners, and to develop the
protocols associated with different threat levels. The
level of ongoing staff commitment will depend on
the specific alert protocols and the frequency of alert
level changes. For this utility, the practice did not cut
into productive work hours or increase costs.
Role and Responsibilities: Threats are monitored
by utility managers through daily reports and email
from Homeland Security Information Network
(HSIN) and Water Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (WaterlSAC) at a national level. These same
networks are also used to provide information on
local incidents. The utility's general manager is the
contact for all communications between each
network and the utility staff responsible to respond
and prepare for changes in threats.
Collaboration with other Partners: This practice
involves collaboration with sector partners through
the HSIN and WaterlSAC. Additional partners for
threat information sharing can include local
Terrorism Early Warning Groups (TEWG) (which
usually include local law enforcement), and EPA
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and regional
offices. Local partners can also contribute locally; for
instance, local law enforcement may agree to assist in
more frequent patrols.
Barriers: There were no specific barriers identified
for this practice; however, one barrier may include a
utility not having electronic access to security
information networks such as HSIN and WaterlSAC.
Water sector information sharing networks, such as
HSIN and WaterlSAC, are readily available to the
water sector. Alert level protocols should not
fundamentally involve new practices, and typically
focus on more frequent and thorough patrols and
inspections. Training on new protocols should be
easily folded into existing security training programs.
Lessons Learned: The main lesson learned during
this practice is that implementing a system of threat-
based security protocols is a low-cost and effective
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
way to improve utility security, which can be applied
to utilities of all types and sizes.
Success Measures: The success of this practice
can be measured by the establishment of threat-based
protocols for increasing utility security (particularly if
law enforcement, security, and/or utility experts
review and agree with the protocols), as well as by
maintaining daily interaction with the different threat
intelligence networks and law enforcement.
Benefits and Incentives: This practice is part of a
broad strategy applied in many practices; establishing
and maintaining a network of people in the region
who have invested in building relationships with each
other to prepare for and respond to emergencies.
Many of the contacts and communications networks
employed in this practice, particularly at the local
level, will be applicable to other emergency
situations.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
20: Procedure for
Contractor and Vendor
Access
Corresponding Feature Description:
Access Control
Category Type:
Operational; Infrastructure
General Description: This utility's vulnerability
assessment recognized that vendors and contractors
have both knowledge of, and access to, critical utility
assets. In response, the utility developed protocols
and procedures for contractor and vendor access to
sensitive utility information and facilities. This
represents a major change in the historical practices
used in the water sector. Utilities often have had a
long-standing relationship with their vendors and
contractors and have relied on them to safeguard the
most important assets with little oversight.
The process began with the identification of each
vendor and contractor and their need for specific
knowledge of, and access to, critical assets. If access
was justified, procedures were developed to restrict
or provide oversight for each access event. The
following are examples of this utility's procedures:
Contractor companies verify personnel employment
and assignment to the utility. When work is to be
performed, each contractor staff person registers on
site as they enter facilities and when they leave, and
are escorted to sites by utility employees.
Identification badges are issued to contractors while
they work at utility facilities. Contractor equipment
or materials cannot be left on site without approval of
the utility.
Vendors are usually chemical supply companies but
can include other types of vendors. Chemical
delivery agents are prescreened for entry to the
facility by having their driver's license verification
issued by facsimile from the chemical supply
company. Chemicals are then tested on site with
portable test equipment. Drivers are accompanied on
site and utility employees observe the unloading to
the utility storage areas. Finally, field water-quality
monitors are observed for unusual changes that may
relate to the delivery and use of new chemicals. In
some cases, chemicals are picked up by employees
directly from the supply company. For other
vendors, drop-off points are provided outside critical
areas.
Cellphone company installations are located on this
utility's property. Cell phone company personnel
who maintain these sites should be accompanied by
utility staff. Utilities are compensated for the use of
facilities, such as water storage tanks, and terms are
agreed to in the contract for the lease of the utility
property.
Utility services, specifically the electric power utility
staff, no longer enter utility sites to read meters.
Instead, the electric utility uses remote meter-reading
technology.
Resources Required: This practice does not
require any resources beyond staff time to review and
revise contractor and vendor access protocols.
Roles and Responsibilities: The specific roles
and responsibilities for this practice may differ by
utility, depending on their existing internal processes
for contracting and procuring supplies and services.
The utility security officer should lead the effort to
revise access protocols, and should coordinate with
different departmental managers to ensure that the
revised protocols are not overly burdensome. Utility
departmental managers are responsible for
identifying vendor and contractor functions that
require access to sensitive sites, for providing
recommendations to the security officers, for
instructing their personnel on the new access
protocols, and for relaying the new protocols to
vendor and contractor staff.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
Collaboration with Other Partners: This practice
does involve collaboration with affected contractors,
vendors, and other entities.
Barriers: This utility did not encounter any barriers
in implementing this practice. However, staff and
contractor/vendor acceptance of, and adherence to, a
change in the status quo could prove difficult for
other utilities.
Lessons Learned: The primary lesson learned was
to have active outreach to vendors and contractors to
ensure compliance with defined protocols and
procedures.
Success Measures: The success of this practice
can be measured by the existence of defined
processes and protocols. Another success measure is
mitigating or reducing risks identified in the
vulnerability assessment.
Benefits and Incentives: The main benefit to this
practice is that it is a low cost, low effort way to
improve security, in both implementation and
maintenance. Developing new protocols means
better controls of who has access to the utility.
Another benefit is the opportunity to gather feedback
through surveys and other means from both their
own staff and contractor and vendor staff on the new
procedures. Additionally, utility security records
concerning unauthorized access by non-utility staff
may also be a data source for determining whether
the program is being accepted by the staff responsible
for implementing it.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
21: Updating a
Vulnerability Assessment
Corresponding Feature Description:
Vulnerability Assessment Up to Date
Category Type:
Operational
General Description: This utility established a
vulnerability assessment (VA) cycle for each
function of their operation, including drinking water
and wastewater. The initial VA was completed
before the deadline set by the Bioterrorism Act of
2002 for water utilities, and was performed with the
Risk Assessment Methodology for Water
(RAM-W) and the Risk Assessment Methodology
for Dams (RAM-DSM). The utility has planned for
the VA update by establishing a VA committee
composed of eight members, which meets monthly.
Timing for an update of the utility's VA is driven by
the cycle for implementation of improvements. This
utility defined that cycle to be every 5 years, and it is
composed of the following:
Conduct the VA, which takes approximately
three months and covers about 150 assets.
Develop security improvement proposals based
on the results of the VA.
Present proposals to elected officials to secure
funding.
Implement the improvements in a phased
approach.
Review progress and initiate the cycle again.
Resources Required: Updating the VA cost the
utility approximately $85,000, which does not
account for costs associated with staff time for
maintaining a VA committee to review and discuss
findings. Developing proposals for utility
improvements and implementing them are already
accounted for in the utility's budget and staff
responsibilities.
Roles and Responsibilities: Utility operations
and security staff compile hazard trend information
for review by the VA committee. TheVA
committee comprises seven members representing
OCTOBER 2008
critical assets (including Information Technology
[IT] and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
[SCADA] system components), and the eighth is a
security specialist. In addition to the responsibilities
of hazard trend review, the committee also advises on
budget expenditures and presents budget proposals
for security improvements to elected officials. They
also oversee improvement implementation and
progress.
Collaboration with Other Partners: This practice
did not involve collaboration with other partners
outside the utility.
Barriers: The main barrier encountered for this
practice was dedicating staff time to gather the data
necessary to perform the VA update, in addition to
their regular duties.
Lesson Learned: The utility learned two main
lessons through updating its VA. First, the utility has
switched to the Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool
(VSAT) to replace the RAM method for the
update. Utility staff found that VSAT's ease of use
(specifically the data displays with color codes)
makes for simple revisions for future VA updates,
and only one primary data collector needed VSAT
training. VSAT also allows for documentation of
AVSAT
specific risk reduction measures and also measures
how much they helped reduce risk. Second, the
committee found that Design Basis Threat (DBT)
conditions documented during the first VA had not
changed; therefore, the rigorous assessment of all
assets done for the initial VA was not necessary for
the update.
Success Measures: The success of this practice
can be measured every cycle by comparing previous
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
VAs and noting the reduction and/or elimination of
vulnerabilities. Additional measures include funding
secured for improvements based on the
recommendations of the VA, and implementation of
those improvements.
Benefits and Incentives: The results of the
updated VA provide documented security needs for
the utility, which can serve as a basis for the utility's
funding requests to budgeting officials, and for
changes in utility security protocols and programs.
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22: Creating and
Maintaining a Security
Culture
SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
Resources Required: This practice potentially
requires significant staff time, particularly in the
development stages. Additionally, resources such as
a Web site, newsletter, and poster publishing, need to
be developed to spread the messages created by the
committee throughout the utility.
Roles and Responsibilities: Creating a security
culture requires the cooperation and participation of
staff from all levels of the utility, but should start at
the highest levels. In particular, the Security and
Emergency Management Director and staff are
responsible for developing a plan to implement the
culture within the utility. Senior management and
supervisors are responsible for presenting a consistent
message to the employees that security is important,
and to reinforce that message by example. All levels
of staff are responsible for participating in training
and events pertaining to security, and utilizing this
knowledge during daily operations.
Staff providing employee training should maintain
knowledge of current threats to the utility as well as
current security practices as this information is
provided to policy and decision makers during
discussions that shape the security culture training
program.
Collaboration with Other Partners: The utility
worked closely with other departments, including
human resources, citizen groups, and the Mayor's
office to develop and present a cohesive message.
The utility also sought to improve communication
and interaction at all levels with responders like
police, fire, public health, and labs to further reinforce
the security culture.
Barriers: When creating a security culture, the utility
encountered employees who were resistant to the
idea that the utility would ever be subject to any sort
of illegal activity or disaster, which hindered efforts
to implement this practice. Additionally, the
deployment of monitoring equipment, such as
cameras, caused privacy concerns for both
employees and the general public.
Lessons Learned: This utility learned a number of
lessons that may help others better implement a
security culture at their utilities. First, the utility
found that creating a team early on to implement the
program helped to maintain a consistent message.
Corresponding Feature Description:
Explicit Commitment to Security; Promote Security
Awareness; and Defined Security Roles and
Employee Expectations
Category Type:
Organizational
General Description: This utility adopted a plan to
foster a security culture using a variety of methods to
increase awareness of security and preparedness
among its employees. The process began with the
formation of an executive committee representing all
branches of the utility. The committee defined a
single plan and message to create the security culture.
This message provided a framework for the other
components of the plan, which were:
Linking safety and security by incorporating a
security message into every safety training
session
Developing a security and emergency
management Web site that provides employee
access to security information, policies, and
procedures
Providing preparedness training for all
employees
Monthly newsletter articles
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
However, adoption and acceptance of the security
culture by employees takes persistent effort. To ease
this, communication to employees should occur often
and in a variety of settings and forms. Also, in some
instances, messages should be tailored to specific
audiences inside and outside the utility. Because of
increased awareness and reporting of security
incidents, additional security staff was added.
Success Measures: In this case, after
implementing the program the utility noted an
increase in the reporting of security incidents each
year. The increase in reported incidents demonstrates
that staff are more aware of and reacting to possible
problems that would otherwise result in more severe
measures needed such as public notifications.
Benefits and Incentives: Fostering a security
culture has shown external as well as internal benefits
to the utility. Utility security concerns have increased
credibility in the eyes of law enforcement and the
local Federal Bureau of Investigation office. This has
improved the utility's ability to win funding for
further security and preparedness upgrades by
acquiring external partners who will support the
utility's security concerns to decision makers. This in
turn results in staff that are well trained in disaster
response and recovery, which can be applied to many
more common events, such as weather related
disasters or civil unrest, that threaten utility assets.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
23: Training on Security
and Emergency Response
Corresponding Feature Description:
Promote Security Awareness; and Denned Security
Roles and Employee Expectations
Category Type:
Organizational; Operational
General Description: This utility developed a
National Incident Management System (NEVIS)-
compliant Emergency Response Plan (ERP). The
utility then created an internal training program based
on its ERP.
The training program is exercised at all stafflevels to
improve the utility's capability to respond to all-
hazard events. It consists of an annual tabletop
exercise based on a different emergency scenario
each year. The utility has also conducted a full-scale
exercise that involved an earthquake scenario. As
part of the exercise, the staff trained on performing
visual inspections of sites and reporting the
assessments to the Emergency Operations Center
(EOC).
Additionally, the utility maintains a library that has
copies of the ERP that can be easily accessed during
an emergency, or if staff feel the need to review the
plan between exercises and training. Another copy
of the ERP is kept at a remote site in case the library
is destroyed or inaccessible. Also, the utility has
placed placards in key locations where response
resources are located.
Resources Required: This practice requires an
initial investment of staff time to revise the ERP for
NIMS compliance, to conduct staff training on NEVIS
concepts and processes, and then to train staff on the
new ERP. However, after this initial investment, this
practice should not represent a significant increase in
the normal emergency response training budget of
the utility. Additionally, there are many local, state,
and federal grants available for emergency
preparedness and training, particularly to bring
response entities into NIMS compliance.
Roles and Responsibilities: The utility formed a
Safety and Emergency Management Committee that
meets once a month. Departmental staff members
are periodically rotated through the team to provide
the utility with a broad emergency response
knowledge base. The district engineer and a few
other key personnel are the only permanent members
of the team. This committee advises management
regarding how to use the training funds and other
available resources. The group also decides who will
be sent to external training events, like regional
exercises.
The average staff member participates in
approximately 16 hours of training each year, as well
as biweekly safety and security meetings. Senior
staff and members of the Safety and Emergency
Management Committee have additional training
requirements.
Collaboration with Other Partners: In this case,
the utility collaborated with the state Office of
Domestic Preparedness Programs, state Department
of Health, the County government, and an outside
consultant to develop its training program. However,
NIMS trainings and exercises can be designed to
incorporate a wide range of partners, ranging from
the local to federal level.
Barriers: In revising its ERP and NEVIS structure,
this utility encountered difficulty in defining the roles
and responsibilities of certain staff if an emergency
occurs after normal business hours.
Lessons Learned: The utility was not awarded
preparedness grant money in 2006. This underscored
the need for dedicating regular annual funds for
security and preparedness, so that the utility is not
caught short if supplemental funding sources do not
come through.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
Success Measures: Success is measured by the
existence of an ERP that has been reviewed and
accepted by the local, county, or state NIMS
compliance officer. In addition, having personnel
that have received the appropriate NEVIS training is a
requirement for receiving Homeland Security grant
funding, and many states and tribes have more
stringent requirements. The current federal NIMS
training requirements can be found at
http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/nims_training
.shtm.
Additional success can be measured by reviewing the
results of training after-action reports. In this case,
successive trainings and exercises have shown staff
and management are better prepared and more
capable to respond to an emergency than prior to the
implementation of the practice. This was
demonstrated by improved communications across
groups both internal and external to the utility and in
awareness of interdependences among different
agencies when various scenarios were applied.
Benefits and Incentives: NIMS compliance is a
requirement for receiving federal preparedness
funding, and individual states and tribes have more
stringent requirements. This practice is a necessary
step towards opening future supplemental funding
pathways for utilities. Additionally, NIMS is a
proven emergency response framework; federal
program administrators have developed specific
NIMS trainings targeted at public works departments.
Finally, the response partners with which a utility will
team during a response will likely be well versed in
NIMS; being NIMS compliant is therefore necessary
to ensure that the utility is capable of a coordinated,
effective response effort.
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
SECTION 6: EXAMPLE OF SECURITY AT A SMALL
UTILITY
Even small utilities can use the practices described in this report to develop an active and effective protective
program. The description below shows how one small utility in the Seattle-King County area implemented such a
program. The program provides them with benefits through collaboration with other utilities and agencies, reduces
costs for the utility and its customers, improves its infrastructure, and enhances its protective posture. For security
reasons, the utility is not identified.
Utility Background
The utility profiled here is a small combined drinking water and wastewater system serving approximately 10,000.
Before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the utility made security and preparedness a high priority. After
September 11, 2001, the utility increased its efforts in response to federal mandates and management's
awareness that more could be doneespecially to address terror-related threats. Historically, the focus was on
natural disasters and vandalism.
Operational Practices
The utility added or changed several practices to increase security and preparedness of its facilities and its control
and communication systems. One step it took after September 11, 2001, was increasing system component
inspection from once weekly to twice weekly.
Remote access to computer and SCADA systems is proven to be valuable to operations, yet the potential for
hacking is a credible threat. The utility addressed the risk by switching connections to "dial-up," which provides
protection by having the ability to monitor who is connecting to the system. In addition, any user will be locked out
after three failed attempts to connect. This feature diminishes the likelihood that code-breaking programs can
access the system.
The utility took simple effective steps to protect communications equipment. The utility keeps a variety of
equipment available such as non-electronic phones capable of maintaining dial tone during power outages, 800
MHz radios, two-way walkie-talkies in vehicles for general maintenance work, and access to a ham radio. The
utility also has access to daily threat information through Northwest Warning, Alert, and Response Network
(NW-WARN). The utility also communicates security information to customers through a newsletter that advises
them to dial 911 if they see suspicious activity, such as persons attempting to connect to a fire hydrant.
The utility secured public access to information by removing pump station location information from its Web site.
The utility also requires those who request information to identify themselves and the purpose of their information
request. Both drinking water and wastewater systems are secured at the same level because the utility included
the entire system in its security and preparedness program.
Organizational Practices
Before September 11, 2001, the utility had policies and procedures in place to prevent and mitigate acts of
vandalism. Each of the utility's staff also had his/her own written emergency response procedures for disasters.
The staff used these emergency procedures during an earthquake in 1989, when a quick visual assessment of
the entire system was necessary. The staff's familiarity with procedures enabled them to confidently assess the
system and report information back to administrators. Because of the procedures, staff was able to complete the
assessment within 40 minutes.
Utility managers provide staff with security and emergency training to foster a culture of safety and security. Staff
members are trained continuously with basic protective practices during weekly staff meetings and participate in
regional emergency exercises.
Continued on next page
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
Infrastructure Practices
The utility implemented several practices to better protect its infrastructure. First, the utility installed water
metering stations at secure points in the distribution system for contractors to safely withdraw bulk water for their
trucks. This protects against contamination and eliminates wear and tear on hydrants, which used to occur when
contractors hooked their hoses directly to a hydrant. Now the hydrants have a non-standard lock to prevent
unauthorized hook-ups. Second, after an incident in which a hatch was left ajar and the utility incurred a $3,000
charge to isolate a tank and sample water, staff modified the hatch so it cannot be left open or ajar; now it can
only be totally removed. Third, all entrances and exits at the utility's headquarters have been secured using a
combination of locks, alarms, and cameras. The details of the protective components at the remote sites are kept
secret from all outside entities.
Collaborative Practices
Historically, utility personnel were not considered first responders. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8
(HSPD-8) redefined public works department staff, including those within the water sector, as first responders.
Utility managers encouraged staff to participate on regional security and emergency management committees in
response to the shifting culture.
The utility manager provided local police with a list of critical sites and contact information of system operators
and managers to help familiarize local responders with the utility system. A much stronger local network has
emerged in which utility operators are fully integrated into the local emergency response community. In addition,
a better understanding exists among local emergency responders about one another's needs, and utility
vulnerabilities.
The utility worked to expand relations with other drinking water and wastewater utilities in the county. According
to the utility manager, although there was a mutual aid response program for water and sewer districts for many
years, after September 11, 2001, agencies and municipalities began to work even more closely together through
the county's regional disaster planning group.
Conclusion
The practices at this utility demonstrate that even a small utility can make meaningful gains in security and
preparedness. Part of this utility's success is due to its commitment towards making security and preparedness a
high priority. As a result, it has been able to make significant progress despite a limited budget. Implementing
security and preparedness priorities through the use of in-house staff, rather than hired consultants, is one way
that it keeps costs low. This is critical, because the utility found obtaining federal, state or county funding is
difficult.
While the utility is unable to define cost savings resulting from its safety and protective programs, management is
confident that in the event of an emergency, they "will be able to respond quickly so that [their] customers are
protected." Moreover, the utility's security and preparedness programs help to educate utility staff and the
community about the importance of security and preparedness issues. "This opened people's eyes to some of
the potential problems that can arise," said the utility's general manager. "It has been a good education."
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SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY CASE STUDY
APPENDIX A: CASE STUDY GUIDANCE TEAM
MEMBERS
Person Affiliation
Allen Alston
Ben Budka
Gene Taylor
Mike Boykin
Shad Burcham
Scott Decker
Robin Friedman
Brandon Hardenbrook
Jim Henriksen
Randy Holmes
Mike Jackman
Mitzi Johanknecht
Bob Lomax
Fred Savaglio
Hal Schlomann
Ron Speer
Ted Stencilin
King County Wastewater Treatment Division
King County Wastewater Treatment Division
Water Security Lead: U.S. EPA Region 10
On-Scene Coordinator: U.S. EPA Region 10
King County Office of Emergency Management; King County Critical
Infrastructure Protection Group
Washington State Department of Health
Seattle Public Utilities Director for Security and Emergency
Management
Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER)
Seattle-King County Department of Public Health
City of Bellevue Utilities
City of Bellevue Utilities
King County Sheriff's Office
Seattle Fire Department
Region 6 Hospital Emergency Preparation Committee
Washington State Association of Sewer and Water Districts
Critical Infrastructure Protection Group
King County
Soos Creek Water and Sewer District
King County Sheriff's Office
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL PRACTICES
The Area Workshop and individual discussions provided opportunities to gather information on practices that are in
use or are needed by the Seattle-King County community. Although the Case Study effort could not document all
of these practices in detail, the following additional practices were captured for future consideration.
Organizational Practices
Conduct management training and briefings about the water sector and interdependent services.
Conduct training and tabletop exercises for water sector management and staff on security, emergency
preparedness, and response.
Provide technical assistance and capacity development for small systems on planning, response and recovery, and
Rural Community Assistance Partnership (RCAP).
Conduct regular tabletop exercises to practice response plans and facilitate collaboration and networking between
water sector utilities.
Dedicate funding resources for security and preparedness activities.
Identify specific staff with security and preparedness as a primary job function.
Train staff on Incident Command System (ICS) and Emergency Operations Center (EOC) functions.
Participate in EOC training and planning.
Identify and document who has primacy over utilities in each jurisdiction (e.g., local health department, state health
department, Department of Environmental Quality [DEQ], Department of Environmental Protection [DEP], and
U.S. Department of Energy [DOE]).
Develop response and recovery plans with the idea that all response activities begin at the local level.
Use water sector needs assessments conducted by local and state agencies to develop response and recovery plans.
Learn to use home rule/jurisdictional agreements (e.g., Memoranda of Understanding [MOUs] to facilitate mutual
aid, collaboration, and resource sharing).
Conduct cross-training with Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) units.
Operational Practices
Establish an ability to connect with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and other Information
Technology (IT) systems remotely.
Ensure a method for continued communications of customer service/communications during an emergency event.
Conduct cyber security and preparedness training.
Provide technical assistance and capacity development for small systems.
Establish cross-sector liaisons within interdependent agencies (e.g., electric customer service representative
dedicated to water sector).
Update local and regional Emergency Medical Services (EMS) contact information.
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Identify organizations and residences exempt from service shutofffor all utilities and share information between
sectors.
Update emergency response plans regularly.
Identify and prioritize equipment needs that facilitate continuity of service.
Plan and develop system redundancies for continuity of service (e.g., personnel, equipment, and fuel).
Use established tools, such as the EPA Response Protocol Toolbox to validate potential contamination events.
Ensure occupational safety and security is integrated.
Establish the ability to track field staff.
Identify essential personnel and cross-train staff to ensure coverage during an emergency; put emergency roles and
expectations into job descriptions.
Create a response plan for radiological contamination events.
Work collaboratively to create specific agreements with hospitals (who are large drinking water and wastewater
users).
Conduct IT/data systems cross-training within the water sector and with other sectors, to support continuity of
business and service outside the disaster area.
Develop water sector response and recovery teams.
Develop lists of laboratories (e.g., public health, environmental, or both), and create agreements on capabilities
during an emergency.
Provide continuing education opportunities on security and emergency response.
Establish rules for disclosing information to the public.
Develop a manual of operations that addresses cross-sector issues.
Prioritize restoration of service for water sector utilities and other critical infrastructures.
Establish emergency permitting protocols and a tiered permit approval process to respond to increasing levels of
urgency.
Conduct assessment of information needs and develop communication plans.
Train field personnel within all sectors to recognize and report issues of concern.
Train operator and field staff on contaminant detection and other security surveillance.
Establish protocols for distributing emergency drinking water.
Routinely re-key assets so that people with old keys cannot open locks.
Use a testing procedure to verify chemical delivery truck contents.
Infrastructure Practices
Develop an ability to isolate portions of the system in a contamination event (e.g., diversion valves).
Develop intra-/inter-agency communications systems (e.g., radios, phones).
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Create off-site data centers.
Develop maps and overlay water, electric, and transportation pipes and conduits.
Catalog equipment within mutual aid areas, including with other critical infrastructures.
Develop plans for accessing resources such as fuel, energy, staging, etc.
Install water hydrant access control.
Install raw water intake protection.
Designate wells as emergency water supply.
Develop multiple source water intake locations.
Secure wellheads for protection.
Install intrusion alarms on assets such as reservoir hatches and remote site doors.
Collaborative Practices
Conduct joint emergency response planning among neighboring water sector utilities.
Conduct joint emergency response planning among critical infrastructures (e.g., energy, dams, and hospitals).
Create cross-sector advisory committees.
Use Northwest Warning, Alert, Response Network (NW-WARN) for information sharing.
Conduct regular meetings in water sector and across sectors to facilitate networking and relationship building.
Conduct outreach and education with public officials.
Submit multi-sector and cross-jurisdictional applications for U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grants
and other funding.
Conduct water sector-specific and cross-sector tabletop exercises.
Establish contact with other sectors for collaboration and networking (e.g., invite to tabletop exercises).
Advocate for water sector inclusion as a first responder in activities.
Identify interdependences and impacts between water sector and other critical infrastructures.
Conduct and participate in multi-sector conferences, trainings, and workshops.
Develop and coordinate Public Information Officer (PIO) functions, especially for organizations without PIO
capacity.
Identify audiences and target messages for communication (e.g., who do we need to reach, what do they want to
know, when do they need to know it, what is the best way to communicate each message to each targeted audience).
Share surveillance data, customer calls, and water quality data with public health departments.
Share information through established security channels (e.g., Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center
[WaterlSAC]).
Learn surveillance methods and capacities of state and local health departments, and integrate syndromic
surveillance when possible.
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Engage the public on security and preparedness issues.
Establish better relations between the local EOC and water sector utilities.
Establish a policy that allows water sector utility leaders to use the county EOC if their own EOC is not available.
Improve collaboration between public organizations and private entities.
Establish protocols for communication channels between local, state, and federal agencies.
Establish multi-sector planning for prioritizing equipment sharing and restoration of service.
Create and implement a risk communication strategy for the water sector.
Develop cross-sector information sharing through Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).
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APPENDIX C: KEY FEATURES OF AN ACTIVE AND
EFFECTIVE PROTECTIVE PROGRAM
The water sector has developed the Features of an Active and Effective Protective Program to assist
owners and operators of drinking water and wastewater utilities (water sector) in preventing, detecting,
responding to, and recovering from all-hazards, including terrorist attacks or natural disasters. The
features are based on the National Drinking Water Advisory Council's recommendation: 14 Features of
an Active and Effective Security Program. The features contained in this version update the original 14
to:
Capture the water sector's post Hurricane Katrina emphasis on "all hazards" preparedness; and
Establish explicit alignment with the Water Sector-Specific Plan for Critical Infrastructure
Protection (Water Sector SSP) prepared under the framework of the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP).
The features describe the basic elements for establishing a "protective program" for owners/operators of
utilities to consider as they develop utility-specific approaches.
Note: Throughout this document, the terms "protective program," "protection," or "protective" are used
to describe activities that enhance resiliency and promote continuity of service regardless of the hazard a
utility might experience. These activities address the physical, cyber, and human elements of prevention,
detection, response, and recovery.
Features of an Active and Effective Protective Program
1. Encourage awareness and integration of a comprehensive protective posture into daily business
operations to foster a protective culture throughout the organization and ensure continuity of
utility services. (Most strongly aligned with SSP Goal 1, Objective 1.)
Senior leadership makes an explicit, easily communicated commitment to a program that
incorporates the full spectrum of protection activities.
Incorporate protection concepts into organizational culture.
Foster attentiveness to protection among front line workers and encourage them to bring potential
issues and concerns to the attention of others; establish a process for employees to make
suggestions for protection improvements.
Identify employees responsible for implementation of protection priorities and establish
expectations in job descriptions and annual performance reviews.
Designate a single manager (even if it is not a full time duty) responsible for protective programs.
Establish this responsibility at a level to ensure protection is given management attention and
made a priority for line supervisors and staff.
Keep current on improvements and good protective practices adopted by other utilities.
Monitor incidents and available threat-level information; escalate procedures in response to
relevant threats and incidents.
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2. Annually identify protective program priorities and resources needed; support priorities with
utility-specific measures and self-assess using these measures to understand and document
program progress. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 1, Objective 1.)
Annually identify and dedicate resources to protective programs in capital, operations, and
maintenance budgets; and/or staff resource plans.
Tailor protective approaches and tactics to utility-specific circumstances and operating
conditions; balance resource allocations and other organizational priorities.
Annually review protection commitments and improvement priorities with top executives.
Develop measures appropriate to utility-specific circumstances and operating conditions.
Self-assess against the measures developed to understand and document program progress.
3. Employ protocols for detection of contamination while recognizing limitations in current
contaminant detection, monitoring, and public health surveillance methods. (Most strongly
aligned with Goal 1, Objectives 2 and 3.)
Recognize that water quality monitoring, consumer complaint surveillance, sampling and
analysis, enhanced security monitoring, and public health syndromic surveillance are different,
but related, elements of an overall contamination warning system. The effectiveness of these
components may vary from system to system.
Establish sampling and testing protocols for events (and suspected events) and understand
availability of, and be prepared to access, specialized laboratory capabilities that can handle both
typical and atypical contaminants.
Track, characterize, and consider customer complaints to identify potential contamination events.
Use security monitoring methods (e.g., intrusion detection devices such as alarms or closed
circuit television) to aid in determining whether a suspected contamination event is the result of
an intentional act. (Also see feature 5)
Establish working relationship with local, state, and public health communities to detect public
health anomalies and evaluate them for contamination implications.
4. Assess risks and periodically review (and update) vulnerability assessments to reflect changes in
potential threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 2,
Objectives 1-3, although is a critical contributor to Goal 1, Objective 1.)
Maintain current understanding and assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences.
Utilities will need to adjust continually to respond to changes in threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences.
Establish and implement a schedule for review of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences and
their impact on the vulnerability assessment at least every three to five years to account for
factors such as, but not limited to, facility expansion/upgrades, community growth, etc.
Reassess threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences after incidents and incorporate lessons into
protective practices.
Individuals who are knowledgeable about utility operations should conduct the reviews. Include
an executive in the review process to provide an ongoing conduit of information to/from
management.
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Use a methodology that best suits utility-specific circumstances and operating conditions;
however, ensure the selected method supports the criteria outlined in the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP).
5. Establish physical and procedural controls to restrict access only to authorized individuals and to
detect unauthorized physical and cyber intrusions. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 2, All
Objectives.)
Identify critical facilities, operations, components, and cyber systems (such as SCAD A).
Develop and implement physical and cyber intrusion detection and access control tactics that
enable timely and effective detection and response.
Utilize both physical and procedural means to restrict access to sensitive facilities, operations,
and components; including treatment facilities and supply/distribution/collection networks.
Define, identify, and restrict access to security-sensitive information (both electronic and hard
copy) on utility operations and technical details.
Establish means to readily identify all employees (e.g. ID badges).
Verify identity of all employees, contractors and temporary workers, with access to facilities,
through background checks as appropriate per local/state law and/or labor contract and other
agreements.
Test physical and procedural access controls to ensure performance.
6. Incorporate protective program considerations into procurement, repair, maintenance, and
replacement of physical infrastructure decisions. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 2, All
Objectives)
Bring forward protective program considerations early in the design, planning, and budgeting
processes to mitigate vulnerability and/or potential consequences and improve resiliency over
time.
Design and construction specifications should address both physical hardening of sensitive
infrastructure; and adoption of inherently lower risk technologies and approaches where feasible.
Design choices should consider ability to rapidly recover and continue services following an
incident.
7. Prepare emergency response, recovery, and business continuity plan(s); test and review plan(s)
regularly, update plan(s) as necessary to ensure NIMS compliance and to reflect changes in
potential threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, physical infrastructure, utility operations,
critical interdependencies, and response protocols in partner organizations. (Most strongly
aligned with Goal 3, Objectives 1 and 3.)
Understand the National Incident Management System (NIMS) guidelines established by DHS
(as well as community and state response plans and FEMA Public Assistance procedures); and
incident command systems (ICS). At a minimum, utility response and recovery planning should
be NIMS compliant.
Coordinate emergency plan(s) with community emergency management partners:
o Establish interoperable communications systems where feasible to maintain contact with
police, fire, and other first responder entities.
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o Establish internal protocols to maintain communications with employees to ensure safety and
to coordinate response activities.
Implement backup plans and strategies for critical operations, including water supply and
treatment (to mitigate the potential public health, environmental, and economic consequences of
events), power, and other key components.
Maintain plan(s) that are exercised at least annually, identify circumstances that prompt
implementation, and identify individuals responsible for implementation.
o Provide employees with appropriate security and preparedness training and education
opportunities.
o At least annually review plan(s) and conduct exercises that address the full range of threats
relevant to the utility.
o Update plan(s), as necessary, to incorporate lessons from training, exercises, and incident
responses.
Ensure plan(s) identify critical and time sensitive applications, vital records, processes, and
functions that need to be maintained; and the personnel and procedures necessary to do so until
utility has recovered. At a minimum, plan(s) should include a business impact analysis and
address need for power, communication (internal and external), logistics support, facilities,
information technology, and finance and administration-related functions; including necessary
redundancy and/or timely access to backup systems and cash reserves.
8. Forge reliable and collaborative partnerships with first responders, managers of critical
interdependent infrastructure, other utilities, and response organizations to maintain a resilient
infrastructure. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 3, Objectives 2 and 4.)
Partnerships should be forged in advance of an emergency, ensuring utilities and key partners are
better prepared to work together if an emergency should occur.
Partnerships with other local utilities, peers, and associations should emphasize formation of, and
participation in, mutual aid and assistance agreements such as a Water and Wastewater Agency
Response Network (WARNs).
Maintain awareness of industry best practices and available protective program-related tools and
training.
Establish relationship with critical customers (hospitals, manufacturing, etc.) to identify
interdependency issues that may impact business continuity.
Participate in joint exercises with identified partners as appropriate.
9. Develop and implement strategies for regular, ongoing communication about protective
programs with employees, customers, and the general public to increase overall awareness and
preparedness for response to an incident. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 4, Objective 1,
although is critically supportive of Goal 1, Objectives 1 and 2.)
Establish public communications protocol, including pre-prepared public announcement
templates, to share critical information; and implement mechanisms for receiving community
feedback.
Public communication strategies should:
o Identify means to reach customers and the general public with incident information;
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o Provide a mechanism for customers and the public to communicate with appropriate
personnel about unusual or suspicious events;
o Inform customers about appropriate actions to enhance their preparedness for potential
incidents that may impact services; and
Internal communication strategies should:
o Increase and/or maintain employee awareness of protective program;
o Motivate staff to support protective program strategies and goals;
o Provide ways for staff to notify appropriate personnel about unusual or suspicious activities;
o Ensure employees understand nature of, and restrictions on, access to security sensitive
information and/or facilities; and
o Ensure employee safety during an event or incident and enable effective employee
participation during response and recovery efforts.
Evaluate effectiveness of communication mechanisms over time.
10. Monitor incidents and available threat-level information; escalate procedures in response to
relevant threats and incidents. (Most strongly aligned with Goal 4, Objective 2, although a
critical contributor to Goal 1, Objective 1 and Goal 3, Objective 3.)
Develop standard operating procedures to identify and report incidents in a timely way and
establish incident reporting expectations.
o In the specific context of intentional threats and acts, ensure staff can distinguish between
normal and unusual activity (both on/off site) and know how to notify management of
suspicious activity.
Develop systems to access threat information, identify threat levels, and determine the specific
responses to take.
o Investigate available information sources locally, and at the state or regional level (e.g., FBI
Infraguard and Water ISAC).
o Where barriers to accessing information exist, make attempts to align with those who can,
and will, provide effective information to the utility.
Make monitoring threat information a regular part of the protective program designee's job and
share utility-, facility- and region-specific threat levels and information with key staff and those
responsible for protection.
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